The development of a discourse of ethics in education

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DISCOURSE OF ETHICS IN EDUCATION

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DATE: March 1998
Abstract

Ed D Thesis: The Development of a Discourse of Ethics in Education

This thesis, although drawing upon many different sources, chiefly draws its key, illuminating idea from the work of four people, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Karl Popper, Richard Rorty and Don Cupitt, all of whom exemplified, in one way or another, the view that in order to extend one's understanding it is first necessary to extend one's language. In other words, this thesis subscribes to the view that 'the limits of my language are the limits of my world' (Wittgenstein, 1993:56). Thus the task of this enquiry is to represent, by synthesis and extension, the kinds of language activity potentially capable of characterising a modern moral discourse.

In the first instance, then, the thesis offers a commentary on the contemporary debate over the role of morality in education. The research is confined to a UK context and it draws its primary theoretical data from five different subject areas: Education, Psychology, Sociology, Theology and Philosophy. A secondary source of theoretical data is derived from an analysis of recent public documents from a range of organisations including the Schools Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA).

Second, the thesis thereafter offers a theoretically derived model of four distinctive value positions: Religion, Humanism, Utilitarianism and Kantianism. It is claimed that this provisional template is typical and largely representative of the mainstream data from above.

Third, it is further claimed that these four value positions are representative of a common morality which can best be characterised as particular manifestations of language embedded in activity; or, to put it another way, as particular forms of language games: in this case games which perform the function of enabling value judgements to become enacted.

Finally, a frame of reference for a common morality flows from the analysis composed of three constituent parts: (a) an objective element designated as A Four Quadrants model and based on the above four value positions; (b) a subjective element designated as A Syntax of Four Voices to reflect the belief that to be moral is also to be subjective (reflection and deliberation are seen here as bedrock metaphysical properties); (c) a synthesis element designated as Six Moral Precepts which emerge from the exploration and yield a codification of moral maxims which cohere as such to be representative of a common morality.

Michael P Collins  
September 1997
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It is perhaps a mere truism to declare that research for a doctoral thesis is a lonely activity; but in this case the loneliness was not so much in the activity itself - in fact here I received great help and inspiration - the loneliness was in the subject matter of the activity.

Let me try to explain, a few years ago I was struck by a remark made by Ludwig Wittgenstein, just a few days before he died, concerning the relationship between knowledge and faith:

If someone believes something, we needn't always be able to answer the question 'why he believes it'; but if he knows something, then the question 'how does he know?' must be capable of being answered (1994 c, p72).

This thesis was derived from the swampy, rough ground that exists between certain knowledge and certain faith: all of its results are amenable to explanation but only some of its results are amenable to testing. For as there is so very little research yet done in relation to a moral vocabulary in education, then struggling to discover one, or an embryonic framework for one, was indeed a lonely but challenging journey.

Finding a satisfactory bridge between facts and values was the challenge and I hope that the emergent theory herein is a worthy answer. But the journey is a continual one and along the route, I have received help from many different sources. There are two principal sources of assistance to which I wish to pay acknowledgement.

First of all, I would like to express my considerable gratitude to the University of Durham for providing the intellectual platform, through the Ed D route, for a professional and personally stimulating experience. Here I am very grateful to the library staff and especially the staff in the education library who were always very helpful. I am also indebted to Professor Gerald Grace who provided the initial impulse for the research topic; and I am no less grateful to Professor Frank Cofield who provided an inspirational spur to many of the initial ideas. My final debt, in this regard, is to my supervisor, Professor David Galloway who, in spite of a busy schedule, always found time to scrutinise and challenge my assertions which has enabled me to achieve much greater clarity in what follows.
Second, I would like to acknowledge my considerable debt to family and friends whose generosity and support have made this possible. In particular I would like to thank my Mother without whom I could not have acquired the critical faculties of an aspiring scholar; also, my sister, Ann, has been very kind in frequently funding my inordinate thirst for new books. But, more especially, I would like to thank my wife Katy and my children Lucy and Michael for believing as much in me as in the task and for their generous emotional sustenance and personal sacrifice, without which this thesis could not have been started. Finally, I must acknowledge a general debt to friends, past and present, for frequently providing an open mind and ready ear. In this regard I would like to thank Gary Nixon for inviting me to present a paper containing the key ideas of the thesis to the 1996 ATP* annual conference. Also I would like to register my appreciation to James Dinsley for suggesting a number of novel extensions to the model herein presented.

I conclude with a remark which I believe was attributed to Samuel Johnson, 'what is written without effort is in general read without pleasure'.

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Michael P. Collins

September 1997

* 14th Annual Conference of the Association for the Teaching of Psychology held at St John's College, University of Durham July 8th-10th 1996
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OVERVIEW

This thesis is a theoretical contribution, based on rationalist principles rather than empirical ones, and is concerned with the issue of developing a vocabulary and conceptual framework in relation to morals in education. It is a strange paradox that what would appear to be the most common, public and accessible world - the world of immediate experience and values - should be the most private and inaccessible. Indeed a major contention of this research is that thus far no adequate underpinning language, nor meaningful conceptual framework yet exists in which to locate a moral discourse for teachers, managers and policymakers.

What follows, then, is a theoretical argument derived from the literature which provides a new synthesis and different way of understanding the concept of moral values than has hitherto been presented. The pattern of theory generation offered is not in terms of causal relationships and proofs but instead is in terms of serendipitous explanation and description by heuristic illumination:

The heuristic researcher is not only intimately and autobiographically related to the question but learns to love the question. It becomes a kind of song into which the researcher breathes life...It creates a thirst to discover, to clarify, and to understand crucial dimensions of knowledge and experience (2).

In 1930 Robert Musil identified the zeitgeist of the twentieth century, 'We no longer see the moral norm as the immobility of rigid commandments, but as a mobile equilibrium continually demanding exertion towards its renewal' (3). And although I am confident that moral discourse has not reached the Orwellian adjectival nightmare of double-plus-good, it nevertheless remains a necessary condition of each moral community's existence to continually seek to renew and enrich our cultural and moral heritage. I hope that this paper may contribute to that end.
CHAPTER 1: THE CURRENT MORAL CLIMATE IN SCHOOLS

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is twofold: Firstly, to identify the ideological tensions and contradictions inherent in the public domain discourse in education during the 1980's and 1990's and second, to locate such ideologies within the context of explicit public values. But although within any culture and school system there resides an implicit idea of what constitutes values in education, when these assumptions are made explicit there is controversy, disagreement and alternative competing views. Of course many commentators had already identified these ideological tensions (see especially Ball, 1994; Bernstein, 1994; Grace, 1994; Hargreaves, 1994 and Tomlinson, 1993) but in terms of this analysis it is necessary to go beyond the descriptive ideological perspectives and begin to make explicit the underlying process of values. In this latter respect research evidence remains sparse, although certainly a small corpus of recent writers have pursued aspect of values in education (e.g., Bloom, 1987; Bottery, 1993 and 1994; Fullan, 1992; Hodgkinson, 1983 and 1991; Sergiovanni, 1992; Tomlinson, 1995) (4).

The purpose of this analysis, therefore, will be to try to encapsulate succinctly the educational process itself within a dynamic of what I shall henceforth refer to as a process dynamic of educational values in action. In other words this chapter will argue that there exists a complex arena of competing alternative public voices, all of which are constantly jostling for position and expression. Such a scenario in education is applicable at the following levels of interaction: National Curriculum classroom teaching; teacher training; LEA administration; policy formulation. In
these terms then, the analysis will thus attempt to explicate more fully the range and type of secular and non-secular value positions expressed within the educational process itself.

The Context

A major difficulty when discussing values in education is to be certain in the first place about whose values are being represented. All theorists would accept that school education is inescapably involved with values both within and across the National Curriculum. Some of these implicit values are to do with curricular bias in particular subjects (such as English where the value of creativity and self-expression may take precedence over grammar and syntax and vice versa where the former is pre-requisite to the latter), or where a preference for a particular pedagogical style predominates; while even other implicit values relate to institutional preferences (school uniform, disciplinary codes and what constitutes good behaviour, etc.) And by contrast, the value perspective of an LEA will differ from that of central Government. Nevertheless and in spite of these demonstrable differences as soon as one seeks specificity for a particular implicit value position the task becomes more difficult.

The answers to such first order questions as: What should I do? and what moral principles should I adopt? remains the perennial quest for each "moral agent". Yet in the absence of an explicit vocabulary and criteria of reference it is easy to see why so much dispute exists. Indeed the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA:) recommends that each school "promotes an ethos which values imagination, inspiration, contemplation, and a clear understanding of right and
wrong" (1996:10). Parallel to this a 1996 House of Lords committee, chaired by the Archbishop of Canterbury, debated a motion concerning "Society's Moral and Spiritual Well-being" and began with Cardinal Hume's premise:

> We are not engaged, surely, in producing just good performers in the market place or able technocrats. Our task is the training of good human beings, purposeful and wise, themselves with a vision of what it is to be human and the kind of society that makes that possible (Official Report No. 120, 1996:1692).

Probably few would quibble with the moral reasoning behind Cardinal Hume's task of "training good human beings". The Archbishop of Canterbury in summing up this debate emphasised agreement on three prerequisites for a moral society:

> First, we have called attention to the importance of nurturing young people to capture a vision of moral values as central to a responsible and caring society. Secondly, we have called attention to the centrality of our schools and affirmed the crucial role of our teachers. We want to encourage the initiative of SCAA. Thirdly we have called attention to the need for all sections of society - parents, the media, the entertainments industry - to exercise their responsibilities on behalf of us all (Ibid:1776).

It is, therefore, the major contention of this paper that a consensus is beginning to emerge for a societal engagement with issues of moral education and ethical teaching. The implications of this moral emergence require society to deepen its moral culture by developing and extending its moral language and ethical concepts. Novak (1995) underscores the urgency for such an agenda:

> Unless society deepens its moral culture it will die. As human lungs need air, so does liberty need virtue. As does this blue-green Planet Earth, so has liberty its own ecology. The deepest and most vital struggles of the 21st century will be cultural arguments over the sorts of habits necessary to the preservation of liberty. What are the habits we must teach our young? Which are the habits we must encourage in ourselves, and which discourage? To allow liberty to survive - and more than that, to make it all worth all the blood and tears expended to achieve it - how do we need to live? (p. 21)
The following section will explore and develop the argument for a moral vocabulary within the context of *values in action* across and within the school curriculum. The thrust for such a quest towards greater clarity is the very point made by T.S. Elliot in his Four Quartets:

> We shall not cease from exploration  
> And the end of all our exploring  
> Will be to arrive where we started  
> And know the place for the first time  
> (1989:48)

**Values in Action**

**Policy Formulation**

Since the time of the first Thatcher Government in 1979 the view that 'the right may engage in social engineering as freely as the left' (Tomlinson 1993:168) has framed unequivocally any analysis of discourse firmly within the context of an ideological power struggle over contested value assumptions - in other words as a battle of ideas; or to put it another way, as an example of values in action, jostling for position and expression. Certainly, as Ball (1994) claims, 'we now need to recognise and analyse the existence of dominant discourses' (p.24). That is a discourse position of neo-Conservatism, the new radical right has its faith in 'the majesty of the market' (Ball, Ibid:144). The culmination of this was given with the emergence of the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA) - an Act with many voices. Such legislation fused the traditional conserving and consensual, neo liberal voices in the party with the voice of Thatcher's moral populism:

> The strength of the 1988 Act politically was its versatility. It could be presented in different ways to different audiences. Baker's line - his 'Great Education Reform',
improving standards and bringing order, sometimes by central prescription, sometimes by enhanced parental choice - was the most consensual version, capable of appealing to a wide audience. A second, neo-liberal version (that the Act paved the way for a free market in education) kept the radicals in line after their increasing rebelliousness under Joseph. A third version was associated with the moralism and populism of Mrs. Thatcher herself and such campaigning agencies as the Daily Mail. Here the Act was presented as a key move in the moral, social and cultural regeneration - 'My New Crusade' - of the third term. It was a crucial item in the alliance with moral and religious orthodoxy, with 'responsible citizens' and with the principle of parental choice-and-responsibility (therefore 'the family') more generally. In this way some of the more difficult conflicts within the ruling bloc were deferred. In the meantime the many 'voices' of the Act helped to hold together and even expand a complex social alliance of a distinctive right-wing kind (Education Group, 1992:72).

The Conservative Government's centralist tendencies towards greater accountability in education, particularly since ERA, have produced a significant demise in the nature of LEA control and a correspondingly stronger central role for government in educational policy (Ball, 1994; Chitty, 1992; Education Group, 1992; Grace, 1994; Hargreaves, 1994; Pring, 1995; Tomlinson, 1995).

In these terms the creation of deregulated markets means that 'the market itself can be controlled and manipulated and used as a tool for social change' (Tomlinson, 1993:168). The question as to whether or not such a values in action process was the catalyst for the present moral malaise in society, which is discussed in chapter 4, requires a good deal more circumspection and reflection than is yet available. In the meantime, however, public sentiments such as 'society is the very nursery of civic virtue' had framed the value position of Thatcher's highly moralising speech to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in May 1988 (5) and thereafter became the catalyst for renewed debate and analysis. Increasingly, Thatcher's strategy became more and more public, direct and 'straight for the jugular' and as such it located morality squarely within the public domain - that is to say that public space in our social world where issues are open and
amenable to debate, reflection, moral argument and eventual change (6). Later analysts reinforced the arguments for a sound, core civic and moral education. Ball (1994) warns of the danger of 'the market crossing an important moral barrier and replacing one ethic with another' (p.145), and Grace (1994), in arguing a case for 'education as a public good and that, this being so, it should be provided primarily by the State and without direct charge, to all citizens' (p. 34) advances an important social and ethical position. A position summarised as follows:

In summary, my position is that education should be regarded as a public good because its free, universal and equal-access provision is fundamental to the generation of other public goods. It is essential for the effective operation of a democratic society and for the enhancement of civic intelligence and participation. It is a powerful source for the nurture of moral, social and community values and responsibilities and for introducing all children to moral and ethical concepts. It represents, through the schooling system, a democratically provided public service for the enhancement of the intellectual and creative potential of all citizens-in-the-making, with a formal commitment that this enhancement process should not be related to class, race or gender of the student or his ability to pay for it. It is premised upon the social and public value of maximising the resources of talent in a population in which conditions establish a sense of fairness and equal opportunity for all in that process. If all of this is not a public good, then what can be? (p. 135).

Here Grace argues persuasively the need for a discourse of civic virtue and social ethics in any debate concerning the values of education. Of course here the debate is framed, unequivocally, in moral and ethical terms, rather than narrow economic and technical ones. The legitimacy for such a philosophical stance is inherent in the principle that the function of thought is not merely to collect, comprehend and order facts, but also to contribute a quality that renders such activity possible, a quality Marcuse (1969) defines as 'a priori to facts' (p. 31). The alternative sees 'the ultimate authority of the fact' (ibid) as paramount and finds its expression in the technical and managerial rationality of the inputs and outputs of
league tables and other such performance variables.

The logic of such managerial rationality is to assume that education is a commercial product and, correspondingly, that a free market model is the most appropriate mechanism for its delivery; but by contrast the extended logic of Grace's interpretation of education as 'a public good' (ibid) negates that argument on moral, civic virtue and ethical grounds. And while Grace argues that 'it is an important source for introducing all children to moral and ethical concepts' (Ibid), it can certainly be added that by defining alternatives and contesting arguments for free markets in education such discourse converts into an important source for introducing the free marketeers' fraternity to alternative concepts to do with moral and ethical concerns.

This is a point of fundamental significance, for unless the most serious and rigorous conceptual alternatives are placed in the public arena for debate then the positivist's free market paradigm will prevail unchallenged. For it is not until well formulated alternatives are submitted to public scrutiny that change can begin. Or to put it another way: If I want something to mean something, then it can mean whatever I choose it to mean; but if I want other people to accept my meaning, then I must argue its case in the public domain. This is the essence of initiating change in values. For I cannot get inside other peoples' heads and nor can I get outside of my own consciousness; in this sense consciousness is perceptual and language mediates between me and others and me and objects (Merleau-Ponty, 1992; Rorty, 1991; and Deleuze, 1991).

It is of course no more than a truism to claim that any theory has to be grounded in reflection; but how much time can that reflection take? There are in fact a number of
important critiques which provide a detailed analysis of the chronological framework and gestation period for Thatcher’s free market philosophy, which began well before she came to office in 1979 (see especially Ball, 1994; Chitty, 1992; Education Group, 1992; Grace, 1994; Hargreaves, 1994; Pring, 1995; Tomlinson, 1993). But nevertheless, and conversely, it is also reasonable to assume that a certain period of time must lapse for emergent alternative theories to be sufficiently well formed to be capable of engagement with the discourse of the dominant New Right theories of the public arena - the social and personal domain. Thereafter, of course, it would then be theoretically possible to engage in well formulated intellectual debate and thus begin to contest and challenge the dominant paradigm of ‘free market’ economics in education.

Following on from this line of reasoning, ‘The Commission on Social Justice’ (1994) published their report, Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal, which can be seen as a principled intellectual contribution from within the “broad church” of the Left wing establishment. And as the debate widens and deepens this contribution may well be regarded as an important forerunner in the quest to establish a new alternative agenda for society:

The UK needs new direction. We need to be clear about our values, understand the forces shaping change, create our own vision of the future - and then set out to achieve it. Our fate is not determined; we can bridge the gap between the country we are and the country we would like to be (Ibid: p.13)

Further to this position, and very much in an incremental sense, a vision of community in terms of civic virtue and social ethics is further exemplified as an alternative discourse in the dominant public domain by the following recent media report:
There is now a new consensus around a market economy allied to a strong community (Finance Guardian, 1 April 1997).

And allied to this (1995) articulates a destructive economic critique of 'free market' theory in public services by disputing the possibility that such a model could exist in anything but an idealised form. Hutton's assertion that 'successful enterprise is a social rather than an individual act' (p. 236) endorses the values of the civic and the social. It is 'the hegemonic machine of Conservative government' (p. 35) that Hutton seeks to challenge through his development of an economist's critique of the flaws in 'free market' theory. Indeed he sees it as indispensable that alternative arguments enter the public debate:

*People are most likely to accept that there is no alternative to New Right policies if the ideas and theories available to them make deregulated market institutions appear natural and inevitable (Ibid: 297)*

A strong indication of this clear shift in favour of discourse exchange in the domain of civic virtue or social ethics is that Hutton's book struck a powerful public resonance in that it reached the top of the Sunday Times' hardback best seller list. As a book imbued with technical economic terms and national and international micro and macro economic comparisons, it is highly questionable that such a publishing phenomenon could have occurred - as this paper has argued - without the existence of the preceding cycle and synthesis of competing ideological struggles. The underlying logic of this phenomenon has enabled the collision of specific ideological stances and, incrementally, produced a debate on values which has thus entered the public domain of social and personal discourse.
This complex alliance of cultural and traditional conservatism fused so successfully with the radical theories of the New Right neo-liberal marketeers, and expressed so powerfully in the 1988 Education Reform Act, is now only beginning to be tested at the ideological level. As the dominant paradigm becomes increasingly subjected to well formulated critical positions, in a climate where attitudes are now much more predisposed to encouraging and nurturing alternative views, if such a movement continues to enter the public discourse domain a change in the dominant paradigm will become inevitable.

At the same time Grey (1993) a recognized exponent of traditional Conservative values is beginning to dissociate himself from new Right neo-liberal marketeers:

One of the basic needs of human beings is membership in a community. Such membership will be stable if, and only if, the community is seen to be meeting basic human needs through the institution of the market, and, where these fail, through other institutions, such as the enabling welfare state (p. 122).

Such a convergence of values as 'a community' and the 'enabling welfare state' is strongly indicative of the pendulum swinging in the opposite direction and towards the ideals of civic virtue and social ethics.

But given the inevitable proliferation of competing values Pring (1995a) frames his analysis within an analogy of competing different conversations:

These ideas are inherited, they are transmitted through the conversations which take place between the generations of mankind. And it is the job of education to get the next generation onto the inside of that conversation (p.111).

And, by extension, we become competent within and across the curriculum by
learning these different conversations. The analogy is fine as far as traditional curricula are concerned but because of the lack of a common moral vocabulary its rationale can not adequately accommodate the discourse of values.

A further development of this theme is developed in Hargreaves (1994) where part of the solution is:

> to think of a plural society not of one in which there is a Babel of conflicting languages, but rather as one in which we each have to be bilingual. There is a first and public language of citizenship which we have to learn if we are to live together. And there is a variety of second languages which connect us to our local framework of relationships: to family and group and the traditions that underlie them (p.32).

I am reminded of Wittgenstein's (1988) dictum, 'Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts' (p. 25) and without such an activity thoughts are destined to remain 'cloudy and indistinct' (Ibid); for it is in this sense that the constant expression and subsequent refinement of conversations must take place. Freedom of thought and free discussion require a readiness to listen and learn and in the Popperian sense a necessary pre-condition is a stance of critical openness:

> Truth is not manifest; and it is not easy to come by. The search for truth demands at least:

(a) imagination
(b) trial and error
(c) the gradual discovery of our prejudices by way of (a) and (b) and of critical discussion (Popper 1992: 157).

In the Popperian sense, White (1994) provides a cogent demonstration of the inappropriateness of economic concepts to support arguments for a 'free market' system in education. Interestingly, White's examination of the key concept
“consumer” is placed within the discourse domain of market theory as it is being applied to education and scrutinised. His conclusion that pupils can only be regarded as consumers in the ‘weaker sense’ (acquirers of dispositions and knowledge but not able to choose what or why to study as they are insufficiently knowledgeable until after the event) and not in the ‘stronger sense’ (knowledgeable and able to make informed decisions) is persuasive. He then turns to establish the status of parents as consumers and argues that in a democracy as decisions arise from democratic values in the expression of ‘civic decision-making’ (p. 122), then citizens per se - which also includes parents - are consumers but with certain constraints. He continues:

In civic decision-making individuals make decisions not about their own flourishing but about the flourishing of a whole community and it is their collective reference, as expressed through democratic procedures, which is authoritative. The proper conclusion is that there is no room for the concept of consumer in decisions about aims and curricula. The consumer is not merely a decider, but a decider within a market. If the market is ruled out, there still can be deciders - i.e., citizens - but no longer room for consumers (p. 122).

The logic of White’s inference in relation to this ‘free market’ conundrum in education is compelling and offers a convincing critique against the use of economic concepts to advance and augment the arguments for a ‘free market’ model in education.

Therefore, it is important to create the optimum conditions, if our culturally impoverished moral language is to grow, for the effective transaction between teacher and learner across the myriad of different school conversations: science and mathematics, history and geography, literature and philosophy, art and engineering, religion and drama. These different voices in the conversation must
engage with the meta-language of values, so that it should be possible, not only to articulate moral views more intelligibly and distinguish right from wrong, but also to be able to ultimately accept that often two "rights" pull in different directions.

Vogt (1997) articulates a strong case in favour of 'tolerance as minimally necessary for civil society' (p. 43) and regards it as the cornerstone virtue for good educational practice:

Schools have a profound influence on student's general orientation toward life in society. In particular, schools shape student's notions of right and wrong in public, impersonal encounters. Most important is the norm of procedural fairness, which is learned in schools through a kind of socialization and personality development. The lessons learned are needed if one is to live in a society in which the people with whom one interacts may have interests and values quite different from one's own. It does not take children long to learn the norm of procedural fairness for all persons who fall into the same category. A child usually resorts to it in the first instance to make certain that he or she is treated fairly. Students learn quickly to keep a sharp eye on teachers for signs of favoritism and inequality of treatment. The concept of equal rights is a natural extension of this vigilance. A school can hardly function without it, nor can a modern diverse society. The principle of equal rights leads inevitably, at least on some occasions, to forbearance, to putting up with others who are different from oneself. Schools and societies may get by without ecumenical, multicultural values, but functional tolerance, or mutual forbearance, is an indispensable minimum (p.113).

Certainly formative experience has to be shaped by language within the remit of the school arena and beyond and in these terms the teaching of tolerance is an important first aim.

Following on from such an endeavour, and if moral reasoning was located within the school arena, then the creative moral impulse could be duly nurtured. From this perspective Wittgenstein's (1993) dictum 'The limits of my language mean the limits of my world' (p.56) becomes central. For it is only by extending our language and
its concepts that we can begin to extend our understanding and although we can distinguish between certain forms of right and wrong, it is only through the development of a moral vocabulary that we can begin to exercise truly moral discernment.

Peters, writing in 1966, refers to this educational process in the following terms:

Such feelings are inseparable from the view one has of people as sons or brothers, as colleagues or competitors. In general respect for persons is the feeling awakened when another is regarded as a distinctive centre of consciousness, with peculiar feelings and purposes that criss cross his institutional roles....To respect a person is to realize all of this and to care. In the teaching situation this general respect for persons is overlaid with the awareness that one is confronted with developing centres of consciousness (1979:59).

And although school education has changed many of its constituent labels since then, Peter's sentiment still resonates sharply. For if school is really to be concerned with laying the foundations for the inculcation and development of such centres of consciousness, then it seems only sensible that a modicum of conceptual clarity be established.

By this reckoning we need a set of symbols to guide our beliefs and behaviour in our schools and to assist in the development and reinforcement of individual and collective responsibilities. For, as Skeen (1980) puts it 'unless we already have some notion of what is morally acceptable we will be powerless to accept or reject any person, book, or institution as a moral authority' (p.15). At a minimal and foundational level Vogt's (1997) 'functional tolerance', which presupposes self-respect and respect for others, has to be a good starting point for establishing a sound institutional value system within our schools.
Tomlinson's (1995) appraisal draws a similar set of conclusions:

If Britain is taken as an example, somewhere in the 1950's and 1960's we shed strong forces of conformity and deference which had provided a social structure: class, religion, 'respect for one's betters', unwritten codes and and respect for strong normative institutions such as the monarch, parliament and the BBC created in the mould of Lord Reith. In their place we have created a society in which different religions and creeds - from the most authoritarian to the most nihilistic - and different life-styles, are deemed equally valid and worthy of respect in the public forum. Late nineteenth-century liberalism created a society in which there was a great deal of of personal freedom (for those with resources to exercise it) set in strong and inflexible social structures. We, in our generation, have chosen to bring these personal freedoms into the public domain, and most of the social structure gas dissolved (p.310).

He continues:

Let me review the argument so far. In the 1950s and '60s all three pillars of the curriculum, knowledge, knower and social context, became problematic. And while we were learning to cope with that two heavier blows fell: all knowledge and morality were declared relative and the government enshrined the selfish self as the basis for civil society'. How could schools - how could teachers - any longer hope to create a moral community in which the world of the mind was worthy of respect and that respect the impetus to learning? (pp. 310-311).

Conclusion

This then is the current educational context whereby a 'values in action' dynamic activates much at the political and ideological level where the prevailing hegemony of the 'markets-in-education' paradigm still prevails. Certainly oppositional value critiques are increasingly being successfully pushed in the public domain. But precisely because such critiques are frequently politically and professional polarised (i.e., in terms of the left or the right or in terms of the philosophical/psychological/sociological/theological and in a limited sense the educational)
there remains a demonstrable need to go deeper and put on a fresh pair of metaphorical glasses.

This is not dogmatic and revolutionary in the sense that any particular ideology is being challenged in the Foucaultian sense whereby 'it is not like a pair of glasses; it is rather like a pair of Guns; it does not enable one to see better but to fight better' (cited in Merquior 1985:85). On the contrary, rather the allusion is more in the sense in which Wittgenstein (1994) applies the same metaphor:

> The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakeable. You can never get outside; outside you cannot breathe.—Where does this come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off (p.45).

A new pair of metaphorical glasses will be worn for the creative and interpretative process of generating new theory from old data, through a constructivist version of grounded theory. Thus a fourfold process begins to emerge: (1) the acquisition of the meta-language, (2) the development and synthesis of a new vocabulary and syntax, (3) the establishment of basic terms of reference with wide applicability and (4) the emergence of a discourse model for the educational practitioner. In these terms it may be possible for the various conversations of differing voices to articulate a consciousness of value itself. For not until you begin to change the language - the social space between people - is it possible to begin to change the reality. It is the contention of this reasoning that such a process is ripe for development; provided, of course, that 'the rhyme must never dictate the meaning' (Voltaire, 1989:103).
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Following Armstrong (1993) the perspectives and methodology of the research design necessarily involve the incorporation of four interrelated areas: (1) the philosophical framework, (2) the theoretical perspective, (3) the methodological and (4) the practical.

