Means or meaning: the logic of Paul’s rhetoric in Galatians 3:10-14

Carver, Andrew Hall

How to cite:
Carver, Andrew Hall (2000) Means or meaning: the logic of Paul’s rhetoric in Galatians 3:10-14, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4345/

Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Means or Meaning:

The Logic of Paul’s Rhetoric in Galatians 3:10–14

by Andrew Hall Carver

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published in any form, including Electronic and the Internet, without the author’s prior written consent. All information derived from this thesis must be acknowledged appropriately.

Thesis submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Durham, U.K.

Department of Theology

September 2000

17 SEP 2001
Abstract

Gal. 3:10–14 is still one of the most controversial and challenging passages in Paul’s letters. The logic of Paul’s rhetoric is that which mainly baffles. Study of this text has been hampered by an inadequate appreciation of the ranges of possible meanings, at all semantic levels.

We seek to redress this lack in chapter 2. We survey the science of logic. We discover overlooked semantic possibilities for three key word-groups in Paul’s rhetoric. Δίκαιος and πίστις could be “discourse” lexical concepts. By ἐργαζόμαι Paul very possibly intends “accomplishments” rather than “endeavour.” Chapter 3 finds the indicated senses Paul’s. Effectively multiplying our data via sociolinguistic cognizance that identical words may denote different “realities” for speaker and hearer, we discover that Paul’s usage implies a three-fold working semantic hypothesis: For Paul “faith” believes in a covenantal condition besides itself, namely obedience (endeavour to fulfil God’s commands); Paul is basically denying that justification depends upon any particular amount of accomplishment of God’s commands; and the issue Paul is addressing is not that of the true means of justification, but that of the true meaning of (“righteousness” and thereby of) “justification” in the context of God’s covenant.

The remainder of the thesis confirms and elaborates this overall meaning for Gal. 3:10–14. In verse 10 Paul points out that logically those who hold to the ἐργαζόμαι νόμον theory of “justification” have circumstances which contradict that theory; thus he is arguing by a “circumstantial” ad hominem type of argument. In verses 11–12 he circumstantially undermines his opponents’ “accomplishments” righteousness-criterion by its incompatibility with Hab. 2:4. In verses 13–14, the “rescue” works entirely by causa cognoscendi: it is not a means of propitiation or repayment, either for man or for God. Our findings support our hypothesis.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgment 8

Copyright and Declaration 9

Chapter 1: Introduction 10

1.1 A tour of the interpretations of Gal. 3:10-14 11

1.1.1 Verse 10 12

1.1.1.1 The traditional view: the Law as impossible to fulfil 12

1.1.1.2 Bultmann, Schlier, Bruce, Reinbold 13

1.1.1.3 Bring, Fuller 13

1.1.1.4 Burton 14

1.1.1.5 Stanley, Braswell, Ziesler, Bonneau, Williams, Witherington, Young 15

1.1.1.6 Sanders, McKnight, Smiles 16

1.1.1.7 Noth, Caneday, Wright, Scott 17

1.1.1.8 Dunn, Cranford, Garlington, Wisdom 17

1.1.2 Verses 11-12 18

1.1.3 Verses 13-14 19

1.2 Some observations on the state of the problem 20

Chapter 2: Some neglected semantic possibilities pertinent to Galatians 24

2.1 Possibilities with respect to argumentative and propositional forms and types 25

2.1.1 Rhetorical genre? 26

2.1.2 Aristotle's classification of argument-types 30

2.1.3 Conveying unstated propositions (and other meanings): pragmatics 33

2.1.4 Logos: basic concepts 39

2.1.4.1 Implication, logic, causa essendi vs. causa cognoscendi 39

2.1.4.2 Propositions, their types, and their possible logical relationships; symbolic logic; exclusive and exceptive hypothetical propositions 44

2.1.4.3 The basic real-life argument-modes; pure hypothetical "syllogisms"; dilemmas; circumstantial ad hominem arguments 48

2.1.5 Logos: formal logic 62

2.1.5.1 The four "categorical forms" of simple propositions; exclusive and exceptive categorical propositions 62
2.1.5.2 The logical relationships between the forms; immediate implication; conversion and obversion; definitive vs. descriptive propositions .................................. 65
2.1.5.3 Categorical syllogisms; sorites and other polysyllogisms .................................. 71

2.2 Neglected semantic potential in three key Pauline word-groups .................................. 74

2.2.1 Lexical senses, denotation, and lexical “meanings” .................................................. 75

2.2.2 Neglected semantic potential in δικαιος and δικαιοσύνη ........................................ 79

2.2.3 A neglected possibility with respect to ἐργά τόμου .................................................. 86

2.2.3.1 The common (if not universal) multivalency of “do”-words, including ἐργον .................................................. 86

2.2.3.2 The nonanalytical, traditional interpretation of ἐργά τόμου ................................. 89

2.2.3.3 The Qumran use of “works of the Law”: a technical phrase? ................................. 92

2.2.4 Neglected semantic potential in πίστις and πιστεύω ............................................ 95

2.2.4.1 “Trust” as a discourse lexical concept ................................................................. 95

2.2.4.2 Survey of uses of πίστις ......................................................................................... 97

Chapter 3: Approaching our passage: the contexts ............................................................... 101

3.1 The literary structure of Gal. 3:2–14 ............................................................................ 101

3.2 “Context” and hermeneutical circles ............................................................................ 104

3.2.1 Breaking a “parts-whole” hermeneutical circle ......................................................... 104

3.2.2 Breaking a “words-things” hermeneutical circle ......................................................... 105

3.3 Paul, sociolinguistics, “heteroglossia,” and the potential individuality of semantic structure .................................................................................................................. 106

3.3.1 Bakhtinian sociolinguistics and “heteroglossia”: multiplicity of social languages .................................................................................................................. 108

3.3.2 Breaking the Pauline “words-things” hermeneutical circle by comparison and contrast with his opponents’ social language .......................................................... 113

3.4 Paul, his opponents, “righteousness,” and “justification” .......................................... 114

3.4.1 Rom. 10:5 and Paul’s lexical sense of “righteousness” ............................................. 115

3.4.2 Paul’s topic: means, or meaning? ............................................................................. 117

3.4.3 Support from Paul’s forensic meaning of δικαιοσύνη ............................................ 119

3.5 Paul, his opponents, and ἐργά τόμου ........................................................................... 127

3.5.1 Contextual “logical relations” between predications of “obedience” and of “acts/accomplishments” of the Law, for Paul and for his opponents respectively .......................................................... 128

3.5.2 “Works of the Law” in Qumran ............................................................................. 131

3.5.3 “Works” in Rom. 4:1–8 ......................................................................................... 137

3.6 Paul, his opponents, and πίστις ................................................................................. 137

3.6.1 Paul’s lexical sense of πίστις ................................................................................. 138

3.6.2 An apparent problem for the discourse-concept-πίστις hypothesis, yet a way around it ........................................................................................................... 140
3.7 A working hypothesis concerning Paul's outlook and rhetorical purpose in Gal. 2:16-3:14 ................................................................. 142
3.8 The focus in Gal. 2:14-3:1: "the Law" or "works of the Law"? ........ 152

Chapter 4: The structure and meaning of 3:10
4.1 Significance of ἀνθωποι instead of οἱ, which Paul used in 3:9? .... 157
4.2 Significance of 10b's textual differences from the LXX? .......... 158
   4.2.1 What does the added phrase "written in the book of" signify, if anything? ... 158
   4.2.2 What does the term "all" (things written in the Law), a term absent from the MT but present in the LXX, signify here, if anything? ... 159
4.3 The sense of γὰρ in 3:10a .................................................. 160
4.4 The force of "cursed": as inherently powerful and effectual, or merely as pronouncement of guilt/liability? .................................... 165
4.5 Type of argument: ultimately denying 10b? ......................... 169
4.6 The meaning of ἐκ in ἐκ ἔργων νόμου in 3:10a .......................... 170
4.7 The meaning of the two main verbs in 3:10b, ἐμμένει (+ dative) and τοῦ ποιήσαι ......................................................... 171
   4.7.1 Lexical issues .................................................................. 172
   4.7.1.1 Lexicography of ἐμμένω and syntax of τοῦ ποιήσαι ........ 172
   4.7.1.2 Lexicography of ἄνθρωπος (Hifil) ................................. 180
   4.7.1.3 The limits of lexicography ........................................... 181
   4.7.2 Semantic neutralisation in the original context? ............... 183
   4.7.3 Conclusions on Deut. 27:26 ............................................ 184
4.8 Type of argument: pure logos (causa cognoscendi), or deliberative "argument from consequences"? ........................................ 188
4.9 Understanding Paul's logic in 3:10 ........................................ 189
   4.9.1 Paul's unstated premise(s): cursed because (sinful) human beings? 190
   4.9.2 Paul's unstated premise(s): cursed merely because they are ἐκ ἔργων νόμου? 192
   4.9.3 The unstated basis of the argument .................................. 199
   4.9.4 The structure and content of 3:10 .................................... 206
4.10 The connection of 3:10 with 3:9, its contribution to Paul's argument, and its relevance for our hypothesis about that argument ............. 209

Chapter 5: The structure and meaning of 3:11-12
5.1 Paul's use of ὅτι (twice) in 3:11 ........................................... 212
5.2 The conjunction δὲ and the connection with 3:10 .................... 214
5.3 The sense and function of παρὰ τῷ θεῷ in 3:11a ..................... 214
5.4 The sense and function of ἐν νόμῳ in 3:11a ............................. 215
   5.4.1 The sense of the terms .................................................. 215
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.4.2</td>
<td>What the phrase modifies</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.3</td>
<td>The function of the phrase, and implications for the “level of affirmation” of 3:11a.</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Hab. 2:4 in Gal. 3:11b</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1</td>
<td>The textual problem: the possessive pronoun that Paul omits</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.2</td>
<td>Who is “the righteous (one)”?</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.3</td>
<td>The semantic import of ἐκ here</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.4</td>
<td>The prepositional phrase: modifying subject or predicate?</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.5</td>
<td>The logical “categorical” form of the proposition in 3:11b</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>The continuation of the argument through vs. 12?</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>The ἐκ in ἐκ πίστεως (vs. 12a)</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>The contents of the ellipsis in Gal. 3:12b</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Lev. 18:5b in Gal. 3:12b</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9.1</td>
<td>The (obvious) logical categorical form of the text</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9.2</td>
<td>The meaning of ἐν αὐτοῖς in (Lev. 18:5b and) Gal. 3:12b</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9.3</td>
<td>The type of “life” in view</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9.4</td>
<td>The meaning of ποιήσως in (Lev. 18:5b and) Gal. 3:12b</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>The overall structure of Paul’s argument in 3:11–12</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>The controversial relationship of the Lev. 18:5 citation to the Hab. 2:4 citation</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>Summary and conclusions on 3:11–12</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter 6: The structure and meaning of 3:13–14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>What does it mean, to “become a curse”?</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Paul’s citation of Deut. 21:23 in 3:13b</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1</td>
<td>Why does Paul change καταπραγμένος to ἐπικατάρακτος?</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.2</td>
<td>Why does Paul omit the words ὑπὸ θεοῦ?</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>What is the meaning of ἔξηγόρασεν?</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Does the “us” in 3:13–14 include Gentiles?</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>The semantic relationship between the “curse of the Law” and the “curse” upon Christ</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.1</td>
<td>Verse 13 and the “substitutionary” or “exchange” view of the atonement</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.2</td>
<td>Some problems with the “exchange” reading of Pauline “redemption”</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.3</td>
<td>Verse 13 and the “participatory” or “interchange” view of the atonement</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.4</td>
<td>The two curses</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>What is the meaning of the genitive in “the curse of the Law”?</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>What is the meaning of ὑπὸ ἔρημος?</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Does the “us” in 3:13–14 include everyone?</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>What is “the promise of the Spirit”?</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.10 The two ἵνα-clauses in verse 14 .................................................. 285
6.11 The rhetorical relationship of 3:13–14 to 3:2–9, and its argumentative value. 290
6.12 The rhetorical connection of 3:2–14 with the material immediately following 292

Chapter 7: Summary and suggestions 296

Abbreviations 300

Bibliography 303
Acknowledgment

There are a number of people and organisations who in some way contributed to this project, and their contributions deserve mention. It seems potentially helpful for an author to mention his or her primary intellectual influences (although this is seldom done); the reader may find the author more intelligible and approachable knowing these. The thinker who has influenced me most (and for good, I believe) is the 20th-century Austrian-American economist, historian, and social scientist Ludwig von Mises. Two other 20th-century thinkers who have notably influenced me, both Christians, are Gordon H. Clark (who first stimulated my interest in reconstructing arguments from the Bible) and Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S. J.

Now for my own acquaintances, in a sort of chronological order. I wish to thank my good friends in Oregon, including Van and Dorothy Curll, Adelaide Smith, Frode and Jesse Jensen, and Jay and Lucy Milojевич, particularly for their theological input and generous book-lending. People I knew at Westminster Seminary, Philadelphia, and to whom I am grateful include Dr. T. David Gordon, who taught a stimulating course in 1992 on “Paul’s understanding of the Law”; and my fellow student Andrew Sparks and my teacher Dr. Moisés Silva, each of whom helped me with biblical languages, profitably influenced my choice of word-processing software, and later sent me an essay he had written on Galatians 3. The software I chose was Nota Bene 4.x; and its speed, functionality, and ability to be programmed and customised were very helpful in my work.

Among those at the University of Durham, I wish to thank first and foremost my supervisor, Prof. James Dunn. This project has benefited immeasurably from his sage advice, reasonable criticism, and ever-cheerful encouragement, and words can neither thank him enough nor repay the debt. I am very grateful also to my thesis Examiners, Dr. Loren Stuckenbruck (Durham) and Dr. Max Turner (London Bible College), for their extremely helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks are due also to my fellow students and to other participants in the Postgraduate New Testament Seminar, including: Stephen Wright, Brian Morley, Chuck Robertson, B. J. Oropeza, Ian Yorkston, Mike Fuller, and Keith Gruneberg. My fellow Ph.D. students James McGrath, Jerry Truex, Doug Mohrman, “Atty” Fujiwara, Simon Gathercole, Hung-Sik Choi, and Rev. John Stube interacted with me in depth on topics that were relevant to my thesis. Especially I wish to thank my fellow student and good friend, Rev. (and now Dr.) Tet-Lim Yee, whose guidance and encouragement in the study of linguistic pragmatics and sociolinguistics were pivotal to the progress of my research, and whose fellowship and camaraderie in Christ were a great support.

I should also thank other friends and helpers in England, including Lance Will, Jon and Julie Winch, Phillip Aranzulla, and Jonathan Moore, for Christian fellowship, advice, help, and encouragement. Rev. John Claydon and Rev. Bob Fyall provided pastoral care for me and my family. Mr. Brian Norton was a great friend, interlocutor, and pastor to me. Also, this thesis would never have seen light, I believe, but for the help of two people at Dryburn Hospital in Durham, Respiratory Nurse Pauline Reynolds and Clinical Scientist Phil Saunders, who under the auspices of the National Health Service were very helpful to me in sorting out satisfactorily a sleep-respiratory problem that had obstructed my work.

Finally, and above all, my family have been patient, understanding, and a great support throughout. My mother and stepfather have been encouraging and supportive in many ways, and without their help the project would never have run its course. But especially the patience and understanding of my family members, and particularly of my dear children John and Lauren, has exceeded all reasonable expectations. My wife Vicki has been also the inspiration which has carried me through. In grateful fondness, I dedicate this work to her. My greatest thanks go to God, from whom come “every good thing bestowed and every perfect gift” (James 1:17). May he bless this work to the furtherance of his kingdom.
STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

DECLARATION

I confirm that no part of the material contained in this thesis has previously been submitted by me for a degree in the University of Durham or in any other university.

Signed: [Signature] Date: 30-9-2000

Andrew H. Carver
Chapter 1

Introduction

Gal. 3:10–14 constitutes a formidable exegetical challenge for Pauline scholars today. N. T. Wright (1992, 137) has called it “one of the most complicated and controverted passages in Paul.”¹ The Greek and typical English translation (NASB) of the passage read as follows:²

Gal. 3:10

For as many as are of the works of the law are under a curse; for it is written, “Cursed is everyone who does not abide by all things written in the book of the law, to perform them.”

3:11

Now that no one is justified by the law before God is evident; for, “The righteous man shall live by faith.”


2. The Greek text is that of the United Bible Society’s Greek New Testament, 3rd edition. Since there are no difficult or even semantically noteworthy text-critical problems in this passage, we will simply accept this text as our basis for exegesis. All English excerpts from the Bible are from the RSV unless otherwise noted. We present the NASB of the passage here so as to begin with as neutral and literal a translation as is available. In quotations generally, round brackets will be the original author’s interpolations and square brackets will signify our own interpolations, unless otherwise indicated.
However, the Law is not of faith; on the contrary, “He who practices them shall live by them.”

Christ redeemed us from the curse of the Law, having become a curse for us—for it is written, “Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree”—

in order that in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might come to the Gentiles, so that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith.

1.1 A tour of the interpretations of Gal. 3:10–14

A brief tour of the main answers given to the larger exegetical questions posed by the passage will help demonstrate both the lack of consensus on these questions and the lack of any reason to suppose that a consensus is currently forming. This tour will not enter into extensive citations or interaction with commentators, which is reserved to later chapters; here we wish to indicate the passage’s most glaring problems and the commonly offered solutions, as well as a few common but questionable assumptions. Since most hypotheses have been offered by commentators regarding only a part of the passage, and since the passage’s overall logical/rhetorical structure and meaning involves many sub-issues, it will be convenient to segment this tour according to the three major parts of the passage: verse 10, verses 11–12, and verses 13–14.
1.1.1 Verse 10

Many view this verse as the most difficult and contentious part of the passage;\(^3\) thus it occupies the longest part of our tour. Its main problem, according to most commentators, is the logic of the overall argument: in 10a Paul pronounces a curse on ἐὰν εἰ ἐργαὶ νῦν (“as many as are of the works of the Law,” AT), which commentators most often (but without much argument) take to mean those who seek merit with God through keeping the Law; but in 10b, Paul cites a scripture (Deut. 27:26) which apparently curses those who do not keep the Law. Thus Paul’s proof-text would seem to prove, if anything, the exact opposite of what he appears to be arguing. What is going on?

1.1.1.1 The traditional view: the Law as impossible to fulfil

According to John Calvin, Paul “concludes boldly that all are cursed because all have been commanded to keep the law perfectly, and this is because, in the present corruption of our nature, the ability is wanting” (see Calvin 1965, 53). Thus Calvin supplies the argument an unstated premise (viz., that all fall short of keeping the Law perfectly), and also finds the argument’s conclusion not in 10a, but in the additional unspoken proposition that therefore all are cursed (ibid.). Though this same unstated premise has been supposed by a great number of modern commentators,\(^4\) virtually all of these find, contrary to Calvin, that 10a is the argument’s conclusion. Perhaps this is not very surprising, as Paul give every indication of wanting to prove 10a by 10b. Yet here Calvin brings out an important point: if the


unstated premise is that all fail to “keep the Law perfectly,” then the argument proves not just that δοκεῖ ἐκ ἔργων νόμου are under a curse, but that everyone is. And that creates tensions: in verses 9 and 13 Paul apparently means that at least some people are not under this curse. Furthermore, the idea that Paul’s argument could assume the Law to be incapable of fulfilment, in a Jewish (if Christian) religious context, has come under increasingly heavy attack in recent decades, particularly since E. P. Sanders’ 1977 monograph exposing Pauline scholarship’s traditional misrepresentations of 1st-c. Judaism.⁵

1.1.1.2 Bultmann, Schlier, Bruce, Reinbold

According to an alternative view, Paul’s unstated assumption is not that the Law cannot be fulfilled. The latter notion may be true enough, but is beside the point: even if man could fulfil the Law, the attempt itself would be sin, an arrogant attempt to gain merit before God, and therefore is cursed. This interpretation was held by Rudolf Bultmann (1951, 263f.) and Heinrich Schlier (1971, 132–33), and supported also by F. F. Bruce (1982b, 160). Recently Wolfgang Reinbold (2000) has defended it, noting that it avoids the criticisms of the traditional view which arise from Sanders’ work on 1st-century Judaism and that it seems more consonant with Paul’s other writings about the Law. But some have noted that in 3:10 this is quite contrary to what Paul explicitly says: the curse is not for doing the things of the Law, but for not doing them (e.g., Stanley 1990, 483–84; Schreiner 1993, 50–51).

1.1.1.3 Bring, Fuller

Ragnar Bring (1961, 120ff.) and Daniel P. Fuller (1975) have supported something rather like Bultmann’s reading by claiming that Paul’s argument is not with “the Law” as such, but only with the “works of the Law,” by which term Paul refers to the 1st-century Jews’ legalistic distortion of the Law. The Law was not intended as a way of gaining merit before

⁵ Krister Stendahl's work (see Stendahl 1976) was an important precursor to Sanders'.
God, says this hypothesis; but the Jews misused it as one. But even if this reading escapes Bultmann's outright conflict with the text, it has not yet made clear why such "legalism" falls under the specific curse of Deut. 27:26 upon those who fail to "abide by" all things written in the Law. What constitutes this sort of "legalism," and what leads to it, and in what way does it depart (as here it logically should) from "abiding by all things commanded" (3:10b)? The linguistic arguments for this meaning of εργα νόμου have been weak and few; nor has the objection been overcome, that the notion "works of the Law" would probably have had no evil connotation to a Jewish (or Jewish-influenced) audience, but quite the opposite.6 This explanation of 10a's curse-pronouncement falls short.

1.1.1.4 Burton

An interesting but usually misunderstood reading, somewhat similar to the preceding, is that of E. D. Burton (1921, 163–65). According to Burton Paul is not trying to prove this curse on δοει δε εργα νόμου, but rather by inferring it he seeks to show invalid (as covenantal law) the passage (Deut. 27:26) from which it was inferred: the Law's verdicts are, for Paul, not judgments which reflect God's attitude now or at any time or under any circumstances, but those which the legalist must, to his own undoing, recognise as those of the law interpreted as he interprets it, and which on the basis of his legalism he must impute to God. . . . the assumption of the legalist that the law is the basis of the divine judgment involves the conclusion that all men are accursed, and [therefore] must be false (p.165).

As an improvement over the above reading, this one incorporates the "Law-misuse" idea into the very structure of the argument. But it draws in also the traditional unstated premise, "No one fulfils the Law perfectly." It therefore is subject to the criticisms arising from Sanders' work (see above). It also seems to conflict with verse 13: if the curse pronounced by Deut. 27:26 is wholly spurious, then from what "curse of the Law" did Christ "rescue us'?  

6. Fuller (1975, 35) notes this objection, but fails to handle it plausibly.
1.1.1.5 Stanley, Braswell, Ziesler, Bonneau, Williams, Witherington, Young

ἔργῳ νόμου. For the curse will come upon them only *if* they fail to “abide by all things written . . .”; it is not certain that they will do so, according to this reading. This uncertainty is evident in the indefinite pronoun ὁσοὶ and in Paul’s phrase “under a curse” in 10a, allegedly less decisive than the notion “accursed” which appears in 10b. Thus in 10a Paul is allegedly warning against the *threat* which would accompany acceptance of the Law. But the indefiniteness introduced by ὁσοὶ is as to the exact number of those who are “of the works of the Law,” not as to whether these “abide by all things written . . .” As for the phrase “under a curse,” it is doubtful that Paul would or could use it here to mean “under the *possibility* of curse.” For one thing, the latter would entail the correlative possibility of blessing, in a 1st-century Jewish context (assuming, as these commentators generally do, that the Law can be fulfilled).<sup>7</sup> So the Galatians would have known *already* that curse is a possibility under the Torah; for they are contemplating observing the Torah in order to gain the *blessing*. Indeed, Paul’s opponents must have themselves already used the curse-threat, but in order to prod the Galatians *into* keeping the Law; otherwise they would not have had leverage to “compel” the Galatians to be circumcised (6:12; cf. 4:17).<sup>8</sup> Therefore the Galatians must have come to believe the Law was *already* binding, not just for Jews but for

---


<sup>8</sup> According to some commentators (e.g. Barrett 1985, 22ff.; Smiles 1998, 201–2), Deut. 27:26 and Lev. 18:5 were probably introduced into the debate by Paul’s opponents.
Gentiles, or at least Gentile Christians. Thus in 3:10’s phrase “under a curse” Paul’s readers would find no suggestion of uncertainty about the Law’s cursing “as many as are of works of the Law.” On the contrary, the clear logical connection of 10a with 10b, signified by γὰρ, would suggest to them the absolute certainty of 10a’s curse upon ὃσοι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου.

1.1.1.6 Sanders, McKnight, Smiles

With the problems attaching to these five readings, it is not surprising that some commentators have suggested that logic was hardly uppermost in Paul’s mind when writing 3:10. According to E. P. Sanders (1983, 21–22), Paul wants a passage which says that the nomos brings a curse, and he cites the only one which does. . . . I think that what Paul says in his own words is the clue to what he took the proof-texts to mean. Thus in 3:10 Paul means that those who accept the Law are cursed.

Scot McKnight (1995, 154–55) and Vincent Smiles (1998, 201–2) have also adopted essentially this approach (see also Martyn 1997a, 309). In effect, it tries to salvage Bultmann’s explanation by claiming that the resulting contradiction between citation and conclusion does not matter; Paul was not paying attention to what his proof-text actually said. But Paul had no computer software by which he might search out every verse which had the terms “Law” and “cursed” and then unreflectingly paste one into his document! Rather, he was familiar with the texts themselves (including their meaning!), and relied upon that familiarity to choose his proof-text. To say Paul might not have noticed that the verse he cited as proof-text was the direct contradiction of the conclusion he drew from it, is almost to imply that Paul might have written this verse while asleep. This reading fails, therefore, to explain 3:10 plausibly.

Likewise in Romans Paul’s exposition of the Law’s condemnation assumes that it falls on Gentile as well as Jew (Rom. 3:9–20). Note particularly Rom. 3:19, and its word ἐνδοκος ("under judgment"), semantically and almost verbally parallel to Gal. 3:10’s ἐνδοκος κατάραν ("under a curse").
1.1.1.7 Noth, Caneday, Wright, Scott

Another approach to the problem sets forward the notion, allegedly held by many 1st-century Jews, that Israel was still under the covenantal curse which caused the Babylonian exile and Jewish dispersion among the nations, and that the exile and curse would not truly end until God came in divine intervention in history. Thus in quoting Deut. 27:26, Paul is referring not to individuals at all: "his point is not that individual Jews have all in fact sinned, but that Israel as a whole has failed to keep the perfect Torah . . .” (Wright 1992, 146). Those who adopt Israel's way of life, Paul argues, will therefore fall under the curse that still burdens Israel. Martin Noth (1966), Ardel Caneday (1989, 195), N. T. Wright (1992, 137-48), and James Scott (1993) have supported this general understanding of the verse. But besides the extreme difficulty or impossibility of discovering elsewhere in Paul's writings this theme of "Israel still in exile," it is not at all clear what the disobedience of "Israel as a whole" has to do with the point Paul is making here: both his citation and his conclusion refer grammatically to individuals, not to some national collective (ὅσοι speaks of an indefinite number, of individuals). And the fact that as a nation Israel did not obey the Torah, does not imply that no individual who adopts the Torah will obey it.

1.1.1.8 Dunn, Cranford, Garlington, Wisdom

James D. G. Dunn (1990b, 226-27; 1993a, 170-74), Michael Cranford (1994, 244-54), Don Garlington (1997), and Jeff Wisdom (1998) also argue that Paul does not have perfect obedience in mind in this verse. "The basic logic of the text is clear: all who are ἐξ ἐργασίας νόμου are under a curse, because they fail to abide by everything that is written in the law"

12. Such an inference would be an instance of the logical "fallacy of division."
(Dunn 1990b, 226; emphasis in original). Thus the latter premise, though unstated, would have been clear to Paul's readers. The Jews considered their service under the Law, which service Paul calls "the works of the Law," to be focused in those things which distinguished and identified Jews as such; which things particularly comprise the ritual observances such as circumcision and dietary regulations. This had the undesirable result that the Jews were more restrictive and exclusivistic than could permit enactment of God's plan for the inclusion of the Gentiles, foretold in Genesis (cf. Gal. 3:8). Thus "to be of the works of the law is not the same as fulfilling the law, is less than what the law requires, and so falls under the law's own curse" (Cranford 1994, 249 n.22, quoting Dunn 1990b, 226). This interesting reading is arguably consistent with the dynamics of Jew-Gentile social relations. But it still seems hard-pressed to explain the logic of 3:10. If those who are "of works of the Law" are demanding these things (such as circumcision and dietary observances) precisely because they are adherents of the Law and these things are commanded in the Law, how could Paul construe someone's insistence upon them as an instance of not "abiding by all things commanded in the Law"? In this case it appears, yet again, that Paul's proof-text says only the exact opposite of his conclusion. Thus none of the above expositions explains unproblematically the connection between 3:10a and 10b.

1.1.2 Verses 11–12

There is no such plethora of views concerning verses 11–12 or 13–14. But no real consensus seems to be coalescing regarding these verses either. Almost all commentators agree (but without much argumentation) that in 11–12 Paul is trying to show that one cannot be justified "by means of keeping the Law" (ἐν νόμῳ, 11a). And most agree that 11b and 12a form the premises of a syllogism whose conclusion is 11a. One might suppose that this narrows down the overall meaning for these commentators; but radical differences among them persist. For
example, Paul's juxtaposing of two OT scriptures (Hab. 2:4 and Lev. 18:5), as if the reader is supposed to see contradiction between them, has caused consternation and contention. Is Paul trying to resolve somehow the apparent textual conflict? If not, is he tacitly assuming some sort of redemptive-historical shift between differing dispensations or ages? If so, what is the shift, and how does it relate to these cited verses? These questions continue to confound and divide commentators. But as we shall see, the problem may derive from assumptions about verses 11–12 that need questioning, such as the meaning of ἐν νόμῳ mentioned above.

1.1.3 Verses 13–14

No less do verses 13–14 give rise to serious disagreements between interpreters. Disagreement here concerns primarily Paul's conception of the atonement and of how that brings blessings to the Gentiles. The most common view has been that Christ's death effected a substitutionary atonement: he suffered the Law's curse "in our stead," thus propitiating the wrath of God or overcoming the cosmic forces of evil that threatened our eschatological blessing, or both (if indeed they are different), by the offering of himself. But it is somewhat difficult to understand, in this case, how for Paul the curse can have been removed only for certain people, since Christ's cosmic or God-propitiating victory is independent of individuals' responses to it. But if the curse has instead been removed for all in this substitutionary fashion, or even only for all Jews, how is it that not even all Jews are blessed, as in verse 10 those who are "of works of the Law" (which includes primarily persons of Jewish heritage) are under this curse?

15. The prepositional phrase ἐν νόμῳ is commonly taken to mean "in our stead," although it could mean simply "in our behalf."
Some exegetes have argued that this redemption from the Law's curse means some type of "redemption" from the mistaken notion that the Law is our way of salvation or that it has (or, still has) jurisdiction over us. The way Christ's death shows this about the Law is supposedly via Christ's vindication in his resurrection: the Law's curse upon him was clearly mistaken; therefore, the Law is an invalid judge of anyone. Yet even if we grant that the curse which fell upon Christ himself was pronounced by the Law (which the text does not actually say), Paul says "redeemed from the curse of the Law," not "redeemed from a mistaken notion" about it. But if we accept that the Law's curse on Christ was mistaken and thus without validity, what becomes of "the curse of the Law," from which we supposedly are "redeemed"? This reading faces a dilemma: either the Law's curse is valid and real, in which case we cannot be "redeemed" from it by being shown its invalidity; or else it is non-binding and invalid, in which case there was no curse to redeem us from.

1.2 Some observations on the state of the problem

We have seen that today there is no exegetical consensus on any part of this passage. There are at least two ways one might react to this situation. One might decide that it is not worthwhile, at least at present, to pursue further exegesis of this passage. If we had enough historical, linguistic, and lexical-semantic data to infer the passage's meaning, it would have been inferred by now, one might argue; the increasing lack of consensus simply suggests that we have an exegetical problem which for the moment defies solution. On the other hand, we might critically re-examine the sorts of exegetical procedure that have been followed in the study of this passage. Before we give in to exegetical despair, then, let us try following this latter train of thought a way.

17. So, e.g., Burton 1921, 168-75; Duncan 1934, 101; Edwards 1972; Weder 1981; Beker 1984, 185-86, 261.
It seems that in each part of the passage, scholars disagree mainly over the flow of Paul's reasoning and, in some cases, over whether it is a truly logical flow. But let us consider: what would it take to determine whether the rhetorical flow is truly logical? Would it not take a knowledge of the various ways in which one may argue in a "truly logical" manner, and then an applying of this knowledge to the passage, a seeing whether Paul's rhetoric accords with any of these known ways? That would seem requisite. And yet we very rarely find this sort of analysis in any exegesis of the passage.

But such analysis is crucial not only for determining whether Paul is being logical, but also for understanding just what his logic is. For arguments are rarely spelled out fully; and as we have seen, there is general agreement that Paul is leaving out parts of his here. Therefore, in order to follow the intended argument, the reader must fill in its gaps by supplying its unstated parts. Yet in order to do that, one must already have guessed the intended flow of the argument. And if one has only parts of the argument with which to work, one must have in mind a model or models of what are the valid, logical types of argument, before one can educatedly guess which of these models is that which the author is trying to follow.

The usual omission of this type of analysis from exegesis of Gal. 3:10–14 implies that interpreters have either overlooked or not sufficiently understood certain known, relevant semantic possibilities. For the meaning of the passage includes not only the meanings of its words and of its sentences, but also any logical relations (e.g., "therefore") connecting those sentences. But if known, relevant semantic possibilities have been overlooked or not sufficiently understood, the exegesis of the passage will not be as thorough or as cogently-argued as it might have been given the available data.

As we will see, however, not only at the level of the passage's logical flow have known semantic possibilities have been neglected or insufficiently understood. At the
proposition-level too, known semantic possibilities have been left unexamined and uncatalogued. Also there are certain key terms that Paul uses, whose known potential senses have been insufficiently considered, appreciated, and compared in exegesis of Galatians 3. These terms have a considerable amount of theological mass in present-day exegesis; their Pauline meanings are therefore frequently more assumed than demonstrated. Once again, the implication of such a state of affairs is that the exegesis of the passage has been less thorough and cogent than it could have been.

18. Commonly the overall argument- or discourse-meaning is assumed first, then the proposition-meanings accordingly, and, finally, the word-meanings are made to conform. But this approach inevitably locks the interpreter into an exegetical (or “hermeneutical”) circle, a circular exegetical argument; for the only known objective way to validate written-discourse meanings is via the meanings of constituent propositions, and the only known objective way to justify the latter is via the meanings of constituent words (and of other signs such as gestures and punctuation points. We consider this “parts-whole” type of hermeneutical circle more fully in chap. 3.)

Unfortunately this problem largely vitiates the noteworthy book on Romans 1–8 by John Moores (1995), one of the extremely rare works applying logic to Paul’s writings in order to reconstruct his arguments (although Moores offers no helpful synopsis of the science of logic or of ways of arguing, but rather a summary of some topics in semiotics). Moores is interested mainly in Paul’s rhetorical strategy, and to what extent and with what effect it depends on use of logic; so naturally the main concern of the book is with the discourse-, argument-level of Paul’s meaning. But doing one’s exegesis at this level initially is a procedure fraught with danger. Moores falsely assumes, and even claims, that we do not need to understand Paul’s propositions in order to reconstruct his arguments. For example (p. 62), we need not know whether Paul affirms that justification is by faith alone; which assertion Moores overturns almost in the next breath by assuming sola fide in the reconstruction of Paul’s argumentation ca. Rom. 3:19–20. Unsurprisingly, the propositions which Moores uses in reconstructing Paul’s arguments seem only loosely based on Paul’s actual statements, on which Moores focuses relatively little attention. It would be rather coincidental, then, if Moores’ reconstructions shed considerable light on Paul’s meaning in the passages where light is most in need. Nor do they. That represents no problem for Moores—in fact, quite the contrary: Moores’ methodology allows him to commit to the supposedly helpful category “fuzzy logic” any word or statement which his exegesis (if unsuccessful!) concludes is unfathomable. (E.g., p. 150: “With [Paul’s] exclusion of any . . . definition of human righteousness as law-obedience, it has become indefinable. It has acquired, however, infinite depth,” which is something like, infinite existential angst in lieu of intelligible content.) But by offering no criterion of situations in which the category “fuzzy logic” is validly applicable (e.g., it is applicable to relative notions, such as “tall”), Moores leaves his reader wondering if it is really Paul’s logic, or only Moores’ analysis of it, that lacks the normal degree of definiteness and cogency. What we seem to need, rather than glib use of the category “fuzzy logic,” is analysis that gives greater attention, first to the semantic possibilities at the word-level, then to those at the proposition-level, and finally to those at the argument- or discourse-level, all the while keeping the exegetical argument flowing in this direction lest it turn back on itself.
In short, there appear to be known, pertinent semantic possibilities for the passage which have not been sufficiently considered and fairly judged. The obstacle to understanding Gal. 3:10-14, therefore, may be less in the exegetical problem which it presents, than in us, its interpreters. Under current exegetical circumstances, a verdict of Paul's incomprehensibility in Gal. 3:10-14 would seem quite premature. The goal of the present thesis is to make a scientifically-grounded and thorough analysis and evaluation of the meaning of Paul's rhetoric, including its thrust and logical structure (if it has any), in Gal. 3:10-14, and to do this by non-fallacious, non-circular exegesis. We consider how to avoid "hermeneutical circles" in chap. 3. We begin in chapter 2 by considering various commonly neglected semantic possibilities which are confirmed and clarified via two language-related sciences, logic and linguistic semantics, and which are pertinent to exegesis of the word-meanings, propositions, and argumentation of Gal. 3:10-14.
Chapter 2

Some neglected semantic possibilities pertinent to Galatians

We have seen that the meaning of Gal. 3:10–14 has not been adequately elucidated, nor has any consensus formed concerning it. One part of adequately elucidating the passage is to ascertain, as much as we can, the possible answers or at least possible types of answers available for the three levels of meaning presumably involved: word-meaning, proposition-meaning, and argument- or discourse-meaning. Grasping the meaning of a passage entails grasping its meaning at all these levels (Cotterell and Turner 1989, 77–82). The word-meanings we will survey in this chapter include the semantic potentials, some overlooked, of certain key terms in the passage. For proposition- and argument-meaning, we survey the forms and types; these are not widely understood.

By proposition we mean not a sentence, but rather the meaning expressed by a sentence (Clark 1985, 30; Cotterell and Turner 1989, 78). Meanings of particular sentences depend not only on the proposition’s type and form, but also on the meanings of its words and on their respective positions and roles in the proposition (e.g., subject vs. predicate). Likewise, discourse- or argument-meanings depend not only on the argument’s or discourse’s type and/or structure, but also on its propositions’ meanings and on the propositions’ respective
positions or roles in the discourse/argument. It would help us understand the impact, at other
meaning-levels, of various choices for word-meanings, if we understood already the potential
types and forms of arguments and propositions. Accordingly we shall discuss argumentative
discourse-types and proposition-types first, then the word-meanings.

Besides various potential hypotheses about meanings, there are also some relevant
methodological, hermeneutical matters that we should address because they are pertinent to
the question of potential meanings. Specifically, we will bring in considerations from
pragmatics and semantics. Such subjects, as also logic, are rich with resources for building
exegetical arguments; our interest here will be primarily in the potential but neglected
meaning-hypotheses they suggest. In this respect they each tend to pertain to a particular
level of meaning; we shall therefore look at these in their proper place when considering
proposition-meanings, discourse-meanings, or word-meanings.

2.1 Possibilities with respect to argumentative and propositional forms and types

Understanding the meaning of an argument involves understanding the logic of it. That
understanding may be conscious or unconscious; but it can be conscious only if one
understands, abstractly, the type of argument used. Obviously then it is to the advantage of
the exegete (i.e., the methodical interpreter)\(^1\) to have a more conscious rather than less
conscious grasp of various argument-types.

But one overvalued and rather abused exegetical tool is identification of the “rhetorical
genre” of an ancient text. We say “overvalued” because it seems to have become, against its
original intention, a sort of master-categorisation of types of argument, rather than simply an
enumeration of some styles or genres of discourse native to various types of rhetorical

---

\(^1\) Cf. Meyer 1994, 90.
situation. As a result, its use has, in our opinion, often been a good example of a bad inductive argument, an unfounded generalisation resulting in forced exegesis. Since this supposed hermeneutical tool has created an undue restriction in semantic hypotheses, whereas our present purpose is to expand our hypothesis-horizon as much as possible, it seems necessary to assess this tool’s value at the outset.

2.1.1 Rhetorical genre?

Much recent attention has been given to the rhetorical aspects of Galatians, and particularly under what ancient rhetorical genre it might be classifiable. The “rhetorical criticism” of Galatians has been dominated by this issue. The matter of rhetorical genre is basically a matter of types of rhetorical (i.e., a speaker’s) situation and audience (Hellholm 1994, 129–30). The fact that Galatians was always a document, not a speech, throws a bit of cold water on the quest for its rhetorical genre. Moreover, the traditional categories of rhetorical genre are either too few or too broad to be exhaustive as true genre classifications: “Epideictic originally referred to demonstrations of merit or faults, but comes to include all oratory which is not deliberative or judicial; in late antiquity it is even used of other literary genres,

2. It is remarkable how similar is recent discussion of New Testament “rhetorical genres,” to the 19th-century neo-classical genre theory popularised in biblical studies by Hermann Gunkel: “In the nineteenth century, genre theorists believed that genres were rigid and pure. Literary texts, it was felt, could be pigeonholed into their respective generic categories, and the genres themselves could be arranged into hierarchies. Gunkel imported this unfortunate understanding of genre into biblical studies, though such a neoclassical position was already obsolete in his own day. According to Gunkel, a particular text had one genre with a corresponding setting in life. Furthermore, so-called mixed genres (Mischgattungen) were considered late and corrupt” Longman (1987, 78–79). Almost all of this reminds one of current NT rhetorical criticism. But in fact, “such a position can be neither theoretically nor practically justified” (ibid., 79).

3. However, also receiving some attention has been the question of epistolary genre. Walter Hansen’s approach (1989), adopting the ‘rebuke-request’ letter genre, leads him to say the letter is a combination of forensic (1:6–4:11) and of deliberative (the remainder) rhetoric. It is reasonable to appeal to epistolary genres at some point in dealing with Galatians, if they are not forced on the text; but it is questionable whether such compound genre-classifying (“part forensic, part deliberative”) is a help or further hindrance. But epistolary-genre considerations can be of some value for studying Paul’s letters; see Longenecker 1990, ci–cix.
including forms of poetry, so that all writing is embraced in the field of rhetoric” (Kennedy 1963, 10, emphasis ours). So either “epideictic” is a valid genre, in which case it is limited to discourses of praise and blame, or else it is a catch-all category for “everything other than forensic or deliberative,” in which case we can hardly call it a genre.

Therefore the hope was forlorn that the discovery of Galatians’ rhetorical genre would shed a significant volume of light upon the epistle; rather, this hope was just as likely to result in Procrustean-bed exegesis, with a miraculous “finding” of the exact meaning anticipated by every rhetorical critic who adopts this approach.\(^4\) Let us briefly illustrate the difficulty here and the extreme potential for unfounded conclusions, by drawing on and critiquing some of the answers that have been given to the questions of the letter’s rhetorical genre and “rational stasis” (i.e., the type of question addressed).

Betz’s (1979) rather trailblazing contention, that Galatians represents an apologetic letter in the “forensic” rhetorical genre, has come under increasing fire, especially for the forensic genre’s inability to account for the parenetic section of the letter; also, Paul does not seem so defensive as he seems attacking.\(^5\) The other two rhetorical genres being the “deliberative” and the “epideictic” (originally demonstrative), the suggestion that Galatians is deliberative rhetoric (by Kennedy, Witherington, Stanley, and others) might initially seem soundest. But a simple observation will show how gratuitous such categorisations of Galatians can be. Often it is assumed that Galatians is deliberative rhetoric, because Paul is allegedly discussing what the Galatians should do (e.g., they should refrain from getting circumcised).\(^6\) But in a broader sense than is used by rhetoricians, “deliberation” is often

---

4. This happens along the lines of the logical fallacy called “affirming the consequent,” as follows: “If X is its true genre, then Galatians will surely make passable sense when read as an example of X; but (lo and behold) it does make passable sense when read in this way, therefore X is its true genre.”


6. For the traditional definition see, e.g., Kennedy 1984, 19; Smit 1989, 13; Stanley 1990, 491; Witherington 1998, 28.
about what is true or is just (e.g., whether the defendant is guilty, or which Law applies in a particular case). Indeed, action is always based on theory, and theory would have been “deliberated” at some point. And this latter sort of “deliberation” is at least as congenial to the data of Galatians 2–4 as is the former: the explicit points made there are often not about actions to take or to forgo, but rather about justification or about whether one is justified ἐξ ἐργῶν νόμου or ἐκ πίστεως, about the Law’s current jurisdiction (or lack thereof), and so on. Should we be satisfied, then, with the traditional notion of “deliberative” rhetoric, in categorising Galatians? If so, at what cost?

On the other hand, there is sometimes a subsidiary discussion of ancient rhetoric’s “rational stasis” theory (i.e., categorising of the type of question being handled by a text) and its relevance to Galatians. If this has any relevance (which is questionable), it seems entirely plausible that Paul is discussing the question of Jurisdiction (i.e., about which law has jurisdiction or about changing or invalidating the juristic procedure), rather than that of Definition (of an act committed; so Morland 1995, 122), Quality (of an act committed; so Betz 1979, 129; Martin 1995, 443), or Fact (of an alleged act; so Kennedy 1984, 145). The latter stases have to do with the nature or actuality of past deeds (Morland 1995, 120–21); whereas the Definition stasis would be a reasonable categorisation, for example, of a debate on the topic, “under which social-covenental law-code one is to be judged” (e.g., the Law of Moses or the Law of Christ). The Definition stasis has apparently been ignored in discussions of the rational stasis of Galatians; every other possibility has been championed, yet none convincingly. 7

7. Morland jumps inexplicably to his conclusion, “Definition,” after refuting and rejecting only the stasis of Fact; he also seems implicitly to consider and reject Betz’s identification of the stasis as Quality (omitting any reasons), but does not consider Jurisdiction. Kennedy, who identifies Galatians as deliberative rhetoric, notes also (p. 147) that “Insofar as stasis theory can be applied to deliberative rhetoric, the stasis [in Galatians] is one of fact: Which gospel is true? What should the Galatians do?” But if the notion “stasis of fact” is to be interpreted so broadly as to comprehend the issue “what should be done and by whom” (ibid., 46) and the latter as including “what should be believed and by whom,” it clearly can comprehend every matter ever deliberated or discussed. That would subvert the whole categorical scheme of “rational” stases. Kennedy does not explain his rejection of the Qualitative stasis for Galatians. We will take up the further
In studying epistles and documents where the rhetorical situation is well established, paying attention to generic approaches to such situations may shed light on a few otherwise obscure features of the text; but with an epistle like Galatians in which identifying the rhetorical situation is so central a part of the problem, the approach may well shed more confusion than light. Thus the search for any plausible "genre of Galatians" still depends, to a degree not often explicated, upon first determining the precise situation and issue Paul is handling, which in the case of Galatians at least (as we discuss in chap. 3) will possibly remain uncertain until we are through, or nearly through, with extensive exegesis of the letter or of some major part of it. In short, rhetorical-genre-identification of Galatians should, if used at all, be more the icing on the exegetical cake than a methodological underpinning of the whole exegesis, as has been wont to happen. In terms of a distinction R. Longenecker noted (1990, cix, citing M. Kessler), our own analysis will be, not along these lines of "diachronic" rhetorical criticism which "lays emphasis on the rhetorical forms in their historical context and seeks to trace out lines of genetic relations with other writings of the time," but rather along those of "synchronic" rhetorical criticism, which "examines the argument on its own, classifying its stages of development in terms of general, more universal modes of persuasion."
2.1.2 Aristotle's classification of argument-types

More exegetically useful, then, than some ancient writer's scheme of rhetorical genre, might be some ancient or modern classification of types of proofs. Here we should have a scheme of genuine universal significance for discourse in general. Aristotle injected the first heavy dose of argumentation theory into ancient rhetoric. It was also the most significant dose of it: his *Rhetorica* was seminal for later Greek rhetorical theorists (Kennedy 1963, 123, 272-73). Furthermore, among historical figures he is foremost in developing and elaborating the field of logic. It is natural, therefore, to apply in the first instance to the theory he initially developed, in order to obtain for our exegesis of Paul at least a provisional, working typology of different sorts of arguments.10 But in doing so, we are looking primarily for any generally-valid system of classification, and not just for a system that was current in Paul's culture.11

The first distinction Aristotle makes between different types of proof (*Ars Rhet.*, 1.2) is between those proofs based on certain or "axiomatic" premises (premises known with virtual certainty to be true, such as laws, precedents, trustworthy witnesses, contracts, records), and arguments based on premises only probably true. The first kind of proof he called "inartistic" or "inartificial" proofs, because the speaker did not need to create such proofs, he merely made use of them (although he should be as rhetorically persuasive as possible in his use of them).12 The latter kind were called "artistic" or "artificial" because


11. Cf. Longman 1987, 52: "We know that there is not universal generic similarity. New genres develop; old ones die out. In addition, certain cultures use some genres and neglect others. For example, in the ancient world there is nothing comparable to the modern novel. . . . Nevertheless, though a culture-free genre system does not exist, the native literary classification of each culture (or lack of such classification, . . .) need not be adopted uncritically in order to identify the genres of that culture."

12. See Book I, chap. 15 for his detailed discussion of the "inartificial" type of proof.
the speaker in effect "invented" the proofs, rather than just using one already given as it were.13

Aristotle saw both "dialectic" (a dialogic, question-and-answer style of persuasion) and "rhetoric" (a basically monologic style) as generally arguing from premises that were opinions or probabilities rather than certainties (Kennedy 1963, 90, 96). Dialectic and rhetoric differ from each other, not only in style of argumentation, but also in the subjects they cover, as well as in the fact that "rhetoric may also make use of proof by ethos [ἦθος] and pathos [πάθος]" (Kennedy 1963, 96; cf. Hellholm 1994, 129). Rhetorical proofs thus included three types according to Aristotle (Ars Rhet. 1.2): "The first depends upon the moral character of the speaker (ἦθος), the second upon putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind (πάθος), the third upon the speech itself (λόγος), in so far as it proves (δεικνύωναι) or seems to prove (φαίνειν δεικνύοντι)."14 Thus the three types of artificial proof adhere respectively in the three factors involved in any rhetorical or persuasive situation: the speaker (or writer), the audience, and the discourse (Kennedy 1984, 15).

The "ethical" proof uses the persuasiveness inherent in the prepossessing moral character (ἠθικός) of the speaker, "since we have confidence in an orator who exhibits certain qualities, such as goodness, goodwill or both" (Ars Rhet. 1.8.6). The second type, the "pathetic" proof, appeals to and tries to stir up in the audience some particular likely emotion(s), value(s), and/or commitment(s) (πάθος), such as filial love, pity, reverence of the gods, respect for the aged (Kennedy 1963, 93). The third type, the "logical" proof, uses

13. One should remember, when studying Aristotle's classifications and terminology, that he was originally much influenced by Plato's low view of "rhetoric" as being a science dedicated to proving whatever the speaker wanted to prove. Plato opposed to rhetoric the method of "dialectic," which was Socrates' dialogic method of finding truth. Perhaps this negative slant on "rhetoric" helps explain Aristotle's fundamental contrast between the "invention" of arguments, and the mere use of given, certain "proofs". Aristotle soon came to see rhetoric as a worthwhile study, however, which he defined as "the faculty of discovering in each case the available means of persuasion" (Ars Rhet. 1.2; see Kennedy 1963, 15-20).

14. This quotation is from Hellholm 1994, 127.
either syllogistic or else inductive reasoning (logos), just as a “scientific” or “inartificial” proof does, and according to Aristotle is the most important and powerful type of proof, but had been neglected due to the previous rhetorical handbooks’ greater interest in swaying audiences emotionally (Ars Rhet. 1.1; cf. Kennedy 1963, 88, 95–96). Aristotle knew it is unnecessary, for many sorts of syllogistic argument, that the premises be certainties: it is only crucial that the truth of the premises be acknowledged by the interlocutors, for the truth of the premises implies the truth of the conclusion (assuming the syllogism formally valid) and so the argument contains sufficient validity to achieve the intended effect as far as the interlocutors are concerned (Hellholm 1994, 121, 128). Syllogisms in a rhetorical proof are called “enthymemes” (ἐνθύμημα) and inductive rhetorical proofs are called “examples” (παράδειγμα).

Thus we see that Aristotle categorised non-“dialectic” arguments in the following way: first were those based on scientifically known, axiomatic premises; then came the “rhetorical” ones, based on probable premises (including values), which probable arguments included the ethical, pathetic, and logical types. It should be noted that this categorisation pays primary attention to the epistemological status of the argument’s contents, rather than to the argument’s structure. As Aristotle acknowledged, there was no difference in structure between a scientific syllogism and a rhetorical one.

For the purposes of an exegesis that may involve reconstructing unstated parts of arguments, however, the more significant differences between these several types of argument are those of structure; for it is structure that must be determined before the missing premises and/or conclusions can be supplied. Thus it would be better for us to think in terms of an

15. This is the original rhetorical sense of enthymeme, a sense also found in most English dictionaries today. The sense we will use in the section on pragmatics, “an argument with suppressed (unstated) parts,” is the sense in which later writers, misunderstanding Aristotle in Ars Rhet. 1.2, used the term, and in which logic textbooks still use it today. In the last century or so most rhetoricians have returned to Aristotle’s usage (Kennedy 1963, 97).
argument-categorisation like that suggested by David Hellholm (1994, 119 n.7, 121f., 127), which groups together the scientific and the rhetorical-logical arguments, under the rubric "logical" or "theoretical" (or "logical-theoretical"), and groups the ethical and pathetic arguments under the rubric "practical" or "pragmatic" (or "practical-pragmatic"). This scheme is clearly better at portraying the major structural differences between the various types of argument. The first kinds of argument, the "logical-theoretical," are about that which is the case, based on logical inference from acceptable premises; the others are about what one should do, based on one's values and the nature or results of various proposed actions.

This gives us a good starting-point for argument classification. However, it omits the interesting and exegetically critical phenomenon of "enthymemes" (in the logic-textbook, post-Aristotelian sense), which are "logical-theoretical" arguments in which some intended propositions are left unstated. We should therefore try to comprehend the phenomenon of unstated-but-intended propositions as well. To understand why they happen, and how they are detected and interpreted, we should understand the rudiments of linguistic pragmatics, to which we turn next.

2.1.3 Conveying unstated propositions (and other meanings): pragmatics

As we have suggested, understanding of the meaning of an argument involves understanding the logic of it. But apart from this, control of argument-type is crucial also when it is necessary to reconstruct a partially-unstated argument.

It is widely understood that exegesis functions properly only through sensitivity to context. When either the meaning of a word or the force or relevance of some proposition is vague, one looks to context to explain the matter. It is pragmatics that tells us how context
sheds light on such questions.\textsuperscript{16} According to pragmatics, certain principles guide both the including/omitting of information in a conversation or discourse, and the reader/hearer's supplying of this information from the context. Grice's "co-operative principle," and the four basic "maxims of conversation" he derives from it as guidelines, are in our opinion the preeminent formulation of these principles.\textsuperscript{17} Since these principles are so important and helpful for interpretation, we shall present them and then illustrate the way they function.

The principle of \textit{cooperation} is:
make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

The maxim of \textit{Quality} is:
try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:
(i) do not say what you believe to be false;
(ii) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

The maxim of \textit{Quantity} is:
(i) make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange;
(ii) do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

The maxim of \textit{Relevance} is:
make your contribution relevant.

The maxim of \textit{Manner} is:
(i) avoid obscurity;
(ii) avoid ambiguity;

\textsuperscript{16} Whereas linguistics tends to study language as a synchronic system, pragmatics is concerned with studying how people make and understand actual utterances; it includes questions such as how presuppositions and other non-linguistic "context" impinge on the formulation and interpretation of utterances. Thus, the findings of pragmatics have direct and immense relevance for hermeneutics. Cf. Cotterell and Turner 1989, 18–19.

\textsuperscript{17} See, e.g., Levinson 1983, 100–18; Grundy 1995, 36–52; Cotterell and Turner 1989, 260–64. Clark and Clark make the "principle of cooperation" only one of five principles that govern conversation (see Cotterell and Turner 1989, 259–66); but clearly their other four principles can be subsumed under the cooperation principle.
(iii) be brief;
(iv) be orderly.

These maxims have fundamental importance for how utterances are interpreted, because they explain how information that is not stated explicitly can nevertheless be communicated and understood. Grice’s theory is not that “people follow these guidelines to the letter. Rather, in most ordinary kinds of talk these principles are oriented to, such that when talk does not proceed according to their specifications, hearers assume that, contrary to appearances, the principles are nevertheless being adhered to at some deeper level” (Levinson 1983, 102). The maxims thus inform inferences in the hearer(s), about what the speaker really means; these inferences are called conversational implicatures, or just “implicatures.” For example, a wife asks her husband, “Are the girls in yet?” and the husband replies, “The porch light is still on.” Taken out of context, the reply may seem to be irrelevant to the question, and thus to have violated the maxim of Relevance. However, on further consideration, it is seen that the husband’s response

had an implicature which did not require to be expressed: ‘The porch light is still on, the girls would have switched it off had they come in, and so I can say that they are not yet in.’ The conversation principle that I should not include unnecessary information is observed and so are [the principle of cooperation and the maxim of Relevance]. (Cotterell and Turner 1989, 48)

The information which was intended but left unstated was a readily-available part of the presupposition pool shared by speaker and hearer; so stating that information would actually have violated part (ii) of the maxim of Quantity.

Thus, interpreting a statement is often not just a question of mechanically decoding what is explicitly stated, but also of drawing implicatures, “inferences based on both the content of what has been said and some specific assumptions about the co-operative nature of ordinary verbal interaction” (Levinson 1983, 104). When it appears that not enough information has been given, the unstated presupposition that actually supplies the lack is
sought. When there appears to be too much information supplied, one seeks for the hidden significance or the conclusion that one is to infer. When there appears to be irrelevant information supplied, one looks in the “non-linguistic” context for the unstated connection or relevance. Even in the case of equivocal or underdetermined utterances (e.g., the ambiguity often inherent in uses of the genitive case), the conversational maxims come into play: the hearer assumes there is enough information given (including that supplied through the context), and that the meaning is relevant to the conversation’s purpose at this point, and in light of the context (including shared presuppositions) proceeds therefore to work out the likely intended meaning.

These principles from pragmatics thus give a great deal of insight on why and how arguments are left with parts unstated, as well as assumptions based upon which the hearer is expected to infer the intended meaning. They are therefore important for reconstructing Paul’s argument(s) in Gal. 3:10-14. We should assume, at least provisionally, that the writer is giving the original readers an adequate yet not superfluous amount of information to accomplish the communication, and that the information given is relevant to the communication intended. Arguments with unstated premises (called enthymemes) are extremely common in human discourse, so much so that they are the rule rather than the exception; and according to logic textbooks, the reason for this is simply that which the Quantity maxim gives (Copi 1968, 193-95; Stebbing 1961, 84, 110):

In most discussions, a large body of propositions can be presumed to be common knowledge. The majority of speakers and writers save themselves trouble by not

---

18. As noted above, Aristotle used the term “enthymeme” to denote any “rhetorical syllogism.” But in *Ars Rhet.* 1.2, he notes that “enthymemes” generally have fewer constituent parts than a primary or normal syllogism, since “if one of them is well known, it need not be stated, as the audience supplies it of its own accord.” Some later rhetoricians mistakenly understood this passage to state a distinguishing characteristic of all rhetorical syllogisms (Kennedy 1963, 97); thus they shifted the sense of the term “enthymeme” to our sense, used still today in logic textbooks. Recent rhetorical-critical studies of the New Testament have tended to return to Aristotle’s sense, which is unfortunate if it causes them to neglect the interesting and exegetically significant phenomenon of “enthymemes” in the suppressed-premise sense.
repeating well-known and perhaps trivially true propositions which their hearers or readers can perfectly well be expected to supply for themselves. (Copi 1968, 194)

Thus the unstated parts will be both available and identifiable from the (explicit or unstated) contexts, and generally will have a true relevance, that is, one of valid deductive logic.¹⁹

The relevance of what is stated will be identifiable to the reader because what is unstated in the argument will be only what is already available to the reader, from the presupposition pool, and because the speaker will give enough of the argument to make the argument-pattern of the unstated logic discernible, and the unstated parts thus identifiable. As Copi continues (1968, 194–95):

Where a necessary premiss is missing, without that premiss the inference is invalid. But where the unexpected premiss is easily supplied, . . . one assumes that the maker of the argument did have more “in mind” than he stated explicitly. In most cases there is no difficulty in supplying the tacit premiss that the speaker intended but did not express. A cardinal principle in supplying suppressed premises is that the proposition must be one which the speaker can safely presume his hearers to accept as true. . . .

In testing an enthymeme for validity, two steps are involved. The first is to supply the missing parts of the argument; the second is to test the resulting

¹⁹. "Inductive logic" is a rather ambiguous term. Often, and unfortunately, it is taken to denote some deductively invalid arguments, generally arguments by analogy (of greater or lesser degree), which are used to infer generalisations from particular instances. (E.g., "All observed crows are black; therefore all crows everywhere are black.") But the persuasiveness of such arguments always depends upon the fact that if one were to include some particular undemonstrated, hypothetical premise (e.g., the inherent colour-genetic homegeneity of crows), which seems (to someone) a plausible explanation for the observed similarity between instances, then the argument would become deductively valid. Without such a hypothesis included as premise, such an argument would be neither valid nor persuasive (even though often this is overlooked). Thus, induction, more helpfully used, does not mean a way of arguing, different from deduction, but rather it is the issue, how to verify such an argument’s explanatory premise (Cohen and Nagel 1934, 276–77; on induction, see also ibid., 249–56, 273–88; cf. Stebbing 1961, 243–56). Of course, the cause such a premise cites is sometimes so unconnected to the similarities it alleges to explain, that it is not even plausible, much less verified. But when the explanatory premise is not only unstated but overlooked, the argument’s remainder is often then mistakenly alleged to constitute a “proof,” of some alleged “inductive” type, since the argument seems rather persuasive somehow. There is actually no “inductive” type of argumentation, as over against deductive ones, we would insist. Only formal, deductive logic ever persuades someone to accept some proposition on the basis of accepting other propositions; so deduction alone is argumentation, for logic-analytical purposes.
syllogism. If one of the premisses is missing, it may be that only the addition of an implausible proposition as premiss will make the argument valid, while with any plausible proposition added the argument is invalid. Pointing this out is a legitimate criticism of an enthymematic argument. Of course, an even more crushing objection is to show that no additional premiss, no matter how implausible, can turn the enthymeme into a valid categorical syllogism.

It should be observed that no new logical principles need be introduced in dealing with enthymemes. They are ultimately tested by the same methods that apply to standard-form categorical syllogisms. The difference between enthymemes and syllogisms is rhetorical rather than logical.

So not just the propositions left unstated must be determined: any clues about the particular argumentative strategy or structure being pursued are significant, and in fact must be sought prior to any judgment identifying the argument’s implicit content. The author therefore cannot leave an enthymeme ambiguous as to the type of argument that is implied; he or she must give enough information so that, in the context, the reader can discern any unstated but intended meanings, which necessarily involves giving independent control (explicit or implicit) over the type of argument being used. That is to say, it is the relevance of some proposition in the presupposition pool, that informs us that it was intended; but its perceived relevance in turn depends upon logic, and upon the type of (valid) argument intended. This shows us another reason, in addition to basic argument-cognition, why it is necessary to understand logic in order to understand particular arguments: Pragmatics says that exegesis is basically implicature; and here that implicature is based on elimination of hypotheses about the particular intended relevance of that information which is explicitly conveyed. But the effectiveness of hypothesis-elimination as a problem-solving method, presupposes that all feasible hypotheses have been collected.

Thus, there is much of exegetical usefulness in the study of “logical-theoretical” types of argumentation. But these are not often studied today by biblical scholars; and in this century certain theories which we deem unfortunate have somewhat muddied the subject of
logic. Therefore, in the next two sub-sections of this section on arguments and propositions, we will briefly treat the matters from logic which are of most critical importance for the exegete, and thus of relevance for understanding Galatians. Because space is limited, the presentation must be very light on examples, more or less a bare outline of the topic. We will also pass by "informal fallacies," which are nevertheless of great interest; yet we should mention a most common one, the "fallacy of equivocation," that of using the identical key term in a different sense at another point in the same argument. (See argument-theory and logic textbooks and philosophical dictionaries for other informal fallacies.) In the discussion we will treat types and forms, both of propositions and of arguments. Some of this material might seem rather abstract and detached from Galatians; but all of it is vitally relevant to its exegesis. Indeed, some of the most seemingly abstruse parts of this theory will prove to be of critical importance in our next chapter.

2.1.4 Logos: basic concepts

We should grasp some basic ideas and methods before we tackle the workings of formal logic. These basic matters include the meaning of "logic" and "implication," and the nature of argumentation. As it turns out, the basic matters are generally no less abstruse than the others, but probably more so, for they touch more closely upon basic philosophical areas such as epistemology (and thus have led to more controversy—e.g., what is the study of logic about?). Thus we will go through the deepest and most controversial waters at the beginning of our voyage across the river Logos.

2.1.4.1 Implication, logic, causa essendi vs. causa cognoscendi

Ironically, one of the most controversial areas of logic is perhaps the most basic: what do we mean by "implication"? Traditionally, it was taken to mean that the form of one proposition (or propositions) was related to the form of some other proposition, in such a way that
knowledge of the truth of the first proposition (or propositions) could be taken as adequate basis for knowing the truth of the second. "Implication" was thus a matter of propositional form and of "logic," the latter being understood as "the science of correct reasoning," that is, of valid inference or argumentation. "Logic" is still commonly taken this way; but the question is often raised, whether it has to do with "laws of thought." On the other hand, "implication" is often no longer seen as formal, in the post-Bertrand Russell era.

Before tackling such matters, we must make a basic distinction that is often overlooked. That distinction is between "cause of (being or) happening" (causa essendi) and "cause of knowing" (causa cognoscendi). The first type of cause is ontological: it has to do with why something particular happened or happens; the second type is cognitional: it has to do with why or how we know this or that.20 We may categorise questions as to which of these types of cause they deal with. Thus there are

- Ontological ("metaphysical") questions
- Cognition-of-ontological ("cognitional-theoretical") questions

These two categories each have a significant sub-category, which are

- Cognitional-ontological ("psychological") questions
- Cognition-of-cognitional-ontological ("epistemological" or "objectivity issue") questions21

In studying logic, we must begin by distinguishing these types of questions, in order even to grasp what logic is about. For logic is about questions of causa cognoscendi, and not of causa essendi. More specifically, it is not about "psychology" (the metaphysics or ontology of thinking). It is thus not about "the laws of thought," for example, although

20. On this distinction and its pertinence for logic, see e.g. Bernard Lonergan 1990, 48–50, 119. The distinction is often ignored, probably because of the common assumption in cognitional study that consciousness, or self-awareness, is a sort of introspection, an inspection directed inward; in which case consciousness is observed rather than the observer. Lonergan has perhaps done more than anyone to destroy this assumption.

21. These categories, but not the longer names, we have derived largely from a combination of passages in Lonergan (see Lonergan 1973, 25, 261; 1990, 177–78).
many have conceived logic in this way. Rather, it is a help for us in identifying valid
deductions and avoiding errors in our reasoning. Indeed, more generally it is a help for us
in clarifying, formulating, critiquing, and communicating (both to others and to ourselves)
our thinking (including questions as well as answers). Copi (1968, 3) defines it thus: “The
study of logic is the study of the methods and principles used in distinguishing correct from
incorrect reasoning.” Ultimately it is to help us answer the causa cognoscendi question,
which can be expressed as “How do I/you know X?”

