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**TOWARDS A TEXTUAL THEORY OF METONYMY: A  
SEMIOTIC APPROACH TO THE NATURE AND ROLE OF  
METONYMY IN TEXT**

**BY**

**ABDUL GABBAR MOHAMMED AL-SHARAFI**

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**Supervised by  
Dr. JAMES DICKINS**

**A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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**Graduate Society  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
University of Durham  
2000**

14 NOV 2000

## **Abstract**

### **Towards a Textual Theory of Metonymy A Semiotic Approach to the Nature and Role of Metonymy in Text Abdul Gabbar Al-Sharafi**

This thesis argues that the scope of metonymy throughout history remains severely reduced to a process of word substitution and the signifying potential of the trope is limited to lexical representation. The study therefore proposes a semiotic approach to take the trope beyond this limitation and to develop a textual theory to the trope. A background study related to how metonymy is treated in previous studies is therefore necessary. This review of literature covers a long period starting from ancient Greece and going up to the present day. Chapters one and two of this thesis, which give this general background, show that the hypothesis is to a large extent valid. The thesis then examines another related hypothesis which is that metonymy is semiotic in nature and a semiotic approach to metonymy will solve the problem of reductionism in the treatment of this trope. Chapter three is devoted to an examination of this hypothesis. It shows that a semiotic approach to metonymy is not only possible but also crucial.

The semiotic approach to metonymy basically concerns the treatment of metonymy as a sign which cuts across three domains of representation. These are the domain of words, the domain of concepts and the domain of things or objects. The last domain is itself treated from a semiotic perspective to stand for the domain of context at large. On the basis of this semiotic approach to metonymy a textual model of metonymic relations in text is constructed. This model is put to the test in chapter four. Here the metonymic relations of FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT, FORM FOR THING, THING FOR FORM and CONCEPT FOR FORM are brought to bear on the formal and semantic connectedness of text. In chapter five the metonymic relations of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT, CONCEPT FOR THING, THING FOR THING and THING FOR CONCEPT are used to explain how these metonymic relations interact to provide a linkage between language, cognition and context.

## Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ii
DEDICATION	iv
COPYRIGHT	v
DECLARATION	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	vii
TABLE OF FIGURES	viii
SYSTEM OF TRANSCRIPTION	ix
INTRODUCTION	1
Research Hypotheses	4
Structure of the Thesis	4
CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	
1.0. Introduction	9
1.1. Rhetoric and Textlinguistics	9
1.2. Figurative Language and Textlinguistics	12
1.3. Metonymy in Western Rhetoric	16
1.4. Metonymy in Arabic Rhetoric	28
1.5. Summary	46
CHAPTER TWO: METONYMY IN MODERN FIGURATIVE THEORY	
2.0. Introduction	47
2.1. Theories of Metonymy	48
2.1.1. <i>Linguistic Theories of Metonymy</i>	48
2.1.1.1. Jakobson	48
2.1.1.2. Group mu	53
2.1.1.3. Ullmann	60
2.1.1.4. Bredin	64
2.1.1.5. Lakoff	71
2.1.2. <i>Cognitive Theories of Metonymy</i>	75
2.1.2.1. Fass	75
2.1.2.2. Gibbs	81
2.1.2.3. Radden and Kövecses	88
2.1.2.4. Stallard	93
2.1.2.5. Nunberg	97
2.2. Summary	99
CHAPTER THREE: METONYMY AND SEMIOTICS	
3.0. Introduction	100
3.1. Semiotics: A General Perspective	100
3.2. On the Notion of Signification	108
3.2.1. <i>The nature of signs</i>	108

3.2.2. <i>Types and modes of signs</i>	120
3.3. On Representational Semiotics and Metonymy	121
3.4. Metonymic Aspects of the Linguistic Sign	129
3.4.1. <i>Metonymy as signification</i>	129
3.4.2. <i>Metonymy as an index</i>	130
3.4.3. <i>Indexicality vs. symbolicity in linguistic signification</i>	132
3.4.4. <i>Indexicality vs. iconicity in linguistic signification</i>	133
3.5. A Relational Model of Metonymic Signification	134
3.6. A Textual Model of Metonymy	136
3.7. Summary	138

#### CHAPTER FOUR: METONYMY AND TEXT COHESION

4.0. Introduction	139
4.1. Metonymy and Cohesion	140
4.1.1. <i>Metonymy and phonological cohesion</i>	148
4.1.1.1. Metonymy and sound repetition	149
4.1.1.1.1. Metonymy and alliteration	149
4.1.1.1.2. Metonymy and assonance	150
4.1.1.1.3. Metonymy and rhyme	151
4.1.1.2. Metonymy and rhythm	152
4.1.2. <i>Metonymy and grammatical cohesion</i>	153
4.1.2.1. Metonymy and reference	153
4.1.2.2. Metonymy and substitution	164
4.1.2.3. Metonymy and ellipsis	167
4.1.3. <i>Metonymy and lexical cohesion</i>	173
4.1.3.1. Metonymy and reiteration	175
4.1.3.1.1. Metonymy and synonymy	178
4.1.3.1.2. Metonymy and hyponymy	181
4.1.3.1.3. Metonymy and superordinateness	183
4.1.3.1.4. Metonymy and meronymy	187
4.1.3.2. Metonymy and collocation	189
4.2. Summary	195

#### CHAPTER FIVE: METONYMY AND TEXT COHERENCE

5.0. Introduction	196
5.1. Metonymy and Coherence	197
5.2. Metonymy and Schema Theory	202
5.3. Metonymy and Schemata	210
5.4. Metonymy and Scripts	229
5.5. Metonymy and Scenarios	239
5.6. Metonymy and Plans	249
5.7. Metonymy and Goals	255
5.8. Summary	261

CONCLUSION	263
BIBLIOGRAPHY	267

## **Dedication**

*To those who made this research possible by their constant prayers:  
to my parents.*

*To my wife and my children*

*Mohammed,*

*Sumayyah,*

*Anas*

*and*

*Tasneem,*

*A sign of gratitude to their company*

*and*

*A gesture of gratefulness to their unfailing support.*

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## Declaration

**This thesis results from my own work and has not been previously offered in candidature for any other degree or diploma.**

## Acknowledgement

This research owes a great deal to many people and institutions. First of all, I would like to express my indebtedness and gratitude to Dr. James Dickins my teacher and supervisor who made the experience of doing this research a great pleasure and who directed my sometimes scatter-brained thinking into constructive creativity. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Sheikh Sultan al-Qāsimi who made this research possible through the Sharjah Scholarship Grant. My profound gratitude goes to professor Tim Niblock and other committee members of the Sharjah Scholarship Panel for selecting my proposal. I wish also to express my thanks to the ORS (Overseas Research Studentship) committee for contributing to the funding of this research project. Many thanks are also due to A. Ehteshami, for help and encouragement.

Sincere thanks are due to Gilles-Fauconnier of the University of California, San Diego, Guenter Radden of the University of Hamburg, Richard Waltereit of the University of Tübingen, Christian Vossnagel of the University of Hamburg, Andrea Blank of Philipps-University Marburg and Dan Fass-Canada, for email correspondence and advice regarding current research on metonymy. Special thanks to Mohammed Khattābi of Ibn Zühr University, Morocco for his illuminating response to my inquiry regarding metonymy in Arabic rhetoric. I am grateful to Klaus-Uwe Panther of the University of Hamburg and Linda Thornburg of the University of Etövös Lorand in Budapest, Anne Pankhurst of the University of Edinburgh, Brigitte Nerlich of the University of Nottingham, and Richard Waltereit of the Tübingen University for sending me some of their papers related to metonymy. My sincere thanks go to Randal Holme of the Department of Linguistics, University of Durham for his invaluable and illuminating comments on an early draft of this thesis.

I am indebted to Janet Watson for all help and support and for helping me to take part-time teaching in the department. My sincere thanks also go to Martha Young-Scholten in the Department of Linguistics for giving me the chance to teach Translation Theory in this Department. Thanks also to my graduate and undergraduate students in this course whose ideas and questions have been a source of illumination to me. My thanks are due to Emma Murphy for research methods seminars and for giving me the chance to conduct one of these seminars under the title 'research in language and language in research'.

As a student at Durham University on the MA and Ph.D levels, I wish to express my thanks to the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies and the Department of Linguistics for all support. My special thanks go to the following in the Department of Linguistics; Joseph Emonds for cross-linguistic syntax and issues in structuralism; Peter Grundy for pragmatics and stylistics; S.J. Hannahs for bilingualism; Abdel Latif Sellami for translation theory; Dan Robertson for sociolinguistics and Bill McClure for semantics. My deep thanks go to the language team in the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies; James Dickins, Janet Watson, Fadia Faqir, Runak Husni, Paul Starkey and Jack Wesson. A word of thanks should also go to Barbara Minto and Barbara Farnworth, the secretaries in the Centre, for their help. A special regard goes to Sara Hallowell and Angela Taylor, the secretaries in the Department of Linguistics, for all their help. My thanks also go to the inter-library loan team in the main library and to all library staff. My sincere thanks go to my friends Ahmed Al-Imādi (Qatar), Tareq Al-Nu'aime (Oman) and Fahd Al-Liheibi (Saudi Arabia) for all help and encouragement.

## Table of Figures

<b>Fig. 1.1. A simple model of linguistic communication</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Fig. 1.2. Classification of types of transference in Arabic rhetoric</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>Fig. 1.3. The three dimensions of contiguous transference in Arabic rhetoric</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>Fig. 2.1. Bredin's theory of metonymy</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>Fig. 3.1. Metonymy and the Saussurean notion of sign</b>	<b>114</b>
<b>Fig. 3.2. Metonymy and the Peircean notion of sign</b>	<b>116</b>
<b>Fig. 3.3. The 'stand for' relation between the three domains of knowledge</b>	<b>123</b>
<b>Fig. 3.4. Frege's representational theory</b>	<b>125</b>
<b>Fig. 3.5. A relational model of metonymic signification</b>	<b>135</b>
<b>Fig. 3.6. A model of textual metonymy</b>	<b>137</b>
<b>Fig. 4.1. A semiotic model of text</b>	<b>142</b>
<b>Fig. 4.2. Classification of reference according to Halliday and Hasan</b>	<b>155</b>
<b>Fig. 4.3. The two-part structure of the clause according to Halliday and Hasan</b>	<b>169</b>
<b>Fig. 4.4. Patterns of form for concept in text 72</b>	<b>180</b>
<b>Fig. 4.5. Patterns of hyponymic relations in text 73</b>	<b>182</b>
<b>Fig. 4.6. A metonymic model of hyponymic relations in text 73</b>	<b>182</b>
<b>Fig. 4.7. Patterns of concept for concept relation in text 78</b>	<b>186</b>
<b>Fig. 4.8. Cruse's illustration of meronymic relations</b>	<b>187</b>
<b>Fig. 4.9. A model of meronymic relations in text 83</b>	<b>189</b>
<b>Fig. 5.1. A unified model of knowledge structures</b>	<b>208</b>
<b>Fig. 5.2. The three types of inheritance</b>	<b>213</b>
<b>Fig. 5.3. The office schema model in text 17</b>	<b>221</b>
<b>Fig. 5.4. The person schema model in text 17</b>	<b>221</b>
<b>Fig. 5.5. A combination of the two models in text 17</b>	<b>222</b>
<b>Fig. 5.6. Metonymic referential relations in text 20</b>	<b>225</b>
<b>Fig. 5.7. Metonymic relations within the town schema in text 20</b>	<b>226</b>
<b>Fig. 5.8. Metonymic relations within the character's schema</b>	<b>227</b>

## System of Transcription

### Consonants:

ء	'	ي	y	ر	r
ا	a	ك	k	ش	sh
ب	b	ل	l	ت	t
ج	j	م	m	ث	th
د	d	ن	n	خ	kh
ه	h	س	s	ذ	dh
و	w	ح	'	ظ	<u>dh</u>
ز	z	ف	f	ظ	<u>z</u>
ح	<u>h</u>	ص	s	غ	gh
ط	<u>t</u>	ق	q		

### Short vowels:

ـَ	a
ـِ	i
ـُ	u

### Long vowels:

آ	ä
ؤ	ü
ي	ï

## **Introduction**

Metonymy is traditionally defined as a process of substituting one word for another with which it is associated. The fundamental hypothesis of this thesis is that this is a reductionist view of the nature of metonymy. My aim in this thesis, therefore, is to take metonymy beyond its traditional confinement and investigate the textual potential of the trope. This thesis argues that metonymy is not a process of *substitution*. Rather it is a process of *representation*. Moreover, the thesis argues that metonymy is not only a process of representation between words but also between concepts and objects. Furthermore, metonymy is not a process limited to lexical representation but also a process of textual representation.

This thesis, therefore, proposes a semiotic approach to metonymy to account for the three-dimensional aspects of the trope. It argues that metonymy is not only a process of substitution between words as the majority of classical rhetorical treatises perceive of it. Nor is it only a process of substitution between concepts as the majority of modern figurative accounts of the trope claim. In fact, metonymy is believed to include a further level of signification. This is the level of things and objects which is seen in this thesis to be primarily the dimension of context. Out of this semiotic treatment of metonymy a textual model of the trope is proposed to account for the nature and role of metonymy in text. Text is popularly defined as any stretch of language that stands as a unified whole. My definition of text is that of an interaction between language, cognition and context from two separate perspectives. The first is the world of the producer and the second is the world of the receiver. Text coherence is the natural result of the successful interaction between these three domains on the one hand and between these two worlds on the other.

Let me now provide a definition of metonymy as I treat it throughout this thesis. **Metonymy is a process of REPRESENTATION in which one word/concept/object stands for another by contiguity or causality.** In my attempt to develop a textual theory of metonymy, I begin by surveying the definitions and treatments of the trope in classical rhetoric. All definitions of metonymy since ancient times tend to agree that the process of metonymy is that of substitution. However, after this general agreement comes a diversification in the treatment of the specificities of this substitution. Three main trends can be distinguished with regard to this variation.



## Introduction

The first is that which defines metonymy as the substitution between 'words'. This I call the linguistic trend; it treats metonymy as a linguistic phenomenon that pertains to linguistic signification. The linguistic trend also subsumes the semantic theory of metonymy to which belong almost all the treatments of metonymy in western classical rhetoric and Arabic rhetoric. To this paradigm also belong the treatments of metonymy within stylistic circles, notably that of Jakobson. The second trend is that which defines and treats metonymy as the substitution between 'concepts' and this I call the cognitive trend. This goes beyond the formal manifestation of the trope as a substitution between forms to address cognitive principles of reasoning and understanding of metonymy. This is obviously the cognitive theory of metonymy to which many modern figurative accounts of the trope belong especially those dealing with the application of this cognitive theory in areas such as artificial intelligence and machine text processing. The third trend is that which defines metonymy as the substitution between objects in the real world. Some philosophical and rhetorical discussions highlight this aspect of ontological signification with respect to metonymic reasoning. Bredin's theory of metonymy discussed in chapter 2 section 2.1.1.4. of this thesis is a good illustration of philosophical accounts of the ontological reality of metonymy. The theories of metonymy as propounded by the Auctor [Cicero] and that of John of Garland also fall into this category.<sup>1</sup>

Each of the above trends looks at metonymy from a rather narrow perspective in the sense that each trend takes the phenomenon from a different angle. There is clearly something missing in all of these treatments. This missing element is the unified and integrative approach to metonymy that combines all of these aspects. Moreover, in all of these treatments metonymy is dealt with as a lexical phenomenon, i.e. it is confined to the level of the lexis. The treatment of metonymy as a process of substitution of things or objects in reality is also a narrow one in relation to the new conception of reality as context introduced in this thesis.

This thesis argues that metonymy is not only a figure of speech whose impact is limited to the level of lexical substitution. Rather metonymy is a fundamental mode of cognition and a principal source of knowledge, if not the ultimate source of knowledge.

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<sup>1</sup> See the discussion of these theories in chapter one section 1.3.

## Introduction

In answer to the question ‘what is knowledge’ or ‘what does it mean to know something?’ we may say that to know something is to be able to define it. To define an entity is to mention what it is made of, i.e. its constituent parts. Alternatively, we can define an entity by giving its function. It often happens that we combine both forms of definition and we add to that for the sake of simplification some exemplification. So, a pen, for example, is a device which has liquid ink inside a cylinder which is linked to a metal tip. The pen could also be defined as a device which is used for writing. We can combine both types of definition and add examples. We can say ‘a pen is a device which contains liquid ink in a plastic cylinder which is connected with a metal tip. Pens are used for writing. Examples of pens include, Parker pens and Pilot pens’. This is actually the way most definitions are constructed. This principle applies to almost everything. In any case, both types of definitions are actually metonymic because while the former is constructed via the PART FOR WHOLE metonymic relation, the latter is constructed via the CAUSE FOR EFFECT metonymic relation.

This thesis aims to establish a textual theory of metonymy because it views text as knowledge applied to a specific context. Text is viewed in this thesis as a dialectic interaction between knowledge presented in the text and knowledge stored in the mind of the receiver of this text. In view of the shortcomings of the traditional accounts of metonymy outlined above, this thesis aims to develop a semiotic approach to metonymy in which a comprehensive theory of the trope can be located to account for metonymy as a phenomenon that cuts across all the various domains mentioned above, i.e. the domain of words, the domain of concepts and the domain of things. This is actually a prerequisite to establishing a textual theory of metonymy because the assumption is that knowledge in text is not limited to the formal organisation of linguistic elements but is rather an amalgamation of forms, concepts and contexts.

The thesis argues that metonymy cuts across various realms. These are the realm of epistemology (i.e. the world of concepts), the realm of ontology, (i.e. the world of objects), and the realm of language (i.e. the world of forms). By doing this metonymy becomes a really powerful theory of how these various realms interact in the textual world. This thesis is a study of how a semiotic theory of metonymy provides principles for the creation of text and principles for the organisation of text. The semiotic approach does not stop at this level. Rather it goes beyond this to offer principles of text interpretation.

## Introduction

### **Research Hypotheses**

This thesis examines the following four hypotheses related to metonymy:

1. The scope of metonymy has been too limited and the potential of metonymy has been largely underestimated in previous<sup>2</sup> accounts of the trope.
2. Metonymy is semiotic in nature.
3. A semiotic approach to metonymy leads to a comprehensive theory of metonymy as *representation* that cuts across the ontological, epistemological and linguistic dimensions of metonymic signification.
4. Based on the *representational* view of metonymy a textual theory of metonymy could be developed.

### **The Structure of the Thesis**

Chapter one outlines the general theoretical framework and the historical background. In the first section of this chapter, I show that there is a strong link between rhetoric and textlinguistics. The second section of this chapter argues that there is a link between figurative theory and textlinguistics. The assumption underlying the discussion is that figurative language is a fundamental part of our cognition and not merely a form of deviation from normal modes of thinking. This discussion draws from cognitive linguistics sources which argue that figurative language is not merely a tool for adornment and embellishment or a matter of defamiliarisation as it is commonly held among formal theories of criticism. Rather it is an important mechanism of our perception.

Section three goes into a specific discussion of the definitions of metonymy in the Western rhetorical traditions.<sup>3</sup> This section tells us that the definitions provided for metonymy in these traditions limited the scope of the trope to either a substitution between words or a substitution between concepts. The section concludes with an observation that the history of metonymy in western classical rhetoric suffers from this limitation and therefore we need to look for some other source of rhetorical scholarship.

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<sup>2</sup> By previous accounts of the trope I mean studies on metonymy that are previous to this study from Greek rhetorical scholarship up till present-day discussions in figurative theory and cognitive linguistics circles. This will be clear once the reader has gone through chapter one and two of this thesis.

## Introduction

This takes us to section four of the chapter, which is the discussion of the trope in the Arabic classical rhetorical scholarship. This section proves to be not easy because the Arabs recognised three forms of transference which could correspond to what is known in western rhetoric as metonymy. The section has to propose a reorganisation of the figurative spectrum in Arabic rhetoric bringing the three modes of figuration, namely *kināyah* 'implicitness' *majāz 'aqli* 'cognitive transference' and *majāz mursal* 'loose or non-similarity transference' to bear on the notion of *representation* as a fundamental metonymic operation.

The aim here is to construct a semiotic account of the trope in the Arabic rhetorical scholarship in such a way that *kināyah* would correspond to treatments of metonymy as a representation between words since the essence of this type of transference in Arabic rhetoric is basically linguistic. In addition, the intention is to relate *majāz 'aqli* to cognitive accounts of metonymy, because, as its name suggests, this type of transference in Arabic rhetoric is essentially cognitive. *Majāz mursal* is also linked to the notion of ontological signification specifically with the representation of objects because the relations that underlie this type of transference in Arabic rhetoric are mainly existential relations including part/whole, whole/part, situationality, positionality, adjacency and so on. Here I argue that in both traditions there were no attempts to discuss the trope from a multi-dimensional perspective but rather from a single dimension of signification. In short, a clearly semiotic treatment of the trope was missing from both traditions.

Chapter two investigates whether any semiotic treatment has been proposed in modern accounts of metonymy in both fields of figurative theory or cognitive semantic studies. The chapter reaches the conclusion that the same reductionism can be witnessed also in modern accounts of metonymy. The only exception to this generalisation is the treatment of the trope proposed by Radden and Kövecses (1999) which is a semiotic analysis of the trope *par excellence*, albeit that it suffers from a lexical orientation in most of its discussions. Radden and Kövecses' study does not proceed from this semiotic analysis to discuss the textual powers of metonymy. The treatments in recent accounts of the trope are restricted to the lexical level of signification, and to the best of

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<sup>3</sup> I mean the Greek and Latin traditions.

## Introduction

my knowledge no work has been done on a semiotic model of the textual level of metonymic signification which is characteristic of my semiotic approach to the trope.

The thesis then goes on to provide a more detailed account of the semiotic dimension of metonymy. This is taken up in chapter three of this thesis where I develop a semiotic theory of metonymy that would correspond to the triadic representations of the notion of sign in semiotics. On the basis of an argument that metonymy is an 'index' in the Peircean<sup>4</sup> sense. Metonymy is argued to be a sign: it is a signifier in the form of words or expressions and it is a signified in the form of either real objects in the world or cognitive concepts in the human brain. The chapter develops a relational model of metonymy, which recognises *representation* as the primary metonymic type of relation, and assigns relations of contiguity and causality to this principal relation. Then the chapter moves on to propose a textual model of metonymic relations based on the relation of representation. The model highlights specifically the following nine types of relations:

1. Metonymic representational relation of form for form
2. Metonymic representational relation of form for concept
3. Metonymic representational relation of form for thing
4. Metonymic representational relation of concept for form
5. Metonymic representational relation of thing for form
6. Metonymic representational relation of concept for concept
7. Metonymic representational relation of concept for thing
8. Metonymic representational relation of thing for concept
9. Metonymic representational relation of thing for thing

The model is interactive in nature but it is possible to specify the first 1-5 relations to account for the formal and semantic aspects of text cohesion while the remaining 6-9 relations account for text coherence. The interactive nature of these relations captures the textual potentialities of metonymy in that in text there is always dynamic interaction between forms, concepts and contexts. The higher level of textuality although realises cognitive and contextual relations like those of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT, CONCEPT FOR THING, THING FOR CONCEPT and THING FOR THING, the forms play a major role as triggers to these cognitive and contextual processes.

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<sup>4</sup> This argument is discussed in detail in chapter 3 of this thesis.

## Introduction

Chapter four explores the proposed relation between metonymy and text cohesion and provides examples illustrating how metonymy actually contributes to the cohesion of text. The chapter integrates the metonymic relations

1. FORM FOR FORM
2. FORM FOR CONCEPT
3. FORM FOR THING
4. CONCEPT FOR FORM
5. THING FOR FROM

into a model of cohesive patterning in text. The chapter takes Halliday and Hasan's (1976) model of cohesion in English as a framework and argues that these metonymic relations are in fact more realistic and more comprehensive as an account of the bonds of cohesive ties than Halliday and Hasan's model. The reason is that when we say that the two elements in the discourse must form a tie, this deems it necessary that there should be explicit mention of the forms in the text leaving it difficult to integrate elements which do not appear on the surface but have to be assumed. The metonymic model of the above mentioned relations solves this problem because if the two or  $n$  elements are explicit then this is accounted for by the FORM FOR FORM metonymic relation while if they are implicit they are still accounted for by the CONCEPT FOR FORM relation.

Chapter five integrates the four metonymic relations

1. CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT
2. CONCEPT FOR THING
3. THING FOR CONCEPT
4. THING FOR THING

into a model of coherence in text. The chapter takes as a framework the work done in the conceptual representation of knowledge structures, notably that of Schank and Abelson (1977), Minsky (1975), Rumelhart (1977). The chapter proposes that knowledge structures such as schemata, frames, scripts, scenarios, plans and goals are essentially mental structures that are based on metonymic relations of PART FOR WHOLE or WHOLE FOR PART, CAUSE FOR EFFECT and EFFECT FOR CAUSE relations and as such the movement between these conceptual structures in text processing is facilitated by the representational relations of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT, CONCEPT FOR THING, THING FOR CONCEPT, and THING FOR THING. Perceived as such these knowledge structures are fundamentally metonymic in nature and once triggered by linguistic forms in the text establish relations of metonymic reasoning between parts of text as either being parts forming wholes or vice versa, or causes pertaining to effects or vice versa. The chapter presents

## Introduction

a reorganisation of these knowledge structures into a unified model based on whether the particular knowledge structure is descriptive or procedural in nature. Within the procedural knowledge structures, I distinguish between those knowledge structures that are conventional and those which are arbitrary and this is related to the two major principles of metonymic reasoning of contiguity and causality. The thesis concludes with an envoi which addresses areas of further research that need to be further investigated in the area of metonymy.

## Chapter One: Theoretical Framework and Historical Background

*The impulse to speak and think with metonymy is a significant part of our everyday experience. Traditionally viewed as just one of many tropes, and clearly subservient in most scholars' minds to the master trope of metaphor, metonymy shapes the way we think and speak of ordinary events and is the basis for many symbolic comparisons in art and literature.<sup>1</sup>*

### 1.0. Introduction

This chapter aims to place this research project in its theoretical and historical context. The first section deals with the relationship between rhetoric and textlinguistics. The second section considers the relationship between figurative theory and textlinguistics. Section three deals with the history of metonymy in western rhetorical traditions. Section four moves on to discuss metonymy in the Arabic rhetorical tradition. The aim of these two sections is to test the following hypothesis *'the treatment of metonymy, as one of the main figures discussed in both rhetorical traditions, suffers from two major problems:*

1. *Theoretical reductionism by reducing the nature of the trope to a mere substitution of words neglecting its cognitive and pragmatic dimensions.*
2. *Practical reductionism by reducing the role of the trope to the level of lexical substitution neglecting its potential power at the level of textual representation'.*

### 1.1. Rhetoric and Textlinguistics

Before outlining the relationship between rhetoric and textlinguistics it is necessary to start with the questions 'what is rhetoric?' and 'what is textlinguistics?' Let me begin by a definition of textlinguistics. Crystal points out that

in recent years, the study of texts has become a defining feature of a branch of linguistics referred to (especially in Europe) as textlinguistics, and 'text' here has central theoretical status. Texts are seen as language units which have a definable communicative function, characterised by such principles as COHESION, COHERENCE, and informativeness which can be used to provide a formal definition of what constitutes their identifying textuality or texture.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Gibbs (1999: 61).

So textlinguistics is the study of human textual interaction or their use of language in real life situations. In this sense the scope of the discipline covers both written as well as spoken texts and in fact this is the sense that is sustained throughout this thesis.

Now let us move to define rhetoric. Wales defines rhetoric as follows: 'from Greek *techne rhetorike* 'art of speech', originally a discipline concerned with the skills of public speaking as a means of persuasion'.<sup>3</sup> In his discussion of the relationship between rhetoric, stylistics and textlinguistics Enkvist argues that 'the expansion of linguistics to cover text and discourse increasingly motivates a new reading of rhetoric and stylistics'.<sup>4</sup> He then defines rhetoric as 'that branch of language study which is teleologically oriented towards effective communication. Everything that fits into this loose and spacious envelope then becomes, actually or potentially, part of rhetoric'.<sup>5</sup> Plett also highlights the aspect of 'persuasion' as a fundamental feature of rhetoric. He argues that 'rhetoric originally was a technique or art of producing persuasive texts'.<sup>6</sup> Plett asserts that rhetoric as a technique 'was always characterised by a set of rules. These did not coexist in a random manner, but regularly strove towards logical consistency and structural coherence'.<sup>7</sup> He maintains that these rules constituted a system which

retained an amazing solidity which lasted for almost two thousand and five hundred years. It was handed down from generation to generation and formed the basis for the production of public and private texts such as political speeches, sermons, letters, declamatory exercises, advertisements, and, most significant of all, literature. Thus rhetoric can truly be termed a science of discourse.<sup>8</sup>

These spacious definitions of rhetoric allow for the discipline to account for human communication in general. Textual interaction being one major type of human communication is then regarded under this definition as a branch of rhetoric. Enkvist proposes four text theories which according to him provide a convenient means of comparing rhetoric and textlinguistics and 'reflect the history of textlinguistics in terms of its expansion from the study of intersentential links to the investigation of everything

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<sup>2</sup> Crystal (1991: 350).

<sup>3</sup> Wales (1989: 405-406).

<sup>4</sup> Enkvist (1985: 11).

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. (16).

<sup>6</sup> Plett (1985: 61).

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

that goes into the pragmatics of discourse'.<sup>9</sup> The first is the sentence-based model or theory of text. Enkvist argues that the text linguists in this tradition 'tried to describe the cohesive ties that cement sentences into texts, often by extending traditional grammatical methods'.<sup>10</sup> Enkvist associates the work in this tradition with the work of Halliday and Hasan (1976).

The second theory of text according to Enkvist is called 'the predication-based model'. This model arose from the shortcomings of the previous model concerning the difficulties of manipulating or altering the sentence division of the text. But such manipulation, according to Enkvist, 'was necessary to reveal the relations between texts and to answer the question "could two texts in fact be regarded as variants (allotexts) of the same underlying set of elements (texteme)"?'<sup>11</sup> This model starts from an ultimate basic unit of text which Enkvist calls 'text atoms, relations between the text atoms, and a text strategy steering the linearization, grouping, coordination and embedding processes that produce surface texts from the underlying set of text atoms'.<sup>12</sup>

The third theory is that which Enkvist calls 'the cognitive model', which 'tries to describe some area of human cognition, usually in the form of cognitive networks'.<sup>13</sup> This model emerged as a result of the need to know where the sentences in the first model or the predications in the second model come from. Perceived as such, the cognitive model provides a higher characterisation of sentences as cognitive propositions in the mind before they are expressed as sentences. Enkvist relates this model to the work of Minsky (1975) and Schank and Abelson (1977) in semantic schema or frames.

The fourth theory of text proposed by Enkvist is the interaction-based model which highlights the multidimensional aspect of human communication. This model stresses the conceptualisation of a sender, receiver, and the relations between them as well as other situational and contextual factors influencing the communication activity. Enkvist

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<sup>9</sup> Enkvist (1985: 23).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

relates these models of text to the various parts of classical rhetoric.<sup>14</sup> The ‘sentence-based’ model and ‘the predication-based’ model of text, according to Enkvist, correspond to the third part of rhetoric known as ‘elocution’ or style. The ‘cognitive’ model, Enkvist argues, corresponds to the part of rhetoric known as ‘invention’ which is the search for material to be textualised. Usually this material exists in a cognitive form in the mind of the speaker. The ‘interaction-based’ model is argued to correspond to the nature of rhetoric as emphasising the effectiveness of communication. It should be noted here that the link I intend to establish between rhetoric and textlinguistics is laid down along the lines proposed by Enkvist. I shall, therefore, focus my discussion in this thesis on the nature and role of metonymy in text. I shall, however, limit the discussion to the first and the third models, i.e. the sentence-based model and the cognitive model.

The logic behind this limitation is that the second model is too logical to be incorporated into the argument of this thesis given the fact that the overall orientation of the thesis is cognitive. This will obviously prevent the adoption of the logical view of language and cognition. Besides, the logical view stipulates that there is a one-to-one correspondence between concepts and categories and assumes that language is a reflection of reality. This undermines the approximative nature of communication and overlooks the inherent nature of fuzziness in concepts and categories. Consequently, this makes the space for figurative treatment within this framework rather difficult. For the first model I discuss the Halliday and Hasan’s model of cohesion in chapter four of this thesis. Minsky’s and Schank and Abelson’s work on the cognitive model of text is discussed in chapter five of this thesis. With regard to the last model, i.e. the interactional model, I argue that the semiotic approach that I propose for the treatment of metonymy is interactionist because it captures contextual factors as well as cognitive and linguistic factors involved in textual communication and metonymic signification.

## **1.2. Figurative Language and Textlinguistics**

As I perceive it, in textlinguistics there should not be any distinction or preference for literal or figurative language. In fact, there is usually a tendency to consider the distinction marginal or even irrelevant. The reason is that textlinguistics, since its emergence in the 1960s, has incorporated a large number of ideas from various disciplines, notably, cognitive psychology and sociology. It also benefited a great deal

from philosophical theories of human communication and language use.<sup>15</sup> This diversified input has made the whole orientation of the discipline essentially semiotic.<sup>16</sup> According to this view, there is no clear line between figurative and literal language because a great deal of human communication is approximative, and linguistic concepts are generally fuzzy.<sup>17</sup>

With this in mind, textual practice is then a reflection of this fuzziness in linguistic concepts and the approximative nature of communication. Therefore, it is difficult to claim that the text is a reflection of either the state of affairs in the real world or the conceptual representation of this state of affairs. There is a great deal of interaction and negotiation between the world of text, the world of concepts and the world of things. This interaction between these three different worlds gives a good chance for imprecise representation and leaves the process of text generation, organisation and interpretation only imperfect. This means that we employ figurative language for the purpose of approximation and compromising exactness in almost all types of language and not only poetic language. Consider the following examples (1-4):

1. *I can hear you.*
2. *Zena went shopping.*
3. *Tom hit John.*
4. *Adam likes apples.*

Although the above examples are individual sentences<sup>18</sup> and they look very normal and typical of everyday language, their interpretation involves a great deal of help of cognitive processes that are typical of what might be called figurative understanding. Example (1) involves a double level of non-literal understanding. The first is that when we hear people we only hear their voices and not them as a whole, but because the voice of someone is very typical of their personality and their self, the voice is used to represent the person. The second level of non-literality is evident in the fact that when

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<sup>14</sup> See the discussion of these parts in Kennedy (1994) and Dixon (1970).

<sup>15</sup> To give but four examples, the notion of 'context' from anthropology, Malinowsky (1923); from philosophy, speech act theory, Austin (1962), cooperative principle and the maxims of communication, Grice (1975); from sociology, politeness and face, Brown and Levinson (1978).


<sup>16</sup> This term will be discussed in detail in chapter three of this thesis.

<sup>17</sup> C.f. Goatly (1997: 14).

<sup>18</sup> I have called these examples sentences. In fact they should properly be considered examples of texts because the understanding of each of them requires an activation of all sorts of cognitive, linguistic and situational factors.

we say 'I can hear you', the interpretation of the utterance is not understood as 'ability' as its form suggests. Rather, the interpretation is that 'I am hearing you' in actuality. Example (2) shows another form of figurative understanding of the utterance. We know that the act of shopping involves many sub-actions. In the example we have no problem imagining them although they are not mentioned in the text. Because this act is ritualised in our life, the whole stands for the parts of this whole and we come to activate this ritualised knowledge and make sense of the text.

Example (3) looks very literal but in fact is not because it is not possible that the whole body of Tom hit the whole body of John. In actuality, it is only one part of Tom that hit one part of John; perhaps the former's hand and the latter's nose were involved in this action. Again our understanding of this text is made successful only through nonliteral understanding of it. Due to the fact that the hand and nose are parts of the bodies of both Tom and John, the whole of their bodies are used to signify the parts. In example (4) there is an element missing but we never normally realise it. We know that Adam does not like apples "for their sake" and that when we say this we mean Adam likes *eating* apples. We understand all these examples, and in fact we always miss the fact that they are examples of figurative language because the cognitive structure of our brains is, as it were, structured along the lines of similar principles. Let me now illustrate the process of linguistic communication by the following model after Goatly.<sup>19</sup>



**Figure 1.1. A simple model of linguistic communication.**

The production stage of communication starts at the top of the diagram with the state of affairs to be communicated or communicated about. This, according to Goatly's model

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

above, is the physical stage because it exists in the world of things and objects or entities. However, it could be argued that this level is not only physical but it also involves some psychological and abstract phenomena, which pertain to abstract concepts. Through a mental process which can be paralleled with 'stringing of concepts into thought' this state of affairs becomes thought which in turn by another mental process becomes a proposition which is realised by linguistic data as text. So the production of a text is a result of an interactive process between reality, mind and language. The reception stage goes along similar lines but in a reverse order, starting this time with the text and then building up propositions as to what this text may mean. Then from the proposition there is a process of guessing and inferencing to arrive at the thought which the speaker might have had in mind about a certain state of affairs. The development of communication through these different worlds is bound to show some sort of imperfect correspondence between one world and another. We know for sure now that there is not a perfect correspondence between objects and linguistic categories because the relationship is not that clear cut. Culture plays a major role in forming our linguistic categories of objects we see in reality. A prototypical house for a European is not the prototypical house for a Bedouin Arab. Categories shift from language to language, culture to culture and from time to time within the same culture and the same language.

The understanding of the following text is dependent on activating pieces of knowledge that are not mentioned in the text. In other words the interpretation of this text goes beyond its literal expression. This is the figurative dimension of text interpretation. How is this possible? Consider the text in (5) below:

5. *Mary went to the kitchen. She found the fridge empty. She opened the freezer and took out some ice cream.*

It is easy to interpret this text because the text activates a schema of a kitchen and this is what makes our understanding of the text possible and easy. In fact, the items referred to using the definite article are regarded as given and known. The text is made interpretable because it utilises a routinised script which helps us expect the rest of the text because we know what someone going into the kitchen would do next. The text is also possible to interpret because it makes use of a general pattern of causal connectivity. We know that people go into kitchens because they want to eat. To

achieve this goal we can easily interpret the opening of the fridge and then the freezer. In fact, we could also predict that if Mary did not find the ice cream in the freezer the text would continue making other searches until the goal of getting something to eat is fulfilled. We can conclude that Mary ate the ice cream although this is not mentioned in the text at all but from our knowledge of similar situations we can expect someone who opens the freezer and takes out some ice cream to eat it.

This series of prediction, expectation and supplying of information not otherwise expressed in the text is the link I want to establish between figurative language and textlinguistics and this is the treatment I propose for metonymic reasoning in text. To conclude, a textual approach does not recognise these figures as forms of deviation but rather as fundamental parts of our cognitive structure that help provide coherence to reality. This approach views figures in general not only as ways of conveying meaning at the lexical level but also at a much wider level of textual communication. Sometimes the whole text is employed to realise one single figure of speech, such as metaphor or allegory. *Animal farm* is a good illustration of such types of texts, which realise one particular figure of speech. The whole novel functions as an allegorical account of the Russian communist revolution. Jakobson's approach to metonymy as characterising realist prose<sup>20</sup> is just another attempt to map the workings of figures onto textual models. In fact, the textual model I am proposing for metonymy is not just this general attempt. It goes beyond this to provide an investigation of a more detailed description and explanation of how metonymy contributes to text creation, organisation and interpretation.

### 1.3. Metonymy in Western Rhetoric

According to Stanford

Herodotus and Thucydides, and later Plato, used the word *μετονόζειν* to mean *to call by a new name, to change something's name*, and in the passive voice *to receive a new name*. But in none of its contexts does *μετονόζειν* suggest any of the significance of the term *μετωνυμία* as afterwards applied to metonymy, a particular kind of metaphor.<sup>21</sup>

This quotation opens our eyes to two vital issues related to the discussion of metonymy in western classical rhetoric. The first issue is that because rhetoricians and philosophers were interested in the poetic use of language they regarded metaphor as primary to the

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<sup>20</sup> C.f. Jakobson's proposal in his article (1971) and the discussion of this proposal in chapter two section (2.1.1.1.) of this thesis.

<sup>21</sup> Stanford (1936: 3).

figurative domain and neglected metonymy because it does not involve symbolism and double-unit signification as there is no transfer on the semantic plane.<sup>22</sup> This observation applies to the western as well as the Arabic rhetorical traditions because both traditions were preoccupied with the study of poetic language. This is usually conveyed through metaphorical expressions which reveal the excellence of the creativity of the poet in bringing together different worlds by means of putting them in a similarity relation through metaphor. The second issue is that even when there is a discussion of metonymy, the treatment appears to be very fragmented and rather narrow.

It seems that Greek rhetorical scholarship at one time became entirely poetic scholarship. Poets and rhetoricians were equally interested in how to attract the attention of their audience by the use of metaphorical language. This involved a transfer on the semantic plane and the poetic power of both the speaker and the listener reflects the way analogies are produced by the speaker and reduced by the listener. Literary scholarship in Greece meant that both participants had to put in some effort towards the understanding of the poem or the oration. This is why they undermined practical and purely referential discourse because it was seen as banal and not containing anything new, strange, or shocking. This is not surprising to us today as this view conforms to modern figurative and stylistic theory also, especially that which is expounded by Jakobson, who maintains that metaphor is a predominant feature of symbolic and poetic language, whereas metonymy is the predominant feature of realist prose.<sup>23</sup>

Stanford also argues that the word *μεταφορά* which meant 'metaphor', 'first appears in Isocrates, *Evagoras* 190D'.<sup>24</sup> Isocrates was trying to draw a distinction between poetic language and non-poetic language. The claim is that prose writers do not have the same linguistic privilege or what we call today the 'poetic license' to use whatever linguistic structure is possible to draw the attention of the recipient of the communicative message to the message itself. Isocrates claims that prose writers are

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<sup>22</sup> Jakobson observes in this connection that 'similarity in meaning connects the symbols of a metalanguage with the symbols of the language referred to. Similarity connects a metaphorical term with the term for which it is substituted. Consequently, when constructing a metalanguage to interpret tropes the researcher possesses more homogeneous means to handle metaphor, whereas metonymy, based on a different principle, easily defies interpretation. Therefore, nothing comparable to the rich literature on metaphor can be cited for the theory of metonymy. (1971: 95).

<sup>23</sup> Jakobson (1971: 96).

<sup>24</sup> Stanford (1936: 3).

handicapped in this regard because their discourse has to conform to the forms and terms used by the citizens and to those arguments which are precise and relevant to the subject matter. In other words, Isocrates proposes here that metaphor is a distinctive feature of poetic language because it conveys the experience of the word afresh and provides a kind of defamiliarisation in the way the citizens perceive the world. Again it is quite clear that the reference is made here to metaphor and not to metonymy.

If we turn now to Plato to see to what extent his accounts of the rhetorical figures can help us in our quest for developing an understanding of classical metonymy, we will be disappointed because Plato's idealistic philosophy prevented him from dealing with rhetoric except to condemn it and criticise it as the enemy of truth.<sup>25</sup> The Platonic dialogues reflect the uncomfortable feeling that Plato had towards rhetoric. Plato's ethical philosophy launched an attack against the 'sophists' who were the trainers of rhetoric at that time. However, one should not ignore the Platonic debates regarding whether or not there is some intrinsic relationship between words and their meanings. Householder argues that the question "is the sound-meaning relation of all or some Greek words inevitable and natural?" is the main topic of discussion in Plato's *Cratylus*.<sup>26</sup> Householder maintains that

Democritus (as quoted in Proclus' commentary on the *Cratylus* 16) offered four arguments (with four specially coined names) in favour of arbitrariness: (a) 'homonymy' or 'polysemy', i.e. the same sequence of phonemes may be associated with two or more unrelated meanings; (b) 'polyonymy' or 'isorrophy', i.e. the existence of synonyms, (c) 'metonymy', i.e. the fact that words and meanings change; (d) 'nonymy', i.e. the nonexistence of single words for simple or familiar ideas.<sup>27</sup>

We can see that metonymy was a theory of linguistic signification and a process of meaning creation in ancient Greek philosophy. This corroborates the view expressed above that by being a trope or a semantic operation that involves movement within one and only one semantic domain metonymy attracted the attention of philosophers interested in meaning creation more than rhetoricians and orators who were mainly interested in poetic language.

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid. (4), and Harris and Taylor (1997: 19).

<sup>26</sup> Householder (1995: 92).

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.(93).

Aristotle's treatment of rhetoric and the poetic devices seems to be more explicit and perhaps more fruitful. From his treatment of metaphor in his *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* we can derive an understanding of metonymy, since Aristotle deals with some metonymic relations under metaphor but without explicitly using the word 'metonymy'. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle argues that

Metaphor is the application of a strange term either transferred from the genus and applied to the species or from the species to the genus, or from one species to another or else by analogy.<sup>28</sup>

In his account, Aristotle discusses four types of metaphor. He regards what is known today as metonymy as one of these types. Of the four types of metaphor Aristotle discusses, the first two apply to what we know today as synecdoche. The third type is what we know today as metonymy and it is only the fourth type that corresponds to what we know today as metaphor. In addition to the third type of Aristotle's metaphor, there are some examples which are based on metonymic relations in his fourth type of metaphor. Those Aristotle obviously did not discuss as metonymic.

We can see clearly the metonymic basis of metaphor in Aristotle's example.

6. *A cup is to Dionysus what a shield is to Ares.*

The basis of the figurative relation in this example is metonymic in the first place. This metonymic basis starts by providing a contiguous relation in which the words 'cup' and 'wine' are realised as metonymic by virtue of the first being the container and the second the content. So when we refer to Dionysus' cup we mean the drink in the cup, i.e. the wine. Similarly, Dionysus is the maker of this wine so the relationship here is that of inventor for invention. So Dionysus is used to mean the thing he makes, i.e. the wine. Metonymic relations also underlie the words 'shield' and 'Ares' by means of the mediating notion 'war'. Ares is the maker of shields so it is an inventor for invention metonymic relationship that is at work here. Also there is a contained for container metonymic relationship evident in the example in which the shield is a salient feature of war, thus 'shield' is contained within 'war'. So the whole process as we can see is essentially metonymic. The metaphor comes only after all these metonymic processes have been cognitively resolved and processed. The metaphor is realised by taking Dionysus' cup for Ares' shield and vice versa.

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<sup>28</sup> Aristotle (1927: chap. 21 7-11).

Lodge argues that Aristotle's definition of metaphor has been very influential throughout the history of rhetoric in the west. Lodge goes on to claim that because Aristotle treated metonymy as a subclass of metaphor, metonymy continued to be discussed as such till the late 1950s when Jakobson proposed that metaphor and metonymy are in fact two distinct figures based on two opposite principles.<sup>29</sup> However, it should be noted that not only was Aristotle aware of the effect of metonymy<sup>30</sup> in language, but also he was aware of it in cognition. It is however strange how the connection between these two fundamental aspects of metonymy was missed throughout the history of the trope. Koch argues that Aristotle sets up three relations to account for the process of remembering

so we track down the sequence [of our ideas] by starting from the present moment or from something else and from something similar or opposite or *close* [to it]. That is the way remembering comes about.<sup>31</sup>

The treatment of the notion of 'contiguity' by Aristotle as an aid to memory is suggestive of a cognitive view of rhetoric at the time. However, when rhetoric was reduced to the critical analysis of written texts, the part of rhetoric known as 'memory' dropped out.<sup>32</sup> This is in fact how the gap began to appear between rhetorical theory and the theory of remembering or rather cognitive science in general. As a result, rhetoricians after Aristotle did not benefit from his cognitive treatments of the fourth part of rhetoric. It should be stressed that the cognitive dimension is one of the vital issues that this thesis intends to bring up and relate to other dimensions of metonymy, namely the linguistic and contextual or pragmatic dimensions.

I now move on to discuss Demetrius' account of metonymy in his treatise *On Style*. The treatise addresses metaphor in five successive sections, which is an indication of the importance given to the figure in the discussion of style. The work seems to be devoted to the treatment of the features of prose style and the difference between this and poetic style. One gets this impression when Demetrius states that:

In the first place, then, metaphors must be used; for they impart a special charm and grandeur to prose style. They should not, however, be crowded together, or we shall find ourselves writing dithyrambic poetry in place of prose. Nor yet should they be far-fetched, but natural and based on a true analogy.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Lodge (1977: 75-76).

<sup>30</sup> As a phenomenon although he did not give it this name.

<sup>31</sup> Koch (1999: 141).

<sup>32</sup> C.f. Enkvist (1985:17) and Dixon (1971: 46).

<sup>33</sup> Demetrius. (1927: II, 78).

There is no mention of metonymy in Demetrius' work. This supports the view that metaphor dominated the scene of western classical rhetoric because it was able to provide this charm and grandeur.

Like Demetrius, Longinus' *On the Sublime* also includes no mention of metonymy. To conclude this section, it is useful to cite Eco about the dominance of the whole rhetorical domain by metaphor. Eco holds that

the term *metaphor* for many authors- and this is true for Aristotle and Emanuele Tesauro- has served to indicate every rhetorical figure in general; the metaphor, as the Venerable Bede put it, is "a genus of which all the other tropes are species". To speak of metaphor, therefore, means to speak of rhetorical activity in all its complexity.<sup>34</sup>

Moreover, Group mu express scepticism about the incapability of ancient rhetoric to formulate a satisfactory definition for metonymy in the statement

La rhétorique ancienné a été incapable de formuler une définition satisfaisante de la métonymie.<sup>35</sup>

This observation is quite supportive of the hypothesis that I have been discussing throughout this section which is mainly that the classical rhetorical accounts are not helpful as far as metonymy is concerned. However, the Latin account of metonymy seems to be more elaborate and it is to this tradition that I turn now.

If we move to the Latin account of metonymy we find that it begins with the Auctor's treatise *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (86-82 B.C.) and continues until *Laborintus* (1250) by the German Eberhard. Rosiene divides this quite long tradition into four phases. The first is the classical period which covers the Auctor, Cicero (106-43 B.C.) and Quintilian (first century A.D). The second is late antique grammar: this covers Sacerdos (3<sup>rd</sup> century), Donatus (mid-fourth century), Charisius (mid-fourth century), Diomedes (late fourth century), Pompeius (late fifth century) and Sergius (fifth or sixth century). The third period is the mediaeval period: this covers Cassiodorus (490-575), Isidore of Seville (570-636), Julian of Toledo (642-690), Isidore Junior (653-704) and Bede (673-735). The fourth period is late mediaeval poetics which covers Matthew of Vendome (1175), Geoffrey of Vinsauf (?), Gervase of Melkley (???), John of Garland (1195-1272) and Laborintus (1250). The Latin tradition continues till the Middle Ages and perhaps to the Renaissance.

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<sup>34</sup> Eco (1984: 87).

<sup>35</sup> Group mu, (1970: 117).

I shall start my discussion with the definition provided by the Auctor in his rhetorical treatise known as *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. The Auctor defines metonymy as

the figure which draws from an object closely akin or associated an expression suggesting the object meant, but not called by its own name.<sup>36</sup>

This definition contains a number of elements that need to be discussed. The first element in the definition above is that of ‘drawing’ which is a cognitive process very much similar to ‘abstracting’, that is abstracting from an object or let us say an ‘entity’ because object is rather physical and this abstraction can occur even within abstract entities. The second element is that of ‘closeness’ or ‘association’, which gives the sense of ‘neighbouring’ both physically and cognitively. This is a fundamental characteristic of metonymy and in fact a distinctive feature of metonymic figuration that distinguishes the trope from other figurative tropes.

That the relation that underlies metonymy is of a neighbouring nature is what makes it different from other tropes in general and from metaphor in particular, the underlying relation of which is that of analogy, similarity and resemblance. The third element is the use of the word ‘expression’ in the definition. Rosiene argues that ‘expression’ in both translations is not quite a successful translation of the Latin word ‘oratio’. Rosiene further argues that what the Auctor meant by the word ‘oratio’ is not ‘expression’ as Caplan and Achard translated it. Rather he meant a Latin translation of the Greek *logos*.<sup>37</sup> Rosiene then engages in a discussion of the Greek notion of ‘logos’ to conclude that the meaning of ‘expression’ if seen under the Stoic linguistic philosophy in fact translates among other things as ‘relation’.<sup>38</sup> Rosiene<sup>39</sup> argues that the Auctor’s definition of metonymy and his term ‘denominatio’ which is translated as ‘metonymy’ has four distinct processes which are fundamental to the understanding of the nature of metonymy. These are:

1. it denominates things
2. and it abstracts a relation from these things
3. in such a way that a thing may be understood

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<sup>36</sup> The Auctor [Cicero]. (1954: iv, 43).

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Rosiene (1992: 178-180).

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. (181).

<sup>39</sup> Rosiene (1992: 183).

4. that may not be not called by its common name

So in any metonymic signification we have four separate processes. These start by denominating, i.e. signifying or picking up a referent. Then there is a process of abstracting a relation between referents. This abstracting is actually the result of perceiving of relations of contiguity between phenomena and things. Understanding is the result of the perception of these relations. The metonymic process is then concluded by the process of calling that thing by a name that it is not its common name but one with which it is associated. Perceived as such then metonymy will be a figure of speech in which there is a process of abstracting a relation of proximity between two words to the extent that one will be used in place of another.

If we move to Cicero we find that he begins his discussion of metonymy by emphasising its importance and value in the stylistic embellishment of the oration. He states

This [metonymy] is a valuable stylistic ornament; but care must be taken to avoid obscurity – and in fact it is usually the way in which what are called riddles are constructed; but this mode does not turn on a single word but consists in the general style, that is, in a series of words.<sup>40</sup>

It is interesting to note that Cicero's definition of metonymy swings between considering metonymy as a trope pertaining to 'general style' as Caplan translates the Latin term 'oratio' or to 'verbal succession and rhetorical period', which is Rosiene's translation of the term, and the consideration of metonymy as a trope pertaining to the word. The first part of Cicero's definition conveys the impression that for him metonymy is a periodical trope as he relates its processes to the series of words rather than to a single word. However, as one goes on in his definition one arrives at the conclusion that Cicero reduces the scope and the tropical power of the trope to the level of the word. In fact, this last reductionist view is what Cicero adheres to when he formulates his last conception of the trope when he maintains that metonymy occurs when 'for the sake of ornament one proper name is substituted for another'.<sup>41</sup> The definition of metonymy in Cicero is both lexically-based and ornamentally motivated. This shows clearly how metonymy was severely reduced to merely a substitution of names for aesthetic purposes.

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<sup>40</sup> Cicero. (1927: III, 167).

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

The fact that Cicero's definition lacks the concept of 'closeness' which appears in the Auctor's definition is an indication of a remarkable change in the rhetorical tradition at this early stage of the classical Latin period. This does not suggest that rhetorical theory in this period was not progressing in an evolutionary manner. Rather the development was individual or personal. I think the Auctor's concept of 'closely akin or associated' is a significant development of a conception of metonymy away from the influence and bias of metaphor. However, there is a notable regression to the Greek conception of metaphor being the trope of tropes when the notion of 'closeness' is cancelled from the definition of both Cicero and Quintilian and the trope is reduced to a mere substitution. This reduction makes the trope rather vague and difficult to distinguish from other tropes, particularly from metaphor which also involves substitution.

Now I turn to the definition of metonymy provided by Quintilian who defines metonymy as a trope which

consists in the substitution of one name for another, and as Cicero tells us, is called hypallage by the rhetoricians.<sup>42</sup>

This definition is nothing but another version of Cicero's definition we discussed above except that the word 'proper' is missing in Quintilian's definition. Perhaps this is a significant late antique change in the way tropes are viewed in isolation rather than in relation to one other. That is to say that the tendency of classical Latin rhetoricians to say that in metonymy we encounter a movement from a proper name to another was mainly an attempt to define metonymy in relation to metaphor which constituted a movement from a proper name to an improper one. It should also be noted that the notion of 'proximity' is missing from Quintilian's definition as it is also from Cicero's.

When we move towards the late antique period we find that the number of orators and rhetoricians who treated rhetorical tropes in a practical manner was increasing due to the fact that rhetoric was increasingly becoming a subject in the school curriculum. This meant that the rhetorical treatises of these periods were in large measure practical accounts of how to improve writing skill and how to sharpen critical ability. In the late antique period, we first meet Sacerdos of the third century whose definition of metonymy is suggestive of a remarkable departure from previous definitions. This departure is embodied in the fact that the definition does not include the traditional terms like 'words' or 'name'. Instead we have the term 'signification' used. This is a

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<sup>42</sup> Quintilian. (1979: VIII. Vi. 23).

very interesting point because it stresses the issue of the relationship between figurative theory and signification, which is the issue to be raised in the third chapter of this thesis.

Sacerdos defines metonymy as

Speech descending from a proper signification to a proper [one]  
through an interpretation of proximity.<sup>43</sup>

In Sacerdos' definition we notice a return to the notion of 'proximity' which I think is both a sign of maturation in tropical understanding and also an indication of a continuation from classical traditions. The account is illuminating in the sense that the two prime elements of the cognitive processes involved in metonymic processing are included in this definition. These are 'signification' and 'proximity'. In essence metonymic processes are semiotic because there is a use of a linguistic sign which has a meaning other than itself. The notion of proximity is also important because this is what makes this signification resolvable and makes it cognitively accessible and easily retrievable.

After Sacerdos we begin a tradition of naming rather than defining the trope. In other words rhetoricians became interested in how to name the trope or what to call it. This was a real problem for them due to the fact that the terms used oscillated between Greek metonymia of the grammarians and hypallage of the rhetoricians as Cicero tells us, on the one hand, and between the Latin denominatio, transnominatio and transmutatio, on the other. Donatus, for example, defines the trope as 'diction one might call "transnominatio" as it were'.<sup>44</sup> So it is the 'naming' that is sought here and the hesitation is indicative of a rather confused account of the trope.

For Charisius, metonymy is 'diction transferred from some signification to another proximity'.<sup>45</sup> There is hope in this definition of a progressive account of metonymy. The definition seems compatible with classical definitions and accounts for both the process of signification and the relation of proximity. This is reminiscent of Sacerdos' account of the trope. However, Diomedes' definition brings us back to the concept of propriety in the relation between elements in a tropical domain while at the same time it lacks the

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<sup>43</sup> See Rosiene (1992: 210).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. (239).

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. (219).

notion of proximity. He defines metonymy as ‘diction translated from some proper signification to another proper [one]’.<sup>46</sup>

Towards the end of late antiquity we witness a return to the reductionist view of metonymy in which the nature of the trope is not given real importance and is only given a name. Metonymy for Pompeius, for example, is ‘what one might call *denominatio*’.<sup>47</sup> Without the hesitation witnessed in Donatus’ “as it were”, Pompeius can be seen as a starting of a tradition in which rhetoricians will try to simply give the name ‘*denominatio*’ to the trope without any hesitation. Cassiodorus describes metonymy as the process in which ‘we indicate the meaning of a thing in diverse ways by means of alien translated words’.<sup>48</sup> Cassiodorus maintains that ‘the trope is called *metonymia* in Greek, *transnominatio* in Latin’.<sup>49</sup> One thing that is significant about Cassiodorus’ definition is that it shifts the description from names or words to ‘things’. This is important for the semiotic treatment of the trope since it tells us that the substitution can actually take place between things also, not only names or words.

Isidore defines metonymy as ‘*metonymia, transnominatio, the translation [of a name?] from some signification to another proximity*’.<sup>50</sup> Julian’s metonymy is ‘what one might call “*transnominatio*” as it were’.<sup>51</sup> Bede gives the same definition for metonymy as ‘what one might call “*transnominatio*” as it were’.<sup>52</sup> Isidore Junior defines the trope as ‘*metonymia is transnominatio as it were*’.<sup>53</sup>

Gervase of Melkley describes the trope as follows: ‘*metonymia is the same as transnominatio. For meta [is] trans, onoma nomen*’.<sup>54</sup> Matthew of Vendome states that ‘*metonymia is transmutatio*’.<sup>55</sup> Geoffrey of Vinsauf argues that

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid. (226).

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. (240).

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. (218).

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. (241).

<sup>50</sup> Ibid (226).

<sup>51</sup> Ibid (239).

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. (244).

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. (242).

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. (244).

among the figures is a certain figure called metonymia when container is posed for contained.<sup>56</sup>

John of Garland uses the name *denominatio* with description to denote a process

when one draws a relation from neighbourly things, by means of which a thing may be able to be understood that was not called by its common name.<sup>57</sup>

To conclude this section it should be pointed out that my hypothesis outlined in the introduction to this chapter that metonymy in western rhetorical scholarship suffers from theoretical reductionism, *prima facie*, is not valid. This is because the investigation shows that western rhetoricians acknowledged that metonymy is not only a substitution of words, but also a process of substituting things for things. The treatment of metonymy as a process of substituting a word for a word is evident in Cicero's treatment of the trope, in Quintilian's treatment, Isidore of Seville and Diomedes. The treatment of metonymy as a process of substitution which involves things is evident in the Auctor, Cassiodorus and John of Garland. The treatment of metonymy as a process of signification is evident in Sacerdos, Charisus, Diomedos and Isidore of Seville. All other definitions of the trope by the scholars discussed above are naming definitions.

However, on a deeper level the brief history provided above shows that although these definitions take metonymy beyond its linguistic boundaries and include other dimensions like ontology, these treatments neglect the cognitive basis of metonymy and are not integrated into a coherent model. Rather they are scattered and random attempts. They, therefore, appear at one time and disappear at another. Some scholars treat metonymy as substitution between words, others between things and others as involving signification. These treatments were never integrated into a coherent model and the history is not progressive in the sense that once a step is achieved the next generation takes the discussion from there and develops it further. Rather we have several examples of some progress which was followed by a total fallback on narrow views. In short, the history of metonymy continued to oscillate between reduced and abrupt definitions and returning back to classical definition or resorting to a method of giving names rather than definitions, as we have seen towards the late mediaeval period. At other times the treatments of metonymy involve nothing but giving examples of metonymy.

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid. (248).

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. (250).

Besides, the treatments were all carried out under the assumption that metonymy is a poetic device which conveys some sort of deviation from normal modes of language structure to provide some charm and grandeur to the style. Furthermore, the treatments were all confined to the lexical level and no treatment attempted to discuss the role of the trope in providing connectivity to text. It should be illuminating to provide a brief history of metonymy in the Arabic rhetorical tradition to see how it was treated here and whether there were similarities or differences in the Arab account of the trope with that of the western account of it; more importantly, to see whether my hypothesis will still hold as far as the Arabic treatment of metonymy is concerned. It is to this aspect that I turn now in the last section of this chapter.