In relation to (1) paradigmatic considerations are paramount, particularly so in terms of epistemological questions about the status of knowledge and of the knower. In regard to (2) the theoretical perspective is crucial in distinguishing between facts and values, as facts become meaningful as such only within the context of a particular theory. In terms of (3) the methodological determinants of this thesis are largely drawn from theoretical sources - in this respect Bevan (1991) makes the following assertion:

What is clear is the need to begin the research enterprise by asking an essential question and then asking what you must do to convince yourself and others of the validity of the ideas supporting it (cited in Rudestam & Newton, 1992:41).

The essential question asked was: What are the guiding principles of morality and how best can we as educators express that morality? By virtue of the fact that language itself is a moral medium, the instruments of illumination need to be clearly demarcated as only clearness and exactness of concept will suffice. And in the sense that Armstrong (1993) defines 'research methodology as part of the scaffolding for constructing meaning' (p.92), so too will this methodology provide a
scaffolding for a common morality consisting of an emergent theory with its key underlying concepts. In the context of the final area (4) the practical, it is important to acknowledge the role of serendipity in the research process - here serendipity is defined as 'the interactive outcome of unique and contingent "mixes" of insight coupled with chance' (Fine and Deegan, 1996:434).

The intention of this chapter is to explore the research issues pertaining to these four interrelated areas.

**The Philosophical: the Paradigm Context**

How one approaches research is determined by the choice of paradigm and 'our actions in the world, including actions that we take as inquirers [researchers] cannot occur without reference to those paradigms' (Lincoln & Guba, 1990:15). In order to understand and apply research methods it is essential that we are aware of the assumptions that are being made about both the nature of human beings and how we learn, as well as the methods used to gather, analyse and interpret our data.

Kuhn (1970) defines paradigms as:

> some accepted examples of actual scientific practice...[that] provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research...The study of paradigms...is what prepares the student for membership in that particular scientific community with which he will later practice. Because he there joins men who learned the bases of their field from the same concrete models, his subsequent practice will seldom evoke overt disagreement over fundamentals. Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice (pp.10-11).
And with regard to the general issue of paradigms, he distinguishes between the paradigm of ‘normal science’ and the paradigm of ‘revolutionary science’. Here the assumption is that the predominance of any given paradigm is merely the orthodoxy of the prevailing ‘normal science’ which in Kuhnian terms is, ‘an attempt to force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies’ (p. 24). Kuhn continues by suggesting that such selectivity is essential, ‘No part of the aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of phenomenon; indeed those that will not fit the box are often not seen at all’ (Ibid:24). In these terms the scientific process appears inclusive and convergent and as such appears contrary to the Popperian view of normal science (7).

Indeed for Popper (1994) science is ‘the method of bold conjectures and ingenious and severe attempts to refute them’ (p.81). The claim is that a good theory is not one which explains everything that can possibly happen; on the contrary, it rules out most of what could possibly happen and is therefore ruled out itself if what it rules out happens. In this sense a theory must be permanently placed at risk, as Falsifiability is the criterion of demarcation between its status as science and non-science. The crucial point is that if all possible state of affairs fit in with a theory then no actual state of affairs can be claimed as supporting evidence for it, for there can be no observable difference between it being true and it being false.

Following on from this line of reasoning, ‘although we cannot justify our theories rationally and cannot even prove that they are probable, we can criticise them rationally. And we can distinguish better from worse theories’ (Ibid). Here Popper draws a useful parallel between ‘the method of the social sciences, which like that of the natural sciences, consists in trying out tentative solutions to those problems from which our investigations start’ (p.66) (8).
And although it is often assumed that there is a conflict between Popper's portrayal of scientific method and Kuhn's account of scientific paradigms (Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970) in reality the conflict is more imagined than real. For Kuhn's purpose is to show how historically one paradigm is overthrown in favour of another paradigm, whereas Popper’s purpose concerns the logic and rationality of the scientific method itself (9).

Certainly the discussion thus far has been unequivocally framed within a qualitative ‘interpretist’ tradition of data analysis. The distinction here is between an interpretist explanation and its more orthodox ‘positivist’ counterpart. Indeed the principal manner in which positivist science constructs its version of social reality is by drawing a distinction between identifiable acts, structures and institutions, such as ‘brute facts’ or ‘brute data’ on the one hand, and beliefs, values and attitudes, reasons, etc., on the other. (Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970; and Hughes, 1993).

However, in these terms the natural sciences can be seen as largely quantitatively-driven and the social sciences as largely qualitatively-driven; the former using a so-called objective methodology with less possibility of human contamination, and the latter requiring the direct interaction of a human being in the research methodology (see for example, Hughes, 1993; Cohen and Mannion, 1994; Hammersley (Ed), 1993; Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). Nevertheless, in education there is a strong emphasis on “the human as instrument’ (Maykut and Morehouse 1994:46). A position which is strongly endorsed by Polyani (1967) who defends this point of view as a legitimate form of knowledge and characterises it as follows:

Tacit knowing now appears as an act of indwelling by which we gain access to new meaning. When exercising a skill we literally dwell in the innumerable muscular acts
which contribute to its purpose, a purpose which constitutes their joint meaning (p31)

Polanyi's point is that if we believe that reliable knowledge must always be clear and explicit and testable by experiment, then we cannot know anything about such intangibles as beauty, justice, goodness, compassion, decency and fairness. Thus:

Indwelling involves a tacit reliance on our awareness of particulars not under observation, many of them unspecifiable. We have to interiorise these, and, in doing so, must change our mental existence. There is nothing definite to which we can hold fast in such an act. It is a free commitment. But there is something imponderable for us to rely on. We have around us great truths embodied in works born of the very freedom which we are hesitating to enter. And recent history has taught us that we can breathe only in the ambience of these truths and of this creative freedom. I, for one, am prepared to rely on this assurance for acquiring and upholding knowledge by embracing the world and dwelling in it (cited in Scott, 1996:112) (10)

Such a perspective sees moral traditions as built up, preserved and upheld by a rational moral community while, at the same time, capable of being modified by the new moral insights of fresh moral communities. By such a reckoning it is difficult to disagree with Eisner's (1993) observation:

I believe we are better served by recognising that whatever it is we think we know is a function of a transaction between the qualities of the world we cannot know in their pure, non-mediated form, and the frames of reference, personal skills and individual histories we bring to them (p.53).

Indeed the conceptual model which has arisen from the research has been specifically drawn from a disparate range of literature spanning sociology, psychology, philosophy and theology, as well as education, in an attempt to synthesise otherwise incommensurable positions which are in Polanyi's sense 'imponderable great truths' (op cit).
By pulling together these disparate strands a model has emerged which seeks to represent a kind of ‘common morality’. Moreover, the model can be likened to Eisner’s ‘frames of reference’ in the objective sense as a body of explicit publicly accessible knowledge intended to typify strategic reference points in current moral discourse. That is to say, what emerges is explicitly verifiable and falsifiable knowledge positions which are amenable to public scrutiny and mutually self-correcting critical openness (Popper 1992).

In summary the method of qualitative inquiry here adopted is firmly located in the interpretist paradigm which regards the “human-as-instrument within a posture of indwelling”. The process is descriptive and reflective rather than calculative and in Maykut and Morehouse’s (1994) terms is based on ‘a posture toward knowledge which is inclusive and indwelling rather than exclusive and distancing’ (p.39). The process is a kind of ‘reflective research’ which blends the principles of heuristic research with those of naturalistic research and is described by Mowry (1992) in the following terms:

A reflective approach aims to understand, rather than explain (the determination of cause and effect), control or predict. Instead of universals, statistical analyses, and growth charts, the reflective approach seeks to understand in order to gain insight into the multiple relationships and subjective factors which people use to make sense of their lives (p.58).

The Theoretical Perspective

The research procedure grew out of an increasing interest in the application of qualitative research methods to research in education. In particular I was attracted and excited by Strauss’ (1987) version of a ‘grounded theory’ conceptual
framework whereby theory must grow out of and be grounded in the data studied. I was no less excited by Moustakas’ (1990 and 1994) heuristic research methods where the role of the researcher as a uniquely “human instrument” is always fundamental to the inquiry. Moustakas’ concluding comments on his own reasoning for applying heuristic research methods, although lengthy, encapsulate superbly my own reasons for following suit:

As I come to a closing place in this reflective and meditative journey I am alive with images and ideas, struck with the wonder of passionately discovering the only way I can truly come to know things...and to immerse myself completely in what is there before me, look, see, listen, hear, touch, from many angles and perspectives and vantage points, each time freshly so that there will be continual openings and learnings that will connect with each other and with prior perceptions, understandings and future possibilities. In other words, I must immerse myself totally and completely in my world, take what is offered without bias or prejudgment. I must pause and consider what my own life is and means, in conscious awareness, in thought, in reflections. I enter into my own conscious reflections and meditations, open and extend my perceptions of life and reach deeper meanings and essences. This connectedness between what is out there, in its appearance and reality, and what is within me in reflective thought and awareness, is in truth a wondrous gift of being human (p.65).

Methodological Context

Methodologically, the design of the research framework is located within the parameters of Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) concept of ‘grounded theory which consist of the following highly interrelated properties:


1. The theory must closely fit the substantive area in which it is to be used.
2. It must readily be understandable by laymen concerned with the area.
3. It must be sufficiently general to be applicable to a multitude of diverse daily situations within the substantive area, not to just a specific type of situation.
4. It must allow the user partial control over the structure and process of daily situations as they change through time (p.23).
Such a process is a highly creative and interpretative process of generating new theory from old data. In grounded research the theory is generated during the research process and from the data being collected (Moustakas, 1994). In Strauss' (1987) 'constructivist' version of grounded theory 'the researcher puts down theoretical questions, hypotheses, summary of codes, tracking and coding results and stimulating further coding, and also as a major means for integrating theory' (p.22). The aim is, of course, to construct an integrated theory. In this respect the theory is inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents.

Strauss (1987) summarises this process as follows:

The grounded theory of analysis...involves a grounding in data. Scientific theories require first of all that they be conceived, then elaborated, then checked out. The aspects of inquiry are induction, deduction and verification. Consider induction first: Where do the insights, hunches, generative questions come from? Answer: They come from experience...from actual exploratory research into the phenomenon, or from a previous research programme, or from theoretical sensitivity, derived from the knowledge of the technical literature. As for deduction: Success at it rests on the ability to think logically and with experience about the particular data under scrutiny. And verification: It involves knowledge about sites, events, actions, actors, also procedures and techniques (and learned skills in thinking about them) (pp. 12-13).

Following on from the subsequent data derived from the 'constructivist grounded theory' framework - which in this case involved a theoretical review of research literature from five different academic disciplines - the emergence of a conceptual model and its emergent theory of a common morality was the initial consequence of the data analysis.

The next and concurrent stage was to apply heuristic methods and procedures to the process of illuminating and evaluating of the model, which Moustakas (1990)
I begin the heuristic investigation with my own self-awareness and explicate that awareness with reference to a question or a problem until an essential insight is achieved, one which will throw a beginning light on to a critical human experience...Emphasis on the investigator's internal frame of reference, self-searching, intuition, and indwelling lies at the heart of heuristic inquiry (pp. 11-12).

Moustakas (1994) puts it this way in relation to the task of illuminating research questions:

this requires passionate, disciplined commitment to remain with a question intensely and continuously until it is illuminated or answered (p.18)

Moustakas (1990) describes the basic design as follows:

Six phases of heuristic research guide unfolding investigations and comprise the basic research design. They include: the initial engagement, immersion into the topic and question, incubation, illumination, explication, and culmination of the research in a creative synthesis (p.27).

The root meaning of 'Heuristic' is derived from the Greek word *heuriskein* and is defined by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1987) as a process of internal search ‘applied to a system of education under which the pupil is trained to find out things for himself’ (p.959). For Moustakas this means ‘a process of internal search through which one discovers the nature and meaning of experience and develops methods and procedures for further investigation and analysis.

Later, Moustakas (1994) emphasises that the underlying mechanisms arises when
'the question grows out of an intense interest in a particular problem or topic and where the researcher's excitement and curiosity inspire the research' (p.140). He continues:

As the fullness of the topic emerges, strands and tangents of it may complicate an articulation of a manageable and specific question. Yet this process of permitting aspects of the topic to enter into awareness is essential in the formulation of a core question that will remain viable and alive throughout the investigation. A human science research question has definite characteristics:

1. It seeks to reveal more fully the essences and meanings of human experience;
2. It seeks to uncover the qualitative, rather than the quantitative factors in behavior and experience;
3. It engages the total self of the research participant, and sustains personal and passionate involvement;
4. It does not seek to predict or to determine causal relationships;
5. It is illuminated through careful, comprehensive descriptions, vivid and accurate renderings of the experience, rather than measurements, ratings or scores (p. 105).

Indeed adaptation and modification of the theory will occur during such an undertaking; for as Strauss (1987) puts it 'the procedures for discovering, verifying, and formulating grounded theory... are in operation all through the research project and...go on in close relationship to each other, in quick sequence and often simultaneously' (pp.23-24).

But whereas much of social behaviour is manifestly rule-governed (Berger and Luckmann, 1966), this does not necessarily imply the position stated by Cohen and Manion (1994) that such educational data 'should be investigated by the methods of natural science' (p.36). On the contrary, this qualitative research will not test in the positivist, scientific sense but instead will test within the more open and exploratory context of an 'interpretist' paradigm of qualitative and heuristic explanation. In accordance with the above qualitative research assumptions,
therefore, the principal objective of the research will be to propose a model and illuminate, evaluate and refine it in accordance with Moustakas' (1990) six phases of heuristic research, while at the same time drawing on Strauss (1987) insights on grounded theory.

The Serendipity Pattern

Armstrong (1993) draws on the observations of Burgess (1984 and 1992) in relation to ‘the importance of evaluating the processes involved in the analysis of data and the writing of research reports’ (p.106). The point is particularly targeted at qualitative researchers who:

although generally good at providing detailed accounts of their data procedures, are rarely explicit about the procedures they use to analyze this data (Burgess, 1992). Analytic induction and grounded theory are sometimes invoked but:
there are few accounts of the way in which these processes actually occur as opposed to the way they are supposed to occur.

Following on from this Merton’s (1968) study, the first influential attempt to apply the concept of serendipity to social science research (Fine and Deegan, 1996), addresses the very same issue:

There is a rich corpus of literature on how social scientists ought to feel and act, but little detail on what they actually do, think and feel
(cited in Fine and Deegan, 1996:438)

In speaking about the serendipity pattern whereby unexpected data provide the spark for the creation of theoretical analysis, Fine and Deegan offer a trio of
analytically distinct components of research: temporal serendipity - happening upon a dramatic instance; serendipity relations - the unplanned building of social relations; and analytic serendipity - discovering concepts or theories that produce compelling claims (Fine and Deegan, 1996).

In these terms, although the research exercise has largely drawn its data from theoretical sources, the serendipity pattern has nevertheless provided a kind of grid - a working template - in which new data can be incorporated creating a template for the development of a new emergent theory of moral discourse. Fine and Deegan's (1996) summation of the process captures precisely these qualities:

Serendipity involves planned insight coupled with unplanned events which are core to the philosophy of qualitative research. By recognizing the centrality of serendipitous findings and events in qualitative research we come closer to understanding how research products are created and appreciated in practice. In a methodology that so values insight, the thin line between brilliance and nothingness is both a powerful image and vast chasm: our fear and our salvation. When a researcher prepares to enter a field setting: the worry exists that nothing interesting will be discovered. Such fear, however, fails to reckon with the intellectual preparedness necessary to to make sense of the power of an ongoing social reality (p.445).

Data Sources

In relation to the issue of data sources in social science research Cooper's (1984) observation is important:

The question of which and how many sources of information to use has no general answer. The appropriate sources will be a function partly of the topic under consideration and partly of the resources of the reviewer. As a rule, however, I suggest that researchers should always employ multiple channels so that the chances of a strong unidentified bias distinguishing included from unincluded is small (p.57).
In this piece of research a triangulation of three different sources of theoretical data are used.

First of all, an initial twelve months literature search, which included extensive access to ERIC and International ERIC computer data bases, took place across five overlapping key disciplines: Sociology, Psychology, Philosophy, Theology, and Education. The first four disciplines were selected because of their explicit immersion in moral and ethical issues. The intention was to identify common moral/ethical concepts, language and theories which would be able to provide a sufficiently general but consistent framework for educational practitioners. Having synthesised the outcome of the literature review, a common morality was then exhibited and its key explicit precepts ascertained and an emergent theory resulted.

In the first place, and as far as theory is concerned, the issue of morality in education has recently resurfaced as a key public concern. And although it is certainly true that there is no single source of authority which legitimates the values we hold in common, this is necessarily very different from the assumption that there is no common morality. In this context, a handful of public bodies have been very active in seeking consensus on what more precisely those particular values are. The result of such activities has produced a range of consultation documents and reports (these are National Forum for Values in Education and the Community (NFVE), 1996 and 1997; Schools Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) Discussion Papers, 1996 and 1997; House of Lords report: Society's Moral and Spiritual Well-being, 1996; The Common Good in Education by the Catholic Church, 1977).
Thus, the major source of data is a sampling of literature drawn from established academic disciplines; whereas the literature drawn from public body discussion documents, although hardly grounded in the same academic rigour as the orthodox literature sampling, represents the current, untested state of play with regard to opinion and concern across a range of the public bodies relevant to education. In other words, the former data source provides the content from which the emergent theory was drawn while the latter data source provides the context.

In terms of the theoretical review of the literature a threefold distinction emerged: (1) a review of literature in relation to education specifically which was largely undertaken in Chapter 1; (2) a review of recent public body discussion documents in relation to morality in education, undertaken in Chapter 3; and (3) a review of literature across Sociology, Psychology, Philosophy and Christian Theology, undertaken in Chapter 4.

The combination of the above three theoretical data sources produced a fruitful interplay and combination of different ideas and resulted in a model with its emergent theory which is the subject of Chapter 5. This ensuing model consists of (a) a set of external publicly accessible reference points - the Four Quadrants - (b) a set of internal publicly verifiable reference points - a Syntax of 4 Voices - and (c) a common morality - Six Moral Precepts.
CHAPTER 3 : The Operational Context: The Current Debate

The Educational Context

It is generally accepted that Philosophy has seen two main revolutions this century - the one analytical and the other more humanistic (Honderich, 1995). In the first place, the analytical tradition was in two forms: the positivism of the scientifically and mathematically orientated Vienna Circle of the 1920s and 1930s, largely inspired by Wittgenstein; and ordinary language philosophy stemming from Wittgenstein, Austin and Wisdom. The second revolution in philosophy was in marked contrast and at odds with the logical and epistemological preoccupations of the analytical tradition and instead focused on moral, political and social issues and is characterised by Sartre, Heidegger, Popper and Rorty.

Following on from this, the analytical tradition of repudiating metaphysics and confining the function of philosophy to clarification and analysis was paralleled by a new concept of the function of the philosophy of education: 'to lay bare the issues; to expose the premises implicit in the reasoning of the contributory disciplines' (Almond 1989:57). At the same time and complementary to this position the widely acknowledged leader of the liberal educational establishment - R.S. Peters published his influential text 'Ethics and Education'. This seminal work, first published in 1966, laid down a blueprint for the philosophy of education that largely determined the path that has been followed since. The issues identified were:

1. the analysis of educational concepts,
2. the application of ethics and social philosophy to education,
3. problems in philosophical psychology, particularly the critique of psychologists’ assumptions, and
4. the examination of the logical and epistemological basis of the curriculum (1979:pp18-19).
In relation to 2. above, education is seen as an initiation into various ‘worthwhile activities’ (p.59) which are largely of an intellectual and aesthetic sort to be pursued for their own sake ‘in developing centres of consciousness’ (p.59). A justification of worthwhile activities as ‘ultimate moral principles’ is rightly regarded as ‘a precondition of a ‘democratic’ system of government’ (p.302). The assertion that ‘there are moral principles such as fairness, liberty and the consideration of people’s interests as well as valuations about what people’s interests are’ (p.113) is a well argued position. But perhaps even more persuasively argued is its corollary position:

The controversies are largely about the application of these principles and valuations to a concrete situation. Questions are seldom raised about the justification of the principles themselves. (p.113).

Nevertheless, and although the underlying principle of this ethical framework is firmly rooted in the Kantian tradition whereby all children ‘should be initiated into traditions in which the fundamental principles of reason are implicit (p.314), Peters certainly favours an ethical framework of Kantian rationalism and Mill’s Utilitarianism:

Like Kant’s rational being they would have respect for law, which would be tinged with the consciousness that the law, demarcating what was desirable, had been arrived at by their own active deliberation and would only be implemented by their corporate striving and the Utilitarian notion of the importance of their individual self-interest (pp.215-216).

Of course there will always be considerable latitude for disagreement about values, in education as elsewhere, but the ultimate basis of any values, if it is not to be
metaphysical, religious, or transcendental can only be choice. The recognition of
this observation necessarily entails an enriching of the range of choices in order to
identify and align shared common values.

Peters' contribution in this regard can be seen as an important precursor to the
current educational debate whereby the moral basis of teaching itself may soon
become codified. In this respect, the 'Universities Council for the Education of
Teachers' (UCET) has drawn up the following list of eleven guiding principles:

1. **Intellectual integrity**: teachers should have a respect for truth, the canon of
   knowledge and the importance of evidence, and should cultivate a "lively
   scepticism".

2. **Vocational integrity**: involves the duty to keep up to date with subject and
   professional knowledge and to develop new skills.

3. **Moral courage**: teachers should show independence of mind and action and
   be prepared to teach subject matter or use methods that are officially frowned
   upon "if intellectual or vocational integrity so demand".

4. **Exercise altruism**: pupils' interests must come first, teachers should respect
   pupils' individuality.

5. **Exercise impartiality**: teachers must avoid favouring one individual or group.

6. **Exercise human insight**: teachers should be sensitive to the diverse social
   background of their pupils, ensure equality of opportunity and avoid stereotyping.

7. **Assume the responsibility of influence**: teachers should be aware that they
   can have a powerful impact on their pupils' lives.

8. **Exercise humility**: teachers must be willing to acknowledge that they are
   fallible, and remember that "their most significant measure of success is a
   pupil who can learn without their aid".

9. **Exercise collegiality**: respect and work co-operatively with colleagues, be pre-
   pared to learn from others and accept that disciplines have common as well as
   separate concerns.

10. **Exercise partnership**: recognise and make use of pupil's talents and the
    talents of their families and associates.

11. **Exercise vigilance with regard to professional responsibilities and aspirations**: be willing to promote the profession by commenting publicly on education policy (cited in the Times Educational Supplement, 16 May 1997:12).

There is probably as much to commend such a list as there is to criticise it, but the
really central question is: how such a list of moral precepts could be drawn
up in the first place? The mere fact that such a set of values, however tentative, now exist within the public domain of competing discourse positions is very significant and by itself worthy of further examination. Although here, it is perhaps sufficient to point out that without the existence of the preceding cycle and synthesis of competing ideological struggles this new orientation towards moral concerns in education could not have occurred at all.

Three Discourse Domains

Indeed the call for a new social agenda about values had already gained a fresh urgency with the recent publication of 'The Commission on Social Justice' (1994) report. A report which laid important foundations for the eventual emergence of a new Labour administration:

"The UK needs new direction. We need to be clear about our values, understand the forces shaping change, create our own vision of the future - and then set out to achieve it. Our fate is not determined; we can bridge the gap between the country we are and the country we would like to be" (Ibid: p.13)

Similarly, and as already noted, Hutton's (1995) economic critique of 'free market' economics in public services can be said to have captured the *zeitgeist* of the people by reaching the top of the Sunday Times' hardback best seller list. Indeed, as a book imbued with technical economic terms, it is highly questionable that such a publishing phenomenon could have occurred at all without such a public shift in values having already started to take place in the first place. Thus, by endorsing the 'values of the civic and the social, rather than the hegemonic machine of Conservative government' (p.35), Hutton had struck a public chord
for change and as such the book can be seen as an essential prerequisite to the eventual emergence of other alternative arguments favouring a new moral discourse:

People are most likely to accept that there is no alternative to New Right policies if the ideas and theories available to them make deregulated market institutions appear natural and inevitable (Ibid: 297)

The logic of this intriguing cycle and synthesis, or product-life-cycle (i1), of the successful emergence of new ideas in relation to values in education can be illustrated by the following diagram:

The Logic of the model requires movement from 1 (where ideas are generated and tested within ideological communities) through to 2 (where public scrutiny affirms or negates, again within ideological communities) to 3 (where sufficiently well formulated new ideas can test, contest and potentially replace the dominant paradigm).

Figure 1: The 3 DISCOURSE DOMAINS (12)
Hence, the parameters of any established paradigm of values will have journeyed a similar threefold route: (1) initiation stage within one's own ideological community (2) nurturing and development stage within the public domain of competing positions and (3) refining and further development stage whereby serious contesting of the paradigm occurs. The dynamic of such a synthesis is be captured by imagining the above series of three concentric circles with (a) as the inner circle, moving through to (b) the middle circle which eventually is accommodated within (c) the outer circle. Indeed the dynamics of the flow and flux of all intellectual engagement and interaction will undertake a not dissimilar cycle in each of the three stages of the overall process. On each occasion the rigours of Popperian, mutually self-correcting, criticism will enrich form and content across these three different discourse domains, before an eventual paradigm change can take place.

Peters' seminal work in 1966, had planted seeds of liberal optimism in an educational system which had become increasingly imbued with new right conservative free market dogma of the eighties and nineties, which found its greatest expression in the 1988 Education Reform Act. Nevertheless, it took a period of almost thirty years before the emergence of equally well formulated and critically acceptable alternative arguments had emerged.

Thus the process of societal change cannot, in any Kuhnian sense, 'attempt to force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies' (Op. cit); on the contrary, it must instead conform to a more gradual and revelationary process, neither sudden, dramatic, nor revolutionary.

Such a model of the process of change necessarily requires its cycle and synthesis
of competing value positions in order for any one position to be overthrown in favour of a better one. It is precisely within this context of change, with its cycle and synthesis of competing value positions, that Kuhn's (1970) paradigm of 'normal science' is displaced by the paradigm of 'revolutionary science'. Thus it is hardly surprising, coinciding as it does with the first change in government in eighteen years, that a veritable eruption of alternative moral critiques is now beginning to emerge against the backdrop of what Rue (1994) refers to as the inevitable 'Kulturkampf' (p.261). Rue continues:

Kulturkampf is a chronic condition of ideological struggle within human social groups. It is a characteristic of the species. Whenever human beings craft memes (13) by which to organize themselves, there we will find competition among incompatible meanings. The condition is incurable. Nor is a cure even desirable, for it is the vigorous struggle of ideas that provides resources for adaptive change. A culture without Kulturkampf is moribund...There are periods when the condition flares up and becomes more noticeable, periods when ordinary, low-level competition rises to the point of pitched battle between identifiable belligerents. And as one might expect, the belligerents in the controversy break down into two camps: the liberals who seek fundamental change, and the conservatives, who wish to maintain the status quo (pp.261-262).

The Liberal/Conservative Dichotomy

Bloom's (1987) impassioned indictment of the American universities', 'great moral consciousness' (p.341) accuses the liberal education tradition of leaving nothing but a supermarket of mediocrity in place of the core and canon of the great humanizing conservative tradition:

...the crisis of liberal education is a reflection of a crisis at the peaks of learning, an incoherence and incompatibility among the first principles with which we interpret the world, an intellectual crisis of the greatest magnitude, which constitutes the crisis of our civilization (p.346).
But despite such an assault on liberal society, Bloom is keen to restore the status quo by a combination of argument and emotional appeal:

The books in their objective beauty are still there, and we must help protect and cultivate the delicate tendrils reaching out toward them through the unfriendly soil of student souls (p. 280).

However, as Williams (1985) has noted, the real challenge with such change is not just that we adapt more rapidly to it, but also that our response capacities are themselves altered. For as the world around us changes, so too do we change with it, as 'the urge to reflective understanding...goes deeper and is more widely spread than it has ever been before, and the thicker kinds of ethical concepts have less currency than they did in more traditional societies' (p. 163).

In these terms, Jonathan (1995) argues convincingly that it is 'urgent to consider how education might play a more positive part while still avoiding simple value reproduction' (p. 345) of the conservative variety favoured by Bloom. Here, Abrams (1982) encapsulates succinctly and persuasively the dilemma and ultimate fear of the conservatives:

A specter is haunting this discussion of the philosophy of the curriculum - the specter of nihilism. We humanists are forever embarrassed at the uncertainty of our conclusions, whereas the logicians and mathematicians can define precisely the validity of their inferences. We can never, alas, determine absolutely the truth or falsity of any proposition (cited in Rue, 1994:268).