This notion causa cognoscendi is also involved in the normal, everyday meaning of
“implication.” But since Bertrand Russell’s work, many logic textbooks have, with Russell,
identified this latter concept with his concept “material implication,” which he distinguishes
sharply from “formal implication.” In a nutshell, “material implication” denotes cases in
which every time some particular thing(s) is (are) so, then some other particular thing
happens to be the case as well. In other words, one finds it true, at least in one’s (or
humanity’s) experience, that every time A happens, B also happens. (One may, however,
find tomorrow a case in which B fails to follow A. For nothing about the situation A
necessarily requires B to happen; they simply do, as a matter of fact, occur together, at least
in our experience.)

What this says, however, is not what people usually mean by “implication,” but rather
an enumeration of instances. All it implies is that in fact B is true every time A is true.

Based on this definition of “implication,” Russell was able to make the astonishing claim that

22. Cf. Cohen and Nagel 1934, 13: “It is not the business of logic to describe what happens in one’s
mind as one discovers rigorous or determinate solutions to a problem. That is a factual question
of psychology. Logic is relevant at every step only in determining whether what seems an
implication between one proposition and another is indeed such. Logic may, therefore, be also
defined as the science of implication, or of valid inference (based on such implication).”

23. Cf. Copi (1968, 227), who accepts “material implication.” Usually accompanying this acceptance
is the suggestion that there are several sorts of “implication”; for a useful critique, see Clark
"2 + 2 = 4" is implied by "Socrates is a man," for they are each always true. G. E. Moore called this claim an "enormous 'howler'" (Stebbing 1961, 224–25). Stebbing incisively comments (ibid., 224):

Certainly it is true that either "Socrates is a triangle" is false or that "2 + 2 = 4" is true, since, in fact, the first of these propositions is false and the second is true. But it seems clear that it cannot be maintained that "2 + 2 = 4" is a consequence of [the falsity of] "Socrates is a triangle." . . . The relation that holds between "This is red" and "This is coloured" is totally different from the relation that holds between [the falsity of] "Socrates is a triangle" and "2 + 2 = 4". If this be so, it seems unfortunate that the same word "implies" has been used to express both relations. Mr. Russell in defending his use of "implies" in a sense in which no one had ever used the word says, 'Provided our use of words is consistent it matters little how we define them' [Principles of Mathematics, § 38]. No doubt the principle of Humpty Dumpty has something to be said for it. But the use of a word already familiar in a certain sense to express a sense different from its original meaning and liable to be confused with it is apt to lead to unfortunate consequences. It is difficult not to slip back to the original meaning, and thus to perplex oneself and others with apparent paradoxes, and even to fall into obvious falsities.

Indeed, it is only Russell’s definition of “implication” that leads to such “paradoxes of implication,” as they are generally called (Clark 1985, 34–35; Stebbing 1961, 194). These paradoxes, which post-Russell logic textbooks generally mention, include such surprising conclusions as, “any false proposition implies any true proposition . . . any false proposition implies any false proposition. Thus, any false proposition implies any proposition, true or false. . . any true proposition implies any true proposition . . . any true proposition is implied by any false proposition. Thus, a true proposition is implied by any proposition, true or false. . . the theorems italicized above are known as ‘paradoxes of implication’. But . . . they are the inevitable consequences of the definition of implication in terms of negation and disjunction” (Stebbing 1961, 194). This last sentence refers to the more technical formulation of Russell’s definition, namely that the proposition “A implies B” is defined by the proposition “Either not-A or B (and perhaps both) is in fact true.” But there is a
legitimate question as to which of these propositions is actually defined by which;
“equivalence” does not imply that each equivalent element validly defines the other.24
Furthermore, there is a definite semantic difference between the second proposition and the
meaning of the more commonly used formulation, “Either not-A or B (and perhaps both)
must be true (in the nature of the case).” Since the “must” in the latter statement is best
accounted for if this formulation’s meaning is to be defined in terms of “implication” and not
vice versa, it becomes apparent that again, by departing from the usual and accepted
meanings of logical relationships, Russell has merely come up with a system that is foreign,
confusing, and misleading.25

Moore proposed instead the definition of “implies” as “entails,” by which he meant
the following: what we mean by “p implies q” is that some proposition q follows from or is
deducible from some proposition(s) p (Stebbing 1961, 222). This is more the normal sense
of “implies”; but note also that here we have settled into the semantic realm, not of causa
essendi, but of causa cognoscendi: for to say that one proposition is deducible from a second,
is to say none other than if we know that the first proposition is true, we may then be sure
that the second is also true.

But if this is what we mean by “implies,” the question arises, “What is it, about one
proposition or set of propositions, that makes us able to deduce another proposition from it?”
And when this question is considered, as it is in the study of logic, the answer one finds is
simply, “the relationship between the forms of the propositions.”26 Thus, it is quite

24. We discuss definitions below.
25. Cf. Clark 1985, 86: “Since all important arguments (perhaps with the exception of pure
mathematics) are expressed in ordinary English, a systematization of logic should stay as close to
English as it can.”
26. This is true even for so-called inductive arguments (see above, n. 19, p. 37): that is, their
only persuasiveness comes from formal implication, which implication, however, they suggest
rather than illustrate. Thus, all “if-then” statements which have no clear formal-logical basis, and
yet seem to be reasonable, generally seem so because they have some unstated conditions (in their
antecedents) which would complete the formal-logical link. E.g., “if I stick this blue litmus paper
in acid, it will turn red” is a likely “if-then” statement, but only when we are assuming that “All
blue litmus paper turns red when placed in acid” (Clark 1985, 37, and see 38–39). Later we will
be able to see how a propositional form(s) implies another.
legitimate to understand the meaning of "implication" as traditional logic does, that is, as "formal implication": when one proposition(s) implies another, this means we may "validly infer" the latter from the former; and "an inference is valid whenever the form of the conclusion is true every time the forms of the premises are" (Clark 1985, 35).²⁷

2.1.4.2 Propositions, their types, and their possible logical relationships; symbolic logic; exclusive and exceptive hypothetical propositions

Now that we know basically what "logic" and "implication" are, we may more profitably consider "propositions." By "proposition," we mean the logical meaning of a declarative sentence. "Logical meaning" will become clearer as we go along, especially when we talk about the categorical forms of (simple) propositions; however, we might just as well, though somewhat less precisely, call it simply the "meaning" of the sentence.

There are "simple" propositions and there are "compound" propositions: simple ones do not have other propositions as elements; compound ones do have. Of compound propositions, there are four basic types:

Hypothetical ("If A, then B"),
Alternative ("Either A or B or both"),
Conjunctive ("Both A and B"), and
Disjunctive (i.e., the denial of a Conjunctive: "Not both A and B").

A terminological note: Alternation is sometimes called "weak disjunction" (or even, confusingly, "disjunction") and contrasted to "strong disjunction," which means a conjunction of the alternation and the disjunction of two propositions (i.e., "Either A or B but not both"); that is what computer science means by XOR, "exclusive or").

Compound propositions can be compounded to make even bigger compounds. This potential complexity makes it often advantageous to use a symbolic language to represent the

propositions and their relationships. In our version of symbolic logic, we will use $<$ to represent implication (of the proposition to the right of the symbol, by the proposition or compound of propositions to the left): $P < Q$ means "if (we know that) $P$, (then we may be sure) that $Q."$ This is any hypothetical proposition's form. We will use an accent $'$ following a symbol or bracketed expression, to represent its negation: $P'$ means "not $P."$ As in Boolean algebra, we will use a $+$ to represent alternation: $P + Q$ means "either $P$ or $Q$ or both." Also as in Boolean algebra, we will use a multiplication sign (here a dot) to represent conjunction: $P \cdot Q$ means "both $P$ and $Q"; \text{ so } (P \cdot Q)'$ means "not both $P$ and $Q," \text{ i.e. disjunction.} \text{ Finally, we will use a } = \text{ to represent a logical equivalence of two propositions or other expressions involving any of the above symbols (i.e., } = \text{ means each of them implies the other and thus is interchangeable with the other in any argument): } P = Q \text{ means } P \text{ is equivalent to } Q. \\

"Deduction," in the logical sense, is valid inference, and thus involves one proposition or set of propositions having causa cognoscendi, implicative force towards another. Let us list here the possible causa cognoscendi relations between propositions or their forms. There are seven ways only, in which some proposition or logical proposition-form $P$ can be "logically related to" (i.e., can have deductive-logical, causa-cognoscendi bearing towards) another proposition or proposition-form $Q$ (Cohen and Nagel 1934, 52–56; the ways are presented here in no particular order):

28. Note that the sort of system we will present here is not the modern symbolic logic of Bertrand Russell and his followers; rather, it is simply another way of presenting traditional, "Aristotelian" logic, a way devised by George Boole. For a helpful discussion of some of the problems in Russell's symbolic logic, see Clark 1985, 85–90.
29. Many symbolic logics use instead a symbol that looks like a U or horseshoe laid over so that its tines are pointing left.
30. Some symbolic logics use instead a $\sim$ before the expression.
31. Many symbolic logics use instead some sort of V-shaped symbol, adopted because the Latin word meaning "alternation" or "weak disjunction" was vel. Unlike English with its ambiguous or, Latin had a distinct word, aut, for representing "strong disjunction."
32. Some symbolic logics will represent conjunction simply by $PQ$. 
1. P may be "irrelevant" to Q, or in other words "independent" of Q. Neither P nor P' implies anything about the "truth-value" of Q (i.e., about whether it is true or false). This relationship is "symmetrical": if P is independent of Q, then likewise Q is independent of P.

2. P may be "contrary" to Q. This means that P < Q', but P' would imply nothing about the truth-value of Q. Both P and Q may be simultaneously false, then, but only one can be true at a time. This is the same as "disjunction." This relationship is symmetrical also: if P < Q', then Q < P'.

3. P may be "subcontrary" to Q. This means that P' < Q, but P would not imply anything about the truth-value of Q. Both P and Q may be simultaneously true, then, but only one can be false at a time. This is the same as "alternation" ("weak disjunction"). The relationship is likewise symmetrical: if P' < Q, then Q' < P.

4. P and Q may be "contradictories." This means that if we know that P is true, we may infer that Q is false (i.e., P < Q'), and if we know P is false, we may infer that Q is true (i.e., P' < Q). At least one of the propositions is true and one false. This relation is the same as "strong disjunction." Essentially a conjunction of the previous two relations, this one is likewise symmetrical.

5. P may be "subimplicant," or "subaltern," to Q. This means simply that Q implies P (i.e., Q < P) but not necessarily vice versa. This relationship is nonsymmetrical (as we have already seen in our discussion of implication).

6. P may be "superimplicant," or "superaltern" or "principal," to Q. This means simply that P implies Q (i.e., P < Q) but not necessarily vice versa. This relationship is nonsymmetrical.

7. P and Q may be "equivalent." This means that P implies Q and vice versa (i.e., P = Q). This relationship is symmetrical: if P = Q, then Q = P. If two or more propositions or propositional forms are equivalent, they will be interchangeable in any part of any argument. Some expression-equivalences that logicians have adopted as theorems include the following:

\[
P = P''
\]

\[
(P \cdot Q)' = (P' + Q') = (P < Q') = (Q < P') \quad \text{(disjunction)}
\]

\[
(P + Q)' = (P' \cdot Q')
\]

\[
(P' + Q) = (P < Q)
\]
It may be noted that the seven logical relationships may be defined using only terms of implication and negation, and (in some cases) conjunction of other relationships. So basically we are still dealing with the fundamental facts of *implication* and how it manifests in real life.

Note that in line with our rejection of B. Russell's meaning of "implication" (see above), we take alternation to mean, "Either A or B or both must be true" (not simply "are true in fact"), and disjunction to mean, "Not both A and B can be true." Also, note that the "hypothetical" or "conditional" or "if-then" compound proposition, also sometimes called an "implicative" proposition, is really nothing more nor less than a statement of implication.

Now, since an "if-then" statement is implicative, and since implication is *causa cognoscendi*, what an implicative statement really expresses is a relationship, not between facts in the external world, but between the respective knowledges of the truth of two propositions. In other words, "If A, then B," really means, "If (we know that) A, then (we may be sure that) B." It is not necessary to state these ellipses every time, but the exegete should be aware that the logical relationships are not *causa essendi* but always *causa cognoscendi*.

We should mention here one point which can be quite important for exegeting the logical meaning of an "if-then" (conditional) statement. When the word *only* gets thrown into it somewhere, discerning which part of the compound is actually the condition (or "antecedent" or "implicans") and which is the conditioned part (or "consequent" or "implicate") becomes more subtle. For example, consider the common statement-form, "C,

---

33. The meanings we forego, however, are those usually employed in truth tables (which we ignore here), in computer science, and in modern, post-Russell symbolic logic. The symbolic-logicians' traditional desire to treat logic like mathematics gave a strong impetus to those meanings. (According to Clark 1985, 85, B. Russell's innovations in logic were a result flowing from Boole's symbolic logic. The latter is also of fundamental importance in computer science.) Even though adopting symbolic logic, however, we define *alternation* and *disjunction* in terms of (our meaning of) "implication" (and not vice versa; cf. above).

(but) only if D”; or, which is the same thing but with the “only” displaced, “If D, only then (is it true that) C.” The logical meaning of both of these statements is, “If C, then D.” We may call these two forms exclusive hypothetical propositions. The common statement “C, if and only if D,” is thus a conjunction of the two hypothetical propositions, “If C, then D” and “If D, then C.” The phrase only because is to be understood as logically identical to only if: “I’ll make up your bed, but only because you’ve got to leave earlier,” is logically the same as, “If (we know that) I will make up your bed, (we may be sure that) you must leave earlier.”

Then there are exceptive hypothetical propositions, which are a bit complicated. “A unless B” means “A except under the circumstances that B,” that is, (B < A'); but it also suggests that (A' < B). Thus it suggests that A and B are in “strong disjunction,” that is, that either A or B must be true but not both are true. Finally, note that “A even if/though (or notwithstanding) B,” means A ∙ (A < B'), which = A ∙ (B < A').

Things can become confusing also when the stated verb is about knowing: “If we know that A, then we can be sure that B,” probably means just what it says: “If (we know that) A, then (we may be sure that) B.” But what about the statement, “If we know anything about logic, it can only be because we have studied it”? Here we must keep distinct the “knowing” stated and the “knowing” which is generally unstated in any hypothetical, or “implicative,” statement and which is due to its causa cognoscendi nature (and which we may distinguish by putting it in parentheses). So this statement is logically (i.e., propositionally): “If (we know that) we know anything about logic, (we may be sure that) we have studied it.”

2.1.4.3 The basic real-life argument-modes; pure hypothetical “syllogisms”; dilemmas; circumstantial ad hominem arguments

35. Proficiency in identifying the “logical meaning” of propositions comes only with practice (i.e., if one is proficient, one has practiced!).
Hypothetical ("If A, then B") propositions, also called "conditional" propositions, are of course ubiquitous. In fact, as we have seen, they are defined simply as statements of implication; therefore, any and every valid implication is in fact one bigger or smaller "hypothetical" proposition! It is clear that conditional statements are at the very heart of logic. However, we must see how other types of proposition work in arguments as well, so that we may analyse the latter.

In fact, up to now we have not considered real arguments at all, but only implications. In what we may call "real-life" arguments (as opposed to those "arguments" of the type that merely illustrate implication in logic-textbooks), implications are not valued for themselves, but only for the indication of the truth of some proposition. But in order for any implication to substantiate the truth of its consequent, the truth of its antecedent must first be adequately substantiated. Thus we arrive at a basic fact not always explicated in logic textbooks: a real-life “argument” will contain not only what we may call an “implication-part,” but also what we may call a “belief-part.” Even a straightforward implication such as “If A, then B” will not exist by itself in a real-life argument; the truth of A must also be separately, even if unstatedly, affirmed: “But (we do know) A; therefore (we may conclude) B.” It may not be very often that both an implication-part and a belief-part will be explicitly stated; but they will both be intended, in any real-life argument, that is, one employed to persuade.

The real-life argument we just used as illustration, is in fact one of the basic modes of real-life argumentation: it is called a hypothetical syllogism, or sometimes called a mixed hypothetical syllogism (i.e., containing both a hypothetical and a non-hypothetical “premise”) as opposed to pure hypothetical syllogisms (which we shall examine later). Although these are called “hypothetical syllogisms,” they are not just a particular mode of syllogism such as

categorical syllogisms—indeed, they are not even helpfully called “syllogisms,” even though the terminology started with Aristotle:

Traditionally the syllogism has been treated as a form of argument, that is, as an attempt to demonstrate that a certain proposition (the conclusion) is true because some other propositions (the premisses) are true. This mode of treatment has the defect of obscuring the essential nature of syllogism, which is a form of implication. As such, it is not concerned with the truth, or falsity, of the conclusion, or of the premisses, but only with the validity of the reasoning, which depends upon the form alone. (Stebbing 1961, 82–83)

Thus the use of that terminology in this case is awkward and potentially confusing, and ideally should have been reserved for what we are calling “formal logic” (from which category we have separated the current discussion, contra most logic textbooks). However, it is now too traditional to avoid; besides, there is no other likely term that means “hypothetical syllogism.”

But likewise, the application of the term premises to both the “If A, then B” part and the “But (we do know) A” part, is unfortunate: for the “premises” of a categorical syllogism’s “implication-part” include only the “If A” of its overall conditional statement, and not even the “then B.” The latter is rather the “conclusion” in the implication-part (and, as we will see shortly, not even necessarily the “conclusion” of the belief-part). The use of this terminology for both types of so-called syllogism is thus hopelessly confusing, and must be avoided if at all possible. It would be better, then, to leave the terms premises and conclusion completely out of any discussion of hypothetical syllogisms, and to speak only of, on the one hand, the “implication-part” (i.e., the conditional proposition, with its “antecedent” and “consequent”), and on the other hand, the “belief-part,” including what we may call its “evidence-part” (here, “But [we do know] A”), from which the “belief-part” infers the truth of its other proposition, which we may call the “inference-part.” That is, in a real-life argument, the belief-part infers its constituent inference-part based on its constituent
evidence-part, and according to the *causa cognoscendi* force of the argument's implication-part (with its antecedent and its consequent). Note that the "evidence-part" must be either a simple or a conjunctive proposition; otherwise it could assert nothing about ontological reality. This new terminology may seem a bit confusing at first, but in the long run it would be less confusing than speaking of "premises" and a "conclusion" in the analyses both of mixed hypothetical syllogisms and of categorical syllogisms.

Now, logic entails adopting and building upon some axioms. Generally, the basic axioms of a deductive system like logic or mathematics are not discovered until after quite a number of other principles have been discovered and their relationship has then become the object of inquiry. "The selection of the primitive propositions [i.e., the axioms] is not purely arbitrary. They must be both sufficient to yield the required results and mutually consistent. A set of primitive concepts and primitive propositions will be sufficient if it is possible to define all the concepts and to demonstrate all the propositions that occur in the system in terms of these initial concepts and by means of these initial propositions" (Stebbing 1961, 179).

One of the axioms of logic is inevitably the "law of Non-contradiction": proposition A cannot be both true and false at the same time (and taken in the same sense). Another is what is called the "principle of Transposition": If A implies B, then not-B implies not-A. We adopt this also as an axiom: it is certainly one that accounts for many of the principles we study in logic. And it immediately gives us a new twist on the standard mixed hypothetical syllogism: complementing its positive form

If A, then B;
But A; therefore B.

we have also a negative form:

If A, then B;
But not B; therefore not A.
Indeed, in light of the fundamentality of so-called mixed hypothetical syllogisms, we can see that this negative form is not only another type of "syllogism," but a paradigm for a whole other class of valid arguments, viz., those designed ultimately to deny by denying (rather than to affirm by affirming) some proposition in the "implication-part" (the conditional statement). Logicians speak of various "modes" of arguing, giving them Latin names. The two modes displayed here are called *ponendo ponens* (literally, "affirming by that which is to be affirmed"), from the Latin verb *ponere* meaning "to affirm," and *tollendo tollens* ("denying by that which is to be denied"), from the verb *tollere* meaning "to deny." Some logic textbooks refer to them merely as *modus ponens* and *modus tollens*; however, that fails to distinguish them from two other basic modes we will discuss shortly.

Each of these first two modes has an invalid form, as well as its valid form given above. The invalid form of the first mode (*ponendo ponens*) is

If A, then B;
But B; therefore A.

This fallacy is informally called "affirming the consequent," for obvious reasons. It is a fallacy that occurs quite commonly; indeed it more or less exemplifies so-called inductive reasoning, and thus, unfortunately, many alleged scientific "proofs."\(^{37}\) Being such a popular fallacy, it occurs quite often in exegetical arguments also; for example: "If this overall paradigm for Galatians is the true one, then we will find that the individual passages are intelligible when read in this light; but indeed they are intelligible when read this way, therefore this must be the overall paradigm for Galatians." The fallacious form of the negative mode of mixed hypothetical syllogism (i.e., of *tollendo tollens*) is as follows:

If A, then B;
But not A; therefore not B.

\(^{37}\) Cf. above, n. 19, p. 37.
As one might expect, this is informally called the fallacy of "denying the antecedent." While it seems rather less common than "affirming the consequent," one needs to recognise it as an invalid form of argument.

These two modes, *ponendo ponens* and *tollendo tollens*, comprise all the basic modes which do not necessarily involve any type of proposition but simple ones and hypothetical ones. And as we have stated, every "real-life" deductive argument is actually a more or less complex mixed hypothetical syllogism, and thus one of these two modes; for a mixed hypothetical syllogism is nothing more nor less than any use, in "real life," of logical implication to demonstrate some truth. Thus these two forms are the most basic of the "basic": if we were to take them broadly, allowing their antecedents and consequents to be other types of compound propositions (not just simple propositions), then any "real-life" argument could be said to be in one or the other of these modes. But logicians restrict these two modes to having simple antecedents and consequents, and then speak also of other "modes," involving other types of compound propositions such as alternative and disjunctive propositions. As it is important to understand these matters we must look at these other "basic" modes, understanding however that while they deserve to be called this, they are perhaps not *quite* as "basic" as the most basic of all, mixed hypothetical syllogisms, the paradigm of real-life arguments.

As we have seen, *alternation* (or "either P or Q, maybe both," \([P + Q]\)) can be defined simply as \(P' < Q\). By the principle of Transposition this \(= Q' < P' = Q' < P\). So, if we know \(P + Q\), we may also be sure that both \(P' < Q\) and \(Q' < P\). Thus, if our antecedent is an alternation ("either P or Q," \(P + Q\)), one valid move would be to deny either alternant (P or Q), in order to affirm the other; thus we get *tollendo ponens* ("affirming by that which is to be denied"), which is also known as an "alternative syllogism." And *disjunction* (or "not both P and Q," \([P \cdot Q]'\)) can be defined simply as \(P < Q'\), which =
Q'' < P' ≡ Q < P'. So, if we know (P ∨ Q)', we may also be sure that both P < Q' and Q < P'. Thus, if our antecedent is a disjunction ("not both P and Q," [P · Q']'), a valid move would be to affirm either disjunct (P or Q), in order to deny the other; thus we get *ponendo tollens* ("denying by that which is to be affirmed"), also known as a "disjunctive syllogism." And like the former two modes, each of these two in turn has its valid and invalid forms. The invalid move in an alternative syllogism would be to "affirm the alternant"; the invalid move in a disjunctive syllogism, on the other hand, would be to "deny the disjunct."

Let us sum up the valid and invalid forms of the four basic modes we have covered:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid moves</th>
<th>Latin name of the mode</th>
<th>Invalid moves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirm the antecedent</td>
<td><em>Ponendo ponens</em></td>
<td>Deny the antecedent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny the consequent</td>
<td><em>Tollendo tollens</em></td>
<td>Affirm the consequent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny the alternant</td>
<td><em>Tollendo ponens</em></td>
<td>Affirm the alternant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirm the disjunct</td>
<td><em>Ponendo tollens</em></td>
<td>Deny the disjunct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Besides the Law of Contradiction and the principle of Transposition, another axiom of logic is the Transitivity of implication.\(^{38}\) Thus when we string implications together, we get a new implication: for example, if (A < B), and also (B < C), then it is also true that (A < C). Corresponding to this, there is a further type of argument, commonly called a "pure hypothetical syllogism." Simply put, this is an argument whose implication-part is actually a string of implications. Thus to call this a single "argument" can be misleading; although we may call it such, we need to recognise that it might better be called a "compound argument," that is, an argument relying upon a string of implications.

Now, we have seen that there is a fourth type of compound proposition, the conjunction. If the antecedent of some implication be a conjunction (e.g., [A · B] < C), then a real-life argument based on this implication would, in order to be valid, either affirm the

---

\(^{38}\) Cf. Clark 1985, 44.
conjunction \((A \land B)\) in order to affirm the consequent \((C)\), or else would deny the consequent in order to deny the conjunction. Each of these is a basic form of argument. The first is what we may legitimately call a *syllogism*. Since in this real-life argument the antecedent is a conjunction ("both \(A\) and \(B\)"), both conjoined propositions (or conjuncts) must be known as true in reality, in order for the conjunction to be known as true, and thus for the inference to be proven thereby.

By the same token, only one of the conjuncts need be known as false in reality, in order for the conjunction to be known as false. So, if one's purpose is to show a disjunction of \(A\) and \(B\) ("not both \(A\) and \(B\)," \([A \land B]'\)), one need only show that some proposition \((C)\), implied by \((A \land B)\), is in fact false. We might call this a "destructive syllogism," on the pattern of the term "destructive dilemma" (see below). Logic textbooks generally ignore this type of argument, perhaps because it seldom occurs; nevertheless, it appears to be a basic mode of real-life argument.

But logic textbooks very seldom ignore one closely related type of argument. Suppose one knows such a syllogistic implication (e.g., \([A \land B] < C\)); how might one disprove one particular conjunct, say \(A\)? Well, if one has already proven the conjunction \((A \land B)\) false (by showing \(C\) false, as in the previous paragraph), one obviously has proven *true* the disjunction \((A \land B)'\). And we have already seen how to prove a disjunct false: one must show the other disjunct true. This two-step approach is how a *reductio ad absurdum* works. In short, one denies the consequent, but then affirms one conjunct of the conjunctive antecedent, in order to deny the other conjunct. It does not matter which particular conjunct one wants to deny, any more than it matters which disjunct one wants to deny in a disjunctive syllogism; for

\[
([P \land Q] < R) = ([R' \land Q] < P') = ([R' \land P] < Q')
\]

The fact that the "second step" of a *reductio ad absurdum* is, in effect, a disjunctive syllogism, suggests there is a corresponding invalid form of the *reductio ad absurdum*, which
would be to deny the consequent but then to deny one conjunct in order to affirm the other conjunct.

This seems to cover all the basic modes of argument; but we can see that others may be built from them. The more-complex one analysed most commonly is the dilemma.

According to Copi (1968, 205)

The dilemma, a common form of argument in ordinary language, is a legacy from older times when logic and rhetoric were more closely connected than they are today. From the strictly logical point of view, the dilemma is not of special interest or importance. But rhetorically, the dilemma is perhaps the most powerful instrument of persuasion ever devised. It is a devastating weapon in controversy.

Cohen and Nagel (1934, 107) explain why one resorts to this type of real-life argument:

"Dilemmatic reasoning is of special value in those cases where we are unable to assert the truth of any one of the antecedents or the falsity of any one of the consequents in a set of hypothetical propositions, but where we can assert alternatively their respective truth or falsity." That is, in the implication-part of this type of argument, one has not one but two hypothetical propositions, conjoined (i.e., they are both assumed to be valid implications). One knows that at least one of the antecedents is true, or else one knows that at least one of the consequents is false; but one does not know which one. So in the belief-part, one might affirm alternatively their antecedents in order to affirm alternatively their consequents (a "constructive dilemma"), or else one might deny alternatively their consequents in order to deny alternatively their antecedents (a "destructive dilemma"). If, in either case, the two final propositions which are (alternatively) affirmed or denied, happen to be identical, then that alternation boils down to one simpler proposition, since to affirm (P + P) affirms P. In this case the (constructive or destructive) dilemma is called "simple"; otherwise it is called "complex." 39

Although not a distinct "basic mode" of argument, one sort of argumentation needs discussing because of its unusual approach; this is the "circumstantial" ad hominem argument.40 Copi's examples are useful:

Where two men are disputing, one may ignore the question of whether his own contention is true or false and seek instead to prove that his opponent ought to accept it because of his opponent's special circumstances. Thus if one's adversary is a clergyman, one may argue that a certain contention must be accepted because its denial is incompatible with the Scriptures. . . . Or if one's opponent is, say, a Republican, one may argue, not that a certain proposition is true, but that he ought to assent to it because it is implied by the tenets of his party. (Copi 1968, 62)

This type must be distinguished from the fallacy called "abusive" ad hominem argument, in which the arguer tries to persuade the hearers that his opponent is not to be trusted, for some reason irrelevant to the issue under discussion (e.g., he is a convicted criminal and therefore supposedly cannot be believed). This "abusive" type of argument may seem quite close to a circumstantial type and may be (and has been) mistaken for it, whenever the former tries to prove the opponent guilty of inconsistency; for the circumstantial type is also trying to persuade that there is or could be inconsistency. But it is trying to persuade the hearers away from the theory, rather than away from some opponent. The inconsistency it indicates will be within the belief-system of those of its hearers who maintain or adopt the theory; it would be alleviated by their rejecting the theory, which is the arguer's hope. This circumstantial argument's approach has often caused it to be erroneously branded a fallacy; for, oddly, it neither affirms nor denies the truth of any proposition whose intent is ontological (i.e., it neither affirms nor denies anything about extra-cognitional reality).

Walton (1992, 146) treats the circumstantial ad hominem as one type of what he calls "precedent slippery slope" arguments, which are "negative arguments from consequences."

40. This argument is commonly, but unjustly, considered a fallacy. For one recent treatment which justifies this type of argument in some rhetorical situations, cf. Walton 1992, 137–46.
However, it is actually a logos-type argument: what distinguishes the circumstantial *ad hominem* from other “precedent slippery slope” arguments is that it suggests the disagreeable *logical* consequences (viz., the consequent inconsistency) of adopting a certain *idea*, rather than the *practical* consequences of adopting a certain course of *action*. That is, the unacceptable “consequences” warned against are constituted by an absurdity, an inconsistency in one’s own position.

However, the argument differs somewhat from other logos-type arguments. It might not directly affirm a contradiction:

There is an important difference between a logical consistency and a circumstantial . . . inconsistency. A logical inconsistency is a well-defined set of propositions containing a contradiction. A circumstantial inconsistency depends on the presumption that certain personal actions or other personal circumstances suggest or make plausible that there may be a logical inconsistency inherent in an arguer’s position. (Walton 1992, 143)

The argument draws the hearers’ attention to an incompatibility between some particular theory (or perhaps the denial of some particular theory) and some belief(s) *suggested by* the opponent’s circumstances. Thus the argument itself has no stated “belief-part,” but only an “implication-part” showing the *inconsistency* which, it is suggested, would be entailed in the hearers’ holding the theory. In other words, the suggestion is that “if the hearers’ own circumstantially-suggested beliefs are true, the contested theory must be false.” It is hoped that the hearers will then supply their *own* “belief-part,” rejecting the theory on the basis of affirming their circumstantially-suggested belief. This makes the argument essentially a *ponendo tollens* (or “affirming the disjunct”). The implication-part of the argument may be stated as “if (the circumstantial belief), then not (the contested theory)”; this is a “disjunction,” logically equivalent to “not both (the circumstantial belief) and (the contested theory).” There is no stated belief-part, for no simple or conjunctive proposition (and thus no ontological situation) is affirmed by the arguer; only this “implication-part” of the
argument is affirmed. This oblique approach is necessary, for example, whenever the circumstance(s) involved is not interpersonally, empirically demonstrable.

The greatest rhetorical weakness of this type of argumentation is that it might not prevent the opponent's escaping the incompatibility either by rejecting the supposedly incompatible circumstances (e.g., leaving the Republican party rather than abiding by its tenets), or by denying the circumstances' applicability or their incompatibility, rather than by rejecting/denying the theory the arguer opposes. That is, the arguer's neglect of affirming anything about extra-mental reality leaves the hearer a loophole or two to escape through.

Two of these loopholes, however, are minimised if the arguer suggests that those circumstances are simply an aspect of being human. For then the hearer still might deny there is incompatibility between those circumstances and holding the opposed theory; but rejecting the circumstances (viz., "being human") and denying the circumstances' applicability are both now out of the question.

And that crucial, third loophole can be eliminated quite strikingly if the arguer can make manifest to the hearers that the theory-incompatible circumstances are involved in the very claiming, or ostensible knowledge, of the theory's truth. Then the hearer understands that even expounding, claiming, and following the theory manifests a human nature whose implications contradict the theory. For example: A skeptical epistemology claims that one can be sure of nothing. Thus, knowing ostensibly the truth of a skeptical theory of epistemology suggests a circumstance (here, a psychological state) which contradicts the circumstances that the theory itself predicts. In short, one cannot claim knowledge of the

41 We learned of this type of incompatibility partly from Clouser 1991, 72: "A theory must be compatible with any state or activity of the thinker without which it could not be produced [i.e. thought, held]." Clouser himself cites a number of Herman Dooyeweerd's works at this point. See also Bernard Lonergan's notion of "self-reversal" (e.g., Lonergan 1973, 16–17 and passim; Meyer 1994, 40–47).
theory without contradicting it. Thus the following is the basic logical form of the argument's implication-part:

If any human should claim or ostensibly know that A (the opposed theory), then it becomes clear that at least in his or her case, not A.

A human's innate, natural circumstances, says the argument, suggest that one should hold a belief contrary to A. However, as suggested, the argument's success depends entirely on the hearers' agreeing with this implication; as with any circumstantial argument, they have to acknowledge that their circumstances (here, being human) do indeed suggest one should believe contra the theory, or the argument fails. Thus the arguer relies, in this case, on the hearers' anthropological/psychological suppositions. But then, if the arguer had empirically verifiable premises to rely on, he or she would simply affirm them rather than take an oblique, circumstantial approach.

Now because this particular type of circumstantial ad hominem argument speakspivotally about holding a certain theory, and points out certain untoward implications of that holding (which implications contradict the opposed theory), we must be careful to differentiate from this type of argument all "practical" types of "precedent slippery slope" argument, which point out the disagreeable practical consequences of adopting a certain course of action. It may appear superficially to belong to this latter type, but one must discern whether the arguer's purpose is to warn of practical consequences or of logical inconsistency; if the latter, the argument is indeed a logos-type, circumstantial argument.

What may we glean from our discussion of the various basic argument-modes? To be aware of them is important; but also we may derive a simple scheme of argument-categorisation that may be helpful in exegesis. We note that there are various means of making one's point: sometimes one's means is to deny, sometimes to affirm, sometimes both to affirm and to deny (in the case of a reductio ad absurdum). But in every case, the goal of
the argument is either to deny or to affirm some proposition that is in the implication-part. This affords us a simple two-way scheme of logos-argument classification; whenever we approach an argument to interpret it, a basic question to answer would be, “Is this argument intended ultimately to affirm, or else to deny, some proposition stated within it?”

Our discussion so far may seem to have focused largely on compound propositions. Actually, our main interest has been the nature of implication and how it powers real-life arguments. In fact we have seen that alternation and disjunction, as well as mixed hypothetical syllogisms, may be defined simply in terms of negation and of implication; but conjunction cannot be reduced in this way. Thus all the arguments we have seen, in fact all real-life valid deductive arguments, boil down to implication (sometimes with some negation or conjunction or both), to affirmation or denial or both, and to inference (based on this affirmation/denial and in accordance with the implication). That which was wrong with the arguments we have called “invalid forms,” was simply that their inference was only erroneously assumed to accord with the depended-upon implication-part. That “invalidity” is therefore not a matter of formal logic (i.e., the “nuts and bolts” of implication itself), but rather of how logic or implication itself is actually used.

We have tried to elucidate the meaning and real-life use of implication, or formal logic, before we proceed to its analysis. One cannot understand what formal logic is, without seeing it in this framework. Logic or implication is a cognitional tool; but like any tool it does not really exist as such until someone recognises its value and employs it for some purpose. Logic is a tool for persuading others, or for persuading ourselves. But it cannot persuade until the one who is the target of the persuasion recognises and appreciates the causa cognoscendi force of the implication.
Like every tool, a *causa cognoscendi* tool has certain laws which constrain and rule its successful use. It is to these rules that we now turn.

### 2.1.5 Logos: formal logic

The rest of logic focuses on simple or conjunctive propositions, but not on any other type of compound propositions. This is because it is the implicative relationships between the forms of various simple propositions, and between those of simple and conjunctive propositions, that ultimately cause any proposition(s) to imply any other(s). Implication is formal; and to understand the way implication actually takes place, one must study the forms of simple and of conjunctive propositions and the logical relationships between these forms.

We will not derive or prove all the implicative, deductive relationships between these various forms, which is done in logic textbooks; we will only list them so they will be available for exegetical work. While there is much to be gained by a study of their derivation (especially derivation via Euler's diagrams), and also by a study of examples of all sorts of implications, there is not space here to go into these. Thus the remainder of our journey across the river Logos can be relatively quick and easy. The things we will pick up are of relevance to exegesis in general, inasmuch as exegesis almost always entails understanding and interpreting, and quite often entails reconstructing, deductive arguments.

#### 2.1.5.1 The four "categorical forms" of simple propositions; exclusive and exceptive categorical propositions

From the viewpoint of traditional or Aristotelian logic, there are four forms of simple declarative proposition. They are called "categorical forms," because they have to do with predication or categorisation (Clark 1985, 88–89); indeed, the categorisation is what propels
Two of the forms are “affirmative,” and two are “negative.” The forms are respectively designated by the vowel-letters A, I, E, and O. The first two letters are taken from the Latin term *Affirmo*, and the last two are from the term *Nego*; thus A and I are affirmative categorical forms, E and O negative. At this point, we should look at the forms themselves:

- **A:** All a is/are b.
- **I:** Some a is/are b
- **E:** No a is/are b.
- **O:** Some a is/are not b.

The letters a and b represent the “terms” of the propositions, the “subject” and the “predicate” respectively. For example, “all dogs are canines”; “some teachers are nice”; “no excuses are acceptable.” Any simple proposition, no matter what its verb, can be put into one of these forms: “Stars emit atomic particles” can be stated as, “All stars are things which emit atomic particles.”

What differentiates A from I, and E from O, is that A and E are “universal,” whereas I and O are “particular.” A “universal” statement says something about *each member* of the class a, whereas that which a “particular” proposition predicates of a may not be true of every member of a. That is, a universal proposition “distributes” its subject, it considers that class distributively (singly) rather than collectively. On the other hand, an affirmative proposition differs from a negative one in that a negative one distributes its predicate, an

---

42. Although this is the traditional or Aristotelian approach to analysing propositions, since the mid-19th century and the work of DeMorgan and Boole it has become clear that this is not the only possible approach, and sometimes not the best, since some propositions are more amenable to an approach that looks on propositions as relating things rather than as describing things. For example, “Boole is the father of symbolic logic” is more easily seen as relating Boole and symbolic logic, than as an attribution of some quality to Boole. Nevertheless, since “having attribute X” is ultimately a relation (between subject and attribute, or between subject and other things similar in some way X), and since a particular relatedness to X is undeniably a quality, it is apparent that any proposition may be analysed by either approach (cf. Cohen and Nagel 1934, 48-49). The propositions in Galatians 2 and 3 are generally better analysed with the traditional, categorical-formal approach, which we take here.
affirmative one does not. If class a clearly contains only one member, then obviously a proposition about it will be a universal statement: for example, "Aristotle is not a triangle."

Some modern textbooks, influenced by Bertrand Russell, claim that "All a is b" has to do with the class a, rather than its members; but this is erroneous, as can be seen from the fact that A (like E) distributes its subject: it means "Every a is b."43 For shorthand reference, we may refer to "All a is b" by the symbol A(ab), and so forth.

As in the case of conditional propositions, categorical propositions can be tricky to translate into their logical meanings or categorical forms when the word "only" is thrown into them somewhere.44 When it is thrown in as the very beginning, "in general [such propositions] assert that the predicate applies exclusively to the subject named" (Copi 1968, 184). For example, "Only ticket-holders will be admitted"; "None but the brave deserve the fair.” These should be translated, respectively, "All those who will be admitted are ticket-holders," and "All those who deserve the fair are brave.” In other words,

So-called exclusive propositions, beginning with "only" or "none but," translate into A propositions whose subject and predicate terms are the same, respectively, as the predicate and subject terms of the exclusive proposition. There are contexts in which "Only S is P" or "None but S's are P's" are intended to express not merely that "All P is S" but also to suggest either that "All S is P" or that "Some S is P." This is not always the case, however. Where context helps to determine meaning, attention must be paid to it, of course. But in the absence of such additional information, the suggested translations are adequate. (Copi 1968, 184)

And, again as with hypothetical propositions, we should note the existence and meaning of exceptive categorical propositions.45 Here also, these propositions are a conjunction of two propositions. “All except students are required to leave” means not merely that “All nonstudents must leave,” but also (generally) that “No students are required

---

43. For a fuller critique, see Clark 1985, 85–90.
44. Cf. Cohen and Nagel 1934, 37; Copi 1968, 184.
45. On these see particularly Copi 1968, 185.
to leave." That is, it means both $A(a'b)$ and $E(ab)$, which is not equivalent to the former. Thus it really means a conjunction of these two propositions.

2.1.5.2 The logical relationships between the forms; immediate implication; conversion and obversion; definitive vs. descriptive propositions

We said that one proposition "implies" another whenever the form of the second is true every time the form of the first is true. Are there then particular logical relationships which regularly hold between these various categorical forms? Yes, and in fact it is a fairly straightforward matter (once you know how) to determine which forms are true every time which other ones are true. We will not go into all this derivation, for almost any logic textbook will do so. Here we simply relate the findings.

Recall that there were seven possible logical relations between propositions, and that they could all be boiled down to implication and negation, and (in some cases) conjunction of two other relationships. Let us consider now the four categorical propositions whose subject is $a$ and whose predicate is $b$ (A[ab], I[ab], O[ab], and E[ab]). None of these four propositions is logically "independent" of another: the truth (or untruth) of any one of them does entail something about the truth (or untruth) of some other, or vice versa. Let us first consider what can be said in terms of implication without bringing in any proposition-negations. We begin, in other words, with those propositional relations traditionally called

46. We recommend Clark's lucid exposition (1985), unhindered as it is by any of B. Russell's fallacies concerning subalternation and "existential import," which errors however Clark ably critiques (on pp. 34-35, 37-40, 85-90): In short, like his idea "material implication," Russell's definition of "All a is/are b" to mean "class a is included in class b," does not comport with normal English usage and ends up leading to paradox and absurdity, and it yields a restricted system of formal logic which denies the validity of $A(ab) < I(ab)$ and of $E(ab) < O(ab)$. But "most modern logic textbooks do not analyze Russell's definition. Instead of fixing their attention on the formula as a translation of the English word all they try to explain the peculiar results by a discussion of 'existential import.' . . . Logic alone does not assert the existence or nonexistence of anything. It would seem therefore that we can dispense with existential import and preserve the validity of subalternation [$A(ab) < I(ab)$ and $E(ab) < O(ab)$]" (ibid., 88-89).
"immediate implication"; that is, we relate every case, barring all negation, in which one
categorical form immediately implies another categorical form.

In the first place, every categorical form implies itself: I(ab) < I(ab). This gives us
four valid but fairly useless implications. Note that this validity is necessary only if we keep
the subject and predicate in their respective positions. For example, it is not true that A(ab)
< A(ba), or "All b is a." A change in the order of the terms in the premise(s) is called a
change in figure. Since there are only two ways to order the terms a and b, and since
immediate implication has only one premise (and one conclusion), immediate implication has
only two figures. Thus we say that the implication AA (A implies A) is valid in the 1st
figure (i.e., A[ab] < A[ab]), but invalid in the 2nd figure (i.e., [A(ba) < A(ab)]'). Or in an
easier and standard notation: AA-1 is a valid implication, but AA-2 is invalid.

There are two more "immediate implications" valid in the first figure. If it is known
that "All whales are mammals," it must be admitted that "Some whales are mammals."
Likewise, if "Nothing I have tried has worked," we may be sure that "Some things I have
tried have not worked." Thus AI and EO are valid implications in the 1st figure. These
two, and the four self-implications, are the only valid immediate implications in the 1st
figure. There are even fewer in the 2nd figure: we retain four of these six, namely EE, II,
AI, and EO, but AA-2 and OO-2 are invalid.

Thus there are several "immediate implications" between categorical forms, barring
negations. That covers two of the seven types of logical relationship, "superalternation" and
"subalternation." But we have already seen some "equivalents" among categorical forms as
well. Since EE and II are valid in the 2nd figure, and also have the same categorical form
for both premise and conclusion, the subject and predicate of an E or I proposition are
practically interchangeable: E(ab) < E(ba) and vice versa, and I(ab) < I(ba) and vice versa.
Simple conversion consists in interchanging the subject and predicate of a proposition; E and
I are therefore said to be *simply convertible*, that is, their "simple converses" are always logically equivalent propositions.

We have covered all the single-premised categorical implications that do not involve negation of propositions; thus we have exhausted the two logical relationships superimplication (or superalternation) and subimplication (subalternation). In order to find the rest of the logical relations holding between various categorical forms, we now admit proposition-negation also. Thus we bring in the logical relations of disjunction (or contrariety), alternation (subcontrariety), and "strong disjunction" (contradiction).47 Allowing negation of propositions will also permit us to identify the remaining equivalences between categorical forms.

In the 1st figure, we find that A and E are disjuncts (contraries): $A < E'$ and $E < A'$. On the other hand, we find that I and O are alternants (subcontraries): $I' < O$ and $O' < I$. Finally, we have two pairs of contradictories: A and O on the one hand, and E and I on the other. So if A is true O is false, and if A is false O is true; the same goes for E and I respectively. This gives us the 1st-figure "immediate" (single-premised) implications involving negation of a proposition.

Now if we recall that E is defined by negating the predicate of A, so that $E(ab')$ ("No a is non-b") $= A(ab'')$ ("Every A is not non-b"), and note that $A(ab'') = A(ab)$, we may infer an equivalence between $E(ab')$ and $A(ab)$. The same holds for I and O: $O(ab') = I(ab)$.

**Obversion** consists in changing the *quality* (i.e., whether it is negative or positive) of a proposition while contradicting the predicate. Note then that obversion is valid for every categorical form, that is, it always produces a logically equivalent proposition.

47. It will be remembered that disjunction (contrariety), and alternation between P and Q are defined, respectively, as $P < Q'$ and $P' < Q$. Contradiction ("strong disjunction") is the conjunction of these two relations (i.e., $[P < Q'] \cdot [P' < Q]$). All these relations are traditionally discussed in connection with a diagram called the "square of opposition"; see, e.g., Cohen and Nagel 1934, 65–68; Stebbing 1961, 57–62; Clark 1985, 45–47.
We have found all the logically-related pairs of categorical forms, in the 1st figure. But also we have now found all the equivalences, regardless of figure, barring negation of subject or of predicate: for we have found that by simple conversion (interchange of subject and predicate, and thus the move from 1st to 2nd figure), one has valid implications in EE and II, and for these only. Granted, allowing negation of the proposition's terms, as required in obversion, would open the door to many other equivalences as well. But these are all derived from successive applications of conversion and obversion or vice versa (Cohen and Nagel 1934, 59; Stebbing 1961, 65). And the only reason we must admit the term-negation involved in obversion, is that we use obversion to define E from A, and O from I (Clark 1985, 54). So, since our analysis so far has already assumed all four categorical forms, obversion actually adds nothing new. Therefore, since within our analysis we have comprehended implications involving not only proposition-negations but also obversion and thus, by extension, every valid term-negation, and have found all the legitimate moves in the 2nd figure, we have found the basic logical building-blocks for every valid "immediate" (single-premised), "categorical" (simple-propositional) implication.

Having discussed all the essential ways in which individual categorical forms (including their negations) are logically related, let us take note of a special type of exceptive categorical proposition, one we have just mentioned. The logical equivalence of the result of obversion, we suggested, derives merely from the fact that obversion is how we define negative forms (E and O) in terms of positive ones. In fact, the meaning of a definitive statement is a conjunctive proposition, since it always entails equivalence. Simple propositions predicate something of the subject, they say something about the subject, they

48. For discussion of these possibilities and examination of some of them, see Cohen and Nagel 1934, 59-63; Stebbing 1961, 62-68, 77. But note that by contrapositive Stebbing denotes the converse of the obverse, whereas Cohen and Nagel, as well as Clark (1985, 54-55), denote by it the obverse of the converse of the obverse (obtained more easily by contradicting and interchanging subject and predicate, which is valid for A and O: "All ponies are horses" is equivalent to "All non-horses are non-ponies").
describe the subject. Definitive statements do not simply say something about the subject, they are intended also to mark out the subject from the rest of reality. Thus, they must not only include, they must exclude: they must identify any instance of the subject, not just describe it. One defines an expression by saying, in other and more numerous (and thus more informing) terms, what it is that the expression denotes.

The symbol being defined is called the *definiendum*, and the symbol or group of symbols used to explain the meaning of the definiendum is called the *definiens*. . . . The definiens is not the meaning of the definiendum, but another symbol or group of symbols which, according to the definition, has the same meaning as the definiendum. (Copi 1968, 97)

Since both the definiendum and the definiens denote the same thing or type of thing, they are *equivalent*, logically interchangeable terms (Stebbing 1961, 421–25).

It follows then, that a definitive statement cannot be just a simple A-type proposition; for if it were, its subject and predicate would *not* be logically interchangeable. Thus, in logical terms, a definitive statement can only mean a *conjunction*, of A(ab) and A(ba): both these propositions are intended.49 It is therefore an "exceptive" proposition (see above).50

In a definitive statement, then, the presence of the characteristic(s) stated in the definiens is enough to notify us of an instance of the thing(s) intended by the definiendum. In other words, with this definition the presence of such characteristic(s) is a "cause of (our) knowing" (i.e., *causa cognoscendi*) that here is an instance of the thing(s) intended by the definiendum, and vice versa.

We have used the term *definitive statement*, rather than *definition*, because we wish to avoid any limiting of the idea to the normal idea of "definition," a defining by a *genus* and a

49. Thus, to prove the falsehood of a definitive statement, it is necessary only to prove the falsehood of either one of its conjuncts; for \((A' + B') = (A \cdot B)'\).

50. That is, one might well define *automobile* by saying, "No things are 3- or 4-wheel motorised vehicles intended for personal travel on ordinary roads, except automobiles," which means both that every automobile is such a thing, and that every such thing is an automobile.
species (i.e., an "essential" characteristic).51 Strictly speaking, in order to define, a statement does not have to stipulate an essential distinguishing characteristics; it is sufficient that it stipulate some distinguishing characteristic(s). Another corollary of the fact that a definitive statement may omit the essential (i.e., most fundamental) distinguishing characteristic, is that any one definiendum may possibly have more than one valid definiens. And if they are indeed all valid, they themselves will be logically equivalent/interchangeable; they all denote the same thing(s).

Note the significance of this "definitive" type of statement to the exegete: it has a different meaning than a simple universal positive proposition, but it often bears no external sign of its different character. It is therefore up to the exegete to discern the presence of a definitive statement, and to know what is the difference in its ("logical") meaning. For example, there is one biblically-relevant class of statements which are always definitive: these are statements of the "terms" of a covenant, statements of what is required to be in right-standing with respect to the covenantal agreement. Such statements do not intend to say merely that "all who (meet these conditions) are in 'right standing'"; nor do they intend to say merely that "all who are in 'right standing' (meet these conditions)"; rather, they intend to convey both these simpler propositions, conjunctively and at the same time. (We might conveniently call such pairs "covenantal converses.") But such is the nature of any criterion.52

51. Cf. Stebbing 1961, 425: "It has been customary to give as the first rule [of definition] that definition must be per genus et differentiam. This, however, involves an unduly narrow conception of the nature of definition."

52. Cf. Copi 1968, 105: "Those who attach the same meaning to a term use the same criterion for deciding of any object whether it is part of the term's extension [i.e., the collection or class of things which the term denotes]. Thus we have agreed to use the property of being a closed plane curve, all points of which are equidistant from a point within called the center as our criterion for deciding of any figure whether it is to be called a 'circle' or not." Criteria are thus definitions and vice versa. But contra Copi here, sometimes there can be more than one criterion of the same thing.
2.1.5.3 Categorical syllogisms; sorites and other polysyllogisms

At the start of this sub-section on formal logic, we said that "it is the implicative relationships between the forms of various simple propositions, and between those of simple and conjunctive propositions, that ultimately cause any concrete proposition(s) to imply any other(s)." Having seen the implicative relations between simple (categorical) propositions, let us now examine those between simple and conjunctive propositions. Once we have those relations in hand, we have the building-blocks of all varieties of implication.

First recall what we said in the previous sub-sub-section about "figure":

A change in the order of the terms in the premise(s) is called a change in figure. Since there are only two ways to order the terms $a$ and $b$, and since immediate implication has only one premise, immediate implication has only two figures. Thus we say that the implication "AA" ($A$ implies $A$) is valid in the 1st figure (i.e., $A[ab] < A[ab]$), but is invalid in the 2nd figure (i.e., $[A(ba) < A(ab)]'$).

But in categorical syllogisms, the antecedent is conjunctive, that is, the antecedent is two categorical propositions taken conjunctively. As a result, there are not two but four figures.

We can show why this is so, and what the figures are, once we have gotten hold of some terminology of categorical syllogisms. A premise is any categorical (simple) proposition included within the antecedent part of the implication. In valid single-premised ("immediate") implication, we found that whatever "terms" (i.e., the subject and predicate) occurred in the premise, also occurred in the conclusion, though perhaps exchanging positions. In a categorical syllogism, the terms appearing in the conclusion appear also in the two premises, but one term in each premise. We call the subject of the conclusion the minor term, and the predicate of the conclusion the major term; accordingly the premise in which the minor term appears is the minor premise, and that in which the major term appears, the major premise. So there is a third term, one which appears in both premises. Unless this other term is identical in both premises, no formal (categorical) implication results. This
term, appearing only in the premises, is called the *middle term*. Standard notation puts the major premise first. If then we write the minor term as a, the middle term as b, and the major term as c, we may express syllogisms according to the pattern of this example: A(ab) A(bc) < A(ac). ("Socrates is a man; all men are mortal; therefore Socrates is mortal.")

Now, let us see why there are four figures. We may simply note in how many different positions the middle term can occur. As Clark (1985, 60) explains: “The middle term may be the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor—first figure; or the middle term may be the predicate of both premises—second figure; or it may be the subject of both—third figure; or it may be the predicate of the major and subject of the minor”—fourth figure. Therefore, to identify completely any particular categorical syllogism, we need only note the categorical forms of the major and minor premises and of the conclusion, and note the figure. Thus a standard notation for categorical syllogisms refers to them as EAE-1, EIO-3, IAI-2, and so on.

Since there are four different categorical forms, three possible places for them to appear in the syllogism (yielding 64 permutations), and four possible figures, there are 256 possible “moods” or forms of categorical syllogism (Clark 1985, 60). Only 24 of them are valid (see ibid., 68); 6 valid moods are in each figure. We forego deriving them, but list them by figure, for later reference:

1. AAA 2. AEE 3. AAI 4. AAI
   AAI AEO AII AEE
   AII AOO EAO AEO
   EAE EAE EIO EAO
   EAO EAO IAI EIO
   EIO EIO OAO IAI

Having identified all the ways in which, barring any proposition-negations, a conjunctive premise can imply a simple conclusion, we may feel that we should now deal
with what happens when we allow proposition-negation. But in fact we need not do so. For what we have been calling proposition-negation is nothing but contradiction (Stebbing 1961, 191); and we have already found that every contradicted categorical form is logically equivalent to some other, non-contradicted one (e.g., $A' = O$, $E' = I$). And we have already dealt with all term-negations through analysis of obversion (see above). So at this point we have encountered all the basic implication-forms which ultimately constitute any valid implication.

There may be longer implications that are made of strings of categorical syllogisms, in which strings the conclusion of one is a premise of the next. Such strings are called *polysyllogisms*. Of special interest, because of its commonality, is the *sorites*, a polysyllogism with only its premises and the final conclusion stated, and arranged so that any two successive premises will contain a common term.53 Within this type there are two standard ways to arrange the premises. Consider two purely theoretical examples (from Cohen and Nagel 1934, 94–95), both of which are syllogistic chains made up of linked instances of AAA-1:

> All dictatorships are undemocratic.
> All undemocratic governments are unstable.
> All unstable governments are cruel.
> All cruel governments are objects of hate.
> Therefore, all dictatorships are objects of hate.

> All sacred things are protected by the state.
> All property is sacred.
> All trade monopolies are property.
> All steel industries are trade monopolies.
> Therefore, all steel industries are protected by the state.

In the first form, called an *Aristotelian* sorites, a minor premise is stated first (contrary to the standard way of presenting categorical syllogisms), and the common terms appear first as a

predicate and then as a subject. In the latter form, called a Goclenian sorites, a major premise is stated first, and common terms appear first as subject and then as predicate. The important thing to note is that in both forms the conclusion of the first two premises is unstated (and omitted above) but serves as one of the premises of the next link in the polysyllogistic chain.

Thus the end of our investigation of formal logic brings us again face to face with the interesting and pervasive phenomenon of unstated yet intended meanings. This phenomenon is hardly more widely understood than is formal logic; yet both must be more or less consciously understood, in order to have the tools required for understanding an ancient writer’s logical rhetoric _no matter what type or shape of logical argument he has deployed_. As pragmatics shows us, exegesis, or practically any kind of reading, involves _eliminating, somehow, unfeasible hypotheses_ about the particular intended relevance of some information conveyed explicitly. Therefore with ancient writings, where the reader must be more methodical in order to extract the intended meaning, it is helpful or even necessary to have conscious understanding of the various possible relevances; our study of formal logic has given us this.

But if it is necessary to understand more or less consciously the various possible argument- or discourse-meanings in order to understand an argument, it is no less necessary to understand the various word-meanings possible for the words in the discourse; for the intended meaning of an argument depends on the intended meanings of its propositions, which in turn depends on the intended meanings of the words. To this level of meaning in Galatians, and to some overlooked or otherwise underappreciated semantic possibilities within it, we now turn.

### 2.2 Neglected semantic potential in three key Pauline word-groups

In this section we point out some known but underappreciated semantic potentials of certain
key words in Paul’s Galatian rhetoric. These include the Greek terms for “righteous,” “works,” and “faith.” We begin with “righteous” because one oversight concerning it tends to prejudice the interpretation of the other two terms. First however, let us indicate some basic considerations and terminology regarding words’ “meanings.”

2.2.1 Lexical senses, denotation, and lexical “meanings”

In lexical semantics we discuss, and consider the relations between, “word” (the phonological form), “concept” or “sense” (the mental activity or content), and the extra-linguistic thing or reality denoted by the word via the concept. Of course, one word may be used to stand for many different concepts (but not at the same time). What we mean by concept in this context is roughly the definition of the term’s meaning, as one might find it in a dictionary (Cotterell and Turner 1989, 117). There is a second, broader sense of concept, which includes one’s entire understanding of the thing or things denoted, including all its or their known characteristics, not just the defining ones. This sort of “concept” one might find elucidated in an encyclopaedia, rather than in a dictionary.

Now, when we speak about some word’s “meaning,” we might be speaking just of its dictionary definition (its “lexical concept” or “lexical sense”), or else also about what part of reality it denotes. An example of the latter, broader sense of meaning is in a statement we cited previously, by Copi (1968, 97):

The symbol being defined is called the definiendum, and the symbol or group of symbols used to explain the meaning of the definiendum is called the definiens.

... The definiens is not the meaning of the definiendum, but another symbol or

54. These represent the three corners of the traditional diagram called the “triangle of signification” (see Lyons 1968, 404; Silva 1983, 103; Cotterell and Turner 1989, 116). A perhaps more adequate version, that of Klaus Heger and Kurt Baldinger, has four corners, thus allowing for a distinction between the activity of conceptualising and the concrete expression of the concept in a particular language (see Cotterell and Turner 1989, 117-18). As is usually the case in semantics, when we speak of “words” we will mean these “grammatical words” or “lexemes,” that is, concrete, phonological implementations of concepts.
group of symbols which, according to the definition, has the same meaning as the definiendum. (Copi 1968, 97)

Now it is true that in this important, broader sense of meaning, "the definiens [i.e. the definition] is not the meaning of the definiendum"; but in the narrower sense of meaning, that is precisely what the definiens is. When people ask about the "meaning" of some word, they usually are expecting a dictionary definition, not perhaps an "ostensive definition" (an indication by pointing of finger) or an article from an encyclopaedia. However, most or even all words also denote some part of extra-linguistic reality. One's grasp of such a word's "meaning," in the broader sense, requires some knowledge also of the thing or attribute or type of thing which, via the word's lexical sense, it denotes (Cotterell and Turner 1989, 83).

And one's grasp of the word's "meaning," in the narrower sense, requires some grasp of the thing(s) denoted by the words within its definition. So both of these senses of "meaning" are crucial.

But it might seem that once one has ascertained the lexical sense (dictionary definition) of a word in a particular context, one will thereby also have determined the denotation of the word, if any (and assuming that one grasps the meanings of the words which compose the definition). This is commonly the case, but it is not always so: sometimes the lexical sense's denotation is inherently dependent upon either the situational or the linguistic context. To see why this is so, let us consider a third type of "concept," which is called a discourse

---

55. As we saw above, that a definition is for explaining the denotation of the word (as Copi implies here) opens up the scope for there to be more than one logically equivalent "definition" of a word (i.e., several definitions which denote the very same extra-linguistic reality). But as also noted earlier, here we are using "definition" in the broadest sense: usually "definition" means more narrowly "dictionary definition" or "lexical sense," of which theoretically there will be essentially only one for a particular word-meaning since it will be built around the "genus and species" and thus the "essential" defining qualities.

56. Even "empty" words like conjunctions denote something, albeit this something is cognitional (e.g. some conjecture or some logical relationship between ideas or propositions; cf. Rand 1990, 17, 37-38). It does not seem clear to the present author that any words denote nothing. It is sometimes the case, however, that the denotation remains unidentified even though the dictionary definition is known; on this phenomenon see below.
concept or discourse sense. This is a particular thing (or quality or event) or class of things to which some part of a discourse has made reference, and to which other parts of the discourse may then refer by shorter expressions. More precisely, we might define discourse concept as "that sort of idea represented by a word or expression denoting, yet not in itself identifying, some entity (or class of objects or quality or event) mentioned and identified elsewhere in the discourse or else given pragmatically" (i.e., 'situationally salient, and so already in the domain of discourse, the set of referents being talked about,' Levinson 1983, 80 n. 12, cf. 67; on discourse concepts see Cotterell and Turner 1989, 123, 151–53, 164–67). For example, a discourse might speak of "the bats that live in caves in Central America." It is then unnecessary for the discourse to repeat that whole phrase in every following sentence where it wishes to refer to these bats again; it may simply say (as we have just done) "these bats," or some similar short phrase. The latter, simpler phrase would not by itself serve to identify which bats were in view; but since it appears shortly after the fuller phrase, it is taken to refer to the same bats as does that fuller phrase. So the phrase the bats will carry more meaning than do the combined lexical senses of its component words. That meaning is the discourse concept which the phrase represents.

It would even be possible to refer back to these bats now with a single word, them. Third-person pronouns represent discourse concepts. These lexical senses are examples of anaphoric senses; that is, they are lexical senses (definitions) which are also discourse concepts. They refer to some thing (or event or quality) or class of things (or events or qualities) which is/are referred to and also identified elsewhere—usually earlier—in the discourse (or pragmatically given in the "domain of discourse"; see above). The point is that, with this type of lexical sense, knowing the word's lexical sense by no means gives you its denotation: the identity of that which is denoted depends finally upon the linguistic context, and not merely upon the lexical sense itself.
There is another type of lexical sense which does not determine its own denotation: that is the deictic or indexical senses (e.g., "yesterday," "you," "here"); with these the situation, not the discourse itself, ultimately determines the denotation. But the study of deictic senses is well developed, whereas the study of anaphoric senses has been fairly limited, focusing largely on third-person pronouns. We suggest that there may be a number of other lexical senses with anaphoric character, and that anyone doing lexicography or exegesis should be alert for such senses. For example, one English dictionary (RHD) lists this as its second lexical sense of the word *fair*:

2. legitimately sought, pursued, done, given, etc.; proper under the rules; a *fair* fight.

We can readily see that "proper under the rules" is an anaphoric, discourse concept. "The rules" here expresses a notion that might be more fully expressed as "whichever set of rules pertains to the game or activity being undertaken within the purview of the current discourse." Thus, "proper under the rules" denotes some quality whose identity nevertheless cannot be known except through familiarity with the linguistic context (the discourse). Concretely, "proper under the rules" in the context of football, denotes a quality or qualities entirely different and distinct from that denoted by "proper under the rules" in the context of cricket. What is "fair," in cricket, may not be "fair" in football, and vice versa, even though the lexical sense is precisely the same in both cases. Thus one cannot know the denotation of this lexical sense of *fair* without first knowing the particular linguistic context in which it is being used (or maybe the larger "domain of discourse"); for the lexical sense itself refers (even if implicitly) to "the discourse."

Thus, when considered abstractly from any discourse such a lexical sense can have no *definite* denotation; thus its meaning remains unidentified and obscure. So those who must understand what some word means when used in such a sense, must be fully alert to the
peculiar, “discourse” nature of this sense, and to the fact that, therefore, knowing this lexical
sense does not by itself give us the speaker’s or writer’s denotation.

2.2.2 Neglected semantic potential in δίκαιος and δίκαιοσύνη

In this section we wish to point out that anaphoric or “discourse” lexical senses are often
found with this group of semantically-related words. The characteristic is seldom rightly and
fully reported but may well be important for understanding Galatians. In fact, it appears that
the overlooking or lack of understanding of the anaphoric nature of some senses in this word-
group, spurred on by theological preconceptions, has led to chronic confusion in the
discussion of these meanings. It is important to consider both Greek and Hebrew usages, for
Paul wrote in Greek yet was doubtless immersed in the Hebrew scriptures.57 Let us consider
first some Hellenistic Greek terms.

Bo Reicke (1968, 38) has stated that “On the whole, etymological observations
illustrate the fact that δίκαιος and related words are not used to indicate any isolated quality
such as blond or pale, but always imply a relation to some criterion.” While this statement is
rather misleading in that it couples the word’s meaning to its etymology, according to what
Reicke states here this word has an anaphoric (or “discourse”) lexical sense. For its
denotation is not identified definitely by the definition, but rather the criterion by which one
knows whether something or someone is δίκαιος is found elsewhere, in the discourse (or at
least in the “domain of discourse”). Although etymology does not necessarily determine the
current lexical sense(s) of a term, it may be easier to notice the peculiar, anaphoric nature of
this lexical sense, and to analyse the sense more fully, if we conduct something of a historical
survey of the use of δίκαιος. Our aim, however, will be to understand the senses of the word
that were still current and available at Paul’s time.

