Socially inclusive governance?: a comparison of local anti-poverty strategies in the UK and the Netherlands

Beaumont, Justin R.

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Socially Inclusive Governance?

a comparison of local anti-poverty strategies in the UK and the Netherlands

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Justin R. Beaumont

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Department of Geography, University of Durham

March 2000
Socially Inclusive Governance?

A comparison of local anti-poverty strategies in the UK and the Netherlands

An investigation into radical democratisation through a comparison of popular involvement in anti-poverty strategies in North Tyneside and Rotterdam
Add, that the wretch is still a theme of scorn
If the soiled cloak be patched, the gown o'erworn;
If, through the bursting shoe, the foot is seen
Or the rough stitch tell where the rent has been.
O Poverty, thy thousand ills combined
Sink not so deep into the generous mind
As the contempt and laughter of mankind.

(Juvenal, 1992, Satires, no. 3, lines 147-53)
For all my family, and the memory “Beau”, and for all those who acknowledge the truth that natural talent, creative flair and intelligence are not always enough in this unjust world of ours
Abstract

Socially Inclusive Governance?
a comparison of local anti-poverty strategies in the UK and the Netherlands

Justin R. Beaumont

It is commonplace for intellectuals and political figures to speak of popular involvement in decision-making as an essential basis for a well-functioning and legitimate democracy, while at the same time institutions of liberal democracy are under threat and face crisis in the west. In response a rhetoric of socially inclusive and participatory governance has taken hold as a means for democratic renewal - a 'third-way' between the outmoded dogma of the command state and free market - one that encourages participation of local people in a plurality of non-state organisations in civil society. Rather than banish ailing representative institutions, new perspectives seek to pluralise and radicalise them, particularly as existing socialism continues to decline, carrying with it a mounting impasse within traditional thinking on the Left. Debates on socially inclusive governance and the deep implications for a democratic and plural socialism are pressing, and require critical attention. Research for this thesis deals centrally with the debate on socially inclusive governance by comparing actual mechanisms for popular involvement in local anti-poverty strategies in the UK and the Netherlands. Comparing these issues in North Tyneside and Rotterdam, this research shows that despite novel attempts towards involvement at grassroots level, this ideal is belied by a more restricted reality. Radical democracy requires intervention along an explicit participatory ideology external to the internal logic of governance pluralism. Any project for radical and plural democracy, moreover, needs to be mindful of the nature of the relationship between state and civil society, and retain a normative conception of the 'third-sector'. Despite enduring institutional specificities and contextual path-dependence, a deepening process of international neo-liberalisation has engendered a tendency for welfare regime convergence in the UK and the Netherlands. Certain possibilities exist for policy transfer between these different institutional contexts.
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### Abbreviations

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAW</td>
<td>General Disability Benefits Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABW</td>
<td>National Assistance Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMA</td>
<td>Association of Metropolitan Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AME</td>
<td>Amsterdam Study Centre for the Metropolitan Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOW</td>
<td>General Old Age Pension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>anti-poverty strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANW</td>
<td>Bewonersorganisatie Aktiegroep het Nieuwe Westen (Nieuwe Westen Citizens Action Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBT</td>
<td>Bewonersorganisatie Bospolder-Tussendijken (Bospolder-Tussendijken Citizens Organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>Big Cities Policy (Grote Steden Beleid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BD</td>
<td>Bewonersorganisaties in Delfshaven (Citizens Organisations in Delfshaven)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDS</td>
<td>Bewonersorganisatie Delfshaven-Schiemond (Delfshaven-Schiemond Citizens Organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHCDP</td>
<td>Battle Hill Community Development Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM</td>
<td>Bewonersorganisatie Middelland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOMWD</td>
<td>Bewonersorganisatie Oud Mathenesse/ het Witte Dorp (Oud Mathenesse/ het Witte Dorp Citizens Organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOOM</td>
<td>Bureau Onderzoek Op Maat (Made-to-Measure Research Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOS</td>
<td>Bewonersorganisatie Spangen (Spangen Citizens Organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRUG</td>
<td>Bijkozondere Rotterdamsse Uitkerings Gids (Rotterdam Special Benefit Guide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVS</td>
<td>Bewoners Vergenging Spangen (Citizens Union Spangen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAB</td>
<td>Citizens Advice Bureaux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Community Action Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASE</td>
<td>Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Compulsory Competitive Tendering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Centrum voor Dienstverlening (Centre for Social Services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Christen-Democratisch Appel (Christian Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Community Development Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CED</td>
<td>community economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Cliënten Paneelen (Client Panels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAG</td>
<td>Child Poverty Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Community Resource Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSPS</td>
<td>Centre for Social Policy Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CURDS</td>
<td>Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVS</td>
<td>Council for Voluntary Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delphi</td>
<td>Stichting Delphi Opbouwwerk Rotterdam Delfshaven (Foundation Delphi for Community Development in Delfshaven)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Disability Advice Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Christian Democratic party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoE</td>
<td>Department of the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETR</td>
<td>Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCK</td>
<td>Delfshavense Instelling voor Sociaal Cultureel Werk en Kinderopvang (Delfshaven Institute for Social Cultural Work Childcare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISK</td>
<td>Dienstverlening Industrieel Sociale Kerkelijk (Service of Churches in Industrial Society)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>Dudley People's Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Department of Social Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDTG</td>
<td>Economic Development Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Education Priority Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERDF</td>
<td>European Regional Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Employment Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>European Social Fund</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EU European Union
EUR Erasmus University Rotterdam
FEF Full Employment Forum
FEOGA European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
GLC Greater London Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
GONE Government Office for the North East
GR Gemeente Rotterdam (Rotterdam Municipality)
GSB Grote Steden Beleid (Big Cities Policy)
HCDT Howdon Community Development Trust
HMSO Her Majesty's Statistical Office
HYPERS Howdon Young Peoples Extended Resettlement Scheme
IEG Institute of Economic Geography
HIS Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies
ILM Intermediate Labour Market
IMF International Monetary Fund
INPS Italian Pension Fund
IP Instelling Panel (Organisational Panel)
ISEO Instituut voor Sociaal-Economisch Onderzoek (Institute for Socio-Economic Research)
ISS Institute of Social Studies
IT Information Technology
KIOSK Kerkelijk Informatie in Overlegplatform Inzake Sociaal en Sociaal-Economische Kwesties (Churches Discussion Forum for Social and Socio-Economic Issues)
KROSBE Kategoriale Rijnmonde Organisatie van Surinamers voor Beleidsbeïnvloeding en Emancipatiebevordering (Specialist Rijnmonde Organisation for Surinamese People to Influence Policy and Stimulate Emancipation)
KSA Kerkelijk Sociaal Arbeid (Churches Social Work)
LCO Landelijk Centrum Opbouwwerk (National Centre for Community Development)
LDEI Local Development and Employment Initiatives
LETS Local Exchange Trading Schemes
LGII Local Government Information Unit
LO Landsorganisationen (Federation of Manual Workers Trade Union)
LOCIN Local Initiatives to Combat Social Exclusion
LPC Longbenton People's Centre
LPU Low Pay Unit
LSE London School of Economics and Political Science
MCCT Meadow Well Community Development Trust
MCP Model Cities Program
MSC Manpower Services Commission
MWCC Meadow Well Construction Company
MWRC Meadow Well Resource Centre
NCC Newcastle City Council
NDC New Deal for Communities
NDPI Northumbria Drugs Prevention Initiative
NDU New Deal for the Unemployed
NEDB National Economic Development Board
NFCU National Federation of Credit Unions
NIZW Nederland Instituut voor Zorg en Welzijn (Dutch Institute for Care and Welfare)
NLG Nederlands Guilders (Dutch Guilders)
NPO Non Profit Organisation
NSPC North Shields People's Centre
NTBC North Tyneside Business Centre
NCC North Tyneside Council
NTCC North Tyneside City Challenge
NTCU North Tyneside Centre for the Unemployed
NVCO National Council for Voluntary Organisations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NWW</td>
<td>New Unemployment Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEO</td>
<td>Office of Economic Opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK</td>
<td>Onbenutte Kwaliteiten (Unused Qualities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMIJ</td>
<td>Ontwikkeling Maatschappij Ijsselmonde (Ijsselmonde Development Company)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWP</td>
<td>Oude Wijken Pastoraat (Old Neighbourhood Pastorage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>Italian Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCJ</td>
<td>Problem Cumulatie Jebeiden (Problem Accumulation Areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>People's Centre Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>Particulier Initiatif (Particular Initiative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKC</td>
<td>Priority Key Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>Policy and Resources Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Italian Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Partij van der Arbeid (Labour Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECIPE</td>
<td>Research Centre for International Political Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIO</td>
<td>Rotterdam Instituut Bewoners-Ondersteuning (Rotterdam Institute for Community Support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skr</td>
<td>Swedish Krona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Sociaal Activering (Social Activation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>(Swedish) Employers Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAO</td>
<td>Stedelijke Adviesraad Ouderen (City Advisory Committee on Policies for the Elderly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Workers Party</td>
</tr>
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<td>SAUS</td>
<td>School for Advanced Urban Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBAW</td>
<td>Stedelijke Bureau Ander Werk (City Work Replacement Office)</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Somervyl Centre</td>
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<td>SEU</td>
<td>Social Exclusion Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SKC</td>
<td>Standard Key Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMDD</td>
<td>Stichting Maatschappelijk Dienstverlening Delfshaven (Foundation for Social Work and Social Services in Delfshaven)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOG</td>
<td>Steunpunt Opvoeding en Gezondheid (Education and Health Centre)</td>
</tr>
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<td>SONOR</td>
<td>Stichting Onderneming Opbouwwerk Rotterdam (Support Foundation for Community Development in Rotterdam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRB</td>
<td>Single Regeneration Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUGBA</td>
<td>Stichting Uitkerings Gerechtigden Bloemhof Afrikaanderwijk (Foundation for Social Justice in Bloemhof and Afrikaanderwijk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZW</td>
<td>Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (Social Affairs and Employment Opportunities)</td>
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<td>TANF</td>
<td>Temporary Assistance for Needy Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Training and Enterprise Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOS</td>
<td>Thuis op Straat (Feeling at Home on the Streets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSER</td>
<td>Targeted Socio-Economic Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trade Union Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSIU</td>
<td>Trade Union Studies Information Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWCC</td>
<td>Tyne and Wear County Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWDC</td>
<td>Tyne and Wear Development Corporation</td>
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<td>TWRU</td>
<td>Tyne and Wear Research and Information Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>UD</td>
<td>University of Durham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>Urban District Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>University of Middlesex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNN</td>
<td>University of Northumbria at Newcastle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNUT</td>
<td>University of Newcastle upon Tyne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Urban Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URBEX</td>
<td>Spatial Dimensions of Urban Social Exclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>University of Sunderland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>USL</td>
<td>Unita Socio-Sanitarie Locali (Local Social and Health Units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTF</td>
<td>Urban Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UU</td>
<td>University of Utrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UvA</td>
<td>Universiteit van Amsterdam (University of Amsterdam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VODA</td>
<td>Voluntary Organisations Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Conservative Liberal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAO</td>
<td>Disability Insurance Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFTC</td>
<td>Working Families Tax Credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIO</td>
<td>Werk in Uitvoering (Work in Progress)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIW</td>
<td>Wet Inschakeling Werkzoekenden (Law on the Deployment of Job Seekers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPC</td>
<td>Wallsend People's Centre</td>
</tr>
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<td>WS</td>
<td>Wijkteam Spangen (Spangen Neighbourhood Organisation)</td>
</tr>
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<td>WW</td>
<td>Unemployment Insurance Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWV</td>
<td>Unemployment Benefit Act</td>
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</table>
Declaration

I confirm that no part of the material offered in this thesis has previously been submitted by me for a degree in this or in any other university. If material has been generated through joint work my independent contribution has been clearly indicated. In all other cases material from the work of others has been acknowledged and quotations and paraphrases suitably indicated.

Copyright

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

Signed: ......................................................

Date: ..........................................................
Acknowledgements

A great many people helped with the completion of this thesis. Without being able to mention them individually, my sincerest thanks go out to them all. As always the responsibility for the opinions and omissions in this thesis remain my own.

I would however like to take this opportunity to mention the following people. I am indebted to the Economic and Social Research Council for providing funds for this research (award R00429634008), in particular Jill Maslen who provided kindness and support throughout. My supervisors Ash Amin and Joe Painter are owed thanks for their critical comments and the insights they have provided on academic life. Numerous people from the Department of Geography helped greatly - including Stella Henderson and Alison Wilkinson - for printing and photocopying, and for dealing with what must have seemed like endless requests. Particular thanks go to Gareth Potts, Angus Cameron and Chris Dunn who helped make the process a bearable one for me.

Many people were kind enough to spend time talking to me in North Tyneside and Rotterdam - on occasions at great length and with no obvious, or at least immediate, benefit to themselves. Without their co-operation this thesis would not have materialised. There is always the danger of getting close to projects in the field, without being able to provide the level of support so important in return, and I sincerely hope my presence did not raise expectations over and above what I could realistically offer. My best wishes to you all for the future.

A debt of gratitude is owed Bert van der Knaap from the Institute of Economic Geography at Erasmus University who very kindly agreed to host my six month stay in Rotterdam. Frank van Oort and Paivi Oinas became friends. Frank introduced me to some of his favourite haunts, arranged cycle tours of Rotterdam and helped me with the map and photos of that fascinating city. I am grateful to Emile van Dijk for producing the map of Rotterdam. Similarly I am very thankful to John Jasper and Dave MacKenzie for that memorable photo shoot in North Tyneside. Ben Humphries provided company and conversation at a crucial time, indeed for us both. Needless to say Miles, John, Joshua and Charles among others all played their part.

On a final note a very special thanks goes to my family and friends for providing the inspiration and continued support in times of immense stress. Despite a heavy workload of his own my father read diligently through earlier drafts, advising on grammar and style. Without you all it would never have been completed. This work is for you.
Introduction

It is customary for academics, politicians and other observers to regard the involvement of local people in decision-making as intuitively a 'good thing' and beyond reproach. After all - who could possibly question this unalienable right of free and equal citizens in a liberal democracy, particularly when more people than ever before enjoy political freedoms unthinkable merely a century ago? There is much talk of 'stakeholding', 'partnership' and 'democratic renewal' in this new political creed - aspects that are beginning to cohere around a somewhat nebulous concept of 'third-way politics' with implications for 'socially inclusive governance'. A question remains concerning the extent to which a socially inclusive and therefore truly democratic governance system under capitalism is a real possibility. Thinkers like György Lukács and Antonio Gramsci in their time - and latterly scholars from the Frankfurt School and other currents in Western Marxism - are deeply critical of the essentially exclusive nature of capitalism. There is a need to approach the notion of 'socially inclusive governance' - with the ramifications this new form of governance holds for radical democratisation - with similar scepticism. Attending to this need this research is centrally concerned with the potential linkage between governance pluralism and radical democratisation, comparing actual mechanisms for popular involvement in decision-making within the field of anti-poverty strategies (APS) in the UK and the Netherlands.¹ To try and gain a sense of these issues locally this research compares empirical material from North Tyneside in the UK and Rotterdam in the Netherlands.

¹ This acronym for anti-poverty strategies is used throughout this thesis. While acknowledging that acronyms run the risk of 'reifying' the object of analysis - in this case APS defined as a diversity of strategies that attempt to deal with the problems of poverty, social exclusion and urban deprivation in their variety of forms - it is important to note that a conscious effort is made to avoid this tendency in this work. It is used here as shorthand for reasons of convenience, but does still refer to a diversity of strategies. As these strategies are investigated from a governance perspective - one that implies a shift from a 'top-down' and monolithic strategic leader to a collage of different organisations in a situation of pluralism - this seems appropriate.
Rise of Governance Pluralism

Commentators from a variety of disciplines - including political economy, industrial sociology and economic geography - claim that the decline of Fordism in the post-war period has generated a 'crisis of regulation' and a 'crisis of governance' in western capitalist economies at local, national and international levels (see Hay, 1995; Jessop, 1995a; 1995b; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; and Tickell and Peck, 1995). Taken together with wider developments such as globalisation, these crises are said to represent a 'hollowing-out' of the nation state, involving the surrender of certain strategic functions to supra-national institutions - such as the EU - and the decentralisation of others to sub-national levels (see Jessop, 1991; 1994; Giddens, 1990; Hirst and Thompson, 1995; 1996). For other observers these crises present the possibility for multiple actors and institutional forms to be endowed with responsibility for the delivery of services previously administered centrally: basically, a shift from 'government' towards new models of 'governance', including the rise of forms of pluralist representation with prospects for radical democratisation.

Interest in new forms of governance cuts across the traditional ideological divide between the Left and Right. Deep-rooted economic inefficiency and authoritarianism in the former Soviet bloc, on the one hand, and mounting structural constraints on corporatism in countries like the UK on the other, have served to greatly discredit hierarchical governance models among critics on the Left (see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Habermas, 1990; 1991; 1996; Mouffe, 1993a; 1993b; ed., 1995b; 1995c). On the Right a certain euphoria over the global hegemony of neoliberalism in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union was proclaimed somewhat euphemistically by one observer as the 'end of history' (Fukuyama, 1989; and 1992), and indeed neo-liberal approaches have gained much popular appeal, particularly since the early 1980s with the Anglo-American New Right. The far-reaching 'market-experiment' of the New Right has nonetheless proved equally unsatisfactory, leading to social fragmentation, widening material inequality and rising levels of poverty (see Wilson, W. J. 1987; 1996; Jargowsky, 1996; and Mingione, ed., 1996; see also Krieger, 1986; Gamble, 1988; Adonis and Hames, eds., 1994; and Pierson, 1994). The ground is fertile for governance models that transcend the

2 The New Right denotes a reaction among western intellectuals against various forms of socialism. Robert Grant (1993) shows there are four main schools of thought within the New Right. The first refers to neoliberalism (or liberal-conservatism) where eminent figures like Friedrich Hayek, Karl Popper and Milton Friedman stress the centrality of individual liberty for the pursuit of private free enterprise, in a market unfettered by any centralised and definitive knowledge of human needs (see Hayek, 1962; 1962; Friedman and Friedman, 1962; Popper, 1966). The second is the neoconservative school, typified by Roger Scruton (and the Salisbury Review) in the UK, William F. Buckley (and the National Review) and the Jewish journal Commentary in the US. Based largely on Burke's conservatism this school is anti-individualist, placing an emphasis on duty, authority, morality, tradition, culture, community and national identity (see Scruton, 1984; and ed., 1988). The third - libertarianism (or moreo-capitalism) - based exclusively in the US through the work of Rand, Rothbard and Nozick - sees state intervention as unnecessary, save enforcement of property rights (see Nozick, 1974). The final school refers to various strands within French and Eastern European anti-communism, including continental existentialism and (unfavourable) experience of 'actually existing socialism'.
There are three main strands of work of a more normative persuasion discussing the rise of pluralist forms of governance with implications for local involvement. The Polish political economist, Jerzy Hausner, develops the notion of an *interactive state* describing an alternative pluralist approach to social change in the context of post-socialism transition (see Hausner, 1995; and various contributions in Amin and Hausner, eds., 1997). He distinguishes between an *imperative* model - where desired changes are forced through by a central authority (such as the state) - and an *interactive* model of social change. The latter follows an 'interactive method' where desired changes are elicited through social innovation, with the central authority as one participant among a plethora of other independent agents. In this pluralist arrangement changes in the behaviour of any one participant can only happen as the result of mutual interaction between participants, and the central authority aims to stimulate the *social process* by which rules of a new system of governance are formulated and defined, allowing participants to satisfy their needs and realise their interests. All governance agents in this approach are subject to this social process of definition and formulation.

The negotiative dimension reflects the second main body of work on pluralist governance, referring to the *negotiated economy* in Denmark as an instance of the flexible adaptation of classic corporatism (see Nielsen and Petersen 1991, Jessop et al., 1993; and Amin and Thomas 1996; see also Jessop, 1997b and Sorensen, 1997). Drawing upon the work of Klaus Nielsen and Ove Pedersen, Amin and Thomas argue at the level of decision-making and policy implementation there are five key elements of the negotiative model cohering around the mobilisation of political voice in governance:

3 The 'third-sector' respects both financial return and social need *without prioritisation of one over the other*. While not engaging in problems of defining this sector, it will suffice to say that by the 'third sector' is meant a range of institutions neither privately nor state owned, occupying an *intermediate* position between the state and market. Included in this definition are numerous organisations from the voluntary sector, including self-help initiatives, familial and informal networks, community groups, charities and aid agencies at all levels. Worker co-operatives and community businesses are also included in this definition. These organisations are owned and managed by the people and communities they serve and not by distant bureaucracies or capitalists (see Beaumont, 1996).

4 Following Putnam 'social capital' refers to 'third-sector' organisations (see footnote 3). There is a growing perception that the formal economy is unable to deliver employment and social justice in the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. 'Third-sector' organisations are also considered a means of reconciling efficiency and equity by filling in the democratic deficit under capitalism. With economic democracy as the 'third-way', 'social capital' is important in four main ways. The 'third-sector' can act as an institutional basis for trust which reduces transaction costs through social interaction (see Etzioni, 1993; 1995; and Fukuyama, 1995). It can also act as the basis for active civic life: restoring democracy in civil society; fostering active associative governance; enhancing institutional efficiency; and engendering a combination of vibrant civic life, well-functioning democracy and economic success (see also Hirst, 1994). It can provide new jobs in the service sector and for the empowerment of communities through community economic development (CED) (see Henderson, 1991; Lipietz, 1992; Daly and Cobb, 1994; EC, 1995; 1996a; 1996b; 1997; 1998; Rifkin, 1995; Hutton, 1996; 1997; and Patel et al., 1996). Finally, the 'third-sector' can act as the organisational basis for local involvement for 'third-way' governance and radical democratic renewal. Bringing to the fore notions of active citizenship, direct action and social movements, it offers the chance of bringing the marginalised back into the governance frame.
The first is a high level of interest representation and organization of public life across economy, politics and society. The second is the considerable spread of decisional authority and autonomy across a system of plural interest representation. Third, and as a consequence, the state plays a distinctive role as arbitrator and facilitator between autonomous organizations, in addition to that of rule-maker and specialized provider of collective services. The fourth aspect concerns the evolution of a dense network of vertical and horizontal channels of representation and communication as the basis for decision-making and policy coordination. The final aspect is the reliance on iterative dialogue for conflict resolution and policy consensus, through a variety of routine organizational devices such as informal policy networks, arbitration councils, multi-interest special committees and co-representation.

(Amin and Thomas, 1996: 257).

Directly concerned with the central importance of plural lines of democratic representation, a number of writers turn to pluralist theory in making the case for democratisation of governance (see Hirst, 1989; 1994; Cohen and Rogers, 1992; 1995a; 1995b; see also contributions in Wright, ed., 1995). Echoing work early this century on both sides of the Atlantic on the dispersed and pluralist character of democracy, Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers revisit arguments around associationism. As the institutional forms of traditional liberal democracy appear increasingly unable to cope with the complexities of governance, they offer an innovative scheme for revitalising, indeed radicalising, modern democracy in the west. By strengthening the role of secondary associations, a plethora of civil society organisations that intermediate between the individual and the state - such as unions, work councils, neighbourhood and community groups, and minority organisations - can engender, for Cohen and Rogers, a process of democratisation by encouraging active participation of people from the grassroots in politics. Elaborating on these points, Paul Hirst in his book *Associative Democracy* (see Hirst, 1994), speaks of the need for empowerment of poor and excluded people at the base of society for reversal of their predicament and maintenance of social cohesion:

The only effective answer to this problem [poverty, exclusion and social fragmentation] is a mixture of crusading by those 'haves' who care and the empowerment of the 'have nots'. That can best be achieved by adequately publicly funded and committed voluntary associations working in partnership with the poor and excluded. Only by resourcing associations that help the poor to organise themselves and then funding projects to transform ghettos and slums can the state help to reverse this corrosive process of social decline.

(Hirst, 1994: 10).

**Radical and Plural Democracy**

Renewed interest in pluralist forms of democracy and enhanced interest representation in governance does not, however, fully resolve the problem of popular involvement in new governance models. Attention to four further areas of inquiry arguably helps deepen an
understanding of prospects for such radicalisation of governance. Recalling earlier work of György Lukács and Antonio Gramsci (see Lukács, 1971; 1974; Gramsci, 1971; 1977; and 1978), various contributions to the New Left literature, that flourished from the late 1950s and 1960s onwards, potentially help deepen understanding of participatory democracy (see Marcuse, 1955; 1964; Horkheimer, 1968; Habermas, 1970; Adorno, 1973; and Markovic and Cohen, 1975). Referring to the ‘full and continuous involvement of all individuals in decision-making which directly affects their lives’, participatory democracy is regarded as the radical alternative to the capitalist system as it stands, which is elitist, serving to exclude and marginalise those people at the grassroots of society from any part of controlling or determining policy (see Outhwaite and Bottomore, eds., 1993). Problematising the difficult relationship between capitalism and democracy, this radical tradition reminds us that ‘socially inclusive governance’ reflects a reformist agenda and not a fundamentally radical package for change. Broadly in keeping with this tradition, other writers stress the relationship and inter-penetration between organisations of the state and civil society as centrally important in determining popular involvement in decision-making. And it is on precisely this note that Nicos Poulantzas (1978) argues for a project of democratic socialism that incorporates a plurality of organisational forms without recourse to authoritarian state domination:

Today less than ever is the State an ivory tower isolated from the popular masses. Their struggles constantly traverse the State, even when they are not physically present in its apparatuses. Dual power, in which frontal struggle is concentrated in a precise moment, is not the only situation that allows the popular masses to carry out an action in the sphere of the State. The democratic road to socialism is a long process, in which the struggle of the popular masses does not seek to create an effective dual power parallel and external to the State, but brings itself to bear on the internal contradictions of the State.

(Poulantzas, 1978: 257).

Radicalism of a more educational nature is found in the celebrated work of the Brazilian philosopher of education, Paulo Freire, which provides a perspective on empowerment - in fact, a raising of critical consciousness - as the blueprint for revolution (see Freire, 1972). A methodology based on critical education - indeed the pedagogy of the oppressed - is the route towards obliteration of class differences. Any other approach fails to address the reality that oppressors - that is to say, the powerful in capitalist society - already use their education to maintain the status quo. As a humanist (unlike certain structuralist observers), Freire believes in the liberating possibilities of education when it avoids authoritarian teacher-pupil distinctions, and is based on actual experiences of students within a continued shared investigation (see also Morgaine, 1994; and Gopalan, 1997). This dialogic and egalitarian approach that is free from class distinctions, develops the ability for creative intelligence in people rather than passive reception of information, and avoids the danger of formerly uneducated people using their education in a new round and type of oppression. In this way the ‘culture of silence’ of poor and oppressed people can be broken, in all contexts of poverty and not just within low-
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income countries like Brazil. By implication this 'pedagogy' is centrally concerned with raising critical consciousness as a means of engaging under-privileged people in political activities. This involvement takes the form of critique of a system that is said to cause their oppression, situating them at the base of society, and in doing so informs a method for transcending particularist, single-issue and culturally-orientated politics.

Much of the most significant work attributed to the New Left came out of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research - the famous Frankfurt School - which spawned critical theory as an extension and reformulation of classic Marxism in the western tradition (see Geuss, 1981; Outhwaite and Bottomore, eds., 1993; Johnston et al., eds., 1994; Honderich, ed., 1995; Outhwaite, ed., 1996). Combining philosophical anthropology, hermeneutics, pragmatism, psychoanalysis and linguistic analysis, it was the work of Jürgen Habermas from the 1960s onwards which took critical theory on to new ground, founded on insights into the 'linguistic intersubjectivity of social action'. In particular, his reformulation of hermeneutic philosophy and Wittgensteinian analysis of language led him to believe that human beings have always been bound to each other by the medium of reaching rational understanding through language - the much vaunted 'ideal speech act' - a programme first presented systematically in the Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols. (see Habermas, 1984a; 1987; see also Outhwaite, ed., 1996). At all times grounded in the Enlightenment project this approach has clear implications for radical democratisation. Most importantly Habermas's work suggests an 'ideal speech situation' where all participants are involved, on an egalitarian basis, in a rational and constraint free communication for a depth understanding and reconciliation of hitherto conflicting value claims. Radical democracy, then, is at the same time the meaningful and egalitarian process of communication between all relevant political subjects - all bringing tacit knowledge to this communication - and the end-state of rational reconciliation and integration between them. The radical democratic ideal is where the voices of all participants are heard equally in the public sphere through rational communication as part of the 'unfinished project of modernity' (see Habermas, 1996).

The work of Habermas has generated a great deal of critical response, especially within the post-Marxist political theory of the French political philosopher Chantal Mouffe (see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 1990; 1993a; 1993b; ed., 1995b; and 1995d; see also Geras, 1987). From an irrationalist and anti-essentialist perspective that is sceptical of the Enlightenment ideal, Mouffe argues that Habermasian radical democracy is universalistic and rationalistic in temper and grounded on an evolutionistic and stagist conception of moral development. Against the view that dialogue rather than agreement is sufficient, she claims Habermas requires an 'undistorted communication' for a final, and to her mind, hopelessly utopian reconciliation of values (see Mouffe, 1993b; and ed., 1995b). Rather than extolling values of liberty and equality for a genuinely 'radical pluralism', she claims that the Habermasian position...
amounts to an unrequited belief in the possibility for rational consensus, with dangerous authoritarian implications. Radical democracy is impossible without the capacity for diverse political subjects to freely exert their multiple identities, above all in an antagonistic and conflict-ridden polity (see Mouffe, 1993b; ed., 1995b; 1995d; and 1997). Traditional liberal democratic theory, for her, is based on increasingly inadequate rationalist and essentialist conception of politics, obscuring the specificity of the political as the constitutive role of antagonism and power in social life. Drawing on the work of Carl Schmitt, John Rawls and feminist critiques, and developing ideas initially presented in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), Mouffe's more recent work has advanced the notion of a radical and plural democracy, which is said to steer a middle-ground between Habermasian rationalism and universalism and postmodern advocacy of absolute heterogeneity. She claims:

... in order to radicalize the idea of pluralism, so as to make it a vehicle for a deepening of the democratic revolution, we have to break with rationalism, individualism and universalism. Only on that condition will it be possible to apprehend the multiplicity of forms of subordination that exist in social relations and to provide a framework for the articulation of the different democratic struggles - around gender, race, class, sexuality, environment and others. This does not reject any idea of rationality, individuality or universality, but affirms that they are necessarily plural, discursively constructed and entangled with power relations. It means acknowledging the existence of the political in its complexity: the dimension of the 'we', the construction of the friend's side, as well as the dimension of the 'them', the constitutive aspect of antagonism. This is why such pluralism must also be distinguished from the postmodern conception of the fragmentation of the social, which refuses to grant the fragments any kind of relational identity ...

(Mouffe, 1993b: 7-8)

Political Background

Equally important for debates on governance of APS and radical democratisation is the nature of the political systems within which these differentiated approaches to welfare in general and poverty in particular occur. Geoff Mulgan, former director of the London-based Centre-Left think-tank Demos, argues in Politics in an Antipolitical Age - similar to Giddens in Beyond Left and Right - for a 'new politics' referring to the decline of the traditional Left/Right dichotomy, blurring the Old Left in a heterogeneous centre-ground (see Mulgan, 1994; and Giddens, 1994). Mulgan claims that many of the well-established political institutions in the west face crises as the era of Enlightenment comes to an end, and where parties and governments seem increasingly unable to cope with pressing social and economic problems. Where these problems once appeared as peculiar to the left, this impasse now covers the whole political spectrum, calling into question the roles of parties, politicians and national governments. Following an approach that parallels the governance debate, Mulgan argues that national political systems have 'hollowed-out', transcending their origins in national institutions and spreading to new domains of social life, from the global arena to the private lives of individuals.
Running concurrently, the economic organisation of society has waned as the central motivating force of politics, with a return to ethical and personal sources of meaning. Encapsulated as the end of the 'old politics' based on the dichotomy of states and markets and rival ideological camps, Mulgan points towards a new brand of politics based on quality and reciprocity of relationships and an alleged non-ideological political pragmatism.

It is no coincidence that within the last couple of years various centrist parties have swept to power across Europe, adopting political slogans and rhetoric somewhat close to this new political pragmatism. New Labour under the leadership of Tony Blair was elected following a landslide general election victory in May 1997, the first Labour government for 18 years. In the following year a new coalition of Social Democrats and Greens was brought to power in Germany, headed by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and in the Netherlands the second parse (purple) coalition under the leadership of Wim Kok from the Partij van der Arbeid (PvdA) (Labour Party) was elected. Alongside these political changes in Europe, the New Democrats in the US under President Bill Clinton have enjoyed successive terms of office at the White House. There are two common elements linking these political administrations. Firstly, all have risen to power in the vacuum left after many years of conservative rule - with the Conservatives in the UK, the Republicans in the US, and the Christian Democrats in Germany and the Netherlands. And secondly, all appear to adopt a Centre-Left political orientation - one that combines a belief in free market capitalism with a project for mitigating social exclusion by bolstering an ethical 'communitarianism'. These new governments are all, one way or another, committed to nebulous concepts of 'stakeholderism' and 'third-way' politics.

The Blairite 'third-way' involves steering a path between the Old Left state control, high taxation and worker interests; and the New Right belief in free markets, financial austerity and individualism (see Blair, 1998; Giddens, 1998; and Novak, M. 1998). For Giddens (1998) this 'third-way' presents an approach for the revitalisation of social democracy, where '[F]reedom ... should mean autonomy of action, which in turn demands the involvement of the wider social community. Having abandoned collectivism, third way politics looks for a new relationship between the individual and the community, a redefinition of rights and obligations' (p. 65). Demanding a new relationship between institutions of the state and civil society, he continues:

State and civil society should act in partnership, each to facilitate, but also to act as a control upon, the other. The theme of community is fundamental to the new politics, but not just as an abstract slogan. The advance of globalization makes a community focus both necessary and possible, because of the downward pressure it exerts. 'Community' doesn't imply trying to recapture lost forms of local solidarity; it refers to practical means of furthering the social and material refurbishment of neighbourhoods, towns and larger local areas. There are no permanent boundaries between government and civil society ... Yet it is particularly in poorer communities that the fostering of local initiative and involvement can generate the highest return.

(Giddens, 1998: 79-80).
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Policy Context

Continuing with the UK case, a number of policy documents have appeared within the last year that begin to place some foundation to the framework of this political vision. All of these policies aim to tackle 'social exclusion', which alongside 'welfare reform', embrace the need for 'partnership' and 'local community involvement' towards the end of 'social inclusion and cohesion' (see Levitas, 1998). From the Department of Social Security (DSS) various documents deal with the politically fraught issue of welfare reform, not least the 'Welfare to Work' proposals, including the 'New Deal for the Unemployed' (NDU) which involves a recasting of rights and duties and a strong work ethic (see DSS, 1998; 1999a; see also Kettle, 1997; Denny, 1997; Brindle, 1997; Timmins, 1997; and Keegan, 1998). The Department of Environment Transport and the Regions (DETR) has published a number of policy documents, including those for urban regeneration, such as the 'New Deal for Communities' (NDC) which aims to turn around deprived communities through 'genuine partnership' and a 'recognisable neighbourhood' approach (DETR, 1998a; 1998b; see also Glennerster et al., 1999; and Smith, 1999). Another document deals with 'Local Government Modernisation', looking to make local government more responsive and amenable to local communities (see DETR, 1998c). The important policy document Bringing Britain Together - the first report of the newly formed Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) published in 1998 - provides a number of social economy case studies dealing with problems of poverty and social exclusion (see Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). Pertaining to various policies - including the 'New Deal for Communities', the 'Single Regeneration Budget' (SRB), 'Sure Start' and the 'Health, Education and Employment Action Zones' - this report exemplifies the government's commitment to 'joined-up thinking' and the so-called 'third-way'.

The long-awaited report of UK government's Urban Task Force (UTF), Towards an Urban Renaissance, was published in June 1999 (see DETR, 1999; see also Rogers, 1998; Arlidge, 1999; Clover, 1999; The Economist, 1999; Hetherington, 1999b; and Pierce, 1999). Set up in 1997 by the DETR and chaired by the architect Richard Rogers, the UTF aims to make UK cities more attractive and encourage people to move back and live in inner-city rather than suburban and rural areas. Drawing on imaginative and innovative examples of urban renewal on the continent - particularly in previously blighted and war-torn cities like Barcelona and Rotterdam presided over by strong municipal wide councils - this report stresses the importance of devolution of power to local authorities, not least in terms of compulsory purchase in the housing sector. Urging public sector investment in partnership with the private sector, this report calls for equalisation of taxes levied on house refurbishment in 'brownfield', inner city...
sites, with those on new housing developments on 'greenfield' sites on the outskirts. Strongly influenced by theories of social and environmental sustainability - alongside notions of civic consciousness and *humane urbanism* - this report places great value on the revitalisation of urban public spaces, including recreational and meeting places, along with robust and efficient public transport networks (see Rogers, 1997). This approach relies on networks of interaction with local communities, involving local people in *all* stages of urban renewal while ensuring they do not become disenfranchised with the process. The report indirectly aims at combating problems of social exclusion by attempting to forge infrastructural and social links with previously isolated and often highly deprived neighbourhoods into an integrated, diverse and exuberant urban environment.

More recently, the first official poverty audit of the UK New Labour government, *Opportunity for All: tackling poverty and social exclusion*, was published in September 1999, revealing the depth of the task facing an administration committed to the eradication of child poverty within 20 years (see Darling, 1999; McSmith and Reeves, 1999; DSS, 1999b; Brindle, 1999; Frean; 1999; Grice, 1999). Re-installing the language of poverty and hailed as the most radical appraisal of UK social policy since the Beveridge Report (1942), this report calls for a wider concept of poverty that takes into account over 30 different indicators of 'opportunity', associated with a EU definition of poverty as households with less than half the national average income (£132 a week in the UK). On this measure a third of all children (4.5 million) are considered poor, three times the figure in 1979 when the Thatcher government came to power, with a fifth living in 'work-poor' households, twice the 1979 level. Emphasising a decrease in the proportion of children from households with no wage earner, a decrease in the proportion living in relatively low income households, a lowering of the proportion living in poor housing and an increase in 19 year olds with two A-levels or equivalent, the report sets targets by which a range of cross-department government policies will be judged on an annual basis. Without clarifying a baseline and timescale, it stresses the importance of non-economic factors, as well as traditional measures of material well-being - for the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) and the Low Pay Unit (LPU) denying the underlying need for more radical redistribution of wealth and extra resources for existing rather than additional initiatives.

**Primary Research Questions**

The preceding discussion indicates novel issues concerning the organisation of political actors at the local level. There are two salient challenges. There might be increased opportunity for the creation of new participatory networks, presenting a chance for new democratic inclusion away from former hierarchical forms. Secondly, the involvement of local marginalised groups
might be a possibility. It is unclear, however, whether these normative outcomes are likely in general and in all contexts, including those with limited non-state organisational strengths. In addition it is uncertain whether the welfare state is subject to the same rise of governance pluralism and prospects for democratisation as with economic management (for the latter see Peck and Jones, 1995; Jones, 1996; and 1997). This thesis investigates the rise of governance pluralism in the realm of welfare and addresses the potential for local involvement at two differing degrees: one, at the level of the organisation, as the governance debate suggests the opportunity for the involvement of hitherto marginalised ‘third-sector’ organisations; and two, at the level of the individual, as these organisations are thought more likely to encourage involvement of individuals in their activities. In doing so the thesis explores the implications of the ‘hollowing-out’ of the state for the voluntary sector, including the rise of governance pluralism and participatory mechanisms through a comparison of APS in the UK and the Netherlands. The broad question that remains unanswered is whether national and local level differences - in other words institutional context - influence issues concerning popular involvement in APS. The broad research questions are:

- does the way APS are governed, including the relationship between the local state and civil society, mechanisms for local involvement and democratisation, vary with institutional context?
- what theoretical and conceptual implications arise from a comparison of these issues in North Tyneside and Rotterdam?
- what are the policy implications for interpreting and imagining contemporary change towards radical democratisation of governance within APS?
- can work of this nature provide the basis for future research?

There are four reasons for addressing APS in this way. Firstly, APS presents a challenging area for testing ‘hollowing-out’, decentralisation and the rise of new ‘third-way’ strategies. Non-state APS are characteristically weak, with limited budgets, often highly dependent on the state for funding and in competition with organisations in the same field (see EC, 1995; 1996b; 1997; 1998; Patel et al., 1996). Secondly, one commentator has distinguished between ‘modalities’ (processes and mechanisms) and ‘objects’ (raw material) of governance:

... the very processes of governance co-constitute the objects which come to be governed in and through these same processes. Thus, while its objects may indeed pre-exist governance attempts as potential ‘raw material’, they only become real objects of governance to the extent that they are subject to specific, more or less effective governance mechanisms. Pertinent examples include: Porterian industrial ‘clusters’; flexible industrial districts; cross-border regions; and ‘negotiated economies’.

(Jessop, 1997b: 105).
Adopting Jessop’s terminology, APS have to date not been regarded as specific ‘objects’ of governance, however a novelty of this research lies in treating them as the ‘raw material’ in order to tease out their status as such. Thirdly, with the decline of Fordism and the rise of governance pluralism, mounting social and economic insecurity has led to increasing levels of poverty (see Mingione, 1991; 1993; ed., 1996; Jargowsky, 1996; and Power, 1997). Alongside this trend, ascendant problems of social exclusion - referring to marginalisation from so-called ‘norms’ of mainstream society - are afflicting a growing number of people in western countries, leading in part to a permanently impoverished ‘underclass’ residing in urban ghettos (see van Kempen and van Weesep, 1994; Wilson, W. J. 1994; 1996; and Zajczyk, 1996). And fourthly, the issue of combating poverty, as a targeted social policy, has become important in the policy literature, away from traditional assumptions of universal welfare provision. With the decline of the universal welfare state, important questions arise as how best to deliver a plurality of APS, and by whom. Some writers argue for an ‘inclusive poverty discourse’ that actively involves people with experience of poverty in all stages of APS (see Beresford and Croft, 1986; 1995; Croft and Beresford, 1989; and 1992). Difficult questions emerge as how to defend the core value of equality previously enshrined within this universalism, and whether a ‘third-way’ strategy is the most appropriate means for achieving this normative end. New research is required to advance current knowledge on welfare reform, ‘third-way’ strategies and local involvement to inform theory and policy for dealing with these escalating social problems and policy concerns.

There are two reasons for comparing these concerns in the UK and the Netherlands. One, a wide variety of welfare regimes are apparent across Europe, where some countries like Sweden and Italy have continued to remain resolutely within a certain model - and others revealing sharp differences and regime cross-fertilisation - as in the UK and the Netherlands (see Cox, 1992; 1993; Klamer, 1996; Peck, 2000; and Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). Presenting some difficulties with categorisation, the UK appears to represent a combination of liberal and conservative characteristics, and the Netherlands a mixture of conservative and social democratic elements (see van Kersbergen and Becker, 1988; Kloosterman, 1994b; Klamer, 1996; and Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). By comparing the governance of APS in the UK and the Netherlands it is attempted to draw out any nuanced differences that might help deepen theoretical understanding of hybrid welfare regimes, changing conceptualisations of poverty and radical democratisation. Two, traditionally rooted in a social democratic welfare system, the Netherlands only experienced an official ‘rediscovery of poverty’ in 1995, raising problems of poverty and social exclusion to the centre-stage of policy (see Gemeente Rotterdam, 1993; 1996; and 1998a). There may be innovative examples and lessons to be learnt by policymakers in the UK and the Netherlands in the field of participatory APS, thus helping advise transfer of policy between national contexts.
To examine these issues *locally*, case studies are taken in North Tyneside in the UK and Rotterdam in the Netherlands. These particular cases are chosen for five reasons. Firstly, a large proportion of economic activity in maritime and related industries - including shipbuilding - have been historically important in these urban localities, facing a severe process of decline and restructuring towards a 'post-industrial', service-based economy. Secondly, this process of restructuring has proved painful for many people previously dependent on relatively secure and well-paid employment in old industrial sectors. Levels of urban poverty and increasing problems of social exclusion brought on by unemployment and welfare reform, have affected a great many people in these declining old industrial areas. Thirdly, there is evidence for innovative anti-poverty experiments in North Tyneside and Rotterdam in advance of other urban areas in their respective countries. Fourthly, the character of governance varies in these places. Governance in North Tyneside displays elements of a 'top-down' and paternalist Labourite regime, with corporatist ambitions as the state opens to interaction with non-state agencies. Governance in Rotterdam, on the other hand, is representative of a classic 'top-down' and paternalist social democracy that has undergone a concerted process of municipal decentralisation - including experimentation in new mechanisms for local participation. Finally North Tyneside was chosen for ease of physical access, while a Dutch city like Rotterdam was chosen to limit potential restrictions of language.

**Thesis Outline**

The following two chapters form a conceptual framework for comparison of empirical material on APS in North Tyneside and Rotterdam. Chapter 2 takes issue with the rise in governance pluralism and the concern with mechanisms for local involvement, to date relatively absent from the governance debate orthodoxy thereby raising conceptual points of concern. A number of themes regarding the 'renewed interest in pluralism' within democratic theory are discussed. Looking to deepen insights into local involvement, the next section critically discusses tensions between positions adopted by Habermas and Mouffe on radical democracy, arguing that problems of rationality, application of pragmatist philosophy and intersubjectivity are key issues in determining popular involvement in decision-making. This chapter argues that the involvement of local people is not gainsaid and implicit within plural governance structures, and in turn is predicated on explicit ideological intervention outside the internal logic of governance. These issues are then related to various work within welfare theory, showing that arguments for state transformation and the rise of governance pluralism apply as much in the context of the 'mixed economy of welfare' as they do for economic management, processes rooted in deepening neo-liberalisation across many institutional contexts. Problems of radical democracy relate to the concerns of pluralist welfare in a number of ways.
The following chapter examines differences among nations for a more nuanced perspective on welfare pluralism and the potential for the involvement of local people. In this way it contextualises preceding theoretical and conceptual issues to get a sense of spatial and historical specificities in the provision of welfare in western nations. The first section of the chapter uses a typology based partly on welfare regime theory to trace broad lines of anti-poverty action in various countries in the post-war period. As a result it gives an indication of changes in APS across different welfare contexts in the transition from Fordist to post-Fordist welfare capitalism. Revealing a variety of welfare regimes - developing the significance of institutional context - it is argued that there is a tendency for welfare regime convergence through neo-liberalisation across these countries, bounded by certain institutional specificities and contextual path-dependence. Presenting a history of the decline in universal state welfare, the following section begins with a brief history of the 'poverty debate' and looks at contemporary issues around poverty and social exclusion - in particular the US 'underclass' debate and the European debate on 'social exclusion'. Following a three-way typology of APS based on market, state and non-state approaches that sees APS as the product of a variety and convergence of different sectors, a conclusion interrogates and problematises the two typologies presented in this chapter.

The fourth chapter looks at the practicalities and theoretical aspects of the methodology adopted for undertaking the fieldwork for this research. Following a section that sets down the primary questions, this chapter discusses various practicalities of the methodology used in attempting to answer them, and indicates why they are appropriate, including: a preliminary critical literature review; a comparative case study approach; and a qualitative research technique. This methodology involves semi-structured and in-depth interviews broadly within the hermeneutic and interpretive school of social science. The final section of the chapter provides theoretical justification for these methods. Following a critical realist epistemology, one that veers more closely to critical theory of the Frankfurt School than the American critical realist tradition, this research follows a conceptually driven empirical approach (rather than empiricist), grounded in categories derived from the governance debate. Wider debates within contextual theory are discussed to account for institutional differences between welfare regimes, while retaining a singular conceptual framework and therefore avoiding recourse to over-simplified context dependency. In doing so the chapter raises important issues with regards context and ideology in social research methodology.

The following two chapters present empirical findings from this fieldwork in North Tyneside and Rotterdam respectively. Chapter 5 shows that twin processes of de-politicisation and de-radicalisation of APS are apparent in North Tyneside. Following political changes in the mid 1980s and processes of restructuring since 1990, North Tyneside Council appears typically
Blairite (New Labour) in its approach to poverty. The development of its official anti-poverty strategy and success in securing urban regeneration funding is attributed to these changes. A period of local community activism and radical campaigning - simultaneously in and against the local state, in a relatively undeveloped non-state environment - has given way to a more professionalised, service-orientated and complex non-state sector in unequal partnership with the local state. In the context of resource constraints this situation has led to a more bureaucratic, paternalistic and managerial local state approach to the voluntary sector. The turning point in the growth of voluntary sector action against poverty was the experience and aftermath of the Miners’ Strike (1984-85). A number of non-state APS are identified, revealing a degree of horizontal and egalitarian association. There is in addition a distinction between mechanisms for participation in state and non-state organisations. There is a tendency for state mechanisms, including quangos, to be top-down, post-hoc and tokenistic - whereas non-state mechanisms tend to follow community development and communicative conceptions of involvement. The active mediation of local practitioners between the state and voluntary sector is crucial in overcoming the distance between state hierarchy and local residents. The chapter concludes by assessing the ways that identified APS have reduced poverty in the borough.

Chapter 6 argues that the way APS are governed in Rotterdam reflects a shift from community opposition to the state, to community partnership in a highly devolved statist environment, where multiple layers of state subsidised, independent foundations provide services for local people. Despite the strength of ‘top-down’ statism, the non-state sector is dominated by grassroots church organisations and neighbourhood action groups that continue to provide an important role in anti-poverty activities. Three broad and inter-related categories of state APS are identified, which taken together show tendencies for integration across different policy fields, a growing ‘neighbourhood perspective’, welfare professionalism and emphasis on local involvement in the midst of rationalised welfare provision. Three types of non-state APS are identified in Rotterdam. In addition to a few instances of grassroots radicalism and autonomous community activism, networks of citizens organisations at the neighbourhood level dominate non-state APS in the city. Approaches to the involvement of local people have tended to shift from formal, ‘top-down’ consultation, to a more communicative model based on publicity campaigns and active mediation by numerous neighbourhood workers. Strong elements of ‘top-down’ tokenism are still evident, despite shifts towards local engagement amidst a crisis of social democracy. As with the previous chapter on North Tyneside, this chapter concludes by examining the ways the identified APS have tackled poverty in the city.

The seventh chapter builds and deepens comparative analysis of the empirical material in light of the first three conceptual chapters. It shows that APS in North Tyneside and Rotterdam reveal a similar neighbourhood focus, policy holism in the social economy and an empowerment philosophy. There are however significant conceptual differences beneath this appearance of
similarity, which are discussed in turn. The chapter further reveals that the rise in governance pluralism has led to a diversity of governance forms in both localities, and comments on the broad picture of governance, and differences between them. Points of departure rest on issues of regulatory and fiscal centralism, conceptions of state dependence and rhetoric of partnership. Reference is made to three issues that emerge with respect to the involvement of local people in both contexts: distinction between means and ends; de-politicisation and de-radicalisation; and evidence for non-structuralism. Extending arguments in chapter 2, this chapter claims that the involvement of local people is not automatic and implicit with the advent of pluralism. Instead, explicit political intervention based on an ideology of participatory democracy is required to bring it about when national economies continually face international neo-liberal pressures. Echoing chapter 3 this chapter confirms that neo-liberalisation has led to a degree of welfare regime convergence in the UK and the Netherlands, through: a recasting of rights and duties and a growing punitive dimension; a decline in universal state welfare and a rise in targeted APS; and a rhetoric of benefit fraud in general and misuse of disability benefits in particular. Contextual path-dependence and institutional specificities - namely differences in social stratification - bound this convergence in both countries. This deepening process of neo-liberalisation in governance at all levels links all elements of the argument.

The eighth and concluding chapter focuses attention on conceptual, theoretical and policy implications that arise from the findings in this thesis. Beginning with the conceptual and theoretical side it addresses the rise of pluralism and 'third-way' perspectives in the provision of reformed welfare services, including targeted APS, and radical democratisation in the provision of those services. On the basis of the argument for welfare regime convergence, the second section discusses various implications for policy, including lessons for policy-makers and practitioners on APS and engendering more popular participation in governance for deepening the project for 'radical democracy'. The thesis ends with a suggestion for further research that can build upon research of this kind. In this way this conclusion points towards future research as part of a continued normative drive for popular involvement in the conceptualisation, design and implementation of APS and welfare more generally.
2

Government to Governance and Democratisation in Welfare

The core issue of this chapter is the general issue involvement of local people and by implication democratisation in plural governance forms. Following a section addressing the 'renewed interest in pluralism', tensions between positions taken by Habermas and Mouffe on radical democracy are discussed in more detail, looking to deepen insights into democratisation of governance. It argues that immutable philosophical problems of rationality, application of pragmatism and intersubjectivity are key issues in determining popular involvement in decision-making. Following this discussion, a section focuses attention on a number of points concerning the scope for democratisation of governance in the real world. Overall, the involvement of local people is not gainsaid and implicit within plural governance structures, reliant on explicit intervention on ideological grounds outside the internal logic of governance. These issues are then related to various strands within welfare theory, revealing that arguments for state transformation and the rise of governance pluralism apply as much in the context of the 'mixed economy of welfare' as they do for economic management, processes rooted in deepening neo-liberalisation across many institutional contexts. Problems of radical democracy therefore relate to the concerns of pluralist welfare in a number of ways, including local involvement in the 'mixed economy of welfare', social relations of welfare, tensions between universalism and particularism within welfare theory, and arguments for active involvement of people with experience of poverty in the poverty discourse.

Renewed Interest in Pluralism

The discussion begins by turning to the renewed interest in pluralist democratic theory to try and deepen an understanding of prospects for democratisation in governance. The previous chapter drew attention to an interactive model (based on the work of Jerzy Hausner), a negotiative model (based on Nielsen and Pedersen) and an associationist model (more recently
with respect to Cohen and Rogers, and Hirst) of governance pluralism. Following a brief background to the American and English strands on pluralism, this section takes issue with the renewed interest in pluralism, and deals with various issues that arise, critically questioning what these suggest for democratisation in governance.

There are three main varieties of pluralism, two of which are addressed here (see Hirst, ed. 1989; 1994; Nicholls, 1974; and 1994).\(^5\) Firstly, the American pluralist approach to political democracy, importantly influenced by de Tocqueville's Democracy in America (see de Tocqueville, 1945), refers to various work claiming that democratic politics are sustained by a wider society where plural forms of representation and influence are institutionalised and maintained (see Hirst, 1993; ed., 1989; and 1994). Less concerned with formal representative mechanisms of participation, this approach stresses the importance of numerous autonomous associations in civil society that mediate between the individual and the state. Aiming to ensure against the tyranny of majoritarian democracy - for the American pluralists, the outcome of Rousseau's 'social contract' formulation (see Rousseau, 1973) - these intermediary organisations disperse opinion and influence more or less equally throughout society given a relative egalitarian distribution of power. A polity is 'democratic' when composed of many competing minority factions, none able to exert inordinate influence at any one time. Developed formally in US political science since the 1940s (see Truman, 1951; Parsons, 1969), the most important work was Robert A. Dahl's A Preface to Democratic Theory that constructed a theoretical model of the conditions a polity must satisfy to ensure 'polyarchy', the plural and successive influence of interest groups (see Dahl, 1966; see also 1961). But as Hirst notes:

> Pluralism neither requires an absolute equality of influence for all groups, nor does it assume politics is without conflict; it tries to argue that inequality and conflict have to be confined below definite thresholds if the system is to be polyarchical. It is, therefore, perfectly possible for a pluralist system to fail either on the dimension of inclusiveness, whence it becomes an oligarchical system, or on the dimension of competition, whence it becomes an 'inclusive hegemony', that is, [where] power is monopolized by a specific minority group.

(Hirst, 1993: 472).

This suggests that pluralist democracy hangs in a perpetual balance, oscillating interminably between extremes of full inclusion and what Hirst calls an 'inclusive hegemony'. Local involvement and democratisation are not gainsaid even within a pluralist polity, and explicit political intervention (perhaps by the state) is required to ensure framework conditions are met (in the sense of Dahl's work) to bring about a process of democratisation.

\(^5\) The third strand - one less relevant to this discussion - sees pluralism in the context of institutional arrangements of a non-Western preindustrial society under colonial or postcolonial conditions. In this conception self-regulating and homogenous social groups live in adjacent and distinct communal sites, linked externally to the state and market, and were hierarchical relations of domination are more likely than equality of opinion and influence and importance between groups. As a result this form of pluralist society is considered a barrier to the development of the modern nation-state and integrated economy society (see Hirst, 1993; see also Furnivall, 1948; and Kuper and Smith, 1969).
Secondly, the *English tradition of political pluralism* flourished in the UK and abroad in the early part of the 19th century, only to fade soon after, but has experienced a recent resurgence (see Hirst, *ed.*, 1989; 1994; Nicholls, 1974; and 1994). Rather than argue for the diffusion of power as an empirical fact - as with the American pluralists - this English variant became more of a critique of state structure and the authority of the state. Challenging unlimited state sovereignty and the unitary, centralised and hierarchical structure of this conception of the state, English pluralists - like the legal historian F. W. Maitland, the Anglican clergyman John Neville Figgis, and socialists G. D. H. Cole and Harold J. Laski - stress the importance of voluntary associations of people in civil society for democracy. Following a more normative temper than the pluralists in the US they urge for the state to pluralise in order to complement and reflect the needs of these associations in a liberal and democratic polity and society. This pluralisation entails for these writers the necessity for devolution of authority and power to self-governing associations in civil society, as the only way to represent the specificity and diversity of will and opinion within the populace. Institutions of traditional representative democracy are simply unable to deal with this diversity. For Cole these institutions should be replaced with a 'functional democracy' based on industrial guilds, whereas Laski argues for a hybrid system that combines representative territorial government with functional self-government (see Cole, 1917; 1920; Laski, 1921; and 1948). As David Nicholls claims:

> [T]he idea that a state can exist only when the people share a common set of values is mistaken ... Certainly, a majority of people must share a belief in the importance of civil peace, combined with a willingness to allow their fellow citizens to live life as they chose to live it. They must also recognise some machinery that is the normal channel for resolving disputes, though this recognition will never be absolute. Individuals and groups will retain the right to use force in defending those which they believe to be vital. But the idea that governments must play an active and dynamic role in imposing or inculcating a single culture of set of values will lead either to totalitarianism or to civil war ... Indeed a pluralist must go further and see the role of the state not merely as allowing freedom to individuals and to groups, but as positively facilitating such freedom and encouraging citizens, by its structural arrangements, to join together in co-operative ventures to pursue some chosen substantive purpose which they share.

(Nicholls, 1994: 135).

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6 As Hirst (1993) shows, Maitland and Figgis were influenced by the German legal theorist Otto von Gierke's theory of associations (see Maitland, 1900). They critique the view that the only legitimate organisations in society are the state - representing the will of the people - and individuals as bearers of right. The state is limited in its power by a plethora of associations between its formal apparatus and individuals. Figgis in *Churches in the Modern State* argues that this situation inhibits the freedom and liberty of individuals and the internal democracy of civil society organisations. For him individuals can only freely exert their freedom in concert with others, and the autonomy of organisations, like trade unions and the church, are limited by the simple opposition of the individual and the state (see Figgis, 1913). Decrying the notion of monolithic state sovereignty, Laski argues all power and organisation are necessarily federative, and that the state should devolve responsibility to the most appropriate, functionally-specific associations (see Laski, 1921). As socialists, Cole and Laski argue for federative patterns of co-operation between firms that actively encourage participation of workers in management. Cole in *Guild Socialism Re-Stated* links pluralism and Guild Socialism (Cole, 1920).
The issue that remains unclear is precisely how this diversity of values in any population can be reconciled with a common and shared project for action without leading, to paraphrase Nicholls, to totalitarianism or civil war.

Bearing in mind this background, the discussion now turns to the contemporary interest in pluralism revived by Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, alongside recent work of Paul Hirst. Firstly, given the diversity of governance organisations under conditions of pluralism the problem of consensus comes to fore. How is the plethora of organisations representing different social, cultural and ethnic groups to be integrated into a coherent political project, one where all relevant parties are reconciled on an egalitarian basis? How should the relevance of parties be determined? And if coherence is regarded as an appropriate end in keeping with the tenets of liberal democracy, should it follow a model of rationality as suggested by Habermas, or a tempered irrationality as with Mouffe? Does responsibility fall into the hands of the central state to underwrite such consensus, perhaps via a written constitution (see Hutton, 1996; and 1997)? Or maybe such a role could be devolved to the local level as the associationists and other pluralists would claim? If either of these scenarios holds sway then perhaps the ultimate authority still lies with the state despite its pluralised, devolved and 'lean' role, as hinted at by Nicholls and Hirst (see Nicholls, 1994; and Hirst, 1994). As Ellen Immergut (1995) discusses, the framework for the rules of the game and the problem of consensus between various groups and values is a far from resolved one:

... even the representation of a wide variety of groups is problematic. Aside from the obvious risk that the more people you include, the harder it is to reach agreement, the inclusion of too many groups may overburden the negotiations by widening the agenda to include conflicts that are extremely difficult to reconcile. Representation of agricultural and social welfare groups in negotiations over employment, income policies and social wages would invite discussion of the large socioeconomic inequalities between urban and rural workers, the employed and unemployed, as well as inequalities of race and gender. While this is precisely the point of associative democracy, consensus bridging such a broad issue space will be difficult to achieve. Resolution of conflicts of religion, language or ethnicity - the identities that have been termed cultural cleavages - pose an even greater challenge to associative democracy than do distributional issues. Certainly, corporatist bargaining institutions do not attempt to span such divides.


Secondly, pluralist governance indicates a concern over the relations between institutions of state and civil society. Considering the form these relations should take, some commentators claim that the proper position for various non-state organisations in civil society is autonomous from representative institutions of the central and local state (see Cohen and Rogers, 1992;

\[^7\] Offe (1995) deals with rational actors and social order. A lateral method of bargaining between collective actors represents, for him, a mode of collective decision-making based on rational principles. By rationality he means the "probability of retrospective approval" or "non-regret" of collective decision-making such that "... it is capable of filtering out passions, its potential for qualitative variation, as well as flexibility in time and space, is greatest, as dimensions of demands and concessions can be discovered and utilized in the process of bargaining itself, and as long-term considerations, even extending beyond a term of office, can easily emerge" (p. 118).
1995a; and 1995b). Or given the problem consensus alluded to above, must there be a necessary constitutional relationship that binds the organisations in a coherent political project, as in some form of neo-corporatist and integrative arrangement? If the former autonomous relationship prevails, again, does effective consensus rely on rational integration of disparate actors in both state and civil society following Habermas? Noting that issues of consensus and autonomy potentially conflict - especially if governance is grounded on rationalist principles - is agonistic conflict the most one can expect as suggested by Mouffe? Is perhaps the case for autonomy and local involvement, then, more suitably manifested through mischievous activity of social movements in open conflict with the state, over secondary associations in a dependent and obedient consensus with the state? Andrew Szasz asks a similar question in relation to the politics of hazard waste management in the US, arguing:

... the process of the [hazard waste management] movement has itself produced important results. We live in a moment where most 'citizens' are profoundly apolitical, inactive and disinterested in the larger world. To the degree that anything political has been going on in our society, conservatism is in command. Given that conjunctural context, the hazardous waste movement's capacity to mobilize and radicalize thousands of previously inactive people is to be praised and cherished. Day-to-day life in the movement is the stuff of popular, truly participatory democracy. The ideological/conceptual development has been remarkable. Artfully constructed secondary associations might have made the process of regulatory implementation more trouble-free in the short run; I cannot see how they could possibly have produced similar changes in political consciousness and behavior ... [Cohen and Rogers] ... are undoubtedly right to argue that the 'mischief of factions' infirms democratic governance. I would venture to respond, though, that disruptive mischief is also the motive force for all real forward movement in social history. If so, then even the best-intended attempts to rid society of the former risks diminishing, as well, the latter.

(Szasz, 1995: 154-5).

If the integrative relationship based on associationist conformity predominates, how can consensus be reconciled with the normative goal of autonomy? The issue of flexibility of institutions comes to the fore; but it is questionable whether the representative state institutions are sufficiently flexible to accommodate political interaction with institutions of civil society (see Offe, 1995; see also Rao, 1998). After all the growth of non-state organisations reflects in the first instance a response to the democratic deficit and inflexibility within outdated representative institutions - not a response to inherent institutional flexibility as such.

Thirdly, relations between institutions of state and civil society under pluralism raise issues around democratic legitimacy in new pluralist governance. Hybridity of representative and participatory forms of democracy renders a potential conflict of representation (see Hirst, 1995; and Offe, 1995). Representative state institutions, traditionally considered in possession of a liberal democratic mandate, arguably conflict with participatory forms of representation in civil society, even in the context of legitimisation problems in late capitalism (see Habermas, 1976; 1984b; see also Held, 1987). How then is a coherent political project possible, one that maintains and upholds democratic legitimacy, given this conflict of interests and hybridity of
representative forms (see Potapchuk, 1996) - a situation exacerbated by fragmentation resulting from the shift in territorial to functional representation as suggested by the pluralists and associationists? Such conflict however may open up new potential:

Conflict within an institution about the structure of the institution and the potential for intentional change may also emerge in institutions that base themselves on more than one basic value or principle. It might then become possible to utilize such latent inconsistencies and ambiguities for the purpose of intentional institutional innovation that alters the mix of already existing ingredients. The examples I think of are dual sovereignties in federal systems, the conflict between liberal and democratic principles in Western democracies, or the co-incidence of 'social rights' of workers and 'economic' rights of owners and managers which together shape the legal framework of labour and industrial relations.

(Offe, 1995: 126).

What is clear is that coherence is problematic without a co-ordinating agency - such as the state, either central or local. But again, if such an agency is necessary, then what happens to the issues of institutional flexibility and organisational autonomy that give rise to the participatory forms of representation in the first place? Again, does such a co-ordinating function follow a rationalist logic as Habermas would have it, or along tempered irrational lines as claimed by Mouffe? There are no simple answers to these questions.

And finally, the issue of local involvement raises a tension between normative radical egalitarianism and the empirical advent of liberal pluralism in the new political governance. Cohen and Rogers argue for a deepening of democracy through secondary associations, bringing together work from the US and English political pluralist traditions. Firmly rooted in US political science and democratic theory, their approach adopts a strongly normative temper in prescribing a project for democratisation, a tone similar to the English pluralists - especially Laski and Cole. The tension between normative radical egalitarianism and empirical liberal pluralism in governance has much to do with the realities of politics in the US. Pluralist lines of interest representation and diffusion of power are generally considered empirical facts in the US, regardless of progressive policies for extending democratic involvement (see Dahl, 1961; 1966; and Polbsy, 1980). And bearing in mind Offe's concern with the non-transferability of explicit institutional arrangements, any project for radical democratic renewal should be cautionary when looking to the US. Radical egalitarian associationism, for Cohen and Rogers, stresses the 'artifactuality' of associative life (p. 30), meaning that associations are grounded based on explicit decisions and do not correspond to 'natural' social divisions and identities (see also Offe, 1995; and Young, 1995). Andrew Levine questions whether radical egalitarianism can inform a renewal of modern socialist ideals, rather than acquiesce in the dominant liberal hegemony. The current debate might help the Left reinvigorate an emancipatory project against structural inequalities and widespread misery under capitalism:
In recent years, as faith in socialism has declined, it has become less clear than was once assumed what the socialist alternative to capitalism involves. But this is not a reason to retract longstanding socialist commitments altogether. It is instead a challenge to develop a more adequate socialist vision. Nor do we need to have that vision fully in hand to assert that 'scientific democrats' must be socialists too. We are entitled to draw this conclusion albeit provisionally, first, because it is likely to that socialism is indispensable for realizing the objectives [that] progressives of all descriptions ultimately want to achieve; and second, because it is almost certainly the case that support for capitalism today, even if only in the course of promoting benignly democratic corporatist ventures, is ultimately detrimental to virtually any progressive agenda.

(Levine, 1995: 165-6).

Calling for democratic theorists to drop their focus on 'democracy' for process-orientated 'democratization', Levine suggests the debate should centre on popular involvement and empowerment of people in decision-making processes for a renewal of a project democratic and participatory socialism. A radicalisation of governance in this way would potentially provide the link between pluralism and popular involvement in democratic theory.

Radical Democracy Debate

The preceding discussion develops the problems in relation to pluralism and democratisation, but it is still unclear as to how and on what basis local organisations and individuals can get involved for radicalisation of plural governance to come about. There are various approaches to the problem of radical democracy, some of which were introduced in the previous chapter, that potentially deepen the discussion on governance pluralism and democratisation. Firstly, various contributions from the Frankfurt School and the New Left focused on participatory democracy as a critique of the elitist and exclusionary nature of capitalism - this work can be described as representing a radical participatory model. The second was Paulo Freire's work on the pedagogy of the oppressed - one that can be termed a critical liberationist model. Thirdly, work on communicative action by Jürgen Habermas is arguably representative of a rational communicative model. And finally, Chantal Mouffe's project for a radical and plural democracy forms the basis for a radical pluralist model. While acknowledging there are numerous other models of radical democracy - many of which embrace postmodern and post-

8 As Dennis H. Wrong (1993) notes the term radicalism is derived from the Latin 'of or pertaining to a root or roots', extending to mean anything that is essential or fundamental to any phenomena. Applied to politics it refers to any far-reaching reforms on either the Left or Right - ranging from incremental policy change to violent revolution - that embody to a greater or lesser extent a systemic belief system. Nonetheless it does not tend to suggest any specific or concrete institutional order to which these changes are directed (see Bell, 1963; Lasky, 1976; and Lipset, 1981). Radicalisation in this section carries with it a notion of 'the grassroots' - questioning whether plural governance can include grassroots organisations and individuals in decision-making structures.

9 Postmodernism is a term deployed in a variety of contexts - including architecture, painting, music, poetry and fiction - that denotes a laid-back pluralism of styles and a desire to do away with pretensions of high-modernist culture. Philosophically, postmodernism shares much with the critique of Enlightenment values and truth claims as advanced by liberal-communitarian thinkers on the one hand (see Etzioni, 1993; and 1995), and neo-pragmatists like Richard Rorty who celebrate the alleged end of the privileged status of philosophy as a truth-seeking discourse (see Rorty, 1982; and
structuralist\textsuperscript{10} positions on a fragmented and multi-faceted social reality and yearn for a identity-
based cosmopolitan democracy (see Trend, ed., 1996; and Amin and Thrift, 1999) - the
discussion that follows is restricted to tensions between positions advocated by Habermas and
Mouffe who arguably represent two opposing schools of thought on radical democracy.

Three inter-connected themes concerning the so-called 'Habermasian problematic' are
addressed, remaining unresolved while representative of the current radical democracy debate.
The first of these refers to the tension between rationality and irrationality\textsuperscript{11} (see Habermas,
There is a tendency in Mouffe's work to set up Habermasian 'communicative rationality' as the
focal point of attack. Habermasian 'ideal-speech act' - one that adopts universal (or latterly
formal) pragmatic linguistics in a way that aims to transcend specific contexts - is for her
grounded on an outmoded utopian and authoritarian position that combines rationalism and
universalism, with a modernist philosophical creed. Only an irrationalist position that denies the
context-transcendence of 'communicative rationality', stresses decentred social identities and
rejects a final reconciliation of values and truth-claims in a conflictual polity can represent a truly
radical and plural democracy. Rational consensus is the end of radical democracy with
Habermas, whereas irrational conflict is the best one can expect from Mouffe. This fundamental
conflict is what makes politics radical; in contrast to Habermasian consensus which for some
leads to a less radical, communitarian position (see Scruton, 1996). How can rational
consensus be guaranteed while respecting social diversity? Is a notion of unity through
'communicative rationality' flawed in its reliance on an idealised social dialogue that cannot take
into account barriers to a common language - such as cultural, ethnic and national differences
- not to mention problems of inequalities of power? Is Mouffe thus justified in branding rational
unity as authoritarian with its denial of individual differences and context-specificity? Answers to

\textsuperscript{10} Post-structuralism refers to a school of thought that emerged in the late 1970s seeking to problematise earlier structuralist
positions. Perhaps best conceived as a French variant of the alleged 'linguistic turn' - where attention to language and
discourse is the best that any philosophy can do in the search for knowledge and truth - post-structuralists follow the idea
that all perceptions, concepts and claims to truth are constructed in language, as are various 'subject positions' which are
similarly transient epiphenomena of one or another cultural discourse. Ferdinand de Saussure sees language as a system
of immanent relationships and differences without positive terms, Friedrich Nietzsche informs an epistemology of extreme
relativism, and Michel Foucault speaks the counter-Enlightenment rhetoric of 'power/ knowledge' behind claims to

\textsuperscript{11} Rationalism emphasises the centrality of reason rather than sensory experience, feelings or authority in seeking truth.
The 18\textsuperscript{th} century Enlightenment thinkers - including Voltaire, Diderot and Montesquieu - claimed the human mind and
society were as rational as other aspects of nature, and realisable through scientific method (reason). The progressive
improvement of the human condition was possible through expansion of the role of reason in human affairs (see Wilson,
W. J. \textit{et.}, 1970; Hollis and Lukes, eds., 1982; Hollis, 1993; and Lacey, 1995). An irrationalist position, by contrast, holds that
faith and intuition are superior to reason in the search for truth. The benefits of reason are largely refuted by irrationalists
- although they rarely advocate a complete disavowal of reason, dialogue tends to be constrained in their thought, often
against constant forms of reason rather than reason itself (see Aiken, ed., 1986; and Wiredu, 1995).
these questions arguably depend on the degree to which one advocates a modernist notion of rational and universal betterment of society. Mouffe is not against the political dimension of modernism, but rather its philosophical and social elements pace Habermas. While recognising that rationality and irrationality do not relate simply to universalism and particularism respectively, an uneasy balance between universal rationality and particularist ir-rationality lies at the heart of her project:

The reformulation of the democratic project [of the Enlightenment] in terms of radical democracy requires giving up the abstract Enlightenment universalism of an undifferentiated human nature. Even though the emergence of the first theories of modern democracy and of the individual as a bearer of rights was made possible by these very concepts, they have today become a major obstacle to the future extension of the democratic revolution. The new rights that are being claimed today are the expression of differences whose importance is only now being asserted, and they are no longer rights that can be universalised. Radical democracy demands that we acknowledge difference - the particular, the multiple the heterogeneous - in effect, everything that had been excluded in the concept of Man in the abstract. Universalism is not rejected but particularized; what is needed is a new kind of articulation between the universal and the particular.


Mouffe does not clarify this new relationship between universalism and particularism, at least it is unclear how a universal tenet of equality can be maintained in her radical and plural democracy in the midst of anti-foundationalist philosophy, anti-essentialist social theory and irrationalist pluralism (see Crook, 1991). Without political organisation of the poor and marginalised along their own distinct identity, this position does not offer a means for radical involvement in governance. Even if an autonomous 'anti-poverty' movement can mobilise sufficient energy, it is unclear how this would lead to democratisation by challenging prevailing power imbalances and enable rational articulation of needs in a radical, egalitarian and context-transcendent way.