By contrast, and according to the liberal argument, the traditional core curriculum has been inaccurate and politically hegemonic (Ball, 1994; Bloom, 1987; Grace,
1994; Johnson, 1995; and Rue, 1994). Hence, we have the postmodernist plea for 'de-centering and re-visioning' of the curricular; in Ball's (1994) terms, this ensures that the debate enters 'the public sphere, a space in our social world in which issues are open to debate, reflection and moral argument' (p.145).

Certainly, Pring (1995) offers a most cogent and impassioned defence of a liberal education:

The broader ideal of liberal education has to take everyone seriously, even those who may not be academically able. Everyone, in his or her own way is capable of what Coleridge refers to as 'the art of reflection'. And teachers, with proper support and with the richness of various form of cultural achievement as their resource, are capable of engaging in that transaction with young people through which they, in their different ways, might explore the issues in literature, history, the arts, the sciences which are of profound personal and social importance (p.195).

At least in one important respect the difference between liberal and conservative positions can be reconciled as indeed both demonstrate support for preserving and transmitting the very best of inherited culture and its associated knowledge. But at another level, of course there are very real differences which Rue (1994) summarises neatly as:

The conservatives have defended the traditional core and canon as the best of human guides through a thicket of perennial questions and on toward the clearing of truth. The classics have struggled with all the key questions of human existence, and they have made some indisputable gains. Indeed the traditional canon is a repository of truth. But the liberal agenda's endorsement of relativism, the view that truth is a variable of time and circumstance, that is no more than an enhanced version of opinion, something to be made up and not discovered or revealed. But if truth is mere opinion, then moral virtue is mere convention, or worse, political power (p.268).

The most general implication of Rue's observation is to avoid the temptation to
adopt an "either/or" mentality, which is restrictive and reductive, and instead to extend the debate to a kind of postmodernist nihilism:

There is no final vocabulary for adequating appearance to reality, nor can there be one. All truths and values are optional. The universe has no meaning, only interpretations do. And no interpretation is privileged by a transcendent point of reference. In fact, I am so persuaded by the postmodernist critique that I am compelled to embrace its nihilism in a way that postmodernists are generally reluctant to do (p.274).

At one level of explanation, Rue's perspective places the onus of responsibility with each individual for generating meaning by personal interpretation; and while this is fine to a point, there is, nevertheless, a very great danger of this resulting in the "throwing the baby out with the bathwater" syndrome. For if there is not sufficient consideration of our cultural heritage - the core and canon of the great works of art and literature - then it is possible that a kind of moral relativism will prevail, where one opinion is not necessarily any better than the next opinion.

Bruner (1990) navigates a careful and sensitive path through the "choppy waters" of this particularly messy dichotomy by insisting instead on a 'viable pluralism' (p.30), which he defines as:

...the pluralism of modern life and the rapid changes it imposes, one can argue, create conflicts in commitment, conflicts in values, and therefore conflicts about the "rightness" of various claims to knowledge about values...But it is whimsical to suppose that, under present world conditions, a dogged insistence upon the notion of "absolute value" will make the uncertainties go away. All one can hope for is a viable pluralism backed by a willingness to negotiate differences in world-view (pp.29-30).

It is precisely within the context of this "slippery slope" of alternatives - leading to
nihilism with a happy face - that the plethora of recent public body consultation exercises, concerning moral issues in society and education, has been undertaken. For unless society can in fact agree a 'viable pluralism' in terms of its moral discourse, then it is unlikely that we can ever discover what values we share as a society.

This preceding remark, then, highlights the central difficulty of whose values are to be promulgated? and whose values are not? Skeen (1980) puts the point in the following way:

(1) Moral values cannot simply be derived from Christianity since moral positions are presupposed by Christianity.
(2) What is seen as a Christian value changes over time.
(3) Reliance on 'Christian values' does not solve the problem of moral education (p.22).

Precisely because religion in itself 'does not solve the problem of moral education' this enriched ethical model of alternative positions was developed.

Public Domain Discourse Documents

Having identified the postmodernist context within which the current debate in education is located, my attention will now focus largely on the specific concerns expressed in a small corpus of recent consultation documents. The organisations concerned are as follows:

School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA); National Forum for Values in Education (NFVE); House of Lords; Catholic Bishop's Conference of England and Wales (CBC); Catholic Education Service (CES).
All of these documents have appeared since July 1996 and directly concern themselves with education and the role of morality. The issues discussed range from what the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Carey, has termed 'the fight back against moral and cultural relativism' (House of Lords. 1996:1695); to what SCAA (1996) defined as a 'cause for concern about spiritual and moral values and the current state of society' (p.5). Or, in specific terms of reference, the remit of NFVE (1996), which is very largely complementary to the other bodies, was to make recommendations on

1. ways in which schools might be supported in making their contribution to pupil's spiritual, moral, social and cultural development.

2. to what extent there is any agreement on the values, attitudes and behaviour that schools should promote (p.1)

The assumption behind such thinking is that we are becoming morally reticent, or inarticulate and lack the linguistic wherewithal to express ourselves morally. Or to repeat the Wittgenstein (1993) dictum, 'the limits of my language are the limits of my world' (p.56), which in the vernacular sense here means you cannot properly express yourself as a moral person if you do not have a moral language! The following pages will endeavour to identify the shared values and common issues and see to what extent this can be placed within a meaningful framework of a moral discourse.

SCAA

For SCAA the initial frame of reference was the 1993 National Curriculum Council publication 'Spiritual and Moral Development' in relation to whole school
policy. Although a mere eight pages of discussion the paper helped to frame the debate in a language of 'spiritual development in an educational context' (p.4). SCAA republished the document in 1995 and emphasised that 'schools transmit values to pupils consciously or unconsciously, and it is important that these values are consistent with those the schools claim to promote' (p.8). In this context the role of values transmission in and by the school was made explicit:

Values are inherent in teaching. Teachers are by the nature of their profession 'moral agents' who imply values by the way they address pupils and each other, the way they dress, the language they use...Values lie at the heart of the school's vision of itself as a community (p.9).

By 1996 SCAA was able to draw on a much wider popular consensus whereby its stated purpose was in declaring that 'the way forward was by the formation of a common language and many delegates believed that SCAA should clearly define the terms of such a debate' (p.9).

Thus in summarising its position, SCAA (1996) begins by stating that 'the current confusion over values is due in part to a misunderstanding of the philosophical debate' (p.5): it then continues, 'The fact that some values or behaviours cannot be defined as 'absolutes' does not prevent them from being promoted as the general rule (p.5). Indeed the paper is one in a series of discussion papers and arose out of a conference which was convened:

...partly in response to public concern at a perceived degeneration in moral standards, especially among young people. Some delegates believed that we are living in a time of 'moral crisis', viewing society as rife with drugs abuse, crime and violence. It was the view of some delegates that, although every generation expresses concern over the values of the young, a significant proportion of young people are now out of control. It was the behaviour of young people that gave the greatest cause for concern. The murder of headteacher Philip Lawrence in
December 1995 was cited by a number of delegates as evidence for this view (p.8).

Overall, however, the conference formulated seven key possible causes for their perceived moral malaise: 'moral relativism; loss of moral discernment; loss of respect for national leaders, both temporal and spiritual; materialism and greed; the fragmentation of the family; technological developments; lack of a common language' (pp. 8-9). Not surprisingly, however, it was in relation to the latter, central observation - the lack of a common language - that much discussion ensued and from which emerged the following four aims, whereby it was 'argued that young people should become':

1. Knowledgeable about standards of right and wrong;
2. skilled in moral reasoning;
3. willing to conduct themselves in a responsible manner;
4. prepared to take responsibility for their own actions (p.11).

And while the above aims are a reasonable basis for further discussion there are still important questions left unanswered. For example, if 1. relates to content, then that content needs detailing more explicitly and if 2. is about process, then this crucially needs much clearer conceptual mapping. By contrast, 3. and 4. relate to attitudinal or predispositional qualities and so fit less readily with 1. and 2. But as 'the conference did not set out to address how spiritual and moral development could be promoted through the curriculum' (p.13) my comments here may seem unreasonable. Nevertheless, this is not the case as 'most delegates did address this issue' (p.13); and while no firm conclusions were reached, the issue of implementation, occupies some six pages of a twenty four page document.
But to return to the issue of the conceptually mapping out of 2, above - being skilled in moral reasoning - the following outline is the sort of 'provisional" starting point which is envisaged:

**Perception of moral problem**

- Produce a model to exemplify and frame the problem and produce an ethical "ought" statement to include:
  1. What is to be done
  2. By whom?
  3. Under what conditions?

- List range of alternative actions available

- Choose appropriate action

- Identify consequences (immediate & long term) if the statement is to be implemented

- Evaluate the consequences against the model in terms of external terms of reference and one's own internal terms of reference; then modify and finally formulate a decision

**FIGURE 2: A PROCESS FOR MORAL DECISION MAKING**
Certainly SCAA’s advice on school’s using the statutory and non-statutory curriculum as a whole is preferable to designating any one subject as a symbolic totem, but even though this was not SCAA’s specific remit there is still no real sense of the “how to” implement issues, or the “what to” implement in terms of specific knowledge beyond the advice that thematic links are suggested in the sense ‘that moral issues should be mapped across the curriculum’ (p.13). The advice is that spiritual and moral dimensions must be central to the school policy and permeate all activities and all subjects in the curriculum (p.13). Indeed Dr. Nick Tate, SCAA’s Chief Executive, criticised the alleged prevalence of moral relativism and concluded by saying “if ever a dragon needed slaying, it is the dragon of relativism” (p.10). And central to this position and much more difficult to realise is the role played by adults:

Adults should lead by example in the school and wider community. Educators must be confident in handling inner as well as outer lives if young people are to be equipped for the world. Knowledge is important, but so are acceptance of personal responsibility, judgement, working with others and understanding codes of behaviour (p13).

The conference concluded by unanimously agreeing that ‘education needs a common language to discuss values’ and that as such ‘national assent to core values would give schools authority and confidence in promoting them’ (p.18). Furthermore, it was directly as a result of recommendations from this particular conference that a national forum for school and community values was established. The recommendations were:

8.1 The report of the conference should summarise the points made by delegates and also aim to stimulate debate

8.2 Any national forum to discuss values in education should be representative of as many constituencies as possible and take account of the diversity of views in society.
8.3 There needs to be a coherent approach to spiritual, moral, social and cultural development.

8.4 There is an urgent need for a working group to track issues related to spiritual, moral, social and cultural developments through the subjects of the curriculum and in other areas of school life.

8.5 Any monitoring of the curriculum should include provision for spiritual, moral, social and cultural development.

8.6 A list of research agencies, publications and interest groups concerned with spiritual, moral and cultural development would be helpful to all concerned with these issues, including schools.

8.7 There is a need for research and development work on the possibility of assessing spiritual, moral, social and cultural development.

8.8 Work on international comparisons should include an investigation of the provision and content of citizenship education in other countries (p. 19).

NFVE

As a direct consequence of the above series of recommendations the ‘National Forum for Values in Education and the Community’ was established by SCAA in September 1996. The first task of the Forum was to initiate a wide-ranging consultation exercise whereby the terms of reference were as follows:

The consultation aims to discover:

1. whether - and if so, how far - there is support for the value statements drafted by the Forum;

2. what schools regard as current good practice in spiritual, moral, social and cultural development

3. whether schools would find the value statements, and their endorsement by society in general, supportive of and complementary to their work in this area;

4. what further support, from SCAA or other agencies, schools would welcome (p. 2).
There are four 'value statements' and thirty principle activities which are intended to exemplify the four values which are concerned with society, relationships, the self and the environment. The value statements are stated thus:

**Society**
We value truth, human rights, the law, justice and collective endeavour for the common good of society. In particular we value families as sources of love and support for all their members and as the basis of a society in which people care for others.

**Relationships**
We value others for themselves, not for what they have or what they can do for us, and we value these relationships as fundamental to our development and the good of the community.

**The Self**
We value each person as a unique person of intrinsic worth, with potential for spiritual, moral, intellectual and physical development and change.

**The Environment**
We value the natural world as a source of wonder and inspiration, and accept our duty to maintain a sustainable environment for the future (p.4).

As this NFVE study as a whole is a two year pilot and this particular research exercise piece is not yet published, the only available progress reports to date are short articles in the national press. Such articles, which are highly favourable to the aims of the project, are typified by a recent leader article in the Guardian:

We have seen recently in SCAA's report, and the ensuing discussion that it is possible and normal to have different views of authority and of particular ethical questions and yet to have strong shared values which we can build on together for the good of all. I understand from the large and heterogeneous group responding to the authority's forum, and much to the surprise of some of them attending, a substantial consensus emerged about a whole series of values...The final report from SCAA's National Forum should be a significant item for an incoming government. It is important to be clear about what the report claims to be. It seeks to describe what the shared values of a wide-cross-section of society are. That is different from saying what they should be (Guardian 22 April 1997).
As a national exercise this is indicative of its importance and significance. It is timely and highly appropriate work which should be able to identify what in general ethical terms is so frequently referred to as the 'common good'. Certainly the forum of 150 members - which included the Archbishop of Canterbury, Cardinal Hume, the Chief Rabbi, Dr Nick Tate, senior politicians and educationalists - achieved a high degree of consensus in agreeing the value statements in the first place. The next step will be to marry the findings with the statements to determine the degree of further consensus. For as the Guardian so astutely points out 'to describe what the shared values of a wide-cross-section of society are is different from saying what they should be'. In other words you cannot simply derive an ought from an is or prescription from description.

CBC

In presenting the CBC's publication, The Common Good, Cardinal Hume prefaced the study with the following remarks:

The Church does not present a political programme, still less a party political one. The social teaching of the church, as expounded in this document, provides a set of consistent and complementary principles, values and goals. We recognise, of course, that many people of other faiths or even none would be able to accept much that this teaching has to offer, whether it is described as Catholic or not. Every public policy should be judged by the effect it has upon human dignity and the common good (p.1).

So although the religious context is Catholic, the central aim is 'to bring about a good and fair society' which is encapsulated by the phrase 'the common good' (p.2).
Two basic, further ideas from Catholic Social Teaching are introduced: subsidiarity and solidarity. They are closely linked with the former meaning ‘decisions being taken as close to the grass roots as good government allows’ and the latter meaning ‘we are all responsible for each other’ (p.3). The message is ‘a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good’ (p.14) and it is a persuasive message:

The fact that men and women in various parts of the world feel personally affected by the injustices and violations of human rights committed in distant countries, which perhaps they will never visit, is a further sign of a reality transformed into awareness, thus acquiring a moral connotation (p.14).

In these terms we ‘have a claim on each other and on society for certain basic minimum conditions without which the value of human life is diminished or even negated’ (p.10). These basic human rights are defined as ‘inalienable, in that individuals or societies may not set them at nought’ (p.10).

The plea is for a new ethical renaissance by a ‘renewed effort to awaken the conscience of the majority’ (p.17) and where ‘the nation’s real crisis is not economic, but moral and spiritual’ (p.25). A crisis defined as one where ‘lives are increasingly dominated by impersonal economic forces which leave little room for morality’ (p.26). Hence, ‘the common good must prevail, even against strong economic forces that would deny it’ (p.27). The argument is prosaic and persuasive:

As a result of this loss of confidence in the public arena, people seek space for personal fulfilment by turning increasingly to their private world. There is a retreat from the public area of community involvement to the domestic and individual sphere. This process of privatisation may well throw more weight than it can bear upon a fragile personal relationship, often a marriage relationship. Thus the very place where satisfaction and security is sought becomes the place where it is less likely to be
The Catholic Church has now extended the debate into education by developing its earlier document into "The Common Good in Education' (May, 1997) which locates the same arguments and ethical principles specifically within the domain of education.

In essence the document is a scathing attack on crude league tables and the competitive 'market forces' ethos of recent education policy. In a plea for community values, education is defined as 'primarily about “human flourishing” and the development of the whole person' (p.7). But in an education system which has become largely market-driven the verdict is that 'individual good is being realised at the expense of the common good' (p.13).

The rhetoric of passion and commitment underscore the ethical position:

Education is about the service of others rather than the service of self. To substitute "public provider" for "public servant" undermines the sense of vocation teachers have. They consider that they have been called to dedicate their lives to serving the young through education, to sharing with them their love of learning, their love of knowledge in a particular area of the curriculum which offers insight into the Author of all knowledge. It is a noble and ennobling vocation which is diminished by the constraints and the language of the market place' (p.13).

Certainly the limitations of the market place are increasingly exposed to ever more articulate critiques in the public domain, where real challenge and change are now beginning to be realised. And it is right to proclaim that teaching is a vocation
whereby individual teachers are indeed moral agents who really can make a difference to their pupils. Here the power of example is key, as teachers offer both opinion and behaviour which are never morally neutral.

The arguments here appeal to both the Christian as well as to the Humanist tradition and are persuasively and convincingly captured in the following summary observation, which concluded the document:

There is no doubt that reforms in the education system have put pressure on teaching staff. Stress can be a creative pressure for some. For others, it has become destructive, as the rise in premature retirements has illustrated recently. It is the responsibility of employers and managers to be able to recognise the cracks before someone falls to pieces, and try to relieve the pressure. Insecurity and a lack of confidence are signs that a person is losing his or her sense of dignity and worth. Staff may need support to regain their sense of vocation in teaching, to understand more fully how, with God's help, they are co-operating in his creative activity (p.19).

House of Lords

This final example of public domain discourse, although a less controlled level of disclosure, is the published proceedings of an unprecedented debate on morality in the House of Lords last July. The topic of 'Society's Moral and Spiritual Well-Being' was debated by Peers from all sides of the House and thus offers a wide range of contemporary 'establishment' views. Indeed the fact that such a debate took place at all is clearly indicative of an increasing consensus towards, as this paper has argued, the need for the development of a common discourse for moral issues.
In opening the debate, the Archbishop of Canterbury emphasised in particular 'the responsibility of schools in society's moral and spiritual well-being' (p.1691). Thereafter, Dr. Carey reminded the House of 'its long-standing concern for the moral and spiritual dimensions of education, because you were indeed responsible for inserting these as primary purposes of education on the face of the Education Act 1988' (p1691). Dr Carey necessarily frames his argument in religious terms, but in so doing argues against moral relativism where no common moral vocabulary can exist:

There is a widespread tendency to view what is good and right as a matter of private taste and individual opinion only. Under this tendency, God is banished to the realm of the private hobby and religion becomes a particular activity for those who happen to have a taste for it. Many people now find it embarrassing to talk about either religion or morality in public, and the traditional vocabulary of moral discourse for example, virtue, sin, good, bad, right, wrong, wholesome, godly, righteous and sober - all these terms have come under acute contemporary suspicion, as though their validity has disappeared along with traditional sources (p.1692).

Following on from this, Lord Griffiths of Fforestfach, former head of Margaret Thatcher's policy unit, speaking for the Conservative Government said:

...a moral and spiritual basis is crucial to our institutions. It is crucial to the family. If a family has a moral and spiritual core, it is very much more likely to hold together and much less likely to be dysfunctional. If a school has a moral and spiritual ethos to it, which distinguishes right from wrong, which respects the pupils for what they are regardless of their abilities but recognises that each one of them has different gifts and wants to develop their character, I believe that it is a better school (p.1696).

Nevertheless, Lord Griffiths believes there to be common shared values "I believe people know right from wrong; people recognise fair play, and people know they have certain responsibilities' (p.1697). His final point, 'moral values are much more likely to succeed when they are underpinned by religious belief' (p.1697)
 validates his own personal position which he expresses as 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom'.

Lord Morris of Castle Morris, Labour's education spokesman, addressed the status of teachers, particularly in relation to low pay, 'it is a sad fact that today respect is given to the higher paid and the low paid workers are despised. Teachers must not be in that category' (p.1697). And in rich rhetoric he concluded by saying:

Now is the hour with a general election approaching, to consider the moral spiritual status of the nation in the light of the ideal, Sir Richard Livingstone said:

"Moral education is impossible without the vision of greatness"

We may say: "Where there is no vision the people perish" (p.1701).

The Lord Bishop of Winchester blamed society since the 1980's for 'its obsession with instant gratification and the pursuit of competitiveness at all costs' (p.1707). The 'role of education' is seen as both 'the repository and the representative of visions of the good society, of moral and spiritual values' (p.1708). He continues:

In a society which has gained in health by being less deferential, we still need models and traditions of behaviour, traditions of values and beliefs and good practice. It seems to me it is cruel and restricting, as well as mistaken, to suggest to people of any age, as many do today, that there is no wisdom into which they can tap and need to tap, that there are no models to look to, no traditions upon which they can depend and within which we can be formed as we grow (p.1708).

Lord Birdwood captured the central difficulty of precise definition in such matters when he admitted:

Of course, at the end of the day, I believe the facts about educational standards in schools on maths., spelling or foreign language proficiency because I can measure these things. But I am much less on firm ground if I turn my attention to to moralities.
Perhaps all the life of rational human beings is the search for moral absolutes, not the finding of them. Something in me says that moral absolutes lie beyond measurement (p.1759).

In summing up the debate Dr. Carey pointed out that 'you cannot take moral behaviour for granted, it needs to be examined, and nurtured again and again' (P.1775). And by prefacing his final summation with the following rhetorical rather than interrogative question: 'What other parliament throughout the world would devote a whole day to moral and spiritual matters in the life of a nation?' (p.1776), Dr. Carey underlines the significance and topicality of this important issue within the public domain of competing moral conversations. His summation of the various contributions is as follows:

It was said in some of the newspapers earlier this week that I was calling for a moral crusade. I have already rejected that understanding of the matter. The Motion on the Order Paper is to "call attention" and perhaps I may point to three areas which I have picked up to which we have called attention. First, we have called attention to the importance of nurturing young people to capture a vision of moral values as central to a responsible and caring society. Your Lordships have echoed that again and again. Secondly, we have called attention to the centrality of our schools and affirmed the crucial role of teachers. We want to encourage the initiative of SCAA. Thirdly, we have called attention to the need for all sections of society - parents, the media, the entertainment industry - to exercise their responsibilities on behalf of us all (p.1776).

A Summary Position

While these public documents offer neither systematic theory, methodology nor a fully developed epistemology, there are nevertheless implications in all of these areas. The emergence of such a clear convergence of views towards a common morality of shared values is indeed very revealing and encouraging, in as much
as it coincides and is consistent with the remit of this particular research. And as the research process is neither strictly inductive nor strictly deductive in terms of traditional reasoning, the result is an emergent theory which is most adequate to the data. Here the criterion for religious or ethical statements accords well with Macquarrie’s (1967) explanation as a form of phenomenology:

Theology must apply the phenomenological approach to all its basic concepts, forcing its critics first of all to see what the criticized concepts mean and also forcing itself to make careful descriptions of its concepts and to use them with logical consistency. The test of a phenomenological description is that the picture given by it be convincing, that it can be seen by anyone who is looking in the same direction, that the description illuminates related ideas, and that it makes the reality which these ideas are supposed to reflect understandable (cited in Long, 1985:100).

In other words, the explanation is a sort of “best-fit” approach to a theory whereby the most adequate description of the pattern of the data examined combines and coheres in favour of the model presented. In these terms a theory can be defined as:

A scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a group of facts or phenomena…which consists in the knowledge or statement of the facts on which it depends, or of its principles or methods as distinct from the practice of it (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1987, Vol 2, p.1281).

By this reckoning, the process of argument is not always a chain of demonstrative reasoning, rather it is frequently a case of a presenting and representing of those features which severally cooperate in favour of the conclusion of the emergent theory with its “common morality”.
It is in this latter sense of representing ethical data that Wittgenstein's last well-known proposition in the Tractatus (1993) gains its greatest strength: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence (p.74). Wittgenstein was in no doubt that everything of real importance, especially the ethical, is inexpressible in ordinary language - by this reckoning the Tractatus was the impossible attempt to demarcate the expressible (logic and mathematics, or facts) from the inexpressible (aesthetics and morals, or values).

However, the urgent appeal for a new 'viable pluralism' and a 'common good' has effectively extended the terms of reference from the merely sacred to the secular, and in so doing begins to express the inexpressible. For there is a clear and discernible quest, not just for greater clarity of moral language and its ethical concepts, but for a new or renewed language to reflect the shared values of consensus and cohesion and of 'subsidiarity and solidarity'; where individual and community fuse into a morally viable whole. And once such a language, or the semblance of such a language begins to properly emerge - as, demonstrably, the consensus is already there to establish such a language - then real "paradigm-busting" in the public discourse domain may well lead to a radical change, from laissez-faire free market ideology to one where human values more frequently take precedence over market force principles.

Such an assessment of the current situation poses a number of challenges to the hegemony of traditional moral thinking. Moreover, this is a hegemony whereby alternatives to the predominance of either Kantianism or Utilitarianism, or Religion or Humanism must be found outside of the particularist or relativistic tradition of the "either/or" set of options. This is an assessment which is neatly summarised by Nussbaum (1992):
...moral philosophy is turning from an ethics based on enlightenment ideals of universality to an ethics based on tradition and particularity; from an ethics based on principles to an ethics based on virtue; from an ethics dedicated to the elaboration of systematic theoretical justifications to an ethics suspicious of theory and respectful of local wisdom; from an ethics based on the isolated individual to an ethics based on affiliation and care; from an ahistorical detached ethics to an ethics rooted in concreteness and history (p.9).

The way forward in such an impasse is not to seek direct reconciliation of these incommensurable positions, which are all equally jostling for the same discourse position in the public domain, but to seek their synthesis instead. The intention here is not to suggest that mere description can, or even should, convert to prescription, rather the suggestion is that moral values need illustration and characterisation to bring them to life, otherwise they may well remain cold, inanimate and factual.

With regard to a 'common morality' it is interesting to note that the Archbishop of Canterbury, Cardinal Hume and the Chief Rabbi have developed a new agreement 'to promote 1999 as a year of national reflection on moral values' (cited in Observer, 18 May 1997). Here the underlying thinking is:

There is a growing sense of anomie in society. There is a loss of meaning of shared values and as we prepare for the millennium we have to ask what kind of society we want to create....the strongest idea emerging was to generate a 'mega-dialogue on society. We live in a country which has lost its spiritual and cultural memory. The task is to use the year 2000 to reawaken that memory (Ibid).
CHAPTER 4: THE OPERATIONAL STAGE - LITERATURE REVIEW

Preliminary Definitional Issues

In accordance with the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1987) common usage defines ethics as 'the science of morals' and 'morals as the practice of ethics'. The former is derived from the Greek word 'ethos' and the latter from the Latin word 'moralis'. At one time both words performed the same function and existed together as English scholars knew both Greek and Latin. However, by 1500 the word moral was defined in terms of "knowledge, opinions, judgements relating to the nature and application of the distinction between right and wrong" (p.1354) and by 1602 ethics was defined as 'the science of morals or the moral system of a particular writer or school of thought' (p.685). As a description of two complementary nouns this will suffice for a preliminary definition, but even so it is worth saying something about the usage of these words as adjectives. For if ethics is the science of morals, whatever concerns morals evidently concerns ethics too, and is as much ethical as it is moral and vice versa. In this context it is perhaps more readily meaningful to refer to a moral individual and an ethical social system; and whereas the immoral usually refers to improper personal behaviour the unethical in contrast usually refers to the infringement of an accepted code of conduct (The Oxford Library of English Usage, 1991, Vol 3). Similarly, while it it would make complete sense to talk about a work ethic it would not be as meaningful to talk about a work moral. This is because in common usage ethics now designates a particular system of values - a prevailing code - and moral relates to the specifics of behaviour, albeit within a particular ethical system.
By this reckoning moral relates to individual action and ethical to a particular ethical theory or paradigm. Such a paradigm could, for example, adopt a Utilitarian, Kantian, religious or other set of moral principles. Furthermore the actual focus could be on medicine, environment, science, education, politics, economics, etc.

In view of such a juxtaposition of paradigms and foci, it is hardly surprising that in everyday language - the moral arena of daily interaction - the words moral and ethical are frequently used interchangeably. Following on from this and premised on the Wittgenstein idea that 'the limits of my language are the limits of my world' (op. cit.) it is not possible to express oneself as a moral person without direct access to a moral language. The major difficulty here is that such a moral language - vocabulary and theories - is rather difficult to locate. Should the emphasis be placed on the intention of a proposed action or its consequences? Alternatively should the emphasis be placed on the social and legal implications of behaviour instead of the religious? In other words what are the necessary criteria to arrive at agreed answers to the following first-order question:

- What should I do?
- What moral principles should I adopt?

