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# **The Political and Economic Transformation of Yemen, 1968-1998**

**Salwa Mubarak Amber**

**Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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**Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies**

**University of Durham**

**July 1999**



17 JAN 2000

## **Declaration**

This thesis is the result of my own work and contains nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration. None of the material has previously been submitted for a degree at this or any other university.

Salwa Amber

Durham

July 1999

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## Abstract

This thesis analyses the political and economic transformation in the two Yemeni states - the YAR and the PDRY - over the period of 1968 to 1998. The unification process between the YAR and the PDRY is critically assessed in preparation and implementation phases over the period 1972 to 1990 under minority rule in both states. The thesis is critically focused on the minority impact of northern Shafais in the ex-PDRY leadership which led to serious struggles within and between the two Yemens out of which a hasty unification was resulted.

The methodology employed in the research utilises many materials and opportunities made available to myself as a high-ranking member of the administration of the ex-PDRY and, subsequently, the Presidential Office of the ROY. Due to my position, I was able to witness the political system and procedures of Yemen first-hand. The data collected includes information from formal sources in Aden, San'a and the UK. This material was substantially added to with extensive interviews and meetings with public figures in Yemen and abroad who were, and are, important actors in the political history and contemporary political system of Yemen.

The integration process was not successful because of several necessary conditions which were not present in either state in the preunification era or, indeed, after it.

The two states had different experiences in terms of administration, policies and above all power structures.

The two states had political and military confrontations in 1972 and 1979 along their border mainly because of the northern Shafais who wanted power legitimacy in either state or independently. Under such minority impact, the south sponsored revolutionary insurgencies in northern areas to force the admission of northern Shafais into the power centre of the north.

The unification process throughout the 1970's and the 1980's was controversial but suddenly achieved its objective in May 1990 though in a hasty manner. A series of agreements took place on both sides with regional monitoring. The platforms on which these agreements were carried out, technically, politically and economically, were weak and rushed as varying factors were not taken seriously into account and the unification process was undertaken in an emotionally charged atmosphere.

During the period of 1990 to 1994, the cooperative unification did not achieve success. The unified system had relatively good northern/southern representation but it was not effective. The northern tribal and the southern factional attitudes and approaches were too strong in the power centre to enhance the level of integration. The tribally-dominated power centre did not encourage a change in the administrative setup and the two sides wanted to impose their former systems on the national administration. As the capital, Sanaa, was in the ex-YAR territory, the central administration was predominantly characterised by the latter's system which was cumbersome and corrupt.

The acceleration of political tensions between the two sides increased after the 1993 elections as a third northern party shared government, diminishing the southern share to a third. In view of the supremacy of southern natural resources, the southerners had a motive to seek deunification, and they duly did so. This was put down by the northern side which used force in the 1994 civil war.


The thesis is concluded with three scenarios discussing the possible directions of the future political development of the Republic of Yemen, with a focus on how the ROY can escape from the predicament of sectarian dominated politics. The first of these scenarios envisages fundamental reforms taking place immediately so as to preserve the present unification system. The second proposes that amalgamated unification could be replaced by

federalism. The third forwards a possibility that Yemen could fragment into many small states as a result of poor national administration and state management. These scenarios are founded in the analysis presented in the main body of the thesis by employing the arguments and dynamics identified as the failings of the current system in an analysis which would allow Yemen to enjoy a more prosperous and stable future.



Map 1: The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)

The international boundaries on this map, shown by dotted lines, should not be regarded as authoritative.  
 PDRY governorates are shown by dashed lines and roman numerals



## Preface

Sectarianism, regionalism and tribalism have undoubtedly played significant roles in the political and socio-economic history of the two Yemens since their independence in the 1960s. Yemeni politicians tend to reject this view while in power, yet accuse each other of pursuing sectarian, regional or tribal objectives when they are out of power.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which sectarianism, regionalism and tribalism played roles in the power struggle between the two Yemeni states and during the period of unification (1990-1998). The main focus of the thesis is on Yemeni integration and how it came about. A central aspect of this which needs to be addressed is the role of northern Shafais in the southern Yemeni state and how they manipulated leftist policies in that state in order to widen the policy gap between the north and south, effectively pushing the unification process back each time.

The problem of northern Shafais will be posed and illuminated in the thesis as a key and common element in both the north and the south of Yemen in terms of their substatus position in the north, and minority position in the south. The northern Shafais were hardly incorporated in top political positions in the north despite their substantial presence while they enjoyed substantial political power in the south. Furthermore, the researcher will attempt to show how the PDRY was forced to adopt strong leftist policies which damaged its foreign standing, and how these policies were intended partly to bring the Zaydi rule down in the north, and partly to eliminate as many southern nationalists as possible who were dedicated to go steadily through with the unification process.

Various academic studies have been made on Yemeni unification, but they have mainly focused on the period of integration (1990 onwards) without analysing the political dynamics sufficiently. These political dynamics were more significant in the south than the north particularly during the period 1978-1989, yet the above-mentioned literature has largely ignored political dynamics in the south.



The researcher sees her thesis, therefore, as being unique in terms of its illumination of the political dynamics of the Yemeni unification and its analysis of how it was brought about in a hasty manner. It also provides a unique account of the linkages of the events and factors that occurred between the two states and among the northern and southern leaderships.

The thesis addresses the continuation of the regionalism and tribalism problem in terms of attitudes and approaches to state-building under a unified power structure. It shows how under the impact of tribalism the two leaderships (the GPC and the YSP) failed to carry out an objective unification. It also shows how southern leaders in the YSP were disappointed by their northern Shafai colleagues in the YSP in the 1993 election which put the party in a disadvantaged position politically and administratively.

The thesis is developed over five chapters in addition to a conclusion. The four chapters are structured chronologically in covering political developments in each state.

The first introductory chapter identifies the problem, the focus of the thesis, and presents different theoretical perspectives on unification. The problem of Yemeni unification is translated in terms of the northern Shafai problem in the two states and how it was originally a northern problem transferred into a problem in the southern state, causing political tensions inside the two Yemeni states and beyond their borders.

The second chapter covers the political dynamics and economic progress in the two states (before unification) and shows how the political dynamics in the south reflected on the north. The interaction of the unification process is clearly and logically traced among the policy makers in both the YAR and PDRY.

Chapter three outlines the unification steps between the two states, with an analysis provided of the political dynamics which affected the unification steps.

Chapter four deals with the cooperative integration between the two states and the power conflicts between southerners and northerners which occurred at all levels. Critically, the chapter analyses the dynamics of political events: political clashes over administration mechanisms, assassinations of YSP members, southerners' frustration over their accommodation in Sana'a and over the activities of the northern security forces.

Chapter five develops the argument on imposed integration and explains how the power structure was turned into a one-man rule – of the Zaydi faction – as formerly in the YAR; and how the whole administrative and financial mechanisms went back into the former structure of the YAR. It also explicitly shows the decline of the south in all respects.

## Introduction

The story of Yemen unification or integration has been on the stage since the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in 1962 at a time when the southern Yemeni state was still under British rule and protection in the form of a federation of several tribal states. The north of Yemen achieved its republic status five years before the southern part and this status contributed to the sponsorship of a 'guerrilla' war in the south against the British forces and the regime of the sultanates. It was the hope that when the south gained its independence, a unification between the two Yemeni states would take place immediately. This did not happen and instead the two Yemeni states existed side by side but at variant axes from each other in terms of policies, social norms and values. It was only after 23 years had passed (1990) that unification took place. Initially the unification was cooperative but that did not last long and it turned into a 'coercive' type of unification with the southern state highly victimised by the northern leadership under the unified system.

The focus of the thesis is on the Yemeni integration: its processes, progress and the future outlook. The theme of the thesis will therefore run into analysing all political and economic dynamics of the two Yemeni states: the YAR and PDRY and those dynamic events between the two states in the pre-unification period (1968-1990). The theme is continued by analysing the unification progress over the period 1990-1998 and develop the arguments of how the impact of past experiences of each state has been influencing each leadership attitudes, behaviours and approach towards the unified power structure in the Republic of Yemen.

The thesis develops the arguments for the theme of the thesis in the chapters as follows:

### Chapter One:

Beside providing background on the country, the chapter lays down the methodology and introduces the theoretical material for understanding both the power struggle in the political structure of each state and of the unified system. Special emphasis shall be placed on the southern Yemeni state for three reasons:

- a. The unique power structure of the PDRY had integrated 17 ex-trucial states of so-called “South Arabian Federation” into the PDRY as, creating a particularly complex set of political dynamics.
- b. The Marxist-Leninist regime in the south was for much of the time run by a northern Shafai group headed by Abdel-Fattah Ismail, who maintained the highest post as Secretary-General of the political structure for over a decade. This was crucial to hindering integration.
- c. The political dynamic after 1978 was more complex in the south as power shifter three time up to 1990, while in the north there was one continuing regime. Political dynamics in the south had a strong political impact on the north.

#### Chapter Two:

Chapter two covers an important background for understanding the unification process. It shows the nature of the power struggle in each state, with how minorities internally or externally fighting for power. The chapter lays emphasis on the basic problem of the northern Shafais who failed to be incorporated in the top power structures in the north (at any time) and could easily climb to the top political power structure(s) in the south through which they strove for political legitimacy. The chapter shows how the northern Shafais used political tactics, manoeuvres and instruments to seek to achieve power within the political structure of the north and the south.

#### Chapter Three

Chapter three covers the series of unification arguments between the two Yemeni states. The argument in this chapter is that violent conflicts between the two states were concomitant with the implementation of the unification process. In other words, the closer the two states came towards unification, the more did variant local policies or violent events come in to drive the two states apart.

#### Chapter Four

Chapter four explains the cooperative integration between the two states. It traces the cooperative unification steps since 1989 until May 1990. It goes on to explain the unification attitudes, behaviour and approach of each party in the top power and the

maintaining of the political power and administrative of each system. The two states existed side by side with representation in the three top political structures: the Presidential Council, the Parliament and the Cabinet (with a 50/50 ratio in each). The chapter indicates the impact of factionalism/regionalism/tribalism on state-building, the elections, and the distribution of resources. It covers the factors behind the civil war between the two military forces which had failed to integrate into one force.

## Chapter Five

Chapter five deals with the post-war period. It develops the argument of how the unification progressed into a coercive type changing some basic constitutional aspects to end the legitimacy of the southern leadership in the unification as a partner. It explains how southern resources were used for the benefit of northerners and how the administration in the south was effectively run by northerners at all levels despite the presence of southerners.

### *The Aim of the Thesis*

The aim of the thesis is to analyse, critically, the Yemeni unification: its objectives, process and progress. Such analysis can best come through objective academic research by a researcher who lived day-to-day the unification process and its progress and witnessed its political dynamics in the south and in the north. This will enable readers to review analytically the Yemeni unification in respect of the new materials put forward in the thesis for the first time.

### *Sources*

Most of the sources of this thesis are provided by original sources: actors who witnessed and played a part in the political dynamics of the Yemeni unification, of whom the researcher is one.

Briefly, the researcher was born in Aden from northern and southern parents. Her mother was a descendent of Imam Yahya Bin Hussain Al-Hadi - the founder of the

Zaydi doctrine in Yemen in the tenth century. Her father was a Hadhrami from the Bamurrah clan. The researcher was brought up by maternal uncles who were more enlightened than her paternal family as they were residing in Aden colony.

The researcher was politically active in the NLF in school and in Aden society. She was among the first female group in the political life in the south. She was in contact – formally and informally – with all the southern elites in the party and the government. Ismail, the Secretary-General of the PONF/YSP, for instance, asked her help to teach his eldest son and daughter in 1975. President Salem Rubaye'a Ali asked her to coordinate a Higher Planning Committee report on agriculture with his office before putting it to the Higher Planning Committee in order for this not to be used politically against him (he was the Chairman of the Political Committee for Agriculture and the researcher was the director of the agricultural sector in the Ministry of Planning).

President Salem Rubaye'a Ali then moved the research to the Ministry of Agriculture in 1977 and appointed her as a deputy director general for the planning and statistics department. When she became deputy minister, the defence and the interior ministers (Ali Anter and Saleh Musleh) would mainly approach her for their needs from the ministry. She had also strong informal relations with many leaders' families in addition to her husbands in-laws of the Hadhrami factions (Al-Beidh and Al-Seyeili).



## Background and Methodology

### 1.1 Geographical Background

The following section addresses the physical geography of the ROY, particularly emphasising the diversity of the physical surroundings between the areas covered by the ex-PDRY and ex-YAR. This difference is most apparent with regard to the geomorphology and climate of the region. Firstly, the location of Yemen in relation to surrounding areas is addressed, followed by a brief description of the geomorphological and climatic characteristics.

#### 1.1.1 Location

The Republic of Yemen (ROY) is located on the south west corner of the Arabia peninsula, between the latitudes of 12-20° north of the equator and longitudes 41-54° east of the Greenwich Meridian.<sup>1</sup> The total area is 555,000 km<sup>2</sup> excluding al-Rub'a al-Khali. The country is bordered by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the north, the Red Sea to the west, the Arabian Sea to the south and Oman to the east.<sup>2</sup> ROY has several islands, of which Mayoon at Bab al-Mandab and Socotra 510 km offshore the eastern coast are the most important.<sup>3</sup> On the Red Sea, several islands are under the sovereignty of the ROY of which Kamaran, Great Hunaish, Little Hunaish, Zaqar, Al-Zubair, Al-Tair are the most important.<sup>4</sup>

#### 1.1.2 Geomorphology and Natural Resources

The physical geography of the ROY may be divided into five distinct geomorphological units: mountainous, plateaux, coastal, al-Rub'a al-Khali (desert) and islands.

**a. *The Mountainous Region***

These are dominated by lava resulting from the fissure following the rifting of the Nubian and Arabian Plates which took place along the north-south axis of the Red Sea. This rift led to the formation of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and a mountainous region in the approximate form of an L-shape running along the north and west side of Yemen.<sup>5</sup>

Geologically, this mountainous region consists predominantly and most obviously of volcanic rocks that rise between 1000 and 3600 metres above sea level. The highest point in this region is Prophet Shuaib mountain that reaches 3666 metres, and is the highest peak in both the Arabian Peninsula and Al-Sham region, excluding the Kurdish areas.<sup>6</sup>

Several major wadis exist in this region: Wadi Haradh, Wadi Moor and Wadi Zabid, all of which flow to the Red Sea on the west side, while Wadi Tuban and Wadi Bana flow to the Arabian Sea in the south. Wadi Khabb, Wadi Al-Sadd, Wadi Adana and Wadi Al-Jawf flow in a north easterly direction.<sup>7</sup>

The largest of the wadis in Yemen is the Wadi Hadhramout which stretches across the eastern half of the country. The wadi is surrounded by mountainous chains and flows into the Arabian Sea.

**b. *The Plateaux Region***

This region is widespread over Yemen but is located mainly alongside the mountainous regions with a maximum altitude of 1200 metres. Most plateaux are located in the northern areas of Yemen such as around Saada, Hajja, Ibb, and the more northerly east areas of Shabwa, Hadhramout and Lahj Governorates.<sup>8</sup>

**c. *Coastal Region***

This region includes the coastal areas along the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, and stretch from the Omani border south-westerly towards Bab al-Mandab, and from here northward to the border of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the Red Sea.<sup>9</sup> The length of the Yemeni coastline is approximately

2000 km.<sup>10</sup>

**d. *Al-Ruba' al-Khali***

This region is the infamous arid desert territory of Yemen. However, it still supports a variety of vegetation, especially in areas where oases have developed. This region is home to Yemeni bedouin nomads who establish seasonal habitats across the area.<sup>11</sup>

**e. *Islands***

There are over 100 Yemeni islands scattered in the territorial waters of Yemen in the Red Sea.<sup>12</sup> Kamaran is the largest and the most densely populated of these islands. Perim (Mayoon) is another large island located in the strait of Bab al-Mandab which connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The large island of Socotra is one of the few Yemeni islands to be found in the Gulf of Aden. The Socotra group of islands has unique animals, birds and plantations that recently attracted the interest of UNEP in preserving the endangered species of flora and fauna found there.<sup>13</sup>

### **1.1.2.1 Natural Resources**

The Republic of Yemen enjoys various natural resources. Oil and gas were struck in the 1980s, and oil production reached around 450,000 b/d in October 1998.<sup>20</sup> The country has large reserves of gas at around 30 trillion cm<sup>3</sup>. In the agricultural sector, the country has about 1 million acres of cultivable land, of which just under half is cultivated. Various crops of cereals, vegetables and fruits are cultivated throughout the year, owing to the diversified climate, as indicated in section 1.3.

### **1.1.3 Climate**

The climate varies greatly throughout the country. It ranges between 15<sup>0</sup>C and

44<sup>0</sup>C in summer, and between 2<sup>0</sup>C to 32<sup>0</sup>C in the winter months.<sup>16</sup> Thus, the country enjoys different climates at any one time in different regions. Humidity along the coastal areas varies between 95% in summer to 65% in winter. Dry weather prevails throughout the highlands and the hinterlands.<sup>17</sup>

#### 1.1.4 Commentary

Yemen is therefore characterised by diverse geographic conditions, which roughly equate to the ex-YAR being a mountainous region, with sufficient rainfall though without an adequate water supply infrastructure. The ex-PDRY region is dominated by low-lying plateaux regions with low rainfall but a good water supply system from the utilisation of the extensive aquifer system. These immense regional differences in the geographic characteristics of Yemen are mirrored in the characteristics of the peoples who inhabit these areas. The manner in which the physical environment has been utilised by the variety of administrations to have governed Yemen is addressed mainly in Chapter 5 with the important issue of the water supply infrastructure.

## 1.2 Administrative Divisions of the ROY

In administrative terms, the Republic of Yemen is divided into 17 governorates and the capital city of Sanaa. These governorates are:<sup>14</sup>

#### *In Northern Regions*

The capital city of Sanaa  
Sanaa Governorate  
Taiz Governorate  
Al-Hudaidah Governorate  
Ibb Governorate  
Dhamar Governorate  
Mareb Governorate  
Al-Baidha Governorate  
Hajjah Governorate

#### *In Southern Regions*

Aden Governorate  
Lahj Governorate  
Abyan Governorate  
Shabwah Governorate  
Hadhramout Governorate  
Al-Mahara Governorate

Al-Mahweet Governorate

Sa'adah Governorate

Al-Jawf Governorate

Each governorate, consisted of four or more districts governed by a Mayor who came under the jurisdiction of the concerned Governor. Governorates, particularly those of northern regions, had no conformity, neither geographically nor in terms of population. The southern governorates each had four districts apart from Hadhramout which had 8 districts due to its larger size in area.<sup>15</sup>


### **1.3 Tribal Groupings**

A central theme of the thesis is the impact of tribalism and tribal groupings on the unification process, indeed, much of the political history of Yemen is pivoted on the tribal political dynamic in the power-centre of the country. The major tribal groupings found in Yemen are illustrated in Maps 2 and 3. It is worth mentioning that the political structures of the mountainous regions of Yemen (mainly in the ex-YAR territory) are strongly influenced by tribal confederations, namely the Hashed and Bakeel confederations of the Zaydi sect. However, tribal clusters are not necessarily mutually exclusive, for example, the Medhaj tribe around the Dhamar region is mainly Zaydi, with a larger Shafai component to the south. The southern tribes of the ex-PDRY region (see Map 3) were structurally weakened during the period of Socialist-rule. However, upon unification, tribal clusters are again gaining strength and becoming increasingly well-organised and could possibly result in the development of strong tribal structures.


### **1.4 Population of the ROY<sup>18</sup>**

The preliminary estimates of the population, according to the recent census of December 1994, are 14,587,807 persons inside the country and 1,243,950

**Map 2: The Major Tribal Clusters of northern Yemen**



Map 3: The Major Tribal Clusters of Southern Yemen



Source: *Area Handbook for the Yemens*, Washington, 1977, p. 44.

persons outside the country. The total number of Yemenis inside and outside the country has been estimated at 15,831,757, of which 7,959,480 are males and 7,872,277 are females with an average of 7 persons per nuclear family.

The population growth rate according to the 1994 census, is 3.7%. However, previous estimates showed 3.1% for northern areas and 2.7% for southern areas as per the census of 1986 of the ex-YAR and census 1988 of the ex-PDRY respectively.<sup>19</sup> The population ratios, by age, are as follows:

0-14 years	52%
15-64 years	45%
65+	3%

Life expectancy at birth is around 48% and the average life-span at birth is 47 years.

Tables 1 to 6c in the appendix indicate the distances between major urban areas (Table 1), some social indicators which both the ex-YAR and ex-PDRY had achieved throughout their developmental processes prior to the unification, including education (Tables 2a to 2c), health personnel (Table 3), employment statistics (Table 4), air transport (Table 5), and political events in Tables 6a to 6c.

## **1.5 Methodology of Integration**

There are two concepts underlying this thesis. The first is the effective role of minorities in the two former Yemeni states, and the second is the concept of integration. Yemen unification reached its aspired objective - integration between the two former separate state entities, the Yemen Arab Republic and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen - in May 1990. Historically, political integration has been undertaken between and among many countries in order to achieve sustainable political and developmental goals and growth, but not always with full success. Some countries have made steady progress in their plans for integration, as has occurred in the GCC and the UAE in



**Table 1.1 : Population of Voting age, by Governorate, 1993**

Governorate	Total	Females	Males	No. Election Centre	No. of MPs
Sana'a City	387,314	197,375	189,939	34	18
Aden	223,161	113,723	109,438	73	11
Taiz	894,258	455,714	438,544	227	43
Laheg	263,012	134,031	128,981	100	12
Ibb	803,724	409,578	394,146	227	38
Abyan	166,732	84,967	81,765	88	8
Al-Baida	200,918	102,388	98,530	79	10
Shabwa	125,175	63,789	61,386	84	6
Hadhramout	350,448	178,588	171,860	170	17
Al-Mahrah	48,685	24,810	23,875	30	2
Al-Hodeidah	703,371	358,438	344,933	175	34
Dhamar	435,818	222,093	213,725	150	21
Sana'a	745,312	379,811	365,501	227	36
Al-Mahweet	168,953	91,194	77,759	47	8
Hajjah	255,929	24,005	231,924	147	23
Sa'adah	183,106	93,311	89,795	50	9
Al-Jawf	46,195	23,541	22,654	24	2
Mareb	63,828	32,527	31,301	39	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6,065,939</b>	<b>2,989,883</b>	<b>3,076,056</b>	<b>2,021</b>	<b>301</b>

Source: Election Committee, 1993

the Arab world. Elsewhere, some attempts have failed such as that which sought to unify Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic.

### 1.5.1 Minority Rule Theory

With regard to minority rule, the former YAR and PDRY both witnessed minority rule. The YAR has mostly been ruled by a Zaydi faction which was less substantial in number than the Shafai faction in the north and in the PDRY was ruled by a politically defined minority within a framework of a political organization made up of various southern factions in addition to a northern Shafai faction. Ironically, in the southern leadership, the smaller group, the northern Shafais, were the most influential ruling group in the PDRY. Similarly, in the YAR, the Hashedis were a minor group in the Zaydi faction (compared to the Bakeel confederation), yet they were predominant in the power structure from 1978 until 1990, and from 1994 until now.

One of the most significant of the theoretical works on the minority rule is by Van Dam (1981). He argues that the Alawis, a minority group in Syria, obtained power through their presence in the military during the French occupation. The Alawis and other minorities had consolidated positions in the army and through this acquired control of political structures. Van Dam indicated several factors which helped the Alawis' rise to power. The most important one was the factions ability to act in a consolidated manner at all levels: geographically, professionally, and politically.

The Syrian case could have some similarities with both north and south Yemen. In some aspects it resembles the former YAR where the Ottomans recruited more Zaydis in the armed forces than Shafais, and then handed the country over to a Zaydi faction, such that Zaydi rule became hereditary.

The case of the PDRY was a little different in view of the identity of its nationals. The northern Shafais were not nationals within the Federation of South Arabia, and even when the PRSY and subsequently the PDRY were formed, the northern Shafais maintained dual nationality, holding both YAR and PDRY passports. This does not have parallels in Syria. The result in the PDRY was that the northern Shafai group could climb to the top of the power structures, but could not dominate the military, which the Alawis in Syria did so effectively. The northern Shafais had no alternative but to defend their position at the pinnacle of the power structure in the south in order to achieve their ultimate aim of power legitimacy in the north.

Other literature which can be grouped under "Third World Politics" has shown how political power structures are shaped by political history, social concerns, political institutions, and the degree or influence of military involvement and external forces. Cammack, et. al., suggest that the history of foreign domination, the class system and the presence of minorities have much to do with reshaping the power structure in a developing country (Cammack, Pool and Tardoff, 1988). They stress the role of political institutions which minorities could play a relevant role in policies.

### 1.5.2 Integration Theory

There is a large literature on integration written by Lindberg, Haas, Etzioni, Deutsch, Nye, Weiner, Levy, Coleman, Roseburg, Claude, Hayward, Jacob, Tuscano, Ionescu, Kavanagh, Coombe and many others. The researcher found these resources useful on regional and international integration despite their diversities. However, the researcher found very little literature on national integration which fits the Yemen integration case.

Each of the above writers defined 'integration' in different forms, though with the same concept. It is therefore a helpful task to provide definitions of integration. The following are some of the definitions of the integration process put forward by the above writers:

- (a) Ernst Haas defined integration as "*the process of shifting loyalties from a national setting to a larger entity*"<sup>21</sup>
- (b) K.W. Deutsch said that integration was "*the ability to ensure peaceful change over time*"<sup>22</sup>
- (c) J. Nye looked at integration as "*the establishment and maintenance of the political community*"<sup>23</sup>
- (d) A. Etzioni referred to the integration process as "*the ability of a system to maintain itself in the face of internal and external challenges*"<sup>24</sup>
- (e) L. Lindberg defined integration as "*the Process whereby a group of nations (or other political units) progressively takes on a collective capacity to make decisions which authoritatively allocates values for all their members*"<sup>25</sup>
- (f) Myron Weiner defined national integration as "*referring to the generalised*

*problem of holding a system together”*.<sup>26</sup>

(g) M. J. Levy suggests that “*the analytic structure of integration in a society or other concrete structure consists of those structures the operations of which make for the co-functional adaptation of the members and/ or members-to-be of the structure to the structure concerned.*”<sup>27</sup>

(h) Coleman and Roseburg defined Political Integration as “*progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and a participant political community*”.<sup>28</sup>

It is important to note that in all of the above definitions of integration, scholars hold a ‘sense of coherence’ as a common factor. This aspect shall be examined below in the light of the Yemeni experience in its unification process.

Another remarkable point of these definitions is that most of them would be applicable to regional integration rather than national integration of two states, a case which does not suit Yemen. The researcher is more inclined to treat Yemen unification as a nationally integrated case rather than a regional. For this reason, the researcher will argue the Yemen case, mainly with regards to some integration literatures made by both Etzioni, Hayward and Nonneman who had written on Middle East experiences and other developing countries in the world.

Solid theoretical bases or paradigms were found in Etzioni's book, *Political Unification*, which could be useful in illuminating the Yemeni experience.<sup>30</sup> Also, a useful classification of factors made by Nonneman in his article ‘Problems facing Co-operation and Integration Attempts in the Middle East’ affecting the integration process is also important for the Yemeni case.

The researcher shall review some of the integration literature throughout the forthcoming subsections with regard to the Yemen unification experience.

After that, the integration of the Yemen shall be critically analysed in other chapters of this thesis.

While definitions of integration can be partly applied to the Yemeni case, the researcher likes to focus on basic aspects for the Yemeni unification experience below with regard to integration methodology. This will be made in consideration to the peculiarities of the two Yemeni states in terms of their distinguished power centres, political and social disparity policies, and their diversified resources in the region. The development of these ideas will be incorporated by the researcher with regard to Etzioni's configuration of national political unification and integration beside others.<sup>31</sup> The researcher will add more illumination to the political unification with regard to the Yemeni case through her own experience in the two Yemens in the political, functional and social spheres.

In addition to the above references, the researcher found the work of Mufti Malek to have applications to the study of Yemen (Mufti, 1996, Sovereign Creations). In brief, Mufti argued the theory of "defensive unionism". The tenets of this theory state that the most frequent cause for alliances and union are external threats, and that non-systematic factors such as regime ideology played a minor role. Mufti argued that this was true or fruitful for old alliances in pre-1967 Egypt, post-1967 Israel, but failed to explain unity projects which eliminated inter-Arab relations in the following decades. Furthermore, he argued that pan-Arab unionism clearly had more to do with internal struggles and transnational penetration than with imbalances of power – or threat – in the international environment.

Mufti turned to the optimistic theorists such as Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch who insisted on four crucial conditions without which political integration would be impossible . These were:

1. A prolonged period of complex economic interaction to generate the interdependence;
2. The existence of effective state institutions, capable of adapting to new

- needs and demands;
3. Political pluralism or broadening elites, and;
  4. Elite value complementability.

Mufti claimed that only the last one of these conditions prevailed in the Arab world during the heyday of unification. Mufti agreed with Stephen David who argued that Third World leaders engaged in “omnibalancing” against both external and internal threats. The omnibalancing theory rests on the assumption that leaders are weak and illegitimate and the stakes in domestic politics are high. David’s approach was relevant as he specified the ultimate goal of third world leaders was to protect himself even if this was achieved at the expense of the state. Mufti, however, demonstrated how defensive unionism would come about when leaders failed to establish autonomy and legitimacy within their states.

On unity projects, Mufti presented formally his argument under two categories: expansionist and defensive motives. He viewed that expansionist motivated unity attempts were rarely made. He argued that at least one partner in a unity agreement would behave defensively out of the following unity patterns or models:

1. A vulnerable regime seeks to neutralize domestic opponents in a union with an expansionist partner, or;
2. Both sides respond to domestic challenges by resorting to defensive unionism. The challenges in this case would likely be domestic.
3. A regime facing a dangerous external threat may be obliged by an expansionist potential ally to a unification accord as a condition for its support.

The unity pacts involving Syria and Iraq, according to Mufti, were explained by the first two models. The Yemeni unification can be explained by the second model. If the northern Shafais in the southern leadership were regarded as exogenous factors to both the northern and southern leaderships, then the third model would also be applicable. The Yemeni unification shall be

analysed along these lines of arguments.

In brief, however, the researcher would assert that the south agreed to the unity pact out of “defensive” motives with a high cost of ceding national sovereignty of southerners. This was made because the ruling party, the YSP, in 1989-1990 was substantially composed of northerners in the party and government, and the southerners effectively lost political legitimacy. The Southern leaders did not even ask for a federation of confederation as argued by Mufti’s models. Such an unstable regime accepted the unity project with the north at a high price to the south in general.

## **1.6 The Configurational Aspects of the Two Yemeni States**

Yemen had a unique position in the Middle East region in terms of its socio-political aspects. It was the only country in the region with two international identities, namely the YAR and PDRY. Yemen was like Korea and Vietnam both of which had been divided into north and south. Many observers believed that it was only a matter of time before the two Yemens would be integrated into one international identity. The two peoples had one origin and other common factors in terms of religion, language, social and traditional customs in addition to some blood relations between the two states. However, because of the political history of each state, the two Yemeni states did not enjoy the same *degree of mutual socio-political norms*. For instance, the social structures of tribes and their social impact on the power centres have been very different from each other as we shall envisage it in chapters 2, 3,4 and 5.

An attempt will be made to apply some principles of integration in the Yemen unity case in respect of the variations and similarities of the common parameters between the two states in their integration process. Within the framework of this methodology, we shall critically analyse the Yemen unification process through the period 1970-1998.

It is important, however, to underline that when Etzioni wrote his

integration/unification literature, he used the concept of union as a socio-political one and not as a legal term, and this is important to be borne in mind throughout our analysis.

### **1.6.1 The Main Principles of Integration**

It is assumed here that an integration process should be based on political compliance, co-operation and co-ordination out of which an integration process ensues. The parties/units concerned in an integration process would need to have/enjoy as many of these features as possible.<sup>32</sup> We shall now look into the basic features and parameters for which a sound integration process would be meaningful if these were critically taken into consideration.

### **1.6.2 Basic Features For Integration**

Political scientists have developed various paradigms for the integration process. Many of these assert the traditional consensus that population norms, language or religion are decisive parameters for integration. While the researcher believes in those basic features of the integration process, she thinks that there are decisive factors which affect the ability of the two or more parties to reconcile their differences/variations in their units or previous systems before going into integration and to be aware of such basic rules and principles of national integration.

There are many basic integration features drawn by Etzioni and others which though applicable to regional integration, the researcher would attempt to apply them to the national unification of the Yemeni case.

#### **1.6.2.1 The Unit/System Properties in the Pre-Unification State**

Etzioni argues that *before going into the unification process*, there needs to be



some required properties enjoyed by the unit/system seeking integration with other units/systems. The first of these properties is *the integration of sub-units or sub-systems in each party*.<sup>33</sup>

In the Yemeni case, this property, generally, had a low-level integration in each of the Yemeni states. The north has doctrinally been divided into two factions; Zaydi (Shi'ite) and Shafai (Sunni), and has mainly had a Zaydi power centre. The northern Shafais, though constituting the majority in terms of population, were not incorporated normally in the northern power centre. The south on the other hand, had in their former state, representations of different regions including northerners in their power centre but all these came from a minority of who were members of the ruling political party.<sup>34</sup> Real integration of all groups in each unit was hardly in existence in either state. Nonneman pointed out in his above mentioned article several factors impede regional and national integration of which lack of integration within units/systems is one. Chapters 2 and 3 have details on this aspect.

The second property Etzioni and Nonneman put forward is *the homogeneity factor among sub-units and sub-systems in the preunification state*. According to them, the homogeneity factor is, to a certain extent, decisive for a successful unification/integration process. Etzioni, in particular, claimed that the less homogeneous the group in the unification, the lower level the integration will be.<sup>35</sup> The more the homogeneity factor is, the higher level the integration will be among the concerned groups. Yet, there are several countries which achieved integration without great homogeneity: the USA, the ex-USSR and Belgium stand out as such cases. Homogeneity is no doubt a contributory factor to the integration process, but it is not as decisive as previous literature suggests. However, through her experience, the researcher believes that this factor has its positive effect on the integration process for its impact in limiting resistance that might come up from some sub-units of some factions lacking homogeneity.

Despite the common features of the two states in terms of language, religion and major social parametres, the heterogeneity factor characterised each state

in other different respects. There was a lack of homogeneity in terms of tribal identities, doctrinal factions and social stratifications. Politically, the north had its historic doctrinal problem heavily reflected in its power centre and military and security forces. The south, on the other hand, had the so-called “central democracy” within its 30,000 party members only and was forced, under marxist-leninist rules to bring all factions in the party system into its limited power centre for the rule of a state. Therefore, population-wise, there was no integration in either political structure in the two states.

Etzioni has questioned whether homogeneity would be a prerequisite factor or an enhancing factor to political integration. The researcher believes that there should be a socially acceptable degree of homogeneity that ought to exist in each unit/system before unification takes place.

The third property which fitted the Yemeni integration experience was the *social property*, which Etzioni talks about in terms of there being *a common enemy*. The researcher discussed this point in the previous concept of the minority rule above. In the yemeni case, poverty and the poor infrastructures in addition to global political changes were sufficient factors for both yemen to get integrated for a long run prosperity. Moreover, the southern leadership was not happy with the northern shafais attitudes and approaches in their performance as partners in the YSP leadership. On the other hand the zaydi leadership in the north did not want to see a political power for northern shafais in the south to grow further. The two leaderships had common ‘enemies’ and ‘challenges’ in the political arena in the two states and these might have convinced each to go into a hasty unionism.

It is important to note down here that the northern shafais were pressing hard and advocating the unification process but on different grounds. They were pressure group for the transformation of the yemeni society into revolutionary communities which must get rid of ‘tribalism’, ‘revionism’ and all old social traditions. This transformation was a pre-requisite for the unification of yemen. Only on these basis, the northern shafais could be legitimately recognised for power centre in a unified yemen.

The fourth property of the units/systems intending a unification process was the *interdependence of the sub-units/sub-systems in the preunification phase*. Etzioni argues that experience shows that interdependent sub-units at all levels - politically, sectorally and socially - are likely to increase the level of integration after unification.<sup>39</sup> The higher the degree of interdependence among these sub-units in the preunification phase, the higher the level of the integration process will be after unification.

The researcher believes that the interdependence factor will only be positively effective in industrialised societies where a real free market economy has a strong force among the community members. Interdependence of the sub-units of developing countries, where the political leadership is free from democratic processes, is meaningless unless the top elite in power centres enjoy strong interdependence between/among them first.

Finally, there is the factor of *the scope of integration* which should expand more and more as the level of integration gets higher and higher. Etzioni implies that the unification process would be working integratively within a unified system if the scope of the unit members to the integration process is respectively high.<sup>40</sup>

Yemeni integration has a short-lived experience and within which the scope could not expand further than its limits which were dictated by several negative factors of which the civil war of 1994 was the climax. Chapters 4 and 5 have details of this aspect.

### **1.6.2.2 The Properties of the Unified System**

Before we study the properties of the unified system, it might be better to distinguish the types of unified systems in the unification processes. Etzioni describes three types of unification compositions in terms of powers and assets. These are: the *utilitarian*, the *coercive* and the *additive powers*.<sup>41</sup> The

first property of a unified system is the identification of the typology of unification employed. The researcher believes that the Yemeni experience has aspects of all the above types. For example, at the outset of the unification process the two states asserted the additive composition as each state prepared its public for the Yemen unification to gain powerful identity in the region. Since the 1980's, the unification process was heading towards utilitarian power compositions with economic and social sectoral integration in both states. However, the development of political tensions between the two sides led to the use of force by which the unification power had a coercive composition.

Etzioni has observed that the utilitarian power in the unification process enhances integration because of the linkages of interests of all units in the unified system. Under the assumption that each unit in the unified system has balanced interests in terms of resources, manpower, trade facilities etc, all units in the unified power centre would enhance/encourage the growth of integration to a higher level.<sup>42</sup> The imbalance in the units' interests, however, would create a disruptive power centre and might lead some units to monopolise the power centre for its own interests. This, in turn, might lead to a low or medium level of integration of the unified system. However, disruption in the unified power centre, he claims, might be resulted from the preception of one leading unit in the unified system, that other units sharing the power centre do not have equal interest weight and accordingly this leading unit would give itself the right to overrule other units in the integration process.<sup>43</sup>

In regard to this point, the experience of Yemeni unification had a disruptive unified power centre in its utilitarian composition. The two Yemeni states were fully complementary to each other. The north had a good agricultural base, though without water resources, strong manpower and good foreign policies. The south had fully diversified resources of water, land, oil and minerals. The unification of the two states accommodated the two power centres with a 50% share in the government but as this equal ratio lost ground in the parliamentary elections of 1993, the northern elite tended to think that

they should enjoy a larger share of power in the centre and in the government. This caused serious disruption between the two sides, and the southerners unsuccessfully sought deunification. This resulted in the use of force between the two sides with the southerners losing the war and the country. The unified system turned into a coercive composition in its power and assets and the former northern Yemeni rule came back alone at the head of the unified system. Chapter 4 and chapter 5 have full details and analyses of these events.

Etzioni raises an interesting question, that is whether coercion, at any stage of integration, will be a determinant factor and necessarily impedes the long-term success of the union.<sup>44</sup> The researcher believes that this is a valid question with a positive answer particularly in an imbalanced situation between or among the units in the unified system. Chapter 3 in this thesis shows the degree of the additive and utilitarian unification process of Yemen over the period 1972 to 1993. Chapter 4 indicates the failure of the utilitarian power composition and its change to a coercive one in 1994. Chapter 5 indicates the firm grip of the northern tribes in the power centre of all units in a coercive power composition. Many of Nonneman's obstacles to national integration are also discussed in these chapters.

The second property for the unified system is the "*effective distribution of power.*" Etzioni claims that two factors need to be considered: (a) the *degree of elitism* of one or few units in the unified system as against more or less equal distribution among the many, and (b) the *nature of the unit(s)* that have more power than others in the new system.<sup>45</sup>

This property of the unified system is very applicable to the Yemeni case. Yemeni integration suffered serious set-backs because of the 'imbalanced elitism'. In consideration of the Yemeni tribal communities, the unified power centre did not involve all Yemeni factions in its decision making structure and, after four years of its cooperative integration, the power centre practically came under the monopoly of one minority faction of one tribe, the Hashed tribe of north Yemen. The tribal nature of their rule had a very narrow vision of state-building, as is shown in chapter 5 of this thesis. This, however, is

related to the first concept above in the methodology.

### **1.6.2.3 The Role of Development in the Integration Process**

Etzioni asserts that one property of the unified system is to have integrated sectors which would enhance the process. For this reason, the researcher would like to discuss this point under a special heading.

For the success of the utilitarian power of a unified system, the researcher believes that it is necessary for the units, in the preunification phase, to have a medium to high level of sectoral integration among units. This will contribute to the boost of the unification process in its early stages. Of course, this is vital for the national unification of an amalgamated nature. It may not be the case for regional or international integration.

More importantly, this tendency will help to prepare relevant legislation in all other sectors: in the social, the judicial, the administrative and the financial sectors beside the economic one. In this preunification phase, unresolved issues between/among units will be easier to solve than they would be during the unification process itself because of the political sensitivities of the unified system. Furthermore, such prior arrangement will give time and space to deal with strategic sectoral issues rather than going into irrelevant issues to be solved at top power structures.

The Yemen experience had passed through several serious difficulties due to insufficient preparations to solve unsolved issues. The southern leadership did not assess or foresee what the situation after unification would be like and how difficult it would be to allow the other side to accept their views without compromising in terms of advanced legislation, financial arrangements for their regions and to keep the British-based administration system. In view of the variations in their sectoral policies, no appropriate sectoral integration took place during the pre-unification phase. This, however, incurred heavy costs to the southern units, as explained in Chapters 4 and 5.

Another feature of political integration was the *increase in the coherence factor* among the unified/integrated units so that the integration process could be cured of its 'ups' and 'downs' at minimal expense.<sup>46</sup> Integration may fall down even after hundreds of years of integrative processes, as could be the case in the UK. Hayward argued that if the contact areas became limited (Welsh and English), then integration would tend to be low and might lead to deunification if not fragmentation. He therefore emphasised that a given level of generalisation of adaptations and orientations should be provided for the political structure by actors as per his definition of integration. By adaptation, Hayward means the response of units/individuals to the directives of the political structure, i.e. whether they comply with the structure or not. By orientation, he refers to actors' identification with, and evaluation of, the political structure. Thus adaptation implies individuals' behaviours and orientation involves individuals'<sup>47</sup> attitudes. The power centre of the unified system to keep the system coherent and be committed to the integration would need to be committed to the political structure in its directives and to have the requisite attitudes for commitment.

As the integration process cannot afford to give room to contradictory political platforms, Yemeni unification failed at its power centre because its lack of coherence during the transitory stage. The two units had completely variant attitudes and different visions to the state-building and, due to insufficient preparations for these issues, this resulted in using force for deunification from one side and imposition of unification by the other.

The final property the unified system should aim to achieve is the *response to the communication, upward and downward*. The success of the unification process is equally levelled with the degree of its response to messages received from all factions in the community. This response should be peacefully positive and dedicated to the national interest or to the reasons for which the unification was made.<sup>48</sup>

Yemen's experience in this respect was not positive to public needs and

national interest. The majority of the Yemeni public needed a change of power centres of both units after the 1993 elections, but the response was negative. Public demonstrations were made against the bad management of governments, and the elite's response was harsh.

### **1.6.3 The Instruments for the Integration Process**

The researcher had experience in detecting major defects of the power centre in the south and the north and, in view of the scant resources on national integration literature, she came up with some conclusions with the above properties in mind. Below are the important points for the instruments of the integration process.

To safeguard the integration process, a good administrative mechanism needs to be established under a good monitoring system. This can only be achieved by a strong legal mechanism capable of enforcing national laws and regulations at all levels, and both centrally and regionally. The power of the judiciary has to outstrip or to go beyond all political or tribal powers in the national system. Without this powerful instrument in the state, there will hardly be any effect or positive impact on the national policies or state integrity, administratively and financially.

To support the enforcement of law in the national system, another supportive instrument needs to be initiated and fully sustained, and that is of accountability. An integration process may be subject to various errors, mistakes, duality, nepotism, etc. within its functional framework. The remedies to these negative deeds can only be made by an accountability mechanism which would target these errors wherever and whenever they appear, from the Presidency to the lower hierarchy institutions.

These instruments of national monitoring have to be within an autonomous body with a power exceeding that of the highest administrative structures such as a higher monitoring committee with a legal basis. The monitoring body, in order to be impartially influenced, must enjoy an independent power separate



from that of the Presidency, especially under a republican status. Its figures must be drawn out of all factions, and be highly selective. They should enjoy public and personnel integrity and if they have a strong educational and an experienced background, that would be an asset.

### **1.6.3.1 The Role of Democracy in the Integration Process**

While many observers may take up the factor of democracy as a required feature of the integration process, the researcher would like to take it as an instrument rather than a feature. The role of democracy as an instrument needs to be strengthened to eliminate the passiveness and corruption of the national power centre towards the violations of power groups such as tribes, merchants or politicians and their in-laws. As an instrument, democratic mechanism would create a strong legal stance against these groups and may force the power centre to act positively in the national interest or move it out.

Democracy is traditionally taken as political pluralism in terms of political freedom, many parties with access to media, etc. This is what many identify as the backbone of democracy. Many democratic countries in the least developed of developing countries (LDCs) enjoy political pluralism but with a fragile democratic process. In India, for example, many votes in elections are achieved by material power – the distribution of money - during the election. The Yemeni experience was not far from this, in addition to the impact of tribal factionalism which makes it even more fragile.<sup>49</sup> Furthermore, some governments in LDCs confine the role of democracy to the competition between political parties only, and let their security forces stand quash demonstrations, freedom of speech/thoughts, and they may violate human rights through such practices.

It is, therefore, important to see democracy as an instrument in the integration process to adjust or rectify undemocratic practices in the national power centres and involving other influential factions and groups within society.

Finally, the integration process must be looked upon as a newly established political identity whereby all concerned parties need to forget their previous political roles in their previous establishments. It is important that the concerned parties recognise their 'new' roles in the integrated system rather than keep attached to their former identities and political systems. As the new politically integrated system is established, new targets, policies, roles, functions and institutions need to be fully and rationally developed by all parties with a national view, national attitudes and national behaviour.

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## **The Development of the Political and Economic Structures in the YAR and PDRY (1968-1990)**

This chapter will deal with the background of the two Yemeni States in terms of their political and economic structures and also their political and economic developments during the period 1968 -1990. In analysing the development of the political and economic structures of Yemen, it is firstly necessary to provide a comprehensive description of the political and economic institutions which form the administrative structures of Yemen. Secondly, an analysis of how these institutions work in practice is provided, highlighting the often personal nature of Yemeni decision-making. Thirdly, the importance of key individuals in the power-centre has to be addressed as many aspects of the relationships between political structure and institutional practice can be traced to the impact of the power struggles which have damaged the process of Yemeni unification. These points are discussed within the context of the political development in the two separate states before unification.

In such a political environment as Yemen, this combination of institutional analysis, based on the precepts provided by the constitution of the state, combined with an assessment of the actions and attitudes of key characters within the power-centre, is a powerful method in understanding the often opaque political dynamics of Yemen, both pre- and post-unification.

### **2.1 Political Structures in the YAR and the PDRY**

The political structures in the two Yemeni States were, as is well known, very different from each other. These political structures will be described below within the context of the ideological background of each state over the stated

period.

### **2.1.1 Political Structures in the YAR**

As the Northern regime did not have any national political organisation until 1982, in terms of political parties or a political front, the political structure of YAR was confined to formal state institutions, both at a central and regional level. At the central level, the main political structures in the YAR were the Presidential Office, the Military Revolutionary Council and the Cabinet, in addition to the Shura Council.<sup>1</sup> At the regional level, political power rested jointly in the hands of the Military Commander and the Governor.<sup>2</sup>

#### **2.1.1.1 Central Political Structures**

At the top of the central political structure in the YAR were the Presidential Office, the Military Revolutionary Council, the Cabinet and the House of Representatives.

The Presidential Office in the YAR represented the ultimate power in the country and was generally linked to one tribal/ religious faction, that of the Zaydis.<sup>3</sup> The President usually made decisions after consultations with a number of influential factions/figures and certain institutional bodies.<sup>4</sup>

The Military Revolutionary Council was the institution which interacted most closely with the President in political decisions. There was hardly any conflict between the President and the Military Revolutionary Council. This stemmed in part from the fact that a substantial number of the Council members originated from the President's tribe.

The Premier and the Cabinet were other formal channels helping the President with internal and external policies.<sup>5</sup> The cabinet constituted a key element in the executive authority in the state. While the Presidential power was

exclusively in Zaydi hands, the power of the Cabinet was shared among all northern factions, the Zaydis, the Shafais and other Shi'ite minorities.<sup>6</sup>

The Shura Council represented the legislative authority, with representatives elected from different regions. This council was very traditional, set to fulfil the Islamic image of the country rather than actually to effect legislation or formulate policies.<sup>7</sup> Most of the representatives of the Shura Council were old traditional figures, Chief Sheikhs and tribesmen, who sought personal ambitions more than national reforms of any kind.<sup>8</sup> In 1989, there were 159 members in this council.

In August 1982, the YAR established its national political organisation, the GPC, which promulgated mild and moderate policies.<sup>9</sup> The GPC was established under the chairmanship of the President of the State.<sup>10</sup> The ideology of the Northern state reflected the socio-economic values of the society at that time. The GPC, however, failed to cope with the dynamic changes of Yemen and kept to its tradition-based ideology and policies. The GPC had a recipient relationship with the formal political leadership in the state, without providing public feedback on government policies.<sup>11</sup>

As its emergence was closely connected to the political development of the YAR, the GPC shall be examined below in the YAR's political development section.

### **2.1.1.2 The Regional Political Structures**

Due to the tribal nature of the North, the regional structure was made up of two administrations, namely those of the Military Commander and the Governor.<sup>12</sup> The Military Commander was intimately interlinked with tribal affairs. The activities of the Governor were restricted to formal state functions and other civil affairs.<sup>13</sup>

Only a few regions in the YAR (namely Taiz, Ibb, Rada'a and Hudaidah) had



formal institutions responsible for major sectors such as agriculture, local administration, power plants, education and health services. In general, regional institutions had no administrative or financial autonomy due to the centralisation of the system.

### **2.1.2 Political Structures in PDRY**

Unlike the YAR, the PDRY experienced a modern state administrative system under the former British administration over the period 1839-1967 when Aden was a British Colony.<sup>14</sup>

Political structures in the PDRY were organised and coherent, both centrally and regionally, although the political ideology (newly introduced into the area) caused disruptions to this coherence from time to time.

#### **2.1.2.1 The Political Structures in PDRY at Central Level**

As the PDRY achieved its independence through armed struggle between the British and an organised political structure, the NLF, the latter continued to have a political structure at the central level. The PONF (Political Organisation of the National Front) constituted a political structure in which political ideologies and perspectives were developed.<sup>15</sup> These were to provide the basis for national policies. In addition to the PONF, there was also the political structure of the state administration.

##### **2.1.2.1.1 The Political Structure of the PONF/YSP**

Centrally, the political structure of the PONF (which turned in 1975 into the UPONF and in 1978 into the YSP) was made up of a General Command of 11-15 members, and an Executive Committee of 29-51 members.<sup>16</sup> The UPONF (Unified Political Organisation - the National Front) and the YSP were established under a similar structure but with larger capacities than the

PONF in terms of manpower and facilities. The polit-bureau consisted of 15-25 elected members of the central committee (C.C.) which comprised 55-65 members elected from all party members.<sup>17</sup>

At the head of this structure was the Secretary-General of the General Command which turned later into a central committee (C.C.), in whose hands was vested the ultimate political power of the country.<sup>18</sup> Theoretically, the Secretary-General (a northern shafai until 1980) enjoyed more power than the President of the State did; foreign advisors especially from the Socialist Bloc also aided his political office. Practically, however, owing to the nature of personnel in the state leadership, the President, who was normally a Southerner, enjoyed more power in state affairs than the Secretary-General of the political party did.

Until 1978, the second figure in this structure was the Chairman of the Political Organisation of the PONF/UPONF/YSP Secretariat.<sup>19</sup> The responsibilities of the Chairman of the Secretariat included the supervision of the following government departments: Economy, Interior, Foreign Relations and the Civil Service.

After the 1986 crisis, the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Secretariat were transferred to the new post of Assistant Secretary-General.<sup>20</sup>

#### **2.1.2.1.2 The Structure of the State**

The central state structure of the PDRY comprised the Presidential Council which was composed of the General Secretary of the PONF, the President of the State and the Premier. The President, presided also the Higher Public Council. Effectively, however, the state was ran by the President and the Premier. The latter, had been on top of the cabinet structure. The Presidential Council, however, met from time to time to review the compliance of the state affairs with the PONF directives.<sup>21</sup>

The top three posts had been incorporated into the Presidential Council until 1978. During the period 1978-1980, the posts of the Secretary-General and the President of the State were held by one figure (Ismail). The Presidential Council, therefore, served little purpose especially after the three powers were concentrated in the hands of one figure, Ali Nasser, in 1980.<sup>22</sup>

The Cabinet was the repository of central and regional authority and contained residual responsibility for executing policies affecting these areas and their associated sectors. The Cabinet was composed of 16-19 sectoral ministers. Governors were accountable to the Premier, but they were not included as members of the Cabinet.<sup>23</sup>

State policies were initiated by sectoral leaders in accordance with the PONF/YSP's organisational structure and directives.<sup>24</sup> The power of the President, however, remained paramount with its foundation emanating from the organisational structure of the PONF/YSP. State ministries and parasatals were expected to follow the political guidelines/policies launched by the political PONF/YSP structure.

There was little harmony between the two structures. The state political structure was more established than the PONF/YSP structure in terms of skilled manpower, resource management, and understanding of public needs. On the other hand, the PONF/YSP's concern centred on complementing a socialist ideology with the national interest. This apparent dichotomy between the two structures led to conflicts among the top figures of the leadership in the PDRY.<sup>25</sup>

#### **2.1.2.2 Regional Political Structures in the PDRY**

In order to guarantee coherence between the centre and region, each region was allocated a representative. The PONF/YSP regional structure comprised a miniature secretariat of the PONF/YSP, which was responsible for regional Front/Party activities.<sup>26</sup> The PONF/YSP regional offices embraced the popular

organisations activities at the regional levels, whilst monitoring the implementation of national policies.<sup>27</sup>

The state political structure at the regional level was, on the other hand, represented by the executive office under the Chairmanship of the Governor. The executive office in the region resembled a miniature cabinet including sectoral representatives.<sup>28</sup> The Governor held the ultimate source of regional power and all sectoral representatives were subordinate to him.<sup>29</sup>

To keep the relationship between the structures, at the regional level, in harmony, the two leading figures were given equal weight in seniority. Both the Governor and the PONF/YSP Secretary in the region held Central Committee membership.<sup>30</sup> More often than not, central problems were transposed into regional problems.

## **2.2 Economic Structures in the YAR and the PDRY**

Economic policies in each Yemeni state were shaped according to the prevalent political ideologies and perceived national interests. The YAR established economic structures concomitant to a market economy, whilst the PDRY created state-owned economic structures to fit a centrally planned economy.

### **2.2.1 Economic Structures in the YAR**

The framework for economic decision-making in the YAR was composed of three elements, and economic decisions and policies were formulated by the top political structures and specialised economic agencies.<sup>31</sup> The basic economic structures in the YAR were represented by:

#### **1. *The Presidential Structure***

The central focus of the decision-making structure was constituted by the interaction between the President and a variety of influential circles. The President of the State granted influential tribal Sheikhs and private investors access to the decision-making process directly and via effective Cabinet figures. They were invited to discuss economic policies and programmes.<sup>32</sup> Economic priorities, principally, were laid down by key-members of the Cabinet and the President, according to the available national resources.<sup>33</sup>

## ***2. The Cabinet and its Parasatals***

The second major economic structure in the YAR was be the Cabinet and its executing agencies. The Cabinet's executing agencies were represented in the sectoral ministries, such as those of Finance, Development and Planning, Agriculture and Trade. In addition to these ministries, there were infrastructural agencies such as those responsible for the provision of power, water, and roads.<sup>34</sup>

Economic structures in the regions were generally poor, apart from the city capital - Sanaa and in 4-5 major cities.<sup>35</sup> Economic structures in the YAR were highly centralised with few regional parasatals. Taiz, Al-Hudaidah, Mareb and Ibb were the major cities to have some economic structures of their own. Moreover, economic services in the regions were poor, and very few towns enjoyed public utility services.

## ***3. Mixed and Private Economic Structures***

Despite encouraging private investment, the YAR's major economic undertakings were state-owned enterprises.<sup>36</sup> There were some 'mixed' structures, partly owned by the private sector and partly by public sector, such as power plants, Al-Thowrah hospital and Al-Yemaneya airways.<sup>37</sup> Some foreign investment was also present in these fields.

The private sector, predominantly was in agriculture and trade. Few

merchants owned some fixed assets in the form of factories and workshops for the production of consumables, and real-estate agencies.

**Table 2.1: Investments by ownership and sector, YAR, 1974-1986**

	1974/5		1982		1982-86	
	Public %	Private %	Public %	Private %	Public %	Private %
agriculture and fisheries	22	78	61	39	75	25
mining *			89	11	97	3
Manufacturing	62	38	39	61	31	69
electricity and water *			95	5	94	6
Construction	0	100	0	100	0	100
trade and hotels **					11	89
transport & communications	51	49	68	32	73	27
financial institutions **	35	65	68	32	66	33
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>33</b>

\* mining, power and water were included under manufacturing in 1975

\*\* trade, hotels, financial services included under services in 1975, 1982

Between 1976 and 1981, the co-operative sector generated one third of investments in transport, 11% of investments in water supply, and 24% of investments in health and education (Carapico, "Political Economy of Self-Help" table 8.10)

Source: World Bank 1979 *Yemen Arab Republic, Current Position and Prospects* (co-operative sector counted as private)

CPO. "Evaluation of the Second Five-Year Plan, April 1987," pp 33-37 (co-operative sector counted as public).

## 2.2.2 Economic Structures in the PDRY

The basic economic structures in the PDRY were represented by:

### 1. *The Political Organization (PONF/YSP)*

The decision-making process was headed by the Polit-Bureau (P.B.) and the Central Committee (C.C.) of the YSP/PONF, which brought together all key leaders of the political organisation and the state. The top three figures of the political structures, namely, the Secretary-General of the PONF/YSP, the President of the State and the Premier were members of the Political Bureau and formulated economic decisions.<sup>38</sup> The Secretary-General always had the upper hand in shaping economic policies and was responsible for aligning policy with ideology, unless the majority voted against him which was very unlikely.

### 2. *The State Presidency and Premiership*

Prior to 1978, the posts of President and Premiership were distinct from the role of the General Secretariat of the PONF/YSP.<sup>39</sup> Both offices were imbued with power to conduct and implement economic policies, in accordance with the national interest, through the auspices of setting committees outside the PONF/YSP influence. The President was mainly responsible to all economic decisions before the citizens and to the outside world. This was due to the fact that not all citizens involved in economic activities were part of the political organisation though they were all aware of its policies but when a situation was risen for a farmer, a senior industrial or agricultural employer who was not part of the political organisation, he/she would only go to the State President to solve his/her problem and therefore, the president would be responsible to take an economic decision. Similarly, was the case with the Premier, who had to take up some economic decisions to do with any economic sectors in his cabinet. However, out of those who lasted long in the Presidential and the Premiership powers were Rubayea and Ali Nasser

respectively.<sup>40</sup>

### ***3. The Cabinet and its Parasatals***

The Cabinet was responsible for both the national and regional economic programmes. Over 90% of the PDRY's economic activities were directed towards the public sector. Thus, the 16-19 sectoral ministries constituted the framework through which the national economy was governed.<sup>41</sup> The ministries of Finance, Planning, Local Administration, Agriculture and Fisheries, for instance, utilised their agencies, authorities, and regional representatives to meet the demands of the nation in terms of goods and services.

### ***4. Mixed and Private Economic Structures***

The PDRY pursued a 'mixed economy' which recognised a role for both private capital and public investment. The public sector was allocated a dominant role in the state's strategic industries, whilst the private sector was left to produce and market consumable items.<sup>42</sup> The private sector was mainly confined to selling groceries, foodstuffs and basic consumption commodities which were bought mainly through state channels.<sup>43</sup>

## **2.2.3 Commentary: The Administrations in Practice**

The institutions of the two states were different in terms of structure and ideology. Furthermore, in practice the day-to-day actions of the administrations were similarly diverse in terms of efficiency, national integration, corruptness, patronage, and the impact of sectarianism. It is therefore necessary to provide a brief appraisal of the operational activities of the administrative / political systems which existed in the pre-unification era.

### **2.2.3.1 The Administration of the YAR**



The YAR's power-centre was highly influenced by the tribal impact of the mountainous areas. The tribal system in north Yemen was characterised by one man-rule, and this had a strong impact on the centralisation of the administrative mechanism throughout the country. The tribal attitude and approach within and among all national institutions were overwhelming, with the mentality governing political actions being essentially tribal.

Values developed in the tribal political sphere were effectively superimposed onto the administrative system of the state, resulting in many operational aspects of the state institutions being ignored. Such a situation did not allow for effective national integration among all northern factions in the northern power-centre. The daily routine work of national institutions was, mainly, governed by the tribal bonds rather than the constitution of the state, giving a wider room for administrative and financial corruption within the administrative system as a whole.

### **2.2.3.2 The Administration of the PDRY**

Unlike the north, the PDRY's administrative system was characterised by the political participation of all southern and northern-originated factions who were members of the dominant political party. While the power-centre was still occupied by party members, it also incorporated various other southern political factions, in addition to a northern Shafai grouping. Accordingly, the PDRY administrative institutions incorporated all of the political groupings in the country, with the highest levels of the bureaucracy being granted to party members.

Unlike the YAR, the daily routine work of the national institutions in the south was mainly governed by the provisions of the constitution of the state until 1986. Since then, the northern Shafais in positions of authority in the administration began to ignore many of the constitutional provisions with the result of weakening the administrative mechanisms of the southern institutions.

### **2.3 Political Developments in the YAR and the PDRY (1968-1990)**

Between 1968 and 1990, the YAR maintained a tribal approach to government with a non-aligned foreign policy, while the PDRY continued its socialist oriented path. The political developments which took place in the two states widened the political gap between the two states in terms of both their attitude and approach. We shall examine these political developments and assess their impact upon the unification process in the following section.

#### **2.3.1 Political Developments in the YAR**

After the Northern Revolution of September 1962 which overthrew the Imam's rule, the YAR underwent a series of major political developments, though all under zaydi power centre only. The Political developments in the YAR shall be discussed below.

##### **2.3.1.1 The Presidency of Abdullah Al-Sallal (1962-1967)**

Marshall Abdulla Al-Sallal, who came to power in 1962<sup>44</sup> was the first President of the YAR. He was removed from office in November 1965 when Qadi Abdul-Rahman Al-Iryani took over the Presidency.<sup>45</sup>

##### **2.3.1.2 The Presidency of Al-Qadi Al-Rahman Al-Iryani (1967-1974)**

Judge Al-Iryani took over power following a coup against President Al-Sallal and was among the first Arab presidents who recognised the newly established state of the PRSY (Peoples Republic of South Yemen) in November 1967.<sup>46</sup> The creation of the PRSY and the Al-Iryani's recognition led to the emergence of two Yemeni identities. Moreover, both led to the loss of the opportunity of unification at an early stage.<sup>47</sup>

There were many important problems in the internal arena of the YAR which forced the Northern regime to recognise the PRSY state. The YAR had to deal with the royal loyalist problem in addition to the organisation and administration of the new state.<sup>48</sup> The Sanaa Siege (December 1967-February 1968), when Sanaa was surrounded by the royalists, was one of the problems that faced Al-Iryani's rule. The Northern leadership was preoccupied with republican stability; President Judge Al-Iryani, therefore, thought that it was better to recognise the Southern Yemeni state to ensure that it would be busy with its own affairs. The royalists and loyalist problem came to an end when the North achieved reconciliation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1972.

<sup>50</sup>

During Al-Iryani's period of rule, both Yemens had a military confrontation along their borders in September 1972. This will be covered in chapter 3.