Secondly, the debate on radical democracy raises in addition the tension over application of pragmatist philosophy. Both Habermas and Mouffe turn to pragmatist philosophers to support their arguments, but in substantially different ways and with contrasting implications for radical democracy (see Habermas, 1984a; 1987; 1999; Outhwaite, ed., 1996; Mouffe, 1993b; ed., 1995b; and ed., 1996). Habermas's 'discourse ethics' and 'theory of communicative action' are

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12 While there are certain antecedents in the work of the Sceptics, Kant and various neo-Kantians like Simmel, the term pragmatism is usually used to denote the philosophical movement that emerged in the US in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Philosophical pragmatism is generally concerned with the practical utility of knowledge, where most effective practical application provides a basis for determination of meaning and truth (or truths), morality and value. Charles Sanders-Pierce is generally regarded as the founder of American pragmatism, a movement involving subsequent work by William James, John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. Pierce later renamed his philosophy 'pragmaticism' to distance it from these other thinkers. Despite clear differences there are various common elements. Against Descartes they ground inquiry in a more substantial doubt where a co-operative search for truth is encouraged to overcome real problems of agency. Two, in situations demanding a solution, the creative realisation of something new is contrasted with those actions associated with habit. Three, pragmatism is not deterministic but stresses the importance of creative agency. Four, knowledge is not acquired for reproduction of reality but for dealing successfully with what reality brings. Finally, meanings of concepts lie in practical outcomes for action (see Smith, 1978; Thayer, 1981; Joas, 1985; and 1993).
both, one way or another, influenced by semiotic intersubjectivity and science discourse (Pierce), radical democracy (Dewey) and human communication (Mead). He writes in Toward a Rational Society:

... the successful transposition of technical and strategic recommendations into practice is, according to the pragmatistic model, increasingly dependent on mediation by the public as a political institution. Communication between the experts and the agencies of political decision determines the direction of technical progress on the basis of the tradition-bound self-understanding of practical needs. Inversely it measures and criticizes this self-understanding in light of the possibilities for gratification created by technology. Such communication must therefore necessarily be rooted in social interests and in the value-orientations of a given social lifeworld. In both directions the feedback-monitored communication process is grounded in what Dewey called 'value beliefs'. That is, it is based on a historically determined pre-understanding, governed by social norms, of what is practically necessary in a concrete situation. This pre-understanding is a consciousness that can only be enlightened hermeneutically, through the articulation in the discourse of citizens in a community. Therefore the communication provided for in the pragmatistic model, which is supposed to render political practice scientific, cannot occur independently of the communication that is always already in process on the pre-scientific level. The latter type of communication, however, can be institutionalized in the democratic form of public discussions among the citizen body. The relation of the sciences to public opinion is constitutive for the scientization of politics.

(Habermas, quoted in Outhwaite, ed., 1996: 47-8 - original emphasis).

Habermas's later work on universal (formal) pragmatics acts as an important theoretical element for his 'theory of communicative action'. Taking Noam Chomsky's 'universal grammar' into realms of social action, he develops Mead's work for a reconstruction of the universal features rather than particular contexts of language use. Habermas's formal pragmatic investigations into everyday linguistic practices are attempts at reconstructing the universal communicative competencies at stake when social (and therefore political) actors interact with the objective of reaching rational and mutual understanding (verstândigung): '[T]his idea of communicative rationality is meant to provide a postmetphysical alternative to traditional conceptions of truth and justice that nonetheless avoids value-relativism' (Cooke, quoted in Habermas, 1999: 5).

Habermas adopts elements of traditional pragmatism in defence of a universalistic democratic ideal. By contrast, Mouffe has flirted with Richard Rorty's neo-pragmatism - where a radical form of social and political contextualism denies the possibility of universal conceptions of truth or reality (see Rorty, 1979; and 1982; see also Kögel, 1995). Claiming that all philosophical attempts at distinguishing analytical-empirical, necessary-contingent, universal-historical (and so on) have failed, truth and meaning are nothing other than moments of specific social practice, Rorty's work is attractive for her particularist, contextualist and anti-essentialist conception of democracy (see also Rorty, 1991; and 1996; see also Dietz, 1995). Whether Habermas's or Mouffe's adoption of pragmatist arguments offer the best means (and hope) for radical involvement in governance depends largely on these philosophical differences, rooted in an opposition between modernist and postmodernist political theory.
Finally, although implicit in discussion of the previous two points, concern with prospects for radical democracy cannot ignore the philosophical problem of *intersubjectivity in social and political life*. Assuming that a radical democracy entails social engagement and mutual understanding between social and political actors, work by Habermas and Mouffe offer differing perspectives on social and political intersubjectivity. Basing his critical investigation of intersubjectivity on work by Husserl, Buber and Kojève's reading of Hegel, Nick Crossley distinguishes between 'radical intersubjectivity' - involving a lack of self-awareness and dialogic openness to the other - and 'ecological intersubjectivity' where intentional empathy leads to an experience of otherness (see Crossley, 1994; and 1996). From this framework he discusses various intersubjective thinkers - including Merleau-Ponty, Mead, Wittgenstein, Schultz and Habermas - arguing that mutually reinforcing approaches suggest that 'intersubjectivity is the fabric of social becoming' (Crossley, 1996: 173). Habermas's 'theory of communicative action' is clearly important in this respect, not least through his tripartite structure of the lifeworld and its reproduction through communicative action, along with validity claims raised in communicative action and the contested nature of symbolic reproduction. For Crossley other important features from Habermas's work include its grounding in material reproduction and social systems - *pace* recent post-Marxist thinking - and thoughts on 'new social movements':

The conclusion to *Theory of Communicative Action* is not wholly pessimistic. On the one hand, the systems dimensions of Habermas's theory itself is said to provide for a more coherent vision of the operation of the system. On the other hand, and better still, Habermas identifies a twofold catalyst for change within the lifeworld. In the first instance, his account of the rationalisation of the lifeworld ... identifies the emergence of a new reflexivity with the erosion and eradication of tradition which is a permanent potential source of criticism and agitation. More specifically, however, he points to the emergence of (so-called) 'New Social Movements' as evidence of a resistance to the colonisation and impoverishment of the lifeworld. Such movements aren't formed in relation to questions of distribution, as used to be the case (e.g. with trade union and socialist resistance), he argues. Their concerns arise out of the 'grammar of forms of life'. They want either to defend threatened traditions or to change (now unsettled) cultural forms for the better. Or again, they aim to achieve some form of local democracy and accountability.

(Crossley, 1996: 122 - emphasis added).

Habermasian intersubjectivity, however, tends to be equated with linguistic communication - in a limited and narrow cognitive sense - and thus ignores an embodiment dimension of intersubjectivity (see Crossley, 1996; and Whitebook, 1996). It does nonetheless offer an attempt to capture the rational and universal dimensions of intersubjectivity. Mouffe's work does not inform a general intersubjectivist position, largely because she denies the possibility of a

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13 Beginning with a distinction between objectivism and subjectivism - an *intersubjective* judgement refers to the status of being in some way accessible to at least two (and usually all) subjectivities. Imposing a dialogue between minds, intersubjectivists not only assume the awareness of other minds but also the intention to communicate with other minds. Some philosophers - particularly those sceptical of the attainability of objectivity - claim the best one can achieve is an intersubjective position, where subjectivities are brought into agreement independent of subjectivity. While it is well recognised that scientific hypotheses require intersubjective verification, a more fundamental issue concerns whether an intersubjective position requires or presupposes an objective environment within which communication between subjects takes place (see Quine, 1960; Lyon, 1995; and Narveson, 1995).
free and undistorted communication between social and political actors. Her refutation of a rational and universalist basis for radical democracy limits dialogue to specific social group identities - *intra-group* as opposed to *inter-group* intersubjectivism - in a highly contextualist form of social interaction and political affiliation. An 'anti-poverty' movement would be distinguished from an 'anti-racist' or 'anti-sexist' movement, without any rational integration - through dialogue and communication - on the basis of commonalities between them.

**Governance and Problem of Democratisation**

The 'hollowing-out' and decentralisation argument, as advocated by Bob Jessop and others follows the regulationist logic that due to the increasing complexity of economy and society in the post-Fordist era, the institutional arrangements that formed the Fordist compromise - namely national state regulation - are unable to deal effectively with issues of governance. As a consequence, various proponents of the idea of governance as discussed in the previous chapter speak of the *empowerment* of supra-national and sub-national agencies, suggesting these organisations are now endowed with responsibility and sufficient resources for provision of services previously administered at the national level.\(^\text{14}\) There is a tendency moreover to assume that the rise in pluralist and interactive governance means local people are automatically brought into the decision-making frame, leading to radical democratisation from the grassroots of society. This view however is far from unproblematic at ground level. It is necessary therefore to consider in which ways non-state governance relates to the concept of local involvement, and in turn whether or not this relationship is largely an assumed one. Certainly it is far from clear whether these concerns with local involvement and democratisation apply in all governance contexts, including those with limited non-state capacities. Perhaps prospects for local involvement are related to factors outside this governance logic that render mobilisation of human potential? Five points on the relationship between plural governance, local involvement and democratisation are addressed.

Firstly, for pluralist governance to be considered properly democratic various non-state organisations require sufficient devolution of *power as well as responsibility* (see Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Tickell and Peck, 1995; Goodwin and Painter, 1996). Enabling non-state

\(^\text{14}\) Using the term *empowerment* in this way does not preclude awareness of a varied literature on the subject. It has become integral to many studies, gaining powerful credence following work on critical education of the oppressed, that is to say, poor and excluded people in low-income countries (see Freire, 1972). The concept has subsequently referred to alternative development strategies in low-income countries where a high premium is placed on mobilisation of human potential (see Friedmann, 1992; Craig and Mayo, *ab.*, 1995); and in recent years forming a core element of a 'gender and development' perspective (see e.g. Blumberg *et al.*, *ab.*, 1995). From within the west, the issue of empowerment has typically referred to inclusion of community organisations in strategies for urban regeneration (see Colenutt and Cutten, 1994; Nevin and Shiner, 1995; and Power, 1996), and participation of community groups in post-Fordist urban politics (see Jacobs, 1992).
organisations - such as charities, community groups and voluntary projects of the so-called 'third sector' - to undertake service provision implies more than a simple devolution of responsibility from the state in the prevailing context of fiscal crisis and financial scarcity (see O'Connor, 1973; and Habermas, 1975; 1984a; see also Muller and Rohr-Zanker, 1989; Lichten, 1991; and Ford, 1996). They arguably require a meaningful and significant realisation of more financial resources, as part of a more general realisation of power. From a business studies and management perspective, Hardy and Leiba-O'Sullivan (1998) argue that the 1990s 'empowerment era', where various policies have sought participatory management - that is employee involvement in decision-making - have failed because they have ignored the 'power behind empowerment' (p. 452; see also Clutterbuck and Kemaghan, 1995). Reflecting an emerging 'convergence thesis', more recent work within participatory development questions the shifts in power needed if organisations and communities are to operate in an inclusive fashion (see Nelson and Wright, eds., 1995; see also Cheater, ed., 1999). Nelson and Wright draw attention to three main conceptions of power to help understand empowerment: one, 'power to' (individual realisation; personal attributes); two, 'power over' (zero-sum; transference); and three, 'power as discourse' (decentred notion; Foucault). Other work reveals that even with these conceptions of power in mind the idea of empowerment should be handled with care, with no simple relationship between them (see James, 1999). The US 'Empowerment Zone' approach to neighbourhood revitalisation - which emphasises participatory community development - is illustrative of this problem (see also Gittell et al., 1998; and Wiewal and Gills, 1995):

... there are dangers in overstating the potential for the neighbourhood movement. The community development movement is no panacea. At best, it offers a transitional programme to address structural issues of urban poverty and racism and the accelerated marginalization of large segments of the US population ... Also, the absolute growth in community development organizations is restricted by their dependence on funding support by traditional sources ... The movement can become an industry in the sense of reproducing the conditions for the self-serving maintenance of its professional (entrepreneurial) class of managers.

(Wiewal and Gills, 1995: 136-7 - emphasis added).

The rise of plural governance under scarce financial conditions does not necessarily lead to participatory structures as non-state organisations require power, including financial resources, as well as responsibility for real participation. The rise of the 'contract culture' and deepening

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15 There is evidence for a 'convergence thesis', referring to the conceptual merging of ideas on participation and empowerment of people from the grassroots within, on the one hand, participatory development studies in low-income contexts, and on the other, participatory governance in the west (see for instance Nelson and Wright, eds., 1995; and Cheater, ed., 1999). In addition some commentators observe new perspectives on poverty and deprivation in the west that draws parallels with similar (although still worse) problems in low-income countries (interviews with Gerard Oude Engberink, Director of CSPS in Rotterdam 29/7/98 and 20/8/98).

16 The 'power over' conception owes much to the work in the 1960s that investigated who prevails in decision-making where interests conflict, revealing the diffuse and pluralist character of city politics in the US (see Dahl, 1961; and Polsbey, 1980). All these conceptions of power can be defined as 'the capacity [for an economy or polity, or co-ordinated individuals] to ... contribute to, outcomes - to make a difference to the world' (adapted from Lukes, 1993: 504).
organisational dependency with the state (see Kramer, 1994; Patterson and Pinch, 1995; Champlin, 1998; and Nowland-Foreman, 1998) limit acquisition and realisation of this power.

Secondly, and in development of the first point, there is a tension between *de facto* power and realisation of additional power resources. Following a number of ideas presented by John Allen on the 'spatialities of power' (see Allen, 1997), one might assume under conditions of pluralist governance that empowerment implies a situation where objects and subjects obtain an increase in power, such as financial resources. What is unclear is whether this increase reflects a certain pre-determined and immutable allocation of resources (and therefore requiring a *realisation* of that power), or whether it amounts to transference of power as part of a zero-sum game in the midst of a finite and closed resource system. From a critical (or transcendental) realist approach, Jessop refers to a concept of 'contingent necessity' (see Jessop, 1982; 1990; and 1997b):

... if we are to avoid the empiricism that derives from an exclusive emphasis on appearances, the reductionism that derives from an exclusive emphasis on one or more abstract determinations, and the subsumptionism of the 'particular' vs. the 'general', we must engage in an analysis of the many determinations that are combined in a concrete conjuncture and show how they are related as necessary and/ or sufficient conditions in a contingent structure of causation. This entails both movement from the abstract to the concrete in a single plane of analysis (e.g., from capital-in-general to particular capitals) and the combination of determinations drawn from different planes of analysis (e.g., popular democratic antagonisms rooted in the relations of political domination vs. class antagonisms rooted in the relations of economic exploitation). Such an approach excludes all pretence to the construction of a general theory and aims at producing the theoretical tools with which particular conjunctures can be examined.

(Jessop, 1982: 213).

Applying this approach - latterly developed as a 'strategic-relational' approach (see Jessop, 1990; 1995a; 1997a and 1997b) - to a consideration of empowerment, any distribution of power is dependent on context and is therefore spatially differentiated. But *de facto* spatial differentiation of power under capitalist relations is not the same as internal pluralisation of power brought on by 'hollowing-out' and decentralisation of the state. If distribution of power

17 Unclear as to the difference between *mere distance* and *intrinsic spatiality*, Allen (1997) questions whether space makes a difference to power and whether different modes of power come into play when extended into space. He claims there are three spatialised notions of power. Firstly, he refers to a *centralised* notion drawing on a Weberian bureaucratic 'chain of command' (see Weber, 1978) and Marxist theory, seeing a separation between exercise and possession of power. Space does not problematise power which is simply shifted, unchanged, from one place to another. The global cities literature (see Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; Sassen, 1984; 1985; and 1991) and Jessop's state theory (see Jessop, 1982; and 1990) are cited as examples. Secondly he refers to a *mobile* notion of power which stresses the production of power through the mobilisation of resources. Similarly, space does not make a difference to this notion of power. Parsons' 'movement of money', Giddens' 'time-space distanciation', Mann's 'networks of power' and Castells' 'network society' are all cited as examples (see Parsons and Shils, eds., 1962; Giddens, 1984; Mann, 1986; and Castells, 1996). And thirdly, a *constitutive* notion of power is apparent in the work of Foucault and Deleuze emphasising the practices of power employed by people to regulate themselves (see Foucault, 1976; and Bogue, 1989). Allen argues for a *collaborative mode of power* based on negotiative, lateral and associative conceptions of social interaction - where power is conceived in terms of seductive and persuasive allure - and Hannah Arendt's work on the public sphere where power relations are seen as essentially co-operative in nature (see Arendt, 1958; 1961; and 1970). Spatialities of power, for Allen, involve many different modes of power where realisation of different modes occurs in particular temporal and spatial contexts.
(and empowerment) is not a zero-sum game, then factors outside the internal logic of governance - such as explicit political intervention - or factors intrinsic to local organisations and people - must account for any process of empowerment. Pluralisation does not lead automatically to involvement in governance.

Thirdly, developing the argument concerning empowerment as an increase in power, it is unclear how governance pluralism can mean empowerment where financial austerity and scarcity prevail over organisational additionality (see Hay, 1995; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Tickell and Peck, 1995). One might assume that grassroots empowerment requires a deepening of governance pluralism through a growth in properly financed non-state organisations. When processes of ‘hollowing-out’ and decentralisation are situated within deepening international neo-liberalisation in all institutional contexts - where increasingly strict limits are imposed on the flow of public expenditure (see van der Pijl, 1984; 1997a; 1997b; Overbeek, 1990; 1993; Overbeek and van der Pijl, 1993) - it is difficult to envisage sufficient transfer of financial resources and therefore power to new organisations. Even existing organisations face an ever tighter budgetary squeeze and downward pressure on finances, limiting an expansion of existing policy remits and extension into new fields. In this way, ‘hollowing-out’ and decentralisation seem to represent institutional and financial austerity due to service rationalisation, rather than additionality, and therefore more inclusive pluralism in governance and the provision of services. It is this austerity over additionality that in part renders governance pluralism problematic in terms of prospects for local involvement and democratisation. Where organisations seek to involve local people in response to these straitened financial circumstances, it is difficult to envisage real transfer, realisation or acquisition of power without additional resources for all involved.

Fourthly, and related to the transfer of financial resources, is the thorny issue of institutional autonomy under plural governance (see Jessop, 1995a; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; and Goodwin and Painter, 1996). For the genuine pluralisation of power between supra-national, national and sub-national organisations, one might expect those organisations to function with a combination of institutional autonomy, in terms of control over policy remits, and financial independence, in terms of control over funding sources and budgetary arrangements. Time and time again, however, non-state organisations, such as voluntary, charity and community groups, are found to be highly dependent, in terms of organisational and financial power, on the central and local state, and indeed the EU (see Byrne, 1989; Wolch, 1989; Mayo, 1994). Recent research on the UK social economy has revealed that many ‘flagship’ innovative experiments, like the Craigmillar Festival Society and the Arts Factory are very much dependent on state support (see Amin et al., 1998). 18

18 The Craigmillar Festival Society employs 80 people within the Craigmillar and Greater Niddrie areas of Edinburgh. It is a non-profit social enterprise, offering intermediary services, including employment training, access to higher education and
This situation questions whether the emergence of highly dependent 'third-sector' organisations in effect represents the reconstitution of rationalised public sector services. Equally these organisations may represent some form of semi-privatised service delivery rather than autonomous 'third-sector' delivery. Certainly a picture of governance is emerging where the state is rationalising, while retaining public funding and political accountability among many different agencies - and becoming, in effect, a 'governor of the governed' (Hirst, 1994: 169; see also Mulgan, 1994). There is a tendency for non-state bodies that 'pick-up the pieces' of the rationalised state to operate as servants of the state rather than masters in their own right. Without an effective transfer of power some have warned that: ‘... instead of allowing individuals and communities to develop their own capacities, the social economy will become little more than a cut-price extension of the welfare state by another name' (Amin et al., 1998: 44). While dependency does not necessarily result in the sublimation of community politics (see Glaser et al., 1996), it does render involvement limited, rhetorical and transitory.

Fifthly, relating directly to the poverty debate, at least in the UK, Beresford and Croft (1995) argue that the UK poverty discourse is characterised by the exclusion of people with experience of poverty. Addressing reasons for this exclusion, they argue for an inclusive poverty discourse for a reconceptualisation of poverty and development of APS:

The dominant debate about poverty is heavily contested and politicised. But one thing characterises and unifies the competing discourses that go to make it up. People with experience of poverty have little place in them. They are largely excluded from mainstream discussions and developments about poverty ... First, people with experience of poverty are largely excluded from or marginalised in the political process and media structures and forms which are the key arbiters and expressions of public discussion and which influence policy development. Second, they have little say or involvement in the academic and research institutions, think tanks, campaigns and pressure groups which are specifically concerned with developing poverty discussion and anti-poverty action. Third, they play little part in poverty discussions and developments. They are generally not included in the process that forms these and are effectively excluded from both the conceptualisation and analysis of poverty.

(Beresford and Croft, 1995: 76).

Local involvement and radical democratisation in the governance of APS are clearly not happening to the extent suggested within the academic literature and political debate. 
Government to Governance and Democratisation in Welfare

Beresford and Croft (1995) progress to show that various arguments on the political Left and Right attempt to explain this exclusion. Firstly, social policy on the Right is fundamentally considered ‘top-down’ and paternalistic. It is therefore unlikely that a right-wing perspective would advocate a ‘bottom-up’ approach to decision-making. The Right tends to stereotype the poor as idle and feckless, their poverty owing to issues of individual morality and social deviance, taken together to minimise the scale of poverty as a problem for policy in the public realm. Secondly, arguments against involvement on the Left are more ambiguous. Given a typical Left-wing preoccupation with humanistic values, proposals for the eradication of poverty, the emphasis on structural causes and the rights and needs of the poor, one might expect participatory politics to be on the Left-wing agenda. Some observers claim that those people who are poor by some form of objective measure may not want to identify themselves in such a negative, exclusionary and stigmatising manner through active involvement in APS (see also Alcock, 1993). After all, it is understandable that people experiencing poverty might not want to admit they are poor, especially when the authorities tend to blame the poor themselves for their plight, especially in the UK. People experiencing poverty sometimes have lower expectations of social needs and standards when defining poverty (see Alcock, 1993). In addition, like the right-wing conception of social policy, the social administration approach of the social democratic/Fabian Left is based on a ‘top-down’, ‘expert’ and elitist conception of social policy - as exemplified by the eminence of figures such as Peter Townsend and Brian Abel-Smith (see Abel-Smith and Townsend, 1965; Townsend, 1979). Participatory strategies do not tie-in well with this ‘expert’ approach characteristic of the post-war Fabian Left. The task ahead for a socially inclusive ‘third-way’ will be a problematic one for the Blair government in the UK if it is to overcome these entrenched problems of marginalisation.

Finally, one needs to be mindful of the institutional context in which the prospects for local involvement unfold (see Hay, 1995; Jessop, 1995a; 1995b; 1997a; and 1997b), especially as the case for state transformation and local involvement assumes organisational change is occurring irrespective of pre-existing governance structures, including nascent non-state and quasi-state strengths and weaknesses. Questioning the transnational transferability of institutional arrangements, Claus Offe notes:

... institutional arrangements are ultimately based on cultural dispositions and national traditions that transcend the scope of what can be easily engineered or manipulated. After all, the politics of designing and implementing new institutions must take place in the context

There is however a strong tradition of grassroots participatory struggles against unemployment, poverty and deprivation. As Colin Ward shows an anarchist approach to social policy decries the universalist and statist turn of the post-war welfare state, claiming the latter relegates voluntarist and mutualist forms of social provision to the sidelines of the political debate (see Ward, 1996). The anarchist tradition focuses on the notion of self-build housing, where people in deprived communities who reside in poor quality housing can re-house themselves through popular ownership and control of housing units. For Ward it is through active encouragement of housing co-ops, based on numerous successful examples - often where cheap credit is granted people usually dismissed by commercial lenders - that participatory approaches can turn around people’s lives, often more successfully and appropriately than through traditional state paternalism (see Ward, 1982; 1985; 1989; 1990; and 1993).
and under the shadow of the very institutional patterns that are to be replaced, and the
expectations, habits and power relations generated by the old system of rules will combine
to obstruct all but the most marginal alterations to the status quo. Thus the whole process
resembles the ambitions of rational-constructivist political theorists. At any rate, it might be
only under conditions of extreme crisis that a negotiated or otherwise agreed change of
institutional rules can ever occur, and the path-dependent self-reproduction of an existing
institutional regime can be interrupted.

(Offe, 1995: 123).

There indeed exists a long history of evolutionary and institutional perspectives in both
sociology and economics (see Granovetter, 1985; Hodgson, et al., eds., 1994; and Mulberg,
1995), and attempts have been made to incorporate these debates into path-dependent and
evolutionary perspectives on the fortunes of particular nations, regions and localities (see Amin
and Thrift, 1995; Amin and Hausner, eds., 1997). One method of comparing different
institutional contexts is through the welfare regime typology of Esping-Andersen. Actual
instances of welfare are mixes of regimes, revealing a complex combination of continuity and
change over time in type of provision in any one institutional setting. Sensitivity to context can
arguably help determine the extent and type of pluralisation and popular involvement.

Rise of Welfare Pluralism

Having problematised the relationship between pluralism and local involvement in governance,
the discussion now draws on recent contributions within welfare theory to situate the preceding
theoretical and conceptual discussion in the context of welfare provision and social policy. In
doing so it acts as a conceptual basis from which to approach the relationship between
governance and democratisation within APS in the following chapters. Among political
economists, welfare analysts and social policy historians it has become widely accepted since
the mid 1970s to the early 1980s that fundamental changes are underway in the complexion
and organisation of welfare provision in nation states across various countries in the west. This
‘crisis of welfare states’ is said to represent a breakdown in the post-war Keynesian-Beveridge
consensus - in terms of financial and political support - over the provision of universal welfare,
and indeed the institutional mechanisms by which such provision is administered. Much
debate has focused on the reasons for this change.

20 Following Ron Johnston the welfare state ‘... is a general term for those parts of the state apparatus involved in the
provision of public services and benefits’ and it is usually assumed ‘... the welfare state redistributes income and wealth in
favour of the poorer groups within society ...’ (Johnston 1994: 676; see also 1993). Following global recession and
‘stagflation’ that ensued in the 1970s lead to mounting pressures to cut welfare spending. This crisis of welfare, exacerbated
in the second global recession of the early 1980s, involves a crisis in values and management - as well as finance - leading
to wholesale retrenchment of welfare systems (see Birch, 1974; Mommsen, ed., 1981; and Jallade, ed., 1988).
Following a broad conception of welfare states - against a narrow social services view - Claus Offe argues in *Contradictions of the Welfare State* that the origins of the difficulties with the provision of state welfare represented the 'crises of crisis management' (see Offe, 1984). That is to say, welfare capitalist states were no longer capable of fully managing the socio-political problems and conflicts generated by late capitalist societies. By drawing on Marxist theory and Luhmann's systems theory, he argues that since the end of the Second World War, the political sub-system has performed a co-ordinating role which is central to the whole social system - the emergence of welfare states is considered the goal of 'crisis management' of this social system. Yet contradictions of the welfare state that stem from the conflictual relationship between the three sub-systems of capitalism (household, economy and politics/administration), meant that the political/administrative system was unable to separate itself from the other sub-systems and allow their independent functioning. John Keane shows in the introduction to this book that Offe argues:

... the 'epicentre' of the present contradictions of the welfare state is no longer traced back to the economy and its class struggles ... Instead, these contradictions are seen to derive from the antagonistic relationship between the three subsytems of late capitalism and, more precisely, from the inability of the administrative-political system to separate itself from its 'flanking' subsystems in such a way that it can facilitate their undisturbed and independent functioning ... Welfare states are rapidly ceasing to be a viable solution to the socio-political problems generated by late capitalist societies because the systems of economic and social life are not in harmony with the requirements of the administrative-political system. The 'panacea' of state intervention and regulation becomes controversial. Welfare state systems generate more policy failures, political conflict and social resistance than they are capable of resolving; the crisis management strategies of the welfare state themselves become subject to new forms of crisis tendency.

(Keane, from Offe, 1984: 13-4).

In short, this work of Offe broadly follows a structural and universal (i.e. non-contextual) logic in the restructuring of welfare whereby the crisis of welfare represents irreversible structural changes under conditions of late capitalism. On this argument prospects for concerted reformulation of universal provision without wholesale systemic changes remain weak.

Ramesh Mishra, by contrast, argues in *The Welfare State in Crisis* and *The Welfare State in Capitalist Society* that UK social policy was the invention of a narrow Centre Left/Fabian elite that never had a well grounded theoretical or class base and simply collapsed when faced with a tough neo-liberal alternative (see Mishra, 1984; and 1990). Writing from an ideological (or 'ideational') perspective, he shows how welfare systems represent the institutionalisation of

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21 *Fabianism* refers to the pioneering work of the Fabian Society between 1884 and the early 1940s, namely the three founding members Beatrice Webb, Sidney Webb and George Bernard Shaw. Against a rapid, revolutionary route to socialism based on class war, the Fabians stressed the importance of hard work, persuasion and research leading to the gradual and inevitable movement of society towards socialism. Governed by a meritocratic educated élite, the Fabian model of welfare held that a system of democratically accountable élites would intuitively know better than the people themselves the requirements for the progressive betterment of society. Fabianism implies a hierarchical and deeply paternalistic conception of welfare (see McBroar, 1966; McKenzie and McKenzie, 1977; Pimlott, ed., 1984; see also Shaw, *et al.*, 1962; and Webb and Webb, 1920).
certain values over time, a 'dialectic of intellectual paradigms', and that '... paradigms never die, they simply fade away - only to blossom again when history calls them to life' (p. 163; see also Clarke et al., eds., 1987). He argues it is unwise to reject the combination of market and state regulation of the economy, and advocates a corporatist or 'integrated' welfare state, as in Austria and Sweden. In this way he aims for successful harmonisation of the market economy with social welfare provision. Such a system, for him, presents the best evolutionary path out of the welfare crisis for the development of capitalist democracy in the west. As a consequence, Mishra emphasises that the crisis of welfare is, in fact, a crisis of ideas.

In this century history has made cruel sport of our principal intellectual paradigms - liberalism, Marxism and social democracy. For a time it has crowned each 'king' only to dethrone him later and replace him with a rival. One lesson to be learnt from history seems to be that all three - the thesis of laissez-faire liberalism, the antithesis of Marxist socialism, and the synthesis of social democracy - seem to be intrinsic to the social as well as the spiritual (i.e. intellectual and moral) formation of modern western society. The values of individualism and liberty, whose institutional underpinning is the free market, private property and the rule of law, and the values of solidarity and community, whose institutional underpinnings is common ownership, political democracy and collective services (social services), provide the essential tension which the social democratic centre has tried to relieve, rather than resolve, through attempted reconciliation and mix of values. (Mishra, 1984: 162).

This work by Mishra broadly falls into an ideological and political perspective on the restructuring of welfare. Despite the undisputed structural pressures on welfare (such as fiscal pressures, population change and so on) the actual characteristics of welfare provision is dependent on the ideological and political forces that respond to such pressures and thus shape the provision that follows. Welfare states are the product of particular ideological imperatives. The debate around alternative governance, the 'third way' and welfare reform in the UK and indeed elsewhere, reflects a continuation of ideological dilemmas facing the (broadly defined) social democratic Centre. This dilemma centres on the most appropriate model of welfare that can balance a plurality of values and identities and uphold a principle of equality in the aftermath of the universal welfare state.

The following relates the models of governance pluralism presented previously to the question of what this alternative 'third-way' governance of welfare would look like in practice. Paul Hirst gives us some clues in his discussion of an 'associationalist welfare system' (see Hirst, 1994: 167-77). Involving the devolution of public welfare services to voluntary self-governing associations, while retaining responsibility for public funding and political accountability, Hirst's model represents the separation of service performance from public control and avoids the pitfalls of welfare state bureaucracy. Firstly, employees will be more committed to their agency of work when they agree with the principles that underpins that agency as the reason for working there. Secondly, self-governing associations will be internally accountable to their members, thus providing a front-line mechanism for 'policing' of service delivery that would
reduce the load of inspection by the state. Thirdly, the delivery of services through voluntary organisations would mean a separation between service provider and the state, mitigating distant bureaucratic administration and provision of services. Overall for Hirst 'associationalism offers thick welfare, thin collectivism' (p. 169). Quoting him at some length:

Associationalism, by contrast [to bureaucratic collectivism], both promotes consumer choice and, because of the joint producer-consumer self-governance of associations, also provides a mutual check on the tendencies to over-consume and to over-produce that are inherent in any form of decentralized welfare provision. In such a system individuals can craft the packages of services that they need. This is because of the high level of choice in the type and mode of services on offer, due to the fact that service providers are voluntary organisations in competition and that their provision is mainly demand led. Consumers have a large element of choice in the services they receive, but also considerable discretion in determining the overall level of funding for them. Thus when it comes to paying for services, individuals will tend to behave differently from how they do now. Employed consumers with a substantial disposable income will have high discretion in controlling what public welfare services they get, and, therefore, will be willing to accept higher taxation if services meet their perceived needs and offer good value compared to private provision. The poor will get common minimum entitlements, but still will be able to choose which agencies should fulfil them. The system is not egalitarian, but it tend to promote higher overall welfare spending and would incline more individuals towards meeting their needs through collective consumption. Welfare expenditures would tend to rise to the extent that consumers see they can control services and that they benefit from consuming collectively. Associationalist structures thus have the potential to unblock the tax constraint on welfare spending, since they take the responsibility for making service provision decisions from the state and place it in the hands of the consumers.


Going beyond a traditional statist model of welfare where a plurality of organisations from the voluntary sector play an active role, Hirst's model relates directly to the rise of welfare pluralism. Indeed some welfare commentators refer to the emergence of the mixed economy of welfare (see Johnson, 1987; McCarthy, ed., 1989; Papadaki, 1990; Mayo, 1994; Carter and Rayner, 1996). With the decline in the Keynesian/ Beveridge welfare state, various services, functions and activities, previously administered centrally, have devolved to a plethora of more localised state and non-state agencies. In this way, a multitude of non-state bodies (including private firms and informal networks), and voluntary and community-based organisations, have become endowed with responsibility for service delivery (see Stoesz and Midgely, 1991) - a change that increasingly entails the charging of customers, the contracting-out of services and the market allocation of resources in the provision of welfare (see Knapp, 1989). Referring to the multitude of organisations involved in the provision of welfare Marjorie Mayo shows that:

[The term 'the mixed economy of welfare' has been around for some time. And so has the reality that this term encapsulates. Welfare systems as different from each other as Britain's and the USA's have in practice included a range of welfare provisions, some services being directly provided by the state whilst others have been provided through the private market or through voluntary organisations ... The balance that has been struck between the different sectors - state, private, voluntary or non-profit, informal - has varied in important ways from country to country and over time.

The advent of the mixed economy of welfare clearly ties-in with the arguments for 'hollowing-out' decentralisation and the rise of welfare pluralism, whereby a heterogeneity of organisations from the public, private and 'third' sectors are engaged in service delivery. The associationist model - as advocated by Hirst, and Cohen and Rogers - informs one possible project for welfare pluralism. Any pluralist 'third-way' system of welfare has to strike a difficult balance between a market logic - with its attendant individualism - and more collectivist and community-orientated conceptions of welfare. While the emergence of the mixed economy of welfare is not exclusively the result of New Right policies, a deepening process of neoliberalisation in welfare - with its celebration of budgetary austerity, individual obligation and consumer choice (see Midgely, 1991) - is occurring (in differing ways and degrees) across all institutional contexts. Notions of local involvement are therefore becoming increasingly (although not exclusively) about individual choice and responsibility in the marketplace of welfare, and recalling the discussion of power in the first section, less about transfer and realisation of power as well as responsibility (either organisational or financial) to sub-national state and non-state agencies.

Taking the example of the rise of the Radical Right in the US, Stoesz and Midgley (1991) identify three social policy arenas that give an indication of pluralism in welfare from this perspective. Firstly, they refer to the family and informal sector, regarded as a basic unit in western society, where (extended) familial welfare maintenance becomes a private and personal concern, upholding beliefs in the traditional nuclear family (see ICC, 1987). The second arena points to the voluntary sector that can provide services beyond the scope of the family and informal sector. Similarly stressing values of neighbourliness, self-reliance and community solidarity, a particularly strong role is accorded the church and its related organisations, such as the Salvation Army in the UK. The third refers to the commercial sector where welfare is provided for profit as part of a wider commercialisation of human services, such as various US proprietary firms that have exploited markets in nursery care, hospital management, health maintenance and child day-care services (see Stoesz and Midgley, 1991). It is in this context of neoliberalisation in the restructuring of welfare that these non-state forms of welfare provision are closely tied with a wider privatisation of social services, and a decline of public accountability and collectivism. An increasing onus and responsibility is placed in the hands of individual people and their immediate neighbourhoods for their own and their family's needs. These forms of service provision are assuming the burden of service delivery by default. They have always in form or another provided a role in welfare, but now are endowed with greater responsibility as the state continues to rationalise. Given the rise in the contracting-out of services, this increased responsibility operates in highly dependent relations with the central and local state. Organisational involvement is limited under the mixed economy of welfare, and this is where normative models of welfare pluralism such as Cohen and Roger's and Hirst's are belied by a more financially scarce and individualistic reality.
It is suggested by some that the advent of welfare pluralism adopts the rhetoric of modernisation in the context of a stunted reality of budgetary cuts (see Johnson, 1987; and McCarthy, ed., 1989). It follows then that local involvement, certainly in theory at least, is individualist rather than organisational or structural. Perhaps the lack of analysis at the level of the organisation in the governance of welfare pluralism reflects the situation of organisational incoherence, complexity and austerity - a far cry not only from the organisational coherence and additionality as claimed by associationists such as Cohen and Rogers, and Hirst, but also by implication radical democrats from the New Left and more recent work from Habermas and Mouffe. Certainly, this lack can be attributed to the weakness of anti-liberal alternatives to welfare provision (see Papadaki, 1990), and consequently new perspectives are required to embrace the organisational implications of the mixed economy of welfare (see McCarthy, ed., 1989; and Tillerton, 1992).

Consideration of the Radical Right has particularly strong resonance in the US, and to a lesser degree in the UK, but it does not reflect the variety of welfare regimes across the European continent in quite the same way. This variety is addressed in more detail in the next chapter. Nonetheless, an important element of this argument is that a complex process of variety and convergence is occurring across all these institutional contexts. Noting that convergence does not equal assimilation or equalisation, the argument is based on a common process of deepening international neoliberalisation leading to convergence in differentiated institutional contexts. This differentiation - namely differences in balance between state and non-state sectors in the provision of welfare - points to varying manifestations of welfare pluralism. In turn there are potentially different models of welfare pluralism and prospects for democratisation in these contexts.

Given that the discussion on governance pluralism in the previous section draws attention to the potential representation of multiple and hitherto marginalised groups, a pluralist welfare system could potentially tailor provision to the needs of particular people and social groups. Indeed, such a project at the very least would address the current crisis of welfare and the hierarchy of oppression contained therein - for some based on increasingly outmoded notions of the universality of class (see Bakshi et al., 1995). Certain agencies could represent the interests of people from these different social groups, such as those representing women, racial and ethnic minorities, disabled people, the elderly and so on. Certainly if we follow the normative pluralist claim as advanced by Cohen and Rogers, Hirst and perhaps Habermas, all these groups would interact and cohere with institutions of both the state and civil society as the means of securing resources for the people they represent, and moreover would participate through equal access in the wider political project of welfare provision. Such an idealised scheme might in principle integrate the pluralism of social identities within a universal welfare system upholding equality for all.
The second contribution from welfare theory helps support this point. The mounting influence of post-class based postmodernist and post-structuralist social analyses has led some writers, especially within the journal *Critical Social Policy*, to refer to a *social relations of welfare* perspective within welfare theory (see Taylor, ed., 1996; see also contributions therein). This perspective begins with the critical position that universal state welfare of the post-war period was grounded in a class-based conception of social rights (see Marshall, 1950; see also Bakshi *et al.*, 1995) that oversimplified, even ignored, a diversity of social identities that exist in society. A complex situation of inclusion and exclusion from social citizenship was the result of this failure to recognise and provide for the social requirements of these diverse social groups. While some proponents of social relations of welfare retain some vestige of universal rights (for instance see Hewitt, 1993; Spicker, 1994; Thompson and Hoggett, 1996), the perspective centres on the recognition of the particular needs of different social identities, such as: gender (see McIntosh, 1981; Carabine, 1992; Morris, J. 1992); race (see Cohen, 1985; Williams, 1987); disability (see Barnes, 1992); and age (see Ginn, 1996). In this way the social relations of welfare perspective aims to transcend the class-based analysis of the Fabians, structuralists and Marxists - ones that tend to view class, in particular the working class, as embodying the universal interests of humanity - in favour of analysis that is more sensitive to the particular needs of different social groups, with class as one of many identities. It potentially offers theoretical justification for a pluralist welfare - such as an associationist welfare system or postmodernist welfare state - that holds respect for such social diversity.

Beyond the ever present problem of discerning mechanisms for co-ordination, coherence and consensus between these multiple organisations (recalling tensions between Habermas and Mouffe) - a further problem of representation arises. Referring back to the seminal contribution of Cohen and Rogers, their case for a plurality of secondary associations in governance hinges on, what they term, the *artifactuality* of those associations: that is to say, associations that are 'unnatural' in that they are human constructions resulting from explicit policy interventions, constituting a diversity social identities, but not constructed on the basis of any one of those particular identities (see Cohen and Rogers, 1992; Offe, 1995; and Young, 1995). 'Artifactual' organisations are for them more likely to engender progressive change towards radical egalitarian pluralism because they are potentially able to integrate members across this diversity and *between* these particularisms. Particular social identities emerge out of postmodern and post-structuralist positions on the diversified, complex and multi-faceted social reality. These positions tend to view social identities introspectively, within themselves (à la Mouffe), rather than in relation to the wider social *totality* - in line with radicals like Freire and Habermas. A particularist welfare approach might veer towards a differentiation between dimensions of need - such as racial, ethnic and gender related - rather than see poverty (and more recently social exclusion) as the complex interface of under-privilege in *all* social spheres.
of identity (see Byrne, 1999). 'Artifactual' associations while sensitive to diversity can arguably transcend social particularisms and respond more closely to the social totality, as with Freire’s critical challenge to the dominant hegemony, towards a radically integrative welfare.\footnote{It is important to distinguish between concepts of the \textit{totality} and the \textit{absolute}. A 'totality' arguably refers to the sum total of individuals and societies stretching across time and space. It does not necessarily infer 'grand theory' as with various forms of abstraction in social science, including different forms of structuralism, but it sometimes does (see Mills, 1959; Skinner, ed., 1985; and Ley, 1989). The ‘absolute’ is a more philosophical term, based originally in the work of Schelling and Hegel, that denotes ‘... that which has an unconditional existence, not conditioned by, relative to, or dependent on anything else. Usually deemed to be the whole of things, conceived as unitary, as spiritual, as self-knowing ... and as rationally intelligible, as finite things, considered individually, or not’ (see Sprigge, 1995). While often used interchangeably, as in critiques of grand theory, it is important to note they are not the same.}

Approaches to welfare that stress these particularisms based \textit{primarily} on social identities \textit{without} a unifying and integrative framework view these identities \textit{(pace} Cohen and Rogers\textit{)} as ‘natural’ organisations that respond to divisions in society, but are not constituted by explicit decisions beyond those identities (see Young, 1995). Often inferring a ‘communitarian’ position - a highly socialised view of people that claims values and norms must be drawn from specific social contexts - this approach means that different standards, including criteria for welfare, will be applied in different places for different people (see Jones, 1990; see also Walzer, 1983; ed., 1995; Etzioni, 1993; 1995; and Mulgan, 1994). A pluralist welfare system of this kind might be less progressive in meeting needs than one based on 'artifactual' associations. Without a framework for unifying and integrating different elements, political action might be limited for meeting needs of particular social groups without regard for the project of social welfare \textit{as a whole}. For the latter there perhaps needs to be a transcendental point of reference, one outside any particularism, that can combine all elements in a coherent whole - as in Habermas and Freire. Not wishing to advance the sort of class-based approach that typified the structuralist heyday (see Wright, 1995; and 1997) - there is nonetheless a need to reconstruct a universalist project that combines these fragmented identities:

Classical Marxism, following themes of the Enlightenment, argued that the working class embodied the universal interests of humanity. Ultimately, then, the identity of the working class was not just another particularism, but the core of a universal, human identity. Postmodernists argue that identities are irredeemably fragmented and plural. There are no privileged agents of history, no privileged identities. All there is are particularisms, which are historically articulated in specific ways \ldots [a problem is posed] \ldots of the institutional conditions for renewing more universalistic identities, since some kind of universalism arguably is critical for egalitarian, emancipatory politics.

(Offe, 1995: xiv).

A more universalist approach would transcend these many identities and arguably more closely reflect the lines of privilege and under-privilege in society in an all-encompassing sense. It would seem that Cohen and Rogers have something similar to this ideal in mind when they talk of 'artifactuality' as the means of overcoming the 'problem of faction'. Essentially representing a reformulated class based approach (see also Allen, 1998 for a similar class based approach to...
social exclusion), revealing some similarities with Habermasian and Frankfurt School perspectives, this model holds respect for social diversity for realisation of a radical egalitarian and pluralist welfare system.

There is a clear tension between universalist and particularist dimensions within welfare theory under conditions of governance pluralism (see Spicker, 1994; Taylor-Gooby, 1994; Hillyard and Watson, 1996; Penna and O'Brien, 1996; and Thompson and Hoggett, 1996). At the most general level, there is a tension between universal rights-based arguments in defence of state welfare, and particularist (or selectivist) needs-based arguments linked with self-advocacy of the 'new social welfare movements' (see Taylor, ed., 1996). It is not intended to advocate a simple conflation of universalism with statism and particularism with non-statism, as in a traditional liberal separation of state and non-state sectors (see Rorty, 1996; see also Mouffe, 1996). Nor is it claimed that extreme heterogeneity and hybridisation of the 'public' and 'private' spheres is apparent (see Derrida, 1996; see also Mouffe, 1996). Rather there is a tendency for post-war state welfare to follow an institutional model of social provision for all, whereas new social welfare movements tend to be targeted models based on particular needs of certain groups. As shown above the rise of particularism relates to the mounting of postmodernism on social policy. Some commentators are vehemently critical of this influence. Peter Taylor-Gooby (1991; and 1994) argues that the postmodernist case against state welfare is unfounded. He claims it is the trend of postmodernism in social science that has facilitated the devaluation of state welfare, rather than actual social change that is better explained through postmodernist thought. Ramesh Mishra takes a less critical line towards postmodernism and welfare, arguing that ideologically and politically the welfare state inhabits a very different world than it did in the mid 1970s and is likely to have a greater impact on European as opposed to North American welfare states. He claims: 'if there is one major implication of postmodernity for welfare it is that the Dionysian spirit of innovation, change and material progress embodied in the market economy has emerged as pre-eminent in the postmodern world' (Mishra, 1993: 35). Tending to equate postmodernism in welfare as the ideology of the market and by implication neoliberalism in social policy, he concludes:

"In any case, in this post-utopian and postmodern situation, social policy emerges more clearly as a relatively autonomous sphere of action which questions, modifies as well as complements the 'economic' mode of being. Paradoxically, and in keeping with the tenets of postmodernity itself, social policy divested of utopian and historicist elements may become truer to itself as an arena for the interplay of the micro-politics of values and interests."

(Mishra, 1993: 36).

The issue of self-advocacy of new social welfare movements points to the participatory practice within these movements. While acknowledging that particularist welfare is not necessarily participatory and that social groups are different - and may even conflict if we accept Mouffe's arguments for agonism - it seems reasonable to claim that particularist welfare potentially
resembles pluralist and inclusive governance. Particularist welfare movements tend to be based on socially inclusive, self-advocacy at the grassroots. It is unclear however whether such movements are supposed to be working with or in open conflict with other organisations and the state. Some commentators claim that the effectiveness of social movements depends on their necessary ‘direct action’ and hostility to the state (see Szasz, 1995). But how is coherence possible for a pluralist welfare system where multiple movements are competing with each other over limited resources, and moreover in conflict with the state? Is Habermasian communicative coherence possible in such a situation, or is it a utopian ideal meshed in a modernist conception of rationality? A question that remains unanswered is whether radical grassroots activism, typically predicated on single issue, particularist concerns outside and in critique of the state, is more empowering for people at the base of society, than in a more egalitarian and integrated relationship with the state? Which model - one that follows Habermasian rationality, or the irrationalism of Mouffe - is more empowering for people at the base of society? One way of attending to this question lies in discerning whether universalism and particularism are reconcilable or incommensurable concepts in the provision of welfare. Is there an approach to the governance of welfare that combines universalism and particularism, on the one hand, and equality with difference on the other?

A number of writers have explored this potential linkage between universalism and particularism. Positive as to the insights from postmodernism, Simon Thompson and Paul Hoggett (1996) argue for a 'sophisticated universalism', one that potentially informs a new form of welfare governance that combines notions of specific universalism, positive selectivism, particularism, equality and diversity through consistency of treatment through a non-institutional approach to group involvement. In doing so they relate their arguments to Hirst's model of associative democracy. They attempt to show how this embodies many of their ideas, not least a Guaranteed Minimum Income and the devolution of responsibility for welfare services to self-governing voluntary associations. Despite noting that Hirst's model over-emphasises delivery over determination of welfare services (p. 40), they unfortunately do not elaborate actual or possible mechanisms for the involvement of local people in this new non-institutional governance of welfare.

Using Mishra's and Taylor-Gooby's arguments for and against postmodernism in welfare theory as the starting point, and taking issue with work by Beck, Giddens and Lash (see Beck, 1992;
Beck et al., 1994; and Giddens, 1994), Tony Fitzpatrick adopts the concept of 'reflexive modernisation' as a more measured response to the otherwise dichotomous arguments for and against universalism and particularism in welfare:

By modernisation Beck means the progressive freeing of social agents from the constraints of social structures. Modernisation first swept away the traditional, feudal order and ushered in an industrial society. But now modernisation has come to undermine that to which it originally gave birth. Science and technology are being demystified; our attitudes towards work, leisure, the family and sexuality are altering profoundly. It is this process of undermining which Beck refers to as reflexive modernisation. This, he claims, is the new modernity ... a risk society ... [where] [the production of dangers and hazards has come to dominate the production of wealth and goods ... As reflexive modernization accelerates, individuals have become more individualised: more able to control their destinies, but at a considerable price. This is because they are less able to rely upon the old support networks of class, neighbourhood, the nuclear family, workplace and occupation. With increased freedom has come increased insecurity.

(Fitzpatrick, 1996: 309 - original emphasis).

Institutional changes towards worsening short-termism and insecurity in work and welfare mean that individuals are increasingly required to act as agents in the context of their own particular life and career trajectories. All members of society - and not just the traditional working class - are susceptible to the whims of the 'risk society', facing the likelihood of spates of employment interrupted with periods of inactivity. Particular life and career situations and trajectory become important factors in determining customised welfare responses. For Fitzpatrick a viable radical politics of decentred welfare requires appreciation of 'reflexive modernisation' combined with a sensitivity to the Left/Right political spectrum. He suggests a universal citizens income - one of the many variants of a basic income strategy24 - as a practical proposal for reform with the potential to establish a system that integrates the particularisms of the 'risk society' with the universality of a unconditional income for all.

Despite drawing advocates from many different fields, including proponents of 'associative democracy' in general and pluralist welfare in particular (see Hirst, 1994; and Thompson and Hoggett, 1996), basic income strategies tend to be criticised on grounds that provision based on universal rights potentially lead to exploitation of the hardworking by the idle (see van Parijs, ed., 1991). One way of understanding these universal rights is viewing them as integral to the very basis of democracy. The political theorist David Held argues for a position of 'democratic autonomy' (see Held, 1994). He claims that '[liberal] democracy requires citizens to be free and equal in the determination in the conditions of their own association' (p. 57). And in addition, he argues that manifest asymmetries of power, resulting from a number of sites of domination and

24 A basic income strategy, as other proponents such as Philippe van Parijs reveal amounts to a benefit based on universal rights - a completely unconditional grant paid ex ante to all adult citizens without recourse to means-testing or work requirement (see van der Veen and van Parijs, 1986; van Parijs, 1990; ed., 1991; see also Gorz, 1982; Purdy, 1988; 1994; Parker, 1989; Walter, 1989; and Collins, 1990). Many labels are attributed to what amounts to a basic income, including: state bonus; social credit; social wage; social dividend; guaranteed income; citizenship income; and universal grant.
subordination, erode democratic autonomy. By autonomy Held supposedly means the existence of various rights to ensure liberty and equality for all. Only what Held calls a 'common structure of action' will overcome these imbalances for a successful and meaningful democratic politics. In other words, equal and free access to various categories of universal rights will ensure the effective functioning of democracy. These rights are: health - for physical and emotional well-being; social - through social security, and universal and free education and childcare; cultural - for freedom of thought, faith, expression and criticism; civil - the ability to form or join autonomous associations; economic - through a guaranteed minimum income and access to productive resources; pacific - through peaceful coexistence, lawful foreign policy and equal treatment before the law; and finally political - as adequate and equal opportunities for deliberation, and a universal and secret voting system. Democracy therefore:

... entails a commitment to a set of empowering rights and duties. To deny entitlement capacities in any significant domain of action is to deny human beings the ability to flourish as human beings and it is to deny the identity of the political system as a potentially democratic system. A democratic legal state, a state which entrenched and enforced democratic public law, would set down an axial principle of public policy which stipulated the basis of self-determination and equal justice for all and, accordingly, created a guiding framework to shape and delimit public policy.

(Held, 1994: 58).

It is unclear nonetheless how these universal rights are to be implemented without some form of radical constitutional legislation. Both Martin Hewitt (1993) and Paul Spicker (1994) are concerned with the interplay of universal and particular welfare, and the relationship of these concepts to the wider political sphere. Hewitt finds a the linkage between universalism and particularism in a combination of work by Habermas, Doyal and Gough, and Townsend. Based on real needs despite cultural variations, social norms and notions of human nature - he argues these commentators provide rational foundations for social policy, whereas postmodern commentators such as Touraine, Melucci and Mouffe tend to stress particularism of welfare in the context of a problematic and vague universalism and, in the case of Mouffe, an irrationalist and conflict-ridden politics. Referring to Habermas, he claims:

Differentiated from 'basic needs', this payment would provide a minimum for individual autonomy, conceptually marrying ethical (justice) and economic (efficiency) values in the reform of welfare provision (see van Parijs, 1990).

25 Len Doyal and Ian Gough's (1991) A Theory of Human Need is a path-breaking contribution to its field, inspiring a great deal of critical attention and subsequent work (see Doyal, 1993; Gough, with Thomas, 1994; Soper, 1993; and Wedderly, 1996). Writing contrary to a social science relativist orthodoxy, and transcending luhembo conflation of needs with wants, Doyal and Gough argue that a universal and thus objective conception of human need (and, as a consequence poverty as existence of insatiate needs) can be identified in both theory and practice. By distinguishing basic and intermediate needs, they formulate a definition of need, distinct from wants, based on preconditions for avoidance of harm. They claim that aggregate statistical analysis can be employed to assess the success of various welfare regimes around the world, pointing towards a 'dual-strategy' for needs-satisfaction based on a combination of state planning and political demoaacy. In conclusion they state that this dual strategy is both feasible and desirable for the optimisation of need satisfaction based on a vision of the 'good'.

26 As a key protagonist in the UK Fabian poverty studies tradition, Peter Townsend has continually maintained a case for a universalist conception of social policy, based on large-scale aggregate statistical analyses and an empirically identified threshold for any given household income (see Townsend, 1979, 1985; and 1993b).
... Habermas consistently grounds his analysis of difference within what he sees as the universal concern of social movements to recover the communicative foundations of social life. By this he means the assumption that parties to a communication expect that the truth claims one party utters to the other can be redeemed if called upon to do so. This 'communicative ethics' holds, for example, for individuals broadly sharing the same community norms, for scientists engaging in scholarly dispute, and, of importance to the present discussion, for political actors in conflict. For though the latter hold conflicting interests, their dispute cannot be settled unless each party is prepared to listen to the other's viewpoint on the basis that each would expect the other to listen to its own, i.e. both parties share an attitude orientated to reaching understanding without which communication would not be possible. Of course, Habermas is fully aware that such reciprocal communication is an ideal - what he terms an 'ideal speech situation' - Nevertheless, his claim is that this supposition must hold if communication is to be possible at all. In this way the communicative ethic has a transcendental status in his theory, whatever happens to actual instances of communication that depart from this ideal speech situation providing the grounding assumption which Habermas claims must be in place for rational and valid decisions to emerge, and indeed for a just and free society to develop.


Finally with respect to interplay between universalism and particularism, Paul Spicker (1993) argues for a 'thin conception of universalism' - one where the same rules apply to everyone - and, like Hewitt, is mindful of the work of Gough and Doyal as a means of combining universal and particular principles in welfare. In addition to issues raised by the social relations perspective, he claims that the contemporary particularist challenge to universalism is articulated through newly emergent communitarian thought (see Etzioni, 1993; 1995; and Mulgan, 1994) - a political theory based on the premise that values and norms are context-specific whereby different moral standards apply to different people. As particularism is inherently discriminatory on grounds of community and kinship, this approach may encourage separatism and racism (if unable to foster tolerance of difference) if not grounded in some form of universal criteria. Spicker's 'moderate particularism' and his project for communitarian socialism points to particular claims to welfare in specific contexts, yet weighed against the universal criteria of human needs as outlined by Gough and Doyal. He stresses the necessity of respecting such universal criteria - criteria on which socialism depends (p. 7) - in practice as well as in theory to avoid the problem of 'emulation of the powerful' (see also Freire, 1972):

Communitarian values have to be applied within a particular social framework. It is often assumed that if people who are most vulnerable and most often excluded are given power, they will ensure that others like them who have been excluded will be given greater opportunities. The reverse may well be the case. Tenants in poor estates do their utmost to keep put 'problem families'; parents of children in schools where many children do not speak English ... have tried to take their children out. This may be distasteful, but there is nothing surprising in it. Empowerment means that people are gaining power in a competition for scarce resources. It means they will have the opportunity to participate - to take part in social relationships and networks. People are being empowered to do the kinds of things which other people do; and the kinds of things that other people do are often discriminatory. The real dilemma for communitarian socialism rests not, then, in the need to reconcile universalism with particularism in theory, but in the problem of respecting universal values in practice.

(Spicker, 1994: 19).
All the preceding contributions make forceful arguments for a reconciliation between universal and particular values and interests in the provision of welfare. Echoing arguments made in previous sections, they are nonetheless relatively silent on actual mechanisms for the involvement of local people in the new governance of welfare.

Work by Peter Beresford and Suzy Croft, on the other hand, is explicit in the need for the involvement of local people in the provision of welfare (see Beresford and Croft, 1986; 1995; Croft and Beresford, 1989; and 1992; see also Taylor, ed., 1996 and various contributions therein). As Taylor (ed.) (1996) notes local involvement implies the active inclusion of people in the social sphere either as a strategy for the achievement of particular welfare goals, or as an end in itself. Put another way, local involvement is regarded as either the political means for social welfare ends - with implications for radical democratisation - or for the end of social participation as an essential characteristic of human subjectivity (see Taylor, ed., 1996; see also Gough and Doyal, 1991). Perhaps as a result confusion exists over the precise meaning of 'local participation' (see Croft and Beresford, 1989; and 1992). They show that the notion of participation is linked to the concept of user-involvement resulting from the shift away from service/ provider led provision to a more user-centred provision of welfare services. User-involvement, however, takes two different forms: one, a consumerist that is more usually concerned with service-providers; and two, a democratic form that is customarily concerned with service-users and their organisations. As Beresford and Croft remind us, the 'paradox of participation' must be overcome - that is where individuals and organisations are co-opted into the political process and as a consequence are effectively silenced and disempowered. For meaningful involvement, welfare organisations need to be clear about the precise objectives of involvement, and moreover whether these objectives genuinely reflect the needs of service-users. Echoing earlier work by Freire on the removal of oppressive class and status differences, organisations must ensure that users are fully able to participate through equal access and by ensuring that social, psychological and technical support mechanisms are available for participants at all times when and where required.

There are three sets of arguments behind the involvement of local people in the discourse on poverty. One, the moral and philosophical argument which recognises that welfare subjects are increasingly demanding political voice mobilisation, and moreover increasingly framing self-advocacy of needs in terms of civil rights. Not only does participation of the vulnerable and excluded show respect for these rights, it also means that encouraging excluded people to air their views allows the rights of political equality and citizenship to be met. Two, there is the practical argument based on the premise that only with genuine involvement of people experiencing poverty in the discussion of welfare strategies, will it be possible to accurately identify, reflect and advance the needs of poor people. In addition, participation allows more relevant and participatory research and analysis to be undertaken, which in turn can lead to
more effective campaigning. Certainly participation of under-privileged people offers a rational and democratic basis for priority setting, as a worthwhile end in itself, in the context of limited and scarce welfare resources. And thirdly, a political argument, similar in orientation as work in the Netherlands by Ruud Vlek (see Vlek, 1997), is based on the view that discussions and campaigns that exclude people have little success, and therefore there are political lessons for both the Radical Right and the moderate Left that popular discussions and campaigns often have the most impact on policy.

The involvement of poor people in the poverty discussion not only represents a fundamental shift in its nature and processes. It is also likely to transform the terms of the debate ... Women, black people, gay men and lesbians and disabled people have all done this, reshaping knowledge and understanding of their issues ... This makes it possible for poor people themselves, individually and collectively, to develop and explore their experience, how they conceive of it, the interpretations that are placed on it and what responses are needed. We can expect discussion to be framed much more in terms of rights and power, rather than as now, material disadvantage and social deprivation ... we may discover that people's denial of their poverty may become an argument for rethinking the basis of campaigning ...

(Beresford and Croft, 1995: 92-3).

Arguments for the involvement of people experiencing poverty are strong. Combined with the preceding discussion, pluralist models of governance can offer the basis for their involvement if they avoid an erosion of universalism and viewing them as just another particular faction among many other social identities (see Flynn, 1997).

Conclusion

Having problematised the relationship between plural governance and democratisation, moving into the realms of radical democratic theory and then relating these insights to theory of welfare, it is clear that 'hollowing-out', decentralisation and the rise of pluralist governance strongly relates to provision of welfare. The issue of local involvement and democratisation in welfare is as problematic as other areas of state activity and not gainsaid and implicit in this context of pluralism. Where involvement occurs it tends to be in individual rather than structural terms. That is to say, involvement is predicated on an enhanced ethos of individual agency within existing mechanisms, rather than wholesale structural renewal for concerted popular empowerment. Local involvement does not seem to be occurring in practice to the degree suggested in the literature - the result of an insufficient shift in resources under austerer financial conditions in the context of fiscal crisis, largely down to deepening international neoliberalisation across all institutional contexts. It is therefore problematic whether local involvement in welfare really amounts to empowerment, partly a reflection of an individualist conception of involvement, over organisational involvement and additionality in governance. Unequal power
relations and dependence on the state afflicting non-state welfare organisations further problematises the involvement of local people. Clearly, the challenge to universalism and fiscal crisis render deep-seated changes to the provision of welfare. Strategies for welfare reform will have to keep mindful of these limitations if they are to really pluralise and empower people and communities in the delivery and acquisition of welfare. Various models of welfare pluralism are vocal about the differentiated nature of service delivery, but are relatively silent on actual mechanisms for local involvement in the conceptualisation, design and implementation of 'third-way' welfare.

Various advocates of an associationist model reveal the importance of devolved responsibility to many self-governing associations that mediate between the state hierarchy and individual citizens. The universality of this model is dependent on provision of an unconditional basic income to all citizens regardless of income. A radical participatory model points out that all structures under welfare capitalism are elitist and exclusionary, and that a radical participatory project is required to reverse this exclusion. Save complete revolution and socialisation of ownership and management, it is difficult to see how this ideal can be realised in practice. Equally revolutionary, a critical liberationist model centres on a raising of critical consciousness in a context of non-oppressive social relations. This model shows how involvement of local people begins with the socio-psychological relations human beings on the basis of intrinsic equality. A rational communicative model stresses a de-contextualised, rational and unconstrained communication between all relevant parties for social consensus and reconciliation of different values and interests. Habermasian welfare governance would be integrationist and all-inclusive within a rationally discerned and singular political project. By contrast, a radical pluralist model is based on irrationalist, anti-essentialist and contextualised identity politics, denying all possible integration and rational consensus.

By accepting Ramesh Mishra's argument for an ideological basis of welfare reform, it is reasonable to claim that political intervention can steer subsequent changes along certain conceptual lines if sensitive to the institutional context in which these changes occur. While mindful of differences in institutional context, this chapter has dealt with the problems of radical democratisation in the governance of welfare in relative isolation from those differences. In order to situate these issues within respective institutional contexts, the next chapter presents a historical and spatially differentiated account of welfare provision in the post-war period.
Welfare Regimes and APS in Historical and Spatial Perspective

By examining differences among nations it is possible to gain a context-sensitive perspective on welfare pluralism and the potential for the involvement of local organisations and individuals. In doing so this chapter contextualises the preceding theoretical and conceptual issues by considering spatial and historical specificities in the provision of welfare in different countries. The first section uses broad historical categories for periods of stable capitalist development from regulation theory and a typology based initially on Esping-Andersen's welfare regime theory and to trace lines of welfare and APS - over time and space - across various nations. In doing so it gives an indication of changes in APS across different welfare contexts in the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism in the post-war period. Presenting a variety of welfare regimes it is argued there is a tendency for welfare regime convergence through neo-liberalisation in different countries, limited by contextual path-dependence and certain institutional specificities. Having charted the decline in traditional universal welfare provision, the second section looks at contemporary issues around more specific concepts of poverty and social exclusion - namely the US 'underclass' debate and the European debate on 'social exclusion' - linking into a three-way typology of APS based on market, state and non-state sectors. It sees APS as the product of variety and convergence of these sectors. The chapter concludes by critically reflecting on the welfare regime and APS typologies.

Welfare Variety and Convergence

Recalling the typology of welfare regimes initially based on Esping-Andersen's work (see Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1994; and ed., 1996; see also Johnston, 1993), this section considers the changing nature of welfare and APS across different institutional contexts in the post-war period. An attempt is made to match 'ideal-types' against particular countries. Part of the purpose of this is to show that some countries stay broadly within a model over time - for
example Sweden and Italy; and that other countries show sharp shifts between models, such as the UK, which was social democratic until the 1960s and (neo)-liberal since 1979 under the influence of Thatcherism. Throughout the post-war period the Netherlands represents a combination of liberal, conservative and social democratic elements. To illustrate these differences this section presents and discusses the experience of welfare and APS across four different institutional contexts - the UK, Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands - arguing that a variety of welfare regimes are apparent across Europe, revealing the significance of institutional context and contextual path-dependence. The historical shifts in welfare in the UK and the Netherlands also acts as a background for more contemporary approaches to poverty in subsequent chapters. For reasons of space this section does not discuss welfare and APS in Germany and France - where strong elements of the conservative model are present - nor does it discuss the state socialist model that characterised the former Soviet Union until 1989.

Referring to table 1 welfare and APS are examined within three stages of capitalist development drawn from regulation theory (see Aglietta, 1979; 1982; De Vroey, 1984; Lipietz, 1986; and Boyer, 1990):\(^{(27)}\) (1) the immediate post-war period where modern European welfare states were consolidated; (2) the 'Golden Age' of Fordism representing the apex of Keynesian economic management and state welfarism; and (3) the period from the mid 1970s onwards where the crisis of Fordism became widespread, leading to structural stagnation, internationalisation and tentative steps towards a new post-Fordist growth paradigm. Table 2 presents notions of poverty and APS across different welfare regimes - adapted from welfare regime theory - indicating a spatial dimension to welfare and APS. Both tables are simplified models of reality, vulnerable to empirical irregularities and therefore criticism, notably with certain problems posed by abstraction (see Johnston, 1993).\(^{(28)}\) While their purpose is to present a broad picture of differentiated welfare and APS across time and space in the western world in the post-war period, one should nonetheless bear in mind the complexity, diversity and nuances of difference within any one regime or time frame.\(^{(29)}\)

\(^{(27)}\) Regulation theory - also known as the Regulation School - describes the writing of a diverse group of French Marxists from the late 1970s and early 1980s on the nature of contemporary capitalism. Various national economies are approached as systems of production and consumption in the context of an international division of labour. In doing so they distinguish between 'regimes of accumulation' and 'forms of regulation' and periodise capitalist history in terms of changing organisation of work and the relationship between the wage system and labour productivity. Some observers are critical of this school for implying a homogenous and linear transition between periods, when 'real-concrete' conditions in actual time and space often reflect only a partial evolution (see Painter and Goodwin, 1995; and Goodwin and Painter, 1996).

\(^{(28)}\) For Derek Gregory (1994a), abstraction denotes the "conceptional isolation of (a partial aspect of) an object" (p. 1). He shows that abstraction means different things depending on epistemology. For positivists it represents the starting point for model-building (see Chorley, 1964; and Chorley and Haggett, eds., 1967). Idealists influenced by Weber see abstraction as formulation of 'ideal-types' for comparison with empirical phenomena (see Parkin, 1982). And realists see abstraction as the means for identifying essential characteristics of objects, especially the internal relations that are necessary for social structures to exist (see Sayer, 1992: 85-92; 138-40; and 1997).

\(^{(29)}\) All models are one way or another subject to a process of abstraction and therefore some qualification is required. Combining elements of Weberian 'ideal-type' and realist forms of abstraction, table 1 embeds within a regulationist stance on the dynamics of capitalist development. Commentators of a more ideological (or 'ideational') persuasion sometimes would argue that more attention should be paid to ideology - such as Keynesianism or neo-liberalism - rather than relatively static institutional arrangements as featured by the regulationists (see Mishra, 1984; and 1990). Controversy exists, for instance, over whether the 'Golden-Age' of Fordism according to the regulationists is really a period where
Drawing initially on Esping-Andersen's *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990), a large part of the information presented in table 2 reflects a static picture of welfare and APS, clearly in tension with the changing temporal dynamic in table 1. With socioeconomic and economic psychology perspectives in mind, Amin and Hausner (1997) argue that contemporary patterns of economic organisation in different countries are possibly connected with institutional specificities in space and time. Applying this argument, table 1 can be said to be *diachronic*, whereas table 2 *synchronic*, and an attempt is made to integrate these tables by incorporating a temporal dimension in table 2 (see also Hausner, 1995). "Real-concrete" welfare regimes are rarely pure and complete versions as laid down by Esping-Andersen: for instance, he characterises the US welfare system as liberal, yet welfare provision under Roosevelt's 'New Deal' in the 1930s drew on social democratic ideals, certainly in rhetoric if not in practice. It is therefore important to be aware of the changing balance between competing *ideologies* of welfare in any one national context, and by implication, any changes in regime over time.

This combination of regulationist motifs and welfare regime caricatures is one way of looking at different perspectives on the evolution of welfare, and approaches to poverty and APS in the post-war period across Europe. It is important to note these conceptual 'tools' are used merely for comparison and not as strict theoretical, analytical and methodological devices for rigorous testing against empirical data.

Keynesian macroeconomic policies were formally instituted. The regulationists would reply that Keynesianism is indeed a defining feature of Fordism. In a similar vein, there is a debate on whether the post-Fordist period reflects a series of neo-liberal policy choices as much as a transition in a 'regime of accumulation'. By considering a temporal dimension, it arguably becomes possible to view the way this ideological factor becomes institutionalised into stable structures over an extended period of time, in effect combining elements from both the regulationists and the 'ideationists' rather than seeing them in opposition. This tension is difficult to resolve however as it does depend on the status accorded to regulation theory. As a theory it is useful for *post-hoc* description of stable periods of capitalist development - but it is less useful as an explanatory, analytical and prescriptive tool in periods of transition (see Mohun, 1993).

There are two main additions to Esping-Andersen's three-way typology of welfare regimes in table 2. Firstly, the inclusion of a *state socialist* regime reflects a more ideological and less empirical concern, certainly with the demise of 'actually existing socialism' since 1989 in the former Soviet Union (see Alcock, 1993: 36-7). Secondly, a *clanistic* model based on historical non-state informalities and enduring patron/client relations in the distribution of social resources is also included (see Ferrera, 1996; Katrougalos, 1996; and Rhodes, 1996).

Although implicit in the above quote, brief background and definition of these terms are useful. *Diachronic* and *synchronic* were first coined in the study of linguistics by Ferdinand de Saussure - the former referring to the evolution of language and the latter to cover 'everything that relates to the static side of our science'. Subsequently borrowed by sociologists and anthropologists, they now denote two distinctive approaches to academic inquiry - *diachronic inquiry* referring to the historical development of a subject, and *synchronic inquiry* concerning 'a subject as it exists in a particular time, not with its historical antecedents' (see Bullock, *et al.*, *eds.*, 1988; and Hawkins, 1988).

There is a problem of periodicity in combining a regulation approach with welfare regime theory. A question emerges whether table 1 provides periodicity of welfare regimes and APS, or whether it adopts the stages of capitalist development from regulation theory and transposes the categories of welfare regimes and APS afterwards? Taking the former line, an explicit regulationist perspective may be rendered inappropriate to APS. Conversely, by assuming the latter a problem where lags in the welfare response to social problems mean that it is unlikely those stages of capitalist development relate to the stages of APS in a simple temporal way.

Esping-Andersen is a useful starting point for analysis; but it is necessary to be aware of local, national and international variations, especially with any locality case study comparison as discussed by some commentators (see Engbersen *et al.*, 1993; and Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). Other observers in the US have developed useful frameworks. Loic Wacquant sees Esping-Andersen as the starting point and incorporates a neighbourhood dimension, building his analysis back up to the welfare regime level (see Wacquant, 1993b and 1996). Various contributions to *Urban Poverty and the Underclass* adopt frameworks as variants on this theme (see Mingione, *ed.*, 1996).
### Table 1: Post-war evolution of welfare and APS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Characteristics of welfare and APS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Modern Welfare State Consolidation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>* Beveridge and Keynes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* absolute/subsistence conceptions</td>
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<tr>
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<td>* post-war political consensus</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* citizen mobilisation during WWII</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>* T.H. Marshall and 'social citizenship'</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* political silencing of poverty</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>* diversity through institutional differences</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>prevalence of social democratic welfare statism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK &amp; Europe</td>
<td>* Fordist production and consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* full employment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* high productivity growth</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* considerable narrowing of poverty</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* criticisms of welfare state and welfare economics</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* 'rediscovery of poverty' during 1960s</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* state sponsored community development influenced by US 'War on Poverty' social movement</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* 'relativist pathology' conceptions of poverty</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>* diversity through institutional differences</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>challenges to statism - grassroots action to fill gaps revealed by 'rediscovery' movement</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>1950-1975</td>
<td>Golden Age of Fordism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UK &amp; Europe</td>
<td>* oil shocks, &quot;stagflation&quot; and structural decline</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* crisis of Fordism, welfare and citizenship</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* growth of mass unemployment</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* escalating levels of poverty</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* uncertainty, insecurity, community dislocation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* emergence of social exclusion concept</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* restructuring of welfare: marketisation, pluralism, convergence, social security reform</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* globalisation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* &quot;hollowing out&quot; and Europeanisation of welfare</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>* EU dimension to local APS</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* EU innovative job creation schemes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* welfare rights and local authority APS in the UK</td>
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<td></td>
<td>* social entrepreneurship, social innovation, grassroots development</td>
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<td>* social economy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* 'third sector'/ non-statism</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* community economic development (CED)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* convergence of social, economic and environmental concerns</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>* diversity through institutional differences</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>rise of welfare pluralism, non-statism and rhetoric of local user-involvement</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>1975-1990s</td>
<td>New Post-Fordist Paradigm</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UK &amp; Europe</td>
<td>* oil shocks, &quot;stagflation&quot; and structural decline</td>
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<td>* crisis of Fordism, welfare and citizenship</td>
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<td>Europe</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>rise of welfare pluralism, non-statism and rhetoric of local user-involvement</td>
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### Table 2: Welfare regimes, poverty and APS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptions of poverty</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Social Democratic</th>
<th>Clientelistic</th>
<th>State Socialist</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>state intervention causes poverty</td>
<td>individual/ social explanations</td>
<td>market failure causes poverty</td>
<td>civil society perspective</td>
<td>capitalism causes poverty</td>
<td>capitalism causes poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pathology</td>
<td>social/ family morality</td>
<td>state/ social responsibility</td>
<td>social/ family responsibility</td>
<td>poverty is functional (Marx)</td>
<td>poverty is functional (Marx)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>residuumism</td>
<td>individual work responsibility</td>
<td>rights of citizenship</td>
<td>informality</td>
<td>responsibility of the state</td>
<td>responsibility of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absolute/ subsistence</td>
<td>relativist tendency</td>
<td>relativism</td>
<td>absolute</td>
<td>absolutist/ maximalist</td>
<td>absolutist/ maximalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruments of APS</td>
<td>free market</td>
<td>state without market distortion</td>
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<td>civil society solutions</td>
<td>state command</td>
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<td>equality of outcome</td>
<td>polarised welfare system</td>
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<td>decommodification</td>
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<td>Institutional Characteristics</td>
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<td>egalitarianism</td>
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<td>Change over time</td>
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<td>China from 1949, North Korea from 1953, Cuba from 1959</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Modern Welfare State Consolidation

In the aftermath of the Second World War it is generally agreed among social and political historians that a broad consensus emerged within the United Kingdom as to future economic governance and social legislation (see Berthould et al., 1981; Digby, 1989; Clarke and Langan, 1993a; and Hill, 1993). Although some remain sceptical of the so-called 'post-war consensus' (see Jordan, 1991; and Whiteside, 1996), most herald this period where cross-party support for Keynesian demand management policies, coupled with Beveridge inspired social insurance and national assistance schemes emerged (see Beveridge, 1942; Keynes, 1973; Moggridge, 1976; and Clarke and Langan, 1993a; and 1993b). This saw creation of a formal 'welfare state' to eliminate the 'five giant evils on the road to reconstruction' of want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness (see Beveridge, 1942; 1943; and 1944; see also Berthoud et al., 1981; Leaper, 1991; and Timmins, 1996). The 'mixed economy' of market and state mechanisms aimed to meet the needs of social and economic renewal, in keeping with a new democratic and egalitarian ethos mobilised during the war effort and extended by new demands from the labour movement. A variant of social democracy - in a context of relatively underdeveloped corporatism (see Johnson, 1987) - was instituted and given intellectual credibility with T. H. Marshall's Citizenship and Social Class (see Marshall, 1950). He argued previous social policies were only for those at the base of society. This welfare state meant they were now universal on the basis of 'social citizenship'. Despite euphoria surrounding this development it arguably led to a silencing of debates on poverty, serving to deepen absolutist and subsistence conceptions, in continuation of liberal and conservative trends stretching far back in history (see Fraser, 1981; 1984; also Dean, 1991).