Becker (1991) rightly identifies the central role of language in determining each individual's ethical position:

Ethics goes back to languaging. The legitimacy of my own experience within my own domain of discourse depends upon - and is built around - the legitimacy of the experience of others, however undesirable that other experience may appear to me. I need not approve, only keep the possibility of conversation open (p232).
Here the shift from noun to verb, from language as an abstract to languaging as an act, is crucial in linking the dynamic and creative nature of language as the mediator of moral expression. The emphasis upon conversation is reminiscent of Pring (1994) and his analogy of competing different conversations:

> These ideas are inherited, they are transmitted through the conversations which take place between the generations of mankind. And it is the job of education to get the next generation onto the inside of that conversation (p.111).

Correspondingly, when John Dewey was asked in his ninetieth year for a summation of his ethics, his reply was 'Democracy begins in conversation' (Observer, 26 May, 1996).

Additionally, and apart from linguistic and conceptual differences in ordinary usage there are different and differing approaches to moral issues across various academic disciplines. Thus the main purpose of this chapter will be to review a selection of the literature across four major academic disciplines: Sociology, Psychology, Philosophy, and Theology in an attempt to provide an outline for a moral vocabulary and ethical framework.

But as a precursor to exploring the more specialist vocabularies of these particular disciplines, it is worth re-emphasising that we currently have neither an adequate moral vocabulary with which to describe ongoing and everyday difficulties nor an agreeable methodology for accessing and employing it. In what follows then, the selection is arbitrary and not fixed, fluid and not solid, amenable to change and not absolute and although necessarily personal the synthesis of academic voices to emerge will provide a controlled reference point and anchored methodology for further research.
Indeed in academic and scholarly writing the emphasis is usually on “controlled” disclosure at the expense of conveying the inner tensions which are a necessary pre-condition to achieving such control. The recognition of this malaise becomes even more important when seeking to identify a moral vocabulary and methodology for its practice. This is because in expressing oneself morally the vocabulary will invariably appear circumspect, arbitrary and predicated on ill-defined meanings; all of which may become exacerbated due to the unstated nature of the subjective internal dialogues inherent in any personal moral struggle. Our normal habits of speech, of definitional logic, of causal relations and verifiability are all grounded in the presuppositions of linearity and symmetry. For what is committed to paper is calculated and considered; whereas the multitude of fragmentary and inconclusive talks to oneself are always absent. My choices are “my” arbitrary choices which may sometimes be spontaneous and sometimes wrenched out of inner struggle, but when marshalled as controlled academic disclosure that inner struggle is absent by its unvoiced silence. Steiner (1978) underlines the importance of this unvoiced internal discourse:

Linguists have given almost no thought to the formal characteristics, statistical mass, psychological economy or social specificities of internal speech. How often, under what lexical, grammatical and semantical categories and constraints, at what rate of flow, in what language (where the polyglot is concerned) do we speak to ourselves? The unvoiced or internal components of speech span a wide arc: all the way from the subliminal flotsam of word or sentence-fragments...to the highly defined, focused and realized articulacy of the silent recitation of a learned text or of the taut analytic moves in a disciplined act of meditation. Quantitatively, there is every reason to believe that we speak inside and to ourselves more than we speak outward and to anyone else. Qualitatively, these manifest modes of self-address...test and verify our “being there” (pp.345-346)

Certainly as a narrative technique - the ‘stream of consciousness’ - this self-evident
capacity for our unvoiced silent conversations with self is crucial to the pioneering novels of Knut Hamsun, James Joyce and Virginia Woolf, but as a medium of critical reflection in academic enquiry concerning moral issues there is certainly scope for its greater amplification. The focus centres, then, on the notion of "reflexivity", where reflexivity can be understood as a "bending back on itself" (Mead, 1962). In this sense the construction of this thesis takes place within a myriad of multiple voices - the voices of my inner dialogues as well as engagement with the voices of others. What emerges from this self-referential nature of language is consciousness about oneself: self-consciousness. In other words the fourth, inner voice of conscience or what Socrates referred to as his Daemon. These multiple voiced and unvoiced conversations are in Becker's (1991) terms acts of 'languaging' and as such "I" decide what my world is to become and who "I" am going to be through these conversations. By adopting such a position personal actions are inseparably linked to personal responsibility; whereby an alternative position, as we shall see below, views self as largely the product of social interaction where personal identity is established in a social context.

A Perspective From Sociology

For Durkheim (1977) the major focus of sociology was 'social solidarity', or social cohesion. In this sense society consisted of a 'collective consciousness' - a moral force, at the centre of which was a core of values and beliefs that was considered sacred and where 'moral truth consisted in action and not in constructing beautiful images in the silence of the mind introspectively' (p109):

Morality is the domain of action, and can only be grasped in relation to real
phenomena: otherwise it is lost in the void. To act morally is to do good to beings of flesh and blood, to change something in reality. But in order to feel the need to change, transform and improve reality, we cannot abstract ourselves from it. On the contrary we have to embrace and love it in spite of its ugliness, its pettiness and its meanness. We must not turn away from it toward an imaginary world but, on the contrary, we must keep our eyes fixed upon it. This is why an exaggeratedly aesthetic culture, by turning us away from the real world, would relax the springs of moral action (pp. 110-111).

Durkheim’s ‘springs of moral action’ are firmly embedded within established social and religious structures. It is in this structuralist sense that Durkheim (1952) sees the role of education:

Education is only the image of and reflection of society. It imitates and reproduces the latter in abbreviated form, it does not create it (p.379)

Durkheim’s perspective on society as a moral entity, mediated through its social structures, provides an important springboard for later, less conservative, thinkers. Indeed, from his conception of the ‘collective consciousness’, with its emphasis on the social rather than the individual, there flow many modern sociological expressions (Berger and Luckmann, 1987; Halsey, 1987; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Reid, 1984; Schultz, 1967).

This particular position is given its fullest modern expression in the pragmatism of Rorty (1991) where the image of self is ‘as a centreless web of feelings and desires’ (p.11). Indeed as Rorty’s position is ‘auxiliary to the poet rather than to the physicist’ (Ibid:8), his endorsement of the dynamics of ‘the contingent historical circumstance and the socially constructed self’ (p.189) becomes all the more persuasive. For Rorty there are no truths independent of language and therefore, reality is always contingently determined by social action. The social contingency
of such a process of "languaging" Rorty (1994) puts as follows, 'The world does not speak. Only we do' (p.6).

For Weber (1977) the focus of sociology was very much on types of action; whereby economics and law were the models of rational action, and religion was designated as non-rational action. His extensive study of the great religious systems of the world: Confucian, Hinduist, Buddhist, Christian, Islamist, Judaism was located within an economic and sociological analysis. For the purposes of this discussion, the significance of Weber's contribution was in locating the religious and the sacred within a secular analytical framework amenable to public scrutiny. Indeed Weber admits his central interest:

The features of religion that are important for economic ethics shall interest us primarily from a definite point of view: we shall be interested in the way in which they are related to economic rationalism...as part of the particular rationalization of civic life which has become familiar in this part of the world (p.293).

And although Weber, concluded that he could not choose between 'reason and revelation' or between 'Jesus or Buddha' his intention was 'to revitalise the great alternatives in showing the gravity and danger involved in choosing among them' (Bloom, 1987: 338). Weber's purpose was to endeavour to 'get beyond the tyranny and oppression of the fact' (Marcuse 1991). In summing up Weber's influence Bloom (1987) shows Weber's intentions as:

...to present the battleground of the great decisions, all of which are spiritual or value choices. One can no longer present this or that particular view of the educated or civilized man as authoritative; therefore one must say that education consists in knowing, really knowing, the small number of views with integrity. This distinction between profound and superficial takes the place of good and bad, true and false (p.338).
Perhaps a helpful way of decoding this mode of sociological analysis is by reference to the sociological constructs of ‘phenomenology’ and ‘constructionism’. In the first instance, phenomenology confirms the primacy of lived experience, and Merleau Ponty (1964), exemplifies this particular primacy of lived experience as crucial by his assertion that ‘the perceiving mind is an incarnated mind’ (p.3). From this perspective, therefore, perception is always an embodied perception - one that is uniquely what it is only within a specific social and cultural context. In these terms, then, perception in itself does not exist:

Consciousness is perceptual and so my body is the fabric into which all objects are woven and the primordial layer into which both are woven (Merleau-Ponty quoted in Barrett, 1991:133).

In the second instance, constructionism emphasises the performative function of language where such interaction is central and where meaning is largely derived from social interaction. Steir (1991) states the case succinctly:

Constructionist inquiry, as a human activity, must concern itself with a knowing process as embedded in a reflexive loop that includes the inquirer who is at once an active observer. Reflexivity, or a turning back onto a self, is a way in which circularity and self-reference appear in inquiry, as we contextually recognize the various mutual relationships in which our knowing activities are embedded. These include, for example, a relationship between language and experience that allows us to see individual experience as socially constructed, rooted in languaging activities whose possibilities for becoming our experience provides (p.163).

Giddens’ (1994) radical sociological analysis for a new political framework, embraces the morality of post-modernist politics and sets out an agenda for ‘an irremediably pluralistic universe of values’ (p.20). His line of enquiry flows directly from Durkheim’s ‘springs of moral action’ (op. cit), through Weber’s sacred/secular analysis and reflexively concludes with the emergence of an ethic of universal
values - a morality of optimism:

Can one say that there are certain more or less universal ethical principles emerging which tend to unite all perspectives? I believe one can... An ethics of a globalizing post-traditional society implies recognition of the sanctity of human life and the universal right to happiness and self-actualization - coupled to the obligation to promote cosmopolitan solidarity and the attitude of respect towards non-human agencies and beings, present and future. Far from seeing the disappearance of universal values, this is perhaps the first time in humanity's history when such values have real purchase (pp. 252-253).

A Perspective From Psychology

Moral psychology represents the study of behaviour in three distinctly different ways: (1) acquiring an understanding of society's various ethical codes - the cognitive, (2) learning to behave in accordance with such rules - the behavioural, (3) adopting certain attitudes or personal traits - the affective (Gross, 1992). This tripartite focus of knowledge, behaviour and feelings in moral psychology, although located within the context of the wider process of socialization, tends increasingly to be located within the cognitive paradigm of explanation (Demey, 1991).

The cognitive study of moral development is largely concerned with the cognitive causal processes of developmental learning whereby each individual acquires their moral knowledge and behaviour (as opposed to the moral rules and ethical principles which distinguish between right and wrong): Held (1994) puts it as follows:

If moral psychology is the psychology of making moral judgements and developing moral attitudes, it seeks causal explanations of how this is done. This leaves unaddressed the normative questions of whether the positions arrived at are morally justifiable (p. 70).
But within these parameters various theories have emerged and in the Deleuzian (1979) sense such ‘a theoretical combination must be conceived as a toolbox producing tools that work’ (p.9). In this respect Kohlberg’s (1981) theories of moral development have had a major influence and so will frame the following analysis. Indeed Kohlberg’s theories contain explicit definitions of what it means to be moral, what it means to be morally mature, and what it takes by way of experience and development to become so.

Kohlberg’s juridical ethics locates the moral self within the framework of a problem-solving agent. This image of the moral person places great weight on being analytical, able to arrive at disinterested but decisive judgements through rational discourse. Central to the theory lie three, mutually confirming, key claims: the philosophical, the psychological and the operational. The first claim concerns the concept of moral goodness which is defined as knowledge of the ideal of justice: ‘Justice is a universal mode of choosing, a rule of choosing which we want all people to adopt in all situations (p.47). The second claim implies that ‘the structure of morality is defined as the cognitive pattern of organization each of us have for processing information or for connecting experienced events in terms of equality or reciprocity’ (p.51). The third claim states that ‘we can analyze the nature of a person’s morality by looking at the the pattern of judgements a person makes about situations in which people have conflicting claims on one another’ (p.53). Kohlberg claims that this will provide a gestalt of the structure of a person’s moral stage.

In relation to the latter claim, first, the operational, the difficulty of using hypothetical moral dilemmas to cross-reference and identify a real person’s morality can only ever provide a fuzzy picture. Moral intelligence even at its best works imperfectly, drawing on a rhizome of interconnections and so the connections between intent,
motive and action will always remain illusive to blueprint modelling. Of course there may be parallels in Kohlberg's model but there can never be a genuine sense of immediacy nor interactive immersion in real 'flesh and blood' angst. For the picture portrayed lacks ongoing immediacy and sense of vision and control, which for Murdoch (1956) are the real characteristics of the active moral agent:

When we apprehend and assess other people we do not consider only their solutions to specifiable practical problems; rather we consider something more elusive which may be called their total vision of life as shown in their mode of speech or silence, their choice of words, their assessment of others, their conception of their own lives, what they think attractive or praiseworthy, what they think funny: in short the configuration of thought which shows continually in their reactions and conversation. These things, which may be overtly and comprehensively displayed or inwardly elaborated and guessed at, constitute what, making different points in two metaphors, one may call the texture of a man's being or the nature of his personal vision (pp. 32-33).

Such a visional ethics is clearly not amenable to traditional academic analysis and Kohlberg's model, at least in its operational context, is not entirely adequate.

Insofar as Kohlberg's first claim about the notion of virtue as knowledge of the ideal is concerned, the philosophical, this can never be a sufficient condition for a moral agent. Why? Because mere cognition of the concept justice is seriously reductive in defining the concept in rational, linear terms. In other words, so long as justice is concerned with the meeting of the objective and publicly articulable needs of persons with objectively definable acts and goods, then this notion of justice is necessarily incomplete. The problem is that this Kohlbergian notion of the rational and the objective fails to accommodate introspection, inter-subjective relationships and the essential incoherent contingent stumbling blocks of genuine reflexivity.
Thirdly, in relation to Kohlberg's second claim, the psychological, it can be argued that the development of a cognitive structure is not always a necessary condition for moral maturity. People can be morally mature, exemplars of moral goodness, without having the capacity to organize information and events in the way Kohlberg's model states. Nonetheless, it is difficult to encapsulate precisely the notion of a moral intelligence; too often 'the boundaries of ethics are hazy and can be seen as running up against the limits of language' (Wittgenstein, 1929).

That apart, however, Kohlberg's central concept of stage has still undergone severe criticism and as Durance (1995) claims 'Development psychologists no longer accept as tenable the stage theory of cognitive development; sequence is now the preferred term' (p.35).

The key to Kohlberg's conception of the psychological core of moral judgement is the Piagetian construct of objectivity. In these terms objectivity depends on cognitive reversibility: the ability to 'move back and forth between premises and conclusions without any distortion' (Ibid:53). What is being assumed is the insistence that all reality is akin to a coherent set of manipulable variables. An alternative which emerges is the notion of imaginal thought (Broughton, 1985). Here the intention is to displace 'the fat relentless ego' (Murdoch, 1985:93) whereby the concept good resists the scientism of the rationalist and refuses to 'collapse into the selfish empirical consciousness' (Ibid). But even though Broughton's criticism is severe, radical and wide-ranging, it does grasp that quintessential quality of being human; which is contrasted with Kohlberg's cognitive patterning:

In place of love and loss, cool, impartial knowledge that is always a gain. In place of pleasure and pain, the advance of rational mastery. In place of attachment with significant others, universal affiliation. In place of fantasy, play or dreams, the
structures of thought. In place of the unconscious, the conscious. In place of meaning, truth. In place of the development of the self, the equilibration and adaptation of the cognitive system. Instead of the fostering of kinship, authenticity and community, the principle of individual moral meritocracy, administered by a professional educational bureaucracy of psychological specialists (p. 379).

Almost Orwellian in its bland portrayal of Kohlbergian alternatives, although surely the real point is that the moral life cannot be reduced to choices and justifications scored in terms of linear stages. Broughton concluded as follows:

None of this is to be blamed on stupidity or deviousness. The desire reparation of our individual and collective condition is in itself of noble intent. But the possibilities of a humane life need constant nurturance. And when the desire for social improvement yields to fascination with the complex and challenging task of totalizing a rational system, we are diverted from the simpler and less charismatic task of giving life (Ibid).

Thus for Kohlberg, the core of the moral life is very much construed in terms of the way individuals adjudicate conflicting claims through linear structured cognitive processes. Not surprisingly, Kohlberg extends this cognitive patterning model to include religion:

At our moral stage 1, divinity is bound to be an authority who is the ultimate dispenser of punishment and reward. At our moral stage 2 one of our children says, "You be good to God and he will be good to you." The relation of man and God is one exchange of trade. At moral stage 3 the notion of divinity as moral ideal, as an ideally good person, as the carer and protector of goodness is first entertained. At moral stage 4 divinity is first seen as lawgiver, bound by law and the ultimate ground of order. At moral stage 5 divinity or the ultimate becomes identified with or is the ground of freedom, individuality and responsibility (cited in Dkystra, 1981:24-25).
Indeed Dykstra (1981) frames his analysis of Kohlberg within a Christian framework and uses Kohlberg's employment of Kantian rationalist principles to negate the model. First of all he cites Kohlberg's admission: 'Philosophically I incline toward Kant's solution, that faith is grounded on moral reason because moral reason requires faith rather than that moral reason is grounded on faith' (p.25). The distinction clinches Kohlberg's argument and preserves the radical autonomy of the institution of morality and thus religious faith and belief have been collapsed into human psychological structures.

Such an explanation of religion in Kantian terms, where value is detached from the inter-subjective world and becomes a function of sheer decision making, is entirely consistent with modern reductionist tendencies in cognitive psychology, and legitimates the primacy and autonomy of Kohlberg's moral domain. But for Dykstra (1981) religious faith can never be an extension of cognitive structures, nor can the transcendental be reduced to acts of human consciousness:

If however, religious faith has to do with the way in which people are related to a transcendent center of power and reality that is distinct from themselves and their own structure of consciousness, and that acts in the world and in themselves to convert their patterns of thinking and ways of living, then faith and morality may be more intimately and effectively related. Here religious faith is not a matter of being confirmed in what we already implicitly know, but of being moved to new ways of seeing, knowing, feeling, and relating. And this has everything to do with how we make moral judgements (p.27).

Even so, Kohlberg's model can illuminate reality by reference to it as one part of a complex theoretical toolbox. Indeed Vogt (1997) claims that 'few researchers have had as strong an impact on values education as Lawrence Kohlberg:'
Thomas (1992), for example, claims that Kohlberg's theory "remains the most stimulating and potentially the most fertile of children's moral growth in current psychological and philosophical circles" (p.514). Cited in Vogt, 1997:143.

Certainly Kohlberg's structured model of moral agency extends and enriches our moral vocabulary, albeit it within the limitations of fixed social conflictual situations. After all, individuals exist as moral agents only in relation to other individuals and collectively and indivisibly form part of an ever increasing wider moral community. In this context, Rorty (1994) puts forward a convincing case for the need to continually extend our vocabulary by conscientiously working within our own self-generated social networks:

Just as there is nothing which validates a person's or a culture's final vocabulary, there is nothing implicit in that vocabulary which dictates how to reweave it when it is put under strain. All we can do is work with the final vocabulary we have, while keeping our ears open for hints about how it might be expanded or revised (p.197).

A Perspective From Theology

The Traditional

The three main Western religions - Christianity, Judaism and Islam - all claim that God is the supreme reality. God is viewed as omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good and a source of moral obligation; who exists externally and necessarily. However, within the confines of the possible, the scope of this discussions will limit its analysis to Christianity: a justification which arises, not from any narrow ethnocentric bias, but from practical expediency.
Honderich (1995) defines theology as

The study or science which treats of God. His nature and attributes, and his relations with man and the universe...and based upon reasoning from natural facts apart from revelation (p.870).

From this perspective a line of foundational Christian scholars from Augustine (354-430 AD) through Aquinas (1225 -1274) and Dun-Scotus (1265-1308) to Ockham (1285-1349) have each underpinned the centrality of one universal God. The crucial difference concerned where to lay most emphasis between 'faith' and 'reason'.

If Christianity is true, then my problematic relationship to God is what must be central to my moral life and the virtues that derive from that relationship must take precedence over those that may arise from my social position. In Augustine's classic formulation, the Christian is essentially a citizen of the City of God and the duties that arise from this role take precedence over those arising from membership of any earthly city (Rudd,1997). For Augustine, therefore, the primacy of faith over reason was sacrosanct:

Understanding is the reward of faith. Seek therefore not to understand in order that you may believe, but to believe in order that you may understand (cited in Collinson,1994:28).

By contrast, however, Aquinas reversed the position by displacing the centrality of faith over reason by asserting that the proposition "God exists" is not self-evident (Honderich,1995:44). Thus, Aquinas developed his 'five intellectual proofs of
God's existence', which remain the bedrock of modern Christian teaching and in particular Roman Catholicism (Velecky, 1994). For Aquinas (1988), then, no demonstration can start from God and work to his effects, as such a demonstration would require insight into God's nature. Moreover, the five intellectual proofs were firmly underpinned by a causal logic which asserted that 'everything that moves is moved by something else, for nothing can move unless it has the potentiality of acquiring the perfection of that towards which it moves' (Ibid:30). Clearly if this reasoning were to be extended "ad infinitum" then the consequences would be an infinite regression of causal links. Here, Aquinas introduced the concept of a first mover: 'it is necessary to go back to some first mover who is not moved by anyone, and this first mover is God' (Ibid:31).

Collinson (1994) provides an excellent summary of the overall argument:

The first proof invites us to consider the changes that take place in the world, arguing that anything that moves is moved by something else, that an infinite series without that beginning is impossible, and therefore we have to arrive at the concept of an unmoved mover. The second proof looks at actual causes of changes, arguing that there must be a first cause which is God since no other cause could be the cause of itself. The third proof argues that the fact that some beings come into existence and perish shows that they are contingent rather than necessary beings and that a necessary being must be postulated as the source of the existence of contingent beings. In the fourth proof Aquinas points out that we judge some things to be better than others and maintains that such degrees of perfection imply the existence of a best, a truest, a supreme being which is the cause of all relative perfections and is itself pure perfection. The fifth proof concerns the way in which natural bodies appear to operate towards some good end or purpose and from this is argued that there must be an intelligent being by whom everything is given an end that relates to things as a whole (p.35).

This set of propositions is now axiomatic to any understanding and acceptance of Christianity and yet, for the purposes of this discussion, their real significance resides in the mode of argument which supports them which indeed usurps the
orthodoxy of Augustine's primacy of faith.

By contrast, Duns Scotus (1987) could not accept Aquinas' five proofs because they argued from facts of ordinary human sense experience to the existence of God:

I ask first whether it is possible to know God. And I ask first: whether the intellect of man in this life is able to know God naturally. I argue that it cannot...the senses perceive only what is sensible. Therefore the intellect is unable to grasp anything whose sense image cannot be known by the senses. Of God there is no sense image. Neither is He such that He could be perceived by such a sense faculty...But if it is impossible to know such things it is impossible to know God (p.14).

Thus for Duns Scotus, philosophical reasoning could never arrive at the concept of a Christian God; faith alone was the only possible path to a true understanding with God (Until last century, the universities of Cambridge, Edinburgh and Oxford all included a Duns Scotus chair in theology). However, parallel to Duns Scotus, Ockham also reaffirmed that whatever concepts could be derived from the concept of a First Being, any knowledge thereby attained could only be knowledge of the concepts and not knowledge of God (Honderich, 1995:633). For both theologians knowledge of God was, of course, possible, though not via reasoning, but through revelation - whereby knowledge is of an entirely different kind and based on entirely different language and concepts.

The scope of this scholasticism - separation of revelation and faith - heralded a new age of inquiry where the theoretical scope of and limits for the study of the natural world were established. The concept of 'Ockham's razor': 'do not multiply meaning beyond its necessity', or 'it is vain to do with more what can be done with
less' (Honderich: Ibid) typified the inexorable shift from the rhetorical and symbolic use of language towards the new orthodoxy of the empirical and verifiable.

Parallel with the Copernican revolution in science was the search for causal connections between God and the universe which was most evident in the Protestant Reformation. Mediaeval religious certainty was displaced by the rise of modern science. An ascent which, complemented by the reductionist principles of Ockham’s razor, found its greatest modernist expression in Descartes’s (1591-1650) and his methodology of rationalism. For Descartes, truth was determined and validated by a concept of certainty located in Cartesian doubt: “Cogito ergo sum”. The formula itself was not new as it had been used by Augustine in answering the skeptics of his day, though what was novel was that it became the first principle of Descartes’ Philosophy. He inherited many of the Mediaeval proofs of the existence of God and adapted Anselm’s (1033-1109) ‘ontological argument’: ‘Just as the sum of three angles of a triangle equalling two right angles is included in the very area of a triangle, so the existence of God is included in the idea of God’ (cited in Towley, 1990:487). Also Descartes adapted Aquinas’ ‘Cosmological argument’ which argued back to a first cause: the difference was that ‘whereas Aquinas had used the world to show the existence of God. Descartes had used God to argue for the validity of our perceptions of the world (Ibid).

Ree (1974) argues that these reductionist principles of Cartesian positivist rationalism retained a stranglehold on scientific explanation until the 20th century and the eventual displacement of Newtonian physics:
The influence of his [Descartes] reductive ideal on the development of science has been so enormous that it justifies even his most boastful claims about the importance of his work. Newton took over Descartes' belief that the purpose of science was to reduce everything to the "universal qualities of bodies whatsoever". And it was in the spirit of Descartes that he wrote dismissively of the things to which "the Aristotelians gave the name of occult Qualities"...Similarly, in advocating the "investigations of things by the Method of Analysis" he echoes Descartes in speaking of it as moving "from particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most general (p.19).

A contrasting corollary to the orthodox Catholic position which Descartes sought to strengthen, albeit through rationalism, was the pantheism of Spinoza (1632-1677). Spinoza's rationalism emphatically denied the existence of God over and above the world, but at the same time asserted that there was only one substance - God, or nature. And although he was against all form of established religion he was nevertheless a passionate endorser of the moral messages in the Bible as a set of guidelines to influence the development of virtue. Indeed Spinoza's 17th century position on ethics anticipates the 20th century humanism of existentialism where the morally good is socially constructed rather than bestowed directly from God:

**PROP. XX1.** No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly and live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, to act and to live - in other words to actually exist.
**PROOF.** - The proof of this proposition, or rather the proposition itself, is self-evident, and is also plain from the deduction of desire. For the desire of living, acting, etc., blessedly or rightly, is the essence of man - that is, the endeavor made by everyone to preserve his own being. (p.82).

Following on from this, Spinoza collapses all ethics into his concept of the self:

**PROP. XX11.** No virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavor to preserve one's own being
**PROOF.** - The effort for self preservation is the essence of a thing; therefore, if any virtue could be conceived as prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be conceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd.
**COROLLARY.** - The effort for self-preservation is the first and only foundation for virtue. For prior to this principle nothing can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived (Ibid).
The traditional Mediaeval realism - the objective belief in a universal and univocal God-given world order - had thus been seriously challenged and Spinoza's pantheism became an influential springboard for alternative human-centred theories of morality.

**The Modern**

The theology of Novak (1991) combines the political and economic with traditional theological arguments in an extensive analysis of the three economic isms; Marxism, Socialism and Capitalism. It is the latter, 'democratic capitalism', which he convincingly defends as the best moral and cultural option available. For Novak, political democracy is synonymous with a market economy and the impulses which gave birth to such an economy are persuasively stated as twofold moral ones:

1. to limit the power of the state, in defence against tyranny and stagnation; and
2. to liberate the energies of individuals and independently organized communities

(p.14).

Novak (1993) is able to cite Vatican sources - Centesimus Annus, Para 35 - in defense of his thesis of the market economy. Pope John Paul II argues for the exclusion of the absolute predominance of the means of production and of the land, and in contrast endorses the necessarily free and personal nature of work:

What is proposed as an alternative is not the socialist system which turns out to be state capitalism but rather a society of free work, of enterprise and of participation. Such a society is not directed against the market, but demands that the market is appropriately controlled by the forces of society and by the state, so as to guarantee that the basic needs of the whole of society are satisfied (p.19).
And later in the same document the Pope again refers to Christianity within the context of democratic capitalism:

This process, which throws practical light on a truth about the human person which Christianity has constantly affirmed, should be viewed carefully and favorably (Ibid).