Δίκαιος may have derived from the Greek verb δείκνυμι, through the former's predecessor δείκτης (TDNT, 2:179–80; Hill 1967, 98–99). Be that as it may, δείκτης came to mean an "attitude," a "state," a "mode" or "manner"; the accusative δείκτης is used adverbially with the sense, "according to the mode or manner." Thus δείκτης came to have the sense, "tradition" or "custom" or "that which is customary"; δείκτης διατύπωσε could mean "it is customary" (TDNT, 2:180; Hill 1967, 99). Although originally the sense may have been broadly "that which is indicated or customary," it soon developed also a narrower sense, "that which is indicated socially, that which is socially established or customary" (cf. Hill 1967, 99–100). That is, it began to have a common usage for specifically social custom:

We may say therefore that δείκτης connotes the norm . . . for human conduct, chiefly for the conduct of men towards one another, and as such was logically regarded as 'right': that which is customary . . . is 'the right'. . . . A person whose conduct conforms to the standard δείκτης is δίκαιος: he does what is right, according to the traditions of society . . . (Hill 1967, 99; cf. TDNT, 2:182)

Of course, what is "right" depends on whether one is speaking of persons or actions, and (especially if the latter) on the particular action and its situation. Thus, so far we are encountering lexical senses that are in some way anaphoric. One might more fully define this social sense of "righteous" as "in accordance with whichever set of terms or rules pertains to that covenant or social system which is accepted and revered within the purview of the current discourse." It should not be surprising that this definition is so similar to the one we gave above for fair; after all, Greek-English lexicons commonly give "fair" as an English gloss for this sense of δίκαιος, and the sense of fair which we cited is clearly the one they have in mind.58

There developed from this broad social use of the two Greek terms some narrower social uses, focused on what is laid down in the society as law, sometimes as manifest in the

---

58. Another sense of fair, "free from bias, dishonesty, or injustice," used of a judge, is a good translation-equivalent for what is probably the other main sense of δίκαιος. It is not clear that not all the NT uses of δίκαιος could fall under one or the other of these two definitions.
decision in a certain legal case. Thus δική apparently came to mean "law," "legal case," “judicial decision,” “punishment,” “case,” “cause,” “plea,” “condemnation,” and “fine.” However, δικαιος stayed with its broader, social sense, sometimes contextually narrowed to “that which is according to the law.” According to Burton, “it denotes conformity to a standard or norm (δική) not conceived of as defined in the word itself” but determined fully by the context (Burton 1921, 460, emphasis ours). Thus the term’s denotation is always determined by the context; in other words, it is a discourse lexical sense.

Similar senses are also available using the Hebrew words which the δικαιο- cognates translate in the Septuagint: “Like the Greek δικαιος the Hebrew words from the root פִּית are (so far as the evidence enables us to judge) fundamentally forensic in sense, expressing agreement with a standard or norm, not conceived of as defined in the word itself” (Burton 1921, 461). But they developed other senses as well. Scholars such as Reventlow (1992) and Olley (1987), following the lead of H. H. Schmid (1968), have emphasised “the wide range of contexts in which the word [ṣdq] is used” in the Ancient Near East: “law, wisdom, nature/fertility, war/victory, cult/sacrifice, kingship. These are brought together in kingship, instituted by God (or gods) for the well-being of all . . . Schmid describes ʿṣ-d-k [sic] as being related to Weltordnung or ‘cosmic ordering’ which is expressed in given concrete situations” (Olley 1987, 308). Olley (p. 309) therefore suggests the senses “being right, putting right, ensuring order, bringing about harmony and what is right . . . Semitic emphasis is upon actions which bring about prosperity, benefit, equal rights for all subjects, including freedom from external oppression and deliverance from enemies. . . . In a broad sense then ʿṣ-d-k signifies actions that bring about what is right and good for all or the state where this is so.” Now, as we have seen, the use of “right” in the definition might usually indicate a discourse concept; for what is “right” depends on the particular situation or activity which is present
within the purview of the current discourse (as also does what is "fair," in our example above).

But it might not always indicate this, especially where the order of society is seen to be in some sort of static harmony with the cosmos. That would indicate rather a non-discourse lexical sense(s); for in this case the harmony in view seems to be determined by the (perceived) laws of the cosmos (which are presumably static more or less) rather than by the terms laid down by some party’s covenant (something dependent, apparently, only upon the wills of the parties involved, which wills might not be static). Where the social rules are considered given and static, therefore, one’s concept of “righteousness” would less likely be formulated as a discourse notion. Thus the Hebrew terms (יִשָּׁה cognates) could probably carry either discourse or non-discourse lexical senses, depending perhaps on whether the cosmos or else the party’s (or perhaps the suzerain’s or deity’s) will was seen by the speakers as determinative of the particular social “harmony.” Granted, one’s understanding of the deity’s static-ness might change or vacillate, and so likewise also one’s understanding and usage of these Hebrew words. But in situations where the paramount concern was about purity regulations and about upholding thereby the harmony of the cosmos, or similar notions, the lexical sense of “righteousness” would tend to be non-discourse. For example, it seems accurate to say that the main concerns of the Qumran community tended to be such.59

What about the Greek usage in the LXX? “The δίκαιος observes the laws. Hence δίκαιον is linked with ῥόμιον” (TDNT, 2:182). Thus, since in Hebrew culture the Law of Moses was the preeminent “way established,” perhaps one could argue that in the LXX δίκαιος retained permanently its narrower social sense “according to the law” (TDNT, 2:185), even as the term νόμος was adopted to mean “the Torah.” Yet it is certainly possible

that since νόμος is, in Greek culture, simply the "laying down" of "that which is customary," δίκαιος perhaps never really developed a narrower social sense of "lawful," but the normal discourse context has determined the broader sense's denotation as "according to the established law."

At any rate, this and other cultural differences account for at least some differences in what social standard was looked to by the "righteousness" of Hebrews and Greeks respectively. The increasing secularisation of classical Greek society led to an increasing focus on the established civil law as the standard of social right and wrong, whereas for the Israelite the comprehensive range of the Law meant that all social duties and customs and mores were found within it. "Thus the fact that ἡγίασμα is always related to God and His law, rather than to social customs and institutions as such, or to abstract principles, gives a different color to its use; ... for the Hebrew righteousness tends to be more inward, more humane, and more inclusive than for the Greek. ... Where the Hebrew conception of righteousness differs from the popular Greek conception we may put it thus, that whereas for the Greek δίκαιοςσώματι is always being pulled over from the broad sense of 'righteousness' to the narrower sense of 'justice,' the pull in Hebrew is in the opposite direction" (Dodd 1935, 44-45; cf. Jamison 1953). There were tendencies in Greek culture, particularly those deriving from Plato's writings, that tended to consider one's social obligations statically, and thus to develop a non-contextual sense(s) of δίκαιος. But the LXX would tend to follow the Hebrew cultural streams here, due to its having been rooted in Jewish culture and its referring to the Law of God, as what is "established or laid down" in that cultural context. So then, we can see there were both discourse and non-discourse lexical senses of "righteousness"; and these were likely both still available by Paul's time. But a Hebrew's idea of it was perhaps more likely than a Greek's to be a contextual, discourse notion, except perhaps where considerations of such things as cosmic harmony and purity were paramount.
But having described broadly these two sorts of lexical sense of "righteousness," a clarification is still necessary: what we are noting here, by this discourse/non-discourse distinction, is not exactly what is commonly said in biblical scholarship about the sense(s) of "righteousness." It is usual in recent scholarship to say that the Hebrew notion of righteousness was "relational" rather than "ethical." This terminology has some potential for helpfulness, in that it would seem to point to a distinction between some discourse and non-discourse senses. But this terminology has been rendered unhelpful, in our opinion, by the equivocations and general unclarity with which both characterisations have been used. We will pass over the question of how there could be any purely non-"ethical" significance to "living up to one's covenantal agreements"; but we must point out that the terms "relationship" and "relational" have been constantly used in an equivocal and misleading manner in this discussion, at least by most Protestant participants. Specifically, those terms start out meaning something like "the behaviour required of one according to the terms or demands of some particular accepted covenantal relationship."\(^60\) But "relational" and "relationship" very soon start meaning also, \(\textit{and at the same time, a forensic declaration}\) that one fulfils the required behaviour. Now, and paradoxically, it is the declaration and not the behaviour which constitutes one "righteous."\(^61\) But no one (not even M. Luther, E. Käsemann, or P. Stuhlmacher) suggests that there are two independently definable senses of "righteousness" here: the allegedly "forensic" sense of "righteous" always boil down to

\(^60\) Cf. E. R. Achtemeier, \textit{IDB}, 4:80, 81: "It becomes clear that \(\text{p\={t}B}\) is a concept of relationship and that he who is righteous has fulfilled the demands laid upon him by the relationship in which he stands. . . . The demands of righteousness changed with the relationship." This is clearly a contextual, "discourse" lexical sense. Cf. also Smiles 1998, 134.

\(^61\) E.g., in the same \textit{IDB} article (4:84): "Not only is he \(\text{p\={t}B}\) who fulfils the demands of the relationship in which he stands, . . . He also is righteous who has righteousness imputed to him. In this sense, righteousness is justification by God, a 'being-declared-righteous' by the Lord of the covenant (cf. Isa. 60:21)." The trouble is that Achtemeier's discussion, and others, proceed not as if they were discussing a second sense here, but rather as if they were discussing the only sense of the term.
God's *calling* someone "righteous" in the other sense, as a sort of *proleptic* declaration that they are (already) that which really they are not (yet) but shall be. (The long discussion of Paul's notion "the righteousness of God" has virtually overlooked the possibility of a purely-discourse lexical sense of "righteousness.") Thus they are in effect equivocating on the term *righteousness*. The popular ploy that justification is "relational" (see Ziesler 1972, 8) simply conflates the same two definitions, using the words *relation* (and *relational*) in the place of *righteousness* (and *righteous*). Apparently these scholars are blithely conflating two senses of "righteous," and producing nothing but equivocation and semantic muddle. One can then fail to live up to the relationship's demands and yet be "righteous," merely by virtue of this declaration (that one has lived up to the relationship? or else that one is being *declared* to be *declared* to be . . . what?).

It seems seriously doubtful that any 1st-century Jew would mean, by the same word and at the same time, that one is "righteous" *and* that one is not "righteous" but nevertheless is pronounced "righteous" (by a God who, according to the Hebrew scriptures, eschews false judgments!). Moreover, a declaration of *something* (whether true or untrue) must ipso facto be essentially a declaration of something *besides itself*, lest there be nothing "out there" for it to assert. A "declaration of itself" is a pure nonsense-"idea," and not likely a 1st-century Jewish one. We are better off acknowledging that for most NT occurrences of the word we must, in considering the term's meaning, choose between a typical Jewish "discourse sense" of "righteous," a typical Jewish non-discourse sense, and a pair of Greek lexical senses more or less equivalent to those. Insufficiently appreciated has been the contextual (yet denotative!) nature of these discourse lexical senses. This lack has made it easier to fall into

---

62. Peter Stuhlmacher (1986 espec.) has been one of the strongest supporters of this paradoxical position.

63. Even "performativ[e] language" declares something besides itself, viz., the declared *will* of the declarer (see more on this phenomenon below, in chap. 4).
the theologically-driven semantic fallacy just indicated, in analysis of these senses, as well as to approach the text’s interpretation presupposing a “relational” Pauline sense of “righteousness” and yet with a restricting, non-discourse preconception about the sense’s denotation.

2.2.3 A neglected possibility with respect to ἔργα νόμου

There has been much discussion of what Paul means by ἔργα νόμου (“works of the Law”), a noun-phrase appearing in Gal. 3:10a and elsewhere in Galatians and Romans (Rom. 3:20, 27–28; 4:2, 6 [both ἔργα absolute]; 9:11 [likewise], 32; 11:6 [likewise]; Gal. 2:16; 3:2, 5, 10). But there has been surprisingly little attention to some rather rudimentary exegetical matters, such as what are the senses of the terms involved, according to the standard lexica. ἔργα νόμου does appear, at least to some, to be some sort of conventional phrase, having some standard meaning; it may, therefore, be inaccessible to standard treatment. But not knowing beforehand whether this is the case, our approach to this phrase must be somewhat roundabout. Let us begin with some apparently underappreciated semantic points regarding almost all general “do”-concepts, including the term ἔργαν.

2.2.3.1 The common (if not universal) multivalency of “do”-words, including ἔργαν

One point that seems commonly ignored, in exegeting ἔργα νόμου in Paul, is that verbs which are synonyms for the general notion of “doing” are, in many or most languages, multivalent. LN (1:469–70) has a helpful discussion of the lexical-semantic distinctions languages sometimes make between different levels or types of obedience:

For terms involving ‘disobedience’ or ‘transgression,’ there are often a number of subtle distinctions reflecting several different types of contrasts. For example, there may be important distinctions between disobeying a person and disobeying a law or custom. A number of languages also make a clear distinction between intentional and unintentional disobedience or transgression. A further distinction may involve repeated activity or consistency of attitude . . .
Accordingly, in the choice of terms for various passages of Scripture it is extremely important to note the distinctive features of meaning; otherwise, much of the emphasis upon disobedience and transgression as stated in the Scriptures may be seriously distorted.

LN is commenting here on the need for alertness to these potential semantic nuances in target languages, when translating the Scriptures; obviously, however, if one is going to make the right choice of words with which to translate these terms from the Scriptures, one must also be alert to such semantic nuances in the words one is translating. LN maintains some of these semantic nuances for several of the New Testament's Greek terms from this domain; for example:

- ἀπείθειν; ἀπείθεια . . . unwillingness or refusal to comply with the demands of some authority . . .
- ἀπεῖθης . . . pertaining to being continuously disobedient . . .
- παρακολουθεῖν; παρακολούθησις . . . to refuse to listen and hence to disobey . . .
- παραβλέπων; παραβλέψις . . . to act contrary to established custom or law, with the implication of intent . . .
- παραβλέπτης . . . a person who customarily breaks or disobeys the law . . . (LN, 1:468–69).

It becomes clear, then, that we might ask lexical-semantic questions before we pronounce on whether, for example, by abiding in all things written (Gal. 3:10b) Paul has in mind, say, perfect (i.e., sinless) fulfilment, or else something like the endeavour to accomplish what has been commanded.

But what of more general terms for “doing”? Like obedience, any human action can generally be looked at from at least two different viewpoints: one may speak of action with reference to its accomplishment, or else as attempt, with reference to goals or values: “What is he doing?” “He’s accomplishing so-and-so [or else trying to do such-and-such].” This is because human action is intentional behaviour, or at least it would be acknowledged as such
by most people; it is seen as action calculated to reach a particular goal, action with an end in view, which in general may or may not accomplish that end.\textsuperscript{64}

It is the particular contexts of general statements about doing which let us know which of these viewpoints is operative in a particular instance of a general term for human “doing.” For example, a man in an office building points at a co-worker who is crawling down the hall, looking at the floor, and asks, “What is he doing?” Clearly, he does not want someone to tell him that the man is crawling down the hall, looking at the floor; what he is asking about is the purpose or goal of the man’s action: “He’s looking for his lost contact lens.” Another man, the manager of a car-racing team, approaches a man with a stop-watch who has just timed a racer’s lap, and asks, “What’s he doing now?” The man is not asking about the racer’s intentions; obviously the racer is trying to win the race. What the man wants to know is the racer’s current accomplishment: “On that lap he averaged 160 miles per hour.” Context can even have a similar influence on the understanding of verbs that are more specific: seeing a neighbour pointing a rifle across a field, someone asks, “Goodness me, what’s he shooting?” The speaker would probably feel frustrated to receive the reply, “Oh, nothing quite yet.” Obviously, what he or she wished to know was what the neighbour was attempting to shoot.

Our point here is the need to be aware of and to address these semantic potentials. Furthermore, one must raise the neglected sociolinguistic matter of the context-implied logical relations between any clearly-made predications of “attempting” and “accomplishing”: that is, in the presuppositions inhabiting a particular “social language” or worldview, is an attempt (of a particular sort perhaps) tantamount to an accomplishment? Or

is it, perhaps, explicitly made a subimplicant of accomplishment (i.e., are “accomplishments” a subclass included within the larger class “attempts”)?\textsuperscript{65}

Furthermore, these potential senses are germane to any discussion of \(\varepsilon\rho\gamma\omicron\nu\), according to what we find in the standard lexical reference works on New Testament Greek. \(\varepsilon\rho\gamma\omicron\nu\) represents virtually the exact same range of senses as the Hebrew \(\aleph\beta\sigma\nu\), which is remarkable in light of the Hebrew for “works of the Law” which appears in the Qumran document 4QMMT (see below and chap. 3).\textsuperscript{66} It may mean either a business/pursuit/undertaking/enterprise, or “deed” in the sense of behaviour/doing, or work/labour, or achievement(s), something (or things or stuff) actually done/produced/made; and also like \(\aleph\beta\sigma\nu\) it may have a “weakened sense” of something like matter/thing (BAGD; GLNT; \textit{TDNT}). Note that “business/undertaking” is more specifically “accomplishment/achievement that is either a normal occupation of some person, that is, a calling freely taken up, or else a calling or obligation laid on him or her by someone else.” Therefore, we may say about \(\varepsilon\rho\gamma\omicron\nu\) that which we shall note later about \(\aleph\beta\sigma\nu\): the basic distinction in the various senses of the word is that between “attempt/endeavour” and “achievement/accomplishment.”

But too often in the exegesis of Paul’s speech about “doing the (whole) Law” or “works of the Law,” one particular concept of “do” or of “deed,” namely obedience (i.e., \textit{endeavour} to accomplish what is commanded), has been assumed to be what Paul intends, without consideration of any alternative possibility, or really even of the question. This widespread tendency calls for a bit of scrutiny.

2.2.3.2 The nonanalytical, traditional interpretation of \(\varepsilon\rho\gamma\alpha\,\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\nu\)

The usual interpretation these days, and in Protestant circles ever since the Reformation, is that in his statements on \(\varepsilon\rho\gamma\alpha\,\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\nu\) Paul is criticising any attempt to merit or win, by

\textsuperscript{65} We discuss the sociolinguistic issue of multiple “social languages” below, in chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{66} It is understandable, then, that \(\aleph\beta\sigma\nu\) is almost always translated \(\varepsilon\rho\gamma\omicron\nu\) in the LXX.
observation of the law’s stipulations, the status of covenantal righteousness. In other words, 
\( \varepsilon\rho\gamma\alpha\ \nu\mu\omicron\upsilon \) is observation/“keeping” of the law’s stipulations. But we may note fairly
quickly, on any survey of the various meanings proposed today for \( \varepsilon\rho\gamma\alpha\ \nu\mu\omicron\upsilon \), that the
authors proposing them often seem to have chosen (whether consciously or unconsciously)
not to base their interpretations on what we may fairly characterise as the normal procedure
for interpretation. That procedure, briefly stated, is to check the lexica for the various ways
in which the words were used, check the grammars for the various possible meanings of the
grammatical constructions involved (e.g., the genitive case), and make their selections in
light of the linguistic and non-linguistic contexts of the utterance. For example, H. B. P.
the phrase as a whole, and gives little attention to the individual linguistic and semantic
elements of which it is composed. Moreover, the long survey Mijoga conducts in an early
chapter shows that lexical and grammatical considerations have historically played little role
in the discussion. This certainly explains the cornucopia of readings of the phrase: if the
interpreter is not to be restricted by the normal use of the phrase’s linguistic elements, there
seems no reason not to propose whatever may seem to fit the context.

However, none of the suggested meanings is necessarily wrong merely because of
being untied to normal linguistic-semantic strictures. After all, there are in language such
things as phrases that do not mean, or at least are not intended to mean, exactly what they
say. These are often called “idioms”; the French linguist de Saussure coined for them the
term “ready-made utterances” (“locutions toutes faites”; Lyons 1968, 177). For example,
“How do you do?” would not make much sense, were it analysed according to the
grammatical rules of English and the semantic potential of the words it contains. Other
phrases, such as “Rest in peace,” could make sense on this sort of interpretation, but
normally are not used with any such sense, but in a sense undiscernible by a “normal”
analysis of the linguistic elements of the utterance. All such expressions are “learned as unanalysable wholes . . . Their internal structure . . . is not accounted for by means of rules which specify the permissible combinations of words. . . . They are to be accounted for simply by listing them in the dictionary with an indication of the situations in which they are used and their meaning” (Lyons 1968, 177). Nor is it uncommon for “technical terms” or technical meanings of words to develop in particular segments of a culture or an economy; and “technical phrases” also may develop. These are very much like idioms, in that they are learned as wholes.

It is very doubtful that many disputing about the meaning of ἐξ ἔργων νόμου have consciously considered it a “ready-made utterance” or “technical phrase,” but that is how many are treating it by effectively denying any exegetical significance to the “normal” meanings of its linguistic-semantic elements, and paying attention only to what the phrase as a whole means. This raises the question: would it not be legitimate for us to treat the phrase this way? Obviously, we cannot simply decide that any phrase that anyone utters on any particular occasion is a “ready-made utterance”: if we could, then language would be merely a series of sounds to which anyone could ascribe any significance they felt was appropriate in the context—but then of course the linguistic context would provide no real guidance, since it would be just as plastic as the utterance in question. Therefore we require some evidence that indicates the phrase is, given its context, being used in a “ready-made” sense. That evidence might take the form of some established standard or technical usage. In absence of any evidence for this it must, at the very least, be quite clear from the context and from our knowledge of the use of the terms and grammar involved that the sense of the phrase is opaque on any “normal” exegesis; that would suggest that there must have been some understood, idiomatic meaning of the phrase for the original readers, even if we ourselves are ignorant of it.
Or, if someone should suggest that Paul was coining a new technical phrase, we would say that there should then be some clear evidence, either in Paul’s writings (especially Romans, written to a church he had never visited), or else in the grammatical and/or lexical-semantic non-standard or non-analysable nature, of the phrase itself, that Paul was coining a “ready-made” phrase. In other words, given that this type of language is actually abnormal, it seems to us that the burden of proof must be on those who would proceed as if a particular phrase is, in a certain context, being used as some sort of “ready-made utterance,” learned as a whole.

Now, there appears to be no evidence, outside of Paul’s epistles, that the phrase had some standardised idiomatic sense. And given the usage in 4QMMT (see below), and the presence of similar if not identical language in the OT, it is doubtful that Paul was coining some new “ready-made” phrase. Rather, it would seem that it is the particular contexts in which Paul puts this phrase, that have caused people to puzzle over its meaning and to ascribe imaginative senses to the phrase as a whole. That is to say, it would appear that people have struggled to make sense of the phrase ἔργα νόμου because of its opacity, at least to them, in the particular contexts in which Paul uses it, and have therefore treated it as a “ready-made” phrase.

2.2.3.3 The Qumran use of “works of the Law”: a technical phrase?

The fact that Paul introduces it abruptly (Gal. 2:16; Rom. 3:20), however, indicates only that it was probably a conventional phrase in such contexts, and not that it was a technical phrase. And a look at the Qumran literature, the only other Jewish literature where equivalent phrases appear, gives no evidence that we have a technical phrase here.

One can find in the OT and ancient Jewish literature plenty of references to “doing the Law” or “doers of the Law” and equivalent concepts, but of all ancient Jewish literature
(including the LXX), it is only in the Qumran literature that the phrase “works of the Law” appears as such (Mijoga 1995). Even there, the phrase appears only in two documents, and only in one of these is the occurrence undisputed.

The text called 4QFlorilegium (or 4Q174) has the following sentence (DSSE, 353):

He has commanded that a Sanctuary of men be built for Himself, that there they may send up, like the smoke of incense, the works of the Law [מפעלי התורה].

“Deeds of the law” was the reading that J. M. Allegro gave to the last phrase in his original publication of the text; but this reading was later questioned by J. Strugnell, who suggested reading daleth instead of resh, yielding the phrase מפעלי תורה or “deeds of thanksgiving.” Yet, in the opinion of J. A. Fitzmyer (1993, 20), a glance at the plate of this Qumran manuscript shows that Allegro read the text correctly. Moreover, it is difficult to make much sense of the phrase, “deeds of thanksgiving,” and the literary context does nothing to clarify it. On the other hand, the phrase “deeds of the Law” has no particular or innate opaqueness (albeit at least one of its words may possibly be taken in various senses), and it fits well the context, in which the new sanctuary (of men) shall not be polluted by uncleanness nor laid waste because of (the new) Israel’s sin: if instead they do “the deeds of the Law,” sin will not cause their destruction.67

The sense “works of the Law” is, moreover, clearly meant by an equivalent wording in another Qumran text. That text is the one called 4QMMT (the abbreviated title “MMT” is short for the phrase, “מפעלי המצוות הרוחני,” or “some of the works of the Law”), a document contained in six fragmentary copies (4Q394–99) which nevertheless complement one another (Fitzmyer 1993, 21). The main extant sections are 1) a calendar, 2) a list of more than twenty halakot, and 3) a hortatory “epilogue” urging the proper observance of the Law. There is some doubt as to whether the calendar is to be considered one with the halakic

67. Cf. the cogent argument of Mijoga (1995, 137ff.).
section, or whether it is simply something that ended up on the same scroll (DSSE, 181; Schiffman 1997); and in fact the halakic section never shows up on the same scroll-fragments as the epilogue, so it is not surprising that some have said these are from two different documents (Schiffman 1997; see, e.g., Eisenman and Wise 1992, 180ff.). However, the “epilogue” says that the author had written to the reader about

some of the works of the Law which we consider for the good of you and of your people

whereas the halakic section introduces itself as being (quoted with gaps shown in brackets)

some of our words [...] which are [...] unannounced

In view of the numerous points of parallel (underlined above) between these two segments, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it is the halakic section to which the “epilogue” refers; and that conclusion is at present the general consensus. Given this, it is of little matter for our purposes (though still debated) whether these two sections were part of the same letter or of successive letters.

Of greater interest to us is the question whether the context in 4QMMT gives indication that the phrase is a technical phrase. In this regard, it is significant that the phrase fits quite smoothly in the context, giving no particular impression of opaqueness (although, again, there may still be disagreement over what sense of some word contained in it fits best in the context). It can make good sense in the context, interpreted as normal language.69

Thus, it fails the test which is, for us in this situation, the fundamental test of whether this is

68. Some of the translations and Hebrew quotations which follow are dependent on a handout sheet distributed by Lawrence Schiffman (see Schiffman 1997), entitled “MMT as reconstructed by Elisha Qimron and John Strugnell.” The handout was copied from Qimron and Strugnell 1994; the latter’s text and translation are also reprinted in Biblical Archaeology Review, vol. 20 (1994), no. 6, 56–61.

69. Below, in chap. 3, we exegete the phrase as used in Qumran.
a technical phrase or idiom. Whether it was a rather “conventional” phrase, one used commonly in a particular context, is another question. Our point here is that there is no evidence that the phrase was learned and understood as a whole rather than by its grammatical and lexical semantic elements.

In conclusion, the tendency to assume that ἔργα νόμον means some variation on “endeavour to fulfil the Law’s commands” (“legalistically” or not) is not justified. We must take into account the real possibility that by ἔργα Paul speaks of completed deeds, that is, “accomplishments.”

2.2.4 Neglected semantic potential in πίστις and πιστεύω

An overlooking of semantic potential occurs with yet another significant term in Gal. 3:10-14, πίστις, and its closely-related verbal form πιστεύω. Or rather, this neglect occurs with the concept “trust,” which exegetes regularly involve in their discussions of πίστις. We believe that the notion “trust,” as it is almost always conceived (both in English and in the NT), is a (lexical) discourse concept, and that this can be readily shown. If that is so, any lexical sense of πίστις or πιστεύω which involves the notion “trust” will also be a discourse concept, whose denotation will correspondingly depend on the particular discourse. But probably the discourse-sense character of these lexical senses will be seen more easily if we consider the idea “trust” first, but referring to NT texts, and then examine the uses of πίστις.

2.2.4.1 “Trust” as a discourse lexical concept

Consider what one generally means by the notion “trust”: it denotes a strong, motivating conviction of the reliability of some person or thing. But there are several points that are more implicit than explicit in that definition. For one thing, the notion “reliability” involves certain things. In general, there is no such notion as abstract “reliability” that exists on its
own, without reference to the goals and values of someone who trusts. Thus for example, if someone says, “My car is reliable,” the meaning is probably not that it is reliable to die at every intersection, although that could conceivably be someone’s idea of “reliability,” but rather that it is reliable to start and run when called upon. For that is what, usually, one hopes one’s car will do. If someone or something is “reliable,” someone trusts the person or thing to do something, and something particular. But that something need not be the same for every person employing the same entity. Frank’s wife may “trust” him to do different things than Frank’s boss does. Someone using the electric cooker as a fan oven “trusts” it to do something different than does someone using it as a grill. So, that which the entity is relied upon to do depends upon the person(s) who is (are) doing the relying within the purview of the current discourse.

Notice something else about this brief definition: trust is a “strong, motivating” conviction. It is not unusual for someone to explain the difference between “trust” and “belief” by pointing out that you would never attribute real “trust” to someone who claimed a belief in a certain chair’s reliability to hold a person up, but who never went and sat on it. In short, the “trusting” presupposes not only belief, but a valuing highly the reliability believed in. This “valuing highly” implies that one wants and wills to make use of it, and wills this even in light of whatever costs and conditions apparently must be met in order to use it. We find this part of the word’s meaning implicit in a number of NT passages: there is the suggestion that an alleged “faith” (trust in God) which does not motivate to action is not real faith (especially James 2:14–26; but see also Rom. 1:5; 16:26; Gal 5:6; Phil. 2:17; 1 Thess. 1:3).

Therefore this sense of trust could be more fully defined as “belief in the reliability of (something or someone) to perform some particular result (i.e., in some particular manner) that is desired and valued (even in view of whatever provisos or costs might seem to
condition such performance) by the one doing this believing within the purview of the current
discourse." Our conclusion is that in general, both "reliability," and (therefore) "trust,"
which is defined in terms of it, are discourse lexical concepts. This may seem
straightforward enough; but still we must relate the latter discourse concept to Paul, and to
πιστις. Is there evidence that Paul himself could have used this term in a discourse lexical
sense in Gal. 3:10–14? We can best consider this question via a survey of the attested uses
of πιστις.

2.2.4.2 Survey of uses of πιστις

Since we have been able to define initially and clearly this (discourse) lexical sense “trust”
(unlike in the case of δικαιος, “righteous”), there seems nothing particular to be gained by
making a historical survey of the use of πιστις.70 We shall instead take the approach of
listing the uses supposedly available at Paul’s time, commenting on the evidence for each.

1. “trust”
   This sense is well-attested in Classical Greek (TDNT, 6:176–77; Burton 1921, 475; Lindsay 1993). It is of course lacking in the LXX, due to
   the lack of a noun in Hebrew corresponding to the verbal sense “to
   trust” (as expressed in לְבָנָה). Thus it appears somewhat sparsely in
   the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha (Burton 1921, 478). However,
   Aramaic did eventually develop such a noun (נִסּוֹת), and this may
   help account for the common use of πιστις with this sense in the NT,
   both within and without the Pauline corpus (Barr 1983 [1961], 202;
   Dodd 1935, 69–70).

2. “belief, credence”
   This sense, closely connected with the first, is also widely attested in
   Classical Greek (Lindsay 1993). It differs from the first in that its
   object is any sort of proposition, not necessarily a hypothesis about the
   reliability of something; thus, “belief of” a person means believing his
   or her words. It appears about 20 times each in Philo and Josephus
   (Hay 1989, 463), but is hardly attested in the NT (but see 2 Thess.
   2:13).

70. The most common and accepted senses were there early on (cf. Lightfoot 1890, 156–57).
3. "faithfulness, reliability"

This is sometimes called a "passive" sense, as opposed to the preceding "active senses." It is well-attested in Classical Greek and the LXX, and fairly well attested in the Apocrypha (Burton 1921, 475, 478; cf. Lightfoot 1890, 156–57). It is lightly attested in the NT (see Matt. 23:23; Rom. 3:3; Gal. 5:22; Tit. 2:10), unless one take Paul's phrase πίστευσεν Χριστόν as an example.

4. "promise, pledge, assurance (of reliability), credibility, proof, evidence"

This sense, closely related to the prior, is quite common in Classical Greek, and is the most common use in both Philo and Josephus (Hay 1989, 463). However, the only clear and generally-recognised instance of this in the NT is Acts 17:31 (Burton 1921, 481; Hay 1989, 470).

5. "a certain mystical apprehension of divine realities"

This might be the best way of summing up Philo's use inspired by Greek philosophy (see TDNT, 6:201–2; Dodd 1935, 69, 199–200; Lindsay 1993, 60–62, 67–73; Lightfoot 1890, 159–61). It is, however, a relatively rare usage, even in Philo (Hay 1989, 463). It sees πίστις as one of the highest "virtues." Like the Platonic notion of δικαιοσύνη, it is not a discourse concept.

6. "faith"

This English word is generally used as a technical religious term; it derived etymologically from Latin fides, which term was pressed into service to translate πίστις in the Vulgate (Lightfoot 1890, 158). Unfortunately, like "righteousness," the notion "faith" is more often described than defined, and little light is shed upon the question whether there is actually a separate, religious sense of πίστις. We will return to that question shortly.

7. "the faith (Christianity)"

In regard to this commonly alleged lexical sense, it should be noted that usually its referentiality (i.e., denotation of a particular entity or entities) is provided not paradigmatically (i.e., by the choice of this particular term), but syntagmatically (by combination of it with other words), by adding either the definite article or the numerical qualifier "one" or such. Conceivably, the combination might be a "technical phrase." But although there are signs of this development in the NT, we would agree with Burton (1921, 483n.), who denies any full-blown such usage in the NT.

In regard to the idea of a special "religious" sense of πίστις (see above, #6), one can hardly deny that there is one. In the New Testament it is the rule, not the exception, to use
\(\pi\sigma\tau\iota\zeta\) (in the sense of “trust”) absolutely, that is, without any mention of its object or of what it trusts the object to do.\(^{71}\) This is so common that one cannot ignore the usage or treat it as merely a common use of ellipsis. It can be explained, however, as a semantic change due to frequent use of a particular ellipsis in a particular context: “[Semantic change through] ellipsis normally takes place when a term (headword) becomes closely associated with a qualifier. If the qualifier is omitted, the headword preserves its syntactical function while adopting a new meaning” (Silva 1983, 82). The qualifier which would naturally be closely associated with “faith” in a 1st-century Jewish context, is the phrase “in God.” And one can clearly hear this implicit qualifier ringing through the NT’s absolute use of \(\pi\sigma\tau\iota\zeta\). This is so in the Gospels and elsewhere in the NT as well as in Paul, even when the “faith” is apparently in Jesus:

According to the synoptic gospels Jesus teaches men to believe in God and invites them to have faith in him, apparently assuming that the production of the one faith will generate the other, and, indeed, expressly affirming that he that receives him receives him who sent him (Mk. 9:37). The fourth gospel expresses the same thought more explicitly in terms of faith (12:44) and reiterates it in other forms. In the Epistle to the Hebrews Christians are exhorted to maintain their faith in Christ by O. T. examples of faith in God. . . . In the synoptic gospels . . . the conception of faith is simple and relatively elementary. On the one hand, it includes the idea of trust in God frequently expressed in O. T. by \(\pi\beta\rho\alpha\gamma\mu\) and in the LXX by \(\pi\epsilon\pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\alpha\) and \(\epsilon\lambda\chi\iota\varsigma\omega\), and, on the other hand, that of confidence in the willingness and ability of Jesus to do certain things, usually to heal sickness or rescue from danger, rarely to forgive sins. (Burton 1921, 484–85)

This is even more clearly so in the writings of Paul:

In Rom. 4:16b \(\delta\epsilon \pi\sigma\tau\epsilon\omicron\omega\gamma\) \(\alpha\beta\rho\alpha\gamma\mu\) means “of an Abrahamic faith,” \textit{i.e.}, possessing a faith which like that of Abraham was exercised outside of the régime of law. . . . [Paul] laid great stress upon the essential identity of such faith in God as existed in the O. T. period and the Christian type of faith. The doctrine of faith in Christ is defended by an appeal to the faith of Abraham, and

\(^{71}\) Strangely, explicit attention is seldom given to this remarkable fact, in the studies of \(\pi\sigma\tau\iota\zeta\). But Burton 1921 (481–84) gives an excellent synopsis of the syntax with which the word is used.
the permanence and continuity of the principle of faith as the determinative element of God's demand upon men urgently maintained. (Burton 1921, 484)

We may explain this fact by characterising "faith in Jesus" as "faith in what God does through Jesus." There is even some indication in Galatians that Paul considered this the content of Abraham's faith (Lambrecht 1999).

We may take it, then, that such a "religious" sense of πίστις did indeed develop in 1st-century Judaism, and is the dominant use of πίστις in the NT. This sense is simply, "trust in God" (#6 above). Its "direct object" is thus implicit in the definition; but what this "trust" expects God to do, including any provisos that may attach to that, is not, since "trust" is a discourse lexical concept (see above). Thus the concept "faith" also has contextual, discourse character. As a discourse concept, it gets its denotation from its context, every time it is used.

In this chapter we have indicated various overlooked or ignored meanings, including on the one hand ranges of potential denotation, and on the other hand senses that might have been Paul's at the word-level, proposition-level, or argument-level of his discourse. We surveyed the various basic argument-meanings and proposition-meanings, and found δίκαιος and πίστις to be capable of context-dependent, "discourse" senses (which fact creates almost unlimited ranges of potential denotations), and ἔργα in the phrase ἔργα νόμου to be capable of an "accomplishments" sense and meaning. All of these senses and meanings have been more or less overlooked or neglected. Now we must consider the context of Gal. 3:10–14, to be fully equipped for our exegesis of that passage.
Chapter 3

Approaching our passage: the contexts

In the previous chapter we have reviewed some semantic possibilities that have not been sufficiently appreciated in dealing with Gal. 3:10-14. In this chapter we will deal with the "contexts" of the passage. Hermeneutics enjoins us to be sensitive to the historical, cultural, situational, and literary contexts of the passage, in order to be fully able to interpret it. This heuristic value of "context" is to some extent indicated by the Quantity maxim of conversation (cf. above): an author or speaker should not make his or her contribution more informative than is required; therefore, that which the situational "context" already supplies does not need explicit stating, so long as enough information is stated to make the unstated but intended parts identifiable. For these unstated bits of information, then, we look to the "presupposition pool," the pool of "information constituted from the situative context . . . as well as the new information from the completed part of the discourse itself" (Cotterell and Turner 1989, 90).

3.1 The literary structure of Gal. 3:2-14

First we should consider an important feature of the literary-formal context of 3:10-14. Paul
appears to have structured 3:2–14 in the form of a chiasm, notes Cosgrove (1988b, 48), who
analyses it as slightly unbalanced, thus:

(Spirit by faith 3:2–5)
people of faith are sons (of Abraham) (3:6–7)
people of faith (incl. Gentiles) are blessed (3:8–9)
people of works of the law cursed (3:10)
no one in the law justified (3:11)
law not of faith (3:12)
Christ has redeemed us from curse of the law (3:13)
blessing comes upon Gentiles, [3:14a]
we receive promise of Spirit through faith (3:14[b])

Now, it is unnecessary to separate 3:6–7 from 3:8–9 in this outline; for in Galatians 3 Paul
intimately connects sonship/inheritance with promise (3:16, 18, 29), and promise with faith
(3:22), and sonship/inheritance with faith (3:26), and in Rom. 4:13 connects all three,
making the point that people of faith are blessed with Abraham. Cosgrove's chiasm thus
could have been balanced, with 3:6–9 parallel to 3:14a.

There is some solid evidence for this chiasm, namely, the parallel forms Paul has
provided his citations of Scripture in 3:10–13. As we shall see, Paul seems deliberately to
have altered the LXX of Deut. 21:23b in Gal. 3:13, to make it more explicitly parallel to
Deut. 27:26a in 3:10; for example, his citations of both Deut. 21:23b and Deut. 27:26a begin
with the words ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς, whereas “the original text of Deut. 21. 23 reads
κεκατηρομένος as the initial word, with no textual variants, and also [immediately following]
includes the words ἑπόθεον which Paul omits” (Stanley 1990, 505 n. 64).1 Also there is the
parallel we have already indicated between Paul's quotations in 3:11b and 3:12b, particularly

1. Stanley continues, “Plausible explanations have been posited for both changes: Paul's
understanding of the significance of Christ's death would have required him to clarify that the
'cursing' referred to here took place (in the case of Christ) in the act of 'hanging' itself, and not
before, as the Deuteronomy text suggests; moreover, his Christian sensibilities may well have
revolled against the idea of speaking of Christ as 'cursed by God.' Unless Paul's readers were
already familiar with the Deuteronomy text, however, the hermeneutical significance of these
changes would have been lost on them.”
with the repetition of the verb ἅπασαν. Thus Paul seems to have forced these citations into supporting a chiastic parallelism, consisting of 3:10–13 at the very least.

Cosgrove is not the only one to have discerned a chiasm here, which fact is significant as there is always some subjectivity involved in detecting one. John Bligh (1969, 238–39) claimed to find in 3:5–14 a chiasm that is almost identical with Cosgrove’s outline; we may summarise Bligh’s outline as follows:

A Spirit; sons of Abraham; faith (3:5–7)
   B Abraham’s blessing; Gentiles (3:8–9)
   C Under law; curse, citing Deut. 27:26 (3:10)
      D By the law no one is justified (3:11a)
         E Citation of Hab. 2:4 (3:11b)
      D’ The law is not a matter of faith (3:12)
   C’ Christ delivered from curse, citing Deut. 21:23 (3:13)
   B’ Abraham’s blessing; Gentiles (3:14a)
   A’ Gift of Spirit; faith (3:14b)

Bligh’s attempt to interpret all of Galatians as a huge chiasm, with three secondary chiasms containing tertiary and sometimes quaternary levels of chiasm, has met with little support; but Silva (1996, 91, whose condensed version of Bligh’s chart we have adapted) notes that the inverse parallels of this particular suggested chiasm are fairly clear.

The most significant difference from Cosgrove’s outline is probably that Bligh’s chiasm has a centre point, at 3:11b. We have suggested that 3:11b (Hab. 2:4) appears rather to be paralleled with 3:12b (Lev. 18:5b). But it would be somewhat premature to argue now about whose structure, Cosgrove’s or Bligh’s, is closer to the text, or whether another outline would be more accurate; that can be left until we find the structure of the argument(s) in the passage. The importance of detecting a chiasm lies in the fact that it is a paragraph-marker,

3. J. Jeremias and F. Mussner (following Jeremias) have also done large-scale chiastic analyses of Galatians (Hansen 1989, 74–75).
as it were, and thus gives us the boundaries of a passage likely structured around and making one particular point. It may also suggest intended connections within the argument that we might otherwise overlook. It suggests, moreover, that word-studies on Paul’s Greek terms for “faith,” “works,” and “righteousness” would be as germane and pivotal to 3:10–14 as they are to 3:2–9.

3.2 “Context” and hermeneutical circles

We turn now to consideration of how to remedy certain instances of abuse or deficiency of context, that is, how to avoid or to break out of “hermeneutical circles.” For in our view these tend to vitiate the exegesis of Galatians even when much heuristic attention is paid to “context.” There are various kinds of hermeneutical circles. Here we consider the two which we believe are most important for exegesis in general and for understanding Galatians in particular.

3.2.1 Breaking a “parts-whole” hermeneutical circle

Perhaps the most commonly recognised sort of circular exegesis involves the circle between the parts and the whole of the discourse:

“I understand the whole in virtue of understanding the parts; I understand the parts in virtue of understanding the whole.” Logically, the circle is vicious; actually it is broken open by insights that, alternating between part-and-part and between parts-and-whole, mediate an ever firmer grasp of the text in its parts and as a whole. (Meyer 1994, 91)\(^5\)

Now, any way of construing the whole discourse’s meaning must at least be compatible with any plausible and independently-established readings of its parts. For as we said in chapter 2, the meaning of the paragraph obviously depends at least partly upon the meanings of its constituent statements and implied propositions, and the meaning of the latter upon the

---

meanings of their words. So any exegetical details that affect the overall reading must be (independently) interpreted before we make any final decision on the overall reading. Otherwise, we base the overall reading on the details (as is always the case) but then, circularly, also base the details on the overall reading. This has unfortunately been a fairly common fallacy in exegesis of Galatians.

3.2.2 Breaking a “words-things” hermeneutical circle

A second type of hermeneutical circle has, in our estimation, been even more troublesome for the interpretation of Galatians. This is the circle between the author’s words and the things (or events or qualities or classes of things) which they denote:

“I understand words by understanding the things they refer to; I understand things by understanding the words that refer to them.” The first limb [of this maxim] states a fundamental insight: “whoever does not understand the things cannot draw the sense from the words” (Luther). If I have had no independent access to what the text is about, the text is likely to be obscure to me. The second limb states how one moves through a grasp of words to a firmer grasp of things; the interpreter understands things, with the writer, by means of his words. (Meyer 1994, 91)

The first limb thus demands an understanding of “the objects, real or imaginary, intended by the author of the text” (Lonergan 1973, 156); it entails understanding the relevant features of the author’s “horizon” or “universe of discourse.” As we noted in chapter 2, to know the “meaning” of a term it is not enough to know the dictionary definition; one must also have some knowledge of the actual thing(s) denoted by the term (even if this can be inferred via the definition; and that is not even the case sometimes, e.g. with anaphoric lexical senses). So ultimately it is in this direction (i.e., understanding the author’s words by understanding the things they can denote) that one must break out of this hermeneutical circle.

A distinction should be noted here, between the overall meaning of the discourse (mentioned above), which is ultimately the result of one’s interpretation, and these closely-
related but non-literary contexts, which include the author’s “life and times, the state of the question in his day, his problems, prospective readers, scope and aim” (Lonergan 1973, 163). When a reader is out of touch with these, the text can be extremely baffling:

When a simple misunderstanding arises, as when [in using a certain word] the author thought of \( P \) but the reader of \( Q \), then its correction is the relatively simple matter of sustained rereading and inventiveness. But there can arise the need for a long and arduous use of the self-correcting process of learning. Then a first reading yields a little understanding and a host of puzzles, and a second reading yields only slightly more understanding but far more puzzles. The problem, now, is a matter . . . of understanding the author himself, his nation, language, time, culture, way of life, and cast of mind. (Lonergan 1973, 160)

Understanding those “contexts” is crucial, if only because communication itself presupposes contact with them. Note that the “conversational maxims” of Relevance and Quantity (above, chap. 2), and also the general maxim Cooperation, presuppose the hearer’s or reader’s grasp of “the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which” the speaker and hearer(s) are engaged. So the maxims require that the reader have access to the general reason, or at least to the possible reasons, for the author’s statements. But even this grasp effectively requires knowing these authorial, historical, and situational contexts; for while we usually get the author’s purpose from the overall flow of the text, that general flow could easily elude our grasp if we do not know those “realities” which the author means by a number of key terms. Then again, the Quantity maxim implies that the reader needs to have access to those parts of the author’s and original readers’ presupposition pools presumably shared. In short, we must understand the relevant realities within the author’s “horizon” or “universe of discourse” before we can understand the words by which he or she denotes these realities.

3.3 Paul, sociolinguistics, “heteroglossia,” and the potential individuality of semantic structure
Often, however, that is easier said than done. Paul’s letters provide good examples of the difficulty. Many have complained of the limitedness of the data which we have on Paul’s own view of things. The letters which Paul writes are addressing specific churches’ needs (as Paul understands those). What we know of the “rhetorical situation” he perceived, of his worldview elements contributing to this, and of the presuppositions he assumed he shared with his readers, must all be gleaned from this handful of letters and from whatever reliable data might be gleaned from the book of Acts. Here we have a true problem of “induction”: how do we establish a generality (viz., about Paul’s pertinent worldview-elements) from such meagre data? But understanding the letters may well depend on having this prior understanding of Paul, as we have just seen. The paucity of the data therefore seems to leave open a range of possibilities as to Paul’s relevant outlook.

But as we shall see, this range of possibilities, even when appreciated, has generally been underestimated. As we saw in chapter 2, there has been an assumption that the lexical senses of Paul’s terms δίκαιος and πίστις give us their denotations; whereas in fact, if Paul is using one (or both) of these terms in its anaphoric, “discourse” lexical sense, only the context can identify its denotation for us. But in addition, there has been a too-ready assumption that both Paul and his readers would share the same lexical senses for his key words. We tend to assume that a particular Greek word would have had a uniform set of senses, which would or could be listed in a lexicon and from which we could infer the word’s meaning in a particular occurrence. But if Paul is arguing from a rather different religious viewpoint from that of his opponents and that of at least some of his Judaising readers in Galatians, might not there be the potential for divergence in meaning in some or all of the religious terms?

6. On the difficulty and limitations of this “mirror-reading” of Paul’s letters, see, e.g., Barclay 1987.
As the new community of faith in effect required a conversion from one’s previous state to another... it is not unnaturally related to the transfer context if some central words tend to take on new shades of meaning. The linguistic novelty [within Christianity] points to a novelty in the realm of religion...
(Räisänen 1992, 117-18)

A real appreciation of the range of lexical-semantic potential in Paul’s key terms (which appreciation is necessary for our exegesis) requires an appreciation of how readily “social languages,” having “specialised” and sometimes even “idiolect” (one-person) word-senses, come to exist within one larger language.

3.3.1 Bakhtinian sociolinguistics and “heteroglossia”: multiplicity of social languages

This latter appreciation is a part of sociolinguistics, and in particular that of Russian linguistic and literary thinkers Mikhail Bakhtin and V. N. Voloshinov. Much of the early 20th-century linguistic thought of Bakhtin and Voloshinov has been duplicated by others in the field of sociolinguistics, which developed rapidly in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s on the basis of empirical studies. But Bakhtin has perhaps given more thought to the forces that cause different “social languages” to develop, and to the intricate interplay that occurs between different social languages; thus his work seems potentially more helpful for a study of a polemical writing like Galatians. Our purpose in this section is to convey an appreciation, not only that the same phonological word may represent a different sense or set of senses (i.e. concepts) for various speakers of ostensibly the “same” language, but also for the rhetorical difficulty faced by someone communicating across “social language” boundaries.

Two terminological notes are in order: the Russian slovo is a broad term that covers anything from a “word” to a “discourse” (much like the Greek term λόγος). Translations of

9. For a good introduction to sociolinguistics, from a perspective quite similar to Bakhtin’s, see Hudson 1980. Two helpful introductions to Bakhtin and his thought are Morson and Emerson 1990; Dentith 1995.
Bakhtin often renders slovo as "word," whereas usually Bakhtin means by this term no such specific, bounded linguistic unit. This will become clear in the passages we quote. Also, in regard to Bakhtin's notions of "dialog" and "dialogisation," we should note that

A word, discourse, language or culture undergoes "dialogization" when it becomes relativized, de-privileged, aware of competing definitions for the same things. Undialogized language is authoritative or absolute.

Dialogue may be external (between two different people) or internal (between an earlier and a later self). (Emerson and Holquist 1981, 427)

Bakhtin and other sociolinguists argue that the Saussurean, structuralist "system" is an abstraction from language as it actually exists historically (and empirically). It is a reified ideal which reflects no actual historical reality. Nor can it (as such) account for the constant flux and change in language, but rather serves to bifurcate linguistic studies into the categories "synchronic" and "diachronic." Both Bakhtin and Voloshinov discuss at length the theoretical problems that arise on such a view, and call for a more realistic, holistic view of language which takes into account both the "centripetal forces" of linguistic cohesion within a society, and the "centrifugal forces," arising from the individual, that tend to "stratify" language into many different "social languages," which latter reality Bakhtin calls heteroglossia (the Russian term, raznorecie, literally means "multi-speechedness").

Cultures strive for unity and order. That striving is reflected in the European regularization of national languages—in the writing of grammars and dictionaries, and in the defining of standard and nonstandard usage. Bakhtin does not mean to say that there is anything wrong with this effort. But he does mean to say that we must understand it for what it is—an attempt to create order by positing it. . . . The constructed system is reified—Voloshinov says 'hypostatized'—and then mistaken for what language really is and for an account of how it really functions. (Morson and Emerson 1990, 140; interpolations in original)
The dynamic change, growth, and development in individuals’ and groups’ conceptual frameworks constantly gives rise, through the “centrifugal” forces of language, to many different “social languages”:

Language, Bakhtin reiterates, is always languages. . . . Different professions each have their own way of speaking, as do different generations, different classes, areas, ethnic groups, and any number of other possible divisions. The important thing to understand is that for Bakhtin these different “languages” are not just a matter of, let us say, a professional jargon. . . . No, what constitutes these different languages is something that is itself extralinguistic: a specific way of conceptualizing, understanding, and evaluating the world. (Morson and Emerson 1990, 140-41)

Thus, not only are “specialised” word-senses common, but so are “idiolect” (one-person) word-senses.10 The only characteristic these various “social languages” all have in common and that might possibly be called “linguistic” is that they “are specific points of view on the world, forms for conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views, each characterized by its own objects, meanings and values. As such they all may be juxtaposed to one another, mutually supplement one another, contradict one another and be interrelated dialogically. As such they encounter one another and co-exist in the consciousness of real people . . . As such, these languages live a real life, they struggle and evolve in an environment of social heteroglossia” (Bakhtin 1981b, 291–92).

As Bakhtin reiterates, the linguistic “forms” that are active in one or more of these various languages are therefore never neutral forms as such: they are always value-laden.

“As a result of the work done by all these stratifying forces in language, there are no ‘neutral’ words and forms—words and forms that can belong to ‘no one’; language has been completely taken over, shot through with intentions and accents. For any individual consciousness living in it, language is not an abstract system of normative forms but rather a concrete heteroglot conception of the world. All words have the ‘taste’ of a profession, a

genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day and hour. Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life; all words and forms are populated by intentions" (Bakhtin 1981b, 293, emphasis ours).

It is at the point of dialog that the two sets of opposing linguistic forces, the centripetal and the centrifugal, intersect and interact. But this is not "dialog" as we often conceive it; Bakhtin's conception of it is at once more dynamic, more pragmatically oriented, and more universal. Human dialog is not verbal interchange between monads who have identically structured semantic systems, but between persons who commonly have more or less differing lexical-semantic systems. Moreover, these differing systems may be plagued with various internal inconsistencies, and are certainly in the process of development and change, whether in "external" dialog (with another person), or through "internal" dialog (between an earlier and a later self; see terminological remarks above). The need to frame his or her own expression in light of the hearer's viewpoint, and also in light of his or her own, thus necessarily involves the speaker in not only external dialogism (as he speaks), but also the "internal" dialogising of his own speech. There is no actual monolog. Dialog is a dynamic, never-ending, universal social process. All discourse is "dialogised."

Bakhtin notes that the speaker's orientation towards the hearer

is an orientation toward a specific conceptual horizon, toward the specific world of the listener; . . . The speaker strives to get a reading on his own word, and on his own conceptual system that determines this word, within the alien conceptual system of the understanding receiver; . . . The speaker breaks through the alien conceptual horizon of the listener, constructs his own utterance on alien territory, against his, the listener's, apperceptive background. (Bakhtin 1981b, 282)

As a result of this complex dialogism, the speaker's discourse dwells on the boundary, as it were, between his own worldview and that of his listeners (ibid., 284; Morson and Emerson
Voloshinov has vividly expressed this almost paradoxical dependence of the discourse both on the speaker's worldview and on that of the listeners:

Orientation of the word toward the addressee has an extremely high significance. In point of fact, word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is meant. As word, it is precisely the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addresser and addressee. Each and every word expresses the "one" in relation to the "other." . . . A word is a bridge thrown between myself and another. If one end of the bridge depends on me, then the other depends on my addressee. (Voloshinov 1995, 129-30)

This social fact of heteroglossia thus gives rise to difficulty in communication across social-linguistic boundaries: the speaker or author is to some extent using a language more or less foreign to the hearer, or to some extent expressing his own view in terms to which it is alien, or both.

From this discussion of Bakhtinian sociolinguistics we can see that we must be sensitive to the fact that Paul, as author, will need to approach his readers in language they may understand and appreciate, even if this requires forms of language Paul might not use otherwise. Therefore we should not dismiss a certain reading of Paul's argument simply on the grounds that it makes his argumentation seem a bit awkward. In such a radically polemical letter, it might be more surprising were his argument not awkward! Moreover, it is very dangerous to assume that Paul and his opponents or readers will be using key words in the same lexical sense. We should allow for their possibly having differing conceptualisations or understandings of various aspects of their respective "universes." This might, or might not, involve contrasting dictionary definitions of the terms: the definitions themselves could still differ in meaning, because they themselves are stated in the terms of someone's "social language." Therefore people with different worldviews and thus to some extent differing universes may to that extent have differing lexical concepts, and vice versa.
As suggested above, recognition of this potential for heteroglossia makes even broader than might have been expected the range of reasonable possibilities for Paul's key word-meanings. However, it might also provide the methodological key we need to solve this inductive problem of Paul's outlook.

3.3.2 Breaking the Pauline “words-things” hermeneutical circle by comparison and contrast with his opponents' social language

We are dealing with a polemical passage. The difference between the relevant elements of Paul's universe of discourse, and thus his key word-meanings, and his opponents', determine their difference of opinion and motivate the polemic issuing from it. Thus the key terms of this passage (and of its Pauline parallels) might be elucidated by the very way in which Paul's polemic reveals the contrast between his view of things and his opponents'. In this way, some of his statements might, via inference at least, map for us pertinent parts of Paul's worldview, by indicating the specific contrast between his conceptualisation of things and his opponents' way of viewing things (in the broader sense of "conceptualisation," including not just the "lexical concept" but also the things denoted). The advantage of this approach is that it would effectively enlist into the service of our search for Paul's outlook whatever relevant data we have on Paul's opponents' outlook. Thus it would effectively increase our relevant data pool, which is a great advantage in view of the severe limitation of the relevant data which we otherwise have available.

In the following three major sections of this chapter, we will draw on certain aspects of Paul's anti-Law polemic in order to attempt such a mapping of Paul's viewpoint. In chapter 2 we looked at neglected semantic potential of three key Pauline word-groups in Paul's polemic; in the following three sections we shall attempt to demonstrate which are Paul's own lexical senses of the terms, making comparison with his opponents' uses of the terms.
In the section after that, we shall adduce some additional inferences about his key word-meanings—or more specifically, about their denotations. In this way we will attempt methodically to break out of Galatians' "words-things" hermeneutical circle.

Clearly, however, a study of these particular Pauline terms is relevant mostly to target-texts in which his main issue is whether "justification" is "from works of the Law" or "from faith" (see e.g. Gal. 2:16; 3:2–9). Below we shall see that there is reason to think that this "justification"-issue is in view from 2:17 through 3:2; and we have already seen some literary-formal evidence that 3:2–9 (which clearly also focuses on that topic) should be about the same basic topic as 3:10–14. So apparently we have adequate contextual reason to see these three terms as potential clues to Paul's outlook and "horizon" as pertinent to 3:10–14. But certainty about this would presuppose that this "justification"-issue is still Paul's issue in the latter passage. We must adopt and use this latter assumption only with caution—as a "working assumption" only—lest we find ourselves doing a sort of "parts-whole" circular exegesis; for we have yet to determine with certainty that 3:10–14 is on that same issue.

Nevertheless, these three terms are pivotal ones within our passage as well. So in any case it is exegetically incumbent upon us to investigate what Paul denotes with them in at least this part of Galatians. And certainly, this approach (i.e., via these key-words' denotations) is a potential pathway to ascertaining Paul's worldview-elements pertinent to the immediate context of our passage. The crucial requirement is to interpret them without "reading-in," from some preconceived overall reading of the passage, the terms' meanings; otherwise we short-circuit our planned escape from all potential "words-things" hermeneutical circles, by interpreting the words before we know which things Paul could denote with them.

3.4 Paul, his opponents, "righteousness," and "justification"

Now Paul was a Jew. In light of that fact and of what we found in chapter 2 about Ἰκανος, it
seems reasonable to ask ourselves whether Paul used a “discourse” (anaphoric) lexical sense of “righteousness,” or if not, what sense he did use.

3.4.1 Rom. 10:5 and Paul’s lexical sense of “righteousness”

It is not immediately evident how we would go about proving or disproving the hypothesis that Paul is using δικαιοσύνα in its discourse lexical sense. But when we look at the polemical Pauline use of δικαιοσύνα and δίκκασσάνη in light of this question, we note some data that take on an interesting significance. It is remarkable, for instance, that in such contexts Paul frequently speaks of various “righteousnesses”: there is

“the righteousness of God” (Rom. 1:17; 3:21, 22, 25–26; 10:3; 2 Cor. 5:21),
a “righteousness that is ἐκ θεοῦ” (Phil. 3:9),
the “righteousness of faith” (Rom. 4:11, 13),
a “righteousness that is ἐκ πίστεως” (Rom. 9:30; 10:6),
the “righteousness that is ἐπὶ τῆς πίστεως” (Phil. 3:9),
a “righteousness one’s [or their] own” (Rom. 10:3; Phil. 3:9),
a “righteousness that is ἐκ τοῦ νόμου” (Rom. 10:5; Phil. 3:9), and
a “righteousness that is ἐν νόμῳ” (Phil. 3:6).

The significant point here is that Paul is speaking of at least two differing “righteousnesses,” for he sets those in the first group (above), individually over against those in the second. Now this does not quite prove that Paul means “righteousness” in a discourse lexical sense; but it certainly puts adversity in the way of the hypothesis that Paul is using a non-discourse sense of “righteousness” and thinks that he and those who oppose him (on the matter of righteousness) are denoting the same definite, extra-linguistic “reality” by the notion “righteousness.” For this hypothesis would entail that Paul, in the second group of citations above, is speaking of “righteousness” in an ironical sense, and that he really means a “pseudo-righteousness,” a factitious idea of the one true righteousness. It would be as if a primary-school teacher, reacting to some submitted geography work of inferior quality, spoke
ironically of "the Belfast that is in Scotland" or "the Vienna that is in Switzerland." The speaker’s intent is that there is no such Belfast, no such Vienna.

Such an ironical use of "righteousness" by Paul is perhaps not improbable in itself; but it becomes so when we consider how often Paul would be using it. And it becomes practically impossible when we look at the particular way he speaks of the "righteousness that is eκ [τοῦ] νόμου" in Rom. 10:5. For there (according to the correct Greek text), Paul states that "Moses writes concerning the righteousness that comes from the law, that 'the person who does these things will live by them'" (NRSV; so also KJV; emphasis ours). If Paul were using an ironical sense of "righteousness" here, he would be consciously and explicitly attributing to Moses an error regarding the identity of "righteousness": Moses wrote that righteousness was X, when really it is not X but Y. (After all, Lev. 18:5 does not say, "The Law says the man who does them shall live by them.") Now, even had Paul thought this about Moses, it would have been a gratuitous rhetorical suicide for him to say so in this context! The suggestion of such a procedure on Paul’s part is wholly implausible; it would be exceedingly more likely that he is citing Moses here as an unimpeachable authority. So it is almost certain that Paul uses "righteousness" in the same lexical sense throughout, rather than sometimes in an ironic sense. But the denotation cannot be the same throughout: otherwise he could not contrast these two "righteousnesses." Thus, the evidence strongly compels us towards the conclusion that here, and probably in other places, Paul meant "righteousness" in the discourse, anaphoric lexical sense which we discussed in chapter 2: only thus could the denotation vary while the lexical sense does not.

But this does not imply that his opponents did so. It is quite possible, perhaps even likely, that they did not; for that would help account for the extremely polemical cast of

11. We must concur with UBSGNT and TCGNT on this text. The textual variation is very likely intentional rather than unintentional; and TCGNT’s account of that intention is the most plausible. Moreover, the other main variant has Paul badly misquoting Lev. 18:5.
Paul's discourse. What is clear at this point is that Paul thought they denoted, by the concept "righteousness," a different set of entities or characteristics than he himself did.

3.4.2 Paul's topic: means, or meaning?

At this point the reader may yet be somewhat doubtful that Paul conceives "righteousness" in this discourse lexical sense rather than in a static, non-discourse sense. One foreseeable objection to our suggestion that Paul distinguishes between his own notion of "righteousness" and his opponents', is that in order for him to discuss the question what does or does not lead to "righteousness," or to a "justification" defined in terms of "righteousness," he must assume that he and his interlocutors mean the same thing by "righteousness." Otherwise he would know they were arguing past each other, discussing different topics. But in fact, it is entirely possible (as we shall see shortly) that when Paul says "by works of the Law shall no flesh be justified" (Gal. 2:16d; Rom. 3:20a), he is actually pursuing not a basically "practical" argument-from-consequences, about the means of justification, but a purely "logical-theoretical" argument, about its very meaning (in the broadest sense, i.e. understood as including denotation—see chap. 2), or more precisely, about the meaning of "righteousness" and thus also of "justification" (since it is defined in terms of "righteousness"). It has been commonly but gratuitously assumed that Paul is discussing the means to justification.

Now, the exegetical choice between the topics "means" and "meaning" of justification cannot be dismissed as a false disjunction. For (as just noted) any interlocutors discussing the best means to some end must suppose that they are discussing the same end, that they have the same concrete reality in mind. On the other hand, if the meaning (as including the denotation, and therefore also what might be a valid criterion) of this desideratum is the point at issue, they cannot suppose that they already agree on its meaning. But either they think
they agree on its meaning, or they think not so, but not both; thus, either they are discussing the means, or they are discussing the meaning, but not both. This interpretive question's disjunction is real, and at some point we must answer it.

Someone might feel rather dissatisfied with this terminology, however. It might be argued that Paul does not even consider faith a "means," because for him it is not something the individual can call forth or manipulate at will but rather is the gracious gift of God. We do not wish to deny this by using the term *means.* We use this term to address an assumption which almost all Christian theological traditions have made at some point, namely, that here Paul is discussing the means to justification.12 We are suggesting the possibility that a contrary is true: not only is Paul not discussing means to justification, he is involved in debating the very meaning of "justification." But admittedly, since we are involved in exegesis and therefore want to know all the possible options, this simple (rather than "strong") disjunction may seem a less than adequate way of putting the issue. If one prefers a "strong disjunction," encompassing all the exegetical options, one may say that Paul is talking either about *causa essendi,* or else he is talking about *causa cognoscendi.* If it is not the one topic, then it is the other. Thus the issue may be accurately and helpfully framed in this way. But to use those Latin phrases constantly is awkward; and framing the issue as "cause or criterion" would be misleading, since a criterion is also a cause of sorts (*causa cognoscendi*). Therefore we will usually speak of the disjunction between the topics "the means" and "the meaning" of justification, as a shorthand way of referring to these two *causa*-topics. But let it be clear that here we are thinking of "meaning" in the broadest sense, including any denotation of a term and not restricted to mere "lexical sense."

12. Even the Reformed tradition, which might be the most expected to say that "faith" is not a means, calls it "the alone *instrument* of justification" (Westminster Confession of Faith, XI.2, emphasis ours).
Not uncommonly, discourse (anaphoric) lexical senses (e.g. “she”) need clarification in particular situations, as to their denotation; and this clarification will naturally involve a “definitive” statement (in the broad sense of “definitive” which we discussed in chapter 2, i.e. not restricted to “dictionary” definitions). So it is entirely possible that Paul (who we suggest was using a discourse lexical sense of “righteous”) considered it necessary to clarify what it is that constitutes one “righteous” before God, or in the New Covenant, in his polemical discussion of what justifies someone. Clearly then, he might be discussing meaning (in the broad sense), rather than means. But the possibility itself, as well as its exegetical relevance, is usually ignored. This we must not do; we must consider and deal with the possibility that Paul is talking about meaning rather than means, just as we must consider also the possibility that he means δίκαιος in its “discourse” lexical sense. Therefore with respect to these issues let us note now the relevance of Paul’s conception of “justification.”

3.4.3 Support from Paul’s forensic meaning of δικαιοσύνη

No matter which way one understands δικαιοσύνη (“be justified,” either as “be made righteous” or “be counted righteous”), its lexical sense (dictionary definition) involves the notion “righteous” (δίκαιος). Therefore if Paul’s lexical sense of δίκαιος is a discourse concept, so will be that of δικαιοσύνη, and vice versa.

But in a stimulating and important article, C. Cosgrove (1987) has argued against the traditional Protestant understanding of Paul’s δικαιοσύνη as “be justified (i.e., judged and declared righteous).” Cosgrove remarks that it seems normal, at least in English, to say “to judge from her behaviour,” but not “to justify her from her behaviour”:

The preposition “from,” while perfectly natural in the first instance as a means of indicating the evidential basis of a “judgment,” sounds out of place introducing the evidential basis of “justification.” The example has obviously not been chosen at random, and it turns out to have a certain parallel in Greek
style in the use of dikein and dikaioun with ek. The Greeks would say ek tôn ergòn autòn dikein ("to judge from their works") but they did not express the evidential basis of dikaioun with the ek-construction.