The Poor Law [of 1834] was the ne plus ultra of selective services: it was socially divisive and imbued with moral stigma. Presumably there are good reasons for believing that future selectivity would not have equal consequences. Whether it would depends largely on the extent to which late twentieth century British society has truly freed itself from the thraldom of individualism and self-help. Do we still believe ... that the greatest duty of social life is in fact 'to strive to the utmost to be self-supporting - not to be a burden upon any other man or upon society'? This is the cultural inheritance of modern British capitalist society which all social policy must deal.

(Fraser, 1984: 249).

There was not the same blend of traditions that led to the development of the welfare state in Sweden during the same period. Rather it is generally considered that the strongly social

34 There was a similar silencing over poverty in the US during this period (see Murray, 1984). Comparable social legislation was not enacted in the US until the 'New Deal' agreements of 1935; even then only partial income maintenance was developed (see Janoski and Hicks, 1994). Memories of economic and social strife following the Great Depression arguably influenced the universal rhetoric of the New Deal. Right from the start, however, employment schemes were linked to the labour market, offering public sector jobs if the private sector could not provide. Although these schemes were phased out during the Second World War, they left a legacy of large scale transfer payments according to social insurance principles via large bureaucracies (see Leiby, 1978), and in continuation of longstanding individualistic and liberal characteristics (see Katz, 1986; 1989; ed., 1993; Handler and Hasenfeld, 1991; and King, 1995).
democratic, statist and universalist character of Swedish welfare reflects in some measure the historical outcome of working class struggle over the last century, led by a strongly supported trade union movement and the Social Democratic Workers’ party (SAP) (see Olsson, 1987; Villadsen, 1991; Valochi, 1992; Ginsburg, 1993; Gould, 1993). Pluralists argue for a more incremental progression of diffuse political pressures - including social movements and measures to placate the middle-class - alongside the traditional working class (see Heclo and Madsen, 1987; Therborn, 1989; and Baldwin, 1990). As Olsson (1987) notes:

Structurally, the existence of a large agricultural population alongside a growing working class was an important pre-condition for the steps taken, both groups being mobilized in the process of transferring poor relief into public welfare policy. The result, the universalism so typical of the Swedish welfare system, was thus born out of the emergence of these broad social forces and their influences on the state and society in the making.

(Olsson, 1987: 47-8 - original emphasis).

Two ‘historic compromises’ in the 1930s between the main ‘social partners’ (Social Democratic Workers’ Party, SAP; the Federation of Manual Workers Trade Union, Landsorganisationen, LO; and the Employers Federation, SAF) led to formal institutionalisation of corporatist governance, paving the way for subsequent social legislation and wage negotiations (see Gould, 1993). The extent to which the Swedish system has combined social democracy with corporatist governance is perhaps the main hallmark that sets it apart. Swedish neutrality in the Second World War spared it from the devastation experienced by other countries and in the immediate aftermath significant wartime public expenditure was redirected towards economic and social ends. Termed by one as perhaps the most developed instance of welfare under capitalism (see Gould, 1993) the Swedish model continues to have three core elements (see Olsson, 1987): (1) a wide system of income maintenance providing state benefits to nearly all citizens; (2) a large public sector providing free or heavily subsidised health, education and other personal social services; (3) and an active labour market policy (achieved through tripartite negotiations in 1948) that implemented a solidaristic wage settlement in the pursuit of full employment. Poverty tends to be prevented rather than ameliorated under this system.

By contrast, the welfare system in Italy developed along incremental and particularist lines, devoid of rationality and restructuring to meet the needs of certain social groups (see Ascoli, 1987; see also Ascoli, ed., 1984; Cotesta, ed., 1995; Ferrera, 1996; Mingione, 1991; 1993; ed., 1996; and Sykes, 1996). Robert Sykes (1996: 304-5) offers a brief account of Italian welfare in the immediate post-war period stressing certain economic and political factors constraining universalist provision. The political support offered by the Allies to the Catholic-based Christian Democratic party (DC), and political bargaining and coalition-building (trasformismo) (especially with the middle classes), ensured that left-wing parties - such as the Socialist party (PSI) and the Communist party (PCI) - were excluded from government. Under the DC government post-war economic policy sought to keep wages down, as a strategy for international
competitiveness, while limited welfare was provided for selected groups to ensure their political support (clientelismo).\textsuperscript{35} Whereas farmers, artisans and traders all benefited from specific proposals - along with an extension of old-age pensions to them all - the standard of living for the working classes was continually held down. Processes of trasformismo and clientelismo - and the resulting inefficiencies and corruption - were already afflicting welfare administration, especially in the Mezzogiorno where life-chances were substantially worse than in the north. There is a great deal of inequity within this system, one that perpetuates poverty for many people. Autonomous non-state welfare was relatively non-existent during this period, as Ugo Ascoli points out:

\textit{... we have to underline the weakness of the non-governmental sector in the welfare arena: there were very few popular initiatives and voluntary welfare organizations independent of political parties, especially after the Fascist repression and centralization of the welfare system. Since this period the working of the political system ... has exercised a very strong influence on the development of welfare policies. 'New' social policies will be more and more dependent on the search for political consensus and the legitimisation of the emergent political elite.}


The welfare state in the Netherlands that emerged in the post-war period represented a combination of liberal, conservative and social democratic elements (see van Kersbergen and Becker, 1988; Therborn, 1989; Cox, 1993; Engbersen \textit{et al.}, 1993; Kloosterman, 1994b; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; Klammer, 1996). Developing much later than other European welfare systems - not formally instituting legislation in the statist sense until the Second World War and then 1950s and 60s - social welfare provision was largely at the behest of various church (predominantly Protestant) and other voluntary organisations, regimented by the 1912 Poor Law (see van Loo, 1981; and van der Valk, 1986). In tandem with attempts at implementation of Keynesian policies for demand management, the period from 1940 to 1959 marked a gradual systematic formalisation of a corporatist welfare state, where:

\textit{... the Social Democrats formed various coalition governments with the Christian Democrats. It was in this period that the foreign model of Beveridge, flat-rate state pension, was introduced in the Netherlands. However, again, elements of the other models persisted and were introduced in new legislation: liberal elements in the National Assistance Act ... [and] Christian-corporatist elements in the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1952 ... [From the turn of the century to the post-war period] pillarization characterized society and politics and influenced the outcome of welfare-state politics. Coexistence of social and religious minorities led to corporatist, consociational, and consensual policy styles and policy}

\textsuperscript{35} Trasformismo relates to a process of coalition-building between political parties to maintain power, whereas clientelismo refers to the process where an 'patron' acts in the interests of a 'client' to ensure a benefit or a service from a landlord, political elite or public official. The patron expects some kind of support from the client at a later date in return for their successful mediation. Both Catholic welfare agencies and other non-profit organisations are part of this clientelistic process. These two processes combined have embedded a certain informality, a form of covert bargaining (often corrupt), presenting for Ranci 'a regime of fragmented negotiations between local and central authorities [that] has permeated both public administration and the political arena, making clientelistic intervention the most incisive way to obtain public benefits' (Sykes, 1996: 309).
networks, which in turn worked together to produce a comprehensive system of programs, covering every conceivable category of disadvantage.\(^{36}\)

(Engbersen et al., 1993: 34).

This corporatist, consensual and consociational style of politics, where 'consensus' and compromise was sought between diverse social and religious minorities, and not just peak organisations, is a peculiarly Dutch phenomenon (see also van Kersbergen and Becker, 1988; Hupe, 1993; and van Kersbergen, 1995). Indeed the pillarised character of Dutch society and politics, a dominant force from the late nineteenth century and a key factor in explaining this style of politics, shaped much of the social welfare policies during this period. Most notably the relative egalitarianism of Dutch welfare can be attributed to this combination of pillarisation and consociationalism, as the outcome of the state not wishing to show favouritism for any particular pillar.\(^{37}\) This formalisation of control by the 'social partners' was the first time in Dutch history where benefits were distributed on the basis of right and not as a favour bestowed upon the state or any other service provider.

Golden Age of Fordism

The period between the 1950s to the mid 1970s saw unprecedented economic growth and the achievement of full employment in the United Kingdom (see Judge, 1987; Clarke and Langan, 1993a; Gould, 1993; and Hill, 1993).\(^{38}\) Although UK governance was not as corporatist as in Sweden - largely the result of its adversarial political system and lack of trust between social partners (see Gould, 1993) - the increasing political role of trade unions in tripartite negotiations contributed to the substantial growth in levels of social spending maintained by the post-war boom.\(^{39}\) Grassroots stirrings over poverty and subsequent development of non-state APS can be also be traced to this period. Previously silenced, the 'rediscovery of poverty' called into question the assumptions of universal social citizenship, following publication of The Poor and

\(^{36}\) As Andeweg and Irwin (1993) show there are two types of insurance programmes beyond the minimum in the Netherlands: the volksverzekering - the people’s insurance - providing benefits all citizens; and werknemersverzekeringen - employee insurance, covering all employed people. Premiums for both are paid either by employees or employers or both, supplemented with government funds. Three further pieces of social legislation are the Unemployment Insurance Act (1952), the General Old Age Pensions Act (1957) and the General Widow and Orphan Act (1959).

\(^{37}\) The path-breaking work by Arend Lijphart is perhaps the most important contribution to the debate on pillarisation in the Netherlands (see Lijphart, 1975). He characterises Dutch society as a pluralist society divided along clearly identifiable segments - zuilen (or pillars) - vertical cleavages with their own distinct social and political organisations. He refers also to the process that leads this segmentation as verdeelzitting (or pillarisation). The main cleavages in Dutch society - at least as was still the case in this period - reflected a distinction between socialist, liberal, Catholic and Protestant pillars (see Pennings, 1991; Hupe, 1993; and van Kersbergen, 1995).

\(^{38}\) The overall expansion and prosperity in the UK, based on an average per annum growth rate of 3%, was nonetheless found falling behind that of industrial competitors (average 5% growth p.a.), leading to a widespread perception of relative national economic decline (see Clarke and Langan, 1993a).

\(^{39}\) In 1951 public expenditure as a proportion of GNP was 36.1% in 1951 rising to over 46.2% in 1974 and just under 45.6% in 1979. Much of this was attributed to social spending, amounting to 16.1% in 1951 and rising to 28.3% by 1979. This period saw the consolidation of the National Economic Development Board (NEDB) and the Manpower Services Commission (MSC), two examples of increasing union influence, the increasing power of which was seen by critics as 'socialism through the backdoor' (see Gould, 1993).
the Poorest (see Abel-Smith and Townsend, 1965) influenced by similar work from the US (see Harrington, 1962; and Galbraith, 1977):

Poverty and inequality first emerged as political issues in the United States, partly as a result of a growing recognition of the persistence of poverty in an age of affluence. The complacency of the post-war world order, with its theories of 'convergence', 'post-industrial harmony' and the 'end of ideology', was undermined by the new forms of social conflict and widespread evidence of a decline in social cohesion. In the USA a series of social investigations, notably Galbraith's indictment of 'private affluence, public squalor' in The Affluent Society in 1958 and Michael Harrington's The Other America: poverty in the United States published in 1962, led to the 1964 'war on poverty' launched by the Johnson administration; parallel studies of poverty and anti-poverty initiatives were taken in Australia, Canada, Sweden and France. The publication of The Poor and the Poorest ... put social security back on the political agenda ... It also led directly to the launch of the Child Poverty Action Group, as well as spearheading a forceful 'poverty lobby'; influenced the growth of a wider 'welfare rights' movement over the next few decades ... This movement included professional associations (representing groups working within the welfare state), charitable bodies (representing particular patterns of need, such as neglected children or forms of disability), activist groups emerging around new needs (such as homelessness and lone-parent families) and groups contesting patterns of discrimination (around 'race', gender and sexuality), newly defined welfare constituencies (people in mental hospitals, older people claimants) and groups emphasizing links between First World industrial affluence and Third World poverty and dependency. This explosion of the 'voluntary sector' added the political tasks of raising public consciousness and political lobbying to the work of direct provision of assistance which had historically been the focus of voluntary agencies.

(Clarke and Langan, 1993a: 37 - original emphasis).

State welfare in this period witnessed a modernisation and reorganisation, initiated by Labour governments under Harold Wilson in the 1960s - with the creation of 'super ministries' such as the Department of Health and Social Security in 1968 - and increased devolution of responsibility for provision of welfare to local authorities. All reforms in this period, as Clarke and Langan (1993b) show, involved three common features: one, greater bureaucratisation and centralisation of power; two, a commitment to managerial efficiency through private sector notions of 'corporate management'; and three, greater public expenditure and resource planning by central government. Institutionalisation of these features set the complexion of state welfare throughout the 1970s. As Michael Hill (1993) notes social policy in the UK reached a watershed in 1975/76 under Wilson and latterly Callaghan. Severe public finance problems in the

40 The Economic Opportunity Act initiated the 'war on poverty', aiming to ensure every citizen shared in all opportunities of society. An important element of Lyndon Johnson's 'Great Society' programs, federal spending (albeit limited) went to community action against deprivation, channelled to the local level via the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) (see Clarke and Hopkins, 1969; Higgins, 1978; Leiby, 1978; Marmor et al., 1990; and Alcock, 1993). Notions of self-help were a central feature (see Marmor et al., 1990; and Alcock, 1993). With US experience in mind, three new APS were implemented in the UK by the late 1960s. One, the Education Priority Area (EPA) programme, targeted primary schools in disadvantaged areas with extra resources. Two, the Urban Aid programme focused additional resources for initiatives set-up on a partnership basis. And three, various Community Development Projects (CDPs) were launched - influenced by the Model Cities Program (MCP) and Community Action Program (CAP) in the US - using central funds for experimental community action research (see Higgins, 1978). Poverty was now regarded as a relative issue. APS aimed at a minority of disadvantaged individuals to re-integrate them into mainstream society through community development, not through generous income maintenance. They intervened in the (sub)-culture of poverty manifest in particular areas. They were therefore based on individual and group pathology (see Lewis, 1961; 1966; and 1969), despite radical and structuralist rhetoric to the contrary.

41 Local authority spending as a proportion of GNP grew rapidly in the post-war period, almost doubling from 9.8% in 1951 to 18.6% in 1975 (see Clarke and Langan, 1993b).
aftermath of the 1973 Oil Shock - and consequent problems of 'stagflation' and unemployment - made the case for welfare reform even stronger.

Fordism was particularly marked in Sweden, combining strong social democratic statism with classic corporatist governance (see Olsson, 1987; Mishra, 1984; 1990; Ginsburg, 1993; and Gould, 1993). It was not until the 1960s - after thirty years of SAP hegemony - that social spending caught up with other European welfare systems, once economic prosperity made higher individual and corporate taxation more acceptable. The relative harmony of the 'social partners', strong economic performance and this robust welfare state lasted until the late 1960s and early 1970s: 'The essence of the Swedish model had been the coexistence and cooperation of both sides of industry, with the state, albeit in the hands in the Social Democrats, playing a neutral role' (Gould, 1993: 167). Following Ginsburg (1993) other pressures emanating from wider social change increased calls for expansion of welfare during the 1960s. Pressure mounted on the SAP leadership to renew a socialist commitment to 'equality of outcome' in class and gender terms - the result of a student movement, the 'rediscovery of poverty' and the rebirth of other social movements including feminism - a policy adopted by SAP in 1969. This policy was based on a report that symbolised the 'rediscovery of poverty' in Sweden, highlighting wage and salary differentials, enduring and persistent poverty (without officially defining it), unemployment figures and gender inequalities. The report argued '... the welfare state should build upon universalism through “targeted” reforms for groups with special difficulties - that is those who had been left behind in the post-war economic boom' (Ginsburg, 1993: 175), leading SAP to introduce a progressive income tax in 1971 thus extending levels of welfare state expenditure. However:

Over the years since the 1930s the welfare state ... has succeeded in ameliorating class and gender inequalities in welfare, though also reconstructing and even sustaining forms of class, gender and racial inequalities and oppression. The social democrat would suggest that the successful development of the welfare state and of the capitalist economy may have been a symbiotic process, but this is impossible to prove.

(Ginsburg, 1993: 199).

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42 **Stagflation** refers to the devastating combination of global economic recession and rapidly increasing inflation, against assumptions of Keynesian economic theory which had underpinned demand management of the post-war economic boom (see Keynes, 1973; and Moggridge, 1976).

43 In the early part of 1975 various social policy schemes were passed through Parliament. Later in the year following trade union agreement to a slight limitation on wage increases, the Chancellor Denis Healey began to impose the 'cash limiting' system that forced most spending programmes to stay within pre-determined budgets. Combined with concerns over balance of payment deficits, this crisis was intensified when Britain was forced to borrow from the IMF in 1976 on the condition that public spending was kept under severe constraints, sounding the 'death knell' for welfare state expansion (see Hill, 1993).

44 In 1960 only 16% of Swedish GDP was spent on welfare, and between 1960 and 1975 this spending grew at a rate well above the OECD average. It was not until the period 1975-81 that growth in social spending really came about, growing four times faster than the economy as a whole and twice the average OECD rate for the same period. Only by the end of the 1970s were levels of social spending as a proportion of national income the highest among capitalist states (see Ginsburg, 1993).
The Swedish approach to poverty involved increased progressive income tax and redistribution of wealth to less privileged groups, further enshrining the social democratic principle of universal equality in APS. This approach could not predict the economic problems of the 1970s which placed substantial pressures for reform on all welfare systems. Largely at the behest of the trade unions, the government increased levels of taxation and social security contributions. Moves towards 'democratic socialism' shifted the allegiance of many voters to the Right and placed strain on corporatist harmony, but nevertheless Sweden retained a commitment to universalist and solidaristic state welfare in the context of crisis (see Olsson, 1987; Mishra, 1984; 1990; and Gould, 1993).

In response to social inequities, the 1960s marked a significant turning point in the development of welfare in Italy (see Ascoli, 1987; see also Ascoli, ed., 1984; Cotesta, ed., 1995; Ferrera, 1996; Mingione, 1991; 1993; and Sykes, 1996). The strength of the unions began to grow, expressed through industrial unrest, and combined with social unrest (especially in the north) among students, women's movement and immigrants from the south, led the government and employers to realise that a new political settlement was necessary. The DC party and the PSI began to work more closely - the 'opening up of the Left' - which led to a series of new social legislation, including compulsory secondary school education in 1962. A promise for a National Health Service was not kept, as was a proposal to 'clean-up' state bureaucracy, and mounting social unrest culminated in the 'hot autumn' (autunno caldo) of 1968-69. Middle-class (medi cetti) students dominated the demonstrations - to little avail - but when workers from large industrial centres such as Turin got involved, the considerable strength of the unions, along with support from the parties of the Left, placed substantial pressure on the government for reform. The Pensions Act of 1969 introduced a substantial increase in old age pensions (pensioni di anzianita), aimed particularly at former manufacturing workers, along with new rules over disability pensions, making access easier for people from disadvantaged areas (see also Saraceno and Negri, 1994). But former tendencies continued:

The Pensions Act ... marked a turning point in that it reflected the demands of the leftist parties and trade unions and as such framed the subsequent development of statutory welfare in Italy. It led to the improvement of pension benefits for low-income groups and the working classes without adversely affecting the benefits of previously favoured groups ... and ensured that the disability pension became of major feature not only of social welfare provision but also of the government's labour market policies and the new political settlement. These pensions became, in effect, a means of 'buying off' political and social discontent in areas of very high unemployment and under-employment, principally in the Mezzogiorno. In short, it was a classic case both of the ... trasformismo and piecemeal policy change which came to characterise the Italian welfare state ... Furthermore, in the field of pensions the increasing complexity and discretionary nature of many benefits provided fertile ground for the growth of ... clientelismo between those governing the welfare bureaucracies (both officials and political party agents) and welfare beneficiaries.

(Sykes, 1996: 306).
Despite the eventual establishment of regional government in 1970 - where responsibilities for welfare including housing, health and other social services were devolved to the regional level - this period witnessed the growth in non-state approaches to poverty. Enzo Mingione shows that familial institutions, informal social ties and the activities of the informal economy grew in importance as survival strategies for the poor given the incomplete and fragmented nature of the state apparatus (see Mingione, 1990; and 1993). The ‘Golden Age’ of Fordism deepened particularist differentiation in Italian welfare.

The ‘Golden Age’ of welfare was experienced in the Netherlands between the late 1950s and the mid 1970s, grounded in a Keynesian consensus between liberal, conservative and social democratic political elements (see van Kersbergen and Becker, 1988; Therborn, 1989; Cox, 1993; Engbersen et al., 1993; Kloosterman, 1994b; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). Contrary to the incrementalist evolution in Italy, the development of Dutch welfare was rapid in the period 1960-1976, when it acquired its comparatively generous character. By 1975 the Dutch spent more of their national income on welfare than any other country (see Engbersen et al., 1993). Significant developments in this period were: the Disability Insurance Act (WAG) in 1967 which covered a maximum of 70% of the last wage, if necessary until the age of 65; the General Disability Act (AAW) in 1976 which provided an income at the level of the legal minimum wage for self-employed and handicapped people; improvement in the Unemployment Insurance Act (WW) offering 80% of last earned wage; and a substantial change with the substitution of the 1854 Poor Law by the Social Assistance Act (ABW) which provided an income for those who were no longer entitled to any other unemployment benefit, a ‘social minimum’ as a safety net derived from the legal minimum wage - 70% for individuals, 90% for lone parents and 100% for couples (see van Kersbergen and Becker, 1988; and Engbersen et al., 1993).

Perhaps the most far-reaching achievement of social policy in these years was the introduction of the statutory minimum wage in 1968 and the (since 1974 de facto) linking of the lowest social benefits to the net minimum wage. The net minimum wage and thus the...
minimum social benefits amounted to about 80 per cent of the net average wage ... Minimum wages were in turn linked to the overall development of the wage level in the private sector and so were all cash benefits. To complete the picture, the salaries of civil servants were linked to the general wage level and the salaries of those employed in the state subsidised sector ... were in turn linked to those of civil servants.

(van Kersbergen and Becker, 1988: 490).

Following van Kersbergen and Becker (1988) there are two central elements in the social context of Dutch welfare in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Unprecedented economic growth contributed greatly to the rise in social spending, attributed to Keynesian economic management, but also to a final break with a regulated incomes policy (1964) in favour of the statutory minimum wage. Liberalisation of the private sector contributed to the economic boom of this period, accompanied by a restructuring of the Dutch economy. Secondly, a Leftist cultural and political climate facilitated development of welfare state policies, a current that permeated political and religious factions, including the more conservative elements of Dutch politics, at a time when a process of 'de-pillorisation' was threatening to weaken the traditional ties between the Christian Democrats and the electorate. High rates of economic growth and low unemployment figures made it easier for radical parties to gain some political mileage, gaining representation in the Den Uyl coalition, ironically coinciding with the outbreak of global recession. It was not until 1982 that the liberal-conservative backlash was able to discard Keynesian policies and break with the passive Dutch welfare characterising the 1970s.

New Post-Fordist Paradigm

The post-Fordist period (from the mid 1970s onwards) in the United Kingdom witnessed the final demise of the post-war Keynesian-Beveridge consensus: a neo-liberal experiment in welfare restructuring from 1979 under Thatcherism was followed in the late 1990s by welfare reform under New Labour (see Fraser, 1984; Digby, 1989; Andrew and Jacobs, 1990; Clarke and Langan, 1993b; Hills, 1993). If the austerity measures imposed by Healey in 1975 - and enhanced by the IMF in 1976 - set UK social policy on the path to retrenchment, the catalyst for
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While the intellectual consensus began to disintegrate, a new, less heroic, executive consensus emerged in the 1970s which led each party to expose retrenchment in response to economic crisis. It was indeed a return to the inter-war years when social policy could be discussed without reference to party labels. By the later 1970s, even before the 1979 election, radical social scientists were talking of the welfare state in profound crisis because of 'the cuts'. What was remarkable about this policy of retrenchment in the period 1973-83 was that it persisted no matter which party was in power.

(Fraser, 1984: 251).

The Thatcherite period (1979-90) saw the influence of a US New Right ideology buttressing this 'culture of retrenchment', on which policies sought to reduce the role of the state in the 'mixed economy of welfare' and encourage a plurality of state, voluntary, informal and private mechanisms. While Clarke and Langan (1993b) argue that welfare state restructuring in practice did not compare to the New Right rhetoric, the Thatcherite project did indeed seek the 'rolling back of the state' to free potential for industrial investment, remove disincentives to work and foster self-reliance and responsibility. Despite bureaucratic inertia, that coupled with changing demography and therefore new welfare demand, restricted wholesale marketisation of welfare, 'compulsory competitive tendering' (CCT) was introduced as part of a 'business-like' approach, seeking 'economy', 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness' in the provision of welfare. The rhetoric and introduction of quasi-markets, rhetoric of service recipients as customers and consumers, the separation of purchaser and providers, increasing residualism and means-testing in benefit entitlement and the 'new managerialism' are all processes that occurred in the overall context of centralisation of financial and resource decisions. After almost two decades of ideological opposition to these changes, there is a chance that New Labour's welfare reform will accelerate the trend towards US residualism and 'workfare'. New Labour

50 The most significant import from the US in this respect is the concept of workfare. Jamie Peck has discerned two sets of contested meanings of workfare in the US that developed at this time (see Peck, 2000; Besley and Coate, 1989; Walker, 1991; and Hill, 1992; see also see Katz, 1986; 1989; et al., 1993; and Handler and Hasenfeld, 1991). Firstly, there is a 'hard' conception referring to the New Right era under Reagan, illustrated by the 'Work First' model in Riverside, California. Benefit entitlement is subject to a compulsory work requirement; a process where potential welfare beneficiaries have to prove they have actively sought work (indeed any job regardless of security, wage levels and wider social utility) through 'job clubs', 'job search' and other mechanisms. Secondly, a 'soft' conception refers to the increasingly technical language of welfare reform with successive Republican administrations and the Clinton administration. Both meanings of workfare represent a deepening of liberal residualism in welfare, away from universal provision, towards a punitive, moral and work imperative conception of benefit entitlement. If people experiencing poverty 'choose' to avoid work (regardless of job availability), their poverty according to advocates of workfare is voluntary so they do not deserve state handouts (see Murray, 1984; 1996a; 1996b; Mead, 1986; 1996; 1997a; and 1997b).

51 Research has revealed that the process of CCT for local authority and health authority services had an impact in cleaning and catering contracts in the health sector, and in environmental and leisure services in local authorities. They were in many ways marginal to the core activities of welfare such as education, health and social services (see Clarke and Langan, 1993b).

52 As late as November 1996 the Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) was launched to replace Unemployment Benefit, showing clear similarities with US workfare. Welfare recipients can only claim meagre benefits when they produce evidence that they have actively sought work. For critics, this policy is an ill-disguised attempt to cull public spending 'dressed-up' as a crusade against moral degeneracy and benefit fraud, driving the principles of UK conservatism to the extreme (interviews with Jamshid Ahmadi, NSPC 16/7/961 and 11/3/98).
has stated it will not repeal the JSA legislation, and arguably has developed ‘work requirement’ and means-test elements within ‘Welfare to Work’, the NDU, the WFTC and with reform of incapacity benefit.53

Two important developments in APS occurred in opposition to the direction of central UK state welfare during the 1980s. Firstly, the welfare rights movement originating in the ‘rediscovery movement’ of the 1960s and in the CDPs in the 1970s, was carried through into the 1980s by certain individuals, often funded by local authorities and building on the existing network of Citizens’ Advice Bureaux (CAB) (see Alcock, 1989; 1991; 1993; 1994; Alcock et al., 1991; see also Blackwell et al., 1990). While additional funding was gained through job-creation projects of the Manpower Services Commission (MSC), overall the process proved time-consuming and expensive. In order to become more cost-effective various organisations developed ‘take-up campaigning’ to maximise usage of local welfare services. Like the CDPs before, the welfare rights movement revealed contradictions in local community action against poverty, highlighting the shortcomings of the wider social security system. Unsurprisingly welfare rights workers - often of radical and critical persuasion - conflicted with the Thatcherite central government. Similarly, a GLC model of local APS emerged in the early to mid 1980s out of the welfare rights movement (see Craig, 1992; Alcock, 1993: 250-4; and Alcock et al., 1996). Given that local welfare rights were usually supported by Left-wing local authorities, and that policies were achieving a great deal in reducing poverty, these authorities began to realise that additional services could be delivered to enhance their anti-poverty effort. Rather than develop new policies, local authorities targeted existing services - such as housing, education and transport - to deprived individuals and families as a priority, following the example of the Greater London Council (GLC). Typically for the period, local authority APS faced severe political and financial restrictions, particularly through ideological opposition from Thatcherite central government. The GLC was abolished outright. Local APS in other authorities have continued to a certain extent, but are largely based on ‘partnership’ through grant aid for the social economy - especially for credit union and community development work.54

Lawrence Mead (1997a) points out three differences between the US and UK on this issue. Firstly, he claims the US system mainly seeks to shift single mothers into work as the social group mostly served by the means-tested Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The TANF is like UK Income Support, but only for families with children, usually headed by lone parents. Reforms in the UK focus on the unemployed more than dependent families. Secondly, contrary to continental Europe where jobs are scarce but well paid, he argues US workfare can assume abundant job availability, to the extent low wages and not jobs are considered the problem. The UK falls somewhere in between, requiring a careful balance between work enforcement and job creation. Finally, unlike the UK and Europe, the US has a long programme history and history of research on difficulties moving people off welfare and into work experience. US experience, he claims, should be suggestive rather than exemplary. Overall he stresses that poverty and dependency have non-economic, behavioural causes.

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54 Interviews with Brian Topping and Annabel McKinnon, Community Services, NTC 14/6/96, 28/6/96, 24/2/98, 26/3/98; 27/3/98 and 9/2/99. High-profile examples of social economy projects include the Wester Hailes Partnership Co. Ltd., an Edinburgh based initiative in receipt of EU funding to combat poverty and social exclusion. It is based on public-private partnership that seeks to integrate unemployed, homeless and young people in-care back into mainstream society through an ‘Internet Cafe’. This cafe is run by the people themselves, allowing development of domestic, management and computer skills (see EC, 1996a). Created in 1983, the Wise Group in Glasgow has grown rapidly since 1987, providing temporary work and training for over 5000 people, over half of whom have moved on to employment.
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... the emerging 'mixed economy' of the British welfare state does not correspond precisely to any abstract 'type': it is not simply social-democratic, residual or corporatist. Both its post-war construction and its more recent reconstruction, however, show the influence in practice of those types as conflicting strategies for the organisation of welfare regimes in late capitalist societies. The present regime - the effort to drag the British state into a more residual more in a new mixed economy of welfare - is marked by both the domestic political imperatives of 1980s conservative economic and social policies and the continued significance of both social-democratic and corporatist strategies.

(Clarke and Langan, 1993b: 73-4).

Despite pressures for change leading to certain departures, the experience of post-Fordism from the mid 1970s in Sweden witnessed a consolidation of a corporatist, social democratic and statist welfare system (see Mishra, 1984; 1990; Ollson, 1987; Ståhlberg, 1991; Villadsen, 1991; Garpenby, 1992; Ginsburg, 1993; Gould, 1993; Sainsbury, 1993; Kangas, 1994; Clasen and Gould, 1995.). Radicalisation of the Swedish model towards 'democratic socialism' in the 1970s maintained levels of service - legislation including the Codetermination Act of 1976 and the LO inspired wage-earner fund - but conversely served to disenfranchise the traditional social democratic electorate, who increasingly shifted their allegiance to various Right-wing and Centre-Right parties, aligning with the now hostile SAF. Corporatist negotiation came under duress, and conflict became the norm. Perhaps the result of these tensions, general elections in 1976 and 1979 brought bourgeois coalitions of the Right to power. Mounting economic problems, exacerbated by the second oil shock in 1979, led these governments to channel public funds in the vain attempt to rescue ailing firms, but budgetary problems were on the increase:

... the contract between the "social partners" [in Sweden] came up for renegotiation. Even this country was hit by the economic crisis, and here to the future of the welfare state became a subject of dispute from the late 1970s onwards. In particular when the first non-Social Democratic cabinet in forty-four years took over the helm in 1976 under an environmentalist Centre Party leadership. Since the Centre-Right parties in principle were not inclined to increase public levies, in a few years public borrowing, especially foreign loans, created a major public deficit problem. Inflation, too, became worse each year. The Social Democratic opposition kept a careful eye on existing welfare achievements, and the new cabinet hesitated to prune the welfare state. Especially the maintenance of full employment by labour market policy was regarded as a sacred cow by both government and opposition, when the employment situation was more strained than ever before in the postwar epoch. In 1980 the Centre-Right Cabinet finally took issue with the deficit problem, after a spectacular growth of the state budget deficit in four years from one to ten per cent of GDP, and switched to a retrenchment policy. This cost the Centre-Right parties their electoral backing in 1982, and highlighted the social forces behind the welfare state.

(Ollson, 1987: 76-7).

Most jobs and training are in energy management, security, building, environmental improvement, park and garden maintenance and new technologies. The Wise Group promotes the notion of an intermediate labour market as a temporary solution to long-term unemployed and unskilled men. By the end of 1995 560 people were in training, with 230 permanent staff (see EC, 1995; and 1998). The Big Issue is a weekly magazine sold on the streets by homeless and vulnerably housed people who purchase a number of copies and then sell them for profit. Set up initially in London in 1991, branches of the newspaper exist across the UK. The Big Issue Ltd. is a private company and not a social welfare organisation, although it does attract donations through an associated charitable foundation (interview with Neil Trotter, The Big Issue North East Ltd. 12/7/96; see also EC, 1995).
The SAP was returned to power in 1982 in vastly different economic and political circumstances, leading to a series of neo-liberal policy changes. Recession and stagnation forced SAP to devalue the Swedish currency - instigating a short recovery - but public expenditure, including social spending, was increasingly viewed as a drain on the economy. As a result the SAP government's move to the Right led to a series of classic austerity measures, including an imposition of limits on local authority spending, deregulation of financial markets, lifting of exchange controls and decentralisation of responsibility to sub-national municipal governments. There were further changes of this kind during the 1980s. Levels of VAT levied on consumers were increased in 1989, reversing the historically predominant progressive character of the Swedish tax system. The reduced tax intake meant that less state resources were available to finance egalitarian welfare to previous levels. Following the 1991 general election, SAP was again returned to power, this time in coalition with the a New Right ‘New Democracy’ party, and subsequently there was a concerted effort to reduce public spending by Skr 10 billion per annum over three years. Notwithstanding these neo-liberal shifts, longstanding institutional features of Swedish economy and society - namely practices of consultation and corporatist arrangements, cultural paternalism rationalism and egalitarianism - serve to maintain an essentially social democratic and statist welfare regime (see Ginsburg, 1993; and Gould, 1993). Representing maintenance and consolidation in the face of pressures for retrenchment, the Swedish model reflects social democratic maturity, and the centrality of an ideological imperative in determining the direction of welfare (see Mishra, 1984; 1990; and Ollson, 1987).

Public expenditure doubled from 30% of GDP in 1960 to 60% in 1980, a level at which it remained until the end of the 1980s (see Gould, 1993). Decentralisation in Sweden has led to the reconstitution of statist welfare and APS at the local level, with little empowerment of voluntary and community sectors. Non-statism is weak in Sweden. The state's 'democratic mandate' to provide services of all kinds partly explains this factor. Nonetheless co-operative development has increased in the sparsely populated and rural area of Jämtland since the 1980s, the number of jobs increasing ten-fold in less than
The post-Fordist period in Italy saw the development of complex and contradictory tendencies in welfare - namely tensions between statism and non-statism, universalism and particularism plus growing demands imposed on a system in crisis (see Ascoli, ed., 1984; 1987; Mingione, 1991; 1993; Saraceno and Negri, 1994; Cotesta, ed., 1995; Ferrera, 1996; Sykes, 1996; and Zajczyk, 1996). Enduring socio-institutional patterns of non-statism, informality and irrationality have nonetheless maintained a particularist and incrementalist welfare system. Changes that occurred in the 1970s are largely attributed to Leftist politics:

The 1970s were characterised by intense legislative activity by the Italian government in social policy, triggered by the women's as well as the social and civil rights movements. The second half of the decade, in particular the period 1977-78, seemed to lead the Italian welfare system to a second "turning point". While the first "turning point" (1968-69) broadened welfare citizenship without significantly modifying the rationale of particularist policies, with the second shift some qualitative changes in welfare philosophy occurred ... There was a breakdown of old rules just when, for the first time since 1947, the most important pro-labour party (the Communist Party, PCI) became a component of the government alliance, even though not in office. In light of this circumstance, analysts of domestic affairs will remember these years (1977-78) as the National Solidarity government period. Structural aspects of the economy, such as, for instance, the increasing public expenditure deficit, the growing inflation rate, as well as low economic growth are important, of course, to understand general pressures to rationalise social expenditure; we feel it necessary, however, to emphasise the political aspects of change. After 1978 indeed, when PCI was again an opposition party, even though structural economic indicators worsened, the welfare system rationale was not characterised by any remarkable change ... A combination of factors like the big leftist parties' success at the polls, the Unions Federation ..., the National Solidarity government, and the social mobilization of women and young people, all played a fundamental role in social policy changes which occurred in this period.


New social policies were implemented during this period, including the Youth Employment Acts (1977 and 1978), a Vocational Training Act (1978), the Public Child-Care Centres Act (1971) and the Family Law Act (1975). Most significant of these was the National Health System Act (1978) intending to set up a universal health care system (see Ascoli, 1987; Saraceno and Negri, 1994; and Sykes, 1996). Social spending as a proportion of GDP grew from 16.8% in 1960 to 29.1% in 1980 (Sykes, 1996). The reality, as Saraceno and Negri (1994) and Sykes
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(1996) show, was rather different. Central government funding for the regions was not forthcoming to the extent required to meet all proposed welfare services. Administrative inefficiency, along with the complexity of the system, meant that much 'under-spend' occurred. These problems, in tandem with regional disparities, cultural practices of clientelismo and trasformismo, and enduring non-statism in welfare rendered a continuation of particularist provision in Italian welfare and APS.

Economic restructuring in response to the crisis of Fordism led to a period of economic growth in the early to mid 1980s, especially in SMEs and services in the new Italian economy (see Sabel, 1982; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Bianchini, 1991; Cooke and Morgan, 1993; and 1998). A widening of disparities between the relatively prosperous north and central areas, and an increasingly impoverished south, placed new and complex demands on a strained welfare system. In the late 1980s poverty was 'rediscovered' when a government commission revealed that 9% of Italians were considered 'poor' in the north, whereas 26% were deemed so in the south (as high as 35% in Calabria); and demands from new 'client groups' such as women, single parents, the elderly and immigrants were identified, putting more strain on a system in crisis (see Saraceno and Negri, 1994; and Sykes, 1996). These pressures were difficult to resist in the 1990s as Italian politics moved towards the Right that, alongside the imposition of a neo-liberal desire to curb public spending, has also entailed attempts at flushing out bureaucratic inefficiencies and corruption in the Italian state. Increased calls for pension reform, further devolution of responsibility for welfare services to local authorities and non-state agencies, and the 1992 National Health Service reform which lead to the enlargement of the USLs and limitation of free prescriptions to the 'certified poor', together represent for Saraceno and Negri (1994): an ambivalent decentralisation; an uneasy alliance between delegation and mistrust in the welfare mix; and a tension between devious universalism or growing residualism in the Italian welfare system (see also Della Sala, 1997).

Manufacturing decline in typical Fordist firms like FIAT in Turin led to an increase in unemployment among skilled workers. Developed in 1975, the cassa integrazione scheme was increasingly used to provide support to these people, and to quell social and political unrest more widely. This scheme charged a levy on employers and paid the proceeds to the unemployed workers at 80-90% of former wages through their respective trade union. It was payable for three months to two years, and centrally after this time for a period of up to ten years. The scheme suffered familiar particularist trappings: resources offered were limited, only benefiting particular occupational and social groups represented by 'recognised' unions. Other workers had to rely on a very limited unemployment fund (see Mingione, 1993; and Sykes, 1996). Existing 'disability' pensions were increasing used in addition to this scheme - regardless of the disabilities or otherwise of claimants - as a form of social insurance for people living in deprived areas, notably the Mezzogiorno (see Ascoli, 1987; and Sykes, 1996).

Growing support for right wing parties, like Forza Italia (led by Silvio Berlusconi) and the Lega Nord (Northern League), partly reflected the mounting public awareness of corruption within the ranks of the DC and PSI parties in the early 1990s through the mafiapoli investigations. Berlusconi became Prime Minister in March 1994, but his government foundered when the Lega Nord withdrew from the coalition and a caretaker government led by Lamberto Dini took control. Alongside a shift towards spending cuts - enhanced in the drive to meet the Maastricht Treaty 'convergence criteria' - there arose a new commitment to 'cleaning up' Italian politics. With what became known as the tagliepoderi (or bribesville) allegations, major figures including Berlusconi, Andreotti (DC) and Craxi (PSI) were found to have accepted...
Institutions of civil society have operated in a highly politicised culture in Italy, with few non-state mechanisms free from the corrupting influences of *clientelismo* and *trasformismo*, including the Catholic Church. The role of the church in the delivery of welfare has substantially weakened since the 1980s, generally attributed to a declining hold of Catholicism in a secularising Italian society, and growing individualist attitudes as former family and kinship ties restructure and market reforms deepen. Various legislative changes have sought to de-politicise non-state welfare, and civil groups are now subject to government regulation and are permitted to buy property, accept donations and enter agreements with local government over tax-exemptions in the provision of welfare (see Mingione, 1991; 1993; Saraceno and Negri, 1994; and Sykes, 1996). Local authorities have also encouraged projects in the social economy to work in partnership for the provision of local welfare services. Building upon these insights on historical non-statism, more recent research has shown there is some potential for innovation in the Italian social economy - for example in care for the elderly - although neo-liberal tendencies and wider social mores pose limitations in other sectors. Childcare is not seen as a major area for job creation in Italy, a reflection of prevailing traditional attitudes towards the family, women and the job market. Above all, the highly devolved Italian polity presents problems for the co-ordination across regions, the Territorial Pacts Act of 1995 obliges local state and non-state actors to commit their activities to designated areas (see EC, 1997). Robert Sykes concludes:

> It is clear that in the 1990s state welfare provision in Italy is undergoing significant change even if it is difficult as yet to estimate quite what the overall effect will be. It is too early to say whether the state system will be residualised, and, in any case, it needs to be remembered that a significant proportion of welfare delivery has been delivered through the Catholic church and other NPOs alongside public provision ever since the growth of the post-war welfare state. It does however appear that the 'welfare mix' discussed so much in Britain and other capitalist welfare systems of late is beginning to be developed in Italy, albeit in a characteristically Italian way. The Italian welfare state is unlikely to disappear in the near future but it is being subjected increasingly in the 1990s to market forces, to demands for greater openness and accessibility, to demands for greater efficiency and depoliticisation, and, ultimately to changes in the underpinning welfare philosophy.

(Sykes, 1996:318-9).

Post-Fordist restructuring in the Netherlands represented a struggle between social democratic forces seeking maintenance and liberal-conservative calls for retrenchment of the welfare state...
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(see van Kersbergen and Becker, 1988; Therborn, 1989; Cox, 1993; Engbersen et al., 1993; Kloosterman, 1994b; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). Calls for retrenchment were first met in 1979. The oil shock in 1979 led to the second major recession of the decade and calls were increasingly being made for budgetary austerity to get government under control; benefit levels were de-coupled from the minimum wage and equalised with market developments, only a year after benefit allocation became based on an 'individuals' and not 'households'. In 1981 the new van Agt coalition of christian democrats (CDA) and conservative liberals (VVD) proposed a neo-liberal/monetarist reform agenda with publication of their Bestek 81 (Design 81) document. Tied to this culture of budget cuts was a 'rediscovery of poverty' in the Netherlands, a culture that required a supporting ideology. A national debate stirred up the issue of 'benefit fraud', distinguishing between 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor - a nieuwe orthodoxie (new orthodoxy) (see Oude Engberink, 1991) - providing a classic liberal-conservative justification for spending cuts. Indeed unemployment insurance and benefit were combined as the New Unemployment Act (NWW) in 1987. Going beyond a naïve pro-corporatist stance, Jelle Visser and Anton Hemerijck (1997) claim this governance of welfare represents a 'truncated corporatism', where the government intervened against the 'social partners' to manipulate the social security to 'dismiss' less productive workers. They show however that corporatist institutions were not dismantled in the Netherlands to the extent they were in the UK, suggesting issues of rigidity and inflexibility in the Dutch welfare system. Godfried Engbersen et al. agree:

lower cost than public enterprise as ticket sales provide 50% of financing. Prospects remain healthy as 'dial-a-ride' has allowed creation of a number of new markets (see EC, 1995).

3. Representing the apex of the Dutch welfare system, each and every eligible individual could claim the minimum wage and then do whatever they wanted with it - the state did not 'police' spending behaviour as before. Access to welfare became 'completely a right, not a privilege', and benefit recipients became full citizens as individuals in terms of full citizenship rights (interviews with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98 and 20/8/98). Marketisation of benefits was therefore in ideological contrast to these citizenship issues.

6. Research on the implications of these policies was undertaken by Oude Engberink and his colleagues at the CSPS, Rotterdam, culminating in the Minimum Zonder Margin (Minimum Without Margins) report (see Oude Engberink, 1984). It revealed that many people were getting into problematic debt and were unlikely to get out of their unfortunate predicament by themselves. The day after publication poverty was 'rediscovered' in the Netherlands, with a subsequent barrage of media publicity. The first APS was a voluntary action in Elbergen in Gelderland, a small village in the eastern part of the Netherlands close to the German border. Perhaps moved by media attention to poverty, a certain lady organised a collection of gifts just before Christmas for all poor people in the area. In the wake of that action some raising of critical consciousness was underway, and the word spread: in the New Year (1984) a similar action occurred in Muiden, a small village in the northern province of Noord-Holland. This Municipality tried to develop an additional targeted income benefit facing poverty, an action immediately dismissed by central government as an 'income policy' and therefore a central government and not a local municipality concern. The Muiden affair revealed that an indirect approach was required to bridge the social isolation of people. Many types of funds were arising everywhere specifically for this purpose, but not in Rotterdam where it took a further four years for this kind of action to develop (interview with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98).

6. In 1984 levels of benefit were cut in absolute terms by 5% which led to a rather difficult time for many people on the margins of mainstream Dutch society, and where the real problems of poverty began to take hold (see Oude Engberink, 1984). These people were increasingly unable to pay their bills getting more deeply into debt (interview with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 17/6/98).

6. The NWW reduced unemployment benefit to 70% of last wage for a shorter period of time, followed by one year entitlement to 70% of the net minimum wage. After that the unemployed have to turn to the ABW. Remaining more or less intact, disability benefits for young people became subject to medical re-examination as a kind of means-test. A social minimum was maintained, one depending on personal circumstances of claimants and derived from the minimum wage (see van Kersbergen and Becker, 1988).
... the last phase ... reorientation, which coincided with and was influenced again by foreign examples: the world-wide liberal backlash, manifesting itself in attempts at deregulation, privatization and so on, and in general in a retreat of the state. The existing consociational and corporatist institutions and political culture in the Netherlands, however, proved to be rather persistent and retarded and minimized the domestic effect of the universal trend. The Dutch welfare state may have become somewhat tougher and more liberal in comparison with former times; in comparison with "real" liberal welfare states, such as the U.S. or Australia, the Netherlands still cannot be called liberal.

(Engerbsen et al., 1993: 35).

In 1989 the slogan Werk Werk Werk (Work Work Work) was introduced when the PvdA was returned to power in The Hague after successive coalitions dominated by the CDA. Changes in legislation sought to get as many people as possible off benefits and into work, driven by the argument that 'every job more is a benefit less', and therefore seen as an opportunity for reducing social expenditure. Funding for local government was reduced, restricting their ability to undertake work such as public maintenance, street cleaning and social care, at a time when many thousands of unemployed people were ready to take up this work. Neither the state nor the market mechanisms were in the position to match supply and demand in these areas, leading to the Banenpool (Job Pool) and Jongerenpool (Youth Pool) additional employment initiatives, where participants earn either the private sector minimum wage, or an additional 20% on benefits to undertake these tasks. A further scheme of this kind was introduced in 1993 by Melkert - the Minister for Social Affairs - to match people with full-time jobs paying 120% of benefits. There was no official recognition of poverty until 1995 with the publication of Melkert's document De Andere Kant van Nederland (The Other Side of the Netherlands) (see Gemeente Rotterdam, 1993; 1996; and 1998a). Now officially recognised, it was permitted to openly discuss poverty, formally instituted through two 'poverty conferences', pulling together all anti-poverty interest groups at the direction of the state.

66 In the aftermath of reforms to disability and industrial injury benefits, it was decided the welfare state needed to be re-arranged dramatically. Reform of social assistance law compelled all mothers with children over five had to register with the Labour Office and seek work, regardless of availability or quality of jobs. Alongside reducing welfare dependency this policy induced new demands on childcare. More generally many people lost rights to welfare without having many prospects of finding employment (interview with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98 and 25/8/98).

67 The Melkert Plan set out to create Melkerthaven (Melkert Jobs). There are three types of Melkert Job: Melkert 1 in the private sector; Melkert 2 in the public sector; and Melkert 3 in the voluntary sector. Between 1994-98 around 10,000 jobs were created in this way for people mainly through the Labour Service. 'Pre-Melkert' training is provided for those that require, bringing opportunities for employment to many disadvantaged people. However, if the employee has to travel some distance to work they may well be worse off than before, and there is only limited evidence of successful throughput into the mainstream economy (see EC, 1997; PW, 1997, 1998a; 1998b; and Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998b; also interviews with Justus Veenman, ISEO, EUR 27/5/98, Mirjam Zaaijer, Lecturer (IHS) and Councillor (Overschie) 2/6/98, Rene van Engelen, Economic Affairs, Gemeente Rotterdam 9/6/98 and 9/9/98, and Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98 and 25/8/98).

68 Rather than represent a change in ideology this document explored the technical means of defining and combating poverty, for some critical observers, for the PvdA to acquire a 'social face' after suffering substantial losses in the previous two general elections. Disaffected people either switched allegiance to extremist parties, especially locally, or did not vote at all, but at the expense of the PvdA. The thrust of the document was that 'emotional categories' like the elderly, disabled and lone parents would collectively receive an extra NGL 200 million in benefits, resources that would be deducted from other groups - as the Dutch would say: 'you get a cookie out of your own box' (interviews with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98 and 25/8/98; and Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 27/7/98 and 4/9/98).

69 Following the Copenhagen Summit (1995) popular involvement of poor people themselves became the focus of a new anti-poverty agenda. Yet despite heightening awareness, these conferences had no effect on the content of APS (interview with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 25/8/98).
While residents and tenants associations have figured prominently in Dutch housing policy (see Johnson, 1987; van Kempen, 1992; and van Kempen et al., 1992), and that themes of social and political liberation have infused certain self-help initiatives (see Bakker and Karel, 1983), it is the reliance on non-governmental organisations as mediating structures in the provision and delivery of all kinds of social services that gives Dutch welfare its alleged non-statist character. For Norman Johnson (1987) 'the Netherlands provides the most complete example of voluntary organisations serving public purposes' (p. 111). Termed the particulier initiatif (PI), stemming from the 'vertical pluralism' based on Dutch pillorisation, these independent foundations provided relatively fragmented and uncoordinated welfare prior to welfare state expansion. During the 1970s they became reliant on government funds - between 95-100% of costs were met by state funds at all levels - thus increasingly integrated into the rationality of statist welfare (see Brenton, 1982). One notable exception is the De Arme Kant van Nederland (The Poor Side of the Netherlands), a social movement against poverty initiated in 1986 by the Social Affairs section of Dutch Council of Churches, a predominantly Protestant affair that continued to campaign over poverty issues, keeping the anti-poverty agenda alive throughout the 1980s. Distanced from this movement, the Catholic church developed its own initiatives, more recently around migrant issues, in addition to the reconstitution of CDA influence in non-state bodies, particularly after the 1989 election. There are examples of social economy innovations in the field of job creation and welfare in the Netherlands (see Beaumont, 1996). In the context of Dutch traditions of tolerance, pacification and the 'moral imperative', it is perhaps with political compromise and consensus between different groups where the essential character of the Dutch welfare state lies.

The Dutch welfare state is worthy of study in comparative work ... First, in quantitative terms it is the most highly developed welfare state around. Second, what make the "Dutch case" especially interesting are some of its structural characteristics. The Dutch welfare state is a product of different foreign influences, intermediated and mixed through the Dutch political

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72 Criticisms of Dutch welfare indicate some of the problems of relying on voluntary provision, including a lack of coordination, variable and incomplete coverage and an absence of democratic accountability. As claimed by some observers: 'the Dutch model is not one that could be transplanted in this [the UK] country' (see Hadley et al., 1978; see also Johnson, 1987), a view that has reversed more recently as elements of Dutch social and urban policy considered instructive of 'the way forward' for the UK (see Rogers, 1997; and 1998).

73 This movement was driven by the enthusiasm, commitment and real interest in the development of poverty in the Netherlands by Nordergraaf and van der Zee. Nordergraaf was a socially and politically orientated theologian from the well respected Protestant side of the CDA. As was van der Zee, a charismatic leader with a lot of influence on the political side of the Council of Churches. Having something to do with the Protestant work ethic, Protestants in the Netherlands always meddled with politics, where concepts of social justice, equity and high morality have played their part, especially within the Calvinist wing (interviews with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98, 20/8/98 and 25/8/98).

74 The Catholic Church was never involved in the Protestant De Arme Kant van Nederland. Catholics became more involved in social issues with the Second Council of the Vatican in 1964, but only discovered poverty as in the 1990s. In 1995 Bishop Muskens from Breda made an individual and rather evangelical stand, claiming that 'it is not a crime for the poor to steal bread'. Castigated by Prime Minister Kok in the uproar that followed, Muskens nonetheless attracted a great deal of attention. An influential and high-profile figure, participating in TV commercials, Muskens is perhaps less significant in substantive debates on poverty and APS (interviews with Wilfred Dolfsma, Economics Art and Culture, EUR 4/5/98 and Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 25/8/98).

75 Interviews with Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 27/7/98 and 4/9/98.
institutions, consociationalism, corporatism, and consensualism, and given specific Dutch
touches in the process. It combines elements of the liberal, conservative-corporatist and
social-democratic welfare states. The structural characteristics thus acquired have
produced a rather comprehensive but complicated, generous and lenient system of
regulations and implementation organizations. And it is these characteristics that are largely
responsible for the enormous size the welfare state programs have acquired. Furthermore,
the Dutch welfare state could be interesting theoretically because it undermines some
popularly held beliefs and accepted theories; for example that the welfare state is the
product of social-democratic political domination ... Third, given the size of the welfare state,
its consequences - in terms of labour force participation, high costs, economic efficiency,
equity, and dependence on government agencies - are also extreme. Therefore the Dutch
system could be a good case for studying welfare state-related problems, which also occur
in less-developed welfare states.

(Engbersen et al., 1993: 38).

The post-Fordist period marks the exposure of welfare systems in all countries to pressures for
international neo-liberalisation, and thus some commentators refer to a convergence among
welfare regimes (see Esping-Andersen, 1996a; 1996b; 1996b; Stephens, 1996; Rhodes, 1996;
Rhodes and Mény, eds., 1998; see also Ellison and Pierson, eds., 1998). These countries have
experienced a rise in universal provision, and a parallel development of selectivist and targeted
elements - either through non-state provision or through the decentralisation of state
mechanisms - in response to the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ and the rise of relativist conceptions of
poverty of social exclusion. It is abundantly clear however that persistent institutional
specificities mean that a variety of models are maintained across different countries in the west
despite this tendency towards convergence (see Rein and Rainwater, 1986; Rose, 1986;
Johnson, 1987; and Mayo, 1994). A partnership model can be said to represent the ‘mixed
economy of welfare’ in the UK, where a burgeoning voluntary sector increasingly carries the
responsibility for many welfare services in the context of a centralised ‘control state’. Sweden is
best described as a rational state model where universal welfare provision has restructured to
meet the needs of certain groups, with responsibility devolved to various sub-national state
agencies. This model retains a strong commitment to redistribution from the rich to the poor
through a progressive state rationality. An irrational model captures pluralist character of
welfare provision in Italy, where historical traditions of non-statism, informality and particularist
mechanisms have persisted in the context of an incremental, devolved and highly politicised
(and often corrupt) state. Finally, an integrative model describes plural welfare in the
Netherlands, where a relatively generous universal system has incorporated traditional non-
state mechanisms based on vertical pillars under the auspices of a statist rationality.

Tackling Poverty Without Universal Welfare

As post-war welfare systems in the west face increasing pressures for restructuring and the
pluralisation of their organisational bases, a closely related rise in specifically targeted APS is
underway as the case against traditional universal provision strengthens. This section draws attention to the main debates on poverty and policies to tackle it in the post-universal context. Over time an increasingly relativist conception of poverty has developed in various countries in the post-war period, particularly in the context of the 'rediscovery of poverty' from the 1960s onwards (see Harrington, 1962; Titmuss, 1963; Abel-Smith and Townsend, 1965; and Galbraith, 1977). An extensive body of literature traces the historical evolution of absolute/subsistence approaches to more relativist conceptions of poverty, and in turn the implications these conceptions have for APS (see Townsend, ed., 1970; 1979; 1993a; 1993b; and Alcock, 1993). While it is not possible to cover all aspects of this literature, what follows is an allusion to a set of strands - the US 'underclass' and the European 'social exclusion' debates - ones that have bearing on contemporary approaches to poverty. It is important to consider the ways in which concepts of the 'underclass' and 'social exclusion' relate to the concept of poverty. This conceptual relationship is often ignored or held implicit, and clarification of it allows any contemporary study of APS to draw upon a wealth of insights from the 'poverty studies' literature, acknowledging that 'poverty' is not a passé term referring to an outmoded statement about the 'social condition'. In addition both the 'underclass' and 'social exclusion' debates point to different APS, but are relatively silent on actual mechanisms for involvement of local people in those strategies. By way of background the discussion begins with a brief account of the evolution of the poverty debate in the twentieth century.

While the concept of poverty has invited a great deal of scholarly and political attention for centuries, including approaches to minimum needs of the 'workhouse poor' with the 1834 Poor Law in the UK (see Himmelfarb, 1984; Woolf, 1987; and Dean, 1991), following Peter Townsend three new conceptions of poverty developed in the twentieth century (see Townsend, ed., 1970; 1979; 1993a; 1993b; see also Alcock, 1993). Firstly, a subsistence conception developed in Britain in the late nineteenth century following surveys undertaken by Booth and Rowntree, and then extended by William Beveridge in the immediate post-war period (see Rowntree, 1901; 1937; 1941; Booth, 1902-3; Beveridge, 1942; 1943; 1944; see also Berthould et al., 1981). Poverty by this approach was deemed to be the situation when the incomes of individuals and families were insufficient to meet the minimum requirements for the maintenance of physical efficiency. An absolutist measure, people were considered poor when their income fell short of a pre-determined poverty line, essentially based on food, shelter and

76 Mitchell Dean (1991) in The Constitution of Poverty traces the history of the English poverty discourse. He argues from around 1600 to the late 18th century the poor were viewed integral to the commonwealth and kept industrious for the well-being of the nation - a discourse that contrasted the poor workhouse (industry) with the alehouse (idleness). Imposition of the Speenhamland Scheme (1795), a system of 'workfare' that provided subsidies for wages out of the existing poor rates, and acted as a fulcrum in the transition to capitalist modernity. Thomas Malthus's Essay on the Principle of Population was published in 1798 providing a new discourse where all able-bodied labourers were conceived individually responsible for the maintenance of themselves and their families. The 1834 Poor Law, which abolished outdoor relief to adult able-bodies males, completed a triad of factors that for Dean amounted to a 'liberal break' in attitudes to the poor, formally instituting a new liberal governance of poverty, revealing the deep-rooted liberal dimension of welfare in the UK.
clothing dimensions of subsistence. Although influencing post-war benefit levels in the UK and notions of subsistence in the US, the subsistence approach to poverty has attracted much criticism, primarily as it is based almost entirely on physical requirements that are not only difficult to discern in the context of constantly evolving consumption ‘norms’, but also because it ignores the many social needs faced by people experiencing poverty. In this way the subsistence approach tends to minimise the range and depth of human needs.

The second approach based on basic needs, although initiated earlier, developed in the 1970s as an extension of the subsistence method (see Drewowski and Scott, 1966; Townsend, 1979; 1993a; 1993b; UNESCO, 1978; and Brandt, 1980). In addition to certain minimum family requirements for private consumption (like adequate food, shelter and clothing, but also household equipment and other basic essentials), the basic needs approach includes essential services for public and collective consumption. Services such as clean and safe drinking water, sanitation, public transport, health, education and cultural facilities are all considered basic community requirements and not just for individuals and their families. The ‘basic needs’ approach tends to be restricted to the infrastructural facilities of communities in low-income countries, limiting its international and universal appeal. It has attracted other criticisms in keeping with the ‘subsistence’ approach:

... proponents of the concept have had great difficulty in producing acceptable criteria for the choice and definition of the items included. One of the attractions of the ‘subsistence’ concept for some thinkers has been its limited scope and therefore limited implications for sociostructural reform, and its easier reconciliation with the strong emphasis given to individualism within liberal pluralism. One of the intellectual attractions of the ‘basic needs’ concept, on the other hand, has been its emphasis on establishing at least some of the preconditions for community survival and prosperity in all countries. (Townsend, 1993a: 503).

The third and most extensive and socialised conception of poverty developed from the previous two into an approach towards relative deprivation pioneered by Peter Townsend (see Townsend, ed., 1970; 1979; 1981; 1985; 1987; 1993a; 1993b; see also Mack and Lansley, 1985; 1992; Desai and Shah, 1988; and Lister, 1991c). Spawning a wide range of approaches to the measurement of poverty, the concept of ‘relative deprivation’ is based on the view that

77 Many studies have attempted to link measurement and de facto definition of poverty (see Gustafsson and Lindblom, 1993; Bruno da Costa, 1994; Hallerød, 1995; Nolan and Whelan, eds., 1994; and Nolan and Whelan, 1996). With the rise of the post-war relativist orthodoxy, new methods of poverty measurement were adopted including budget standards, behavioural and social consensus approaches (see Bradshaw et al., 1987; and Piachaud, 1987). Social consensus approaches can be divided into two strands (Walker, 1987): the first involves direct public consultation over an adequate minimum income, a list of necessary items and acceptable levels of tax (see Townsend, 1979, Mack and Lansley, 1985; and 1992); the second focuses on income proxy measures and deprivation indicator methods (see Veit-Wilson, 1987; Callan et al., 1993). There are certain problems with any measurement of poverty. One, poverty is a highly politicised concept and therefore approaches to measurement are hotly contested on their claims to objectivity, especially where rising levels of poverty are the outcome (see Townsend, 1979; and Alcock, 1993). Two, consensual approaches tend to be restricted by reliance on a quantitative methodology, suggesting the adoption of alternative qualitative techniques (see Walker, 1987). Three, measurement is often based on a ‘narrow empiricism’, one that traces existing patterns of resource allocation, underestimating real levels of need (see Townsend, 1979; 1985; and 1993b).
rapid social change in any context makes a standardised and atemporal measure and threshold of poverty difficult to apply in new circumstances. People experience poverty as victims of inequitable distribution of resources in society and when those resources fail to meet the manifold social demands and customs of all citizens of that society. As Townsend claims in *Poverty in the United Kingdom*:

Poverty can be defined *objectively* and applied consistently only in terms of the concept of *relative deprivation*. ... The term is understood objectively rather than subjectively. Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities.

(Townsend, 1979: 31 - emphasis added).

Despite widespread appeal the concept of ‘relative deprivation’ has induced much in the way of scholarly dispute, usually over the ‘scientific’ and methodology minutiae concerning the delimitation of an arbitrary threshold, below which individuals and families can be said to be in poverty (see Townsend, 1979; 1985; Piachaud, 1981; 1987; Desai, 1986; Desai and Shah, 1988; Sen, 1981; 1983; 1985; and 1992). David Piachaud is sceptical of Townsend’s claim to objectivity in an essentially relativist framework, arguing that poverty-line delimitation is ultimately arbitrary involving the imposition of a subjective judgement of needs in a particular context. Conversely Amartya Sen argues that an ‘absolutist core’ - based on objective categories of human capability and avoidance of shame in any society - would prevent a relativist conception of poverty conflating with socio-economic inequality.

While there are many other contributions dealing with numerous aspects of the poverty debate, the discussion now turns to the debates on the ‘underclass’ in the US and ‘social exclusion’ in Europe. The *underclass* debate - referring to those people experiencing persistently extreme conditions of poverty, isolated from mainstream society and increasingly concentrated in particular urban areas, often racially-specific ghettos - has made a significant

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78 In *Poverty and the State* Tony Novak enlarges the thesis that poverty is necessary component of capitalism, and that social security has only a limited role under capitalist relations (see Novak, 1984; and 1988): Throughout history ...[the social security system] primary role has been to uphold the operation of a capitalist labour market ... [it] has never been intended to abolish poverty, nor has it been capable of doing so' (Novak, 1988: 200). Similarly Richard Peet (1978) shows that Marx saw the normal functioning of capitalism as necessarily producing a more-or-less permanent pool of unemployed and therefore poor people. The *effects of modernisation* serve to shed labour as capitalists constantly seek to lower costs of production through productivity gains of new machinery. Secondly, capitalist economies require an *industrial reserve army* - a pool of poor people that can be employed and discarded according to the whim of the market. Other observers like Bob Holman, a Christian community development worker on Glasgow’s Easterhouse estate, argues that poverty is rooted in a combination of individual deficiencies, cultural deprivations and failings in social services, serving to uphold and justify socio-economic inequality (see Holman, 1978). He claims that poverty can only be understood in the context of affluence - that is, in relation to other classes, social groups and identities. Many cross-national and international perspectives on poverty exist (see Doyal and Gough, 1991; George and Howards, 1991; Spicker, 1993; and Townsend, 1993b). Other work addresses the gender dimension of poverty (see Delphy, 1984; Pascall, 1986; Glendinning and Millar, ed., 1987; 1992; and Millar and Glendinning, 1989).
impact on the American poverty debate over the last couple of decades (see Wilson, W. J. 1980; 1987; Murray, 1984; 1996a; 1996b; Katz, 1986; 1989; ed., 1993; Mead, 1986; 1996; 1997a; 1997b; Jencks and Peterson, eds., 1991; Peterson, 1991; Magnet, 1993; Massey and Denton, 1993). The debate was provided ideological impetus with the rise of the New Right in the early 1980s, and indeed it is difficult to decouple behavioural, moral and pathological explanations associated with writers like Charles Murray and Lawrence Mead from this ideological imperative. The original notion of an 'underclass', however, is generally attributed to observations by the journalist Ken Auletta on four distinct categories of poor Americans:

... (a) the passive poor, usually long-term welfare recipients; (b) the hostile street criminals who terrorize most cities, and who are often school drop-outs and drug addicts; (c) the hustlers, who, like street criminals, may not be poor and who earn their livelihood in an underground economy, but rarely commit violent crimes; and (d) the traumatized drunks, drifters, homeless, shopping-bag ladies and released mental patients who frequently roam or collapse on city streets.


Around this time the American sociologist William Julius Wilson was raising awareness of the structural labour market position of the American 'underclass', including the disproportionately disadvantaged position of urban blacks (see also Murray, 1984; and Massey and Denton, 1993). In The Declining Significance of Race he calls attention to the worsening condition of the black 'underclass' in the context of the improving position of the black middle class (see Wilson, W. J. 1980). Responding to criticisms that this work represents a neo-conservative celebration of privileged blacks, his follow-up The Truly Disadvantaged directly addresses the social pathologies of the inner city, arguing for a transcendence of race-specific policies for amelioration of urban poverty (see Wilson, W. J. 1987). He advances a universal reform programme where the 'underclass' and 'ghettoisation' relate to wider factors of economic and social organisation, and not to specific racial categories and discriminatory policies:

... the problems of the ghetto underclass can be most meaningfully addressed by a comprehensive program that combines employment policies with social welfare policies and that features universal as opposed to race- or group-specific strategies. On the one hand, this program highlights macroeconomic policy to generate a tight labour market and economic growth; fiscal and monetary policy not only to stimulate noninflationary growth, but also to increase the competitiveness of American goods on both the domestic and international markets; and a national labour market strategy to make the labour force more adaptable to changing economic opportunities. On the other hand, this program highlights a child support assurance program, a family allowance program and a child care strategy ...

79 The 'poverty paradox', as Paul Peterson (1991) explains, refers to the situation where growing affluence in American society is coupled with worsening poverty in American inner cities. He suggests there are four distinct explanations for the 'poverty paradox' and the 'underclass' in the US. The first holds that inner city poverty is attributable to an inadequate welfare state, rather than to wider social changes or the cultural and behavioural characteristics of the poor (see Lipset, 1977; and Weir et al., eds., 1988). Secondly, the culture of the poor position follows Oscar Lewis that the style of life to which the poor have become attached is attractive and exhilarating, and therefore self-perpetuating. The third following Charles Murray and Lawrence Mead refers to perverse government incentives arising from the Great Society reforms in the 1960s that encouraged a culture of dependency and disincentives to work. A final explanation following William Julius Wilson holds and that poverty and the 'underclass' reflect the inner city in a changing economy, in other words the social by-product of economic restructuring in areas where unemployment is a particularly acute problem.
although this program also would include targeted strategies - both means-tested and race-specific - they would be considered secondary to the universal program so that the latter are seen as the most visible and dominant aspects in the eyes of the general public. To repeat, the hidden agenda for liberal policymakers is to enhance the chances in life for the ghetto underclass by emphasizing programs to which the more advantaged groups of all classes and racial backgrounds can positively relate.


With the rise in Reaganism in the early 1980s the notion of an 'underclass' was appropriated by new perspectives seeking ideological justification for New Right welfare reform. Right-wing debates on social policy began to centre on the notion of a morally degenerate 'underclass'. The most notorious voice was Charles Murray from the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, who argued in Losing Ground: American social policy 1950-1980 that the large-scale increase in levels of inner city poverty since the 1960s was caused by the Great Society Reforms and the growth in US welfare expenditure (see Murray, 1984; see also 1996a; and 1996b). By encouraging a culture of dependency and providing a disincentive to work, he claimed welfare creates rather than relieves poverty, contributing to the material and moral degeneration of the working aged poor. Murray was critical of those he saw as 'apostles of structural poverty' who claim it is not the fault of the poor that they are poor; and regarding poverty as the fault of the poor themselves if they fail to 'pull themselves up if we offer them a helping hand'. Explaining poverty in terms of innate moral and behavioural deviance from middle class 'norms', and echoing earlier work on the 'culture of poverty' by Oscar Lewis (see Lewis, O. 1961; 1966; and 1969), he argues for a substantial withdrawal of the state provision, leaving life chances of poor people to the job market, their families and other informal support networks. He concludes:

Escapism is a natural response. Most of us want to help. It makes us feel bad to think of neglected children and rat-infested slums, and we are happy to pay for the thought that people who are good at taking care of such things are out there. If the numbers of neglected children and numbers of rats seem to be going up instead of down, it is understandable that we choose to focus on how much we put into the effort instead of what comes out. The tax checks we write buy up, for relatively little money and no effort at all, a quieted conscience. The more we pay, the more certain we can be that we have done our part, and it is essential that we feel that way regardless of what we accomplish. A solution that would have us pay less and acknowledge that some would go unhelped is unacceptable ... To this extent, the barrier to the reform of social policy is not the pain it would cause the intended beneficiaries of the present system, but the pain it would cause the donors. The real contest about the direction of social policy is not between people who want to cut budgets and people who want to help. When reforms finally do occur, they will happen not because stingy people have won, but because generous people have stopped kidding themselves.

(Murray, 1984: 235-6 - original emphasis).

80 Murray proposes a three-pronged approach to the alleviation of poverty in US inner-cities. One, a proposal for social policy and race to repeal law and reverse every court decision that differentiates treatment of people according to race. Two, a proposal for education to install a universally free education system from pre-school to university, including a voucher system for the payment of school fees. And three, a proposal for public welfare to scrap the entire federal welfare and income support system for working aged people, including AFDC, Medicaid and Food Stamps (see MacDonald, 1977). Social benefits would be restricted to children, the elderly and other non-working groups (see Murray, 1984).
In a similar vein, Lawrence M. Mead argues in *Beyond Entitlement: the social obligations of citizenship* that the Great Society Reforms of the 1960s failed to overcome poverty in US inner cities because they ignored the behavioural problems of the poor (see Mead, 1986; see also 1996; 1997a; 1997b). As people received more services and benefits without any compulsion to behave differently, state handouts provided a strong disincentive to accept or retain low-wage jobs, many of which (he claims) are constantly available in the local economy. The problems of labour market disadvantage faced by numerous unemployed people (including blacks), represents a high turnover rate within jobs and not a lack of jobs themselves. Joblessness and therefore poverty among the 'underclass' are not the result of the economic system, but the result of people's unwillingness to accept the working conditions and low wages of menial jobs, repeatedly moving on in the hope of finding something better. Generally positive on the desire to work among people experiencing poverty, Mead claims people will only work under the right conditions where barriers like appropriate skills, finding jobs and childcare are removed. Rather than highlight the structural limitations of the labour market in providing an adequate number of quality and decently paid jobs, the problems of the 'underclass' result from not obliging welfare recipients to behave according to mainstream norms, such as completing school, working and obeying the law: '... the challenge to welfare statemanship is not so much to change the extent of benefits as to couple them with serious work and other obligations that would encourage functioning and promote the integration of recipients' (Mead, 1986: 4). Unsurprisingly Mead is one of the key advocates of punitive workfare schemes for getting people away from benefits and into work (see Mead, 1996; 1997a; 1997b).

