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Abstract

Ethical Foreign Policy?

A Study of U.S. Humanitarian Interventions in the 1990s

Chih-Hann Chang

This research is situated within the introduction of a strong ethical dimension into foreign policy-making in the study of international relations in the post-Cold War era. While the 1990s gave rise to a wealth of literature on the notion of ethical foreign policy, it has tended to simply focus on a version of realism, which overlooks the role of ethics in international affairs, lacking an empirical analysis of foreign policy decision-making, with relation to ethical values in the post-Cold War period. The purpose of this thesis is to address this gap in the literature by exploring ethical realism as a theoretical framework and, in particular, by looking at US humanitarian interventions in the 1990s at an empirical level to analyse an ethical foreign policy in practice.

This study analyses the concepts of ethical realism and responsible power. The application of ethical realism to the conduct of international affairs involves the assertion that powerful states should have responsibilities and exercise leadership with ethical obligations. This research looks at the foreign policy of the United States and its experiences of dealing with humanitarian interventions during the Clinton administration, focusing on Bosnia and Kosovo, to see whether the United States could thus effectively promote liberal values and make a commitment to moral goals, rather than simply follow considerations of national security against the background of the end of the Cold War.

This thesis argues that the United States, as the only world's superpower, should not only pursue national interests but also shoulder the responsibility of power. However, as the world still divides itself into separate sovereign states, statespeople are primarily responsible and accountable for their own citizens and national survival. Therefore, a foreign policy with an ethical dimension needs to be conducted in a pragmatic way.

Ethical Foreign Policy?

A Study of U.S. Humanitarian Interventions in the 1990s

Chih-Hann Chang

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

School of Government and International Affairs

Durham University

2010

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Chih-Hann Chang

September 2010

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Chapter 1. Introduction

The possibility of introducing ethics and values into international relations emerged strongly in the post-Cold War era. The 1990s gave rise to a wealth of literature on the notion of ethical foreign policy in the field of international relations.¹ Much recent discussion has focused on the shift from the pursuit of national interests to the emphasis on moral responsibility to protect the rights and interests of others in foreign policy.² In particular, the end of the Cold War led to religious and ethnic conflicts in several parts of the world. This soon raised the questions: “Where a government engages in genocide against a minority in its territory, what ought we to do about it?” and, “May we use force of arms to stop human rights abuses in other states?”³ It then raised the debate over whether a state should send its troops to save strangers in distant lands.⁴ Humanitarian intervention thus became a heatedly debated issue amongst international relations scholars in the post-Cold War period.

The idea of a foreign policy with an ethical dimension challenged the traditional understanding of foreign policy from the classical realist point of view - that governmental action should be determined by national interest. While the literature on this has provided critical analyses, it has tended to simply focus on a version of realism, which overlooks the role of ethics in international affairs,⁵ lacking empirical analysis of foreign policy decision-making, with relation to ethical values in the post-Cold War period. This research aims to address this gap in the literature, by exploring ethical realism as a theoretical framework and, in particular, by looking at

¹ See e.g. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (eds.), *Ethics and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); David B. MacDonald, Robert G. Patman, and Betty Mason-Parker, *The Ethics of Foreign Policy* (London: Ashgate, 2007); David Chandler and Volker Heins (eds.), *Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: pitfalls, possibilities and paradoxes* (London: Routledge, 2007); Robert W. McElroy, *Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ethics in International Affairs* (Princeton; New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992); Michael Cromartie (ed.), *Might and Right after the Cold War: Can Foreign Policy Be Moral?* (Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1993).

² See e.g. Robert Cooper, *Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Atlantic Books, 2003); Ken Booth, ‘Human Wrongs and International Relations’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 1 (1995), pp. 103-126; Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

³ Mervyn Frost, *Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 2.

⁴ See e.g. Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Interventions in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

⁵ See e.g. Joel H. Rosenthal, *Righteous Realists: Political Realism, Responsible Power, and American Culture in the Nuclear Age* (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1991).

US humanitarian interventions in the 1990s at an empirical level to analyze an ethical foreign policy in practice. The following section will further demonstrate the objectives of the study; the research methodology; the contribution of the research, and the structure of the study.

1.1 The Objectives of the Study

There are three objectives of this study. Firstly, it will explore ethical realism and the concept of responsible power. It is important to note that ethical realists criticize idealists' conceptions of utopianism, but not of morality.⁶ They propose the idea of responsible power as an opportunity for balancing the tension between ethics and politics. The concept of responsible power comes from the work of Max Weber. In his classic essay 'Politics as a Vocation', Weber outlined the central problem of political ethics and proposed the idea of the ethics of responsibility, attempting to balance the tension between ethics and politics.⁷ The application of ethical realism to the conducting of international affairs involves the assertion that powerful states should have responsibilities and exercise leadership with ethical obligations. This seems particularly useful as a guiding philosophy for the United States and its role as the only superpower in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Thus, the second objective of this research will be to look at the foreign policies of the United States and its experiences of dealing with humanitarian interventions during the Clinton administration. There are two reasons that US humanitarian interventions in the 1990s provide an ideal arena to study the notion of ethical foreign policy in practice. The first is that following the collapse of the bipolar world in the 1990s, the role of America's power has been essential. In Stephen Walt's description, the United States was in a position of "unprecedented preponderance".⁸ The United States witnessed the mobilization of a wide diversity of opinion among well-informed students of foreign relations regarding America's proper international role in the post-Cold War era.⁹ In addition, the world's only superpower had to set out new strategies to replace the obsolete containment policy that had guided

⁶ Alastair J.H. Murray, *Reconstructing Realism: Between power politics and cosmopolitan ethics* (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997); Anatol Lieven, and John Hulsman, *Ethical Realism: A Vision for America's Role in the World* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006); Anatol Lieven, and John Hulsman, 'Ethical Realism and Contemporary Challenges', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 28, No. 6 (December 2006), pp. 413-420.

⁷ Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958).

⁸ Stephen M. Walt, 'Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 2 (March/April 2000), p. 64.

⁹ Cecil V. Crabb, Leila S. Sarriddine, and Glenn J. Antizzzo, *Charting A New Diplomatic Course: Alternative Approaches to America's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001).

America's diplomatic behaviour for almost half a century. Therefore, the development of how the United States sought an alternative strategy and redefined its role in the new era is highly worthy of examination.

The second reason is that the period of the 1990s witnessed several humanitarian crises, such as starvation in Somalia, genocide in Rwanda, a refugee crisis in Haiti, and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo. With the United States as the leader of the free world and Bill Clinton as its first genuinely post-Cold War president, it is important to explore the development of Clinton's foreign policy on humanitarian interventions in order to examine the relationship between ethics and foreign policy. This is also important in order to see whether the United States could effectively promote liberal values, and make a commitment to moral goals in its foreign policy, rather than simply follow considerations of national security against the background of the end of the Cold War.

The criteria to underpin American engagement and the questions such as under what kind of circumstances the United States should intervene in the case of humanitarian crises beyond its borders, and how to intervene, militarily or diplomatically, dominated Clinton's foreign policy agenda. This leads to the final objective of this study, which will be to provide an in-depth examination of the experiences of dealing with humanitarian interventions in Bosnia (in Clinton's first administration) and Kosovo (in his second term). The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War made the Balkans lose its strategic importance in the eyes of most Western policy-makers.¹⁰ Therefore, it is important to study how and under what conditions the United States decided to intervene.

1.2 Methodology

The means of achieving these objectives outlined above will be through qualitative research, including content analysis, case studies, and elite interviews. The two case studies on the Balkans will provide a "levels of analysis" framework for understanding Clinton's foreign policy decision-making process, covering the spectrum from the individual psychology of decision-makers (the individual level) to the role played by American domestic factors such as the power of Congress, public opinion, and the media (the national level) and to the changing international system in post-Cold War conditions (the global system level).¹¹

¹⁰ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 24-33.

¹¹ Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, 'Foreign Policy', *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, 4th edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 226-239.

Primary research draws on government publications, including public speeches, statements, press briefings, and Congressional testimony, available online at the GPO (Government Printing Office) Access (<http://www.gpo.gov/>) and the William J. Clinton Presidential Library (<http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/>). Foreign policy dispatches are also available online US Department of State's Electronic Research Collection (<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/index.html>). Other sources of data were collected during three months of archival and official documentary research and semi-structured interviews in Washington, D.C. As official documents with regard to humanitarian interventions policy during the 1990s has not been declassified, this research was conducted by interviewing relevant scholars and former Clinton foreign policy staff now resident in Washington universities or think tanks to understand the motivations for interventions. Interviewees included: Victor Jackovich who was US Ambassador to Bosnia in 1992-95; Daniel P. Serwer who was the US special envoy and coordinator for the Bosnian Federation from 1994 to 1996 (he also negotiated the first agreement reached at the Dayton peace talks); Charles A. Kupchan who was Director for European Affairs at National Security Council in 1993-94; James Goldgeier who was a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow serving at the State Department and on the National Security Council staff in 1995-96; Gary Schmitt who was a consultant to the US Department of Defense in 1992-93 and Executive Director of the neo-conservative Project for the New American Century in 1997-2005; Tomicah Tillemann who is professional staff member (specializes on the Balkans) of US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Donald McHenry who was US Ambassador to the United Nations from 1979 to 1981; Janusz Bugajski who is Director of the New European Democracies Project and senior fellow in the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies; John Sitalides who is the Chairman, Board of Advisors, Southeast Europe Project at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Other important sources for the research included foreign policy-makers' memoirs and publications, academic journal articles, newspapers, magazines, and books.

1.3 The Contribution of the Study

This research aims to make a contribution to developing a deeper understanding of ethical foreign policy in theory and practice by means of providing an in-depth study of ethical realism and examining US humanitarian interventions in the 1990s. Ethical realism proposes the idea of responsible power as an opportunity for balancing the tension between ethics and foreign policy and concentrating on achievable results rather than good intentions. This work addresses concepts of moral leadership and pragmatic foreign policy in the field of international relations in general and foreign

policy analysis in particular.

It suggests that the United States, as the only world's superpower, should not only pursue national interests, but should also shoulder the responsibility of power and demonstrate moral leadership; especially if the United States intends to keep its position of power in international politics. Actions that pursue narrow self-interest tend to lead to ethical failures of leadership. Besides, the maintenance of international order demands that powerful states have responsibilities and exercise leadership with ethical obligations; and a peaceful international society will help to consolidate the leading status of powerful states and enhance their security and prosperity.

On the other hand, despite its role as a superpower, America's superiority and strength are limited by its amount of resources. Moreover, as the world still divides itself into different sovereign states, statespeople¹² are primarily responsible and accountable for their own citizens and for national survival. Therefore, it could be concluded that an ethical foreign policy is not an abstract moral conception; instead, it has to be based on a prudent calculation, "given the facts of international competition and human nature".¹³ As a result, a foreign policy with an ethical dimension should be conducted in a selective and pragmatic way. This study thus bridges a link between the academic study of foreign policy and real-world foreign policy-making.

1.4 The Organization of the Study

This thesis consists of seven chapters. This first chapter provides the introduction, including a demonstration of the aims and objectives, methodology, contribution, and organization of this research. The second chapter provides an evaluation of the relevant literature in order to explore the debate over ethical foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold War and highlight research questions. The third chapter explores ethical realism and the idea of responsible power, and links these concepts to understand the essence of US foreign policy. This provides the theoretical framework where this study will be lodged. The fourth chapter discusses options for post-Cold War US foreign policy, reviews Clinton's diplomacy, and briefly examines the experiences of the Clinton administration in dealing with humanitarian

¹² "Statespeople", according to Robert Jackson, "are the organizers and managers who attend the ordering and operating of the states system". See Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 34.

¹³ Michael J. Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), p. 9.

interventions in Somalia and Haiti. That chapter aims to demonstrate the nature of Clinton's foreign policy in the post-Cold War international environment.

The fifth chapter will examine the Clinton's administration's intervention in Bosnia. It first divides the policy decision-making process into three stages and then explains the administration's decisions for intervention. The sixth chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the Clinton White House's intervention in another case, Kosovo. It also divides the decision-making process into three stages and then explores the reasons why the administration decided to intervene. These two chapters provide a "levels of analysis" framework for understanding Clinton's policy decision-making in resolving both the Bosnian crisis and the Kosovo conflict. The final chapter will provide the theoretical framework to evaluate the Clinton administration's foreign policy on humanitarian interventions and examine its implications for future US foreign policy. This chapter demonstrates the concepts of moral leadership and pragmatic foreign policy in the field of international relations and foreign policy analysis.

Chapter 2.

Debates on Ethical Foreign Policy in the aftermath of the Cold War

Introduction

Interwar debates between idealism (identified by values, morality, and ethics) and realism (identified by facts, power, and politics) resulted in Idealism/Liberalism and Realism becoming the mainstream theoretical traditions in International Relations (IR).¹⁴ During the Cold War, power politics between a much freer Western democratic system, led by the United States, and a communist system, led by the Soviet Union, helped to consolidate Realism's status as the dominant intellectual framework in foreign policy and international relations theory. Realists recognize that the rules of international politics are that states exist in an anarchic, self-help system, and therefore states must engage in power politics in order to secure their survival.

However, with the end of bipolarity in the post-Cold War world, political leaders and policy-makers in major states have claimed a central role for ethics, morality, and values in the shaping of international goals such as human rights, humanitarian intervention and international justice. As a consequence, the role of ethics in international relations became a hotly debated issue. As Leslie H. Gelb and Justine A. Rosenthal described the phenomena, "With the passing of the Cold War and America's emergence as the sole superpower ... the tradeoffs between security and ethics became less stark, and a moral foreign policy seemed more affordable."¹⁵

Perhaps one of the more dramatic examples of the new power of morality on foreign policy agendas and international affairs has been humanitarian interventions in the 1990s. The issue has remained of whether states could intervene in the sovereign territory of other states to stop massive violations of human rights, such as genocide or ethnic cleansing.¹⁶ However, this research will not try to solve issues of legality or legitimacy on humanitarian intervention. Instead, it will focus on whether a state would intervene for humanitarian purposes. The traditional understanding of foreign policy has been that it is based on national interests and national security issues; however, increasingly, it has become widely debated whether ethical and moral concerns should dominate foreign policy.

¹⁴ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, 2nd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

¹⁵ Leslie H. Gelb and Justine A. Rosenthal, 'The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy: Reaching a Values Consensus', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 3, (May/June 2003), p. 5.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6; Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (eds.), *Ethics and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 6.

This chapter will examine the role of ethics returning to international relations and its place in foreign policy discourses on the demise of the Cold War. First, it will look at the rise of the role of ethical or moral values in foreign policy discourses and the role of the United States in President George H. W. Bush's New World Order. Second, it will look at humanitarian intervention issues in the 1990s and its challenges to international order built on principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force. Finally, it will analyze the debate between Realism and other perspectives over the tension between "national interests" and "ethics" in the conducting of foreign policy.

2.1 The Rise of Ethical Foreign Policy

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Soviet communism brought about the end of the Cold War. With the disappearance of the threat and the ideological basis of the contest with the Soviet Union, the mission of American "containment" foreign policy throughout the Cold War was vindicated. American policy-makers were searching for an alternative focus for American energies to fill the vacuum left by containment's evisceration. Normative pleas for moving beyond containment and recasting America's role in the post-Cold War era made the 1990s a decade of reassessment of America's foreign policy goals.¹⁷ Certainly, the George H. W. Bush administration had to "carry American foreign policy into the century's last decade amidst a climate of internal debate about America's world role and in an international environment characterized by profound change".¹⁸

The first opportunity for President Bush to chart the new vision came during the early stages of the Gulf crisis. Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft envisaged an American-initiated "new world order" to justify US involvement in the wide coalition against Iraq and the continuing role of the United States in post-Cold War international relations.¹⁹ Shortly after the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's Iraqi troops, Bush delivered a speech to a joint session of Congress:

We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward a historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled

¹⁷ Linda B. Miller, 'American Foreign Policy: Beyond Containment', *International Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (April 1990), p. 313; Hal Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad: America's Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World* (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), p. 75.

¹⁸ Karl Kaiser, 'A View from Europe: The US Role in the Next Decade', *International Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Spring 1989), p. 209.

¹⁹ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, pp. 79-80.

times, our fifth objective – a new world order – can emerge: a new era – freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today, that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come.²⁰

In Bush's New World Order, the international community had a shared responsibility for freedom and justice and protected the weak against an aggressor. Also, since the end of the Cold War and bipolarity brought about more harmonious and cooperative international affairs, this historic period provided the opportunity for the United States to cooperate with its former adversary, Russia.²¹ In particular, they could work on the enhanced peacekeeping function of the United Nations (UN), since it was hard to achieve during the Cold War period.²²

Furthermore, a New World Order showed that sovereign states could reach a consensus about what rules of international behavior might be enforced by using international institutions to prohibit state aggression.²³ As Bush stated:

We can now point to five United Nations Security Council resolutions that condemn Iraq's aggression. They call for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and categorically reject Iraq's cynical and self-serving attempt to annex Kuwait. Finally, the United Nations has demanded the release of all foreign nationals held hostage against their will and in contravention of international law.²⁴

Therefore, within this new world order, international institutions, especially the UN, would play a more important role in global management and, more importantly,

²⁰ 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit', 11 September 1990, George Bush Presidential Library (BPL).

²¹ Lawrence Freedman, 'Order and Disorder in the New World', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 1 (1991/1992), p. 21.

²² 'Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Meeting of the Economic Club in New York, New York', 6 February 1991, *Public Papers*, pp. 123-124.

²³ Steve Brinkoetter, 'The Role for Ethics in Bush's New World Order', *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 1992), p. 70.

²⁴ 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit'.

could provide a recognizable version of collective security operations as had been envisaged in the UN Charter with the active support of the world's major powers to guarantee international peace and security.²⁵ Thus, the UN played a central role in Bush's New World Order, especially in relation to peacekeeping.²⁶ In short, Bush's New World Order provided "a version of American internationalism which stressed American global responsibilities and opportunities, but recognized limits and the need for burden-sharing".²⁷

Meanwhile, the role of the United States in Bush's New World Order was as the world leader.²⁸ Bush stressed that American leadership was required to stand up to aggression:

Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying power. We will stand by our friends. One way or another, the leader of Iraq must learn this fundamental truth. From the outset, acting hand in hand with others, we've sought to fashion the broadest possible international response to Iraq's aggression. The level of world cooperation and condemnation of Iraq is unprecedented.²⁹

Most importantly, many thought that Bush attempted to place a moral and ethical slant on his phrase "New World Order", for instance, the respect for the rule of law, justice, and freedom, and the consequent prospects for multilateral action. It seemed that Bush tended to address the grander moral import of the New World Order.³⁰ As Steve Brinkoetter argued, there existed visible moral links in Bush's statements of his principles of conduct for his new world order. For example, Bush stated that the

²⁵ Freedman, 'Order and Disorder in the New World', p.22; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'The Real New World Order', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 5 (September/October 1997), p. 183; Stephen F. Burgess, 'Operation Restore Hope: Somalia and the Frontiers of the New World Order', in Meena Bose and Rosanna Perotti (eds.), *From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002), p. 262; Earl C. Ravenal, 'The Bush Administration's Defense Policy: Transcending the Cold War', in Meena Bose and Rosanna Perotti (eds.), *From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002), p. 404.

²⁶ Ivo H. Daalder, 'Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping', in William Durch (ed.), *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 37.

²⁷ John Dumbrell, 'Evaluating the Foreign Policy of President Clinton – or, Bill Clinton: Between Bushes' (The Second Eccles Centre for American Studies Plenary Lecture given at the British Association of American Studies Annual Conference, 2005), p. 6.

²⁸ Malcolm Hayward, 'The Making of the New World Order: The Role of Media', in Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael (eds.), *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), p. 236.

²⁹ 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit'.

³⁰ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, pp. 81-82.

United States had a “moral responsibility” to intervene in the Persian Gulf War because “we were compelled by the moral compass that guides our nation”. He described Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as “immoral” and the principle that “one country won’t take over another” as “a fundamental moral principle”. Referring to state-destroying aggression, he spoke of “a strong moral underpinning” in “a world free from unlawful aggression” and the demand for Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Also, with regard to the promotion of democratic values, he linked human rights to morality by stating that it was a “moral imperative to put a stop to the atrocities in Kuwait once and for all”.³¹

In his subsequent speeches, Bush frequently referred to his vision of a New World Order and its link to moral values. In his address before a joint session of Congress on the State of the Union on 29 January 1991, he said: “A new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind – peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law.”³² By the same token, at the 50th anniversary observance of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s four freedoms speech, he stated: “As we look around the world at the events of the past year, we see how these very same beliefs are bringing about the emergence of a new world order, one based on respect for the individual and for the rule of law – a new world order that can lead to the lasting peace we all seek.” Furthermore, he addressed the role of ethics in US foreign policy, which was emphasised in President Roosevelt’s four freedoms speech: “Our national policy in foreign affairs has been based on a decent respect for the rights and dignity of all nations, large and small, and the justice of morality must and will win in the end.” Bush claimed, “That charge is as true today in the Gulf as it was 50 years ago in Europe. And the triumph of the moral order must still be the vision that compels us.”³³

Then the Gulf War was over. Bush described the war as a “first step toward a just international order”:³⁴

Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a world order in which “the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong.....” A world where the United Nations, freed from

³¹ Steve Brinkoetter, ‘The Role for Ethics in Bush’s New World Order’, *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 1992), p. 71.

³² ‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union’, 29 January 1991, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Public Papers)*, p. 74.

³³ ‘Remarks at the 50th Anniversary Observance of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms Speech’, 30 January 1991, *Public Papers*, p. 81.

³⁴ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, p. 82.

cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations. The Gulf war put this new world to its first test. And my fellow Americans, we passed that test.³⁵

Bush's emphasis on morality and justice in his vision of the New World Order "appealed to those looking for a new US role in the world".³⁶

Essentially, Bush's New World Order was grounded in the end of the Cold War,³⁷ a period of historic shift that demonstrated the triumph of Western liberal democracy. The 1990s was seen as the high moment of liberalism and Francis Fukuyama's concept of the 'end of history' represented the most influential liberal theory of the post-Cold War era.³⁸ Fukuyama argued that what the end of the Cold War presented not only the passing of a particular period of postwar history but also 'the end of history': "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government". Moreover, a "universal homogeneous state" emerged that "is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects through a system of law man's universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed".³⁹ He stated,

The liberal state must be *universal*, that is, grant recognition to all citizens because they are human beings, and not because they are members of some particular national, ethnic, or racial group. And it must be *homogeneous* insofar as it creates a classless society based on the abolition of the distinction between masters and slaves. The rationality of this universal and homogenous state is further evident in the fact that it is consciously founded on the basis of open and publicized principles, such as occurred in the course of the constitutional convention that led to the birth of the American republic.⁴⁰

For Fukuyama, "'the Western idea' had become universal: Western-style liberal democratic institutions provided the norm for states everywhere".⁴¹ Overall, the theory of 'the end of history' was mainly derived from three key liberal arguments:

³⁵ 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict', 6 March 1991, *Public Papers*, p. 221.

³⁶ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, p. 83.

³⁷ Burgess, 'Operation Restore Hope', p. 262.

³⁸ Michael Cox, 'From the cold war to the war on terror', in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 3rd edition (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 135.

³⁹ Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History', from *The National Interest* (1989), in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader*, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 107-108.

⁴⁰ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Perennial, 2002), pp. 201-202.

⁴¹ John Gray, 'Global utopias and clashing civilizations: misunderstanding the present', *International Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1 (January 1998), p. 151.

“that democracies do not go to war with one another; that institutions can overcome the logic of anarchy; and that modern globalized capitalism binds states more closely together.”⁴²

Obviously, the success of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 brought out optimism in Bush’s New World Order and raised the prospect of greater international cooperation among major countries and a revitalized UN.⁴³ The UN was envisaged by the Bush administration to become a major vehicle for defending international law and order and democratic regimes, for resolving disputes, and for supporting human rights.⁴⁴ Earl C. Ravenal argued that the Bush New World Order attempted to create – or re-create – a regime of collective security in world politics, which became the progenitor of “assertive multilateralism” in the early Clinton administration by the eventual Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and in the guise of the “engagement” proposition by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake.⁴⁵

As a consequence, the George H. W. Bush administration started to use US forces for humanitarian missions, which was regarded as beyond their traditional role of defending the national interest. The first was the US-led intervention in northern Iraq, known as Operation Provide Comfort, to rescue and relieve Kurdish refugees in April-June 1991 following the end of the Gulf War.⁴⁶ The notion of humanitarian intervention was articulated by many leaders, such as with the phrases “humanitarian concern” and “humanitarian need”, frequently used by President Bush to explain the US military presence in northern Iraq.⁴⁷ It also sparked the debate on armed interventions on behalf of humanitarian concerns in the post-Cold War era.⁴⁸

2.2 Humanitarian Interventions in the 1990s

“Humanitarian intervention”, according to Bhikhu Parekh, “is an act of intervention in the internal affairs of another country with a view to ending the physical suffering caused by the disintegration or the gross misuse of the authority of the state, and helping create conditions in which a viable structure of civil authority can emerge.”⁴⁹

⁴² Cox, ‘From the cold war to the war on terror’, p. 135.

⁴³ Adam Roberts, ‘International Relations after the Cold War’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 2 (March 2008), pp. 349-350.

⁴⁴ Burgess, ‘Operation Restore Hope’, p. 262; Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, p. 83.

⁴⁵ Ravenal, ‘The Bush Administration’s Defense Policy’, pp. 398-404.

⁴⁶ Burgess, ‘Operation Restore Hope’, p. 262.

⁴⁷ Adam Roberts, ‘Humanitarian war: military intervention and human rights’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (July 1993), p. 437.

⁴⁸ Robert C. DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo* (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), p. 23.

⁴⁹ Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’, *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January 1997), p. 55.

That is to say, it is an intervention inspired by humanitarian considerations.⁵⁰ Furthermore, Parekh defines the term “humanitarian” as being “wholly or primarily guided by the sentiment of humanity, compassion or fellow-feeling.”⁵¹ Such interventions usually involve military force,⁵² which is different from humanitarian aid that is only concerned with “[relieving] suffering and not to create peace and order”.⁵³ However, it is important to note that “if a state sought to relieve suffering in another country with a view to establishing a government of its choice, or to acquiring control over its natural resources, its action would be motivated by selfish, not humanitarian, considerations”.⁵⁴

Intervention has been a controversial concept for state sovereignty. It appears to violate the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of force enshrined in the UN Charter. In Article 2 (7), it states that nothing “shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”. In particular, it has been argued that Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, which states that “all members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”, makes interventions for humanitarian purposes illegal. Only “the right of individual or collective self-defense”, and thus the necessity for the UN Security Council to “maintain international peace and security” under these circumstances found in Article 51, could be a legitimate exception to this general ban.⁵⁵

However, since internal or intrastate conflicts (which are wars fought within a state’s territory) became a new pattern of armed conflict in the 1990s, including examples in Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, the former-Soviet Union and the former-Yugoslavia,⁵⁶ the development of “state failure”, “humanitarian intervention” and “international peace and security maintenance” has challenged the absoluteness of sovereignty. State failure refers to states being “unable to provide basic social, economic, legal, and political services and safeguards to the populations”; in other words, when a state “no longer performs the functions

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 53.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 54.

⁵² Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid, ‘Introduction’, in Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid, (eds.), *Ethics and Foreign Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 1.

⁵³ Parekh, ‘Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’, p. 55.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 54.

⁵⁵ Alex J. Bellamy and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics’, in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 1st edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 472.

⁵⁶ Tom Woodhouse and Tamara Duffey, *Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution* (PICR 060401). A course textbook produced by The United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations, 2000, p. 62.

normally attributed to it”.⁵⁷ Although for a long time the principle of non-intervention in state sovereignty has been emphasised as the basis for order in the society of states, when state failure occurs and leads to collapse into internal war devastating the basic human rights of a population, it forms the boundary of authority between domestic jurisdiction of states over individuals within its territory and international jurisdiction over inalienable human rights. It thus raises the question: which authority is superior?⁵⁸

As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed in his millennium report: “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend very precept of our common humanity?... We confront a real dilemma. Few would disagree that both the defence of humanity and the defence of sovereignty are principles that must be supported. Alas, that does not tell us which principle should prevail when they are in conflict.”⁵⁹ However, the question could be asked that since in a failed state sovereign authority has collapsed, does it still have the right to exclusive domestic jurisdiction?

Furthermore, its international legal sovereignty is questionable since it has been recognized as a ‘failed’ state. Perhaps this enhances the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Fernando R. Tesón defends humanitarian intervention on the grounds that it is “morally justified”, deriving from the argument that “a major purpose of states and governments is to protect and secure human rights, that is, rights that all persons have by virtue of personhood alone”.⁶⁰ Kurt Mills demonstrates that “individuals have human rights, which must be upheld by any entity claiming sovereignty” and “the authority of a state is derived from the popular sovereignty of the people”; hence human rights and popular sovereignty are viewed as constitutive principles of state legitimacy.⁶¹ He further states that:

Theoretically, states exist for the well-being of their inhabitants. The primary function of states is that of protection. In other words, the state exists to ensure that its citizens are able to live their lives free

⁵⁷ Tonya Langford, ‘Things Fall Apart: State Failure and the Politics of Intervention’, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 1 (1999), p. 64.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁵⁹ Kofi A. Annan, *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century* (New York: United Nations, 2000), p. 48 [www.un.org/millennium/sg/report] 11 September 2009.

⁶⁰ Fernando R. Tesón, ‘The liberal case for humanitarian intervention’, in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 93.

⁶¹ Kurt Mills, *Human Rights in the Emerging Global Order: A New Sovereignty?* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 42-43.

from the fear that an outside force will interrupt their lives. A reasonable extension of this would be that the inhabitants of a state should also be as free from internal persecution as from external persecution. Thus, the social function of states is to ensure the ability of people to live.⁶²

Therefore, it has been suggested that the social identity of the state as sovereign possesses moral purposes to do rightful state action within the society of states.⁶³ If states' governments massively abuse the human rights of their citizens, then, as Tesón claims, "We have a general duty to assist persons in grave danger if we can do it at reasonable cost to ourselves. If this is true, we have, by definition, a *right* to do so. The right to intervene thus stems from a general duty to assist victims of grievous injustice".⁶⁴ Ultimately, as Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley asserted, interventions for humanitarian purposes "belongs in the realm not of law but of moral choice, which nations, like individuals, must sometimes make".⁶⁵ Despite their view that humanitarian intervention is *morally permitted*, they maintained that this moral imperative could not be legally recognized as such a legal right might be wrongly abused.⁶⁶

However, counter-restrictionists argue that "human rights" actually plays an equal role to "international peace and security" in the UN Charter. Human rights have been emphasised in the Charter's preamble and Articles 1 (3), 55, and 56.⁶⁷ Indeed, according to Article 2 (4), Members shall refrain from any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and Article 1 (3), as part of the Purposes of the United Nations, clearly indicates that:

To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.⁶⁸

This assertion is reinforced in Annan's comment on international interventions for humanitarian crises:

⁶² Ibid., p. 37.

⁶³ Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 30-31.

⁶⁴ Tesón, 'The liberal case for humanitarian intervention', p. 97.

⁶⁵ Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, 'After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force', *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 67, No. 2 (April 1973), p. 304.

⁶⁶ Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 41.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 41-44.

⁶⁸ Article 1 (3) of the UN Charter [<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>] 8 January 2010.

States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty – by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties – has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.⁶⁹

On the other hand, humanitarian intervention also brought a new understanding of the concept of security. As Annan remarked in his millennium report, “Once synonymous with the defence of territory from external attack, the requirements of security today have come to embrace the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence.”⁷⁰ When the UN Security Council authorized Resolution 688 to conduct Operation Provide Comfort, it asserted that refugee flows and cross-border incursions, resulting from the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, could pose a threat to “international peace and security”.⁷¹ In the case of Somalia, the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote:

At present no government exists in Somalia that could request and allow such use of force. It could therefore be necessary for the Security Council to make a determination under Article 39 of the Charter that a threat to the peace exists, as a result of the repercussions of the Somali conflict on the entire region, and to decide what measures should be taken to maintain international peace and security.⁷²

This understanding led to Operation Restore Hope, authorized by Resolution 794 in December 1992.

The debate between pluralism and solidarism in the English School has affected the theory and practice of humanitarian intervention. Pluralism emphasises reciprocal recognition of state sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention. It argues that state sovereignty and the rule of non-intervention are sacrosanct; and hence, individual acts of intervention are illegitimate.⁷³ Moreover, pluralism identifies the absence of a consensus on what principles should underpin a doctrine of humanitarian intervention. If there is a right to govern individual or collective humanitarian

⁶⁹ Kofi A. Annan, ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’, *The Economist*, Vol. 352, No. 8137 (18 September 1999), p. 81.

⁷⁰ Annan, *We the Peoples*, p. 43.

⁷¹ Roberts, ‘Humanitarian war’, p. 437.

⁷² Boutros-Ghali quoted in *ibid*.

⁷³ Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International Society’, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July 2003), pp. 321, 322.

intervention, then it would undermine international order. As Hedley Bull commented:

As regards the right of so-called humanitarian intervention.... there is no present tendency for states to claim, or for the international community to recognize, any such right. The reluctance evident in the international community even to experiment with the conception of a right of humanitarian intervention reflects not only an unwillingness to jeopardize the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention by conceding such a right to individual states, but also the lack of any agreed doctrine as to what human rights are.⁷⁴

The international community's inaction in response to the genocide in Rwanda and its controversial intervention in Kosovo's conflict are illustrations of the absence of international consensus and clear legal authority.⁷⁵

For example, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo claimed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s military intervention in Kosovo was "illegal but legitimate". It is likely that this long-standing controversy stems not only from a legal and legitimate issue but also, most importantly, from whose right it is to authorize it.⁷⁶ Article 53 of the UN Charter shows that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council".⁷⁷ Therefore, the controversy over NATO's bombing of Kosovo was linked to the fact that NATO is a trans-Atlantic military organization, while the UN Security Council was unable to act due to Russia and China vetoing the use of force. Moreover, the argument involves not only the tension between non-intervention and human rights but also the differences of interpretation amongst the international communities over when, how, and under what conditions that intervention must be taken.

From a constructivist point of view, "practices of humanitarian intervention are conditioned by their international normative context, which frames the interests and values of actors, and how that normative context changes over time".⁷⁸ For example,

⁷⁴ Hedley Bull (1984) quoted in Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, 'Hedley Bull's Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will', *International Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 104-105.

⁷⁵ Annan, 'Two Concepts of Sovereignty'.

⁷⁶ Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert, *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) [<http://www.idrc.ca/openbooks/963-1/>] 13 January 2010.

⁷⁷ Article 53 of the UN Charter [<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml>] 8 January 2010.

⁷⁸ Bellamy, 'Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International Society', p.

Cynthia Weber stated that “when state practices do not fit supposed intersubjective norms of what a sovereign state must be, then intervention by a sovereign state into the affairs of an ‘aberrant’ state is deemed to be legitimate by a supposed international community”.⁷⁹ Hence the interpretation of intervention can change over time as long as the rules of non-intervention also change and rely on a supposed international community to interpret these norms.⁸⁰

However, in contrast to pluralism, solidarism claims that “state sovereignty is not ontologically prior to humankind and that a universal solidarity exists between humans”.⁸¹ It assumes that states have both a legal right and a moral obligation to intervene in extreme cases of human rights violations,⁸² and argues that humanitarian claims could constitute a legitimate exception to the principle of non-intervention. For example, Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 688, demonstrated that “human suffering could constitute a threat to international peace and security and hence warrant a collective armed intervention by the society of states”.⁸³ In other words, pluralists emphasise the rights and duties of states while solidarists emphasise the rights and duties of individuals at the centre of its ethical code. Bush’s New World Order may be interpreted as a solidarist moment in the society of states in the post-Cold War era.⁸⁴

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) produced *The Responsibility to Protect* in 2001 and affected a shift from the “right to intervene” to the “responsibility to protect”. It highlights the basic principles that:

- A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.
- B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.⁸⁵

327.

⁷⁹ Weber, ‘Reconsidering statehood: examining the sovereignty/intervention boundary’, p. 209

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 201-210.

⁸¹ Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International Society’, p. 321.

⁸² Wheeler and Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian intervention and world politics’, in Baylis and Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, 1st edition, pp. 474-475.

⁸³ Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International Society’, p. 325.

⁸⁴ Wheeler and Dunne, ‘Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will’, pp. 95, 101.

⁸⁵ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*

In addition to the attempt to build a conceptual bridge between human rights and state sovereignty, it also intends to provide an alternative framework for forging some sort of consensus on when and how to intervene. It outlines that military intervention for humanitarian reasons could be undertaken under circumstances which comprise of:

- A. **Large scale loss of life**, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or
- B. **Large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’**, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.⁸⁶

It sets up the precautionary principles, which are basically derived from the Just War tradition,⁸⁷ and are:

- A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.
- B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.
- C. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective.
- D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.⁸⁸

Furthermore, it suggests that the UN Security Council is the right authority to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. It indicates that “the task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has”.⁸⁹ It also reflects the concept of human security: “What matters is not just state security but the protection of individuals against threats to life, livelihood, or dignity that can come from within or

(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), p. XI
[<http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf>] 12 January 2010.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. XII.

⁸⁷ As Nicholas J. Wheeler had mentioned in *Saving Strangers*, pp. 33-34.

⁸⁸ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, p. XII.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

without.”⁹⁰ The principle of responsibility to protect was adopted at the UN 2005 World Summit. It reinforces the idea that a state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; however, when the state fails to do so, the international community should take the responsibility to react to situations in which there is need for human protection.⁹¹

The 1990s has been described as the golden era of humanitarian activism. Not only was human rights the dominant moral vocabulary in foreign affairs, but also in state practice it was more likely for states to contemplate intervention to protect strangers in distant lands. This was because “Western militaries had spare capacity and time” to make it possible.⁹² However, after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and President George W. Bush’s declaration of ‘the war on terror’, it raised the question: “Now with America launched on an indefinite military campaign against terrorists, will there be the political energy necessary to mount humanitarian interventions?” Michael Ignatieff argues that “the intellectual and political climate of a war on terror now resembles the atmosphere of the Cold War.”⁹³

Despite skepticism that ‘the war on terror’ may make it less likely for powerful states to place their own strategic interests ahead of concerns for human rights to save strangers, there has been criticism pertaining to humanitarian intervention that states will never genuinely engage in interventions motivated by primarily humanitarian concerns.⁹⁴ For instance, the interventions in East Pakistan (Bangladesh), Cambodia, Uganda, northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo were widely seen as acts for political and military ends rather than for humanitarian concerns. As a result, they were all partial and selective.⁹⁵

Nicholas J. Wheeler has tried to identify the threshold conditions for an intervention

⁹⁰ Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sabnoun, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 6 (November/December 2002), p. 102.

⁹¹ See Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document [<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement>] 12 January 2010.

⁹² Alex J. Bellamy and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Humanitarian intervention in world politics’, in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 4th edition (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 528; Michael Ignatieff, ‘Is the Human Rights Era Ending?’, *New York Times*, 5 February 2002.

⁹³ Ignatieff, ‘Is the Human Rights Era Ending?’.

⁹⁴ Bellamy and Wheeler, ‘Humanitarian intervention in world politics’, in Baylis, Smith, and Owens (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, 4th edition, p. 531-532; Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International Society’, p. 336.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

to qualify as humanitarian.⁹⁶ In his definition,

The primacy of humanitarian motives is not a threshold condition. But if it can be shown that the motives behind the intervention, or the reasons behind the selection of the means, are inconsistent with a positive humanitarian outcome, then it is disqualified as humanitarian. It follows that, even if an intervention is motivated by non-humanitarian reasons, it can still count as humanitarian provided that the motives, and the means employed, do not undermine a positive humanitarian outcome.... The society of states should reserve its praise and material support *only* for those governments that accord humanitarian reasons a significant factor in their decision to intervene...⁹⁷

By the same token, Tesón argues,

The humanitarian outcome should be a central factor in evaluating the intention of the intervention... politicians, even in democratic states, will never have pure humanitarian motives, because they have a fiduciary duty to their citizens, and because they have other selfish personal motives, such as incumbency. It follows that in order to judge the legitimacy of intervention we must look at the situation as a whole.⁹⁸

This is because “governments owe a fiduciary duty to their citizens. They are bound to advance their interests internationally, so it would be *morally* wrong for them to care only about saving others”.⁹⁹ Indeed, regardless of the debate over the legality, legitimacy, and moral reasoning of humanitarian intervention, the debate will ultimately return to the argument of whether a state should or would risk its soldiers’ lives to save strangers. In the next section, this thesis will explore the debate over whether ethical concerns such as the interests of humanity should be placed in the centre of foreign policy-making.

2.3 The Debate on Ethical Foreign Policy

The doctrine of humanitarian intervention challenges not only the norm of state sovereignty but also the statist view of international relations derived from Realism. The classical tradition of realist thought is derived from the work of Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes. These realists developed the notion of reason of state, or *raison d'état*, which demonstrated that the fundamental principle of national conduct was to preserve the health and strength of the state, and thus “the

⁹⁶ Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, p. 37.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

⁹⁸ Fernando R. Tesón, ‘Ending Tyranny in Iraq’, *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Summer 2005), p. 8.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

interests of the state predominate over all other interests and values”.¹⁰⁰ For this reason, such a belief became the guiding principle for statesmen in the conduct of their foreign affairs. This thus leads to Machiavelli’s notion of a dual morality for states and individuals.¹⁰¹ “A dual moral standard” means “one moral standard for individual citizens living inside the state and a different standard for the state in its external relations with other states”.¹⁰²

Perhaps we can understand this in more detail by examining Parekh’s interpretation of Hobbes’ view:

For Hobbes (1588-1679) there was neither a universal human community nor a society of states. States were sovereign and self-sufficient moral communities, and in a state of nature in their relations with each other... The sovereign’s sole concern was to promote the interests of his state, and neither he or his subjects had duties extending beyond its boundaries...his view involved a complete rejection of the ideas of the universal human community... the view represented by Hobbes prevailed in practice, giving rise to the statist view of international relations...¹⁰³

Given this, it could be concluded that states are legally self-contained and morally self-sufficient units having no wider obligations than the pursuit of their self-interests. Thus, states have a moral duty for and a responsibility to its citizens alone; in other words, an ethical political community only exists domestically. For realists, the state is the dominant actor in international relations.¹⁰⁴ States have remained the chief holders of external sovereignty since the system of sovereign states.¹⁰⁵

Realism holds the view that state behaviour in international politics is mainly shaped by power and material interests.¹⁰⁶ “International politics”, as Hans J. Morgenthau wrote, “like all politics, is a struggle for power”. Power, in Morgenthau’s definition,

¹⁰⁰ Friedrich Meiecke, translated by Douglas Scott, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison D’état and its Place in Modern History* (New Brunswick, N.J.; London: Transaction, 1997), p. 1; Jonathan Haslam, *No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 17.

¹⁰¹ Michael J. Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Bato Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), p. 15.

¹⁰² Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Realism’, in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 4th edition (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 93.

¹⁰³ Parekh, ‘Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’, p. 50.

¹⁰⁴ Dunne and Schmidt, ‘Realism’, p. 93.

¹⁰⁵ Daniel Philpott, ‘Ideas and the Evolution of Sovereignty’, in Sohail H. Hashmi (ed.), *State Sovereignty: Change and Persistence in International Relations* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University, 1997), p. 20.

¹⁰⁶ Michael C. Desch, ‘It Is Kind to Be Cruel: The Humanity of American Realism’, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July 2003), p. 416.

is “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men”. Furthermore, Morgenthau held that the concept of interest in international politics is defined in terms of power. “The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place”, and “the struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience”.¹⁰⁷ He stated that “a foreign policy guided by moral abstractions without consideration of the national interest is bound to fail”.¹⁰⁸

For classical realists, the desire for power and the drive to dominate others is derived from human nature. As Hobbes pointed out, in the nature of man, there are three principal causes of quarrel: competition, diffidence, glory. “The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation”.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, Morgenthau indicated that the root of conflict stemmed from the desire for power, a general quality of the human mind:

The desire for power is closely related to the selfishness... but is not identical with it. For the typical goals of selfishness, such as food, shelter, security...have an objective relation to the vital needs of the individual; ... The desire for power, on the other hand, concerns itself not with the individual’s survival but with its position among his fellows once his survival has been secured. Consequently, the selfishness of man has limits; his will to power has none. For while man’s vital needs are capable of satisfaction, his lust for power would be satisfied only if the last man became an object of his domination, there being nobody above or beside him, that is, if he became like God.¹¹⁰

Morgenthau further wrote, “Politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.” “The drives to live, to propagate, and to dominate are common to all men”.¹¹¹ Consequently, “the essential continuity of state’s behaviour is their power-seeking, which is rooted in the biological drives of human beings”; and “the behaviour of the state as a self-seeking egoist is understood to be a reflection of the characteristics of the people that comprise the state”.¹¹²

In contrast to this, structural realists view the struggle for power in international

¹⁰⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th edition (New York: Knopf, 1967), pp. 25, 26, 5, 8, 30-31.

¹⁰⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Knopf, 1951), pp. 33-34.

¹⁰⁹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited, with an introduction by C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 185.

¹¹⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics* (London: Latimer House, 1947), p. 165.

¹¹¹ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 4, 31.

¹¹² Brian C. Schmit, ‘Competing Realist Conceptions of Power’, *Millennium*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (June 2005), p. 527.

politics as resulting from the lack of an overarching authority above states and the relative distribution of power in the international system.¹¹³ It is because “the essential structural quality of the system is anarchy – the absence of a central monopoly of legitimate force”¹¹⁴ and hence, “in crucial situations the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security”.¹¹⁵ Kenneth Waltz notes, “Competition and conflict among states stem directly from the twin facts of life under conditions of anarchy: States in an anarchic order must provide for their own security, and threats or seeming threats to their security abound.”¹¹⁶ As a consequence, “the uneasy state of affairs is exacerbated by the familiar ‘security dilemma,’ wherein measures that enhance one state’s security typically diminish that of others”.¹¹⁷ By the same token, Frederick Dunn indicates that “international politics is concerned with the special kind of power relationship that exists in a community lacking an overriding authority”.¹¹⁸

In such an anarchic structure, “self-help is necessarily the principle of action”.¹¹⁹ As Waltz observes, “A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend towards the creation of balances of power.”¹²⁰ “The mechanism of the balance of power seeks to ensure equilibrium of power in which case no one state or coalition of states is in a position to dominate the others”.¹²¹ Also, because of the inequality and imbalance of capabilities among states, such as size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence, states have to estimate one another’s capabilities, especially their abilities to do harm, in order to secure themselves in a self-help system.¹²²

However, offensive realists like John Mearsheimer assert that “the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the

¹¹³ Dunne and Schmidt, ‘Realism’, p. 98.

¹¹⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds.), *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 42.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Frederick S. Dunn, ‘The Scope of International Relations’, *World Politics*, Vol. 1 (1948), p. 144

¹¹⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (London: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 111.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

¹²¹ Dunne and Schmidt, ‘Realism’, p. 94.

¹²² Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 131.

optimal way to maximize their security”.¹²³ That is to say, in opposition to classical realism’s human nature assumptions, offensive realists hold that “great powers behave aggressively not because they want to or because they possess some inner drive to dominate, but because they have to seek more power if they want to maximize their odds of survival”, with hegemony as their ultimate goal.¹²⁴ As rational actors, great powers are aware of their external environment and work on strategies in order to survive.¹²⁵ Overall, as Richard G. Gilpin summarizes the realist view, “Anarchy is the rule; order, justice, and morality are the exceptions. The realist need not believe that one must always forgo the pursuit of these higher virtues, but realists do stress that in the world as it is, the final arbiter of things political is power. All moral schemes will come to naught if this basic reality is forgotten.”¹²⁶

Therefore, as John Mearsheimer states:

There is not much place for human rights and values in the Realist story. Realists basically believe that states are interested in gaining power, either because they’re hardwired that way or because it’s the best way to survive, and they don’t pay attention to values.¹²⁷

Moreover, realists are skeptical about whether there exist universal moral principles. For instance, Morgenthau argued that “universal moral principles, such as justice or equality, are capable of guiding political action only to the extent that they have been given concrete content and have been related to political situations by society”. However, “no such consensus exists in the relations between nations. For above the national societies there exists no international society so integrated as to be able to define for them the concrete meaning of justice or equality, as national societies do for their individual members”. As a result, it is difficult to find a concrete meaning that could provide rational guidance for political action in the international sphere.¹²⁸

Mark F. N. Franke sums up:

International Relations and the considerations of ethics made possible within that vision respond

¹²³ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), p. 21.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 31.

¹²⁶ Richard G. Gilpin, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, *International Organization*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), p. 290.

¹²⁷ Harry Kriesler, ‘Through the Realist Lens: Conversation With John Mearsheimer’, *Conversations With History* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 8 April 2002)

[<http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people2/Mearsheimer/mearsheimer-con7.html>] 7/7, 29 January 2010.

¹²⁸ Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest*, pp. 34-35.

primarily to the notion that there is no natural structure or code upon which actions and judgements in human relations may be legitimately justified in any final sense. No person or groups of persons has view to any thinking like what one might call the universal conditions of humanity. Each is limited to particular perspectives and cultural mappings of how a human universe may appear if local understandings could be extended globally. It is for this reason that persons are said to naturally in a state of war with each other.¹²⁹

This is because “there is never actually a single world to which all ideas of human life may agree”; and hence, “there are no natural grounds upon which a singular world may be justifiably created from this variety of views”.¹³⁰

Nevertheless, European Union (EU) diplomat Robert Cooper argues that in the postmodern world the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs has broken down; non-state actors can pose a danger to the postmodern system and hence the threats to security within the postmodern world are no longer threats in the traditional sense. Besides, “a large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer”, and the European Union is the example of a postmodern system. Consequently, the notion of *raison d'état* has been replaced by a moral consciousness that applies to international relations as well as to domestic affairs in the postmodern world.¹³¹

Critical theorist Ken Booth has assumed that:

The nineteenth century has been called the century of history, and the twentieth century that of philosophy. To my mind the twenty-first will be the century of ethics, and global ethics at that. What I would like to see is a shift in the focus of the study of international relations from accumulating knowledge about ‘relations between states’ to thinking about ethics and applied ethics on a global scale.¹³²

He argues that in postmodern times “what is needed must have *moral* at its center because the fundamental questions of how we might and can live together concern values, not instrumental rationality”.¹³³

¹²⁹ Mark F. N. Franke, ‘Refusing an Ethical Approach to World Politics in favour of Political Ethics’, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2000), p. 310.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

¹³¹ Robert Cooper, ‘The Post Modern State’ [<http://fpc.org.uk/articles/169>] 5 November 2007.

¹³² Ken Booth, ‘Human Wrongs and International Relations’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 1 (1995), p. 109.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

It was Immanuel Kant who raised the idea of the community of humankind, with individual human beings having natural rights prior to the legal rights of sovereign states: “the right of man as a citizen of the world”.¹³⁴ Hedley Bull also stated the need for justice in world politics, demanding “equality in the distribution or in the application of rights as between the strong and the weak, the large and the small, the rich and the poor, the black and the white”.¹³⁵ Joseph Nye argues that in the global information age the concept of “national interest” should be redefined, which should take the interests of others into account.¹³⁶ He states:

In a democracy, the national interest is simply the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world. It is broader than strategic interests, though they are part of it. It can include values such as human rights and democracy, if the public feels that those values are so important to its identity that it is willing to pay a price to promote them. The American people clearly think that their interest include certain values and their promotion abroad – such as opposition to ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. A democratic definition of the national interest does not accept the distinction between a morality-based and an interest-based foreign policy. Moral values are simply intangible interests.¹³⁷

Similarly, the ICISS’s *The Responsibility to Protect* suggests that another dimension of national interest which is highly relevant to intervention for human protection purposes is the “national interest in being, and being seen to be, a good international citizen”. “The interest in being seen to be a good international citizen is simply the reputational benefit and regularly willing to pitch into international tasks for motives that appear to be relatively selfless”.¹³⁸

In general, IR scholars traditionally emphasise that the duties of states should extend no further than their territorial boundaries. Their arguments are based on the concept of a social contract among citizens and between citizens and the states, and that the responsibilities and duties which states and their citizens have to each other stop at the boundaries of the territorial states. However, as a result of deepening interdependence and growing transnational connections in the globalized age, the concept of “duties beyond borders” emerges. It suggests that all individuals share a

¹³⁴ Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 176.

¹³⁵ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 76.

¹³⁶ Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 138-139.

¹³⁷ Joseph S. Nye, ‘Redefining the National Interest’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78 (July/August 1999), pp. 23-24.

¹³⁸ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, p. 72.

common humanity that “each person is of equal moral worth and a subject of moral concern”. Thus, “if the concept of sovereignty appears to put a brake on the concern for others, the concept of humanity pushes us forward”.¹³⁹ Especially the emergence of the notion of failed states in the early 1990s led to the question whether the international community, or liberal-democratic societies in particular, have a moral responsibility to the peoples of failed states and to intervene when massive violations of human rights occur.¹⁴⁰

It seems that Realism stands against or at least could not follow this trend. However, it is worth noting that Morgenthau claimed that “international politics cannot be understood by considerations of power alone. Man is an animal longing for power, but he is also a creature with a moral purpose”.¹⁴¹ Therefore, if self-interest is human nature, morality and moral sense are also human nature. This thesis will defend that realism *does* recognize the importance of morality, takes interests of others into account, and also tries to create a better world for all human beings. However, because they see the world as it *is*, they achieve it in a prudent and pragmatic way. The next chapter will move on to explore ethical realism. This thesis will apply ethical realism as a theoretical framework to assess Clinton’s foreign policy on humanitarian intervention in the 1990s.

Conclusion

As Volker Heins and David Chandler state, “Ethical foreign policy cannot be explained without understanding the moral void left by the end of the cold war which allowed Western nations to generate a strong sense of mission and a dramatic representation of their meaning in history.”¹⁴² The end of the Cold War left the only superpower, the United States, searching for an alternative focus of American energies to fill the vacuum left by containment’s evisceration. The 1991 Persian Gulf War provided an opportunity for President George H. W. Bush to situate the role of leadership for the United States and to place a moral and ethical slant on the new world order. This subsequently had an influence on the US-led intervention in northern Iraq, Operation Provide Comfort. The United States started to send its

¹³⁹ Michael Barnett, ‘Duties Beyond Borders’, in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

¹⁴⁰ Andrew Linklater, ‘Globalization and the transformation of political community’, in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 4th edition (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 549.

¹⁴¹ Quoted in Alastair J. H. Murray, *Reconstructing Realism: Between power politics and cosmopolitan ethics* (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997), p. 87.