Cosgrove accounts for this point of usage, which he documents at length, by saying that it is due to style or convention in both languages. Here his argument could actually be strengthened, for on consideration one can see that there are logical and not just stylistic factors involved. A pertinent difference between the "causal" prepositions Cosgrove notes, and the ones used to indicate evidential basis, is that those in the first group speak only of causa essendi, while the second, in such contexts, generally speak of causa cognoscendi.\(^\text{13}\)

When one asks why (or from what) someone is judging some case, the question is about causa essendi rightly enough, and so these causal prepositions are appropriate; but the question, "From (or because of) what evidence did the judge justify her?" generally seems out of place because the relevant question in regard to some particular judicial decision is generally not one of causa essendi but of causa cognoscendi, that is, asking on what logical grounds the judge reached that particular conclusion. In general, the question of the causa essendi of some particular judicial decision would not even be asked: obviously, the "reason" for that particular judgment was that the judge believed the premises logically warranted it! The very concept of judging makes the accepting of bribes, for example, abnormal.

This normal explanation for any particular judgment would have been all the more presumable in an ancient Jewish-religious context: for there God was always an objective, just judge who would never declare righteous someone who is unrighteous, and who demanded that other judges do likewise and not take a bribe (see Exod. 23:7; 34:7; Deut. 7:10; Job 10:14; Prov. 17:15; 18:5; 24:24; Isa. 5:23; Nah. 1:3). So then the presumable reason for a particular forensic judgment on God's part is causa cognoscendi, rather than

\(^{13}\) For these terms, see chap. 2, § 2.1.4.1.
causa essendi; but the objects of Paul's causal prepositions are causa essendi, at least if he uses these prepositions literally. Thus Cosgrove initially appears to have a reasonable argument against the forensic-declarative Pauline usage of δικαιοδοθεῖν.

What Cosgrove overlooks, however, is the possibility that Paul is discussing the very meaning of justification, rather than the means of it. In fact, it is a rather common figure of speech (an example of "metonymy of the adjunct") to speak of the causa essendi of one's knowing some premises(s), or of one's therefore making some inference from them, in place of the causa cognoscendi (i.e., the logical basis) of one's knowledge of the fact inferred. For example, when arguing, one seldom says, "If we know A, then we can be sure that B." Commonly we omit one or both of these mentions of knowledge; yet arguments connect items of knowledge, on the basis of causa cognoscendi, categorical-formal links between these items. Again, statements of covenantal conditions commonly speak figuratively, in terms of causa essendi of a judgment: "Whoever does X will (as a result) be liable to the penalty for violation of this contract." Nevertheless this is actually meant as a definition, identifying a causa cognoscendi, a criterion, of whom it is who is in violation of the contract. There is nothing surprising or particularly opaque about such a figure of speech. It is entirely possible, therefore, that Paul uses his causal prepositions figuratively, to mean causa cognoscendi.

This consideration undermines Cosgrove's argument, or at least modifies its structure. For what Paul's causal prepositions legitimately imply now is only that if he is not using them figuratively, to mean causa cognoscendi rather than causa essendi, then we may conclude fairly confidently that he is not using δικαιοδοθεῖν in a forensic manner. This conditional proposition may be inverted, via logic's Principle of Transposition, to this: "If Paul is demonstrably using δικαιοδοθεῖν in a forensic manner, we may conclude fairly confidently that he is using the causal prepositions figuratively, to mean causa cognoscendi.
rather than *causa essendi*." This latter inference, if bolstered by confirmation of its antecedent, would support our suggestion that Paul is discussing the criterion and thus the meaning, rather than the means, of "justification." Let us therefore consider briefly the evidence for Paul's forensic use of *δικαιούσθαι*.

According to standard studies, the following senses seem to be attested for the verb *δικαιοῦω* at Paul's time, whether in its active or passive form:

1. "To hold or deem or judge to be *δίκαιος* (right, suitable, or righteous)."
   In classical Greek this is attested only with things, not persons, as object; it seems this sense was nevertheless extended to the case of personal objects in the LXX and the NT (*IDB*, 2:1027-28; *TDNT*, 2:212; Ziesler 1972, 48; Dodd 1935, 50-53). The morphological analogy with such verbs as *ἀξιόω* indicate the possibility of this usage with human objects (Sanday and Headlam 1902, 30; cf. Ziesler 1972, 48; Hill 1967, 101n.3). In the LXX the active form often translates the Hiph'il of *τίθημι*, the passive form the Qal.

2. "To acquit (from)."
   This usage, always with *ἀποκατάστασις*, appears in Acts 13:38, 39 and Rom. 6:7.

3. "To do right or justice (to someone), treat justly."
   This neutral sense appears in Classical Greek; although generally used in a case of negative judgment, the sense was not restricted to this, as a citation from Aristotle shows (Dodd 1935, 49-50). The neutral sense also appears in the LXX, translating the Hiph'il of *τίθημι*: 2 Sam. 15:4; Ps. 81 (82):3 (Watson 1960, 256; Burton 1921, 464). However, this usage seems not to have appeared in the NT, outside of Paul anyway (not to beg our exegetical question!).

4. "To vindicate, show to be righteous, make appear righteous."
   This sense appears in both the active and passive forms in the LXX,

14. Including BAGD; Burton 1921 (460-74); Dodd 1935 (42-59); *EDNT*; Hill 1967 (82-162); *IDB*; Sanday and Headlam 1902 (30-31); Snaith 1944 (51-78, 159-73); *TDNT*; Watson 1960; Ziesler 1972.

15. New Testament lexicons (e.g., LN) have an unfortunate tradition of listing something like "set free (from)" as a sense of this term, under the mistaken impression that Paul must be using it this way in Rom. 6:7 (instead of as "acquit [from]"). Thus they overlook this verse's likely discourse-connection to Rom. 7:1-6 (which apparently harks back to it), and force an alien meaning onto a word that elsewhere is of a semantic domain quite remote from the idea "set free (from)."
both forms translating δικαιούσα, and the active translating the Pi'el of ḫqś.
This sense appears in the NT also, outside of Paul anyway and in 1 Timothy (e.g., Matt. 11:19; Luke 7:35; 1 Tim. 3:16).

5. “To make pure or righteous.”
In non-biblical, non-Christian Greek this usage appears only in Corp. Herm. xiii.9, but “it is possible that the author here betrays acquaintance with the interpretation which Greek commentators gave of Paul’s language” (Hill 1967, 102; cf. Dodd 1935, 58–59; Ziesler 1972, 48; TDNT, 2:212). In the LXX, this sense appears possibly in Ps. 72 (73):13, translating the Pi'el of ḫqś; but this verb was used quite often in later Hebrew to mean “acquit” or “declare righteous,” and the LXX translators may have taken it in this sense (Watson 1960, 259; TDNT, 2:213). There is no hard evidence, therefore, for this sense outside of Greek writings of Christian commentators unfamiliar with the Hebrew and possibly misled by the structure of Paul’s theology (Dodd 1935, 58–59).16 In medieval Christianity however this reading dominated.17

6. “To be manifestly righteous, be innocent, be in the right, be righteous.”
The passive of δικαιούσα is used a number of times in the LXX to translate the Qal of ḫqś where the latter has this sense (Hill 1967, 107–

---

16. According to Burton (1921, 461), “Cremer (p. 319) in an approximately exhaustive examination of the usage of the word in classical and other non-biblical Greek writers found no instance of the use of the term with a personal object in the sense ‘to make righteous.’” Sanday and Headlam (1902, 30) cite the following persuasive explanation: “How can δικαιοῦν possibly signify ‘to make righteous?’ Verbs indeed of this ending from adjectives of physical meaning may have this use, e.g. πυροῦν, ‘to make blind.’ But when such words are derived from adjectives of moral meaning, as αἰλιοῦν, διώκων, δικαίον, they do by usage and must from the nature of things signify to deem, to account, to prove, or to treat as worthy, holy, righteous” (emphasis in original).
Dodd (1935, 58–59) explains how the sense “make righteous” nevertheless crept into the writings of Christian commentators such as John Chrysostom: “Since . . . Paul explains with emphasis how this attainment of ‘righteousness’ is implicit in the initial act of God in ‘justification’, it was excusable for his Greek commentators, who knew no Hebrew, to understand δικαίων in the sense ‘to make righteous’. . . . In any case the meaning of the verb δικαίων has reached the predestined conclusion of its development. Δικαίων should mean, etymologically, ‘to make righteous’, as διοῦν is ‘to make a slave’, and διώκων ‘to make clear’. Commonsense rejected this meaning, but religious experience affirmed that an unrighteous man may indeed be ‘made righteous’—by the grace of God.” This sociolinguistic development may well have been made easier by the influence of Platonic epistemology on some Greek-speaking thinkers, which view hypostatised some abstract concepts including “righteous” (δικαιος; cf. below on this word), thus making it, as regards this usage, practically an “adjective of physical meaning” (cf. Sanday and Headlam, above).

17. That was true also of Martin Luther, at least early in his career, as reading The freedom of a Christian, for example, will verify. Cf. Lowell Green (1973; 1974).
The question, though, is whether the LXX translators were using the Greek verb also in this sense. Additional instances are found in the translations of Job in Aquila (10:15; 15:14), Symmachus (22:3), and Theodotion (15:14). The Greek verb may also have been translating the Qal of רַעַף in a number of passages in 2 Baruch (29:9, 11, 12; 24:1, 2; 62:7) in which this seems the sense, but of which the Hebrew original is not available (Watson 1960, 263–64).

In regard to this last purported sense of δικαιοῦνθαι, which Cosgrove champions, the question arises as to whether these translations of the Qal of רַעַף really do reflect "the fluidity of the use of δικαιοῦνθαι in current usage," or else merely "the difficulty of finding an exact [Greek] equivalent of רַעַף in certain contexts" (so Watson 1960, 264). But it is not necessary for us to go into this question. For this lexical sense (6) becomes indistinguishable from some one of the others, depending on how one takes its constituent semantic element "righteous": if one intends "righteous" in a non-discourse lexical sense, this purported sense of δικαιοῦνθαι becomes the passive form of sense number 5; but if one intends "righteous" in a discourse lexical sense, the sense turns into the passive of sense number 4.

The senses plausible for Galatians 3 are therefore senses 1, 4, and 5. Sense 1, though a forensic sense similar to that of 4, is preferable to it, because although the passive of sense 4 works well for Paul's passive forms of δικαίωσθαι in such contexts as Galatians 3, its active sense is not feasible where Paul uses active forms in these same contexts (e.g., Rom. 3:26, 30; 4:5; 8:30, 33; Gal. 3:8). Sense 5 is not only quite poorly attested, it is incompatible, for a Jew, with the clearly forensic immediate contexts in which Paul uses this term (see especially Rom. 2:13; 3:19–20; 4:1–8; 5:1, 9; 8:33; 1 Cor. 4:4; Gal. 3:8, 11 [παρατείνησεν Ἰηνάντας]). Simply put, how can the Jewish God set about to make someone "righteous" whom he has declared to be "righteous" already? (and vice versa). Obviously, "righteous" could not

18. These include Gen. 38:26; Ps. 18 (Heb. and Engl. 19):9 (Heb. 10); 50 (Heb. 51):4 (Heb. 6); 142 (143):2; Isa. 43:9, 26; 45:25; Ecclus. 18:2, 22; Tob. 6:12, 13; 12:4.
denote the same thing to God in both cases, unless God is a liar when he passes judgment;\(^{19}\)
and the latter possibility no Jew could or would admit—see Rom. 3:4, where Paul explicitly repudiates it. So these two senses of δικαίωσθαι, "make righteous" and "declare righteous,"
are by no means combinable into one, \textit{at least not for Paul the Jew}.\(^{20}\) Thus by a process of elimination, we must interpret δικαίωσθαι in Galatians 3 as the passive of the sense, "to hold or deem or judge to be δικαιος (right, suitable, or righteous)."

\(^{19}\) See above, towards the end of §2.2.2, on the equivocation here.

\(^{20}\) E. P. Sanders (1983, 13–14 n. 18) wishes to avoid the almost universally drawn disjunction between senses 1 and 5, claiming that his odd translation "be righteoused" helps circumvent this decision: "It is a standard debate as to whether 'be made righteous' or 'be justified' catches the meaning better. There are sound objections to both translations [which are what?], and it seems to me that we should refuse to be impaled upon either horn of the dilemma. Since 'justified' is the common English verb, I shall remark about it that it conveys to most English speakers the meaning of 'be declared or found innocent,' when the question is precisely whether or not Paul has shifted the meaning beyond that of the law court." Our reply to the latter question is that since the word can only mean one or the other (sense 1 or 5), not both, Paul's forensic contexts show that he has not "shifted the meaning beyond that of the law court." Sanders wishes to reject neither of the above senses, but he ignores the obvious question as to whether these senses can be coherently combined into one for a Jew. Were it not for the exegetical (and theological) difficulty of Paul's material about the Law, neither Sanders nor anyone else would have had to suggest the conflation of these incompatible senses. But such a far-fetched expedient is more likely an indication of deficient exegesis than of Paul's real intention.

Indeed, even Sanders does not succeed in riding this semantic fence for long. He introduces an allegedly Pauline distinction more dubious than the one he rejects, namely, that between the issues "getting in" and "staying in" the body of the saved community (he originally introduced this distinction in Sanders 1977, in the context of comparing Paul with Palestinian Judaism). In Paul's statements denying the necessity of works of the Law, Paul is supposedly saying these works are not necessary for "getting in" the community of the to-be-saved; but "staying in" is a different matter for Paul. Sanders' distinction is not parallel to the one we are making, between the topics "means" and "meaning" of "justification." On the contrary, the way Sanders sketches his distinction tends to prejudge this latter issue, as it also chooses sides in the issue of which sense (1 or 5) Paul means by δικαίωσθαι (albeit Sanders does not explicitly answer either question). Apparently Sanders would not attribute the status "saved" to an individual so much as to a community (unlike Paul!); thus the individual's only issues are "how to enter" or "how to stay in" this community, and these two communal objectives are cast as ontological events rather than as purely a legal status (see Sanders 1983, 45). This makes the individual's concern always a "means"-issue (i.e., means of getting in, or else means of staying in). By contrast, we insist on raising the above two questions, which Sanders effectively begs; in particular, we wish to ask whether Paul is discussing "means" at all. Apparently it is because he has prejudged this latter question, that Sanders is compelled to offer a strange, conflated sense of δικαίωσθαι. As Cosgrove intuits, if Paul is indeed discussing "means" of justification, a truly forensic δικαίωσθαι reading (viz., ours) is not a feasible option.
While we could thus appear to concur with the majority opinion of modern scholarship on this verb, we wish to make perfectly clear that our "forensic" sense of the verb is not the popular sense according to which the judge simply declares righteous some person who in the judge's own view may or may not be righteous. So we emphasise the following: As pointed out above, the very notion of "judging" presupposes, especially in a Jewish context, that accepting bribes or otherwise "perverting justice" is abnormal. So the theologians who forced such a distorted, emasculated "forensic" sense upon the verb appear to have overlooked or ignored the possibility that Paul's sense of "righteous" is a discourse lexical concept (cf. above, chap. 2). For in the latter case, it denotes anything and everything which the covenant-maker wishes to make a valid "term" (condition) of right-standing in the covenant; the God of Paul is not constrained by anyone's absolute standard of what is "true righteousness." Given Paul's discourse lexical sense of "righteous," it would be entirely possible for God to declare, and really to believe (strictly maintaining God's integrity), some sinner "righteous" who attempts, yet does not accomplish, all the acts which God commands.

And as that very possibility shows (contra Cosgrove), no one should have seen Paul's verb δικαιοσύνην as posing (because of universal human sinfulness) a dilemma between a non-forensic sense of δικαιοσύνη and a Judge who perverts justice. Rather (as we noted above), if Paul is using δικαιοσύνη in a clearly forensic manner (which we see he is), it implies, not necessarily the disastrous result that God calls those "righteous" who are unrighteous, but perhaps simply that Paul is using his causal prepositions figuratively, to mean causa cognoscendi rather than causa essendi. And the latter is a much more plausible solution. We infer then that Paul is discussing the question, what is a criterion of covenantal right-standing, before God; he is discussing the meaning, not the means, of "justification," in this covenantal context. And his sense of "justification" does not imply some dissembling, but rather a completely sincere, verdict of some sinner's "righteousness."
But note that Paul's argument concerning the meaning of "justification" does not at all proceed as if he were discussing the lexical sense of a term. Rather, he speaks of ontological realities, some of which justify and some of which do not (e.g. 2:16). If he is discussing "meaning" (in the broad sense) at all, clearly he is discussing denotation yet not via discussing dictionary definition (i.e., lexical sense). There must therefore, with his sense of "justification," be a detaching of its denotation from its dictionary definition; otherwise, he could discuss the former only by discussing the latter. In short, given his topic and (yet also) his argument’s non-lexicological, ontological approach, Paul’s sense of “justification” must be a discourse lexical sense. That implies the same about his lexical sense of “righteous,” inasmuch as this is the constituent semantic element which renders Paul’s lexical sense of “justification” a discourse concept.

This result gives us only the term’s lexical sense, in passages parallel to Romans 10:5 and its context, which our part of Galatians is. We will return shortly to the question of what extra-linguistic reality Paul denotes by δικαιος.

3.5 Paul, his opponents, and ἔργα νόμου

In chapter 2 we examined the tendency to interpret ἔργα νόμου ("works of the Law") in Paul as “endeavour” to fulfil God’s commandments. We argued that there is no evidence that ἔργα νόμου was a technical phrase, rather it seems not to have been one, at least not according to 4QMMT; that in many or most “social languages” there will be a semantic distinction between “attempt” and “accomplishment,” which will therefore be germane to interpretation of any general “do”-words in that language; and that ἔργον is a good candidate for being capable of these semantic nuances in any “Hellenistic Greek”-speaking “social language.”
3.5.1 **Contextual "logical relations" between predications of "obedience" and of "acts-/accomplishments" of the Law, for Paul and for his opponents respectively**

But this does not mean that it must have been capable of these semantic distinctions within *Paul's* "social language," or that of his opponents. Even if it should seem clear as sunlight to us that "attempt" is equivalent to "accomplishment" neither semantically nor logically, one's view on the matter depends on the anthropology/psychology intrinsic to one's outlook. There is, for example, some evidence that 1st-c. Judaisms commonly had an anthropology in which good accomplishments were attributable to the "good inclination," bad ones to the "bad inclination" (see below).

One must approach a foreign social language with tests more or less empirically verifiable, although this rule restricts what can reliably be said about that language. One such test is, whether this semantic distinction can be demonstrated elsewhere in the social language, by a use of words or phrases that definitely mean "accomplish" as opposed to "attempt," or vice versa. This may however simply shift the problem into the sphere of another word or phrase, unless we can demonstrate that the speakers of this social language did *not* see such terms as all *co-extensive* in denotation. For example, if some speaker states or implies clearly, in whatever terminology, that attempts are not tantamount to accomplishments, then we have proof that the speaker makes a semantic distinction between these concepts.\(^{21}\) If in addition one can show that this speaker shares some general "do"-word with speakers who use it in these differing senses, it then becomes presumable that this speaker would also have made these semantic distinctions when using the term.

What do we find in the case of Paul? We find that for him, attempting to fulfil God's will was not tantamount to accomplishing it for post-Fall man, not even for a Christian. One good way of showing this might be by way of a short critique of some of W. D. Davies'

---

comments on Rom. 7:14–25; this will also allow us to contrast Paul with some other
Judaisms. Arguing that “in Romans 7 Paul reflects and possibly has in mind the Rabbinic
doctrine of the Two Impulses,” Davies (1980, 27) nevertheless notes a significant difference
between Paul’s discussion and that which we might call the classical form of the Rabbinic
doctrine: “The yētzer hā-rāʿ was located generally in the heart, whereas Paul clearly regards
the σάρξ as the base of operations for sin. The question is inevitable whether, had Paul been
describing the conflict with his yētzer, he too would not have spoken of ‘the heart’ rather
than ‘the flesh’?” Davies’ own answer minimises the difference:

There was no scientific fixity or accuracy about the use of psychological and
anthropological terms in his day and the Old Testament use of σάρξ (bāsār) . . .
would naturally and suitably suggest itself to him. In addition to this the
location of the yētzer in the heart, while dominant in Rabbinic thought, must not
be too hard pressed. The yētzer hā-rāʿ as we saw, had a long start over the
yētzer ha-tōb in man, and some passages suggest that it had gained dominion
over the whole 248 members of the human body: it would not be difficult then
for Paul to envisage sin as invading all his members and having its base in all his
flesh. (ibid.)

This is all reasonable; yet in a discussion of Romans 7 it misses the point, obfuscating the
real difference between Paul’s view and the “dominant” rabbinic view. For the point made
most strenuously and vigorously in Rom. 7:14–25, is precisely the distancing of the mind
(νοῦς) from the flesh, even their opposition.22 The battle, in other words, is between a
(single-willed) mind (or “heart”) and the flesh, not between two influences, tendencies,
inclinations, or wills warring on the battlefield of the mind or even of the flesh. If one chose

22. Kümmel’s (1974) interpretation of 7:14–25, with which most German commentators agree, falls
into the trap of identifying the wicked “me, that is, my flesh” of vs. 18 with the “I” throughout
vss. 15–17, 19–22, and concluding that this passage is not about the Christian, but about the man
under the Law. But surely the weight of the passage, rhetorically reinforced by the A—B—C—
A’—B’—C’ parallelism between vss. 14–17 and 18–20, is simply that it is the flesh and not at all
the “inner man” or “mind” who wants to do these wicked things, rather the “inner man” wants
desperately not to do them. For a good critique of Kümmel’s interpretation and a better exegesis
of the passage, see Laato 1995, 110–24.
therefore to identify the νους with the יֵיתֶר הַטְּפָה (good tendency or impulse), the difference would still appear: the battle would again lie not between two morally antithetical opponents on the same field or plane (of the mind or heart), but rather between two different planes (the mind and the flesh) that Paul distances from and opposes to each other (so also Gal. 5:17). The classical Rabbinic moral anthropology is not commensurable with Paul's, but rather suggests that the distinction is between the “good intention” and the “bad intention,” both of which inhabit the inner sphere, that of the mind or “heart.”

A similar anthropology appears in some of the Qumran passages. The Community Rule (1QS) has in columns 3 and 4 a portrayal of two Spirits which work in each man, one producing good works and one producing evil. Furthermore, the same Hebrew word יְשֵׁר (yēṣer), which according to Jastrow ([c1903] 1992, s.v.) means “the formation of thoughts, bent of mind, inclination, desire,” is found in the Thanksgiving Psalms (5:6; 7:13; 9:16; 15:13; 18:11) and in CD 2:16, referring possibly to an evil inclination or nature in man (Ringgren 1995, 102). And generally at Qumran sin is not so much a consequence of a fall from Paradise, as a corollary of man's creatureliness and his dissimilarity from God (ibid., 100–3). Thus, there is some corroboration at Qumran of the attribution of bad accomplishment to the bad inclination, found in some streams of Rabbinic thought;23 nor does it seem that anything at Qumran would effectively contradict this picture of man.

This does not prove that this anthropology was characteristic of the particular brand of Judaism with which Paul interacted in Galatians; but clearly it is quite possible that for Paul's opponents, “good volition” and “good attempt” were tantamount to “good accomplishment.” For him, on the other hand, this was not the case.

At this point the reader may yet be somewhat doubtful of the likelihood that Paul means “acts (accomplishments)” rather than “works (endeavours).” But there are reasons to

think that he means the former, as we shall see, and really no reasons to think that he means the latter. For it is entirely possible that the sociolinguistic difference between Paul and his opponents, consisting in the differing contextual-presupposition-assuming logical relations which they place between these two sorts of "doing" of God's Law, lies near the heart of Paul's religious disagreement with his opponents. That is, it may lie at the very core of their disagreement, that in his opponents' "social language" they considered "attempt" of God's commands logically tantamount to their "accomplishment," whereas Paul did not. For example, this sociolinguistic difference correlates with his opponents' insistence upon using, and his own refusal to use, the de facto accomplishment of certain rituals as a valid "boundary-marker" (i.e., criterion) of who was within and who was without God's true covenant.24 So at the very least, the possibility that Paul means "acts/accomplishments" of the Law must be seriously considered. And as we shall now see, there are reasons to believe that it was Paul's meaning.

3.5.2 "Works of the Law" in Qumran

In chapter 2 we saw that Paul's phrase "works of the Law" appears, among Jewish literature, only in the Qumran writings. Although it is not a technical phrase there, the Qumran phrase may still be of significance for understanding Paul, due to the possibility that it was "conventional" in some particular context. If an ancient Jew were to translate the Hebrew of the Qumran phrase, he or she would very likely translate it by the phrase Paul uses, \( \varepsilon\rho\gamma\alpha \nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\nu; \) for in the LXX, each of those two Greek words is overwhelmingly the most frequent choice for translating that Hebrew word which corresponds to it in the Qumran phrase. More importantly, as many authors have noted the literary context of the Qumran phrase (in the epilogue) is clearly similar, one might even say identical, with that of Paul's phrase in

24. James Dunn in particular has, in many writings, indicated this as the true nature of the conflict between Paul and his opponents; see, e.g., Dunn 1991d.
Galatians 3:10: in particular there is discussion of the right way to "be accounted righteous,"
and also the recounting of blessings and curses on various parts of the nation Israel. This
occurrence of the phrase is therefore worth our investigating.

After explaining that the things Israel had suffered were for its wickedness,
abominations, and straying "from the path (of the Torah)," and exhorting that the reader
should (by contrast) "study (carefully) the book of Moses and the books of the Prophets and
(the writings of) David" (II. 10-12), the MMT author quotes several Bible texts dealing with
blessings and curses, as prophecies and threats fulfilled. The author then exhorts the reader,
by citing the examples of the kings of Israel and of David, to contemplate the character and
outcome of their deeds. Then comes the sentence (quoted above, chap. 2) about his or their
having written concerning "the works of the Law," after which the writer adds (DSSE 182,
interpolations Vermes's, emphasis ours):

For [we have noticed] that prudence and knowledge are with you. Understand
all these (matters) and ask Him to straighten your counsel and put you far away
from the thoughts of evil and the counsel of Belial. As a result, you will rejoice
at the end of time when you discover that some of our sayings are true. And it
will be reckoned for you as righteousness when you perform what is right and
good before Him, for your own good and for that of Israel.

Note that the emphasised words allude to Deut. 6:25 and Ps. 106:31, but also to Gen. 15:6
and the reckoning of Abraham's faith to him as righteousness, which verse Paul quotes in
Gal. 3:6 (and Rom. 4:3, 9, 22). Clearly the question at issue here is how one can have
"righteousness reckoned to" one, that is, how one can be justified. The same issue is the one
in the verses leading up to Gal. 3:10.

Since the Qumran phrase may be significant for our understanding of Paul, let us see if
we can exegete it, as "normal language" (rather than as an idiom). This means we will
consider the lexical items and grammatical structures individually, deciding on which of their
possible senses fits the context best. We shall necessarily draw upon the standard OT lexica and grammars, as well as on Jastrow (1992 [c1903]).

The range of meaning of the genitive function is quite extensive in Hebrew, as in many other languages. Waltke and O'Connor (1990, 143) divide the various Hebrew uses into three broad groupings: the subjective (including possessive), the adverbial (including objective), and the adjectival (including epexegetical) genitives.

BDB lists the senses of נֶפֶשׁ as ranging from "deed" in the sense of behaviour/doing, to work/labour, to a business/pursuit/undertaking/enterprise, to achievement(s), to something (or some things or stuff) actually produced/made. The last sense seems the most common one, and the first and second the next most common. KB seems to agree with this range of meanings, as does Jastrow (1992 [c1903]) and Holladay (1988), although the latter groups three of these senses together under the rubric "work (as an object), product (of a technique)." In a "weakened sense," it also can mean affairs/occurrences. As for the word נֶפֶשׁ in this context, there is hardly any question that it is being used as a referential term for "the Mosaic Law."

The question is, what combination of senses of the Hebrew genitive and of נֶפֶשׁ not only is feasible, but also fits best, in this context. We should note first that the basic distinction between the senses of נֶפֶשׁ is that between "attempt/endeavour" and "achievement/accomplishment," the first two senses listed above being "endeavour" and the last three of the "strong" senses being "accomplishment"; "business/undertaking" is more specifically "accomplishment/achievement that is either a normal occupation of some person, that is, a calling freely taken up, or else a calling or obligation laid on him or her by someone else." This sense would therefore cover also the translation "task," which means "a definite piece of work assigned to or expected of a person" (RHD). As we indicated above, it is ultimately accomplishment(s) that one assigns or commands; a human action, as
intentional behaviour, can proceed only towards a desired and sought-after product/goal/achievement/yield/accomplishment.

As for the genitives, the ones that could feasibly combine with הָעַבְדָה in this context would be the subjective genitive (as in, “the tasks assigned/commanded by/in the Law”), and the objective-adverbial genitive (as in, “the observance of the Law”). The reading “accomplishment of the Law” (i.e., the accomplishing of the Law, or an instance of it) seems not to be an option: the noun הָעַבְדָה can mean “the act of working,” but apparently not “the act of accomplishing” as such.

The most pressing question facing us now is, which basic sense of הָעַבְדָה, “endeavour” or “accomplishment,” is in view at this point in MMT. Looking at the immediate context, it might seem that it is endeavour, that is, the “observance” or “keeping” of the Law, that is in view. Just before the sentence containing the phrase, there are two sentences exhorting to consider the examples set by Israelite kings; the first of these sentences says that “whoever among them feared [the Torah was delivered from troubles; and these were the seekers of the Torah whose transgressions were forgiven” (emphasis ours). But what is more important here is the overall context and the more immediate context. Our phrase’s sentence actually begins: “We have written to you (concerning) some of the works of the Law . . .” The purpose of the letter was to correct the readers’ “counsel” on these various halakic matters. The question at issue was clearly the right interpretation of these covenantal stipulations. It is actually because of differences concerning the meaning of various laws, that the letter was written, and that the senders of the letter had (according to the first few lines of the epilogue) “separated themselves from the multitude of the people.”

The writer holds out the promise that, if they follow the instructions given, the readers will rejoice at the end of time when you discover that some of our sayings מְלַטְנָה are true. And it will be reckoned for you as righteousness when you perform [ברשה] what is right and good . . . (DSSE, 182)
Here then is the key to understanding the outlook of this text: one is counted righteous, not just for *trying* to fulfil what one is commanded, but for *doing correctly* what one is commanded. The boundary between those who are “in” and those who are “out” of the true Israel is not just a matter of who *faithfully obeys* the Law, of who understands and fulfils it to the best of his or her available means, but a matter of who *correctly understands and fulfils* the Law. It is not just anyone’s *faithful observance* of the Law that is acceptable, but rather the observance that is *correct*, the one that (correctly understands and thus) fulfils the Law correctly. *It is thus certain accomplishments, and not merely endeavour as such, that constitute a criterion of righteousness in this letter.* This conclusion does not prejudge the issue of whether it is constant accomplishment, or accomplishment most of the time, or even one good accomplishment, that constitutes the whole formulation of the criterion; be that as it may, the criterion is still in terms of achievement/accomplishment.

As one definite indication of this attitude on the part of the writer(s), note that he or they deal quite seriously with the question what should be done about

the blind who cannot see so as to beware of all mixture and cannot see a mixture that incurs [reparation]-offering; and concerning the deaf who have not heard the laws and the judgments and the purity regulations, and have not heard the ordinances of Israel, since he who has not seen or heard does not know how to do [תָּשָׁה] (the Law) . . . (II. 49–54 in Qimron and Strugnell 1994’s reconstruction of the halakic section)

Note the strictness betrayed by this concern. The focus on right accomplishment rather than merely on faithful obedience as such has put in question the purity-status of the blind and deaf, whose lack of perception prohibits them from reliably fulfilling the purity ordinances correctly. And given the letter’s suspension of salvation itself upon executing these purity requirements correctly, one must conclude that even the *salvific* status of these crippled is in question.

This accomplishment-bound attitude is implicit not only in this document, however, but in the Qumran writings in general. The attitude is almost always present, explicitly or implicitly, that what makes the Qumran community superior and righteous is their better insight, knowledge, and wisdom about the specifics of what God has commanded. The insight is indeed acknowledged to come from God; but this does not mitigate the fact that it is those Law-observers who have the right understanding and practice of the laws, and they alone, who are the righteous ones. These themes, the necessity of wisdom and understanding of the Law and the blessedness of those who follow it correctly and the cursedness of those who depart from the right interpretation, completely pervades the Damascus Document, for example. Indeed, as in MMT, correct knowledge and practice of the Law is a soteriological essential. One may see this also in 1QS 1:8–10, 12–18; 2:1–5; 3:7–9; 4:2–7, 19–23; CD 3:8–10, 13–19; 6:14–21; 4Q266/270 (ending of Cave 4 version of the Damascus Document), II. 10–21 (re. the “boundary” mentioned in this last text, it seems to be the correct performance/accomplishment of God’s precepts: cf. the similar passage CD 1:12–21).

Moreover, note that the sectarian separation and disagreement was chiefly about what could be called “purity” (i.e., that which is understood by a concretistic, empiricised conception of righteousness or holiness). It is significant here that righteousness, when conceived as empirical, is necessarily a matter of things not only concrete but also empirical, measurable. This being the case, “purity” can never be only a matter of volition or endeavour as such, but a matter of achievement/accomplishment. It is only what one actually accomplishes that can be measured; what one intended to accomplish can be understood by another person, but it is not empirical and thus not measurable. It seems quite clear from the Qumran documents that “purity” is commensurable with the conception of “holiness” and “righteousness” that one finds in the Qumran documents; and the implication, confirmed by

the texts themselves, is that righteousness is always measured, is always a matter of accomplishment (of God’s tasks) rather than of attempt/obedience alone or even primarily. Since it denotes specifically the rightly-understood and -accomplished tasks of the Law, it would seem reasonable to conclude that “accomplishments” are primarily in view in 4QMMT’s notion “works of the Law.” As we have seen, this correlates to a reading of the genitive as subjective: “the tasks (accomplishments) commanded by the Law.”

3.5.3 “Works” in Rom. 4:1–8

Furthermore, it seems that only reading ἔργα as “accomplishments” is feasible in Rom. 4:1–8. For that passage requires interpretation of the verb ἔργαζομαι (“work,” vss. 4, 5) in its potential sense “carry on a trade or business” (which by nature would be accomplishment-oriented). Only on this interpretation would the “reward” be reckoned for Paul “not as a favour, but as what is due” and worthy of boasting (vs. 4, AT; see 1 Cor. 9:16–17; cf. Luke 17:10). Likewise only on this interpretation would it be possible for Paul that the faithful one is the one μὴ ἔργαζομένῳ (“not working,” vs. 5); for see Gal. 5:6b; 1 Cor. 7:19. Our conclusion is that by ἔργα νόμου Paul probably means “accomplishments,” rather than “endeavour” or “attempt,” of the things which the Law commands. But the reality he intends by this term is probably a reality different from that intended by his opponents; for them, “accomplishments” are logically equivalent to corresponding good/bad intentions, whereas for Paul “accomplishments” does not have this logical equivalence.

3.6 Paul, his opponents, and πίστις

In chapter 2 we considered the anaphoric, “discourse” character of the common lexical sense of “trust.” We then related this to, and spelled out, 7 attested senses of πίστις. We must consider now the question which of these senses Paul uses.
3.6.1 Paul's lexical sense of πίστις

Let us consider the 7 possible senses of πίστις which we listed previously. We can safely dismiss from consideration senses 2, 4, and 7. That leaves senses 1, 3, 5, and 6; but we have already implied that the special, religious sense of “trust in God” (#6) is much more likely here than the absolute sense “trust” (#1).

What about Philo’s sense, our #5? There is no particular reason to doubt that the sense was available to Paul, although probably it was a usage more common among the Alexandrian Jews than among the Jews in Palestine and Asia Minor. There are, however, at least three considerations which rule out the suggestion that Paul is using πίστις in Philo’s sense. In the first place, although Abraham and his faith are very important themes both for Paul and for Philo, there is a vast difference between their respective treatments of Abraham’s faith. Philo comments repeatedly on Abraham’s character and life, and at least ten times upon Gen. 15:6 (Lightfoot 1890, 159–60). But for Philo, Abraham’s story “was not a history, but an allegory; or, if a history as well, it was as such of infinitely little importance” (Lightfoot 1890, 160). Abraham’s journey from Mesopotamia to Haran to Canaan was an allegory for the soul’s journey from idolising the material universe, to instruction by the senses and observation of the creation, to the (mystical) knowledge of the one true God. Here there is little room for Abraham as trusting and obeying God’s call. The promise of God to Abraham takes a back seat here, if indeed any seat; whereas it is in the front seat in Paul’s treatment of Abraham (see Romans 4).

In the second place, Paul’s commonly speaking of trust “in Christ,” and of the gospel “about Jesus Christ,” leaves little potential for a Philonic interpretation:

If a Philonic concept of faith was the only reference point which someone had, there would have been no guarantee at all that this person would have correctly understood the Christian proclamation: “Believe in Christ.” Faith in Christ for
the Christian mission was *faith in the cross*. Precisely this kind of faith was a scandal to the Jews and folly to the gentiles, and precisely this kind of faith would not have fit well into Philo’s concept of faith. (Lindsay 1993, 72)

Thirdly, for Paul faith was a believing response to a message, not a mystical virtue worked up by meditation or by any other means. “So faith comes from hearing, and hearing comes by the preaching of Christ” (Rom. 10:17, AT). Faith does not even appear apart from Christ’s appearing (Gal. 3:22–26). But a trusting response to a message concerning God’s faithfulness to his promises and covenant (Rom. 3:3) is a very small part, and not an essential part, of Philo’s conception of faith. We can therefore dismiss the latter (#5) from consideration.

We probably should comment upon the still-common tendency to assign two different senses, both the active sense “faith” and the passive sense “faithfulness” (our #3), to πιστις in the LXX of Hab. 2:4. Barr (1983 [1961], 203, cf. 218, 222) has rightly attacked this tendency, denying that πιστις is or could be this sort of “polarised expression.” As biblical scholars are increasingly realising these days, language does not work this way: words are used with one meaning in each use, apart from rare and exceptional instances (e.g., double entendre for stylistic purposes). We may not sit on this semantic fence.

Thus we must choose between senses 3 and 6 (but no mixture of the two). Quite a few interpreters today are exegeting more and more of Paul’s Galatian uses of πιστις as meaning “faithfulness, reliability” (3). This is also a discourse concept, as we have seen in our

29. Cf. Rom. 10:9–10, 14, 16; 1 Cor. 15:2, 11, 17; 2 Cor. 5:7; Gal. 3:2–5; 2 Thess. 1:10, and possibly 2:13.

30. This is largely an attempt, it seems, to justify Paul’s interpretation of πιστις as “faith” (the Hebrew term נאמץ lying behind the LXX probably could not mean this). E.g., see Keil and Delitzsch 1981 [1986], 73; Lightfoot 1890, 154–55; Zemek 1980; Dockery 1987. Earlier advocates included B. F. Westcott (see Dockery 1987, n.54) and T. F. Torrance. More recently the alleged ambiguity has been cited, e.g., by Richard Hays’ treatments of Galatians 3 and Hab. 2:4 as speaking of “the faithfulness of Christ.”

discussion of “trust.” But it is Jesus’s faithfulness towards God, rather than towards sinners, which they intend; thus the actual referent is entirely different. Unfortunately, there is not space here to treat fully the currently controversial Pauline phrase πίστις Χριστοῦ; we can only question (as pragmatics adjures us to do) whether the notion “the faithfulness of Christ” appears, as such, to be the possible meaning most directly relevant to Paul’s purpose at the particular points where Paul uses it. When one thus methodically attends to the immediate contexts of the phrase (especially in the crucial text for this issue, Gal. 2:16), we believe one must conclude—regardless which Pauline purpose one hypothesises—that Paul does not intend Jesus’s faithfulness, but the individual’s faith in Christ.\(^{32}\) We therefore reject sense 3 in favour of sense 6. And that lexical sense, as we have indicated, is a discourse concept, with the peculiar features of all such lexical senses.

3.6.2 An apparent problem for the discourse-concept-πίστις hypothesis, yet a way around it

The suggestion that “faith” is for Paul a discourse concept appears to run into a problem deriving from the contexts in which Paul uses the term πίστις. But we shall see that this problem is only apparent, and may fairly easily be circumvented.

If Pauline “faith” is a discourse lexical concept, it gets its denotation from the context; yet its definition puts constraint on which features of the context may supply the denotation. Specifically, the “discourse” character of this lexical sense indicates that one meaning-element, the identity of that which God is considered reliable to do (and under what conditions or lack thereof), is supplied by the identity of the one who trusts, or rather by what he or she believes about God and his dealings with humankind (see above, chapter 2). This

\(^{32}\) Claims that this would make Paul too redundant in 2:16 are not cogent; repetition, especially of important points, is a standard pedagogical device and does not constitute a violation of the Quantity maxim of conversation. For a survey of the literature on πίστις Χριστοῦ and the best treatment of this issue so far, see Dunn 1991a; cf. also Hultgren 1980.
meaning-element can usually remain unstated, being understood by the hearers. Nevertheless it is intended and communicated, as part of the word’s lexical sense.

Therefore, what could be implicitly understood as this word’s meaning, in a polemical context where the question at issue is what God will do, or under what conditions he will do it?33 For the latter clearly includes the question we have in Galatians. There can be no “presupposition pool” of understood truth shared by Paul and his readers regarding the very question that is at issue. So, “what right ‘faith’ believes” cannot be assumed, but rather itself needs demonstrating, in the theological debate which Paul is conducting with his opponents. Therefore, unless Paul supplies this meaning-element explicitly, there would be no way for even his readers (who are presumably being torn between conflicting views on the conditions for being justified) to know exactly what Paul intends by πίστις.

Does Paul, then, give some explication of what conditions (or lack thereof) Christian “faith” sees as applying to justification? We will argue later that he does do so, at one point in our target passage; but it will be clear also that he does not do this in order to explain what he means by “faith.” Apparently he takes no trouble to define this meaning explicitly anywhere in Galatians. So we are faced with the remarkable fact that Paul uses in key parts of his argument, and as the main term representing his contrary position, a term whose definitive denotation would entail that there already be agreement on the very matters at issue!

What can be said about this? The only explanation that could account for it is that Paul’s positive point (about πίστις and justification) is not his primary message to his readers, where he opposes πίστις and ἐργα λόγου: rather, he intends his negative point (about ἐργα λόγου and justification/righteousness) as his primary polemical point, and expects that by clarifying what “faith” does not believe, which is his real rhetorical goal, he

33. We use “conditions” in the broad, non-legal sense of “requirements” in this section.
might convey an accurate understanding (or rather correct their current understanding) of what it does believe.\textsuperscript{34} That is, Paul is interested not in \textit{adding} some particular semantic content to his readers' and opponents understanding of “faith,” but rather in \textit{banishing} some particular semantic content from it, in regard to the conditions it places upon justification. This seems the only feasible explanation of Paul's remarkable use of this term $\pi\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$. In weighing this explanation, and this discourse-concept Pauline-“faith” hypothesis, let us remember our conclusion in the section (above) on sociolinguistics: No hypothesis about Paul's argumentation should be rejected merely because it makes his argument seem a bit awkward.

As in our argument above concerning $\delta\acute{i}k\acute{a}\iota\omega\varsigma$ in Paul, here we have only arrived at the lexical \textit{sense} of Pauline $\pi\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$; and since that proves to be a discourse concept, we do not know yet what it denotes. But in our three word-studies we have been able, through comparison and contrast with the usage of Paul's opponents' (as Paul understood them), to advance towards Paul's “meanings” for these terms (in the broader sense, as including denotation), and indeed to specify his meaning for $\varepsilon\rho\gamma\alpha\ \nu\omicron\omicron\nu$. Now we will seek not only to confirm our findings for these three word-senses, but also to identify the denotations of $\pi\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$ and $\delta\acute{i}k\acute{a}\iota\omega\varsigma$ for Paul, as well as to establish his overall rhetorical purpose in this part of Galatians.

3.7 A working hypothesis concerning Paul's outlook and rhetorical purpose in Gal. 2:16–3:14

Paul's lexical sense of $\pi\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$, “trust in God,” leaves much of its denotation to be determined

\textsuperscript{34} This is corroborated by the fact that Paul seems to argue for both points side by side, so presumably primarily for one or the other, but while justification $\varepsilon\kappa\pi\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ (in Paul's sense) implies justification \textit{not} $\delta\xi\ \varepsilon\rho\gamma\omega\nu\ \nu\omicron\omicron\nu$, the latter does not imply the former; so the former topic would not account for Paul's making the latter point, but the latter topic would account for the former point.
by context. In chapter 2 we found that “trust” could be lexically defined as “belief in the reliability of (something or someone) to perform some particular result (i.e., in some particular manner) that is desired and valued (even in view of whatever provisos or costs might seem to condition such performance) by the one doing this believing within the purview of the current discourse.” By narrowing the definition to “trust in God,” we know who is the “something or someone” whose reliability is believed and valued. But the concept is still a “discourse concept”: we still do not know what particular thing Pauline “trust” believes God reliable to perform, nor under what conditions, supposedly, he will perform it. Both of these semantic elements depend on which person is doing the believing.

Gal. 5:5 says that ἐκ πίστεως ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεκδεχόμεθα (“by faith, we wait for the hope of righteousness”). So in the context of Paul’s apocalyptic eschatology, in which “we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so that each one may receive good or evil, according to what he has done in the body” (2 Cor. 5:10), we may safely assume that (at least in Galatians) Pauline “faith” believes God (and Christ) reliable to find and pronounce one “righteous” (i.e., to “justify” one) on the day of judgment. But now, under what conditions will God justify one? That is precisely the issue in Galatians, as indicated above. So the definition-element, “whatever provisos or costs might seem to condition such performance, to the one doing this believing within the purview of the discourse,” would need Paul’s elucidation, rather than be safely presumed by the readers. In order to complete our identification of “faith’s” denotation, then, we must consider the context with great care.

We may affirm immediately that there is at least one justification-condition which Pauline “faith” believes in, namely “faith” itself. Paul makes clear and reiterates that justification is ἐκ πίστεως. And anyway, since we have found “justification” to be “forensic” in Paul, and since we mean by this that in “justification” God really finds (not just
declares) the person "righteous," we may infer that there is certainly a proviso conditioning justification, which proviso is the meeting of God's criterion (or criteria) of "righteousness." Justification is conditional.

But next we may say that even if "faith" itself is one justification-conditioning criterion, it cannot be seen as the only one. For after all, the reason we are seeking the Pauline criteria of "righteousness" here is precisely so that we may know what Paul denotes by this lexical concept "faith." Even God himself would not be able to discern someone's "righteousness" solely by the criterion "faith" before knowing the denotation of the latter concept. As pointed out, until we find out under what conditions, in Paul's expectation, God will justify someone, Paul's Judaising opponents' "faith" is indistinguishable from his own; there is as yet no difference between them. So we must be able to define "faith" by eliciting some operative righteousness-criterion besides "faith"; else we (and Paul) become enmeshed in a circular definition of the latter.35

It is also important to note that this non-"faith" criterion of righteousness (and thus also precondition of justification) must be something which both God and the individual "believer" in God's reliability-to-justify will be able to use for discerning whether he or she is "righteous." Otherwise, Paul's emphasis on "the hope of righteousness" (Gal. 5:5) is completely empty. "Hope" entails an anticipation of a situation that is better from the point of view of the one hoping. Moreover, "faith" entails valuing the reliability which is believed in, according to our definition; and that implies that this reliability-to-justify is seen as valuable by the person believing in it. None of this would be so, were the believer in Pauline "justification" unable to tell whether he or she ever met the justification-controlling criteria of "righteousness." So the criterion must be applicable to human beings by human beings.

Furthermore, any statement of a righteousness-criterion will be composed either of something over which the individual has some control, or else of something over which the individual has no control (e.g., being unconditionally elect), or of both. But it does not appear that, in Paul's universe of discourse, the individual can have confident hope of meeting some condition that is utterly beyond his or her control and which is a criterion applicable to human beings by human beings. For example, there appears no list of all those unconditionally elect, which God has published so that one may check it and see whether he or she shall be justified. Nor is there given any criteria of the elect, other than "obedience" in the sense of endeavour (something within our control) to achieve what is commanded, and "faith" (which is precisely what we are seeking to define). To argue, for example, that one has confidence in one's election only because "faith" has revealed it to one's heart, would only circularise our definition of "faith," making it invalid.36

But Paul says, "you have received a spirit of adoption as sons by which we cry out, 'Abba! Father!' The Spirit Himself bears witness with our spirit that we are children of God" (Rom. 8:15-16, NASB). Is not this "witness," someone might ask, a feasible and practical criterion, for Paul, of who is "righteous"?37 Perhaps Paul indeed believes that all Christians receive this witness of the Spirit. But nevertheless it could not be a criterion of "righteousness" before God. For according to Paul, this witness comes when and because we have already become sons of God, that is, have received the adoption (Gal. 4:5-6). And this "adoption" (4:5), with its correlative status of heirship (4:7), Paul says comes through the "righteousness of faith" (Rom. 4:13-16; // Gal. 3:24, 26, 29; 4:7). So first (i.e., first causally even if not temporally) is this righteousness; then the adoption; then the Spirit of adoption. Now, the Spirit of adoption cannot be necessary to satisfy the criterion; the chain

36. Cf. above, p. 144 at n. 35.
37. I am grateful to Dr. Max Turner for bringing to my attention the pertinence of the Holy Spirit's operations for my present argument.
of causation would become a circle, which no one could enter. One could never possibly
meet the criterion of this “righteousness,” since one has to have already this “righteousness”
before one can experience this operation of the Spirit.

What about some other operation(s) of the Spirit? In 3:2–5, Paul appeals to the
Galatians’ experience of “receiving the Spirit” and of concomitant miracles. But we would
argue that for Paul, this experience, like that of the “spirit of adoption,” is due to
justification and not vice versa. In the first place, Paul clearly appeals to this experience—
which he implies was ek pisteως and not εξ ἔργων νόμου—in order to argue that justification
is ek pisteως and not εξ ἔργων νόμου (see the adjacent passages in which he contrasts πίστις
and ἔργα νόμων: 2:16; 3:6–12). And in order for this rhetorical purpose to be served by
Paul’s attributing this experience of the Spirit to πίστις and not ἔργα νόμου, it is necessary
that Paul’s readers already see a logical connection between “causality” in this experience of
the Spirit and “causality” in their justification. Specifically, Paul’s inference that πίστις and
not ἔργα νόμου brought about their experience of the Spirit, must imply for them that also
πίστις and not ἔργα νόμου brought about their justification. Now, since Paul’s major point
actually concerns ἔργα νόμων and not πίστις (see above), his unstated, main premise is that
“things unnecessary for ‘receiving the Spirit’ are unnecessary for justification.”38 For this
argument to work, the Galatians must already either see the Spirit-experience as a “sufficient
cause” of justification; or justification as a “necessary cause” of the Spirit-experience; or the
two concepts as denoting the same thing or otherwise logically equivalent (“justification"
denotes the Spirit-experience and vice versa, or at least one who has this experience is ipso
facto “justified” and vice versa); or else the attribute “this Spirit-experience” is a hyponym

38. Paul does not bring out that logical connection; yet it must be there, implicitly, for his argument
to succeed. The main syllogism is an AAA-1:
Works of the Law are unnecessary for receiving the Spirit.
Things unnecessary for receiving the Spirit are unnecessary for being justified.
Therefore, works of the Law are unnecessary for being justified.
of "justification," that is, as a subset of it, a special type of "justification."

But these last two suggestions (the former which is increasingly appearing in Pauline scholarship—see e.g. Cosgrove 1988b) we have implicitly ruled out by our findings on Paul's use of δικαιοδοσία, which is purely a forensic decision or ruling (and not some sort of transformation). This dismissal of both semantic connections leaves us with the question of the causal connection between justification and this experience of the Spirit. The first suggestion, that the Galatians and Paul would have seen this experience of the Spirit as sufficient-causal of justification, is extremely difficult to maintain.39 Recall that Paul's letter is meant to oppose a "different gospel" (1:6), and that an important element in the false gospel, apparently, is that justification is επί εὐνομίαν (2:16, etc.). Paul opposes this false doctrine with the assertion that justification is εκ πίστεως, not επί εὐνομίαν νόμου. And for Paul, any Galatians who get this wrong are in serious trouble: they have been "severed from Christ" and have "fallen from grace" (5:4). Now if, for Paul, one's having a correct understanding of what brings about justification is so crucial to one's salvation, and if, for Paul, having this (perceivable) experience of the Spirit (whether caused by faith or causal of faith) is sufficient-causal of justification, how is it that Paul fails to explicate this latter point at all in the letter, indeed in any of his extant letters? Any suggestion that Paul believes it and taught it earlier to the Galatians, so that now he can simply assume it in the argument of 3:2-5, would be vastly implausible: if the Galatians believed that doctrine, they would hardly

39. Some might, in rebuttal, point to the mention of "the Spirit" in Gal. 5:5: ἡμεῖς γὰρ πνεύματι ἐκ πίστεως ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεδεχόμεθα. This verse is pertinent if the dative, πνεύματι, is instrumental or causal. But first one must determine that this dative is indeed instrumental/causal, as opposed to an associative/manner-type dative (or even a locative dative, but associative seems more plausible and Pauline here). The immediate context does not indicate, except that it would perhaps be a bit awkward to have an instrumental dative followed immediately by some type of causal ἐκ-phrase. But if Paul's usage of πνεύματι elsewhere in Galatians must be the deciding factor, then in 5:5 it is a manner/associative dative. Except for 5:18, where it is a dative of agency, every other occurrence of πνεύματι in Galatians is manner/associative: 3:3; 5:16, 25 (twice); 6:1. Thus 5:5 does not support the idea that, for Paul, receiving the Spirit causes justification.
credit the Judaising suggestion that they need to have also the ἐνέχον in order to be justified; which however is the very idea Paul is trying to fight. We must conclude that it is justification which was seen as (necessary) cause of the Spiritual experience, rather than vice versa. Therefore, just as in the case of the “spirit of adoption,” this Spiritual experience cannot be a Pauline criterion (much less cause) of “righteousness,” nor of “being justified,” because one must have the righteousness in order to obtain this experience.

We have eliminated all the plausible other-than-“faith” Pauline criteria of “righteousness” which are things outside of human control but which can be applied as criteria to humans by humans. His non-“faith” criterion (or criteria) of “righteousness” must therefore be something which is within human control (i.e., a criterion which humans have the means to satisfy). Therefore, for Paul “faith” is confident in God’s justifying one who meets some particular other-than-“faith” condition(s), which the individual does have some control over. This must be so, in order for Paul’s notion of “faith” to be (non-circularly) definable and thus to denote any particular belief whatsoever.

So, the one with Pauline “faith” thinks he or she has (and can deploy) the means of meeting God’s non-“faith,” human-applicable criterion (or criteria) of “righteousness.” Now, since that “faith” is a type of “trust,” which includes reliance and valuing, it will imply one’s availing oneself of such means; and that includes effort or endeavour of some sort. The only non-“faith” endeavour that Paul suggests as a prerequisite condition of justification is steadfast endeavour to fulfil those things which God commands (see Rom. 2:6-16; 6:15-23; 1 Cor. 7:19; 2 Cor. 5:10). Therefore obedience (endeavour to carry out the commands) is, for Paul, one condition that “faith” believes is a prerequisite to justification. This is completely normal in this 1st-century Jewish context; the Jews saw no disjunction at all between “being justified because of obedience” and “being justified because of faith.” Indeed, the idea that “faith” believes in some justification unconditioned on
obedience would have seemed preposterous in this Jewish context, and would have required much more extensive and clearer explanation and defence on Paul’s part than appears. As G. Howard incisively notes,

[In Rom. 4:3–6] Paul supposedly sets the faith of Abraham against any works he might have performed. In other words, it is [traditionally] thought that Paul establishes Abraham’s justification according to grace by referring to the fact that he merely believed. Faith is supposed to evoke in Paul’s mind the concept of “grace.”

But it does not seem reasonable that Paul would attempt to prove “grace” by the word “faith” when the word “faith,” as used by his contemporaries, implied attainment. To construe Paul in this way is to have him base his argument on a reasoning which no one could accept. (Howard 1990, 55–56)

In later chapters we shall argue that for Paul true “faith” does believe that obedience is a condition for justification. That is, for Paul one “condition” of God’s true covenant (in the sense that it must be met as a prerequisite, in order to justification) is “obedience to God”; for indeed Paul presumes and even portrays this as being a condition, not only elsewhere (and quite clearly) but also within Gal. 3:10–14 itself.

Not surprisingly, confirming this hypothesis about the content of Paul’s meaning of “faith” would entail that certain other theologically basic things are true for Paul. But now we have, via our pondering the possible differences between Paul’s meanings and his opponents’, come to a place where, at least hypothetically, we may satisfy those requirements. First: If εὐγανα νόμον meant “obedience to the Law,” then if Paul were discussing means (and thus cause) of justification when he says “by εὐγανα νόμον shall no flesh be justified” (Gal. 2:16), he would obviously be contradicting his belief that obedience is a precondition for justification. On the other hand, if instead he were discussing meaning and criteria (of “righteousness” and thus of “justification”), with this same “obedience” meaning of εὐγανα νόμον, then in Gal. 2:16 he would be saying that obedience to God is not a criterion of “righteousness,” even though he also considered it a prerequisite of justification. Those
last two beliefs, taken together, would only suggest that something else, not logically
equivalent to Law-obedience, but of which the latter is a prerequisite, is a criterion of
"righteousness." But that could only be "accomplishments"; and we already know that for
Paul obedience, not accomplishments, is a criterion of (both "faith" and) "righteousness."
So whether "means" or "meaning" is Paul's issue, ἐργα νόμον could not mean "obedience to
the Law" without contradicting our previous conclusion that for Paul, "obedience to God" is
a precondition for justification. This contradiction leaves "accomplishments" (a hyponym of
the category "endeavours") as the only possible general meaning for Paul's term ἐργα in the
phrase ἐργα νόμον. We affirm therefore (in confirmation of some previous arguments in this
chapter) that "accomplishments of the Law" is what Paul means by the phrase.

But now something else is also entailed. By ἐργα νόμον in Gal. 2:16 Paul is thus
denoting something that, while conceptually distinct from "obedience," is not physically
distinct from it. That is to say, all accomplishments of God's Law are endeavours, even if
not all endeavours towards it are accomplishments. As another example of this semantic
relation (called "hyponomy"), every rose is a flower, but flowers are not always roses. So if
Paul said "A man is justified by beautiful flowers and not by beautiful roses," we would
know he was really talking about a criterion of right-standing (in a flower-show perhaps), not
about the means of right-standing. For strictly speaking, beautiful roses would necessarily be
as effective a means as are beautiful flowers, because in fact they are beautiful flowers.
Likewise then, if Paul believes that obedience (i.e., endeavour to fulfil the commands) is a
prerequisite of justification but asserts that particular accomplishments (or particular amounts
of them) are not, then Paul must (in contrast to his opponents) be talking not about "means"
but about the meaning or criterion of "righteousness" and (thus) that of "justification." For
accomplishments would necessarily be as effective a means of justification as would
endeavours, because in fact they are endeavours. Thus Paul is saying that God's criterion of
"righteousness" includes the notion "obedience" (endeavour to carry out commands), but not that of "accomplishments."

We have derived here three conclusions concerning Paul's key word-meanings in this part of Galatians, including Gal. 3:10-14. In the process, we have arrived at a general idea of Paul's rhetorical purpose and overall meaning, at least in the parts of Galatians in which he is arguing that we are justified not \( \varepsilon \gamma\alpha\nu \nu\omicron\omicron\upsilon \) but \( \varepsilon \kappa\omicron\pi\acute{i}\sigma\tau\epsilon\omicron\omicron\varsigma \). As noted above, however, that may or may not be true of our target passage, 3:10-14; thus we must hold this only as a working exegetical hypothesis. Let us state then the following working hypothesis, as an overall-only (and thus partial), coherent and supported reading of Paul's general meaning and rhetorical purpose in at least this part of Galatians: According to the passages where he opposes \( \varepsilon \gamma\alpha\nu \nu\omicron\omicron\upsilon \) to \( \pi\omicron\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma \), Paul is arguing, not about the means to righteousness or to justification, but about the meaning of (i.e., the extra-linguistic reality denoted by) the idea "righteousness" (which is a discourse concept to Paul), and thus also that of the idea "justification," in the context of God's covenant. More specifically, he is arguing that in that covenantal context, and thus in accordance with the "conditions"/terms of that covenant, not any particular amount of "acts (i.e., accomplishments) of the Law" but rather the (to him) logically non-equivalent attribute "faith (in Christ, to save those who steadfastly obey God, precisely because they do obey him)," is a valid (albeit not uniquely so) criterion of "righteousness."

Thus, Paul's rhetoric deals not with any causa essendi but rather, being about the definition and thus the discerning of "righteousness" in this context, deals merely with implication or causa cognoscendi. Nothing we have found in chapter 2's survey, regarding any of the three levels of meaning, has made this hypothesis unfeasible; on the other hand, considerations in chapter 3 have separately or conjointly supported this hypothesis. Nor, in our awareness, is there any Pauline data that contradicts it.
3.8 The focus in Gal. 2:14-3:1: “the Law” or “works of the Law”?

However, although we will not engage in any detailed exegesis of 2:14-3:9, there is one question which the passage as a whole raises here and which bears on this issue of Paul’s overall topic in Galatians. That is the question whether Paul is fundamentally speaking about “the Law” or about the matter of justification (and “works of the Law” as contrasted with “faith”). This question has commonly been overlooked by commentators. Perhaps this is due to the general assumption (sometimes conscious, sometimes not) that when Paul disparages “the Law” this is simply another way of his disparaging endeavour—that is, “works of the Law”—conceived as meriting one’s justification. But the question is not so easily disposed of: why, if Paul means “works of the Law,” does he say “the Law”? Clearly they are not synonyms. With the assumption that Paul is discussing means rather than meaning, this question is quite difficult to answer. It is all the more puzzling inasmuch as Paul in fact cites the Mosaic code as if some of its stipulations were for him quite authoritative (e.g., Gal. 5:13-14, 23; Rom. 13:8-10; cf. Eph. 6:1-3). This evinces of course the notorious paradox of Paul’s positive-negative attitude towards “the Law.”

The key to these puzzles, we would suggest, is to note that a covenant’s terms are essentially a kind of performative, “constitutive,” social meaning, which in fact can change or vary independently of changes in the text in which it is ostensibly recorded:

Just as language is constituted by articulate sound and meaning, so social institutions and human cultures have meanings as intrinsic components. . . . What is true of cultural achievements, no less is true of social institutions. The family, the state, the law, the economy are not fixed and immutable entities. They adapt to changing circumstances; they can be reconceived in the light of new ideas; they can be subjected to revolutionary change. But all such change involves change of meaning—a change of idea or concept, a change of judgment or evaluation, a change of the order or request. The state can be changed by rewriting its constitution. More subtly but no less effectively it can be changed by reinterpreting the constitution or again, by working on men’s minds and
hearts to change the objects that command their respect, hold their allegiance, fire their loyalty. (Lonergan 1973, 78, cf. 74–75, emphasis ours)

So if Paul is discussing social meaning, rather than means, in speaking of “the Law” he is not talking about an external artifact, the Mosaic text, but is operating in a semantic domain that concerns the inner, cognitional matter of that text’s covenantal meaning (and its proper construal). This fact has potential to explain much: for even though Paul does not spend much time (if any) exegeting the Mosaic text for its meaning, his concern could still be the text’s fundamental covenantal meaning, for he apparently finds two contrasting but intended covenantal meanings in the Mosaic text (see above, § 3.4). So in opposing “the Law” he may be opposing only his opponents’ construing, as the text’s fundamental intended meaning, some particular level of meaning in that text (e.g., the literal level).

This sorts out the difficulty of Paul’s positive-negative attitude towards “the Law”: generally when using this term he speaks of that discourse and meaning-level which his opponents construe as the essential (or even only) meaning of the Mosaic text; but sometimes he intends that (Christological-typological?) discourse and meaning-level which he himself takes as the text’s essential meaning. But how does this meaning-orientation of his term “the Law” sort out the question about “the Law” versus “works of the Law” as Paul’s more primary topic? The answer is that for him the question of “the Law’s” jurisdiction and that of the true meaning of human “righteousness” before God would be simply two ways of stating the same question. They are both questions of God’s social, covenantal meaning. Paul treats them as interchangeable questions, because for him they are interchangeable, even identical questions. Its unique power to resolve this exegetical puzzle is additional corroboration of our hypothesis that Paul is talking about the meaning, rather than the means, of justification. To connect back to the first matter we discussed in chapter 2 (viz., rhetorical genre), Paul’s issue is, not “how one can meet the requirements of God’s law or covenant,” but rather “to what sort of, or to which, law or covenant God has given jurisdiction.”
In this chapter we have covered some important features of this passage’s context which are commonly neglected or misconstrued. We believe we have dealt adequately here with the topic of the passage’s “contexts.” We have perhaps not dealt with every exegetically relevant aspect of the contexts of Gal. 3:10-14; we have not dealt with the letter’s date, for example. But others deal with these topics. At any rate, our analysis has taken care to avoid making insufficiently-supported assumptions about Paul’s meanings (his denotations) based on his key words (creating a “words-things” hermeneutical circle), and has allowed us to derive a well-grounded working hypothesis as to Paul’s rhetorical purpose and meaning in this part of Galatians (i.e., at least 2:14–3:14).

We must remember, however, that it is a “working” theory only, and so be careful, as with any passage, to base our conclusions firmly on our passage’s relevant data, lest we inadvertently entangle ourselves in a “parts-whole” hermeneutical circle (cf. above). Theoretically, at least, there are ways in which one might be able to argue for the truth of our hypothesis from that passage, besides the points we have raised in this chapter. For example, one might attempt to show that Paul’s argument presupposes that his justification-statements in 3:11b and 3:12b, which (as we shall see) appear to be universal-positive, A-type statements, are actually “simply convertible” and thus “covenantal converses” (see chap. 2: definitive statements, criteria), and thus must be about meaning (of “righteousness” and of “justification”) rather than about means (to the latter). Again, one might attempt to show that Paul’s main concern is evidently on the negative side, on what “righteousness” does not mean (viz., ἔργα νόμου), rather than on what it does mean (e.g., πίστις Χριστοῦ). But in any case, let us now turn to our passage and begin our exegesis.
Chapter 4

The structure and meaning of 3:10

The first verse of 3:10-14 is perhaps the most controversial. Since Luther, and probably before, commentators have perceived a major obstacle for interpreting it:

Whereas Paul’s own statement appears to pronounce a “curse” upon anyone who would attempt to live by the Jewish Torah, the biblical text to which he appeals clearly affirms the opposite: its “curse” falls not on those who do the Law, but on those who fail to do it. What is Paul trying to say? Does he simply misunderstand his citation at this point? Or is there an underlying link between text and “interpretation” that is not evident at first sight? (Stanley 1990, 481)

This is doubtless the most arresting and baffling aspect of the exegesis of 3:10-14 as a whole. We have already dealt with some of the proposed solutions in chapter 1; and the least plausible of these suggestions we shall disregard in the present chapter. These include Sanders’ suggestion (1983, 21–27) that Paul chose Deut. 27:26 merely because it uniquely contained both concepts “the Law” and “curse.” Paul would have noticed that it contained the (presumably inconvenient) word not as well. Likewise we omit Bultmann’s explanation, that for Paul obedience to the Law is sinful in itself. We will also disregard Stanley’s (1990)

1. While Stanley’s summary of the problem seems clearest, most other commentators have indicated this conundrum.
suggestion, apparently independently proposed by Braswell (1991), accepted by Bonneau (1997), and elaborated upon by Young (1998), that Paul was warning against becoming $\varepsilon \xi\varepsilon\rho\gamma\omega\nu\ \nu\omicron\mu\omicron\upsilon$ because of the associated risk that one might then incur a curse, out of (only potential) disobedience.²

Not so easy to dismiss, due to their plausibility, are what Stanley rightly calls "the most common solution by far," namely supplying an unstated premise that all humans fail to do all the things written in the law, and the even simpler reconstruction, offered with varying explanations, that according to the only intended missing premise none of those who are $\varepsilon \xi\varepsilon\rho\gamma\omega\nu\ \nu\omicron\mu\omicron\upsilon$ abides by all things written in the Law.³ We will interact with these further below. Also requiring more careful consideration is the view of E. D. Burton (1921), which denies that Paul is actually affirming the curse, but rather he infers it only in order to show the non-feasibility of its premise, the Law’s legal force and validity.