The US 'underclass' debate has attracted a great deal of critical attention. Michael Katz and other critics on the Left challenge the stereotypical social categories offered by the proponents of the underclass thesis by calling for a longer-term perspective in the analysis of poverty (see Katz, 1986; 1989; ed., 1993; Handler and Hasenfeld, 1991). Alluding to the ideological dimensions of the 'underclass' discourse, Katz argues that since the late 1970s social commentators use the notion of an underclass as a convenient metaphor to evoke the novelty, danger and complexity of contemporary urban crises. Furthermore, it suggests a rise in poverty and social problems of unprecedented proportions in recent history, a rise not only unsubstantiated with sufficient evidence (see Jencks and Peterson, eds., 1991; and Peterson, 1991), but also used to mobilise individualist, cultural and pathological explanations of poverty, distinguishing in classic liberal fashion between the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor, to justify elimination of state action by placing the blame on the poor themselves (see also Fainstein, 1996; Gans, 1996; Morris, L. 1994; and 1996). Wishing to distance himself from the pathological version of the 'underclass', Wilson in *When Work Disappears* (and other commentators from Europe as well as the US) drop the concept in favour of the more sanitised 'ghetto poor' (see Wilson, W. J. 1996; see also Wilson, W. J. 1991; Logan et al., 1996; Marcuse,
If the notion of an 'underclass' typifies the American (and to a lesser extent the British) poverty debate in the 1980s, the debate on social exclusion reflects a wide-ranging and increasingly hegemonic discourse among academics, policy-makers and politicians across Europe since the late 1980s (see Jordan, 1996; Levitas, 1996; 1998; Mingione, ed., 1996; Madanipour eds., 1998; and Byrne, 1999).^{82} The concept of 'social exclusion' describes the multi-dimensional conditions of poverty and inequality, embracing the language of social cohesion and social solidarity, and referring to the spectre of marginalisation through exclusion from 'normal' standards of mainstream society:

Social exclusion is defined as a multi-dimensional process, in which various forms of exclusion are combined: participation in decision-making and political processes, access to employment and material resources, and integration into common cultural processes. When combined, they create acute forms of exclusion that find a spatial manifestation in particular neighbourhoods.

(Madanipour et al., eds., 1998: 22 - emphasis added).

The 'social exclusion' discourse aims to transcend 'more limited notions of poverty and inequality' (sic) by capturing real-life experience of people, and explicitly informing an approach to 'integration' as the full involvement in the institutions and dynamic processes of society,

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^{81} Certain writers have embraced the notion of an 'underclass' in the UK. Ruth Lister (1996) shows that the term was used in the 1970s, tending to denote a racial dimension through the discriminatory employment and housing policies that marginalised certain ethnic minority groups. She attributes the popularisation of the concept in relation to race to Ralf Dahrendorf. Other commentators like Sivanadan and Moore also draw attention to the symbiosis of racism and poverty, and its effects as experienced by a group of marginalised migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers and inner-city ethnic minority people. Both Charles Murray (1996a) and Frank Field (1989; and 1996) are critical of this relationship between race, class and poverty in the UK where the black population is much smaller than in the US. Field's (1989) Long Out: the emergence of the British underclass argues that the three hundred year evolution of citizenship in Britain has been thrown into reverse as the result of four factors: one, record post-war levels of unemployment; two, widening class differences; three, exclusion of the poorest from rapidly rising living standards; and four, a change in attitudes to those people deemed to have 'failed' in Thatcher's Britain. Rather than see the emerging British 'underclass' as beginning to form its own culture - as claimed by Dahrendorf - Field advocates a series of non-state mechanisms to help foster a new sense of self-reliance through mutualist organisations like credit unions and 'friendly societies' (pp. 178-81). In the aftermath of Murray's first visit to the UK in 1990, David J. Smith adopts a definition of the 'underclass' based on Runciman's class analysis (see Smith, D. J., ed., 1992). Whereas Runciman sees the 'underclass' as those dependent beneath the working classes, Smith develops a structural definition where the 'underclass' refer to people who fall outside Runciman's class model, not belonging to family units with any stable relationship with the 'mode of production' and legitimate employment. Lydia Morris (1994; and 1996) argues that the US 'underclass' concept is based on a notion of cultural and structural exclusion, recalling the Victorian language of the 'dangerous classes'. R. MacDonald (ed., 1997) makes a novel link between the 'underclass' debate with notions of 'social exclusion' among contemporary youth.

^{82} Brought to prominence in the EC following the publication of the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment in 1994, the concept of 'social exclusion' figures highly in EU social policy, the Borrie Report on social justice in the UK and Will Hutson's recent evocation of a '30-30-40' society in Britain (see EC, 1994a; 1994b; Commission on Social Justice, 1994; Hutson, 1995; 1996; 1997c; see also Levitas, 1996; and 1998). The concept was originally coined in 1974 by a Gaullist Minister for Social Action in France, referring to les exclus (the outcasts) - one tenth of the French population not covered by social insurance - including the handicapped, the aged, single parents, multi-problem households, and marginal, asocial people and other social misfits, deriving "... from the idea of society as a status hierarchy comprising people bound together by rights and obligations ... that reflect a shared moral order" (Walker, K., 1995: 102), and where social exclusion is overcome by 'insertion' into the national community (see Atkinson, 1997, and Cameron, A. 1997).

Claiming that 'social exclusion' is part of a new political discourse about cohesion, community, stakeholding and inclusion, Ruth Levitas in The Inclusive Society?: social exclusion and New Labour identifies competing approaches to the 'social exclusion' in contemporary British politics (see Levitas, 1998; see also 1996). Drawing attention to work by Peter Townsend and others, she shows that there is a great deal of commonality between relativist conceptions of poverty and 'social exclusion', but the latter tends to gloss over insights from the former towards a notion of social inclusion (or more precisely integration). Recent work by Will Hutton examines the need for a new kind of 'moral regulation' in the organisation of British capitalism to counter the rise in a virtually permanently impoverished group of people at the base of society (see Hutton, 1995; 1996; and 1997c). Such perspectives, along with EU social and employment policies, amount for Levitas to a new 'Durkheimian hegemony', meaning a discourse that treats social divisions and inequalities - as endemic to capitalism - as the result of a breakdown in social cohesion otherwise maintained by the 'division of labour' (see Durkheim, 1984). Levitas argues the discourse on 'social exclusion' devalues unpaid work in the voluntary, informal and family sectors - activities that are still of paramount importance within deprived communities (see Mingione, 1991; 1993; and Ofhe and Heinze, 1992), is silent on inequalities between paid workers and obscures fundamental social divisions between classes. It represents little more than ameliorative steps for maintenance of social order within the status quo. Concluding on a more radical note but without elaborating whether radical involvement in decision-making would constitute an alternative, she writes:

"... while inclusion, as the obverse of exclusion, is repressive of conflict, it simultaneously, and for the same reason, conjures up an image of a good society. If this vision is collapsed into the present, as is partly so in Durkheim, it becomes a defence of the status quo. If it is maintained as a utopian other, it invites the possibility of creating a more radical discourse of..."

63 This approach to social exclusion builds upon a tradition within EU policy towards combating poverty. In addition to EU structural funds, more specific initiatives known as the Poverty Programmes were created to deal directly with the problems of poverty, providing funding for small-scale local project-based APS (see Dennett et al., 1982; Alcock, 1993; and Hantrais, 1995). The first poverty programme (1975-80) provided funding for a small number of pilot schemes in community development. The second programme (1984-89) included 91 action research projects across the community that aimed to build upon actual experience of local APS (Room, 1993). The 'Poverty 3' programme (1989-94) followed on directly from the second with the aim of fostering economic and social integration of least privileged groups, drawing on concepts of partnership - referring to collaboration between all relevant institutions; participation - referring to inclusion of local poor people in the programmes; and multi-dimensionality - referring to the complexity of issues leading to social exclusion (Eskine and Breitenbach, 1994; Hayden, 1994). These programmes were small-scale and limited, yet significant in the importance they accorded to the active involvement of poor people.
inclusion. This discourse would explore both the contours of a radically inclusive society and the conditions of our potential inclusion within it. The logic of a more egalitarian radical approach to inclusion leads beyond the metaphor of inclusion and exclusion itself, into that critique of capitalism which the neo-Durkheimian hegemony removes from the political agenda. If we or any future generations are to have any hope of living in a society which is built around our needs as persons ... the question of alternatives to capitalism must be reopened. It may be countered that capitalism is the only game in town and there is no alternative; but humankind must sometimes set itself questions which it cannot immediately solve.


The political dimension of ‘social exclusion’ is addressed directly by Bill Jordan in *A Theory of Poverty and Social Exclusion* (see Jordan, 1996). He advances the novel thesis that the deterioration of living standards and the rise of poverty and social exclusion have coincided with the salience of a free-market political creed, and accompanying collective action among exclusive groups. The distinction between the liberal tradition of poverty as a natural condition of population and resources, and the traditional continental mercantilist concern with social exclusion, Jordan argues, cannot provide a convincing analysis of the contemporary relationship between poverty and social exclusion. Drawing on public choice theory, he develops a notion of collective action based on an ‘economic theory of exclusive groups’ where ‘people interact in relation to their economic risks, capacities and resources’ (p. 7 - original emphasis), from households and clubs to communities and politics. Incorporating analysis of the ‘feminisation of poverty’ and ‘racialisation of social exclusion’, he proceeds to argue that economic globalisation and activities of well-off majorities in high-income countries have deepened the marginality of the poor, the latter turning increasingly to strategic resistance - including informal and illegal activities - action that in turn increases social costs for the whole society. The growing antagonisms between exclusive groups unleashed by this process of resistance pose threats to democracy rather than advance processes of democratisation. A long time proponent of a universal basic income (see Jordan, 1987; and 1989), Jordan claims that APS should not seek to ‘integrate’ the poor and excluded (pace EU employment and social policy) into mainstream employment, civic responsibility or suburban culture - including popular involvement in formal decision-making. Instead policies should examine the feasibility of legitimising, enhancing and supporting the survival strategies of the poor on their own terms:

Poor and socially excluded people would be the indirect beneficiaries of such changes [basic income strategy and legitimisation of survival strategies], which would shift the emphasis of policy from enforcement to security and support. If it is too much to expect the emergence of new forms of mass collective solidarity in the foreseeable future (as it probably is), this might be the most practical and feasible way of achieving a sort of inclusion - by letting them pursue their individual and collective strategies with less hindrance.


It is however unclear how this essentially liberal APS would prevent the poor and excluded from ‘stewing in their own juices’, serving to deepen institutionalised divisions within the economy
and society between the excluded few and the comfortable majority. It is indeed uncertain how poverty and social exclusion can be curtailed without a collective project for mass solidarity. Dave Byrne writing in *Social Exclusion* adopts this kind of ideological perspective to combat impoverishment under post-industrial capitalism (see Byrne, 1999). He points out that 'social exclusion' represents a fashionable phrase for a complex range of social problems associated with a structural increase in social inequality in western societies. This inequality is brought on by a combination of declining manufacturing employment, a rise in post-industrial labour market exploitation and prolonged crisis in post-war welfare states. Following Walker and Walker (1997) Byrne distinguishes between 'poverty' and 'social exclusion', emphasising the multidimensionality of exclusion, understood in terms of the complex dynamics of life trajectories and the significance of spatial concentrations of exclusion in urban areas of advanced industrial societies. While social politics under post-industrial capitalism are based around ideological disputes - such as classical liberalism, democratic socialism and conservatism - he shows in practice these cross-fertilise and vitally relate to real and general material interests. The reversal of 'social exclusion', for him, requires a new social politics focused on a reinvigorated labour movement and 'Freirean' engagement with 'excluded people' (see Freire, 1972), where competing interests are reconciled into a common agenda. He concludes:

... social exclusion derives from inequality. It is product of the post-industrial social order dominated by globalizing capital and the superclass associated with that globalizing capital. Attractive as the notion might be of watering the fields with the blood of the superclass, practically the way to deal with them is through two other forms of bloodletting - through the proper taxation of high incomes and accumulated wealth with the revenues used to sustain a process of global development on a sustainable basis, coupled with a restoration of basic organizational rights to workers so that they can both resist job instability and reduce the levels of corporate profits and senior executive remuneration to the benefit of wage earners. I think that the development of local coalitions against exclusion, popular fronts based on all social forces which are prepared to set solidarity as the key social goal, is a means towards the development a political culture in which such a programme has some chance of being put into effect.

(Byrne, 1999: 137).

With these contributions to the debate in mind, the concept of 'social exclusion' arguably adopts a language less evocative than the discourse on poverty, suggesting a 'dynamic' state of flux, possibly rectified through appropriate policy intervention. Partly explained by the historical quantitative character of Anglo-American 'poverty studies', the dynamism of 'social exclusion' implies an optimism that something can be done with the redistribution of social spending (especially within the EU) for job creation and social policy. Politically tamer than the concept of poverty - suggesting more abject deprivation - 'social exclusion' implies a more relativist position akin to Townsend's 'relative deprivation'. Whereas Europeanisation of social policy has led to a rhetoric of participation within local APS (see Geddes, 1997), it remains uncertain what this rhetoric amounts to in practice. Despite Byrne's version of a participatory class-based alliance, concrete policy prescriptions for the radical involvement of people from the base of
society in APS are largely absent in both the US debate on the 'underclass' and the European debate on 'social exclusion'. Both these debates however serve to embed an understanding of poverty and therefore approaches to APS with the end-state of universal middle-class consumption norms: the former through a conservative work ethic and morality; the latter through 'inclusion' in the institutions of mainstream society. While basically worthwhile for amelioration of poverty, it is unclear whether these similar conservative ends are desirable for all concerned in practice.

Typology of APS

The 'underclass' and 'social exclusion' debates show that poverty - as with the preceding approach to 'relative deprivation' - is a multi-dimensional concept, involving multiple explanatory frameworks and operating at differing spatial scales. Identifying three spheres of activity that determine household and neighbourhood resources, a framework for current research in the EU on the spatial dimensions of urban social exclusion is drawn upon for a three-way typology of APS (see AME, 1998). Developing a framework combining Polyani’s The Great Transformation, with Harvey’s Social Justice and the City and Mingione’s Fragmented Societies, the URBEX project sees three elements - market exchange, redistribution and reciprocity - as key to Polyani’s ‘modes of economic integration’ and therefore relating to social exclusion (see Polyani, 1944; Harvey, 1973; Mingioni, 1991; and Musterd and Ostendorf, eds., 1998). By implication one can distinguish between market, state and non-state APS (see also Glennerster et al., 1999).

To begin with market APS refer to various strategies where access to resources is dominated by the social utility of individuals and households who sell their labour for a wage which provides an income (see AME, 1998). Business development and labour market opportunities are characteristically weak in blighted areas where many poor and excluded people reside, but the typical view of a free-market economist is that poor areas are best left alone. A period of decline in one area is considered as the inter-dependent and necessary result of restructuring in another; any intervention by the state is held to interfere with a ‘natural’ process of resource allocation and perpetually limiting areas to a debilitating subsidised existence. The fortunes of areas are inextricably related to the whim of the market. This laissez-faire approach tends to be supported by a liberal-conservative ideological perspective stressing a strong work ethic and

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84 Entitled 'The Spatial Dimensions of Urban Social Exclusion and Integration: a European Comparison' (URBEX), this project compares processes of exclusion and policies for integration in eleven cities in six countries across Europe. It is co-ordinated by AME and commissioned by the EU 4th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development, Targeted Socio-Economic Research (TSER), Area 111: Research into Social Exclusion and Integration in Europe - Contract SOE-CT98-3072.
other individual moral and behavioural factors. Autonomous individual (or group) actors get pitted against each other in the competition for scarce resources, a characteristic feature of market APS. Irrespective of the availability of suitably well paid and secure jobs, it is the fault of the poor themselves if they are poor and it is fundamental to their desire and willingness to accept any work to elevate them out of poverty. Recognising the central importance of local employment (and not welfare) as the basis for market APS, neo-liberals stress the free mobility of capital and labour, and the need to facilitate large-scale inward investment and local business development where unemployed people are required to tailor their skills and actively seek new employment opportunities in a supply-side approach to economic development.

Secondly, state APS refer to various interventionist policies where structural inequalities generated by market failure are partly compensated by the redistribution of wealth, usually in the form of welfare payments, social benefits and social insurance contributions in the fields of housing, health, education and social security (see AME, 1998). Traditionally collected and administered centrally, these payments imply a hierarchical organisational structure whereby people receive entitlements when they meet certain eligibility criteria, usually the result of low-income and unemployment. Historically the state has facilitated massive redistribution of wealth from the richer to the poorer sections of society, but also through horizontal transfer between different households within similar income and class strata. Providing universal provision based on citizenship rights and equality, state APS guarantee access to basic resources for all and without exception. As argued in this chapter a variety of welfare states (or regimes) among western nations where varying balances between universal and selective, and state and non-state mechanisms, are apparent based on institutional specificities and contextual path-dependence. While there is evidence to suggest that a process of welfare regime convergence is occurring as the result of deepening international neo-liberalisation, these institutional differences are likely to continue determining the type and extent of state APS in any national context. Local state APS typically tailor central state services to their particular circumstances, and in the absence of concerted devolution of financial autonomy and therefore power, tend to target scarce resources to the most needy sections of the local population. Traditionally seen as the institution with the authority to legislate on the basis of equality, reliance on state redistribution alone leads to a stigmatisation of the poor thus embedding rather than reducing their poverty.

Finally, non-state APS refer to various mechanisms which help people gain access to resources through reciprocity and mutual exchange (see AME, 1998). Including co-operatives and community businesses, neighbourhood and community organisations, foundations and charities, social movements (including LETS), extended family, household and other informal networks, these 'third sector' mechanisms rely on common and lasting lines of affiliation and mutual trust between members. All participants are provided for within a symmetrical and
egalitarian system of association. All goods and services brought into the system by an individual, family or group are returned, usually in the form of different goods and services, and often at another time. Operating at the interface between the state and market, they customarily represent plural and hybrid organisational forms where elements of public service and commercialism can combine within social economy organisations. Radical grassroots initiatives - such as anarchist movements and self-build housing - although often considered to be outside the traditional social policy are included in this category. As with market APS the poor have to face the costs of their poverty themselves, despite the fact causes of poverty relate to wider social and economic forces. Inter-network harmony and full integration of local actors cannot be guaranteed where intra-community rivalries and competition serve to erode common interests. The URBEX framework sees the final resources available to a household as the inter-play between the market exchange, state redistribution and reciprocal non-state spheres of economic integration. By implication this typology of APS also considers the relationship between strategies from different sectors and how APS in any institutional context reflect a variety and convergence of many diverse approaches.

Conclusion

This chapter has developed a typology of welfare regimes on the basis of Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime theory, and a typology of APS drawing on the URBEX project examining the spatial dimensions of urban social exclusion in Europe. Taken together these typologies complete the conceptual framework for comparison of APS in North Tyneside and Rotterdam. Both typologies represent one possible approach and are not without their problems and limitations. Esping-Andersen’s distinction between liberal, conservative and social-democratic welfare regimes tend to refer to relatively static conceptions of statist welfare, to the exclusion of grassroots activities outside the state, such as quasi-anarchist lifestyles and self-build housing. For this reason (among others) it is important to combine the welfare regime and APS typologies to incorporate market exchange and reciprocal non-state APS into the conceptual framework. In addition the welfare regime typology represents an ambitious attempt at reconciling the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of changes in welfare regimes over time. While incorporating a temporal dimension in table 2, there is a tendency to view tables 1 and 2 in isolation from each other. It is nonetheless important to retain an awareness of their inter-links, helping conceptualise the balance between continuity and change in any particular welfare context. One should also be aware of the ‘explosion of diversity’ - including a broad range of internal contradictions and heterogeneity of organisational forms at varying spatial scales - that any typology masks through ‘ideal-type’ abstraction. It is important therefore to bear in mind the heterogeneity inherent in each of these models.
The same point concerning inherent diversity and heterogeneity applies to the typology of APS. Rarely do APS in practice represent a pure form, free from hybridisation and cross-fertilisation between sectors. For instance, market APS essentially represent supply-side approaches to economic development. By stressing the free mobility of capital and labour, they place an onus on the attraction of global inward investment to boost economic activity and provide jobs locally. Many high-profile instances of foreign direct investment are heavily subsidised from the public purse via local regeneration partnerships, such as City Challenge and SRB in the UK. These hybrid public-private 'partnerships' - ones seeking the 'inclusion' of voluntary sector representatives alongside local government and business people - provide incentives to firms to persuade their investment decisions towards the local economy of their concern. Secondly, there are problems with the non-state category of APS, covering an overly broad range of organisations, institutions and networks at many different spatial scales. There is a tendency to define non-state organisations by default - as all those situated in between the state and market - but comparison of non-state governance in the UK and the Netherlands renders this definition doubtful. Despite attempts at capturing the variety of organisations encompassing the voluntary sector (see Johnson, 1987), the nature of state-funded PI in the Netherlands suggests the vast majority of organisations are directly or indirectly non-statist. Yet contrary to the usual characterisation of Dutch governance as non-statist, chapter 6 argues the near complete dependence by so-called independent foundations on state funding indicates more statist governance of welfare than otherwise expected.

An unprecedented combination of welfare variety and convergence, a globalising economic environment in the context of international neo-liberalisation and worsening problems of poverty and social exclusion, pose particular challenges for national welfare systems as they face continued pressures for restructuring and the pluralisation of their governance mechanisms. Is a project for radical democratisation of welfare a sustainable, appropriate and feasible one in light of this constellation of social, economic and political forces? The immediate task ahead lies in asking this fundamental question - and others like it - as the basis for a comparison of APS from a governance perspective in North Tyneside in the UK and Rotterdam in the Netherlands. The next chapter is devoted to this end, along with a consideration of the method followed in attempting to answer them.
Key Questions and Methodology

In light of the primary research questions presented in chapter 1, the first section outlines the key conceptual and empirical questions for the research in North Tyneside and Rotterdam, followed in the second by a discussion of the practicalities of the fieldwork. The third section considers the relationship between these practicalities and the theoretical and epistemological aspects of the proposed methodology. Arguing that empiricist and positivist epistemologies are incapable of coping with questions of governance, the research adopts a realist perspective where a conceptually driven empirical (rather than empiricist) methodology uses concepts from a literature review. In order to combat hermeneutic and subjectivist relativism (both rejecting realist ontological depth), it is necessary 'radicalise' a realist position by recovering the 'depth-hermeneutics' of Jürgen Habermas. This radical version is arguably more akin to a Frankfurt School-reformulated-Marxism, than one following the American neo-pragmatists (like Rorty) and American critical realists such as, Santayana, Sellars and Lovejoy. Limitations of case study comparison - including problems with the 'localities' methodology - are potentially overcome by a consideration of wider debates in 'contextual theory', retaining a singular conceptual framework and therefore avoiding recourse to complex and multi-faceted context-dependency. While unable to fully develop their theoretical and practical implications, important issues are raised regarding context and ideology in social research methodology, briefly outlining the ways in which these contested concepts are understood.

Key Questions

Bearing in mind the primary research questions presented in the introductory chapter, there are two further sets of questions for this research. From a conceptual point of view:
what is the nature of governance of APS, including the relationship between the local state and civil society?

to what extent has the local state opened to interaction with non-state organisations within APS, and does this process enhance democracy at the local level?

what evidence is there for innovative anti-poverty experiments in the non-state sector?

to what extent are local people involved in APS and does this involvement contribute to a democratisation of governance?

From an empirical perspective:

who are the main actors involved with APS?

does the decentralisation of services to tackle poverty represent a genuine devolution of power from the state?

what are the organisational implications of such decentralisation, and do problems of coordination emerge?

is there evidence to support the claims for popular involvement of local people in APS and what are the mechanisms for this involvement?

Research Practicalities

Attempting to answer these questions the research for this thesis adopts a qualitative methodology broadly within the hermeneutic/ interpretative tradition in social science (see Giddens, 1976; Bryman, 1988; Habermas, 1988; Outhwaite, 1991; Sayer, 1992; and Silverman, 1993). While Cook and Crang (1995) argue that all research is non-linear, reflexive and iterative in practice, where any one step may be revisited in view of the insights gained from latter stages, the following provides an account of five main aspects of fieldwork conducted in North Tyneside and Rotterdam: a critical literature review; a comparative case study approach; semi-structured interviews; analysis of empirical material; and a consideration of ethics.

The first step was to undertake a literature review in order to acquire a deeper understanding of the theoretical, conceptual and policy context of the research (see Layder, 1993; Silverman, 1993; Marshall and Rossman, 1994; and Cook and Crang, 1995). Five distinct yet potentially related literatures were explored: (1) the 'hollowing-out' of the state, decentralisation and new plural governance; (2) plural democratic theory and radical democracy; (3) welfare theory in an organisational context; (4) welfare regime theory and historical development of welfare provision and APS in western countries; and (5) historical and contemporary debates on poverty and social exclusion, including more recent work on APS. The review endeavoured to retain a
critical awareness of the inter-links between these different literatures, involving a tracing of academic books, journal articles, documentary sources, policy documents, other official sources and newspapers. The collection of secondary statistical data - often through documentation made available on request during the interview process - assisted in gaining a sense of the prevalence of poverty over time in both case studies.

The research adopted a comparative case study approach to explore key questions in two contrasting institutional contexts (see Massey and Meegan, eds., 1985; Yin, 1989; 1993; Sayer, 1992; King et al., 1994; and Stake, 1995). As a relatively uncontested area of social research methodology, a comparative case study approach adopts a manageable focus for conceptual ideas in actuality, providing a descriptive basis for explanation of social phenomena. While chapter 1 provided a more detailed rationale, it was important to choose case studies that struck a balance between similarity and difference for meaningful comparison. The methodology paid attention, moreover, to points of conformity and departure from the 'ideal-type' governance models. After all, recent commentaries on the governance debate suggest the existence of a diversity of governance forms at differing spatial scales (see Amin and Hausner, 1997). It was important to note that any governance model reflects a complex interplay of local, national and international level processes, and that North Tyneside and Rotterdam represent the local institutional nexus of this complex interplay of variable governance. In this way, it was possible to be mindful of the limitations of Weberian 'ideal-type' abstraction in the collection, collation and analysis of the data gathered from the field (see Sennett, 1973; Parkin, 1982; Sayer, 1992; and Gregory, 1994a). A case study might not offer the representativeness provided by large aggregate data sets, but it can compare relevant aspects of the population in order to gain a sense of representativeness, and it can offer a crucial test of a theory or concept in the field accessing contingencies obscured by aggregate data. Qualitative researchers would argue that if a model is tested on a sufficiently large scale then statistical tests become unnecessary (see Silverman, 1993; and Massey, 1995). Not all agree with the need for representativeness or crucial tests. Mitchell (1983) suggests case study researchers need to be more concerned with generalising their studies in terms of theories that apply in many different contexts, rather than trying to find 'typical' cases (see Mitchell, 1983; and Silverman, 1993). There is arguably room to strike a compromise between representativeness - from which policy recommendation might flow - and a more academic interest in creating a broader theory encompassing outlier cases.

A methodology based on a number of in-depth semi-structured interviews with a selection of key-informants was appropriate for this intensive case study approach (see Burgess, 1984; Massey and Meegan, eds., 1985; McCracken, 1988; Sayer, 1992; Cook and Crang, 1995). Being semi-structured, this method allows the researcher to take into account wider and non-observable structures occurring in time and space, that other qualitative methodologies - such as participant observation and more structured questionnaires - cannot capture in the same
way. Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to engage in open-ended discussion and converse with people on their own terms. Rather than simply charting their frequency and noting their descriptive format, this method permits the researcher to acquire a more nuanced understanding of the 'politics' between respondents. The method involves a cross-checking of information with accounts of others, secondary data material and basic aggregate data - a process called 'triangulation' by Denzin (1970) and 'synthesis research' via 'corroboration' by Sayer (1992). As David Silverman points out: 'as an assembly of reminders about the partiality of any one context of data collection, such a “field strategy” makes a great deal of sense’ (p. 157), although he cautions that it is problematic to suggest that radically different methodological approaches can be 'fused' to offer one ultimate reality (see Silverman, 1993).

Identification of the main conceptual themes from the literature review led to the development of interview checklists, providing a schedule for the interviews (see Burgess, 1984; McCracken, 1988; and Cook and Crang, 1995). Fundamentally, these checklists were designed to cover all the required topics and be sufficiently open-ended to allow the discussion to carry its own momentum, while avoiding the possibility of overly long interviews. In the early stages, pilot interviews were carried out for a preliminary exploration in the field (see Appendix 1). It was also considered important to keep the checklist suitably flexible to allow for continual modification as the knowledge base developed. With this preliminary exploration complete three more specific checklists were developed, tailoring questions to state representatives, non-state representatives and local individuals (see Appendices 2, 3 and 4 respectively).

The next stage involved making arrangements for the interviews (see Burgess, 1984; McCracken, 1988; and Cook and Crang, 1995). A printed letter on headed paper was forwarded to potential respondents informing them of the purpose of the research and to emphasise the confidentiality of any information they might offer (see Appendix 5), a process that attempted to alleviate the problem of access (see Beynon, 1988). Throughout the interview procedure a 'snowballing technique' allowed the identification of potential key-informants, and relevant individuals were subsequently approached for interview. It was the objective to approach people from a wide arena and therefore not to prioritise representatives from the state or non-state sectors, including those from all the main governance institutions, key policy-makers, state actors, officials, community leaders, activists, academics and residents (see Appendices 6 and 7). The overseas element of the fieldwork required some preparation. In addition to funding opportunities and other practicalities like accommodation, it was important to make arrangements with a contact university to host the stay in Rotterdam. Aided by Professor Amin's contact base, Professor Bert van der Knaap from the Institute of Economic Geography (EGI) at Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) kindly agreed to provide access to office space and departmental facilities. Similar letters of approach (supplemented with email contact) and a
4. Key Questions and Methodology

'snowballing technique' again helped identify key-informants and eventually arrange for interviews in the Netherlands.

It was important to bear in mind aspects of interview technique (see Burgess, 1984; McCracken, 1988; Silverman, 1993; and Cook and Crang, 1995). Prior to each interview, the (semi) structure of the interview was outlined, including a suggested length, and the respondent was asked if they minded being recorded on tape. A 'face to face' technique was preferred, but if this was not impossible, then telephone interviews were conducted. On occasions simultaneous interviews with different respondents meant the process tended towards a 'focus group' methodology (see Kreuger, 1988; Cook and Crang, 1995; Morgan, 1997; and Barbour and Kitzinger, eds., 1999). The interviews were conducted according to an established protocol to ensure confidence and trust in the respondent, to utilise limited time effectively and to maximise the quality of data collected (see McCracken, 1988; Cook and Crang, 1995). Sellitz et al. (1964) suggest that interviewers 'should not show surprise or disapproval of an answer, offer impromptu explanations of questions, suggest possible replies or skip certain questions' (quoted in Silverman, 1993: 93). Although tempting to do so and occasionally occurring by accident, considerable care was taken not to offer prompts or biased questions, although explanations were given if requested, often involving the suggestion of possible scenarios for the respondent to consider. David Silverman warns of the dangers of saying too little: '... where the researcher maintains a minimal presence, asking few questions, this can create an interpretative problem for the interviewee about what is relevant. Moreover, the passivity of the interviewer can create an extremely powerful constraint on the interviewee to talk' (Silverman, 1993: 95-6). The total number of interviews undertaken reflected the point of 'theoretical saturation' (see Cook and Crang, 1995), or the point where substantial corroboration and triangulation of data had occurred (see Denzin, 1970; and Sayer, 1992). For a full list of respondents for the North Tyneside and Rotterdam case studies see Appendices 6 and 7 respectively.

Lasting anything between 45 minutes to three hours (on average around one and a half hours), as many interviews as possible were recorded on tape, making it possible to concentrate on the discussion and ensure the accuracy of reporting (see Burgess, 1984; McCracken, 1988; and Cook and Crang, 1995). Respondents were informed that the recorder was there to help them rather than trap them, as it would ensure the accuracy of reporting. Despite limitations, copious notes were taken by hand on the few occasions where respondents were uncomfortable with taping. On other occasions respondents asked for the tape to be turned off in order to say something of a sensitive nature. For this reason a notebook was carried around at all times for useful recording of personal observations during and after the interviews. Interviewee responses can be distorted in a number of ways, including the problem of 'self-presentation' especially in the early stages of the interview, and the relative status of interviewer and interviewee (see Denzin, 1970: 133-8). While confidence in conducting interviews developed
over time, the more specific reasons for interviewing particular individuals usually required a
degree of preparation, including some prior reading of background information. It was then
possible to display knowledge of the topics under discussion, and contribute to them, which for
Barry Glassner and Julie Loughlin form part of a 'methodology for listening' (quoted in
Silverman, 1993: 100). Over time it was discovered that the most enlightening and rewarding
research occurred through a more informal, conversational style, where participants (including
the researcher) were respected for their differences and regarded as equal parties to the
dialogue. And in these instances the question of whether the event was taped or not became
secondary to the richness of the material generated.

The fourth main stage involved analysis of the interview material (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967;
Strauss, 1987; Sayer, 1992; Layder, 1993; Silverman, 1993; and Cook and Crang, 1995). The
labour-intensive task of transcribing the tapes was initially completed verbatim to maintain
attention to detail, but once a critical mass of information was accumulated it was possible to be
more selective regarding what was recorded, involving a combination of detailed notes and
direct quotes. Entailing a personal judgement on the initial categories and themes, the
transcripts (and field notes) were re-read to situate them in the contexts in which they occurred.
Representing a tendency towards 'grounded theory', the method was open to new thematic
insights while retaining a strong awareness of the concepts discerned from the literature review
(see Glaser and Strauss, 1967; and Strauss, 1987; see also Layder, 1993; and Silverman,
1993). It was therefore not strictly based on 'grounded theory'. The research was less about
the generation of theory, and more a blend of theory testing (based on etic analysis - using an
imposed frame of reference) and theory-building - founded on emic analysis within the
conceptual framework of those under study (see Layder, 1993; Silverman, 1993; and Cook and
Crang, 1995). Issues of internal validity were accounted for by the 'triangulation' and
'corroboration' of information from different sources (see Denzin, 1970; Sayer, 1992; and
Layder, 1993). A detailed reading of the transcripts and field notes entailed a hermeneutic
interpretation (either etic or emic) of the texts, a process assisted by simultaneous playback of
the interviews. Where this revealed certain knowledge gaps, a selected number of repeat
interviews where undertaken.

Another form of validation of qualitative data involves respondent validation where the
researcher relays findings back to the respondents for approval (see Burgess, 1984; Silverman,
1993; and Cook and Crang, 1995). While a small number of written texts were sent to
respondents, it is certainly the intention at a later stage to forward copies of relevant chapters to
those who expressed a desire at interview to see the final work. As these people will be asked
to comment on the work and highlight any errors or omissions, this process of validation will
form an important part in the preparation of publications on this research. Admittedly, there
remains a question whether respondents will be interested in the report (see Silverman, 1993),
while Abrams has remarked that 'overt respondent validation is only possible if the results on
the analysis are compatible with the self-image of the respondents' (quoted in Silverman, 1993:
159). Others claim that such responses might not in any case improve the validity of the report
(see Silverman, 1993). In any event the process is worthwhile for thanking respondents for
giving their valuable time and effort, but also for checking basic facts and revealing any
additional knowledge gaps.

The final aspect of research practicalities relates to a concern with ethical issues (see Kimmel,
1988; and Homan, 1991). While all research requires an awareness of ethics, projects relating
to poverty and APS arguably amplify this need. The 'poverty studies' tradition in the UK
developed out of the Fabian conception of social reform based on research by an educated elite
(see Townsend, ed., 1970; 1979; see also McBriar, 1966; McKenzie and McKenzie, 1977; and
Pimlott, ed., 1984). Those people experiencing poverty were treated as 'scientific' objects
rather than subjects of analysis, arguably a degrading and de-humanising process for those
under study. Possibly representing the 'good intentions' of the upper and middle classes for
placation of their 'guilt conscience', the approach arguably served to reinforce rather than
reverse hierarchical inequalities of power in society. Although acknowledging the problem of
the relative status of the researcher and the 'researched', the present work avoided humiliating
'objectification' of the lives and experiences of the poor by meeting and talking with people as
individuals in their own right. The methodology did not fall into any formal category - like
'participatory action research' or 'sensitive research' (see Whyte ed., 1991; and Renzetti and
Lee, eds., 1993) - but in a sense combined elements of both in an informal and people-
orientated manner. This method was not immune from problems. While helping to alleviate an
inherent and deep-seated distrust of 'outsiders', on one occasion the approach raised
expectations for more formal involvement by the researcher superceding what could be
realistically offered under the circumstances.

A more general ethical concern relates to confidentiality (see Kimmel, 1988; Homan, 1991; and
Cook and Crang, 1995). Well over two hundred interviews were conducted in North Tyneside
and Rotterdam, involving many hours of discussion and generating much sensitive material. A
pressing issue remains over the protection of the tapes. A short anecdote from the fieldwork in
Rotterdam serves to highlight the problems associated with data protection and copyright in the
competitive 'marketplace' of research. Increasingly close links with a small group of
researchers from an independent urban policy foundation led to a proposed three-way
collaboration of effort. One of the participants would cover the bulk of the Dutch policy literature
and assist with the interviews with Dutch residents. The other researcher offered to oversee the
collaboration without any additional input. In return they 'expected' full access to any written
work, and more alarmingly, full access to all the taped interviews from fieldwork in North
Tyneside and Rotterdam. Permitting these people (and this organisation) full access to the data
would not only reflect highly unprofessional conduct in its own right, but it would also represent a horrendous betrayal of the original respondents' trust with respect to confidentiality. Needless to say the 'collaboration' was promptly terminated, and the research was completed single-handedly without surrendering any sensitive and confidential material.

Radical and Critical Realism

As indicated the research follows a conceptually driven empirical approach based on a review of the literature in a number of fields of inquiry. This section addresses selected theoretical and epistemological themes to support the case for a radicalised realist approach that draws on critical hermeneutics, in particular the 'depth hermeneutics' of Habermas. In addition it discusses the limitations of the comparative case study approach, arguably partly overcome through a consideration of wider debates in contextual theory.

The key questions for this research on governance are perhaps not best served by a strictly empiricist or a positivist epistemology (see Habermas, 1971; Kolakowski, 1972; Bloor, 1976; Bhaskar, 1978; 1993; and Gregory, 1978; 1994b; and 1994c; Fuller, 1988; and Outhwaite, 1991). As a philosophy of science, empiricism places an ontological privilege on empirical observations as the only ones capable of directly referring to objects and subjects in the real world. For an empiricist the truth or falsity of judgements on the real world are possible independent of any theoretical constructions of that world. Regarded as an 'atomistic' epistemology adopting a 'flat ontology' of events, empiricism typically regards the real world as a collection of occurrences scientifically observable along a singular plane of incidence in space and time. While perhaps suitable for studying phenomena like demographic change, an empiricist approach cannot appropriately address governance issues that are imbued with a set of theoretical and conceptual assumptions about the organisation of political actors at all levels.

It is important to note that an empirical inquiry may or may not rely on the strict ontology and epistemology of empiricism (see Gregory, 1994b). Similarly atomistic, a positivist epistemology accords a central importance to empirical observation in the search for casual explanation through inductive generalisation. Following Loic Wacquant there are three related principles within a positivist social science (see Wacquant, 1993a): one, the ontology of phenomenalism where it is possible to base knowledge on 'facts' derived from sense-experience alone; two, the methodology of scientific unity between the natural and social sciences for creation of general and predictive laws about the causes of social phenomena; and three, the axiology of neutrality that denies any normative statements about knowledge with an austere separation between facts and values. Appropriate for predicting non-social phenomena like patterns of rainfall, a positivist approach based on quantitative analysis cannot take into account issues of ideology
and institutional context exerting an important influence on the debate on governance. Both empiricist and positivist epistemologies suffer an 'ecological fallacy' where characteristics are inferred (sometimes wrongly) about individuals from aggregate data (see Alker, 1969; and Openshaw, 1984).

Certain humanistic approaches - those critical of empiricism and positivism, questioning the possibility of knowing the world objectively and free from human interpretation - are equally inappropriate for addressing questions of governance (see Ley and Samuels, eds., 1978; Smith, 1984; Kobayashi and MacKenzie, 1989; and Cloke et al., 1991). Seeing the world as socially constructed in time and space, humanistic approaches can be traced back to the philosophy of **pragmatism**, first developed at the turn of the century by Sanders-Pierce, Dewey, James, and latterly by Rorty (see Rorty, 1979; 1982; 1985; and 1991; see also Smith, 1978; Thayer, 1981; Joas, 1985; and 1993). Concerned with the practical utility of knowledge, pragmatists claim the truth of a proposition should be measured by its practical outcome, its 'objective' status judged on the degree of inter-subjective agreement among 'scientific' observers (see Crossley, 1994; and 1996). In its denial of a neutral framework - or objective essence, whose structure can be illuminated by philosophy - the pragmatist opposition to epistemology tends to an anti-foundationalist position, with some parallels with postmodernism where the only true ontological claim is that the world is: 'constituted of nothing but fragmented clouds of communication bound together by nothing but garbled dialogues between peoples who do not (who cannot) properly understand one another' (Cloke et al., 1991: 192-3). While the radical and anti-essentialist contextualism of Rorty is appealing to certain post-Marxists like Mouffe (see Mouffe, ed., 1995; and ed., 1996), the idealist tendency of pragmatism is problematic for research requiring a general framework to approach particular empirical instances of governance clearly grounded in the materiality of institutional context.

Other philosophical strands move against these pragmatist and idealist tendencies, especially in the thought among **realist** philosophers of science, including the neo-realists and critical realists, who make arguments for knowledge independent of mind (see Lovejoy, 1960; Dummett, 1978; Putnam, H., 1983; Nagel, 1986; Devitt, 1991; Wright, C. 1993; Beck, 1995a; and 1995b). While the neo-realists hold a theory of direct acquaintance with physical objects (epistemological monism), by contrast the critical realists - notably George Santayana, R. W. Sellars and Arthur O. Lovejoy - maintain an epistemological dualism whereby subject and object (as well as the mind and body) are considered ontologically different, but existing in a relationship of connection that may reveal either essential or symbolic knowledge. Veering toward an idealist position it is unclear how this connection relates to the wider material reality - independent of the human mind more generally - and therefore to questions of governance.
It is perhaps by situating governance issues within a *transcendental critical realism* - as presented most notably by Roy Bhaskar and developed by others like Andrew Sayer - that it becomes possible to overcome these ontological and epistemological limitations (see Bhaskar, 1975; 1978; 1979; 1986; Williams, S. 1981; Gregory, 1982; Pratt, 1991; and Sayer, 1992). Transcendental realists refer to a 'depth ontology' indicating three distinct but related tiers of reality: *structures* which possess particular causal powers (global capitalism; neoliberalisation); *mechanisms* which lead to the realisation of structures under specific conditions (welfare regimes; governance); and *events* as the pattern of empirical outcomes (particular countries, regions or localities) that lends itself to (social) scientific inquiry (see Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Jessop, 1990; 1997a; and 1997b). Cloke *et al.* (1991) have suggested that realism may be approaching postmodernism, while John Lovering (1989) suggests 'critical realism' is already like postmodernism. Cloke *et al.* suggest that realism may instead be offering a method for meaning and understanding, a: 'multi-layered methodological approach which retains a belief in the possibility of developing “superior” social scientific theorisations that can slice through the “misunderstandings” of situated human agents' (Cloke *et al*., 1991: 124-7; 142-3; and 166-9).

The critical realist search for meaning and understanding relates to the broad philosophical area known as *hermeneutics*, one with a long history involving the work of many diverse thinkers (see Palmer, 1969; Ricoeur, 1974; 1981; Gadamer, 1975; 1986; Bleicher, 1980; 1982 Mueller-Vollmer, 1986; Wachterhauser, 1986; Habermas, 1988; and Outhwaite, 1991). Beginning with the publication of Hans-Georg Gadamer's *Truth and Method* in 1960, the modern hermeneutic tradition is concerned with the theory and practice of understanding in general, and the interpretation of texts and actions in particular. Not immune from limitations, interpretative epistemologies within the social sciences involve the problem of the 'double hermeneutic' as revealed by Giddens (see Giddens, 1976). For Giddens, social inquiry assumes a pre-given interpreted notion of reality as the foundation for the reconstruction of that reality, interpreted through the sense-experience of the researcher. Yet all interpretations - including those of the researcher - are grounded in popularly adopted views or 'theories' of the world, and these views are fundamentally important for explaining social phenomena. Qualitative researchers must come to terms with the problems presented by hermeneutics if they are to understand who they are and what they do as researchers (see Smith, 1993) - including those researching issues of governance. Christopher Norris shows it is fashionable in recent poststructuralist and postmodernist thought to subordinate an objective notion of truth to a multitude of specific 'language games' in a wider context of cultural relativism, one linking with the radical contextualism and anti-foundationalism of Rorty (see Norris, 1992; 1996; see also Rorty, 1979; 1982; and 1991). However, contextualism does not necessarily imply relativism (see Knorpp, Jr., 1998), and some commentators on governance relate a critical realist epistemology to the primacy of 'real-concrete' context (see Painter and Goodwin, 1995; and Goodwin and Painter,
It is arguably unclear how hermeneutics can overcome interpretivist and subjectivist relativism on the one hand, and recover the centrality of 'ontological depth' in relation to the structures and mechanisms of capitalist material reality on the other.

Jürgen Habermas's *depth hermeneutics* presents an attempt at grounding an interpretivist epistemology within the framework of a universal history of capitalism (see Habermas, 1988; see also Bleicher, 1980; 1982; Thompson, 1981; Geuss, 1981; Mueller-Vollmer, 1986; and Outhwaite, ed., 1996). Habermas argues in *On the Logic of the Social Sciences* - first published in 1967 - that Gadamer reduces hermeneutics to a mere investigation of the transcendental conditions of understanding, neglecting the methodological demands of the human sciences and a 'universal history' of the concrete social and material conditions of capitalism. Targeting positivist and empiricist epistemologies (including Weber's interpretive sociology), he develops an approach for the 'hermeneutic understanding of meaning' (*hermeneutisches sinnverstehen*), through integrated elements of hermeneutic, linguistic and Hegelian-Marxian philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism, and Freudian psychoanalysis. Looking to mediate the objectivity of history with the subjectivity of social actors, Habermas aims to emancipate social life from the forces of repression constituted in language. Through a consideration of Wilhelm Dilthey, Alfred Schutz and the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, emancipation is achieved through a 'theory of communicative competence' (see Bleicher, 1980; and 1982), where a false or distorted consensus among actors is overcome via discourse in the public sphere as the necessary precondition for intersubjective and rational understanding (see Habermas, 1984a; 1986; 1987; and 1999; see also Crossley, 1994; and 1996). He concludes:

> A history has a beginning and an end. The beginning can only be reconstructed anthropologically from the ongoing conditions of existence of socialized individuals, as the beginning of the human species. The end can only be anticipated through the experience of reflection, from a point of view from a given situation. For this reason, the framework of a general interpretation, however saturated it may be with prior hermeneutic experience and however much it may have been confirmed in individual interpretations, retains a hypothetical moment. The truth of historically oriented functionalism is confirmed not technically but only practically, in the successful continuation and completion of a formative process ... Here we are again confronted with the problem of that singular relationship to theory and practice that since the eighteenth century has appeared wherever the logic of inquiry has involved the intention of the Enlightenment.

(Habermas, 1988: 189).

As Mueller-Vollmer points out it is difficult to see how actual methodological problems can be met on this basis, suggesting there may not to be a necessary connection between Habermasian historical and political philosophy and a Habermasian 'depth hermeneutics' (see Mueller-Vollmer, 1986). At most this critical depth hermeneutics takes hermeneutics as a historical and critical metatheory, hoping it guides the development of a hermeneutic epistemology. Nonetheless by integrating a realist ontology and Habermasian critical depth hermeneutics the research for this thesis adopts a *radical and critical realism*, potentially
avoiding the limitations of empiricism and positivism, without recourse to relativist and contextualist excesses of more idealist and subjectivist hermeneutics.

A methodology based on radical and critical realism primarily involves the use of intensive case studies, raising further issues in relation to the localities under study and meaningful comparison (see Williams, S. 1981; Gregory, 1982; Pratt, 1991; and Sayer, 1992). Some have attempted to reveal the relationship between locality research and critical realism (see Urry, 1987; Duncan, 1989; Sayer, 1991; and 1992). As Joe Painter (1994) shows there are three main elements to this relationship: one, localities can become the empirical outcome of a contingent constellation of causal processes; two, localities may exert causal influences on wider social structures; and three, locality (case study) research can seek to discern these causal processes thus identifying the necessary relations of social structure.

The case studies in North Tyneside and Rotterdam for this research are undertaken to discern the influence of institutional context in determining the type and extent of pluralisation and local involvement in APS. Meaningful comparison becomes an analytical possibility. This localities approach, however, does not necessarily overcome the local parochialism, spatial fetishism and narrow empiricism of many studies (see Smith, N. 1987; and Duncan and Savage, 1989). It is therefore necessary to draw attention to wider debates within contextual theory as a means of overcoming these limitations. Viewing time-space settings and sequences of human agency as essential to its constitution and stressing relations of coexistence, connection and togetherness, 'contextual theory' runs counter to 'compositional theory' which focuses on relations of similarity (see Johnston et al., eds., 1994). Examples of contextual theory include the 'time geography' of Hägerstrand and the 'structuration theory' of Giddens, where 'place' becomes a process, an active/passive convergence of social structure and human agency (see Giddens, 1984; and Hägerstrand, 1984). Other geographers have furthered the debate into one of 'spatiality' where context reveals the site for the 'production of space' (for example Soja, 1980), whereas others have gone as far to argue for context as constituting an intrinsic 'spatial ontology' (for example Schatzki, 1991). Attention to these debates will ensure an awareness of certain limitations associated with intensive research, helping guarantee meaningful case study comparison.

**Conclusion**

Implicit in the preceding discussion on methodology is that events are often shaped by social structures and institutional mechanisms that are not co-present in time, and that even those observations are customarily influenced by certain ideological and axiological bias. Not only do the conceptual frameworks and hermeneutic understandings of the researcher need
considering in light of these factors, but so too do those of the individuals being interviewed. A comparative case study approach that follows a radical and critical realist methodology is arguably the most appropriate means for obtaining as complete a picture as possible of these institutions, world-views, meanings and understandings, while retaining a relation to the wider social and material reality. Accepting that even the most carefully selected case study will struggle to overcome problems of representation, the choice of North Tyneside in the UK and Rotterdam in the Netherlands is strong on conceptual grounds and for practical reasons. There is however a problem over spatial scale. The resident population in Rotterdam is approximately three times that of North Tyneside, covering a much wider geographical area. The suggestion that comparison with Newcastle-upon-Tyne would be more equitable in terms of population size and geographical coverage, does not outweigh conceptual factors - namely governance issues and characteristics of local APS, in addition to economic and social aspects - that make North Tyneside an appropriate UK case study. North Tyneside and Rotterdam are sufficiently similar as well as different to make this analytical comparison meaningful. Finally, it is conceded that an intensive, semi-structured interview method is vulnerable to 'after-the-event' rationalisations, but inaccuracies may be minimised through corroboration of evidence with other interview evidence and with secondary material. In the final analysis there can be no substitute for a 'common-sense' methodology at all stages of the research for maximising the value gained through such a method.

A radical and critical realist epistemology raises issues around concepts of ideology and context in social research methodology. As a critique of empiricism and positivism, a realist approach pertains to a philosophy of (social) science, while maintaining an awareness of the contested, political and fundamentally ideological nature of social life. Any inquiry looking to understand and explain society constantly faces this ideological 'conflict', including the particular values and ideological bias of the researcher. By maintaining a link between depth hermeneutics and a realist epistemology, it is possible to situate this ideological confrontation squarely within capitalist social and material history, preventing it from descending into an infinite rhetorical regress. Differences of opinion abound among social scientists in general - and commentators on governance in particular - as to the status accorded the 'real-concrete' empirical reality in relation to various levels of abstraction from that reality. This research views context as the contingent outcome of various causal mechanisms and social structures at a particular institutional nexus in space and time.

With the discussion on methodology complete, the next three chapters deal with the empirical findings from the research on governance of APS in North Tyneside and Rotterdam following these methodological guidelines. The first of these presents evidence from North Tyneside where the thesis now progresses.
This chapter shows that the governance of APS in North Tyneside reflects a shift from community opposition and antagonism to the state to a more professionalised, service-orientated and complex non-state sector in unequal partnership with the local state. The milestone in the development of non-state APS in North Tyneside was the experience and aftermath of the Miners' Strike between 1984 and 1985, and now a number of distinct networks of non-state APS operate in the borough. Mechanisms for local involvement differ in the state and non-state realms. State mechanisms tend to be top-down, post-hoc and tokenistic - but the equivalent mechanisms in the non-state sector often follow a community development or communicative conception of involvement; yet mechanisms in both realms rely on the active mediation of local practitioners committed to the welfare of residents in working class neighbourhoods. The chapter is organised into six sections. The first provides a brief outline of indicators of poverty and deprivation in North Tyneside, followed in the second section by an account of the evolution and range of state APS. The third looks at the rise in non-state approaches, the fourth examines the mechanisms for involvement of local residents in APS, and the final section briefly examines the ways in which the identified APS have tackled poverty in the borough.

Poverty in North Tyneside

Six aspects of poverty in North Tyneside are addressed in this section, beginning with the general processes of macro-economic restructuring effecting the whole economy, followed by a brief allusion to five areas most adversely affected by these developments. Since the early 1970s the local economy in North Tyneside has experienced a severe and concerted process of macro-economic restructuring from a powerhouse manufacturing economy based on old, traditional industries - such as coal-mining and maritime industries like fishing and shipbuilding -
5. Governance of APS in North Tyneside

This transition is not a comfortable one for a locality where the social relations of production and consumption have historically centred on working class employment in large manufacturing firms, and where entrepreneurialism and the spirit of free enterprise is less pronounced than in other parts of the country (see Amin and Tomaney, 1991). The problems associated with a shift to a service based economy are compounded by pressures for internationalisation and rationalisation experienced by local manufacturing industries in the face of mounting competition from abroad. The age of long-term employment in North Tyneside industries - the romantic notion of a 'job for life' - vanished long ago, and those fortunate enough to find work today tend to endure increasingly casualised and part-time contracts, often on a temporary basis with little or no protection against the whim of the market (see Pyke, 1982; and Hudson, 1988). Many others find themselves unemployed for long periods of time with little or no prospects of finding work, surviving on meagre benefits increasingly subject to a punitive 'means-test'. The advent of the flexible labour market is a very real one for North Tyneside inhabitants experiencing widening socio-economic inequalities and worsening social and material conditions for the most deprived members of society. As with most social (and economic) phenomena these processes have a spatial dimension, and many of these most deprived people in North Tyneside live in certain parts of the borough.

... unemployment and poverty in North Tyneside is becoming very much like it is in other urban areas however, it's becoming much more ghettoised - while it can also be spread out, the different types of poverty, you know the child who doesn't get the opportunity to go to a party because their parents are unemployed or their incomes has some kind of reduction, can be experiencing a certain kind of poverty ... And that child can live in any part of the borough. But the real pockets of unemployment and deprivation ... we are experiencing a kind of 'ghettoisation' and a separation of areas now. So you can find huge huge pockets of, where there are common features of poverty ... and there is a kind of 'Chinese Wall' around them ...

(Interview with Brian Topping, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 14/6/96 - original emphasis).

Particularly marked concentrations of unemployment and poverty in North Tyneside are located in the de-industrialised areas along the Riverside (see North Tyneside CDP, 1976; 1977; 1978a; 1978b; North Tyneside Council, 1995b; 1996a; and 1997). A line of urban settlements

85 Interviews with John Goddard, CURDS, University of Newcastle upon Tyne 3/6/96 and Fred Robinson, Sociology and Social Policy, University of Durham 7/6/96. For a general background on the borough of North Tyneside see Appendices 8 and 9. See Appendix 10 for a map and Appendix 11 for images of North Tyneside. For more detail on various aspects of the history, economy and society of Tyneside - including North Tyneside on the north bank of the Tyne River - see Sinfield (1970); McCord (1979); Barke (1986); Goddard (1987; 1990); Byrne (1989; 1995); Philimore (1989); Champion and Townsend (1990); and Goddard and Thwaites (1991).

86 See Appendix 12 for a summary of North Tyneside's poverty profile (1995) and Appendix 13 for a summary of the Department of Environment's 1991 Index of Local Conditions indicating levels of deprivation in North Tyneside, a borough ranked the 51st most deprived local authority area in 1991.

87 Interviews with Margaret Nolan, NFCU 28/5/96, Brian Topping, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 14/6/96 and 28/6/96, Thom Bradley, Director, VODA 9/7/96, Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 30/8/96 and 13/3/98 and Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96. See Appendix 10 for a map and Appendix 11 for images of North Tyneside, including council housing stock in Rosehill.
situated in the northern bank of The Tyne - including Wallsend, Meadow Well, Howdon and North Shields - historically developed as housing areas for working class families employed in the many heavy industries mentioned earlier - coal-mining, shipbuilding and fishing (see Journal, The 1996). Severe downturn in local manufacturing demand coupled with structural changes in the wider macro-economy and an altered strategic significance of the north east region in the UK space economy, have resulted in the growth of mass, structural unemployment in these areas (see table 3 showing economic activity rates and unemployment by ward in North Tyneside). By 1991 51.7% of men and 63.2% of women over 16 were unemployed in Howdon, the fourth most deprived ward out of a total of 20 in North Tyneside. Of housing, 60% is council owned in Howdon, with around 46% council stock in nearby Rosehill (see North Tyneside Council, 1997; see also Hetherington, 1999). As a proxy measure of poverty and deprivation almost half (48%) of social security claimants in 1995 received a North Tyneside Council Key Card, 45% of which were in the priority key card category, about the same as the borough average of 44.7 per cent (see notes in table 4 for explanation of standard and priority key cards; see also North Tyneside Council, 1995b). The Riverside ward consists of a number of communities including part of Howdon and Willington Quay, East Howdon, south Meadow Well, Royal Quays, Percy Main and a section of North Shields town centre, ranking in 1995 the most deprived ward in the whole of North Tyneside (see North Tyneside Council, 1997). Over three fifths of working age residents in the Riverside ward were unemployed in 1991, with figures higher among females than males (65.8 and 55.7% respectively). By 1995 over half (54.8%) of the Riverside population received a key card, a staggering 62.9% of which were 'priority'.

Thirdly, the post-mining hinterland and north-west frontier in North Tyneside covers an area to the north of Longbenton - including Weetslade, Wide Open, Seaton Burn, Dudley, Fordley and Annitsford - where former pit villages and largely rural communities face problems of social exclusion from the other, more urbanised, parts of the borough (see North Tyneside CDP, 1976; 1977; 1978a; 1978b; North Tyneside Council, 1995b; 1996a; and 1997). While the general problems association with poverty and deprivation afflict residents, the less urban and more rural, relatively isolated, parochial and insular former pit-village identities, and a more elderly local population suggest a particular complexion to problems faced in the north-west frontier. Traditionally a key coal-mining area, all of the pits have since closed - the Weetslade pit closed in 1966, followed by the Dudley pit in 1977 - the Brentley pit in Seaton Burn was the last to go closing just after the Miners' Strike (1984-85). Alongside issues of unemployment, skill shortages and a shortage of work locally, the area suffers from a relative lack of

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### Table 3: Economic activity rates\(^1\) and % people not working by ward in North Tyneside (1991)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>economic activity rates (%)</th>
<th>% people aged 16+ not working</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male</td>
<td>female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Hill</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benton</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camperdown</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilton</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collingwood</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cullercoats</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holystone</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howdon</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longbenton</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monkseaton</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Shields</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northumberland</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Mary's</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seatonville</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tynemouth</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valley</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallsend</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weetslade</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitby Bay</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Tyneside</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyne &amp; Wear</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
\(^1\) The proportion of the population either in work or available for work (the local earning capacity)

**Source:** North Tyneside Council (1995b) - taken from OPCS 1991 Census

Public resources. Urban regeneration schemes tend to focus on more urbanised areas, mainly along the Riverside, at the expense of the rural north west which receives few additional resources. Fordley Community Primary School and Dudley People's Centre are the main resource centres in an area whose aggregate unemployment statistics do not appear as severe as in the wards in the Riverside area. Typical problems associated with unemployment, particularly benefit dependency, are exacerbated by the area's geographical and social isolation from the rest of the borough. The male economic activity rate for the Weetslade ward in 1991 (68.4%) was just below the borough average at 69.7%, whereas the female rate (46.8%) was just above the average for the borough (48.6%). The proportion of people over 16 out of work was below the borough average, but there were proportionately many more unemployed women of working age (see table 3). Just over a quarter of residents in Weetslade were receiving NTC key cards in 1995 (see table 4).

Fourthly, *pockets of poverty* are apparent in certain parts of North Tyneside, either hidden within aggregate statistics of relatively affluent wards, or characteristics of single neighbourhoods or
Table 4: Figures and % Standard\(^1\) and Priority Key Card\(^2\) take-up by ward in North Tyneside (1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>PKC adult</th>
<th>PKC junior</th>
<th>SKC adult</th>
<th>SKC junior</th>
<th>Key Cards (total)</th>
<th>% PKC</th>
<th>% pop with Key Cards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battle Hill</td>
<td>2112</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>2287</td>
<td>1218</td>
<td>6044</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benton</td>
<td>1308</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>1358</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>3449</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camperdown</td>
<td>1510</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>1245</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>3834</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chirton</td>
<td>2254</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>1497</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>4716</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collingwood</td>
<td>2612</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>5702</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cullercoats</td>
<td>1675</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>3048</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>5694</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holystone</td>
<td>2151</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>2311</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>5781</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howdon</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>4033</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longbenton</td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>2999</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monkseaton</td>
<td>1253</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>2938</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>5274</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Shields</td>
<td>2699</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>3021</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>6728</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northumberland</td>
<td>1714</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>2148</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>5140</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside</td>
<td>2441</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>4828</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Mary's</td>
<td>1079</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>3368</td>
<td>1079</td>
<td>5740</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seatonville</td>
<td>1465</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>2435</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>4996</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tynemouth</td>
<td>1756</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>2736</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>5385</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valley</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>1488</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>4609</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallsend</td>
<td>2349</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>5529</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westcliff</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1198</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>2587</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitley Bay</td>
<td>2153</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>2503</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>5908</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>63.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Tyneside</td>
<td>36998</td>
<td>7214</td>
<td>40681</td>
<td>13954</td>
<td>98847</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Key Card is the NTC discounting system, providing reduced prices for a wide range of Council services and special offers from local shops and businesses. Standard Key Card (SKC) is available to everyone over the age of eight living in North Tyneside.
2. Priority Key Card (PKC) provides an additional discounted level, and is targeted at deprived residents. It is available to those people (and their children) receiving unemployment benefit, invalidity benefit, income support, family credit and housing benefit. It is also available for people on YTS, ET or TFT programmes, and full-time students over 16.


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5. Governance of APS in North Tyneside

North Tyneside Council (1995b) - taken from NTC Customer Services.

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89. Interviews with Margaret Nolan, NFCU 28/5/96, Brian Topping, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 14/6/96 and 28/6/96, Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 27/6/96\(^1\) and 29/1/98, Thom Bradley, Director, VODA 9/7/96\(^1\) and 2/2/98, Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 30/8/96\(^1\) and 13/3/98\(^1\) and Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96. See Appendix 10 for a map of North Tyneside.

Economic activity rates for men and women in 1991 were above the respective borough averages, and at 41.1% the proportion of working age people out of work in the same year was below the borough average of 49.2 per cent (see table 3). Just over two fifths of the population in Battle Hill were in receipt of a priority key card in 1995, slightly less than 44.7% for the borough as a whole (see table 4). Homelessness is less visible throughout the north east than in other urban areas like London, although ironically the situation is converging with a growing number of 'Big Issue' vendors on the streets.92

In terms of a deprived area of North Tyneside which has become the focus of a major urban regeneration initiative, Longbenton has attracted a great deal of policy and political attention over the last few years (see North Tyneside CDP, 1976; 1977; 1978a; 1978b; North Tyneside Council, 1995b; 1996a; 1997; and 1998b).93 Located towards the north west of the borough and bordering Gosforth Park in Newcastle to the west, Longbenton ward is divided into two distinct residential areas - West Moor, a private estate consisting of three bedroom owner-occupied homes, and the Longbenton estate, originally constructed in the 1950s and 1960s as overflow accommodation by Newcastle City Council. Most units on the Longbenton estate are two bedroom flats in three storey blocks, enclosing a declining shopping centre, and surrounded by traditional three bedroom homes and two multi-storey tower blocks. Two thirds of units in the ward are rented from the council. Residents fortunate enough to find work are more likely to fill low paid positions in jobs outside the North Tyneside area, but many people remain unemployed. In June 1997 total unemployment in the ward was 6.6% above the national average, disproportionately higher among men (9.2% above the average) than women at 2.5% above the national level. In April of the same year 44.9% of unemployed residents in Longbenton have been out of work for over a year and claiming social benefits, well in excess of the national average of 36.5%. But the claimant count is said to underestimate the true level of unemployment, and in April 1996 it was estimated that over a quarter (25.4%) of residents were without work (see North Tyneside Council, 1997). Over three fifths (60.6%) of key card claimants in Longbenton in 1995 received a priority card, the highest proportion of all wards in North Tyneside (see table 4).

92 Interviews with Malcolm Dove, Training/Research Officer, Homeless North 27/6/96 and Neil Trotter, Editor, The Big Issue North East Ltd. 12/7/96.
Finally, the *Meadow Well Estate* in Chirton ward along the riverside to the west of North Shields and south of Wallsend Road is one of the most deprived estates in North Tyneside, ‘... an estate of specially disadvantaged character, suffering from economic decline, physical decay and social disintegration’ (North Tyneside Council, 1991: 8). Since the early 1990s the estate has attracted a lot of political, policy and media attention, much to the chagrin of residents (who feel stigmatised) and the activists on other estates who feel marginalised in policy terms (see also North Tyneside CDP, 1976; 1977; 1978a; 1978b; North Tyneside Council, 1991; 1995b; 1996a; and 1997).  

The estate was originally constructed between 1932 and 1939 by Tynemouth County Borough Council to rehouse residents of the Banksides - an area of overcrowded and insanitary ‘back-to-back’ housing fronting the Tyne - in flats built in blocks of four, and called 'the Ridges'. From the outset the estate was overcrowded, but despite a small amount of development in the 1950s it was not until 1971 that North Meadow Well was modernised, followed by a similar re-development during the 1980s on the southern part of the estate. Suffering a long established reputation as a ‘problem area’, re-development in 1971 tried to eliminate stigma by changing the name to Meadow Well.  

Sadly the reputation persists, fed by stereotypes associated with the disturbances on the estate in 1991. Poverty and deprivation are still very real problems in the context of a new fatalism, as revealed by Margaret Nolan, a native Meadow Well activist and local councillor:

... poverty is extreme in ... [Meadow Well, where] ... we could produce the worst statistics that you could think of on mainland Britain. I mean, there are pockets where there are 100% unemployed and have been in the third generation unemployment; streets where you can look up and you won't find a car in the street; you won't find a telephone; and now when you've got communities who have no access to those what we, many people take as normal.


95 Meadow Well is the name given to the estate following the process of modernisation in 1971, one that remains popular with the residents today. With the implementation of the City Challenge in North Tyneside between 1992-97 - where problems on the estate figured prominently - policy documents within NTCC and NTC began referring to the 'Meadowwell' in an attempt to break with the images of the past (interview with Margaret Nolan, NFCU 28/5/96).

96 Civil disturbances erupted in the evening of 9 September 1991, largely organised and in response to a few incidents involving the police in the context of a clamp-down on 'ram-raids' at the time: one, where two young men were killed in a car crash involving a stolen car; two, where a boy was beaten brutally by the police; and three, a police officer's family has been threatened at home. By most accounts the unrest was a response to the perceived misdemeanours of the authorities on the estate, where the 'duty-tinder' of the severe deprivation was waiting to ignite. A lot of buildings were attacked - including the police station - and local Asian shops, the shopkeepers from which were eventually saved in time, but could quite easily have been killed as their shops were alight at ground level. Fortunately no-one was killed; but the old community centre - the 'Collingwood' - was burnt down. Bea Campbell has written the disturbances in *Gōshā* (see Campbell, 1993); but local people feel aggrieved at the amount of negative publicity received by the estate, to the point certain individuals are compiling an 'insiders' view of events that night (interviews with David Peel, Cedarwood Trust, 4/3/98, Pat Hope, Meadow Well resident, Cedarwood Trust 4/3/98, Peter Hope, Meadow Well resident, Cedarwood Trust 23/3/98).
amenities now, then you’ve got poverty ... there’s nobody dying in the street ... Fifty years ago ... the poverty was evident; there were young people on the street corners who had no shoes on their feet and no coats on their back. [Fifty years on] ... the poverty isn’t as evident - kids have designer clothes on in the areas of poverty; what they hadn’t got, the poverty was evident in their eyes - before there was a sparkle in the eyes of the kids on the corner where at least there was striving, they thought they had a future. Kids in now, their eyes are dull and there’s no ... there’s no aspirations there, and that’s the major difference ...

(interview with Margaret Nolan, NFCU 28/5/96 - emphasis added).

Chirton ward ranked the third most deprived out of all wards in North Tyneside in 1991. By June 1997 the total unemployment rate was 10% above the national average, and male unemployment was 14.3% higher than the national male average. In April 1996 the real, underlying level of unemployment in Chirton ward was estimated at 25.8%; and 58.4% of key card holders received a priority card. Given the relatively less deprived conditions experienced by residents on the adjacent Balkwell estate, these figures are likely to be more severe on the Meadow Well itself.

Evolution of State APS

Labour controlled since 1974, North Tyneside Council politically orientated towards the Centre-Left in the aftermath of the Miners' Strike (1984-85), in keeping with changes within the Labour Party at the national level. Partly reflecting a taming of leftist politics in the Council, as with other radical local authorities, these changes were wrought through a growing centralisation of financial management and therefore power. It also arguably reflects innovation and modernisation on behalf of local civil servants and politicians for maintaining and securing financial resources for impoverished people in the context of budget cuts and pressures for restructuring, in advance of Blairism at the national level. It would be fair to say that for a while North Tyneside Council resisted this shift - for instance during the 1980s the council held out against the imposition of central government rent hikes, and retained its subsidies for Tyne and Wear public transport longer than most other authorities. Yet local government is essentially a creature of central government, the latter in control making key decisions affecting the former. North Tyneside like all other radical left authorities of the 1980s was brought in line - there was only a small group of romantic left-wingers who retained an ideology of local activism in the context of these national changes. In other words, this shift to the Centre-Left was largely inevitable in the context of Thatcherism. What follows is an account of the evolution of local government and its approach to poverty since the early 1970s in North Tyneside.

Interview with Graham Stevenson, Wallsend People's Centre 26/3/98.
In the early 1970s local government in North Tyneside was constructed along old Urban District Council (UDC) lines, including Wallsend, Longbenton and Whitley Bay UDCs, and Tynemouth Borough Council. These UDCs were traditional and top-down, run along Old Left Morrisonian principles in a way that reflected the 'industrial split' in the borough. Longbenton and Wallsend UDCs were heavily influenced by industrial (especially the riverside, shipyard and miners') trade unions, and social reforms were usually at their behest. These UDCs were perhaps at best reformist in temper, in the context of a civic consciousness committed to the needs of the majority of their local residents. Tynemouth and Whitley Bay UDCs were governed in a similar top-down fashion, yet drew upon a mixture of local business, the professional classes and working-class artisans for involvement in local government. The social policies that developed reflected the interests of these people. Tynemouth in particular was rather Conservative and not generally committed to social reform, despite large pockets of working-class deprivation in the midst of middle-class affluence. These UDCs were more committed to the aspiring middle-class, run along an old paternalistic and philanthropic style of local government - the idea of 'good deeds for the deserving poor'. The landscape, moreover, was generally untainted, to a certain extent still rural, as compared to Longbenton and Wallsend which were more urban in character and scarred by industrial development. The result was room for new development.

This split between these areas reflected the local government situation in North Tyneside throughout the 1960s and in the early 1970s. Following recommendations of the Bains Report (1973), local government reform in 1974 set up the Metropolitan Borough of North Tyneside, attempting to amalgamate these different local administrative areas along the principles of corporate management. Yet the historical tension between these areas persists, even to this day, exerting an effect on Labour Party politics in the borough. The first Leader of North Tyneside Council, Jimmy Bamborough, came from a mining background in Dudley, positioning himself as a 'town boss' in the old 'Morrisonian' tradition. He was able to secure support from a majority of councillors and was unassailable for a while, not least because he had Labour allies...
in the traditional Conservative areas along the coast in working-class communities on post-war estates. His leadership and political stability - characteristically of the 'gentlemanly left' - remained fairly solid, staying in place until around 1980. Rather more left-leaning Labour councillors emerged in this period, one or two previously involved in the former Community Development Project (CDP), who then found themselves in the Council when the CDP finished. By 1980 the political complexion of the Council was more cosmopolitan in outlook.

In 1979 a new Conservative government came to power under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, and local politics in North Tyneside began to change. Following a schism in 1983, Brian Flood took over as Leader, with Bamborough relegated to Deputy; but it was the advent of the Miners' Strike the following year that drew attention of the Council to the stark reality of hardship, deprivation and poverty in the borough. Although the Council has always had a strong welfarist tradition, this event acted as the catalyst for political intervention for the new emerging Centre-Left led by Flood. It was Flood, in collaboration with Byers, Stringfellow and Murray (a local authority officer) who mobilised sufficient power within North Tyneside to try and mitigate this hardship. In the days of the Strike the Council was looking at hardship funds to assist those in need. These key political figures took a broader view, looking to develop more child care, drop-in facilities, and the provision of food and clothing. They were able to direct more money into social services in general, and initiatives to tackle poverty in particular - policies remaining in the borough ever since. The People's Centres were established (see case study), and play schemes and 'parent and toddler' groups were set up in areas where former miners' and their families lived; even providing free food throughout the week during the Strike. At the end of the Strike in 1985 these political figures were able to argue for maintenance of these services in the Council's mainline budget, providing the basis for a series of APS, leading ultimately to the Community High Schools, consolidation of the People's Centre Network and Childcare Enterprise (see case studies).

base along the coast, until the local election in 1996, when there was a big anti-Conservative mood across the country and they lost a lot of seats.