### **2.3.1.3 The Presidency of Ibrahim Al-Hamdy (1974-1977)**

An ex-Colonel in the army, Ibrahim Al-Hamdy (from the Bakeel tribe) assumed the office of President between 1974 and 1977.<sup>51</sup> Al-Hamdy was a pragmatic figure who wanted to transform the YAR from a tribal into a modern urban society. In order to achieve this aim, he implemented grass roots reforms.<sup>52</sup>

These reforms included:

- The establishment of Reform Committees in each sector to eliminate administrative and financial corruption in society.<sup>53</sup>
- Sending students for further studies abroad to transform the tribal communities.
- Re-organising and re-equipping the Military and Security Forces for

modernisation.<sup>54</sup>

- Employing personnel from different factions on an equal footing.
- Encouraging co-operatives in rural areas so as to promote economic growth by social co-operation.<sup>55</sup>

The position of the opponents to Al-Hamdy was based on a realisation that these social reforms threatened their interests. Sheikhs and Chief Sheikhs of tribes opposed the social transformation as it would not only endanger their tribal integrity, but also take away their prestige and material power. Social modernisation meant the breakdown of tribal ties, the ascendancy of social equality, and the adoption of new social values.

In order to maintain a close link between the tribes and the political system, the opposition in the North eliminated the man behind the reforms. President Ibrahim Al-Hamdy was assassinated on 11 October 1977, the day before he was scheduled to attend the anniversary of the 14 October Revolution in the South.<sup>56</sup>

#### **2.3.1.4 The Presidency of Ahmed Al-Ghashmi (1977-1978)**

Upon the death of Al-Hamdy, the ex-chief Commandant of the Armed Forces in the YAR, Colonel Ahmed Al-Ghashmi (from the Hashed tribe) assumed office.<sup>57</sup> After eight months, Al-Ghashmi himself was assassinated in his office by a Southern envoy delivering a personal letter from the President of the South, Salem Rubayea Ali.<sup>58</sup> The bomb, carried by the envoy, killed both Al-Ghashmi and the messenger.<sup>59</sup>

Al-Ghashmi's assassination was reputed to be plotted by the Southern President in retaliation for Al-Hamdy's death. Salem Rubayea Ali had accused Al-Ghashmi of orchestrating Al-Hamdy's death on 24 June, 1978.<sup>60</sup>

### **2.3.1.5 The Presidency of Colonel Ali Abdulla Saleh (since 1978)**

The YAR's Presidency remained for 40 days without a candidate until Colonel Ali Abdulla Saleh marched from Taiz and accepted to be President on 17 July 1978.<sup>62</sup>

On 17 July 1978, after serving in Taiz as a Regional Military Commander, Colonel Ali Abdulla Saleh took over the YAR Presidency.<sup>61</sup>

During the rule of President Saleh, the two most critical political developments for Yemen's future were the establishment of the GPC and Yemeni unification.

#### **2.3.1.5.1 The Establishment of the GPC**

After Al-Sallah's period in office, almost every president tried unsuccessfully to establish a national political organisation.<sup>63</sup> Despite the numerous attempts to create such an organisation, only the GPC was successfully established under the auspices of Saleh, in August 1982. The organisation comprised 1000 members at its first meeting in Sanaa.<sup>64</sup>

There were two main reasons for the establishment of the GPC, namely the absence of a national political organisation to fill the political gap in the North, and the need for a Northern political organisation to act as a counterpart to the Southern political organisation - the YSP in the process of unification.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, the establishment of the GPC gave political recognition, regionwide, to his power base.

The political ideology of the GPC was very different from that of the Southern YSP. The GPC was based mainly on moderate Islamic lines in which tribal values easily fitted.<sup>66</sup> In contrast to the extreme left ideology of the YSP, the GPC was based on Arab nationalism and an Islamic methodology. The GPC

National Charter (*Al-Mithaq al-Watani*) was carefully drafted to attract the national citizen to this organisation.<sup>67</sup> Unfortunately, for over 20 years the GPC Charter has remained static and unchanged. The GPC leadership never tried to update it in order to adapt to recent changes in the national, regional and international environments.

Although northern opposition parties already existed in the North and was strengthened in 1979, the impact of the GPC was immediate and detrimental to their groupings in the shafais area.<sup>68</sup> The YAR had many political parties working covertly in the 1970s.<sup>69</sup> The major five parties were amalgamated in February 1976 under a single centralised party called the NDF which later incorporated other parties and became known as in 1979 “the Yemeni Peoples’ Unity Party” (YPUP) - colloqually nicknamed as Hoshi<sup>70</sup> was formed after addition of some other opposition parties. The NDF/YPUP was a revolutionary party inspired and supported by the YSP in the South.<sup>71</sup> The moderate ideology of the GPC was more realistic to northern tribal region in its southern part than that of the opposition. As the formal political vehicle of the state, the GPC enjoyed unprecedented access to economic, material and national media support.

The opposition leadership, many of whom were residing/working in the PDRY, were not qualified enough to carry out the required political activities, particularly within tribal communities. Their exile in Aden undermined the revolutionary gestures by which they could have organised a powerful opposition front in the North.<sup>72</sup> However, that made the GPC at an advantaged position to work among nationals in all regions effectively and within a short time it enjoyed more popularity in the opposition areas than expected.

#### **2.3.1.5.2 President Ali Saleh and the Unification Process**

The unification process was a necessary move to preserve the political stability of the YAR, in particular with respect to the Northern opposition working

against their regime from the neighbouring state. The establishment of the GPC was not sufficient for the Northern regime to attain political peace with the Southern leadership. Although the YPUP had weak support in the YAR, especially in the upper-land and western regions, its support from outside did cause the Northern regime many problems.<sup>73</sup> The only solution was to revive the unification process which brought the threat of the YPUP's agenda to an end. The period 1988-1990, therefore, witnessed active unification programmes and activities drawing the two states together.<sup>74</sup> Thus, President Saleh had to work on two fronts simultaneously, namely to build the GPC and to forward unification moves with the South.

### **2.3.2 Political Developments in the PDRY**

The dramatic political developments that took place in the PDRY over the period 1968-1989 could be mainly attributed to two major factors. The first factor relates to the socialist and leftist policies of the PONF/YSP. The second factor lies in Ismail's mentality who was originally a northern shafai and felt the need to solve the northern Shafai problem in order to attain political weight in the northern regime equivalent to that of their Zaydi brothers in the central political power structures of the YAR.

Below, we shall examine critically the inter-relationship of these two factors, as well as other related issues in the two national administrations of both the political organisation and the state apparatuses.

#### **2.3.2.1 The Presidency of Qahtan Al-Sha'abi (1967-1969)**

President Qahtan Al-Sha'abi was the first President of South Yemen, which was then called the Peoples Republic of South Yemen (PRSY). He was an Egyptian-educated agriculture engineer.<sup>75</sup> He was the Chairman of the Executive Office of the NLF, representing the Nationalists faction (MAN).<sup>76</sup> Prior to the independence of the South, he was advisor to President Al-Sallal on Southern affairs.<sup>77</sup>

President Qahtan Al-Sha'abi was a member of the Arab National Movement, which explained his moderate views in the NF.<sup>78</sup> He failed to exert influence on the NF to run along more moderate lines. As the NLF (the National Liberation Front) members who were struggling in the South for independence were dependent upon the Socialist Bloc for their munitions, many of them were understandably influenced by socialist policies.<sup>79</sup> President Al Sha'abi made an attempt to cleanse the army of these left-wing figures in March 1968, but failed.<sup>80</sup> In June 1969 he was arrested and put in prison by the left-wing groupings. This coup became known as 'the Corrective Movement' - *Al-khatwah Al-tas'hiyah*.<sup>81</sup>

### **2.3.2.2 The Presidency of Salem Rubayye'a Ali (1969-1978)**

Following the 22nd June 1969 coup, the PONF elected Salem Rubayye'a Ali as President of the PDRY, while Abdul-Fattah Ismail was elected Secretary-General for the Executive Office of the PONF.<sup>82</sup>

During the period 1969-1978 serious political developments took place jeopardising not only local stability in the PDRY but also the Yemeni unification process. The country experienced, at later stages, strong conflicts that marred the Southern leadership with bloody crises - as quoted by Ali Nasser Moh'd - an ex-PDRY President when he became in exile.<sup>83</sup> However, this shall be examined later below in the following subsections.

President Rubayye'a was executed following the assassination of President Al-Ghashmi of the YAR. This event is explained in detail in Chapter Three. The removal of the moderate nationalists from the NF did not end disputes among the PDRY leadership. Below, I shall briefly discuss the factors that caused the instability in the Southern leadership.

#### **2.3.2.2.1 The Northern Shafais in the PONF/UPONF**

President Rubayye'a was noted to be a very pragmatic Southern statesman



who wanted to mobilise the Southern nation objectively and with stability, and protect the south from tensions with the North or with neighbouring states.<sup>84</sup> He was dissatisfied with the extreme policies of the Secretary-General in internal affairs.<sup>85</sup> As he lacked the support of the majority of the polit-bureau members, he had to employ extreme measures to show his militancy and dedication to the revolutionary measures as compared to his colleagues in the polit-bureau. Rubayye'a and some of his regional fellows in the polit-bureau such as 'Muqbel' adopted the Chinese methods as their model in the state's policies. He thus initiated the 7-days uprising against the feudal landowners (who were already out of the country) whereby Southern peasants took over the land for cultivation.<sup>86</sup> Rubayye'a's aim was to give more benefits to Southerners in their regions before the Northern Shafais in the Southern leadership did so under the so called "left measures" for the enhancement of the Yemeni Revolution. The flow of Northern Shafais to the South was remarkable, and it was illegal to stop them. Rubayye'a foresaw the consolidation of Ismael's power in the South through them. He was dissatisfied with northerners' practices of recruiting more Northern Shafais in the PONF in order to gain control of the political organisations. He, therefore, found the chinese model appealed to him whereby he could express revolutionary attitudes and gesture and putting the southerners' working class and peasants on advantageous positions on their own soils. Without such revolutionay measures, Rubayye'a would have been eliminated at much earlier time by Ismael and his Soviet fellows for the policy confrontations he used to show in the polit-bueau meetings.

Furthermore, as the country was launching a serious investment programme, Northern Shafais, some of whom were in key positions in the Cabinet and in the PONF/UPONF, were heavily recruiting fellow immigrant Northern Shafais; thus increasing the political weight of their leaders in the capital and in sectors.<sup>87</sup> Rubayye'a took some measures to counter this phenomenon, and aimed to stabilise regional development across the country and give priorities of employment in the regions to their people.<sup>88</sup> He initiated some 'Presidential Projects' under presidential supervision to push ordinary northerners in Aden

to go back home.<sup>89</sup>

At the political level, although the presence of northern Shafais in the capital Aden was historical, the presence of the northern radical elements in the political power in Aden was damaging to the Southern political profile, particularly because of their extreme left views. With Ismail as the head of the PONF/UPONF, North Yemen distrusted the Southern leadership. The adoption of extreme policies internally and externally caused many unnecessary conflicts with the North and other neighbouring states.<sup>90</sup> Above all, the political recruitment of northern Shafais in the PONF and the political security sector, which was directed by a member from the Northern elite (Mohsen), gave more political power to Ismail at that period.<sup>91</sup> In practical terms, Mohsen was the most important Shafai figure and being groomed by the East German security experts for the Southern leadership. He was the ultimate manipulator for the northern Shafais interest politically and economically as he was having an upper hand on strategic sectors (except the military sector) through his political security organisation.

On this Northern/Southern account, political frictions arose between Ismael and Rubayye'a. Many writers wrongly identified the conflict as personal or ideological.<sup>92</sup> In fact, the conflict between the two leaders stemmed from the Northern Shafais' attempt to dominate the PDRY's policies. The researcher witnessed many of these conflicts in practical policies between the state's and party's leadership throughout the seventies and the eighties.

The strong position of the Northern Shafais came about through a political development in the mid seventies, namely the amalgamation of two small local parties [the Syrian Baath and the Marxist parties (named Al-Talee'aah and Ittihad Al-Shabiba respectively)] with the PONF.<sup>93</sup> This was pushed strongly by Ismail and his Northern faction and was not much favoured by Rubayye'a and some Southerners. Rubayye'a and his Southern faction soon realised Ismail's aim. The latter wanted to consolidate his political power via the Northern Shafai elements in the leadership of these two parties, such as

Abdul-Ghani Abdu-Qader, Othman Abdul-Gabbar Rashed, Farooq Ali Ahmed, Abdul-Kasim Shamsan and others in lower hierarchies. The membership of these parties contained many of the socialist and Arab countries' graduates.<sup>94</sup> Ismail's faction did not find difficulty in bringing over to his side many of those of northern origin in these parties and other independent northern cadres in Aden. However, Ismail, found it very difficult to persuade some of northern/Adeni British graduates to be on his side. The majority of the British graduates of northern origin did not accept extreme leadership of any faction, though there were odd ones such as Dr Amin Nasher.<sup>95</sup>

The two local parties; Al-Talea'ah and Ittihad Al-Shabibah had gained some momentum in Aden city and most of their members were of northern origin.<sup>96</sup> Rubayye'a and other southerners in the polit-bureau agreed to incorporate these two parties within the PONF but with a power-voting system 2:1:1 i.e. 2 votes for PONF members and one vote for other party members in the political set-ups.<sup>97</sup> In October 1975, the PONF became UPONF (The United Political Organisation of the National Front) with the amalgamation of these two parties. The Northern Shafais' recruitment via those parties had served the interest of Ismail as shall be explained later.

#### **2.3.2.2.2 The Impact of the Scientific Socialist Ideology on the State's Policies**

The PDRY adopted the ideology of scientific socialism for its state policies, which were strongly backed by the Soviet Union and the Socialist Bloc.<sup>98</sup>

The Soviet Union and the Socialist Bloc stood by the leftists who supported Ismail rather than supporting Rubayye'a.<sup>98</sup> Very few Southerners sided with Rubayye'a, despite him having a vested interest in national issues by virtue of being the President of the State. The Dale'a and Radfan bloc in the polit-bureau were interior and defence personnel who had strong links with the Soviets and the East Germans. They resented his interventions in their sectors, particularly when he was in charge of political supervision on the military

sector. Rubayye'a's role as a Preseident of the State compelled him to adopt moderate attitudes to be able to fulfil the functions of state. For example, various executive authorities such as those supervising power plants and agricultural machinery stations needed spare parts from western countries or Japan which was not approved by many polit-bureau members.<sup>99</sup> Also, the political affairs of the state required the strengthening of political ties with the Gulf and other Arab states. Such matters were not favourably received by the leftists.<sup>100</sup> The President thus had to strive hard to obtain PONF/UPONF approval, otherwise he was accuse of being nothing more than an opportunist leftist if he acted without consultation.

The scientific socialist ideology, unfortunately, was very much used by the northern shafais not only to cripple the progress of the state and the President's integrity, but was also used to hinder the unification process from progressing smoothly.<sup>101</sup> Being turned into a common enemy to both states' leaderships, it was not in the interests of the Northern Shafais to achieve a unification for Yemen between the two leaderships: Southerners in the South and the Zaydis in the North, as this would effectively leave the Northern Shafais powerless.

The Soviets and other experts in the security and defence institutions played a great role in making the Southern elite adhere to Soviet ideology in their functions.<sup>102</sup> This rendered the unification process unfeasible as planned, and did not allow good diplomatic ties to develop with neighbouring states (See Chapter 3).

#### **2.3.2.2.3 Relations with the YAR and other Arab Countries**

During Rubayye'a's Presidential term, the relations with the North and other Arab countries were generally cold. In compliance with its left views, the PONF/UPONF leadership changed the constitution and the name of the country from PRSY to PDRY.<sup>103</sup> The 1970 Constitution emphasised the democratic national path of the state and described its alliance with the

Socialist Bloc as its destiny.<sup>104</sup> Therefore, the YAR leadership was suspicious because of these socialist lines. The result was a military confrontation in September 1972 along the borders of the two Yemeni states (see chapter 3).

The relations with the north were not normal in view of the changing policies of the southern leadership which kept revolutionary measures and policies exacerbant internally and externally. Some critical incidents took place concomitant with the escalated left views of the PONF/UPONF. The bombing of an aircraft carrying 30 local ambassadors on a field visit to Socotra Island in April 1973 was one of the major incidents orchestrated by the leadership.<sup>105</sup> The ex-Premier, Mohamed Ali Haytham, fled and sought refuge in Egypt as he felt that he was targeted for his moderate views within the radical leadership.<sup>106</sup> Rubayye'a was blamed internally and externally as a head of the state for these incidents while the figure behind the so-called scientific socialist ideology, General Secretary Ismail, was away of criticism, though he was the prime cause for the high tensions in the region for adherence to such ideology.

Owing to these political problems, the unification process was almost stagnant apart from what followed from one visit made by Rubayye'a to the North in 1977. This visit was made by the Southern President in an attempt to push forward a Unification programme.

Rubayye'a gained Al-Hamdi's trust and both men developed a mutual understanding. They aimed to carry out the unification process within a short period of time and with a minimum of formalities<sup>107</sup>. Furthermore the two leaders prepared a federal unity and were ready to announce it in October 1977.<sup>108</sup> However, two days before the announcement, Al-Hamdy was assassinated as will be explained in chapter 3. In retaliation for the latter's assassination, Rubayye'a arranged for the assassination of the Northern President - Al-Ghashmi - which led to his own execution within two days.

The relations between the PDRY and other Arab and Islamic states were

characterised by coolness. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) was regarded as the most important neighbouring state because of the substantial presence of Yemeni emigrants there.<sup>109</sup> The Gulf states came a close second for the same reason, and then other Arab countries followed. Owing to its socialist policies, the PDRY did not have any diplomatic relations with its neighbours in the Gulf countries until 1976, when Rubayye'a challenged that situation and flew the KSA flag on PDRY soil at the opening of diplomatic relations with the KSA. The UPONF Secretary-General was dissatisfied with such ties particularly when they were extended to most other Gulf countries.<sup>110</sup> On the other hand, some Arab states - apart from those which sponsored radical Arab movements - including those with arab nationalists policies such as Iraq and Egypt were unhappy with the PDRY's policies. Indeed, Rubayye'a contributed to the improvement of the PDRY profile as an Arab nationalist country.

Similarly, Rubayye'a preserved the profile and integrity of Islam in the country before the world.<sup>111</sup> The PDRY participated in all Islamic conferences and political events, and extended its ties with non-Arab Muslim countries.

### **2.3.2.3 Abdul-Fattah Ismail**

It is important to separate Ismail's leadership as Secretary-General of the PONF/UPONF (1969-1978) from that of the period between 1978 and 1980 when he held the two most important posts - the Secretary-General of the YSP and President of the State of PDRY- at the same time. This separation is necessary to assess his capacity in leading the Southern state, an area from which he did not originate.

#### **2.3.2.3.1 Abdul Fattah Ismail, as Secretary-General of PONF/UPONF 1969-78**

Throughout his career as the Secretary-General of the PONF and then of the UPONF, Abdul Fattah Ismail caused significant tensions both internally and externally. He caused tensions amongst the Southern leadership inside the

PDRY, and between the PDRY and its neighbours.<sup>112</sup> The reason for these tensions was his strong adherence to the 'Scientific Socialist Ideology' and his attempt to apply it to the conservative society of the Arabian Peninsula.

Despite the approval of the overall Southern leadership to this leftist ideology, many elements in the Southern leadership still found it cumbersome in application. The religious background of the people and the need for a constant supply of spare parts for equipment were difficult day-to-day aspects with which the newly laid down rigid ideology failed to cope with. The state leadership, Salem Rubayye'a and Ali Nasser, were often in disagreement with Ismail because of the hardships they faced in running the affairs of state.<sup>113</sup> Bad relations with neighbouring states also resulted from the adoption of the ideology. Furthermore, the unification process was often handicapped by the escalation of the left ideology in the South which sponsored all opposition movements in the north and else in the region.<sup>114</sup>

There was, however, a strong underlying motive for Ismail's strong adherence of 'Scientific Socialist Ideology'. He believed that this was the means whereby Northern Shafais would come together and form a strong front, either to bring down the long-lasting Zaydi rule, or to form a third Yemeni republic for the northern shafais.<sup>115</sup> The perception was that the only way for the Northern Shafais, who constituted the majority in Yemen, to gain political power was to adhere to this ideology while Ismail was in power in the South. The grouping around Ismail discussed the shape and the name of the new Yemeni Republic among themselves and the project was launched, but it did not achieve its aims.<sup>116</sup>

From Ismail's point of view, the unification process could not be achieved in the absence of the Northern Shafais as a third Yemeni power. The existing unification process was taking place between the leaderships of the two states: the Southerners in the South and the Zaydis in the North. The emphasis on scientific socialism in Southern programmes was the instrument which would bring in the third dimension. Several PONF/UPONF programmes and writings

by the Secretary-General called for the completion of the 'Democratic Revolution Stages in Yemen', by which he meant that the North had to reach the position that the Southern state had attained.<sup>117</sup> Ismail emphasised that only when North Yemen had undergone this transformation could the unification of Yemen be undertaken on an equal political footing (see Chapter 3).

#### **2.3.2.3.2 Abdul Fattah Ismail as Secretary-General of the YSP and President of the PDRY 1978-80**

Following the execution of President Rubayye'a in October 1978, Ismail became President of the PDRY, in addition to being Secretary-General of the UPONF, a ploy that was employed in order to diffuse the political tensions which arose from having different figures in the two posts.<sup>118</sup> There had often been political disputes between the top two figures as explained above. Academic observers, such as Halliday and Kostiner had interpreted these disputes as being personal, tribal or ideological<sup>119</sup> but the fundamental issue behind these disputes was the establishment of a base of political power for the Northern Shafais in the PDRY.<sup>120</sup> Ismail felt the need to pursue this objective at any cost while Rubayye'a thought of it as a long lasting problem which needed time to be solved, but not at the expense of the interest of Southerners and the political profile of the country.

It was these unnecessary arguments in the political leadership which led Ismail and the Soviet advisers to reach an agreement that the two posts should be held by one figure.<sup>121</sup> Ismail, therefore, was the first figure to hold both of the top posts of the Southern leadership and he himself was from the North. This showed Southern flexibility and dedication to Yemeni integration, though this action was admittedly only under a Southern flag.

As President of the State, Ismail had a negative impact on the effective running of the functions of the state. His private secretary - Mr Fahdl Mohsen (a Southern brother-in-law) - and his Northern staff at the Presidency could not do much to help him in placing the affairs of state on sound basis. This



resulted in delays in formulating projects and fulfilling agreements, and caused stagnation in many other affairs of the state.<sup>122</sup> It also created frustrations in many governmental departments and among the Southern elite. As a result of this, most of the functions of state were either diverted to the Premier to deal with or left unsolved.<sup>123</sup>

Obsessed with the Northern Shafais problem, Ismail sought to pressurise the Southern military and security forces to allow Northern Shafais to be integrated into their organizations in high positions.<sup>124</sup> This, however, was rejected by the military and security leaders, and Ismail became frustrated at being unable to gain a military basis for his Northern Shafai faction. His inability to have full control over the military forces in the South weakened Ismail politically and led to the paralysis of virtually every other aspect of the state.<sup>125</sup>

Ismail had limited administrative experience or skill. He had had a short period of experience as Vice-Minister for the Ministry of Culture,<sup>126</sup> but, when he was Secretary-General, he was mainly concerned with meeting delegations of socialist countries and representatives of Arab nationalist movements such as Nayef Hawatamah, George Habash and Fawaz Tarrabulsi.<sup>127</sup> He was never involved in the more practical affairs of the state which required YSP attention. He depended mainly on his colleagues from the Northern faction within the Cabinet such as A.Aziz Abdul-Wali ( Minister of Planning and of Industry), Mahmoud Ushaish (Minister of Communication) and his brother in law Fadhl Mohsen who was (Minister of Finance) and became his private secretary in the presidency. These individuals used to brief him mainly on Southerners' activities rather than on the practical problems of their sectors. The researcher had several meetings with Ismail in his office and his family residence and pointed out the dangerous actions undertaken by his colleagues in their ministries but it was obvious that he was not looking for an informed voice on any matter other than the Shafai problem.<sup>128</sup> The Northern/Southern problem that prevailed in Southern society may be attributed to Ismail's attitude, approach and work methodology.

The 1979 war on the Yemeni border against the YAR regime revealed Ismail's failing as a Northern leader of the Southern state. The YAR regime at that time had a new leadership under Colonel Ali Abdulla Saleh of the Hashed tribe.<sup>129</sup> He was young and inexperienced in dealing with state responsibilities. At this time, the South had a well-established military force.<sup>130</sup> Ismail wanted to seize this opportunity to establish Shafai power in the North by using the Southern military forces. War broke out in February 1979 between the two states on all fronts following a minor incident in the Beidh-Mukairas borders among low-ranking soldiers of the two states<sup>131</sup> (see chapter 3 for details). The Southern forces occupied five Northern positions inside the YAR but pulled out after regional protests and threats against the PDRY.

The Northern Forces learned their lesson and would not again consider military harassment against Southern soldiers along the borders. According to Kostiner the Soviets too thought the same, and thought the incident was too minor to have a long-term impact. But to Ismail, this was not the case. He had wanted the Southern forces to go as far as Dhamar and cut off the major road which connected the Zaydi areas from the Shafais'. It was this incident which caused the Southern military leadership not to provide further support for Ismail in the polit-bureau for radical policies against the North.<sup>132</sup>

As it became clear to the military leadership in the South that Ismail might cause further tensions between the two Yemeni regimes, Brigadier Ali Anter, Minister of Defence, put him under house arrest until he was moved to Moscow in June 1980 for "medical reasons".<sup>133</sup> Ismail, was moved politically out of his position by the central committee which voted for his removal out of his two posts. However, He returned in March 1985 and subsequently regained a leadership position: in the Third YSP Conference in (October 1985) he became a polit-bureau member. He was killed during the 1986 civil war by the marine forces which captured him from a military tank after being escaped from the massacre hall of the polit-bureau members on the 13th, January 1986.

#### **2.3.2.4 Ali Nasser Mohammed, Secretary-General of the YSP, President of the PDRY and a Premier (1980-1985)**

Between 1980 and 1985, the political arena was beset with internal problems that owed their origins to two major causes, one domestic and one external. The first was the direct clash between Ali Nasser and other factional groups in the YSP. The second cause related to the impact of perestroika on South Yemen and the implications this held for the socialist orientation of the state.

The clash between Ali Nasser and his opponents stemmed from Ali Nasser lacking a charismatic character which would enable him to bring all factions in the YSP together into a unified political platform. Instead, he became involved in clashes with many of the political and military factions. He had succeeded in his past position as Premier of State because President Rubayye'a set all the policies of the state which he only had to follow. Ali Nasser as President left matters to be run by members of his faction whom together he could not control.

Below, we shall examine critically the political developments in the South during the Ali Nasser era, as briefly explained above.

##### **2.3.2.4.1 Divisions in the Political Leadership**

Political dynamics in this period were marked by divisions among the political elite. These divisions were both of an ideological and policy-related type which became concomitant to the political organisation, namely the YSP in the south. Although differences were often expressed in ideological terms, this did not mean that factional groupings did not have personnel differences and ambitions among the *comrades*. It is important to note that Ali Nasser adopted a practice which previous leaders had not used, namely the elimination of his opponents in the YSP.

The hard-liners in the party, however, did not support the moderate policies, which were often pursued without the YSP's consent. Impediments, therefore, started to be raised against state policies. Military figures in the party's leadership were always aligned with the hard line as they were closely in touch with military experts from the Socialist Bloc (Soviet, Cuban, and East German) in their daily work. The Northern faction in the party encouraged the differences between the left and right wings among the Southerners. Northern factions also continued, through all channels, to support the Northern opposition, represented by the NDF organisation. The leftist alliance enabled the party to stand against the state administration. Despite his control of state affairs, Ali Nasser was weak in the party leadership because of his many differences with Southern groups in the party. We shall now consider the rival groups and the procession of events in his era.

#### 2.3.2.4.1.1 Rival Groups

The principal groups that competed for power at the central committee and polit-bureau levels were regionally based as follows:

- a. *The Modia-Lawder faction*, headed by Ali Nasser.<sup>134</sup> The most active political members in this factional group were:

Mohamed Ali Ahmed	member of the central Committee, Governor of Abyan.
Mohamed S.Nasser	member of the central committee and Minister of Agriculture
Alawi Farhan	member of the central committee, Vice-Minister of State Security.

Hadi A. Nasser

member of the central committee. YSP Secretary of Aden region

This group was characterised by its moderate views and for its involvement in practical affairs of state rather than purely ideological matters.<sup>135</sup>

- b. *The Dhale'a-Redfan factional group* headed by Staff Colonel Ali Anter (ex-Minister of Defence minister - Vice-President in 1980-85).<sup>136</sup>

The basic political associates of this faction were:

Staff-Colonel Saleh Musleh

polit-bureau member and Defence Minister.

Colonel Ali Shaye'a

polit-bureau member and YSP secretary for defence affairs

Saif Munasser

member of the Central Committee and Secretary of YSP for Lahj region.

This factional group represented the rigid leftist views of the YSP. Due to their ideological disposition the members played a marginal role in the daily affairs of the state.<sup>137</sup>

- c. *The Yafe'a Group*. This was distinguished for the following: firstly, the group contained the largest tribal faction in terms of population; secondly, its support was distributed over many areas, with a concentration in Lahj and Abyan, and not confined to one area, like the above-mentioned factions.<sup>138</sup> The Yafe'a faction in Hadhramout alone constituted between 25-30% of the Hadhrami population.<sup>139</sup> Some of this group sided with Ali Nasser, but the majority of the Yafe'a faction

opposed him. The most active members in the polit-bureau were:

Salem Saleh Mohammed	polit-bureau member and YSP Secretary
Saleh Munasser Al-Seyilli	polit-bureau member and YSP Secretary
Mohammed Saleh Mutee'a	polit-bureau member and Foreign Minister

While the former showed signs of moderation from time to time, the latter stuck firmly to his ideological principles.<sup>140</sup> The third, however, did not last long for he was executed by Ali Nasser, as shall be explained below.

Other factional groups in the the central committee of the YSP such as the Hadhramis, the Adenese, the shabwanies and others were divided into supporters of factional group (a) the right/moderate views, or to factional group (b) - the left views. Other factions, especially of the two local parties within the YSP, the Hadhramis and the Adenese such as Al-Dali, Al-Attas, Badeeb, Anis and others were divided into supporters of right/moderate views (group a), or left views (group b). In the polit-bureau, Ali Salem Al-Beidh sided with (group b), and Colonel Ahmed Musaed, Minister of State for Security sided with (group a). Anis H.Yehya and Ali Badeeb both sided with (group a). Despite Ali Salem Al-Beidh originating from Hadhramout, very few Hadhramis in the YSP offered him support. Al-Attas, remained impartial, but deep inside he was with the left, group (b), who pushed his nomination to premiership at later stage. Colonel Ahmed Musaed of Shabwa was tribally minded but district-wise, his tribe was closer to modia region than Dale'a or Radfan regions.

The absence of Ismail from office did not diminish the role of the Northern faction in the YSP. Fadhle Mohsen, the brother-in-law of Ismail, and

Mohammed Saeed Abdulla 'Mohsen' allied with the Dhale'a-Radfan group and sought rival intensity between the two major southern groups.

#### 2.3.2.4.1.2 The Procession of Events

Ali Nasser committed his first serious mistake with the elimination of the Foreign Minister Mohammed Saleh Mutee'a.<sup>141</sup> Mutee'a was one of the oldest NLF members in the YSP, coming from a powerful Yafe'a tribe. He had been in the Foreign Ministry for nine years and was experienced figure in the foreign policy of the state as he was concomitant with all political developments of the country. The researcher believed that Mutee'a was highly intelligent figure in the southern leadership as he was manipulating all internal and external policies with the ex-southern president, Rubayye'a. Mutee'a, however, showed his direct ambition to take up the premiership from Ali Nasser when the later would take up the two top posts of the YSP and the state.<sup>142</sup> This proposal was not welcomed by Ali Nasser.<sup>143</sup> The Northern faction sought to intensify differences between the two southern figures by disclosing the danger of Mutee'a's ambitions after becoming a premier.<sup>144</sup> Ali Nasser sought the earliest chance to move Mutee'a away and had him convicted for national treason while Ali Anter, the second on command in the state, was absent.

After a visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in 1980, Mutee'a was accused of treason.<sup>145</sup> The accusation was based on his absence for 2-3 hours from the delegation while it was in the Kingdom. Mutee'a was imprisoned for a few months and then sentenced to death in February 1981.<sup>146</sup> In an interview with the researcher, Al-Sayilli, Minister of State Security, confirmed that Mutee'a was innocent. He authorised Mutee'a's file to be passed to Ali Nasser in order to show the proof of his innocence. However, Ali Nasser opted for Mutee'a's execution when Ali Anter, who was second in command of the polit-bureau, was visiting India.<sup>147</sup> Ali Anter was then holding the vice-president post in the state and was a strong person to let personal verdicts to override on such polit-bureau members. He was terribly upset by the

execution of Mutee'a in his absence.

Ali Nasser also made another mistake within the Yafe'a faction when he imprisoned Hussein Qumatah, the chief of the Militia in the state. Following the imprisonment of Mutee'a, Qumatah was imprisoned in fear of committing military assault on Ali Nasser for the tribal bonds that were implicated between the two. Qumatah was reported to have been found strangled in his cell in the prison in 1981.

Ali Nasser's second major mistake was to gain the enmity of Ali Salem Al-Beidh whom he dismissed from the YSP Central Committee because of a Family Law violation.<sup>148</sup> Mrs Al-Beidh (first wife) had complained to Ali Nasser about her husband's breach of the Family Law by a second marriage. As Secretary-General of the YSP, Ali Nasser dismissed Al-Beidh from the central committee in a special session in 1982.

In the following year, Ali Nasser eliminated A.Aziz A.Wali from the polit-bureau. Admittedly, A.Aziz A.Wali of Northern origin, was a troublesome and often impetuous decision-maker within the polit-bureau, especially throughout the 1970's.<sup>149</sup> However, he was one of Ismail's political pillars. Between 1975 and 1977, A.Aziz A.Wali held two ministries and was renowned for formulating and implementing *ad hoc* decisions.<sup>150</sup> In the July, 1980's Ali Nasser removed him from office and despatched him to the GDR for 'studies'.<sup>151</sup> In 1982 and early 1983, he was spotted visiting Mohamed Saeed Abdulla the ambassador to Bulgaria; both figures had maintained their contacts with Ismail in Moscow.<sup>152</sup> In June 1983, news was received that A.Aziz A.Wali had died of excessive drinking. It was later discovered that he had been poisoned by Yemeni security in co-ordination with GDR security.<sup>153</sup> As the security apparatus was responsible solely to Ali Nasser, he was implicated in the death of A.Aziz A.Wali.<sup>154</sup>

The above mistakes committed by Ali Nasser, had opened a wide opposition front in his face by these southern factions particularly that of Yafais and



Hadhramis beside the Dal'ees and the Redfanis. He practically started a new fragmentation era of southern leadership. The Northern Shafais, though had their share in the leadership fragmentation, they were not directly targeted as southerners within themselves. Regional groupings among southern leaderships could easily be detected in official institutions, streets, occasions and formal meetings at all levels. The Yafais, the Dalees and the Radfanees were constituting main opposition bloc against Ali Nasser. The Hadhramis were divided between the oppositions and Ali Nasser and the rest apart of the northern faction were with Ali Nasser.

With the emergence of these opposition fronts, Ali Nasser was compelled to depend upon his own faction, thus occasionally involved turning a blind eye to their defects. The majority of the top positions within the central and regional governments were awarded to members of his faction or to their close supporters.<sup>155</sup> However, in the southern system, no power centre can change the administrative step-up entirely into its favour, though it can partly influence its composition. For example, no premier or president can make all cabinet posts of his faction or region. There was bound to have cabinet posts from all factions and regions. However, there were no members of the Dhale'a-Redfan group in civilian cabinet posts or among regional governors as they were substantially predominant in the security and military force; but they feel that there was a need to be in the civil service as well. There were, however, 5 ministers of Northern origin in the cabinet posts who were like some southern oppositions were not on Ali Nasser side.<sup>156</sup> This aspect of Ali Nasser's rule contributed to rising tensions between the Modia and Dhale'a-Redfan factions.

The major weakness of Ali Nasser's leadership came from his enduring, and at times blind, support of the Modia Lawder faction. One instance where he displayed this support was when Mohammed Ali Ahmed, the Governor of Abyan, was engaging in illegal activities without due accountability from the Secretary-General of the YSP.<sup>157</sup> Mohammed Ali Ahmed imported consumables without formal permission from the authorities concerned.<sup>158</sup> His

aim was to create a Dubai city out of Abyan Governorate. Furthermore, the Governor imported modern weaponry from the international market.<sup>159</sup> This action increased the level of political tension between the rival factions. In general, the affairs of state were loosely monitored, whilst the absence of accountability allowed Ali Nasser's faction to earn political and material capital in terms of capital fortunes, political popularity and sound foreign policies.

With the political developments on the scene, the Dhale'a-Redfan faction did not like the concentration and the misuse of all powers by Ali Nasser. They sought power deregulation to others. With the support of other polit-bureau members of other factions, they succeeded in depriving Ali Nasser from the Premiership and enacted Haider Al-Attas in April 1985.<sup>160</sup> The latter, who was only a member of the central committee, automatically became a polit-bureau member and was regarded as part of the rival faction to Ali Nasser.<sup>161</sup> The faction, defeated Ali Nasser by the same political means, just as they had previously defeated Ismail.<sup>162</sup>

The Dhale'a-Redfan faction, however, failed to identify the difference between Ismail, who never enjoyed a military backing, and Ali Nasser who had at least one third of the military power on his side.<sup>163</sup>

The Third YSP Conference of 1985 further weakened Ali Nasser's position despite his control over some parts of the military and security apparatus. With the return of Ismail and Al-Beidh to the polit-bureau, Ali Nasser did not enjoy the majority of votes within the polit-bureau. The key military leaders belonged to the rival faction.<sup>164</sup> While his critics attacked the lack of accountability within the government, Ali Nasser's faction reinforced these perceptions through their mild policies and negligence of formal responsibilities. This provided an environment in which his critics intensified their grievances.<sup>165</sup>

In view of the majority of the rival faction in the polit-bureau, Ali Nasser was

reluctant to call for the first meeting for the polit-bureau to distribute the new tasks for the fresh period following the third YSP conference. Since October, 1985, until the end of December, 1985, the polit-bureau did not have its weekly schedule in the fear that Ali Nasser might lose another post of his power. Under strong pressure of its members, Ali Nasser called for the meeting on the 2nd of January, 1986 and did not finish it until the 13th of January with the disaster of 1986 factional war among its party members.<sup>166</sup>

#### **2.3.2.4.2 The Impact of Perestroika on PDRY Political Developments**

The restructuring of the political and economic system within the Soviet Union, known as perestroika, not only undermined the coherence of domestic policies in Southern Yemen, but also reinforced the political divisions within the YSP. In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union sought to improve its political relations in the region after 1978 and 1980 party crises in Aden.<sup>167</sup> It encouraged inter-arab relationships of the region and supported South Yemen relations with its neighbours. This relationship with the Soviet Union had been formalised by the Treaty of Brotherhood of 1979.<sup>168</sup> By 1985, perestroika called for the liberalisation of political and economic policies in the Soviet Union and this had a positive impact on Yemeni policies. The private sector was encouraged to engage more actively in the national economy and fixed prices were removed from local production.<sup>169</sup>

The transformation of rigid policies into soft policies served to increase political tension within the YSP. Within the body of Soviet experts, those working within the military sphere appear to have been dissatisfied with the pace and scale of reform taking place within the Soviet Union. They laid emphasis in the articles in the Treaty of 1979 which called for continuing the fight against imperialism from within the international political system. The Dhale'a-Redfan faction similarly placed its faith in the Treaty as a bulwark against the policies adopted by Ali Nasser, which included extending ties with the North and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.<sup>170</sup>

Ali Nasser later claimed that the Soviets had given him the green light to start the 1986 war against the 'radicals'.<sup>171</sup> However, if the Soviets wanted to eliminate radical groups in PDRY, it was surprising that they sent Ismail back and helped in rescuing him and Al-Beidh from the massacre on 13 January 1986.<sup>172</sup> It was this contradictory stance of the Soviets in Aden that gives the impression that there was conflicts within the Soviet leadership, which manifested themselves at the advisory level in the PDRY.

### 2.3.2.5 The 1986 War

With the increasing divisions within the YSP political elite in the early 1980s, open conflict could have occurred at any time.<sup>173</sup> The political tensions between the Modia-Lowder and Dhale'a Redfan factions escalated through the eighties. By 1985, the political situation worsened as the Premiership was taken away from Ali Nasser.<sup>174</sup> The political conditions were aggravated by the return of Ismail and Al-Beidh to the polit-bureau at the third conference of the YSP. Their return challenged Ali Nasser's role as Secretary-General and weakened his platform.<sup>175</sup>

As a result of this political tension, each grouping within the YSP was forced to side with the Modia-Lowder or the Dhale'a-Redfan factions.<sup>176</sup>

#### **Faction**

#### **Principal Bases of Support**

#### ***Modia-Lowder (Ali Nasser)***

Abyan: Modia-Lawder YSP members headed by Mohamed Ali Ahmed. Salem Rubaye'as grouping (Ali Saleh Obad, Abdulla Al-Bar)

Shabwah: all YSP members headed by Ahmed Musaed

Aden: Aden Technocrats only, including those in the Popular Vanguard Party and Popular Democrat Union (Anis Yehya and Ali Badeeb)

Lahj: Lower Lahj YSP members in Al-Hota and Saber area

***Dhale'a-Redfan (Ali Anter)***

Dhalea and Redfan: YSP members headed by Saleh Musleh and Ali Shayea Hadi

Yafei faction:the majority of Yafe'ai faction in the YSP headed by Salem Saleh Moh'd.

Northern Faction: majority of Northern-born members in the YSP.

Ali Salem Al-Beidh, Al-Seyeilli in addition to the majority of Hadhramis in the YSP.

It is important to note that under these conditions there were effectively no "independent" figures. Dr Al-Dali and Haider Al-Attas tried to show an impartial attitude but deep inside they were on the side of the second faction against Ali Nasser. It was natural that Al-Attas to side with Al-Beidh, as both characters sharing Hashmite blood.<sup>177</sup> In his book *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, Halliday labelled both Dr Al-Dali and Al-Attas as neutral in the polit-bureau during the climax of this episode<sup>177a</sup>. In fact they were placed in their positions by their respective factions which expected their support in times of need.

Frustration erupted into war at 09.40 on 13 January 1986, with a series of massacres taking place at all levels within the YSP and the state institutions of

Aden. <sup>178</sup> Between 2 and 12 January, the polit-bureau had held daily meetings in an attempt to resolve the crisis, but they were unable to find an acceptable solution. <sup>179</sup> On the morning of the 13th January, some polit-bureau members arrived at the meeting hall of the Central Committee secretariat at 9.30am. At 9.40am, 5 polit-bureau members were in the hall, these were: <sup>180</sup>

Staff-Colonel Ali Anter	Vice-President of the state
Staff-Colonel Saleh Musleh	Defence Minister
Abdul Fattah Ismail	YSP secretary at the YSP secretariat
Ali Salem Al-Beidh	Minister of Local Administration
Colonel Ali Shayea Hadi	YSP secretary - at the YSP secretariat

Apart from Al-Attas and Al-Dali who were outside Aden, the rest were, by various means, prevented from reaching the hall at that time. <sup>181</sup>

Ali Nasser had remained in Abyan and instructed his Chief Guard to kill the top five figures in the meeting hall. <sup>182</sup> Chief Guard Mobarak and two other guards, undertook the task, but failed to kill Ismail and Al-Beidh as both pretended death for over ten hours and by the time they were leaving the site, Mobarak and other guards ran out of amunitions to kill them. <sup>183</sup>

Two Soviet tanks arrived in the evening to rescue Ismail and Al-Beidh. Each took a tank and few metres ahead they were shelled by Ali Nasser supporters at short distance. Al-Beidh stepped down from the tank and took a pegout car to Basuhaib hospital after being hit in the lower part of his body. <sup>184</sup> Ismail continued his journey in the tank via a road strip leading to the port area where he was taken by the marine forces who cut off his road. In the marine headquarters no news was recieved on him; and was assumed that the marine forces who were in allegiance with Ali Nasser took his life. <sup>185</sup>

Ali Nasser's supporters had been given instructions to eliminate members of the Dhale'a-Redfan faction in all military and civil institutions.<sup>186</sup> As they had no presence in the civilian posts, the Dhale'a-Redfan faction lost most of their experienced figures in the military and the security service, including Ali Kaid Muthana (murdered in his bed at the Aden Refinery Hospital,) who had been a mayor in one of the Dhale'a districts. In all military units, several of the Dhaleis were killed, including those in the Air Force.<sup>187</sup> Within the first 2-3 days of the civil war not less than 4,000 were killed.<sup>188</sup> The majority of these were from the civilian population, who had come from the Dhale'a-Redfan areas to avenge the death of their leaders.<sup>189</sup>

The ultimate outcome of the conflict may be attributed to Tank Commander Haitham Qassem Tahr from Dhale'a. His military strategy was believed to have had altered the final permutation of political power. At the breakout of war, Haitham Qassem sent several tanks one after the other to help his faction down the city centre of Aden by these tanks were successfully ambushed by Ali Nasser faction 2 kilo metres away.<sup>190</sup> Lieutenant Haithem then dispatched another two small tanks (side by side); one was destroyed, but the second tank counter-attacked the strategic area of his opponents.<sup>191</sup> He managed to break through and head to the close of the airports, thus breaking international links for any forthcoming help to Ali Nasser. The new military leadership rolled into the city centre in tanks (with Ali Nasser posters attached to them to add confusion).<sup>192</sup> These tactics brought Ali Nasser's power to an end. It was only then, that the Dhale'a-Redfan faction seized control, but it was won at a heavy price.<sup>193</sup>

As the scale of destruction, in material and human terms, was so great, it took over 3-4 months for the lives of people in Aden, Lahj and Abyan to return to any sense of normality.<sup>194</sup> The military and security institutions had lost between 11,000-12,000 personnel.<sup>195</sup> Corpses were left on streets for days and the country was verging towards an epidemic.<sup>196</sup> The aftermath was even worse than that of the first week. Trials were carried out by the Dhale'a-Redfan faction against the Modia faction.<sup>197</sup> In these trials, 6-8 people were

lined up simultaneously and asked one question: “Where were you on the morning of 13 January”<sup>198</sup> Most likely, his ID card which would show where he came from and thus, which faction he belonged to, and this determined his fate.<sup>199</sup>

Even when the blood revenge was over, the new leadership, headed by Ali Salem Al-Beidh, did not attempt to embrace all political factions in pursuit of the national interest. All those belonging to the Modia-Lowder faction were removed from the civil service.<sup>200</sup> In some cases even those officials who had been non-aligned, such as the researcher, (a deputy Minister), were removed from office by Al-Beidh’s faction.<sup>201</sup> Al-Beidh mixed personal revenge with political orientation and subjected the national interest to personal animosity.

#### **2.3.2.6 Ali Salem Al-Beidh (1986-1990)**

Before we proceed further, it is necessary to provide some personal background of Ali Salem Al-Beidh.

##### **2.3.2.6.1 The Character of Al-Beidh**

Descending from a Hashemite family known for its polygamous lifestyle, Al-Beidh grew up in Hadhramout. He was known to be shrewd and proud of his ‘blue blood’.<sup>202</sup> Al-Beidh’s grandfather married more than ten wives and could not recall all the names of his numerous children. Similarly, Al-Beidh’s father married twenty-one wives who were scattered over many nomadic areas.<sup>203</sup> This familial pattern enabled Al-Beidh to seek shelter whenever he was engaged in troubles or wars.<sup>204</sup>

Al-Beidh went to Ghail Bawazeer Preparatory School and studied under the guidance of his uncle, Salem Hussain Al-Beidh.<sup>205</sup> He finished his ‘City Angels’ certificate in Aden Colony and continued his education at Cairo University. However, he left the university during his second year in order to join the NLF in Aden.<sup>206</sup>



Al-Beidh had a shrewd character, with a strong base in traditional life. He enjoyed spending time with the Bedouin, who gave him the respect he felt he deserved as a descendent of the Hashemite tribe. <sup>207</sup> Before his death, Al-Beidh's father, who was well-known for his astrology, prophesied that his son would encounter bloodshed, but would die a natural death after surpassing such bloodshed. <sup>208</sup>

On a personal level, Al-Beidh was temperamental and moody and this made him vulnerable to political criticism. His self-centred attitude, mixed with a temperamental character, made him a difficult team-player. He found great difficulty expressing himself, and lacked a common understanding with his associates. As a result, he came into conflict with other political leaders, over a variety of issues

- a. Qahtan and Faisal Al-Sha'abi (ex-President and ex-Prime minister of the PRSY), on employing moderate policies in the affairs of state. <sup>209</sup>
- b. Salem Rubaye'a Ali ( ex-President of the Presidential Council of the PDRY), on the management of development plans. <sup>210</sup>
- c. Ali Nasser (ex-General Secretary of the YSP, President of the PDRY and Premier), on open policies and Family Law violation. <sup>211</sup>
- d. Saleh Munasser Al-Seyilli, (ex-YSP Secretary for Hadhramout region), on tribal/factional attitude and policies of the region. <sup>212</sup>

In general, Al-Beidh was never capable of working within a team or group unless he was dictating policy in something resembling a king-slave relationship. <sup>213</sup>

#### **2.3.2.6.2 Al-Beidh's Policies**

Ironically, in contrast to his earlier radical views, Al-Beidh adopted moderate policies after 1986, both internally and externally.<sup>214</sup> Neither the regional nor international arena in this period encouraged Al-Beidh to maintain his radical views while in power.<sup>215</sup> Against the backdrop of perestroika, Al-Beidh had to rethink his strategy and introduce a process of change in accordance with the economic and political processes taking place in the Soviet Union, before it was too late.

Within the rethinking of his strategy, Al-Beidh made three serious policy mistakes which without them he would not be in the assyem.<sup>216</sup> There were three wrong policy aspects Ali Salem Al-Beidh made in his reign: recruitment of a weak Premier for that critical period, recruitment of weak cabinet figures predominantly of northern ministers and wrong proceedings towards the unification process.

### ***1. The character of the Premier, Dr N'oman***

Dr N'oman was described as the least efficient Premier in the PDRY history as he lacked leadership character and high technical capacity to lead the country forward in its worst political and economic conditions. Dr N'oman took the Premier's office in January 1986 at a time when the country was passing through its worst political and economic conditions.<sup>217</sup> Despite his Egyptian and Bulgarian educational background, Dr N'oman did not have sufficient practical experience from his previous careers.<sup>218</sup> He was also unlucky in having the weakest government figures prodominantly of northern Shafais whom had no experience in sectoral leadership neither in the north nor in the south. Worst of all, however, Dr N'oman was observed to be under the influence of a northern elite in the southern leadership, namely, Mohamed Abdulla Saeed, nicknamed as 'Muhsen' whom many of southerners disliked very much.<sup>219</sup> Dr N'oman traded off many of southerners' rights for northerners freshly coming from northern areas and were given southerners' houses, particularly those of the Ali Nasser faction.<sup>220</sup>

## ***2. The northern Shafai ministers in the cabinet (1986-1990)***

To keep loyal to the left faction in the YSP, Al-Beidh recruited from Northern factions who generated unnecessary obstacles to the transformation and integration process for the two Yemens. He was under pressure to remain loyal to his leftist views and to sponsor left groups of the old system. To compensate the northerners for the loss of Ismail, Al-Beidh recruited 8 ministers over four years and dispensed with the only independent southerner, Dr Bin Ghanem, the Minister of Planning.<sup>221</sup>

During this period, the government performance was bad and had a negative impact politically and economically on the state resources and the southern public.<sup>222</sup> There were many reasons for this negative tendency. First, the northern ministers failed to keep up with the southern administration mechanisms.<sup>223</sup> The replacement of southerners with northerners, for example, was intolerable.<sup>224</sup> On account of some employees being of Ali Nasser's faction, many southerners were driven from their posts (the researcher was one) and replaced by northerners from the north and of the Yemen Peoples' Union Party (YPUP).<sup>225</sup> Ministers of Agriculture and Trade & Supply and the Chairman of the Central Statistical Organisation in particular incurred serious damages in their sectors with their factional attitudes and behaviour towards southerners in their regions.<sup>226</sup> Public expenditures for the new northern elite for accommodation, cars, furniture etc., were beyond the capacity of the budget. Cars were taken back and given to newly recruited northerners.<sup>227</sup> In response to factional behaviour, southern frustration increased and so did the public pressure on the southern leadership to solve these problems.<sup>228</sup>

As national problems increased politically and economically, the two top figures, Al-Beidh and Al-Attas, with other members of the southern leadership, thought of the unification process among other things for an escape. The conditions in the PDRY were too bad to be left without intervention.<sup>229</sup>

### *3. The uncalculated unification process*

As pressure continued to mount, Al-Beidh risked the national interests of the South by engaging in an uncalculated unification process. The bad management of the state administration and the deterioration of economic conditions allowed the unification process to revive again against the will of many northerners in the party.<sup>230</sup> It was the Southern leadership which facilitated the process of unification, though within the southerners there were few who objected to the manner by which the unification process was carried out.<sup>231</sup>

There were two reasons, however, for the revival of the unification process: first, to provide cover for new bridging policies that were designed to assist the introduction of economic reform within the country, secondly, to dissipate public frustration by promoting internal migration to the North, thus marking a prelude to unification. Both reasons represented factors of defensive unionism. However, after thorough discussions in the YSP, Al-Beidh took the initiative to continue the unification process where it ended in 1985 and sent Minister of Unification, Rashed Thabet to Sanaa for unification negotiations in 1988. No doubt there were various forces playing their role in taking this decision apart than those above reasons, such as border confrontations around Shabwa and Ali Nasser faction activities in Sanaa through their radio stationed in the north, but these were minor compared to internal pressures of northerner elite behaviour in the strategic sectors and the global changes.

The unification process could well have been studied with regard to the new economic and political parameters in the region. Al-Beidh failed to assess the magnitude of the parameters in terms of population, area, tribal concentration in the north, variational gaps in the administrative and legal structures and many other issues between the two states. He failed even to assess the capacity of his men and their mentality towards the process itself before and after the unification took place. All these shortcomings resulted in a southern catastrophe, particularly after the 1994 war.

## **2.4 Economic Developments in the YAR and the PDRY**

Economic developments in both the YAR and PDRY were formulated according to each state's political ideology. While the YAR opted for the adoption of a market economy approach, the PDRY pursued a developmental plan with a highly centralised economy. A brief description of the major developmental issues of the two states is presented below.

### **2.4.1 Economic Developments in the YAR**

The YAR faced serious challenges in its socio-economic development as it inherited very little from the previous imamate dynasty. It had to create a basic infrastructure for its economy in terms of schools of all levels, medical units and roads in addition to the establishment of the basic institutions which had to administer these infrastructures. In view of its scanty natural resources and limited manpower, this was a formidable challenge to the YAR.

#### **2.4.1.1 The Socio-Economic Plans**

The YAR's developmental policies and programmes commenced in 1972/3 with the launch of the first (Triennial) Plan (1972/3,-75/6), followed by three five year plans.<sup>232</sup> Starting from scratch, the YAR had been unable to collate sufficient raw data to launch a new plan before 1972/3. Internal instabilities and lack of resources over the period 1962 -1972 did not allow the government to formulate an effective investment programme. The Triennial Plan was initially comprised of an investment programme that sought to build basic institutions in the following sectors: agriculture, trade, social services, and roads.<sup>233</sup> Successive plans, all of which were set for the duration of five years, concentrated on roads, manpower training, communications, social services, and the development of industry and trade.<sup>234</sup>

#### 2.4.1.2 Developmental Strategies and Policies

Several features were apparent in the YAR developmental process:

1. The market-economy strategy on which the YAR's developmental process was based did make possible the expansion/transformation of the economy. Economic activities in the YAR expanded at a fast rate during the 1970's and early 1980's.<sup>235</sup> GDP grew in real terms at an annual average rate of 8.7% between 1970 and 1977.<sup>236</sup> Economic growth was strongest in the modern sectors of industry and services. Whilst the share of agriculture declined from 51% in 1970, 45% in 1977, to 22% in 1986, the share of industry and the services sectors increased [IFAD EB 80/10/R.38 C Report No. 0106.YA of July, 1988]. Growth rates in the 1980's, however, were much lower than those in the seventies with an average of 4-5% per annum.<sup>237</sup>
2. The higher growth rates in the YAR, however, were not attributable to good positive economic performance or planning, but to the repatriation of capital from remittances and other official transfers from abroad.<sup>238</sup> The trade accounts exhibited some of the characteristics of a relatively small under-developed country endowed with a narrow domestic resource base covering 2-3% of the YAR imports. With exports lagging behind the rapidly growing imports, the trade deficit exceeded US\$ 700 million in 1976/77 and increased to US\$ 900 million in 1978.<sup>239</sup> The YAR's imports depended heavily and increasingly on private transfers (workers remittances), which increased from US\$ 58 million in 1970 to US\$ 948.9 million in 1976/77.<sup>240</sup> In addition to the remittances, official transfers and capital inflows, mostly received in grant and concessional loan form, increased. As a result, the balance of payments in the current account, which had been in deficit until 1974/75, recorded a surplus in the year of 1975/76.<sup>241</sup> The gross reserve of the YAR in the foreign exchange grew

rapidly to US\$ 1,477 million at the end of 1978, which was equivalent to more than one year's imports.<sup>242</sup>

3. Despite the boom in investments in the 1970's and 1980's, the YAR remained within the category of least developed country. Two plans were launched in the 1970's, namely the Triennial Plan (1973-76) and the First Five-Year Plan (FFYP) (1977-1981) with the objective of supporting more infrastructural projects such as roads, communications and an array of social services.<sup>243</sup> For example, education was expanded at all levels, health services were supplied in urban areas and some rural developmental projects were established to encourage the private sector. The Second Five-Year Plan (SFYP) (1982-86) and the Third Five-Year Plan (TFYP) (1987-91) continued the development theme with a concentration on constructing major roads and developing human and natural resources. But, in spite of the commendable achievements with development, poverty was still prevalent throughout the state. The agricultural workforce which comprised the poorest of the population made up 75% of the resident national workforce. They lived mainly in villages and seldom enjoyed the benefits of electrification, potable water, adequate schooling, or the provision of health services. Income disparity between urban and rural areas widened. Only specific factions/groups benefited from development.<sup>244</sup>
  
4. Despite the encouragement of the private sector, public investment remained dominant in building the national economy, providing employment and social services. Investment data is far from complete because of poor data collection facilities especially for the 1970's, but it is evident that the Northern leadership had encouraged the private sector in terms of credit and other material privileges. While public investment was directed towards infrastructural projects such as communication, social services, and human resources, the private sector cared for real estate, trade and industry and sought to meet consumption demands.<sup>245</sup>

The SFYP (1981-6) was the first formal plan linked to investments. The figures are given in the table below, and they indicate the ratio of public to private investment.

**Investments during the SFYP (1981-6)**

	<b>YR Millions</b>	<b>Actual</b>
Total	28,100	19,296
Investments		
Public	18,433	11,832
Private	9,667	7,464

**Investment in Agriculture**

Total	3,825	2,016
Public	2,470	1,316
Private	1,355	0,700

Source: Ifad Report - EB 80/10/R.38 - 4/8/1980, Rome, September 1980

The above table shows the modest nature of the YAR's investment policy. In the first instance, private investments made a modest contribution to the plan. Secondly, agriculture, which comprised 75-80% of population, attracted only modest investments in both the public and the private sectors, accounting for 10% of the total investment in 1978/9 and 9% in 1984<sup>246</sup>. In general, this investment policy of the YAR, created a basic infrastructure with the added benefit of raising per capita income, and yet



it still fell short in generating self-sustaining economic development.

5. In an effort to overcome its economic difficulties, the Northern leadership revised its fiscal policies.<sup>247</sup> The leaderships' adapted policies did achieve nominal success, but this remained negligible as the necessary structural measures remained outside the economic prescription. During the 1980's, the YAR faced economic difficulties, in particular with its balance of payments and budget deficits. The overall deficit in the balance of payments widened, which led to a decline in the country's foreign exchange reserves.<sup>248</sup> Also, as official budgetary support from oil rich Arab states declined, the government resorted to implementing drastic cuts in funding development. Therefore, imports and foreign exchange rates were revised. The national currency was devalued and imports were restricted. This led to a substantial decline in imports and improvements in the current accounts, but did not produce a structural improvement in the overall balance of payments, let alone the rates of inflation.

The fiscal position, however, reflected the development of the external sector. As customs duties had been the most important source of revenue, the sharp rise in imports boosted government income. Unfortunately, public expenditure increased at more than double the pace of domestic revenues and the overall budgetary position was marked by a widening deficit, reaching 33% of the GDP in 1982, but declining to 20% in 1985.<sup>255</sup> By 1988 the increase in public expenditure, which had risen to 65% of the GDP compared to the previous year (1987), was covered by oil revenues rather than taxation resources.

#### **2.4.2 Economic Developments in the PDRY**

Unlike its sister state, the PDRY was compelled by its own political ideology

to adopt a socially-orientated economy. <sup>249</sup> When South Yemen gained independence from the British after a four year struggle, it only received support from socialist countries. The Soviet Union, China, East Germany, Cuba, and Poland recognised the PRDY immediately, and offered military, political and economic assistance. It was, therefore, important for the newly established state to maintain its socialist orientation. <sup>250</sup>

#### **2.4.2.1 Socio-Economic Plans**

Since proclaiming its centrally planned economy, the PDRY development policies and programmes followed a Triennial Plan (1970-73) and three successive Five-Year Plans. All plans were committed to public investment programmes with the aim of building a sound infrastructure in the productive sectors and the social services with priorities given to the rural areas. <sup>251</sup>

#### **2.4.2.2 Developmental Strategies and Policies**

Several features can be identified from the development process in the PDRY. <sup>252</sup>

1. Whilst the YAR started its development from scratch, the PDRY was more fortunate in that its capital city, the former British Colony of Aden, contained administrative infrastructures, namely Aden Port, the British Petroleum Refinery, banks, and the administration of law. Apart from Aden, however, South Yemen had little infrastructure capable of coping with the projects of development.

As the problems facing the country were substantial, the government adopted a policy of state production investment to cope with the depressed economy and introduced austerity measures in public expenditure. The PDRY adopted a balanced socialistic strategy throughout the country. It

provided a social infrastructure in education and health without regional or factional discrimination. The state leadership provided a link between areas which were scattered over 333,000 km through a network of roads and other communication facilities. Such challenges were beyond the resources of the state and itself which made it dependent upon external aid. Internal austerity measures in fiscal and monetary terms were adopted to circumvent corruption. The Triennial Plan was devoted mainly to roads, communications and the social services sectors. Later on, the state leadership gave priority to production-oriented investment in the First Five-Year Plan, (1974-1978) and onwards. These policies resulted in substantial achievements both with regards to economic and social development. In the wake of planning efforts, total investment expenditure increased from 3% of the GNP in 1972 to 29% in 1978.

2. The comprehensive economic and social plan enabled the country to strengthen its economic infrastructure which provided an important base for further economic growth. The PDRY made considerable socio-economic progress through its successive development plans. Real GDP was estimated to have risen at an average rate of 7% annually during 1974-78, compared to 2% in 1970-73. Sectorally speaking, fisheries comprised 10% of GDP, industry 8% (increasing at 15%p.a.) and agriculture only comprised 12% in 1977, but increased to 16% (including fisheries) in 1988. 40% of the population were engaged in agriculture. The rest would be accounted for other sectors.

There is ample evidence of improvement in the standard of food consumption, which was achieved mainly through higher imports. Formal education expanded rapidly to all provinces and areas (see annexes).

3. In spite of the high investment efforts and spectacular improvement in social indicators, the PDRY remained essentially poor and structurally one of the least developed countries. Until 1978, development plans were balanced between the production-oriented and service-oriented

programmes, whereby basic infrastructures (in roads, education and health) were laid down for further developmental plans. After that, investment plans were mainly diverted to the production sectors with agriculture receiving the lion's share. Owing to the successive wars during 1978-1986, it was common to revise development plans. Such interruptions left a negative impact upon national growth.

4. Although economic growth in the PDRY was primarily attributed to government services and its comprehensive planning and control, the inflow of remittances and external aid played a substantial role. Development activity in the PDRY was based on comprehensive economic and social planning which became an integral part of the political framework. In view of the shortages of skilled manpower and natural resources, the leadership did its utmost to mobilise its available resources. Also, in view of the high dependency on imports for food, consumption items, and for support of development efforts, the inflow of remittances and external aid was important for the developing the country. Exports, excluding petroleum products processed at Aden refineries, were but a fraction of the total imports resulting in a high and widening trade deficit, which was offset by external aid and cash remittances from nationals aboard. Remittances peaked in 1984 at US\$ 480 million and by 1986 had fallen to US\$ 282 million. External aid also declined, and in response to this situation, import restrictions were introduced in 1986 and these helped to cut the deficit from US\$ 261 million in 1984 to US\$ 191 million in 1986.
5. Despite the coherent fiscal policies and instruments utilised by the PDRY, fiscal deficits were maintained in order to achieve development beyond the national resources of the country. Unlike many Arab countries, South Yemen continued to maintain British financial methods. The treasury was an independent body that functioned away from the Ministry of Finance. The Central Bank of Yemen in the South only regulated monetary policies, and implemented no other functions. Public finance, however,

was only linked to development activities in the external sector.