Despite this variety there is nearly a consensus, one may say, around the idea that Paul is cautioning here against the adverse consequences of Law-adherence. He is warning that if the Galatians start observing the Law in order to be justified, they shall (or “might,” says Stanley) reap the awful end result, a curse.⁴ It does however give one pause, that this nearly universal consensus accompanies the almost-as-universal disagreement about what Paul actually says in the argument. Perhaps our investigation may shed some light on either or

---

² We dismiss also therewith the issue of the significance or lack thereof in Paul’s use of $\iota \pi\omicron\delta$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha\rho\nu$ in 3:10a rather than the term $\epsilon\pi\iota\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha\rho\nu\delta\omicron\sigma\tau\omicron$ which appears in his citation of Deut. 27:26.

³ As we have seen, this type of explanation includes the thesis of Martin Noth (1966), N. T. Wright (1992), James Scott (1993), and Scott Hafemann (1997), that Paul is speaking of the Deuteronomist’s curse and exile that came on Israel collectively for her disobedience, under which, in a way, she still languished at Paul’s time; and the thesis of Dunn, that it is the contemporary Jews’ exclusivist and misguided fixation upon the Law as “boundary marker,” and particularly upon its rituals, that Paul is condemning. Also we may include here the positions of D. P. Fuller (1975) and of H. D. Betz (1979), even though they spurned the traditional idea of an unstated premise in 3:10; for they themselves simply relate Paul’s logic in another, less formal way, and as a different logical content.

⁴ So Longenecker 1990, 117; most other commentaries.
both questions. Let us first set out the relevant biblical texts (we cite KJV as a literal English translation):

Galatians 3:10 (KJV)
For as many as are of the works of the law are under the curse: for it is written, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them.

Deut. 27:26a (BHS)
עַדָּה יִשְׂרָאֵל יָהּ רֵאְשֶׁה לַכְּלָיְכֶם לְכָלָיְכֶם
הַמַּרֶדֶךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכָלָיְכֶם

Galatians 3:10 (UBSGNT)
οοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοοο
4.2 Significance of 10b’s textual differences from the LXX?

Two other word-choices in verse 10 have been cited as significant. These both involve the difference between Paul’s wording and that of the LXX which he cites. It is clear from the number of key words in common (and particularly ἐμενεί) that Paul is citing the LXX rather than the MT. However, there are a couple of divergences, big enough that one may wonder if Paul is trying to alter the meaning.

4.2.1 What does the added phrase “written in the book of” signify, if anything?

The LXX version of Deut. 27:26 says everyone is cursed who does not abide in πᾶσαν τοῖς λόγοις τοῦ νόμου τοῦτου (“all the words of this Law”) to do them. Paul writes instead that everyone is cursed who does not abide in πᾶσαν τοῖς γεγραμμένους ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ τοῦ νόμου (“all the things written in the book of the Law”) to do them. Some have concluded that Paul means to take in the whole Law as opposed to the original intent of Deut. 27:26 which comprehended only “this Law,” that is, the “dodecalogue” of 27:15-26.5

But it is doubtful that many Jews would have taken the LXX’s rendering of Deut.27:26 in the latter, restricted way. In the first place, the phrase “words of this Law” is used commonly elsewhere in Deuteronomy (two instances of which are earlier in chapter 27 itself), not referring to the “dodecalogue.”6 Furthermore, note the parallels with “words of this covenant” in 29:1 (28:69 Heb.) and 29:9(8), and note 29:21(20): “Then the LORD will single him out for adversity from all the tribes of Israel, according to all the curses of the covenant which are written in this book of the law” (NASB, emphasis ours), and Exod. 24:7: “the book of the covenant.” The Hebrew word for “law,” בְּרִית, can also mean “teaching, instruction,” and is thus often used of the covenant as a whole: “The law specifically is the


stipulations of the covenant. But in the broad sense of law, namely God’s teaching, covenant plays the central part” (TWOT, 404). Indeed, what is commonly called “the Mosaic law” is actually the document(s) establishing God’s covenant with Israel: “Then the LORD said to Moses, ‘Write down these words, for in accordance with these words I have made a covenant with you and with Israel.’ . . . And he wrote on the tablets the words of the covenant, the Ten Commandments” (Exod. 34:7, NASB).7 Since נַעֲרֵה refers here to the whole covenantal revelation made through Moses, and since it is a “referential” term (i.e., a label for a specific extralinguistic object or reality), we can assume that νόμος in the LXX of Deut. 27:26 refers to the same thing (Silva 1983, 94, 107). Therefore, to “stand by all the words of this Law” meant, even originally, something like to “stand by all the words of this book of the covenant.”8

The phrase which Paul uses instead, “things written in the book of the Law,” seems unexceptional in light of these passages. Furthermore, it appears in several other places towards the end of Deuteronomy (28:61; 29:21; 29:27; 30:10). Probably Paul altered 27:26 unintentionally, while quoting it from memory. There is no reason, then, to think that Paul meant to alter the meaning of his citation by this change of wording.

4.2.2 What does the term “all” (things written in the Law), a term absent from the MT but present in the LXX, signify here, if anything?

How significant might be the word “all” in the above phrase (“all things written . . . ”)? Though missing from the MT, it is in the LXX, and Paul does seem to be citing the LXX version; so this may well be a mere textual matter rather than a particular point Paul is trying to make. After all, the distributive meaning “all” would seem to be naturally suggested even

7. The Law given at Sinai, and not the Exodus, is that which established the covenant (Exod. 19:3–6; 24:4–8; 34:27–28; Deut. 4:13, 23; 5:2; 9:9, 11, 15; 29:1, 9, 12, 14–15), contra several commentators (e.g., Sanders 1977, 419, quoting H. A. A. Kennedy; Hong 1994, 175–76).
8. Contra Bruce 1982b, 158; Fung 1988, 141; Hong 1993, 80.
in the MT's wording (Longenecker 1990, 117). On the other hand, Hübner (1984, 18–19) has suggested not unreasonably that Paul chose the LXX version over the MT precisely because of this extra word: In the Hebrew text of Deut. 27:11–26, says Hübner, "the requirements of this dodecalogue are thought of as being altogether capable of achievement"; so Paul uses the LXX text because he "is able to deduce from this version the theologoumenon which is important to him and according to which each one is guilty because there is no individual person who has done everything that is commanded in the Law" (ibid., 19, emphasis in original; here Hübner is maintaining the traditional reconstruction of Paul's argument, with its unstated but intended premise that "no human being does all the things written in the Law").

Now, it is doubtful that we have any real shift in meaning between the MT and the LXX. The LXX here views the commandments distributively rather than collectively, but probably the MT does too, in which case the meaning stays the same. On the other hand, it is not at all impossible that Paul intended to reinforce this meaning, by citing the LXX text rather than the MT. But here again we have no evidence to suggest a semantic shift or different nuance on Paul's part. In any case, he reads the text distributively, that is, as referring to each and every one of the commands written in the Law.

4.3 The sense of γὰρ in 3:10a

The conjunction γὰρ is usually translated with the illative sense "for, because" in the New Testament. Doubtless this is how it is intended in 3:10b. However, although it is undoubtedly the most common sense of γὰρ in the NT, this translation has been "greatly overworked" (DM, 243). At any rate, in Gal. 3:10 the KJV, RSV, NRSV, NKJV, and NASB translate also the γὰρ in 10a as "for"; the NIV leaves it untranslated.

9. See Zerwick 1963, §188.
Commentaries commenting on Galatians 3:10a generally translate the γάρ as "for," if at all; but though they often make no comment on the conjunction itself, those that do comment on it generally shy away from this illative sense. Betz (1979, 144 n. 50) asserts that in 3:10a γάρ is best taken "as inferential ('certainly, so, then') or as marking another step in the argument"; Morris (1996, ad loc.) and Eckstein (1996, 122) concur. Both of these, the "inferential" and the "continuative," are clearly potential senses of this conjunction itself (BAGD, s.v., 3-4).

But it seems clear that here Paul is using it neither "demonstratively" nor "inferentially." He proves that "those who believe are blessed with Abraham who believed" (3:9 NRSV) not from verse 10, but rather from the scripture-citations in verses 6-8. At any rate, it is difficult to see how a curse on ὁμολογεῖντες ὁμολογεῖντες would imply a blessing on ὁμολογεῖντες. Likewise he does not seem to prove 10a by verse 9, but rather by the scripture-citation in 10b. We must appeal then to some other sense of γάρ than either the "demonstrative" or the "inferential."

The "continuative sense" is still open to us, as also the "explanatory sense." Dunn (1993a, 171) and Longenecker (1990, 116) both translate γάρ in 3:10a as "for," but their comments give it an explanatory sense and say that Paul is going to explain or exposit, starting in 3:10a, the point he was making in 3:6-9. There is also an "emphatic" force that γάρ may take, especially when combined with other particles, as in μην γάρ, ἀλλάχρα γάρ, τί γάρ; it may be variously translated "yes, in truth," "in fact," "indeed," "really," "certainly," "why!" or "what!" (DM, 243-44; BAGD, s.v., l.f.; BDF §452). GLNT categorises this last sense with the inferential, or "conclusive," sense. At any rate, this sense

---

10. Eckstein says that γάρ is used here "nicht als begründend, sondern als anknüpfend bzw. fortführend zu bestimmen" (p. 122); but he gives as possible translations, "allerdings«, «freilich», «aber», the last of which is a sort of adversative, exceeding a strictly "continuative" sense. Cf. Zerwick 1963, §472, on one adversative sense of γάρ, under which he categorises Gal. 3:10a.
does not seem to fit the argumentative context of Gal. 3:10 so well as the other two. Nor is there any evidence that Paul intended an exclamatory or emphatic sense here.

The continuative sense, probably best translated by a simple “and,” is so plain as to have few opportunities to conflict with any context. Nevertheless it is inadequate here, because there are plentiful indications that Paul meant something more specific. For example, there is the clear disjunction between “blessed” in verse 9 and “cursed” in verse 10. Is this merely coincidental, or should we see Paul as communicating a more pregnant connection between these verses than a simple “and”? It is difficult to see how verse 10, a curse-statement, can be relevant to and serve the same ultimate point as verse 9, a blessing-statement (which seems to be the case, since 3:2–14 are in a chiasm dealing with the “works of the law” vs. “faith” justification-dispute), if the connection here is merely continuative. Between these two verses we have not only the contrast of blessing and curse, but also the contrast Paul has been making all along, that of justification “by faith” and justification “by works of the Law.” Paul would certainly take “blessing” and “cursing” as opposites, and has clearly done likewise with justification “by faith” and “by works of the Law” in 3:2–5. It is extremely unlikely that these antonymous oppositions between verses 9 and 10 are merely coincidental in the flow of Paul’s discourse: it would require, in fact, that Paul give some indication that this contrast were not his focus. Therefore, we must cast around for some specific way in which 3:10 is “explanatory” of 3:9, in order to understand the logic of Paul’s evident “explanation.”

It may seem dubious at first, that a proposition about “curse” could be explanatory of a proposition about “blessing.” To be explanatory, a proposition would need to be saying more or less the same thing, that is, declaring the same situation, as the first proposition, although demonstrating or highlighting that situation in a somewhat different way; how then
could some proposition about blessing be elaborating the same situation as a proposition about curse, which is the opposite of blessing? In fact, all that is necessary for this is that the proposition which is expressed negatively must really be a double negative. In order to say essentially the same thing as the positive proposition, a statement which already has a negative element within it, in the form of an antonym, must in turn be negated. (Poythress 1982, 186)

Poythress gives several examples of this type of propositional relation from Scripture, including (the italics indicate the double pairs of opposites):

Mark 3:29
but whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never has forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin.

Prov. 19:9
A false witness will not go unpunished, and he who utters lies will perish.

It is clear that two verses, dealing respectively with a blessing and a curse, may nevertheless be explanatory of each other, or at least the second be explanatory of the first. One can easily make up a sententious, semantically biblical example: "Blessed shall be those who serve the Lord; but those who rebel shall be cursed." Thus all we need for 3:10 to be explanatory of 3:9 is to find another pair of negations involved, perhaps an antonymous opposition, in addition to the blessing-curse disjunction. And since there are no verb-negations (οὐδὲν's) here, we must look for a pair of antonyms. These must be crucial, pivotal

11. Williams (1997, 88) makes the understandable error of supposing that a propositional connection translated as "but" would imply that the two connected propositions are antithetical (which sense γὰρ does not support). But Poythress (1982) makes clear that there are at least three different propositional relations commonly represented by "but": an explanatory "but" (as in the above sentence), which Poythress calls a Positive-Negation of Negative relation (ibid., 186f.; this is our reading of γὰρ in 3:9-10); a Concession-Contraexpectation relation (ibid., 176); and an Opposition relation (ibid., 189f.). "The Opposition relation is quite distinct both from the Positive-Negation of Negative relation . . . and from the Concession-Contraexpectation relation . . . . It differs from Positive-Negation of Negative in that the second proposition is in tension with rather than simply in reaffirmation of the first. It differs from Concession-Contraexpectation in that there is no cause-effect temporal sequence involved in Opposition" (ibid., 190).
parts of the subject or predicate, so as to effect this opposition in the very meaning of the sentence.

The obvious candidates for antonymous opposites here are “those of works of the Law” and “those of faith.” But here we run into a difficulty; we have already argued, just previously, that these social classes would not have been already seen as opposites, as mutually exclusive, by Paul’s readers. The theories of faith-justification, on the one hand, and of “works of the Law”-justification on the other, are indeed apparently disjunctive in Paul’s eyes, in the sense that they cannot both be true; on any other assumption, his rhetoric in 2:16 and in 3:2–6, if not 3:6–9 also, would be rendered quite unintelligible. And if Paul could demonstrate on independent grounds that those who are €κ€ψγων νόμου are cursed, his argument would not need to presuppose any such group-disjunction (unlike the argument-reconstruction we critiqued above), for his double negation would supply it (again, those who are cursed are ipso facto absent from among those who are blessed). He leaves the grounds for this curse unstated (but intended) in 3:10, but it is likely that he is intending 3:10 to evoke previous teaching he had given to the Galatians; the unstated premise might thus emerge from the “presupposition pool” of earlier discourse.

Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that Paul means 10a as a double negative of verse 9: “cursed” is set over against “blessed,” and “those who are partisans of the deeds of the Law” is set over against “those who are partisans of faith.” Paul thus means γάρ in an “explanatory” sense, its most likely translation being “but.”12

12. Cf. Zerwick 1963, §472. It is interesting to note a seemingly parallel use of γάρ in Rom. 1:18, connecting a statement on the “righteousness of God” revealed in the gospel upon those who have faith, with a passage on the “wrath of God” revealed from heaven upon those who rebel against God in unrighteousness. Seeing that Romans 2 turns the tables of this latter condemnation on the Jews who tried to disfranchise Gentiles from good standing in the church (Dunn 1991d), it is quite possible that Paul’s basic arguments are working along the same lines in both Rom. 1:17–18 and Gal. 3:9–10.
4.4 The force of “cursed”: as inherently powerful and effectual, or merely as
pronouncement of guilt/liability?

As a further word-study in 3:10, we need to consider the meaning of “cursed”
(ἐπικατάφρατος). What exactly does Paul mean by “cursed”? Even if we understand that the
curse here is a pronouncement against transgressors of the Law/covenant (Deut. 27:26), the
question arises whether it was just a pronouncement or whether the pronouncement itself was
seen to have an inherent power, or at least inherent implications consisting in an effect. This
important question is seldom explicitly raised in connection with this verse. As a result,
many have exegeted this verse without being aware of the Pauline-theological and -rhetorical
implications of their reconstruction.

In the modern world, if someone was said to have “cursed” someone else, it would
simply mean a statement or discourse of some sort, perhaps a wish for evil to fall upon that
person. It would seldom mean that the pronounced words carried some inherent power to
bring disaster into the life of the cursed. But the latter was a common view in the ancient
world, including the biblical world, as it still is in some primitive societies today.13

What has been called the “traditional” view of such phenomena occurring in the Bible,
accounts for them as remnants of primitive, “magical” worldviews, which ways of thought
were eventually almost overcome by the cultic worship and monotheism of Israel (Morland
1995, 4).14 The (residual) influence of this “traditional” view is problematic for a number of

13. See the encyclopaedias, such as ISBE and NBD, s.v. “curse.” See also the survey of study on
Finnegan 1969. Curses were a part of treaties and many other sorts of writings in the ancient
Near East; but they were never intended simply as an impotent expression of a wish (ISBE,
1:837–38).

14. But this traditional, easy disjunction between “magic” and “monotheism” has come under
increasing scrutiny and criticism. The questions “what is magic,” “what is the relationship of
“magic” and “religion,” and whether the two are not essentially similar, are now being asked by
various history-of-religion scholars, some of whose answers draw on social-scientific research.
No consensus seems imminent, however. There are at least three positions: what we might call
the mediating position sees magic and religion as two poles within a single continuum, rather than
basically similar or basically dissimilar. For a recent representative of the traditional view, see
Kee 1986, 95–121; for representatives of the view that magic and religion are basically similar,
see Mauss 1972; Smith 1978; for the mediating position, see Goode 1949; 1951. For a survey of
reasons. First, the scholarly consensus has shifted in the middle and later 20th century, towards a view that sees the curses in the Hebrew Bible as juridical formulae of social expulsion from family, clan, or other community (Thiselton 1974, 294–96; Morland 1995, 5–7).

Secondly (and this is not the fault of the traditional view itself), to regard such pronouncements in Scripture as remnants of "magical thinking" might incline us to dismiss too quickly the idea that there is real power inherent in them (particularly when they are made by or with the sanction of God). Such a dismissive attitude would follow from a false alternative between what has been called a "dianoetic" and a "dynamic" view of language: the "dianoetic" sees words as each simply expressive of an idea, whereas the "dynamic" view sees words as material forces, filled with power (Thiselton 1974, 297). This sometimes-alleged alternative overlooks an important linguistic and pragmatic phenomenon described by J. L. Austin, called "performative language" (ibid., 293). As an example, "When a bachelor in appropriate circumstances answers the question 'Wilt thou . . . take this woman . . .' with the words 'I do', he is not giving anyone information, he is actually marrying a bride" (ibid.). Significantly, Austin classifies blessing and cursing as examples of performative language. When spoken by someone in the proper position, within a social context in which an accepted conventional procedure has a certain conventional effect, such language has force; Austin calls this "illocutionary" force (ibid.). Such includes some pronouncements which "themselves effect an award, a sentence, or a commitment. But they no more depend upon primitive notions of word-magic than a modern judge and jury do when

incantations and "magic" in ancient and early-mediaeval Jewish literature, see Alexander 1986. For an overview of the social-scientific research, see Versnel 1991. For a discussion of the methodological question "what is magic," see Garrett 1989, 1–36. I owe these citations and this point to Dr. Loren T. Stuckenbruck's seminar presentation at the University of Durham, 15 January 1996, on the topic "Magic in the Ancient World and the New Testament."

15. See e.g. Austin 1962.
their words actually consign a man to prison or to freedom" (ibid., 296, emphasis in original).

But a dismissive rationalising away of the force behind and implicit in biblical curse-pronouncements, might acknowledge this phenomenon of performative language and its relevance to the biblical curse material and yet talk as if the God of Paul were nevertheless quite free to pronounce covenantal curses and then not to follow through with the indicated punishment. This viewpoint seems manifest, for example, in Evans 1994, 82:

The curse is not, strictly speaking, a punishment for not keeping the law . . . This explains why the curses outlined in Deuteronomy were not always or automatically found as a result of behaviour which theoretically should have brought them into play. God’s mercy has to be seen as a significant factor in the equation. It is true that everyone who breaks the covenant stands under the threat of the curse. Of course they do, because to break the covenant is to be outside the covenant, and to be outside the covenant is what it means to be cursed. To acknowledge the significance of the curse and the effectiveness of the curse, then, is not a simple statement of legalism. Everything hangs on the question of relationship with God as a living reality rather than on what Eichrodt describes as ‘the mechanism of a distributive justice, dispensing reward and punishment.’

The reference to “legalism” here with obvious bad connotation betrays certain theological presuppositions at work. Were God to be so “legalistic” as to follow strictly the covenantal terms which he laid down in Deuteronomy, suggests Evans, he would be reduced to a mere mechanism. (Presumably the same is true of judges today who enforce the laws in this fashion.) But this approach glides past the difficult and pertinent question of how God could with integrity allow rebellion against his covenantal authority to go unpunished. How, for example, would we account for such a rigidly “legalistic” passage as this:

**Deut. 7:9**

Know therefore that the LORD your God is God, the faithful God who keeps covenant and steadfast love with those who love him and keep his commandments, to a thousand generations,
7:10

and requites to their face those who hate him, by destroying them; he will not
be slack with him who hates him, he will requite him to his face.

It is not necessary for us here to address how Paul felt about this question: it is enough
to show that the curse he mentions in 3:10 must have been an effectual one to Paul, or else he
would undermine his evidently intended contrast we have already found with 3:9. 16 That
verse declares, “those who believe are blessed with Abraham who believed” (NRSV). We
cannot simply assume here that οἱ ἔκ πίστεως are cursed in some sense, and for some
reason, that would apply just as well to οἱ ἔκ πίστεως. If they are cursed simply because
they are human, say, and οἱ ἔκ πίστεως are likewise human and therefore cursed in the same
sense and for the same reason, we have failed to support the contrast between the groups:
they are both “cursed” then. We see that if the blessing is real, so must the curse be, to
uphold the contrast; we cannot have a pseudo-curse here, nor an impotent curse, which might
apply to οἱ ἔκ πίστεως as well. (This point is, of course, not undermined by the fact that the
curse’s power, perhaps even its pronouncement, may be seen as partially or completely
delayed until the final, eschatological day of judgment, as would be the case in an apocalyptic
Jewish eschatology like Paul’s.) Just as the faithful are really blessed as per 3:9, a double-
negative contrast requires that the curse of 3:10 be just as real, just as effectual.

This finding casts doubt on the idea that Paul’s argument presupposes general human
sinfulness and lack of means to muster the necessary Law-doing, assuming that the argument
is affirmative of verse 10’s statements (as in the traditional reading). For were that sort of
premise part of such an argument, all humans (including Christians) would implicitly be
really, eschatologically cursed. 17

16. See above, § 4.3.
17. In regard to this alleged premise generally, and in regard particularly to the appeal sometimes
made here to a “substitutionary-atonement” reading of vs. 13 as nevertheless accounting for the
efficacy of this curse, see below, § 4.9.1, on the traditional reading of Paul’s logic in vs. 10.
4.5 Type of argument: ultimately denying 10b?

All this has certain implications for the question of Paul's type of argument in 3:10. We may as well consider those implications straightaway; let us therefore take an initial look at this question. We should note first that verse 10 evidently constitutes a self-contained enthymemetic syllogism of some sort. The middle term, "abides by all things written, etc.,” certainly does not appear again before 3:12b (if even there), and the minor term, "those who are ἐκ ἔργων νόμου,” does not appear again in the whole passage. Therefore the needed premise was left unstated.

The initially-indicated choices for basic real-life-argument type, at least insofar as the evidently logos part of 3:10 is concerned, would probably be three: the syllogism, the polysyllogism or structurally similar positive argument, or the reductio ad absurdum or structurally similar negative argument (see above, chap. 2). The traditional reading, and most others, opt for one of the two former, affirming-type arguments; E. D. Burton (1921, 163–65), almost alone in the 20th century, opted for the latter, denying type. In Burton's reading, Paul states the "implication-part" of this real-life argument and leaves the "belief-part" unstated, which belief-part denies the truth of 3:10a and affirms the unstated premise in order to deny the stated premise, 3:10b. The unstated premise is the universal failure of man to do all the Law:

Those that are of works of law are under the curse of the law, which falls on all who do not fully satisfy its requirements. This being so, Paul argues, the assumption of the legalist that the law is the basis of the divine judgment involves the conclusion that all men are accursed, and must be false. (Burton 1921, 165)

The reading has a fair degree of initial plausibility, assuming it correctly identifies the unstated premise. There is a significant problem however. According to this reading Paul is not affirming, but rather denying, that ὅσοι ἐκ ἔργων νόμου are really under a curse. This
would undermine any contrast that Paul could have been trying to make with the "blessed" condition of those who are \( \varepsilon \kappa \pi \iota \sigma \tau \varepsilon \omega \zeta \) (vs. 9); for Paul is actually affirming, or at least agreeing with, the stated parts of 9, so that the "explanatory" \( \gamma \alpha \rho \) assumes there is an affirmation or at least agreement in 10 as well. If the \( \gamma \alpha \rho \) of 10a is evidently explanatory (as we have argued), then the evident double-negation between 9 and 10 must either be acknowledged, or Paul must give a clear indication that this evident intent is not really intended, and of what is intended.\(^{18}\) So Paul must be affirming or at least agreeing with 10a, so he cannot be denying it so as to deny 10b. This is a subtle problem, but a crucial and ultimately fatal one for Burton's *reductio ad absurdum* reconstruction of verse 10.\(^ {19}\)

We infer that the argument is of some other type. Further consideration of the argument's type will wait until we have finished our word-studies in verse 10.

### 4.6 The meaning of \( \varepsilon \kappa \) in \( \varepsilon \xi \ \varepsilon \rho \gamma \omega \nu \rho \mu \omega \nu \) in 3:10a

Much interesting semantic content has been extracted from the preposition \( \varepsilon \kappa \) in 10a, as from the same preposition in verse 9. In particular, it is taken as more or less axiomatic by many or perhaps most commentators that \( \varepsilon \xi \ \varepsilon \rho \gamma \omega \nu \rho \mu \omega \nu \) here means approximately "relying upon or based upon works of the Law." It seems to be a common assumption that \( \varepsilon \kappa \) must retain here its original sense, "from." But this overlooks the point made by BAGD (s.v., 3.d.) that in such instances as these verses, "the idea of belonging often completely overshadows that of origin." BAGD offers under this heading translations of which the gist is "who are partisans of" or "who are members of the party of," and notes 3:7, 9 as examples. At any rate,

---

18. This is due to the Quantity maxim of conversation; see above, chap. 2.

19. This also happens to confirm our rejection of Stanley's "threat"-reading of the verse. For the contrast with verse 9 dictates that 10a affirm a real curse, not just the threat or potentiality of a curse (as to Stanley it appears to do), just as verse 9 pronounces a real blessing and not the potentiality of one.
nowhere does BAGD or any other lexicon give a sense of ἐκ that could feasibly yield the translation of οἱ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου as “those who rely on works of the Law.”

This fact has an obvious bearing on the issue of Paul’s overall rhetorical thrust, that is, on whether it is about legal matters such as jurisdiction and the content of “righteousness” or else about the means of righteousness or of justification. Paul is evidently saying that it is ultimately because οὓς ἐξ ἔργων νόμου are of the social group or party of the ἔργα νόμου that they are cursed. This could conceivably mean that it is because they hold to a certain theory, or because they cleave to a certain ideology or to a certain party or social group whose banner or general distinctiveness is the ἔργα νόμου. What it does not and lexically cannot say, at least not by its wording, is what so many commentators have assumed it meant, something like “those who endeavour to fulfil the Law to merit favour with God, i.e., those who rely upon works of the Law.” That may or may not be implied by what Paul says; that is a matter for investigation still. But it is not what Paul says.

4.7 The meaning of the two main verbs in 3:10b, ἔμμενει (+ dative) and τοῦ ἡσυχαί

We must address the issue of whether Paul intends both these verbs as action-words, and if so whether as “attempt” or “accomplish.” As we saw in chapter 2, this semantic issue is independent of the sociolinguistic, logical relationship for Paul between attributions of attempted doing of God’s Law, and those of its accomplishment. Moreover the issue is important for our attempt to understand Paul’s logic, since as we have seen Paul’s worldview does not hold attributions of the Law’s “accomplishment” and those of its “attempt” to be logically equivalent.

4.7.1 Lexicographical issues

First we should address the problem from the standpoint of lexicography. That is, does either term itself mean “accomplish” or can it more broadly mean “attempt” (where context allows), or perhaps must it always mean simply “attempt”?

4.7.1.1 Lexicography of ἐμμένω and syntax of τοῦ ποιήσαν

We find the verb ἐμμένω used commonly with the dative following, or else with ἐν plus the dative. In his quotation in Gal. 3:10b, Paul alters the LXX by omitting the preposition ἐν; however, this is not a concern, for following this verb either of these constructions can have one of (probably) two senses: locative or associative.21 We find the former sense perhaps in Acts 14:22 (ἐμμένειν τῇ πίστει); but the latter is the sense of the other NT instances of this verb (Acts 28:30, Heb. 8:9, and our verse), and in any context of keeping to vows, oaths, pledges, covenants, relationships, and so forth (e.g., Paul’s use of “ἐν the Law” in Rom. 2:12; 3:19; 1 Cor. 9:21).

This verb is, in NT interpretation, commonly translated “abide” or “remain.” According to LN (1:656, 729), ἐμμένω has two senses in the NT, one in the semantic domain “aspect” and subdomain “continue,” with the sense “to continue in an activity or state” (translatable as “to continue, to remain in, to keep on”), and the other sense in the semantic domain “existence in space,” subdomain “remain, stay,” with the sense “to remain in the same place over a period of time.” Clearly the word is, in Gal. 3:10, closer to the first sense; as an example of the word with this sense, LN translates from Heb. 8:9: “because they did not continue in my covenant,” and it notes that “in Heb. 8:9 the implication of ‘to continue in a covenant’ is to adhere to the articles or stipulations of a covenant. Accordingly

21. On the associative ἐν, see Zerwick 1963, §§116-17. On the associative dative, see BDF, §§193-94, 198. It seems hard to imagine the use, with this verb, of either construction in the sense of “accompanying circumstances,” which is a type of associative use. On the use of ἐν in the LXX (with an emphasis on the “ἐν of accompanying circumstances”), see Conybeare 1988, §91.
one may render He 8.9 as ‘because they did not remain faithful to my covenant’” (LN, 1:656).

And yet one wonders whether the translation “continue, remain in” really captures all that is going on in Heb. 8:9. Is it the fact of continuing, of not leaving, that is in view here? If so, where did LN get the word *faithful* in its translation, “remain faithful to”? Perhaps the verb may have another sense, perhaps in a different semantic domain. BAGD (*s.v.*, 2) seems more accurate in giving the sense as “persevere in, stand by *τιν* someth[ing].” LS expresses itself in similar terms.

This notion of “stand by” or “stand with” is especially interesting, because surprisingly ἐμένω is used at least once in the LXX in the literal sense of “stand” (Deut. 19:15). Moreover, ἔμενω is used quite often in that sense in the LXX, translating both מָצַב (Qal) and פָּשַׁת (*TDNT*, 575), as well as in the sense of “stand by (an opinion)” (LS, *s.v.*, 1.6); and the meaning of μένω is not irrelevant, in light of the potential etymological “transparency” of ἐμένω.22 Perhaps, then, ἐμένω belongs also to a semantic domain with words meaning “stand (by or with).” Quite significant in this regard is Ecclus. 11:20–21:

*Ecclus. 11:20*

\[\Sigmaτηθι \ εν διαθήκη σου καὶ ὅμως \ εν αὐτῇ καὶ \ εν τῷ ἔργῳ σου παλαιώθητι.\]

*Stand* by your covenant and attend to it, and grow old in your work.

*11:21*

\[μὴ βαθύμαζε \ εν ἔργοις ἐμαρτημῶν, πίστευε \ δὲ \ κυρίῳ καὶ \ ἐμένε \ τῷ πόνῳ σου; ὅτι \ κοῦφον \ ἐν \ ὀφθαλμοῖς \ κυρίου \ διὰ \ τάχους \ ἔξάπτωσε \ πλούσιον \ πένητα\]

\[Do \ not \ wonder \ at \ the \ works \ of \ a \ sinner, \ but \ trust \ in \ the \ Lord \ and \ keep \ at \ your \ toil; \ for \ it \ is \ easy \ in \ the \ sight \ of \ the \ Lord \ to \ enrich \ a \ poor \ man \ quickly \ and \ suddenly (RSV).\]

22. On the relevance of “transparency” for the present semantic significance of a word’s etymology, see Silva 1983, 48–51.
Note here the interesting use of ἵστημι ("stand") in relation to διαθήκη in verse 20; this is significant for the meaning of ἐμμένω also in a parallel passage such as Jer. 38(31 MT):32 (cited in Heb. 8:9), of which there are numerous parallel usages in the LXX. Also significant for ἐμμένω is the apparent parallelism between the first two clauses of vs. 20, closely relating "standing by your covenant" to "growing old in your work," and the corresponding expression of the idea, "keeping at your toil," in verse 21, by ἐμμένω plus the dative.23 This all suggests further that we are on the right track in seeing ἐμμένω here as semantically related to ἵστημι, as a synonym. In fact LN (1:152, s.v. ἱστήμενα, §13.29) places ἵστημι, used in this sense, in the semantic domain "be, become, exist, happen" and the subdomain "state," and gives it the sense "to continue firmly or well-established in a particular state," translatable (says LN) as "to firmly remain, to continue steadfastly." The additional idea of "by" or "with" is, of course, then related by the associative-dative construction (with or without ἐν) following the verb.

Admittedly, there seems only a slight difference between this sense of ἐμμένω and the one it had in the domain "aspect" and subdomain "continue," the difference consisting only in the notion of steadfastness. Yet in fact this is a whole different emphasis, different enough to put the idea in another semantic domain.24 Since in English "abide by" is an idiom meaning "to submit to, agree to" and "to remain steadfast or faithful to," it would surely be an acceptable translation of the verb when the word in the dative refers to vows, promises, commands, or other obligations. At any rate, to "stand [ἐμμένει] by all the words of the Law" in this verse means, according to our analysis, something like "stand steadfastly by all the words of the book of the covenant."

23. Note also the correlation of these ideas in the quite parallel Pauline passage, 1 Cor. 15:58: "... be steadfast, immovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, knowing that your toil is not in vain in the Lord [i.e., 'in' his covenant]" (NASB).

24. LN (1:149 n.1) mentions the closeness of the "aspect" domain to the domain "be, become, exist, happen"; yet it also insists on a significant contrast between the senses belonging to the latter's subdomain "state" and similar senses belonging to the domain "aspect" (1:149 n.2).
The other major semantic element we need to examine is the infinitive-construct phrase τοῦ ποιήσαι αὐτά which follows ὁκ ἐμμενεῖ ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς λόγοις τοῦ νόμου τούτου in Deut. 26:27 LXX, and we must ask what light, if any, that sheds on the meaning of ἐμμενώ. Let us first consider the Hebrew, and in particular the grammar, of the MT here. The Hebrew of the infinitival phrase is בְּגוֹא וְתוֹשֵׁשך. Grammatically, the options for the Hebrew construction in this context are the “infinitive of result” and the “explanatory” or “epexegetical” infinitive (explaining the “circumstances or nature of a preceding action”; Waltke and O’Connor 1990, §36.2.3, ¶d-e; Williams 1976, §§195, 198).25 The options in LXX and NT Greek are the same (Conybeare and Stock 1988 [1905], §60b–c; Zerwick 1963, §§391–92).26

Conybeare (1988 [1905], §60b) classifies the construction in Gal. 3:10b (Deut. 27:26) as “explanatory” infinitive. Waltke and O’Connor (1990, §36.2.3, ¶e) similarly classify a parallel example (Deut. 13:19), also with רָשָׁשְׁך, of a common co-occurrence of “keeping” (משב) and “doing” (משם), the latter appearing either with the direct object “the commands” or with the adverbial phrase “according to all that I have commanded.”27 This common construction often has רָשָׁשְׁך in the infinitive instead, sometimes has רָשָׁשְׁך in the infinitive, and often has neither in the infinitive, connecting the two with ר. This random pattern shows that when the infinitive רָשָׁשְׁך follows רָשָׁשְׁך in these parallelisms, it is not an infinitive of result, so must be an epexegetical-or-explanatory infinitive. Moreover, the same reasoning is true of the LXX translations of these verses. Since this is such a common pattern in these

25. It seems impossible to fit the infinitive of purpose into a context like this.

26. “The LXX is on the whole a literal translation, that is to say, it is only half translation—the vocabulary has been changed, but seldom the construction. We have therefore to deal with a work of which the vocabulary is Greek and the syntax Hebrew” (Conybeare and Stock 1988 [1905], §38).

27. Examples of this parallelism in the Pentateuch include Gen. 18:19; Exod. 31:16; Lev. 18:30; 19:37; 20:8, 22; 22:31; 25:18; 26:3; Deut. 4:6; 6:3; 7:11, 12; 8:1; 11:22; 12:1, 32 (13:1 Heb.); 13:18(19); 16:12; 17:19; 19:9; 23:23(24); 24:8; 26:16; 28:13; 29:9(8).
in covenantal contexts, it seems most likely that this is the sort of infinitive we have in Deut.

27:26.28

But let us be more precise. Are the "explanatory-or-epexegetical" instances of נפוג in these parallelisms, explanatory or epexegetical? That is to say, does the infinitive explain the circumstances, or else the nature, of the preceding action? It does not seem that the infinitive is used here merely to explain the circumstances or manner of the preceding action; would "doing" the commands be the mere manner or circumstances in which one "exercises care over" them? It seems clear that we have here a purely epexegetical, or glossing, infinitive. This is true of these parallelisms both in the MT and in the LXX.

But if so, and especially if (as we have suggested) the parallel instance of נפוג in Deut. 27:26 is likewise following this epexegetical pattern, that would imply that ἔμμενω with the dative construction has here necessarily some sense of action, and does not merely mean someone's goals, values, intentions, emotions, or any other state(s) of mind; for the infinitive phrase τοῦ ποιῆσαι αὑτοῦς, which has a manifest action sense, is also epexegetical (and to be translated "[in, by] doing them") and not an infinitive of result. Although classifiable broadly as a "participle expressing manner or means," more informatively and precisely it "denotes the same action as that of the principal verb, describing it from a different point of view" (Burton 1976 [1900], §447).29 The focus on action also shows that

28. But also interesting in this regard is the form these parallelisms take sometimes, with רפוע as the first verb, and the direct object ("commands") or adverbial phrase only following the second verb (نشرרה : "keep to do them"; see Deut. 5:1, 32; 6:25; 11:32; 17:10; 28:1, 15, 58; 31:12; 32:46). Since רפוע in the Qal (as in these verses) is an action-verb and does not carry the idea of "be careful" (although the Nif'al can have a sense something like this, "take care to yourself"), and given the limited possibilities for the sense of the infinitive construction (not including as a modifier), the common translation of this parallel construction as "be careful to do" would seem not very literal. But the absence of the complement after רפוע is grammatically puzzling. Probably the infinitive is the object of רפוע (cf. Williams 1976, §193); and a literal translation might be "exercise care over doing," and a more idiomatic translation, "do carefully or diligently" (Holladay 1988, s.v. רפוע, 5; TWOT, 939).

"all the words of the Law" means, not literally every lexical item in the text, but specifically all the commands, "terms," and obligations laid down in the covenantal documents.

A semantic potential for an "action"-sense of ἐμμένω is confirmed by examination of the places where ἐμμένω is used in the LXX. The word appears 21 times. Nine of these times it is used absolutely, with no dative construction following. In six of these nine times, it means "to continue, be unchanged," the aspect of continuance being the focus.30 In another of the nine instances, it means "stand" physically (Deut. 19:5).31 Of the other two, one (Num. 23:19) involves an ellipsis, where a dative construction of "vows" or "promises" is to be understood from the context:

οὐ ὡς ἀνθρωπός ὁ θεός διαρτήθησαι
οὐδὲ ὡς νῖς ἀνθρώπον ἀπειλήθησαι:
ἀυτὸς εἶπος οὐχὶ ποιήσαι;
λαλήσει, καὶ οὐχὶ ἐμμένει;  

God is not man, that he should lie, or a son of man, that he should repent.
Has he said, and will he not do it? Or has he spoken, and will he not fulfill it?

The parallelism in the last half of the verse shows us clearly that ἐμμένει refers to action here. Also in the remaining instance of ἐμμένω used absolutely (1 Macc. 10:27), there seems to be an ellipsis of a dative construction, this time of "friendship," to be understood from the previous verse (we quote both):

1 Macc. 10:26
ἐπεὶ συνετήρησατε τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς συνθήκας καὶ ἐμμείνατε τῇ φιλίᾳ ἡμῶν καὶ οὐ προσεχωρήσατε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἡμῶν, ἠκούσαμεν καὶ ἐχάρημεν.

Since you have kept your agreement with us and have continued [in] your friendship with us, and have not sided with our enemies, we have heard of it and rejoiced.

31. All of these seven that is a translation of the MT (six of them), except one (Dan. 12:12), is a translation of יָשָׁר (Qal).
10:27
καὶ νῦν ἐμμένωντε ἐπὶ τοῦ συντηρήσας πρὸς ἡμᾶς πίστιν, καὶ ἀντυποδώσαμεν ὑμᾶν ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἥν ἐν ποιεῖτε μεθ' ἡμῶν.

And now continue still to keep faith with us, and we will repay you with good for what you do for us (RSV).

Here we have a covenantal context, but at first blush it may appear that we do not have a meaning of action, but rather of mental states, because of the verb-and-dative construction’s meaning “remain in (friendship)” in verse 26 and its epexegetical infinitive in verse 27, “keep faithfulness towards us.” But it is the verbal notion “keep” that is epexegetical in this latter construction, and this verb, συντηρέω, appears in parallel with εἰμί in verse 26. Moreover, in the above verses both the “friendship” and the “faithfulness” are in parallelism with actions (“not siding with enemies” and “the good you do”). So in fact it is action that is meant by εἰμί in these two verses.

Where εἰμί has an accompanying dative construction, the dative substantives include “the fear of [God]” (Ecclus. 2:10), “wisdom” (6:20), “you” (7:22), “[God]” (Isa. 30:18, with εἰς plus the dative), and “[God’s] covenant” (Jer. 38(31):22). In at least some of these, the dative is locative rather than associative, and the verb simply means “remain in.” At any rate, whenever elsewhere in the LXX εἰμί is used explicitly with the dative or with εἰς plus the dative the word in the dative always refers to vows, promises, commands, or obligations in general; and in each case it is clear (as in 1 Macc. 10:26 just above) that εἰμί (with the dative construction) refers to actions. Besides our target text, these other instances of εἰμί used with a dative construction in the LXX include: Dan. 6:13a (LXX); Ecclus. 11:21; 28:6; Jer. 51(44):25 (twice; once translating an infinitive absolute). Thus we have seen that in many cases in the LXX translations where εἰμί is used with the dative of a word referring to vows or commands or other covenantal obligations, the idea expressed is the performance (whether accomplishment or merely attempt) of the thing vowed or...
commanded. Thus it is indeed a semantic likelihood for the ἐμένω in Deut. 27:26. And we saw that that sense is apparently demanded in Deut. 27:26, for ἐμένω ("stand steadfastly by" or "abide by"), by its "epexegetical" or glossing infinitive ποιήσας ("doing").

But can we narrow these verbs' senses more than this? Is the focus on the endeavour in the action or on the accomplishment of the action, or both? The immediate literary context gives us no particular grounds for either of these statements, it seems. Indeed, that the idea conveyed by ἐμένω plus the dative construction is general and comprehensive seems confirmed in Deut. 27:26 by the generality of the epexegetical infinitive that follows, "in doing them."

As we will see below, there are reasons to think that in the covenantal context of these passages, the focus of the speaker would be the endeavour of the action, rather than what is actually accomplished; but be that as it may, this information is apparently not conveyed by the mere verb ἐμένω plus the dative construction. With regard to its lexical semantics, it appears that this word, with the dative construction referring to vows, promises, or commands, carries simply the general sense of "do (these things) steadfastly." This means that as far as we can tell, it had the potential for being contextually "neutralised" to the sense "accomplish," although that potential seems rather doubtful in view of the semantic element of "steadfastness" or "faithfulness" in ἐμένω. But that is as far as Greek lexicography will take us.

We must turn then to the corresponding Hebrew word in the MT. It is admittedly more important for our purposes to know what is intended in the LXX of Deut. 27:26, than to grasp the meaning of the MT of that verse; for Paul is quoting the LXX translation. (Actually he paraphrases it, probably quoting from memory, although it is clear that by changing the wording he has neither added to nor taken away from, nor altered, the semantic import of the LXX.) The sense of the Hebrew is not totally irrelevant, however. Paul was
probably also familiar with the Hebrew of the verse, and it may have influenced his understanding of the verse. In addition, the LXX translator of Deuteronomy 27 was trying to express in Greek the meaning of the Hebrew, and it is just possible, though not really likely, that he was trying to pack a little more or a little different meaning into the Greek than what it could bear. At any rate, we need to look at the lexicology and context of ḥoph (Hif'il) in this verse, if only to be sure it does not undermine or qualify the conclusion we reached in our study of the Greek.

4.7.1.2 Lexicography of ḥoph (Hif'il)

The Hebrew word we are dealing with here has a meaning rather different from that of the Greek word ἐμμενω: the verb ḥoph in the Hif'il is a transitive verb; it takes a direct object, rather than a dative construction. The etymological, original sense would be “Make stand, establish, set up.” But what did the word come to mean when used of vows or promises or commands or covenants? When the direct object is “covenant,” it usually means, or seems to mean, to initiate or set up a covenantal relationship, but in some passages it clearly refers to action taken pursuant to existing covenantal obligations (e.g., Lev. 26:9; Deut. 8:18). In such passages, the sense seems to be “confirm.” Such seems to be the sense also in one passage concerning a wife’s vows; that is, it means to confirm the vows as binding (Num. 30:14(15)). In the other passages concerning vows and commandments, however, the sense clearly is “carry out, perform, give effect to” (cf. BDB; Holladay 1988).32 We have already looked at Num. 23:19 (see p. 177). Here are a few other examples:

1 Sam. 2:13
And Samuel came to Saul, and Saul said to him, “Blessed be you to the LORD; I have performed the commandment of the LORD.”

32. E.g., Gen. 26:3; Deut. 9:5; 1 Sam. 3:12; 15:13; 1 Kings 2:4; 2 Chron. 6:10; 10:15; Neh. 9:8; Isa. 44:26; Jer. 11:5; 23:20; 28:6; 29:10; 30:24; 33:14; 44:25. Others, in which this sense is only probable, include 1 Sam. 1:23; 15:11; 2 Sam. 7:25; 1 Kings 6:12; 2 Kings 23:3; Neh. 5:13; Ps. 119:38; Jer. 35:16; Dan. 9:12.
1 Kings 8:20
Now the LORD has fulfilled his promise which he made; for I have risen in the place of David my father, and sit on the throne of Israel, as the LORD promised, and I have built the house for the name of the LORD, the God of Israel.

1 Kings 12:15
So the king did not hearken to the people; for it was a turn of affairs brought about by the LORD that he might fulfil his word, which the LORD spoke by Ahi'jah the Shi'lonite to Jerobo'am the son of Nebat.

Jer. 34:18
And the men who transgressed my covenant and did not keep the terms of the covenant which they made before me, I will make like the calf which they cut in two and passed between its parts --

Jer. 35:16
The sons of Jon'adab the son of Rechab have kept the command which their father gave them, but this people has not obeyed me.

Can we be more specific about the focus of the word here, and claim that it focuses either on the action as attempt to do something, or on the action as accomplishing a certain thing? The literary contexts do not clearly support either claim. All that the words clearly indicate is the general idea of “doing” the thing vowed or commanded.

The sense of the Hebrew of Deut. 27:26 is thus in line with what we found in our study of the Greek phrase: the general idea of “do the things commanded.” It would seem that, as with the English concept “do,” only the broader situational context can shed light on whether it is the attempt to do a certain thing, or its actual accomplishment, that the speaker intends.

4.7.1.3 The limits of lexicography

But nevertheless we need to ask this question. As we saw in our examples with the English
word "do," the speaker often, indeed probably always, is thinking either of an intent (manifest in action calculated to accomplish the intent) or else of some actual accomplishment (see chap. 2).

When the speaker is using a general term (like "do") and yet intends to convey a more specific notion (like "accomplish" is for Paul), there is additional information conveyed (a narrower term conveys more information, Lyons 1968, 454); and it is the situational or linguistic context which the speaker uses to convey the additional semantic information.33 This semantic phenomenon is called "contextual semantic neutralisation" (i.e., context neutralises the semantic difference between the broader concept and a narrower one). Linguists claim this phenomenon is a common one (Lyons 1968, 452; Silva 1983, 166).34 So the question arises: does this phenomenon occur in the case of these verbs in Deut. 27:26? Does Paul mean "accomplish" even though he uses a general term that in itself only signifies "endeavour"?

This is a reasonable question. But in any particular instance the burden of proof should be placed on the suggestion that semantic neutralisation is taking place. The Quantity maxim of conversation (see chap. 2) calls for a speaker (or writer) not to use a more-informative, narrower term if the context would effectively neutralise the semantic difference between a broader term and the narrower one; for then the narrower, more-informative term is unnecessary, the context provides the extra information. But the Quantity maxim also calls

33. English dictionaries that do a synonym study comparing them will generally suggest that "accomplish" is a narrower concept than the general idea "do," in that the former implies also success in some (measurable) achievement.

34. Lyons' discussion and examples are very helpful for getting a feel for semantic neutralisation (see Lyons 1968, 452-53): "For instance, the difference between the marked term bitch and the unmarked term dog is neutralised in a context, like My ______ has just had pups, which determines the animal referred to as female. . . . One can say either I'm flying to New York or I'm going to New York by air, either I'm driving to New York or I'm going to New York by car. In the one case the distinction is made by the paradigmatic choice of the verbs fly and drive, in the other by the syntagmatic modification of the more general verb go" (ibid., 452).
for the speaker to use as informative a term as is necessary; so when the context would not provide the information neutralising the semantic difference between such terms, the speaker will need to use the narrower term. So when neutralisation is taking place, the context, assuming one is familiar with it, provides evidence of the fact; but to prove that no neutralisation takes place, one must show that the context does not provide such evidence. Since it is a universal negative, that would be very difficult to prove, even for a member of the original audience; one would need a comprehensive knowledge of the linguistic and non-linguistic contexts in view of which the author might be composing his speech.

Communication presupposes that the hearer actually has a feasible knowledge of the presuppositions which the author assumes are in common, but it does not presuppose that the hearer has a god-like ability to read the author’s mind. An original hearer assumes that the author provides, either explicitly or through context, all the information necessary. So what the hearer does is to infer neutralisation only when the evidence indicates it; he or she does not assume until and unless contrary evidence appears, that neutralisation is intended. The former is therefore the right model for exegesis.

There is some evidence to suggest neutralisation is taking place in the original literary context of Deut. 27:26. We must therefore scrutinise this evidence to see if the reader should infer neutralisation of “do” in 27:26, to the narrower sense “accomplish.”

4.7.2 Semantic neutralisation in the original context?

If we claim that according to the evidence the curse of Deut. 27:26 came on the Israelite only for deliberate rebellion against God’s commands, there may seem to be a conflict with this reading arising from the OT passage in which verse 26 occurs, Deut. 27:15–26. For there, in verses 15–25, we see the curses being invoked on anyone who commits this and that specific sin. Does this not weigh in favour of seeing these, and verse 26 also, as referring to concrete, completed actions, rather than mere intention/attempt?
This is not really a problem for the non-neutralisation reading. As we saw in chapter 2, the context of a statement determines whether even terms for specific actions (i.e., not only general terms like *do*) refer to the action from the standpoint of accomplishment or that of attempt to accomplish. One could even say that each usage of such a verb has one of two implicit qualifiers: either the speaker means “accomplishment of (such and such),” or else he or she means “attempt to do (such and such).” So in Deut. 27:15-25, it seems unlikely that the author of this passage could have intended that everyone who ever commits any of these particular sins, *either intentionally or unintentionally*, is *cursed*. There was in the Torah, after all, a system of sin-offerings ostensibly effective for unintentional sins. Moreover, the references to deeds done “in secret” (27:15, 24), if they indicate anything, suggest that the doer knows he or she is sinning, and tries to hide the fact. So 27:15-25 does not well bear the burden of proof that semantic neutralisation is narrowing the meaning to “accomplish.”

4.7.3 Conclusions on Deut. 27:26

The main verbs used in Deut. 27:26a, ἐπιμένω (plus the dative construction) in the LXX, and יָשָׁב (Hif'il) in the MT, are general terms, referring here to action taken pursuant to the commands of the covenant. This is also true of the epexegetical infinitive, “[by] doing them,” which follows the main verbs in both the MT and the LXX. The covenantal context of this verse does not suggest that semantic neutralisation to the narrower sense “accomplish” was intended in the original text. So Paul would probably assume that these verbs focus, in the original context, on the action as attempt or endeavour to carry out the wishes of the covenantal suzerain. So in the original context of Deut. 27:26, or at least as Paul would probably read that passage, the verbs translated by ἐπιμένω and ποιεῖω in the LXX have the sense “abide by” or “do faithfully,” that is, “endeavour/attempt diligently to fulfil.”

This conclusion does not tell us what the usual Jewish reading (if any) of this OT text was, in Paul's time. But no doubt the conclusion is more or less relevant: it gives us a rather remote literary-historical background, and thus a hint, at least, as to Paul's own probable reading of this OT text, or else his opponents', or both. This may well help us to understand Paul's intended sense in Gal. 3:10b. At least it points us to the most likely reading. That reading is not contradicted by the context in Gal. 3:10 (indeed, as we shall see, it could not reasonably work there). And it is corroborated, we believe, by the sorts of criteria by which God judges people, according to Paul's portrayals of such judgment in Romans 2 and 3.

None of the verbs or verbal phrases which Paul uses there, within the criteria-statements, are inherently focused on completed deeds; but some of them are inherently focused on endeavour to fulfil. For example, God will render to each according to his "deeds" (vs. 6):

*Rom. 2:7*

to those who *by patience in well-doing* seek for glory and honor and immortality, he will give eternal life;

*2:8*

but for those who are factious and do not *obey the truth*, but obey wickedness, there will be wrath and fury.

Likewise, God's condemning of "Both Jews and Greeks [Gentiles]" (3:9, cf. 19) is because, among other things, "No one *seeks* for God. All have turned aside . . . There is no *fear of God* before their eyes" (Rom. 3:11–12, 18). The focus here is on attitude and obedience, that is, endeavour to accomplish, rather than on completed deed as such; it is "qualitative" rather than "quantitative."

Also strongly corroborating this reading is our finding (above) that Paul is actually affirming this curse (on ὧδοι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου) and that the curse is at least tantamount to a truly effectual, eschatological one. For in order for this curse to be on that ἐξ ἔργων νόμου party and yet not on οἱ ἐκ πίστεως, it cannot be for failure to *accomplish* all the things written, since both Paul and his Jewish contemporaries would have considered it beyond any
man's means to live completely unhindered by sinful habits of thought and deed, such that he accomplished fully all the things commanded in the Law.\textsuperscript{36} Yet if Paul intended some unstated qualification of such an accomplishments-requiment (e.g., accomplishes "most of the time"), then those "of works of the Law" would surely be less likely to fall under this curse than some Gentiles who are "of faith" (vss. 8–9) but not Law-devotees. So by these verbs Paul almost certainly means "attempt, endeavour" all the things written in the Law.

Now, there is substantial significance to this exegetical result, with respect to the sort of unstated premise(s) Paul may be using here in Gal. 3:10. For the heated debate over whether Paul is implicitly (i.e., unstatedly) denying οὐκ ἔχει ἔργων νόμου the "ability" to keep the Law, has evidently been rather misplaced if not misguided. This debate has fallen into two pitfalls of ambiguity: most participants leave ambiguous what they mean by "ability," which can mean either "the means" or "the power, the capacity" to do something (one may have the means and yet not have the inherent power, perhaps lacking the necessary will); and most participants fail to ask or explain the question with which we have dealt here, namely, whether Paul means, by the main verbs in 10b, "endeavour" or "complete/accomplish."

That leaves a debilitating lack of clarity about the issues involved. By contrast we are now in a position to clarify those issues, and to come to some conclusions which may contradict both parties to this debate.

If Paul were denying not merely that they had the capacity/power, but also that they even had the means to "do" all of the Law, he would be bringing the debate into a quantitative, counting or measuring mode (since means are necessarily perceived as having some measurable and quantifiable effect). So this means-denying premise would (as we have just noted) imply that Paul was talking about completions (which are measurable, quantifiable) rather than just about endeavour (which is not measurable, in and of itself). But

\textsuperscript{36} For biblical teaching to this effect see 2 Chron. 6:36; Job 9:2; 15:14–16; Pss. 130:3; 143:2; Prov. 20:9; Eccles. 7:20; James 3:2a; 1 John 1:8–10.
our analysis has found no indication that such was the meaning of Deut. 27:26, either originally or in Paul's thinking; and we have placed the burden of proof on the suggestion that it was.

Yet the traditional reconstruction of 3:10 has usually been stated in terms of the "futility" of trying to do the Law, since humankind is "unable" to do what it requires; thus it strongly suggests that human means for satisfying the covenant's conditions are lacking, the conditions being nothing less than perfect achievement of all that the Law commands. Such explanation of Paul's unstated meaning has now drawn vigorous protest from those who believe that in 1st-century Judaism a human being was seen as fully "capable" of meeting the Law's requirement (if he or she wished to do so). This protest is probably well-founded if it intends to say that for 1st-century Jews, all humans have the means to obey (i.e., to endeavour to fulfil). But it has not often been made very clear whether this interpretation intends "means" or "power," nor even whether it intends "obey (endeavour to fulfil the commands)" or "fulfil" (complete, accomplish). Paying attention to these definitional issues, we are now in a position to say that the traditional reading, when put in terms that suggest a lack of human means to do that which the Law requires—namely to "abide by" (endeavour to fulfil) all the things commanded, is probably a wrong reading of 3:10b, since it would entail that the verbs there mean "accomplish." But surely we can say that for 1st-century Jews, all humans have the means to obey, to endeavour. Moreover, if (all) humans lack the means to "abide by" the Law, then so do Christians; but then (as we intimated above, in the section on "cursed") this would destroy the contrast Paul is trying to draw between oi ἐκ πίστεως and ὄσιν ἐξ ἐργαν νόμου.


38. Our finding has implications also for Paul's logic, which implications we shall have occasion to note as we proceed.
But on the other hand, this finding about the traditional missing premise does not entail that no unspoken premise about some humans' “inability” in the broader sense (the “power” or capacity, as including the will) is involved; for if one has the means but not the will, in this sense one still “cannot” obey. Thus, our reading gives us no reason to conclude that Paul is sanguine about the possibility of being justified through the Law.

4.8 Type of argument: pure logos (causa cognoscendi), or deliberative “argument from consequences”?

There is another and related exegetical significance to our reading of these verbs. This reading implicitly denies that Paul’s overall argument in 3:10 is warning the readers against taking on an obligation (viz., the Law as a covenant) that they have not the means to discharge and whose inevitable non-discharging would reap a curse. For since the lack of “doing” of which Paul speaks must, in his eyes, be due to a lack of will (to endeavour), rather than to a lack of means (to accomplish), Paul’s argument would become a trying to warn against adopting theory X (about the right means of justification) because the theory would lead “as many as” adopt it to reject it! There is no way to have a coherent, intelligible, or rational argument, working within these parameters; quite obviously any such argument “begs the question” (i.e., assumes what it tries to prove): “You should not adopt this theory, because in the end you will decide that you should not have adopted this theory.”

This leads one naturally to the inference that Paul’s argument in 3:10 is not ultimately about means at all (whether of justification, of righteousness, or whatever); it is not an argument-from-consequences warning about the dire repercussions of following some particular wrong course. Rather, it is simply an attempt to prove or disprove some proposition. Apparently at least, that proposition is that “δοςι εξ έργων νόμου are under a curse.” How he seeks to imply that proposition, in any case, is what we must now consider.
4.9 Understanding Paul’s logic in 3:10

We move on now to consideration of the propositional meanings and logic of 3:10. There is hardly any reason to doubt the obvious categorical forms of either 10a or 10b. Both of them at least seem to constitute universal, positive propositions: “All who are ἐξ ἐργῶν νόμου are under a curse,” for “All who do not abide by all things written in the Law, are cursed.” One thing that easily escapes notice, however, is that the second proposition is actually a definitional one. Like all covenantal statements that define who is cursed or who is blessed, this statement includes, but also implicitly excludes: it states the criterion by which one may determine whether someone is cursed or not. Thus, there is another categorical form intended by it as well, the converse of the stated one, which converse is: “All those who are cursed do not abide [or, None who are cursed do abide] by all things written in the Law.”

It is in the question of how to reconstruct Paul’s argument in verse 10, that the real interest and debate arises. At the outset, we should indicate that the few writers (e.g., Fuller 1975, 33; Betz 1979, 145; Cranford 1994, 245, 248) who criticise the very idea of an unstated premise in this verse, are always in effect protesting one particular unstated premise (viz., that no one is “able” to do all the things written in the Law); unconsciously or not, informally or not, they almost always go on to supply their own explanation of Paul’s logic, in fact their own unstated premise(s). As Schreiner (1984, 156) correctly notes,

The presence of an implied proposition should not be excluded out of hand. Implied propositions, after all, are a common feature of human language, and thus the real question is whether there is an implied proposition in this verse. . . . We think the evidence supports . . . use of an implied proposition in Gal 3:10. Otherwise . . . the citation of the OT passage would be meaningless.

The only way around this exegetical inference would be the claim that the argument of 3:10 is not implicit in that verse but rather explicit in the following verse or verses. A few commentators do more or less take this route (e.g., Barrett 1985, 26). That suggestion is
fairly plausible on the face of it; the problem is that the following verses do not supply the needed premise(s).

4.9.1 Paul's unstated premise(s): cursed because (sinful) human beings?

Before we plunge in to supplying the details of the argument, however, it would be well to see if we might first categorise it as to basic type of “real-life” argument. Therefore we must look at the remaining possible types of argument (having ruled out the reductio ad absurdum), namely the syllogism and the polysyllogism (cf. above; a “pure hypothetical syllogism” is ruled out by the non-conditional inference, 10a). Note first that the traditionally supplied missing premise, “No human being abides by all things written in the Law,” is not strictly necessary to complete the syllogism. All that is logically necessary is the missing minor premise, containing the middle term (“do not abide by all things written in the Law”) and the minor term (“as many as are of acts of the Law”). Since both the stated premise and the conclusion are A-type propositions, only AAA(1) is a possible logical reconstruction of the syllogism. Specifically, then, we need this unstated premise: “As many as are of acts of the Law do not abide by all things written in the Law.” There may be additional unstated premises working here that imply this one; for example, theoretically the argument could be a polysyllogism as follows:

a. (unstated) All who are of works of the law are human beings.
b. (unstated) All human beings do not abide by everything written in the Law.
(unstated conclusion of the above) All who are of works of the Law do not abide by everything written in the Law.
c. All who do not abide by everything written in the Law are cursed (3:10b).
Therefore, all who are of works of the Law are cursed (3:10a).

39. See above, chap. 2, § 2.1.5.3.
But there is no way to complete the syllogism without implicitly involving this particular proposition (it is the 3rd proposition, in the above reconstruction).\(^{40}\) This fact is almost always overlooked in the exegesis of this verse.\(^{41}\) What exegetes need to explain is this: by what thinking or assumptions did Paul arrive at this rather surprising but entailed premise, and further, how could he leave the latter unstated, as if it were a presupposition shared with the reader. It is basically this challenge that makes this verse so difficult.

Let us also recapitulate what we have found in the present chapter, concerning the "traditional" reading of the argument. We have found that the unstated premise that "none have the means to abide by the Law" would not be a plausible one, since all have the means to _endeavour_ to carry out the Law's commands. Furthermore, if (all) humans constantly fail to "abide by" the Law, then Christians do as well, ipso facto; but then this would deny the contrast Paul is trying to draw between _οἱ ἐκ πίστεως_ and _ὅσοι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου_, for it would make them cursed for the same reason and in the same way. Some commentators indeed appeal to verse 13 here, and say that yes, this curse pronounced upon all is effective, but effective only upon one person, Jesus Christ (e.g., Mussner 1974, 225; Hübner 1984, 39).

This expedient is problematic: First, it assumes that Paul has a "cosmic-ontological," substitutionary theory of the atonement, which assumption we shall see is doubtful (below, 40. The above is stated in the order of a Goclenian sorites (see chap. 2). It is true that one could reverse the order of premises _a_, _b_, and _c_ and obtain the form called Aristotelian sorites, in which case the 3rd proposition above would not seem directly involved in the argument. But the point is that premises _a_ and _b_ must in any case _imply_ that proposition, else they could not complete the argument of vs. 10.

41. Those who support the traditionally supplied premise almost never acknowledge that it is not really required for the completion of the logic; generally, they suggest that it is. A typical and oft-cited statement comes from Moo (1983, 98): "Thus, although Paul does not state in so many words that no one does the law, his assertion that 'all who ( hosoi) rely on 'works of the law' for justification are cursed makes sense only if, in fact, 'all' fail to do the law." Similarly Calvin (1965, 53); Lightfoot (1890, 137); Mussner (1974, 225–26); Hübner (1984, 19, 38); Schreiner (1984, 156); F. Watson (1986, 200–1 n. 108); Fung (1988, 142); Hansen (1989, 119; 1994, 92–93 n. ); R. Longenecker (1990, 118); Hong (1993, 137). On the other hand, those who oppose this supplied premise usually overreact by suggesting that the argument contains no unstated premise (e.g., Fuller 1975; Cosgrove 1978; Sanders 1983; Cranford 1994).
chap. 6). Second, in this case Christian "faith" could not be in this supposed substitutionary
efficacy of Christ's death alone (as the theory presumes), lest this "faith" be definable only
circularly; for the "faith" must then believe that the substitutionary efficacy is precisely for
the "faithful" only: otherwise διός ἐξ ἔργων νόμον are redeemed from the curse along with
the faithful in which case 3:10 fails to portray any contrast with οἱ ἐκ πίστεως of verse 9.
Third, this reading dubiously weakens the inherent power of a pronouncement of God (cf.
above): if God says that "A is cursed," then undoubtedly, to a Jew who believes the Hebrew
Bible, A is indeed effectively "cursed." The burden of proof would surely be on any denial
of the latter, which proof Paul does not at all clearly give or intimate. Again, see chap. 6;
but we should mention here the ambiguous (because deictic) term ἡμᾶς of vs. 13, on the
contextual definition of which such exegesis of vs. 10 would have to depend but which
definition would ultimately have to depend on vs. 10 itself. What Paul unequivocally
intimates is simply that which fills out the logic of his argument, namely that "All those who
are of deeds of the Law do not abide by all things written ..." In light of the above defects,
then, we must dismiss the traditional reading from consideration.

4.9.2 Paul's unstated premise(s): cursed merely because they are ἐξ ἔργων νόμου?

Does Paul have an unstated syllogism underlying his unstated premise (that "As many as are
ἐξ ἔργων νόμου do not abide by all things written in the Law"), thus creating a
polysyllogism? Or is this unstated premise meant as so self-evidently true that no presumed,
underlying reasoning is necessarily invoked? There have been a number of exegetical
theories that tend to take the unstated reason as more or less self-evident to any 1st-century
person familiar with the beliefs, traditions, and sociological dynamics of Judaism in the
general area of Palestine. It is hard to know exactly which readings to place in that category,
for generally they do explain a certain logic behind Paul's unstated meaning; but this logic is
portrayed as part of the general presupposition pool of the culture belonging to such a person. In any case, we shall examine the basic view of Wright and Scott and Hafemann and Thielman and Bligh, the view of Dunn and of Cranford and Bonneau, and that of D. P. Fuller and C. Cosgrove (formerly). 42

Before we begin, however, we should reiterate the basic problem facing every attempt to explain the logically-required unspoken premise. This premise denies something that would be, not merely a presupposition, but virtually an axiom within the general culture to which we have just referred. As Dunn notes (1990b, 226, cf. 1993a, 170-71), “most Jews of Paul’s day would simply assume that to be ἐξ ἔργων νόμου is to remain within all that the Torah lays down, is to do what the Law requires.” 43 This would generally have been taken as true by definition; at any rate, those who are “of works of the Law” would have been seen as implicitly those who “do all things written in the Law.” Thus, if Paul were appealing merely to this general Mediterranean-cultural presupposition-pool, his argument would have to fail dramatically. Consider his unstated premise, in light of what we learned about supplying suppressed premises. The cardinal principle was that “the proposition must be one which the speaker can safely presume his hearers to accept as true” (Copi 1968, 194). Could Paul safely presume that Mediterranean readers in general would accept as true the proposition that “None who are of works of the Law attempts (steadfastly) to do all the things written in the Law”? No; but he probably could safely presume that all those whom he had not closely instructed would accept it as false! To such readers it would seem almost a contradiction in terms.