¹⁴² Volker Heins and David Chandler, ‘Ethics and foreign policy: new perspectives on an old problem’, in David Chandler and Volker Heins (eds.), *Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: Pitfalls, possibilities and paradoxes* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).

troops for humanitarian missions, which was viewed as beyond their traditional role of defending the national interest.

In the post-Cold War period, humanitarian intervention emerged from state failure to assure the meeting of humanitarian concerns and international peace and security. Humanitarian intervention has invited wide debate on its legality and legitimacy. Solidarists and liberalists argue that states have both a legal right and a moral obligation to intervene in extreme cases of human rights violations. Pluralists claim that there is a lack of consensus on what principles should underpin a doctrine of humanitarian intervention. They also argue that the right to govern individual or collective humanitarian intervention would undermine international order. However, there is a new version of the concept of security: that refugee flows caused by internal or intrastate conflicts will destabilize the region and pose a threat to international peace and security. Ultimately, the practices of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s help to construct the concept of the responsibility to protect, looking at interventions from the perspective of the victims rather than the interveners and hence granting the opportunity to redefine the legitimacy and legality of interventions made in the name of human rights and humanitarianism.¹⁴³

Humanitarian intervention also raises the question whether states have moral duties to save strangers in distant lands. Realists argue that the state's ethical or moral duties are only restricted to its citizens. Postmodernists argue that political communities in the postmodern world are no longer restricted by the territorial boundaries of sovereign states. Critical theorists emphasise the importance of moral values on a global scale in postmodern times. 'Kantian' internationalists uphold the notion of the community of humankind, meaning that individual human beings have natural rights prior to the legal rights of sovereign states. The English School and cosmopolitan liberalists take the demand for justice and equality in world politics into consideration and reject the distinction between a values-based foreign policy and an interest-based foreign policy. However, it is important to accept the force of Morgenthau's assertion of the nature of man as both a political and a moral animal. In the next chapter, we will look at ethical realism and its idea of "responsible power" as an opportunity to balance the tension between "ethics" and "politics".

¹⁴³ Joelle Tanguy, 'Redefining Sovereignty and Intervention', *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 2003), p. 148.

Chapter 3.

Ethical Realism and Responsible Power

Introduction

Deep in minds of students of international relations, realism is not concerned with ethics or morality. National interests and security are the predominant concerns of the states and the states must engage in power politics and maximizing its capabilities in order to secure its survival. State leaders have a clear notion on their mind that they need to distance themselves from traditional morality, which attaches a positive value, and the greater good of humankind as a whole;¹⁴⁴ and therefore, it seems that the only viable ethics for realists are those of self-interest. Statespeople only have a duty to their own people and a responsibility to ensure the survival of their state in the uncertain conditions of international anarchy.

Self-help is moral duty and such self-interested ethics are considered as virtuous. State leaders are advised to work on material and strategic outcomes rather than to act in the name of universal morality. Ultimately, realist ethics is characterized as “amorality”. It especially appears opposite to universal ethics such as human rights.¹⁴⁵ When it comes to the case of humanitarian intervention, realists would certainly suggest that the national interest over the interests of outsiders, and avoid risking the lives and interests of their own people. It seems to realists that there exists the conflicting tension between “ethics” and “politics”.

However, many mid-twentieth-century realists have assumed that “anarchy could be mitigated by wise leadership and the pursuit of the national interest in ways that are compatible with international order”. Moreover, they observed that if states only behaved in a manner on the basis of power and self-interest without considering any moral and ethical principles, they would possibly produce self-defeating results.¹⁴⁶ In the meantime, there are more and more IR scholars attempting to bring ethical agenda into realist approach to international relations and trying to make international politics more humane and within the limits of what international anarchy allows. They make the efforts to advocate policies driven by ethical agenda

¹⁴⁴ Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Realism’, in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 4th edition (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 92.

¹⁴⁵ Richard Shapcott, ‘International Ethics’, in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 4th edition (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

¹⁴⁶ Dunne and Schmidt, ‘Realism’, p. 98.

such as trying to mitigate human suffering.¹⁴⁷

This research is situated within this apparent introduction of a strong ethical dimension into the study of international relations. This chapter will explore ethical realism and the idea of responsible power. First, it will outline key discourses of the intellectual fathers of ethical realism, including Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, and George Kennan. Meanwhile, it will also explore Weber's conception of "ethic of responsibility", attempting to balance the tension between "ethics" and "politics". Next, it will apply ethical realism to the conduct of international affairs and propose the concept of "responsible power". Finally, it will suggest ethical realism as a guiding principle for the only superpower, the United States, in the aftermath of the Cold War.

3.1 Ethical Realism

In *Reconstructing Realism*, Alastair J.H. Murray proposed to return to the realism contained in the works of Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, and George Kennan as an alternative perspective to approaching contemporary debates about international relations in general and international ethics in particular. Murray suggested that realism needed to move beyond the historical tradition of political thought articulated by Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes in order to fit in with modern normative theory. The revival of interest in Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Kennan provide an opportunity to reconstruct *realist* moral theory.¹⁴⁸ In the article 'Ethical Realism and Contemporary Challenges', Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman go further to identify Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Kennan as the intellectual fathers of ethical realism.¹⁴⁹

Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) was a Christian theologian but his writings have contributed to the evolution of realism as an approach to international politics. Kennan called Niebuhr as "the father of us all". Niebuhr was famous for his Christian conception of human nature and human society. As he described, "Man is insecure and involved in natural contingency; he seeks to overcome his insecurity by a will-to-power which overreaches the limits of human creatureliness... All of his intellectual and cultural pursuits, therefore, become infected with the sin of pride.

¹⁴⁷ Michael C. Desch, 'It Is Kind to Be Cruel: The Humanity of American Realism', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July 2003), p. 419.

¹⁴⁸ Alastair J.H. Murray, *Reconstructing Realism: Between power politics and cosmopolitan ethics* (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997), pp. 1-32.

¹⁴⁹ Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, 'Ethical Realism and Contemporary Challenges', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 28, No. 6 (December 2006), p. 413.

Man's pride and will-to-power disturb the harmony of creation."¹⁵⁰

"The survival impulse, which man shares with the animals, is regarded as the normative form of his egoistic drive"; however, Niebuhr further described:

The most significant distinction between the human and the animal world is that animal impulses are "spiritualized" in man. Human capacities for evil as well as for good are derived from this spiritualization. There is, of course, always a natural survival impulse at the core of all human ambition. But this survival impulse cannot be neatly disentangled from two forms of its spiritualization. The one form is the desire to fulfill the potentialities of life and not merely to maintain its existence. Man is the kind of animal who cannot merely live. If he lives at all, he is bound to seek the realization of his true nature; and to his true nature belongs his fulfillment in the lives of others. The will to live is thus transmuted into the will to self-realization; and self-realization involves self-giving in relation to others..... the will-to-live is [also] spiritually transmuted into the will-to-power or into the desire for "power and glory". Man, being more than a natural creature, is not interested merely in physical survival but in prestige and social approval."¹⁵¹

Niebuhr's primary concern was to reassert the relevance of a Christian approach to man and society,¹⁵² and he aimed to combine political realism with the tradition of Christian social ethics.¹⁵³ He demonstrated that national interests had to be qualified by universal ethics.¹⁵⁴ But his approach to ethical and political action is quite pragmatic. In other words, he was concerned about compromise and pragmatic choices instead of theological or ideological purity.¹⁵⁵

Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980), whom Niebuhr called "the brilliant and authoritative political realist", was a professor of political science. He was identified as the father of modern realist thought in the United States.¹⁵⁶ Despite placing power and national interest at the centre of his analysis, Morgenthau also emphasised: "Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful

¹⁵⁰ Reinhold Niebuhr (1941) quoted in Michael J. Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Bato Rouge: LSU Press, 1986), p. 103.

¹⁵¹ Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and The Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and A Critique of its Traditional Defenders* (London: Nisbet, 1945), pp. 20-21.

¹⁵² Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, pp. 99, 134.

¹⁵³ Joel H. Rosenthal, *Righteous Realists: Political Realism, Responsible Power, and American Culture in the Nuclear Age* (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), p. 16.

¹⁵⁴ Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, *Ethical Realism: A Vision for America's Role in the World* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), p. 60.

¹⁵⁵ Robin W. Lovin, *Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 160.

¹⁵⁶ Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, p. 134.

political action.”¹⁵⁷ He maintained, “Man is a political animal by nature; he is a scientist by chance or choice; he is a moralist because he is a man.”¹⁵⁸ “In brief,” Morgenthau described, “man is also a moral being. It is this side of man which the age of science has obscured and distorted, if not obliterated, by trying to reduce moral problems to scientific propositions.”¹⁵⁹

Therefore, Morgenthau insisted that “a mature political science must combine utopian and realistic thought, purpose and analysis, ethics and politics”. For Morgenthau, “It is a dangerous thing to be a Machiavelli. It is a disastrous thing to be a Machiavelli without virtue.”¹⁶⁰ In sum, as Morgenthau stated:

Political realism considers a rational foreign policy to be good foreign policy; for only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success.... Aware of the inevitable gap between good - that is, rational - foreign policy and foreign policy as it actually is, political realism maintains not only that theory must focus upon the rational elements of political reality, but also that foreign policy ought to be rational in view of its own moral and practical purposes.¹⁶¹

George Kennan (1904-2005) was a US diplomat, serving as United States ambassador to the Soviet Union during the Second World War, head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, and key player in the formulation of the Marshall Plan. After he left the Foreign Service, he pursued an academic interest in the diplomatic history of early Soviet-American relations at Princeton University. His *Foreign Affairs* article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct by X”, which was largely composed out of the text of his “Long Telegram” of 1946, set out the policy of “containment” that was to be followed in different forms by every US administration until the end of the cold war.¹⁶² Instead of the pursuit of direct competition against the Soviet power, Kennan called for a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.¹⁶³

Kennan viewed man as a deeply flawed creature: “I have no high opinion of human

¹⁵⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th edition (New York: Knopf, 1967), pp. 9, 10.

¹⁵⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics* (London: Latimer House, 1947), p. 145.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘The Political Science of E. H. Carr’, *World Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1948), pp. 129, 134.

¹⁶¹ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁶² Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, p. 165.

¹⁶³ George F. Kennan, ‘The Source of Soviet Conduct’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25 (1946/1947), p. 575.

beings: they are always going to fight and do nasty things to each other. They are always going to be part animal, governed by their emotions and subconscious drives rather than by reason.”¹⁶⁴ But at the same time he also considered man as a creature capable of striving for some justice in an imperfect world. Although he was suspicious of the utopian moralistic-legalistic approach to international affairs, he was not only concerned about “power politics” alone but also attempted to bridge morality and power. As Joel H Rosenthal described Kennan’s position: “For him (Kennan), there could be no separation of the moral from the practical: an amoral conception of realpolitik was unacceptable.”¹⁶⁵ Kennan’s conception of foreign policy was suffused with moral purpose; nevertheless, for highest possible achievement of diplomacy, he suggested a “moderate” approach.¹⁶⁶

To sum up, the modern ethical realists recognize that the controlling nature of selfishness and egoism is inescapable and therefore the darkness of human nature ultimately leads to an imperfect human world. As Michael J. Smith concluded, at the heart of Niebuhr’s Christian doctrine of human nature: “Man is an ‘organic unity’ of a spirit capable of self-transcendence and a creature that sins inevitably.”¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, instead of Machiavelli’s harsh realism and the Hobbesian logic of competition, ethical realists draw on a Christian intellectual tradition stretching back through Edmund Burke to St. Augustine. An Augustinian perspective centered on an ethics of imperfectionism; that to work for a better world in an inevitably imperfect one requires a realistic view of human nature and human society.¹⁶⁸

Morgenthau claimed that political realism “aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good”.¹⁶⁹ He wrote:

It is only the awareness of the tragic presence of evil in all political action which at least enables man to choose the lesser evil and to be as good as he can be in an evil world. Neither science nor ethics nor politics can resolve the conflict between politics and ethics into harmony. We have no choice between power and the common good. To act successfully, that is, according to the rules of the political art, is political wisdom. To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless, is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least evil one is moral judgement. In the combination of political wisdom, moral courage, and moral judgment, man reconciles his political

¹⁶⁴ George Kennan (1982) quoted in Rosenthal, *Righteous Realists*, p. 8.

¹⁶⁵ Rosenthal, *Righteous Realists*, p. xvi.

¹⁶⁶ Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, p. 172.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

¹⁶⁸ Murray, *Reconstructing Realism*, pp. 125-126.

¹⁶⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century*, abridged edition (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 205.

nature with his moral destiny.¹⁷⁰

Consequently, if one wants to act ethically in the political sphere, one has to clearly recognize the role of power and make a choice of the lesser evil in every concrete human situation.¹⁷¹

As a result, an Augustinian framework, in which a transcendental morality could be combined with a realistic appraisal of the conditions of life, provides a compromise between abstract moralism and pure *realpolitik*, and thus a solution of the tension between power politics and cosmopolitan ethics.¹⁷² Also, in his classic essay ‘Politics as a Vocation’, Max Weber outlined the central problem of political ethics and proposed the conception of “ethic of responsibility”, attempting to balance the tension between “ethics” and “politics”.¹⁷³ Weber stated that “the career of politics grants a feeling of power. The knowledge of influencing men, of participating in power over them”. Therefore, striving for power is one of the driving forces of all politics and an unavoidable means for the politician. “Power instinct” belongs to his normal qualities, but in addition to power as the unavoidable means, leaders may use power as serving national, humanitarian, social, ethical, cultural, worldly, or religious ends. Then the question for the professional politician is how to do justice to this power and to the responsibility that power imposes upon him.

What are the relations between “ethics” and “politics”? Weber assumed that “all ethically oriented conduct may be guided by one of two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably opposed maxims: conduct can be oriented to an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ or to an ‘ethic of responsibility’”.¹⁷⁴ As Weber wrote,

... This is not to say that an ethic of ultimate ends is identical with irresponsibility, or that an ethic of responsibility is identical with unprincipled opportunism. Naturally nobody says that. However, there is an abysmal contrast between conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of ultimate ends – that is, in religious terms, ‘The Christian does rightly and leaves the results with the Lord’ – and conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of responsibility, in which case one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one’s action.

¹⁷⁰ Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, p. 173.

¹⁷¹ Robert W. McElroy, *Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ethics in International Affairs* (Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 21.

¹⁷² Murray, *Reconstructing Realism*, p. 48.

¹⁷³ Rosenthal, *Righteous Realists*, p. 43.

¹⁷⁴ Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 115-120.

You may demonstrate to a convinced syndicalist, believing in an ethic of ultimate ends, that his action will result in increasing the opportunities of reaction, in increasing the oppression of his class, and obstructing its ascent – and you will not make the slightest impression upon him. If an action of good intent leads to bad results, then, in the actor’s eyes, not he but the world, or the stupidity of other men, or God’s will who made them thus, is responsible for the evil. However, a man who believes in an ethic of responsibility takes account of precisely the average deficiencies of people; as Fichte has correctly said, he does not even have the right to presuppose their goodness and perfection. He does not feel in a position to burden others with the results of his own actions so far as he was able to foresee them; he will say: these results are ascribed to my action.¹⁷⁵

In Joel H. Rosenthal’s interpretation:

The first phrase is “ethic of ultimate ends”. It refers to intention, and it holds that *intent* is the most important factor in considering the moral dimension of an action. Therefore, a person subscribing to the ethic of ultimate ends would have less regard for the actual consequences of his action than for its intended effect. Opposed to this ethic is the “ethic of responsibility”. This phrase refers to consequences and implies that the morality of an act is related directly to the *results* that stem from it. Intent is secondary. A person subscribing to the ethic of responsibility would judge the morality of an act by the outcome it produces.¹⁷⁶

That is to say, in the oxymoronic phrase, “political ethics”, there are two standards of morality: “one for the ideal world and one for the real world – the world of politics. Neither standard is superior to the other, but each is appropriate to its own realm: ideal standards must hold for the ideal realm, and pragmatic standards must hold for the political realm”. In other words, “‘ethics’ deals with the way the world *ought* to be, ‘politics’ with the way it *is*”. Weber’s model of ethical dualism illustrates the paradox of “political ethics”.

Therefore, Weber argued that “whoever wants to engage in politics at all, and especially in politics as a vocation, has to realize these ethical paradoxes. He must know what he is responsible for what may come about under the impact of these paradoxes”.¹⁷⁷

“Politics is made with the head, but it is certainly not made with the head alone; in particular when a *mature* man – no matter whether old or young in years – is aware of a responsibility for the consequences of his conduct and really feels such

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 120-121.

¹⁷⁶ Rosenthal, *Righteous Realists*, p. 43.

¹⁷⁷ Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, p. 125.

responsibility with heart and soul”. For Weber, “An ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine man – a man who can have the ‘calling for politics’.”¹⁷⁸

This ultimately comes to a pragmatic conception of morality articulated in ethical realism. Morgenthau clearly claimed that:

The contest between utopianism and realism is not tantamount to a contest between principle and expediency, morality and immorality, although some spokesmen for the former would like to have it that way. The contest is rather between one type of political morality and another type of political morality, one taking as its standard universal moral principles abstractly formulated, the other weighing these principles against the moral requirements of concrete political action, the irrelative merits to be decided by a prudent evaluation of the political consequences to which they are likely to lead.¹⁷⁹

He distinguished between judging action by its conformity with moral law in ethics and judging action in relation to its consequences in the real world in political ethics. “Realism,” he wrote, “then, considers prudence - the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions - to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences.”¹⁸⁰ Consequently, the virtue of prudence enables a moral man in an immoral society to seek the possibilities for humanity.

Furthermore, Morgenthau claimed: “What is done in the political sphere by its very nature concerns others who must suffer from unwise action. What is here done with good intentions but unwisely and hence with disastrous results is morally defective; for it violates the ethics of responsibility to which all action affecting others, and hence political action par excellence, is subject.” As he quoted from President Abraham Lincoln’s speech: “I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me won’t amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference.”¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 127.

¹⁷⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Another “Great Debate”: The National Interest of the United States’, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (December 1952), p. 988.

¹⁸⁰ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 10.

¹⁸¹ Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, p. 160.

Prudence, therefore, becomes a guideline for shaping goals and deciding on actions, in particular with regard to the launching of military operations.¹⁸² For example, referring to US external undertakings and involvement, Kennan stated:

No divine hand has ever reached down to make us, as a national community, anything more than what we are, or to elevate us in that capacity over the remainder of mankind. We have great military power – yes; but there is, as Reinhold Niebuhr so brilliantly and persuasively argued, no power, individual or collective, without some associated guilt. And if there were any qualities that lie within our ability to cultivate that might set us off from the rest of world, these would be the virtues of modesty and humility.¹⁸³

Hence, ethical realists shared a belief in the values of prudence, moderation, and humility.¹⁸⁴

Overall, ethical realism rejects the juxtaposition of “power” politics and “moral” politics. As Morgenthau wrote:

Morality is not just another branch of human activity, co-ordinate to the substantive branches, such as politics or economics. Quite to the contrary, it is superimposed upon them, limiting the choice of ends and means and delineating the legitimate sphere of a particular branch of action altogether. This latter function is particularly vital for the political sphere. For the political actor is peculiarly tempted to blind himself to the limits of his power and thereby to overstep the boundaries of both prudence and morality.¹⁸⁵

Moreover, the conducting of international affairs in an ethical realist spirit leads to the respecting of the views and interests of other nations.¹⁸⁶ Niebuhr noted that: “It is a concern for both the self and the other in which the self, whether individual or collective, preserves a “decent respect for the opinions of mankind,” derived from a modest awareness of the limits of its own knowledge and power.”¹⁸⁷ Also, Morgenthau maintained that: “The national interest of a nation which is conscious not only of its own interests but also of that of other nations must be defined in terms compatible with the latter. In a multinational world this is a requirement of political

¹⁸² Lieven and Hulsman, ‘Ethical Realism and Contemporary Challenges’, p. 417.

¹⁸³ George F. Kennan, *Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy* (New York; London: W. W. Norton, 1993), p. 183.

¹⁸⁴ Lieven and Hulsman, *Ethical Realism*, p. 61.

¹⁸⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 17-8.

¹⁸⁶ Lieven and Hulsman, ‘Ethical Realism and Contemporary Challenges’, p. 413.

¹⁸⁷ Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History* (New York: Scribner, 1985), p. 148.

morality; in an age of total war it is also one of the conditions for survival.”¹⁸⁸ Lieven and Hulsman argued that states have to serve their national interests as well as act in ways that will serve the good as far as possible. Otherwise, the world will quickly go to hell if states always act according to their own self-interests.¹⁸⁹ Therefore, the international strategy on achievable results rather than good intentions, a close study of interests of other states and a willingness to accommodate them when possible constitutes the philosophical root of ethical realism.

3.2 Responsible Power

The application of ethical realism to the conduct of international affairs involves the assertion that powerful states should have responsibilities and exercise leadership with ethical obligations. As Niebuhr noted, “Government is never completely under the control of a total community. There is always some class, whether economic overlords or political bureaucrats, who may use the organs of government for their special advantages. This is true of both nations and the community of nations. Powerful classes dominate the administration of justice in the one, and powerful nations in the other.”¹⁹⁰ In other words, “as powerful classes organise a nation, so powerful nations organise a crude society of nations”.¹⁹¹

It could be said that hierarchy and inequality also exist in the society of states. Although “sovereign equality is a foundational principle of the Westphalian order”,¹⁹² it could not be denied that a hierarchic relationship exists in the global system. For instance, when the principle of sovereignty became a global norm as a result of colonial independence after 1945, the emergence of ‘quasi-states’ has shown that their sovereignty is more juridical than empirical in the post-colonial game.¹⁹³ Georg Sørensen has argued, “It is clear that the legal equality between modern and post-colonial states is not matched by substantial equality; post-colonial states are much weaker players.”¹⁹⁴

This therefore leads David A. Lake to state that “the norm of juridical or international

¹⁸⁸ Morgenthau, ‘Another “Great Debate”’, p. 977.

¹⁸⁹ Lieven and Hulsman, ‘Ethical Realism and Contemporary Challenges’, p. 415.

¹⁹⁰ Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1932), p. 239.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁹² Jack Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society’, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12 (2006), p. 145.

¹⁹³ Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, ‘The social construction of state sovereignty’, in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 9.

¹⁹⁴ Georg Sørensen, ‘Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution’, in Robert Jackson (ed.), *Sovereignty at the Millennium* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 179.

legal sovereignty has taken such deep roots that it is unseemly or impolite to point out and talk about hierarchies in contemporary international relations; nevertheless, as we have seen, “hierarchy is still there, lying in the middle of the table”.¹⁹⁵ Since “states are simply groupings of men”,¹⁹⁶ “among states as among individuals”,¹⁹⁷ hierarchy is an essential part of international relations just as it is in a society within a state. The absence of a world government among states and no higher authority to regulate their relations with each other leads to anarchy in the system of sovereign states, and hierarchy is present in this anarchic order. Or more precisely, as Jack Donnelly described, it is “hierarchy *in* anarchy”.¹⁹⁸

Since every state is different in terms of territory, population, size, military strength, economic development, culture, and social structure, Robert Jackson reinforced that “the practical ethics of world politics cannot ignore the fact that states differ enormously in their particular characteristics and capacities and allowance must be made for those differences”. Consequently, “a great power has fundamental global capabilities and responsibilities that minor or medium powers do not have”.¹⁹⁹ “Because states are grossly unequal in power”,²⁰⁰ “great powers have greater responsibilities than lesser powers”²⁰¹ to promote international order. In other words, it is expected that those with power act responsibly. This leads to the assertion that along with power comes responsibility and constructs the concept of “responsible power”.

The realism of responsible power came from Weber’s conception of the ethic of responsibility. In ‘Politics as a Vocation’, Weber described a ‘state’ as “a human community that (successfully) claims *the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory”; and ‘politics’ as “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state”. “He who is active in politics strives for power either as a means in serving other aims, ideal or egoistic, or as ‘power for power’s sake,’ that is, in order to enjoy the prestige-feeling that power gives.”²⁰² However, “the honor of political leader, of

¹⁹⁵ David A. Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’, *International Studies Reviews*, Vol. 5 (2003), p. 303.

¹⁹⁶ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 1st edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 19.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁹⁸ Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’, p. 141.

¹⁹⁹ Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 21.

²⁰⁰ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 199-200.

²⁰¹ Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, p. 31.

²⁰² Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, p. 78.

the leading statesman lies precisely in an exclusive *personal* responsibility for what he does, a responsibility he cannot and must not reject or transfer”.²⁰³ Furthermore, Weber pointed out that irresponsibility is one of two kinds of deadly sins in the field of politics. A politician’s irresponsibility reflected that “he enjoy power merely for power’s sake without a substantive purpose”. As a direct consequence, “the mere ‘power politician’ may get strong effects, but actually his work leads nowhere and is senseless”.²⁰⁴

Obviously, for Weber, a true politician has more than a simple lust for power but possesses the proper ethics of statecraft.²⁰⁵ In Weber’s *Parliament and Government*, he wrote: “The struggle for personal power and the resulting personal responsibility is the lifeblood of a politician,” however, that struggle must never “become purely personal self-intoxication”.²⁰⁶ In sum, Weber’s ideal political actor is “aware of the ethical paradoxes facing him and remains willing to act”, while at the same time, is “aware of the practical consequences of his actions” and takes the responsibility for the outcome of his actions. “Because he is responsible to his constituents and must take action that will produce consequences favorable to them, he cannot afford the luxury of idealism”.²⁰⁷

On the other hand, it is also worthy to note that in *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, Niebuhr maintained that “human beings are endowed by nature with both selfish and unselfish impulses”; however, “his natural impulses prompt him not only to the perpetuation of life beyond himself but to some achievement of harmony with other life”.²⁰⁸ Therefore, for Niebuhr, although man is a lion – a ferocious and carnivorous animal, he is also “a curious kind of lion who dreams of the day when the lion and the lamb will lie down together”.²⁰⁹ As Lieven and Hulsman put it, “acknowledging reality does not mean approving that reality or abandoning the duty to try to change that reality for the better.”²¹⁰

As a result, despite living in an imperfect world, “individual men may be moral in the sense that they are able to consider interests other than their own in determining problems of conduct, and are capable, on occasion, of preferring the advantages of

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 95.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 116.

²⁰⁵ Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, pp. 44-45.

²⁰⁶ Weber quoted in *ibid.*, p. 45.

²⁰⁷ Rosenthal, *Righteous Realists: Political Realism*, p. 45.

²⁰⁸ Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, pp. 25-26.

²⁰⁹ Niebuhr quoted in Lieven and Hulsman, ‘Ethical Realism and Contemporary Challenges’, p. 415.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

others to their own.”²¹¹ For that reason, “the dependence of ethical attitudes upon personal contacts and direct relations contributes to the moral chaos of a civilization, in which life is related to life mechanically and not organically, and in which mutual responsibilities increase and personal contacts decrease”.²¹²

This is the same when applied to the international sphere. In distinguishing his position of a pragmatic understanding of international morality, Morgenthau wrote: “Let me say... in criticism of those who deny that moral principles are applicable to international politics, that all human actions in some way are subject to moral judgement. We cannot act but morally because we are men.”²¹³ That is to say, “morality is an inherent and inescapable element of international relations – as it is of any sphere of human relations”. After all, “statespeople are human beings too”.²¹⁴

As mentioned before, ethical realism claims that the conduct of foreign policy could not act only according to national interests and the pursuit of power without taking the moral factor into consideration. Ethical realism thus embodies Weber’s notion of an ethic of responsibility. Lieven and Hulsman further extend the notion: “Under an ethic of responsibility, having good intentions is not remotely adequate. One must weigh the likely consequences and, perhaps most important, judge what actions are truly necessary to achieve essential goals.”²¹⁵ Or, to borrow Jackson’s word, ‘responsibility’ here, it could be explained as follows:

Anyone who is in a position of responsibility is accountable *to* somebody and is also answerable *for* something. Both of those dimensions of responsibility are defined constitutionally by the sovereign state and the society of states. At a minimum stateleaders are answerable to their citizens and to the leaders of other states. Statespeople are answerable for their policies and for failures of policy.²¹⁶

In other words, it is that the “legal and moral duties of state leaders in exercising the powers of their offices in the conduct of foreign policy: the public decisions and actions for which they are answerable”. Jackson thus interprets Weber’s notion: “the distinctive responsibilities of state leaders derive from their control of the state’s monopoly of legitimate force: with power comes responsibility”.²¹⁷ For those who

²¹¹ Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, p. xi.

²¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

²¹³ Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy’, in Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.), *Moral Dimensions of American Foreign Policy: Ethics in Foreign Policy Series* (New Brunswick and London: Council on Religion & International Affairs, 1984), p. 341.

²¹⁴ Jackson, *The Global Covenant*, pp. 8, 34.

²¹⁵ Lieven and Hulsman, *Ethical Realism*, p. 77.

²¹⁶ Jackson, *The Global Covenant*, p. 137.

²¹⁷ Robert Jackson, ‘The Situational Ethics of Statecraft’, in Cathal J. Nolan (ed.), *Ethics and*

attain leadership positions of dominant powers in particular, it is expected that they use power in relation to its possible political and ethical ramifications in an anarchistic international order and a hierarchical international society. In sum, they are expected to exercise responsible power by making pragmatic choices without ignoring the moral dimension of their decisions when facing morally ambiguous situations.

As a result, responsible power “derives its meaning from what the statesman was responsible *to*”.²¹⁸ It thus involves *judgment* and *accountability*, which is similar to what utilitarianism emphasises, that the standard of judgement are practical results.²¹⁹ Above all, to quote Lieven and Hulsman:

Ethical realism does not seek to evade responsibility for necessarily ruthless actions or to whitewash their cruelty. It does, however, insist that these actions, and the strategies of which they form a part, should be truly necessary. For example, Niebuhr argued that the massive Allied bombardment of cities in Germany and Japan was morally defensible, but the American bombardment of civilians in Vietnam was not.

Indeed, a certain capacity for ruthlessness in making such moral choices lies at the heart of ethical realism, though ruthless action is only acceptable if it is truly necessary in defense of the country or higher human goals against threats to civilization itself. As Burke said, it all depends on the circumstances. The Allied bombardment of Germany and Japan was part of a necessary war to preserve humanity from the twin scourges of Nazism and Japanese militarism. On the other hand, Niebuhr, like Morgenthau, Kennan opposed the war in Vietnam not so much for its cruelty but because they rightly saw the war as irrelevant or even detrimental to the basic struggle against Soviet Communism. Its cruelty had no moral justification in necessity.²²⁰

Consequently, “foreign policy must be carefully calculated and the responsibility for its consequences fully accepted”;²²¹ and, “responsibility for making foreign policy or military policy clearly rests with the leading officials of the state, particularly the politicians”.²²² Responsibility, therefore, becomes another key virtue of ethical realism.

Furthermore, it is assumed that international ethics must start with “the ethics of

Statecraft: The Moral Dimension of International Affairs, 2nd edition (Westport: Praeger, 2004), p. 20.

²¹⁸ Rosenthal, *Righteous Realists*, p. 49.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

²²⁰ Lieven and Hulsman, *Ethical Realism*, pp. 77-78.

²²¹ Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, p. 32.

²²² Jackson, *The Global Covenant*, p. 133.

statecraft because statespeople – leaders of the major powers especially – are the ones who have the greatest ability and opportunity to affect the lives of the largest number of people around the world, particularly, with regard to military power”.²²³ In the new post-Cold War world system, major powers, including the United States, Russia, the European Union, Japan and China, emerge as a new concert of powers to control the organization of world order.²²⁴ Or more specifically, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council could be defined as the foremost military powers and the Group of Eight (G8) as leading economic powers.²²⁵ For instance, in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it indicates: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Therefore, the responsibility to uphold international peace and security rests on those great powers.²²⁶

With regard to “the ethics of statecraft”, as addressed in Weber’s concept of the ethics of responsibility, they are understood as situational ethics in which both circumstances and judgment have an extremely important place rather than an absolute morality divorced from possibility and necessity.²²⁷ It is an applied ethics: “the normative criteria that apply to state leaders in their conduct of foreign policy”.²²⁸ It suggests that stateleaders or foreign policy-makers must make responsible choices in confining circumstances. As Jackson expressed:

When we judge the conduct of state leaders with reference to the virtues, we are not judging it by a rule or a consequence. Instead, we are judging it in relation to what could reasonably be expected of a person of sound mind and good character in the circumstances. For example, we expect leaders to base their policies on correct information and to conduct them with due care and attention to the situation at hand: in short, we expect them to use prudential ethics. This assumes that leaders are responsible agents.²²⁹

This reflects what Edmund Burke termed “the empire of circumstances”.²³⁰ As Burke described:

²²³ Ibid., p. 130.

²²⁴ Richard Rosecrance, ‘A New Concert of Power’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 65.

²²⁵ Jackson, *The Global Covenant*, p. 134.

²²⁶ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 1st edition, p. 202.

²²⁷ Jackson, ‘The Situational Ethics of Statecraft’, p. 17.

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 18.

²²⁹ Ibid., p. 19.

²³⁰ Jackson, *The Global Covenant*, p. 20.

I cannot stand forward and give praise or blame to anything which relates to human actions, and human concerns, on a simple view of the object, as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction. Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing color and discriminating effect.²³¹

This is similar to what Weber expressed: “relentlessness in viewing the realities of life, and the ability to face such realities and to measure up to them.... [the politician] then acts by following an ethic of responsibility and somewhere he reaches the point where he says: ‘Here I stand; I can do no other.’”²³²

Ultimately, it helps powerful states consolidate their standings as moral leaderships if they act responsibly. As Joanne B. Ciulla asserts:

Leadership is not a person or a position. It is a complex moral leadership between people, based on trust, obligation, commitment, emotion, and a shared vision of the good. Ethics is about how we distinguish between right and wrong, or good and evil in relation to the actions, volitions, and character of human beings. Ethics lie at the heart of all human relationships and hence at the heart of the relationship between leaders and followers.²³³

Moreover, “a leader helps people change for the better and empowers them to improve their lives and lives of others”.²³⁴ It therefore applies to relations between states. And if leadership is about “change and sharing common purpose and values”,²³⁵ it thus applies to relations between alliances in particular. Consequently, in a global political community, it is expected that great powers should not only protect their own national interests but also help other states to protect human rights. As Niebuhr demonstrated:

It is possible for both individuals and groups [including nations] to relate concern for the other with interest and concern for the self. There are endless varieties of creativity in community; for neither the individual nor the community can realize itself except in relation to, and in encounter with, other individuals and groups... A valid moral outlook for both individuals and for groups, therefore, sets no limits to the creative possibility of concern for others, but makes no claims that such creativity ever annuls the power of self-concern or removes the peril of the pretension if the force of residual egotism

²³¹ Edmund Burke (1987) quoted in *ibid.*, p. 137.

²³² Weber quoted in Jackson, ‘The Situational Ethics of Statecraft’, p. 19.

²³³ Joanne B. Ciulla, ‘Introduction’, in Joanne B. Ciulla (ed.), *Ethics, the Heart of Leadership*, 2nd edition (Westport, Connecticut London: Praeger, 2004), p. xiv.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

is not acknowledged.²³⁶

Therefore, human beings are willing to do good in relation to others rather than simply considering their own concerns and interests. And “the ultimate sources of social conflicts and injustices are to be found in the ignorance and selfishness of men.”²³⁷ For that reason, if leaders or powerful nations sacrifice morality for self-interest, it would not only involve ethical failures of leadership, since ethical failure of human behaviour is egoistic, but also lead to a world in a state of chaos.

3.3 Ethical Realism and US Foreign Policy

Ethical realism thus seems especially useful as a potential guiding philosophy for the United States and its role as the only superpower in the aftermath of the Cold War. Lieven and Hulsman mention that ethical realism combines two essential elements of strong US tradition in thinking about the conduct of international affairs. That is, a majority of Americans have always wanted their country’s foreign policy to serve the interests and security of the United States as well as to conform to certain ethical constraints and to pursue certain moral goals.²³⁸ This reminds us of the Jeffersonian tradition, namely American exceptionalism. Basically, it means that “America is unique, is different in crucial ways from most other countries”,²³⁹ or in a sense that “‘the American way’ is a model that all others would do well to emulate”.²⁴⁰ It emphasises that the United States is unique in defining its *raison d’être* ideologically.²⁴¹ Leo Strauss has stated, “The United States of America may be said to be the only country in the world which was founded in explicit opposition to Machiavellian principles, to the power of the Prince.”²⁴² Moreover, Thomas Paine described that the American Revolution, “was not made for America alone, but for mankind”.²⁴³

James M. Scott and A. Lane Crothers have attempted to identify the *societal impulses* and *foreign policy orientations* to connect these aspects of culture and foreign affairs within which US foreign policy is made. In term of the *societal impulses*, it could

²³⁶ Reinhold Niebuhr (1959) quoted in Lieven and Hulsman, ‘Ethical Realism and Contemporary Challenges’, p. 415.

²³⁷ Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, p. 23.

²³⁸ Lieven and Hulsman, ‘Ethical Realism and Contemporary Challenges’, p. 413.

²³⁹ Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘American Exceptionalism Reaffirmed’, in Byron E. Shafer (ed.), *Is America Different? : A New Look at American Exceptionalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 1.

²⁴⁰ James M. Scott and A. Lane Crothers, ‘Out of the Cold: The Post-Cold War Context of U.S. Foreign Policy’, in James M. Scott (ed.), *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 4.

²⁴¹ Lipset, ‘American Exceptionalism Reaffirmed’, p. 6.

²⁴² Leo Strauss quoted in *ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁴³ Quoted in Morgenthau, ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy’, p. 345.

range between *moralism/idealism* and *pragmatism/realism*. Moralism/Idealism tends to promote certain values rather than defend various interests in foreign policy. Therefore, moralists/idealists assert that the conduct of US foreign policy should be motivated by moral principles. In their point of view, “a peaceful and prosperous world can be created according to universal (i.e., US) moral principles, so that adherence to these (US-defined) principles of right and wrong are as important as some conception of interests”. This makes moralism/idealism become the “missionary urge to remake the world in the American image” in order to “save” it. Consequently, it involves “a sense of duty and destiny best defined as the ‘US mission’ to serve as ‘the custodian of the future of humanity’”.

However, pragmatism/realism tends to “eschew broad moral, ideological, or doctrinal purposes in favor of a concern with concrete interests and a results-based standard of evaluation”. As a result, it turns to pragmatic approaches to problem solving, or ad hoc problem solving.²⁴⁴ Despite still being within the broad parameters of US values, it asserts that the conduct of foreign policy should be concerned with interests and necessity, “case-by-case-ism,” and “a focus on the short term rather than the long term”.²⁴⁵

In term of the foreign policy orientations, it could range between *isolationism* and *internationalism*. In a simple way, *isolationism* could be defined as “the desire to keep the United States out of substantial political and military involvement with the world (especially Europe)”. Or it could be summarized as “a preference for a passive response to the world whereby the United States serves chiefly as an example, without assuming responsibility for the world, acting as agent to reform the world, or intervening in the affairs of others on the world”.²⁴⁶ A symbolic illustration would be the speech by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams: “Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will [America’s] heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator of her own. She will recommend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and by the benignant sympathy of her example.”²⁴⁷ Therefore, “it was not for the United States to impose its own principles of government upon the rest of mankind, but, rather, to attract the rest of mankind

²⁴⁴ Scott and Crothers, ‘Out of the Cold’, p. 4.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Quoted in *ibid.*

through the example of the United States”²⁴⁸.

On the other hand, internationalism supports the United States to actively get involved in the world in order to protect US interests and provide necessary American leadership. Therefore, internationalism involves “the willingness to exercise power, to intervene – politically, militarily, and economically – in affairs around the world, to exercise leadership in world affairs, and even to transplant American values and institutions”. An illustration of this can be found in President Harry Truman’s statements, “The free people of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms... If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world – and we shall certainly endanger the welfare of our own nation.”²⁴⁹

American exceptionalism implies that US foreign policy consists of a combination of these dimensions. Good examples were President Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson’s beliefs that US foreign policy “must combine power and principle, realism and idealism, national self-interest and an altruistic international mission”. Both of them viewed their foreign policies as “motivated by something nobler than the cold-blooded calculus of *raison d’état* or *realpolitik*”.²⁵⁰ As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott once stated, “The American People want their country’s foreign policy rooted in idealpolitik as well as realpolitik.”²⁵¹ Ultimately, ethical realism fits this US tradition.

Another reason for ethical realism to provide a guiding philosophy for US foreign policy is that the United States is not merely one of a number of equal powers within the Western alliance, but enjoys a position of leadership or primacy in the world since the end of the Cold War. Thus, the role of American power has been essential. The American power emerged on the world stage when the Second World War came to an end. It eventually joined with other great powers in the design and the management of international institutions afterwards. For instance, Bretton Woods resulted in the establishment of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco in the creation of the UN, and the Washington Treaty in the founding of NATO.²⁵² During the Cold War, the United

²⁴⁸ Morgenthau, ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy’, p. 345.

²⁴⁹ Scott and Crothers, ‘Out of the Cold’, pp. 4-5.

²⁵⁰ Strobe Talbott, ‘War in Iraq, revolution in America’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 5 (2003), p. 1039.

²⁵¹ Douglas Brinkley, ‘Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 106 (Spring 1997), p. 127.

²⁵² Talbott, ‘War in Iraq, revolution in America’, p. 1039.

States stood as the role of leadership in the containment of the Soviet Union and communism as well as promotion of an open, multilateral economy in a bipolar world.²⁵³

When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War came to an end, it altered the international “playing field” of US foreign policy²⁵⁴ and left the world with only one superpower. The post-cold war world era has been accompanied by the notion of American decline and the unipolar moment for the United States.²⁵⁵ Nevertheless, perhaps the new post-cold war world could be better described as *multilevel interdependence*. As Joseph S. Nye stated:

No single hierarchy describes adequately a world politics with multiple structures. The distribution of power in world politics has become like a layer cake. The top military layer is largely unipolar, for there is no other military power comparable to the United States. The economic middle layer is tripolar (Europe, Japan and the United States account for two-thirds of the world’s products) and has been for two decades. The bottom layer of transnational interdependence (e.g. private actors in global capital markets, the transnational spread of technology, a number of issues such as drug trade, AIDS, migration, global warming flowing across borders outside of governmental control) shows a diffusion of power.²⁵⁶

Above all, the United States lacked a consensus on how to exercise its power in the post-cold war world. As Scott and Crothers quoted the words of Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, “The post-cold war world lacks the “very things that gave structure and purpose to post-World War American foreign policy.... Now these guideposts, which had imposed a rough sense of order and discipline on the world, are gone.”²⁵⁷ Soon after President George H. W. Bush’s New World Order, ethnic conflicts and civil wars broke out in different parts of the world, for instance, in Yugoslavia and Somalia. It led to the post-cold war world from “new world order” to “clash of civilizations”, from the “end of history” to “global chaos”.²⁵⁸

The question soon becomes: How did US military action take place in brutal civil

²⁵³ Scott and Crothers, ‘Out of the Cold’, p. 13.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 14.

²⁵⁵ See e.g. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998); Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Unipolar Moment’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990/1991), pp. 23-33.

²⁵⁶ Joseph S. Nye, ‘What New World Order?’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (March/April 1992), p. 88.

²⁵⁷ Scott and Crothers, ‘Out of the Cold’, p. 19.

²⁵⁸ Adam Roberts, ‘International Relations after the Cold War’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 84 (2008), pp. 349-350.

conflicts? As Operation Restore Hope, the US-led United Task Force (UNITAF), began in Somalia in December 1992, it sparked the debate whether a humanitarian operation was in America's interest. Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger stated:

This debate is around the issue of our national interest, and that's a legitimate issue. But the fact of the matter is that a thousand people are starving to death every day, and that is not going to get better if we don't do something about it, and it is in an area where we can affect events. There are other parts of the world where things are equally tragic, but where the cost of trying to change things would be monumental. In my view, Bosnia is one of those.²⁵⁹

National Security Adviser Anthony Lake has put it well:

There is a moral imperative that is all the deeper with our superpower status. How can America sit on the sidelines when innocent civilians are being slaughtered? We lose credibility on other issues if we turn our back on humanitarian tragedies. More important, it is wrong to do so. With our great power comes great responsibility and leadership in human as well as geopolitical terms. Not acting when you can is as much a decision as becoming involved. This does not mean that we *must* always act. But there are consequences when we do not.²⁶⁰

On 26 February 1999, President Bill Clinton delivered his speech in San Francisco, saying:

It's easy to say that we really have no interests in who lives in this or that valley in Bosnia, or who owns a strip of brush land in the Horn of Africa, or some piece of parched earth by the Jordan River. But the true measure of our interests lies not in how small or distant these places are, or in whether we have trouble pronouncing their names. The question we must ask is what are the consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester and spread. We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or be everywhere. But where our values and our interests are at stake, and where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do so.²⁶¹

Moreover, on 22 June 1999, when Clinton gave a speech to NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Macedonia, he said:

²⁵⁹ Quoted in Adam Roberts, 'Humanitarian war: military intervention and human rights', *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (July 1993), p. 442.

²⁶⁰ Anthony Lake, *6 Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them* (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2000), p. 115.

²⁶¹ 'Remarks on United States Foreign Policy in San Francisco', 26 February 1999, *Public Papers*, p. 273.

If we can say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa or central Europe or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background, or their religion, and it is within our power to stop it, we will stop it.²⁶²

The issue of humanitarian interventions gave the United States an opportunity to project its power to defend its moral values. Facing such moral quandaries in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, how did the Clinton administration develop its foreign policy-making on humanitarian intervention and decide to send US troops to save strangers? This thus becomes an important subject for applying ethical realism as theoretical framework to explore.

However, before we move on to case studies and evaluate Clinton's foreign policy on humanitarian interventions, we will look at the application of the tenets of ethical realism in examining some cases of US foreign policy. First of all, the Marshall Plan and containment policy, carried out by the Truman administration, were regarded as the best illustrations of the principles of ethical realism. The Marshall Plan, an initiative to save Western Europe from Communism, was not only in the national interests of the United States but also in the service of higher moral ground. It was a mixture of the idealistic and the practical that has characterized US foreign policy at its best.²⁶³ As President Truman himself commented, "I am doing it because it is right, I am doing it because it is necessary to be done if we are going to survive ourselves."²⁶⁴ The central project of containment was neither to engage in regime change nor to pursue military supremacy.²⁶⁵ Instead, it aimed to manage potential threats in a world of scarce military resources and, more importantly, to involve war as a last resort in response to an imminent threat.²⁶⁶

Consequently, when the tenets of ethical realism were applied to the war in Afghanistan and to the war in Iraq, they came to support the former and to oppose the latter. For Lieven and Hulsman, the Afghan war was justified by the classical Christian traditions preached by ethical realism. As they note, "It was not a war of choice, but a response to an attack.... and it was supported by the international community. None of these standards was met by the Iraq War, and in consequence its

²⁶² 'Remarks to Kosovo International Security Force Troops in Skopje', 22 June 1999, *Public Papers*, p. 993.

²⁶³ Lieven and Hulsman, *Ethical Realism*, p. 14.

²⁶⁴ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁶⁵ Ian Shapiro, *Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 112, 33.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

abuses must be judged unnecessary and gratuitous.”²⁶⁷ As we can see below, the statements President George W. Bush made to justify his military action in Iraq were:

The American people know my position, and that is that regime change is in the interest of the world.

The United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.

To protect our Nation and honor our values, the United States seeks to extend freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy.²⁶⁸

This is quite opposite to how Kennan once put it:

When we talk about the application of moral standards to foreign policy, therefore, we are not talking about compliance with some clear and generally accepted international code of behavior. If the policies and actions of the US government are going to be made to conform to moral standards, those standards are going to have to be America’s own, founded on traditional American principles of justice and propriety. When others fail to conform to those principles, and when their failure to conform has an adverse effect on American interests as distinct from political tastes, we have every right to complain and, if necessary, to take retaliatory action. What we cannot do is to assume that our moral standards are theirs as well, and to appeal to those standards as the source of our grievances.²⁶⁹

Similarly, Morgenthau argued, “Those universal principles the United States had put into practice were not to be exported by fire and sword if necessary, but they were to be presented to the rest of the world through the successful example of the United States.”²⁷⁰

This is the reason why the George W. Bush administration failed to convince many traditional allies, especially those who had been part of the 1991 Gulf War coalition and supported the Afghanistan operation, and could not gain authorization from the UN Security Council to support US military action in Iraq. As Ian Clark argued, “If there was consensus that Iraq was such a danger, why was there so much resistance to the proposed action.”²⁷¹ “Five years of the Bush Doctrine have cost the United

²⁶⁷ Lieven and Hulsman, ‘Ethical Realism and Contemporary Challenges’, p. 418.

²⁶⁸ Quoted in Shapiro, *Containment*, p. 23.

²⁶⁹ George F. Kennan, ‘Morality and foreign policy’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 64 (1985/1986), p. 208.

²⁷⁰ Morgenthau, ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy’, p. 345.

²⁷¹ Shapiro, *Containment*, p. 64.

States huge amounts of moral capital”.²⁷² And it is certain that the United States should not lead by an example like this. It will take many years to restore America’s moral authority and international image damaged by the Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War.²⁷³ This is an obvious example of ethical failure of leadership.

As Talbott maintains, “America’s strength depends on the strength of the institutions America has, along with its key international partners, put in place over the last 50 years.”²⁷⁴ “Not even a superpower can afford unilateralism.”²⁷⁵ Therefore, he argues,

The key question is whether the US recommit itself to the utility of collaborative institutions and consensual arrangements – not just as a participant, but as a leader. There is a difference being a leader and a boss, if the US either fails to see that difference or does see it that difference or does see it but makes the wrong choice, the result would be the consolidation of exactly the sort of international consensus we do not want – a consensus on the part of every country on earth except for the US that American power is a problem for the entire world, a problem to be managed, offset and, to borrow a phrase from another era that is now actually back in use in another context, to be contained.²⁷⁶

As a result, Clark suggests that the United States should return to “containment” as a grand strategy of “the war on terror”.²⁷⁷ Truly, what the postwar grand strategy of containment showed was a successful balance which served America and the world well. Its success came from cooperation between the United States and traditional allies rather than from the projection of US military power.²⁷⁸

To sum up, if the United States wants to lead by example, she has to serve the common good in a pragmatic way and help others, especially those who are allied with the United States, within the needs of her own capacity. Moreover, she has to act responsibly and thus provide moral leadership to attract others who will want to follow.

Conclusion

Modern ethical realists recognize that the controlling nature of selfishness and

²⁷² Ibid., p. 41.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Talbott, ‘War in Iraq, revolution in America’, p. 1044.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 1043.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ See Ian Shapiro, *Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007).

²⁷⁸ Sherle R. Schwenninger, ‘Revamping American Grand Strategy’, *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Fall 2003), p. 27.

egoism is inescapable. The natural survival impulse and seeking to overcome insecurity inevitably result in man's struggling for power. As a direct consequence, it ultimately leads to an imperfect human world. Despite their pessimistic view of human nature, they also emphasise that man is a moral being. Man is not merely interested in physical survival but in prestige and social approval. More importantly, man seeks to fulfill his life involving self-giving in relation to others. Therefore, if one wants to act ethically in the political sphere, one has to recognize the role of power and make a choice of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good in every concrete human situation.

In such an ethical dilemma, the morality of an act is judged by the outcomes it produces rather than good intention, which has less regard for the actual consequences. This conception of 'ethic of responsibility' builds a bridge between "ethics" and "politics". When it applies to the conduct of foreign policy, it suggests that policies should be not only made on the basis of the rational elements of political reality but also ought to be rational in view of its own moral and practical purposes. Therefore, ethical realists have a pragmatic conception of morality and a moderate approach to diplomacy. The virtue of prudence and a study of interests of other states constitute the philosophical root of ethical realism.

Moreover, ethical realism asserts that powerful states should have responsibilities and exercise leadership with ethical obligations. Because of the reality that a hierarchic relationship exists in an anarchic order, it is assumed that great powers have the responsibilities to help other states to improve their lives for the better. In doing so, it actually helps powerful states to consolidate their standing as moral leaders. On the contrary, if powerful states sacrifice morality for self-interest, it would not only involve ethical failures of leadership but also lead to a world in a state of chaos. Ethical realism thus seems useful as a guiding philosophy for the United States and its role as the only superpower in the aftermath of the Cold War. The spirit of American exceptionalism makes American people want their country set an example for the rest of mankind. When it comes to the conduct their foreign policy, they want it act nobler than the cold-blooded calculus of *raison d'état*.

Especially since the end of the Cold War, the United States enjoys a position of leadership or primacy in the world. Thus the United States has more opportunities to exercise its power to achieve its moral goals. The incoming challenge was humanitarian intervention issue, whether it should intervene in the countries where ethnic conflicts and civil wars, such as in Yugoslavia and Somalia, cause massive

human suffering. The next three chapters will look at the first post-Cold War president Bill Clinton's foreign policy and examine its foreign policy-making on humanitarian intervention, especially focusing on the Balkans. Finally, it will evaluate Clinton's foreign policy on humanitarian intervention by applying ethical realism as a theoretical framework.

Chapter 4.

US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Clinton's Foreign Policy

Introduction

The end of the Cold War left the United States in a world without the Soviet threat. There was now no single great power, or coalition of powers, posing an imminent danger to the national security of the United States. However, since the single focus of the Soviet threat had long occupied US foreign policy during the Cold War, the collapse of Soviet communism made it difficult for the United States to set a foreign policy course in the post-Cold War world. The United States had to set new diplomatic principles or strategies to replace the obsolete “containment” policy that had guided America’s diplomatic behaviour for almost half a century after 1947. Both the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations struggled to search for a new strategy. Some commented that it was even more difficult to follow a single unified and coherent diplomatic strategy in such an increasingly diverse world.

Apparently, the collapse of the old “bipolar” international system presented Americans with a number of problems, the most difficult one of which was how to redefine the nation’s role in global affairs in the new era. American commentator Norman J. Ornstein raised the question: “What does a superpower do in a world no longer dominated by superpower conflict?”²⁷⁹ Further questions posed were: What is America’s role in the post-Cold War world? How should US national interests be redefined with the passing of the Cold War? George H. W. Bush’s defeat in the 1992 presidential election appeared to send the message that the United States, as the world’s only superpower, would put its own house in order first. It is likely that this shift was influenced by the notion of American decline. At the same time the United States would not exactly abandon the world. In particular, governmental collapse and civil wars in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo during the 1990s raised the issue of humanitarian intervention and dominated the foreign policy agenda.