Customs, used as an instrument of fiscal policies, was the most important form of taxation, and therefore the sharp rise in imports boosted government revenue during the early 1980s.

Apart from a few years, however, the overall budgetary position was marked by a wide deficit which continued to expand as the growth in revenue slowed down and expenditure continued to rise particularly after 1986. The deficits in 1985 and 1986, were US\$ 386 million and US\$ 392 million respectively.<sup>261</sup> The larger part of the deficit was financed through external aid and borrowing. The local currency was then over-valued, but no attempt was made to devalue it (DYD 1 = 2.98 US\$).

No doubt the PDRY engaged in a development programme beyond its limited natural resources. However, its limited population allowed it to achieve major part of its infrastructural programmes within a relatively short time.

## **2.5 Assessment and conclusion of the political and economic developments in the two former Yemeni states**

There is no doubt that there were inter-relations between the ex-YAR and the ex-PDRY political structure and development, though many of these came about in reaction to each-other's policies. The political developments in the ex-YAR in the 1970's were very conservative and of a highly tribal nature. The YAR leadership - apart from that of the Al-Hamdi period - looked suspiciously at PDRY policies internally and externally. The southern policies were manoeuvred to address the historic zaydi/shafai problem - by the Northern shafai faction in the southern leadership. This, indirectly, resulted in a political rift among the southern leadership in both the party and the state administrative framework. The southerners worked for the southern interest, using socialist policies as instruments; and the northern faction in the party

were looking for political power for the northern shafais in the north by using social instruments to bring down the Zaydi rule in the north. It was this mental attitudes of tribalism and factionalism in the two states which made the political developments of the two states inter-related.

Natural forces, no doubt, helped in enabling tribal and factional mentalities to develop at the expense of national interests. There were social and economic factors which led Zaydi rule to operate tribally. The republican regime in 1962 came to power in a country with a raw tribal background and no infrastructure in its regions to support an effective change in its mentality and attitudes in the rule. President Al-Hamdi tried hard to bring about an effective change in the northern community, but the tribal background of the whole community was much stronger than the impact of his reforms.

The southern leadership, which was much more cohesive though with more tribal/factional groups than the north, witnessed some tribal and factional clusters in its power centre. In the military set-up, for example, tribal clusters existed in the higher hierarchies, which were dominated by mountain habitants, namely the Dhale'a, Radfan, and Yafe'a. Also, for over half of the period of the ex-PDRY, the presidency was in the hands of Abyanis (Rubayye'a and Nasser). Because of the presidential figures, some Abyanis gained senior posts in the military set-up. The left party policies were effectively maintained by the northern faction in the policy-making power under a southern flag. So, there was an *ad hoc* political mixture in the southern political system. The researcher discussed with the leadership the absence of Dhalees and Radfanis in the civil system. She deduced that these factions preferred to have the key posts in the military sector than to have irrelevant posts in the civil administration. In the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, for example, there was only one person from Dhale'a in the main office out of 450 personnel. 90% of the agriculture staff in the main offices of agriculture in Aden came from Abyan and Hota (of Lahj) areas.

On the economic front, the two states incorporated economic policies that fitted their political ideologies. The north adopted a free market policies in tribal form. There were no appropriate economic instruments to regulate effectively the free market policies and therefore, economic developments ran with minimum intervention of the leadership policy-wise. However, despite the open market policy, the government was compelled to take up the responsibility of building basic infrastructure in its poorest form. The PDRY, on the other hand, had a centrally planned economy with major commitment to basic social infrastructure and thus had large public activities in its economy. The private sector had no room to participate in the national development in the PDRY and thus the cost for public infrastructure for the small populated state was costly.

It is important to note that the high degree of tribal elitism in the north had a strong impact on the policies of Ismail and his faction in the PDRY. Ismail concentrated his party programme, especially after 1976, on the penetration of the tribal communities in the north by radical socialist policies incorporated within the NDF's political agenda. His main target was to foster all 'socialism pioneers' in the whole Yemeni arena in the hope that the Zaydi rule would be eliminated and could be replaced by a socially progressive regime where the northern shafais could be partners in. Ismail forgot that the Zaydi rule had also its own political agenda and was more effective than he could foresee. Ismail was lucky enough to be in a civic society as existed in the south where tribalism was much more refined than anywhere else, and, thus, his socialist programmes were tolerable but not taken as seriously as he might have thought.

In conclusion, it was obvious that neither state achieved strong integration within its system, a property of a unit to which a political unification will be successfully feasible. The lack of integration in units in the preunification period does not give high level degree for the scope of future integration.





# ENDNOTES

1. The YAR constitution of 1964. Several talks with Premier Abdul-Aziz Abdul-Ghani, Premier of YAR (1978-1990).
2. Ibid.
3. All Presidents in YAR have been so far Zaydis from Al-Sallah to Ali Saleh.
4. Meetings with YAR key figures; Hussein Al-Maqdani - ex minister of Health (1974), Colonel A. Al-Ra'ai (Advisor at Presidential Office) and others (1992, 1993 and 1994), as colleagues at the Presidential Office.
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
7. Meeting with Jamal Al-Qashshar - Director General at the Parliament (1992, 1993, 1994).
8. The researcher had talks with Qadi Ali Al-Anesi, Qadi Yaha Qadi - both senior staff at Presidential Office, on this issue, 1992, 1993 and 1994.
9. Mane'a, I. - The Parties and Political Organisation in Yemen (1984-1993) - analytical study - p 180 by Ilham Mane'a - Sanaa 1994 (p 186).
10. Ibid.
11. Cabinet figures were appointed in the permanent and higher committees of the GPC. Thus, they feed the GPC with policy making rather than the other way around.
12. The YAR Constitution of 1970.
13. Meeting with ex-Governor of Ibb - Saleh Obad Al-Kholani - Governor of Hadhramout in (1992, 1993, 1994, 1997) in the Presidential Office and Mukalla.
14. Wenner, M. - An article "South Yemen since Independence: An Arab Political Maverick".

15. PRSY Constitution of 1970 - Item 7.
16. The NF structure as explained by Muqbel to a Cuban delegation in 1972. (See also, F Halliday - "Revolution and Foreign Policy - the Case of South Yemen 1967-1987") p 22.
17. The Organisational Structure of the YSP - October Press 1978.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid
20. That was Salem Saleh Mohammed - (1986-1994).
21. Aden Gazette, November 1972.
22. The P.C. became of three members. (Refer to PDRY Constitution of 1972).
23. The PDRY Constitution of 1972.
24. The majority of Cabinet members were C.C. members.
25. Refer to Rubayye'a and Ismail sections of this chapter.
26. The Organisational Structure of the PONF - 1972 and UPONF - 1975.
27. The Programmes of the PONF: "Al-Baramej Al-Tandhimeyyah lil-jabaha Al-Queumiyyah - 1972".
28. Dustoor Jumhoreyyah Al-Yaman ayyah Al-Demoqratiyyah Al-Sha'abiyyah - 1972. (PDRY Constitution, 1970).
29. Ibid.
30. Political decision by the Polit-bureau in October, 1975 (not for public announcement) but within polit-bureau members. Source from Ali Shaye'a Hadi - Director of Political Dept, in Ministry of Defence.
31. Discussions with Colonel Abdulla Al-Ra'ai and Mr H. Maqdami in 1992-1994.

32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Dustoor Jumhoreyyah Al-Arabeyyah Al-Yamanenia - bab Al-Hukoomah - 1972. (The YAR Constitution - section - The Government).
35. Interviews with C.S.O. officers in 1991 & 1991 - Farooq Ali, Bamasood and others, on regional offices for sectors in the ROY.
36. Table 2.6 Investment by ownership and sector - YAR 1974-1986 "Civil Society in Yemen" by Carapico, S. - Cambridge Middle East Studies, p 47.
37. Ibid. Also refer to the Financial Statement of the Budget of 1980.
38. Dustoor Jumhoreyyah Al-Yaman Al-Dimoqratelyyah Al-Sha'a biyyah - 1972. (The PDRY Constitution, 1972).
40. Rubayye'a - 1969-1978, Ali Nasser - as a Premier from (1972 to 1985). The researcher's memos. Also "Civil Society in Yemen", by S. Caparico, p 37.
41. Annual Reports of the Higher Planning Committee "Allajnah Al-U'lya lil-Takhtit" 1976, 1977.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. O'Ballance, E. "The War in the Yemen" Op Cit p 66-67.
45. Dr A. Al-Ghafari: "The Yemen Unity: Reality and Future" - (Al-Wahda Al-Yamenenia: Al-Waqe'a wal-Mustaqbal) - Sanaa 1997, p 96.
46. Ibid p 97.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.

50. F Halliday: “Revolution and Foreign Policy” - The Case of South Yemen 1967-1987. p 114. Cambridge Middle East Library: 21.
51. Kostiner, J. - “South Yemen’s Revolution Strategy, 1970-1985” p 67. Westview Press, Jerusalem.
52. Wysiwyg://right.s/http://www.al-bad.com/unity/saif3.htm An MA dissertation on Yemeni Unification, 1990 by A.A.K. Saif - University of Exeter - September, 1997.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Halliday, F. - Op. Cit p 110.
57. Ibid, p 123.
58. Dr A.A. Al-Ghafari - Op. Cit p 117.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Interviews with some Presidential figures in 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1997, such as Ali Al-Maghrabi, Al-Kulabi, Al-Rai’ai and Al-Maqdami.
62. Ibid.
63. Mane’a, I. - Op. Cit. p 177-180.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid. p 181.
67. Ibid. p 182.

68. The researcher's observation through her political experience at the Presidential Office. (1991-1998).
69. Dustoor Al-Jumhooriyah Al-Arabiyyah Al-Yamaneyah - The YAR Constitution Item 37. "All forms of parties are banned!".
70. Ilham Mane'a Op. Cit p 198.
71. Ibid.
72. The insurgencies carried out in the north by the opposition parties were sporadic and not fully sustained in strategic areas.
73. Interviews with the P.S.O. men who did not want their names to be disclosed. (Hamza Al-Kibsi and Sadr-Uddin Al-Qashshar) in 1992.
74. Kitab Al-Yaman al-Wahed - Sanaa - Ministry of Culture p 175-291.
75. 26th September Newspaper: bibliography of Q. Al-Shaiabi. Also, F. Halliday Op. Cit. p 12.
76. Shaker Al-Johari: "Al-Sira'a fi Adan" - The Struggle in Aden - Cairo 1992. p 143. Als Ilham Mane'a. Op. Cit. p 98.
77. Discussion of the researcher with Presidential Officials (Mr A. Al-Faqih and Mr A.M. Al-Halali) Sanaa, April 1998.
78. Halliday, F. - Op. Cit p 11-12
79. The writer's memorial agenda - she was a member of the NLF.
80. Ilham Mane'a: Op. Cit. p 162-163.
81. Ibid. p 164-165.
82. Dr A. Al-Ghafari: Op. Cit. p 158.
83. Al-Wasat magazine: Issue (183) of 31.7.1995, p 30.
84. The researcher's memorial agenda. The researcher was a closed technocrat to the President in meetings of the agricultural sector and of the Higher Planning Committee in the said period.

85. Ibid.
86. To counter his rival policy-maker whom the USSR backed, Rubayye'a was forced to be in strong allegiance with China for power balance in the country.
87. The researcher together with other southern observers in the elite had to accommodate some of these - the NDF figures in sectorial ministries. Mr Al-Masoodi, who was employed in the Planning of Stats. dept, in agriculture when the researcher was his director in 1976/7, became the Chairman of the C.S.O. with political assignment in Aden in 1986/9.
88. President Rubayye'a was also the Chairman of some sectorial committees, particularly of infra-structural nature such as the "Higher Agricultural Committee for Agriculture" and one for "Education" and through committees, he gave 'directives' through planning Ministry - to expand investments in regions and rural areas. The researcher was Deputy, and therefore had direct experience of this.
89. President Rubayye'a initiated a building contracting body called 'Al-Mashary' with purely southerners' employees, to take over many projects in agriculture. He also had a local public transport company called 'Al-Dabaq' in Aden, to compete with local taxi drivers whom many were northerner Shafais and some were involved in security of 'Muhsen Shargabi'. This had some impact and drove northern Shafais laymen to go back to the north.
90. Dr A. Al-Ghafari: Op Cit p 132.
91. Op. Cit. (87)
92. Kostimer, J. - "South Yemen's Revolutionary Strategy, 1970-1985". Westview Press, Jerusalem, p 24-25.
93. Dr A. Al-Ghafari: Op. Cit. p 159.
94. These were some of the key figures in the two parties amalgamated with the PONF.
95. Aden-born figures who were of northern origin and educated in UK such as Judge Naheels Shamiry and Dr A. A, Wali, were, indeed, rational elite in the southern leadership.
96. Mr Anis H Yahya and A Ba-deeb - Chairmen of the two parties that joined the PONF - were Aden born and could gather their elite mainly from the capital Aden.
97. "Mu'atamar Al-Tandhim Al-Siyyasi Al-Muwahhad - Al Jabaha Al-Kawmiyyah" (the UPONF Conference ) 11-13 October, 1975.
98. Kostiner, J: Op. Cit.



99. The researcher faced these problems in her functions as deputy Minister in Agriculture. (1982-1988).
100. Many projects faced slow progress because of not getting policy clearance for them from the polit-bureau or CC in the seventies.
101. Dr a. Al-Ghafari: Op. Cit. p 159.
102. Kostiner, J. Op. Cit. p 22-25
103. Halliday, F. - Op. Cit. p 23 and 102.
104. Ibid.
105. A meeting with Mr Ali Moh'd Saleh Dhalai - a cousin of Saif Al-Dhalai - Foreign Minister of PDRY.
106. Halliday, F - Op. Cit. p 24.
107. Contacts between Al-Hamdi and Rubayye'a were made by the southern foreign minister - M.S. Mutee'a from abroad.
108. Several interviews were made by researcher with Mr N Yassin - a legal figure who was a closed associate to President Rubayye'a.
109. There were over half a million of southerners residing in the KSA as nationals/emigrants according to 1973 census estimates of PDRY.
110. Ismail expressed his dissatisfaction to Rubayye'a policies in seeking ties with 'revisionists' forces to the researcher who was his children's' teacher in 1976.
111. The researcher had several talks with President Rubayye'a and Mutee'a the Foreign Minister, both showed concern on not having strong ties with Arab and Islamic nations.
112. His conflicts with Rubayye'a up to 1978, then with the north in the 1979 war, then with southern leadership in 1980.
113. Ibid.
114. Halliday, F. Op Cit. p 98-139.
115. Diplomat source in South Yemen, Mr S. Al-Go'ari - ex YSP member.

116. Ibid.
117. Halliday, F. Op. Cit.
118. Aden Gazette: issue October, 1978.
119. Kostiner, J. Op. Cit. p 22-25.
120. The Researcher talks with her closed comrades Ali Anter, Ministry of Defence (1975-76) and Ali Shaye'a, Minister of Interior (1978-1980) in many occasions.
121. The southerners were against centralisation of power in one figure, but failed to convince the Soviets in this respect. Source: Mohammed S Nasser, ex-Minister of Agriculture.
122. The researcher was Deputy Director-General in 1979-80 and had experienced this in the agricultural sector.
123. Ibid.
124. In order to have harmonious relationships with the north, southern military forces integrated northern military factions in the force, but at lower hierarchies. Colonel A. Wahed A. Hafedh had a battalion of 2,000 force but he was not in the military decision making structure.
125. Ibid.
126. A bibliography on Ismail on a TV programme on 20th January 1986, on Aden media.
127. The researcher was a close friend to Ismail family and a part-time teacher to his elder son and daughter. She knew his schedule from several meetings with him.
128. Ibid.
129. Informed sources at the Presidential office who were too close to the President.
130. Kostiner, J. Op. Cit. p 83-85.
131. Ibid. p 71.
132. The researcher talks with her colleague in the Ministry of Agriculture - Awadh Nasser (brother of ex-President Ali Nasser) in April 1980.



133. Ibid.
134. He was holding the three top key-posts: the General Secretary of the YSP, President of the State and Premier.
135. As their functions were stated in the state administration.
136. Aden Gazette, April issue, 1980.
137. Many of them from the military faction with headline ideological discipline.
138. The administrative division for districts - Local Administration Ministry, 1980 - PDRY.
139. The major part of Hadhramout was under the Qu'aiti Sultanate which was ruled by Yafe'ai faction, and thus had Yafai army and tribes particularly on the coastal areas.
140. Al-Sayilli was known of his attachment to socialistic views and firm principles in them. The researcher's in-laws were closely associated with Al-Seyilli's family as they fell within the same faction.
141. Halliday, F. Op. Cit. p 45-46.
142. In April 1980, the polit-bureau meeting discussed this subject which was put forward by Colonel Ali Anter - the research was informed by Comrade Ali Shaye'a - a polit-bureau member.
143. Ibid.
144. The Redfan-Dhale'a faction was watching the other side of the northerners on Ali Nasser's side: A. Ghani A. Qader, Al-Dali, A.K. Shamsan and others who were also pushed by Muhsin & Ismail to take this role of splitting the southern block to a large extent.
145. Halliday, F. Op. Cit. p 36.
146. Ibid. p 45.
147. Ibid. The research had a close co-operation at Governmental level, with Al-Seyilli and he told her that Mutee'a was illegally executed. However, it is important that both Mutee'a and Al-Seyilli fall within one faction, namely, the Yafe'a faction.
148. Mohamed Ali Ahmed - Governor of the third Governorate - mentioned this to the researcher, who was a Deputy Minister in Ministry of Agriculture. The researcher

then, got it confirmed by Al-Beidh's wife (Salma). The researcher's in-laws and Al-Beidh's family are related.

149. Halliday, F. - Op. Cit. p 46-47.
150. He was giving projects contracts to Arab countries without referring to general state rules and sometimes if technocrats gave different views on technical matters that did not go with his wish, he would move these technocrats to other posts. This happened with some southern technocrats, of whom the researcher was one.
151. This was made when Ali Nasser took over the Presidency. He got rid of all Ismail close circle figures. Muhsin was appointed as an ambassador and Wali was sent to E. Germany to study.
153. Dr A.A. Wali was the researcher friend and he went to E. Germany to receive the body of his brother. As a medical specialist - he knew the facts but did not want to release this news publicly.
154. Aden TV, programmes on January 1986, following the 1986 war. A documentary film on Ali Nasser's evil activities while in leadership: Akadeeb Takshefreha Haqa'eq.
155. The Minister of Agriculture was his cousin, the Governor of Abyan was from his district. The Ministries of Security, Justice, Industry and Oil were given to his supporters.
156. Ushaish, M Saeed Abdulla, Rashed, A. Sallam, Al-Dali, A.G.A.Qader and others.
157. The third conference report of the Party.
158. The researcher was Deputy Minister in the MAAR and had several talks with the Governor, who made it bluntly that he would change the Abyan Governorate to look like Dubai.
159. Post-war reports on the TV programme "Akadeeb Takshefuha Haqa'eq".
160. Aden Gazette of April 1985.
161. The NLF Charter, 1965 - the researcher was a member also in the NLF, UPONF and the YSP until 1986.
162. It was made and taken implicitly that the key posts in the Cabinet were polit-bureau members. The Premier was one of the key members in the polit-bureau.
163. Abyan Governorate came second in population after Hadhramout and beside other

factors, it had substantial presence in the military and security forces.

164. Colonels Ali Anter, Ali Shaye'a Saleh Musleh and others were forming one group with Ismail and Al-Beidh against Ali Nasser.
165. The researcher was defending Ali Nasser in her talks/discussions with his citizens, especially with Anter, Sheye'a and Seyilli but they would react that 'her' friend (i.e. Nasser) had many loopholes in his functions to render him in weak position; and that was very true.
166. Five days before the massacre took place, the researcher, with many leading figures of the NLF went to Aden Cemetery to bury a female pioneer in politics and went to Sheye'a's house where she held an informal discussion on the political tension prevailing in the country. The latter gave a gloomy picture on the polit-bureau agenda which meant to take off power from Nasser.
167. Kostimer, J. Op. Cit. p 109.
168. Halliday, F. Op. Cit. - Article 11 p 244.
169. Mrs S. M. Amber, "Al-Taqreer Al-Sanawi lil-Qita'a Al-Zira'ai 1984" (The annual report of the Agricultural sector, 1984).
170. The third Conference Report of the YSP - 1985.
171. Party discussion in the Ministry of Agriculture, the Minister - M. S. Nasser, explained to party member (the researcher was, then, a member) that the Soviet headed to soft policies in South Yemen.
172. Ibid.
173. The tension reflected on the administrative set-ups publicly, and was felt by the layman, though was not publicly disclosed.
174. The Premiership was taken from Ali Nasser by heavy criticism from his rivalries in retaliation to Mute'a's execution and on the basis of misuse of power.
175. With two abstentions (Attas and Dali) there were seven members with voting power against Ali Nasser and his group who were 5 only in the polit-bureau sufficient to pass any decree against his power. Halliday, F. Op. Cit. p 42.
176. Factions and supporters were deduced from the then current affairs in the party.
177. The Minister of Agriculture, M.S. Nasser - repeatedly commented so. Halliday, F. Op. Cit. p 42-45.

178. ME/8167/A/1-7, 27 January 1986.
179. refer to note 166.
180. Halliday, F. Op. Cit. p 42-44.
181. Ibid.
182. Aden TV programme on 27th January "Akadeeb Takshefuha Haqa'eq" (lies disclosed by facts).
183. Ibid.
184. Aden TV programme on 3rd February 1986. A speech given by the General Secretary of the party - Ali Salem Al-Beidh.
185. Ibid.
186. Aden TV programme - Op. Cit.
187. Ibid. Airforce Bakil Ghaleb and his colleague were killed by cutting off their facial parts (ears, noses, etc.) an eye witness reported on the TV programme.
188. Ibid. Halliday, F. - Op. Cit. p 42.
189. Ibid.
190. Ibid. Also, eyewitnesses from the military force explained to researchers by A. Bakr Hussain - Lieutenant in the force.
191. Ibid.
192. Ibid.
193. Ibid.
194. The researcher lived that period in Aden.
195. The YSP Report in its extra-ordinary conference in June, 1987. Also, refer to ME/8371/A/13, 23 September '88.

196. The researcher had to walk over some death corpses to go back home two weeks after the start of the war.
197. Military trials continued on daily basis for at least one month and an ad hoc decision, they were executing people by I.D.s.
198. Ibid.
199. Ibid.
200. While in ministerial power, the researcher was instructed to dispose 24 employees - many of them from Dathina (Modin and Lowder) by the new northern minister (Dr A.A. Muqbel) but she refused.
201. I was granted two months compulsory vacation as a result of being outspoken.
202. The researcher's in-laws and Al-Beidh's family are relations. Also, A. Salem Al-Beidh was the Planning Minister in 1974/75, when the researcher was serving as Director of the Agricultural Department in the Ministry.
203. Close relations with Al-Beidh's family enabled the researcher to understand all versions of his life and surroundings.
204. Ibid.
205. His father's name was Saleh and his elderly sister is nicknamed with her father's name as "Salheyyah" - a traditional custom that the first daughter to be nicknamed by her father's name. Close acquaintance with the researcher as both families live in Hadhramout.
206. Ibid. Also, several discussions between the researcher and Al-Beidh on formal and informal issues through their careers in South Yemen.
207. Highly self-centred, Al-Beidh finds himself in such rural atmosphere.
208. In-law's talks and reported by Um-Fawzi Bin Humam.
209. Assessments were made by A.S. Obad, Al-Bar, Salem Saleh and many others including the researcher.
210. Ibid.
211. Ibid.

212. Ibid (Al-Seyyilli was of tribal origin and always a land-liver, while Al-Beidh was Hashemite and would sound soft policy-maker among Hashemites and the conservatives as the Hadhramies but would also sound a hard-liner on the party/political circles.
213. Ibid.
214. The researcher experienced this contradictory gesture of Al-Beidh when she was in the Planning Ministry and also through her interactions with the party figures in the South (1973-1988).
215. This was due to global changes in terms of the perestroika in particular.
216. Al-Beidh has resided in Oman Sultanate since the 1994 civil war in which southern forces lost the battle for southern reunification.
217. Aden Gazette, January, 1986
218. The researcher knew Dr N'oman and family very well from neighbourhood.
219. Muhsen was the key man for northern shafais, he was more important than Ismail for he was intelligently maneuvering northern shafais policies within the southern policies and protected their interests at all cost on southern soil, though this was enmity attitudes to southerners.
220. Most agricultural housing blocks were transferred from southerners to northerners by the Premier's instructions. Dr N'oman, however, showed strong favourism to the northern faction.
221. Some of these northern ministers were newly graduates with no experience on sectorial leadership such as Mohammed Othman of trade and supply and Ahmed Ali Muqbel of agriculture. Bin Ghanem failed to cope with the new premiership and was asked to stay at home until was recruited as an ambassador to the UN after sometime.
222. Public resources was drained mainly because of high expenditures to northerners and the new southern military elite accommodation. At the same time the public frustration was high due to the factional attitudes and behaviours of the northerners towards southern employees.
223. Due to their inexperience in the southern british-based administrative mechanism, northerners were violating the administrative rules.
224. The Premier didn't work under the british system either and failed to assess the damage his cabinet caused to some southern technocrats. Tribal/factional attitudes were running the southern state in that period.

225. The replacement policy was very high in the agriculture as 90% of this sector were of Ali Nasser faction and by 1987, the majority of central staff were northerners of northern origin.
226. These sectors happened to be worst effected sectors suffering of factional problems between northerners, the leaders and southerners, employees. It indicates the weak character of the Premier.
227. Within southern law, elites (Presidents to deputy ministers) should not be affected in their absence, leave or death. The northerners irresponsibly, took away, the disposed privileges and had them transferred to their possessions.
228. In view of the fact that public enterprises were large and multi for the benefit of the public in the PDRY, the newly recruited managers and directors on these public institutions caused serious frictions with the southern public.
229. As matters ran loose in the society, the conflicts came again to the YSP leadership. It took southern/northern factional form. Only the Premier who was sided with the northerners.
230. In general, northerners did not want to proceed with the unification process with the north for the reasons explained in this chapter.
231. Colonels Saleh Al-Seyeilli and Saeed Saleh; both polit-bureau members and contemporary National Liberation Front leaders were objecting on the manner the unification process was carried out.
232. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) - Report No 0106 - YA - July 1988 p 8-9 Rome. RESTRICTED Dist.
233. Ibid.
234. Ibid. p 10-11.
235. Ibid. p 3-7
236. IFAD - Report No EB 84/22/R.44 - 27th July, 1984 p 2 - Distr. RESTRICTED, Rome, 1984.
237. IFAD - Op. Cit.
238. Ibid. p 4.
239. Ibid. P 4 -7.

240. IFAD - EB 80/10/R.38 - 4/8/1980 p 3. Rome, September 1980.
241. Ibid.
242. Ibid.
243. Ibid.
244. Ibid.
245. Ibid. p 4-5
246. IFAD Report of 1980. Op. Cit. p 4-5.
247. Ibid. p 9, table 1-3, p 6.
248. All facts in this and following paragraphs are from the IFAD report in 1980 of the special programming mission to Yemen.
249. Halliday, F. Op. Cit. pp 22-23.
250. IFAD report No EB/88/34/R.47/Rev./ on Proposed loan to the PDRY - Rome, September 1988 - page 1.
251. IFAD Report EB/82/16/R.37 - July 1982, Rome on a proposed loan to the PDRY - RESTRICTED distribution, p3.
252. The following facts are in the IFAD reports on proposed loans to projects in the PDRY. They are restricted reports in distribution. However, the researcher was a director of agriculture department in the Ministry of Planning (1973-1977) and then in several posts in the Planning and MAAR until she became Deputy Minister for MAAR in 1982-1988 in the PDRY. She therefore, was a key figure in the national development process in PDRY.



## CHAPTER 3

### THE STEPS TOWARDS UNIFICATION TAKEN BY THE TWO YEMENI STATES

#### 3.1 The Issue of Unification of Yemen:

The principle of unification between the Northern and Southern parts of Yemen formed part of the political strategies pursued by the regimes in each of the two former states, the YAR and the PDRY.<sup>1</sup> Despite this aspiration, the practical political and economic policies pursued by the two republics were very different. The North adopted a non-aligned international strategy with a liberal economic approach,<sup>2</sup> while the South adopted a close relationship with socialist countries with a central planning economic approach.<sup>3</sup>

The unification process, over the period 1969-1989, was affected by the character of the political developments within the two states: the consequences of these development undermined the momentum of the unification process. Local and foreign commentaries on Yemen, have interpreted the problems confronting unification in terms of the two regimes' differences in ideology, policies and legal structures. Although there is an element of truth in this, it will be contended here that the central issue of contention between the Yemeni states was the problem of the Northern Shafais, who constituted a majority of the Northern population but had very limited representation in the central authority structures of the North.<sup>4</sup> This issue was never openly recognised as 'the cause' behind all Southern/Northern problems but in fact it was crucial for being a central problem behind the differences between the two Yemeni states. The ideological differences were simply instruments used in the struggle.

Ironically, the Northern Shafais, despite their minority presence in Southern regions, enjoyed substantial authoritative power in the South. The political organisation during the period 1969-1980 was chaired by Ismail, who was a Northern Shafai.<sup>5</sup> The Presidency of the State was also held by Ismail between 1978 and 1980).<sup>6</sup> All Southern cabinets included Northern Shafais and Zaydi elements.<sup>7</sup>

The Northern Shafai leadership in the South, both in the political organisation of the PONF/YSP and in the Cabinet, sought with determination to strengthen the position of Shafais in the north. Their objective was to achieve full integration of Northern Shafais into the Northern central authorities or to create an independent third Yemeni republic based on the Shafais areas of the north.<sup>8</sup> For this reason, the political organisation chaired by Ismail, supported by substantial numbers of Northern Shafais, exacerbated tensions between the two states using 'scientific socialism' as an instrument to foster leftist movements and radical associations in the Northern region. Ismail seized all opportunities, especially by promoting left/socialist measures, to keep the two Northern and Southern leaderships apart, until a third Yemeni power could come into being. While the ultimate political aim may have been valid, the impact on the South was harmful.

Below, the political developments related to the unification process will be followed through the period between 1969 and 1989. The interaction between the central issue of the unification and the development stages in the history of the two states will be analysed.

### **3.1.1. Factors affecting the Unification Issue over the period 1967 to 1972**

During the period 1967-1972, no steps were taken towards the Unification of the two Yemeni states for three different reasons. The first and most important reason was the ideological difference between the two former

Yemeni states.<sup>9</sup> As mentioned above, the YAR had adopted a non-aligned political stance with a market-oriented economy, while the PDRY was fully committed to a socialistic ideology with a strong centrally planned economy. As time passed, the political stances of the two states parted further.

The second reason for the absence of any unification moves between the two Yemeni states stemmed from the role of Egypt in the region.<sup>10</sup> The YAR's republican regime was backed by Egypt both politically and militarily.<sup>11</sup> Though Egypt was the first Arab nation to attempt to foster the Southern liberation movement, it had failed to achieve this. Due to various political developments in the region such as the defeat of June 1967, and the closure of the Suez Canal, the left faction in the MAN regrouped themselves and formed a counter-weight to the Egyptian-supported faction.<sup>12</sup> To counter the left's influence, Egypt had forced a merger between the NLF and the OLOS, essentially the Adeni bourgeoisie, into what became known as FLOSY on 13 January 1966. FLOSY served to maintain Egyptian influence over the Yemeni region.<sup>13</sup> The NLF, however, broke away from the merger in December 1966 and continued its struggle against the British and the Sultans by self-reliance.<sup>14</sup> The NLF ultimately defeated FLOSY and gained absolute power on all the protectorates and Aden Colony.<sup>15</sup> In power, the left faction within the NLF became stronger across all political spheres. This pushed the ideas of unification out of scope.<sup>16</sup> The NLF came to power with the scope of integration with the north in its tentative programme.

The third reason for the absence of unifying moves, was the instability of local affairs. With the establishment of the republican regime in the YAR, loyalist riots, backed by tribes favouring the Imamate, produced a period of internal instability.<sup>17</sup> Attacks were also directed against the regime owing to its Egyptian flavour. The KSA sponsored the Imam's loyalists, inside the country in order to counter the new regime and the presence of Egyptian forces.<sup>18</sup> The climax of this instability was the Sanaa Siege, in December-February 1968, for

70 days.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, in the South there was instability. Two coups were carried through: on 30 March 1968, when the left wing was eliminated from key military posts,<sup>20</sup> and in June 1969, when the left wing eliminated the majority of the right wing faction from the civil and military establishments.<sup>21</sup> The Southern leadership proclaimed more 'democratic' policies in its newly drafted constitution of 1970.<sup>22</sup> This constituted a formal step widening the gap with the Northern leadership. The two states began hosting each other's hostile factions. The YAR incorporated key hostile figures, such as Abdulla Al-Asnaj, Mohammed Salem Basindowah and Husain Ashshal, in its formal administration and formal establishments. The PDRY hosted Northern opposition movements, such as Sultan Omer chairman of the National Democratic Front and many hostile figures to the YAR's administration. The accommodation of such 'guests' contributed to the build-up of mistrust between the two states, and this, in turn, prevented either side from making any movement towards unification.

### **3.2 The Commencement of the Unification Process**

The issue of unification became more apparent in both states from 1972 with meetings taking place and agreements being signed between the two Yemeni states. However, commensurate with this diplomatic advancement, there was also a development of political and military tension.

However, while these agreements were being signed, the political elites were pursuing more parochial political aims. As the problem of the Northern Shafais was guiding the hidden agenda of Ismail and his faction in the PONF/UPONF, neither side was fully dedicated to serious unification steps. There remained, moreover, the differences in policies, structures, laws and all formal establishments between the two states.<sup>24</sup>

In this section, the moves relating to unification will be covered in chronological order. The unification measures involved several steps that started with the Cairo Agreement and on which all other later steps and agreements were founded. Ironically, throughout the political developments of the two states, unification steps would only come active after political and military tensions were diffused by southerners in the southern leadership and Zaydi northerners in the northern leadership, leaving the northern shafais in the southern leadership as enemies to the unification process. For this reason, the researcher was careful to illuminate more on political developments which took place between each unification step throughout the period 1972-1990.

Several agreements were made between the two states to enhance the unification process despite the variations apparent in their political systems. In the proceeding section, these agreements shall be critically analysed with reference to the political developments which occurred between the two states.

### **3.2.1 The Outbreak of the 1972 War**

Ironically, the move towards unification came about as a result of the conflictual relationship between the two Yemeni states.<sup>25</sup> Political and military clashes between the two states often occurred due to the presence of figures settled in each state which were hostile to the other.<sup>26</sup>

Due to the escalation of political confrontation between the two Yemeni states, the 1972 war was waged along the Qaatabah-Dhale'a borders between 12 and 14 September 1972.<sup>27</sup> This was initiated by some FLOSY factions residing in the YAR, led by Colonel Al-Ashshal, occupying some southern villages in Dhale'a area.<sup>28</sup> The Southern troops, however, expelled them from the area.<sup>29</sup>

In early September 1972, the YAR sent a top-level delegation to some Arab countries complaining of Southern sponsorship of insurgency

in the North. The Northern Premier, Mohsen Al-Ainy, led a five member cabinet delegation to several Arab countries asking for their mediation to settle political differences with the PDRY.<sup>30</sup> The South, similarly, sent a delegation, to other Arab countries. This consisted of one man: Mohammed Saleh Mutee'a a member of the Central Committee, Secretary of the Central Committee, and Secretary of the foreign department of the PONF secretariat.<sup>31</sup>

The Southern leadership in the PDRY believed that the response to the political and military incursions along their borders should be limited and short-term. However, Ismail's faction argued that the PDRY had to adopt a long-range strategy whereby Northern society had to be changed fundamentally a revolutionary one if unity was to be considered.<sup>32</sup> This was at the heart of disputes between Northern and Southern factions in the PONF/UPONF and later YSP leadership.<sup>33</sup>

### **3.2.2 The Unification Steps 1972-1974**

The unification steps over the period 1972-1974 were dramatic in terms of serious involvement of both leadership figures and important regional characters. The Cairo Agreement, and other subsequent agreements in this period, were relevant as they paved a recognised practical platform for unification between the two states. The impact of the Cairo Agreement, the Tripoli Announcement, and other events of relevance to the unification process are addressed in the following section, which together form an analysis of this founding period of Yemeni unification.

#### **3.2.2.1 The Cairo Agreement - 28th October 1972**

The Cairo Agreement established an ambitious unification programme comprising 15 items.<sup>34</sup> The southern Premier, Ali Nasser, left for Cairo when he was contacted by a number of Arab countries to make an

agreement with the northern premier on uniting the two Yemeni parts together. The northern Premiers, Muhsen Al-Ainy was in Cairo and both Premiers launched the Cairo Agreement. It laid down the cornerstone for a unity between the two Yemeni states.<sup>35</sup> It envisaged the brotherhood of the two nations and their collective struggle against imperialism and Zionism. It stressed that Yemeni unity was the ultimate destiny of the people in the two states, and that a unified Yemeni state would create a national economy built on strong integral grounds. The Cairo Agreement contained, among others, the following articles:<sup>36</sup>

***Article 1:***

*Unity shall be set up between the two states of the Yemen Arab Republic and the Peoples Democratic of Yemen in which shall be dissolved the statal personality of each one into one single state personality, and the formation of a single Yemeni State.*

***Article 2:*** *The new state shall have:*

- (i) one flag and one motto;*
- (ii) one capital;*
- (iii) one presidency*
- (iv) one legislative executive and judicial system*

***Article 3:***

- (i) The governmental system of the new state shall be a democratic, national republican system ...*

The Cairo Agreement was launched in Cairo and signed by the two Premiers Mohsin Al-Ainy of the North and Ali Nasser of the South, on 28 October 1972. The agreement was also signed by an Arab mediation committee in the Arab League.<sup>37</sup> The Cairo Agreement envisaged 8 technical

sectorial committees to fulfil unification preparation between the two states.

From the content of the Cairo Agreement, one can detect various loop-holes in it which made it unrealistic. First, it incorporated over-ambitious unification programmes within a limited period of 12 months:

**Article 7:** “A period of not more than a year shall be defined for the completion of tasks entrusted to these committees ...”<sup>38</sup>

Secondly, the agreement did not recognise the character of the problems between the two states, in terms of variant policies, structures, laws, etc. Thirdly, it completely ignored the problem of hostile ‘guests’ in and did not attempt to find a feasible solution for this. Finally, the agreement was concluded between the Presidents of the two states as if they held equal power. This, however, was not realistic: while the Northern President held ultimate power, the Southern President was second in command (at most) and ultimate power rested with the General Command of the PONF (later the polit-bureau of the UPONF<sup>39</sup>) over that period.

### **3.2.2.2 The Tripoli Accord, November 1972**

In respect to Article 4 of the Cairo Agreement which called the two Presidents to hold a summit meeting to examine unification measures<sup>40</sup>, President Judge A.R. Al-Eryani of the North and President Salem Rubaye’a Ali of the South met in Tripoli in the presence of the Libyan President Mu’amer Al-Qaddafi on 28 November, 1972.<sup>41</sup>

The Tripoli Accord consisted of 10 Articles, most of which were based on the Cairo Agreement.<sup>42</sup> There were, however, three articles (1-3) which made the



earlier proposals more specific and one new article (9) :<sup>43</sup> Articles 1 -3 read:

*Article 1: The Arab people in Yemen will establish a single state called the Republic of Yemen.*

*Article 2: The Yemeni flag will have 3 colours; red, white and black.*

*Article 3: Sanaa is the capital.*

The accord recognised the absence of any participatory organisation in the Northern system, and sought to create a unified political structure for the state:

*Article 9: A political organisation is to be established gathering all population factions with national interest for national production and revolution against backwardness, Imam heritage, foreign colonisation and Zionism.*<sup>44</sup>

The Arab League, in co-ordination with Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Iraq established a regional committee to safeguard the unification process and monitor its completion. This committee, which consisted mainly of diplomatic personnel of respective embassies in the two states, attended most of the local committees' meetings.<sup>45</sup>

### **3.2.2.3 The Summit Meeting in Algeria on September, 1973**

The functional committees created to fulfil the measures of unification within a year did not accomplish their job and the period had to be extended.<sup>46</sup> The two Presidents, Judge Al-Eryani and Rubaye'a, met in Algeria and extended the agreement to another year in the presence of Hawari Boumedienne.<sup>47</sup> Both Presidents signed a meeting protocol, on 4 September 1973, which guaranteed

a 12 month extension of the Cairo Agreement.<sup>48</sup>

### **3.2.3.4 The Hudaidah Meeting on November, 1973**

The two Presidents met in Hudaidah on 10-11 November 1973 to review the progress of the joint committees on unification measures.<sup>49</sup> They expressed their satisfaction on the progress reports made by the assigned committees.<sup>50</sup> This meeting marked the first Presidential visit made by a Southern President to the North.<sup>51</sup>

The eight technical committees incorporated in Article 8 of the Cairo Agreement compromised 4-5 members each from each side.<sup>52</sup> Having examined the figures involved in these committees (tribally-minded individuals on the Northern side versus the militant-minded left on the Southern side), were not well-suited to drafting objective unification measures couched in compromising language. The key FLOSY figure, Abduliah Al-Asnaj, was on one on these committees of the Northern side, whilst Sultan Naji and other Northern Shafais were in committees on the Southern side.<sup>53</sup> The committees would not have worked without a healthy environment away devoid of the tension among their members.

### **3.3 The Unification Measures (1974-1977)**

The unification programme was slow and limited during the period 1974-77. It was affected by the internal development in each of the Yemeni states.<sup>54</sup> Internal political changes in the North, and conflicting policies in the South between the state and the political organisation, limited the possibility for developing the unification programme.

In the North, there was rivalry for power between the President and the tribal sheikhs, who opposed any progressive measures towards popular participation, public associations or corrective movements<sup>55</sup> In the South, there was rivalry for power between Northern Shafais in the Southern leadership, who opposed rapid unification measures with the Northern regime, and the Southern leadership, who did not want the country led into military confrontations with the North.<sup>56</sup>

The following subsection will shed further light on the political developments in the two Yemeni States which led to the limitation of the unification measures over this period.

### **3.3.1 The Political Reforms Period in the YAR**

After his ascent to power, President Ibrahim Al-Hamdy managed to carry out grass root reforms in the North, despite facing strong opposition.<sup>57</sup> He had come to power on 13 June 1974 and was from Bakeel tribe, the largest Zaydi confederation in the North.<sup>58</sup> During his period in power, 13 June 1974 - 11 October 1977, the country experienced significant reform programmes. These reforms included programmes to combat corruption, tribalism and the establishment of the local development councils.<sup>59</sup> 'Corrective Committees' were established in every sector to remove tribal favouritism and financial corruption from the formal administration institutions.<sup>60</sup> Many students, from all the national factions, were sent abroad for education and training. He removed corrupt military and security officers and provided equal opportunities for non-Zaydis factions. Had he been allowed to live longer, Al-Hamdy could have reduced the impact of tribal values on Yemen's political and social life.

As Al-Hamdy's reform programmes became more effective, opposition from the Yemeni tribal community became stronger, and the threat to his

life increased.<sup>61</sup> The Hashed tribe and other interest groups did not want “the reforming leader and his changes” to continue.<sup>62</sup> The improvement of education, for instance, was seen as threatening to bring tribalism to an end. Public political awareness would intensify and thus threaten the material and spiritual interests of the sheikhs. Another threat was Al-Hamdy’s reconciliation with the opposition, bringing together all the Northern political groupings and the NDF.<sup>63</sup> This gesture included giving the latter ministerial posts in his cabinet. His opposition to traditional tribal values endangered the tribal way of life and forced the public to cut their tribal ties. This led the traditional tribal figures, led by the Hashed tribe, to plot the assassination of President Al-Hamdy and his brother. He was invited for a lunch in Sanaa, a day before leaving for Aden to attend the national day of the South, (the anniversary of the 14 October Revolution) and was assassinated.<sup>64</sup>

Observers close to the Southern President have told the researcher that, at the 14th October Festival of 1977, the Presidents would have announced the unification of the two Yemeni states.<sup>65</sup> Referred observers said that the Presidents had secretly come to the agreement that Aden and Sanaa would alternate as capitals of the unified federal Yemen, each for a 5-year period. The leadership of the country would also alternate between a Southern and Northern president for each of these periods. In other words, when the Presidency was held by the Southern president, the capital would be Sanaa and vice versa. Federal unity would strengthen sectoral unification for the benefit of the two parts of Yemen.

### **3.3.2 Political Differences in the South**

As explained in the introduction of this chapter, the key issue in Southern leadership disputes related to the absence of a political position for the Northern Shafais in the central Northern power authority. The Northern Shafais in the Southern leadership wanted either to cause the downfall of the

Northern tribal regime and replace it by a socialist entities, or to build up a third Yemeni state out of the Shafai regions in the North.

Ismail sought to pursue his objectives by using the PDRY state as an instrument. This, however, ran counter to the interests of Southerners. The President of the State, Salem Rubayye'a, and his many Southern supporters were trying to pursue unification policies in harmony with the YAR.<sup>67</sup>

Although this issue was acknowledged by everyone working in the central authorities in the PDRY, it was never raised publicly or in the media. Ismail and his faction adopted radical measures primarily so as to cripple the unification process.

Below is an account of policies developments between Northerners and Southerners in the PDRY political leadership during this period. This will display the impact of these developments on the unification process.

### **3.3.2.1 The Competition for Political Power within PDRY Leadership**

There was a severe competition for national political power at all levels between the PONF's Secretary-General (Ismail) and the State President (Rubayye'a).<sup>68</sup> The latter was a pragmatic statesman, taking seriously his national responsibilities: visiting projects in all regions, talking to peasants about their needs, advocating mild policies, etc.<sup>69</sup> The Secretary-General of the PONF hardly moved out of his office or residence in Aden.<sup>70</sup> He absorbed himself in meetings with foreign experts, or with his faction in the office, to promote the Northern Shafais' struggle in the YAR by deepening left views in the arena and insurgencies in the Northern Shafais areas in the North.<sup>71</sup> Rubayye'a gained wide support among the public in all Southern regions while Ismail's support was confined to his Northern Shafais faction who constituted a minority in the South - although concentrated in the

vicinity of Aden. The only significant Southern element which sided with Ismail was the military faction originally based on the Redfan and Dale'a region. There were two reasons for this. First, there was a geographical sensitivity factor as this area was bordering the North (adjacent to Qaatabah in the YAR). There were many tribal/military frictions between the two states across this border back in history. Secondly, there were personal problems between the leading figures of this area and the President Rubayye'a. Ali Anter, the Minister of Defence, was in disagreement with the President over many Soviet deliveries in the military sector without the latter's consent and was sent to the Soviet Union for 4 years to study at the Military Academy\*. When he came back, the minister was hardly in good terms with the President. Ali Shaye'a, the director of the political department in the Ministry of Defence was from the same region and had also suffered from what he regarded as a discriminatory treatment by the President.<sup>72</sup> There were many cases which seemed to show that the President did not favour the Redfan and Dale'a figures in the leadership because of their political/radical stance against the national interest.

Ismail pursued two strategies to gain more supporters, for his leftist programmes, inside the PONF. The first strategy was to form a coalition between two other local parties and the PONF. These two parties were: the Peoples' Vanguard Party (PVP), which was a Ba'ath party (Syrians faction), and the Peoples' Democratic Union (PDU), which was a Marxist-based party.<sup>73</sup> After some hesitation the Southern leadership in the PONF - particularly the military personnel - the latter agreed to the coalition based on a 2: 1: 1 ratio in voting. Ismail's aim was to strengthen the role of Northern Shafais in the political leadership. Both parties had many Northern Shafai elements in their

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\* In his Absence, the President, acting as General Secretary Assistant for the PONF, took in-charge of political supervision of the military forces.

leadership and the two Secretary-Generals (although they were Adenis of southern origin ) supported Ismail's programmes and provided him with strong moral support in the UPONF when it was formed in October 1975.<sup>74</sup>

Ismail's second strategy was the completion of his programme termed as " the functions of the National Democratic Stage" by which he would enhance more radical measures for the NDF in the north and left policies in the south. This programme was incorporated in the new UPONF programme which reads as follows:<sup>75</sup>

*Article 1: The UPONF constitutes the political vanguard for the PDRY and includes progressive labourers, peasants, revolutionary cadres, soldiers and small bourgeoisie.*

*Article 2: The UPONF is guided by 'Scientific Socialism'. With it alone, the UPONF finds the translation to social progress. The UPONF rejects all forms of contra-theories to Scientific Socialism.*

The content of Ismail's programme was very radical and full of revolutionary expressions which contradicted Rubayye'a's mild policies internally and externally. The milder the policies adopted by Rubayye'a, the harder the policy measures taken by Ismail and his faction.

### **3.3.2.2 The Impact of the Political Programme of the UPONF on the Unification Process**

Despite the recognition of the political programme of the UPONF by all CC members, the Secretary-General (Ismail) and the President of the State (Rubayye'a) adopted divergent policies and towards the unification process in particular. In the mid-1970s, President Rubayye'a adopted moderate foreign policies, extending ties with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,

limiting support for guerrilla struggles Oman only (excluding the United Arab Emirates and others) and strengthening ties with the reforming Northern President, Al-Hamdy.<sup>76</sup> Such moderate policies were not appreciated by Ismail and his Northern faction.<sup>77</sup> To the contrary, the Secretary-General of the UPONF continued to rely on revolutionary measures to eliminate revisionists and feudalists in neighbouring countries. He called for the promotion of the PDRY's social principles regionally and internationally with the so called Hizb Min Taraz Jachid.<sup>78</sup> Ismail used these radical policies to gain both time and effective support for his Northern Shafai power base.

Ismail was never enthusiastic about progressing the unification process.<sup>79</sup> While President Rubayye'a was fully dedicated to unity with the North, Ismail was implementing measures to cripple the project. Rubayye'a managed to build a bridge of trust between himself and President Al-Hamdy in the North.<sup>80</sup> There were no open meetings between the two Presidents for over three years, but secret contacts were fully maintained through the Southern Minister of Foreign Affairs.<sup>81</sup> Ismail meanwhile enhanced the integration of the left movements in the YAR through promoting one strong movement: the National Democratic Front (NDF).<sup>82</sup> The two Presidents, nonetheless, blessed this integration of 5 left movements in the YAR and hoped that the NDF would pursue a democratic approach in its work.

### **3.3.3 The Qaatabah Meeting ( February 1977)**

Despite the political conflicts between the two states, a top-level effective meeting may be held in Qaatabah, between President Ibrahim Al-Hamdy of the North and President Salem Rubayea Ali of the South, on 15 February 1977.<sup>83</sup> This meeting may be regarded as the most effective meeting held so far between the two states. There were three reasons for this.



First, the two Presidents were genuine in their concern for unification. Second the meeting took an important practical step toward unification: the establishment of a higher council (HCY) for unification.<sup>84</sup> Third, the meeting brought together leading figures in each sector of state activity: foreign affairs, interior, defence, planning, economy and trade.<sup>85</sup> This meeting was the first meeting since November, 1973 and without previously secret contacts between the two President, it would not have been achieved at such level and with such supportive degree to the unification process.

It is worth noting that the ministers of the basic sectors who joined the meeting were 5 Southerners and 1 Northerner on the Southern side, and all Northerners on the Northern side.

A memo of understanding was signed at this meeting which stated:

*"The two Presidents and their companions discussed in this meeting, major issues in the unification process. The most important of these concerned economic and commercial matters and the co-ordination in industrial and agricultural development which serves the high Yemeni interest. The two sides agreed the establishment of the Higher Yemen Council."*<sup>86</sup>

#### **3.3.4 Al-Hamdy's Death**

After the Qatabah Meeting, there were positive aspects to the relationship between the two states while internally within each state there were conflicts and opposition, leading in North Yemen to the assassination of Al-Hamdy on 11 October 1977.<sup>87</sup> The two Presidents had worked together closely in fostering co-operative understanding. For example, Al-

Hamdy helped to establish links between the PDRY and Saudi Arabia. There was initially no substantive development in the movement towards unification,<sup>88</sup> but with the realisation on the strong opposition they had in their respective regimes, the two leaders decided to announce a federal unification between the two Yemeni states. This was to take place in October 1977, but it did not happen due to Al-Hamdy's death. Southern confidants of President Rubayye'a, hinted that opposition in the North had learnt that unification was to take place on the occasion of the October Festival in Aden, and this caused Al-Hamdy's assassination one day before his departure from Sanaa for Aden.

As explained in Chapter 2, the unity proposed was to be of a federal character, where each President would assume Presidency for five years alternatively, with the capital located in the other state, i.e. Rubayye'a in Sanaa and Al-Hamdy in Aden. Sectoral unification, between the two states, would move forward slowly and administration decentralisation would be a major feature of the new unified state.

### **3.3.5 The Funeral of Al-Hamdy**

The Southern President was determined to pay his respects to the assassinated Northern President, but his arrival to Sanaa was not welcomed by the Northern leadership.<sup>90</sup> Salem Rubaye'a Ali accompanied by 150 soldiers and attended the funeral of his counterpart.<sup>91</sup> It was reported by an eyewitness that the Southern President swore on Al-Hamdy's grave, in the presence of many Northern leaders, that he would take revenge on his assassins.<sup>92</sup> The forthcoming events proved that the Southern President kept his pledge and carried out a vendetta for his counterpart, though at a heavy cost.<sup>93</sup>

### **3.4 Unification Measures – 1977 - 1978**

#### **3.4.1 The Ascent of Al-Ghashmy**

At a time of great political tension between the two Yemeni states, Ahmed Al-Ghashmy – Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces - assumed Presidential Office in the North.<sup>94</sup>

Many of Al-Hamdy's supporters from the North sought refuge in the South.<sup>95</sup> Among them was a Northern paratroop commander, Colonel Abdullah Abdul Al-Alem who in January/February 1978 led some of his troops across the border.<sup>96</sup> Many Northern graduates fled to Aden after Al-Hamdy's death and were accommodated as nationals in the South.<sup>97</sup> Despite the meagre resources, the Southern leadership provided help to these Northern factions at the expense of the Southerners.

#### **3.4.2 Al-Ghashmi's Assassination**

This drift of Northerners, from all fields, to the South accelerated political tensions between the two states. This led up to the death of Al-Ghashmi by a Southern bomb-suicider. The escape of Colonel Abdulla Al-Alem and his troops to the South was of substantial concern to the North.<sup>98</sup> To smooth bilateral relationships between the two states, Southern President-Salem Rubayea Ali expressed his willingness to mediate between the Northern regime and the forces which had escaped to the South.<sup>99</sup> Rubayye'a's target, however, was to take revenge for the assassination of his close Northern counterpart, Al-Hamdy. Al-Ghashmi believed that Rubayye'a's offer was genuine and that it was stimulated by Rubayye'a wanting to weaken Ismail's power position by removing elements who supported him. It was arranged that a private message was to go to Al-Ghashmi from the Southern President. Haj Saleh Tafaresh, a special envoy of the Southern President,

arrived in Sanaa on 24th June 1978, to deliver the message. Once he opened his briefcase in front of the Northern President, a bomb exploded, killing the envoy and the Northern President.<sup>100</sup>

### **3.4.3 The Execution of Salem Rubaye'a Ali**

The bomb incident had an international impact, particularly in the Middle East. The Northern leadership announced, through their media, an open war with the South.<sup>101</sup> The YAR demanded that the Southern leadership pay a price for its crime. The Southern leadership was put in an embarrassing situation and all Central Committee members were called together to consider the matter. On 24 June, the Central Committee held a meeting at night and decided to execute the President to avoid war between the two states.<sup>102</sup> This decision had been approved by the Soviet Union and by Ismail (Secretary-General of the UPONF) before the meeting started.<sup>103</sup> The President and a few of his close associates did not attend the meeting. On 25-26 June 1978, Soviet pilots shelled the Presidential residence heavily.<sup>104</sup> On 27 June, the media announced that Salem Rubaye'a Ali - the "left opportunist" - was sentenced to death for his crime against the Northern President.<sup>105</sup>

### **3.5 The Ascent of Ismail to Political and State Leadership in the PDRY (1978 – 1980)**

It is important to note that many of the political development addressed in Chapter 2 are referred to in this section in order to illuminate the necessity of the unification steps in this period. Chapter 2 material is also important in terms of understanding the interaction of political developments with unification steps taken during this period.

Following the execution of President Rubayye'a in the South, the country adopted a new administrative structure, whereby the two major

administrative powers rested in one person. Ismail became the new President of the South, while at the same time retaining his former post as Secretary-General of the UPONF.<sup>106</sup> This was intended to eliminate power conflicts between the UPONF and the State leadership.

Ismail's taking over of both positions perturbed the YAR leadership.<sup>107</sup> Ismail was seen as a leading figure by the Northern Shafias, and the Zaydi regime was strongly averse to him wielding absolute power in the South. At a time when the Northern regime had just come out of turmoil (the assassination of Al-Ghaashmi, a failed Nasserite Coup and the new established presidency under Ali Abdallah Saleh) moreover, Ismail came up with a political new project - the formation of the Yemen Socialist Party (*Al-Hizb Al-Ishteraki Al-Yamani*).<sup>108</sup>

The establishment of the YSP had a negative impact on the unification process. It called on all the Yemeni proletariat, working class and farmers/peasants, to join the party to be as one against all forms of backwardness, exploitation and humiliation. In other words, the YSP was to be the spark for revolutionary change against the "Zaydi" tribal regime in the North.<sup>109</sup>

As mentioned in Section 2.3.2.3.2 (p. 64), Ismail had hoped, in view of the political power in his hand, to dominate the military and security forces of the South but found this very difficult.<sup>110</sup> The Southern military forces, however, ultimately reached a compromise with Ismail. The Ministry of Defence established two Northern units of around 1200 force each in Abyan and Hadhramout. These were independent military forces, but were under the Southern military command, and they were not to adopt military actions without permission from central military administration. Colonel Qaid Abdul-Hafidh, a Northern Shafai, was in charge of the units.

Below we shall explain the impact of Ismail's policies on the unification process.

### **3.5.1 The Impact of Ismail's policies on the Unification Process**

During his time in power, Ismail brought the Soviet Union very close to PDRY.<sup>112</sup> He needed their support if he was to have an effective revolutionary impact in Northern regions. Arms shipment grew.<sup>113</sup> Top Soviet military personnel visited the PDRY and a military agreement for 15 years was concluded.<sup>114</sup> Furthermore, Ismail invited the Soviets to use naval bases and airfields for monitoring, storage and communications, in return for provision of tanks, MiG planes and other equipment.<sup>115</sup>

Ismail supported revolutionary elements in the North, especially the NDF, so as to mobilise the Shafai part of the YAR's population.

In 1978, a war was waged between the two states.<sup>117</sup> The war broke out as a result of military frictions in the Beidha-Mukairas border region but extended later to all Yemeni border areas. YAR army units had captured two Southern villages in July 1978, and in 1979<sup>118</sup> Ismail countered this attack by sending regular PDRY forces backed by NDF elements into the YAR. The Southern forces captured a few Northern villages but retreated upon Arab countries mediation.<sup>119</sup>

It is important to note that Ismail and the main Southern-born PDRY leaders had different perspectives of this war. Ismail and his faction wanted the Southern troops to take over major part of the YAR. The main Southern born leaders did not share this objective, they wanted only to hit the Northern troops hard as they had started this war. The Soviets too were not really interested in allowing the PDRY leadership to become entangled in a long

range war over a minor incident.

### **3.5.2 The unification process during Ismail's Presidency**

The unification process did not make much progress during Ismail's presidency, due to the high tension between the two states. Ismail, was in principle, against all unification moves with the Northern Zaydi regime. Nonetheless, because of the 1979 war, he was compelled, by the regional community, to conclude a unification agreement with the YAR. The Northern regime, on the other hand, was also reluctant to enter into a unification move with the "communist regime" in the South, particularly in view of Ismail's character, ideology and objectives.<sup>123</sup>

Below is an account of the unification process following the 1979 war between the YAR and the PDRY.

#### **3.5.2.1 The Kuwait Agreement, March 1979**

The resumption of talks on the programme of unification occurred when Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, Amir of Kuwait, invited the two Yemeni Presidents to attend a meeting in Kuwait. The two Presidents, Ali Abdullah Saleh of the North and Abdul-Fattah Ismail of the South, met in Kuwait on 4-6 March 1979. They signed an agreement, the Kuwait Unification Accord, on 30<sup>th</sup> March 1979. This agreement emphasised the legality of all previous agreements between the two Yemeni states and agreed that the unification programme incorporated in the Cairo Agreement should be carried out.

1. The constitutional committee was to launch the constitution of the unified state within 4 months.
2. The Presidents of the two states would approve the constitution

and call the two representatives' houses to approve this constitution in their respective countries.

3. The two Presidents would form a ministerial committee to supervise the general poll on the constitution within six months from the creation of a unified legislative authority.
4. The two Presidents would be combined by the Cairo Agreement and Tripoli Announcement in their contexts and rules.
5. The two Presidents would be responsible for the supervision of the progress of the legislative authority and other committees.

#### **3.5.2.2 The Bi-Annual Meeting of the HCY, October 1979**

Following the last meeting in 1977, the next bi-annual meeting of the HCY between the two states was commenced on 4 October 1979.<sup>126</sup> President Ali Abdulla Saleh of the North and Premier Ali Nasser Mohammed of the South met in Sanaa, on 4 October 1979, to assess and review the unification programme carried out so far between the two "brotherly States of Yemen."<sup>127</sup> Abdul-Fattah Ismail, who was supposed to attend the meeting, failed to do so as he was reluctant to enhance any unification programme at that stage.

In this meeting, however, the two sides agreed on only one basic principle, namely the non-interference of either side in the internal affairs of the other. This principle was vital for the YAR given that the Northern opposition had been actively supported by the PDRY.



### **3.6 The Ascent of Ali Nasser Mohamed and the Unification Measures, 1980-1985**

By 1980, the management of the state had fallen on the Premier, Ali Nasser Mohamed.<sup>128</sup> Many top tasks, such as the conclusion of bilateral agreements for development projects (which needed the President's signature/approval) had been left unattended until the Premier dealt with them.<sup>129</sup> Meetings at bilateral and international levels were increasingly attended only by the Premier.<sup>130</sup> Most of the national ceremonies were also attended by the Premier or a lower official, while President Ismail would never be on the scene.<sup>131</sup> In general, most of the important state functions were paralysed.<sup>132</sup> In Chapter 2, the removal of Ismail, the main enemy of the unification process, was discussed and analysed.<sup>133</sup> It is in this political environment which we shall now chart the ascension of Ali Abdallah Salih.

#### **3.6.1 The Sana'a Meeting of June 1980<sup>134</sup>**

A general agreement was signed between Ali Abdullah Saleh of the North and Ali Nasser Mohamed of the South on 13<sup>th</sup> June 1980 in Sanaa.<sup>136</sup> While previous unification discussion had been concerned only with the broad programme of unification, the unification measures discussed in this meeting were practical and specific. Economic and political agreements were signed at sectoral levels by the respective ministers.<sup>137</sup> Each state nominated a minister for unification affairs (Abdullah Homran in the North and Abdullah Al-Khamri in the South).<sup>138</sup> A migration agreement was signed, on 12<sup>th</sup> June 1980, between the Interior Ministers of the two states, allowing citizen's mobility between the two parts of Yemen.<sup>139</sup>

Within the economic context, three agreements were made:<sup>140</sup>

- a. A joint tourism company was created between the two states,

under an agreement signed by the Ministers of Tourism on 12<sup>th</sup> June 1980.

- b. Joint companies were created for transport (land and sea), under an agreement signed by Transport Ministers on 12<sup>th</sup> June 1980.
- c. A project for natural resources in the Shabwah-Marib area was drafted by the Oil Ministers of the two states. The Janna Area Project had to be reviewed and approved by higher authorities and came into force in 1985.