What is needed, then, is an underlying logic that effectively disconnects the subject and predicate of this unwritten premise, that undermines their generally-presumed axiomatic

42. Cosgrove (1978) accepted Fuller’s reading without defence and sought to follow it further into Galatians 3; but later he retracted his support of Fuller’s reading (1988b, 53 and n. 31).
43. Garlington (1997, 112) also recognises the ironic nature of any denial of this equation: “To be sure, such ideas would have appeared entirely far-fetched to the opponents . . .”
logical equivalence, that in fact makes them contraries.\textsuperscript{44} Let us examine the views of Wright (and of Scott), of Dunn (and of Cranford and Bonneau), and of Fuller (and formerly of Cosgrove), to see whether any of them provides such a logic.

Wright's explanation of the logic (1992, 147) places the focus on the nation of Israel.\textsuperscript{45} As we have seen, this reading is problematic in that it makes national and collective a subject which is singular ("every one [person]") in Deut. 27:26 in both the MT, the LXX, and Paul's quotation. It makes the unspoken premise of 3:10 to be about Israel, not about each individual who is "of works of the Law" (10a). At any rate, the problem remains: How do we now connect this premise back, logically, to Paul's explicit premise, Deut. 27:26?

Wright supplies another implicit premise: "All who embrace Torah are thereby embracing Israel's national way of life" (ibid.). This might help complete the required logic, but only if the phrase "Israel's national way of life" refers to disobedience (wilful disregard) of the Torah. Then the question remains: Why would it be entailed, or even plausible, that "all who embrace the Torah" ipso facto refuse to obey it? Again, one is faced with the latent self-contradiction in such a suggestion. This Gordian knot of Paul's argument Wright has failed to untie, even though he may have loosened it a bit. And neither Bligh (1969, 258) nor Scott (1993) nor Thielman (1994, 126-27) nor Hafemann (1997) goes as far as Wright in

\textsuperscript{44} This might seem odd for a Paul who boldly claimed that in his pre-Christian life he had been "as to zeal a persecutor of the church, as to righteousness under the law blameless" (Phil. 3:6). But note that this blamelessness is only according to "the righteousness under the law" (δικαιοσύνη τῆς ἐν νόμῳ), a "righteousness" which he insists is an invalid criterion (3:9; Rom. 9:30-10:6). H. Räisänen and F. Watson have helpfully discussed the difference between Paul's conception of grace, which they call "dynamic," and that of Paul's Jewish interlocutors, which they call "static" (see e.g. Watson 1986, 66, 78-79, 112; Räisänen 1992, 26, 34-35). In the static view, God has granted and inculcated into a certain society the laws and customs that enable "righteousness," and the human response is simply not to reject, but rather continue to fulfil, these socially standard customs, which "did not demand an enormous effort" (Räisänen 1992, 34). In the dynamic view, the response is to change one's ways, repent of one's sins, submit to God's will. Unusually, Watson and Räisänen both recognise that, of the two patterns of religion, it is Paul's that is characterised by vigorous striving to fulfil God's commands (see Räisänen 1992, 35-36; Watson 1986, 112 and passim).

\textsuperscript{45} See above, chap. 1.
detailing the logic implicit in this reading. Therefore none of them has provided a feasible explanation of Paul's logic; though they started off in an interesting direction by insisting on collectivising the curse, they fail to clarify what Paul actually says.

Both Dunn and Fuller, on the other hand, find the solution in the particular slant with which Paul intends the phrase "works of the Law." It is precisely because they are "of works of the Law," that those of this party do not really fulfil the Law's requirement; once we understand that phrase, the verse is much more understandable. In Fuller's reading, the key is the term "law" in this phrase: unless we interpret it innovatively, we cannot avoid a conflict between 10a's "works of the Law" and 10b's "doing all the Law" (1975, 32). Fuller claims that by "the law" in 10a Paul does not mean "the Mosaic Law," but rather "the Jewish misinterpretation of the Law" (ibid.). The misinterpretation lies in their belief that one can, through "legalistic endeavours" to conform to the Law, merit God's approval.

But Fuller's reading is inadequate. First, it entails that we take "the Law" in a sense completely foreign not only to 1st-century Jewish culture, but even to Galatians. Paul spends almost the rest of chapter 3 trying to show that "the Law" has passed away, or else that it never had jurisdiction to begin with. Never does he intimate that he means here something other than "the Mosaic Law," as his opponents and readers would naturally understand that

46. Here he is following R. Bring (1961, 120ff.). The same sort of approach to "the Law" was followed earlier by Burton (1921, 165, 447ff.), who however used it in 10b as well and then cast the argument of 10 as a reductio ad absurdum; see above.

47. Cf. Silva 1990, 164–66. While agreeing with Silva's comments here, concerning the sense of 3:12, we must disagree concerning vs. 21: in light of 18a ("For if inheritance is by the Law, it is no longer by promise"), the principle inherent in "the Law" is most definitely contrary to that of the promises, so that in 21a ("Is the law then against the promises of God?") Paul must mean "Did the Law actually come into jurisdiction and thus overrule the promise-principle?" a question to which he has already supplied an explicit "No" (vs. 17). Rather than soften the Law-promise antithesis, 21a fully assumes it; it has already been stated in 18a. However, that Paul might be able to use the term the Law in a different sense, in other contexts or by making the meaning clearer, we would not deny.
referential term. Paul’s point is not to deny their understanding of the Law, but to deny the Law’s jurisdiction as a covenant from God. Secondly, one can hardly imagine a more obvious non-sequitur than the underlying logic which Fuller supplies 3:10: If one admits the admittedly inescapable sense of the Law (e.g., Deut. 27:26!) that “righteousness” consists (at least partly) in steadfastly endeavouring to fulfil its commandments, and one therefore does this and then brings these endeavours before God as (at least partial) proof of one’s having satisfied the Law’s conditions for “righteousness,” one will on this very basis be charged with bribery and the grossest unrighteousness! This exegetical argument almost proves the opposite of its intended outcome.

Dunn has given a much more historically plausible explanation of the logic, and has (at least in analysing 3:10) avoided the problems into which Fuller falls by trying to take “the Law” as meaning the Jewish distortion of the text. While also claiming a particular Jewish slant to the phrase “works of the Law,” Dunn grounds this in the evidence from such sources as Qumran, that this phrase had a connotation of intra-Jewish debates about the proper meaning and exact requirements of certain of the Law’s stipulations, and in our knowledge that insistence on these same matters also provided social distinctiveness, as well as some amount of social friction, between Jews and Gentiles.

One can hardly find fault with the historical groundedness of Dunn’s premises. The picture he has drawn of the sociological dynamics between Jew and Gentile over the “works of the Law” is of considerable value for our understanding the sort of situation Paul was

48. Fuller himself is aware of, and addresses, the objection “that in the Jewish parlance of the day, ‘the works of the law’ meant doing what the law commands, and to a Jew carried no implication at all of committing some heinous sin” (Fuller 1975, 35). But his response to this formidable objection is strained and weak.

49. Cf. below the debate on 3:11–12, in chap. 5. This undermines also Betz’s contention (1979, 145–46) that Paul cites here the true Torah, in opposition to the Jewish Torah (involved in the notion “works of the Law”) which by contrast it was possible to keep fully.

facing. But we still would question whether that broad historical background, in itself, clears up the argument of 3:10. In one place (1990b, 227) Dunn explains it as follows:

Those who are \( \delta \xi \varepsilon \rho \gamma \alpha \nu \nu \rho \omicron \omicron \upsilon \) are those who have understood the scope of God's covenant people as . . . that people who are defined by the law and marked out by its distinctive requirements. Such an understanding of the covenant and of the law inevitably puts too much weight on physical and national factors, on outward and visible enactments, and gives too little weight to the Spirit, to faith and love from the heart. . . . Paul could now see that fulfilment of the law has to be understood in different terms, as something which Gentiles can do without any reference to whether they are inside the law or outside the law . . . To thus misunderstand the law by giving primacy to matters of at best secondary importance was to fall short of what the law required and thus to fall under its own curse (Deut. 27:26). Paul could assume that his readers would recognize his train of thought, precisely because what we now call “the social function of the law” would be part of the framework of perception for any reasonably well-informed individual of Paul's day when he encountered Judaism . . . .

We would readily agree with every part of this explanation but the last sentence: while this general background knowledge would certainly tell the reader that Judaism is exclusivistic, the reader of 3:10 still needed an explanation why, in Paul's radically changed view, Judaism was too exclusivistic even for the criterion voiced in Deut. 27:26. Again: how can a verse from the Law (Deut. 27:26), about the necessity of “abiding by” the things written in the Sinai Law, condemn those who are (as Dunn states) only insisting on those boundary-markers which the Law itself demands? Dunn's reliance upon sociological theory does not seem to solve this stubborn problem: even if “social pressures” do sometimes cause groups to emphasise their ritual boundary markers (Dunn 1990a, 216–19) at the expense of other parts of their law or principles, does it not simply follow that the majority of the group must have already seen the ritual part of its law as actually the essential or most important part? For if the social “boundary” gives identity to the group (Dunn 1990a, 216, citing Hans Mol), then when “sense of identity” is threatened why would the “boundary markers” be emphasised,
unless they be also the boundary itself? But then the question remains: Why did the group come to see their law in this way?

But Dunn’s treatment of this passage has also relied on his unusual handling of the phrase ἐργα νόμου. In his understanding, this phrase denotes particularly those aspects of Torah observance which tended to mark out the Jew socially; thus it focuses particularly on the ritual aspects, like circumcision and dietary law. Clearly this meshes with the rhetorical situation giving rise to Paul’s letter to the Galatians (see espec. 2:14ff.). It might even serve to disengage ἐργα νόμου from Paul’s idea of “abiding by all things written,” inasmuch as a focus on the rituals “puts too much weight on physical and national factors, on outward and visible enactments, and gives too little weight to the Spirit, to faith and love from the heart. Such an understanding of the people of God inevitably results in a false set of priorities,” and “To thus misunderstand the law by giving primacy to matters of at best secondary importance was to fall short of what the law required and thus to fall under its own curse (Deut. 27.26)” (Dunn 1990b, 227). But a problem arises from Dunn’s simultaneous acceptance of E. Lohmeyer’s defining of ἐργα νόμου as “service of the Law” (Dunn 1990a, 220). The problem is this: if Paul understands ἐργα νόμου as “service to the Law,” and if “service of the Law” means (as evidently it does mean) “abiding by all things commanded in the Law,” Paul still glaringly contradicts himself in 3:10.

But we would have a feasible solution if Paul himself would not define ἐργα νόμου as “service to the Law” but the phrase does indeed naturally focus on (but does not restrict itself to) the ritual aspects of the Law. Let us see how and why both parts of this condition are true.

52. Dunn (1992) has emphasised this point.
4.9.3 The unstated basis of the argument

Evidently we must semantically and logically "disconnect" 3:10a's "works of the Law" from 10b's "abiding by the Law" so that we do not find a flat contradiction in Paul's unstated premise which denies that "abiding in the Law" is an attribute of "those who are of deeds of the Law." One must show how being ἐὰν ἐργαζόμενοι does not imply someone's being among those who "abide by all things written . . .", but on the contrary denies their being among the latter. But if being ἐὰν ἐργαζόμενοι means the same thing as "abiding by the Law," it obviously implies the latter. At the very minimum, then, if we are to save Paul from self-contradiction (which, of course, theoretically he may not deserve), we must find either an equivocation between the meanings of "the Law" in these two sub-verses (which Fuller tried valiantly and failed); or else a difference in the gist of ἐργαζόμενοι and that of "to abide by all the things written in the book of the Law, to do them." The latter is our only hope.

And the only possibility of the latter is that which our hypothesis has already suggested, namely, that by ἐργαζόμενοι Paul does not mean "endeavour to fulfil, complete, accomplish the stipulations of the Law," but rather the completed acts which the Law stipulates. For only this effectively differentiates ἐργαζόμενοι from "abiding by all things written in the Law." And it does it not only semantically, but for Paul, as we have already argued (chap. 3), it does it logically as well, which is necessary for our purposes.

But whether it differentiates logically the respective parties "those who are ἐὰν ἐργαζόμενοι" and "those who abide by all things written," is another question. Paul would of course say that those who attempt the Law are not those who accomplish the Law, for no one really accomplishes it completely. But this premise would already have been taken into account by his opponents, and at any rate this argument is almost the reverse of how we have interpreted his words: he actually means that those who hold to the righteousness-criterion of
"completed deeds of the Law," do not in fact steadfastly attempt ("abide by") all deed-stipulations written in the Law. Granted that our semantically differentiating that negative proposition's subject and predicate makes it possible that there is a coherent rationale underlying it; but what might that rationale be? Why do these persons not steadfastly attempt to fulfil the Law's commands?

We know that those who are εἰς ὑπακοήν ὑπομακαίνον espouse the Mosaic "Law." And conversely, for Paul a major problem with "the Law" is that it is εἰς certain ἡράγων; that is, its "righteousness" is definable in terms of certain completed, accomplished deeds.⁵³ Now, it seems evident from Romans 3, 4, 9, and 10, and from Galatians 2 and 3, that Paul does believe the Law is "εἰς ἡράγων." But in order to ground more firmly our own reading of the phrase, we will address the obvious question: "Why would Paul think the Law is 'of completed, accomplished deeds'?'" What is there about the Law that sees "righteousness" as definable in terms of measurable, outward accomplishments? One ready answer to this question is, "its purity laws."⁵⁴ Whatever one's history-of-religions perspective regarding the genesis of such laws, the fact remains that they portray "purity" as something tangible and measurable and as somehow necessary for acceptance before God. Paul's own comments in regard to certain "purity" matters show that he is aware of and eschews this very portrayal; for example: "Food will not commend us to God. We are no worse off if we do not eat [certain foods], and no better off if we do" (1 Cor. 8:8; cf. 10:25ff.; Rom. 14:14,

⁵³. Cf. 3:12; Rom. 10:5; 9:32; on the latter verse, see the original and insightful exegesis by T. David Gordon (1992b): the verse's ellipsis is not "they tried to obtain it" by works, but rather "it (the Law) is" of works, making it semantically similar to "the Law is not ἐκ πίστεως," Gal. 3:12a.

⁵⁴. For a helpful overview of the Jewish conception of purity, including various views on the genesis of the concept "purity," see Neusner 1973b.
20). It seems clear therefore that if they were taken more or less literally, the presence of such laws within “the Law” would make the latter’s notion of “righteousness” definable in terms of “accomplishments” of God’s commands; for only accomplishments, not attempts, are as such tangible and measurable.

At any rate, for Paul “the Law” (as that term is used in 3:10–14 and probably throughout Galatians) defines “righteousness” in terms of accomplishments. This is not to say that the Law would not define “righteousness” also in terms of “obedience”: but it is to say that “the Law” extends the focus of “righteousness” to the “outer man,” but the latter’s accomplishments constantly fall short of the good intentions of the “inner man,” who nevertheless can accomplish something only with the cooperation (as it were) of the outer man (Rom. 7:21–23, 25b). So by making the criterion “obedience” ostensibly interchangeable with the criterion ἔργα νόμου (“accomplishments”), as if the endeavour to fulfil the Law were tantamount to accomplishing it (and vice versa), the Law badly and even fatally misleads (in Paul’s view) those who espouse it. In forcing “obedience” to be commensurable with accomplishments, it must slant so as to distort (from Paul’s point of view, that is) either the one or the other or both, to make them “commensurable.” But that distortion must necessarily be of “obedience,” of endeavour; it can hardly be of the “accomplishments,” for accomplishments are results of intentional action and as such are measurable and interpersonally verifiable. “Obedience,” on the other hand, is an inward category, something understandable by others but never tangible or measurable as such; so it

55. Cf. Neusner 1973b, 60: “There can be no doubt that Paul regards the impurity decreed in biblical food-laws as suspended.” It may even be that this concept is the hermeneutical key, for Paul, between “the Law” of his opponents and “the Law” rightly interpreted and still binding; see e.g. Col. 2:20–22 which in this regard seems a crucial text in light of its “verbal parallels” with Eph. 2:15 (“ordinances,” cf. also Col. 2:14) and Gal. 4:3, 9 (“elements of the world,” cf. also Col. 2:8).

56. There is in the OT a certain ambiguity regarding uncleanness. It almost becomes a metaphor for sin, but remains something concrete (Neusner 1973b, 11ff., 20–21; cf. Lonergan 1973, 88).
is much more amenable to sociolinguistic “heteroglossia” (see chap. 3, § 3.3.1). For example, one might conceptually split each human’s “will” into two independent wills, a “good” and an “evil” will, that ostensibly battle each other to control or win the person’s choice in a particular situation. Then while the notion of a “good” will accounts for any accomplishments of God’s commands, the “bad” will can account for the inevitable failures to accomplish them which accompany even attempts to do them. So only by some such explanation of the question, how bad accomplishments still accompany good intent, can such a Jew successfully maintain the logical equivalence between “endeavour” to fulfil God’s commands, and the “accomplishing” of them.

As we noted particularly in chapter 3, Paul’s use of the notion “the Law” does not assume that he sees only one discourse inhabiting the Pentateuchal texts, only one layer of meaning; he himself may read Deut. 27:26 with a different meaning (spoken in a different “social language”) than do his opponents, and he may be aware of that disparity. But this does not mean that he cannot venture to use Deut. 27:26 as a “bridge” thrown across the abyss of heteroglossia that divides them, with the hope that they will be drawn to his reading of it, that it will compellingly suggest itself to them as correct.

For clarity’s sake we should point out here the differences between what we have just said regarding “the Law,” and the traditional reading in which Paul is denying that fallen humanity has the means to fulfil the Law and so is accursed. True, Paul does point out the gulf between attempt and accomplishment; but even if he personally attributed this to a lack of means to accomplish God’s will (say, because of ingrained sinful habits hard to overcome), his arguments always handle it otherwise. He never speaks of the “flesh’s” intractability as an impersonal, physical barrier to the inner man’s achievement, but rather speaks of it as the personal, wilful disobedience of the “old man” (e.g. Rom. 7:25: “I of myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin”). This
language is perhaps due somewhat to sociolinguistic rhetorical exigencies. After all, many or most Jews would have taken Paul’s discussion in Rom. 7:14–25 as dealing with something like the “bad intent” (the “evil yetzer) which supposedly fought with good intents in the human heart (see Davies 1980, 27). In any case, as Paul’s argument assumes that the flesh’s intractability is wilful, he treats the guilt attaching to it not merely as failure to accomplish, but as *failure to attempt*. It is for this reason that Paul’s passages which speak of human flesh’s universal guilt before the Law (e.g. Rom. 3:10–20; Gal. 3:10) speak in terms of failure to *attempt* (i.e., to “abide by”) all things commanded by God. So much for the traditional reading’s difference from ours.

But moreover, Paul evidently expects any Jewish Galatian readers to accept this premise without much ado; he never seems to think this viewpoint would be surprising or need substantial defence. That fact is a vital clue for a proper understanding Paul’s arguments about the curse of the Law. It suggests that for Paul, the 1st-century Palestinian-Jewish attempt to rationalise and regularise the shortcomings of “the flesh” is unacceptable (it is against the Judaism of his former life that he is polemicising, after all). From his different anthropology (see above, chap. 3), such regularising would be simply a more or less conscious attempt to excuse not merely unintentional failures but wilful *rebellion* against God. For in his anthropology, rebellion is not some normal, occasional-but-temporary dominance of the Evil Inclination over the human’s will, as if the human will itself was not at fault. No: it is wilful, culpable rebellion, pure and simple. If Paul indeed sees things this way, then his characterisation of the Jews as rebels against God is ipso facto explained: for every attempt to rationalise and normalise rebellion is morally tantamount to that rebellion.

The failure to see this Jewish underpinning of Paul’s arguments has historically contributed to the assumption that Paul chided his Jewish opponents about the lack of *means* to fulfil perfectly all of God’s commands, as if the Jews had never heard about humanity’s
sinfulness and moral inability to accomplish all God's will. Paul had no need to instruct his fellow Jews about man's inability to fulfil the Law perfectly; it was precisely because they knew this already, but also because they saw this inability as manifesting rebellion, that they had ways to rationalise and regularise, with respect to God's covenant, the old, sinful nature (Rom. 10:3). Our main point here is that Paul's arguments presuppose this regularising; and this presupposition widens the scope of the issue Paul is addressing, from lack of effective means to lack (even) of steadfast attempt. The historical tendency to see Paul as talking about a lack of means is probably due more or less to the Gentile church's reading a Greek-philosophical, mediaeval sort of "Spirit-flesh" dualism into the sociolinguistically quite different Jewish "Spirit-flesh" (i.e., "Creator-creature") categories in whose terms Paul polemicised. At any rate, if the Jews were guilty of any "legalism," it was not a legalism that sought misguidedly to achieve sinless perfection, as has often been assumed by Pauline scholars, but rather a legalism which, under the influence of "the Law," relaxed the criteria of what was required, in order to accommodate man's already-recognised sinfulness (Silva 1986, 120f.; 1991, 348f.).

Paul argues that "as many as are of the deeds of the Law do not abide (steadfastly) by all things written in the Law." Thus he is not concerned that his Jewish opponents are spending their efforts in vain on what is impossible to achieve; on the contrary, he is concerned that their efforts fall short because of not being steadfast, their incentive having been dampened by "the Law's" compelled distortion of God's true requirement, namely

57. Cf. J. G. Machen 1925, 179: "The legalism of the Pharisees, with its regulation of the minute details of life, was not really making the Law too hard to keep; it was really making it too easy. Jesus said to His disciples, 'Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven.' The truth is, it is easier to cleanse the outside of the cup than it is to cleanse the heart. If the Pharisees had recognized that the Law demands not only the observance of external rules but also and primarily mercy and justice and love for God and men, they would not have been so readily satisfied with the measure of their obedience . . ." This viewpoint should have more cogency today, since E. P. Sanders (1977), especially, has inspired New Testament scholars to adopt a more historically-realistic perspective on 1st-century Palestinian Judaism.
steadfast obedience. He could hardly be denigrating obedience as an effective means of justification, as in the traditional reading; that reading implies background problems which Paul never faced.

In summary one might say that in Paul’s view, “the Law” forces the “obedience” righteousness-criterion onto the Procrustean bed of logical equivalence to the criterion “outward, completed deeds,” and a Jewish worldview would accordingly have considered all failures to accomplish God’s will as tantamount to failure to attempt it. So all steadfast, “true” (in Paul’s eyes) obedience and faith must become endangered species, as it were, within Judaism, due to the “Law”-forced regularising and rationalising of the outer, “old man” (whom Paul sees as unitary and rebellious), and can survive only among those who look beyond “the Law” for God’s true criterion of “righteousness.” All these differences reflect a heteroglossia, a difference of “social language,” due largely to a difference in anthropological and perhaps metaphysical outlook. For Paul, by contrast, our knowing that we (i.e., our “old man”) have, through the body of Christ, already legally “died to the Law” frees us up (i.e., our singular “inner man”) psychologically to serve God (Rom. 7:4; cf. 8:3-4). That is, the potential lack of condemnation of the inner man becomes, not the “efficient” cause (to use Aristotle’s terms), but rather the “final” (teleological) cause of its new obedience. Then we “serve in the Spirit,” “walk in the Spirit” and “are led of the Spirit” (7:6, 8:4-14); aware that we (as inner man) are not automatically under condemnation, we have become psychologically a “new creature” (Gal. 6:15).58

58. This phrase, καιρὴ κτίσις, must in this context be translated “a new creature” rather than (with Martyn 1985; 1997a, as a pivotal text) “a new creation.” According to Paul “neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is anything,” but rather καιρὴ κτίσις, whereas in 5:6 “neither circumcision nor uncircumcision effects σωτηρία πληροφόρηση anything” (AT), but faith working through love. In 1 Cor. 7:19, “circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but what matters is the keeping of the commandments of God” (NASB). Obviously these are parallel texts; and in their contexts they clearly have to do with what constitutes an individual acceptable before God, and not with some eschatological schedule of cataclysmic cosmic shifts. The only other text in Paul where we read of a καιρὴ κτίσις is 2 Cor. 5:17: “Therefore if any man is in Christ, he is a new creature; the old things have passed away; behold, new things have come” (NASB); notice the subject of the opening clause is an individual, so that the ellipsis “he is” (before καιρὴ κτίσις) is justly supplied.
4.9.4 The structure and content of 3:10

What then, structurally, is the logic of 3:10? We will use here, as in the previous section, a crucial notion that Paul uses in both Romans (especially 7 and 8) and Galatians, namely "flesh," referring to the "old man" (Rom. 6:6) who, in the footsteps of Adam his forebear, was "sold under bondage to sin" through rebellion against God's command (Rom. 7:14, cf. 18). As we have said, Paul's arguments on the Law always assume (in Jewish style) that "the flesh" (the nature inherited from Adam) is not just in sin, but in wilful sin, and that any attempt to rationalise and normalise such sin covenantal-legally is itself rebellion. With this terminology then the logic of 3:10, both stated and unstated, amounts to this polysyllogism (each sub-syllogism is of type AAA-1):

(unstated) All who are of works of the law "set their minds on the things of the flesh." (not those of the Spirit; cf. Rom. 7:6, 8; 8:2, 4–14)

(unstated) All who "set their minds on the things of the flesh" do not abide by everything written in the Law. (5:13–17; Rom. 6:14; 7:6; 8:2, 4–8)

(unstated conclusion of the above) All who are of works of the Law do not abide by everything written in the Law. (cf. 6:13; Rom. 2:23–24; 6:14)

All who do not abide by everything written in the Law are cursed. (Gal. 3:10b)

Therefore, all who are of works of the Law are cursed. (Gal. 3:10a)

59. If there were space, we might pursue an exegesis of parallel passages in Romans 6–8; but we must forego this. On the crucial significance of the "Spirit-flesh" contrast for Galatians, see Fletcher 1982; Barclay 1991. For a helpful discussion of Paul's use of "flesh" (σάρξ) see Dunn 1998, 62–70. We agree with Dunn that Paul's usage of the term, though seemingly ranging over a spectrum, is essentially unified. We would not unqualifiedly agree, however, with Dunn's denial that for Paul "the flesh" may involve overconfidence in human ability to fulfil the Law. Dunn complains that this sense causes a "disjunction in the spectrum" of Paul's usage, since "human presumption of ability . . . seems somewhat remote from the more obvious range of σάρξ" (ibid., 69). But this sense is "remote" from this range only if and where the human "ability" is not seen as contrived by a spurious accommodating of God's supposed covenant to the sinful, rebellious "old man."

Here we should perhaps voice our opinion that the use of this term in Gal. 2:16d and Rom. 3:20a, in lieu of the term "all living" in Ps. 143:2 which Paul is apparently citing, is significant for those verses' exegesis. Thus we disagree with this estimation: "It is not important as a misquotation; the two expressions have essentially the same meaning; we may simply say 'No one' and leave it at that" (Barrett 1985, 19). On the contrary, Paul purposely changes the term to "flesh," thus restricting the non-justification to this sort of being.
This reading avoids putting Christians also under this eschatological curse, and thereby maintains the contrast with verse 9, as it also avoids a conflict with 13a. Furthermore, Hübn er (1984, 36–41) has derived a somewhat similar understanding of 3:10 while ostensibly, and apparently, drawing on Galatians alone (not Romans). After deriving the above reading and argument we discovered the commonality between Hübn er’s reading and our own. There are significant divergences, however: crucially, Hübn er insists on seeing a “quantitative” (measurable accomplishments) demand in Paul’s citation of Deut. 27:26, like the traditional reading.60 This introduces into his exposition an unresolved tension,

60. If Paul’s focus is indeed on endeavour, there is no way to come up with a quantification of it, in and of itself, assuming it is not commensurable with accomplishments. That is, Paul would not be saying that all their accomplishments must conform to the Law’s stipulations, nor that a certain percentage must. Such may have been part of his opponents’ doctrine, but not of Paul’s. From this we can see that the debate into which Hübn er (1984, 44 n. 16) and others entered, as to whether Paul was of the school of Hillel (which allegedly considered 51 percent good accomplishments acceptable) or of that of Shammai (which reckoned 99 percent as less than acceptable), was beside the point; when writing Galatians Paul had not a quantitative, but a qualitative view of the criterion. (On this debate, cf. Bruce 1982b, 159f.)

But on the other hand, and more plausibly, according to Hübn er (1984, 18) Paul here assumes that “for those who are dependent on the Law there is a quantitative factor in their self-understanding and . . . this quantitative factor is the essential one and is that which actually delimits or defines their self-understanding.” E. P. Sanders’ denial (1977, part I) that 1st-century Palestinian Jews ever thought of acceptance with God as conditioned quantitatively by some percentage or “weighing” of good deeds vs. bad, seems too spirited for the evidence and argument he assembles, and for the exegesis he performs on the relevant rabbinic texts (see pp. 125–47; interestingly, he was quite willing to admit to such a “weighing” view’s being presented in the Testament of Abraham, a contemporary Jewish document of likely Egyptian provenance; see his introduction to that text in OTP, 1:871ff., espec. 875–77). In its discussion of 1st-c. Judaism, Sanders’ 1977 book is explicitly dependent on the methodology of assuming (with Max Kadushin, and without supporting argument, pp. 72–75) that there was a fundamental “coherence” to the Palestinian Jewish religion, and dismissing thereafter as a fluke any Jewish text that fails to cohere with the Jewish view which he deems the one true view. Sanders has accordingly a prejudice, before even coming to the Rabbinic texts, that any such deeds-weighing judgment could not possibly be a part of Jewish soteriology, since (in his view) it would not cohere smoothly with the “grace”-emphasising religion which he considers 1st-c. Palestinian Judaism to have been. This sort of inference is textually ungrounded at best, and question-begging at worst. And the specific conception of “grace” which Sanders attributes to this Judaism seems to be more or less imported from a Lutheran-like Protestant soteriology (see Neusner 1978)! Contrast the explanation of the rabbinic view of the Judgment in Guttman 1974, and the exegesis of the pertinent rabbinic texts by Quarles (1996, rebutting Sanders). Sanders also claims (1977, 294–95) that in the Qumran literature “there is no picture of God holding a judgment at which he weighs the deeds of each man and punishes or rewards him according to his deserts, for man’s destruction or eternal reward has been determined in advance according to whether or not he is a member of the sect.” But he fails to mention the numbering- or measuring-picture of the judgment that one finds in 1QS 4. In particular, it is hard to deny such a reading of 1QS 4:15–16,
addressed lamely with the unexplained claim that “... Paul was tacitly presupposing in Gal 3.10 a general breakdown in the legal principle of Deut. 27.26” (ibid., 38; in other words, Paul meant the opposite of what he actually said!). Nevertheless Hübner argues, significantly, that it is only the man whose mind is set on “the flesh” who is really in view in 3:10:

The works of the flesh ... are not done by the person who is driven by the pneuma. ... the person who does not live on the basis of faith and who consequently is not led by the Spirit is simply not in a position to achieve what is called in 5.22f. the fruits of the Spirit. Thus it is only at the level of argument involving faith [i.e., that “level” which presupposes the need for a psychological “new creature”] that there is demonstrated the impossibility for those outside the bounds of faith of doing the love which is required by the Law (Lev. 19.18). It is the carnal man, the man of αἵρεσις, who is here meant by ‘men.’ Once we have seen this, it then becomes clear that the non-fulfilment, presupposed in Gal 3.10, of the quantitative requirements of the Law by all men implies their carnal nature. Quantitative fulfilment is not possible because the Torah contains stipulations which must be ‘qualitatively fulfilled.’ After all, even the ‘whole’ Law [5:14], which makes demands on the Christian, is a demand of the Torah. The man presupposed in Gal 3.10 vainly imagines in his flesh, his αἵρεσις, that he can “do” the Law and in his illusion loses himself in the quantity he has to produce ... he deceives himself in seeking to obey a quantitative standard. (Ibid., 41, emphasis in original, square-bracketed interpolations ours)

Except for the aforementioned tension (from finding “quantitative requirements” here) appearing in the middle of this quotation, it seems to argue for most of what we have claimed in the exposition above. In any case, it appears that only our own view both avoids all the

25; as DSSE correctly translates 4:15–16a: “And the whole reward for their deeds [ἐνδοκορύφωμα] shall be, for everlasting ages, according to whether each man’s portion in their two divisions is great or small.” The literary context here is about the time of God’s “visitation,” i.e., the eschatological time of judgment (see 3:15, 17–19; 4:7–9, 11–14, 18–26).

61. This unnecessary and unsubstantiated intrusion of the traditional unstated premise into 3:10 also serves pivotally Hübner’s allegation of development in Paul’s thinking between Galatians and Romans: the tension of this reading is not present in Romans, notes Hübner. But as it is so in tension also with Hübner’s own reading of Galatians 3:10, and is after all an unstated element which arises only there, it is far better not to read it as a Pauline affirmation in Galatians either.
various problems that have plagued this verse’s interpreters, and adequately explains Paul’s meaning including its rhetorical structure.

4.10 The connection of 3:10 with 3:9, its contribution to Paul’s argument, and its relevance for our hypothesis about that argument

But how does the meaning for which we have argued function in rhetorical connection with 3:9? Since we have argued that 3:9 and 10 are a positive and negative way of saying more or less the same thing, the question arises what their collective thrust is.

The answer to this has already arisen. We argued, just before the section on Paul’s logic, that Paul is opposing a certain theory and not a certain course of action. This is confirmed by the sense of ἐκ in both verse 9 (ἐκ πίστεως) and 10 (ἐκ ἔργων νόμου), namely, “in the party of” or “who are partisans of.” If he had wanted to say “those who have faith” and “those who rely on works,” Paul would not have used this preposition. Again, the implicit presupposition is not the general human lack of means to accomplish all the things in the Law. His point is not that the one theory directs its adherents to the correct means while the other directs its adherents to the wrong means; his point in 3:10 is rather that the wrong theory divests its adherents of the incentive (and thus the will, and thus the power, the capacity) to do what is required for justification. Paul’s issue is not the relative efficacies of faith and works; for in both 3:9 and 3:10 the focus is on the two theories identifying these two parties.

But if his focus is on the two contrasting justification-theories held by two parties, one may ask, why is his subject in both 9 and 10 the parties themselves, rather than the theories, or justification, or righteousness? Has Paul not shifted the argument, at least to this extent? Not necessarily; for this polysyllogism may still be understood as fitting into the rhetorical framework of opposing justification-theories, if only it assumes that a correct justification-
theory would certainly vindicate its supporters at least some of the time, even as an incorrect one would certainly put its supporters to shame at least some of the time. Reading in that larger, partly unstated argument for 3:9–10, or rather for all of 3:6–10 or 3:7–10 (where the first of ἐκ πίστεως appears), is necessary in order to make a coherent rhetorical relation between them and the immediately preceding verses (and the following ones, as we shall see), to which verses, as the literary pattern (including the chiastic parallelism of 3:2–14) shows, they should quite closely relate.

Apparently then, Paul's criterion for judging between the theories, at this rhetorical juncture, is simply the inferable circumstances of those who espouse the diverging theories. These inferable circumstances suggest truths that are counter to the theory itself; thus the argument is a circumstantial ad hominem one. The larger argument of verse 10 is not, "Do not go that way, you will only end up cursed," but rather, "If anyone holds that theory of justification they shall not be justified, but rather cursed; the covenantal circumstances of its proponents are thus contrary to those predicted by the ἐργα νόμον theory itself." By using ἵνα in 10a Paul implies the first, explicit, implicative, conditional proposition. And this second, emphasised proposition, an implicit but obvious corollary of the first, is effectively a disjunction: Not both Deut. 27:26 and the ἐργα νόμον justification-theory can be true.

Thus 10a comprises within itself not only the conclusion of his polysyllogism, but indeed the whole gist of the polysyllogism, the whole implication-part of his argument in verse 10. Paul is "affirming" this statement, but he affirms it not as some categorical proposition about reality (i.e., "all members of that group are in fact under a curse"), but rather as the above conditional proposition. (This is the one kernel of truth in the claim of Stanley (1990, 498) that by using ἵνα in 10a Paul suggests "an element of 'uncertainty' or

62. In fact, any A-type proposition implies a conditional, as per the valid syllogism AAA-1: that is, A(a,b) < [A(c,a) < A (c,b)]. Thus "all who are ἐκ ἐργά νόμον are cursed" implies "If anyone is ἐκ ἐργά νόμον, he or she is cursed," which last is what Paul evidently means to suggest by using ἵνα.
'potentiality' regarding the membership of the group of those ἐκ ἔργων νόμου.) So, as in any circumstantial argument: only the implication-part is stated; the author hopes the reader will supply the belief-part; and the argument as a whole (including belief-part) is ponendo tollens ("affirming the disjunct"), the affirmed disjunct being in this case Deut. 27:26 (the circumstantial belief) and the denied disjunct being the ἔργα νόμου theory of justification.

What then is the relevance of our findings on 3:10 for the overall hypothesis we formulated at the end of chapter 3? They confirm our suggestion that Paul's argument, so far at least, is not about means of justification or righteousness, but rather about the correct meaning (i.e., particular denotation) of the concept "righteousness" in the context of the church of Jesus Christ and of God's new covenant. For he is warning, not of the practical consequences of their taking a certain course of action, but rather of the logical consequences of their adopting a certain theory, namely the ἔργα νόμου ("accomplishments of the Law") justification-theory. Furthermore, the fact that Paul is affirming the truth of Deut. 27:26, as a true, eschatologically valid criterion of righteousness (cf. Romans 2, 6), confirms our suggestion that what a Pauline "faith" believes in is a covenant whose conditions are "general steadfast obedience," or in other words "abiding by" all the commands of God. So far then, the exegesis supports our hypothesis.
Chapter 5

The structure and meaning of 3:11–12

Although verses 11–12 is perhaps less controversial than verse 10, there are quite a few exegetical problems facing the interpreter in this part of our passage as well. We will take them almost in the order that we meet them. At the end we will summarise the most important of our findings.

5.1 Paul’s use of ὅτι (twice) in 3:11

The first thing that we must exegete correctly, in order to discern the structure of Paul’s argument here, is the twin occurrence of ὅτι in 3:11. This term introduces both clauses of verse 11.

Gal. 3:11, UBSGNT

ὅτι δὲ ἐν νόμῳ οὐδεὶς δικαιώται
παρὰ τῷ θεῷ δῆλον, ὅτι ὁ δίκαιος
ἐκ πίστεως ἠστειλαίη

Gal. 3:11, NRSV

Now it is evident that no one is justified before God by the law; for “The one who is righteous will live by faith.”

1. We offer this translation only as representative, not as correct. Translations differ widely; ours will emerge in the present chapter.
The possible senses are "that" (as a conjunction) and "for, because." The verse becomes unintelligible if we take ὅτι the same way in both places. Thus, we must consider whether it means "that" the first time and "for" (or "because") the second, which is how "virtually all translations" render it (Thielman 1994, 127), or else vice versa. The former, traditional way yields something like the NASB translation:

Now that ὅτι no man is justified before God by the law is evident; for ὅτι, "The righteous man shall live by faith."

Thielman suggests the alternative as a better translation:

"But because [ὅτι] no one is justified before God by the law, it is obvious that [ὅτι] 'the just shall live by faith.'"

Thielman's translation is initially plausible but ultimately dubious. First, it leaves Paul in a position very strange and awkward for him, of arguing to a Scriptural truth rather than from it (Burton 1921, 166; Zerwick 1963, §418).

In addition, it makes Paul argue fallaciously; his conclusion, "that the just shall live by faith," would be neither "obvious" nor even logical based on the premise that this reading gives. Denial of justification ἐν νόμῳ does not imply justification ἐν or ἐκ something else specific. Admittedly, the first translation makes the verse just as illogical, if verse 11 be taken for the complete argument. However, that translation makes Paul’s premise the second clause rather than the first, and thus makes it possible that Paul is continuing the argument through verse 12, which is connected to 11 with δέ. The second reading would require rather a γάρ or ὅτι or some such conjunction connecting 11 with 12, in order to involve part of the latter also in the argument. Thus the first reading alone salvages the possibility that we can reconstruct a logical argument out of the verses. For both these reasons, then, the first treatment of the ὅτι's is preferable.

2. B. Longenecker (1998, 164) tries to do this, taking both occurrences as meaning "for," and claims that this makes the verse read "this way: 'For no one is righteous before God by the law, for clearly "The righteous will live by faith."'" But this surprising attempt completely overlooks the δέ, and inexplicably reads διὰ λόγου ὅτι as "for clearly," as opposed to the only possible translation, "it is clear that" (which he himself had just cited, from BAGD, at n. 33).
5.2 The conjunction δέ and the connection with 3:10

Is the δέ which connects verses 10 and 11 an adversative δέ, or continuative, or purely transitional? Both 3:10a and 3:11a initially appear to be concluding a lack of justification/-blessing with the Law (11a) or works of the Law (10a). Far from any obvious contrast, these verses appear on the surface to be saying almost the same thing. It would appear then that in 3:11 δέ is transitional.³

Normand Bonneau (1997, 72) writes that “Verse 11 opens with δέ, suggesting that what follows serves to explain and carry forward the thought expressed in v. 10. Verse 12 also features the connective δέ in order to signal the continuation and elaboration of what was contained in v. 11.” While these statements are perhaps all true, we would qualify them. In chapter 4 we denied that Paul was continuing the syllogism of 3:10 into verse 11; the presence of δέ at the beginning of verse 11 by no means overrules this conclusion. It does, however, indicate some connection between 3:10 and 3:11, and suggests that they are part of the same “paragraph” or larger structure. But as an individual, complete syllogism and argument, 3:10 is discrete from verse 11.

5.3 The sense and function of παρὰ τῷ θεῷ in 3:11a

There are several possibilities for 3:11a, according to whether the two prepositional phrases respectively are modifying the verb or else the clause as a whole. Certain considerations confirm that παρὰ τῷ θεῷ modifies only the verb. In the first place, there is the word order. The phrase παρὰ τῷ θεῷ comes immediately after the verb, in a suitable position if it is intended to modify the verb.

In the second place, παρὰ τῷ θεῷ is a common construction in the New Testament, meaning “with” God in the sense of “in the region, sphere, or view of” God.⁴ It is

---

4. For this sense of παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, see BAGD, s.v. παρὰ II.2.
synonymous with ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ. Of the 16 other instances of παρὰ τῷ θεῷ in the New Testament, 11 are in contexts of judgment, justification, or favourable opinion. Moreover, in the 3 instances of παρὰ τῷ θεῷ that have contexts of judgment or justification with a δικαιο-cognate present, the phrase always modifies that cognate. The 3 instances are all Pauline: Rom. 2:13; 9:14; 2 Thess. 1:6. It is also worth noting, in this connection, that the 3 times ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ appears in the New Testament in the context of a δικαιο-cognate, it modifies that cognate: Luke 16:15; Acts 4:19; and Rom. 3:20. This characteristic usage of the two formulas, especially in Paul, suggests very strongly that in Gal. 3:11 παρὰ τῷ θεῷ is modifying the verb δικαιοθῇ.

5.4 The sense and function of ἐν νῷμῳ in 3:11a

The phrase ἐν νῷμῳ in 3:11a is important for the understanding of the structure of Paul’s present argument. Before we decide what it modifies, let us investigate the meanings of its words.

5.4.1 The sense of the terms

Commentators on this passage frequently claim ἐν νῷμῳ in verse 11 to be basically a “shorthand” for δὲ ἐργαν νόμου, “by works of the Law.” “After δὲ ἐργαν νόμου in v 10 ἐν νῷμῳ suffices to express the same idea” (Bruce 1982b, 161). But the few arguments put forward for this unusual semantic innovation are not convincing. In fact, this conclusion appears to be founded upon the popular assumption that with the phrase δὲ ἐργαν νόμου Paul

5. See BAGD, s.v. ἐνώπιον 2-4.

6. Those 11 are Luke 1:30; 2:52; Rom. 2:11, 13; 9:14; 1 Cor. 3:19; Eph. 6:9 (παρ’ αὐτῷ, referring to God); 2 Thess. 1:6; James 1:27; 1 Pet. 2:4, 20. The other 5 are Matt. 19:26; Mark 1:27 (twice); Luke 18:27 (these 3 verses are synoptic parallels); 1 Cor. 7:24.

7. The view is espoused by Lightfoot (1890, 138), Mussner (1974, 228 n. 78); Betz (1979, 126), Bruce (1982b, 161), Hübner (1984, 50 n.92), Westerholm (1988, 111), Longenecker (1990, 118), Schreiner (1993, 41, 60), Lambrecht (1994, 283–84). However, some of these possibly mean simply that the latter idea is implied in Paul’s phrase.
is describing obedience, as an ineffective means (to righteousness or justification). His objection to the Law can then only be this same one, the ineffectuality of obedience. But we have argued that this assumption needs to be demonstrated, not merely assumed; for the real possibility exists that ἐργαὶ νόμου means “accomplishments” rather than “obedience,” and that Paul is discussing meaning (of “righteousness”) rather than means.

Among those surveyed who hold or in some way promote the “shorthand” view of ἐν νόμῳ, only Bruce (1982b, 161) and Dunn (1990a, 235 n.51; 1993a, 174) offer arguments, which both point to a supposed parallel between “no flesh is justified ἐκ ἐργαῳ νόμου” in 2:16d and “no one is justified ἐν νόμῳ” in 3:11. It is certainly proper to point to parallels where they are relevant, but if establishing lexical usage by them they must first be “verbal” parallels, rather than merely supposed “conceptual” (or “real”) parallels:

[Parallels] are divided into two classes, viz., verbal and real. “When the same word occurs in similar connections, or in reference to the same general subject, the parallel is called verbal . . . Real parallels are those similar passages in which the likeness or identity consists, not in words or phrases, but in facts, subjects, sentiments or doctrines” (Terry, Biblical Hermeneutics, p. 121). Verbal parallels establish points of linguistic usage, while real parallels serve to explain points of historical, ethical, or dogmatical interest. (Berkhof 1950, 79; cf. Ramm 1970, 140-41)

But there is no verbal parallel between ἐν νόμῳ in 3:11 and ἐκ ἐργαῳ νόμου in 2:16; both the prepositions and their objects are different. Apparently then, one could not claim that ἐν νόμῳ means ἐκ ἐργαῳ νόμου as the latter is intended in 2:16 except on two assumptions: that ἐν is being used here instrumentally or causally, and that νόμῳ as an ellipsis for ἐργας νόμου, “works of the Law.”

8. Concerning this phrase Bruce (1982b, 161) cites D. P. Fuller (1975, 40), who takes both “Law” and “works of the Law” to signify “legalism” in this context.

9. Longenecker’s argument (1990, 118) is just a paraphrase of Bruce’s. Schreiner (1993, 60) merely argues in a circle: “In verse 11 Paul probably refers to the works of the law when he uses the phrase by law (ἐν νόμῳ, en nomo), since verse 11a restates and elaborates on verse 10.” The other commentators cited offer no real arguments.
Now, an ellipsis is a figure of speech, and so the problem of proof now becomes more complicated: the context of 3:11 must somehow show that Paul is indeed using a figure of speech. For "there is an old and oft-repeated Hermeneutical rule [in regard to figures], that the words should be understood in their literal sense, unless such literal interpretation involves a manifest contradiction or absurdity" (Berkhof 1950, 85). This rule is sound, for generally a reader recognises a figure of speech only by the non-feasibility of a literal interpretation in the given context.\(^\text{10}\) But the context here does nothing to indicate that taking νόμῳ as "Law" in 3:11 involves "a manifest contradiction or absurdity." Thus there is no reason, in the word νόμῳ itself, to suppose that he is speaking of ἔργα νόμου in this verse. In other words, unless ἐν in this verse is to be understood as instrumental, and this is seen as evidence that there is an ellipsis with νόμῳ, there is no reason to suppose that νόμῳ is an ellipsis for ἔργα νόμου.

But here we encounter a vicious circle; for just as there is apparently no reason to suppose νόμῳ is an ellipsis here unless ἐν is instrumental, so also there is apparently no reason whatever to suppose ἐν is instrumental here unless we assume νόμῳ to be an ellipsis for ἔργα νόμου. The preposition ἐν, the most frequently used in the New Testament, encompasses a very wide semantic range within the latter. Moule (1959, 75), citing MM (209), calls it a "maid of all work."\(^\text{11}\)

In particular, we should recognise that the "instrumental" use of it is actually part of a larger category of meaning, which Zerwick (1963, §117) calls "a general notion of association or accompaniment."\(^\text{12}\) We find this meaning expressed in the instrumental-associative type of dative. DM, in their discussion of the "instrumental dative," categorise

---

10. The exception would be idioms and such “ready-made utterances,” but there is no reason to interpret ἐν νόμῳ as one.

11. In the NT this preposition, “thanks in part at least to the influence of Semitic be, increases its scope to a very great extent” (Zerwick 1963, §116).

the "instrumental of association" sense as a subset of it; but their discussion makes the associative sense at least as fundamental (and the earlier, in the historical development of Indo-European languages). Their comments help elucidate the semantic relationship between the two senses:

[The "instrumental dative"] case was likely preceded historically by the old associative case, of which traces remain in the Sanskrit. The idea of association and instrumentality are really much more closely related than might appear at first thought. One is in a sense associated with the means by which he accomplishes an objective, and in personal association the second person supplies the means of fellowship. The connection between the two ideas appears in the use of our word with in the expression, "I walked down the road with my friend, who was walking with a cane." The simpler and cruder idea of the implement used in a task being associated with the one using it developed into the more advanced notion of its being the instrument. (DM, 88–89)

To have association, a second party must furnish the means of that association. However, association is not necessarily personal, though predominantly so. In Rom. 15:27, τοῖς πνευματικοῖς ἐκουσώσαν means literally they had fellowship (with you) by means of your spiritual benefits. This is clearly an example of association. (DM, 90)

Thus, we could consider an associative ἐν as "instrumental" in a certain inexact sense, since one's fellow becomes "the means of fellowship" (or perhaps the means to the benefits of fellowship); again, the instrumental is in a way an associative usage, since one is associated with the means one uses. Doubtless it is for this reason that BDF calls this broad category of dative-meaning "the instrumental-associative dative." But note that DM's explanation makes the associative sense the "simpler and cruder," that is the broader and less specific, sense.

This category includes a wide range of senses, including cause, manner, and accompaniment or attendant circumstances, all of which ἐν can stand for as well. Moule (1959, 77–79) points out how difficult it is to demarcate clearly between these various senses. Indeed, Zerwick (1963, §118) claims that it is only the context, and not the preposition ἐν, that conveys what sort of association, more precisely, is in view:
Just as the genitive in itself indicates merely an appurtenance of one thing to another, and for this reason may, according to the subject matter, express even the most exalted mystical union between Christ and those who are «Christ's», so too \( \epsilon v \), indicating of itself merely association or concomitance, may represent, according to the subject matter, connections of utterly different kinds, from that between an action and its rapidity (\( \epsilon v \ \tau \alpha \chi e i \)) to that between Christ and those who are «in Christ». Hence the nature of this connection is to be sought in divine [i.e., the written] revelation, and not in the sense of the word \( \epsilon v \). It would be a waste of time and energy to collect from profane literature all the occurrences of \( \epsilon v \) with a noun standing for a person, in the hope of arriving at a deeper understanding of the mystery which Paul intended to express by the words \( \epsilon v \ \chi r i o t \). 

Thus it is in the context, and not in \( \epsilon v \) itself, that we must look for any “instrumental” or other more-specific sense of it.

But nothing in the immediate context here, not even the phrase “\( \epsilon \kappa \) works of the Law” (3:10a), conveys an instrumental sense. The instrumental sense would be more likely with a prepositional object that is an inanimate tool, than with the Law, a discourse which explains and inaugurates a covenantal relationship. In the sphere of personal relationships, one would naturally expect a broader associative/relational sense for \( \epsilon v \). For what is it, after all, to achieve covenantal righteousness or justification “by means of” the written or spoken agreement-discourse? That sounds as if the set of words within the discourse is a tool by which one attains some extra-covenantal goal, as in, “those who proclaim the gospel should get their living by the gospel” (1 Cor. 9:14). Rather, in the present context the question is one of achieving right-standing within the social relationship that the covenantal agreement represents. That suggests an associative sense.

Bruce appeals to another passage where Paul uses \( \epsilon v \ \nu \delta \mu \rho \), Phil. 3:6; but a careful study of all the places where Paul uses the phrase makes it appear most likely that \( \epsilon v \) is being used in an associative sense in Gal. 3:11. In fact, in the 8 instances outside of Gal. 3:11 and 5:4 (which, though contextually similar, is no clearer than 3:11 and thus cannot be used to
elucidate it) where Paul uses ἐν (τῷ) νόμῳ with νόμῳ referring to the Mosaic Law (including Acts and the compound ἐννομος in 1 Cor. 9:21), he never uses ἐν in a strictly instrumental sense, not even in the passage that Bruce cites (Phil. 3:6). There is a parallel there between “the righteousness that is ἐν νόμῳ” (3:6) and “my own righteousness which is ἐκ νόμου” (3:9); but in neither case should we understand the preposition as instrumental, since this would necessarily make the prepositional phrase adverbial whereas in both cases it is modifying δικαιοσύνη and therefore must be adjectival. It would be better to take the phrase in 3:9 to mean “from the Law,” and ἐν in 3:6 as locative or perhaps associative. Of the other 7 instances, 1 (Rom. 2:20), is a “descriptive” use (Moule 1959, 79); 1 is qualifying κοινωνία (Rom. 2:23); 1 is locative (1 Cor. 14:21); and 4 are associative (1 Cor. 9:21; Rom. 2:12; 3:19; Acts 13:38).

Especially relevant to Gal. 3:11 is Acts 13:38, since there also ἐν νόμῳ modifies δικαιοσύνη (although δικαιοσύνη is not used absolutely there but rather with ἀπὸ πάντων, thus with the sense “be exonerated (from)”)

14 According to Acts’ account of the speech, Paul sets up an antithetical parallel in Acts 13:38b–39 between the ability to be exonerated from sins ἐν τῷ στῷ (i.e., “this man,” referring to Christ) and the inability to be exonerated from them ἐν νόμῳ (vs. 38). This parallelism would strongly suggest, though not conclusively prove, that these two ἐν’s are being used in the same sense. Since the former of these Greek phrases is best taken in Paul’s common associative sense (“in Christ”; Zerwick 1963, §§116–17), and since the latter of the phrases is used elsewhere by Paul 3 times in an

13. Of these 4 instances of the phrase, the first is translated: “under the law” or equivalent (KJV, RSV, NASB, NIV); the second is translated: “in the law” (KJV), “under the law” (RSV, NASB, NIV); the third is translated: “under the law” (KJV, RSV, NASB, NIV); the fourth is translated: “by the law” (KJV, RSV, NIV), “through the law” (NASB) which is not necessarily instrumental. The first 3 instances are adjectival and thus clearly not instrumental, whereas the last instance is adverbial and thus more prone to be (mis)construed as instrumental.

14. Cf. LN, vol. 1, §56.34; GLNT, s.v. δικαιωθῆναι.

15. Both Dunn (1993a, 141) and Bruce (1982b, 136) translate δικαιωθῆναι ἐν Χριστῷ in Gal. 2:17 as “to be justified in Christ.”
associative sense and never (unless in Gal. 3:11) in an instrumental sense, it seems most feasible to take it in a broad, associative sense in Acts 13:38 as well.

The upshot of all this is that there is no convincing or even suggestive evidence for taking $\epsilon\nu\nu\mu\nu\varphi$ in Gal. 3:11 in the sense of "by works of the Law." Unless we take $\epsilon\nu$ in an instrumental sense, there is no real indication that Paul is using $\nu\mu\nu\varphi$ as an ellipsis for $\epsilon\rho\gamma\alpha\nu\mu\mu\nu\varphi$; and there is no reason at all to take $\epsilon\nu$ this way here—on the contrary, the evidence from verbal parallels would indicate that Paul means this phrase simply in a broad, associative sense, "with [or 'under,' or 'in'] the Law," as he evidently uses this same phrase 4 other times in the NT. And since the instrumental sense is the more specific and informative one, the Quantity maxim of conversation (see chap. 2) places the burden of proof on the hypothesis that that is Paul's sense. We must conclude rather that Paul means it associatively. 16

Moreover, we have another reason not to take the phrase instrumentally in 3:11a, which is the resulting difficulty of constructing a plausible logical argument out of 3:11, or from 3:11–12. But we postpone discussion of this matter until later in the chapter.

5.4.2 What the phrase modifies

Since an associative $\epsilon\nu$ may be either adverbial or adjectival (in which case it might be called "stative"), it was not necessary to know prior to the foregoing discussion, what the $\epsilon\nu$-phrase is modifying in 3:11, nor whether it is adverbial or adjectival. But in order to grasp the meaning of the verse, we must answer both of these questions.

What is $\epsilon\nu\nu\mu\nu\varphi$ modifying here: the verb $\delta\kappa\alpha\omega\nu\tau\omicron\alpha\iota$, or the subject $\omicron\iota\delta\beta\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, or else the whole clause? Inasmuch as it comes before anything else in the clause (not including the

---

16. Cf. Hansen 1989, 121: "The $\epsilon\nu$ is not instrumental; it expresses the primary orientation of life, the sphere of existence." Cf. also S. K. Williams 1997, 90, who however likewise gives his associative definition ("whose personal, communal, and social existence is defined and determined by the Law") a misleading spatial descriptor, "locative."
nominalising ὅν), and immediately precedes the subject ὁδεῖς, not the predicate or verb, it is quite unlikely to have been intended with the verb alone. Even Greek’s syntax of word order, as lax as its rules may be, generally requires placing modifiers alongside the things they modify, lest semantic confusion reign. Thus, the Greek reader would sooner infer that the phrase goes with the subject, or with the clause as a whole, than that it goes with the verb. Note also the ἐν τοῦτῳ in Acts 13:39, clearly separated from the verb δικαιοῦται (“be justified”), as is the ἐν νόμῳ of vs. 38).

Might it go with the subject then? Does the clause mean, “No one who is in/under the Law is justified before God”? The position of the phrase before ὁδεῖς militates somewhat against an adjectival force, since the normal place for an attributive in Greek would be after the substantive it modifies (or immediately after an article, before or after the substantive). More significant perhaps is the parallel grammatical structure and meaning of Acts 13:39: “ἐν τοῦτῳ πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων δικαιοῦται.” This clause-structure with ἐν and δικαιοῦσθαι may have constituted something of a Pauline formula. At any rate, the ἐν νόμῳ in Acts 13:38 (“οὐκ ἠδυναθη ἐν νόμῳ Μωϋσεως δικαιωθῆναι”) is set in literary parallel to the ἐν τοῦτῳ of verse 39 and is obviously a passage parallel to Gal. 3:11; and here the ἐν νόμῳ is clearly adverbial, as also probably the ἐν τοῦτῳ. In view of the evidence, the most likely interpretation of 3:11a is to take ἐν νόμῳ as adverbial but modifying the clause as a whole.

5.4.3 The function of the phrase, and implications for the “level of affirmation” of 3:11a

What then is the thrust of the phrase? “Under/with the Law, no one is justified in God’s eyes.” Its placement at the beginning of the statement gives it emphasis (Duncan 1934, 93). The whole main clause is qualified by ἐν νόμῳ on our reading of it, which phrase places upon the clause a qualification or condition that contrasts with Paul’s own circumstances: Paul is not (is no longer?) ἐν νόμῳ, “in [or under] the Law” (Gal. 3:23–25, 4:2b, 4a; Rom. 6:14; 7:1; 8:2; 1 Cor. 9:20). But what is the exact force of this qualification?
One might suggest that the condition concerns the Law’s jurisdiction before God: “If the Law truly had jurisdiction, . . .” Then the phrase would, for Paul, be effectively an unfulfilled, untrue condition, and the clause a logical result based on that condition: “If we were all in [or ‘under’] the Law, none would be justified before God.” The argument’s thrust would then be to infer an unacceptable, false conclusion in order to show, implicitly, the unacceptability and falsehood of the antecedent which implied it. The argument would be a tollendo tollens, denying in order to deny.

This hypothesis is analogous to E. D. Burton’s treatment of 3:10’s argument; and it is subject to difficulties analogous to that interpretation’s. First, the meaning simply seems too much to squeeze out of the two words which Paul uses. Second, it makes Paul deny a result (11a, similar to 10a) that Paul would probably agree with rather than deny. In 3:9–10a it is not an “absurdity” to Paul, that ὁσι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου be under a curse; rather, he affirms it in the same way and to the same extent that he affirms that οἱ ἐκ πίστεως are blessed with faithful Abraham. Likewise 3:11 has a strong parallel, in Paul’s reported statement in Acts 13:38–39:

Acts 13:38 (AT)
Let it be known to you therefore, brethren, that through this man forgiveness of sins is proclaimed to you, and from everything from which you could not be exonerated through the law of Moses,

Acts 13:38 (UBSGNT)
γινώσκον οὖν ἑστω υμῖν, ἵνα ἐν τοίσιν ἡμῶν ἔλθῃ ἐξ ἀμαρτιῶν καταγγέλλεται [, καὶ] ἀπὸ πάντων δὲν οὐκ ἠδικηθῆτε ἐν νόμῳ Μωϋσεώς δικαιωθῆτε

13:39
through him every one that believes is acquitted.

13:39
ἐν τούτῳ πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων δικαιοῦται.

Is not Paul affirming here that there are things from which they were not able to be justified (δικαιωθῆτε) ἐν νόμῳ Μωϋσεώς? Surely he is, to some extent and in some fashion; or at
least we may insist that he is not denying it! So it is the above tollendo tollens reading, rather than Paul’s conclusion, which appears incredible.

But if ἐν νῷμῳ is not an “if” condition that refers to the theory as true, what is its meaning? If we are right that the ἐν is associative, the solution we chose with regard to the ὅσοι ἐξ ἔργων νῷμον of 3:10 seems attractive again here, even necessary: the phrase evidently refers to a holding that the Law is covenantally authoritative (i.e., has jurisdiction); it still serves, then, as a condition qualifying the rest of the verse. So we have an inference which involves hypothetical proposition(s) as a part(s). But 11a’s condition is the holding of the theory, rather than the truth of the theory itself. We may therefore seem to have here another circumstantial ad hominem argument, arguing along lines similar to verse 10; but it is perhaps too early to make a decision regarding that. We will return to the argument’s structure, but let us first examine the rest of the argument’s propositions.

5.5 Hab. 2:4 in Gal. 3:11b

That part of Gal. 3:11 which we have yet to examine comprises a quotation from Hab. 2:4b: Ὅ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ἔχεται. The textual and interpretive problems of Hab. 2:4 have received much attention. The Hebrew MT and LXX (Rahlfs) of Hab. 2:4 are:

Here Rahlfs follows manuscripts Κ and Β. Hab. 2:4 is quoted 3 times in the NT (bold type here indicates the quotations):

Gal. 3:11

Rom. 1:17

Heb. 10:38

δ o de δίκαιός μου ἐκ πίστεως ἣσεται, . . .

5.5.1 The textual problem: the possessive pronoun that Paul omits

The Palestinian recension and 1QpHab 8:2 follow the MT of Hab. 2:4b in making the pronoun 3rd-person; the Greek texts, however, along with Aquila and Old Latin, have μου (Zemek 1980, 45).\(^{18}\) Codex Alexandrinus and Group C (Ephraemi) mss., from the 5th c., put the pronoun after δικαίος, perhaps due to a messianic interpretation of that term (Lane 1991, 304), or possibly due to influence from Heb. 10:38, where δ δικαίος μου refers rather to the believer (Moo 1986, 404 n. 106). But this seems an unintentional textual variant; a scribe would not likely transpose these words intentionally, particularly if he had any knowledge of or access to the Hebrew text.\(^{19}\) Thus, the pronoun probably went with πίστεως at first, following the Hebrew text. The most likely explanation for the original shift from 3rd person possessive pronoun to 1st person is “the well-known confusion in Hebrew scribal orthography between * and 1” (Southwell 1968, 615; cf. Cavallin 1978, 35; Janzen 1980, 53–54); thus it would have happened in or before the making of the translation.\(^{20}\)

The author of Hebrews may have misquoted the LXX from memory, or may have been following a different Greek textual variant, or may have deliberately emended the LXX to conform more closely to the MT’s meaning. But Paul omits μου from Hab. 2:4b both the

18. The pronoun μου is missing from the Freer ms. W\(^{c}\) (TCGNT; Rahlfs), likely in assimilation to the Pauline usage (Smith 1967, 14).

19. Among such unintentional changes as occur in textual transmission, “variations in the sequence of words is a common phenomenon; thus the three words πάντες καὶ δεσπότων in Mark i.5 also appear in the order καὶ δεσπότων πάντες as well as καὶ πάντες δεσπότων” (Metzger 1968, 193).

20. Janzen (1980) supplies a very interesting and plausible reconstruction of the Hebrew text’s intended sense, wherein the prepositional phrase means, “by its [i.e., the message’s] reliability,” rather than “by his faith.” This helps answer those who claim the Hebrew word הַיְשָׁם can only mean “reliability,” not “faith”; for even if so, the original pronoun was possibly third-person.
times he quotes the verse, whereas Hebrews merely has it in a different position than does the LXX. Paul omits all possessive pronouns, whether from the LXX or the MT. He may have quoted the LXX loosely from memory, or else may have translated loosely from the MT, or may have deliberately emended the LXX text he was using. The last two possibilities seem the most likely: Paul usually quotes the LXX (loosely sometimes) and seldom seems to quote the Hebrew contrary to it; moreover, the presence of δέ in Paul’s quotation virtually demonstrates that he has some LXX translation in mind rather than the Hebrew (Smith 1967, 15). The omission of μοῦ may display a textual conservatism on his part, whereby he wanted to avoid a hazardous decision between textual variants; or perhaps he wanted to avoid the potential, lurking within the text that Hebrews uses, for a messianic interpretation; or perhaps he was working from a Greek version of Habakkuk unknown to us.

In any case, it effectively ascribes this “faith” to the “righteous one”; so it raises the interpretive question whether Paul is thinking of God’s “faithfulness,” that is, his reliability (so LXX K, B, with μοῦ interpreted as possessive genitive), or rather of man’s faith (so perhaps MT and LXX A, C; so Heb. 10:38, and LXX K, B, with μοῦ interpreted as objective genitive21), or of the Messiah’s faith or faithfulness (so perhaps LXX A, C). While this question may be debatable in Romans 1, in Galatians it is at least partly answered by the context, which up to 3:11 has been basically an argument about whether justification of humans is ἐκ πίστεως or ἐξ ἔργων νόμον (see espec. 2:16; 3:2–10), and especially by 3:9: “So then, those who are men of faith are blessed with Abraham who had faith.”22 This is also the issue in 3:11a. There can be no question of Paul meaning God’s faithfulness. But some have argued that Paul’s citations of Hab. 2:4 intend Christ’s faithfulness (or faith); especially has this been argued for Rom. 1:17, where the immediate context is less obviously concerned with humans’ justification by faith.23 The question thus becomes,

22. Cf. Moo 1986, 208, 404 n. 107. J. D. G. Dunn (1991a) has convincingly refuted two arguments (R. Hays’ and M. Hooker’s) that in effect deny this through making all references to faith in Galatians speak of Christ’s faith.
5.5.2 Who is “the righteous (one)”?