This chapter will focus on US foreign policy in the 1990s. First, it will discuss options for post-Cold War foreign policy. The United States witnessed the mobilisation of a wide diversity of opinions among well-informed students of foreign relations regarding America’s proper international role. The historical debates over isolationism *versus* interventionism and unilateralism *versus* multilateralism appeared in America’s diplomatic course again; while pragmatic interventionism was

²⁷⁹ Norman J. Ornstein, ‘Foreign Policy and the 1992 Election’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Summer 1992), p. 1.

emerging. Second, it will review Clinton's diplomacy. Bill Clinton, the first post-Cold War president, focused on America's pressing problems at home, unlike a 'foreign policy' president such as George H. W. Bush. However, the strategic approach of "engagement and enlargement" to foreign policy issues under the Clinton administration kept America internationally engaged; especially, "selective engagement" led the United States towards a pragmatic approach to foreign policy. Finally, it will examine how the Clinton administration responded to humanitarian interventions in the case of Somalia and Haiti, as well as the wider debate on the issue of humanitarian intervention.

4.1 Options for post-Cold War U.S. Foreign Policy: From 1989 to 2001

Despite experiencing two momentous events, the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush failed to grab attention with global transformation, such as technology revolution and globalization. In particular, the public had placed its greatest priority on America's economic interests rather than national security (which motivated American politics during the Cold War).²⁸⁰ Since the United States spent its resources combating the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the economy went into recession. The Democratic campaign of Bill Clinton used Bush's attention to foreign affairs as a weapon against him and turned it to his advantage by making the 1992 presidential election about "it's the economy, stupid".²⁸¹ Bush's defeat reflected what American people considered as real priorities after the Cold War. They turned to candidate Clinton who focused on America's pressing problems at home rather than a 'foreign policy president' like Bush.

It is likely that this shift was influenced by the notion of American decline. America was now the world's biggest debtor, a problem inherited from the presidency of Ronald Reagan.²⁸² Paul Kennedy argued that, although the United States was still economically and militarily "the number one" in world affairs, its world power had declined relatively faster than Russia's over the last few decades of the Cold War.²⁸³ "The United States now ran the risk, so familiar to historians of the rise and fall of previous Great Powers, of what might roughly be called "imperial overstretch": that is to say, decision-makers in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact

²⁸⁰ Daniel Yankelovich, 'Foreign Policy after the Election', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Fall 1992), p. 7.

²⁸¹ Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), pp. 26-31.

²⁸² John Dumbrell, 'America in the 1990s: Searching for Purpose', in Michael Cox and Doug Stokes (eds.), *US Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 91.

²⁸³ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998), p. 514.

that the sum total of the United States' global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country's power to defend them all simultaneously". Consequently, "in each case, the declining number-one power faced threats, not so much to the security of its own homeland, but to the nation's interests abroad - interest so widespread that it would be difficult to defend them all at once, and yet almost equally difficult to abandon any of them without running further risks".²⁸⁴

Beginning in the late 1980s, the effort to develop possible options for US foreign policy without a Soviet threat was first of all the classical isolationist approach, known as Buchananism, named after Republican presidential aspirant Patrick Buchanan.²⁸⁵ Buchanan urged policy-makers to withdraw US troops from trouble spots such as Europe and South Korea, and to abandon most of America's global commitments, for instance to end the mutual security treaty with Tokyo, payments to the World Bank and payments to the IMF.²⁸⁶ He was against America's promotion of democracy abroad, saying: "How other people rule themselves is their own business. To call it a vital interest of the United States is to contradict history and common sense".²⁸⁷ He further stated that "what we need is a new nationalism, a new patriotism, a new foreign policy that puts America first and, not only first, but second and third as well."²⁸⁸ This "America First" theme was persuasive one; especially as it came at a time when Americans were looking inward and feeling economic pain and frustration over long unsolved domestic problems.²⁸⁹ By the same token, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former US Ambassador to the UN, argued, "The time when Americans should bear such unusual burdens is past. With a return to 'normal' times, we can again become a normal nation".²⁹⁰ For Nathan Glazer, it was a time closer to the modest role that the Founding Fathers intended.²⁹¹

It seemed that the American people were not in an expansive mood in the post-Cold War era; nevertheless, conservative neo-isolationists supported US action in defense of vital US interests.²⁹² However, they were against promoting democracy abroad,

²⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 515.

²⁸⁵ See classification of America's post-Cold War diplomatic course into six distinct approaches: isolationism, conservative neo-isolationism, conservative interventionism, liberal neo-isolationism, liberal interventionism and pragmatic internationalism in Cecil V. Crabb, Leila S. Sarriddine, and Glenn J. Antizzo, *Charting A New Diplomatic Course: Alternative Approaches to America's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001).

²⁸⁶ Ornstein, 'Foreign Policy and the 1992 Election', p. 9.

²⁸⁷ Patrick Buchanan quoted in *ibid.*

²⁸⁸ Patrick Buchanan, 'America First-and Second, and Third', *National Interest* (Spring 1990), p. 82.

²⁸⁹ Ornstein, 'Foreign Policy and the 1992 Election', p. 9.

²⁹⁰ Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, 'A Normal Country in a Normal Time', *National Interest* (Fall 1990), p. 44.

²⁹¹ Nathan Glazer, 'A Time for Modesty', *National Interest* (Fall 1990), p. 35.

²⁹² Michael Cox, *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower without a Mission?* (London: Pinter, 1995), pp. 18-19.

particularly in places peripheral to US interests. They preferred working with other great powers within international institutions, such as the UN, to serve US interests. The best example was the experience of the Persian Gulf War.²⁹³ Despite the fact that the United States remained a superpower, conservative neo-isolationists assumed that its relative power position was declining. Therefore, they urged policy-makers to exercise a selective and discriminate diplomacy to scale down America's international obligations and to avoid overcommitment abroad. Since the purpose of US foreign policy was primarily to safeguard national security and interests, they believed that its external commitments should be focused on the nature and scope of US power in the post-Cold War international environment.²⁹⁴ The 1994 Republican Congressional election victories illustrated this isolationist strain.²⁹⁵

On the other hand, neo-conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer argued that the post-Cold War era was the "unipolar moment" for the United States; as shown in the world's response to the invasion of Kuwait, where the United States did not tread, the alliance did not follow. For Krauthammer, "American preeminence is based on the fact it is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself".²⁹⁶ Such a unipolar world required US strength and will to lead in order to preserve international stability. Therefore, Krauthammer indicated that the demand for multilateral action was mainly derived from domestic concerns about the legitimacy of US unilateral action. For that reason, US political leaders tried to "dress unilateral action in multilateral clothing".²⁹⁷

Despite the fact that not every international problem required an American solution, conservative interventionists claimed that certain problems *did* require American leadership.²⁹⁸ Bob Dole, the Senate majority leader, for instance, supported sending US troops to Bosnia in order to preserve NATO's credibility and provide American leadership.²⁹⁹ However, he was against risking American lives in places like Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda with marginal or no American interests at stake.³⁰⁰ On the other hand, conservative interventionists claimed that the United States must not rely on

²⁹³ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, p. 19.

²⁹⁴ Crabb, Saredidine, and Antizzo, *Charting A New Diplomatic Course*, pp. 25-35.

²⁹⁵ Cox, *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, p. 19.

²⁹⁶ Charles Krauthammer, 'The Unipolar Moment', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990/1991), p. 24.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-33.

²⁹⁸ Peter W. Roman, 'Points of Order', *National Review*, 1 May 1995, p. 38.

²⁹⁹ Elaine Sciolino, 'Dole Backs Plan to Send U.S. Force on Bosnia Mission', *New York Times*, 1 December 1995.

³⁰⁰ Bob Dole, 'Shaping America's Global Future', *Foreign Policy*, No. 98 (Spring 1995), p. 41.

naïve multilateralism;³⁰¹ instead, policy-makers should exercise preventive diplomacy and act unilaterally if necessary.³⁰² They pointed out that the United States had failed to respond decisively in time to the Bosnian crisis.³⁰³ Other analysts argued that in the post-Cold War world the major military danger the United States would face was not a particular country but the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially from rogue states, notably Iraq and North Korea. Those countries were openly hostile to the United States. They called for policy-makers to take whatever steps necessary to prevent rogue states from acquiring nuclear weapons.³⁰⁴ Moreover, they advocated that the United States should place “burden-sharing” among America’s friends, allies and relations with great powers as a high priority goal of US foreign policy after the Cold War. For example, the United States should shoulder the burden of collective security with its NATO alliance in regional conflicts like the Balkan crisis, cooperate with the second and third largest economies in the world, Germany and Japan (and support them to gain permanent seats on the UN Security Council), and cope with Russia and China, preventing them from external aggression, but not respond to each of their action along their borders.³⁰⁵

The notion of American decline did not only stem from the Reagan budget deficit but also from the perceptions of problems concerning American economic competitiveness and the defeat in Vietnam.³⁰⁶ As a result, it was argued that liberal neo-isolationists were preoccupied with the lessons of Vietnam. J. William Fulbright had concluded in the 1960s that it was the arrogance of US power that led the nation to become involved in the Vietnam War and other instances of intervention abroad.³⁰⁷ Given the fact that few challenges would confront US security after the Cold War, many liberals claimed that the destiny of American society would lie in its ability to solve pressing *internal* problems.³⁰⁸ For them, foreign policy was the extension of domestic politics. Therefore, when the Clinton administration was distracted by the promotion of democracy abroad and humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Haiti,

³⁰¹ Roman, ‘Points of Order’; Adam Nagourney, ‘Dole Portrays Clinton as ‘Misguided’’, *New York Times*, 26 June 1996.

³⁰² Crabb, Saredidine, and Antizzo, *Charting A New Diplomatic Course*, p. 76.

³⁰³ Lawrence Freedman, ‘Why the West Failed’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 97 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 57-62.

³⁰⁴ Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Lessons of the Next Nuclear War’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 2 (March/April 1995), pp. 22-37.

³⁰⁵ Michael J. Brenner, ‘EC: Confidence Lost’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 91 (Summer 1993), pp. 40-41; Hanns W. Maull, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 5 (Winter 1990/1991), pp. 91-106; Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Vision Thing’, *New York Times*, 21 August 1996.

³⁰⁶ Dumbrell, ‘America in the 1990s’, p. 91.

³⁰⁷ Crabb, Saredidine, and Antizzo, *Charting A New Diplomatic Course*, p. 52.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

liberal neo-isolationists argued that the United States should look back at its domestic troubles, such as drugs, guns, and violence, which were increasingly stratified by social class, torn by racial tension, and riven by insecurity. It could be argued that if democracy did not work in American society, it would make it difficult to persuade others to follow America's values.

On the other hand, they argued that not only had the collapse of the Soviet Union brought about the end of the Cold War, but also that of the allies. Since there was no single enemy, alliances had lost their meaning.³⁰⁹ As Ronald Steel observed, "Our task today is not so heroic as fighting a war, but it is no less difficult, and in the end it may be as important: to recognize our limitations, to reject the vanity of trying to remake the world in our image, and to restore the promise of our neglected society".³¹⁰ Since the end of the Cold War provided the United States with an opportunity to disengage from trouble spots around the world, they argued that the Clinton administration should not "go abroad in search of monsters to destroy".³¹¹ At the same time, the United States should not exaggerate the threats posed by the Third World, for instance, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the unpredictability of regional aggressors.³¹² Some analysts stated that the United States should only dedicate itself to guaranteeing democracy upon the request of a state but not to impose its will or its own version of government on people who did not ask for assistance. Moreover, they asserted that policy-makers should have appropriate considerations before using force for any interventions. More importantly, they mentioned that policy-makers should gain the explicit consent of the international community acting through the UN Security Council (UNSC) or a regional organization.³¹³

Despite the necessity for American society's ability to solve its domestic problems, liberal interventionists believed that the primary objective of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War world would be to extend democracy on a global basis. Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the ideological triumph of the West had arrived at what Fukuyama called "the end of history", it helped to expand democratic market economy and to accelerate the twin forces of globalization and interdependence,

³⁰⁹ Ronald Steel, 'The Domestic Core of Foreign Policy', *Atlantic Monthly* (June 1995), pp. 86-88.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

³¹¹ Leon T. Hadar, 'What Green Peril?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Spring 1993), p. 41.

³¹² David Callahan, 'Saving Defense Dollars', *Foreign Policy*, No. 96 (Fall 1994), p. 100.

³¹³ Morton Halperin, 'Guaranteeing Democracy', *Foreign Policy*, No. 91 (Summer 1993), p. 120; Charles William Maynes, 'Relearning Intervention', *Foreign Policy*, No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 96-113.

which reduced the distinction between domestic and international issues.³¹⁴ In the liberal mind, they believed in the “democratic peace theory”, in which democratic states rarely engage one another with military force and democratically elected governments tend to settle their differences in a peaceful and secure way. As a consequence, the expansion of democracy throughout the world would increase the prospects for international peace and security.³¹⁵

Given trends such as economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues in the post-Cold War world, it was argued that exercising power in traditional means was less effective for achieving purposes than in the past. Joseph Nye developed the idea of soft or co-optive power, attracting other countries to follow, rather than using hard or coercive power to order them to do what was wanted. For example, a state might get other states to willingly follow it because it possessed cultural and ideological attraction.³¹⁶ Clinton’s foreign policy was profoundly influenced by the liberal perspective. The term “democratic enlargement” conceived by Jeremy Rosner and Anthony Lake was regarded as the winner of the “Kennan sweepstakes”.³¹⁷ By replacing Kennan’s strategy of containment, US officials agreed with the strategy of democratic enlargement; that “America wouldn’t be using its power to keep a rival in check; it would use its power to expand its circle of friends and spread its values”.³¹⁸ National Security Adviser Samuel “Sandy” Berger stressed that America’s responsibility to lead the world was inescapable if the United States wanted to maintain its security and increase its prosperity.³¹⁹

Although the 1990s was a time without threats, global economic interdependence and regional conflicts in many parts of the developing world were emerging as a variety of global challenges to the US foreign policy agenda. As former secretary of defense Richard Cheney described, “The Clinton administration faces more difficult problems than anything we dealt with over the past five years. The pace of change is accelerating rapidly, and rather than making the world safer, it is making things less

³¹⁴ James M. Scott and A. Lane Crothers, ‘Out of the Cold: The Post-Cold War Context of US Foreign Policy’, in James M. Scott (ed.), *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 15-16.

³¹⁵ William J. Dixon, ‘Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict’, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 1 (March 1994), p. 19.

³¹⁶ Joseph S. Nye, ‘Soft Power’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 88 (Autumn 1990), pp. 166-167.

³¹⁷ Douglas Brinkley, ‘Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 106 (Spring 1997), pp. 114-116.

³¹⁸ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, p. 67.

³¹⁹ Samuel Berger, ‘Challenges Approaching the Twenty-First Century’, in Robert L. Hutchings (ed.), *At the End of the American Century: America’s Role in the Post-Cold War World* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), p. 185.

stable and less predictable.”³²⁰ It could be argued that the post-Cold War international system actually complicated US foreign policy. Not only America’s role, interests, and priorities must be redefined, but specific strategies and policies must aim at dealing with the specific problems and issues in light of the changing world. As a result, foreign policy was more about “discrete problem solving”.³²¹ Irving Kristol suggested that “relations with other nations will be decided candidly on a case-by-case basis” and “there is no general formula that enables us to arrive at easy conclusions in any particular case”.³²² As Republican Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky described: “The difficulty of stating foreign policy these days is that it’s of necessity ad hoc. There’s no way in this day and age without a clear enemy to have an expression of a totally coherent foreign policy.”³²³

Ultimately, the development of a pragmatic approach to external problems during the Clinton administration recognized the essentially pluralistic nature of the post-Cold War interventional environment.³²⁴ Secretary of State Warren Christopher advocated a “pragmatic” relationship between Washington and Moscow: “Pragmatic engagement with Russia means that we will continue to co-operate with them when our interests coincide and to manage our differences candidly and constructively when they do not”.³²⁵ Concerning violations of human rights or ethnic cleansing within states, the United States could not “adopt a hard-and-fast policy of either cool isolation or righteous intervention”.³²⁶ As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated after NATO’s bombing of Kosovo in 1999, “Some hope, and others fear, that Kosovo will be a precedent for similar interventions around the globe. I would caution against any such sweeping conclusions. Every circumstance is unique. Decisions on the use of force will be made by any president on a case-by-case basis after weighing a host of factors”.³²⁷ Meanwhile, the Clinton administration took a “principled and pragmatic” policy towards China. President Clinton explained that “it was in Washington’s interest to engage China on shared commercial and security issues, while not turning a blind eye to Beijing’s troubling human rights”.³²⁸ In

³²⁰ Lexington, ‘The Keys of the Pentagon’, *The Economist*, Vol. 326, No. 7796 (30 January 1993), p. 50.

³²¹ Jurek Martin, ‘Clinton Abroad’, *Washington Monthly* (March 1999), p. 23.

³²² Irving Kristol, ‘Defining Our National Interest’, *National Interest* (Fall 1990), p. 23.

³²³ Robert S. Greenberger, ‘Dateline Capitol Hill: The New Majority’s Foreign Policy’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 101 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 169.

³²⁴ Crabb, Sareddine, and Antizzo, *Charting A New Diplomatic Course*, p. 128.

³²⁵ Quoted in Bill Bradley, ‘Eurasia Letter: A Misguided Russia Policy’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 101 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 84.

³²⁶ William Safire, ‘The Kosovo Dilemma’, *New York Times*, 18 June 1998.

³²⁷ Quoted in Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, ‘Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 116 (Fall 1999), p. 129.

³²⁸ John M. Broder, ‘Clinton Defends Trip to China and Policy of ‘Engagement’’, *New York Times*, 12 June 1998.

dealing with African affairs, the Clinton White House conducted the “new model” based on “varying standards”, for instance, working constructively with those African leaders who will “manage their governments well, taking care of basic services”.³²⁹

4.2 Criticisms of Clinton’s Diplomacy

4.2.1 Clinton and the Search for a Successor to ‘Containment’

During the 1992 campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized President George H. W. Bush’s failure to articulate clear goals for American foreign policy. Clinton outlined his own vision that the United States could lead “a global alliance for democracy as united and steadfast as the global alliance that defeated Communism”.³³⁰ Moreover, Clinton attacked National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft’s trips to Beijing following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 and the George H. W. Bush White House’s inaction on Bosnia and its mistreatment of Haitian refugees. The candidate and his foreign policy advisors, including Richard Holbrooke, Anthony Lake, and Sandy Berger, accused Bush of being vulnerable on human rights issues and passive in confronting challenges to democracy. For Clinton, the end of the Cold War brought the opportunity that “interests could give way to ideals”. Once elected, former Carterites, including National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright, constituted most of Clinton’s foreign policy team; consequently, it was not surprisingly that democracy and human rights-based strategies dominated the new administration’s foreign policies.³³¹

In the search for a coherent vision and America’s role in the post-Cold War era, the Clinton administration articulated the new strategy of ‘democratic enlargement’, as mentioned before, the winner of the “Kennan sweepstakes”. As Lake pointed out, “Throughout the Cold War, we contained a global threat to market democracies; now we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significance to us. The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement – enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies”.³³² By the same token, Clinton delivered a speech at the UN: “In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world’s community of

³²⁹ James C. McKinley, ‘A New Model for Africa: Good Leaders Above All’, *New York Times*, 25 March 1998.

³³⁰ Thomas Friedman, ‘Turning His Sights Overseas, Clinton Sees a Problem at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue’, *New York Times*, 2 April 1992.

³³¹ Gwen Ifill, ‘Clinton Seeking Forceful Image as a Leader in Foreign Affairs’, *New York Times*, 28 June 1992; Hal Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad: America’s Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World* (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), pp. 102-107.

³³² Anthony Lake, ‘From Containment to Enlargement’, *Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 39, 27 September 1993.

market-based democracies. During the Cold War we sought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions”.³³³ With the Cold War over, democracy promotion appeared as an appealing theme. As Thomas Carothers pointed out, democracy promotion promised to fuse “the traditionally disparate strands of morality and realpolitik in US foreign policy”; moreover, “it implies US global leadership through the inherent assumption that the United States is especially qualified to promote democracy around the world”.³³⁴

Two illustrations of these policies were the NATO enlargement and the aid to democratize Russia. The goal of US policy for post-Cold War Europe was to cooperate with an integrated democratic Europe to keep the peace and to promote prosperity;³³⁵ and the Clinton foreign policy team perceived an expanded NATO as “the engine to create a Europe peaceful, undivided, and democratic”.³³⁶ At the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994, Clinton proposed to NATO that the allies should enlarge to include the new free market democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. NATO alliances accepted a process of enlargement, later called Partnership for Peace (PFP), which “would reach to democratic states to our East as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe”.³³⁷ Consequently, the first post-Cold War NATO enlargement was in 1999 when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were added to the Alliance.³³⁸ Meanwhile, Clinton’s policy towards Russia was to assist democratic market reform and to integrate Russia into the Western community of democratic states. For example, Clinton offered Russia an equal seat in what had been G-7 and was now G-8, and worked with institutions including the World Bank and the IMF to support Russian internal transformation with financial assistance.³³⁹

It is important to note that the Clinton administration attempted to relate the politics of democracy promotion to the economics of the global market.³⁴⁰ The Clinton

³³³ ‘Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City’, 27 September 1993, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, p. 1903.

³³⁴ Thomas Carothers, ‘Democracy Promotion Under Clinton’, *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1995), p. 13.

³³⁵ *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. 25.

³³⁶ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, p. 125.

³³⁷ Brinkley, ‘Democratic Enlargement’, p. 122.

³³⁸ ‘Enhancing security and extending stability through NATO enlargement’ [http://www.nato.int/docu/enlargement/enlargement_eng.pdf] 10 February 2010.

³³⁹ James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, *Power and Purpose: US Policy toward Russia after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp. 11-12, 93.

³⁴⁰ Michael Cox, ‘Wilsonianism Resurgent? The Clinton Administration and the Promotion of Democracy’, in Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi (eds.), *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 231.

team's belief that a combination of trade and democracy would build the road to international peace reflected a version of the neo-Kantian democratic peace theory that democratic states have not fought and will not fight each other.³⁴¹ In other words, the Clinton administration believed that promoting democracy abroad would advance US economic as well as security interests.³⁴² This concept was reinforced in the report of the *National Security Strategy* in February 1995:

It is premised on a belief that the line between our domestic and foreign policies is disappearing – that we must revitalize our economy if we are to sustain our military forces, foreign initiatives and global influence, and that we must engage actively abroad if we are to open foreign markets and create jobs for our people.

We believe that our goals of enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity, and promoting democracy are mutually supportive. Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Nations with growing economies and strong trade ties are more likely feel secure and to work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten our interest and more likely to cooperate with the US to meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development.³⁴³

In particular, when the phenomenon of globalization, a single global market and culture resulted from the integration of trade, finance and information, seemed inevitable,³⁴⁴ the Clinton administration embraced the process. Clinton stressed that the United States benefited from trade arrangements that reducing barriers to the movement of American goods and services across national boundaries. The United States would continue to expand exports as it created jobs and opportunities for American people and maintained American leadership in the world.³⁴⁵ He announced that “fast track”, the symbol of the US commitment to free trade, was about more than economics.³⁴⁶ “It’s about whether other countries will continue to look to the United States to lead to a future of peace and freedom and prosperity... about whether our economic ties will lead to cultural ties and ties of partnership, or whether we will be viewed as somehow withdrawn from the world, not interested in leading it, and therefore not nearly as influential as we might otherwise be”.³⁴⁷

³⁴¹ Bruce Russett, Christopher Layne, David E. Spiro, and Michael W. Doyle, ‘The Democratic Peace’, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), p. 165.

³⁴² ‘Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City’, p. 1904

³⁴³ *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. i.

³⁴⁴ Thomas Friedman, ‘Roll Over Hawks and Doves’, *New York Times*, 2 February 1997.

³⁴⁵ ‘Remarks Supporting Renewal of Fast-Track Trading Authority’, 10 September 1997, *Public Papers*, pp. 1149-1150.

³⁴⁶ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, p. 150.

³⁴⁷ ‘Remarks Supporting Renewal of Fast-Track Trading Authority’, p. 1150.

Nevertheless, Richard Haass criticized the administration's attempt to articulate a strategy of enlargement as the successor to a doctrine of containment, arguing that it did little to provide guidelines for pressing foreign policy problems such as those presented by Bosnia, Iraq, North Iraq, North Korea, Rwanda, or Somalia. The United States still had to deal with other principal interests such as the issues of proliferation of nuclear weapons, Western access to oil, regional crises, and potential aggressors, rather than democracy promotion.³⁴⁸ Moreover, he argued that NATO enlargement not only caused tensions between Washington and Moscow but also was an unnecessary initiative and mostly a strategic distraction. The Clinton administration must be aware of structural changes in the post-Cold War international system; especially the Asia-Pacific region would replace Europe and the Atlantic to become the focal point of foreign affairs in the twenty-first century. For example, China was emerging as a significant power while the United States had conflicting interests with China, such as the Taiwan issue, Chinese provision of nuclear technology to Iran, diplomatic cooperation vis-à-vis North Korea and within the UNSC, democracy and market reform on the mainland and in Hong Kong, and environmental policy. It would be expensive and dangerous to contain an expansionist and hostile China; and it was also an unjustifiable luxury to narrowly focus on China's human rights record.³⁴⁹

By the same token, neo-conservative Joshua Muravchik suggested, "At a time of peace it is important not only to preserve friendship, but also to think ahead about possible future enemies". He pointed out that Russia and China were the greatest potential powers to confront America; and hence the United States should have strategies to prevent such conflict. On the other hand, since the developments of nuclear programs in Iraq, Iran and North Korea posed threats to international order, the United States would be the indispensable role in leading a campaign against nuclear proliferation.³⁵⁰

Despite the administration's attempt to put economic competitiveness at the heart of foreign policy,³⁵¹ some worried that the administration's economic policy would lead to "a growing dependence on outsiders for critical products or technologies,

³⁴⁸ Richard N. Haass, 'Fatal Distraction: Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy', *Foreign Policy*, No. 108 (Autumn 1997), p. 113.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 119-121.

³⁵⁰ Joshua Muravchik, 'Carrying a small stick: President Clinton has been weak on defense and international issues', *National Review*, 2 September 1996

[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/is_n16_v48/ai_18614093/] 23 May 2009.

³⁵¹ Brinkley, 'Democratic Enlargement', p. 116.

which leaves the nation vulnerable to denial or manipulation by external supplies”.³⁵² James Schlesinger argued that the fostering of democracy was a delicate and quite tenuous guide to policy and would come at a cost by violating the traditional diplomacy to involve internal arrangements of other states.³⁵³ Similarly, George Kennan was doubtful about America’s diplomatic behavior in promoting democracy and human rights beyond its own borders. He described the United States under such a policy as “a stern schoolmaster clothed in the mantle of perfect virtue, sit in judgments over all other governments, looking sharply down the nose of each of them to see whether its handling of domestic affairs meets with our approval”. He called for “a modest and relatively self-effacing foreign policy” and urged the policy-makers to “carry out internal reforms with a minimum of outside interference and distraction”.³⁵⁴ Also, some argued that globalization caused job losses, income inequality, and stagnant or worse real wages in the United States. Moreover, the rapid flow of investment moving in and out of countries due to the change of investor sentiment had resulted in the Mexican and Asian financial crises.³⁵⁵

On the other hand, the benefits of globalization also brought risks. As the 1999 *National Security Strategy* reported, “Weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking and other international crime are global concerns that transcend national borders”.³⁵⁶ Also, the *National Security Strategy* in 2000 reported, “Globalization and electronic commerce transcend conventional borders, fast rendering traditional border security measures at air, land, and sea ports of entry ineffective or obsolete.”³⁵⁷ The Clinton administration called these challenges “borderless threats”.³⁵⁸ Clearly, globalization not only gave a convenient way to international terrorism but also stimulated its development. The phenomena brought about by globalization such as Internet pornography, US movies and the spread of cultural and social values had resulted in many Muslims countries’ discontent with the West. Thus, it was argued that it fostered the anger of jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda.³⁵⁹

³⁵² Theodore H. Moran, ‘An Economics Agenda for Neorealist’, *International Security*, Vol. 18, No.2 (Autumn 1993), p. 211.

³⁵³ James Schlesinger, ‘Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72 (1992/1993), pp. 18-28.

³⁵⁴ George F. Kennan, *Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy* (New York; London: W. W. Norton, 1993), pp. 206, 255.

³⁵⁵ Richard N. Haass and Robert E. Litan, ‘Globalization and Its Discontents: Navigating the Dangers of a Tangled World’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 3 (May/June 1998), pp. 2-3.

³⁵⁶ *A National Security Strategy for A New Century* (Washington, DC: White House, 1999), p. 1.

³⁵⁷ *A National Security Strategy for A Global Age* [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss_dec2000_part2.htm] 7 June 2009.

³⁵⁸ Dumbrell, ‘America in the 1990s’, p. 89.

³⁵⁹ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, p. 246.

Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, had been charged with committing several terrorist attacks, including the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Manila air plot in 1995, and the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996. Clinton declared its counterterrorism policy - Presidential Decision Directives in 1995 (No. 39) and May 1998 (No. 62) – which perceived terrorism as a national security problem.³⁶⁰ At the same time, Clinton connected Iraq with the phrase “rogue state”, by saying: “In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now – a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals who travel the world among us unnoticed”.³⁶¹

However, it was not until the attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 that the administration believed that Al Qaeda was responsible for the bombings and launched cruise missile strikes. Nevertheless, critics charged the President with using the US military strikes to distract the American public’s attention to his sex affair and legal jeopardy. Clinton finally admitted his relationship with a young White House intern, Monica Lewinsky, on a nationally televised statement three days before the US military action against Sudan and Afghanistan.³⁶² The same criticism was also leveled at the Anglo-American military operation, Operation Desert Fox, against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and NATO’s bombing of Kosovo.³⁶³ For example, Senate majority leader Trent Lott was against the military operation on Iraq and suspected that Clinton “had timed it to trump the House impeachment debate”.³⁶⁴ When the US policy on Iraq changed towards a forceful posture to replace Saddam Hussein’s regime, by contrast to the coalition allies united in the Persian Gulf War, the administration found itself isolated.³⁶⁵ The Clinton administration had to go it alone. It was argued that this isolation was partly because of “an honest clash of interests over Iraq”.

The military action against Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq, the decision to intervene in

³⁶⁰ Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (New York; London: W. W. North, 2004), pp. 60-114.

³⁶¹ ‘Text of Clinton Statement on Iraq’, *CNN Special Report*, 17 February 1998 [<http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/02/17/transcripts/clinton.iraq/>] 15 June 2009.

³⁶² Barton Gellman and Dana Priest, ‘US Strikes Terrorist-Linked Sites in Afghanistan, Factory in Sudan’, *Washington Post*, 21 August 1998; Sharon Lafraniere, ‘Yeltsin ‘Outraged’ by Attacks’, *Washington Post*, 22 August 1998.

³⁶³ Crabb, Saredidine, and Antizzo, *Charting A New Diplomatic Course*, pp. 133, 138.

³⁶⁴ Taylor Branch, *The Clinton Tapes: Wrestling History with the President* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009), p. 524.

³⁶⁵ Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq* (New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 88-93.

Kosovo without the UNSC authorization, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were illustrations of the Clinton administration's move in a unilateralist direction.³⁶⁶ However, Richard Haass argued that US superiority would not last and its strength was limited by the amount of resources (money, time, political capital) it could spend. Thus, the United States should avoid unilateralism because it did little to promote international order. Instead, multilateralism, working with allies and the other great powers such as Russia and China, was the best way to foster a world that protected US interests. It helped to distribute the burden of promoting international order, to reduce opposition to US actions, and increase the chances of policy success.³⁶⁷ It was argued that the tendency towards a unilateralist thrust in Clinton's second term reflected Republican pressure and the administration's new international confidence.³⁶⁸ In his second inaugural address, Clinton described America's role as "the world's indispensable nation" which was quoted from Secretary Albright, who summed up the vision for American power and global responsibility.³⁶⁹ Nevertheless, it seemed that the rest of the world did not accept the idea of "indispensable nation"; in particular, France was complaining about American "hyperpower".³⁷⁰

It could be said that following the computer revolution, growth in global free trade and the US consumer spending boom in the mid-1990s, Clinton became more confident in dealing with a broad range of international problems when he began his second term in office. At the same time, the President's confidence, especially in being a commanding leader, also came from the success of NATO's intervention in Bosnia.³⁷¹ When the Bosnian War became "a cause for deep skepticism and cynicism about whether NATO had any relevance to the post-Cold War world",³⁷² NATO's strikes on Bosnia helped to secure the Dayton Agreement at the end of 1995 and found its relevance to the post-Cold War world.³⁷³

Clinton's newfound confidence could be seen on his handling of the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996. It was not until 1998 that the reciprocal visits made by Clinton and

³⁶⁶ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, pp. 242-245.

³⁶⁷ Richard N. Haass, 'What to Do with American Primacy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 5 (September/October 1999), pp. 37-44.

³⁶⁸ John Dumbrell, *Clinton's Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992-2000* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 31.

³⁶⁹ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, pp. 148-149.

³⁷⁰ Interview with Gary J. Schmitt on 18 June 2008. Schmitt was a consultant to the US Department of Defense in 1992-93 and Executive Director of the neo-conservative Project for the New American Century in 1997-2005.

³⁷¹ John F. Harris, *The Survivor: Bill Clinton in the White House* (New York: Random House, 2005), p. 321.

³⁷² Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, p. 125.

³⁷³ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, pp. 178-179.

President Jiang Zemin brought Sino-American relationships to a conciliatory phase. During his visit to China, Clinton announced the “three no’s” principle over Taiwan. Moreover, he promised to secure China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) status and to support China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The administration attempted to build a constructive “strategic partnership” with China.³⁷⁴ However, Stephen Schlesinger criticized the Clinton White House for sacrificing human rights issues to increase trade with China.³⁷⁵ Clinton defended his policy towards China as a “moderate” course, balancing the belief that the United States should isolate China because of its human rights records and slow progress towards democracy with the view that expanding business cooperation with Beijing was the only policy that could lead to liberalization.³⁷⁶

Above all, critics argued that the Clinton administration encountered many problems, such as losing sight of the connections between specific objectives and the overall strategic picture, and struggling to prioritize their time and energy.³⁷⁷ Republicans argued that Clinton’s foreign policy was weak and visionless. For example, Senator John McCain of Arizona, an adviser to Bob Dole, contended that “this administration lacks a conceptual framework to shape the world into the next century and [to] explain what threatens that vision”. As a direct consequence, “without that global strategy”, McCain added, “we keeping getting ourselves involved in peripheral matters such as Northern Ireland and Haiti”.³⁷⁸

Henry Kissinger argued that Clinton’s foreign policy had been less a strategy than “a series of seemingly unrelated decisions in response to specific crises”.³⁷⁹ John Ikenberry argued that the period of the Clinton administration was a “lost decade” in which “a distracted Bill Clinton failed to craft a coherent grand strategy or anticipate the dangers of the coming terrorist era”.³⁸⁰ Although the Clinton administration failed to articulate a strategy to replace Kennan’s ‘containment’ policy, some argue that the administration did “find an integrating purpose in its commitment to the

³⁷⁴ Dana Priest and Judith Havemann, ‘Second Group of US Ships Sent to Taiwan’, *Washington Post*, 11 March 1996; Robert S. Ross, ‘The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and Use of Force’, *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87-123; Yasuhiro Nakasone, ‘As Clinton Leaves the Ring’, *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 2001), p. 186.

³⁷⁵ Stephen Schlesinger, ‘The End of Idealism: Foreign Policy in the Clinton Years’, *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 24 (Winter 1998/1999), p. 38.

³⁷⁶ Broder, ‘Clinton Defends Trip to China and Policy of ‘Engagement’.

³⁷⁷ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, pp. 198-199.

³⁷⁸ Quoted in Brinkley, ‘Democratic Enlargement’, p. 124.

³⁷⁹ Quoted in Anonymous, ‘It’s the world, stupid’, *The Economist*, Vol. 354, No. 8158 (19 February 2000), p. 52.

³⁸⁰ John Ikenberry, ‘Book Review: America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 5 (September/October 2008), pp. 164-165.

expansion of market democracy under conditions on accelerating globalization”.³⁸¹

Furthermore, in response to former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger’s complaint about the Clinton administration’s lack of “hard strategic thinking about how we want to see the world in the first part of the next century”, Douglas Brinkley argued that Clinton’s enlargement policy had already catapulted the United States into the next millennium.³⁸² More importantly, in defending the administration’s approach to foreign policy, Lake characterized the term “Pragmatic Neo-Wilsonian” – “to expand democracy and take advantage of the democratic tide running in the world... but through a determined pragmatism that then can give substance to the general principles”.³⁸³ Overall, it seemed that the “democratic enlargement” policy could be seen as an effort the Clinton team consistently made to craft themselves for the post-Cold War world; while at the same time, the “pragmatic engagement” policy, in particular with regard to humanitarian intervention issues and the changing international environment, caused disarray and confusion. Moreover, it was argued that the tensions within the administration contributed to the difficulty of forming a consensus on foreign policy issues. The next two sections will look at intra-administration divisions and the challenges humanitarian intervention issues posed to the Clinton administration.

4.2.2 Intra-Administration Divisions

How the notion of enlargement became official policy was not entirely clear. It was not initially a consensus amongst the Clinton team. It seemed to be developed after some period of discussion and finally was adopted in the autumn of 1993. It was mentioned in a speech by the less than enthusiastic Secretary Christopher at Columbia University on 20 September 1993. Then it was addressed in the centrepiece of a speech made by Lake at the School of Advanced International Studies. It was referred to in Albright’s speech at the Naval War College two days later. Finally, Clinton addressed it openly in his speech to the UN on 27 September. As a direct consequence, the idea of enlargement was granted the official seal of approval.³⁸⁴ However, Christopher was cautious about what Lake called democratic enlargement as a “grand strategy”. As Douglas Brinkley described, “To Christopher’s lawyerly way of thinking, enlargement was little more than neat packaging.” Secretary Christopher still preferred diplomacy conducted in the old-fashioned way,

³⁸¹ Dumbrell, *Clinton’s Foreign Policy*, p. 41.

³⁸² Brinkley, ‘Democratic Enlargement’, p. 126.

³⁸³ Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Clinton’s Foreign policy: Top Adviser Speaks Up’, *New York Times*, 31 October 1993.

³⁸⁴ Cox, ‘Wilsonianism Resurgent?’, p. 224.

by which international problems could best be solved case by case. Perhaps Vice President Al Gore was the most ardent booster of enlargement within the administration. Gore was convinced that open market democracies flourishing worldwide were essential for America's economic prosperity.³⁸⁵

Meanwhile, Albright outlined a vision of "assertive multilateralism". She indicated that to promote democracy and human rights in a fragmented world, the United States could exert its moral leadership through multilateral diplomacy, for example, working with international institutions, notably the UN.³⁸⁶ Nevertheless, it seemed that the Clinton team was unable to share a single concept to replace containment.

On the other hand, Clinton's foreign policy team was divided on the means of achieving political purposes, especially with regard to the use of force in regional conflicts. The State Department tended to use military deployments as one more tool to shape a negotiated outcome, but the Defense Department preferred to hold troops back until a political outcome was reached.³⁸⁷ Moreover, the Clinton administration had a troubled relationship with the Pentagon. During the presidential campaign, Clinton had promised to remove the ban on gay persons serving in the military. Nevertheless, the gay issue angered the military.³⁸⁸ Some analysts interpreted the tensions between the administration and the military as a sign of Clinton's uncertainty of the purpose and use of American power itself; and as a result, of his lack of a sense of priority and confidence in dealing with foreign affairs and the role of American leadership.³⁸⁹

However, Clinton's second administration no longer tried to search for one-word encapsulations of national security strategy.³⁹⁰ National Security Advisor Sandy Berger described that "they usually emerge from a particular set of circumstances and you get into trouble when you try to apply them to others". He added, "We tried to establish common law rather than canon law. We set out to build a new role for the US in the world by experience rather than doctrine".³⁹¹ Interestingly, it was assumed

³⁸⁵ Brinkley, 'Democratic Enlargement', pp. 120-122.

³⁸⁶ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, pp. 112-113.

³⁸⁷ Jim Hoagland, 'Flaws and Fissures in Foreign Policy', *Washington Post*, 31 October 1993.

³⁸⁸ Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 43-46; Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine, 1995), pp. 570-574; David J. Rithkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), p. 322.

³⁸⁹ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, p. 57, 62.

³⁹⁰ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, p. 198.

³⁹¹ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, p. 219.

that Lake's pragmatism also pushed him to reject doctrines.³⁹²

4.2.3 The Clinton Administration and Humanitarian Intervention

Some argued that the Clinton administration's attempt to build a new vision for the post-Cold War era died in October 1993, when 18 American soldiers were killed in Somalia. That same month also saw the embarrassing return of the United States ship *Harlan County* from Haiti.³⁹³ The debacles of that October reflected the challenges of the crises inherited from the George H. W. Bush administration that Clinton's foreign policy team faced. The administration's inaction to genocide in Rwanda in 1994 reflected the shadow of the memory of Somalia.³⁹⁴ However, the Clinton administration decided to get involved in Haiti in the same year that the genocide in Rwanda occurred. The Clinton White House was reluctant to intervene in Bosnia in 1995 but quick to respond to the Kosovo conflict when it exploded again between 1998 and 1999.

The 1990s witnessed several humanitarian crises caused by armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars and the collapse of governmental authority in some states. It thus resulted in the emergence of peace enforcement operations involving the threat or the use of force, which was more challenging than traditional peacekeeping operations.³⁹⁵ And these humanitarian crises, as Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger wrote in his memo, would confront the United States with "the dilemma of whether to take part in limited military interventions in situations which do not directly threaten our interests. . . ."³⁹⁶ As a consequence, during the Clinton administration, events such as the starvation in Somalia, genocide in Rwanda, refugee crisis in Haiti, and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo all dominated the foreign policy agenda. The criteria to underpin American engagement and questions such as under what kind of circumstances the United States should intervene and how (military or diplomatic) dominated Clinton's foreign policy agenda.

Despite their support for peacekeeping under the theme of multilateralism, the administration steadily moved away from it. For instance, Secretary Christopher announced: "Multilateralism is a means, not an end. It is one of the many foreign policy tools at our disposal. And it is warranted only when it serves the central

³⁹² Jacob Heilbrunn, 'Lake Inferior', *The New Republic* (20 and 27 September 1993), p. 35.

³⁹³ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, pp. 69-72.

³⁹⁴ Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Knopf, 2004), p. 593.

³⁹⁵ 'Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution' course given by The United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations, 17~19 March 2008.

³⁹⁶ Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, 'McCain's Choice', *National Interest* (July/ August 2008) [<http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=18692>] 3 July 2008.

purpose of American foreign policy: to protect American interests”.³⁹⁷ Furthermore, Anthony Lake noted: “Only one overriding fact can determine whether the US should act multilaterally or unilaterally, and that is America’s interests. We should act multilaterally where doing so advances our interests, and we should act unilaterally when that will serve our purpose”.³⁹⁸

US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright, acknowledged: “The world has changed, and the Cold War national security framework is now obsolete. The Clinton Administration is fashioning a new framework that is more diverse and flexible than the old – a framework that will advance American interests, promote American values, and preserve American leadership. We will choose the means to implement this framework on a case-by-case basis, relying on diplomacy whenever possible, on force when absolutely necessary”.³⁹⁹ In his UN speech in September 1993, Clinton highlighted the criteria for UN peacekeeping missions, which implied that the United States would participate, provided the missions included a real threat to international peace, clear objectives, an identifiable end point, and anticipatable costs.⁴⁰⁰ However, it seemed that the principal force behind interventions during the Clinton administration varied from case to case.

Undoubtedly, the Clinton White House received criticism from different points of view. First of all, Michael Mandelbaum’s famous description of Clinton’s “foreign policy as social work” was a symbolic example. Mandelbaum argued that “the foreign policy of the United States has, historically, centered on American interests, defined as developments that could affect the lives of American citizens”; the interventions in these countries such as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia did not fit that criterion. He claimed that the Clinton administration had tried to turn American foreign policy into a branch of “social work”. It was an expensive proposition to serve as Mother Teresa in conducting foreign policy and “sometimes it is necessary to sacrifice good will for the sake of more important goals”, especially if the purpose of foreign policy was to maintain the best possible relations consistent with national interests.⁴⁰¹

In her critiques of Clinton’s foreign policy on multilateralism in general and the

³⁹⁷ Warren Christopher, ‘Building Peace in the Middle East’, *Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 39, 27 September 1993.

³⁹⁸ Anthony Lake, ‘From Containment to Enlargement’, in *ibid.*

³⁹⁹ Madeleine K. Albright, ‘Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World’, in *ibid.*

⁴⁰⁰ ‘Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City’, p. 1906.

⁴⁰¹ Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Foreign Policy as Social Work’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No.1 (January/February 1996), pp. 17-31.

Somalia mission in particular, former US Ambassador to the UN Jeane J. Kirkpatrick stated:

The Clinton administration offers us a vision of foreign policy from which national self-interest of purged. And it proposes to forgo US control over important decisions and rely instead on the judgment of international bodies and officials. The reason the Clinton administration's foreign policy seems indecisive is that multilateral decision-making is characteristically complicated and inconclusive. The reason Clinton policy seems ineffective is that UN operations – in Bosnia or Somalia or wherever – are characteristically ineffective. The reason [Senate Minority Leader Bob] Dole demands an explanation of our purposes in Somalia, now that starvation no longer looms, is that it is difficult to relate Somalia's international political struggles to any US goals except the goal of honoring the priorities of the UN secretary general.⁴⁰²

By the same token, Henry Kissinger described the administration's policy towards multilateral peace operations as “a recipe for chaos”. He wrote:

If these statements imply that international consensus is the prerequisite for the employment of American power, the result may be ineffective dithering, as has happened over Bosnia. If they mean that international machinery can commit US forces, the risk is American military involvement in issues of no fundamental national interest, as is happening in Somalia.⁴⁰³

Moreover, Kissinger argued that “the implication that the absence of any definable national interest is a valid criterion for risking American lives could erode the willingness of the American people to support any use of military power for any purpose”.⁴⁰⁴

Stephen John Stedman suggested that interventions had to be “selective”. The Clinton White House had to avoid an expansive doctrine that risked extending American intervention to all areas of the globe; instead, “selective engagement” should be applied. For example, the war in the Balkans was more threatening to international security than civil war in Somalia because it posed a greater danger to Europe's political stability and economic productivity, prerequisites for Third World development and its refugee problems placed heavy burdens on newly independent east European states undergoing transitions to democracy. Furthermore, the purpose of military intervention had to be defined according to what was in America's own interests, for instance, that it was necessary to prevent a possibly larger interstate war

⁴⁰² Jeane Kirkpatrick, ‘Where is Our Foreign Policy?’, *Washington Post*, 30 August 1993.

⁴⁰³ Henry A. Kissinger, ‘Recipe for Chaos’, *Washington Post*, 8 September 1993.

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

that might involve the NATO alliance. Even though there was an emerging notion in the international community that the interests of people should come before the interests of states, the Clinton administration must “avoid the temptation of rhetoric that speaks of upholding the rights of people everywhere, of supporting the dictates of international morality or of doing, in President [George H. W.] Bush’s phrase, ‘God’s work’.”⁴⁰⁵

However, Charles Krauthammer was doubtful that military involvement in Bosnian conflict would face up to its real costs. “I do not believe that we can possibly do what needs to be done at any cost remotely commensurate with our interests in the conflict”, he wrote in *Washington Post*.⁴⁰⁶ Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz complained that US intervention in places like the Balkans, which are of marginal strategic importance, had similarities with its intervention in Vietnam. They argued that in a post-Cold War world, the United States should carefully reassess its costs and benefits of interdependence in Europe and East Asia in favor of a more discriminating grand strategy.⁴⁰⁷ James Schlesinger argued that the administration had engaged in Somalia or Bosnia on impulse because the TV cameras were there for the public’s attention. Since America’s political capital, both domestic and foreign, was limited, national policy should focus on those substantial matters that might pose a direct threat to national interests and not on action without reckoning the costs.⁴⁰⁸ Some also suggested that when American troops were to be put in harm’s way in non-strategic areas, the President needed to explain the reasons to the country through effective means of communication.⁴⁰⁹

It seemed that there were no agreed rules for dealing with humanitarian cases. However, this research will examine how and under what conditions the United States decided to intervene, especially by looking at the experiences of dealing with humanitarian interventions in Bosnia in Clinton’s first term of administration and Kosovo in his second term. How did the United States perceive its national interest in the Balkans and define its relationship with US national security, especially in the post-Cold War period? How did the United States perceive the implications of the Balkan war for international relations and international order? What kind of factors influenced and motivated the Clinton administration’s decision-making on

⁴⁰⁵ Stephen John Stedman, ‘The New Interventionists’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 1 (January 1993), pp. 9, 15.

⁴⁰⁶ Charles Krauthammer, ‘Inept to Disgraceful’, *Washington Post*, 22 April 1994.

⁴⁰⁷ Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, ‘American Hegemony-Without an Enemy’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 92 (Autumn 1993), pp. 15-18.

⁴⁰⁸ Schlesinger, ‘Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy’, pp. 18-28.

⁴⁰⁹ Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ‘The New Moralists on a Road to Hell’, *Orbis*, Vol. 40 (Spring 1996), pp. 292-294.

humanitarian intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo? What role did moral conscience and the interests of humanity play in the process of decision-making? Why was the Clinton administration slow to respond to the Bosnian crisis in the early 1990s, but quick to respond to the Kosovo conflict in the late 1990s? Before moving on to the two case studies, the next section will analyze the reasons for the Clinton administration's interventions in Somalia and Haiti and their impacts on its handling of the following humanitarian crises.

4.3 Humanitarian Interventions during the Clinton Administration (Somalia and Haiti)

Somalia

In January 1991, the power vacuum inside Somalia when President Mohammed Siad Barre was forced from power by a coalition of opposition forces caused it to implode into clan-based civil war. The Djibouti Accord, which was reached after a series of talks in June and July, appointed Ai Mahdi Mohamed as interim president. However, the Somali warlord Mohammed Farrar Aideed rejected the accords. Consequently, the clan warfare in Somalia intensified, and the capital Mogadishu was divided into the forces of Ali Mahdi Mohamed in the north and the forces of Mohammed Farrar Aideed in the south. The conflict resulted in massive flow of refugees and severe food shortages. Somalia was regarded as a "failed state".⁴¹⁰

Since the Cold War was over, both Washington and Moscow no longer competed with regional allies and thus did not regard Somalia as a strategic prize on the Horn of Africa.⁴¹¹ Therefore, despite the description of the man-made famine in Somalia as "the most acute humanitarian tragedy in the world today" by Andrew Natsios, the overseas relief chief of the Agency for International Development (AID), it was not until the cable "A Day in Hell" from Smith Hempstone, US Ambassador to Kenya, got to President George H. W. Bush that the Somali crisis drew the administration's attention. After reading the *New York Times* report of 19 July 1992 on death and starvation in Somalia, President Bush "was very upset by these reports and he wanted something done, both in Somalia and northern Kenya". As a result of interagency meetings on Somalia, the White House announced that the United States would take the leadership and work with other nations and international organizations to offer an emergency food airlift to Mogadishu.⁴¹²

⁴¹⁰ Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert, *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) [<http://www.idrc.ca/openebooks/963-1/>] 27 May 2009; DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, pp. 44-45.

⁴¹¹ 'Who Cares About Somalia?', *New York Times*, 8 January 1991.

⁴¹² Don Oberdorfer, 'US Took Slow Approach to Somali Crisis', *Washington Post*, 24 August 1992.

On 25 November, President Bush proposed to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that the United States would carry out a UN-sponsored intervention to secure the immediate delivery of humanitarian aid. Considering the ineffectiveness of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), a US-led multinational force, known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), was authorized by Security Council Resolution 794 on 3 December “to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia”.⁴¹³ President Bush sent roughly 28,000 US troops as part of Operation Restore Hope. Bush clearly indicated that the mission had a limited objective: “to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving”. The US troops would withdraw from the region once a secure environment was established. “Our mission is humanitarian,” the President said to the American armed forces. “As commander in chief, I assure you ...we will bring you home as soon as possible.”⁴¹⁴

On the path towards new international roles in the post-Cold War world, the United States recognized that the action in Somalia had more than a fleeting significance. Since the United States had no strategic or economic interest in Somalia, the George H. W. Bush team acknowledged that the involvement in Somalia would be very different from previous large-scale military operations. The scale of the disaster and the likely effectiveness of US intervention became the two important criteria for the administration to intervene in the Somali crisis. As acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger said, “This is a tragedy of massive proportions, and, underline this, one that we could do something about. We had to act.”⁴¹⁵

In addition to humanitarian concern, it was believed that “the CNN effect” forced the George H. W. Bush administration to pay attention to Somalia “because the TV cameras were there”.⁴¹⁶ Similarly, George Kennan wrote that “there can be no question that the reason for this acceptance lies primarily with the exposure of the Somalia situation by the American media, above all, television”. He argued, “The reaction would have been unthinkable without this exposure. The reaction was an emotional one, occasioned by the sight of the suffering of the starving people in

⁴¹³ Thomas G. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises* (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), pp. 81, 83; Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds.), *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), pp. 158-59; Security Council Resolution 794, 3 December 1992.

⁴¹⁴ ‘Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia’, 4 December 1992, *Public Papers*, p. 2175.

⁴¹⁵ Don Oberdorfer, ‘The Path to Intervention: A Massive Tragedy ‘We Could Do Something About’’, *Washington Post*, 6 December 1992.

⁴¹⁶ Warren P. Strobel, ‘The CNN Effect’, *American Journalism Review* (May 1996), p. 35.

question.”⁴¹⁷ Thus, it was televised pictures of humanitarian suffering from Somalia that “goaded a reluctant Administration to act”.⁴¹⁸

Meanwhile, another reason was that George H. W. Bush’s new world order was embarrassed by the characteristics of the mass starvation of Somali children.⁴¹⁹ The administration faced the growing restlessness among Islamic nations and the developing world, who pointed out that the West only went to war with Muslims (as with Iraq) but did not come to their aid in either Bosnia or Somalia. Moreover, they criticized that the developed world made use of the Security Council only to deal with the problems they were interested in;⁴²⁰ under these circumstances, the George H. W. Bush administration concluded that an intervention in Somalia would be easier than one in Bosnia. As Secretary Eagleburger said, “We knew the costs weren’t so great and there were some potential benefits.” The administration officials viewed the intervention as ‘doable’. They stressed, “There are always risks in any operation but this time they are relatively small.”⁴²¹

The Clinton administration inherited the operation in Somalia when it came into office in 1993. On 26 March, UN Security Council Resolution 814 recognized the need for “a prompt, smooth and phased transition from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the expanded United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)”, and requested Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali “to direct the Force Commander of UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia”. Moreover, UNOSOM II would be “to promote the process of political settlement and national reconciliation and to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy”. Those efforts were expected to establish representative democratic institutions in Somalia.⁴²² In early May, UNITAF was replaced by UNOSOM II. When the armed forces returned from Somalia, President Clinton declared, “Mission accomplished.” Meanwhile, the United States continued to contribute forces as part of the UN-led UNOSOM II operation. Clinton stated that the mission would be “to complete the work of rebuilding and creating a peaceful, self-sustaining, and

⁴¹⁷ George F. Kennan, ‘Somalia, Through a Glass Darkly’, *New York Times*, 30 September 1993.