### **3.6.2 The Taiz Meeting September, 1981**

In continuation of the unification programme between the two Yemeni states, a meeting was held between President Ali Abdulla Saleh and President Ali Nasser Mohamed of the North and the South respectively, on 14-15 September 1981, to review the unification measures accomplished so far.<sup>141</sup> The two Presidents signed the Document of the Higher Yemeni Council (HYC) to give the HYC legal status. The latter was implemented on 6<sup>th</sup> December 1984 when fully-staffed formal unification offices were established in the two states.<sup>142</sup>

### **3.6.3 The Taiz Meeting in May 1982**

In keeping with the biannual schedule, a second meeting was held between the two Presidents in May 1982.<sup>143</sup> This meeting emphasised that each state would mind its own internal affairs, and that non-interference in the other's affairs should characterise the unification programme:<sup>144</sup>

*Article 1: Non-Interference to be made on others' affairs; and avoidance of struggles in the relationship of the two Yemen states. Problems to be solved peacefully.*

This meeting expressed the Northern leadership's anger because of the involvement of the Southern leadership in support given to the NDF which accelerated the insurgency in the Shafai areas against the regime over this period.<sup>145</sup>

#### **3.6.4 Political Changes in each State and their Impact on Unification, 1982-1985**

Since the last meeting in May 1982, the two Yemeni states had undergone a series of political developments, separately but significantly, among which the unification programme stood stagnant. The major political development in the North was the establishment of the General Peoples' Congress (GPC) in August 1981, which gave a popular boost to the Northern President and leadership.<sup>146</sup> The political boost was combined with an economic boost with developments in agricultural production, oil explorations and basic infrastructures.<sup>147</sup>

While economic and political developments were taking place positively in the North, political frictions and complications were developing in the South causing serious party fragmentations.<sup>148</sup> The moderate line in the Southern leadership had influenced, positively, the country's profile internally and externally.<sup>149</sup> The private sector was encouraged to grow in production sectors. Extension of diplomatic ties, especially with neighbouring countries, was promoted; and more flexible policies were introduced at all levels by the new Southern leadership headed by Ali Nasser Mohamed.

As a result of political frictions and differences in the

Southern leadership, Ali Nasser failed to push the unification programme further than the meeting in 1984 and 1985. In early 1986, he left office for good as a result of the January war.<sup>153</sup>

### **3.6.5 Aden-Taiz Meeting of January 1985**

While economic and political changes were taking place, smoothly in the North and with problems in the South, the two Presidents called for a meeting of the two states to promote the unification programme. On 19<sup>th</sup> January 1985, President Ali Abdulla Saleh of the North arrived in Aden, where a meeting was held between him and Ali Nasser of the South in the presence of the HCY members.<sup>155</sup> On 20<sup>th</sup> January 1985, the two Presidents travelled by land to Taiz to continue their meeting until 21<sup>st</sup> January 1985.<sup>156</sup> This meeting was meant to indicate the strong co-operation between the two Presidents on the unification programme, although one enjoyed a stronger platform in his internal national affairs than the other. President Ali Abdulla Saleh had all types of institutions under his hand, while Ali Nasser did not have the military under his control. The two Presidents reviewed all past unification agreements and passed necessary regulations.

## **3.7 The Stagnation of the Unification Process 1986-1988**

There was, over this period, a complete deadlock in the unification programme due to the 'civil war' in the South between the leftist and rightist party factions in January 1986.<sup>157</sup> Until April 1988, the unification programme between the two states was essentially moribund.

### **3.7.1 The War of 1986**

The Civil War of 13<sup>th</sup> January 1986, was the worst civil war in the PDRY's history, with a severe impact on the unification programme and

bilateral relations with the North.<sup>158</sup> As indicated earlier in Chapter 2, over 12,000 of military people were killed and several thousands injured, in addition to material losses incurred in buildings, weaponry, and other equipment.<sup>159</sup>

Among the reasons for the high tension between the hard-line left and the moderate policy makers that led to the war, was the unification issue. Abdul-Fattah Ismail - who came back to power in the third conference with Southern leftists (October, 1985) - Al-Beidh, Ali Anter, Saleh Mosleh, Al-Seyeili and others; did not approve of the high speed of the unification process.<sup>160</sup> Principally, they were for unification, but they did not see it as a feasible option while the Northern regime was tribally-based. They were looking for a revolutionary regime in the North, through which the unification between the two states would be meaningful, based on similar political platforms. This would mean waiting a long time until such a political base was developed in the North.

### **3.8 Unification Measures 1988-1990**

#### **3.8.1 The Revival of the Unification Programme**

As a substantial portion of the faction of the ex-Southern President faction left the country to the North in 1986 with Ali Nasser himself, the unification programme remained stagnant until 1988.<sup>161</sup> Although Ali Nasser's faction had no official authority in the North, their presence did not encourage an

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<sup>161</sup>

atmosphere of trust during talks discussing unification. Furthermore, with the death of 27 top leftist-leaders of the party, it was not easy for the leftist successors to overcome the impact of the 1988 war.

The revival of the unification programme, in effect, came about as a result of some negative political and economic developments in the two Yemeni states as shall be explained below.

### **3.8.2 Political and Economic Developments (1986-1988)**

A number of political developments during the period 1986-1988 contributed to the revival of the unification programme in 1988 in both states. In the south, *Perestroika* in the former Soviet Union had an impact on PDRY policies. The new leadership of the YSP wanted to pursue the same leftist policies in both the state and the party as had been established under an extreme leftist power centre.<sup>162</sup> However, the Soviet advisers advised them to encourage the gradual transformation of the centrally-planned economy into a market-oriented one.<sup>163</sup> They also advised the PDRY leadership to establish strong diplomatic ties with neighbouring countries, and with the YAR in particular. Such recommendations were difficult for the northern factions within the YSP to accept. Their presence in the state administration during this period was more substantial than ever,<sup>164</sup> much to the annoyance of the power-centre of southern origin. These southern elites therefore forced the revival of the unification programme in order to ensure that the northern factions did not obtain unrivalled power.<sup>165</sup>

On the other hand, the YAR was very much involved politically in both the Arab Co-operation Council (ACC) and the Iraq-Iran war.<sup>166</sup> Internal sources revealed that Northern leadership had much opposition from fundamentalists against sending troops to Iraq to fight against the Iranians. This proved to be true when the war was over in 1988, but the real problem to Ali

Abdulla Saleh, during this period was the substantial presence of Northern Shafais in the Southern leadership in the party and the state administration. His overriding fear was that they would build up a strong Northern Shafai army in the PDRY with the aim of attacking the YAR. To prevent this goal from being achieved, he had to revive the unification programme at any cost.

Economically speaking, the Southern economy started to lose some ground after the 1986 war for many reasons. First, the restructure of the military and civilian institutions after the war of 1986 imposed a burden on the annual budgets of 1986, 1987 and 1988.<sup>167</sup> Secondly, as most of current equipments of workshops, factories and others were from socialist countries, prices of spare parts (of pumps, bulldozers, fish factories, etc.) were extremely high. Thirdly, current political expenditures - particularly to the new leadership and the large Northern faction who came to the South after the war - were made of highly inflated budgets (7-8 new Northern ministers in the government, in addition to over 50 party elite members from the North residing in Aden).<sup>168</sup> The northern faction was composed of groups opposed to the GPC and the administration of Ali Abdallah Salih. The budgetary burdens created by this influx of people (which numbered several thousand) contributed to the acute economic problems in the South.

On the other hand, despite its oil production which began in 1986, the North also faced economic difficulties. With an open market economy, demand exceeded the supply of local production. A substantial portion of the North's agricultural production was marketed in neighbouring countries, the KSA in particular, and prices rose mainly because of the high proportion of imported goods.<sup>169</sup> The dollar rose slightly to 4.5 riyals and was artificially maintained at this level.

### **3.8.3 The Taiz Meeting of April 1988**

As the unification programme was the only feasible outlet for the political and economic problems of the two states, the two leaderships agreed to revive it on a mutual acceptable basis. This what was referred by Malek Mufti as a “defensive Unionism” whereby the two parties were eager to protect their power interest through such integrative mechanism. The first move was started by the southern leadership which sent the Minister for Unification Affairs, Rashed Thabet, to the North, to sign with his counterpart Hussein Al-Arashi, an agreement on the revival of the unification programme.<sup>170</sup> Accordingly, the two Interior Ministers signed an agreement allowing citizens of the two states to move between the North and the South with their personal identity cards only.<sup>171</sup>The Oil Agreement between the two states, to cover cooperation in the common Jannah area (between Marib and Shabwa), was renewed.

#### **3.8.4 The Impact of the Revival of the Unification Process on the Public Opinion in the Two States. 1988-1990.**

As political and economic developments in the two states were not favourable to a high portion of the two leaderships, the unification programme was highly welcomed by the public in the two states.<sup>175</sup> The Southern population, including the technocrats, had been disappointed by their immature Southern leadership. They were hurt and humiliated by the Northern leaders in the South, who never respected Southerners. The Northern Shafais and those Zaydis outside Hashed tribe, moreover, looked forward to the Southerners helping to set up a unified Yemeni political system, with a law and order mechanism similar to that in the South. The Northerners were fed up with the Hashidis and their tribal rule. Public opinion was, therefore, asking for a change through the unification programme.

#### **3.8.5 The Aden Meeting, November 1989**

As 30 November of each year marked the Independence Day



Anniversary in the PDRY, President Ali Abdulla Saleh made a significant move by arriving in Aden, at the head of a large group delegation from the North, on 30<sup>th</sup> November 1989. He delivered a unification speech, asking the Southern leadership to expedite the unification programme at the earliest stage.<sup>177</sup>

Ali Salem Al-Beidh - the Secretary-General of the YSP since the 1986 war - delivered the party speech where he indicated certain obstacles (in constitutional laws, financial and administrative systems, etc.) standing against the formalisation of the unification programme. It was obvious that the two leaders did not have a common language for the unification programme.<sup>178</sup>

In due course of the programme of that day, the two Presidents had a closed session of six hours talks. They came out of the closed meeting approving the finalisation of the unification programme within six months only.<sup>179</sup>

### **3.8.6 The Practical Steps for the finalisation of the Unification Process**

As the two leaders agreed on the finalisation of the unification process within six months starting in November 1989, practical steps had started to take place between the two states. Sectoral committees were established to arrange for new financial, legal, monetary and administrative systems. Files of leadership at all levels were moved between Aden and Sanaa, arranging for their transfer.<sup>180</sup>

Other regional powers (Iraq, UAE and Libya) helped in the accommodation of Southerners in Sanaa and blessed the unification process.

On 22<sup>nd</sup> May 1990 the two leaderships signed the Unification treaty in Aden and a new flag was put up on the former Southern Presidential site, marking

the first day of the newly established State, 'The Republic of Yemen'.<sup>181</sup>

### **3.8.7 Assessment of the Unification Process by the Two Yemeni Constituent States**

It was obvious that the differing internal and foreign policies pursued by the two states had an adverse impact on the unification process. The unification principle had been genuinely adopted by the two sides since the eve of their independence. Ironically, however, each side pursued policies which prevented the unification process from making progress due to the impact of these policies on the other state. In other words, each side wanted to impose its ideology on the other in the unification process. The northern leadership, within its setup did not want to proceed with the unification process if this led to the spread of socialist power not only in the south but in the northern Shafai parts also. The southern leadership, with Ismail playing the leading role, did not want to proceed with the unification process if this involved 100% Zaydi control on the northern side. These attitudes from each side, destructed the unification process in several intervals and culminated in two inter-states wars in the 1972 and 1979.

Consequently, the mechanics of the unification process were complimented by covert objectives from the beginning, and were not pursued seriously. The agreements of Cairo and other successive unification pacts were not manipulated logically and rationally in terms of policy variations, developmental processes, leadership compositions, the impact of law and order in the two states, the social variations between Sanaa and Aden, the role of women in the two societies and many other social norms and values.

Two major factors influenced the hazardous path of Yemeni unification in the seventies and the eighties, namely the tribalism in the north and the radicalism of the southern policies. The north had had Zaydi rule since

centuries and continued to have this under the republican status of the YAR, thus preventing the Shafais from participating in the power centre i.e. in the presidential authority. This problem had a great impact in the south as the policy-making body in the political organisation of the south was primarily in northern Shafais' hands (Ismail and his faction). Under the influence of Ismail, the south adopted radical political policies which primarily targeted the north and its Zaydi power centre through the insurgencies of the northern Shafais supported by the south. The radical views of the political organisation in the south created fragmentation among the southern leadership that led to some alliances forming between the southerners and the Zaydis in both leaderships (Rubayye'a and Al-Hamdi, & Ali Nasser and Ali Saleh) against the other factions in the south. Political friction rose to the extent that the unification process was often subject to freezing and defreezing modes.

With Ismail's death in the 1986 civil war in the south, northern opposition parties continued to work, ineffectively, in the south. The unification at the end was finalised between the southerners and the Zaydis in the two leadership, leaving the northern Shafais outside presidential power in the north.

Many Yemeni writers wrote about the unification process between the two Yemeni states without addressing the tribal/factional problem as an underlying cause behind all the political instabilities between the two states. No doubt the precarious conditions would not allow any Yemeni to address it as such. However, the researcher, who had the privilege to work with both leaderships and had been informed by her contacts from the two sides, is hereby addressing the problem which need to be addressed for further forthcoming research and study. The researcher thinks that unless this problem is nationally addressed and recognised as the pivot for all Yemeni problems, political

stability will hardly be achieved and thus the prosperity of Yemen will continue be without reach.

### 3.9 Conclusions

It is clear that the work and platform for Yemeni unification was not sound. It resulted in an *ad hoc* unity which led to many complications both in the north and in the south. Eventually, the unity moved from a willingly entered unification, at least from the southern side, into an imposed one, as shall be examined in the next chapters.

The two former states did not attempt to undertake studies on the form and pattern of the unification between the two variant states' administrations during the pre-unity period. This resulted in severe political confrontations between the two parties and had a highly negative impact on both nations.

The doctrinal/tribalism factor was, no doubt, the prime cause for the unification process dislocations in both its pre-unity period and later. The unification process in the pre-unity period ignored many parameters of which the political one by itself needed to be thoroughly studied before incorporating those agreements and accords. The preparation mechanism for the unification went into discreet maneuverings which were not in favour of a healthy unity between the two Yemeni states.

The socio-economic parameters were far different from those of the 1972 period, on which the unity of the two parties was based. The national institutions of the south were more sound than those of the north. The law and order machinery was more effective and highly respected in the south than in the north. The influence of tribal power was too strong in the north and outweighed the power of the state. The status of women was better in the south than in the north. None of these parameters were taken care of

in the Cairo Agreement and other successive accords.

The regional authorities' roles, namely that of the Arab League and some other states in the region, were too weak in understanding the requirements of the unity process. The Arab League did not take account of the variations between the two systems in terms of the socio-political parameters, and therefore contributed to the *ad hoc* unity arrangement which was based on weak planning. The Arab League and other Arab states did not realise the tribalism/factionalism problems that plagued both Yemeni states.

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27. Ibid., p 117.
28. Ibid., p 116.
30. This is taken from a telephone discussion between the researcher and the ex-Premier Al-Ainy in June 1996 when he was an Ambassador in Washington to the ROY. He later explained to the researcher the major events that led to the Cairo Agreement between the two Yemeni states.
31. Ibid.
32. Kostiner, J., p. Cit., pp 85-86.
33. Ibid.
34. Government of Yemen, The state documentary series on Yemen Unity , Katab Al-Yaman Al-Wahed (The One Yemen Book) , Sanaa, 22nd May, 1994, pp 38-43.
35. All other subsequent agreements referred to Cairo Agreement.
36. Country documentary series, Op. Cit., p 38-43.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. This was according to the legal administrative structure of the PDRY as explained in Chapter 2.
40. Katab Al-Yaman Al-Wahed Op. Cit., pp 44-49.
41. Ibid.



42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Katab Al-Yaman Al-Wahed, Op. Cit., pp 50-51.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Katab Al-Yaman Al-Wahed, Op. Cit., pp 52-53
50. Ibid.
51. Al-Ghafari, Op. Cit., pp 120-121.
52. Katab Al-Yaman Al-Wahed, Op. Cit., 44-49.
53. Al-Janahi, S., Op. Cit.
54. Halliday, F., Op. Cit., p 110
55. Saif, A. K. A., M.A. dissertation, Department of Politics, University of Exeter, September, 1997. Section 3B.
56. The researcher was an old member in the political organisation in the south and a Deputy Minister in the state administration, all of which qualified her to be closed to inner political circles.

57. Saif, A. K. A., Op. Cit., Section 3B.
58. Halliday, F., Op. Cit., pp 120-122.
59. Carapico, S., Op. Cit., p 33.
60. Ibid.
61. Saif, A. K. A., Op. Cit.; Halliday, F., Op. Cit., p 122.
62. Halliday, F., Op. Cit., pp 120-122
63. Ibid. p 122.
64. ME/5639/A/5-6, 13 October, 1977; Halliday, F., Op. Cit., p 123.
65. Nasser Yassin, the researcher's close friend and neighbour, was the Attorney General in the South (1972-1973). He was one of the right-hand men of President Salem Rubayye'a Ali.
66. This was the essence of the political problems between the northern faction (Ismail) and the Southerners in the state administration (Rubayye'a).
67. President Rubayye'a expressed this idea often to the researcher, who was Director General in the Ministry of Agriculture, the Minister of Agriculture (S Nasser), the Vice-Minister (S. Al-Alinoo who was the researcher's in-law) and officials in the agriculture ministry. The researcher sometimes would give policy advice which would keep away conflicts among the leadership.
68. The facts in this sub-section were from the memos of the researcher who actively played a role in both the political and state administration in the south during this period (1973-1978).

69. Kostiner, J., Op. Cit., p 84.
70. Ismail had a family residence in Steamer Point and a sole residence in Crater.
71. Kostiner, J., Op. Cit., p 58-78.
72. Ali Sheye'a Hadi, Minister of Interior (1978-80), spoke to the researcher when she was accompanying him on an official trip to Moscow and Vietnam in January, 1979.
73. Halliday, F., Op. Cit., p 24.
74. At the beginning, they were in support of Ismail, but in the eighties. At later stage, some key figures of these parties were in support of Ali Nasser against Ismail.
75. Mane'a, I., Op. Cit., p 168.
76. Halliday, F., Op. Cit., pp 27-29.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid. p. 29.
79. Refer to endnote No. 68.
80. Interviews with N Yassin and SA Al-Ninoo, ex-Minister of Housing and Vice-Minister of Agriculture and Central Committee respectively in 1982 and successive talks with them up to 1996.
81. Ibid.
82. Kostiner, J., Op. Cit., p 58-78.

83. Katab Al-Yaman Al-Wahed Op. Cit., p 67.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Halliday, F., Op. Cit., p 123.
88. Ibid., p121
89. Interview with Nasser Yassin in 1996.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.; Also talks with Colonel Al-Maqdami confirmed the incident.
92. Senior officials in the north, at the Presidential Office, talked to the researcher on this event.
93. The assassination of Al-Ghashmi in 1978 was instigated by President Rubayye'a. (See also Halliday, F., Op. Cit., p 30.)
94. Halliday, F., Op. Cit., pp 30-31.
95. Ibid. p 123.
96. Ibid.
97. The researcher , as deputy Director General in Agriculture (1977-80) recruited some

northerners in her department. This was the case in other sectors.

98. This meant more support for the NDF and its leadership in Aden.
99. There were contacts between President Rubayye'a and President Al-Ghashmi on this issue. Source: Zaid Sulaiman, President Rubayyea'a's Office Director.
100. Halliday, F. Op. Cit., p 123-124; Carapico, S., Op. Cit., p 36.
101. Ibid.
102. Mr S. Al-Nino, member of the Central Committee and Vice-Minister of the Agricultural Ministry, lived above the researcher's flat and explained what happened in the meeting. Early morning he went into hiding for three weeks before surrendering himself to his friend, S Nasser, the Minister of Agriculture and Ali Nasser's cousin.
103. Ibid.
104. The researcher was living in an area close to where the shelling was taking place.
105. Central PDRY media on TV and radio on 27/6/1978.
106. Aden Gazette, October, 1978.
107. Late Judge A.R. Al-Iryani, ex-YAR President, phoned Ismail from Syria and asked him to step down from the southern Presidency. The source (Ambassador S. Al-Go'ari) said: *The ex-President Iryani told Ismail that the southern Presidency should be in southerners' hands and that 'you' (referring to Ismail) were one of 'our' northern natives.*
108. Halliday, F., Op. Cit., p 123-126.

109. Ibid.
110. The facts in this and the second two paragraphs were collected by the researcher from her interaction with Ali Anter (ex-Defence Minister), Ali S. Hadi (Interior Minister) and Al-Seyilli (ex-Security and Interior Minister).
111. The researcher visited Colonel A.Wahed in July 1989 in his unit in Hadhramout.
112. Kostiner, J., Op. Cit., p 82-83.
113. Ibid. p 82.
114. Ibid. pp 91-91.
115. Ibid. p 91.
116. Ibid. p 69.
117. Halliday, F., Op. Cit., p 124. )The war period 24/2 - 3/3/79); Carapico, S., Op. Cit., p 36, for different views on who started the 1979 war.
118. Kostiner, J. Op. Cit. p 71.
119. Halliday, F. Op. Cit. p 124.
120. Ex-Unification Adviser to the President in the YAR, H. Al-Daf'ai, came on a formal visit and spoke to ex-Agriculture Minister, S. Nasser, that he found it difficult to negotiate on southern/northern unification issues with a northern native.
121. Kitab al-Yaman al-Wahed, Op. Cit., pp 72-74.
122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
126. Ibid. pp 75-77.
127. Ibid. pp 75-77.
128. The researcher was in the Ministry of Agriculture as a deputy Director General and then as a deputy Minister in the south. She had an effective interaction politically and economically in the state and party administrations. All the facts in this subsection were gathered from her experience with the southern leadership, both at formal and personal levels.
129. In agriculture, for example, many projects co-financed by international agencies, were delayed because of the slow response of the Presidency.
130. As in the case of the Unification Process, where Ali Nasser signed some agreement with Ali Abdulla Saleh, President of the YAR.
131. It was the Dhale'a-Redfan factions who put pressure on the Soviets to keep their relations with the PDRY state and not with individuals. Colonel Anter informed the researcher of this in 1980 when he visited the Ministry of Agriculture to discuss joint irrigation projects between the two ministries.
132. Talks went on this issue within the closed party circles.
133. A meeting was held between the Minister of Defence, Anter, and the USSR Ambassador when the latter objected to the House Arrest of Ismail in March, 1980. In this meeting, Colonel Anter made it clear to the Ambassador that the relationship between USSR and PDRY was at a state-to-state level and not a state-to-individual level. They came to a compromise where Ismail was to leave PDRY on health reasons. (This was stated by Anter in his office when the researcher with another comrade were in his office in August, 1980. At that period, Anter was the Vice-

President of the PDRY)

134. Halliday, F., Op. Cit., p 35.
135. Ibid.
136. Katab Al-Yaman Al-Wahed, Op. Cit., p 82-88.
137. Ibid. p 89.
138. Ibid. pp 82-88.
139. Ibid. pp 91-94.
140. Ibid. pp 95-120.
141. Ibid. p126.
142. Ibid. pp 127-137.
143. Ibid. p138.
144. Ibid. p 138.
145. Halliday, F., Op. Cit., p 130.
146. Mane'a, I., Op. Cit., p 130.
147. Carapico, S., Op. Cit., p 42-43.
148. Halliday, F., Op. Cit., p 128.



149. Gulf states and some Islamic countries had good relations with the PDRY during Ali Nasser's rule.
150. This was natural attitude as all military/security loans, equipments and expertise were from the socialist bloc.
151. In 1980-81, the northern faction in the YSP achieved in widening the gap between Dhal'ees and Ali Nasser who sent Haitham Taker off to Moscow for studies for nine months. The latter was the second man in the military force and was replaced by Colonel A. Alaiwah (from Shabwa).
152. Refer to details in Chapter 2.
153. Ibid.
154. Katab Al-Yaman Al-Wahed, Op. Cit., pp 171-173.
155. Ibid. pp 198-201.
156. Ibid. pp 198-201.
157. Halliday, F., Op. Cit., pp 133-136.
158. Ibid.
159. Refer to details in Chapter 2.
160. Colonel Anter and his Dhale'a Redfan faction did not approve of Ali Nasser's foreign policy, especially with regard to the KSA and the YAR. This attitude was because of the alliance of the Royal (Saudi) regime with the Zaydi regime against the poor in Shafai areas.
161. Discussion with A. Ghanen, Minister of Legal Affairs and Parliament (1996-1998) with the researcher revealed that he was paying monthly

allowances to not less than 4,000 southerners in exile (YAR) following the 1986 war. Most of money was coming from UAE and other Arab countries. (Also see Halliday, p 42.)

162. The new Redfan-Dale'a faction in the leadership (Saleh Obaid, Hatihem Qassem, A Hadi and others) wanted naively to continue working on the hard line policy.
163. Many Soviet diplomats were passing over their messages which were rejected by some figures in the leadership.
164. There were 7-8 northern Shafai Ministers in the southern Cabinet.
165. The negative impact of northerners in the southern administration was too strong on resources and on southern technocrats.
166. The north sent a few hundred of its military troops in support of Iraq.
167. The economic destructions in buildings alone was estimated at 140m. (See Halliday, F., p 42.)
168. The Northern faction elite who resided in Aden after 1986 took over the southerners' houses of the Ali Nasser faction, in addition to the Government Housing projects allocated to Aden citizens since the mid-seventies.
169. A large portion of the north agricultural output, was marketed in the KSA and some neighbouring countries. Because of Gulf Crisis, marketing channels were closed.
170. Katab Al-Yaman Al-Wahed, Op. Cit., pp 232-235.
171. Ibid., pp 240-242.
172. Ibid. p 236.

173. Ibid.
174. Ibid. p 247.
175. The Yemeni Public in the two states were not satisfied with their Governments' performance: the south started to enter a chaos state of administration and the north was highly tribal and corrupt in its administration.
176. Katab Al-Yaman Al-Wahed, Op. Cit. pp 276-278.
177. Aden TV on 30/11/1989 (on the news at 9.00pm).
178. Ibid.
179. Ibid. Breaking news bulletin at 12.00.
180. The Process took 6 months indeed and everyone in the top hierarchies of the two administrations was either going/ coming to/from Sanaa/Aden.
181. Kitab Al-Yaman Al-Wahed, Op. Cit., p 311-314.

## CHAPTER 4

### **The Progress of the Integration of the State (1990-1994)**

This chapter will deal with the progress of the integration process between May 1990 and May 1994. It will show the achievements obtained by the two leaderships and the problems that they encountered in the integration process.

It will also deal with certain problematic issues which surrounded the integration process during this period and over which the two leaderships in the coalition intensified their disagreements resulting in a political crisis.

There will be a sub-section on the military problems between the southern and northern forces in the integration process as well as a critical review on the civil war of 1994 at the end of the chapter.

#### **4.1 Basic Issues in the Unification Agreement to form the Republic of Yemen from the former YAR and PDRY**

Several unification moves/meetings were undertaken during the period 1988-1989 between the two former Yemeni states, as explained in the preceding chapter.

The Aden summit meeting between President Colonel Ali Abdulla Saleh and Ali Salem Al-Beidh, President of the YAR and General Secretary of the YSP respectively, on 30th November 1989 was the most significant one for the establishment of the ROY.<sup>1</sup> In this meeting, the two leading figures approved the Constitution document project which was to be approved by the public after the integration was made as according to the second article of the Kuwait agreement.<sup>2</sup> They asked the authorities concerned to follow up and finalise all

the requirements of the Cairo agreements as referred to in articles 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13.<sup>3</sup>

The second important summit meeting was held between the 24<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> of December 1989 in which the two leaderships gave instructions to the authorities concerned to fulfil the requirements of the unification process within 6 months (December 1989 to May 1990).<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, all ministerial committees and executive agencies in the both states had 6 months in which to prepare for the unification process.<sup>5</sup>

#### **4.1.1 The Announcement of the Establishment of the ROY and the Organisation of the Transitional Period (May 1990 to April 1993)**

The Unification announcement establishing the Republic of Yemen (ROY) and the organisation of the transitional period was signed on 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1990 by Colonel Ali Abdulla Saleh and Ali Salem Al-Beidh.

The announcement document had 10 articles which read as follows:<sup>6</sup>

##### ***Article 1***

*On the 22nd May 1990, a fully integrated confederation/unification is to be established between the two Yemeni states, YAR and PDRY, whereby the international identity of each state is to be eliminated and both to be replaced by a new international identity called the Republic of Yemen (ROY). The latter will have Islamic legislative and executive authorities.*

##### ***Article 2***

*On the validity of this agreement, a Presidential Council will be formed for the transitional period made of five members, of whom a President and a Vice-President will be elected.*

*The formation of the Presidential Council will be made upon an election made by the Shawra Council of YAR and the Higher Peoples' Council of PDRY. The Presidential Council will give their authority before their first mutual meeting.*

*The Presidential Council will perform immediately its function in respect of its duties as per the constitution of the country.*

### **Article 3**

*A transition period of 2 years and 6 months only, to be defined starting from the validity of this agreement/announcement.*

*A representative council (Parliament) is to be established out of all members of Al-Showrah council (of former YAR) and the higher presidential council (of former PDRY) in addition to 31 members to be appointed by the Presidential Council.*

*The representative council is to perform all constitutional authority in its respect except Presidential Council election and constitutional changes.*

### **Article 4**

*In its first meeting, the Presidential Council (P.C.) is to issue a decree for the formation of a Consultative Council (C.C.) made of 45 members (from the two former states).*

### **Article 5**

*The P.C. is to form the Government of ROY with functions set in the constitution.*

### **Article 6**

*In its first meeting, the P.C. entrusts a technical committee for reviewing the country's administrative divisions whereby old country's partitions are dissolved.*

#### **Article 7**

*The P.C. is entrusted in decrees' issuance with legal power for country's flag, national anthem, etc.*

*The P.C., also in its first meeting, is to take a decision for inviting the representative council (Parliamentary) to make a session for the following:*

- a. the approval of the Presidential decrees by laws.*
- b. to grant the government the parliamentary trust/confidence on its programmes*
- c. to instruct the P.C. to put the constitution for Public approval for it before 30th November 1990.*
- d. to validate basic laws forwarded to it by the P.C.*

#### **Article 8**

*This agreement/announcement to be valid together with the new constitution which should be approved by the Al-Showra's and Higher Peoples' Councils.*

#### **Article 9**

*The agreement/announcement is regarded a regulatory instrument for the whole transitional period. The constitution - after being approved - as per the above item will be valid in a form that it does not contradict these rules of this agreement/announcement*

#### **Article 10**

*The approval of this agreement/announcement and of the ROY constituted by the Showra and HP councils invalidates the constitutions of both former states YAR and PDRY.*

Two initial points can be made with regard to the shortcomings of the basic unification agreements of Cairo and Tripoli upon which the unification in 1990 was based (see Chapter 3 for the importance of the Cairo and Tripoli Agreements to the unification process).<sup>7</sup>

The first point was that the basic agreements, on which other successive unification steps rested, were not updated in view of the dramatic changes that took place in the two states. The Cairo and Tripoli Agreements kept to the same original foundation for all actions of unification despite the changes in policies of the two states, political and economic developments, and the divergent attitudes of each state towards the other.

The second point was that the basic problem behind the unification problems in the past was never recognised.<sup>8</sup> Specifically speaking, the integration of the northern Shafais as a third Yemeni power block was never openly recognised or addressed in these basic agreements.

On the contrary, oppositions to the two power centres, the northern Shafais in the south and the Ali Nasser faction in the north, were left out of the integration process at the administrative organisations both centrally and regionally. The 'defensive' gesture of both power centres did not allow their integration into the unified system. It was, therefore, the Yemeni integration could be regarded as a 'defensive unionism' in the region.

Below, the progress of integration shall be analysed chronologically in respect of different power authorities: the Presidential Council, the Parliament and the cabinet.



## **4.2 The Progress of Integration in the Political/Administrative field during the period May 1990 - April 1993**

This section will look into the progress of integration between the former Yemeni states within the newly established state the ROY during the transitional period, which was extended from 2½ years to 3 years.

Below, the creation and operation of the three central authorities will be discussed, namely the Presidential Council (with a supervisory executive role), the Council of Ministers (and its administrative structure) and the Parliamentary institution. For each of these structures, an analysis will be carried out on the progress of integration of the two former administrative structures during the transitional stage.

### **4.2.1 The Progress of Integration at the Presidential Structure**

The progress of integration of the presidential structures will cover the following areas:

1. The composition of the Presidential Council
2. The differences in the approach to Integration and the struggle for power between the two leaderships. This section would include the followings:
  - a) The causes of the union from each power perspectives.
  - b) The impact of the predominance of northerners in Central Administration.
  - c) The Political Struggle over the Southern Public Sectors.
  - d) The Split of the Decision-Making between the two leaderships.
  - e) Saleh's Advantages at the Presidential Council and Al-Beidh's Reactions.

The centre of the interaction between the two leadership factions was the Presidential Council (P.C.). It was this key institution where critical decisions over integration were made and where the struggle for power and influence was focused.<sup>9</sup> This section will begin, therefore, with a description of the Presidential Council. It will then explain and analyse the issues which existed between the two rival leaderships as per above items.

#### **4.2.1.1 The Composition of the Presidential Council and the Implementation of the Unification Agreement**

The Presidential Council in the ROY was integrated with a five member's entity from the two former Yemeni states. The five members were:<sup>10</sup>

*Colonel Ali Abdulla Saleh, President of the ROY (GPC)*

*Ali Salem Al-Beidh, Vice President of the ROY (YSP)*

*Abdul Aziz A. Al-Ghani, Member of the P.C. (GPC)*

*Salem Saleh Moh'd, Member of the P.C. (YSP)*

*Al-Qadi Abdul Karim Al-Arashi, Member of the P.C. (GPC)*

An examination of the individuals in the Presidential Council reveals that the ex-YAR members constituted a stronger and more effective grouping than the ex-PDRY members within it. Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh was a military man, Abdul-Aziz A, Al-Ghani was an economist (USA Graduate) and Al-Qadi Al-Arashi was an experienced judicial man. On the other hand, both Ali Salem Al-Beidh and Salem Saleh Mohamed were politicians with no academic background. They both had long political experience, but ones characterised with political disputes and military confrontations rather than political stability.<sup>11</sup>

The Presidential Council fulfilled all the requirements of the unification agreement signed on 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1990. Both parties/leaderships in the P.C. fulfilled the following as items of the unification agreement: <sup>12</sup>

1. The establishment of the Presidential Council
2. The establishment of Council of Ministers
3. The choice of the new national flag for ROY and the national anthem
4. The amalgamation of sectors, manpower and embassies of the two former states the YAR and the PDRY
5. The establishment of the Consultation Council
6. The country unitary laws

The Presidential Council also agreed upon an objective arrangement for all national power in Sana'a (the administrative capital) and Aden (the economic capital and other major cities).<sup>13</sup> Material accommodations were made for southerners moving to Sanaa and other northern cities and for those northerners moving to southern regions for official governmental functions. While the southern leadership provided formal accommodation for northern elements in its leaderships out of its ration, the northern leadership did not accommodate southerners from the Ali Nasser faction out of its ration formally at executive levels.<sup>14</sup>

#### **4.2.1.2 Differences in the Approach to Integration and the struggle for Power between the leadership**

The following subsections will illuminate how defensive unionism did not work well between two different power centres. The power-sharing attitude was hardly existing due to the tribal background and individualistic mentality which the researcher asserted in the methodology in chapter one. The yemeni case witnessed various differences between the two leaderships while the

integration process was in its infancy. Major issues of differences between the two leaderships at the Presidential Council level will be explained below.

#### **4.2.1.2.1 The Causes of Union from the perspectives of each Power Centre**

The two political leaderships entered the integration process with an adverse attitude and approach for a fully integrative process. On account of having high numbers of members from the northern Shafai areas, the YSP thought that it would be able to gain political control of the national political arena in the near future.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, the GPC thought it would control the southern part on account of its large membership and its large military and security force.<sup>17</sup> Again, on political policies, the YSP thought that northerners would favour mass-involvement policies rather than tribal bond policies. The GPC leadership, however, thought that tribal bond policies - even in southern areas - would have more impact in their favour than the YSP's. Each one's political ideology, therefore, was strengthened under the unification auspices without consideration to the Yemeni unity requirements of political stability and economic prosperity in real terms.<sup>18</sup>

Similarly, the judicial mechanisms of the two former states rivalled against each other for predominance. The YSP leadership thought that its judicial system was a modern one and ought to supersede the northern system. The GPC leadership thought its judicial system was very much more Islamic based and ought to dominate the unsuitably ex-communist judicial mechanism.<sup>19</sup>

#### **4.2.1.2.2 The Predominance of the north in Central Administration**

The predominance of the ex-YAR administrative system in the central administration of the ROY was the key area of dispute between the two leaderships in the ROY at the Presidential Council level as it led to the ability

of the northern elite to manage, with flexibility, their affairs at the expense of southerners' rights and merits.<sup>20</sup> The Premier – a southerner - often expressed frustration (within his closed circle) at the frequent intervention of the President in cabinet affairs and the executing authorities without prior consultation.<sup>21</sup> The northern elite, at all levels, would respond to each other without giving consideration to the legality of the administration in the formal establishments. The YSP leadership, however, instead of objecting to such administrative violations followed suit but in southern affairs and regions.<sup>22</sup>

As the central administration of the ROY continued to operate an ex-YAR administration, the President's impact was much greater than the Vice-President within the central authorities. Reports, files, and all relevant information in the central administration were full accessible by the President but not the Vice-President. The latter, however, had much more access to southern reports and files more so than the former; but as these did not have relevant impact on the centrally current administration, the Vice-President was in a weak position in the overall decision-making structure.

The reactionary policy adopted by the YSP did not solve the predominancy problem in the central administration and, therefore, this problem continued to cause political friction between the northern and southern leaderships of the ROY.

#### **4.2.1.2.3 Political Struggle over the Public Sector in the South**

One of their major disputes at the P.C. level was the power dispute between the two leaderships over the public sector in the southern regions. Saleh and the ex-YAR central administration were not providing the minimum requirements to the southern public sector equally with those in northern regions such as the cement, cotton and other industries.<sup>23</sup> Al-Beidh on the other hand, was making arrangements for southern public sector support from within

the southern territory.<sup>24</sup> For example, the fishing corporations which were making high foreign profits did not submit these profits to the Ministry of Finance and were keeping it to cover maintenance and other running costs of their institutional subsidiaries.<sup>25</sup> Saleh was aiming to make the public sector stagnant to assist privatisation, which would likely be undertaken by the northern private sector. Al-Beidh regarded the non-support to the public sector in the south as an attempt to embarrass the YSP leadership in front of its own public. Saleh's struggle against the southern public sector was based on the new economic strategy for the ROY which implied the free market economy adaptation for all public sectors in Yemen. Al-Beidh, though, accepted the new strategy with hesitation and did not trust the northern leaderships genuineness/objectivity in the transformation process of southern public sector into a positive course. He was careful that the transformation process should not take place swiftly as this might have cost him in person, and the southern leadership, politically rather than economically. On the other hand, Saleh's administration was not objective towards the southern public sector in terms that scrutinised policies were not equally performed in the northern public sector and the mixed ones.<sup>26</sup>

Having examined the way the northern leadership handled the public sector in the southern regions, Al-Beidh and his leadership were right in their suspicions and consciousness of the transformation process. This will be explained in chapter 5.

#### **4.2.1.2.4 The Split of the Decision-Making between the two leaderships.**

The two leaderships at the P.C. level were practically split into northern/southern leaderships in the decision-making mechanism.<sup>27</sup> Despite the agreement on basic policies by the two leaderships, each one performed its policies with its authorities. Financial policies were totally ran by Saleh's administration while fisheries policies were under Al-Beidh's control.<sup>28</sup>

Similarly, this situation was operating with sectors under northern/southern ministers. There were, practically, no formal laws, regulations or institutions to restrict the two key-figures at the P.C. from ad-hoc formal behaviour/intervention in the executive authority.<sup>29</sup>

There was general consensus by observers that the two leaderships which created the ROY were, ironically, pushing matters to such an extent as to endanger the survival of the ROY. Northern problems, for example, sought northern key-figures for solutions at all levels. Similarly, southern problems sought their key figures for solutions.<sup>30</sup> The split and the distrust in the decision-making mechanism at P.C. level reflected itself throughout all lower hierarchies in the government, creating the main step towards the disintegration of the unified state.<sup>31</sup>

#### **4.2.1.2.5 Saleh's Advantages at the P.C. and Al-Beidh's Reactions**

As the ex-YAR administration was running on in the ROY's central administration, President Ali Saleh enjoyed more privileges than the Vice-President Al-Beidh.<sup>32</sup> Indeed, President Saleh enjoyed easy access to all northern authorities in his system in Sanaa.<sup>33</sup> He had easy access to all Presidential files, portfolios, reports and accords. With major key institutions - particularly Finance and Civil Service Ministries - in northern hands, Saleh was able to order/stop expenditure to/from any channels. He could recruit any number of employees to Governmental/Security institutions under northern hands. In general, Saleh enjoyed flexible decision-making apparatus in national policies at several northern fronts owing to geographical and structural reasons.<sup>34</sup>

The Vice-President, on the other hand, had very limited space for policy implications and this was confined more or less to southern regions and sectors only.<sup>35</sup> The first difficulty faced by Al-Beidh was on the definition of

his title 'vice', by which his limited authority and function were governed. The two leaderships had different understanding to the meaning of the 'Vice-President'. The northerners thought that the Vice-President would only be functioning on the absence of the President.<sup>36</sup> The southerners' understanding to the vice job, however, was a complementary function to the President, i.e. all issues were to be discussed and agreed upon simultaneously by the two figures; and in case of dispute, the two men had to forward disputable issues to the Council, the Parliament or the public for final say.

The second difficulty faced Al-Beidh in his tasks as a second leading figure at the P.C. was the northern supremacy in having elastic access to the central administration at the expense of southerners. Presidential reports/files would not be retrieved flexibly to Al-Beidh or his faction. Monitoring and screening of southerners work at P.C. (as well elsewhere) by northerners were often causing frustrations to the latter. Worst of all, bugging over telephones conversations and inside southerners' lodgings was naively overdone.<sup>37</sup> This led to severe reactions by Al-Beidh and his faction who found the situations highly intolerable.

#### **4.2.1.3. The Results of Leaderships Disputes**

No doubt leaderships disputes at P.C. level had negative impact on all national dimensions centrally, regionally and on sectors. At political fronts, the two leading parties: the GPC and the YSP - instead of coming closer - they parted further.<sup>38</sup> Through their daily and weekly papers, each accused the other of being traitor to the unification process. Each party media - Sanaa and Aden TV and Radios - accused each other of infringing the provisions of the unification process and sought for solitary domination.<sup>39</sup>



The worst measure of disputes between the two leaderships was the assassination measure mainly carried out against the YSP.<sup>40</sup> The flexible geographical background enjoyed by Saleh's administration in Sanaa made out of the YSP an easy target for the elimination of some of its key figures and supporters. Several assassination attempts - 154 - were made on YSP figures of whom the Minister of Justice - Mr Abdul Wase'a Sallam was one in 1992.<sup>41</sup> The minister survived but lost one eye plus other injuries.<sup>42</sup> The speaker of the Parliament in 1993 Dr Yassin Saeed Noman was another target. Dr Noman who was a key polit-bureau member in the YSP had his house shelled with heavy attack in the City of Sanaa.<sup>43</sup> The assassination series started in August 1991 against a southern opposition leader Mr Omer Al-Jawi - Chairman of the Yemeni Congregation Party in Sanaa where a northerner member of this party was the victim.<sup>45</sup> The northern security forces - under northern leadership - failed to bring the perpetrators to justice. Saleh's administration was held responsible for the assassinations' measurement in view of the failure of security forces to bring perpetrators to justice.<sup>46</sup>

As a result of these contestations between Saleh and Al-Beidh over power control, the latter after contemplating with his YSP leadership, left Sanaa and confined himself in Aden to run the southern regions affairs.<sup>47</sup> Al-Beidh was discussing all Presidential issues and problems with his Polit-bureau colleagues in all meetings, particularly, the top key-figures in the polit-bureau.<sup>48</sup> His confinement in Aden received unanimous consensus of the YSP leadership.<sup>49</sup>

#### **4.2.2 The Overall Political Integration of the ROY before the election of 1993**

Democracy was the major issue that both parties agreed upon to be an instrument in the yemeni arena. 46 political parties were recognised in the ROY to have equal chances to exercise their political rights in nominations,

voting and participation in political power. Below, the researcher will, critically examine the impact of these parties in the political arena of the ROY. However, in this section, the impact of the 1993 elections will only be discussed. The progress of integration in the Parliament will be discussed in section 4.2.4.

#### **4.2.2.1 The Parliamentary Election of 1993**

46 parties participated in the National Election of 1993 of which 8 political parties only competed effectively across the national arena.<sup>50</sup> Out of the 46 parties, only 8 parties participated effectively in the 1993 election of which the GPC and the YSP - the two formal parties in the Coalition - had the leading role in the election campaigns. Islah, the Sons of Yemen League and the Ba'ath were the other three parties with some decent representations in the country.<sup>51</sup> The Nasserites were divided into three separate parties and they could afford to compete effectively if they were united. All other parties were small in number and had no meaningful support at the national level.<sup>52</sup>

The new Parliament was based on the election results, resulting in a the following distribution of seats:<sup>53</sup>

**Table 4.1: Results of parliamentary elections, 1993 and 1997**

Party name	% vote	Seats	% vote	Seats
	1993	1993	1997	1997
General Peoples' Congress	28	123	42	187
Yemeni Reform Gathering	17	62	23	53
Yemeni Socialist Party	18	56	0	0
Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party	3	7	1	2
al-Haqq	>1	2	>1	0
Wahdawi-Nasiri	1	1	2	3
Democratic-Nasiri	>1	1	0	
al-Tashih	>1	1	0	
Independents	29	48	28	56
Other Parties	>2		>3	
Total		301		301

In terms of the absolute results, the above election figures were very much misleading. Though the GPC had won the majority of seats, a substantial number of seats in the northern regions went to other parties, notably Islah. In the south, the YSP won 47 seats out of its 57 constituencies. The YSP gave up, by its own choice, one seat to the GPC, one seat to a Al-Haqq candidate in Seyoun district, and 8 seats to independent figures supported by the YSP.<sup>54</sup> The YSP, however, was very disappointed by the political stance of its 2 million supporters in the north, who were supposed to have voted for the YSP northern candidates. The handful of seats won by the YSP in the north, for its 160 northern members, was far from the target figure envisaged by the northern YSP leadership.

#### 4.2.2.2 The Conduct of The Parliamentary Elections

There has been a controversial discussion whether the parliamentary elections were fair or not in consideration of the tribal background of the Yemeni

community and its leaderships. The writer was a member of the reception committee and her observations are given below:

*“All parties involved were entitled to get a specific amount from public resources for their election campaigns. However, both the GPC and the YSP used huge amounts of public resources for their respective election campaigns. The former drew resources from the budget and the oil resources, and the latter from oil and land resources in southern regions where the YSP still maintained predominance. The election campaigns were characterised by both tribalism and factionalism. Each side made alliances with other groups and parties of rival ideologies. The outbreak of violence, though at a minimum, was destructively strong in limited areas. In Hajja area, for example, the YSP secretariat building was destroyed on election day by the son of Sheikh Abdulla, Al-Ahmer-Hameed, who was a candidate running for parliamentary membership. His rival in that area was a northern YSP candidate. Several people were killed and injured. This resulted in Hameed winning through tribal supremacy rather than through the established system of voting, as reported by eye witnesses of the election poll.”*

However, when considering the tribal community of the ROY, the writer thought that it was a big achievement to have such a democratic experience irrespective of its negative/positive magnitudes. If the general educational standard of the public is taken into account, and the fact that firing incidents were low during the elections, the experience of the election was far more positive than could be expected before the event.

#### **4.2.2.3 The Impact of the Election on the YSP Leadership**

With the third largest majority in the parliamentary elections, the southern leadership in the YSP was compelled to revise its strategy in both northern and southern regions. The southerners in the YSP realised that they were under an illusion with regard to the militancy of their party members in northern areas.<sup>55</sup>

As the impact of the electoral policies of the northern leadership on the YSP was unable to play an effective role in the election, the YSP southern leadership thought it would be able to capture their ex-50% share of political power in the national arena.

In the next sub-section, the impact of the election results on the political crisis between the northern and southern leadership following the creation of the new state administration is discussed.

The Islah party, which won the second largest majority in the election, formed a serious threat to both the GPC and the YSP leadership in policy-making structures.<sup>56</sup> The Islah party proved to be politically effective in northern areas and with a great potential effect in the long run.

#### **4.2.2.4 The Political Crisis after the 1993 Election**

In view of the new leaderships of the post-transitional period, the YSP was forced to revise its political position in respect of the new political parameters. Based on the results of the parliamentary election, the new leadership composition for the ROY had changed in respect to the ROY's multi-party system. The former coalition enjoyed by the GPC and the YSP now had a third partner, namely the Islah party with its second majority in the Parliament. The YSP perceived that the election results revealed the dominance of the northern leadership over the southern and were sceptic of having an effective role in the state-building.<sup>57</sup> The decision-making structure had, therefore, a change in the composition of its Presidential Council. A representative from the Islah party was included, namely Sheikh A Majid Al-Zanadani - a formal and well-known religious scholar.<sup>58</sup> He replaced A.K. Al-Arashi of the GPC. Although the composition should have been three members from the GPC, 1 member from YSP and one from Islah, Colonel Saleh gave up one GPC seat to the YSP in order to keep the integration process running smoothly between the north and

the south. Everyone, however, knew that such generosity would not continue for long.<sup>59</sup>

With only a third of Parliament majority, the YSP revised its critical position along specific lines which were contradictory to the process of integration it had envisaged.<sup>60</sup> In view of the unification process that took place between the north and the south, the differences between the two states in terms of population, geographical disparities and other parameters were not addressed in the shaping of the power centre and political power-sharing mechanism of the unified system. However, based on the election results, the YSP started to contemplate the new challenges to it. From the YSP's point of view, the balancing power had migrated to the northerners, as all Islah figures in the Parliament were northerners or north settlers. The new leadership (at all levels) from then onwards put 'the former PDRY' in a disadvantaged position. The ex-50% share in power was reduced to a third, and possibly less, in the longer term. The YSP thought that, if the population norms would be the only measurement for sharing power in the post-transitional period, then this measurement would be refutable from the YSP side. The former PDRY, the YSP argued, had more than double the area of the former YAR and its national resources far exceeded those of the YAR's.<sup>61</sup> Such arguments, however, did not comply with the type of agreements on which the unification announcement was based. The unification agreements had many shortcomings but the ultimate responsibility for these shortcomings was blamed on YSP decision-making alone for coming to such an *ad-hoc* integration compared to what would have naturally taken place in view of a minority in population and a *laissez-faire* doctrine.

In view of the composition of the new leadership at all levels, the members of the YSP leadership confined themselves to their former power base in the south after the results of the parliamentary election.<sup>62</sup> On the eve of the formation of the new Parliament, Al-Beidh left Sanaa and stayed in Aden like he did in September 1992, but this time he never returned. Furthermore, he

refused to attend to give the oath of allegiance as a vice-president before the Parliament.<sup>63</sup> Various reconciliation attempts by the leaderships of major parties, tribes, factional groups and regional key leaders to bring Al-Beidh into the presidential power centre in Sanaa all failed.<sup>64</sup>

To keep its formal obligation to the integration process intact, the YSP leadership constructed an 18 point proposal on state management for the new leadership to consider.<sup>65</sup> The GPC also forwarded a 19 point proposal to the new administration about the position of the YSP.<sup>66</sup> An opposition group of 5 parties volunteered to study all the points and came up with a 16 point proposal.<sup>67</sup> The points forwarded by the YSP could be regrouped into the following:<sup>68</sup>

*3 points on security: To bring criminals behind the previous assassination attempts to justice, to take away military camps from major cities and to recruit security/military manpower with respect to qualifications and experience only.*

*4 points on legislation: To review the constitution in co-ordination with all influential/social factions, and to eradicate corruption from the legislative set-up.*

*5 points on political issues: To prevent the Presidential Council interfering with executing authorities, to give regions full authority to run their local affairs and to finalise laws for the establishment of local governments.*

*6 points on Economic Reforms: To decentralise financial and administrative systems in order to eradicate corruption. To deregulate and decentralise financial power to regions.*

The GPC points could be regrouped into the following:

*5 points on security/military aspects: Calling for immediate integration of the two forces, to be independent from tribes and political affiliation.*

*5 points on legislation: Asking the YSP to bind by the results of the election and the unification agreements.*

*5 points on politics: Asking the YSP to withdraw its hegemony on regional /public enterprises, authorities etc., and to reveal what happened to those lost in former PDRY political struggles and wars etc., and to bring administrative/financially corrupt figures to justice.*

While the YSP points were pragmatic in terms of administrative and institutional reforms, some of the GPC points were impractical in terms of criticising the ex-PDRY nationalisation law and the extermination of outlaws in the past history of the former southern state. Almost all YSP points called for a new state-building framework, with which future organisational work could be adopted. This was emphasised following the hard and intolerable experience faced by the southerners under unity.<sup>69</sup> Some of the GPC points, unfortunately, were not objective and especially those points related to former PDRY policies. There were a few points which if implemented would commit Colonel Saleh and his administration more than that of Al-Beidh's to thorough grass-root changes in the administrative set-ups and financial reforms and. These points were incorporated within the " Agreement and Pledge Accord" which shall be discussed later on in the next subsection.

As the political differences escalated more between the two leaderships, several attempts were made for the reconciliation of the two key figures of the President and Vice-President.

Below, the reconciliation steps shall be examined with their political outcomes.



#### 4.2.2.5 Reconciliation Attempts and the Agreement and Pledge Accord

The political crisis period (May 1993 - May 1994) witnessed a series of reconciliation attempts made by various national, regional and international figures which did not help the integration process positively.<sup>70</sup> Since the outcome of the results of the parliamentary election, the YSP leadership was not at ease in the capital Sanaa. The General Secretary of the YSP - Ali Salem Al-Beidh - withdrew from unification politics and confined his activities to the affairs of the YSP. He left Sanaa for Aden in May where his former power base was. In July 1993, he left for the USA for a medical check and came back to Aden instead of Sanaa on August 19th 1993 where he maintained his formal office as General Secretary of the YSP.<sup>71</sup> This decision was unanimously supported by the YSP leadership in the polit-bureau meeting of the following week.

In the hope of bringing him back to Sanaa, several reconciliation attempts were made by senior national, regional and international figures to close down the gap of political disputes between him and President Ali Abdullah Saleh.<sup>72</sup>

All reconciliation attempts failed in bringing Al-Beidh back into the integration process. Therefore, a national dialogue committee was established to lay down the basis for new political and administration strategies for the ROY's administration. Key figures from major tribes, parties and public associations were included in this national committee and succeeded in producing what became known as 'the Agreement and Pledge Accord' (APA).<sup>73</sup> The accord took over 6 months of dialogue between the two major northern/southern parties in the presence of other parties' mediators.<sup>74</sup> It was signed by all parties on 20<sup>th</sup> February 1994 in Amman, in the presence of the King of Jordan.<sup>75</sup> The APA was, in practical terms, a national document presenting a new basis for the integration process between the former YAR and PDRY.<sup>76</sup>

The APA basically considered three basic principles for national unity within a flexible confederate system. The first principle was the decentralisation of administration and financial systems in terms of budgetary control and employment.<sup>77</sup> The second one was the involvement of all northern and southern factions in central administrative-political power, and in their respective territories.<sup>78</sup> The third principle was that economic progress of the ROY had to be realised by central and regional authorities simultaneously to ensure justice in income distribution and employment opportunities.<sup>79</sup> These points and others were incorporated in the eighteen points forwarded by the YSP to the dialogue committee as well as to the GPC leadership which constituted the majority in the new coalition.

#### **4.2.3 The Progress of Integration in the Council of Ministers during 1990-1994**

The government between the two leaderships was shared out on a 50/50 ratio base and the 39 ministerial and deputy-premier posts of the cabinet were divided equally between them.<sup>80</sup> The Republic Decree Number 1 for 1990 was issued for the formation of the cabinet headed by a southern Premier- Haider Abu-Baker Al-Attas.<sup>81</sup> The Cabinet was formed of four Deputy-Premiers and 34 sectoral ministers, who were equally recruited and approved by the two leaderships again on a 50/50 ratio base.<sup>82</sup> Annex no. .... displays the cabinet members.

##### **4.2.3.1 Problems arising from the Characters of the Government Personnel**

There were certain basic features in the Council of Ministers which did not help the integration process positively. These features were:

1. The character of the Premier was not fit for such a powerful, and precarious, post. Haider Al-Attas, with an Egyptian education background in electrical engineering, started his career after 1968 in PDRY. He was then successful enough as Minister of Communication and Construction under an administrative machinery governed by good laws and regulations.<sup>83</sup> He carried out the ministry's programmes with top class foreign companies which were recruited by international agencies in his sector in the south.<sup>84</sup> He also carried out a premiership post in the south (1985) and was good enough when compared to other southern premiers.<sup>85</sup> However, he failed to carry out the position of the premiership of the YAR efficiently for many reasons. Below, I shall explain objectively these reasons behind the failure of Al-Attas as a premier.<sup>86</sup>

As the new Premiership job required grass-root changes for both parts of Yemen, Al-Attas found great difficulty in designing a flexible administration and set-up which would promote out the new unified system across the national arena satisfactorily. He failed to enforce an effective legal machinery or enact objective institutional laws for the central administration. He also failed to put trust in his colleagues or to form a team for this purpose. Ultimately, he found himself working on his own, suspending the workloads of various sectors, and thus causing a total paralysis in major issues and subsequently creating problems for the government.<sup>87</sup> This was partly to do with the weak monitoring institutional framework which existed to oversee the state administration and the top elite.<sup>88</sup> Under southern machinery, Al-Attas could not have done what he did in the YAR because of him being held accountable to the the party and watched by state monitoring systems.<sup>89</sup> The Premier in the ROY was not subject to an effective monitoring mechanism and the system was therefore easily corruptable.<sup>90</sup>

Furthermore, Al-Attas adopted nepotism in his administration at a remarkable rate, following the tribal pattern in the north. He recruited Hashemites, and mainly Southern Hashemites, at a much higher scale than their merits

allowed.<sup>91</sup> At the same time, he downgraded many good southerners, particularly females, to lesser grades than their old merited scales before the unification era.<sup>92</sup> Worst of all, however, he displayed extraordinary administrative and financial corruption himself by misusing his power and ordering the release of strategic lands to himself, his relations and faction.<sup>93</sup> In general, he allowed the affairs of the council of ministers to become increasingly corrupt and, under a tribally based system in the north, he felt weak even to support the existing poor legal force in the national system.

2- The type of figures brought/recruited by the GPC and YSP were far from being supportive to the national cause and technically of a poor standard for such critical period of time. Ironically, the south, which had more technocrats than the north in terms of the population ratio, recruited poor standard figures for the Council of Ministers. Southern observers were surprised by the YSP figures being recruited into the first government of the ROY. Ministers of Trade, Fisheries, Local Administration, Oil and minerals plus others were not technical figures and not at a standard to carry out grass-root changes without causing political frictions with the northern side.<sup>94</sup> The YSP could easily afford to recruit the best technical figures it had, not only to run sectors effectively, but also to build up a bridge of trust with GPC colleagues on an objective platform of understanding.<sup>95</sup> Most of the figures recruited by the YSP, unfortunately, were not qualified to function in harmony with the GPC figures at that stage.<sup>96</sup> Specifically, Salem Gobran - Minister of Fisheries, Fadhl Mohsin Abdulla - Minister for Trade, Saleh Bin-Hussainoon – Minister of Oil and Minerals, and Moh'd Saeed Abdulla of the local administration were traditional politicians who would not be qualified for a transitory stage in Yemeni development in the national and global dimensions. Experience proved at later stages that those ministries had hardly harmonal relationships in their institutions between northern and southern factions.<sup>97</sup> The GPC figures were not ideal either, but definitely represented a better technical group than those of the YSP. Both Dr Al-Iryani and Dr Al-Attar, of the Foreign and Industry Ministries respectively, had high international profiles

technically and politically and had better outlook on the global reality than the Premier; but again for a transitory stage they were not objective figures who could afford to be dedicated for national causes and interests. Indeed the only negative aspect in the GPC group was their total unobjective outlook towards southerners' conditions in terms of their public enterprises' needs and employment in the south. The northern elite underestimated the competence of many of the southern technocrats in their sectors. The majority of the GPC figures did not welcome southerners in their institutions and badly humiliated them with regard to their financial earnings (salaries and allowances). Unfortunately, both the GPC and the YSP valued loyalty to their parties as the most important measure at the expense of technical competence for the national interest in the first government of the ROY.

#### **4.2.3.2 The Progress of Integration in the Council of Ministers**

The progress of integration in the Council of Ministers was negative owing to tribal and factional attitudes and approaches of government personnel amongst themselves, and within their institutions towards the alternate faction. These parameters will be discussed separately.

The attitude of the two leaderships to each other at this level of the structure was very negative to the integration process for the national cause. Neither group was really dedicated to the national interest.<sup>99</sup> Each group remained loyal to its political leadership and its administrative set-up.<sup>100</sup> Both administrative systems were handled simultaneously and, because Sanaa was the capital, the northern administrative set-up prevailed and its cumbersome administrative system was predominant. For instance, each formal paper had to be signed by 4 people: the Minister, Deputy Minister, Departmental Director and Section Chief. In customs clearance, it required in excess of 50 signatures.<sup>101</sup> The southerners were not used to such an over-centralised,

bureaucratic system. Their frustrations, therefore, were often expressed scornfully because of the delays in recruitment and financial deals.

The approach of each of the leaderships of this structure on national policy problems was not in favour of an integrative process.<sup>102</sup> Sectoral problems, whether they were for individuals or for institutions, were effectively considered and handled by the minister if it concerned his faction. Northerners would, therefore, have their problems solved with a northern minister/deputy minister, and vice versa. It would be only occasionally where one would find an objective elite to solve the problem of an alternate faction. Thus, trivial matters, sometimes, followed northern/southern leaders in the government for solutions outside the normal hierarchies. The administrative system was, thus, subject to factional groupings rather than administrative laws and regulations.<sup>103</sup> In certain cases, illegal actions would be involved when friction grew high.

#### **4.2.4 Progress in the Integration of the Parliamentary Committees 1990-1994**

Up to 1993, the two formal Houses of Representatives were joined together in addition to a 30 appointed members from the two sides. In May 1990, the Presidential Council passed a decree joining the Al-Shaura Council of the YAR and the Higher Peoples Council of the PDRY into one parliamentarian institution.<sup>104</sup> The Presidential Council appointed 30 independent members out of public figures in the national arena. Dr Yassin Saeed No'aman was elected as the Chairman of the Parliament.<sup>105</sup>

##### **4.2.4.1 The Progress of the Parliamentary Committees before the Election of 1993**

As noted above in section 4.2.2., the progress of integration in the Parliament shall be discussed in this section.

The Parliament structure in the ROY is far from similar to that of the UK's. The parliament in the Yemeni State functions through a number of functional committees.<sup>106</sup> The reports of these committees would then be discussed by MPs on the floor. The Chairman of the Parliament and his deputies would be members too, and therefore they would have votes - not like the Speaker in the British Parliament. With this introduction, we shall proceed in our analysis.

The Parliamentary institution in the ROY was not functionally integrated in a constructive manner between its two northern/southern factions. Before the amalgamation of the two legislative houses took place, each house was functioning for the benefit of its leadership rather than for the benefit of its people.<sup>107</sup> The GPC, for instance, advocated very liberal policies for all economic national problems etc. The YSP, on the other hand, defended public enterprises, women's emancipation, and addressed administrative and financial corruption. In general, each group was not committing itself to address national problems objectively or in a compromising attitude.<sup>108</sup> The joint committees were, therefore, working under great stress, reflecting the political crisis which existed between the two leaderships.

There were, however, various supporting factors that contributed to the disintegrative attitude between the two groups.<sup>109</sup> The first factor was related to the character of the Chairman of the Parliament - Dr Yassin No'aman. Given the nature of the very tribal community of the north which represented 4/5th of the national population, Dr Yassin No'aman was not the right figure for the job. He was neither a strongly tribal man nor educated enough in Islamic thought and affairs by which he could appease the northern Ulama in Parliament.<sup>110</sup> Despite his moderate attitude and personality, Dr No'aman was seen by the northern extremists as a YSP - communist figure. This by itself would make him an undesirable figure for the post. Secondly, his civic personality and background did not qualify him to be accommodated within the overwhelming northern group of tribes and religion in the parliament.<sup>111</sup> No

doubt, as this position was for the YSP to take in the sharing power, the YSP could afford to bring a moderately religious figure who could foster the stage of infancy of the parliament in a positively manner. Many southern figures, though outside the YSP political frame would have been more suited for the job. This was badly needed for a Chairman of Parliament when disagreements would arise among different factions; for he would only have the final say of the disputed issue and be able to keep the integrity of his institution.