Here the Pope advances two new and important arguments in favour of the thesis that market systems shed practical light on Christian truth and thus extend human welfare. The first argument sees markets as giving free reign to the creativity of each individual. The second argument is that markets generate new and important kinds of secular community. Novak (1993) is unrestrained in the Pope's endorsement of his arguments for a democratic capitalism:

To concede that markets in themselves are good is to concede a great deal. To recommend them as better than any known alternative is to praise them quite sufficiently (p.19)

Again in 1996 the Pope stated:

The Church can certainly affirm a system that recognises the fundamental and positive value of business, the market and private property, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector (Catholic Bishop's Conference [CBC]:10)

In these terms Novak (1995) advances his modernist conception of Christianity which is framed within a spirit of moral optimism:

...modernity has, to its great credit, by grant of Providence, made three great institutional discoveries. Modern thinkers first worked out, as neither the ancients nor the medievals did, the practical principles of the threefold free society; free in its
polity, free in its economy and free in the realm of conscience and inquiry. The great modern achievements in these matters have been supremely practical: How to make free institutions work at least tolerably well, and better in most ways than earlier regimes (p.16).

The moral obligation to accept creative responsibility for one's own actions places the person at the centre of a sacred morality within a secular context. A context which includes ‘the Golden Rule, Beatitudes and Ten Commandments” (Skeen, 1980, p.20) Nevertheless, The Ten Commandments, said to be given by God to His people through Moses in Exodus 20: 2-17, provides the mainstream moral code by which ultimately each Christian must be guided (Peschke, 1997):

1. You shall have no other gods before me
2. You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain
3. Remember the sabbath day to keep it holy
4. Honour your father and your mother
5. You shall not kill
6. You shall not bear false witness
7. You shall not steal
8. You shall not commit adultery
9. You shall not covet your neighbour’s wife
10. You shall not covet your neighbour’s house or field or anything that is your neighbour’s (cited in Peschke, 1993:16).

Parallel with this moral code Christian tradition developed a catalogue of main sins, designated as the capital sins of Pride, Avarice, Envy, Lust, Gluttony, Anger, Sloth. Along side this, tradition lists seven main virtues: the three theological virtues of faith, hope and charity and the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance. Yet within this interesting melange of value characteristics there is little direct correspondence between the sins and virtues. Indeed the virtues opposed to the capital sins are different from the seven main virtues and vice versa. Peschke (1993) nevertheless points out their enormous
importance to a critical and reflective morality:

In fact the table of the capital sins and cardinal virtues are not the result of systematic analysis and logical deduction, but stem from a popular ethics and have something of accidentalness. They are not so much aids in the scientific study of moral theology as helps for spiritual incitement and ascetic reflection (p.306).

In spite of the inclusion of the above virtues, it is fair to say that the concept of virtue is not the dominant idea in Scripture which it is in the Greek and Humanistic ideal of the virtuous personality. For the latter aims at the perfection in virtues as the highest summit of moral excellence; whereas Christian perfection consists in conformity to the image and ideals of God. In Peschke's terms 'a man has either all virtues or none at all' (Ibid:342) and, if this is so, it probably follows that Christian virtues are rather more aspirational than realistically possible to achieve.

The modern usage of the concept "conscience", as the dominant constituent part of moral agency, in a sense draws together the different Christian moral positions (CBC,1996; Peschke,1993). Conscience is neither the exercise of reason alone nor of will alone because it is possible to will and do what is opposed to conscience. The Conference of Catholic Bishops argue for 'the extending of the traditional Catholic custom of "examination of conscience" to be extended into the social and political realm' (CBC.11). Peschke defines conscience as both 'the centre of the soul where man encounters God and as the result of the interplay between intellect, will and man's total personality' (p.204). If, by this reckoning, conscience is concerned with the processes of reflexivity and languaging, what logically must then follow is a space for those metaphysical qualities of reflection and deliberation. In other words, what therefore, is required is a silent
space whereby the focused and the foggy can co-exist within a range of internal silent conversations which are frequently and simultaneously cross-referenced to a chaotic myriad of other unspecifiable data.

The Postmodern

In `The Postmodern Condition` (1984), written as a report on knowledge for the Quebec government, Lyotard examined knowledge, science and technology in advanced capitalist societies. The idea of a society with a fixed national identity was judged to be inadequate as was the epistemological foundations of modernity, reflected in its "metanarratives". Two influential metanarratives, knowledge is produced for its own sake, and knowledge is produced in the quest for emancipation, were severely criticised. Lyotard's Postmodernity contested such goals of knowledge and implied that no ultimate proof was available. His argument was that these metanarratives lock civilization into restrictive totalitarian and logocentric thought systems whereby knowledge and truth are viewed as abstract and theoretical constructs rather than direct, subjective human experience. Lyotard stressed the contingency of socially constructed meaning and dismantled the Enlightenment conception of reason and of the rational subject. The phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (1962) had already signalled the possibilities for a socially contingent reality by claiming "consciousness is always actively perceptual" (op. cit) and in these terms the primacy of lived experience reinforced "the perceiving mind as an incarnated mind" (Ibid). Ricouer (1988) and Rorty (1994), built on Lyotard's critique and adamantly rejected the dominant "great master narrative" of the positivist cognitive and epistemological world view and instead posited the notion of the dissolution of self into a host of living social
networks and active relationships.

Ricoeur (1990) sees the problem of personal identity as the problem of change, inherent in the notion of personal history. In these terms it is impossible to base one's identity of selfhood on one's identity of sameness, as sameness is simply not permanent enough. The identity of sameness can diminish over time and vanish. People change in appearance and they also change inwardly; they change their opinions, acquire new predispositions and so on. The identity of sameness thus disappears, but it is not necessarily the case that the identity of selfhood disappears as well. Therefore, the identity of self does not depend ultimately on a stable identity of sameness, neither in appearance nor in terms of the inner kernel of self (13). In Ricoeur's terms then:

It is not substance that call identity into existence, but interpretation. This hermeneutical concept of narrative identity then, is historical and dynamic. Personal identity lies in the narrative mediation between the two types of identity which never totally coincide. One's biographical story restores unity by bringing coherence into the diversity, continuity into the changes in one's life, including the changes in oneself. Personal identity, therefore, is a history, an interpretation (1990:138).

For Ricouer, the subjective and objective aspects of a situation cannot be isolated because they interweave dialectically. But language forces us to relate to situations in terms of either subject or object and yet we find that neither can singly provide an adequate vocabulary for describing situations. (14)

For the theologian, Cupitt (1995) this development inevitably led to:

...vulgar relativism, "nihilism with a happy face." For them it is certain that there is no truth, only opinion, my opinion your opinion...nothing else is left but preference (p.19).
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...vulgar relativism, "nihilism with a happy face." For them it is certain that there is no truth, only opinion, my opinion your opinion...nothing else is left but preference (p.19).
The controversial theology of Cupitt (1995) presents perhaps the most extreme interpretation of modern Christianity:

The god was so patent and vivid that you scarcely had time to think about the ritual vocabulary in which you were communicating...But the centuries passed, oracles and prophecies ceased. God fell silent and became distant and impersonal, and the practice of one's religion replaced the old immediacy. A certain fetichization of the religious system began (p.38).

The culprit of this 'fetichization' is positivist science, or in Nagel's (1986) terms "scientism". Cupitt's point is that the activity of science - mathematics and physics, etc. - cannot step outside language but tries to do so: 'The error arises because when we are trained in science we are trained systematically to bracket out our own subjectivity and pay no attention to it' (pp.40-41). In this respect the referential nature of scientific inquiry- the thinking-about - is assumed to be outside language, 'whereas thinking-about remains firmly inside language' (p.41) and by analogy the argument is reinforced:

A man who supposes he has moved outside language is like a man who searches for his spectacles, forgetting that he wouldn't be able to search unless they were already on his nose...There is no non-human language, and no non-human vision of the world against which we can check our own perspectives...truth and value are thus radically humanized (Ibid).

Here language is the mediator of morality and accordingly Cupitt's language thesis offers an important contribution to Christian theology by its stress on the intersubjective and socially contingent structure of religious communication. This particular kind of languaging and reflexivity can be seen as crucial elements in fusing the myriad of different and often competing conversations within and across a diversity of particular language games (15).
Cupitt's other, more radical, thesis is that 'God is objectified only in his absence. When present, he is just people's own charisma, their creativity, their freedom' (1995:126) violates mainstream Christianity like an earthquake. Moral values are now construed in terms of social values woven into a post-modernist Christian tapestry (Grenz, 1996)

A Perspective From Philosophy

By reason of the assumption that all rational responses to moral dilemmas are necessarily theory-dependent, as they can only make complete sense within a specific intellectual frame of reference, it then follows that the way in which a moral problem is approached will depend on the ethical framework which is either explicitly or implicitly appealed to. What this further implies is, of course, that the language and concepts used will be largely drawn from within the specific ethical culture in order to exemplify and amplify the moral reasoning thus supported. Even so, and with the exception of formal and symbolic logic, all philosophy is part of natural language; which is a point Murdoch (1997) is keen to make emphatically in relation to moral issues:

It is important to remember that language itself is a moral medium, almost all uses of language convey value. This is one reason why we are almost always morally active. Life is soaked in the moral, literature is soaked in the moral. If we attempted to describe this room our description would naturally carry all sorts of values. *Value is only artificially and with difficulty expelled from language for scientific purposes* (p.27). [my italics]

In other words the limitations of the language will always necessitate the limitations of the ethical system, and until the language is changed neither the reality nor the
theory underpinning it will be changed. For it is only by consciously contesting and challenging the dominant discourse - which shapes and is the embodiment of consciousness - that change can happen at all (Deleuze and Guattari, 1977 & 1990; Merleau-Ponty, 1964; Ricour, 1990). Or to put it another way, experience needs to be shaped by language in order to become real. This underlying binding principle is the point of Whitehead’s (1970) famous dictum: ‘the fallacy of misplaced concreteness’, whereby experience is seen as primary.

In contemporary western culture, modern moral thinking emerges largely by reference to two particular ethical traditions: the liberal utilitarian and the conservative Kantian (Billington, 1993; Foot, 1990; Honderich, 1995; MacIntyre, 1987; MacNiven, 1993; Murdoch, 1992; Scruton, 1994; Williams, 1993).

Both of these ethical systems have deep roots in western culture. In the first instance, Kantianism is related to both secular and religious humanism and was strongly influenced by the classical natural law tradition and derives its name from Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804). And secondly, Utilitarianism has a more recent lineage associated with the rise of modern science and derives its name from John Stuart Mill (1806-1873).

Therefore, the scope of this section will be to examine these two ethical systems and to examine as well secular, as distinct from religious, humanism and then to conclude with an exploration of Wittgenstein’s approach on ethics as exemplified in his ‘Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’, first published in 1921 and his ‘Philosophical Investigations’, first published in 1953. Following on from this, a synthesis will be developed within a new frame of reference from what otherwise would necessarily remain four incommensurable approaches. In this respect
Wittgenstein's (1993) dictum, 'the limits of my language are the limits of my world' (p.56) will provide the rationale and the impulse for the emergence of a new ethical framework.

The Kantian Perspective

For Kant morality is just rationality in action - that is to say it is the condition of rational consistency in action, and, as such, it is entirely autonomous and self-supporting. In these terms and central to Kant's ethical theory - as expounded in his 'Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals', written in 1785 - are two deceptively simple theses: (1) If the rules of morality are rational then it follows that they must be the same for all rational people; and (2) if the rules of morality are binding on all rational people then contingency is displaced in favour of the rational will. Kant asks the question 'How is an imperative of Morality possible?' (p.82). By jettisoning the reference to 'empirical conditions' (Ibid) in terms of needs and desires that are only known a *posteriori*, Kant produces an *a priori* imperative whose validity is guaranteed by reason alone:

> Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law (p.84)

Adherence to this highly compressed principle captures Kant's rationalist demand for reason as well as endorsing the Christian golden rule: Do unto others as you would like them to do unto you. The practical imperative thus follows:

> Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end (p.91).
The moral conviction implied by such imperatives sees freedom as the condition that makes morality possible by virtue of the fact that ‘rational nature exists as an end in itself’ (Ibid). The ‘universal’ good is willed by a sense of duty:

Wherever an object of the will has to be put down as the basis for prescribing a rule to determine the will, there the rule is heteronomy; the imperative is conditioned as follows: ‘If, or because, you will this object, you ought to act thus or thus, consequently it can never give a moral - that is, a categorical - command. However the object determines the will - whether by means of inclination, as in the principal of personal happiness, or by means of reason directed to objects of our possible volitions generally, as in the principle of perfection - the will never determines itself immediately by the thought of an action, but only by the impulsion which the anticipated effect of the action exercises on the will: ‘I ought to do something because I will something else.’ And the basis for this must be yet a further law in me as a subject, whereby I necessarily will this ‘something else’ - which law in turn requires an imperative to impose limits on this maxim (p.105).

Kant’s moral obligation must be be fulfilled for its own sake and not for happiness or utility nor for the sake of a Christian God since ‘an obligation imposed on men by God would result in turning men into slaves’ (Ibid). This clear emphasis on a rational moral autonomy, independent of God, places the onus for doing good squarely on the metaphorically broad shoulders of each rational agent. But by basing morality on the individual’s judgement of what is deemed to be a universal law, there is a real danger that this could lead to subjectivism and thereafter to moral relativism.

Rawls (1986) furthers Kant’s approach by his “hypothetical” contractual theory of justice which is premised on two key concepts: (1) the veil of ignorance and (2) reflective equilibrium. In terms of (1), each person draws up the best possible rules of justice for an ideal society by placing themselves in a state of fictional ignorance: ‘That is, nobody knows which place he will obtain in this society, whether he will be rich or poor, intelligent or dull, healthy or handicapped, white or black’ (p.12). In
relation to (2) Rawls employs reflective equilibrium as a method for achieving coherence in our moral views:

by achieving coherence in our moral views through mutual adjustment between particular moral judgements, general principles, and theoretical constructions like the social contract (p.53).

A distinguishing feature of the reflective equilibrium approach is its appeal to the individual’s natural capacity for reflection over everyday judgements about what is right and wrong. By framing his approach in a concept of aspirational impartiality, Rawls provides a rational framework from within which a decision procedure for moral issues can be applied. Here the distinction between the moral and ethical is sharply drawn, as Kant’s categorical criteria relate to an ethical system but Rawl’s model for "considered judgements' does not:

A considered judgement does not provide any reason for the decision. It simply states the felt preference in view of the facts of the case and the interests competing therein (p.186).

In both Kant and Rawls the emphasis is on the impersonal rational thinker and a personal will and in these terms complex issues are amenable to resolution through general first principles (Kant) and abstraction (Rawls). With this conception, moral life requires moral knowledge, and moral knowledge means knowledge of the true moral principles. It is almost as if the moral life is an intellectual riddle to be solved, and if the burden of proof is demonstrable then intellectual reasoning is essential. But when the burden of proof is less so then it is necessary to discover an alternative. In this context the process of discovery can be regarded as a creative
process whereas the process of proof is not.

Moreover, Kantian moral thought has always had to struggle against the charge of vacuity, the suspicion that the description of a person as simply a rational agent is just too thin for any significant moral constraints to be derived from it (Rudd, 1997). But whereas for Murdoch (1997), however, the idea of a more humanistic Kantian moral agency is just about right:

The moral agent is thus pictured, in a manner which remains essentially Kantian, as using his reason to survey the ordinary factual world, and making decisions therein which he will defend by reference to facts and to simple principles offered as patently rational. He is not pictured as using his reason to explore the intermediate area of concepts. Moral action, in short, is seen as the making of sensible choices and giving of sensible and simple reasons. It is not seen as the activity of theorising, imagining, or seeking for deeper insight (p.177).

Nonetheless the strength of Kantianism is, not in it use as a template or formula, but in its use as a model capable of yielding a reasonable return on explanation. The underpinning logic is that by reference to enriched theoretical constructs which yield high informational content and aspire towards low probability of being false there is always a demonstrable value. Flowing from this epistemological position, in accordance with probability theory, the more information a theory contains then the greater the number of ways it can turn out to be false. Thus if highly falsifiable, it is also highly testable and nearer the truth (see Popper, 1979, pp.101-103).

But whereas, Kant’s paradigmatic ethical first principle ‘Act only on that maxim which you can, at the same time will to become universal law’ does fulfill these epistemological criteria, so too does the sharply contrasting social utility of its Utilitarian counterpart: ‘Act always so as to produce the greatest good for the
The following paragraphs will seek to illuminate some of those key differences.

**The Utilitarian Perspective**

Mill's Utilitarianism distances itself from Kantian ethics by its assessment of actions in terms of their ends and consequences, their contribution to human happiness and the prevention of human suffering. Mill (1987) states his first moral principle:

> The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of happiness (p.6).

Following on from this, Mill distinguishes between first principles and secondary principles, the latter being a list of moral rules such as: do not commit murder, tell no lies, keep promises etc. The core of Mill’s reasoning here involves two basic premises: (1) a particular action is justified as being right if it can be demonstrated that it accords with a moral rule, and (2) a moral rule is shown to be right by demonstrating that the recognition of the rule promotes the ‘greatest happiness principle’ (GHP). The significance of the distinction between first and secondary principles is stated thus:
We must remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to. There is no case of moral obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved; and if only one, there can seldom be any real doubt which one it is, in the mind of any person by whom the principle itself is recognised (Ibid:26).

For Kant, the moral law requires a very heavy appeal to reflective agreement, but whereas in Kant such reflection is guided by reason, in Mill it is guided by desire; desire as both a means and as an end in the pursuit of the GHP. In this way the individual fulfils personal happiness as well as promoting the general civic good. The value of Mill’s approach is in providing a criteria - frequently known as consequentialism - to determine what is right and wrong based upon actual states of affairs and not hypotheticals. Indeed the scope does not extend to a definition of these terms which was central to Moore’s (1991) Principia Ethica.

Norman (1983) provides a useful summary of the effects of Mill’s GHP:

The combined effect of all these sanctions is to induce people to pursue their own pleasure in such a way as to co-operate also in the production of pleasure and avoidance of pain for others. The task of the moralist and of the legislator is to manipulate the various sanctions, so as to maximise the happiness of all (p.125).

Interpreted in the light of his GHP, Mill’s utilitarianism can be viewed as complementary to Christian ethics. Mill recognized the affinities with Christianity and argued that when properly understood, although not derived or dependent on Christianity, it was completely compatible with the Christianity of Jesus Christ:

...utilitarianism is essentially concordant with the ethics of Christianity. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility...as a religion of humanity (p.27-28).
The criterion to be chosen for the values of happiness is 'the experience of intelligent people as competent judges' (Ibid:41). Of course there are certain difficulties in deciding which people and whose values? But precisely because Mill's utility principle is deeply rooted in the premises of enlightenment humanism (Honderich, 1995), value is intended to reside in the well-being achieved in day-to-day social life and not in universally-fixed absolutes.

The Humanist Perspective

After the collapse of the intellectual hegemony of the Christian Middle Ages, the major project of moral philosophy had become the search for an abstract rational foundation to build a modern ethical framework. The Enlightenment introduced radical new ideas which contradicted the fixed moral certainties of the Bible and, in these circumstances, the separation of Church and State inevitably led to the alternative voices of Protestantism, Science and Humanism.

In these terms it is hardly surprising that Existentialism, as a variant of Humanism, enters the frame with its strong emphasis on an individual morality grounded in experience. Certainly the impulse for modern Existentialism was Sartre (1905-1980) in his 1945 lecture, 'Existentialism and Humanism' where he defined the central tenet of his aesthetic variant:

existence comes before essence - or if you will we must begin from the subjective...I am thus responsible for myself and for all men, and I am creating a certain image of man as I would have him to be. In fashioning myself I fashion man (p. 30).
He refers to God as 'an out of date hypothesis' (p.33) and sets out his alternative argument over the next two pages which is summarised as follows:

1. To be morally constrained to do something is to be commanded by somebody with moral authority to do it
2. Only God can have moral authority
3. But God does not exist
4. Therefore there is nobody with moral authority over us
5. As we are not constrained morally, we are free to choose (see pp33-35).

Central to this reasoning is a belief in 'the absolute character of free commitment, by which every man realises himself in realising a type of humanity' (p.47). Sartre concludes by emphasising 'the universe of human subjectivity' (p.55):

...in such a sense that man is not shut up in himself but forever present in a human universe - it is that which we call existentialist humanism. This is humanism, because we remind man that there is no legislator but himself; that he himself, thus abandoned, must decide for himself; also because we show that it is not by turning back upon himself, but always by seeking, beyond himself, an aim which is one of liberation or of some particular realisation, that man can realise himself as truly human (pp.55-56).

The link between human agency and being moral and in separating will from reason is uppermost in the claim that 'to be authentically human is to view conduct as problematic' (Ibid:48). These various claims are also important in the religious existentialism of Kirkegaard (1813-1855) who states in his journal that he wants to create a pattern of life which would allow him to:

lead a complete human life and not merely one of the understanding, so that I should not...base the development of my thought upon...something that is called objective...but upon something which grows together with the deepest roots of my life (cited in Golomb, 1995:33).
For Kirkegaard, 'man is a living passion' and not an abstract reason and must embrace the ethics of social and civic responsibilities:

The person who has ethically chosen and found himself possesses himself in his entire concretion...Here the objective for his activity is himself, but nevertheless not arbitrarily determined, even though it became his by his own choosing. But although he himself is his objective, this objective is nevertheless something else also, for the self that is the objective is not an abstract self that fits everywhere and therefore nowhere but is a concrete self in living interaction with specific surroundings, these life conditions, this order of things. The self that is the objective is not only a personal self but a social, a civic self (cited in Matustik and Westphal, 1995:7).

The transition to authenticity and enlightenment is incorporated into three key stages of development, each imbued with its own set of values:

1. Aesthetic  A person must explore the world of wit & sensuality
2. Ethical    A person must explore the world of moral responsibilities

Stage 3 is further divided into (a) Socratic religion and (b) Christian religion. In the former 'the totality of a guilt-consciousness is the most upbuilding element' (Ibid:8). In this respect the individual is striving desperately to become a true Christian and the struggle is from within. And in the latter, religion B punctuates the decisive moment in the life of the existent spheres by demarcating the internal into the temporal:

In Religiousness B, the upbuilding is something outside of the individual; the individual does not find the upbuilding by finding the relationship with God within himself, but relates himself to something outside of himself to find the upbuilding (Ibid:10)
This capacity to interact reflexively is a cornerstone of existentialist thinking. This quality of being able to "step back" from the empirical data to make free decisions is what Hampshire (1996) describes as:

The paradigm of moral choice which is that of escaping from the data via a wild leap of the will, making choices which may be perverse and are certainly free from the dictates of reason... What is of primary moral value is the will and its movement of free choice, the actions we perform have only secondary value (cited in O'Connor, 1996:66)

For Murdoch (1989) moral life can not be entirely reduced to pure Kantian or Utilitarian principles and instead she argues for a moral reality whereby 'What is real may be non-empirical without being in the grand sense systematic' (p.41). Her conclusion, based on humanist ethical principles, that 'the concept good resists collapse into the selfish empirical consciousness' (p.93) is persuasively argued:

A genuine sense of mortality enables us to see virtue as the only thing of worth; and it is impossible to limit and foresee the ways in which it will be required of us. That we cannot dominate the world may be put in a more positive way. Good is mysterious because of human frailty, because of the immense distance which is involved. If there were angels they might be able to define good but we would not understand the definition. We are largely mechanical creatures, the slaves of relentlessly strong selfish forces the nature of which we scarcely comprehend. At best, as decent persons, we are usually very specialized. We behave well in areas where this can be done fairly easily and let other areas of possible virtue remain undeveloped... The self is a divided thing and the whole of it cannot be redeemed anymore than it can be known. And if we look outside the self what we see are scattered imitations of Good. There are few places where virtue really shines: great art, humble people who serve others. And can we, without improving ourselves, really see these things clearly (p.99).

Murdoch captures the quintessential simplicity of the Good in creative and reflective ways by illuminating aspects of the self which remain hidden to Kantian and Utilitarian criteria. Here the fabric of moral life is in the active weaving of new
patterns rather than in the pursuance of patterns already pre-defined. In contrast Kant and Mill largely define the moral in terms of the world of facts and overt behaviour: while certainly this "choice and argument" model of morality, although yielding high explanatory value, it does not provide a pattern for all morality.

The Language Perspective

This running up against the limits of language is ethics. I think it is definitively important to put an end to all the claptrap about ethics - whether intuitive knowledge exists, whether values exist, whether the good is definable. In ethics we are always making the attempt to say something that cannot be said, something that does not and never will touch the essence of the matter (cited in Murdoch, 1992:29).

These remarks were written by Wittgenstein (1889-1951) in a letter to a friend in 1919 and what is interesting is that the problems stated, if not the sentiment, are the same problems occupying me while operating this word processor here today. So in one sense nothing much has changed.

Murdoch (1992) describes Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as ‘the definitive book on ethics’ (p.28) which on first sight may seem somewhat surprising as there are only a very few remarks to do with ethics which cluster in the last two pages and climax in the remark: ‘What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence’ (p.74).

Nevertheless, closer textual scrutiny tends to support Murdoch’s assessment. The following section will, therefore draw together a number of Wittgenstein’s key principles within the terms of reference he advocated for the framing of ethical
questions. George Moore (1873-1958), author of ‘Principia Ethica’ of 1903, and one time mentor and friend to Wittgenstein, endorses the importance of Wittgenstein's method in his autobiography:

When I did get to know him [Wittgenstein], I soon came to feel that he was much cleverer at philosophy than I was, and not only cleverer, but also much more profound, and with a much better insight into the sort of inquiry which was really important and best worth pursuing, and into the best method of pursuing such inquiries...when his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus came out, I read it again and again trying to learn from it. It was a book which I admired and do admire extremely. There is, of course, a great deal in it which I was not able to understand; but many things I thought I did understand, and found them very enlightening...He made me think that what is required for the solution of philosophical problems which baffle me, is a method quite different from any which I have ever used - a method which he himself uses successfully, but which I have never been able to understand clearly enough to use it myself (cited in Levy, 1989:272).

The immense humility of Moore is striking, but as significant is his allusion to the insight and unspecifiability of Wittgenstein's method which appears to emerge from the intuit and tacit rather than any explicit known criteria.

This analysis will, however, endeavour to apply aspects of Wittgenstein’s method and in doing so will draw on two complementary explanations of language. One account in the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’, written in 1918, where a model of explanation is presented which draws a line between factual public language verifiable by logical analysis or experience, and private or personal language verifiable by reference to one’s ethical framework. In ‘Philosophical Investigations’, published posthumously in 1953, the emphasis is shifted towards usage in a multiple of different “language games” generated by different social interactions. The earlier view arrived at in the ‘Tractatus’ is that philosophical problems arise from our misunderstanding of the logic of language and that philosophy is no science but an activity of elucidation and clarification. The later ‘Investigations’
sees the nature and conception of philosophy as the same, namely a development of the earlier view (Fann, 1969).

Of course there are many other interpretations, some of which tend to disfigure the sense of the book such as that which the Logical Positivists’ claim (e.g., there are two kinds of meaningful statement portrayed in the Tractatus: analytic statements as in mathematics and logic which are true by definition; and statements that can be verified by experience; other statements are either metaphysical or rhetorical, Ayer, 1990). Alternatively, there is Russell’s school of thought known as Logical Atomism (e.g., a picture theory of thinking whereby language represents a composite reality) and many other interpretations all of which wrongly assume that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was a radical break with the Tractatus; whereas this analysis will seek to demonstrate that there exists strong continuity between the earlier and later Wittgenstein in his conception, rather than method, of philosophy.

A phrase which permeates the spirit of this analysis is the central ‘Tractatus’ dictum: ‘The limits of my language mean the limits of my world’ (op. cit.). Clearly the limits set upon thought are not as narrow as the limits set upon written language, and the limits set upon the various expressions of language (i.e. Sociology, Psychology, Theology, Philosophy, Education) fall somewhere in between. In this sense language is able to refer to what it cannot adequately express. The result of this forces us to recognise that we can set a limit to language - as this controlled disclosure demonstrates - because we can think both sides of such a limit (i.e., the requirements of this piece of research writing requires both (a) extensive and deep reflection as well as (b) controlled and clearly articulated written argument and both of which need to eventually complement each other as approximately as possible).
But by contrast, we cannot set a similar limit for thought since this is only done by coming up against what cannot be thought. Thus, in between the logical limits of language and the failure of thought - and this is the central point in terms of ethics in the 'Tractatus' - lies all ultimate expressions of value. In one sense (i.e., the sense of this thesis) language ought to stop with as much clarity as can be realistically achieved, whereas it frequently pushes against reality until finally it is forced into silence.