#### 1.4. Metonymy in Arabic Rhetoric:

The title of this section is somewhat strange because metonymy is a western concept and there is some sort of imposition of this notion on Arabic rhetorical scholarship. However, in bilingual Arabic/English dictionaries there is a constant tendency to translate the word *kināyah* as metonymy. This section aims to show that metonymy as a substitution of one word for another with which it is related is wider than this dictionary rendering and involves more than what is conventionally regarded as *kināyah*. I provide the following illustration of the classification of figuration in Arabic rhetoric which shows the place of *kināyah* in relation to the overall figurative space in Arabic rhetoric:




Figure 1.2. Classification of types of transference in Arabic rhetoric.

The diagram above shows that in Arabic rhetorical theory there are two major types of transference. The first is linguistic transference and the second is cognitive transference. Within linguistic transference we have borrowing, covering and other loose relations. I am not interested in transference which is based on *mushābahah* relations, represented in the diagram by the Arabic term *isti'ārah*, i.e. borrowing. I am interested in three types of transference which I believe are related or at least can be related to build up a model of non-similarity transference. The first of these is the transference based on cognitive relations. This is termed in the diagram above as *majāz 'aqli* 'cognitive transference'. The second is the type of linguistic transference which is based on *mulāzamah* 'contiguity' relations, which is termed in the diagram above as, *kināyah*. The third type of *majāz* I am interested in is the type of transference which is based on loose relations and is termed in the diagram above *majāz mursal*.

The division of transference into two major categories is a remarkably significant attempt by Arab rhetoricians to view transference not only as a linguistic phenomenon but also as a cognitive phenomenon. This takes the discussions of Arab rhetoricians of transference far beyond formal substitution and considers the whole process in its wider cognitive as well as linguistic context. I therefore argue that the term metonymy involves the following three types of transference discussed in Arabic rhetoric.<sup>58</sup>


1. *Majāz 'aqli*
2. *Majāz mursal*
3. *Kināyah*

The logic behind this classification is that while the first and third of these pertain to the worlds of concepts and language respectively, in view of the fact that they are known in Arabic rhetoric as cognitive and linguistic respectively, the second pertains to the world of things and objects, in view of the fact that the relations underlying it are essentially existential relations such as adjacency, positionality and contingency. With this I conceptualise metonymy in Arabic rhetoric as having three dimensions: the cognitive dimension represented by *majāz 'aqli*, the linguistic dimension represented by *kināyah*

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<sup>58</sup> See Miftāh for a similar attempt to treat both *kināyah* and *majāz mursal* as one phenomenon. In this connection he argues that *majāz mursal* becomes one special case of *kināyah* because both involve a relation between two things', *ibid.* (1985: 114-115).<sup>29</sup>

and the ontological dimension represented by *majāz mursal*.<sup>59</sup> This is the semiotic approach under which I intend to deal with the trope and develop a textual model in which the three levels of representations interact to provide unity and connectedness to text in its three realms. The following is an illustration of the three-dimensional transference I am calling contiguous transference in Arabic rhetoric.



**Figure 1.3. The three dimensions of contiguous transference in Arabic rhetoric.**

In the following paragraphs, I shall present the definitions provided for these three types of contiguous transference by Arab rhetoricians.

#### 1.4.1. *Kināyah*:

We find the first reference to *kināyah* by Abū 'Ubaydah<sup>60</sup> in his book *Majāz al-Qur'an*. He refers to it as a linguistic phenomenon and uses the grammarians' conception of it when he considers it the omission of the noun and its substitution with a pronoun. In other words, Abū 'Ubaydah treats *kināyah* as 'implicitness' in linguistic reference where only a pronoun is mentioned without any nominal antecedent before it or any resolvable reference after it. The examples he uses include the following verses from the Qur'an:

7. *Kullu man 'alayhā fān*. The Qur'an. (55: 26).<sup>61</sup>
8. *Ḥattā tawārat bi al-hijāb*. The Qur'an. (38: 32).<sup>62</sup>
9. *Falawlā 'idhā balaghātī l-hulqūm*. The Qur'an. (56:83).<sup>63</sup>

<sup>59</sup> This type of *majāz* is based on existential relations like totality, partiality, situationality and positionality. These relations obviously pertain to the world of things and objects and not so much to the world of words or concepts.

<sup>60</sup> Died 833/210).

<sup>61</sup> *All that is on it will perish.*

<sup>62</sup> *Until it was hidden in the veil of night.*

<sup>63</sup> *Yea when it reaches to the collar-bone.*

Then Abu 'Ubaydah comments that the pronoun highlighted in (7) means 'the earth' and in (8) means 'the sun' and in (9) means 'the soul'. This is a subtle explanation of a linguistic phenomenon known nowadays as exophoric reference where there is no noun in the text and yet a pronoun is used to be interpreted by means of context because the reference is outside the text. The referent might be construed in the immediate context of situation or it might be a salient feature of the universe of discourse. What is interesting in Abū 'Ubaydah's treatment is that he considers *kināyah* an example of implicitness or covering a linguistic item. This treatment, although primitive, constitutes the first attempt to account for this linguistic phenomenon by giving it a rhetorical explanation.

Al-Jāhiz also alludes to *kināyah* in his book *al-Bayān wa al-Tabayin* when he reviews the definitions of rhetoric in other cultures. He presents the definition of rhetoric in the Indian tradition as follows: 'rhetoric is insight in proof and the awareness of when to exploit chances of argument'. Al-Jāhiz then comments that the indication of the awareness of these two principles in rhetoric is to avoid explicitness and resort to implicitness if explicitness would be more difficult for the audience.<sup>64</sup> According to al-Jāhiz, the sign of rhetoric is the use of implicitness<sup>65</sup> where it is appropriate and the use of explicitness where it is fitting.<sup>66</sup> This, of course, corresponds to the definition of rhetoric in the Arabic culture as the appropriateness of speech to the context of speech. If the context requires a grand style then it is mandatory to use grand style, and if it requires a middle or a low style then it is considered foolishness to use grand style in this type of context.

Al-Mubarrad<sup>67</sup> in his book *al-Kāmil*, instead of defining *kināyah*, identifies a number of functions of *kināyah*. It should be noted however that the treatment of *kināyah* by al-Mubarrad is entirely linguistic; this is not surprising due to his linguistic and particularly grammatical background and orientation. In fact, most rhetorical remarks were first identified by grammarians trying to explain the various styles of Arabic

<sup>64</sup> Al-Jāhiz (1948: vol. 1, 88).

<sup>65</sup> The word used in the Arabic text is '*kināyah*' which could be translated as metonymy but I preferred to use the general meaning which is intended in the original text as contrasted to *tasriḥ*, i.e. explicitness. It should be noted here that the term *kināyah* in Arabic is always associated with implicitness – a point that will be elaborated further in the course of this chapter.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Died in 898/285.

sentence construction. It is important to note here that al-Mubarrad and other grammarians did not do rhetorical study any significant benefit and it was only with the work of rhetoricians like al-Jurjāni, al-‘Askari, Ibn al-Athīr and al-Sakkāki and others that rhetoric began to emerge as an art separate from grammar, although it continued to exhibit a strong grammatical affiliation. In addition to the discussion of the linguistic aspect of *kināyah*, Al-Mubarrad discusses the social aspect of *kināyah* which is not relevant to the course of this thesis.<sup>68</sup>

I shall turn now to a well-known book in Arabic rhetoric. This is *Kitāb al-Badi‘* by Ibn al-Mu‘tazz who attempted to search for the origins of *badi‘* in classical sources of the Arabic language, i.e. in the classical poetry of the pre-Islamic period and the very early Islamic poetry as well as in the Qur’an and in the Traditions of the Prophet. His aim was to prove that the innovative styles were not actually new and that they had their origins in classical Arabic poetry and in the Qur’an. Ibn al-Mu‘tazz seems to regard *kināyah* and *ta‘rīdh* ‘*allusion*’ as the same phenomenon. Other Arab rhetoricians, on the other hand, regard the former as an example of indirect meaning interpreted by means of an attribute or a word semantically related to the omitted word, while the latter corresponds to a phenomenon whereby the indirect meaning is interpreted by means of context.<sup>69</sup>

The next important author is Qudāmah ibn Ja‘far,<sup>70</sup> who was one of the leading literary critics of the tenth century. He discussed *kināyah* under the heading *‘irdāf* which could roughly be translated into ‘contiguity or adjacency’. He defined it as

the process in which the poet intends a meaning but does not give a word conveying that meaning. Rather he gives a word that conveys a meaning contiguous or adjacent to that meaning.<sup>71</sup>

We can see from this definition that Qudāmah considers *kināyah* and *‘irdāf* as the same phenomenon. The treatment of *kināyah* and *‘irdāf* as one and the same trope has been used by rhetoricians and critics other than Qudāmah. For example Khafāji also holds the

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<sup>68</sup> Al-Mubarrad’s social functions of *kināyah* revolve around the social values designated to covering names by means of title ‘*kunayah*’. It should be noted here that some Arab rhetoricians give examples of what they perceive as *kināyah* that are derived totally by means of convention rather than by means of proximity or contiguity. For example, they would interpret the word *na‘jah* ‘ewe’ which is mentioned in the Qur’anic verse *inna hādihā ‘akhi lahu tis‘un wa tis‘ün na‘jatan* ‘this man, who is my brother, has ninety nine ewes’ as ‘woman’.

<sup>69</sup> Context here refers to the wider notion of context which is the cultural context as in the case of idioms for example.

<sup>70</sup> Died 945/337.

<sup>71</sup> Qudāmah (1958: 113).

same view and gives al-Buḥturi's line in which he describes the way he killed a wolf as an example.<sup>72</sup> The line runs:

10. *Fa'atba 'tuhä 'ukhrä fa'adhlaltu naṣlahä*

*biḥaythu yakünu al-lubbu wa al-ru'bu wa al-ḥiqdu.*<sup>73</sup>

According to Khafäji<sup>74</sup> there is a use of *kinäyah* in the line in the words 'where reason, fear and malice reside'. The poet intended to say the heart but instead of this word he used words for feelings that usually occupy the heart so he used a container/content relationship in this *kinäyah*. Then Qudämah gives a line of poetry that describes a woman:

11. *Ba'idatu mahwa al-qurti 'immä linawfalın*

*'abühä wa'imma 'abdu shamsin wa häshimi.*<sup>75</sup>

Qudämah maintains that the earring being described as long is a *kinäyah* because the intended meaning is that the woman's neck is long and this according to the Arabs is a sign of beauty in a woman. The semantic adjacency or the semantic entailment of the expression stems from the fact that if the woman's earring ornament is long then this entails that she has a long neck.

Abü Hiläl al-'Askari who was both a rhetorician and a literary critic is said to have transformed *balāghah* 'rhetoric' into criticism.<sup>76</sup> He is a proponent of the scholastic school of al-Jähiz and Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir and others. This can be understood from his pursuit of the significance of form in the rhetorical organisation of a piece of speech, be it a poem or a piece of prose. In this sense, he was a supporter of al-Jähiz's formal school.<sup>77</sup> Therefore, we find that al-'Askari's discussion of *kinäyah* is included under the part of rhetoric known as *badi'* 'embellishment', which is basically the adornment of form. In his discussion of *kinäyah* Al-'Askari treats *kinäyah* and *ta'riḍh* as the same

<sup>72</sup> See for a further discussion Kanazi (1989:156).

<sup>73</sup> *I stabbed it again and made the spear head*

*disappear where reason, fear and malice reside*

<sup>74</sup> See for details Kanazi (1989: 156).

<sup>75</sup> Her ear-hanging ornament is long. Her Father is

either of the Nawfal House or of 'Abd Shams or Häshim.

<sup>76</sup> See Maṭlūb (1978: 140).

phenomenon. He discusses them both under one heading entitled *al-kināyah wa al-ta'riḍh* 'metonymy and allusion'. The definition he provides for *kināyah* and *ta'riḍh* is 'the manner in which meanings are expressed in a suggestive way rather than a declarative way'.<sup>78</sup> He gives two examples illustrating *kināyah* and *ta'riḍh*. Both examples are Qur'anic verses:

12. 'aw jā'a 'aḥadun minkum min al-ghā'iti 'aw lāmastumu al-nisā'. The Qur'an (4: 43).<sup>79</sup>

13. *wa furushin marfū'ah*. The Qur'an (56: 34).<sup>80</sup>

In (12), there are two examples of *kināyah* where the word 'privy' is used to give the meaning of 'passing the bowels' and the word 'touch' is used to denote an extended meaning beyond touching which is 'sexual intercourse'. Both metonymic examples are actually euphemistic examples of metonymy to express taboo meanings. In example (13) the word 'couches' is used to suggest women.<sup>81</sup> This type of interpretation is warranted by following discourse.

Among the literary critics who discussed *kināyah* in their critical works is Ibn Rashīq al-Qayrawāni<sup>82</sup> who wrote a book entitled *al-'Umdah fi Sinā'at al-Shi'r wa Naqdihi*. Al-Qayrawāni included a chapter on the rhetorical aspect he called *tatbī'*. Looking at the examples he provided one reaches the conclusion that he meant by *tatbī'* the concept of *kināyah*. Moreover, al-Qayrawāni's *tatbī'* corresponds to Qudāmah's *'irdāf*. Al-Qayrawāni defines *tatbī'* as a type of signalling and he points out that some people call it transference in which the poet intends to mention something but omits that thing itself and mentions something strongly associated with it.<sup>83</sup> The first example al-Qayrawāni gives to illustrate *tatbī'* is 'Imru'u al-Qays' line:

<sup>77</sup> For details see Ṭabbānah (1981) who discusses al-'Askari's theory of form in a whole chapter (127-150).

<sup>78</sup> Al-'Askari (1952: 360).

<sup>79</sup> *if you come from the privy, or you have touched women.*

<sup>80</sup> *and on couches raised high.*

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Died 1063/456.

<sup>83</sup> Al-Qayrawāni (1907: 215).

14. *Yabītu futātu al-miski fawqa firāshihā na'ūmu al-dhuhā lam tantatīq min tafadhdhuli.*<sup>84</sup>

In this example al-Qayrawāni argues that *kināyah* is in the phrase 'forenoon sleeper' by which the poet intended to convey a meaning that the woman is a prosperous woman who does not get up early in the morning to bring the necessary things like wood for cooking because she has servants to do such things for her. Another level of reasoning comes into action once we know that she is a prosperous woman and that she has servants doing all the housework for her. This is that she is a soft woman because she does not hurt her body with work. Of course, softness is regarded among the signs of beauty and this is why the poet has described her as such.

In his book *Dalā'il al-'i'jāz*, al-Jurjāni defines *kināyah* as

the situation in which the speaker wants to convey a meaning which he does not convey via the conventional word in the language. Rather he goes to a meaning which is adjacent and contiguous to that which he wants to convey; so with this he indicates the conventional meaning.<sup>85</sup>

The examples Al-Jurjāni gives to illustrate his definition include

15. *Tawīl al-nijād.*<sup>86</sup>

16. *Na'ūm al-dhuhā.*<sup>87</sup>

17. *Kathīru ramādi al-qidr.*<sup>88</sup>

In example (15) we have the expression 'long sword' giving the meaning that the man is tall. Because if the sword is long this entails that the man carrying that sword is tall. This example seems to exploit a cause-effect metonymic relationship in which the fact that the sword the man wears is long is because the man himself is tall. This example is similar to the woman having a long earring. The fact that the earring is long means that the neck of the woman is long. In example (16) of the woman who sleeps in the forenoon, the meaning intended is that she is a prosperous woman because according to the life patterns of the Arabs, women get up early in the morning and spend the whole morning working to earn their living. This woman sleeps in the forenoon because she has servants doing the job for her. This means that 'Imru'u al-Qays' lover is beautiful and soft because she does not do any work. Example (17) shows that the more ash

<sup>84</sup> The bits of musk remain in her bed till late morning

A forenoon sleeper who does not wear work clothes

<sup>85</sup> See al-Jurjāni (1964: 52).

<sup>86</sup> he has a long sword.

<sup>87</sup> she sleeps in the forenoon.

found under one's pot the more generous one is, simply because this means that he cooks a lot which in turn means that he feeds a lot of guests. Therefore, *kathir al-ramād* 'he has a lot of ash' is a sign that is associated with generosity.

In the three examples given by al-Jurjāni we find a common feature shared by all of them which is a distinctive characteristic of *kināyah*. This is the strong association between the term substituted and the term substituted for. The definitions above provide a ground to claim that a principal feature of *kināyah* is the meaning associations in which one meaning calls or conjures other related meanings either from the immediate context of situation as probably example (15) shows or from the broader context of culture like that depicted in examples (16) and (17).

Al-Sakkāki gives a quite different definition for *kināyah* in which he states that *kināyah* is

to leave pronouncement of a term and resort to mentioning what that term entails to transfer the interpretation from the mentioned item to the left item.<sup>89</sup>

What is interesting in the treatment of al-Sakkāki is his concentration on the notion of entailment; *lāzim* 'the entailing' and *malzūm* 'the entailed' in the definition of *kināyah*. This reminds us of the logical background of the man as one of the leaders of the scholastic school of rhetoric. This school focussed on the application of logic to the study of rhetoric and their contribution was in the classification and categorisation of figurative notions and rhetorical concepts. Al-Sakkāki then gives a number of frequently-cited examples of *kināyah* like that of the woman who sleeps in the forenoon, of the man who has a long sword, and the man who has a lot of ash under his pot.

Al-Qazwīni in his *'idhāh* defines *kināyah* as

the term used to entail something semantically concomitant with it, with the possibility of intending the literal meaning of this term.<sup>90</sup>

The fact that the use of the expression *ṭawīlu al-nijād* 'long sword' to mean the tallness of the body of the carrier of this sword is a type of *kināyah* is true in view of the logical inference that is motivated by the expression 'long swords' which suggests that the people wearing these long swords must be tall. This is the metonymic use because we

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<sup>88</sup> *he has a lot of ash under his cauldron.*

<sup>89</sup> See al-Sakkāki (1937: 189).

<sup>90</sup> Compare al-Qazwīni (n.d.: 183).

do not mean the literal meaning of the words 'long sword' but we go beyond it to mean its semantically related concept of tallness. However, the speaker may also intend the literal meaning of the words 'long sword' and this according to al-Qazwīni is the difference between *kināyah* and *majāz* 'metaphor'. In metaphor only the transferred meaning is intended because when you say that Zaid is a lion you cannot mean that Zaid is the animal in reality. In *kināyah*, by contrast, you can mean the literal meaning of the term also. So you can use the expression 'He is the man who has a long sword' to mean that he has a long sword and nothing more.

Ibn al-Athīr<sup>91</sup> defines *kināyah* as

the word which refers to a meaning that can be taken on both planes,  
i.e. the literal and the figurative by means of a general term relating  
the two types of meaning.<sup>92</sup>

Ibn al-Athīr gives the example of the word *na'jatan* 'ewe' which is used in the Qur'anic verse given here as (18)

18. 'inna hādha 'akhi lahu tis'un wa tis'un na'jatan wa liya na'jatun wāhīdatun. (The Qur'an, 38: 23).<sup>93</sup>

Ibn Al-Athīr argues that the word *na'jatan* 'an ewe' in this verse is a metonymic expression for woman because both 'woman' and *na'jah* 'ewe' agree in one semantic feature which is that they are both '+ feminine'. In this case Ibn Al-Athīr substantiates his theory of *kināyah* as pertaining to the two levels of signification; the literal as well as the figurative because the word *na'jah* 'ewe' could be interpreted as 'woman' and could also be interpreted as *na'jah* 'ewe' and nothing else.<sup>94</sup>

Al-'Alawi in his treatise *Al-Tirāz* gives a three-level definition of *kināyah*. Two of these are literal and the third is figurative. The first linguistic meaning of *kināyah* is the root *kanaya* or *kanawa*:<sup>95</sup> this means 'titling'. The Arabs were used to addressing one another with titles as a sign of respect. For example they would call someone Abu Ali (the father of Ali) if he has a son called Ali. The second linguistic meaning is derived from the meaning of 'covering'. This explains why the third meaning, which is the

<sup>91</sup> Died 1237/637.

<sup>92</sup> C.f. 'Atīq (n.d. 44).

<sup>93</sup> This man, who is my brother, has ninety nine ewes and I have only one ewe.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. This view is very important in view of modern treatments of metonymy which view the trope as comprising two types; one is called referential metonymy and the other predicative metonymy. (See chapter 2, sections 2.1.2.4. and 2.1.2.5. for details of this.

<sup>95</sup> Both forms are morphologically possible.

rhetorical meaning, is also, to some extent, based on this second definition. In this case, however, the covering is figurative rather than physical.

Then al-‘Alawi reviews a set of definitions provided by rhetoricians before him, such as al-Jurjāni, al-Māliki and Ibn al-Athīr. Al-‘Alawi seems to reject the definitions provided by these rhetoricians. He attempts a refutation of these definitions, which he sees as containing some faulty expressions of *kināyah*. After he refutes the definitions of *kināyah* provided by these scholars, he provides his own definition in which he states that *kināyah* is ‘the term referring to two different meanings, literal and figurative, without a medium and not in a declarative way’.<sup>96</sup> Having posed this definition, al-‘Alawi then explains the elements of his definition. Each element of the definition is explained and narrowed down to eliminate all other semantic possibilities of the element. This is a logical method in which precision in definition is sought. The use of the word ‘referring’ in the definition is significant because this distinguishes *kināyah* from *ta‘riḍh* ‘allusion’ which is understood by contextual interpretation rather than by semantic reference. The reason why he uses ‘two meanings’, al-‘Alawi argues, is to differentiate *kināyah* from other words that have one meaning like ‘man’ and ‘horse’. The use of the term ‘different’ in the definition is to distinguish *kināyah* from synonymy. The use of the terms ‘literal and figurative’ is to distinguish *kināyah* from simple polysemy, where words have more than one meaning but all of them are literal. The term ‘without a medium’ is to distinguish *kināyah* from simile, which is expressed via a linguistic medium, i.e. the particle ‘like’ or ‘as’. The term ‘not in a declarative way’ tells us that *kināyah* is indirect and that it is metaphor, which is expressed via direct declaration of the term.<sup>97</sup>

#### 1.4.2. *Majāz ‘aqlī*:

This is what has been translated earlier as ‘cognitive transference’. It is the type of figuration in which the verb or the action is predicated to an agent other than the real doer. In western rhetorical traditions discussed in this chapter section 1.3., this type of figuration is discussed under the general heading of metonymy. In this section, I shall review the set of definitions provided by Arab rhetoricians for this type of figuration. In the discussion of this type of figurative use, attention will be paid to the insights we can

<sup>96</sup> See al-‘Alawi (1914: 373).

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

extract from these definitions to incorporate into a combined approach to the way metonymy is viewed and how it functions in texts.

In his book *al-Ṣinā'atayn*, Abū Hilāl al-'Askari is mainly interested in the discussion of *majāz* in its general sense. That is to say he concentrates on the discussion of '*isti'ārah*' 'metaphor' and provides numerous examples for this type of *majāz* in the Qur'an and in the speech of the Arabs whether poetry or prose. It seems that at that early stage of Arabic rhetoric the concept of *majāz* was not yet developed into a fully-fledged theory as expounded in the writings of al-Jurjāni or al-Sakkāki who came later towards the fifth century and onwards. Therefore, the discussion of *majāz 'aqli* is lacking in earlier treatises.

Al-Jurjāni discusses *majāz 'aqli* in some detail in his book *Asrār al-balāghah*. In this book al-Jurjāni considers the distinction between *majāz 'aqli* and *majāz lughawi*. The discussion is detailed and sophisticated. It strongly suggests the importance of the distinction between *ḥaqīqah* and *majāz* due to the religious background this distinction came to represent. In fact, the differences that cropped up between the various Muslim groups involved in the scholastic debates known as '*ilm al-kalām*' was basically the issue of interpreting the verses which exhibit figurative use of the language. The main thrust of al-Jurjāni's discussion of *majāz* is the distinction between three elements in the sentential semantic structure. The first element is that of *musnad 'ilayh* 'subject', the second is that of *musnad* 'predicate' and the third element is the relationship of '*isnād*' 'predication'. On the basis of this distinction al-Jurjāni proposes his theory of *majāz*. He maintains<sup>98</sup> that if the transfer is in the word that is functioning as predicate then the type of figuration is *lughawi* 'linguistic' because it is going to be a play on the meaning of the word – a quality that is provided by the language as a conventional system. However, if the transfer is in the predication then the type of figuration is '*aqli*' 'cognitive' because the action will be attributed to some entity other than the real doer – a phenomenon that can only be interpreted by means of a cognitive judgement that there is some kind of relationship between the real doer of the action and the subject used. This relationship has to be a relationship other than similarity otherwise the figuration will be that of metaphor.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. Al-Jurjāni (1954: 345-360).

One very interesting point al-Jurjāni puts forward in his discussion is that of 'intentionality' in *majāz 'aqli*. He states that the use of the deviated form in the construction of *majāz 'aqli* has to be intentional. This is to say that the user has to opt for this deviated form to achieve aesthetic effect, and that he should not believe that the subject used is the real doer of the action. He illustrates this from the Qur'an including the verse in which God speaks on behalf of the nonbelievers who say:

19. *wa mā yuhlikunā 'illa al-dahr*. The Qur'an (45: 24).<sup>99</sup>

Here we cannot say that these nonbelievers were opting to use *majāz 'aqli* when they attributed the action of destroying to time instead of God. The reason for this is that they really think that it is Time that destroys them and they said this without the intention of using language figuratively in this particular example. The definition that al-Jurjāni provides for *majāz 'aqli* is

any sentence whose semantic judgement is transferred from that which it normally conveys with the purpose of figuration is *majāz*.<sup>100</sup>

In his book *Dalā'il al-'i'jāz* al-Jurjāni discusses *majāz*, which he thinks is vital to the understanding of how language is used in real life situations to create certain aesthetic effect. Al-Jurjāni defines *majāz 'aqli* as that type of figuration which does not involve a transfer in the meaning of a word but a transfer in the predication or rather in the attribution of actions to entities that do not normally do them. Al-Jurjāni gives as an example the verse in which God says:

20. *'ulā'ika alladhīna 'ishtaraw al-dhalālata bil-hudā famā rabihat tijāratuhum*. The Qur'an (2: 16).<sup>101</sup>

Al-Jurjāni dwells on the concept of 'profit' being a verb predicated to 'trade' which is obviously not capable of doing any action. This predication, al-Jurjāni maintains,<sup>102</sup> is a good example of *majāz 'aqli* because the transfer is not in the nature of the meaning of the verb 'profit' itself, but in the fact that it is being predicated to 'trade' - a subject that is not animate and hence not capable of performing an action of profiting. Al-Jurjāni's argument centres on the fact that the meaning of the word 'profit' is by no means transferred because the original meaning of it is still intact. However, it is the

<sup>99</sup> And nothing but time destroys us.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Al-Jurjāni (1954: 356). Here he means *majāz 'aqli* because the whole discussion is devoted to this type of *majāz* and the examples are illustrations of it.

<sup>101</sup> They are those who bought guidance for error so their trade did not profit.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Al-Jurjāni (1946: 227).

predication of this verb to 'trade' that makes the desired aesthetic effect by means of a cognitive transfer.

Al-Sakkäki defines *majäz 'aqli* as

speech that is transferred from its conventional meaning for the purpose of creating some kind of interpretation.<sup>103</sup>

Among the examples Al-Sakkäki gives are the following:

21. *yunbitu al-rabi' u al-baql.*<sup>104</sup>

22. *yashfi al-tabibu al-maridh.*<sup>105</sup>

23. *kasä al-khalifatu al-ka'bata.*<sup>106</sup>

24. *banä al-waziru al-qasr.*<sup>107</sup>

Al-Sakkäki's discussion of *majäz 'aqli* does not differ very much from al-Jurjäni's discussion. It seems, however, that al-Sakkäki's discussion is more of a logical nature, and that the rhetorical significance of *majäz 'aqli* is lost in the detailed logical discussion of the issue.

Ibn al-Athir includes *majäz 'aqli* in his discussion of the notion of *majäz*. He introduces more or less the same arguments provided by rhetoricians before him. However, he concentrates on *majäz lughawi* as it is, according to him, the core of figurative use of language since there is a transfer in the conventional meaning of the word whereas *majäz 'aqli* involves a transfer in the construction or in the predication of actions to subjects other than the real doers of those actions. This is more or less a similar treatment to that of al-Jurjäni.

Al-Qazwini in his book '*idhäh* defines *majäz 'aqli* as

the predication of the verb or its meaning to an agent that it is not its agent in the conventional sense for the purpose of interpretation.<sup>108</sup>

Al-Qazwini engages in a detailed discussion of the notion of *majäz 'aqli*. He discusses the various forms of this type of figuration which he attributes to the relationship between the verb on the one hand and the subject, object, infinitive, time, place and cause on the other. It is very interesting to note that Al-Qazwini discusses *majäz 'aqli* as

<sup>103</sup> Al-Sakkäki (1937: 185).

<sup>104</sup> The spring grows radish.

<sup>105</sup> The doctor cured the patient.

<sup>106</sup> The Caliph clothed the Ka'bah.

<sup>107</sup> The minister built the palace. *Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup> Al-Qazwini (n.d.: 21).

an aspect of *ma'āni* 'notions'. In this respect, his analysis differs from that of those who preceded him who regarded this type of figuration as an essential aspect of *bayān* 'eloquence'. In fact, Al-Qazwīni draws our attention to this point at the end of his discussion of this *majāz* because it discusses the states of predication which is essentially an aspect of *ma'āni* –the branch that deals with the way the construction of sentences reflects appropriateness of the speech to the context.<sup>109</sup>

Al-'Alawi's treatise of *Al-Tirāz* does not account for *majāz 'aqli* in the way other contemporary rhetoricians do.<sup>110</sup> He provides a detailed discussion of fifteen types of *majāz mufrad* 'transference in the individual words' and he includes some examples of *majāz 'aqli* among the examples he provides for these types. Also he discusses this sort of *majāz* but under a different name, i.e. under what he calls *majāz murakkab* 'constructional transference'. This is precisely what al-Jurjāni calls *majāz 'isnādi* 'predication transfer' and what al-Sakkāki calls *majāz 'aqli* 'cognitive transfer'. This is in fact the name under which this type of *majāz* came to be known.

#### 1.4.3. *Majāz mursal*

*Majāz mursal* as the name suggests is a type of transference. Arab rhetoricians call this type of figuration *majāz mursal* for two reasons. First, the relations underlying it are open and not confined to a specific type of relation. Second, the relationships underlying it are not those of similarity.<sup>111</sup> There is a great deal of similarity between *majāz mursal* and *majāz 'aqli* because they both refer to a phenomenon whereby the use of a word or a construction is intended to convey a meaning other than its conventional one with the aid of a strong connection between the meaning intended and the conventional meaning of the word or the construction. The first difference between the two however is that while the first occurs in individual words the second occurs in the construction. Furthermore, another vital difference between these two types of *majāz* is that while the first one is an example of *majāz lughawi* the second is an example of *majāz 'aqli*. This means that the former utilises the linguistic possibilities of word meanings and builds the transfer on a kind of deviation from the norms of the word meaning provided by the language.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> I mean here al-Qazwīni who showed some sort of systematicity in his discussion of *majāz*.

<sup>111</sup> Cf. Atīq (n.d.: 143).

By contrast, the latter capitalises on a deviation from cognitive processes that are the outcome of transfer of predication. While the words themselves are used in their conventional sense, it is the construction or the predication that deviates from normal language construction in that verbs or actions are attributed to subjects other than their real doers. This might be seen as 'personification' in the western sense which according to Wales is 'a figure of speech or trope in which an inanimate object, animate non-human, or abstract quality is given human attributes'.<sup>112</sup> Wales gives as an example of personification the following lines from Gary: (the personification is marked bold)

25. *Here rests the head upon the lap of Earth*

*A youth to fortune and to fame unknown.*

*Fair **Science frowned** not on his humble birth,*

*And Melancholy marked him for her own*

*(Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard)*

In the example above the verb 'frowned' is attributed to an inanimate abstract noun 'science' which is unable to do any sort of frowning. This is regarded as a major feature of poetic language which attributes a sense of animation and sometimes a sense of humanity to non-animate or non-human objects.

I think the difference between *majāz 'aqli* and personification is that *majāz 'aqli* is a much broader concept than personification because it not only includes verbs or actions but also extends to include predication, which in Arabic includes all forms of noun phrases. Besides this transfer is based on logical connectedness and cognitive association between the subject used and the subject omitted.

Al-Jurjāni alludes to *majāz mursal* although he does not give it this name. In his book *Asrār al-balāghah*, al-Jurjāni goes into detail about the various forms of *majāz* and suggests that *majāz* is the area where there had been dispute before him because the issue is very much related to the disputes between Muslim religious groups regarding the names and attributes of God. Therefore, al-Jurjāni attempts to outline a standard to which Muslims can refer to in their debates. Al-Jurjāni begins his discussion of this figurative aspect by introducing a definition of *majāz* in general. His definition runs:

*majāz* is every word that is used for a meaning other than that for which it was originally invented by virtue of a connection between the first and the second.<sup>113</sup>

<sup>112</sup> C.f. Wales (1989: 349).

<sup>113</sup> Cf. Al-Jurjāni (1954: 325).

This 'connection' is what came to be known in later rhetorical circles as the 'relation' that ties the two meanings, i.e. the conventional meaning and the figurative meaning.

Al-Jurjāni then cites the verse in which God says:

26. *Balā qādirīna 'alā 'an nusawwiya banānahu.* The Qur'an (75: 4).<sup>114</sup>

In this verse the word *banānahu* 'fingertips' is used in a part-whole relationship in which the whole finger is meant. This then enters into a cyclical metonymic signification to mean the whole hand.<sup>115</sup>

Al-Sakkāki discusses *majāz mursal* under the heading of 'linguistic figuration attributed to the meaning that is devoid of any exaggeration of likeness'. He then defines it as 'the transfer of the meaning of the word from its original meaning with the aid of a context to another meaning for the purpose of establishing a form of connectedness between the two respective meanings'.<sup>116</sup> It is clear from al-Sakkāki's definition that context is needed to determine the interpretation of this figurative use. The emphasis on the establishment of a form of connectedness between the two meanings of the two words in question is a characteristic of this type of *majāz* and the set of relations underlying it illustrate this aspect in more detail.

Al-Qazwīni is considered the first Arab rhetorician to use the word *mursal* to describe this type of *majāz lughawi*.<sup>117</sup> In his book '*idhāh*', al-Qazwīni divides *majāz* according to the type of relation underlying each type into two types. The first he calls *mursal* and the second '*isti'ārah*. Then, he defines *majāz mursal* as

the *majāz* in which the relation between the meaning used and the original meaning is not that of similarity, like the word 'hand' when it means 'benevolence'.<sup>118</sup>

Rather it is a relationship of semantic connectedness in which the hand is the instrument by which the blessing is bestowed. Therefore, one can call this an 'instrumental' relationship.

Although al-'Alawi is a contemporary of al-Qazwīni we find that al-Qazwīni in his '*idhāh*' is more systematic in his division and classification of the types of *majāz*. Al-

<sup>114</sup> Nay, we are able to make his fingertips equal.

<sup>115</sup> According to one interpretation, the verse means that by making fingers equal, man will not be able to do skilful things with his hands.

<sup>116</sup> Al-Sakkāki (1937: 200).

<sup>117</sup> Cf. Haddārah (1989: 59).

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Al-Qazwīni (n.d. : 154).

'Alawi divides *majāz* into fifteen types. Some of these types fall under *majāz 'aqli* like the examples he gives in type number four.<sup>119</sup> In this example, al-'Alawi treats the predication in

27. *Sāla Al-Wādī*.<sup>120</sup>

as a type of *majāz mufrad* 'figuration in individual words'. However, this type of predication is in fact a type of *majāz 'aqli* because the transfer involved in this example is not in the meaning of individual words but in the predication.<sup>121</sup> That is to say that the words 'valley' and 'flowed' as individual words are used in their literal meaning. The transfer nonetheless is in predicating the action of flowing to the valley while the real subject is the water and not the valley. This type of *majāz* is based on a spatial relationship, i.e. because water runs through the valley we can figuratively say that the valley flows.

To conclude this section it is essential to make the following observation. The treatment of metonymy in Arabic rhetoric is also severely reduced and rather unsystematic. Although the treatment in this section seems systematic, it is because the model which has been imposed on the data makes the treatment generally systematic. The triadic scheme of signification that is used in this section has considered metonymy in Arabic rhetoric from the perspective of the three domains of metonymic signification. These are the domain of words, the domain of concepts and the domain of objects. The section argues that *kināyah* could be the type of signification involving words, *majāz 'aqli* the type of signification involving concepts and *majāz mursal* the type of signification involving objects. The connection between the first two is evident while the connection with regard to the third is plausible, especially if we take into consideration that the relations underlying *majāz mursal* are actually relations which conform to the realm of ontology. The relations are those of contiguity, adjacency, totality, partiality, locality, and positionality.

The Arabic tradition it could be safely argued therefore was no better than the western tradition as far as the treatment of metonymy is concerned. The trope in both traditions suffers from epistemological limitations, and from confinement to the lexical level in

<sup>119</sup> Al-'Alawi (1914: vol.1: 70).

<sup>120</sup> The valley flowed.

<sup>121</sup> Although this might involve some modification in the semantic structure of the verb.

addition to its treatment as a phenomenon pertaining to the language of poetry or highly elevated styles of diction rather than to everyday language and normal modes of thinking.

### **1.5. Summary**

This chapter has centred around two issues. The first was to place the thesis in its theoretical context by relating it to its parent disciplines, namely rhetoric, figurative theory and textlinguistics. The second was to place the thesis in its historical context by providing a discussion of the various treatments of metonymy in western and Arabic rhetoric. The chapter concluded that metonymy in classical rhetoric was sometimes discussed as substitution between words, sometimes between things and sometimes between concepts but never all of these together. Besides, metonymy in these rhetorical treatments was treated as a stylistic ornament and as a process pertaining to the lexical level. The treatments fail to address the semiotic aspect of metonymic signification that cuts across language, mind and reality. Before the thesis moves on to outline the characteristics of a semiotic approach to metonymy, it should be wise to trace the treatment of metonymy in what I call a modern figurative theory of metonymy to see if modern accounts of the trope are able to capture this semiotic potential. It is this aspect that I shall turn to in the next chapter.

## Chapter Two: Metonymy in Modern Figurative Theory

*Metonymy may in fact be more common than metaphor, and indeed is held by some to be the distinguishing mark of realist prose, yet it is seldom subjected to the detailed and lengthy investigations that metaphor undergoes. And not only is it not widely studied but most accounts of it are unsatisfactory.<sup>1</sup>*

### 2.0. Introduction

In the previous chapter we have seen that the majority of studies of metonymy in classical rhetoric treated the trope as a process of substitution mainly involving words and hence reducing the power of the trope to linguistic substitution. In addition, metonymy has been treated as a process of substitution at the lexical level only. I have shown that this is a narrow view in both respects: as will be shown in the course of this thesis, metonymy is not only a process of word substitution or a process only limited to the lexical level. This chapter investigates the nature and function of metonymy in modern figurative theory. The aim is to see whether and to what extent have modern accounts been able to capture these two important aspects of metonymy? The word 'modern' in the title of this chapter refers particularly to the work carried out in the area of metonymy from the early 1950s till the present day. This date marks the early attempts to apply structural techniques to the study of literature and figurative language. It is generally accepted that the structural analysis of figurative language has benefited the field of figuration in terms of systematisation and paved the way for the creation of modern rhetoric. This is by no means to discredit the works of I.A. Richards (1936) and K. Burke (1945) which to some extent revolutionised the study of rhetoric and gave it fresh insight. Rather the interest is precisely centred on the attempts to carry out structural analysis of rhetorical devices as principles underlying and regulating human cognition and communication.

This chapter draws from three main sources to discuss the concept of metonymy. The first source is the rhetorical and figurative studies carried out recently on metonymy. The second source is those semantic studies that have investigated metonymy as a semantic phenomenon dealing with shifts of meanings and referents. The third source is

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<sup>1</sup> Bredin (1984: 45).

the cognitive approach, which enriches our understanding of the concept of metonymy as a conceptual structure and as a mode of cognition. I believe that each of these sources has its own merits and taking one and leaving the others would lead to an awkward theory of metonymy. Taking them separately would also lead to unsatisfactory results because the merits of each will not be combined with the merits of the others to provide a coherent account of metonymy.

### **2.1. Theories of metonymy**

Metonymy is the figure of speech which involves the substitution of one word with another with which it is associated. This definition has been alluded to on several occasions in this and the previous chapter. Metonymy has not, until recently, been sufficiently studied. This section deals with the various theories of metonymy that have begun to emerge since the 1950s. It aims to provide a survey of views regarding the concept in order to assess the status of metonymy in modern figurative theory.

#### **2.1.1. Linguistic theories of metonymy**

In this section I am concerned with reviewing the theories of metonymy that have been proposed by linguists or people working in the field of rhetorical studies. I consider both fields of linguistics and rhetoric to share more or less similar concerns throughout history. Rhetoric was one of the principal disciplines for the study of language in use in classical times and it continued to be so through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. In the post-Renaissance period rhetoric as the study of the language of argumentation declined and was reduced to the study of a handful of figures. The term 'rhetoric' acquired its pejorative sense in this period as mere nonsense and an act of adorning language to conceal factual defects. However, rhetoric and linguistics nowadays work hand in hand to explore language in use and to study all forms of effective communication. This is to say that there should not be any confusion between the two disciplines as far as this section is concerned. Moreover, it should be stressed here that the most natural home for rhetoric in modern linguistics would be textlinguistics or discourse analysis. This is what I think rhetoric is and it is what I advocate throughout the course of this thesis.

##### **2.1.1.1. Jakobson**

In his paper 'Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances' Roman Jakobson attempts to bring literature under the scrutiny of linguistics to give the

study of literature more precision and objectivity. Jakobson outlined a very influential and controversial theory at the same time about the application of linguistic techniques combined with fundamental aspects of figurative theory to the study of literature and writing in general and in fact to various aspects of cultural phenomena. Jakobson's article has been a subject of extensive study since its publication. In this section I will try to discuss this paper which initiated a considerable amount of interest and drew the attention of linguistic and literary circles to the role of these two poles of metaphor and metonymy in language in the development of discourse.

Jakobson's theory of metonymy and metaphor comes in a highly technical treatment of the subject of language disorders. From this specialised discussion which seems initially irrelevant to both linguistics and critical theory,<sup>2</sup> Jakobson builds his theoretical constructs of 'selection' and 'combination' by relating these two concepts to the Saussurean concepts of paradigmatic and syntagmatic arrangements of the linguistic sign. Jakobson argues that 'speech implies a SELECTION of certain linguistic entities and their COMBINATION into linguistic units of a higher degree of complexity'.<sup>3</sup> Jakobson develops on this and establishes his semiotic theory of the linguistic sign involving metaphor and metonymy as two fundamental modes of signification.

The next step came naturally to apply these two concepts to shed new light on the traditional typology of rhetorical figures. Among those who have discussed rhetorical figures Jakobson is the most reductionist of all.<sup>4</sup> He reduced the figures into two main ones, metaphor and metonymy. The Renaissance period reduced the classical tropes into four: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony. Jakobson reduced this fourfold classification into two. Jakobson regards synecdoche as belonging to the metonymic realm as both among other relations express contiguous relations of genus to species and vice versa.

I am concerned with outlining Jakobson's theory of metonymy in an attempt to show how his theory has benefited the subsequent study of metonymy. Jakobson argues that

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<sup>2</sup> This is perhaps why the paper remained for quite a long time very much unnoticed by linguists or critical theorists. Lodge (1977: 73) rightly argues that the paper did not seem very inviting to literary critics due to the fact that its contents did not sound relevant to their concerns.

<sup>3</sup> Jakobson (1971: 72).

<sup>4</sup> Bansloben (1996: 8) argues that 'critics such as Burke and White consider the two-fold model far too limiting. Instead, they advocate the more traditional four trope approach to rhetoric'.

metonymy is based on contiguity whereas metaphor is based on similarity. The question that I want to raise and that has been raised by a number of scholars before me<sup>5</sup> is: what does Jakobson mean by the term 'contiguity'? The term 'contiguity' seems to have caused a remarkable confusion among linguists, cognitivists and literary critics who attempted to study Jakobson's theory of tropes. Perhaps the term 'contiguity' was also confusing for Jakobson himself. This feeling can be elicited from his statement that '.....metonymy, based on a different principle, easily defies interpretation'.<sup>6</sup> This observation comes after Jakobson tries to give a justification of why the literature on metaphor is far larger than that on metonymy. His justification is that metonymy being based on contiguity is more difficult to interpret. Jakobson wants to say that the relation underlying metonymy is heterogeneous rather than homogenous. In other words, the principle underlying metonymy does not provide the researcher with a homogenous means to deal with it. The most plausible interpretation of this is that 'contiguity' is a heterogeneous term or an umbrella term covering more than one principle of interpretation.

From a linguistic perspective, 'contiguity' can be interpreted as linguistic contiguity or more precisely concatenative contiguity the most obvious aspect of which is linguistic DELETION. The evidence that theorists adopting this approach provide is that examples like (1)

1. *The keel ploughed the deep*

actually realise an underlying deep structure of the type in (2) below:

2. *The keel of the ship ploughed the deep sea.*

The word 'keel' stands in contiguous relation to the word 'ship' and the word 'deep' stands in contiguous relation to the word 'sea' because they *can* coexist in concatenation. In this case the two forms coexist in a virtual code but because of problems related to 'redundancy' the surface structure realises only the informatively essential elements. From a cognitive perspective, 'contiguity' can be interpreted as 'cognitive contiguity'. In this case, example (1) above would be interpreted as the concept 'keel' is contiguous to the concept 'ship' and the concept 'deep' is contiguous to the concept 'sea' by means of cognitive adjacency because they coexist in some form of adjacency in a conceptual schema.

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. Lodge (1977, 1988), Osterwalder (1978) and Bansloben (1996).

<sup>6</sup> Jakobson (1971: 95).

The idea that 'contiguity' is heterogeneous is also evident in another respect. The principle of 'similarity' underlying metaphor is always interpreted as a mapping between two entities pertaining to two different domains by means of a similarity established between a tenor (T) and a vehicle (V)<sup>7</sup> on the basis of a particular ground (G). In metonymy, however, it is difficult to establish such a coherent metalanguage because each metonymic relation is unique and therefore it is essential to account for metonymy by means of a typology of metonymic relations or metonymic concepts rather than formulas like in the case of metaphor. The list of metonymic relations provided by linguists and cognitivists which is calculated at 46 by Radden and Kövecses (1999) is a good example of how diverse and heterogeneous the concept of contiguity is. Moreover, in metonymy, tenor and vehicle are not similar and also are not based on one relation. They might be existentially contiguous, cognitively contiguous or causally related. This is perhaps why Jakobson thought that metonymy does not provide the researcher with a homogeneous means to deal with it.

My view is that one can still argue that even if metonymy is based on contiguity and even if contiguity has diverse manifestations this does not necessarily mean that the interpretation of metonymy is problematic. In fact, a counter argument against Jakobson could be levelled here since he implies that the interpretation of metaphor is easier than the interpretation of metonymy. I think the problem lies in the linguistic approach Jakobson is imposing on the interpretation of tropes. Had Jakobson approached the issue with a cognitive orientation, I think his conclusion would have been different. The reason is that cognitively speaking metonymy is in fact much easier to interpret than metaphor because the signification of metonymy, unlike metaphor, does not involve a transfer between different domains which normally involves more effort in message comprehension and processing. Rather the substitution takes place between different aspects or elements of the same domain. This feature should make interpretation easy rather than difficult. It should be easier to understand metonymy because one does not need to make a conceptual shift between domains but shifts within the same domain.

As the French linguist Gaston Ensaunt argues, metonymy 'does not open up new paths to follow as metaphorical intuition does; instead it hurries over the stages in paths that

are too well-known and shortens the distances so as to facilitate the rapid intuition of things that we already know'.<sup>8</sup> Nerlich et al comment on this quotation and argue that metonymy therefore 'enables us to say things quicker, to shorten conceptual distances'.<sup>9</sup> They further assert that metonymy is 'a universal strategy of cost-effective communication'.<sup>10</sup> The plethora of studies on metonymy that were produced after Jakobson's paper<sup>11</sup> shows that Jakobson's thesis about the polarity of metaphor and metonymy in the progression of discourse and indeed in areas other than linguistics is in fact fundamental and intellectually significant. The only problem with Jakobson's treatment is his linguistic or rather his formal approach which led to the categorisation of metonymy as problematic.

The argument that I am putting forward here is that a linguistic approach on its own is not sufficient to account for metonymy because it will wrongly assume that metonymy is difficult to deal with by means of the traditionally established terms of tenor, vehicle and ground. From this wrong assumption a wrong conclusion would be drawn that it is difficult to interpret metonymy simply on the ground that metonymy does not offer a homogeneous means for the study of its various manifestations. My argument is, therefore, diversity is not at all a problem for interpretation. In fact, it seems that we do not understand things only because they are *similar* to one another but also because they stand *next to* each other.

Metonymy is realistic, it is referential and it is contextually relevant, and this is what makes it a concept of powerful interpretive force. As soon as we apply a cognitive methodology to approach the issue we shall find that metonymy presents us with such remarkable interpretative power that it must be seen as an aid to cognition and by implication to interpretation. The fact that metonymy is inherently referential makes it more geared to the literal side of the scale if there is one. In this case it is more easily interpretable. The concern of metonymy with details that belong to what semanticists call 'semantic fields' or what researchers in artificial intelligence would call 'schemata'

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<sup>7</sup> Terms invented by I.A. Richards in his *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. Goatly uses topic instead of tenor and uses the term ground (G) (1997).

<sup>8</sup> Cited in Nerlich et al (1999: 362).

<sup>9</sup> Ibid (363).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

make metonymy an inherently semantic and cognitive phenomenon that is not exotic to our normal conceptualisation processes.

### 2.1.1.2. Group mu

Group mu is the nickname of a group of French linguists comprising Dubois, Jacques, Edeline, Francis, Klinkenberg, Jean-Marie, Minguet, Philippe, Pire, Francois, & Trinton, Hadelin, who were interested in reviving rhetoric. They saw in it a subject that could help the study of language and communication. This was a view that had gone into oblivion as a result of the mediaeval reductionist approaches to rhetoric which reduced the scope of this discipline to the study of how to ornament and adorn the style of the message rather than how to compose, persuade and convince by means of argumentation. The Group's theory of metonymy is developed within a general treatment of the fundamentals of rhetoric. After considering both metaphor and synecdoche, the Group discuss metonymy. The first reference they make is to Jakobson's theory of metonymy as opposed to metaphor.

The Group criticise traditional rhetoric as a pre-scientific whole<sup>12</sup> and attempt to apply the principles of the structuralist project to provide some coherence and systematisation to rhetoric. The main aim of the structuralist project as Rosiene sees it is 'to place the "essentially taxonomic" character of classical rhetoric upon firm scientific ground'.<sup>13</sup> The Group accuse classical rhetoric of offering an unsatisfactory definition of metonymy on the ground that the definitions provided by classical rhetoricians merely enumerated either the types or the examples of the trope rather than defining the nature or the function of the trope. Rosiene<sup>14</sup> contends this view and argues that the Group's claim is not quite right because in the definitions of the classical rhetoricians one finds really useful accounts of metonymy. He gives as an example the definition of metonymy provided by the Auctor<sup>15</sup> whose definition of metonymy has been discussed in chapter 1 section 1.3. and is reproduced here for convenience.

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<sup>11</sup> Cf. Bohn, (1984: 534-550).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Rosiene (1992: 24).

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. (33).

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. (173-199).

<sup>15</sup> As we have seen in chapter one, this is the name Rosiene uses for an unknown Latin Antiquity rhetorician to whom *Rhetorica ad Herennium* is credited. Sometimes the treatise is ascribed to Cicero and as a result the author is sometimes referred to using the name Cicero and between square brackets [the Auctor]. This is the way the author is referred to in the bibliography of this thesis.

the figure of speech which draws from an object closely akin or associated an expression suggesting the object meant, but not called by its name.<sup>16</sup>

Rosiene argues that this is a satisfactory definition of metonymy because it involves four fundamental operations that characterise the process of metonymic understanding. These four operations are:

1. denomination
2. abstraction
3. intellection
4. appellation<sup>17</sup>

The Group take metonymy to mean the substitution of one verbal expression for another, whenever the expressions are related to one another within a web of connotative associations.<sup>18</sup> They present their theory of metonymy under two main headings, each of which pertains to a fundamental principle underlying the process of metonymy. They begin their discussion by borrowing the concept of 'contiguity' from Stephen Ullmann who used it in his definition of metonymy as a transfer of meaning 'based on sense-contiguity'<sup>19</sup> and then attempt to assess the relevance of this concept to metonymisation. The Group argue that the notion of 'contiguity' might not be sufficiently helpful and as a result might not be 'a beginning of a satisfactory theory of metonymy'.<sup>20</sup> However, it could be a useful notion to use to provide a specification of metonymy. In this case metonymy could be easily identified and distinguished from other closely related tropes, notably metaphor. It does not seem at all surprising that the Group are actually concerning themselves with the particularities of and differences between tropes because their main thrust is to provide a complete system of all the tropes. However, despite their vigilance, they fall in the trap of reductionism. In fact, they actually reduce the tropes or at least propose a reductionist approach to the interpretation of tropes. They use Aristotle's definition of metaphor in which he talked

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<sup>16</sup> Cicero [the Auctor] (1954: IV, xxxii).

<sup>17</sup> For discussion of this argument and the four operations see chapter 1 section 1.3.

<sup>18</sup> See also Bredin's account of the Group's theory of metonymy (1984: 49).

<sup>19</sup> Ullmann (1951: 223).

<sup>20</sup> The Group mu (1981: 120).

about species- genus, genus-species as a basis to postulate that in fact the trope of tropes is synecdoche.<sup>21</sup>

With reference to metaphor, the Group maintain that metaphor is not a substitution of meaning, but a modification of the semantic content of a term. This modification is the result of the conjunction of two basic operations: addition and suppression of semes.<sup>22</sup> In other words, metaphor is the product of two synecdoches.<sup>23</sup>

With regard to metonymy the Group's view centres around the argument that 'contiguity' is spatial, temporal and causal then there would be little difference between metonymy and synecdoche, for in both cases there is a relation of some sort of contiguity. Leech confirms this when he comments on Webster's Third New International Dictionary's definition of metonymy as 'a figure of speech that consists in using the name of one thing for that of something else with which it is associated'. Leech comments that this definition 'covers all rules of transference, including that of metaphor, since similarity is a form of association'.<sup>24</sup>

It seems that the Group are unhappy with linking the concept of metonymy, or perhaps any rhetorical figure, to the ontological domain since this makes it difficult to abstract relations and establish systems from a diverse variety of phenomena. The Group are also not content with the idea of assigning the workings of metonymy to the realm of language alone. They have expressed unhappiness with the term 'thing' which keeps recurring in many definitions of metonymy as a transfer of reference of 'things'. They consider the problem of metonymy to lie in this particular aspect of pragmatic understanding of the concept of metonymy. Reference to things implies a realistic and contextual account of the trope which tends to highlight the types, species and examples of metonymy rather than derive a universal principle to account for the phenomenon. In other words, ontological approaches to metonymy were, for the Group, reminiscent of

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<sup>21</sup> See for further details on this Bredin (1984: 46).

<sup>22</sup> In semiotics and semantics, the term semes as Wales asserts is 'from Greek sema 'sign', and by analogy with PHONEME and MORPHEME, seme is used in European STRUCTURALISM and semantics (e.g. Greimas 1966; Coseriu 1967) to describe a minimal DISTINCTIVE FEATURE of meaning or COMPONENT'. Semes define the essential denotations of different lexical items within a lexical field in terms of binary oppositions: e.g. items of clothing can be marked as being 'with [+] or without [-] sleeves' (e.g. jacket vs. waistcoat), Wales (1989: 415).

<sup>23</sup> The Group (1981: 107). In page (109) the Group maintain that to construct a metaphor, we must couple two complementary synecdoches that function in a precisely inverse way and that fix an intersection between the terms S and R.

<sup>24</sup> Leech (1969: 152).

previous unscientific accounts of rhetorical tropes as taxonomies of unrelated phenomena. The Group emphasised a twofold theory of metonymy in which both 'the semantic plane' and 'the material plane' are accounted for. In our terminology their theory is at the same time epistemological and ontological.

The Group aim to place metonymy on well-defined borders from other tropes. Part of their unrest with traditional rhetoric is the confusion between metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche especially after the general treatment of Aristotle's metaphor which in fact subsumed metonymy and synecdoche. The Group, therefore, cite Du Marsais' account on the distinction between metonymy and synecdoche in which he argues that in the first figure the 'relation between the objects is such that the object whose name is borrowed remains independent of the thing whose idea it awakens and does not form a whole with it .... While the union found between objects in synecdoche assumes that the objects form a whole, such as the whole and a part'.<sup>25</sup> The Group argue that 'within the vagueness of this formulation, we find, believe it or not, metonymy's specific character'.<sup>26</sup> It seems that the Group found what they seek in terms of separating metonymy and synecdoche. So metonymy is a relation which does not involve union between the objects, and synecdoche is a relation that does. Although this seems a promising criterion in terms of which metonymy and synecdoche could be distinguished, the criterion itself is certainly derived from a linguistic conception of the nature of both relations rather than a cognitive conception. Studies in semantic domains and semantic fields support the view that it is extremely difficult to distinguish between metonymy and synecdoche. In fact, the concept of 'contiguity' the relevance of which to metonymy the Group attempt to discuss makes the possibility of drawing a line between metonymy and synecdoche extremely difficult. The argument of the Group seems futile because they tend to impose a metaphorical model on the interpretation of metonymy when they talk about the relations between 'objects' although we know and the Group know also that the relations underlying both metonymy and synecdoche do not involve more than one object or one semantic domain. When the Group try to distinguish metonymy from synecdoche they argue that the relation that underlies metonymy remains independent and does not involve union with the objects. However, when they compare metaphor and metonymy, also to separate metonymy from

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<sup>25</sup> The Group mu (1981: 120).

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

metaphor, they identify metonymy with 'co-inclusion of semes in a whole' on the semantic plane and they identify it with 'membership in a material whole' on the material plane.<sup>27</sup>

I find the Group's position confusing and quite contradictory. Their argument that

in the metonymic operation, the passage from the first starting term (S) to the resulting term (R) is made via an intermediary term (I) that includes S and R in either mode  $\Sigma$ <sup>28</sup> or mode  $\Pi$ <sup>29,30</sup>

is ample evidence that there is a sense of totality in the metonymic operation and that the criterion of union or totality is not a useful tool to distinguish the two commonly confused tropes. In fact, when the Group offer an example to illustrate their point, they resort explicitly to the notions of unity and totality in their explanation of what is going on in the interpretation of the example.

### 3. *Take up your Caesar*

spoken by a teacher to tell his students that they were to continue their study of *De Bello Gallico*'.<sup>31</sup> When they come to explain the metonymic operation involved in the example they point out that

the intermediary term will be the spatio-temporal totality, including the life of the famous consul, his loves, his literary works, his wars, his times, his city. In this totality of type  $\Pi$ , Caesar and his book are contiguous.<sup>32</sup>

It is clear from this discussion that the theory of metonymy offered by the Group does not provide criteria which are sufficiently well defined to separate this trope from synecdoche. The Group confuse the two tropical operations of metonymy and synecdoche and instead of distinguishing the two tropes they in fact blur the view of the two tropes altogether. I think this is the natural result of any attempt to separate the two tropes because they are simply inseparable especially if they are looked at from a 'levelling'<sup>33</sup> point of view for the purpose of developing a coherent theory of how

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid. (120-121).

<sup>28</sup> This is the symbol the Group use to designate 'semantic plane'.

<sup>29</sup> This is the symbol the Group use to designate the 'material plane'.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Osterwalder cites George S. Klein who has labelled two basic attitudes; levelling and sharpening. The former 'tends towards the obliteration of differences to facilitate categorisation' while the latter 'is a tendency to be hypersensitive to minutiae, to respond excessively to fine nuances and small differences' (1978: 17).

'contiguity' functions in discourse. This is the theme of this thesis and I feel inclined to accept the view that metonymy and synecdoche are inseparable especially when they are taken as the manifestations of contiguous relations in both cognition and language.

The Group then move to discuss the notion of 'connotation' and its role in the metonymic operation. Two important points can be made about the Group's position in this respect. The first concerns their view that metaphor is denotative whereas metonymy is connotative. This model falls sharply in contradiction with the model Osterwalder provides and which views metonymy to be denotative and metaphor connotative.<sup>34</sup> Osterwalder argues, and perhaps many structuralists would agree, that metaphor being a trope based on a mapping from one level of conceptualisation to another on the basis of a similarity established between the two levels, is in fact connotative or brings connotative experience into play, as the degree of similarity and the distance between the tenor and the vehicle will be determined by the cultural values of the society in question.

Recalling Esnault's statement that metaphor opens new paths of metaphorical intuition it is plausible to see how connotative metaphor is. It makes sense also to see how the gap that metaphor tries to create and bridge at the same time is by no means understood by means of the denotation of the conceptual sense of the word. In other words, metaphor produces an infinite multiplicity of meaning intuitions. Metonymy, however, can be seen as a reductive operation on understanding in which the multiplicity of meanings is actually zoomed down to fit into a particular context. This context may be either linguistic, by means of syntagmatic contiguity, or cognitive, by means of spatio-temporal contiguity. Given this position let us see why the Group hold the view that metaphor is actually denotative and metonymy is connotative.

The Group state that

metaphor brings out denotative semes, nuclear semes, included in the definition of terms. Metonymy, on the other hand, brings out the connotative semes, that is, those contiguous to the array of a larger grouping and combining to define this grouping.<sup>35</sup>

This argument is simply built on a wrong assumption that metaphorical interpretation does not call for general meanings. It is based on a myth that what is involved in the

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<sup>34</sup> Osterwalder (1978: 23).

similarity between the two things is in fact the critical features that define each thing or what is known in semantic studies as the intentional features of that thing. This is obviously not true: the essence of metaphor is to allow imagination an open space to draw fictional worlds to try to reconcile the tension created by the violation emanating from the metaphorical operation. My position, which is opposed to that of the Group and Osterwalder, is that there is a great deal of connotation involved in both tropes. I agree with Osterwalder that metaphor involves connotation and disagree with him that metonymy is only denotative. In the same way I agree with the Group that metonymy involves a great deal of connotation and disagree with them that metaphor is only denotative. In any act of figuration there is a connotative background and what might sometimes seem denotative is nothing but an act of lexicalisation through the process of demetaphorisation or demetonymisation whereby the signifier-signified relationship gets naturalised to the extent that people think it is real and mandatory while in reality it is a connotation. In other words there is no 'denotation' in figurative language. If we seek to be referential in a literal sense then there is no need to use figurative language. In fact, our minds are figuratively structured in such a way that we approach the real world in a figurative way and this makes our use of language amount to an act of connotation.