The second factor, which did not help the integration process in the parliamentary committees, was the framework within which the parliamentary institution had to function. Parliament had 17 joint technical committees, from the two sides.<sup>112</sup> Unfortunately, the legislative background of the two sides was extremely different. The southerners' legal system was too progressive for an Islamic state and the northerners' legal system was too old and problematic for a modern state. To bring the two under joint functional committees without prior preparations on the mode of work was extremely difficult for both sides. What happened in practice was that committees headed by northerners incorporated their methodology, and committees chaired by southerners did the same. When committees' reports were discussed on the floor, observers noticed that members of the same committee were violating the committee report.<sup>113</sup> This way one concluded that the integrative process in the function of the parliament did not exist.

The best approach to function of the parliament would have been best viewed by the realisation of the infancy of the integration process in this institution. This could have been tackled by practical measures. No doubt, at that infancy stage of democratisation and unification, it would have been better to give more power to parliamentary committees to do the major part of parliamentary agendas without referring the committees' work to the floor's discussion. This policy instrument of Parliament would achieve a two-fold aim. First, it would help and train members on team work/function on serious and mutually integrative tasks' performance. And it would minimise unnecessarily



arguments and differences on the floor. As each member was practically a Committee member, the power delegation to committees would have made each member busy with its committee work in producing good/sound contributions in his field. The main condition for this would be of course to pick the right persons for this institution from the beginning with the right qualifications because of its sensitivity in the overall state administration.

#### **4.2.4.2 The Progress of Integration in the Parliamentary Committees after the Election of 1993**

A parliamentary election was held in April 1993, where 14 political parties out of 46 competed in the national arena for the 301 seats in the Parliament.<sup>114</sup> When the transitional period was over, the leadership called for a parliamentary election to take place on the 27<sup>th</sup> April 1993. Out of the 46 political parties registered in the country, only 14 parties participated in the elections' campaigns.<sup>115</sup> Eight political parties, however, won parliamentary seats in addition to 48 independent figures. The party results were as follows:<sup>116</sup>

GPC	122 seats
Islah	62 seats
YSP	56 seats
Ba'ath	7 seats
Al-Haqq	2 seats
Nasserites (public unitary)	1 seat
Nasserites (democratic)	1 seat
Nasserites (public correction)	1 seat
Independents	48 seats

Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer, Chief Sheikh of the Hashed tribe and Chairman of the Islah party, was elected as Chairman of the Parliament.<sup>117</sup> Mohammed Khadem Al-Wageeh of the GPC, Ali Saleh Obad of the YSP and

Dr Abdul-Wahab Mahmood of the Ba'ath party were elected as Deputy Chairmen to the Parliament.<sup>118</sup>

Among the 301 Members of Parliament, there were two females representing the YSP from the south.<sup>119</sup>

No doubt the appointment of a figure like Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer had both its pros and cons on Parliament in its integration process, and there were positive and negative sides in the election of Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer for the Chairmanship of Parliament.<sup>120</sup> The major positive aspect was his social weight as Chief Sheikh of a sound tribe of which its key figures were represented in the leadership. The second positive aspect was his leadership capacity of such a tribal institution. Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein, tribally speaking, was fit for such a post as he would understand the tribal mentality which overwhelmed Parliament. He did not have difficulties of communication in that respect. He was also, as experienced showed, capable of controlling any chaos or unnecessarily long discussions of a topic on the floor.<sup>121</sup>

The negative aspects of the election of Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer as Chairman of Parliament were: first, that he was very raw in thinking and in expressing technical/administrative issues.<sup>122</sup> Secondly, he favoured his party members with tribal perceptiveness, attitude and approach. Specifically speaking, priorities for speeches were given to Islah figures then Hashedies/Zaydis. If any time was left over then YSP southerners might have the chance to express their views.<sup>123</sup> Thirdly, he exhausted the party budget on excessive self-expenditures.<sup>124</sup>

The image of Sheikh A. H. Al-Ahmer however, as a Chief Sheikh of the Hashed tribe had damaged the unification image and the democratic process for one main reason. The two major formal authorities of the state were ruled by two Hashedi figures - a tribe which represented a minority in the Zaydi

faction, let alone in the national arena. The democratic process, therefore, was shaken to its foundation.

#### 4.3 The Progress of the Integration in the Economic and Social Fields

The two Yemeni states had agreed to adopt a new economic strategy based on an Islamic Socialistic approach for the ROY. This was stated in the Tripoli Announcement of November 1972, in articles 6 and 7 which state the following:<sup>125</sup>

##### *Article 6*

*The state of ROY aims to achieve socialism based on an Arab Islamic pattern, human' value, and the conditions of the Yemeni Community. This is to be achieved through social justice which bans all forms of exploitation. The state should achieve, via socialist relations, production sufficiency and justice in income distributions whereby differences among social stratas are peacefully eliminated”*

##### *Article 7*

*Public enterprise ownership is the basis for community promotion and growth and for the achievement of production sufficiency. Private ownership which is not of an exploitative nature is protected and cannot be taken away, except by law and with justified compensation.”*

The above statements incorporated in the Tripoli Announcement implied the market-economy strategy for the economy with public infrastructure for the state to foster.

It is worth noting that all unification agreements made during the period of 1972-1990 were valid for the integration process as long as these agreements

did not violate the set up of the new unified constitution. The Tripoli Agreement of 1972, therefore, was a valid one for the ROY.

#### **4.3.1 The Progress of Economic Integration in the ROY during the Cooperative Unification May, 1990 - April, 1994**

The coalition of the GPC and the YSP (up to April 1993) and with the Islah (May, 1993-April, 1994) did not achieve much due to the political escalation between/among them, other than implementing the principle agreement on the adoption of a free market strategy for the economy.<sup>126</sup>

Within this context, we shall review three basic issues by which economic development in the ROY suffered serious setbacks throughout this period. These issues are:

- (1) The conflictory visions of the elite in the power centre;
- (2) The economic conditions over this period, and;
- (3) The impact of these conditions on southern areas.

##### **4.3.1.1 The Conflictory Visions of the Power Centre Elites on the Economy**

The GPC and the YSP, the two parties involved in the unification process, agreed in principle to the adoption of a free market economy as a strategy for economic development but with different visions on the state-building national system.<sup>127</sup> Saleh's administration was dominant in this respect for it had past experience of this strategy while the south did not.<sup>128</sup> Saleh, therefore, thought that there would be no need to go through big changes in his former system and, with new modern policies for trade and industry, the situation would be right for a boost in the economy.<sup>129</sup> Al-Beidh, however, came to the unification process with a more modern state vision than the mechanism which existed in

the south. He thought of a modern state-building national system which would be based on sound institutions and with some state control over fiscal and price policies.<sup>130</sup> Though Al-Beidh was, to a certain extent, influenced by the past Marxist experiences of the south and thus he did not think of the traditional laissez-faire system for the ROY.

After the 1993 elections, Islah came into the power centre but with different vision to those of the GPC and the YSP. Unlike the GPC or the YSP, Islah did not have any experience of running a state and national affairs.<sup>131</sup> Its key members were of traditional tribal roots and thus their ideology reflected tribal cohesion and Islamic brotherhood.<sup>132</sup> The Islah vision on state-building, therefore, was based on the promotion of tribal structures in the society and the adoption of Al-Share'a laws for all state policies and activities.<sup>133</sup>

The conflictory visions in the power centre regarding possible state-building national systems did not give room for the accommodation of appropriate policies for economic development to take place. The infighting over political dominance continued among the factions in the power centre and the administration of the country remained in chaos, with sound policies for the economic development of the ROY being lost. Political instability continued and this led to further complications in the economy.

#### **4.3.1.2 Economic Conditions during the Cooperative Unification in the ROY (1990 - 1994)**

The northern/southern leadership entered into unity with a hope they would overcome economic problems in the unified system of their respective countries through a nation-wide good system of economic integration.<sup>134</sup> This hope was dashed by several factors which contributed to worsening economic conditions in the newly established republic. The Gulf Crisis (GC) was the foremost factor in depriving the ROY of several foreign contracts and aid because of its political stance with Iraq.<sup>135</sup> The USA reduced its assistance in

1991 and 1992 by approximately 92% - from US\$ 42 millions to US\$ 4 and 6 millions respectively.<sup>136</sup> The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) also withdrew its annual assistance of US\$ 500 millions and the privileged residency status which northern Yemenis had before, resulting in the return of more than 800,000 Yemeni immigrants.<sup>137</sup> The return of Yemeni immigrants workers exacerbated the unemployment problem in the ROY. It also deprived the country of the foreign exchange the ROY would have got from the remittances of its workers in the KSA.<sup>138</sup> However, with regard to the KSA assistance, it might have been expected to have been cut off under the unified system of Yemen without any other concessions.

The oil recession following the GC in the region also had a negative impact. Aden Refinery lost substantial resources because of boycott by the Gulf States.<sup>139</sup> Kostiner estimated the ROY losses due to the oil recession in 1990/91 to be US\$ 3 billion, and in 1992 to be about US\$ 1.8 billions. The ROY's losses of oil concessions only, went down from US\$ 700 million in 1991 to US\$ 100 million in 1992.<sup>140</sup>

The last important factor that contributed to worsening economic conditions was the absence of good economic policies from the government during this period.<sup>141</sup> As a result, food prices rose by 150-400%, inflation ballooned by over 100%, unemployment rose generally by 35%. The blame for such a negative performance in the economy was attributed to financial and administrative corruption.<sup>142</sup>

Despite the rise in oil production from 180,000 bpd in 1990 to 350,000 bpd in 1993, the government failed to resolve these economic issues. This was due to the continuing infighting among the factions in the power centre for which the Yemeni citizen ultimately paid dearly.<sup>142</sup>

#### **4.3.1.3 The Impact of the Current Economic Integration on the South**

The two leaderships agreed in principle, within the unification accords, to adopt a free market economy as the strategy for the economic development of the ROY.<sup>143</sup> In respect to this agreement, for which the north had felt strong through its previous experiences, all preparations for the amalgamation of central set-ups in the two former states were made as per the meeting of two Premiers between the 1<sup>st</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> June 1990.<sup>144</sup> Financial and planning institutions were joined and southern manpower moved to Sanaa. The southern leadership practically moved to Sanaa all its central capital assets in preparation to work together with the northern leadership in the new economic system for the good of the nation. While basic economic issues were settled such as unification of the currencies (the dinar and the riyal) and the distribution of manpower in the institutions, many relevant economic issues were left unresolved to be discussed at a later stage with the new government and the unified elite in the power centre.<sup>145</sup>

In considering the southern state which had over 90% of its activities ran by public sector, the free market economy would have needed much longer time to have an effect on its public enterprises. To change over from public ownership to a private or mixed enterprise system would need studies, well planned policies, feasibility studies and rationally based decisions to be implemented without causing problems to southern manpower. This, unfortunately, did not take place as the power centre elite continued their infighting for political dominance, leaving current economic situations in turmoil.

Consequently, the south suffered serious setbacks due to hasty unification which left unresolved issues concerning its economic institutions.<sup>146</sup> The southern public enterprises were vulnerable institutions and Saleh's administration failed to look at them as being beneficial for the whole of Yemen in the long run. The northern administration looked at these institutions as pillars for the ex-communist regime which had to be demolished and put out

of existence.<sup>147</sup> They also argued that these public sector institutions were running at a loss and would cost the public huge amounts to run them. While this was true for some, this was not the case for all of them. Most of the large public sector institutions were not only covering their running costs but bringing many returns and profits to the national accounts.<sup>148</sup> Aden Refinery, the Electric Power Corporation, the national trade companies, the Insurance and Re-insurance Company, and the airways company (Alyemda) were only a few of the institutions of the public sector. Compared with the northern public sector, of which the majority was heavily subsidised by public resources, the southerners were running many public plants efficiently with meagre resources. The northerners, however, would not accept such arguments at all and, therefore, with a tribal mental attitude made the free market economy strategy an excuse to demolish all public sector institutions by *ad hoc* privatisation policies, essentially for the interest of the northern private sector which key leadership figures had interests in.<sup>149</sup>

Tribal attitudes and the approach of the northern leadership towards the southern public sector were key issues in the political escalation between the two leaderships. There was a major reluctance to handle southern institutions with fair judgement, mainly because of their vulnerability both politically and administratively.<sup>150</sup> The southern institutions of public enterprises would have needed some time to change over from public to other economic modes without unnecessary disruptions to its manpower and capital assets. The northerners did not want to give the southerners this chance in order not to allow any administrative viability or supremacy. There was also another reason, namely, that these institutions might benefit southern traders or key figures in the leadership if they were given time for an appropriate transformation. The escalation of political power struggles did not help the southern leadership and made these institutions vulnerable.

In view of the limited manpower accommodated by new economic programmes from these public sectors, the problem should not have had a



strong negative impact between the two leaderships. The major problems were in two basic sectors, namely, the agricultural and the trade and commerce sectors. In the agriculture sector, steps were already taken to give cooperative personnel lands out of governmental land to live on and to give back original landowners their land.<sup>151</sup> All other aspects of public agricultural infrastructure were subject to dismantling policies by the leadership. While maintenance expenditure for northern public sectors were met, the southern public sectors were negatively discriminated against. The northern leadership failed to show objectivity for such a valuable infrastructure.

As the Ministry of Finance was in the hands of the northern administration, southern public sectors suffered serious setbacks in terms of resources and programming.<sup>152</sup> Most of the key southern figures in the major sectors were transferred to Sanaa. In the former PDRY, technical people at the central administration were programming and supervising major works for the public sectors in view of limited manpower resources for many projects over large areas of the country. In their absence, many public sectors were left alone to struggle with technical issues and programmes.<sup>153</sup> The critical issue for southern sectors in southern regions was the release of public resources for basic requirements, including maintenance and salaries. The northern administration severely cut the public sectors of the southern regions and continued to support the public and the mixed sectors in northern regions out of public resources.<sup>154</sup> This made the southern leadership to consider retreating from the unification process, causing high political tension between northern and southern leaderships.

As the political tension was rising between the political leaderships, no room was given to consider economic issues rationally and address their problems gradually and positively.

In the first year of the unification process there were few efforts made to address economic issues positively by the technocrats of both parties. In 1990-

1991, the state planned economic issues between the two former Yemeni states though without prior and sufficient studies. It settled the currency issue, namely the northern riyal and the southern dinar by imposing a ratio of 1 dinar to 26 riyals. It carried out all southern monetary transactions in the north and accomplished the structural integration of all financial and planning establishments of the south and the north in the capital. (Regional financial and planning set-ups were established beforehand (1970's) in all southern regions to fulfil regional activities' needs before the unification, but northern districts did not all have financial and planning set-ups).

The economic problems, at executive level, were the responsibility of two strategic ministries, namely, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Development and Planning. The Ministry of Finance was under the control of the northerners, and the Ministry of Development and Planning was under an independent figure from the south. The Ministry of Development and Planning was to deal with launching plans and external cooperation. The Ministry of Finance was the key institution for the performance of the national economy as all public resources and foreign loans/assistance were redistributed by it into the national economy.

The Minister of Planning, however, prepared for a round table conference in 1992 with bilateral and multilateral donors to ease the economic problems of the ROY after the Gulf Crisis. The Round-table Conference, to a certain extent, achieved its purpose but the political instability in Yemen did not allow the minister to continue in work and he left the ministry. The 1994 war brought further stagnation to economic conditions in view of the spiralling inflation which overwhelmed the economy.

The Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, adopted harsh policies towards the southern public sectors. Resource allocation in the annual budgets was very biased against southern public enterprises. Major economic institutions of the southern public sector were left without resource allocations right from the

start of the integration process, while northern public enterprises such as textiles, cement, electrical power etc. continued to be financially supported by the annual budget. Southern employees of some public sectors came to Sanaa protesting about their miserable status and the cut-off of their salaries which were the only income for their livelihood.

There were, however, two major economic issues for which political problems between the two leaderships intensified, namely the oil issue and the state's land in the south. Having seen the northern attitudes and approaches towards the southern public sector, the southern leadership redirected the southern oil resources and its lands to finance and help public enterprises which needed money for their running costs. Unfortunately, this was done outside the legal scope and pushed political matters out of control on both sides.

External factors had also played their roles positively and negatively. Some European countries objectively helped in national economic issues, in particular Holland and Germany. Others suspended most of their assistance to ROY due to the latter's support to Iraq in the Gulf Crisis. The Gulf Crisis itself, however, left a negative impact on the ROY's economy. About 900,000 Yemenis working in neighbouring countries were driven off by the GCC countries - mainly KSA - and sent back to Yemen. The unemployment figure rose to 35% of the working force in this period. To feed these populations, the Government had to provide heavy subsidies for basic food items (see Chapter 5). This ultimately caused heavy depreciation of the local currency and worsened economic conditions, especially in southern areas.<sup>155</sup>

#### **4.3.2 The Progress of Integration in the Social Field**

Principally, the two Yemeni states shared similar social structures, values and cultural background but did not share the same degree of social progress and social style of life. Tribal attitudes and values, in general, existed in the two

states but with degrees of social variation.<sup>156</sup> The south, for instance, owing to a background of British occupation had a strong colonial impact in the colony of Aden - the former capital of the south. Women were working with men since the 1940's and education for girls covered all parts of Aden colony.<sup>157</sup> The ex-PDRY enhanced the education sector for both males and females in all districts/villages and centres and led an effective illiteracy campaign programme until the ratio of illiteracy went down to 40% of the population in 1980.<sup>158</sup> These achievements were made possible by the socialist-orientated policies the ex-PDRY adopted, and by the low profile of tribalism in the south. The ex-YAR invested in education in its development plans, but for males more than females. The ex-YAR did not invest in social structures as horizontally as the south because of socio-economic reasons. Few cities in the north provided decent education to females and, under the impact of tribal bonds in the northern community, there was a naturally slow process of educational progress for both rural males and females.<sup>159</sup> This resulted in a wide gap developing in the educational standards of the north and the south.

With the above background on the key sector of education in the two Yemeni states, we can understand some of the apparent difficulties in the social integration of the ROY.

There were, however, hypersensitivities between the two leaderships in the integration of the social field which ought to have progressed without difficulties. There were two reasons for these sensitivities. The first one was that there was no question that the south, socially, was more advanced than the north and that could be attributed to the political environment of both the ex-British and communist systems which the northern leadership hated intensely. The second reason was that the tribal mentality of the northern leadership, which opposed very much the idea of equalisation of men with women, as this (from their point of view), violated basic principles of Islam.

This northern state of mind crippled the social progress of the southerners and any efforts of substantial integration in social fields. Instead, it forced the socially advanced trend in the south to regress.

As the social integration issue is too varied, we shall only pick up a couple of issues to show the lack of integration in this field over this period. These issues are the family law and the Yemeni womens' union.

#### **4.3.2.1 The Family Laws**

The family laws were traditionally incorporated within Al-Share'a law, which would be subject to multi-factional Islamic doctrines in Arab and Islamic countries of which the ROY is one.<sup>160</sup> In the former southern state, the socialist regime enacted a family law (no. 1) of 1974 whereby females would get all their Islamic and national rights within their domestic lives.<sup>161</sup> Women for instance, would not be divorced without a good reason and without their prior consent. They would also have the right of divorce on good reasons via courts, in addition to many rights elaborated in the law. In the former northern state, there was no family law as such, and women were only subject to the traditional code of civil conditions which were incorporated within Al-Share'a in its pure form.<sup>162</sup> In view of the changing socio-economic parameters in Yemeni society, northern females did not enjoy the same formal rights of their sisters in the south. Family Law in the south defined the marriage age for the female and the age gap between the wife and the husband plus other issues.<sup>163</sup> It also put a limit on the dowry paid by the man to the women to eliminate social stratification in the society.<sup>164</sup> It went further than this in limiting polygamy i.e. one wife for a man unless there were good reasons for another one and with the consent of the first wife to live with the husband, otherwise she could be freed from the marriage.<sup>165</sup> Legally the family law put males and females on the same legal stance of equality.

Under the unified system, the family law was the southern version, but did not enjoy recognition among the judiciary of the northerners.<sup>166</sup> It was under severe attack by many forces, particularly the power centre and other effective tribal forces.

#### **4.3.2.2 The Position of Women in the Community**

The position of women in the two former Yemeni states was variable and was highly marginalised in the unified system. The south, within its socialist system, gave women equal rights in terms of employment, payment, education and all political rights. Southern women were represented in almost all institutions and at all hierarchies of the political and civil administrations except the polit-bureau and the cabinet. They were represented in the military and security forces, although at lower hierarchies. In the north, women did have a state-administrative role but at a far lower level than the southern females.<sup>167</sup>

The main reason for the higher level of southern females than northern females in the northern community related to the type of regime and the extent of tribal clusters in the power centre of the leadership.<sup>168</sup> The tribal clusters in general existed in both leaderships, but the ideologies of the political systems in the two states had different impacts. The social - oriented system of the south fostered women's unions in a much more horizontally organised form in the state. It created branches of the Yemeni Women's Union across the country with a heavy policy impact on women's liberation for self-economic support. In the north, the YAR leadership also created such organisations, but in fewer regions. However, the tribal mentality in the rulership of the YAR impacted on the types of work of these social institutions. The rural women for example were receiving some help for rural diversification in terms of economic support but the legal backbone of the rural females remained tied up by the traditional legal mechanism.

After unification, these unions were amalgamated and worked together, but instead of supporting each other within the Yemeni Women's Union framework, they tended to compete negatively with each other. Thus reflecting the political struggle in the power centre of the two leaderships.

The social dimension, therefore, did not benefit within the unified system, like other dimensions.

#### **4.4 The Military Structures in the Two Yemeni States<sup>169</sup>**

**4.4.1** Basically, the two military structures of former YAR and PDRY did not vary from each other. The YAR's structure had the same type of forces - Coastal, Marine and Navy, and Air Forces - like the PDRY, and all came under the supervision of the Chief Commandant of the Armed Forces. There was, however, some difference in the high-level administration of the two structures and in the extent of disciplinary systems between the two.

##### **4.4.1.1 The Military Structure in the YAR Before Integration**

The military structure in the YAR was within a military institution chaired by the President of the State as the General Commandant of the armed forces at the top of the institutional hierarchy.

The YAR also enjoyed a national defence council - the Higher National Defence Council (HNDC) - presided by the President of the State, and had the key figures of the military institution as members.

The second figure in the military institution was the Chief Commandant of the Armed Forces, who was responsible for the daily routine of all military

institution activities. The Chief Commandant of the armed forces was also responsible for all other tower hierarchies in training, administration, finance, technical affairs and ammunition, as well as all military operations.

#### **4.4.1.2 The Military Structure in the PDRY before the Integration**

The PDRY military structure was within a ministry framework which constituted part of the cabinet parastatals though with a unique relevance than other ministries. The Minister of Defence was the top key figure of the military structure and one of the key figures in the Cabinet. He was also a key member in the Executive Office of the NF or polit-bureau member in the YSP.

The Vice-Minister of Defence was the second man in the structure and he and the Minister were mainly responsible for the policy making of the sector.

The Chief Commandant of the armed forces was the key figure in the structure for implementing all activities.

Below this level, the same hierarchies of the YAR's structure were in the PDRY's though with slight differences.

#### **4.4.2 Manpower Composition in the Military Structures of the YAR and PDRY**

There were differences in manpower composition of the military structures of the states both in high-level administration and in the lower hierarchies.

##### **4.4.2.1 Manpower Composition in the YAR's Military Structure**



Due to the strong tribal bonds in the YAR's society, the YAR's military structure was characterised by tribal recruitment both in the higher and lower hierarchies. The major areas of manpower recruitment in the military institution in the YAR was from the Hashed and Bakeel tribes. Other small tribes like the Al-Hamdy tribes from Mareb and Jawf were also recruited. Zaydi Hashemites (Prophet's descendants) also enjoyed recruitment into this structure. Military power, however, was exclusively for either the Bakeel or Hashed tribes' figures.

On a doctrinal basis the Shafais, who constituted a majority in the YAR's population, were fewer than the Zaydis at all hierarchical levels of the military institution. Considering the strength of tribal bonds in the society, most of the trainees for this institution (locally and abroad) were from the Zaydis who always held the policy-planning power of the state. The Shafais had fewer chances in this respect and therefore they were recruited into technical hierarchies, but away from ammunition storage or military policy planning. This resulted in the majority of Zaydis being in key positions, and the majority of Shafais in lower orders.

There was a high level of mistrust in this institution between the two main factions of the Zaydis and the Shafais. This mistrust was accelerated by a Nasserist coup in 1987 against the regime, which failed. Three of its Shafai leaders (and one Zaydi) were sentenced to death.

The military labour force in the YAR was very difficult to estimate for two reasons. First, the labour database was poorly constructed and badly organised in the national arena, let alone in the military institution. Second, it was highly unlikely under tribal bonds to escape tribal loyalty for forces who were paid but without disciplinary rules for their presence. In case of emergencies, it would be the tribal bonds rather than military discipline which would guarantee the defence of the country. However, reliable sources estimate that

the military force of the YAR in the preunification period was about 200,000 personnel. This figure includes children aged (10 years to 15 years).

#### **4.4.2.2. Manpower Composition in the PDRY's Military Structure**

Some tribal values were inherited from the British military system in the PDRY. The British administration in the former Eastern and Western Protectorates recruited important tribe's personnel for the military institutions in southern regions. Aulaqis in Shabwa, Hadhrami Bedouins in Hadhramout and the Bedouin tribes in Abyan were ideal for such recruitment. Dhale'a Redfan and Yafe'a in Lahj regions were all strongly tribal areas.

It was, therefore, natural that the PDRY's military institution - in the form of the ministry - was composed from these tribal areas, namely Dhale'a, Redfan, Yafe'a Awaleq (Shabwah in General) Abyan and Hadhramout. With such a composition of manpower, the PDRY had a wider spectrum of tribal factions from southern regions. The leadership in high level hierarchies of the military structure were composed of Redfan, Dhale'a, Abyan and Yafea. It is worth mentioning that the higher presence in the structure as a whole was for the Redfan and Dhale'a factions, whose presence in civil posts was nominal.

Manpower figures in the south hardly exceeded 70,000. This includes the military reserves but not the militia forces. The formal military forces of the PDRY, according to military sources, were between 55 and 60,000. The students, who were compelled to join the forces as part of their compulsory two-year service, were around 3000 to 5000. The Militia force was made of the civilians of both sexes who would go for 45 days military training with Cuban experts. This force was practically ineffective and was created by Ismail to assist in urban areas in specific circumstances such as a coup d'etat or emergencies, but, they had only light weaponry.

#### **4.4.3 The Impact of Ideology in the Military Administrations**

While the PDRY incorporated a Marxist-Leninist socialist ideology in its military structure, the YAR stressed further the tribal loyalty ideology in its military institution.

We shall discuss below the extent of the impact of these ideologies on the military administration and discipline in the YAR and the PDRY.

##### **4.4.3.1 The Impact of the Tribal Bonds Ideology in the YAR's Military Institution**

The YAR administrative system had built-in formal tribal structures, and this administrative system had a deep impact on the military administration. The hegemony of the Zaydi cast in the military institution reflected the strong loyalty to tribal bonds among the Zaydi tribes and Hashemites. Specifically, tribal bonds were the prime ideology spoon-fed to this vital sector which was regarded as the backbone for the cast's survival in the leadership of the state.

The strength of tribal bonds in this institution had a strong negative impact on the administrative performance of the military institution. There was hardly a Shafai figure in the top 5-6 highest administrative posts. Disbursement of tasks, ammunitions and other sensitive functions were fully controlled by the Hashed or Bakeel tribes, or another Zaydi faction. This would be subject to personnel loyalties to the institution's leadership. Enrolment of forces would include youngsters aged 9-15 years old of the same faction. The institution's discipline practices in its deployed forces was of a low profile. At lower hierarchies, there was hardly a disciplinary order. By 9.30am, the majority of soldiers were seen driving their taxis in cities or disposed to personal activities, though wearing formal military uniform. As the YAR's borders we

assured by all surrounding neighbours - for its non-aligned policies - the institution, probably, had a flexible military discipline compared to its sister in the south as the state policies made it open to attacks.

#### **4.4.3.2 The Impact of Marxist-Leninist Ideology in the PDRY's Military**

##### **Institution**

There was, at least, a touch of tribal bond impact, in addition to the well-established socialist ideology adopted by the military institution two years after independence (1969) in the southern military institution. Most of the NF and YSP Southern leadership had tribal bonds, but of a fragmented nature. Because of the civic urban life in the main towns of each southern district, tribal bonds tended to have a regional rather than purely tribal basis. The military institution was absolutely committed to the political ideology of scientific socialism adopted and strongly adhered to by the NF/YSP. Despite the deep penetration of this political ideology into the military structure, tribal or regional bonds among military manpower (at all levels) were remarkably observed. The political affiliation of military personnel was meant to supersede tribal and regional bonds but in effect it did not fully achieve this.

Political disputes in the political and state administrations in 1969, 1978, 1980 and 1986 reflected on the military institution. Deposed state figures were followed with deposed military personnel of the same regions or factions.

On the disciplinary aspect, the southern set-up had a British legacy of autonomous administration. The southern military set-up acquired British experience, financially and administratively. It had a profound disciplinary system, morally and materially. It incorporated serious programmes of training, manufacture, manoeuvring and others. Some of its leading figures had studied at the British Military Academy, and later on at the Russian high level military academies in all fields.

Two factors helped its disciplinary progress, namely, the political viability of the area and the topography of the country. The institution was under pressure to safeguard its territories from neighbouring states, many of which had bad relations with PDRY because of the socialist-oriented policies. This had often made southern troops along the borders very alert. The geographical topography of PDRY was also another factor in the strong discipline of the military institution. The total area of the PDRY was approximately 300 sq. km, while the military force did not exceed 60,000 personnel in all fields. The northern land borders of the country was over 2,000 km and the PDRY coasts were of a similar length. To keep well protected from invasion, the southern military institution had to have sound disciplinary machinery especially after the 1972 war with KSA in which the latter over-ran the Al-Wade'a area north of the Hadhramouti border with KSA. Frequent attacks on the eastern sides were also further challenges. All of these attacks were underlined by the non-recognition of the PDRY State by its neighbours.

#### **4.4.4 Military Integration in the ROY in 1990**

The story of military integration in the newly established republic of the ROY is a sad one. Both the former Yemeni states arranged for the integration of their two armies but the magnitudes in their variational differences could not positively have helped their integration, especially in the way it was handled. The two sides exchanged military sites for some of their units; a few northern battalions/brigades were in Abyan, Lahej and Hadhramout and some southern units were in Sanaa, Dhamar and Harf-Sufian. These arrangements, however, were disintegrative rather than integrative measures in the overall integration process of the country, particularly in view of no prior preparation for establishing harmonial relations between the two forces.

Below is an account of the military integration of the ROY and its aftermath. The above introduction and the preceding information on the two armies needs to be in mind for the forthcoming analysis.

#### **4.4.4.1 The Ideological Impact on Military Integration in 1990-1994**

One of the major factors that did not help in achieving successful military integration was the ideological division in the psyche of the southern and northern military personnel. The socialist oriented ideology in southern troops was too strong and would not accept the tribal Zaydi (Islamic) mentality into the military system. Though tribal influence was a phenomenon in the southern army, it was of a much lesser degree than in the northern army, and this was related to the community structures of both states. While the socialist system helped in disintegrating tribalism in the south, the north was characterised by a system which socially supported tribalism. Originally, southern tribes were of a fragmented nature while northern tribes, especially of the Zaydi faction, were very much consolidated. This had a great impact in the northern military force, not only in the enrolment of the payroll sheets, but rather in the type of Task Force assigned to specific factions.

After the integration, the military set-up clearly developed into two military blocks with different national attitudes, and politically motivated by their respective political leaders. The two top military personnel in the set-up of the Ministry of Defence were the Minister of Defence - Haithem Qassen (from the south) and the Chief Commandant of the armed forces - Abdulla Al-Basheiri (from the north). The two figures were politically committed: the former to the YSP and the latter to the GPC. Each one of them had command access only to his regional faction in the set-up. Generally speaking, the two military set-ups were working side by side under one central roof, owing to the wide difference in the ideological impact of the two systems.

#### **4.4.4.2 Organisational Problems in the Military Set-up.**

Due to the large ideological chasm between the two military set-ups, some organisational problems enclaved within the new joined military apparatus became apparent. The two military set-ups maintained in their units administrative and financial organs. Both systems used to have budgetary resource allocations for their annual needs from the Ministry of Finance in each state. This, centrally, remained so but was distributed through the southern machinery since the set-up was under the control of southerners. Within the military institutions of the southern regions, military expenditures were run under a self monitoring financial system, appropriately and efficiently. But, within the northern military institutions, this self - monitoring system failed to be applied properly as it revealed mismanagement of the allocated resources such as imaginary recruitment on the payroll sheets and a highly over-centralised system leading to financial corruption in resource allocation.

On the administrative side, military recruitment continued to be made on tribal/ideological bases. The northern side in the military institution was recruiting on a tribal basis. If the father of a family had died, one of his offspring would normally be recruited even if he were a juvenile. The southern military elite would never refuse to allow a YSP applicant to join the institution.

Units of tanks, land and other sites were exchanged between the two former states. Northern task forces moved to Abyan and southern task forces moved to Dhamar and Sanaa under the control of their respective administration. It was hoped that after some time there would be some integration at regional level as well but the negative experience in that respect brought disappointment to central leadership.

#### 4.4.4.3 Political Intervention in the Military Set-up

One of the major setbacks to military integration in the ROY was the political intervention of the two leaderships in military affairs. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was the General Commander of the Armed Forces of the North up to the eve of unification day, remained the ultimate sponsor of the northern military institutions. As his tribal members were the elite of the key military northern institutions, he kept in touch with all military developments and continued to give a helping hand when needed to the northern faction in the military. On the other hand, Al-Beidh - the General Secretary of the YSP - was also in touch with military developments directly with the southern Minister of Defence.

The political intervention by Saleh and Al-Beidh had a negative impact on the military institution. The first reason was the political disputes which developed between the two leaderships in running the integration process objectively. Neither side, as seen in the preceding sections of this chapter, could come objectively to a compromised formula with the other. The rivalry of power supremacy reflected in the whole of the ROY systems, including that of the military.

The second reason of the negative impact due to political intervention was a constitutional one. In view of the new military institutional changes which took place after unification, President Saleh realised that there would be no place for him for direct involvement in the armed forces after a defence ministry was established. This problem was solved constitutionally. The project of the Unified State Constitution involved the establishment of a National Defence Council (NDC) in the 4<sup>th</sup> section of Chapter One. The NDC was to be presided over by the President and he was to be responsible for the ROY security. This constitution did not involve the Vice-President in the affairs of NDC, but only gave access to the President of the Presidential



Council to run military affairs. Thus, the President's intervention was legalised through such limited access.

On the other hand, the YSP administrative structure implied the inevitable membership of key governmental figures of which the Minister of Defence was the most relevant one. This allowed the Minister of Defence to provide regular reports on the function of his institutions to the polit-bureau of the YSP as a key member in the political institution.

The final reason for such a negative impact from political intervention was the concealed loyalty of the leadership to their tribes' Sheikhs and factional grouping.

Military and security recruitment was often observed by the writer to take place at high-level authority (Presidential Council) in response to Sheikhs' applications (from both sides) to enrol teams or individuals into the military institutions. Several enrolments were also seen by the writer based on applications made by the two political organisations - the GPC and the YSP - to their respective military leaders. Experience and qualifications were not considered for administrative, technical functions, advice, responsibility or recruitment sectors. Such acts accelerated the political friction between the two leaderships in the military institutions.

#### **4.4.4.4 The Civil War of 1994**

Due to the acceleration of political disputes between the southern/northern leaderships, the country experienced a rough bloody war between the two armies which resulted in the national devastation of military manpower, weaponry, loss of equipment and damage to public properties.

As political frictions between the GPC and YSP leaderships were reaching boiling point, the two armies escalated their harassment against each other in the different parts of Yemen.<sup>170</sup> This obviously had a negative impact on military affairs, and culminated with public speeches by both Saleh and Al-Beidh in their respective media, each accusing the other of national treason against Yemeni unification. The military of the northern faction in southern areas, namely, the Al-Amaleqah Task Force Unit in Abyan, irresponsibly was publically provocative after the 1993 election. The Minister of Defence, a young southern elite, over-reacted to such harassment and often had to be calmed by some wise southern elites to keep calm and prevent southern forces from reacting. Worst of all, however, President Saleh in whose ultimate security the ROY rested, was surrounded by irresponsible over-reacting advisors of the northern military institution. These drove him further to deliver critical statements in his speeches and in parallel with Al-Beidh's statements in the south.

The war started after a public statement delivered by the President on 27<sup>th</sup> April 1994 stated that the YSP had opened a war front and commenced with military activity in Dhamar and other areas, and warned the YSP that a heavy negative impact would be the result of this irresponsible attitude.<sup>172</sup> Within hours, heavy fighting broke out in a suburb of Sanaa, and a whole southern unit was destroyed.

Several efforts were made with the help of international figures from France, and other regional military figures to contain the situation, but all failed. A joint military committee was made of the two sides and supervised by foreign military personnel from Jordan, France and USA to contain and discuss the situation with all concerned authorities in the two leaderships for a few days, but in vain. The Harf Sufian incidents, which wiped out all southern units in the area, was followed by a similar incident in Dhamar when another southern tank force was provoked by northern security forces. The confrontation

between the northern/southern units was heavy and on May 4<sup>th</sup> 1994, a full war was launched between the two forces.

Since 4<sup>th</sup> May 1994, two months of civil war went on between the two armies leaving great military and civil destruction in southern areas. Tanks, airforce and land troops were fully mobilised and concentrated in southern regions. Military attacks were described hour by hour *One Thousand Hours of War* by Dr Colonel Abdul-Wali Al-Shamiri - a northern Islamist from the Islah party. Despite the valuable recorded information on military events, Dr Al-Shamiry failed to keep his personal emotions neutral, at the expense of the ex-communist southern leaders.<sup>173</sup>

The general strategy of the war was to destroy each other's military capacities, but then the strategy went further and attempted to deplete the political power of the other. No one denied the supremacy of southern military institutions against the northern ones in terms of equipment (airforce in particular) and trained manpower. In the first two weeks, and despite the loss of all southern tank forces in northern areas, the northern army suffered heavy losses particularly in Dhalea area. This loss was almost equal to the losses of southern forces in northern areas. However, later on, Saleh used his valuable card, namely, the southern ex-military leadership who fled in 1986 to the YAR with the ex-President Ali Nasser.

Headed by Colonel-Staff Abdo Rabbu Mausoor Hadi, southern ex-military personnel arranged themselves in various military groups and marched in support of northern forces from all directions against southern regions, guaranteeing victories to Saleh. Saleh then appointed Staff-Colonel Hadi as Minister of Defence, replacing Staff-Colonel Haithem Qassin.

Southern military groups, which were mainly from Abyan and Shabwa, who were on Saleh's side had a significant role in the victory of northern military forces over southerners. They opened the roads in Abyan, Shabwah and

Hadhramout regions through old routes into these areas. Backed by northern forces, they surprised southern troops from the rear. The southern airforce had two roles: hitting the advance of the northern masses (who were mainly civilian volunteers from the Islamists) and northern troops marching towards Aden from Dhalea's route, and lifting the injured to local hospitals and abroad.

As the fighting grew severe, the southern leadership realised that it was the end of unification with the north and, accordingly, the YSP leadership declared the re-establishment of the PDRY once again. Such a decision was not made lightly by the southerners. In the south, this was highly welcomed but condemned in the north. Under such a situation, the war was accelerated and this time the northern side enjoyed more support, politically and militarily. Masses of people voluntarily joined forces and outnumbered the southern forces. By 7<sup>th</sup> July 1994, northern troops achieved an absolute military victory in all southern regions.

There were a few reasons for the northern victory over the southern military. There is no doubt that the southern military force in Saleh's hand was the major factor in terms of their military experience and in terms of tribal weight in their indigenous areas. Of these the most important were Colonel Ahmed Musa'ed Hassein of Shabwa, Sulaiman Baqais of Abyan, Faisal Rajab also of Abyan, and Qatan and Al-Mohmadi of Hadhramout. With the exception of Shabwa, other groups accessed old and left over old track roads which the new southern military elite was unaware of or probably never thought it would be traceable by the enemy.

The second reason for the demoralisation of the southern troops was because of the swift change in their life which was formally was secure in the centrally planned economy, and then became subject to market forces with remarkable negligence to their conditions. Under the new economic system, the poor soldier would not have the chance to compete effectively with his limited technical capacity especially in view of wide-scale corruption. To the majority,

however, the situation would get worse if the leadership was composed of northern Shafais, as it was before unification. In consideration to the composition of the YSP, the northern shafais members were exceeding 75% of the total. Going into sole power in the ex-PDRY, would mean the incorporation of those northern shafais again in the PDRY power structure – a situation the layman southerner would accept at all.

All these factors made most of the military elite in the southern military institution not to be enthusiastic about committing to long drawn out war with their northern brothers. The southern force on Saleh's side provided huge amounts of money to some southern camp leaders to surrender. Al-Anad camp, the largest military institution, and highly equipped as an autonomous military site, was, thus, surrendered by a key figure in the southern elite (Haithem's cousin) in exchange for US\$ 14 million, which turned out to be counterfeit money at a later stage.<sup>174</sup>

The third reason was a political one. It was a historic mistake to re-establish the PDRY under its former name. The whole world would not approve of having two states under one/similar entity fighting each other again. The YSP leadership could have won the war politically if it chose another entity such as the South Arabia Federation for South Yemen. It could only then be given a second chance but with a different elite formation.

#### **4.5 Assessment and conclusion**

In assessing this chapter, the researcher feels that great damage took place against the unification process due to tribalism and factionalism in both sides. The two sides, unfortunately, did not honour Yemen unity with a positive national destiny. Each side wanted to control the whole national arena for its party and faction. The two systems, as a result of the unity disfunction, went

hand in hand; and the power centre with its tribal attitudes and approaches to national issues kept itself occupied by fighting each other for political gains.

Tribalism in the north was still very raw and the southern leadership, unfortunately, was hasty in promoting such a type of unification. The southerners realised too late their mistake. However, they did not make use of the transitional stage by which they could revise unification steps rationally with the assistance of regional and international circles. On the other hand, made many mistakes as well. They became corrupt, politically, administratively and financially; they even reacted factionally to the tribal attitudes of the northern leadership. There were some attempts made by the southern leadership to build central institutions based on law and order, but this came very late. The southerners did not utilise the strong cadres they had in the south and preferred to fill the ministerial posts with 'loyalists' rather than strong technocrats. Northerner tribalism, however, did not give any chance to build up strong and sound central institutions. They wanted their previous mechanisms to continue in order to serve tribal needs in the power centre primarily. In general there was a huge lack of understanding towards the unification process and for the national needs for Yemen integrity.

Yemen democracy was good on the surface, but very hollow underneath. All types of illegalities, restrictions and prohibitions were exercised in the name of democracy. Tribalism, nepotism, financial corruption, forging, assassination, kidnapping and theft were exercised in Sanaa against the southerners, some opposition groupings, and sometimes against foreigners. Public resources were misused and mishandled by the top political parties. The YSP, in particular, through its corrupt figures in the government, sold southern lands and used the money for its election campaign. The GPC with the YSP had the major share of the budget resources for their election campaigns and this put them at an advantaged state compared to other small parties.

Tribalism and factionalism in the power centre of the two major parties had a strong impact on their respective communities. This could easily be seen by the election results where the major seats of both the northern and the southern in the parliament were taken by the GPC and YSP respectively. These decisive, and divisive, results showed that the unification of Yemen was not in good shape at all.

# REFERENCES

- 1 The State Documentary Series on Yemen Unity (SDSYU): The One Yemen Book (Kitab Al-Yaman Al-Wahed) Sanaa - May 1990, Section 9 - pp 276-178
- 2 Ibid. p 277
- 3 Ibid pp 277-278
- 4 Ibid pp 277-278
- 5 Ibid pp 280-281
- 6 Ibid pp 311-314
- 7 From the researcher's own analysis through her long interaction with all Yemeni events in the unification process.
- 8 The doctrinal/tribal/factional problems were never addressed openly between the two leaderships, namely the Zaydi/Shafai and southern/northern problems.
- 9 The PC was the ultimate power centre of the ROY. Neither party had an influence on the state decisions, except through its chairman in this institution.
- 10 The PC was established by the Higher Public Council which was made of the two upper houses of Representatives in its extra-ordinary session. Refer to SDSYU - pp 418-421
- 11 The researcher knew each figure very well through her career interactions with the two sides. Though she was a southern technocrat, she was an adviser to Abdul-Aziz A. Ghani at the Presidential Council.
- 12 The State Documentary Series on Yemen Unity Op. Cit. pp 418-443
- 13 These arrangements were made through a series of republican and ministerial decrees in the state administration.
- 14 The state administration was divided between the two sides on 50/50 ratio-base. The southerners accommodated in their ratio many top/high ranking Shafai northerners such as AA Muqbel (ex-agriculture minister in the south) and MA Othman (ex-trade minister in the south) and many others. The northerners did not do this with their southern alliance in the GPC.
- 15 A Presidential Report prepared by the researcher on the reasons behind the civil war, 1994. (Asbab Al-Harb Al-Ashleyyah, 1994).
- 16 Over 175,000 members from the northern Shafai regions joined the YSP. In 1986, there were only 26,000 members in the YSP in the south. The researcher was a YSP member with cultural task in the office which keeps the records. Also, an interview with Muqbel - General Secretary of the YSP in 1996, 1997 and 1998 confirmed this fact.
- 17 The Northern population is at least 4 times that of the southern.
- 18 Al-Ghaffari, A. - The Yemen Unity: in reality and perspective (Al-Wahdah Al-Yamaneyyah - Al-Waqe'a wal-Mustaqbal) Sanaa, 1997. p223.
- 19 Ibid. (Also refer to Dr Noman's interview in Le Monde - Published in Al-Thawri newspaper on 28/4/1994).
- 20 The system was tribally structured and was hard for the southern elite to have an impact on it for national interest as the former southern system used to be.
- 21 The Premier used often to come to the Presidential Council complaining of some northern figures. The researcher was serving at the Presidential Council as an adviser (1991-1998)
- 22 The southern administrative set-up was practically run by the southern leadership but got affected only in the budget which was centrally controlled by the northerners.
- 23 The financial statements of the Ministry of Finance: (Al-Bayay Al-Mali) for the years 1992, 1993, 1994.
- 24 Some good public sectors in the south were making profits and these would not hand over the while profits to the public resources in view of the chaos state of the state administration. The researcher paid visits to these sectors in Aden, Abyan and Hadhramout every year to assess economic conditions.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 The Financial Statements Op. Cit.



- 27 Zain, M. - A Separation Causes War, (Infiscal Yusha'el Harban) Dar-Al-Siyyasah - Kuwait, p 48.
- 28 Northern/Southern policies continued to run through northern/southern executing agencies and figures in the Cabinet respectively.
- 29 Kostiner, J. - Yemen: The Tortuous Quest for Unity, 1990-94 The Royal Institute of International Affairs - London, p 49.
- 30 The researcher, through her presence at the PC observed the southerners' carried their grievances to the vice-president and the northerners to the President's office, Also refer to Kostiner, Op. Cit. p 42.
- 31 Kostiner, J. - O. Cit. pp 48 and 43.
- 32 The administrative and financial systems in the ex-YAR did not change in the ROY. The southerners failed to cope with it for its cumbersome mechanism and being over centralised for a large area like Yemen. In terms of security, Government and power centre institutions, were also over-centralised and southerners had difficulty to penetrate it for functioning within it.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Ibid
- 35 Kostiner, J. - Op. Cit. p 43.
- 36 In the ex-YAR system, the vice figure would have not authority at all and in the absence of the key figure there would only be a limited role for him to act upon serious issues.
- 37 Southern sources - who wished not to disclose their names- said that southern technicians found bugging devices in Al-Beidh's house, telephones and cars. Upon these findings, Al-Beidh decided to work from Aden and left Sanaa. This is contrary to what was being described by Zain, M. Op. Cit. p 45.
- 38 Kostiner, J. OP. Cit. pp 43-46.
- 39 Zain, M. Op. Cit. p 48
- 40 Al-Ghaffari, A. - Op. Cit. p 233.
- 41 Ibid, Also Carapico, S. Civil Security in Yemen - Cambridge, 1998, p 174.
- 42 The researcher knew the Minister of Justice - Mr AW Sallam very well from the south. (Refer to Al-Ghaffari, A. Op. Cit. p 228)
- 43 Al-Ghaffari, A. Op. Cit. p 235.
- 44
- 45 He was Hussein Al-Husaibi.
- 46 Premier Al-Attas forwarded his resignation to the President in October 1992, for the failure of his Cabinet members to bring the perpetrators to justice.
- 47 Al-Ghaffari, A.A. - Op. Cit. p 240.
- 48 The YSP continued to hold its weekly sessions for its polit-bureau members as it was in former PDRY.
- 49 Talks with Salem Saleh, Al-Seyilli and others in 1994. The researcher's main residence continued to be in the south.
- 50 Mane'a I. - The parties and the political organisations in Yemen (Al-Ahزاب wal-Tandhimat Al-Seyyasiyyah fi al-Yaman) - Sanaa, 1994 pp 227-228.
- 51 As per their representatives in the Parliament.
- 52 Mane'a, I. Op. Cit. p 253 (table which shows the winning seats of each participating party).
- 53 Ibid
- 54 The researcher was a member of the Reception Committee on election day receiving and analysing the Election Data. In the south, 1 seat went to Al-Haqq and another to GPC only. The rest were independent figures.
- 55 Northern YSP figures were giving promises to the southern leadership that the former would guarantee 2 million supporters in the north to vote for YSP northerners in the election. Such promises were false.
- 56 The Islah party figures in the election were all from northern areas only. This lowered the YSP share to less than a third in the Government.
- 57 Kostiner, J. - Op. Cit. pp 56-57.
- 58 Al-Ghaffari, A. - Op. Cit. p 215.
- 59 The south was constituting a small population sector in the national arena and in an amalgamated unity it should not get more than its fifth or sixth share in political

- representations in the Parliament which it did. The number of southern constitutions in the election was 56 out of 301. The YSP got 47 in the south.
- 60 Al-Ghaffari, A. - Op. Cit. pp 224-225.
- 61 This argument was used in the election committee too, to get more poll centres for the south, but it was not used..
- 62 Al-Ghaffari, A. - Op. Cit. p 225.
- 63 Ibid. p 227.
- 64 Ibid. pp 240-257.
- 65 Ibid. p244.
- 66 Ibid. p 244.
- 67 Ibid. p244.
- 68 Ibid. pp 244-246.
- 69 Those points should have been the basis for Yemen Integration during the unification process and before accomplishing it in 1990.
- 70 Al-Ghaffari, A. - Op. Cit. pp 240-257.
- 71 Ibid. p 237.
- 72 Ibid. pp 240-257.
- 73 Ibid p 247.
- 74 Ibid. p 246.
- 75 Ibid p247.
- 76 Some Yemeni observers said about it that the APA represented an objective document for the best outcome of the Yemeni problems.
- 77 It called to the division of Yemen to 5 autonomous regions.
- 78 The withdrawal of the central administration from the regionals.
- 79 A share of regional resources was to go to the central public resources for national basic infrastructures.
- 80 The State Documentary Series on the Yemen Unity, Op. Cit. pp 432-433.
- 81 Ibid.
- 82 Yemen Gazette - Issue 1 , June 1990.
- 83 The researcher knew Al-Attas from 1973 and had formal interaction at the state administration in PDRY throughout their careers at various work levels including technical meetings in the Cabinet and in the Presidency in the south and in the north.
- 84 Ibid.
- 85 No doubt, he was better than Ali Nasser and Y Noman.
- 86 The analysis in this and the following subsection was deduced by the researcher from her experiences with the northern tribal community and its tribal mechanism and from her overall assessment on the ROY's political and economic conditions.
- 87 The Premier's director - office - M. Ben Rabi'aah - justified (to the researcher) in April 1992 the postponed work of many issues at the Premier's office because the Premier distrusted his cabinet members in strategic issues and had to work things on his own. (The former was a next door neighbour to the researcher in Aden).
- 88 The monitoring Institution (he Central Organisation/Bureau for auditing and monitoring) headed by Ahmed Al-Iryani, was annexed to the Presidential Council Office. The COAM was technically very weak and programmed mainly for targeting specific areas, circles or figures. It was geared by tribal mentality to fulfil its functions.
- 89 The YSP was fully geared to a self and general criticism mechanism, - an area where many members lost their positions in their political status and which caused heavy conflicts leading to military confrontations within the YSP leadership. If nepotism, tribalism or regionalism was substantially detected the responsible figure would be downgraded if not expelled. At the same time, the civil audit machinery was also too strong in the south which prevented financial corruption in the administrative system though this was only confined to public resources.
- 90 As it happened in Ismail's case when he was state President.
- 91 Observers of technocrats (of the south) criticised the Premier for the appointment of 27 Hashemites in the top hierarchies of the state administration whom some were far below the standard of other technocrats, for example: M Balfaqih who had only primary education was given a deputy Minister scale in the Premier's office; H Baharoon was appointed a deputy minister while F. Bin-Shamlan (who was minister of Public Works (1987) and then became

- Minister of Oil (1994-1996)) was only appointed a Director-General. There were many more examples committing Al-Attas for nepotism and administrative corruption.
- 92 Al-Attas downgraded the researcher from her previous deputy-Minister scale (in the south) to a General Director status but then she was upgraded to Ministerial level without his wish. At the same time, he upgraded Hashemite females in specific sectors.
- 93 Acres of lands in the south were occupied by him and his faction in the south and in Sanaa. Before leaving the south, Al-Attas liquidated his assets to millions of Yemeni riyals. Al-Rada'ai - an estate agent - was interviewed by researcher in August, 1994 and he confirmed the sale of 200 libnas in Sanaa for Al-Attas for over 100 million riyals.
- 94 S Gobran, Fadhle Muhsen, Hassainoon and others.
- 95 F. Ben-Shamlan, Dr MS Medhi, H. Hubaishy, F Bahsu and others.
- 96 These figures were of provocative nature and militarily minded.
- 97 Most of Presidential conflicts between the President and his vice, were on conflictory events/incidents between the ministers of vice-ministers of these sectors; and these events were purely factional northern/southern problems.
- 98 Despite the fact that many northern technocrats graduated from socialist countries or at best from 'states' colleges in the USA, the northern administration did not recognise many southerners' qualifications and consequently, the latter lost their old merits. This matte went so far to the extent that northerners accused some British grads of forging their academic qualifications. The researcher found that substantial forging did take place in northern administration and particularly in local academic/educational fields. Up to 1990, the south had none of these.
- 99 The tribal/factional rivalry between the two elites was covered politically by parties rivalry. In chapter 3 of Kostiner, J. - Yemen: The Tortuous Quest for Unity 1994 R11A, 1996 pp 22-35.
- 100 Kostiner, J. - Op. Cit. pp 27-30. Also Halliday, F. - article Yemen's Uneasy Elections - The World Today, March 1997, pp 73-74.
- 101 The World Bank/IDA: ROY: Dimensions of Economic Adjustment and Structural Reform March 1995, p 35.
- 102 Because of the factional attitudes of each elite in the power centre.
- 103 Kostiner, J. - Op. Cit. pp 44-45.
- 104 Presidential Decree no 2 for 1990 - calling the Parliament to its first session - refer to the State Documentary Series, Op. Cit. p 438.
- 105 The State Documentary Series, Op. Cit. p 440.
- 106 There were seventeen sectorial committees for the Parliament, each with 20-25 members.
- 107 Kostiner, J. - Op. Cit. pp 48 & 66.
- 108 Each group had a different vision on the state building. Refer to Kostiner, J. - Op. Cit. pp 30-35.
- 109 The researcher deduced certain evaluation to the facts in this subsection in the following photographs through her strong acquaintance with leading figures and different Yemen Communities (represented by blood background).
- 110 The ex-Majlis al-shura of the ex-YAR were mainly of traditional Ulama and tribes all of which constituted the extreme opposite version of the other half of southerners' - mainly equipped with Marxism and Leninism.
- 111 Dr Noman, was very much pro-northern Shafais as being influenced by Mohammed A Saeed (Muhsen). The northern figures in the parliament were substantially Zaydis with raw Islamic thoughts. These variational tendencies made a gap between Dr Noman and his MPs in the north.
- 112 Copies of some committees came often to the Presidential Office for comments or follow-up of specific issues. The researcher was associated with the work of some committees (Finance and Economic issues).
- 113 Parliament sessions were on Sanaa TV on an hour daily programme after being montaged from violence language.
- 114 Al-Ghaffari, A. - Op. Cit. p 211.
- 115 Ibid.
- 116 Ibid pp 211-212.
- 117 Ibid. p 215.
- 118 Ibid

- 119 Ibid. p 213.
- 120 Sheikh Abdulla Bin-Hussain was tribal, not educated, but he was of high social weight in the northern community.
- 121 Wonderfully, he controlled the floor and was able to control chaos discussions among members.
- 122 Sheikh Abdulla was not appreciating YSP discussions or views even if they were for the best interests to the nation. He was, however, appreciating few views of conservative southerners in the parliament as long as they did not stand against his faction interest.
- 123 The Daily Parliamentary Programme on Sanaa TV. it has been an ongoing programme on the Sanaa TV, the researcher used to watch in Yemen.
- 124 The Parliamentary budget increased continuously since 1994 (refer to the Financial Statement of 1994, 1995 onwards). The researcher came to know from merchants who did not want to disclose their names that purchases to build extensions to Al-Ahmer residence and its equipment ran in millions of Yemeni riyals in 1993/1994 and continued in successive years at the public resources.
- 125 Carapico, S. op. Cit. pp 54-55.
- 126 There was no room for making objective compromises ion economic development strategy. The researcher was the economic adviser to the Presidential Office since 1991.
- 127 Kostiner, J. - Op. Cit. pp 30-35.
- 128 Refer to Chapter 2.
- 129 Kostiner, J. - Op. Cit. p 33.
- 130 Ibid. Discussions with her private secretary of the Presidential Council - O. Ben-Dhubai'a - the researcher's colleague at the Presidential office.
- 131 It was the first experience for Islah to share national power administration in Yemen. The researcher was a Yemeni national who was acquainted fully with Yemeni Governments since 1962.
- 132 Kostiner, J. - Op. Cit. pp 30-35; also Mane'a, I. Op. Cit. p 240-241.
- 133 Ibid.
- 134 Carapico, S. - Op. Cit. p 54.
- 135 Ibid. Also Kostiner, J. - Op. Cit. pp 30-35.
- 136 Kostiner, J. - Op. Cit. pp 30-35.
- 137 Ibid.
- 138 Ibid.
- 139 Ibid.
- 140 Ibid.
- 141 Ibid pp 65-66.
- 141 The corruption factor had substantial role in worsening economic conditions but this was only one area of the political tensions carried out between northerners and southerners.
- 142 Kostiner, J. - Op. Cit. p 31.
- 143 Chapter 4, section 4.3 of this thesis.
- 144 The State Documentary Series, Op. Cit. p 318-320
- 145 Kostiner, J. - Op. Cit. pp 30-35.
- 146 Carapico, S. - Op. Cit. p 172.
- 147 The researcher was observing such remarks from northern elite in the central authorities.
- 148 The Financial Statements since 1991-1994 were free from profitable southern institutions. (Al-Bayam Al-Mah - lil-Muwazanah Al-A'amah lil-Dawlah wa-Muwazanat Al-Qita'a Al-Iqtivadi Wal-Muwayanat Al-Mustaqillah - lil-Sannah Al-Maleyyah, 1997). This shows from 1993 to 1997.
- 149 Large part of southern public sector was misused and mishandled in the post war.
- 150 Basic recognition between the two leaderships to the positive areas in their experiences was not there. The northerners elite in the economy such as Dr Al-Attar, Al-Iryani and A Aziz Abdul-Ghani, were not ready to understand the difficult circumstances of southerners and their public institutions. Eventually, the researcher held them responsible for their reluctance to address southern economic transformation rationally to their northern elite in the GPC.
- 151 National and Regional committees were set up for land distribution. This took over three years (1990-1994) to function in southern regions but with chaos administration. Being a former deputy minister for this sector, the researcher was not happy about the mechanism by which land was randomly distributed.

- 152 Public resources were tightly scrutinised on southern Public institutions by the northern  
Minister of Finance (A. Al-Salami - (1990-1993))
- 153 Presidential Reports made by the researcher on the performance of the southern public sectors  
in 1992 and 1993 to A. Abdul-Ghani - member of the Presidential Council (1990-1994).
- 154 The Financial Statement of Ministry of Finance Op. Cit.
- 155 Carapico, S. - Op. Cit. pp 31-36
- 156 Carapico withdrew the variations of the two states in terms of social reforms in her book:  
"Civil Society in Yemen" pp 31-36. The researcher, also. was a mixed off shoot, partly  
southerner and partly northerner (of Zaydi sect) and emphasised the social variation within  
her southern and northern family members (in customs and traditions, in food consumption  
and in social practices: of death, marriage ceremonies and others).
- 157 The researcher was British born and studied in Aden since childhood where she represented  
the 4th - 5th educated generation in the south.
- 158 The Law no 32 of 1973 regarding the eradication of illiteracy in ex-PDRY was effectively  
carried out across the national arena and she was made compulsory on the elite's relations to  
participate in it to encourage elderly people to make use of the illiteracy campaign  
programme.
- 159 Sanaa City, Taiz, Ibb, Rada'a and Hudaidah had public schools for both males and females in  
many of their districts. Other provisional capitals had male schools mainly.
- 160 Al-Na'eem, A.A.: Towards a Progressive Islamic Legislation, "Nahw Tatweer Al-Tashree'a  
Al-Islami" Seena for Publishing - 1994, Cairo.
- 161 Molyneux, M. - Article: "Legal Reform and Socialist Revolution in Democratic Yemen:  
Women and the Family" in the International Journal of the Sociology of Law 1985. pp 147-  
172.
- 162 The YAR Constitution, 1970 - Sanaa - YAR.
- 163 The Family No. 1 of 1974, Aden, PDRY.
- 164 Ibid.
- 165 Ibid.
- 166 It never worked during the co-operative unification and by 1995, it became an illegal  
document.
- 167 Despite the disparity in population of the two Yemeni states, northern females did not get the  
required opportunities for the country developmental challenges because of tribal impact in  
the power centre and the administration, refer to table 5, p 21 of the "Economic Development  
of the YAR" by Mallarch, R. - Croom Helm, London, 1986. pp 21-31.
- 168 The facts in this paragraph, were deduced by the researcher's experience in the social field,  
both in the south up to 1988 and in the north (since unification). The researcher, herself,  
failed to build a trust bridge with female pioneers in the north or to carry out mutual social  
programmes due to the factional gap that Yemeni females had as an impact of social progress  
disparity between the two former regimes.
- 169 The facts of this subsection (apart from 4.4.4.4) had no formal references because of the  
nature of military data which was incorporated in. However, the researcher was regarded as a  
female key figure in the NF since 1965. At that time, she was acquainted with most of NLF  
key figures freedom fighters of whom some had military/security posts such as  
Colonel/Porifideir Anter, Sheye'a, Al-Seyyilli and others. Through the researcher's career in  
the south, she was on frequent contacts formally and informally with most of political key  
figures. She recorded most of her memories for such use. In the north, the researcher had her  
own blood relations, of whom the majority involved in military/security set-ups. This helped  
in deducing to her best knowledge and estimates these facts.
- 171 Kostiner, J. - Op. Cit. Chapter 6 (pp 71-84).
- 172 Most of the stated facts in this part of the military subsection of Chapter 4 were stated in  
Kostiner's reference "Yemen: the Tortuous Quest for Unity, 1990-94" Chapter 6.
- 173 Dr Colonel Al-Shamiri, in his last book "Alf Sa'aat Harb" (one thousand hours of war)  
recorded the military confrontations between the two sides. However, the researcher could  
easily see some forging in some military documents the author put in the book with regard to  
military correspondence. Also; Colonel Al-Shamiri who later became Governor of Marib,  
underestimated the southerner faction in the northern force in their vital role in the military  
tactics by which victory was given to the Saleh's forces.

174 The forged money was one of the top war stories in the national arena. The researcher talked to Colonel H.A. Hasson about it and he reacted positively.

## CHAPTER 5

### **Yemen Integration in the Post-War Period, 1994-1998**

This Chapter covers the integration between north and south Yemen following the civil war of 1994. It critically analyses Yemeni integration after changes in the unified constitution were made and approved by Parliament in July 1994, and were endorsed by the Presidency in October 1994. This chapter shows the negative influence of tribal bonds on national affairs and how the unification between the two parts of Yemen was heavily damaged in its profile and contents as northern tribal power, in different forms, achieved hegemony within the power centre of the ROY.

#### **5.1 Political Measures taken after the 1994 War**

The pattern of co-operative unification, which had existed prior to 1994, was changed after the 1994 war into a pattern of imposed unification. One-man rule within the context of the Zaydi hegemony over the state - the system which had characterised the former YAR - became the framework within which decisions were made at the highest levels of the ROY's administration.<sup>1</sup>

##### **5.1.1 The Central Trends of Political Organisation in the Post-War Period.**

At the political level, the two most dynamic factors (besides the war) that changed the co-operative unification pattern of integration into an imposed one were: (i) the changes in the constitution in July 1994, and (ii) the formation of a government based on the coalition of the two major northern parties, namely the GPC and Islah, with the exclusion of the YSP from the power centre and the government.