In these terms analysing language is an unending process, precisely because no actuality is finally ultimate. And since language arises between the possible and the actual, the process of continually constructing a new possibility ensures this constant state of flux. Wittgenstein's ingenious solution to the problem was to distinguish between theory and practice and logic and reality. Bernstein (1967) has put the case succinctly in an excellent article:

At least three languages are distinguished in the Tractatus: the perspicuous language, ordinary language, and the ladder language. The perspicuous language is an aid for understanding how language works when we use it to make true and false statements. It is not an ideal language which ordinary language must "approach" in order to fulfill its function. To describe this perspicuous language, we must use a language - which must not be confused with the object language that it describes: the propositions in the ladder language cannot occur in the perspicuous language (pp. 236-237).

Wittgenstein's ladder language has affinities with the rationalist language of Kant and the colloquial language has affinities with the utilitarianism of Mill. And as it is not possible to step outside of one's own consciousness we cannot transcend our own language or thought, but by the construction of the perspicuous language we can attempt to lay bare the structure of that particular reality. Such a language of
logic is constructed by determining what elements are necessary for the symbolism to have meaning.

It is true that in the ‘Tractatus’ Wittgenstein was seeking to establish an ‘ideal language’, i.e. one which had been purged of everything unsayable and only consisted of propositions from the natural sciences; but there are things which although they cannot be spoken about do still show or manifest themselves. It is by virtue of this manifestation into the 'suburbs of our language' (Pl:18) that while we are silent we can yet communicate. Hence the significance of the concluding remark in the Tractatus: 'What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence' (1993:74).

This language of silence, introspection and reflection, is the very essence of reflexivity and the cornerstone of metaphysics in its non-empirical form. Here Wittgenstein's philosophical method consists of an inner dialogue, posing questions and inwardly listening to answers. This phenomenon is not amenable to public and explicit scrutiny but is no less real, which is Wittgenstein's purpose in stating 'ethics is transcendental' (Ibid.71). However, in his earlier notebooks, intended as preparatory sketches for the Tractatus, Wittgenstein's remarks are in more open prose:

> When my conscience upsets my equilibrium, then I am not in agreement with Something. But what is this? Conscience is the voice of God (Notebooks 1914-16,1969:75).

Again in ‘Philosophical Investigations’ the emphasis is upon ‘the silent internal discourse of others’ (p.222) as well as the socially construed, observable
conversations which Wittgenstein terms the 'multiplicity of language games'. Such an examination of the language games of ethics is invariably complex, but it is possible to identify specific modes of moral vocabulary and forms of ethical theory (Sherry, 1977) (16).

A Summary and Synthesis

The manner in which moral dilemmas are to be resolved will ultimately depend on their method of justification which will be inherent in the system of ethics being appealed to. Translated into practical terms the Kantian will assume the motivation of an action predominates in moral judgements and the Utilitarian will lay emphasis on consequences. But, whereas traditional moral philosophy lays a line of demarcation between these two different theories because of their "incommensurability" (Billington, 1994; Foot, 1990; Honderich, 1995; MacIntyre, 1987; Murdoch, 1992; Scruton, 1994; Williams, 1993), this analysis brings them into equilibrium as two modern cornerstones in a composite ethical system.

Subsumed within this composite ethical structure also will be religion as a cornerstone which, in the terms of this limited discussion, means the inherited impact of Christian ethics. The fourth and final cornerstone is secular humanism whereby the socially and psychologically construed aspirations of the individual are seen as ends in themselves as they result from human experience and help to shape and determine it. Peschke (1997) neatly encapsulates this particular form of humanism in his list of 'existential ends':

...self-preservation, including bodily integrity and social respect; self-perfection, including the enlarging of experience and knowledge and the improvement of the
But how to establish priority in the case of conflicting moral signals is, of course, the seminal difficulty. Now, however, with a new template as a frame of reference, it is possible to correlate specific issues against competing ethical systems. The composite model presented in the next chapter provides this template and is a summation of the preceding description and analyses. A model is thus proposed which draws together incommensurable ethical structures into a new architecture and scaffolding for framing moral issues.

The crucial next task will be to provide a method capable of representing common key concepts such as "languaging" and "reflexivity," and at the same time nurturing the common denominator Peschke (1997) refers to as the 'ultimate subjective norm of moral conduct' (p.205) i.e. conscience. In this respect, Rawls (1986) constructed the 'reflective equilibrium' method as a reasoning-tool for ethics while Daniels (1979) broadened the scope of the method:

The method of wide reflective-equilibrium is an attempt to produce coherence in an ordered triple of sets of beliefs held by a particular person, namely (a) a set of considered moral judgements; (b) a set of moral principles; (c) a set of relevant background theories (cited in Furrow 1995:16).

An adaptation of this "best-fit" approach to moral reasoning will inform and frame the unfolding of the following emergent theory of morality.
CHAPTER 5: A MODEL FOR MORAL DISCOURSE

Introduction: An Emergent Theory

The radical contention of this argument - guided by the Wittgensteinian view that until you change the language you cannot change the reality - is that a subliminal Treasure Chest of Ethics is potentially available and accessible to us all. This is to suggest that we possess, individually and collectively an innate primitive data storage capacity which, potentially, enables us to discriminate between value positions but currently we cannot easily do so as we lack a moral vocabulary of common terms. In other words if I want something to mean something, then it can mean whatever I choose; but if I want others to accept my meaning then I must argue its case in the public domain. This is the essence of initiating change.

Or to put it another way, without a commonly agreed explicit conceptual frame of reference and an associated moral vocabulary it is impossible to consistently behave morally within the confines of a complex and pluralist society. In any case, experience needs to be shaped by language in order to become socially real. In these terms, until you change the language you cannot change the reality; hence the importance placed here on creating a framework for a public discourse domain of ethics in education.

Recent attempts by the Schools Curriculum Assessment authority (SCAA) to develop moral values in the school curriculum, allied to the recent establishment of the National Forum on Values in Education (NFVE), are strongly indicative of a real desire now taking place to locate that which constitutes a public morality in our
pluralist society. Chapter 3 focused specifically on recent public body discourse in this regard, although here I have merely elaborated the point as a contextual marker. The fact is that a real search for a public moral vocabulary and agreeable frame of reference is now a major objective for a number of key public bodies.

Parallel to this, the primary goal of this research is to present, through synthesis, extension and argument, a 'common morality' with sufficient generality and applicability that it may provide a provisional working model for education.

Clearly, there will always be a discrepancy between, on the one hand, language and its concepts and, on the other hand, the reality it serves to describe. For as Pirsig (1991) observed, 'the former are static and discontinuous while the latter is dynamic and flowing' (p.372). In a similar context, Tomlinson in his wonderfully illuminating article "Teachers and Values" (1995) argues that 'we must not abandon the deeper humanistic values that have nourished western civilization just because we happen to live in a period of nihilistic and self-seeking moral confusion' (p. 311). Instead, he argues that 'the object of all our learning should be a sense of personal and social moral responsibility' (p.313). He locates the present dilemma for teachers in the following 'post-war intellectual terms':

Thus, in our lifetime especially, all three pillars of our curriculum - knowledge, the knower and the context - have been shaken. Educators have carried not only the burden but also much of the blame - attributed to them sometimes from ignorance, much more often from confusion, anxiety and malice in the face of half-understood and much feared intellectual and social forces. That might have stood for a description of our situation as teachers at any time from 1960 to 1980. It is reflected in the movements to set up councils for the development of the curriculum and teaching methods and in legislation towards racial and sexual equality with its consequences for schools. I want to argue now that, in fact, our current situation is even more dire. That is because of recent radical political policies, the effects of which are structurally already with us but whose social and spiritual consequences have still to be harvested (My emphasis; pp.306-307).
In Tomlinson's terms then, the structural changes - especially post-1988 ERA - are still at the reactive level of response rather than the more reflective 'social and spiritual'. In these terms, Tomlinson cites the poet Kathleen Raine in support of his passionate case for a new agenda for education:

To recreate a common language for the communication of knowledge of spiritual realities, and of the invisible order of the psyche is the problem now for any serious artist or poet, as it should be for educators (p. 314).

Nonetheless, without such a moral discourse our direct experience lacks explicit moral descriptors and frequently hovers, at best in muffled silence and at worst in anger and violence. For until we shed the encumbrances that muffle and stifle moral expression we will continue to have chaos, or at best what Novak (1991 calls 'moral relativism' where personal preference dominates (19).

However, if we begin by removing the subject/object perceptual distinction and apply instead Merleau-Ponty's (1964) observation which regards 'consciousness as perceptual' (p.113), then the primacy of experience can be validated through feelings, which is prior to analysis through language. Such an experientially-driven view of language and morals was emphasised in the nineteenth century socially polemic dramas of Ibsen and typified by the expression “Eksempelens makt” to underscore the importance of the power of example over public rhetoric (20); similarly, Whitehead (1974) had introduced the clever concept of "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness" (21) (Op cit.) in order to reinforce the primacy of experience over description. In both cases the point to emphasise is that unless conceptual clarity is ultimately achieved in moral discourse then the values of each individual will chaotically continue to collide ad-infinitum. In a sense values
can only be ascribed publicly when it is understood exactly what is being valued and what criteria are being employed to value it.

Following on from this, the belief here countenanced is that a common morality does in fact exist: a common morality that binds society rather more than it disunites it and a morality, once made explicit, is capable of clarifying and uniting the public self with the private self. These, then, are the underlying assumptions upon which this thesis is built. The intention of this chapter, therefore, is to set out more clearly those elements which constitute the basis of such a common morality.

In the first instance, I shall present an examination of the two basic, constituent parts of the emergent theory: (a) a Four Quadrants' model and (b) a Syntax of Four Voices' model (where (a) is intended to be representative of and to demonstrate an external and publicly accessible frame of reference and where (b) is intended to be representative of and to demonstrate an internal and privately accessible frame of reference). And, second, by linking the two separate parts of the model and drawing upon fresh insights which flow from the synthesis, the basis of a common morality emerges which is encapsulated by (c) Six Moral Precepts.

Hence the above combination and synthesis of (a), (b) and (c) will provide a model and emergent theory which cumulatively represent a common morality.

In other words, and as previously stated, the approach, analysis, illumination and explanation of the emergent theory will be a sort of "best-fit" approach whereby the most adequate description of the pattern of the data examined combines and coheres in favour of the models presented. In these terms a theory can be
defined as:

A scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a group of facts or phenomena...which consists in the knowledge or statement of the facts on which it depends, or of its principles or methods as distinct from the practice of it (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1987, Vol 2, p.1281).

By this reckoning, the process of argument is not always a chain of demonstrative reasoning, rather it is frequently a case of a presenting and representing of those features which severally cooperate in favour of the conclusion of the emergent theory with its "common morality". Indeed as Rorty (1994) puts it, when applying Rawls' (1986) process of "reflective equilibrium", 'there is no neutral ground...all we can do is work with the techniques for reweaving our vocabulary of moral deliberation...while keeping our ears open for hints about how it might be expanded or revised' (pp196-197). The self-same spirit of enrichment and consequent necessary revision frames and informs the following deliberations.

Thus, my own starting point is to question orthodoxy, dig deeper than mere explanation and to be guided by J.S. Mills' penetrating insight of 1859:

There is nothing more awesome to behold than a vested interest masquerading as a moral principle (cited in Collinson, 1994:105).

In a sense what is really needed is a sort of Copernican revolution, capable of displacing epistemology and instead locating morality at the centre of our socially construed universe. In other words, we need a model which is capable of transcending conventional received wisdom.
Model 1: The 4 Quadrants

The intention here is to arrive at a new synthesis from existing ethical systems by incorporating the following four cornerstone ethical positions: (1) the rationalism of Kant's moral agency; (2) the empiricism of Mill's Utilitarian consequentialism; (3) Religion as a moral paradigm (framed here in terms of Christian ethics); (4) Humanism represented here by one of its major postmodernist derivatives, Existentialism.

First of all, and in relation to Kantian ethics and Utilitarian ethics it is generally recognized, as already noted, that these two ethical theories have not only been particularly dominant in contemporary moral philosophy, but equally they have been very influential in practical ethics and in the field of jurisprudence as well (see especially Billington, 1993; Foot, 1990; Honderich, 1995; MacIntyre, 1993; MacNiven, 1993; Scruton, 1994; Vardy, 1994; Peschke, 1997).

Both ethical systems have deep roots in western culture. Kantianism is representative of an older, conservative tradition which is related to both secular and religious humanism. By contrast, the position of Utilitarianism represents a more recent, liberal tradition associated with the rise of modern science. The major philosophical difference between these two systems resides in the methods used to justify moral judgements as their epistemological foundations differ markedly.

Utilitarians are empiricists who believe that all knowledge is based on experience and use scientific method - incorporating observation and experiment - in acquiring knowledge as their paradigm of reasoning. Following on from this line of reasoning, Utilitarians hold that the morality of an act depends upon its
consequences rather than from the motives which produced it. For, of course, the actual consequences of acts are observable to the extent that they produce a greater degree of happiness and minimise suffering, while the actual motives are themselves not amenable to such scientific scrutiny.

By contrast, Kantians, as rationalists, believe that all knowledge is ultimately arrived at through a universal rationalist process of reason. Consequentialism is rejected and the morality of an act depends upon the underlying motives and intentions of the agent. Indeed Kantians are universalists who hold that moral rules apply equally to everyone, while the utilitarians are particularists who hold that the rightness or wrongness of a particular act depends upon its circumstances and eventual consequence.

MacNiven (1993) argues for an ethical position which is able to unify Kantianism and Utilitarianism:

Ordinarily most of us are strictly neither utilitarians or Kantians. Our moralities are a mix of utilitarian consequentialist and Kantian non-consequentialist principles. Even the most systematic of us tend to incorporate important elements of the opposing standpoint into our moral practice...Ultimately the way we try to resolve moral dilemmas will, as we have seen, depend on the method of justification which is implicit in the system of ethics appealed to (pp. 41-42).

But whereas MacNiven chose to unify Kantianism and Utilitarianism this is very much an isolated phenomenon. Most mainstream philosophers still cling to the view that while undeniably these systems are cornerstones of modern moral philosophy they remain incommensurable.

However, as no unified theory of ethics, as such, has yet emerged, MacIntyre's
Our "intuitions" are simply opinions; our philosophical theories are the same...a reasonable task for the philosopher is to bring them into equilibrium. Our common task is to find out what equilibria there are that can withstand examination, but it remains for each of us to come to rest in one or another of them...Once the menu of well-worked out theories is before us, philosophy is a matter of opinion (p. 267).

But even though the scope of MacNiven's analyses is very much to be commended, as it successfully extends and enriches ethical theory by embracing what is apparently incommensurable - Utilitarian and Kantian systems - it is still not sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the social and religious diversity of moral behaviour. Here MacNiven's answer is to appeal to idealist systems of ethics:

In idealist systems of ethics our duties, rights, liberties and responsibilities are defined by social roles, by the functions we perform within a social entity (p.41).

In these terms the concepts of any given social function will only make sense in terms of the purposes or functions they are characteristically expected to serve.

And for MacIntyre (1994), morality is also context-specific and all we can do is 'to articulate the morality of some particular social and cultural standpoint' (p.268). Leaving aside whether or not such a view leads to what Scruton (1994) dismisses as moral relativism, what is absolutely central to MacIntyre's argument is the location of all decision making within a specific social and cultural context. This is an important extension to the debate as the individual is no longer represented as a sovereign chooser who determines the values to live by independently of context:
My account of the virtues proceeds through three stages: a first which concerns virtues necessary to achieve the goods internal to practices; a second which considers them as qualities contributing to the good of a whole life; and a third which relates them to the pursuit of a good for human beings the conception of which can only be elaborated and possessed within an ongoing social tradition (p.273).

Tomlinson (1995) extends the same argument to teachers with a plea ‘for a personal moral responsibility grounded in the plain fact that we are all mortal individuals with absolutely no way of justifying claims to greater importance and rewards than anyone else’ (p.316). His advocacy for a renewed moral community in the school is persuasive:

Human institutions are constituted by language and unless our best values are renewed in a common speech they will wither and die. The school must be a moral community, continually exploring the ethics of the common life (Ibid).

A similar, humanistic ethic emerges from within the field of pure science. For example, Johnstone (1997) in reviewing the biologist Matt Ridley’s recent publication ‘The Origins of Virtue’ endorses the notion of Darwinian natural selection which ‘has equipped us with a a toolkit of specialised social instincts (p.26). His summation is particularly germane:

To conclude, Ridley’s book offers us a deep insight into the way that selfish genes can forge social groups, and shows us that the formation of a society is not merely a human challenge, but a recurring theme of evolution. With clarity and honesty he shows us that to solve the problems of society, we cannot afford to overlook the mental tools with which natural selection has equipped us. But while the origins of virtue and society lie in our evolutionary past, the social contract is not written unalterably in our genes. It is one thing to ask how society can be built, and another to ask how it should be built. Here, we may look to our evolutionary origins for guidance, but not for an answer (p.27).
Clearly these sentiments echo Richard Dawkins' very influential 'Selfish Gene', written in 1979, which prefaces its intention as follows:

This book is mainly intended to be interesting, but if you would extract a moral from it, read it as a warning. Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism (new revised edition, 1989:3).

In this particular context, Darwin's 'The Descent of Man' written in 1871 offers the definitive interpretation of morality:

Ultimately a highly complex sentiment, having its first origin in the social instincts, largely guided by the approbation of our fellow-men, ruled by reason, self-interest, and in later times by deep religious feelings, confirmed by instruction and habit, all combined, constitute our moral sense or conscience (cited in Wright, 1995:210).

The significance of Johnstone and Dawkins' contributions is, as modern and influential biologists trained in the Darwinian tradition of 'natural selection', that they nevertheless argue that moral choices must be fused inextricably in the pursuit of a common good within and across social and cultural networks.

Still, the real point of emphasis here is precisely and emphatically this humanistic capacity for determining the social values we live by. Such a humanism locates individual choices squarely at the centre of interest; which for Sartre (1975) necessarily implies that 'existence precedes essence' (p.29), because 'the aim is to precisely establish the human kingdom as a pattern of values and a human universality of condition' (pp.46-47). In other words in choosing I do not choose to
exist as existence is given and one has to exist in order to choose. Therefore, what I choose is my essence of meanings and values. Existentialism is defined as a morality of freedom:

What is at the very heart and centre of existentialism, is the absolute character of the free commitment, by which every man realises himself in realising a type of humanity - a commitment always understandable, to no matter whom in no matter what epoch - and its bearing upon the relativity of the cultural pattern which may result from such absolute commitment (p.47).

Sartre’s primary concern is not to prescribe what human beings ought to do but what they are like, and in this respect the conditions of human existence are such that we cannot avoid making value choices. For Sartre then, humanity is author of its own values:

There is no other universe except the human universe, the universe of human subjectivity. This relation of transcendence as constitutive of man (not in the sense that God is transcendent, but in the sense of self-surpassing) with subjectivity (in such a sense that man is not shut up in himself but forever present in a human universe) - it is this that we call existential humanism. This is humanism, because we remind man that there is no legislator but himself; that he himself, thus abandoned, must decide for himself; also because we show that it is not by turning back upon himself, but always by seeking himself, an aim which is one of liberation or of some particular realisation, that man can realise himself as truly human (p.56).

Sartre, like Heidegger, attacks the Cartesian Cogito ergo sum. There is no ‘I’ that thinks, but only thought. Thus the long journey towards the dissolution of the Cartesian egological self, initiated by Nietzsche, reaches its climax:

To summarise, since all objects of consciousness, including the ‘me’, are outside consciousness, and since only consciousness possesses absolute ‘certitude’ (ibid., p.44), all states and hence all authentic states, transcend consciousness, and are thus dubitable (ibid., p.64) [cited in Golomb, 1995:135-136].
Implicit in this reasoning is the view that the more intense the reflection on one's consciousness, then the clearer a sense of 'me, 'I' or 'self' will then necessarily emerge. In these terms the notion of self to emerge is the self-generating existentialist self which Cooper (1995) defines as follows:

The Existentialist argument for an ethic of reciprocal freedom, then, is this: since my view of myself is indelibly coloured by how I take myself to stand in the eyes of others, then an authentic understanding of myself as freedom - one released from 'connivance' in bad faith - requires me to view others as possessed of this same kind of existence. Unless I so view them, I cannot expect them to view me in that manner. Only if I regard and treat others - or better, regard them through treating them as loci of existential freedom, will I receive back an image of myself as such a locus (p. 181).

The greatest challenge for Existentialism is how to marry the exercise of individual freedom with collective freedom? Or to put it another way, how to reconcile the appetite of what Murdoch (1985) refers to as 'the fat relentless ego' (p.93) with the common needs of a society. An Existentialist ethic, rooted in intense reflection and directed towards an ideal of reciprocal freedom can be made to work, but only, as Cooper (1995) rightly points out, 'against a background of relative stability in the thought and vocabulary of that society' (p,187).

At a deeper level of fundamental values there is a strong case to argue in favour of a historical aprioristic position where values are a priori correct. The belief that human life should be worth living, for example, should be self evident to all rational beings; as too should a range of ethical and religious ideal conceptions of a more just social structure be preserved. The major difficulty remains of an absence of a common vocabulary and agreed frame of reference which are prerequisite to establishing any notion of the common good.

Nevertheless, for any ethical system to claim comprehensive coverage, religion as
one paradigm of values must necessarily be included; which, in the case of this particular analysis, will be Christianity as the final cornerstone of the 'Four Quadrant' model.

With the rise of modern science and technology the significance of religion both historically and culturally has, according to Progoff (1958) changed dramatically from a context whereby:

individuals experienced the meaning of their lives in terms of local religious orthodoxies and accustomed national or tribal ways of life of their communities. These traditional practices and institutions provided built-in psychic security for the individual. When faith in these commonalities broke down, however, the individual was left unprotected. With no recourse to a spiritual past shared with others, the individual was isolated and cut adrift; and it is this situation of the lone individual no longer sustained by the cultural resources of his ancestors that is the main root of the psychological problems that have arisen in modern times (cited in Guignon, 1995:216).

Progoff is right to equate cultural resources with religious heritage, although his major point is that some aspects of our humanity suggest a transhuman spiritual source. In other words his argument is that the higher dimensions of human experience - the intellectual, the moral and the personal - combine to suggest that the creative potentialities of the universe can trace their origins to a spiritual reality.

And thus language, conscience and morality are seen to be positing a convergence toward a moral community and level of being no less personal and spiritual than ourselves.

Peschke's (1997) definition of Christian ethics defines moral goodness as 'a quality in the person, constituted not by rule-keeping behaviour alone, but by the formation
of character, patterns of action, the right vision of life, the basic values and convictions which move a person to ask: What sort of person should I become because I believe in Christ?’ (p.3). The parameters of this discussion are framed in accordance with these Christian values:

A presentation of Christian ethics implies that the ideals and norms presented are inspired by the sacred books of the Old and New Testament and related to what Christians believe about the world, God and each other. Above all it implies a permanent inspiration by the ideas, values and concerns of Jesus Christ...and the positive revelation of the Old and New Testament as source of its moral knowledge and guidance (p.4).

These traditional sources include the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20: 2-17); the Eight Beatitudes (Matthew 5: 3-10); the Golden Rule (Matthew 7:12); the Seven Deadly Sins and the Seven Main Virtues (Peschke:309-310). A lesser known list of qualities defined by O'Connell (1958) are no less traditional:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporeal</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>To feed the hungry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>To give drink to the thirsty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>To clothe the naked</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>To visit the imprisoned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>To shelter the homeless</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>To visit the sick</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>To bury the dead</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spiritual</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>To admonish the sinner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>To instruct the ignorant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>To counsel the doubtful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>To comfort the sorrowful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>To bear wrongs patiently</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>To pray for the living and the dead</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(cited in O'Connell 1959: 159)
This, then, completes these four distinct value positions - the Kantian, the Utilitarian, the Humanist, and the Religious - a juxtaposition of these four ethical systems can produce the following configuration:

![Figure 3: The 4 Quadrants](image)

(a) Political Continuum (b) Theological Continuum

The assumption underpinning the model's rationale is that the best ethical structure will strive to embrace as higher a proportion of meaning and certainty as it can. Next, it is necessary to further designate categories within these two co-ordinates
by ascribing the properties of high or low value to each characteristic. Such a combination produces four options:

(1) High certainty/high meaning
(2) Low certainty/high meaning
(3) High certainty/low meaning
(4) Low certainty/low meaning

Clearly numbers (1) and (4) represent the two extremes whereas Numbers (2) and (3) represent the other value permutations. The results of this is represented by a four square table which reveals two ideological continuums - theological and political - and which reflect the four different ethical structures of this new synthesis: Religion, Utilitarianism, Rationalism and Existentialism.

**Model 2: The Syntax of 4 Voices**

Heidegger (1995) makes the point that there is no such thing as raw experience, experience is always interpreted:

What we first hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking waggon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column of the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling. It requires a very artificial and complicated mind to hear a pure noise. The fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case *Dasein*, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside 'sensations'; nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl of sensations to provide the springboard from which the subject leaps off and finally arrives at a 'world'. *Dasein*, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what is understood (p. 207).

Heidegger is arguing that true 'Dasein' experiencing always involves some kind of reciprocal relationship between the individual interpreter, the world and the act of
interpreting itself. Such experience is essentially intentional in structure and always initially inwardly directed towards one's private frame of reference before then being outwardly directed towards a public frame of reference. This clearly involves the risk of misinterpretation and so therefore, we must provide for discussion and argument about the adequacy of interpretations.

By seeking to identify the fourth, private inner voice, which at an everyday level we communicate with all the time, in terms of all sorts of hidden assumptions veiled in what Searle (1995) refers to as 'a huge invisible ontology of competing moral choices' (p.6), the model of the 'Syntax of Four Voices' emerges.

Indeed what this in fact represents is an internal frame of reference which is neither visible, nor easily described in traditional analytical terms; and yet we are constantly actively engaged in its exercise. Indeed, as long ago as 1890, William James introduced the phrase 'stream of consciousness' to characterise this unbroken flow of thought and awareness in the mind. The concept was quickly translated into a successful and major narrative technique where long passages of introspection attempt to capture the spectrum and flow of a character's inner thoughts. The technique was used by Henry James, Knut Hamsun, James Joyce and Virginia Wolf.

So although it is difficult to deal with analytically its treatment in creative terms does have a distinguished pedigree. The concept of an unvoiced self has many labels, i.e., 'a sixth sense'; 'conscience'; 'an inner voice', the 'language of silence' Freud's 'Unconscious', Socrates' 'Dæmon', Heidegger's 'Dasein'; Sartre's 'pour-soi/en-soi'; Polyani's tacit knower, etc. But the most important point is that the formation of a concept of conscience is an integral part, albeit the subjective dimension, of
this particular theory. In other words, while the Four Quadrants model represents the external, public frame of reference, the Syntax of Four Voices draws attention to our internal repertoire of silent reflections and innumerable deliberations. The purpose of the following model, then, is to act as a sort of analytical trigger mechanism in order to locate by differentiation the invisible fourth voice:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voice</th>
<th>Personal = 1st person</th>
<th>Preacher = 2nd person</th>
<th>Objective = 3rd person</th>
<th>Moral = 4th person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice 1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>You/Thou</td>
<td>He/She/It</td>
<td>Subliminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice 2</td>
<td>Me</td>
<td>You/Thee</td>
<td>Him/Her/It</td>
<td>Conscience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The problem is, of course, that the vocabulary of inner self is necessarily private, unshared, unsuited to argument, but it nevertheless exists. The fundamental premise of this thinking is that a belief or a sort of conscience stirring can still regulate action. For the purposes of this particular analysis, although these various meanings may be complex and multi-dimensional, their special significance lies in the fact that they are shared and implicitly in the public domain along with other competing voices. The fact that, no public space exists to accommodate our inner voice is not the same thing as saying no inner voice exists.
First person expression and third person expression serve different functions. The former is representative of self-interest and subjectivity and the latter is representative of public-interest and objectivity. In the third person, for example, the quest for objectivity can remove moral puzzlement and reverence, as there are only questions of clarification and enforcement. Indeed it is the third person narrative that asserts moral objectivity and appears at a moral distance. But, unlike a code of ethics, a morally-living situation is never just the application of rules to situations. In this context an imposition by third person expression is alien and alienating and the emergence of a moral dialogue can never be a power struggle between first and third person evolving around issues of legitimacy or autonomy.