The second point that needs to be commented upon is the model of metasememe interpretation provided by the Group. This model underestimates the figurative nature of both metaphor and synecdoche because it claims that the interpretation of these two processes takes place in a normal straightforward manner. Only when this straightforward and default mode of interpretation fails is a metonymic interpretation sought. It places metonymic understanding as the last resort to be sought only when all other options are exhausted. The Group maintain that

the reader has recourse first to analytic procedures to reduce metasememes. He will first see whether the figure is synecdoche, metaphor or antiphrasis. It is only when the consideration of the semic datum (nuclear and coded and therefore certain) has failed that he will seek connotative extrapolations that will allow him to identify metonymy.<sup>36</sup>

The most readily attainable interpretation of the Group's statement is that metonymic interpretation is figurative while metaphoric and synecdochic understanding is literal.

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid. (121).

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. (122).

This is a strange position that is not supported by solid evidence from empirical cognitive investigation.

### 2.1.1.3. Ullmann

Stephen Ullmann's theory of metonymy is outlined in two of his semantic books, namely *Principles of Semantics* (1951) and *Semantics: an Introduction to the Science of Meaning* (1962). I have alluded to Ullmann's account of metonymy when I discussed the Group's notion of 'contiguity' in the previous section. There I mentioned that the Group discuss the notion 'contiguity' which they found in Ullmann's account of metonymy. Ullmann's theory of metonymy comes within his discussion of semantic change which he ascribes to associations of similarity and associations of contiguity. Like the associations of similarity, the associations of contiguity, Ullmann argues, can be either between the senses or between the names. For the former type of association he talks about examples like the

"tongue" as the principal organ of speech-activity is associated with the latter. (Resultant semantic change (metonymy): 'the English tongue').<sup>37</sup>

For the second type of contiguity association, i.e. that between names, Ullmann gives the example of the contiguous link established between the words 'private' and 'soldier' to the extent that this connectedness led to a semantic change manifested as 'deletion' in occurrences like 'a private'.<sup>38</sup>

Ullmann returns to a more or less similar argument regarding the motivation of semantic change a few pages later where he discusses examples like 'the French 'bureau' office'. In this example the motivation of the semantic change is based on

the most peculiar trait of changes of meaning, ..... the coexistence of old sense and new within the same synchronous system.<sup>39</sup>

In the example above the semantic change is motivated by a contiguity association established between the office and one of the salient pieces of furniture normally available in an office. This is the 'bureau' which is the writing desk. In fact, the word 'bureau' has undergone a double change from the *burel* an old French word meaning a type of cloth used for covering desks. Then the word came to stand for the whole

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<sup>37</sup> Ullmann (1951: 80).

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. (89).

writing desk and then the word *bureau* came to stand for the whole office where there will usually be a desk.<sup>40</sup>

Ullmann argues that metonymy is 'less interesting than metaphor since it does not discover new relations but arises between words already related to each other'.<sup>41</sup>

However, after supporting his argument by a quotation from Esnault regarding the difference between both metaphor and metonymy, Ullmann asserts that 'if metonymy is of limited interest to the student of style, it is an important factor in semantic change'.<sup>42</sup>

This shows clearly that Ullmann's theory of metonymy develops out of an interest in semantic change and how this change is semantically motivated. I think Ullmann's argument that 'metonymy is of less interest to the student of style' is outdated and falls short of accounting for the power of metonymy in both composition and stylistic analysis. In this respect, Jakobson's paper that I have discussed in (2.1.1.1.) above shows how metonymy is in fact a way of conceptualising and of understanding. Metonymy, Jakobson argues, is one of the two ways in which a 'discourse may take place'.<sup>43</sup> Also, metonymy for Jakobson is one of the two modes in which 'an individual exhibits his personal style, his verbal predilections and preferences'.<sup>44</sup>

Ullmann tries to provide a classification of various metonymies based on the various types of contiguous relations underlying each of the metonymic occurrences. He talks of metonymies that are based on spatial relations. The example he gives for this type of metonymy is the shift from the Latin *coxa* 'hip' to French *cuisse* 'thigh' as these two organs are two contiguous parts of our body therefore the semantic shift was contiguously motivated. I think examples of this semantic shift can be found in many other languages particularly those languages which exist in two different varieties<sup>45</sup> like

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<sup>40</sup> This is of course indicative of a cyclical metonymic signification process which begins with the cloth moving to the desk and then to the whole office.

<sup>41</sup> Ullmann (1962: 218).

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Jakobson (1971: 90).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. (91).

<sup>45</sup> This situation is usually referred in sociolinguistic studies as 'diglossia'. The first occurrence of the term 'diglossia', according to Harry (1993), was in Krumbacher's (1903) in which he discussed both Greek and Arabic diglossia. Charles Ferguson reintroduced the term in his influential paper bearing the name 'diglossia' as its title. He defines 'diglossia' as a relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards),

Arabic; where one variety is classical (at least in origin) and the other modern. It should be easy to trace the meaning change from the classical to the modern varieties and vice versa. My guess is that a large proportion of sense change that has taken place between the two varieties is metonymically motivated.

The second type of contiguity is that of temporal relations and in this type of relation the stress is on time contiguity. Either preceding or following actions or events come to stand for an event or a state. So the Arabic words *sabūh* and *'asha* meaning 'breakfast' and 'supper' respectively; both are derived from the temporal meanings of the periods in which these meals are usually eaten. The word *sabūh* is derived from *subh* meaning 'morning' and the word *'asha* is derived from *'ishā* meaning 'evening'. So the name of the time period came to represent the meal eaten around that period. Ullmann then talks about other metonymic relations than the spatial and temporal contiguities. Here he talks about the relation of 'part for the whole'. The example he gives for this relation is the word 'redbreast' for 'robin' in which the part of the bird, i.e. its breast, comes to stand for the whole bird.<sup>46</sup> This last type of metonymy shows that Ullmann does not distinguish between metonymy and synecdoche as some rhetoricians do. It seems that a semantic theory of tropes would usually undermine the minute differences in favour of deriving more general rules governing the phenomenon or the results of the phenomenon, in Ullmann's case it is the semantic change that results from the metonymic extension.

The previous three types of relations are relatively easy to interpret because there is some sort of logical link between the substituted element and the element substituted for whether that relation is spatial, temporal or part-whole contiguity. However, there are examples where the interpretation of metonymy is difficult to attain by means of intensional judgment from the canonical and critical features of the item itself but rather has to be made on the basis of the extensional properties and events that surround the utterance both situationally and culturally. The examples Ullmann provides for this category of metonymic relations are those designating social class like 'redcoat', 'redcap', and 'blue-stocking'. These are culturally motivated metonymies and need

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there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation', (1964: 435).

<sup>46</sup> Ullmann. (1962: 218-219).

familiarity with the culture to be able to interpret them. The same thing applies to certain metonymies which apply to the Arabic context but seem to be difficult to interpret in other contexts. The *ramād* 'ash' example discussed in chap1. section 1.4. and repeated here as (4) is a case in point.

4. *Kathiru al-ramādi 'idhā mā shatā.*

*He has a lot of ash in the winter.*

The fourth category of semantic change which Ullmann discusses is that which relates to what is usually called in figurative accounts of metonymy the 'inventor for invention' relation or 'producer for product'. The example Ullmann gives for this category is the utterance said by a physicist 'one ampere is the current that one volt can send through one ohm'.<sup>47</sup> Ullmann argues that this utterance involves three examples of metonymy. All are 'inventor for invention' metonymies in which the name of the man who invented the instrument, the Frenchman André Ampère, the Italian Count Volt, and the German Georg Ohm, came to stand for the instruments they invented.

One more aspect of Ullmann's theory of metonymy that needs to be elucidated here is his distinction between contiguity of senses and contiguity of names. He calls the first category 'metonymy' but the second he calls 'ellipsis'. I have outlined the definition of 'contiguity of senses' above. As regards the 'contiguity of names' Ullmann defines it as 'those words which often occur side by side'.<sup>48</sup> The association that exists between these words is not due to a semantic relatedness that is inherent to the lexical item by virtue of sharing a similar semantic field. Rather, it is a conventional one that exists between words as a result of their co-occurrence in similar linguistic environments. Two words keep recurring in similar linguistic environments until a conventional link is established between them. A further development takes place when one of these two words is usually omitted because its meaning has transferred to the sense of the other word. A good example is found in the utterance

5. *She is going to the ladies.*

The original form is 'she is going to the ladies' toilet' but because there has existed a link between the two words the word 'ladies' is regarded as informative enough and the addition of the word 'toilet' could be regarded as redundant.

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. (222).

Ullmann's distinction seems to be based on a semantic principle that distinguishes 'system' and 'use'. In the 'contiguity of senses' which Ullmann gives the term 'metonymy' the 'system', i.e. the semantic properties of the lexical items involved are seen to be inherently related due to some sort of a contiguity relation. However, in the 'use' case the two items come to have this connectedness because of rules of use. In other words Ullmann's view throws some light on the notion of 'motivatedness'. He seems to argue that there are two types of motivatedness. The first is cognitive motivatedness in which the meaning is cognitively motivated because it appears in domain relationships. The second is the situation in which the meaning is conventionally motivated by rules of use. In the view of metonymy as I am developing it, there is no such distinction between conventional motivatedness and cognitive motivatedness.

#### 2.1.1.4. Bredin

Bredin begins his paper entitled 'metonymy' by criticising the general tendency to augment metaphor at the expense of metonymy, which he thinks could be more common than metaphor. He then moves on to assess the modern status of the trope especially with reference to its being 'the distinguishing mark of realist prose'.<sup>49</sup> Here he thinks that the effort of Jakobson which was further augmented by the study of Lodge gave metonymy a real boost and called attention to the potential of this trope as a mode of cognition. Bredin attacks the 'enumeration' accounts of metonymy which he thinks are prevalent even in the most contemporary reference works. The problem does not stop, according to Bredin, at trying to provide exhaustive lists of metonymic instances and species. In fact, it extends to the general disagreement among 'various authorities' as to what these instances are.<sup>50</sup> The most scientifically alarming problem is that the number of examples that have been suggested by scholars in the field have varied considerably and there seems to be no attempt to develop an organising principle that would systematise the relation between objects or names underlying metonymy.

Bredin holds that in the history of metonymy there has been a great deal of confusion and obscurity as to both the nature of the trope and its relationship to other closely related tropes like metaphor and synecdoche. The history of metonymy has swung between taxonomic enumeration of species, types and reductionism of the system of

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<sup>49</sup> Bredin (1984: 45).

tropes. The former was actually the central feature of the classical rhetoric project of which Aristotle, the Auctor and Cicero are chief examples. The latter is the central feature of the structuralist project of which Jakobson, Lodge and the Group mu are good examples. Whenever there is an attempt to derive rules and principles there tends to be some sort of reductionism in the treatment of the data. When there is an attempt to stress the types and species there is usually a tendency to enumerate examples rather than explain the nature of the trope. Bredin is not content with either approach. He is keen to explicate the nature of metonymy and at the same time place a well-defined border between metonymy and other closely related tropes, i.e. metaphor and synecdoche.

The 'transfer of the name of a thing to something else', which is the standard definition given to metonymy in many rhetorical treatises, is seen by Bredin to be too general to the extent that it is in fact a definition of trope in general since any trope involves a transfer. He thinks that this is a beginning of a definition of any trope because it outlines the genus to which each trope belongs. Bredin then emphasises the need to give what he calls the "differentia", which distinguish metonymy from other tropes. It is here that difficulty arises Bredin argues.<sup>51</sup> For Bredin the difference between different tropes lies in the difference in the nature of the relation which holds between the two elements between which the transfer takes place. Therefore, characterising the nature of the relation that holds between what is sometimes called the trigger and target<sup>52</sup> in metonymic interpretation is the beginning of the solution to the confusion and obscurity in metonymic understanding.

Of course Bredin cannot claim that he is the first to think of this because Jakobson and even Ullmann before thought about the nature of the metonymic relation and tried to characterise it in an attempt to distinguish this type of relation from other figurative relations especially from that of metaphor. Bredin expresses his discontent with the accounts of this relation that were offered by classical rhetoricians like Quintilian, Bede and Doyle who according to Bredin favored a very general definition of metonymy that suits the definition of trope in general and completely ignored the nature of the relation underlying the trope. He does not agree also with the formulations provided by Cicero,

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. (46).

<sup>52</sup> See for these terms Fauconnier (1985, chapter one pp: 3-34).

Abrams and Preminger who characterise the relation between the objects involved in the transfer in general terms as 'closely associated' or 'closely related'. Nor does Bredin feel happy with Fraunce's 'agreement' or with Jakobson's 'contiguity' on the ground that these are still too general accounts to give the specific character of metonymic relations.

Thus, Bredin rejects all previous accounts of metonymy and places himself in a position to offer a new account on the nature of the trope and the relation underlying it. Bredin begins this endeavor by a provocative claim regarding the essence of the trope. He argues that the essence of metonymy is not a transfer in the 'sense' of the name of a thing to something else but rather a transfer of the 'reference' of a thing to the reference of something else. He alludes to Frege's distinction between 'sense' and 'reference' and uses this distinction to serve his goal of situating metonymy on the ontological level of representation as an aspect of reference. It is worth mentioning that the notion of transfer in metonymy has been contested and the majority of researchers in metonymy assert that there is no actual transfer in metonymy as there is only one domain involved in the operation. What is actually involved is 'substitution'. The word 'transfer' seems to be biased towards the implication of two domains while the term 'substitution' reveals an internal movement between parts and wholes and other single domain spaces.

The methodology Bredin uses to achieve his goal, which is to provide an unambiguous definition of metonymy, is to compile a list of metonymies in an attempt to derive a general principle from the mass of examples and species. He gives a list of 11 metonymic relations. Each of these can be reversed giving a total of 22 examples. I am not particularly concerned with the typology offered by Bredin, just as I am not interested in various other typologies proposed in the literature. This is because typologies are not important to the course of this thesis which tries to transcend the enumeration of types, species and examples in order to probe into the nature of the trope and derive general rules as to how it actually operates in real-life language use. Therefore, I am here concerned with the treatment of Bredin's attempt to present metonymy as independent from other related tropes. Bredin's adoption of the view that metonymy actually operates on objects rather on senses leads him to criticise the Group's conception of the web of connotative associations. This is simply because the connotations pertain to the verbal expression rather than to the objects themselves.

Bredin rejects the Group's theory of metonymy as insufficient to reveal the specific character of metonymy in an unambiguous manner.

Bredin thinks the Group's use of the notion 'connotative association' blurred the picture regarding which of these connotative relations is actually metonymic and which is not. There are examples of connotative relations that seem related but they cannot be examples of metonymy, argues Bredin. The words 'inflation' and 'economy' are related but 'replacing one expression by the other would be neither figurative nor intelligible'.<sup>53</sup>

Bredin argues that one may agree with the Group that there are two modes of connotative association, one being conceptual and the other material, a view the second half of which would suit Bredin's view of metonymy. Even in this case however, the problem is that according to the Group's theory of metonymy it 'is not enough simply to classify connotations as semantic or referential. For what we want to know is which connotative relations are, in addition to being connotative, metonymical as well'.<sup>54</sup>

Then Bredin moves to discuss yet another theory of metonymy proposed by Albert Henry. According to Bredin, Henry draws a distinction between two fundamental modes of meaning. One is the intensional mode and the other is the extensional mode. Metonymy is then related to the mode of intension. This mode means that

the intension of a word is the set of constituent concepts which, taken together, constitute the 'concept entity' designated by the word.<sup>55</sup>

Henry's argument is that metonymy arises when one constituent concept is used to designate the whole 'concept entity'. On the same grounds that Bredin criticises the Group's notion of the web of connotative associations, Bredin also attacks Henry's notion of 'concept entity'. Bredin gives an example to show that Henry's notion of 'concept entity' does not necessarily create a metonymy. The semic field of the expression 'publishing company', includes such concepts as 'book', 'distribution', and 'profit'; yet it is impossible to employ the name of any of these as a metonymical replacement for "publishing company".<sup>56</sup> Bredin concludes that the accounts of metonymy since ancient rhetoric have been rather general, lacking an analysis of what

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid. (50).

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.


<sup>55</sup> Ibid. (51).

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. (52).

Lakoff and Johnson call the 'systematic'<sup>57</sup> character of metonymy. Bredin states that 'metonymical connections are not random, but are specific types of connection'. Bredin further asserts that 'it is this specificity which is lacking in Group mu and in Henry, despite their best efforts'.<sup>58</sup>

I would argue that the most legitimate proposal to provide 'specificity' can only be found within the confines of a cognitive theory of meaning in which the notions of 'semic fields' and 'concept entity' could be cognitively studied to see what actually forms a concept totality or a semic field in the cognition of language speakers. This is with regard to the solution to the 'specificity' issue in metonymic operation. A more important issue here is that this research is not particularly interested in pursuing the debates regarding the differences between metonymy and other related tropes because it is believed that some overlap is inevitable since we are dealing with modes of thinking rather than with formal systems of logic or language. Cognitive theories of metonymy will be the topic of section 2.1.2. below. Let me now turn back to Bredin's theory of metonymy.

I will use the diagram which Bredin gives to illustrate his theory of metonymy in relation to other closely related tropes. In fact his model is able to account for several major tropes. Thus the model attains a significant empirical power.



**Figure 2.1. Bredin's theory of metonymy.**

<sup>57</sup> C.f. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 37).

<sup>58</sup> Bredin (1984: 52).

Bredin maintains that the model is based on the 'well-known distinction of analysis and synthesis'.<sup>59</sup> Cognition, Bredin argues 'is a connected series of encounters between subject and object in which we analyse things into their constituents, synthetically combine objects in larger or more abstract wholes, such as concepts, classes and kinds'.<sup>60</sup> After outlining the distinction between analytic and synthetic dimensions of cognition Bredin then relates the first to his concept of structural relations which he thinks are essentially intrinsic because they are relations within things. To the synthetic dimension of cognition Bredin relates the concept of 'synthetic' relations because these are extrinsic relations which involve a great number of synthesising processes to group things among things not within things.

Bredin associates 'synecdoche' with the analytic structural relation, as it is believed that the trope involves relations within the same object: part for the whole or whole for the part. This is reminiscent of the Group's account of metonymy when they refer to Du Marsias as 'one of the rare classical rhetoricians to have asked himself summarily about the difference between metonymy and synecdoche'.<sup>61</sup> Du Marsias assigns metonymy a feature of independence from both objects of signification whereas in synecdoche there is union between these objects. It is worth pointing out here that Bredin's classification of relations into structural and extrinsic is not theoretically justified because it can be argued that all relations are, in fact, structural whether they are intrinsic or extrinsic; otherwise they cannot be called relations. So there would have been greater systematicity if the schema proposed was actually divided into intrinsic and extrinsic structural relations.

The extrinsic type of relation breaks down into two types of relation, one simple and the other dependent. Bredin relates metonymy to the simple relation because metonymy, according to him,

neither states nor implies the connection between the objects involved in it ..... it relies wholly upon those relations between objects that are habitually and conventionally known and accepted.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid. (55).

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> The Group (1981: 120).

<sup>62</sup> Bredin (1984: 57).

Bredin relates metaphor and other tropes to the dependent type of the extrinsic relation and asserts that these are dependent because they involve a twofold synthesis:

a conceptual synthesis based upon a shared property of the relata. (A and B have length) and the synthesis of the relation itself (A is longer than B).<sup>63</sup>

Bredin argues that the difference between metonymy and metaphor lies in the fact that 'metaphor *creates* the relation between its objects, while metonymy *presupposes* that relation'.<sup>64</sup>

Bredin holds that metonymy can never articulate a newly discovered insight and thus lacks the creative depth of metaphor. He concludes that metonymy is 'irresistibly and necessarily conventional'.<sup>65</sup> Because metonymy is based on a simple extrinsic relation and because it presupposes the relation between the objects involved then it is conventional, in the sense that it involves relations that are known already to exist between the objects involved in the metonymic operation. We know that a 'keel' is part of a 'ship' in example (6) below

6. *The keel ploughed the deep.*

The problem of metonymic interpretation is its arbitrariness which makes it subject to change from one culture to another and from one generation to another within the same culture. Towards the end of his paper Bredin argues that 'it is no doubt this arbitrariness which has caused the remarkable and general failure to discern its true nature'.<sup>66</sup>

Two points should be raised in connection with the above treatment of metonymy. First, metonymy is not a hackneyed operation where the information conveyed is sort of banal and already known. If this were the case the trope would not be regarded as a trope in the first place. It is true that metonymy involves the transfer of the name or the object on the basis of well-known relations of contiguity and causality. However, it is not true that metonymy does not add new insight simply because the motives behind the transfer cannot be regarded as commonplace. Rather they are ideologically loaded and convey a great deal to the overall meaning via the metonymic interpretation. The choice of one part to represent the whole or the whole to represent a particular part cannot be seen as

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid. (56).

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.(57).

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

an innocent one. Always there is extra meaning resulting from the simple choice of things to stand for other things.

In example (6) above, there is strong evidence that metonymy does convey new information. It is not a matter of conventionality that the word 'keel' comes to stand for the word 'ship'; why not any other part of the ship? Is this random? Or arbitrary? It is certainly not. Metonymic relations are motivated and purposeful. In fact, in metonymic operations there is a great deal of suppression of certain aspects of cognition for the sake of foregrounding other aspects. Indeed, metonymy is perhaps the most prominent example of motivatedness in language. Therefore, assigning the features of 'conventionality' and 'arbitrariness' to the operations of metonymy will not do justice to the trope in any objective way. The reason is that the notion of 'conventionality' boils down to the concept of 'symbolicity' in linguistic signification. I shall discuss these aspects of linguistic signification in the next chapter sections 3.4.3. and 3.4.4. Here I want to stress the fact that metonymy resides in the indexical mode of signification which is causal or contiguous.<sup>67</sup>

#### 2.1.1.5. Lakoff

Lakoff's theory of metonymy is first encountered in his *Metaphors We Live By*, which he co-authored with Mark Johnson. Lakoff and Johnson begin their discussion of metonymy by giving a general definition of the trope. They hold that metonymy is 'using one entity to refer to another that is related to it'.<sup>68</sup> They attempt to distinguish metonymy from personification, which is commonly confused with metonymy. The reason for this confusion is that personification involves assigning animate or human properties to non-animate or non-human subjects. This is a common aspect of the metonymic operation also. So in the example

7. *The Times has not arrived at the press conference yet*

which Lakoff gives as an example of metonymy, the verb 'arrived' is attributed to a non-animate and non-human subject. The difference that Lakoff and Johnson see between metonymy and personification is clarified in the example

8. *Inflation robbed me of my savings.*

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<sup>67</sup> I am using the term 'indexical' in the Peircean sense. See the discussion of this point in the next chapter section 3.4.2.

They think this example is personification because there is no reference to a person. Rather the term 'inflation' is given the qualities of an animate and human subject as a matter of metaphorical personification. Inflation refers to inflation. However, in the example

9. *The ham sandwich is waiting for his check.*

as well as example (7) above, there is an actual person referred to in the example and the words 'the ham sandwich' and 'the Times' are used to refer to something other than themselves. The reference is to a person who is related in some way to these entities.

This start makes Lakoff and Johnson maintain the view that

metaphor is principally a way of conceiving of one thing in terms of another, and its primary function is 'understanding'. Metonymy, on the other hand, has primarily a referential function; that is, it allows us to use one entity to *stand for* another.<sup>69</sup>

It looks as if Lakoff and Johnson are attempting a reductionist view of metonymy as nothing but a referential trope. This undermines its role in interpretation and understanding. If metonymy is merely referential then it is of marginal importance to cognitive processes because it does not contribute much to the conceptual structuring of our experience. Its 'standing for' relation is characteristic of an ontological account of experience only and does not participate in the epistemological dimension of our experience. It should be noted that Lakoff and Johnson later admit that the role of metonymy is not and cannot be merely referential. Metonymy, they argue, contributes to understanding in that the item used highlights particular aspects that are deemed particularly important to the communication.

Lakoff and Johnson refer to the metonymic example

10. *we need some good heads*

in which 'heads' stands for 'people' because of the part-whole relation that stands between heads and people. However, the function of metonymy does not stop at the level of referentiality alone. Rather it extends that to the level of cognitive informativity because the use of 'heads' to stand for people in this particular example is not random or innocent. In fact, it is purposeful, it is informative and it serves the function that we need 'intelligent' people not just any people. In this case 'intelligence', 'heads' and

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<sup>68</sup> Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 35).

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. (36).

'people' stand in contiguous relations and they enter into multiple signification. 'Heads' stands for 'intelligence' because 'intelligence' is thought to be a property of the human brain, which is situated in the head, and the head is part or perhaps the most important part of the body. By the same token we can think of the example

11. *I have been reading Shakespeare*

in which the use of the term Shakespeare to refer to his work is not a result of a random or purely innocent choice, but of a purposeful choice to signify that the whole life of the man, his comedies, his tragedies and his sonnets were all in my mind even though I was reading only one particular work. Therefore, there is an act of implied cognitive hyperbole which augments our conceptual space.

Lakoff and Johnson extend the argument of the cognitive power of metonymy to include even seemingly pure referential examples of metonymy. Example (12) below:

12. *The ham sandwich wants his check*

is used as an act of 'dehumanising' in which case the aspect of the referent highlighted is that of being a customer nothing more and nothing less. One could also add that in example

13. *Table 10 is waiting for the order*

the metonymy is not purely referential but it serves to highlight a physical aspect of the restaurant arrangement which is all that is important in the conceptual structuring of the experience of the waiter/waitress. It is of particular relevance to the course of this thesis to include the statement with which Lakoff and Johnson conclude their chapter on metonymy. They assert that

in fact, the grounding of metonymic concepts is in general more obvious than is the case with metaphoric concepts, since it usually involves direct physical or causal associations.<sup>70</sup>

Lakoff and Turner discuss further the hypothesis which Lakoff and Johnson make in (1980) regarding the referential nature of metonymy. This relates metonymy to the pragmatic phenomenon of deixis, a term defined by Crystal as 'the term used in linguistic theory to subsume those features of language which refer directly to the personal, temporal or locational characteristics of situation within which an utterance

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid. (39).

takes place, whose meaning is thus relative to that situation; e.g. now/then, here/there, I/you, this/that are deictic expressions'.<sup>71</sup> In example

14. *We are ahead of time*

Lakoff and Turner claim that there are two metonymies involved in this example. They argue that

*we* stands for the point that we are at on the path from past to future events, and *time* stands for the point on that path at which we were scheduled to be at the present time.<sup>72</sup>

Whether the example is readily interpretable as metonymic or not is irrelevant. The interesting part of the argument is the linking of metonymy to the process of deictic reference. This point will be elaborated further when I discuss Nunberg's and Stallard's theories of metonymy in this chapter sections 2.1.2.4. and 2.1.2.5. respectively. The point will also be raised in the next chapter when I discuss metonymy as an index in section 3.4.2.

Lakoff and Turner introduce the notion of 'schema' in relation to the set of conceptual structures that metonymic expressions activate. I think this notion is very useful in the explanation of the nature of metonymy. Seeing metonymy as being primarily a cognitive process involving schematic mapping between two parts or aspects of the same conceptual domain will make clear how basic the notion of schema is to the operation and interpretation of metonymy. Lakoff and Turner provide as an example of how metonymy activates schemas the lines from Yeats's "The Second Coming":

15. ... *but now I know*

*That twenty centuries of stony sleep*

*Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle ...*<sup>73</sup>

In this example the 'rocking cradle' *stands for* the baby inside the cradle which is Jesus Christ and the sense of rocking is suggestive of the cyclic return of Jesus. These images are activated in our schema once we read 'twenty centuries' which is a reference to Christ first coming and evokes a sense that if there is a first coming there will surely be a second coming. This sense is particularly activated by the word 'rocking' which evokes images of continuity and repetition.

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<sup>71</sup> Crystal (1991: 96).

<sup>72</sup> Lakoff and Turner (1989: 46).

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.* (101).

### 2.1.2. Cognitive theories of metonymy

In this section I intend to complement the discussion in the previous section which primarily focused on the linguistic theories of metonymy by an account of the increasingly growing interest in the trope in cognitive circles. The discussion will include work done in cognitive semantics and in artificial intelligence.

#### 2.1.2.1. Fass

Fass discusses metonymy as one of the contiguity-based tropes along with synecdoche, merism, antonomasia, periphrasis, toponymy, euphemism and dysphemism. He chooses for the trope a definition proposed by Perrine (1992): 'the substitution for the thing meant of something closely associated with it'<sup>74</sup> Fass holds that the distinction between metonymy and synecdoche is disappearing<sup>75</sup> and argues that the difference in nature between metonymy and metaphor leads to a difference in function. While metaphor maps things or names among domains by virtue of its comparison and similarity power, metonymy maps things or names within domains by means of its connectivity and contiguity power. Fass further asserts that the function of both metonymy and metaphor can be further distinguished on the lines that

metaphor is a brief and often creative way of illustrating certain features of a word by drawing from another domain, whereas metonymy is a concise way of allowing one thing to stand for another within one domain.<sup>76</sup>

Fass points out to a phenomenon he calls 'twice-true metonymy' which highlights the process of meaning transfer involved in metonymic interpretation. He selects an example from Fauconnier<sup>77</sup>:

16. *Ari painted a tanker.*

Fass mentions that this example has two interpretations one is literal and the other is metonymic. In the metonymic interpretation the 'tanker' means 'an image' of a tanker. As for the literal meaning 'Ari painted a tanker' means 'Ari covered the tanker with paint'. I would argue that this phenomenon informs us about the issue of factuality

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<sup>74</sup> See Fass (1997: 32).

<sup>75</sup> I think the reason for this is that there is a shift in theoretical perspectives in which modern accounts of tropes tend to be more intellectually driven to find out general rules and principles governing the cognitive processes involved in both of these two tropes. This focus is obviously different from that which is characteristic of traditional accounts of the tropes and which aimed to provide taxonomies of figures and strive to enumerate types, examples and species without actually providing general principles. See for further discussion on this Cooper (1986: 12-20).

<sup>76</sup> Ibid. (48).

<sup>77</sup> Fauconnier (1985: 24).

inherent in the nature of metonymy. This is to say that in the example whether in its literal or its metonymic interpretation there is an actual tanker involved. Perhaps the multiple interpretation is caused by an inherent ambiguity in the verb 'paint' itself. It might have acquired two independent senses. One meaning is 'to cover with paint' and the other meaning is 'to draw with paint'. In any case, the distinctive feature of metonymy and synecdoche is that there is a referential function involving actual referents as opposed to metaphor which involves imaginative concepts. In the example

17. *John is a fox*

there is no actual reference to a fox but rather to a feature that the fox has which is in turn shared by John. The view of metonymy as a form of indirect reference has been proposed by Nunberg (1977).<sup>78</sup>

In his account of metonymy Fass mentions also the process in which there is a chain of metonymic interpretation; he selects an example from Reddy<sup>79</sup>:

18. *You'll find better ideas than that in the library.*

In this example a chain of metonymies is evident. According to Reddy cited in Fass 'ideas are expressed in words, words are printed in pages, pages are in books, books are found in libraries'.<sup>80</sup> Although this chain of metonymies is based on a part-whole metonymy there are chains of metonymy which are based on other relations also. The causal relation underlying the chain of metonymy in the 'ash' example mentioned in chapter one section 1.4. of this thesis in relation to metonymy in Arabic rhetoric is a case in point. The ash stands for a lot of cooking. A lot of cooking stands for a lot of food. A lot of food stands for a lot of guests and a lot of guests stands for generosity, which is the ultimate metonymy intended when we say that someone has a lot of ash. Perhaps this example is culture specific and is not generalisable. Nevertheless, the point to be made is that in chain metonymies there is a considerable space for cultural variation due to the connotative nature of this type of multiple signification.

Fass' cognitive account of metonymy and his attempt to find a solution to the problems created by the arbitrariness of the trope is very interesting. If metonymy is arbitrary, the argument forwarded by Bredin as we have seen earlier in section 2.1.1.4. then

<sup>78</sup> C.f. the discussion of this view in this chapter in section 2.1.2.5.

<sup>79</sup> Reddy (1979: 309).

<sup>80</sup> Fass (1997: 73).

metonymic relations are in fact open-ended. This makes the trope a murky area where there are no clear boundaries. Fass' proposal to constrain 'what can and cannot be a metonymy' on the basis of viewing metonymy as relationships between case roles should be regarded as a genuine attempt to address the specific character of metonymy. However, it is still an account of species and types rather than an account of principles underlying the nature and process of metonymic operations.

Fass seems to be interested in a grammatical analysis of metonymy and his proposal of case role relations is indicative of this inclination. However he goes beyond this to consider grammatical variation in the realisation of metonymy. He refers to metonymies in noun sense extensions such as

19. *A watched pot never boils*

in which the noun 'pot' is extended to mean the contents of the pot and not the pot itself. These metonymies have been called CONTAINER FOR CONTENT metonymies. It is also worth mentioning here that the traditional view of metonymy is that it is a trope that occurs only in nouns, hence the 'nymy' root from Greek meaning noun. However, this is not actually true because verbs, for example, can function metonymically as well. In the example

20. *I went to court*

the verb 'went' is used metonymically to stand for the whole scenario that takes place when people go to courts, because 'going to court' is one act of the whole scenario of going there and standing in the dock and arguing your case, and so on and so forth. Similarly, in the example

21. *I went shopping*

the verb 'went' signifies the whole scenario of shopping which includes going from one shop to another, scanning the products, deciding what to buy and what not to buy, thinking about the prices and perhaps bargaining about these prices. Fass' account of metonymy falls within this view of thinking that metonymy is actually prevalent in all language.

The discussion of 'metonymic objects' which Fass cites from Curme (1964: 134) makes us think of how metonymy could function as a semantic interpretation of certain syntactic processes. The example cited is

22. *He wiped the table*

in which the table is not the real object of the verb because the wiping off is not done to the table but to the dust on the table. In this example there is clear reference that metonymies occur with objects in the same way they do with subjects. Due to the contiguous relationship between the table and the dust on it, it becomes conceptually possible to metonymically substitute one for the other. Fass goes beyond the noun sense extensions and metonymic objects to discuss other metonymic lexical combinations. He talks about preposition-noun metonymies as in examples like

23. *After the alarm*

which is a preposition-noun metonymic combination as the preposition and noun both cooperate to create this metonymy. 'After the alarm' means after the sounding of the alarm, because after 'expects an event as its object'.<sup>81</sup>

Fass also discusses adjective-noun metonymies, citing examples from Quillian (1969: 469) like

24. *young client*

which 'involves inferring that the client's age is being judged young, which is not explicit'.<sup>82</sup> Other examples of adjective-noun metonymies include

25. *jealous letter*

26. *angry report*

Fass argues that a possible analysis of these adjective-noun combinations is in terms of a metonymic chain consisting of a PROPERTY FOR WHOLE metonymy, where 'jealous' is the PROPERTY and 'person' is the WHOLE, followed by an ARTIST FOR ARTFORM metonymy in which ARTIST is 'person' and ARTFORM is 'letter'. After outlining the various types of grammatical variation in metonymic operations, Fass moves on to review some of the accounts related to the interpretation of metonymy. Fass tells us that not much literature on the interpretation of metonymy is available and that the 'best work is in the computational literature'.<sup>83</sup>

Not only is Fass interested in exploring the nature of metonymy but also in investigating how metonymy is recognised and interpreted. I am more interested in discussing his account on metonymy recognition than his account on metonymy interpretation. I

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<sup>81</sup> Fass (1997: 92).

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid. (93).

believe that metonymy recognition necessarily involves metonymy interpretation because metonymy cannot be recognised without it being interpreted. In other words the distinction between metonymy interpretation and recognition is baseless. Fass distinguishes between two approaches in the interpretation of metonymies. One is conventional or conventionalised and the other is novel. The distinction is based on the assumption that the former is the approach which considers metonymies as 'knowledge-specific relationships and that metonymic interpretation is the application of those relationships'.<sup>84</sup> The latter regards metonymies as 'essentially arbitrary relationships'<sup>85</sup>, (whose interpretation is always new and fresh each time they occur).

Fass relates the conventional view to the work of Lakoff and Johnson and the works inspired by them. The novel view is related to the work of Stallard (1993) who seeks a characterisation of the argument structure of metonymic utterances and Nunberg (1995) who looks at the predicative and referential aspects of metonymies. In fact, the typologies proposed for metonymic relations fall under the conventional view because they assume that the trope is or has been conventionalised into certain concepts or types. Within the conventional view, there exists a notion that is similar to the concept of metonymy. This is the concept of 'coercion', which according to Grosz 'occurs whenever some property of an object is used to refer indirectly to the object'.<sup>86</sup>

With regard to metonymic recognition, Fass distinguishes three views that have been offered in the literature. The first concerns the syntactic clue of 'proper nouns with indefinite determiners'. The words 'Ford' and 'Boeing' are typical examples of proper names used for products which they make. A use of any indefinite article before these names renders the expression metonymic and signals the non-literal usage. However, in names like ampere, ohm and volt which were discussed above the matter is not as straightforward because the substitution has been very much conventionalised and as a result has been naturalised to the extent that one finds it difficult to recognise the metonymy in such instances. Therefore, there are perhaps different levels of recognition within this view depending on the extent of how live, active or dead the metonymy is.

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Grosz et al (1987: 213), cited in Fass (1997: 94).

The second view of how metonymy can be recognised is through violations of selection restrictions. This is, according to Fass, 'the most common approach to metonymy recognition'.<sup>87</sup> It is the most common because the overall view of figures is that they are semantic deviations, hence they violate the normal categorisation that verbs subcategorise in their argument structure. A point has to be raised here though. This concerns the notion of violation of selection restrictions and how it relates to tropes in general and to metonymy in particular. Metaphor is recognised by violations of selection restrictions, as is personification. So what makes the violations in the case of metonymy distinct? Consider the following examples:

- 27. *Table 10 is getting angry*
- 28. *The sea is getting furious*
- 29. *Inflation robbed me of my savings*

Examples 27, 28 and 29 all exhibit violations of selection restrictions. 'Tables' cannot get angry whether they are 10 or 11 because 'angry' is an attribute peculiar to animate entities. The 'sea' cannot be 'furious' because 'furious' is an adjective that pertains only to animate objects. Also 'inflation' cannot rob; only human beings can rob. It seems as if violation of selection restrictions is a working strategy in the recognition of metonymy as well as metaphor and personification. It also seems as if the process of recognition goes in the following manner. First, violation of selection restrictions gives rise to the recognition of a figurative use in general. There follows another process to recognise the type of transfer involved. I argue that it is at this second stage that a distinction is drawn between the various types of violations leading to various types of figuration. In the case of metonymy the recognition of the trope is characterised by a recognition of a discrepancy between a surface subject and a surface predicate. The violation on the surface structure of the utterance conceals a harmony in the underlying deep structure in which the underlying real subject is in agreement with the predicate in terms of semantic features.

Fass offers a third view of metonymic recognition based on Stallard's application of Grice's maxim of quantity. This maxim is in fact one of four-dicta that make up what Grice calls the "Cooperative Principle", which is

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid. (97).

make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.<sup>88</sup>

Fass tells us then that Stallard argues that the maxim of quantity prevents a referential interpretation and supports a predicative interpretation of example (30) below:

30. *Which airlines fly from Boston to Denver?*

The reason is that a predicative interpretation conforms to the maxim of quantity and thus does not give superfluous information while a referential interpretation does give redundant information. This is because if the intended meaning is the set of flights and not the set of airlines then there is redundancy because flights are necessarily on airlines.

#### 2.1.2.2. Gibbs

This section deals with Gibbs' account of the nature and role of metonymy in language and thought. The immediately striking thing about Gibbs' chapter entitled 'metonymy' is the statement he makes at the outset of the chapter which runs 'this chapter explores the role of metonymy in thought and language'.<sup>89</sup> This is quite remarkable as it shows clearly that Gibbs is not interested in the nature of the trope as it has been debated for more than two thousand years. Instead, he is proposing a new way of looking at metonymy. This dwells on the role or function of metonymy rather than the nature and the principles underlying it. It is worth pointing out here that this is generally the view that I am putting forward in this thesis. I argue that the most useful way of understanding the workings of metonymy is by looking at its role in discourse and its function in understanding.

Gibbs does not provide a definition of metonymy apart from his general comment on our understanding of a poem which he mentions at the beginning of the chapter. In this regard he states that this understanding

depends on our ability to think metonymically at the mention of parts of some event and infer something about an entire situation.<sup>90</sup>

Gibbs asserts 'that metonymy is a fundamental part of our conceptual system'.<sup>91</sup> While Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Lakoff and Turner (1989) talk about metonymic concepts, Gibbs talks about metonymic models and thinks that

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<sup>88</sup> Grice (1975: 45).

<sup>89</sup> Gibbs (1994: 320).

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.* (319).

speakers' frequent use of metonymic expressions and listeners' understanding of these utterances are motivated by metonymic models that form a significant part of our everyday conceptual system.<sup>92</sup>

The first issue that Gibbs deals with in his treatment of the role of metonymy in language and thought is how to set metonymy out as distinct from metaphor and synecdoche. This has been a concern of many rhetorical theorists, linguists, philosophers and cognitive psychologists. I have referred to such debates in a previous section in this chapter section 2.1.2.1. Here I am more interested in Gibbs' discussion of metonymy as a cohesive device.

Gibbs' interest in the cohesive power of metonymy reflects the basic thrust of this thesis and his assertion that

many conversational inferences about what speakers mean by what they say require metonymic reasoning. Metonymy serves in many such instances as an important cohesive device in text and discourse understanding<sup>93</sup>

constitutes the basic hypothesis that this thesis aims to validate. The textual function of metonymy which Gibbs refers to here is not only the global function that has been identified by scholars like Jakobson in which the literary production of poets, novelists and playwrights is classified globally according to whether it is metonymically or metaphorically dominated. Rather it goes beyond this generality and becomes more specific when we also look at patterns of local connectedness.

Gibbs discusses the role of metonymy in thought, drawing evidence from experimental cognitive psychology about the ways people categorise and classify objects in reality. Of particular relevance to this issue is the notion of prototypes which involves judging 'certain members of categories as being more representative of those categories than other members'.<sup>94</sup> One source of prototype effects is metonymic, Gibbs argues. The following example shows how people use metonymic models in their everyday life:

31. A: *How did you get to the airport?*

B: *I waved down a taxi.*

Gibbs maintains that this example shows how 'conversational implicature' helps us make inferences about the speaker's intended meaning. Gibbs then questions the

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid. (320-21).

<sup>93</sup> Ibid. (323-324).

epistemological basis of these conversational inferences. He asks 'How does a listener infer that B actually found a taxi to take him to the airport?'<sup>95</sup> The answer is that this is possible through metonymic utilisation of idealised models in which one part of the model evokes the entire model. This is what happens in the interpretation of B's utterance in which the listener will take 'waving down a taxi' as representative of the whole scenario of getting to the airport.

Similar to this is his example of anaphoric reference in the following example:

32. *They were told to expect the prime minister at twelve the next day. Punctually at noon the car drove up in front of the State Department.*

In which the noun phrase 'the car' in the second sentence anaphorically refers to the phrase 'prime minister' in the first sentence. Gibbs highlights the issue of conceptual anaphors and even argues that they are sometimes more easily interpretable than grammatical anaphors due to the fact that people apply metonymic processes when they attempt to interpret discourse. Gibbs provides examples:

33. *A: I need to call the garage.  
B: They said they'll have it ready by five o'clock.*

Gibbs argues that

a series of experimental studies demonstrate that people rate as more natural and read more quickly sentences with conceptual anaphors ..... than they do sentences with appropriate singular pronouns.<sup>96</sup>

As the example above shows, the pronoun 'they' is grammatically incorrect because it does not agree with its antecedent in number. The garage is singular and the pronoun is plural. However, the interpretation of this utterance is made easier with the plural pronoun because of our pervasive ability to establish a metonymic relation of PLACE FOR PEOPLE WORKING IN THE PLACE. The garage stands for the people who work in it. It is conventionally known that garages are usually run by more than one person. Therefore, the use of the pronoun 'they' is more natural than 'it'.

Gibbs argues also that metonymy is a main source of our ability to understand implicit cause-effect relations. These relations are activated by a set of causal associations

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid. (325).

<sup>95</sup> Ibid. (327).

<sup>96</sup> Ibid. (329).

between certain lexical items. These associations are essentially metonymic in nature. The example Gibbs provides to illustrate this point is the tale:

34. *He wanted to be king.*  
*He was tired of waiting.*  
*He thought arsenic would work well.*

There are causal and procedural connections between the parts of this tale which make our understanding of the tale depend on general knowledge rather than on the linguistic structure of the tale. It can be argued that between the word 'king' and the word 'arsenic' there is a conceptual association of some kind. It can be asserted that within the 'semic field' or the 'concept entity' of the word 'arsenic' there is a sense of 'assassination of a political rival'. This sense gets activated by the word 'king' which is a political term. This lexical signalling of causal relations underlying the narrative structure of the tale facilitates our interpretation of the tale if explicit information about the plan of the tale is missing.

Understanding metonymic expression is an important aspect of Gibbs' theory of metonymy. In this regard Gibbs talks about two main principles underlying the understanding of metonymic expressions. These are 'sense creation' and 'sense selection'. Gibbs argues that in metonymic understanding the listener/reader does not only perform an act of selection of the appropriate sense of the word used from the set of potential senses available to him in his mental lexicon. In fact, s/he also has to apply the principle of 'sense creation' because in many cases the sense intended by the utterance will not be specified within the mental lexicon. As soon as the listener/reader realises the lack of a contextually appropriate sense in his mental stock and given that the utterance is anomalous if interpreted literally, s/he will try to create a sense that suits the context and facilitates his/her understanding of the utterance. This is a temporarily created sense which is facilitated by means of other clues within the utterance, mainly lexical clues.

The example Gibbs gives to illustrate his argument of sense selection and sense creation is

35. *John fired the tuxedo because he kept dropping the tray.*

Gibbs argues that readers do not find a difficulty in understanding the utterance despite the apparent anomaly due to the use of the word 'tuxedo'. How they find it easy to

interpret the utterance, according to Gibbs, is by first recognising that there is a sort of discrepancy between the literal meaning of the word 'tuxedo' and the overall meaning of the whole utterance. Second, listeners and readers resort to the process of sense creation since 'the contextually appropriate meaning of 'tuxedo' cannot be selected from a short list of potential meanings in the lexicon'.<sup>97</sup> I think that the metonymic interpretation of the utterance is guaranteed by virtue of the relation of association between the word 'tuxedo', which means a dinner jacket, with the person wearing it. Nevertheless, the problem now is how listeners and readers interpret the word 'tuxedo' as a butler? In principle the word 'tuxedo' could stand for many types of people. Essential here is the role of lexical signalling within text to establish relations of associations between lexical items. The verb 'fired' establishes a relation between 'He' and the 'tuxedo' as that of employer/employee. Then the word 'tray' further specifies the schema in which 'an employee with a dinner jacket holding a tray' is activated, thus creating the sense of 'tuxedo' as butler.

Gibbs also considers the role of metonymic reasoning in the interpretation of colloquial tautologies. These are expressions used to give some sort of emphasis to the utterance or to convey certain attitudes whether positive or negative, towards the nouns mentioned in these tautological constructions. There are two main types of tautologies; one has the construction N (singular) is N (singular) such as

36. *War is war.*

37. *Politics is politics.*

The other has the structure N (plural) will be N (plural) such as

38. *Murderers will be murderers.*

39. *Rapists will be rapists.*

Gibbs argues that these expressions exhibit a metonymic reasoning in that a mention of a whole stands for one particular quality of these wholes. According to the context of interpretation, 'the whole boy' in the expression

40. *Boys will be boys*

will come to stand for one property of boys or the boy as a token will stand for the whole class of boys. *Boys will be boys* means boys will be unruly or sweet and lovable.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid. (337).

<sup>98</sup> See the interesting discussion of the pragmatic aspects of tautologies in Wierzbicka (1991: 392-452).

With respect to the interpretation of these metonymic tautologies, Gibbs presents three different views. The first of these is the pragmatic view which suggests that

the interpretation of nominal tautologies is context-dependent, with different meanings attached to the same tautology, depending on the conversational context and the shared beliefs of the participants.<sup>99</sup>

The second is the semantic approach which argues that

there is a good deal of regularity in the interpretation of colloquial tautologies because these phrases are to some extent language specific.<sup>100</sup>

In other words the meanings of these colloquial tautologies can be accounted for by means of semantic representation of the various structural patterns which realise these colloquial tautologies. The examples mentioned above of the structure N (singular) is N (singular) and the structure N (plural) will be N (plural) is just a case in point. Each of these structures tends to impose some sort of regular interpretation regarding the attitude behind the expression. According to Gibbs, the first type of structure tautologies tend to

convey a sober, mostly negative, attitude toward complex human activities that must be understood and tolerated.

Those of the second type of structure tend to

refer to some negative aspects of the topic but also convey an indulgent attitude toward this relatively unchangeable negative aspect.<sup>101</sup>

The third view is a hybrid theory 'that captures aspects of the previously described views'.<sup>102</sup> This view regards the interpretation of colloquial tautologies as an interaction between the systematic and conventional meaning of these tautologies and the speaker's/listener's conceptual knowledge of the objects referred to in the construction of the colloquial tautology. This view seems reasonable and compatible with evidence from studies which show that listeners and readers seem to apply stereotypical knowledge about certain nouns included in these tautological structures. This knowledge seems to be shared and quite regular to the extent that it can be generalised and coded within a semantic system. However, it also gets modified according to contextual factors determining between two possible stereotypical features surrounding a category. In this case the pragmatic approach helps in setting the parameter as to which feature is contextually more appropriate.

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<sup>99</sup> Gibbs (1994: 346) and see also Wierzbicka for similar views.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid. (347).

Gibbs also addresses the role of metonymic reasoning in the interpretation of indirect speech acts. Gibbs argues that the use of metonymic reasoning in the form of indirectness in making requests and orders helps to maintain face among the participants in the conversation. The issue of face has been raised in sociological and pragmatic studies of language in use and pertains to the psychology of the addresser when he expresses the directive or regulative function of language through which he is able to modify and direct the behaviour of the addressee. In most cases of indirect speech acts there is a metonymic relation of the type PART FOR WHOLE OR WHOLE FOR PART. So in the request:

41. *Can you lend me ten dollars?*

metonymic reasoning involved in the interpretation of the request as a request to give the person the amount of money specified and not about the ability to lend. Our understanding of such examples is facilitated by our metonymic reasoning which stipulates that people infer a whole series of steps from only part of this whole scenario.<sup>103</sup>

The *obstacle hypothesis* which Gibbs discusses in relation to the metonymic interpretation of indirect speech acts suggests that the

apparent conventionality of an indirect request depends largely on the extent to which an utterance specifies an addressee's projected obstacles in complying with the speaker's request.<sup>104</sup>

This means that the particular act of the whole exchange which the speaker feels might constitute an obstacle to the listener comes to stand for the whole exchange. For example having the time might be an obstacle to answering the question 'What is the time?' So the request of a passer-by about the time is appropriately carried out with the part that is believed to form the obstacle. That particular part of the exchange comes to represent the whole speech act. The question then appears in the form, as Gibbs argues,

42. *Do you have the time?*

I find Gibbs' theory of metonymy compatible with his overall aim of arguing for the poetic nature of mind and supporting his argument with empirical evidence. This is why

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Panther and Thornburg (1999) treat this type of metonymy as potential for actual.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid. (354).

his theory of metonymy is very distinct from other accounts. He concerns himself centrally with the role of metonymy in language and thought providing examples of how metonymy is interpreted in natural language data. Unlike other researchers he does not occupy himself with the investigation of the classification of the trope. For example, he is not particularly interested in enumerating the species or types of metonymy. This is by no means to say that these are not important. Rather, Gibbs' theory of metonymy is functional<sup>105</sup> and this is what makes it particularly relevant to the theory I am developing throughout this thesis. My theory of metonymy is a theory of its textual function. One effect of this orientation on Gibbs' account of the four principal tropes is that he treats metonymy and synecdoche as the same phenomenon. He is not very interested in minute differences, especially given that his goal is to outline the function of these closely related tropes in discourse. It should be noted that the same approach is adopted in this thesis in that the two tropes of metonymy and synecdoche are not sharply distinguished because the orientation is functional and in their function metonymy and synecdoche tend to overlap.

#### 2.1.2.3. Radden and Kövecses

Radden and Kövecses state at the outset of their paper that their aim is to propose a coherent conceptual framework for metonymy. They also contest the traditional view of metonymy which treats the trope purely as a matter of language. They argue that their theory goes beyond the traditional definition of metonymy 'as a figure of speech that consists in using of the name of one thing for that of something else with which it is associated'.<sup>106</sup>

Radden and Kövecses identify four fundamental shortcomings of the traditional view of metonymy. The first of these is the treatment of metonymy as an aspect of language. This treatment falls short of current findings in cognitive studies which assert that metonymy is essentially conceptual in nature. The second point which Radden and Kövecses raise pertains to the nature of the relation underlying metonymy. While they admit that the notion of contiguous connection between entities is fairly uncontroversial, they question whether the term is clearly enough defined to identify the specific character of metonymy. They refer to the debate surrounding the nature of contiguity

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<sup>105</sup> Here functional has not terminological load. It refers to the fact that Gibbs is more interested in the function of metonymy in discourse.

between ontological and cognitive studies. Each of these looks at the term in accordance with its own theoretical framework. So ontological theories look at metonymy as a set of relations in the 'world of reality', whereas cognitive theories consider metonymy as the set of relations in the conceptual world. The authors express their satisfaction with the notion of ICMs (idealised cognitive models) proposed by Lakoff (1987). Lakoff<sup>107</sup> defines each of these idealised cognitive models as 'a complex structured whole, a gestalt, which uses four kinds of structuring principles:

- propositional structure, as in Fillmore's frames
- image-schematic structure, as in Langacker's cognitive grammar
- metaphoric mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson
- metonymic mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson

An ICM is, as Gibbs states, 'a prototypical "folk" theory or cultural model that people create to organise their knowledge'.<sup>108</sup> Gibbs further argues that ICMs make some sense, given that ICMs are idealised and don't fit actual situations in a one-to-one correspondence but relate many concepts that are inferentially connected to one another in a single conceptual structure that is experientially meaningful as a whole'.<sup>109</sup>

Radden and Kövecses argue that these ICMs 'may capture metonymic processes best'.<sup>110</sup> This is because they do not account for the immediate conceptual components of a particular domain but rather characterise the cultural models of which the domains are parts. The notion of ICMs, Radden and Kövecses argue, is 'not restricted to either the world of reality, the world of conceptualisation, or the world of language but ... may cut across these ontological realms'.<sup>111</sup> In this way the authors think that the notion of ICMs will solve the problem of scattered interest in metonymy among cognitivists, philosophers, linguists and rhetoricians and bring them all under one unified theory.

The third issue Radden and Kövecses discuss with reference to the shortcomings of the traditional view of metonymy is the notion that metonymy 'has referring function

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<sup>106</sup> Radden and Kövecses (1999: 17).

<sup>107</sup> Lakoff (1987: 68).

<sup>108</sup> Gibbs (1994: 58).

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Radden and Kövecses (1999: 20).

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

(only)'. The authors attribute this shortcoming to the erroneous assumption that metonymy is a substitution of *things*. Metonymy, they argue, also occurs

at the purely conceptual level (categorisation, linguistic reasoning), at different levels of language (lexis, morphology, syntax, discourse), and as a linkage interrelating different ontological realms (concepts, forms and things/events).<sup>112</sup>

The fourth point deals with the way the traditional view defines metonymy as 'substitution'. Radden and Kövecses argue that 'metonymy does not simply substitute one entity for another entity, but interrelates them to form a new, complex meaning'.<sup>113</sup>

In their attempt to solve this problem they refer to Langacker's cognitive explanation of metonymy in which he talks about metonymy as a 'reference-point phenomenon' in which 'one conceptual entity, the reference-point affords mental access to the desired target'.<sup>114</sup>

The discussion of these four shortcomings of the traditional view of metonymy leads the authors to formulate their own definition of metonymy which is entirely cognitive as expected. Their definition runs as follows: 'metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model'.<sup>115</sup> Radden and Kövecses suggest that the development of a theoretical framework for metonymy involves answering four fundamental questions related to ICMs and metonymy. These questions revolve around the following four issues:

1. the ontological realms in which metonymy occurs
2. the conceptual relationships which may lead to metonymy
3. the cognitive principles governing the selection of the preferred vehicle
4. factors overriding the preferred default routes and yielding 'non-default' cases of metonymy.

In their discussion of the first issue Radden and Kövecses argue that metonymy occurs within and cuts across three realms: the world of concepts, the world of things and events, and the world of forms. Examples of metonymies that result from the interaction

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid. (21).

<sup>113</sup> Ibid. (19).

<sup>114</sup> Langacker (1993: 30).

<sup>115</sup> Radden and Kövecses (1999: 21).

between concepts within one realm in which a concept stands for another concept include:

(form) *concept (A) for concept (B)*

(*mother*) “mother” for “housewife-mother”

The interaction between forms and concepts, in which the metonymic operation cuts across two different realms, is exemplified by:

form (A) for concept (A)

dollar for “money”

The interaction between the realm of concepts and the realm of things is exemplified by:

Concept (A) for thing (A)

“cow” for thing *cow*

The interaction between the realm of form, concepts and things is exemplified by:

form –concept (A) for thing (A)

*cow* –“cow” for thing *cow*

The interaction between two forms and one concept is exemplified by forms of clipping and acronyms.

form (A) – concept (A) for form (B) concept (A)

UN for United Nations

As for the second issue ‘conceptual relations which may lead to metonymy’, Radden and Kövecses present a lengthy discussion of various types of metonymic relations. The main idea of the classification is that ‘the types of metonymy-producing relationships may be subsumed under two general conceptual configurations:

(i) Whole ICM and its part(s)

(ii) Parts of an ICM’.<sup>116</sup>

They argue that the first possibility realises whole-part relations and their converses. The second shows part-part metonymies. The authors provide a detailed explanation and enumeration of the various types of metonymic expression that result from certain conceptual relations. The discussion is carried out in two broad sections. The first section deals with configurations within the whole-for-part conceptual system and the reverse of this system. The second section deals with the configurations within the part-for-part conceptual system.

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid. (30).

Radden and Kövecses give a detailed discussion of various aspects relating to metonymy which due to the aim of this thesis need not be included in the discussion of their theory here. It should be noted however that the authors seem to have probed deeply not only into the nature of metonymy but also into the motivation behind the metonymic relation and the selection of the particular vehicle. There is, nonetheless, a remarkable shortcoming in this treatment in that the authors provide too many principles<sup>117</sup> which involve repetition. I propose therefore that the principle of 'relevance'<sup>118</sup> is a crucial governing principle in the selection of a particular vehicle. Thus the principles of functionality, immediacy, interactionality and so on which Radden and Kövecses suggest can be reduced to one global principle, which is 'relevance'.<sup>119</sup> Each speaker will normally assess the situation and judge what is 'relevant' to him and accordingly select the vehicle. This conceptualisation supports the hypothesis that metonymic signification is actually motivated signification because the selection of the vehicle is based on certain intentional aspects governing this selection.

Radden and Kövecses also maintain that metonymy can be motivated by certain expressive goals that the speaker has in mind due to social needs or rhetorical purposes. In the first case the metonymic expression violates the communicative principle Clear over Obscure. So the speaker will resort to obscure constructions in order to achieve this expressive need. In the second situation it is claimed that the violation involves one or more cognitive principles. This leads to the creation of a non-default metonymy that exhibits striking aspects of figuration. Due to the underlying intentionality the resulting metonymic expression shows personal style and personal preference of metonymic vehicles.

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<sup>117</sup> The number of these principles reached 21.

<sup>118</sup> C.f. Sperber and Wilson (1986) particularly when they argue that 'people have intuitions of relevance: that they can consistently distinguish relevant from irrelevant information, or in some cases, more relevant from less relevant information', *ibid.* (119).

<sup>119</sup> It should be stressed that my critique of Radden and Kövecses which is outlined here is based on an earlier version of the paper 'Towards a theory of metonymy' that was published on the internet by Radden himself at the address <http://www.uni.vechta.de/termine/ostwest/radden.html>. I have to confess also that in the final version of their paper which appeared in the volume entitled 'Metonymy in Language and Thought', Radden and Kövecses have made radical changes to the paper and consequently avoided this repetition and reduced the number of these principles and more importantly included the principle of relevance which they did not include in the previous version of the paper.

Radden and Kövecses relate euphemism-based metonymies to the violation of the communicative principle in that there is tendency to favour obscure over clear expressions which is against the cooperative principle of communication. However, for sociolinguistic reasons pertaining to keeping face and solidarity, the violation is licensed. The example given is the use of the word 'redundancies' instead of 'dismissals'. The argument is that 'dismissals' is a more direct word than 'redundancies' and that the former might constitute a threat and hence a negative face whereas the latter is a much more mitigated expression. The lack of clarity in the expression

43. *Where can I powder my nose?*

is justified on the grounds that it is a euphemistic expression for the more literal and relevant expression

44. *Where can I urinate?*

Thus the speaker overrides the cognitive principle of relevant over irrelevant by selecting 'powdering the nose' which is totally irrelevant to the act of urinating as the vehicle of the metonymy.

With regard to the violation of cognitive principles Radden and Kövecses assert that metonymy is first and foremost a figurative mode of thought. Like other figurative modes of thought, it is usually used to achieve rhetorical effects as in humour, jargon, literature, persuasion, slang, poetry and the like. The result of the violation of cognitive principles results naturally in the creation of unmotivated original and live metonymies that had attracted the attention of rhetoricians, philosophers and linguists since ancient times. This feature has also recently attracted the attention of cognitive psychologists who have extended their analyses to original and live metonymies to look into the nature of more conventional and more cognitively motivated metonymies, as these are believed to shed more light on the conceptual structure of our cognition.