The constitution was changed in July 1994, giving the President extensive

national powers at all levels, and marginalising the position of the Vice-President in national affairs.<sup>2</sup> Though this followed the American experience/model, Yemeni statutes were not made to conform with the federal statutes of the USA. The changes in the constitution gave more power to the President in particular and to the Hashedi tribal power base in general.<sup>3</sup> The power centre in Yemen came under the domination of two key Hashedi figures, namely the President of the state, Saleh, who was also the Chairman of the GPC, and Sheikh Abdulla Al-Ahmer, Chairman of Parliament, Chief Shiekh of the Hashed tribe and the Chairman of the Islah Party. It should be noted, however, that although both figures were close to each other, they did have some conflicting views on state governance.

The new government, after the war, was presided over by Premier Abdul Aziz Abdul Ghani, an ex-YAR Premier from the Taiz region, with all cabinet members coming from the two major northern parties of the GPC and Islah.<sup>4</sup> The only independent minister in the new government was Mr. Faisal Bin Shamlan, Minister of Oil and Mineral Wealth. He was a southerner from Hadhramout with pro-Islamist views, clearly expressed in the '*Al-Minbar*' quarterly paper which he sponsored.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Bin Shamlan, however, resigned in 1996 because of what he considered to be unsatisfactory policies and interventions in his sector.<sup>6</sup>

The YSP was removed from an active role in government and was generally restricted, particularly in the military sphere, effectively removing formal political representation to the new leadership structure for the southern regions. With the political and the material ground of the YSP destroyed, a political gap was left in the southern region which other parties sought to fill. The GPC and Islah parties both adopted strategies aimed at increasing their roles in the southern regions, and enrolled thousands of southerners in the membership of each party.<sup>7</sup>

At the top leadership level of the two parties, few southerners were incorporated into the leading bodies. The "General Committee" - the policy making body of the GPC presided over by the President - incorporated five southerners out of 31



members in 1994. These were:<sup>8</sup>

Staff Brigadier A.R. Mansoor:	Vice-President of the State who had been a YSP until the 1986 war.
Mr Abdul Qader Bajammal:	Deputy Premier and Minister of Planning, who had been a YSP central committee member up to 1986 war in the south.
Mr Abdullah Al-Bar:	Advisor to the President who had been a Polit-bureau member of the YSP up to 1978.
Mr Abdulla Ghanem:	Minister of Legal Affairs who had been a member of the Central YSP until 1986.
Mr Mohamed Al-Shaddadi:	Deputy-Governor of Abyan who was employed in the Ministry of Agriculture in the PDRY

It is worth noting that all of the above candidates were from the Ali Nasser Mohamed faction which had caused the 1986 civil war in the former PDRY and fled to North Yemen.<sup>9</sup> Two of the above members were from Hadhramout, two were from Abyan and one was from Aden.<sup>10</sup> Lahej and Al-Mahara regions in the South were not represented in the General Committee. The only member from Shabwa was Dr Nasser Awlaqi who had lived in North Yemen since South Yemen's independence, but was of Shabwa origin.

The Islah Party incorporated even fewer southerners in its top level policy-making structure, namely the "Higher Committee". Out of its 16 members, the Higher Committee incorporated only two southerners, both of whom were of Hadhrami origin:<sup>11</sup>

Mr Mahfoodh Shammakh:	A Hadhrami merchant residing in San'aa since south independence
Mr. Abdullah Bukair:	A <i>Qadi</i> from Hadhramout.

Neither one of these members had enjoyed any political experience in the former PDRY, nor was widely known among southerners, except in Hadhramout.

It should be noted that both parties had previously sought to ensure that every major tribe and region of northern Yemen was represented in their top policy making committees. That consideration was achieved in northern regions by incorporating key figures from different Zaydi tribal groups (Hashed, Bakeel and the Zaydi faction from Medhaj) and similarly of influential Shafai figures from Taiz, Ibb, Al-Hudaidah and Al-Beida regions.<sup>12</sup> It was also important to include individuals from the Hashamite and Qadi factions, and some Zaydi/Ismaili educated figures.<sup>13</sup> However, it was not intended to achieve or maintain a balance of power for southern regions or for southerners under the ROY. In view of there being only a handful number of members from the southern regions, there was a natural tendency to pursue northern orientated goals/policies.

As can be seen from the information given above, not all southern regions were represented in the policy-making committees of the two parties.<sup>14</sup> The Islah, moreover, incorporated southern figures from Hadhramout with no political weight (one was a merchant and the other a religious figure). The Islah party in particular regarded the southern population, with the exception of Hadhramis, as living outside Al-Share'a law. This was declared formally by Qadi Al-Dailamy who was Minister of Justice in the Coalition.

Both parties were concerned more with gaining control of southern resources than with gaining support from the southern population. The southern regions had significant potential in their diversified resources, especially Aden and Hadhramout where the main activities in oil and minerals, oil refineries and international services were concentrated. Shabwa and Al-Mahara had also some oil prospect while all southern regions had abundant of fish resources. Most important, however, southern regions had various underground water aquifers, a characteristic which hardly existed in Northern Yemen and other areas of the

Arabian Peninsula. Such diversified strategic resources in southern regions made both parties interested in gaining an upper hand in the south at any cost.

The small number of southern members in the political parties' leaderships indicated that neither the GPC nor Islah were keen on having southerners in the leadership. They wanted as many southern members as possible but would not allow them a 'say' in the policy-making mechanism.<sup>15</sup> The southerners that were in the GPC leadership did not carry the same political weight in the leadership as their northern colleagues, nor did they have high technical capacities. Apart from Mr. Abdulla Ghanem, who was distinguished for his sustained legal experience, the rest of the GPC southern elite had little experience as policy-makers.

The two governing parties used a variety of means to attract southerners to join their membership such as offering employment, land and money (and even marriage expenses to the very few southerners that became members of the Islah party). Some young southerners were genuinely dedicated to the parties' principles. The majority, however, were not interested in politics and only joined out of self-interest and a desire for self-protection. Some, indeed showed resentment at having to join the party for these reasons.<sup>16</sup>

### **5.1.2 The Formation of the New Coalition Government (1994-1997)**

The new cabinet was presided over by Abdul-Aziz Abdul-Ghani, a key member of the GPC. Of the 17 GPC seats in the Cabinet, 5 seats were given to southern members of the party.<sup>17</sup> see table no 5-.4.

The following members of the GPC were in the 1994-1997 cabinet

1. Abdul Aziz Abdul Ghani	Premier of the Cabinet (N)
2. Dr Abdul Karim Al-Iryani	Deputy Premier, Minister of Foreign affairs (N)
3. Dr Mohammed Sa'id Al-Attar	Deputy Premier, Minister of Industry (N)

4. Abdul Qader Bajammal	Deputy Premier, Minister of Development and Planning (S)
5. Brigadier. A.M.Al-Sayyani	Minister of Defence (N)
6. Brigadier Hussein Arab	Minister of Interior (S)
7. Sadeq Abu Ras	Minister of Civil Service and Training (N)
8. Abdulla Al- Batani	Minister of Labour and Insurances (S)
9. Ahmed Salem Al-Jabali	Minister of Agriculture and Water Resources (N)
10. Abdul Rahman Al-Akwa'a	Minister of Information (N)
11. Ali Hamid Sharaf	Minister of Housing, Municipality and Construction (N)
12. Hussein Al-Arashi	Minister of Culture (N)
13. Ahmed Musa'ed	Minister of Transport (S)
14. Ahmed Sofan	Minister of Industry (N)
15. Ahmed Al-Anesi	Minister of Communication (N)
16. Mohammed Raweh	Minister of Sports (N)
17. Abdullah Ghanem	Minister of Legal Affairs (Adeni of northern origin)

The Islah party held the following eight ministeries, of which only one was held by a southerner: <sup>18</sup>

1. Abdul Wahab Al-Anesi	Deputy Premier (N)
2. Ahmed Al-Dailamy	Minister of Justice (N)
3. Mohammed Al-Qurashi	Minister of Endowment (N)
4. Mohammed Afandi	Minister of Trade and Supply (N) He resigned in 1996 and Mohammed Othman (GPC) took over.
5. Abdul Rahman Bafhadhl	Minister of Fisheries (S) (never worked in the south. He resigned and the ministry was left under the supervision of A. W. Al-Anesi, the deputy Premier.)
6. Dr Abdo Qubati	Minister of Education (N) (He defected his Party and was

	replaced by another Islah figure
	Abdul-Majid Al-Mekhlafi (N)
7. Dr Nageeb Ghanem	Minister of Health (N)
8. Mohammed Dammaj	Minister of Local Administration (N)

### 5.1.3 The Policies of the New Coalition, October 1994 to April 1997

In July 1994, the new coalition Government which was formed temporarily during the war under the premiership of Dr Al-Attar and excluded the YSP members began by formulating some security measures. Aden City was placed under a curfew for the period from 16<sup>th</sup> to 27<sup>th</sup> July 1994 in an attempt to halt looting and violence within the city.<sup>19</sup> Between August and September 1994, southern fundamentalists of the Islah party started to create security problems by attempting to eradicate traditional Islamic practices and destroying sacred tombs and graves of traditional Islamic holy figures. This caused a strong reaction, not only in southern regions but even in some neighbouring countries where influential southern factions supporting financially those sacred sites were living. The state leadership used a force of 2000 soldiers, equipped with heavy weaponry to crush the revolt of the Islah Islamists, causing the death of 500 persons.

A further problem was over the heavy machinery owned by the former regime of the PDRY. Heavy machinery including tractors, combine harvesters, caterpillars, graders, buses and miscellaneous vehicles, and also office equipment and all types of weaponry were looted by the northern armed forces (outside their formal capacity) and by the public.<sup>20</sup> The government called for an immediate restoration of security.<sup>21</sup> In response to Government concern, equipment were returned after money was paid to those who had seized them. This Government policy of security restoration continued to be at the forefront of the Coalition's concerns for some time.<sup>22</sup>

A second principal policy for the two parties in government was to move out all YSP figures from key posts in government institutions and to replace them by southerners and northerners from their own parties. One element of this followed automatically from the structure of the new Government of Abdul Aziz Abdul Ghani. In so far as it was coalition between the GPC and Islah, there was no longer space for YSP members as ministers, vice-ministers and deputy ministers. While all YSP polit-bureau and Central Committee members lost their formal positions in government it should be noted that there were some ex-YSP deputy ministers who had held no leading positions in the YSP and who therefore kept their jobs. Among those were Dr Jaffer Hamed in the Ministry of Planning and Mr Obaid Ba-Lahmer in the Ministry of Planning.<sup>23</sup> Some YSP technocrats and associates who happened to be in Sana'a during the war also remained in office.

At other levels, the new Government attempted to replace some of the YSP junior officials in the central authority and all YSP senior officials at the southern regional level. A few southern juniors remained in the central authority in the capital, though many of them would have preferred - if given the choice - to go back to work in their regions. This attitude of returning to the southern regions was mainly attributed to the deterioration of their living standards in Sana'a, especially when equal treatment with their northerners colleagues had lost ground.<sup>24</sup> Spiralling inflation in 1994/1995 was also a contributing factor for southerners to leave Sana'a and work in their regions where they did not need to pay rent or incur extra expenses away from their families. All YSP senior employees in southern regions were replaced either by northerners or by southerners who were members of the two leading parties.

A third policy between the two parties was the eradication of administrative and financial corruption from governmental institutions. This was mainly emphasised by the Islah party as the corruption factor in the administration and the finance of the country had been going on (since the YAR establishment) leaving negative consequences on the nation and its economy. Recruitment, for instance, had been influenced by tribal factors; and persons with better qualifications and other merits

were often passed over, particularly for higher posts both at the central and regional level.<sup>25</sup> The relations of those in the power centre would push forward the names of their relatives or tribe members to the authorities concerned internally and externally to fill higher national and international posts at the expense of others with better qualifications and experience ( such as the case of Mr. A. K. Al-Arhabi – an in-law of the President - who was appointed to a World Bank managerial job for a project worth US\$ 80 million.<sup>26</sup> He was among only five northern candidates forwarded for the post. Other candidates exceeding one hundred in number were removed from the competition even for the second line appointments of the project management.<sup>27</sup> )

The role of the tribal element in administrative corruption should not be underestimated. A Hashedi technocrat would have the best chance to go up the administrative ladder within a short period of time. Then would come the Bakeel tribe, but still with better chances than the northern Shafai, and at the bottom of the ladder would come the highly technical southerner if he/she politically appealed to the power centre. This socio-administrative dynamic and phenomenon had become a general characteristic in the Yemeni administration, and Islah, which was more Shafai-based, was very keen to eradicate it but experience showed that it failed in such detiny.

An extreme example of administrative corruption was in the financial sector. Sale of positions in public services, and particularly in the Ministry of Finance, was a strong element in administrative corruption. A prominent figure in the GPC told the researcher that he would be willing to pay up to 300,000 Yemeni Riyals to obtain a customs post in the Ministry of Finance. He said that within a few months, he would get his money back five-fold.<sup>28</sup>

Tribes' influence on 'resources' posts in the taxation and customs administration was great. As the ultimate political power of the two parties was in northern tribal hands, many of the taxes and customs posts were determined by those tribal figures and their allies.<sup>29</sup> Smuggling had been an active trade in the northern parts

of the north.<sup>30</sup> It was, in fact, the major resource in those harsh areas. Smuggling would involve arms, drugs, crops, gas, oil, gold and other consumer commodities.<sup>31</sup> Very few customs and tax revenues went to the public budget as the major share of it would be absorbed by the tribes in these areas who would provide security for smugglers. The tax on qat should have raised around 7 billion Yemeni Riyals, but the annual collection hardly exceeded 500 million Yemeni Riyals.<sup>32</sup>

As for bribery which characterised the YAR system and continued flourishing in the unification period, it had a significant impact on the population. The employee suffered a substantial loss by forfeiting at least 20% of his/her entitlements.<sup>33</sup> The Ministry of Finance kept after the war, its YAR traditional accounts' practices at full fledged scale and cut-off expenses of many budget items for savings. The Ministry of Finance then would distribute annual savings among its employees/personnel with different ratios.<sup>34</sup> Financial bribery in the system was like a major artery in the body, and it was not looked upon as an illegal action; it was rather treated, customarily, as a normal 'fee service' in the community.

The coalition government, on the basis of the understanding between the two parties to eliminate financial and administrative corruption; removed in 1995 from positions of authority a large number of deputy ministers and general directors of strategic sectors. Among these were Abdulla Kholani, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, who was replaced by Farid Mujawwer (a southerner from Shabwa) and Hazem Baker, Director-General of the Medical Authority who was replaced by an Islah figure. In 1996, the state leadership in co-ordination with the coalition moved out and reshuffled 120 accounts clerks and officials in the Ministry of Finance and passed a decree<sup>1</sup> whereby an accounts clerk or accounts official would not serve for more than 2 years in his/her position.<sup>35</sup> The President of the State was met the Ministry of Finance officials to get this done in 1996.



#### 5.1.4 Problems in the Coalition

Over the three years in which the coalition Government existed, there were a number of problems which affected the coalition's coherence. The first related to the different experience which the two parties had. The two parties were not on an equal basis when it came to running the state's affairs. While most of the GPC cabinet members had already been part of the government elite, most of the Islah Cabinet members were new to ministerial posts. This created a difficulty in having a common language on policy issues, and in the way these issues were handled.<sup>36</sup>

The second problem between the two northern parties was related their differing visions of state-building despite the similarities in their tribal attitude and approach. Since the start of their coalition, the Islah sought to spread Islamic rules and principles in all state affairs, and mainly targeted two basic sectors: education and information. The GPC, on the other hand, targeted the control of state affairs within the existing tribal set-up. It sought, therefore, to control basic and strategic sectors, such as defence, interior and security, foreign affairs, planning, oil and agriculture. The two parties held long discussions on the distribution of ministerial posts between them. They agreed on the majority of sectors except education and information. After thorough discussions, the chairmen of the two parties came into agreement whereby the education sector was given to Islah and the information sector was retained by the GPC. However, the accommodation of the ministerial posts did not solve the basic difference in their vision of state-building.<sup>38</sup> Differences between the two parties were practically settled between the two chairmen, each of whom played a supportive tribal role to the other.

The third problem was that there were certain policy issues on which they did not agree. Islah, for example, never accepted the Economic Reform Programme (ERP). This was due to the ERP's short-run negative impact on the poor who

represented about 70% of the population.<sup>39</sup> The Islah feared that the policy might negatively affect Islah's image in future elections. This was clearly expressed by its members in parliament in successive sessions following the launch of the ERP in March 1995.<sup>40</sup> Its objections to ERP policies, however, became weaker over time as many of its leaders, especially its chairman, Sheikh Abdullah Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer, benefited from the second stage of the ERP.<sup>41</sup>

The fourth problem was that there was a disagreement over material payments and privileges given to military and security personnel. The security and defence sectors were absorbing 22-24% of total public budget expenditures. In 1996-1997, the wage bill of those sectors amounted to 30% of the total wage bill.<sup>42</sup> Military personnel enjoyed higher salary rates than technical civilians and had special medical facilities internally and externally.<sup>43</sup> This was natural as the majority of Islah in the Parliament were of Shafais-based figures and did not like the Zaydi tribally military and security institutions taking the lion share of government support against the majority of poor civilian.

### **5.1.5 The Impact of the War and Coalition on the YSP and its Members**

The impact of the war and the coalition on the YSP leadership was, in effect, the removal of all polit-bureau and central committee members from employment in governmental institutions in addition to all southern technocrats who happened to be in the south during the war period. As mentioned earlier (5.1.1) a handful of YSP deputy-ministers who had no leading positions in the YSP were left in their posts as they happened to be in Sana'a during the war and thus maintained their offices in the post-war period.<sup>44</sup> Others lost their jobs, mainly because they happened to be in southern regions before or while the war was on. However, those who lost their jobs, continued to receive their salaries, though without most allowances.

At the regional administrative level, the YSP members lost all their formal posts in all Southern regions. Both the GPC and the Islah parties put their own figures

in all key posts. In the sub-regions in the South, the YSP had no representation and, in general, the YSP lost ground in its formal representation in both the central administration and the southern regional administrative set-up.<sup>45</sup>

In terms of the party's physical infrastructure and financial resources, the impact of the war and the coalition on the YSP could not be underestimated. The YSP lost all of its important buildings and resources in the country, estimated to be around US\$ 30 million.<sup>46</sup> Almost all the key sites centrally and regionally were confiscated, partly by the state leadership and partly by the northern forces.<sup>47</sup> The YSP main building in Aden - built and beautifully equipped by the former USSR - had its furniture and equipment seized by northern forces and the building was handed over to Aden University.<sup>48</sup> Financial accounts of the YSP in Yemeni banks were frozen and were still frozen at the time of writing. With no buildings and no financial resources, the YSP political mechanism stood still for a period of time, except in the capital - Sana'a - where current meetings went on to keep the YSP operational.

A further impact of the war and the coalition on the YSP was the flight of its key leaders (both in the Polit-bureau and the Central Committee) from the country. They fled to other arab states, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Qatar, Ethiopia, Somalia, Egypt and Syria. Some also left for the UK and USA. The key figures who left for neighbouring peninsula states were:<sup>49</sup>

Ali Salem Al-Beidh	General Sec of YSP left for Oman
Haider Abu Bakr Al-Attas	Ex-Prime Minister left for Jeddah
Salem Saleh Moh'd	Assist Gen. Sec. left for KSA
Yasim Saeed Noman	Polit-Bureau member left for UAE
Anis Hassan Yehya	Polit-Bureau member left for UAE
Haitham Qassem Taher	Ex-defence Minister left for UAE
Mohammed Abdulla Saeed	Polit-bureau member left for UAE
Salem Mohamed Gobran	Polit-bureau member left for Egypt
Mohammed Ali Ahmed	Central Committee member left for UK.
Mohamed Sulaiman Nasser	Central committee member left for

The passing of the General Amnesty Law by the State leadership in 1994 did not solve the problem of southern YSP members facing discriminatory treatment. The General Amnesty law of 1994 (after the war) had hardly any positive impact on the YSP southerners inside and outside the country. Dr Saif Sayel and Dr Haidara Masdoos, both polit- bureau members, were among those YSP members who came back to the country hoping to benefit from the General Amnesty Law and to return to their normal life. Neither of them was accommodated in any formal post in the administration. The Law, however, had a positive impact on northerners in the YSP. Mr Mohamed Yehya Al-Gholy (a Central Committee member), for instance, came back and led a normal life in his community. The state leadership eventually provided him and his family with overseas medical expenses.<sup>50</sup> Ironically, while the General Amnesty Law was being issued, the state leadership was also issuing the call for 15 Southerners of the YSP leadership and one key southern figure of the Yemen Sons' League to be sued for High Treason in Yemen. After the death of one of them in Hadhramout, in the last few days of the war, the state leadership continued to call the 14 Southerners who were all outside the country to present themselves to the Yemen High Court for the High Treason trial.<sup>51</sup>

Despite all types of pressures it faced, the YSP continued to organise itself again after the hard blow it had received. It is worth looking at the old and new structure of the YSP to compare the difference in terms of the loss of the party leadership.

The YSP Polit-Bureau members before the war of 1994 are listed below:<sup>52</sup>

- |    |                                |                                     |
|----|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. | Ali Salem Al-Beidh             | Secretary General (s)               |
| 2. | Salem Saleh Moh'd              | Assistant Secretary-<br>General (s) |
| 3. | Haider Abu-Bakr Al-Attas       | Polit-bureau Member (s)             |
| 4. | Yassin Saeed Norman            | Polit-bureau Member (s)             |
| 5. | Staff Brigadier Haithen Qassan | Polit-bureau Member (s)             |
| 6. | Mohammed Haidra Masdous        | Polit-bureau Member (s)             |
| 7. | Saleh Monasser Al-Seyeli       | Polit-bureau Member (s)             |

8.	Ali Saleh Obad (Muqbel)	Polit-bureau Member (s)
9.	Hassan Ahmed Ba'oum	Polit-bureau Member (s)
10.	Anis Hassan Yahyar	Polit-bureau Member (s)
11.	Moh'd Abdullah Saeed (Mohsen)	Polit-bureau Member (s)
12.	Saif Sayel Khaled	Polit-bureau Member (s)
13.	Abdul-Ghani Abdul-Qader	Polit-bureau Member (s)
14.	FadhI Mohsen Abdulla	Polit-bureau Member (s)
15.	Salem Gobran	Polit-bureau Member (s)
16.	Mohammed Ali Ahmed	Polit-bureau Member (s)
17.	Jarallah Omer	Polit-bureau Member (n)
18.	Ahmed Ali Al-Salami	Polit-bureau Member (n)
19.	Abdul-Malek Al-Eryani	Polit-bureau Member (n)
20.	Mohammed Qassen Al-Thour	Polit-bureau Member (n)
21.	Yahya Mohammed Al-Shami	Polit-bureau Member (n)
22.	Yahya Mansour Abu-Osbu'a	Polit-bureau Member (n)
23.	Abdul Wahed Al-Muradi	Polit-bureau Member (n)
24.	Abdullah Ahmed Mugaide'a	Polit-bureau Member (n)
25.	Abdulla Baidar	Polit-bureau Member (n)
26.	Abdul-Ghani Abdul-Qader	Polit-bureau Member (s)
27.	Haidara Masdoos	Polit-bureau Member (s)

Ten of the above left the country in 1994 and sought refuge in neighbouring countries while the rest continued within the new structure of the YSP.

When the war was over, the state leadership thought it would allow a new YSP to be formed under a leadership which would cooperate with the new state leadership. The state leadership initially intended to ask Mansoor Abu-Osbu'a to be the new leader, but it eventually followed opinion of a southerner adviser (the researcher) at the presidential office, and approached Ali Saleh Obad Muqbel who was seen as a more suitable alternative to take over the new YSP leadership.

The new YSP Polit-Bureau members were as follows:<sup>53</sup>

1.	Ali Saleh Obad (Muqbel)	The General Secretary (s)
2.	Ahmed Haidra Saeed	Polit-Bureau member (s)
3.	Hassan Ahmed Ba'oum	Polit-Bureau member (s)

4.	Salem Ahmed Al-Khanbashi	Polit-Bureau member (s)
5.	Saif Sayel Khaled	Polit-Bureau member (s)
6.	Salem Omer Bukair	Polit-Bureau member (s)
7.	Saleh Awad Sinan	Polit-Bureau member (s)
8.	Saleh Nasr Nasran	Polit-Bureau member (s)
9.	Abdul Ghani Abdul Qader	Polit-Bureau member (s)
10.	Abdul Bari Taher	Polit-Bureau member (s)
11.	Othman Abdul-Gabbar	Polit-Bureau member (s)
12.	Ali Munasser Mohammed	Polit-Bureau member (s)
13.	FadhI Mohsen Abdulla	Polit-Bureau member (s)
14.	Mujahed Al-Quhali	Polit-Bureau member (s)
15.	Mahmood Hussein Saba'a	Polit-Bureau member (s)
16.	Mohamed Ghaleb Ahmed	Polit-Bureau member (s)
17.	Jarallah Omer	Polit-Bureau member (n)
18.	Ahmed Ali Al-Salami	Polit-Bureau member (n)
19.	Abdulla Baider	Polit-Bureau member (n)
20.	Abdulla Mugaide'a	Polit-Bureau member (n)
21.	Abdul-Wahed Al-Muradi	Polit-Bureau member (n)
22.	Mohemed Saeed Muqbel	Polit-Bureau member (n)
23.	Mohammed Salem Al-Shaibani	Polit-Bureau member (n)
24.	Mohamed Qassem Al-Thour	Polit-Bureau member (n)
25.	Yahya Mohamed Al-Shami	Polit-Bureau member (n)
26.	Yahya Mansour Abu-Osbu'a	Polit-Bureau member (n)*

To restore the right membership, the new structure upgraded some of the Central Committee members to become Polit-Bureau members.<sup>54</sup>

The new YSP continued to face severe pressures from the coalition leadership. Apart from the non-restoration of its buildings and resources, the Party found that its members were vulnerable to government discrimination and that it could do nothing to defend them. Some of its members were prevented from going back to their regions after the war. Among the latter, for example, was Abdul Majid Wahdain, deputy minister of Culture who was in San'aa during the war. He was refused permission to go back to his region when he was removed from his job. A year later, he was allowed to return to his region, Hadhramout.<sup>55</sup> The YSP newspaper (Al-Thawri) was subject to accusations of being a separatist or

secessionist publication. The same treatment was applied to YSP MPs who were reluctant to speak for their regions and for the deterioration of the living standard of southerners in general.\* Political harassment was practised on the new YSP leadership, as when the security forces in Sana'a attempted to arrest the polit-bureau member Hassan Ba'oum to keep him from attending a critical polit-bureau meeting regarding parliamentary election participation by the YSP.<sup>56</sup> Ba'oum, however, disappeared in 1998 following a public demonstration led by him and other opposition figures in the Hadhramout capital, Mukalla.

### 5.1.6 The Election of April 1997

The ROY experienced another general election in March 1997 when the GPC won the majority of seats (227 seats of the total 301 seats in the Parliament). Over 14 parties stood for election, but only a few parties won parliamentary seats:<sup>57</sup>

General People's Congress	42% of the vote
Yemen Reform Gathering (Islah)	23
Yemeni Socialist Party	0 (boycotted the election)
Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party	1
Al-Haqq	1
Wahdawi Nasiri	2
Independents	28
Other parties	3

The YSP boycotted the elections on the account that its properties were confiscated and it was not in a position to campaign fairly with other northern parties involved in the power centre. Some of the YSP southern members were very active in the national arena and paid a heavy price as the power centre could not tolerate their activities and accordingly took harsh measures against them.

Though the Islah party came second in the elections, it refused to share political power with the GPC in the Government which was subsequently formed. This was a result of the many political frictions they had in the past coalition and

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\* (after 55 footnote) The San'aa TV, the parliamentary daily programme.

during the latest elections. They therefore decided that they would be more influential in opposition.<sup>58</sup>

### 5.1.7 The New Government, May 1997 - March 1998

Having won a substantial majority in the elections, the GPC offered the Premiership to an independent figure and reserved all cabinet seats to its members except the Health Ministry which was handed over to a qualified independent figure. An independent southern figure, Dr Faraj Bin Ghanem, became the Premier for less than a year.<sup>59</sup> Bin Ghanem was a public southern figure with experience of operating financial and planning orientated sectors in the south and then in the north. He was approached after the war to take over the premiership of the coalition government, but, at this point, was very reluctant to do so. However, in 1997 he accepted the position only after being promised full support from the regime in helping him with all political problems that might arise inhibiting his function as Premier. With almost all of the GPC figures in governmental posts, Bin Ghanem realised that he could not carry out his functions in the face of power centre interventions. He left office in March 1997 and his position was taken up by Dr A. K. Al-Iryani, the former Foreign Minister and the General Secretary of the GPC.<sup>60</sup>

Bin Ghanem's Premiership was very promising, particularly in tackling national problems, because of his independent political stance and his respectable image in society. However, for a tribal society like Yemen, this was not sufficient to oversee the smooth transformation of a tribal society into a civic one without the full support of the power centre in acting in the national interest.

Conversely, Al-Iryani's Government suited the tribal nature of Yemeni society, given that he was an *Ismaili with qadi* status. However, despite this qualification, Dr Al-Iryani faced severe problems, particularly in the internal security. With the endorsement of the third stage of the Economic Reform Programme, on the eve of his Government (May 1998) coming to power, public riots and demonstrations



occurred in the country leaving over 100 dead and many injured. These demonstration and public riots broke out in sensitive areas in the north, namely Marib and Al-Jawf, with the participation of powerful tribes.<sup>61</sup> Following these public riots, a series of kidnapping took place since July, 1998. The most important ones which involved European tourists (German and British), were in December 1998. Four Germans were kidnapped by Bani Dhibyan in the *northern regions* and about 16 British and Australians were kidnapped by Al-Fadhli tribes in the *southern regions*. The Government had different attacking measures to different tribes. The government forces mishandled the hostages in the southern tribes' hands and ended it with a deadly results. The Germans hostages might end with the same result if the government fails to be realistic to the tribes' demands.

### **5.1.8 Regional Policies, with Special reference to the South**

In this sub-section we shall examine the following:

- 5.1.8.1 (a) The change in the regional administrative structure
- 5.1.8.2 (b) The change in regional administrative personnel
- 5.1.8.3 (c) The impact of administrative and political changes on:
  - (i) Living standards
  - (ii) Tribalism
  - (iii) Women
  - (iv) The Judiciary
  - (v) NGOs

#### **5.1.8.1 Changes in the Regional Administrative Structure**

In terms of geographical division, administrative structures in the south did not change. The Southern area continued to be divided into 6 Governorates, namely Aden, Lahej, Abyan, Shabwa, Hadhramout and Al-Mahara.<sup>62</sup> Sub-regional administrative structures also were maintained, with four districts for each region,

except Hadhramout which had eight districts due to its vast area.

The first critical change in the administrative structure in southern regions was the downgrading of sector representatives from deputy minister to director-general. While very few sector representatives remaining the same, all new appointments in southern regions were recruited as director-generals instead of deputy ministers.<sup>63</sup> The central political authority did not attempt to standardise regional structures throughout the southern regions as they used to be before the unification period.

The second changing factor was the diminution of the sub-regional (district) structures. District administration structures in the south would usually encompass the major sectoral administrative structures of those sub-regions, especially the social infrastructures plus agriculture, fisheries and/or tourism.<sup>64</sup> Subregional structures diminished in authority to such an extent that only mayors were kept in those administrative structures, with hardly any other staff for other sectors. This was partly due to the over-centralised system in the central and regional authorities and partly to the new economic order, which left southern regions with the very minimum of budgetary support level. The impact of such ineffective sub-regional administration was very negative. In view of the absence of public and private investment, unemployment was caused in most districts of southern regions. Social infrastructure became highly ineffective and many sick people and unemployed were forced to travel to major regional towns for health services and employment in the private sector (if any).<sup>65</sup>

The third changing factor was in the duality of regional sectoral liability between the regional and central authorities. The lack of clarity in regional responsibility in southern regions caused some political friction between regional and central authorities. Southern governors used to have ultimate power over all sectors of their concerned region. All sectoral problems in the region would be solved by the Governor in co-ordination with ministers of the respective sectors. Contrary to those old regulations, new director-generals (deputy ministers) from northern

areas in southern regions would solve their sectoral difficulties with the central authorities directly. There were, however, no formal local administration laws which would define the relationship between regional and central authorities in this respect. The state leadership launched a Local Administration Law Project but at the time of writing this remained under scrutiny by the authorities concerned.<sup>66</sup>

### 5.1.8.2 Changes in Regional Administration Personnel

Following the civil war of 1994, regional administration personnel changed dramatically in the southern regions.

At the top level, regional administration personnel in the south were either GPC or Islah figures due to the removal of all YSP figures. At the time of writing, the Governors of the southern regions were:<sup>67</sup>

1. Aden: Taha Ghanem	A known Adeni figure (GPC)
2. Lahej: Awad Bamatraf	Southerner of Hadhrami origin residing in the region (Islah). Changed to Abdul Jalil Mansoor in 1997- a Northerner(GPC)
3. Abyan: Ahmed Mohsin	Northerner from Al-Beida (GPC)
4. Shabwa: Ali Sheikh	Southerner from Abyan (GPC), changed in 1997 to Moh'd Al-Qar'aa from Shabwa
5. Hadhramout: Saleh O. Al-Kholani	Northerner from Kholan (GPC)
6. Al-Mahara: Ali Al-Adhal	Northerner from Hudaidah (Islah)

Apart from the Aden Governor and the last Shabwa Governor, none of the above really represented the region under his control. This contributed to the setback of regional management and development of Southern regions as shall be explained later in other sections.

At the regional sectoral level, changes in administrative personnel were remarkable, particularly in strategic sectors. Trade and Supply, Oil and Gas,

Finance, Land, Taxation, Customs, Electricity and Water sectors were mainly staffed by northerners, as well as the military and security sectors, in Aden and Hadhramout - the most economically viable areas in the south.

The state leadership targeted its regional policies in the south on the two major regions, namely Aden and Hadhramout due to their economic viability. Critical changes in administrative personnel had taken place since the war. The following are some examples:

**(a)** The oil sector in Aden was basically constituted by the National Yemen Oil Company (NYOC) and the Aden Refinery Company (ARC) (comprised of a well-integrated city under the refinery auspices). Since the war, the NYOC was headed by an inexperienced northerner- Yousef Qeleqel from Hudaidah (October 1994). Sayed Omer, ex-Director General of NYOC, was driven off the post as he was a YSP member.<sup>68</sup> In August 1998, a Hadhrami technocrat who came from Kuwait following the Gulf Crisis was appointed in place of Qeleqel. Awadh Homran took over the Aden branch of NYOC following the bad management of the branch by his predecessor.

The ARC, on the other hand, was headed by another northerner from Al-Beidha - Mr Fathi Salem ex-Director-General of the NYOC (of the north). Mr Salem did not possess the same technical experience in running such a highly technical large-scale enterprise as his predecessor, Mr Hussein Al-Haj, or other southerners involved in the refinery for years had enjoyed. Due to the mistrust with regards to southerners' co-operation, the state leadership insisted on northern recruitment for the collection of resources in these vital sectors.<sup>69</sup>

**(b)** The Government Land & Properties Authority (GLPA) in the central authority was attached to the Ministry of Finance in Sana'a for the selling/buying function to the Government or individuals. As over 90% of southern land was under state ownership, the GLPA was in a financial

position to make large sums out of this sector. A son-in-law of the President, from Kholan, headed the institution in Aden, and most of the land was distributed and sold mainly to northerners.<sup>70</sup>

Up until 1994, land departments in the South were part of the construction and housing sector with only one Director-General for the whole sector. Because of the nature of resource collection, the state leadership treated that section as a separate sector with a director general for it in each region. Mr Yahya Al-Duwaid from Kholan in the North and Mr Al-Mattari from Sanaa were both appointed as Director-Generals of the GLPA in Aden and Hadhramout respectively in place of former Southern technocrats. Their appointments eventually allowed northerners to hold many plots of lands, of which some areas already belonged to Southerners. Most strategic areas, in fact, were handed over to key northern figures inside and outside the state leadership.<sup>71</sup> Little northern land was distributed to the southern elite in Sana'a and those areas which were distributed were minimal.<sup>72</sup>

(c) In Aden, the other three major resource sectors, namely Taxation, Customs and Trade & Supply were headed by northerners. According to observers, there came to be corruption in the handling of money raised from these sources.

(d) The power sectors of electricity and water in Aden were also headed by northerners, namely Mr Yehya Al-Abyadh and Mr Abdul-Fattah Nasser. The two sectors had enjoyed good infrastructure since the colonial period and were actively maintained by the former PDRY leadership. Despite the high rise in the price of both strategic items, the new personnel of that administration failed to fulfil peoples' needs by properly maintaining these infrastructures. The corruption and the over-centralised administrative system that characterised both regional and central authorities caused public frustration and led many people to commit defaultory actions on their installed regulators, to avoid high price increases.<sup>73</sup>

Changes in administrative personnel in southern regions created some administrative friction between the northern and southern groups. It also created friction between top regional management and regional sectoral management. There were several cases - witnessed by the researcher - where northern personnel in southern regions would co-operate together, and separately from southerners and vice versa. Southern Governors, however, especially in Aden Governorate found it difficult to exercise control over corruption or programme discipline of regional sectors controlled by northerners.<sup>74</sup>

### **5.1.6.3 The Impact of the Administrative and Political Changes on Social Affairs**

There is a number of social affairs on which the administrative and political changes had an impact. These are covered below.

#### **(i) The Standard of Living of the Southern Population**

The impact of the administrative and political changes in southern regions had two dimensions, each having a severe negative impact on the standard of living of the population.

The first dimension related mainly to the inexperience of Governors in dealing with the southern governorates. Apart from the Governor of Aden, who had held the post in the 1970s, other governors did not have the appropriate experience in handling southern regional issues. Mr Saleh Al-Kholani had served as the Governor of Ibb and other areas in the north,<sup>75</sup> but northern regions, then, did not enjoy the same social infrastructure and public facilities as southern regions. Moreover, the Hadhramout region covered an area which was equal to more than half of the former YAR. The inexperience factor of the Governors resulted in the accumulation of southern problems in numerous aspects. Even with the help of the central authorities in acute problems such as electricity, water or any social infrastructural problem, the process of rectification/building up was very slow

which left negative repercussions on the standard of living of the southern population.<sup>76</sup>

The inexperience of Governors reflected also in the lack of communication between the public and the Governor's administration. The public, for instance, would ask for maintenance of water pipes, sewerage problems, electrical failure, school and hospital maintenance, etc. The governor would not see the validity of these claims made by the public to the state<sup>77</sup>. Public resources were hardly made available for such public claims in southern regions, especially in view of the then current ERP. Northerners, in most regions, did not have such infrastructure facilities, with high sunte-cost as the one existed in the south.<sup>78</sup>

In view of the attitude of the northern Governors in southern regions, the lack of their experience led to the frustration of the southern public when their problems were left unresolved. Rural public would travel from their villages/centres to provisional capitals seeking resolution for their problems. In some areas, this would mean high costs for the public to stay a few days in the regional capital for his/her needs to be met. Long queues of people were witnessed in every southern region.<sup>79</sup> A handful of people would succeed in seeing the Governor, who would more than likely be incapable of meeting the applicant's needs due to a lack of resources or the ineffectiveness of the regional administration.<sup>80</sup>

The fact that all aspects of life in southern regions became highly politicised was also due to the Governor's inexperience in handling administrative power appropriately. Governors spent great amounts of their time fighting YSP members and their associates in their regional activities (if any) and their movements in their regions. Political friction was also witnessed between the two leading parties among southerners. This had caused serious frustration and anxiousness to the extent that many southerners wanted to emigrate.

As a result of the above difficulties, a high proportion of the social infrastructure was either destroyed or neglected, and the standard of living had gone down

remarkably. This will be explained below at a later stage.

The second dimension in the impact of the administrative and political changes in the standard of living of southerners was represented in the over centralised administrative system in southern regions. The state leadership did not attempt to delegate regional power to regional administrations.<sup>81</sup> This rendered regional administration very ineffective resulting in the following factors that had negative impacts on the standard of living of the population:

a. Corruption

The over-centralised administrative system would usually result in the ineffectiveness of the administrative machinery. Financial corruption would, therefore, be the only outlet by which some people would have their needs met; such as enrolling students in an illegal way, queue-jumping for social benefits and so on. As financial corruption increased in formal administration, the standard of living of the population would decrease further and further.

b. Immobilisation

Over centralisation in regional administration also led to the immobility of manpower resources. In view of the limited resources available for southern regions, most factories and public institutions were closed down and became subject to privatisation<sup>82</sup>. This automatically created high unemployment amongst the southern workforce. This factor lowered the standard of living of southerners to a great degree, and relative to what it had been before.

**(ii) Tribalism**

A major development which resulted from the administrative and political changes in southern regions was tribalism. The former PDRY, and before then the British administration in Aden, had tried to transform south Yemen into a modern



state where tribalism would have little impact on peoples' life.<sup>83</sup> However, the changes in regional administration and politics into the south injected the tribal mode of life to these areas.

The Tribal Affairs Authority (TAA), a major government institution, formally accommodated certain public figures in each locality of each district and region - in the South - as recognised Sheikhs for their groups/tribes with its formal governmental area. TAA recognition for southern tribes on a formal basis meant the transformation of southern communities into increasingly stereotypical northern communities. The state leadership found itself obliged to meet financial commitments to thousands of Sheikhs of tribes in the South. The TAA generally would pay a monthly allowance to each recognised Sheikh of a tribe or group. This allowance would be very small compared to that of a northern tribal Sheikh.

The impact of tribalism in the southern regions was serious. Very 'old blood', of 50 years and more, accounts were brought for settlement and courts could hardly cope with them for the absence of records. Moreover, revival of feud did not only mean greater social divisions, but rather exhaustion of material power and social degrade when it comes sale of women or forced marriage \*

### **(iii) Women**

Within its overall internal policies, the state leadership intended to make southern regions into a stereotype of northern communities, particularly with regard to the status of women. The change in the status of southern women, therefore, was not an outcome of the regional changes in politics and administration, as much as it was part of central authority policies for the change over of all southern regions into a different mode of life.

The position of women in the south had changed dramatically in their communities, both within and outside the household. The *hijab*, for instance, was indirectly imposed on women and young girls of 12 or 13 years (in some cases

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\* Sometimes part of the material settlements would involve sale or marriage by force of females to the

younger than 10 years old).<sup>84</sup> Aden region before the 1994 war would have many girls swimming in the sea. After the war, one would hardly see a female in the street without the hijab. Schools, colleges, offices would be seen with females wearing the black *hijab*. (To the writer this was a very striking social phenomenon). The reason for this social trend was that some Islamists had intimidated females in the streets who would not wear the *hijab* by throwing acid in their faces.<sup>85</sup>

The other factor that influenced the position of women in southern areas was the redundancies of females resulting from the ERP policies. Women were the social victims of bad economic policies conducted by the Government. Women used to constitute 60-70% of manufacturing manpower in the south. The closure of these factories rendered females unemployed, and therefore weakened their economic position in society.<sup>86</sup>

The Islamists, also, contributed to the diminishing status of the position of women in southern areas by opposing their legal status as qadis (judges) or members of the attorney authority. Various syndicates' objected to these policies and in 1996 some female judges maintained their posts in southern areas.<sup>87</sup>

Women's position in southern areas used to be, socially speaking, much stronger than in any other Arab state, by virtue of the Family law of 1974. The new coalition government abolished that law and substituted it the former YAR civil law, in which womens' affairs had a very restricted role, which was based on Sharea'a law in its rawest form.<sup>88</sup>

Yemeni women, in general, had some political rights within the democratisation process exercised in the country. Social rights, however, had been damaged as far as southern females were concerned.

#### (iv) Judiciary:

In its new policies, the state leadership changed the whole legal set-up of southern regions into a stereotype of the northern machinery. Civil and Criminal laws of the former PDRY were repealed and replaced by new laws that would fit northern tribal communities. For instance, the Criminal Law issued in Sana'a by Republican Decree No 12 of 1994 repealed the Southern Criminal Law No. 3 of 1976, issued in Aden. Family Law No 1 of 1974 issued in Aden was replaced by a section on women's right within the Civil Law of 1995.<sup>89</sup>

In constitutional respects, the judicial mechanism should be the third independent authority after the presidential and governmental authorities.<sup>90</sup> This would imply that neither the presidential nor the governmental authorities would have any impact on it. In reality, however, this independence was not maintained. The Higher Judiciary Council (HJC) was presided over by the President of the State.<sup>91</sup> State intervention in the HJC was often practised, resulting in tribal attitudes affecting some criminal cases. In cases where southern and northern factions were involved, state intervention under tribal influence would intervene in favour of the northern faction.<sup>92</sup> The independence of the judiciary mechanism, thus, was hardly maintained as set in the Yemeni Constitution.

On the functional side, the judicial mechanism in southern regions was the worst formal institution with regard to the presence of large-scale corruption.<sup>93</sup>

Several factors had contributed to the mismanagement and corruption of the judiciary in southern regions. First, as the free market economy in southern regions was not founded on a clear legal platforms, a mess was created in many socio-economic areas, such as selling land with illegal documents, taking control of others' land/buildings, or open business on illegal grounds, etc. Cases would go daily through the judicial channels and, though the majority would be simple civil cases, it would take months if not years to deal with compiling cases in the appropriate legal manner.<sup>94</sup>

Second, the inefficiency of the judicial manpower was be a major problem causing

mismanagement and corruption in the judicial apparatus. Most Judges in southern regions were appointed by the Minister of Justice Qadi Al-Dailami, an Islah figure, who recruited many Islah figures into the judicial mechanism in the southern regions. The majority of Islah figures were too inexperienced to deal with judicial cases in southern regions. Also, those GPC figures in major southern towns did not possess the required legal training in dealing with either civilian or criminal cases, and chose to solve the cases by corrupt means.<sup>95</sup> The writer had a simple civil case concerning a land issue since 1993 and until early 1997, it had still not been solved.

The third factor was the politicisation of the judicial machinery between the two leading parties. In all cases, of any level, the Judge would normally pass the court order for the benefit of his fellow party member in the case. Some criminal cases, unfortunately, would be wrongly judged because of this political bias as in the case of the rape of two Hadhrami females by northern security men in September 1995,\* which caused public demonstrations against the regime.<sup>96</sup>

Finally, the impact of the ineffectiveness of the regional authorities in the south had its repercussion on the judicial set-up. Due to the over-centralisation of the regional administrative system, most regional issues in the south were not in the hands of the concerned authorities. Most problems were therefore dealt with corrupt means. This had a two-fold impact; firstly, judicial cases increased and became a heavy burden on an ineffective judicial mechanism; secondly, it increased corruption to a high degree in these institutions.

#### **(v) The Non-Governmental Organisations**

In the face of negligible public resources left for southern regions, the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) stood a very slim chance for survival in the South. There were many reasons for the futile status of southern NGOs such as women unions, youth associations and clubs.

The first reason for the low profile of NGO activity in the south would be attributed to the overall political changes in 1994, where state leadership at both the central and the regional levels did not want to leave any socio-political phenomenon of the former style of life in the south, and that decision would include the NGOs. The new regional administrative authorities were, therefore, responsible in keeping up that policy, though the new political changes would be in favour of the two leading parties' NGO's only. Specifically, the state leadership feared that anti-political activities in the south might take place within or in form of various NGO's and therefore, restricted measures were taken in order not to encourage establishment of strong NGO's in southern regions without monitor.

The second reason was that the economic situation of the south was very poor. Government resources were very limited in those regions and private investments were inactive at the required level for fundraising or manpower mobilisation. Southerners were very experienced in NGOs manipulating activities and with respect to the ineffectiveness of regional authorities, they would be able to activate effective NGOs but the material power was not in hand to push them forward. Moreover, the safety network, a relevant component in the Economic Reform Programme was in the hands of a northerner elite who was reluctant to release easy and soft loans to southern NGO's on equal basis as loans to northerners'.

The third reason for the stagnation of the NGOs in the south was the unavailability of the media and access to foreign embassies and international organisations. Almost half the work of NGOs would require various means of media; publications, radio, television and collective sessions which southern NGO's miss very much. In view of non representation of effective southerners in the power centre, southerners could not afford to have access to national media unless they were fully affiliated in the northern parties effectively. Moreover, as foreign embassies and international organisations were sited in the Capital San'aa, it was not feasible for southern NGO's to have access to these areas for material help. Southern NGOs therefore, had no incentive to establish themselves with no help

from anywhere.

## **5.2 ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND PERFORMANCE AFTER THE 1994 WAR**

This section will deal with the economic performance of the ROY following the civil war of 1994. It analyses critically the integration process in the economic field between the two former parts of Yemen under the fully-integrated political system.

### **5.2.1 Changes in the Composition of the Presidential Council**

The post-war period witnessed greater integration in the economic field, but of a kind which would lead to problems in the country's long-term development. In the co-operative integration stage, there had been a five-member Presidential body made up of members from the two parts of Yemen, with various Yemeni factions represented.<sup>97</sup> After the war, the Presidential Council changed into a vertically integrated structure, with decision-making ultimately resting with the President of the State. The change (as regards economic policy as well as all other spheres of policy making) represented a step back to the old YAR decision-making process.<sup>98</sup>

The key element in economic decision making after 1994, therefore, was the domination of the process by the Northern “power-elite” centre grouped around President Ali Abdulla Saleh and Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer. The implications and dimensions of this are sketched out in the following sections.

### **5.2.2 Institutions and Individuals influencing Economic Decisions**

The decision-making process rested with the President and key northern figures located within the relevant state institutions.

In the Presidential Office, the President and his office had technical and non-technical advisors in addition to the Economic and Development Department at

the Presidential Office.<sup>99</sup> The two technical economic advisors to the Presidential Office, comprising the researcher and Mr. Ahmed Al-Samawi, both had limited roles in economic policy consultations; but the Economic and Development Department had substantial roles in policy consultation and formulation with other key government figures. The president also appointed a team of personal advisors. They were not technical advisors, but were brought-in to offer advice on 'regional economic problems' rather than 'strategic economics.'<sup>100</sup> They were mainly northern figures of high social profile in the Zaydi community, or financially empowered Shafai figures, such as merchants and traders.

At the cabinet level, responsibility for economic policy effectively rested with key ministers who held strategic posts. These posts included the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Planning and Development (if he was a northerner), the Minister of Oil, the Governor of the Central Bank and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. These figures were considered to be trustworthy by the power elite. Northern ministers enjoyed more trust from the president than southerners did, and this allowed them greater access to the decision-making process. For instance, although Dr Al-Iryani was not in the economics field and was in charge of the foreign affairs sector, he was entrusted with economic consultations whereas Mr. Bajammal, the Minister for Planning and Development and a GPC southerner, was not.<sup>101</sup>

Dr. Mohammed Saeed Al-Attar, Minister of Oil and Mineral Wealth (1994-1997), had always received special attention from the President and was consulted on economic affairs often not related to his sector. In this period, Dr Al-Attar, beside being Minister for Oil, held the Ministry of Industry until 1996 and the Chairmanship of the General Investment Authority (GIA) at the same time. He was, therefore, an important strategic figure for the decision-making process in economic policies.<sup>102</sup>

Mr Bajammal, Minister of Planning (1994-1998) was a Southerner from Hadhramout. He did not become a trustworthy economic policy-maker at the



same level as his northern colleagues. This was mainly due to his Southern socialist experiences which the northern elite considered to be a permanent defect.

Ironically, the Minister of Finance, Mohamed Al-Junaid (1994-1997), was neither an economist nor business/financial graduate (he was a sewerage engineer) but being a northerner, he was one of the trusted figures in economic policies. This was due partly to his Northern experiences in finance and monetary affairs, and also to balance the Shafai figures from different regions in the central administration and economic consultancies.<sup>103</sup>

At this level, the President and his allies in the decision-making structure tended to be listeners than speakers, and in consultation with other influential (tribal/political) groups, the President would give the green light to economic decisions agreed upon by the elite of the power centre.<sup>104</sup>

Economic advisors at the Cabinet level and below only enjoyed limited power within the system. Although there were some good advisors for national economic policies at various government institutions, their advice was seldom sought or used by cabinet members, or by the power elite.<sup>105</sup>

At the Premier's office, there were over 20 advisors, of whom the majority were ineffective due to their low level of technical expertise. They were accommodated for political reasons. At the sector level, there were 2-3 advisors for strategic sectors, but again they would hardly be of any effective use in economic policy decision-making. It was very rare for a minister to take advice, even when the minister lacked experience and technical knowledge.<sup>106</sup>

While the advisory services had a limited role in decision-making in general, Northern advisors enjoyed a better status than Southern advisors at all levels.<sup>107</sup> This was generally attributed to the Southerners' past experiences, particularly in the economic field of socialist-orientated economics. The decision-makers, therefore, would not trust the advice of Southerners which might be based on

influenced by a socialist mentality or approach. The leadership viewed Northern advisors as more competent than Southerners, irrespective of the Southerners' technical capacities. The tribal element played a significant role in the choice of advisors and in making use of their advisory services.

Economic affairs in Southern regions were primarily run according to the recommendations of Northern advisors instead of those of Southerners'. As the strategic economic posts were centrally and regionally in the hands of the Northerners. Southern economic advisors were not given the chance to advise on programmes in their regions.

### **5.2.3 The Impact of the Tribal factor on Economic Decisions**

The tribal factor exerted great influence on the economic decision-making process and on the shape of the state and the economy to be operated in the ROY. The tribal power elite whether in Islah or the GPC did not want grass-roots changes for the ROY's economy to be run on modern global grounds with strong and effective mechanism for a free-market economy.<sup>108</sup> Northern tribes, specifically of the Zaydi faction, had been exerting an overall power on major economic institutions: the infrastructure machinery (Komatsu, Caterpillars, and other 'Yellow Monsters') were in various trading companies (Al-Ahmer Trading Company, Al-Sinaidar Trading Company, Al-Hashedi Trading Company and Al-Watary Trading Company), Exchange Rate Companies (Al-Hadhdha, Al-Sinaidar, Al-Hashedi and Al-Kumaim), Transport and Cars' Companies ( Al-Hashedi and Al-Ruwaishan).<sup>109</sup> This were very few examples, the researcher could recall, but there many more of these gangitic economic institutions which almost had a monopoly in its commercial functions. Moreover, there were three basic northern companies for basic food items, the wheat, the wheat flour and sugar which were under the monopoly of: Al-Fahem, Al-Habbary and Al-Ruwaishan trades men. All these commercial entities, receive money facilities from the power centre to run their businesses with high profits. They take soft loans from the central bank of yemen and from other commercial banks in running their businesses. Wether these soft

loans were repaidable is highly questionable. The state leadership, in the case of basic food items, provided merchants with high profits through special exchange rate for these items.<sup>110</sup> This shall be discussed below.

The largest trading/commercial enterprise in the ROY was the weaponry trade (trading of arms and amunitions) and this belonged to the President's brothers, Ali Mohsin Al-Ahmer, in particular. Substantial part of the economic activity in the ROY had been the sales of arms and amunition in the yemeni society to tribes and individuals. It had been observed that large shipment of arms enter yemen (through Al-Hudaidah port) and the sale of these arms had been flourishing for years, in particular in the post war period (1995-1998). The ROY, in 1998, had about 50 millions piece of arms of different kinds and makes.<sup>111</sup>

The most influential Shafai group which had the strongest impact on the decision-making process in economic affairs was the Hayel group. This group, from the Taiz region, had been an influential economic group in Yemen since 1966. It controlled about 70% of the consumption sector in the Yemeni market: soap, oil, drinks, livestock, canned food, etc. The Hayel group obtained major parts of Southern public enterprises in Southern regions within the auspices of the Economic Reform Programme (ERP) at negligible prices.<sup>112</sup> They claimed back their old buildings which were left over after they left Aden in 1967 to the north. Unfortunately, the state leadership had given up, to Hayel group, big public buildings of former PDRY institutions which could be used for public interest rather than private hands.

There was some Hadhrami-Saudi investment in Southern regions, but this did not enjoy the same preference in economic decisions as Northern investors. Bin-Mahfoodh enterprises, within the auspices of "Yemenvest" for example, had to pay very high prices for their investments in the south. For about 1-2 km<sup>2</sup> of land in Aden, US\$ 20 million was paid<sup>113</sup>. In an interview with Yemenvest by the researcher on the work done on their programme, Yemenvest complained of serious harassment by security forces against their programme.

The tribal factor did not have a direct impact on the ERP during the stabilisation period, but it did after 1996. When the reforms programme started, the tribal sheikhs could see the benefits of these reforms through privatisation and free trade policies. Various gigantic projects in the oil and gas industries were, thus, granted to large foreign companies via tribal agents in Yemen. For instance, Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer and his sons were the sole agents of the gas project (with the Total French Company) worth US\$ 4-5 billion, air transport with the UAE (the Emirates) and other diversified services such as tourism and printing under the name Horizon.<sup>114</sup>

Tribal factors, also, had a strong impact on decisions relating to financial expenditures. At the top of the ladder came Zaydi tribes and factions. The informal decision-making process, represented by the Chairmen of the two leading parties (GPC and Islah), ensured that the northern tribes' demands were met in order to avoid rioting. The Shafai tribes of the Northern areas were second in priority, and the Southern tribes resided at the bottom of the ladder. Financial assistance awarded to the Southern tribes would hardly exceed 100,000 Yemeni Riyals a year (this is equivalent to around US\$850), this compared poorly to the US\$ 33,000 given to a Northern Sheikh in 1995.

Generally speaking, the presidential leadership gave greater weight to tribal elements than was acceptable in the national interest. The presidential leadership failed to differentiate between its economic national role and its obligations to tribes. Economic national interests were not prioritised.

#### **5.2.4 The Role of the leading Political Parties in Economic Decision Making**

Although the two leading political parties, the GPC and the Islah (up to 1997) and then GPC alone (1997-1998) had their personnel in the government authority, neither of the coalition parties played a significant role in formulating or shaping

governmental economic strategy or policies on their own. No doubt the basic ideologies of each party were instilled in the minds of their personnel, but the political parties themselves were not capable of launching economic policies.<sup>115</sup> There were two main reasons for this. First, neither had the infrastructure or facilities to develop coherent policies in this sphere. In the secretariats of the two leading parties, there were economic departments, but these acted as recipients in the decision-making process. The top authorities, comprising a very few key figures (mainly GPC), manipulated these policies with the President and his tribal circles.

The second reason for the insignificant role of the two parties, was that neither of the economic departments in the secretariats of the two parties had specialist who were competent enough to challenge government programmes. The Islah Party, in particular, had not been in Government before and did not have sufficient expertise to develop an economic framework at national level in its party organization. The Islah Party talked of Islamic economics, but this was not substantiated by material programmes or specific policies. The GPC at least had cabinet figures with some governmental experience, but the national policies which were pursued were mostly done on an *ad hoc* basis.<sup>116</sup>

Another factor in the absent role of political parties in formulating policies for the nation was of the involvement of international agencies such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the national economy. The WB and IMF, since March 1995, had launched a reform programme.<sup>117</sup> The ROY was obliged to follow this reform programme for economic stabilisation and growth in several phases. In return, the WB and the IMF provided some cash assistance (a soft loan) for the ROY to overcome its economic difficulties. This will be examined below.<sup>118</sup>

### **5.2.5 The Role of Parliament in Economic Decision Making**

In effect, the role of parliament in economic decisions was limited. One can

identify four principal reasons for the limited role.

Firstly, the majority party in parliament was the GPC, with 127 members. As both the decision-making process and the cabinet were presided over by GPC figures; it was natural for parliament to vote favourably for legislation proposed by the main party.

Secondly, the Chairman of Parliament, Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer, was - in an individual capacity - a key figure in the decision-making process. In order to smooth the transit of bills through parliament, the Chairman ruled out much critical discussion.<sup>119</sup>

Thirdly, the Islah and the YSP played a weak role. The major Islah representatives were from the Shafai areas of Taiz, Al-Hudaida, and Ibb, and were opposed to the policies of the ERP. Yet they submitted to the wishes of their party leader, Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer who had a vested interest in the success of the ERP. The YSP was unable by itself to counter the government's economic programmes.

Fourthly, although there were some figures in the parliament who could provide objective alternatives to the government economic policies, the tribal mechanism in Parliament prevented them from making contribution. For example, Dr Mahmood Medhi, an MP in the YSP grouping, was an LSE Graduate with 30 years of experience in economic spheres, yet socialist figures like him were not asked for their advice following the 1994 Civil War.

## 5.2.6 THE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMME

The Economic Reform Programme, (ERP) was launched by the Yemeni authorities in coordination with the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It called for certain economic measures to be adopted, for economic stability to be achieved and Yemen's development to proceed.<sup>117</sup> Specifically, the ERP called for the following adjustments:

### 1. Macroeconomic adjustments which would include:<sup>118</sup>

- (a) Reduction Of Budget Deficits
- (b) Non-Inflationary Resources
- (c) Curtailment of Inflation
- (d) Encouragement of the Private Sector
- (e) The External Debts Problem

### 2. Protecting the poor by specific social policies during the adjustment period and this would include:<sup>119</sup>

- (a) The Removal of Subsidies
- (b) Improvement of Social Services (Health and Education)
- (c) The Social Safety Net (SSN) and NGOs

### 3. Structural Reforms which would include:<sup>120</sup>

- (a) Liberalisation of trade policies
- (b) Improvement of pricing policies
- (c) Improvement of the Financial and The Judiciary sectors

These elements will be covered separately below.

## 5.2.6.1 Macroeconomic Adjustments

### (a) Reduction Of Budget Deficits

In making macroeconomic adjustments, the ERP targeted budgetary deficits which had to be reduced to a small amount of the country's GDP. According to the World Bank Report, budget deficits in 1992-1993 were large, averaging 18% of GDP and increased to an estimated 22.5% of the GDP in 1994.<sup>121</sup> The First Five Year Plan (FFYP) 1996-2000, reported the following figures for the budget deficits, as a percentage of the GDP,<sup>122</sup>

**Table 5.2-1 The ratio of budget deficit to the GDP**

1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
8.0%	4.1%	12.4%	13.8%	16.2%	8.0%

Source: The Financial Statement, 1997, Ministry of Finance

However, annual growth for the GDP was reported by other agencies as following throughout the period 1991-95:<sup>123</sup>

**Table 5.2 - 2 The growth of the GDP over the period (1991-1995)**

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995*	1996*	1997*
according to FFYP	0.0	5.3	4.3	0.5	9.6	7.0	7.5
according to WB	0.0	4.2	5.9	5.7	—	—	—
according to MEED	-5	-2	+3	-1	2	—	—

\* Estimated

Source: Nonneman, G., Economic Indicators of the ROY, presented in a Seminar on the Future of Yemen Unity, SOAS, London

For the year of 1995, budget deficits were to be reduced to 11% of the GDP; the FFYP reported that deficits constituted only 8% and the financial statement of the Ministry of Finance of 1997 addressed to the Parliament, reported a 7% of the



GDP did the 1995 budget deficit constitute.<sup>124</sup>

### **(b) Non-Inflationary Resources**

In accordance with the plans for macroeconomic adjustment, the ERP called for the provision of resources without inflating the economy. Measures were required to enhance government revenues and curtail real current expenditures. According to WB reports, revenue-enhancing measures would include unifying the official exchange rates at the parallel market rate and increases in electricity and petroleum product prices. In addition, replacing quantitative restrictions of imports with tariffs would provide more revenues for the Government.<sup>125</sup>

The adoption of these policies proved feasible and had some success. The financial statement of 1997 stated that the general resources of the budget of 1996 were estimated at 155,886 million Riyals and that of 1997, at 301,222 million Riyals, representing an increase of 93.2% from the 1996 budget (1997 - 1996).<sup>126</sup> Most of those resources came from the oil and gas sector.<sup>127</sup> Expenditure-reducing measures were also pursued in the ERP since 1995. These were within the framework of subsidies elimination policy and prices restructure of different commodities: wheat, wheat flour, water, electricity and petroleum products.

### **(c) Curtailment of Inflation<sup>12</sup>**

Inflation in the ROY had been rising over the period from 1990 to 1994 and started to be stabilise after 1995. The following table represents the general rise of inflation over the stated period.