⁴¹⁸ Walter Goodman, ‘How Much Did TV Shape Policy?’, *New York Times*, 8 December 1992.

⁴¹⁹ Samuel Makinda, *Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. 69.

⁴²⁰ Warren P. Strobel, *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influence on Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace, 1997), pp. 137-138.

⁴²¹ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 138; Goodman, ‘How Much Did TV Shape Policy?’; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War’, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (May 1996), p. 209.

⁴²² Security Council Resolution 814, 26 March 1993.

democratic civil society”. Consequently, the mission in Somalia turned from a “humanitarian mission” into “nation building”.⁴²³

On 5 June, 24 Pakistani peacekeepers from UNOSOM II were killed in Mogadishu and the forces under the command of General Aideed were suspected of carrying out the attack. The Security Council passed Resolution 837, authorizing the Secretary-General to “take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks”. Now, the UN-US forces had done more than nation building, they were conducting combat operations. The two UN resolutions, according to John R. Bolton, marked a deliberate experiment in “assertive humanitarianism”.⁴²⁴ As Clinton said to the American people after the UN-US forces attacked the military positions of General Aideed, “The US must continue to play its unique role of leadership in the world. But now we can increasingly express that leadership through multilateral means such as the United Nations”.⁴²⁵

Nevertheless, criticism of the continuing US presence in Somalia mounted. The *New York Times*, which earlier had drawn George H. W. Bush’s attention to the Somali crisis, now criticized Clinton’s deep involvement in Somalia’s internal politics,⁴²⁶ and the *Washington Post* criticized that the hunt for Aideed had made the United States, together with the UN, co-warmakers.⁴²⁷ Republican Senator Larry Pressler of South Dakota stated that “we had a moral obligation to the starving Somalis, but we have no obligation to referee a civil war”. He pointed out that since the United States had fulfilled their original mission of securing the supply lines for humanitarian aid distribution, US troops should withdraw from Somalia as soon as possible. The US armed forces did not serve the purpose of getting bogged down in a civil war.⁴²⁸

In August, when more US troops, including the Army Rangers and the Delta units, were requested to beef up the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) after four US soldiers had been killed in Somalia, it smelled like Vietnam. For General Powell, the Vietnam experience had made him distrust nation building by well-meaning foreigners.⁴²⁹

⁴²³ ‘Remarks on Welcoming Military Personnel Returning From Somalia’, 5 May 1993, *Public Papers*, p. 565; John R. Bolton, ‘Wrong Turn in Somalia’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January/February 1994), pp. 62-63.

⁴²⁴ Security Council Resolution 837, 6 June 1993; Bolton, ‘Wrong Turn in Somalia’, p. 63.

⁴²⁵ ‘The President’s Radio Address’, 12 June 1993, *Public Papers*, p. 840.

⁴²⁶ ‘Drawing the Line in Somalia,’ *New York Times*, 20 June 1993.

⁴²⁷ Colman McCarthy, ‘When Peacemakers Turn Warmakers,’ *Washington Post*, 27 June 1993.

⁴²⁸ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ‘US Policy in Somalia’, 29 July 1993 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 18.

⁴²⁹ Louise Lief and Bruce B. Auster, ‘What Went Wrong in Somalia’, *US News and World Report*, 18 October 1993; David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001), p. 259.

Despite these problems, the *New Yorker* described the mission as a “moral advance” for US foreign policy which set an example for similar actions in the future.⁴³⁰ By the same token, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff called UNOSOM a model of advancing American humanitarian values with limited US military involvement.⁴³¹ In his speech on August 27, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin reaffirmed the administration’s “staying the course” policy. He said, “We went there to save a people, and we succeeded. We are staying there now to help those same people rebuild their nation.”⁴³² At the same time, he acknowledged the need for the disarmament of the clans in Somalia.⁴³³

However, on October 3, in their attempt to capture General Aideed, three US Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by his forces. Afterwards, the gun battle between the Somali militia and the US Army Rangers and Delta commandos led to 18 US soldiers being killed. The most disastrous thing was that the bodies of several US casualties of the conflict were dragged by Aideed’s men through the streets of Mogadishu past jeering crowds of Somalis. Instantaneously, the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident appeared in the world’s headlines and became an enduring image of the risks of humanitarian impulses. There was a widespread demand calling for the withdrawal of all American forces from Somalia. Several days later, President Clinton ordered US troops to completely withdraw from Somalia by March 1994. Hence, as Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert described, “Those who saw a ‘CNN effect’ encouraging intervention also saw the impact of unpalatable images forcing the withdrawal of military forces”.⁴³⁴

Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst argued that the failure of the Somali mission was because of the Clinton administration’s attempt to shift from humanitarian relief to “nation building”, which the George H. W. Bush administration had tried to avoid.⁴³⁵ Richard Haass countered Michael Mandelbaum’s claim that humanitarian intervention inevitably led to political tasks. He argued that the expanded mission in Somalia failed because “policy-makers got ambitious” but “did not match their ambition with adequate force”.⁴³⁶ Meanwhile, the Somali experience reinforced the

⁴³⁰ ‘Hope Restored?’, *New Yorker*, 8 March 1993, pp. 4-6.

⁴³¹ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ‘US Policy in Somalia’, p. 4.

⁴³² Quoted in Bolton, ‘Wrong Turn in Somalia’, p. 64.

⁴³³ Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, ‘Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 2 (March/April 1996), p. 76.

⁴³⁴ John H. Cushman Jr., ‘5 G.I.’s Are Killed As Somalis Down 2 US Helicopters’, *New York Times*, 4 October 1993; Leonie Murray, ‘Somalia and the “Body Bag Myth” in American Politics’, *International Politics*, Vol. 44 (2007), p. 553; Weiss and Hubert, *The Responsibility to Protect*.

⁴³⁵ Clarke and Herbst, ‘Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention’, p. 76.

⁴³⁶ Michael Mandelbaum, ‘The Reluctance to Intervene’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 95 (Summer 1994), p.

Powell Doctrine of using decisive force in places where there was a clear US interest and an equally clear way out. “Be careful what you get into,” Powell emphasised again. “We have to better understand our national interest.”⁴³⁷

The events of October 1993 also reflected that the UN and the United States had based their policies on poor understandings of Somali society and culture. Mohammad Sahnoun, a former UN envoy to Somalia, stated, “In Somali culture, the worst thing you can do is humiliate them, to do something to them you are not doing to another clan...” Therefore, the hunt for Aideed had instead elevated the warlord’s standing in Somalia. “He appears, because so much effort is focused on him, kind of like Saddam Hussein,” Robert Oakley, US special envoy to Somalia from December 1992 to March 1993, said. Also, US forces were just seen as another militia by many Somalis.⁴³⁸ Moreover, it had been argued that there was a lack of policy direction towards Somalia because the Clinton administration was more concerned with domestic agenda and not fully engaged with the Somalia policy. Besides, the administration had a poor relationship with the military. As a result, it seemed that the administration did not care about what was going on in Somalia, and was naively reliant on its “assertive multilateralist” foreign policy. Unfortunately, the relationship between the United States and the UN did not go very well throughout the Somali operation. Because of the distrust and split between the United States and the UN, the US Rangers did not tell other UN forces when they launched the raid on October 3.⁴³⁹ For many observers, this was viewed as a watershed in US-UN relations.⁴⁴⁰

The probable cause of the rift between the United States and the UN was the complicated command structure. The traditional UN peacekeeping force, the US QRF, and the US Army Rangers had formed “three distinct forces with three different missions and three separate command-and-control structures”.⁴⁴¹ The failure in Somalia raised questions about whether US forces could or should operate under UN command. As the third-ranking National Security Council (NSC) staff Nancy Soderberg wrote, “Never again would President Clinton allow US forces to take part

12; Richard Haass, ‘Military Force: A User’s Guide’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 96 (Autumn 1994), p. 26.

⁴³⁷ Quoted in Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, p. 83.

⁴³⁸ Lief and Auster, ‘What Went Wrong in Somalia’.

⁴³⁹ Ibid; Murray, ‘Somalia and the “Body Bag Myth” in American Politics’, pp. 559-560; Robert Oakley Interview in *PBS Frontline: Ambush in Mogadishu* [<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/oakley.html>] 29 May 2009.

⁴⁴⁰ Dumbrell, *Clinton’s Foreign Policy*, p. 67.

⁴⁴¹ Alan Cowell, ‘Italy, in UN Rift, Threatens Recall of Somalia Troops’, *New York Times*, 16 July 1993; John G. Ruggie, *Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 96-97.

in an enforcement operation under UN command”.⁴⁴² Meanwhile, Ivo H. Daalder, also an NSC staffer in the Clinton administration, pointed out, “Critics also attacked the administration’s commitment to multilateralism, arguing that this both undermined much-needed American leadership and subordinated US national interests to the concerns of multilateral bodies like the United Nations”.⁴⁴³ Consequently, as Republican Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky concluded, “Creeping multilateralism died on the streets of Mogadishu.”⁴⁴⁴ The policy of “assertive multilateralism” that the Clinton administration had promoted in its early days ended with the Somalian episode.⁴⁴⁵

On the other hand, Congress, and the Republican Party in particular, increasingly criticized the mounting cost of UN-driven peace operations. The United States was obligated to pay about one-third of a UN peacekeeping operation. Although President Clinton informed the UN that they “must know when to say no” in the autumn of 1993, the Security Council had expanded its peacekeeping operations in Mozambique, on the Iraq-Kuwait border, in Somalia, Georgia, Cyprus, El Salvador, Haiti, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and Liberia. The Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole, a Republican from Kansas, complained that the UN was even considering new operations in places like Tajikistan, Angola and Nagorno-Karabakh. The only “say no” case was Burundi. Dole claimed that US troops should be led by US commanders and prohibited from serving under foreign command in UN operations. Moreover, he stressed that US soldiers should only be asked to risk their lives in support of US interests.⁴⁴⁶

Shortly after the retreat of US forces from Somalia, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) was released by the administration on 3 May 1994. It set guidelines for US decision-making on issues of peacekeeping and peace enforcement suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period and aimed to impose discipline on both the UN and the United States to make peace operations a more effective instrument of collective security. The Directive was the result of a one year-long interagency policy review and extensive consultations with dozens of members of Congress from both

⁴⁴² William G. Hyland, *Clinton’s World: Remaking American Foreign Policy* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999), p. 59; Nancy Soderberg, *The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might* (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2006), p. 40.

⁴⁴³ Ivo H. Daalder, ‘Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping’, in William Durch (ed.), *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), p. 51.

⁴⁴⁴ Quoted in Hyland, *Clinton’s World*, p. 59.

⁴⁴⁵ Bolton, ‘Wrong Turn in Somalia’, p. 66; Linda B. Miller, ‘The Clinton Years: Reinventing US Foreign Policy?’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 4 (October 1994), p. 629.

⁴⁴⁶ Bob Dole, ‘Peacekeeping and Politics’, *New York Times*, 24 January 1994.

parties. It showed that peace operations could be a useful tool to advance US national interests and pursue US national security objectives; however, as the United States could not be the world's policeman, the use of peacekeeping should be selective and more effective.⁴⁴⁷ After completing the policy review, Lake claimed, "Peacekeeping is not at the centre of our foreign or defense policy. Our armed forces' primary mission is not to conduct peace operations but to win wars." He further stated that the United States had learned from the lesson of Somalia that "peacekeepers can create an opportunity for peace, but the responsibility for the future of a society must always rest with its own people".⁴⁴⁸

The Somalia debacle had a significant effect on the administration's subsequent military decisions such as the fear of "crossing the Mogadishu line" in Bosnia.⁴⁴⁹ One of the direct effects of the Somalia disaster was America's failure to support the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda.⁴⁵⁰ As Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne described:

The Somalia debacle had serious ramifications for the foreign policy agenda of the Clinton administration. Its delayed action in mid-1994 at the United Nations Security Council, which sought US logistical support to deploy an African-led UN peacekeeping force to Rwanda, contributed to the unnecessary deaths of many Rwandans. The stalling at the United Nations, no doubt, was to appease the administration's critics in Congress and to demonstrate that the administration could be tough on the United Nations. Rwanda, therefore, became the first victim of the administration's Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25).⁴⁵¹

Serious tensions between the minority Tutsi and the majority Hutu populations in Rwanda resulted in massive ethnic violence in April 1994. During the three months of the genocide, Clinton did not gather his top policy advisers to discuss the killings, nor did Lake convene a single 'principals' meeting, consisting of the cabinet-level members of the foreign policy team. If the subject was brought up at top-level meetings, it was only along with, and "subordinate to", discussions of Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.⁴⁵² Clinton's refusal to respond to the genocide in Rwanda became one of the greatest regrets of his presidency. As he wrote in his memoir, "We were so

⁴⁴⁷ 'The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations', Presidential Decision Directive 25, 3 May 1994 [<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm>] 14 February 2010.

⁴⁴⁸ Anthony Lake, 'The Limits of Peacekeeping', *New York Times*, 6 February 1994.

⁴⁴⁹ Clarke and Herbst, 'Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention', p. 70.

⁴⁵⁰ Joseph S. Nye, 'Redefining the National Interest', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4 (July/August 1999), p. 32.

⁴⁵¹ Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne, 'Congress and the Somalia Crisis', in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds.), *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), p. 191.

⁴⁵² Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America in an Age of Genocide* (New York: Times Books, 2002), p. 366.

preoccupied with Bosnia, with the memory of Somalia just six months old, and with opposition in Congress to military deployments in faraway places not vital to our national interests that neither I nor anyone on my foreign policy team adequately focused on sending troops to stop the slaughter.”⁴⁵³

However, the administration’s nonintervention policy towards Rwanda was largely concerned with insufficient national interests to justify the use of American military power. As President Clinton stated in a commencement address at the United States Naval Academy, “We cannot solve every such outburst of civil strife or militant nationalism simply by sending in our forces.”⁴⁵⁴ Also, when James Woods, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the Defense Department, added Rwanda as potential serious crises, he was told, “Look, if something happens in Rwanda-Burundi, we don’t care. Take it off the list. US national interest is not involved and we can’t put all these silly humanitarian issues on lists, like important problems like the Middle East, North Korea and so on. Just make it go away.”⁴⁵⁵ Moreover, a *Washington Post* editorial commented on the inaction to stop the killings in Rwanda:

The United States has no recognizable national interest in taking a role, certainly not a leading role. In theory, international fire-engine service is available to all houses in the global village. Imagine a fire department that would respond only to the lesser blazes. But in a world of limited political and economic resources, not all of the many fires will be equally tended. Rwanda is in an unpreferred class. It received a UN peacekeeping force last October, but then its political class chose to renew tribal carnage. Second chances don’t come easily. Its disintegration cannot fairly be blamed on a lapse of the “international community”.⁴⁵⁶

As a consequence, the Clinton administration did not take any military action to stop genocide in Rwanda. Instead, the administration only provided humanitarian aid such as delivering food, medicine, and supplies to Rwanda’s refugees.⁴⁵⁷

Haiti

In September 1991, the first democratically elected president in Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown by the General Raoul Cedras-led military forces and fled to

⁴⁵³ Clinton, *My Life*, p. 593.

⁴⁵⁴ Paul Lewis, ‘Boutros-Ghali Angrily Condemns All Sides for Not Saving Rwanda’, *New York Times*, 26 May 1994.

⁴⁵⁵ James Woods Interview in *PBS Frontline: The Triumph of Evil* [<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/woods.html>] 14 February 2010.

⁴⁵⁶ Editorial, ‘One, Two, Many Rwandans?’, *Washington Post*, 17 April 1994.

⁴⁵⁷ ‘Anthony Lake Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Commencement Address National Defense University’, 12 June 1996, William J. Clinton Presidential Library (CPL).

the United States. The military coup caused massive human rights problems, and it was reported that 60,000 to 100,000 refugees fled to the shores of Florida and the Dominican Republic between 1991 and 1994. Although there was a national interest in restoring democracy, the George H. W. Bush administration believed that there was not a sufficiently vital interest to use military force in Haiti. Therefore, the George H. W. Bush administration's decision was to join with the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) to impose economic sanctions on the Haitian military junta.

During his presidential campaign, Clinton criticized George H. W. Bush's policy of forcibly returning Haitian boat refugees. Moreover, he called for the removal of the military rulers and the return to power of Aristide. Nevertheless, once in office, Clinton did not make his promise a reality. The new administration continued Bush's policy on Haiti. In July 1993, with the backing of the United States and the UN, Cedras and Aristide signed the Governor's Island Agreement (GIA), which agreed to a transition to democracy and set a deadline of October 30 for Aristide's return.

On October 11, only one week after the "Black Hawk Down" incident, when the USS *Harlan County*, carrying more than 200 American and Canadian troops under the UN flags sent to help implement the agreement, arrived at Port-au-Prince, Haitian mobs and armed militants threatened waiting diplomats and reporters with a crowd shouting: "Kill the whites!" and "Somalia! Somalia!"⁴⁵⁸ With the graphic images of the Somalia debacle still fresh in minds of most American people, Clinton ordered the ship to return. The humiliating retreat from Port-au-Prince showed that the agreement had collapsed. As result of the embarrassment in Somalia, few administration officials were enthusiastic about "gunboat diplomacy" in a troubled country. Thus, the Clinton administration renewed economic sanctions that had been lifted.⁴⁵⁹

From October 1993 to April 1994, Clinton sought economic sanctions and diplomacy other than the use of force to oust the junta in Haiti and restore Aristide to power. However, those efforts were unsuccessful. In April 1994, the Congressional Black Caucus, as well as human rights groups, Hollywood stars, and several prominent Democratic senators began to show a growing impatience with the administration's Haiti policy. For example, Democrat Representative David R. Obey of Wisconsin

⁴⁵⁸ Lester Brune, *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, 1992-1998* (Claremont, California: Regina Books, 1998), pp. 49-50.

⁴⁵⁹ Howard W. French, 'Haiti's Curse', *New York Times*, 17 October 1993; Hyland, *Clinton's World*, p. 62.

called for an American invasion to restore democracy in Haiti. In the meantime, as the Haitian refugee problem got worse, Randall Robinson, the head of the TransAfrica organization, began a protest against Washington's policy of direct return. He described the Clinton administration's Haitian refugee policy as "cruel, grossly discriminatory and profoundly racist".⁴⁶⁰

The administration conducted a policy review of Haiti. At a principal meeting on 7 May, Lake proposed a military intervention. Learning from the Somalia and Bosnia experiences, Lake suggested that the United States had to show its willingness to use force unilaterally before the UN would follow. The disenchantment with the UN became a remarkable turning point for the administration. "It realized the power of the lone superpower. When the United States acted, others would follow. That principle would guide much of the rest of Clinton's foreign policy."⁴⁶¹ However, Clinton was not yet ready to commit the use of force; instead, he tightened economic sanctions and still sought a "peaceful, negotiated settlement" in Haiti. The President did not seek other options should the Haitian military rulers refuse to compromise.⁴⁶²

Nevertheless, the deteriorating refugee crisis and domestic pressure for more effective action led the administration to press the UN for military intervention in Haiti. At the end of July, the Security Council passed Resolution 940, authorizing member states to form a multinational force to "use all necessary means" to remove Cedras from power.⁴⁶³ But the administration was divided over the deployment of US armed forces in Haiti. Lake, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger favored an invasion of Haiti and continued to urge the President for the use of force. But the Pentagon opposed such action. Talbott argued that avoiding an invasion was "morally repugnant". Defense Secretary William Perry (Aspin had resigned over the Somalia disaster) countered Talbott's "strange morality" and claimed, "It would be immoral for the United States not to do whatever it could to avoid the deaths of American soldiers."⁴⁶⁴

However, the Clinton administration's domestic and international credibility was at

⁴⁶⁰ Soderberg, *The Superpower Myth*, pp. 46-51; Steven Greenhouse, 'Clinton policy Toward Haiti Comes Under Growing Fire', *New York Times*, 15 April 1994.

⁴⁶¹ Hyland, *Clinton's World*, p. 62; Soderberg, *The Superpower Myth*, p. 48.

⁴⁶² Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, p. 140; Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, ' "Disobedient" Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 112, No. 3 (Autumn 1997), p. 376.

⁴⁶³ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, p. 93; Security Council Resolution 940, 31 July 1994.

⁴⁶⁴ Anthony Lake, *6 Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them* (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2000), p. 134; Elaine Sciolino, 'Top US Officials Divided in Debate on Invading Haiti', *New York Times*, 4 August 1994.

stake. The President did not show much promise to remove the military junta, while the political and humanitarian situation in Haiti was getting worse because of sanctions. On 26 August, the President approved the invasion plan.⁴⁶⁵ In his speech to the nation on 15 September, Clinton warned the Haitian dictators: “Your time is up. Leave now or we will force you from power.”⁴⁶⁶ On 17 September, before the deployment of military forces, Clinton sent former president Jimmy Carter, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, and Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Senator Sam Nunn to negotiate with Cedras for a peaceful transfer of power.⁴⁶⁷ The negotiation team succeeded in their mission. On 19 and 20 September, the US-led multinational force, called Operation Restore Democracy, peacefully landed in Haiti. The military rulers left and Aristide was soon returned to power.⁴⁶⁸

Why did the Clinton administration decide to take military action towards Haiti? Since Clinton had spoken grandly of a “hemisphere of democracies”, it was hard to ignore “the fact that an authoritarian regime was thumbing its nose at the United States from the nearby Caribbean”. In early September 1994, Lake pointed out that American “essential reliability” was at stake. The crisis in Haiti became “a test of US commitments to defend democracy, to prevent further destabilization in the region and resulting flights of refugees, and to curb ‘gross abuses of human rights’”.⁴⁶⁹ The four major issues: human rights, refugee problems, democracy, and American credibility were restated in Clinton’s televised speech to explain why the United States had to move beyond sanctions to military force:

Now the United States must protect our interests.... with the cold war over that so many Americans are reluctant to commit military resources and our personnel beyond our borders. But when brutality occurs close to your shores, it affects our national interests. And we have a responsibility to act.... Three hundred thousand more Haitians – 5 percent of their entire population – are in hiding in their own country. If we don’t act, they could be the next wave of refugees at our door. We will continue to face the threat of a mass exodus of refugees and its constant threat to stability in our region and control of our borders.... History has taught us that preserving democracy in our own hemisphere strengthens America’s security and prosperity. Democracies here are more likely to keep the peace and to stabilize our region.... Beyond the human rights violations, the immigration problems, the

⁴⁶⁵ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, p. 97; Ann Devroy and R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘Debate Over Risks Split Administration’, *Washington Post*, 25 September 1994.

⁴⁶⁶ ‘Address to the Nation on Haiti’, 15 September 1994, *Public Papers*, p. 1558.

⁴⁶⁷ ‘The President’s Radio Address’, 17 September 1994, *Public Papers*, p. 1567.

⁴⁶⁸ Weiss and Hubert, *The Responsibility to Protect*.

⁴⁶⁹ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, p. 141; Ann Devroy and John Goshko, ‘Clinton May Request Reservists for Haiti’, *Washington Post*, 13 September 1994.

importance of democracy, the United States also has a strong interest in not letting dictators, especially in our region; break their word to the United States and the United Nations.⁴⁷⁰

Later, when NSC staff Nancy Soderberg gave a speech at United States Institute of Peace (USIP), she stressed again that it were democracy, human rights, and refugee problem that drove the administration to take decisive action. She stated:

We had important interests in shoring up democracy in our hemisphere, ending the abuse of human rights, and stemming the tide of desperate refugees... and we tried every peaceful avenue to achieve our goals. But when it became clear that peaceful means alone would not succeed, the President decided to back his diplomacy with force.⁴⁷¹

Furthermore, as Taylor Branch suggested to Clinton, “If democracy could take root there, it would nurture hope everywhere from Saudi Arabia to China.” And it was possible that Haiti could aspire to another miracle from the bright side of American heritage.⁴⁷² However, William Hyland indicated that the administration’s “rationale for occupying Haiti had reflected less of the human-rights and democracy-building ethic of his aides and more of a traditional geopolitical framework”. In particular, the phrase “*close to our shore*” the President used reflected “the quaint aura of the Monroe Doctrine”.⁴⁷³

Beyond these concerns, it was also argued that the Clinton administration was driven by “naked political fear – the fear of domestic fallout over continued flows of Haitian refugees and of the righteous wrath of the US community that supported President Aristide”. Since it had become “a major headache” for the Clinton administration by the summer of 1994, the President and his foreign policy team decided to “get Haiti off Washington’s political agenda”.⁴⁷⁴ Moreover, within the administration, a group of moralists led by Lake, known as “Haiti hawks”, who had served under the Carter administration and were speaking the same language - “the Carteresque human rights first policy”, were also considered as the catalyst for driving the administration into action.⁴⁷⁵

Conclusion

⁴⁷⁰ ‘Address to the Nation on Haiti’, pp. 1558-1560.

⁴⁷¹ Nancy Soderberg, ‘US Intervention in the Post Cold War Era’, 10 July 1996, CPL.

⁴⁷² Branch, *The Clinton Tapes*, p. 190.

⁴⁷³ Hyland, *Clinton’s World*, p. 65.

⁴⁷⁴ Carothers, ‘Democracy Promotion under Clinton’, p. 15; Morley and McGillion, ‘“Disobedient” Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization’, p. 383.

⁴⁷⁵ John Barry and Karen Breslan, ‘How Did We Get Here?’ *Newsweek*, Vol. 124, No. 13, 26 September 1994, pp. 26-27.

Different schools of thought had offered alternative diplomatic courses for post-Cold War US foreign policy. Classical isolationists suggested the United States should look inward and return to a normal nation again. They proposed putting “America First” and abandoning most of America’s global commitments. Influenced by the notion of American decline, the conservative neo-isolationist approach suggested a selective and discriminate diplomacy to scale down America’s international obligations and avoid overcommitment abroad. They advocated that the United States should only act in world affairs in defense of its vital interests. Although the United States could not solve every international problem, conservative interventionists claimed that certain problems required American leadership, such as the issues of proliferation of nuclear weapons and regional conflicts. They suggested the United States should share the burden with allies and friends and work with other great powers to solve international issues. Preoccupied by the lesson of Vietnam War, liberal neo-isolationists called for policy-makers to solve pressing internal problems. They advocated a foreign policy that was an extension of domestic politics. It was only when the United States could solve its domestic problems first that it could persuade others to follow it. On the other hand, liberal interventionists perceived the post-Cold War environment as an opportunity to promote American values such as democracy and human rights. They believed in the democratic peace theory and assumed that the expansion of democracy would bring prospects of international peace and security.

The Clinton administration’s foreign policy was profoundly influenced by the liberal perspective. In the search for a successor to containment policy, the new strategy of ‘democratic enlargement’ was the winner of the Kennan sweepstakes. Two examples of these policies were NATO enlargement and aid to democratize Russia. In addition, the administration attempted to relate the politics of democracy promotion to the economics of the global market. Clinton’s foreign policy had put democratic peace theory into practice. However, critics argued that the strategy of enlargement did little to provide guidelines for foreign policy issues such as threats posed by rogue states, notably Iraq and North Korea, and humanitarian crises caused by intrastate conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda, or Somalia. Moreover, some argued that at a time of peace it was important to prevent potential future threats. For example, Russia and China were the greatest potential powers that might confront the United States.

On the other hand, accompanied by the process of globalization, borderless threats, such as WMD and international terrorism, were emerging. It was assumed that the development of global economic interdependence and regional conflicts in the 1990s

complicated US foreign policy. It could be argued that specific strategies and policies needed to aim at dealing with the specific problems and issues in light of the changing world. As a result, the Clinton administration ultimately developed a pragmatic approach to external problems, such as its policy of pragmatic and principled engagement with China. Overall, critics argued that Clinton's foreign policy lacked strategic visions and specific objectives. However, some analysts claimed that the administration did follow such a strategy, which essentially consisted of the intertwined concepts of economic globalization and political democratization. Perhaps the inability to shape a single concept to replace containment within the administration and an incoherent handling of humanitarian intervention issues resulted in disarray and confusion.

The Clinton administration inherited the peace operation in Somalia when it came into office in 1993. Relying on an assertive multilateralism policy, the Clinton White House worked closely with the UN to promote an assertive humanitarianism policy. However, the 'Black Hawk Down' incident demonstrated the policy failure of turning a peace operation to one of nation building. The Somalia debacle had a significant effect on the administration's subsequent military decisions. It was Rwanda that suffered first and most. Nevertheless, it was argued that the nonintervention policy towards Rwanda was rooted in insufficient national interest. As a result, it was assumed that the reason for the Clinton administration to intervene in Haiti was largely because of the consideration of geopolitical interests based on the Monroe Doctrine; while at the same time, the intervention helped to promote American ideals such as democracy and human rights.

Chapter 5.

The Clinton Administration's Intervention in Bosnia

Introduction

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), generally known as Yugoslavia, was formed in 1945 and divided into the six Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter "Bosnia"), Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia until it was formally dissolved in 1992. In the first post-Communist elections of 1990 in Yugoslavia, nationalist parties won electoral victories in most of the republics. Following the Yugoslav constitutional crisis and increasingly disturbed by growing Serbian nationalist belligerency, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence on 25 June 1991 and the wars soon broke out in Yugoslavia. The Bosnian War started after a referendum on independence in March and the declaration of independence in April 1992.

Bosnia was a multiethnic fabric, which consisted of about 45 percent Muslim, 32 percent Serb (majority were Orthodox Christians), and 18 percent Croat (majority were Roman Catholic). However, they had conflicting goals. Bosnian Serbs wanted to remain with the Belgrade-dominated rump Yugoslavia and intended to divide the republic along ethnic lines to create a "Greater Serbia". On the other hand, Bosnian Muslims wanted to establish a centralized independent Bosnia, and Croats wanted to unite with an independent Croatian state. When the War broke out, Bosnian Serbs, supported by neighboring Serbia, soon controlled over half the republic. Although it was marked by evidence of widespread killings, the siege of Sarajevo, mass rape, and ethnic cleansing conducted by different Serb forces, the fighting on the ground was extremely complex. In Herzegovina, Muslims sided with Serbs against Croats; in north-west Bosnia, rival Muslim forces were against each other; and in central Bosnia, Croats and Serbs formed an alliance against Muslims.

Just a few days before Croatia and Slovenia's declarations of independence, US Secretary of State James Baker met with leaders of all the Yugoslav republics to support a united Yugoslavia with no border changes. However, the United States recognized the independence of Bosnia as well as Croatia and Slovenia in April 1992, and these three newly independent states were admitted to the UN in May 1992. Although Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and was proclaimed the successor to the SFRY in April 1992, the United States did not recognize this new state.

The UN Security Council (UNSC) imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia after the failure to secure a cease-fire in the early days of the fighting. In February 1992, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), as a peacekeeping operation for the former Yugoslavia, was initially established. On 30 May, the UN imposed economic sanctions on Serbia according to Security Council Resolution 757.⁴⁷⁶

The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War had made the Balkans lose its strategic importance from the perspectives of most Western policy makers. The George H. W. Bush administration found it difficult to come up with good policy options to deal with the Yugoslav crisis and define American interests in the region.⁴⁷⁷ For a year and a half, the administration had no intention of leading a Western coalition to put military pressure on the Serbs.⁴⁷⁸ As President George H. W. Bush remarked on Bosnia: “I do not want to see the United States bogged down in any way into some guerrilla warfare.... There are a lot of voices out there in the United States today that say use force, but they don’t have the responsibility of sending somebody else’s son or somebody else’s daughter into harm’s way. And I do.”⁴⁷⁹

Despite the triumph in the Gulf War against Iraqi aggression and the talk of a new world order, Serbian aggression against non-Serbs in Bosnia, an internationally recognized state, was regarded as a civil war by top US officials.⁴⁸⁰ Most of Bush’s foreign policy advisers were traditional realists. Baker’s famous quip - “we didn’t have a dog in that fight” - was an illustration. They believed that the United States did not have “the most powerful military in the history of the world” to undertake humanitarian “social work”; nevertheless, the United States should act in response to aggression that would affect US strategic interests, whether economic or security related. For example, the Gulf War was fought in order to prevent Saddam Hussein’s

⁴⁷⁶ ‘Background Note: Bosnia and Herzegovina’, May 2008, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, *US Department of State* [<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm#history>] 17 July 2008; ‘Bosnia Chronology: Developments Related to the Crisis in Bosnia: March 10-August 28, 1992’, *Dispatch*, Vol. 3, No 35, 31 August 1992; Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert, *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background* [<http://www.idrc.ca/openbooks/963-1/>] 10 July 2009; ‘Timeline: Bosnia-Herzegovina’, *BBC News*, 7 January 2009 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1066981.stm] 11 July 2009; James A. Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), pp. 478-483.

⁴⁷⁷ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 24-33; Robert C. DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo* (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), p. 118.

⁴⁷⁸ Elaine Sciolino, ‘In Bosnia, Peace at Any Price Is Getting More Expensive’, *New York Times*, 10 January 1993.

⁴⁷⁹ Jonathan Rauch, ‘How Kosovo Buried the Bush Doctrine’, *National Journal*, 31 October 1998, Vol. 30, p. 2540.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

regime from becoming regionally dominant and to maintain US access to cheap oil.⁴⁸¹

Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, preceded by Baker, was influenced by memories of Vietnam. He questioned whether the complex Bosnian crisis could meet the criteria for military intervention, a view defined by the Powell Doctrine. It argued that the use of force should be matched to clear political objectives and “restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweighs the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue”.⁴⁸² The representatives of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff consistently opposed military intervention there. As Baker recalled in his memoir, “Their model for using force was, understandably, the Gulf War - and Bosnia had more characteristics of Vietnam than Iraq.”⁴⁸³ As a result, Warren Zimmermann, Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1989 to 1992, concluded, “The Vietnam syndrome and the Powell doctrine proved to be powerful dampers on action by the Bush administration, particularly in an election year.”⁴⁸⁴

In the meantime, Foreign Minister of Luxembourg Jacques Poos, whose country then held the rotating presidency of the European Community (EC), later renamed the European Union (EU), confidently stated: “If anyone can do anything here, it is the EC. It is not the US or the USSR or anyone else.” It was “the hour of Europe”. The United States was happy to let the Europeans take on a leadership role since the George H. W. Bush administration did not want to get involved diplomatically, not to mention militarily.⁴⁸⁵

During the presidential election campaign in 1992, Democratic Party candidate Bill Clinton criticized the George H. W. Bush administration’s inaction, saying: “President Bush’s policy toward former Yugoslavia mirrors his indifference to the massacre at Tiananmen Square and his coddling of Saddam Hussein Once again; the administration is turning its back on violations of basic human rights and our own democratic values.”⁴⁸⁶ “We cannot afford to ignore what appears to be a deliberate and systematic extermination of human beings based on their ethnic

⁴⁸¹ Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America in an Age of Genocide* (New York: Times Books, 2002), pp. 260-261.

⁴⁸² Colin L. Powell, ‘US Forces: Challenges Ahead’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 5 (Winter 1992/1993), p. 40.

⁴⁸³ Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, p. 649.

⁴⁸⁴ Warren Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers* (New York: Times Books, 1996), p. 215.

⁴⁸⁵ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, pp. 258-259.

⁴⁸⁶ Quoted in Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 138.

origin,” the candidate said in a campaign speech on 5 August, “I would begin with air power against the Serbs to try to restore the basic conditions of humanity.” Moreover, on 11 October, he claimed that he would support lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims as “they were in no way in a fair fight with a heavily armed opponent bent on ‘ethnic cleansing’”. Based on moral obligation, Clinton claimed that the United States should take forceful action to halt Serbian aggression.⁴⁸⁷

This chapter examines how and under what circumstances the Clinton administration eventually decided to intervene in the Bosnian conflict. It first divides the response of the administration to the Bosnian War into three stages and looks at the process of the administration’s key decision-making during each stage. The first stage was an approach called “lift and strike”, which would use NATO air strikes to frighten the Serbs into signing the Vance-Owen peace accord with a combination of lifting the arms embargo against the out-gunned Bosnian Muslims to enable them to better fight their own battles. However, it encountered the European allies’ opposition. Afterward, the administration lacked any effective strategy or action. It was not until the events of the Srebrenica massacre that the Clinton White House started to commit the full force of diplomacy, including the threat of unilateral military force if necessary. In the final section, this chapter will provide an in-depth analysis of the Clinton administration’s decisions to intervene.

5.1 The Clinton Administration’s Decision-making Process on Bosnia

5.1.1 Decision-making Stage 1: January ~ May 1993

When the Clinton administration entered office in January 1993, the Bosnian crisis was the highest priority on the National Security Council (NSC)’s agenda.⁴⁸⁸ However, the administration’s foreign policy team held numerous rambling and inconclusive meetings about the crisis without achieving a consensus.⁴⁸⁹ Colin Powell, still Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, described the meetings “like graduate-student bull sessions or the think-tank seminars”.⁴⁹⁰ One top-level official even described, “It wasn’t policy making. It was group therapy – an existential debate over what was the role of America.”⁴⁹¹ Although Clinton had pushed for a changed policy during the campaign, such as ending the arms embargo against Bosnia and using US air power to deter Serbian aggression; once in office, he was confronted by not only the hostility of the Europeans to any change but also the

⁴⁸⁷ Michael Kelly, ‘Surrender and Blame’, *New Yorker*, 19 December 1994, p. 47.

⁴⁸⁸ Elaine Sciolino, ‘Christopher Leery of Bosnia Accord’, *New York Times*, 22 January 1993.

⁴⁸⁹ Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir* (London: Macmillan, 2003), p. 180.

⁴⁹⁰ Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 576.

⁴⁹¹ Drew, *On the Edge*, p. 150.

cautiousness of his own military. This led to his interest in Bosnia getting more “episodic”.⁴⁹²

Within the administration, Vice President Al Gore, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, and US Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright were the most hawkish proponents, favoring the use of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs on moral grounds. Despite his push for a tougher line against the Serbs, Gore soon recognized the classic limitations of being a vice president. Lake, regarded as a moralist and a true Wilsonian, also believed in the moral aspects of foreign policy, but faced a situation filled with moral complexity in the case of Bosnia. Influenced by his Vietnam experiences, he did not want to send US troops to fight an unwinnable war, but thought that the conflict in Bosnia threatened European security and therefore America’s own interests, a view shared by Albright. However, he was unable to push the President to make a decision.

Albright had passionately called for military action; unfortunately, her views had not carried much weight. Secretary of State Warren Christopher wanted to avoid another Vietnam War. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, “like a graduate student in classical rhetoric”, was taking on different sides of the issue at different times. He acknowledged that dealing with the Bosnian crisis required enormous military force, but neither the United States nor Europe was willing to pay that price. In place, he favoured a cease-fire and doing as little as possible in Bosnia.⁴⁹³

Richard Holbrooke, who was one of Clinton’s foreign policy advisors during the presidential campaign and later played a major role in the Bosnian crisis, had urged “a more vigorous policy against Serb aggression”. In a memorandum to Christopher and Lake before the Clinton administration assumed office, he wrote: “Continued inaction carries long-term risks which could be disruptive to US-European relations, weaken NATO, increase tension in Greece and Turkey, and cause havoc with Moscow.” Moreover, he pointed out the so-called “*not-so-secret*” secret arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims from Iran: “An important reason the Bosnian Muslims are surviving is that they are beginning to get significant weapons shipments from Islamic nations, apparently including Iran.” Moreover, a growing

⁴⁹² David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001), pp. 195-196.

⁴⁹³ Leslie H. Gelb, ‘Chris’ And Aspin And Lake’, *New York Times*, 24 January 1993; Margaret Garrar Warner and Tom Post, ‘The Road to Indecision’, *Newsweek*, 24 May 1993, p. 18; Drew, *On the Edge*, p.142; Bob Woodward, *The Choice: How Bill Clinton Won* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 57, 254; Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 180.

numbers of “freedom fighters” or “mujahideen” were joining the Bosnian forces.⁴⁹⁴

The Pentagon retained the position of not intervening in Bosnia as the George H. W. Bush administration had done. As Powell declared,

Whenever the military had a clear set of objectives, I pointed out – as in Panama, the Philippine coup, and Desert Storm – the result had been success. When the nation’s policy was murky or nonexistent – the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, creating a Marine “presence” in Lebanon – the result had been disaster. In Bosnia, we were dealing with an ethnic tangle with roots reaching back a thousand years. The fundamental decision was simple, but harsh.⁴⁹⁵

Aspin shared Powell’s view. However, Albright confronted Powell at one session, “What’s the point of having this superb military... if we can’t use it?” Powell later wrote in his memoir, “I thought I would have an aneurysm. American GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board.”⁴⁹⁶ The revelation of this exchange reflected the Clinton administration’s uneasy relationship with the military.⁴⁹⁷

Meanwhile, the Clinton administration viewed the Vance-Owen plan, proposed by UN Representative Cyrus Vance and EC Representative Lord David Owen and calling for the division of Bosnia into ten ethnically autonomous provinces under a central government in Sarajevo (the capital of Bosnia) as a flawed initiative due to its disadvantages for Bosnian Muslims.⁴⁹⁸ This was because it would legitimize Serb control of the land from which the Muslims had been driven by ethnic cleansing.

Despite its criticisms of the plan, the administration embraced it when unveiling its long-awaited Balkan policy on 10 February.⁴⁹⁹ Secretary Christopher outlined six steps for the Bosnian crisis:

1. To engage actively and directly in the Vance-Owen negotiations and support the efforts of the United Nations and the European Community through the Vance-Owen negotiations to arrive at peace agreement.
2. To communicate to the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats through negotiation to

⁴⁹⁴ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, pp. 42, 50-51.

⁴⁹⁵ Powell with Persico, *My American Journey*, p. 559.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 576-577.

⁴⁹⁷ Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), p. 146.

⁴⁹⁸ Gwen Ifill, ‘Clinton and Mulroney Fault Balkan Peace Plan’, *New York Times*, 6 February 1993.

⁴⁹⁹ Elaine Sciolino, ‘US Backs Bosnian Peace Plan, Dropping Threats to Use Force’, *New York Times*, 11 February 1993.

end the conflict.

3. To work with allies and the Russians to tighten the economic sanctions and put political pressure on Serbia and deter Serbia from widening the war.
4. To enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia under a UN resolution.
5. To prepare to join with the United Nations, NATO, and others in implementing and enforcing an agreement, including possible military participation.
6. To consult with friends and allies on these actions; in particular, to work closely and cooperatively with Russia in search for a peaceful resolution.⁵⁰⁰

He explained the administration's decisions to engage diplomatically in resolving the Bosnian conflict:

We cannot ignore the human toll. Serbian "ethnic cleansing" has been pursued through mass murders, systematic beatings and rapes of Muslims and others, prolonged shelling of innocents in Sarajevo and elsewhere, forced displacement of entire villages, inhumane treatment of prisoners in detention camps, and the blockading of relief to sick and starving civilians. Atrocities have been committed by other parties as well. Our conscience revolts at the idea of passively accepting such brutality.

Beyond these humanitarian interests, we have direct strategic concerns as well. The continuing destruction of a new UN member state challenges the principle that internationally recognized borders should not be altered by force. In addition, this conflict itself has no natural borders. It threatens to spill over into new regions, such as Kosovo and Macedonia. It could then become a greater Balkan war, like those that preceded World War I. Broader hostilities could touch additional nations, such as Greece, Albania, and Turkey. The river of fleeing refugees, which has already reached the hundreds of thousands, would swell. The political and economic vigor of Europe, already tested by the integration of former communist states, would be further strained.⁵⁰¹

Christopher described Bosnia as a crucial test that would address America's post-Cold War role in Europe and the world, as well as the willingness of the United States and its allies to commit to their institutions of collective security, such as NATO, in meeting the demands of this new age.⁵⁰²

President Clinton further stressed the importance of US engagement in multilateral efforts to reach a solution to the conflict – a lesson learned from the Gulf War: "If we

⁵⁰⁰ Warren Christopher, 'New Steps Toward Conflict Resolution In the Former Yugoslavia', *Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 7, 15 February 1993.

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*

operate with the support of the United Nations and with the support of Europe and with the support of allies, we can do a lot of things at an acceptably low cost of life, and get something done. If we go off on our own and everybody else is over here, we can't get it done."⁵⁰³

Agreeing with Christopher's emphasis on strategic interests, retired General William Odom advocated that stability in Europe would be disturbed by the Bosnian conflict spilling over into neighboring countries. If this happened, General Odom told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's European Subcommittee, "Russia might eventually be more clearly sided with Serbia and the Central European powers more openly sided with Croatia, Turkey and other Moslem countries being very much on the side of Bosnia, that is not a formula for economic prosperity and international stability in a key region of the world. Eventually it would adversely affect US jobs through our interdependency with Europe. And therefore a large intervention force just may be an overhead cost that one has to pay." He claimed that unless the United States took the lead in contributing mightily, there would not be any action taken by the Europeans. Meanwhile, former UN Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick urged the administration to act unilaterally if necessary.⁵⁰⁴

In March, Lake began a new round of meetings to search for a new policy. Options were discussed and refined but no decisions had been made. The administration's policy on Bosnia continued to tighten the embargo to press both sides to negotiate and insisted on working in concert with the allies.⁵⁰⁵ In mid-April, it was reported that Serbian forces had moved in on the besieged Muslim town of Srebrenica. The West, and above all the Clinton administration, were humiliated by the news seeping out of Srebrenica.

At a press conference, President Clinton emphasised:

We are reviewing other options. I think we should act. We should lead – the United States should lead... but I do not think we should act alone, unilaterally... the United States, even as the last remaining superpower, has to act consistent with international law under some mandate of the United Nations.

⁵⁰³ 'Remarks at a Town Meeting in Detroit', 10 February 1993, *Public Papers*, pp. 79-80.

⁵⁰⁴ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 'American Policy in Bosnia', 18 February 1993 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. 67, 69; Steven A. Holmes, 'Ex-Officials Urge US to Act to End Serbian Siege', *New York Times*, 19 February 1993.

⁵⁰⁵ 'Press Briefing by George Stephanopoulos', 3 March 1993, CPL.

He further stated:

I think that's a good argument against the United States itself becoming involved as a belligerent in a war there. But we are, after all, the world's only super power. We do have to lead the world and there is a very serious problem of systematic ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, which could have not only enormous further humanitarian consequences...but also could have other practical consequences in other nearby regions where the same sorts of ethnic tensions exist.⁵⁰⁶

“The principle of ethnic cleansing is something we ought to stand up against,” Clinton said.⁵⁰⁷

However, some argued that the President seemed to have “a tendency to pronounce on principle, prevaricate in practice and preempt the policies and plans of others.”⁵⁰⁸ His position showed a sense of confusion and uncertainty, as his advisors were uncertain whether or not the United States should take military action in the Balkans. On the other hand, his foreign policy aides also had to interpret what he wanted. Gradually, a consensus was reached about lifting the arms embargo and using airpower.⁵⁰⁹

As a result of a principals' meeting on 1 May, Clinton agreed to the “lift and strike” approach. It was proposed by Gore, Lake, and Albright, and would use NATO air strikes to force the Serbs into signing the Vance-Owen peace accord and lift the arms embargo to enable Bosnian Muslims to fight their own battles. The final decision would depend on consultation with European allies to see if they would join the operation. On the same day, Christopher left for Europe to sell the American strategy.⁵¹⁰

Unfortunately, Christopher encountered strong opposition from European allies, particularly Britain, France, and Russia.⁵¹¹ One British official countered that ending the embargo would result in all three warring parties being armed and escalate the

⁵⁰⁶ ‘Press Conference by the President’, 23 April 1993, CPL.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (London: Hurst & Co., 1997), p. 208.

⁵⁰⁹ Drew, *On the Edge*, pp. 149-150; Michael R. Gordon, ‘Clinton Considers a Tougher Policy to Halt the Serbs’, *New York Times*, 17 April 1993; Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, p. 208; Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, pp. 224, 196.

⁵¹⁰ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 180; Drew, *On the Edge*, p. 155; Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Bosnia Air Strikes Backed by Clinton’, *New York Times*, 2 May 1993.

⁵¹¹ Warren Christopher, *In The Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 346.

fighting.⁵¹² French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said: “There is a division of tasks which I don’t think is acceptable, that of having some flying in planes and dropping bombs and others, the Europeans – especially the French – on the ground”, which indirectly reflected Washington’s refusal to contribute peacekeeping troops to Bosnia.⁵¹³

As a result of consultations with the allies, although none embraced the core of Clinton’s proposal for lifting the UN arms embargo, they agreed in principle to use NATO air strikes only if the Serbs launched new attacks.⁵¹⁴ When Christopher reported back, he said: “Our central concept of lifting the arms embargo ran into stiff resistance.” The allies were worried about the safety of their peacekeepers on the ground.⁵¹⁵ Now, Christopher “understood what a ‘loser’ the lift and strike policy was and he tried to turn the Bosnia issue off. He was convinced that any serious US involvement in Bosnia would be politically disastrous for Clinton”.⁵¹⁶ Furthermore, “he felt that if the US got out too far ahead of the Europeans and then couldn’t persuade them to come along, it would hurt American leadership on this and other issues. And that, in turn, would hurt Clinton’s Presidency. This reasoning closed the circle on American leadership”.⁵¹⁷

However, it was argued that Clinton’s indecisiveness and unenthusiastic support for “lift and strike” doomed the initiative. Clinton feared that pushing the issue would affect his support for the reform policies of Russia. Russian President Boris Yeltsin had warned Clinton not to counter military action against the Serbs. Moreover, he was afraid that the issue might become a new American quagmire.⁵¹⁸ Clinton’s political adviser Dick Morris had warned him to avoid involvement in Bosnia, “You don’t want to be Lyndon Johnson. Sacrificing your potential for doing good on the domestic front by a destructive, never-ending foreign involvement. It’s Democrats’ disease to take the same compassion that motivates their domestic policies and let it lure them into heroic but ill-considered foreign wars.”⁵¹⁹

⁵¹² Elaine Sciolino, ‘Christopher Seeks Backing On Bosnia’, *New York Times*, 3 May 1993.

⁵¹³ Elaine Sciolino, ‘Allies Still Resist Christopher On Call to Arm The Bosnians’, *New York Times*, 4 May 1993.

⁵¹⁴ Elaine Sciolino, ‘Christ Fails to Win Consensus’, *New York Times*, 7 May 1993.

⁵¹⁵ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 180.

⁵¹⁶ Wayne Bert, *The Reluctant Superpower: United States’ Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 203.

⁵¹⁷ Drew, *On the Edge*, pp. 273-274.

⁵¹⁸ Woodward, *The Choice*, p. 57; Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 17.

⁵¹⁹ Dick Morris, *Behind the Oval Office: Getting Reelected Against All Odds* (Los Angeles: Renaissance Books, 1999), p. 253.

Despite Lake's effort to craft a strategy to proactively resolve the Bosnian crisis, it appeared that Clinton usually reacted to the events in Bosnia rather than shaping them.⁵²⁰ During his European trip, Christopher was told by Aspin that Clinton had changed his mind about the policy. "The president's gone south on us," Aspin said. In the bureaucracy, it was widely said that one of the reasons for Clinton's pull back was because the President had read Robert Kaplan's *Balkan Ghosts*. "To Clinton, it seemed to say that the people in the Balkans had been killing each other for centuries and nothing could be done about it".⁵²¹ It could be said that the costs would be too high for the United States to intervene in the Balkans; and the opposition from European allies strengthened this argument. Ultimately, the administration's Bosnia policy turned towards preventing the conflict from spreading and dealing with the humanitarian issues.⁵²²

In spite of the failure to gain support from European allies for the "lift and strike" policy, the administration still insisted on resolving the Bosnian crisis cooperatively with allies. Moreover, Christopher indicated that any intervention in a situation he once called "a problem from hell" would have to embody a clear view of what American interests were. He pointed out the principles that guided the President to respond to the Bosnian conflict:

The first principle is that we will not act alone in taking actions in the former Yugoslavia. This is a multilateral problem, and it must have a multilateral response. There are a number of countries already involved on the ground, and a number of countries have moral, political, and strategic interests at stake here. Furthermore, at heart this is a European problem. We will do what we can, in concert with our allies and friends, to respond to the violence and contain the conflict; but we will not act unilaterally.

Second, the United States will not send ground troops into Bosnia to engage in military action. ... we are prepared to commit our military forces to implement a peace settlement entered into consensually and in good faith by the parties, but we will not use our military forces to impose a settlement in the Balkans.⁵²³

On 22 May, Christopher announced that the United States, Russia, France, Spain, and Britain had agreed a new policy on Bosnia, known as the Joint Action Program,

⁵²⁰ David Rothkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), p. 365.

⁵²¹ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, p. 228.

⁵²² Christopher, *In The Stream of History*, p. 347.

⁵²³ Warren Christopher, 'Foreign Assistance Priorities After the Cold War', *Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 22, 31 May 1993.

which would implement humanitarian assistance to Bosnia, enforce economic sanctions under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 820 against Serbia, secure Bosnia's borders from Serbia, enforce the no-fly zone; work a new UN Security Council Resolution on "safe areas" in Bosnia, support the establishment of the War Crimes Tribunal, reach a negotiated settlement on the basis of the Vance-Owen plan, and contain the conflict with joint efforts to prevent it from spilling over into neighboring countries.⁵²⁴ After the declaration of Srebrenica as a safe area under UNSCR 819 in April, the concept of "safe areas", which was proposed by France during Christopher's European trip, was extended to the towns of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac under UNSCR 824 in May.⁵²⁵ Nevertheless, the Bosnian Serb parliament overwhelmingly rejected the Vance-Owen plan in their referendum.⁵²⁶ On the other hand, some argued that the EC was reluctant to support the formation of an autonomous Muslim state as it would lead to some major problems in the region.⁵²⁷

Nevertheless, the joint action program was regarded as "a holding action" rather than a policy for Bosnia. It was the administration's effort to try to restore allied unity.⁵²⁸ Some argued that the Clinton administration's Bosnia policy changed to be one of containment, which showed a "sort of encircling [of] Bosnia, forgetting about what's happening inside Bosnia and just preventing the whole thing from spreading". Dee Dee Myers, one of the administration officials, responded that the Clinton White House had two objectives: "One is to contain the conflict to keep it from spilling over into other regions, and the other is to stop Serbian aggression and the policy of ethnic cleansing." However, the administration still tried to search for what kind of measures should be undertaken to achieve the objectives.