In order to establish rapport in any moral dialogue, at the very least another voice is needed. If the encounter is mediated by a second person, the "thou" or "it" - the language of prescription - then the moral waters become somewhat muddied by imposed values rather than negotiated ones. For neither the self-interest of the first person nor the aspirational objectivity of the third person can ever be fully mediated by the somewhat prescriptive voice of the second person.

The development of a moral dialogue requires listening as well as speaking and an acknowledgement of the primacy of experience over language. We must become as comfortable with ambiguity and chaos as with symmetry and logic. Indeed, as Freud once pointed out, "It is only in logic that contradictions are forbidden!" (Guardian 12 March 1996). So what is actually required is what Rawls (1971) refers to as a 'thickening process of reflective equilibrium' (p.20) in which we learn to be at home with both public and private, voiced and unvoiced.

In educational terms Pring (1995b) defines this demonstrable interplay between
the two different aspects of self - the private and the public - as the arena in which explorations developed in school are but the beginning of those further explorations of the values which are often much later found to be worth pursuing’ (p.130). What is crucial for Pring is to ensure that a sharing of private and public voices takes place within the school arena: a school arena conceived as an educated moral community and ‘captured by a language which is shared within a form of life, and preserved within a community of educated people. Education surely lies with familiarising the next generation with that world’ (p.137). Pring captures the spirit and dynamic of this interactive process:

the subtle interplay of the personal and impersonal, of public tradition and personal searching, of confidence in the objective world of books and artifacts and uncertainty over what is of most worth, of moral commitment and moral doubt. The significance of the community of educated people is that it provides a framework in which that confidence can grow and yet in which the uncertainties can be recognised, respected and explored together (p.139).

These multiple voiced and unvoiced conversations are in Becker’s (1991) terms acts of ‘languaging’ and as such “I” decide what my world is to become and who “I” am going to be through these conversations. By adopting such a rationalist position personal actions are inseparably linked to personal responsibility. Peschke (1997) locates conscience very much within these social and temporal parameters:

Formation of conscience however does not merely consist in the rational appropriation of a set of moral norms and principles and the acquisition of the necessary factual knowledge for a concrete judgement of conscience. We make our decisions more out of the beliefs we live by and the habits we have formed than out of the principles we have learned. The world of moral values to a large extent consists in a collection of traditions and religious observances, exemplary figures and ways of acting, stories and images, which are all mediated by the communities to which a person belongs (p.206).
In these, then, terms a credible, workable morality must include both an objectively grounded coda of external reference points, as well as space for a subjectively grounded set of silent internal reference points. Here the mediator for such critical reflection is to be found in Becker's (1991) reflexive dynamic of the "Chekovian" act of 'languaging':

Ethics goes back to languaging. The legitimacy of my own experience within my own domain of discourse depends upon - and is built around - the legitimacy of the experience of others, however undesirable that other experience may appear to me. I need not approve only keep the possibility of conversations open. Hence this languaging is seen as a continuous orientation within world - and self-sustaining circular domains of consciousness, created in human interaction and hence from the beginning basically ethical (pp.232-233).

Here is Becker's source of inspiration for these silent conversations of languaging:

The stupendous reality that is language cannot be understood unless we begin by observing that speech consists above all in silences. A being who could not renounce saying many things would be incapable of speaking. And each language represents a different equation between manifestations and silences. Each people leaves some things unsaid in order to be able to say others. Because everything would be unsayable. Hence the immense difficulty of translation: translation is a matter of saying in a language precisely what that language tends to pass over in silence (Jose Ortega y Gasset, cited in Becker, 1991).

Thus by explicitly acknowledging the language of silence, the capacity and scope for reflection is more fully accommodated; and by implication so too is the non-empirical inner voice of the Socratic Daemon.

Ultimately, therefore, in order to arrive at a valid understanding of reality as a moral agent it is necessary to accommodate and internalise meanings, rooted in a myriad of different language games, from both objective and subjective perspectives. Moral understanding is both objective in the social sense and personal in the
subjective sense. Moustakas (1994) puts the case convincingly in the context of education:

As a learner, to know *initially* what something is and means, I listen to my inner dialogue, purified as much as possible from other voices, opinions, judgements and values. This is a challenging task we are too often taught the reverse in our homes, schools and society. We are expected to attend to and repeat what other people think, believe, and say regarding what is true (p.62).

**A Common Morality: Six Moral Precepts**

As individuals we are both self-creating - in terms of our inner resources - and products of our social and cultural environments. The combination of these influences - the internal and the external - combine on each individual differently. The significance of rationalism, however, as a major common denominator and determinant in matters of morality cannot be ignored as it permeates each of the four quadrant positions of the model respectively, albeit to differing degrees and to a lesser extent in relation to utility. In this respect the overriding thesis is that moral judgements are expressions of practical as distinct from theoretical reason which does not depend on an absolutist ‘God's-eye view' of an independent reality.

Being moral requires that I should respect the capacity for rational agency, and therefore that I should treat all persons never merely as means to an end but always as ends in themselves. This idea of a preeminent ‘respect for persons’ regardless of consequences, although theoretically difficult for philosophers does convert, often too easily, into the sacrificial “lambs to the slaughter” syndrome. Sometimes the greater good must become the servant of the common good rather
than the agent of its downfall.

Clearly, this issue is very contentious and it is not my intention to state choices in terms of either/or particularities. Instead I offer an enrichment by extension of these otherwise incommensurable dogmas of Kantian agency and Mill's consequentialism. For it is possible to embrace and enrich both positions: in the former sense by integrating the allegedly incommensurable and, in the latter sense, by including religion and humanism.

To a very large extent, the ethical framework I am proposing is rooted in an historical reality which at least goes back to the time of the Old Testament. Kelly (1996) puts the position as follows:

In a sense, our moral principles are the product of a host of conscience-decisions made by our forebears. These conscience decisions have led them eventually to formulate the most important fruits of their experience in some sort of moral code or system of taboos (p.67).

With the emphasis on 'conscience-decisions' the importance of the "fourth voice" as filter and regulator of moral action is key. Here the role of reflection, the status of the language of silence and the value of inner deliberation in accessing one's own subliminal treasure chest of ethics are all fundamental. And perhaps what is equally fundamental, is the belief in our individual and collective capacity for a rationally-based, humanistic wisdom which will always favour the common good rather than the individual good.

Arguments which favour either means (in the Kantian sense of moral agency) or ends (in the Utilitarian sense of consequences) can never have sufficient breadth
to claim commonality; moreover, neither too can Humanism with its emphasis on 'the fat relentless ego' (Murdoch, 1992) claim commonality, and nor can Religion, with its self-confessed allegiance to Christian dogma (22), claim sufficient commonality. In a sense, the gap between these four ethical positions is too great ever to be bridged by any outright synthesis, but a combination of all four as composite external reference points does seem to offer greater possibilities in the quest towards a common model of morality (23).

There must be constant striving toward better and richer, lived definitions of what it is to be a moral community by exploring the ethics of the common life. And what flows from such an analysis is a view of moral agency which can be tentatively represented in the formulation of six provisional moral precepts:

1. The individual, considered as a moral agent, is a rational agent.

2. Each individual acquires a social and moral identity by interaction within and across particular social and religious groups, from which a subjective/objective schema of 'meaning' and 'certainty' about moral issues is derived.

3. Each socialised individual, although uniquely different mentally and physically, ultimately appeals to the basic dignity of being human and deserving of equality of treatment.

4. The world inhabited by each individual exists within a cultural mosaic of highly complex yet interrelated frames of reference in the form of specific ethical systems: Religion, Utilitarianism, Rationalism, Humanism.

5. There exists a 'common morality' which regulates individual actions both objectively as explicit doing and subjectively as the doing of such action. Objectively, such action is either permissible or impermissible and subjectively, either culpable or inculpable.

6. Language is the major moral medium and mediator of meaning and means for regulating action between, on the one hand internal and, on the other hand external experience of one's cultural community. And by continuously checking and rechecking value perspectives, accessible through language activity [Language Games], one is able to assimilate and reflect this common morality.

Figure 5: The Six Moral Precepts
A Summary Position

For Durkheim (1977) society was viewed as a 'collective consciousness'; a moral force firmly embedded in social and religious structures, at the centre of which was a core of values and beliefs considered sacred. This sociological perspective viewed society as a moral entity with meaning mediated through its social structures. Complementary to this position, Weberian action theory allowed explanations which explicitly acknowledged that social structures are inseparable from the subjective meanings of the individuals whose repeated behaviour constitutes these various social structures.

Moreover, such a socially-construed image and influence permeates the recent and influential pragmatism of Cupitt (1995) where 'selfhoods overlap in ecstatic immanence' (p.119). Additionally, the same can be said of Rorty's (1991) even more influential pragmatism where self is understood as 'a centreless web of feelings and desires' (p.11). This post-modernist fashionable trend locates any notions of self exclusively in social and secular forms, whereby self is largely explained reductively in terms of 'the pragmatic motive' (Berger and Luckmann, 1987:56). However, the real dilemma is how do we accommodate this 'pragmatic motive' of self-interest without allowing vested interests to masquerade as moral principles?

Perhaps the answer to this conundrum flows in part from Kohlberg's (1981) model which, although operationally inadequate, is able to illuminate and extend reality by novel reference to it; albeit oppositionally, as one part of a complex Deleuzian theoretical toolbox. Vine's (1996) assessment of Kohlberg's contribution views it as an essential foundation stone.
And whereas the 'consequentialism' of Mill's 'greatest happiness principle' appears to conflict with the 'categorical imperative' of Kant's rationalism, there is inherent in both theories a fundamental acceptance of rational human agency. After all, rational individuals exist as rational moral agents only by virtue of their complex relation to other individuals. It is in this respect that the Old Testament's 'Ten Commandments' and the New Testaments 'Eight Beatitudes', although explicitly formal and largely prescriptive, also presuppose that each person is a rational moral agent. Rationalism in Christian ethics has indeed a very durable pedigree, stemming from Aquinas' 'five intellectual proofs' right through to modern theology (Dowley, 1990, Honderich, 1995 and Peschke, 1997).

For the purposes of this particular analysis, although these various meanings may be complex and multi-dimensional, their special significance lies in the fact that they are shared and in the public domain along with other competing voices. And, in the same vein, the significance of rationalism as a major common denominator cannot, therefore, be ignored as it permeates each of the four quadrant positions of the model respectively. And, moreover, by explicitly acknowledging the language of silence, the capacity and scope for reflection can begin to be accommodated.

In terms of actual moral choices we can distinguish between moral rules, on the one hand, and moral ideals on the other hand; although even then the issues are by no means clear cut (24). I may, for example be committed to a particular kind of morality and yet because of adverse or odd circumstances be confronted with a
moral dilemma where I must choose between my own values and someone else's values. It may, for example, be that the choice is between my own self-interests and the interests of another person (see case study 1 and 4 in appendix), or it may even be that the choice is between sacrificing a few lives to save many other lives (see case study 2), or it may be a case of choosing between staying at home to look after a frail parent or pursuing some other ideal (see case study 6). How do I choose?

Often there will be a clash between ideals and rules, the former abstract and usually remote and the latter concrete and usually immediate. Often a major flaw in one's own moral thinking is to neglect the distinction between moral rules and moral ideals. For unlike moral ideals, everyone is morally obliged to obey moral rules impartially. Indeed in this respect everyone is morally prohibited from murder or deception. Prohibitions against causing harm, directly or indirectly, can always be obeyed impartially, whereas injunctions to help others cannot be followed impartially (Gert, 1992).

But, as this thesis has argued, there is now a general recognition that - apart from a religious, Christian value position which ultimately appeals to an omnipotent and omniscient higher authority - no other moral theory can claim to capture all the factors that must be taken into consideration in making moral decisions. In terms of the four quadrant value positions, this means that sometimes the rules of Kant's position which emphasizes the autonomy of the individual's 'good will' should be used, and sometimes the utilitarian principles which stress the aggregate social welfare should be applied. Or in terms of humanism this means that there will necessarily be a tendency at times to embrace either one of these secular positions, but there will always be tension between individual and collective
responsibility as each individual strives to create their own meaning in their own particular and unique social milieu.

The rules of Kantianism will always favour an outcome predicated on a moral obligation which must be be fulfilled for its own sake and not for happiness or utility nor for the sake of a Christian God since 'an obligation imposed on men by God would result in turning men into slaves' (Kant, 1991:91). By contrast, the rules of Utilitarianism will always favour an outcome based on the social utility of the GHP principle. The rules for Christianity are cast largely in terms of Biblical exegesis and have their ultimate authority in the moral laws of the Church (Peschke, 1997). Humanism tends to turn from a spiritual law giver to a human one. In any event these different approaches to morality all combine to reflect the Confucian Golden Rule - 'do not do to others what you would not like them to do to you' - which has been a guide to good conduct for some 2500 years (Hobson and Jenkins, 1994). Indeed the Christian form 'do unto others as you would have them do to you' emphasises the reciprocity of social responsibility for the humanist, while for the Christian following the Golden Rule is seen as God's will.

And yet if a word or concept, such as good or bad, does not have a uniform employment, but an irregular one, then it follows that there cannot be any one theory of morality. By this reckoning an inherently pluralistic and richer perspective emerges: the view that values, obligations, virtues, ideals, or fundamental moral principles are inherently diverse and cannot be reconciled into one harmonious scheme of morality (Berlin, 1988). Hence, this leads to the view that moral choices, if they cannot be reconciled into any one theory, are a function of the particular context and language game then being enacted.

Before proceeding further, it is perhaps worthwhile to pause here in order to point
out that, in accordance with this view of language games, we should not regard the words in language - language embedded in action - as being like the pieces in a game; for they are not to be understood by looking for some associated idea in the mind, or by following some procedure of verification, or even by looking at the object for which they stand. Instead we should think of words in accordance with their use - referring to objects in the world is, of course, only one of many uses that words have. Thus the meaning of a word is arrived at by its use, and the family of related uses that a group of words has constitutes a language game. (Wittgenstein, 1994).

In the context of moral rules, then, a utilitarian will tread a categorical path which follows a consequentialist route and is based on the rational grasp of 'the greatest happiness principle'; and, by contrast, the Kantian will tread a no less categorical path based on the rational grasp of a first moral principle 'the categorical imperative'. In both cases, although the moral reasoning is based on rational thinking, the decision reached will usually be very different as one is concerned with ends while the other is concerned with means to an end.

The important point to grasp here, though, is that although each particular language game is governed by its own rules and criteria of value this does not imply that language games are either reductionist or foundationalist. In other words each language game is discretely unique and cannot be reduced to other language games.

Similarly, religious practice in this context forms a family of related language games. The pattern here is one in which the words and gestures are interwoven in acts of worship, prayer, confession, absolution, all of which combine into a unified
135

and coherent religious value position. The difficulty arises when one tries to explain the moral language game by words that lie outside of its terms of reference. To be a practising Christian is to enact and embody a form of life which is not directly translatable to non believers who will necessarily amplify other moral messages from their own particular language game.

Moral language games can be regarded as descriptive and indicative of behaviour in different contexts and roles, rather than as prescriptive templates for the purposes of moral guidance. To understand a moral concept is to be able to use the corresponding word or words in their particular language game in which the concept has a home. Thus, mastery of a concept consists not in having any particular idea, but in having a certain skill: namely being able to participate, by means of 'just doing' in a certain pattern of action. And this 'just doing will consist in using the word in the language game to do a certain job, namely that job which it is the word's role in that language game to do' (Philips, 1993:193).

Nevertheless, the language game defines only the public and the visible, but is is equally important to recognise that the private and the invisible role of moral reflection is crucial. Thus, acting and doing is the focus to be considered from within the language game - objectively and subjectively - rather than reasoning or interpreting from outside. Gellner (1982) puts the point elegantly: 'by looking at language games, we hunt with the empirical-naturalistic hounds; but by accepting their contents, we run with the transcendental hares' (p85).

It is thus untenable to merely view moral reasoning as the application of moral principles to particular situations; for as Kelly (1996) puts it:
...that does not allow the situation to influence the principle and does not give sufficient consideration to the origin and cultural transmission of moral principles themselves. These moral principles represent the collective wisdom of humankind...In other words there is a continual dialectical process between principles and situations, between facts and moral reflection, a two-way-traffic rather than simply a one-way application of principles (p.67).

Nevertheless, the underlying importance of the role of reasoning for effective moral agency remains critical, but no less critical is the crucial and fruitful interplay between objective terms of reference and subjective terms of reference. In terms of the former, this is summarily represented by the ‘Four Quadrants model’ whereby there is a publicly accessible objective body of views drawn together and amenable to critical debate and demonstrable modification. In relation to the latter, conscience, and its formation and development, this can be regarded as the ultimate subjective norm and regulator of moral conduct, which Wittgenstein (1993) described as ‘the voice of God’ (p.63). In this latter sense, of course I can dip in and out of various moral theories and religious viewpoints, but the ultimate moral arbiter for my own actions will always reside within me in the form of a silent, internal dialogue with my subliminal self (25).

Of course it can never be sufficient to claim moral reasoning is simply the application of moral principles to particular situations. This is largely why the three constituent parts of the emergent theory - the Four Quadrants, the Syntax of Four Voices and the Six Moral Principles - emerge from a synthesis of the collective wisdom of many previous generations. Thus, in order to accommodate more than mere reasoning there must be a continual dialectical process between, on the one hand objective principles and external situations and, on the other hand, between subjective moral reflection and dialogue.
It is little more than a rhetorical truism to state that it is essential to establish moral dialogue with people culturally different to ourselves; but I wonder how often the same case is put for establishing moral dialogue with people who share the same language and culture as ourselves? This is one of the central points in Pring's (1995 b) article 'The Community of Educated People' where he concludes:

Such a community of educated people is fragile. That fragility is threatened from the inside as much as from without, as those who should know better seek their future security in bending with the wind - in taking on board the language of quality control or in responding to whatever banal initiatives come from a Secretary of State, surrounded by a carefully picked advisers, believes that he or she knows, without the advice of the wider community, all the answers to the latest crisis (p.144).

In these terms, Tomlinson's (1995) analysis locates both the problem and its solution. In relation to the problem he states:

...all knowledge and morality was declared relative and governments enshrined the selfish self as the basis of civil society. How could schools - how could teachers - any longer hope to create a moral community in which the world of minds was worthy of respect and that respect the impetus to learning? (p.311).

And in relation to the solution he states:

Human institutions are constituted by language and unless our best values are renewed in a common speech they will wither and die. The school must be a moral community, continually exploring the ethics of the common life (p.316).

Thus by identifying separate and discrete propositions of various incommensurable theories it is possible to discover unifying threads which bind and unite into a single body of systematic theoretical reasoning. In this respect it is important to
point out that no definitive blueprint has emerged from these deliberations. Instead, however, the result of these cogitations on the nature and scope of morality can be characterised by the multiple and contrasting voices from disparately different disciplines.

Indeed Donagan (1977) grasps precisely the case in similar, complementary terms to Tomlinson (1995) when he says:

Morality is characteristically learned as one learns to speak one's mother tongue grammatically: not by formal instruction, in times set aside for it, but by conversation and by participation in a common life. And one learns it incidentally to learning how to act well (p.12).

In this respect there is an appeal to an informal, less structured kind of learning which is directed toward an inner kernel of self - a subliminal self. A position which finds its finest post-modern literary expression in Pirsig's (1980) odyssey 'at the cutting edge of consciousness' (p290)(26).

In respect of our accessing our subliminal moral self it is, of course, essential that we must have good information in the first place in order to make good moral judgements. And while integrating different moral language games into the school curriculum must be regarded as prerequisite to children enriching their moral imaginations and flexing their moral muscle, it is no less instrumental to such a purpose to somehow nurture and develop the role of reflection and deliberation - conscience - as the ultimate subjective norm of moral conduct. Indeed it is inconceivable for truly moral action to occur without the illuminating quality of moral reflection preceding it. Peschke (1997) puts this point convincingly:
Since conscience stands in need of illumination and guidance, a man is responsible for its formation. To call upon the judgements of one's conscience without having striven to inform it properly is an insulting abuse. (p.205)

Of course this discussion has rarely behaved as a scientific theory searching for proofs to test and verify, as the solution to the problem could not be solved by the amassing of new empirical knowledge; rather the major characteristic of its method has been the re-arrangement of existing knowledge into objective and subjective descriptive units in order to codify the parts anew (Wittgenstein, 1994).

To briefly restate the position then, it is necessary to point out that the emergent theory is very much a first attempt, a first stab at provisionally establishing the basic underlying structure for a "common morality" within the highly localised context of an English, Humanist and Christian perspective. Language games, as forms of life, are not testable hypotheses, but ways of reacting to and meeting life situations. The application of the theory to particular instances will require sensitivity and great care. But the fact that we are not all behaving like savages, although we could easily be doing so, suggests that something, somewhere binds and unites rather more than, at first sight, seems obvious. It is the contention of this thesis that that something is the sort of common morality typified by the Six Moral Precepts and legitimately arrived at by means of the objective and subjective processes described.
CHAPTER 6: THE WAY FORWARD

The Model Revisited

The constituent parts of the model and its concomitant emergent theory are threefold: (1) the "Four Quadrant' model, (2) the 'Syntax of Four Voices' and (3) the Six Moral precepts. In relation to (1) and (2) these represent the external and internal reference points respectively; whereas (3) draws from (1) and (2) its principal specific precepts to arrive at a view of a common morality. Thus there emerges a theory with a system of moral precepts which is binding on all rational individuals and as such its contents are ascertainable by human reason, rather than by revelation or religious faith. In the latter case it is unlikely that this emergent theory would in any fundamental sense dislocate the basic premises of Christianity. Donagan (1977) argues convincingly and cleverly for a similar kind of 'rationally autonomous' moral agency:

Finally, the grounds on which the first principle of common morality has been held to be binding on all rational creatures as such will be considered. They will be shown to involve a kind of teleology that is very widely misunderstood and hence neglected; namely, a teleology in which the end for the sake of which an action is done is not something to be produced by doing it but something already in existence to be respected in doing it (p.31).

Nevertheless, by actually drawing out the common themes into the resultant moral precepts some things will be lost while other things will be saved, but of course things do not carry their identity about in themselves. This is an important point as all meanings need to be generated within a public arena of competing, often weightless and invisible, multiple voices (1996). And although in principle
Kant's categorical imperative is the philosophical formulation of the golden rule of love of neighbour, this is, as previously argued, a formulation which also underpins much socially construed behaviour as well, including positions inherent in Utilitarianism and Humanism.

Still there is a real danger of regarding what one has got as the extent of what is possible, but lines have to be drawn somewhere and language and its concepts require shaping by experience. Hence, heuristic research must constantly push against the existing limits of language in an effort to expand understanding by broadening the scope of its application. Otherwise, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, the limitations of the language will continue to limit understanding of the particular world under scrutiny. However, the real litmus test will be, in accordance with probability theory, the extent to which the emergent theory is able to yield a high return of rich information. For the more information a theory contains then the greater the number of ways it can turn out to be false and if highly falsifiable, it is also highly testable and nearer the truth (Popper, 1979, pp. 101-103).

Some Language Games

Of course, attempts to try to collapse conceptions of morality into any one theory may lead to a form of moral myopia in which explanations become telescoped into reductive and selective criteria. Indeed from Kant to Kohlberg, the tradition has been to seek to define the essence, to reduce moral discourse to its one true form, to exclude all other forms as not truly moral, and to define definitively what morality is. Hekman (1995) neatly summarises this tendency, as she assesses Carol Gilligan's feminist theories against Wittgenstein's notion of language games:
Modernist moral philosophers' attempt to define the one, true morality, the one correct moral discourse, are motivated by the same desire as the logical positivists' attempt to define an ideal language, to get it right once and for all. By contrast Gilligan like Wittgenstein, is attempting to get back to the rough ground, to return to the complexities of everyday language, she explicitly calls for the need to account for the "messiness" of human life. The attempt to define something like Kant's categorical imperative or Kohlberg's Stage 6 as the essence of morality closely parallels the logical positivists attempt to define an ideal language. Gilligan's attempt to listen to moral voices, to see what it is we do...her work entails that moral discourse is something about which we cannot fashion a single set of rules (p.125).

What flows from such a view is a representation of moral reality as an "archipelago" of autonomous language games. In these terms the language game is the minimum bond upon which society rests and becomes, therefore, the unit of analysis:

to the extent that human action is social, it is rule governed and takes place within various "language games". As public and social actions are meaningful and intelligible to the agents who conduct them and to others who share the same linguistically mediated form of life (Bohman, 1994:58).

This representation of a post-modernist vision of social reality - a fractured world composed of numerous incommensurable language games, each with their own goals, aspirations and rules that govern discourse and action - is a compelling explanation of moral reality. Indeed whenever we come to value anything, matters become difficult: there is no independent way of comprehending what it is we are valuing, as we are confronted by a complex mixture of different communities of speakers. Bauman's (1994) optimism captures this characteristically post-modernist dynamic of morality in terms of 'ambivalence and decisional uncertainty' (p.32) whereby moral responsibility is defined thus::
...morality is a practice negotiated between learning agents capable of growth on the one hand and a culture capable of change on the other. Rather than reiterating that there would be no moral individuals if not for the training/drilling job performed by society, we move toward the understanding that it must be the moral capacity of human beings that makes them so conspicuously capable to form societies and against all odds to secure their - happy or less happy - survival (p.32).

For each language game to be distinct from other language games 'it must be characterised by a distinctive set of activities (with their attendant beliefs and assumptions) and a distinctive set of rules' (Barrett, 1991:119). Whatever similarities exist between different language games, nevertheless, there must be significant differentiation in the combination of activities, purposes and sets of rules. Thus, not only are all the scientific disciplines - physics, chemistry, biology, geology, meteorology - distinctive language games in themselves, but science itself is a language game as distinct from, say, theology or sociology.

Within and across each of these disciplines and various subjects will be different theoretical positions (e.g., facts versus values, empiricism versus rationalism, or nature versus nurture, and indeed the quantitative versus the qualitative). According to Wittgenstein, one of the greatest mistakes that can be made in this respect is to mistake one language game for another and try to apply the rules of the one to the other. This is the reasoning behind Wittgenstein's (1994) assertion that 'Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language' (p.104).

Goldberg (1993) puts the case as follows:

Our socio-cultural tradition includes many overlapping, but partly competing moral languages: Homer's, Plato's, Aristotle's, the Old Testament's and the New testament's, Augustine's, Aquinas's, Kant's, Mill's, Marx's, Freud's, etc., etc. (p.229).
Thus in relation to moral discourse there are perhaps as many language games as there are established theories of morality, albeit that some will be more established than others. Moral discourse can therefore be defined as a multiplicity of competing voices where no neat division between words and actions exists, but instead language is construed as something we do (Hekman, 1995).

And as this analysis has located what many commentators regard as the major four ethical systems, in a western UK context, the next challenge is to delineate the characteristics of the particular types of language games each of them practice. Perhaps, then, the next stage would be, as schools and teachers are indeed highly influential moral agents, to explore a sampling of these language games in schools. For although moral education is not really about memorising rules and precepts, it does involve acquiring a moral language, or moral languages; and, likewise, in learning to express oneself morally it is first necessary to acquire the wherewithal - the vocabulary and underlying concepts - to do so.

In other words, and central to my argument, language is seen less as a mosaic and more as a living organism 'since it no longer needs to be judged from a single view-point, that of pellucid logic, but from the many view-points of everyday life' (Peursen; 1969:83). Moreover, without a moral vocabulary it is not possible to express oneself adequately as a moral person. In these terms, language is everything; for as well as being the means of description, language is also the instrument of action. The capacity to behave morally, then, is linked inextricably to the capacity to express oneself in different moral language games; as a minimal requirement this would at least demand the capacity to accommodate different moral languages.
In terms of moral education, tolerance is seen as the minimal necessity:

Tolerance is minimally necessary for civil society. Although I could easily be persuaded that we should aim higher than mere tolerance, tolerance should be our first step; it is the lowest acceptable level of intergroup harmony. After we have attained it, we can perhaps move to a higher ground (Vogt, 1997:43).

While the arguments in this thesis have aimed higher than 'mere tolerance', at least at the level of description, certainly Vogt's case is a persuasive one at the level of practicality. But beyond the teaching of tolerance lies the possibility of learning an archipelago of different moral language games in our classrooms and combining this with a pedagogy of silence and space for moral reflection, which again, in T.S. Elliot's (1989) terms, means that:

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time
(p.48).