**Table 5.2 - 3 Inflation Rate in the ROY (1990-1995)**

<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>
35%	45%	55%	55%	145%	100%

Source: Nonneman, G, Economic Indicators of the ROY, presented in a seminar on the Future of Yemen Unity. SOAS, London

Also, according to the formal government financial statement of 1997, inflation

would have been expected to be at 55% in 1995 and 30% in 1996. The ERP estimated the inflation in 1997 would be at 10% only.<sup>129</sup>

The curtailing of inflation implied several fiscal and monetary policies being applied at different levels. The first fiscal policy was that financing the deficits should be from non-inflationary means, i.e. not by increasing the supply of money by printing the currency but rather by encouraging the public to save through purchasing treasury bills or bonds from the Government. Removal of subsidies from many basic products and services was the second fiscal policy adopted by the authorities.<sup>130</sup>

The third fiscal policy to curtail inflation was the liberalisation of interest rates and the attempt to move towards unifying exchange rates unification. Under the inflationary conditions, interest rates at their various levels for saving or borrowing ranged from 6% - 24% and even so, these rates did not reflect the actual economic rates. The Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) formally had several exchange rates as follows:

US\$/Riyals<sup>131</sup>

1 = 5 for Yemeni Diplomats

1 = 18 for customs

1 = 25 an incentive rate applied to investment transactions especially of

oil companies and also UN organisations.

1 = 45 for patient transactions

The CBY was not making normal transactions for the tourists or the citizens. These were left for other commercial banks to function on.

Despite these rates differences, there was considerable depreciation in the parallel market, which was trading in early 1995 at 115 Riyals per US\$ and in some places in Yemen, it traded at 165 Riyals per dollar.

The authorities concerned, i.e. the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY), started to take

action in 1995 by depreciating formally the local currency, whereby US\$ was made equal to 50 Yemeni Riyals. This did not work well, and in the parallel market the dollar jumped up to 180 Riyals. In mid-1995, the CBY announced the floating of the interest rates with the parallel market rates for the riyal becoming the official bank rates. Inflation was gradually curtailed.<sup>132</sup>

#### **(d) Encouragement of the Private Sector**

The private sector received special attention in the ERP, though over this period, it made no improvement. Within the macroeconomic stabilisation component, the ERP targeted some policies towards the removal of impediments from the private sector which was crucial to the overall economic development in Yemen. The Yemeni government tried, with the adoption of the free-market economy, to encourage the private sector. The economic environment, however, was still full of constraints for the private sector. These constraints were represented in various distortionary governmental policies in taxation, trade, prices and subsidies.<sup>133</sup>

The Investment Law No. 22 of 1991 was enacted to encourage the private sector through the many facilities it provided. Major facilities for the private sector were to cover the initiation period of the projects/enterprises.<sup>134</sup>

The General Investment Authority (GIA), a governmental institution, emerged in 1991 to foster private sector activities, solve problems and make sustained reforms in the private sector's environment. The GIA was under the supervision of the Premier.

Other policies related to Private sector will be covered in subsection 5.2.2.3. below.

In practice, the private sector did not develop substantially after the war.<sup>135</sup> The main reason for this was the prevailing post-war chaotic situation, in terms of security instability and political and economic deteriorating conditions. Most consumer prices had risen and purchasing power had decreased. The speed with

which ERP policies were applied to the daily life of citizens did not give confidence to investors to invest without political disruption in the near future. (The researcher talked to an investor of the Hayel Group about the group's hesitation in taking up good projects. He said that he did not believe ERP policies would work without a heavy price being paid either by investors or by the population {who were not used to such harsh policies}). Investors believed that there would be a high risk in taking up large-scale enterprises at this early stage of the ERP.

#### **(e) The External Debts Problem**

External debts were the last item in the menu of the macroeconomic adjustments component which the ERP had targeted. External debts were a heavy burden on the economy, constituting 185% of the GDP in 1995.<sup>136</sup> According to the Financial Statement of 1997, external debts amounted to US\$ 9 billions in that year.<sup>137</sup> The ERP required the government to approach the Paris Club and other creditors, in order not to lose its credibility before the international community. On the 24<sup>th</sup> September 1996, Yemen signed an agreement with the Paris Club, re-scheduling its debts..<sup>138</sup>

The re-scheduling was made conditional on Yemen going into the second phase of the ERP in 1997 where Yemen could be assisted by the ESAF (Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities) Programme. That step was, however, necessary for the completion of the ERP in all its dimensions. It followed then that Yemen gained similar concessions to those of the Paris Club from other creditors also.

#### **5.2.6.2 Protecting the Poor with Specific Social Policies During the Adjustment Period**

The ERP included reforming the social safety net (SSN) and social sectors with the objective of providing assistance to persons who had fallen below a socially acceptable living standard. The main issues of this components will be discussed

below.

### **(a) The Removal of Subsidies**

The social measures component in the ERP-formulated policies for the removal of subsidies in wheat, wheat flour and other power commodities which constituted a burden on the economy. This was made in order to encourage farmers and investors to obtain good prices for their goods. The heavy subsidies on the basic food and power commodities caused price distortion and discouraged local farmers and investors from production and investment in the local markets. The subsidies on these basic commodities were, eventually, in the benefit of local merchants who receive high margin profit from these subsidised goods. The WB and the IMF drew this pricing policies which should be concomitant with the implementation of other trade liberalisation policies to be discussed below.

Subsidies on wheat and wheat flour amounted in 1994 to US\$ 271 million and constituted 10% of the GDP.<sup>139</sup> In 1997, the Financial Statement of the finance authorities stated that 42,750 million Riyals or (2.42 billion Riyals) was allocated to wheat and wheat flour subsidy in the budget of 1997. This was equal to US\$ (400,000). But in June 1997, the new Premier, Dr Faraj Bin Ghanem repealed the whole subsidies of these two basic commodities in addition to the power commodities.<sup>140</sup> The Yemeni public, whom mainly of the poor, did not mind the hardship of the ERP, if in the long run, its impact would be positive, but they foresaw that positive impact was not feasible at all.

ERP policies were also formulated towards the removal of power (electricity and water) and petroleum products within the social safety net. Power and petroleum products' prices were far below their operating costs. The Financial Statement of 1997 envisaged an allocation of power subsidies for 1997 as follows:<sup>141</sup>

Power: 8074 millions Riyals ≈ US\$ 70,000

Petroleum Products: 23200 million Riyals ≈ US\$ 200,000

More often than not, subsidies were awarded to the CBY, and in turn, they were allocated to merchants and corporations. Merchants and corporations were then able to purchase commodities, and supply the demand of the market. The subsidies, thus, were of greater benefit to the merchant and the corporation than to the citizen. The ERP, however, required the financial authorities to incorporate any left-over subsidies within the budget into projects for the poor under the auspices of the SSN programme.<sup>142</sup>

### **(b) Improvement of Social Services (Health and Education)**

The social measures in the ERP had called for specific policies to be created for the health and education sectors, to improve these sectors with cost-effective measures. Government expenditures in 1993 in the health and education sectors (primary and secondary) accounted for 24% of total government expenditures. The majority of these current expenditures were for education (81%).<sup>143</sup> The budget was biased towards covering operating costs, leaving around 5% only for capital expenditures.<sup>144</sup> This had an adverse impact on the quality of health and education services rendered to the public. The ERP, therefore, recommended resources provision in the health sector to capital expenditure in terms of equipment, laboratories and other non-operational expenditures.

### **(c) The Social Safety Net (SSN) and NGOs**

Under its social measures, the ERP targeted some policies for the encouragement of non-governmental organisations in Yemen, designed to help the poor through various SSN programmes. Up to 1995, Yemen had a small number of domestic and foreign NGOs, which faced serious setbacks in their work. There were difficult and cumbersome regulations facing NGOs, especially in Southern areas. Most Southern NGOs had stopped operations due to difficulties in fund raising and in their general operation, and also for political reasons.<sup>145</sup>

### 5.2.6.3 Structural Reforms

The third major component in the ERP were structural reforms, aimed at achieving a higher sustainable economic growth via a strong and effective private sector. To achieve this, the ERP called for a series of economic measures for the private sector to have a strong economic foundation.<sup>146</sup> The first of these measures was related to the trade liberalisation policies.

#### **(a) Liberalisation of Trade Policies**

Within the structural reforms component, the ERP targeted reform of specific instruments in trade liberalisation policies for the encouragement of the private sector. These trade instruments were, tariffs (taxation and customs), trade licences and customs administration.

With respect to tariff rates, the World Bank reported that a restrictive trade environment had been maintained because of high tariffs on export-oriented firms. The ERP, therefore, called for these rates to be reduced. By 1996, tariff rates reached very low levels: 4.2% of their statutory rates.<sup>147</sup> Also there were no tariff rates on investment goods which were all duty free, by the of Investment Law No 22 of 1991.<sup>148</sup>

On exports and imports, the WB had reported that the trade sector was crippled by protective instruments in export and import licences. The ERP, in its structural reform component, therefore, emphasised the need for a liberalised trade policy by which such restrictions would be removed.<sup>149</sup>

The ERP also called for the deregulation of customs administration, which was impeding the private sector in its import-export activities. The previous customs administration had required 50 signatures for goods clearance.<sup>150</sup>

The ERP addressed these above problems and asked for reforms to be made within the period 1995-1997. The Financial Statement of the Yemen Authorities in March 1997 stated that basic reforms in the Customs and Tax authorities would take place when the ESAF programme came into action.

### **(b) Improvement of Pricing Policies**

These were the second item of structural reform called for by the ERP.

The ERP called for a price adjustment policy for various relevant commodities to repeal price distortions in the economy. In its efforts to keep prices at low levels, the government had caused distortions in the economy, where financial prices were set at levels significantly below economic prices (as in the case of wheat and wheat flour).<sup>151</sup> The low, and controlled, prices of major items in major sectors (power, petroleum, agriculture and industrial) led to the excessive use of these goods and services and overburdened the budget. They deprived the country of export opportunities and foreign exchange earnings or savings and caused environmental pollution and/or degradation. This provided incorrect signals to producers and consumers alike and constituted a significant adverse fiscal impact.

Based on the above analysis, the ERP stressed the need to implement price adjustments and liberalisation to the address commodities: power, (water and electricity) petroleum derivatives, agriculture(wheat and wheat flour) and industry (cement). As a result, since mid-1995, prices of these commodities rose by 60-100%.<sup>152</sup> In Southern areas (Aden) power prices went up by as much as 500%.<sup>153</sup>

**(c) The Financial and Judiciary Sectors** were areas in which structural reform policies were to be part of the ERP.

Within the structural reform component, the ERP called for crucial supportive policies for financial and judiciary sectors to remove all restrictive regulations and financial distortions surrounding the private sector in the economy. The banking



system in the financial sector was very inefficient, with only 19% in the lending power function in 1991-93, to a few reliable clients in the private sector.<sup>154</sup> Many clients could not repay their banks' debts and banks failed, in view of ineffective judicial machinery to obtain its debts from clients. Moreover the system was characterised by considerable dis-intermediation which was encouraged by:

- (i) the level and structure of nominal interest rates
- (ii) the absence of effective legal recourse for banks to address unperformed assets problem
- (iii) restrictive Central Bank regulations.

The ERP addressed banking problems with a deregulation policy in the interest rates and liberalisation of the CBY restrictive regulations. In 1996, with the liberalisation in interest rates and other monetary policies, the country could develop a secondary securities market of Treasury Bills and Bonds Market.<sup>155</sup>

The ERP, within the structural reform component also called for judiciary reform policies to be supportive to the financial policies. In 1996, commercial courts were established to look into commercial disputes effectively.<sup>156</sup> Up to 1997, however, these courts had not been able to operate successfully.

## **5.2.7 The Impact of the Change in Presidential Power and the ERP on Southern Regions**

Southern regions suffered a serious economic setback after the war of 1994. Below, we shall examine the factors that had an impact on the southern regions, both economically and socially.

### **5.2.7.1. The Inverse Relationship between the Decision-making Structure and the ERP**

Both the decision-making structure and the ERP were new set-ups introduced to the newly established State of the Yemen Republic after the war of 1994. Each had its own features and dimensions, yet it was necessary for the two to work in harmony to achieve sustained development.

To assess the impact of the changes in the decision-making structures and of the ERP on the development of Southern areas, it is important to examine the variations in the features and the dimensions of these variables, with respect to their functions and to each other in the development process.

The basic feature which set the new decision-making structure apart from the ERP related to structural attitudes. While the decision-making structure was based on tribal attitudes, the ERP was based on an ethic of national interest with a national outlook.<sup>157</sup> Economic decisions were primarily made by decision-makers of the 'tribal elite'. The ERP, though harsh in the short-term, was ultimately geared towards the national interest. This inverse relationship meant that where the tribal elite's interest conflicted with the ERP, the latter failed to be implemented.

A second variant feature was in the proposed administrative set-up. While the ERP called for decentralisation of all economic activities and regulations, the

government leadership wanted centralisation in the administrative set-up of the country. In principle, it approved the ERP's mechanisms for decentralisation and deregulation of economic activities, but in practice it undermined these procedures. This caused dislocation in the work of the ERP. For instance, the new official exchange rate of the local currency was to be parallel with the market exchange rate, and therefore there would be no obligation for anyone or any corporation to exchange foreign currency at the CBY at any specific rate other than the one in the market. Some officials, however, would work contrary to ERP regulations and would formally oblige oil corporations (for example) to exchange currencies at the CBY at a specific rate lower than the on-going parallel rate.<sup>158</sup>

A third variant feature lay in the data used by the government leadership and the ERP management. The government leaders would rely on tribal information while the ERP management sought scientifically-analysed data from the community to provide a basis for decisions.<sup>159</sup>

Finally, the critical feature of the ERP in its managerial contribution inside the country, was his utmost cooperation with the tribal power structure. The ERP was run by two categories of expertise; local and foreign. World Bank expertise were 'technically' selected and the local 'expertise' were 'tribally' selected.<sup>160</sup> Local key figures who handled the ERP in management were purely northerners: The following is a small example;

- |    |                        |  |
|----|------------------------|--|
| 1. | Motahher Al-Sa'aidi    | Vice-minister of Planning (relative of Dr Al-Eryani - the Premier, ex-Foreign Minister)    |
| 2. | Abdul-Kalim Al-Arhabi  | The President's in-law   |
| 3. | Amat-al-Alim Al-Soswah | Deputy Minister in Information (the most influential Zaydi lady in the northern community) |

Under such management, the ERP was bound to have many dislocations in the implementation, with little scope for achievement. International expertise, however, had been misled in many aspects of those parameters in the above varied features and soon would discover the real difficulties facing the ERP in the long-term. Up to

1998, the ERP hardly struck any of its goals. Indeed, the local currency gained some stabilisation for about two and a half years, but since October 1998, the Riyal started to loose stability and rose up by about 15 % (from 125 riyal per US\$ to 150 riyal per US\$).

#### 5.2.7.2 Ratio of Resources between Northern and Southern Parts

It is important to examine critically the ratio of material resources of the Southern region relative to the overall resources of the country. Table 5-1 shows the governmental revenues (in billions of Riyals) for the year 1997.\*

**Table 5.2 - 4      Government Revenues in 1997**

(In billion Riyals)

Resources of:		%
Oil & Gas	191	63.2
Taxes	34	11.1
Customs	29	9.6
State share of profits	16	5.4
Loans & assistance	19	6.5
Personnel resources	6	2.0
Differences in cement prices	4	1.5
Zakat taxes	2	0.6
TOTAL	301	100

\* Source - The Financial Statement (1997), Ministry of Finance

It is noticeable that the oil sector constituted 63% of the total resources. The oil sector's

activities were present in Marib, Shabwa and Hadhramout, with Aden as a refinery and bunkering area. Only Marib Governorate is Northern, whilst the rest are Southern. The ratio of oil production for Southern areas to Northern areas was 55:45 respectively in 1996/7.<sup>161</sup> In terms of refinery capacity, Marib refinery had a capacity of only 10,000 b/d while that of Aden had a capacity of 170,000b/d.<sup>162</sup> Refinery revenues according to the Government were 22 billion Riyals and 3.5 billion Riyals for Aden and Marib refineries respectively in 1997.<sup>163</sup> Also, while Northern oil production was diminishing, Southern oil production was expanding, though at a much lower pace than had been hoped. Other revenues would have come more from Northern areas than Southern, owing to the fact that there had been more substantial commercial activities in the north than in the south. But, if state-owned land resources were taken into account, the South's resources would appear stronger<sup>164</sup> On least estimate, therefore, Southerners would have the right to enjoy 50% of those resources for the development of their areas and for improving their standard of living.

One can conclude that although the ERP was bound to lead to high level of unemployment (up to 35% in practice for the whole country), it would not be expected under an objective policy for there to be a 60-70% unemployment in Southern areas alone as there was.<sup>165</sup> The standard of living in the South declined in terms of nutrition, environment, social facilities and expenditure on food and non-food commodities.<sup>166</sup>

Economic enterprises in the South moved from the public state-ownership under the ex-YSP regime into the elite's private ownership. Various private groups such as Hayel, Al-Ahmer, Bin-Mahfouz and others who were collectively called the 'money-power' acquired the ownership of public enterprises or established business on old state-owned lands in Southern regions.<sup>167</sup> Southern citizens could not afford either to compete in acquiring similar former state-owned enterprises or to purchase the expensive services/facilities in their region. The state leadership failed to provide effectively any coherent economic framework within which Southerners could live satisfactorily.

### **5.2.7.3 Impact of Northern Developmental Policies on Southern Infrastructure**

Specific elements of the Southern infrastructure will be examined below to assess the impact of the ERP and the decision-making structure on the development of Southern regions.

#### **(a) Water**

The water infrastructure can be considered according to three dimensions:

##### **(i) Water Priority in the national economic strategy**

##### **(ii) The Level of Maintenance of Water Infrastructure**

##### **(iii) Water Development Impact on the Standard of Living:**

#### **(i) Water Priority in the national economic strategy**

Water was said to constitute a top priority in national strategy and policies but that level of priority was not maintained in Southern regions to the same degree as existed in former PDRY. The state leadership benefited from inheriting a sound infrastructure for water in Southern regions. With its technical specifications, Southern water distribution was regulated by a legal mechanism properly attached to it and was managed by a sound administration. The Northern leadership under the YAR did not give the water issue the same priority as the Southerners did.<sup>168</sup> This resulted in the absence of a consolidated water infrastructure in Northern regions which later had detrimental results for nearby Southern regions, namely those of Lahej, Aden and Abyan. After 1994, the water infrastructure in Southern regions was strained by the withdrawing and transfer of water to the Northern regions (Taiz and Ibb regions)

In terms of water administrative management, the decision-making structure did not attempt to build up a systematised integrated authority for water to

reflect development policy across the country. While the National Water and Sanitation Authority (NWSA) in the South was a public enterprise, in the North, the NWSA was partially owned (60%) by private shareholders.<sup>169</sup> Also, there was the General Authority for Rural Electricity and Water (GAREW) which existed in Northern regions but hardly had any activities in the south. As a partially public institution, the GAREW had never contributed to the public budget up to 1996, and government contribution to its overhead costs continued as follows:<sup>170</sup>

**Table 5.2 - 5 Government Contribution to the northern overhead cost of the mixed sector of Water (GAREW)**

(in Millions of Yemeni Riyals)

1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
336	369	1000	2000	2646

Source: The Financial Statement, 1997, Ministry of Finance

This institution was supposed to have made millions of Riyals profit which should be subject to taxation and partial donation of its profits to the public budget, but due to the tribal basis of the shareholders involved, the Government continued to support the overhead costs out of public funds.<sup>171</sup> The government policy, in the post-war, went further in its discriminatory resources' policies by providing some resources to cover the deficits of some northern public institutions while would be refrained from provision of resources to some basic needs in the southern infrastructures. This was indicated in the Financial Statement of 1997 as following:

**Table 5.2 -6 Budgetary Contribution to (GAREW) for Deficits'  
Coverage for the period (1993-1997)**

(YR millions)

1993	1994	1995	1996	1997 (est)
20	25	26	36	72

Source: The Financial Statement, 1997, Ministry of Finance

**(ii) The Level of Maintenance of Water Infrastructure in the South**

In Southern regions, basic infrastructural services such as water were handled in a discriminately fahsion by the state leadership following the change in the decision-making structure and the start of the ERP in the post-war period. This can be explained through the aspects covered below.

**(a) Administrative and Financial Management of the Water Sector:**

The NWSA was managed by the Northern technical elite, both in Sanaa (the central authority) and in Aden (the major Southern city). The south enjoyed a more efficient infrastructure than the north, yet the Northern management in both Sanaa and Aden proposed a price increase for the south only, in addition to a newly introduced fee on each regulator (per family) at a minimum charge of 750 Riyals. Due to variations in climate and the civic style of life, domestic water consumption would be much heavier in Southern areas. The price increase, therefore, put a correspondingly heavy economic burden on the Southern population.<sup>172</sup>

The new increases in water charges in the south, eventually, were made to subsidise the northern sector which received various subsidies which in turn



went to shareholders rather than to effective management of these institutions. In consideration to the fact that the water institutions in the south were purely public, the proposed increases in the water bills (in the south) should have gone to the improvement of their management and maintenance.

Thus the government would receive resources from all Southern water sectors to the budget and would not contribute to the renewal of their overhead costs, whereas the Northern resources would not always meet the operating costs of their institutions and would continue to receive subsidies at the expense of southerners'. Major portions of the bills of some of the elite, influential groups or ministries would not have to be paid which would cause high deficits in the northern public institutions such as water sector. The Government, however, would pay 'its share of the turnover of both Northern water institutions (NWSA & GAREW) out of Government resources.'<sup>173</sup> The Government's contributions in the last five years to NSWA is in the table below.

**Table 5.2 - 7 Budget Contribution to NWSA over the period (1993-1997)**

(Yemeni Riyal Millions)

1993	1994	1995	1996	1997 (est)
643	198	636	1400	1440

Source: The Financial Statement, 1997, Ministry of Finance

Up to 1997, the above allocations failed to provide an adequate water supply system to Northern regions. In the Southern regions, water management suffered serious setbacks because of the impact of the war, yet gained no financial support for repairs. Hadhramout, for example, up to 1998, could not obtain the required support in finance from the government to rebuild its technical infrastructure for water control.

## **(b) Technical Maintenance**

Taking Aden as an example, the Northern technical elite failed to provide the required maintenance which used to exist in the south for water infrastructure. The state leadership in 1994 appointed a Northerner from Hudaidah to manage water resources after the war, instead of one of many highly qualified and experienced Adeni figures who could have run the sector efficiently.<sup>174</sup> The collected resources, if utilised properly, would have been sufficient for the required maintenance. Also with the support of international institutions, the Southern water infrastructure could have been maintained at a very sophisticated level. Up to 1997, however, water institutions in the south had fallen short of the adequate standard in maintenance and development.<sup>175</sup>

## **(iii) Water Development Impact on the Standard of Living:**

The negative impact of water development on the standard of living of the Southerners was the third aspect of the impact of the decision-making structure and the ERP in the development in the south. The NWSA had lost its credibility as a positive lively sector owing to many reasons. First, the decision-making structure had passed/implemented discriminatory policies in the South. As a result of these financial discriminatory policies, the required maintenance could not be achieved due to a lack of resources. For instance, the quantity of chloride was lowered and the cleaning of reservoirs was not regularly undertaken. This had caused the spread of water-borne diseases among children.<sup>176</sup> Also, sewerage problems in major cities were not solved and very little expenditure for such programmes would be available.<sup>177</sup>

The second reason for such a negative impact on the standard of living of the Southern population with regard to water development was the impact of ERP policies. Unlike the Northern system, the Southern water infrastructure was not subsidised before 1994, but could cover its operating costs under non-inflationary conditions. The Northern water infrastructure was badly hit

in its subsidies to cover its operating costs.<sup>178</sup> Central authorities, however, continued to provide assistance to it in various forms. The ERP pricing policy was targeted to effect Southerners only, for the following reasons. Firstly, they were consuming more water than Northerners, domestically for climatic reasons. So, they would be liable to pay more. Secondly, as they were enjoying a sewerage infrastructure, which existed since the 1930s, they were asked to pay a minimum charge of 750 Riyals for its maintenance, which never happened. And finally, the Southerners (in Aden and Lahej) had to stay 7-10 hours weekly without water, in order to fill water from these regions into tankers for Taiz Governorate.

## 2. Electricity

Southern electricity infrastructure had suffered serious setbacks in the post-war period due to changes in the decision-making structure and the policies of the ERP. These serious set backs had come out as a result of:

- (i) Non-systematic structure of the Public Electric Corporation (PEC)
- (ii) The recurrent deficits of the PEC in its Northern branch and the impact of this on the Southern branch
- (iii) Power prices made Southerners a disadvantaged group as their power need was greater than the Northerners'.

### (i) **The Non-Systematic Structure of the Public Electric Corporation (PEC) in the Two Regions of Yemen**

The negative impact of the decision-making process and the ERP policies on the Southern electrical infrastructure, was basically attributed to the non-systematic structure of the Public Electric Corporation and ineffective management in the two regions of the country. Typical of any public enterprise in the south, the PEC was purely a public enterprise and was not

integrated totally with the Northern PEC, which was a mixed economic institution with 49% of it belonging to private shareholders. Such variations in their legal entities had caused policy fragmentation within each part of the PEC. Shareholders would intervene in management and would add to its management complications and corruption. The writer had been three times to the main office of PEC in Sanaa and every time she would witness long and cumbersome queues at the Executive Director's office door for unsolved problems. This implied that most Northern branches were ineffective in solving native problems and therefore had to come to the main office. In the south however, the PEC used to have the most sophisticated administrative system. Since the 1940s, and when enlarged into former PDRY, each new installation was independently administered.<sup>179</sup>

Administratively speaking, the impact of the decision-making process in particular, was the same as in the water sector. The PEC administration did not change hands after the war and was kept under the same old Northerner. There was, however, a change in financial pricing policies which had changed after 1994 and this was attributed to the ERP policies alone.

#### **(ii) The Recurrent Deficit in Electricity**

The second reason for the negative impact of the decision-making process and the ERP policies on electrical power was the recurrent deficits of the PEC in the northern region due to improper management. Despite the private element and its monopoly of the market, the PEC in the north failed to recover its managerial and operating costs even before inflation had reached high levels.<sup>180</sup> The Financial Statement of 1997 estimated YR 56.6 millions profit for Government share which the PEC (both the north and south region) would be expected to make. This amount would most likely come from Southern resources after the high increase in prices were made (on Southerners bills which for climatic reasons would come out from Southern areas).<sup>181</sup>

The recurrent deficits made by the Northern PEC had an impact on

governmental resources at the expense of the publicly-owned Southern branches of the PEC. The following figures were paid-out as PEC public expenditure (in northern regions) as Government shares in this corporation.

(YR millions)

1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
457	246	1539	4076	2784

Source: The Financial Statement, Ministry of Finance, 1997

### **(iii) Power Prices**

As the ERP only recommended a 50% price increase in the first stage to be followed by another price increase, power prices became a burden on the Southern population.<sup>182</sup> The climactic variation, especially in summer and autumn had made the Southern population a disadvantaged group for electrical use. Prices, practically, rose by 100%\* and those who could not meet such high costs for power suffered from deteriorating living standards. This was very noticeable in major towns. The infrastructure had maintained its facilities without power cuts, in Aden City at least. Maintenance from internal resources (in Aden Branch) was adequate. In the north, power cuts would be regular and at least twice a day.

In conclusion, both power infrastructures (water and electricity) were insufficiently supported for developmental process while discriminatory policies were maintained in favour of the Northern infrastructure. The Southern population, as a result, was badly affected and their standard of living with respect to this power sectors and sanitation deteriorated remarkably.

#### **5.2.7.3 The Impact of Changes in the Presidency and of the ERP on the**

## **Development of Social Services, Health and Education, in Southern Regions.**

Both the decision-making process and ERP policies had contributed to the deterioration of the Southern social services, in the health and education sectors, following the war period. The deterioration of those sectors had come about from two aspects, namely the non-availability of resources to these sectors in Southern areas at the required standard and secondly, the politicisation of management to their sectors.<sup>183</sup>

At the level of the deterioration of each of health and education sectors out of non-availability of resources, the Southern social infrastructure was badly damaged in the former material resources that used to exist before the war period. Government resources, despite the strict ERP policies, continued to spend indiscriminantly in the north at the expense of the south. Specifically, the overall expenditures in both sectors from the General Budget had decreased, as will be shown later. The south, however, lost most of its former subsidised resources while the Northern sectors continued to get them, but under different financial categories in the budget:

Total expenditure (by sectors):(YR millions)

<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>
General Budget Expenditure	68,984	87,128	119,880	181,146	313,986
Education	13,531	16,738	22,860	39,808	52,534
Health	3,102	2,983	4,219	8,041	10,046

Expenditures for Institutions (YR millions)

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997 (est)
<u>Education Sector</u>	<u>13,531</u>	<u>16,738</u>	<u>22,860</u>	<u>39,808</u>	<u>52,534</u>
Research Education Centre (N)	29.7	36.2	34.9	44.3	48.5
Sanaa University (N)	943	1,049	1,406	3,072	3,813
Academic Kuwait Hospital (N)		44	152	320	366
Aden University (S)	432	488	604	1,325	1,629
Taiz University (N)			23	927	1,302
Hadhramout (S)			45	388	356
Al-Hudaidah University (N)					248
Ibb University (N)					344
Dhamas University (N)					310
Yemen Research Centre (N)	20	21	26	65	44
The Ministry (N>S)	12,104	15,096	20,565	33,688	44,065
<u>Health Sector</u>	<u>3,102</u>	<u>2,983</u>	<u>4,219</u>	<u>8,041</u>	<u>10,046</u>
General Authority of Sanaa Hospital* <sup>1</sup>					
(main)	236	214	327	432	976
General Authority of Sanaa Hospital* <sup>2</sup>					
(main)	9.4	26.0	103	189	170

\*<sup>1</sup> = Resources out of budget (for Public Enterprise Support against recurrent deficit).

\*<sup>2</sup> = Resources out of budget (for Governmental share in the over-turns of the mixed economic sectorial units)

Source: The Ministry of Finance, 1997

The examination of the above tables and figures clearly explains the extent of

the discriminatory policies of the decision-making structure in resource allocation to Southern institutions against public institutions in the south.

The second aspect with which development of the Southern social infrastructure in health and education was deteriorating, was the politicisation of the management of these sectors by either GPC or Islah figures. Prior to the war, the Southern elite maintained YSP figures at the top of the sectoral management but because there was no political rivalry other than independents, there was no political friction in the management. After 1994, several political problems between the two leading parties were reflected in all levels of administration, including students in higher education institutions.




### 5.3 The Military Sector in the Post-War period

The military sectors of both the north and the south were discussed in the preceding Chapter 4. In this subsection of Chapter 5, the military sector will be analysed on its composition and performance following the civil war of 1994.<sup>184</sup>

#### 5.3.1 The Integration of the ROY's Military Sector

With the removal of the YSP from all political power in the power centre leadership, the YSP military force was also removed from the military structure. The new leadership in the military organisation changed the structure and brought it again under the command of General Ali Abdallah Saleh, the President of the State. A Southern Minister was appointed during the war, namely, Brigadier Abdo Rubbo Mansoor who continued to hold the post until the war was over. Brigideir Mansoor, became Vice-President of the State, and the Ministry then came under Brigadier A. M. Al-Sayyani, from Sanhan in the north, in October 1994. The hierarchy of the administrative structure of the Ministry of Defence is depicted below.



Under the deputies of the C.C.A.F. there were several departments in

charge of the various technical functions of the ministry. Very few southerners were incorporated in these senior departments, and these were from the Ali Nasser faction who played a big role in the victory of the northern forces over the South. However, these southern forces were mainly part of the GPC political set-up and none of them represented the YSP.

### **5.3.2 The Immediate Effects of the War on the Southern Armed Forces**

The southern armed forces suffered serious setbacks in the post-war period under the new fully integrated leadership of both former parts of Yemen. Those setbacks were very serious in two forms. Firstly, that some armed forces fled the country and, secondly, that some remained in the country but outside military service, apart from the those in GPC organs. However, even those who fought on the northern side and were integrated in the military set-up did not enjoy the same authoritative power as their northern colleagues. The tribal bonds *within* the northerners was too strong to allow equal treatment between the northern and southern forces take place at any point of time during the period 1995-1998.<sup>185</sup>

#### **5.3.2.1 The Southern Armed Forces Who Fled**

Different levels of the southern armed forces defected to neighbouring countries. For example, Staff Brigadier Haitham Qasem, ex-Minister of Defence (1990-1994), left for the United Arab Emirates (Abu-Dhabi). His assistants, Colonel Ahmed Ali and others, left with him. Some of the well-trained airforce pilots left to KSA and Gulf States.<sup>186</sup> Some military leaders preferred to stay in Cairo and Damascus. A handful of the security and defence forces fled to the UK and USA, joining their relations, who were British/American nationals. The majority of junior military staff, however, fled and preferred to stay in military training camps abroad and/or near Yemeni borders.

Political harassment was observed along the Yemeni-Saudi borders from these camps during 1996 and 1997.<sup>187</sup> They were signalling their threat to the country's stability.

### **5.3.2.2 Southern Armed Forces in the Country**

For analytical purposes it is important to distinguish between two factions of the southern armed forces in the country. The researcher is identifying them as faction A and faction B.

Faction A was that part of the southern armed forces under which the cooperative unification was made between the two former states: PDRY and YAR.

Faction B was that part of the southern armed forces which defected from the south of the country, after the 1986 civil war, to the north.

The two factions were involved in the 1994 war but on different sides and came out of the war with differing results.

#### **a. Leadership Recruitment:**

The immediate effects of the war and of the political changes in the country were negative in all aspects for the southern factions, for many reasons. The first and the major reason was related to the ideological background of the southern armed forces. In view of the fact that the whole military set-up of the south was politicised by YSP-Marxist ideology, there would hardly be an accommodation for southerners in the northern military force under the new political administration of the State. Faction A, in particular, had lost all possibility to be incorporated in the

new military leadership.<sup>188</sup>

The second reason for the negative impact of the war and political changes in the southern armed forces in the country was the narrow vision of the northern forces with regard to national interest for the establishment of a strong military for the country. Northern forces had been living in a very tribal-orientated set-up. Their victory over the then gigantic YSP military force was over-estimated and not properly analysed with respect to their modest capacities, particularly in war strategy and air-force utilisation. They lost many forces and volunteers at the start of the war. The really decisive role in the war was played by Faction B of the Southerners. Under the influence of tribal attitudes, Northern forces failed to foresee the national need for a fully integrated military organisation. As a result of that unawareness, the Hunaish problem developed in the Red Sea with Eritrea in 1995/1996 and the boundary issue between Yemen and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remained as a source of constant anxiety to the state leadership. Within these threats, the new military establishment failed to objectively absorb the forces of the South.<sup>189</sup>

The third reason was the inability of the tribal power centre to accept a change in its power composition and its military force for the benefit of the new unified state. There was strong tribal attachment between the state leadership and the military set-up. Unlike in other sectors, the military sector mirrored the decision-making structure in its tribal features. The Southerners' forces, therefore, would not be accepted in any accommodation within such a power centre characterised by such tribal features.<sup>190</sup>

Faction B of the Southern forces, however, was in a better position due to their role in assisting in the victory of the North over the South. The new military establishment placed them in high positions, though with insufficient authority. Staff-Colonel Abdulla Elaiwah, who was Vice-

Minister of Defence in 1985 in the PDRY and defected with Ali Nasser, was recruited as Chief-in-Command of the Armed Forces, a secondary title in the military organisation after the Minister of Defence. Colonel Sulaiman Qais, another Southerner, was recruited as the Director of Military Operations Department in the central organisation but far away from the centre of the establishment.<sup>191</sup> Colonels Qatan, Rajab, and many more who had vital roles in the war victory were recruited into the new unified structure, but far away from sensitive areas of the organisation such as those of logistics and the airforce. No Southerner in a high position enjoyed the same authority as their northern colleagues. This was, however, partly due to the over centralised administration that had characterised northern institutions since the YAR period. The office director of the Minister would have equivalent authority in the military to Southerners, for example.

#### **b. Junior Recruitments:**

The impact of the war and the political changes on recruiting junior staff from the southern armed forces, of whom the majority were of Faction A, was not positive. While the above reasons for the poor recruitment of Southerners remained valid, junior staff recruitment had further restrictive factors too. The first reason was the impact of political changes. The Islah Party had brought forward many junior staff from Northern areas to be incorporated into the new military organisation. The Islah had more grounds to claim for the introduction of its faction as it lost most of its volunteers in the war than others, namely the GPC or southerners of Faction B. The second reason was economic. In view of the spiralling inflation in the period following the war, the government had to make a lot of cuts in its budgetary expenditure, and particularly of that of the armed forces. This could only be achieved by the expulsion of all of the Southern leadership and the major portion of the junior staff.<sup>192</sup>

As a result of the above analysis, the Southern armed forces suffered heavy losses in their jobs and entitlements. Southerners of Faction A, at all levels, lost employment, their salaries and allowances, during the first 6-9 months.<sup>193</sup> The majority remained in their regions, waiting for the right time to go back to Sanaa to claim their entitlements of salaries, allowances or pensions if they were driven away from the service.

In view of the economic crisis situation in the country after the commencement of the ERP, the state leadership released only basic salaries to the leadership of the Southern armed forces in the country in August 1996, a year after the 1994 war.<sup>194</sup>

Junior staff were called for recruitment but in remote areas which were far away from their regions. They faced a difficult choice: either to be in service in remote areas or to stay in their regions without any salary.

Faction B, on the other hand, though recruited with no power-authority, enjoyed many material facilities, particularly at the beginning of the new period. Southern military vehicles, houses and properties of Faction A were mainly taken inappropriately by them. Some of them had misused their military power in taking over the houses of civilians in the Southern regions on the grounds that 10 years previously (in 1985) these properties were theirs.<sup>195</sup>

### **5.3.3 Southern Military Institutions:**

Southern military institutions in the south were numerous, diversified and economically viable to Northerners. South Yemen was large, in terms of its geographical area and had a sparse population, and its military force was under great pressure from neighbouring states. Consequently, Southern forces built highly equipped military sites in all provinces, where

local staff and foreign expertise could be accommodated comfortably. Al-Anad military camp, as explained earlier in Chapter 4, was similar to a Russian Military City, with a housing compound, hospital, entertainment facilities, plane hangars, lodgings and military training facilities. Another large complex in Hadhramout, near Al-Khash'aa, had similar diversified facilities and functions. Military camps along the eastern borders were fully equipped with all military equipment, including tanks and helicopters. In Aden, various military and security sites were situated in the best locations of the city, which Northerners considered to be the most economically viable locations for businesses. Tariq site (near the ex-Elizabeth Hospital), Al-Fath site in the Steamer Point area, the Marine site on the Steamer-Point coast and the Gold-Mohr sites, the best coast in Aden, all of which represent some of the many economically viable sites taken over by the northern forces.<sup>196</sup>

The value of southern military institutions and equipment ran into billions of US dollars. On the external account only, debts to the former USSR from the former PDRY amounted to US\$ 7 billion, of which 70% was in the military sphere. Cuba, Germany and local material input would amount to at least US\$ 3 billion during the past 27 years of the existence of the PDRY.

The largest institutions in the South were taken over and fully staffed by Northern forces, such as Al-Anad, where hardly any Southern leader would be found. Following the war, a Southerner would not be allowed to get into such premises.<sup>197</sup>

Southern institutions were exclusively divided. Southern forces of Faction B, who hoped to have some share in administration over these institutions, were disappointed when all the administration of these institutions in the south were kept under the President's relations and his faction alone.<sup>198</sup> Colonel Dhaif-Ullah (who became the Minister of Defence in April 1997)

was in charge of Al-Anad complex. Colonel Moh'd Ismael, also from Sanhan, the President's area, was in charge of all military institutions in Hadhramout. Aden was left to the President's brother, Staff Colonel Mohamed Abdulla Saleh, Chairman of Central Security. Areas such as Jabal Abu-Hadid,<sup>199</sup> and Tariq had been cleared of military equipment to become commercial sites for northern companies.

#### **5.3.4 The Progress of Military Integration in the Post-War Period**

In this subsection, we shall analyse critically the progress of the integrated military organisation of the ROY.

##### **5.3.4.1 The Ransacking of the Southern Infrastructure**

The Northern forces were highly irresponsible in the restoration of security in southern areas and a raw tribal mentality prevailed in the attempts to preserve state interests after the July 1994 victory. After the departure of the Southern forces, the northern forces looted the major cities of the South. The majority of the stolen material was taken away by Northern forces with the approval of the leadership.<sup>200</sup>

##### **5.3.4.2 The Harassment of Southerners by Northern Forces**

The behaviour of the Northern forces was intolerable because of the high degree of harassment they exercised against Southerners, particularly in the south. There was a high degree of military deployment right from the beginning of the victory in the southern areas by the Northern forces. In the first few weeks of July and August, there were some confrontations



between Northern and Southern forces who belonged to Ali Nasser's faction in Aden. The city was too small to accommodate 6 battalions in addition to the Salah-Uddin Camp in Little Aden. Despite this fact, the military leadership decided to split the 6 battalions between the two factions: three northern and three southern battalions. Fortunately, external forces intervened and advised the government to move all battalions out of the city. This policy was not that successful as some semi-defence forces (Security and Republican Guards) came to Aden as security forces in addition to the formal security forces of the interior and of the Political Security Organisation. Aden, Mukalla, Seyoun, Abyan and other southern cities became practically under the hegemony of security forces of all colours.

The presence of a high number of military/security forces in these provincial cities was not only for security reasons as they also caused serious harassment to people and land. They were deployed in every public institution as guards, and in many cases they were taxing people for getting into these offices to pay bills or to conduct official business.<sup>201</sup> The researcher happened to be in such a situation and was denied access to a public institution because she did not pay the security guards. The security guard felt that he was above her status and did not bother with the possible legal implications. Similarly, tens of cases everyday were faced by Southerners with Northern forces harassing them in their daily routines, and their leadership being incapable of controlling them.

One of the main reasons for the deployment of Northern forces in the south was the security of the resource-rich southern regions. From the leadership's point of view, Aden and Hadhramout were more economically important than the whole of the northern region; and that is why they had to have strong control over these Southern places. From the point of view of a Northern security man, it was his aim to get a piece of land in the South sell it quickly for a large profit. This could not happen

in the north as the land was owned by tribes. The south was very large in area and diversified in resources but, above all, it was mainly owned by the state.<sup>202</sup>

Outside their formal capacity, northern forces had taken over complete civil and public institutions (with the land, buildings and equipment for their personnel ownership such as irrigation department of the Ministry of Agriculture, USSR-Yemeni programme sites, milk factories, plus many others). Up to 1996, most military factions on those sites were prepared for privatisation programme within the ERP auspices, but the presence of the military forces on them impeded the process.

The Northern force's behaviour in the south was aggravated by their determination to stay in southern areas with their tribal attitudes and behaviours. In Aden, for instance, Northern forces would patrol the streets with heavy weapons on their cars, as they used to do in the north. As most southern cities and towns would be more civic and be unused to such a patrolling phenomenon, northern forces were resented by the southern population who found it difficult to cope with the new militarised situation in their region. Despite their various privileges in their sector, northern forces competed very much with the population of the south for southern lands, houses and traded goods. Many military figures, at various levels, in major southern regions had acquired good plots of land in the south and traded them and acquired again other plots until they made large fortunes at the expense of the locals.

At the military level, northern forces set a very bad example. There were cases of rape, theft, and the shooting of civilians. Three cases took place in the Hadhramout region. The first was in February - March 1995 when a woman and her daughter were raped by two security men from northern forces. The whole of the 'northern machinery' (judicial, security, defence and the press) were on the side of the two men, accusing the mother and

her daughter of seduction. After a public uprising in the region, the northern judge ran away to Sanaa and the two men were tried under another judge before being sent to Sanaa for a further trial.

The second case was in Hadhramout when three northern forces men tried to kill a husband and to rape the wife on the Khalf Road in Mukalla. The man shot one of them and the other two ran away. The husband, Mr Al-Somahi, was imprisoned. The Somahi tribe threatened to commit a collective action, which would damage the political stability in the region if their son was not released. After his release, the three men were called back to Sanaa.

The third case was in Thamoud in April 1997, where 2-3 northern soldiers blocked the road between Yemen and the UAE. Three members of a family were killed by northern forces who also stole their belongings. After thorough investigations by local al-Share'a courts, a court order was passed to execute the three armed forces men by crucifixion.

#### **5.3.4.3 The Loss of Hunaish Island**

Despite the new challenges posed internally and externally to the country, northern armed forces proved that they were incapable of defending the state against serious external challenges. In December 1995, the Eritreans attacked Yemeni forces in the Red Sea and overran Hunaish Island, which was regarded as an important military garrison for the security of the ROY in the Red Sea. It took two years for Yemeni to reassert its sovereignty through the International Court of Justice in October, 1998.

#### **5.3.4.4 The Operational Efficiency of Northern Forces**

Northern forces failed to fulfil their roles efficiently and meet the new external and domestic challenges. Several factors were responsible for the general relaxation of the northern forces. The main factor was the tribal arrogance attributed to them after the July victory by which the Northern leadership had given them the absolute freedom to misbehave in the south. They therefore tended to be more merchant than soldier.

The second factor for the arrogance of the Northern forces towards southerners was the feeling that the tribal military institutions had come back into power with a new material form. There is no doubt that the war victory brought a lot of materials to the northern armed forces. In the first place, the military wealth of ex-southern armed forces (of buildings, vehicles, weapons - heavy and light - planes, ships, cars, etc.) were of high value. Also, the two million dollars per annum paid by the oil companies for the security of sites was an additional resource to their budget. What was more important was the fact that the majority of the 60,000 enrolled southern forces on the monthly payment sheets were deleted from the payroll sheets, by either retirement, leaving the country, or stayed in the country without payments. This meant an extra transfer of funds within the military sector in favour of northern forces. The intentions of the military forces in the north, unfortunately, were closely associated with material acquisition, rather than self-pride, integrity, or military discipline.

At the same time the country's borders were severely threatened by the Saudis. Border encroachments were repeatedly taking place and Saudi forces advanced to Yemeni areas due to the ineffective defence of Yemeni forces. Such a relaxed attitude in military discipline was critically observed by the public.

In conclusion, the northern armed forces did not adopt themselves to a modern acceptable level of military integrity. Tribal influence made the

majority of them very raw in their behaviour in civic areas. They would, therefore, need a long time to have adaptable changes to a modern standard of military life with dignity, integrity and national responsibility. The military organisation needed to define its role appropriately within the military framework and away from civilian activities. Unfortunately, so far, the military forces continued to exercise dual roles both in the military and civil spheres and this caused serious damage to integrity of the military.

## **Conclusion**

The post war period, up to 1998, witnessed a high degree of integration, both politically and administratively at the national level between the northern and southern parts of Yemen. Unfortunately, this high integration was not naturally positive and it led to many complications.

While the tribal power centre ruled, they did not govern all aspects of state affairs as these were left to the tribal technocrats who could not afford to lead the nation into a healthy unification between its two parts. Tribal interests and ambitions grew in because of ERP activity in terms of privatisation policies, free market strategy and opened southern resources. Tribal technocrats and other interest groups in the governmental institutions launched political and economic programmes and activities for the new tribal corporates' benefits without forgetting their share of the new economic pie. Close advisers in the power centre circuit were those in the key posts of the government and who opted to serve tribal interests rather than the national one.

Politically speaking, the two major northern parties enjoyed a good honeymoon, though with problems between them from time to time until April 1997. However, the two top figures (chairmen of the GPC and

Islah), remained intact as far the tribal interest was concerned as both of them represented the top two figures of the Hashed tribe. The 1997 Parliamentary election which was boycotted by the YSP, the southern major party, saw the GPC unanimously winning the election, gaining 228 seats out of 301 seats. The new government was composed of the GPC and headed by an independent southern Premier who did not last more than 10 months in office. The GPC and Islah failed to be in harmony in the 1996 government for their conflictuary political views on the building of the state.

In general, despite the differences in the views of the GPC and Islah on the building of the ROY, the basic tribal administrative structure remained strong. The difference between the two was that the GPC advocated some liberal and modern state polices, at least superficially, while Islah insisted in having the ROY strictly based on Islamic laws and tribal structures.

The YSP lost all hope in getting a chance to advance some modern state changes based on institutions and law and order away from the impact of tribalism. The YSP, however, continued its fight for a popular political participation within the opposition parties which were ineffective in their political mandate.

## REFERENCES

- 1 Welton, M. "The establishment of northern hegemony in the process of Yemeni unification". MA dissertation, SOAS, London, 1997; see also Kostner, J., "Yemen" pp. 27-28
- 2 Carapico, S., "Civil Society in Yemen", Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 189.
- 3 The State President, Saleh, and the Chairman of the Parliament, Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer were both of the Hashed tribe.
- 4 Yemen Gazette, October 1994; also internet site <http://www.al-bab.com/gov/gov2.htm>; also

Carapico, S., Op. Cit.

- 5 Al-Minbar started publishing in 1990 with the establishment of the ROY. It was sponsored by some southern Islamists under the leadership of Bin-Shamlan who was a student in London University in the sixties. Bin Shamlan was an MP between 1993 and 1998 and gained the support of all northern and southern public and parties figures for his personal rationality and credibility displayed in national affairs.
- 6 Several unsatisfactory policies and interventions were exercised from top and lower management in the oil sector. Bin-Shamlan expressed his frustration to his closed small Hadhrami circle with whom he would meet weekly. The researcher's husband was a member of this circle.
- 7 The researcher met Al-Hamshari and Qa'atabi - the GPC regional elite in Aden Governorate - and found that many Adenese were enrolled in the GPC and in Islah. Two of the researcher's in-laws were enrolled and both emphasized this fact. In Hadhramout, one of the researcher's in-laws was working in the GPC organization in the region. He also emphasized the high degree of enrolment in the two parties. However, the majority of southerners who were enrolled in the GPC thought they could safeguard their interest (employment, studies etc.) but many were disillusioned at later stages.
- 8 Al-Thawabet, Quarterly Journal of Culture, Development and Politics, Sana'a, 1997.
- 9 For details of the 1986 war, see Chapters 2 and 3.
- 10 The researcher knew these characters very well as comrades in the YSP.
- 11 Al-Thawabet, Op. Cit.
- 12 The researcher, through her knowledge of northern politics from her northern relatives and the presidential office in which she worked, noted that the northern leadership (particularly in the power centre) always made in-roads into all 'substantial groups/units/regions' by incorporating them in formal and informal institutions for reasons of stability.
- 13 Al-Wazir, Al-Shami, Al-Kibsey, Abu-Reja, Al-Iryani, Al-Saeedi, etc., all of whom represent the top social Shiite/Zaydi strata in northern communities.
- 14 They were represented in lower hierarchies in the GPC and Islah but with un-influential figures in their regions, apart from Akoosh, a GPC member from Al-Mahara who was a minister in the south.
- 15 The tribal element in the leadership of these parties plus the concentration in important positions made it impossible for southerners to have their 'say' in these structures.
- 16 Some of the southern elite in those political structures spoke of their disappointment of the policy trends of the top elite and of the tribal attitudes of these structures. This disappointment came from those who had experienced the YSP/PONF methodology in running state affairs.
- 17 Sana'a TV news on 6th October, 1994; internet resource: <http://www.al-bab.com/gov/gov2.htm>
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 RUSI - International Security Review 1995 'War in the Yemen', p. 20.
- 20 On the 7th July, large numbers of people came from northern regions to take part in the looting.
- 21 Ibid.

- 22 RUSI, Op. Cit.
- 23 Both deputy ministers were professionals with long experience. However, they did not enjoy full authority like their northern colleagues. They were the researcher's colleagues in the south when she was director of the agricultural department in 1974/5.
- 24 Also, in view of rising prices and rents, the southerners could not afford with their incomes from one salary to meet such expenditure in Sana'a. In their regions, they need not pay rent at least.
- 25 Key posts in institutions were predominantly filled up by northerners from top Zaydi tribes and influential Shafais in the system. This was very true even in non-governmental posts with foreign companies and international organizations.
- 26 The Office Director of Al-Batani, Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, mentioned this to the researcher in February 1997.
- 27 The researcher knew southern technocrats who applied for the job in this project to be highly qualified (from British universities), but they stood no chance due to tribal influence.
- 28 The researcher's relations in different northern regions easily talked about this phenomenon. Al-Sairafi, a GPC member, emphasised it in 1997 in the researcher's office in Sana'a.
- 29 The southerners were removed from these resource posts centrally and regionally.
- 30 Al-Buq'a, a custom point north of Sa'ada bordering KSA, was a very active custom point and most northern tribes smuggled their trade from here. The researcher interviewed some northern contractors in 1997 and 1998 (from Bakel and Medhaj), and they confirmed that heavy smuggling occurs in such areas.
- 31 Relative to international prices, gold prices in Yemen were regarded as very cheap in Sana'a. The major gold dealers in Sana'a were from Zaydi factions, and mainly the Al-Hadhadha and Al-Hashidi groups.
- 32 An economic report presented to the Presidential Council on Financial Reforms in 1995, Sana'a.
- 33 Several southerners who were not used to this kind of financial corruption complained to the researcher as she was working in the Presidential Office. The researcher found that, to the northern community, this was a customary practice, but not one for southerners.
- 34 A reason for many northerners wanting to be employed in the Ministry of Finance.
- 35 An internal decree signed by the Minister in April 1996, backed the President's actions to help in combating corruption.
- 36 Source problems took place in the commerce and fisheries sectors. These sectors were in Islah's hands and both ministers failed to communicate with the GPC elite in these sectors. The Minister of Supply and Commerce resigned and was replaced by a GPC minister. The Fisheries Minister was asked to resign in early 1997, but was without replacement until the new government was appointed.
- 37 Kostiner, J., "Yemen: The Tortuous Quest for Unity", The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1996, pp. 30-32 & 59-63.
- 38 A. Al-Adwa'a was the GPC Minister. Dr Qabati was the Islah Minister of Education who lately became a GPC member in 1997 and had to leave the Ministry.
- 39 Several times the Government was called to account to Parliament on the ERP issue and the TV Parliamentary Programme (daily programme) showed the resentment of the Islah members



towards the programme.

40 Ibid.

41 Several commercial contracts were made by Al-Ahmer families in the private sector which ERP strategy was based. The Financial Statement of 1997, Ministry of Finance.

42 The researcher's relations in northern areas confirmed these facts.

43 An internal decision in the power centre was taken up leading to the removal of all southern employees who were in the south over the war period from government services. The researcher's husband was one of these.

44 The researcher visited five southern regions in the south and found that no government posts was staffed by a YSP member. The General Amnesty Resolution did not have a positive impact in this respect.

45 Interviews with the Secretary General of the YSP in 1996 and 1997.

46 Ibid.

47 The researcher visited the Rector of Aden University in 1996 and 1997.

48 The researcher visited some of these figures in United Arab Emirates in 1996 and 1997 and met those in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Egypt in London in 1995 and 1998.

49 Yehya Al-Goly had been a neighbour to the researcher in Sana'a and the latter was aware of his social status after the war.

50 Al-Ayyam newspaper, issue 447, 25/3/1998

51 These were provided by the Secretary General of the YSP in his Parliamentary office in December 1996.

52 Ibid.

53 26 September newspaper, issue 756, 5/6/1997

54 The researcher interviewed him in February 1997.

55 Ba'oum disappeared from Matealla after a public demonstration on 27/4/1998. The public accused the regime of orchestrating his disappearance.

56 The website of the General Peoples' Congress: [www.gpc.com](http://www.gpc.com)

57 Al-Hayat newspaper, 12/1/1998, Al-Quds, 12/1/1998.

58 The internet: <http://www.al-bab.com>

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 The Population Census, Central Statistical Organisation, 1995.

62 Yemen Gazette, November '94, December '94, January-May 1995.

63 Formal Government structures at district level hardly existed and governance was mainly left to

tribal power to administer, normally with feuds.

- 64 Southern regions do not enjoy proximity to certain centres like northern regions and in view of scrutinized budgetary policies, they were left at a disadvantaged position in terms of social infrastructure.
- 65 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund urged the authorities to finalise the Local Administration Law this year to support administrative reforms. This government had undertaken a series of amendments to it which would restrict the democratic process at local levels in its final stage.
- 66 The researcher was in contact with many southerners of all southern regions and met five of these governors in 1998.
- 67 The researcher met Qeleqel in his office. He appeared unsuitable to hold such a strategic post in the Aden region. He was also accused of stealing a large share of the company finances in 1997 and was removed in August 1998.
- 68 Mr Fathi Salem was Deputy Minister of Planning in YAR and in 1996 he was accused of taking employee's money. The ARC quickly lost resources under the new leadership.
- 69 The researcher undertook several interviews with southern estate dealers who confirmed the hold of good lands in Aden were in northern hands.
- 70 The researcher drove by car from Mukalla to Ghail-Ba-Wazir (65km) and found that over 35 km of the land on both sides were surrounded by Sheikh Moh'd Ismail, the regional commander of Sanhan, who claims he had done so for military utilisation of these areas.
- 71 The President distributed very few and small plots to some southerners whom the researcher's husband was one, but his brothers, Ali Mohsin of the First Armoured Group (tanks) and Mohamed Saleh of the Security Service, would tend to take them back by force from Southerners.
- 72 It was one way for southerners to counter northern corruption.
- 73 The Governor in Aden was seen to always be occupied by public demonstrations regarding land taken over, conflicts of citizens with security forces, and other related issues. If someone wanted another to go to prison, he would only need two thousand Riyals to give to a security officer. Each northern director-general felt he had more strength than the Governor.
- 74 The researcher's uncle, Sayyed Mohammed Al-Kitavy, was serving as Chief Judge in Ibb when Kholani was a Governor.
- 75 Northern Governors could afford to do the job well if the influence of tribes was at a low level. For each solution to a problem in a southern region, the northern Governor would firstly think of the reaction of the tribal power centre.
- 76 Ibid.
- 77 Ibid.
- 78 The researcher noticed this phenomenon.
- 79 What made it worse was that many southerners accepted and recognised the centralisation phenomenon of the ex-YAR system and therefore had to go directly to the Presidency and/or the Premier's office with their problems. In these top institutions, memorandums for applicants would only be addressed to ministers or governors. If the applicant came from a village, he/she would need 1/2 weeks to seek a solution to the problem, and even then this was not guaranteed.

- 80 This was due to the powerful tribal clusters in the northern power centre.
- 81 See the economic section of this chapter.
- 82 Tribalism was banned in the former PDRY; even tribal names were not allowed to be used in formal communication.
- 83 The researcher was astonished with the speed of change in women's' position in the south, especially after the war.
- 84 Two incidents took place, one in Sana'a and one in Aden.
- 85 Taqreer A'an Awdha'a Al-Mara'a Al-Yammaneyyah fi al-Muhafadlet Al-Janoubeyyah, 1994, Ittihad Nisa'a Al-Yaman (Report on the conditions of Yemeni Women in Southern Regions, 1994).
- 86 Judge Ahlam, Judge Angham both in Aden Courts were the only two well known judges.
- 87 Dustoor Al-Jamoureyyah Al-Yamaneyyah, Bab Al-Ajwad Al-Shakhsiyyah, 1994, (The Constitution of the ROY, 1994), also see the Civil Law of 1995.
- 88 Ibid.
- 89 Ibid.
- 90 Ibid.
- 91 The northern judicial machinery had been highly corrupt tribally, financially and socially. The researcher had relations who were key figures in the organisation. They complained of power centre intervention in their work. A great deal of politics were often involved.
- 92 Ibid.
- 93 The researcher experienced this in her own case which lasted six years and is still not finalised.
- 94 The GPC replaced some of the Islah figures by northern GPC figures, but without a positive impact.
- 95 It became a national case; at the end the authorities took away the judge and brought another more rational one.
- 96 Al-Ghaffari, A., "Al-Wahdah Al-Yamaneyyah - Al-Waqe'a wal-Mutaqbal" - (The Yemeni Unification - Reality and future) Sana'a, 1997, p. 183
- 97 Carapico, S., "Civic Society in Yemen", Cambridge, 1998, p. 189.
- 98 Most of the facts in these subsections were from the researcher's experience in the Presidential Office as an economic advisory during this period.
- 99 Top tribal Sheikhs and public figures in northern areas, such as Muqahed Abu-Shawareb, Makki, Y Al-Mutawakel, Al-Kubbi and others, were personnel advisers to the President. The small southern elements included A. Al-Bar, Al-Shareif, Al-Habili (of Beihan) Fadhl Mohsin (Yafe'a).
- 100 Two financial posts, the Ministry of Finance and the Governor of the Central Bank of Yemen were vital to the regime and these had been in northern hands throughout the unification process

up until 1998.

- 101 Dr Al-Attar and Al-Iryani were the most trustworthy characters in the tribal power-centre in government. Southerners, like Bajammal, did not match this trust-worthiness. The researcher had been fully acquainted with these matters through her own career in the Presidential Office.
- 102 Al-Gunaid was a Hashemite figure from Al-Hudaidah with a British background in engineering. The researcher had a few meetings in his presence with World Bank missions and he was competent by experience in monetary policies.
- 103 The role of personal advisers to the President would be in these cases.
- 104 Many southern advisers in the cabinet and technical sectors fell into this category.
- 105 The new Minister of Agriculture, Ahmed Ali Al-Jabali, who came from the oil sector, was one of the handful of ministers who mobilised advisers in his sector. The researcher was informed of this by Saleh Al-Nino, the southern adviser to the sector.
- 106 The researcher was regarded a southerner and more highly qualified than the adviser's colleagues in the Presidential Office, but she did not enjoy the same material privileges.
- 107 The researcher would voluntarily provide memorandum reports on economic problems at national level.
- 108 Kostiner, J., Op.Cit., pp. 30-35.
- 109 The researcher visited Al-Watary, Al-Ruwaishan and Al-Hashedi companies in 1993, 1996 and 1997 respectively. She was in a position to assess the impact of their capital on the Yemeni community.
- 110 The researcher spoke to Al-Habbary, a member of the Consultative Council at the Presidential Office, in March and April 1998 and discussed the impact of the repeal of the subsidies on the basic food items.
- 111 This was reported by the Minister of the Interior, Brigadier Hussein Arab, in his monthly report to the Cabinet and copied to the Presidential Office (March 1998).
- 112 The Hayel Group was the only group of merchants in Aden colony. After the 1994 war, the group claimed some basic economic institutions as their own. However, they took over strategic areas in Aden, Abyan and Hadhramout at low prices. So far, they have invested nothing of a strategic nature in the southern regions.
- 113 Yeminvest was believed to be politically manipulated to enter southern regions as a southern entity. Apart from its petroleum subsidiary 'Nimir', it has not yet achieved its scheduled programme in the free zone.
- 114 The liquid natural gas project in Yemen was a controversial issue in the leadership. Finally, Total, the French company, made the deal with the government through its local agents - the sons of Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer - in 1996.
- 111 Both the GPC and Islah acted as recipient to traditional government policies. The GPC leadership did not make grass-root changes for national policies away from what the tribal power centre wanted. Practically, the President with 4-5 other members decide upon government policies at all levels. Islah, on the other hand, had nothing in its structure, other than emphasis on Islamic Laws, to give. The rank and file of these parties had to follow their tribal leader in return for material benefits.
- 112 Economic conditions had been deteriorating since 1994. Riots and violence had been daily

occurrences as price hikes of basic food items continued.

- 113 Document of the World Bank/IDA: Dimensions of Economic Adjustment and Structural Reform, Republic of Yemen, WB, March 1995.
- 114 Ibid.
- 115 Sana'a TV programme on Parliamentary Sessions, daily.
- 116 Document of the World Bank, Op. Cit.
- 117 Ibid.
- 118 Ibid.
- 119 Ibid.
- 120 Ibid.
- 121 The First Five Year Plan (1996-2000), Action to accelerate the Economic Growth and Development. Ministry of Development and Planning, 1996.
- 122 Ibid.; also see Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 17/11/1995.
- 123 Ibid.; also see the Financial Statement, 1997, Ministry of Finance, ROY.
- 124 Document of the World Bank, Op. Cit.
- 125 The Financial Statement, 1997, Ministry of Finance, Yemen, p. 31.
- 126 Ibid. p. 32.
- 127 Nonneman, G., Key Issues in the Yemeni Economy, Paper for the Conference on the Unity of Yemen: Crisis and Solutions, SOAS, University of London, 25-26th November, 1995.
- 128 The Financial Statement, Op. Cit. p. 21.
- 129 Document of the World Bank, Op. Cit.
- 130 Ibid.; see the Yemeni Economic Conference, Al-Dughoot Al-Tadakhumeyyah wa-siyasat se'ar Al-Sarf, by Ali Al-Zubaidy, Al-Thawebet Journal, p. 388-405.
- 131 The parallel rate was also fixed at \$1 = 120 Riyals throughout 1996, then jumped to 130 through the first six months of 1998 and finally reached 140+ in the second part of 1998.
- 132 The second Yemeni Economic Conference. Article by Dr Yahya Al-Mutawakel, Economic Reforms and the Domestic Resources Gap, and by Mr Indr Sud of the World Bank, Experiences of Developing Countries; Yemen Economic Reform Programme. Sana'a, 1998.
- 133 Ibid.
- 134 The second Yemen Economic Conference, Op. Cit., article by Dr Saif Al-Asali, Economic Growth of the ROY in Light of the E.R.P.
- 135 The First Five Year Plan (1996-2000), Op. Cit.
- 136 The Financial Statement, 1997, Op. Cit.