On the other hand, some were doubtful whether or not the United States should continue to get involved in Bosnia. Myers said:

The president believes that, as the only superpower left in the world, that the United States has a responsibility to lead, not just to stand by. The United States – the world community cannot stand by

⁵²⁴ Warren Christopher, 'Announcement of the Joint Action Program on the Conflict in Bosnia', *Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 21, 24 May 1993.

⁵²⁵ William G. Hyland, *Clinton's World: Remaking American Foreign Policy* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999), p. 37; Security Council Resolution 819, 16 April 1993; Security Council Resolution 824, 6 May 1993.

⁵²⁶ John F. Burns, 'Bosnian Serbs' Leaders Meet to Ratify Vote Rejecting Peace Plan', *New York Times*, 20 May 1993.

⁵²⁷ House Committee on Armed Services, 'The Policy Implications of US Involvement in Bosnia', 25 and 26 May 1993 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 15.

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

in the face of ethnic cleansing in an ethnic conflict like this and allow it to happen without registering a protest and doing something to try to stop it.

In the face of the further question of whether the American people still wanted to be this world power that intervened overseas, Myers stated:

That is an enduring value of the American people, and particularly now in the wake of the Cold War where there is only one superpower left. It has always been a pillar of American foreign policy that we have a special role in the world.⁵²⁹

However, some argued that “Clinton was confused, in policy terms, between the emphasis on domestic affairs in his Administration and his personal reaction both to the events in Bosnia and to the charges of others”.⁵³⁰ While Clinton was focused like a laser on the economy, his indecisive policy on Bosnia had damaged the effectiveness of his whole presidency, both at home and abroad. Obviously, how the President dealt with the Bosnia issue would have an impact on his domestic initiatives, such as health care, budget, and national service plans.⁵³¹

The Congress was divided over US involvement in Bosnia. The Democrats were still shadowed by their Vietnam experiences and were struggling to see if they were capable of leading the world, while the Republicans were debating whether the country should return to its isolationist roots and adopt an “America First” foreign policy or remain in its position as leader of the free world engaged in foreign affairs in the aftermath of the Cold War. For example, Republican Trent Lott of Mississippi, Thad Cochran of Mississippi, and John McCain of Arizona, who were some of the most conservative leaders in the US Senate, were all Bosnia doves. These conservatives did not believe that there was any US interest in Bosnia. They were, ironically, paralyzed by the Vietnam syndrome and opposed US involvement in Bosnia.

Senator Lott described that Bosnia would be a Vietnam-type quagmire. Senator McCain argued that Europe should take care of its own backyard. The conservative *National Review* advocated that the United States had no vital interests at stake in Bosnia and that arguments such as avoiding a wider Balkan war and re-establishing American leadership across the Atlantic were only justified as “modest risks”.

⁵²⁹ ‘Press Briefing by Dee Dee Myers’, 12 May 1993, CPL.

⁵³⁰ Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, p. 214.

⁵³¹ Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Any War in Bosnia Would Carry a Domestic Price’, *New York Times*, 2 May 1993.

However, Republican Minority Leader, Bob Dole of Kansas, allied with liberal Democrat Joseph Biden of Delaware, was the Senate's leading Bosnia hawk and called for stronger US action in the Bosnian crisis.⁵³²

During the early stages of the decision-making on Bosnia, as NSC staff Nancy Soderberg recalled:

Essentially, we had as a central question to define the role of the use of force in the post-Cold War era. When we won the Cold War, people wanted the troops to come home. They didn't understand the need to continue to engage and use force.... when you're in there it's not obvious what the right courses are. For example, in these cases we had there was not a threat on the par of World War II or even Vietnam or Saddam Hussein being in Kuwait. And for the military, the use of force threshold was very high... It was just not clear to most policy makers in 1993 that we actually had to use force to stop the killing in Bosnia. Although Clinton called for it during the campaign, when he got in he learned...none of the European allies were there, nobody wanted to do it.⁵³³

The new Clinton administration, like the George H. W. Bush administration, struggled to determine its own vital interests in the Balkans. Clinton was criticized as being "never really on board", "disengaged", having "lack of commitments", and "less a concrete plan than a proposed 'direction'" on the subject. On the other hand, the administration insisted on a multilateral effort to resolve the Bosnian conflict.⁵³⁴

5.1.2 Decision-making Stage 2: June 1993 ~ April 1995

In June 1993, the administration moved to accept the partition of Bosnia into three ethnically-based states proposed by President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia and President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, which would allow the Serbs to keep the territory they seized by force if Bosnian Muslims and Croats agreed.⁵³⁵ The three-way partition plan was then promoted by EC Representative Lord Owen and UN Representative Thorvald Stoltenberg. The Owen-Stoltenberg proposal called for the division of Bosnia into the three constituent entities leaving only a loose federation as central authority. It granted the possibility for future reunification between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia and the Bosnian Croats and Croatia. However,

⁵³² Vin Weber, 'Bosnia: Strange Alliances', *National Review*, 7 June 1993, p. 24; Editorial, 'Requiem for a Policy', *National Review*, 7 June 1993, p. 17.

⁵³³ Quoted in Rothkoph, *Running the World*, p. 325.

⁵³⁴ Hyland, *Clinton's World*, pp. 37-38; Elaine Sciolino, 'Bosnia Policy Shaped by US Military Role', *New York Times*, 29 July 1996.

⁵³⁵ 'Press Conference By The President', 17 June 1993, CPL; Thomas L. Friedman, 'President Softens Opposition by US to Divided Bosnia', *New York Times*, 17 June 1993.

the Bosnian leaders opposed the plan and warned that it would reward aggression.⁵³⁶

In early July, the TV pictures of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in and around Sarajevo made Bosnia return to the headlines. Clinton's foreign policy team suggested that the use of air power in the service of diplomacy would be necessary to end the siege of Sarajevo and to force the Serbs into peace negotiations and cease-fire agreements.⁵³⁷ One senior administration official demonstrated that the United States would take stronger measures, which was "lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian government with compensatory air strikes until they receive weapons to defend themselves". However, the Clinton White House still waited for an affirmation from the Europeans.⁵³⁸ At the end of the month, Clinton wrote to NATO Heads of State and Government, saying: "The Serbs' efforts to strangle the city of Sarajevo -- through continued artillery attacks, military offensives, and cut-offs of food, water and fuel -- had reached a critical point, threatening a humanitarian disaster and undermining prospects for the negotiations". He suggested "putting NATO air power in the service of diplomacy"; that is to say, using air strikes, if necessary, "to relieve the siege of Sarajevo and to promote a peaceful settlement at the Geneva talks".

On 2 August, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting confirmed the view from Washington that the situation in Bosnia was "unacceptable".⁵³⁹ The Allies agreed to undertake air strikes against the Serbs and reached a "dual-key" agreement, in which the use of air strikes should be authorized by the UNSC and the NAC.⁵⁴⁰ In February 1994, due to the shelling of Sarajevo's marketplace and the violation of the no-fly zone by Bosnian Serbs, NATO, with the approval of the UN, conducted a series of air strikes. It was the first military action in the 44-year history of the alliance. "We have an interest in showing that NATO, history's greatest military alliance, remains a credible force for peace in post-cold-war Europe," Clinton said.⁵⁴¹

At the same time, Congress pushed for a unilateral lifting of the UN arms embargo, a move strongly backed by Senator Dole. Despite support for lifting the embargo, most of Congress still opposed the possibility of direct US military involvement. "They

⁵³⁶ Paul Lewis, 'Bosnian Leaders Oppose Plan to Carve up the Country into 3 States', *New York Times*, 2 August 1993; Bert, *The Reluctant Superpower*, p. 204.

⁵³⁷ Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, pp. 20-21.

⁵³⁸ 'Background Briefing By Senior Administration Official', 8 July 1993, CPL.

⁵³⁹ 'Statement By The Press Secretary', 2 August 1993, CPL.

⁵⁴⁰ Bill Clinton, *My Life* (London: Hutchinson, 2004), p. 534; 'Decisions Taken At the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 9 August 1993', *NATO Press Releases 1993 (52)*, 9 August 1993 [<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1993/p93-052.htm>] 20 July 2008.

⁵⁴¹ Douglas Jehl, 'Clinton Outlines US Interest', *New York Times*, 10 February 1994.

wanted a ‘free lunch’: to help the Muslims militarily and to keep the United States out,” Zimmermann described in his memoir.⁵⁴² Clinton considered that NATO had just received the green light for air strikes, and a unilateral abandonment of the Bosnian embargo would be used as an excuse to disregard the embargoes the US supported in Haiti, Libya, and Iraq.⁵⁴³ On the other hand, as Taylor Branch described, “‘Unilateral lift’ was a euphemism for violating the embargo. Doing so would compel Russia and other countries to send offsetting weapons to the Serbs, and it would undermine international impact all over the world.”⁵⁴⁴

Despite the division, the Clinton administration became more active in diplomatic negotiations. For Clinton, “Bosnia was more than a religious kinship. Bosnia tested their reform platforms against fundamentalist propaganda that Western democracy was a façade for corrupt, postcolonial domination of Muslim nations”.⁵⁴⁵ The United States began a diplomatic effort to bring the Muslims and Croats together to establish a joint Muslim-Croat federation that would consist of about half of Bosnia’s territory, in what came to be known as the Washington Agreement. The cooperation between the Muslims and Croats would end the Muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia. Most importantly, it would change the military balance of power on the ground and isolate the Serbs at the negotiating table.⁵⁴⁶ Clinton claimed:

The United States has clear interests at stake, an interest in helping prevent the spread of a wider war in Europe, an interest in showing that NATO remains a credible force for peace, and interest in helping to stem the terrible, destabilizing flows of refugees this struggle is generating, and perhaps clearly, a humanitarian interest we all share in stopping the continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia.⁵⁴⁷

Meanwhile, Russia emerged as a major player on the Bosnian peace-negotiating scene. In April, the Contact Group, consisting of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia, was formed. The international community’s diplomatic efforts in the Balkans entered a new forum. The Contact Group provided an international stage for Russia to confirm its continued standing as a major power. As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott recalled,

⁵⁴² Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe*, p. 225.

⁵⁴³ Clinton, *My Life*, pp. 581-583.

⁵⁴⁴ Taylor Branch, *The Clinton Tapes: Wrestling History with the President* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009), p. 140.

⁵⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁵⁴⁶ Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, p. 27; Clinton, *My Life*, pp. 590-591.

⁵⁴⁷ ‘Remarks at the Bosnian Federation Signing Ceremony’, 18 March 1994, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, p. 558.

The Contact Group existed for the sole purpose of including Russia in a kind of steering committee otherwise made up of key NATO allies. Its stated objective was to revive the peace process in Bosnia, but its real purpose, in the minds of the allied foreign ministers, was to keep Russia, as they variously put it, inside the tent, on the reservation or, in Chris's [Secretary Christopher's] phrase, sullen but not obstructionist.⁵⁴⁸

Throughout the spring and early summer of 1994, the Contact Group developed the Owen-Stoltenberg plan into the Contact Group plan, which called for the territorial division of a sovereign Bosnia into two entities, 51 percent controlled by the Muslim-Croat Federation and 49 percent by the Bosnian Serbs. However, the Serbs, who controlled 70 percent of Bosnia's territory, turned the plan down.⁵⁴⁹

In a CNN interview, President Clinton demonstrated that the leadership of the United States was indispensable in resolving humanitarian crises. He said:

This era has seen an epidemic of humanitarian catastrophes, many caused by ethnic conflicts or the collapse of governments. Some, such as Bosnia, clearly affect our interests. Other, such as Rwanda, less directly affect our own security interests but still warrant our concern and our assistance. America cannot solve every problem and must not become the world's policeman. But we do have an obligation to join with others to do what we can to relieve suffering and to restore peace.

The means we use will and must vary from circumstance to circumstance. When our most important interests are at stake, we will not hesitate to act alone if necessary. Where we share an interest in action with the international community, we work perhaps through the United Nations.

In other cases we will work in partnership with other nations. In Bosnia, for example, we have stepped up our diplomatic involvement, alone with Russia and others. We supported NATO enforcement measures and committed to provide United States forces as a part of a NATO enforcement mission if and when the parties can reach a workable peace agreement.⁵⁵⁰

In late 1994, the Clinton administration suffered not only an electoral defeat when the Republicans won both houses of Congress, but also differences within NATO over the Bosnia policy. Due to Congress's vote to cut off all funds for enforcing the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government by November 15 if the Bosnian

⁵⁴⁸ Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy* (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 123.

⁵⁴⁹ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, pp. 110-111; Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, p. 28.

⁵⁵⁰ 'Interview on CNN's 'Global Forum With President Clinton', 3 May 1994, *Public Papers*, pp. 823-824.

Serbs had not agreed to a peace settlement, the administration announced on November 10 that the US military would stop enforcing the embargo. Although it meant that the United States would not unilaterally break the UN Resolution or supply arms, at the same time they would not stop others from shipping weapons to the Muslim-led Bosnian Government. Moreover, Dole, the likely majority leader after the Republican gains in the elections, continued to push for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. However, the European allies responded that the unilateral move would expose their peacekeeping troops to greater risks. Also, it would undermine NATO and lead to an intensified war rather than a negotiated peace.⁵⁵¹

In late November, in response to the Serbian advance on the Muslim enclave of Bihac, a UN-designated “safe area”, NATO launched a three-day bombing of Serbian targets. However, facing 250 UN peacekeepers immobilized by the Bosnian Serbs, NATO air strikes were hardly decisive, and were labeled “pinpricks” by the press. At a NATO meeting in Brussels, the United States’ proposal for further NATO air attacks against the Bosnian Serbs unless they withdrew from Bihac met with resistance, especially from France (who provided about 7,000 troops in UNPROFOR) and Britain (who provided 4,000). France, the largest contributor to UNPROFOR, criticized that the United States only wanted to rely on the threat of air strikes to stop the fighting but refused to get involved on the ground.⁵⁵² By the same token, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd defended that Europe had “no reason to be ashamed” of its diplomatic efforts, especially when the United States would not take part in an allied ground operation.⁵⁵³

It was NATO’s worst dispute since the Suez crisis of 1956. The fact that the allies failed to act in Bihac had implications beyond the Balkans. It was about the role of the 45-year old NATO alliance in a world without a common enemy (the Soviet Union). The United States, Britain, and France found it difficult to define the point where their national security interests converged. Gradually, Clinton’s foreign policy aides recognized that the American effort “to use NATO air strikes to prevent the fall of Bihac had only intensified trans-Atlantic frictions”. Spending his Thanksgiving weekend working on a memorandum to the President on what the Bihac crisis meant, Lake wrote: “Bihac’s fall has exposed the inherent contradictions in trying to use

⁵⁵¹ Michael R. Gordon, ‘President Orders End to Enforcing Bosnian Embargo’, *New York Times*, 11 November 1994; Craig R. Whitney, ‘Move on Bosnia by US Alarms Allies in NATO’, *New York Times*, 12 November 1994.

⁵⁵² Derek Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 7; Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 61; ‘NATO Gives UN Bosnia Action Plan’, *New York Times*, 25 November 1994.

⁵⁵³ Richard W. Stevenson, ‘Britain and France Criticize US on Bosnia Positions’, *New York Times*, 29 November 1994.

NATO air power coercively against the Bosnian Serbs when our allies have troops on the ground attempting to maintain impartiality in performing a humanitarian mission.”

Then, at a principals’ meeting chaired by Lake, was agreed that NATO’s unity was more important than the Bosnian crisis. One senior Administration official described the conclusion of the meeting: “We have been putting straws on the back of NATO solidarity over Bosnia for the last two years. We have been pushing them over and over to use military force, to the point where we have come to threaten the destruction of the transatlantic treaty. We are not going to do that anymore. We are not going to break NATO over this. If the Europeans generally reject the use of air power, we’re not going to put up a big fight on this anymore.” Lake suggested that the United States should put its diplomatic efforts into securing a cease-fire agreement instead of further pushing for bombings. Consequently, in order to be close ranks with its European allies, the United States abandoned its proposal of using NATO air power coercively against the Bosnian Serbs to save Bihac. Now, “the primary goal of the United States’ Bosnian policy - saving Bosnia - had become a secondary concern to salvaging NATO”. Some even argued that the United States’ policy “had never been concerned with saving Bosnia, only with preserving America’s global leadership”. Ironically, when these monumental changes to the most serious foreign policy mission this administration had ever faced were under way, one official said, “Bill Clinton isn’t in the room.”⁵⁵⁴

In the face of humiliation and harassment by the Bosnian Serb forces, the UN announced that it would withdraw its peacekeepers unless there was reached a countrywide cease-fire agreement. Each time in response to NATO’s air strikes, the Serbs had usually harassed the peacekeepers and taken some hostages. However, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR would show the failure of Western powers in Bosnia, especially for the EU, which thought that it could solve the Yugoslav crisis without direct American help. Britain and France, with the largest military forces in the UN mission, would be the most embarrassed.⁵⁵⁵

In response to the possibility of a UNPROFOR withdrawal, the Clinton

⁵⁵⁴ Michael Gordon, ‘US, in Shift, Gives Up its Talk of Tough Action Against Serbs’, *New York Times*, 29 November 1994; Michael Gordon, Douglas Jehl, and Elaine Sciolino, ‘US and Bosnia: How a Policy Changed’, *New York Times*, 4 December 1994; Michael Kelly, ‘Surrender and Blame’, *New Yorker*, 19 December 1994, pp. 50-51; Joan Hoey, ‘The US “Great Game” in Bosnia’, *The Nation*, 30 January 1995, p. 132.

⁵⁵⁵ Roger Cohen, ‘UN to Withdraw Unless the Firing in Bosnia Ceases’, *New York Times*, 30 November 1994.

administration decided to send 25,000 US troops to Bosnia to assist if a pullout was requested. In the past, the administration had made clear that the United States would send forces to Bosnia only to enforce a peace agreement. Now, “the President believes it is important that the United States, as a leader of NATO, be ready to assist our allies if their forces are in danger,” the State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelly said. “It is a test of solidarity,” one administration official said.⁵⁵⁶

On the other hand, Newt Gingrich, the incoming Speaker of the House, claimed that the allies should pull peacekeeping forces out of Bosnia since the troops had become “hostages”. Then, they should arm and train Muslim-led Bosnian Government forces, and conduct an all-out air attack if the Serbs responded with a general offensive. However, Christopher commented, “The United States, having caused the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, lifting the arms embargo, starting a bombing campaign, would have its commitment made. Our national interest would have been engaged there. And I think we would probably have to vindicate that interest by then putting in ground troops.”⁵⁵⁷

William J. Perry, who succeeded Aspin as Secretary of Defense, stated that unilateral action by the United States would result in the withdrawal of British and French troops, and that this probably required at least 10,000 troops to help get them out. Nevertheless, Dole countered, “If President Clinton had been providing leadership the last 16 to 18 months; we wouldn’t be where we are today. And now how do we get out? We just give the Serbs everything they want and say we’ve had a victory.” Obviously, the Republican pressure for a more forceful Bosnia policy would challenge the Clinton administration when the Republican majority took control of Congress in January 1995.⁵⁵⁸

In mid-December, as a result of the deadlock between the Clinton administration and its European allies, former president Jimmy Carter, as a private mediator, went to Bosnia to negotiate with the warring parties. On 21 December, Carter announced that a nationwide four-month cease-fire agreement had been reached. However, there was still the deep territorial dispute over the Contact Group plan, which would result in the Serbs’ holdings of Bosnia’s territory being reduced from 70 percent to 49 percent. The Bosnian Serbs ultimately wanted to secede from Bosnia and did not want to

⁵⁵⁶ Douglas Jehl, ‘25,000 US Troops to Aid UN Force If It Quits Bosnia’, *New York Times*, 9 December 1994; Ann Devroy and Bradley Hraham, ‘Ground Troops Would Help in Evacuation’, *Washington Post*, 9 December 1994.

⁵⁵⁷ Steven Greenhouse, ‘Gingrich Is Urging a Tougher Policy on Bosnia’s Serbs’, *New York Times*, 5 December 1994.

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

become a minority under a Muslim-led government.⁵⁵⁹

During the period of cease-fire, which went into effect on 1 January 1995, the Contact Group offered a lifting of economic sanctions on Serbia in exchange for their recognition of Bosnia and Croatia. However, Serbian President Milosevic rejected the proposal. He informed Russian Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev that most people in Serbia would view the recognition of Croatia and Bosnia as betraying more than one million Serbs who had fought to change the borders of those countries.⁵⁶⁰

In the meantime, it was reported by the *Washington Post* that over the past six months the Clinton administration had been silent about Iran's arms deliveries to the Muslim-led Bosnian Government. Having viewed Bosnian Muslims as the victim of aggression by better-armed Serbs, the Clinton administration tended to support their obtaining of arms to fight back. Despite this, the United States could not violate the UN arms ban unilaterally because of the opposition from its European allies. The fact that arms shipments from Iran to Bosnia occurred was actually discovered the previous year. Also, another issue was that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard was training the Muslims in Bosnia. It raised the concern that the Bosnian Muslims might be radicalized by the Iranians since Iran had been suspected of sowing seeds of Islamic revolutions abroad. In particular, the Clinton administration, conversely, had put much effort into containing the fundamentalist threat emanating from Iran.⁵⁶¹

At this stage, despite the achievements of some diplomatic efforts, it was criticized that the administration's Bosnian policy ended basically where it had begun: "without a diplomatic initiative, without the threat of military action, and without much credibility to deliver on either". Moreover, "led by the United States, the international community appeared only capable of carrying out policies to contain and limit the Bosnian tragedy, not end it".⁵⁶²

5.1.3 Decision-making Stage 3: May ~ December 1995

When the four-month cease-fire expired, the fighting in Bosnia escalated again. In May 1995, the Bosnian Serbs began shelling the capital Sarajevo. UN and European allies used NATO air strikes to intimidate the Serbs. In response to "pinprick"

⁵⁵⁹ Douglas Jehl, 'Carter Says He May Travel to Bosnia as Private Envoy', *New York Times*, 15 December 1994; Roger Cohen, 'Bosnia Foes Agree to 4 Month Truce, Cater Reports', *New York Times*, 21 December 1994.

⁵⁶⁰ Roger Cohen, 'Serb Leader Rejects US-Backed Proposal', *New York Times*, 21 February 1995.

⁵⁶¹ Daniel Williams and Thomas W. Lippman, 'US Is Allowing Iran to Arm Bosnia Muslims', *Washington Post*, 14 April 1995.

⁵⁶² Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, p. 7.

NATO air strikes, the Bosnian Serbs took more UN personnel hostage and threatened to chain them to possible air targets for use as human shields if the strikes continued. Those embarrassing and humiliating images were broadcast to the world.

For Britain and France, the hostage-taking had led to domestic political crises.⁵⁶³ Senior French officials asked for broader powers for their soldiers to shoot back and protect themselves. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd requested the withdrawal of its troops from the UN force unless the security condition in Bosnia was improved. The UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali considered the possibility of UNPROFOR's withdrawal, since the four-month cease-fire had ended. Moreover, in order to avoid a recurrence of the "Somalia syndrome", in which the US and other governments backed away from a peacekeeping mission after a frustrating experience, Boutros-Ghali called for a redefined mandate in Bosnia.⁵⁶⁴

Meanwhile, the newly-elected French president Jacques Chirac proposed to dispatch a rapid-reaction force of up to 10,000 troops to Bosnia to protect UN peacekeepers. The proposal was adopted by the Contact Group on May 30, by NATO on June 3, and by the UN Security Council on June 16. The Clinton administration promised to provide air support, intelligence, and transport to boost the capability of the new multinational force, but ruled out any US role on the ground. As Perry said, "We will lean forward as far as we can to provide all of the support that the United States has available, not including putting ground forces in."

Being aware of the consequences of a complete UN withdrawal and the possibility of sending 25,000 US troops to Bosnia to assist the withdrawal as he had promised last December, Clinton was now "clearly in command of the subject, of his government, and of himself" when it came to Bosnia. "All meetings with him," Lake described, "were far more crisp and presidential." Clinton was kept informed by General John Shalikashvili when the Pentagon developed contingency plans for a rescue operation. Shalikashvili had replaced Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when Powell retired in September 1993.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶³ Stephen Engelberg and Alison Mitchell, 'A Seesaw Week for US Policy in the Balkans', *New York Times*, 5 June 1995; Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 348.

⁵⁶⁴ William Drozdiak, 'Total Review Of Peacekeeping Ordered by UN', *Washington Post*, 13 May 1995; Barbara Crossette, 'New Role Sought for UN Bosnia Force', *New York Times*, 17 May 1995.

⁵⁶⁵ Michael Dobbs, 'US, Europeans to Beef Up, Regroup UN Force in Bosnia', *Washington Post*, 30 May 1995; William Drozdiak and Bradley Graham, 'US to Provide Support for Rapid-Reaction Unit, but No Ground Troops', *Washington Post*, 4 June 1995; Ann Devroy and Bradley Graham, 'Seeking to Reassure Europe, Clinton Alarmed Congress', *Washington Post*, 5 June 1995; Anthony Lake, *6 Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them* (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2000), p. 144; Sidney Blumenthal, *The Clinton's Wars* (New York: Farrar,

The contingency plans approved by Clinton required US troops to enforce a peace agreement if the Bosnian Serbs and Muslim-led Bosnian Government reached such an agreement, or to help facilitate UNPROFOR's withdrawal. The latter contingency, then approved by the NAC, became known as OPLAN 40104, and called for about 20,000 US troops to go to Bosnia as part of a 60,000-member NATO-led force. Perry explained to House and Senate panels that "the United States did not have a vital interest in Bosnia but held a security interest in containing the war". However, "American troops would only be used under the "remote possibility" of a UN plea for help".⁵⁶⁶

While 10,000 members of the RRF, consisting of French, British, and Dutch troops, began their operations in Bosnia, leaders in Washington, London, and Paris insisted on keeping UN peacekeepers in the Balkans. This was because the withdrawal of the UN troops would commit up to 60,000 European and American troops and cost \$2 billion to help them fight their way out of the country. The OPLAN 40104 withdrawal plan would be the greatest fear for the Clinton administration. It would send American soldiers to a place which Clinton called a "shooting gallery".⁵⁶⁷ As Lake recalled, "We all agreed that [a UN] collapse would mean that American troops would have to go into Bosnia in order to rescue UNPROFOR, which meant that we were going in the context of a defeat. And nobody wanted that."⁵⁶⁸

The question of the withdrawal or not of UN troops had caused the worst tensions between the United States and its European allies since the creation of NATO after World War II. Since France and Britain had large contingents of soldiers in UNPROFOR, they were deeply concerned about risking their soldiers and charged the United States with sitting on the sidelines.⁵⁶⁹ Holbrooke argued that "the strains endangered NATO itself just as Washington sought to enlarge it." Therefore, "the Clinton Administration was severely criticized for renegeing on our commitments to European security and for lowering the general priority accorded to foreign affairs – in short, for weak leadership in foreign policy".⁵⁷⁰ Similarly, Democratic Senator Joseph Biden made the link between Bosnia and NATO enlargement, "A failure in

Straus and Giroux, 2003), p. 63; Hyland, *Clinton's World*, pp 39-40; Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, p. 9.

⁵⁶⁶ Donna Cassata, 'Congress Bucks White House, Devises Its Own Bosnia Plan', *Congressional Quarterly*, 10 June 1995, p. 1653.

⁵⁶⁷ Elaine Sciolino and Craig R. Whitney, 'Costly Pullout in Bosnia Looms Unless UN Can Prove Effective', *New York Times*, 9 July 1995.

⁵⁶⁸ Quoted in Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, p. 9.

⁵⁶⁹ Sciolino and Whitney, 'Costly Pullout in Bosnia Looms Unless UN Can Prove Effective'

⁵⁷⁰ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 361.

Bosnia would signal the beginning of the end for NATO, which is currently restructuring itself to meet Bosnia-like challenges in the twenty-first century.”⁵⁷¹ When French President Chirac returned home after his visit to Washington in June, he said, “The position of leader of the free world was vacant.”⁵⁷²

From 6 to 16 July, the Bosnian Serb forces killed more than 7,000 Muslim men in Srebrenica, a UN-designated “safe haven” under the protection of Dutch peacekeepers, and drove 23,000 women and children to Bosnian Muslim territory near Tuzla.⁵⁷³ Despite the UN flag over Srebrenica, this single most genocidal act of the Bosnian War was regarded as the West’s greatest shame. The mass murder was on a scale that had not been witnessed in Europe since the end of World War II.⁵⁷⁴

“I’m getting creamed on Bosnia... Why aren’t you all giving me better options? Chirac at least has some new ideas [which meant Chirac’s proposal for a new 10,000 strong European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) on the ground to protect the UN peacekeepers],” Clinton shouted at his NSC staff at one of their meetings.⁵⁷⁵ Realizing the war in Bosnia “was killing the US position of strength in the world”, Clinton was determined to get the war off the front pages before the presidential election of autumn 1996.⁵⁷⁶ Consequently, “his attention was gradually becoming less episodic. It was the simplest of equations: the more open the sore, the less it was about foreign policy and the more it was about presidential effectiveness. Thus it was tied to his political future and he had to pay more attention”.⁵⁷⁷

Concerning the UN’s inability to draw firm lines against the Bosnian Serbs, Senator Dole, now the Republican Majority Leader, was urging a quick vote to end US participation in the UN arms embargo against Bosnia. But French President Chirac warned that a unilateral American decision to lift the embargo would result in an immediate withdrawal of UNPROFOR. He described the fall of Srebrenica as a major defeat for the United Nations, the NATO alliance, and all democracies. In order to restore Western credibility in the former Yugoslavia, he called on the United States and Britain for an aggressive armed force against the Bosnian Serbs to save

⁵⁷¹ Quoted in Charles-Philippe David, ‘At Least 2001: US Security Policy and Exit Strategy in Bosnia’, *European Security*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 2000), p. 10.

⁵⁷² Sciolino, ‘Bosnia Policy Shaped by US Military Role’.

⁵⁷³ Timeline: Siege of Srebrenica, *BBC News*, 9 June 2005 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/675945.stm] 10 January 2008.

⁵⁷⁴ Ivo H. Daalder, ‘Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended’, *Foreign Service Journal*, December 1998 [http://www.brookings.edu/articles/1998/12balkans_daalder.aspx] 8 July 2008.

⁵⁷⁵ Nancy Soderberg, *The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might* (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2006), p. 76.

⁵⁷⁶ Sciolino, ‘Bosnia Policy Shaped by US Military Role’.

⁵⁷⁷ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, p. 306.

other UN-designated “safe zones” - Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac – from attack, while Zepa was already under Serb bombardment. French officials stated, “We do not expect American troops on the ground. What we want from them is air and helicopter transport”. Nevertheless, if France’s partners did not agree to intervene militarily, France would pull its peacekeeping troops out of Bosnia, setting the stage for a full-fledged UN withdrawal.⁵⁷⁸

In response to French proposals for US air support and for NATO military air power to protect that operation, Clinton decided, with the Pentagon’s indispensable support, to use NATO air strikes (unrestrained by the UN’s “dual-key” agreement) to defend Gorazde. He then sent Christopher, Perry, and Shalikashvili to the London conference, called by British Prime Minister John Major because of the worsening situation in Bosnia, to discuss this proposal with allied defense ministers. Opinions were divided. Reluctantly, the allies agreed to Clinton’s proposal: NATO would respond to any attack on a safe area with a “substantial and decisive” air campaign.

Though the removal of “dual key” decision-making system was still debated and came into force later, Christopher, Perry, and Shalikashvili all viewed the London meeting as a turning point; it was America’s first real success concerning Bosnia.⁵⁷⁹ Christopher said, “We finally decided to put some real muscle behind our rhetoric.”⁵⁸⁰ The agreement later became the framework for the first sustained NATO air campaign in Bosnia, Operation Deliberate Force, which was to commence on 30 August 1995.⁵⁸¹

Nevertheless, the Clinton administration still wanted to avoid deploying US ground troops into Bosnia. According to a *Washington Post* - *ABC News* poll, 58 percent of respondents opposed US ground forces into the conflict and 50 percent supported “keeping in place the UN arms embargo of Bosnia” which was an essential element of Clinton’s policy, although 56 percent disapproved of the way Clinton was handling Bosnia.⁵⁸² Clinton had been unwilling to commit US ground troops to the

⁵⁷⁸ Eric Schmitt, ‘US and NATO Face Unhappy Choices for UN Force in the Balkans’, *New York Times*, 12 July 1995; Craig R. Whitney, ‘France Asks Allied Forces to Help Hold ‘Safe Areas’’, *New York Times*, 14 July 1995; Art Pine, ‘On the agenda: a French call for intervention’, *Los Angeles Times*, 15 July 1995; Alison Mitchell, ‘US Weighs a Response To French Call on Bosnia’, *New York Times*, 15 July 1995.

⁵⁷⁹ Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, pp. 73-75; Elizabeth Drew, *Showdown: The Struggle Between the Gingrich Congress and the Clinton White House* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 250-252; Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, pp. 27-30.

⁵⁸⁰ Christopher, *In The Stream of History*, p. 348.

⁵⁸¹ Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, pp. 75-79.

⁵⁸² Michael Dobbs and John F. Harris, ‘US Favors ‘Aggressive’ NATO Airstrikes in Bosnia’, *Washington Post*, 19 July 1995.

Bosnian conflict ever since he had entered into office. However, as one senior Administration official said, “It is very hard to claim your rightful place at the head of the table as the world’s only superpower when we’re not playing the lead role there.”⁵⁸³

France and Britain were unhappy about American efforts to avoid military involvement in Bosnia. They indicated that the basis of the Atlantic Alliance and the future existence of NATO would be in doubt if the United States refused to live up to its promise to bail out its allies. Moreover, if the United States delayed in halting Serb aggression now, the result would require greater US involvement in the future, such as sending 25,000 US soldiers to help extricate all UN peacekeepers from Bosnia.⁵⁸⁴

While the allies discussed military measures to protect the enclaves, the Bosnian Serbs continued the shelling of the UN-designated safe areas in Bihac, Zepa, and Sarajevo.⁵⁸⁵ In late July, the 69-29 Senate vote, including 21 Democrats jointly with 48 Republicans, passed the legislation (S 21) lifting the Bosnian arms embargo. Dole, the Republican top presidential candidate, indicated that the issue “was not about philosophy. It’s not about politics. It was about whether some small country that had been ravaged on all sides, pillaged, women raped, and children killed – do they have any rights in this world?”⁵⁸⁶ He argued, “The bottom line is that since the war against Bosnia began, America has been a follower, not a leader.” In the absence of American leadership and as a result of the West’s indecisiveness and ineffectiveness, the Serbs had moved rapidly on all fronts.⁵⁸⁷

Clinton vetoed the legislation on 11 August. He responded that a unilateral embargo lift would mean unilateral American responsibility and “Americanize” the conflict. This was because breaking the embargo would lead to the retreat of UNPROFOR from the Balkans, and Clinton had promised to commit US ground troops to assist the withdrawal. “It would intensify the fighting, jeopardize diplomacy and make the outcome of the war in Bosnia an American responsibility,” Clinton said. Undoubtedly, it would damage Clinton’s standing as a world leader if Congress succeeded in

⁵⁸³ Todd S. Purdum, ‘Clinton Now Tries to Define Role for the US in Bosnia’, *New York Times*, 23 July 1995.

⁵⁸⁴ William Drozdiak, ‘Allies Set to Prod US Into Role in Bosnia’, *Washington Post*, 19 July 1995.

⁵⁸⁵ ‘Serbs Continuing to Shell 3 ‘Safe Areas’, *New York Times*, 22 July 1995.

⁵⁸⁶ Carroll J. Doherty, ‘In Stinging Rebuff To President, Senate Votes To Lift Arms Ban’, *Congressional Quarterly*, 29 July 1995, pp. 2282-2283.

⁵⁸⁷ Bob Dole, ‘Let Bosnia Control Its Own Future’, *Newsweek*, 7 August 1995, p. 31.

overriding his veto.⁵⁸⁸ Overall, the pressure from the Republican Congress made President Clinton, as Taylor Branch described, feel that “to accomplish anything was like threading a needle”.⁵⁸⁹

According to a *New York Times* - *CBS News* poll, 61 percent of respondents favored ending US participation in the UN arms embargo against Bosnia, with 24 percent opposed; however, most Americans did not believe that the United States had a responsibility to end the fighting in Bosnia. France, Britain, and some other countries with their troops in Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR threatened to withdraw if the United States acted on its own to lift the embargo.⁵⁹⁰ Holbrooke, now Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, indicated, “A vote for lifting the arms embargo is also a vote for the UN’s withdrawal, which is also a vote for the 25,000 troops to assist in the withdrawal.” He claimed that NATO would come to an end if the United States, as the leader of NATO, failed to support NATO allies in a difficult mission.⁵⁹¹

In early August, the success of the Croatian offensive to retake the Krajina area started to change the balance of power in the region and began a dramatic turn in the Balkan game. It was the first time that the Serbs had suffered a military setback in four years.⁵⁹² Clinton perceived it as an opportunity to open up for peace. The abandonment of the Croatian Serbs by Milosevic and the Croatian success on the battlefield also changed the psychology of all the parties and proved helpful in resolving the conflict.⁵⁹³ Clinton sent Lake and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff to Europe to promote a new version of the peace plan.⁵⁹⁴

Under the proposal, seven points were outlined:

- (1) a “comprehensive peace settlement”;
- (2) a three-way recognition among Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of

⁵⁸⁸ Bill Clinton, ‘The Risk of ‘Americanizing’ the War’’, *Newsweek*, 7 August 1995, p.26; Carroll J. Doherty, ‘Clinton Vetoes Bill Forcing Him To End Arms Embargo’, *Congressional Quarterly*, 12 August 1995, p. 2455; Jonathan Freedland, ‘Congress Votes To Arm Bosnians’, *The Guardian*, 2 August 1995.

⁵⁸⁹ Branch, *The Clinton Tapes*, p. 277.

⁵⁹⁰ Elaine Sciolino, ‘Defiant Senators Vote to Override Bosnian Arms Ban’, *New York Times*, 27 July 1995.

⁵⁹¹ House Committee on International Relations, ‘Overview of US Policy in Europe’, 28 July 1995 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 24, 25, 53, 50, 51.

⁵⁹² Holbrooke, *To End a War*, pp. 72-73.

⁵⁹³ Clinton, *My Life*, p. 667.

⁵⁹⁴ R. W. Apple Jr, ‘Clinton Sending 2 Foreign Policy Advisers to Europe With New Proposal on Balkans’, *New York Times*, 9 August 1995.

- Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);
- (3) the full lifting of all economic sanctions against Yugoslavia if a settlement was reached, and an American-backed program to equip and train the Croat-Muslim Federation forces if there was a settlement;
 - (4) the peaceful return to Croatia of eastern Slavonia - the tiny, oil-rich sliver of Croatian land on the Serbian border that had been seized by the Serbs;
 - (5) an all-out effort to pursue a cease-fire or an end to all offensive operations;
 - (6) a reaffirmation of support for the so-called Contact Group plan agreed to in June 1994 by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia – dividing Bosnia into two entities, 49 percent of the land going to the Bosnian Serbs, 51 percent to the Croat-Muslim Federation;
 - (7) a comprehensive program for regional economic reconstruction.⁵⁹⁵

The Lake-Tarnoff presentation to the Europeans was the “endgame” strategy, which was produced through the interagency process. In early 1995, Lake directed national security officials to review all policy options and to begin studying a final settlement of the Bosnian conflict. In late June, Lake reported the idea of the endgame strategy to Clinton. In early July, Lake began a series of weekly meetings that included Albright, Shalikhvili, Perry, and Christopher. On 9 August, Lake discussed the 31-page package of “endgame” papers, which was the result of work from the State Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NSC Staff, and the office of the UN Ambassador, together with Clinton and top foreign policy advisors. “Muddling through,” Lake wrote on the papers’ memo, “was no longer an option.” Clinton liked Lake’s approach, both in terms of the sticks and the carrots – bombing of the Serbs and peace talks. On the same day, with the administration’s full backing, Lake and Tarnoff were dispatched as presidential emissaries to Europe to sell the strategy to allies.⁵⁹⁶

Two years earlier, Christopher had made a similar trip to consult the allies about the administration’s proposal, “lift and strike”: to arm the Bosnian Government and bomb the Serbs. The European allies had rebelled and charged the United States with having no peacekeeping troops in Bosnia facing retaliation from the Serbs. The issue was that as long as the United States had no troops in Bosnia, the administration was put in the uncomfortable position of “leading from behind”. However, “this time Lake did not ask – he informed”. Lake gave the European leaders a very clear message: it was time for UNPROFOR to withdraw if it had to, so that UNPROFOR’s

⁵⁹⁵ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 74.

⁵⁹⁶ Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, pp. 38-44; Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, pp. 81-111; Woodward, *The Choice*, p. 265; Lake, *6 Nightmares*, p. 168.

credibility would not continue to stagger; and the United States would use much more vigorous bombing if necessary. Lake declared, “The President has made the following decisions. We want you to be with us; however, if you don’t, we’re going to go ahead and do it, anyway.” Surprisingly, the Europeans were ready to go ahead with the United States.⁵⁹⁷ Despite some skepticism, especially in Paris, and dislike of the idea of bombing, the allies were pleased to see the United States become engaged and willing to take the lead.⁵⁹⁸

The next stage of the President’s strategy was to send Holbrooke with a team of American diplomats to Bosnia to begin negotiations among the parties. The American plan included the Contact Group plan (the 51-49 territorial divisions between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serbs) and if the Bosnian Serbs objected, Western countries would jointly lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and train Bosnian troops, while halting the Serbs’ attacks with air strikes.⁵⁹⁹ On their way crossing Mount Igman to Sarajevo, three members of the Holbrooke team were killed. This tragedy became an emotional blow to Washington and stiffened the administration’s resolve to push forward.⁶⁰⁰ Holbrooke later described in his memoir that during his first ten months as Assistant Secretary, “most high-level meetings on Bosnia had a dispirited, inconclusive quality” and “there was little enthusiasm for any proposal of action”, and “the result was often inaction or half-measures instead of a clear strategy.” However, “the loss of three friends infused our meetings with a somber sense that there was no turning back.” In particular, Clinton was showing his own sense of urgency now.⁶⁰¹

In late August, in response to the Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo, killing 38 people, NATO Operation Deliberate Force began three days of air strikes on Serb targets in Bosnia. This time there were sustained NATO attacks on military targets instead of “pinpricks”. Holbrooke, who was initiating his diplomatic mission in the Balkans, described NATO’s response as the “most important test of American leadership since the end of the Cold War... not only in Bosnia but in Europe.”⁶⁰² In September, the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia, and the FRY agreed that a new republic of Bosnia would consist of two entities – a Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska (a new Serbian republic), sharing territory on a 51-49 percent basis.

⁵⁹⁷ Stephen Engelberg, ‘How Events Drew US into Balkans’, *New York Times*, 19 August 1995; Anthony Lake Interview in *PBS Frontline: The Clinton Years* [<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/clinton/interviews/lake.html>] 7 July 2008.

⁵⁹⁸ Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, pp. 113-114.

⁵⁹⁹ ‘America’s Plan for Bosnian Peace’, *New York Times*, 18 August 1995.

⁶⁰⁰ Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 350.

⁶⁰¹ Holbrooke, *To End the War*, p. 81.

⁶⁰² Hyland, *Clinton’s World*, p. 40-41.

Holbrooke regarded the Joint Agreed Principles as “an important milestone in the search for peace”.⁶⁰³ In the meantime, NATO air strikes continued to pound Bosnian Serb positions until mid-September when Holbrooke succeeded in reaching an agreement signed by the Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadzic and the military leader General Ratko Mladic to end the three-year siege of Sarajevo.⁶⁰⁴

In October, Clinton announced that the parties had agreed to a nationwide cease-fire, and soon they were scheduled to arrive in Dayton, Ohio, for the final talks. As a result of the combination of the Muslim-Croat ground offensive and NATO bombing, the Bosnian Serbs had lost almost 20 percent of the Bosnian territory it had controlled since the summer of 1992. Fearing more military and territorial losses, the Bosnian Serbs were ready to settle. Milosevic was also ready to compromise, since a peace agreement would lead to the end of economic sanctions and the possible reintegration of Serbia into the community of nations.⁶⁰⁵

When the conference opened on 1 November at Dayton, Christopher remarked in his opening speech:

The United States and the international community [also] have a vital stake in sustaining progress toward peace. If war in the Balkans is reunited, it could spark a wider conflict like those that drew American soldiers in huge numbers into two European wars in this century. If this conflict continues – and certainly if it spreads – it would jeopardize our efforts to promote stability and security in Europe as a Whole. It would threaten the viability of NATO, which has been the bedrock of European security for 50 years. If the conflict continues, so would the worst atrocities Europe has seen since World War II. As President Clinton has said, the “only way to stop these horrors is to make peace”. We must and we will stay engaged to advance our interests and to uphold our values.⁶⁰⁶

In his address to the Nation on 27 November, Clinton explained to the American people why the United States had to act on Bosnia. Firstly, the United States acted to end the suffering of the Bosnian people, and it fulfilled American ideals. Secondly, he highlighted that Europe’s stability was vital to US national interest and security:

Securing peace in Bosnia will [also] help to build a free and stable Europe. Bosnia lies at the very

⁶⁰³ Chris Hedges, ‘3 Enemies Agree to Serbian State as Part of Bosnia’, *New York Times*, 9 September 1995.

⁶⁰⁴ Clinton, *My Life*, p. 667.

⁶⁰⁵ Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, p. 135.

⁶⁰⁶ Warren Christopher, ‘The Promise of This Moment Must Be Fulfilled’, Statement at the Opening of the Balkan Proximity Peace Talks, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, 1 November 1995, reprinted in Christopher, *In The Stream of History*, pp. 361-362.

heart of Europe, next-door to many of its fragile new democracies and some of our closest allies. Generations of Americans have understood that Europe's freedom and Europe's stability is vital to our own national security. That's why we fought two wars in Europe. That's why we created NATO and waged the cold war. And that's why we must help the nations of Europe to end their worst nightmare since World War II, now.⁶⁰⁷

Thirdly, NATO's credibility was also a major concern. The President said:

The only force capable of getting this job done is NATO, the powerful military alliance of democracies that has guaranteed our security for half a century now. And as NATO's leader and the primary broker of the peace agreement, the United States must be an essential part of the mission. If we're not there, NATO will not be there; the peace will collapse; the war will reignite; the slaughter of innocents will begin again. A conflict that already has claimed so many victims could spread like poison throughout the region, eat away at Europe's stability, and erode our partnership with our European allies.⁶⁰⁸

Finally, America's leadership would be questioned if the conflict continued. Clinton made clear that:

When America's partnerships are weak and our leadership is in doubt, it undermines our ability to secure our interest and to convince others to work with us. If we do maintain our partnerships and leadership, we need not act alone. As we saw in the Gulf war and in Haiti, many other nations who share our goals will also share our burdens. But when America does not lead, the consequences can be very grave, not only for others but eventually for us as well.⁶⁰⁹

Later, Clinton reinforced the importance of Europe's stability, NATO's viability, and American leadership to US strategic interests as a whole:

Europe's security is still inextricably tied to America's. We need a strong Europe as a strong partner on the problem from terrorism to the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Europe's stability is threatened as long as this war burns at its center. We have to stand with the Europeans on Bosnia if we're going to stand with them and if we expect them to stand with us, on the whole range of other issues we clearly are going to face together in the years ahead. Our engagement in Bosnia is also essential for the continued viability of NATO. All the parties there, asked for NATO's help in securing this peace. If we're going to be NATO's leader, we have to be part of this mission. If we turn our backs

⁶⁰⁷ 'Address to the Nation on Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina', 27 November 1995, *Public Papers*, p. 1785.

⁶⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 1785-1786.

⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1786.

on Bosnia now; our allies will do the same... NATO would be shaken at its core. Its ability to shape a stable, undivided Europe would be thrown into doubt, and our leadership in Europe and around the world would pay a terrible price... We cannot be the world's policeman. But when our leadership can make a difference between war and peace and when our interests are engaged, we have a duty to act.⁶¹⁰

At the end of the Dayton talks, the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia finally reached a peace agreement, the Dayton Peace Accords. It was formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. It ended the worst conflict in Europe since World War II. Albright concluded that three factors contributed to ending the Bosnian war: the overreaching on the part of the Bosnian Serbs, the changing military situation engineered by the successful Croatian offensive, and Clinton's willingness to lead.⁶¹¹ Furthermore, James Gow commented that the critical difference between the failure of Vance-Owen in 1993 and the success of Dayton in 1995 was the absence of unity and, after all, "the lack of political will, particularly with regard to the use of force which was necessary if there were to be any chance of success."⁶¹²

The success of the Dayton agreement and the end of the Bosnian War was a crucial achievement for the Clinton administration's foreign policy. Firstly, it reinforced the unity of the Transatlantic Alliance and reaffirmed the role of American leadership in the Alliance. Secondly, it defined a new purpose for the role of NATO in Europe's security architecture in the post-Cold War era, transforming from a mere mutual defense organization into an instrument of collective security beyond its borders. Thirdly, the involvement of Russia and Central European countries in the military Implementation Force (IFOR) proved that NATO and former Warsaw Pact nations could build a cooperative relationship. Finally, it demonstrated that the Clinton's vision of a Europe that was undivided, peaceful, and democratic was well on the way to come into effect. The core element of this vision was NATO enlargement, and it was NATO's air campaign that had helped end the war and reach the Dayton agreement that brought to an end one of the most difficult periods in the history of US-European relations. Without Dayton, an expanded NATO might appear meaningless and irrelevant to the future.⁶¹³

⁶¹⁰ 'Remarks to the Committee for American Leadership in Bosnia and an Exchange With Reporters', 6 December 1995, *Public Papers*, pp. 1844-1845.

⁶¹¹ Christopher, *In The Stream of History*, pp. 353-357; Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 192.

⁶¹² Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, p. 2.

⁶¹³ Christopher, *In The Stream of History*, pp. 358-359; Robert Wright, 'Who lost Bosnia?', *The New Republic*, 29 May 1995, p. 6; Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, p. 179; Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, p. 200.

At this stage, in Holbrooke's words, "in only eighteen weeks in 1995 – when the situation seemed most hopeless – the United States put its prestige on the line with a rapid and dramatic series of high-risk actions: an all-out diplomatic effort in August, heavy NATO bombing in September, a cease-fire in October, Dayton in November, and, in December, the deployment of twenty thousand American troops to Bosnia. Suddenly, the war was over – and America's role in post-Cold War Europe redefined."⁶¹⁴

5.2 Explaining the Clinton Administration's Intervention in Bosnia

Why did the Clinton administration decide to intervene in Bosnia and ultimately to take the lead to end Europe's most bloody war since World War II? From the beginning of the Bosnian War, there were two voices within the United States: one was supporting a US intervention for either moral or strategic reasons; the other was opposing any intervention because of the fear of becoming entangled in a Vietnam-like quagmire.⁶¹⁵ As James Goldgeier described,

...because he [President Clinton] asked Colin Powell the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff how many troops would be required to do Bosnia. Colin Powell tells him, you would need 200,000 American troops and it's jungle fighting and mountain fighting and, yeah, they weren't going to do it.⁶¹⁶

At the time, Powell was a powerful figure within the administration. He dominated Clinton's foreign policy councils until his departure in September 1993.

The Powell Doctrine, based on his understanding of the Vietnam War, had a powerful influence on the public's mind. Since it was not clear whether there was any national interest at stake in Bosnia, Clinton was unsure about whether or not to use force there and feared that there would be a lack of public support. Even the strongest hawks in the Congress were dead against putting any US troops on the ground. The first year of Clinton's presidency was undoubtedly the test of the Powell Doctrine. On the other hand, there was a general consensus that Bosnia was "a European problem" in the early Clinton administration.⁶¹⁷

The strains within the alliance over Bosnia mounted after the assault by the Serbs on Bihac. Many of the administration's officials worried that "continued squabbling

⁶¹⁴ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 360.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid.

⁶¹⁶ Interview with James Goldgeier on 7 July 2008.

⁶¹⁷ Blumenthal, *The Clinton Wars*, pp. 63-64; Lake, *6 Nightmares*, p. 143.

over Bosnian tactics was eating away at the foundation of the Atlantic alliance”.⁶¹⁸ Clinton’s foreign policy aides became gradually aware that the tensions with NATO’s allies resulted from the lack of American leadership. The Clinton White House had come to the conclusion that “as the months of war turned into years, it became clear that Europe alone could not end the conflict”.⁶¹⁹ “The longer the war dragged on, the greater it undermined the credibility of NATO, the United Nations, and the United States, making Clinton look unsure, weak, and ineffective”.⁶²⁰

By the summer of 1995, the crisis in Bosnia had reached a new level. In May, in response to “pinprick” NATO air strikes, the Bosnian Serb forces took hundreds of UNPROFOR personnel hostage. The UN exposed its incompetence and weakness in the Balkan quagmire and thus gained a humiliating international image.⁶²¹ There was a wide debate over UNPROFOR’s withdrawal. “If this happened,” Christopher recalled, “the United States was committed to contributing ground troops to a NATO force that would help ensure a safe withdrawal. I felt that this would be an embarrassing as well as perilous use of American forces, but, on the other hand, failure to keep our commitment would undermine our credibility as the leader of the Alliance.”⁶²² Holbrooke argued, “We need to work in partnership with the Alliance on a large number of other issues – the enlargement of NATO, a common policy toward the former Soviet Union, the Mideast, and Iran, terrorism, human rights, the environment, and organized crime – but Bosnia had begun to adversely affect everything.”⁶²³

At the same time, Senator Dole, the majority leader and the likely Republican presidential candidate for 1996, was leading a campaign in Congress to urge a unilateral lifting of the UN arms embargo, which would result in an immediate withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the deployment of US ground troops to help the withdrawal. This was the kind of risk-taking behaviour that the administration tried to avoid in resolving the Bosnia issue.⁶²⁴ On the other hand, the Clinton administration controversially allowed Iranian arms to flow into Bosnia, something which might further destabilize the region.⁶²⁵ Above all, the loss of both houses of

⁶¹⁸ Hyland, *Clinton’s World*, p. 38.

⁶¹⁹ ‘Address to the Nation on Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, p. 1786.

⁶²⁰ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, p. 123.

⁶²¹ Woodward, *The Choice*, p. 254; Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, pp. 163-164.

⁶²² Christopher, *In The Stream of History*, p. 348.

⁶²³ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, pp. 83- 84.

⁶²⁴ Daalder, ‘Decision to Intervene’.

⁶²⁵ Daniel Williams, ‘Acquiescence on Iran Arms Taken as an Indicator’, *Washington Post*, 15 April 1995.

the Congress in the 1994 election “added to all the failures of the past two years and raised doubts in the entire Clinton team about whether it was up to the job”. “The story in Bosnia, then, was in transition from being a foreign one to a domestic one, like Vietnam”, especially as the Bosnia tragedy had the capacity to occupy all front pages and headline news as long as it continued. Clinton was beginning to see that Bosnia had influenced judgements on his presidency, both internationally and domestically, and blocked progress on other aspects of his presidency.⁶²⁶ Most importantly, it could have a severe impact on his 1996 reelection campaign.