Poetic Disclosure

Wittgenstein (1990) claims 'The meaning of a question is the method of answering it. Tell me how you are searching, and I will tell you what you are searching for' (p.12). And he further claims that 'it isn't possible to believe something for which you cannot imagine some sort of verification' (p.89). But as traditional skills, intuition, scientific practice, poetic and religious insights are all fed from the same rhizomatic and swampy root, it is necessary to account for discovery as it actually
occurs: in other words, it is equally necessary to accommodate other forms of knowledge besides the explicit, exact and testable kind and where 'the domain between religion and knowledge is poetry' (Musil, 1979:301) and where the 'sublime experience is what makes life worth living'(27).

In this context, Goldberg (1993) argues convincingly for the role of creative literature:

My basic contention is that imaginative literature has traditionally been, and still is, a distinctive and irreplaceable form of moral thinking. Compared with philosophy in its various branches, or history or psychology, or biography, or any combination of the 'moral sciences', it has a unique capacity to look at human experience with, as it were, stereoscopic moral vision. (p.63).

Such a view, I believe, compelling, as it makes us recognise that in a certain sense we are each author of our own values. For if being who we are is largely disclosed through language, it must then follow that being moral requires largely the same disclosure. The fact that there is now a flurry of public body activity trying to define what constitutes the common good in educational terms is perhaps a symptom of the general exhaustion towards the renewal of such a moral language.

In pursuit of the view that any moral interpretation must be animated and guided by the power of illumination, as it is only through such power that moral interpretation can risk that which is otherwise too audacious to risk, the entrusting of an idea to one's inner poetic voice thus instead becomes a way of drawing out that which may otherwise remain unsaid. And although the formal analysis of this thesis has been conducted in a discursive language - the language of the academic world - to pursue such a line of poetic reasoning any further leads appropriately to the
summation of this thesis to conclude instead with the telescopic moral vision of the poet, complementing that of the academic:

TO BE STRANGLED AT THE GATES OF THE WOMB

(A Moral Odyssey)

Always in action and yet always at rest
a puzzle of logic in a new litmus test
When question and answer dissolve in a riddle
explained by the law of the excluded middle

A criteria of facts without either/or
kindled by a magic in its own moral core
For to state what 'is', is merely to describe
instead of 'ought' which is to morally prescribe

So how then is right so different to wrong?
if good bestows evil in its old marriage song
Pleasure is maximised as a utility
consequences calculated of what's to be

A prescriptive ensemble, socially construed
contrasts with more fodder, more moral food
A categorical imperative, Kant's agency
invokes moral intent to the Godhead trinity

So is good in action? or in consequence?
or is it a vapour, a spiritual dispense?
Something of which we can barely forego
enslaves disobedience in its crude show

To confess to our sins is to acknowledge instead
an omniscient something outside of our head
Or otherwise something much deeper within
encased in a daemon with no original sin

A contingent self, or a fourth inner voice?
narrow the choosing and yet narrows the choice
How, therefore, then can there be morally right
if my interests prevail and yours must take flight?

In spite of confusion in this strangulation's tale
such quintessential goodness does still prevail
And even though evil spreads its own curse
still, the sow's ear can become the silver purse

For truth is not cognitive, but is moral deed
like the route of the wombgate's virginal seed
Where the clash of new facts is not the main goal
but is verily replaced by the needs of the soul
And if actions speak louder than the words we say,
then words must precede action as night is to day.
Thus language we compromise at great moral risk,
sacrificing moral's meridian, the treasure's fisk.

A taxonomy of values is not what is needed
when social injustice goes all but unheeded.
And where political might so tortures the brave
and where children and women no one man can save.

Thereafter, collective individuals must speak with tongues uncurled
when the limits of a new language become the limits of a new world.
Appendix: Some Language Games in Action

Wittgenstein (1994 a) states that 'Language is a labyrinth of paths' You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about' (p.82). By this he means that 'we remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language-games because the clothing of our language makes everything alike' (Ibid:224).

In one particular sense, then, morality becomes a question of grammar:

In the use of words one might distinguish 'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of a sentence, the part of its use - one might say - that can be taken in by the ear - And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word "to mean", with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to find our way about (Ibid:168).

For in these terms it is only by knowing the rules of language games - syntactically and culturally - by their myriad of applications that we can establish what morality actually is: thus to extend one's morality one must first extend one's repertoire of language games (29).

By the same reckoning, there isn't any point of view available from outside the language games where we can stand back and appraise the relationship between language and the reality of that particular language game. We cannot get outside of language to look at the relation between language and reality and see whether or not language is adequately representing reality. As indeed Searle (1987) puts it "There isn't a non-linguistic Archimedean point from which we can appraise the
success or failure of language in representing, coping with or dealing with the real world. We are always operating in some language game or other (p.331).

There may be as many language games as there are theories of morality, but for illustration purposes I shall sketch an outline of some indicative simple exemplars in relation to the four quadrants' model (although in practice language games are complex and overlap with other language games in many different ways). First, I shall illustrate Utilitarian and Kantian positions, followed thereafter by Humanism and then Religion.

The following tabulation briefly lists in two parallel columns just a few of the many philosophical and moral differences between Utilitarian and Kantian ethics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UTILITARIAN--------- (PHILOSOPHICAL)--------- KANTIAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Empiricism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(all knowledge comes from experience)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Consequentialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Right/wrong depends on consequences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Public Morality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(concerned with public conduct)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MORAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Social Utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(maximise happiness &amp; pleasure; minimise human pain &amp; suffering)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Hedonism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pleasure definitive good; pain - definitive evil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Expediency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A good end always justifies the means)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At this point that I would like to introduce the notion of a moral dilemma by reference to four simple case studies:

1. **The man in a white suit**

   A man in his late 20's was out walking across a deserted town square one late afternoon and was late for a romantic rendezvous. Earlier it had been raining heavily. Various puddles criss-crossed his path so he moved somewhat cautiously to avoid splashing his expensive white mohair suit.

   Suddenly he noticed a mother with two children - the one a young girl of around 4 years and the other a baby in a push chair - and as he directly passed them he noticed that the baby had fallen face-down into a pool of water. The baby was unable to right itself and the mother was pre-occupied with the young girl and completely unaware of her baby's dilemma. The man continued on his journey as he was unwilling to risk getting his white mohair suit dirty and the baby died.

2. **The Sinking Ship**

   A passenger ship sank in a storm. Two large lifeboats full of people managed to get clear. The lifeboats lost contact with each other, but one of them began to take on water and was sinking rapidly. It was decided that unless the load was significantly lightened then the boat would sink. The first mate decided that the only means available to lighten the load - all superfluous goods had already been thrown overboard - was to throw a number of passengers overboard.

   He reasoned that the three crew members were necessary to man the large lifeboat, that women and children should be saved, that married couples should not be split up and that the rest were expendable. The mate and crew reluctantly threw 13 passengers overboard. The boat stopped taking on water. Eventually the crew and hundreds of passengers were rescued with no other fatalities.

3. **Who benefits?**

   For the purpose of this exercise you need to put yourself into the role of being a unique teacher in a unique teaching situation. You are an experienced teacher with a background of successful teaching of high-ability pupils in the Science department of a Comprehensive school. Moreover, you have also worked, equally successfully, with groups of profoundly handicapped children in a special school environment. In your new teaching post you are presented with the smallest teaching group in your career - a mere two pupils:

   - Susan is a 16-year old girl with multiple physical and mental handicaps. She requires a great deal of individual attention and skilled teaching in order to maximise her independence and communication skills.
Gary is academically highly able and is keen to read for a Science degree. On the basis of an optimal teaching and learning environment, Simon is expected to excel in his forthcoming exams.

**NB** The achievements of both pupils are equally dependent upon the level of teaching input and time they receive from you (30)

4 Ann Frank

During the second world war in Nazi-occupied Holland a Dutch family hid an adolescent girl - Ann Frank - in their cellar because, as a Jew, she was vulnerable. When Nazi soldiers called at the house and asked if there were any Jews living there the family said, no there was no Jews living in their house. The family had lied to protect the girl. from what would have entailed certain death.

By consulting the ethical framework presented - Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics - and with reference to your own personal value systems, I would now like you to consider the following questions in relation to the four case studies.

(a) In terms of case studies 1 and 2 please answer the following two questions:

(1) Was murder committed?

(2) Was the behaviour moral?

(b) In terms of case study 3

How much time will you spend with each child?

- e.g., more time with Susan?
- e.g., more time with Gary?
- e.g., or 50/50?

(c) In terms of case study 4

Were the Dutch family right to lie?

(NB: for Kantianism the means can never justify the ends, whereas for Utilitarianism the reverse is true)

Use the space below to make notes and answer the questions:-
CASE STUDY 1    The man in the white suit

CASE STUDY 2    The sinking ship

CASE STUDY 3    The Schoolteacher

CASE STUDY 4    Ann Frank
Here are two examples of Sartre's particular form of Existentialist humanism, whereby because all the values and meanings are derived from one's own choices, so too is the responsibility for making those choices:

(a) **Waiter in the cafe**

Let us consider the waiter in the cafe. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes towards the patrons with a step too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally, there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-rope walker by putting it in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium which he perpetually reestablishes by a light movement of the arm and hand. All his behaviour seems to us a game. He applies himself to chaining his movements as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other, his gesture and even his voice seem to be mechanisms; he gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things. He is playing, he is amusing himself. But what is he playing?...he is playing at being a waiter in a cafe. There is nothing there to surprise us. The game is a kind of marking out and investigation (Sartre, 1971:59).

Questions: To what extent is this a description of a person playing a game? and to what extent is it an accurate description of a waiter doing his job?

(b) **Philosophy student**

I shall cite the case of one of my students who came to see me under the following circumstances: his father was on bad terms with his mother and, moreover, was inclined to be a collaborationist; his older brother had been killed in the German offensive of 1940, and the young man, with somewhat immature but generous feelings, wanted to avenge him. His mother lived alone with him, very much upset by the half treason of her husband and the death of her older son; the boy was her only consolation.

The boy was faced with the choice of leaving for England and joining the Free French Forces - that is, leaving his mother behind - or remaining with his mother and helping her to carry on...As a result, he was faced with two very different kinds of action: one, concrete, immediate, but concerning only one individual; the other concerned an incomparably vaster group, a national collectivity, but for that very reason was dubious. And, at the same time, he was wavering between two kinds of ethics. On the one hand, an ethics of sympathy, of personal devotion; on the other, a broader ethics, but one whose efficacy was more dubious. He had to choose between the two (Cited in Navia & Kelly, 1980:490-91).

Question: Who or what could help him choose?
In general, the practice of religion, Christianity in this context, involves many different language forms: prayers, parables, commandments, sacraments, sermons, creeds, collective worship, etc. The frame of reference for Christianity as a language game, along with other language games, is a frame of reference which can only be properly arrived at from within its own religious discourse. And the fact that even within the scope of this particular language game there are still other distinct and overlapping language games operating does not alter this; as they belong to a wider language game of expressions of value, in the same way as biology, physics and chemistry belong to the language game of science.

I detail below a selection of quite common religious forms of life which are indicative of a religious language game within a Christian context:

1. A person crosses themselves with the sign of the cross before a very critical experience; say a life-threatening operation, an important examination or the making of a really big decision.

2. A mother places a garland on a statue of the Virgin Mary

3. A repentant sinner confesses his sins to a priest

4. A young widow prays for her dead husband, killed in a car accident (3 3)

5. A church congregation pray to God for world peace

6. A professor of theology asserts that rather than Charles Darwin being the definitive source for the explanation of our origins, God is and the true explanation lies in the book of Genesis (3 4).

Questions: Are these activities testable hypotheses? If they are testable, what criteria would be used?
In the same vein Phillips (1993) offers some illuminating examples:

If one man contradicts another, they can be said to share a common understanding, to be playing the same game. Consider the following examples: The man who says that the sun is 90 million miles away from the earth contradicts the man who says that the sun is only 20 million miles away from earth. The man who says that the profit from a business venture is £100,000 is contradicted by the man who says that the profit is £50,000. The man who says that there are unicorns contradicts the man who says there are no unicorns. In these examples the disputants participate in a common understanding. The disputants about the distance of the sun from the earth share a common understanding - namely, methods of calculation in astronomy. The disputants about the business profit share a common understanding - namely, business methods of calculating gain and loss. The disputants about the unicorn share a common understanding - namely, the methods of verifying the existence of various animals. The disputants differ about the facts but they are one in logic - that is, they appeal to the same criteria to settle the disagreement (p.61).
An extensive literature search of both the International ERIC database (mainly UK, USA, New Zealand, Australia and Canada) and the WORLD catalogue on the internet has yielded masses of information and stacks of paper relating to ethics and morals in education. Various and multiple permutations of these key words and related words produced actually very little in terms of my specific query concerning (1) a moral vocabulary in education and (2) an ethical discourse framework in education. There were literally thousands of references for religious and moral education and even more concerning moral philosophy - some of which proved to be useful and sometimes even inspirational but by far the majority were simply too technical and specialist and abstract for my purpose (although once my hopes were really raised when I noticed a reference to values in education in relation to an American university, but only to be dashed when I discovered it to be an accountancy analysis of a new ‘value for money’ formula being tested!)

I list below a limited exemplar, numerically tabulated, of what the literature survey actually yielded, although I must stress this is the metaphorical tip of a metaphorical iceberg:

| 150,320 | Moral Philosophy |
| 97,790  | Ethics          |
| 3,508   | Ethics & Education |
| 349     | Language of Values |
| 106     | Language of ethics |


3. Specifically in the context of the UK there are few texts which go beyond the necessary preconditional critiquing stage and offer a theoretical model for moral discourse in education: hence this author's choice of the topic for Ed D theoretical research.


5. In addition to Fullan's (1994) model of change, a variety of different models of the change process inform this discussion. For further reference see the following perspectives (a) Business : Moss Kanter (1983) The Change Masters and Martel (1988) Mastering Change - the former is a text for senior managers with models and recipes on innovation and change implementation strategies for business, while the latter is a macro economic.
analysis of cyclical and structural changes (mainly in the USA) and the implications for business. (b) **Systems Thinking:** Checkland (1991) *Systems Thinking in Practice,* is considered the definitive introduction to this form of modelling. (c) **Science:** Popper (1980) *The Logic of Scientific Discovery,* contrasted with Kuhn (1970) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* (d) **Social Science:** Hegel (1978) *Philosophy of Right,* Marx (1977) *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,* Popper (1957) *The Poverty of Historicism.* (e) **General:** In terms of organizational analysis, Morgan (1984) *Images of Organizations,* in relation to qualitative change Woodcock and Davis (1978) * Catastrophe Theory* and a good general introduction to different modelling devices is Waddington (1977) *Tools For Thought.*


Magee, B. (1975), Popper, London, Fontana provides the definitive introduction to Popper’s key ideas in epistemology, political and social philosophy. The book is a part of the ‘Fontana Modern Masters’ series and is eminently readable.


Michael Polanyi occupies a unique and distinguished position within the debate on scientific method contrasted with method in the social sciences, as he was both an eminently successful scientist as well as an equally successful philosopher. He held the Chair of Physical Chemistry at Manchester from 1933 to 1946 during which time he established a world reputation in physical chemistry. In 1946 he turned to philosophy and until his death in 1976 worked continuously in that field. He once remarked ‘I believe that the doctrine derived from our erroneous scientific world view have in our days shattered our culture, casting much of the world into mindless servitude, while afflicting the rest with confusion’ (cited in Scott, 1996:3)

In relation to philosophy, he wrote, 'I came into my true vocation in 1946 when I set out on the pursuit of a new philosophy to meet the needs of our age. My way of starting off with little or no schooling was wholly beneficial here, For a sound knowledge of philosophy makes the necessary radical advances extremely difficult. One must shoot here first and ask questions afterwards, as I have always done.' (Ibid:4) Shoot first and ask questions afterwards - draw your conclusions and then find the reasoning to support them - these two half jesting remarks about his methods tell something important about Polanyi. According to Scott (1996) 'he did not start from formal reasoning leading to conclusions, but from a few conclusions to which his own experience led him inescapably' (p.4).
The 'product life cycle' is a key concept in marketing and includes four crucial stages in the development of a product from the introductory to the stage of rapid growth and then maturity to the stage where decline is identified. And corresponding to each stage in the cycle there is a need for different marketing approaches. A useful introduction to this concept is contained in Piercy, N. (1992) Market-Led Strategic Change, Oxford, Butterworth Heinemann Ltd.

A very unusual adaptation of the concept is in De Mey, M (1992) The Cognitive Paradigm, Chicago, the University of Chicago Press. Here De Mey, a cognitive psychologist, undertakes an analysis of the change process in science by adapting the product life cycle concept to the changes in the social structure of science (see especially Chapter 9).

The idea of competing discourse domains, although in principle it draws on the dynamic of the product life cycle model, it originated in my thinking during the taught part of the Ed D when pursuing the Policy Studies unit. Here, with hindsight, I was struck by the complete lack of any seriously articulated challenges to Thatcherism and the 1988 ERA; indeed, in the first instance it was not until after ERA that well formulated critiques began. Hence my thinking evolved in this way.

In 'The Selfish Gene' Richard Dawkins describes human beings as possessing a dual system for transmitting information, genetics and culture. The latter he refers to as "memes".

There is a long and enduring analytical tradition in the sciences and social sciences whereby subject and object are held apart in order to analyse the relationship between them. When this practice is extended to ethics the great bete noir for a discourse of moral values sets in; that is the infamous - in this case illusory - subject/object dichotomy, or to give it its philosophical name "the law of the excluded middle.

In relation to Wittgenstein's notion of language games Finch (1996) offers an illuminating observation:

Before we look we look into the question of what a language-game is, we should notice one fact of central importance, that the unit of meaning here already involves in one complex three factors of human beings, a world-setting, and language. So far as I Know, this is the first tome ion Western thought when the starting point for thought was not, in however disguised a way, a subject and object (p.44).

See Appendix for examples of language games drawn from across the Four Quadrants model

See SHERRY, P (1977) Religious Truth and Language Games, London, Macmillan where a theologian defines religious understanding in terms of 'language games of ethics as highly complex and that they touch and overlap with other language games' (p,65).

At a subliminal level we are influenced by an extraordinary range of knowledge and understanding, including cultural heritage, religious teachings, political ideology the formal and hidden curriculum, family values - this is the essence of the subliminal treasure chest of ethics.
It is of course important to distinguish between, on the one hand the “what” of change (the content) and, on the other hand the “how” of change” (the process). In the context of the latter, Fullan (1991) states:

...we need to comprehend the dynamics of educational change as a socio-political process involving all kinds of individual, classroom, school, local, regional, and national factors at work in interactive ways (Fullan 1991:5).

Fullan illustrates the multiple nature of his model of change by illustrating its implementation at the classroom level which he divides into three dimensions:

(1) the possible use of new revised materials. (2) the possible use of new teaching approaches...and (3) the possible alteration of beliefs...My point is the logical one that change has to occur in practice along the three dimensions in order for it to have a chance of affecting the outcome (Ibid:37).

This lynch pin concept is central to Fullan’s thesis of educational change along with his other central concept encapsulated in the phrase ‘Ultimately the transformation of subjective realities is the essence of change’ (p.36). Fullan’s assertion that ‘interaction is the primary basis for learning’ (p.77 demonstrates powerfully and vividly the constant interplay of struggle to construe meaning against a backcloth of the divergent world of policymakers conflicting with practitioners.

For a fuller discussion see Novak, M (1991) The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, London, IEA; or his more controversial essay: Eight Arguments about the Morality of the Marketplace, in a IEA (1993) pamphlet entitled, God and the Marketplace where he proposes “a theology of economics” and cites a Catholic - Pope John Paul’s - endorsement of Capitalism along with a corresponding negation of Socialism. A more recent development of Novak’s views is briefly stated in an IEA (1995) pamphlet entitled Awakening from Nihilism: Why Truth Matters which posits the practical principles of Novak’s “threefold society:

Free in its polity, free in its economy, and free in the realm of conscience and inquiry.
The great modern achievements in these matters have been supremely practical: How to make free institutions work at least tolerably well, and better in most ways than earlier regimes. (p. 16)

He continues, most poignantly and persuasively, to describe the single, unifying key characteristic for a free society:

Unless society deepens its moral culture it will die. As human lungs need air, so does liberty need virtue. As does this blue-green Planet Earth, so has liberty its own ecology.
The deepest and most vital struggles of the 21st century will be cultural arguments over sorts of habits we must teach our young? To allow liberty to survive - and more than that, to make it all worth all the blood and tears expended to achieve it - how do we need to live (p. 21)

Taken from Ibsens Samlede Verker: Henrik Ibsen Nutidsdramaer 1877-99 (Et Dukkethjem), Oslo,Gyldendal Norsk Forlag. Indeed in all of Ibsen’s dramas, and especially the social dramas, the power of visible example, rather than characters’ psyche, was critical.

In Henrik Ibsen’s great classical poet fantasy Peer Gynt written in 1867 there is a character known as the ‘Onion Peeler’ from whom Peer seeks inspiration in terms of his quest for his true self. The onion Peeler advises Peer that his quest is like the peeling of an onion, as with
every layer there is a feeling of reaching the kernel but, of course, eventually removing the layers results in being left with nothing. Thus the quest for discovering that essential kernel of self has a durable, albeit unsuccessful, pedigree.

A.N. Whitehead had been a distinguished Mathematician who, with Bertrand Russell, wrote the influential Principia Mathematica (1903) which propounded a system of logic which uniquely generated mathematics, thereby reducing the latter to logic. And although Russell clung to the basic premises of the book, Whitehead abandoned it and begun a new career at Harvard as a Professor of Metaphysics. It is in this context, “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness” was born and flourished and what is interesting is that Whitehead completely rejected the scientific positivism of verifiable hard facts and chose instead to wrestle with metaphysical problems. Russell (1959) was at his dismissive best when describing his former colleague’s conversion as “Obscure and difficult to read” (p.297).

Interestingly, Russell’s mean spiritedness caused him to completely ignore mention of G.E. Moore, his influential fellow Professor of Philosophy, in all of his main writings.

As a term in Christian theology, dogma refers to a doctrine claiming its authority over and beyond private opinion or hesitation in a believer’s mind. Indeed it is held to be a religious truth established by divine revelation and in accordance with the factual underpinning of the Church and thus defined by the Church (Peschke, 1997). However, if the believer rejects it, he becomes to that extent a heretic. So in a sense the word means in accordance with the facts - the facts of the Church - and being dogmatic means, pejoratively, an opinion not in accordance with the facts and therefore unreasonably held.

I make these points because when I referred to ‘allegiance to Christian dogma’ (p.129), I was not deliberately intending to be pejorative, but when I read the sentence later I was suddenly struck by the negative and pejorative connotations which were entirely unintentional.

Moral rules can be regarded as largely public and specific. By contrast, moral ideals can be regarded as rather more personal and general and an intrinsic, subliminal part of one’s private moral repertoire [see note 17 above].

In the context of moral rules, then, everyone is required to obey them unless they have some justification for not doing so; whereas in the context of moral ideals the predisposition to act is very much with the individual. Gert (1992) offers a useful definition:

Neglect of the distinction between moral rules and moral ideals, together with the view that morality requires impartiality, leads some to make bizarre claims about what morality requires, e.g., claiming that when two people’s lives are in danger, my wife’s and some strangers, morality requires me to regard them impartially in deciding whom to rescue. Distinguishing between moral rules and moral ideals explains why accepting that one is not morally allowed to kill a stranger in order to save one’s wife does not require accepting that one is not morally allowed to choose to rescue one’s wife rather than a stranger (p.439).
It is interesting to note that primitive cultures, such as the Aborigines or Maories, access their concept of conscience by a process known as "vision quest" - the self in search of self, to gain psychological or religious insight (a person would wander alone into the wilderness, searching for a sign or vision that would reveal some truth). The parallel to be drawn here is that the modern mind equally needs to engage in similar experiential probing, although in this context the 'wandering into the wilderness' will be usually in terms of moral reflection.

I came across this fascinating concept during my literature search of 'ethics in education' and related topics via the International Eric database. The Eric reference is:

- **Eric No.** ED275917
- **Author:** Suler John, R.
- **Date:** August 22 - 26, 1986
- **Status:** Research Paper
- **Audience:** Annual Convention, American Psychological Association
  Washington DC

Pirsig's (1980) wonderful moral odyssey 'Zen and the Art of Motor Cycle Maintenance', London, Corgi goes to the very heart of many of the issues I have been discussing. Pirsig states his moral revolution as follows:

I think that if we are going to reform the world, and make it a better place to live in, the way to do it is not to talk about relationships of a political nature, which are inevitable, dualistic, full of subjects and objects and their relationship to one another, or with programs full of things for other people to do. I think the kind of approach starts it at the end and presumes the end is the beginning. Programs of a political nature are important end products of social quality that can be effective only if the underlying structure of social values is right. The social values are right only if the individual values are right. The place to improve the world is first in one's own heart and head and hands and then work outward from there. Other people can talk about how to expand the destiny of mankind. I just want to talk about how to fix a motorcycle. I think what I have to say has more lasting value (p.291).


The notions of 'surface grammar' and 'depth grammar' at one level of understanding concern untangling syntax, punctuation and semantic properties that claim our attention; and yet at another deeper level are about unravelling meaning from within a myriad of conflicting assertions all competing for our engagement and immersion.

I am grateful to Professor Frank Coffield for bringing this case study to my attention. It was used at a conference consisting of specialist teachers of SEN and psychologists. As a matter of interest, I am told that about one third of these professionals voted to spend more time with Susan!

Here Sartre's own answer to the dilemma is defined inextricably in terms of 'an ethic of action' (p.491):

Who could help him choose? Christian doctrine? No. Christian doctrine says, "Be charitable, love your neighbour, take the more rugged path, etc., etc." But which is the more rugged path? Whom should he love as a brother? The fighting man or his mother? Which does the greater good, the vague act of fighting in a group, or the concrete one of helping a particular human being to go on living? Who can decide a priori? Nobody. No book of ethics can tell him. The Kantian ethics says, "Never treat any person as a means, but as an end." Very well, if I stay with my mother, I'll treat you as an end as not as a means; but by virtue of this very fact I am running the risk of treating the people around me who are fighting, as means; and, conversely, if I go to join those who are fighting, I'll be treating them as an end, and, by doing that, I run the risk of treating my mother as a means (pp.490-491).

With regard to the power of prayer the John Templeton Foundation, a United States charitable organisation devoted to promoting progress in religion, is about to fund a prayer experiment. Professor Stannard of the Open University describes it as follows:

Patients about to undergo coronary artery bypass graft surgery at three big US hospitals will be divided into groups. One group of 600 will be prayed for by teams from religious groups. Another 600 will not be prayed for. Their case histories will be followed for over two years to see if there are any differences in the groups as regards the rate and degree of recovery.

The project has been designed as a rigorously controlled scientific experiment. All patients will be told that they might or might not be prayed for, but no one will know to which group her or she has been assigned. Neither will the medical staff have access to this information (p. 19).

Fortunately, Professor Stannard lives in the real world:

Do we really want some Treasury official to use a positive result to close down hospital wards - because vicars can be hired to pray more cheaply? It would not altogether be surprising if God, in his wisdom, decided to frustrate the best efforts of the investigators - for our own good. WE should recall in the Bible: "Thou shalt not put the Lord thy God to the test" (p.19).

A review article by Fred Hoyle, 'Search for a Universal Prologue', THES (p.19), 14 March 1997, casts an interesting light on the current debate regarding 'big-bang cosmology'. Hoyle's point is that in big-bang cosmology we do not start from a known position but conjecture a n entirely theoretical position and assume that the theory is correct:

Standard scientific procedure starts from a known state of affairs whose reality is guaranteed by observation. Theories are then used to argue forwards in time to a conclusion which can be tested by observation. The initial position is entirely conjectural. And it is logically not possible to use present-day observations to test the theory and to infer what the initial situation must have been.

What is done, therefore, is to assume that the theory is correct. The aim then becomes to
infer by backwards logic how thing must have been in the past, especially how things were in the early moments of the universe. Instead of this being a proof of the theory, it is a protestation of faith. In effect, the theory becomes a religious doctrine.

In other words, the 'big-bang' theory is the sort of theory, I described on page 57 of this text where “the explanation is a sort of “best-fit” approach whereby the most adequate description of the pattern of the data examined combines and coheres in favour of the model presented. In these terms a theory can be defined as:

A scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a group of facts or phenomena...which consists in the knowledge or statement of the facts on which it depends, or of its principles or methods as distinct from the practice of it (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1987, Vol 2, p.1281).

And, in the light of Hoyle’s assertions, the process of argument has not, therefore, always been a chain of demonstrative reasoning, but rather frequently it has been a case of presenting and representing those features which severally cooperate in favour of a conclusion and its emergent theory.
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