Within the last year the more reactionary elements have taken root in the Conservative Party at the coast, resurrecting a popular campaign to break up North Tyneside and reconstruct the old-style councils for Whitley Bay and Tynemouth. The Tories have always found themselves in a position where they are unable to really influence the political direction of the Council.

Interview with Graham Stevenson, Wallsend People's Centre 26/3/98.

In 1976 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed cuts on the Labour Government of the time, causing a slight blip on an otherwise stable political situation.


Interviews with Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 30/8/96, and Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96.

At this point Steve Byers, now MP for Wallsend and the Trade and Industry Secretary, was Chair of the Education Committee and Rita Stringfellow was Chair of the Social Services Committee.

Winning this argument, however, was an arduous task. Local politics in the borough were rather factionalised in the immediate aftermath of the Strike, not least due to the rise of a militant tendency, but Bamborough - the figurehead of the Old Left - refused to continue as Deputy, and in turn the Council split.\(^{110}\) In turn the Council split. The new political cosmopolitanism (and radicalism) in the Council reflected the strengthening of the trade unions and the Far Left as part of a general discontentment with the Thatcher government, a movement which resonated with a mounting Leftist movement within the national Labour Party. The leftist element within the Labour Group included a Militant Tendency, which induced a counter-coup by the 'gentlemanly' Old Left.\(^ {111}\) In 1986 12 councillors wanted to quell the perceived influence of the 'Militants' and return Bamborough as Leader, breaking away from the Labour Group, setting themselves up as Labour Against Militant and forming an alliance with the Conservatives, taking control of the Council for a year.\(^ {112}\) These defectors progressively lost their seats over the next two or three years, and the void was filled with an influx of new, young, intellectual and largely middle-class Labour councillors (see Byrne, 1989).

The Labour Group won back majority control of the Council in 1987 under the Centre-Left Leadership of Flood, with Byers as Deputy, and, for Byrne (1989), marking the emergence of a political liberal new realism. It was a further turning point for APS in North Tyneside. A concerted approach to poverty was now mounted in North Tyneside, and certainly the continued support of the People's Centre Network was apportioned to the political initiative of the Byers/Flood partnership. It should be noted that, due to support from local Tories, spending on these various APS was maintained.\(^ {113}\) The Council became increasingly policy-driven away from the old-fashioned committee structure - indeed a new anti-poverty strategy committee was established. Yet these various policies were not explicitly recognised as 'anti-poverty' as such, because in the words of Brian Flood: '... it's so much part of what we'd expect to be doing ... everything that the Council does is an anti-poverty strategy because of the nature of the problem in North Tyneside'.\(^ {114}\) Representing a maximalist approach to poverty, an onus was placed on 'top-down' economic development of the borough; again quoting Flood: '... the most powerful anti-poverty strategy that the Council is doing is encouraging large-scale foreign investments in North Tyneside'.\(^ {115}\) Furthermore the anti-poverty dimension was written as one

\(^{110}\) Interviews with Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 30/8/96\(^ {1}\) and Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96\(^ {2}\).

\(^{111}\) The Militants no more than a small group of political idealists - there was a certain influence from Labour Party radicals and Labour Party Young Socialists at the time. As with the Old Labour 'right wing' they were routed by the Centre-Left, laying the political foundations for the present administration under Stringfellow.

\(^{112}\) A two-tier local government existed until 1986 when the Tyne and Wear County Council (TWCC) was abolished at the dictate of the Old Left. Ironically the Old Left won this argument at the time New Centre-Left was consolidating power in North Tyneside Council. The former TWCC was composed of young, enthusiastic and intellectual councillors, as did the New Centre-Left in North Tyneside (interview with George Melvin, Council Administration, North Tyneside Council 22/2/99).

\(^{113}\) Despite one or two exceptions Conservative councillors in North Tyneside at that time were not particularly Thatcherite (interview with Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96\(^ {2}\)).

\(^{114}\) Interview with Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96\(^ {1}\).

\(^{115}\) Interview with Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96\(^ {2}\).
of the ten criteria, including 'equal opportunities' and 'social justice', by which all Council policies became evaluated. The principle of equality was the cornerstone of the new anti-poverty orientation, away from the top-down conservatism of the Old Left, and reflecting a new intellectualism in the Council. In 1990 the committee structure was again overhauled, forming new issue-based groupings concerning women, youth issues and older people.

During the 1980s it was increasingly acknowledged that new urban regeneration programmes were required to reverse under-investment and arrest widespread urban malaise in the borough. After the experience of the CDP successive state financed urban regeneration schemes were increasingly subject to a process of competitive bidding, targeted to selected areas and managed by urban policy quangos in partnership with the local authority, the private sector and local communities (see Shaw, 1993; Robinson and Shaw, 1994; and Nevin and Shiner, 1995).

In the context of Thatcherism and the ideological move to limit local authority power, these quangos increasingly interacted with the private sector, for some at the erosion of democratic accountability as decision-making power shifted into the hands of local business and other elites (see Stoker, 1989; 1995 Harding, 1990; Peck, 1995; Peck and Tickell, 1994; and Axford and Pinch, 1994). The Urban Programme, for instance, channelled resources for the regeneration of inner city areas. In North Tyneside funds were targeted in an area broadly running from Wallsend to North Shields, encompassing the whole of the Riverside ward and the Meadow Well Estate and the quayside area near North Shields, and delimited by the coast road. The Tyne and Wear Development Corporation (TWDC) was established in 1987, a clear example of public/private partnership for urban regeneration focusing regeneration schemes in a similar stretch along the riverside (see Stoker, 1989; 1995; Shaw, 1993; Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; Stoker and King, eds., 1996; Imrie and Thomas, 1993; and Imrie et al., 1995). TWDCs 'flagship' in North Tyneside is the Royal Quays development on a former industrial site just outside North Shields (see North Tyneside Council, 1996b), a project that has a strong record on community involvement through the Royal Quays Monitoring Panel.

In extension of the Council's anti-poverty orientation set down with the Plan for Jobs, North Tyneside's official APS, Tackling Poverty in North Tyneside, was published in 1988 laying the

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119 Interviews with Ian McKinnon, Regeneration Officer, North Tyneside City Challenge 9/7/96, Marty Lawrence, Research Section, Newcastle City Council 23/7/96 and 9/3/98, Thom Bradley, Freelance Consultant 2/2/98, and Charles Hope, Percy Main Vicarage and MWRC 3/2/98.
120 In the same year the Trade Union Studies Information Unit (TUSIU) in conjunction with North Tyneside Council produced a Plan for Jobs, an intentionally ambitious plan to create around 10,500 manufacturing jobs in the borough, via a Keynesian strategy for national public investment (see TUSIU, 1994; see also Byrne, 1989; also key-informant interviews with the author 12/6/96, 23/7/96 and 9/3/98). At this time the Save Our Swans campaign was underway to assist the ailing ship-builders Swan Hunter Ltd. in Wallsend, especially through the work of Wallsend People's Centre (interviews...
basis for the Council’s approach to alleviating hardship for those most in need (see TUSIU, 1994; see also North Tyneside Council, 1993; and 1994a).\(^{121}\) A collection of initiatives aiming to foster an inter-departmental approach (see tables 5 and 6), it was similar to a former Greater London Council (GLC) model, tailoring traditional services to assist the most needy in society, combining a commitment to services for locally unemployed, with other services like women’s issues, as part of a radicalisation of policy (see Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; Thompson, 1989; Campbell, ed., 1990; Alcock, 1993). The official anti-poverty strategy was a statement to alleviate poverty, focusing basically on the various departmental remits; and in this way there was little specifically new about it. Overall it was largely about encouraging councillors and officers to focus service provision to those most in need, in the contradictory situation where local authority resources were dwindling on an annual basis (see also Gaffikin and Morrissey, 1994a; Alcock, 1994; Alcock et al., 1996; Geddes and Eskine, 1994; and Thomas and Balloch, 1994). Brian Flood spoke about poverty in non-structural terms in the context of the wider economy:

> Fundamentally, solving poverty is an *individual* matter - I don’t want to sound Margaret Thatcher about it - [but] ... if they ain’t trying there’s nothing we can do. But if people expect and come up with ideas, then turn to others in the community saying what they’ve achieved ... it’s a process of raising awareness ... There’s nothing you can really do as a Council against the macro-economic policy of an antagonistic government. You can militate against some effects; it’s like the wide and the tide - if they’re going to do the buggers down, they’ll do ‘em down!

(interview with Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96\(^2\) - emphasis added).

The development of *Key Card* remains central to North Tyneside’s APS (see North Tyneside Council, 1993; and 1994a; see also table 4),\(^{122}\) but according to Brian Topping, the Principal Officer of Community Services, and Julie Todd, the Manager of North Tyneside Business Centre, it remains largely *palliative* in nature.\(^{123}\) This framework has been retained since

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\(^{121}\) Interviews with Kate Howie, Corporate Policy, North Tyneside Council 7/6/96, Brian Topping, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 14/6/96, Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 27/6/96, Ian McKinnon, Regeneration Officer, North Tyneside City Challenge 9/7/96, Marty Lawrence, Research Section, Newcastle City Council 23/7/96 and 9/3/98, John Foster, Executive Director, North Tyneside Council 2/8/96, Julie Todd, Manager, North Tyneside Business Centre 6/8/96, Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 30/8/96, Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96, and David Corkey, Business and Community Studies, Newcastle College 9/9/96.

\(^{122}\) There are three types of *Key Card*: a *Standard Key Card* (SKC) is available for all local residents for entitlement to certain benefits; a *Priority Key Card* (PKC) entitling those most in need to special benefits - two-thirds of recipients are entitled; and a *Carers Card* which allows carers for the disabled free service access (interviews with Brian Topping, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 14/6/96, Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 30/8/96 and Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96).

\(^{123}\) Interview with Julie Todd, Manager, North Tyneside Business Centre 6/8/96.
Table 5: Additional APS in North Tyneside Council (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charging Policies</td>
<td>Care in the Community</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Services</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Customer Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Take-Up of Housing Benefit/</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Tax Benefit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benefit Take-Up Campaigns</td>
<td>Community Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>Community Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Efficiency</td>
<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Property Services</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime and Community Safety</td>
<td>Community Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Profile</td>
<td>Corporate Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-racism</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Allocations/ Rent Arrears Policy</td>
<td>Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMO/ Private Rented Sector</td>
<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: North Tyneside Council (1994a)

1994, losing much of its early energy, but is now re-instated on the agenda in a recast format now that a New Labour government is in power.

After a troublesome time following the disturbances of the Meadow Well Estate in 1991 a harsh financial predicament forced the Council into a dramatic process of restructuring that has ‘revolutionised’ its organisation. Beginning in 1992 for completion by April 1993, North

124 A Review of Anti-Poverty Conference was held on 28th June 1993 at Wallsend Town Hall. It was here that the Council restated its APS commitment; it also for the first time brought the concept of social exclusion into the debate (see North Tyneside Council, 1993). An Anti-Poverty Strategy Seminar was held on 27th September 1994, again at Wallsend Town Hall. It called for production of a Poverty Profile and a strategy for maximisation of benefit take-up and service-use (see Appendix 12).

125 By the end of the 1980s central government revenue support to the Council was operating virtual standstill budgets, 'increasing' at a meagre 0.06% per annum, in the context of massive local spending commitments, especially in education and childcare in anticipation of a Labour victory in the 1993. Limited budget settlements in 1990, 1991 and 1992 compelled the Council to borrow heavily from a Japanese bank. But the problem persisted - by April 1992 it was still over £17M in debt. The Centre-Left led by Flood took the decision to restructure (interviews with Kate Howie, Corporate Policy, North Tyneside Council 7/6/96, Rita Stringfellow, Leader of the North Tyneside Council 30/8/96, Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96, Brian Topping, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 14/6/96, 24/2/98 and 9/2/99, John Foster, Executive Director, North Tyneside Council 2/8/96, Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 27/6/96 and David Corkey, Business and Community Studies, Newcastle College 9/9/96.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>Progress</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating Job Growth:</td>
<td>* SIEMENS</td>
<td>Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>training; support to firms; childcare</td>
<td></td>
<td>Property Services</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Childcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Community Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Collection</td>
<td>* Problem area - little progress</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Corporate Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursery and Extended Day Care</td>
<td>* Ongoing</td>
<td>Childcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free School Meals and School clothing allowances</td>
<td>* Free School Meals</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Subsidised School Milk 5-9 years</td>
<td>Community Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* 'Meals on wheels'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Subsidised/ Priority Key Card meals</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Community Luncheon Clubs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Support in Adult and Community Education</td>
<td>* Free Adult Continuing Education: all schedule 2 (i.e. award-bearing courses) free to PKC holders; all non-vocational courses 75% reduction on SKC rates to</td>
<td>Community Services</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKC holders</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Libraries: book loan free to all; cassettes and record hire for PKC holders 45% SKC rate; video and CD hire charges for</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKC holders 23% below SKC rates</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Targeted Issue-Based (e.g. drugs awareness) Youth Work: current priority areas: Dudley, Battle Hill, Howdon, Longbenton</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth Work Support</td>
<td>* Play Development/ Youth Playschemes: support of 14 kids clubs; school holiday schemes</td>
<td>Community Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Holiday Relief Scheme: children with special needs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Subsidy: support for eight credit unions</td>
<td>Community Services</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Targeted Cultural/ Arts Service: including equal opportunities</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>* Leisure Care: for local community groups; free use of minibus; free use of equipment disadvantaged groups</td>
<td>Community Services</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Events: 35 events organised annually, including Fish Quay Festival</td>
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<td></td>
<td>* Steam Railway: 10% fare discount PKC</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>* GP Referral Scheme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Key Card: access to all facilities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Family Seafront Saver: subsidised entrance all facilities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Credit Union Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Health and Leisure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Voluntary Sector</td>
<td>* Grant Aid: for all voluntary organisations; 28.8% budget allocated to advice/ CAB related projects, excluding People's Centres and youth organisations</td>
<td>Community Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Free Advice/ Training: for voluntary organisations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inward Investment Initiative</td>
<td>* SIEMENS</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* City Challenge</td>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* TWDC (Royal Quays)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximising Public Resources: government bids</td>
<td>* Successful SRB Bids</td>
<td>Corporate Policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: North Tyneside Council (1994a), updated via interview with Brian Topping, Principal Officer Community Services, North Tyneside Council 14/6/96
Tyneside was one of the first councils to turn its management and political structures around. Changing from a departmental to a functional structure based on amalgams of specific services, an executive directorate of chief officers was instituted, seeking to develop inter-functional delivery of services (see Gallant, 1995). It is in this context that the Council's anti-poverty strategy reviews in 1993 and 1994 need to be understood. The aim was to break down old departmental 'fiefdoms', a 'baronial' tendency present in the borough even prior to reorganisation in 1974. Senior council officers tended to work closely with key elected councillors, closely guarding their departments - and many suspected them of acting in the interest of fellow freemasons rather than for North Tyneside residents. In the wake of the restructuring, certain of these individuals retired, and younger people in their 30s and 40s were appointed to senior positions. The Flood/Byers partnership drove the process, although Byers was adopted as a candidate for the Wallsend constituency in 1992 and by April 1993 had relaxed his involvement in the Council.

In early 1991 City Challenge was inaugurated, a new inner city initiative involving the private sector in partnership with local government and community organisations (see Cameron, 1992; Atkinson and Moon, 1994a; 1994b; Robinson and Shaw, 1994; Davoudi and Healey, 1995; and Healey, 1996). The second round was launched in February 1992, coinciding with North Tyneside's restructure; arguably this rejuvenation and the recent Meadow Well experience were instrumental in North Tyneside's success, announced in July 1992, in securing £37.5M over a five year period beginning in April 1993 (see Atkinson and Moon, 1994a; 1994b; and Davoudi and Healey, 1995). It was the first urban policy regime to use the language of community involvement, drawing on a notion of 'active citizenship' in vogue within the Conservative government of the time (see Atkinson and Moon, 1994a; and 1994b). Yet despite some instances of politicisation within projects of this kind (see Ram, 1995), the reality of community involvement in City Challenge was relatively poor. Local authority and private sector elites tended to take the lead. New inter-institutional pragmatism is actively embraced in North Tyneside, as clarified by John Foster, then Executive Director of North Tyneside Council:

126 Interviews with Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 27/6/96 and Graham Stevenson, Wallsend People's Centre 26/3/98.
127 One councillor expressed reservations about this process of restructuring, akin to a process of deregulating in the private sector. Fostering inter-functional interaction arguably blurred the lines of democratic accountability between councillors and officers. And as a result there was a move away from a political to a new service-oriented culture, in line with national Thatcherite (and more recently New Labour) changes, and indicative of a rise in neo-managerialism (interview with David Corley, Business and Community Studies, Newcastle College 23/3/98).
128 Interviews with Fred Robinson, Sociology and Social Policy, University of Durham 7/6/96, Patsy Healey, Town and Country Planning, University of Newcastle upon Tyne 13/6/96, Thom Bradley, Director, VODA 9/7/96, Marty Lawrence, Research Section, Newcastle City Council 23/7/96 and 9/3/98, Stuart Cameron, Town and Country Planning, University of Newcastle upon Tyne 26/7/96, John Foster, Executive Director, North Tyneside Council 2/8/96 and David Clouston, Chairman, North Tyneside City Challenge 10/3/98.
129 Interviews with Margaret Nolan, NFCU 28/5/96, Thom Bradley, Director, VODA 9/7/96, and Marty Lawrence, Research Section, Newcastle City Council 23/7/96 and 9/3/98.
So as a Council, it's not uncomfortable with the new notions that we all talk about now in local government... in terms of the necessary interface between local democracy represented by the local Council - in relation to its community - and the many other agencies and players that are on the scene... And therefore the notion of necessary networking, joint working arrangements, partnership schemes, joint ventures, the opening up of the role of the public/private partnership interface... are now well grounded in North Tyneside and rest reasonably comfortably with us... [explaining]... in my opinion... some of the reasons for our success in recent [years], which has been considerable...

(Interview with John Foster, Executive Director, North Tyneside Council 2/8/96 - emphasis added).

Engendering a competitive bidding process for regeneration in tightly geographically delimited areas, City Challenge projects have concentrated in the riverside area broadly similar to areas under the Urban Programme and TWDC. Institutionalising a spending commitment in specifically defined areas, other communities like Longbenton and Battle Hill failed. Some anti-poverty initiatives did however benefit from City Challenge funding, for instance Howdon Community Development Trust (HCDT), but especially in post-riot Meadow Well, including large-scale housing regeneration, a Community Centre, and the jointly corrupt and ultimately ill-fated Meadow Well Community Development Trust (MWCDT) and Meadow Well Construction Company (MWCC) (see North Tyneside City Challenge, 1996; and 1997). Advocates herald the short-lived Siemens investment as the highlight of North Tyneside City Challenge.

Spatially targeted neighbourhood regeneration was extended in 1994 with the launch of the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) (see Robinson and Shaw; and Nevin and Shiner, 1995). This regime essentially follows the style of City Challenge, yet expressly draws together 20 different sources of urban regeneration funding under one initiative, aiming to co-ordinate regeneration across them all. In this way it is a 'cost-cutting' exercise, seeking further rationalisation of central government funding for the most deprived urban areas (see Robinson and Shaw, 1994). The SRB does however embrace the concept of 'relative deprivation' in

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130 The Howdon Community Development Trust was set up in 1993 through City Challenge funding, but the plush new community centre building was Council property. This project was always close to the City Challenge initiative, alienating itself from other community projects and people in the borough. When it transpired that City Challenge would run on for a further year until March 1999, but would not be able to support HCDT, it was announced that HCDT would come under local authority control (interviews with Billie Kane, Project Leader, HCDT 10/6/96, Thom Bradley, Director, VODA 9/7/96; Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 29/1/96, Thom Bradley, Freelance Consultant 2/2/98, Paul Irwin, Volunteer Youth Worker, Howdon Community Centre 10/3/98, Billie Kane, Project Leader, HCDT 10/3/98 and Graham Stevenson, Wallsend People's Centre 26/3/98).

131 Interviews with Margaret Nolan, NFCU 28/5/96, Billie Kane, Project Leader, HCDT 10/6/96, Natalie Heath, Communications Officer, North Tyneside City Challenge 24/7/96, and David Peel Cedarwood Trust 20/2/98 and 4/3/98.

132 It was revealed in 1995 that Siemens, the German micro-electronics manufacturer, planned to invest in a new plant on the Silverlink Business Park along the A19 Corridor in the centre of North Tyneside, creating euphoria within the Council as to their local economic 'success'. It began production in May 1997. By July of the following year it was announced that the plant was closing with the loss of 1,100 jobs... (interviews with Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 27/6/96, John Foster, Executive Director, North Tyneside Council 2/8/96, Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 30/8/96, and Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96; also personal correspondence with Bob Groves, Wallsend People's Centre 2/8/98).

133 Interviews with Marty Lawrence, Research Section, Newcastle City Council 23/7/96 and 9/3/98.
aggregate statistical terms, a clear development on City Challenge and the TWDC that operated simply on a bidding system. In this way it is looking at local conditions in the allocation of targeted funds for deprived neighbourhoods (see DoE, 1994; and North Tyneside Council, 1995b). Although displaying a continuation of the 'community involvement' rhetoric initiated with City Challenge (DoE, 1995), it is far from clear whether mechanisms for interface with local residents are in any way less top-down, post-hoc and tokenistic with SRB than City Challenge.\(^{134}\) SRB money has initiated development work on the Meadow Well estate - primarily housing improvements and new buildings and new community facilities - but it has also served to dismantle previous social ties and exacerbate a north/south axis in terms of regeneration on the estate.\(^{135}\)

Areas like Longbenton and Battle Hill were by-passed by these successive urban regeneration regimes, and local activists were increasingly vocal about this neglect. Whereas the Battle Hill Community Development Project (BHCDP) was underway on the Battle Hill estate, displaying a strong record on community involvement (see case study),\(^{136}\) the Somervyl Centre in Longbenton was considered to be non-representative of local people. The resulting local discontent was most dramatically articulated in the 1996 local government elections. Ronnie Fletcher, an independent candidate for the Action for Longbenton Party, defeated Brian Flood, the well established Leader of the Council. By all accounts Fletcher's action was a protest against local authority neglect of the ward, as opposed to other areas like the Meadow Well.\(^{137}\)

Although a lot of money was spent on housing regeneration in Longbenton in the early 1980s, this was limited to environmental improvements and internal changes in existing three-storey units. The first Longbenton SRB bid was submitted prior to the 1996 local election, but proved unsuccessful when the furore unleashed by the result focused attention elsewhere.\(^{138}\) At the second attempt SRB money was secured for Longbenton (see North Tyneside Council, 1998b),\(^{139}\) and an SRB 'community safety' bid for Battle Hill was also successful (see BHCDP, 1997).\(^{140}\)

\(^{134}\) Interviews with Margaret Nolan 28/5/96, Fred Robinson, Sociology and Social Policy, University of Durham 7/6/96\(^{4}\), Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 27/6/96\(^{4}\) and 29/1/98, Thom Bradley, Freelance Consultant 2/2/98, Marty Lawrence, Research Section, Newcastle City Council 9/3/98 and Graham Stevenson, Wallsend People's Centre 26/3/98\(^{5}\).

\(^{135}\) Interview with Thom Bradley, Freelance Consultant 2/2/98.

\(^{136}\) Interviews with Thom Bradley, Freelance Consultant 2/2/98, Karen Clarke, Project Leader, BHCDP 25/3/98\(^{1}\), Annabel McKinnon, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 26/3/98\(^{1}\) and Graham Stevenson, Wallsend People's Centre 26/3/98\(^{1}\).


\(^{138}\) Interview with George Melvin, Council Administration, North Tyneside Council 22/2/99.

\(^{139}\) Interviews with John Wigham, Bidding Unit, North Tyneside Council 30/1/98, Julie Todd, Longbenton SRB, North Tyneside Council 5/2/98 and George Melvin, Council Administration, North Tyneside Council 22/2/99.

\(^{140}\) Interview with Karen Clarke, Project Leader, BHCDP 25/3/98\(^{1}\).
Brian Flood was voted back on to the Council following the Holystone bye-election, a Labour stronghold with the largest majority in the borough. In the immediate aftermath of the 1996 debacle, Rita Stringfellow - former Chair of Social Services, Councillor for the Riverside ward and Flood's partner - was voted in unopposed as the new Leader. This Leadership continues today and is viewed close to the Blair/Byers position at the national level. Although the Labour Group is still the largest faction in the Council, it only constitutes a minority faction - for some observers there is not the unitary leadership and singularity of purpose as evident with the Flood/Byers partnership. In the words of one community activist Stringfellow was: 'a compromise candidate; not such a strong personality, and things have drifted a bit under her leadership'. Despite the consolidation of the Centre-Left in the aftermath of the Miners' Strike, and the continuation of the modernising Left under Stringfellow, it would be misleading to claim that Labour politics in North Tyneside are dominated by an explicitly local version of national Blairism. The Leadership of the Council is unquestionably sympathetic to New Labour, but a number of diverse elements remain influential.

Throughout the 1980s the issue of poverty was used as a weapon, with much success, by North Tyneside Council against its neglect by central government. Since the New Labour government came to power in May 1997, local politicians and practitioners want to continue the fight against poverty, but at the same time do not want to jeopardise their funding arrangements. A dilemma is constantly faced, but especially in the local voluntary and community sectors as the New Deal for the Unemployed evolves as part of the government's Welfare to Work strategy. Partly in response to the altered context, a change in the mindset of local activists is evident, recognising that local politics is about managing decline, and retaining a sense of reality among staff, reminding them of their role at the local level, despite having a New Labour government. A sensitive balance is created between political idealists who thought New Labour meant the end of all politics, and the political cynics who saw New Labour as 'Tories in disguise'. In the words of a community activist in Wallsend: 'bringing the refusniks into the fray and bringing others down off the cloud'. Nowhere does this apply more than with New Deal...
for the Unemployed, in particular the development of a New Deal Gateway to help young people prepare for the scheme.\textsuperscript{146}

It appears that the 'hard' economic development approach to local unemployment and poverty, one pervasive in North Tyneside for many years, was struck a fatal blow with the withdrawal of the Siemens investment in July 1998. As a result the Leadership of the Council now speaks, again in line with Blairite parlance, for the need of 'joined-up thinking' and a more holistic policy approach, illustrated by the Council's strategy for CED.\textsuperscript{147} Continually argued for within North Tyneside, the concept of CED was only seriously embraced about two years ago (see Economic Development Task Group, 1996a; 1996b). Concurrently the EU was increasingly using the language of 'capacity-building', and money was made available through the European Social Fund (ESF) for local community regeneration (see EC, 1995; 1996b; and 1997). In preparation for a bid a CED team undertook 'community appraisals', surveying the conditions within the five most deprived areas of the borough, identifying needs expressed by local residents and assessing potential for innovation within the local social economy to meet these needs (see North Tyneside Council, 1997). The priority areas identified were Chirton, Collingwood, Howdon, Longbenton and Riverside wards. On the basis of this consultation the bid was successful and projects are underway to implement CED activities in these areas.

The advent of New Deal and the shift to a holistic CED approach occurred in the context of an increasingly service-orientated and managerial local government, largely about furthering the Thatcherite service ethos, viewing local residents as customers who deserve best value from local government (see DETR, 1998c).\textsuperscript{148} In North Tyneside a 'cabinet' and 'select committee' structure was implemented in October 1998, and is up for interim review in May and annual review in December 1999 (see DETR, 1998c; see also North Tyneside Council, 1998c; and 1998d).\textsuperscript{149} In keeping with New Labour rhetoric, this new model of local government seeks

\textsuperscript{146} For background on the New Deal for the Unemployed see Denny (1997), Kettle (1997), Barnett and Wintour (1998), Keegan (1998) and Peck (1998b). The Gateway proposes a period of pre-vocational training in advance of the New Deal proper. A Voluntary Sector Consortium produced a Gateway Design Draft, informing a delivery plan for North Tyneside. Since 1979 representatives from these organisations felt they were simple on the 'outside shouting in', so this development represents a sea-change in inter-sectoral relations. The extent to which these issues were genuinely listened to and engaged with is however quite another matter (interviews with Jamshid Ahmadi, North Shields People's Centre 10/2/98, Jan Worters, Project Leader, North Tyneside VODA 26/2/98\textsuperscript{1} and Graham Stevenson, Wallsend People's Centre 26/3/98\textsuperscript{2}).

\textsuperscript{147} Interviews with Nathan Pellow, Policy Development, Tyneside TEC 22/7/96, Julie Todd, Manager, North Tyneside Business Centre 6/8/96, 16/8/96 and 3/9/96, David Corkey, Business and Community Studies, Newcastle College 9/9/96, Julie Todd, Longbenton SRE, North Tyneside Council 5/2/98, Nathan Pellow, Policy Development, Tyneside TEC 12/2/98 and Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 13/3/98\textsuperscript{1}.

\textsuperscript{148} Interviews with Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 13/3/98\textsuperscript{1} and David Corkey, Business and Community Studies, Newcastle College 23/3/98\textsuperscript{1}.

\textsuperscript{149} Interviews with Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 13/3/98\textsuperscript{1} and George Melvin, Council Administration, North Tyneside Council 22/2/99. The Regeneration and Social Inclusion local select committee deals with the issues of the former Anti-Poverty Strategy Committee - significantly the language of 'anti-poverty' is dropped in favour of 'social inclusion'. Work areas such as this are being determined annually, whereas parliamentary select committees pick there own work areas within their own remit. The local version does not possess decision-making powers - they report to
engagement with local people, through listening, enabling and supporting local communities. An onus will probably be placed on further consultative mechanisms, in the drive for engagement with local people. And for observers, like David Corkey from Business and Community Studies at Newcastle College, these mechanisms are arguably essential if concepts of equal partnership with communities, democratic renewal and best-value where the community sets the standards, are to hold any meaning (see AMA, 1993; Geddes, 1996; LGIU, 1995; 1997a; and 1997b; see also Wood et al., 1995; and Healey et al., 1996). But whether these can overcome the problems of manipulation by officials and post-hoc tokenism of City Challenge and other regimes of the past is, however, quite another matter. In this way North Tyneside is trying to bridge the previous antagonistic divide between the community and the state, through the establishment of a genuine community infrastructure. The present governance situation represents a renewal of interest in community development in local authorities (see AMA, 1993; and North Tyneside Council, 1998a). Community development is often cited as a method for engagement with local people; but the jury is still out over whether this represents a renewed interest radical community development.

Case Study: Childcare Enterprise Ltd.

A novel experiment in governance pluralism, NTCs Childcare Enterprise Ltd. is the only organisation of its kind providing welfare services in North Tyneside. In response to a growing demand for child care and continued reductions in local authority budgets, North Tyneside Council's Childcare Enterprise was launched in 1990 to provide full child care services in the borough. By 1996 it was providing over 100 nursery places, employing over 200 people - and is heralded as a Council flagship. A number of services are offered: (1) Childcare Centres - providing enhanced services for local parents and employers in existing centres; (2) Childminding - providing services to childminders and play-groups, such as assistance with statutory registration and support for private providers; (3) Nannies - providing properly trained
and vetted nannies who receive on-going support and training; (4) Creche Services - in addition to permanent facilities at North Tyneside College and the Community High Schools a mobile crèche service is provided, enabling groups and conference/ seminar organisers access to crèche provision; and (5) Consultancy - generating income through provision of consultancy service, such as advising on child care needs, offering employers the opportunity to secure places and operating workplace nurseries for them. In 1994 at the dictate of the auditors the Council lost majority representation on the board, and the organisation became Childcare Enterprise Ltd., trading under the name Childcare. Childcare operates much of its activities at the Riverside Early Years Training Centre on the Royal Quays, a centre opened in 1995, bringing together child care services and early years training, funded through Council partnership with City Challenge.154

Childcare occupies an intermediate position between the public and private sectors, as an example of new forms of social care provision in the UK mixed economy of welfare (see Charlesworth et al., 1996). As a municipal enterprise it operates as a not-for-profit company with an independent management structure, channelling any surplus income back into child care services and aiming for self-financing status (see Brotchie, 1990; and Foster, 1990). Management of all child care was brought under the Day Care Advisory Service, housed at the Childcare shop in Whitley Bay. Rather than submit to wholesale privatisation under national neo-liberal pressures, Childcare represents an example of local authority pragmatism in levering private money from more prosperous areas (Brotchie, 1990). Embodied through inter-institutional partnership, this pragmatism secured innovative funding arrangements in a scarce financial environment. Having municipal enterprise status, independent yet only a fraction away from the local authority structure, has facilitated access to supplementary funding. Bearing in mind discussion on governance in chapter 2, it represents an instance of devolution of management responsibility, but not power, from the local authority, reflecting a 'hollowing-out' of the local as opposed to the national state (see Rhodes, 1994; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; and Patterson and Pinch, 1995). Opening up opportunity for endless innovation in the provision of local authority services (see EC, 1995; 1996a; 1996b; and 1997), this initiative is unique in North Tyneside, but as revealed in the following chapter, there are countless examples of this model of governance in Rotterdam.

Childcare represents an anti-poverty strategy in three ways. Firstly, from a Council perspective it aims to support women as they face pressures to return to work. Moreover it directly employs a number of people, and is therefore viewed as part of the Council’s wider economic development, equal opportunities and social care strategies (see Foster, 1990). By expanding

154 See the North Tyneside Council leaflet The Riverside Early Years Training Centre, North Tyneside Council. Childcare also attracts funding from North Tyneside Council’s Social Services, the Government Office for the North East (GONE) and the European Union (EU).
free provision and de-stigmatising access, Childcare offers services for people in disadvantaged
eighbourhoods. As the Rita Stringfellow, Leader of the Council, explained:

... [these services] are now valued [by residents in poor neighbourhoods] ... they are on an
equal footing as those who can afford to pay. And that's been of direct benefit for the
poorest and most disadvantaged in the community, because they're getting a very good,
accessible level of child care. While they had access before ... but they didn't value it
because they weren't valued themselves. Once they were part of this integrated paying
system they were valued because they were on equal footing as those who afford to pay.

(Interview with Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 30/8/96).}

Secondly, Childcare was launched only two years after initiation of the Council's official anti-
poverty strategy, a time when the Council was arguably keen to couch 'flagships' as anti-poverty
projects, perhaps indicative of a degree of separation in the substance and form within local
politics of APS. And thirdly, although the anti-poverty dimension of Childcare is limited (see
Brotchie, 1990), the provision of child care strongly links with the government's 'welfare to work'
proposals for welfare reform (see Denny, 1997; Kettle, 1997; Barnett and Wintour, 1998;
Keegan, 1998; and Peck, 1998b). Lone parents in particular will benefit from accessible child
care as they become increasingly compelled to make the transition from benefits to
employment. Regardless of the government's proposals for a 'childcare tax credit', this anti-
poverty dimension remains problematic (see Brindle, 1997; and Atkinson, 1998). For Suzanne
Moore the resulting vocation of 'child care' will inevitably institutionalise a system of low wages
and marginalise women in certain forms of employment (see Moore, 1998).

For Brian Flood, a senior political figure in the Labour Group, the future for Childcare lies in
branching out into new areas, like Information Technology (IT), or possibly offering facilities for
others, like the handicapped and older children. In a more direct anti-poverty sense it could
provide free food for local people in need; and overall it could broaden its provision towards
something like a community centre, community development project or a People's centre. North
Tyneside is well placed to provide much in the way of child care and related services at a time
when the New Labour government is developing its National Child Care Strategy (see Cooper,
1998; and Ward, L. 1998; see also Harker, 1998). There might be some scope for similar
pluralist governance and institutional innovation of the area of 'home care' for provision of
services like 'meals on wheels' and other social policies, especially for the elderly and other

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155 The surplus generated by Childcare has enabled the Council to triple the amount of child care in the borough, and at the
same time to double the amount of free provision. Note that in addition to this free provision, child care is also available
at a fee for those who can afford to pay the amount charged, which in 1996 was somewhere between £60-65 per week.
156 Interview with Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96.
157 Interview with Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 13/3/98. In May 1998 a government Green
Paper Meeting the Childcare Challenge unveiled a National Childcare Strategy. In addition to £300M pledged by the
Chancellor in the 1997 budget to establish new childcare places over the next five years, an extra £20M will provide
20,000 new childcare places, as well £4M to train childcare workers and an extra £2M to fund local childcare partnerships
(see Cooper, 1998; and Harker, 1998).
vulnerable members of society (see EC, 1995; 1996a; 1996b; and 1997). Following the Childcare model this development would potentially extend the scope and depth of the North Tyneside Council anti-poverty strategy.

Rise in Non-State APS

The voluntary sector in North Tyneside has moved from a relatively undeveloped yet radical sector, simultaneously in and against the local state, to one that is more professionalised and service-orientated, at the expense of this politicised and campaigning edge, in the context of unequal partnership between the community and the state. The radical community sector in the 1970s was dominated by the CDP and the trade unions - the CDP was significant in terms of methodology and benefits to local people, yet short-lived. Trade unions have always exerted an influence on local politics in North Tyneside, especially in the old industrial heartland, but as elsewhere suffered in the 1980s at the hands of anti-union legislation under successive Conservative governments. Their political impact as a result was greatly reduced. Despite a few notable exceptions, such as the People's Centre Network - which has undertaken campaigning work against unemployment and national legislation - in the main the voluntary sector now does not follow a politicised and confrontational model of community activism. And even the People's Centres were established in the aftermath of the Miners' Strike primarily as service-providers for local unemployed people. As revealed in the previous section the social geography and industrial split in North Tyneside impacts on the conception of local politics and consequent social policies. The same argument holds for the voluntary sector. What follows is an account of developments in voluntary sector action against poverty since the early 1970s in the borough.

The voluntary sector in the 1970s mirrored the political and institutional situation that gave birth to the Council. In the coastal wards (Tynemouth and Whitley Bay) voluntary action was customarily middle-class philanthropy in a traditional Victorian sense - as Brian Topping, Principal Officer of Community Services described it: 'blue rinse ladies doing good turns for the poor'. But overall there was a relatively under-developed community infrastructure. The Whitley Bay Council for Voluntary Service (CVS) was the only umbrella organisation in existence, and although it still operates it is largely irrelevant to modern voluntary sector organisations. By contrast in the old industrial heartland (Wallsend, Longbenton and Dudley) voluntary social provisions were more radical. For instance, Miners' welfare organisations.

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158 Interview with Brian Flood, Labor Group Councillor 30/8/962.
159 Much of the information that follows in this section is drawn from interviews with Brian Topping, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 27/3/98 and 9/2/99. As before other sources are referenced where appropriate.
160 Interview with Brian Topping, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 9/2/99.
influenced by local trade unions, organised initiatives like the Children's Treat Committee in Shiremoor, a group of self-organising families and others from the mining industries, which arranged gifts for children of miners' families. They would perhaps organise social events, like a fair or trips to the coast, for people who could otherwise not afford these things. The voluntary sector was very vibrant in that sense, and many organisations undertook action of this kind, as with local government, reflecting the spatial differences in class-characteristics in the borough.

The Home Office CDP, the first official state-sponsored anti-poverty strategy, began in 1969 to research poverty and deprivation in UK 'blackspots', and ended up facilitating political activism with local residents through radical community development (see Specht, 1975; 1976; Corkey and Craig, 1978; Loney, 1983; Byrne, 1989; and Alcock, 1993). The North Tyneside CDP began in 1973 involving projects in North Shields and on the Meadow Well. At the outset the assumptions of the project to an extent followed a pathological and behavioural perspective on poverty, on the assumption that CDP workers would go into deprived communities and observe symptoms of poverty by the way people lived. For participants in the two North Tyneside projects, especially David Byrne and David Corkey in the North Shields project, a more radical approach was required. They expressed the need to assert a political consciousness at the local level and increase the capacity (or power) of deprived people to secure more employment, adequate housing, better welfare, improved education and information. In this way they felt a need to assist local people in influencing local and national policy, following an empowerment and confrontational model for engagement with local people in the political sense of the term (see Freire, 1972). The work actively involved local residents in identifying their needs and researching local housing conditions, industry and land ownership, and low-incomes. Leading to structuralist perspective on unemployment and poverty, the CDP conceptualised the borough as a special development area where primary industries were in decline, experiencing high unemployment, acute housing shortage and imbalance in the distribution of essential resources mediated through local and national government (see Bennington, 1976).

Once all the reports were completed in the mid to late 1970s (see North Tyneside CDP, 1976; 1977; 1978a; 1978b; and 1978c; see also Bennington, 1976) the CDP simply wound down. Despite CDP workers suffering negative stereotyping as radical revolutionaries, for David Corkey many positive outcomes were achieved for local people. Some improvements were

161 Interview with Chris Bishop, Co-ordinator, Dudley People's Centre 19/3/98.
163 Interview with David Corkey, Business and Community Studies, Newcastle College 23/3/98. Deliberating over their perspective, workers in the CDP felt they could not have an openly Marxist revolutionary perspective due to state intolerance to overt propaganda of that nature. Largely at the suggestion of David Byrne it was decided to follow a perspective of radical reformism. Qualitatively different to traditional reformism, radical reformism follows a more
made to housing renovation contracts, and on at least one occasion the Council held its rents at a certain level following a CDP campaign resisting rent hikes. Neighbourhood information centres were established in many deprived parts of the borough, a novelty for practitioners and residents on the Meadow Well estate. Overall the CDP produced a novel analysis of poverty in the borough making a direct impact in terms of Labour Party and government policy, linking in with other models of community development and grassroots empowerment from the US (see Alinksy, 1969; and 1971).

As mentioned in the previous section the People’s Centre Network (PCN) was established in the 1980s. Margaret Thatcher, by 1979, was leading the Conservative government in Westminster, leading to a series of neo-liberal legislative reforms throughout the 1980s, severely restricting the activities of trade unions and other radical local initiatives. Certainly the Thatcherite administration would not tolerate initiatives like the CDPs. It is in this neo-liberal national context that the voluntary sector in the UK increasingly professionalised (see Anleu, 1992; and Bond, 1992), becoming more service-orientated and subject to a contract culture through ‘compulsory competitive tendering’ (CCT) (see Kramer, 1994; Lewis, J. 1994; LGIU, 1994; Deakin and Walsh, 1996; Kirkpatrick and Lucio, 1996; Champlin, 1998; and Nowland-Foreman, 1998). Leading towards a tendency for de-politicisation and a decline of the radical campaigning edge in the voluntary sector, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the national coordinating agency of the UK Labour Movement, fought hard to retain its commitment to the working classes. But the efficacy of Thatcherite reforms meant it had to temper its approach to unemployed people. The result was the establishment of a network of local support agencies that became known as Centres for the Unemployed, representing a unique combination of the former radical approach with provision of new services.

Towards the end of 1983 the North Tyneside Centre For the Unemployed (NTCFU) was established in North Shields, a centre providing welfare support for local unemployed people, with an integral focus on campaigning against unemployment: ‘it should bring people into campaigning initiatives to expose the inequities of unemployment and mass unemployment, confrontational and politicised approach, calling for significant reforms beyond the state’s capability to deliver. The CDP pushed the idea that radical community development was not about solving local problems locally, but about helping generate a general political awareness. It was all about the ‘Coalition of the Left’ involving the community, the trade unions and the Labour Party; there was a strong ‘Left’ view that developed in the borough throughout the 1970s.

164 At this time there was a debate within the TUC whether they should encourage Centres For the Unemployed or Centres Against Unemployment. A complex and evolutionary process this debate crystallised a Left/Right split within the TUC. The Militant Campaigning fringe of the Left advocated radical grassroots antagonism to the state, deliberately employing a conflict model of community activism, arguing that anything other than a revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist conception of class struggle was ultimately ‘avoiding the issue’. This strand was in favour of Centres Against Unemployment. Social Constructivists on the Right advocated education for changing society, reformist and gradualist in temper, perhaps closer to the politics of Gramsci, advocating educational strategies of a supportive nature, and representing a modified Marxist analysis akin to Habermasian critical theory (see Habermas, 1984b; 1987; 1991). This strand was in favour of Centres for the Unemployed (see Groves, 1998; and interview with Bob Groves, Wallsend People’s Centre 17/3/98).
particularly youth unemployment at that time’. Beginning with a small grant from North Tyneside Council, the NTCFU operated from a room in the YMCA in North Shields, producing leaflets, holding meetings and organising street agitation. By March of the following year the Miners’ Strike was underway. Initiated by the miners’ themselves, this Strike made a stand against unemployment, and in this respect was a unique event in post-war industrial history because it was not a strike for higher wages as was the Industrial Relations convention. In the aftermath of the Strike a question remained as to the nature of future action. In 1985 at Gateshead Town Hall, Brian Topping, Principal Officer of Community Services, North Tyneside Council (at that time a trade union official) spoke of the need for a change of direction. His now famous fable of the Fish Head Soup led to the formation of the People’s Centres.

I don’t mind in our Centre organising courses for people who are on low incomes, who are poor, who are experiencing social exclusion … there are around, say, a hundred ways to make soup from a fish’s head. If it helps them directly because they need this … as long as we’re asking the question: who gets the rest of the fish? That’s the key issue and we had to be practical about it - we can help and intervene in people’s everyday lives and as a result see some tangible benefit, as long as this is put in the context about well who the fuck’s getting the rest of the fish!

(interviews with Brian Topping, Community Services, North Tyneside Council, 28/6/96 and 27/3/98 - emphasis added).

A persuasive argument, soon after the NTCFU, the Community Resource Centre (CRC) (a relic of the North Shields CDP) and the Arts Centre combined forming the North Shields People’s Centre (NSPC), retaining its affiliation with the TUC and moving to new premises in North Shields. In Dudley a similar development grew out of direct council provision. Being a mining village, the council had established a ‘parent and toddlers’ group in the old premises of Dudley First School during the Miners’ Strike; so the service that formally became the Dudley People’s Centre (DPC) in 1985/86 was built upon the Council’s Social Services. Soon after two organisations in Wallsend - Wallsend Action Group and Wallsend Youth Action - were approached and persuaded to work together, in 1987 forming Wallsend People’s Centre (WPC). Finally in Longbenton an Unemployment Unit that was also part of direct council provision, developed in 1987 into Longbenton People’s Centre LPC.

166 Interview with Brian Topping, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 27/3/98.
167 North Tyneside had been a ‘post-mining’ area since 1981. The classic mining village model was a community positioned ‘cheek by jowl’ with the pit. In North Tyneside it was common to have a miner living in a street where there was not another miner for a mile or so. They might be living in a suburban, semi-detached house, often in former mining villages, like West Allotment or Shiremoor. When the strike happened they were isolated from their union organisations. In this context the NTCFU provided welfare support and some training for around 200 miners’ in the area.
168 Interview with Chris Bishop, Co-ordinator, Dudley People’s Centre 19/3/98.
169 The LPC ceased to exist in 1996 when the Servem Centre, another community resource on the estate, and Longbenton Community College largely subsumed its work. There was always some tension between LPC and what was then Longbenton High School. The People’s Centre was seen by the High School as a ‘left-wing organisation on their doorsteps’, whereas the High School was viewed by the People’s Centre as a ‘hotbed of bourgeois reaction’ - an inevitable conflict in those competitive times (interview with Bob Groves, Wallsend People’s Centre 17/3/98).
In the aftermath of the Strike a series of new voluntary sector projects emerged in the borough. The BASE, established in Whitley Bay in 1986, is a youth project, funded jointly by Barnados and North Tyneside Council (see The BASE, 1996; and 1997). Initially supported by European money through the second EU Anti-Poverty Programme (see Dennett et al., 1982; Room, ed., 1991b; 1993; Alcock, 1993; and Hantrais, 1995), since 1991 it receives Grant Aid from the Council. Aiming to provide support, information and advice for young people aged 16-25, especially around poverty and homelessness, the project encourages the young people to set the agenda themselves. Over the last decade the remit and function of the project has gone through four phases overlapping each other - the novelty indeed of the project is the integration of various dimensions in a holistic approach. The initial phase from 1986 focused on training courses to help develop the skills of young people, including computers, photography, video equipment and an art and craft workshop. The second phase from 1988 was about social development including the development of social skills, the building of confidence and self-esteem and learning how to forge relationships. The third phase began addressing issues of housing and homelessness, including some experiments in self-build housing in Shiremoor. And the fourth phase focuses on health-issues, especially HIV health promotion and mental health issues. Well established in the borough, the project is significantly one of a small group explicitly referring to problems of poverty and anti-poverty when describing its work.

In 1987 a Volunteer Centre was established. Concerned primarily with volunteering for individuals, it also dealt with organisations that were keen to promote volunteering in their work. Through time local organisations began to ask more questions, requiring information about legal matters, constitutional issues and advice about funding - the sort of activities that were beyond its remit. There was little in the way of an organisational infrastructure for the voluntary sector in North Tyneside - the local authority tended to invite voluntary sector representatives to their meetings and imposed their agenda on them. Invitations were infrequent and representatives from the voluntary sector felt dependent and marginalised; above all the proceedings were local authority controlled. So the voluntary sector made moves towards setting up its own infrastructure. A report was commissioned through the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO), the national umbrella organisation for the voluntary sector, and in 1991...
on the strength of that report a consortium of voluntary organisations attracted funding to establish an umbrella organisation for the non-state sector in North Tyneside. The Voluntary Organisations Development Agency (VODA) was initially separate from the Volunteer Centre; but from the outset there was every intention to eventually merge these two organisations. The initial period was a difficult one for VODA - work centred on construction of a database - and indeed it was perhaps not until 1993 when the Volunteer Centre and VODA finally merged that the formal role of North Tyneside VODA was established.  

The mission statement of North Tyneside VODA states: 'VODA ... [provides] independent specialised support and information for the continued development of voluntary organisations, community groups and volunteering in North Tyneside'. Alongside local authority Grant Aid, North Tyneside VODA attracts funding from a variety of sources, providing a number of services: (1) Advocacy and Representation - it convenes meetings of the Voluntary Sector Joint Forum (VSJF) where voluntary organisations can discuss issues of mutual interest, then relayed to the local authority; (2) Development Function - providing advice for groups looking to become established, together with information on legal, constitutional and registration matters; (3) Advice and Information - providing regular newsletters (features on organisations, funding opportunities) and direct mailings (specific information) on an alternating six week basis; (4) Training Function - providing training for organisations and individuals in all aspects of voluntary sector work, including community group organisation and community development; (5) Volunteer Section - promoting the value and opportunities for volunteering through press-releases, distribution of leaflets and visits to local organisations, including the encouragement of special needs volunteering; and (6) Administrative Function - providing administrative support for local organisations, including: PCs; desk-top publishing; overhead projectors; video cameras and display boards. At the end of 1997 VODA restructured in the face of budget pressures, and at the dictate of the local authority the Director was replaced by a new Project Leader. Five paid staff and one volunteer are currently employed.

VODA represents an anti-poverty initiative in three ways. Firstly, in an organisational sense it provides advice and support for groups of local people wishing to set up a voluntary organisation or community group to deal with their issues of concern. These issues may or may not directly relate to poverty, low-income and unemployment; but they all aim for the betterment of community life for local residents. Research indeed shows that many organisations do not use the language of anti-poverty, yet by definition their work concerns poverty one way or another.

174 The information that follows refers to interviews with Brian Topping, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 14/6/96, 28/6/96 and 24/2/98, Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 27/6/98 and 29/1/98, Thom Bradley, Director, VODA 9/7/96, Thom Bradley, Freelance Consultant 2/2/98 and Annabel McKinnon, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 26/3/98.

175 Interview with Thom Bradley, Director, VODA 9/7/96.

176 These sources include North Tyneside City Challenge, various local trusts like the Baring Foundation, one-off grants for particular projects and small subsidised charges for some services.
another given the nature of the problem in the borough (see Ford, 1996). Secondly, it provides social training for individuals and organisations and encourages volunteering: on the one hand to help individuals build confidence and self-esteem for personal development, and to acquire certain skills in the hope of finding work; and on the other to encourage voluntary sector vibrancy for community development (see Ford, 1996; BHDCP, 1997; and VODA, 1997). And thirdly, as with all organisations in the voluntary sector VODA follows the philosophy of local determination of needs. It is through active communication and interaction with local residents and organisations that needs are discerned from the residents’ perspective (see Croft and Beresford, 1989; 1992; and Beresford and Croft, 1995). For many practitioners and activists of a more radical persuasion this approach is the best way to counter the flaws of the distant state hierarchy. Taken together these three dimensions represent a community development approach to anti-poverty (see Mayo, 1994; Mayo and Craig, 1995; and Taylor, 1995), assuming the seeds for change lie within people and the neighbourhoods in which they live, irrespective of wider macro-economic conditions and other structural factors.

The story of VODA is a complicated one, reflecting a series of organisational highs and lows. Yet despite its success as a voluntary training and information provider in its own right, it was arguably not completely fulfilling its remit as an umbrella organisation, in a political sense, for the voluntary sector at large in the borough. What VODA successfully demonstrated in its anti-poverty work was that there is a crucially important role for the voluntary sector in the fight against poverty and deprivation in North Tyneside. Voluntary organisations are socially sensitive and generally are better placed to respond to the needs of local people than more hierarchical organisations like local authorities. Workers at VODA are currently looking to develop a more proactive role, directly approaching communities and neighbourhoods, rather than waiting for local residents and organisations to come to them. But the restructure at the end of 1997 has dampened its political role; and the extent to which it is able to tackle poverty directly remains fundamentally a resource issue. For Chris Ford (1996) without additional resources, an issue inextricably bound up with the politics of state/ non-state relations, a limit on feasible achievements will inevitably be imposed in the context of the dual fiscal and rationality.

177 Many local practitioners expressed the importance of these factors more generally (interviews with Margaret Nolan, NFCU 28/5/96, Malcolm Dove, Training/ Research Officer, Homeless North 27/6/96 argues, Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 27/6/96 and 29/1/98, Brian Topping, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 28/6/96, Ian McKinnon, Regeneration Officer, North Tyneside City Challenge 9/7/96; David Corkey, Business and Community Studies, Newcastle College 23/3/98; Andy Dumble, Youth Project Worker, MWRC 10/3/98; Richard Taylor, Project Leader, The BASE 12/3/98, Maurice Brainfield, Project Manager, Waterville Detached Youth and Children’s Projects 24/3/98; Karen Clarke, Project Leader, BHCDP 25/3/98 and Graham Stevenson, Wallsend People’s Centre 26/3/98).


180 Interviews with Jan Worters, Project Leader, North Tyneside VODA 26/2/98 and Annabel McKinnon, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 26/3/98.
crises of the state (see O'Connor, 1973; and Habermas, 1975; 1984a; see also Muller and Rohr-Zanker, 1989; and Lichten, 1991). \[181\]

Following the civil disturbances on the Meadow Well in September 1991 much attention was focused on regeneration on the estate. A number of initiatives were implemented, with mixed results - indeed many local residents speak of ‘initiative fatigue’; \[182\] but nonetheless a number of interesting projects have taken shape. The Cedarwood Trust, a pastoral care and drop-in centre, jointly funded by the Diocese of Newcastle and the local authority, has operated since 1979 and is the longest standing project on the estate. \[183\] In 1991 The Meadow Well Community Development Trust (MWCDT), funded by City Challenge and the local authority, was established as the umbrella community organisation on the estate, attempting an innovative approach to local democratic representation, involving direct elections of representatives at the street level. \[184\] The MWCDT helped develop another City Challenge initiative in 1993, the much vaunted Meadow Well Construction Company (MWCC), a worker co-operative that trained and employed young lads to young men - it was indeed these very workers who helped build a new community centre to replace the burnt out ‘Collingwood’. \[185\] The MWCDT faced a series of insurmountable problems, not least a prolonged episode of intimidation by certain residents and financial corruption, disbanding in 1994. The MWCC faced similar problems and it too folded just over a couple of years into its activities. \[186\] After the demise of the Development Trust the Meadow Well Resource Centre (MWRC), a community development organisation set up in 1991, took over the remit as the umbrella community organisation; \[187\] and in 1996 the Meadow Well Consortium, an example of local community partnership, successfully applied to the

\[181\] VODA can be said to describe a 'power and control' model of governance where non-state networking has evolved into unequal and bureaucratic partnership with the local state. More regular forums for mutual dialogue perhaps lie at the heart of a strategy to more effectively co-ordinate APS across the borough. The irony is that this process of political enlightenment is likely to reveal more than just organisational identity, but perhaps also the reality of inter-organisational power inequalities, between state and non-state sectors; and most significantly reveal the contradictions and shortcomings of the rationality of the state (see Ford, 1996).

\[182\] Interviews with Brother Alan, Temporary Curate, Walker Vicarage 4/2/98, Lee Binalle, Meadow Well resident, MWRC 16/3/98, Linda Fraser, Meadow Well resident, Cedarwood Trust 23/3/98, Peter Hope, Meadow Well resident, Cedarwood Trust 23/3/98, and Ashley (Jim) Kirk, Meadow Well resident, Cedarwood Trust 23/3/98.


\[184\] Interviews with Margaret Nolan, NFCU 28/5/96, Billie Kane, Project Leader, HCDT 10/6/96, Thom Bradley, Director, VODA 9/7/96, Ian McKinnon, Regeneration Officer, North Tyneside City Challenge 9/7/96, Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 30/8/96, Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96, Thom Bradley, Freelance Consultant 2/9/98, David Peel, Cedarwood Trust 4/3/98 and Andy Dumble, Youth Project Worker, MWRC, 10/3/98.

\[185\] Interviews with Margaret Nolan, NFCU 28/5/96, Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 27/6/96 and 29/1/98, Natalie Heath, Communications Officer, North Tyneside City Challenge 24/7/96, John Port, Manager, MWCC 31/7/96, Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 30/8/96, Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96, Julie Todd, Longbenton SRC, North Tyneside Council 5/2/98, David Peel, Cedarwood Trust 4/3/98 and Andy Dumble, Youth Project Worker, MWRC, 10/3/98.

\[186\] Interviews with Margaret Nolan, NFCU 28/5/96, Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 30/8/96, Brian Flood, Labour Group Councillor 30/8/96 and 20/2/98, and David Peel, Cedarwood Trust 4/3/98.

\[187\] Interviews with Charles Hope, Percy Main Vicarage and MWRC 3/2/98, Carol Bell, Project Manager, MWRC 10/3/98, Andy Dumble, Youth Project Worker, MWRC 10/3/98 and Maurice Brausfield, Waterville Detached Youth and Children's Projects 24/3/98.
National Lottery money for community development and grassroots regeneration. The Resource Centre, located at The Meadows - informal name for the new community centre - is now the focal point of voluntary action on the estate. Expressing his opinion on the nature of poverty in North Tyneside, Andy Dumble, a Youth Project Worker at the MWRC revealed:

I've got this hunch: I mean, obviously this has been a very working class area in its time - you know - the Smith's Dock and the coal and the pits and that; and it was all going on not too long ago. And that was going on for a long, long time - hard graft from families (and young people as well) - I mean, fifty year ago when they were 12 or 14, going down a pit! It's all come to a very quick end ... over a space of a generation and a bit. I just think that ... that effect on families, that must have been, like, used to working class lifestyle ... knowing what your purpose was, I think, was very important. Now people are searching for purposes. Now it's work! Work is obviously still the main objective; but the distance between being in work and out of work for some people is massive, ya na! And when you've no ability to change things for yourself, no power, then you don't increase your chance, ya na. I mean, it's just like i'm on top of or on bottom of a heap - you know what I mean - without any power in the situation.

(interview with Andy Dumble, Youth Project Worker, MWRC 10/3/98 - emphasis added).

By 1995 the voluntary sector was taking on a more explicitly anti-poverty and political edge. In that year VODA invited representatives from the local authority to present their anti-poverty report, initially written in 1988 and currently under review (see North Tyneside Council, 1994a; and 1995c), to an audience from the voluntary sector. According to Thom Bradley, a former Director of VODA: '[this report] ... was very good ... but we felt that it did didn't really take into account all of the services that were provided in the borough, because it looked at the local authority's work specifically ... The local authority actually sponsors and provides for a lot of services through the voluntary sector, and it really was not taking account of those'. VODA then set up an Anti-Poverty Working Group, consisting of representatives from various local organisations, providing the remit for research on the anti-poverty dimension of the voluntary sector in the borough. It suggested that while: 'The whole aim [of the voluntary sector] should be to make itself redundant ... an effective anti-poverty strategy needs to acknowledge the voluntary sector as a distinctive, independent sector based on mutual trust between state and non-state organisations' (Ford, 1996: 24-25). Moreover: 'it is clear ... that there is not currently...
sufficient resources within the voluntary sector to undertake developments of this nature in addition to existing commitments" (p. 1), and ultimately:

[If] the local authority wants to work in partnership with voluntary organisations to combat poverty this requires voluntary organisations to take on additional roles. Additional resources must be made available. If these resources are at the expense of other parts of the voluntary sector many of the most problematic perceptions ... will be reinforced (Ford, 1996: 25).

For various voluntary sector activists the impetus for this report was the result of three main factors. Firstly, it was the voluntary sector response to the local authority's anti-poverty review and the need to engage with these issues from a grassroots perspective. Secondly, it was part of increasingly autonomous action on behalf of the voluntary sector in its own right. And thirdly, there was mounting concern in the voluntary sector that the local authority, as claimed by Jan Worters, the current Project Leader of VODA: 'had been doing a lot of economic regeneration, but it had certainly not brought the community along with it'. There was much in the way of high-profile economic regeneration: the Siemens deal was clinched, and the Royal Quays development and City Challenge projects were well underway. In other words a lot of money was being spent in the borough through top-down economic development initiatives; but the growing concern was that so-called 'trickle-down' to local residents was simply not happening. It was discovered that in many cases local people simply did not have the necessary skills to work in high-profile firms like Siemens. It was felt moreover that local people were not having enough say in the conceptualisation, design and implementation of these initiatives; and in that something should be done to redress this imbalance. Chris Ford's anti-poverty report was perhaps the high-point for conceptual autonomy for VODA and the voluntary sector at large in North Tyneside.

Partly in response to the increased activism and confidence within the voluntary sector, a VODA conference, The Future of the Voluntary Sector in North Tyneside, was held in June 1997 (see VODA, 1997). At this event new synergies within the sector were forged around proposals for the New Deal initiative. In the aftermath of the conference a Voluntary Sector Consortium (VSC) was established, a group of interested parties including representatives from VODA and

192 Interviews with Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 27/6/96, Thom Bradley, Director, VODA 9/7/96 and Jan Worters, Project Leader, North Tyneside VODA 26/2/98.
193 Interview with Jan Worters, Project Leader, North Tyneside VODA 26/2/98.
194 As one young man from Howdon revealed, the kinds of jobs on offer to local people were particularly menial and low-skill, offering extremely low rates of pay. Highly skilled, well-paid positions were taken by people from outside the borough (interview with Paul Irwin, Volunteer Youth Worker, Howdon Community Centre 10/3/98).
195 Interviews with Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 27/6/96, Thom Bradley, Director, VODA 9/7/96, Thom Bradley, Freelance Consultant 2/2/98, Jan Worters, Project Leader, North Tyneside VODA 26/2/98, Rita Stringfellow, Leader of North Tyneside Council 13/3/98 and Annabel McKinnon, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 26/3/98. This was an inter-sectoral conference, bringing together representatives from a wide range of voluntary organisations, including self-help groups, community organisations and larger voluntary organisations; together with local councillors, and officers from the local authority and health sector. A number of workshops were organised including: the future of a community development approach; the value of community education; social regeneration; and building voluntary sector
the People's Centres, looking critically at issues around the implementation of the initiative. A number of meetings were convened, including visits from national political figures like Paul Convery, Director of the Unemployment Unit in London, who sits on the National Advisory Committee for New Deal. Two main concerns were expressed: one, as MARI was chosen to take the lead over New Deal in North Tyneside, the VSC must act to ensure the private company relates to the voluntary sector in a meaningful way; and two, the VSC should work on the proposals for the New Deal Gateway. For many local community activists, especially those of a more radical persuasion, there are many short-comings with New Deal. Yet a consensus is emerging amongst them that New Deal is something everyone must work with irrespective of ideology - as Graham Stevenson from Wallsend People's Centre put it: 'we've got to work with it ... what else is there at the end of the day?'.

The fiscal crisis has led to a more paternalistic and bureaucratic state approach to the voluntary sector. The local authority relationship with VODA best illustrates this approach in North Tyneside, always a tense one, but these tensions were brought into open relief in 1997. VODA has always relied heavily on the local authority for Grant Aid. By August 1997 it was revealed that the Grant Aid settlement for that year would be dramatically reduced, which caused problems, not least as VODA had already committed to spending on the basis of the original deal. As a result Community Services within the local authority 'took control' and devised a new streamlined structure for VODA, proposing the existing Director and Deputy compete over a new single post of Project Leader. As the local authority controlled finance it inevitably won the argument, and by the end of the year VODA was reorganised - some people were made redundant, new people brought in. For local authority representatives, like Annabel McKinnon from Community Services, VODA was overly reliant on Grant Aid, tended to rely on procedure not service and chose to internalise its activities at the expense of a more proactive and co-ordinating role in the voluntary sector. For Thom Bradley, a Freelance Consultant and the former Director of VODA, the débâcle revealed a contradiction in the relationship between the local state and the voluntary sector in North Tyneside. VODA was established to co-ordinate activities across the voluntary sector in the borough, but when it started to achieve its stated aims, the local authority bureaucratised at the prospect of a genuine partnerships. Around 200 people from between 80 or 90 different voluntary groups; a significant show of strength on one day, marking a clear success for the voluntary sector in North Tyneside.  

198 Interviews with Annabel McKinnon, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 26/3/98.  
199 Interviews with Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 29/1/98, Thom Bradley, Freelance Consultant 2/2/98, Julie Todd, Longbenton SRB, North Tyneside Council 5/2/98, Jan Worster, Project Leader, North Tyneside VODA 26/2/98 and Mary Lawrence, Research Section, Newcastle City Council 9/3/98.  
100 The Director of VODA was made redundant as part of this restructure. He has since taken the subject further, and in light of his trade union background, has sought legal advice and plans to take North Tyneside Council to an industrial tribunal. Because he lost his post to a woman he intends making an argument for unfair dismissal on the grounds of sexual discrimination (interviews with Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 27/6/96 and 29/1/98, Thom Bradley, Director, VODA 9/7/96, Thom Bradley, Longbenton SRB, North Tyneside Council 2/2/98, Jan Worster, Project Leader, North Tyneside VODA 26/2/98 and Annabel McKinnon, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 26/3/98).  
101 Interview with Annabel McKinnon, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 26/3/98.
transfer of power. Clearly partnership with the voluntary sector is acknowledged as long as the local state retains power and control.\textsuperscript{200}

With respect to the anti-poverty report and the June conference, it might be fair to say that VODA was moving too fast for the comfort of the local authority. After all there is a fundamental tension between the local authority and the voluntary sector because services tend to be devolved, or more accurately contracted, to the latter as long as the local authority retains overall power and control (see Lewis, J. 1994; Kramer, 1994; Deakin and Walsh, 1996; Kirkpatrick and Lucio, 1996; Champlin, 1998; and Nowland-Foreman, 1998). As a result the local authority hesitated on levels of support for VODA. It is important to note that it would have been too damaging for the council to stop VODA completely; it represents a large part of the council’s own APS; and it would be politically insensitive, with probable negative repercussions for the Council. Overall we have the recurring contradiction of voluntary sector autonomy and the conflict this produces with local authority control; an argument resting almost entirely on the issue of power. The devolution of responsibility without devolution of power is a theme that repeatedly reoccurs in local politics in the UK, allowing a more nuanced and empirically informed perspective on the ‘hollowing-out’ and governance theses as addressed in chapter 2. North Tyneside is typical rather than exceptional in this sense.

Following a series of restructuring processes since 1990 local government in North Tyneside has moved from a classically top-down and corporatist model in the mould of the Old Left, to a ‘flatter’ and ‘leaner’ model, displaying a new managerial approach to policy. The consolidation of the Centre-Left since the mid 1980s, in advance of national Blairism, laid the foundations for this change and provides an insight into the character of the Council today. Its approach to poverty closely follows conceptual changes at the national level. Notwithstanding the massive growth in voluntary organisations, especially after the Miners’ Strike, the voluntary sector in North Tyneside has reversed its position in relation to community opposition to the state, becoming more professionalised and service-orientated in unequal partnership with the state. Despite notable exceptions, such as the People’s Centres and to a limited extent VODA and Battle Hill CDP, voluntary organisations have become service-providers at the expense of a radical campaigning remit, in spite of increased scope for radicalisation. In reflection of Thatcherite neo-liberal legacies a clear de-politicisation and de-radicalisation is apparent in both sectors in the name of alleged non-ideological pragmatism.\textsuperscript{201}

\textsuperscript{200} Interviews with Chris Ford, Freelance Consultant 29/1/98 and Thom Bradley, Freelance Consultant 2/2/98.

\textsuperscript{201} For elaboration on these many trends, and comprehensive analysis of the voluntary sector and volunteering in the UK see Saxon-Harrold et al. (1994), Davis-Smith et al. (eds) (1995), Gaskin and Davis-Smith (1995), and Taylor et al. (1995).
Case Study: People's Centre Network

One of the longest standing and perhaps the most politically significant example of non-state anti-poverty action is the North Tyneside People's Centre Network (PCN), consisting of two voluntary sector projects in North Shields and Wallsend, and a mainline Council resource in Dudley. A fourth at Longbenton closed down in 1996. All these projects provide similar services along common objectives: (1) Community Development - towards the collective empowerment of local working-class communities, ensuring more equitable distribution of resources and engaging people with the maxim 'Unity is Strength'; (2) Challenging Discrimination and Oppression - on the basis of gender, race, sexuality, age, ability or belief; (3) Culture and Style of Work - encouraging a culture and style of work that is open and empowering, valuing the contribution of individuals within a collective approach based on a tradition of working-class solidarity; (4) Community Education - providing flexible courses for adults who missed compulsory education, promoting individual and collective development in a non-threatening and non-alienating environment; (5) Welfare Advice and Support - providing advice, information and advocacy services connected with social benefits, such as the Job Seekers Allowance and New Deal; (6) Legal and Related Advice - providing advice on legal matters for more specific social benefits, such as industrial injuries benefit claims; (7) Campaign Co-ordination - providing support for campaign issues of community interest, such as the closure of local industries and against unemployment and the demand for full employment at the national level - for critical education and active democracy; and (8) Drop-In Facilities and Room Hire - providing space and some amenities for local people to meet on a social basis, and space for local organisations to hold meetings.

Revisiting discussion in chapter 2, Young (1992; and 1995) argues that artifactual organisations, as described by Cohen and Rogers (1992; 1995a; and 1995b), are 'unnatural' organisations based on explicit decisions that do not align with 'natural' social identities such as gender, race and sexuality. The People's Centres provide anti-poverty services for anyone who requires them and do not direct at any one particular social group. It would seem that Mouffe's model of agonistic pluralism is inappropriate here (see Mouffe, 1993b; ed., 1995b; 1995c; ed., 1996; and 1997). Rather they resemble artifactual and ultimately class-based organisations as favoured by Cohen and Rogers. They address poverty (at root an issue of privilege and under-
privilege, and therefore class), across all social groups including gender, race and sexuality, and are therefore socially integrationist in character, perhaps akin to a Habermasian model of social empowerment in the public sphere (see Habermas, 1984b; 1987; and 1991). More specifically they encourage a raising of critical consciousness, echoing in part the early work of Paulo Freire (see Freire, 1972), but also strands of critical theory from the Frankfurt School that stress non-Marxian types of liberation (see Marcuse, 1955; and 1964; see also Habermas, *ibid.*). Finally, for some the People’s Centres represent a social movement perspective, combining a number of organisations and individuals, against poverty, low-income and unemployment, as an alternative form of governance (see Castells, 1983; Mayer, 1991; 1994; 1995; Szasz, 1995; Fainstein and Hirst, 1995; and Kriesi *et al.*, 1995). Despite attempts at resisting twin processes of de-politicisation and service-orientation, the People’s Centres are still dependent on local authority funding, and are therefore not completely autonomous from state control. In fact their continued existence is a direct outcome of long-standing support - both political and financial - within the Council.

The People’s Centres can be considered as an anti-poverty strategy in four inter-related ways. Firstly, as their campaigning approach to poverty and unemployment at both local and national levels reflects a political approach, a concept of *hybrid politicisation* arguably captures the novelty of the People’s Centres. They see poverty and unemployment as direct outcomes of national government economic policy, and therefore their approach is explicitly about influencing national and local policy (see Kitson and Michie, 1993; Michie and Grieve-Smith, *eds.*, 1994; and TUSIU, 1994). Secondly, and clearly linked to the first, they follow a radical reformist model of social change that combines a campaigning remit with the educational and supportive strategies of the ‘social constructivist’ model (see Groves, 1998; see also footnote 165). In this way, the People’s Centres approach to social change and therefore poverty is about empowering people for the development of their individual and collective capacities as creative human beings. Thirdly, activities within these Centres have an existential impact on the people who get involved. For Bob Groves, an educationalist within the PCN:

[[It’s a slow change, and it takes a lot of ... it’s not work, it’s like exposure over a period of time. People become accustomed to the idea to which the centre [Wallsend People’s

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205 Interview with Bob Groves, Walsend People’s Centre 17/3/98.
206 This term *hybrid politicisation* means the provision of services for local people combined with a campaigning role in raising awareness and influencing the government’s social and economic policies. In other words, it is an approach that intends influencing policy from the outside the official political sphere, outside party politics, in the same way a pressure group or other campaign organisations would do.
207 Interviews with Jamshid Ahmad, North Shields People’s Centre 16/7/96 and 10/2/98, Mary Mulgrove, North Shields People’s Centre 16/7/96 and 11/3/98, Chris Bishop, Co-ordinator, Dudley People’s Centre 19/3/98 and Graham Stevenson, Walsend People’s Centre 26/3/98. In fact the PCN (North Shields People’s Centre in particular) has close links with the Full Employment Forum (FEF) through Jonathan Michie and Michael Kitson at the University of Cambridge (interview with Jamshid Ahmad, North Shields People’s Centre 10/2/98).
208 The influence of Freire is again evident here (see Freire, 1972). In 1987 the People’s Centres campaigned around the slogan *Everyone Teads, Everyone Learns*, which came directly from Freire, also reminiscent of early Socialist ideas found in the work of Ruskin, Marx and Cowan (interview with Bob Groves, Walsend People’s Centre 17/3/98).
Centre] operates; and slowly with the kind of assimilation with themselves into the kind of society the centre has got, find they have changed their attitudes, but don’t realise it. It’s only later when they come into confrontation with where they used to be that they realise they’ve changed, because they don’t realise things have altered for them.

(interview with Bob Groves, Wallsend People’s Centre 17/3/98 - original emphasis).

And fourthly, anti-poverty services are provided through a social process that values everyone equally in a non-threatening, non-alienating and non-hierarchical environment - an egalitarian philosophy is maintained throughout. Reflecting the politics of the Network, this philosophy retains sensitivity towards the real-life contexts of people facing the hardships of poverty and deprivation. In this way the People’s Centres operate a highly supportive educational anti-poverty for North Tyneside residents.

The challenges facing the PCN today focus on how to deal with the embedded status quo, which on the surface appears as more favourable circumstances with the imposition of a New Labour government. According to Bob Groves:

... we’ve got a Labour government so what are we complaining about? When we didn’t have a Labour government we could complain! So when we had Thatcher or Major we had a good reason to complain and everyone had a feeling of solidarity in the sense that the enemy was clear-cut.

(interview with Bob Groves, Wallsend People’s Centre 17/3/98).

The challenges facing the orientation of the PCN relate to the wider anti-poverty dimension, because poverty and APS were a useful means for workers to criticise previous Conservative governments. Now that a New Labour government is in power it is not so easy to advocate and follow such a confrontational approach. Workers within the Network are always keen to develop new relationships with any organisation relating to their approach. But the new alliances and partnerships that are likely to emerge in the context of New Labour, may pose a further threat to their campaigning side already impeded in the more general culture of de-politicisation in the voluntary sector.