#### 2.1.2.4. Stallard

David Stallard (1993) distinguishes between two kinds of metonymy. The first is referential metonymy and the second is predicative metonymy. Stallard begins by asserting that 'the phenomenon of semantic coercion is quite a common one in natural

language'<sup>120</sup> What is special in Stallard's treatment of the trope is that he challenges the universal view of metonymy as a process of indirect reference in discourse. He contends that this view is not adequate to account for data in which the reference is actually to the direct surface noun phrase and the expression still exhibits a metonymic operation. Stallard's approach is semantically oriented and he develops the distinction between the two types of metonymy on the basis of two main examples, the interpretation of which, he thinks, differs radically.

45. *The ham sandwich is waiting for his check*

46. *Which airlines fly from Boston to Denver?*

Stallard argues that in example (45) there is an act of indirect reference. The proof of this is the intra-sentential anaphora in which we find the pronominal 'his' referring to the subject noun phrase. This shows that the agreement is actually with the deep or indirect antecedent noun phrase (NP) 'the person ordering the ham sandwich' and not the surface or the direct (NP) 'the ham sandwich'. The indirect reference is necessitated by virtue of the violation of the selection restrictions. This renders the literal interpretation problematic, since ham sandwiches do not normally wait, only humans do. By contrast, in example (46), although there is a violation of selection restrictions in the predication of the verb 'fly' to 'airlines' which do not normally fly, literal interpretation is actually necessary. The dilemma arises when we realise that a non-literal interpretation would yield an absurd answer to this question, for example, if the listener were to answer this question by giving the set of flights going from Boston to Denver.

Stallard indeed discovered a deep problem in traditional metonymic interpretation. But this means that the majority of metonymic examples are in fact predicative because the agreement is usually with the surface and direct literal antecedent. It seems as if in the case where there is a shift in rank between the literal and direct and nonliteral and indirect referent there tends to be a referential function of metonymic relations. In fact, this is what Stallard asserts when he says that:

as for the referential type of metonymy, we have found only a few cases of it in this corpus. We hypothesize that the reason for this is that referential metonymy, involving as it does an encoding of a reference in terms of a categorically different thing, is a more marked and unusual even in psychological terms. Predicative metonymy on the other hand involves no such operation, merely the convenient

<sup>120</sup> Stallard (1993: 87).

making-way of a predicate for a non-standard but related argument. For this reason, our work prefers predicative metonymy as the default choice in processing when no other evidence is present.<sup>121</sup>

Stallard defines 'referential metonymy' as the process in which 'the metonymic noun phrase does indeed have an intended referent related to but different from its literal meaning'.<sup>122</sup> Predicative metonymy however, Stallard continues, is the process in which 'the actual and intended referent of the noun phrase is just the literal one, and it is more accurate to say that the predicate is coerced'.<sup>123</sup> Stallard suggests two criteria by which we can generate the correct reading. The first one is 'the external binding agreement condition on applying the referential metonymy schema'.<sup>124</sup> Stallard continues explaining this first criterion 'if an NP's external semantic context agrees with its literal referent, but not its referentially coerced version, then referential metonymy is ruled out for that NP'. The second criterion is the intra-sentential anaphora which figures out in examples like:

47. *The ham sandwich is waiting for HIS check.*

48. *Which airline flies to ITS headquarters?*

Stallard argues that in example (47)

the pronoun 'his' cannot agree with the literal referent, but can agree with the metonymically interpolated PERSON, and so provides evidence for the referential reading.

In example (48), Stallard continues,

the pronoun 'its' cannot agree in number with the interpolated set of flights, but can agree with the singular 'airline' and so provides evidence for the predicative reading.<sup>125</sup>

So in both examples we have linguistic constraints determining the preferred reading of the metonymic type involved.

One could perhaps further demonstrate the distinction by adding an appropriate adjectival phrase to the relevant metonymic noun. Consider examples 42–45 below:

49. \*<sup>126</sup>*The ham sandwich, which was carefully prepared in our own kitchen is waiting for his cheque.*

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid. (93).

<sup>122</sup> Ibid. (88).

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid. (92).

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

50. *The ham sandwich, who's obviously in a hurry, is waiting for his cheque.*  
 51. *This airline, which was founded in 1983, flies from London to Newcastle.*  
 52. *\*This airline, which was built in Japan, flies from London to Newcastle.*

In the example,

53. *Which airlines fly from Boston to Denver*

the constraint that determines the reading of this utterance as predicative is not a linguistic constraint however. It is a pragmatic constraint related to Grice's maxim of quantity. This stipulates that any superfluous and redundant information is rejected by virtue of the principle that communicators are generally cooperative and do not provide more information than is needed. The pragmatic constraint tells us that the intended referent in the example above is in fact the surface NP because if it were the interpolated NP it would lead to some sort of superfluous information because all flights are actually on airlines.

Fass comments on these proposals and argues that Stallard's analysis 'though impressive appears to be incomplete'.<sup>127</sup> Fass thinks that Stallard did not explain why examples like

54. *Nixon bombed Hanoi. \*They sang all the way back to Saigon,*

fail the agreement test.<sup>128</sup> He asks what type of metonymy is the one in this utterance. Is it referential or predicative? According to the rules Stallard provides it is predicative because the pronominal reference 'they' is ruled out since the intended referent is actually the surface noun phrase which is singular. I think the referential/predicative metonymic distinction is also useful in other respects. For example, it has been rather difficult to integrate examples of personification where it is felt that there is some metonymic relation underlying these types of expressions.

55. *Inflation robbed me of all my savings.*

The traditional account of example (55) is that it is 'personification'. However, Stallard's predicative metonymy extended the scope to include transfer on verbs as well as nouns. Here the noun phrase intended is actually the surface noun phrase 'inflation'. However, there is still violation of selection restrictions in that 'inflation' does not

<sup>126</sup> This asterisk shows an unacceptable form.

<sup>127</sup> Fass (1997: 86).

actually rob. So the solution is that there is a predicative metonymy involved in which the verb 'rob' actually changes its argument features.

#### 2.1.2.5. Nunberg

I move on now to discuss Geoffrey Nunberg's treatment of metonymy in his paper 'Transfers of Meaning'. Nunberg distinguishes two types of metonymy. The first is 'predicate transfer' metonymy and the second is 'deferred reference' metonymy. Nunberg states

By 'transfers of meaning' I mean the ensemble of productive linguistic processes that enable us to use the same expression to refer to what are intuitively distinct sorts of categories of things.<sup>129</sup>

Nunberg tries to distinguish between transfers and rhetorical figures on the ground that the former category is essentially a linguistic phenomenon whereas the latter is a conceptual matter. He asserts that

granted that there is a salient correspondence between monarchs and crowns, for example, it still has to be explained why the word *crown* can be used to refer to monarchs – or for that matter why this fact should have any linguistic consequences at all.<sup>130</sup>

Nunberg introduces the distinction between the two types of metonymic reference in his discussion of the mechanism of transfer. He provides two examples uttered in the context of 'a customer hands his keys to an attendant at a parking lot and says either:

56. *This is parked out back.*

*or*

57. *I am parked out back'.*

Nunberg argues that both examples involve metonymies in the sense that both subjects in (56) and (57) can be thought as related in some way to the car and the location where the car is parked. Whereas the reference in (56) is actually to the intended deep referent, i.e. the car, and not to the surface demonstratum. In (57) the reference is to the surface noun phrase. The evidence of this characterisation of the nature of referentiality of the NP in the two utterances is based on some linguistic tests which provide evidence for the distinction. The first is the gender test in which the example (56) *This is parked out back*, is translated into Italian (an inflecting language showing gender differences). The

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<sup>128</sup> Compare also 'Nixon, who was a staunch anti-communist, bombed Hanoi almost immediately after taking office', which is surely predicative.

<sup>129</sup> Nunberg (1995: 109).

<sup>130</sup> Ibid. (109-110).

translated version shows that the referent rather than the demonstratum determines agreement in the Italian example. Similar results will be obtained when examples like (56) are translated into Arabic, an inflecting language for gender and number and person. The inflection for gender and number would clearly show that the intended reference in example (56) above is deferred and the real reference is made to the car and not to the person or the key. This demonstrates that the above example is in fact a case of deferred reference.

The second test is that of conjunction in which we conjoin additional information about the subject in the first clause. The conjunction will show us whether the agreement in the second clause depends on the surface NP or the deep NP. If the first case then it is a case of deferred reference. If it is the second case then it is an example of predicate transfer. The example Nunberg gives for this is (58) below:

58. *This is parked out back and may not start.*

The conjunction in (58) above supports the view that the intended reference is not the surface demonstratum but the implied referent 'the car', because the additional information conjoined is essentially a description of a car and not of a key. Regarding example (57), the gender as well as the conjunction tests support the view that the intended referent is the surface NP. A tag question to ascertain the example above will be shown in (59) below.

59. *I am parked out back, aren't I'?*

A conjunction test will reveal that it is only possible to conjoin information referring to the person having the car rather than to the car itself. So the conjunction examples Nunberg gives are:

60. *I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes.*

61. *\*I am parked out back and may not start.*

For this type of meaning transfer, Nunberg suggests the term 'deferred ostension or deferred indexical reference'. This is

a process that allows a demonstrative or indexical to refer to an object that correspond in a certain way to the contextual element picked out by a demonstration or by the semantic character of the expression.<sup>131</sup>

Example (61) exemplifies another kind of transfer, Nunberg argues.

The principle here is that the name of a property that applies to something in one domain can sometimes be used as the name of a

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<sup>131</sup> Ibid. (111).

property that applies to things in another domain, provided the two properties correspond in a certain way.<sup>132</sup>

Nunberg calls this type of metonymic transfer 'predicate transfer' indicating that the transfer that is evident in utterances like (61) for example, is not a transfer of the noun phrase but a transfer in the semantic properties that the predicate projects on its arguments.

## **2.2. Summary**

With the exposition of Nunberg's theory of metonymy I reach the end of this chapter which has considered the various linguistic and cognitive theories of metonymy. The aim has been to investigate the nature of metonymy in order to arrive at a better understanding of the workings of the trope. The conclusion of this chapter is that although a theory of metonymy as a cognitive phenomenon is evolving, a great deal of reductionism is still witnessed in terms of treating the trope as a lexical and not as a textual phenomenon. Therefore, the need to develop a comprehensive semiotic approach to metonymy is deemed necessary. The next chapter is therefore an attempt to outline a semiotic approach to metonymy which will lead the researcher to develop a specific definition of metonymy based on which the textual model of the trope will be proposed.

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<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

## Chapter Three: Metonymy and Semiotics

*'When I use a word', Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean- neither more nor less'.<sup>1</sup>*

### 3.0. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is twofold. The first is to develop a semiotic approach to metonymy. In this connection I argue for a theory of motivatedness in linguistic signification based on the conceptualisation of metonymy as a mode of contiguous and causal signification. Metonymy is viewed essentially as a way of abstracting a relation between concepts, words and objects. This relation is fundamentally a relation of *representation*. As such metonymy resembles to a great extent the notion of a sign<sup>2</sup> which is perceived as a three-dimensional entity covering the three modes of knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of words, the knowledge of concepts and the knowledge of objects or things. This chapter aims to develop a semiotic approach to metonymy based on this rudimentary assumption. The second aim is to develop a textual model of metonymy based on this semiotic approach.

In this chapter I shall give a general overview of semiotics and discuss metonymy as representational signification. The aim is to link semiotics, signification, communication and metonymy together and propose a textual model of metonymic signification. The chapter hopes to bring to the understanding of the reader the view that metonymy is not only a semiotic operation on lexical items; more than this, it is a process of representational signification that stretches beyond the individual lexical item to the text level. In short, metonymy with its signifying power is seen to be a major factor in text cohesion and coherence.

### 3.1. Semiotics: a general perspective

It is therefore possible to conceive of a science *which studies the role of signs as part of social life*. It would form part of social psychology, and hence of general psychology. We shall call it semiology, (from the Greek *sēmeîon* 'sign'). It would investigate the nature of signs and

<sup>1</sup> Lewis Carroll quoted in Aitchison (1995: 91).

<sup>2</sup> In the Peircean perspective as shall be discussed below.

the laws governing them. Since it does not yet exist, one cannot say for certain that it will exist. But it has a right to exist, a place ready for it in advance. Linguistics is only one branch of this general science. The laws which semiology will discover will be laws applicable in linguistics, and linguistics will thus be assigned to a clearly defined place in the field of human knowledge.<sup>3</sup>

With these words the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure was actually proclaiming the birth of a new discipline or perhaps predicting its birth. But in any case, it was a discipline that had the right to exist because it is there in our everyday conscious or unconscious life or as Saussure put it 'it has a place ready for it in advance'. The scholar's task with regard to this discipline is to identify the rules and the principles that underlie and govern the process of signification. As far as the subject matter of this discipline is concerned it was already there even before Saussure because it is the essence of cognition and communication. In fact, the concept of signification is not new or a breakthrough of the 19<sup>th</sup> or the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Rather it is a concept that was debated in ancient Athenian society. What is usually referred to in books dealing with semiotics as 'Plato's puzzle'<sup>4</sup> is a good illustration that the notion of signification has attracted the attention of philosophers from ancient time.

The main concern of semiotics or as Saussure and his followers prefer to call it 'semiology' is the study of the system of signs. There is not a big difference between semiology and semiotics. The former has its origins in the theory propounded by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure around the early years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the latter goes back to the work on signification undertaken by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce who gave it the name 'semiotics'. In the course of this section I shall need to refer to the differences between both theories and the implications of such differences on the development of the discipline in Europe and America. Stam et al define semiotics as 'the study of signs, signification and signifying systems'.<sup>5</sup> If semiotics is the study of how signs are created, transmitted and interpreted, then semiotics is actually a theory of meaning.<sup>6</sup> This is in fact the premise on which I have decided to discuss the semiotic dimension of metonymy. Semiotics, I believe, will be of

<sup>3</sup> Saussure. Harris (1983: 15-16).

<sup>4</sup> Keller (1998: 47) coins this term to refer to Plato's mystery of how is it possible 'when I utter this sound, [and] I have that thing in mind...[that] you know that I have it in mind'?

<sup>5</sup> Stam et al (1992: 1).



immense help in the explication of the meaning of the concept of metonymy or rather in broadening our understanding of metonymy. Moreover, taking metonymy as a form of signification promotes the concept to the level of communication, instead of keeping it restricted to the level of lexical meaning.

Semiotics is also defined as the science of signs especially by those who draw from Peirce, the founder of semiotics. These quote his famous statement in which he asserts that logic can be seen as 'the science of the general necessary laws of signs'<sup>7</sup> However, the attribution of the quality of 'science' to this discipline is far from settled yet. Semiotics has "thick" descriptive power; what I mean by this is that it allows for a deep treatment of the data and looks at the data from a multidimensional perspective. Yet it suffers from a lack of agreement as to its 'scientificity'. Perhaps the reason is that although it has "thick" descriptive power it does not, however, have predictive power, which is the basic principle of scientific inquiry. Semiotics cannot predict the future of any signifying system or what could be signified in a particular situation because this depends entirely on various factors that are difficult or perhaps impossible to bring under control. All semiotics claims to do is to provide causal explanation by relating objects and actions to their underlying norms of social and cultural systems, semiotic explanations do not have predictive power. Linguistic semiotics for example does not aim to predict although it 'shows why the sequence has the form and meaning it does by relating it to the system of language'.<sup>8</sup>

Semiotics is largely qualitative and favours thick description of the phenomenon in which a grounding theory emerges from the data rather than imposing on the data preconceived categories and patterns of an a priori system. In fact, the vastness of the phenomena that semiotics purports to deal with<sup>9</sup> makes it difficult to consider it a scientific discipline because almost all social sciences have something to do with semiotics in one way or another. This obviously reduces the definiteness and discreteness of semiotics.

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<sup>6</sup> In this connection, Fiske and Hartley maintain that 'the central concerns of semiotics ... are: ... the relationship between a sign and its meaning; and the way signs are combined into codes' (1978: 37).

<sup>7</sup> Peirce (1955, vol. 2. Para.227).

<sup>8</sup> Culler (1986: 73).

<sup>9</sup> For a good survey of this vastness see Eco (1976: 9-14) who refers to the numerous areas that are related in some way or another to the semiotic field as the political boundaries.

According to Ullmann,<sup>10</sup> C. Morris divided semiotics into three areas:

- Semantics: the meaning of signs (the relationship of signs to what they stand for)
- Syntactics: the relations between signs
- Pragmatics: the ways in which signs are used and interpreted.

This classification is very much influenced by linguistics and the levels represented here are used widely in linguistic studies. The remarkable difference is that while the classification of linguistic data begins with the material or the substance and then moves on to the form, here we have only form because the substance as far as semiotics is concerned is presumably not important since what is important is the systematisation of this substance.<sup>11</sup>

The relationship between semiotics and linguistics is quite special because among all systems of communication or rather of signification, language is the most systematised and the most conventionalised one. In fact, no other forms of signification qualify as fully-fledged systems of communication due to the fact that these systems have not yet been fully conventionalised into proper systems of communication.<sup>12</sup> In discussing the concept of arbitrariness Saussure refers to the relationship between linguistics and semiology as follows:

We may therefore say that signs which are entirely arbitrary convey better than others the ideal semiological process. That is why the most complex and the most widespread of all systems of expression, which is the one we find in human languages, is also the most characteristic of all. In this sense, linguistics serves as a model for the whole of semiology, even though languages represent only one type of semiological systems.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Ullmann (1962: 15).

<sup>11</sup> It should be noted that even in linguistics the level of substance is usually regarded as to fall outside the scope of linguistics. C.f. Aitchison (1995: 8), where she illustrates the scope of linguistics by a diagram and maintains that 'in the centre is **phonetics**, the study of human speech sounds. A good knowledge of phonetics is useful for a linguist. Yet it is a basic background knowledge rather than part of linguistics itself.

<sup>12</sup> It should be noted here that 'sign' language which is a non-verbal system of communication has acquired quite a lot of conventionality and systematicity. This would make it a proper communication system albeit a restricted one. Hawkes shows the validity of this assumption when he argues that 'a language, .... , does not construct its formations of words by reference to the patterns of 'reality', but on the basis of its own internal and self-sufficient rules. The word 'dog' exists and functions within the structure of the English language, without reference to any four-legged barking creature's real existence. The word's behaviour derives from its inherent structural status as a noun rather than its referent's actual status as an animal', Hawkes (1977: 16-17).

<sup>13</sup> Saussure. Harris (1983: 68). Elsewhere Saussure asks 'why is it that semiology is not yet recognised as an autonomous science with its own object of study, like other sciences? Saussure provides an answer to

Dickins argues in this connection that

this extraordinary communicative ability of natural languages is linked to (and can be regarded as a consequence of) an extremely high degree of complexity at the abstract analytical level.<sup>14</sup>

Dickins further asserts, quoting Micheal Lamb, that

natural languages seem to be of such a higher degree of complexity as compared with other semiotic systems that one might reasonably expect any analytical situation exhibited in other semiotic systems to be exhibited in natural language also. One would not however, expect analytical situations exhibited in natural language necessarily to be exhibited in other semiotic systems.<sup>15</sup>

Eco treats the issue of verbal and non-verbal signification as problematic as far as semiotics is concerned. He asks: what is the proper object of study of semiotics? Is it verbal language, which is language proper, or is it all other languages? Eco concludes that 'the problem could be solved by saying that the theory of signification and communication has only one primary object, i.e. verbal language, all other languages being imperfect approximations to its capacities and therefore constituting peripheral and impure instances of semiotic devices ... so that linguistics is not the most important branch of semiotics but the model for every semiotic activity'.<sup>16</sup>

Hawkes holds that the main thrust of semiotics is to study communication and in this it overlaps with *structuralism* because, as he argues, the 'interests of the two spheres are not fundamentally separate'.<sup>17</sup> Hawkes defines structuralism as 'a way of thinking about the world which is predominantly concerned with the perception and description of structures'.<sup>18</sup> In fact, Hawkes predicts that the future will witness a unification of semiotics and structuralism under one heading called 'communication'.<sup>19</sup> However, this comprehensive view is by no means the only way semiotics has been discussed. Semiotics has also been reduced to a mere methodology of structural analysis. In this connection, Lye argues that

structuralism enables both the reading of texts and the reading of cultures: through semiotics, structuralism leads us to see everything

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this stating that 'nothing is more appropriate than the study of languages to bring out the nature of the semiological problem', *ibid.* (16).

<sup>14</sup> Dickins (1998: 17).

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Eco (1976: 172).

<sup>17</sup> Hawkes (1977: 124).

<sup>18</sup> Hawkes (1977: 17).

<sup>19</sup> Hawkes (1977: 124).

as textual, that is composed of signs, governed by conventions of meaning, ordered according to a pattern of relationships.<sup>20</sup>

Sapir also conceives of communication as a fundamental characteristic of human beings. He maintains that

every cultural pattern and every single act of social behaviour involves communication either in an explicit or implicit sense.<sup>21</sup>

Semiotics has changed quite a lot since its early modern theorisation by Saussure and in fact it has grown increasingly less Saussurean. The standard terms have changed as well, notably; semiology is not very much used now and has given way to semiotics, the new term coined by Peirce. Semiotics has also changed in terms of the perspective it has adopted. Saussure looked at it as the super-discipline under which linguistics would be a branch. Nowadays, however, linguistics is seen to be the general heading under which semiotics is discussed. Semiotics is divided regarding the issue of semiosis, which is a term coined by Peirce and defined by him also as

an action, an influence, which is or involves a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in anyway resolvable into actions between pairs.<sup>22</sup>

Later semioticians, such as Eco<sup>23</sup>, used the term 'semiosis' to explain the phenomenon whereby a particular culture creates signs or imposes meanings on signs. Sebeok regards semiosis as a sign action and thus perceives semiotics not to be about the "real" world at all but mainly about 'complementary or alternative actual models of it and – as Leibniz thought – about an infinite number of anthropologically conceivable possible worlds'.<sup>24</sup>

Semiotics has changed focus also. Traditional accounts of semiotics concern the classification of signs and sign systems and their structural organisation; i.e. they mainly study the architecture of signs and sign systems. Modern theories of semiotics however, concentrate on the modes of production of signs and meanings and the work performed through these signs. This study of the modes of production of signs covers a vast area

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<sup>20</sup> Lye (1996: 2). This quotation is taken from 'some aspects of structuralism and its application to literary theory' in a website belonging to the author at the following address: <http://www.brocku.ca/english/courses/4F70/struct.html>

<sup>21</sup> Sapir (1949: 104).

<sup>22</sup> Peirce (1960, vol.5: 488).

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Eco (1976: 125-128).

<sup>24</sup> Sebeok, T. (1991: 12).

and may become a risky game of 'arrogant imperialism' as Eco expects the discipline to do when it claims to define 'everything' as its proper object.<sup>25</sup> This shift casts some doubt on the reliability of semiotics as a theory of communication, because it claims to be concerned with all forms of communication or rather with all that signifies, be it conventional or non-conventional, systematic or non-systematic and intentional or unintentional.

Turner for example maintains that among these forms of communication are 'writing, speech, photography, film, television, and so on'.<sup>26</sup> This claim for such a comprehensive empirical power renders the boundaries of semiotics quite vague. In spite of such critical accounts, some linguists like Kress and Hodge, argue that 'semiotics offers the promise of a systematic, comprehensive and coherent study of communication phenomena as a whole, not just instances of it'.<sup>27</sup> Semiotics helps us understand more the concept of linguistic determinism and cultural relativism, the idea known today as the Sapir/Whorf Hypothesis, because it tells us how through the process of semiosis each social community constructs its own reality as it interacts with its environment through language.

It should also be stressed that semiotics has been used in text linguistics. Semiotic-oriented approaches to text analysis<sup>28</sup> have provided text linguistics with really deep-rooted insights into the nature of textual communication and how meaning is created through communication, in contradiction to the view that communication is the result of meaning. Through semiotics we see everything as textual as far as it is composed of signs, governed by meaning conventions and ordered in patterns by means of various relationships. Semiotic-conscious text analysis grants the text analyst a grounding theory that emerges from the text itself and makes the data alive. Semiotics makes text analysis an intellectually demanding and rewarding practice rather than a mathematically dry endeavour. This is to say that traditional text analysis was mainly concerned with the quantification of the number of times each linguistic item is

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. Eco (1976: 6-7).

<sup>26</sup> Turner (1992: 17).

<sup>27</sup> Kress and Hodge (1993: 1).

<sup>28</sup> Halliday is a pioneer in this respect. His theory of language as social semiotic and his concern for the functions of language in society have helped him to offer a detailed model of language in society which attempts to explain how language is actually used by people in real life communicative situations.

mentioned in the text. This quantification, although apparently scientific, deprives the treatment of the text as a living organism which creates meanings all the way through its generation and interpretation. Quantification is based on the assumption of fixed meaning and fixed interpretation. However, semiotics is based on the assumption of multiple interpretation and this assumption is the part and parcel of an illuminating textual analysis.

To conclude this section I think it is essential to cite an important definition of semiotics provided by Umberto Eco, who writes 'semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything which can be used in order to lie'.<sup>29</sup> According to Eco anything that cannot be used to tell lie cannot be used to tell the truth and in fact cannot be used to tell at all'.<sup>30</sup> The assumption underlying this definition is presumably the paramount importance Eco places on the idea of intentionality and conventionality as two important aspects of signification. It looks as if these two concepts lie at the heart of Eco's conception of what could qualify as a sign. However, this property would ultimately lead to the limitation of Eco's semiotics to the conventional systems of signs that are used for communication notably human language, because other semiotic systems seem to lack the property of lying.<sup>31</sup> Lying in language can occur in various ways, for example literally by flouting the maxim of quality according to Grice's maxims or figuratively by using figures of speech like irony, hyperbole or metaphor. In fact, both of these ways manifest themselves in figurative language. Cook gives an example where the use of a figure of speech actually leads to the flouting of the maxim of quality. In example (1) below:

1. *I've got millions of beer bottles in my cellar*<sup>32</sup>

there is an exaggeration involved in this example and this figurative speech is mainly achieved via the flouting of the maxim of quality. In other words there is an act of lying in the example. In fact, any literal interpretation of the example would lead to absurd responses like 'You English people must have very big houses!'<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Eco (1976: 7).

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> C.f. Lyons (1977b: chap.3) who argues that prevarication is one of the main properties of human language because human language is perhaps the only system of communication that allows for misinforming.

<sup>32</sup> Cook (1989: 31).

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

According to speech act theory correspondence between sentence meaning and utterance meaning in speech results in literal speech acts.<sup>34</sup> So declarative sentences are seen to be assertions, interrogative sentences questions, and imperative sentences orders. But figurative language always plays on the lack of correspondence to create some sort of tension between literal and figurative interpretation. This aspect is also discussed by Searle when he discusses metaphorical expressions and the issue of truth conditions.<sup>35</sup> A woman in classical Arabic culture upon seeing the Caliph<sup>36</sup> said the following:

2. *'ashkü 'ilayka qillata al-jirthän fi bayti*

*I complain to you of the lack of mice in my house.*

Taking this sentence as a declarative sentence realising a complaint would totally miss the point. The utterance requires a figurative interpretation based on a causal inferencing of the type 'mice have left my house because there is no food there'. An indirect speech act, which is a request for financial help, would therefore result from this interpretation.

### **3.2. On the notion of signification**

In this section I shall discuss the notion of signification. This will require a discussion of the concept of sign. Most of the work consulted here will be by Saussure and Peirce. The section aims to provide a general overview of the nature of signs and the various definitions that have been provided for the process of signification. Also of importance will be the discussion of the various types of signs and more particularly the various modes of signification. The ultimate aim of this section is to develop a semiotic approach to metonymic signification.

#### **3.2.1. The nature of signs**

In his *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Language and Languages*, David Crystal defines the word sign as

a feature of language or behaviour which conveys meaning, especially when used conventionally within a system (such as speech, writing, gesture, dance); also called a symbol (but many writers make a distinction between these terms).<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Searle (1975: 60).

<sup>35</sup> See for detail Searle (1979: 113).

<sup>36</sup> A king or a commander.

<sup>37</sup> Crystal (1992: 353).

Wales provides the following definition:

From Latin *signum* 'mark, token', sign is sometimes used interchangeably with symbol to denote 'something' which stands for, or refers to something else, in a meaningful way.<sup>38</sup>

The principle of interpretation says 'a sign is something by knowing which we know something more'.<sup>39</sup> According to Peirce, a sign is 'something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity'.<sup>40</sup> Morris asserts that

something is a sign only because it is interpreted as a sign of something by some interpreter. Semiotics, then, is not concerned with the study of a particular kind of phenomenon, but with ordinary phenomena insofar (and only insofar) as they participate in semiosis.<sup>41</sup>

In essence signs are mediators between messages and signals or between thought and expression. Signs are meaningful units. These units include words, images sounds, gestures or objects. When we invest these units with meaning, then they become signs. So there is a process of semiosis that the word, image, gesture or any form of signification has to undergo for it to be regarded as a sign laden with meaning. To this end Turner argues that for something to qualify as a sign

it must have a physical form, it must refer to something other than itself, and it must be recognised as doing this by other users of the sign system.<sup>42</sup>

In this concise definition of the notion of sign, Turner provides us with three criteria for anything to qualify as a sign or rather as a signifier. It should have a physical form and this could be a sound, an image, an object or a gesture. In other words this signifier should be something that can be seen, heard, touched, smelt or tasted. It must signify something other than its own entity and it must be conventionalised in the sense that it must be recognised by the users of the code as doing so.

It is worth mentioning in this connection that Saussure's view of both the signifier and the signified is a mentalistic one because he excludes reference to any object in the world. He asserts that 'the linguistic sign is then a two-sided psychological entity'.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, Saussure points out that 'a sign is the combination of a concept and a sound

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<sup>38</sup> Wales (1989: 419).

<sup>39</sup> Peirce cited in Eco (1984: 2).

<sup>40</sup> Peirce (1960, vol.2 : 228).

<sup>41</sup> Morris (1938: 20).

<sup>42</sup> Turner (1992: 17).

<sup>43</sup> Saussure. Harris (1983: 66).

pattern'. However, he then alters this terminology by proposing 'to keep the term *sign* to designate the whole, but to replace *concept* and *sound pattern* respectively by *signification* and *signal*'.<sup>44</sup> For Saussure both signification and signal are concepts that reside in the mind of the speaker or perhaps in the collective mind of the speech community.<sup>45</sup> Just like *langue*, which is the system of rules of a particular language being stored in the collective mind of the speech community, signification could be a mental concept that is stored in the collective mind of the speech community in some schematic shape. In this case every individual in this particular speech community would have some sort of manifestation of this system. Saussure's semiotic thought especially the concept of 'signification' could be perceived along the lines of his linguistic thought.

Perhaps the most important thing to point out about Saussure's theory of semiology is the way he deals with the concept of 'sign' and how this affects his semiological theory in general. What Saussure calls 'sign' is the arbitrarily established link between a particular signifier and a particular signified. This link is conventionally established and has to be learned before one can actually use it. But what does Saussure mean by the arbitrariness of this association between the form and content? For Saussure a link is arbitrary if and only if it is established by convention alone. Any natural connection between the signifier and the signified would render the outcome a symbol rather than a sign.<sup>46</sup> In this sense, words like 'house', 'white', 'see', etc. are essentially concepts pertaining to psychology and they 'become linguistic entities only by association with sound patterns'.<sup>47</sup> Thus they would naturally qualify as signs because there is no natural connection between these forms and the contents they denote and this is why they are different in different languages. It is only the conventions of English that have

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid. (67).

<sup>45</sup> In this connection he argues that 'the individual's receptive and coordinating faculties build up a stock of imprints which turn out to be for all practical purposes the same as the next person's. How must we envisage this social product, so that the language itself can be seen to be clearly distinct from the rest? If we could collect the totality of word patterns stored in all those individuals, we should have the social bond which constitutes their language. It is a fund accumulated by the members of the community through the practice of speech, a grammatical system existing potentially in every brain, or more exactly in the brains of a group of individuals; for language is never complete in any single individual, but exists perfectly only in the collectivity. Saussure. Harris (1983: 13).

<sup>46</sup> C.f. his example of the symbol of justice 'the scales' which he wittily questions whether we can replace it with a chariot. Saussure. Harris (1983: 68).

<sup>47</sup> Saussure. Harris (1983: 101).

established such a link between the word 'cat' and the small furry four-legged animal that usually lives in houses.

But in languages there are words that are not totally arbitrary, i.e. they express some kind of intrinsic natural relation between the word and the meaning it denotes. The clearest example is 'onomatopoeia' in which the word echoes the thing it refers to. This category and the category of *exclamations* are treated as 'symbolic' and thus the term 'symbol' is used instead of sign as far as the Saussurean theory is concerned.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, the term 'sign' is reserved in Saussure's use of it to the total arbitrary relation between the signifier and the signified. This implies that for Saussure all motivated associations are not signification systems because they are marginal, as it were, to signification.<sup>49</sup> It should be stressed here that it is the notion of arbitrariness in Saussure's theory of semiology that is going to be contested in this thesis because the assumption is that propositional and textual signification is largely motivated. In fact, a semiotic theory of metonymy leads to the conception that linguistic signification is highly motivated because our selection from the paradigmatic axis and our combination on the syntagmatic axis is loaded with intentions, ideologies and biases.

Peirce's theory of semiotics exhibits a different conception of the nature of sign, signification and interpretation from that of Saussure.<sup>50</sup> These issues will be dealt with in other sections of this chapter. What I intend to elucidate here are the key issues that are peculiar to Peirce's semiotics. It should be noted that while many examples of the differences between Peirce's semiotics and Saussure's semiology are treated in various sections of this chapter, the intention is to look with particular focus at the issue of the scope of the discipline as perceived by Saussure and Peirce. The scope of semiotics as portrayed by Saussure is quite narrow if compared to that proposed by Peirce. Saussure's narrow conception of semiology stems from the fact that he perceives the discipline to be the science of signs as he defines them. Saussure treats signs as arbitrary and conventional. Other 'signs', which are produced as a result of natural motivation or generally 'signs' that are motivated, are not regarded as signs according to Saussurean

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<sup>48</sup> See the discussion of onomatopoeia in *ibid.* ( 69).

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> As will be shown later in this chapter Peirce's conception of sign is more relevant to the course of this thesis because of its consideration of an ontological dimension of sign in addition to the cognitive and linguistic dimensions.

semiology. Now this conception of sign if compared to Peirce's semiotics is only one subcategory of the vast conception of the Peircean sign. In fact, what Saussure conceives as a sign proper corresponds to what Peirce calls symbol which is arbitrarily signified.

Peirce's semiotics goes beyond the concept of sign as symbol to include sign as index and sign as icon. It looks at the concept of sign from a philosophical perspective as a unit of understanding, knowledge and interpretation. He is interested in deriving a rule as to how signification operates in general, whether the source of this signification is a human being or is natural. For Peirce a sign like 'smoke' coming out of a house is as important a sign as the utterance 'there is smoke coming out of that house' although the former is a natural sign that is produced by a non-human sender. Linguistic signs for Peirce are only a part of the system of signs that can be seen in nature. While Saussure stresses the importance of the sign being composed of a linguistic expression in order to qualify as a sign, Peirce regards as a sign any element in nature that yields knowledge and leads to interpretation.

Semioticians generally regard the concept of sign as a unitary concept and the division of the elements comprising it as a matter of pedagogy rather than a real division. They see sign as a coin, having two faces, which cannot be separated from each other. Saussure compares the sign to a human being, comprising body and soul. Better still, according to Saussure, is the comparison with chemical compounds such as water which he argues 'is a combination of hydrogen and oxygen; but taken separately neither element has any of the properties of water'.<sup>51</sup> This type of approach has encouraged such integrated conceptions of the notion of sign. Lewis maintains that 'the sign incorporates both signifier and signified: it is the material entity made meaningful'.<sup>52</sup> In Lewis' quotation we have a clear reference to the current trend of materialising the concept of sign. While Lewis agrees with Saussure regarding the integrated structure of the notion of sign, we find a departure from Saussure's mental conception of signification. It seems that there is a movement to bring the concept of semiotics into concrete manifestation in socio-cultural contexts. I believe this is likely to be a fruitful development, as communication cannot be thought of only as a mental phenomenon. In

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<sup>51</sup> Saussure. (102).

<sup>52</sup> Lewis (1991: 27).

fact, it is more naturally a real life phenomenon that takes place within a material socio-cultural context. Perceived as such communication is seen as the process of meaning creation. The process of meaning creation in communication is far from an arbitrary process. Rather it is a process of motivated selection of concepts and motivated combination of these into thought.

Some semioticians<sup>53</sup> think of the concepts of signifier and signified as corresponding to the linguistic concepts of form and content. The signifier is paralleled with 'form' and the signified with 'content'. This view looks rather naïve. The way signifiers are looked at as 'form' that is used to carry 'content', i.e. meaning, leads to some problematic understanding regarding the role of the signifier. First, this view looks at the signifier merely as a carrier of meaning, but not as an element that is itself meaningful. Second, it assumes a one-to-one correspondence between content and meaning. This might not be as straightforward as it is being presented by those who attempt to link semiotic concepts to linguistic concepts especially if we take figurative language into consideration.<sup>54</sup> In fact, meaning is the result of a process of interpretation and a result of a long series of inferences, and it is not merely a matter of relating a particular signifier to its conventionally established content or meaning. The problem becomes more particularly recognisable when we have one signifier representing more than one signified as is the case in polysemy, and the case of having one signified being represented by more than one signifier, for example, in synonymy. Regardless of the differences regarding the specific features of the signifier and the signified, and whether it is legitimate to relate these semiotic concepts to their linguistic counterparts of form and content, there is a general tendency among semioticians to agree that the concept of sign involves all the three elements of signification. These are the sign itself, the signifier and the signified.

Given that Saussure's concept of *langue* is influenced by Durkheim's notion of 'collective mind'<sup>55</sup>, it is equally reasonable to argue that his concept of signification is

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
<sup>53</sup> Cf. Wells (1977:3), Anderson and Trudgill (1992: 75).

<sup>54</sup> C.f. Gibbs (1994: chap. 2.).

<sup>55</sup> Sampson (1980: 47) after a lengthy discussion of Durkheim's concept of 'collective mind' and the clash between 'methodological collectivism' and 'methodological individualism' as two ways of thinking about the subject-matter of sociology, argues that this was 'very much a live issue in the intellectual milieu within which Saussure's views on language were formed'. Compare also Eagleton who refers to the concept as the 'collective consciousness' (1983:110). See also Ricoeur (1976: 3) for similar view.

also influenced by the same view. In this case Saussure could be interpreted to mean that the reference of the sign is not necessarily the object in the world but the mental concept the language users construct of that object. Each of the members of the speech community is expected to have his own mental concept of that thing in the world but these mental concepts will not be very different from each other because they are united with a stereotype of that thing. This perfect and holistic representation is what resides in the collective mind of the speech community. The link I intend to establish from this discussion is that the concept of sign in the Saussurean conception although mentalistic in nature is itself metonymic in the sense that the signification or the concept and the sound pattern or the signal stand in a metonymic relation of representation between language and cognition. Reality is virtually ignored in Saussurean semiology but nonetheless the model is still characteristically metonymic.

Saussure's model of the sign could be represented in the following diagram:



**Figure 3. 1. Metonymy and the Saussurean notion of sign.**

For Eco a sign is 'always an element of an expression plane conventionally correlated to one (or several) elements of a content plane'.<sup>56</sup> In fact, this definition of sign is reminiscent of Saussure's definition of sign as the correspondence between a signifier and a signified. In a sense it is the relation of correspondence that makes the sign and hence there is nothing physical called sign. It is an abstract relation that is drawn between a signifier and a signified by means of conventionalised norms. Hjelmslev suggests that

it appears more appropriate to use the word sign as the name for the unit consisting of content-form and the expression-form and established by the solidarity that we have called the sign-function.<sup>57</sup>

Hjelmslev thus perceives 'sign' as a unit that is established by virtue of a correlation between an expression and content. This correlation becomes a sort of a code that as

<sup>56</sup> Eco (1976: 48).

<sup>57</sup> Hjelmslev (1961: 58)


Eco argues 'provides a rule to generate signs as concrete occurrences in communicative intercourse'.<sup>58</sup> This does not mean however, that Hjeltmslev is concretising the concept of sign by looking at it as a unit. This unit is a theoretical construct and the focus is mainly on the set of relations that are established in the structure of the sign function. This is because the sign function is a type of a language and language for Hjeltmslev is a 'structure, not to be discovered by the linguist but to be established by him'.<sup>59</sup>

Peirce's model of sign, on the other hand, looks quite different because it perceives of the concept of sign as comprising three facets rather than two as in the Saussurean tradition. This is important to the course of this thesis which aims to establish a three-dimensional model of metonymic signification. Saussure's notion of signifier is called representamen in Peirce's model and this is the form which the sign takes. This can be both material and abstract. In other words, an abstract concept can function as a signifier and can trigger some sort of interpretation of its own. The second aspect of sign is that of the interpretant which according to Peirce is not an interpreter but rather the sense the representamen signifies. Now according to the abstract view of the concept of representamen, the interpretant could as well qualify as a sign. So we have a kind of cyclic signification in which one sign triggers more than one interpretation in a successive way. Peirce's third concept is the object and here the referent is the object in the world. While Saussure's signified or reference is abstract, Peirce's is material: the thing in the real world. However, this does not mean that the Peircean concept of sign is material or that the sign is only physical. Rather, the sign might be physical and abstract. It is the referent in the Peircean sense that is physical. The following diagram illustrates Peirce's model and relates it to metonymy:

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<sup>58</sup> Eco (1976: 49).

<sup>59</sup> See Mulder and Hervey (1972: 7).



**Figure 3.2. Metonymy and the Peircean notion of sign.**

Figure 3.2. above shows a great deal of similarity between the notion of sign and the notion of metonymy. This similarity is warranted by the view of both notions as representational. A sign mediates between a representamen, an interpretant and an object. In the same way, metonymy mediates between a word, a concept and an object. The notions of sign and metonymy facilitate 'standing for' relations between forms, concepts and objects. This is the representational view of metonymy that is sustained throughout this thesis and will be discussed in detail in section 3.3.

Saussure's concept of sign is structural in the sense that he was seeking an explanation of the internal structure of the sign and the processes of signification and interpretation. In other words his concern was to build a model with emphasis on internal structure within the sign system. This led to his theory of linguistic signification, an insightful work that helped to found the study of linguistics on semiological grounds. By means of its internal structure language creates its reality without the need to refer to the patterns of reality. The word 'cat' in the English language exists in the language without need for reference to the four-legged, long-tailed animal. How does language do this? The answer is simply by means of internal structure through which the word 'cat' behaves according to the laws of its status as a noun, i.e. an element in the linguistic structure and not according to its physical referent as an animal. While Saussure's semiology is instrumental, Peirce theory of sign is representational. From an epistemological perspective Peirce approaches the issue of signs and signification in an attempt to know how representamen 'stand for' their objects.

The Saussurean emphasis on the internal structure of the sign system justifies an early structural interest in looking at language as the determinant of our worldview. This was to evolve into what is now known as the Sapir/Whorf Hypothesis. The view expressed by this hypothesis is that

Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression of their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving particular problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the real world is to a large extent built upon the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached.<sup>60</sup>

Or as Whorf put it later on

And every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness.<sup>61</sup>

The more recent account of the issue is provided by Bickerton who writes 'the categories into which we divide nature are not in nature, they emerge solely through interaction between nature and ourselves'.<sup>62</sup> This structuralist perspective regarding the dialectic relationship between language and thought has allowed for a huge body of cultural studies, which sprang from anthropological linguistics and sociolinguistics. The essence of signification is the interaction between cognition, language and reality. The structuralist quest has always been to explore the relationship between these three fundamentals.

Saussure's theory of sign and signification tells us that language with its internal structure does not merely reflect reality, rather it creates its own reality.<sup>63</sup> Saussure's concentration on the internal structure of the linguistic sign and his emphasis on the notion of conventionality inform us that his view of language is that of a medium as well as a topic. In other words reality is what the language creates. This view is quite

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<sup>60</sup> Sapir (1949: 162).

<sup>61</sup> Whorf (1956: 252).

<sup>62</sup> Bickerton (1990: 53).

<sup>63</sup> As we have seen above in 3.1. Hawkes also echoes this view also.

important for the theory of motivatedness in linguistic signification that I am concerned with in this chapter. This is because if the process of meaning creation is purely conventional, i.e. culturally produced, then there is cultural motivatedness in the creation of these meanings as we will encode our ideologies and perceptions into the process of semiosis. It is true that this aspect is not as clear if we conceive of signification as taking place at the level of individual lexical items. However, once the signification process is seen at the level of text where the interaction between language, mind and reality is presumably in its most perfect form, the relationship between the signifier and the signified is not at all innocent and is largely motivated by all sorts of cultural and even ontological factors. The reason why motivatedness is much clearer at the level of text, is that once we select from the paradigmatic axis and put into strings of language to serve a particular communicative function, the processes of selection and combination are never innocent.

An important conception in this regard is Saussure's concept of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign. As we have seen, according to Saussure, there is no intrinsic relationship between the signifier and the signified.<sup>64</sup> That is the relationship is a matter of convention and the sole source of this is the speech community. One result of this is the tremendous number of languages spoken around the world. This proves that the signifier is fundamentally a cultural product and is bound to change from one language to another unless the word in one language is borrowed from another to refer to the same meaning. In this case the act of borrowing is itself an intentional communicative act. Again we need to interpret this notion of arbitrariness in a special way because an arbitrary theory of language signification means in essence that there is no physical correspondence between the signifier and the signified. This means that nature does not impose its categories on language; rather language creates categories to describe and explain nature. If we conceive of language as a social reality present in the unconscious of the speech community, then this unconscious will actively operate when meaning is created to reflect all sorts of rational motivatedness in linguistic signification especially at the textual level. The arrangement and organisation of signs is heavily influenced by ideological purposes and personal intentions as well as cultural patterns of cognition.

In this connection Fairclough argues that

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<sup>64</sup> C.f. Saussure. Harris (1983: 67).

Ideological struggle pre-eminently takes place in language. We can think of such struggle as not only *in* language in the obvious sense that it takes place in discourse and is evidenced in language texts, but also *over* language. It is over language in the sense that language itself is a *stake* in social struggle as well as a *site* of social struggle.<sup>65</sup>

Similarly, Kress and Hodge advocate a theory of motivatedness in linguistic signs when they maintain that 'linguistic signs are always motivated conjuncts of form and meaning'.<sup>66</sup> This would mean that any use we make of language will be influenced by our ideological stance, the values we hold and the biases we adopt. Language is not an innocent reflection of reality rather it is a means by which we construct reality. What can be concluded from the above discussion is that our lexical and grammatical choices are not innocent choices. There is always a struggle to attain desirable things and a struggle to avoid undesirable things. Hence text linguistics should account for this important aspect of language as a social fact and as a product of social processes.

Hatim and Mason argue that the notion of motivatedness underlies the essence of language because 'it is this notion which provides the essential link between textual occurrences and the context in which they are embedded'.<sup>67</sup> Birch argues, on the same line, that aspects of language

signal different points of view, these in turn signal different realities, and these realities determine and are determined by different (multiple) ideologies.<sup>68</sup>

He further argues that 'there is in any use of language a struggle for dominance; a struggle to bring about change'.<sup>69</sup> Ghadessy puts forward a more specific argument about motivatedness in linguistic signification when he argues that

our lexical and grammatical selections are not innocent choices. There is always a struggle for power which results in ideologically conflicting systems of classifying and controlling the world.<sup>70</sup>

The view of motivatedness in linguistic signification seems to be something that cannot be disputed and if there is any chance to perceive language as innocent it is simply because we share the myths and biases expressed in our native languages. Cameron

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<sup>65</sup> Fairclough (1989: 88).

<sup>66</sup> Kress and Hodge (1993: 205).

<sup>67</sup> Hatim and Mason (1997: 24).

<sup>68</sup> Birch (1993: 43).

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ghadessy (1993: 3).

argues in this connection that 'there is always a point of view in language but we are apt to notice it only when it is not the one we share'.<sup>71</sup> Fairclough asserts that

the operation of ideology can be seen in terms of ways of constructing texts which constantly and cumulatively impose assumptions upon text interpreters and text producers, typically without either being aware of it.<sup>72</sup>

The above discussion aims to argue against the notion of arbitrariness in order to establish a theory of metonymy as a theory of motivated signification.

### 3.2.2. Types and modes of sign

There are various types of signs and there are various classifications of signs.<sup>73</sup> Perhaps the classification which is most useful and relevant to our discussion here is Peirce's classification, which is based on the relationship between the sign and its object. In a sense this can be seen as a classification based on the mode of signification. According to this conception signs have three modes of signification. If the relation between the signifier and the signified or rather between the sign and its object is that of similarity then this is an iconic signification. The type of sign thus designated is an *icon*. If the relationship between the signifier and the signified or rather between the sign and its object is that of symbolism in that the signifier symbolically signifies the object, then this mode is symbolic and the sign thus designated is a *symbol*. The third mode of signification is perceived when the relationship between the signifier and the signified or rather the sign and its object is that of causality in the sense that the signifier causes the signified or the object of the sign. In this case the former is called the cause and the latter is called the effect and the sign thus designated is an *index*.<sup>74</sup>

Another type of classification proposed by Peirce is that which is based on the nature of the interpretant which each sign represents. This classification includes, *rheme*, *proposition* and *argument*. A rheme can be understood as a referring expression and representing a particular kind of object. Therefore, proper names would fall into this category because they merely name an entity in the real world. A proposition on the other hand involves two entities. This is because propositions generally express an

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<sup>71</sup> Cameron (1995: 74).

<sup>72</sup> Fairclough (1989: 83).

<sup>73</sup> See Eco (1976) who provides a number of classification systems which have been used to classify signs.

<sup>74</sup> For a detailed discussion of the various types of Peirce's sign classification see Hervey (1982: 23-32).

assertive point of view regarding the state of affairs in the real world. In order to understand propositions one has to go beyond the proposition itself which is the sign according to this conception to examine the conditions of the world of the utterance to judge the sign as true or false. An argument is a sign that involves mediation between two entities. These are the premise and the conclusion.

An example can be provided to illustrate these three divisions of sign according to the interpretant or the sense of the sign. If I point to a chair and say 'chair' then this is a referring expression and thus is understood as a way of naming or indicating that particular object. So the rheme is understood as a one-way process in which I do not need to draw a relationship between two or more interpretants. Now if I point to this chair and say 'this chair is comfortable', I am making a proposition and to confirm or falsify this assertion I need to examine the conditions of the real world, i.e. to see whether the chair is actually comfortable or not. In this sense the interpretation of the interpretant requires a kind of a two-level process in which the sense of the signification is resolved by means of taking recourse to the world outside the sign-vehicle but which is part of the sign-object. The third example is that when I proceed further to make an argument about the state of the world and say 'because this chair is comfortable I always like to sit on it'. Here the sign is mediating between a premise and a conclusion regarding the sense of the argument. This last type or model of signification is very relevant to this research project in two respects. First, it is related to the semiotic conception of metonymy as causal linking between significations and propositions. Second, it is related to a textual theory of metonymy because it allows for the notion of signification to go beyond the sentence level to account for textual relations underlying discourse. This theme will be elaborated further in the course of this study and will be used to derive a model of how semiotics could provide textlinguistics with useful insights into the nature of signification in the socio-textual world of discourse.

### **3.3. On representational semiotics and metonymy**

This section aims to link the representational theory of semiotics and the representational relation of metonymy. I shall discuss the representational theory of semiotics by examining two theories that treat the process of signification as a process of representation. The first of these theories is that which was proposed by the Greek philosopher Aristotle in his book *De Interpretatione*. Aristotle's statement of his sign theory runs as follows:

Now spoken sounds [phonai] are symbols [symbola] of affections in the soul [pathemata], and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of – actual things [pragmata] – are also the same. ... A name is a spoken sound significant by convention, without time, none of whose parts is significant in separation. For in “Whitfield” the ‘field’ does not signify anything in its own right, as it does in the phrase ‘white field’. I say “by convention” because no name is a name naturally but only when it has become a symbol. Even inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance) do indeed reveal something, yet none of them is a name.<sup>75</sup>

Underlying Aristotle’s representational theory of signs is the assumption that the world of concepts is universal, and the world of actual things is universal too. It is only the world of names that changes due to the arbitrary nature of this name. So according to this conception signs ‘represent’. That is, by way of conventionality, they symbolise affections of the soul, which naturally resemble the actual things in the world. This is a clever account designed to solve the dilemma of nature vs. convention which Greek philosophers long debated about.<sup>76</sup> It is clever because it combines the conventional aspect of name and at the same time it accounts for the natural resemblance of affections of the soul to the actual things in the world. The question that arises is how is it possible to verify that the affections of the soul actually resemble the actual things in the world? And, in fact, more importantly what is the individual role of cognition? According to this conception all humans think in the same way but express these thoughts differently. I think this is quite a faulty postulation because although a considerable part of human thinking is objective, i.e. shared by the group or at least standing to some extent independent of the individual, the majority of the cognitive processes involved in experiencing reality result from personal interaction between the individual and the world. This is what is meant by the term ‘idea’ that Frege<sup>77</sup> talks about as being different from sense in this particular personal vs. communal or subjective vs. objective dichotomy.


<sup>75</sup> Aristotle (1984: 25), cited in Keller (1998: 25).

<sup>76</sup> Interesting discussions regarding the notion of nature vs. convention occupied much of Greek philosophy. Different views were provided by the two famous Greek schools of linguistic philosophy, namely, the Stoics and the Alexandrians. The former advocated the analogist perspective of language as being essentially regular due to the system of symmetries provided by convention. The latter advocated a view of language as anomalous and maintained that language lacks regularity due to the inherent irregularities in nature. See for further details Lyons (1968: 4-12).

<sup>77</sup> I shall present a discussion of Frege’s theory of meaning in the next few paragraphs.

From the above quotation it is possible to distinguish three levels of representation that concern the concept of sign and signification. These are what Aristotle calls 'spoken sound', affections of the soul, and actual things. These respectively correspond to the linguistic, epistemological and ontological dimensions of phenomena. Aristotle's presumption that sounds symbolise affections of the soul which are like actual things in the real world gives rise to a crucial question as how these sounds or sound-forms symbolise these affections. A possible answer is that sounds symbolise their contents which are the affections of the soul here by means of standing for them or representing them. But this is not enough an answer because the same question comes to mind again 'on what basis do sounds represent or stand for affections?' It seems as if we are in a vicious circle in which no matter how precise we are in forming our answers to such questions the outcome will always lead to another question.

The fundamental principle underlying Aristotle's representational theory of signs can be summarised in the following diagram:



**Figure 3.3. The 'stand for' relations between the three domains of knowledge.**

The arrows in this diagram mean 'stand for'. So expressions stand for affections (concepts or ideas) which in turn stand for things in the real world. In a sense language as perceived by Aristotle is a representation of a representation or in other words language is a representation of an imitation. Aristotle suggests that language is conventional but cognition is imitative and universal. This conception is strongly challenged by cultural and anthropological studies. Most notably, the criticism of this theory comes from work done on some American Indian languages like Hopi and Maya in the Americas, by linguists like Edward Sapir, Franz Boas and subsequently by Benjamin Lee Whorf, Berlin and Kay and Rosch. The final formulation of the relativistic hypothesis was formulated as what is now known as the Sapir/Whorf hypothesis, the main argument of which is that humans are at the mercy of their native languages and they dissect nature along lines laid down by those languages. The main issue of this hypothesis is that language is not innocent; it does not merely represent reality, rather it creates and constructs reality.

The relationship between the representational theory of signs and the concept of metonymy follows from the fact that metonymy is largely representational. Metonymy is essentially a cognitive process in which certain things 'stand for' other things. This brings the process of metonymy very close to the phenomenon of linguistic representation in which a particular expression is conventionally associated with a particular content. Similarly, metonymy is a cognitive phenomenon where one thing becomes associated with another thing until it conventionally stands for it on many occasions. So in the example

3. *Sana'a denied the accusations*

because 'Sana'a' is the place where the Yemeni government is based. This kind of contiguous association allows that the former concept to stand for the latter, i.e. it allows Sana'a to stand for the Yemeni government.

Let us examine now a theory of signs as representation expounded by the mathematician and logician Frege. Frege (1966b), in his paper entitled 'On Sense and Reference', provides a theory of sense and meaning in which he also conceptualises the three levels of phenomena discussed earlier. He states that

a proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) *expresses* its sense, *stands for* or *designates* its reference. By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference.<sup>78</sup>

Frege talks of linguistic expressions like names, predicates and sentences. He also talks about 'sense', which could be taken to correspond to the epistemological level of representation discussed above. However, Frege distinguishes between two epistemological levels of experience. These are what might be called the communal and the personal levels. His analogy of observation of the 'moon' is indicative of this distinction. For him if someone observes the moon through a telescope, then the moon itself will be the reference. The term 'reference' here means the object of the observation, i.e. what can be called the ontological level of representation (albeit in a different sense from the way I am using 'ontological' in this thesis). That is to say 'reference' is not always the object of observation. Frege means by 'reference' also the truth-value of a designated predicate, i.e. a sentence. The sentence, according to Frege, results from the designation of a particular proper name to a specific predicate. When this sentence is created its reference becomes its truth-value.

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<sup>78</sup> Frege (1966b: 61).

Again on Frege's analogy, the moon is the reference, and according to him also, the image on the lens of the telescope is called the 'real' image. Frege calls this the 'sense'. Then Frege talks about the retinal image and to this he gives the term 'idea' or 'experience'. Now what is the difference between 'sense' and 'idea'? Frege answers this question by arguing that while the former is the 'objective' meaning the latter is 'subjective' meaning. He states that

the optical image in the telescope is indeed one-sided and dependent upon the standpoint of observation; but it is still objective, inasmuch as it can be used by several observers. At any rate it could be arranged for several to use it simultaneously. But each one will have his own retinal image.<sup>79</sup>

So 'sense' is what everybody gets from the sign as its direct literal meaning, and 'idea' is the personal input into this general interpretation.

Keller<sup>80</sup> attempts a schematic overview of these Fregean concepts which it is useful to present here because it clearly illustrates Frege's representational theory of signs.

Linguistic Level	Epistemological Level	Ontological Level
Sign	Sense	Meaning <sub>F</sub>
Predicate	Mode of presentation	Concept
Name	Mode of presentation	Object
Sentence	Thought	Truth-value

**Figure 3.4. Frege's representational theory.**

The diagram shows that Frege perceives of signification to be triadic in the sense that the sign, which he regards as the linguistic level of representation or more precisely the linguistic expression, is related to other two corresponding levels of representation. These are the 'sense' which could be the ideational and cognitive level and 'meaning' by which Frege means 'reference'.<sup>81</sup> This is the actual thing in the world. But the question that arises now is what is precisely the relation underlying this type of correspondence? The answer to this question demands us to refer to his statement referred to earlier in which he explicitly maintains *that a proper name stands for its reference*. Frege, as I mentioned earlier, is a mathematician and a logician. His general

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. (60).

<sup>80</sup> Keller (1998: 42).

<sup>81</sup> It is to be noted here that the English translation of Frege's *Bedeutung* is 'reference' which captures the ontological features that Frege himself intends.

theoretical framework is the rules of logic and his main interest is to achieve a theory of meaning that is essentially an attempt to explain the two major concepts of his article's title, i.e. 'sense' and 'reference'. It would seem as if Frege is taking language for granted and it is this treatment that makes his theory more of a theory of interpretation than one of signification. Sense and reference are the mental idea and the actual thing respectively. However, language is in fact underlying the objective interpretation of the sign which Frege calls 'sense'.

The fact that Frege's theory of meaning is perhaps more formal than communicative does not mean that it is totally devoid of interest for a theory of meaning as signification and more importantly a theory of meaning as representation. Although Aristotle's and Frege's theories of meaning are essentially representational, they exhibit certain differences. Perhaps the most notable of these is their account of the epistemological level. Whereas Aristotle thinks it is one for all human beings because it is the affections of the soul which resemble the actual things in reality, Frege conceives of two levels of epistemology; one universal or at least collective and the other personal and individual. Yet both theories regard the relations underlying signification as representational in which the sign 'stands for' the referent.

Now I shall move on to discuss the relevance of this theory to the theory of metonymy as I am presenting it here in this thesis. The distinction that Frege proposes between 'sense' and 'idea' is very relevant to the theory of metonymy for two reasons. The first reason concerns the way in which the Fregean theory of meaning allows for both a personal and subjective meaning, and a general and objective meaning. Now the whole realm of rhetorical figures and figurative language can be comfortably located on the personal subjective side of the meaning creation process, whereas the literal meaning can be seen to reside on the general and objective side of the continuum. In fact to this end Frege himself points out that even this notion of 'idea'- the personal side of meaning is also potential of achieving a consensus. According to Frege this is the way art is created because people do not depend on sense alone when they interpret art. Rather they make a great deal of use of human ideas, the absence of which 'would make art impossible' as Frege puts it.<sup>82</sup> So Frege distinguishes sharply between the sense of the word, the reference of the word and the idea that the word arouses in the hearer.

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<sup>82</sup> Frege (1966b: 61).

This intermediate level of representation which Frege calls 'idea' is where he places the interpretation of arts and it is the same level where I place figurative language as opposed to the literal language that can be said to correspond to the Fregean notion of 'sense'.

To drive home a point, Frege conceives of three terms, namely, sign, sense and reference. The fact that he recognises the sign to stand for the sense which in turn stands for the reference shows that he is totally involved with literal objective signification here. Perceived as such Frege's theory of meaning might not be as relevant as it is hoped to be for the theory of metonymy as a process of signification. However, Frege does not stop at this level of explanation, rather he goes further to outline his theory of 'idea', i.e. his view of certain aspects of personalised meanings or more precisely those ideational aspects that are aroused by the words in the hearers of these words. In a sense this is the level of multiple interpretation of the sign. This does not mean that a particular sign has more than one interpretation. Rather it means that the sign undergoes a cyclical process of signification and interpretation. The sign signifies its referent and this referent itself becomes a sign on its own, arousing certain ideational meanings that might be peculiar to the hearer of the utterance. It is at this level of ideational representation that a potential for a figurative theory becomes available, because it is the level at which the initiator of the signification encodes his own ideas, myths and beliefs and tries to lead the receiver to accept these myths and beliefs. It is also the same level whereby the receiver adds his own ideas, myths and beliefs to the sense of the word or the utterance.<sup>83</sup>

A simple example to illustrate the point might be the artificial sign of a fire alarm. This sign itself has been a target for mechanical signification that took place at a previous stage. This is the detection of fire or smoke which gave the signal to the fire alarm to make the ringing. This fire alarm, perceived as a signifier, yields various further types of signification and this I believe is the part where there might be a correspondence with the notion of 'idea' according to Frege and where figurative language use, as I argue, resides. People's responses to this sign differ widely. Some people might run away. Others will call the fire brigade. Others according to the sort of ideas this sign arouses in them might prefer to remain seated, especially those who are familiar with false alarms.