Without launching into an interaction with the mass of secondary literature concerning Rom. 1:17, one may say that an anthropocentric understanding of πίστις in 1:17b is on the face of it at least as plausible, and indeed slightly more so, than a Christocentric one. In the first place, although in 1:16 Paul identifies the gospel as “the power of God unto salvation,” it would appear that δικαιοσύνη in vs. 17a is not the same thing, for the δικαιοσύνη is not identified with the gospel, but rather is “in it.” Furthermore, between Paul’s identification of the gospel as “the power of God for salvation” in 16 and as the “righteousness of God” in 17a, he inserts the qualifying dative, “to everyone who believes, to the Jew first and also to the Greek,” and it is no irrelevant qualification, Paul states it for a reason. Thus his attention just prior to 17 is on man and his faith, not on God’s salvation. Therefore it seems quite gratuitous to jump over 16b, back to 16a, for an understanding of 17 (as speaking of God’s personal salvific δικαιοσύνη and thus of Christ’s own πίστις); even more so is this gratuitous when the only other verses mentioning faith (πίστις) or believing (πιστεύω) in Romans 1–2 clearly speak of humans’ faith (1:5, 8, 12, 16). Thus Rom. 1:17 does not require or even suggest a Messianic interpretation of Paul’s citation of Hab. 2:4 in Gal. 3:11b.

As for Paul’s intent in the latter citation, we have already suggested that the context in Galatians indicates strongly a concern with human justification, and specifically with whether it is ἐκ πίστεως or ἐξ ἔργων νόμου. Thus one can sustain a Messianic interpretation of Paul’s quotation in 3:11b only if one starts taking all of Galatians 1–4’s references to faith and believing as about Christ’s faith rather than man’s; but as Dunn (1991a, 740) has incisively argued, this reading “leaves Paul’s teaching on how Gentile and Jew receive the blessing of divine acceptance with a very large and unexplained hole in it.” Besides, it is of the faith of Abraham and those who are blessed with him, that Paul speaks in 3:6–9 (cf. Rom. 4:11–12.

23-24). Thus the Messianic interpretation cannot be sustained; Paul has in view man’s faith in Gal. 3:11b, not Christ’s faith or faithfulness.24

5.5.3 The semantic import of ἐκ here

Cosgrove (1987, 659) has convincingly demonstrated that “the apostle expresses the relationship between justification and works or faith always in terms of means or instrumentality, never in terms of juridical or evidential basis.” However, the ἐκ may (figuratively) assume the latter sense, as Cosgrove admits and as we have argued (above, chap. 3). Therefore D. Hill (1967, 146, 157) may well be correct when, citing A. Feuillet, he claims that the clause means “he who is righteous on the basis of faith shall live,” for Paul’s intention may well be “to establish the basis on which a man may be righteous,” that is, “with what kind of righteousness he must be clothed in order to be able to live,” rather than “to establish how the righteous shall live.” In this context as elsewhere, however, the meaning of this ἐκ is determined only by resolving the question as to whether Paul is discussing the means or else the meaning of “justification.” That question we are presently investigating.

5.5.4 The prepositional phrase: modifying subject or predicate?

Another issue in Gal. 3:11b, one “strongly contested,” is whether Paul is “stressing that ‘the one who is righteous will live by faith’ (taking ἐκ πίστεως with ἔσεσαι) or that ‘the one who is righteous by faith will live’ (taking ἐκπίστεως with δικαιος)” (Moo 1986, 208; emphasis in original). Again, the form of Paul’s quotation is:

'Ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ἔσεσαι'

24. Cf. Dunn 1993a, 174-75; Williams 1997, 91: “if Christ is ‘the righteous one,’ then the prophet’s affirmation cannot serve to substantiate Paul’s contention that no one is justified in the Law.” Some commentators want to have their semantic cake and eat it too, through alleging that both the Messiah’s and the Christian’s faith are in view here, perhaps as multiple implications Paul employs (e.g., Hays 1983, 156-57; Martyn 1997a, 314).
The RSV, NEB, TEV, and a host of commentators on Romans 1:17 take Paul's citation there as meaning, "He who is righteous by faith shall live"; as also a number of commentators on Gal. 3:11. The KJV, NIV, and NASB follow the more traditional interpretation, "the righteous one shall live by faith."

Now, it is exceedingly rare in NT Greek to have an attributive prepositional phrase not preceded by the article, unless it is in postposition and a genitive intervenes between the substantive and the attributive phrase, making the use of the article awkward (BDF, §§272, 269(2)). Thus many have rightly pointed out that if Paul wanted the prepositional phrase to modify ὁ δικαιος, he probably would have put it between ὁ and δικαιος, or else repeated the article with the phrase (Smith 1967, 16; Cavallin 1978, 36; Moody 1981, 205). Grammatically, then, it appears that the original texts prompt us to interpret as, "the righteous one shall live by faith."

But these commentators understate the grammatical argument. For if the phrase indeed modified ὁ δικαιος, it could not mean, "he who is righteous ἐκ πίστεως," as many claim. Ὁ δικαιος is a substantive, "righteous one." If the prepositional phrase were adjectival, then, the whole construction would mean, "the righteous one who is ἐκ πίστεως." This translation no one seems to have posited. It is certainly awkward semantically. For one thing, there is the strangeness of "the righteous one who is of faith": if he who is righteous necessarily has faith, the relative clause is superfluous, and if he does not, it is irrelevant here; thus it

25. The commentators on Rom. 1:17 include Moo (1996, 78), Cranfield (1975-79, 1:101-2), Hill (1967, 146), and the many listed by Cavallin 1978 (33 n. 3); the commentators on Gal. 3:11 who support this interpretation unequivocally are fewer: see Cavallin 1978 (espec. 39 n. 31). See also the lists of commentators on both sides of the debate, in Moo 1996, 78 nn. 67-68; Smith 1967, 21 nn. 3-4.

26. The objection to this, made by Cranfield (1975-79, 1:102), that "Paul is quoting, not formulating something quite independently," is without force. It supposes that Paul slavishly followed some text of the LXX word-for-word, despite grammatical errors. But not only is this not Paul's customary procedure when citing the LXX (which sometimes he quotes loosely), there is also no text of the LXX, at least none available to us, which matches Paul's citation of Hab. 2:4b word-for-word, which fact argues fairly strongly that he was not doing this here.
violates either the "conversational maxim" of Quantity or that of Relevance. Another problem is that Paul is apparently trying to create there a parallelism between the "ἐκ πίστεως ἔργα αὐτοῦ" from his quotation of Hab. 2:4b, and "ἤγεται ἐν σωτηρίᾳ" from Lev. 18:5b, quoted in Gal. 3:12b. That he intends this parallelism seems quite likely, especially in view of the chiasm Paul appears to have built in 3:2-14 with its climax in the parallelling of 3:11 and 3:12 (see above, chap. 3; Cosgrove 1988b, 48). But this parallelism is not only formal but also semantic, only if in 3:11 ἐκ πίστεως modifies the verb (Cavallin 1978, 38). There seem adequate reasons, then, to reject the idea that the prepositional phrase modifies the subject; but that leaves us, as the only alternative, "the righteous one shall live by faith [ἐκ πίστεως]."

5.5.5 The logical "categorical" form of the proposition in 3:11b

There is also an important but almost unnoticed question here as to whether, by saying, "The righteous one shall live by faith," Paul is putting the accent of predication on "live" or on "by faith." That is to say, is he stating that "all who [have faith and therefore] are righteous shall live because of faith," or is he stating rather that "all who are righteous[, and therefore all who] shall live[, shall do so precisely] because of faith"? The former categorical form says, in effect, "all who meet this 'faith' criterion of righteousness shall be blessed (accordingly)"; the other states the converse, that "all who shall be blessed must necessarily meet this 'faith' criterion of righteousness." This last form is the way Stanley (1990, 504), Cosgrove (1988b, 54-55, 58-59), Cavallin (1978, 38-41), and many others seem to take it.

27. See above, chapter 2, under section on "pragmatics."

28. As Cosgrove notes (1988b, 58-59), in the parallel passage Rom. 9:30-10:13 "Paul virtually equates being righteous and having life"; so also Bruce, 163; cf. Cavallin 1978, 40. We may assume that here, for Paul, "life" signifies "righteousness," as a metonymy for it.
although none of them explicitly addresses the issue. In the first of these interpretations, *faith* is in the subject, and *live* is in the predicate; in the second, vice versa. Therefore these two propositions are not logically equivalent; neither immediately implies the other. Of course, if Paul is discussing the criterion of "righteousness" in this text, he is treating it as a definitional statement, in which case he implies both of these propositions. But in case he is discussing not this but the means of justification or of righteousness, the issue of the statement's categorical form is important, and therefore we must address it.

Some considerations that weigh for the former meaning, "All who have faith shall live," are as follows. Literary-formally, as we noted in chapter 3, Paul seems to have structured 3:2-14 in the form of a chiasm. Paul has cast his Scripture-citations into forms that support a chiastic parallelism consisting of 3:10-13 at the very least. Now, the question, which of the above "categorical" forms we should attribute to Paul's citation of Hab. 2:4, needs sensitivity to this apparent chiastic parallelism, so as not to overlook or neglect any intended literary structure. But contra Cosgrove and Stanley, our categorical form listed second (above) is not really parallel, in its meaning at least, to the Lev. 18:5b quotation in 3:12b, for as we shall see and which is at any rate evident from the stated form of that text, its categorical form is "all those who *do* them shall *live,*" a semantic parallel to "all those who have *faith* shall *live*". So, Paul's likely desire for these to be semantically as well as formally parallel in his chiastic structure (see above on Hab. 2:4) adds weight to the hypothesis that this categorical form is the meaning of 3:11b.

There is also a reason, in the context of Rom. 1:17, to hold "All who have faith shall live" as the meaning of Paul's citation of Hab. 2:4 there. The immediate context in Romans is "justificatory," the question at issue being, how man can be righteous before God.

---

29. Others who seem to follow the "All who shall live have faith" interpretation include Lightfoot (1890), Burton (1921), Betz (1979), Moody (1981), Bruce (1982b), Hays (1986), Dunn (1990b), and Longenecker (1990).
Moreover, it is a context of “good news”! Paul is “not ashamed of the gospel”—for it is something immensely positive, “the power of God unto salvation . . . for the righteousness of God is revealed in it” (Rom. 1:16–17). But which of these propositions is good news: that “all who [have faith and therefore] are righteous shall live (because of that faith),” or, that “all who are righteous[, and who therefore] shall live[, shall do so precisely and only] because of faith”? In other words, is it good news, that “All who have faith shall live,” or that “All who shall live have faith”? The second proposition is in itself simply a limitation or qualification of whom it is who shall live, a restricting of the company of the saved to those who have faith. Where is there good news in that? A restriction or limitation of means or access can hardly constitute glad tidings. In the first proposition, however, there is the kind of gospel we hear from Paul elsewhere: “all who have faith shall live, because faith is accounted for righteousness!” This makes our second categorical form a very dubious way to take Paul’s citation of Hab. 2:4b in Rom. 1:17b. In light of these considerations, probably the first categorical form is the correct meaning of the statement in 3:11b.

5.6 The continuation of the argument through vs. 12?

Again, if Paul’s point concerns meaning rather than means, 3:11b would be cited as a definitional statement; in that case, it would be convertible, so that both the above categorical forms would be implied (though only one would be stated). But no matter which categorical form of 3:11b we take as operative in Paul’s argumentation, we cannot reconstruct it a logical argument, with 11b implying 11a, unless we add a further premise or premises (see above). We have “Law” and “justified” as seemingly key terms in 11a, and “righteous” and “faith” as key terms in 11b, so it natural to expect “Law” and “faith” to be key terms of the needed premise. We find in 3:12a the statement of such a proposition. And though the needed premise might conceivably be unstated, it is unclear what it would be if not equivalent to this
stated one. We infer that the argument extends beyond the boundaries of verse 11 and encompasses at least 12a. We therefore turn now to verse 12.

5.7 The ēk in ēk πίστεως (vs. 12a)

In 12a the prepositional phrase ēk πίστεως is a predicate adjective:

Gal. 3:12, UBSGNT

\[\delta \ δε \ νομος \ ουκ \ \epsilonκ \ \pi\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\varsigma, \]
\[\alpha\lambda\lambda' \ Ο\ \pi\sigma\iota\phi\sigma\alphaς \ \alpha\tau\tauα \ \iota\mu\sigma\tauαι \ \epsilonν \ \alpha\nu\tauα\varsigma.\]

Gal. 3:12, KJV

And the law is not of faith: but, The man that doeth them shall live in them.30

This being so, it would be grammatically awkward to attribute to it instrumental or causal sense, as in “The Law is not because of faith.” Some scholars pursue a sense somewhat related to the “from” sense of ēk, such as “based on faith” (Longenecker 1990, 120, but he translates it “relying on faith” in 3:9), or, “has its origin in faith” (Martyn 1997b, 468).

Such translations are not feasible in this context, however: they violate the conversational Manner maxim (above, chap. 2) by being unclear. What would it mean, exactly, to say that some particular discourse or text is “not from faith”? Since this statement is quite unclear, and since making it clear would require departing too much from the attested senses of ēk, this approach faces a destructive dilemma. Much the preferable reading takes the ēk in the same sense as in verses 9 and 10: “partisan(s) of, from the party of, from the school of.”31

So, the clause reads: “The Law is not a partisan of faith”; or in other words, “The Law does not teach, or hold to, the theory of justification ēk πίστεως.”

That reading does tend to raise a question however, which it may be well to address a bit further here even though we dealt with it already in chapter 4. The problem is this: We have seen that Paul cites Deuteronomy 27 in 3:10 affirming the criterion of righteousness

---

30. We offer this translation only as representative, not as correct. Translations differ widely; ours will emerge in the following sections.

which it presents (steadfastly "abiding by all the things written," etc.). Moreover, in Rom. 10:6–8 Paul cites Deuteronomy 30 to expound "the righteousness that is \( \epsilon\kappa\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\zeta \)"! So how can he rationally say in Gal. 3:11 that "the Law is not \( \epsilon\kappa\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\zeta \)," that is, of the faith-justification theory? But this objection assumes that the boundary of "the Law" must naturally include Deuteronomy, and so must include the discourse-parts which Paul approvingly cites here. In turn, this assumes that by "the Law" Paul signifies a particular text, or else of the discourse inhabiting some particular text or texts, rather than one particular discourse inhabiting that text(s). In other words, it assumes that Paul does not acknowledge more than one discourse as inhabiting that text. As we saw in chapter 3, however, that assumption is false. Therefore it cannot serve as a basis for rejecting the above reading of \( \epsilon\kappa\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\zeta \).

5.8 The contents of the ellipsis in Gal. 3:12b

In view of this sense of \( \epsilon\kappa \), the disjunctive opposition in the \( \alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha \) connecting 12a and 12b suggests that 12b (Lev. 18:5b) presents the justification-theory which the Law does teach. This is further confirmed by Rom. 10:5, where Paul explicitly characterises Lev. 18:5b as a Mosaic statement of "the righteousness that is \( \epsilon\kappa \tau\omicron\omicron\delta \nu\omicron\mu\omicron\omicron \)". The stated proposition is evidently to be taken as a definitional one, that is, as a criterion, which further evidence below will confirm. Clearly therefore there is an ellipsis in 12b: "but rather (the Law's criterion of righteousness is that) 'he who does them [etc.]'."

5.9 Lev. 18:5b in Gal. 3:12b

This OT citation is not as controversial as Paul's OT citation in 11b; it may appear to many to be fairly straightforward. However, as we shall see, this Pauline OT quotation is more commonly misinterpreted, and perhaps worse, than the one in 11b.

32. As, again, he evidently says in Rom. 9:32 that "the Law is \( \epsilon\xi\delta\rho\gamma\omicron\nu \) and not \( \epsilon\kappa\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\zeta \) (T. D. Gordon 1992b; cf. 9:30).
5.9.1 The (obvious) logical categorical form of the text

It is almost impossible to err concerning the statement’s categorical form, since the statement itself is practically in categorical form: clearly the subject is “the one who does them,” and the predicate is “shall live ἐν αὐτοῖς.” The subject is not some particular person (i.e., “referential”), but denotes each and every one who does them; thus the proposition is a positive universal (or “A-type”) proposition. But again we should note the possibility that it is intended as a criterion, a definitional statement. According to our findings about the ellipsis (see above), that is how Paul intends it. And if this is how Paul intends it, then (and only then) it also implies its converse, that “All who shall live do them.”

5.9.2 The meaning of ἐν αὐτοῖς in (Lev. 18:5b and) Gal. 3:12b

Here we are faced with the same sort of decision we had in regard to the phrase ἐν νόμῳ in verse 11a: Is Paul intending, by the preposition ἐν, a broad, associative sense, or a more narrow causal or instrumental sense? Commentators are often fairly vague on this issue; but a fair number seem to go for each reading. Before considering the arguments for each one, let us look at the NT texts again, alongside the OT texts of both Lev. 18:5 and one definite allusion to it, Ezek. 20:25:33

Gal. 3:12, UBSGNT

ο ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ πίστεως,
ἀλλ’ ὁ ποιήσῃς αὐτὰ Ἰκάνεται ἐν
αὐτοῖς.

Gal. 3:12, KJV

And the law is not of faith: but, The man that doeth them shall live in them.34

---

33. There is no question that Ezek. 20:25 alludes to Lev. 18:5, for Ezekiel quotes the latter more or less verbatim in 3 previous verses of that chapter (vss. 11, 13, and 21). The textual apparatus of Rahlfs indicates no relevant textual variants for either verse, so we are content to go with his readings. In a number of ways, however, vs. 25 sheds more light on our exegetical problems than does Lev. 18:5: for one thing, it is closer to Paul in time.

34. We offer this translation only as representative, not as correct. The translations differ widely; ours will emerge in the following sections.
Any argument for one or the other should take into consideration the linguistic-pragmatic “conversational maxims” of relevance, quantity, and so forth, and take into account any grammatical considerations. Again, the Quantity maxim places a certain burden of proof on any narrower sense, since a narrower sense conveys more information, which information must in this case be signalled by the context since it is not signalled by the use of the word itself.

First let us consider some implications of taking \( \varepsilon \nu \) in the broader, associative sense. Note that there are two clauses of interest, in both the Greek and the Hebrew of Lev. 18:5. The relationship between these clauses is debatable in the Hebrew, but in the Greek the first is clearly subordinate to the second, as an antecedent (casus pendens) of the latter: “Whoever does them (or, if one does them, he) shall live \( \varepsilon \nu \) them.” Now, if the preposition \( \varepsilon \nu \) were stative/associative there, it would make the statement a non-informative tautology (“he who does them shall pass his life in that fashion”), which fact in itself argues against this interpretation of the preposition. Redundancy is to be expected; but such gratuitous tautology is not, it conveys no useful information (not even a defining-equivalence) and thus violates the Quantity maxim.

But perhaps it is possible to get around the unacceptability of this tautology within at least the Hebrew of Lev. 18:5. This would require that the second Hebrew clause (“he shall
live in/with them") be coordinate, rather than superordinate, to the first ("which [if] a man does them . . ."); the Hebrew clauses would then say "which a man shall do and he shall live in them," the second clause becoming an epexegetical unpacking of the first. That sort of statement would be more or less justifiable (whereas "If A, then A" is simply absurd). But other problems then arise instead. It would imply that the waw connecting them could not be a waw-relative (waw-conversive), for in this grammatical context the latter would entail clausal subordination (since it follows a non-perfective, prefix-conjugation verb representing modality or perhaps futurity). So it must be a simple waw-conjunctive (Waltke and O'Connor 1990, 525ff.). In this case the perfective form of the second clause's verb, "live," would indicate that perfective (i.e., "punctiliar" or "global") aspect was intended. But that would be quite odd in this situation, especially with the verb in apparently epexegetical coordination with the first clause's non-perfective-aspect verb. Note also Ezek. 20:25's allusion (in the MT) to this clause, which allusion construes the second verb as non-perfective in aspect.

Moreover, this Hebrew preposition ("3) never appears elsewhere in the MT modifying the verb nn and with a stative/associative sense, where statutes, judgments, or the like are the object of the preposition. But frequently it modifies nn with an instrumental or causal sense, sometimes where judgments, laws, or the like are the object of the preposition. Furthermore, to take the preposition as stative/associative here rather than instrumental, would entail that we take nn here as meaning "to pass one's life" or "to direct one's life" (in/with them). But while these are legitimate senses of the English word live, this Hebrew verb (in whatever stem) is never used in either of these senses in the OT (outside of the passages in question: Lev. 18:5; Neh. 9:29, which alludes to that verse; Ezek. 20:11, 13, 21, 25). Its semantic focus is rather on "having life," or on "continuing alive" (see BDB; Holladay 1988, and TWOT, all s.v.).
In all, the grammatical and contextual evidence weighs heavily against reading the preposition in a sociative/stative sense. Rather, we should read it as instrumental: "He who does them [or, ‘If one does them, he’] shall live by/because of them."

What does this say about the question of “means or meaning”? We have already noted in this chapter (see on vs. 11b), and in chapter 3, that the ἐκ in ἐκ πίστεως can figuratively be speaking of a causa cognoscendi rather than expressing its usual, literal sense, causa essendi. Again, if “justification” is forensic (i.e., a judgment/authoritative pronouncement according to some criterion) for Paul, that would argue for a causa cognoscendi sense of the preposition; and a forensic reading of δικαιοσύνη is highly likely here since Paul commonly uses it in clearly forensic contexts, and that includes the present argument (see the δικαιοσύνη παρὰ τῷ θεῷ in vs. 11a). A causa cognoscendi link within the causality represented by ἐν αὐτοῖς is therefore quite likely. But we shall look further at the “means vs. meaning” question for 3:11–12 below.

5.9.3 The type of “life” in view

Targums Ps.-J. and Onkelos explicitly identify the life mentioned in this verse as “life eternal”; likewise Targums at Ezek. 20:11, 13, 21, which are re-iterations of the Lev. 18:5b motif. This is unsurprising in view of some eschatological views common in Judaism at the time. There is little doubt that Paul’s readers would have understood the verse as speaking of “eternal life,” the life of eternity in Paradise.35 It is clear, however, that this type of life was not always conceived, particularly not by Paul, as starting only after death (Gal. 2:20; cf. Eph. 2:5f.; Col. 1:13).36

35. Cf. Lightfoot 1890, 139; Garlington 1997, 103; contra Morland (1995, 214), who tries to resolve 3:11–12’s conflicting Scripture-citations through an equivocation on “live,” with Hab. 2:4 alone referring to life eternal (see below).

36. Cf. Dunn 1993a, 175.
Perhaps a more important issue is whether Paul actually has "life" in view here, or the "justification" which issues in life. Since he has been discussing righteousness or justification in 3:2–11a, or else some who are justified (or "blessed," which includes it) and some who are not, we would have to agree with Bruce (1982b, 162, 163) that Paul is speaking figuratively, both in 11b and 12b: "Righteousness by faith is for Paul so closely bound up with true life that the two terms—'righteousness' and 'life'—can in practice be used interchangeably (cf. v 21b)." The figure here is a metonymy of an effect for its cause. And if this be so, then the causal/instrumental preposition ἐν is perhaps also used figuratively, for causa cognoscendi, if indeed the ἐκ of ἐκ πίστεως in 11b is also (see above).

5.9.4 The meaning of ποιήσως in (Lev. 18:5b and) Gal. 3:12b

As in dealing with the verbs in 3:10b, we must ask which is the general sense of ποιέω here: "attempt" or "accomplish"? Has the verb been contextually neutralised to the narrower sense, "accomplish"?

Unlike that of Deut. 27:26, the original thrust of Lev. 18:5 appears to be about the morality or holiness of the commandments, not the righteousness of those persons who follow them (note also Ezek. 20:25, quoted above). According to the original context, the verse presents the goodness and holiness of these commandments according to the criterion "life-enhancement"; there is no indication that it concerns personal covenantal righteousness. We can see that the immediate context is talking about the holiness of the statutes (cf. vss. 3–4, 24–30), and we can see the same concerns in the immediate context of Ezek. 20:25. In Leviticus 18 and Ezekiel 20 (and the context of CD 3:13–20 where also it is quoted: see


38. As in the case of the verbs in Paul's citation of Deut. 27:26 (in verse 10), most commentators do not directly address this question regarding the ποιέω in 12b. Often they assume that it means "keeping" the laws, i.e., attempting to carry them out, living under their direction; see e.g. Dunn 1993a, 175f.; Garlington 1997, 102–3; Witherington 1998, 235.
P. R. Davies 1982, 84–85), the emphasis is on the cleanness of God’s statutes as opposed to the uncleanness of their violation and of contrary statutes. The literary parallelism in Ezek. 20:25 shows that “cannot live by them” semantically parallels and elaborates “statutes not good”; thus the former is clearly an ethical-evaluative statement about the commandments themselves (cf. Neh. 9:13, which informs 9:29, and Deut. 4:8, which are clear ethical evaluations of God’s commands). Since there is no indication that personal right-standing is under discussion, according to the Quantity maxim (chap. 2) we should not read it into the author’s intent.

And in order for the specific command itself (in contrast to tasks not commanded) really to enhance life, the thing commanded must be accomplished (correctly); good intentions are irrelevant in this matter. In the “attempt”-interpretation, that is, the verse’s clear ethical concerns would become irrelevant to the statement; this irrelevance would violate the conversational maxims of Relevance and of Quantity. Thus it is the particular accomplishment enjoined by the command, that is in view in the original context of the verse, via a contextual semantic neutralisation of “do.”

This theme of the holiness of God’s commands, prominent in Proverbs and the Psalms (cf. 19; 119), apparently is widespread in the Intertestamental period (cf. Ecclesiasticus; Wisdom of Solomon). This same idea seems present in Qumran in CD 3:13–18, an allusion to Lev. 18:5—or practically a quotation, although without any quotation formula. But a subtle shift has taken place in this Intertestamental literature: now not only does a passage like Lev. 18:5 exclaim the rightness of God’s statutes, but also it seems to be construed as proclaiming the preconditions of right-standing in the covenant; for it suggests that a man must accomplish these things in order to “live,” it is a condition for his obtaining this life. See particularly 4Q266 10–15
(CD),\textsuperscript{39} which seems to make one's doing precisely \textit{these} stipulations the boundary
determining inclusion in the covenant, that is, a criterion of covenantal righteousness; and
compare it with the very similar text 4Q399 (4QMMT\textsuperscript{5}), which we examined in chapter 3.\textsuperscript{40}

Now, given the post-Fall situation, \textit{as Paul sees that situation}, this context of "the
commandments' holiness" would militate against interpreting the verse as covenantal-
criterion. For in this situation attempt of God's commands is never tantamount to their
accomplishment. So if faithful obedience is a criterion of righteousness, as it is for Paul,
whether the command is "holy" (i.e., in its accomplishing) or not and whether one carries it
out successfully are beside the \textit{judicial} point, as is whether one pursues it with a strictly
correct understanding of it (so as to be equipped to accomplish it). Yet Lev. 18:5b is a
statement at least partly about the uprightness of the deeds commanded (cf. Ezek. 20:25; Lev.
18; CD 3:10-15); so it cannot be that \textit{does} in that passage means merely "attempts/obeys,"
but rather "accomplish" (as we just saw). If Lev. 18:5 be seen as terms of the covenant,
those terms must be "accomplishment," not just "obedience/attempt" as in Paul's
understanding. Thus Paul would \textit{not} see Lev. 18:5 as he does Deut. 27:26, that is, as
righteousness-criterion that is covenantally valid post-Fall.

Thus we can see a clear potential for conflict between Paul and some of his Jewish
contemporaries, concerning the criterion of covenantal righteousness. For as we have seen,
Paul portrays Lev. 18:5 here as presenting the Law's criterion of righteousness (cf. Rom.
10:5), and explicitly opposes its criterion to the criterion "faith" (3:12a). Furthermore, it
would seem quite irrational of him, in the situational and literary context, to contrast (i.e., as
not-logically-equivalent attributes) "faith" to (faithful) obedience/attempt to fulfil the
commands; for these attributes would be seen as logically equivalent (i.e., as implying each
other). A contrast with "faith" would be feasible therefore only with the "do"-meaning
"accomplish." We conclude that by "does" in 12b, Paul means "accomplish."

\textsuperscript{39} See \textit{DSSE}, p. 117.

\textsuperscript{40} See \textit{DSSE}, p. 182.
The overall structure of Paul’s argument in 3:11–12

So far, the most remarkable of our findings regarding 3:11–12 concern three prepositions and a verb: We interpreted ἐν νόμῳ in 11a as sociative (not instrumental), ἐκ πίστεως in 12a as “partisan of” (justification by) faith (not “from” or “based on” faith), and ἐν αὐτοῖς in 12b as causal or instrumental (not associative or stative), albeit perhaps figurative for causa cognoscendi. Then we found that πονηρός in 12b means “accomplishing” (not “endeavouring to fulfil” or “attempting”).

Let us now analyse the structure of Paul’s argument in 11–12. The second ὥστε in 11 signals that the flow of argument is moving from 11b (and 12) towards 11a. Moreover, since none of the explicit statements is an alternation or disjunction, the inference is a syllogistic, polysyllogistic, or pure-hypothetical-propositional type of inference, or perhaps an inference-chain using both categorical-formal and hypothetical propositions.

John Calvin (1965 translation, p. 54) offered an interesting reconstruction of 3:11–12 as a hypothetical syllogism:

If we are justified by faith, then it is not by the Law.
But we are justified by faith.
Therefore it is not by the Law.

The second line (i.e., the argument’s “evidence-part”) and the third line (the “inference-part”) seem plausible readings of 11b and 11a respectively; but what about the first line (the ‘implication-part’)? Calvin ostensibly got this from verse 12; but 12a seems to say the exact converse of Calvin’s hypothetical proposition. Rather than “if by faith, then not by the Law,” 12a seems to say “if by the Law, then not by faith.” The two hypothetical propositions are not strictly equivalent logically (unless their corresponding constituent propositions are, which clearly they are not, their terms being different). Therefore this reconstruction, while clear, is so distinct from what Paul actually says in verse 12 that it fails to account for the difference.
As we saw when considering whether Paul's argument extended further than verse 11, the reader, if expecting a syllogism, is naturally looking for a second premise which has the terms "the Law" and "faith" in it. Unsurprisingly then, J. S. Vos (1992, 257) and some other commentators (e.g. Bligh 1969, 262, citing Thomas Aquinas; Cosgrove 1988b, 58; Stanley 1990, 503; Lambrecht 1994, 283) have consciously reconstructed 3:11-12a as an AEE-2 syllogism; and most others seem to do so even if not consciously and deliberately. That syllogism is of course formally valid; but few if any commentators have actually put these propositions in their logical categorical forms to see how feasibly they might comprise such a syllogism. If one were to accept the instrumental reading of ἐν νομίμωσι, one would have to put the argument in categorical form thus:

No human shall be justified (before God) by means of the Law. (11a)
for All who are justified have faith; (11b)
but No user of the Law has faith. (12a)

This has quite a number of problems. It is not actually a legitimate AEE-2 syllogism: in order for it to be so, 11a would need to read "No user of the Law is justified before God." This meaning seems a bit removed from the proposition as stated, if ἐν νομίμωσι is indeed instrumental. And Paul himself "used" (by keeping) the Law, when it served a "useful" evangelistic purpose (see 1 Cor. 9:19-21); so we would need Paul to be ultimately denying this alternate 11a rather than affirming it, for this reading to be plausible. But we have already found it highly unlikely that Paul is denying 11a. And note that the logical form of 11b here is actually the converse of what we found 11b's categorical form probably to be; but using that converse in place of 11b would be logically illegitimate if Paul's focus is indeed on means rather than meaning (i.e., definitions, which are convertible albeit universal positive propositions). Furthermore, the supposed meaning of 12a is too much to get from the words

41. See above, § 5.4.3.
"The Law is not of faith," and how it follows logically from 12b is none too clear. The problems with the instrumental reading are thus so many and so serious as to be prohibitive.

Though an instrumental ἐν νόμῳ affords us no plausible reconstruction of 3:11–12 (which confirms our earlier finding about ἐν νόμῳ), we may structure the passage in the following valid polysyllogism:

None who are of works have faith. (unstated, but implied by vss. 9–10)
All partisans of the Law are of works. (3:12b)
Therefore, No partisans of the Law have faith. (gist of 3:12a; by EAE 1st fig.)
All who are justified have faith. (covenantal corollary of 3:11b)
Therefore, No partisan of the Law is justified. (3:11a; by AEE 2d fig.)

This takes ἐν νόμῳ as adjectival, and as modifying "no one" rather than the sentence as a whole; but we found the latter more likely, if differing only slightly. Changing the inference somewhat so that ἐν νόμῳ modifies the whole clause (and thus making ἐν νόμῳ sociative rather than potentially stative), we get:

None who are of works have faith. (unstated, but implied by vss. 9–10)
Holding to the Law, all are of works. (from 3:12b: its "covenantal converse")
Therefore, Holding to the Law, none have faith. (relevance of 3:12a; via EAE-1)
All who are justified have faith. ("covenantal converse" of 3:11b)
Therefore, Holding to the Law, no human is justified. (3:11a; by AEE-2)

This appears a feasible reconstruction. Note that it is the covenantally-implied converses of 3:11b and 3:12b (viz., that the justified necessarily have faith, and that the justified necessarily "do them") that are actually operative in this polysyllogism. This suggests strongly that by the phrases ἐκ πίστεως and ἐν οὐσίᾳς Paul is discussing meaning (specifically, the referents of covenantal "justification" and "righteousness") rather than means; for the latter topic would not allow one to take as corollary the converse of the scriptural propositions, for the latter would not be definitional statements, so would not imply their converses.
This is the only feasible reconstruction that is compatible with our exegesis of the individual statements in 3:11-12, uses all of them, and would be a logically sound and evidently plausible argument for Paul to make in this context. Note that we can obtain a logically feasible reconstruction only by abandoning the instrumental interpretation of ἐν νῷμῳ. 42

But though this provides a valid inference ending with a conditional (i.e., qualified) proposition, we have yet to see whether this stated inference expresses the belief-part (making the final affirmation or denial) or only the implication-part of the argument, and if the former, what Paul is trying to affirm or to deny by this resultant conditional proposition. Now, we saw earlier that Paul is not denying, although perhaps neither affirming, the (prepositional-phrase-qualified) proposition that “no one is justified [i.e., counted righteous] before God.” So he is not “denying to deny” (tollendo tollens). But on the other hand, we saw that the phrase ἐν νῷμῳ is designating the existence of a viewpoint opposed to Paul’s own; so neither is he “affirming the antecedent” (ponendo ponens). This evidence strongly suggests that we are dealing not with the belief-part of the argument, but only the implication-part. And we also found that the qualifying phrase ἐν νῷμῳ is associative, not instrumental, and denotes the holding of the Law-as-valid theory, rather than the very truth of that theory. We suggested the natural conclusion, that this was a circumstantial ad hominem argument, which makes it ponendo tollens. We have found nothing since then to contradict this suggestion, for nothing has indicated that Paul is warning about the consequences of taking a certain course of action (in which circumstances he would almost certainly intend ἐν νῷμῳ instrumentally), rather than merely about the implications of adopting a certain theory.

42. An insightful comment from Dunn (1993a, 176) is worth quoting: “The thought is badly skewed if the emphasis is placed upon ‘doing’ the law . . . , as though that for Paul was a negative shorthand for the objectionable idea of achieving righteousness (contrast Rom. ii.13); in contrast, the curse clearly falls on not doing, not on doing.”
So, if Paul is arguing circumstantially, he might well be showing the logical incompatibility between the circumstances implied by holding the theory, and the situation predicted or implied in the theory itself. This would mean however that something in the overall argument, either stated or unstated, must clash with the (implications of) the Law-theory, which is stated explicitly in verse 12. This brings up a certain controversial issue which we must address, concerning the suggestion, implicit in the above, that the two scriptures which Paul here cites he sees as clashing.

5.11 The controversial relationship of the Lev. 18:5 citation to the Hab. 2:4 citation

We should not assume it impossible that Paul can present "the Law," scriptural as it is, as opposing some other discourse in Scripture (e.g., Hab. 2:4): after all, he spends 3:15–25, not to mention other passages in the letter, arguing against the jurisdiction (current, at least) of "the Law." In 3:11–12 Paul literary-formally draws a parallel between the two passages, and J. S. Vos (1992, 257), for one (see also Stanley 1990, 504; Dunn 1990b, 227–28; cf. Dunn 1987), has recognised and argued cogently that Paul is consciously presenting, in 3:11b and 3:12b, two apparently contrary principles of justification: the literary parallelism is thus antithetical.43

On the other hand, this scriptural antithesis certainly raises a significant question concerning Paul's understanding of the coherence of Scripture. Here we should note again a distinction, important for this discussion, between "text" and "discourse." As we noted in chapter 3, it is semantically plausible that someone might find either or both of these OT texts to express more than one discourse, various levels of meaning inhabiting the one text; this is even somewhat likely for Paul, in light of some NT passages that speak of "shadows" of

43. Thus Vos rightly notes (1992, 258–60) the parallel passages in Romans 9–10 and Phillipians 3.
Christ in the OT laws (Col. 2:17; Heb. 8:5; 10:1). In fact, the *legitimate* issue here is whether Paul finds to be in conflict the two *discourses* (here, "levels of meaning") which he has in view. It would be only a fallacious loading of the question, to infer that it involves the issue of whether the two *texts* oppose each other, as if Paul necessarily perceived only one discourse per text. In light of Paul's own citation of Lev. 19:18 ("love thy neighbour") and other Mosaic passages as if they were authoritative, apparently he recognises more than one covenantal discourse, different strata of meaning, inhabiting the Mosaic text. In that case Paul probably refers only to one of these levels of meaning when he uses the referential term "the Law," and therefore rejects the covenantal jurisdiction of only that one discourse. In other words, "the law of Christ" may be identical, for Paul, with some Christologically-understood discourse or level of meaning within the Pentateuch's texts. So let us not confuse the issue, but rather keep in mind that what Paul is discussing is two seemingly contradictory Scriptural discourses.

"Apparently" contrary, one may grant: but does Paul see these premises as *really* contrary? Betz (1979, 138 n. 8) argues that "for Paul, Hab 2:4 and Lev 18:5 do not contradict each other, but prove separate points in a consecutive argument." If taking the statements in isolation, Betz is correct. But he overlooks Paul's assumptions (unstated here but fairly explicit at 5:17 and in Romans), which we discussed earlier, that in the post-Fall world "faith" and accomplishments are never commensurable criteria or attributes. If they are not logically equivalent in any really-existing world, then it *is* contradictory (in any currently-existing world) to uphold them both as criteria (definitive statements) of the same

---

44. Cf. Martyn 1997b, 472: "That Paul should find in Leviticus both a false promise (Lev 18:5) and the positive statement of God's true guidance for the church's daily life (Lev 19:18) is clear indication of his conviction that, with the coming of Christ, the two voices of the Law have been brought out into the open, thus being now distinguished from one another throughout the whole of the Law." This is much more helpful than speaking of Paul pitting scripture against scripture, but more helpful also than speaking of Paul opposing some *interpretation* of Lev. 18:5 (e.g. Smiles 1998, 206). Rather than debating exegesis (though perhaps he might easily have done so under somewhat different circumstances), here Paul disparages the theory or discourse itself.
“righteousness” at the same time. In fact, it is only by noting and incorporating the mutual contradictoriness of these Scriptures’ “covenantal converses,” and thus of themselves taken as definitional statements, that we have been able to reconstruct Paul’s argument as a coherent logical structure.

However, we must clearly distinguish this sort of rhetoric from what many New Testament commentators today, and also many ancient rhetoricians, understand by the legal stasis of “contrary laws.” For they see this legal stasis as a mere sub-category of that of “Letter and intent” (so Hermogenes; cf. Vos 1992, 261–62; see Morland 1995, 126. Here we will interact mainly with Vos’s article, perhaps the fullest defence of this position.) Thus Paul’s purpose, alleges Vos, is ultimately to reconcile these two apparently contradictory texts, by the re-interpretation which Paul gives Lev. 18:5 in 3:15ff. (see Vos 1992, 266). But there is in Galatians 3 no real evidence of this intent to reconcile. Rather, it appears only that Paul wants to juxtapose them as saying contrary things. This intent is completely clear from the οὐκ . . . ἀπὸ πίστεως in 12a. Therefore the only sort of “contrasting laws” genre we might cite in this connection would be the one in which the laws are seen as really (not just apparently) contrasting, and the question therefore is not how shall we harmonise them, but rather, which one of them has jurisdiction.

45. We mentioned the rhetorical theory of “legal stasis” in our section on rhetorical genre, in chapter 2.
46. Cf. Hays 1983, 221; Martyn 1997b, 468–69 n. 8. Morland (1995, 214) finds his resolution in noting that “it is only Hab 2:4 which is found in an eschatological context, not Lev 18:5. Thus it is Hab 2:4 which can be defended as the most important principle, while Lev 18:5 represents the superseded and restricted one. This interpretation implies that the term Ἰδωρεία is ambiguous: It is only Hab 2:4 which refers to life as a blessing in the new era; Lev 18:5 uses the term in a weaker sense.” We have already found false this latter interpretation of Ἰδωρεία; this destroys Morland’s solution. But even were Paul’s Lev. 18:5 quotation rightly handled this way, it would simply mean there was no conflict to resolve: the two verses would be addressing distinct issues.
Contra this obvious genre-possibility, Vos (1992, 260) accepts as a Pauline rhetorical axiom Quintilian’s presupposition that ultimately Justice is never in conflict with itself.48 (Oddly, this presupposition seems to have biased and perhaps misled much of the discussion of Paul’s objections to “the Law;” for example, it would account for the prejudice against seeing two conflicting covenantal meanings within one text.) Now, this presupposition is probably only to be expected in 1st-century Greek rhetoricians, in keeping with their increasingly Greek-philosophical notion of “Justice”; therefore also these writers would only be expected to identify “to a great extent” the “contrary laws” stasis with that of “letter and intent” (i.e., the question of a law’s true intent; see ibid., 261). If Justice cannot conflict with itself, and our laws are manifestations of this eternal, absolute Justice, then logically we must quash any apparent conflict in them by finding their true, harmonious intent. But with a Jewish writer, like Paul, the idea that Justice is static must be exegeted rather than assumed (see above, chap. 2). So we cannot take as exegetically determinative here these Greek writers’ idea of the generic relationship between these juridical stases (types of question).

In light of the argument-structure insights we gleaned in the last section, then, it appears that Paul is using 3:12 to lay out particularly one implication of being ἐν νόμῳ that he has in mind, namely, that one also adopts the ἐργα νόμου theory. We have already seen, in the previous chapter, how for Paul (in 3:10) the latter theory leads to loss of incentive for steadfast obedience, and thus destroys “faith” as he understands the latter. And since Hab. 2:4 implies that faith is required, Paul argues, those who hold the Law-theory are, contra the Lev. 18:5 text, not justified. This is a valid circumstantial ad hominem argument.

48. Cf. Martyn 1997b: “Crediting the apostle, in effect, with Quintilian’s dictum that the law cannot finally stand in contradiction with itself, Vos [1992, 265] assumes that Paul found both Hab 2:4 and Lev 18:5 in the substantively indivisible Law of God” (p. 469, n. 8). But Martyn demurs: “Paul does not adhere to a major presupposition of the Textual Contradiction [genre], the assumption that the two texts, Hab 2:4 and Lev 18:5, have their origin in a monolith that is larger and more fundamental than either of them” (ibid., 470). “On the contrary, he is concerned to emphasize the contradiction between the two texts” (ibid., 471).
Now, one might reasonably ask how Paul could assume Hab. 2:4 as implying any absolute, unqualified statement about justification, as over against the opposing Lev. 18:5 principle. Indeed some (e.g. Stanley 1990, 504) have noticed that by rearranging key terms and conjunctions, Paul could turn the argument the other way, against justification ἐκ πίστεως! But the direction of the imbalance of the citations is explained by the circumstantial structure of the argument. He is not in this inference playing off the “acts”-theory (vs. 12b), as such, against Hab. 2:4; rather he writes of the holding of the “acts”-theory (cf. 11a: ἐν νόμῳ), which is one implication of the holding of the Law-theory (12a). Paul brings Hab. 2:4 in as a statement which he assumes the readers will find unimpeachable, even if uncomfortable. He uses it to draw out a further implication of holding the Law-theory: since justification requires faith (Hab. 2:4), and since ἄνευ ἐξ ἐργανων νόμων do not have faith (to obey, cf. vs. 10), one must infer (11a) that the latter are not justified. This implication is contra the prediction of the Law-theory itself concerning these persons. Thus the argument is along the very same lines as that of verse 10. But stated is merely the argument’s implication-part, since the argument is circumstantial; the belief-part (which Paul hopes the reader will supply for him/herself) will deny the Law-theory, based on the contrary implications of Hab. 2:4. Thus the conflict between Lev. 18:5 and Hab. 2:4 is not mitigated, but rather confirmed, by Paul’s circumstantial argument.

5.12 Summary and conclusions on 3:11–12

We have seen a great deal of evidence here supporting our hypothesis that Paul is arguing against the jurisdiction of “the Law” of Moses, whose “righteousness”-criterion contrasts with that of Paul’s favoured covenant, the “law of Christ.” Particularly supportive of the

50. On the similarity between these verses’ arguments, cf. Cosgrove 1988b, 54 n. 32: “The construction, ἐστιν δῆλον ὅτι, and especially its variation, δῆλον . . . ὅτι (as here), almost invariably takes up or completes a preceding idea.” Cf. also Bonneau 1997, 72.
idea that Paul argues "righteousness"-criteria rather than means, is what we found concerning the ἐν νόμῳ of 11a (not instrumental) and the οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ πίστεως of 12a, and that these senses and the use of the otherwise non-available "covenental converses" of 11b and 12b were necessary for reconstructing 11-12 as a valid argument. In concert with these findings is the conclusion that the argument is a circumstantial ad hominem one, and is merely about the unacceptable implications of holding a particular theory, and not (even implicitly) about the unacceptable consequences of pursuing a certain course of action. Thus the evidence is strongly in support of our theory that this argument is about social, "constitutive" meaning (of "justification," and in particular the denotation, with God, of the notion "righteousness") rather than about means (to justification or righteousness).
Chapter 6

The structure and meaning of 3:13–14

On first glance, verses 13 and 14 seem more straightforward than verses 10–12. But verse 13 has generated hardly less controversy than any of those verses. This verse has led Morna Hooker (1971, 349) to suggest that

If a prize were to be awarded for the most difficult of all Paul’s statements, it would surely be divided between Gal. iii. 13 and 2 Cor. v. 21—passages whose difficulty arises not so much from their obscurity as from the impossibility of what they so clearly seem to say: ‘Christ became a curse’; ‘Christ was made sin’.

Again as in the previous three verses, although some key terms present ambiguity the greatest challenge seems to lie in determining what if anything Paul has left unstated, those connecting links of his rhetoric.

Before we tackle that interpretive challenge, we shall try to understand the verse’s details as much as possible, although certain terms and constructions must wait until after reconstructing the logic. Then we shall examine the problems which verse 14 poses, and locate both these verses rhetorically in their relationship to what precedes and to what follows.

Let us first lay out the texts relevant to 3:13:
6.1 What does it mean, to “become a curse”?  

Paul’s statement that Christ has “become a curse” (γενόμενος κατάρας) may be puzzling at first glance. This participial phrase suggests Paul’s awareness of the above Hebrew text with its phrase מִלְחָם יְהוָה (“a curse of God”; Bruce 1982a, 30; 1982b, 165); but Paul’s use of the “tree” motif suggests that he has rather the LXX text of Deut. 21:23 in mind. In any case, in this verse and many other passages the MT speaks of someone as “a curse” when it means that they are “cursed” (e.g. Num. 5:27; 2 Kings 22:19; Jer. 24:9; 29[Heb.49]:13; 32[Heb.25]:18; 33[Heb.26]:6; 49[Heb.42]:18; 51[Heb.44]:8, 12, 22; Zech. 8:13). Clearly, this is a common biblical figure of speech, specifically a metonymy of the adjunct. Since also Paul’s ὅτι γέγραπται presumably introduces a Scripture-proof that Christ has “become a curse,” and that proof-text states that everyone is “cursed” who hangs on a tree, we may conclude that Paul is saying not that Christ was literally a “curse,” but that he was

---

1. However, the phrase “upon the tree” (ὑπό δέντρον) appears at this point in 11Q Temple Scroll 64:12 (Bruce 1982b, 166), as earlier in verse 23 and in verse 22 in the MT.

2. So E. W. Bullinger (1968 [1898], 591) classifies it.
"cursed."³

We may now with confidence logically reconstruct the first (though last stated) part of Paul's argument:

All who hang on a tree are accursed. (3:13c; Deut. 21:23)
Christ hung on a tree. (unstated)
Therefore, Christ was accursed. (3:13b)

That this particular OT text was applicable to Christ, Paul's readers would likely have believed already, so here it might be left unstated. For this OT verse apparently constituted for early Christians a testimonium to Christ's death (Wilcox 1977; Tuckett 1986, 349; see the allusion in Acts 5:30; 10:39; 13:29; 1 Pet. 2:24).⁴ There seems, then, no reason to doubt this simple and obvious reconstruction of the argument so far.

3. So Burton 1921, 171; Fung 1988, 148; McLean 1992, 538–39; Dunn 1993a, 177; Williams 1997, 93; Witherington 1998, 239. Some find additional significance in Paul's use of this figure: "Paul avoids the implication that in His own person Christ was actually 'accursed.' He became 'a curse' in the sense that He allowed Himself to come under a curse, just as it is said in 2 Cor. v. 21 that He was made to be 'sin' though He Himself knew nothing of sin" (Duncan 1934, 97). Others get exactly the opposite significance: "Paul evidently intends to say that Christ became so heavily cursed and so deeply sinful that all curse and sin were laid upon him" (Bring 1961, 143; cf. Lightfoot 1890, 139; Martyn 1997a, 318). In light of the standardness of the figure and its use here in an argument based on Deut. 21:23, it seems unwise to read any such unusual significance into it.

4. We know that the idea of hanging "on a tree" was understood by some Jews at that time to include crucifixion (Fitzmyer 1978, 511; Dunn 1993a, 178). There are some commentators who believe this OT text must surely have been used widely by Jewish critics to argue against the Messiahship of Jesus: No one who is cursed could be the Messiah (e.g., Lightfoot 1890, 153; Duncan 1934, 97; Bruce 1982b, 166; Räisänen 1983, 249–50). Likewise, some are sure this must have been the early Paul's rationale for rejecting Jesus and persecuting the church. Obviously, such a situation would make it unlikely that early Christians quoted Deut. 21:23 very often. However, the evidence is slim that any Jewish critics would have likely used to or to understand Deut. 21:23 in this way: In the first place, it was common, even usual, for Jewish interpreters at this time to interpret the genitive construction in the MT as an objective genitive; thus the hanging was seen as an affront to or a reproach of God, or the verse is taken to speak of the hanging of someone executed for cursing God (Lightfoot 1890, 152–53; Barrett 1985, 30; Tuckett 1986, 348; Hong 1993, 85; Elgvin 1997; this is not the way the LXX takes it.) Secondly, probably not all parts of the church were persecuted; the Law-abiding parts were fairly undisturbed, only the Hellenistic part was seriously persecuted. This is inexplicable if the reason for persecuting the Church was primarily its support of a cursed Messiah (Tuckett 1986, 348). Obviously, a crucified Messiah would not have been an immediately appealing idea for many Jews; but this does not imply that they would have inferred that Jesus was cursed according to Deut. 21:23.
But we have only reconstructed a part of the argument. We have not thereby even determined what type of argument this verse presents. Also, and importantly, we have yet to explain how Christ was a curse \( \nu \pi \tau \rho \ \hat{\eta} \mu \omega \nu \). This phrase is not explained or included in the above syllogism; likely, then, there is more to the logic of the rest of the verse than is stated.\(^5\) Shortly we will tackle that question; first there are some issues that we must address pertaining to the form of Paul’s citation.

### 6.2 Paul’s citation of Deut. 21:23 in 3:13b

The questions concern whether there is any semantic significance in certain changes Paul seems to have made to the LXX text of Deut. 21:23. There are only two notable changes of wording.

#### 6.2.1 Why does Paul change \( \kappa \epsilon \kappa \alpha \tau \rho \alpha \mu \varepsilon \omicron \zeta \) to \( \epsilon \pi \kappa \alpha \tau \rho \alpha \tau \omicron \omicron \sigma \zeta \)?

Paul’s change of word here presents hardly anything by way of semantic change. The adjective \( \epsilon \pi \kappa \alpha \tau \rho \alpha \tau \omicron \omicron \sigma \zeta \) is based on the verb \( \epsilon \pi \kappa \alpha \tau \rho \alpha \rho \omicron \omicron \alpha \omicron \) (GLNT, s.v. \( \epsilon \pi \kappa \alpha \tau \rho \alpha \tau \omicron \omicron \sigma \zeta \)) and retains a verbal sense, “accursed.” The perfect participle \( \kappa \epsilon \kappa \alpha \tau \rho \alpha \mu \varepsilon \omicron \zeta \) thus hardly presents any semantic contrast to it; in this regard, even its tense is insignificant. One must therefore reject Edwards’ suggestion (1972, 262–63) that Paul changed this word because for him it was the Law, when mistaken for a tool of justification, that brings the curse, so that for Paul to retain the participle would have undesirably conveyed another, more traditional sense, namely that it was God himself who was cursing via the Law (that is, the passive participle conveys the idea of a *curse-pronouncement* on someone’s part, whether God’s or

---

\(^5\) Cf. Hooker 1971, 350–51; Betz 1979, 150–51; Williams 1997, 92. We are surprised by Fitzmyer’s bald assertion (1978, 511): “Judged by the canons of Aristotelian logic, [Paul’s] argument is defective, indeed. If it were put into a syllogism, it would clearly have four terms, because the ‘curse of the Law’ (referring to Deut 27:26) does not have the same sense (or ‘comprehension’) as the ‘curse’ which Jesus became by being hanged on the tree (Deut 21:23).” Even if this is true, Paul does not even apparently intend the whole verse to be taken as a single syllogism.
the Law's or both). In fact, the adjective conveys this idea as well; so by this word-change Paul did nothing to expunge this meaning from the text. We must seek another explanation for the word-change.

Nor can we credit the explanation offered by Stanley 1992 (246):

Despite being stripped from its original context, the Perfect participle κεκατηραμένος continues to imply that the "curse" of Deut 21.23 had already fallen upon the victim prior to his being "hung on a tree." This implication was clearly unacceptable to Paul, who adduced the verse to support his contention that "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us" (v. 13a), presumably through his death on the cross. To eliminate the possibility of misunderstanding, Paul replaced the Perfect κεκατηραμένος with the neutral adjective επικατάρατος, which was already at hand from his previous citation of Deut 27.26 in Gal 3.10.

The problem with this is that it is not "clearly unacceptable to Paul"; at least not from the text is it clear, nor from Pauline-theological considerations in general does there appear any reason why that idea would be unacceptable to Paul. Why would it matter to Paul, the time precisely at which God cursed Christ: in the garden of Gethsemane, on the way to the cross, as they lifted him up on it, or at some other point in time? The original literary context of Deut. 21:23b concerns someone who has been executed as a criminal and then hung on a tree; but the text is unclear about the time or even the origin of the curse (which unclarity probably caused its variegated history of interpretation). It is not even clear from the Perfect tense itself that the curse did not take place at the moment of his being nailed to the cross.

A clue leading to a better solution is the fact that this adjective, επικατάρατος, is the first word of Deut. 27:26 (LXX), which Paul cites in verse 10b. Just as Paul has made a literary-formal parallelism in verses 11–12 by juxtaposing Hab. 2:4b and Lev. 18:5b, with their similar form and constructions and common word ἔφεσαν, so his purpose in making this purely formal word-change in the citation of Deut. 21:23 may well have been to help
establish a similar literary-formal parallelism between verses 10 and 13. There are other factors present that would contribute to establishing such a parallelism: both verses' citations come from the latter part of Deuteronomy; both citations announce a curse; and the person subject to this curse, in each citation, is “πᾶς who . . .” Furthermore, this parallelism is part of a chiastic parallelism that Paul seems to build into 3:2-14, as we noticed in chapter 3. It seems very likely that this was Paul’s reason (assuming he has one) for his formal, non-semantic change from κεκαταρακτός to ἐπικαταράκτος in citing Deut. 21:23. However, it could be that Paul, citing the latter from memory, inadvertently carried over the ἐπικαταράκτος from the citation in verse 10. But in light of the apparently careful structuring of the present passage, this seems a less likely explanation.

6.2.2 Why does Paul omit the words ὑπὸ Θεοῦ?

A more interesting and challenging issue concerns Paul’s omission of the phrase ὑπὸ Θεοῦ. A number of commentators have found this omission semantically significant: Paul apparently seeks to avoid the suggestion, or at least the unqualified one, that God himself is cursing Christ here (along with the Law or what/whoever is cursing Christ here (along with the Law or what/whoever is cursing Christ). There are indeed reasons for thinking that Paul would not have conceived God as cursing Christ: Christ was sinless, according to Paul (2 Cor. 5:21); indeed his going to the cross was obedience to God (Bruce

---

6. So Wilcox 1977, 87; Bruce 1982b, 165; Caneday 1989, 196-97; Longenecker 1990, 122; Stanley (!) 1990, 505 n. 64; Dunn 1993a, 177-78; Hong 1993, 85. Some commentators claim that Paul would have been using here the Jewish exegetical device of gezera shawah (‘equal category’): “Where two texts share a common term . . . each may throw light on the other” (Bruce 1982b, 165; cf. Stanley, loc. cit.). But Caneday (loc. cit.) points out that “if Paul employs the exegetical technique gezerah shawah here, the common term [ἐπικαταράκτος] of the two texts brought together is in neither the Masoretic text nor in the LXX.” Cf. the doubts of Fitzmyer 1978, 511. There seems, then, no basis for this claim in the present instance.

1982b, 165, cf. Rom. 5:19, Phil. 2:8); and God vindicated him by resurrecting him (cf. Rom. 1:4). Yet just as undeniably, or even more so, Paul is saying that somebody or something cursed Christ; covenantal curses do not just appear, they are pronounced, authored. The LXX makes it clear who is doing the cursing; but the whole problem is that Paul, in citing the LXX, has omitted the very phrase that clarifies this. However, several considerations show that this omission could not have been for the semantic purpose of subtracting meaning from the text. 8

The omission withdraws explicit information, viz., that it was God who was cursing the man. But only those familiar with the LXX text would even notice the omission, much less think it significant; and anyone familiar with that text would very possibly take it simply as textual background presupposed by Paul, that it was God who cursed the man. Even for those not familiar with the text, Paul’s citation-formula \( \gamma\epsilon\gamma\rho\alpha\pi\tau\alpha \) identifies it as OT Scripture; and the very idea of “curse” in such a context conveys the idea of curse from God:

In curse-pronouncements it is understood that the divine powers are to be the agents who will realize the conditional curse-pronouncement. In this case the divine agent is God; it is understood to be God and the inclusion of \( \Theta\epsilon\omicron\omicron \) is not prerequisite to such an interpretation. (Edwards 1972, 263)

In the words of H. A. W. Meyer (1884, 153–54), 9 “The idea of \( \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\rho\alpha \) as the curse of God [is] obvious itself to every reader . . . And if Paul had not meant the curse of God, . . . he would have been practising a deception.” In short, Paul would have known that his readers would naturally understand this as the curse of God. We can hardly suppose, therefore, that

---

8. Nor could it have been to add meaning to the text; subtraction of words can hardly add information.

by his omission he was trying to avoid the suggestion. And certain parallel Pauline verses make this very unlikely (Rom. 8:3; 2 Cor. 5:21).

Edwards (1972, 262–63) gives an unusual interpretation of Paul’s omission:

Paul turns the statement into a curse-pronouncement: Cursed be any man who hangs on a tree; hanging on a tree becomes a prohibition, a commandment of the law. The new wording [which omits ἡ σφαγὴ Θεοῦ] leaves no room for the possible understanding that the man is already cursed because of his crime or else he would not be hanging on a tree. The effect of Paul’s change is that the declaration in Dt.21:23 becomes a statement of law and Christ in fact transgresses it by hanging on the cross. By Paul’s alteration of the text he places Christ not simply in the role of being passively in a position which deems one as accursed by God, i.e. hanging on a tree, but in the active role of disobeying a prohibition of God’s law and thereby willingly and willfully becoming accursed by him.

This will not do, however. In the first place, Paul’s new wording rules out nothing regarding when and how the curse came on the one hung on the tree; the mere fact that God is not mentioned is neither here nor there, with respect to “the possible understanding that the man is already cursed . . . or else he would not be hanging on a tree.” True, if Paul were indeed trying to interpret the text this way, he would probably leave out the phrase ἡ σφαγὴ Θεοῦ; but his omission by no means implies that interpretation. Furthermore, the idea that some people would need a commandment placed in front of them to make them abstain from “willingly and willfully” being crucified, is one not likely to occur to Paul’s readers (or to anyone else). Certainly none of Paul’s readers familiar with the original text would have understood it this way, or would have guessed Paul to do so. We may safely dismiss this interpretation.

There is a pertinent grammatical point, however, which Edwards almost alone points out (1972, 263):

A principal reason, the present writer believes, Paul omitted the words ἵπτῳ Θεοῦ is that it was a necessary consequence of his having turned κεκατηραμένος into [the adjective] ἐπικατάρατος. ... the adjective is never found with the words ἵπτῳ Θεοῦ or any comparable phrase in the entire LXX; in fact, grammatically the construction would be extremely awkward.

This prepositional phrase is adverbial and the preposition points out agency or cause, which are inherently verbal, action-ideas. Thus Edwards is quite right about the grammatical ineptness of this phrase's modifying an adjective, such as ἐπικατάρατος, and Paul's constraint, under the circumstances, to omit the phrase. This likely explains at least part of Paul's reason for the omission.

Another part of his reason may have been, again, the desire to make his citation parallel in form to the citation of Deut. 27:26 in verse 10. His two citations begin respectively as follows:

of Deut. 27:26
Ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς δὲ όνε ἐμμένει
... of Deut. 21:23
Ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς ὁ κρεμάμενος
...

By omitting the noun δινθρωπος (following πᾶς) from the LXX of Deut. 27:26, and by changing κεκατηραμένος ἵπτῳ Θεοῦ πᾶς to Ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς ὁ in Deut. 21:23, Paul has done virtually everything possible that will make the two citations formally similar. It seems unlikely that this formal parallelism is purely accidental.

In summary, we conclude that the changes Paul has made to the LXX of Deut. 21:23 in Gal. 3:13 are basically for purposes of literary-formal parallelism. In neither case has the change been made in order to avoid making the suggestion that God had actually cursed Christ. This holds all the more true if the explanation is that Paul was using a different text from the LXX or MT, which is also a possibility (Betz 1979, 151; Longenecker 1990, 122).

6.3 What is the meaning of διαλυτικός?

This verb means "redeem," although in other contexts it can mean "buy up" (Lightfoot 1890, 139; Morris 1965, 55). Martyn (1997a, 317) notes that this verb "refers to the action of one person redeeming another by delivering him from slavery. That meaning is clear from Paul's use of the same verb in 4:5, where he speaks explicitly of redemption from enslavement (4:1, 3)." Although the idea of "buying back from slavery" generally cannot be strictly and literally applied when it is God who does the "redeeming," clearly it is used of him metaphorically, throughout the OT (Morris 1965, 11-64), which usage does not necessarily involve any permanent semantic change or addition to the word's range of senses.

Here, then, does it mean "redeemed" in the general, metaphorical sense of "rescued," or is it literally the "buying back" of a slave from out of his or her slavery? Paul almost certainly uses it metaphorically here, as also in 1 Cor. 6:20; 7:23 (LN, 1:488; Bring 1961, 149-50; Betz 1979, 150; Bruce 1982b, 166; Ziesler 1992, 40-41; Dunn 1993a, 176). This is in keeping with Paul's frequent figurative use of slavery language in connection with the Law later in Galatians (Witherington 1998, 238): the "slavery vs. sonship" motif is obviously figurative. "Rescued" would therefore be a feasible, but less picturesque, rendition of Paul's meaning.

6.4 Does the "us" in 3:13-14 include Gentiles?

A crucial question about verse 13 is, Who is the "us" whom "Christ redeemed . . . from the curse of the Law" (vs. 13)? Does it include Jews only, Gentiles only, Christians, the elect, everyone, or some combination of such categories?12 Paul includes himself obviously, as

---

12. Commentators are divided on this. Among those claiming it includes Jews only, are Lightfoot (1890, 139); Duncan (1934, 99); Betz (1979, 148); Hays (1983, passim in chap. 3, though he never really defends this view); Donaldson (1986); Caneday (1989, 195, 203-4); Braswell (1991, 75); Matera (1983, 120, 124; 1993, 291 n. 19, though in the text he says it includes the Gentiles); Wright (1992, 143-44); Hong (1993, 84; 1994, 178); B. Longenecker (1996, 91-92, 96; 1998, 143); Witherington (1998, 237-38). Among those claiming that it includes Gentiles also, are Whiteley (1957, 246); Dunn (1974, 137, cf. 130-31; = Dunn 1991b, 46-47; 1993a, 176); Thuruthumaly (1981, 118 n. 83); Bruce (1982b, 166-67); Cousins (1982, 77; 1990, 115-18);
well as at least some Galatians, in the "us" redeemed from the curse of the Law. It therefore includes some Christians, or some persons who, redeemed, then became Christians.

Donaldson (1986, 95) notes that it "is generally recognized" that 3:13, 3:23–25, and 4:5 "are parallel and need to be interpreted consistently as referring either to an inclusive group of Jewish and Gentile Christians, or to Jewish Christians exclusively." He then points to 4:5 and argues that the redeemed group there is explicitly "the ones under the Law," which naturally would be taken as meaning "the Jews." The inference is that in 3:13 also, the "us" who are redeemed are the Jews only.

However, Donaldson overlooks that for Paul the Law brings a judgment on Gentiles as well as on Jews, in the very same forensic action (Rom. 3:9, 19–20). Indeed, Paul's point in such a passage is that the Law condemns Jews also; how much more, then, would it for Paul condemn "Gentile sinners" (cf. Gal. 2:15). This implicit curse of the Law on Gentiles along with Jews, deprives of all force Donaldson's argument regarding 3:13. On the other hand, there are strong positive evidences, right in Galatians, that Paul means Gentiles as well as Jews in 3:13 (Bruce 1982b, 167): the τὰ πᾶντες ("all people") of vs. 22; the strongly inclusive language of vss. 23–29 and 4:4–6; and Paul's logical connection of 3:13 with vs. 14a's blessing that comes εἰς τὰ ἔθνη — a logical connection Donaldson does not convincingly explain. Furthermore, Lull (1986, 481 n. 1) rightly points out the fairly obvious but often overlooked: a natural linguistic assumption is that "the first person plural

---

Ebeling (1985, 179–80); Lull (1986, 481 n. 1); Fung (1988, 149); Westerholm (1988, 194–95); Hansen (1989, 123; 1994, 95 n.; but Christians only); Howard (1990, 58–60); R. Longenecker (1990, 121); Morland (1995, 222–23); Martyn (1997a, 317–18); Williams (1997, 92).

13. We must demur regarding Dalton's claim (1990, 40) that "Paul distinguishes those 'under the law' from Jews [citing 1 Cor. 9:20–21] . . . Those under the law would seem to be pagans, who do not stand within the covenant of Israel, and yet are bound by the law . . ." (similarly Gaston 1987, 29–30). While those "under the Law" may include others besides Jews, it cannot be taken as excluding Jews; see espec. Gal. 3:22–23; cf. Rom. 2:12.

in 3:13 . . . includes the Gentile addressees of the letter to the Galatians."¹⁵ In 3:10 the group subject to a curse may, on the surface, appear to include only “those who are of works of the Law”; but in fact, we have seen that implicitly this curse is on all “flesh.”¹⁶ We must conclude that Paul comprehends both Jews and Gentiles within the “us” redeemed from the curse in 3:13–14.