To sum up, the undermining of credibility at home and abroad, NATO’s credibility and stability in Europe, the challenge from Capitol Hill, and the incoming reelection campaign all drove the Clinton administration’s decision to use force against the Serbs in mid-1995. It seemed that the Srebrenica Massacre was the catalyst for a 180-degree turn in Clinton’s attitude and policies;⁶²⁷ however, David Halberstam argued that Bosnia had not become “an all-consuming issue”. Yet many of Clinton’s top advisors started to worry that Bosnia was becoming “not just a moral problem but potentially a domestic political one as well”. From the beginning, Lake had warned that it would become a cancer that could destroy the Clinton administration’s entire foreign policy if they failed to come up with a viable policy on Bosnia.⁶²⁸

“There is no question that the President’s support for the Bosnia initiative in 1995 was driven not only by his horror at the suffering abroad and damage to our interests, but also by the sense that the ongoing conflict was starting to damage him at home”, Lake recalled, “And there is no question that for political reasons Morris urged the President to act.”⁶²⁹ During the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton made his first speech on Bosnia in July at Little Rock, saying:

The continuing attacks by Serbian elements in Bosnia threaten the delivery of urgently needed humanitarian aid, jeopardize the safety of UN personnel and put at risk the lives of thousands of citizens..... The United States should take the lead in seeking UN Security Council authorization for air strikes against those who are attacking the relief effort. The United States should be prepared to lend appropriate military support to that operation. Air and naval forces adequate to carry out these operations should be visibly in position.⁶³⁰

⁶²⁶ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, pp. 306-307, 297-299.

⁶²⁷ Hyland, *Clinton’s World*, p. 39.

⁶²⁸ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, p. 302.

⁶²⁹ Lake, *6 Nightmares*, p. 261.

⁶³⁰ Quoted in Andrew Rosenthal, ‘Clinton Attack on Foreign Policy’, *New York Times*, 28 July 1992.

Nevertheless, for nearly two and a half years of his presidency, what he promised on Bosnia did not come into effect. His own credibility was being undermined. The news of Bosnia was kept in headlines across all the media, but by 1995, the Clinton administration still could not accomplish anything. Lake argued that the war was gradually becoming a symbol of the administration's foreign policy as a whole. Ultimately, facing the upcoming election year of 1996, the administration decided that they had to "do something about it" before the reelection campaign.⁶³¹

Besides, as Ivo H. Daalder, an NSC staffer working on the Bosnia issue at the time, argued, "The day-to-day crisis management approach that had characterized the Clinton administration's Bosnia strategy had lost virtually all credibility. It was clear that events on the ground and decisions in allied capitals as well as on the Capitol Hill were forcing the administration to seek an alternative to muddling through."⁶³² On the other hand, the more confrontational Congress also drove the President's decision to get more involved. As Gore stated, "It's driving us into a brick wall with Congress." Moreover, one advisor said, "He [Clinton] was about to lose control of foreign policy on a fundamental issue. The passage of the Dole bill made the President and others more aware of the political danger, that Congress could do real damage to American foreign policy, and of the problems presented by Presidential politics – meaning Dole."⁶³³ Dole had criticized the administration's fecklessness and weakness in Bosnia for years. It was believed that "the Republican majority in both the House and Senate was behind Dole on this one, pushing legislation aimed right at the heart of the United Nations' and the Clinton administration's policy".⁶³⁴

Perhaps it was right to say, as with Baker's phrase (the US 'had no dog in this fight'), that the United States had no primary vital interest at stake in the Balkans; however, the United States had to deal with European security and the NATO alliance, which were considered as secondary interests.⁶³⁵ For instance, Daniel P. Serwer stated:

⁶³¹ Interview with Victor Jackovich on 17 July 2008. Jackovich was US Ambassador to Bosnia in 1992-95; Interview with Goldgeier; Sciolino, 'Bosnia Policy Shaped by US Military Role'; 'Enter the Americans', *The Economist*, Vol. 336, No. 7796 (19 August 1995), p. 31.

⁶³² Daalder, 'Decision to Intervene'.

⁶³³ Drew, *Showdown*, p. 252.

⁶³⁴ Woodward, *The Choice*, p. 255.

⁶³⁵ Interviews with Goldgeier; Jackovich; Gary J. Schmitt on 18 June 2008. Schmitt was a consultant to the US Department of Defense in 1992-93 and Executive Director of the neo-conservative Project for the New American Century in 1997-2005; Daniel P. Serwer on 16 July 2008. Serwer was the US special envoy and coordinator for the Bosnian Federation from 1994 to 1996. He negotiated the first agreement reached at the Dayton peace talks; Charles A. Kupchan on 22 July 2008. Kupchan was Director for European Affairs at National Security Council in 1993-94; Janusz Bugajski on 30 June 2008. Bugajski is Director of the New European Democracies Project and senior fellow in the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies; John Sittlides on 19 June 2008. Sittlides is the Chairman, Board of Advisors, and Southeast Europe Project at Woodrow Wilson International

James Baker in the beginning of the 90s said we had no dog in that fight. He was right, there are no vital American interests at stake in the Balkans. The trouble was, that there was an accumulation of secondary interests, not primary interests but secondary, having to do with the NATO alliance, holding it together, having to do with the CNN effect, the impact on the Muslim population in the Balkans. It was a series of secondary interests that accumulated to the point that we might not have a dog in that fight but the Europeans did and we were gonna have to help out.⁶³⁶

Similarly, Goldgeier said:

I don't think there was a huge national interest in the Balkans, but to the extent that the United States felt that there was any kind of national interest I think you sort of had two things. One, a general notion that stability in Europe was important for American interests and if there was an unstable part of Europe then the United States needed to do something about that. And just fears that there would be other types of situations like that, that would emerge in other parts of Europe. And then the second was NATO, that the United States wanted to ensure that NATO continued to function effectively after the end of the Cold War, and even though this wasn't a mission that was a traditional NATO mission, it did come to be seen as influencing the credibility of NATO, that there was this sense that if NATO couldn't deal with something right there in Europe that it wasn't going to be able to deal with things outside, that it wasn't going to be relevant to the post-Cold War world. So I think both stability in Europe and NATO's credibility were things that were important to people in Washington.⁶³⁷

Ambassador Kirkpatrick pointed out regarding US strategic interests in Yugoslavia:

They are manifest in our participation in World War I and in World War II and in the long decades of the cold war afterward. Our own society is grounded in European civilization. We share a civilization. I do not believe countries either thrive or survive without the survival of the civilizations of which they are a part.⁶³⁸

Furthermore, Holbrooke stated:

America's strategic political and economic interests in Europe remain as vital to us now as they have been at any time since 1945. And we are not going to allow the tragedy in Bosnia to wreck American's long-term national security and economic interests in the rest of Europe.

Center for Scholars.

⁶³⁶ Interview with Serwer.

⁶³⁷ Interviews with Goldgeier.

⁶³⁸ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 'American Policy in Bosnia', p. 8.

We have, for example, a high priority of extending the institutions of Europe eastward into Central Europe and bringing stability and democracy to the rest of Central Europe. Bosnia is an object lesson in why that has to be done since Bosnia is clearly the greatest collective failure of the West since the late 1930's.⁶³⁹

After all, “the value of the Administration’s other achievements in Europe would be dependent on what happened in Bosnia”.⁶⁴⁰ Therefore, the United States had to intervene for the sake of a larger US-European interest. The idea of building a Europe that was whole, free, and democratic also made the United States feel compelled to assist Europe to stop genocidal wars taking place on European territory. As John Sittilides described,

I think especially on the first front [Bosnia] there was far less of a perceived direct threat to US national security than a larger threat to what one might call a new international balance in Europe between the European Union and our European allies in the NATO alliance and forces that were just emerging into democracy in Eastern Europe with the collapse of the Cold War, and the idea that Europe, half a century after World War II, was in the grips of yet another genocidal onslaught and was politically and diplomatically ill-suited to stop the genocide and to engage the perpetrators of genocide militarily after repeated diplomatic and political failures, compelled the United States to intervene at a leadership level to help restore balance between forces on the ground and allow for a diplomatic solution to the Serbia-Bosnia conflict after a greater balance of forces militarily, so essentially it was because Europe was unable to prevent war in Europe that the United States had to intervene for the sake of a larger US-European interest, not because American interests were directly imperiled by what Serbs were doing to Bosniacs or the three-way war between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia.⁶⁴¹

Moreover, the United States, as a leader of NATO, was looking weaker as NATO looked weaker in terms of protecting the UN force. During his trip to Europe in late 1994, Dole argued that the alliance was in jeopardy of becoming “irrelevant” as a result of its performance in Bosnia. Thus, “the need for us to protect and preserve the alliance is driving our policy,” as Vice President Gore said.⁶⁴² “Even the sophisticated countries of Europe were not yet capable of maintaining regional security agreements without US leadership, and our assurance means more to them than we realize,” President Clinton said.⁶⁴³ This was the key reason for the intervention, as Janusz Bugajski stated,

⁶³⁹ House Committee on International Relations, ‘Overview of US Policy in Europe’, p. 8.

⁶⁴⁰ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 61.

⁶⁴¹ Interview with Sittilides.

⁶⁴² Woodward, *The Choice*, p. 255; Carroll J. Doherty, ‘Dole Takes a Political Risk in Crusade to Aid Bosnia’, *Congressional Quarterly*, 11 March 1995, p. 763.

⁶⁴³ Branch, *The Clinton Tapes*, p. 327.

The war began in 91/92 and it went on for three years in Croatia and Bosnia before intervention. The US was losing a lot of prestige that it wasn't intervening, that it was allowing for mass slaughters in Bosnia, the European Union itself was not being very effective, NATO was not involved, so the alliance was losing credibility and I think this was the key reason for the intervention, a reason in other words to restore the credibility of NATO, to give really NATO a purpose, a mission in the post-Cold War world.⁶⁴⁴

It was also about affirming US leadership.⁶⁴⁵ Gary Schmitt emphasized,

I think the primary reason why the US eventually decided to intervene in the Balkans was because it saw itself as having a position of transatlantic leadership and then indirectly global leadership. I would say the real concern was its capacity to, or the ramifications for not leading within the transatlantic relationship and what that would do to the alliance and then secondarily if the alliance was not healthy how that would impact on our capacity to lead globally. So there's a kind of a very subtle interplay between our alliance partners that needs to be understood to understand what the US was thinking so it wasn't... Washington wasn't simply looking at the Balkans from its own perspective it was also looking at the Balkans from the perspective of the alliance which of course is of interest to us to maintain its being healthy so it's a national interest but it's a more complex national interest than is commonly understood.⁶⁴⁶

Another concern was to prevent the creation of "a non-viable rump Muslim state" that would be a platform for Iranian terrorism in Europe. Since Iran was equipping the Bosnian Muslims with weapons and training them, there was a fear that Iran would gain a foot-hold in Bosnia. As Samantha Power stated:

People victimized by genocide or abandoned by the international community do not make good neighbors, as their thirst for vengeance, their irredentism, and their acceptance of violence as a means of generating change can turn them into future threats. In Bosnia, where the United States and Europe maintained an arms embargo against the Muslims, extremist Islamic fighters and proselytizers eventually turned up to offer support... The failed state of Bosnia became a haven for Islamic terrorists shunned elsewhere in the world.⁶⁴⁷

Thus, Serwer stated,

⁶⁴⁴ Interview with Bugajski.

⁶⁴⁵ David, 'At Least 2001', p. 9.

⁶⁴⁶ Interview with Schmitt.

⁶⁴⁷ Samantha Power, *A problem from Hell*, p. 513.

... the reason we intervened, more than anything else, more I think even than the humanitarian considerations, was to prevent the creation of this Islamic state.... So it wasn't a primary vital American interest, it wasn't the United States that was really at risk from the creation of this Islamic state in Bosnia, it was Europe that was at risk. But, you know, it was right after the Cold War, we still believed that our security and European security were very closely tied.⁶⁴⁸

One critical aspect of the Dayton process was to remove Iranian Revolutionary Guards or foreign mujahideen fighters from Bosnia, and to end the Bosnian Government's military and intelligence relationship with Iran.⁶⁴⁹ The investigations into the administration's secret policy of permitting Iran to arm the Bosnian Muslims, which resulted in Iran's influence expanding in Bosnia, began in April 1994. In 1996, the Senate Intelligence Committee held several hearings concerning the events.⁶⁵⁰

Lastly, the reasons for the Clinton administration to intervene in Bosnia could be summarised as follows:

Policymakers had very real concerns: the potential for Europe cleaving along Christian-Muslim lines, unchecked flows of drugs, guns, and people through a no-man's land in southeastern Europe, and the unwanted economic consequences of war and instability in the heart of Europe. Standing on the sidelines had by 1995 damaged the United States' prestige and moral authority. Especially in the new globalized age, the superpower was expected to act in the face of Europe's obvious inability to stem the slaughter of innocent that had pledged "never again" just fifty years before....⁶⁵¹

Conclusion

In the first stage of decision-making on Bosnia, as William Hyland put it, "the United States had no real strategy: Vance-Owen was dead; lift and strike was dead; military intervention had been ruled out; there was no prospect of a settlement."⁶⁵² In order to discourage a wider war, it seemed that "constrict and contain" had replaced "lift and strike".⁶⁵³ The primary reason for the failure of the "lift and strike" policy was the Europeans' concern about the safety of their peacekeepers on the ground. Despite that, the Clinton administration still insisted on a multilateral effort to resolve the Bosnian conflict.

⁶⁴⁸ Interview with Serwer.

⁶⁴⁹ Lauren Van Metre and Burcu Akan, 'Dayton Implementation: The Train and Equip Program', *USIP Special Report No. 25*, September 1997
[https://origin.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/dayton_imp/train_equip.html] 20 July 2009.

⁶⁵⁰ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 51; Carroll J. Doherty, 'Two Diplomats Defend Policy On Iran's Aid to Bosnia', *Congressional Quarterly*, 1 June 1996, p. 1544.

⁶⁵¹ Soderberg, *The Superpower Myth*, p. 78.

⁶⁵² Hyland, *Clinton's World*, p. 38.

⁶⁵³ John Newhouse, 'No Exit, No Entrance', *New Yorker*, 28 June 1993, p. 51.

Obviously, Clinton was clear that the United States ought to stand up against the principle of ethnic cleansing, and as the only superpower, the United States had the responsibility to lead. But he was uncertain about what kind of measures should be undertaken to achieve the objectives. In particular, there were debates over whether the United States had any interest in Bosnia. Some claimed that with the Cold War over, the country should keep its distance from engaging in foreign affairs, in particular as there was no vital interest at stake in Bosnia. However, some argued that the United States had strategic interests, for example that the conflict could spill over into neighboring countries and disturb Europe's stability, which would indirectly affect US interests. Although the Clinton administration recognized that there were humanitarian interests and a potential for regional instability in Europe (which would impact US interests), it seemed that these were not sufficient to justify using military force to intervene.

In the next stage, the Clinton administration was diplomatically active. It succeeded in persuading NATO allies to conduct air strikes against the Serbs and in brokering the Muslim-Croat Federation. Also, with the administration's support, the Contact Group and its plan were created and Russia was brought into the process. However, the Clinton White House encountered intensified criticism and difficulties on its Bosnia policy with the electoral victories of the Republicans in both houses of Congress in late 1994; in particular, Senator Dole continued to push for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.

The unilateral move received strong resistance from the European allies as it would expose their peacekeeping troops to greater risks. This also led to the allies' criticism that the United States refused to take part in an allied ground operation and only wanted to rely on the threat of NATO air strikes. In face of increasing intensified trans-Atlantic frictions and the possibility of UN withdrawal, the administration's ultimate decision to contribute troops to assist the withdrawal was considered more associated with NATO solidarity than the Bosnia conflict itself. In the meantime, Iran's arms deliveries to the Muslim-led Bosnian Government eventually raised the concern that Bosnia would be a link to terrorism.

Due to the escalation of fighting after the four-month cease-fire, the decision-making process entered into a new stage. The Clinton administration faced more challenges from the allies' criticism, in particular from the newly-elected French president Jacques Chirac, as a result of the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR and its possibility

of withdrawal. Ultimately, the Srebrenica massacre stimulated the moral consciousness of people around the world as well as driving more attention to the world's only superpower, the United States. As long as the Bosnia conflict endured, it seemed that it was more associated with presidential effectiveness rather than foreign policy. The administration developed the "endgame" strategy, which would commit the full force of US diplomacy, including the threat of unilateral military force if necessary. As Herbert Okun, Vance's deputy at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), stated: "Diplomacy without the threat of force is like baseball without a bat".⁶⁵⁴

On the other hand, Chirac's statements and requests, the pictures on television of the refugees' horrible conditions from Srebrenica, and the pressure from Capitol Hill all contributed to the President's decision to become engaged in August 1995. The Clinton administration hoped to show significant progress towards a settlement before Congress returned to override the President's veto of legislation lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government by early September. Moreover, the President gradually recognized both that the Bosnia issue would be a political time bomb that could go off in the coming 1996 presidential campaign,⁶⁵⁵ and the dangers Bosnia posed to America's relationship with Europe, the United Nations, and NATO.

"For three years, the Clinton Administration felt constrained by fears that decisive action would damage relations with Europe; now it believed that the relationship would be hurt *without* decisive action. It believed that nothing less than the credibility and solidarity of the entire Transatlantic Alliance was at stake".⁶⁵⁶ As a result of the Muslim-Croat offensive (the renewed determination of European allies with the combination of NATO's continuous air strikes), the Bosnian Serbs were forced to the negotiation table.⁶⁵⁷ Finally, the peace settlement, the Dayton agreement, was reached at the end of 1995.

Overall, the Clinton administration's intervention in Bosnia was for secondary, not primary, interests, such as NATO's credibility and European stability and security. Domestic concerns such as the challenge from Capitol Hill and the incoming reelection campaign also drove the administration to use force against the Serbs in mid-1995. Moreover, the position of American leadership in the world and the

⁶⁵⁴ David Rieff, 'Almost Justice', *The New Republic*, 6 July 1998, p. 32.

⁶⁵⁵ Drew, *Showdown*, p. 250; Engelberg, 'How Events Drew US into Balkans'.

⁶⁵⁶ Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, p. 28.

⁶⁵⁷ 'Address to the Nation on Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina', p. 1786.

president's own credibility at home and abroad were some of the reasons for the United States to become fully engaged in resolving the Bosnian crisis. However, it seemed that humanitarian interest alone was not sufficient to justify sending military forces to save innocent civilians in Bosnia.

Chapter 6.

The Clinton Administration's Intervention in Kosovo

Introduction

At the close of the Cold War, Kosovo was an Albanian-inhabited autonomous province of Serbia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The majority ethnic Albanian population was Muslim, while the ethnic Serb population was Orthodox. Slav and Albanian populations had been settled in Kosovo since the 8th century, and Muslim Albanians shifted to this region in the later Ottoman period. After the First Balkan War, there was an eastward expansion of the Albanian population again and a frontier was formed between the two main ethnic groups – Serbs and Albanians - in Serbia. Serb-Albanian relations, as a result of the different roots - cultural and religious alignments, and regional variations - had experienced a series of bloody encounters in historical record.

The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution under Josef Tito's government granted Kosovo a significant degree of political autonomy, which was substantively identical to that of the six constituent socialist republics of Yugoslavia. However, when Slobodan Milosevic, a Serb nationalist, became President of Serbia, he illegally revoked Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 and replaced it with direct rule from Belgrade. Kosovar Albanians were excluded from all forms of public life.

In the early 1990s, Dr Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), began to campaign for a peaceful resistance movement against Serbia. The LDK created a new republican assembly and government, and Rugova was elected as the president of the "Republic of Kosovo". They pursued various policies: nonviolent revolt; international political involvement, such as visiting foreign capitals and setting up a UN Trusteeship over Kosovo in order to internationalize the problem and change Western powers' perception that the Kosovo issue was an internal issue for Serbia; and denial of the legitimacy of Serbian rule.⁶⁵⁸

Despite the awareness of Kosovo as a powder keg in the middle of a highly volatile region which include Albania, Greece, and Turkey, Kosovo was not the centrepiece of American and European Balkan policy. On the other hand, Western policy-makers

⁶⁵⁸ 'Background Note: Kosovo', Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, *US Department of State*, June 2009 [<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/100931.htm>] 28 July 2009; Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (London: Pan, 2002), pp. 2-263, 347-348; Alex J. Bellamy, 'Human Wrongs in Kosovo: 1974-99', in Ken Booth (ed.), *The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 112-113.

tended to view Kosovar Albanians as a minority ethnic group which might express their individual human rights to claim political and cultural status but not the right to form a state by applying the principle of self-determination. The European Community (EC) rejected Kosovo's request for recognition as an independent state in December 1991.⁶⁵⁹

Fearing that the war in the former Yugoslavia could spread into Kosovo as tensions increased there, the George H. W. Bush administration warned Serbian President Milosevic, "In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper."⁶⁶⁰ This so-called Christmas warning was reaffirmed in Secretary of State Warren Christopher's statement on 10 February 1993, "We remain prepared to respond against the Serbians in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action."⁶⁶¹ As Christopher stated before a House Committee in March, "We fear that if the Serbian influence extends into either of these areas, it will bring into the fray other countries in that region – Albania, Greece, Turkey and from there, on it could extend very broadly." He further stated, "So the stakes for the United States, are to prevent the broadening of that conflict to bring in our NATO allies, and to bring vast sections of Europe, and perhaps as happened before, broadening into a world war."⁶⁶² Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrooke repeated the Christmas warning to Serbia during the Dayton negotiations. However, in order to affirm Serbia's territorial integrity, the Dayton Peace Accords did not address the Kosovo issue to any significant degree.

Frustrated by Rugova's lack of progress, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), whose primary goal was to secure the independence of Kosovo, emerged in 1997. The KLA smuggled arms from its anarchic neighbor, Albania, and initiated a series of attacks against Serb targets in order to get international attention.⁶⁶³ The aggressive action against Serbian forces by the KLA and ethnic cleansing against Kosovar Albanians by Serbian forces resulted in an intensified internal armed conflict in Kosovo

⁶⁵⁹ Ivo H. Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2000), p. 9; Richard Caplan, 'International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo', *International Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (October 1998), pp. 748-749.

⁶⁶⁰ David Binder, 'Bush Warns Serbs Not to Widen War', *New York Times*, 28 December 1992.

⁶⁶¹ Warren Christopher, 'New Steps Toward Conflict Resolution In the Former Yugoslavia', *Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 7, 15 February 1993.

⁶⁶² Stephen Engelberg, 'Weighing Strikes in Bosnia, US Warns of Wider War', *New York Times*, 25 April 1999.

⁶⁶³ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, pp. 2-263; Robert C. DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo* (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), p. 133; 'Background Note: Kosovo'; Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America in an Age of Genocide* (New York: Times Books, 2002), p. 445.

between February 1998 and March 1999.⁶⁶⁴

This chapter will examine the reasons for the Clinton administration's decisions to intervene in the Kosovo conflict. In the first section, it divides the decision-making process into three stages. The news about the killings of Kosovar Albanians by Serb forces in Prekaz (in Kosovo) as well as conflicts between Serbian and Yugoslav security forces and the KLA in late February and early March of 1998 began to draw the Clinton White House's attention. However, it was not until the Racak incident in January 1999 that Washington started to take meaningful action.

The Clinton administration supported the Rambouillet peace talks initiated by the Contact Group; while at the same time was united with the NATO alliance on the readiness to launch air strikes against Serbia if the Serb side rejected the peace plan. As a result of the Serb rejection of the plan, the administration, unlike in Bosnia, was quick to respond to the Kosovo conflict and take the lead. In the second section, this chapter will explore the reasons why the Clinton administration decided to become engaged in the Kosovo conflict.

6.1 The Clinton Administration's Decision-making Process on Kosovo

6.1.1 Decision-making Stage 1: February ~ November 1998

In late February and early March 1998, the clashes between Serbian security forces and the KLA in the Drenica region, a stronghold of the KLA, led to about 70 dead. This included Adem Jashari, the KLA commander, and twenty members of his family. The violence was the worst since Kosovar Albanians had begun to campaign for regaining their autonomy status. The event in some ways paralleled the actions of Serbian forces during the Bosnian War.⁶⁶⁵ The Kosovo conflict thus began to command the Clinton administration's attention.

On 23 February, when Robert Gelbard, who had taken Holbrooke's former position as US special envoy to the Balkans, visited Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, he described the KLA as "a terrorist group". Yet even he changed his statement to say that the KLA had "committed terrorist acts" but "not been classified legally by the US Government as a terrorist organization" before the House International Relations Committee one month later.⁶⁶⁶ His description of KLA as a terrorist group was

⁶⁶⁴ Carrie Booth Walling, 'The History and Politics of Ethnic Cleansing', in Ken Booth (ed.), *The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 50-55.

⁶⁶⁵ 'Strife in Kosovo Leaves 20 Dead', *New York Times*, 2 March 1998; Chris Hedges, 'New Serbia Fighting Recalls Bosnia War', *New York Times*, 6 March 1998; Chris Hedges, 'On a Garage Floor in Kosovo, a Gruesome Serbian Harvest', *New York Times*, 10 March 1998.

⁶⁶⁶ Philip Shenon, 'US Says It Might Consider Attacking Serbs', *New York Times*, 13 March 1998.

accused as giving the Serbian authorities a “green light” with a legitimate pretext for brutally unlawful measures. For example, Gorica Gajeric, secretary-general of the ruling Socialist Party, defended their position in Belgrade; “Serbia will fight terrorism the same way the rest of the world does”.⁶⁶⁷

President Bill Clinton remarked on the violence in Kosovo, “We do not want the Balkans to have more pictures like we’ve seen in the last few days, so reminiscent of what Bosnia endured.”⁶⁶⁸ Madeleine Albright, who now was Secretary of State, urged the administration to stop Milosevic (then Yugoslav president)⁶⁶⁹ immediately. As she wrote in her memoir, “With Franjo Tudjman’s health failing in Croatia and Bosnia finally stable, Milosevic was the last powerful obstacle to the integration of the Balkans into a democratic Europe.” Since the Kosovo conflict erupted, she had tried to ‘lead’ European allies, US public opinion, and her own government “through rhetoric”. She stressed, “We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia.”⁶⁷⁰

Within days of the Serb attacks in the Drenica region, the foreign ministers of the Contact Group, the same group dealing with the Bosnian War and later joined by Italy, met in London to discuss the situation in Kosovo. At the London conference, Secretary Albright urged immediate action, saying:

When the war in the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, the international community did not react with sufficient vigor and force. Each small act of aggression that we did not oppose led to larger acts of aggression that we could not oppose without great risk to ourselves. Only when those responsible paid for their actions with isolation and hardship did the war end. It took us seven years to bring Bosnia to this moment of hope. It must not take us that long to resolve the crisis that is growing in Kosovo; and it does not have to if we apply the lessons of 1991. This time, we must act with unity and resolve. This time, we must respond before it is too late.⁶⁷¹

⁶⁶⁷ Caplan, ‘International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo’, pp. 753-754.

⁶⁶⁸ ‘Remarks Prior to Discussion With United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and an Exchange With Reporters’, 11 March 1998, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, p. 409.

⁶⁶⁹ Since Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia seceded from the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992, Serbia and Montenegro jointly formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with its capital in Belgrade, on 27 April 1992. Slobodan Milosevic became Yugoslav president in 1997. See ‘Background Note: Serbia’, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, *US Department of State*, June 2009 [<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5388.htm>] 29 July 2009; ‘Timeline: Serbia’, *BBC News*, 7 April 2010 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/5055726.stm] 28 April 2010.

⁶⁷⁰ Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir* (London: MacMillan, 2003), pp. 381, 380; Steven Erlanger, ‘Albright Warns Serbs on Kosovo Violence’, *New York Times*, 8 March 1998; Barton Gellman, ‘The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War’, *Washington Post*, 18 April 1999.

⁶⁷¹ Madeleine Albright, ‘Statement at the Contact Group Ministerial on Kosovo’, *US Department of*

The main point of Albright's view was not to make the same mistake as in Bosnia. Albright's enthusiasm for compelling Milosevic to change his policies on Kosovo was shared by British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook. Cook suggested a "stick, carrot, stick" approach, which imposed sanctions on Milosevic, and those sanctions were only to get lifted when Milosevic took steps and to be tightened if he did not.

Despite the disputes between the foreign ministers of the Contact Group at the beginning of the meeting, they, except for Russia, achieved a consensus on the threat of sanctions. The second Contact Group meeting was held on 25 March in Bonn. France and Germany were ready to confront Moscow. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov contended that Kosovo was a domestic matter and that sanctions against Milosevic would only inflame Serb nationalists.⁶⁷² However, in Albright's view, "Russia's position was shaped less by solidarity with their fellow Slavs than by the possibility that international action there would serve as a precedent for outside intervention in Russia, where Chechen separatists regularly clashed with the army."⁶⁷³

The result of the Contact Group meetings led to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1160 on 31 March. The resolution condemned the use of force by Serbian police against civilians in Kosovo and terrorist action by the KLA, and imposed an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). It called upon the Serbian government to withdraw special police units from Kosovo and to enter into a dialogue on political status issues with the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community.⁶⁷⁴

Nevertheless, Albright felt that this was not sufficient. She raised the possibility of NATO bombing to press Milosevic for a political solution, and it was crucial that the United States took the lead in this issue. Albright found that the first step to achieve this was to forge a consensus within the administration. However, it seemed that the NSC and the Pentagon were not willing to follow Albright's resolve. For instance, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger responded, "You can't just talk about bombing in the middle of Europe. What targets would you want to hit? What would you do the day after? It's irresponsible to keep making threatening statements outside of some coherent plan. The way you people at the State Department talk about

State, 9 March 1998 [<http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980309.html>] 29 July 2008.

⁶⁷² Albright, *Madam Secretary*, pp. 381-383.

⁶⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

⁶⁷⁴ Security Council Resolution 1160, 31 March 1998.

bombing, you sound like lunatics.”⁶⁷⁵ And, having put troops in Bosnia, the Defense Department did not want to get involved in another confrontation using the threat of force.

Moreover, Berger expressed that the Christmas warning was a unilateral American commitment by President George H. W. Bush in December 1992, but the Clinton administration believed that it would be meaningful to work multilaterally with NATO allies and to gain a consensus on how the conflict might be resolved.⁶⁷⁶ The fact that NATO troops were in neighbouring Bosnia showed that NATO was the principal instrument for exerting military pressure and influence in the region. In addition, it implied that any NATO military action would have to gain allied consent. As one policy-maker said, “The idea of using force over the objection of allies who have troops on the ground, subject to retaliation, is fantasy-land. Allies do not do that to each other.”⁶⁷⁷

However, the largely European ground forces implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement had an impact on the decision-making. For example, Secretary of Defense William Cohen was concerned about whether NATO allies were willing to invest in another campaign. Thus, he said, “I was absolutely convinced that the United States could not afford to take any kind of unilateral action from a political point of view, and certainly we were not going to recommend to the president and to the Congress that we intervene unilaterally without NATO consensus and support.”⁶⁷⁸

In addition, despite the concern about potential instability in the region, in particular with an influx of refugees entering into their borders, a majority of NATO countries claimed that they would not take any action without a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution. At the time, there was heated debate over whether NATO had any legal authority to take military action, since it was unreasonable to expect the Security Council to authorize any kind of force to prevent what was taking place.⁶⁷⁹ Consequently, as one official said after a defense planners’ meeting, “The first question we had to ask was whether the Christmas warning was still on the table. And the fact is the Christmas warning was not on the table. We were not prepared for

⁶⁷⁵ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 383.

⁶⁷⁶ Samuel “Sandy” Berger Interview in *PBS Frontline: War in Europe* [<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/berger.html>] 31 July 2008.

⁶⁷⁷ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, p. 30; Gellman, ‘The Path to Crisis’.

⁶⁷⁸ William Cohen Interview in *PBS Frontline: War in Europe* [<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/berger.html>] 31 July 2008.

⁶⁷⁹ Cohen in *PBS Frontline*.

unilateral action.”⁶⁸⁰

In the meantime, Clinton and his aides were distracted by the Monica Lewinsky affair. As one of Clinton’s political advisers recalled, “I hardly remember Kosovo in political discussions. It was all impeachment, impeachment, and impeachment. There was nothing else.”⁶⁸¹ Also, the Clinton team concentrated on upcoming presidential trips to China and Africa and on Russia’s economic implosion. On the other hand, it is worthy to note that the emergence of the guerrilla force, the KLA, also had an influence on the decision-making. The KLA not only fought against Serb army and security forces but also attacked Serb civilians and others associated with Belgrade. As one policymaker stated, “We weren’t in a situation where there was a Serb crackdown on an unarmed, peaceful Albanian populace.”⁶⁸² Thus, Cohen stressed, “My concern was that NATO not be seen as the air force of the KLA. If any kind of action were to be taken, it must be consistent with making sure that we were entirely neutral, and that the KLA not use NATO to serve its own purposes.”⁶⁸³

In May, Ambassadors Holbrooke (Richard Holbrooke) and Gelbard (Robert Gelbard) arranged the first meeting between Rugova and Milosevic to resolve the Kosovo conflict. The payoff for Rugova was a visit to Washington to meet with Clinton.⁶⁸⁴ However, peace talks between Rugova and Milosevic broke down after the Serb shelling of Kosovar Albanians in the Decani region in June.⁶⁸⁵ In order to deter further brutal ethnic cleansing by the FRY, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who had succeeded John Major in 1997, and Secretary Cook pushed the Western powers to conduct “a much tougher policy, both politically and militarily”. They urged NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana to study various military options “with a good deal of urgency”.

As a result, Britain drafted a UNSC resolution calling for the authorization of NATO to use force “in or over Kosovo”. This was also considered as an attempt to put pressure on Russia, the Serbs’ traditional ally, to act more aggressively against

⁶⁸⁰ Gellman, ‘The Path to Crisis’.

⁶⁸¹ Elaine Sciolino and Ethan Bronner, ‘The Road to War: How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War’, *New York Times*, 18 April 1999.

⁶⁸² Gellman, ‘The Path to Crisis’.

⁶⁸³ Cohen in *PBS Frontline*.

⁶⁸⁴ ‘Statement on the Situation in Kosovo’, 13 May 1998, *Public Papers*, p. 747; Sciolino and Bronner, ‘The Road to War’.

⁶⁸⁵ ‘Kosovo Chronology’, *US State Department*, 21 May 1999

[http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_kosovo_timeline.html] 3 June 2008; ‘Serbs Keep Shelling Kosovo Villages Despite Threat of Sanctions’, *New York Times*, 7 June 1998.

Serbia.⁶⁸⁶ At a NATO meeting in Brussels, NATO defense ministers directed their military authorities to conduct air exercises in Albania and Macedonia, aimed to demonstrate NATO's capability to project power rapidly into the region.⁶⁸⁷ As NATO Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark recalled, "It was a critical meeting, because that's the meeting in which NATO began to seriously discuss the process of taking action, if necessary."⁶⁸⁸

Nevertheless, there were three obstacles for the allies to overcome before they could reach a consensus on the issue. Firstly, some allies argued that NATO military intervention against Serb forces would favor the KLA. In mid-June, following Milosevic's visit to Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow, Serb forces had moderated their actions in Kosovo. On the other hand, the KLA used the relative Serb passivity in early summer to take control of as much as 40 percent of Kosovo's territory. The consequence of the shifting situation on the ground made the imminent NATO intervention less likely. NATO allies feared that military intervention would strengthen the military and political fortunes of the KLA more than weaken Milosevic's forces.⁶⁸⁹

Secondly, there were disagreements among allied governments over how the alliance ought to intervene and how to do it effectively with the least risk. Britain was most strongly in favour of the possible use of force. However, the NATO alliance had still not worked out what military strikes would be used to harm the Yugoslav Army. As one US diplomat said, "You can't use ground troops. If you strike with cruise missiles, then it becomes solely a US operation, because no one else has them. The US doesn't want to act alone. So then you are left with air strikes. But NATO doesn't want to use air strikes if it means that first you have to take out the entire Yugoslav integrated air-defense system."⁶⁹⁰

Thirdly, there was considerable disagreement over what would constitute the legal basis of a NATO military action; in particular, Russia threatened a veto at the UNSC.⁶⁹¹ The debate was that NATO was a defensive military organization that

⁶⁸⁶ R. Jeffrey Smith, 'Officials Seek Kosovo Intervention', *Washington Post*, 6 June 1998; Steven Erlanger, 'Milosevic Agrees to Let Diplomatic Observers into Kosovo', *New York Times*, 8 June 1998.

⁶⁸⁷ 'Statement on Kosovo', *NATO Press Release*, 11 June 1998
[<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-077e.htm>] 31 July 2008.

⁶⁸⁸ Gellman, 'The Path to Crisis'; General Wesley Clark interview in *PBS Frontline: War in Europe*
[<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/berger.html>] 31 July 2008.

⁶⁸⁹ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, pp. 34-35.

⁶⁹⁰ Mike O'Connor, 'Thousands of Refugees Flee Serb Mountain Attack', *New York Times*, 5 August 1998.

⁶⁹¹ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, pp. 35-36; Cohen in *PBS Frontline*.

could exercise the right of collective self-defense, recognised by Article 51 of the UN Charter - that an armed attack against one or more of its members shall be considered an attack against them all. It was obvious that Kosovo was not a member of NATO and therefore it was not a question of self-defense. On the other hand, NATO members agreed that Kosovo was an integral part of the FRY. As a result, NATO military intervention in Kosovo would violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY, the principles of state sovereignty, and non-intervention enshrined in Articles 2 (4) and (7) of the UN Charter.

In the case of Kosovo, the possibility of using force against the FRY would only be possible with the explicit authorization of the UNSC under one interpretation of international law. However, Russia and China had claimed that the Kosovo issue was an internal affair of the FRY and made clear that they would veto authorizing the use of force. The international community, and Russia and France in particular, insisted on getting a UN mandate, while “the United States [did] not feel it’s imperative. It’s desirable, not imperative”, as Secretary Cohen stated.⁶⁹²

Overall, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was the leading hawk in favour of using NATO airpower against Milosevic. Her view was shared by US special envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard in the administration and by NATO Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Foreign Secretary Robin Cook in the international community. The chief negotiator with Serbia, Richard Holbrooke, might have been an ally although he was out of government. But his rivalry-driven relationship with Albright got in the way.

On the other hand, Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton, who had replaced John Shalikashvili, were dovish and cautious about any US military involvement. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger was viewed as “a weather vane to Clinton’s political mood and needs” and therefore, “reading him was the purest litmus test as to where the president stood politically on any foreign policy issue”. “Berger most emphatically reflected the president’s desire, if at all possible, to delay any action”. The Congress worried about the uncertainty of what the next military step might be. The Europeans were reluctant to contribute to any additional use of force. Or more precisely, the Europeans were “waiting for American leadership”.⁶⁹³

⁶⁹² ‘The North Atlantic Treaty’, 4 April 1949 [<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>] 5 August 2008; Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, p. 36; Craig R. Whitney, ‘NATO to Conduct Large Maneuvers to Warn off Serbs’, *New York Times*, 12 June 1998.

⁶⁹³ David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner,

Since the conflict between Serb security forces and the KLA had broken out in March, it had driven tens of thousands of Kosovar Albanians from home. In late July, the Belgrade government countered the KLA's "summer offensive", which had succeeded in taking control of a substantial part of Kosovo, by seizing control of areas along the province's border with Albania and then expelling the insurgent forces from "literally every village". The strategy was to destroy the guerrillas' supply lines. The Serb counteroffensive resulted in driving hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians along with KLA fighters into the mountains and woods. When visiting the areas where the military had conducted its offensive, German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger described Kosovo as "an empty country, a wasteland... {with} quite a bit of destruction of property".⁶⁹⁴

The United States, acting with the involvement and support of the Contact Group, remained engaged in the diplomatic efforts in Kosovo. The process was principally guided by Christopher Hill, US Ambassador to Macedonia, and designated US special envoy to Kosovo. Ambassador Hill worked with the Kosovar Albanian side to receive the views of those engaged in the fighting, and with Milosevic to press him to meet his obligations and revive the prospects for dialogue. Meanwhile, the Contact Group continued to impose economic sanctions on the FRY. In addition to consulting with allies about possible action at the UNSC to reinforce the Contact Group's demands, the United States worked with NATO on possible action.⁶⁹⁵

The Serb offensive made Albright believe, as she had from the outset, that it was necessary to "back diplomacy with force". She even suggested that the administration should "initiate a concerted strategy aimed at ending Milosevic's rule in Belgrade". Beyond humanitarian concerns, Albright argued that "our interests in Kosovo, moreover, stemmed from our interests in a peaceful Europe, and Yugoslavia would never find its way into such a Europe with Milosevic at its helm".⁶⁹⁶ Accompanied by daily news of disasters from Kosovo, Clinton was thus convinced by Albright's arguments and approved a strategy for "supporting alternatives to Milosevic through overt, public means". Meanwhile, the administration also worked

2001), pp. 376, 377, 387, 397; 'The Late March on Kosovo', *The Economist*, Vol. 350, No. 8112, 27 March 1999, p. 57; Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), pp. 112-114.

⁶⁹⁴ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, pp. 386-87; R. Jeffrey Smith, 'An Empty Country', *Washington Post*, 31 July 1998.

⁶⁹⁵ Robert S. Gelbard, 'US Efforts To Promote a Peaceful Resolution to the Crisis in Kosovo', *Dispatch*, Vol. 9, No. 7, August 1998; Marc Weller, 'The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo', *International Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 2 (April 1999), p. 220.

⁶⁹⁶ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 387.

on pushing for “a clear-cut Alliance decision on Kosovo”.⁶⁹⁷

In August, the NATO alliance approved the ACTWARN plan for using force with air campaigns rather than ground troops for the Kosovo crisis. In the meantime, considering that the deteriorating situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and security in the region, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1199, which called upon the FRY to withdraw security units, to enable an international monitoring mission conducted by the EC in Kosovo, and to allow the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes safely with the aid of humanitarian organizations.⁶⁹⁸ After the adoption of UNSCR 1199 in September, NATO reinforced the ACTWARN plan for its readiness to use force to enforce the UN resolution.⁶⁹⁹

There was a growing consensus within the Clinton administration and NATO that the alliance’s credibility was at stake since Milosevic had by and large ignored NATO’s threats and his forces had stepped up their crackdown by shelling villages in Kosovo. NATO Secretary-General Solana pointed out one Serb diplomat’s joke, “A village a day keeps NATO away.” Secretary Cohen said, “The credibility of NATO is on the line.” He called on NATO to be prepared to act. Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and other countries also supported the military action. However, some European allies such as France remained reluctant to order NATO into action without explicit UN authorization. The allies continued to press Milosevic to negotiate with Kosovar Albanian political leaders about restoring the province’s autonomy. Yet they did not support the province’s demands for independence.⁷⁰⁰

Despite the adoption of UNSCR 1199 and NATO’s threat of military force, three villages in Kosovo were under siege by the Yugoslav Army and Serb police forces in late September. There was no sign that the army and the police were about to be withdrawn. Ambassador Hill told CNN, “This is a very brutal conflict; there have been a number of these reports of massacres.”⁷⁰¹ A Principals Committee meeting was held on 30 September. The outcome of the meeting was a recommendation to

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 388.

⁶⁹⁸ Security Council Resolution 1199, 23 September 1998.

⁶⁹⁹ Steven Erlanger, ‘NATO Approval Renews Threat of Force in Kosovo’, *New York Times*, 4 August 1998; ‘Statement by the Secretary-General of NATO’, *NATO Press Release*, 12 August 1998 [<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-094e.htm>] 3 June 2008; ‘Statement by the Secretary-General: following the ACTWARN decision’, *NATO Press Statement*, 24 September 1998 [<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p980924e.htm>] 3 June 2008.

⁷⁰⁰ Gellman, ‘Path to Crisis’; Steven Lee Myers, ‘US Urging NATO to Step up Plans to Act against Yugoslavia’, *New York Times*, 24 September 1998; Craig Whitney, ‘Allies Inch toward Action against Serbs’, *New York Times*, 25 September 1998.

⁷⁰¹ Jane Perlez, ‘Massacres by Serbian Forces in 3 Kosovo Villages’, *New York Times*, 30 September 1998.

President Clinton that he should send Richard Holbrooke, then a private citizen, to Belgrade to deliver NATO's terms.⁷⁰²

On the other hand, Albright mentioned that the United States was prepared to act and was optimistic that the Russians would reluctantly change their position to go along with the United States like they had done in the cases of Bosnia and the Gulf. Nevertheless, Russia used its veto at the UNSC to block air strikes against the FRY, and warned that the Russian military was ready to carry out any order from the Kremlin over Kosovo.⁷⁰³

On 8 October, Albright and Holbrooke met with the NATO alliance's representatives in Brussels to discuss whether an agreement with Milosevic was possible only if NATO authorized the use of force. Then, they went to London to attend the Contact Group meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to make the same assertion, and in the meantime, to make sure that Russia would be on board. At the meeting, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel pressed Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to support a UNSC resolution to authorize the use of force. However, Ivanov claimed that Milosevic had promised to withdraw troops and therefore, Russia would veto such a resolution. Failing to alter the Russian position, the Europeans acknowledged that the UN Security Council would not act decisively in this case.⁷⁰⁴

Following the NATO meeting, Holbrooke went back to Belgrade again to deliver a final ultimatum. At the same time, North Atlantic Council was poised ready to strike on 13 October. NATO activation orders – ACTORDS – “for both limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in the FRY, execution of which will begin in approximately 96 hours”, allowed four days for Milosevic to comply. With NATO's backing, this time Holbrooke had more leverage to negotiate with Milosevic. In early October, Ambassador Hill had drafted a settlement for Kosovo, which assigned public authority to differing levels of governance and would have a comprehensive assessment after a period of three years. However, Kosovar Albanians did not accept the settlement and the Serbs were cautious about it. Instead, Serbia preferred the 11-point principles of a political settlement proposed by Holbrooke.

A few hours after NATO's formal authorization of force, Holbrooke announced a

⁷⁰² Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 388.

⁷⁰³ Madeleine Albright, 'Remarks on Board Air craft en Route to Jerusalem', 5 October 1998 [<http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/visits/october98/albright0905a98.html>] 6 June 2008; Celestine Bohlen, 'Russia Vows to Block the UN from Backing Attack on Serbs', *New York Times*, 7 October 1998.

⁷⁰⁴ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 389.

cease-fire agreement with Milosevic that Serbia would withdraw security forces from Kosovo and let 2,000 unarmed international monitors, led by William Walker, former US Ambassador to El Salvador, under the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) verify compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UNSCR 1199.⁷⁰⁵

To sum up, at the early stage, “the second Clinton foreign policy team, perhaps mirroring Clinton himself, was as divided on Balkans policy as the first team”.⁷⁰⁶ Meanwhile, Clinton was distracted by the Monica Lewinsky affair and the possible impeachment. Also, the Clinton team was preoccupied with the presidential trips to China and Africa in early 1998 and later on a confrontation with Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda.⁷⁰⁷ Thus, Kosovo remained “largely off the radar screen”.⁷⁰⁸

6.1.2 Decision-making Stage 2: December 1998 ~ March 1999

The fighting escalated again in Kosovo in late December when the KLA killed 6 Serb youths at the Panda Café in Pec. Consequently, Yugoslav and irregular Serb forces began to violate the October agreement.⁷⁰⁹ At the time, as Albright wrote in her memoir:

I felt we had to try something new. The situation was emerging as a key test of American leadership and of the relevance and effectiveness of NATO. The Alliance was due to celebrate its fiftieth anniversary in April. If my fears proved correct, that event would coincide with the spectacle of another humanitarian disaster in the Balkans. And we would look like fools proclaiming the Alliance’s readiness for the twenty-first century when we were unable to cope with a conflict that began in the fourteenth.⁷¹⁰

At an NSC principals meeting on 15 January 1999, top foreign policy aides, including Berger, Albright, General Shelton, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) George Tenet, gathered together in the White House Situation Room

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 389-90; ‘Statement to the Press by the Secretary General following Decision on the ACTORD’, *NATO Press Release*, 13 October 1998

[<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981013a.htm>] 6 June 2008; Weller, ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’, pp. 119-220; Kosovo Verification Mission

[<http://www.osce.org/item/22063.html>] 6 June 2008; Steven Lee Myers, ‘2,000 Monitors to Go to Kosovo, But Their Power is Unclear’, *New York Times*, 15 October 1998.

⁷⁰⁶ David J. Rothkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), p. 373.

⁷⁰⁷ Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), pp. 264-269.

⁷⁰⁸ Rothkopf, *Running the World*, p. 373.

⁷⁰⁹ Gellman, ‘Path to Crisis’.

⁷¹⁰ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 391.

to discuss the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. The final outcome of the meeting approved a thirteen-page classified Kosovo strategy known as “Status Quo Plus”, the goal of which showed that: “Our fundamental strategic objectives remain unchanged: promote regional stability and protect our investment in Bosnia; prevent resumption of hostilities in Kosovo and renewed humanitarian crisis; preserve US and NATO credibility”. It proposed to beef up the KVM with additional personnel, helicopters, and bodyguards and to plan an election in Kosovo during the summer of 1999.⁷¹¹

The strategy papers had two sections on “revitalizing negotiations” and “increasing leverage”, with a list of goals. However, in Albright’s view, “it was all rhetoric. The so-called ‘decisive steps’ were muddled. There was no clear path to a solution”. During the meeting, she stressed: “We must go back to our allies and renew the threat of air strikes. We must tell Milosevic bluntly that we will use force if he doesn’t meet his commitments. We must go to the public and highlight his failures. We must emphasize over and over again that Milosevic is the problem”. Again, her colleagues did not share her enthusiasm. As she described in her memoir, she could sense them thinking: “There goes Madeleine again”. To sum up, for Albright, the administration was moving in constant motion but getting nowhere. And her fear, again, was that “Bosnia’s past would become Kosovo’s future”.⁷¹²

The next morning, there was a report that Serb security forces had killed 45 Kosovar Albanians in the village of Racak, Kosovo. When Ambassador Walker, head of the KVM, visited the site, he described the killings as a massacre, “an unspeakable atrocity”, and “a crime very much against humanity”. About the same time, Western intelligence detected signs that Belgrade planned a major spring offensive code-named Operation Horseshoe, a military operation for pushing hundreds of thousands of Albanians out of Kosovo.⁷¹³ Since Milosevic had launched a series of large-scale offensive attacks against the KLA the previous February and tried to reinforce Serbian governmental control over Kosovo, the nearly year-old conflict in the Albanian-majority province of Serbia, had led to 2,000 people dead.⁷¹⁴

The Clinton administration, though preoccupied with the impeachment hearings and with its concentration on Iraq, condemned the Racak massacre by Serb security forces in the “strongest possible terms” and called for the Serb authorities to cooperate with the KVM, to carry out all the commitments they had made to NATO,

⁷¹¹ Ibid; Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, p. 70.

⁷¹² Ibid., p. 392.

⁷¹³ Gellman, ‘Path to Crisis’; Sciolino and Bronner, ‘The Road to War’.

⁷¹⁴ ‘Mutilated Kosovo Bodies Found After Serb Attack’, *New York Times*, 17 January 1999.

and to cease their repression.⁷¹⁵ As one NATO diplomat stated, “Once again, it takes a massacre to put this back to the top of the international agenda.”⁷¹⁶ By the same token, Halberstam noted, “The last time, in Bosnia, it was Srebrenica that had moved the West to take action. This time, in Kosovo, it was a village called Racak.” “What happened at Racak changed everyone, and its political import was obvious: Kosovo, like Bosnia, could no longer be ignored”.⁷¹⁷ For Albright, as she told Berger, “It looks like spring has come to Kosovo early this year.”⁷¹⁸

Albright mentioned that the fragile Kosovo agreement brokered by Holbrooke was about to fall apart and described how the administration faced a “decision point” in Kosovo now: either by stepping back or muddling through or taking decisive steps.⁷¹⁹ At the State Department on 19 January, Albright convened a meeting with her team members, including Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and chief spokesman Jamie Rubin, and Policy Planning Director Morton Halperin. They developed an approach linking the threat of air strikes to press Milosevic for a political settlement that provided the Kosovar Albanians with self-government, and there was to be a NATO-led peacekeeping force to guarantee their security. If the Serbs refused to endorse the settlement, NATO would commence a phased air campaign. “Instead of linking the threat of force to a simple ceasefire, we would like it to a definitive diplomatic solution,” Jamie Rubin stated. “This would be a clear mission, with a real peace to keep, not a dressed-up ceasefire like the one in October”.⁷²⁰

The evening of 19 January, Albright presented her proposal at an NSC meeting. However, Defense Secretary Cohen and General Shelton were against a NATO-led peacekeeping force, in particular contributing US troops to it. Once again, as Halberstam put it, “The tensions between the administration and the military, most particularly the US army, were not that different from the time almost six years earlier when Clinton had first arrived in office and Colin Powell dominated the play, slowing down the administration’s somewhat unfocused vision of a more flexible policy toward peacekeeping missions”.⁷²¹ Still, the military did not want to get

⁷¹⁵ Jane Perlez, ‘Defiant Yugoslav Orders Expulsion of US Diplomat’, *New York Times*, 19 January 1999; ‘Statement on the Situation in Kosovo’, 16 January 1999, *Public Papers*, p. 57.

⁷¹⁶ Jane Perlez, ‘US Weighs Its Reaction To Massacre in Kosovo’, *New York Times*, 17 January 1999.

⁷¹⁷ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, p. 409.

⁷¹⁸ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 393.

⁷¹⁹ Jane Perlez, ‘Defiant Yugoslav Orders Expulsion of US Diplomat’, *New York Times*, 19 January 1999.

⁷²⁰ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 394; Jamie Rubin, ‘Countdown to A Very Personal War’, *Financial Times*, 30 September 2000.

⁷²¹ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, p. 411.

involved in a second major long-term mission in the Balkans and feared that the mission might get caught in the middle of a civil war. They preferred keeping the KVM team rather than deploying new armed forces. Meanwhile, they doubted whether Congress would agree on the share of peacekeeping costs.