This latter group might leave the place just like others but they will not have got the same meaning from the sign. That is the sign will not be a sign of a real fire for them.<sup>84</sup>

I have tried to show that the Fregean notion of 'idea' is a useful tool for mapping figurative uses of language as being subjective and to a large extent aesthetic. This is true because literary language involves a great deal of personal preference for certain styles, personal use of imagery, and so on. However, not only is Frege's representational theory of meaning useful to metonymy in this general sense, but also it is quite promising for the theory of metonymy in a more specific way. That is to say, because Frege's theory of meaning accounts for all aspects of meaning starting with the linguistic, the epistemological and the ontological, it is helpful in treating metonymy as a process of signification encompassing all these levels. Metonymy is a signifying process whereby one linguistic item is substituted for another with which it is associated. Now the criterion on which the substitution is based might not be shared by all recipients of the message and might not be a normal way of perceiving signifying relations. In other words these relations might be examples of 'ideas' in the Fregean terminology simply because after all they are personal preferences for establishing a relation between the literal and the figurative meaning. Yet, this does not mean that they are left to random whims for their creation and interpretation. The reason is that the relations that underlie such a substitution are quite objective ones and these make the sign creation and interpretation remarkably objective.

Soskice provides useful insights into the nature of representation in the metonymic operation. These, in fact, complement those of Frege's and Aristotle's representational view on signification. Soskice argues that metaphor and metonymy seem to be similar on the surface but in fact they are different as far as their underlying representational relations are concerned. Metonymy tends to be referential and this referentiality carries with it some factuality. She maintains that

Metonymy and synecdoche seem superficially similar to metaphor,  
but they are functionally (that is, semantically) different. In

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<sup>83</sup> Compare Hervey (1982: 136) for similar ideas expressed by Barthes' notion of connotation which itself draws on ideas from Hjelmslev.

<sup>84</sup> This can be related to the three types of speech acts which speech act theory postulates. The first is the locutionary level, which refers to the speech activity, which is here the signification activity. The second is the illocutionary act, which refers to the type of act the utterance is enforcing and which can be linked with the notion of warning of potential fire in our example here. The third level is the perlocutionary act which is the response of the receivers to the warning. See for further detail on this Lyons (1977b: chap.16), Levinson (1983: chap.5).

metonymy and synecdoche, one word or phrase stands in for a more straightforward reference and this standing in is of a different nature from that which characterizes metaphor. The plugging in of an adjunct for the whole, or a more comprehensive term for a less, is essentially an oblique and less prosaic way of making a direct reference. Instances of metonymy and synecdoche point one directly to the absent item, it would be a failure in comprehension if, on hearing the phrase 'the White House said today' one wondered if shutters and doors opened like mouths.<sup>85</sup>

Soskice concludes that 'with metonymy and synecdoche, meaning is largely subsumed by the reference it makes'.<sup>86</sup> The relation of reference believed to underlie the process of metonymy is quite important to the theory of metonymy as I am trying to develop it in this thesis particularly with reference to my interest in developing a textual model of metonymic relations in text.

### **3.4. Metonymic aspects of the linguistic sign**

This section is directly concerned with the explication of the metonymic basis of the linguistic sign. The main aim is to argue that metonymy underlies a great deal of language use. The fact that we do not often recognise this does not mean that the argument is not valid. This is simply because metonymy is such an integral part of our cognition that most metonymies actually go unnoticed. Here, I am concerned with the semiotic dimension of metonymy and more particularly of metonymy as a feature of linguistic signs.

#### **3.4.1. Metonymy as signification**

If signification, as I pointed out earlier in this chapter, is a process of naming two entities and then abstracting a relation of 'standing for' between them, then metonymy is this and something more. This is to say that metonymy involves the process in which one thing comes to give a meaning other than itself by means of various relations, hence it involves a process of signification or rather it is a process of signification. Metonymy also adds to this a process of thinking on which the relation underlying the signification is founded. This could be a relation of causality or contiguity in its various facets. This in turn means that the processes of metonymy are not arbitrary because they involve a considerable amount of thinking and rationality.

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<sup>85</sup> Soskice (1985: 57).

<sup>86</sup> Ibid. (58).

In fact, if we trace the development of the theory of metonymy over time<sup>87</sup> we find that signification is a common notion used in relation to the discussion of metonymy regardless of whether the rhetorical tradition is the western or the Arabic tradition. Among the western classical rhetorical treatises that treat metonymy as signification or at least make explicit use of this notion are those of Sacerdos, Charisus, Isidore of Seville and Diomedes.<sup>88</sup> In the Arabic rhetorical tradition we find allusions to the notion of signification by Al-Jurjāni who in his definition<sup>89</sup> of the trope uses the word ‘yūmi’u’ which translates as ‘indicates’ or even as ‘signifies’ as an allusion to the process of signification by indication. This in fact makes Al-Jurjāni’s definition even more relevant to the theory of metonymy as developed in this thesis than other classical proposals. This is simply because the theory of metonymy introduced in this thesis is a theory of indexical signification. This is the point that I turn to next.

### 3.4.2. Metonymy as an index

In the discussion of the various modes of signification I mentioned that Peirce perceived of signification as having three modes. I am concerned here with the third mode of signification suggested by Peirce. This is the mode he calls ‘index’ and he means by this the mode of signification in which the signifier and the signified are related to each other in some indexical relation. Peirce maintains in this connection that

the demonstrative pronouns, ‘this’ and ‘that’ are indices. For they call upon the hearer to use his powers of observation, and so establish a real connection between his mind and the object; and if the demonstrative pronoun does that – without which its meaning is not understood – it goes to establish such a connection, and so is an index.<sup>90</sup>

But Peirce’s index is not only deictic. It pertains also to any kind of contiguous connection between an interpretant and an object with or without the mediation of the representamen. Nunberg defines the notion ‘indexicals’ as

expressions whose interpretation requires the identification of some element of the utterance context, as stipulated by their lexical meanings.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>87</sup> See sections 1.3. and 1.4. in chapter one for historical background.

<sup>88</sup> This argument is founded on the translation of the definitions of metonymy by these authors. The translations are those of Rosiene’s in his thesis.

<sup>89</sup> See the definition and the discussion of this definition in chapter 1, section 1.4.1.

<sup>90</sup> Peirce, C. (1955: 110).

<sup>91</sup> Nunberg (1993: 2). Nunberg argues that the meaning of indexicals like *we*, for example, has three components. The first is the *deictic component* which is ‘a function from occurrences or utterances of an expression to elements of the context of utterance’. The second component is what Nunberg calls the

When a sign like smoke signifies fire this process of signification works on the cognitive relation of causality in which smoke is perceived to be caused by fire and as such smoke is an index to fire. Now this cognitive linking is not purely conventional because there is an intrinsic relationship between the sign and the signifier. However, it is difficult to argue that there is no element of conventionality involved in that people start associating smoke with fire in a conventional sense. In other words if we imagine that there is a community which never saw fire or smoke, it would be difficult for them to conceptualise the causal relation. This brings us back to the overlap between denotation and connotation as two inseparable aspects of signs.

Now I want to extend this notion further to include causality within the symbolicity of the linguistic sign. In other words, language items although generally believed to be symbolic still exhibit certain aspects of motivatedness or causality such that one meaning is seen to be the result of another. In language there are certain meanings that are seen to cause the existence of other meanings. In more technical terms there tends to be a relation of causality between specific meanings. The best example of this causality is the notion of saliency which is the major cause of metonymic expressions. So the fact that the customer ordering a ham sandwich is called 'the ham sandwich' is because this property is the salient feature of this customer in this particular context. So it is quite plausible to ask why is the customer called 'the ham sandwich?' That is asking for the motivation behind the naming process. Similarly when we say:

4. *the player headed the ball and scored the goal*

we can ask the question why the word 'headed' is used as a verb and we soon get the answer that the word 'headed' actually stands in a representational metonymic relation of part for whole with the whole action of 'the player hitting the ball with his head'. Again it is the saliency of the most important element in the action that comes to stand for the whole action. In this thesis I want to exploit this to argue that metonymy is one of the fundamental operations that accounts for the phenomenon of motivatedness in language. Metonymy is fundamentally indexical. This indexicality is broader than the

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*classificatory component* which is associated with the interpretation of an expression rather than with its index. This tells us about features of plurality and animacy of the expression. The third component is that which Nunberg calls the *relational component* which 'constrains the correspondence that has to hold between the index and the interpretation. *ibid* (8-9). Nunberg further argues that the main difference between a description and an indexical is that the former characterises its interpretation whereas the latter provides an object that corresponds to it. The object is an index according to Nunberg who maintains that this index 'stands in a "relation of contiguity" to its object, as a rolling gait to a sailor, a rap on the door to a caller, a symptom to a disease. This is the characteristic and most remarkable feature of these

concept of causality because it goes beyond it to cover relations of contiguity, part-whole relations and figure-ground relations and of course deictic expressions which include both contextual and textual deixis. As such metonymy is seen as a theory of pointing in speech action and referencing in text and this gives the trope an empirically significant role in the creation and organisation of text. Metonymy as a signifying index will broaden the scope of the figure to include various facets of cognitive understanding. This indexical interpretation of metonymy is significant for the study of text. I believe that this conceptualisation will constitute a breakthrough in the study of texts in terms of accounting for these aspects in text and how they provide explicit cohesion and underlying coherence. This is the central aim of this thesis.

### 3.4.3. Indexicality vs. Symbolicity in linguistic signification

The linguistic sign is generally symbolic in terms of the nature of its signification. This means that in the majority of cases there is no link whatsoever between the signifier and the signified. This feature has been regarded as one of the main features of human language and is generally known as 'arbitrariness'. In fact, this feature makes the diversity of the languages of the world a comprehensible phenomenon. If there are numerous languages in the world today it is because each and every language names things in reality according to the conventions of that speech community. The point that needs to be stressed here is that linguistic signs are not only symbolic as Peirce argues but they are also indexical. This is the challenge to Saussure's arbitrariness and it is also the point I have been raising to support a view of metonymy as motivated signification. The sign enters into various relations with its signified. The sign 'blade' in the example

5. *The blades will solve the issue*

enters into a part-whole relation with its signified. This is to say that the blade is a part of the sword, which is intended in the sentence. The meaning intended is 'the sword will solve the issue'. Yet the sign 'sword' which is the signified of 'blade' is itself a signifier for another signified. The sign 'sword' signifies 'war' and this signification is fulfilled through the relation of instrumentality in which the sword is the main instrument of war. It might be thought that one needs to specify and say 'pre-modern' war but this thought is to be rejected on the ground that although the sword is not used any more in wars of modern times, the word is still used on many occasions when there is reference to war.

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expressions. They enable us to turn the context itself into an auxiliary means of expression, so that contextual features are made to serve as pointers to the content of the utterance', *ibid.* (19-20).

In recent years there has been a tendency to use the word 'gun' in exactly the same way; this also involves metonymic signification.

#### 3.4.4. Indexicality vs. Iconicity in linguistic signification

I have discussed the indexical aspect of signs in various parts of this chapter. However, something needs to be stated here regarding the relation between indexical signification and the concept of metonymy. This is the cognitive nature of this relation. In other words, the interpretation of the sign takes place in an entirely cognitive domain. The words function only as a formal realisation of this signification. The words 'gun' and 'pen' on their own do not convey any inherent indexical relationship with their metonymic expression, 'war' and 'knowledge' respectively. The words 'gun' and 'pen' stand for 'war' and 'knowledge' because we have associated these words with their signifieds so to speak and established this causality between these concepts. However, this relation is not naturally in-built in the concepts. An illustration for this argument is an imagined speech community which is basically an oral society. These people would not associate the 'pen' with knowledge. Perhaps they would associate the 'ear' instead. As regards the 'gun' example it is easy to assume a primitive tribe in the jungle who are still using arrows in their wars. In this case the word 'arrow' would be used instead of 'sword' or 'gun'. What I want to say here is that the relationship of indexicality established is not natural between the words themselves as signs as is the case with the natural association between smoke and fire for example. It is rather between cognitive domains which are essentially established by convention.

Similarly, the relation of iconicity is not a natural resemblance between the signifier and the signified only inasmuch as we think of onomatopoeia. But here of course I am not concerned with similarity between the signs in this sense. I am again concerned with the similarity established within the symbolicity of the linguistic sign and not the notion of sign in general. In metaphorical expressions like

##### 6. *Juliet is the sun*

there is no relationship whatsoever of actual similarity between Juliet and the sun. The idea is that one aspect of the sun is likened to a corresponding aspect of Juliet and thus the metaphor is established. So the argument that I am putting forward here is that like contiguity relations, similarity relations are not natural relations but conventional and cognitive ones. The likening of Juliet to the sun is an iconic signification but of course it is not iconic in the sense of the iconicity of a portrait to the figure. This is natural

iconicity while the type of iconicity I am discussing here is conventional iconicity. To sum up this section we may say that in signification there are natural contiguous relations and there are natural similarity relations. These can be understood even without the intervention of language. In language, however, contiguity and similarity relations are typically between cognitive domains represented by language.

In general semiotic terms the relations of indexicality and those of iconicity are both associated with the structure of reality in both its denotative and connotative aspects. The sign of a woman washing the dishes in a kitchen in a film is indexical of the whole role of that woman. This in turn is a stereotypical interpretation of the role of women and is likely to vary from one culture to another. Underlying this scene are a number of indexical relations. The scene might stand in a part-whole relationship to its content, so the scene of washing the dishes is one part of the whole role of a woman. This signification might just be in terms of a standing-for relation in that the scene semiotically stands for or symbolises the role of the woman.


### ***3.5. A relational model of metonymic signification***

I am concerned here with outlining a relational model of metonymy which will be a practical tool to develop a textual theory of metonymy. The aim here is to choose a prime relation that could be said to characterise the process of metonymic signification. One might choose the term 'contiguity' suggested by Jakobson taking into consideration that it is in fact a general term covering all those spatial, temporal and part-whole relations. This seems a good term and it looks comprehensive, but unfortunately it is not comprehensive enough. Although it takes us far it does not take us far enough to group all the relations that underlie metonymy under one general term. That is to say, the notion of 'contiguity' alone misses out the relation of causality which is a fundamental metonymic relation.

I believe that the crucial relation that underlies the process of metonymy is that of 'representation'. So metonymy is then a process of signification in which the signifier represents a signified which is associated with it in some way. This macro-relation of metonymy is significant especially if we take into account the aim that this thesis is trying to achieve. A representational theory of metonymy will help us to extend the notion of metonymy from its lexical confinement to account for textual analysis. A representational theory of metonymy will help us look at the function of metonymy as

that of representing one mode of knowledge by another. The representational process of metonymy is in fact cyclical uniting all the three knowledge domains.<sup>92</sup>

So if we have a text we can see this text as representing the cognitive processes underlying it. If by means of cognitive reasoning we interpret something from the text without it being explicitly stated in the formal text, this means that the formal text stands in metonymic representational relation of PART FOR WHOLE to the cognitive text; obviously the cognitive text is the whole and the formal text is just a part of it. The same can be said with regard to the ontological domain. Any formal text will be just one way of encoding social experience. So the social potential stands in a metonymic representational relation to the formal actual. This relation of representation is realised in various ways. The following diagram illustrates the two fundamental metonymic principles that I take to be constitutive of the textual model of metonymy. The illustration should read as: metonymy is a process of signification whose prime nature is that of *representation*. Various relations underlying metonymy are perceived to emanate from this general relation.



**Fig. 3.5. A relational model of metonymic signification.**

The representational nature of the trope is realised via two main principles. These are the contiguity principle and the causality principle. The contiguity principle realises, among other relations, the part for whole and whole for part relations. These are taken to be the most relevant contiguity relations to the development of the textual model of metonymy. The causality principle realises the cause for effect and effect for cause

<sup>92</sup> These are the knowledge of words, the knowledge of concepts and the knowledge of things that I have outlined in various places in this chapter. This inter-domain conception of metonymy has been integrated with a parallel three-dimensional conception of sign and also with a parallel three-dimensional conception of sign modes.

relations. These four relations are the substantial material for the more abstract relations which account for the interrelations between form, cognition and context.<sup>93</sup>

The relational model of metonymy is in line with the general understanding of the patterns of knowledge structure. I argue throughout this thesis and particularly in chapter 5 below that knowledge is of two types. One is descriptive and the other is procedural. The first pertains to the knowledge of the 'what' and the second is concerned with the knowledge of the 'how'. For the first type of knowledge, it is argued, we need contiguity metonymic relations to describe and express relations between items that already exist in contiguous structure. In the second type of knowledge, it is argued, we need causality relations to realise the connections between pieces of text and in this we are invited to account for intentions and plans and goals of the communicative act as a whole.

### **3.6. A textual model of metonymy**

So far in this chapter I have established the strong relation between the concept of metonymy and the concept of sign on the premise that both of them cut across domains of reality, language and mind and provide coherence to our experience and communication. I have also shown that metonymy seen as a semiotic signification is a powerful tool capable of providing unity and coherence to our textual practices because these latter are seen as a manifestation of the interaction between the three worlds of epistemology, ontology and language. In this section I intend to propose a textual model of metonymy based on a semiotic interpretation of the processes of the trope. This will be the ultimate result of this chapter and will provide the basis for further discussion to be carried out in the next two chapters which will apply this textual model to texts to identify their formal connectedness (cohesion) and their cognitive connectedness (coherence). The model I propose is fundamentally based on the conception of metonymy as representation, taking the metonymic relation 'stand for' to be the main and most relevant relation to the model in hand. The model is divided into two main parts. The first is the world of forms and the second is the world of concepts. I treat the first level as the level of formal signification in text which involves four metonymic relations. These are:

1. CONCEPT FOR FORM
2. FORM FOR FORM

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<sup>93</sup> These more abstract relations will be outlined below when I propose the textual model of metonymy.

- 3. FORM FOR CONCEPT
- 4. FORM FOR THING
- 5. THING FOR FORM

I term this level of metonymic signification the level of cohesion. At this level the three realms of language, mind and reality interact but the interaction is led by language and thus form has primacy. The second is the level of cognition. This combines both the realm of concepts as well as the realm of objects because in textual interaction objects in reality do have independent existence outside cognition although they are seen as salient features of context in its immediate sense, i.e. situation and its wider sense, i.e. culture. This level is represented by the following relations:

- 1. CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT
- 2. CONCEPT FOR THING
- 3. THING FOR THING
- 4. THING FOR CONCEPT

Two points need to be raised here about the model. The first is that the model is interactionist in nature and as such the semiotic level builds on the formal level. The second concerns the fact that the model also incorporates ideas from rhetoric. So the formal level in the model below corresponds to the parts of classical rhetoric known as 'arrangement' and 'elocution' which can be both termed 'the level of text organisation'. This I have termed specifically 'the level of text cohesion'. The semiotic level corresponds to 'invention' and gives an idea about where the ideas and the forms in the text come from. This can be termed 'the level of text generation'. I have termed this level 'the level of text coherence'.




Fig. 3.6. Model of textual metonymy.

### 3.7. Summary

This chapter has centred on explaining the concept of metonymy as signification. It began by giving a general perspective on semiotics. Then it went into discussion of the notion of sign and signification. In this section various definitions of the concept of sign were reviewed especially those proposed by the founders of modern semiotics, i.e. Saussure and Peirce. The chapter went on to discuss the types and modes of signification to fit the concept of metonymy in one of these modes, namely the indexical mode of signification. Then the discussion proceeded to one of the very important sections of this chapter. This is the section concerned with the representational theory of semiotics and metonymy. The discussion then moved on to discuss the metonymic aspects of signification and in this section the notion of metonymy as an index was elaborated. The chapter then proposed a relational model of metonymy which highlighted the representational relation of metonymy and regarded it as the prime relation. The chapter concluded by outlining a textual model of metonymy based on the metonymic relation of *representation*. This model is to be put to application in the next two chapters.

## Chapter Four: Metonymy and Text Cohesion

*The development of a discourse may take place along two different semantic lines: one topic may lead to another either through their similarity or through their contiguity. The metaphoric way would be the most appropriate term for the first case and the metonymic way for the second, since they find their most condensed expression in metaphor and metonymy respectively.<sup>1</sup>*

### 4.0. Introduction

This chapter investigates the relationship between metonymy and cohesion. The aim is to apply the textual model of the metonymic relation of representation which has been developed in the previous chapter into a model of formal and semantic relations underlying textual signification. The chapter specifically applies the following metonymic relations:

A: 1. Form for Form }  
2. Form for Concept } to deal with all forms of phonological cohesion in text.

B: 1. Form for Form }  
2. Form for Concept } to account for 'reference' in text.  
3. Form for Thing }

C: 1. Form for Form }  
2. Form for Concept } to realise 'substitution' in text.

D: Concept for Form to realise 'ellipsis' in text.

E: 1. Form for Concept }  
2. Form for Thing } to deal with patterns of lexical cohesion in text.  
3. Form for Form }

The following hypotheses underlie the chapter:

- If metonymy is essentially referential then it should help us understand more about referencing in text.

<sup>1</sup> Jakobson (1971: 90).

- If metonymy is the manifestation of the syntagmatic and combinational dimensions of signification then a theory of metonymy is in fact a theory that should help us to understand how combinations in language<sup>2</sup> are actually licensed.
- If metonymy is based on relations of causality and contiguity, then metonymy is in fact capable of providing a complete theory of text cohesion.

Metonymic processes and relations have as their primary function the cohesive link between ideas, between concepts and between discourses. The above hypotheses have been developed and nurtured since the early part of this thesis albeit in an implicit form. They awaited a relatively comprehensive account of the nature of metonymy to allow them all to be assimilated into the development of the textual theory of metonymy. In chapter one sections 1.1. and 1.2. I have briefly outlined how textlinguistics originated from classical rhetoric and benefited from various modern disciplines such as stylistics, anthropology, sociology and cognitive psychology. In this chapter I am mainly concerned with considering a theoretical framework for metonymy as a textual cohesive device in relation to the theory of cohesion as outlined by Halliday and Hasan (1976). I shall however start this section by considering phonological cohesion which, among other grammar and syntax studies, I think is largely neglected in current textlinguistic studies.<sup>3</sup>

#### **4.1. Metonymy and cohesion**

In this section I intend to outline the relationship between metonymy as a textual cohesive device and the theory of cohesion as outlined by Halliday and Hasan (1976). Although my discussion of metonymy as a textual cohesive device is based on this framework, I am actually developing a new insight and approaching the topic from a new perspective. For example, I do not discuss cohesion as a set of surface text ties only but from the point of view of its creation by metonymic relations in text. I have a strong intuition that all the cohesive devices that Halliday and Hasan propose can actually be seen as metonymic relations contributing to the texture of discourse and making it stand as a unified whole. A fundamental feature of my treatment of this semantic aspect of

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<sup>2</sup> By combination in language is meant combination within and beyond the level of the sentence. The combinations or connectivities beyond the sentence are referred to by Halliday as non-structural while combinations within the sentence are regarded as structural.

<sup>3</sup> See Kress and Hodge (1993) for a similar view in which they argue that 'currently, most forms of discourse analysis do not provide discussions of grammar and syntax', *ibid.* (202).

text is that it is semiotic. This springs up from the general semiotic approach under which the whole thesis is carried out. The semiotic approach to the interpretation of cohesion is evident in the treatment of the concept in Halliday and Hasan's framework albeit in a restricted sense. This framework treats the concept of cohesion as a semantic concept in which one element signifies the meaning of another within the text and overlooks extralinguistic signification as exemplified by exophoric reference. Occurrences do not have a meaning by themselves but by being linked to other occurrences in the form of a tie.


Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion is entirely a theory of meaning in its actuality. It is a formal theory of meaning in text, in that it is the study of meaning as created by a set of formal features in the text. 'Text' for Halliday and Hasan is 'the word which is used in linguistics to refer to any passage, spoken or written, of whatever length, that does form a unified whole'.<sup>4</sup> For Halliday and Hasan, however, a text is a semantic unit not a unit of form. They conclude from this conceptualisation that '[text] is related to a clause or sentence not by size but by REALIZATION, the coding of one symbolic system in another. A text does not consist of sentences; it is REALIZED BY, or encoded in sentences'.<sup>5</sup>

It is easy to trace the orientation of a formal approach to text from the definition above which highlights internal connectedness of pieces of language to form a formally knit whole. Text is better seen as a multidimensional unit that cuts across domains and not as a unit of language only. In chapter 3 section 3.2.1. above I related the notion of sign in its three-dimensional nature to the concept of metonymy which I established on a similar basis. I thus established a semiotic approach to account for the three fundamental aspects of signification this thesis is concerned with. The first is the three-dimensional model of metonymy. The second is the three-dimensional model of sign. The third is the three-dimensional model of text. Here I argue that text should also be seen from a three-dimensional angle. The following is an illustration of the triadic representation of text:

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<sup>4</sup> Halliday and Hasan (1976: 1).

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. (2).



**Figure 4.1. A Semiotic Model of Text.**

Text is not just a collection of sentences. Rather it is something more than the sum of these sentences. It is the contextual and cognitive dimensions that interact with the linguistic forms presented in the piece of language to make it 'text'. Text is not even the characteristic outcome of 'texture' which is the actual presence of linguistic 'ties' in text as Halliday and Hasan argue. Text is essentially the process of 'meaning creation' using explicit and implicit resources in and outside the text. There is a continuous process of interaction, negotiation, expectation and prediction that a formal definition of text<sup>6</sup> misses. In text production and text interpretation sentences are not value-free because our understanding of these sentences necessarily requires a context. So it is better to view 'text' as a collection of utterances rather than a collection of sentences.<sup>7</sup> Each utterance calls for a context for its interpretation and each utterance provides a context for the interpretation of following utterances.<sup>8</sup>

Halliday and Hasan then move on to discuss an important aspect related to textness. This is the concept of 'texture' which they view as a distinctive property of text. Although Halliday and Hasan's notion of text is fundamentally semantic, their notion of

<sup>6</sup> Like that of Halliday and Hasan.

<sup>7</sup> Here I attend to the tradition which distinguishes sentence meaning from utterance meaning on the ground that the former is the meaning that is conveyed by a sentence regardless of context and the latter is primarily the meaning the speaker intended to convey regardless of the form. See for this view Blakemore (1992: 5-6). From a semiotic perspective 'sentence meaning' would correspond to 'meaning potential' while 'utterance meaning' would correspond to 'meaning actual' whereby the signification is reduced to a particular context or intended signification.

<sup>8</sup> See also Brown and Yule who propose a communicative definition of text when they state 'text, ..., is the verbal record of a communicative event', *ibid.* (1983: 190).

texture, however, is formal<sup>9</sup> because it is the 'linguistic features *present* in that passage which can be identified as contributing to its total unity and giving it texture'.<sup>10</sup> Thus, they seem to disregard cognitive and contextual features that also provide texture to text. I argue that as soon as we incorporate metonymic processes as textual cohesive devices we will be able to view cognitive principles and contextual factors as contributing effectively to the texture of text.

One of the principal devices of cohesion is that of reference. As we have seen earlier in chapter 2, sections 2.1.2.4. and 2.1.2.5. Stallard (1993) and Nunberg (1995) have proposed a theory of metonymy as a referential phenomenon. They suggest that metonymy accounts for the phenomena of indirect reference or deferred reference. Examples of this indirect reference include:

1. A: *The Cabinet decided in favour of an increase in petrol prices yesterday.*  
    B: *They anticipated a lot of protest from the people though.*

In (1) above we notice an indirect anaphoric reference in the use of the pronoun 'they' to refer to a singular inanimate antecedent. This is a violation to a fundamental property of the pronoun 'they'. This pronoun normally refers to a plural antecedent. The solution to this 'textual tension' is provided by a metonymic interpretation of the whole exchange in which 'the Cabinet' is actually a surface NP standing for an underlying deep NP 'the ministers in the Cabinet' with which the pronoun 'they' naturally agrees.

I would, in fact, go even further than this quite limited treatment of metonymy as only a phenomenon of indirect referentiality in text to argue that in fact, all types of reference are metonymic, in the sense that there is a process of substitution in referencing and there is a process of signification in substitution. This view is even more plausible if we

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<sup>9</sup> C.f. Halliday and Hasan's statement that 'it is the underlying semantic relation ... that actually has the cohesive power', *ibid.* (229). However, as Brown and Yule argue 'they insist that it is the presence of the cohesive marker which constitutes 'textness', (1983: 192). Brown and Yule further argue that 'any adequate model of discourse description must be able to accommodate the various connections which do exist in texts ... The 'cohesion' model does not. It is however, only fair to point out that Halliday & Hasan are not concerned to produce a description which accounts for how texts are understood. They are, rather, concerned to examine the linguistic resources available to the speaker/writer to mark cohesive relationships', *ibid.* (204). Moreover, Brown and Yule hold that Halliday and Hasan's model of cohesion does not make a distinction between 'the meaning relations which hold between items in a text and the explicit expression of those 'meaning relations'. This distinction as Brown and Yule state is 'an important distinction to be drawn, which many students adopting Halliday & Hasan's approach have failed to draw and which Halliday & Hasan themselves are somewhat ambivalent about' *ibid.* (195).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* italics mine.

take into consideration that 'cognitive reference' is primary while 'textual reference' is secondary because for a thing to be present in text is a special case of it being present in cognition at large. So in a sense whatever we find in a text stands in a part/whole relationship to what is in cognition. This is a proper metonymic relation. When we use a 'pronoun' we use it to stand for a particular 'noun' or vice versa. Both of these terms, i.e. noun and pronoun are actually forms of language. So there is a *stand for* relation at stake. This is a fundamental process of metonymic interpretation in which one form stands for another form. Moreover, as we have seen in chapter 2, section 2.1.2.3. when I outlined Radden and Kövecses' theory of metonymy, which in particular provides a wider application of metonymy and claims that a relation of FORM FOR FORM is an important metonymic relation, we could easily argue that all types of 'reference' in text are actually metonymic of this type. All other types of cohesive devices can be dealt with in the same way as we have done with reference. This is not the place to elaborate on this. It will be discussed further in various sections of this chapter.

Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion claims to be a theory of connectedness in text which they define as a semantic unit. I argue here that a semantic theory of text connectedness should not limit itself to the numeration of cohesive elements and cohesive ties because this quantificational approach has proved to be rather shallow. If text is a semantic unit and not a unit of form it follows then that a textual theory must be based on a semantic interpretation of the nature of the relation that unites both elements in the cohesive tie. To ensure semantic interpretation of text we need to account not for the relation that connects 'John' to 'he' in the following example:

2. *John is a student. He studies at Durham*

but also we need to account for the identity of reference and the seeming discrepancy between the elements of a cohesive tie. Consider the following example:

3. *The lobster did not leave any tip because he was not happy with the service.*

A semantic theory of text connectedness should not limit its explanation to the statement that the NP 'the lobster' is connected to the pronoun 'he'. This is not enough. A semantic theory of text connectedness should address the nature of the relation between the two elements of reference. This aspect is not accounted for in Halliday and Hasan's model of cohesion but a metonymic model of text cohesion does.

Substitution as a cohesive device is fundamentally metonymic, as metonymy itself is

basically a process of substitution. Now we can think of 'substituting' one element for another in text as a relational operation which provides a text with formal connectedness.<sup>11</sup> By the same token we can conceptualise metonymic substitution as playing a central role in providing logical and cognitive texture and connectivity because there are no surface elements mentioned on the surface text for this to be called formal connectedness. This is to say that metonymy provides text with a kind of schematic coherence in that both the virtual meaning and the actual meaning are brought up and activated in the mind of the reader to give the reading of the text a more encyclopedic interpretation. This is not at all to say that metonymy as a process of substitution does not provide formal cohesion. On the contrary, substituting one element for another is a fundamental part of the FORM FOR FORM metonymic relation. It is only to say that metonymic substitution in text provides both formal connectivity in text, i.e. cohesion and cognitive connectivity and relevance in text, i.e. coherence.

If we recall Ullmann's theory of metonymy as semantic change and his designation of a change based on 'contiguity of names' as 'deletion' we would appreciate highly the kind of logical link to be established now between metonymy and 'ellipsis'. Metonymy as a representational relation of CONCEPT FOR FORM where an empty slot stands for a previously mentioned form is essentially based on spatio-temporal contiguity. This feature figures out in linguistic structuring of utterances and in text organisation in general. So when we say

4. *The keel ploughed the deep*

we actually conceive of two types of contiguity. One is cognitive and is based on the PART FOR WHOLE relation. The other is a spatio-temporal contiguity created by the spatio-temporal sequencing of the principle of combination of the syntagmatic axis of the linguistic structure. We could also say

5. *The keel of the ship ploughed the deep sea.*

Perhaps this was the original expression and as it became conventionalised people started to use the form 'the keel' to stand for the whole expression 'the keel of the ship' and 'the deep' to stand for the whole expression 'the deep sea'. The point I want to make here is that in metonymy as a process of ellipsis there is not only logical or

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<sup>11</sup> There is actually an approach to the analysis of text which is known as 'substitutional text linguistics' which perceives of the relations underlying textness as substitutions. See for example Harweg (1977).

cognitive ellipsis but also is there formal ellipsis as we can see from this example. Similarly, the example

6. *I want to go to the Gents*

is a good illustration of a metonymically based ellipsis in which the original expression is 'the Gents' toilets' but as this expression became very routinised, the word 'toilet' dropped out of the expression and the form 'Gents' came to represent the whole original phrase.<sup>12</sup> As we shall see 'ellipsis' plays a major role in text cohesion and text coherence since people tend to assume that their partners in the discourse are actually active inferencers so they leave out many details assuming that these details will be supplied by the general knowledge of the universe of discourse. This phenomenon of ellipsis can be accounted for from a metonymic perspective as well. Perceived as such metonymy ensures economy and compactness in text and thus shortens distances of interpretation.

Conjunction is regarded by Halliday and Hasan to be

somewhat different from other cohesive relations. It is based on the assumption that there are in the linguistic system forms of systematic relationships between sentences. There are a number of possible ways in which the system allows for the parts of a text to be connected to one another in meaning<sup>13</sup>

In this study, I treat conjunction as a semiotic relation pertaining to the semiotic level of text generation and interpretation because the linguistically explicit connectors between sentences are usually not useful in determining the underlying cognitive relation that ties sentences into text. Consider example (7) below:

7. *John fell and broke his leg.*

'And' in (7) above although additive (according to Halliday and Hasan's typology) it does not give this function only inasmuch as it pertains to adding one linguistic unit to another without accounting to the logical relation underlying both sentences. I argue that the relationship between the two sentences in (7) above is not additive but rather a metonymic representational relation of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT based on CAUSE FOR EFFECT. The first sentence is the cause for the second and a proper reading of the text in (7) above should run as 'because he fell, he broke his leg'. From this we can see that

<sup>12</sup> It should be pointed out here also that the word 'gents' is itself metonymic standing in a formal part-whole relationship with the full form of the word 'gentlemen' of the type form for form exactly like the form UN stands in a part-whole relationship with the full form United Nations.

<sup>13</sup> Halliday and Hasan (1976: 320).

linguistic connectors are not usually helpful as indicators of underlying cognitive connectedness in text. Consider examples (8-11) which are taken from Halliday<sup>14</sup>:

8. *They gave me fish to eat. **And** I don't like fish.*
9. *That must be Henry. **Yet** it can't be; Henry is in Manchester.*
10. *We are having guests tonight. **So** don't be late.*
11. *He found his way eventually. **Then** he had left his papers behind.*

Halliday and Hasan argue that the type of conjunctive relations involved in examples (8-11) above is 'internal' because it relates the sentences as linguistic units in the communication and not as events taking place in the external world outside language. I agree with Halliday and Hasan and emphasise that linguistic connectors are not usually adequate indicators to the underlying cognitive relations. The words 'and', 'yet', 'so' and 'then' are not indicating any additive, adversative, causal or temporal function respectively. They merely connect the sentences as linguistic events.

Based on these observations I regard conjunction as a metonymic relation pertaining to the level of text coherence<sup>15</sup> where the interaction between text and context explains the nature of the relation between texts. In short, I perceive conjunction to be realised by the metonymic relation of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT where the interaction takes place in the domain of conceptual representation. So the concept of 'falling' in example (7) above stands in contiguous relation with 'breaking one's leg' because they are causally linked.

Lexical cohesion is also a resourceful area in which metonymy can be fruitfully applied. I shall reserve my detailed discussion of all these cohesive devices to the appropriate sections which will be devoted to discussing with examples of authentic texts the role of metonymy in relation to each of these devices. All I am concerned about now is providing a general introduction to the relevance of the theory of metonymy as a textual tool for the theory of cohesion as propounded by Halliday and Hasan. It should be noted here that Halliday and Hasan discuss cohesion under two main headings; grammatical cohesion and lexical cohesion. These will be considered here under the same headings.

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid (321)

<sup>15</sup> And therefore will be addressed in chapter 5 of this thesis.

However, before I go into the discussion of the two major areas of cohesion proposed by Halliday and Hasan I shall argue that cohesion is not only grammatical and lexical. It is also phonological. This concerns the phonological patterning of text and is an important aspect of cohesion that is not discussed in either account of cohesion. This is what I call phonological cohesion. Therefore, before I discuss grammatical and lexical cohesion I want to start by discussing how phonological recurrences contribute to the unity of text and how they also provide meaningfulness to the text. After this treatment I also intend to link all forms of phonological patterning to the theory of metonymy as a textual theory.

#### 4.1.1. Metonymy and phonological cohesion

Our representational theory of metonymy allows us to adopt a bottom-up approach to account for the signifying relations in text. It allows us to begin with the phonological level. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the metonymic representational relations of FORM FOR FORM and FORM FOR CONCEPT account for all phonological patterns in text. By phonological cohesion is meant the set of phonological recurrences in text that provide unity to the text and contribute to the creation of meaning in that text. This aspect of cohesion might not be present in all types of text but its absence from certain texts does not mean that it should be ignored. Phonological patterning of text is a cohesive device that is commonly employed in poetic texts. Jakobson explains the reason for this in the following dictum: 'The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination'.<sup>16</sup>

Jakobson's dictum here is an attempt to give a systematic account of how to characterise poetic language from other types of language uses and thus how to distinguish the poetic function from other language functions. It has been a major interest among literary and linguistic circles to try to propose a definition of what literature is and how its language differs from everyday language. It should not be assumed that only poetry has phonologically structured language and that phonological recurrences based on the similarity principle are the distinctive features of poetry alone. Jakobson's argument is that any piece of language which exhibits phonological patterning based on similarity is

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<sup>16</sup> Jakobson (1960), cited in Lodge (1988: 39).

poetic whether it is poetry or non-poetry. In an earlier work<sup>17</sup> I have applied the Jakobsonian theory of poetics to the analysis of an Arabic piece of argumentative prose. The findings were supportive of the Jakobsonian dictum; although the text was clearly prose it was actually poetic and exhibited striking similarities with the language of poetry.<sup>18</sup>

Here I am concerned with the integration of this poetic model in the analysis of how phonological patterns contribute to the cohesion of text. The overall claim is that phonological recurrences in text are actually metonymic of the type FORM FOR FORM if we treat these phonological recurrences as providing mental access to other similar forms in the text. They are also metonymic of the type FORM FOR CONCEPT when each occurrence cooperates with other similar occurrences to suggest a general conceptual image or impression of the whole text. This could be the onomatopoeic or the symbolic aspect of the sound repeated. As soon as we encounter a particular sound repeated throughout the text then we know that these 'similar' occurrences are actually parts of a general scheme that is abstract and governs the similarities between all these actual occurrences. The argument is much like the theory of abstractness of the phoneme. Any sound human languages have must be related to an abstract entity which represents its form.

#### 4.1.1.1. Metonymy and sound repetition

##### 4.1.1.1.1. Metonymy and alliteration

Alliteration is the repetition of the same consonant at the beginning of two or more words. Sometimes it is loosely referred to as the 'initial rhyme'.<sup>19</sup> Alliteration is a typical feature of poetic language as it gives aesthetic effects to the overall organisation of the text. The following line from Pope's *The Rape of the Lock* is a good illustration of how the repetition of similar sounds at the beginning of words adds an aesthetic effect and at the same time contributes to the meaning of the whole text.

FORM FOR FORM    FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT

12. While *melting music steals* upon the sky,  
       And *soften'd sounds* along the waters die.

<sup>17</sup> Al-Sharafi (1997).

<sup>18</sup> The study concludes that in some cultures including the Arabic culture, if we want to draw a distinction between poetic and non-poetic language, the distinction should in fact be drawn not between poetry and prose but between elevated styles of diction on the one hand and everyday language on the other.

In addition to the aesthetic effect it gives and the musicality of the line, this phonological patterning in the line also brings the line into harmonious relation of meaning association with those lines that preceded it and those which followed it. The effect here is that of psychological onomatopoeia in which the sounds used in the construction of the word to describe something suggest what is being described. Alliteration also figures out in poetic language other than that used in poetry. The example Jakobson provides about the girl who used to talk about 'the horrible Harry' is quite suggestive of the prevalence of the phenomenon of playing with similar sounds at the beginning of words even in everyday talk. The girl when asked "Why horrible?" 'Because I hate him.' "But why not dreadful, terrible, disgusting?" 'I don't know why, but horrible fits him better'. Jakobson then comments on the incident that the girl was clinging to the poetic device of paronomasia without actually realising it.<sup>20</sup>

The way alliteration is viewed as metonymic here is twofold. The forms stand in a representational relation; each one suggests the other in a systematic way. This is what I call representational metonymic relation of FORM FOR FORM. The sound on its own does not say much but once it is related to other actual similar forms in the text then it claims a functional role within the meaning of the whole line or the whole poem. Second, the sound as form stands for the meaning it invokes in the poem.

#### 4.1.1.1.2. Metonymy and assonance

Assonance is 'a partial or half-rhyme much used in poetic language as an aspect of sound patterning and cohesion. The same stressed vowel is repeated in words, but with a different final consonant'.<sup>21</sup> In the poem by Tennyson beginning


FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT  
 13. *Break, break, break,*  
       *On thy cold grey stones, O sea!*

the assonance in the sound /ei/, in addition to the musical effect it adds to the lines, also contributes to their expressiveness and their unity with other parts of the poem. The assonance suggests the steady movement of the sea paralleling this with the narrator's feelings. The following lines from Coleridge show assonance in the long vowel /i:/:

<sup>19</sup> Wales (1989: 18).


<sup>20</sup> Jakobson. See Lodge (1988: 38).

<sup>21</sup> Wales (1989: 39).



The assonance in these two lines gives the sense of calmness and tranquillity, as the vowel is steady and long throughout the lines.


Again Jakobson suggests that this is not at all a peculiar feature of poetry but a feature of poetic language in general. He gives the example of the political slogan



This slogan was succinctly structured in this way to give more than its surface meaning. The similarity in the phonological structuring of the slogan suggests the meaning of the slogan. It suggests unity of the subject with the object and thus it suggests love between the person to elect and the person to be elected. The same metonymic representational relation of FORM FOR FORM is responsible of providing formal connectedness to the text above and the metonymic representational relation of FORM FOR CONCEPT is responsible for connecting the text to its context.

#### 4.1.1.1.3. Metonymy and rhyme

Rhyme 'is a kind of phonetic echo found in verse: more precisely a phonetic matching'.<sup>23</sup> The following lines from Gray's *Elegy* written in a country churchyard are good illustrations of how rhyme, which is a phonological feature, actually signifies the meaning of the lines or what they talk about:



The slowing of the movement of the cattle and the general feeling of boredom because of the curfew are represented in the use of long vowels. It is difficult to perceive of this effect if we restrict our attention to only one occurrence of this phonological feature, i.e.


<sup>22</sup> Ike was a familiar name for General Dwight David Eisenhower, President of the US 1956-61. I like Ike was a political campaign slogan.

<sup>23</sup> Wales (1989: 408).

rhyme. The effect is established only when we relate the set of these occurrences to a general and abstract schema of the long vowel and to the psychological effects this length creates in the individual and eventually bring all of this to attest for the meaning of the whole text. This is the essence of metonymic understanding of ACTUAL FOR POTENTIAL relation.

#### 4.1.1.2. Metonymy and rhythm

Rhythm is 'the pattern of accented or stressed and unaccented or unstressed syllables in a language'.<sup>24</sup> This is not a particular characteristic of poetry or even poetic language but a general feature of speech. It seems that speech in general is structured in such a way to show prominent and weak elements with regard to the content or meaning of each unit of language and how much this unit contributes to the overall meaning of the ultimate unit, be it the word, phrase, clause, sentence or even the text. Rhythm in poetic language is stressed for aesthetic as well as semantic reasons. The following example from Dickens' *Dombey and Son* illustrates how the pattern of rhythm suggests the movement of the train and the feeling of the person narrating the story in that train.



Rapid rhythm suggests rapid movement. We are able to abstract this effect only after we look at the text from a holistic point of view. Only when we relate the set of similar occurrences to a general unifying schema are we able to appreciate the effect of the patterns of rhythm in this text. The essence of this gestalt reasoning is metonymic.


<sup>24</sup> Wales (1989: 409-410).

## 4.1.2. Metonymy and grammatical cohesion

## 4.1.2.1. Metonymy and reference

Reference is treated in this thesis as a semiotic phenomenon realising signification between language, cognition and context. So the view expressed here of reference is that of a phenomenon that cuts the domain of form, concepts and objects and not only textual reference as it has been reduced in Halliday and Hasan's (1976) model of cohesion. Halliday and Hasan define 'reference' as that linguistic phenomenon in which certain items in language make reference to something else for their interpretation instead of being interpreted semantically in their own right.<sup>25</sup> The authors call such 'reference items' 'directives', as they 'indicate that information is to be retrieved from elsewhere'.<sup>26</sup> This is not very different, it should be noted, from the treatment of the phenomenon called PRO-FORMS by de Beaugrande and Dressler.<sup>27</sup> Pro-forms are forms that 'can stand in the surface text in place of more determinate, context-activating expressions'.<sup>28</sup> However, these two views limit the scope of reference to formal signification. This is believed to be a reductionist treatment of the power of reference as a phenomenon that cuts across domains of epistemology, ontology and language.

Both of these views are similar to the notion of 'sign' which, as we have seen in chapter 3 can be defined as 'an element that conveys a meaning other than itself'. I relate to these two perspectives a third one which concerns the conceptualisation of metonymy as a pro-form also. If the reference item points at another item then that is some sort of signification. This signification can either be symbolic, iconic or indexical. With regard to 'reference' it is always indexical because there is an act of pointing each time there is reference. In the example:



18. *John went to the market. He bought some apples.*

<sup>25</sup> Halliday and Hasan (1976: 30), with some change to the actual definition.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> This model of cohesion is to be considered later in this chapter.

<sup>28</sup> de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 60).

the reference item 'he' does not mean anything by itself apart from 'its own conceptual signification', i.e. third person singular pronoun. Its function in the organisation and interpretation of text is dependent on perceiving it as a component in a signifying system the resolution of which requires a backward cognitive movement to its antecedent.


Whether we perceive the relation between 'John' and 'He' as forms or as concepts or even as entities and objects we cannot escape a metonymic interpretation of this relation. By means of the metonymic representational relations of FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT, CONCEPT FOR FORM, FORM FOR THING, THING FOR FORM it is possible to propose a universal model of reference in text. The first two relations account for the phenomenon of reference in languages like English and Arabic which have the tendency to use the proper noun or the common noun at the beginning of the text and rely on the use of pronouns to refer back to the proper or common noun throughout the discourse. The latter relations account for the phenomenon of reference in languages like Hebrew, Japanese and Chinese. According to Callow 'Hebrew, unlike English, prefers to use proper names to trace participants through a discourse'.<sup>29</sup> Baker also points out that 'in some languages like Japanese and Chinese, a totally different pattern seems to be in operation. Pronouns are hardly ever used and, once a participant is introduced, continuity of reference is signalled by omitting the subjects of following clauses'.<sup>30</sup> In this case reference is, in fact, some kind of ellipsis. It is, therefore, the concept of the identity of the participant that is retrieved each time an action or an event is attributed to that subject. As such it is the metonymic relation of CONCEPT FOR FORM that is in operation here. The remaining relations account for the pragmatic dimension of reference and particularly the reference involved in the use of deictic expressions.

Halliday and Hasan classify 'reference' into two broad categories according to whether this reference is situational, i.e. referring to something outside the text, or textual, i.e. referring to something within the text. The following is a reproduction of their schematic diagram:

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<sup>29</sup> Callow (1974), cited in Baker (1992: 183).

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. (185).




**Figure 4.2. Classification of reference according to Halliday and Hasan.**

Whether it is exophoric or endophoric, based on its function, reference is classified into three types:

- (a). Personal Reference
- (b). Demonstrative Reference
- (c). Comparative Reference


I shall take an example of personal reference to show how this is directly related to metonymic reasoning. All first and second personal pronouns show a tendency to express exophoric reference although they do not always do so. On the other hand, third person pronouns tend to express endophoric reference. However, in all these cases we are better off if we interpret this reference as metonymic whether it is direct or indirect. This is to say that 'reference' in its reduced form as textual reference is able to explain phoric relations of the type:

FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT, FORM FOR THING



19. *Tim is a professor of politics. He lectures at Durham.*

FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT, FORM FOR THING



20. *Janet is a lecturer in Arabic. She speaks very good Arabic.*


The relationship between 'Tim' and 'He' in example (19) and 'Janet' and 'She' in example (20) is cohesive because both the identity of reference is maintained. But what are we going to say about texts like the following?

FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT



21. *Halliday is on the top shelf. You will find it in paperback.*

FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT



22. *Table 4 is getting impatient. He has been waiting for a long time.*

FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT

23. *The ladies is getting dirty. It needs to be cleaned as soon as possible.*

FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT

24. *The diabetes is leaving tomorrow. He is better now.*

Halliday and Hasan's notion of personal reference does not explain the change of the reference in the above examples but a metonymic processing of the text does. Textual cohesion is then established on the basis of metonymic reasoning of the two respective elements of reference, i.e. the surface NP and the deep NP. The text is formally connected when 'Halliday' and 'it' in example (21) above are related as two forms regardless of the discrepancy in the identity of the reference and the violation of agreement rules between 'Halliday' and 'it' and in fact in all the examples above. This account is not sufficient to account for meaning in text. Therefore, the metonymic representational relation of FORM FOR CONCEPT solves this problem by postulating that the reference is not actually to a form but to a concept which the form stands for. So 'it' in example (21) refers back to a concept which is 'the book by Halliday'. Although Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion claims to be a theory of text meaning, it clearly falls short of accounting for this phenomenon which is quite common in language.<sup>31</sup> The notion of reference as proposed by Halliday and Hasan does not answer this discrepancy and indeed does not account for it. Therefore, I argue that Halliday and Hasan's notion of reference is not sufficient to account for all pronominal relations in text and particularly the identity of reference relations and hence the semantic interpretation of the discourse.

The second problem with Halliday and Hasan's 'reference' relates to the fact that they limit the scope of referential cohesion to 'endophoric reference' or 'textual reference'.<sup>32</sup> They argue that exophoric reference is not a cohesive tie. It only 'contributes to the CREATION of text in that it links the language with the context of situation, but it does not

<sup>31</sup> Stirling maintains that 11.4% of anaphoric relations in a corpus of GP consultations are actually of metonymic nature (1996: 72).

<sup>32</sup> Baker in this connection argues that 'the term reference is traditionally used in semantics for the relationship which holds between a word and what it points to in the real world... In Halliday and Hasan's model of cohesion, reference is used in a similar but more restricted way. Instead of denoting a direct relationship between words and extra-linguistic objects, reference is limited here to the relationship of identity which holds between two linguistic expressions', *ibid.* (1992: 181).

contribute to the integration of one passage with another so that the two together form part of the same text'.<sup>33</sup> This view shows once again the formal tendency of Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion. Their theory of textual cohesion pertains only to the formal texture of the linguistic features that make a text 'text'. This falls short of accounting for various phenomena which provide connectedness in text. We know that language without context is almost always indeterminate. Unless we know who said the utterance, where and why the utterance is said, it becomes very difficult to reach a proper interpretation of the utterance.

Moreover, there are many cases in which the text might be dense with cohesive devices yet it does not make sense because there is considerable difficulty in construing a line of continuity in the flow of ideas to serve a particular communicative purpose. Consider example (25) below:

25. *The man went to the bath. Baths are usually warm. Warm is an adjective. The adjective in English usually comes before the noun. English is spoken all over the world. This is not strange. To be strange is not always funny. John speaks funny English. He is from England.*

Although the text in (25) above is cohesive, it does not make sense because the sentences are quite independent units and do not form a whole. This is in turn because they do not express a continuity of ideas and at the same time it is difficult to construe a purpose which the utterance is set to convey. On the other hand, there are examples of real language in use, which are not cohesive on the surface, but on the underlying level are coherent.

Consider the following example from Cook:<sup>34</sup>

- FORM FOR FORM
26. *I wish someone had told me he was vegetarian. I could have made an omelette.*

In terms of Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion this text is not cohesive because it does not show any of the formal devices they identify as cohesive devices. Even the

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. (37).

referring expression 'I' which is repeated in the text twice is, for Halliday and Hasan, not cohesive because it is exophoric. However, the text is perfectly natural and it hangs together as a unified whole by virtue of the cognitive relations that underlie the text.<sup>35</sup>

The combination of these two sentences is a text because it has a purpose. Besides, it is difficult to interpret the text unless we conceive of a metonymic relation between the word 'vegetarian' and the word 'omelette'. This metonymic relation is that of cognitive association. The word 'vegetarian' activates a schema in the mind which includes the concept 'omelette'. More specifically the relation is a part/whole relationship in which 'omelette' is part of 'vegetarian' food.

In fact, metonymic reasoning in text interpretation does not stop at the level of cognitive linking in text but goes beyond this to contribute to the functional understanding of text also. Three metonymies are actually involved in a functional interpretation of the text in (26) above. The first is the metonymic relation of FORM FOR FORM in which we interpret the two sentences as actually standing for another intended underlying form which is 'if someone had told me she was vegetarian, I could have made an omelette'. This gives us a chance to treat the surface text as providing mental access or a metonymic representational relation to an underlying conditional structure which is known as in grammatical studies as 'unreal'.<sup>36</sup> Having established that, we as interpreters employ yet another metonymic relation which is FORM FOR THING.<sup>37</sup> With the help of the tense expressed in the sentences and with the help of the 'if' construction we come to realise that in reality none of the two actions mentioned in the two sentences had happened. That is to say no one had told the speaker she was vegetarian and therefore she did not make an omelette. This discrepancy between the form and the context gives rise to an indirect interpretation of the whole text and this serves to realise the functional aspect of

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<sup>34</sup> Cook (1989: 6).

<sup>35</sup> All that I am proposing here is that the trace of cognitive relations, notably metonymic ones, in these two utterances is one major aspect of establishing connectedness in the text. I am not neglecting the fact that this unity could also be established via other means such as the thematic structure of the utterances with the repetition of the pronoun 'I'. Even this textual aspect is not universal. Rather it is language-specific. Baker illustrates how this specificity is manifested in an inflecting language like Arabic where the whole notion of Halliday's model of theme/rheme organisation is disturbed. In an Arabic TT Baker argues that 'the version tends to display a reasonable level of thematic continuity in its own right'. Baker (1992: 127).

<sup>36</sup> C.f. Quirk and Greenbaum (1973: 325).

the text as an apology. The third metonymy serves in a functional linkage between the two sentences. This can be made explicit by postulating a cause/effect relation between the two sentences. This metonymic interpretation could be paraphrased as *None of you had told me she was vegetarian. Therefore, I did not make an omelette.*

All the above arguments suggest that endophoric referential relations are not enough to provide textness. The need arises for exophoric relations which relate language to context. Above all the need arises for a metonymic interpretation of referential expressions in text which would include both endophoric as well as exophoric relations, and will go beyond them to solve problematic aspects of indirect reference in text also. The conclusion that Cook arrives at after assessing the extent of formal links in discourse supports my view to an extent. Cook maintains that 'these [formal] links are neither necessary nor sufficient to account for our sense of the unity of discourse. Their presence does not automatically make a passage coherent, and their absence does not automatically make it meaningless'.<sup>38</sup>

Much of the meaning of an utterance is conveyed through the understanding of the purpose and function of that utterance and this function and purpose is not conveyed only through the formal resources of the language. The function of the utterance is only achieved through the resolution of the context of this particular utterance. Much of contextual description is achieved mainly through metonymic details of the context of the text. My argument here then is that Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion does not qualify as a fully-fledged textual theory of text interpretation.<sup>39</sup> Regarding this particular point I argue that metonymy, as a textual approach is capable of providing a complete theory of textuality because in its FORM FOR FORM relation and FORM FOR CONCEPT relation, metonymy subsumes the formal links proposed by Halliday and Hasan. Moreover, in its CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT relation, metonymy indeed explains cognitive

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<sup>37</sup> As I have shown in the introduction to this thesis I take the notion of 'thing' in its widest sense to include the whole notion of ontology starting from the notion of object up to the notion of context. So in this particular instance 'thing' refers to 'context'.

<sup>38</sup> Cook (1989: 21). It should be noted, however, that this aspect of density or otherwise of explicit cohesive devices is again to a large extent language-specific. Arabic texts especially standard Arabic texts, for example, tend to exhibit a relatively high constellation of formal links like *fa*, *wa*, and *li'anna*. It seems therefore that the lack of these formal links in a standard Arabic text would make the reader feel that the text is incoherent even if he/she could in principle provide a reasonable interpretation of its meaning.

principles underlying texture and thus relating the realm of language to the realm of cognition. In its referential nature, metonymy links language to context. Most narrative texts exploit metonymic details to set up the scene for the narrative.<sup>40</sup>

Instead of discrediting cohesion and its explicit formal resources for the sake of coherence and its underlying relations, or perhaps stressing the reverse of this statement, metonymy actually provides the solution in that it incorporates both dimensions of text and opens paths for rich textual analysis and interpretation. This is to say that metonymy actually opens the text for social, cultural and ideological scrutiny, which amounts to thick and deep textual description and interpretation. At the same time it also regulates textual interpretation because metonymic concepts or relations constrain to a large extent cognitive processes during textual interpretation.<sup>41</sup> Thus is the argument that I put forward regarding the distinction between situational and textual reference proposed by Halliday and Hasan. The position I take is that it is not useful for a theory of text<sup>42</sup> to make this distinction because meaning is not only that which is in the text but it is also that aspect which pertains to context. I argue that metonymy accounts for both situational and textual meaning. By virtue of the fact that metonymy is a multidimensional unit of signification it is evident that it will account for both situational as well as textual reference. Let us consider the following example:

Upon coming home one day I found the following message on a piece of paper on my door.


  
 27. *I came to see you. I can't wait now. I'll call in later.*

To interpret this text I had to understand the context of the utterance. Who is 'I'? Even the immediate context will not be of help either because the time of the utterance is not clear enough. The temporal aspect of the utterance is mixed between the past which is not sufficiently specified, and the future which is expressed by the phrase 'call in later'

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<sup>39</sup> Although it is a comprehensive pedagogical theory of discourse description.

<sup>40</sup> It is a common way of starting novels to set up the scene by introducing the context and main participants. I argue that this scene setting is achieved via metonymic details of the context and via metonymic movements within that prescribed context. This issue will be raised again in chapter 5 of this thesis where I discuss metonymy and text coherence.

<sup>41</sup> This point is made in view of the metonymic relations of causality and contiguity which are fairly objective relations, hence they constrain our cognitive processes to ensure speed recognition and interpretation of discourse.

<sup>42</sup> Baker takes a similar position with reference to translation purposes (1992: 182-183).

is even more indeterminate. When is this 'later' and it is later in relation to what? In order to understand this text I had to go beyond the immediate context and look for a wider source of knowledge which is the knowledge of the world outside the text and even outside the immediate context. I had to resolve the referent of the pronoun 'I'. I had no problem understanding the text, not because the text as a collection of sentences helped me to do so but because I depended on my knowledge of other factors rather than the formal presentation of the text. I knew that I had an appointment with a friend and that I was late for the appointment. Anyone else reading the text would not be able to understand the intended reference of the pronoun 'I'. In other words a reader of this text other than me would be able to understand the semantic input of the text but would not be able to interpret the pragmatic aspect of it, particularly the exact referents of the personal pronouns and time adverbials.

Now I move on to discuss demonstrative reference and how metonymy could solve many problems of demonstrative reference in text that Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion is not able to solve. Metonymic reasoning of text also raises issues of textness that have not been accounted for by the Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion. I have raised the point in chapter 3 section 3.4.2. above that metonymy is actually a form of an indexical sign which guarantees an indexical form of signification. If we agree with this view then my linking of demonstrative reference, which Halliday and Hasan define as 'essentially a form of verbal pointing', to metonymy is justified on both theoretical and practical grounds. Generally speaking metonymy expresses a contiguity relation of some sort of spatio-temporal distance between elements in the language, the cognitive realm and the physical world. Demonstrative pronouns belong to all of these realms because they depict a relation of proximity between participants in the discourse on the one hand, and the surrounding physical environment.

The formal theory of demonstrative reference proposed by Halliday and Hasan is able to deal with examples like:

FORM FOR CONCEPT

▼──────────────────▼

28. *I can't get any reliable information.* *This is what worries me.*<sup>43</sup>

<sup>43</sup> From Halliday and Hasan (1976: 70)

'This' in this example has an anaphoric reference hence it is textual or endophoric and according to Halliday and Hasan it is cohesive. However, given that Halliday and Hasan do not consider exophoric reference as cohesive as I have pointed out earlier, then their theory falls short of accounting for the most essential part of demonstrative reference which is fundamentally exophoric. In the following example from a dialogue between two nurses, 'this' has an exophoric reference and its reference is understood only via metonymic reasoning. The nurses are reviewing reports of patients in the hospital.