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209 In the post-war period a process of bourgeoisification of the adult, post-compulsory education system has occurred, meaning that formal education has operated largely at the exclusion of the working-class. In counter to this trend the sort of courses offered at the PCN are designed to re-introduce less-privileged people back to education, bringing it down to earth from its ‘ivory tower’. It gives people access to appropriate courses within a critical environment, free from traditional top-down teaching practices and methods of assessment, working to ensure success for as many people as possible. Some people who get involved acquire a new enlightened sense of things through the social process of doing what they are doing - a collegiate atmosphere is maintained with people working co-operatively. The work is their own, with ‘teachers’ there as assistants and not as founts of all knowledge (interview with Bob Groves, Wallsend People’s Centre 17/3/98).
Involvement of Local People in APS

Like most western nations in the context of 'advanced' and late capitalism, the always tense relationship between capitalism and democracy in the UK deepens as the institutions of representative democracy face crisis in legitimacy. The high-point in turnout for local government elections in North Tyneside was 1990 when over half of residents voted, but a downward trend is evident since then with figures as low as 34.2% across the borough in 1996 and 27.8% in 1998 (see table 7). Representing average turnout across the borough, higher turnout is customary in the more affluent Tynemouth and Whitley Bay wards, and lower turnout in the more deprived Riverside, Chirton and Howdon wards, especially in Riverside where a tradition of extremely limited voting behaviour exists. While turnout is much higher across the board for parliamentary elections, figures are lower in the Wallsend constituency (Labour stronghold held by Stephen Byers MP) compared to the more affluent Tynemouth represented by the Conservative MP, Neville Trotter.

As a result a number of innovations in North Tyneside seek to engage more closely with local residents outside the realm of formal politics. State mechanisms include, on the one hand, neighbourhood forums following a classic 'top-down' and largely post-hoc consultative model of popular involvement (for instance the Percy Main Village Forum and the Collingwood Neighbourhood Forum), and on the other various mechanisms for 'community involvement' within urban regeneration regimes like the TWDC, City Challenge and SRB. Despite positive outcomes with popular involvement in the Royal Quays Monitoring Panel (City Challenge), these mechanisms - like the neighbourhood forums - tend to ‘top-down’, post-hoc and tokenistic. Speaking of the tension between representative and participative forms of democracy, Brian Topping, the Principal of Community Services in North Tyneside Council drew attention to limits of popular involvement in NTC mechanisms:

[T]he Council has a particular dilemma, I think, because it's a representative democracy ... and it has in servicing that representative democracy a well-established civil service. Both ... protect themselves. They have their own interests, and there is a synergy and tension ... But at the end of the day they are naturally very defensive. So when it adopts a policy, think it's in the interests of the community, I think it's almost inherent that it'll say 'but that consultation and that participation can only go so far'. Once that consultation and participation begins to gather energy and self-confidence, the Council begins to retreat and it doesn't like it, it begins to feel uncomfortable with it. ... We are undertaking consultation exercises as part of our 'anti-poverty strategy' which is to try and encourage people to have that much closer working relationship with the Council ... But it is a dogshit way of doing it.

(interview with Brian Topping, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 28/6/96 - emphasis added).

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210 Interview with George Melvin, Council Administration, North Tyneside Council 2/2/99.
211 Interview with Brian Topping, Community Services, North Tyneside 28/6/96 and Mary Mulgrove, North Shields People's Centre 16/7/96 and 11/3/98.
Table 7: Electoral turnout in North Tyneside Council elections (1984-98)\(^1\)^\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>39.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>44.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>47.56</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>34.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>27.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. These figures do not include bye elections 2. 1985, 1989, 1993 and 1997 were 'fallow' years for Metropolitan Council elections

Source: North Tyneside Council Election Results, 1984-1998 (interview with George Melvin, Council Administration, North Tyneside Council 22/2/99)

Table 8: Parliamentary elections (1987-97)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Tynemouth</td>
<td>78.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Wallsend</td>
<td>75.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Tynemouth</td>
<td>79.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Wallsend</td>
<td>73.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Tynemouth</td>
<td>76.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>North Tyneside</td>
<td>67.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: North Tyneside Council Election Results, 1984-1998 (interview with George Melvin, Council Administration, North Tyneside Council 22/2/99)

While grassroots involvement in the PCN reveals elements of 'hybrid politicisation', non-state mechanisms tend to follow a community development model of popular involvement, where more general activities of an individual and collective nature actively empower residents in all dimensions of work. The Battle Hill CDP presents a good example where this approach successfully mobilises local residents (see case study). Distinct from a community development approach - as Charles Hope, Percy Main Vicar and Chairman of the MWRC asserted 'consultation is not about communication. Consultation is about asking people about what they want, and then doing your own thing'\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^2\) - certain non-state mechanisms also follow a communicative model of popular involvement. Expanding on the communicative mode as a structured and hierarchical approach, Charles Hope continued with the case of 'The Meadows', the new community centre on the Meadow Well Estate:

While grassroots involvement in the PCN reveals elements of 'hybrid politicisation', non-state mechanisms tend to follow a community development model of popular involvement, where more general activities of an individual and collective nature actively empower residents in all dimensions of work. The Battle Hill CDP presents a good example where this approach successfully mobilises local residents (see case study). Distinct from a community development approach - as Charles Hope, Percy Main Vicar and Chairman of the MWRC asserted 'consultation is not about communication. Consultation is about asking people about what they want, and then doing your own thing'\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^2\) - certain non-state mechanisms also follow a communicative model of popular involvement. Expanding on the communicative mode as a structured and hierarchical approach, Charles Hope continued with the case of 'The Meadows', the new community centre on the Meadow Well Estate:

The Meadows [site of the Meadow Well Resource Centre, and the Waterville Detached Youth and Children's Projects] follows a 'communicative' model, not a classic consultation model. It is a participate (not in the stereotypical sense), consultative ... but it's about

\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^2\) Interview with Charles Hope, Percy Main Vicarage and MWRC 3/2/98.
5. Governance of APS in North Tyneside

Communicating at the right level - so in other words, if you're talking about a policy issue you need to have the Directors because we are responsible for determining policy. That's why we meet as a consortium, we have Directors of the Waterville Projects, the Chair and the Project Worker from the Meadow Well Resource Centre, the Council Manager and the senior City Challenge Officer. So it's at that level at policy is set. That then gets fed back into either the Resource Centre Management Committee or the Waterville Board of Directors, to set policy. If it's a 'gripes and groans' issue, like your project's leaving this room in a mess - that's a 'fag level' meeting. So it's all about appropriate levels. But then you've got to have your users meetings - saying things like we need to have more sessions for the under-13s - a users group issue, voicing their concern which can be 'batted up' from there to 'fag' or 'management'.

(interview with Charles Hope, Percy Main Vicarage and MWRC 3/2/98 - original emphasis).

Popular involvement in North Tyneside is occurring at two distinct levels: (1) individual and community level and (2) at the level of the state. The interesting issue emerging is the nature of the interface between these two levels of governance determining the type and extent of local involvement in the governance of APS in North Tyneside. One cannot overstate the importance of community activists with experience in different sectors and overall wisdom on governance and politics of North Tyneside. Often rounded and balanced, these individuals tend to have official knowledge of local politics and insights into the workings of the local authority, but also social awareness and general humanity in their dealings with residents in working-class communities. North Tyneside Council, on the other hand, operates relatively weak mechanisms for popular involvement. Traditionally a strongly statist authority, North Tyneside has evolved into an archetypal Blairite regime, meaning there is now a rhetorical desire to 'engage' with local people without the necessary institutional and social mechanisms. Local residents are often rather cynical about the local authority in general and local consultative fora in particular.

**Case Study: Battle Hill Community Development Project**

The most 'politically' aware and arguably successful approach to community involvement in North Tyneside is the Battle Hill Community Development Project (BHCDP). Established in 1993 as a voluntary organisation working for the sustainable regeneration of the Battle Hill estate through community development, 'the Project and its resources belong to and is for the people of the Battle Hill area, offering a co-ordinated approach to identifying needs and contributing to the growth and development of our community' (BHCDP, 1997).

Central to this approach is the 'absolute commitment to supporting the active participation of local people

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213 Unless otherwise stated the information that follows refers to interviews with Karen Clarke, Project Leader, BHCDP 25/3/98; Annabel McKinnon, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 26/3/98; and Graham Stevenson, Wallsend People’s Centre 26/3/98. See also BHCDP (1997). Since the early 1970s the only community resource on the estate was the Battle Hill Community Centre, an old-fashioned community centre run by the increasingly ailing Battle Hill Community Association. This was very traditional - the centre was pensioners' 'drop-in', at the exclusion of young people; it was out of touch with the needs of local residents at large. A Key Project Steering Group was set up, claiming that a new approach was required. In 1992 the Council, which was going through its major restructure at the time, suggested the Community Association and Key Project amalgamate and operate as a new single community development organisation, dealing more directly with the needs of local people. In October of the following year Battle Hill Community Development Project was established.
in all our areas of work’ (ibid: 3), which means, according to Thom Bradley, a Freelance Consultant, the project: ‘has a particularly good record on community involvement’. This approach is followed in all the activities of the Project:214 (1) Active Citizenship - as a community organisation all local residents are legal trustees of the Project and every effort is made to encourage their involvement through volunteering in all aspects of community development - project management, sub group structures and service use; (2) Quality Services - providing a range of initiatives covering areas of identified need, including: children and young people; women and girls; older people; drugs awareness; and outings for low-income families; (3) Community Resource - providing the focal point for other initiatives like the Battle Hill Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB), Battle Hill Credit Union, Self Programming Groups and Activity Classes; (4) Training and Education - viewing education and training (formal and informal) as a necessary pre-requisite for labour market participation, including: pre-vocational training; confidence building; empowerment; and various accredited courses; (5) Community Safety - the Bristol Drive Community Clean Up campaign fostering environmental awareness, and the Bowness and Brighton Residents Group influencing decision-making within the North Tyneside SRB Community Safety Initiative on the estate; and (6) Community Consultation - engaging with local residents through an Area Forum, a community newsletter and outreach work.

Battle Hill CDP was officially established at the suggestion of the North Tyneside Council when the latter was undertaking its major restructure in the context of financial crisis. In effect community development activities were being devolved to the non-state sector by a rationalising local state that could not afford to undertake these activities ‘in-house’, but wanted to maintain this provision of services in the ward. The creation of Battle Hill CDP, in other words, was a means of undertaking community development inexpensively, with the responsibility of service provision ‘contracted’ to the non-state sector (see Lewis, J. 1994; Kramer, 1994; Deakin and Walsh, 1996; Kirkpatrick and Lucio, 1996; Champlin, 1998; and Nowland-Foreman, 1998). As with VODA this form of contract culture represents the increasing service ethos and depoliticisation in the voluntary sector; it also displays an instance of devolution of responsibility but not power in the provision of local services. By devolving the responsibility to the voluntary sector in this way, the local state hopes more financial resources will get levered in through community governance partnership with other local agencies and indeed voluntary sector funding bodies. Finally this project represents a bottom-up consultative model of governance, whereby local community development practitioners act as intermediaries and facilitators for a process of interface with local residents (see Clark, 1995; Power, 1996; and Chaskin and Sunil, 1997). The approach to community involvement, one that follows a classic conception of

214 Interview with Thom Bradley, Freelance Consultant 2/2/98.
215 The Project receives most of its core funding from North Tyneside Council. The rest of its core funding comes from the Sir James Knott Trust and the Church Reaching Out to People. Other key funding comes from the BBC Children in Need and the Northumbria Drugs Prevention Initiative (NDPI). Smaller grants and donations are received from a variety of trusts and charities, including the Northern Rock Building Society and the Greggs Charitable Trust.
community development, is followed in critique of City Challenge and SRM mechanisms that, as shown in the second section, tend to be top-down, *post-hoc* and tokenistic.

Battle Hill CDP represents an anti-poverty strategy in three ways. Firstly, it actively encourages *involvement of local residents* in all aspects of community life and neighbourhood management. As Karen Clarke, the Project Leader of Battle Hill CDP explained:

> We actually talk to local people and ask them how they perceive the problem and address the problems they identify - rather than what we perceive to be the problem - because as even you can have these ideas in your head, and obviously we can all read things about poverty and have our own ideas. But when you actually come into an area you'll often find that what people will identify as the problem is not always what professional people would necessarily identify as the problem.

(interview with Karen Clarke, Project Leader, BHCDP 25/3/98').

It is an explicit part of the philosophy of the project to consult with local residents at every stage to ensure they are brought along with changes, so in turn they acquire a sense of ownership in the neighbourhood (see McArthur, 1995; Channan, 1996; and Patel et al., 1996). The *Area Forum* is the main public consultative mechanism; but other mechanisms include outreach work, involvement of local people on the management committee and interface with people on an everyday basis. This approach to poverty relates to current thinking within the EU on 'capacity-building' (see EC, 1995; 1996a; 1996b; and 1997). Secondly, and linked to the first, the project encourages *volunteering* by local people in any local community activities, on the one hand to help build confidence and self-esteem as the first towards successful participation in the labour market or other activities, and on the other to encourage social contacts and development in the community (see Ford, 1996; BHCDP, 1997; and VODA, 1997). And thirdly, in line with VODA, Battle Hill CDP actively follows an approach for the *local determination of needs*. Workers within the project display an ardent commitment to a bottom-up approach as a means of tackling *real* needs in the neighbourhood, and countering the top-down imperatives of the state (see Croft and Beresford, 1989; 1992; and Beresford and Croft, 1995). Taken together these elements of APS reflect a classic community development model that follows a genuine

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216 Some important initiatives have encouraged active involvement of local people. The *Battle Hill Youth Project* aims to empower young people through involvement in decision-making processes ('active citizenship'), including the Project's management committee, the *Youth Issues Committee*, the *Youth Voices Initiative* and the *Police and Youth Forum*. The *Drugs Awareness Initiative* was launched as part of the SRB Drugs Accord, with additional support from the Home Office Northumbria Drugs Prevention Initiative (DFI). The *Battle Hill Youth Project Peer Education Group* successfully produced information on drugs for young people by young people. The resulting *Cabbage* leaflet was well received in the community.

217 Initial consultation revealed the needs of women, children and young people on the estate. The *Women's Support Group* was set up to help build confidence, and provide support, advice and information for women on the estate. In addition two local authority youth workers undertake activities with girls aged between 11-14, discussing sensitive issues and building confidence, events organised by the girls themselves. A number of initiatives have developed for children and young people. The *Battle Hill Kids Klub* is an after school initiative for under 8's; another group is organised for children between 8-12 years - both involve the children's in the planning process. Finally the Project is registered as a Football Association (FA) recognised *Mini Soccer* centre, where children between 5-11 can learn basic footballing skills, increasing their confidence and have some fun.
commitment by local practitioners to the real lives of working-class people in deprived neighbourhoods (see Mayo, 1994; Mayo and Craig, 1995; and Taylor, 1995).⁵¹⁸ For them the first step in the reversal of poverty and deprivation is a change within local people and communities themselves.

Battle Hill CDP reveals the important gains for local people when local practitioners follow a community development approach with genuine commitment to working class communities. Experience also shows that the process of community involvement is a problematic one, not least in taking a long time and requiring patience and an unflailing belief in the capacities of local people to make informed decisions for the betterment of the neighbourhood. The Project strongly articulates the need for a political approach, one that actively engages with the issues facing local people, acting on their behalf at the interface between the local community and the state. In this way it reflects the political legacy of the CDP; but again, in the context of increasing service-orientation and de-politicisation as argued in the second section, this political dimension is more rhetorical and less a substantive methodological approach. Nonetheless this Project does reveal the importance of recognising the governance niche within which any organisation operates, and therefore the realities of power inequalities between organisations of state and non-state sectors. The issue of financial resources will continue to plague projects like Battle Hill CDP; but continued advocacy of a community development model of local involvement will certainly help foster a sense of local 'ownership', build local 'capacity' and influence policy for a neighbourhood previously ignored by regeneration projects.⁵¹⁹

Conclusion

It was argued in this chapter that the governance of APS in North Tyneside reflects a shift from community activism and opposition to the state, to inter-institutional networking and community incorporation in a fragile non-state environment. North Tyneside is a classically statist locality that has undergone a severe process of rationalisation under deepening neo-liberalisation; it has in turn increasingly become 'by default' a non-statist environment, especially in terms of anti-poverty action. The Council has attempted to reconstruct its relationship with the non-state sector through a rhetoric of partnership networking and inter-sectoral co-operation as the resources available for the local state (and by implication the voluntary sector) have reduced on

⁵¹⁸ Interview with Annabel McKinnon, Community Services, North Tyneside Council 26/3/98.
⁵¹⁹ The Bowness and Brighton Residents Group has held monthly meetings in homes of the participants, and residents are very active in defining and prioritising the needs in their area. They in turn devised a local action plan that has influenced the board decisions of the North Tyneside SRB Community Safety team in the direction of regeneration underway in Bowness Avenue. This process reveals that local residents do indeed care about their neighbourhoods, areas that customarily get stigmatised as 'poverty areas' or 'sink estates'. Local people can help in the process of prioritisation in the context of limited funds.
an annual basis. Underlying this financially scarce environment is the evolution of the non-state sector as one, initially in the 1970s at least, in clear conflict with the central and local state, certainly in terms of ideological commitment, towards one incorporated into the governance framework set by the local state, through processes of resource dependency, professionalisation and bureaucratisation in the context of a 'contract culture'. State mechanisms tend to be top-down, post-hoc and tokenistic, whereas non-state mechanisms tend to follow community development and communicative conceptions of involvement. Active mediation by activists committed to the welfare of residents in working class neighbourhoods is a key to cementing the relationship between the hierarchy and residents.

Childcare Enterprise Ltd. is a good example of institutional innovation within North Tyneside Council in maintaining levels of child care provision. Originally providing child care as an integral part of the Council's economic development strategy, the recent Siemens débâcle has served to raise the profile of Childcare's social and anti-poverty dimension, particularly through subsidisation of services. The People's Centre Network arguably remains the centre-piece of non-state anti-poverty action in North Tyneside, combining a number of community development and educational activities with a more 'politically' conception of anti-poverty. The Battle Hill Community Development Project provides invaluable community development activities in an area previously neglected by the Council. The Project also provides a robust (and highly successful) mechanism for the mobilisation of local residents, channelling their opinions back to the hierarchy. The SRB initiative in Longbenton focuses a high-profile regeneration scheme on a blighted estate in desperate need of new housing, retail and social facilities. North Tyneside VODA continues to provide useful services for the voluntary sector in the borough, although a recent restructuring process has 'tamed' its 'political' role previously progressing towards creating a voluntary sector anti-poverty infrastructure. Finally The BASE in Whitley Bay is a highly successful and invaluable youth project, with an explicit remit to deal with problems of poverty and homelessness among young people. In short, a number of organisations in North Tyneside are addressing problems of poverty and deprivation for various target groups.

The empirical material on the governance of APS in North Tyneside thus presented, the following chapter addresses similar issues in Rotterdam, preparing for comparative analysis of the two case studies in the seventh chapter.
Beginning with an account of the extent and distribution of poverty in the first section, this chapter shows that governance of APS in Rotterdam reflects a change from community opposition to the state, to a devolved and incorporated statist environment, where multiple layers of state subsidised foundations provide welfare services for local people. Grassroots church organisations and neighbourhood action groups continue to provide an important role in anti-poverty activities in the city. Three broad and inter-related categories of state APS are identified in the second section, showing tendencies for integration across different policy fields, a growing 'neighbourhood perspective', welfare professionalism and an increased emphasis on the involvement of local people. While three types of non-state APS are identified in the third section, networks of citizens organisations dominate anti-poverty activities in the city. Approaches to the involvement of local people - as addressed in the fourth section - have tended to shift from formal, 'top-down' consultation, to a more communicative model based on publicity campaigns and mediation by numerous neighbourhood workers. Elements of 'top-down' tokenism are still evident, despite shifts towards local engagement amidst a crisis of social democracy. The chapter concludes by examining the ways the identified APS have addressed poverty in the city.

Poverty in Rotterdam

Six aspects of poverty in Rotterdam are addressed, beginning with the general processes of macro-economic restructuring effecting the whole economy, and then focusing on areas worst affected by these changes. Firstly, since the early 1970s Rotterdam has undergone severe macro-economic restructuring, from industrial development to post-industrial service sector growth (see Jobse and Needham, 1988; Burgers and Kloosterman, 1996; Kloosterman and
Governance of APS in Rotterdam

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Dieleman, 1997; see table 9 providing evidence). Unpalatable for a city based largely on old industries, the local economy faced increased labour costs and growing competition from the Far East. The resulting mechanisation and containerisation in the port led to a decrease in low-skill, low-middle-wage employment as firms shed jobs to retain global competitiveness (see Kloosterman, 1994a; 1996; and Engbersen and Snel, 1997). These processes intensified as rapidly increasing levels of in-migration to Rotterdam occurred, not only from former Dutch colonies - like Surinam, the Dutch Antilles and Indonesia - but also from Mediterranean countries like Morocco and Turkey (see Musterd et al., 1997; van Kempen and Öziekren, eds., 1997; and Musterd and Ostendorf, eds., 1998; see table 10 for evidence supporting this trend). Processes of social and economic decline were exacerbated by this combination of restructuring and immigration, especially in the former industrial areas, where neighbourhoods became increasingly populated by many people unable to find work and reliant on social security payments. A more polarised city, income inequalities have widened and levels of poverty have increased in Rotterdam (see Oude Engberink, 1984; 1998; Kloosterman, 1994a; 1996; and Veenman, 1997); by 1993 it had the highest proportion of low-incomes and long-term low-incomes of all Dutch cities (see Engbersen and Snel, 1997). While it is problematic to talk of US style 'urban ghettos' in the Dutch context (see Engbersen et al., 1993; and Engbersen and Snel, 1997) and at the same time questionable to equate diverse ethnicity with poverty, a clear process of urban socio-spatial segregation in terms of standard of living and quality of life is evident across the city (see Nelissen, 1981; Mik, 1983a; 1983b; 1987; van Kempen, 1997). As one of the key protagonists in the debate on poverty in the Netherlands reveals:


... when Professor William Julius Wilson visited the Netherlands about a decade ago his reaction on seeing so-called poor areas in the large Dutch cities, including Rotterdam, was to ask: 'where's the problem?' The physical built environment is of relatively good quality following many years of Urban Renewal; but 'beneath the facades' figures exist for unemployment and poverty revealing deep-seated and hidden problems ... Also, 'modern poverty' is concentrated in multi-cultural and multi-ethnic areas. So, although the Dutch case far from represents the level of the problem as witnessed in the US ghettos, Wilson would be 'interested' in these areas today.

(interview with Godfried Engbersen, Sociology, EUR 7/7/98).

Despite some remnants of an affluent history, one can find some of the more deprived and impoverished neighbourhoods in the whole of the Netherlands in the district of Delfshaven (the former harbour of Delft) in Rotterdam West (West Rotterdam) (see Oude Engberink, 1984; COS, 1995; 1996; 1997a; Engbersen and Snel, 1997; Staring et al., 1998; Vis, 1998; see also Hilker, 1993; and Anon., 1998b). The combined effects of economic decline in the harbour, mass unemployment and immigration of ethnic minorities has resulted in a concentration of social problems: 65% of the 75,000 inhabitants in Delfshaven are from ethnic minorities, and in excess of 50% of households shelter people under retirement age in extreme poverty; certain areas like Spangen and Het Nieuwe Westen suffer around 27% unemployment.

In Schiemond, a number of poor quality, cheap housing units were constructed in the 1970s to re-house residents from Urban Renewal neighbourhoods, and problems have remained there ever since: although social security dependency fell from 63% in 1989 to 54% in 1994, the latter figure is substantially higher than the 34% figure for Rotterdam as a whole. This figure in surrounding neighbourhoods - such as Bospolder, Tussendijken and Het Nieuwe Westen -
### Table 9: Incoming and working population\(^1\) according to business sector\(^2\) in Rotterdam (1995 and 1996)

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture and fishery</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>+3.6</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>+1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minerals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-20.0</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>-83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>1204</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>33211</td>
<td>31157</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public utilities companies</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
<td>2249</td>
<td>1853</td>
<td>-17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>1089</td>
<td>1106</td>
<td>+1.6</td>
<td>14962</td>
<td>15020</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale trade</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>+1.3</td>
<td>15587</td>
<td>15523</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail trade and repairs</td>
<td>5369</td>
<td>5285</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>22530</td>
<td>22527</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering</td>
<td>1750</td>
<td>1733</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>6712</td>
<td>7174</td>
<td>+6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, storage and</td>
<td>2065</td>
<td>2089</td>
<td>+1.2</td>
<td>42036</td>
<td>40512</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial institutions</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>17657</td>
<td>16590</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business services</td>
<td>3387</td>
<td>3597</td>
<td>+6.2</td>
<td>31026</td>
<td>33260</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>12878</td>
<td>12806</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>17632</td>
<td>177712</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and welfare</td>
<td>1344</td>
<td>1377</td>
<td>+2.5</td>
<td>34177</td>
<td>35360</td>
<td>+3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture, recreation and</td>
<td>1624</td>
<td>1679</td>
<td>+3.4</td>
<td>9216</td>
<td>9104</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21689</td>
<td>21689</td>
<td>+0.9</td>
<td>250421</td>
<td>259294</td>
<td>+3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
\(1\) 12+ hours a week
\(2\) On the basis of the Standard Business Sectors (SBI) 1993

**Source:** Register of Companies for South-Holland, taken from Anderiesse et al., (1997)

was 49%, 46% and 44% respectively in 1994, again significantly higher than the city average.\(^{228}\)

For all these neighbourhoods, including others like Historic Delfshaven, Middelland and Oud 
Matthenesse, ‘deprivation scores’ in the period 1980-1995 fluctuated between slight improvements and subsequent drops, a reflection of vulnerability to local and wider socio-economic developments.\(^{229}\) Between 1991 and 1995 Schiemond underwent a dramatic drop in local conditions. People residing in all these neighbourhoods remain highly vulnerable, in poverty and often suffering exclusion from mainstream society.

Thirdly, despite water-front gentrification on the Kop van Zuid (Head of the South) (see Mik, 1989; CIKvZ, 1998a; and 1998b),\(^{230}\) highly deprived neighbourhoods are observable in the

\(^{228}\) Interviews with the author Rob van der Veen, BBT 28/9/98, Piet Wolters, BBT 28/9/98 and Peter Rokers, BBT 28/9/98.

\(^{229}\) A number of indicators were used to construct the ‘scores’: (1) educational level; (2) Proportion benefit recipients; (3) proportion ethnic groups; (4) mobility (% of relocations); (5) average income; (6) economic value of dwellings; (7) proportion unemployed people; and (8) mortality rate. Constructed through principal component analysis, the ‘deprivation score’ assumes that all eight indicators are fairly strongly statistically correlated. It aims to find a factor accounting for the greatest proportion of the total variance as a general score of social deprivation (see Appendix 18).

### Table 10: Population (and %) classified according to ethnicity in Rotterdam (1991-96)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surinamers</td>
<td>39501</td>
<td>41527</td>
<td>43674</td>
<td>45724</td>
<td>6679</td>
<td>46870</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillians</td>
<td>8996</td>
<td>10167</td>
<td>10891</td>
<td>11398</td>
<td>11708</td>
<td>11774</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verdeans</td>
<td>10774</td>
<td>11590</td>
<td>12462</td>
<td>13073</td>
<td>13437</td>
<td>13534</td>
<td>+0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>29966</td>
<td>32198</td>
<td>33784</td>
<td>34916</td>
<td>35598</td>
<td>36137</td>
<td>+1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>19155</td>
<td>20703</td>
<td>22106</td>
<td>23433</td>
<td>24550</td>
<td>25222</td>
<td>+2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Europeans</td>
<td>12773</td>
<td>13509</td>
<td>14809</td>
<td>15632</td>
<td>16350</td>
<td>16657</td>
<td>+1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority</td>
<td>121165</td>
<td>126694</td>
<td>137716</td>
<td>144176</td>
<td>148322</td>
<td>150194</td>
<td>+1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other immigrants</td>
<td>93879</td>
<td>93852</td>
<td>93866</td>
<td>92786</td>
<td>91528</td>
<td>89058</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>367198</td>
<td>368132</td>
<td>364532</td>
<td>361732</td>
<td>358425</td>
<td>353134</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>582242</td>
<td>589678</td>
<td>596116</td>
<td>598694</td>
<td>598275</td>
<td>592684</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ^1 BIZA definition ^2 Percentages are given in brackets

Source: COS, adapted from Andriesse et al., (1997)

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The district of Feijenoord in Rotterdam Zuid (South Rotterdam), in cases where conditions have deteriorated more than anywhere else in the city (see Oude Engberink, 1984; COS, 1995; 1996; 1997a; Gemeente Rotterdam, 1996; 1998a; and Engbersen and Snel, 1997). The former industrial heartland of Rotterdam, the district of Feijenoord was home for thousands of workers (and their families) in the harbour, shipbuilding and related sectors. With industrial collapse, these neighbourhoods suffered a typical post-industrial 'fall from grace', experiencing widespread unemployment, social problems and ethnic tensions. Many industrial units are


232 Far-Right extremism is evident in the district of Feijenoord, given its most virulent expression in the 1994 local elections where the local fascist party (Partij Carnet) mobilised a great deal of support, especially in poor neighbourhoods on the south bank. A diverse ethnic mix, combined with widespread unemployment for all and a local feeling of neglect by the ruling Partij van der Arbeid (Labour Party), arguably contributed to this result. Fans of Feijenoord football team no doubt played their part. Growing support for the Sociaal Politieke Partij (Socialist Party) since then has ousted all fascist elements from both municipal and district government (interviews with Ronald van Kempen, Geography, UU 11/6/98, Henk Overbeek, RECIPE, Uva 15/6/98, Kees van der Pijl, RECIPE, Uva 15/6/98, Hans Visser, Paulus Kerk 24/6/98, Tiny Kox, SP 8/9/98, Chris van Heuman, SP 8/9/98, Ina Nelissen, KIOSK and KSA 24/9/98, Daan Keller, SUGBA 9/10/98 and 14/10/98, and Annie, SUGBA 14/10/98).
left derelict in the neighbourhood of Feijenoord. In Bloemhof, where 1940s and 50s housing stock is largely owned by housing corporations, some units are left in a deplorable state. In 1994 49% of Bloemhof residents were dependent on social security, an increase of 5% on 1989 - again much higher than the Rotterdam average (34%). In the same year figures for other neighbourhoods, like Afrikaanderwijk and Katendrecht (the latter a former red-light district), were higher - 56% and 53% respectively; in Hillesluis it was 48%. All these neighbourhoods have experienced a downward trend in local conditions between 1980-1995, particularly in Afrikaanderwijk and Feijenoord; others like Tarwewijk and Oud Charlois also fared badly. Afrikaanderwijk is adjacent to Hillesluis, Bloemhof and Feijenoord, and all share similar characteristics - a 'deprivation score' provides some idea of change over time, but is not able to account for these changes, causes which stretch over the whole area and not unique to any one neighbourhood. Overall, between 1980-1995 more neighbourhoods in Feijenoord have experienced a deterioration of conditions; and in addition, more neighbourhoods with a constantly falling 'score' can be found in this district, reflecting its geographical and social isolation from the urban core on the north side of the river.

Fourthly, alongside Delfshaven and Feijenoord, pockets of poverty are apparent, either in the midst of relative affluence, or in single neighbourhoods with certain histories and characteristics. While the district Centrum as a whole is not particularly affluent, the neighbourhoods of Agniesebuurt and Provenierswijk have suffered at the hand of incomplete urban renewal, resulting in instances of community antagonism to the state. Although both neighbourhoods display a steady (albeit limited) improvement in fortunes, by 1995 they still 'score' relatively low on the deprivation scale: -0.57 and -0.47 respectively. These neighbourhoods fare substantially better than Het Oude Westen for that same year (-1.37), a neighbourhood adjacent to Het Nieuwe Westen yet under the administration of Centrum - in fact the former shares similar characteristics with the latter, but does not fall within the official boundaries of the stigmatised district of Delfshaven. Conversely, Schiebroek in Rotterdam...
Noord (North Rotterdam), a traditional working-class neighbourhood, nestles among general suburban affluence to the northern fringe of the city; despite a steady decline since 1980, it still 'scored' +0.93 in 1995. This aggregate picture hides the fact social unrest broke out here in the 1970s, instigated by white, native Dutch residents, resisting entry of ethnic minority immigrants into the neighbourhood. It is now generally considered a respectable working-class area, where law-abiding residents are generally frustrated (and stigmatised) by their relative immobility.

While experiencing a steady improvement in local conditions since 1980, Oude Noorden still only 'scored' -0.94 by 1995, perhaps an indication of unemployment problems in the neighbourhood. The most affluent area is Kralingen, in particular Kralingen-Oost in Rotterdam Oost (East Rotterdam) which has greatly improved its fortunes from +0.26 (1980) and +0.45 (1987) to a staggering +1.75 in 1995. The former Prime Minister Lubbers lives there. Although adjacent to Kralingen, both Nieuw Crosswijk and Oud Crosswijk fared far worse: both neighbourhoods have witnessed fluctuating local conditions since 1980, but by 1995 they 'scored' -1.17 and -1.19 respectively, both deprived urban environments.

Fifthly, as addressed in the next section, a recent central state APS was the Grote Steden Beleid (GSB) (Big Cities Policy, BCP), where selected deprived areas are targeted for social and economic renewal (see MBZ, 1995; Bons and Oudijk, 1997; Priemus et al., 1997; Huitink, 1998; Jansen, 1998; and Oude Engberink, 1998; see also Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998b).

Following an area-based approach, five areas are targeted in Rotterdam on the dual basis of the degree of the policy challenge (including poverty and deprivation), combined with reasonable prospects for success: they are Hooglevet-Noord; Oud-Charlois; Hillesluis; Delfshaven (especially Bospolder-Tussendijken) and Oude Noorden. All these neighbourhoods possess certain issues of concern. Hooglevet-Noord has experienced a steady decline in local conditions since 1980, and although perhaps not the most deprived neighbourhood in Rotterdam, by 1995 its 'deprivation score' stood at -0.64 and faced a downward trend. Admittedly not as severe as a few years earlier, long-standing problems with young people from Dutch Antillian immigrant families still present a pressing policy challenge in this neighbourhood. Oud-Charlois 'scored' -0.23 on the deprivation scale in 1995.
reflecting steady and largely unaltered local conditions since 1980. The adjacent areas of Waalhaven and Waalhaven Zuid were included in the Oud-Charlois remit, former harbour areas with very few inhabitants - they 'scored' +1.03 and +0.88 in 1995 respectively. This area is designated as a 'Chance Zone', similar to the 'Empowerment Zone' concept in the US (see Wiewal and Gills, 1995; Gittell et al., 1998; and James, 1999), where regulations, such as tax and environmental considerations, are relaxed to foster small and medium size enterprise. Hillesluis has undergone a concerted decline in local conditions since 1980: in that year it 'scored' -0.96, falling to -1.41 in 1987 and -1.44 in 199; by 1995 it was as low as -1.50. A prolonged decline in the local shopping area, where many local vendors have gone bankrupt or moved elsewhere, largely accounts for this trend. The area has a 'youth problem', with little in the way of playground opportunities and other facilities for the younger inhabitants. Finally, Spangen in the district of Delfshaven - recently found to be the most deprived neighbourhood in Rotterdam - has attracted a great deal of attention, not always for the benefit of local residents (see Dekker, 1994; Burgers and Kloosterman, 1996; and WS, 1996). First constructed around 1916 and completed in the 1920s, Spangen is based on a symmetrical, star-shaped street pattern, with the football stadium Het Kasteel (The Castle) at its apex, the home of Rotterdam's second team after Feijenoord. It is a typical Delfshaven neighbourhood - in 1996 almost 75% of housing was owned either by the housing corporation Woonbron, or by the housing association de Combinatie. There is a high density of ethnic minority groups resident on the estate - especially Moroccan, Turkish, Surinamese and Cape Verdians: nearly 80% of households have at least one parent born in a foreign country. The estate suffers at the hands of negative media stereotyping - the result of serious problems with drugs and prostitution experienced in the neighbourhood. While these high-profile academic and media
images perhaps distort the reality of social and economic life in Spangen, the area nonetheless faces serious problems. As Jack Burgers and Robert Kloosterman describe it:

[High unemployment, ethnic tensions, high incidence of mostly drugs-related criminality (there are, for instance, a lot of cars, many of them with French number plates, driving slowly through the area in search of houses to buy hard drugs) and part of the housing stock is dilapidated or even boarded up ... Spangen is undoubtedly a deprived neighbourhood with a high level of social exclusion. Nowadays, it is squeezed between a new, designated location for streetwalkers (many of them heroin addicts) on its west side and a shelter for hard drug users on the north side. During the night, junkies, prostitutes and their customers roam the streets of Spangen as the Dutch creating a distinctly eerie atmosphere.

(Burgers and Kloosterman, 1996: 440-1; and 443).

Due to unfinished Urban Renewal, which began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, there is much 'green' recreational space and many houses are still in a state of disrepair. As many local businesses (mainly retailing) have disappeared, residents are compelled to travel further afield for their shopping. Despite a large number of hopeful initiatives, Spangen remains a highly deprived neighbourhood, and conditions are worsening: between 1989-1994 the proportion of social security dependents increased to 51%;\textsuperscript{257} in 1980 it 'scored' -0.93 on a 'deprivation scale' - in 1987 this figure was -1.37, and 1991 -1.71. By 1994 a 'score' of -1.59 showed a slight improvement, but the neighbourhood remains severely deprived.\textsuperscript{258}

Evolution of State APS

Opening with a brief background to governance in Rotterdam, three broad categories of state APS are identified in Rotterdam: (1) urban policy; (2) local welfare state; and (3) municipal poverty policy. Firstly, the evolution of urban policy for the revitalisation of deprived urban areas shows: a shifting tension between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches; a decline in formal mechanisms and a rise in a communicative model of local involvement; and an increased emphasis on a neighbourhood-specific focus. Secondly, there is a tendency for neighbourhood-level workers to shift from radical advocacy of local residents, to a more professionalised, laissez-faire and market-driven - and therefore neutral - role vis-à-vis local people. The district of Delfshaven is the only exception to the rule where elements of radical advocacy are still evident. Across Rotterdam, different types of worker operate in separate institutional structures, a unique feature of the city. De-politicisation has occurred in the wider context of quangoisation.

\textsuperscript{257} See Appendices 19 and 20.
\textsuperscript{258} See Appendix 18. One should not overplay the importance of these 'deprivation scores', revealing little as to causal mechanisms in neighbourhoods, simply providing an aggregate statistical measure, standardised in such a way for comparison across numerous neighbourhoods for a given time period. In 1998 Spangen was identified contentiously as the most deprived neighbourhood in the whole of the Netherlands. Other researchers claimed that Zuid\textsuperscript{e} was the poorest (interview with Wilfred Dolfsma, Economics Art and Culture, EUR 4/5/98). Such a 'poverty competition' arguably diverts attention from the substance of the issues at hand.
and rationalisation, as social democratic universalism has given way to a more particularist and targeted system, with elements of 'hollowing-out' to highly professionalised commercial providers. Finally, the development of the official Municipal Poverty Policy is a direct corollary of this shifting welfare system, and represents a local tailoring of national provision for the restoration of social citizenship for poor people in the city. Originally directly concerned with financial incomes, it has evolved a more social, 'bottom-up' and participatory orientation (less an incomes approach) as the Municipal poverty policy faces increasing pressures for restructuring.

For many commentators the Gemeente Rotterdam (Rotterdam Municipality) is a monument to social democracy of the 1970s and, although some changes are underway, represents a classic 'top-down' model of governance (see Kloosterman and Dieleman, 1997; and Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998b). The PvdA has held majority control of the Council since the 1960s, and continues to do so today - for Kees van der Pijl, an international political economist from the University of Amsterdam, Rotterdam is a typical 'Red Municipality'. Despite often being pejoratively labelled a 'bureaucratic' Municipality, Rotterdam has a strong reputation for efficient governance within a technocratic tradition on the Left - a reputation based largely on the personalities of Bram Peper, Mayor of the City since 1982 and now at the Ministry of the Interior, and Bert Riezenkamp, a high bureaucrat and now Director of the Ministry of Culture. Politics in Rotterdam, however, interestingly combine 'top-down' elitism with a strong populist tradition stretching back into history. For Gerard Oude Engberink, Director of the Centre for Social Policy Studies (CSPS), Rotterdam is a 'working city' with a pervasive working-class population, and historically under-developed bourgeois and élite classes. The importance for the local economy of harbour and related activities, and indeed shipbuilding, reflect this social composition. As Rotterdam faces a difficult process of industrial decline and transition to a post-industrialism, working-class pride and civic consciousness combine, forming a tradition of...
egalitarian and humanitarian values in the governance of the city. One could say real people matter in Rotterdam. For Rotterdam displays a flair for public-sector entrepreneurialism - it takes policy risks for the benefit of 'Rotterdammers', illustrated by the transformation of the city centre in the 40 years following devastation during the last war (see RCIC 1996; 1997; RCDA 1997a; 1997b; and 1997c).

The Rotterdam Municipality has a monist structure, where the élite representatives from the political and bureaucratic flanks integrate into a Municipal Executive (see Zaaijer, 1998). The Mayor, together with a collection of Aldermen (Executive Councillors), form the Executive, the pinnacle of decision-making and political power in the city. Members of the Executive are appointed by fellow Council Members. The Aldermen run the administration, each responsible for a particular portfolio, and the Mayor chairs both the Municipal Executive and the City Council. Municipal administrative and departmental functions were separated in the early 1990s, a novel feature of city government in the Netherlands. As a result the various Municipal Departments, such as Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (SZW) (Social Affairs and Employment Opportunities), act as quasi-companies, possessing a large degree of organisational autonomy and working in a business-like manner. Each year they strike deals with politicians to secure budgets in exchange for policy outcomes. Municipal services are delivered to local citizens via a network of specialist foundations, independent, yet fully subsidised by the Municipal Departments; these foundations are hierarchical and highly professionalised organisations.

Finally, since 1972 Rotterdam has operated a decentralised system of Deelgemeenten (District Councils), to bring government closer to the people, building on a tradition of Community Councils established in the 1950s and 60s (see Morlan, 1982; and Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998b). In total 11 Districts operate as more localised Municipalities, but ultimate power is still retained within the hierarchy. The Districts hold responsibility for a
number of social issues - like youth, community development and unemployment - and all funding comes from the Municipality.\textsuperscript{271}

**Urban Policy**

Recognising that deteriorating housing conditions in certain neighbourhoods contributed to the experience of poverty for local residents, urban policy during the 1970s focused on a process of *Stads Vernieuwing* (Urban Renewal). A central government policy, it was a ‘top-down’ approach implemented by the municipalities that introduced an ‘erasing system’ whereby rundown neighbourhoods were either pulled down and rebuilt, or renovated (see Meulenbelt, 1994; McCarthy, 1998; Oude Engberink, 1998; and Parkinson, 1998).\textsuperscript{272} Focusing solely on the physical infrastructure (namely social housing), the provision of relatively cheap units in the social rented sector continues to be a defining characteristic of housing stock in Rotterdam. For many observers the mono-dimensionality of Urban Renewal was its main shortcoming, paving the way for the development of subsequent policy of a more socio-economic nature (see Bons, 1992; Bons and Oudijk, 1997; McCarthy, 1998; and Parkinson, 1998).\textsuperscript{273} Involvement of local residents during Urban Renewal occurred through *Project Groups*, bringing together a strong network of *opbouw werkers* (community developers), municipal urban planners and local residents in designated areas across the city (ibid.).\textsuperscript{274} For Hugo Mulder, Director of SONOR in Rotterdam, the first generation of Urban Renewal (1970-75) was somewhat conflictual, with local people organising actions against Municipal policy, especially in Het Oude Westen, Het Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 17/6/98\textsuperscript{1} and 29/7/98\textsuperscript{1}, and Johan Henderson, Chairman Deelgemeente Feijenoord 9/5/98\textsuperscript{1}.

27\textsuperscript{1} In 1993 the Municipal Government proposed a further process of political decentralisation to form ten or eleven independent Municipal Councils, thus increasing the powers of District Councils, as part of a wider proposal for regional government covering the whole *Rijnmond* area. This proposal was dropped, however, after a referendum held on 7 June 1995. Local citizens did not favour the idea and were deeply distrustful of the Executive. Taken together, a decrease in the power of the Rotterdam Municipality would tie-in with an empowerment of both regional and district governments. The *status quo* remains today (interviews with Mirjam Zaaijer Lecturer, IHS and Councillor, Overschie 2/6/98 and Jan Oosterman, Housing and Spatial Planning, Gemeente Rotterdam 2/9/98\textsuperscript{1}).

27\textsuperscript{2} Interviews with Justus Veenman, ISEO, EUR 27/5/98, Jack Burgers, Sociology, EUR 5\textsuperscript{1}/6/98\textsuperscript{1}, Robert Klootsterman, Delft University 5/6/98\textsuperscript{1}, Ronald van Kempen, Geography, UL 11/6/98, Henk Huitink, Housing and Spatial Planning, Gemeente Rotterdam 3/7/98\textsuperscript{1}, Herman Meijer, Alderman, Gemeente Rotterdam 6/7/98\textsuperscript{1}, Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 4/9/98\textsuperscript{1}, Conrad Bons, BOOM 18/9/98\textsuperscript{1}, Ricks Westrik, WS 21/9/98, Erik Meijer, SP 25/9/98\textsuperscript{1}, Hugo Mulder, SONOR 30/9/98\textsuperscript{1}, Toine Schroeder, BANW 5/10/98\textsuperscript{1} and Ria Leurs, WS, Spangen resident 6/10/98\textsuperscript{1}.

27\textsuperscript{3} Running parallel to Urban Renewal was the policy concept of *Probleem Concentratie Gebieden* (PCJ) (Problem Accumulation Areas), beginning with ‘education backwardness’ and ‘social welfare’ programmes. These aimed to influence the education of young people at an early age and a lot of money was invested in the monitoring of children in school. Discussion of these issues still happens locally in problem neighbourhoods today. On closer inspection the PCJ approach was in fact less concerned with participation and more about helping relationships in a more paternalistic and therefore ‘top-down’ manner. There were no discussions at all about hard economic issues - at the time, economic issues were not viewed as part of the ‘urban question’, rather the concern of ‘out-of-town’ business parks and other specially designated areas on the urban fringe (interviews with Jack Burgers, Sociology, EUR 5\textsuperscript{1}/6/98\textsuperscript{1}, Robert Klootsterman, Delft University 5/6/98\textsuperscript{1} and Conrad Bons, BOOM 18/9/98\textsuperscript{1}).

27\textsuperscript{4} Interviews with Jack Burgers, Sociology, EUR 5\textsuperscript{1}/6/98\textsuperscript{1}, Robert Klootsterman, Delft University 5/6/98\textsuperscript{1}, Evert Smit, IEG, EUR 3/7/98\textsuperscript{1}, Conrad Bons, BOOM 18/9/98\textsuperscript{1} and Hugo Mulder, SONOR 30/9/98\textsuperscript{1}. During the 1970s and 1980s the Project Groups came into open conflict with their respective *Delegaties* over the contested issue of local democratic legitimacy, both organisational forms claiming an unalienable right to a democratic mandate (interviews with Conrad Bons, BOOM 18/9/98\textsuperscript{1} and Hugo Mulder, SONOR 30/9/98\textsuperscript{1}).
Governance of APS in Rotterdam

Central government spending on Urban Renewal was halted at the end of the 1980s, leaving certain neighbourhoods like Spangen and Agniesebuurt neglected, exacerbating the process of urban decay. In the context of truncated Urban Renewal, Peper and his colleagues colluded, arguing that Rotterdam required a new policy - *Economisch Vernieuwing* (Economic Renewal) - one that would develop a ‘Manhattan Skyline’ for Rotterdam, and incorporating previously neglected issues of social concern in the deprived neighbourhoods of the city.

The social dimension of Economic Renewal evolved into *Sociale Vernieuwing* (Social Renewal) between 1990 and 1994, implemented originally in Rotterdam under the direction of Vermeulen, De Kleijn and to a lesser extent Peper, and later at the national level following the introduction of the concept to central government by Ina Dales (see RCSV, 1989; Voogt, 1994; van der Wardt, 1994; van der Berg et al., 1997; Gemeente Rotterdam 1998b; and Oude Engberink, 1998). For researchers like Conrad Bons, Director of BOOM, Social Renewal represented a social movement where a collection of intellectuals, political activists and other interested parties came together, spearheaded through a publicity campaign organised through a newly formed Communication Group. De Keijn adopted a ‘shotgun’ technique for initiation of social projects and the ‘catch’ was the policy of *Opzoomeren*, becoming the most successful element of Social Renewal. Named after *Opzoomerstraat* in Het Nieuwe Westen in the district of Delfshaven where it first happened, *Opzoomeren* refers to a process whereby local residents work together for the collective benefit of their street: organising clean-up actions, implementing new security measures and having street parties and festivals. The wider aim of the approach is to foster social contact between hitherto isolated groups, especially between native and non-native Dutch people. An *Opzoomerdag* (*Opzoomerday*) was held on 28 May 1994, a one-day festival that encouraged around 1000 street actions across the city, with many yellow balloons, T-shirts and *Oppi* logos on view. A resounding success, it provided the impetus for many subsequent actions, in keeping with the populist tradition in Rotterdam. A number of spin-off

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275 Interview with Hugo Mulder, SONOR 30/9/98.
276 The ideas for Economic Renewal were formulated by Peper, who appointed Albeda - a Professor of Sociology, but an economist by training - as Chairman of the Committee for Economic Renewal (see Commissie Albeda, 1987). The Albeda Committee worked parallel to the Idenburg Committee, setting up later projects for Social Renewal, and these two committees were viewed as two sides of the same coin (see Commissie Idenburg, 1989) (interview with Conrad Bons, BOOM 18/9/98).
278 Interview with Conrad Bons, BOOM 18/9/98.
projects grew out of the Opzoomeren approach. As with the former Urban Renewal Project Groups, local residents participated through opbouw werk activities in the local bewonersorganisaties (citizens organisations): a Bureau Opzoomeren was established, a focal point for seasoned community developers, in effect making Opzoomeren, for Conrad Bons, 'a large experiment in community development and social engineering, typical of Rotterdam'. In a novel move by Bureau Opzoomeren, different types of neighbourhood worker were brought together, forming a large network of social intermediaries, an unprecedented development in the governance in the city.

The Social Renewal philosophy continued in Rotterdam after 1994 with Sociaal Investering (Social Investment), a more structured approach formulated by the Groen-Links (Green-Left) Alderman, Herman Meijer (see Reijndorp and van der Zwaard, 1995, and Oude Engberink, 1998). Social Investment evolved at the national level into what became the Grote Steden Beleid (GSB) (Big Cities Policy, BCP) in 1994 (see MBZ, 1995; Bons and Oudijk, 1997; Priemus et al., 1997; Huitink, 1998; Jansen, 1998; and Oude Engberink, 1998). The BCP allocated central government funding for certain cities, those considered having pressing social and economic problems. Presided over by the Ministries for Internal Affairs, Housing, Economics Affairs, Education and Social Policy, BCP engendered a more systematic inter-departmental approach, making agreements and striking deals (or covenants) with the four main Randstad cities (Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague and Utrecht), and 25 others around the country all falling within the remit of policy. The policy introduced an element of 'monitoring and evaluation' for the first time into Dutch urban policy, representing a centralisation of power and control away from the Municipalities. As revealed by Conrad Bons, the 25 cities outside the Randstad were content with this arrangement, but the four powerful Randstad municipalities felt constrained by the central government regulations and are now developing their own procedures for monitoring and evaluation. The novelty of the BCP lies in attempting the full integration of social,
economic and physical issues for regeneration, with a priority placed on the economic development of neighbourhoods.266

The first phase of BCP came to an end in 1998, and in its wake two competing urban policy regimes are apparent at the national level, one ‘top-down’ and the other ‘bottom-up’ - but both still in the early stages of their development.267 The Wijkaanpak (Neighbourhood Approach) is the regime broadly inheriting the policy remit of the BCP, involving the same government Ministries in The Hague (see van der Krogt et al., 1997; Anon., 1998b; and BANW, 1998). It does indeed carry forward the ‘top-down’ orientation as evident with BCP, despite the strong emphasis on the neighbourhood dimension, alongside a continuation of an integrated social and economic approach. As with BCP, Heel de Buurt targets specific neighbourhoods for integrated social and economic development, but unlike the BCP it developed from the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, an organisation that declined during the 1980s, becoming marginalised during the period of Social Renewal (see Heel de Buurt, 1998).268 Revitalised since the mid 1990s, this Ministry reorganised, creating a new network of policy-makers, urban practitioners and ‘social engineers’.269 At the direction of the Commite Etty, the Heel de Buurt policy incorporated a programme for ‘local social policy’, involving a strong element of opbouw werk, presenting a social, cultural and above all an intentionally ‘bottom-up’ orientation (see Bons and Oudijk, 1997).270 Away from a target-group approach and in extension of the Social Renewal philosophy, Heel de Buurt seeks generic improvement of neighbourhoods, arguing for a symbiosis of community confidence and economic vibrancy. As with Wijkaanpak and the BCP, Heel de Buurt focuses on neighbourhoods in certain designated areas, selected on the basis of particular criteria at the expense of other neighbourhoods (see Anon., 1998b).

Big Cities Policy (BCP)

The BCP in Rotterdam involves partnership between the Municipality, District Councils, Housing Corporations, local business, the police and local residents (see MBZ, 1995; Bons and Oudijk, 2004). The oft-quoted work by Michael Porter on economic competitiveness within inner cities was very influential in the formation of the BCP in Rotterdam (see Porter, 1995; see also Porter, 1990; and Johnson et al., 1995). Indeed he was widely read by local practitioners and policy-makers, and used to legitimise the introduction of the economic dimension back into the neighbourhood, by starting with an explicitly economic point of view. The extent to which these people were fully aware of Porter’s intellectual credentials and academic background is, however, quite another matter (interview with Conrad Bons, BOOM 18/9/98).266

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267 Interviews with Monique Peltenburg, IFS 4/6/98; Hans Lopik, Marconiplein Police Department 15/9/98; Herman Harmsen, Deelgemeente Delfshaven 15/9/98; Conrad Bons, BOOM 18/9/98; and Ton Kroostjes, BDS 24/9/98.266

268 The policy-makers connected with this Ministry were outsiders throughout the 1980s and early 1990s - they did not have a lot of money and were by-passed throughout the periods of Social Renewal and BCP. Although some limited initiatives for social integration were implemented, they were small in number and did not gather much momentum (interview with Conrad Bons, BOOM 18/9/98).268

269 Heel de Buurt is organised through collaboration of three national organisations concerned with issues at the neighbourhood level: the Nederland Instituut voor Zorg en Welzijn (NIZW); the Landelijk Centraal Optiekenwerk (LCO); and FORUM, Instituut voor Multiculturele Ontwikkeling (interview with Conrad Bons, BOOM 18/9/98).269

270 Etty, a Social Democratic politician in the Hague, organised this committee, and combined with the work of Peper, decided to something for the welfare of Rotterdamer (interview with Conrad Bons, BOOM 18/9/98).270
Beginning in 1994, Phase 1 (1994-98) involved: (a) a process of discussion and negotiation between the Municipality and central government; (b) formation of a BCP organisation; and (c) implementation and execution of policies, beginning in 1997. As mentioned in the previous section, five neighbourhoods were targeted for investment: Hoogvliet-Noord; Oud-Charlois; Hillesluis; Delfshaven (especially Bospolder-Tussendijken and Oude Noorden). It was not a policy merely to combat deprivation, but also to encourage mechanisms for local people to take opportunities for renewal into their own hands, with economic goals at the forefront, representing a 'top-down' policy for the development of 'bottom-up' solutions. There are certain lessons from this first phase. Firstly, the co-operation of all relevant actors was not gainsaid, requiring continued work and professionalised support to create suitable conditions for inter-organisational collaboration. Secondly, following many years of policy to mitigate poverty and deprivation, the explicit economic development objective was found exaggerated in the context of target neighbourhoods with around 8000 inhabitants. Perhaps not the level at which policy intervention could influence wider economic goals, more balance is therefore required between the economic, social and physical realms. Thirdly, the involvement of local people proved problematic (especially from ethnic minority groups), contingent on the relevance of the themes addressed for their everyday lives - often local environmental concerns such as the condition of local streets and squares. As Peter Bol, an Advisor to the Municipality on the BCP in Rotterdam claims:

There has been less participation of local people with the Big Cities Policy than there was in the Urban Renewal period ... under Urban Renewal people's interests were very clear - bricks and cement directly affected people's lives - but the Project Group infrastructure vanished rapidly after Urban Renewal ended. The Project Groups were on the side of the Municipality ... also, local residents organisations involved have declined too ... As a result, Big Cities Policy participation needs to begin at 'level zero', needs to start from scratch if you like ... With respect to the participation of locals, it is something that requires a constant professional attention - it is not an automatic process ... [This] needs taking into consideration when building organisations and co-operation with others

(interview with Peter Bol, BCP, Gemeente Rotterdam 12/10/98).

Different issues of concern emerged in the five neighbourhoods, although the issue of generating local employment was prominent in all areas. The Brede School concept captured the most attention in Hoogvliet-Noord, a campaign for making schools social centres, reaching out and serving the wider community as well as their pupils. The local police opened an office on the premises of a school in the area (see Gemeente Rotterdam, 1995; and Anderiesse et al., 1997). Unemployment in the area fell by 11% in 1997, and the number of social security dependents declined by 8% (see Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998b). In Hillesluis,
activities concentrated on the organisation of local entrepreneurs, such as local shopkeepers in the Beijerlandselaan for the regeneration of the local neighbourhood economy. Unused business premises dropped by 40% in 1997, and numbers of social security claimants fell by 12% (see Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998b). Investment went into safety for local housing in Bospolder-Tussendijken, a response to the widespread drugs and related incidents in the area. The need for job creation was strongly articulated. During 1997 unemployment in Delfshaven fell by 11%, and 48% of local residents experienced a visible improvement in security, compared with 26% in 1996 (see Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998b). Overall the implementation of the BCP was most successfully received in Oude Noorden and Hoogvliet-Noord. Only really impacting on these neighbourhoods from 1996, the success of the BCP lies in establishing new social infrastructures from which new neighbourhood policies can develop in continuation of a local partnership approach to poverty and deprivation (see Geddes and Eskine, 1994; and Geddes, 1997).

Local Welfare State

There are four distinct yet related categories of local welfare provision that deal either directly or indirectly with the problem of poverty in Rotterdam: (1) bijstands maatschappelijk werk (social assistance social work); (2) sociaal cultureel werk (social cultural work); (3) opbouw werk (community development work); and (4) professionalised social welfare. Firstly, bijstands maatschappelijk werk deals with benefit issues of individuals, the character of which has changed over time. According to Aat Brand from the CSPS in Rotterdam, the 1970s and 1980s were generally times of radical grassroots advocacy of local residents, working simultaneously in and against the local state. Although these workers were employed by the state, they explicitly sided with local people in a highly politicised manner, in cases following a populist ideology against hierarchical state power. For Brand it was customary for social workers to ‘dress down’ - men perhaps wearing a jacket and jeans, long hair and bearded - working for the people, often turning a ‘blind-eye’ to individual instances where claimants ‘massaged’ the welfare system for their own ends. An informal system operated whereby social workers themselves judged what activities were acceptable or fraudulent, a judgement ultimately

295 Interview with Peter Bol, BCP, Gemeente Rotterdam the author 12/10/98.
296 Bijstands maatschappelijk werk (social assistance social work) deals with the issues faced by local residents, on an individual case-by-case basis, concerning their social benefits. This work is organised through the SZW municipal department and the district level counterparts. Sociaal cultureel werk deals specifically with social groups, such as ethnic minorities (but also for individuals), organised at the district level via a network of buurthuisen (neighbourhood centres), co-ordinated by a district-specific specialist foundation. Finally, opbouw werk specifically addresses issues affecting the whole neighbourhood, organised within each district via a network of buurtorganisaties, co-ordinated, as with social cultural work, by a specialist district foundation (interviews with Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 4/9/98, Marianne Martens, DISCK 23/9/98 and Hugo Mulder, SONOR 30/9/98).
298 Interview with Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 4/9/98.
depending resting on the amount of finance involved and the type of activity undertaken. The onset of the *new orthodoxy* changed this situation in the late 1980s and early 90s, resulting in a national level crack-down on benefit-fraud in the welfare system (see Oude Engberink, 1991). There is a tendency for social assistance social workers to follow a far less politicised ideology, adopting a more neutral and intermediate role vis-à-vis benefit claimants, especially with the *new Onbenutte Kwaliteiten (OK) (Unused Qualities).* Symbolising this shift the term *bijstands maatschappelijk werker* is now increasingly dropped in favour of *bijstands consulent,* reflecting their more neutralised role. Many of these workers now wear formal suits. It is only in Delfshaven, a district with a long history of radical advocacy organised for the municipality through the *Stichting Maatschappelijk Dienstverlening Delfshaven* (SMDD) - where social workers have resisted this change.

Secondly, *sociaal cultureel werk* deals with various activities for all groups of people, not specifically on an individual basis. Taking *Delfshavense Instelling voor Sociaal Cultureel Werk en Kinderopvang* (DISCK) (Delfshaven Institute for Social Cultural Work and Childcare) as an example, three main strands of work are undertaken: (1) a basic function involving traditional social cultural work with adults and young people; (2) work with children; and (3) *Sociale Activering* (Social Activation), undertaken in *buurthuisen* in Het Nieuwe Westen, Spangen, Delfshaven-Schiemond, Middelland and Bospolder-Tussendijken (see DISCK, 1997; 1998a; and 1998b; see also Bommel et al., 1998). The basic function includes children's courses on cookery, drawing and sports, and adults courses in various languages, including clothes making, Dutch lessons and first aid. Work with children focuses mainly on stimulation and education for mothers and their children - and groups are organised for children to learn to play, and mothers to acquire parental skills. For young people between 4-16 years, the *Thuis op Straat* (TOS) (Feeling at Home on the Streets) initiative empowers local unemployed people to play with children in local squares, providing them with toys on a hire basis, along with indicating potential neighbourhood problems at an early stage. The Social Activation strand addresses issues of social empowerment of vulnerable people, representing a convergence of activities with those of social workers. Decentralisation of social cultural work famously occurred early in Rotterdam. A similar process in other types of neighbourhhood work did not follow until the

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300 In Delfshaven the OK project is called *Sociale Activering* (Social Activation) in continuation of an earlier project of that name initiated there (see DISCK, 1998a; interviews with Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 4/9/98, Arjen Dekker, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98 and Marianne Martens, DISCK 23/9/98).

301 Interviews with Arjen Dekker, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98, Marianne Martens, DISCK 23/9/98 and Hugo Mulder, SONOR 30/9/98.

302 Particular attention is paid to Moroccan mothers and their children, informing them of the services on offer and looking to integrate them into the wider society. This 'Moroccan approach' is evident in all strands of work at DISCK (interview with Marianne Martens, DISCK 23/9/98).

303 The motto for the 'TOS initiative reads: *love and attention are more economical in the end* (interviews with Conrad Bons, BOOM 18/9/98, Rieks Westrik, WS 21/9/98 and Johan Henderson, Chairman Deelgemeente Feijenoord 9/9/98).

304 Interview with Arjen Dekker, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98.
6. Governance of APS in Rotterdam

1990s, in part a reflection of the unique separation of these workers in the city, in contrast with the rest of the Netherlands.\(^{305}\) As revealed by Marianne Martens at DISCK, social cultural workers in Delfshaven consider their activities independent from the state (despite nearly 100% state subsidy), wanting to take politics out of social activities and focus on the needs of local people. Local government was an enemy a decade ago, but since the early 1990s a more interactive approach has emerged for securing funding.\(^{306}\) Many courses are provided free of charge, particularly initiatives for young people of all origins between 16-26 years to develop skills with the view of finding employment.\(^{307}\)

Thirdly, opbouw werk addresses activities affecting the neighbourhood as a whole, and not just on an individual basis, undertaken within bewonersorganisaties at the neighbourhood level. Following Hugo Mulder, Director of SONOR, there are four distinct phases of opbouw werk (see SONOR, 1997).\(^{308}\) During the first generation of Urban Renewal (1979-75), opbouw werkers facilitated the participation of local residents in Project Groups in neighbourhoods across the city, a period that was characterised by a ‘conflict model’ of community involvement. The second generation (1976-84) saw the emergence of a ‘compromise model’ of state/community interaction, where relations improved and more money was directed to bewonersorganisaties for neighbourhood improvements as the first effects of mass immigration and unemployment were felt. In the third phase (1984-94) political decentralisation and the deepening of immigration into the city, placed stress on governance structures as the bewonersorganisaties clashed with the new deelgemeenten; moreover, active residents were increasingly removed from the reality of the new multi-ethnic society. Pressures mounted for the decentralisation of RIO.\(^{309}\) Finally from 1990 onwards, the increased street congruence of diverse ethnic groups,
especially of young people, represented new challenges for opbouw werkers. This period illustrated the experience of Social Renewal in Rotterdam, aiming to revitalise the social fabric and bring hitherto isolated people into contact with each other via project-based initiatives such as Opzoomeren. Latterly, opbouw werkers have undertaken activities as part of BCP, Wijkaanpak and Heel de Buurt (see for instance Anon., 1998b). Again taking the district of Delfshaven as an example, Delphi, co-ordinates activities and employs opbouw werkers operating in neighbourhood bewonersorganisaties throughout the district (see case study).\textsuperscript{310}

Fourthly, a number of professional welfare organisations provide services for local residents in Rotterdam.\textsuperscript{311} Regarded as independent from the state, these organisations are nonetheless in receipt of virtually all their funding from the municipal and regional state. As hierarchical organisations, they are professionally operated in an efficient manner, and generally do not interface with local people, except as clients for their services. The Stedelijke Bureau Ander Werk (SBAW) (City Work Replacement Office) is a municipal level organisation which brings together a number of social welfare and employment activities, including welfare organisations, community development, social work and social cultural work (see case study).\textsuperscript{312} In addition, Stedelijke Adviesraad Ouderen (SAO) (City Advisory Committee on Policies for the Elderly), established in 1992 by the Rotterdam Municipality, aims to create opportunities for the integration of the elderly into the wider community (see SAO, 1998).\textsuperscript{313} SAO supplies advice, either on request or on its own accord, for Municipal policies on the elderly, many of whom live in conditions of poverty and are excluded from mainstream society (see Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998b). The advice it offers concentrates on general problems. Although the concerns of individuals or individual organisations are not considered, such issues certainly influence the formation of any written advice. There are five areas of policy addressed by SAO: (1) urban renewal and housing policies; (2) public areas, traffic and transport, police and public safety; (3) welfare, social renewal and professional market advice; (4) healthcare and social services; and (5) local advisory committees for the elderly, and administrative developments. The committee consists of a maximum of 12 members and a chairman, all of whom are at least 55 years of age in a massive reversal of policy changed its allegiance away from the bewonersorganisaties towards the new delphic. At the behest of the latter RIO went through a process of modernisation, including a new professional philosophy and a project-based approach, further estranging it from the grassroots. It was forced to disband in 1994, fragmenting into a number of district-specific organisations, like Stichting Delphi Opbouwwerk Rotterdam Delfshaven (Delphi) (Foundation Delphi for Community Development in Delfshaven) and Stichting Ondersteuning Opbouwerk Rotterdam (SONOR) (Community Development Support in Rotterdam) (see SONOR, 1997; interviews with Monique Peltenburg, IHS 4/6/98, Rieks Westrik, WS 21/9/98 and Hugo Mulder, SONOR 30/9/98).\textsuperscript{310}

and living in Rotterdam. Meetings are held six times a year and not open to the general public. Members are carefully selected through public application, and in turn act independently, not promoting the interests of any organisation or sector. *Kategoriale Rijnmonde Organisatie van Surinamers voor Beleidsbeinvloeding en Emancipatiebevordering* (KROSBE) (Specialist Rijnmonde Organisation for Surinamese People to Influence Policy and Stimulate Emancipation), supports local organisations: 'to promote better participation of Surinamese ethnic groups and companies' (see KROSBE, 1998).

*Kategoriale Rijnmonde Organisatie van Surinamers voor Beleidsbeinvloeding en Emancipatiebevordering* (KROSBE)

First established as a small self-organisation in 1984, KROSBE has grown into a large specialist foundation, operating from premises in Rotterdam with a remit covering the Rijnmonde region and the 'Drecht' cities (Dordrecht and Utrecht). It is secondary foundation providing support services for 'frontline' service organisations. According to the Director Kenneth Woei-a-Tsjoi, in general: ‘Surinamers face an unsatisfactory social position, experiencing disproportionately high rates of unemployment and levels of under-achievement in education’ (see KROSBE, 1998; see also Cüsters and Bons, eds., 1993; Voogt, 1994; Anderiesse et al., 1997; FORUM, 1997; and Staring et al., 1998). By seeking emancipation of Surinamers, KROSBE aims for full and equal integration of all Dutch people in a multi-ethnic society: economic integration by reducing unemployment; educational integration by lowering numbers of school repeaters and improving study skills; cultural integration by fostering a sense of multi-ethnic acceptance in Dutch society; and political integration by encouraging participation in the highest possible positions in all organisations. From 1987 a focus on employment, education and training took over of 50% of the budget, activities to include: cooperation with Job Centres wanting to recruit more ethnic minority workers; promotion of a pro-school attitude in parents; and provision of advice for self-organisations. Courses developed and supervised include: performing the role of Chair and leading organisations; developing assertiveness and skills of articulation; compilation of reports; everyday running of

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315 Migrant organisations have operated in the Netherlands since the early 1960s, financed directly by central government. With central government reorganisation and the creation of regional administration in 1994, money is now channelled to KROSBE through the Rijnmonde regional government. An acronym, KROSBE is also a Surinamese word for "close by" to people (interviews with Kenneth Woei-a-Tsjoi, KROSBE 11/9/98 and Fred May, KROSBE 11/9/98).
317 Recruitment for around 70% of jobs in the Netherlands occurs on an informal basis, in the main through a personal or family contact, meaning that one has a greater chance of securing employment with contacts in high places. A leading part of the philosophy at KROSBE therefore is to attain the highest possible positions for Surinamers in all organisations, including regional and national level organisations. KROSBE continues to campaign for at least one minister from the ethnic minorities in The Hague in the next political period, 1998-2002. In 1985 new legislation paved the way for individuals from ethnic minorities to enter municipal politics, previously the exclusive right of native Dutch citizens. From 1986 this issue has grown in importance.
KROSBE has achieved many beneficial outcomes for Surinamers in particular and ethnic minorities in general in Rotterdam. A programme was started in 1994 to reach and stimulate people for increased participation, on an equal basis, in political bodies such as the municipal government and district councils. Between 1994 and 1998 KROSBE helped raise the number of political representatives from ethnic minorities (mainly Surinamers) from 18 to 41 at the last local election. In the same period the number of members in the city council from ethnic minority backgrounds increased from 4 to 11. Similarly, a special project was initiated aiming to increase participation of ethnic minorities in local self-organisations by 400 within three years from 1996. By September 1998 KROSBE had already succeeded in placing 265 people. 

Primary School teacher training courses developed at KROSBE are rather successful, where all participants are formally qualified in two years (normally four in the country of origin). By 1998 120 people have attained the necessary teacher training certificate to teach in primary school, and the completion rate is as high as 90%, in compared with 50% for general Dutch projects. Ethnic minority people are also encouraged to participate on school boards. Efforts are made to encourage schools to adopt improved programmes for this participation, and set up schemes for parents to develop skills and abilities to participate in these mechanisms. These achievements are partly down to interaction with two other foundations of this kind - one working with Dutch Antillians and people from Aruba, and the other working with Turkish, Moroccan and other European people - all part of Stimulans, a forum for migrant issues across the city. Relations are of an inter-personal and client nature with the Municipality, and participation is an important policy issue, as Kenneth Woei-a-Tsjoel explains:

> If we have a guiding philosophy at all at KROSBE it is to work for, to actively encourage and bring about an equality of participation and representation in Dutch society ... in terms of the matters concerning people and decisions made on the level of boards of directors or within non-profit organisations ... participation of people in the activities of KROSBE occurs on a client and project ... basis, but ... local people cannot influence decision-making in KROSBE ... It is my opinion that in working for participation at the highest level, you have to start from somewhere, and you are also dealing with matters of participation at a very basic level.

(interview with Kenneth Woei-a-Tsjoel, KROSBE, 11/9/98).

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318 A number of issues emerged from this conference: (1) migrants are ashamed to say they are poor, and along with communication problems it is difficult to address their problems; (2) migrant families face particular budgetary issues: for one, many migrants have a family member in their country of origin who they still support financially, and as a result many have a strong tie with their country of origin, wanting to visit, say, Surinam once a year, incurring substantial travel costs; (3) cultures of migrant groups mean there are mutually supportive structures and relationships that can help people in a poverty situation, over native Dutch groups, especially for first generation migrants who cannot speak or understand Dutch; and (4) above all, unemployment is three to four times higher amongst migrant groups than with Dutch people, and as a result a higher proportion of people on or below the poverty-line are from ethnic minorities.
Despite the stress on the centrality of participation, local people cannot influence decision-making within KROSBE. The continued existence of KROSBE is evidence that much more is required to equalise the participation and address problems of poverty of Surinamers - indeed all ethnic minorities - in Dutch society.

**Municipal Poverty Policy**

Public concern with poverty in Rotterdam resurfaced in 1983 following the publication of the *Minima Zonder Marge* (Minimum Without Margins) report (see Oude Engberink, 1984). Yet despite some anti-poverty action and continued activism on the part of the Church, especially the Protestant Church, there was no official recognition of poverty until 1995 with the publication of the central government document *De Andere Kant van Nederland* (The Other Side of the Netherlands), bringing poverty to the political agenda in 1996 (see Gemeente Rotterdam, 1993; 1996; and 1998a). From 1988 the Municipal government in Rotterdam implemented a series of APS, and for Oude Engberink there are four discernible 'generations'. The first generation of policies was ad hoc and mostly initiated outside the state and subsequently taken over by the Municipality. They were generally concerned with social action whereby underprivileged people got involved in activities aimed at preventing their social isolation from mainstream society. The primary innovation in the city was the development of the Rotterdam Pas (Rotterdam Pass), a book of cheques for cost reduction access to social activities like admittance to zoos and swimming pools, and for courses in certain educational institutions (see Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998b). The initiative is still in operation today, covering over 120 elements, and from 1998 two strippenkaarten (strip travel tickets) are provided with the pass, which people on the social minimum can buy at the highly subsidised rate of NLG10 and lasting a year. If one parent buys a pass for NFL10, then children living at home can receive their own pass free. People not dependent on the social minimum pay the full price (NLG125), so all

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319 This document included a number of measures giving Municipalities more scope in the prevention and combat against poverty. Partly on the basis of this national policy document, but also largely at its own initiative, Rotterdam began developing its own official poverty policy, in addition to those developed since 1988, principally targeted at: (1) elderly people with General Old Age Pension (AOW) state pension without (or with a small) occupational pension (approx. 20,000 households); (2) long-term social benefit recipients who have received a benefit for three years or more (approx. 14,000 households); (3) benefit recipients with problematic debts (approx. 20,000 households); and (4) those on a minimum income with high fixed expenses (e.g. due to accommodation, illness or handicap (see Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998b).