The debate within the national security team continued for the next four days. Albright was determined to push her Washington colleagues to agree on a plan to “encourage negotiations by threatening air strikes and to support a NATO-led peacekeeping force, with US participation ‘possible’”. She believed that “the way to avoid disaster was to use diplomacy backed by the threat of NATO force to achieve and implement a political solution”. Despite the skepticism from the military, it seemed that there was no better alternative to the proposal. Clinton approved Albright’s strategy.⁷²²

Having her own government more or less on board, Albright travelled to Moscow and other European allies to fashion an agreement on NATO air strikes. Despite the fear that Racak was just “the beginning of a campaign of mini-Srebrenica”,⁷²³ none of the allies, with the exception of Britain and, to some extent, France, was supportive of immediate military action.⁷²⁴ This was partly because they feared that it would repeat the disastrous experience in Bosnia - that NATO troops would be sent to Kosovo to stabilize the situation and enforce a peace without American participation. As one senior US national security official said, “Any serious discussion on how to resolve Kosovo over the long term must explore all options, including American participation on the ground. It’s just a fact of life that our allies are reluctant to support air power against the Serbs in the absence of a clear strategy for what happens next on the ground”.⁷²⁵ They were also concerned that the threat of force directed solely at Belgrade would benefit KLA’s military aims and radicalize the Albanians’ push for independence.⁷²⁶

As NATO’s 50th anniversary was approaching, the Clinton administration was under pressure to “do something” to save NATO from appearing irresolute over Kosovo. As a result, the administration pushed hard to persuade NATO to agree on air strikes

⁷²² Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, pp. 69-73; Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 395.

⁷²³ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, p. 447.

⁷²⁴ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, pp. 69-73.

⁷²⁵ Dana Priest, ‘Allies Balk At Bombing Yugoslavia; Europeans Want US in Ground Force’, *Washington Post*, 23 January 1999.

⁷²⁶ Helene Cooper, Thomas E. Ricks, and Carla Anne Robbins, ‘Military Action in Kosovo Moves Closer as US, Allies Plan to Force Settlement’, *Wall Street Journal*, 28 January 1999.

against Serbia.⁷²⁷ Concerning European objections to air strikes because of the lack of US commitment on ground troops, Berger claimed that the Clinton administration remained opposed to deploying US ground troops but might be prepared to participate in a peacekeeping force if there was a political settlement first. However, he stressed that the White House had to consult with Congress under those circumstances. On the other hand, the Clinton administration suggested that the revision of the Ambassador Hill plan could provide a framework for an interim settlement, which would restore Kosovo's political autonomy for a three-year period before a final decision on the province's long-term status. At the same time, NATO forces would push military pressure on the KLA if its leaders continued to demand full independence rather than restored autonomy.⁷²⁸

When visiting Moscow, Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov issued a joint statement, calling upon the Serbian authorities to carry out the October agreement and to comply "without delay" with UNSCR 1199.⁷²⁹ Having Russia on board, Albright then joined the Contact Group in London on 29 January, announcing that peace talks would commence in Rambouillet, Paris on 6 February for the Serb and Kosovar Albanian authorities to negotiate an effective self-government for Kosovo.⁷³⁰ In Washington, Clinton announced that the United States, along with NATO allies, was ready to back the strategy of using force, and with Contact Group allies, to achieve the terms of an interim agreement that would protect the rights of all the people of Kosovo and give them the self-government they deserved.⁷³¹ In the meantime, the North Atlantic Council authorized Secretary-General Solana to launch NATO air strikes against military targets in Kosovo and elsewhere in Serbia if the Serb side resisted the negotiations.⁷³²

Before the diplomatic conference opened in Rambouillet, Albright delivered a speech at United States Institute Peace (USIP) explaining why it was important to bring about peace in Kosovo. Firstly, she pointed out where American interests and values were at stake.

⁷²⁷ Jane Perlez, 'US to Push NATO to Issue Ultimatum to Serb Leader', *New York Times*, 21 January 1999.

⁷²⁸ Thomas W. Lippman, 'US Could Join Force to Manage Postwar Kosovo', *Washington Post*, 27 January 1999.

⁷²⁹ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, pp. 74-75.

⁷³⁰ James Rubin, 'Contact Group Ministerial Meeting on Crisis in Kosovo', *US Department of State Press Statement*, 27 January 1999

[<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1999/ps990127a.html>] 19 August 2008.

⁷³¹ 'Remarks to the United States Conference of Mayors', 29 January 1999, *Public Papers*, p. 123.

⁷³² Craig R. Whitney, 'NATO Authorizes Kosovo Air Raids if Serbs Bar Talks', *New York Times*, 31 January 1999.

America has a fundamental interest in peace and stability in southern Europe, and in seeing that the institutions which keep the peace across that continent are strengthened. America has a fundamental interest in preserving Bosnia's progress toward peace, for which our soldiers, diplomats and humanitarian workers have given so much – and which would be seriously jeopardized by renewed violence in nearby Kosovo. America has a fundamental interest in strengthening democratic principles and practices in the Balkans and throughout Europe. Developing a real democracy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is crucial. And America has a fundamental interest in seeing the rule of law upheld, human rights protected and justice done.

We must never forget that there is no natural boundary to violence in southern Europe. Spreading conflict could re-ignite fighting in neighboring Albania and destabilize fragile Macedonia. It could affect our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. And it could flood the region with refugees and create a haven for international terrorists, drug traffickers and criminals.

Secondly, she emphasized the importance of NATO's credibility.

Regional conflict would undermine NATO's credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in Europe. This would pose a threat that America could not ignore.⁷³³

Lastly, Albright demonstrated that American leadership was crucial in bringing about peace in Kosovo.

We know that the longer we delay in exercising our leadership, the dearer it will eventually be – in dollars lost, in lost credibility and in human lives. Simply put, we learned in Bosnia that we can pay early, or we can pay much more later.

.... we learned in Bosnia, and we have seen in Kosovo, that President Milosevic understands only the language of force. Nothing less than strong engagement from NATO will focus the attention of both sides; and nothing less than firm American leadership will ensure decisive action.⁷³⁴

The Rambouillet conference was conducted by three negotiators, appointed by the Contact Group: Christopher Hill from the United States, Wolfgang Petritsch from the EU, and Boris Mayorski from Russia. The three negotiators were supported by a group of legal experts, headed by Jim O'Brian of the US Department of State.⁷³⁵ The proposed Rambouillet agreement, which would replace the October agreement, provided for:

⁷³³ Ibid.

⁷³⁴ Ibid.

⁷³⁵ Weller, 'The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo', p. 227.

- (1) The withdrawal of most Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces from Kosovo.
- (2) The restoration of Kosovo's political autonomy.
- (3) A three-year transition period, at the end of which there would be a referendum on Kosovo's future.
- (4) Disarmament of the KLA.
- (5) Deployment of an armed NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo.⁷³⁶

At the conference, the Serbian delegation, led by Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Ratko Markovic, insisted that Kosovo, the heart of Serbia's medieval empire, must remain a part of Serbia; while the Kosovar Albanian delegation, including the moderate political leader Ibrahim Rugova and the KLA commander Hashim Thaci, demanded full independence for Kosovo. However, diplomats from the United States, the EU, and Russia sought an in-between autonomous status for Kosovo.⁷³⁷

While the international sponsored peace talk was under way in Paris, the Clinton administration was under pressure from NATO allies to make a final decision over whether US troops would take part in a peacekeeping force. It was assumed that the details of the promised NATO force would affect Serbia's and the Kosovar Albanians' decision whether or not to sign a settlement.⁷³⁸ On 13 February, the day after his impeachment charges by the Senate, Clinton announced during a Radio Address that he would send "a little less than 4,000" US troops to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping force if there was an agreement reached by the warring parties.

The President explained why peace in Kosovo was important to America:

In this decade, violent ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have threatened Europe's stability and future. For 4 years Bosnia was the site of Europe's bloodiest war in half a century. With American leadership and that of our allies, we worked to end the war and move the Bosnian people toward reconciliation and democracy. Now, as the peace takes hold, we've been steadily bringing our troops home. But Bosnia taught us a lesson: In this volatile region, violence we fail to oppose leads to even greater violence we will have to oppose later at greater cost. We must heed that lesson in Kosovo.⁷³⁹

⁷³⁶ Christopher Layne, 'Miscalculations and Blunders Led to War', in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.), *NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War* (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2000), p. 14.

⁷³⁷ Jane Perlez, 'Kosovo Talks Begin With Stern Warning; Delayed by Serbian Maneuvering, Kosovo Talks Begin', *New York Times*, 7 February 1999.

⁷³⁸ Jane Perlez, 'US Under Pressure to Decide On Kosovo Force', *New York Times*, 12 February 1999.

⁷³⁹ 'The President's Radio Address', 13 February 1999, *Public Papers*, p. 190.

As a result, he stressed the importance of the Rambouillet peace talks:

America has a national interest in achieving this peace. If the conflict persists, there likely will be a tremendous loss of life and a massive refugee crisis in the middle of Europe. There is a serious risk the hostilities would spread to the neighboring new democracies of Albania and Macedonia, and reignite the conflict in Bosnia we worked so hard to stop. It could even involve our NATO Allies Greece and Turkey. If we wait until casualties mount and war spreads, any effort to stop it will come at a higher price, under more dangerous conditions. The time to stop the war is right now.⁷⁴⁰

Clinton made a last point:

America cannot be everywhere nor do everything overseas. But we must act where important interests are at stake and we can make a difference. Peace in Kosovo clearly is important to the United States...⁷⁴¹

Nevertheless, even though Secretary Albright and other Western leaders repeated the threat of NATO air strikes against the FRY if there was no settlement reached, the first week of the conference ended nowhere. The Kosovar Albanians insisted on a substantial military presence guaranteeing their safety; however, the Serbs refused to allow any foreign military presence on their sovereign soil. Serbian President Milan Milutinovic stated, "We're against any kind of foreign troops. If the agreement is good and fair and supported by a vast majority of residents of Kosovo, no foreign force is necessary to make them implement it". Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov also objected any military action to force a settlement. As a consequence, the Contact Group decided to extend the deadline.⁷⁴²

During the second week of the negotiations, Ambassador Hill went to Belgrade twice to present the entire peace plan to Milosevic. Unfortunately, he tried in vain to convince Milosevic to sign the agreement.⁷⁴³ On the other hand, Albright devoted her efforts to getting the Kosovar Albanians to endorse the agreement. Also, General Clark flew from NATO headquarters to meet with KLA members to explain what NATO ground troops would do in Kosovo. The guerrillas were unhappy about the demilitarization of the KLA and wanted immediate independence. Thaci was the

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁴¹ Ibid.

⁷⁴² Charles Trueheart, 'Serbian Leader Rejects Kosovo Peace Force, Autonomy Plan', *Washington Post*, 16 February 1999.

⁷⁴³ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, p. 81.

main opponent of signing the agreement, while Rugova had minimal influence at the talks.⁷⁴⁴ In order to complete the Rambouillet process, the Contact Group decided to extend the deadline for signing the agreement to 15 March.⁷⁴⁵

When both parties returned to Paris in mid-March, the Kosovar Albanian delegation signed the accord; while Serbia accepted most of the political provisions but remained opposed to NATO peacekeepers to enforce the settlement, even in the face of the threat of possible NATO bombing. Russia, though, agreed with the allies to have a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo, but still opposed the use of NATO bombing to force the Serbs to agree to the settlement. Nevertheless, as Albright remarked, “There can be no agreement if the Serbs do not sign.” Moreover, she stated, “The situation is as clear as it could be: the Albanians have said yes to the accords and the Serbs are saying no.”⁷⁴⁶ As a result, the co-chairs of the Contact Group announced, “We consider there is no purpose in extending the talks any further. The negotiations are adjourned. The talks will not resume unless the Serbs express their acceptance of the Accords.”⁷⁴⁷ Consequently, the diplomatic efforts to reach a political solution to the Kosovo crisis ended.

At the same time, it was reported that Milosevic had used the break in talks since 23 February to amass 30,000 to 40,000 troops into or close to Kosovo.⁷⁴⁸ After peace talks collapsed, KVM international monitors and Western embassy staff were informed that they had to leave the FRY. Milosevic took the advantage of the vacuum and launched a heavy offensive against the KLA. In particular, Serbian forces deployed tanks and troops all around the Drenica region, the heart of the Kosovar Albanians’ revolt. General Clark described, “All sources indicate that the situation has dramatically deteriorated on the ground in Kosovo as the verifiers have departed.” The terrifying situation drove thousands of panicked refugees from their homes.⁷⁴⁹

⁷⁴⁴ Jane Perlez, ‘Talks on Kosovo Near Breakdown; Deadline Is Today’, *New York Times*, 23 February 1999.

⁷⁴⁵ ‘Statement Rambouillet Accords: Co-Chairmen’s Conclusions’, *Contact Group Statement – Rambouillet*, 23 February 1999 [http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/contact-g/default.asp?content_id=3560] 20 August 2008.

⁷⁴⁶ ‘Secretary of State Albright, Remarks on Developments in Kosovo’, 18 March 1999, reprinted in Marc Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo, 1989-1999* (Cambridge: International Documents and Analysis, 1999), p. 493.

⁷⁴⁷ ‘Statement by the Co-Chairs of the Contact Group’, 19 March 1999, reprinted in Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo, 1989-1999*, p. 493.

⁷⁴⁸ Carlotta Gall, ‘Kosovo Rebels Act to Accept Peace Accord’, *New York Times*, 13 March 1999; Craig R. Whitney, ‘Ethnic Albanians Move to Accept Kosovo Pact’, *New York Times*, 16 March, 1999; Craig R. Whitney, ‘Kosovo Talks Near End as Serbs Build Up’, *New York Times*, 18 March 1999; Weller, ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’, p. 436.

⁷⁴⁹ Craig R. Whitney, ‘Monitors and Embassy Staff Told to Leave Yugoslavia’, *New York Times*, 20

At this stage, despite diplomatic setbacks at Rambouillet, the Clinton administration was determined to end the Kosovo crisis. As some senior administration officials argued, “Rambouillet at least allowed the administration to show to other NATO nations, still dubious about any military action, that the United States had walked the last mile to bring peace.”⁷⁵⁰

6.1.3 Decision-making Stage 3: March ~ June 1999

On 19 March, the foreign policy team met with the President to review possible options. During the meeting, Albright said, “Let’s remember the purpose of using force is to stop Milosevic-style thuggery once and for all. There’s no guarantee it will succeed, but the alternatives are worse. If we don’t respond now, we’ll have to respond later, perhaps in Macedonia, maybe in Bosnia. Milosevic had picked this fight. We can’t allow him to win.” Clinton advocated, “In dealing with aggressors in the Balkan, hesitation is a license to kill.” Facing NATO’s upcoming 50th anniversary, it seemed that for the second time in its history (the first time being in Bosnia), the alliance’s military commitment to maintain order in the Balkans was inevitable.⁷⁵¹

In a presidential press conference on the same day, Clinton first of all stressed, “Kosovo, a part of the former Yugoslavia, lies in the heart of the Balkans, a region of strategic importance of the United States and Europe.” In short, the speech could be summarised to say that the continued violence threatened US national interests in two ways:

The Threat of Spreading Conflict. The United States has a strong interest in preventing Kosovo from spiraling out of control. Violence in Kosovo could spread, threatening the fragile stability of the entire region, including Bosnia, Macedonia and Albania. Greece and Turkey – both NATO allies – could also be drawn into a conflict.

An Ongoing Humanitarian Crisis. Over 200,000 Kosovar Albanians have been driven from their homes in recent weeks, highlighting the potential for a humanitarian crisis that could spill over into neighboring countries. The United States has a strong interest in seeing that Milosevic is prevented from burning towns and terrorizing civilians with impunity.

March 1999; Jane Perlez, ‘Kosovo Situation Worsens as Serbs Press Offensive’, *New York Times*, 21 March 1999; Jane Perlez, ‘Milosevic To Get One ‘Last Chance’ To Avoid Bombing’, *New York Times*, 22 March 1999.

⁷⁵⁰ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, p. 421.

⁷⁵¹ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 406.

Lastly, Clinton claimed that the United States and NATO allies were united and prepared to carry out military action against the Serbs if they continued to mount an offensive in Kosovo.⁷⁵²

After the president's press conference, a Gallup poll result showed that 46% of the American public were for air strikes and 43% against it. In the poll data, it also showed that a majority (58%) believed that the United States had a moral obligation to secure peace in Kosovo, in comparison with a minority (42%) who considered that the United States should get engaged to protect its national interests.

In the meantime, Clinton began to lobby Congress to support his military intervention in Kosovo. Internationalist Senators such as Democrat Joseph Biden of Delaware and Republican Richard Lugar of Indiana strongly supported intervention. Some Republicans such as the new speaker Dennis Hastert and Henry Hyde were also for an intervention. Still others opposed such an intervention for fear of getting embroiled in a civil war like Vietnam. On the other hand, the motivation for Republican presidential aspirant, Senator John McCain of Arizona, to agree with the intervention was to produce unity in crisis rather than support the president's policy. In early March, the House of Representatives had voted 219-191 to support the president's plan to send troops if there was a peace agreement reached. On 23 March, the Senate voted 58-41 to support NATO bombing.⁷⁵³

On the same day, Clinton sent Holbrooke to negotiate with Milosevic to persuade him to agree to the Rambouillet settlement. It was considered as a "last chance" for Milosevic to avoid NATO bombing. However, it seemed that Milosevic refused "every opportunity" to avoid NATO air strikes. Yugoslav Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic defended, "Yugoslavia desires a peaceful resolution to Kosovo that provides extensive autonomy, self-government, democracy and human rights to the province's population" but, as a sovereign state, "cannot accept foreign troops to occupy our land".⁷⁵⁴ As a consequence, NATO Secretary-General Solana directed General Clark to initiate air strikes. Despite having a majority of Congress and all NATO allies' support, Russia was not happy about this. When Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was en route to the United States to meet with Vice President Al Gore, he flew back to Moscow as Gore informed him that the NATO

⁷⁵² 'President Clinton: A Commitment to Peace in Kosovo', 19 March 1999, CPL.

⁷⁵³ 'The Late March on Kosovo'; Bill Clinton, *My Life* (London: Hutchinson, 2004), p. 850; Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 405.

⁷⁵⁴ Steven Erlanger, 'US Negotiators Depart, Frustrated by Milosevic's Hard Line', *New York Times*, 24 March 1999.

bombing was imminent.⁷⁵⁵

On 24 March, NATO began air strikes against Serbian forces. “It was the first time in history that the United States or its European allies had intervened to head off a potential genocide”.⁷⁵⁶ The NATO mission, called Operation Allied Force, set up five objectives for Kosovo:

- (1) A verifiable stop to all Serb military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression.
- (2) The withdrawal from Kosovo of all Serb military, police, and paramilitary forces.
- (3) An agreement to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence.
- (4) The acceptance of the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations.
- (5) Credible assurances that Belgrade would work, on the basis of the Rambouillet accords, to establish a political framework agreement for Kosovo.⁷⁵⁷

In Washington, Clinton explained to the American people why the United States had had to act. He pointed out that inaction to end the conflict in Kosovo would bring about greater catastrophe later. As he said,

I have concluded that the dangers of acting now are clearly outweighed by the risks of failing to act, the risks that many more innocent people will die or be driven from their homes by the tens of thousands, the risks that the conflict will involve and destabilize neighboring nations. It will clearly be much more costly and dangerous to stop later than this effort to prevent it from going further now.

Moreover, he demonstrated that “a stable, peaceful and democratic Europe” was very much in US national interests. He stated:

At the end of the 20th century, after two world wars and a cold war, we and our allies have a chance to leave our children a Europe that is free, peaceful, and stable. But we must act now to do that, because of the Balkans once again become a place of brutal killing and massive refugee flights, it will be impossible to achieve.⁷⁵⁸

In his second address on the same day, Clinton made clear that the decision to use military force against Serbia was in order to uphold American values. The

⁷⁵⁵ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, pp. 405-406; Clinton, *My Life*, p. 850.

⁷⁵⁶ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, p. 448.

⁷⁵⁷ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, p. 102.

⁷⁵⁸ ‘Remarks Announcing Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)’, 24 March 1999, *Public Papers*, p. 449.

determination to avert a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo was a moral imperative. He stated:

We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war; to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results. And we act to stand united with our allies for peace. By acting now, we are upholding our values, protecting our interests and advancing the cause of peace..... Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative.

Yet beyond moral concerns, the President also emphasized that it was an act on behalf of geopolitical interests after a calculated assessment of US interests in the Balkans.⁷⁵⁹

It is also important to America's national interest.... Kosovo is a small place, but it sits on a major fault line between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, at the meeting place of Islam and both the Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity. To the south are our allies, Greece and Turkey; to the north, our new democratic allies in Central Europe. And all around Kosovo there are other small countries, struggling with their own economic and political challenges – countries that could be overwhelmed by a large, new wave of refugees from Kosovo. All the ingredients for a major war are there: ancient grievances, struggling democracies, and in the center of it all a dictator in Serbia who has done nothing since the Cold War ended but start new wars and pour gasoline on the flames of ethnic and religious division.⁷⁶⁰

Furthermore, Clinton learned from the lessons of Bosnia, when he had not acted earlier to stop ethnic cleansing:

At the time, many people believed nothing could be done to end the bloodshed in Bosnia. They said, "Well, that's just the way those people in the Balkans are." But when we and our allies joined with courageous Bosnians to stand up to the aggressors, we helped to end the war. We learned that in the Balkans, inaction in the face of brutality simply invites more brutality, but firmness can stop armies and save lives. We must apply that lesson in Kosovo before what happened in Bosnia happens, too.⁷⁶¹

On the other hand, as NATO 50th anniversary was approaching, the United States and 18 NATO alliance countries had to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's purpose

⁷⁵⁹ John M. Broder, 'President's Reasons: Moral Revulsion and Weight of US Interests', *New York Times*, 25 March 1999.

⁷⁶⁰ 'Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)', 24 March 1999, *Public Papers*, p. 451.

⁷⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 451-452.

to restore the peace in Kosovo:

Imagine what would happen if we and our allies instead decided just to look the other way, as these people were massacred on NATO's doorstep. That would discredit NATO, the cornerstone on which our security has rested for 50 years now.⁷⁶²

As a consequence, Clinton claimed that the United States had the responsibility to work in concert with allies to end the conflict.

America has a responsibility to stand with our allies when they are trying to save innocent lives and preserve peace, freedom, and stability in Europe. That is what we are doing in Kosovo.

If we've learned anything from the century drawing to a close, it is that if America is going to be prosperous and secure, we need a Europe that is prosperous, secure, undivided, and free. We need a Europe that is coming together, not falling apart, a Europe that shares our values and shares the burdens of leadership. That is the foundation on which the security of our children will depend.⁷⁶³

In a session with the American Society of Newspaper Editors in San Francisco on 15 April, Clinton addressed again that it was moral and strategic imperatives that were driving the United States and NATO allies to get involved in the Kosovo conflict.⁷⁶⁴ He stated:

We and our 18 NATO Allies are in Kosovo today because we want to stop the slaughter and the ethnic cleansing; because we want to build a stable, united, prosperous Europe that includes the Balkans and its neighbors Were we to stand aside, the atrocities in Kosovo would go on and on. Neighboring democracies, as you see, would be overwhelmed by permanent refugees and demoralized by the failure of democracy's alliance. . . . NATO would be discredited because its values and vision of Europe would be profoundly damaged. Ultimately, the conflict in Kosovo would spread anyway, and we would have to act anyway.⁷⁶⁵

To sum up, the Clinton administration asserted that the United States had moral as well as strategic interests at stake if the Kosovo crisis continued. Other factors such as the lessons of Bosnia, NATO's credibility, and the necessity for American leadership were also considered as important factors that motivated the

⁷⁶² Ibid., p. 452.

⁷⁶³ Ibid., p. 453.

⁷⁶⁴ 'President Clinton: The Moral and Strategic Imperatives in Kosovo', 15 April 1999, CPL.

⁷⁶⁵ 'Remarks and a Question-and Answer Session With the American Society of Newspaper Editors in San Francisco, California', 15 April 1999, *Public Papers*, pp. 551-552.

administration to intervene in the Kosovo conflict.

Although Clinton stated that the purpose of the action was to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe or a wider war, it was estimated that 4,600 Kosovar Albanians were killed by Serb forces during NATO's bombing campaign, whereas more than 1,800 had died as a result of the fighting between the Serb authorities and the KLA from the beginning of 1998 until the air campaign began on 24 March.⁷⁶⁶ Meanwhile, the State Department reported that 90 percent of Kosovar Albanians had been expelled from their homes by early May. The Belgrade government claimed that most of the refugees had fled Kosovo because of NATO's bombing.⁷⁶⁷ Russian President Yeltsin had denounced the bombing in strong terms at the beginning, "This is in fact NATO's attempt to enter the 21st century as global policeman. Russia will never agree to it."⁷⁶⁸ In fact, the expansion of NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic two weeks before NATO's bombing had provoked Russia.⁷⁶⁹

Moreover, NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy on 7 May had seriously damaged US-Chinese relations. Despite explanations from US officials with a report detailing the errors, China was not convinced that the attack was an accident.⁷⁷⁰ Michael Mandelbaum argued that the Clinton administration went to war in Kosovo where there was no US national interest at stake, but that the war had affected its most important strategic interest: relations with Russia and China, the only two countries in the world that had nuclear weapons pointing towards the United States.⁷⁷¹

Concerning the failure of NATO's air war to deter a worse humanitarian crisis in Kosovo within the first week, military analysts started to argue that air strikes alone could not disrupt the Serb strategy Operation House - village-by-village burnings and assassinations. It seemed that the deployment of US ground troops was necessary if NATO wanted to achieve its goal. As one retired army official said, "The only way to stop that sort of ground movement is to put troops on the ground and stop that advance."⁷⁷² However, there was wide debate over an invasion of Kosovo by ground

⁷⁶⁶ Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, 'Kosovo II: For the Record', *National Interest* (Fall 1999), pp. 13-15.

⁷⁶⁷ John Kifner, 'The Ravaging of Kosovo', *New York Times*, 29 May 1999.

⁷⁶⁸ Barton Gellman, 'US Allies Launch Air Attack on Yugoslav Military Targets', *Washington Post*, 25 March 1999.

⁷⁶⁹ Michael Mandelbaum, 'A Perfect Failure: NATO's War against Yugoslavia', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 5 (September/October 1999), p. 5.

⁷⁷⁰ Michael Laris, 'US Details Embassy Bombing for Chinese', *Washington Post*, 17 June 1999.

⁷⁷¹ Mandelbaum, 'A Perfect Failure', p. 5.

⁷⁷² Rowan Scarborough, 'Military Experts See a Need for Ground Troops', *Washington Times*, 30

forces. In a news interview, when being asked whether ground troops might be necessary, Senator McCain said: “We’re in it, and we have to win it...We have to exercise every option”.

Democrat Senator Charles S. Robb of Virginia indicated that the United States should not rule out the possibility of using US and other NATO ground troops. He said: “It is very difficult to take a whole territory without the use of ground forces. I don’t want to see anything taken off the table”.⁷⁷³ Similarly, Republican Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska wrote: “The only acceptable exit strategy is victory...We have to have the will and the vision to work our way through this, and to do so we must not foreclose on any options. We must be prepared to do what is necessary to achieve our objectives and ensure victory, including the option of ground troops”.⁷⁷⁴

Nevertheless, Republican Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas stated that while ground troops might be needed to stop the suffering in Kosovo, “Americans should absolutely not be part of such a deployment”. Republican Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas stated that the deployment of ground troops was “a political judgment the President is not willing to take, and I must say there’s not any support for that in Congress”.⁷⁷⁵ Overall, many Republican congressmen remained against any military involvement in the Balkans, just as they had done throughout much of the decade.

Secretary Albright was in favour of a credible threat of ground invasion. But she did not gain any support within the administration. Both the Pentagon and the White House were less than convinced that ground forces would be necessary and did not concede that airpower would fail to do the job. NATO supreme commander General Clark was strongly supportive of using ground forces in Kosovo. He indicated that “an expanded air effort would be a necessary precursor to a ground campaign”.⁷⁷⁶ In the meantime, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was leaning hard to push ahead on planning the ground option. In order to use NATO’s upcoming 50th anniversary summit as an opportunity for Washington and London to convince the other allies to support an invasion of Kosovo, Blair visited Clinton to propose the plan on 21 April, two days before NATO’s summit. However, he did not succeed in his mission.

The NATO summit did not consider the plan for ground troops, but became a turning

March 1999.

⁷⁷³ Bill Sammon and Joyce Howard Price, ‘Pentagon Considers Ground Operations’, *Washington Times*, 29 March 1999.

⁷⁷⁴ Chuck Hagel, ‘Victory: The Only Exit Strategy’, *Washington Post*, 31 March 1999.

⁷⁷⁵ Sammon and Price, ‘Pentagon Considers Ground Operations’.

⁷⁷⁶ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, p. 252.

point in US-Russian relations. Instead of opposing the war, President Yeltsin tried to find a way to end the war while helping Milosevic get as good a deal as he possibly could: “continued Serb sovereignty over Kosovo, a UN role in Kosovo’s administration, a Serb sector of Kosovo if possible, and a balancing role by Russia and other non-NATO countries to any NATO troop presence that might ultimately deploy to the territory”. The Yeltsin government sought a key role for Russia in bringing that about.⁷⁷⁷

In mid-May, when the war had been dragging for about two and a half months, Clinton claimed for the first time that he would consider sending ground troops to Kosovo. This marked a rhetorical shift from what he had announced on 24 March, the first day of NATO air strikes – “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war”. But now, as a practical matter, Clinton stated that his mind was open to putting combat troops in Kosovo if an invasion might eventually push Milosevic to embrace a settlement offer that NATO and Russia were hoping to jointly craft.⁷⁷⁸

Given the increasing tension within the United States and NATO alliance about the possibility of ground invasion, Clinton wrote in the *New York Times* on 23 May to clarify core objectives of the mission in Kosovo:

First, and most important, it is working and will succeed in meeting NATO’s basic conditions of restoring the Kosovars to their homes, with Serb forces out of Kosovo and the deployment of an international security force... Second, this strategy has broad and deep support in the alliance, and allows us to meet our objectives... Third, this strategy gives us the best opportunity to meet goals in a way that strengthens, not weakens, our fundamental interest in a long-term, positive relationship with Russia... Finally, we must remember that the reversal of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo is not sufficient to end ethnic conflict in the Balkans and establish lasting stability. The European Union and the United States must do for southeastern Europe what we did for Western Europe after World War II and for Central Europe after the cold war. Freedom, respect for minority rights, and prosperity are powerful forces for progress.

Clinton called the NATO war over Kosovo “just and necessary”.⁷⁷⁹

At a meeting on 2 June, Berger met with several foreign policy experts who were activists on Bosnia and Kosovo, including former US Ambassador to the UN Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former NATO commander George Joulwan, former US Ambassador to

⁷⁷⁷ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, pp. 132-138.

⁷⁷⁸ John F. Harris, ‘Clinton Says He Might Send Ground Troops’, *Washington Post*, 19 May 1999.

⁷⁷⁹ William Jefferson Clinton, ‘A Just and Necessary War’, *New York Times*, 23 May 1999.

NATO Robert Hunter, and former NSC staff member Ivo H. Daalder, to discuss how NATO could win the war. In the meeting, it was made clear that NATO's victory outweighed other American goals – holding the alliance together and keeping Russia on board – for the war. Berger stated that “we will win” no matter what was required, getting “the Serbs out, NATO in and the Albanians back” to Kosovo. He made four points: “First, we will win. Period. Full stop. There is no alternative; second, winning means what we said it means; third, the air campaign is having a serious impact; fourth, the president said he has not ruled out any options. So go back to one. We will win”. “Go for a ground invasion. This was the only option left,” Berger stated, who having previously doubted any kind of air campaign, now sounded more hawkish. Clearly, failing to win the war over Kosovo would “do serious, if not irreparable harm, to the US, NATO, and European stability”.⁷⁸⁰ More important, as General Clark pointed out, “There could be no future for NATO without success in this mission”.⁷⁸¹

On the same day, President Clinton gave the commencement address to the US Air Force Academy, emphasizing:

We are in Kosovo for the same reason you are here today. We believe that there are some things worth fighting for. If we have the power to act, and we do not reject and reverse ethnic cleansing, we will ratify it. We have acted to end this horror – and that is exactly what we will do.⁷⁸²

In a previous speech, Clinton had showed the determination to win the war. He said:

I believe that our air campaign in Kosovo is working and will ultimately succeed in its objective of returning the people of Kosovo to their homes with security and self-government. With that in mind, we are planning with our allies for success.⁷⁸³

Later, in a television interview, Clinton stressed again that “NATO would have put ground forces in there and that we were determined not to lose this thing. We were determined to reverse the ethnic cleansing”.⁷⁸⁴ General Clark proposed an invasion by up to 175,000 allied troops. However, General Shelton, who did not favor an

⁷⁸⁰ Steven Erlanger, ‘NATO Was Closer to Ground War in Kosovo Than Is Widely Realized’, *New York Times*, 7 November 1999; Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, pp. 159, 160; Dana Priest, ‘A Decisive Battle That Never Was’, *Washington Post*, 19 September 1999; Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, p. 476.

⁷⁸¹ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, p. 305.

⁷⁸² ‘President Clinton: Planning for Peace in Kosovo’, 2 June 1999, CPL.

⁷⁸³ ‘President Clinton: Achieving Success in Kosovo’, 31 May 1999, CPL.

⁷⁸⁴ President Bill Clinton Interview in *Newshour with Jim Lehrer*, 11 June 1999 [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-june99/clinton_6-11.html] 22 August 2008.

invasion, warned that this would commit “too few American troops to too limited a goal”.⁷⁸⁵

In the meantime, former Russian Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari were in Belgrade, presenting NATO’s terms to Milosevic. As a result of NATO’s intense bombing of electricity plants and targets of immediate interest to Milosevic’s chief associates and cronies, combined with a militarily stronger growing KLA on the ground and Russia’s pressure, Milosevic was in a true crisis. Moreover, the plan of a ground invasion of Kosovo had a psychological impact on Milosevic. Ultimately, Milosevic accepted the terms.⁷⁸⁶

On 10 June, Clinton announced that NATO had suspended its air campaign as a result of an agreement reached between NATO and the FRY. Moreover, the Serb troops started to withdraw from Kosovo. In the peace agreement, it indicated:

The complete withdrawal of all military, paramilitary, and police from Kosovo; the establishment of an international security force with NATO at its core; and the return of Kosovar refugees to their homes in security and self-government.

The NATO-led peacekeeping force, called KFOR, would include 7,000 US troops. KFOR’s mission was to create a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo.⁷⁸⁷ In the meantime, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1244, based on the peace agreement signed by Milosevic, which would place the UN in administrative charge of the province.⁷⁸⁸

There was an agreement between Russia and the United States that about 3,600 Russian troops would participate as a part of KFOR and be placed under the command of NATO.⁷⁸⁹ Since the NATO alliance had failed to force Milosevic’s troops out of Kosovo after four days of bombing, the Clinton administration had approached Moscow to serve as a go-between with Serbia in order to find a diplomatic solution to end the war.⁷⁹⁰ As John Sittides stated, “The Russians made

⁷⁸⁵ Steven Erlanger, ‘NATO Was Closer to Ground War in Kosovo Than Is Widely Realized’, *New York Times*, 7 November 1999.

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid; Harden, ‘A Long Struggle That Led Serb Leader to Back Down’; Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, pp. 142-143.

⁷⁸⁷ ‘President Clinton: Implementing Peace in Kosovo’, 10 June 1999, CPL.

⁷⁸⁸ Security Council Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999; Judith Miller, ‘Security Council Backs Peace Plan and a NATO-Led Force’, *New York Times*, 11 June 1999.

⁷⁸⁹ Celestine Bohlen, ‘Accord Is Reached on Integrating Russian Troops in Kosovo Force’, *New York Times*, 19 June 1999.

⁷⁹⁰ Jane Perlez, ‘Clinton Seeking Moscow’s Help in Kosovo Crisis’, *New York Times*, 7 April 1999;

very clear that they would support the United States, in exchange for being part of the peacekeeping team, and joining the West in asserting its presence in this part of Europe that the war finally came to an end.” In comparison with the minimal role they played in shaping Western policy-making in the Bosnia conflict, Russia played a very important role in helping to bring about the end of the war in Kosovo.⁷⁹¹ However, some argued that Clinton’s second administration tended to marginalize rather than integrate Russia into the international effort to resolve global issues as a result of its newfound confidence on the world stage.⁷⁹²

The Kosovo War was extremely controversial. For example, Mandelbaum argued that the war, especially with regard to the humanitarian goal of NATO seeking to prevent more human suffering of Kosovar Albanians, was “a deliberate act of policy, a perfect failure”. Also, critics argued that NATO bombing could have been avoided if NATO’s position at the Rambouillet negotiations could have been more “flexible”.⁷⁹³ Mandelbaum illustrated that “whereas Rambouillet gave NATO forces unimpeded access to all of Yugoslavia, including Serbia, the June settlement allowed the alliance free rein only in Kosovo”.⁷⁹⁴ Milosevic, quoting Henry Kissinger’s words, described the Rambouillet peace conference as “a mechanism for the permanent creation of problems and confrontation”.⁷⁹⁵

Moreover, because US involvement took place soon after Clinton’s impeachment scandal, many argued that “this was the president’s way of ‘wagging the dog’, or in Henry IV’s words, busying ‘giddy minds with foreign quarrels’”. Some even argued that “NATO was trying to secure yet more markets for American companies or to stuff capitalism down the throats of socialist stalwarts”.⁷⁹⁶ Despite the fact that Russia and China used their veto powers, NATO, who, as a regional alliance, went to war without a UNSC resolution, had disregarded international law. It was an illustration of the tendency towards a unilateralist thrust in Clinton’s second administration. For example, as one analysis described:

Intra-NATO squabbling and operational calamities, such as the Chinese embassy bombing, actually

Interview with John Sitalides on 19 June 2008. Sitalides is the Chairman, Board of Advisors, and Southeast Europe Project at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

⁷⁹¹ Interview with Sitalides.

⁷⁹² John Dumbrell, *Clinton’s Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992-2000* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 95.

⁷⁹³ Rubin, ‘Countdown to A Very Personal War’; the point that NATO’s position was too inflexible, see note in DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, p. 217.

⁷⁹⁴ Mandelbaum, ‘A Perfect Failure’, pp. 5, 4.

⁷⁹⁵ Quoted in Power, *A Problem from Hell*, p. 453.

⁷⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 462.

reinforced the case for American unilateralism. The war also stimulated lines of criticism of the United States – as a power prepared to act outside international law – which were to reverberate and intensify in the years following Clinton’s departure from the White House.⁷⁹⁷

On the other hand, “the conflict enhanced the international standing of NATO, which was now carving out an expansive post-Cold War role”.⁷⁹⁸

At the final stage, in *The Economist*’s words,

The polling data, together with the shift in favour of the administration in Congress, pose an obvious question. If Mr. Clinton is able to increase support for his policy by explaining it energetically, why did he not to do so earlier? The simplest answer is temperament: the president lacks the discipline to work steadily on big issues, and so is reduced to last-minute scrambling. But there is also a more complicated answer. On some issues, the president’s party and advisers are so divided that firm leadership is not easy.⁷⁹⁹

Ultimately, as the war had dragged on longer than expected, winning the war became the primary goal. It was Washington’s and the NATO alliance’s plan for a ground invasion that eventually forced Milosevic to agree to a settlement and brought the Kosovo War to an end.

6.2 Explaining the Clinton Administration’s Intervention in Kosovo

When the Kosovo crisis broke onto the international scene in early 1998, the Clinton administration was preoccupied with the Monica Lewinsky affair. As Senator Dole returned from Kosovo in September 1998, he described his meeting with Clinton and Berger: “The President listened carefully; I don’t recall him saying a great deal. He agreed it was terrible. Sandy Berger didn’t say much, either. When Berger left, we discussed impeachment. This was a critical time in the Monica events”.⁸⁰⁰ Similarly, a Cabinet member commented, “The whole rhythm of the Government was thrown off, because the big guy had something more important on his mind than any foreign-policy crisis – a 900-pound gorilla that was always in the room with him, named impeachment.”⁸⁰¹

However, after the President’s impeachment trial, the Clinton administration was

⁷⁹⁷ Dumbrell, *Clinton’s Foreign Policy*, p. 98.

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁹ ‘The Late March on Kosovo’.

⁸⁰⁰ Sciolino and Bronner, ‘The Road to War’.

⁸⁰¹ R. W. Apple Jr., ‘A Domestic Sort with Global Worries’, *New York Times*, 25 August 1999.

quick to respond to the Kosovo conflict and to take the lead.⁸⁰² It was believed that the administration acted more quickly and was better prepared because of the experience of Bosnia.⁸⁰³ For example, Charles A. Kupchan stated, “Yeah, and in Kosovo I think they were better prepared because of the experience of Bosnia, and that’s why they acted more quickly and made clear ultimatums to Milosevic. So I think there was a positive...positive learning curve.”⁸⁰⁴ Besides, as Sitalides described, “There was the belief that in the end the only way to deal with Slobodan Milosevic after a decade of aggression in the Balkans was to bring about a military defeat that would help bring about the end of his regime in Belgrade.” After all, Milosevic was seen as a perpetual aggressor, continuously upsetting the stable balance in this part of Europe.⁸⁰⁵

On the other hand, the handling of Kosovo also reflected Clinton’s newfound international confidence. As Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier described it,

In past situations when the use of military force did not go as expected – in Somalia, in the first Haiti intervention, in Bosnia, and even at times in Iraq – the president responded with outrage, anxiety, and blame. But this time, rather than worrying about the costs to his political prospects and complaining about being ill-served – which his aides were bracing for – Clinton greeted his team with a pep talk, displaying a kind of steely confidence his top advisers weren’t expecting. “Guys, let’s not lose sight of why we did this,” he said. “Let’s not forget what prompted us to do this and who is responsible.”⁸⁰⁶

Nevertheless, the Monica Lewinsky scandal had eroded Clinton’s moral authority and powers of persuasion. Clinton found it difficult to get public or congressional support to send in ground troops or take unilateral military action.⁸⁰⁷ As Clinton recalled in his memoir, “The Republicans seemed to have reverted to the theme they had trumpeted since 1992: I was a person without character who could not be trusted. During the Kosovo conflict some Republicans almost seemed to be rooting for us to fail. One Republican senator justified his colleagues’ tepid support for what our troops were doing by saying I had lost their trust.”⁸⁰⁸

⁸⁰² DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, p. 135.

⁸⁰³ Interviews with Charles A. Kupchan on 22 July 2008. Kupchan was Director for European Affairs at National Security Council in 1993-94; James Goldgeier on 7 July 2008. Goldgeier was a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow serving at the State Department and on the National Security Council staff in 1995-96.

⁸⁰⁴ Interviews with Kupchan.

⁸⁰⁵ Interview with Sitalides.

⁸⁰⁶ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between The Wars*, pp. 210-211.

⁸⁰⁷ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, p. 137.

⁸⁰⁸ Clinton, *My Life*, p. 861.

In the meantime, it is important to note that Clinton was aloof to the policy-making process during most of the Kosovo conflict. It was Secretary of State Albright who mainly drove US policy and motivated the administration to support the threat and eventual use of force.⁸⁰⁹ Albright, together with her British counterpart Robin Cook, managed to mobilize a strong international response.⁸¹⁰ In the case of Bosnia, Albright's voice was largely on the periphery of the decision-making. As Daalder recalled, "Everybody listened to her interventions, some more politely than others, but no one really was swayed one way or the other by her arguments."⁸¹¹ However, for Lake, her arguments were "excessively ideological".⁸¹²

Similarly, Chollet and Goldgeier describe Albright as an idealist, believing in promoting liberal values, more comfortable in expressing them and "more willing to advocate for the use of military force than many of her colleagues".⁸¹³ As Michael Dobbs put it, "She was a politician with a penchant for staking out firm moral questions and seeing the world in black and white." Moreover, "she had been brought up to view America as the world's "indispensable nation" that had ridden to the rescue in two world wars".⁸¹⁴

Yet now, in the case of Kosovo, Albright was instrumental, pushing for more intensive US engagement, both political and military.⁸¹⁵ In David Halberstam's words, Albright "was absolutely certain of her beliefs about what needed to be done in Kosovo"; and "was absolutely sure that Kosovo was a repeat of Bosnia and the United States would, sooner or later, have to take military action against Belgrade".⁸¹⁶ As a consequence, the Kosovo conflict was described as "Madeleine's war".⁸¹⁷

It was believed that Albright's initial impulse to take some kind of preventative action was linked to her family background. Albright was born in Czechoslovakia, and her family had twice driven from home because of the control of Hitler's Nazism

⁸⁰⁹ See note in DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, p. 221.

⁸¹⁰ Clinton, *My Life*, p. 850.

⁸¹¹ Quoted in Michael Dobbs, *Madeleine Albright: A Twentieth-Century Odyssey* (New York: Owl Books, 2000), p. 363.

⁸¹² *Ibid.*, p. 363.

⁸¹³ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between The Wars*, p. 146.

⁸¹⁴ Dobbs, *Madeleine Albright*, p. 377.

⁸¹⁵ Interview with Janusz Bugajski on 30 June 2008. Bugajski is Director of the New European Democracies Project and senior fellow in the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies.

⁸¹⁶ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, p. 376.

⁸¹⁷ See Walter Isaacson, 'Madeleine's War', *Time (Canadian Edition)*, Vol. 153, No. 19, 17 May 1999.

and Stalin's communism over the country. In particular, many of her relatives died in Nazi concentration camps.⁸¹⁸ Similarly, Janusz Bugajski stated, "Madeleine Albright who's from the region, she's from Eastern Europe originally, understands the problems much more, and didn't want America to stand on the sidelines as this terrible war unfolded, so she was I think instrumental both in the case of Bosnia but also in the case of Kosovo."⁸¹⁹ For this reason, "she was one of the first members of the Clinton administration to understand the threat posed to the new world order by the rise of nationalism in the geopolitical vacuum created by the collapse of communism".⁸²⁰ Thus, "there was every reason to believe that Kosovo represented the final battleground for Serbian nationalism".⁸²¹ On the other hand, as Chollet and Goldgeier wrote, "For many observers, Madeleine Albright personified the newfound confidence and ambition that came to characterize the second Clinton administration's approach to the world."⁸²²

As shown in major speeches of the Clinton administration, it was clear that the Kosovo War involved a degree of humanitarian concern. In particular, the massacre at Racak, like the Srebrenica massacre in the case of Bosnia, became "the critical lever for those in the American government and in allied Western governments to move for military action against the Serbs". It was viewed as "a sure sign that the worst of Bosnia would be repeated".⁸²³ The United States and its allies were thus determined to fight for ending human suffering. For instance, Albright later recalled:

My reasons were partly strategic: Europe was never going to be fully at peace as long as the Balkans were unstable, and the Balkans were never going to be stable as long as Milosevic was in power. My primary motive, however, was moral: I did not want to see innocent people murdered. NATO's presence in Europe gave us the means to stop ethnic cleansing on that continent, and I hoped that by doing so we could help prevent similar atrocities elsewhere.⁸²⁴

However, humanitarian concerns were not the only primary goal for the Clinton administration in Kosovo. As Republican Senator Slade Gorton of Washington argued, "If simply stopping a slaughter is a primary goal – and I believe that it is – there are far greater slaughters taking place in Sudan, in several countries in Africa, and in a number of other places around the world in which there has been no request

⁸¹⁸ Dobbs, *Madeleine Albright*, pp. 374-381.

⁸¹⁹ Interview with Bugajski.

⁸²⁰ Dobbs, *Madeleine Albright*, p. 403.

⁸²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 418.

⁸²² Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between The Wars*, p. 146.

⁸²³ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, p. 410.

⁸²⁴ Madeleine Albright, *The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs* (London: Macmillan, 2006), pp. 59-60.

on the part of the administration to intervene”. Yet perhaps Senator Biden, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was right to counter that “the loss of a life in Kosovo and the loss of a life in Somalia have totally different consequences, in a Machiavellian sense, for the United States’ interests. If there is chaos in Europe, we have a problem; we are a European power.”⁸²⁵

Again, in a similar way to the Bosnia situation, the reason for the administration’s intervention in Kosovo was not because there was any direct threat to US national security, but because there was a series of secondary interests which seemed to drive the administration into action.⁸²⁶ It was believed that stability in Europe was important for American interests. If the conflict in the Balkans continued, there would be other similar types of situations emerging in other parts of Europe. If there was an unstable part of Europe, the United States had to do something about it.⁸²⁷ For instance, if the situation in Kosovo continued and large numbers of refugees emerged, it could explode into a wider war and destabilize the region. It could thus pose a threat to international peace and security. As Daniel Serwer said:

The American became convinced that if Milosevic was successful in expelling the Albanians from Kosovo that would destabilize Macedonia and potentially lead to a chaotic war that would involve Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey. This is what I call the Holbrooke nightmare scenario. I think it was a very low probability, but it was possible and it would have been unhappy, and I think that was a major reason for the intervention. Of course the humanitarian factor existed, there were 800,000 people out of their homes, and you needed to get them back to their homes. But I think that the wider war aspect of the thing was really what drove American intervention.⁸²⁸

Similarly, as Taylor Branch wrote in *The Clinton Tapes*:

The outline of Clinton’s argument that Kosovo heightened all three danger points to the post-Cold War quest for a stable, democratic Europe. One was the potential collapse of democracy in Russia. Two was the stubborn conflict between Greece and Turkey. Three was the proven danger of secession and ethnic hatred in the Balkans. Only on the second was Clinton at all sanguine, citing history’s first cooperation between NATO members Greece and Turkey in relief efforts for Kosovo. In Russia, said the president, hard-line nationalists supported the Serb Milosevic, their fellow Slav, against all the

⁸²⁵ Quoted in Miles A. Pomper, ‘Members Rally Around Kosovo Mission Despite Misgivings About Strategy’, *CQ Weekly*, 27 March 1999, p. 765.

⁸²⁶ Interview with Daniel P. Serwer on 16 July 2008. Serwer was the US special envoy and coordinator for the Bosnian Federation from 1994 to 1996. He negotiated the first agreement reached at the Dayton peace talks.

⁸²⁷ Interview with Goldgeier.

⁸²⁸ Interview with Serwer.

Kosovar minorities. Demonizing Yeltsin as a stooge of NATO, they mobilized Slavic fear and resentment behind authoritarian visions of a restored Russian empire.⁸²⁹

Moreover, there were fears that continued wars and political instability in the Balkans would invite Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to infiltrate the region.⁸³⁰ As Albright described in her memoir, “If NATO had not acted, the Serb offensive would have permanently displaced more than half a million Kosovars, radicalizing many and creating a new source of long-term tension within Europe.”⁸³¹ In particular, during Clinton’s second term, terrorism was placed under a higher threat status. This kind of transnational threat was able to cross beyond old notions of political boundaries or national allegiances and allowed the few and the weak to challenge the mightiest of nations by taking advantage of new and constantly shifting global networks and virtual organizations.⁸³²

To sum up, as Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon concluded:

The United States is engaged there... because the stability and security of the region are of real US interest. These interests are partly humanitarian, but they are at least as much strategic. For decades, the United States deployed hundreds of thousands of troops to safeguard the security of Western Europe. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became possible to extend the stability and security that NATO countries long enjoyed to the rest of Europe – to build a Europe that was “whole and free (in President George Bush’s words) and “undivided, peaceful, and democratic” (as President Bill Clinton has urged). That is not just a noble sentiment but a vision with deep strategic meaning. Such a Europe is more likely to be a partner of the United States in meeting the many challenges of the global age and much less likely to pose a threat to US interests.⁸³³

Therefore, it was an “undivided, peaceful, and democratic” Europe that was central to America’s interests. “Stability and decency in Kosovo were important to Europe, they were also important to Washington”.⁸³⁴ “Washington has been heavily invested in this effort ever since the United States entered World War II. That investment has paid off – in a stable, prosperous, and democratic partner in Western Europe”. And

⁸²⁹ Taylor Branch, *The Clinton Tapes: Wrestling History with the President* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009), p. 543.

⁸³⁰ Steven Woehrel, ‘Future of the Balkans and US Policy Concerns’, *Congressional Research Service*, 13 May 2009, p. 10.

⁸³¹ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 428.

⁸³² Rothkopf, *Running the World*, pp. 382-387.

⁸³³ Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, ‘The United States in the Balkans: There to Stay’, *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Autumn 2000), p. 158.

⁸³⁴ Elizabeth Pond, ‘Kosovo: Catalyst for Europe’, *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Autumn 1999), p. 79.

hence, when a peaceful and democratic Europe was threatened by the prospect of organized violence in the Balkans, the United States, as the world's only military superpower, still had to play its proper role as the alliance's leader.⁸³⁵

Ultimately, Clinton described Kosovo as an example of a policy in which America's values and interests were intertwined, "It's to our advantage to have a Europe that is peaceful and prosperous. And there is the compelling humanitarian case: if the US walks away from an atrocity like this where we can have an impact, then these types of situations will spread. The world is full of ethnic struggles, from Ireland to the Middle East to the Balkans. If we can convince people to bridge these tensions, we've served our interests as well as our values".⁸³⁶

Another key element in the US decision to intervene was NATO's credibility. As James Goldgeier said, "The United States wanted to ensure that NATO continued to function effectively after the end of the Cold War, and even though this was not a mission that was a traditional mission, it did come to be seen as influencing the credibility of NATO."⁸³⁷ In particular, NATO had just formed new partnerships -- with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic --, and was due to celebrate its 50th anniversary. Consequently, if NATO had not acted to punish atrocities committed on its doorstep, the alliance's credibility would certainly have been in doubt.

Regardless of the diversity of their political cultures and historical relationships with the Balkans, NATO allies did find that they had a common interest in ending the Kosovo conflict. As James Steinberg stated:

A prolonged conflict there would have had no natural boundaries. The allies had an interest in not seeing Kosovars driven from their land, across national borders into fragile new democracies that would be overwhelmed and destabilized by their presence. If NATO had not acted, Kosovo's neighbors might have felt compelled to respond to this threat themselves, and a wider war might have begun. The allies clearly had an interest in preserving the stability of southeastern Europe -- and protecting the strides it has made away from a violent past toward a more democratic future. And the allies had an interest in maintaining the unity and credibility of NATO, which would have been impossible, had the alliance done nothing in the face of unspeakable atrocities committed at its doorstep -- a lesson learned in Bosnia. One can dispute whether these interests justified NATO's decision to use force. But one cannot dispute that these interests exist.⁸³⁸

⁸³⁵ Daalder and O'Hanlon, 'The United States in the Balkans', p. 169.

⁸³⁶ Quoted in Isaacson, 'Madeleine's War'.

⁸³⁷ Interview with Goldgeier.

⁸³⁸ James B. Steinberg, 'A Perfect Polemic: Blind to Reality on Kosovo', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No.