- FORM FOR THING, FORM FOR CONCEPT
29. A: *Who is **this**?*
- B: ***This** is the hernia. You know **he** has to be seen by the doctor today.*
- 

We have a double metonymy here. The demonstrative pronoun 'this' refers exophorically to 'the report'. Although it is the report that is being referred to, the agreement is with the patient to whom the report belongs. The referent of the demonstrative 'this' is retrieved from the context and the agreement is with the possessor of this report. The NP 'the hernia' is metonymically understood as the patient who is having a hernia surgery. The reference to the patient is thus justified. This example is very similar to that which Nunberg provides in his paper 'Transfers of Meaning'. Nunberg gives the following example (already discussed in chapter 2, section 2.1.2.5. The example has the background of 'a customer hands his key to an attendant at a parking lot'.<sup>44</sup>

- FORM FOR THING
30. ***This** is parked out back.*

The demonstrative pronoun in this example although exophorically accompanied by the handing over of a key does not refer to the key but to the car. This is what Nunberg calls deferred reference and what Stallard calls indirect reference. Nunberg gives further evidence by conjoining another predicate to the previous example. The conjoining shows that the demonstrative pronoun actually refers to the car and not to the key. The following is Nunberg's example:

- FORM FOR THING
31. ***This** is parked out back and may not start.*

The argument I am putting forward in this connection is that metonymy explains all types of demonstrative reference in text, whether endophoric, exophoric or even indirect

<sup>44</sup> Nunberg (1995: 110).

demonstrative reference like the examples above. However, Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion falls short of accounting for the last two types of demonstrative reference. This means that metonymy is indeed a powerful textual tool that encompasses all aspects of textuality.

I move on now to consider the third category of reference suggested by Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion. This is the type of reference they call 'comparative reference', which they divide into two broad types. One is general; this is deictic comparison. This type breaks down into three subtypes: identity comparison, similarity comparison and difference comparison. Examples of the identity comparison type include adjectives like, *same*, *equal*, *identical* and adverbs like *identically*. Examples of similarity comparison include adjectives like, *such* and *similar*, and adverbs like *so*, *similarly* and *likewise*. Examples of difference comparison include adjectives like *other*, *different* and *else*, and adverbs like *differently* and *otherwise*. The second type is particular and it is non-deictic. This type breaks down into two subtypes: numerative and epithet. Examples of numerative comparative reference include *more*, *fewer*, *less*, *further*, *additional*. Examples of epithet comparative reference include adjectives like *better*, *so*, *equal*, and a combination of adjectives and adverbs in occurrences like *equally good*. The most important point in comparative reference is that it has a referential role in text because nothing can be identical with itself or similar to itself or different from itself. There is always some other entity to which the comparison applies. This other entity is what brings about textual connectivity.

Comparative reference relates to metonymy in the same way that reference in general relates to metonymy. This is to say that because comparative reference is referential then the *stand for* relationship is inherent in referential phenomena. In comparison the same kind of relation applies whether the relation of comparison is that of identity, similarity or difference. Consider the following examples:

FORM FOR CONCEPT


32. A: Did you like **the cake?**  
 B: Yes, can I have some **more?**

33. A: I have listened to **the lecture.**  
 B: You will have **better** ideas in the book.


### 4.1.2.2. Metonymy and substitution

This section applies the metonymic representational relations of FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT to explain patterns of substitution in text. The basis of my argument in this section regarding the close relationship between metonymy and substitution is the fact that metonymy itself is a form of substitution. Metonymy is a process of substituting one item for another with which it is associated. This is precisely the case with Halliday and Hasan's notion of substitution which they define as 'the replacement of one item by another'.<sup>45</sup> Halliday and Hasan maintain that 'substitution, on the other hand, is a relation within the text. A substitute is a sort of counter which is used in place of the repetition of a particular item'.<sup>46</sup> The examples the authors give to illustrate this particular point are the following:

34. *My **axe** is too blunt. I must get a sharper **one**.*



35. *You think Joan already **knows**? – I think everybody **does**.*




'One' in example (34) substitutes for the word 'axe' and 'does' in example (35) substitutes for the word 'knows'. Halliday and Hasan divide 'substitution' into three main types according to the grammatical function of the substitute item. These three types are:


NOMINAL SUBSTITUTION: ONE, ONES, SAME

The following are some examples of nominal substitution taken from Halliday and Hasan.


36. *These **biscuits** are stale. – Get some fresh **ones**.*




37. *This **bread**'s stale. – Get **some** fresh.*



38. *Mummy will you buy me **a bus**? I want that red **one**.*



39. *A: I'll have **two poached eggs** on toast please.*



*B: I'll have **the same**.*

*C: I'd like to have **the same**, but ... ..*



<sup>45</sup> Halliday and Hasan (1976: 88).

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. (89).

## VERBAL SUBSTITUTION: DO

Here are some examples provided by Halliday and Hasan for verbal substitution

40. *The words did not **come** the same as they used to **do**.*  
 FORM FOR FORM
41. *I don't **know the meaning of half those long words**, and what's more, I don't believe you **do** either!*  
 FORM FOR FORM
42. *Does Granny **look after you** every day? – She can't **do** at weekends, because she has to go to her own house.*  
 FORM FOR FORM

## CLAUSAL SUBSTITUTION: SO, NOT

I take the metonymic relation of FORM FOR CONCEPT responsible for clausal substitution relations because although the connector *so* in examples (43 and 44) below refers to the clause 'you agree to have a battle', and 'is there going to be an earthquake?' respectively, it clearly does not refer to the actual form of these grammatical units but to the proposition expressed by them. Let us consider the following examples of clausal substitution provided by Halliday and Hasan.

43. *Of course you agree to have a battle? Tweedledum said in a calmer tone. 'I suppose **so**', the other sulkily replied, as he crawled out of the umbrella.*  
 FORM FOR CONCEPT
44. *Is there going to be an earthquake?  
 It says **so**.*  
 FORM FOR CONCEPT

Halliday and Hasan's notion of substitution relates to metonymy in various ways. Substitution is largely anaphoric in nature in that it usually refers back to elements mentioned earlier. The nature of this reference is nothing but some sort of internal signification, i.e. textual signification in which one form signifies another. Halliday and Hasan maintain that the difference between reference and substitution is that while the former is semantic the latter is essentially grammatical. I argue here that substitution is not only grammatical but it is also conceptual and example (44) above is a case in point. Therefore, I argue that Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion once again falls short of accounting for conceptual substitution in text. I propose that metonymy accounts for both types of substitution in text. The formal substitution is accounted for by the FORM FOR CONCEPT relation and the conceptual substitution is accounted for by the FORM FOR FORM relation.

Substitution involves categories that not all languages have and this reduces the universal applicability of Halliday and Hasan's model of cohesion. For example, Arabic seems to lack 'auxiliary verbs' which take the place of main verbs to show connectivity via substituted forms. If I want to translate the following example<sup>47</sup> into Arabic:

45. *You think Joan already **knows**? I think everybody **does**.*

where 'does' stands in FORM FOR FORM metonymic relationship with 'knows', I shall find difficulty in retaining the same substitution pattern in the Arabic rendering of the expression. Arabic would repeat the same verb as the example in (46) shows:

46. *hal ta 'taqid 'anna jawan **ta'rif**? 'a'taqid 'anna al-kull ya'**rif**.*

However, Arabic seems to accept nominal substitution in some marked structures like (47) below:<sup>48</sup>

47. *My **axe** is too blunt. I must get a sharper **one**.*

48. ***Fa'si** asbaha sahinan. Yajibu 'an 'akhudha **wahidan** 'akhar.  
My **axe** became blunt. I must get another **one**.*

where *wahidan* 'one' stands for *fa's* 'axe'. There is also substitution of the type FORM FOR CONCEPT and is attested in both Classical as well as modern varieties of Arabic. Let me begin with an example from Classical Arabic and is taken from the Qur'an. Usually this substitution is motivated by factors related to euphemism and is usually expressed via the verb *fa'ala* which means 'to do'. In the Qur'an for example, the Pharaoh argues with Moses about the latter's childhood in the former's palace. The text goes on as follows:

49. *qala 'alam nurabbika fina walidan wa labitha fina min 'umurika sinina, wa fa'alta fa'lataka allati fa'alta wa'anta min al-kafirin, qala fa'altuhü 'idhan wa'ana min al-dhallin.*<sup>49</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Baker (1992: 187).

<sup>48</sup> The unmarked structure would involve a repetition of the word *fa's* 'axe'.

<sup>49</sup> The Qur'an. (26: 18-20).

(Pharaoh) said: 'Did we not cherish you as a child among us, and did you not stay among us for many years of your life? And you **did** your **deed** which you **did** while you were ungrateful. Moses said: I **did** it then when I was in ignorance.<sup>50</sup>

The reference in the use of the verb *fa'ala* 'did' and its derivatives in example (49) above is to the action of Moses' killing of an Egyptian. It seems as if the euphemistic function of the substitution involved in the verses above is dominating. Due to the fact that killing and death are considered and also were considered at that time 'taboo' the reference to them was conveyed via a general lexical item which is the verb *fa'ala* 'did'. Similarly, this lexical item is still used in almost all dialectical varieties of Arabic today to convey the same euphemistic function. In a criminal report one would normally encounter the following:

50. *Ba'd 'an fa'ala al-mujrimün fi'latahum harabü.*

After the criminals **did** their **deed** they ran away.

Now it could be argued that the two examples above are actually of the metonymic type FORM FOR CONCEPT rather than examples of substitution *par excellence* which is conveyed via the metonymic relation of FORM FOR FORM for the simple reason that there are no forms which have been substituted, i.e. it is a euphemistic style of covering taboo expressions. However, if we conceive of text as an integral world of socio-cultural practice of a speech community then the notion of intertextuality and the concept of interactions between texts will be the norm of social cognition. As such, we will realise that the form *fa'ala* 'did' and its derivatives in the Qur'anic verse is actually a substitution of the form *qatala* 'killed' which is mentioned in another Qur'anic verse – in a different chapter – and hence the substitution is actually a FORM FOR FORM. The same thing applies to the criminal report example. One would easily assume that the actual form of 'killing' or 'raping' has been mentioned before, and these forms, i.e. *fa'ala* and its derivatives have as their reference forms also.

#### 4.1.3. Metonymy and ellipsis

The aim of this section is to implement the metonymic representational relation of CONCEPT FOR FORM to explain patterns of ellipsis in text. Ellipsis is 'substitution by zero'

<sup>49</sup> The Qur'an. (26: 18-20).

<sup>50</sup> My own translation.

as Halliday and Hasan argue.<sup>51</sup> The authors define ellipsis as 'something left unsaid'. Halliday and Hasan admit that this definition might be misleading due to its generality because not everything that is left unsaid is an example of ellipsis. The interpretation of any text involves a great deal of 'inferencing' in which we supply a great deal of information from outside the text. Is this ellipsis? For Halliday and Hasan it is not, nor is it cohesive, as it does not relate to textual relations. So what is ellipsis then? Halliday and Hasan point out that when talking about ellipsis 'we are referring specifically to sentences, clauses etc. whose structure is such as to presuppose some preceding item, which then serves as the source of the missing information'.<sup>52</sup> They elaborate this point further and state that 'an elliptical item is one which, as it were, leaves specific structural slots to be filled from elsewhere'.<sup>53</sup> So the idea that differentiates ellipsis from any other form of information supplying or inferencing is that it forms a slot in the structure of the text.

Like 'substitution', ellipsis is divided into three main parts:

#### NOMINAL ELLIPSIS

Halliday and Hasan define this type of cohesion as ellipsis that takes place within the nominal group. They give the following examples as illustrations:

CONCEPT FOR FORM



51. Which last longer, the curved **rods** or the straight **rods**? – The straight  are less likely to break.

CONCEPT FOR FORM



52. Which **hat** will you wear? – This is the best .

CONCEPT FOR FORM



53. The first **three buds** fell off. We'll have to watch the next .

#### VERBAL ELLIPSIS

Halliday and Hasan define this type of cohesion as ellipsis within the verbal group. They distinguish between two types of ellipsis:

Lexical ellipsis. This occurs from the right, i.e. the lexical element in the verbal group which normally occurs to the right of the verbal group.

<sup>51</sup> Halliday and Hasan (1976: 142).

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. (143).

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

CONCEPT FOR FORM



54. *Have you **been swimming**?* – *Yes, I have* .

Operator ellipsis. This is ellipsis from the left; the initial element or elements from the verbal group are omitted except the lexical verb.

CONCEPT FOR FORM



55. *What have you been **doing**?* – *Swimming*.

#### CLAUSAL ELLIPSIS

According to Halliday and Hasan verbal ellipsis involves other elements in the clause which are not part of the structure of the verbal group but elements of the clause structure. This justifies their coining of clausal ellipsis to account for omissions external to the structure of the verbal group. Halliday and Hasan define the notion of clause in English as ‘the expression of the various speech functions, such as statement, question, response and so on, [which] has a two-part structure consisting of MODAL ELEMENT plus PROPOSITIONAL ELEMENT’.<sup>54</sup>

Halliday and Hasan define these two elements as follows. ‘The MODAL element, which embodies the speech function of the clause, consists in turn of the Subject plus the finite element in the verbal group’.<sup>55</sup> With regard to the other element in the structure of the clause the authors continue ‘THE PROPOSITIONAL ELEMENT consists of the residue: the remainder of the verbal group, and any Complement or Adjunct that may be present’.<sup>56</sup>

They give the following example to illustrate the division:

56. <i>The Duke was</i>	<i>going to plant a row of poplars in the park.</i>
Modal element	Propositional element

**Figure 4.3. The two-part structure of the clause according to Halliday and Hasan.**

Halliday and Hasan conclude that ‘the two types of verbal ellipsis are derivable from these two major divisions of the clause’.<sup>57</sup> This is to say that in elliptical clauses it is either the modal element that is omitted or the propositional element. Halliday and

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. (197).

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

Hasan argue that modal ellipsis occurs in response to WH- questions and provide two examples of this type of ellipsis as follows:

CONCEPT FOR FORM



57. *What were they **doing**? – **Holding hands**.*

CONCEPT FOR FORM



58. *What were you **doing**? – **Swimming**?*

As regards the propositional type of ellipsis, Halliday and Hasan argue that it is associated with those instances where the mood and the polarity are the principal components of the message: typically, responses to statements and yes/no questions, where the subject is presupposed by a reference item'.<sup>58</sup> They provide the following two examples as illustration:

CONCEPT FOR FORM



59. *The plane has **landed**. Has it  ?*

CONCEPT FOR FORM



60. *Has the plane **landed**? Yes, it has .*

The classification of clausal ellipsis in Halliday and Hasan into two major groups as seen above corresponds to some extent to the division of *hadhf* 'ellipsis' in the Arabic rhetorical tradition. According to 'Atiq 'the *musnad* [predicate] and *musnad 'ilayhi* [subject], which are the two fundamental components of the sentence, are subject to various operations for the sake of rhetorical purposes'.<sup>59</sup> Among these operations is *hadhf* which, according to 'Atiq, is divided into three types. The first is the *hadhf* of *musnad 'ilayhi* which 'Atiq explains in detail especially with regard to the reasons leading to this type of ellipsis. Among the examples of this type of ellipsis 'Atiq gives the following from the Qur'an:

CONCEPT FOR FORM



61. *Wa'in tukhālītūhum fa  'ikhwānukum<sup>60</sup>*

If you mix their affairs with yours then your brothers.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. (198).

<sup>59</sup> 'Atiq (1985: 122).

<sup>60</sup> The Qur'an (2: 220).

In the above verse there is an example of ellipsis in which the subject 'they' is elided from the second clause. The verse should read 'if you mix their affairs with yours then [they are] your brothers'. Here again we have the metonymic representational relation CONCEPT FOR FORM which provides unity and connectedness to the text. Whenever, this verse is read there is a cognitive slot felt to be filled with a subject. According to 'Atiq the passive constructions fall into this category of ellipsis because they involve the omission of the subject usually to hide the doer of the action for safety reasons or because it is so well-known that it need not be mentioned. An example given for this type of ellipsis is the following:

62. *Kusirat al-nāfidhatu*

The window was broken.

We could imagine a context of this utterance to be in a house, for example, where the mother is reporting the incident of one of the children having broken the window. She opts for the passive, deliberately omitting the subject so that the father does not beat the child.

The second type of ellipsis in Arabic is related to the omission of the *musnad* 'predicate'. An example of this type of *hadhf* is the following:

- CONCEPT FOR FORM
63. A: *Man huwa ahsan shā'ir Arabi?*
- B: *Al-Mutanabbī*
- A: *Who is the best Arab poet?*
- B: *Al-Mutanabbī.*
- 

Here we have an ellipsis of the predicate because a complete answer to the question should have been 'Al-Mutanabbī is the best Arab poet'. The metonymic representational relation is obviously at work here to provide continuity for the text by means of the CONCEPT FOR FORM.

The third type of ellipsis in Arabic is the omission of the 'object'. Among the examples given to this type of ellipsis are the following:

- CONCEPT FOR FORM
- ◀ ← ▶
64. *Wallāhu yad'ū  'ilā dāri al-salām.*<sup>61</sup>

God calls to the Home of Peace.

CONCEPT FOR FORM



65. *Walaw shā'a Allāhu* □ *lahadükum 'ajma 'in.*<sup>62</sup>

Had He willed He would indeed have guided you all.

In example (64) we have the object 'all his servants' omitted to give the utterance a generalising force. The verse means 'God calls [all His servants] to the Home of Peace'. Example (65) indicates an ellipsis of the object 'your guidance' to make the utterance more effective. The verse means 'Had He willed [your guidance] He would indeed have guided you all'. In all these examples the type of ellipsis involved is that of syntactic ellipsis which is not significant for a textual interpretation of ellipsis. Nonetheless, we can see the metonymic representational relation of CONCEPT FOR FORM at work even though the concept is actually made obligatory because it is sometimes the object of a transitive verb.

Let us now take some more examples<sup>63</sup> of the three types of ellipsis and see how metonymy could explain this phenomenon.

#### Nominal ellipsis:

66. A: 'And how many hours a day did you do lessons?' said Alice, in a hurry to change the subject.

CONCEPT FOR FORM



B: 'Two hours the first day', said the Mock Turtle: 'nine □ the next, and so on'.

#### Verbal ellipsis:


CONCEPT FOR FORM



67. John brought some carnations and Catherine □ some sweet peas.

#### Clausal ellipsis:

CONCEPT FOR FORM



68. A: Who taught you to spell? B: Grandfather □ .

<sup>61</sup> The Qur'an (10: 25).

<sup>62</sup> The Qur'an (6: 149).

<sup>63</sup> All the examples are from Halliday & Hasan, c.f. the chapter entitled 'ellipsis' in Halliday and Hasan (1976).

### 4.1.3. Metonymy and lexical cohesion

This section aims to explain the role of the metonymic representational relations of FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT, FORM FOR THING in the development and organisation of lexical patterning in text. Lexical cohesion is the category of cohesion which concerns connectivity between lexical items in the text. It is thus different from the grammatical cohesive devices discussed so far in that it is not a feature of grammatical dependency and also it does not represent a relation between forms but between meanings and concepts. Lexical cohesion is the result of a network of semantic relations underlying the selection of lexical items in the text. The main argument underlying this section is that metonymy explains all the types of lexical cohesion and adds to this the fact that it brings all these relations under one coherent system of conceptual relations that apply globally in the text to ensure maximum ease of processing of the text as a unified whole. In the following sections this argument will be clear when we give examples showing how metonymy accounts for the relations of lexical cohesion in a more satisfactory way than the term 'lexical cohesion' itself.

Halliday and Hasan talk about two major types of lexical cohesion namely, reiteration and collocation. Under the former category they include repetition, (same word) synonym (or near synonym), superordinate and general word. The second category which they describe as the most problematical part of lexical cohesion is a category by itself. Although Halliday and Hasan do not explicitly sub-classify collocation, they in fact give examples which indicate some kind of implicit classification. My comments about lexical cohesion will be more or less the same as those raised against grammatical cohesion. I argued earlier in this chapter that Halliday and Hasan's theory of grammatical cohesion is not satisfactory because it falls short of accounting for the multiple motives of cohesive devices. The most notable motive is the interaction between language and context. Here I argue that Halliday and Hasan's theory of lexical cohesion is also not satisfactory for a number of reasons. First, it is largely confined to the organising function and does not account for the generating function. In other words it does not tell us why the lexical cohesive devices are the way they are. It can be said that Halliday and Hasan's theory of lexical cohesion and perhaps their theory of cohesion in general is a theory that has descriptive adequacy but which lacks explanatory adequacy. Furthermore, Halliday and Hasan's theory of lexical cohesion is still formal because it picks up the items that are inherently related. It does not

however treat elements that are made related by means of language use in context to realise aspects of intentional meaning, ideological meaning and socio-cultural negotiation of meaning in text.

I argue that the theory of metonymy as a textual tool accounts for all of the lexical cohesive relations by means of *standing for* based on PART FOR WHOLE and WHOLE FOR PART relations. Within 'collocation' Halliday and Hasan become confused. They provide many examples of the phenomenon without actually proposing a general principle governing all these examples. Their treatment of this particular aspect is rather general. For example, they maintain that 'there is cohesion between any pair of lexical items that stand to each other in some recognisable lexicosemantic (word-meaning) relation'.<sup>64</sup> However they do not specify these recognisable lexicosemantic relations. They further argue that 'this would include not only synonyms and near synonyms such as climb ... ascent, beam ..... rafter, disease ..... illness, and superordinates such as elm ..... tree, boy .... child, skip .... play, but also pairs of opposites of various kinds, complementaries such as boy ..... girl, stand up ..... sit down, antonyms such as like.... hate , wet .... dry, crowded ..... deserted, and converses such as order ..... obey'.<sup>65</sup> As can be seen there is no general principle governing the features of lexical relations that are cohesive. These lexical relations can be subsumed under one metonymic relation which is the part/whole relation. Even opposites, antonyms, and converses can be included under this general relation if we think that there is a particular cognitive domain in which both opposites or antonyms are actually co-members or using metonymic terminology they are both parts of the same cognitive domain. For example, the pair 'stand up' and 'sit down' is actually a pair which belongs to the cognitive domain of body actions which in a particular context the former might activate the latter and vice versa.

Further on in the same section Halliday and Hasan assert that lexical cohesive relations 'also include pairs of words drawn from the same ordered series. For example, if 'Tuesday', occurs in one sentence and 'Thursday' in another, the effect will be cohesive; similarly, dollar .... cent, north ..... south, colonel ..... brigadier. Likewise with any

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<sup>64</sup> Halliday and Hasan (1976: 285).

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

pairs drawn from unordered lexical sets, like basement ..... roof, road .... rail, red .... green'.<sup>66</sup> Halliday and Hasan do not specify these relations and argue that 'the members of any such set stand in some kind of semantic relation to one another, but for textual purposes it does not much matter what this relation is'.<sup>67</sup> This is exactly what has been criticised about traditional accounts of metonymy which characterise the essence of metonym as a substitution based on association. When we come to ask what type of association this is, no satisfactory answer is provided. Some argue it is 'contiguity' association, others assert it is that of inclusion and some others argue it is adjacency and concomitance.

I argue that a *stand for* relationship is a general relation that satisfactorily describes all types of metonymic understanding and at the same time describes all types of cohesive devices in text. Although this relation is rather general, it is always based on certain specified cognitive principles and these actually constrain the vagueness of the term 'stand for'.<sup>68</sup> I also argue that in the process of textual analysis we are required to show the set of cognitive models and conceptual schemata that actually generate the text and make it stand as a unified whole. These models can only be attained through a characterisation of what relations actually underlie the generation and organisation of the text. Therefore, I propose a new way of analysing a text which brings more than one factor together to the analysis process. First, it is not concerned only with the *actual* it also cares about the *virtual*. Second, it does not concern itself only with the organising principles of text but rather it goes deeper and is concerned about the generating principles of text. Many organising principles are as they are because of the influence of the generating principles of text on them.

#### 4.1.3.1. Metonymy and reiteration

Halliday and Hasan use 'reiteration' as an umbrella term to cover certain lexical cohesive devices such as repetition, synonymy, superordinates and general words. They define 'reiteration' as a general phenomenon in which 'one lexical item refers back to

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> This is to say that the metonymic relation might be representational, i.e. a stand for relation realising a cause for effect or the effect for the cause, or the part for the whole or the whole for the part. See the relational model of metonymy I provided in figure 3.5. in chapter 3 above.

another to which it is related by having a common referent'.<sup>69</sup> Reiteration as a lexical cohesive device is quite similar to 'reference' in that both devices have an anaphoric referential function. The only difference between them is that while the former uses pronouns the latter uses various forms of semantically related lexical items having the same referent. So in the following example the words 'bull', 'animal', 'creature', 'buffalo', etc. are all words which have the same referent, i.e. the male cow.

69. *I was on the farm last weekend. I saw a bull there. The*

<i>animal</i>
<i>creature</i>
<i>buffalo</i>
<i>bovine</i>
<i>bison</i>
<i>bull</i>

 *was friendly.*

This example suggests a general principle of relatedness between the lexical item used and the noun with which it is co-referential. This relatedness might be synonymy, as in 'buffalo' and 'bison' or superordinate as in 'animal', 'bovine' and 'creature' or it might be a simple repetition as in 'bull'. Perceived from a formal perspective the metonymic representational relation underlying the choice of any of the above lexical items would be that of FORM FOR FORM. So the form 'creature' *stands for* the form 'bull' in this particular example. However, since Halliday and Hasan define the nature of the relation between the lexical items in reiteration as that they have a common referent, this metonymic relation will not be sufficient to characterise the semantic linkage although it is useful in informing us that the two forms are related thus providing formal connectivity. It seems, therefore, that we need cognitive and contextual relations to account for the connectivity between the lexical items in the above example. Two fundamental relations are actually responsible for the connectivity between the lexical items. These are the FORM FOR CONCEPT and the FORM FOR THING. In this way we account for the relationship between the signifier which is a linguistic form and the signified which might be a cognitive concept in the Saussurean sense or an ontological object in the Peircean sense.

<sup>69</sup> Halliday and Hasan (1976: 279).

Let us consider the following example of lexical reiteration from Arabic a language<sup>70</sup> that is argued by Beeston to make more frequent use of reiteration than English.<sup>71</sup>

70. 'i'lam 'annahü fi al-zamäni al-sälif dhakarü 'annahu këna rajulun min al-hukamä' rafiqan bi al-tibbi, dakhala 'ilä madīnatin min al-muduni, fara'ä 'ämmata 'ahlihä bihim **maradhun** khafiy lä yash'urüna bi'illatihim, wa lä yuhissüna bi **dä'ihim** alladhī bihim. Fafakkara dhälik al-hakīmu fi 'amrihim kayfa yudäwīhim liyubri'ahum min **dä'ihim** wa yashfihim min 'illatihim allatī 'istamarrat bihim, wa 'alima 'annahü 'in 'akhbarahum bimä hum fihi lä yastimi'üna qawlahu wa lä yaqbalüna **našihatahu**, bal rubbamä näṣabühu bil-'adäwati wa **sta'jazü ra'yahu**, **wastanqaṣü 'ädäbahu**, **wastardhalü 'ilmahu**. Fahtäla 'alayhim fi dhälika lishiddati **shafaqatihī 'alä 'abnä' jinsihi**, wa **rahmatihī lahum** wa **tahannunihī 'alayhim** wa **hirsihī 'alä mudäwätihim**.

#### Translation:

You should know that in times gone by it was said that there was a wise man who was well-versed in medicine. This man once went into a town and saw that the mass of its people were afflicted by a hidden **illness** whose **ill effects** they could not **feel** and whose **sickness** they could not **sense**. The wise man thought about them and how to **treat** them, to **cure** them of their disease and to **heal** them from their sickness which had continued to ail them. He knew, however, that if he told them that they were sick, they would not **listen** to his **saying**, and they would not **accept** his **advice**. In fact, they might even take him as an enemy. They would **ridicule** his **opinion**, **belittle** his **views** and **disdain** his **knowledge**. So he decided to go about his work surreptitiously out of his deep **kindness** towards his fellow human beings, and out of his **mercy** for them and his **compassion** and his **caring** for treating them.

The reiterated lexical items are made in bold in the two versions of the text. Let me spell out the patterns of reiteration in the text above. We have four patterns of reiteration in the text above:

Pattern One

maradh (disease)

Pattern Two

yash'urün (feel)

Pattern Three

yudäwīhim (treat)

<sup>70</sup> The example is taken from the third epistle of 'ikhwän al-ṣafä' the 'Brethren of Purity' cited in Dickins and Watson (1999: 540).

'illatihim (illness)	yuhissün (sense)	yubri'ahum (cure)
dä'ihim (sickness)		yashfihim (heal)
Pattern Four	Pattern Five	Pattern Six
Yastami'üna (listen)	qawlahu (saying)	asta'jazü (ridicule)
Yaqbalün (accept)	nasihatahu (advice)	astanqasü (belittle)
		astardhalü (disdain)
Pattern Seven	Pattern Eight	
ra'yahu (Opinion)	shafaqatihi (kindness)	
'ädäbahu (views)	rahmatihî (mercy)	
'ilmahu (knowledge)	tahannunihi (compassion)	
	hirsîhi (caring)	

Each lexical item in each pattern stands in a metonymic representational relation of FORM FOR CONCEPT in relation to the other lexical items in the same pattern because all the lexical items in each pattern belong to one general concept. We should not forget the interactive metonymic relations of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT which connect the patterns together to unite the text and provide it with cohesion. For example, one cannot ignore the metonymic relation of contiguity between the first three patterns because they include very closely associated concepts like 'disease', 'feel' and 'treat'. Similarly, it is not easy to ignore the associative relationship between patterns four and five because they convey a set of closely contiguous concepts like those of 'advice', 'accept'. By the same token the relations of association between the concepts 'opinion' and 'ridicule' in patterns six and seven is inevitable. The interactive nature of these associative relations ensures that the text is unified as a whole and that it is cohesive.

#### 4.1.3.1.1. Metonymy and synonymy

Synonymy is the semantic relation which 'can be said to occur if the items are close enough in their meaning to allow a choice to be made between them in some contexts, without there being any difference for the meaning of the sentence as a whole'.<sup>72</sup> Cruse treats synonymy as the case whereby 'certain pairs or groups of lexical items bear a special sort of semantic resemblance to one another'.<sup>73</sup> He asserts that 'synonyms are,

<sup>71</sup> Beeston (1970: 112).

<sup>72</sup> Crystal (1991: 340).

<sup>73</sup> Cruse (1986: 265).

then, lexical items whose senses are identical in respect of 'central' semantic traits, but differ, if at all, only in respect of what we may provisionally describe as 'minor' or 'peripheral' traits'.<sup>74</sup> Lyons<sup>75</sup> suggests a three-level classification of synonyms:

1. Synonyms are *fully* synonymous if, and only if, all their meanings are identical;
2. Synonyms are *totally* synonymous if, and only if, they are synonymous in all contexts;
3. Synonyms are *completely* synonymous if, and only if, they are identical on all (relevant) dimensions of meaning. Then Lyons argues that absolute synonymy is the phenomenon that exists in expressions that are fully, totally and completely synonymous. Obviously, it is impossible that two lexical items could reach this degree of sameness because they might be fully synonymous but with a chance of variation due to certain shades of affective, social or collocational meaning.<sup>76</sup>

Synonymy is related to metonymy in two different ways. One is lexical and the other is textual. The lexical relationship between synonymy and metonymy springs from the fact that metonymy is a phenomenon in which two different lexical items are brought together to have the same referent. Then one of these two lexical items (usually the unfamiliar) is used instead of the more familiar one. So in the example:

71. *The ham sandwich is getting impatient.*

there is a cognitive synonymy created between the person ordering the ham sandwich and the sandwich itself. In this case one of the two expressions is used instead of the other yielding the same meaning albeit with a slightly different stylistic effect. This relatedness between metonymy and synonymy is as I said lexical and is motivated by a definition of synonymy provided by Cruse as 'the lexical relation which parallels identity in the membership of two classes is, of course, synonymy'.<sup>77</sup> The other relation is textual and this concerns the fact that synonymy or near synonymy has a referential

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
<sup>74</sup> Ibid. (267). Perhaps the terms 'central' and 'peripheral' can be correlated with their semiotic counterparts of 'denotative' and 'connotative' respectively. So the central semantic traits are those which pertain to the denotative and basic dimension of signification whereas the peripheral traits are those which are concerned with the behaviour of lexical items in texts and social contexts which is a value added to the basic core meaning.

<sup>75</sup> Lyons (1981: 50).

<sup>76</sup> For further detail on this issue see the discussion of 'absolute synonymy' in Cruse who argues that if we conceive that 'two lexical units would be absolute synonyms if and only if all their contextual relations were identical', then 'it would, of course, be quite impracticable to prove that two items were absolute synonyms by this definition, because that would mean checking their relations in all conceivable contexts (it would be theoretically impossible, if, as is probably the case, the number of possible contexts is infinite).

function in text. The use of synonymous or the near-synonymous items in text provide cohesion and they can be treated as metonymic examples of the type FORM FOR FORM OR FORM FOR CONCEPT metonymic relations.<sup>78</sup> The following is an example of the generating patterns of synonymy in text to create ideological perspectives.<sup>79</sup> The example<sup>80</sup> is taken from Hatim and Mason.<sup>81</sup>

72. *The genuine ulema of Islam have never given in to capitalists, money-worshippers and landlords, and they have always preserved this decency for themselves. It is a vulgar injustice for anyone to say that the hands of the genuine clergy siding with Mohammadan Islam are in this same pot and God does not forgive those who make publicity in this way or who think in this way. The committed clergy are thirsty for the blood of parasitical capitalists. They have never been in a state of conciliation with them- and never will be.*



**Figure 4.4. Patterns of FORM FOR CONCEPT in the text 72.**

It should be emphasised here that textual synonymy is slightly different from lexical synonymy in various ways. Lexical synonymy is a feature of the semantic system of language and the synonyms identified are virtual synonyms irrespective of context. This is to say that lexical synonymy is a context-free phenomenon. However, textual synonymy is an aspect of meaning in context. In my search for synonyms in text I am not looking for virtual context-free synonyms only but also for the context-bound

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. (88).

<sup>78</sup> C.f. the example and discussion of reiteration above.

<sup>79</sup> This is a common feature of lexical relations in text which are mainly used to impose an ideology.

<sup>80</sup> This example is an extract from a translation of a message addressed by the late Ayatollah Khomeini to the instructors and students of religious seminaries in Iran.

synonyms or rather what the writer treats as synonyms even if they are not actually synonyms in their semantic structure. This is in line with the general approach of motivated signification that has been proposed in the previous chapter section 3.2. In addition, this approach ensures a contextual and a cognitive treatment of the text to show us the set of ideologies underlying the generation of text which are realised by creating or coercing a set of cognitive synonyms between elements which are not synonymous otherwise.

#### 4.1.3.1.2. Metonymy and hyponymy

Hyponymy is one of the relations of inclusion. Like superordinateness and meronymy, which are going to be discussed shortly in this chapter, hyponymy is a relation which designates an internal relationship of association between lexical items. This association is that of belonging or membership. This sense is found in Cruse who defines hyponymy as 'the relationship corresponding to the inclusion of one class in another'.<sup>82</sup> The sense of inclusion figures also in Crystal who defines the concept as 'the relationship which obtains between specific and general lexical items, such that the former is 'included' in the latter'.<sup>83</sup> Lyons discusses hyponymy within a wider framework of sense relations which he divides into two broad categories. These are substitutional sense relations and combinatorial sense relations. He relates the former to the Saussurean notion of paradigmatic relations and the latter to the Saussurean notion of syntagmatic relations. Hyponymy is dealt with within the former category of relations simply because it is essentially a result of a substitutional process between closely related lexical items. Within the latter category Lyons mainly deals with collocational relations because they exhibit several combinatorial features in terms of frequency and acceptability of co-occurrence.<sup>84</sup>

The relationship between hyponymy and metonymy is obvious since one of the fundamental relations of metonymy is that of signifying inclusion through part/whole

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<sup>81</sup> Hatim and Mason (1997: 148-49).

<sup>82</sup> Cruse (1986: 89).

<sup>83</sup> Crystal (1991: 168).

<sup>84</sup> Lyons (1995: 124).

relations. The following example from Gibbs<sup>85</sup> illustrates the point. It is a passage that describes a person:

73. *fine eyes, in steel-rimmed glasses and a most expressive and sensitive mouth, by turns tremulous, amused, morally reprovng or full of scorn. It was the mouth, one felt, of a man defending the right to be sensitive. Physically he was awkward, limp and still at the same time. He would stand askew, as it were, holding himself together by gripping his left hand in his right. By contrast his gestures were most graceful.*

The following diagram illustrates the patterns of these hyponymy relations which relate to the description of the man. Some of these relations are hyponymy/hyponymy relations while others are hyponym/superordinate relations. On the whole all relations are metonymic whether those of species to species or those of species to genus because the principle is the same, i.e. all of the relations are of inclusion.




Figure 4.5. Patterns of hyponymic relations in text 73.

The part/whole relations can be represented more explicitly as follows:




Figure 4.6. A metonymic model of hyponymic relations in text 73.

The relation underlying the diagram on the left is that of physical hyponymy which is taken to mean a relation of physical inclusion. The relation underlying the diagram on

<sup>85</sup> Gibbs (1994: 11).

the right is that of cognitive hyponymy. According to the triadic semiotic model of metonymic signification proposed in this study, the distinction between the cognitive and the physical or ontological is realised in such a way that physical hyponymy signifies ontological inclusion while cognitive hyponymy signifies epistemological inclusion. So it could be argued that the diagram on the left shows ontological hyponymic relations and that on the right shows epistemological hyponymic relations. However, both of these types of relation are actually metonymic given that metonymy covers both epistemology and ontology.

It should be noted that Halliday and Hasan do not include hyponymy in their inventory of cohesive devices. This is one of the shortcomings taken of against their model. The model, for example, subsumes 'same' and 'different' under similarity, and 'included' and 'including' under superordinate without further elaboration on these subtypes of relations. This hampers its operationality. Hasan has alluded to these points and accordingly proposed a 'revised version'.<sup>86</sup> It is worth mentioning that the model of metonymy as a textual device proposed throughout this thesis covers all these aspects and gives a detailed account of relations and converse relations. It also provides justification for why a relation is sometimes interpreted in some certain ways while the converse of this relationship might not necessarily be so interpreted.<sup>87</sup>

#### 4.1.3.1.3. *Metonymy and superordinateness*

Superordinateness is the converse of hyponymy and the two notions imply one another. A hyponym entails its superordinate whereas the superordinateness does not entail its hyponym. This statement can be reformulated differently drawing from the literature in semiotics as follows: a hyponym denotes its superordinate whereas a superordinate connotes<sup>88</sup> its hyponym.

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<sup>86</sup> See for further detail Hasan's paper (1984) particularly page 202.

<sup>87</sup> Compare for example the superordinate/hyponymy vs. hyponymy/superordinate and the discussion of denotation vs. connotation in linguistic signification between parts and wholes and between wholes and parts below.

<sup>88</sup> It should be pointed out in this connection that the terms 'denotation' and 'connotation' have acquired a high degree of diversity in treatment. Garza-Cuarón provides a six-way distinction between the two terms. 'The first is the distinction between denotation, understood as the direct reference of a sign to an object, and connotation, understood as adjacent meaning which is added to primary meaning. The second is the relation between suppositio and significatio. The former here is the referential realisation of a sign in a given proposition or the property of a term to stand for something (or the 'actual' representation of an

74. A: *I saw a lion.*

B: *I saw an animal.*<sup>89</sup>

A entails B because the relation of inclusion is logically necessary that a lion is an animal. In semantic terms we can say that A entails B. However, B does not necessarily entail A although it may presuppose it. The relation through which we move from the genus to the species is a relation outside language because it relates to culture and it relates to the notion of prototypicality. However, the relation through which we move from the species to the genus is essentially linguistic. In the examples

75. A: *I cooked lamb.*

B: *I cooked meat.*

If you cooked 'lamb' you necessarily cooked 'meat' because 'lamb' is part of the concept 'meat'. However, if you cooked 'meat' it is not necessary that you cooked lamb.

Let us consider the following two examples:

76. A: *I bought a chair.*

B: *I bought some furniture.*

If we can think of a culture where the chair is a prototype of furniture then we can say that the whole typically signifies the part. So in this culture when the category 'furniture' is mentioned it typically signifies 'chair'. This category is not only culture-specific but also context-specific. So if somebody says 'I need to buy furniture for my house' we activate a schema of sofas and beds more than desks. If someone says 'I need

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object in a concrete sign). The latter is the assignation of a meaning to a form or the convention by means of which a form signifies a class of objects. The third point concerns the senses modern logicians associate with the terms denotation and connotation. Denotation is used to refer to those subjects of which a term can be predicated, or simply the object to which a term refers. Connotation, in turn, is the set of properties that determine membership in a given class. This pair of terms are [sic] generally associated with other pairs such as extension-intension and comprehension-extension. The fourth is the distinction between denotation, as a referential meaning, and connotation as emotive meaning (the association of images, experiences and values). The fifth is the opposition between the denotation of a word, as its principal, primary, fixed or literal meaning, and its variable and ambiguous connotations, as secondary meanings added figurative or metaphoric senses and affective values. The sixth is the point in which Urban suggests that there are three different kinds of connotation: conceptual connotation, which is the abstraction that most words imply, intuitive connotation, which is the conjuring up of meaning itself, the intuition of the world or of objects through meaning, and emotional connotation'. Garza-Cuarón (1991: 119-120).

<sup>89</sup> Compare the example of 'dog' and 'animal' by Dickins (1998: 301-302) which addresses a similar issue of the role of denotation and connotation in euphemistic expressions. Cruse gives the example: 'I'm going to take the animal for a walk' which is used instead of 'I'm going to take the dog for a walk'. Cruse then argues that this substitution is 'no longer neutral – to produce a neutral utterance, the speaker must use dog. The effect of avoiding the generic term in this way is often to add negative emotive overtones to the utterance' (1986: 155).

to buy furniture for my office' we activate a schema of chairs, an office desk, and so on. In all of these cases we are able to infer the part from the whole.<sup>90</sup> Also in the examples:

77. *A: I hit him on the nose*

*B: I hit him on the face.*

A entails B but B does not entail A because the part does not entail the whole.

The textual theory of metonymy as I am developing it in this thesis allows us to combine both aspects of denotation and connotation in our analysis. We combine both language and context. We combine both the semantics and the pragmatics of text in the process of text analysis, text description and text interpretation and both the conventional and motivated aspects of language in text analysis. Moreover, the theory of metonymy as a textual tool does not necessarily require that the superordinate be mentioned in the text. Metonymy allows us to conceive of a superordinate as soon as the parts are mentioned even if it is not present in the text. The notion of superordinate if interpreted metonymically is a powerful tool for the analysis and interpretation of text and relates coherently with the metonymic principle actual for virtual especially when 'virtual' is seen to correspond to 'whole/superordinate' and 'actual' to 'part/hyponym'. Within such an approach phonological recurrence in text for example has meaning because it signifies a system of repetition of similar sound species which belong to an abstract entity that stands as the ideal form of the sound repeated throughout the text. The same also applies to morphological repetition and syntactic parallelism, as well as to the semantic relations in text.

Let us consider this example from Hoey<sup>91</sup>, which illustrates lexical patterns in text. I am interested in the patterns of superordinates and hyponyms in the text as these are of direct relevance to this section:

78. *A drug known to produce violent reactions in **humans** has been used for sedating grizzly **bears** *Ursus actors* in Montana, USA, according to a report in the New York Times. After **one bear**, known to be a peaceable **animal**, killed and ate a camper in*


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<sup>90</sup> This point will be further discussed in the next chapter when I discuss the notion of schematic knowledge and text organisation and interpretation. There I shall show that part/whole movement seems to be logical and therefore necessary whereas whole/part movement amounts to expectation by inferencing. This might or might not be satisfied by the progression of the text. And perhaps this is what creates the dynamic interactive process of text interpretation.

<sup>91</sup> Hoey (1991: 37).

*an unprovoked attack, **scientists** discovered it had been tranquillised 11 times with phencyclidine, or 'angle dust', which causes hallucination and sometimes gives the **user** an irrational feeling of destructive power. Many **wild bears** have become 'garbage junkies' feeding from dumps around human developments. To avoid potentially dangerous clashes between them and **humans**, scientists are trying to rehabilitate the **animals** by drugging them and releasing them in uninhabited areas. Although some **biologists** deny that the mind-altering drug was responsible for uncharacteristic behaviour of **this particular bear**, no research has been done into the effects of giving **grizzly bears** or other **mammals** repeated doses of phencyclidine.*

The following diagram illustrates the patterns of superordinate/hyponymy in text 85 above:



**Figure 4.7. Patterns of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT relation in text 78.**

We can see that the CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT metonymic relation is responsible for connecting lexical items like 'humans', 'scientists' and 'biologists' because they are metonymically related as superordinates and hyponyms. Similarly, the lexical items 'animals', 'mammals' and 'bears' are also metonymically related via the metonymic representational relation of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT.

Metonymy helps us also to see models of superordinates and hyponyms even in cases where there exists no explicit hierarchy, because the hierarchy can be implicit and latent. This approach allows us to see the repetition of 'it was through the war' in text (79) below as a species of a general structural parallelism in the text, which is also manifested by other recurrences in the text, either of the same type or of a slightly

different type. Consider the following text from Hatim and Mason,<sup>92</sup> again from the Khomeini speech.

*79. It was through the war that we unveiled the deceitful face of the World Devourers. It was through the war that we recognised our enemies and friends. It was during the war that we concluded that we must stand on our own feet. It was through the war that we broke the back of both Eastern and Western superpowers. It was through the war that we consolidated the roots of our fruitful Islamic revolution. It was through the war that we nurtured a sense of fraternity and patriotism in the spirit of all the people. It was through the war that we showed the people of the world –in particular the people of the region – that one can fight against all the powers and superpowers for several years.*

#### 4.1.3.1.4. Metonymy and meronymy


Meronymy is a semantic relation of inclusion in which the semantic domain of a lexical item is seen to be branching in a lexical hierarchy. Meronymy is the lexical relation of part/whole. Defining meronymy is not easy as Cruse suggests.<sup>93</sup> Perhaps the best way to define meronymy is to say that the lexical relation is perceived in the formula 'A has X'. If A has X then X is a meronym of A. Let me give some examples:

80. *Hands have fingers.*

81. *Faces have noses.*

82. *Cars have wheels.*

As we have seen in various parts of this thesis, the part/whole relation is a fundamental relation of metonymic reasoning. Therefore, the link between metonymy and meronymy is evident. Cruse<sup>94</sup> illustrates of the nature of the relation of meronymy as follows:



**Figure 4. 8. Cruse's illustration of meronymic relations.**

<sup>92</sup> Hatim and Mason (1997: 149).

<sup>93</sup> Cruse (1986: 160).

<sup>94</sup> Cruse (1986: 157).

The most interesting aspect of Cruse's discussion is his distinction between two notions related to part/whole relations. The first is 'meronymy' and the second is 'meronymy'. The difference between these two concepts as Cruse perceives it is that 'a meronymy is a lexical hierarchy whose relation of dominance is the lexical relation of meronymy'.<sup>95</sup> So meronymy is the structure whereas meronymy is the relation. This interpretation is evident from Cruse's later clarification that 'the semantic relation between a lexical item denoting a part and that denoting the corresponding whole will be termed meronymy'.<sup>96</sup> As regards meronymy Cruse argues that '...there is first of all a true meronymy, whose structure is determined by purely linguistic criteria'.<sup>97</sup>

Relevant to this thesis is Cruse's distinction between 'meronymy' and 'labelled part-whole hierarchy'. The former, according to Cruse, is the 'true meronymy' which is based on linguistic criteria. The latter is 'formally identical to the corresponding extralinguistic hierarchy'.<sup>98</sup> Cruse makes it clear that his concern in his book is 'meronymy' because it is the linguistically-based hierarchy. I argue here that a theory of metonymy accounts for both linguistic and extra-linguistic inclusion relations and hierarchies. The textual theory of metonymy as I am developing it throughout this thesis is a theory of linguistic and extralinguistic (i.e. cognitive) 'stand for' relations, the most notable relation among these being CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT which is based on part/whole relations. The following passage illustrates how metonymy explains both linguistic as well as extralinguistic networks of part-whole relations.

*83. The city was quiet. The streets were all covered with snow. He walked up the street. The shop round the corner was the only place to find something to eat. In the food section he stretched out his hand to the shelf to take some cheese and a piece of bread. He paid and continued his aimless night journey.*

In the above text we can think of 'a city' meronymy in which the part/whole relations are not actually linguistic but extralinguistic, i.e. ontological relations. This is to say that


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<sup>95</sup> Ibid. (ff.1: 180).

<sup>96</sup> Ibid. (159).

<sup>97</sup> Ibid. (160).

street does not really relate to city by means of semantic inclusion but by means of cognitive inclusion. The following is a model of the meronymic relations in the above passage:



**Figure 4.9. A model of meronymic relations in text 83.**

#### 4.1.3.2. Metonymy and Collocation

I have indirectly mentioned collocation previously in chapter 2 section 2.2.1.3. when I discussed the different theories of metonymy, and particularly when I discussed Ullmann's theory of semantic deletion. I argued that one aspect of a semantic theory of metonymy is that it is collocational. Here I am concerned with elaborating on this concept but I should start with a general definition of collocation. Crystal defines collocation as 'a term used in lexicology by some (especially Firthian) linguists to refer to the habitual co-occurrence of individual lexical items'.<sup>99</sup> Crystal argues that 'collocations are then a type of syntagmatic lexical relation'.<sup>100</sup> From this definition it is clear that there seem to be at least two traditions with regard to collocation.

The first is the Firthian tradition which proposes a lexical dimension to the environmental co-occurrence. In this sense collocation means the set of predictable lexical items which co-occur next to each other. Perhaps the classical example of this kind of co-occurrence relations is the difference between the words 'pretty' and 'handsome'. The word 'pretty' collocates with 'girl' whereas 'handsome' collocates with 'boy'. The reverse of this will lead to some kind of foreignness and oddity. Perhaps

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Crystal (1991: 62).

a clearer example would be the collocation between 'resounding crash' but not 'resounding tinkle'. The former seems to collocate perfectly well while the result of the latter is a little incongruous. Perceived as such, collocation in the Firthian sense is entirely a lexical phenomenon. Therefore, if collocation is a kind of syntagmatic lexical relation and if metonymy is essentially combinational then the link between the two in the creation of text is evident.<sup>101</sup>

The second tradition is that of Halliday and Hasan which extends the scope of collocation over lexical boundaries to explain textual patterns based on this lexical aspect. Halliday and Hasan define collocation as 'the cohesion that is achieved through the association of lexical items that regularly co-occur', and claim that this type of lexical relation is the most problematical of all lexical cohesive devices.<sup>102</sup> The treatment of collocation by Halliday and Hasan is very useful as far as textuality is concerned because they took the concept outside its traditional domain and promoted it to also explain textual phenomena. However, their treatment of the concept is rather general and as Hoey argues 'Under this heading [collocation] Halliday and Hasan include a ragbag of lexical relations, many of which have no readily available name'.<sup>103</sup> Among the examples they provide are the following: boy ... girl, stand up ... sit down, like ... hate, wet ... dry and so on and so forth. The view of collocation as problematic is raised up again by Hasan who asserts that:

Altogether the notion of collocation proved problematic. While I firmly believe that behind the notion of collocation is an intuitive reality, I have come to accept the fact that unless we can unpack the details of the relations involved in collocation in the Firthian sense, it is best to avoid the category in research. The problems of inter-subjective reliability cannot be ignored.<sup>104</sup>

Hasan here seems to be rather skeptical about the validity of the notion of collocation because of its rather loose nature. She suggests a theory of lexical cohesion without collocation and her classification does not show this relation at all. She conceives of two

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> See Firth (1957: 124-127) where the term 'collocation' is suggested as a technical term. In (1957: 11) Firth argues that 'collocation is not to be interpreted as *context* by which the whole conceptual meaning is implied. Nor is it to be confused with *citation* .... Collocations of a given word are statements of the habitual or customary places of that word in collocational order but not in any other contextual order and emphatically not in any grammatical order'.

<sup>102</sup> cf. Halliday and Hasan (1976: 284).

<sup>103</sup> Hoey (1991: 7).

<sup>104</sup> Hasan (1984: 195).

major types of lexical cohesive devices. The following is a reproduction of her classification<sup>105</sup>:

Categories of lexical cohesion:

A. *General*

i. repetition	leave, leaving, left
ii. synonymy	leave, depart
iii. antonymy	leave, arrive
iv. hyponymy	travel, leave (including co-hyponyms, leave, arrive)
v. meronymy	hand, finger (including co-meronymys, finger, thumb)

B. *Instantial*

i. equivalence	the <i>sailor</i> was their <i>daddy</i> ; you be the <i>patient</i> , I'll be the <i>doctor</i>
ii. naming	the dog was called <i>Toto</i> ; they named the dog <i>Fulffy</i>
iii. semblance	the <i>deck</i> was like a <i>pool</i> ; all my <i>pleasures</i> are like <i>yesterdays</i>

As we can see the table above does not include collocation among the lexical cohesive devices. Hasan's comment on the absence of this lexical cohesive device is that 'it proved remarkably difficult to operationalise this category sufficiently to ensure consistent analysis. But the reason for its exclusion is not entirely negative. Many relations previously handled under this rubric are now subsumed in the revised version'.<sup>106</sup>

Collocation is not only a semantic but also a cognitive phenomenon, since it involves regular co-occurrence. It occurs when certain words acquire a sort of currency and conventionality because of *standing next to* each other or perhaps more precisely because of co-occurring in the same textual and contextual environment to the extent that some of these lexical collocations (which are semantically, cognitively and logically related) can actually be omitted and the meaning will still remain the same because the whole perceptual understanding is supplied by our cognition. Many part/whole metonymies are actually of this sort. These are either of the FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT, CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT or CONCEPT FOR THING. In other words these relations can either be in the realm of form, in the realm of cognition or in the realm of reality. So the established conventionality between 'the ladies toilets' allows for an ellipsis to take place without affecting the semantic content and the processing of the message. This

<sup>105</sup> Ibid. (202).

allows for expressions like 'the ladies', 'the gents', 'the barber's' and so on to be used quite frequently in language.

The established cognitive association between 'the city', 'the street' and 'the shop round the corner' in example (83) above is a good illustration of a cognitive association based on a relation of co-occurrence which is essentially collocational. This relation of co-occurrence is cognitive because 'streets' and 'shops round the corner' are not essential components or critical features of the semantic structure of 'a city'. However, the relations of co-occurrence are built via cognitive reasoning of 'concomitance'. The third type of collocation is semantic or ontological and this concerns phenomenological realities. The example of the 'keel' being used instead of the ship is a case in point. The 'keel' is an essential or a prototypical part of a ship. Conversely, the 'nose' is a prototypical part of a 'face' so when we use the whole to stand for the part in expressions like 'I hit him on the face' while the hit was actually on the nose for instance, the substitution is based on a whole for part relation.

Metonymic collocation in all of its three forms is a major factor in text generation because the set of lexical items that co-occur may stretch over a passage to give it unity and continuity of occurrences.<sup>107</sup> The set of collocations in text is a major factor influencing text membership and text typology. Based on the three previously mentioned relations which link collocation to metonymy, it is possible to argue that collocation is not only an organising principle in text but also a fundamental factor in text generation. This is an argument that runs against Hoey's (1991) and Phillips' (1985) arguments of regarding collocation as a purely organising principle. However, their insights should be seen within their framework and purpose of analysis. By the same token, my observations about metonymic collocation should be seen within the context of my own analytical framework.

Collocation is a constitutive device because it links all the three realms of phenomena, the world of concepts, the world of forms and the world of things. Collocation creates text and allows for the creation of the linguistic specification of register and text typology. It does not merely organise text. The set of collocations in text largely

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

determines the type of text and specifies the kind of register to which that particular text belongs. While Hasan excludes 'collocation' from her 'revised version' of the lexical cohesive devices I shift the notion of collocation from text cohesion, i.e. from a regulative notion, to text generation, genre membership and register membership, i.e. to a constitutive notion.<sup>108</sup> I am able to do this because the traditional relations covered by 'collocation' in Halliday and Hasan are already accounted for by other relations specified in the system. For example, the pair 'come' and 'go' which are traditionally seen as an example of collocation, are actually taken care of by the *stand for* relation which is based on category membership, i.e. both of 'come' and 'go' are co-hyponyms of a general category of 'movement'. This is to say, collocation as a cohesive device becomes redundant.

It is also interesting to note that Hasan admits that her exclusion of 'collocation' from lexical cohesion has resulted in a text analysis which is deprived of a fairly comprehensive cohesive device, such that some relations which are categorised as cohesive were in fact previously described as collocative, and these cannot be explained by the relations she proposes instead of collocation. In this regard Hasan maintains that

although the above minimised the effects of the exclusion of collocation, it does not entirely cover the phenomena handled through collocation. Certain relations intuitively recognised as cohesive cannot be accounted for in the revised version.<sup>109</sup>

Hasan gives the words 'ship', 'sailor' and 'sea' as examples of 'collocation' that are, according to her, difficult to handle by other relations within the 'revised version'. I believe that metonymy as defined in this thesis solves this problem, in that the words 'ship', 'sailor' and 'sea' are very closely related to one another as parts of a general idealised cognitive model of the sea experience. In some psychological studies these idealised cognitive models are described in terms of schemata. Thus the phenomenon is handled within the model I am proposing and there is no need to regret the exclusion of collocation from the 'revised version'. Hasan acknowledges that a broader view of textuality is able to solve the problem of finding ways to explain relations within text. She specifically mentions 'coherence' as this broader view. It is to this vital aspect of textuality that I turn in the next chapter. However, before I begin the discussion of text

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<sup>107</sup> Phillips (1985) addresses the nature of collocation and how it organises large-scale texts.

<sup>108</sup> See Baker (1992: 52) who argues for a registral nature of collocation.

coherence it is important to remind the reader that the argument that this thesis attempts to put forward is that metonymy as a textual tool subsumes both cohesion and coherence, form and meaning, language and context, semantics and pragmatics. It also goes beyond this to include a stylistic aspect of textual analysis, through the incorporation of the systematic patterns of phonological, morphological and syntactic repetition in text.

In a later<sup>110</sup> work Halliday provides a summary of the theory of cohesion in one chapter in which he retains almost all the arguments he and Hasan proposed in (1976). Two points can be raised regarding this chapter. The first is that the chapter addresses almost all the cohesive devices discussed in the 1976 *Cohesion in English* but with a different focus. In this chapter Halliday tries to provide a more comprehensive scope of cohesion in which text connectivity is not limited to the explicit formal devices but is also evident in implied ones. This is a remarkable shift as it acknowledges clearly the cognitive aspect involved in text organisation and processing. The role of inferencing here is obvious and this takes the theory outside semantics and well into pragmatics. The second point is that Halliday in this chapter speaks about the notion of coherence and maintains that 'for a text to be coherent, it must be cohesive; but it must be more besides'.<sup>111</sup> Halliday admits that his theory of cohesion is not adequate as a theory of text meaning because text meaning involves much more than formal connectedness in text.

Metonymy is the signifying relation which combines both aspects of textuality: that of linguistic structuring and that of cognitive structuring. I am not implying that linguistic patterns are not cognitive patterns or that cognitive patterns can be realised without linguistic patterns. Rather, I am positing that the theory of metonymy as semiotic configuration between the realms of words, concepts and things is able to account for the multidimensional nature of text. It will help us interpret the linguistic patterns listed as cohesive devices and will also take us beyond this to interpret unsaid but implied or concealed facts about the culture and ideology of the text. The choice of one aspect of a thing/concept to stand for the whole thing/concept is essentially a cultural and

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<sup>109</sup> Hasan (1984: 203).

<sup>110</sup> Halliday (1985: chapter 9).

ideological matter. Metonymy will help us reveal or, to use a more critical term, deconstruct these mysteries. So far I have outlined the significance of metonymy as a textual tool for the interpretation of the formal patterning of text. In the next chapter I will attempt to illustrate the other side of the coin. This concerns the ways in which metonymy helps us carry out inferences and judgments about how the text hangs together and how it makes sense by means of revealing the set of cognitive relations metonymy creates in the generation and organisation of text.

We have seen so far that Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion limits the scope of the notion and confines it to a rather marginal role and places it under the textual component of the semantic configuration of text. The proper place of cohesion should however pervade the entire model of signification. As I showed in 4.1.1. the sound has a cohesive role in the harmony of the text just as the word and the phrase do. Besides, cohesion, whether on the phonological, grammatical, or semantic level, is always motivated by factors from outside language. This makes the concept of cohesion a transparent one which pervades all linguistic levels, and which is motivated by higher levels of signification.

#### **4.2. Summary**

In this chapter I discussed the theory of cohesion as propounded by Halliday and Hasan in their classic joint work (1976) and also in later work. The aim of the chapter was to relate each of the principles of text cohesion to one aspect of metonymic operation. I went on to claim that metonymy is in fact not only a theory of formal connectedness in text but is also a pragmatic theory of textuality. It will be the task of the following chapter to investigate this latter aspect.

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<sup>111</sup> Halliday (1985: 318).

## Chapter Five: Metonymy and Text Coherence

*As a conceptual process of locating a reference point, metonymy belongs to the wider set of strategies of finding a point in the common reference space between a speaker and a listener that can serve as a bridge or link to the intended referent.<sup>1</sup>*

### 5.0. Introduction:

In the previous chapter I have shown that metonymic relations of FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR THING, THING FOR FORM, CONCEPT FOR FORM and of FORM FOR CONCEPT can actually be integrated into a textual model of formal and semantic connectedness in text. This I have termed the cohesive power of metonymy. In this chapter I argue that metonymic processes as text organising principles are not limited to the set of formal or semantic bonds in text. Rather these processes go beyond this to explain the pragmatic dimension of text generation, organisation and interpretation. This chapter builds on the relations of the formal component and goes beyond that to investigate the dynamic interaction between language, cognition and context in text creation and organisation. The metonymic representational relations to be discussed in this chapter are CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT, CONCEPT FOR THING, THING FOR CONCEPT and THING FOR THING. This I term the coherence power of metonymy. This chapter is particularly an attempt to answer the question how, from a metonymic perspective, a text is perceived to form a unified whole and how it is perceived as meaningful. There are several approaches to the pragmatic aspect of meaning and one could be tempted to investigate all of these but given the shortage of space I shall limit the scope of this chapter to discussing the theoretical framework of what has been generally referred to as Schema Theory<sup>2</sup>. The following claims underlie the chapter:

- If metonymy is a mode of representing knowledge then it should tell us how this knowledge is stored and used in real life interactions between thought and text.

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<sup>1</sup> Driven (1999: 275).