But does it include all Jews and Gentiles, or just the elect, or just the saved? Though seldom addressed, this is an important exegetical question. In light of the universal substantives Paul uses in the parallel passage 2 Cor. 5:14–15, 18–21, “all” people might seem Paul’s thought in Gal. 3:13 also. However, we had better answer this question from the immediate context, rather than appeal to a letter written to a different congregation. But it does not appear yet that we are in a position to achieve this. There is too much still that we do not know: for example, we do not know the force of the genitive in “the curse of the Law”; we do not know in what respect “we” are “rescued” by Christ—that is, to precisely what change of circumstances Paul refers when he speaks of this “rescue”;¹⁷ we do not know whether the “curse” in the second half of the verse is identical to the one that is mentioned in the first half; and, in a somewhat related issue, we do not know the preposition’s force in the phrase ἐν τῷ ἁμαρτία τῆς νόμου, whether “in our behalf” or “in our stead.”¹⁸ Now, prepositions and the genitive case are semantically quite slippery; probably we cannot determine their exact semantic force here without first understanding the force of their context. Similarly, to what exactly Paul refers, when he speaks of our “rescue” by Christ, is quite difficult to determine

¹⁶. See above, chap. 4.
¹⁷. From the heated polemical context, it is clear he thinks we are “rescued” from some particular state of affairs, rather than in some general sense only.
¹⁸. There has been some skepticism about the potential of ἐν τῷ ἁμαρτία to mean “instead of” (e.g., Burton 1921, 172; Edwards 1972, 301–2), but most scholars acknowledge this as a potential sense of the word. See the thorough study in Davies 1970, 81–90; also Zerwick 1963, §91; Morris 1965, 62–64; Cousar 1990, 55–56; 1998, 50 n. 7.
without first knowing the precise semantic relation between the “curse” he suffered, and the “curse” from which he rescued us: are they the same curse? Since this latter question holds out the most initial promise, let us deal with it first.

6.5 The semantic relationship between the “curse of the Law” and the “curse” upon Christ

Do these two mentions of a “curse” refer to the same curse? If not, to what curses, respectively, do they refer? These questions are often overlooked; it is commonly assumed that these terms refer to the same curse, namely, the one which the Law pronounced in 3:10b. If both mentions of “curse” refer to that curse, it follows readily from verse 13 that Christ’s taking the force of the curse upon himself is the means or manner whereby he set us free from that identical force. In other words, he suffered it in our place, as a substitute. In some way or other, Christ’s death was given in exchange for ours: we no longer are threatened by this curse’s power. One might understand this mechanism as Christ’s affecting “our” treatment under God’s covenant, by intercepting the force of a curse upon us that is already pronounced and, as it were, sent on its powerful way. This is a common reading of the verse.

But what if the two “curses” mentioned are not the same one? Then the above chain of exegetical reasoning has its presupposition removed. And proponents of at least one current way of understanding Paul’s view of the atonement have argued that it does not involve a straight “exchange” of Christ’s cursedness for ours (or, of his blessedness for ours). Morna Hooker (1971) has helpfully offered the term interchange for representing the alternative possibility, namely, that Christ does not give up his “righteousness,” even if we participate in it; likewise we do not give up our mortality and fleshly weakness, even though Christ participates in it. Thus the view has been called a “participatory” view of the atonement (Whiteley 1957, 242). And if this view is Paul’s, it would, by a tollendo tollens on the
above implication, rule out the suggestion that the two mentions of “curse” in 3:13 refer to the same thing. It would be worth our trouble, then, to examine the respective correlation, with the Pauline evidence, of these two views of the atonement.

6.5.1 Verse 13 and the “substitutionary” or “exchange” view of the atonement

This is the traditional, “substitutionary-atonement” reading of these and other Pauline verses. In this reading of Gal. 3:13 Christ became a curse “in our stead” (υπὲρ ἡμῶν), and by this means “rescued us from the curse of the Law.” The participial phrase “becoming a curse in our stead” (γενόμενος υπὲρ ἡμῶν κατέργασα) is thus an “aorist participle of identical action” used as an “adverbial participle of means.” The idea is not merely that Christ suffered the punishment that comes on “mortal flesh” because of sin; rather the idea is one of substitution, of interception of the punishment as it were, so that the punishment’s falling upon Christ removes it from “us” due to some transaction that it effects besides the mere instilling of faith in the worshipper. It is only because of Christ’s death, in other words, that even those who have “faith” (in Paul’s sense) are justified; even their justification requires additionally this atonement, the atonement effects some transaction that is required apart from their faith and the latter’s effects. In 3:13, according to this view, the connection between the Law and the curse laid on Christ is made by the substitutional prepositional phrase υπὲρ ἡμῶν, which implicitly identifies this escaped “curse of the Law” with that very curse laid upon Christ.


20. On these see Burton 1976 [1900], §§121, 139-41, 443, 447; cf. Burton 1921, 172; Hong 1993, 84. No one doubts that it is a participle of means; but whether it is a participle of identical action, or else one of (causally if not temporally) antecedent action, remains to be seen.

21. There has been some skepticism about the potential of υπὲρ to mean “instead of” (e.g., Burton 1921, 172; Edwards 1972, 301-2), but most scholars acknowledge this as a potential sense of the word. See the thorough study in Davies 1970, 81-90; also Zerwick 1963, §91; Morris 1965, 62-64; Cousar 1990, 55-56; 1998, 50 n. 7.
There appears nothing formally wrong with the logic of the text read thus. But one question is whether Paul supplies enough information for us to harvest this intended meaning from the text. In particular, note that this reading depends heavily upon \( \nu\pi \nu \eta \mu \omega \nu \) being taken as “in our stead”; but this is a narrower and therefore more-informative sense of the preposition, so pragmatics’ “conversational maxims” (e.g. the Quantity maxim, “enough information, but not more than necessary”) would seem to place the burden of proof on any suggestion that Paul intends this additional information: If he does, by what context of this phrase does he communicate this additional information? Is this information required to make Paul’s statement relevant to the point of this passage? Only through answering these questions could one argue that the context “neutralises” the semantic difference between the word’s broader sense and that of some narrower sense, changing the intended sense from the broader to the narrower sense. Similarly, the translation of \( \iota \lambda \alpha \alpha \tau \rho \iota \mu \iota \alpha \nu \) (Rom. 3:25) as “propitiation” (or “appeasing”) rather than as “atonement” or “expiation” entails a narrowing of sense and thus an increase of information intended. Such a reading would probably imply a substitutionary-atonement meaning of that verse; but again, the burden of proof is on showing that Paul conveys this narrower sense. One cannot prove narrower intended senses from the bare fact that the words themselves could carry these senses.

Would the idea that Christ was accursed in our place, that is, as our curse-intercepting substitute, be likely contained in, or at least compatible with, the original readers’ presupposition pool? It appears more or less compatible with it; the religious background of sacrifice and sin-offering provides the possibility of a substitution-rationale. But it is quite doubtful that the religious presupposition-pool would require this meaning here. We shall argue that sacrifice or sin-offering did not necessarily involve substitution, in Paul’s thinking and writing.

As most commentators agree, it is virtually undeniable that Paul's passages about Christ's death use language of sacrifice and of sin-offering (Dunn 1974, 131-33; 1998, 213-18). Allusion to sin-offering probably also informs Paul's usage of the phrase Ἰἱὸς τοῦ ἄνθρωπος (Dunn 1974, 133; e.g., here in 3:13; 2 Cor. 5:21). Even the pertinence of Christ's sinlessness (2 Cor. 5:21) probably alludes to the OT idea of an offering "without blemish." Moreover, it is very doubtful that one can dismiss all or any of these usages as metaphorical. A 1st-century Jewish reader would be more likely to take them literally; any non-sacrificial point of such a metaphor would apparently remain opaque. To Paul, it seems, Jesus's death was literally an atoning, sacrificial sin-offering.

23. See, e.g., Rom. 3:21-25; 5:9; 8:3; 1 Cor. 5:7; 2 Cor. 5:21.
24. Cf. Rom. 5:6–8; 8:32; 2 Cor. 5:14ff.; Gal. 2:20; 1 Thess. 5:9ff.; and note the sacrificial language of Eph. 5:2.
25. Cf. Heb. 9:14; 1 Pet. 1:19; 3:18. B. H. McLean (1992; 1996), following J. Milgrom, has argued that "in post-exilic times the expiatory feature of the ὀλαχ was taken over by the ἡττατ offering and the reparation offering" (McLean 1992, 533), which latter two offerings generally became confused and identified with each other; and "strictly speaking, the ἡττατ offering is a purification offering, not a sin offering. In other words, the function of the ἡττατ was to cleanse the sanctuary (not the offerer) of the contamination conferred by the sin or impurity of the offerer" (ibid., 534). But the evidence which Milgrom indicates is not all that compelling; others have reached contrasting conclusions from it (e.g., B. A. Levine: see ibid., 534 n. 9). Dunn (1998, 219) comments that "The more consistently emphasized objective of the sin offering is the removal of sin and the consequent forgiveness of the sinner. And the 'mechanism' whereby a purification ritual of the sanctuary achieved that end is more speculative and less rooted in the text than" that of removing sin from the sinner. Applying Milgrom's thesis to Paul, however, McLean argues against a sin-offering backdrop for his atonement-passages: "The priestly writers were very careful to avoid making the impression that the [ḥattaʾ] sacrifice itself became defiled in any way. . . . This means that the ἡττατ paradigm is unable to explain Paul's atonement theology as he defined it in texts such as Gal 3:13, 2 Cor 5.21 and Rom 8.3" (McLean 1992, 541–42). But if we may assume, for the sake of argument, that a ἡττατ offering might be used as a "sin-offering" and not just as a "purification-offering," then the reason for the offering's purity would still be clear: "The animal had to be holy, without defect, precisely so that both priest and offerer could be confident that the death it died was not its own. As 2 Cor. 5.21 [itself] clearly implies, only the sinless could effectively make atonement for the sinful" (Dunn 1998, 221). McLean opts instead for a "scapegoat," "scapeman" or "scapebeast" background for the mechanism of atonement which Paul intends in such passages (see ibid., p. 553; McLean 1996). Williams (1997, 92) follows McLean here; cf. Betz 1979, 150 n. 122. Schwartz (1983) also argues for a scapegoat background, noting that by Paul's time the scapegoat was actually killed (ibid., 261), and that also by that time "the scapegoat was considered to become accursed" (ibid., 263). This might just be part of the background Paul has in mind (cf. Dunn 1998, 220–21); but his writings and the rest of the NT more clearly suggest that of sin-offering.
What must yet be determined, however, is Paul's thinking on the *modus operandi* of such an atoning sacrifice. It is here that great difficulty lies for the "substitution" explanation of Paul's thinking on this. It is difficult to demonstrate the "propitiation" sense for ἰλασσόμενον (Rom. 3:25), for example:

Paul explicitly states that it is God himself who provided the *hilasterion*. ... In Hebrew [as opposed to Greek] usage God is never the object of the key verb (kipper). Properly speaking, in the Israelite cult, God is never propitiated or appeased. The objective of the atoning act is rather the removal of *sin*—that is, either by purifying the person or object, or by wiping out the sin. ... And it can be said that it is God himself who expiates the sin (or for the sin). (Dunn 1998, 214)26

Moreover, "there is no clear rationale in scripture or in Second Temple Judaism concerning sacrifice" or of "just how the sacrifice effected" this atonement (Dunn 1998, 218). Thus Paul could hardly rely upon the religious "presupposition pool" to provide clear signals of a "substitutionary," cosmic-ontological atonement-rationale behind his writings. Since pragmatics puts the burden of proof on the suggestion that this rationale is the presupposition behind Gal. 3:13, the conclusion would be that it is not.

It is true, as Cousar (1998, 39) remarks, that "Paul never directly addresses atonement as an issue in and of itself. No doubt this is because it never arose as a contested matter in the Pauline communities." Nevertheless, the above argument is more than an "argument from silence," inasmuch as for the substitutionary reading to prevail here either the "presupposition pool" or the immediate context should be *not* silent on the matter. But the immediate context does not compel a reading of substitution (i.e., it does not compel us to see the two "curses" as identical). And further considerations, in the form of conflicts which arise with it, cast a weight of doubt on the idea that Paul agreed with this "substitutionary" portrayal of the redemptive mechanism.

6.5.2 Some problems with the “exchange” reading of Pauline “redemption”

This substitutionary-atonement reading of Paul has been denied by a number of writers, who argue that Paul did not see the mechanism of atonement/redemption as working in this way. Their objections are weighty enough to demand our attention.27 Hooker (1971) points out that a simple “substitution” or “exchange” scenario, in which Jesus receives death in our place and we in exchange receive his life, does not comport with reality, even within Paul’s worldview. In the first place, there is the persistent reality of death: even Christians die, a fact well-acknowledged by Paul (Romans 5:12; 1 Corinthians 15:20-23, 50-53; 1 Thess. 4:13-15; see Whiteley 1957, 243; Swain 1963, 133-34; Hooker 1971, 359; Dunn 1974, 141). Indeed, they die a death just as real as Christ’s. Neither is it as if Christ had given up his life altogether for our sakes; indeed, he was vested with a new and better vitality in his resurrection a short time after his burial. Thus, nowhere in this reality can we discern any coherence with a scheme in which Christ is a substitute.

Furthermore, the substitutionary reading of Paul’s atonement-rationale runs into some intractable paradoxes. Many of these are revealed by asking the question, “Is this atonement limited to some sinners, or does it extend to all?”28 In the substitutionary, curse-intercepting explanation, the transaction effected is not a moral or psychological conversion, but a physical substitution of Christ’s punishment for ours (through “propitiation,” “imputation,” or whatever name we wish to give it). This implies that either the atonement is not limited to the faithful or, if it is limited so, their acceptance is not because they are faithful, but only (for example) because they are elect and this atonement only affects the elect. Either of these implications produces serious logical difficulties. If the atonement is not limited to the

---

27. Here we draw mainly upon four authors: D. H. Whiteley (1957, reworked and republished as Whiteley 1974 [and also 1st ed., 1964], 130-48); C. W. Swain (1963); M. D. Hooker (1971); J. D. G. Dunn (1974, reworked and republished as Dunn 1991b).

28. This is of course one of the central issues in the centuries-old theological dispute between “Calvinism” and “Arminianism.”
faithful, for example, why are not the unfaithful also accepted through it? If, on the other hand, this lack of acceptance is not because they are unfaithful but rather because they are not elect and the atonement is limited to the elect, how could anyone who is aware that election is the sole cause ever acquire the faith that he or she personally will be justified, without having some non-doctrinal, mystical knowledge of who is and who is not elect? But Paul nowhere speaks of such knowledge. Indeed, in this case how could one even know what “faith” is? One would be left to define it in terms of the justification of the “elect” or that of the “faithful,” each of which ideas would still lack definition. But if, for lack of any feasible criterion of who is justified, no one can acquire assurance in one’s personal justification, how will any ever acquire “faith” and thus be justified? Having “trust in God” could hardly be, in Paul’s understanding, independent of one’s beliefs about one’s own personal future. For both of the above reasons, then, we must reject the “substitutionary” or “exchange” understanding Paul’s view of the “atonement” or “redemption” which Christ accomplished on the cross.

6.5.3 Verse 13 and the “participatory” or “interchange” view of the atonement

But as suggested above, there is another scheme, which coheres with Pauline reality much better, and which we can glean from Paul’s own writings and which has been called a “participatory,” “interchange,” or “incarnational” view of the redemption. However, supporters of this scheme concretely specify not so much what the modus operandi of the atonement is, as what that modus is not (viz., a straight substitution). The essence of this

29. We dealt with this problem in detail in § 3.7.

scheme is what Hooker calls "interchange": the idea is that Christ becomes what we are (in our mortality) in order that we might become what he is. Thus it is not a simple exchange. It is not that Christ is cursed and we are blessed. Rather he enters into our experience, and we then enter into his, by sharing his resurrection... Christ does not cease to be Son of God, and we receive the spirit of the Son. (Hooker 1971, 352)

Not only do we share in his spirit and resurrection, but Christians participate also in Christ's death; but "we undergo eternal death in a 'harmless' form, since, through baptism, our potential sharing in the death died by Christ is made actual (Rom. vi. 6–7)" (Whiteley 1957, 243; see also Dunn 1974, 141). And "if we have been united with him in a death like his, we shall certainly be united with him in a resurrection like his" (Rom. 6:5; cf. Romans 8). It is in this sense, then, that "he died for all, that those who live might live no longer for themselves but for him who for their sake died and was raised... For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God" (2 Cor. 5:15, 21).

There seem adequate reasons, then, to insist that Paul would not have agreed strictly with the portrayal of the atonement which the "substitution" explanation of 3:13 offers. The contrary "participatory" explanation seems the one adequate to the Pauline texts. However, it does not explain how this participation in Christ actually comes about; therefore, it goes only a certain distance towards explaining the redemption Christ accomplished. We shall have occasion to examine the participatory modus operandi later, when we discuss ἐνέργεια. In any case, we see that there is no particular reason, not even the presence of that preposition, to think that the curse mentioned in 3:13b is the same one as that mentioned in 13a. And, as we shall now see, there are definite reasons to think that it is not the same one.

6.5.4 The two curses

In reading 3:10–14, there is a common tendency to assume that "the curse which Christ
became" in verse 13b is the curse which the Law pronounces, and which Paul cites (from Deut. 27:26) in verse 10b, and thus, is also that curse from which Christ rescued us (13a). The commonality of the identification is not very surprising; and yet when one examines this assumption, it begins to appear dubious.

Since Paul does not see the spirit of a Christian as “fleshly” (but rather Spiritual, see Romans 8), “the Christian,” taken in this sense, is not subject to the curse of 10b (because this “Christian” does not meet the curse’s criterion of who deserves curse, but rather the Christian abides by all things God commands). Rather, the Christian is blessed with faithful Abraham (vs. 9). But in another sense, the curse is on “the Christian,” in that the latter does inherit Adam’s sin and consequent mortality; in this respect one may say that even the Christian comes under the curse of 10b. In the first, eschatologically more accurate sense, the “Christian” is not cursed, but participates in the life and resurrection of Christ (1 Cor. 15:45–49; Rom. 8:10f.).

And it is with respect to this latter, eschatological sense that Paul wants to distinguish, in this passage, the covenantal standing of “the Christian” and that of the “Law”-adherent. It is with regard to “Christians” in this sense, then, that he warns against “the Law” in 10a, 11a, and 12a. The point is, however, that the ambiguity with regard to what a Christian is, is really an ambiguity with regard to what Paul means by “human being.” Where Paul thinks “a human” in the broadest sense, including the outer, Adamic man, he will have to admit that there is a “curse” on this person, whomever it is, Christian or not (Rom. 6:6; 7:22–25).31 Yet it is a “curse” whose impact and eschatological significance is, for the Christian, dramatically qualified: indeed, it is nothing but a participation in the death of Christ, a transitional phase between this life and the life of Paradise. (God must have made a

31. It may surely be regretted that Paul’s language of “inner man” and “outer man” may make him sound sexist; but it is his language, thus we use it in expounding Paul, even at the risk of sounding sexist with him.
distinction, for covenantal-legal purposes, between the inner man and "the flesh," i.e., the inherited, Adamic nature; for otherwise even Christ, condemned as flesh, could not have been also legally vindicated.) As a "curse" on the outer man only, it is a mere matter of mortality. But where Paul means "a human" in the narrower sense, the inner man, the "curse" is quite another thing: this "curse" has no relation to "the Christian" (i.e., the new inner man), whereas for the non-Christian, it will be far more serious than the mere mortality of this earthly, fleshly vessel.

Our point is this. Paul might have in view two different "curses" in this passage: one already pronounced on "flesh" as such (10b), and one only proleptically, not yet finally pronounced (10a), which judgment will depend on the nature of the inner man (on that day), which person may yet become Spiritual or else stay fleshly. One "curse" is already a given, even for Christians (as descendants of Adam); yet the other, which regards the inner man only, is not a given. But which of these Paul means by the idea "curse" in any particular place, will depend on whether he has in view there the covenantal judgment of the inner man or else that of the outer man.

Which of these curses then, if either, is the one mentioned in 13a? And is it the same one mentioned in 13b, the "curse of the Law"? Since 13a speaks of a group that is exempt (having been "rescued") from the curse, it is surely the proleptic, eschatological "curse" on the inner man, that Paul denotes here, the one which he warns shall come upon the "Law"-adherents. For there is no group whatsoever that is exempt from the other "curse," the one on the outer man, which for everyone is "flesh."

Well then, which of these two curses, if either, does Paul denote in 13b, by the "curse" which Christ "became" ἠμῶν on the cross? For Paul, the cross of Christ means Christ's dying "in the likeness of sinful flesh"; in condemning Christ God was really condemning "sin in the flesh" (Rom. 8:3). This is a sinfulness in which "Christians," as
descendants of Adam, share. Legally they have "died with Christ" (6:8; 2 Cor. 5:14), in
that "our old self was crucified with him" (Rom. 6:6; Gal. 5:20). Their bodies no less than
those of unbelievers must die, because of the sinfulness of the flesh (Rom. 8:10; 1 Cor.
15:50-53). In short, Christians participate in Christ's death, the death of sinful flesh.

In summary, the "curse of the Law" (13a) is that eschatological curse against which
Paul is warning the Galatians in 3:10-14. If they are steadfastly true to Paul's gospel, they
can instead "await the hope of righteousness" (5:5 NASB), the hope of a good verdict in that
last judgment. For that judgment has reference only to the inner man. But when speaking of
"the curse" which Christ suffered (13b), this curse on sinful flesh as such, Paul included the
outer man in his purview. He never warns Christians that they will suffer this "curse" if
they apostatise: on the contrary, he warns them that they will suffer it regardless, or even that
they can expect to suffer more of it, the more faithful they are in the inner man (Rom. 8:17;
2 Cor. 1:5, 7; 4:7-11; Phil. 3:10; Col. 1:24; 1 Thess. 2:14; see also Acts 14:22; 2 Tim.
3:12). Clearly then, the curse which Christ "became" in Gal. 3:13b is not the proleptic,
eschatological one from which he "rescued" Christians according to 13a.

6.6 What is the meaning of the genitive in "the curse of the Law"?

In light of this last point, we can make a much more informed judgment on the "curse of the
Law" genitive, in 13a. The most common reading is that it means the curse is "pronounced
by the Law" (a "subjective genitive of authorship" if you will), harking back to 10b.32 This
reading will not do. It follows, from the above, that in 13a Paul is using "the Law" in a
rather pejorative way (to speak of the wrong—or perhaps the merely superseded—covenantal
discourse expressed literally in the text of the Torah), as he does virtually throughout
Galatians. But Paul elsewhere warns that the curse pronounced by that "Law" is on "all

32. Cf. Longenecker 1998, 144, and most commentators.
flesh," inclusive of everyone (see Rom. 3:19-20, // Gal. 2:16). Christ participated in that curse; and we have just shown that that is not the curse of 13a. There (13a) Paul has in mind rather the inner man's covenantal standing; and consequently the Christian's standing is good with regard to this "curse." So "the Law's curse" in 13a does not mean "the curse which the Law pronounces."

What then? In light of what we have just determined about 13a, the relationship between its (eschatological) "curse" and "the Law" (in this pejorative sense), is that those who adhere to this Law end up being "cursed" (in the last day). So, it is the curse "that pertains to the Law"—in that it is the lot of those who adhere to "the Law." There is no need to shave this reading down any further so that it will fit nicely into one of the traditional Greek-grammatical cubbyholes prepared for genitives (subjective genitive, objective genitive, etc.). The Greek genitive is simply a noun functioning as a qualifying adjective (DM §§86-88; Zerwick 1963, §39). Since it qualifies, Paul wishes to tell us which "curse" he means; namely, it is the one that is associated with "the Law" inasmuch as all who adhere to the latter are subject to that curse.

6.7 What is the meaning of υπέρ?

Earlier we found in favour of the "participatory" reading of the "redemption from the curse." For there is no contextual basis, either in Paul's "presupposition pool" or in the linguistic context, for reading the narrower, more-informative, substitutional sense into the prepositional phrase υπέρ ἡμῶν. But in light of the Quantity maxim of conversation, Paul should be assuring enough information is present to communicate his intended sense of the preposition. So we must assume that he intends only its broader, less informative sense, "in behalf of."

33. "The genitive defines by attributing a quality or relationship to the noun which it modifies" (DM, p. 74, §88).
But in order for this to be a truly satisfactory reading, particularly in view of its conflict with the traditional exegesis, we need to explain how it is that Christ's death, “in the likeness of sinful flesh” (Rom. 8:3), is “in behalf of us.” Or, in terms of 13a, how could this deliver us, or help us escape, from the “curse” which comes upon Law-adherents? We know that the “rescue” of 13a happens through the “becoming a curse” of 13b; for the participle “becoming” (γένομενος) is clearly an adverbial participle of means, no other semantic possibility being feasible. By rejecting (on behalf of Paul) the substitutionary modus operandi of the atonement, we have rejected the idea that Christ, by standing in its way and intercepting it, delivers us from a curse already pronounced. The only alternative conceivable is that he enables us to avoid this curse’s ever being pronounced upon us.

That enablement could conceivably happen either because Christ changes the criterion by which one is cursed—so that we no longer must satisfy that criterion—or else because he gives us some information which motivates us to satisfy the criterion for blessing, rather than the one for curse. The first of these possibilities is in conflict with the text before us. For this curse is pronounced according to the very criterion which Paul cites approvingly in verse 10b, that of Deut. 27:26 (see above, chap. 5); therefore he is affirming this criterion, as that of the eschatological judgment. This leaves us the second possibility: Paul is saying that we escape this “curse” because Christ gives us the incentive to “abide by all things” which God commands, so that we satisfy the criterion for blessing instead. Probably it does this by changing or informing our thinking concerning the criterion (the cost) itself; otherwise, it would need to change or inform our thinking about eternal life (the benefit), which informing does not seem to be in view either here or elsewhere in Paul’s writings.

Now whether the “participation” has its redemptive effect through some substitutional, wrath-intercepting modus operandi or rather in a more “psychological,” conception-altering

34. A participle of “manner” is next in feasibility here, but fails to fit the context.
way is, as we have said, an issue that Paul does not address directly. But we have found insuperable difficulties with the wrath-intercepting mechanism of atonement; and that, for Paul, Christ does not save all humanity but rather only those persons who believe the gospel, suggests that the atonement involves some psychological element. Let us then consider two “psychological” explanations of the modus operandi.

A psychological explanation will construe the “deliverance” as consisting in the relating or inducing in us a particular line of thought, which arrives at a particular conclusion. But the “psychological” Pauline modus operandi of atonement, that inferential line of thought, may be alleged by interpreters in differing forms. In essence, the first form which we will note runs as follows: “Christ was innocent, as shown in his vindication through resurrection; yet he was cursed. Obviously then, the curse was mistakenly pronounced. As this curse was announced in the covenantal context of Deuteronomy, we may take it that the Law pronounced, or at least concurred with, this curse. The curse being a mistake, the natural inference is that the Law is covenantal-legally unreliable. We cannot, nor need we, rely upon it to pronounce upon who is within and who is without God’s true covenant.”35

35. Some form of this interpretation is adopted by a number of commentators, including Burton 1921, 168–75; Duncan 1934, 101; Pannenberg 1968; Edwards 1972; Weder 1981; Beker 1984, 185–86, 261; Kim 1984, 274, 357; Stuhlmacher 1986; also, in his own way, Hamerton-Kelly 1990. Dunn has introduced what we might call a sociological version of this reading (1990b, 228–29): “The curse of the law is not simply the condemnation which falls on any transgression and on all who fall short of the law’s requirements. Paul has in mind the short-fall of his typical Jewish contemporary, the curse which falls on all who restrict the grace and promise of God in nationalistic terms, who treat the law as a boundary to mark the people of God off from the Gentiles, who give a false priority to ritual markers. . . . The curse which was removed by Christ’s death therefore was the curse which had previously prevented that blessing from reaching the Gentiles, the curse of a wrong understanding of the law.” But inasmuch as in Dunn’s and most others’ interpretation of 3:10 the curse seems to be an actual covenantal-judicial pronouncement, there is a tension set up between these two verses. If the curse on Christ shows us the error of using the Law as boundary-marker, but only because we assume that the Law concurred, wrongly, with this curse, then the implied covenantal non-jurisdiction of the Law debilitates Paul’s warning in 3:10 of an actual curse pronounced on those who fail to live up to what the Law really demands. Cf. the critiques of Dunn’s position in Sloan 1991, 44–45; Caneday 1992, 50–51. Braswell (1991, 87), Bonneau (1997, 77–78), and Garlington (1997, 115–16) have followed Dunn in this reading of verse 13, as also in regard to verse 10.
According to hermeneutical guidelines we adopted in chapter 2, if *this* modus operandi of redemption is what Paul intends in the unspoken logic of 3:13 then we should be able to determine this from the text; for the unspoken part of an argument should be identifiable from what is stated and what is supplied from the contexts. Furthermore, we should deduce a *valid*-argumental reconstruction if possible; and the unstated parts should be part of the hearers’ presupposition pool, or at least propositions they would be likely to entertain. Now, this first psychological interpretation must, in order to be consistent, see the “curse” from which Christ delivers “us” as *metaphorical* for an error, or for the general results of error, regarding the Law’s soteriological/covenantal authority and validity. For according to it, the Law cannot pronounce a real, valid curse. But this view is problematic. If “the curse of the Law” is seen as a metaphor for something and not an actual curse pronounced, then nothing whatever in the text of the verse even suggests that the Law either *pronounced* or *concurred with* the curse which Christ became (according to Deut. 21:23); but the latter would be required by this explanation of verse 13. Deut. 21:23 does not actually *pronounce* a curse, judicially, but only *announces* one as being fact.36 The idea that the Law pronounces or even concurs with this curse is not actually entailed. Nor does the text of Gal. 3:13 provide this connection, *unless* one find it in a narrower, more-informative, substitutionary sense of *ἐπὶ τῷ ἡμῶν*; but as we have argued, one could get that narrower, more-informative sense only from the phrase’s context, and thus the burden of proof lies on showing that narrower sense.

Since the text of verse 13 does not seem to provide this connection between Christ’s curse and ours, one which is necessary for this version of Paul’s alleged “psychological” atonement-rationale to cohere, that connection would have to be provided from the

36. Cf. Räisänen 1992, 44: the fact that Deut. 21:23 puts Jesus’ manner of death under a curse “does not mean that the law which spells out the curse also brought the victim under the curse.” This is contra Edwards’ attempt, critiqued already above, to claim that Paul’s citation turns Deut. 21:23 itself into a law threatening a curse upon anyone who gets himself hanged upon a tree.
presupposition pool of the readers in order for the readers to grasp Paul’s meaning. But it is quite doubtful that the readers would find this connection in their presupposition pool. In the first place, apparently no 1st-century Christian thought Christ transgressed “the Law”; he was sinless (which is a presupposition of this explanation anyway; cf. 2 Cor. 5:21).37 So there is no reason, apart from Deut. 21:23, to think the Law pronounced a curse on him (Räisänen 1992, 41–44). Secondly, it is hard to imagine that many Christian readers, particularly those who were enamoured of the Law, had connected the Deut. 21:23 testimonium to such a “curse of the Law”; as Tuckett explains (1986, 348–349),

According to the logic of the scheme proposed, the corollaries about the Law inevitably follow from the conviction that Jesus was Messiah/Lord/accepted by God or whatever. The fact is, however, that a sizeable part of the early Christian church failed to draw such corollaries. As far as we can tell, a part of the church (perhaps under James) stayed within the confines of Judaism and remained faithful adherents of the Law. The inexorable logic which, it is claimed, led from Paul’s new assessment of Jesus to his beliefs about the Law was not shared by a large number of his contemporary Christians.

Thus, this connection seems absent from the presupposition pool from which the reader would have to retrieve it. This reading would hardly have been expected to occur to the original reader.38

It therefore has an additional problem. The phrase “the curse of the Law” is a referential one, which requires that the context tell us to specifically which “curse of the Law” it refers; and the context tells us that it is the one mentioned in 3:10 (cf. the Quantity

37. E.g., Jesus’ forgiving of sins was, even according to his accusers’ charge, blasphemous only if he really had no authority to forgive, and (therefore) really was not divine. Did not Paul think Christ had at least the former of these characteristics? (“We must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ,” 2 Cor. 5:10.) Cf. Räisänen 1992, 43: “Dietzfelbinger shares the common view that Jesus was openly critical of the law and that this was historically an important reason for his death. Severe historical difficulties stand in the way of that position, however. Apart from the late comment in Jn 19.7, the passion narratives do not represent such a view. The death sentence is connected, instead, with Jesus’ confession to his messiahship (Mk 14.62 par.) . . .”

maxim: the discourse must give enough information to serve its purpose). The inference would be that the "curse of the Law" from which Christ redeemed "us" in 3:13 is the one ostensibly pronounced in 3:10. But the latter curse is genuinely covenantal-legal, and not merely metaphorical. So verse 13’s clear reference to the curse of 3:10 is counter to the interpretation of this "curse of the Law" in 13 as a merely metaphorical "curse," and thus is counter to this psychological explanation of Paul’s argument. We conclude that this "psychological" reading is incompatible with the text as well as absent from the readers’ presupposition pool.

But there is another, more general way to frame a "psychological" redemption-scheme: the "deliverance from" the Law’s curse may be understood as deliverance from the idea that "the Law" has final jurisdiction over us, yet without any reference to a mistaken curse. To be more precise: if that which brought on the curse in 3:10 was one’s being δικαιωμένου (i.e., of the δικαιοσύνη θεωρεῖν theory of justification), then abandoning any belief that "the Law’s" criterion of righteousness ("accomplishments") is a valid one before God, and accepting the valid criterion instead (thus having the mind of the Spirit, not the flesh) should naturally deliver us from that curse. So it might not be necessary, for achieving that deliverance, that the logic which delivers us from this idea contains any premises about the Law’s mistaken cursing of Christ.

In fact, the logic flows directly from right understanding of a point spelled out in 2 Cor. 5:14–15; Rom. 6:6–7, 7:1, 4a, 6; and Gal. 2:20, 6:14: all flesh has, for purposes of Law, died already with Christ, so the Law, whose “accomplishments”-criterion would have been feasible only pre-Fall, no longer can be seen as having jurisdiction over us (for “he who has died [viz., at the Law’s hand] is acquitted from sin,” Rom. 6:7 AT, cf. 7:1ff.).

39. It seems likely that Paul inferred this from the premise that the true Messiah’s death and resurrection made no sense (for a Jew) unless intended as a lesson, a parable of some sort; and that this parable made no sense unless his death and resurrection were somehow representative and paradigmatic for his followers’.
is, our flesh is already judged, cursed with Christ (Rom. 8:3); what is yet to be judged is therefore only the response of the "inner man." This inner man's response of course cannot be measurable, external "accomplishments" of all things commanded, since post-Fall the outer man frustrates even the godly inner man's desires (Rom. 7:25; 8:4, 10, 13; Gal. 5:17), so that attempt and accomplishment are not commensurable or coextensive categories. So rather the only "doing"-criterion of judgment now is steadfast endeavour (Rom. 2:7, 25-29; 6:22; 7:6, 22; 8:4-13; Gal. 3:10b). This then is the logic and the message which delivers us from the Law's false (or perhaps merely superseded) "accomplishments" criterion of "righteousness" and teaches instead a true one.

Thus according to Paul's rationale underlying 3:13, Christ's resurrection teaches us to see God's "doing"-criterion of "righteousness," not as εργα νόμου (accomplishments) but rather as "faithful obedience" to God and Christ. By doing this, it gives us every causa cognoscendi that effects in us the mind of the Spirit and thereby gives us virtual deliverance from the curse of the Law (see 3:10) by giving us, in whose "flesh dwells no good thing" (Rom. 7:18), incentive nevertheless to "abide by all things commanded."

We have found an entirely Pauline way in which Christ's death was "in behalf of us" without being a substitution for the curse of our "old man," our inherited sinful nature. So, in light of the difficulties we found with the substitutionary sense of ὑπὲρ, we must opt for the broader sense, "in our behalf."

6.8 Does the "us" in 3:13–14 include everyone?

One assumption that language forces upon us, is that Paul is referring to the same "us" throughout the two verses: "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us . . . that in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might come upon the Gentiles, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." Language would become
totally disjointed were it not for the requirement, stipulated by pragmatics and by logic, that the same key words should mean the same thing or sort of thing throughout a statement (and an argument) unless the speaker clearly indicates otherwise. Furthermore, we have already seen that the “us” in verse 13 comprises both Jews and Gentiles; but it has in view the eschatological judgment, that of the “inner man” only. But the question arises as to whether it includes the “inner man” of everyone, or only of the elect, or only of current believers.

We can see now that it includes every human being. The “us” in 13a is the same “us” as in 13b, in whose behalf Christ died. *By his becoming a curse* (since “becoming” is a participle of means here), Christ gave everyone *causa cognoscendi* to reason that they have the means to satisfy the true criterion of “righteousness.” His apostles then set out to proclaim the message of the cross everywhere. Paul does not expect all his hearers will acknowledge the message’s truth. But the preaching is directed to elect and non-elect alike, since no one knows, before the preaching, who belongs to one group or the other. So this logical antecedent (Christ’s death and resurrection), *if* the hearer accept it and its Pauline logical consequent (the true criterion), gives them the incentive to meet that criterion. There is thus a qualification. That which “delivers” from “the curse of the Law” is a message, one which must be heard and accepted in order for the deliverance to have its full effect, since that acceptance is the crucial part in the *modus operandi* of the deliverance.

So there is a sense in which the message delivers everyone who hears it, and a sense in which it delivers only those who accept it. So it is easy to equivocate on “delivered” here. We must be clear in our minds, when discussing this “deliverance,” what we mean by this concept: do we mean “deliverance” from the curse itself, or else deliverance from its inevitability by being shown the means of escape? If we conceive the “deliverance” broadly, not limiting it to a deliverance from the curse’s *inevitability*, then we must conceive the “us”
narrowly; if we conceive the “deliverance” narrowly, the “us” includes all who were to hear the message (i.e., everyone). These are the alternatives facing us.

Now, the deliverance is from the eschatological consequence of a particular ignorance, through relieving that ignorance. The modus operandi is through a causa cognoscendi; for it changes primarily our thinking (about the criterion of “righteousness”), and not just our circumstances. And it is a causa cognoscendi that Christ instituted on the cross and by means of the cross. But what causa cognoscendi would that be? It is, of course, the “word of the cross” (1 Cor. 1:18) which Paul preached “to the Jew first, and also to the Greek” (Rom. 1:16), that is, to everyone (see also Rom. 10:17–20; 15:18–19; Col. 1:6, 23). So the “deliverance” in 13a must be conceived narrowly, and the “us” broadly: the causa cognoscendi which Christ enabled on the cross was the entire and sole modus operandi of the “deliverance,” and its message was to be preached to “every creature.” Thus the “us” in 3:13a and 13b (and by implication the “we” in verse 14) includes everyone, without discrimination.

We have elucidated the meaning and structure of Paul’s implication in 3:13. By means of his death and resurrection “on behalf of” all humanity, Christ enabled the gospel proclamation of the true criterion of “righteousness” with God, and thus delivered all from the inevitability of being cursed according to this criterion through ignorance or confusion about this criterion (and through the consequent lack of incentive to “abide by all things commanded” by God). 2 Cor. 5:15 (// 5:21) provides strong corroboration of this reading, for it makes the same point as Gal. 3:13 more clearly: “And he died for all [ἵππνεω πάντων], that those who live might live no longer for themselves but for him who for their sake [ἵππνεω αὐτῶν] died and was raised.” It is noteworthy that the verse preceding makes a straight substitutional meaning for this ἵππνεω practically impossible: “... we are convinced that one has died for all [ἵππνεω πάντων]; therefore all have died.” If one had died instead of all,
obviously he would be the only one who had died, rather than “all” dying. And we should point out that the participle γένομενος in Gal. 3:13b is an aorist participle of causally—if not temporarily—“antecedent action,” not one of “identical action.” 40

But is Gal. 3:13 a statement of Paul’s argument’s implication-part, or of its belief-part? Is Paul trying merely to deduce and demonstrate an inconsistency between the ἔργα νόμου theory and its holders’ circumstances, and thus implicitly undermine the theory, as he was in the circumstantial ad hominem rhetoric of 3:10–12? Since the argument of 13 is evidently continued in 14 (see its ἵνα’s), it would be better to address these questions after we finish reconstructing the logical flow in both verses.

Let us lay out the texts relevant to 3:14, to which we may now turn:

3:14
that in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might come upon the Gentiles, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith.

3:14, UBSGNT
ἲνα εἰς τὰ ἄθνη ἡ εὐλογία τοῦ Ἱσσοῦ ἀποκατάσταται ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ἵνα τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πνεύματος λάβωμεν διὰ τῆς πίστεως.

6.9 What is “the promise of the Spirit”?

“The promise of the Spirit” (τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πνεύματος) in 14b is a peculiar construction. Apparently it was traditional in early Christian circles to speak of the Pentecostal outpouring of the Holy Spirit as “the promise of the Father,” that is, as what was promised by the Father (Luke 24:49; Acts 1:4), or alternatively “the Holy Spirit of promise” (Eph. 1:13, cf. Acts 19:1–7), or “the promise of the Holy Spirit” (Acts 2:33), that is, the promised Holy Spirit. In Gal. 3:2–5 Paul speaks of miracles as occurring in conjunction with the Galatians’ “receiving the Spirit”; and the chiastic structure we have discerned in our passage places 3:14b in parallel with 3:2–5. Thus there can hardly be any doubt that in 14b

40. On the former, see Burton 1976 [1900], §§134–38; note also §149.
Paul refers to some outpouring of the Spirit basically similar to Pentecost. Paul speaks of the promised Spirit.\textsuperscript{41} The figure's distinctive character is that the describing noun has been converted into the headword, and vice versa. Bullinger (1968 [1898], 508) identifies this kind of figure as \textit{antiptosis}.

\textbf{6.10 The two $\nu\alpha$-clauses in verse 14}

These clauses present at least two initial riddles: whether each $\nu\alpha$ is consecutive or else telic,\textsuperscript{42} and whether the second $\nu\alpha$-clause is consequent or else parallel to the first.\textsuperscript{43} It is not semantically \textit{identical} to the first,\textsuperscript{44} since the second is Pentecostal (cf. 3:2–5), whereas the "blessing of Abraham" is just that, covenantal blessing as opposed to cursedness (3:8–10).\textsuperscript{45} As many commentators note, 4:4–5, somewhat parallel to 3:13–14, also ends with two $\nu\alpha$-clauses, presenting the same questions and thus tempting the exegete to go there for answers. But 4:5 gives no readier or clearer answers; we must rely on what was available to the reader of 3:13.

\textsuperscript{41} So Lull 1980, 153–54, and most commentators.

\textsuperscript{42} Among those reading them as telic are Burton 1921, 176; Bruce 1982b, 167; Longenecker 1990, 123; Morris 1996, ad loc.; Martyn 1997a, 321; Williams 1997, 93. Commentators have usually ignored the consecutive option.

\textsuperscript{43} Those claiming they are sequential include Lightfoot 1890, 140; Duncan 1934, 103; Stanley 1990, 494 n. 45. Those saying they are parallel include Burton 1921, 176; Thuruthumaly 1981, 120; Longenecker 1990, 123; Martyn 1997a, 321; Williams 1997, 93–94.

\textsuperscript{44} Contra Esler 1998, 175.

\textsuperscript{45} Cf. Burton 1921, 175, and see above, §3.7. There has been much discussion, though, of the semantic relationship (in Paul, and elsewhere in the NT) between "the baptism of the Holy Spirit" (here viewed globally rather than as one instalment in a series) and "conversion" (conceived more broadly than "justification"): are they more or less the same concept, or at least logically equivalent? Again, where does the Spirit fit into the life of the believer: as power for ministry, Spirit of prophecy, spiritual "second blessing," or what? (For discussion and references to the literature, we would refer the reader to Turner 1996.) However that may be, note that if our argument was valid and our premises sound in §3.7, then justification is a prerequisite (but "justification" is neither tantamount nor semantically related) to the "receiving of the Spirit" mentioned in 3:2–5. So, there and in 3:14, Paul apparently views this "receiving of the Spirit" not globally (as tantamount to "conversion"), but more narrowly, either as a "second blessing" or as one instalment in a series.
The second ἡμαρτάνετε probably connects 14b directly to 13, rather than to 14a; for otherwise the “we” (14b) would seem to refer to Gentiles (like 14a), since “it is difficult to see how the reception of the Spirit by the Jews could be conditioned upon the Gentiles obtaining the blessing of Abraham” (Burton 1921, 176). The problem is that Paul was no Gentile. Both clauses are therefore direct results of Christ’s work in 13.

The ἡμαρτάνετε-clauses being parallel, these two occurrences of ἡμαρτάνετε probably share the same sense. Whether they are telic (declaring “the end which someone intends to reach”) or consecutive (declaring “the end which in the nature of things is reached by something”), only context can tell us (Zerwick 1963, §351, 352). But in a Hebrew context, in which “God is the principal and universal cause of all that happens,” the common tendency to confuse these two meanings is enhanced; for God accomplishes all his will (ibid., §351). In the present context, the reader can only surmise that God both intended and accomplished all the things detailed in the two parallel ἡμαρτάνετε-clauses (cf. 3:8: “And the scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by faith, . . .”). Since the intending is logically (though not semantically) equivalent to the accomplishing in this case, the respective implications of the clauses would remain the same whether the meaning be telic or consecutive; so testing their implications would be of no exegetical avail.

But if Paul meant for what purpose Christ did his work Paul’s emphasis would naturally tend to fall on the clause which states Christ’s work (vs. 13); whereas if Paul means rather the results of that work, his emphasis would naturally fall on the results.46 The latter fits better the thrust of the overall passage as we have interpreted that. For the mention in 14a of the Gentiles (not the Jews) and in 14b of the Spirit (not justification) would seem to shift the focus from “Christ’s work” to link topically back to 3:6–9 and 3:2–5 respectively; and those passages concerned either the means or the meaning of justification, and not 46. I owe this linguistic, discourse-analytical point to my hermeneutics teacher, Vern Poythress of Westminster Theological Seminary.
Christ's work on the cross which somehow effected or enacted it. We conclude that the clauses are probably consecutive (i.e., resultative), not telic.

But the "somehow" of two sentences back raises a serious question: How, according to the "presupposition pool" implicit here, did Christ's death affect the means or meaning of justification? Clearly, Paul's point in verse 14, as in 3:2-12, is about the means or meaning of justification, and not about the fact that we have had it preached to us (which point, in and of itself, is neither here nor there with regard to the former issue). We have indeed argued that Christ's death did not "make satisfaction" in a substitutionary manner; yet if not in that way, how did Christ's death affect the basis on which God accepts people, so that Paul can, based on it, make his point in verse 14a, that "in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might come upon the Gentiles"?

It is commonly surmised that God has, through Christ's death, made some satisfaction to the demands of a "perfect justice" usually understood as his own (cf. above). If this satisfaction were, like OT sin-offerings, only effective for unintentional sins, would it not ostensibly make the "righteousness"-criterion "attempt" rather than "accomplishment"? As some commentators have noted, there is even evidence, not only within Jewish Second Temple writings but also in the Gospel of Mark, that a rather commonly-conceived vehicle of atonement was that some very devout Jew could sacrifice life in service to God, and this offering serve as a "ransom" for the nation as a whole, through propitiating God's wrath (see Mark 10:45; Matt. 20:28; 1 Tim. 2:6; 2 Macc. 7:37ff.; 4 Macc. 6:27-29; 17:21-22).47

Yet in this substitutionary atonement-scenario ("ransom" being taken literally), the actual criterion of "perfect justice" is not attempt, but accomplishment of the things

47. I am grateful to Dr. Max Turner for reminding me of this point and providing me several of these citations. On the passages in 4 Maccabees see OTP 2:539, which also notes: "The idea that the suffering and death of the righteous atoned vicariously for the sins of others is sufficiently well attested in the apocalyptic literature (e.g. TBenj 3:8) and at Qumran (e.g. 1QS 5:6; 8:3ff., 10; 9:4) to suggest that it was in the air in the intertestamental period."
commanded; and the atonement is effected primarily by a substitutionary *causa essendi* (even if by a satisfaction which God made to his very own Justice). This view of atonement thus contradicts all our findings so far, pertinent to Paul’s main thrusts in 3:10–12 and in verse 13 (and to the gist of 2 Cor. 5:14–21). We therefore still must reject the suggestion that Paul understood atonement in this way. It is only to be expected that Paul (like Mark, like Jesus) is using the common Jewish terminology of sin-offerings and atonement (Whiteley 1957, 244); indeed, he himself evidently understood such an offering as somehow impinging upon God’s operative criterion for “righteousness.” But this does not imply that Paul’s concept of atonement (in the broader sense of “concept”) was in all or even in just fundamental aspects the same as every other 1st-century Jew’s—any more than the commonality of such terminology among 1st-century Jews implies there was a broad Jewish consensus on the *modus operandi* of sin-atoning sacrifices.48 Yet if not by a *causa essendi* (the reader still may ask), by what plausibly Pauline mechanism might the cross affect God’s criterion of “righteousness”?

Here is a plausibly Pauline mechanism. Christ’s willing offering of himself, seen as a means necessary for evangelism, causes God to place a complementary value on the temporary forbearance of sinful flesh, since he sees such forbearance as another means necessary for bringing individuals to repentance (see Rom. 2:4; 3:25–26). This forbearance of sin implies God’s making a legal distinction between sinful, Adamic “flesh” and the inner man, so that God “might be [covenantally] just [in eventually punishing sinful flesh], and [yet] the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus” (Rom. 3:26 KJV, interpolations ours, see

48. To draw that semantic inference would be to confuse words’ lexical senses, and perhaps even words, with the things they denote. Different speakers working within a common language are quite capable of having diverging “concepts” (in the broader sense) of that which they denote by the same word, are in fact even capable of meaning different lexical senses by identical words (see above, §2.2.1, and chap. 3, particularly on sociolinguistic “heteroglossia”; Cotterell and Turner 1989, 119f., 166f.). On the lack of a Jewish consensus about the *modus operandi* of atonement, see above.
Zerwick 1963, §455α on this Semitic καί for "and yet"; cf. above). And, as we noted earlier, this legal distinction implies that "accomplishments," which are exclusively the province of the outer man, cannot possibly serve as criterion of the inner man's "righteousness"; which fact leaves "attempt" as the only "doing"-criterion of this "righteousness." Christ's death "caused" this forebearance of sinful flesh, but it thus propitiated (temporarily) God's wrath, not by a wrath-intercepting substitution but by being seen as a complementary, value-enhancing means of evangelism, and thus favourably influencing God's valuation of this forbearance. The "cause" was therefore not a causa essendi but rather a causa cognoscendi, one affecting God's valuation of forbearance.49 It would be in this causa cognoscendi way, then, that "in Christ [i.e., in his death] God was reconciling the world [with its sin] to himself, not counting their trespasses against them" (2 Cor. 5:19, emphasis and interpolations ours).

This explains why Christ's death evidently had, for Paul, at least two distinct soteriological, "atonning" aspects: it affected both the criterion of "righteousness" and the ability to proclaim that criterion. In Paul's terminology: it both accomplished this "reconciliation" of the world with God, and enabled the "ministry" and "message" of reconciliation.50 Thus for Paul the apparatus of "atonement" has a God-ward action and a human-ward action, both of which are causa cognoscendi.

In summary, Paul's focus migrates in 3:13-14 as follows: in 13a, the "ministry of reconciliation" is in view; in 13b, the cross itself; in 14, the "reconciliation" (i.e., the true covenantal terms) which this ministry's "message" proclaims. In describing Christ's death as

49. For it would be in the realm of 'final (teleological) cause' rather than that of 'efficient cause'; and the 'teleological' realm is part of the 'cognitional' realm, rather than of the 'ontological'.

50. Note that the former "reconciliation" and the reconciliation enjoined in the message are not quite the same thing, inasmuch as the former is already accomplished (on the cross, 2 Cor. 5:18a, 19) but its "ministry" or "message" still enjoins that we should choose to "be reconciled to God," by living "for him who for their sake died and was raised" (2 Cor. 5:15, 18b, 20).
causing (ἵνα) God to judge people without regard to their actual accomplishment but by the criterion “faith” (vs. 14), Paul speaks neither of a causa essendi of God’s redeeming any universal “us,” nor even of a causa essendi of God’s justifying those who have “faith,” but rather his discussion is about causa cognoscendi throughout 3:13–14. This implies that Paul’s two uses of ἵνα here, like his causal justification-prepositions (e.g., ἐκ in δικαιοσύνην ἐκ πίστεως), are used somewhat figuratively, in a metonymy of causa essendi for causa cognoscendi.

6.11 The rhetorical relationship of 3:13–14 to 3:2–9, and its argumentative value

As noted, 14a and 14b recall themes from 3:2–5, 6–9; they each summarise one of those passages. Yet they are also connected logically to 13, as consequences of Christ’s work on the cross. And 13 is literarily connected to 10, with which it is in parallel in Paul’s literary chiasm, whereas 10 is in antithetical rhetorical parallel to 3:9. These points are relevant to the identifying of the structure of Paul’s argument in 3:13–14.

In pursuit of Paul’s meaning at the level of discourse or argument as well as at the clause and sentence levels, we face again the questions which 13 raised: Is the logical flow of 13–14, drawing out implications of Christ’s death, the implication-part of Paul’s “real-life” argument, or the belief-part? (It could be belief-part only if Paul is trying ultimately to confirm a positive point, since his statements here are positive.) What is the basic mode of the argument? Most fundamentally, is it aiming ultimately to affirm or to deny some proposition stated? Is Paul trying, as he did in the circumstantial ad hominem rhetoric of 3:10–12, merely to deduce and demonstrate an inconsistency between the ἔργα νόμου theory and certain beliefs suggested by the circumstances of any Galatians adopting it, and to undermine implicitly the theory thereby?

If our interpretation of verse 14 has been correct, that verse is implicitly undermining the εργα νόμου (accomplishments) theory of justification, by reference to the meaning and evangelistic purport of Christ’s death (and resurrection), alluded to in verse 13. On the other hand, 14a clearly returns to the “faith” theme of 3:6–9. Of the two points, as we have seen (above, chap. 3), Paul’s primary point must concern εργα νόμου, since the denotation of “faith,” a “discourse” (anaphoric) lexical concept, is made clear in Galatians only by contrast to what “faith” does not believe in (namely, justification εξ εργων νόμου). So he is ultimately arguing to deny the latter, even if the denial is left unstated in verse 14. He affirms the “faith”-teaching (3:14a) in order to undermine implicitly the εργα νόμου teaching.

The Scriptures and premises which Paul relies upon throughout this passage could be countered by Scriptures and viewpoints his opponents would use; so ultimately Paul’s argument does not decide the issue by relying upon Scripture as such or upon common presuppositions, but on the hope that his readers will find the gist of his citations and arguments more forceful, more suggested by their own learning and experience.52 Thus Paul’s argumentation is still essentially circumstantial ad hominem, and still primarily intended to show an inconsistency, between the εργα νόμου theory and certain beliefs suggested by the circumstances of the theory’s proponents in Galatia (viz., they have heard Paul’s preaching about Christ; cf. 2:21–3:1). Unlike in 3:10–12 however, in 3:(6–9 and) 13–14 it is not the holding of the contested theory itself that entails his opponents’ “circumstances,” inconsistent with their own theory; rather, it is merely certain teachings (argued from Scripture) that the Galatians would presumably accept. Thus it is a weaker sort of circumstantial ad hominem (see above, chap. 2). Nevertheless, Paul still hopes that his readers will be unable to repudiate the circumstantial implications which he does present.

52. See more on this below, in the section on the rhetorical connection with 3:15ff.
Paul must resort to circumstantial argumentation here because Christ’s being cursed has not necessarily provided any empirical, obvious-to-all evidence whereby Paul can affirm to his opponents that the criterion of righteousness is other than ερώτα νόμον. What sense one makes of Christ’s being cursed depends, partly, on whether one sees him as sinless; and this or other elements of the logic may depend upon one’s presuppositions regarding post-Fall human psychology or moral constitution, God’s sovereignty, whether God might be propitiated by a blood-offering, the significance of Christ’s resurrection, and so on. Almost certainly Paul is working from some basic presuppositions regarding some or many of these issues that are different from his opponents’; and so he must engage in circumstantial argumentation rather than rely on affirmation of some premise(s) likely not held in common with his Galatian doubters.

So what is stated in 13–14 is the implication-part, not belief-part, of Paul’s argument, as is always true in circumstantial ad hominem rhetoric. Verses 13 and 14 state the same implication-part that Paul stated in 3:2–9: According to the Galatians’ presumed beliefs and experience, many of those justified are justified ἐκ πίστεως, and therefore none are ἐξ ἐρώτων νόμου, contra his opponents’ theory. As is usual in circumstantial arguments, the basic type of argument is a negative one, ponendo tollens. But as is also true in circumstantial arguments, the argument states no belief-part; the arguer hopes that the circumstances indicated suggest to the hearers belief of the circumstantial ideas that ostensibly contradict the theory, so that they will supply their own belief-part to the argument, affirming the circumstantial beliefs and thus denying (ponendo tollens) the contested theory.

6.12 The rhetorical connection of 3:2–14 with the material immediately following

According to the UBSGNT text, Paul begins verse 15 with: Ἀδελφοί, κατ' ἐνθρωπον λέγω

53. See above, chap. 2.
δμωζ . . . Almost all commentators take the first clause as referring to what Paul is preparing to say next. But we could just as reasonably take it with what comes before; for Paul uses the characteristic vocative ἔδελφοι not only at the beginnings of sections, but also frequently at ends and even in their middles, in fact at transition-points either major or minor.\footnote{It appears at the end of sections in 1 Cor. 7:24; 11:33; 14:39, 15:58; Gal. 4:31; 6:18; 2 Thess. 2:15; 3:13. It appears within sections in Rom. 7:4; 1 Cor. 14:6; Gal. 4:28; Phil. 3:13; 1 Thess. 1:4; 2:9, 14, 3:7; 4:10; 5:4.} Furthermore, in the only other places where Paul uses the clause κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω or equivalent (viz., Rom. 3:5, 1 Cor. 9:8), it comes \textit{after} the speech to which it refers. To take it rather as referring to 3:15ff. here results in serious awkwardness, due to the presence of ὅτι (“yet, nevertheless”). This is so even if we take the δμωζ as actually δμωζ (“likewise”), as is reasonable also at 1 Cor. 14:7 (BDF \S 450(2), BAGD s.v.). But if, while doing the latter, we also take the first clause as referring to what came \textit{before} it, we eliminate the awkwardness. That is therefore the best reading of the accenting of δμωζ and of the clause’s referent.

As for the clause’s meaning, Cosgrove’s analysis (1988a) is compelling. Paul says, “I am arguing in a human way,” i.e., arguing from human premises (that is, from his hearers’), and thus in a circumstantial \textit{ad hominem} fashion (though Cosgrove does not use the term \textit{circumstantial}). The δμωζ (“likewise”) indicates that the \textit{same type} of argument, but a \textit{new} one, will follow in 3:15ff. In our reading of 3:15a, then, we find further evidence, but here Paul’s own claim, that he is arguing by circumstantial \textit{ad hominem} preceding 3:15.

In what do his “human premises” consist, though? Note that in 3:2–5 Paul was arguing from the historical circumstances of the Galatians’ salvific experience. In 3:6–14, every argument depends on accepting some scripture that Paul has, in this rhetorical situation, chosen to rely upon despite the fact that his opponents will have just as many scriptures to offer, and perhaps just as logically, in rebuttal. Paul’s rhetorical obstacles are
displayed clearly in 3:11-12, where the force of his argument actually depends on the reader preferring Hab. 2:4 to Lev. 18:5, at least as a criterion of "righteousness"! Again, Paul is contrasting two different covenantal discourses that inhabit one text, the Pentateuch (cf. the allegorical interpretation in 4:21-31). Only one of these covenantal discourses can hold jurisdiction at a time, post-Fall, for their respective criteria of righteousness are incommensurable then. But rather than pursue an exegetical argument as to which discourse is the true or fundamental meaning of the text, he has chosen merely to acknowledge both as discourses inhabiting the text and to pursue his readers' support for his preference of discourse via circumstantial *ad hominem* arguments. Again, probably Paul felt that his argument, including his exegesis, ultimately depended upon acceptance of presuppositions not necessarily obvious to his interlocutors. The choice of the one exegesis over against the other becomes, therefore, a "merely human premise" as far as Paul's argument is concerned, a circumstantially-suggested belief which he cannot interpersonally and empirically verify but can hope his readers will find compelling.

In none of this argumentation, then, is there any suggestion that he is discussing any particular "means" to justification or redemption, whether it be faith, ἐργα νόμον, or the death of Christ. In verses 9-10, Paul cites the respective status of οἱ ἐκ πίστεως and οὓς ἐκ ἔργων νόμον not to warn about a practical consequence of a certain action, but to illumine as to a logical incompatibility of a certain theory. Likewise in the chiastically parallel verses 13-14, Christ's death is cited not for some salvific *means* that it indicates or represents, but for the covenantal, performative *meaning* which it promulgates to humanity and, correlatively, *motivates* on God's part. Christ's death and resurrection are not a *causa essendi* of God's accepting us on the terms of this gracious covenant, but rather a *causa cognoscendi* of it, both for God and for humankind. Again we conclude that Paul's polemic is not about means to justification, but about the meaning of it, and more specifically, God's
true criteria of "righteousness."
Our analysis of Gal. 3:10–14 calls for a rejection of several traditional but misleading assumptions pertinent to Paul’s meaning in this and similar passages. For it has found the assumptions to be incompatible with the textual evidence.

Especially harmful, in our opinion, has been the almost universal if often implicit assumption that for Paul, “righteousness” could be defined as “accomplishment of the things commanded by God.” This assumption, which owes more to Plato’s, Plotinus’s, Augustine’s, and resulting mediaeval thought than to the Hebrew scriptures, has dominated the reading of Paul for centuries, and is hardly ever questioned by either mediaeval, Reformation, or modern interpreters.

One corollary of this assumption is that Paul would have acknowledged only one particular reality (or type of reality) as rightly called “righteousness” or “justice” or scriptural “law”: the denotation of these concepts could not be relative to the discourse or the speaker, but are fixed by their (non-discourse) lexical sense. Thus Paul could not be posing one “righteousness” or law over against some other also proclaimed by Scripture. A second corollary is that Paul is contrasting two different means to justification: reliance upon “works
of the Law" leads to disaster, Paul is warning, whereas simple faith in Christ meets with
God's approval and reward. If this second corollary were correct, two others would seem to
follow: that by "works of the Law" here Paul means endeavour to fulfil the Law's
commands; and that (therefore) Pauline "faith" certainly does not believe that such endeavour
gains any merit in connection with, or is any contributing factor towards, one's justification.

But in chapter 2 we found that the above unargued assumption and its derived
corollaries were gratuitous, at least as far as logic and lexical semantics were concerned. We
then discovered that (contrary to the second corollary above) Paul is discussing, not the
means to justification, but precisely the meaning (and specifically the denotation) of
"justification," which is a "discourse" lexical concept for Paul, because of his discourse
lexical sense of its definition-element "righteousness." When it is a discourse concept, any
debate concerning "righteousness" should specify what is denoted by it, even if that is not the
main topic of the debate. But it is precisely here (and not at the later, subordinate issue of
"means") that Paul's disagreement with his opponents arises. In his view, the criterion by
which one is found "righteous" is not "acts of the Law" (i.e., accomplishments of it), but
rather "steadfast obedience" or (which is a logically equivalent attribute and thus an
interchangeable criterion) "faith" which believes in God's "justification" of people as
conditioned on such obedience. Paul's objection to "the Law" is that it misleads, not
concerning the true means of justification or of righteousness, but concerning the true
meaning of these concepts in the context of God's covenant: it makes "accomplishments of
[some level of] what God commands" a valid criterion of "righteousness," which equation
distorts or replaces any correct understanding of the criteria.

One corollary of these findings which challenges aforementioned assumptions is that,
inasmuch as Paul is discussing social, covenantal meaning, it is impossible to reconcile his
rhetoric with the idea that for Paul, Scripture naturally could contain only one "Law." Thus
we are set free, in our hypothesising, to propose any semantically plausible answer to the question, to what discourse within the Mosaic texts does Paul refer, by his idea “the Law.”
A further assumption-challenging corollary is that for Paul, “righteousness” does not denote “perfect accomplishment of that which God commands.” For one’s having “faith,” for Paul, is not tantamount to having these accomplishments, though it is nevertheless tantamount to “righteousness.” Indeed, it is precisely any defining of “righteousness” in terms of “accomplishment,” which Paul is opposing.

Given our findings and these corollaries, one may reasonably dispense with some troubling construals of Paul’s statements on the Law, construals which have inexorably led to vacillating, equivocating, and downright conflicting understandings of Paul’s theology.

Among these construals are the long-outmoded reading called sola fide, that is, “justification by faith alone,” and a supposed Pauline antipathy to the “Law” in general. Construals such as these, based on the above gratuitous assumptions, have created the strong antinomies that have seemed to characterise Paul’s statements on the Law. And by causing antinomy to appear within Paul, they have led inevitably to antinomy and profound theological disagreement and conflict among Paul’s followers—such as, but by no means limited to, the “material” issue (“justification,” as distinct from the “formal” issue, sola Scriptura) separating the Roman Catholics and the Protestants.

1. This doctrine, coined by Luther at a time when he was still doing all his theologising with Augustine’s idea of “justification” (more or less, “being made righteous,” see e.g. Luther’s The Freedom of a Christian), became outmoded as soon as Philipp Melanchthon and John Calvin changed the discussion by a different, new conception of “justification” (based on a more “forensic” understanding of Paul’s term δικαιοσύνη). This new conception not only exposed the inaccuracy of Luther’s earlier Pauline exegesis but also made his earlier theological arguments supporting sola fide—though logical and useful when understood as originally intended—quite inapplicable to this new concept of “justification.” Unfortunately, ongoing religious and political developments, and the prevailing culture of how one does theology, soon made it awkward, seemingly disrespectful, and probably just unthinkable, for anyone in the Protestant camp to point this out. On the historical development in the doctrine of “justification” within Luther’s movement, cf. Green 1973; 1974.
Fortunately, it appears that the insights we developed in chapters 2 and 3 are quite fruitful in resolving the sorts of paradoxes and antinomies that have been so frequently attributed to Paul in his passages concerning "the Mosaic Law." We have found Paul to be actually quite coherent and intelligible in his own view of "the Law," although that view (and even this question) is not actually as simple as we might have expected. For example, what he means by "the Law" in any particular passage is in itself an essential question, even in cases where it is already clear that he must be referring to a discourse speaking within the texts of "the Mosaic Law." Likewise the question arises as to the hermeneutical key whereby Paul distinguishes various discourses speaking within this part of Scripture. Paul is an extremely sophisticated and interesting thinker, whose patient and exegetically vigorous study bears significant (and apparently coherent!) rewards.

We would suggest, as further study along these lines, that these latter questions should be pursued (or at least raised) in exegesis of Paul, and also that the hermeneutical insights which we put forward in chapters 2 and 3 should be brought to bear on other passages in Paul. The insights regarding sociolinguistics are universally pertinent. As we have seen, among other things they suggest how one might, by comparison and contrast, better discern and specify a polemical author's meaning within the heteroglossia of his or her rhetorical situation. The insights regarding logic and enthymemes are pertinent to any logos-type passage. Those regarding specific Pauline terms are, of course, pertinent only to passages which involve those terms; but such passages are crucial to current debate about Paul, the Law, and justification. At any rate a primary contribution of all these insights will be to apprise us more fully of the ranges of possible answers to questions about Paul's meaning, and in this way to prevent or to unseat false preconceptions about that meaning.

---

2. We have suggested that this hermeneutical key likely comprises the notion "purity," which notion understands "righteousness" as something external and measurable and thus as definable in terms of "accomplishments." See above, p. 201, n. 55.
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Author’s translation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KJV</td>
<td>King James Version.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXX</td>
<td>The Septuagint.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>Masoretic text.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASB</td>
<td>New American Standard Bible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEB</td>
<td>New English Bible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIV</td>
<td>New International Version.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKJV</td>
<td>New King James Version.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OT</td>
<td>Old Testament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSV</td>
<td>Revised Standard Version.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TEV   Today's English Version.

Bibliography


Finnegan, Ruth. 1969. How to do things with words: Performative utterances among the Limba of Sierra Leone. Man n.s. 4:537-52.


A. H. Carver, 2000  


Noth, Martin. 1966. 'For all who rely on works of the Law are under a curse'. In *The laws in the Pentateuch and other studies*. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd.


Segal, Alan F. 1990. Paul the convert: The apostolate and apostasy of Saul the Pharisee. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.