321 Interviews with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 17/6/98 and 29/7/98.

322 This social minimum refers to an income at the level of social benefits only, and depending on the family situation refers to a maximum of NLG 1800 per month (see Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998b; also interviews with Rene van Engelen, Economic Affairs, Gemeente Rotterdam 9/6/98 and 9/9/98, Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98 and Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 4/9/98).
Rotterdam citizens, rich and poor, show the same pass for various activities, aiming to destigmatise poverty. It is an egalitarian and socially levelling anti-poverty initiative.

The second generation occurred between 1988-90 where projects were implemented to address problematic debt and the clearance of those debts (see Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998b). The concern with debt clearance began in Rotterdam when a certain energy company was operating at a loss and increasingly unable to meet its NLG60 million tax bill, mainly because its clients could not pay their bills. A group of civil servants in the city were instructed to develop a project to clear these debts, especially housing debts - a combination of energy bills and rents. Clearly a social measure, this policy was in essence a financial operation to save the local government, the energy company and the housing corporations from potential financial morass. Money for debt clearance came from two social benefit funds: (1) Algemeen Bijstands (General Assistance); (2) Bijzondere Bijstands (Special Assistance), and therefore engineered locally, but (unbeknown to them) about 90% financed by central government. For Gerard Oude Engberink, Director of CSPS in Rotterdam, manipulating benefits in this way was only possible because no regulatory limit was placed on them. In the first year debts were cleared in 4000 households, impacting directly on incomes of many poor people. Their debt however was not cleared entirely. About 50% of eligible households had their debt completely cleared due the severity of their problems. But if a person, or household, had only one debt or just a small debt, there was a mediation between the creditor and the individual whereby the latter paid about 10% for three years, becoming then a kind of 'final quittance' debt.

The third generation implemented in 1992 involved a more direct concern with financial income through development in 1992 of the new Balans Uitkering (Balance Benefit). With around

324 Interview with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98'.
325 This category of people later became a problem. About 25% of people did not have enough money to even pay 10% of their debt, largely due to rent hikes and increased energy bills. For these people the Municipality urged the creditors to defer debt repayments for one year, providing some short-term relief, but inevitably the same problem arose the following year. These people were appointed professional social workers to try keep them out of financial trouble, but this move was not really capable of getting people back on their feet. After all, with a few hundred guilders a month to their name there was little these people could do but fall into new debts. After three years the SZW department evaluated this policy. Around 40% of people with sanitised debt were back in debt, a situation that should have been impossible as they were unable to borrow more money. This 40% had got into financial difficulties in an informal way by borrowing from neighbours, friends and acquaintances. Many of them moreover were getting into problems with unscrupulous 'loan-sharks' who lent money at exorbitant rates of interest, especially to ethnic minorities still accustomed to this type of activity. A striking indication of this worsening debt situation was the re-emergence after well over half a century of pawn-shops in Rotterdam (interview with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98').
326 Despite a concern with financial income, this policy was ironically condoned by central government because it still officially denied there was poverty at all in the Netherlands. It therefore could not prevent municipalities from doing anything about it as this would elevate the issue and bring it to the attention of the public. It was the first time central government admitted, without words, that there was a problem that needed addressing. Notwithstanding the debt sanitation APS - which was directed at housing costs - there was little the municipality could do to prevent people being thrown out on to the streets by unscrupulous landlords - and with debts problems worsening, no politician in their right
NLG10 million still available from the Urban Renewal programme, the Municipality decided to spend this money to keep people in their homes in the renewal areas where rents had risen, proposing that these people would get a structured increase in their benefits each month. If someone was in receipt of social benefits and rent subsidies, but due to special circumstances simply did not have enough to cover the cost of living, then the Balans Uitkering served to 'balance' the difference, with a maximum limit of about NLG300 per application. For instance, certain individuals are overweight, others are diabetic: they need expensive tailored clothes or medication, where additional payments are unavoidable. The Balans Uitkering was designed to meet this special need, but failed completely. Only 1% of social security clients in Rotterdam expressed any interest - happening to coincide with the apogee of central government crackdown on benefit fraud - and people quite understandably thought Balans Uitkering was a decoy in the fight against fraud (see Oude Engberink, 1991). Like all benefits in the Netherlands it was means-tested, but contrary to popular belief was outside the normal procedure for social security claims, and was an innovative attempt at tailoring universal provision to particular anti-poverty ends.

The fourth generation (1994-98) involves a broad range of new measures in terms of social benefits, 'bottom-up' initiatives and mechanisms for the involvement of social security claimants (see Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998b). There are four main elements. Firstly, in continuation of the previous incomes approach, emancipation of social assistance increased the leniency of regulations and improved access to benefits. Bijzondere Bijstands (Special Assistance) was made available to all people on the social minimum, and not just those in receipt of Algemeen Bijstands (General Assistance). Individuals on 'additional labour schemes' (like Melkert jobs), became entitled to special benefits, such as childcare, spectacles and dietary products, the costs of which could not otherwise be met. Broadcasting on local TV and radio, advertisements in the local press and distribution of a Bijzondere Rotterdamse Uitkerings Gids (BRUG) (Rotterdam Special Benefit Guide) informed local people as to their possible entitlements. Secondly, from 1997 many local people were granted exemption from municipal taxes. People living on the 'social minimum', and renting accommodation, now do not have to pay Property...
Tax, saving them many thousands of guilders a year. In this way it became possible to waive taxes for the deprived, amounting to somewhere between 80-90,000 people in the city. Eligible beneficiaries do not have to request more money, and savings are made for the Municipality in terms of debt collection. As from 1998 exemption also applies to refuse collection charges.

Thirdly, a participation policy has led to the formation of 'client panels' across the city where social security claimants get a chance to voice their opinions (see case study). Finally, the Onbenutte Kwaliteiten project - known in Delfshaven as Sociaal Activering - seeks full participation of vulnerable and marginalised people in mainstream society through involvement in voluntary work and other social activities.330

Onbenutte Kwaliteiten (OK)/ Sociaal Activering (SA) in Rotterdam

The Onbenutte Kwaliteiten (OK) (Unused Qualities)/ Sociaal Activering (SA) (Social Activation) project targets the long-term unemployed, with little or no chance of gaining employment, and other vulnerable and marginalised people, offering them opportunity to get involved in socially useful voluntary work or other creative activities (see DISCK, 1998a; Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998b; 1998d; and Oude Engberink, 1998).331 By stressing its voluntary character this project aims to combat social isolation and loneliness of people in extreme poverty and social exclusion, without any element of compulsion or job-search obligation. The participant is the central figure, deciding what they can do and would like to do, supported by sociaal cultureel werkers in local buurthuisen. Through part-time voluntary activities - such as assisting at a community centre, child care and help for the elderly - individuals can participate in local community life, at least four hours a week, and receive their usual benefits plus NGL50 a month (4-10 hours a week) and NGL100 a month (10+ hours a week). Participants also have the choice of various courses, free-of-charge, including Dutch lessons (for ethnic minorities), lessons in hairdressing, administration courses, car maintenance - aiming to build confidence and raise self-esteem, sometimes (but not necessarily) for pre-vocational skills development. Local management of OK/SA offers advice and facilities to all interested parties, who interact via the work of a 'communication team'. OK Management Groups facilitate the co-operation of

330 The fourth generation has the potential for 'revolutionising' the whole benefits system in Rotterdam, but politicians and civil servants are beginning to question why more money should be made available when other departments need support. APS have arguably become more of an organisational question as different departments get pitted against each other in the competition for dwindling public funds. Ironically, as the state rationalises further, poverty becomes increasingly significant, especially as poverty is now accepted politically as a reality at the national level - so APS as a priority issue will attract new organisational resources. The question of anti-poverty at the municipal level is not one of benefits - they are centrally funded; it is the problem of the local municipality and the way it distributes its budget (interviews with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98 and 25/8/98, and Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 4/9/98).

between the Social Services Department, local organisations and district councils - the latter employing an OK manager. The OK project hinges on a network of OK ‘banks’ which offer activities and vacancies for potential participants, placed in local neighbourhood church halls or local service centres. Local people can arrange a meeting with a co-worker of the ‘bank’ to assist them find a suitable activity, aiming to facilitate full participation of vulnerable and marginalised people in the mainstream of Dutch society - and therefore viewing their individual participation as the end-state of anti-poverty action. As Arijen Dekker advises:

[]It is useful to make a distinction between types of participation - on the one hand there’s all those mechanisms for decisions how projects should look like ... Client Panels ... where the government gets people to advise how policy should be ... a more institutionalised conception of participation. Then there’s the more individualised methods of helping people, such as Social Activation ... I’m thinking of Giddens’s structuration theory and democracy in individual action, in agency ... helping people to be an agent, an important part of democracy and participation itself.

(interview with Arijen Dekker, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98).

Following current research at the CSPS in Rotterdam, the SA began in Delfshaven in 1995 at the neighbourhood level (in Het Nieuwe Westen), responding to the element of compulsion in various active labour market policies, and driven by the persuasive influence Gerard Oude Engberink, Director of the CSPS. Occurring in tandem with a similar development within Deelgemeente Delfshaven, the two merged as SA, retaining the original name while becoming OK two years later in the rest of the city, and later enlarged to cover the whole of Delfshaven through the co-ordinating activities of DISCK. With respect to participants: (1) around 50% see SA as the first step towards employment, whereas the other 50% have disregarded the perspective of paid work, happy with the social activities within the project; (2) others break off from the project completely, either due to deep personal problems, negative conceptions of the project and fear of involvement, or because they simply want paid work; and (3) participation is voluntary and based on an empowerment philosophy, but some people do not believe this - they feel they have to take part in activities because social workers say so. Research shows that in some cases social workers can use limited coercion, in an individual case sensitive way,

This research in Delfshaven is part of a larger project looking at SA and OK the whole of Rotterdam. Following an ‘action-research’ approach, this research involves interviews with participants and social workers, looking to get a sense of the extent to which people feel integrated. It also assesses the methodology of social workers. A three year project, it is currently entering the final stages (Interview with Arijen Dekker, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98). Involving the Labour Offices for the first time, active labour market policies were developed in the late 1980s and early 90s to find work for social security clients. There are three observable developments: (1) social obligations of clients became more strictly enforced; (2) levels of support to find people work or training increased; and (3) the emergence of ‘additional labour’ schemes. Not all groups could be helped, especially in Rotterdam where 50% of unemployed people were unlikely to work again. A more social approach was required (interview with Arijen Dekker, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98). SA is much larger than OK, employing 14 social workers compared to between two and five in the rest of the city. The project is well established in Delfshaven, but still in conceptualisations and implementation stage as OK. More significantly, the Delfshaven model follows an individual case approach, engaging with particular needs in line with an empowerment philosophy. The approach in the rest of the city follows a more 1980s market and consumerist model, with little or no engagement and empowerment in mind (interview with Arijen Dekker, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98).
to involve people in the project. With respect to social workers: (1) an individual case sensitive and tailored approach is general for Rotterdam, but particularly relevant in Delfshaven, where high value is placed on engagement with local people; and (2) against a long-standing tradition of paternalism in the Dutch welfare state, SA workers follow a concept of empowerment, where participants are helped to make their own decisions. \(^{335}\) Research shows it is very difficult to empower people without telling them what to do, but nonetheless this philosophy remains its defining feature, novelty and strength.

**Case Study: Stedelijke Bureau Ander Werk (SBAW)**

While there are many city-wide, specialist foundations delivering services to citizens in Rotterdam, SBAW illuminates issues of governance, APS and local involvement in novel ways. SBAW provides technical advice, guidance and support for project development in the field of social activation and active labour market policy for poorly educated and marginalised people excluded from the labour market in Rotterdam (see SBAW, 1997a; 1997b; and 1998). \(^{336}\) A highly professionalised and specialist *stichting* (foundation), it occupies an intermediate position between the Municipality and several individually aimed, front-line unemployment service organisations, performing an advisory and development function as a ‘think tank’ for Gemeente Rotterdam. SBAW is sub-divided into four divisions: (1) *projectontwikkeling* (project development), recognising three types of project; \(^{337}\) (2) *financiële ondersteuning* (financial support), including the direct provision of subsidies, a unique feature for a foundation; \(^{338}\) (3) *leasen* (leasing), providing help to projects with start-up difficulties, such as computer hardware; and (4) *maatschappelijk ondernemen* (social enterprise), including a platform where commercial interests can meet with non-governmental organisations to ‘socialise’ their image, but also to encourage social responsibility in business. SBAW is however not responsible for the delivery of services to unemployed people, but is responsible for: (a) creating the right conditions for

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\(^{335}\) Although starting to change, paternalism is strong in social services and care sector, especially in psychiatric help and support for the mentally disabled. Social work was paternalistic up to the 1960s, but from the 1970s social and cultural changes forced workers to abandon their paternalism, becoming very politicised. In the 1980s and 90s the ‘market’ became predominant - *a laisser-faire* approach, offering simply what the client says they want, with little or no needs-based engagement (interview with Arjen Dekker, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98’).

\(^{336}\) Interviews with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98’, Albert van Damme, SBAW 10/9/98¹ and Mark van der Eerden, SBAW 10/9/98². Unless otherwise stated the information that follows refers to interviews with Albert van Damme, SBAW 10/9/98¹ and Mark van der Eerden, SBAW 10/9/98². SBAW was established in 1986 amidst rapidly growing unemployment, and the initiation of additional labour schemes. The Municipality decided to reorganise these activities, bringing under together all organisations and people with an affinity with unemployed people. Previously organisations set up projects and retained responsibility for the performance of those projects. The *Centrum voor Dienstverlening* (Centre for Social Services) was formed, a specialist foundation with a municipal wide remit to make projects for unemployed people. In a sense it was a kind of offshoot from the Municipality, but organisationally independent from it. It was this organisation that evolved into SBAW as it is today. Latterly SBAW helps set up projects, but responsibility is devolved to the projects - they can no longer hide behind the Municipality if things go wrong.

\(^{337}\) These three kinds of projects are: those aiming at *refusant* - for revitalisation of knowledge and skills of SBAW in existing projects; those that are *innovators* - new but highly insecure projects; and those that are *transferable* - given proven success for replication in other neighbourhoods.
front-line organisations; (b) undertaking research, for itself and other organisations; (c) experimentation to reach new target groups with poor or no access to the labour market; (d) an advisory role to reshape the activities of various organisations to maximise socially useful activities among the unemployed; and (e) project implementation. SBAW employees 18 professional people, filling 11 full-time posts, with an annual budget (1997) of NLG2.4 million. As a foundation it is independent from the Municipality, but heavily subsidised by it (90%) - the rest of its funding comes from other organisations, mainly local government, that purchase SBAW services. As revealed by Albert van Damme and Mark van der Eerden - Project Developer and Director respectively - SBAW is the only organisation in Rotterdam that provides technical knowledge and support for unemployment projects without engaging as an emotionally involved party.

The types of project that SBAW help develop and support cover a broad range of activities, from administration and IT (especially computer courses) to social services (day-care, youth-help, taking care of the elderly), public green maintenance and recycling. The kind of employment created in these activities can take a number of different forms, reflecting the various types of 'additional labour' scheme in operation in the city: (1) a job plus an additional settlement on usual benefits; (2) regular employment in intermediate labour markets (ILM); (3) the Jongerenpool (Youth Pool), a pool of work especially created for young people; (4) the Banenpool, a non age-specific 'job pool'; (5) the Melkertbanen (Melkert Jobs), artificially created through 100% subsidy for the lowest segment of the labour market for activities like street cleaning and ticket inspection on trams; (6) voluntary work; and (7) prospects for social enterprise. On a national level it was decided in 1997 that employment and social benefit institutions should combine their strengths towards one clear objective aimed at the problems associated with long-term unemployment. Part of the new projects that year were carried out together with Werk In Uitvoering (WIO) (Work in Progress), a similar organisation as SBAW in Rotterdam. The Onbenutte Kwaliteiten (OK) project figures highly in the work at SBAW (see example) - in fact the Gemeente Rotterdam asked SBAW to develop it, and since 1997 has helped its implementation as part of the new goals of the deelgemeenten across the city.339

SBAW targets organisations that deal with people out of work for long periods of time, often in a vulnerable social position and isolated from the mainstream of Dutch society. In this way SBAW tackles poverty indirectly. While not engaging in front-line poverty issues, as in social work, it does provide funding, support, development and other services for other organisations that look

338 Projects must meet the following criteria to be eligible to receive subsidies: (1) projects that improve personal skills of people; (2) projects that require education that cannot be met by regular supply of formal courses; (3) projects that encourage local neighbourhood facilities; and (4) projects that are socially innovative.
339 For 80% of the time SBAW is institutionalising a project that already exists. The remaining 20% is spent dealing with completely new and experimental projects, ones that are often creative and innovative. SBAW is probably the only organisation in Rotterdam that can develop projects from initial ideas without the constraints of paperwork, regulations and bureaucracy, giving some sense of the benefits of its status as an independent governance institution.
to develop 'additional employment'. Taking a labour market and employment conception of anti-poverty, SBAW supports projects aiming to reduce long-term unemployment through socially useful activities that are couched as jobs for marginalised people, reminiscent of approaches advocated within the EC. While it is fanciful to talk of US style 'workfare' in the Rotterdam context, these activities are certainly representative of a recasting of rights and duties in welfare, with an increasing emphasis on the latter. Many organisations in Rotterdam try placing people in jobs from the 'cream' of the unemployment list, people that could well have found work on their own. SBAW tries to go one level below, targeting organisations for particularly disadvantaged people, such as those with disabilities, psychiatric illness and self-esteem problems. Conversely, SBAW does reach out to a wider audience - often more affluent, middle class individuals and organisations, as well as those for more disadvantaged, working class people - encouraging social enterprise and social responsibility within the commercial sector.

Although SBAW is small, it is a hierarchical organisation dealing with local people as clients in a paternalistic manner, especially through the OK project and other initiatives for the unemployed. As Albert van Damme, a Project Developer at SBAW, explains:

No ... No ... we do not get local people involved directly in the management of this organisation; that is not something we do here ... I mean, we work with local people as clients especially with the OK project. Actually, SBAW only deals with projects: they start as a good idea from an individual, and we form it into an organisation, away from individual entrepreneurs ... that's how SBAW deals with individuals ... it could be for an individual, but [the] process goes through as if a firm - [SBAW is] probably the only organisation in Rotterdam which can develop projects from initial ideas without paperwork, regulations and other bureaucracy ... I'm currently working on a project for 'OK people' who have a vague idea - suffer low self-esteem, think they cannot do anything, but have the ideas and skills ... but you have to draw it out of them ... no ... that's how we work for local people.

(interview with Albert van Damme, SBAW 10/9/98).

Reflecting a de-politicisation (in a party political sense) of unemployment issues, SBAW project development and support services are handled by neutral professionals, and not self-interested and partisan political figures. Providing an advisory function to the Municipality, SBAW brings local activists in contact with policy-makers in the Municipality. While relations with the Municipality are generally positive, representatives from SBAW are candid about the enduring tensions between the municipal bureaucracy the quasi-business philosophy of SBAW. It would be misleading to consider SBAW as an intermediary between the municipality and the districts, as if on a continuum of knowledge, information and power. A more diffuse organisation, it represents devolved responsibility from the official state apparatus, but where knowledge, expertise and power remain intact across all organisations. Occupying this intermediate
Rise in Non-State APS

In addition to networks of bewonersorganisaties engaging in community development activities that predominate anti-poverty activity at the neighbourhood level, three types of non-state APS are identified in Rotterdam: (1) church initiatives; (2) radical initiatives; and (3) social economy. The Church, in particular the Protestant Church, was pivotal in bringing the issue of poverty to the attention of the Dutch government, providing many innovative anti-poverty projects and campaigning for public action. While various small scale Catholic and Protestant initiatives operate at the neighbourhood level, the Protestant Paulus Kerk in the centre of Rotterdam provides services for deprived and marginalised people across the whole city. There are a few instances of grassroots radicalism and autonomous community activism in addition to the political success of the Socialistische Partij (SP) in Rotterdam, but they are usually the exception rather than the rule in a governance culture where such extremes are often tolerated and subsidised by the state. The Stichting Uitkerings Gerechtigden Bloemhof Afrikaanderwijk (SUGBA) (Foundation for Social Justice in Bloemhof and Afrikaanderwijk) is a notable exception, an action group following a classical Marxist conception of class struggle. The social economy exists in a rather formal partnership with the local state, reflecting the incorporated and highly statist character of governance in Rotterdam. While functioning in partnership with district government, the Ontwikkeling Maatschappij Ijsselmonde (OMIJ) (Ijsselmonde Development Company) is a notable exception displaying a strong commercial orientation, more as a social business than as a welfare organisation. More generally the tradition of the Particulier Initiatif based on distinctive pillars in Rotterdam - as in the Netherlands as a whole - has increasingly incorporated into an overall statist rationality, especially following implementation of the 1964 Social Assistance Law and in the wider context of de-pillarisation. The arrival of an incorporated governance model makes the definition of non-state action difficult as the activities of all organisations operate in one form or another under the influence of the state.

340 Overleg is difficult to translate, referring to something close to *consulting* or *multiple consultation* in English. The cornerstone of the famous Dutch *polder model*, it implies that representatives from organisations inform and check all possible institution and people who can tackle their policy, making them accomplices as if they invented the policy themselves. Full co-operation with the commercial sector over policies for the unemployed is questionable as it tends to follow its own approach to *overleg* (personal correspondence with Frank van Oort, IEG, EUR 13/4/99).
6. Governance of APS in Rotterdam

Church Initiatives

While there are examples of social work in general and action against poverty in particular within the Catholic Church, the most significant anti-poverty activities are undertaken by the Protestant Church in Rotterdam. DISK is a Catholic organisation providing pastoral services for industrial workers in Rotterdam, especially those in the old, declining industries on the southern bank of the Maas River around Feijenoord. Working closely with the Catholic trade unions, DISK developed a critical and radical social perspective on poverty, based on rights to jobs and welfare in industrial society. As with trade unionism its importance has declined in parallel with the rise of post-industrialism in Rotterdam. The Kerkelijk Informatie & Overlegplatform Inzake Sociale Kwesties (KIOSK) provides a church based forum for debate on social issues relating to unemployment and the fight against poverty (see KIOSK, 1998a; and 1998b). Other strands, such as the ecumenical Kerkelijk Sociale Arbeid (KSA) and the Catholic Calama Group, focus attention on social work issues, including poverty and unemployment, where armoede (poverty) is generally understood as a complex phenomenon, where individuals and communities require assistance in developing the 'social tools' to help themselves. The Oude Wijken Pastoraat is another Catholic initiative where enlightened individuals operate in deprived neighbourhoods, dealing with the realities of everyday life for those living in conditions of poverty. Providing 'drop-in' facilities for local residents, this initiative centres on neighbourhoods like Het Oude Westen. It is however the Protestant Church that initiates the most significant anti-poverty activities in Rotterdam, supported by the Dutch Council of Churches and the Arme Kant van de Nederland social movement at the national level, most notably the Paulus Kerk in the city centre.

Paulus Kerk

Established in 1980, the Paulus Kerk, a Calvinist initiative led by the radical vision of the colourful and charismatic Rev. Hans Visser, provides support services - such as emergency shelter, social work, pastoral care, advocacy and assistance - for marginalised people, including drug addicts, sexual 'deviants', prostitutes, alcoholics, homeless people and asylum seekers.
Financed by a combination of state and church funds, this organisation employs 25 paid staff and involves over 200 volunteers in all types of initiatives. Conceptualising poverty as a social evil, the Paulus Kerk adopts the slogan - Overwin Het Kwadedoor Het Goede (Overcoming Evil with Good) - as its guiding philosophy. Rather than representing typical bourgeois charity, Hans Visser's perspective for 'radical opposition' begins with the view that poor people have little or no political voice, following Herbert Gans. While taking the view that local voluntarism cannot alter the structures of the global capitalism, he sides with Manuel Castells claiming that local networks of solidarity can counter structures where the state takes an integral part. From this basis the Paulus Kerk provides: (1) a campaigning function on behalf of the poor to strike a balance between state dependency and individual autonomy, including popular involvement in street demonstrations; (2) a controversial liberal drugs policy aiming to regulate drug dealing and use (including hard drugs like heroin) by permitting these activities on the church premises; (3) a refugee policy providing emergency shelter for individuals and their families, in addition to organising protests to raise awareness on the plight of asylum seekers; and (4) an unemployment policy where individuals from the streets can work in security and cleaning jobs, or indeed sell the Straatkrant magazine - similar to The Big Issue in the UK - the offices for which are located in the same building. The Moroccan community is considered an important target group for policy.

Critical of classical Marxism - which he claims has 'little relevance to the city' - Visser advocates grassroots solidarity for gradual reform based on Castells, while engaging in direct action against poverty often in open conflict with the local state. In the late 1980s an area immediately behind the Central Station ('Platform Zero') became a place often visited by drug addicts, prostitutes, homeless people and other déclassé members of society. The Mayor, Peper, authorised their compulsory dispersal with nowhere else for them to go. Following a series of confrontations with Peper, Visser permitted them to reside in the Paulus Kerk, a decision instantly met with a barrage of controversy, especially over the liberal drugs policy. Paulus Kerk openly encourages the full participation of individuals, where collective resistance through civil (dis-)obedience is the preferred route to social justice over 'violence'. Visser is nonetheless candid about the problems in mobilising individuals at the grassroots. He claims desperately poor and marginalised people are tired and lack energy, possess a hopelessly pessimistic sense of the future where it 'makes no sense to participate', and whose lives are debilitated by short-term strategies in the search for cash. Under these circumstances it is difficult to motivate the populace towards a gradual strategy of reform.

347 Interview with Hans Visser, Paulus Kerk 24/6/98.
Radical Initiatives

There are similar radical currents within non-state APS in secular society, the most immediate expression being the recent growth in the electoral support for the Dutch Socialisthe Partij, both nationally in The Hague with the Jan Marijnissen and in Rotterdam under the leadership of Chris van Heuman (see Marijnissen, 1996; Hoofdstemburo, 1998a; 1998b; SP, 1998a; 1998b; and 1998d; see table 11). Recognising that classical Marxism was not going to win votes, from the early 1990s the SP altered its ideology from revolutionary class struggle, towards democratic socialism as an alternative to neo-liberalism. Adopting a more pragmatic, humanistic and parliamentary form of radicalism, the SP - both nationally and locally in Rotterdam - encourages more active popular involvement in the public realm. Campaigning against the divisive effects of neo-liberalism, the SP follows a methodology of direct engagement with residents, raising awareness of real needs (over benefits, housing issues) and canvassing for political support into the bargain. Local residents in Rotterdam are often positive about this socialist alternative, especially to counter the mobilisation of Far Right extremism in poor Dutch districts like Feijenoord. The existence of two socialist councillors on the municipal council serves to democratise the local political debate, raising awareness among the other parties as to the issues affecting the lives of local people. Not all radical APS have turned to a parliamentary methodology, however, as illustrated by SUGBA.

Stichting Uitkerings Gerechtigden Bloemhof Afrikaanderwijk (SUGBA)

Established in 1983, SUGBA began life as a small action group bringing together various residents with radical backgrounds from Bloemhof and Afrikaanderwijk, looking to undertake action against poverty. At this time the first Christian Democratic cabinet of Lubbers was implementing a series of liberal reforms, including an annual reduction in benefit levels. Organising a protest against these changes, SUGBA realised the problems were structural, not incidental, requiring more concerted organisation and mobilisation of residents. Unlike almost all other organisations in Rotterdam, SUGBA is completely autonomous from the state, financed solely by charitable donations: 'in the 80s we decided not to be [state] subsidised because we would be attached ... they are controlling you ... and before you know it they're telling you what to do, not residents'. Conceptualising poverty as the structural consequence of capitalism

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349 Focus group interviews with Christine, SP, IJsselmonde resident 25/9/98, Kevin Dixon, SP, Delfshaven resident 25/9/98, Rick Schonenberg, SP, Oude Noorden resident 25/9/98, Erik Meijer, SP 25/9/98.
350 Interviews with Hans Visser, Paulus Kerk 24/6/98, Chris van Heuman 8/9/98, 25/9/98 and 29/9/98, Daan Keller, SUGBA 9/10/98 and 14/10/98, and Annie, SUGBA 14/10/98. Unless stated otherwise the following information refers to the interview with Daan Keller, SUGBA 9/10/98.
351 The original founders considered calling the organisation CUBA, but later dropped the idea when they realised this abbreviation was too politically loaded, especially as many of them were former radicals in the PvdA, communist trade unionists and activists from the peace movement.
Table 11: Change in electoral support for Socialistische Partij in the Netherlands (1994-98)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>swing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnhem</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breda</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Eindhoven</td>
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<td>6.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emmen</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enschede</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Groningen</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
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</tr>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leiden</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maastricht</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nijmegen</td>
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<td>7.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
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<td>Tilburg</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Zwolle</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Netherlands 3.8

Notes: * Figures taken from General Elections in 1994 and 1998
Source: adapted from Hoofdstemburo (1998a)

Based on classical Marxism - and recognising that poverty is not an issue of unemployment alone - SUGBA adopts an anti-dogmatic and organic approach to popular involvement, where all participants are committed to the betterment of society based on common-sense and the real-life experiences of people. There are two main strands to SUGBAs activities: (1) radical protest and campaigning, advancing a conflict model of community activism against the policy decisions of the authorities; and (2) welfare services providing for people needing assistance with benefit claims and other issues. While initially dealing with the issues affecting residents in Bloemhof and Afrikaanderwijk, SUGBA now covers a Rotterdam wide remit, and also includes work with individuals and organisations in places like Spijkenisse to the south west of the city.

During the early years SUGBA successfully mobilised many vulnerable individuals, such as the elderly and other dependent groups. Local activism peaked around 1986 in the context of policies implemented by the second cabinet of Lubbers, and again in the early 1990s with resistance to initiatives of the first Social Democratic cabinet of Kok. One of Daan Keller's more amusing anecdotes refers to the occasion in 1985 when SUGBA managed to get the Mayor - the powerful and authoritarian Bram Peper - summoned to court (much to his annoyance) in relation to a scandal over police brutality. Turkish market traders were increasingly dismayed with the conditions and pay of their work, organising a strike and asking SUGBA to attend as a display of solidarity and to prevent the event escalating into a racial conflict. During the strike around twenty policemen - authorised by Peper, who had acquired a reputation as a tough law enforcer in Rotterdam - interrupted the proceedings with a display of brutality without any warning. While nothing came of the hearing, SUGBA had collected money from the immediate vicinity amounting to NGL 3000 (interview with Daan Keller, SUGBA 9/10/98).
SUGBA protagonist, refers to the 'duty to point out ... and prick the balloon that is blown by the propaganda and the wishful thinking of the government', and although the situation today is relatively dormant, disappointments with the second cabinet of Kok are mounting, especially since 1996 with the official government strategy against poverty. Not a party political organisation, anyone can attend SUGBA meetings - including housewives and senior citizens who may never have attended meetings before, although fascist and racist organisations are strictly forbidden. Encouraging a common, everyday sense of social injustice among Rotterdammers, SUGBA avoids 'top-down' imposition of dogmatic platitudes, leaning towards a more radical, 'bottom-up' approach. As Daan Keller explained, the mobilisation of residents is a cyclical process, where people tend to be more active with the advent of new governments and policies, and it is generally (but not exclusively) the same people each time.\(^{355}\) Individuals from ethnic minorities tend to use the welfare services of SUGBA but rarely participate in protests alongside the native Dutch. For Daan Keller many previously active people are tired, having to acknowledge that changes are always marginal and that radical activism faces \textit{stasis} where are all those involved know each other, effectively institutionalising certain individuals as 'monuments' to radicalism rather than instigators of change - a problem for all radical initiatives in Rotterdam. Other projects seek to merge social and economic aspects without radical activism.

\textit{Social Economy}

While SBAW supports social economy employment projects and encourages social responsibility in the commercial sector across the whole of Rotterdam, there are only few examples of novel social economy projects in the city.\(^{354}\) As revealed by Sietze van der Hoek and Marian van der Lely from the Deelgemeente Ijsselmonde, a cluster of social economy projects exist in the district of Ijsselmonde - those providing pre-vocational training and socially-useful employment - but also for the 'creation' of new jobs within existing companies through state subsidies. For instance \textit{Stichting En Route} involves young men between the ages of 17-23 with social and behavioural problems - many suffering from drug problems with a criminal history - in pre-vocational activities for the development of social skills and then improving their prospects for employment. Channelling government money form the \textit{Jongerenpool}, Stichting En Route acts as an intermediary organisation between the individual and the formal labour market. Working with youngsters across the whole city, 40 places are provided in Ijsselmonde - where participants learn to make bicycles for low-income countries - supported by the

\(^{355}\) Just a few streets away from the new \textit{Kop van Zuid} regeneration on the southside, many disenfranchised residents in Bloemhof and Afrikaanderwijk - those by-passed by this process of gentrification - rather amusingly refer to the area as the \textit{Kontzan Zuid}, the 'Arse of the South'. Rotterdammers tend to be critical of their own city, but will vehemently defend it if derogatory statements are made about it by people from the 'outside'.

\(^{354}\) Interviews with Sietze van der Hoek, Deelgemeente Ijsselmonde 29/6/98\(^1\), Marian van der Lely, Deelgemeente Ijsselmonde 29/6/98\(^2\), Peter Franken, Stichting En Route 8/9/98\(^3\), Henk Kosse, Director OMIJ 11/9/98\(^4\) and 8/10/98\(^4\),
Jongerenpool and Deelgemeente Ijsselmonde. *Rijnmond Supplies* is a strictly commercial company set up in 1993/94 supplying computers and printers, and employing eight disabled people for a minimal wage. As Willem Rottevee, the Director of the company, exclaimed in no uncertain terms: 'this company is about normalisation, participation and acceptance ... but at the end of the day, I don't give a shit about "acceptance" - I'm here to make money.' This company, along with *Pameijekeerke Ring Stichting* - a social care and welfare organisation for disabled people - and *Ontwikkeling Maatschappij Ijsselmonde (OMIJ)*, provides the main trinity of social economy projects in Ijsselmonde. OMIJ also covers a wider geographical area.

*Ontwikkeling Maatschappij Ijsselmonde (OMIJ) (Ijsselmonde Development Company)*

Established in 1994 and formally registered a company in 1995, OMIJ is a 'social business' employing around 250 mentally and physically disabled people alongside 'abled' long-term unemployed people in low skill service jobs across 13 sites in Ijsselmonde. As the enigmatic Director and former community developer, Henk Kosse, put it: 'you ask [for it], [we] do [it] ... well, not literally everything, but all sorts of work that is too expensive for a normal company to undertake ... as long as you pay for it'. Keen to differentiate OMIJ from more explicit welfare organisations, Kosse stresses the combination of its social and commercial objectives: 'I don't want [OMIJ] to be a charity!'. Offering services inexpensively and the chance for employees to develop their labour market skills, OMIJ employs three groups of people: (1) those from the Banenpool; (2) physically disabled people; and (3) those on the Melkert 1 Banen scheme. The novelty of the project lies in the combined employment of all three types of worker. Based on a supportive, self-help philosophy, OMIJ aims to 'help people to help themselves' by engaging people in socially useful work for a small payment. A difficult process, especially where many employees suffer debilitating handicaps, but an organisation where on the whole - as one employee put it '99% of the time' - the positive social benefits tend to outweigh the constraints. Services provided include housing repair and maintenance, washing and laundry, collecting, repairing and selling second hand goods, security, care for the elderly, environmental improvements and street cleaning, with clients stretching across the whole of Rotterdam - including local governments and housing corporations - and in the outskirts like Capelle a.d. IJssel.

and Willem Rottevee, *Rijnmond Supplies* 8/10/98;
355 Interview with Willem Rottevee, *Rijnmond Supplies* 8/10/98;
356 Interviews Sietze van der Hoek, Deelgemeente Ijsselmonde 29/6/98, Marian van der Lely, Deelgemeente Ijsselmonde 29/6/98, Henk Kosse, Director OMIJ 11/9/98 and 8/10/98, Vincent Kiaan, OMIJ 15/10/98, Edward Grabijn, OMIJ 15/10/98, Monique van der Sanden, OMIJ 15/10/98, Cora van der Heen, OMIJ 15/10/98, Irene Prinsen, OMIJ 15/10/98 and Betsey Geven, OMIJ 15/10/98. Unless otherwise stated the information that follows refers to the interviews with Henk Kosse, OMIJ 11/9/98 and 8/10/98.
357 Vincent Kiaan, OMIJ 15/10/98, Edward Grabijn, OMIJ 15/10/98, Monique van der Sanden, OMIJ 15/10/98, Cora van der Heen, OMIJ 15/10/98, Irene Prinsen, OMIJ 15/10/98 and Betsey Geven, OMIJ 15/10/98.
While the creation, development and success of OMIJ is attributed to the energy, dynamism and vision of the Director, in collaboration with two other key individuals at the local level, OMIJ greatly benefited from a grant from Ijsselmonde District Council, a major client for OMIJs services. While contributing to its success, this relationship raises issues around the provision of ‘cut price’ services otherwise supplied by the state, and therefore by implication the exploitation of OMIJ employees. The organisation is a business and not a charity. It would however be fanciful to claim that OMIJ does not place a high importance on the social integration of employees - including new friendships and social contact expressed positively by many - regardless of low throughput to the mainstream economy (10%) and limited financial benefits. One employee, however, expresses a down-side of ‘integration' within OMIJ:

I’ve come to think now that, that atmosphere is a kind of negative thing ... sometimes I think ... yes, yes ... because everyone is learning and training and everyone has a ‘spot’ - difficulties, getting to work ... (let’s talk about me) ... sometimes it’s hard not to think ‘well, it’s not all real, it’s like ... it’s playing, it’s not real work’. But it is real work, but because of that atmosphere sometimes you think, well they’re all amateurs, I can’t learn anything from them. You have to be alert to stay on top of things, to follow your own goals.

(interview with Vincent Kiaan, OMIJ 15/10/98').

The future vibrancy of OMIJ relies on the extent that it can secure enough customers for its services without unfairly undercutting the commercial sector, for Henk Kosse contingent on the ability to bend the rules in order to ‘play the game’ and strike deals to make things happen. Whether this ‘game’ can continue to integrate handicapped and long-term unemployed people depends on the extent OMIJ can avoid the certain liberal and conservative undercurrents of compulsion within the Dutch social security system:

We are not really being pushed to work here, but there is some pressure from social security of course ... and if you say ‘well, I don’t want to do it’ they ask you why not ... there is an element ... there is from the social security, and also (you don’t have to follow that but...) family, friends - they ask you what you do, ‘do you have a job?’ So, there is some pressure. Also you have to show social security that you’ve written letters for jobs. Otherwise they can take your benefits away.

(interview with Vincent Kiaan, OMIJ 15/10/98').

Case Study: Bewonersorganisaties in Delfshaven (BD)

If the preceding examples of non-state APS reflect particular and sometimes unique aspects of governance, the network of bewonersorganisaties provide the institutional framework for opbouw werk and help mobilise local residents for neighbourhood regeneration. While broadly representative of similar networks in other district, the network of BD illustrates typical activities, emerging issues and the governance tensions apparent at the neighbourhood level in Rotterdam (see Koopman and Lammers, 1992; Custers and Bos, 1993; BANW, 1994; 1997;
A number of fully state subsidised residents organisations comprise this Delfshaven network, each covering a certain local neighbourhood: Bewonersorganisatie Bospolder-Tussendijken (BBT), Bewonersorganisatie Delfshaven-Schiemond (BDS), Bewonersorganisatie Middelland (BM), Aktiegroep Het Nieuwe Westen (BANW) and Bewonersorganisatie Oud Mathenesse/ Het Witte Dorp (BOMWD). Before 1994 the Bewonersorganisatie Spangen (BOS) and the Bewoners Verneniging Spangen (BVS) were previously active in Spangen, but recent conflicts have since fragmented local synergies and minimised their role. The Steunpunt Opvoeding en Gezondheid (SOG) (Education and Health Centre) is located in Bospolder, and the whole network is co-ordinated by the Central Bureau Delphi situated in Historic Delfshaven. Activities include: sociaal verniewing, Opzoomeren en active bewoners (social renewal, Opzoomeren and residents activity); het buurt overleg beheer (neighbourhood management); wijkveiligheid en criminaliteit (neighbourhood security and criminality); stadsvernieuwing (urban renewal); de herinrichting van der straat en het straatmeubilair (maintenance of streets and street furniture); de wijkraantje (community newspaper); publiciteit en informatie (publicity and information); de

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The mainstay of resident led community development, BOS represents the civic consciousness of the white, so-called 'respectable' native Dutch working class in Spangen. Established in the early 1970s it represented the residents of Spangen throughout the heyday of urban renewal. Bringing together residents, civil servants, planners and politicians, the Project Group facilitated discussion and sometimes conflict, but for Riëks Westrik - a seasoned community development worker in Spangen - this 'discussion' did not mean that the bureaucrats and politicians were able to communicate properly with residents. The influx of new social groups, such as students and ethnic immigrants, accelerating from the 1970s onwards has problematised the process of resident mobilisation - and despite a Turkish and Moroccan self-organisation in Spangen, communication and interaction with ethnic minority residents became ever more difficult. By the late 1980s the approach at BOS came under great strain, and in 1991 a number of residents transgressed the discursive model advocated at BOS, adopting a philosophy of direct action. Outraged by the amount of rubbish accumulating in the neighbourhood, they collected many dustbin bags and started a large fire in demonstration against the Municipality - an action splitting BOS into two rival camps and leading to the formation of BVS in 1993 comprising methods of direct action. Nicknamed 'the Union', the BVS saw BOS and the community development workers as enemies, creating tensions and culminating in quarrels among residents. By 1994 BOS wound down to the extent only the buwtumkd service remains of the former remit. Although still operating in some capacity, BVS officially ceases to function in January this year, suffering at the hands of short-termism and organisational problems. Interface with local residents increasing follows a more informalised approach as part of the social renewal philosophy (interviews with Riëks Westrik, WS 21/9/98 and Ria Leurs, WS, Spangen resident 6/10/981).

The most publicised example of residents action against criminality occurred in Spangen, where Annie Verdoold - a longstanding white, native Dutch inhabitant - formed an action group in the early 1990s committed to banishing both drug trafficking dealing and 'drug tourism' from the neighbourhood. Assisted by social workers and community development workers, the local self-organisation arranged road blocks preventing the passage of cars with foreign number plates through the locality. Oustensibly owned by drug-seekers, number plates were removed from any foreign cars in the area, indicating the purpose of their visit to the authorities. Attracting a great deal of attention in media and political circles, the personal standing of Annie Verdoold was raised alongside a reduction (but not eradication) of drugs related activities in the area (interviews with Wilfried Dolfsma, Economics Art and Culture, EUR 4/5/98, Maryk Huijsman, IHG 4/6/981, Monique Peltenburg, IHS 4/6/981, Hans Lopik, Marconiplein Police Department 15/9/981, Arjen Dekker, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/981, Conrad Bons, BOOM 18/9/981, Riëks Westrik, WS 21/9/98 and Ria Leurs, WS, Spangen resident 6/10/981).

References


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buurtwinkels (neighbourhood advice shops); samenwerken (social workers); and samen leven en samen feesten (social life and social feasts). Activities are fully subsidised by the state.

The BD are less about explicit APS and more about participatory community development in the context of extreme deprivation at the neighbourhood level. Guided by professionals (especially the community development workers), the BD are the result of the hard work and ingenuity of active residents and institutionalised civil groups in the respective neighbourhoods. All those involved are committed to their neighbourhoods, actively attempting to make them more liveable in terms of safety and cleanliness. Comprising a network structure, these bewonersorganisaties hold a fixed pattern of compulsory meetings: when a resident discerns a new need or set of needs, a ‘board’ of participating representatives is convened forming a discursive ‘platform’. In Het Nieuwe Westen 50 out of the 70 streets have at least one contact person as a representative on the neighbourhood board. Communication between ‘contacts’ is achieved through distribution of a monthly newsletter alongside the minutes of the previous neighbourhood platform. Individuals representatives and community development professionals function as partners in organising the more formal monthly neighbourhood consultation meeting (overleg), where information is exchanged between participants. During the monthly meeting, the buurt overleg beheer (neighbourhood co-ordination consultants) co-ordinate and consult with the police, local service providers, residents and other municipal institutions over the key issues facing the locality, acting as the intermediaries between the daily life of residents and various institutions of the state. The BD are independent foundations, but totally dependent on state subsidies for funding. As Ria Leurs pointed out: 'when you get money to do the things you want to do, the Municipality ... have a great control over you. You have to watch what you say and do, or else'!

Every new year a plan for the neighbourhood is presented in co-operation with local schools, elderly-organisations, housing corporations, police, social-cultural organisations and municipal institutions - the Dutch 'neighbourhood approach' - and a slogan within BANW is 'Don't talk, do!', typical of the pragmatic governance in Rotterdam, but arguably contrasting the more general notion of overleg (see BANW, 1998). Rieks Westrik, a community

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361 For Rieks Westrik the advent of social renewal in general and Opzoeken in particular in Spangen was 'a present from heaven' in the context of tense community politics and intra-neighbourhood rivalries. Opzoeken presented the chance to transcend these conflicts and work towards new social relations within neighbourhoods beyond the more limited concern with housing and street maintenance. More successful than most other neighbourhood, the process manages to involve around half of residents, compared to an average of a third elsewhere. Myrna (Mamita) Lourens, an articulate and vivacious lady speaking seven languages and originally from Curacao, was concerned with drug dealing on her street, based in the residence of an elderly drunk opposite her own home in Spangen. Looking to 'clean' up the street, she informed the police of the activities, but fearing for her own safety she came across the idea for a street party to bring all residents of the street together to break down habitual isolation of different people and display collective resistance against the dealers. Securing a grant from social renewal funds a party was held on 5 September 1998 to general positive acclaim (interviews with Rieks Westrik, WS 21/9/98 and Myrna 'Mamita' Lourens, WS, Spangen resident 23/9/98).

362 The problem of the representativeness of decision-making is called into doubt and reflects an enduring problem for local community level practitioners. On average around a hundred people attend public meetings at this level. As only a small handful of residents sit on the board, there inevitably arises the problem of 'skew' in the representation of the local population. The involvement of individuals from ethnic minorities remains particularly difficult.

363 Interview with Ria Leurs Ria Leurs, WS, Spangen resident 6/10/98).
development worker in Spangen, spoke of the need for more informalised interaction with residents to attempt dealing with social diversity:

When it's formalised in, say, the BOS and the BVS ... you've got a board, you have all the more localised versions of mayors - they go to the district council and claim they speak for 10,000 Spangeners! ...You get a lot of division and quarrels where you talk on that level. We often say 'Spangen doesn't exist! There is no one Spangen!' There is no Spangen ... because for everyone it's different ... different horizons ... You need to have to think about new models to get into contact with people. We try to do that ... In Dutch we call it 'on the coffee' - drinking with people in different streets to talk to people that way ... [developing] more informal contacts.

(interview with Rieks Westrik, WS 21/9/98).

Projects for social renewal indeed encourage more informal interface with people, aiming to develop what Jan Willem Duyvendak terms 'boundary traffic' for interaction between different ethnic groups.\(^\text{364}\)

The bewonersorganisaties in Delfshaven (BD) exemplifies a networking model of governance, a number of neighbourhood-specific organisations and other organisations. Although the vast majority of financial support comes from the local Municipality, this network is 'bottom-up', constructed by local residents for local residents, guided and assisted by opbouwwerkers and other professionals, for the collective benefit for all residents. The active involvement of street-level representatives is a mainstay of the model. Individuals may well benefit, but the approach is one for the collective development of the whole community. Despite financial dependency on the local state, this network represents a classic example of community governance. It performs a co-ordinating role for various neighbourhood-specific and community orientated activities. Revisiting discussion of governance in chapter 2, this network addresses local issues, including poverty and deprivation, for all social groups - it is socially integrationist along the lines of Habermasian social empowerment in the public sphere as it does not privilege any one particular group over another. It does nonetheless reveal the difficulties in reaching people from certain ethnic minority groups. Despite a politicised and antagonistic past during the early days of Urban Renewal, the organisations in this network do not explicitly follow a politicised model social empowerment and would appear to function in relative autonomy from political struggles and debates. They are however keen to 'market' their activities and successes in the eyes of local politicians in the attempt to attract more funding, and thus the network is arguably indicative of community incorporation within the local state.

\(^\text{364}\) In her speech for the official opening of the Dutch Parliament in 1996, Queen Beatrix spoke of the dual processes of fragmentation and individualisation in Dutch society, a view supported by Jan Willem Duyvendak, a professor of community development at Erasmus University in Rotterdam. Rieks Westrik, a community development worker in Spangen, agrees with the fragmentation and individualisation thesis between ethnic groups, but points out this obscures the reality of strong lines of affiliation within specific ethnic groups. There is little evidence of mono-ethnic segregation typical of US inner cities, but there are few activities where different ethnic groups participate together. It is in this way that one can conceptualise the Netherlands as a pluralist society upholding clear lines of socio-spatial segregation (interviews with Rieks Westrik, WS 21/9/98 and Jan Willem Duyvendak, Philosophy, EUR 14/9/98\(^2\) and 5/10/98\(^2\)).
Involvement of Local People in APS

As in most nations under conditions of 'advanced' capitalism the Netherlands is facing a crisis in its institutions of representative democracy, and in Rotterdam electoral turnout is lower than average (see table 12), a trend more clearly in evidence in poorer areas of the city. In the 'poor' neighbourhoods turnout at the last General Election (6 May 1998) was 5-10% below the city average of 62%; in Charlois it was 57%; in Delfshaven 54%; and Feijenoord 52%. Turnout in the 'rich' Hillegersberg-Schiebroek was 74%, a full 11% above the Rotterdam average (see Hoofdstemburo, 1998a; see also Hoofdstemburo, 1998a; COS, 1995; 1997b; SP, 1998a; 1998b; and 1998d). Since 1996 the Municipality in Rotterdam has responded with two main policy innovations to get closer to and engage with local people: (1) two participatory conferences; and (2) SZW Client Panels (see case study). With respect to the participatory conferences the first, Rotterdam Koers 2005 (Rotterdam Course 2005), took place in 1996/97, involving local residents in the design and implementation of various models of urban planning in the city, as part of the more general process of conceptualising the image and character of Rotterdam for the 21st century (see Straasheijn, undated; Gemeente Rotterdam, 1998c; Gemeentebestuur van Rotterdam, 1997a; 1997b; 1997c; and 1998; see also RCIC, 1996; and 1997). Referring to an undated report by Willem Straasheijen, Project Leader of Rotterdam Koers 2005:

Participation was a very real element of Koers 2005. There was a strong idea that the process, the creation of a Future Vision, was as important as the product, the vision ... After all, it is precisely that process, the method to be chosen, that has to contribute towards establishing trust in the city and the urban authorities, in bonding with the city, in support for joint implementation. In this context, traditional forms of participation are in danger of becoming outmoded. A hearing is not a very attractive form, given the lack of scope for making an effective contribution, it underlines the distance between administration and civilians and tends to attract the same audience every time. That is why new paths were taken in Koers 200 ... [involving interactive and communicative working groups].

(Straasheijn, undated: 12-13).
6. Governance of APS in Rotterdam

Table 12: Socio-economic variation in electoral turnout in the Netherlands (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'poor' neighbourhood^ 1</th>
<th>'rich' neighbourhood^ 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breda</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmond</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veldhoven</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Den Haag</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1 in ‘poor’ neighbourhoods turnout was 13.8% lower than the average
2 in ‘rich’ neighbourhoods turnout was 12.9% higher than the average
Variation in turnout between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ neighbourhoods amounts to 26.7 on average

Source: adapted from Hoofdstemburo (1998a)

The second and more recent conference was held in November 1998 entitled Armoede en de Arme in Rotterdam (Poverty and the Poor in Rotterdam), an inter-disciplinary and inter-departmental conference that actively sought and fostered participation of local residents in the discussion and conceptualisation of poverty in Rotterdam.369

There are three main mechanisms for involvement of local people in non-state APS. Firstly, involvement through service-use and user-involvement. One of the key APS involving non-state organisations is the SA/OK project, which is characterised as an end-state participation APS, where the full participation of local people who get involved in the mainstream of Dutch society is the objective. Representing an instance of Giddens' democracy in individual agency, this example follows case-sensitive and individualised methods to engage and empower people to develop their own agency (see Giddens, 1984; 1990; and 1994).370 Secondly, there are limited instances of mobilisation of residents against unemployment, poverty and injustice - with particular attention paid to the anti-drugs tourism in Spangen led by Annie Verdoold - but also through Marxist political struggle through the activities of SUGBA (see Kriesi, 1993; Vlek, 1997; and Berkel et al., eds., 1998).371 It is important to note that these are exceptions, and the anti-drugs action in Spangen was actively supported by opbouwwerkers from the

369 Interviews with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam25/8/98 and Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 4/9/98. Initial evaluation work found that over 90% of participants were white, native Dutch, revealing under-representation of ethnic minorities. About half of participants were in paid employment, and very few were from south-side of The Maas (see Straasheijn, undated). Research carried out at Universiteit van Amsterdam (University of Amsterdam) assessed this process the people from two Rotterdam neighbourhoods - Blijdorp (a middle-class, predominantly white suburb) and Bregelder (a working-class, multi-ethnic and poorer area). The research found that local residents often have overly high expectations, and as compared with similar work in Amsterdam, administrators were easier to collaborate with in Rotterdam. Rotterdam was more committed to process, but less committed to implementation, a reflection of its ‘top-down’ and expert tradition. While highly effective and visionary, it was found that Rotterdam does not represent a good example of participatory democracy - it is rather more dirigiste (in the mould of the 1970s) and less inclined than elsewhere to stimulate ‘bottom-up’ approaches. Rotterdam tends to think that decentralised state bureaucracies, rather than community governance, is the way forward (interview with Annemieke Roobeek, General Economics, UvA 15/6/98’).

370 Interview with Arijen Dekker, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98’.

 bewonersorganisatie in that neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{372} Finally, the network of bewonersorganisaties at the neighbourhood level across the city provide the backbone of non-state governance and the involvement of residents in local neighbourhood life, either through various community orientated activities, social campaigns or inclusion on neighbourhood management boards (see BANW, 1994; 1997; 1998; and Voogt, 1994; see also case study). Repeatedly these structures are found to be over-represented by the so-called 'respectable' white, Dutch working class at the expense of people from ethnic minority backgrounds, although this situation is beginning to change.\textsuperscript{373}

Over time the character of local involvement in Rotterdam has changed. Shifting from formal 'top-down' and single-issue consultation with the Urban Renewal Project Groups in the 1970s, local involvement is more informal and communicative based on publicity campaigns, openness and transparency, and mediated by various neighbourhood level workers under the present BCP, similar to a new organic planning approach (see Plein et al., 1998).\textsuperscript{374} This complex mixture of social workers, social cultural workers and community developers act as an intermediary interface between residents and the local hierarchy. There is in addition evidence for both means and end-state conceptions of participatory state APS in Rotterdam. In the main non-state APS follow a service-use conception of participation, but there are some instances, albeit limited, where grassroots mobilisation of local residents has resulted in local social gains. These are however the exception rather than the rule, and actively supported by local bewonersorganisaties, which provide the key mechanisms for local involvement within neighbourhoods. Overall, Rotterdam has shifted from classically 'participatory' model of popular involvement to a socially communicative and interactive one, where non-state action has lost much of its radical antagonistic edge. These changes are arguably representative of new attempts to engage with local individuals and communities as the local state searches for novel mechanisms to legitimise its decisions and activities. Strong elements of 'top-down' tokenism are still evident, despite shifts towards grassroots engagement in the context of legitimacy crisis in the local social democratic state.

\textsuperscript{372} Interviews with Rieks Westrik, WS 21/9/98 and Ria Leurs, WS, Spangen resident 6/10/98\textsuperscript{1}.

\textsuperscript{373} Interviews with Hans Visser, Paulus Kerk 24/6/98\textsuperscript{1}, Kenneth Woei-a-Tsipi, KROSBE 11/9/98\textsuperscript{1} and Fred May, KROSBE 11/9/98\textsuperscript{2}, Rieks Westrik, WS 21/9/98, Erik Meijer, SP 25/9/98\textsuperscript{3}, Rob van der Veen, BBT 28/9/98\textsuperscript{4}, Abdessalem Agnes, BBT, Bospolder-Tussendijken resident 28/9/98\textsuperscript{2}, Toine Schroeder, BANW 5/10/98\textsuperscript{3}, Ria Leurs, WS, Spangen resident 6/10/98\textsuperscript{1}, and Daan Keller, SUGBA 9/10/98\textsuperscript{2} and 14/10/98\textsuperscript{1}.

\textsuperscript{374} Interviews with Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 27/7/98 and 4/9/98, Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98\textsuperscript{4}, 20/8/98 and 25/8/98, Marcel Peetersen, IHS 29/7/98\textsuperscript{4}, 10/8/98 and 27/8/98, Jan Oosterman, Housing and Spatial Planning, Gemeente Rotterdam 2/9/98\textsuperscript{4}, Arjen Dekker, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98\textsuperscript{4}, Renata Kolk, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98\textsuperscript{4}, Conrad Bons, BOOM 18/9/98\textsuperscript{1}, Rick Schonenberg, SP, Oude Noorden resident 25/9/98\textsuperscript{4}, Erik Meijer, SP 25/9/98\textsuperscript{4}, Daan Keller, SUGBA 9/10/98\textsuperscript{2} and 14/10/98\textsuperscript{1}, Vincent Kiaan, OMiJ 15/10/98\textsuperscript{1} and Monique van der Sanden, OMiJ 15/10/98\textsuperscript{1}. 
Case Study: SZW Cliënten Paneelen (CP)

In 1997 the Municipal SZW Department established ten Cliënten Paneelen (CPs) (Client Panels) following national legislation implemented in 1996 making ‘client participation’ a legal requirement. Nine were established at the district level and one at the city level - providing a forum for debate and giving social security clients the chance to air their views about provision of social benefits. The district CPs are headed by district managers of social affairs, and the city level CP is headed by the general manager, covering more general issues across the whole of Rotterdam. A further Instelling Paneel (IP) (Organisational Panel) was established, involving 22 professionals and representatives from the voluntary sector concerned with clients issues, advising the Municipal Director of Social Affairs about social policy - including lawyers, tenants associations and professionals, but not clients themselves. Between 10-15 clients sit on the ten CPs, clients selected via an initial press advertisement; district managers then approached social workers to suggest the most 'suitable' clients. At the beginning fewer people responded to the advert than there were places, so all the initial volunteers were selected, but after a year more people showed an interest, and now participants hold their post for a year before passing it on. Despite this increased interest, participation tends to be limited to an élite within local social security clients - the most articulate individuals - and in common with many organisations in Rotterdam, clients from ethnic minority backgrounds are under-represented. Meetings are held monthly, and moves are underway to formalise the role of the central CP - in addition to the 1996 legislation, all documents sent to the City Council include a standard line indicating the matter was discussed with local clients.

Research indicates that clients tend to signal at meetings how to improve the social service, yet often by the next meeting the problem is still not resolved, and as a result it is difficult for the

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375 Interviews with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98', 20/8/98 and 25/8/98, Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 27/7/98 and 4/9/98, Arjen Dekker, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98', Renata Kolk, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98', Rick Schonenberg, SP, Oude Noorden resident 25/9/98. The whole issue of local client involvement began in 1986 when Leni Jansen, wrote a university thesis on client participation. She was formerly a Director of Social Services in a small town to the south of Rotterdam, but was laid-off when she was in her 50s and went to university. She had always been active in various non-state organisations, so she knew exactly what she was talking about. The concept of client participation that developed drew on a number of existing social security client organisations, what often get called 'occupational clients' in that the client has an occupation of some sort. 'Occupational client' organisations were already in existence at the end of the 1970s - people without paid jobs that did a lot of work on an ideological basis - like women's groups. By 1990 the word participation started appearing in various policy documents as an 'ethical' thing for the municipality to do. Then by 1991 the first statutes of what became known as the close panels were written up, a new mechanism for local participation. The current Director of Social Affairs in Rotterdam drove one of the most 'successful' ones while in Apeldoorn, a small town in the eastern part of the Netherlands. In the aftermath of Melkert's De Andere Kant van Nederland (The Other Side of the Netherlands) document in 1996, new legislation made client participation an integral part of Social Assistance Law, with municipalities obliged to have client panels in operation within three years. Rotterdam was ahead of the game, in fact saw it coming and made arrangements for institutionalisation of panels. Other municipalities, such as Utrecht, had operated a client panel for ten years or more (interview with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98').

376 There was a discussion for a more formally democratic system for the selection of clients, but this was definitely not favoured by district managers who saw this approach as too bureaucratic, involving too much red-tape. They argue with a lot of organisational issues to consider, they were fearful that an insufficient number of clients would actually vote, weakening the legitimacy of this approach (interview with Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 4/9/98).
district manager to demonstrate positive and concrete results. While remaining ideologically committed to the principle of involvement, some clients of a more radical persuasion have become cynical, but do recognise that it is still the experimental phase in the first year of operation. District Managers are not always clear whether they should be talking about social policy or just immediate local issues - as it happens both are discussed, but it remains unclear whether discussion of both types of issue is their proper function. While clients take CPs seriously, people in positions of power tend not to regard them as a priority and they are rarely mentioned at vital Council meetings. The CP format is problematic - it was not designed to revolutionise popular involvement in social policy - thus sometimes creating woefully misplaced expectations among participants, limitations increasingly addressed by the participants themselves. 

Clients on the district CPs expressed the desire to meet collectively to discuss social policy, evolving into an organisation akin to a union. As the Municipal Department of Social Affairs is still unclear as to the precise purpose of participation, it views this development with some concern. Powerful individuals in the Municipality have to maintain the image they are in favour of more influential CPs, but they argued that if the clients want to discuss social policy and politics then they should do so in their own time, on their own premises, and not in the Department of Social Affairs.

There are three main anti-poverty issues that arise. Firstly, as a forum for debate the CPs provide a mechanism for clients to express their views on the local benefits system. Yet observers are critical of the extent this involvement actually influences policy:

They can say something about the letters they receive about the colour of something ... I may sound cynical, but this is of course the beginning of a very long process: already there are documents circulating that clients should be involved in the definition of a problem and the formulation of a policy; the implementation of a policy; and an evaluation of a policy - the whole policy cycle.

(interview with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98).

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377 Since July 1998 monitoring research under Gerard Oude Engberink from the CSPS was undertaken on CPs in Rotterdam involving a combination of semi-structured interviews with the chairman of each CP (usually the district manager of social affairs), the Director of Municipal Social Affairs, City Council politicians and participating clients. The methodology also involved participant observation during a series of CP meetings (interview with Renata Kolk, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98). Much of the following information is based on this research.

378 Interviews with Kevin Dixon, SP, Delfshaven resident 25/9/98, Rick Schonenberg, SP, Oude Noorden resident 25/9/98 and Erik Meijer, SP 25/9/98.

379 Important issues for many clients were the style, layout and culture of the district benefit office, and were particularly critical of the waiting line as an infringement of personal privacy. Raising some interesting issues, including the bypassing of 'normal' human values for benefit claimants, district managers were also encouraged to come down from their offices and see for themselves people on benefits. Opening hours attracted much debate (interview with Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 4/9/98).

380 There is a strong need to engage with clients beyond the CPs to acquire a more rounded picture of neighbourhood life. As some neighbourhoods may be home to over 60 different ethnic groups, other mechanisms are required, as full participation and equal representation by representatives of all groups would be impossible. Municipal practitioners want to reach elusive locals, an enduring problem - they cannot be found, are not interested, too cynical or shy. Hard choices have to be made between either getting many different people as possible to participate, or selecting the most articulate and eloquent people. In response some participants have organised their own surveys, looking to gather more information from local residents (interviews with Gerard Oude Engberink, CSPS, Rotterdam 29/7/98, Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 4/9/98 and Anjen Dekker, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98).
While it is highly doubtful whether discussion on the layout and style of district benefit offices can ever amount to a concrete anti-poverty initiative, this process of involvement can advise district managers towards an altered culture of benefits. The instances of privacy in queues and urging district managers to meet people on benefits are clear examples where this is advantageous to local clients. Aat Brand, a Manager of the Municipal Poverty Policy (1994-98), maintains a strong position:

I still advocate the Client Panels ... The Department [of Social Affairs and Employment Opportunities] should be ashamed of itself that it waited until a change in the Social Assistance Law before moving in this [participatory] direction ... It's also a national level movement, and managers [of social services] are a bit afraid of the implications, but they are slowly coming around ... But the fact is local clients are not involved enough in the policy cycle - and this is why the Left-wingers are against it, they think it's fake ... a Dutch expression ... 'a cloth to stop the bleeding', and from a structural perspective this is difficult to refute ... But from an internal, cultural perspective various new developments and cultural change in Client Panels and benefit offices point to a more positive view.

(interview with Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 4/9/98).

Secondly, CPs represent the first step in a move towards popular involvement in the social policy cycle, and the local determination of needs. It is difficult however to fully justify the CPs as a participatory APS when the extent of popular engagement in the social policy cycle is so limited, without experiencing any substantial social policy outcomes. For Renata Kolk, a researcher from the CSPS in Rotterdam, by accepting the right to participation, the Municipality should by definition acknowledge this right at all levels, and not just to a point where it is convenient for those in positions of power. Alternatively, the level of participation could be made explicit from the outset so as not to inflate the expectations of clients. Finally, in contrast to the OKI SA project, client participation in CPs views local involvement as the means towards an end-state APS, where the act of client participation is regarded as the prerequisite for anti-poverty gains for clients.

There are three further issues of note. Firstly, there is little in the way of interaction between the various CPs. There is no mechanism to provide an overview function of all CPs, and at present there is no contact between the different CPs as they all operate individually. The CPs do not have knowledge of the more powerful and influential IP, which is more hierarchical and detached than the CPs; and the extent to which clients on the CPs - and indeed clients more generally - know about the individuals and organisations representing them on the IP is unclear. Secondly, the process of client participation is greatly restricted by: (1) an undemocratic process of selection; (2) an under-representation of clients from ethnic minority backgrounds; and (3) a remit to deal mainly with superficial issues concerning the district benefit

381 Interview with Renata Kolk, CSPS, Rotterdam 16/9/98.
382 An 'adoption model' was developed to mitigate this problem (interview with Aat Brand, CSPS, Rotterdam 4/9/98).
office - 'fake' participation that does not deal with the real content of social policy and issues of entitlements, a criticism often levelled at the CPs by critical observers on the Left. Finally, the CPs are perhaps more about the Municipality meeting its legal obligation and less a concerted move towards 'bottom-up' and participatory social democracy. It is however the first step in an overhaul of the welfare system in Rotterdam, where client participation in particular and engagement with local people in general will play an increasingly important role in the revitalisation social democratic governance. It is difficult to see the CPs as anything other than a means to deal with the problem of ailing representative democracy and the consequent crisis of legitimacy in the local welfare state.

Conclusion

There are three strands to the argument in this chapter. Firstly, three categories of state APS are identified which, taken together represent tendencies for: integration across different policy fields, a growing 'neighbourhood perspective' and welfare 'professionalism', and emphasis on local participation in the context of restructured social democratic welfare. State APS are heavily reliant on a dense network of neighbourhood level workers that intermediate between local residents and state structures. Secondly, five types of non-state APS were identified, and it was argued that the Protestant Church was instrumental in raising awareness about poverty within governmental spheres, in addition to various anti-poverty actions of its own. A network of citizens' organisations at the neighbourhood level provides the linchpin for non-state APS in Rotterdam. Finally, it was argued that the involvement of locals has shifted from formal 'top-down' consultation and conflictual model, to a more communicative model based on publicity and media campaigns, and the active engagement with local people by various neighbourhood workers. Enduring 'top-down' social democratic institutional legacies are still evident, despite shifts towards engagement with local people at the grassroots of society. Overall, APS in Rotterdam tends to shift from community opposition to the state, to community partnership in a highly devolved statist environment, where multiple layers of state subsidised, independent foundations provide services for local people. Despite the devolved statist character of governance in Rotterdam there are many instances of innovative non-state action against poverty, projects that are financed almost entirely through the state.

The work of SBAW helped implement the OK/ SA project, an important project offering many new opportunities for marginalised people. The networks of bewonersorganisaties provide a community infrastructure for all aspects of neighbourhood management, including Opzoomeren and the organisational basis for opbouwwerk in deprived neighbourhoods. The SZW Client Panels give selected benefit recipients the chance to express their opinions about the running of
district benefit offices. Many gains are attributed to the BCP - such as lower unemployment, increased perceptions of safety, and new shopping developments - and most certainly the policy has greatly contributed to these improvements. While KROSBE continues to help Surinamers and other ethnic minority groups to integrate fully in society on an equal basis with the native Dutch, and the provision of educational courses and support to local organisations have greatly benefited their target groups, there is still a long way to go and the task is not easy. The Paulus Kerk offers excellent support, development and advocacy work for the déclassé section of Rotterdam society - homeless people, refugees and asylum seekers, drug addicts, alcoholics and prostitutes. SUGBA continues to fight a more politicised battle against social injustice for local residents in Bloemhof and Afrikaanderwijk, and in Rotterdam more generally. Finally OMIJ provides many social security recipients, many suffering emotional, psychological and mental handicaps, the chance to do socially useful work to earn a little extra on top of their benefits. In short, many projects in Rotterdam are engaging in problems of poverty and social exclusion for a number of target groups.

Having presented the empirical material from APS in North Tyneside and Rotterdam, the purpose of the following chapter is to engage in comparative analysis of these cases in order to account for the similarities and differences between them.
7

Governance of APS in North Tyneside and Rotterdam

This chapter builds and deepens comparative analysis on the basis of details provided in the previous conceptual and empirical chapters. It therefore aims to sharpen attention to conceptual themes for comparison of the ways APS are governed in North Tyneside and Rotterdam, looking to delve beneath 'surface rhetoric' and discern essential differences as well as similarities between them. These themes include the character of APS and welfare regimes - recalling the typologies presented in chapter 3 - and governance issues including 'hollowing-out', governance pluralism and models for democratisation from discussion in chapter 2. The objective is to draw together the characteristics of APS and the mechanisms by which people can get involved in those strategies, and relate these to the nature of governance in North Tyneside and Rotterdam. This characterisation of local governance and mechanisms for involvement of individuals in both places is then situated within the respective national level welfare contexts, arguing - with discussion in chapter 3 in mind - for a convergence tendency in the UK and the Netherlands. An enhanced process of neo-liberalisation in governance at all levels links these elements of comparative analysis. With respect to these themes the most important similarities and differences between North Tyneside and Rotterdam are teased out and an attempt is made to explain the balance between them.

APS in North Tyneside and Rotterdam

A similar diversity of market, state and non-state APS can be found in both North Tyneside and Rotterdam, although official APS are more recent in Rotterdam and the range of policy is much wider and more directly related to financial incomes than in North Tyneside. North Tyneside APS are largely subsumed in a community development approach; but whereas Rotterdam APS have directed financial resources to the populace, they are also increasingly moving towards this community development orientation. In both cases APS tend not to be structural and
proactive, but rather 'conjunctural' and 'reactive'. As they represent responses to poverty experienced by a growing number of people, these terms mean these APS do not set out to prevent poverty by addressing social structures and therefore wider causes of poverty (see Novak, 1995). Dealing with their effects, they target specific individuals in certain neighbourhoods with palliatives in the short-term in the hope that wider shifts in the mainstream economy can 'do the rest'. Conceptually relativist to alleged social norms in both cases, the understanding of poverty is arguably more individualist in North Tyneside, closer to the US 'underclass' tradition than the debate on social exclusion, despite the growing salience of the latter. The approach to poverty is more sociological in Rotterdam, nearer to the concepts of 'relative deprivation' and 'social exclusion'. Issues of morality and pathology, however, are common to both localities, illustrated by a growing rhetoric against 'benefit fraud' and 'blaming the poor' for their poverty (see Engbersen and van der Veen, 1987; Andrews and Jacobs, 1990; and Alcock, 1993; and Engbersen et al., 1993). A highly deprived part of the UK, North Tyneside APS follow a former GLC model where all local public services are targeted to those most in need. Similarly deprived, APS in Rotterdam represent selectivist targeting in the context of a traditionally universalist social democracy. Radical APS in Rotterdam are largely relegated to grassroots organisations on the governance and political fringe, but are nevertheless still important, more so than in North Tyneside. Despite one or two instances of enlightened church action and innovative projects in the social economy in North Tyneside, the influence of the Church, especially the Protestant Church, is far more significant in Rotterdam.

Four further issues are addressed in more detail. One, a strong \textit{neighbourhood dimension} is contained in APS in both contexts. There is a substantial working class resident population in both localities. Rotterdam however is an immigrant city with many deprived residents from ethnic backgrounds living in certain areas, and APS there clearly incorporate sensitivity to ethnic diversity, as illustrated by KROSBE. Diverse ethnicity is not a policy concern in North Tyneside - indeed on the whole it is mono-racially white - and unsurprisingly issues of race and ethnicity rarely surface within APS. While the local authority and much of the voluntary sector in North Tyneside work towards a normative anti-racist objective, issues of race and ethnicity are transcended by a generic notion of disadvantage, appearing to support Wilson's contention of 'race' as a 'non-issue' in local (community) politics (see Wilson, W. J. 1980; and 1987). Whether this is simply down to a relative absence of ethnic minorities rather than a transcendence of race matters in APS is a bone of contention. Social structure in Rotterdam is not particularly hierarchical, and generally no one is better or worse, or regarded as more or less deserving with respect to policy. This is reflected in the governance of the city that has developed a pragmatic and egalitarian anti-poverty response in recent years. By contrast, hierarchical social order, even within generic working class neighbourhoods, is a key factor in determining local identities in North Tyneside. Practitioners (and residents for that matter) working on particular estates - such as Howdon - tend to feel that initiatives on the Meadow Well
7. Governance of APS in North Tyneside and Rotterdam

Estate receive inordinately large amounts of financial support as a result of its high-profile status in the wake of the riot in 1991. A fragile balance is achieved between associative interaction among neighbourhood organisations - as illustrated by the 'extended' People's Centre Network - and competitive struggle for funding against other groups. The result is a fragmented neighbourhood response - largely necessitated by competitive and geographically specific urban regeneration funding regimes - but also the result of complex lines of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' within neighbourhoods. While neighbourhood renewal is similarly targeted in Rotterdam, it operates as part of a municipal wide rationality.

Two, a concern with image is common in both cases, and both Spangen in Rotterdam and the Meadow Well in North Tyneside typically suffer at the hands of negative stereotyping and media imagery (see Given, 1998). Residents on the Meadow Well estate often get stigmatised as immoral, work-shy and criminal, due to various (sometimes illegitimate) survival strategies undertaken by residents where employment opportunities are few and far between. Similarly, deep-seated problems of drugs and prostitution in Spangen, largely the consequences of restricted life-chances and immiseration - thus serving to blur the distinction between cause and effect of their poverty - mean that local residents can be regarded by outside observers as only having themselves to blame for their predicament. Organisations in both neighbourhoods face difficulties in combating these prejudices, in addition to dealing with problems of everyday life in deprived communities. An important element of their anti-poverty action follows a 'neighbourhood marketing' approach where local activists promote positive aspects and successes in their respective neighbourhoods, as part of an approach for the empowerment of local residents, counter to these negative and debilitating stereotypes.