<sup>2</sup> See the definition and discussion of this theory below. This term has been treated as the general area of conceptual representation of knowledge in the mind. See for example the list of references in de Beaugrande and Dressler where they discuss the elements of this theory (1981: 90).

- If metonymy is a fundamental principle of our cognitive structure<sup>3</sup>, then it should be able to explain how cognitive continuities are established and licensed in text.
- If text coherence means basically text prediction and text expectation then metonymy as a principle of conceptual contiguity and causality is capable of assisting us in predicting what could be coming *next* in text.

The chapter will specifically address the relevance of the five major knowledge structures commonly discussed in the literature on schema theory. These are frames and scenarios proposed by Minsky (1975), schemata proposed by Bartlett (1932) and Rumelhart (1976), scripts, plans and goals discussed by Schank and Abelson (1977) and prototypes and stereotypes discussed in Ungerer and Schmid (1996). The chapter aims to integrate all these notions into a unified cognitive framework and relate them to the concept of metonymy in its cognitive and textual aspect to account for continuities and coherence in text.

### **5.1. Metonymy and coherence**

Coherence is that text property which makes a text logically accessible and conceptually relevant to its context. But is coherence a property of text as a formal and static entity or is it a property of text interpretation as an interactive and dynamic process? Charolles argues that:

No text is inherently coherent or incoherent. In the end, it all depends on the receiver, and on his ability to interpret the indications present in the discourse so that, finally, he manages to understand it in a way which seems coherent to him – in a way which corresponds with his idea of what it is that makes a series of actions into an integrated whole'.<sup>4</sup>

This section aims to show that coherence is actually a feature of interpretation which is dynamic and interactive within a multidimensional spectrum in which the text is only one dimension. More importantly, the section primarily aims to show that the concept of metonymy as developed throughout this thesis is also capable of accounting for the dimension of text coherence. Halliday and Hasan do not discuss text coherence at all in their (1976) book. However, later they begin to realise the importance of the notion, and Hasan in her (1984) paper addresses the issue of the contribution of cohesion to the coherence of text. Halliday and Hasan (1989) address the issue of coherence more clearly. In the following paragraphs I will consider the notion of coherence as presented

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<sup>3</sup> This hypothesis has been demonstrated in chapter 2 of this thesis.

in Halliday and Hasan. I will then proceed to address the notions that have come to characterise the study of coherence in text like frames, goals, scripts, plans and goals.

In her article 'Coherence and Cohesive Harmony', Hasan provides a textual theory of coherence by relating it to the notion of cohesive harmony and more precisely to the cohesive chains in text. These are identity and similarity chains.<sup>5</sup> This textual theory is supported by a claim which Hasan tries to prove in her paper. This is that 'the basis for textual coherence lies in cohesion'.<sup>6</sup> More explicitly she argues that 'situational coherence is not a prior requirement for the existence of coherence in a text which describes these situations'.<sup>7</sup> Hasan here argues against her and Halliday's earlier argument in *Cohesion in English* (1976) that 'reference to the situation is the prior form of reference, and that reference to another item within the text is a secondary or derived form of this relation'.<sup>8</sup> Halliday and Hasan (1976) go even further to suggest that 'it is certainly possible that, in the evolution of language, situational reference preceded text reference'.<sup>9</sup>

The main problem with Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion is that they initially placed it under the textual component of the semantic system of language. This is a reductionist view of the notion of cohesion and a gross limitation of the scope of the phenomenon of text connectivity. The insufficiency of a formal approach to text forced the development of a wider notion of textuality which is 'coherence'. However, under the principles of their approach they could not escape the formal orientation of their treatment of connectivity in text. Therefore, the question that arises is 'what is the reason behind the variation between the following two texts?' The first is after Enkvist<sup>10</sup> and is densely cohesive but does not make sense.

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<sup>4</sup> Charolles (1983: 95).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Hasan (1984).

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. (210)

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Halliday and Hasan (1976: 32).

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Enkvist (1978: 110).

1. *I bought a Ford. A [sic] car in which President Wilson rode down the Champs Elysees was black. Black English has been widely discussed. The discussion between the presidents ended last week. A week has seven days. Every day I feed my cat. Cats have four legs. The cat is on the mat. Mat has three letters.*

The second text is adopted from Brown and Yule<sup>11</sup> and does not show any cohesive devices and yet makes sense.

2. *Epistemics Seminar: Thursday 3<sup>rd</sup> June, 2.00 p.m.*  
*Steve Harlow (Department of Linguistics, University of York).*  
*'Welsh and Generalised Phrase Structure Grammar'*

Instead of answering this query by resorting to the context of situation and the context of culture as the main reasons behind this variation, Hasan extends her formal approach to suggest that the set of cohesive chains can explain text coherence. My argument is that, although the theory of cohesion might be legitimately formal in the sense that it looks for the interrelationships between formal ties in the text, coherence is essentially a phenomenon that is best understood through reference to the extralinguistic setting whether in the immediate context of situation or in the broader context of culture.

Although Halliday's writings about the subject of language as social semiotic discuss the notion of 'context', these discussions regrettably restrict this notion to the higher levels of linguistic signification particularly to those of language variation. This notion developed in these writings into the notion of 'register', which in practice concerns the variation in language determined by diversity of circumstances of 'use', and in theory concerns the configuration of the three components of the context of situation, i.e. field, tenor and mode. Field is realised by the experiential component of the semantic system, tenor is realised by the interpersonal component, and mode is realised by the textual component. It is under this final component that Halliday and Hasan place 'cohesion' and it is this reductionism that led to their overall formal theory of cohesion.

Hasan's treatment of the notion of coherence as 'the property of unity or that of 'hanging together'<sup>12</sup> on the basis of 'cohesive harmony' or the set of 'cohesive chains' in text makes 'coherence' entirely a property of text. It is vital to point out that this is

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<sup>11</sup> Brown and Yule (1983: 223).

<sup>12</sup> Hasan (1984: 181).

contradictory to her own assumption that 'textual coherence is a relative, not an absolute property, so that it is possible to rank a group of texts on a cline from most coherent to least coherent'.<sup>13</sup> My argument here is that if coherence is entirely a property of text then it is objective or at least it can be both objective and deterministic. This is to say we could reach a consensus about it since all that is needed is to count the number of ties and the number of chains of these ties in a text. If we take the word 'relative' further we shall notice that it indirectly involves reference to the reader whom Hasan intends to exclude from her analysis.

Widdowson argues in favour of a distinction between cohesion and coherence and concludes that cohesion is 'the overt, linguistically signalled relationship between propositions' and that coherence is 'relationship between illocutionary acts'.<sup>14</sup> This treatment agrees with the definitions which Hoey provides for cohesion and coherence. Hoey defines cohesion as 'a property of text whereby certain grammatical or lexical features of the sentences of the text connect them to other sentences in the text'.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, Hoey defines coherence as

a quality assigned to text by a reader or listener, and is a measure of the extent to which the reader or listener finds that the text holds together and makes sense as a unity. It is not therefore identifiable with any combination of linguistic features and will never be absolute. The same text may be found coherent by one reader and incoherent by another, though an overwhelming consensus can be achieved for most naturally occurring texts.<sup>16</sup>

The link between the text and the non-linguistic world outside the text is clear in Widdowson's and Hoey's treatment of the concepts of coherence. Hoey's approach is more explicit in assigning the property of coherence to the reader or the listener. It is this approach that is adopted in this thesis.

Similar distinctions between the two notions have also been put forward by other scholars such as Cook who defines cohesion as 'formal links between sentences and between clauses'.<sup>17</sup> He defines coherence as 'the quality of meaning, unity, and purpose

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid. (184).

<sup>14</sup> Widdowson (1978: 28, 31).

<sup>15</sup> Hoey (1991: 266).

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. (165-266).

<sup>17</sup> Cook (1989: 156).

perceived in discourse'.<sup>18</sup> Cook reviews the origins of discourse analysis and addresses the long-standing question of how to account for the description of pieces of language longer than the sentence to find out what gives these stretches unity and meaning. He comes to the conclusion, which supports my argument here of the need to:

- (a) distinguish between cohesion and coherence and
- (b) establish the notion of coherence on the contextual level of linguistic signification.

Cook concludes that

if we are to find the answer to the problem of what gives stretches of language unity and meaning, we must look beyond the formal rules operating within sentences, and consider the people who use language, and the world in which it happens as well.<sup>19</sup>

This has been precisely my argument throughout this thesis: we need more than the notion of cohesion to account for the interpretation of text. In my model of metonymic relations in text I have placed cohesion at a lower level, i.e. the semantic level, where the metonymic relations realising it are those of FORM FOR FORM/CONCEPT/THING and the converse of these relations. On the other hand I have placed coherence on a higher level, i.e. the semiotic level, where the common metonymic relations are those of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT/THING and the converse of these relations. These are believed to be inclusive of interdomain relations uniting the world of things, concepts and language.

Cook regards the formal patterning of discourse as only one element in the interpretation of discourse. The other factors influencing text or discourse interpretation are the understanding of the set of functions language actually performs in certain circumstances. Cook mentions the theory of speech acts propounded by the philosopher Austin and later developed by John Searle. Speech act theory explains language use as a series of actions and in this way it probes deeply into the set of relations beneath the surface of the text. There are also other factors that account for the way in which stretches of language are perceived as meaningful unified wholes. Among these are the conversational principles proposed by Paul Grice; these account for how meaning is negotiated in discourse by the assumption that people normally adhere to principles like those of truthfulness, brevity, clarity and relevance. The flouting of any of these maxims leads to implicatures, i.e. inferred meanings. Perhaps all of these issues can actually be subsumed under the more general principle of text interpretation, i.e. that of the role of

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. (13).

knowledge in creating and interpreting text. This is the issue that I am going to dwell on in sections (5.2.- 5.7.) of this chapter.

The general theme of the nature of knowledge of the world and how it contributes to the creation of text has also been a major aspect of de Beaugrande and Dressler's theory of coherence. De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) define coherence as the aspect of text which 'concerns the ways in which the components of the TEXTUAL WORLD, i.e. the configuration of CONCEPTS and RELATIONS which *underlie* the surface text, are *mutually accessible* and *relevant*'.<sup>20</sup> De Beaugrande and Dressler maintain that coherence in text concerns the actualisation process of virtual 'meanings' into actual 'senses'. They view the coherence of text as the 'continuity of senses'. This involves a great deal of work on the part of the reader and the listener because this continuity is attainable only through a process of negotiation between the 'presented knowledge' which the speaker/writer gives in the text and the 'stored knowledge' which the listener/reader has about the world. As de Beaugrande and Dressler suggest the negotiation is between meaning in its virtuality and sense in its actuality.

## **5.2. Metonymy and schema theory**

Schema theory (ST) is one of the theories<sup>21</sup> that look into the nature of how conceptual structures are constructed in the human brain. More generally ST looks at how knowledge structures are organised in the human brain and how they are used in the processing of text. This section tries to establish the relationship between the various modes of knowledge construction in the human brain and the various processes of metonymy to show that our cognition is fundamentally metonymic and that textual knowledge is also metonymically constructed and metonymically interpreted. The chapter will not consider the debates about the validity or otherwise of the various proposed mathematical models of machine intelligence because this is outside the scope of this thesis. What this chapter intends to do, rather, is to investigate the issue of text coherence in its human aspect and relate this to the various metonymic processes, to show that coherence in text is achieved through an interaction between shared

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<sup>20</sup> De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 4).

<sup>21</sup> Other theories also exist, for example frame theory, theory of higher level knowledge structures and script theory see for details Schank and Abelson (1977) De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) and Cook (1989).

knowledge which is metonymically constructed and organised in memory, and inferencing principles that are metonymically motivated.

Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus (1995) provides a three-fold definition of the concept of 'schema':

1. A plan, diagram, or scheme.
2. (In the philosophy of Kant) a rule or principle that enables the understanding to unify experience.
3. Logic. (a) a syllogistic figure. (b) a representation of the form of inference.

The three definitions, it can be noted, are related and they together provide a unified definition of the concept schema in the sense we are concerned with here as representational structure. Schema theory is the theory of mental representation of stereotypical knowledge. It can be argued that schema theory had its origins in the way of thinking known as structuralism and more particularly in the theory of structural psychology known as Gestalt psychology. The major claim of Gestalt psychology is that perception is carried out according to 'gestalt laws of perceptual organisation'. The most important tenets of gestalt psychology as discussed in Koffka (1935) and Wertheimer (1958) are the following:

- 'principle of proximity': this is essentially the principle of adjacency which states that adjacent elements will be perceived as related.
- 'principle of similarity': similar elements tend to be perceived as one element.
- 'principle of closure': perception tends to complete uncompleted figures.
- 'principle of continuation': continuous and not severely interrupted elements will be perceived as wholes.

These laws or principles of perception indicate that perception is essentially metonymic because it is based on cognitive relations of contiguity and association. In fact, under the principle of association which is the basic metonymic principle we could include all the four principles mentioned above. This justifies the choice of the model of schema theory as a framework for this chapter.

De Beaugrande and Dressler maintain that schema theory goes back to Bartlett (1932), who according to van Dijk and Kintsch was 'a psychologist working within the gestalt

tradition'.<sup>22</sup> De Beaugrande and Dressler trace the development of the theory onward in the works of Rumelhart (1975), (1977b); Kintsch (1977b); as well as others.<sup>23</sup> I am not particularly concerned here with the history and development of the theory as this has already been discussed in detail in van Dijk and Kintsch (1983), Schank and Abelson (1977) and Cook (1990) as well as others. What concerns me rather is what the theory postulates and how this relates to the processes of metonymy and to the overall development of a textual model of metonymy. Schema theory postulates that our cognition of the world is essentially holistic.<sup>24</sup> The basic claim of schema theory, as Cook puts it, is 'that a new experience is understood by comparison with a stereotypical version of a similar experience held in memory'.<sup>25</sup> So in a sense there are two processes involved in this cognition. One is accommodation in which the person accommodates a concept or an image or a sound, and structures that image, concept or sound into a stereotype or into a whole with internal coherence. The other process is that of modification in which the person modifies previous concepts or experiences in the light of new experiences. Here he may either reinforce a previous stereotype or modify it to accommodate new data.<sup>26</sup>

It should be noted that schema theory is a theory of human understanding and this applies to the processing of linguistic data as well as to other types of data like the sensory data of smell, taste, sight, etc. Due to the fact that we are able to learn about sensory data other than linguistic data only through language, the linguistic manifestation of our cognition is perhaps the most widely studied phenomenon in schema theory and it is the type that I will be concerned with in this chapter. Schema theory is a pragmatic theory of understanding based on shared knowledge which facilitates the process of inferencing and makes communication possible between

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<sup>22</sup> Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983: 3).

<sup>23</sup> See de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 90).

<sup>24</sup> This obviously contrasts with Rosch's (1975) model of categorisation which is essentially interactionist. There is interaction both ways up and down. From the basic level people generalise to reach superordinates and at the same time they also make discriminations to make subordinates.

<sup>25</sup> Cook (1990: 1).

<sup>26</sup> This view was propounded by the Genevan psychologist Jean Piaget (1896-1980) in relation to cognitive development in children.

people. The relationship between schema theory and the textual theory of metonymy is evident in virtue of the following observations.

Schema theory postulates the existence of mental structures called schemas or schemata in the brain, which correspond to the three domains of reality, mind and language. According to Cook 'if an intelligence is to process discourse, it will need language schemata, text schemata and world schemata'.<sup>27</sup> This interdomain nature of schemata is reminiscent of the interdomain nature of metonymy proposed in this thesis. The textual theory of metonymy developed in this thesis also postulates that metonymies are stored as stereotypical representations of language structures and conceptual structures which, once activated, operate in facilitating understanding by means of the conceptual relations they establish in text. As argued above in chapters 2 and 3, metonymy does cross these three domains and provides a coherent understanding of language, epistemology and ontology. I argue here that these schemata as mental structures are essentially metonymic structures because they operate in discourse under metonymic operations of PART FOR WHOLE and WHOLE FOR PART, CAUSE FOR EFFECT and EFFECT FOR CAUSE.

I shall now give an example of how schema theory works in text processing and show how this is related to metonymic processes in text. Schema theory postulates that the mental structures called 'schemata' or 'frames' help us in two ways not only in input processing which is the interpretation process but also in output processing which is the generation process by making our contribution to the discourse concise and relevant. The text in (3) below is interpreted as perfectly meaningful and relevant and thus as coherent because it builds on an assumption of some further knowledge of detail to be supplied by our knowledge store.

3. *I got up, washed, had breakfast and left for work.*

The four actions mentioned in (3) above can be termed 'global actions' not merely specific actions because each of these global actions involves several other sub-actions that we do not need to mention because they are supplied by our conceptual structure of previous experience. So each of the four actions mentioned in text (3) above stands for the sub-actions involved in a metonymic relation of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT via a PART FOR WHOLE metonymic relation.

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<sup>27</sup> Cook (1990: 7-8).

Now our understanding of the statement depends on our activation of this global knowledge of the everyday-routine of getting up, and in fact any further detail of the specifics of this knowledge structure would be regarded as redundant. The same thing applies to the acts of washing, having breakfast and leaving for work. This concision and compactness in language is a precise operation of metonymic reasoning. This whole/part metonymic relation is the default case of both generating and interpreting text. However, there is also the unmarked form of these two processes. For example, if the originator of the above is a witness in court of a road accident, the last global action of 'leaving for work' would not be sufficient because the judge will most likely interrupt the flow of the text and ask the witness to mention the details of the action. She might be asked to give further details whether she went to work alone or with someone else and whether she took the bus, taxi, underground and so on.

All these schematic operations of knowledge structures are nothing but metonymic operations of the part for the whole and the converse of this process and they function in activating shared knowledge so as to rid communication of redundancy or in fact to give metonymic details if need be. If further in the text we encounter the phrase 'the bed' with the definite article 'the', we would not be surprised simply because this has been activated via the 'getting up' schema. Similarly, if the phrase 'the car' or any other mode of transport is mentioned in the definite we will not ask 'which car?' because this is supplied by our 'going to work' schema. This is essentially a process of part/whole metonymic reasoning. This chapter argues that much of the coherence of text is heavily dependent on the recognition of metonymic relations underlying the surface structure of the text.

The fact that metonymy is essentially representational operating through a 'stand for' relation provides ample evidence that metonymy is strongly linked to the notion of schemata. Moreover, the claim that 'the mind, stimulated either by key linguistic items in the text (often referred to as triggers'), or by the context, activates a schema, and uses it to make sense of the discourse'<sup>28</sup> is very supportive of the strong relationship between metonymy and schema theory. The word 'pen' in example (4) below

4. *The pen is mightier than the sword*

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<sup>28</sup> Cook (1990: 7).

is a trigger of the schema of 'knowledge' of which the 'pen' is a part or perhaps an instrument with which it is in a stand-for relation by virtue of stereotypical cultural association. Schema theory proposes that knowledge is structured around global structures in our brains corresponding to what different writers term either plans, goals, frames, scripts or scenarios. Once this global pattern is activated then the details can be left unmentioned because they will be supplied by the schematic structure in our cognition. The various components of one version of schema theory which is the SPGU (Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding) model of Schank and Abelson (1977) testify to the strong linkage that I intend to establish between this version of the theory and metonymic processes in text.

Bartlett's schema theory is often confused with Minsky's frame theory and Schank and Abelson's script theory. It should be pointed out that there is a great deal of terminological confusion and phenomenal overlap between these theories since all of them are set up to deal with more or less the same phenomena, i.e. to account for knowledge structures and to understand the processing and production of texts. This overlap in terminology is typical of the rapidly expanding discipline of linguistics which began in the 1970s to cover various new areas not trodden before especially in the field of computational linguistics. Sometimes the war of terminology conceals a failure to achieve substantial success in the investigation of phenomena.


There are also of course obvious differences between all of these terms. These differences will be addressed in various sections of this chapter. Nevertheless, it is generally the case that these theories all agree on a general premise, which is as Maida states, that 'modules of knowledge impose coherence on experience'.<sup>29</sup> Whether we submit to a frame theory, schema theory or a script theory or to them all together, or in fact to any other approach in the field, the outcome will still be the same as far as metonymy is concerned. This is because the same premise still holds for all of these theories that metonymy is essentially knowledge-based and is systematically structured and causally and contiguously triggered. With respect to the problem of terminology it should be noted that this chapter adopts the general term 'schema theory' to designate 'the theory of mental representation of knowledge structures'. For the subsystems of mental structure the chapter follows the division provided by Schank and Abelson

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<sup>29</sup> Cf. Maida, Anthony S. (1987: 302).

(1977) in the SPGU. The chapter also incorporates terms from de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) especially those pertaining to schemata. With regard to the notion of frames this mainly draws from the discussion outlined by Maida (1987).

As far as the specific terms are concerned there is quite a lot of disagreement about terminology in the literature on schema theory. Some scholars, like Schank and Abelson (1977), talk about scripts, plans and goals as crucial components of the theory. De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) discuss a general notion which they call 'global patterns' under which they include frames, schemata, plans, goals and scripts. Other terms like scenarios, stereotypes and prototypes have also been suggested.<sup>30</sup> Instead of pursuing the debates and arguments of the proponents of one term or the other I shall adopt a different attitude towards the classification and attempt to integrate these terms in a unified treatment of knowledge structure that also reflects my conception of metonymy both as an aspect of knowledge and an aspect of pragmatic application of this knowledge in text. The following diagram shows my proposed classification of knowledge in memory and relates this to theoretical aspects of metonymy.



**Figure 5.1. A unified model of knowledge structures.**

<sup>30</sup> See for example Sowa (1984) and Minsky (1975).

The diagram above shows that we can conceptualise knowledge structures in memory as comprising two major modules. One is the module of entities or the storage of conceptual items each with its own specifications. We also can call these the module of words. The second is the procedural model of stringing together. We can call this also the module of rules of sequencing and combination.<sup>31</sup> Here the conceptual items are actually combined in various modes to make up models and networks of knowledge structures, i.e. thought. The model refers to the first module as the knowledge of the 'what' and gives it the quality of being descriptive, while it refers to the second module as the knowledge of the 'how' and deems it procedural. According to this model, frames and schemata are actually the same thing because they both pertain to description of states and conceptual categories. These are assumed to exist in memory in architectural structures based on a hierarchy or some other forms of contiguity like causality and association. From now on whenever the word 'schemata' is used it will refer to both schemata and frames.

In my discussion of all these components of our schematic knowledge I shall therefore treat schemata and frames as two aspects pertaining to the same phenomenon, which is the knowledge of things or entities. By the same token I shall also treat scripts and scenarios as pertaining to the realm of experience and sequenced events. However as the model shows they will be treated separately because they pertain to two different types of sequenced events; one is conventional and the other is arbitrary. With regard to plans and goals I argue that they explain the arbitrariness of the scenario. Therefore, I shall discuss these two aspects separately to show the subtle differences between them and how they both give explanation to arbitrary scenarios.

Due to the fact that scenarios are essentially arbitrary they do not show any internal coherence because of their very nature as creative and inventive. Goals, therefore, give this internal coherence to these scenarios and plans serve to realise specific procedures to achieve specific goals in the scenario. As for prototypes and stereotypes I have placed them at the bottom of the model in order to show that both of these terms account for a characterisation of the specific features of each of the two paradigms in the model. I argue that frames and schemata are established via the interaction with prototypical knowledge and that scripts and scenarios are established by means of stereotypical

knowledge. More of this discussion shall be provided in the sections which treat the relationship between metonymy and these two concepts sections 5.3- 5.7. The double headed arrows in the model indicate the interactive nature of the model and the dialectic relationship between its components. None of these components operates in isolation.

Let me now outline the theoretical aspects that relate this model of knowledge in general and language and cognition to metonymy. The two modules of knowledge postulated correspond to the structural notions 'paradigmatic' and 'syntagmatic'. These are believed to underlie all linguistic and cultural behaviour. The link between the model and metonymy is evident when we know that metonymic processes are based on these fundamental notions. First, the word/concept/thing is selected from a paradigm and then a syntagmatic relation is abstracted between the item substituted and the item substituted for. These syntagmatic relations are based on the two principles of contiguity and causality. The descriptive module of knowledge in the model above is actually the paradigmatic level where knowledge is stored in the form of entities and objects. The procedural module outlined in the model above corresponds to the syntagmatic level where, after the selection, entities and objects are stringed and combined. More importantly the model above captures the two fundamental metonymic principles, i.e. that of contiguity and causality. I relate schemata and frames to the metonymic principle of contiguity because I argue that descriptive knowledge is contiguously stored because it makes use of conventional knowledge of how things are structured mainly through category membership relations of part/whole and adjacency relations. I also argue that arbitrary knowledge is made coherent only through the metonymic principle of causality which involves intentions and interests, plans, scenarios and goals. Hence conventional knowledge is made meaningful through contiguity relationships and arbitrary knowledge is made coherent through causality relationships. These are fundamentally metonymic.

### **5.3. metonymy and schemata**

In the previous section I discussed the notion 'schema theory' but I did not specifically address the concept schemata. What are schemata, how do they operate in text understanding and how are they related to metonymic operations in text processing?

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<sup>31</sup> The two terms 'words' and 'rules' are generally based on a recent public lecture by Pinker. The terms also appear in his book *Words and Rules* (1999).

This section attempts to provide an answer to these questions. As I mentioned earlier the coinage of the notion of schema is usually attributed to Bartlett who maintains that:

schema refers to an active organisation of past reactions or of past experiences which must always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organic response. That is, whenever there is any order or regularity of behaviour, a particular response is possible only because it is related to other similar responses which have been serially organised, yet which operate, not simply as individual members coming one after another, but as a unitary mass.<sup>32</sup>

We notice a great deal of behaviouristic thinking and terminology in the quotation from Bartlett. The definition revolves around certain behavioural and observable concepts like reactions, responses, experiences and mass. Yet the definition is obviously a detailed account of the concept of schemata especially when it relates it to the notion of experience. This shows that Bartlett is using the term in a general sense to mean the general knowledge structure which pertains to both object organisation and to sequences of events and actions. It should be noted however that the notion of schemata developed in this chapter is different from Bartlett because it is limited to the set of objects and entities activated by a part/whole or whole/part metonymic reasoning.

Rumelhart defines the concept of schema as

an abstract cognitive representation of a generalised concept or situation. A schema contains, as part of its specification, the network of interrelations that characterise the major constituents of the situation or concept in question.<sup>33</sup>

The first thing that we notice in the definition is the cognitive orientation, unlike Bartlett's definition which is behavioural. This actually explains each work within its predominant intellectual climate. Rumelhart's definition has the same generality as Bartlett's and both definitions differ from the treatment of the notion of schema developed here in the manner explained above. Schema here is treated as the organisation of descriptive knowledge which includes knowledge about objects, entities and concepts.

Cook defines schemata as 'mental representations of typical situations and they are used in discourse processing to predict the contents of the particular situation which the discourse describes'.<sup>34</sup> De Beaugrande and Dressler define schemata as 'global patterns

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<sup>32</sup> Bartlett (1932: 201).

<sup>33</sup> Rumelhart (1977: 290).

<sup>34</sup> Cook (1989: 69).

of events and states in ordered sequences linked by time proximity and causality'.<sup>35</sup> I find Cook's definition more satisfactory than de Beaugrande and Dressler's because it is compatible with the model developed above in section 5.2. Cook actually highlights the specific properties of schemata as mental representations of typical situations and as pertaining to the prediction of the contents rather than the sequence of these contents.

Minsky, the originator of the frame theory, holds a general view of frames which I have regarded here in the model above as the same thing as schemata. Minsky defines the notion of 'frame' as

a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation, like being in a certain kind of living room, or going to a child's birthday party. Attached to each frame are several kinds of information. Some of this information is about how to use the frame. Some is about what one can expect to happen next. Some is about what to do if these expectations are not confirmed.<sup>36</sup>

It is clear that Minsky regards 'frames' as general knowledge structures exactly the same way de Beaugrande and Dressler treat 'global patterns'. This is evident in the fact that Minsky designates these frames to both descriptive and procedural knowledge. Moreover, Minsky's definition of 'frames' is the same as that of de Beaugrande and Dressler's account of schemata. The definitions of schemata and frames provided by de Beaugrande and Dressler on the one hand and Minsky on the other are unsatisfactory as far as my proposed model is concerned. This is because they confuse frames, schemata, plans and scripts and do not allow for a systematic understanding of knowledge structures, which I believe is crucial. In view of this, my model attempts to designate a general term for the higher-level knowledge structures, and propose differences between the parts of this superordinate entity based on epistemological classification of these knowledge structures. According to a more recent argument, language knowledge for example is essentially knowledge of words and knowledge of rules.<sup>37</sup>

It should be noted that de Beaugrande and Dressler's account of the notion of 'frames' is compatible with the model proposed above. They define frames as 'global patterns that contain commonsense knowledge about some central concept, e.g. 'piggy banks',


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<sup>35</sup> De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 90).

<sup>36</sup> Minsky (1975: 212).

'birthday parties', etc. Frames state what things belong together in principle, but not in what order things will be done or mentioned'.<sup>38</sup> Although this proposal agrees with my model with regard to frames as an inventory of entities having categorical specifications, the new element in the model I propose is that it also treats schemas as the same phenomenon. This is something with which de Beaugrande and Dressler would not agree since they treat schemas the same way I treat scripts, i.e. as structures of sequenced events.

Within descriptive knowledge I also discuss a further knowledge structure which concerns the notion of prototypes. This mainly relates to schemata as this latter deals with concepts, entities and objects. This is briefly discussed by de Beaugrande and Dressler<sup>39</sup> under the notion of 'inheritance'<sup>40</sup> which the authors define as 'the transfer of knowledge among items of the same or similar types or subtypes'.<sup>41</sup> The authors suggest three types of inheritance which can be represented in the following three diagrams:



**Figure 5.2. The three types of inheritance.**

The model of inheritance is perhaps a further specification of the notion of frame or schema. This is because it is a natural or a general semantic principle which specifies class membership in the real world or perhaps in the semantic cognitive world. Frames, on the other hand, are more general in this regard in that they account for class

<sup>37</sup> See for further details of this proposal Pinker (1999).

<sup>38</sup> De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 90).

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. (91).

<sup>40</sup> De Beaugrande and Dressler's notion of inheritance is very closely related to the notion of prototypes discussed by Rosch (1975) and the notion of 'best example' discussed by Ungerer and Schmid (1996).

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

membership in a pragmatic sense in which not only are the semantic relations of inclusion and exclusion involved in class identification, but also some other pragmatic factors which bring together textual worlds that are otherwise unrelated and which bear on the process of text generation, organisation and interpretation.

So in this section we are actually introduced to a specific type of mental structure. This describes entities and specifies their category membership or other contiguous associations between these entities or concepts. This is expressed in metonymic terms as specifying the concepts' part/whole relationships and other causal and associative relations between these concepts. We are not however in the realm of time- and context-bound and sequenced events to which I designate the term scripts. The notion of scripts is an issue which will be dealt with in section 5.4. in this chapter. A good example of a schema would be a 'city' schema which involves several small parts contributing to this global pattern; once this higher level knowledge structure is triggered the whole schema is activated.

Schemata also help us localise our perception and understanding. In fact, this is a common technique used by the cinema industry. Some films start a particular scene by zooming in on the visual space and hence the cognition space from the whole to the part in a consecutive series of whole/part movements. In these films the scene begins with a global shot of the whole city, then it zooms down to one block, further to one street, further to one house and further to one room. This metonymic movement is exploited to facilitate the audience involvement and emphasise the gestalt or holistic perception. This corresponds to the notion of 'universe of discourse' in discourse analysis and it aims to tell the receiver that every thing said or seen in this particular episode should be interpreted within the global shot which the scene started with.

Schemata are also useful in a more practical sense. They help us in keeping to the maxims of cooperation in conversation. Of paramount importance among these maxims are the maxims of quantity and relevance. If we give more information than expected we might be interpreted as being facetious and demeaning the intelligence of our audience. It is for this reason that Arab and western rhetoricians equally define eloquence as brevity. Schemata help us to maintain a friendly atmosphere with the audience because we are not being monotonous and boring.

Schemata help us in recovering ambiguities of reference in text and in resolving problems of definiteness. Consider example (5) below:

5. *The time was running fast and the train was due in half an hour. The weather was also very bad. We had to call a taxi. The driver was an old man who could not help very much with the luggage.*

In example (5) we find that the noun phrase (NP) 'the driver' and the (NP) 'the luggage' are definite. This is not compatible with pedagogical grammatical rules which dictate that a noun phrase cannot be definite unless it is one of its kind or it has been mentioned previously in the text and thus made known to the receiver. However, a textual model of metonymy resolves the problem via the schematic knowledge of part/whole relationships. Metonymy as a schematic representation of knowledge states that the schema of 'taxi' consists of a driver as an essential part of it. So it is plausible to maintain that the definiteness of the NP 'the driver' is cognitively justified and the concept 'driver' is made available to the reader even before encountering it in the text because it is salient in the universe of this particular textual world. Similarly, the 'train' schema activates a 'travel schema' which guarantees that the NP 'the luggage' is supplied, thus making it definite.

Classical Arabic grammatical treatises address this issue by postulating a sort of semiotic treatment of it. The phenomenon is known as *al al-'ahdiyyah* which can be roughly translated as the 'al of knowledge (or familiarity)' because definiteness in Arabic is realised via the definite article *al*. Arab grammarians were puzzled by this phenomenon of a noun appearing with *al* when it has not been mentioned earlier in the text, and is not one of its kind or a generic noun. They dealt with it by postulating that there are actually three modes of definiteness. In a sense they dealt with the concept of definiteness from the three domains of epistemology, ontology and language. Ibn Hishām (d. 1360) says: '*al* might also function as a definite article and as such it is of two types: knowledge-based *al* and generic *al*'.<sup>42</sup>

Hasan provides a more detailed definition of *al al-'ahdiyyah*. He states that '*al al-'ahdiyyah* is the *al* which attaches to an indefinite noun and adds to it a definite aspect capable of making the referent of this noun definitely identifiable in cases where it

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<sup>42</sup> Ibn Hishām (n.d.: 49).

would otherwise be general and unspecified'.<sup>43</sup> Hasan also discusses the other type of definite *al* which, like Ibn Hishām, he calls the generic *al* and defines it as 'the *al* which attaches to the indefinite to give it the meaning of a genus without implying knowledge'.<sup>44</sup> This is in contradiction with another view that Ibn Hishām mentions about the difference between the generic *al* and the knowledge-based *al*. This holds that the generic *al* is also used to identify the knowledge-based *al*. This is because generic nouns are also known in cognition and they are distinct from each other.<sup>45</sup>

What concerns us here in this section is the knowledge-based *al* (the *al al-'ahdiyyah*) This is of three types. The first type is that which is termed *al al-ma'hüdatu dhikriyyan*,<sup>46</sup> i.e. *al* which is known by means of it being mentioned in the text. This can be more idiomatically translated into the 'textually known' *al*. Among the examples Ibn Hishām provides for this category are the following Qur'anic verses:

6. *Kamä 'arsalnä ilä fir'awna rasülan fa'asä fir'awnu al-rasüla.* The Qur'an (73:15-16).<sup>47</sup>
7. *Allähu nürü al-samäwäti wa al-'ardh mathalu nürihi kamishkätin fihä mişbähun al-mişbähu fi zujäjah.* The Qur'an (24: 35).<sup>48</sup>

As can be seen in the two verses above we have the noun *rasül* 'messenger' mentioned twice. The first is without *al* and the second with *al*. The first is indefinite and the second is definite by virtue of the fact that it has been mentioned in previous text. This is the reason that Arab grammarians termed this type of definiteness or this type of *al* as *al-ma'hüdatu dhikriyyan*. Among the secular examples Ibn Hishām gives for this type of *al* is example (8)

8. *'ishtaraytu farasan thumma bi'tu al-faras.*<sup>49</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Hasan (n.d. : 423).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. (425).

<sup>45</sup> See for further details Ibn Hishām (50).

<sup>46</sup> This is also called *al-'ahad al-dhikri* see for example Hasan (n.d. 420).

<sup>47</sup> 'As we sent down a messenger to the Pharaoh, but Pharaoh disobeyed the messenger'.

<sup>48</sup> 'Allah is the Light of the heavens and earth. The likeness of His Light is that of a niche within it a lamp. The lamp is in glass'.

<sup>49</sup> I bought a horse. Then I sold the horse.

This type of *al* is essentially cohesive by the virtue of being textual or formal, i.e. explicitly stated in the text. However, the link is fundamentally semantic and cognitive because it is a process of cognitive derivation of the aspect of specificity by means of mentioning the noun twice to familiarise the reader with its reference. There is an interaction of signification between the two worlds of form and things and this is mediated by the world of concepts. So in one type of semiotic domain of signification we can actually perceive of all the three domains at play.

The second type is that which they call *al al-ma 'hüdatu dhihniyyan*,<sup>50</sup> i.e. *al* which is known by means of it being present in the cognition of the interlocuters or by virtue of the fact that it is well established in the universe of discourse. This could be idiomatically translated as 'the cognitively known' *al*. Here Arab grammarians explicitly refer to the existence of the thing in the cognition of both the speaker/hearer or writer/reader. Ibn Hishäm gives two Qur'anic verses as examples of *al al-dhihniyyah*.

9. *'idh humä fi al-ghäri*. The Qur'an (9: 40).<sup>51</sup>

10. *'idh yubäyi 'ünaka tahta al-shajarahi*. The Qur'an (48: 18).<sup>52</sup>

The nouns *ghär* 'cave' and *shajarah* 'tree' are definite in both examples even though they are not mentioned earlier in the text. Arab grammarians argue that both are deemed definite by virtue of the fact that they are salient in the cognitive domain of the discourse. In short they are present in the minds of the receivers.

However, this is not an adequate explanation because the question is how are they made present in the receivers minds? I think that both occurrences of *ghär* 'cave' and *shajarah* 'tree' in examples (9) and (10) pertain to the first type of *al* which is the textual *al*. Although it is true that both nouns are not mentioned previously in the text, i.e. in the Qur'an, there is no way that they can be cognitively constructed from nowhere. One could argue that the schema of travelling which is the topic of example (9) which pertains to the migration of the Prophet Mohammed and his friend Abu Bakr from Makka to Madina activates the slot 'cave' and thus makes 'cave' definite. If we think in this way, however, our argument will be rather weak because a travelling

<sup>50</sup> Compare the concept of *al- 'ahad al-dhihni* in Ibn Hishäm (p: 50).

<sup>51</sup> 'When they were in the cave'

<sup>52</sup> 'When they gave you their allegiance under the tree.'

schema does not necessarily involve a slot of a cave even if this travelling schema is culturally specified to travelling in Arabia.

My claim then is that this *al* is textual and not cognitive because both nouns, i.e. 'cave' and 'tree' are made definite by virtue of the fact that they have been mentioned in other texts, i.e. the history of the Prophet which tells us that he and his friend stayed for three nights in a cave called the Cave of Thawr between Makka and Madina. Without this textual information we would find difficulty in understanding the definiteness of the word 'cave'. The same thing applies to the word 'tree'. If we were not told in another text, i.e. the history of the Prophet, that the allegiance took place under a tree we would find it difficult to explain the definiteness of the noun 'tree'.

Hasan<sup>53</sup> provides some examples which I find interesting as far as cognitive *al* is concerned. The examples include:

11. *'indamä yas'alu tälibun zamīlahu: ma al-jadīdu fī al-kullīyyati?*<sup>54</sup>
12. *hal katabta al-muhādharah*<sup>55</sup>
13. *hal 'anta dhāhibun'ila al-bayt*<sup>56</sup>

The words *kullīyyah* 'college', *muhādharah* 'lecture' and *bayt* 'house' are definite because they are present in the cognition of the two participants in the discourse and not because they are previously mentioned in the text or because they are present in the situation of the discourse. Nevertheless, one could argue that the definiteness of these nouns in the examples is justified on the grounds of schematic knowledge that the two individuals have. This is the schema of 'studying' which involves a college, a lecture and much more than this. As regards the third example it is easily accounted for by means of a 'studying script' which involves the sequenced actions that are stereotypical of this life situation. We would expect a student finishing college to go to his house.

The third type of *al* is what the Arab grammarians call *al al-ma'hiyatu hudhūriyyan*,<sup>57</sup> i.e. *al* which is known by means of it being present in the physical context of the

<sup>53</sup> Hasan (n.d. 50).

<sup>54</sup> What is new in the college? Said by a student asking his classmate.

<sup>55</sup> Did you write down the lecture.

<sup>56</sup> Are you going to the house?

utterance. The item or entity is existent in the situation of discourse. This could be idiomatically translated as 'the existential' *al* and conventionally as 'the ontological *al*'. It might also be referred to as the exophorical *al*, by which is meant that the thing referred to is a salient entity in the context of situation of discourse. Ibn Hishām gives the following examples of this type of *al*.

14. *yä 'ayyuha al-rajul*<sup>58</sup>

15. *kharajtu fa'idha al-'asadu*.<sup>59</sup>

The argument Ibn Hishām raises concerning these two examples is that the first is definite by virtue of it coming after a vocative and the deictic 'you'. Both the vocative and the deictic are strong indices to the fact that the referent is known by it being present in the physical context. This also applies to the second example which has the deictic expression 'there'. Hasan<sup>60</sup> provides another example highlighting the role of contextual factors in this type of *al*.

16. *'inda ru'yatu kätibin mumsikin bi qalamin fi yadihi taqūlu, al-waraqah, taqsidu khudhi al-waraqah al-hädhirah fi maqämi al-hadith*.<sup>61</sup>

Hasan argues that these utterances are made definite by means of the circumstantial factors surrounding the speech event. In the first example the situation makes the paper known because it is existent in the situation. The three modes of definiteness in the Arabic grammatical scholarship again correspond to three domains of knowledge. The domain of language is represented by the *al al-dhikriyyah*, the domain of things and objects is represented by the *al al-hudhuriyyah*, and finally the domain of concepts is represented by the *al al-dhihniyyah*. This corresponds to my overall argument of metonymy as a representational relation connecting the world of concepts, the world of words and the world of things.

As I have mentioned earlier the terms 'schema' and 'frame' are both generally used to denote knowledge structures in memory. Thus we encounter uses like schematic representation of knowledge which roughly means general conceptual representation of

<sup>57</sup> Compare the concept of *al- 'ahad al-hudhuri* in Ibn Hishām (p: 50).

<sup>58</sup> O you the man!

<sup>59</sup> I went out, and there was the lion.

<sup>60</sup> Hasan (425).

<sup>61</sup> Upon seeing a writer holding a pen in his hand, you say: 'the paper', meaning 'take the paper', which is present in the context of the speech.

knowledge. This should not concern us because I have already specified what I mean by schemata and frame with respect to the scope of this thesis. Since I have argued above that frames are actually schemata, what is said about schemata equally applies also to frames. As we can talk of a city schema we can also talk about a city frame. We can also talk about a room frame, supermarket frame, hospital frame and school frame and so on and so forth. All these types of knowledge structures include knowledge about the contents of these domains as referred to in Cook's definition. In fact, if we go back to the originator of frame theory, Marvin Minsky, we find the ultimate legitimacy for our conception of schemata and frames as descriptive and designating contents and entities or concepts. The classical example of a frame given by Minsky himself consists of an imaginary anecdote describing the experience of seeing a room. In his illustration of this perception and expectation experience Minsky describes an interactionist model of frame activation, assimilation and modification.<sup>62</sup> We are made to believe that the expectations and perceptions all pertain to the realm of entities which we expect to see in the room. This equally applies to the world of language. It is not limited to the realm of vision but also to the realm of language processing which is the expression of these visual experiences.

It should be noticed that metonymy operates in the realm of schemata and frames in both directions. That is from the particular to the general or what is referred to in metonymic terms as from the part to the whole and vice versa. So if we encounter a text which relies on mentioning wholes or generalities and leaving the reader to supply the details from his schematic memory, then we perceive this text as coherent simply because the details are taken to be given and known. Usually metonymic networks operate on both directions in the same text and this is what gives coherence to this text. For an example of a text that depends heavily on metonymic reasoning for its coherence and unity in terms of its details, consider the following example of an office schema from an introductory part of a crime story after Van Dijk<sup>63</sup>:

17. *Clare Russell came into the Clarion office on the following morning, feeling tired and depressed. She went straight to her room, took off her hat, touched her face with a powder puff and sat down at her desk. Her mail was spread out neatly, her*


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<sup>62</sup> C.f. Minsky (1975: 221-222).

<sup>63</sup> Van Dijk (1977: 98).


*blotter was snowy and her inkwell was filled. But she didn't feel like work. She pushed the mail away and stared out of the window.*

In this example we have two types of schemata. The first is the office schema which is triggered by the word 'office' giving naturalness to the parts of this schema and making them easier to interpret in relation to the general pattern. The second is the person schema of Clare Russell herself. For the first type we could have this metonymic model of coherence:




**Figure 5.3. The office schema model in text 17.**

The second model is that of the person of Clare Russell herself which can be represented as follows:



**Figure 5.4. The person schema model in text 17.**

Actually the text fuses both schemata in one to suggest unity between the person and the office and work. The coherently combined schema is represented in the diagram below:



**Figure 5.5. A combination of the two models in text 17.**

In this example we find the frame or schema of an office activated, the details being supplied by our prototypical knowledge of offices, e.g. that they contain desks, mail trays, inkwells and so on. So in this example we have the global pattern activated and some of the details mentioned as if known. As such the text is perceived as a unified whole describing a schematic representation that we construct as soon as we encounter the word 'office'. The same thing applies to other types of schemata. For example in a school schemata we would normally expect teachers, tables, chairs, blackboard, chalk, and depending on when and where this school is contextualised we could also have some other elements of what constitutes a school like computers, overhead projectors and televisions, etc.

The above are examples of texts in which the whole is mentioned and some of the details are also mentioned but in which the interpretation of these details is made easy by means of the activation of the global pattern. As I argued above, metonymy functions both ways and in the following we shall see how parts of a frame or a schema could actually make it easy for us to work out the whole and perceive of the context of the text. In the following text for example the context is a kitchen and by mentioning some details of this schema we are able to go from the specific to the general even before we actually reach the mention of the word 'kitchen' which comes only late in the passage. The text is from *Like Water for Chocolate* (1992: 9) by Laura Esquivel:

18. *Take care to chop the onion fine. To keep from crying when you chop it (which is annoying), I suggest you place a little bit on your head. The trouble with crying over an onion is that once the chopping gets you started and the tears begin to well up, the next thing you know you just can't stop.*

As soon as we encounter the expression 'chop the onion' the schema of a 'kitchen' is activated. The text actually uses the word 'kitchen' a few lines later only as a qualifier of the word 'table' and not as a headword and with further parts of this schema. The text describes the birth of a baby called Tita as follows:

19. *Tita was so sensitive to onions, any time they were being chopped, they say she would just cry and cry; when she was still in my great-grandmother's belly her sobs were so loud that even Nacha, the cook, who was half-deaf, could hear them easily. Once her wailing got so violent that it brought on an early labour. And before my great-grandmother could let out a word or even a whimper, Tita made her entrance into this world, prematurely, right there on the kitchen table amid the smells of simmering noodle soup, thyme, bay leaves and coriander, steamed milk, garlic and of course onion.*

We can see from this text that the parts could easily signify the whole and this part/whole signification provides unity and ensures that expectations are met. Even the digression to the issue of Tita being in her mother's belly and the explanation of her birth does not actually obstruct the functional continuity of our schema because this digression is, as it were, a sub-schema functioning to give further explanation of the superschema. This is more obvious in schema interaction and interplay with other cognitive mechanisms like scripts, plans and goals, which will be the subject of subsequent sections of this chapter (sections 5.4-5.7). One particularly interesting aspect that can be raised here is the use of the deictic expression 'there' in *right there on the kitchen table*. This shows that there is actually strong reason to believe that the 'kitchen schema' is not only supplying all the details but also making them concrete in the mind of the receiver. Such an extralinguistic ontological reference can be understood because the 'kitchen schema' is so pervasive in our cognition as text receivers that the deictic and exophoric reference is easily resolved.


Example (20) below is a narrative text in which I intend to show how metonymic details establish cognitive structures and create cognitive models of text processing:

20. *In the town there were two mutes, and they were always together. Early every morning they would come out from the house where they lived and walk arm in arm down the street to work. The two friends were very different. The one who always steered the way was an obese and dreamy Greek. In the summer he would come out wearing a yellow or green polo shirt stuffed sloppily into his trousers in front and hanging loose behind. When it was colder he wore over this a shapeless grey sweater. His face was round and oily, with half-closed eyelids and lips that curved in a gentle, stupid smile. The other mute was tall. His eyes had a quick, intelligent expression. He was always immaculate and very soberly dressed. Every morning the two friends walked silently together until they reached the main street of the town. Then when they came to a certain fruit and candy store they paused for a moment on the sidewalk outside. The Greek, Spiros Antonopoulos, worked for his cousin, who owned this fruit store. His job was to make candies and sweets, uncrate the fruits, and to keep the place clean. The thin mute, John Singer, nearly always put his hand on his friend's arm and looked for a second into his face before leaving him. Then after this good-bye Singer crossed the street and walked on alone to the jewellery store where he worked as a silverware engraver.*<sup>64</sup>

The first thing that attracts us in this text is the metonymic representation of the referential relation of the type CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT to ensure unity and continuity of reference in text. Let me show how these referential relations are established by means of metonymic structuring which is largely schematic mapping forms onto concepts and things, i.e. the forms of pronominal reference stand in metonymic representational relationship with its signified concepts and referents of this referential expressions. The following is an illustration of how these referential relations are actually metonymically structured.

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<sup>64</sup>From Carson McCuller (1961: 7).




**Figure 5.6. Metonymic referential relations in text 20.**

The diagram above shows how we can perceive of referential networks in text as essentially metonymic building up cognitive models of whole/part and part/whole relations which provide unity and coherence to text. One particularly interesting aspect of text coherence that this text shows is that it seems that there is a process of textual transformation in terms of the knowledge allocation to particular elements in the text.

This is a phenomenon that is more especially apparent in texts with cataphoric reference as is the case in the text above where the description and the use of pronouns and common nouns actually precede proper nouns. Once the receiver of the text reaches the point where proper names are mentioned s/he seems to make a transformation in which the name then replaces the descriptions by pronouns, nouns and adjectives that preceded the proper name. This textual strategy seems to be vital to assist interpretation and resolve ambiguity in text interpretation.

Another aspect of cognitive connectivity in the above text is found in the organisation of schematic knowledge of the physical setting of the text. The text is anchored in the situational context of a town. The following diagram shows the set of metonymic relations present in the text with regard to the schema of a town.




**Figure 5.7. Metonymic relations within the town schema in text 20.**

It is clear from the above illustration that the schema of the contextual background of the text determines the progression of the text. The diagram shows a remarkable balance in the schematic structure of the concept of 'street' in terms of the details given to each of the two participants' type of job. In the top left-hand corner of the diagram we have the schema 'house' which stands alone in the schematic structure. This indicates that the house is not a significant element in the generation and organisation of this text. It serves a minor function in the production of the text in that it provides the text with a point of departure from which to start. This allows the camera eye of the text to move away from this point out to describe the outside world, i.e. the street and the two people in question. Just as syntactic structures are represented in the generative tradition using

tree diagrams, one can argue that textual structures can be similarly represented. Cognitively speaking the head of this text is the schema 'street' which further sub-branches, yielding a right-branching diagram. In syntactic terms, the schema 'house' is a non-head element and therefore it does not further sub-categorise for any other elements.

One can actually go on and on in the description of several types of schemata activated in the reading of this text. Where one stops basically depends on the level of delicacy that one adopts and the level of detail one wishes the analysis to account for. Therefore, I shall limit myself here to presenting one more schematic representation pertaining to the characteristics of the two people involved in the text. For the sake of reference I shall present a somewhat surface structure representation of this text taking into consideration the process of transformation that I have mentioned in the above model. This process actually takes the element 'proper names' and puts it at the beginning of the text in order to make the interpretation clearer and the processing easier. In the following diagram straight lines indicate direct metonymic relations and curved lines indicate indirect metonymic relations.



**Figure 5.8 Metonymic relations within the characters' schema.**

It is noticeable from the diagram above that in cognitive domains we do not have regular patterns like those in linguistic domains especially if the schemata are employed to realise certain plans to achieve certain goals. For example, in the domain of language

we have those languages which are left branching and those languages which are right branching, depending on the place of the head in relation to other elements in the structure. In cognitive structure, however, the branching is determined by the intentions of the originator of the message and the requirements of the context. On some occasions we have right branching and on other occasions we have left branching. Model 5.8. above shows left branching and this suggests that Spiros Antonopoulos could be the main character or element of the narrative, hence a detailed description about his physical appearance and his clothes. It seems as if these features have special bearing on the development of the plot of the narrative. One should, however, be very careful in making such a generalisation especially in the field of literature where one's schemata are not always satisfied and one's expectations not always met. This is due to the fact that literary language relies heavily on defamiliarisation<sup>65</sup> which basically means shocking the receiver by deviating from his established schematic knowledge.

It should be noted that this detailed description is based on metonymic details and relies on parts forming wholes or wholes categorising their parts. By contrast, in the description of the other 'mute', i.e. John Singer, we have only wholes without mentioning parts. Apart from the concept 'eye' there is a remarkable tendency to use general terms in the description of Singer. For example, the concept 'tall' which suggests that his body is tall and this in turn by implication suggests that he has long legs, long arms and long fingers and so on. All these details are not mentioned but our schema of 'someone who is tall' supplies them. With regard to his clothes again the general approach is adopted in their description. Apart from telling us that he was always immaculate and very soberly dressed we actually have no idea about the details of his clothes. However, the general schema of someone who is soberly dressed will supply plausible details. In both cases whether that of the detailed description or that of the general description, cognition is aided by metonymic reasoning of the synthetic and analytic structural relations between wholes and parts, and is assisted by metonymic understanding of cognitive movements between this structural network.

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<sup>65</sup> The concept of defamiliarisation is a central notion in Formalist Criticism propounded by the Russian school of linguistics and Poetics. For details of the school and the concept see Havranek (1932), Mukarovsky (1932), Shklosvsky (1917) and Fowler (1996).

#### **5.4. metonymy and scripts**

As the model of knowledge in section 5.2. above shows the concept of scripts lies at the heart of our stereotypical and conventional knowledge. This means that scripts are mental structures of stereotypical knowledge of events. What is meant by the word 'stereotypical' is that the knowledge is conventionally available to the individual by means of cultural saliency. Dyer et al define the concept of script as 'a knowledge structure containing a stereotypic sequence of actions'.<sup>66</sup> They continue 'scripts encode culturally shared knowledge of stereotyped actions that occur in socially ritualized activities, such as going to stores, restaurants, and museums; riding trains and subways; attending plays and banquets; and playing games or driving cars'.<sup>67</sup> Two important points can be said about the definition of scripts provided by Dyer et al. The first one is that they are essentially related to sequenced events and actions and not to entities and content. The second point is that they are culturally shared and thus conventional. These two important aspects distinguish scripts from frames and schemata on the one hand and from scenarios on the other as captured in my model in section 5.2.

Schank and Abelson provide a similar definition to that of Deyer et al emphasising the aspect of a script as a representation of sequenced events. Their definition runs 'a script is a structure that describes an appropriate sequence of events in a particular context'.<sup>68</sup> They further affirm the view of 'scripts being conventional' a view that is also held by Dyer et al and is strongly emphasised in the model I proposed in section 5.2. above. In this regard they maintain that 'scripts handle stylized everyday situations'.<sup>69</sup> Reisbeck & Schank treat a frame as a fundamentally stable set of facts about the world whereas a script is more dynamic in that it accounts for 'a standard sequence of events that describe a situation'.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Dyer et al (1987: 980).

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Schank and Abelson (1977: 41).

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Reisbeck and Schank (1978: 254).

As regards the function of scripts Schank and Abelson argue that 'what scripts do, then, is to provide connectivity'.<sup>71</sup> They provide this connectivity by means of facilitating prediction in text in terms of what sequences of events one should expect, in a restaurant for example. One could imagine the set of actions involved in a restaurant script to start with the customer getting into the restaurant, looking for a table, sitting down, looking at the menu, ordering, eating, paying and then leaving. If one of these acts is not mentioned our scriptal knowledge supplies it.

De Beaugrande and Dressler define scripts as 'stabilised plans called up very frequently to specify the roles of participants and their expected actions'.<sup>72</sup> Although the treatment conflates the notion of scripts with the notion of plans it tells us something important about scripts which we should take into consideration. This is that scripts are not always global patterns of knowledge in the sense that they do not form holistic concepts of stereotypical situations. They are often reduced to the viewer's perspective but they are still universally standard and culturally shared. This means that the script of a restaurant for example, is not homogeneous. Rather it varies according to the person viewing it. A restaurant script of a customer is different from a restaurant script of the cook or the owner of the restaurant. This is to say that the set of actions prescribed for each of the above roles will vary. This point further highlights the need for differentiating between schemata and scripts. While all the above participants will have more or less a unified view of the schema of a restaurant they would have different representations of the roles and actions each one should abide by in the restaurant.

In the example:

21. *I got up, washed and had breakfast.*

There is a great deal of detail that is missed out, and to provide this we rely on metonymic inferencing based on script activation. Each of the three acts involved in the example actually *stands for* a whole series of smaller acts needed to accomplish it. If after this text the following text is encountered:

22. *I was annoyed upon finding out that there was no hot water.*

we would not find a problem interpreting it because this sub-act would be available thanks to the 'washing schema' and to the metonymic relation of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid. (40).

<sup>72</sup> De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 91).

which is based on the metonymic relation of PART FOR WHOLE, which enabled us to construct this schematic representation, and to recover it when the need arose. The script of someone washing activates other detailed scripts in our memory, and one of these being the act of using water to wash. Moreover, this subscript on its own becomes a superscript for further minute detail, which this subscript itself activates. Among these is the subscript that people get irritated if the water is cold when they get up in the morning. However, the washing script itself might be said to be universal because it seems that human beings irrespective of their different cultures, generally wash when they get out of bed. The subscript relating to 'hot water' is not universal because it is quite easy to imagine a world where people do not get irritated if the water is cold in the morning and in fact one could imagine a world where people get irritated if the water is hot. Nonetheless, both types of scripts are still culturally shared and thus they do not lose their autonomy, in contrast with those knowledge structures which are not culturally shared.

I want now to elucidate further the difference I am proposing between a schema and a script. The most important thing about schemata is that they help us predict entities and objects within certain knowledge domains. Scripts, on the other hand, involve more than mere entities. In fact, scripts include these entities in a textured manner. That is they involve them with the action sequence of the whole stereotypical act. Therefore, scripts are more comprehensive than schemata because while the former group involves both entities and actions the latter includes only entities. The treatment I propose for metonymy as a script goes beyond the modern figurative account on metonymy which can be illustrated as follows:

23. *The ham sandwich is getting impatient.*

The lexical view of metonymy deems the treatment of this example as an issue of deferred or shifted reference based on a metonymic process of the type THE THING ORDERED FOR THE PERSON ORDERING THAT THING. However, this treatment of metonymy as a figure of speech, i.e. a lexical phenomenon, fails to capture the power of metonymy as a text organising principle.

Example (23) is not only metonymic in its lexical or referential aspect but is also metonymic in its textually scriptal aspect. The example activates the script of a restaurant. This script tells us that the person who ordered the ham sandwich had already found a table and sat down and perhaps had read the menu. The restaurant script

also tells us that he must have ordered a ham sandwich although the text does not explicitly tell us so. The script similarly tells us that he had been waiting for so long that he was getting impatient, and that he would perhaps not leave a tip or come again to this restaurant. Finally, the script tells us that the person ate a ham sandwich although nowhere in the text is this mentioned. If we gave this example to a reading class and asked them: what did the person eat? The answer would be: he ate a ham sandwich. This information is supplied by our scriptal knowledge because we know that when people order things in a restaurant they eat them. In this way, metonymy has a powerful function in terms of putting the example text in its wider textual context. In fact, this understanding makes the example not only a part of a wider world but renders it the creator of this wider context, thanks to our metonymic understanding. The treatment of example (23) as a lexical phenomenon is not sufficient because it does not tell us why the person is referred to by the thing he ordered. A scriptal metonymic treatment does tell us that the principle of saliency is paramount and is a driving force behind text generation. This is to say that the script of a restaurant and the participant roles within this script make the metonymic use necessary as a form of dehumanising the relation between the customer and the waitress. This is because all that is important for the waitress in this script about Mr. or Mrs. X is that he/she ordered a ham sandwich.

Schank and Abelson argue that scripts are usually invoked by means of certain conceptualisations. These are essentially key elements which activate the whole script. They maintain that there are four types of what they term headers.<sup>73</sup> The first type of script header is the precondition header (PH) and this 'triggers the script reference on the basis of a main script precondition being mentioned in the text'.<sup>74</sup> They claim that (24) for example,

24. *John was hungry*

is a PH for the restaurant script. This gives a chance for the receiver to predict what is going to be said in the next text from the available data in front of him. So upon understanding that John was hungry, we could predict that he is going to try to fulfill a need, which is getting fed. One of the paths in our script for getting fed might be a restaurant. So in this sense the restaurant is metonymically predicted by means of the metonymic relation CAUSE FOR EFFECT. The cause of going to the restaurant which is

<sup>73</sup> See for further detail Schank and Abelson (1977: 48-49).

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

'hunger' stands for the effect of this hunger. Hunger activates and facilitates the prediction of the entity 'restaurant' by means of metonymic causality that can be phrased as 'because he was hungry he went to a place to eat'. This universal knowledge is followed by the option of cultural knowledge. This is the schema of a restaurant with the possibility of other paths in the script. For example the person might go home for a meal or go to a takeaway and eat in the park. Nonetheless, all these paths within the script of 'getting fed' will be activated and it is the progression of the discourse that will either confirm or deviate from each of these paths.

The second type of script header is that which Schank and Abelson call the 'instrumental header' (IH). The authors argue that this type of header comes up in situations where there are usually two or more contexts.<sup>75</sup> The idea is that in such situations where two frames are activated by the script usually one of them is an instrument for the other main frame. In the example which the authors provide 'John took the subway to the restaurant' there are two frames activated. One of them, the subway schema or frame is actually an instrument to achieve the main schema, the restaurant. This conceptualisation of a main header and an instrument header in script organisation is useful in many respects. It helps in predicting the direction and the progression of the discourse and explains how branching is possible in some elements in the script while it might not be in some other elements. It is also useful because it tells us that the progression of the text will dwell much on the main script, i.e. the restaurant in the example above as the target of the text. We expect further elaboration on the 'restaurant script'. The subway script is only instrumental and as such it will not be the main part of the epistemic dimension of the discourse. So, as we can see, certain scripts can be suppressed by the way we expect the discourse to proceed. We expect no more elaboration on the subway script apart from that which has already been mentioned. However, both scripts, i.e. the subway and the restaurant script will be kept open to account for the interpretation of the discourse to come.