- 137 The Second Yemen Economic Conference, Op. Cit., article by Hussein Qa'ataby, Foreign Debt Settlement and the E.R.P.
- 138 The World Bank Document, Op. Cit.
- 139 Ibid.
- 140 26th September Newspaper, 25/6/1997.
- 141 The World Bank Document, Op. Cit.
- 142 Ibid.
- 143 Ibid.
- 144 Ibid.
- 145 Ibid.
- 146 The Five Year Plan (1996-2000), Op. Cit.
- 147 The Second Yemeni Economic Conference, Op. Cit., article by Mohammed Dhafer, Future Investments in Yemen.
- 148 The World Bank Document, Op. Cit.
- 149 Ibid.
- 150 Ibid.
- 151 The researcher's house bills in Sana'a and Aden showed these increases like the rest of citizens. They went up further in 1998.
- 152 Ibid.
- 153 The World Bank Document, Op. Cit.
- 154 Monthly Presidential reports from July 1996 to April 1997.
- 155 Interviews with Judge Naqeeb Shamiri, member of the Higher Judiciary Council in Yemen in 1996, 1997 and 1998.
- 156 See Chapters 3 and 4.
- 157 The researcher witnessed the CBY intervention in one of their official circulars in the Nimir Oil Company in Sana'a in March, 1997.
- 158 The Central Statistical Organisation was heavily backed by figures of the northern technical elite such as Dr Al-Iryani who preferred weak structures to be kept for the power centre.
- 159 Not a single southerner had jurisdiction to negotiate the contents of the ERP directly with the World Bank and the IMF. The Deputy Minister of Planning, Dr Jaffer, was the only indirect relation to the ERP via Dr Al-Saidi, ex-Minister of Planning and the monitor for the whole ERP mechanism.
- 160 The Financial Statement, 1997, Op. Cit.
- 161 Ibid.

- 162 Ibid.
- 163 Many land resources in the south did not appear in public budgets.
- 164 Thousands of unemployed in Shabwa, Hadhramout and Mahara left the regions to work in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. Remarkably, it became an exodus.
- 165 The Second Economic Conference, Op. Cit., article by Dr Khaled Sheikh, The Consequences and Impacts of Liberalising Prices of Goods and Services.
- 166 The researcher visited most of the old public institutions under the new private owners in 1996 and 1997. Some of the old public institutions had been still under northern forces without promising that they would be utilised for the regional interest.
- 167 In the South, everything was planned for, and this was the case for the utilisation of water resources. In the north, the free-market strategy allowed the Government to be more relaxed in the administration of water resources. The control of more than 60% of water in the north was therefore in private hands.
- 168 The World Bank document, Op. Cit.
- 169 The Financial Statement of 1997, Op. Cit.
- 170 Ibid.
- 171 The researcher estimated that about 20% of a southern employee's salary would go to pay for water.
- 172 The Financial Statement, 1997, Op. Cit.
- 173 Interviews with engineer Saeed Qassin, Deputy Director-General of the national water and sewerage authority in Aden in 1996 and 1997.
- 174 Ibid.
- 175 Ibid.
- 176 Ibid.
- 177 This was due to the reduction of subsidies in the ERP.
- 178 The World Bank Document, Op. Cit. Interviews with Yahya Al-Abyadh, Deputy Minister of PEC in Aden (1990-1997) and Chairman of the PEC in Sana'a, also with Ahmen Al-Safi, director General of PEC in Aden (1998).
- 179 The World Bank attributed this to price distortions but from the researcher's point of view, it was the tribal management in such an important sector that encouraged corruption and led to heavy losses.
- 180 The researcher's bill in Aden increased by 2,000% despite her often being absent. However, her power bill in Sana'a hardly exceeded 150 Riyals per month, compared to 2800-3000 Riyals in Aden. The power bill in Sana'a was in the name of the house of Lord, a northerner from a powerful background, and this was the reason for price discrimination in bills.
- 181 Ibid.; not less than 20% of the salary of southern employees would go to pay power bills.
- 182 The management personnel of these sectors were exclusively from either the GPC or Islah.

- 183 All information in this part of Chapter 5 is obtained from existing military figures who wish to remain anonymous.
- 184 By 1996, many southerners in elite forces were transferred to areas away from sensitive or strategic areas in the military such as ammunition, tanks, airforce and relevant region, and from Marib and Hadhramout in particular.
- 185 The researcher met some of the ex-military people abroad and found that it was not advisable to name their residences.
- 186 The major camp was the Kharakheer Camp, under the leadership of Colonel Al-Minhali.
- 187 That was an excuse to keep the southern forces out of the service.
- 188 The Yemen-Saudi border issue has not yet been finalised because of frequent bloody confrontation along the borders.
- 189 The northern regime, with its tribal attributes had a grip on sensitive areas, and even eliminated other northern elements. The researcher's relations from the Hashemite faction were driven from their strategic areas and were replaced by Sanhanis.
- 190 The researcher spoke to some of the southern leadership in 1996 and 1997.
- 191 Many junior military staff came to the researcher at her office in the Presidency for help. She referred many cases to the military leadership, which were subsequently resolved.
- 192 The researcher's brother-in-law, like the majority of people, did not get his salary until 9 months later.
- 193 Financially, the wages were paid in full, but the corruption factor was too strong in the military organisation and imaginary payrolls ran to thousands and their resources eaten by its leadership.
- 194 Old southern residencies of the Ali Nasser faction retaliated from those civil leadership which overtook their residences and properties. The President protected properties of the ex-leadership in the south but did not protect the weak.
- 195 The researcher, through her past careers in the south, visited most of the southern military sites in Aden, Hadhramout and Shabwa.
- 196 Northern forces pledged that they would never give up these sites for any price without bloodshed.
- 197 Only southern forces administered these institutions.
- 198 A major military site built by the British under a massive mountain, giving proper shelter from missiles.
- 200 RUSI, International Security Review 1995, "War in the Yemen".
- 201 The researcher experienced these attitudes, and local people complained to her as well
- 202 See Chapter 2.



## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter consists of two parts: conclusions and recommendations. The conclusions section is derived from Chapters 2 to 5. It will analyse the unification problem of Yemen, emphasising the effect of Yemeni tribalism and political factionalism. This tribal and factional dimension became the pivot of all political developments in Yemen, in both northern and southern parts.

The second part of this chapter will incorporate some recommendations for Yemen's political problems. It will be in the form of scenarios put forward for the future of Yemen's development.

#### 6.1 Conclusions

Chapter 2 dealt with the political developments of the two Yemeni states and Chapter 3 addressed the unification process over the period 1968-1990. The two chapters revealed inter-related problems of factionalism in the two states. Chapter 4 dealt with the cooperative unification between the north and the south, examining those aspects which ultimately undermined the integration process. Chapter 5 covered the unification process under an imposed integration whereby the government leadership was exclusively made up of northern parties and the power centre was confined to a one man-rule from the north as had been the case in the YAR.

Below, an analysis will be given of the main factors which affected the unification process between the north and the south.

### 6.1.1 The Tribalism and Factionalism Problem in the two Yemeni states

While tribalism and factionalism in Yemen were common characteristics in Yemeni communities, like most Arab/Muslim communities, the factional problems in the two former Yemeni states were intertwined with the political and administrative structures. The Zaydi/Shafai division in the north was basically a religious doctrinal problem, which was politicised due to a lack of proper accommodation by both factions in the power centre of the north.

Similarly, the south had fragmented factional problems within its communities, but found itself affected by the Zaydi/Shafai problem through the influence of the northern Shafais in its political organisations. Ismail, a northern Shafai figure, was at the head of the southern policy-making apparatus. He was supported by his faction in trying to bring down Zaydi rule in the north. Ismail was very much dedicated to socialist oriented ideology and advocated strongly leftist policies in order to transform “*the Yemeni workers, farmers and all productive people*” in the two Yemens into revolutionary instruments to force all reactionary and revisionist forces from their power base in the north. These revisionist/reactionary forces were the Zaydi ruling elite and their tribal supporters.

The southerners accepted socialist ideology to serve that particular stage of southern development which required large investment programmes with very limited resources. Presidents Rubayye’a and Ali Nasser did not want to become involved in the northern Zaydi/Shafai problem which was not addressed formally in the PDRY’s political arena. Even with the two YAR-created inter-state wars of 1972 and 1979, the southerners only reacted within the limit of northern aggression against their borders – counter to Ismail’s wish.

The Northern Shafais, suffered serious grievances from the long lasting Zaydi rule. Since the start of the republican regime in the north, the YAR’s

presidency had never been under Shafai control and the Shafai regions were left in a disadvantaged state, both politically and economically. Apart from strategic projects and basic infrastructures in the Shafais' regions, such as Hudaidah port, Taiz and Hudaidah airports, and main roads connecting the region to the rest of the country, the Shafai areas continued to be predominantly poor and highly disadvantaged. The Zaydi areas were also poor, but at least this was made by the choice of their tribes' leaders. In general, however, a junior Hashedi governmental or military figure would enjoy more authority than any Shafai at the top of government.

This political status had a severe negative impact on the Shafais and led to political difficulties and insurgencies. The Shafais wanted national rights, and sharing central power with the Zaydis was the major objective. The tribal power-centre, composed of Shi'ites, made no constructive response to this problem. Ambitious Shafai politicians therefore found in the insurgencies against the Zaydi rule a possible solution to their problem, especially as the southern revolutionary regime was dominated by the Shafai faction in Aden. On the other hand, the Shafais who could not afford to run away had to stay in their villages or emigrate to Saudi Arabia and work abroad. Those who stayed in their areas were subject to hard political/security measures. They carried out insurgencies from time to time against the regime, although at a cost. The more political awareness the Shafais had about their political status, the more the Zaydi rule employed harsh measures against them.

Willingly or unwillingly, the southern regime was involved with this Zaydi/Shafai problem. As was described in Chapters 2 and 3, Ismail was totally dedicated to gaining power for the Shafais within the northern regime, or independently of it. Under the socialist ideology, Ismail and his faction created an ultra-socialist scenario, in order to lead to the elimination of Zaydi rule or to the creation of a third Yemeni republic for the Shafais in the North, called by them *Jumhoriyat Al-Liwa'a Al-Akhdar* (the Yemeni Republic of the Green Land).

To achieve this target, Ismail and his northern Shafai faction supported all

revolutionary forces in the north against Zaydi rule and helped the latter in the insurgencies in the north in the seventies.

While these political activities were met with some satisfaction by the left-wing groupings in the southern regime who constituted the military and security power, the right wing represented by the state administration (Rubayye'a and Ali Nasser) were not happy about them as it cost the PDRY heavily in terms of resources and in damaging its political profile, both regionally and internationally.

The state's personnel in the PDRY opposed the General Secretary over his stand on this northern political issue. The political confrontation between the two wings in the southern administration resulted in a drain of resources. Though convinced of the validity of their case, Rubayye'a and Ali Nasser did not want to create intra-state clashes over the northern issue. But, as they could not stop Ismail and his faction undertaking radical policies, serious confrontations between the southern state apparatus and Ismail's party power-centre occurred in 1978 (with President Rubayye'a) and in 1980 (with Ali Nasser) and finally in 1986 (the moderates against the radicals). The common factor in these confrontations was Ismail and his faction, until Ismail's death in 1986. The southern military apparatus was completely under southerners' hands but ideologically, it was under the Soviets and Ismail's influence until 1980. As Ali Nasser did not show dedication in integrating the military apparatus in his policy-making structures, they turned against him and confided with Ismail and his faction again.

The Zaydi/Shafai political problem in the north, thus, evolved into a southern/northern problem in the south.

### **6.1.2 The Impact of the Factional Political Problem on the Unification Process 1972-1990**

Despite the aspiration of both Yemeni states to unity, the unification problem

ran a hazardous course because of the Zaydi/Shafai problem in the north, and the southern/northern problem in the south.

The problems of factionalism in the two states had acute political implications. The Zaydi/Shafai problem, though of religious-doctrinal origin, was a political issue to Ismail. It was at the top of his political agenda, irrespective of the southern attitudes towards it, and what effects it might have. Ismail did not want the unification process to go ahead between the Zaydis in the north and the Southerners in the south leaving the northern Shafais out of the unified power centre (as happened at a later stage). His alternative revolutionary road to unification would have cost the southerners and northerners more blood rivers and it might not be achieved for centuries.

The promotion of revolutionary measures and programmes in the north was Ismail's strategy, and the result was the crippling of the unification process. Ismail failed to grasp the illogical situation which he and his faction were in: he was at the head of another country's power structure and was using this for objectives not accepted by the native demands in the power structure. It was the result of his radical policies and his factions pressures on southern politics after his death that the south went through a hasty unification with the tribal power centre in the north.

Ismail's programme for the unification with the north was translated in what became known as the '*finalisation of the function of the national democratic state*' (*maham al-marhala al-wataniyyah al-dimocratiyyah*). Ismail wanted unification with the north after the finalisation of this stage, whereby the north would have been expected to be socialist like the south. He claimed that 'true' unification could only be meaningful when the 'revolutionary instruments' in both the north and south were the same and equal.

Under this pattern of unification ideology, there were a series of conflicts, wars and assassinations, including the 1972 war staged by the north and the 1979 war. Several assassinations were carried out by the Ismail faction in the north against Shafai figures. Presidential assassinations occurred in the north

of Al-Hamdi (because of a federal unification which was about to be made between the northern and southern presidents) by northern elements, and in the south, the assassination of Al-Ghashmi by the southern administration (Rubayye'a). Rubayye'a, however, was executed by the polit-bureau members headed by Ismail in the southern administration.

The two systems, in general, were devastated by this factionalism within their systems. Both states had weak economies and failed to achieve the desired standard of living promised by the respective administrations to their nationals.

### **6.1.3 How Unification was Achieved**

As can be seen in chapter three, there were three main factors which contributed to the revival of the unification process: the 1986 war; the global changes in favour of the capitalist system; and the third factor which was more important for having a defensive unionism between the two states, was the rise of political power of northern shafais in the southern state and their bad performance in it.

As noted in chapter 2, the tension between northerners and southerners in the PDRY administration was aggravated by the mismanagement of the government under Dr. Yassin Noman (1986-1990). Dr. Noman's Government had at least eight northern ministers, many of them newly recruited to compensate the northerners for the loss of Ismail in the 1986 war. However, they were both corrupt and incompetent, effectively stopping southern technocrats from functioning; taking southerners' houses, and illegally obtaining many resources. The Southern elite in the party and the state became frustrated by complaints about the northern elite which allowed the southern public to ask for unification with the Zaydi rulership at any price in order to remove the 'irrational' northern Shafais from the southern administration.

The above three reasons, compelled the southern state to take the initiative in the revival of the unification process in 1988 with the north. The north welcomed the step and reciprocated with similar visits. In 1988, serious agreements were made between the two states on citizens' movements and some joint ventures for the public interest.

#### **6.1.4 The Continuation of Factionalism During Unification**

Unification between the two former Yemeni states was achieved in May 1990. It was a unification between the southern and northern central power authorities of the two formal states.

While each of the political organisations, namely the GPC and the YSP, incorporated opposition members of the others state, the unified central authority of the ROY did not incorporate any opposition figures from within either system. The GPC had a substantial number of southerners associated with ex-President Ali Nasser in its set-up. Similarly, the YSP incorporated a substantial number of the NDF/Hoshi figures in its political set-up. Neither of these opposition groups were part of the central unified power-centre of the ROY during the period of co-operative unification. Yemen's unification, therefore, was as a basis of some factions coming together – but not all.

The joint central administration of the ROY was a new experience for Yemen. Northern presidential power had been monopolised by the Zaydis until 1990 and now were having their first joint political experience of formal cooperation with the southern leadership. The southern leadership had had some experience of cooperation among different groups in the power/policy making mechanism, but this new experience had a different political profile. The southern leadership was a minority in terms of population, though they had a theoretical 50/50 ratio in the central administration. In practice power was not distributed on this basis. Worst than that, they were sharing in a central authority located outside their natural territories. This was a difficult experience for them as they felt they were subject to theft, bugging in their

telephones and residences, and easy targets for assassinations and intimidation in the ex-Capital of the north, Sana'a. The Northern leadership failed to bring perpetrators of such intimidation to justice and political conflicts escalated along tribal/factional grounds.

Chapter four revealed the disagreements and conflicting policies of the two former systems in the unified administration in almost all fields. Despite general agreement during the last steps of unification that the best parts of the two systems in each field should be adopted, there was in fact a complete denial by each side of the other's experiences. For example, the former PDRY administrative and financial systems, which were British-based, would have been ideal for the ROY's administrative and financial mechanisms. The northern elite in the ROY would not accept this as they believed that their systems were better and/or suited them more than the southern systems did. The financial system in the ROY, therefore, continued to operate according to the YAR system, in its fully centralised manner. The presence of old traditional figures at the top of sectors, as Ministers, contributed to the growth of the tribal and factional problems in their previous modes.

The central authority of the ROY, therefore, had a split administrative mechanism: one in the north and the other in the south. In practice, the ex-YAR and the ex-PDRY were functioning separately under one flag. Though the problem in the power centre took on the colour of a political version of the northern/southern problem, in essence it represented a heritage of tribal struggle in governance, rather than an understanding of national management.

The Zaydi/Shafai division was marginalised publicly but still pervaded overall outlooks. The northern Shafais who were politically motivated by the southern leadership looked at the division as a Zaydi/southerner problem, and they were included in the southerners. The southerners looked at the division as purely a northerner/southerner problem and included the Shafais with the northerners. The Zaydi faction (in the rulership) did not formally recognise the factionalism problem at all, but accused the rival factions of being separatist and treasonous against the Yemeni state, particularly when the rivalss



threatened to leave the partnership.

The whole system in the ROY ran into a northern/southern problem which divided Yemeni society again into two national identities. The factional northern/southern problem brought about continued in-fighting between the two parties in the power centre which aggravated national political and economic problems. Corruption of all types found its way into all fields. The Ministry of Finance allocated resources to northern public sectors, but refrained from doing so to public sectors in the south. The southern Premier, Al-Attas, found it hard to control his northern ministers on national policies, and ultimately failed to impose a respect for national interest on factions.

As a result of such rigid factionalism, the southern regions remained functioning according to the ex-PDRY mechanisms and the north functioned according to the ex-YAR system. The Vice-President, Ali Al-Beidh, left San'aa and confined himself in his residence in Aden, where he acted as President of the South. Political friction rose high in the first quarter of 1994 and, with the mediation of top national and regional figures, the two sides signed the '*Agreement and Pledge Accord*' in Amman on 20<sup>th</sup> February 1994. The accord was signed by the President and the Vice-Presidents and was witnessed by King Hussain of Jordan and all the chairmen of Yemeni political parties.

The factionalism problem, however, was too strong to have been eliminated by signatures on accords and agreements as it required a grass-root change of attitudes, and a respect for the national interest.

A civil war between the two factions broke out which resulted in the complete destruction of the ex-PDRY infrastructure, public sector and overall law and order system. The northern forces which won the war were supported by the southern military faction which fled to the north following the 1986 war.

### **6.1.5 The Impact of Factionalism/Tribalism in the Post-War Period**

By the change of the constitution and the return of the YAR administrative system, the cooperative Yemeni integration phase was finished. The ROY became an enlarged YAR mechanism after the constitution was changed in July 1994, giving the President many new powers. The one-man-rule Presidential structure was dominant, and the Premiership was taken over by a northerner, though of Shafai origin as in the pre-unification period. There were a few ineffective southerners in the system such as a southern Vice-President and a handful of southern figures in governmental authority, but they were there as a façade, simply to show that northern/southern unification was still being maintained. Real power was held absolutely by the Zaydi (Hashedi) and Ismaili minorities.

The factionalism problem at the start of the post-war period became more devastating than before in terms of the socio-political-economic framework under the imposed integration. The power centre became based on a form of Sanhan rule, where key posts were held by the Hashed tribe and especially those from Sanhan region. This can be clearly seen by identifying the backgrounds of central figures in high positions. The President, Ali Abdallah Saleh, was from the Hashed tribe. The Chief Sheikh of the Hashed tribe, Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer, was the Chairman of Parliament. Sensitive posts in the Government (both military and civil) were firstly reserved for the Hashed tribe. After that would come other Zaydis, then northern Shafais. If anything remained, a handful of well-qualified southerners would be considered.

Chapter five revealed that the already considerable administrative and financial corruption was enlarged, under the new mode of integration, due to tribalism and factionalism at the power-centre. The country was passing through critical political and economic stages and the tribal/factional problem led to further complications in political and economic conditions. The key posts in the government were handed over to the traditional 'loyalists' in the system. These loyalists were working for tribal interests rather than the

national interest.

Ironically, some key figures who were highly educated in the west and well experienced in governance did understand the requirements of national interest but opted, out of fear mixed with self-interests, to support tribal and factional interests. As a result of their supportive attitude to the power elite, major projects, ventures and installations were put under the control of key tribal figures in the elite such as the President's and Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein's relations.

## **6.2 Factors Supporting Factional/Tribal Problems**

Tribalism and factionalism have been basic elements in the Yemeni society, encouraged by many factors. These factors were not affected by the developmental process carried out in the Yemeni states. Because of tribalism and factionalism, the integration between the two parts of Yemen cannot be achieved. The stronger tribalism/factionalism is, the lower degree the integration. For this reason, we need to analyse the factors behind the sustianability or the growth of this social phenomenon.

Below, we shall examine the supportive factors of tribalism and factionalism, despite the presence of republican structures and institutions which were supposed to have a positive impact in dissolving tribal bonds.

### **6.2.1 The Socio-Political Factors**

There were a number of socio-political factors which contributed to the growth of tribalism and factionalism in Yemen, particularly in the north.

The first reason was the absence of a solid and sound infrastructure in tribal regions. The researcher observed through her experiences in the south and north that tribal mentalities and attitudes grew stronger in regions or areas where the state's role in development was passive and infrastructure was

absent. In the south, for example, Redfan, Dale'a and Yafe'a were the most prevalent areas of violent tribal actions as these areas did not enjoy developmental priorities in southern investment plans. The state could not afford to push adequate developmental projects and programmes to these more remote areas because they were correspondingly costly. In view of the scanty resources available to the ex-PDRY, the tribal areas which needed high sunk cost resources were not within the national plans. They therefore lacked adequate education, health facilities, production potent realisation and its population thus had to resort to their only employment option, and that was in the military. In the north, different factors were apparent. The tribal areas on the outskirts of the capital city were under the tribal Sheikhs' influence, and they did not want to see these areas to develop at the expense of their control. If everyone was allowed access to education, health and employment, then tribal bonds would be loosened and tribal transformation would be enhanced, which would not favour the Sheikhs. These regions therefore, were developed into centres of Sheikh-dominated tribal manpower. This manpower, under the state umbrella, would join the military organisation as the only available option in the unity programme. Tribal clusters in the armies contributed to the ongoing problem of tribalism and factionalism in Yemeni politics. The armies, therefore, contributed to the tribalism and factionalism problem.

The second factor was the blurred understanding of the northern leadership as to the distinction between the tribal role and the state role. The Zaydi elite in the power-centre failed to distinguish between their duties to tribal members and their duties to other citizens of the state. They therefore looked at national interest with a perspective dominated by tribal attitudes, and could not separate it from the tribal interest. Al-Hamdy tried to do so but he faced natural resistance from many Zaydi tribes, who ultimately took his life for attempting to transform the society.

The south had a strong integrated leadership in its power centre, but the tribal/factional structure, though weak, nonetheless had a strong impact. Ismail's factionalism based on northern Shafais undermined national sentiment in the south. Being at the head of the policy-making structure,

Ismail had a strong impact on the developmental process. The military group who supported him in the policy-making process had strong tribal mentality as they came from areas neighbouring the northern borders. They looked at the national interest from the security point of view. They defended the ideology which provided their livelihood in the military service and did not put priority on the overall development of the state. As a result of this built-in tribal structure in the power-centre, the whole administrative system became saturated with tribalism (in the mountainous areas) and factionalism (in the cities).

The governments did not adopt serious measures to combat the impact of tribalism and factionalism in their institutions. In the north the Zaydis did not want to do this, and, the Shafai elite figure did not dare to address the problem. In the south, on the other hand, the government abolished tribalism by the use of force. It stripped the tribes of their arms and ammunition and enacted laws to abolish tribal names on official papers. These forceful measures, however, did not abolish tribalism in practical terms.

The third factor was the passive role played by the northern technocrats, advisors and academics in both the central authorities and academic institutions. Strategic key figures such as Dr Al-Iryani, Dr Al-Attar, ex-Premier A Aziz Abdul-Ghani, Dr Maqaleh (Director of Sana'a University) and many others, indeed, sometimes even played a supportive role towards tribalism and factionalism. As key advisors to the presidency and responsible for the future of successive generations, they could have directly or indirectly drawn the distinction between the dual roles of tribe and state.

They could at least have incorporated from an early stage educational programmes on the danger of tribalism/factionalism, and institutionalised such teachings into the central mechanism of the national authority. Such attitudes and approaches would, at least, provide warning signals for national stability and prosperity. The Zaydi elite would have needed to provide honest personnel at a much earlier time to help in launching objective developmental programmes at the national level without putting the interests of their

tribes/factions in political or social jeopardy. No doubt they would have needed courage and there was a cost to be paid, but it would have led to a better situation than the one which developed. What was needed was a decisive stand in favour of national concerns. But they opted for an indifferent attitude and approach.

### **6.2.2 The Economic Factors that Contributed to the Growth of Tribalism and Factionalism**

There was one major economic factor which contributed to the growth of tribalism and factionalism: the ability of some regions to have more access to national wealth/resources than others. This was complemented by a subordinate factor: some regions had their own outlets to the external world, such as ports and land routes.

In the northern case, tribalism and factionalism were, to a great extent, supported by these economic factors. The Zaydi regions were not resource-rich, other than having fertile soils in some of the plateaux areas. They also did not possess ports, airports (apart from Sana'a) or important land routes. The Shafais' regions were, relatively speaking, more promising in terms of resources and the possession of a sea-port (Al-Hudaidah). The discovery of oil in Marib (a Shafai region) further strengthened the resource base.

The Zaydis, therefore, had a strong incentive to maintain a strong grip on state power and key strategic sectors. Sharing presidential power with the Shafais would mean sharing these strategic economic sectors and the military set-up as well. This would lead to the gradual elimination of the tribal society and the tribal power structure.

As the major portion of public resources came from the Shafais' regions (taxation, Hudaidah port and airport, fisheries and the mainly Shafi remittances) the Zaydi elite gave some room to loyal Shafai figures in the cabinet, though with limited authority. The word loyal meant loyalty to the

regime, with no links at all with the southern regime, even if the individual had relatives on the other side.

The south had a different experience. The British system had resulted in there being a good modern state administration. The factionalism problem in the south, therefore, developed as a result of there being two different mentalities: that of the southerners (although from bedouin origins, they were enlightened in administrative affairs), and that of the northerners (who under the Imamate-rule had found it hard to grow used to the law and order machinery of the central authority).

As there was no substantial personal wealth in the south under the socialist regime, inequalities could not constitute a contributing factor to factionalism. The factionalism problem in the south came about as a result simply of the different mentalities. It was a conflict between the 'native born souls' and the 'strangers' which undermined unity in the southern leadership.

In the ROY, the factionalism problem of northerners versus southerners became sharp because of economic factors, and this jeopardised the cooperative unification between the two states. The economic sections of Chapters 4 and 5 revealed that the south proved to be more resource rich than the north in terms of natural resources (oil, gas, gold and above all, water). The northerners could not put their hands on these resources during the period of cooperative unification as the YSP leadership was manipulating southern resources to keep them away from Saleh's central authority - a main reason that led to the civil war. In the post-war period however, everything came under absolute power of the northerners, both centrally and regionally. Hadhramout, for example, had a northern Governor, Al-Khowlani, and a Sanhani military commander, Mohd Ismail. Both figures failed to provide employment, safety and security to the average Hadhrami citizen. The northern leadership would not recruit Hadhrami leadership for the region because of the need to control the oil resources.

### **6.2.3 The Military Factor and its Contribution to Tribalism.**

The military factor was decisive in leading to the integral strengthening of tribal bonds in the two former states of Yemen.

By the nature of the highly vertically integrated tribal system in the north, the military set-up followed the central authority in style and was highly tribal and centralised in its mechanism. The military personnel in the north were predominantly recruited from the Zaydis, particularly in the higher administration. It was directly administered and directed by the state President until 1990. The President lost this position in the cooperative unification period (1990-1994) but regained his former title as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in the post-war period. In theory, the Premier was responsible for the activities of the Ministry of Defence, like other sectors, but in practice the President directed the ministry through the Higher Defence Council. All the top figures in this council during the YAR period were Zaydis, thus strengthening tribalism in this institution. The shafais in the north were made up of tribes but as the Imamate were of zaydi origin, shafais were not allowed to hold weaponeries, though many owned their weapons but without formal licences.

The southern military set-up, despite the socialistic ideology of the system, was also saturated with tribalism/regionalism. The set-up was predominantly ruled and run by the highlanders, namely those from the Dhale'a, Radfan and Yafe'a regions. The Abyanis, Hadhramis and Shabwanis did have some representation but this was limited as they substantially sharing power in civil structures. Strategic posts in the top administration of the military hierarchy, therefore, were almost equally shared by highlanders groups with some representations of other regions. Ministers of Defence in the south were: Ali Nasser, (Abyan), Ali S. Al-Beidh (Hadhramout), Mohammed Saleh Awlaqi (Shabwah), Ali Anter (Radfan) and Saleh Musleh (Dhale'a), but the majority of its structures had been from highland regions of Dhle'a, Yafe'a and Radfan..



The main two factors that prevented the southern military set-up from having strong tribal growth similar to the north was the fragmented nature of tribalism and factionalism in the south and the socialist-oriented ideology of the political organisation over the period (1969-1990).

The socialist ideology weakened tribal practices and withheld all weaponry from southerner tribes in the early stage of the socialists' rule. Maybe the strict rules covering all military staff, including being incorporated within the party system, made the military organisation very conscious in avoiding tribal bonds as much as possible. At the end, however, one could see that regional clusters had an impact on the institution.

### **6.3 The Impact of Tribalism/Factionalism on Yemen Unification**

Below, we shall examine factors responsible for the haphazard path of Yemen's unification.

#### **6.3.1 The Political and Military Factors**

Tribalism/factionalism was a key factor responsible for the haphazard nature of Yemen unification. The political in-fighting between the two leadership was natural and expected in view of their tribal/factional attitudes. The political instability of each state in the pre-unification period was naturally reflected in the unification period. In view of the preceding analysis on tribalism and factionalism, successful integration would have needed to be founded on a new and different basis.

The military dimension, where tribal clusters of both sides were accommodated, was dangerous to the cooperative unification and brought it to an end by the civil war of 1994. Chapter 4 revealed the story of this dimension in detail.

The military power centre in the post-war period was exclusively made up of effective northern elite. There were a few southern figures in the military

institution, but these were ineffective.

### **6.3.2 The Weak Democratic Structure in Yemen**

The democratic development of Yemen was addressed in Chapters four and five. Democracy was represented by: political pluralism, with over 40 parties in the national arena, over fifty national and local newspapers, and, above all, free elections taking place for parliament in 1993 and 1997 as mentioned in 4.2.2. Such democratic measures were, in reality, very misleading for they hid the realities of power. The basic requirements of modern democracy were simply not present in the ROY.

These basic requirements should have been provided by the central authority of the system: the integration of, and respect for, the laws and regulations of the state, full freedom and access to all national media for all citizens, and prevention of the misuse of public resources for factional interests. Unfortunately, none of these pillars were in existence in the ROY's short democratic experience.

The ROY's laws and regulations were mishandled and were subject to the wishes and moods of the leading figures. This was largely due to the tribal/factional power impact, especially through the security organisation and the Presidential Office.

Public resources were highly misused in favour of tribal/factional power groups. In the 1993 election campaigns, public resources were distributed to political parties which participated in the election, and specifically the two major parties (the GPC and the YSP) had most of their campaigns financed from public resources.

### 6.3.3 Other Problems Related to the Dislocation of Unification

On the political front, there was political fragmentation within political parties, a matter that put the ruling elite(s) in an advantaged position. As mentioned in Chapter four there were 46 political parties in the ROY, of which the major three parties, the GPC, Islah and the YSP (southern) had strong positions in the political arena. Such political fragmentation, however, provided a strong tribal platform for the ruling elite against a fragmented opposition.

Economically, the ROY experienced hard economic conditions since its formation. The Gulf Crisis had a severe impact on it due to the return of 900,000 Yemeni emigrants expelled from KSA and other Gulf states, joining the growing unemployed already in Yemen. To a large extent, the Yemeni economy had been dependent on foreign exchange entering the country as remittances from Yemen emigrants from the Gulf states. Also, because of its political stance, Yemen lost all Saudi and other Gulf states' assistance in terms of building schools, medical units and other infrastructural items.

The security factor played a negative role in the internal stability of the country. Often, the security forces themselves created instability, due to their tribal attitudes. They were involved in kidnapping, assassinations and humiliation of figures of other factions, particularly the Shafais, both northern and southern. The Central Security Organisation, run by the President's brother was particularly bad in its attitudes, approach and behaviour towards citizens. The recurrent kidnapping of tourists, diplomats and nationals were common events in tribal regions. Cars were stolen with the compliance of the security forces, and the aggrieved citizens could not regain them without a cost. In general, the role of the security forces in dislocating the unification was critical.

The negative support of the tribe/faction groupings in positions of authority reflected tribal attitudes and behaviours which worked contrary to national interests.

## **6.4 The Outcome and Recommendations**

There was a substantial element missing in the overall political system, namely the recognition of a demarcation between the tribal/factional role and the operation of the state on the basis of national interest. The country's development needs to be re-structured on the basis of this demarcation. Below are three scenarios for the development of Yemen.

### **6.4.1 The First Scenario**

Having examined the ROY's problems in the past period, the researcher sees three different scenarios for the development of Yemen in the forthcoming period.

The first scenario portrays a political unified system whereby the ROY maintains its full integration in one complete unified system, as in the present case. This will be achieved if the power centre can afford the required changes necessary to this scenario.

#### **6.4.1.1 The conditions for this Scenario**

The present situation does not please most Yemenis other than the Hashidis or some of the smaller interest groups. This is a natural outcome as the tribal mentality in the power centre is incapable of providing good administration without incorporating other Yemeni factions in the national administration across the country. To maintain a good unification profile between the two parts of Yemen in particular, and among all Yemeni factions, the ROY needs to adopt balanced and integrative strategies in all sectors, and particularly in terms of human, material, legal, social, political and military resources.

It would be important to concentrate on basic strategic issues which will give room for a peaceful accommodation of various national factions and to

safeguard a smooth transformation of all resources for the development of the ROY. These basic issues would be incorporated in the following measures:

1. *The establishment of a presidential council composed of influential Yemeni groups, namely the tribes of the Hashed, Bakeel and Medhaj, the northern Shafais, and southerners. However, the presidential council will need to think nationally and not tribally. Tribal representation should not mean that those in the power centre pursue tribal roles in government.*

This rule would hopefully bring about political stability. The key figures in the power centre will need to be elected by their own factions and not appointed by the desire of one man in a position of supreme authority. The recognition of major powerful factions in the Yemeni communities will be the real progressive spark for the ROY, particularly in view of the democratisation process in the national arena. It is time that the northern Shafais and southerners are accommodated in the power centre by legitimacy rather than by loyalties; and to have their say in national and domestic affairs with regard to their regions.

2. *The realisation of the relevance of the integrity of laws and regulations nationwide and their enforcement in the national administration. This weak link in the ROY's administration has been so far an obstacle to the ROY's development in all dimensions. However, this problem will need the first condition to be fulfilled.*

The integrity of national laws and regulations will have a strong positive impact on many present weaknesses in the present system. The financial and administrative corruption, the nepotism/tribalism in the national administration, the radical attitudes of some factions, the kidnapping, the theft, the misuse of power in the security and/or military, plus many other issues will only be overcome by the establishment of a good legal machinery and the proper enforcement of laws. This would not be an easy objective to achieve, but the solidarity of the power centre elite can make it happen if they desire to do so for the improvement of the country. A legal machinery with enforceable

laws is a must for the development of the ROY.

*3. To support the above rules, the third rule for this scenario is the adoption of decentralisation in the national administration, with well-enforced policies in the local administration and local government. For the power centre to succeed in its aims, the national administration must be decentralised and deregulated to cope effectively with the free market economy strategy in the ROY. Decentralisation of administration will be powerful and achievable with the enforcement of a local administration law. This in turn will give room to the power centre to deal with more relevant issues at the national level.*

Decentralisation of regional affairs will have positive impacts in various ways. On the one hand, it will minimise political friction among factions and enable regional peoples to reach agreement among themselves without taking the time of the top elite. Decentralisation will give more room to the power elite to consider issues of major national importance, particularly in view of the precarious economic position of the ROY. Moreover, decentralisation will assist the regional mobilization of the unemployed and might help in placing human resources optimally in their respective areas. Regional competition for attracting projects or activities will be for the national benefit as long as each region is governed by its own people. It is important to avoid regional political friction occurring through the employment of inappropriate figures in positions or in inappropriate regions. Exchanges of human resources between regions is best to come about naturally without higher political involvement, as the latter may lead to complications as has happened in the past.

*4. Complementary laws and regulations in the national and regional administration should be favoured in view of the conditions of economic hardship in the ROY. Many countries minimise their economic and social losses by safeguarding their national administration by complementing laws and regulations. In other words, the state must avoid enacting conflicting laws or adopt double standard measures in its national administration.*

Supportive laws and regulations are necessary for newly-established states or

states which suffer serious economic hardships such as Yemen. With the decentralisation of the national administration, national laws must be strongly supported by regional and local laws and regulations in all areas of the state. For instance, if the national law forbids the carriage of weapons in the major cities, this law must be enforceable in all capital/major provincial cities and the state must look into this matter with concern and support regional and local regulations. Similarly, if an outlaw went to a territory in one of the regions, the state must ask the authorities concerned to bring him to justice. In the trade or economic sphere, there should be complementary regulations at regional levels to support national economic or trade laws.

Of great importance in this field is the compliance of economic/political liberalisation policies with liberal social laws. Illiteracy campaigns, encouragement of positive policies for youths and females in education, and utilisation of their capacities must be encouraged to open opportunities positively impacting national development. This may require cuts in military expenditure to fund such projects.

#### **6.4.1.2 The Argument Against this System/Scenario**

The majority of the Shafais and the southerners (outside the elite circle) are now pessimistic/sceptical of this scenario. In fact, no southerner is interested in unification any more following the treatment of the south by the power centre in the north. The southerners and the majority of northern Shafais whom the researcher interviewed pointed out the defects of this scenario, despite some positive benefits.

The strongest point against the scenario is the unlikelihood of a transformation of the tribal/factional attitudes in the power centre occurring. Tribal and factional attitudes have, so far, made national laws and regulations powerless instruments and thus too weak to be enforced for the national cause. Tribal rule, for example, has continued to affect employment recruitment, leaving many Yemenis unemployed and poor. The Local Administration Law has also been waiting for five years to obtain the go-ahead from the government and

Parliament for approval, but so far with no effect. A southern legal adviser said that, in any case, southerners expected a Local Administration Law (if it came about) to be a futile law with little implications for actual local administration.

A further sceptical view of this scenario concerns the weaponry held in public hands. Yemen is distinguished from other countries in the Middle East by the large store of ammunition in public hands and particularly that held by the tribes. Some Yemeni tribes would counter a formal governmental attack in their areas. The state law is too weak to withdraw these weapons from tribes or the public. In view of this situation the power centre, which strongly supports these phenomena, will not be able to effect grass-root changes under the present system.

Generally speaking, for the system to be changed from a tribally dominated system to a national one where all Yemeni citizens have an equal say in policy-making, the constitution must be adjusted to serve such a democratic purpose. But, again, the majority of the Parliament are from the ruling party (the GPC) which is chaired by the state President (Ali Abdallah Saleh) while the Parliament chairman is Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer who, alongside the President, represents the highest authority in the Hashed tribe - a minority in the Yemeni population. It would be, therefore, very unlikely that constitutional transformation would be undertaken whereby grass-root changes can be achieved in favour of this scenario.

#### **6.4.2 Scenario 2: A Federal State**

This scenario calls for Yemen integration within a federal state. During the last 30 years, three main factions have been involved in the political conflicts of Yemen, namely the Zaydis, the Shafais, and the southerners. Each of these three factions requires a degree of power to rule its own region fairly and squarely. Of course there are sub-sections in each of these factions but for practical analysis it is convenient to consider the problem of factionalism by



this three-way division. The geography of Yemen helps us in drawing clear boundaries between the three regions.

#### **6.4.2.1 The Arguments in Favour of this Scenario**

Under this scenario, there would be 3 major semi-autonomous governments in the country, under a central federal arrangement. There would, then, be a Zaydi government, a northern Shafai government, and a Southern government, the federal power centre would be composed of a federal council of the three factions, headed alternately by one president of each faction.

The federal system would need to have a central (federal) government made up of representatives of the three factions in the three states. The federal Premier and the cabinet would need to be appointed by the federal presidential council.

Each state administration would run its own affairs primarily from its own population, manpower and resources. There should be no role for the federal authorities to recruit, employ or deploy anyone or anything from one state in a different state. Each state would enjoy full autonomy in running its affairs for the best interest of its native population, in conformity with federal integration.

The state President would mainly responsible for monitoring the legal functions of the state government such as elections, appointments etc. He could be an appointee or an elected figure. Governors of the regions would be elected together with other members of regional executive offices.

Each state would have to contribute to the federal treasury/finance 50% of its public resources in terms of taxes, natural resources and customs. The other 50% would go to the development of the state's infrastructures, programmes and other needs.

Federal resources would go to the development of the least developed areas in the country. For example, most of the Zaydi regions are in a very poor economic condition (such as Saada, Kholan and Dhamar) and thus need financial assistance directed to their social infrastructures in the fields of education, health and environment.

The adoption of decentralisation would help the state administration to give attention to immediate problems and needs that have to be resolved. To guarantee sustained economic growth, the federal state would have to pursue a clear developmental strategy. If one of the states did not fulfil its programmes, it would need to sacrifice its allocated resources for projects at the federal level.

The legal machinery at both the federal and state level would need to be integrative and complementary to each other and never be in conflict. A state's laws and regulations would have to be supportive to the federal ones and not be competitive.

It would be important for the federal system to handle tribalism with care. Special programmes for the promotion of tribal culture may be valuable, so as to ensure that the tribe keeps its heritage but for the benefit of the nation. The federal system and the states would need to incorporate tribes in their development programmes and activities.

To ensure the democratic process operates effectively, the federal parliament would need to be composed of representatives of the constituent states' parliaments. Speakers for both the state and the federal parliament would be appointed (without voting power) by the federal authorities.

Having drawn the main outlines of the federal state for Yemen, we shall examine the arguments for this option below.

The first merit of this federal option is that *it minimises the tribal problem to a large degree by the division of the power centre into federal and state*

*identities*. Each faction would compete in the state power centre, and the ability of one tribal grouping to monopolise power would thus be limited.

The second advantage of this scenario is that it *creates competitiveness among all factions within the statehood frameworks, but under the federal umbrella*. Each state will be bound to submit a developmental plan for its region and would strive to show its seriousness towards this goal. The state which does not fulfil its developmental plans would lose federal resources.

The third merit of this system is that it would *minimise corruption in both of the power centres*. The monitoring mechanism would be at different levels; at the federal level and the state level, in addition to public assessment of the performance of three states under the federal umbrella.

Above all, however, *Yemeni unity would be maintained. Although it might constitute a retreat of one step back, it would give Yemen a chance to survive under some form of unification*.

#### **6.4.2.2 The Arguments Against this Scenario**

The first point against this option is that *it represents a retreat from the form of Yemen unification which has been proceeding for the last eight years*. However, if the present integration was doing well, this would have been unnecessary; but in view of the real situation, the present form of unification is not satisfactory. The majority of the Yemeni population did not benefit from this unification. It is important to amend the mistakes and try to take up the right path. Yemenis in the rural areas in the south and even in many of the Zaydi areas have paid a heavy price in the recent political and economic turmoil in Yemen.

The second point against this federal option is that *the federal system does not guarantee the removal of the tribal/factional problems in the federal and state administrations*. While this point is valid, the federal system by nature would

have at least managed to break the power centre elite into three main factions. No doubt there would be some tribalism or factionalism within the state administrations; but at least there would be some integrity of the law machinery to effect the participation of various tribes/factions/groups in each state and the federal monitoring system would need to safeguard the rights of citizens to participate in the political sphere in his/her own state.

Whatever the disadvantages of this option, the federal system still remains a better option for the Yemeni citizen in each faction than the first one.

### **6.4.3 The Third Scenario: Independent Yemeni States**

The third and last option for Yemen is to be divided into Independent Yemeni states. This option also has its pros and cons. Below, we analyse this option in political and economical terms.

#### **6.4.3.1 The Arguments for this Disintegrative Scenario**

The southerners (in terms of general opinion) constitute the only faction in Yemen who are interested in this option. The high rate of unemployment, the deterioration of their living standards in addition to many other factors have led them to complete disbelief in the value of Yemeni unification.

The first merit of this option is *the freedom which some factions would have from the tribal mentality which has deprived them of playing a national role*. If the south regained some part of its former international status, it would no doubt be better off than under its present conditions which may be characterised as northern occupation of its land.

However, this option might also benefit some factions *in retaining former minor entities in the form of sheikhdoms, emirates or sultanates and thus would be attracted to join other similar entities in the region*. While this is also predictable if matters deteriorated in the future, the researcher does not

agree with this option at all.

#### **6.4.3.2 The Arguments Against this Scenario**

There are many points against this option.

The main one is that *this disintegrative option for Yemen is indeed a complete retreat. It represents a set-back for Yemeni heritage and Yemen's prosperity in the future.* The researcher would accept a degree of retreat, but not a complete retreat from Yemeni unity/integration. Yemen seek a strong positive impact at the regional level on the basis of its natural and manpower resources. Its disintegration might be beneficial to some, but would mean that the country could not have a positive impact at the regional level.

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### **6.5 The Outlook of the International Community to Yemen Unity**

It is important to conclude this chapter on the outlook of the international community to Yemen unity and its problems.

The Yemeni citizen, on average, believed that unification did not come up to his/her expectations in performance and the future would be very gloomy. The international outlook is not far from this belief, but tended to turn a blind eye to the problem. The international community, however, employs a double standard towards the Yemen's leadership. In the first place, it held a negative attitude towards Yemen for its political stance in the Gulf Crisis of 1990/1991. Conversely, in view of the economic conditions of deterioration in Yemen, the international community, and mainly the USA and UK dominated IMF and WB, the Paris Club and others, promoted policies only when Yemen showed complete submission to their rules and measures. The budget was, therefore, scrutinised to a great extent and subsidies were removed irrationally and rapidly, causing severe damage to the rural population. The international community, unfortunately, blessed the reform programmes irrespective of the negative impact on the nation and thus opened the door of instability inside the

domestic arena between the natives and the leadership. The international community cared for its interests in the country and the safety of its nationals rather than the stability of Yemen. However, it gave priority to some political agendas such as human rights and democracy.

The international community depended largely on the assessment of strategic key figures in the leadership in Yemen who were not giving the full picture of the true structure of the power centre. The international community may believe that it knows everything which occurs. The researcher, however, from the many international reports of some western organisations and international projects' personnel believes that many relevant parameters are hidden or at least imicorrectly estimated.

Democracy in Yemen, while taking a positive profile world-wide, is far from the real democracy western countries enjoy. This is natural as tribalism and democracy do not go hand in hand. The presence of 45 parties cannot be marginalised to that extent in a tribal community if something did not go wrong with the ruling party's performance. The human rights file of Yemen was not a good one. Although it did not include as many serious violations as actually occurred, what it had was more than sufficient to keep Yemen under strong international scrutiny.

The international community needs to re-assess its neutral attitude and position towards Yemeni unification, especially as it played a great role in the ultimate result of the civil war of 1994 between the south and the north. With a proper assessment of the human right's file of Yemen, the international community can support the best option for the Yemeni people in deciding for themselves. It is never too late to do so for the real stability of Yemen and the whole region.

**APPENDIX**

**Table 1: Distances Between Major Urban Centres of Yemen, in Kilometres**

City	Al-Buqa	Harad	Al-Jawf	Al-Mahwit	Sadah	Marib	Hajjah	Zinjubar	Al-Bayda
Sana'a	382	432	143	113	242	173	123	425	268
Aden	745	645	510	481	605	540	486	55	218
Taiz	638	478	403	374	498	433	380	220	275
Al-mukalla	1172	1140	761	908	1032	617	913	565	521
Sayun	1494	1463	1084	1227	1354	940	1227	888	843
Al-Hodeidah	608	206	373	160	468	402	164	501	413
Laheg	722	618	493	454	582	513	458	89	191
Ibb	575	541	340	311	435	370	317	274	261
Ataq	853	889	442	589	713	295	594	314	270
Dhamar	482	452	247	217	342	377	224	337	168
Al-Ghayadah	1670	1626	1246	1393	1520	1102	1399	1050	1006
Al-Baida	650	619	415	386	510	441	395	170	-
Zinjubar	807	707	571	543	667	598	548	-	170
Hajjah	405	169	266	238	265	296	-	548	395
Marib	555	608	144	288	415	-	296	667	510
Sadah	140	180	390	357	-	415	265	667	510
Al-Mahweet	497	182	258	-	357	288	238	543	386
Al-jawf	530	567	-	258	390	144	266	571	415
Harad	320	-	576	182	180	608	169	707	619
Al-Buqa	-	320	530	497	140	555	405	807	650

Source: Highways and Bridges Authority



**Table 2a: Number of schools, classrooms, students (by sex), teachers (by nationality and sex) at all stages of education for 1992/93**

Stage	Secondary 4 yrs	Secondary 3 yrs	Basic
Schools	86	766	8079
Classrooms	1053	2577	61200
Students (male)	32045	90597	1477084
Students (female)	13069	15145	534640
Students (total)	45114	105742	2011724
Teachers (male)	1692	4186	47875
Teachers (female)	908	506	10752
Total Teachers	2600	4692	58627
Yemeni Teachers	2465	1171	53213
Non-Yemeni Teachers	135	3521	5414

Source: Ministry of Education

**Table 2b: Kindergartens (Public and Private) by children, education list and sex in the Republic of Yemen for 1992/93**

Governorate	* No. of teachers	* No. of children		* No. of Kindergartens			
	Total	Females	Males	Total	Private	Public	
Sana'a City	71	916	388	528	16	14	2
Aden	255	4298	2008	2290	13	-	13
Lahej	30	335	166	169	3	-	3
Taiz	32	314	132	182	3	1	2
Abyan	110	1327	375	352	7	-	7
Al-Hodeidah	12	586	258	328	3	3	-
Shabwah	18	671	307	364	5	-	5
Hadhramout	105	1289	828	461	6	-	6
Al-Mahrah	26	457	251	206	4	-	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>659</b>	<b>10193</b>	<b>5013</b>	<b>5180</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>42</b>

Source: Ministry of Education

\* = estimated data.

**Table 2c: Number of schools, classrooms and students by sex and by Governorate at different stages of education for 1992/93.**

Governorate	Total										Secondary						Basic					
	Students					No. of					Students			No. of			Students			No. of		
	Females	Males	Classes	Schools	Students	Females	Males	Classes	Schools	Students	Females	Males	Classes	Schools	Females	Males	Classes	Schools	Females	Males	Classes	Schools
Sana'a City **	83782	120457	2729	114	5907	18331	308	33	77875	102126	2421	81	**									
Aden *	39795	45996	1941	88	6743	6586	328	17	33052	39410	1613	71	*									
Sana'a **	49046	253622	13427	2115	660	15270	534	204	48386	238352	12893	1911	**									
Laheg *	28770	82825	3204	399	1868	10441	261	28	26902	72384	2943	371	*									
Taiz **	134166	291968	8400	1102	5211	24315	714	212	128955	267653	7686	890	**									
Abyan *	21877	47731	1985	220	1476	4174	101	11	20401	43557	1884	209	*									
Ibb **	66146	223248	7705	1118	2013	12417	366	96	64133	210831	7339	1022	**									
Shabwa *	7284	36251	1528	178	11	3322	77	12	7273	32929	1451	166	*									
Al-Hodeidah **	20615	82777	3071	483	291	6883	134	33	20324	75894	2937	450	**									
Hadhramout *	43631	85067	3192	308	2859	7277	277	16	40772	77790	2915	292	*									
Hajjah **	17851	104051	5635	929	334	799	39	14	9244	31920	1605	254	**									
Al-Mahrah **	2905	4819	233	40	112	245	9	2	2793	4574	224	38	*									
Dhamar **	21246	110487	5172	736	225	3966	130	48	21021	106521	5042	688	**									
Sa'adah **	577	8905	596	116	-	763	31	14	577	8142	565	102	**									
Al-Baida **	9578	32719	1644	268	334	799	39	14	9244	31920	1605	254	**									
Al-Mahweet **	8103	42515	2313	370	156	1745	82	29	7947	40770	2231	341	**									
Mareb **	5117	14681	1254	215	4	735	27	11	5113	13946	1227	204	**									
Al-Jawf **	2365	11607	801	132	10	905	48	15	2355	10702	753	117	**									
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>562854</b>	<b>1599726</b>	<b>64830</b>	<b>8931</b>	<b>28214</b>	<b>122642</b>	<b>3630</b>	<b>852</b>	<b>534640</b>	<b>1477084</b>	<b>61200</b>	<b>8079</b>										

**Source: Ministry of Education**

\* Basic 8 years secondary 4 years

\*\* Basic 9 years secondary 3 years

**Table 3: Specialised manpower in health by specialisation and Governorate for 1993**

Governorate	Total		Laboratory Technicians		Social Officers		Bio Chemists		Nutritionists		Pharmacists		Dentists		Doctors	
	Non Yem	Yem	Non Yem	Yem	Non Yem	Yem	Non Yem	Yem	Non Yem	Yem	Non Yem	Yem	Non Yem	Yem	Non Yem	Yem
Sana'a City	293	917	59	138	-	6	3	4	2	1	17	103	12	41	200	624
Aden	72	652	-	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42	-	28	72	545
Sana'a	55	129	2	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	-	16	52	94
Laheg	16	131	-	61	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	2	16	62
Taiz	67	508	2	59	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	2	17	63	419
Abyan	19	91	-	45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	1	19	39
Ibb	78	101	4	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	10	8	64	71
Shabwa	2	38	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	27
Al-Hodeidah	112	128	2	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	-	5	110	84
Hadhramout	31	305	-	74	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	23	-	10	31	196
Hajjah	39	41	5	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	33	31
Al-Mahrah	8	23	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	13
Dhamar	22	48	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	6	-	16	38
Sa'adah	89	23	16	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	73	20
Al-Baida	25	29	2	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	23	23
Al-Mahweet	8	21	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	8	14
Mareb	20	15	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	19	9
Al-Jawf	8	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>964</b>	<b>3206</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>521</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>817</b>	<b>2315</b>

Source: Ministry of Health

**Table 4: Total of Labour Force, Employed and Employment Rates by Sector and Sex**

Sector	Employment Rates			Employed			Labour Force		
	total	female	males	total	female	males	total	female	males
Government	0.969	0.983	0.966	235152	38932	196220	242628	39602	203026
Public	0.919	0.963	0.914	51126	6024	45102	55622	6258	49364
Private	0.923	0.993	0.902	197773 5	491086	148664 9	214251 8	494341	164817 7
Mixed	0.878	0.785	0.898	11056	1714	9342	12591	2183	10408
Co-operative	0.938	0.851	0.947	10012	812	9200	10669	954	9715
Not Stated	0.383	0.813	0.346	25247	4251	20996	65874	5229	60645

Source: Labour Force Survey, 1991

**Table 5: Movement of Passengers and Freight at Domestic and International Airports during 1991-1993**

<b>Airports</b>	<b>Movement of Freight (Ton)</b>			<b>Movement of Passengers (000)</b>		
	Total	Departing	Arriving	Total	Departing	Arriving
Sana'a Airport	7390.5	1274.9	6115.6	451.1	235.8	215.3
Aden Airport	2438.5	759.8	1678.7	234.2	120.2	114.0
Rayan Airport	389.0	60.4	328.6	85.9	41.8	44.1
Sayoon Airport	42881.0	5468.0	37413.0	36.9	20.0	16.9
Al-Ghaidaha Airport	39.9	5.1	34.8	21.8	10.3	11.5
Qishn Airport	2.9	0.1	2.8	6.4	3.5	2.9
Beihan Airport	1.8	-	1.8	3.6	1.9	1.7
Ataq Airport	0.4	0.1	0.3	1.7	1.0	0.7
Socotra Airport	3.8	0.8	3.0	2.1	0.9	1.2
Taiz Airport	127.9	1.3	126.6	41.5	22.8	18.7
Al-Hodaida Airport	317.3	206.9	110.4	62.7	33.4	29.3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>53593.0</b>	<b>7777.4</b>	<b>45815.6</b>	<b>947.9</b>	<b>491.6</b>	<b>456.3</b>
Sana'a Airport	10434.7	1658.4	8776.3	586.4	292.6	293.8
Aden Airport	3206.0	835.0	2371.0	273.0	136.0	137.0
Rayan Airport	417.0	30.0	387.0	86.0	42.0	44.0
Sayoon Airport	42.9	5.5	37.4	36.9	20.0	19.9
Al-Ghaidaha Airport	65.4	5.7	59.7	26.7	13.5	13.2
Qishn Airport	1.0	-	1.0	2.6	1.3	1.3
Beihan Airport	0.602	0.002	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.4
Ataq Airport	1.0	0.2	0.8	1.8	1.1	0.7
Socotra Airport	7.4	2.9	4.5	3.8	2.0	1.8
Taiz Airport	183.9	13.4	170.5	74.0	40.5	33.5
Al-Hodaida Airport	58.6	22.7	35.9	66.2	36.4	29.8
Mokiras Airport	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>14418.5</b>	<b>2573.8</b>	<b>11844.7</b>	<b>1158.2</b>	<b>585.8</b>	<b>572.4</b>
Sana'a Airport	11436.6	2025.0	9411.6	665.7	315.9	349.8
Aden Airport	10039.2	8067.0	1972.2	316.1	16.0	150.1
Rayan Airport	605.8	44.6	561.2	163.6	82.8	80.8
Sayoon Airport	12.8	2.6	10.2	25.6	14.3	11.3
Al-Ghaidaha Airport	38.8	3.9	34.9	20.4	11.3	9.1
Qishn Airport	-	-	-	-	-	-
Beihan Airport	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ataq Airport	10.3	2.1	8.2	3.4	1.6	1.8
Socotra Airport	5.3	2.9	2.4	4.7	2.4	2.3
Taiz Airport	67.0	0.0	67.0	81.2	41.6	39.6
Al-Hodaida Airport	64.8	29.92	34.88	64.8	35.2	29.6
Mokiras Airport	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>22280.6</b>	<b>10178.0</b>	<b>12102.6</b>	<b>1345.5</b>	<b>671.1</b>	<b>674.4</b>

The data for the airports in the southern governorates are estimated for 1993

**Table 6a: A snapshot of three political openings in Yemen**

Location & time period	political circumstances	Economic conditions	Civil society activity
Aden and Protectorates, 1950s-1960s	British colonial authorities authorise syndicates, propose constitutions, elections for minority of Legislative Council seats; restrict political organising, strikes, opposition press	Foreign currency investment in transport, commerce, utilities, health-care, education, military; high inflation in post-W.W.II recession	Labour unions, cultural clubs, independent presses, labour Political parties, rural movements, local self help; independence movement
Yemen Arab Republic, 1970s-early 1980s	Military corrective movement suspends constitution; no press, party, labour rights; accedes to demands for local autonomy and local elections	Aid and labour migrants' remittances, finance consumption, commerce, infrastructure; second-hand prosperity ends in early 1980s	Self-help roads, schools, water supplies, pressure for release of taxes for local services to elected bodies; local elections
Republic of Yemen, 1990-1994	New constitution and legislation permit independent parties, presses, associations; civil war and constitutional amendments retract freedoms	Development of Yemeni oil industry attracts investment, raises expectations; fallout from Gulf Crisis causes unemployment, inflation, structural adjustment	Multiparty competition, press, conferences, organising provide multiple forums to pressure for political and constitutional reform human rights.

**Table 6b: Regime changes in the YAR and PDRY**

Date	Event	Deposed	Inaugurated
<b>The YAR 1962-1990</b> September 26 1962 November 1968 June 13 1974 October 1977 June 1978	Free officer coup, YAR declared compromise ends civil war corrective coup mysterious assassination briefcase of PDRY emissary explodes	Imam Ahmad 'Abd Allah al-Sallal 'Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani Ibrahim al-Hamdi Ahmad al-Ghashmi	'Abd Allah al-Sallal 'Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani Ibrahim al-Hamid Ahmad al-Ghashmi 'Ali' Abd Allah Salih
<b>The PDRY 1967-1990</b> November 30 1967 June 1969 June 26 1978 April 1980 January 1986	Independence day, NLF assumes power corrective move death by firing squad "retirement for health reasons" thriteen day civil war, 'Abd al-Fattah Ismai'il and others killed	Colonial system Qahtan al-sha'bi Salim Rubayi' Ali 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il 'Ali Nasir Muhammed	Qahtan al-Sha'bi Salim Rybai' Ali 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il 'Ali Nasir Muhammad 'Ali Salim al-Bid Haydar Abu Bakr al-Attas Yasin Sa'id Nu'min

**Table 6c: Major Cabinet changes, Republic of Yemen, 1990-1997, by Party**

Post	1990	1993	1994	1997
Prime Minister	YSP	YSP	GPC	Independent
Deputy PM	GPC	GPC	Islah	
Deputy PM	GPC	Ba'ath		
Deputy PM	YSP	YSP		
Cabinet Affairs	GPC			
Foreign Minister	GPC	GPC	GPC	GPC
Minster of State, Foreign Affairs	YSP			
Oil	YSP	YSP	GPC	GPC
Planning	Independent	GPC	GPC	GPC
Administrative Reform	YSP	Islah		
Awaqf	GPC	Islah	Islah	al-Haqq
Civil Service	GPC	GPC	GPC	GPC
Construction	GPC	GPC	GPC	GPC
Communications	GPC	GPC	GPC	GPC
Culture	GPC	YSP	GPC	GPC
Defence	YSP	YSP	GPC	GPC
Education	GPC	GPC	Islah	GPC
Electricity and Water	GPC		Islah	GPC
Finance	GPC	GPC	GPC	GPC
Fisheries	YSP	YSP	Islah	GPC
Health	GPC	Islah	Islah	Independent
Higher Education	Independent			
Housing	YSP	YSP	GPC	
Industry	GPC	GPC	GPC	GPC
Information	YSP	GPC	GPC	GPC
Interior	GPC	GPC	GPC	GPC
Justice	YSP	GPC	Islah	GPC
Legal Affairs	GPC		GPC	GPC
Local Administration	YSP	Islah	Islah	GPC
Labour	YSP			Independent
Migrant Affairs	GPC			Islah
Social Affairs	GPC	GPC	GPC	GPC
Parliamentary Affairs	YSP	Islah	Islah	GPC
Social Affairs	GPC	GPC	GPC	GPC
Supply	YSP	Islah	Islah	GPC
Tourism	GPC			
Transport	YSP	YSP	GPC	GPC
Youth	GPC	GPC	GPC	GPC
Without Portfolio	GPC	Islah		

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## INTERVIEWS/MEETINGS

### In Sana'a:

Meetings in the Presidential Council/Presidential Office with -

Abdul-Aziz Abdul-Ghani	Member of the Presidential Council (1991-1994) on a daily/weekly basis as Economic Adviser.
Abdul-Aziz Abdul-Ghani	Premier (1995-97).
Abdul-Aziz Abdul-Ghani	Chairman of the Consultative Council (1997-1998).
Ali Mohammed Al-Anesi	Director of the Presidential Office, seen often by the researcher in his office.
Hussein Al-Maqdani	Ex-Secretary of the Consultative Council, the researcher often talked to him during 1991-1994 in his office and had two meetings in his house in 1996 and 1997.
Lutf Al-Kulabi held	Advisor to the President's Office, often meetings on current issues in the office on weekly/monthly basis (1991-1998).
Ahmed Al-Samawi	Governor of the Central Bank of Yemen and an ex-Adviser to the President's Office, several economic meetings were held with him over the

period 1993-1997.

Yahya Musleh

Adviser to the Presidential Office. Three  
interview sessions in February/March, 1998.