For the United States, a NATO that was united and held together was crucial.⁸³⁹ It was important that NATO not only “still existed as a functioning, relevant alliance” in the aftermath of the Cold War, but also adapted to meet 21st century challenges. For example, Albright argued that if NATO had not acted, it “would have been left divided and questioning its own relevance as the twenty-first century dawned”. This could show not only the distinctive characteristic of the United States as a leader of NATO but also the reassurance of US dominance, providing for the new democracies in central and southeastern Europe.⁸⁴⁰ If the United States did not take any action over the Kosovo conflict, “the new democracies of central and southeastern Europe would feel abandoned by the West, left to fend for themselves in their search for security”.⁸⁴¹

Therefore, both in Bosnia and Kosovo, the United States was within a NATO mandate, as Bugajski said,

... it [wouldn't] just be an American mission, it would be a joint European-American mission. So you know it was...of all the wars I would say, of all the conflicts for America to be involved in, that made most sense, for restoring the transatlantic relationship, restoring stability in Europe, even demonstrating I would say to the moderate Islamic world that here we are defending an Islamic population in the middle of Europe, the same with the Kosovar Albanians, who were mostly Muslim. So, yes, I mean there's always a choice but I think this made most sense I think in the nineties.⁸⁴²

Finally, as Goldgeier argued, neither the “Bosnia [nor the] Kosovo [intervention] was done for American national security interests because [those conflicts] could have gone on and wouldn't have had any impact on American national security”. However, in comparison to Bosnia, the “Kosovo [intervention] really was done for humanitarian reasons”.⁸⁴³

Conclusion

During the early stages of the decision-making on Kosovo, Secretary of State Albright was enthusiastic in mobilizing a strong domestic and international response in case Kosovo would lead to a repetition of Bosnia. Albright's approach to the Kosovo crisis was to “back diplomacy with force”; a view strongly shared by NATO

6 (November/December 1999), p. 131.

⁸³⁹ Interview with Serwer.

⁸⁴⁰ Pond, ‘Kosovo: Catalyst for Europe’, p. 82; Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 428.

⁸⁴¹ Steinberg, ‘A Perfect Polemic’, p. 133.

⁸⁴² Interview with Bugajski.

⁸⁴³ Interview with Goldgeier.

supreme commander General Clark. However, similarly to his first term, the second Clinton foreign policy team was divided. Whereas Albright was in favour of using NATO airpower against Milosevic, Secretary of Defense Cohen shared General Shelton's lack of enthusiasm for any US military involvement. Despite sharing Albright's view, President Clinton was distracted by the Monica Lewinsky affair and impeachment proceedings, and therefore, was aloof from the policy-making process. On the whole, it seemed that "mid-1998 was not a good time to push ahead too aggressively in the Balkans. As the Lewinsky scandal unfolded and impeachment became a real possibility, both Berger and the president were tiptoeing through a potential minefield. The last thing they wanted was military intervention in Kosovo".⁸⁴⁴

Meanwhile, Kosovo was overshadowed by other events, such as the president's trips to China and Africa and later a confrontation with bin Laden's Al Qaeda. Moreover, having largely used ground troops to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia, Congress and European allies were reluctant to deploy additional forces to the Balkans. Besides, a majority of NATO countries did not want to take any action without a UNSC resolution. On the other hand, the emergence of the KLA also had an influence on the willingness of the US military and NATO alliance to take any military action against the Serbs. Thus, it was clear that the administration would not take the Christmas warning into action in response to the Kosovo crisis. Finally, the diplomatic efforts succeeded in NATO's authorization of force and thus resulted in the October Agreement.

When the fighting escalated again in late December of 1998 and the Racak massacre occurred in January 1999, the decision-making process entered a new stage. This time Albright was determined to forge a consensus within the administration. She and her team members developed an approach which linked in the threat of air strikes to encourage negotiations and sought for a political settlement that provided the Kosovar Albanians with self-government. Also, they supported a NATO-led peacekeeping force, with the possibility of US participation, to guarantee security for Kosovar Albanians. Again, the military was dubious about Albright's proposal, particularly with regard to US troops' participation. But it seemed that no one could come up with an alternative, and therefore, Clinton approved the strategy.

However, the European allies still worried about NATO sending troops to Kosovo without American participation. In order to strengthen NATO unity, in particular in

⁸⁴⁴ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, p. 387.

the face of its upcoming NATO's 50th anniversary, the Clinton administration announced that US ground troops would participate in a peacekeeping force if there was a political settlement. Having Washington's commitment and Russia, Serbia's traditional ally, on board, NATO was ready to back the strategy of using force. The diplomatic effort brought the warring parties, the Serbs and the Albanians, to the bargaining table at Rambouillet. Despite facing the threat of NATO air strikes, the Serbs refused to sign a settlement because they could not allow NATO forces to enter their sovereign soil. As a consequence, the diplomatic efforts for the Kosovo crisis came to an end. Some argued that the Rambouillet negotiations were bounded to fail because NATO's position was too inflexible. Yet others argued that the Rambouillet conference at least showed the Clinton administration's determination to end the Kosovo crisis.

At the final stage of decision-making, it was obvious that Clinton was fully engaged in bringing peace to Kosovo. He demonstrated that a massive humanitarian crisis in Kosovo threatened US interests and challenged US values. In other words, for the Clinton administration, Kosovo was a region of strategic importance to the United States and Europe. The United States had a strong interest in standing up against Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaign as well as preventing a wider war in Europe. The voting outcome of both Houses and the polling data revealed that the country was supportive of military intervention, with the belief that the United States had a moral obligation to end human suffering in Kosovo.

When NATO began the bombing campaign on 24 March, Clinton, in two speeches to the nation, stressed again that the determination to end the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo was a moral imperative. It was in order to uphold American values. Moreover, it was also an act on behalf of geopolitical interests, since Kosovo's strategic importance in the Balkans and "a stable, peaceful and democratic Europe" were very much in the US national interest. In addition, the experience of Bosnia, NATO's credibility, and American leadership were also reasons that motivated the administration to get involved in the Kosovo conflict.

Again, in the case of Kosovo, it was clear that humanitarian interests alone were not sufficient to justify sending military forces to save lives in distant lands. It was combined with a series of secondary interests such as the stability and security of Europe, NATO's credibility, and the necessity for American leadership, which eventually drove the Clinton administration to intervene in Kosovo.

Chapter 7.

Conclusion

The analysis presented in this thesis has identified a number of key motivations for US foreign policy interventions in the 1990s. As shown by the US intervention in Somalia in 1992, the desire to pursue a moral and humanitarian agenda formed one of these motivations. However, the subsequent history of the intervention – especially following the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident – indicated the limits of morality-based humanitarian intervention. The Rwandan non-intervention appeared to confirm that American lives would not be risked without any compelling national interest being at stake. The Haitian intervention, as we have seen, was clearly linked to such a compelling interest. In the case of an island so close to the United States, non-intervention in Haiti really would have called America’s regional credibility into question.

Bosnia and Kosovo, of course, were lands far more distant than Haiti. Direct, compelling US national security interest in the Balkans was difficult to find. We have seen, however, that secondary interests (such as affirming the post-Cold War credibility of NATO) were present in the Balkans. Experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo appeared to demonstrate the possibility of intervention in conditions in which humanitarian motives were strengthened by secondary geopolitical concerns. The concluding chapter of this thesis applies an ethical realist theoretical framework to the evaluation of Clinton’s foreign policy on humanitarian intervention. The implications of this analysis will be examined in terms of future US foreign policy.

7.1 Moral Leadership

In the case of humanitarian interventions, the Clinton administration made it clear that American leadership was part of the reason for action. Recognizing the American military’s unparalleled fighting ability in his speech at the National Defense University, Anthony Lake acknowledged that the United States could not escape from its responsibility as a superpower. Even though the United States should not be the world’s policeman and could not answer every emergency call [911] around the globe, Lake emphasized that the United States, as the world’s most powerful nation, would not simply sit on the sidelines when millions of human lives were threatened if it could make a difference. That is to say, the United States had a responsibility to act.⁸⁴⁵

⁸⁴⁵ Anthony Lake, ‘Commencement Address National Defense University’, 12 June 1996, CPL.

This seemed to support the ethical realists' assertion that human beings are willing to do good in relation to others, rather than simply considering their own concerns and interests. Moreover, perhaps a state might not have the right to intervene in the affairs of others but have a responsibility to save strangers in suffering – for common humanity. For example, in the cases of Somalia and the Balkans, the United States “had the capacity to intervene and stop those atrocities and because the cost wouldn't be extremely high there [was] a moral impetus to help, which [was] completely unconnected to national interest”.⁸⁴⁶

In particular, in the case of the Balkans, NATO's credibility was a major concern for the Clinton White House. As a leader of the transatlantic organization, the United States had a responsibility to take the initiative. In his speech to the nation on the implementation of the peace agreement in Bosnia, President Clinton argued against isolationist assertions that the United States should step back from the responsibilities of leadership with the end of the Cold War. He stressed that there was still the need for American leadership in many global issues:

As the cold war gives way to the global village, our leadership is needed more than ever because problems that start beyond our borders can quickly become problems within them. We're all vulnerable to the organized forces of intolerance and destruction; terrorism; ethnic, religious, and regional rivalries; the spread of organized crime and weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking. Just as surely as fascism and communism, these forces also threaten freedom and democracy, peace and prosperity. And they, too, demand American leadership.⁸⁴⁷

Hence, he demonstrated that the case in Bosnia was an example in which American leadership was required. Clinton stated:

When America's partnerships are weak and our leadership is in doubt, it undermines our ability to secure our interests and to convince others to work with us. If we do maintain our partnerships and our leadership, we need not act alone. As we saw in the Gulf war and in Haiti, many other nations who share our goals will also share our burdens. But when America does not lead, the consequences can be very grave, not only for others but eventually for us as well.⁸⁴⁸

Similarly, Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger remarked that “American

⁸⁴⁶ Interview with Gary J. Schmitt on 18 June 2008. Schmitt was a consultant to the US Department of Defense in 1992-93 and Executive Director of the neo-conservative Project for the New American Century in 1997-2005.

⁸⁴⁷ ‘Address to the Nation on Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, 27 November 1995, *Public Papers*, p. 1784.

⁸⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1786.

leadership was essential to put out the fire and stop the slaughter”.⁸⁴⁹

To sum up, as mentioned before, the primary reason why the United States eventually decided to intervene in the Balkans was transatlantic leadership and then indirectly global leadership. It was clear that the crisis in the Balkans was not a matter of core national security interest to the United States. Yet as it did matter to America’s European allies, the United States had to pay attention to what they thought was of interest, particularly if the United States wanted to exercise leadership within the alliance. Therefore, “it was [this] kind of secondary national interest that eventually led the US to take the role”.⁸⁵⁰ So the United States did have ‘the dog’ in this fight, and it was America’s alliance partners, which goes against the phrase “we don’t have a dog in this fight” by former Secretary of State James Baker.

Again, as Gary J. Schmitt (Executive Director of the neo-conservative Project for the New American Century in 1997-2005) maintained, “One could argue [that the intervention was] not strictly speaking in the US national interest narrowly defined, but in terms of the US position as leader it was in our interest.”⁸⁵¹ This seems to support the ethical realist assertion that the conduct of international affairs by the United States should consider and respect the views and interests of other nations, and that powerful states should have responsibilities and exercise leadership with ethical obligations. In addition, it seems that this ethical realist spirit is particularly essential when applied to their relations with alliances.

Moreover, it is worth noting that US-led humanitarian interventions in the Balkans led not only to the alleviation of human suffering but also to the United States improving its relations with the other intervening countries. Tomicah Tillemann, a professional staffer who specialised in the Balkans on the Committee on Foreign Relations of United States Senate stated:

By virtue of the intervention ... we were able to save many lives. And if you go to Bosnia these days, despite the fact that it is a predominantly Muslim country, the United States is very popular in most corners of the country, and the people of Bosnia, particularly the Bosniac population, I think feel a great debt of gratitude to the United States for what we undertook there.⁸⁵²

The same story happened in Kosovo. He concluded:

⁸⁴⁹ Samuel Berger, ‘Remarks at the Wilson Center’, 18 June 1996, CPL.

⁸⁵⁰ Interview with Schmitt.

⁸⁵¹ Ibid.

⁸⁵² Interview with Tomicah Tillemann on 8 August 2008.

I don't think there is a Muslim country in the world at this point where the United States is more popular than in Kosovo. ... the big street going down into the city is named after Bill Clinton; there are American flags and Statues of Liberty all over the place.⁸⁵³

Furthermore, when being asked whether the United States found it was worth putting a lot of effort into Bosnia and Kosovo, Tillemann responded:

We would say absolutely it was worth it and we've come a long way... we feel that things are moving in a very good direction, and we have very good relations with every country in the region including, and this one is particularly important, with Serbia, and the United States went to war with Serbia not that long ago, and today... we have friends throughout the Serbian government and people who we work closely with.⁸⁵⁴

These illustrations show that a foreign policy with an ethical dimension can help a state to enhance good relations with other states. In this case, it is in return for the support of American capitalism in the former communist countries, which are described as "secondary benefits".⁸⁵⁵ As Lake remarked on US military achievement in his speech at the National Defense University, "We should always keep in mind that the force of our example bolsters our leadership in the world and enhances our ability to achieve our interests."⁸⁵⁶

On the other hand, as far as overall international relations are concerned, if powerful states have good relations with other states, it would of course contribute to promoting international order. Again, such international order would in return be of benefit to the powerful states. For example, John Mearsheimer argues that "great powers can transcend realist logic by working together to build an international order that fosters peace and justice. World peace, it would appear, can only enhance a state's prosperity and security".⁸⁵⁷ For Jean Bethke Elshtain, American stability and international stability are closely linked. To put it more precisely, "as the world's superpower, America bears the responsibility to help guarantee that international stability". Elshtain has asserted, "We, the powerful, must respond to attacks against persons who cannot defend themselves because they, like us, are members of states,

⁸⁵³ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁵ Interview with Valon Gashi on 27 March 2010. Gashi is a citizen of Kosovo and was a member of the KLA during the Kosovo conflict.

⁸⁵⁶ Lake, 'Commencement Address National Defense University'.

⁸⁵⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 48.

or would-be states, whose primary obligation is to protect the lives of those citizens who inhabit their polities.” In Elshtain’s view, it is in America’s long-term national interest to foster and sustain an international society of equal regard; and thus, “strategic necessity and moral requirements here meet”.⁸⁵⁸

Also, Mearsheimer demonstrated that there are various strategies for a state’s survival, such as shifting the balance of power in its favour or preventing other states from shifting against it. Nevertheless, he did not indicate how states should act to gain and maintain such power and what kind of strategies they could employ to maximize their share of world power.⁸⁵⁹ My research would suggest a strategy of keeping the ethical realist spirit, that is to say, of acting responsibly. This study thus supports the Clinton administration’s strategy of enlargement, as mentioned in Chapter 4, that “America wouldn’t be using its power to keep a rival in check; it would use its power to expand its circle of friends and spread its values”. Although this thesis agrees with Joshua Muravchik’s assertion that it is important to think ahead about possible future enemies, it argues that it is far more important to preserve friendships at a time of peace.

This has an important implication for US foreign policy, as the second term of Clinton’s presidency gradually acknowledged borderless threats as new challenges to the United States. In dealing with these issues that transcend national borders, the United States needs to work with other states. As President Clinton put it: “Because the post-Cold War world was increasingly interdependent, our country could not afford to withdraw from the world’s problems; neither could we solve them on our own. Instead we had to strengthen the institutions -- and habits -- of international cooperation.”⁸⁶⁰ Ironically, despite the fact that the notion of an indispensable nation and the tendency towards unilateralism in his second term reflected Clinton’s newfound international confidence, it nevertheless became a dangerous signal that an overly-confident power without humility would turn out to be an arrogant power. For example, John Ikenberry observed, “Some intellectuals in the West even suggest that an arrogant America brought the terrorism of 11 September on itself.”⁸⁶¹

In a hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate,

⁸⁵⁸ Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Just War Against Terror: The burden of American power in a violent world* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), pp. 169, 170.

⁸⁵⁹ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 138-167.

⁸⁶⁰ Bill Clinton, ‘Foreward’, in Nancy Soderberg, *The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might* (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2006), p. vii.

⁸⁶¹ John Ikenberry, ‘American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror’, *Survival*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Winter 2001/2002), p. 20.

Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia has stated, by referring to Byron's view of the ruins of Rome in his *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*,

"There is the moral of human history. It is but the same rehearsal of the past. First, freedom, then, the glory, wealth, corruption, vice, and barbarism at last. History, with all her volumes vast, hath but one page" – meaning that history repeats itself... Why does history repeat itself? Because human nature has never changed since Adam and Eve were created and placed in the Garden of Eden. Adam, made in the image of his Creator. Human nature has never changed. Consequently, we can expect that history will have a way of repeating itself.⁸⁶²

Senator Byrd further pointed out: "We are right in the center of that page of history. That is where we are. And we should heed the lesson."⁸⁶³ This reminds us that as modern ethical realist George Kennan warned during the Cold War, "We are going to have to recognize that a large proportion of the sources of our troubles and dangers lies outside the Soviet challenge, such as it is, and some of it even within ourselves."⁸⁶⁴ Therefore, it could be argued that the decline of a powerful state sometimes results not from external threat or defeat but from self-defeating behaviours, usually beginning with moral destruction within a state itself.

Meanwhile, NATO's intervention in Kosovo "without any of the checks and balances provided by US law, international agreements, or even the *realpolitik* of the Security Council" has led many analysts to draw "a direct line between Clinton's handling of Kosovo and the way the George W. Bush administration approached the world after the 9/11 attacks".⁸⁶⁵ As mentioned before, in dealing with global issues that transcend national barriers, the United States needs to work with allies and friends, particularly in the war against terror. For instance, John Ikenberry has asserted, "To fight terrorism effectively, the United States needs partners: the military and logistical support of allies, intelligence sharing and the practical cooperation of frontline states."⁸⁶⁶ However, the unilateral military intervention in Iraq has severely damaged not only America's moral authority and international image but also its alliance relationships. To borrow Joseph Nye's words, "Failure to pay proper respect to the opinion of others and to incorporate a broad conception of justice into our

⁸⁶² Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 'The Role of US Armed Forces in the Post-Cold War World', 10 February 1994 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 2.

⁸⁶³ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁴ George F. Kennan, 'Containment then and now', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65 (1987), p. 890.

⁸⁶⁵ Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), p. 230.

⁸⁶⁶ Ikenberry, 'American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror', p. 28.

national interest will eventually come to hurt us.”⁸⁶⁷

As former US Ambassador to the UN Donald F McHenry commented:

9/11 proved that you can be as strong economically and politically and militarily, and yet you are vulnerable and you are dependent upon the co-operation of others. You cannot simply go around throwing your weight. Now unfortunately we didn’t learn that lesson, otherwise we wouldn’t be in Iraq. The United States can seek to lead but it can’t dominate if it wants a world in which it is respected and where it respects itself, and it has to depend upon the co-operation of others, even to protect itself...that instead of welcoming the co-operation of the international community after 9/11 we embarked on Iraq, and basically told the rest of the international community you do it my way or we’ll do it alone.⁸⁶⁸

Moreover, as Tim Dunne and Brian Schmidt argue, “A costly military intervention followed by a lengthy occupation in the Middle East has weakened the USA’s ability to contain the rising threat from China. In short, the Bush Presidency has not exercised power in a responsible and sensible manner.”⁸⁶⁹

This was why Barack Obama suggested renewing American leadership, as the war in Iraq had led the world to lose trust in American purposes and American principles. Obama called for a retrieval of leadership rooted in the fundamental insight of Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy. He argued:

One [thing] is truer now than ever before: the security and well-being of each and every American depend on the security and well-being of those who live beyond our borders. The mission of the United States is to provide global leadership grounded in the understanding that the world shares a common security and a common humanity.⁸⁷⁰

In Obama’s view, when it came to the use of military force “in circumstances beyond self-defense in order to provide for the common security that underpins global stability – to support friends, participate in stability and reconstruction operations, or confront mass atrocities”, the United States should “make every effort to garner the

⁸⁶⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 137.

⁸⁶⁸ Interview with Donald McHenry on 21 July 2008. McHenry was US Ambassador to the United Nations from 1979 to 1981.

⁸⁶⁹ Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Realism’, in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.), 4th edition, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 104.

⁸⁷⁰ Barack Obama, ‘Renewing American Leadership’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July/August 2007), p. 4.

clear support and participation of others”. The best example of this was President George H. W. Bush who led the international effort to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991. However, it seems that the United States has in recent times forgotten the lesson of the Gulf War, so that it suffers grave consequences in the context of the conflict in Iraq. Thus, for Obama, in order to “rebuild the alliances, partnerships, and institutions necessary to confront common threats and enhance common security”, it is now definitely necessary to renew American leadership in the world.⁸⁷¹

Overall, this study suggests that the role for the United States in the aftermath of the Cold War should be as a responsible power. Plus, if the United States acts responsibly, it helps to consolidate its standing as a moral leader. This thesis thus argues against Michael Mandelbaum’s description of the Clinton administration’s humanitarian intervention as “social work”. But why is moral leadership important? In Nye’s words, “If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes.”⁸⁷² This research suggests that it is only when a state acts ethically and responsibly that its power is made to appear legitimate in the eyes of others.

7.2 Pragmatic Foreign Policy

On the other hand, it is important to note that in his speech at the National Defense University, Lake also emphasized that when it came to operations other than war, the goals must be “practical and limited”. As mentioned in Chapter 2, because a state owes “a fiduciary duty” to its citizens, a state leader has no responsibility more solemn than to decide when to put its armed forces in harm’s way. Thus, Lake made it clear that the use of American force would be for one purpose: “To protect and promote American interests.”⁸⁷³ However, the emergent issue of ethnic conflict in the post-Cold War era posed new challenges to the only superpower in the world. The United States was in between “the heartless-ness of doing nothing in the face of human suffering and the callousness of making promises it cannot keep”.⁸⁷⁴

Thus, Lake divided American interests into three categories. The first involved a direct attack on America’s soil, people, and allies, which was to override the importance of American national security and survival. Under these circumstances,

⁸⁷¹ Ibid., p. 11.

⁸⁷² Joseph S. Nye, ‘Soft Power’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 88 (Autumn 1990), p. 167.

⁸⁷³ Lake, ‘Commencement Address National Defense University’.

⁸⁷⁴ James B. Steinberg, ‘A Perfect Polemic: Blind to Reality on Kosovo’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 6 (November/December 1999), p. 132.

Lake claimed, “We will do whatever it takes to defend these vital interests, including the use of decisive military force – with others where we can, and alone when we must...” The second comprised of situations that did not threaten America’s vital interests, but still affected American interests. For instance, the conflict in Bosnia jeopardized stability in a region that was of vital importance to the United States. Because the threats might be less clear and American interests are less immediate in this kind of case, the United States should make a careful assessment before using force. As Lake stated: “Before we send our troops into situations where our interests are less than vital, they need a clear and achievable mission, the means to prevail, and a strategy for withdrawal that is based on the military mission’s goals.”

The third category involved primarily humanitarian interests; the military might not be the best to address such concerns. Relief organizations may be overwhelmed in the case of humanitarian disasters such as those in Somalia or Rwanda.⁸⁷⁵ These arguments go a long way to explaining why the Clinton administration intervened in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, but did not send US troops to end the Rwandan genocide. As a result, this study concludes that the administration’s foreign policy on humanitarian intervention did follow a guiding principle. Overall, the administration’s approach to the humanitarian intervention issue was, in Lake’s term, “pragmatic neo-Wilsonian”. This thus implies a pragmatic conception of morality articulated in ethical realism.

Perhaps one might expect the world’s only superpower to intervene in every case of humanitarian crisis in the name of common humanity or universal moral principles; or one might accuse of the United States of being hypocritical. However, ethical realists view the world as it is. Because the world is still divided into different sovereign states, statespeople are primarily responsible and accountable for their own citizens and for national survival. As Hans Morgenthau argued, “As long as the world is politically organized into nations, the national interest is indeed the last word in world politics. When the national state will have been replaced by another mode of organization, foreign policy must then protect the interest in survival of that new organization.”⁸⁷⁶

This was why Morgenthau attempted to distinguish the relation between universal moral principles and political action. He maintained that “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation”.

⁸⁷⁵ Lake, ‘Commencement Address National Defense University’.

⁸⁷⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Another “Great Debate”: The National Interest of the United States’, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (December 1952), p. 972.

Instead, the state itself should be “inspired by the moral principle of national survival”.⁸⁷⁷ Also, George Kennan attempted to draw a clear distinction between state morality and the morality of ordinary men and women. He argued, “Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience”. As a result, “the interests of the national society for which government has to concern itself are basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and the well-being of its people”.⁸⁷⁸

Thus, in such a divided world, “a wise leadership will preach the joys of selectivity”⁸⁷⁹ and one can hardly expect that a state would send its troops to distant lands for only humanitarian concerns without there being any further interest involved. Even when the state decides to intervene to save human lives beyond its borders, its policy decisions must be made after careful calculations and the consequences of the actions ought to be fully weighed. Take the case of Bosnia - it was not until the success of the Croatian offensive to retake the Krajina region that the United States became engaged and willing to take the lead. The Bosnian War involved three warring parties, something which made outside intervention especially difficult. The abandonment of the Croatian Serbs by Milosevic and the Croatian success on the battlefield changed not only the balance of power in the region but also the psychology of all the parties.

Besides, prior to the successful Croatian offensive on the ground, Washington’s diplomatic efforts had successfully brought the Muslims and Croats together to establish a joint Muslim-Croat federation. As the changing military situation engineered by the successful Croatian ground offensive took a dramatic turn in the Balkan game, the Clinton administration identified an opportunity to initiate the endgame strategy. Moreover, it is important to note that in the cases of intervention of Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the Clinton administration was engaged in diplomatic efforts and sought a political solution first, with the use of military force always the last resort. It could be argued that Clinton’s foreign policy on humanitarian interventions was rooted in a realist calculation of consequences. This exemplifies the ethical realist assertions that prudence leads to a guideline for shaping goals and deciding on actions (especially with regard to the launching of military operations) and that an international strategy must be worked on achievable results rather than

⁸⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 986.

⁸⁷⁸ George F. Kennan, ‘Morality and foreign policy’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 64 (1985/1986), p. 206.

⁸⁷⁹ Linda B. Miller, ‘American Foreign Policy: Beyond Containment’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (April 1990), p. 324.

good intentions.

Overall, this research concludes that the Clinton administration's foreign policy on humanitarian intervention was essentially selective and thus, was coherent in its policy-making. From the administration's experiences of dealing with humanitarian intervention issues, it could also be concluded that an ethical foreign policy is not an abstract moral conception; it needs to be conducted on the basis of a prudent calculation of the consequences and of a case-by-case approach. That is why Edmund Burke emphasized that "pure metaphysical abstraction" did not belong to any moral or political subject. The lines of morality on political subjects admit of exceptions and demand modifications. "These exceptions and modifications are not made by the process of logic, but by the rules of prudence. Prudence is not only the first rank of the virtues political and moral, but she is the director, the regulator, the standard of them all".⁸⁸⁰ Morgenthau further reinforced the importance of prudence by saying, "There can be no political morality without prudence, that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action."⁸⁸¹

Also, Alastair J. H. Murray argued that "moral principles must be realised as far as possible in action, but always in line with the canons of prudence". Therefore, "realism's principal concern is not with the exposition of a highly complex explanatory theory, but with the interface with ethics and politics".⁸⁸² In other words, the conduct of foreign policy with an ethical agenda needs to be followed from a "prudent consideration of interest, not from the direct application of morality or idealism".⁸⁸³ Ultimately, as Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman suggest, "US officials must both pursue American interests and seek to set those interests within a framework that will be beneficial for humanity in general... Ethical realism in general would help US policymakers to create a hierarchy of US interests after deciding which ones are vital and which ones can be adapted in order to accommodate the vital interests of other states."⁸⁸⁴

In conclusion, this research recommends an ethical realist approach to foreign policy decision-making on those agendas associated with an ethical dimension. The virtues of responsibility and prudence, which constitute the philosophical root of ethical

⁸⁸⁰ Edmund Burke quoted in *ibid*.

⁸⁸¹ Morgenthau, 'Another "Great Debate"', p. 986.

⁸⁸² Alastair J. H. Murray, *Reconstructing Realism: Between power politics and cosmopolitan ethics* (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997), pp. 155, 156.

⁸⁸³ Michael J. Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Bato Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), p. 9.

⁸⁸⁴ Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, 'Ethical Realism and Contemporary Challenges', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 28, No. 6 (December 2006), p. 413.

realism, provide a compromise between abstract moralism and pure realpolitik, and a solution of the tension between ethics and politics.

Appendix – 1: Interviewing Questions

1. How did the United States perceive its national interest in the Balkans and define its relationship with US national security, especially in post-Cold War period?
2. How much did the United States understand the cause of the Bosnian and Kosovar conflict and its implications for international relations and international order?
3. Why did the administration intervene in the Balkans? Was it because national security issue? Or was it because foreign policy agenda, in particular with regard to Clinton's 'assertive humanitarianism' foreign policy agenda ?
4. How do you think the influence of the actors of foreign policy team on foreign policy decision-making?
5. From your perspective, what kind of domestic factors did influence and motivate the Clinton administration decision-making on humanitarian interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo? For example, Vietnam Syndrome, Congress, media and public opinion..etc
6. What did the role of morality in the process of decision-making? Did the pictures of massacre reported by media (esp. CNN effect) stimulate moral conscience and moral sense of public opinion and policy-makers?
7. How do you think American power changed following the collapse of the world in 1990s? Did the issue of humanitarian intervention challenge the US foreign policy-making? Did the structural transformation in the international system and new international environment, for instance, globalization and information age, after the Cold War influence the role of US in international politics?
8. How do you think the role of US leadership and its relationship with European allies played on these conflicts?
9. Do you think, the US, as the only superpower in the post-Cold War era, should take moral responsibility to protect the interests of others? Esp. genocide and ethnic cleansing...

10. Should the interests of humanity be considered as a part of national interest and placed in the centre of policy-making?

11. Why was the Clinton administration slow to respond to the Bosnian crisis but quick to respond to the Kosovo conflict?

12. Of course, the US could not intervene in every case of humanitarian crisis. Does the US during the 1990s have any criteria or strategy for military interventions? For example, towards pragmatic foreign policy based on 'cost/benefit analysis'?

13. Can the United States keep its position of leadership in the international order if it does not act in ways which are consistent with its shared values?

Appendix – 2:

Transcript of the interview with Daniel P. Serwer

1. How did the United States perceive its national interest in the Balkans and define its relationship with US national security, especially in post-Cold War period?

James Baker in the beginning of the 90s said we had no dog in that fight. He was right, there are no vital American interests at stake in the Balkans. The trouble was, that there was an accumulation of secondary interests, not primary interests but secondary, having to do with the NATO alliance, holding it together, having to do with the CNN effect, the impact on the Muslim population in the Balkans. It was a series of secondary interests that accumulated to the point that we might not have a dog in that fight but the Europeans did and we were gonna have to help out.

2. How much did the United States understand the cause of the Bosnian and Kosovar conflict and its implications for international relations and international order?

Well I mean different people understood things in different ways but I would say this, that we certainly understood, correctly I think, that this was not about ancient hatreds, it wasn't about...it was about people wanting to stay in power and using ethnic strife to do it, and we certainly understood that. I think we also understood, and this is very important, that if it continued, especially in Bosnia, that what you were gonna get was the ethnic cleansing of the Muslims from the Serbian territory and from the Croat territory, and you would end up with what we referred to as a rump Muslim state, non viable rump Muslim state, which would be a platform for Iranian terrorism in Europe, those were the words we used many times to describe this problem. A non-viable rump Muslim state, Islamic state, that would be a platform for Iranian terrorism in Europe. Terrorism in the United States hadn't been conceived of yet ..., but terrorism in Europe had been, and there were good reasons to fear that the Iranians were gaining a foothold in Bosnia because they were supplying the Bosnians with weapons and we in fact were allowing them to do that.

3. Why did the administration intervene in the Balkans? Was it because national security issue? Or was it because foreign policy agenda, in particular with regard to Clinton's 'assertive humanitarianism' foreign policy agenda ?

And the reason we intervened, more than anything else, more I think even than the

humanitarian considerations, was to prevent the creation of this Islamic state.... it wasn't a primary vital American interest, it wasn't the United States that was really at risk from the creation of this Islamic state in Bosnia, it was Europe that was at risk. But, you know, it was right after the Cold War, we still believed that our security and European security were very closely tied. I don't think it had anything to do with assertive humanitarianism, I don't believe that. I don't even believe that the Kosovo intervention had anything to do with that. The Kosovo intervention, Bosnia, I mean there were humanitarian considerations, no question about that, but it wasn't an agenda...President Clinton waited three and a half years before doing what he had promised to do during his first campaign which was to bomb the Serbs when they attacked and then Sarajevo. But he did that mainly because Senator Dole was criticizing him in the Presidential campaign for failing to do it, three and a half years after he'd promised it. So it wasn't Clinton's 'assertive humanitarianism' foreign policy, that's conservative claptrap. Just not true.

4. How do you think the influence of the actors of foreign policy team on foreign policy decision-making?

..... the trouble was that the circumstances on the ground changed very dramatically during the summer, so that by August, early September, the federation, well at the time of the ceasefire and I can't give you a precise date for that, you'll have to look that up, the federation controlled 66% of the territory. Now frankly I believe that during that summer somebody should have gone back to the President and said Mr President you had a nice peace plan but circumstances on the ground have changed, the guys we've been supporting for three and a half years are winning, let's see if they can win. Nobody did that. And I think that was Holbrook's responsibility to do that and he didn't do it.

5. From your perspective, what kind of domestic factors did influence and motivate the Clinton administration decision-making on humanitarian interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo? For example, Vietnam Syndrome, Congress, media and public opinion..etc

Well, you know, I think public opinion has its impact, I mean you know in a democratic society, you know, Senator Dole starts getting headlines, Dole criticizes Clinton for not carrying out what he promised in the Balkans and there's an impact. And I don't think there is any question that it was Dole's headlines that summer that really pushed things ahead. Holbrook never mentions that in his book. I think

Americans were kinda fed up with the war, I think they found what happened in Srebrenica disgusting, and I think Holbrook was determined to try to demonstrate that American power could be used effectively to intervene abroad, he was very concerned about, you know, he was, in Dick's mind Vietnam was ever-present, you know, and it was a failure of the use of American power and he wanted to demonstrate, he says this in the introduction to his book, that this obsessed him, the need to demonstrate the effective use of American power in a good cause and so Vietnam was very much on his mind. You know, I think there was a feeling that, you know, it's amazing when you think about it today, that what was going on in Bosnia was regarded as the most important problem in the world at that time, those were happy days compared to today. Today we've got much bigger problems, but we had relatively few problems then.

6. What did the role of morality in the process of decision-making? Did the pictures of massacre reported by media (esp. CNN effect) stimulate moral conscience and moral sense of public opinion and policy-makers?

Yes I mean the moral dimension was always there but frankly it was there every day for people who worked in the State Department, I mean it wasn't, you know, just because, the fall of Srebrenica had a real impact in the State Department, that was a very depressing moment and people really felt that we had to do something. So moral conscience I think did have an impact but, you know, when it came to listing the reasons for intervention, preventing the formation of a rump Islamic state that would be a platform for Iranian terrorism in Europe was very high on the list, and you'll find if you get the declassified memos of that period you'll find that phrase dozens and dozens of times.

7. How do you think American power changed following the collapse of the world in 1990s? Did the issue of humanitarian intervention challenge the US foreign policy-making? Did the structural transformation in the international system and new international environment, for instance, globalization and information age, after the Cold War influence the role of US in international politics?

Well. There was certainly a feeling that America, if it wanted to do something about Bosnia, about Kosovo, it could do it. It just had to mobilize the power that it inherently had, and this was where Holbrook was amazingly effective because it's not, you know, everybody comes to Washington and thinks that there's a lot of power in Washington and then when you get here you can't find it, where is it? Who has it?

And the answer is it's very divided, it's divided between the President and Congress, it's divided between two houses of Congress, it's divided between the State Department and the Defence Department, it's divided...economic power can't be influenced so readily by the government, the whole economic world is insulated from government influence, so when you get here you realize my God there's a lot of power but it's all divided up into little packages and nobody has it all, so to use it effectively you have to get it all in one place, and that's what Holbrook did, and that's the brilliance of what he did, was that he managed to accumulate...Holbrook managed to accumulate the diplomatic, economic, political, military power and exercise it all in one place, he had it all in his hands, and that's how he got the Dayton agreements because the Dayton agreements were agreements that Milosevic wanted ...and we would never have gotten them except for this really quite remarkable accumulation of power in Dick's hands. Now globalisation, information age, Cold War influence, certainly the information age had a certain impact, I mean you had instant responses, I mean something happened on the ground in Srebrenica and you knew about it an hour later in Washington, I mean it's absolutely incredibly velocity of information. And...but in many respects the Bosnian war was an old style war, I mean it was a war of attrition, it was a war against civilians, it was a war that was just as crude and as nasty as war can be, there was nothing modern about it at all really, I mean the Bosnian army had one tank, you know. Kosovo, there the situation was a little bit different, I think what happened with Kosovo was that, and again Holbrook was quite instrumental, but what happened with Kosovo was that the Americans became convinced that if Milosevic was successful in expelling the Albanians from Kosovo that that would destabilize Macedonia and potentially lead to a chaotic war that would involve Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, this is what I call the Holbrook nightmare scenario. I think it was a very low probability, but it was possible and it would have been very unhappy, and I think that was a major reason for the intervention. Of course the humanitarian factor existed, there were, whatever, 800,000 people out of their homes, you needed to get them back to their homes, but you know all of that accumulates, but I think that the wider war aspect of the thing was really what drove American intervention, and remember we didn't intervene on the ground. We were planning to if we had to, but we were trying to avoid that kind of commitment. The Balkans when all is said and done, just didn't cost the United States very much, I mean compare it with the Iraq War or the Afghanistan War and it's nothing, it's 25 billion dollars, no-one killed in Bosnia, no-one killed in Kosovo, an air war, it really was not a gigantic burden, it's, again the right wing in criticizing Clinton says it was but it wasn't ... it was 25 billion over ten years, we're now spending ten billion, twelve billion a month, there's a big difference.

8. How do you think the role of US leadership and its relationship with European allies played on these conflicts?

I mean the point is the Europeans were hopeless, they really were. I mean, today they're in better shape but they're still pretty hopeless.... NATO didn't exist to go to war, it existed to prevent war, and it didn't dawn on us for a long time that not everybody felt that way, that Milosevic had gone to war before we had and before we were ready to even contemplate it. The Europeans...sometimes Europeans say to me that we imposed at Dayton a European agreement, the Americans imposed a European style agreement because it provides for group rights and all sorts of...and they're right. But the Europeans would never have gotten that, they weren't capable of it. Too divided, too fragmented. Watch them on Kosovo now, I mean they're very ineffective on Kosovo right now because they're divided, they can't get anybody to agree on anything. US leadership was vital. The end of the Bosnia war...the Bosnian war would not have ended the way it did if not for the United States, the Kosovo war would not have ended the way it did except for the United States. We were vital and no single European power was as important. The Germans and British were important but they were significantly less important than the United States.

9. Do you think, the US, as the only superpower in the post-Cold War era, should take moral responsibility to protect the interests of others? Esp. genocide and ethnic cleansing..

Ah well. Yes and no, I mean it's a very difficult thing to do. I mean you intervene, the world is still a world in which you intervene to protect your own interests not the interests of others, and Darfur is the classic case now. Should we be intervening, and if we did would it really help the situation or would it make it worse? A lot of tough issues surrounding that and we'll see the recommendations...we have a task force on prevention of genocide that is working now, it's chaired by Madeleine Albright and William Cohen and we'll see what they recommend on this subject.... should we take moral responsibility to protect the interests of others? Well, I don't think we should ignore the interests of others. The question is, how much responsibility do we take?

10. Should the interests of humanity be considered as a part of national interest and placed in the centre of policy-making?

I wouldn't place it at the centre of policy-making, but I think you have to consider always what the broader impacts are of...on interests that may not be in the first instance your own, I mean, you know in, you know, we're not the only country that faces that problem. China faces that problem too, people are saying the Chinese shouldn't be developing oil in Sudan when they're doing these things in Darfur. Well, you know, they have to weigh those things, and it's a question of how much should they weigh Darfur? And ultimately, you know, the problem with genocide is it probably will effect your interests at some point, so better to stop it earlier rather than later, and so, you know, you have to take it into consideration, I'm not sure that it should be the centrepiece of policy-making.

11. Why was the Clinton administration slow to respond to the Bosnian crisis but quick to respond to the Kosovo conflict?

That's not true, it was even slower to respond to the Kosovo conflict than to the Bosnia conflict. The crisis in the Balkans started in Kosovo in 1989. We put the Kosovo conflict on ice, refused to deal with it while we dealt with Bosnia. But we came back to it, forced by what Milosevic was doing, we came back to it in 98/99. But it had been a problem since 89 and we knew that, so it's not true that we were slow...that we were quick to respond to the Kosovo crisis. I think we were slow to respond to the Bosnian crisis and that's because our primary vital interests were not involved. We were even slower to respond in Kosovo because there were even fewer interests involved.

12. Of course, the US could not intervene in every case of humanitarian crisis. Does the US during the 1990s have any criteria or strategy for military interventions? For example, towards pragmatic foreign policy based on 'cost/benefit analysis'?

You'll have to ask the administration. I think the answer is yes, I mean these guys will intervene wherever they think that they have to to counter possible terrorist attacks, that's the current main criterion. Cost/benefit analysis, well, you know, when it comes to vital interests you don't talk cost/benefits.

13. Can the United States keep its position of leadership in the international order if it does not act in ways which are consistent with its shared values?

I mean American leadership is...is, is on the one hand a fact of our lives, I mean it's

just a big powerful country with a big military and big economy and...at the same time, looked at from, in the long-term perspective, World War II forwards, we are a declining power. And the question is how to manage our decline as safely as possible. Declining in the relative sense because we are a smaller percentage of the world's economy, a smaller percentage of the world's population, than, than we were at the end of World War II, obviously, everybody else was destroyed, we were intact. So it's a question of managing declining relative power in a way that is safe for the United States, and the best way to do that in my view is to construct institutions that make the world safe for us. UN in many ways has been a disappointment but it has its functions. NATO doesn't do what it used to do but it has its functions. There are, you know, in every region of the world whether it's the, you know, the OAS and Latin America, or...almost every place actually, there was that cover story in The Economist the other day about this, the elaborate nature of our international institutions and they were criticizing it, but I think, you know, it may need rationalization but we can't intervene in every place, we have to divide the labours with others. In order to do that you need some common understandings of when it's appropriate, when it isn't appropriate to intervene, you know, see you have to build institutions for that purpose. You can't, you can't just ignore everything that's there and try to, you know, savagely defend your own interests by yourself, and that's close to what this administration tried to do at the beginning, and got into a lot of trouble trying to do it. We are a declining power. The world, you know, frankly I think the world will regret that. It's not avoidable, it's the natural evolution of things. Powers are growing faster than we are and we will be less dominant than...we'll be, we'll be more dominant than we were during the Cold War because we had a single adversary, but we will be less dominant than we were at the end of, right at the end of World War II before the Cold War started, because we...there's just no way we can maintain dominance and there's no need to maintain dominance. I mean there's no need to maintain dominance, I mean there's no...you have to maintain a system that protects your interests, not just a capacity to unilaterally protect your interests, and, you know, we haven't done very well in recent years at building that system, but there are elements like, you know, responsibility to protect and things of that sort that help to build a system of rules that, even the...even the indictment of Bashir in Sudan is part of the emerging rules. And it may not help in Sudan, it may cause us problems in Sudan, but it's a warning to other guys like him, you will not get away with this. You need to think twice before you, you know, you chase two million people off their land and mistreat them the way you have. So I think there are new emerging rules. We haven't played the leadership role we should in recent years in building that set of rules, but it's still in our interests to do that, both candidates have

made it clear that they will return to an effort to do that. So I think we're headed back to more multilateralism.

Appendix – 3:

Transcript of the interview with James Goldgeier

14. How did the United States perceive its national interest in the Balkans and define its relationship with US national security, especially in post-Cold War period?

I don't think there was a huge national interest in the Balkans, but to the extent that the United States felt that there was any kind of national interest I think you sort of had two things. One, a general notion that stability in Europe was important for American interests and if there was an unstable part of Europe then the United States needed to do something about that. And just fears that there would be other types of situations like that, that would emerge in other parts of Europe. And then the second was NATO, that the United States wanted to ensure that NATO continued to function effectively after the end of the Cold War, and even though this wasn't a mission that was a traditional NATO mission, it did come to be seen as influencing the credibility of NATO, that there was this sense that if NATO couldn't deal with something right there in Europe that it wasn't going to be able to deal with things outside, that it wasn't going to be relevant to the post-Cold War world. So I think both stability in Europe and NATO's credibility were things that were important to people in Washington.

15. How much did the United States understand the cause of the Bosnian and Kosovar conflict and its implications for international relations and international order?

Well I think the United States saw both as caused by the same thing, which was a leader in ... a leader in Yugoslavia who was threatening these populations, and that this was something the United States didn't want to allow after the Cold War was over, that it thought it should do something about people like Milosevic. I don't think from the US standpoint there was a lot of other thought given to who was doing what, I think it was pretty much there's a bad guy in charge in Belgrade and the United States should do something about him.

16. Why did the Clinton administration intervene in the Balkans? Was it because national security issue? Or was it because foreign policy agenda, in particular with regard to Clinton's 'assertive humanitarianism' foreign policy agenda ?

Well Bosnia and Kosovo are different, I mean in Bosnia the United States did not do

anything really for four years, the last couple of years of George HW Bush and then the first two years of Clinton, and the problem was that by 1995 the Clinton administration couldn't accomplish anything else on foreign policy because it, because if you looked at the newspapers everything was about Bosnia and all the front page stories were about Bosnia, and I think they really felt like they had to deal with it in 1995 before the election year of 1996. So I think that in some cases for political reasons they finally decided that they had to act. In Kosovo I think the issue there was having been successful in Bosnia, and having the same guy in charge in Serbia doing something again, I think they felt like they couldn't allow it to happen, that they had to, they had to do something. I do think the responsibility to protect was much more important even in Kosovo than it had been before. I think they really had by then really felt like this was an important thing for the United States.

[Author: I think also in your book, I think you mentioned that Kosovo war as a humanitarian effort?]

Right, these are not national interests to us, the United States could have just totally ignored this and it would have had no impact on the American national interest. So I don't think you can really argue that either Bosnia or Kosovo was done for American national security interests because they could have gone on and it wouldn't have had any impact on American national security.

[Author: But how about comparing Bosnia and Kosovo?]

Well I think people had more national security concerns in Bosnia just because it was seen as an issue of credibility for NATO. I mean I think Kosovo really was done for humanitarian reasons, and I think they also thought it would be easy, so I think that's also partly why they got started on it. And, the other question though for both of them is would the United States have been involved in either of them had they not been in Europe? I mean that's a big question because there are conflicts in other parts of the world that the United States does not get involved in, and I think Europe being an area of special interest to the United States, I think that also did play a role.

[Author: So do you think because Kosovo is in Europe, because compared to Rwanda...]

Right.

17. How do you think the influence of the actors of foreign policy team on foreign policy decision-making?

Well, there were definitely people who wanted to do something, and there were other people who didn't. So in Bosnia for example, Anthony Lake the National Security Advisor, really wanted to do something about Bosnia, and I think it took time for him to be able to have an impact because I think there were others who weren't so sure. Kosovo, I think Madeleine Albright the Secretary of State was a big person promoting the idea of doing something about Kosovo, so I do think that there were specific individuals who were very important for pushing this idea that the United States should do something.

18. From your perspective, what kind of domestic factors did influence and motivate the Clinton administration decision-making on humanitarian interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo? For example, Vietnam Syndrome, Congress, media and public opinion..etc

Well, so I think that part of the reason why Bosnia took so long was the domestic, the fear that there was not going to be domestic support and not wanting another Vietnam, and again because it wasn't so clear that there was a national interest issue it took a while. Now as I said, because it starts to get a lot of press attention and it's on the front page and the United States isn't doing something about it, I think that for domestic reasons in fact the United States did have to act in the end in Bosnia. Kosovo, you see the, you see the impact of the public most in the decision about how to fight the war. The Clinton administration decision to say that in the beginning, they were not going to use ground troops in Kosovo and it was just going to be an air campaign. That was for domestic political reasons. There was a fear that if they started talking about a ground war that people would start thinking about Vietnam.

[Author: But how about Bosnia? Because at the very beginning the Clinton administration, I think President Clinton he also didn't want to...]

Right, that's correct. Right, because he asked Colin Powell the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, how many troops would be required to do Bosnia. Colin Powell tells him, you would need 200,000 American troops and it's jungle fighting and mountain fighting and, yeah, they weren't going to do it.

[Author: So do you think the reason President Clinton didn't want to put ground troops in Bosnia was the same reason why he didn't want to in Kosovo?]

I don't think the issue really came up in Bosnia, I don't really remember it coming up in Bosnia. But they were very clear in Kosovo, at the beginning of Kosovo, that they were not going to put ground troops in.

19. What did the role of morality in the process of decision-making? Did the pictures of massacre reported by media (esp. CNN effect) stimulate moral conscience and moral sense of public opinion and policy-makers?

Well, I don't think it had that much of an impact because, again, it went for four years. So, those pictures were out there for four years and the United States hadn't done anything. I really do think that the United States finally acted because it needed to, it needed to get it fixed so that it could move on to other things. And Kosovo of course... the big ethnic population movements didn't take place until after the war started, so I don't think it had, I don't think the CNN effect was important in Kosovo at all.

20. How do you think American power changed following the collapse of the world in 1990s? Did the issue of humanitarian intervention challenge the US foreign policy-making? Did the structural transformation in the international system and new international environment, for instance, globalization and information age, after the Cold War influence the role of US in international politics?

Well I think what these cases showed in the 1990s was the United States starting to act for humanitarian reasons as long as no Americans were killed. And that's what you start to see during the 1990s, that the military is so powerful that it can do these campaigns without losing American soldiers and it can do humanitarian intervention. I think had there been significant American casualties then the public wouldn't have supported it because it wasn't a national interest issue. That's why for example in Somalia in 1993 as soon as a few Americans were killed the US leaves because it wasn't in the national interest, and we don't really have, you don't see a national interest war until Afghanistan after September 11th, and then the population is supportive because the United States had been attacked, but in the 1990s these were all, these weren't national security interest interventions so it was important that the United States not have Americans killed in the process.

21. How do you think the role of US leadership and its relationship with European allies and Russia played on these conflicts?

Well, so in the Bosnia case, in the George HW Bush administration and even I guess in the early Clinton years there was a sense that Europe should do something about Bosnia, and over time there was a realization that Europe would not do something about Bosnia without the United States leading the effort. So that was important in Bosnia. In Kosovo it was important to have NATO because the United States was not going to be able to get UN Security Council authorization but it wanted to go through a multilateral institution for legitimacy reasons. And so NATO was important for that.

[Author: But do you think the Kosovo war is also because of the pressure, because NATO is going to celebrate I think its 50th...]

Right, its anniversary? Right. No I don't think there was, I mean the only person who was really out there saying the United States needed to do something was Tony Blair, from Great Britain. But if the United States hadn't wanted to do Kosovo I don't think there would have been a huge European outcry. In fact the anniversary made it harder because there was a concern at the meetings in April in Washington that the allies would be divided as opposed to be united, so it was a huge effort to make sure that NATO was united in trying to prevent the, I mean in trying to do the war correctly.

22. Do you think, the US, as the only superpower in the post-Cold War era, should take moral responsibility to protect the interests of others? Esp. genocide and ethnic cleansing..

Yeah I think the United States, I think that this notion of the responsibility to...well, the responsibility to protect is an important international obligation. So I think the international community needs to take seriously this responsibility to protect. Now, the problem is if the United States isn't able and willing to lead the international community to support the responsibility to protect, it's going to be hard to do anything because there's no other country powerful enough to do this. But it's an international community obligation, not a, it's not something unique to the United States.

[Author: But because the United States is a powerful country it's like a leadership...]

Yes, it has to. Absolutely.

23. Should the interests of humanity be considered as a part of national interest and placed in the centre of policy-making?

Well I don't know that it's, I don't know that I would say it's a national interest, I would say that it is one of the reasons why the international community should act, and I think that the important thing in the 1990s is that previously the notion in the international community was that you should not intervene in the affairs of a sovereign state, and the notion in the 1990s was if that state was so violating part of its internal population that the international community should as a community do something about it and not let sovereignty stand in the way, and I think that was an important development in the 1990s. But it's not going to happen all the time and, you know, in cases when it's not in a country's core national interest it's going to be hard to get action. I mean Darfur for example, the international community should act, but if it's not in the core national security interest of particular countries it's going to be hard to get that action.

24. Of course, the US could not intervene in every case of humanitarian crisis. Did the US during the 1990s have any criteria or strategy for military interventions? For example, towards pragmatic foreign policy based on 'cost/benefit analysis'?

Not that I know of. I mean there was an effort, there was an effort in 1993 or so to have a sort of set of criteria laid out for, for intervention. And in fact the people who wrote that argue that that's one of the reasons why the United States did not intervene in Rwanda but I don't think there had been really a widely discussed plan about when the United States would or would not intervene or what kind of checklist there would be. I mean again there was something that was done in 93 and there are those who argue that that was looked at and, or at least that that was the basis for not intervening in Rwanda but I don't know how widely discussed that was.

25. Can the United States keep its position of leadership in the international order if it does not act in ways which are consistent with its shared values?

You mean in terms of either at home or, you know, torture? Those kinds of things?

[Author: I think, yeah, in international system, yeah.]

Well hopefully the United States will act in a way that's consistent with its values but sometimes it does not. And, that is a problem. I mean, it's a problem for them trying to act on the basis of values because then countries accuse it of being hypocritical and not, why does it act this way in one case but then it doesn't act in accordance with its own values in other cases. I think that those are imperfections that are unfortunate but it's hard to...but it is important for the United States, I mean that's why these issues like the torture issues are so important in the American political debate, because if the United States is engaging in torture then that makes it harder for the United States to prevent other countries from engaging in torture.

26. Why was the Clinton administration slow to respond to the Bosnian crisis but quick to respond to the Kosovo conflict?

Well I think, so it was slow in Bosnia because it was worried about getting involved in another Vietnam, and because it wasn't clearly in America's national interest there was no sort of compelling, we have to go do this, and concern about public...lack of public support. And the reason the United States acted more quickly in Kosovo was because after the Bosnia experience went so well in finally acting there was a sense that Kosovo would be over quickly. I think if they had known that Kosovo was going to be, you know, as long as it was going to be, I don't know that they would have done it so quickly.

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