The third type of script header is the locale header (LH). This explains the particularly specific types of scripts which as soon as they are mentioned in the text reinforce the retrieval of stereotypical knowledge of certain sequenced and determined actions and events related to that script. Examples of locale headers are schools, hospitals, churches,

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

prisons, museums and so on, where both the entities as well as the set of actions to take place can be easily expected and predicted. However there is a problem here with the activation of a particular script and the various participant roles involved in the script. The best examples of this case are church, hospital and the prison scripts where each one of these would demand a certain specified set of actions to take place.

These actions however will differ according to the role of the participant involved. For example we would expect the behaviour of someone going to church for the sake of performing the service to be radically different from the behaviour of someone visiting the church as a tourist. Similarly, the person going to prison as a criminal is not going to behave as someone going to prison as a visitor. So for the person going to prison as a prisoner we would use the construction,

25. *He went to prison*

whereas for the person going to prison as a visitor we would use the structure

26. *He went to **the** prison.*

The definite article here has the function of specifying the role of the participant and thus characterising the type of script to be activated.

This particular aspect has been formally taken care of by the language and has become a component of the grammar of English in this example. Arabic however does not make this formal distinction with regard to the change of the role of the individual involved by using the definite article, as it is the case in English. However, it seems that Arabic depends heavily on the semantics of the verb to make such a distinction. So

27. *Huwa dhahaba 'ila al-sijn (He went to prison)*

would automatically be interpreted as

28. *He was there as a visitor.*

But

29. *'ukhidha 'ila al-sijn (He was taken to prison)*

would be readily interpreted as

30. *He was taken there as a prisoner.*

Arabic tends to use a completely different verb to show the distinction pertaining to the participant roles. By using two different verbs, Arabic makes use of this potential to provide economy of interpretation and hence to activate one and only one of the two possible scripts. The way the text is constructed in the passive to show that the person involved was in prison as a prisoner is a subtle aspect of the thematic structure of the

semantic system of the Arabic language.

The fourth type of script header is that which Schank and Abelson call the internal conceptualisation header (ICH). The case with the previous type of header is that two types of scripts are activated and depending on the role of the person involved the interpretation is accessed via one of these two scripts. The situation in this case is fairly similar; the person involved has two roles and the text activates both roles but only one is primary to the interpretation of the text. The difference between LH and ICH is that while the ambiguity in the former is disambiguated by means of formal possibilities, i.e. the definite article, the ambiguity in the latter is disambiguated by means of resolving the role pattern of participants in the schema. This is coupled with resorting to the oncoming discourse which further specifies the type of role that should be activated and the type of role that should be suppressed. This is to say it is the progression of the discourse that determines which role is to be activated.

The example of the 'waitress' given by the authors and reproduced here as (31).

31. *John went to visit his friend Mary who was a waitress. While he was waiting for her, he ordered a hamburger*

is characteristic of this situation. The main role of a waitress is to work in restaurants to give orders to the customers. As soon as we encounter the word 'waitress' in a text the metonymic reasoning of PART FOR WHOLE functions to help us access the restaurant schema. However, the case here is quite different because the role of a 'waitress' here is not called up for its main unmarked function, i.e. as a person taking orders in a restaurant, but for its marginal marked function, i.e. as a friend. The mention of this friend as being a waitress is a piece of bypassing information and an internal conceptualisation, thus the restaurant schema is only marginally activated.

Let us imagine that in a text from a novel in Arabic we encounter the word *ma'dhün* which means 'the authorised marriage contracts conductor'. The word *ma'dhün* will automatically activate the script of marriage or wedding. However, depending on the role this particular element, i.e. the *ma'dhün* takes on, the interpretation and the expectation of the progression of the discourse will change. If, for example, we were told in previous discourse that Ahmad had a friend who is a *ma'dhün* and that he was coming to visit him in the house, we would expect that the principal role of this element in the text would be suppressed in favour of the marked role of him as just a friend.

However, we need to keep open the path of a possibility of a marriage contract to be conducted because, we must bear in mind the potential for script deviation that is characteristic of literary language.

As we have seen throughout the discussion of the notion of script, the processes of script activation and text expectation are based on metonymic relations of PART FOR WHOLE, WHOLE FOR PART, CAUSE FOR EFFECT OR EFFECT FOR CAUSE. The reason why this is so is that the actions and sequences in scripts are normally universal or at least culturally shared. So in a sense we have as it were in-built systems for identifying sequences in such scripts without much difficulty because they are part of our being human or being members of social communities. Let me provide here an example showing the role of metonymic reasoning in script activation in another text. This is a poster that was put up some time ago in my department.

32. *Arabic Language/Linguistics/ Literature Seminars*  
*Abdul Gabbar al-Sharafi (research student)*  
*'The Construct in Modern Standard Arabic: NSO Genitive Constructions'*  
*10 March, 1.10 p.m. Seminar Room.*

The above text activates a 'seminar script'. The text as it stands is very fragmented, yet it is perfectly coherent. The text exploits the knowledge that is shared among a specific community to establish coherence links. It is through metonymic reasoning that we actually construct the parts and the sequences of the event. Indeed, the whole text as it stands involves nothing but descriptive knowledge and does not involve any action or account of procedural knowledge. It is our script knowledge that supplies us with the details or the verbs that are missing. Each of the above descriptive concepts suggests a contiguous procedural sequencing of the event at large once the global script of a seminar is activated. A fuller text of the version above might be (33) below:

33. *As a part of the Arabic Language/Linguistics/ Literature Seminars, Abdul Gabbar Al-Sharafi who is a research student will talk on the issue of 'the Construct in Modern Standard Arabic: NSO Genitive Constructions. The talk will be held on the 10<sup>th</sup> of March at 1.10 p.m. in the Seminar Room.*

Scripts facilitate global understanding but they do not perform this function on their own. In fact, scripts become coherent themselves only when our cognition supplies the details of a script or sometimes the logic behind the specific sequencing of events in the script in case of script deviation from our shared knowledge. If this logic of sequencing which is fundamentally causal based on CAUSE FOR EFFECT OR EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymic relations is missing, a script will not be able to function properly in text generation,

organisation and interpretation. Equally if the part for whole reasoning which is essentially metonymic, as we have seen in the various examples in this section, is missing from a script, the whole structure of a script is bound to collapse. This is evident in machine text processing because in case of a machine nothing can be taken for granted and every piece of knowledge must be computed. This shows what a huge amount of knowledge and cognitive reasoning the machine needs to be able to process text. In the case of human processing of text there is usually a considerable amount of underestimation of the powerful processes of organisation and conceptualisation of thought into coherent discourse. I believe metonymy is one of the fundamental principles of thought organisation which makes it possible for this thought to conform to culturally shared scripts. In short, metonymic reasoning of causality and contiguity is a prerequisite for any process of script activation. More importantly, the conception of metonymy as essentially a relation of representation allows for each mode of knowledge to stand for another via contiguity or causality. As we have seen so far in the examples discussed in the previous two sections, metonymy provides mental access that helps us move from one domain of knowledge to another to account for the coherence of discourse.

The notion of causality should not, however, distract us from the fact that scripts represent standard stereotypical situations that are either universally or culturally shared. Such distraction could actually cause a confusion which I want to avoid. If scripts are explainable only through causality then it might be argued that they are not universal or culturally shared, as we have to think always about the cause. However, we should not go too far in stressing the notion of causality here. Causality here still has a universal aspect or at least a culturally shared aspect. In other words we can think of global causality and local causality. So in the example:

34. *Tom was hungry. He went to a restaurant.*

there is a strong causal connection between the two sentences which can be expressed as 'because John was hungry he went to a restaurant'. The point that I want to make is that this notion of causality should not be confused with the concept of scenarios which I am going to discuss in the next section. The reason is that this causality is itself universal because as human beings when we become hungry we look for food. Even the second part of the text is culturally shared because now in many cultures when people are hungry they go to restaurants. On the other hand, the causality pertaining to scenarios is a rather restricted form of causality and this is only explainable by means of other

knowledge structures, i.e. plans and goals.

Consider the following example:

35. *John went to the toilet.*

Here, the script of a toilet is activated but hardly would anyone ask why John went to the toilet because the reason is universally known. It is part of our cultural knowledge that we accumulate throughout our lives. However, there are many actions in our behaviour that are difficult to explain because they are arbitrary and these require a different version of causality to account for them. This is what might be termed personal or contextually bound causality, and it explains certain arbitrary behaviours that do not conform to general stereotypical patterns. An important point that should be made at this stage is that scripts being stereotypically universal or culturally based are quite limited; it seems that the conception of a script as a stereotypical sequence of events leads to the conceptualisation of text processing as static and involving the stable imposition of ready-made formulae of standard situations. This is obviously not totally true because text coherence and text interpretation are essentially dynamic. This dynamicity is evident in many situations where our expectations are not actually met.

Let us now consider the following text:

36. *John was hungry. He was looking for a restaurant. He remembered a good, cheap one he had been to before. But it was quite far away. John thought about taking a taxi but he was not sure he had enough money. He then decided to take the underground. Inside the station he went directly to the ticket machine and purchased a single ticket to Baker Street.*

In this example we have the general script of 'someone hungry' and it is easy to predict what will come next in the text. However, this prediction that the person in question will have food is only very general. The details of how he attained this goal are not accounted for in the script and in fact they cannot be specified by our scriptal knowledge because there are many ways, in fact infinite ways, to achieve this goal. The details in the above example are given to us by the various scenarios which are set to achieve the goal. The construction of these scenarios is arbitrary in the sense that it is not predictable via a global pattern. The topic of arbitrariness in text generation, organisation and interpretation is one that I turn to in the following sections.

### 5.5. *metonymy and scenarios*

What are scenarios? How do they differ from other knowledge structures discussed in this chapter? How do they contribute to text coherence and thus facilitate text interpretation? How do they relate to metonymic reasoning? This section will try to answer these questions. Again the literature on knowledge structures conflate the notion of scenarios with that of schemas<sup>76</sup> and scripts<sup>77</sup> and sometimes with the notion of frames.<sup>78</sup> Scenarios as discussed in this chapter are knowledge structures which resemble scripts but which differ from them in that while scripts are explained by conventional sequences of actions, scenarios are explained by means of specific causality which pertain to particular interests and intentions.

As the model in 5.2. shows, scenarios are treated here as arbitrary knowledge structures. However, a word of caution is necessary here regarding the notion of arbitrariness. This term has acquired a strong semiotic connotation especially in connection with Saussurean structuralism which propounds that linguistic signification is arbitrary<sup>79</sup> in the sense that there is no logical or intrinsic connection between the signifier, i.e. the linguistic expression, and the signified, i.e. the meaning of that expression. In this case the Saussurean theory of linguistic signification denies 'motivatedness' in language.<sup>80</sup>

The notion of arbitrariness as presented in this chapter<sup>81</sup>, it should be noted, does not have this terminological load. The simple reason for this is that the fundamental principle underlying this thesis and indeed many other accounts of the role of metonymy in our language and thought<sup>82</sup> is that there is a considerable amount of motivatedness in language and cognition and that metonymic signification is contiguously and causally motivated.

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<sup>76</sup> C.f. Brown and Yule (1983: 246).

<sup>77</sup> C.f. Sanford and Garrod (1981: 110).

<sup>78</sup> C.f. Minsky (1975: 240-246).

<sup>79</sup> C.f. Harris (1983: 67).

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. (69). See for a critique of Saussure's theory of arbitrariness Keller (1998: 130-140).

<sup>81</sup> See also the discussion of the notion of motivatedness of linguistic signification that I provide in chapter 3 section 3.2.1. above.

<sup>82</sup> C.f. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff and Turner (1989), Gibbs (1994), Fass (1997), Goatly (1997), Lakoff (1999), Radden and Panther (1999).

Therefore, the notion of arbitrariness in this chapter should be taken in a restricted sense to denote a situation where the prediction of text does not rely on universal or cultural standards but rather on personal intentions and individual manipulations of context to achieve certain goals. We can, to some extent, accept the notion of arbitrariness in the Saussurean sense if it is applied to the relation between the signifier and the signified in individual lexical items as in the examples provided by Saussure himself. Saussure postulates 'there is no internal connexion, for example, between the idea 'sister' and the French sequence of sounds s-ö-r- which acts as its signal'.<sup>83</sup> However, it is quite difficult to accept the notion of 'arbitrariness' when we deal with text. The reason is that in the realm of text we are actually dealing with intentions, biases, prejudices and ideologies that cannot be thought to be arbitrary but strongly motivated.

Within one script we might encounter one or more scenarios. If we look at example (36) above we find that the 'John hungry' script allows us to predict that the following text will be an explanation of how this hungry person will feed himself. We know this because of stereotypical knowledge. So in this case taking a taxi or the underground is a scenario of transferring oneself to one particular place to get fed. Within this scenario of transferring location we can encounter one or more scripts depending on the choice of the means of transport. So if the choice was for a taxi, the taxi script will be activated in our memory and the details will be automatically supplied. If however, the taxi script is activated but then later on suppressed in favour of another more convenient choice as is the case in the example above, the taxi script is then shut and the underground script is activated to account for the interpretation of the oncoming text.

The interactive nature of the process of script and scenario activation and in fact between all other knowledge structures in text processing is crucially important<sup>84</sup> because the assumption is that these mechanisms are not autonomous and obviously cannot function in isolation. Rather they collaborate to make sense of text. The schema allows for the activation of a script and the script enables the activation of a scenario which is explained by the set of plans and goals governing the whole act of communication. This is, in fact, the rationale behind my integrated model of all these

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<sup>83</sup> Harris (1983: 67).

<sup>84</sup> This is shown by the use of double headed arrows in the model in 5.2.

mechanisms. In the literature these are usually discussed separately and with a great deal of overlap and confusion between them. Here I attempted to systematise them and treat them as a chain of problem solving and inferencing mechanisms, such that where one fails the other comes in to solve the problem.

The model in 5.2. is inspired, to some extent, by de Beaugrande and Dressler's classification of what they call 'control centres' which they include in their account of text coherence. By 'control centres' they mean 'points from which accessing and processing can be strategically done'.<sup>85</sup> They classify these control centres into primary concepts and secondary concepts. The model in 5.2. was indirectly inspired by the notion of 'primary concepts' proposed by de Beaugrande and Dressler, though their discussion of knowledge structures like schemata, frames and scripts and so on was also to some extent confused as I have shown in section 5.2. of this chapter. The primary concepts de Beaugrande and Dressler<sup>86</sup> suggest are the following:

- (a) Objects: conceptual entities with a stable identity and constitution.
- (b) Situations: configurations of mutually present objects in their current states.
- (c) Events: occurrences which change a situation or a state within a situation.
- (d) Actions: events intentionally brought about by an agent.

I have related the notion of schemata to the notion of 'objects' suggested by de Beaugrande and Dressler to denote conceptual entities with stable identity and constitution. Similarly, I have designated the term 'script' for the notion of situations proposed by the authors to refer to the mutually present objects in their current states which is the appearance of the objects in stereotypical sequence of events. With regard to the notion of 'events' suggested by the authors I have associated it with the notion of scenarios taking into consideration that these are not standard situations with conventionally predictable roles and objects. Rather they are arbitrary events and sequences of events that derive their interpretation from the knowledge of the tactics of the specific causality of the situation. In fact, it is the next step in de Beaugrande and Dressler's classification that helps to explain the intentionality and direction of these events. So in a sense it is the plans and the goals which explain the scenarios.

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<sup>85</sup> De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 95).

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

One could perhaps extend the argument of conventional vs. arbitrary knowledge to account for general epistemic patterns. For example, one could argue that descriptive text is generally conventional. It conforms to real accounts of ontological specifications of properties. It stems from well-established conventions shared by human beings in general. So the sense of contiguity is well-rooted in descriptive reasoning and is usually coached via contiguous associations like part/whole relations, cause/effect relations, maker/made relations and so on. However, if we move to the other end of the cline of descriptive vs. argumentative text we have the kind of knowledge one might call political or perhaps more generally ideologically loaded. This pertains to texts with argumentation whether, for example, in religion or in politics. This is characteristically unpredictable and depends heavily on scenarios which are explained only by recourse to the intentions and interests of the participants. So while descriptive knowledge relies heavily on scripts, argumentative knowledge relies heavily on scenarios. The sign loses its referential power in argumentative knowledge, more of the epistemic ground of the discourse is symbolic, and there is a large number of abrupt conclusions. The referential power of the sign is more or less stable in descriptive knowledge. Descriptive knowledge can be associated with narrative and descriptive or expository discourse while argumentative knowledge can be associated with argumentative discourse in general. This latter depends on activation of various scenarios in the process of the interpretation.

Consider the following example from al-Sharq al-'Awsaṭ Newspaper:<sup>87</sup>

37. *kuntu dā'iman dhidd ar-ra'is rābīn, kuntu 'u'aridhuhu wa 'uqāwimuhu wa'uqabbihu min taṣarrufātihi al-'anīfati dhidd al-'arab, walākinni ḥazintu limaṣra'ihī, wa sha'artu bi'annanā khasirnā khaṣman qawīyyan kāna yu'arqīlu al-mufāwadhāt, wa kāna yatashaddadu fi mawāqifihi dhidd al-'arab walākinnahu kāna yuḥibbu bilādahu, wa qad ḥāranā wa ntaṣara 'alaynā thumma ḥāranāhu wa ntaṣarnā 'alayhi fi 6 'uktūbar. 'istankartu maṣra'ahu li'annanā dhidd al-'ightiyālāt sawā' kāna al-majnī 'alayhi ṣadīqan 'am khaṣman, wa kāna 'ahamma mā fi ḥādhā al-ḥādith al-mu'lim 'annahu 'athbata 'anna al-'arab laysū waḥdahum maydān al-'ightiyālāt, bal 'inna 'isrā'īl kadhālik tushārikunā ḥādhā l-balā'. wa nahmadu allaha 'anna rābīn qūtila biyadi yahūdi, wa law kāna al-qātilu 'arabiyyan lanḥalat 'alayna al-'ittihāmāt min kulli makān, wa lamā baqiya 'arabiyyun wāḥidun bighayr 'an yuttaham bi'annahu qātil ra'is wuzarā' 'isrā'īl. 'amma al-'ān fal qātilu shakhṣun wāḥidun lā malāyīn al-'arab alladhīna yuttahamūna bikulli shay'in yahduthu fi al-'ālam.*

<sup>87</sup> A column entitled *fikrah* 'idea' written by Mustafa Amīn when Rabin the Israeli Prime Minister was assassinated.

**Translation:**

I was always against Rabin. I hated his violent actions against the Arabs, and opposed him in whatever ways I could. However, I was sad when he died. I felt that we had lost a powerful adversary, who, while he may have hampered negotiations and adopted an extreme attitude towards the Arabs, nonetheless loved his country. He fought and defeated us in 1967, then in 1973 we fought and defeated him. I felt revulsion at his death, because one must be against assassination regardless of whether the victim is a friend or an enemy. The most important aspect of this sad incident is that it showed that the Arabs are not the only people who go in for assassinations. Israel is also afflicted by the same disease. I thank God that Rabin was killed by a Jew. If the assassin had been an Arab, accusations would have been flung at us from all directions. There wouldn't have been a single Arab who hadn't been accused of the killing of the Israeli Prime Minister. Now, however, it's clear that the killer was a single person, not millions of Arabs who find themselves accused of everything that happens in the world.

The first sentence in the text does not topicalise or set the scene for a global schema or script as it is usually the case in narrative and descriptive text. Normally, the topicalisation is a syntactic aspect which has a textual role. This role is to activate a conceptual knowledge structure which is the schema to account for the oncoming discourse and integrate it with the activated schema or script. In example (37) above we do not seem to have such activation; neither do we have topicalisation, as the sentence begins with the verb to which the subject is annexed as is the case in the canonical VSO word order in the unmarked Arabic sentence. So what does this sentence activate and how does it facilitate the interpretation of oncoming discourse? Actually, the sentence activates a scenario of someone opposing someone else. We do not know why. The reasons are explained later on from the point of view of the originator of the discourse. This point is crucially important in the scenario interpretation of text because the text is heavily loaded with ideological bias.

The difference between a script and scenario is that while there is some sort of activation of conceptual knowledge involved in both, the activation of the former helps in prediction of further text and establishes a shared understanding between the sender and the receiver of the text. In the latter, on the other hand, there is an activation of some sort of event which is not conventionally shared between the sender and the receiver. Rather this action or event is expressed from the point of view of the sender which might not necessarily agree with the receiver's own perspective. According to our conception of global patterns of knowledge we would expect the text above to continue with one script in which the writer or sender will continue hurling expressions of hatred and opposition throughout. However, this is not the case. Rather the text mixes several scenarios leading to multiple interpretations, which is characteristic of political

discourse.

In scenario activation we proceed in the text because we are keen to know why the actions are the way they are presented. In script and schema activation, apart from deviant and defamiliarised schemata and scripts of poetic or literary language, we normally proceed in the text with quite sound expectations. When we encounter a text beginning with 'in the hospital .....

we activate a schema of a hospital. As a result concepts like nurses, doctors, beds, x-rays and so on will be supplied by our memory and as we go on in the text we take these items as given. The same thing applies if we activate the hospital script. Here in addition to the set of things and objects that are treated as given we will also be able to supply a great number of sequenced actions and roles for participants in the script. However, with the text above it is difficult to imagine a situation that is universal where someone is against someone else by convention. This kind of conceptualisation necessarily requires that there are specific reasons for this attitude.

In the text above there is no global pattern that is activated and the whole text is embroiled in a socio-cultural plot which although it depends on wider historical events is essentially a sequence of unpredictable actions each with its own causality pattern. Expressions in the text such as *'u'āridhuhu wa 'uqāwimuhu wa 'uqabbihu min tasarrufātihi al-'anīfah dhidda al-'arab* 'I was always against Rabin. I hated his violent actions against the Arabs' seem quite predictable because these are compatible with the sense of 'someone being against someone' which has been activated in the first sentence of the text. However, it is strange to find the expression *walakinni hazintu limasra 'ihi*, 'However I was sad when he died'. This is because we would not normally expect someone who hates another to feel sorry for his death. However, this is justified if we take into consideration that the text is argumentative and it makes use of several scenarios, perhaps the most relevant of which here is that the writer is trying to show sympathy with the deceased. Nonetheless, as will be shown later, this is just one among the scenarios that are invoked in the text.

As I pointed out earlier, scenario activation is based on specific causality. In the text above the sequence of causality, it should be noted, is not mentioned in the order which we would normally expect, i.e. the cause preceding the effect. Rather we are first introduced to the statement of the expressions of hatred and opposition, i.e. the effect

even before knowing the reason. One could argue that the text here is displayed against a wider historical and socio-cultural background which explains the reason behind this hatred and opposition. However, although this might prove true to some extent, the text actually expresses the cause but only after the statement of the effect, i.e. *taṣarrufātihi al-'anīfah dhidda al-'arab* 'his violent actions against the Arabs'. The fact that this text is displayed against the background of the Arab-Israeli conflict is evident in the use of the word '*al-mufāwadhāt*' 'the negotiations' with the definite article although it has not been mentioned earlier. This shows that as soon as the text activates the global schema of the Arab-Israeli conflict by mentioning the word Rabin, the concept of 'negotiations' comes into mind and is thus treated as known. One could also argue that the word 'negotiations' is definite here because it takes its specified reference from other texts salient in the socio-cultural background invoked by the text.

With the word *walākinni* 'But I ..' a new scenario starts. This is quite different from the previous scenario which exhibits a rather negative attitude towards Rabin. In this scenario we are informed that the death of Rabin is causing to the writer sadness and that the Arabs had lost a powerful adversary, and so on. On the surface these expressions seem to be praising Rabin but at a deeper level the same scenario of negative attitudes is still operating because although the phrase 'a powerful adversary', is presented as a way of praising, it is actually loaded with opposition and dislike. A powerful adversary is an enemy who is not just an enemy but an extreme enemy. The text goes on to explain that the Arabs had lost this powerful adversary who was hampering the negotiations and adopting an extreme attitude towards the Arabs. Obviously none of these qualities is liked by an Arab and the question that comes to mind is how it could be possible to claim that the Arabs had really 'lost' Rabin? It seems these expressions are mentioned here just to mislead the reader and force him to employ multiple scenarios, a feature characteristic of argumentative discourse.

The text is an argumentative text. In this type of text the producer of the text utilises his power to force certain views and ideas on the receiver. Analysis of the balance of power relations in argumentative texts is an important technique to reveal the interaction between scenarios and expectations, the scenarios being the input from the text producer and the expectations the input from the receiver of the text. In this text, however, there seems to be no pattern of power exerted by the text producer. On the other hand, the text is torn between apologetic and hostile expressions. There is a general sense of trying to

please more than one party rather than imposing the producer's own plans. There is keen interest in compromise between conflicts of interest and this is achieved through the activation of multiple scenarios. This activation is warranted by metonymic relations of causality and contiguity in the sense that each state leads to the existence of another causally related state.

The sentence *waläkinnaḥu kāna yuḥibbu bilādahu* 'but he loved his country' is put in the text as to misleadingly show sympathy with Rabin. In fact, however, the proposition expressed in this sentence is that he is the enemy of the Arabs if he loves his country. This sentence might be a positive appraisal if said by an Israeli but it is actually the opposite if said by an Arab. Here it is just another way of allowing for a positive scenario to come in the interpretation to somewhat mitigate the rather negative general attitude. The text continues by mentioning the military confrontations between the two sides, i.e. the Israelis and the Arabs. The mention of wars is an indication of hostility in which bad memories are recalled for both sides. Thus in view of the scenarios of the text it is easy to see why the writer included this point in his article. Now let us consider another part of the text *wa kāna 'ahamma mā fi ḥādha al-ḥādith al-mu'lim 'annahu 'athbata 'anna al-'arab laysü waḥdahum maydän al-'ighṭiyälät* 'An important aspect of this sad incident was that it proved that the Arabs are not alone in the field of assassinations'. This point is perhaps the statement of one of the main goals of the whole text. This is to show the triumph for the fact that not only Arabs assassinate their leaders as was the case with Sadat.

Then comes the climax and pivot of the text which expresses the real motive of the article. This is the part which begins with *wa naḥmadu allāha 'anna räbin* 'we thank Allah that Rabin ...'. This shows clearly that the aim of the whole text is to use the fact that Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli to defend the Arabs from potential accusations and to show that they are usually wronged and misrepresented. It is clear from the scenario analysis of the text that the whole text is split between the conflict of scenarios. One scenario is activated and then soon it is suppressed in view of more global knowledge related to history and socio-political knowledge. In fact, the conflict between the scenarios activated and then suppressed is a natural reflection of the conflict between the author as a writer who should adopt an objective attitude towards the incident and the author as an Arab who has his own emotions and ideologies. Nonetheless, all these apparently contradictory scenarios in fact run coherently to realise

the ultimate goal of the text which is to express the fact the Arabs are usually misrepresented.

The writer seems to be following an objective and universal code of conduct in mitigating his attitude towards the incident. In fact, it could be argued that he is neither happy nor sad regarding the incident. What he is interested in is to use the incident to draw analogies of how the incident reflects bias and prejudice. The author wants to blame the international community for applying double standards when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is evident from his concluding remarks *'amma al-'än falqät il shakhs lä maläyin al-'arab*, 'Now, however, it's clear that the killer was a single person, not the millions of Arabs'.

The writer wants to say that if the assassin had been an Arab, then all the Arabs would have been accused of terrorism but because it is now clear that the assassin was an Israeli the world will treat it as an individual case. The fact that scenarios are based on localised causality is what makes scenarios basically metonymic structures, because metonymy realises causal relations underlying sense continuity which give the text its unity and coherence. Standard or universal causality is actually part of schematic knowledge because once we read that 'John is hungry' we expect that he will get fed. However, the conflict of intentions and interests in scenario manipulation is by no means conventional. Rather it is the result of continuous negotiation with the text and its own epistemic as well as ontological dimensions of knowledge. It is clear from the above example that text coherence depends largely on identifying the set of cause/effect relations not only on the linguistic presentation of facts but also by going deeper and consequently wider than that. That is by taking the formal text as only one resource and searching for other sources of knowledge that contribute to our understanding of the text as purposeful and thus make it stand as a coherent and meaningful unit.

Minsky discusses an interesting point which proved useful to my discussion of the three main knowledge structures, i.e. schemata, scripts and scenarios. Minsky elaborates the following point sketched in Winston<sup>88</sup>:

What does it mean to expect a chair? Typically, four legs, some assortment of rungs, a level seat, an upper back. One expects also certain relations between these "parts." The legs must be below the seat, the back above. The legs must be supported by the floor. The seat must be horizontal, the back vertical, and so forth. Now suppose that this description does not

<sup>88</sup> Winston, P. (1970).

match; the vision system finds four legs, a level plane, but no back. The “difference” between what we expect and what we see is “too few backs”. This suggests not a chair, but a table or bench.<sup>89</sup>

On the basis of the above quotation we can draw a conclusion bringing together the three concepts I have been discussing in this chapter. Minsky talks about the ‘typical’ features of a chair. I relate this aspect to the notion of schemata which I have argued to contain knowledge of entities. Then Minsky deals with what he calls ‘relations’. These are obviously the structural relations between these entities. They are structural in the sense of category membership and thus forming structures. The notion of ‘relations’ can also be expanded somewhat to include ‘sequential’ relations, covering both ‘spatial and temporal’ dimensions. In this case it is easy to postulate that this level of ‘relations’ pertain also to the notion of script as I have outlined it above. Then we come to the notion of ‘deviation’ which is expressed by Minsky using the expression ‘not matching’. I take this level of representation to belong to the third category where our global or universal expectations are not met due to specific reasons. This is the level of scenarios.

Now theoretically speaking these three levels of representation, i.e. schemata, scripts and scenarios correspond to the three levels of metonymic representation. The first is the entity or the selection level where two word/things/concepts are made to be forming a system. This level can also be termed the paradigmatic level of metonymic representation. It consists of words/concepts/things which corresponds to the level of typicality referred to in Minsky’s discussion and to the notion of schemata in my account. The second level of metonymic representation is the level where one of the two entities is actually put in the representational string. This is the syntagmatic level of metonymic representation which corresponds to the level of relations in Minsky’s account and to the notion of script in the conceptual structure of our knowledge. The third level is the level of ‘not matching’ as referred to in Minsky’s argument. This consists of unpredictable connections which are explainable only via contiguous means. This is the level of metonymic interpretation which involves a great deal of reasoning and searching for various types of association. The jump from the lexical domain of metonymy outlined here to the textual level of interpreting text is actually guaranteed by the nature of metonymy as an essentially combinatorial aspect of language and thought.

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<sup>89</sup> Minsky (1975: 252).

### 5.6. *metonymy and plans*

If coherence in discourse were always achieved via stereotypical situations which describe frequently encountered situations and sequences of events then this would make it easier for us to understand any type of text without much effort. Or in more technical terms this would put understanding always in the default mode. In fact, according to this view any model of scriptal knowledge would be sufficient to account for text processing and therefore we would not need to look for other types of knowledge structures. A moment's thought however will reveal that this is not the case because human understanding is far more complex than this reductionist view of standard knowledge structures. There are many types of text that we wrestle with to understand. Human generation and interpretation of knowledge is much more complex than a model of stereotypicality associated with schemata or scripts could account for. For this reason Schank and Abelson proposed the notion of 'plans' to account for situations where 'people can deal with situations that they have never encountered before. They can do this because they have access to the mechanisms that underlie scripts'.<sup>90</sup>

Schank and Abelson define a plan as a theoretical entity which

is intended to be the repository for general information that will connect events that cannot be connected by use of an available script or by standard causal chain expansion. A plan is made up of general information about how actors achieve goals. A plan explains how a given state or event was prerequisite for or derivative from another state or event.<sup>91</sup>

They further assert that 'plans describe the set of choices that a person has when he sets out to accomplish a goal'.<sup>92</sup> It is clear from Schank and Abelson's treatment of plans that they regard plans as devices which explain people's intentions. The nature of plans as used in this chapter is instrumental in the sense that they give connectivity to certain actions that are otherwise disconnected. The role of plans is explanatory and they give information as to why a set of sequence is made contiguous although there seems to be no explicit thread of continuity between its parts. The example from Gibbs is a good

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<sup>90</sup> Schank and Abelson (1977: 70).

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

illustration of the role of the metonymic relation of causality in explaining the role of plans and goals in activating scenarios.

The example tale provided by Gibbs<sup>93</sup> runs as follows:

38. *He wanted to be king.*

*He was tired of waiting.*

*He thought arsenic would work well.*

Without activating the metonymic relation of causality, the interpretation of this text is severely hampered. The coherence of this text is based on the activation of a certain scenario which is established by means of the identification of the plans and purposes underlying the text. The text activates a scenario of someone planning to be king and indirectly alludes to the state of the affairs that there is already a king and that is why he has to wait for a long time and as a result has become tired of waiting. This state allows for some action to take place. This action is actually a plan and it aims to get rid of the cause of this tiresome waiting situation, which is the existence of the present king in this example. The mention of the word 'arsenic' activates a whole scenario of plotting an act of poisoning the present king to get rid of him. Without metonymic reasoning of causality and without scenario activation by identifying the set of plans that underlie the text, the text would be extremely difficult to understand. This shows how the role of metonymic reasoning is fundamental in discourse processing. These processes, it should be noted, are not alien to the cognitive structure of our brains as it is sometimes believed in certain figurative accounts of metonymy. Rather they are processes that are fundamental parts of our thought and cognition.

De Beaugrande and Dressler define plans as 'global patterns of events and states leading up to an intended goal'.<sup>94</sup> This definition seems to confuse frames and schemas in the use of the phrase 'global patterns' especially if we know that the authors regard these latter two as different. The definition is rather general also because it uses the term 'plan' to designate events and states which lead to intended goals. Any event or action, if deliberate, leads to an intended goal so there is nothing specific about plans to make them different from scripts for example. Here, I shall dwell on the intentional aspect highlighted by de Beaugrande and Dressler's definition. A plan is a purposeful action in

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<sup>93</sup> Gibbs (1994: 330).

<sup>94</sup> De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 90-91).

the sense that it serves to explain why a particular scenario is presented in the way that it is. Let us look at the following text from Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Newspaper (April, 17<sup>th</sup>, 1993). The text shows how metonymic reasoning of causal relations underlying the text is actually a fundamental aspect of text coherence.

39. *Bada'a nizām hukm ar-ra'is al-'irāqi saddām husayn hamlatan mukhattatatan litajfif qitā'atin wāsi'atin min 'ahwār al-'irāq kawasilatin lihirmān al-mutamarridin fi al-janūb min 'ayi ghitā', wa li'ijbār sukkān al'ahwār 'nfusahum 'lā al-khudhū' lisaytarati an-nizām fi baghdād.*

**Translation:**

*The regime of the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein began a planned project to drain vast areas of Al-Ahwar in Iraq as a means of depriving the rebels in the south from any cover and to force the people of Al-Ahwar themselves to submit to the dominion of the regime in Baghdad.*

The understanding of this text is first of all based on an understanding of a metonymic relation of CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED. This is evident in the attribution of the act of draining to Saddam Hussein's regime although the act itself is not actually carried out by Saddam Hussein or any member of his government. This metonymic reasoning at the beginning of the text reveals and exposes a latent ideology and an implicit blaming attitude against Saddam Hussein by a Saudi-owned newspaper. The attribution of the act of draining Al-Ahwar is a technique to throw the blame for the action on Saddam Hussein and his regime because they are the controllers of the people who actually carried out the draining. The controlled, i.e. the people who performed the action of draining, are basically workers for Saddam Hussein's regime. Besides they are not known any way, in which case it is difficult to blame them. In such cases where the real doer of the action is not known or not important enough to be known or to be blamed, then our cognition shifts the reference from the real doer of the action to the cause behind the doing of the action. In this way the responsibility for this act of environmental catastrophe is thrown onto Saddam Hussein and his regime.

The coherence of the text also depends on metonymic reasoning in a more specific way. Without identifying the network of plans, goals and scenarios in the text it is impossible to understand the text. Without establishing a relation of cause/effect between the act of draining and the act of depriving the rebels of any cover the text will not stand as a meaningful whole. Not only that but also we have to supply information that is not actually mentioned in the text. Our metonymic reasoning of causality will tell us, though the text itself does not help us in this regard, that when an area is drained of

water then the trees dry up and the land is denuded of cover. Also we have to make yet another metonymic inferencing process by which we use our general knowledge of the world that rebels usually hide under trees and therefore the removal of the foliage of these trees make the lives of these rebels at stake. Moreover, the fact that the removal of the foliage of the trees and perhaps subsequently the trees altogether deprives the rebels of shelter to hide, forcing them to submit and surrender to the attackers, which is in this text the regime in Baghdad. Without these inferencing processes text unity and text continuity will be disrupted.

It should also be noted here that the amount of knowledge our metonymic reasoning of causality and contiguity supplies us with depends heavily on the level of detail required and the level of sophistication our knowledge should have. For example, there are still several metonymic processes of cause/effect relations that are not mentioned in the analysis above let alone the text. For instance, the causality in the draining process might be elaborated more in such a way as to show minute details of causal chains, such as the fact that lack of water in the land causes lack of water in the roots of trees. Lack of water in the roots of trees causes lack of water in the stem and this leads to lack of water in the leaves. When the leaves do not have water they become yellow, dry up and fall, leaving the tree without leaves. In fact, the account would be more detailed than this if we were to adopt a zoological or botanical analysis of what actually happens in the roots, stem and leaves when there is no water.

Our metonymic reasoning of CAUSE FOR EFFECT relations underlying the text helps us interpret the text as a purposeful unit on the basis that each state is either a result of another state or a state that initiates a further state. This causal connectivity in the text is not the only way we can perceive of metonymic roles in text interpretability however. In fact, the text is also interpretable by means of other metonymic relations of structural perception of part/whole organisation. The mention of wholes deems the parts of these wholes known and thus accessible in the memory. This facility ensures that the amount of language we use in our communication is minimised and that language is economical enough to avoid redundancy. Language as a system of communication stands against a cognitive representation that is far more detailed than what is actually made explicit in speaking or writing, as the text above shows. In this sense the essence of cognition can be seen to represent a metonymic operation in which the linguistic elements of communication stand for the whole realm of cognition.

The word 'arsenic' in example (38) above helps a great deal in resolving the interpretation problems associated with the very elliptical form of the scenario. In the following example we find the word 'gun' as a useful tool to activate specific plans which help to realise the goals at which the initiator of the text is aiming.

40. *John needed some money.*

*He took the gun and headed towards the local bank.*

We have a robbery scenario here in this example and this interpretation is warranted by the mention of the word 'gun'. We understand that the state of being in need of money leads to a state of trying to get money. At this stage there are several plans or actions for the scenario to proceed. John might take one of his valuable things and sell it. Within this plan-based scenario, the gun could actually be a valuable antique gun that John has inherited, because he is now in need of money he has taken the gun and is heading towards the bank to put it as a pawn to borrow money from the bank. However, this interpretation is not directly accessible because the description of someone needing money and going to the bank carrying a gun is in its unmarked interpretation highly suggestive of a robbery scenario.

Another path in the scenario would be that John might phone one of his relatives or friends and ask for help. However, the text imposes on us a specific progression. Because the progression of the text through the robbery scenario is supported by default plan interpretation we would normally expect that other plans of getting money had failed. If our interpretation was to be directed towards the 'valuable antique gun' interpretation we would normally expect some more specification to be explicit in the text to guide us to take that particular path of reasoning. For example, we would expect that the text would explicitly state that

41. *John was in need for money. John decided to pawn his antique gun so he carried his gun and headed towards the local bank.*

Of course each of these scenarios would activate a particular path of text understanding and prediction and each would activate a particular setting and a specific script. We would for example expect the robbery scenario to take place at night when there is no one in the bank whereas we would expect the 'gun pawning' scenario to take place during the day and more precisely during work hours.

From the above discussion of the role of plans in text understanding and text prediction

we can see that processes of both understanding and prediction in text are interrelated and each depends on the other. It seems that our understanding of a text is based on our prediction of the progression of causality with regard to the set of plans underlying the linkage between events and actions. In the same way our prediction of the progression of the text relies heavily on our understanding of the current state of affairs that the text is describing and the mechanism the text is employing to stand as a unified whole. Metonymic reasoning provides text understanding and text prediction with a unique tool that does not limit understanding to one or two cognitive principles but rather integrates all the available knowledge structures to work in an interactive manner to test hypotheses and attest the most probable ones with evidence from the text and from other sources outside the text. Thus the hypothesis of the chapter is that metonymy as a representational relation provides mental access that cuts across the three domains of language, mind and reality.

One of the examples that Schank and Abelson provide for the notion of plan is very suggestive of a metonymic relation of CAUSE FOR EFFECT. Their example<sup>95</sup> is:

42. *Willa was hungry.*

*She took out the Michelin guide.*

In this example there is ellipsis not very much different from the ellipsis in

43. *John went to McDonalds.*

In Willa's story in example (42) above the second sentence strongly invokes an elliptical element which is 'to search for a restaurant'. In example (43) there is an elliptical element which is 'the restaurant which is called McDonalds'. There is not a very big difference between the two types of ellipsis except that in the second example the reference is fairly fixed and is invoked by well-established cultural semiosis. However, in the first example there is only a sense of expectation and although the causal linkage strongly activates a scenario of searching for a restaurant in the guide it is still an expectation. Example (43) is also metonymic in the causally-driven expectation sense also. One should expect an elliptical element to continue. This is 'to eat' because this element is supplied by the schema of a restaurant that it contains 'food' and by our script of going to a restaurant which tells us that people go to restaurants to eat.

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<sup>95</sup> C.f. Schank and Abelson (1977: 71).

### 5.7. metonymy and goals

Goals are more general plans. A plan may describe a specific action in a scenario to achieve a general goal. Text coherence is, among other things, a dialectic interaction between the fulfilment of the goal, or the declining of that goal if it is not fulfilled and resorting to another goal. The following text from Naguib Mahfouz's *Za'balāwi* illustrates how text coherence is governed by the overall goal that the text sets out right from the start. The text begins with the following:

44. *'iqtana 'tu akhīran bi'anna 'alayya 'an 'ajid ash-Shaykh za'balāwi.*

*'I was finally convinced that I had to find Sheikh Za'balawi'.*

This start actualises a general goal and text coherence depends heavily on pursuing this goal. In other words the writer is expected to subsequently elaborate on how he fulfilled this goal. In fact, for a few lines after this statement the writer gives the background as to why he needs to find Sheikh Za'balāwi. Mahfouz spends a considerable amount of time giving the reader the background of this overall goal. He tells us that Za'balāwi, according to the narrator's father, is a holy man, a saint who was able to solve all sorts of problems. The text tells us also that the narrator was in a crisis and that was the reason why he was searching for Za'balāwi. Within the description of the actions and events that were carried out to fulfill the goal of finding Sheikh Za'balāwi, we encounter several other scenarios and plans contributing to the fulfillment of the goal.

For example, the following text tells us that the narrator remembered what his father had told him about the location of Za'balāwi which is a prerequisite state for the person to transfer his location to that place to fulfill the goal of finding this Sheikh .

45. *wa tadhakkartu 'anna 'abī qāla 'innahū 'arafahu fi bayt ash-Shaykh qamar bi khān ja'far, wa huwa Shaykh min rijāl ad-dīn al-mushtaghilīn bilmuḥāmāh ash-shar'īyyah. Faqaṣadtu baytahu wa 'aradtu at-ta'akud min 'annahu mā zāl yuqīm fih fasa'altu bayyā' fūl asfal al-bayt, fanazara 'ilayya bistighrāb wa qāl:*

*- ash-Shaykh qamar! Tarak al-ḥay min 'ahdīn ba'id, wa yuqāl 'innahu yuqīm fi gardīn*

*siti wa'anna maktabahu bimaydān al-azhar ..... wastadlaltu 'alā 'unwān maktabihi bidaftar at-tilifūn, wdhahabtu 'ilayhi min tawwī fi 'imārat al-ghurfah at-tijāriyyah.*

#### **Translation:**

I remembered that my father had told me that he had known him in Sheikh Qamar's

house in Khan Ja'far. Sheikh Qamar was a clergyman whose profession was that of lawyer in Islamic courts. I headed towards his house. But I wanted to make sure that he was still living there. So I asked the "foul" seller at the basement of the house. The man looked at me strangely and said:

Sheikh Qamar! He left the block long ago. It is said that he now lives in Garden City and his office is in Al-Azhar Square. I found out his address from the phone book and went to him immediately in the Building of the Chamber of Commerce.

From the text above we can see that there are several actions that took place all of which contribute to the realisation of the main goal. Going to see Sheikh Qamar and asking the man who sells 'foul' at the basement and consulting the phone book are all actions to achieve the general goal. In fact, these actions are predictable or at least easy to process because of the activation of the general goal of the text. All these actions are causally linked and thus their interpretation is processed by means of CAUSE FOR EFFECT metonymic relations. Identifying a goal is also a metonymic process in the sense that a text is usually perceived as purposeful, i.e. as having a general goal. This general goal functions like a holistic cognitive domain from which specific actions and plans derive their interpretation and meaningfulness.

The search for Sheikh Qamar which occupies the whole text above is only an instrumental secondary goal to serve the general goal of the text, i.e. to find Sheikh Za'balāwi. The actions within the secondary goal are scenarios realising the set of particular plans. This chain of interconnectedness of plans, scenarios and goals is the unique characteristic of metonymic reasoning of the relations PART FOR WHOLE and CAUSE FOR EFFECT and the converse of these relations. In this case the unity of the text is cognitively maintained by means of structural integration and cognitive causality. This interconnectivity is what provides the text with coherence and meaningfulness and makes its interpretation possible. In fact, the overall plot of the story revolves around this general goal of searching for Sheikh Za'balāwi. The text goes on with this goal, which however also includes several digressions to other scenarios and elaborations on various plans in order to fulfill it.

The idea that there is a central aim of the story ensures that the text hangs together and that digression and elaboration are assumed to be serving the main aim in one way or another. This feature is not only a characteristic of narrative discourse to which the text

above belongs but also a feature of almost all types of text. The understanding of this centrality is metonymically-based. This is because this feature derives from a general principle that all communication is purposeful. For example, an expository text describing a room will have the general aim of enumerating the features of this room. The description might take various forms. It might begin from the place where the initiator of the discourse is located and move further from this point. It might then move left or right or in fact in any direction and come back to the point of origin. This movement in the description is easily interpretable because of a fundamental principle of our cognitive structure. This is the metonymic principle of contiguity, i.e. cognitive contiguity or ontological contiguity. This is to say the description might be accessed from the cognitive schema of a room that has been activated once the concept of room is encountered. Or the description might be accessed from the real arrangement of the things in the room.

To take another example from non-verbal communication let us consider this hypothetical situation in which a student comes to see his supervisor in his office upon a fixed appointment. However, the student finds the professor busy in a telephone conversation. The conversation extends for a long time. Now if the student starts making frequent yawns and looking at his watch then this means that he is trying to communicate something. These actions are purposeful and thus their interpretation is based on causality since we assume that he is doing these actions because he is bored and he wants to tell the professor that he might be missing another appointment perhaps. In fact, in order to understand the situation we have to assume that these actions are purposeful and causally linked to the context.

Goals have been a subject of intensive research in cognitive as well as social psychology because they provide a guide to the interpretation of human behaviour.<sup>96</sup> Schank and Abelson provide a taxonomy of these goals. They divide goals into seven types according to three categories. The first category is that which involves striving for desired states. The second category involves avoidance of undesired states. The third category involves intermediate subgoals. Under the first category they recognise three types of goals. The first is the satisfaction goal which is a 'recurring strong biological

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<sup>96</sup> Schank and Abelson provide a list of references which relate to the study of goals and to their terminology: 'instincts' McDougal (1932), 'needs' Murray (1938), 'values' Allport and Vernon (1951), 'ways of life' (1956). C.f. Schank and Abelson (1977: 111).

need'.<sup>97</sup> Satisfaction of hunger, satisfaction of sex and satisfaction of sleep are typical examples of this category. These types of goals are very useful in text interpretation and text prediction because they are so basic to our lives that they are easy to predict and pursue in text. If the satisfaction of one of these goals is invoked and the goal itself is not satisfied we tend to predict that there will be persistence to try and succeed in satisfying it. Generally there is no goal substitution in this type of goals and this stems from the fact that they are very basic to our life. For example we do not expect a goal to sleep if not satisfied to change to a goal to play.

The second type is what they call the enjoyment goal which is 'an activity which is optionally pursued for enjoyment or relaxation'.<sup>98</sup> Good examples of enjoyment goals are travelling, doing exercise, entertaining and so on. These goals are useful in providing text coherence by virtue of the fact that they allow for optional goals to proceed if the original goal is not satisfied, but this substitution is governed by various other factors. Generally the substitutions are not radical shifts of goal; rather they are usually mild changes. For example we would not expect someone who goes to the movie and finds it full to decide to go to see the Pyramids instead (unless the situation of the discourse happens to be in Giza in Egypt).

The third type of goal in the first category is what Schank and Abelson call the achievement goal. This is 'the realisation, often over a long term, of some valued acquisition or social position'.<sup>99</sup> Examples of this type of goal include striving to have possessions, a good job, and social relationships, and so on. These are useful in text coherence because they actually stand for a number of plans that we expect to take place to realise this goal and because of their long term nature we expect that they will occupy a great deal of time and hence of text in order to materialise. It seems that a great deal of realist narrative texts revolve around these goals. The whole text in this case is a realisation of one particular goal.

The first type of goal in the second category is the preservation goal which is geared towards 'preserving or improving the health, safety, or good condition of people,

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid. (112).

<sup>98</sup> Ibid. (113).

position or property'.<sup>100</sup> We might understand, in fact we did, the goal in Za'balāwi's text above as 'to search for Sheikh Za'balāwi'. However, the real goal was actually one of preserving health. Because according to the background information that the text tells us the narrator had some health problems. In this case, searching for Sheikh Za'balāwi was actually an instrumental goal serving to achieve the ultimate goal which is to preserve his health. It is actually a chain of goals and subgoals and further subgoals all of which are causally linked in a specific order. Text coherence depends heavily on identifying this chain of causal connectivity and it is believed that the way to identify this linkage is through metonymic reasoning of CAUSE FOR EFFECT relations.

The second type of goal in this category is what Schank and Abelson call 'crisis goal' and define as 'a special class of preservation goals'.<sup>101</sup> Because they acquire a sense of urgency and as a result they are given priority they are called crisis goals. Immediate action is deemed vital in this situation. The threat is actual in the case of crisis goals and not potential as is the case in preservation goals. The two remaining types of goals are the instrumental goal and the delta goal. These two types of goals are intermediate goals and they help to allow for a condition that is conducive to another goal. The two types of goal are quite similar except for the fact that the former is script-based while the latter is plan-based. In other words, instrumental goals are more standard than delta goals. This is because an instrument usually indicates the purpose of its use by means of convention whereas delta goals are more of scenario based goals which are explained by means of various sets of plan boxes which pertain to intentions and interests.

In addition to the fact that goals and also plans are essential text coherence tools and that they are all integrated into a metonymic model of textual causality, they are also experiential accounts of how text progresses and leads to the degree of expectation and prediction. No matter what type of goal might underlie a particular text, our perceiving of this text as coherent and our understanding of it as meaningful depends on the dynamic interaction between our background knowledge and the knowledge presented in the text. This dynamic interaction is essentially metonymic in the first place in the sense that the textual knowledge *stands for* (i.e. in representational mode) the

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid. (114).

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. (115).

<sup>101</sup> Ibid. (116).

background knowledge. On another level, the textual knowledge also relates to the background knowledge in a metonymic relation of PART FOR WHOLE. On yet another further level of conceptualisation the understanding of the various types of goals that might underlie a text is dependent on a dynamic interaction between what is potential and what is actual via *stand for* relations. As we have seen in Chapter 2 of this thesis, one of the major metonymic processes is that which relates or substitutes the potential to/for the actual and the converse of this relation.

If we attempt a further discussion of how goals, and in fact all other knowledge structures which I have been discussing in this chapter, contribute to text coherence we shall find that the interpretation of these knowledge structures is largely based on an understanding of 'context'.<sup>102</sup> This understanding in turn makes the interaction between our knowledge as readers and text knowledge possible and effective. In our communication and cognition we will register from among the various types of goals, scripts, plans, schemata or scenarios that are virtually activated only what is 'relevant' to the context of situation of the discourse. Let us consider the following examples from schemata to make this point clear.

46. *I bought a village house which is 200 years old.*
47. *I now live in a house next to the town centre.*
48. *The house that I bought recently is very expensive.*
49. *The house where I live is very cheap.*

Now let us imagine our house schema in the four different situations above. Obviously, the first thing that comes to our mind regarding the house in the first example is that it is historic, built in stone, has high walls, small windows, no parlour, and perhaps is rather castle-like. But is this a prototypical example of a house? The answer is definitely no. But how did it come to our mind quickly although it is not the best example of a house that we have in our minds?<sup>103</sup> The answer is that the type of house schema that comes to mind by default mode is that which is invoked by the context of the discourse and not

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<sup>102</sup> This term was first coined by the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski in 1923, 1935. Malinowski defines context as the environment of the text. For further details on this notion see Halliday and Hasan (1989: 5-6).

<sup>103</sup> Rosch discusses the notion of 'prototypes' in her studies of cognitive categories and human categorisation. In her research she aims to refute the relativist view of human cognition. She aims to establish that there are stable prototypical categories that we as human beings store in our minds to be used as reference points for cognition and understanding. See for details Rosch (1973) and (1975).

that virtual and universal prototypical category. The same thing would apply to the other examples of house schemas in examples 48-49. However, we should not go very far in cognitive localisation to assume very specialised contexts for cognition. Contexts do not normally stand in isolation because they will always conjure up associations with other related contexts and thus the retrieval of one context might also conjure up other related contexts. Therefore, it is better to perceive the notion of context here as the cultural context which brings into the cognitive process much more than the immediate situation.

The issue of context in its cultural and immediate aspects has been increasingly used in cognitive discussions of communication and with especial reference to the notion of relevance. This began in recent years with the publication of Sperber and Wilson's (1986) book bearing the word 'relevance' as its title. I argue that metonymy is a fundamental asset to context interpretation and hence a very strong help to the notion of relevance. Formally, metonymy represents the syntagmatic level of linguistic arrangement and here syntagmatic is not limited to the sentential level but extends to the textual level. Perceived as such, metonymy provides a linguistic environment for the text. Cognitively, metonymy is based on the notion of contiguity and this applies to both the realm of concepts as well as to the realm of things. In this case, metonymy provides a clear understanding of the context of situation also. This interactive mode of knowledge between language, mind and reality makes our communication concise and our comprehension relevant. The metonymic representational relation is pervasive in all types of knowledge structures I have discussed so far.

### **5.8. Summary**

This chapter has shown how metonymy could be used to develop a theory of text coherence. In this regard the chapter has brought to light a number of issues that are vital to both text coherence and metonymic reasoning. The chapter began by outlining the rationale for a unified metonymic approach to coherence. This is that the researchers have typically proposed an overlapping and somewhat confusing interdependent relation between the notions of cohesion and coherence. Metonymy clarifies the distinction and integrates the two notions into one model of formal and pragmatic metonymic relations connecting text on the one hand and relating text to its context on the other. In this way text stands as a unified coherent whole. The chapter concentrates on one theory of coherence known as 'schema theory'. The discussion, however, was

not restricted to the level of cognition but was extended to include speaker's intentions and contextual factors affecting the choice of one rather than the other option of text progression. The chapter offers an integrated model of the various types of knowledge structures and relates this model to the nature of metonymy as essentially representational.

## Conclusion

This thesis examined the following four hypotheses related to metonymy:

1. The scope of metonymy has been severely reduced and the potential of metonymy has been largely underestimated in previous<sup>1</sup> accounts of the trope.
2. Metonymy is semiotic in nature.
3. A semiotic approach to metonymy leads to a comprehensive theory of metonymy as *representation* that cuts across the ontological, epistemological and linguistic dimensions of metonymic signification.
4. A textual theory of metonymy could be developed based on the representational view of metonymy.

The study has shown that the semiotic treatment of metonymy is necessary to take the trope beyond its traditional limitation. The study has also shown that a semiotic approach to metonymy is crucial for the development of a textual theory of metonymy. The textual model of metonymy is constructed in chapter 3 of this thesis and is put to the test in chapter 4 and 5 where the analysis of texts is carried out using the nine metonymic relations proposed in the textual model of metonymy. The analysis of texts was successful and provided deep insights into the processes of text organisation and interpretation. In the following paragraphs I shall suggest some areas of further research on metonymy.

### Metonymy and definiteness

I have alluded to the notion of definiteness in various parts of this thesis especially in chapters 4 and 5. The term 'definiteness' refers to the semantic phenomenon in which a particular referent is perceived to be known or specific and thus when referred to by means of linguistic form it is marked by a definite article in some languages like the English 'the' and the Arabic *al*. However, the fact that both English and Arabic use definite articles to mark this semantic phenomenon does not mean that the two languages share the same mechanism of expressing definiteness. It seems that Arabic tends to use the definite article more than English and this becomes obvious when

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<sup>1</sup> By previous accounts of the trope I mean studies on metonymy that are previous to this study from Greek rhetorical scholarship up till present-day discussions in figurative theory and cognitive linguistics circles. This will be clear once the reader has gone through chapter one and two of this thesis.

## Conclusion

writings of Arab advanced learners of English are assessed. I would say that from my informal observations more than half of the mistakes advanced Arab learners of English make are mistakes with the definite article 'the'. They tend to overuse it in places where native speakers of English would not. This suggests that the semantic space of definiteness is not the same in both languages. I believe that a metonymy-based investigation of this discrepancy will reveal a great deal about the space of definiteness each language provides for its speakers. This means that if we apply the knowledge model proposed in chapter 5 of this thesis we could account for the phenomenon of definiteness as a theory of knowledge and how it is structured in human cognition by various languages and how this structuring is reflected in texts.

## Metonymy and anaphora

In rhetoric, anaphora refers to 'a popular figure of speech involving repetition of the same word at the beginning of successive clauses, sentences or verses'.<sup>2</sup> In linguistics it is 'a term used in grammatical description for the process or result of a linguistic unit deriving its interpretation from some previously expressed unit or meaning (the antecedent)'.<sup>3</sup> Metonymy is related to anaphora in terms of what has been called 'indirect', 'conceptual' or 'bridging inference' anaphors. These, as Stirling argues, 'can be broadly characterised as instances of reference where there is no explicit identical antecedent for the referring nominal expression, yet nevertheless it is felt that its interpretation depends in some systematic way upon the linguistic context'.<sup>4</sup> The example given for this phenomenon is:

1. *We checked the picnic supplies. The beer was warm.*

Here 'The beer' is interpretable by virtue of a part-whole metonymic reasoning in which 'beer' is part of the supplies normally provided in picnics. From a psychological perspective this text is interpretable by virtue of an activation of a specific schema. This is the 'picnic supplies' schema. In this schema there is an item 'beer' and this gets activated every time the 'picnic supplies' is mentioned within a specific cultural background.

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<sup>2</sup> Wales (1989: 23).

<sup>3</sup> Crystal (1991: 19).

<sup>4</sup> Stirling (1996: 69).

## Conclusion

Stirling includes a table of types of anaphoric relations in a corpus of GP consultations. The percentage of indirect reference is 11.4% of the data. This is quite a significant figure, which indicates that indirect reference amounts to a large proportion of textual patterning. This in turn highlights the important role of metonymy in the organisation and interpretation of text. It would be interesting to investigate this in other languages and in settings other than the one in Stirling's study.

## Metonymy and relevance

The principle of relevance as formulated by Sperber and Wilson states that 'every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance'.<sup>5</sup> They define 'ostensive communication' in a formulaic form as 'the communicator produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimulus to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions {I}'.<sup>6</sup> It should be noted that the principle of relevance plays a major role in the use and interpretation of metonymy because it is this principle which determines the selection process of the vehicle of the metonymic signification. So in the 'forenoon sleeper' example discussed above, the principle of relevance is at work in governing the selection of the vehicle to be the 'forenoon' because as I said earlier this is culturally marked as not the time for sleeping except for those who are prosperous. This example represents cultural relevance. One can also use the 'ham sandwich' example to illustrate situational relevance. This dehumanising aspect of customer-waiter interaction is situationally relevant because for the waiter/waitress the most relevant aspect of the customer is the thing he/she ordered. The waiter/waitress does not need to establish intimate relations with the customer for the situationally based communication of providing the order. The issue of relevance should even be extended along the lines of the extension of the concept of metonymy to text. In the script structure of a restaurant, each participant has his own script which is relevant to him as a participant. I have argued in chapter 5 that a waiter/waitress has his own script of a restaurant and a customer has his own script of a restaurant according to the set of roles each one plays. The owner of the restaurant will have a different restaurant script. These relevance theoretic aspects make communication possible and discourse

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<sup>5</sup>Sperber and Wilson (1986: 158).

<sup>6</sup>Ibid. (155).

## Conclusion

coherent. This particular aspect of metonymic process needs more detailed and further investigation.

### **Metonymy and semantic change**

I have a strong intuition that a considerable amount of semantic change is metonymically motivated. This is perhaps the reason why it is fairly common that when people encounter a name be it a proper name or a common name for the first time they usually ponder about the rationality behind it, i.e. why it is the way it is. This is more evident in proper names although the general rule is that names are not rational or as it is commonly known in Arabic *al'asmä' lä tu'allal*. When it comes to name a new born baby, parents usually look for possible meanings and then choose the name accordingly. This is perhaps more relevant in Arabic than any other language that I know of and is still in common practice as far as the Arabic context is concerned.

But what is the role of metonymy in semantic change? As we have seen in chapter two of this thesis Ullmann's theory of metonymy is a theory of semantic change and it is an area of research that should be stressed here. A metonymic basis of semantic change is a compelling argument and it is suggested here that a full-scale study of semantic change in any language based on this perspective will witness to the validity of this argument. Besides, the role of metonymy in creating meaning should be highly appreciated by lexicographers. In other words, metonymy should be the closet friend of dictionary makers and these are required to consider the role of metonymy in creating meanings and senses.

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