Three, social economy innovations are evident in both North Tyneside and Rotterdam, representing a degree of policy holism - that is to say, the fusing in equal measure of social and economic dimensions (see EC, 1995; 1996a; 1996b; 1997; 1998; and Patel et al., 1996). Although the social economy is not well developed in either context, especially in Rotterdam where governance is particularly statist, one-off examples in Rotterdam tend to exist in more formal partnership with the local municipality, but ironically are more commercially orientated and run as socially orientated businesses, aiming to make profit and not provide charity. OMIJ is a pressing case in point. High-profile (but ultimately ill-fated) examples do not detract from the fact that the social economy is far weaker in North Tyneside. Without managerial, financial and commercial expertise, projects in the social economy tend not to operate as profit-seeking businesses. Almost entirely pump-primed and buttressed by the local authority, these initiatives are orientated to the public sector, on occasions providing services 'on the cheap' as if contracted-out from the latter for that very purpose (see Amin et al., 1998). Legacies of an economic and social history dominated by manual labour employment in heavy industries, trade unionism, working class culture and a relative lack of an entrepreneurial spirit partly explains the
weakness of the local social economy - and the indigenous private sector for that matter - in North Tyneside.

And four, an empowerment philosophy is apparent in grassroots APS in both cases. Evidence suggests that the model of empowerment followed in North Tyneside at times comes close to a 'critical liberationist' model following Freire, especially in the PCN (see Freire, 1972; see also Morgaine, 1994; and Gopalan, 1997). While it would be fanciful to speak of the revolutionary potential of this approach, it nonetheless follows a more politicised conception of empowerment, rooted in a tradition of working class politics and trade unionism in the area, and where responsibility has devolved to the voluntary sector. It should be noted, however, that this element is rapidly on the wane in the context of the de-politicisation and professionalisation of non-state service delivery. The model of empowerment followed in Rotterdam's OKI SA project is quite different. Retained within the rationality of the local state (albeit decentralised to the district level), empowerment is not politicised in the same way as in the People's Centres, but is based on an approach that aims to develop agency in individual people through individual case sensitive social work. This issue is revisited in the third section.

**Governance Models**

Referring to the case studies presented in chapters 5 and 6, Childcare in North Tyneside and SBAW in Rotterdam are identified as hierarchical models of governance. As municipal/borough wide organisations, professionalised, commercial and independent - yet closely associated with the local state - they both represent a hybrid institutional approach for leveraging in additional non-public funds for welfare purposes (see EC, 1995; 1996a; 1996b; 1997; and 1998). Delivering social services that are 'hollowed-out' from the local state as reconstituted bureaucracies (see Rhodes, 1994; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Patterson and Pinch, 1995; and Goodwin and Painter, 1996), decisions are made at a distance from local people. They differ however in a number of respects. Childcare is a municipal enterprise and SBAW is a municipal level foundation, and while both operate in a commercial fashion, the former is more directly competing with firms in the private sector. Despite obvious functional differences, their remits differ conceptually. SBAW deals with a broad range of large scale, specialist problems concerning projects for the unemployed and is situated between the local municipality and frontline organisations, but while employment issue are indirectly addressed, Childcare is primarily concerned with issues of childcare and related services alone. They differ greatly in relation to funding: 90% of finance for SBAW comes from the Rotterdam Municipality, whereas Childcare relies more heavily on commercial contracts and funds from numerous other sources, including urban regeneration schemes like City Challenge. As to service delivery Childcare is a
frontline service provider, whereas SBAW is a secondary organisation that facilitates implementation of projects for frontline organisations. *Childcare* is the only organisation of its kind in North Tyneside, in contrast to foundations like SBAW which are commonplace in Rotterdam and indeed throughout the Netherlands. Perhaps as a result of these factors their respective relationships with the local state differ. Despite its commercial leanings *Childcare* is heralded as a ‘flagship’ of North Tyneside Council, but while SBAW is organisationally closer to the Rotterdam Municipality (primarily a reflection of funding arrangement, but also policy remits), it operates in an ambivalent governance relationship - as with all 'independent' foundations in the Netherlands - arguably down to ideological differences between the so-called public and independent sectors.

The PCN in North Tyneside and the BD in Rotterdam are identified as *networking models of governance*. Both these networks operate at the interface and broker interaction between local residents, community development and social workers, educationalists and various local neighbourhood organisations for the collective development of local people (see Colenutt and Cutten, 1994; Craig and Mayo, eds., 1995; Nevin and Shiner, 1995; and Glaser et al., 1996). By pooling resources across their respective networks, they are able to highlight and raise awareness over issues affecting the lives of local people. Through their campaigning functions they actively involve local residents, through user-involvement and elements of decision-making, a philosophy central to all their activities. These networks do differ, however, in various ways. Rooted in the UK Labour Movement, the PCN is ideologically motivated by leftist trade unionism and the struggle for full employment, presided over by a network of voluntary sector projects dealing with issues at the grassroots. Although arguably on the decline, there is a strong element of critical consciousness raising and tacit politicisation in the PCN that is not apparent in the BD, where the latter is apolitical and motivated by a tamer community development approach. Although initiated from the 'bottom-up', it is now totally subsidised and incorporated into rationality of the municipality - it is therefore akin to a community arm of statist governance in Rotterdam. The PCN has similarly become increasingly incorporated into 'partnership' with the local state, but in contrast continues to use its former politicised rhetoric. As typical of UK voluntary organisations, the PCN attracts funding from many sources - it is less financially dependent on the local state, although it remains highly constrained by state regulations. The PCN is arguably indicative of a 'power and control' model of state dependence, whereas the BD possibly denotes an 'empowerment/ facilitation model' - the latter in the context of a more 'top-down' and statist governance system.

The Battle Hill CDP in North Tyneside and the SZW CPs in Rotterdam are identified as *participatory models of governance*. Both providing a mechanism for engagement with hitherto excluded local residents in their respective neighbourhoods, these initiatives are based on the intuitive view that it is worthwhile to involve local people in governance mechanisms (see Croft
Experience of the activities of these two organisations reveal the many problems faced by activists and practitioners in facilitating popular involvement, nonetheless representing a first step towards more concerted mechanisms for involvement in both contexts. Despite these similarities there are significant differences between them. The Battle Hill CDP is a voluntary sector project that secures funding from a variety of sources, including the local authority, unlike the SZW CPs which are an expressly local state mechanism, and therefore controlled by it. The Battle Hill CDP adopts a more 'politicised' approach that aims to mobilise voice for all marginalised residents, following a 'community development' conception of popular involvement. While mobilising voice for local residents, the SZW CPs are apolitical because the civil service bureaucracy in Rotterdam controls them. Governed in this way, they are not at all autonomous, and local clients who participate are not permitted to discuss politics or indeed the content of social policy entitlements. They are discursive fora that select 'appropriate' people and follow a 'top-down' and 'consultative' conception of popular involvement. The Battle Hill CDP arguably represents community development that actively involves local people, activities 'hollowed-out' from the local state to the voluntary sector in a certain area of North Tyneside. By contrast the SZW CPs are retained in the local state structure, and represent a minimal response to new participatory legislation that attempts to reverse the crisis of legitimacy in local representative institutions across the Netherlands.

Evidence for pluralism in both North Tyneside and Rotterdam supports the central arguments made for the 'interactive' (following Hausner), the 'negotiative' (after Nielsen and Pedersen) and the 'associationist' (as with Cohen and Rogers, and Hirst) models of governance. The governance of APS in North Tyneside arguably follows a pattern that combines elements of the 'rational communicative' model based on Habermas and the 'radical pluralist' model as advocated by Mouffe. In fact a 'partnership' model best describes welfare pluralism in a context of limited and scarce resources, where non-state de-politicisation and professionalisation has led to interactive and dependent governance. While not providing all subsidies to the voluntary sector, the local authority does control budgetary decisions for many voluntary organisations. This 'partnership' includes 'rational' and 'integrative' dimensions, but these are put to the test when harsh financial decisions have to be made. Voluntary projects are therefore compelled to seek additional funds elsewhere. While funding diversity presents potential for greater autonomy, it can also lead to a conflict of objectives and values and a loss of rational governance coherence. It would however be fanciful to claim that governance in North Tyneside represents a radical pluralism in line with Mouffe. The 'partnership' model limits the realisation of non-state autonomy, where inter-organisational inequalities and a 'power and control' model of state dependence are presided over by the local authority with an interest in maintaining the status quo. It is unclear whether the future is likely to see further pluralisation and increasing autonomy for the voluntary sector in North Tyneside (in line with Mouffe), or a
deepening of an integrative rationality and a radicalisation of governance interaction to deal with scarce resources, as with a 'rational communicative' model. Most likely the local state will seek strategies to retain its power over an increasingly complex and differentiated voluntary sector and a continuation of unequal partnership between them.

_Governance of APS in Rotterdam_ can be described as a rational and integrative system that follows a concept of 'co-governance', and in this way closer approaches the 'rational communicative' model based on Habermas than the 'radical pluralist' model outlined by Mouffe. The Municipality acts as the governor of social activities, the strategic leader at the local level, even if the activities are delivered in the non-state sector. Ultimately all organisations are subsidised by the central state - the much vaunted 'fiscal centralism' of the Netherlands (see Terhorst and van der Ven, 1995; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; and Groenendijk, 1998). Regulations for the SZW are set down by central government and the Municipality decides on how to implement policies. Local practitioners in Rotterdam customarily consider governance in their city to be non-statist, but all organisations receive 100% or near 100% financial subsidy from the state. In this way notions of multiple-layered, de-layered or complex statism more accurately capture the complexion of governance in Rotterdam, largely due to relative public sector abundance despite pressures for withdrawal of the state in the Netherlands (see De Swann, 1988; and Thrift, 1994). Although receiving direct subsidies from the state, the management structures of the so-called non-state organisations are independent, representing a high degree of 'hollowing-out' of governance responsibility from the Municipality. The character of non-state governance has over time lost much of its former radical campaigning edge and antagonism to the state, as these organisations have increasingly incorporated into this de-layered and complex statist structure, supporting the argument for an 'integrative' model of welfare pluralism in the Netherlands. Governance of APS is highly 'statist' (as opposed to 'state') in Rotterdam, and despite a more advanced process of 'hollowing-out' than other municipalities in the Netherlands, this model is likely to remain for some time, largely due to the long-standing 'top-down' and 'expert' social democratic tradition in the city. Taken in conjunction with a strong and pervasive populist tradition, the future of governance in Rotterdam will represent an interesting combination of 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches _under the auspices of the state_.

Alongside high levels of state subsidisation of non-state activity and enduring legacies of 'top-down' paternalism in both contexts, there are three main themes for consideration when comparing differences between governance of APS in North Tyneside and Rotterdam. One, _regulatory and fiscal centralism_ is marked in both the UK and the Netherlands, with implementation and delivery of services largely devolved to the sub-national state organisations and foundations, with ultimate resource decisions and therefore power retained in the central state (see Terhorst and van der Ven, 1995; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; and Groenendijk,
7. Governance of APS in North Tyneside and Rotterdam

Rotterdam is highly statist where state subsidised foundations, representing 'hollowed-out' and de-layered state responsibility, implement central and local state policies. North Tyneside is similarly statist, but in a more entrenched neo-liberal context, where resource scarcity has resulted in a more concerted process of 'hollowing-out' and contracting-out to the voluntary sector than in Rotterdam (see Lewis, J. 1994; LGIU, 1994; Kramer, 1998; and Nowland-Foreman, 1998). In Rotterdam the Municipality has more political power than North Tyneside Council to manipulate central regulations for implementing and tailoring policies for local needs.

Two, conceptions of state dependence differ in North Tyneside and Rotterdam. It was assumed that North Tyneside was indicative of a high level of state dependence, but it transpires that non-state and independent organisations are more dependent on state funding in Rotterdam. State subsidisation is the norm in the Netherlands - all organisations in one form or another are subsidised by the state, and is considered a positive feature of governance. Where the cases differ is that the state dependence in North Tyneside occurs in the national context of neo-liberal resource scarcity, and where voluntary sector organisations are reliant on funding from a diversity of sources, including local, national and international charities, and indeed the EU. While many organisations are fully dependent on state funds in Rotterdam, this dependence occurs amid relatively abundant social democratic resources, where there is perhaps little need to pursue funds from other sources. North Tyneside arguably represents a power/control model of state dependence, and Rotterdam an empowerment/facilitation model.

Finally, a partnership rhetoric is apparent in the governance of both North Tyneside and Rotterdam (see Peck and Tickell, 1994; Healey et al., 1996; Peltenburg, 1996; and Geddes, 1997). Over time both cases show that, despite notable exceptions, the character of the non-state sector has lost much of its radical campaigning edge and antagonism to the state. There is indeed evidence to suggest a tendency for a conflict model to succumb to de-politicised and interactive governance model under increasingly scarce budgetary conditions. The resulting egalitarian 'partnership' rhetoric bestowed by the state, however, hides deeply unequal power relations between institutions of the state and civil society (see Amin and Hausner, 1997; and Amin and Hausner, eds., 1997). This inequality is more marked in North Tyneside under a power/control model of state dependence, and it is more ideological and less power-related under an empowerment/facilitation model in Rotterdam. The voluntary sector in North Tyneside is more genuinely grassroots, varied and complex - a result of diverse funding arrangements and policy remits, again in the context of scarce resources. These organisations receive a lower proportion of their funding from the state, but remain highly dependent on it, exacerbating unequal power relations. The concept of autonomy is undermined in such a relationship, although arguably less so in Rotterdam where resources are more abundant. The 'partnership' rhetoric is heard throughout North Tyneside, particularly within the local authority...
which is content to retain the status quo, but it is more critically embraced in the local voluntary sector, where a more egalitarian 'social partnership' is generally desired. The language of partnership is less openly articulated in all sectors in Rotterdam.

Mechanisms for Local Involvement

In both North Tyneside and Rotterdam mechanisms for the involvement of local people occur at two relatively distinct levels - at non-state, community level, and at the level of the state. Involvement in either realm is highly dependent on a network of neighbourhood workers - social workers, community development workers and community activists - helping bridge the gap between the local state hierarchy and the everyday lives of local residents. These social intermediaries perform a dual role - on the one hand dealing with the reality of life in impoverished working class communities, and on the other raising awareness within a wider community by relaying this information from the grassroots to bureaucrats and politicians (see Smith and Blanc, 1997; and Blanc, et al., 1999). Such a role has increased in importance as both localities have experienced declining legitimacy in their representative institutions: low and decreasing turnout for local elections continues, especially in poor wards. In response the local state in both North Tyneside and Rotterdam is rhetorically strong on 'reaching out' to local communities to reverse this crisis of legitimacy. Despite some novel attempts, however, state mechanisms following a consultative model of involvement are generally weak, 'top-down' and tokenistic in practice: they tend to lack real political muscle to mobilise voice for local people (see Robinson and Shaw, 1994; McArthur, 1995; Chanan, 1996; 1997; Power, 1996; Healey, 1996; and Chaskin and Sunil, 1997). Non-state mechanisms tend to follow a community development model, combining user-involvement, grassroots mobilisation and social mediation, including a degree of popular involvement in decision-making structures. Cynicism among local residents abounds as to these mechanisms, although they tend to agree with the principle of involvement. The problem is often that individuals do not feel they can really change anything, their involvement does not lead to immediate gains and is not taken seriously by bureaucrats and politicians. Partly as a result, it is usually the same limited number of people who get actively involved.

There are however some important differences in the state mechanisms for local involvement in North Tyneside and Rotterdam. While elements of a 'consultative model' are apparent in both contexts, mechanisms (such as area forums) are implemented in local neighbourhoods in North Tyneside, where state bureaucrats and politicians consult with local residents (see LGIU, 1995; 1995; 1997a; 1997b; and Hayton, 1995). In this way a mixture of consultative and community development models of involvement are apparent in North Tyneside. Despite these state
mechanisms an onus is placed on the non-state sector for involvement of locals in North Tyneside. State mechanisms are more imaginative in Rotterdam, involving people in conference activities and publicity campaigns, combining elements of a 'communicative model' with classic consultative methods. Rotterdam is a more robust instance of social democratic, 'top-down' paternalism. Instances of participation tend to be project-specific and based on a move to overcome the legitimacy crisis of the local state by bringing government 'closer to the people'. While the same impetus applies in North Tyneside, it does not inform the shift to local engagement in the same way. In North Tyneside it is arguably more about presenting the 'social countenance' of the local state, in the context of 'hollowed-out' responsibility for community development to the voluntary sector. The issue of ethnicity, especially the lack of representation and participation of individuals from ethnic minorities, is a key issue in Rotterdam requiring practical and conceptual attention, but it does not figure as an emotive and significant issue in North Tyneside.

There are, furthermore, significant differences in non-state mechanisms for local involvement between North Tyneside and Rotterdam. Certain APS in North Tyneside and Rotterdam follow an empowerment philosophy based on user-involvement and an individual case sensitive approach (see Croft and Beresford, 1989; Friedmann, 1992; and Taylor, ed., 1996). As exemplified through the work of the PCN, this approach in North Tyneside follows a politicised model of empowerment, based on a 'critical liberationist' model, rooted in a tradition of trade unionism and working class politics in the area (see Freire, 1972; see also Morgaine, 1994; and Gopalan, 1997). By contrast the model of empowerment apparent in Rotterdam is apolitical and not geared towards a raising of critical consciousness in participants. Instead it is more about developing individual agency and not grounded in any radical ideology (see Giddens, 1984; 1990; 1994; Beck, 1992; and Beck et al., 1994). Two, radical grassroots mobilisation of local residents in an ideological sense is somewhat scarce on the ground in North Tyneside. While being the exception rather than the rule in Rotterdam, there are instances where local residents have organised autonomous actions against certain issues in the city. Despite raising the profile of particular issues, these actions remain relegated to the political fringe, and are tolerated in keeping with Dutch political culture. And thirdly, supporting Smith and Blanc's (1997) argument that '[Y]ou do not pass from traditional representative democracy to participatory democracy by waving a magic wand' (p. 300; see also Blanc, 1994; and Blanc et al., 1999), social mediation by 'professionals' who engage with local residents is important for facilitating popular involvement in both contexts, especially through neighbourhood campaigning and voluntary management boards. These cases differ, however, in terms of scale of mediation. There are more types of neighbourhood operator in Rotterdam than in North Tyneside, including community developers, 'social assistance' social workers and social and cultural workers, and the boundaries between them are somewhat vague, reflecting the
complexity and diversity of their work and arbitrarily defined job remits. Roles are more clearly defined and distinct in North Tyneside.

There are three further issues of note. One, it is important to make a *distinction between means and ends* of local involvement in APS. There is evidence in North Tyneside and Rotterdam for both types of involvement. Involvement as a 'means' refers to an act of popular participation in local decision-making structures - such as local discursive and consultative fora - to inform policy where traditional representative mechanisms are under duress. This type of involvement is at issue when considering radical democratisation of governance. Involvement as an 'end' indicates social policies where the full participation of citizens in institutions and structures of mainstream society is the intended outcome of those policies. Participants may or may not be involved in decision-making in these policies. The former is a normative and political conception, rooted in a 'radical participatory' perspective of the New Left (see Marcuse, 1964; Horkheimer, 1968; Adorno, 1973; and Markovic and Cohen, 1975). The latter social conception is also normative but increasingly indicates an empirical situation when related to questions of democratisation. Echoing work by Giddens and others on 'agency' and democratisation, and accounts of 'reflexive modernisation' and 'individualisation' of social and political life (see Giddens, 1984; 1990; 1994; Beck, 1992; and Beck et al., 1994), this conception holds that democracy is achieved through realisation of this agency *without* radical shift in power within existing mechanisms for involvement. It is nonetheless unclear how either conception can have an impact without concerted shifts towards socio-economic and material equality, and therefore it is important to combine both approaches.

Two, and perhaps as a consequence of the first point, the involvement of local people has *depoliticised* and lost much of its former radical campaigning and antagonistic edge in reflection of a more widespread decline in radical political consciousness in the UK and the Netherlands. While particularly the case in the UK, the highly pluralist and consensual character of politics in the Netherlands has historically accommodated for political extremes; moreover, Dutch socialism has arguably never been as virulent as in other countries. Occurring in the context of the rise in interactive governance, professionalisation in the voluntary sector and with a growth of ends-based conceptions of involvement, this process of de-politicisation concurs with Giddens and others that democratisation is increasingly predicated on the 'reflexivity' of individual agents. There appears to be an 'empirical-normative opposition' at work here, apparently where prevailing patterns of social organisation and political involvement - in short, the *status quo* - are relinquished from radical critique and reformulated as intrinsically democratic in a reflexive world. Far from rendering obsolete radical perspectives, it is quite another matter whether this decline in radicalism indicates new forms of involvement are sufficient to bring about a truly democratic governance system given enduring inequalities under capitalism. And three, in both North Tyneside and Rotterdam local involvement is *not*
considered a structural issue - rather it tends to get couched as a non-structural addition to existing mechanisms, without making great in-roads into prevailing power structures. These placatory and tokenistic 'additions' are perhaps more about engendering social control, and mitigating widespread distrust and the legitimacy crisis of the local representative state, than for revolutionising the input of people from the base of society. If participatory democracy is the end of radical policy then explicit political intervention is required outside the internal logic of governance pluralism. These issues indicate national level process as much as local specificities.

Welfare Regime Convergence

By relating the governance of APS in North Tyneside and Rotterdam to their respective national welfare systems, differences in local conceptualisation and implementation are to a degree subsumed in the context of national level welfare regime convergence in the UK and the Netherlands (see Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; Kloosterman, 1994b; Cousins, 1995; and Kemeny, 1995). Referring to the discussion on regulation theory in chapter 3, it is important to retain an awareness of a temporal and historical dimension, looking to get a sense of conceptual changes over time in the provision of welfare and APS in the UK (North Tyneside case) and in the Netherlands via the case of Rotterdam.

There are three main conceptually inter-related elements to this argument for convergence. One, a recasting of rights and duties and a growing punitive dimension is evident in the UK and the Dutch welfare systems. With the implementation of various active labour market policies and 'workfare' schemes - such as the New Deal for the Unemployed in the UK and Melkertbahnen (Melkert Jobs) in the Netherlands - a compulsory work ethic and punitive approach is on the ascendancy in the UK and Dutch welfare systems. Articulating a dimension of moral duty, these policies represent the growing social obligations of citizenship away from the a priori rights as citizenship in the provision and receipt of benefits (see Midgely, 1992; Culpitt, 1992; Etzioni, 1993; 1995; and Mulgan, 1994). While the experience of 'workfare' in neither the UK nor the Netherlands follows the degree of compulsion as in the US, the American model increasingly influences welfare policies in both countries. Two, a decline in universal state welfare and a rise in targeted APS is occurring in the UK and the Netherlands. Since the early 1980s welfare systems in the UK and the Netherlands have faced neo-liberal pressures for cuts in social expenditure, as arguments in favour of increased budgetary austerity have gained political importance. Policies for welfare reform under New Labour with Blair in the UK and the second Kok cabinet in the Netherlands, demonstrate a decline in universalism and a rise in particularism, with a concomitant emphasis on the punitive means-test, an element common to
both contexts as much now as in the early years of welfare state consolidation. Three, a *rhetoric of benefit fraud in general and misuse of disability benefits in particular* has grown in both the UK and the Netherlands (see Vanophein and Schelwart, 1993). There is a tendency for the debate on poverty in both countries to be replaced with a debate on fraud and the so-called 'undeserving poor' as part of a politically motivated attempt to mask underlying issues and justify cuts in social spending. The clamp-down on the alleged misuse of disability benefits by unscrupulous employers seeking to lay-off less productive workers, along with so-called 'work-shy' individuals in the Netherlands, now paralleled with the more recent proposals for means-testing of incapacity benefit in the UK, are indicative of this trend.

In addition to these arguments for convergence there is a vital point that distinguishes these welfare regimes despite this trend. With respect to socio-institutional characteristics, welfare regimes in the UK and the Netherlands are differentiated in terms of their systems of *social stratification*. While acknowledging that various work on systems of social stratification tend towards Weberian 'ideal-type' abstraction and that strata are customarily studied on the basis of class cleavages (see Grusky, 1993; see also Giddens, 1973; Goldthorpe, 1987; and Bottomore, 1991), the UK is generally thought to represent a well-entrenched class system, whereas Dutch society is historically organised through relatively self-contained, hierarchical and vertical pillars. Class structure in the UK, in contrast to pillarisation in the Netherlands, is more hierarchical and structured on a condition of inequality, with little dialogue between classes (see Marshall, 1950; Titmuss, 1963; Wright, 1985; and Marshall *et al.*, 1988). As Gould (1993) notes: 'It is often said of Britain that it is a class-ridden society. This cannot mean that other countries do not display the same degrees of material inequality, but it does suggest that divisions in British society have been less open to meritocratic competition than many others' (p. 107). For some observers the development of the post-war welfare state in the UK acted as a means of social control, containing any potential conflict between classes (see Novak, 1984; 1988; 1995; and 1996). In contrast to the relative egalitarianism of the Netherlands, the UK welfare regime is a by-product of class differences and therefore serves to institutionalise inequalities based on class strata in the wider society.

Although class differences are to a degree apparent, the organisation of Dutch society is less hierarchical and based on class differences and more pluralist with respect to pillars than in the UK. Nonetheless there is evidence for *intra-pillar* inequality on the basis of hierarchical organisation, but this occurs in the context of relative *inter-pillar* equality as the state has historically treated each pillar equally for purposes of pacification, in part explaining the egalitarianism in the provision of Dutch welfare (see Cox, 1993; Klamer, 1996; and Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). Dutch pillars tend to work together against the central state, but compete with each other over local state services. With continued immigration to the Netherlands, there is much debate on the gradual emergence of an Islamic pillar in addition to existing liberal,
socialist, Catholic and Protestant pillars (see Roth and Meyer, 1997). This process raises questions as to further pacification and equality of treatment that potentially conflicts with mounting duty-based elements of welfare for non-Dutch claimants, on the one hand, and the tendency towards de-pillarisation on the other (see Hupe, 1993). This latter tendency is largely contributing towards welfare regime convergence with the more class-based UK. Fundamental differences in the stratification of society in the UK and the Netherlands influence the provision of welfare in these countries - institutional specificities that are still important and likely to continue influencing future developments in welfare in both contexts.

Welfare regime convergence in the UK and the Netherlands is occurring, to use Esping-Andersen's typology, somewhere along a continuum between the liberal and social democratic models, around the conservative 'nightwatchman' regime (see Esping-Andersen, 1990). This convergence is arguably the result of a concerted and deepening process of neo-liberalisation. As the result of specific institutional trajectories, the UK welfare regime veers to the liberal end, reminiscent of the US model, and the Dutch welfare regime identifies with the social democratic side, as with the Swedish model. In this way these cases retain a strong element of institutional path-dependence and contextual specificity. As shown in chapter 3 the welfare regimes in the UK and the Netherlands are instances where hybridisation and cross-fertilisation of models are apparent - the UK model a mixture of liberal and conservative elements, in the context of an adversarial and liberal parliamentary democracy - and the Dutch model a mixture of social democratic and conservative tendencies in the midst of consensus politics and corporatist governance (see Hemerijck, 1992; Mair, 1994; and Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). International neo-liberal pressures have served to tease out the conservative elements of welfare in both contexts, revealing how a liberal-conservative ideology buttresses allegedly value-free processes of market reform in the provision of welfare.

The meaning of 'convergence' in this argument does not imply 'assimilation' or a wholesale 'equalisation' of welfare regimes. Rather it refers to a process where elements of social policy in both contexts are moving in a similar direction, towards a conservative model, where individualist and selectivist elements are considered important. Noting that these elements have conceivably held a place in the welfare mix in both countries, this convergence can be said to represent a shifting balance between universalism, on the one hand, and particularism/selectivism on the other, where greater emphasis is now placed on the latter. An interpretation of this argument might suggest that welfare regimes in the UK and the Netherlands are likely to experience deeper convergence in the future. Another would claim that the historical importance of social democratic and corporatist elements in the Netherlands - where state retrenchment has not led to an increase in welfare pluralism despite neo-liberal pressures - will continue to differentiate it from the UK. State retreat during the 1980s in the UK, for some commentators, has returned welfare to a Victorian system of self-help and bourgeois charity,
closer to liberal and residual welfare in modern America than to the Dutch system (see Krieger, 1986; see also Clarke and Langan, 1993a; and 1993b). Corporatist traditions, moreover, have never been as robust in the UK as in the Netherlands. Certainly welfare systems in both the UK and the Netherlands are likely to continue experiencing financial pressures thus limiting prospects for universal provision; but the nature of the policy response to this crisis is more likely to veer to the liberal side in the UK and to the social democratic end in the Netherlands.

Conclusion

The similarities and differences with respect to these four themes on research in North Tyneside and Rotterdam hang in a subtle balance, supporting the argument for a combination of welfare variety and convergence. APS in both North Tyneside and Rotterdam represent elements of individual morality and pathological conceptions within an overall relativist perspective, although they are viewed more sociologically in Rotterdam. While there is some evidence for critical consciousness raising and empowerment of people in APS in North Tyneside, Rotterdam APS are not politicised in the same way. A diversity of governance models - including the case studies labelled 'hierarchical', 'networking' and 'participatory' - are apparent in both, illustrated by Childcare, the PCN and the Battle Hill CDP in North Tyneside, and SBAW, the BD and SZW CPs in Rotterdam respectively. More generally governance in North Tyneside follows a 'partnership' model in the context of a 'power and control' conception of state dependence. The complexion of governance in Rotterdam is best described as an 'integrative' model in the context of a multiple-layered and complex statism, where an 'empowerment and facilitation' notion of state dependence can be observed. Mechanisms for local involvement reveal a similar distinction between state and non-state sectors, between means and ends, de-politicisation and non-structuralism in North Tyneside and Rotterdam. Nonetheless, state mechanisms are more imaginative in Rotterdam, combining consultative and communicative approaches, whereas they follow a more classical consultative method in North Tyneside. Unlike Rotterdam, non-state mechanisms in North Tyneside have retained elements of politicisation, in ideological opposition to the state, despite rhetoric to the contrary in Rotterdam. Overall, the welfare regimes in the UK and the Netherlands are arguably converging within the conservative model, where mechanisms for local involvement tend to be de-politicised, reflexive and non-structural. These regimes are differentiated by their institutional specificities of social stratification, political culture and approach to governance, factors that also highlight the balance between their similarities and differences.

Relating to enduring institutional factors, one should be reminded of work by John Dewey, the radical American democrat, psychologist and pragmatist philosopher, who argued in *Human
Nature and Conduct that the bulk of popular opinion takes far longer to transform than political and legal institutions, and that 'actual social change is never as pronounced as apparent change' (Dewey, 1922: 108). But as he elaborates in Reconstruction and Philosophy: '[S]ince changes are going on any way, the great thing is to learn enough about them so that we will be able to lay hold of them and turn them in the direction of our desires. Conditions and events are neither to be fled from nor passively acquiesced in; they are to be utilised and directed' (Dewey, 1921, quoted in Murphy, 1978: 127). Despite the persistence of institutional context, ideological intervention can drive social change along certain normative lines for the radical democratisation of welfare. The concluding chapter addresses such normative issues, and points towards implications for theory and policy revealed by this research.
Conclusion

This thesis claims that: *international neo-liberalisation is leading to the convergence of welfare systems in the UK and the Netherlands towards a conservative model, but the resulting pluralisation of governance does not lead automatically to the radical democratisation of APS in either context at the local level.* Increasingly exposed to market pressures, these welfare systems are 'hollowing-out' responsibilities to numerous 'non-state' institutions and restructuring traditional universal provision towards more targeted policies. The 'hollowing' of the state includes placing responsibilities (without power) for tackling poverty in the hands of local communities, neighbourhoods and residents. While persistent and enduring socio-institutional specificities underlie this tendency towards 'convergence' and a 'neighbourhood dimension' - maintaining an empirical variety across countries - mechanisms for popular involvement tend to be de-politicised, reflexive and non-structural in both contexts. The realisation of a truly radical democracy requires intervention along an explicit participatory ideology outside the logic of governance. The nature of relations between institutions of the state and civil society, and a normative and essentially political conception of the 'third-sector', are key elements of this ideology. The tendency towards welfare regime convergence suggests the possibility of policy transfer between the UK and the Netherlands. Policy-makers in the UK can learn a great deal from the Dutch, but against a 'pro-Dutch' convention, arguably so too can the Dutch acquire vital insights on governance and APS from the UK.

Conceptual and Theoretical Implications

The research for this thesis reveals the importance of the relationship between institutions of the state and civil society in determining the character of welfare pluralism and the balance between the state and non-state sectors in any context. Contrary to classic Marxist positions on the relatively autonomous and separate realms of the state and civil society, it is vital to examine
the complex nature of their inter-relationship to understand the governance of APS in the UK and the Netherlands. Hinging on the degree of *rationality* among social and political actors, and concurring with recent commentaries on the inequalities inherent within interactive governance, this relationship represents an unequal *partnership* in the UK, where the state actively encourages interaction in the context of overall authority over the non-state sector. While similarly based on inter-organisational inequalities of power, this relationship follows an *integrative* model in the Netherlands where the historically pluralist character of Dutch political culture - including non-state mechanisms - are incorporated into the overall rationality of the state. The tension between an overall statist rationality on the one hand, and varying degrees of 'irrationality' among non-state agents on the other, plays a crucial role in determining the model of welfare pluralism. Any conceptualisation or theorisation of the governance of welfare pluralism needs to incorporate this inter-sectoral relationship to distinguish between empirical instances of strategies for 'third-way' welfare.

The governance perspective on 'third-way' welfare raises the issue of the conceptual distinction between 'diversity' and 'pluralism' in social and political theory. For reasons of convenience the acronym APS is used throughout this thesis to denote 'anti-poverty strategies' in their plural form. Recalling the definition of APS as: *a diversity of strategies that attempt to deal with the problems of poverty, social exclusion and urban deprivation in their variety of forms*, it is important to remember this acronym does not imply a monolithic and singular conception of 'strategy' - where all governance agents are somehow committed to a unitary conceptualisation of poverty and APS - over and above an approach seeing a multitude of strategies in the context of heterogeneity and diversity. Recognising diversity does not, however, imply a celebration of a fundamentally complex, multi-faceted and fragmented social reality or realities. Qualifying the acronym to denote diversity is quite another thing from upholding this latter de-centred and pluralist conception of society. Recalling Manuel Castells who once wrote of 'the richness of diversity and the poverty of pluralism', any empirically sensitive analysis acknowledges the complexity and diversity of social life without necessarily lapsing into a normative critique of more universalist accounts. In any event, a universalist position worthy of the name does not deny particularist tendencies by suggesting the uniformity of social life. Tantamount to the view equating universalism (and objectivism for that matter) with political authoritarianism, the recognition of particularist elements does not need to equate with a radical relativist or contextualist analysis. The distinction between diversity and pluralism lies at the heart of differences between models of welfare pluralism based on Habermas and Mouffe, among others.

This distinction relates to the concerns over universalism and particularism in welfare, and by implication, the critical issue of whether a pluralist 'third-way' welfare system can uphold the universal tenet of equality. Traditional thinking on the Left - including those defending more
universalist and class based arguments for the welfare state - reveal a somewhat persistent and enduring tension between 'equality of opportunity' and 'equality of outcome'. An effective 'third-way' welfare (including APS) arguably relies on a generic conception of social organisation, one that more closely links with a reconceptualised class-based analysis, than with multi-faceted and pluralist analyses, based on fragmented social identities like gender, race and ethnicity. As complex and multi-dimensional phenomena, poverty and social exclusion effect individuals across all these social identities, and so any explicitly particularist and thus differentiated strategy would potentially fragment an otherwise coherent and unified strategy for tackling poverty for all concerned. Rather than representing an out-moded preoccupation with class, one viewing class as the only basis for universal equality, this approach sees the objective of APS as the end-state of equality of outcome, in other words, an *end-state* class-based APS.

Deprived, impoverished and poor people from all social identities share the same problems associated with a relative lack of social and material goods. While recognising the commonality between them, certain groups within this collectivity are targeted to meet their particular needs, aiming towards a standard of living and quality of life worthy of everyone in a civilised society. One can begin to make sense of the maxim 'inequality of treatment, equality of outcome', where a combination of universal and particular elements provides a means for upholding the normative tenet of equality in a pluralist 'third-way' welfare system.

Whether the involvement of the populace in the delivery of welfare under a 'third-way' system is compatible with a project for radical democracy requires some consideration. Clearly the problem of radical democratisation is a structural one, relating to the ways liberal democracies operate in general, and not simply a process invoked by the 'arrival' of governance pluralism and the desire for engagement with local people. For a truly radical democracy one would have to facilitate the involvement and representation for people from all strands of life, including those from different backgrounds and other social identity groups. Inferring an unfeasibly large polity, radical democratisation of welfare would be highly problematic. The issues of governance among a state bureaucracy and interactive 'partner' organisations similarly relate to the *political* realm. Once a political party gains real power by being voted into government, it does everything in can to retain that power, exerting a political hegemony during its term of office that presents massive obstacles for governance mechanisms between the polity, welfare bureaucracy and the citizenry for overcoming this power inequality. If a policy issue (like poverty) cannot easily be solved then the government attempts to create a distance between the problem - as experienced by the people on the ground - and what as a party in government it can do for them. Caught in the middle of the governmental hierarchy - which still abounds in spite of processes of 'hollowing-out' and the emergence of pluralist governance - are those governance mechanisms, like quangos, panels and forums looking to facilitate popular involvement, presenting the appearance of authentic engagement with local people. These intermediate mechanisms are perhaps the most that can be expected in terms of socially
inclusive governance under a liberal democracy, however pluralist, partly explaining why Centre-Left governments in the UK and the Netherlands maintain their rhetorical commitment to 'stakeholding' and the 'third-way' without radically altering the structures of liberal democracy. Calling for a 'small revolution' in the way liberal democracies operate, a radical alternative would have to go far beyond post-hoc and tokenistic mechanisms to engender popular involvement with the potential to create an empowered populace. Empowering 'third-sector' organisations with sufficient political muscle would be a vital step in this direction.

Barriers to the radical democratisation of welfare also include issues of socio-economic inequality, and the psychological issues facing those experiencing poverty. There is an interminable distance between politicians, bureaucrats (and academics for that matter) and the 'outside world'. The separation from the reality of life at the base and at the apex of society hierarchy is equally relevant to the fundamental difference between people experiencing poverty (who need money) and the taxpayers who provide it. It is extremely difficult to genuinely discuss issues of poverty and APS in a 'pleasant', bourgeois and humane - and therefore 'democratic' - manner when the degrading difference between the 'haves' and the 'have nots' persists among parties to the dialogue. Partly for this reason there remains a great deal of stigma on the part of the poor themselves for speaking out in various local fora and consultative mechanisms, indeed in politics more generally, and it is difficult to reconcile that fundamental socio-economic inequality for real radical democratisation of such a discussion. While rendering obsolete the need for a discussion of this kind in any case, this argument turns the debate from a means to an end state conception of democracy. In addition to the active involvement of citizens in decision-making mechanisms and local consultative fora, the process of real democratisation relies as much (if not more) on a certain standard of living for all citizens, as it does for political involvement. Radical democracy requires underlying socio-economic citizenship as well as political citizenship for it to occur.

Well-intentioned rhetoric about the importance of local involvement in the absence of a necessary link with social and material improvement provides little incentive for people to become involved. Rhetoric of this nature is abundant in North Tyneside and Rotterdam, but is arguably unclear as to what the process of involvement actually amounts to in practice. Experience and research repeatedly show that in addition to more financial resources, the majority of people living in deprived neighbourhoods want to be treated as 'normal' human beings, and are hardly concerned with bourgeois 'intellectual' discussions about grassroots involvement in politics and 'elevation of the working class'. Reflecting the wider de-politicisation and de-radicalisation of social and political life, individuals want to live their lives like any other self-respecting citizens, enjoying the pleasures of society as much as anyone else, together with meeting their own basic needs and those of their families. People generally wish to exert the right to choose voluntarily whether or not to participate in local politics and consultative fora, and
not being obliged to get involved as the compulsory prerequisite for positive social and material outcomes. Other sections of society do not tend to have this compulsion for political citizenship foisted on them. Singling out the poor in this way serves to further institutionalise a differentiated strategy between those in poverty and the rest of society. The individuals who regularly get involved are usually those frowned upon by the rest of the local neighbourhood as ‘do-gooders’ with little else in their lives but to interfere in lives of others. These entrenched stigmas greatly impede the realisation of a genuinely democratic welfare system.

In spite of these barriers, a radical democratic class model of social change provides the best means for the democratisation of welfare, one where differences between various social groups are integrated into a collectivity in the struggle against poverty. Drawing on the radical egalitarian and rational communication dimensions of Habermas, the grassroots critique of bourgeois democracy from Mouffe and the critique of oppressive status hierarchy in Freire, this model challenges the inequalities of power under liberal democracy through a concerted socialisation and humanisation of governance. Representing a reconstituted class approach, this model upholds equality through a combination of universalism and particularism in welfare, and the active engagement with local people on an egalitarian and informal basis, while establishing a broad class-based alliance that involves people from grassroots level in the politics of welfare and APS. The radical democratic class model would take into account the nature of the relationship between institutions of the state and civil society in different contexts, yet retaining a normative and essentially political conception of the ‘third-sector’ for engendering a project for radical democratisation of welfare.

Implications for Policy

While recognising the utopianism of a model where the likelihood of mobilising a broad social collectivity is limited, it is important to note that major developments in welfare throughout history have been based on similar class-based alliances. There are certain implications for policy arising from this discussion. There is an emerging and increasingly pervasive perception among observers - including Richard Rogers, the chairman of the UTF in the UK - of the a priori belief in the positive value of Dutch urban and social policy. Taking a more cautious and measured view, the following consideration of the implications for policy shows that there are lessons for policy-makers and practitioners in both countries. The tendency for convergence of welfare regimes within the conservative model in the UK and the Netherlands supports an argument for two-way policy transfer between these contexts.
Firstly, with regard *policies to combat poverty*, experience of APS in Rotterdam shows that initiatives can direct extra financial incomes to poor people when the local authority manipulates central government policies for this end. Acknowledging that this approach characterised the GLC model of local APS during the 1980s in the UK, the Rotterdam case reveals this need not conflict with the parameters set by central government. The key is to manipulate existing mechanisms under the auspices of those mechanisms in new directions for those most in need. The universally accepted sociological conception of poverty in the Netherlands helps mobilise political support for this purpose. While the 'neighbourhood dimension' is common to APS in North Tyneside and Rotterdam, Dutch policy-makers should bear in mind that 'neighbourhood marketing' within geographically specific urban regeneration can lead to community fragmentation in the competitive struggle for funds. The symbiosis of economic vitality and social cohesion is not gainsaid; an important issue for Dutch urban policies like the BCP. Experience of APS in North Tyneside reveals the importance of battling against negative and debilitating stereotypes, confirming the positive worth of this activity for similar work in the Netherlands. Social economy innovations in Rotterdam (like OMIJ) reveal the importance of commercial, financial and managerial awareness, suggesting CED in the UK would benefit from business support customary for SMEs in the mainstream economy. The more politicised 'empowerment philosophy' found in the PCN could influence radical APS in non-state neighbourhood networks in the Netherlands.

Secondly, concerning the *mechanisms for popular involvement in APS*, a significant lesson from the Rotterdam case is revealed by the degree of grassroots mobilisation of local residents engendered through the Opzoomeren social movement. Without facilitating popular involvement in the formal institutional sense, this movement energised a great deal of social activity, bringing local residents into contact with local politicians, bureaucrats and other officials in an informal, social and egalitarian manner. Representing a combination of classic community development and social movement approaches, practitioners in the UK are advised to encourage more informal interface with local residents as a means of transcending status differentials and 'humanising' their interaction with people from deprived neighbourhoods. The UTF in the UK extols the virtues of community involvement and consultation with the public over design and planning decisions. It is advised to bear in mind that similar well-intentioned projects often evolve a more 'top-down' and paternalistic approach when financial and time constraints prove overbearing. Officials in all urban policy initiatives should develop an ability to listen and engage with the views, opinions and needs of poor and deprived residents, in addition to facilitating their involvement on tokenistic panels and consultative fora. It should be made clear at the outset what participants can feasibly expect from their involvement in order not to disenfranchise them at a later stage. All social policies in the UK and the Netherlands - especially in the context of New Labour's commitment to abolish child poverty within a generation - should build upon the SZW CPs in Rotterdam as the first step towards popular
involvement in decision-making on social issues. There is a pressing need for proper mechanisms by which people can get opinions heard without any compulsion or obligation, along with real and demonstrable benefits from doing so. Where problems concerning the real needs of residents persist, classic ethnographic research may prove helpful; certainly new projects could build upon informal street initiatives like TOS in Rotterdam.

Finally, in relation to the radical democratisation of welfare, it is important to bear in mind the relationship between the state and non-state sectors, and encourage a normative political conception of the ‘third-sector’. Research for this thesis reveals that the relationship between the state and non-state sectors are different in North Tyneside and Rotterdam, indicative of the wider complexion of governance in their respective welfare regimes. There is a need for the state to follow a more ‘enabler’ and ‘facilitator’ role by encouraging a facilitation/empowerment model of interaction with the non-state sector. Allowing increased management autonomy in the voluntary sector, especially over finance and recruitment decisions, would assist in this process, freeing representatives to pursue their objectives without restrictive local authority control. Rather than opening the voluntary sector to future uncertainty, this change in management would potentially lead to a more egalitarian and democratic partnership with the state. Recognising the restricted character of the labour movement, especially in the UK, the radical democratisation of welfare would require the non-state sector to work more closely with the trade unions as a crucial first step in forging a new class-based alliance. The government could begin by repealing the numerous debilitating and restrictive anti-union laws. The new class-based alliance would, in addition, need to incorporate more politically orientated non-state organisations, unlike the more abundant professionalised and de-politicised organisations under the influence of market reforms in welfare. Encouraging a politicisation of the ‘third-sector’ is not a simple task, but it might be eased through a softening of the state’s approach to campaigning and by encouraging a revitalised enthusiasm for such activities among voluntary sector workers. The latter could become a more important focus of policy for local and national umbrella organisations representing the voluntary sector.

Suggestion for Further Research

There are many areas omitted from this research that, if included, would potentially enrich the findings and strengthen the inferences that could be drawn. Perhaps the most immediate one concerns the various activities of the ‘black economy’. While clearly of importance for survival strategies within deprived neighbourhoods, it was beyond the remit of this research to address these activities in any depth. Certainly the research undertaken in certain neighbourhoods in North Tyneside and Rotterdam raised awareness about informal activities - either paid cash in
hand, or illegal 'businesses' like drug dealing. Further research into the informal/ black economy would greatly deepen a sociological and anthropological understanding of everyday survival strategies of people experiencing poverty in deprived communities. These activities could be incorporated into the typology of APS, acknowledging they form an important and integral means of supplementing low incomes. New research of this kind could seek to deepen an understanding of attitudes towards involvement in consultative fora and in politics more generally, and examine the extent to which the reality of informal activities (on which the livelihoods of individuals and their families depend) prevents people venturing anywhere near the authorities. Research of this nature would help explain political apathy and address possible policies to assist the reversal of this situation. A more informal process of social engagement would be required where the research process was actively part of the everyday activities on the ground. Further research needs to consider a way to reconcile formal and informal mechanisms of interface with people for the radical democratisation of welfare.

In Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State Karl Marx writes:

The direct participation of all individuals in deliberating and deciding on political matters of general concern is, according to Hegel, 'tantamount to a proposal to put the democratic element without any rational form into the organism of the state, although it is only in virtue of the possession of such a form that the state organism is purely formal'. This is to say that where the state organism is purely formal, the democratic element can enter it only as a formal element. However, the democratic element should rather be the real element which confers a rational form on the organism of the state as a whole. On the other hand it enters the organism or formalism of the state as a 'particular' element, its 'rational form' will be nothing more than an emasculation, an accommodation, denying its own particular nature, i.e. it will function purely as a formal principle.

(Marx, 1992: 185-6 - original emphasis).

Questioning whether all individuals should engage in the formal mechanisms of the state, or whether they decide on matters of general concern by virtue of their existence as individual human beings in civil society, Marx draws a distinction between a formal conception of democracy, based on the separation of the political state and civil society - where it is impossible for all individuals to participate - and an informal conception where civil society is considered the sum total of individuals as the real political society (see Marx, 1992: 189). The rise of interactive and plural governance, including token mechanisms for popular involvement, represents a combination of formal and informal conceptions of democracy, where the former is predominant, rendering the incompleteness and artificiality of the latter. The task for real democratisation lies in the radical socialisation and humanisation of governance, where the formal and informal conceptions of democracy are integrated in a mutually reinforcing whole.

Only then will it be possible to facilitate popular involvement without burdening people and communities with responsibilities that should remain in the hands of the authorities. One day.
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Introduction
- Name
- Organisation
- Position
- Responsibilities
- Establishment
- Structure

Remit
- *Raison d'être*
- Stated aim
- Main functions/ purpose
- Personal view

SECTION B
Governance Poverty and APS
- Nature of poverty in North Tyneside/ Rotterdam
- Key poverty issues
- Nature of anti-poverty initiatives in North Tyneside/ Rotterdam
- Particular schemes
- Location
- Novelty
- Funding
- Innovative job creation experiments and welfare initiatives
- Who is involved in them
- With whom and in what ways do different governance institutions interact
- Partnership and interaction between agencies, or duplication and lack of co-ordination
- Extent to which local organisations and individuals involved
- Success of initiatives. Examples of success and failure. Measures of success

SECTION C
Issues for the Future
- Recap on issues in North Tyneside/ Rotterdam
- Restatement of problem
- Direction perception of poverty and APS moving
- Changes to improve effectiveness of APS
- Anything to add
- Suggestions
- Literature, reports, studies, statistics
- Comments and/ or advice
### SECTION A

**Introduction**
- Name
- Organisation
- Position
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- Establishment
- Structure

**Renum**
- *Raison d'être*
- Stated aim
- Main functions/ purpose
- Personal view

### SECTION B

**Poverty and State APS**
- Nature and location of poverty in North Tyneside/ Rotterdam
- Changing state perception of poverty over time
- Key poverty issues
- Nature of state APS in North Tyneside/ Rotterdam
- Particular schemes. Range of initiatives
- Location. Novelty. Funding
- Changes in state APS over time
- Innovative job creation experiments and welfare initiatives
- Increased state pluralism. Interaction with non-state organisations. Decentralisation
- Increased democratisation in service provision. Views on local democracy
- Co-ordination between agencies. Basis. Mechanisms
- Views on non-state initiatives. Worth
- State 'interface' organisations/ individuals conceptualisation and delivery APS
- Success of local involvement. Examples. Issues. Problems

### SECTION C

**Issues for the Future**
- Recap on issues North Tyneside/ Rotterdam
- Direction state perception poverty/ APS moving
- Changes to improve effectiveness of state APS
- Anything to add
- Suggestions
- Literature, reports, studies, statistics
- Comments and/ or advice
Appendices

Appendix 3
Interview Checklist: non-state representatives

SECTION A

Introduction
- Name
- Organisation
- Position
- Responsibilities
- Establishment
- Structure

Remit
- *Raison d'être*
- Stated aim
- Main functions/ purpose
- Personal view

SECTION B

Poverty and Non-State APS
- Nature and location of poverty in North Tyneside/ Rotterdam
- Changing non-state perception of poverty over time
- Key poverty issues
- Nature of non-state APS in North Tyneside/ Rotterdam
- Origins and reasons non-state action. Particular schemes. Range
- Location. Novelty. Funding
- Changes non-state APS over time
- Innovative job creation or welfare initiatives
- Views on APS other sectors
- Increased democratisation in service provision. Views on local democracy
- Organisation 'interface' local organisations/ individuals conceptualisation and delivery APS
- Success of local involvement. Examples. Issues. Problems
- Problems with service delivery

SECTION C

Issues for the Future
- Recap on issues North Tyneside/ Rotterdam
- Direction non-state perception poverty/ APS moving
- Changes to improve effectiveness of state APS
- Anything to add
- Suggestions
- Literature, reports, studies, statistics
- Comments and/ or advice
SECTION A

Introduction

- Name
- Age
- Where from
- Where live
- With whom
- Views on where live
- Character change over time
- Happy to stay

SECTION B

Life and Work History

- Employment
- Unemployment. How long
- Claim state benefits
- Personal story

Poverty and APS

- Understanding of poverty
- Involvement in APS
- Views on mechanisms for involvement
- Attend any local meetings and consultative fora. Opinions
- Extent views representative
- Other survival strategies. Opinions

SECTION C

Issues for the Future

- Job prospects
- Changes for more local involvement in APS
- Things better in past. When. Why
- Local involvement more important in future
- Changes: (1) more effective APS; and (2) improve your ability shape agenda
- Anything to add
- Suggestions
- Comments and/ or advice
Appendix 5
Approach for Interview Letter: an example

Ms M Nolan
National Federation of Credit Unions (NFCU)
Unit 1.1 - 1.2
Howard House Commercial Centre
Howard St
North Shields
Tyne and Wear

Dear Ms Nolan

Re: PhD Research Project

I would like to take this opportunity to renew our acquaintance and to inform you of my requirements. We first met on 28 May 1996 when we discussed the concerns of poverty and anti-poverty initiatives in North Tyneside for completion of my Masters degree at the University of Durham.

Having just commenced the second year of a PhD in the Department of Geography at the University of Durham under the supervision of Prof Ash Amin and Dr Joe Painter, I am in the process of arranging the fieldwork section of this work. Research for my PhD involves a comparison of the way in which anti-poverty initiatives are organised in the UK and the Netherlands. In particular, this research aims to explore and compare issues concerning the participation of local people in strategies to combat poverty in North Tyneside and Rotterdam.

There are strong reasons for comparing North Tyneside with Rotterdam; these localities share a similar industrial past and furthermore both experience severe problems of poverty and social exclusion. Differences lie, however, in the principles behind and the nature of service delivery in these localities. The broad question this research aims to address, then, is whether these differences influence issues concerning participation of local people in anti-poverty activities.

In order to undertake this comparison, I intend spending an initial period of time in North Tyneside speaking to various people in an informal and exploratory fashion. This process will assist me in acquiring a general impression of and background to the ways in which diverse organisations from the public, private and voluntary sectors respond to and indeed work together in the policy field of anti-poverty. Following a short period reflecting on this information - a process that will allow time to analyse key policy documents and help pin-point and categorise key themes - a series of more in-depth and selective interviews can take place. In total, the interview process will be conducted over a period of three months.

My request therefore is to ask if it would be feasible to arrange an occasion to have a talk with you over the concerns of this research. This talk should not take more than about an hour of your time; in addition I would like to stress that any information you give will be treated with the utmost confidence. Do you think this request can be granted? The issues I would like to address are as follows:

- nature and prevalence of poverty in North Tyneside;
- specific initiatives implemented by your organisation to combat poverty;
- ways in which this organisation interacts with other organisations over anti-poverty policy;
- ways in which local people in North Tyneside participate in these initiatives.

The results of this research should be of interest to both academic and policy communities: for one, the findings will contribute to the contemporary concern over participation of people in the delivery of services; and for another, the results will be of relevance to those concerned with the design and implementation of policies to combat poverty and social exclusion.

Finally, with personal interest in the completion of my PhD, I look forward eagerly to your reply and would like to thank you in advance for your consideration.

Yours sincerely

Justin R. Beaumont
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Appendices

49  Fred May       KROSBE       Assistant Director  11/9/98
50  Henk Kosse     OMUJ        Director           11/9/98
51  Richard Staring Department of Sociology, EUR PhD Research 14/9/98
52  Jan Willem Duyvendak Department of Philosophy, EUR Professor 14/9/98
53  Hans Lopik     Marconiplein Police Department Community Police, Spangen 15/9/98
54  Herman Hammsen Delfshaven District Council Neighbourhood Co-ordinator 15/9/98
55  Anjo Klaer     Department of Economics, Art and Culture, EUR Professor 15/9/98
56  Anton Zijdeveld Department of Sociology, EUR Professor 15/9/98
57  Arjen Deiker   CSIP, SZW, GR PhD Research 16/9/98
58  Renata Kolik   CSIP, SZW, GR Researcher 16/9/98
59  Conrad Bons    BOOM        Director 18/9/98
60  Rieks Westrik  WS          Community Development 21/9/98
61  Dennis Brard   Mariaschool & Valentijschool (Spangen) Director 22/9/98
62  Rian van Merode BANW        Community Development 22/9/98
63  Anga Hoogewerff BANW        Community Development 22/9/98
64  Marianne Martens DISOK      Social Cultural Work 23/9/98
65  Myrna Lourens  WS          Spangen Resident 23/9/98
66  Fred Kiesen    DISK, KIOSK Labour Pastor and Chairman 24/9/98
67  Ina Nelissen   KIOSK, KSA  Activist and volunteer 24/9/98
68  Bea Rowinson   SAO         Manager 24/9/98
69  Ton Krooijes   BDS         Co-ordinator 24/9/98
70  Raizye Akilli  BDS         Community Development Co-ordinator 24/9/98
71  Christine     Socialist Party IJsselmonde Resident 25/9/98
72  Kevin Dixon    Socialist Party Delfshaven Resident 25/9/98
73  Rick Schonenberg Socialist Party Oude Noord Resident 25/9/98
74  Erik Meijer    Socialist Party Volunteer 25/9/98
75  Wil Jagers     BANW        Nieuwe Westen Resident 28/9/98
76  Rob van der Veen BBT        Community Development Co-ordinator 28/9/98
77  Piet Wolters   BBT         Co-ordinator 28/9/98
78  Peter Rokers   BBT         Project Leader 28/9/98
79  Abdessalem Agnes BBT        Bosbolder-Tussendijken Resident 28/9/98
80  Netty Smits    BBT         Bosbolder-Tussendijken Resident 28/9/98
81  Janette Trompert BBT        Bosbolder-Tussendijken Resident 28/9/98
82  Tobias Brians  Socialist Party Volunteer 29/9/98
83  Hugo Mulder    SONOR        Director 30/9/98
84  Simon Horstink BDS         Volunteer 30/9/98
85  Richard       Woonbron     Trainee Social Worker 30/9/98
86  R. Landsink    Department of Economics, EUR Lecturer 5/10/98
87  Toine Schroeder BANW        Co-ordinator 5/10/98
88  Ria Leurs      WS          Spangen Resident 6/10/98
89  Ineke Geerdink Delfshaven District Council Nieuwe Westen Resident 6/10/98
90  Elly van Rooyan c/o Ineke Geerdink Nieuwe Westen Resident 6/10/98
91  Henk Vis       Delfshaven District Council Policy Development 7/10/98
92  Willem Rolteveo Rijnmond Supplies Director 8/10/98
93  Jacques van der Tak Almterdam, GR Social Services 8/10/98
94  Jacques Sier   Catholic Church OWP in Oude Westen 9/10/98
95  Daan Keller    SUGBA        Volunteer 9/10/98
96  Peter Dolf     GR          Advisor on BCP 12/10/98
97  Ruud Vlek      Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, UVA Senior Researcher 13/10/98
98  Annette de Vries Projectbureau Werk, GR Senior Policy Advisor 13/10/98
99  Annie          SUGBA        Afrikaanderwijk Resident 14/10/98
100 Vincent Klaan OMIJ        Employee 15/10/98
101 Edward Grabijn OMIJ        Employee 15/10/98
102 Monique van der Sanden OMIJ        Employee 15/10/98
103 Cora van der Heen OMIJ        Employee 15/10/98
104 Irene Pronsen OMIJ        Employee 15/10/98
105 Betsay Geven OMIJ        Employee 15/10/98
North Tyneside: a profile

North Tyneside is one of the five metropolitan districts which make up the Tyne and Wear conurbation. The borough has a resident population of 194,000 according to the 1991 Census, and covers an area of 8,367 hectares. It stretches from the eastern boundary of Newcastle upon Tyne to the North Sea and from the southern boundary of Northumberland to the River Tyne. The northern fringe of the borough is open countryside with the main urban areas, including the towns of Wallsend, North Shields, Tynemouth and Whitley Bay, along the river and coastline. There are three other large settlements, Longbenton, Forest Hall and Killingworth, between the main towns and the rural hinterland. In the north of the borough are a number of old mining villages.

Large open areas extend into the urban area separating settlements.

It is a borough of considerable contrasts. Along the riverside are urban areas undergoing major regeneration, whilst along the coastal strip are some of the most affluent areas in the northern region.

The Tyne is a commercial river with ship repair, offshore fabrication, fishing and port related industries. There are passenger ferries to northern Europe and the river is increasingly used for recreational purposes. The borough contains a number of high quality industrial estates and business parks, and there are excellent shopping facilities.

The coastline is outstanding with sandy beaches, one of which has the European blue flag for cleanliness. The coast and riverside remain popular tourist areas.

The borough has good external road links south through the Tyne Tunnel, west to Newcastle and north to the A1.

The metro rail system loops through the borough connecting the main towns and coastal area with Newcastle and the other districts of Tyneside. Newcastle airport is to the north west and is linked to the metro.

North Tyneside contains significant areas of land being developed by the Tyne and Wear Development Corporation and the North Tyneside City Challenge Partnership. The borough also has almost a hundred hectares of Enterprise Zone at Silverlink, Balliol Business Park and the Baltic Industrial Park, Royal Quays.

Source: North Tyneside Council (1996a)
## North Tyneside: facts and figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong> (mid-96)</td>
<td>193,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Households</strong> (mid-95)</td>
<td>84,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area</strong></td>
<td>84 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>People in Employment</strong> (Sept-95 - workplace based)</td>
<td>50,760</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Labour Force</strong> (resident mid-96)</td>
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<td><strong>Employment by Industry</strong> (Sept-95: % of total)</td>
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<td>Agriculture</td>
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<td>Energy/Water</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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<td>Retail/Wholesale</td>
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<td>Hotels/Catering</td>
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<td>Transport/Communications</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance/Business</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health/Social Work</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment</strong> (Aug-97)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>5,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business (VAT Registered)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2,700 (stock)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>-0.6% (net change)</td>
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<td><strong>Principal Manufacturing Industries</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offshore Engineering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship-Repair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-Electronics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Processing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Major Companies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>AMEC Offshore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siemens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cookson Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proctor &amp; Gamble</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formica</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ChiRex Ltd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elmwood Sensors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;P (Tyne) Ltd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nestle UK Ltd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freudenberg TPLP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Roads</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1(M) or A19 (from the south)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A65 (from the west)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1 (from the north)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higher &amp; Further Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Tyneside College, Wallsend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tynemouth College, North Shields</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: North Tyneside Council, Office for National Statistics, Department of Trade and Industry*
Appendix 10
Map of North Tyneside (not to scale)
Appendix 11
Images of North Tyneside

a. Housing dereliction and vandalism in Rosehill, 18/10/98

b. Boarded-up housing in Rosehill, 18/10/98
c. Graffiti on derelict house in Rosehill, 18/10/98

d. Boarded-up housing and dereliction in Rosehill, 18/10/98
e. Isolated boarded-up house in Weetwood, 10/6/99

f. Urban malaise on the Longbenton estate, 10/6/99
g. Urban dereliction on southern edge of Longbenton, 10/6/99

h. Boarded-up housing and environmental neglect in Rosehill, 10/6/99
Appendices

Appendix 12
North Tyneside Poverty Profile, 1995

Summary

Against a range of deprivation indicators, 4 wards - Riverside, Chirton, Longbenton and Howdon - consistently showed high levels of deprivation. A further 2 wards (Collingwood and Wallsend) are also significantly deprived.

Within the 4 core wards:

Economic Indicators

- more than 1 in 5 economically active men are unemployed
- more than 2 in 5 unemployed men have been for more than a year
- more than 3 in 10 unemployed 16-24 year olds have been unemployed for more than a year
- more than 50% of population aged 16+ is not earning
- more than 3 in 10 household heads are in Social Classes IV and V
- more than 2 in 5 houses are rented from the council
- more than 3 in 5 households have no access to a car

Vulnerable Groups

- 3 in 10 dependent children live in households with no earner
- 7 in 10 dependent children living in one-parent households live in a house with no earner
- 25% of Longbenton and Howdon residents are pensioners, the figure is less than 20% in Chirton and Riverside
- 50% of pensioner households contain a lone pensioner, predominately female, aged 65-74
- Chirton and Riverside have a proportion of ethnic minority residents slightly above the borough average, whereas Howdon and Longbenton are less than half the average

Take-up of Council Services

- 4 core ward show highest levels of Housing Benefit take-up: 800+ standard cases and 1,000+ income support cases
- eligibility for free school meals regularly highest in schools situated in these core 4 wards, or serving them
- 50% of North Tyneside residents have a Key Card, but 3 in 5 people in the core wards have a Priority Key Card

Purpose of Profile

1. a framework for developing policies and strategies to tackle poverty
2. a basis for planning service delivery in response to anti-poverty strategies
3. a base line measurement of current poverty levels
4. a comparison with local and national poverty data sets

The data used in this report is by no means exhaustive - only a handful of key indicators have been considered in any detail.

Source: North Tyneside Council (1995b) - taken from the 1991 Census
Appendices

Index of Local Conditions, 1994

In May 1994 the Department of Environment published its Index of Local Conditions. This replaced an earlier index based on the 1981 Census and is often referred to as the z scores.

The Index utilised 13 key indicators in an attempt to measure 3 features of deprivation:

- degree - overall deprivation
- extent - proportion of enumeration districts in the most deprived 7% in England
- intensity - severity as an average of the worst 3 wards

The indicators used were:

- Unemployed persons
- Children in low earning households
- Overcrowded households
- Residents in households without basic amenities
- Households with no car
- Children living in unsuitable accommodation
- Educational participation of 17 year olds
- Ratio of long-term to all unemployed
- Income support recipients
- Standardised mortality rates
- Low educational attainment
- House contents insurance premiums
- Derelict land

The result of this was a ranking across 366 English local authority areas. The table below indicates the ranking of each of the Tyne & Wear authorities. Using this list of indicators it can be seen that North Tyneside is the least deprived area of Tyne & Wear. Although it still ranks 51st most deprived area in England.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Extent</th>
<th>Intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Tyneside</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gateshead</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Tyneside</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunderland</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So far as individual indicators are concerned North Tyneside showed itself to be particularly deprived in terms of car ownership, families on income support, derelict land and unemployment. However, it also showed itself to be far from deprived on Households lacking amenities, crowded housing and educational participation by 17 year olds.

Source: DoE (1994) and North Tyneside Council (1995b)
Appendix 14
Rotterdam: a profile

Rotterdam is the second largest city in the Netherlands (in terms of population), with 600,000 inhabitants. It is the largest port in the world and the socio-cultural centre of the region, where over a million people live. The city is in the south-west of the Netherlands and is linked to the North Sea by the Nieuwe Waterweg. It covers a total surface area of 27,000 hectares. The international and multi-cultural nature of the city is a characteristic feature.

Rotterdam was granted a city charter in 1340 and has traditionally been a place for port and trading activities. In the Second World War, the inner city was more or less completely destroyed by bombing. After liberation, the city and port were rebuilt at top speed. Many new neighbourhoods were built, many of which had a garden-city character. The port area was also expanded considerably.

Rotterdam offers a wide range of facilities when it comes to education, culture, sport and recreation. There is, for example, a university with 19,000 students and a polytechnic with 21,000 students. In 1996, the budget was in the region of 9.9 billion guilders. In the field of architecture, Rotterdam is one of the most progressive cities in the Netherlands. A recent highlight is the construction of the Kop van Zuid, where a former port area is being transformed into a residential and commercial area with international allure.

The city has a variety of residential environments. In addition to the garden cities and colourful neighbourhoods of the city there are suburban new estates with family houses and maisonettes. There are also chic apartments with views over the Maas and high-rise in the centre. Since 1974, the urban renewal programme has ensured that 110,000 Rotterdammers have been given a good, affordable home. With the renovation or construction of 70,000 homes and various facilities, urban renewal is was underway.

Source: Anderiesse et al. (1997)
Appendix 15
Rotterdam: facts and figures

Rotterdam 1997
Second largest city in the Netherlands
The World’s number one seaport
Social and cultural centre of the Rhine Estuary area
Industrial heart
Largest urban area in the Netherlands (>1 million inhabitants)

Flag
Three horizontal bars – green white green
Heraldic Motto
“Stronger through Struggle”

History
City Charter granted in 1340
Important historical figures:
Wolfert van Borselen (1299); and Desiderius Erasmus (1469-1536)
Development from fisherman’s hamlet to seaport:
1872 Official opening of the Nieuwe Waterweg giving access to the sea
1957 Botlek port and industrial area finished
1958 Europoort port and industrial area finished
1974 Maasvlakte port and industrial area finished

Population (1/1/97)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>(% of Total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Dutch</td>
<td>348206</td>
<td>(59.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>47736</td>
<td>(8.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>36916</td>
<td>(6.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccones</td>
<td>26254</td>
<td>(4.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europeans</td>
<td>16621</td>
<td>(2.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verdeans</td>
<td>13708</td>
<td>(2.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillians</td>
<td>12114</td>
<td>(2.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other groups</td>
<td>88408</td>
<td>(15.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>589965</td>
<td></td>
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Employment (12+ hours) (1/1/97)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Employment Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>(%) of Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Fisheries</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>(0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral Extraction</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(0.001%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>31361</td>
<td>(11.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Utility Companies</td>
<td>1784</td>
<td>(0.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>15788</td>
<td>(5.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale Trade</td>
<td>15797</td>
<td>(5.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade and Repair</td>
<td>23504</td>
<td>(8.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering</td>
<td>7316</td>
<td>(2.7%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport Storage and</td>
<td>39510</td>
<td>(14.8%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial Institutions</td>
<td>17552</td>
<td>(6.6%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commercial Services</td>
<td>35580</td>
<td>(13.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>13922</td>
<td>(5.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>18137</td>
<td>(6.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Welfare</td>
<td>36349</td>
<td>(13.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture Recreation and</td>
<td>9623</td>
<td>(3.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other Services</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>266774</td>
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Registered Unemployed (1/1/97)

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Working population</td>
<td>235000</td>
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Registered unemployed

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<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.9</td>
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Composition of Housing Stock

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<tr>
<th>Pre-1945</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between 1945-1964</td>
<td>63422</td>
<td>(22.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1965-1974</td>
<td>30288</td>
<td>(10.8%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Between 1975-1984</td>
<td>38516</td>
<td>(13.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1985-1996</td>
<td>43333</td>
<td>(15.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>281543</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gemeente Rotterdam (1998b)
Appendix 16
Map of Rotterdam (not to scale)
Appendix 17
Images of Rotterdam

a. Rotterdam: the maritime city, 26/6/99

b. Social housing behind Euromast Tower in Delfshaven, 26/6/99
c. Boarded-up housing in Delfshaven, 26/6/99

d. Housing dereliction along Coolhaven in Delfshaven, 26/6/99
e. Boarded-up housing and graffiti in Delfshaven, 26/6/99

f. Dereliction in Delfshaven, 26/6/99
g. Urban decay in Bloemhof, 14/10/98

h. Housing dereliction in Feijenoord, 26/6/99
Appendices

Appendix 18

The following data were derived from the report *Achterstandsscores in Rotterdam: de stand van zaken in 1995 en de ontwikkeling sinds 1980* (Deprivation Scores in Rotterdam: scores in 1995 and development since 1980) from the Centrum voor Onderzoek en Statistiek (COS) ("Research and Statistics Centre") from 1995. This report presents the scores on a social deprivation scale for neighbourhoods in Rotterdam. Eight aspects, which are generally associated in some way with social deprivation, are translated into numerical indicators. Each of these indicators tells us something about a certain aspect of social deprivation. Together, it can be assumed that the indicators give as complete a picture of social deprivation as could be quantified. The following eight indicators were used to construct the scale:

(1) Level of education; (2) Proportion of inhabitants on social welfare; (3) Proportion of ethnic groups; (4) Mobility (% of relocations); (5) Average income; (6) Economic value of dwellings; (7) Proportion of inhabitants unemployed; and (8) Mortality rate.

The social deprivation scale is constructed by means of a so-called principal component analysis. A precondition when using this analysis is that all eight indicators, or variables, are fairly strongly correlated, statistically speaking. The aim of this analysis is to find a factor that accounts for as much of the total variance as possible. In this case, the first factor that was found in the analysis accounted for 67.9% of the total variance. This factor can therefore be identified, with good reason, as a general score of social deprivation.

The component 'proportion of ethnic minorities' has been included in the social deprivation scale only for reasons of statistical correlation. A disadvantage of this is however that this inclusion can be interpreted as if the presence of ethnic groups (or individuals) in a neighbourhood causes deprivation. For this reason it is now under consideration to exclude this component in the future measurements of the social deprivation scale.

When looking at the scores on the social deprivation scale, some things must be borne in mind: for some neighbourhoods, the scores seem to have altered enormously when compared to earlier calculations. In most cases, however, these scores relate to the smaller neighbourhoods of Rotterdam – neighbourhoods with less than 1,000 inhabitants. Apparently the smaller the numbers, the larger the fluctuations. Another thing that must be kept in mind is that some of the indicators were not available for these smaller neighbourhoods. In these cases, the contribution made by the missing indicators had to be estimated. As a result of the problems stated above, scores for the neighbourhoods with less than 1,000 inhabitants were less reliable.

Results

The scores are standardised to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for the whole of Rotterdam, so the scores only lend themselves to intra-city comparisons. The scores vary from -2 (social deprivation) to +3 (no social deprivation).

Almost two thirds of the neighbourhoods with more than 1,000 inhabitants have a score between -1 and +1 as shown in the table below. The most striking fact is that there are more neighbourhoods with an extremely negative score (less than -1) on the south bank of the River Maas, whilst there are more neighbourhoods with an extremely positive score (more than +1) on the north bank of the Maas.

Comparing these scores for 1995 with those for 1980, it can be seen that again, there is some difference between the north and south bank of the Maas. On the south bank, there are apparently more neighbourhoods with a lower score than the previous time. On the north bank, on the other hand, there are more neighbourhoods with an improved score. For Rotterdam as a whole, the number of better and worse scores is almost equal (this is a logical outcome of the standardisation).

The development of the scores between 1980 and 1995 shows that most of the neighbourhoods have scores that fluctuate over the years: better one year, worse the next. Only a few neighbourhoods show a clear rise or fall in the trend of their scores over the years. Almost all neighbourhoods with a constantly rising score are found on the north bank of the River Maas, almost all neighbourhoods with a constantly falling one, on the other hand, on the south bank. The scores for the so-called urban renewal areas reveal that the scores for about two thirds of the 'first generation' urban renewal areas, designated in 1974/1975, were higher in 1995 than for 1980. The 'second generation' urban renewal areas, designated in 1980, show an entirely different picture. About two thirds of these areas have a worse score in 1995 than for 1980. This may be because urban renewal in these 'second generation' areas is not fully complete.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strand en Duin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorp</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rijnpoort</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botlek</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europoort</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maasvlakte</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stadsdriehoek</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oude Westen</td>
<td>-2.51</td>
<td>-1.68</td>
<td>-1.23</td>
<td>-1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cool</td>
<td>-1.57</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>0.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. S. Kwartier</td>
<td>-1.43</td>
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Notes: * neighbourhood with less than 1000 inhabitants.  
### Neighbourhoods with the highest share of social security recipients in Rotterdam (1989)

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**Notes:**

- a Classified according to predominant building period - see van Kempen and Teule (1989)
- b Share of adults with a regular income belonging to the upper 20% of the national income distribution
- c Share of social security recipients as percentage of adult population (15-64 years) with a regular income

### Neighbourhoods with the highest share of social security recipients in Rotterdam (1994)

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### Notes:

* Classified according to predominant building period - see van Kempen and Teule (1989)
* Share of adults with a regular income belonging to the upper 20% of the national income distribution
* Share of social security recipients as percentage of adult population (15-64 years) with a regular income

### Source: