THE USE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN THE WORKPLACE: A QUALITATIVE INVESTIGATION

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THE USE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN THE WORKPLACE: A QUALITATIVE INVESTIGATION

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August 2010
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Abstract

Electronic workplace surveillance takes many forms. It includes CCTV, recording telephone conversations, employee ID cards, and electronically gathering and measuring work performance. The increased incidences of electronic surveillance have had a number of effects on employees. This research concentrated on the use of quantified electronic performance measurement. It specifically examined the impact on managers and managing. It examined surveillance from an employment relationship perspective, taking as its primary lens that of exchange and exchange theory. The research demonstrated that the exchange relationships managers have with other managers, workers, or employers, as part of the psychological contract, is being compromised. Managers feel under pressure to manage based on the surfeit of electronic measures rather than by using innate or acquired management skills. Many managers in this research are no longer managers in the conventional sense; instead, they have become “Performance Intermediary Executives” invariably reliant on a plethora of electronic measures provided for them to help them manage successfully. Managers have also started questioning the equitable nature of the psychological contract between them and their employer/line manager. The result of this equity disjuncture was made manifest by the subtle forms of resistance used on a daily basis. Managers are being led down a managerial path leading to further resistance and inequitable employment and exchange relationships. This research suggests that claimed improvements in performance and performance management using electronic surveillance could be wiped out by poor and de-professionalised management. Organisations should be aware that surveillance for surveillance sake is not necessarily always the best way forward. Electronic workplace surveillance is not intrinsically all good or all bad, but judging from the findings in this research, its impact is broadly perceived by managers negatively, which is not good for all parties in the employment relationship.
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This thesis is dedicated to the memories of Cally and Shell who were always there for me (both of whom sadly died before the thesis was completed).
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Electronic surveillance in the workplace comes in many shapes and sizes. It is characterised by diverse methods such as, monitoring emails (Lyon, 1994; Lyon & Zureik, 1996; Brin, 1998), Internet browsing (Botan & Vorvoreanu, 2000; Fitzpatrick, 2002), CCTV cameras (Smith, 2007), employee ID cards to track employee movements (Stanton & Weiss, 2000), and keystroke logging (Young & Case, 2004). In addition, and pertinent for this research, there is a range of other electronic (invariably computer-based) means of gathering performance data. This research examined some of these techniques and identified a range of impacts. The impact of the surveillance in some cases has been profound. This research seeks to build on aspects of those research studies.

This thesis examines electronic surveillance in the workplace and the effects that it has on employees. The research empirically examines it primarily from a manager’s perspective. It investigates the propensity for organisations to use electronic surveillance and performance measures in the workplace. The research explicitly looks at managers in seven organisations, examining how the different level of workplace surveillance influences managers, and what, if any, the inherent tensions are. It further examines how electronic surveillance and the use of quantitative performance measures make them feel and how using them alters their perceptions of managing and management.
High on the agenda of issues to be resolved before commencing this study lay in the explanation and use of key terms, whether the word surveillance is the most appropriate or whether monitoring is a more accurate term for the thesis. The position of this thesis is within the academic discipline of surveillance studies and as such, it was felt that all examples of observation, however obtained, should come under the umbrella term of surveillance, rather than monitoring. A definition relevant for this research is therefore given, and on that basis, this thesis consistently refers to all such observations as surveillance. The only exceptions to this come either from direct expressions in the literature or from interview participants. The precise reasoning behind the decision to use the term surveillance is set out in more detail in Chapter Three.

1.1 The Background

Individuals and societies have always been surveilled. It does not matter where you choose to live in the world or whichever city you live in, there is surveillance. There is nothing new in that. What is new is the almost ubiquitous nature of the surveillance. The way the surveillance is carried out might be different, indeed the intensity might also vary depending on where you live, and work, but you are nonetheless surveilled. The primary driver behind these increases has been the huge number of socio-economic and technological changes from around the mid-twentieth century onwards. The appearance of the Personal Computer (PC) and the digitising of data towards the end of the century have wreaked changes in societal surveillance, taking it to levels previously thought unachievable either technically or practically.

The same escalations in surveillance are also true of the workplace. Increasingly, workers at all levels are subject to high amounts of surveillance. The surveillance may be couched in the language of performance monitoring, and annual appraisals, nevertheless it is still dependent on some form of surveillance (Sewell, 1999). The surveillance associated with performance management or appraisal might take the form of visual observation by a senior colleague or line manager, or increasingly the surveillance takes place using electronic and computerised means.
1.2 The Research Problem

The broad question this thesis investigates relates to the use of electronic surveillance and performance measures in the workplace. The research asks the question, what is the impact of electronic workplace surveillance, and in turn, what is the impact specifically on managers? The questions delve into the nature of the managers’ exchange relationships between them and their line manager/employer and between them and their team. The questions require an understanding of the reaction of the managers to the impact of surveillance, and an understanding of management.

At the start of the twentieth century, Fayol described the functions of management thus; to organise, forecast and plan, coordinate, control and command (Watson, 1994). Many business textbooks still describe management roles in terms of these functions (Robbins, 2005). Mintzberg (1971) in researching the role of managers (in his case, senior executives), discovered the practice was somewhat different to what textbooks said. From a behavioural perspective, Sayles (1964) described how managers and supervisors could be seen as symphony orchestra conductors “endeavouring to maintain a melodious performance” (Sayles, 1964, p. 162). Weick (1998) took the orchestral conductor metaphor a stage further by likening managers and organisations to members of improvisational jazz bands. Most managers in this study, like the orchestral conductor, have a ‘set tune’ or musical manuscript from which to play, which the organisation typically determines. All the organisations in this research study show that despite the best intentions of managers to adopt and adapt to these roles, the daily situation is somewhat different. Only the fortunate (the best, the most knowledgeable, and the experienced) managers have the ability to ‘improvise’ around the quantitative manuscript from which many expect to work.

Comprehension of the findings further requires an understanding of the complex nature of exchange and exchange relationships in the workplace. Not just the simple commercial exchanges of buying goods, but the more complex social exchange relationships seen in human interactions between worker and worker, worker and manager, manager and manager, and manager and employer. Each of these relationships blends the subtle and the complex, the simple and the complicated. Untangling the mesh of exchanges is not straightforward. It draws on theories that have not been examined empirically for some years. Some were last tested empirically in laboratory conditions in the 1960s. The question of whether the same
theories would still stand up to the rigour of real world examination today with the mass of electronic, technological, and interpersonal relationships that managers encounter every day, remains. This is especially interesting given that the complex electronic workplace surveillance and electronic performance measures used today were almost non-existent at the time.

Current literature has not examined too deeply surveillance and exchange relationships in the light of modern technology or current working practices. While there is some literature that examines the employment relationship and the psychological contract from a theoretical standpoint (Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2005), there is the opportunity for this research to combine the empirical and the theoretical. This research might identify whether introducing a new variable into the equation i.e. surveillance, changes or substantially alters or affects the traditional models of workplace exchanges. Coyle-Shapiro, Shore, et al (2005), suggest that this particular gap in the literature ought to be researched. Such a gap is not a trivial one; they believe it is an important omission in the research literature. The gap is borne out of improvements and advances in technology at one level, changes in organisations and organisational structures at another, and finally a need to examine the role that exchange plays in relation to workplace surveillance. This is highly significant as the links between surveillance and exchange, directly and indirectly, sit behind much of the work in the thesis. Therefore, the thesis draws from a number of exchange and surveillance theories in order to understand the way in which they influence individuals. This takes place through a number of qualitative semi-structured interviews.

The structure of the thesis commences with a potted history of surveillance, detailing historically how the notions of workplace and societal surveillance are not new. Chapter Two unveils contemporary society’s difficulty in understanding what surveillance means. It discusses whether surveillance is benign, malignant, possibly both, or a ‘fact of life’ that we should just learn to live with. The chapter also introduces the primary concepts associated with surveillance. Most of these concepts are comparatively recent, although there are clear association to much older concepts, the metaphor of the Panopticon being the obvious one.

The Panopticon was originally a prison design by Jeremy Bentham from the late eighteenth century. It expanded on contemporary cellular prison designs created by Mazas. Although Bentham’s Panopticon was never built (he was paid off to the tune of some £23,000, a small fortune at the time), a variation of the Panopticon was built by Haviland, in Pennsylvania in 1821 (Johnston, 1964).
The chapter also introduces the metaphor of Big Brother, perhaps the most popular contemporary metaphor used to describe surveillance. The prominence of Big Brother in popular culture as a term for surveillance cannot be overstated. Barely a day goes by without a mention in the media of Big Brother type activities, in either the public or private sector. The chapter also provides a broad discussion on surveillance theories and concludes with a look at the notion of privacy.

Chapter Three starts to crystallize some of the more general notions surrounding surveillance and places them in the context of the workplace. It provides a detailed breakdown of the various types of research in the area that have taken place in recent years. The chapter highlights the importance of the psychology of surveillance and the close associations of surveillance and the psychological aspects of surveillance to appraisals. It addresses possibly the single most important literature issue, the etymological problems associated with using either the term monitoring or surveillance. As mentioned at the outset, this chapter addresses in detail the question of whether monitoring or surveillance is the most appropriate term for this research. It shows that the mélange of terms, and uses of terms, causes problems for all researchers. As an academic exercise, comparing, contrasting, and analysing one research paper against another can be deeply problematical, especially where different terms indicate similar notions.

Importantly, Chapter Three provides a discrete definition of workplace surveillance for this research. The definition provided is, ‘the observation of any action at work, if the observation is made for either immediate or subsequent use for any performance related, personal, or disciplinary purpose.’ This definition is strongly influenced by Lyon’s (1994; 2001b) understanding of the nature of surveillance. The chapter closes by looking at some pieces of empirical research that examined workplace surveillance, and concludes with a brief mention of the Surveillance Society Report by the UK’s Information Commissioner (Surveillance Studies Network, 2006).

Chapter Four moves the literature to the focal point of the research, examining surveillance through the lens of exchange. The chapter examines exchange and exchange theory, looking at the influence on the employment relationship, and specific elements of social psychology, power, and power typologies, all the while framed by surveillance. It provides a historical perspective on exchange, dating from its early roots in bartering, through anthropology to the sociological social exchange theories of the late 1950s and early 1960s, to the more specific
economic statement of exchange. The chapter continues by bringing exchange and exchange theories up to date, situating exchange in its various guises within the workplace as a key component of the employment relationship and the psychological contract. The links suggested by the literature between psychological contracts to psychological reactance and from psychological reactance back to exchange and exchange theories is explicitly made, thus providing clear associations and strong provenance for the research.

While the general terms and concepts associated with exchange theories are well known and frequently used, the history of them needed closer examination. Early in the investigation process, it emerged that stronger links than had previously been thought existed, due to some un-translated (at the time) work in a related academic area. Although it should be noted that neither of the two proponents of exchange theory [Homans and Blau], appeared to be aware of the works at the time. However, these elements are not central to the theory, just to its origins.

The changes in technology that have taken place since exchange theory was first proposed have also been monumental. The technological changes have no direct bearing on the theory, save as an enabler, as exchange typically involves social processes. The advances in technology have however changed the social processes and the way humans interact. Much research into workplace exchanges and exchange relationships has crystallised around the employment relationship, although there is some debate as to whether the use of exchange is “too simplistic and reductionist” (Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2005, p. 19). Part of the problem could be that exchange theory was shaped by the imperfect premise that most social interactions take place face-to-face. Whereas in the modern workplace, the premise that communication between employees takes place face-to-face is no longer true.

Forty years on from Blau and Homans, the social world and the workplace have changed. Research that once relied on tests completed in the social world of the 1950s and 1960s, while easily replicable, are no longer representative of the social interactions and workplace communication of today. For instance, managers in the 1960s could not have dreamt that the desktop PC would become their own personal team performance auditor. Sayles (1964) made this very point in discussing the influence a manager has in determining/understanding who the best performers are in their team. To achieve success in the 1960s managers would employ an assistant to be their ‘eyes and ears’. Sayles makes the point that such is the pace that organisations are developing at, and the increased specialisation of both workers and
workplaces means that “... groups whose existence depends upon their [the managers] ability to make appraisals, evaluations, and checks that the manager himself [sic] has neither the time nor the skill to make” (Sayles, 1964, p. 93). Furthermore, it was thought the manager in 1960s organisations was a Machiavellian character eager to disguise and deceive (or be deceived), keen to play up the good and de-emphasise the bad (Sayles, 1964). Whether the performance auditor enabled this role is not discussed directly by Sayles, although it is suggested that they could free the manager to indulge in complex office politics and become the Machiavellian character.

One of the points made by Sayles was that the reason for employing someone specifically as a mechanism for auditing workers is due to the failure of the reward and punishment system. Sayles’ claim that all too often the reward system can lead to conflict is arguably a truism. Yet, forty years on, managers are still persevering with a system of management that was thought failing in the 1960s. Very little has changed in the perception of what constitutes a manager. Their role is still thought to be, one of an organiser, forecaster and planner, coordinator, and to control and command (Watson, 1994; Robbins, 2005), although the reality of what each of these roles involves has, in fairness, changed considerably.

This provides another reason for the investigation. The notion of the control and command role of a manager in the organisations in this research is disputable, not least by the managers. This research shows that managers audit workers against daily (sometimes hourly or continuous) targets and determine their employment status on the strength of a sometimes-arbitrary set of performance monitoring figures. In some instances, managers are doing it because of an email, a telephone call, or because a computer ‘Dashboard’ identifies they should discipline someone.

1.3 Methods and Methodology

The methods used to gather the data for this research involved a qualitative study of over 100 individuals across seven organisations. The organisational size ranged from international businesses with multi-billion pound turnovers, to smaller organisations with turnovers of several hundred million pounds. The vast majority of those interviewed were managers or at senior supervisory level. The interviews were predominantly face-to-face, although nearly 20% were conducted over the telephone. The research is contextualised by the discussion on
surveillance, both in society and in the workplace, thus providing a historical and contemporary take on what has been termed the ‘Surveillance Society’.

The interviews are analysed using template analysis (King, 2004) also drawing on influences from Watson (1994) and his take on analysis. It also draws on minor influences of social psychology aspects of discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The focus of the analysis is seen through the lens of exchange with psychological influences to understand how and why managers feel how they do about surveillance. A fuller explication of the nature of the methods and the methodology is provided in Chapter Five.

1.4 Plan of the Thesis

This chapter has thus far provided a guide to the thesis as a whole. It has outlined and contextualised the study. The remainder of the thesis is divided into four sections. The first section is divided into three further chapters. The broad literature review is contained in Chapters Two and Three, and a more detailed review of the primary focus in Chapter Four. The broad literature review chapters introduce some of the wider theoretical and conceptual ideas associated with surveillance, drawing primarily on the concepts of the Panopticon and ‘Big Brother’. They give a balanced overview to the research subject. They help place the research subject in context, looking at the contested terms of surveillance and monitoring, and examines what they mean from academic and public viewpoints. The chapters also include a discussion on the psychology of surveillance and the close psychological associations to the appraisal and appraisal process.

Chapter Four, discusses the focal area of research, offering an examination of social exchange and the broader meaning of exchange and exchanges in the workplace. The thesis uses a number of theories to help understand and analyse the research. The majority arguably based loosely around choice and choices. That is to say that the actions of the managers in the research are not based simply on altruistic behaviours, although some might be. How managers’ make their decisions is usually as a direct result of a deliberate choice, sometime rational, sometimes irrational, invariably a combination of the two taking them down a path that best reflects the reality of the situation. The manager’s decision-making processes might also be because of a choice made by an employer to surveil or make use of performance management techniques. These choices both influence and are influenced by social exchange, exchange theory, psychological factors (associated with surveillance and appraisals), equity
theory, power typologies, power, which occasionally lead to resistance. Concerning worker resistance, the research also briefly looks at the role played by psychological reactance. Psychological reactance is (very simply) borne out of a subconscious motivation to right a perceived wrong, or balance a perceived imbalance. There is little if any choice involved in psychological reactance, it differs from, a deliberate choice to resist, any resistance resulting from reactance is not initially a deliberate choice. The final part of the chapter identifies the gap in the current literature that the thesis seeks to fill and specifies the research questions.

Chapter Five details the methodology employed in the research. The methodology chapter offers the overriding methodology behind the research. It sets out why the epistemological perspective of interpretivism is used. It also justifies a constructionist ontological position. The part of the chapter looking at the methods details why the particular organisations were identified for potential research. A brief segment details the logistics of how the research took place, examining the interview negotiation processes, where the interviews took place, and how their conduct. Around 20% of the interviews were conducted over the telephone, which provided a completely new and different set of challenges for qualitative interviews and for the research. The chapter spends some time discussing the issues surrounding interviewing either in person (face-to-face) or over the telephone. The chapter also includes a brief exposition on specific methodological and axiological concerns. A more comprehensive section looks at the participant organisations, what they do, their location, and gives some information on who the interviewees were. A discussion on the way the data was gathered, transcribed, coded, and analysed then follows.

In this research, how different managers interpret (or have it interpreted for them) performance management data, and how they subsequently react is an important aspect. It is a notion consistent with the idea of the theoretical positions outlined.

The third section offers two chapters. The first (Chapter Six) details the broad surveillance findings of the research including analysis. The second chapter in this section, (Chapter Seven) takes a more focussed approach analysing why managers behave in the way that they do towards surveillance seeking to understand their behaviours.

The final section offers some summary discussion and conclusions (Chapter Eight) and suggestions for future research.
1.5 Definitions, Limitations and Scope

One of the first hurdles to overcome when reading this thesis is to understand the terminology involved. For many people the terms monitoring and surveillance are interchangeable. During the course of the production of this thesis, a considerable amount of time was spent wrestling with how best to use the terms, given that for some interviewees their use was different from other interviewees. In the end, a decision was made to use the term surveillance (in all its guises) throughout the thesis to indicate all forms of observation regardless of how it was carried out. Such a decision was not taken lightly, the decision to opt for surveillance risks confusing any readers own personal interpretation and the interpretations put upon it in other research works. The only exceptions to this are when other researchers use an alternative term, or where an interviewee uses or refers to an alternative term.

The thesis is like any research study, limited both in the scope of the research, and to areas that can be effectively covered. A number of other research areas have associations to surveillance; in this instance, they were not the focus of this research. For example, surveillance is of growing interest to human geographers. The increase in electronic surveillance involving digital technology, networks, and the Internet, has led to a number of discussions on spatial elements, especially how virtual space is merging with actual space in surveillant processes (Bogard, 1996; Boyne, 2000). Today, surveillance is not confined to traditional Cartesian or Euclidean definitions of space. The creation of the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) addressing system, the system which lies behind the Internet, created a mechanism that, unlike in the real world where, “anonymity has to be created, in cyberspace anonymity is the given” (Lessig, 1999, p. 33). This fundamental difference between ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ literally offers an added dimension. The use of TCP/IP addressing allows personal and spatial anonymous surveillance to take place. The use of distributed networks and the ‘autonomous agents’ of the individual PC have created a new type of surveillance. The Internet and TCP/IP addressing system, challenges fundamentally common perceptions of geography in the Cartesian or Euclidian sense. To misquote Webber,1 cyberspace offers, ‘Surveillance without propinquity’.

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1 “Communities without propinquity” citing Webber (1963) In: Driskell and Lyon (2002, p. 373)
The most obvious example of this is in the use of wireless CCTV cameras, where the location of the observer and the name of the observer are preserved by the IP address. Inherent in this technology, again as the enabler of the surveillance, is the opportunity for interception of the signal, for criminal or other purposes, thereby further confusing the issue of who is watching and why².

It also indicates that it is no longer a ‘Closed Circuit’. This would not be so worrying, except that it has been estimated that the average person in a major UK city is seen on CCTV between 8 and 300 times every day (Biressi & Nunn, 2003). A high proportion of these systems are in commercial hands, associated with shopping centres, shops, public transport and other commercial locations (Norris & McCahill, 2002). It should be noted that while the figure of 300 is an often cited one (Surveillance Studies Network, 2006; Lyon, 2007), the origins and accuracy of the figure are to this day shrouded in mystery (Aaronovitch, 2009).

This research however does not directly deal with the use of the TCP/IP protocol. However, its use and the anonymising features of the protocol are referred to (only as the technology behind the software) when looking at e-mail, Internet browsing and Instant Messenger (IM) services as part of workplace surveillance. This research has also chosen to avoid deliberately looking at the implications of CCTV in the workplace, as it does not fit within the scope of the research. This is for several reasons; negotiating access for CCTV operations might have proved problematic with no assurances that other areas of workplace surveillance would be present. There could be no guarantee that all organisations actively or consistently use CCTV, or if they employ it, there is no guarantee that they operate it themselves, as was the case with Privet (one of the organisations in this research) who operated jointly CCTV operations with the security services. There is also the suspicion that, it is too closely associated with broader societal concerns rather than the workplace. An exception to this might be in the retail environment where the use of CCTV continues to maintain a higher profile for employees.

The role of technology in surveillance, particularly in the workplace is a complex one. Without technology and technological advancements, managers would still be limited to managing small parties of workers gauging their productivity by visual means. The Industrial Revolution changed that, it allowed managers to oversee many more workers in one location than was previously thought possible (Sewell, 1999). Sociological questions of what technology means and the role that technology plays as an enabler of surveillance, can be judged in an historical

perspective through key technological advances such as the punch-card loom, the electric telegraph, the Personal Computer, and the Internet.

Another area not covered in the research is the issue of gender and surveillance. There was no discussion during access negotiations for the provision of a biased gender sample. The request was always that the sample was representative of their workforce. Nonetheless, the workplace is a gendered environment, where surveillance can be characterized by the “unwanted male gaze” (Zureik (2003) In: Lyon, 2003b, p. 50). It also involves Goffmanesque appearances and performances related to forms of dress and the management of work (Lyon, 2003b). In addition, Weber’s views on the workplace, have been extended to theorizing present sex and gender in terms of the boss-secretary relationship, and where managers are portrayed as being “obsessed with masculinity and potency as surviving relics of patrimony and personal relations” (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999, p. 122). This area whilst also worthy of investigation does not form part of this thesis. To include it would require a completely different set of epistemological, ontological, and theoretical perspectives. With sufficient resources and access, it might be possible to undertake a research study in this area in the future.

The final area that has been excluded from the research is the emergent theory of Complexity as an organisational theory, which can be applied to surveillance in the confines of understanding how organisations operate. It draws heavily on influences of Chaos theory, originally known as the ‘butterfly effect’ (Lorenz, 1972). It can be loosely linked to work on the metaphor of the rhizome, which is discussed in a slightly more detail in Chapter Two. The main reason for not going down the route of Complexity and the impact of surveillant activity is that a more objectivist epistemology and positivist theoretical perspective would have been required. Such an approach would not sit well with the notion of gathering data through semi-structured interviews.

This chapter offered an outline of the complete thesis, detailing who, how, when, where, and the why of the research. It laid down foundations for the research and introduced the research themes and the research questions. It set out how the research would be accomplished, the scope and justified why specific themes were engaged and others were not. From this point, the research literature commences with an overview of surveillance.
Chapter Two

Societal Surveillance

The first chapter in this section looks at the background and history of societal surveillance. It explores the diversity of surveillance interpretations and specifically contextualises them in a societal setting. It looks at how surveillant activities are realized, conceptualised, and theorised. The chapter takes a broad overview of what has developed from a niche or specialist academic field rooted in sociology or business, into a very broad academic subject. The use of the term “overview” is deliberate and is intended to convey the same sentiments Lyon expressed that “…we are all in a sense implicated in surveillance, both as watchers and as the watched” (Lyon, 2007, p. vi). Surveillance now has researchers working in areas as diverse as sociology, business, art, gender studies, human geography, and technology (Levin, Frohne & Weibel, 2002) under the umbrella term of ‘surveillance studies’ (Wood, 2003; Ball & Haggerty, 2005; Simon, 2005).

The chapter consists of four key sections with a number of sub-sections. The first section introduces the notion of surveillance in society, from its early visual origins of simply watching people in society, through to present-day hi-tech variations. The second section examines how societal surveillance is conceptualised, paying particular attention to the popular metaphors of Big Brother and the Panopticon. The third section looks at how societal surveillance is currently theorised. The fourth and final section looks at the impact of surveillance on individual perceptions of privacy.
2.1 Surveillance

Individuals have always been observed, both in society and in the workplace. Historically, the aims and variation of the surveillance depended on the context and the mode. Societally, surveillance has maintained and increase state control. The early Egyptian Dynasties surveilled their people, whether it was an overseer watching slaves building the Pyramids or in a more general societal sense (Trigger, 1983). Similarly, Chinese societies from around the fifteenth to early seventeenth centuries formalised state surveillance with the appointment of the Provincial Surveillance Commission of the Censorate, who in turn appointed at local government level a tu~ch’a yüan or Chief Surveillance Officer (Finer, 1997).

Dandeker (1990) believed the influence of the state, and in particular the military of the nation-state, was significant in the emergence of surveillance as a means of control. He indicated that changes in hierarchies and bureaucracies beginning around the 17th century allowed greater control for the military and army generals. He went on to say that by the turn of the 18th century “the armed forces of states were probably the most developed organizations from the standpoint of surveillance” (Dandeker, 1990, p. 68).

The mode or method of the surveillance remained largely unchanged over the centuries, outside of the bureaucracies and military forces detailed by Dandeker, usually consisting of an individual (a manager, supervisor, or overseer) watching small groups of individuals in close detail, or larger groups in less detail. During the period of the Industrial Revolution, advances in manufacturing processes allowed overseers or managers to observe many more employees at any one time than previously was possible under one roof (Sewell, 1999). The apotheosis of this was the water-powered textile mills of North-West England in the 19th century. Early in the 20th century, mass production factories and production line working, personified by manufacturers such as the Ford Motor Company, replaced the factories of the early Industrial Revolution. Recent advances have seen electronic surveillance increase in the workplace.

The obvious starting point to obtain a meaning for surveillance can be drawn from a number of dictionaries. For example, the meaning attributed to the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Soanes & Stevenson, 2006), appears somewhat hostile: “close observation, especially of a suspected person”. However, and somewhat confusingly, it also indicates that the roots of the word are “origin French, 19C from sur- ‘over’ + veiller ‘watch’”, which suggests a much more benign interpretation. The interpretive differences do not stop there. By taking the root of
veiller back one stage further, one arrives at the Latin origin, Vigilare: be awake, watch: to care for by watching, from which we get vigilant. That single definition highlights one of the paradoxes surrounding surveillance; the derivation of an apparently hostile meaning comes from several much more benign root meanings. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary definition appears to suggest that anyone under surveillance is ‘a suspected person’ and that surveillance require ‘close observation’, neither is the whole or accurate picture. Similarly, Cambridge Dictionary Online provides equally as sweeping a definition, “the careful watching of a person or place, especially by the police or army, because of a crime that has happened or is expected.” Although Dictionary.com does provide some needed balance, by including alongside a similar definition to the others the following alternative definition, “supervision or superintendence.”

It is apparent that extracting one single straightforward and clear meaning, particularly from a dictionary, is not as helpful as might be first thought, at least for research into surveillance. Writers such as Lyon and G. T. Marx attempted to clarify precisely what is meant by surveillance by using dictionary definitions (Marx, 1999; Lyon, 2003b). However, both G. T. Marx (1999), and Lyon (2003) found that such an approach had limitations. Both identified their respective dictionary definitions served as good starting points for discussion, although both agreed that neither of their definitions alone was able to capture the many nuances of surveillance. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, and both Lyon and Marx’s dictionary definitions, highlight the implicit and explicit problems with defining surveillance.

In academic circles, a number of definitions have been proposed. For example an alternative, non-dictionary definition, based on his own work, was put forward by G. T. Marx (1999). He suggests that contemporary surveillance “…is the use of technical means to extract or create personal data.” This definition, while useful, still does not encompass or accurately define all aspects of contemporary surveillance.

There is however no mention in his definition of the benign aspects to contemporary surveillance in relation to individuals. Furthermore, there is a negative presumption of how the data is used. This need not be the case. There are occasions where the contemporary extraction of data can be benign and non-personal, such as in car-sharing schemes where the data gathered is a simple count on car occupants, or in ‘anonymous’ clickstream data used for determining advertising rates.

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In the latter example, clickstream data could be anonymous, the nature of the TCP/IP protocol means that while the data is at least at face value, anonymous and non-personal, that position is not always the case. The recent instance of search engine providers making available such data to the US Justice Department proved that ‘anonymous’ in relation to clickstream data is a relative term. Sophisticated software can detect personal data from so-called anonymised data as was shown in the case of Thelma Arnold\(^4\) whose identity was revealed from Justice Department ‘so-called’ anonymised data.

To aid his case for the inclusion of technical aspects, Marx provides allusions to Lyon’s ‘social sorting’, writing of societal surveillance that “The use of ‘contexts’ along with ‘individuals’ recognizes that much modern surveillance also looks at settings and patterns of relationships” (G. T. Marx, 2002, p. 12). This definition suggests a more dystopic take on the morass of meanings of surveillance, hinting as it does to the actions of the ‘Records Department’ in Orwell’s *Nineteen eighty-four* (2000), and the constant visibility and worker efficiencies in Zamyatin’s *We* (1993), both books described ways in which control of society was maintained though the gathering and use of information. They also lead to Clarke’s interpretation of surveillance as “…one of the elements of tyranny. The word conjures up unpleasant visions of spies, repression of individuals, and suppression of ideas” (Clarke, 1988, p. 498). Lyon (2001b) takes the apparent conflict in meanings further, and proposes that surveillance, far from being just repressive, or just benign, actually has a duality or dichotomous aspect to it. On the one hand, it does mean to benignly watch or look out for, and on the other, it means to watch suspicious persons or watch with mistrust,

“…watching over – both enables and constrains, involves care and control. What is sold as a great enabler and as a means to new-found freedoms also displays another facet which may be less welcome” (Lyon, 2001b, p. 3).

This duality or paradox can be seen in many areas, such as public safety and health in the community. In the case of public safety, the traditional active ‘bobby on the beat’ is being gradually updated with/by passive technology. Police officers now patrol in vehicles rather than on foot, and the use of video cameras on the streets has arguably replaced visual observation by police officers. Although a surprising side effect of the recent fuel price hike, at

\(^4\) [http://tinyurl.com/6ljc7d](http://tinyurl.com/6ljc7d) [accessed 19 February 2008]
least in Durham, has according to Assistant Chief Constable Barton seen an increase in police officers on cycles and on foot. Others argue that the CCTV cameras are a passive addendum to policing, as advances in camera and surveillance technologies now include real time voice contact. The CCTV cameras are watched around the clock, sometimes by police officers in control rooms, or what has been dystopically termed a “room of control” (Smith, 2007, p. 281). The control rooms are sometimes operated by outside security organisations and occasionally by a combination of both police and private security workers. In the majority of cases, the CCTV footage is controlled and monitored by non-law enforcement individuals, working for the local authority, local shops, or shopping centre employees (although recently, there has been some online debate as to role of the police in private security CCTV systems).

Contemporary uses of ‘surveillance’ in the health field also invoke a plethora of interpretations. In medical contexts, it can have a benign and supportive meaning. For example, in hospital radiology departments monitoring the amounts of radiation to which nurses and practitioners are exposed is vital for health and safety reasons. It is reasonable to argue that monitoring the amounts of radiation to which an individual is exposed, is a helpful approach, particularly for women of childbearing age.

In the recent past, Public Health, hospital/medical surveillance simply related to the benign surveillance of a nurse, doctor, health worker, or patient. The traditional health surveillance approach utilises what might be perceived as the benign visual surveillance and monitoring by a nurse/doctor on a patient. Although more recently the latter incorporates technological camera solutions combined with internal physical security forces. Hospital surveillance now includes CCTV surveillance on the car park, CCTV surveillance of the visitor in the grounds, in the entrances, and in the confines of the hospital and hospital wards.

Public health surveillance in the community using technology is also increasing, with the incorporation of Radio-Frequency Identification tags (RFID) in maternity wards and the use of smart fabrics to monitor the elderly, the infirm, and sufferers of Alzheimer’s disease.

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5 [http://www.bbc.co.uk/wear/content/articles/2008/07/17/police_fuel_feature.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/wear/content/articles/2008/07/17/police_fuel_feature.shtml) [accessed 20 August 2008]
9 [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2007_Sept_4/ai_n19494400](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2007_Sept_4/ai_n19494400) [accessed 6 September 2007]
Unlike in the workplace where employee’s uniforms can have RFID tags sewn into the fabric, the example of schoolchildren in the UK being ‘tagged’ with microchips is for many of greater concern. While the benefits of embedding RFID tags into school uniforms were claimed to be by Trevor Darnborough, Managing Director of the company, “The system saves valuable lesson time, often wasted in registration and monitoring, while ensuring parents of their children’s security. And there’s the additional benefit of reduced costs in replacing school uniforms that have gone astray,” nevertheless, some parents might prefer to ponder on the use of a product that suggests children’s uniforms at this school are less secure. There is also an implicit suggestion in the use of RFID that the children are being monitored for some other reason.

There are also experiments currently taking place in Universities around the world attempting to identify the limits to RFID tagging and personal privacy, notably in The University of Washington in America. The RFID experiment seeks to identify the privacy limits, if there are any, to tagging both individuals and objects throughout the University. Somewhat surprisingly, the students appear to have embraced the project and have created a set of mash-ups (combining multiple sources of information on the web) that display in real time the precise locations of the individuals and their associated objects, via Google Maps and Twitter (an Instant Messenger/micro-blogging client).

In the examples above, particularly in the uses of CCTV and RFID, a function that appears to enable a more secure environment, can without that aim necessarily in mind, offer a less benign or more hostile alternative, one that opens the door to a more invasive and obtrusive society, or workplace.

There is also a widespread perception or acknowledgement, that national Governments operate a multitude of legitimate and some less legitimate surveillance processes. These range from, State on State (conventional spying), to State on population (or sections thereof). This perception is in part due to the conflation of military and state surveillance that was manifest in Eastern Bloc countries at the end of the twentieth-century. In the years immediately following the end of the Second World War, the Cold War between the East and the West developed. This ‘conflict’, rather than directing surveillance towards countries on either side of the Iron Curtain (although massive amounts of state on other state surveillance did take place), produced some of the most pervasive, introspective, and intensive surveillance of a

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10 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/education/article2698062.ece [accessed 20 October 2007]
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society or populace. For example, the Staatssicherheitsdienst or Stasi (Secret Police) of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), directly using Stasi operatives and indirectly through surrogates (informants), maintained files and recorded telephone conversations on a large proportion of the population.

The number of four-drawer filing cabinets full of data for this secretive surveillance by the GDR was estimated to number around 16,000. Computer based storage of this data would at the time have been a huge undertaking, as in the 1980s computer hard drives were still in their infancy. In 1980, a single 1 GB hard drive from IBM weighed around 550lbs and cost around $40,000\(^{13}\) to transfer all the data from the surveillance to hard drive would have required a thousand new drives from IBM. The cost of the drives alone would therefore have been in the region of $40m (equivalent to around $100m\(^{14}\) at today’s rate with a combined weight of 250 metric tonnes). However, if the same plans were put in place today by any state (or for that matter any organisation), they could digitally transfer the information contained onto a pair of 500GB hard drives costing today less than £150 for the pair. This thesis examines later the impact advancements in technology and the associated reduction in costs has on organisations adopting workplace surveillance.

2.2 Surveillance Metaphors

Throughout the myriad of research projects, empirical, theoretical, or conceptual, there is invariably the use of metaphors to help clarify the issues. This section provides an overview into the main concepts and metaphors associated with surveillance. The use of metaphors to conceptualise what are at times complex issues is particularly useful. Metaphors frequently help to bring about a new understanding to many aspects of surveillance. Predominant for surveillance are the metaphors of Big Brother and the Panopticon. Both metaphors help explain how and understand why surveillance takes place.

The Panopticon, popularised by Foucault (1977), is taken and adapted from an original architectural design by Bentham, it is widely utilised by academics. However, in the public’s consciousness Big Brother remains the more popular. This is possibly heightened through television programmes such as the Endemol production Big Brother, and the increasing public interest in societal surveillance highlighted by the UK Information Commissioner in A Report on

the *Surveillance Society* (Surveillance Studies Network, 2006). Big Brother’s popularity might also be credited to the frequency with which the media attribute news stories with the by-line of ‘Big Brother’ to indicate any type of surveillance or an activity that, however loosely, might be associated with surveillance.

### 2.2.1 The Panopticon

In the late 1970s, while researching the historical design of hospitals and how the benign medical gaze was institutionalised, the French philosopher Michel Foucault came across the neglected architectural design of the Panopticon. It was only later, when looking at nineteenth century penal systems did it become clear to Foucault that the Panopticon might be influential in terms of social control and discipline (Levin, Frohne & Weibel, 2002). The Panopticon, while a well construed and well constructed architectural plan, was ostensibly a mechanism to observe and moderate the behaviour of prison inmates (Bentham, 1832). Although, Bentham indicated somewhat insightfully, that the design might have more far-reaching applications, suggesting that the design could be extended to workhouses, hospitals, or even poorhouses. Foucault claimed that in designing the Panopticon, Bentham had “…invented a technology of power designed to solve the problems of surveillance” (Foucault, In: Levin, Frohne & Weibel, 2002, p. 96). While Bentham’s Panopticon was never actually built, a reasonable facsimile, based loosely on Bentham’s original design was built by John Haviland in Pennsylvania in 1821, in doing so, Haviland formed the basis of the US prison designs for over a century (Johnston, 1964). Ironically, Haviland’s ensuing prison design was subsequently copied, and attributed to him in various forms around the world. Although for the original design template, credit should rightly go to Bentham and the Panopticon.

What made the design of the Panopticon different from contemporary prison plans was that it was “…designed to maximize the visibility of inmates who were to be isolated in individual cells such that they were unaware moment-to-moment whether they were being observed by guards in a central tower” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 607). In his book, *Surveiller et Punir* (Discipline and Punish), Foucault argues that the Panopticon offered a form of surveillance that not only placed individuals under scrutiny, but crucially did so without the inmates being sure if or when they were being observed. This led to the inmates disciplining themselves. It was this unseen gaze that the Panopticon fashioned, allowing a way of “obtaining compliance through fear” (Lyon, 2001a, p. 175). Rule (1996) took the concept of compliance beyond the
prison setting, moving the Panopticon concept beyond that previously envisioned making the observation that for Foucault the Panopticon was a “... model of a whole world in statu nascendi” (In a state of inception or an emerging state) (Rule, 1996, p. 68).

Other interpretations of Foucault’s work have concentrated on the suggestion that it is only those watched who are the metaphorical prisoners. Although, Bentham suggested that inspectors and subordinates at all levels potentially are equally as watched, hence the rhetorical nature of the question - *quis custodiet ipsos custodies* (Bentham, 1832). The phrase, popularly, but roughly translated as: ‘who watches the watchers’, is better translated as ‘who guards the guardians’, which implicitly is a more benign suggestion. Thus demonstrating that even from its inception the design of the Panopticon was a more complex notion than a simple one-way observation system.

In his book *The Panoptic Sort*, Gandy acknowledges Foucault’s influence in reinterpreting the Panopticon, however he suggests the Panopticon is less of an architectural device, more of an administrative technique (Gandy, 1993). This subtly introduces the notion of administrative power into the panoptic-surveillance-power equation. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn referred to the nature of administrative power as being ‘web-like’ in the book, *Cancer Ward* (1968) when he wrote, “Something negative or suspicious can always be noted down against any man alive. Each man... naturally develops a respect for the people who manipulate the threads” (Solzhenitsyn, 1968, p. 208). Introna follows the web analogy claiming that power “is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation” (Introna, 1997, p. 127). Gandy (1993), quoting Lenk went to the nub of the administrative issue suggesting “It is power gains of bureaucracies, both private and public, at the expense of individuals and the non-organized sectors of society” (Gandy, 1993, p. 52). The notion of power linked to surveillance is an ever-present academic aspect. Gandy makes the link explicit, identifying that power associated with administration and bureaucracy influences and shapes contemporary thinking of surveillance and monitoring.

The self-disciplining or normalising aspect is crucial to understanding both contemporary social and workplace surveillance (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; Stanton, 2000; Marx, 2002; Andrejevic, 2003; Lyon, 2003b; Zweig & Webster, 2003). Foucault understood the normalizing effect as one that should be seen as part of a “bundle of disparate techniques” (Munro, 2000, p. 682), all coming together in the shape of the Panopticon as a ‘diagram of power’. Foucault’s analysis of the Panopticon was expounded upon by Sewell (1998) when he dismissively wrote, “direct
control of the labor process is no longer seen as necessarily the most effective way to realize organizational goals” (1998, p. 401). He went on to say that the subtleties of contemporary societal, and particularly workplace surveillance, have the ability to “instil a profound sense of self-discipline and self-control” (Sewell, 1998, p. 403).

Another reappraisal of Foucault’s (benevolent) normalising behaviour in the Panopticon came from Lukes (2005) who suggests the much more hostile notion of control,

“What is meant by ‘power’ here is the idea of controlling – rather ‘producing’ – behaviour, whether directly through the disciplinary training of offenders or more indirectly, by way of deterrent threat and example to the general population. Punishment is thus thought of as a means of control which administers the bodies of individuals and, through them, the body politic” (citing Garland, 1990, In: Lukes, 2005, p. 92).

This particular explanation, using the prison example in a more literal sense, paints Foucault’s interpretation of power through the Panopticon as having much more to do with control and discipline (despite Foucault’s book title suggesting as much). It however displays an obvious take on power and a lack of understanding of the subtleties of power (and power typologies) as a crucial aspect in organisations.

A further dissenting voice to how the Panopticon is generally applied to surveillance and organisational studies comes from Sewell and Barker (2001). They suggest that the Panopticon as a metaphor for surveillant activities is somewhat overplayed as it blurs Foucault’s original premise. They further suggest that rather than seeing the Panopticon as a metaphor for surveillance, it should be discussed or considered, at least in relation to surveillance, as a tropological device, to rehabilitate the “irrational, dissident, or recalcitrant” (Sewell & Barker, 2001, p. 188). Perhaps a more accurate term for current academic uses of the Panopticon, at least in relation to surveillance, might be as metonymy (Burrell, 2006). Using the Panopticon as an example of metonymy is particularly helpful, as knowing and understanding in a broad sense what is meant by the Panopticon sits comfortably in academic work. Using metonymy to convey and reduce complex associations and individual interpretations and meanings in this instance can be particularly beneficial. This reductionist simplicity allows the Panopticon, panoptic, panoptical or any of its other adjectival applications, to be used almost as academic shorthand for different types of surveillant activity. Perhaps because of this, the Panopticon remains the enduring metaphor for academics in interpreting power and surveillance. It has
endured partly because of this ability to be almost chameleon-like in the various interpretations assigned to it.

However, the panoptic metaphor struggles to be as rigorously applied to contemporary explanations of organisations, as perhaps it was once. The Foucauldian premise “emphasises that the possession of power may be unrelated to other more traditional resources of power, but may lie in the possession of knowledge” (Black, 2002, p. 192). It does however offer an understanding of how power as knowledge in organisations might be achieved.

The possession and use of power in organisations is, in part, based on the perceptions of the acquisition of knowledge, knowledge based on ‘monopolistic access’ or ‘privileged access’ accrued by managers or supervisors (Merton, 1972). Introna (1997) refers to management surveillance as operating “power at a distance – both physically and institutionally” (Introna, 1997, p. 79). The power/knowledge nexus frequently associated with managers/supervisors is based on remnants of Taylorism and Scientific Management (Sewell, 1996). Although Merton (1972) disputes the importance placed on Scientific Management and the acquisition of knowledge. He asserts that contrary to the ‘powerful’ role of the insider (manager) acquiring knowledge, the outsider (worker) is potentially equally as powerful (if not more so in dyadic relationships), in that the outsider brings much needed perspective and insight (Merton, 1972). The complex processes at play in the negotiation of power in the workplace are a two-way street. Managers and employees acquire, synthesise, and disseminate information on an ongoing basis. These actions are reminiscent of some of the iterative processes in acquiring tacit and explicit knowledge, and in the workplace the nature of the Employment Relationship and exchange processes. Both are examined in more detail in Chapter Four.

It is also possible that the academic upsurge of the Panopticon metaphor, can be seen in part, as a knee-jerk response to the events of 9/11 (Haggerty & Gazso, 2005b), almost in the hope that the constant visibility suggested by the Panopticon in some way acts as a deterrent to terrorist activity. The intensification of surveillance, post 9/11, in the name of the United States’ ‘war on terror’ has moved surveillance beyond that of simply self-monitoring. It is directly “mobilizing citizens as spies” (Lyon, 2003a, p. 42). Of course, this semblance of self-monitoring is reminiscent of both the dystopic self-disciplining and normalising scenario painted by Foucault of the Panopticon, and the conversion of Winston Smith in Nineteen eighty-four who eventually succumbs to Big Brother.
2.2.2 Big Brother

The notion of the omniscient ‘Big Brother’ was first coined by George Orwell in his dystopic novel, *Nineteen eighty-four* (Orwell, 2000). The novel first published in 1949, sees the lead character, Winston Smith, rail against the faceless and omniscient figure of Big Brother\(^\text{15}\). In the public’s perception this is the most memorable novel of the genre, it was not however the first. Similar dystopically themed novels with omniscient figures with the power to oversee and control individuals existed at the time. Indeed, there have been a number of subsequent novels with similar themes, yet none has eclipsed Orwell’s impact. Orwell himself acknowledged the influence of the earlier and similarly dystopically themed novel by Zamyatin, *We* (1993). Nonetheless, Orwell’s novel struck a chord at the time in the public’s consciousness, and continues to do so, not least because of the transferability of the notion.

The popularity of the metaphor is illustrated by the upsurge in the public and media talk of Big Brother type activities. In the UK, Big Brother has been recently associated with the much-vaunted ID card scheme. Unfortunately, the proposed scheme, much like Orwell’s Big Brother, has suffered from a credibility problem, in part due to the number and severity of incidents of data mismanagement by the UK Government in recent years.

The collection of information on a population for the purposes of control, which was once the sole preserve of the State, is now similarly associated with commercial and employer activities in the workplace. That is not to say that the conventional centralised state Big Brother type activities are a thing of the past (Lyon, 2003a). They are not. In the public’s mind, Big Brother has now become synonymous with any form of surveillant activity regardless of whether it comes from central Government, local Government, commercial or even in the workplace. The recent loss of assorted personal data by various UK Government Departments, or by outside Government contractors, has not helped alleviate fears of Big Brother. It is perhaps not directly associated by the public with the actual loss of data, but more an awareness of the depth and breadth of the data held on file.

\(^{15}\) While the novel was published when Stalin was still alive, it could also be seen as a metaphor for communism. Some have noted that it was also a metaphor for the BBC, then under the draconian control of Lord Reith. As such, therefore, the metaphor is very transferable.
For workplace surveillance the notion conveyed by Orwell’s Big Brother, and the many subsequent re-interpretations, is that monitoring people is a way “to maintain a form of hierarchical social control” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 615). The implicit threat from Big Brother is the image of the ‘telescreen’ and the ‘thought police’ act as a way of “inducing and maintaining compliance and social order” (Hier, 2003, p. 401). The total control in Orwell’s Oceania was only possible by centralisation; with today’s extensive computer networks, both in the workplace and in society, control has become decentralised and local. The overt ‘Big Brother is Watching You’ has became the covert –‘Big Brother Might be Watching You’ (Rossin & Reilly, 2003).

This is particularly true of organisational computer networks and the use of hidden ‘clickstream data’ derived from Internet browsing where control aspects are disguised (Regan, 2002; Haggerty & Gazso, 2005a). The popularity of the metaphor of Big Brother is for organisations equally as tightly bound to the consciousness of the public as it is for societal surveillance. In the same way that using the Panopticon as metonymy for academics is helpful, then perhaps the same is true of Big Brother for the public.

While no one doubts the initial impact of Foucault or Orwell in academic writings, the last ten years has seen a subtle shift away from the original interpretation of the Panopticon espoused by Foucault and to a different extent Orwell’s Big Brother. During this period, as the technology changes a number of alternative metaphors have emerged to help understand surveillance. These include the “Electronic Panopticon” which draws its influence from the 1990s shift towards just-in-time/total quality management (JIT/TQM), and the controlling uses to which management puts those production systems (Bain & Taylor, 2000). The similarly themed “Electronic Cage” put forward by Kling and Allen (1996), is clearly influenced by Weber’s ‘Iron Cage’ of bureaucracy. David Lyon (2003a, 2006) has recently picked up on the metaphors of plague management (Green, 1999) and the rhizome (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), to help shed new light on the subject. Latour’s (2005) ‘Oligopticon’ is also emerging as a potential alternative for certain types of surveillant activity, notably involving CCTV systems. For the Internet and particularly social networks and virtual worlds like Second Life, I believe the metaphor of Plato’s Cave might be relevant. In the surveillant mesh, that is social networking and online virtual worlds, the personal postings, and virtual lives are much like the visions of the inhabitants of Plato’s Cave, where the electronic ephemera are mere shadows, and echoes of the real person.
Recently, Dandeker (2006) has examined and updated the impact of bureaucracy in the military and the role it plays in relation to surveillance. While Stanton and Stam (2003) have examined surveillance using social psychology and social exchange. The following sub-sections, while acknowledging the impact of the other alternatives, concentrate on the impact that the rhizome and the oligopticon have made. They also reflect more broadly on the notion of surveillance when used as a mechanism of social sorting. The impact of social psychology and exchange and the specific relevance to this study is examined separately and more extensively in subsequent chapters.

### 2.2.3 Rhizome

The rhizome as a metaphor for surveillance is originally based on work by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), in their book *A Thousand Plateaus: Schizophrenia and Capitalism* (1987) the title of which is coincidentally borrowed from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (Bateson, 2000). Deleuze and Guattari conceptualised systems as ‘rhizomes’ or ‘rhizomic’ in nature. This train of thought diverged significantly from what was at the time the dominant theme, that of the ‘arboreal’ or tree-like nature of contemporary systems and the hierarchical structures of organisations.

Deleuze and Guattari proposed the rhizome as an alternative way of understanding the flow of information, knowledge, and systems, including organisations. Their proposition sought to move away from the hierarchical structures and linear thinking associated with organisations at the time. They believed the metaphor provided a better model for interpreting contemporary socio-organizational structures and knowledge-based systems. The non-hierarchical non-linear nature led some to view the rhizome as offering the potential of a more accurate metaphor for surveillance, one that better reflects the digital world (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; Lyon, 2003a).

The premise of machinic assemblage’s draws together academic work on cybernetics and surveillance. Contemporary organisations further blur the lines between man (as worker) and machine, with the implementation of wearable computers (Blakemore, I-DRA Ltd & GMB, 2005). These real world cybernetic machinic assemblages have organisations deterritorializing cybernetic workers removing their body from the centralised machine geographically, thereby creating machinic and distributed networks of ‘virtual assemblages’.
The link between computing and computer networks is reinforced by the tree-like hierarchical systems that Deleuze and Guattari sought to move away from being reminiscent of modern computer operating system file structures. Others have taken the rhizome/computer connection further, suggesting the network topology of the modern organisation’s distributed computer network bears striking parallels to the rhizome (Galloway, 2004). Mapping diagrams of distributed computer networks accurately match rhizomic activity, thus conforming to the rhizome metaphor. The network mapping and topology of computer nodes are almost indistinguishable when mapped against organic rhizomic activity.

This notion can be seen in the nodes of organisations computer networks, and on a much wider scale mirroring the redundancy built into the original premise behind the World Wide Web. Moreover, Graham and Wood (2003) associate the rhizomic assemblages of computers and digital technology with Foucauldian notions of normalization saying “Social, commercial and state definitions of norms of behaviour within the various contexts of the city are thus increasingly automatically policed by assemblages of digital technology and software” (Graham & Wood, 2003, p. 233). The metaphor of the rhizome lies behind much of the technology associated with workplace surveillance. However, despite its importance to discussions on surveillance and technology, this research does not specifically examine technology except as the enabler of the surveillance; as such, a more detailed discussion would be appropriate for research with a different focus.

2.2.4 Oligopticon

The oligopticon is an alternative and less well-known metaphor for surveillance activities. It was originally offered by Latour (2005), who, following a period spent observing CCTV screens in a Paris traffic centre, suggested that the metaphor of the ‘oligopticon’ could represent specific types of surveillance and monitoring. The control rooms of CCTV operations (societally or in the workplace) provide a setting where the [restricted] observers see just a small segment of the overall picture, but in high detail.

The trend towards greater mobility individually or in the workplace matches oligoptic surveillant mechanisms. One of the more subtle examples of oligoptic observation is in the algorithmic (and covert) gathering and triangulation of mobile phone cell data. This surveillance along with more formal (and overt) cellular location systems and GPS are changing the scope for individuals and organisations by geo-locating friends and workers respectively. In
the oligopticon, the information, along with whomever the information/data is abstracted from, becomes part of a flow that is neither hierarchical nor administrative. It becomes part of “… the fluids that circulate and flow within and beyond what were once taken for granted as ‘societies’” (Lyon, 2003b, pp. 25-6). The fluids that Lyon describes also appear in Urry’s work on complexity and the mobility of individuals “where people have the right to ‘travel’ corporeally, imaginatively and virtually” (Urry, 2003, p. 133).

2.2.5 Social Sorting

The previous sub-sections examined alternative surveillance metaphors and signposted the way in which popular technological advancements can affect society and how academia portrays them. This section largely leaves the metaphors behind, by taking a slightly wider brief and looking at what the surveillance data, as opposed to the actual surveillance, can accomplish when used, and suggests meanings behind it.

Earlier discussions centred on how the data and information gathered by surveillance technology can be used for social sorting (Lyon, 1994; Lyon, 2001b, 2003b). Lyon suggests that the coding of the data in huge linked databases acts like “invisible doors that permit access to or exclude from participation in a multitude of events, experiences or processes” (Lyon, 2003b, p. 13).

An example of social sorting in practice is the ubiquitous mobile [cellular] phone, which has opened up new possibilities for function creep and dichotomous surveillance. Mobile phone customer records acquired and retained by telecommunications companies socially sort and market additional products based on their profile to individual users. In the case of mobile phones, the process of social sorting commences when users register their purchase, invariably via the company’s web site. The registration process requires users to provide a plethora of apparently unconnected and vague personal data, such as age group, address, interests, salary, and hobbies.

Organisations can combine this data with other data held in commercially available databases. Some of the databases link addresses to social grouping via geodemographic classifications such as ACORN, or other similar geodemographic listings, to help create a profile of an individual and their lifestyle. Of course, this profile is not discrete; it is associated to a classification that is precise enough for marketing or mailing companies. However, it signally
fails to reflect any of the individual reasons why you like or dislike something, or even whether or not you might purchase any particular product in the future. Lyon makes this very point, suggesting that the data is far from being signally representative of the individual, instead that the individual is being grouped or sorted according to purchases, address, or social activity, determined by ephemera, rather than the tangible, the permanent, and the accurate.

A sub-group of social sorting on the increase in society is class-based surveillance. This form of surveillance typically takes place via an object that is price sensitive (invariably a high-value product) towards a particular social group (Andrejevic, 2003). This more accurate variation of Lyon’s more generalised and mass social sorting, further erodes Governmental control of data and places it firmly in the hands of commercial organisations. The reasoning is simple, high-priced goods are primarily available only to niche or elite customers. These customers, because of their purchase of ‘exclusivity’ are subject to more surveillance because of their class, income, or ability to purchase the high value goods. As an example, in the late 1980s, the ‘mobile phone’ (at the time ‘mobile’ was a misnomer, with early phones weighing several kilos) was the status symbol. Due to their prohibitive cost at the time, they were only available to those on high incomes, or to employees of a certain status. Thus, if you owned/operated a mobile phone in the 1980s you were automatically characterised as a certain type of customer, with sufficient wealth and/or sufficient status to afford or need the phone. The data on these individuals was at the time worth a great deal of money to marketers.

Today, the cost of a mobile phone has dropped considerably, permitting the wider population, regardless of income, to own one or more mobile phones. This can be portrayed as a democratising event, as it demonstrates how formerly expensive, high-status niche consumer goods can over time become available to the masses. However, while it is true on one level, scratch beneath the surface and the picture is not that simple. Despite the apparent democratisation of the mobile phone, the simple surveillance of providing registration data is still the same social sorting surveillance, the only difference is that it has shifted from the elite to the masses.

Obtaining good quality surveillance data (for social sorting) from the elite through simple mobile phone data has subsequently become much more complicated. The surveillance data provided by the masses (via mobile phones) has now become a key source of information for the elite product purchaser. Today’s average mobile phone user is not generally aware that they are being surveilled, either geographically or for social sorting. Some users are aware that
the data they provide mobile phone companies directly or indirectly is used to market other products to them – even in relation to the basic call plan offered to them. However, very few users are aware that the location signal data enables the provision of exclusive services for wealthy [elite] individuals. This data forms the backbone of high value bespoke navigation and tracking systems for vehicles. For this particular product, the mobile phone geographic signal data is acquired [anonymously] by ITIS Holdings plc, to assist in providing their premium tracking and navigation products. These products use signal data from the mass of mobile phone signals, cellular floating vehicle data (CFVD™), synthesise it with other road and traffic data, then resell the information to ISP’s, telecommunication companies, or motoring organizations\(^\text{16}\). ITIS Holdings also combine the information with their premium NavTrak™ car security product to assist Police forces to locate and recover stolen vehicles. The use of this type of cellular data is now being further extended and refined, it is currently being gathered and tested in a number of cities around the world for use in urban planning and traffic forecasting schemes (Gonzalez, Hidalgo & Barabasi, 2008). Presumably, some of these schemes will be premium ‘congestion charge’ products with a higher proportion of elite users, either by dint of their home address or for their shopping convenience.

2.3 Surveillance Theory

Previous and present research into surveillance, in relation to both society and the workplace, identify a number of theories that can be utilized to help understand it. Each has their merits and demerits. It would however be impossible to précis such a large body of work, from fields as diverse as sociology, psychology, philosophy, criminology, and geography. Therefore, in keeping with the previous concentration on selected conceptualisations, greater emphasis is placed on the more relevant theories. In this section, a very brief discussion on theories around knowledge/power/control takes place, although there is a more extensive discussion of theories more relevant to this research in Chapter Four.

2.3.1 Knowledge/Power Nexus

Dominant sociological theories on surveillance centre on how knowledge, power [control], and discipline are contested. Understanding power in surveillance requires an appreciation of the nature of power and power relations. Power is not necessarily about a strong figure with

\(^{16}\) http://www.itisholdings.com/applications.asp# [accessed 5 June 2007]
power and a subservient one under their control (Lukes, 2005). Power has been defined and redefined several times including, “to have power is to be able to act more freely, while being relatively less powerful or powerless, means having the freedom of choice limited by the decisions made by others via their capability to determine our actions” (Bauman & May, 2001, p. 62/3). Alternatively, power is, “an individual or collective ability to influence another individual or collective to think or to act differently than that individual or collective would otherwise think or act” (Jasperson et al., 2002, p. 410).

A preeminent influence in academic, particularly sociological, discussions on power is Foucault, who helped shape discussions on the exercise of power, particularly in relation to surveillance in society. His re-interpretation of Bentham’s Panopticon design, as a metaphor for administrative or bureaucratic power, underpins thirty years discussion on surveillance. Foucault described power not as a force of repression (unless conceptualised as part of a legal framework), but as a force that “…induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse” (Foucault & Gordon, 1980, p. 119). The conceptualisation of power as a force for repression in a legal sense arguably refers back to writings by Weber (1964) and his legal/rational power typology, a more detailed discussion of which takes place in Chapter Four.

Bradshaw-Camball and Murray (1991) note that power in an organisational context is much more complex than ‘A having power over B’. It can be exerted amongst other things by, “the use of language, information, metaphor, symbols, myths and humor” (Bradshaw-Camball & Murray, 1991, p. 379). Power [and control], can for example be manifest in the day-to-day interactions between actors, it can be built into the workplace holistically or culturally in the processes, language, actions, and terms of service (i.e. the employment contract/relationship). Some of these interactions are Perrow’s (1986) so-called “third-order controls.” Weick describes these controls as “the vocabulary of the organisation, procedural and substantive routines, preferred communication channels, selection criteria, meeting agendas, and socialisation practices” (Weick, 2001, p. 77). Herriot (2001) further indicates the complexity of the discourse-power relationship in organisations when he refers to the use of rhetoric in organisations, saying it “… is usually to be interpreted as an attempt to manage meaning so as to gain or attain power” (Herriot, 2001, p. 79). The literal use of rhetoric as a tool for persuasion is also seen as important to certain types of managers and managing (Larson & Callahan, 1990).
While predominant in contemporary theorising on power, Foucault is certainly not alone in theorising about it, Lukes (2005) provides several characterisations of power. A particularly relevant characterisation is that ‘power’ is polysemic. That is to say, it has “multiple meanings appropriate to different settings and concerns” (Lukes, 2005, p. 61). This interpretation strikes a chord as it echoes the alternative interpretations of surveillance. The inconsistencies and difficulties when defining surveillance alluded to earlier and expanded upon in the following chapter, are mirrored in the similar definitional inconsistencies inherent in ‘power’, thus polysemy appears to be an apt description.

Lukes (2005) also suggested that under certain circumstances, power might be given a specific interpretation. He cites the apparently limited and one dimensional, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, (1957) In: Lukes, 2005, p. 60). That statement draws from both anthropological and sociological models, in that it conforms to the so-called interaction model – “A behaves in a certain way towards B so that B responds in a certain way” (Nadel, 1957, p. 23). This model appears to be more closely associated to psychology and power typologies than ‘power’ per se. It also fittingly takes the discussion into the areas of social exchange and exchange in the workplace, and their relevance to surveillance, reciprocity, power, and coercion. This research discusses these notions much more fully in Chapter Four.

2.4 Privacy

No study examining the role of surveillance would be complete without exploring the effects and impacts of surveillance on personal privacy. The relationship between privacy and surveillance is one that implicitly and explicitly permeates all aspects of personal and professional life.

Privacy is a subjective, abstract, and nebulous concept. Nonetheless, several attempts to provide definitions have been made, Perhaps the single most known definition used in discussions on the impact of surveillance dates from the end of the 19th century, it is provided by Warren and Brandeis who simply indicate that privacy is, “the right to be let alone” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). This description from over a century ago has become synonymous with the American constitution and the Bill of Rights17. Although the (United Kingdom Parliament’s)

17 [http://tinyurl.com/exygh](http://tinyurl.com/exygh) [accessed 18 August 2006]
Calcutt Committee (1990) disputed the authority of a single definition saying that, “nowhere have we found a wholly satisfactory statutory definition of privacy.”

This chapter has provided an overview of surveillance from a broad societal perspective. It discussed some of the origins of surveillance, be that Governmental, military, societally, or from the workplace. It also suggested some reasons why some types of surveillance occurred. It discussed the key surveillance metaphors of the Panopticon and Big Brother. It also introduced some lesser-known metaphors. It also introduced some of the notions that play a part in understanding the research findings and analysis. A more detailed discussion of these notions demonstrates their relevance in subsequent chapters. The chapter concluded with a short section on the nature of privacy. The following chapter examines the surveillance gaze in the workplace.
CHAPTER THREE

Workplace Surveillance

The previous chapter discussed surveillance from a societal viewpoint, it indicated how such surveillance took place, using both historical and contemporary perspectives. It also discussed some of the main notions and metaphors for conceptualising surveillance. This chapter builds on those arguments and hones them from a workplace surveillance perspective.

Over the last twenty or thirty years, a great deal of research has taken place in the field of surveillance (Foucault, 1977; Zuboff, 1988; Gandy, 1993; Green, 1999; Garfinkel, 2000; Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; Lyon, 2001b, 2002; Ball & Webster, 2003; Lyon, 2003b; Surveillance Studies Network, 2006). A great many of these works specifically mention or deal with aspects of workplace surveillance or have overlapped from societal surveillance into the area of the workplace.

This chapter is after a brief introduction, divided into four sections. The short introduction looks at some of the differences and similarities between workplace and societal surveillance. As with the previous chapter on societal surveillance, this chapter offers as a starting point a number of academic definitions. These definitions illustrate further the complex nature of surveillance.
The first section in this chapter discusses how ‘monitoring’ has entered the organisational lexicon as a euphemism for surveillance. It goes on to outline the many terms used by academics and practitioners in a range of disciplines to describe what this work calls workplace surveillance. The section argues why the word surveillance is used instead of monitoring to describe the range of electronic and visual observations in the workplace. The section concludes by providing the working definition of surveillance for this thesis.

The second section examines the psychology of workplace surveillance. This section is the most substantial section in this chapter it provides a basis for the psychological themes introduced in the appraisal section and highlights the notion of an organisational locus of control as key to understanding managerial attitudes to both appraisals and surveillance. A locus of control framework combined with several workplace surveillance frameworks also provides the basis for subsequent data analysis.

The third section develops the psychological influence further looking at appraisals. It commences with an academic overview of appraisals, initially from a historical perspective. It goes on to discuss how appraisals have changed over the years bringing them to their current state as an organisational mechanism for workplace surveillance. It also details the behavioural and psychological associations of current appraisal systems, thus providing the early indications of the psychological and exchange relationships taking place. It also reinforces a number of key psychological/locus of control/surveillance frameworks for the analysis of the research data. The fourth section echoes the earlier discussion on the main metaphors. It is therefore a brief section. The final section looks at the main methods of surveillance in the workplace.

3.1 Monitoring or Surveillance?

It was identified at the outset of this thesis that there was a need to address the question, which is the more appropriate word for this research, surveillance or monitoring. This opening section specifically addresses the conflicts and inconsistencies in the use of monitoring, surveillance, and some of the associated terms in academic literature. The section explains how the many interpretations behind workplace surveillance are, as with societal surveillance, littered with apparent contradictions and euphemisms. It continues to explain how understanding the literature in the field of workplace surveillance can be clouded by terminological ambiguity.
The ambiguity and confusion is in part due to the number of apparently interchangeable terms. *Surveillance* for example, is often confused with *monitoring*, while *performance monitoring* and *performance management* appear to be almost interchangeable, and paradoxically, *performance appraisal* is described as being both part of *performance monitoring* and *performance management* and vice versa.

It would be helpful at this stage to offer some broad academic definitions of workplace surveillance. Rule and Brantley (1992) suggested a definition of ‘workplace surveillance’ as, “...any systematic monitoring by management of individual employees’ job performance, where carried out with an eye to ensuring compliance with management expectations” (Rule & Brantley, 1992, p. 410). Such an apparently straightforward definition underlies the duality and etymological conflict between surveillance (in society) and monitoring (in the workplace).

Botan and Vorvoreanu (2000) however, make an explicit distinction between *workplace surveillance* and *workplace monitoring* indicating “the term monitoring is generic and can be applied to all automated collection of information about work, regardless of purpose. ... Surveillance on the other hand, more narrowly refers to a relationship between some authority and those whose behaviour it wishes to control” (Botan & Vorvoreanu, 2000, pp. 3-4 underscoring in original). While Botan and Vorvoreanu apply explicit distinctions between the two terms, others are less certain and seek to blur the lines between the two. Research into performance monitoring suggests that “monitoring may be defined differently depending on whom one asks” (Stanton, 2000, p. 87). Stanton goes on to suggest that describing performance monitoring in relation to the techniques used, rather than by any of the definitions might be more appropriate.

*Performance monitoring* is also claimed to be associated with and to benefit personal improvement, team effectiveness (Belfield & Marsden, 2003), and organisational performance (Stanton, 2000). On the other hand, *performance management* (rather than *performance monitoring*) is simply described as the way of measuring performance (van den Broek, Callahan & Thompson, 2004). To illustrate further the inherent duality even within what might be thought of as precise terms; *performance management* is described as either:
Workplace Surveillance

i) a term that “...frequently replaces ‘Employee Monitoring’ in call centre access negotiations” (Ball & Haggerty, 2005, p. 134) or,

ii) “a term used to improve team performance, based on the principles of performance appraisal, action and monitoring”18.

Research into what constitutes performance monitoring in academic literature provides little or no more clarity. Stanton suggests “[performance] monitoring may be defined differently depending on whom one asks” (Stanton, 2000, p. 87). He goes on to propose somewhat insightfully that the term is best described in relation to the number of surveillance techniques, rather than by any actual definition. These techniques typically include; telephone call accounting, (Stanton, 2000), keystroke monitoring (Young & Case, 2004), telephone service observation (Kidwell & Kidwell, 1996), although each of the techniques can be mediated by feedback and performance appraisals (Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989).

On the other hand, Performance appraisal is seen as, “the general heading for a variety of activities through which organisations seek to assess employees and develop their competences, enhance performance and distribute rewards ...a part of a wider approach to integrating human resource management strategies known as performance management” (Fletcher, 2001, p. 473). Interestingly, neither performance management nor performance appraisal is exclusively used for defining performance measurement. The confusion over which is the correct term to use, and in which context to use it, is made doubly difficult as the single term monitoring is regularly discussed as “critical to the development and survival of organisations” (den Hartog, Boselie & Paauwe, 2004, pp. 556-7).

Annual appraisals are one of a number of tools available to organisations under the general heading of performance management or performance monitoring. Organisations and individuals typically view the appraisal as a mechanism for personal/professional improvement, to help recognise talent and identify individual training requirements. Appraisals are a means of both measuring performance, and of identifying ways to improve performance through development and training. Importantly, the appraisal system should not take place in a vacuum. Appraisals and the associated feedback processes occur in the context of a range of complex interpersonal relationships. Although, paradoxically the annual appraisal can be used as a mechanism for mitigating the potentially damaging effects of monitoring (Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989), and for additional employee surveillance, as for some employees

18 http://www.teamtechnology.co.uk/performancemanagement.html [accessed 10 May 2007]
the actual feedback process is the part that proves beneficial (Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989). The specific historical and psychological impact workplace appraisals have on the workforce is discussed in much more detail in subsequent sections.

It is also possible that the meanings of the words (in this case, surveillance and monitoring) can change independently. Why researchers use a particular word over another, “may well have implications for how we study the world” (Webb, 1995, p. 50) According to Webb, words normally have three kinds of meaning, denotative, connotative and indexical. The denotative is the descriptive element, for surveillance it is the act of observation. The connotative relates to “the emotional, normative, and evaluative components of meaning” (Webb, 1995, p. 50). The emotional meaning of surveillance for someone who has been subjected to oppressive surveillance would be different to someone who has not. For example, the emotional meaning for a celebrity hounded by paparazzi would be different from those of an average citizen who has perhaps only experienced benign medical surveillance. Finally, the indexical meaning refers to the links and associations made in the mind to the word (Webb, 1995). For surveillance these might include, Big Brother, CCTV, Governments, and spying.

Perhaps this helps explain why there are clearly difficulties in obtaining a single unambiguous definition for societal surveillance or surveillance that occurs in the workplace. There is also academic disquiet over which is the more correct term to use. Some academic researchers prefer to use the word ‘surveillance’, whereas other academic researchers prefer to use ‘monitoring’. In workplace research, each word has the potential to be used in a pejorative sense, depending on the respective researchers’ viewpoint. Equally, each can be used benignly, again depending on the viewpoint. For example, the term ‘monitoring’ is frequently used by exponents of human resource management (HRM) in the context of ‘performance enhancing’ or in terms of the assessment or appraisal procedure (Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989; Aiello, 1993; Kolb & Aiello, 1996; Winstanley, Woodall & Heery, 1996; Herriot, 2001; den Hartog, Boselie & Paauwe, 2004). Therefore, rather than alienate or exclude any particular definition, this study embraces the meanings used in the literature, acknowledging that each researcher and academic’s interpretation has value in its own particular context. Nonetheless, the single term this study uses to describe any workplace observation is ‘surveillance’.

This research is clearly positioned within surveillance studies, it is therefore right, and for this specific research, it is more accurate, to use the word surveillance throughout to describe all aspects of workplace and societal observation regardless of whether it is electronic, visual,
implicit, or explicit. Of course, during the course of the interviews interviewees used a number of alternative terms. Some of these terms contained local meanings for observations. Some clearly implied a way to gather data for the purposes of improving, enhancing, and measuring performance by managers or employers. By including the alternative terms in the thesis it maintains the integrity of the data, it should not, and does not diminish the choice of ‘surveillance’ to represent all observations. Nonetheless, this researcher recognises that whichever word was used it would be laden with highly disputable values. All of which further illustrates how difficult it is to obtain consensus in surveillance studies even when conducting discrete research. What this means in practice for surveillance carried out in the workplace can be clarified by the following description used for this research, workplace surveillance means, ‘the observation of any action at work, if the observation is made for either immediate or subsequent use for any performance related, personal, or disciplinary purpose.’ This statement helps frame what surveillance means for this research. It borrows from the viewpoint frequently expressed by Lyon (1994; 2001b), in that all observations are technically surveillance, but it is the use to which the observations are put that determines its impact.

3.2 Psychology of Workplace Surveillance

This section examines the psychology associated with surveillance and highlights many of the psychological themes that emerge when workplace surveillance takes place. The section is divided into several areas; the first provides a brief background into workplace psychology, it then moves on to look at psychological aspects of surveillance contextualising it in terms of this research. It concludes by examining the impact of a number of frameworks associated with a behavioural locus of control and draws on several other key aspects relevant for this research. Drawing from the various literatures on psychology of surveillance and associated work, a framework that understands the specific role of managers and surveillance starts to evolve. This emerging framework will be subsequently conflated with input from exchange theories. The usefulness and appropriateness of the final complete framework emerges in the findings and analysis of the research.

Workplace psychology is typically classified as a sub division of the more inclusive field of social psychology. It is in historic terms, quite a recent discipline. Although, it has been argued that Aristotle, Machiavelli (The Prince), Hobbes, Locke, and Adam Smith were all instrumental in raising issues directly associated with what eventually became known in the twentieth century
as industrial psychology. A number of changes in terminology have occurred since then, most notably in the United States, where the field has become a broad sub-division known as industrial/organisational (I/O) psychology (with strong links to behaviourism – notably research by B. F. Skinner). In Europe the field is known as organisational psychology, although in Britain it is more commonly referred to as work psychology (Furnham, 1997). However, for the purposes of clarity throughout this section, I shall refer to all industrial/organisational (I/O) psychology, organisational and work psychology by using the generic term of workplace psychology, unless a specific distinction is needed. Social psychology is the umbrella term under which all the others fall regardless of the local or national designation.

The first workplace psychologists with research relevant to this work emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Frederick Taylor was amongst the earliest to make a specific impact with The Principles of Scientific Management (published in 1911: Taylor, 2005). Elton Mayo’s research in the late 1920s, known as The Hawthorne Studies/Effect led directly to the human relations movement, and arguably provided the starting point of modern Industrial/Organisational (I/O) psychology (Brehm, Kassin & Fein, 2002). Both Taylor and Mayo’s research remain subject to debate and re-interpretation. Perhaps because of this, both sets of research continue to be relevant to workplace psychology by helping understand the human condition at work. A brief critique of both Taylor and Mayo’s work appears in the following chapter.

The psychology of surveillance as a sub-group of workplace psychology has been obliquely discussed in various ways within organisational literature usually by using euphemisms such as ‘performance evaluation’ and by managerial activities such as ‘auditing’ or by the employment of a personal ‘team performance auditor’ (Sayles, 1964). The importance of surveillance as a distinct and emerging area with a psychological outlook was signposted by Westin (In: Congress of the United States Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 1987). The report identified issues surrounding new workplace technology and the impact of the ‘Electronic Supervisor’ in relation to electronic workplace surveillance and electronic performance management. The report was particularly prescient in that it also provided Regan (1996) with an early outline for her future taxonomy of workplace surveillance.

In his particular research for the OTA report, Westin identified fairness as a key variable, using it extensively to construct the Union/Taylor model (Appendix One). He further sub-divided the model into privacy and access issues, and the employment relationship (N.B. Westin uses the
terms ‘labor relations/employee relations’) issues. Technology has however moved on apace since Westin created his Union/Taylor model. While today there remains for employers and employees alike a distinct and arguable position in the workplace for both the Union and Taylor positions, the influence of technology on surveillance in the workplace allows an alternative, more sophisticated electronic model than Westin originally envisaged to emerge. This suggested new model both conflates and augments the Union and Taylor models. How findings from electronic workplace surveillance in this research and others, differs from the Union/Taylor model are shown in the additional highlighted row at the bottom of the table (Appendix One).

Westin (1992) continued to develop the notion of fairness in relation to surveillance by including and developing in a subsequent article, fairness of work standards, fairness of the measurement process, and fairness in applying measurements. The issue of fairness is also well recognised in the appraisal process, thus marrying up Westin’s notions of fairness in relation to surveillance with associations to an individual’s human right of fairness in the expectations and delivery of the appraisal process.

Attewell (1987), was also in the forefront of electronic surveillance research, although he took a more sociological approach. He referred to surveillance/monitoring as simple “work measurement” (Attewell, 1987, p. 87), which appears at first glance to both excuse and acknowledge that the surveillance is appropriate for speeding up work. However, his use of the term ‘sweatshop’ (taken from the title of the article) betrays the notion that in his opinion electronic surveillance is not an even-handed or equal relationship. He went on to declare, “Management use these work measurements to enforce work speed” (Attewell, 1987, p. 92), thus indicating that the control systems used in electronic surveillance are directly related to the punishment and pressure on employees to deliver increased productivity.

The theme of increasing work performance by using surveillance was not a new thing for US workers as Attewell referred to the ‘Drive System’ of the late 19th and 20th centuries. The system was, according to Jacoby (1985, p. 20) one involving “close supervision, abuse, profanity and threats.” The result was that supervision of the workforce was intense during this period and regular firings of employees frequent to “put the fear of God in their hearts” (Jacoby, 1985, p. 21). Managers and supervisors were all-powerful at that time, partly due to the economic climate and partly due to the lack of unionisation. This might be of particular interest given the possible impact on workplace surveillance in the current economic climate.
The control systems in electronic workplace surveillance Attewell wrote of relate directly to behavioural changes in the workforce. The notion that changes in behaviour can result from surveillance technology and cybernetic control theory was identified several years earlier. Cybernetic control theory is associated with the use of technology, and how in particular surveillance technology, can both control, and alter worker behaviours through self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1982).

The notion of self regulation and control contains aspects of increased performance as raised by Aiello and Svec (1993) when referring to social facilitation, something discussed later in this chapter. An example directly associated with this research is a feature commonly identified with Call Centres. Many UK Call Centres have electronic notice boards situated above call handling teams on Call Centre floors, saying for example, ‘all calls should be answered in 15 seconds’, or ‘there are 27 calls in the queue’. These notices serve two purposes; first, they are a reminder to Call Centre operatives of their targets (N.B. the employer does not need to say explicitly that the target is ‘12 calls in the queue’, as workers already know this, and the employers know the majority of workers will strive to meet the target). Second, they act as a medium offering praise to workers or teams, as a technological motivational tool. In the first purpose when used as a control mechanism, technically it is a negative feedback loop. The input function is in identifying the current condition (‘there are 27 calls in the queue’). While the comparator is the call handler’s knowledge that the target is 12 calls in the queue. When the call handler recognises that there is a discrepancy between the two, they typically perform a specific behaviour, the output function. The behaviour does not directly influence the notice board system, but on the call-handling environment, i.e. the speed at which the handlers answer calls (indirectly it does, as eventually when any displayed quota statistic is reached the message alters). This behavioural change results in a change in the condition i.e. the number of calls in the queue. Once a new statistic is displayed, the call-handler will typically change behaviour until the target is met, or if the target is met, the loop is complete. Once the target is achieved (12 calls in the queue), the message automatically becomes meaningless, as the handlers have achieved the target. However, since they are not incentivised to work even harder to lower the number of calls in the queue, no further changes in behaviour are needed.

Once the specific target statistic is achieved, the message (input function) would typically then change to whichever statistic is lagging behind target, and a new loop commences. It is

19 http://www.datadisplayuk.com/applications/call_centre/ [accessed 8 February 2009]
important to emphasise that the function of the feedback loop (the control system) is not to create behaviour or behaviours, but to “create and maintain the perception of a specific desired condition” (Carver & Scheier, 1982, p. 113), that is, to achieve the underlying reference value (i.e. 12 calls in the queue).

The same reasoning that applies to the feedback loop for a Call Centre operative, can apply just as effectively to a manager (who also typically has no input into the automated computer-generated messages). Managers will also see the messages (input function), they are also aware of the targets (comparator), perhaps even more so. The behaviour they might adopt could be to remind the call handling team by email that they need to improve performance (output function). Like the call handling operatives, the manager’s input at each stage is due to the original notice, not because of their desire to manage people. It serves a similar purpose to the Call Centre manager’s computer ‘Dashboard’, where electronic performance measures highlight team member’s performance and then ‘guide’ managerial actions, performance, activities, and outputs.

Also from a psychological perspective, the technology (the electronic notice board), can also be characterised as a form of operant behaviour reinforcer, i.e. something that reinforces a conditioned behaviour (Skinner, 1965). In the case of the electronic notice board, the requirement to meet a target is reinforced by the mass notification on the electronic notice board of the failure to meet the call-handling target. In both instances, either as operant reinforcer, or as feedback loop, the managers and workers are disempowered, or to borrow from management speak ‘kept out of the loop’, thus becoming ever more reliant on quantitative measures of surveilled performance.

The ‘operant’ surveillance systems and electronic performance systems in place in many of the organisations in this research can also be hierarchically interconnected. The typical Management Information System (MIS) provides surveillance across several hierarchical levels as in the operant surveillance/performance system in a Call Centre environment. In one of the organisations in this research (a casino), the interconnection of the operant systems takes place not by electronic notice boards, or reminders on a computer screen, but by the combined use of CCTV, microphones and back office whiteboards. Both the CCTV and microphones are for legitimate business reasons, for example, to prevent fraud and ensure customer safety. However, their use changes worker behaviours in a similar way to the overt electronic notice boards. Knowing there is a CCTV camera in the street (or workplace)
provokes a psychological response (negative or positive); similarly, someone working in an overtly and highly surveilled environment is provoked into a psychological response to the mere presence of cameras. A conditioned response to the stimulus would be the normalised behavioural pattern, displayed by the employee being subconsciously reminded by the camera or microphone of the required behaviour. Their performance or other behaviour subconsciously adjusts accordingly, and if not, managers (or senior managers) are all too ready to remind them of the operant reinforcer (the surveillance system). In many of the organisations in this research, hierarchical interconnections up the management ladder exist, although the psychological operant mechanism would change accordingly.

Evidence of how behaviours, specifically the leadership and operant behaviours of managers, are influenced by workplace surveillance was illustrated by Komaki (1986) and also Komaki, Zlatnick and Jensen (1986). Their two sets of research produced a taxonomy of managerial behaviours associated with performance antecedents, monitoring, and consequences, the “Operant Supervisory Taxonomy and Index (OSTI)” (Komaki, Zlatnick & Jensen, 1986, pp. 262-3). The taxonomy detailed how to distinguish between highly and marginally effective managers. Komaki (1986) hypothesised that managers who personally collect performance data are highly effective, whereas managers who are only involved in the performance consequences (i.e. the knowledge of performance, rather than the collection), are less effective. In other words, effective managers physically observed or directly and personally collected surveillance data (i.e. primary data). In contrast, less effective managers physically surveilled less, but acquired more, or were provided with more surveillance information by the employer (i.e. secondary data). This particular finding from a psychology study appears to be confirmed by sociological research by Irving, Higgins, and Safayeni (1986) who identified that many managers had more knowledge of surveillance, but collected less themselves. With the result that “increasing the quantitative information available to management tends to minimize the emphasis given to subjective information in performance evaluations” (Irving, Higgins & Safayeni, 1986, p. 800). Thus, it appears that managers who either choose to, or are required to, manage according to quantitative data, place less emphasis on the subjective judgements of people management, which would characteristically be classed as a typical management skill set. Instead, they place more emphasis on numerical measurement, which might not necessarily be an accurate measure of performance. It was also clear in Irving, Higgins, and Safayeni’s (1986) research that in the organisations where computer monitoring took place, managers placed far more emphasis on quantity than quality of work.
Komaki (1986), also noted that the time spent either gathering data or obtaining knowledge of the performance amounted to less than 3% of their total working time for highly effective managers, and only 2% for marginally effective ones. This suggests that the monitoring process even in non-electronic surveillant organisations appears to consume very little of a managers time. However, the research strongly suggests the emphasis and/or time spent by managers on gathering and analysing electronic surveillance data in many modern electronically surveilled organisations, although only 1%, appears disproportionate (a 50% increase) to its usefulness. Nonetheless, many employers appear to be going down the route of electronic surveillance regardless of the perceived benefits.

Ottensmeyer and Heroux (1991) appear to add further weight to the assertions made by Komaki about what constitutes effective management, identifying that only the physical observation by a manager/supervisor appears to improve productivity. Although, that claim can be partially offset by research from Oz, Glass and Behling (1999). Whose research claimed that managers in their research do see electronic surveillance as leading “to increased employee productivity” (Oz, Glass & Behling, 1999, p. 168). The findings from that particular research appear to add to the body of work that supports the perspective that more surveillance equates to more productivity. However, a similar short-term (and equally contentious, even today) result was identified in Mayo’s *Hawthorne Studies*. The picture based on these conflicting research studies is both ill defined and complex; neither view can claim to be dominant or right. Regardless of whether the claim that surveillance improves productivity is true or not, organisations appear to have made their minds up, and they are pressing ahead with ever more ambitious ways of accomplishing it.

Current electronic surveillance in the workplace concentrates on measuring simple repetitive tasks, because they are simple, repetitive and importantly, easily measurable. Employers are increasingly introducing the quantification of qualitative tasks into the workplace, similarly, complex tasks are clearly not easily measurable, yet employers continue to strive to monitor these tasks and the employee as well. The choice for employers and employees alike appear simple, “people must either be able to trust each other or to closely monitor each other if they are to engage in cooperative enterprises” (Ouchi, 1979, p. 846). Ouchi goes on the say that when employees permit the heavy monitoring of their behaviours and the results of their behaviours, they automatically give up some autonomy or self-control, thus producing an unenthusiastic and purely compliant response (Ouchi, 1979). Essentially, employers must trust their employees, or if they do not trust their employees, then they must monitor then closely
to be effective, and if it is the latter, employers should be prepared to recognise that their workforce will be the worse for it.

Research, specifically in relation to appraisals, identify the impact social facilitation (Zajonc, 1968; Bond & Titus, 1983) has on workplace performance management. These studies indicated that the ‘mere presence’ of others has a negative effect on complex tasks and a positive one, particularly on speed when performing simple tasks. The social facilitation model was further examined by Aiello and Svec (1993) with a view to extending its use from the ‘physical presence’ to the ‘electric presence’ of electronic workplace surveillance systems. The intention was to extrapolate ‘mere presence’ effects to see if they can be applied to an ‘electronic presence’. The study analysed a number of papers on social facilitation (involving physical presence), including the substantial meta-analysis from Bond and Titus (1983). They determined that it would be useful to take the framework one stage further and identify if the same social facilitation effects were present with an implied or indirect (i.e. electronic) presence. The apparent sub-text to the study was the routinization of managerial tasks as identified in the OTA report (1987), and how the use of computer monitoring to measure/improve managerial performance was seen as the ‘last great frontier” (Congress of the United States Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 1987, p. 30). The conclusions of the Aiello and Svec study indicated that an electronic presence provides similar results to those with a mere [physical] presence. Thus, electronic workplace surveillance appears to have the same positive effects of improved speed on simple tasks (because even the most complex of management tasks has routine elements) and the same deleterious effects on complex tasks.

To discover why electronic and mere presences might produce similar results, Aiello and Svec (1993) examined the effect using the behavioural locus of control. The locus of control details an individual’s perception of what influences the underlying causes of events in their lives. A popular explanation is “A locus of control orientation is a belief about whether the outcomes of our actions are contingent on what we do (internal control orientation) or on events outside our personal control (external control orientation)” (Zimbardo, 1988, p. 361). Aiello and Svec (1993) managed to produce some corroboratory results between electronic and physical presence, indicating that in workplace situations, individuals with an external locus of control experienced greater anxiety when electronically surveilled than those with an internal locus of control. The results from Aiello and Svec’s study showed that in computer-based surveillance situations, there was little difference between an ‘electronic presence’ that a ‘physical presence’. Interestingly, groups who were given a sense of control over the surveillance,
“reduced the negative impact of monitoring on task performance by almost 40%” (Aiello & Svec, 1993, p. 545). This would suggest that in high surveillance organisations simply by giving the employees (including managers) a sense of control over the surveillance might improve worker performance. Although a potentially even more successful electronic surveillance control strategy suggested by Aiello and Svec is that organisations “with complex tasks do not use computer monitoring at all” (Aiello & Svec, 1993, p. 545). Clearly, for many (but not all, as will be shown) organisations this is not a practical option. Many organisations, including several in this research, have built their organisational performance or competitiveness around the use of electronic measures and electronic surveillance.

The notion of the “locus of control has been applied to behaviour in organizations” (Furnham, 1997, p. 250). Spector (1982) through his locus of control scale, based on the original research from Rotter (1966), linked the notion to several behavioural criteria, specifically those of motivation, effort, satisfaction, performance, perception of the job, compliance with authority, supervisory style, as well as being an important moderating factor for incentives and motivation, and job satisfaction and turnover. Of these associations, some are more relevant to this research than are others, namely those of performance, effort, satisfaction, and job perception.

Research by Andrisani and Nestel (1976) identified that ‘internals’ (those who believe that their own efforts/abilities influence their lives), are more likely to be employed in higher status occupations (i.e. supervisory and above), than ‘externals’ (those who believe that luck, fate, or something else influences their lives). Thus, combining the research from Andrisani and Nestel (1976) and Aiello and Svec (1993), identifies that managers, who by the nature of their position, are already more likely to be internals, have an innate sense of control (internal locus of control) and already perform better. Whereas those who are not managers/supervisors potentially without the innate sense (external locus) might perform better if provided/offered ‘the sense of control’ over the surveillance (Aiello & Svec, 1993). Similarly, Greenberger, Strasser, Cummings and Dunham, note that “the more control a person possessed the higher their performance” (1989, p. 34).

It should also be remembered that while many of the models/frameworks cited use the term control (including locus of control); this does not mean ‘control over’ as in exerting ‘power over’ in a Weberian or Foucauldian sense, it means either personal control, as a control possessed/desired or volitional control. It should not be confused with control in the ‘power’
sense or an individual being powerful, nor should it be confused with an organisational sense of control over a worker (Etzioni, 1961).

According to Furnham (1997), a number of studies since the 1960s have unequivocally demonstrated that Instrumentalism (the new term for ‘internal locus of control’) is both a cause and consequence of success, and that Fatalism (the new term for ‘external locus of control’) is both a cause and consequence of failure. Furnham eventually condensed Spector (1982) and Rotter’s (1966) locus of control influences down to six key influences.

To lend further credence to the notion that the organisational locus of control is an appropriate construct for understanding managerial attitudes and perceptions Each of Furnham’s (1997) condensed influences has been assigned a strong connection/citation to at least one conceptual model/framework of surveillance or a surveillance study by way of justification.

- **Motivation**: Instrumentalists believe that their own efforts will result in good performance (Furnham, 1997). In workplace surveillance situations, motivation can be seen as analogous to controllability insofar as instrumentalists believe their efforts will produce better performance, thus they have more control over individual workplace events. Controllability over the work environment is vital for instrumentalists, Greenberger, Strasser, Cummings and Dunham (1989) identified that personal control over a workplace environment leads to better performance. Stanton (2000) however, appeared to disagree, by including controllability as a characteristic of workplace surveillance, rather than a factor that influences the behavioural locus of control. I would argue that many of the managers in this research and beyond, offer the illusion of greater control over surveillance, although in practice they have as much control over the surveillance as any other worker or as much as their employer permits. Nonetheless, the perception is that there is more control; it therefore follows, in my opinion that it should come under personal cognitions thus developing on Stanton’s framework (see: Appendix Two).

- **Performance**: Instrumentalists perform better because of their own efforts (Furnham, 1997). Research shows a direct causal relationship exists between personal control and performance, “performance was higher when the amount of control possessed was congruent with a person’s ability ... providing their level of control was no greater than the amount of control they could use effectively” (Greenberger et al., 1989, p. 34).
Similarly, Stanton and Barnes-Farrell (1996) noted that individuals control over their work environment affected performance, and that the degree of the ability to prevent monitoring strongly affected control.

- **Satisfaction**: Because of their personal success, instrumentalists are more satisfied with their job than are fatalists (Furnham, 1997). Chalykoff and Kochan (1989) and Kidwell and Bennett (1994) both identified satisfaction (using fairness as the determinant) with the surveillance system as an important consideration. Westin (1992) also placed fairness high on the agenda for understanding attitudes to surveillance. Westin used fairness extensively in creating the Union/Taylor conceptual model (In: Congress of the United States Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 1987). Stanton and Barnes-Farrell (1996) also suggest that the ability to either delay or prevent the surveillance is important for locus of control. However, too much control (actual or apparent) over the surveillance system might result in resistance or misbehaviour, with, as will be shown, managers ignoring performance systems data altogether.

- **Leadership**: Instrumentalists (managers) rely more on personal persuasion, a key trait in leadership (Furnham, 1997). Instrumentalists perceive their ability to persuade as fundamental to their success as motivators (Larson & Callahan, 1990). In contrast, fatalist leaders “tend to use a coercive leadership style in dealing with subordinates” (Spector, 1982, p. 486). Although Larson and Callahan link motivation with productivity and monitoring, they acknowledge that the more effective managers are responsible for collecting monitoring data personally, rather than being reliant on other sources as identified by Komaki (1986).

- **Job Perception**: The greater perceived personal control results in less strain and stress (Furnham, 1997). Aiello and Kolb added to the literature on electronic performance surveillance (monitoring) and stress (Aiello & Kolb, 1995), and stress where locus of control was used as a moderator variable (Aiello & Kolb, 1996). The potential for increased health risks directly associated with surveillance and stress are documented by Smith and Amick (1989).

- **Turnover**: Dissatisfied instrumentalists exhibit higher job turnover (Furnham, 1997). Chalykoff and Kochan’s (1989) conceptual model places a premium on feedback processes and appraisals in workplace surveillance situations and employee turnover.
Equally, in group/teamwork situations the exchange relationships are more complex and require greater effort to be successful.

Several attempts have been made to understand the impact of surveillance or electronic surveillance in the last decade or so using psychological perspectives. Prominent amongst these was Stanton (2000) who offered a conceptual framework for examining employee reactions to monitoring (surveillance). The framework incorporated attitudinal and motivational effects on surveillance and appraisals. The influence of an organisational behaviour locus of control in Stanton’s (2000) framework (Appendix Two) shows that an individual’s cognitions, attitudes, and judgement are central to understanding a surveillance system. Clearly, there are a number of other contributory features in the complex determining outcomes of workplace surveillance. Stanton (2000) identifies the Organizational Context, the Monitoring Characteristics, and Trust (both in an individual Supervisor and the Organisations Management). Stanton’s framework provides four areas that they feed into, the Monitoring Cognitions, and Individual Differences and Feedback Reactions (and Stress Reactions). While the influences of a behavioural locus of control (Furnham, 1997), are shown in Stanton’s framework, I argue that he understates the influence of the locus of control, which has a major role in personal surveillance cognitions, rather than being just a contributory one. The two key outcomes from these areas he identifies as Long Term Outcomes (Job Satisfaction, Organisational Commitment) and Performance.

Several other areas in Stanton’s framework draw on and utilise Westin’s (1992) notion of fairness (fairness of work standards, fairness in the measurement process and fairness of applying measures to the appraisal process). As detailed earlier, the notion of fairness is strongly associated with Satisfaction as an aspect of behavioural locus of control. Stanton’s framework is a renowned piece of work, but by taking a more comprehensive view of what constitutes a locus of control the associated influence that can attributed to the locus of control increases substantially.

While acknowledging their importance and relevance, this research does not examine several areas present in Stanton’s framework. It specifically does not examine the Organisational aspects of the monitoring, nor are some of the longer-term outcomes (although short and medium term outcomes are discussed). The Monitoring Characteristics are only relevant to this research insofar as they are used to contextualise the types of electronic surveillance taking place, with the exception of controllability, which I remove from that section and place
within the locus of control. Trust, both in the wider organisational management and individual managers is touched upon later in this research, although its relevance to this work is left open. The importance of Feedback Reactions is discussed more fully in the following section on appraisals.

3.3 Workplace Appraisals

Appraisals have taken place in one form or another for centuries. They are, put simply, a mechanism for judging employee performance. The first formal performance appraisals started in the United States Army in the early nineteenth century, and for over a century appraisals were fairly static and limited in their use. However, the arrival of research by F. W. Taylor (2005) with Scientific Management and his development of time and motion studies, provided measurements for, and thus popularised, performance appraisals.

Although appraisals gradually became more common after the two World Wars, it was not until the 1950s that something akin to modern appraisals became generally accepted. The publication, in 1954, of Drucker’s (2007) management work was arguably the catalyst for this. Further major changes in the methods of appraisal occurred in the 1960s and 1970s with a ‘management by objective’ approach. This was followed in the 1990s by behaviourally-rated and trait-based appraisals, which by the turn of twenty-first century morphed into the multiple, contextual, 360° computerised performance surveillance systems of today (Wiese & Buckley, 1998).

Psychology literature on appraisals identified the shift away from ‘trait-based’ and behavioural appraisal systems, where appraisal systems measured (and rewarded) positive traits such as friendliness (Grint, 1993). Instead, the focus of appraisals shifted to what has been termed contextual performance. Contextual performance relates to an individual’s attributes that “go beyond mere task competence which foster behaviours that enhance the climate and effectiveness of the organisation” (Fletcher, 2001, p. 475). Worker cooperation would be a typical example of contextual performance, other examples would draw on a workers personality and motivation (Conway, 1999, p. 3). Many contemporary appraisal systems encompass contextual performance in their mechanisms in one way or another (Fletcher, 2001). There has been an upsurge in popularity of contextual performance for gauging the effectiveness of an individual’s performance. Nonetheless, how to measure performance in
rapidly changing organisations and appraise it, particularly where the measures quickly become obsolete, still remains something of a mystery (citing McNamara, In: Halachmi, 2005).

Despite the obvious advantages for organisations of a good appraisal system, for some academics “it seems extraordinarily difficult and often unreliable to measure phenomena as complex as performance” (citing McNamara: Halachmi, 2005, p. 504). Equally, the mechanics of the task are generally seen as uncomfortable and unproductive, by both the person being appraised and by the person conducting the appraisal (Wiese & Buckley, 1998). Despite these reservations, virtually every organisation today has some form of performance management or appraisal scheme in place (Lawler, 2003).

The typical performance appraisal system seeks to measure, amongst other things, individual performance, personal and group productivity, behaviours, accomplishments, training needs, potential, and attitudes (Torrington, Hall & Taylor, 2002). However, Grint (1993) argues that “the appraisal does not so much discover the truth about the appraised as construct it” (Grint, 1993, p. 61). There is on that basis, a clash between an organisations intention and the reality for the individual. The organisation seeks to discover (or reinforce), whereas the individual (appraiser or appraised) constructs the reality. Nonetheless, in many organisations, the appraisal is the sole business process to measure such things, and although it is not perhaps as objective as once thought, with various suggestions of subjective bias, it should still be characterised as an organisational asset (Wiese & Buckley, 1998), albeit treated more sceptically and reflexively (Grint, 1993).

The psychological aspects behind contemporary behavioural/contextual appraisals, hark back to pioneering research in the field of industrial/organisational psychology by Skinner (1965) and with social facilitation (Zajonc, 1968). Skinner’s (1965) work into operant behaviour and reinforcement, was discussed in more detail in the earlier section on the psychology of workplace monitoring. This is because behavioural psychology has closer associations to [cybernetic] control theory (Carver & Scheier, 1982) and electronic monitoring than performance appraisals per se. On the other hand, social facilitation research by Zajonc (1968) is much more relevant to behavioural/contextual performance appraisals.

Social facilitation theory can be defined as one “whereby the presence of others enhances performance on easy tasks but impairs performance on difficult tasks” (Brehm, Kassin & Fein, 2002, p. 267). The research and subsequent understanding derived from social facilitation arguably provides a clue to the change in work patterns from individual task management to
group performance and team working. Zajonc identified that social facilitation improves performance when simple tasks are completed in the ‘mere presence of others’ or in groups.\(^\text{20}\) Zajonc was however, not the first to identify the impact of the presence of others in performance issues. Over half a century earlier Triplett (1898) noted that cyclists performed better, when either in a group, against, or simply in the presence of, other cyclists when time trialled or paced. Thus, on the face of it, teamwork, or working in the mere presence of others would appear to be an obvious choice for an employer seeking to improve the speed aspects of performance, although an analysis of social facilitation studies showed that when social facilitation effects occur, to its detriment the accuracy of work suffers (Bond & Titus, 1983).

In addition to reduced work accuracy, there another downside to social facilitation. Even with the ‘mere presence’ of others (Zajonc, 1968), it only appears to be effective in situations where work is ‘performed automatically’ (Furnham, 1997), this can be either by dint of experience/knowledge or by the ease of the task. In this research, effective social facilitation effects can be seen in the repetitive work of Call Centres (Roses plc; Tulip plc*), food production facilities (Chestnut plc*), hotel and leisure (Daffodil plc*), and casino work (Sunflower plc*).\(^\text{21}\) Additionally, in casino work and in the hotel and leisure industries, the mere presence effect is multiplied, as front of house workers in casino’s (croupiers, pit bosses, etc.), and hotel and leisure (bar, reception and restaurant staff), also have an audience, which according to Cottrell, Wack, Sekerak and Rittle (1968) can have both a positive and negative effect on performance. In their research, it was shown that some workers thrive with an audience, whereas other will wilt in precisely the same circumstances.

Closely associated to social facilitation theory in the appraisal process (the act of being appraised as opposed to determining the performance for the appraisal), is the notion of ‘Evaluation Apprehension’. Evaluation apprehension can be defined as, “[the] fear caused by being evaluated by others, particularly experts” (Furnham, 1997, p. 508). It can produce social facilitation effects, but only in those instances where the appraised holds the appraiser to be experienced enough, qualified enough, or skilled enough to judge their performance accurately. This moves the discussion into the amount of respect (or perhaps trustworthiness) with which a manager is held by the employee. Equally, for the manager, the same apprehension can, even for experienced managers, cause anxiety, and stress. For newly

\(^{20}\) Zajonc refers to the mere exposure to stimulus, which has over time in psychology and appraisal literature has become ‘others’ or work colleagues

\(^{21}\) * All names in parentheses are pseudonyms assigned to specific organisations where research took place.
promoted or inexperienced managers it can cause them to overcompensate in the appraisal process by indulging in ‘job creep’ by, for example, a manager taking appraisal work home (Van Dyne & Butler Ellis, 2005), or abdicating responsibility for the process altogether by giving everyone the same appraisal regardless of ability (or information available), the so-called Veblen Effect (Grint, 1993).

The psychology of workplace behaviour in appraisals also identifies that the various effects on group or teamwork are not uniformly positive for aiding performance. In addition to ‘social facilitation’ and ‘evaluation apprehension’, the notion of ‘social loafing’ (Furnham, 1997; Brehm, Kassin & Fein, 2002), suggests that teams of workers can, particularly when working on additive or repetitive tasks, become less efficient, as the responsibility for the task performance is diffused between the team. In these instances, A can rely on B to finish a task, except, B is relying on C or A to complete it, thus the task fails or is diminished.

For a great many people attending or undertaking an appraisal is a complex and time-consuming event, it can involve multiple reports with ongoing feedback loops on their individual performance, as seen in 360° appraisal systems. It invariably also relies on a great deal of surveillant activity. For others, despite all the best practice shown in the research, the appraisal can turn out to be a very simple statement of their performance and on occasion even that simple form of appraisal can be used for disciplinary purposes.

Many contemporary appraisal systems, despite all the surveillance and surveilled performance measures, still rely on a manager exercising their own judgement, potentially leaving decisions open to abuse or personal bias. The issue of managers exercising bias in the appraisal process and of managers are being influenced by their personal feelings towards colleagues is well documented (Varma, DeNisi & Peters, 1996). This so-called “Crony or Doppelganger Effect” distorts the appraisal process (Grint, 1993). Lefkowitz (2000) identified that a large part of the ‘positive affective regard’ (liking) toward subordinates by managers occurs in the initial weeks/months of employment, the influence of which lasts much longer. All of which raises further equity and trustworthiness issues for many employees, both in the line manager and the wider appraisal process.

For a number of poorly trained or inadequate managers any appraisal system, regardless of how good it is, will still cause them or the appraised individual problems. There are several other recognised issues that the poorly trained or inadequate managers (although not exclusively) are more susceptible to. There are a number of potential ‘distortions’, such as the
‘Halo Effect’ where appraisals are distorted by poor choice of assessment criteria, and the previously mentioned ‘Crony Effect’, where the closeness of personal relationships affect appraisals. There is also the ‘Veblen Effect’ where the appraiser gives all the appraised moderate scores in the appraisal irrespective of performance, thus ensuring all receive equal, but meaningless, reports. Sometimes there is just a disparity between what the human resource department require and what takes place, or where socially constructed factors influence the appraisal (Grint, 1993). Whether it is an issue of training, or ability, or a manager’s lack of interpersonal skills or personal style (Galin, 1989), or the manager’s reluctance to use the performance data provided, the appraisal process is fraught with the potential for problems. Indeed, for a process that has been revised and reconstructed for over 50 years it seems reasonable to ask, “why can’t we seem to get it right?” (Metz, 1988, p. 47).

Many organisations seek to avoid the possibility for managerial appraisal bias and try to improve overall performance in the workplace by adopting different methods of appraisal. The 360° appraisal has been proposed as one such method, as it appears to measures both behavioural and contextual performance although in a way that avoids or even eliminates managerial bias. Furthermore, 360° appraisals due to their multiple inputs are also seen as a way to improve and measure overall performance. However, 360° appraisals are not a universal panacea. Concentrating on behaviours and competencies as a way to improve performance is not on its own the answer. In many organisations, the appraisal seeks to reward cultural orientation and positive work group behaviours (Cole, Schaninger & Harris, 2002), and as such managers should be aware of their vulnerability in this particular exchange process, as others can exploit the very exchange relationship.

Managers face yet another dilemma; they both perform appraisals and are themselves appraised. Therefore, the issues of bias from the appraiser towards the appraised regarding their appraisals equally apply to managers (albeit reversed) in their own appraisal. Interestingly, there is literature that suggests that managers, in contrast to other workers, will regardless of favouritism seek out and follow up both positive and negative feedback and subsequently display improvement, which somewhat surprisingly is not the case for the typical worker (Fletcher, 2001).

The issue of fairness in the appraisal process (and thus surveillance) appears to permeate every aspect, whether from the employer, manager, or employee’s perspective. The employer wants the system to fairly reflect overall performance and for the individual to achieve
improved performance (via increased productivity, or perhaps by being better trained), the manager wishes a process that fairly reflects the performance of a particular employee, and the typical appraised person wants a fair appraisal for their individual efforts. For all the parties the means and methods of achieving this invariably involve some sort of surveillance, and above all, each party should see this surveillance (assuming that the wider premise of surveillance is acceptable) as being fair from their point of view.

In the context of many of the organisations in this and in other research, the use of computerised performance surveillance does not appear to reflect accurately an individual’s performance (Grant & Higgins, 1991). Which, if taken together with sections of earlier literature, it begs the question whether some experienced managers are by ignoring multiple sources of electronic performance data, and instead rely on personal bias, might be a better judge of their team’s performance after all, and therefore appraise them more accurately.

3.4 Workplace Surveillance

This section looks at the artefacts used for surveillant solutions, including both hardware and software. The majority of the hardware solutions that allow organisations to undertake surveillance are invariably built upon existing technology, rather than as bespoke technology specifically for surveillance. CCTV for example is based on television technology, the modern broadband internet connection is still largely based on the copper wire technology from the 1950s, and TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) dates from technology developed in the early 1970s.

There is surveillant technology across all facets of work and employment. Pre-employment checks using social networking sites and blogs are becoming more prevalent, the use of which is starting to raise ethical concerns in UK trade unions[^22]. There is also ongoing general and specific surveillance throughout an individual’s term of employment. In addition to the many methods previously identified, ways of observing the personal attributes of an individual once they have commenced employment include the use of biometrics (van der Ploeg, 2003), drug, alcohol, DNA, and blood testing (Marx, 1999). The surveillance of the workspace and the working environment for many organisations also now incorporates the use of a smart or an

[^22]: [http://www.tuc.org.uk/organisation/tuc-13930-f0.cfm](http://www.tuc.org.uk/organisation/tuc-13930-f0.cfm) [accessed 10 November 2007]
ID card (Stanton & Weiss, 2000; van der Ploeg, 2003), and there is the almost ubiquitous CCTV (Stanton & Weiss, 2000).

Once the employee commences their work the monitoring and surveillance takes a more Orwellian turn. There is monitoring of email (Botan & Vorvoreanu, 2000; Fitzpatrick, 2002), Internet browsing (Brin, 1998; Weckert, 2000a; Lyon, 2001a; Young & Case, 2004), Keystroke Monitoring (Sewell, 1998) and Keystroke Dynamics (Sewell, 1998). The use of vehicle tachographs (Lyon, 2001b; Leigh-Pollitt, 2002) is also becoming much more sophisticated (including vehicle embedded GPS transponders), especially given that the use of tachographs are mandatory in the European Union for the majority of commercial vehicles. In addition, Norwich Union, a large UK insurer, is trialling the use of vehicle 'black boxes' for young and new drivers,²³ ostensibly to keep insurance premiums down for newly qualified drivers.

If the abundance of techniques for monitoring employees was not enough, employers legitimately utilise techniques of observation that would be unacceptable outside of work. To illustrate this, there are workers who are compelled to wear computers in warehouses to assist in collecting orders (Blakemore, I-DRA Ltd & GMB, 2005). Similarly, there are workers whose company mobile phones are being used to overtly track their movements via GPS (Victorian Law Commission, 2005; Surveillance Studies Network, 2006), all without any apparent concerns expressed for intrusion, except perhaps by trade unions.

Once an employee sits at their desk, pod, cubicle, or vehicle, the nature of the surveillance and what is acceptable changes. In addition to an employer monitoring the external environment or location of the employee, the employee’s performance is also intensely surveilled. Voice communications are subject to monitoring for the apparent purposes of improving performance, although for voice, this has been the situation since the introduction of the telephone or telegraph (Standage, 1998). Voice communications typically includes telephone call monitoring (Taylor et al., 2002), cell phones/mobile phones (American Management Association, 2005), and also the use of mobile telephone GPS signals and VoIP (Voice over IP) data flows. The surveillance of VoIP and conventional data (i.e. not just voice) transferred via mobile or cell phones is becoming more relevant is due to advances in mobile smartphone technology. In the UK, the recording and use of personal call recordings in the workplace is rare, in part due to the complex legal situation associated with the use of, or listening to, such

²³ http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2382681,00.html [accessed 1 October 2006]
recordings. However, the monitoring of data from a smartphone, due to different legal rules, is less of a problem for employers.

One of the earliest, and most widely read, examples of research into electronic workplace surveillance was published in the seminal book by Zuboff (1988), *In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power* (although her initial findings were published in a journal some six years earlier). The research looked at the introduction of computers and computerised work systems into a number of departments in eight manufacturing plants across the United States. Zuboff’s research identified that the introduction of computer technology into the workplace not only automated tasks to aid efficiency (although not at that stage expertise), but also to “informate”. The technology that was introduced not only automated processes and actions, which had previously taken place by updating/upgrading the machinery, but it generated previously unknown or difficult to obtain data. Then, and only then, in the process of generating the unknown data, was the expertise added. This begged the question for Zuboff, whether the information generated from the smart machine, while knowable and sharable in new ways, was knowledge conceived from the machine, or knowledge conceived by the manager aided and abetted by the machine.

For Zuboff, the transformation of the relationship and the transfer of the workforce’s knowledge to the computer, echoed Taylorist concepts associated with the introduction of Scientific Management techniques to optimise productivity. Parallels also existed with Braverman (1974) and the deskilling of machinists caused by employers hardwiring and coding years of experience (knowledge) into new manufacturing machines. Indeed, Zuboff (1982) in preliminary findings of the research alluded to the similarities of how ‘intelligent technology’ seeks to substitute ‘judgement’ with ‘decision rules’ and how the decision rules themselves are no more than an information processing activity.

In today’s computerised information or management information systems, an algorithm or multiple algorithms substitute for what were in 1982 simple information processing or decision based rules. In practice, the simple programming languages of the time made it difficult to automate processes much beyond simple repetitive ones, not unlike the programming equivalent of Jacquard’s punch card loom (Essinger, 2004). This is not such an unlikely connection, as Hollerith’s updated computer punch cards were widely used for programming and data storage until the mid-1970s. Despite this obvious limitation, at the time the machines were perceived as smart, hence Zuboff’s title. However, compared to the algorithms and
complex programming employed in robotics, cybernetics, modelling, and software analytics today, the basic programming and hardware of the 1980s would be thought of as simple. Today’s ‘smarter machines’ use more sophisticated and complex programming languages, which when coupled with computer advances courtesy of Moore’s Law (Moore, 1965), mean that much more is possible today.

In the earlier paper based on the same research, Zuboff (1982) suggested in the informed workspaces of the early/late 1980s, worker and managerial knowledge was starting to become embedded into information systems. She claimed this was diminishing the importance and relevance of the knowledge and skills of the individual worker and manager. According to Zuboff, managers at the time sought to use computers and computerisation to eliminate the skill-sets of individual workers. Zuboff further raised the spectre of future full automation in the workplace, with managers at the time wishing to completely eliminate the “messiness and potential conflict of real human interaction” (Zuboff, 1988, p. 268). Managers and workers in Zuboff’s research assigned the computers with human characteristics, anthropomorphising them almost as a substitute for the human interaction that they sought to avoid.

Zuboff asked at the time whether surrounding the smart machine with smart people would undermine managerial authority. Operators at the plants over time, relinquished control and responsibility for their work task, and became more and more dependent on the computer, “Realizing that there was no way back from computer control, the operators finally gave up their attachment to personal control” (Zuboff, 1988, p. 272). Ironically, one operator suggested, that twenty years hence “you will just need one computer operator to run the mill” (Zuboff, 1988, p. 269). Such an outcome would have provided Zuboff’s managers with the ideal solution.

Moving forward those twenty years, in retail distribution centres, employees are wirelessly connected to computer systems through wearable personal computers and automated voice-picking systems where employees are insulated from external influence, and controlled by computer instructions transmitted through headsets (Blakemore, I-DRA Ltd & GMB, 2005). The parallels that exist between Zuboff’s managers, workplace surveillance, cybernetics, automation, and the research completed in this study are manifest.

There are aspects where this research echoes Zuboff’s work, in that it identified the same changes workers saw taking place in the 1980s, taking place some twenty years later. The key difference between this research and Zuboff’s is that this research takes the viewpoint of
managers, line managers, and supervisors. Much like the unease expressed by the plant operators in 1980s United States, this research examines whether today’s managers find their respective roles, expertise, and skills gradually replaced or governed by an even smarter machine.

Even without the benefit of this research, in some workplaces the potential for Zuboff’s dystopic nightmare has already become a reality. The use of aircraft autopilot systems echoes Zuboff’s computerisation of worker knowledge, with systems reliant on algorithmic replications of pilot’s experiential knowledge. Aeroplanes can now go from one destination to another almost exclusively on autopilot. In fact, landing on autopilot (CATIII - ILS) is mandatory once a month whether pilots need it or not. While the incidence of crashes caused by aircraft being on autopilot are infrequent, they do occur, and in at least one investigation (Continental: Flight 3407), US Transportation investigators noted that the human operator (the pilot) might have detected problems before the autopilot, thus preventing the crash and subsequent loss of life.

In other fields, the once worker intensive areas of car production and the production line, are now also highly automated and in some areas completely worker free. These worker-free areas rely almost exclusively on robotics and automated guided vehicles (AGV) for manufacture, controlled centrally using a computer/computer system with a solitary worker/manager overseeing the system.

A year earlier than Zuboff’s 1988 book, Attewell (1987) wrote a predominantly theoretical piece on how the introduction of computers and computerised systems might affect workers, particularly clerical/office workers. In the same paper, Attewell included a small empirical study based in one large office of an insurance company, ostensibly to identify whether the theoretical married up with the practical experience of the research. Attewell identified five alternative theories, or groupings of theories used in workplace surveillance. They were as follows,

- Corporate Culture – for use in firms with an existing ‘Theory X’ in place
- Neo-Marxist – Surveillance used for speed-ups, limited by union activity and workplace resistance
- Product or Technological Lifecycle – In mature organisations with mature technology where costs can only be cut by intensifying the pace of work
Workplace Surveillance

- Contingency Theory – To intensify the pace of work where both there is a high proportion of routine clerical work, and the strategy is cost competition

- Industrial Sociology – Surveillance generates organised resistance. Used in piecemeal work, labour intensive small firms, individual production, unskilled work, home work (telecommuting), or where there is a glut in the local workforce

Of these, Attewell concentrated on aspects of Industrial Sociology in the empirical research, classing the workers in the office as having aspects of both piecemeal work and elements of unskilled work. Although at the time, working with computers, even in data entry, was seen as more glamorous than perhaps someone who works in data-entry today. Data-entry workers today comprise a high proportion of students working part-time, people with few qualifications, and a number working from home. With the increases in teleworking and telecommuting and working from home, data entry or its equivalent is one of the simplest (in a technical sense) jobs that can be done from home. Indeed, home working for one of the organisations in this research study proved particularly popular, with more than 10% of the workforce in all capacities, working from home. It raises the question of whether employers seek to dumb down work even at managerial level to facilitate the switch to totally computerised or automated workplaces. It also raises questions about data security following recent data leakages from the UK Government, which illustrates the potential for problems by employing a fragmented and poorly committed workforce.

The issue of surveillance and supervision and its effect on individual performance, is not a recent phenomenon. It was touched upon by Homans (1954) in the 1950s. In his well-known Cash Posters study, Homans conducted research into data entry type work, although the data entry there was manual rather than electronic. In his study, Homans identified that the workers who were the most productive were not those who were the most highly supervised. Instead, he showed there was a positive statistical correlation between workers who were noticeably socially active and workers who were most productive. This suggests that productive workers are not necessarily the ones whose freedoms at work are strictly controlled, rather, the opposite. Or, if they are not the opposite, then certainly the more productive worker might be the one who has far more freedom to socialise than the worker who is tightly controlled in their social activity or networking whilst at work.

As indicated earlier, there are complex links between increased productivity and surveillance, yet despite this the potential for surveillance and performance monitoring when working from
home has increased. In the past for home based workers, employers would use the telephone to check that employees were working at acceptable levels. Today the computer does this automatically for the employer checking both keystroke inputs and outputs. Indeed several organisations replicate Call Centre environments in employee’s homes along with all the monitoring systems.24

In the early 1990s, Ottensmeyer and Heroux (1991) examined the extent of electronic surveillance and opened up an ethical dimension to the acceptability of electronic surveillance, suggesting that the ‘new’ forms of monitoring were highly targeted and invasive. The measuring of performance was they said dominated by workplaces applying it to the lower end of the skill continuum, with data entry workers again subjected to high surveillance with analysis of keystroke dynamics, identification of errors, operator speed of work, and the time away from the workstation. The use of the performance data was according to Ottensmeyer and Heroux, primarily for performance evaluation and for disciplinary action. This posed for them ethical issues, both on a personal and on business level; they cited that there was an ethical dichotomy between treating employees fairly, and improving productivity. Ottensmeyer and Heroux held that the two were irreconcilable ethical attitudes. They argued that managers would not see something as unethical if the intrusive act improved productivity.

Aiello (1993) alluded to this very point in trying to reconcile the two diverse opinions of proponents and opponents of surveillance. Aiello noticed that managers frequently adopted business decisions based on the legality of surveillance rather than its ethical impact. In many of the workplaces in the 1990s, Theory X (the authoritarian approach to management) was the dominant theory in organisations (McGregor & Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 2006). Today, most workplaces adopt a blend of surveillance for the purposes of improving productivity and surveillance for measurement. Botan and Vorvoreanu (2000) draw together the theoretical and the ethical discussions, concluding that the performance of workers is adversely affected by too much surveillance regardless of whether the surveillance was conducted ethically or not. They indicate that there are processes at play that were not fully understood, and that there was a gap in the research. They indicated that more work was required to understand exactly why the processes were taking place. They raised the issue of resistance to the surveillance, not just as a concern that it occurred, but that the resistance was manifest in so

24 http://www.flexibility.co.uk/cases/AA-virtual-call-centre.htm
many different and subtle ways. Hollander and Einwohner (2004) make the same point, identifying several forms of structural and cultural resistance appropriate to this research.

One possible explanation to workplace resistance to surveillance is suggested in Kruglanski’s work (1970). Kruglanski identified that “The frequently monitored worker might interpret the close surveillance as conveying the supervisor’s distrust and his generally derogatory evaluation” (Kruglanski, 1970, p. 216). He speculates that “one possible way to react to such an insult might be to retaliate by double crossing the supervisor whenever the opportunity arises” (Kruglanski, 1970, p. 215). Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) also researched resistance in all its guises, academically led the way by comprehensively discussing the impact and nature of workplace resistance. They charted the various dimensions of misbehaviour, and how workers mis-appropriated, time, work, product and identity (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999). Ackroyd and Thompson soften the double-crossing conclusion offered by Kruglanski slightly. They believe that because of any number of conflicts, and struggles at work, workers will continue to seek to innovate and adapt to their working environments, and will thus find new ways of misbehaving/resisting in the workplace, rather than simply double-crossing.

For Kruglanski (1970), one of the key findings related to the judgement/position of supervisors to the monitoring. Kruglanski found that ‘rational’ supervisors i.e. supervisors who make judgements about their workers based on the behaviour of the workers to the surveillance, were the most trusting towards the workers. Such a finding is wholly consistent with exchange theories particularly where the exchange is dyadic in nature, where issues of power have less significance, especially when there is the potential for mutual benefit (Cook & Emerson, 1978). In these instances, trust between the two parties assumes greater significance – the so-called Kuhnian principle of least interest (Kuhn, 1964). Kruglanski’s ‘rational’ supervisor, links to surveillance connected to reward will have positive associations of trust and faith, whereas surveillance linked to punishment is for these supervisors likely to be associated to distrust and “generally derogatory evaluation of the worker” (Kruglanski, 1970, p. 216).

In the contemporary workplace where virtual teamwork abounds and mobile workers/road warriors are de rigour, trust either in the technology or the employer/manager is even harder to find and “mobile information and communication technologies certainly will place great stress on the mutual trust between the ones observing and the ones being observed” (Sorensen, 2004, p. 31).
There has been some acknowledgement by researchers that workplace surveillance is simply a fact of the twenty-first century working life. Examining the impact workplace surveillance has on individuals is therefore an important consideration. There are also issues of trust evident, both in the surveillance and the technology associated with workplace surveillance. The same trust issues arise when discussing wider societal surveillance. In particular Lyon (2003a) suggested that in the post 9-11 society mutual trust between the observer and the observed is at a very low ebb. Similarly, trust in the integrity of the gatekeepers of the electronic world of computers and computer technology is difficult to find. Late in 2007, the UK Government lost computer discs containing over 25 million records pertaining to child benefit recipients. In the immediate aftermath, further losses of personal data were disclosed, including information on driving licence theory test applicants. These incidents damaged trust in Government, but also helped alert the UK public to the dangers of surveillance and data gathered on individuals, something that was highlighted a year earlier with the large-scale report into *The Surveillance Society* prepared by the Surveillance Studies Network for publication by the UK’s Information Commissioner (Surveillance Studies Network, 2006).

Research into surveillance in the workplace does not stand still. In recent years, research into surveillance technology has examined the use of algorithmic computer facial recognition programs (Introna & Wood, 2004) and digital prioritising systems (Graham & Wood, 2003). Links to genetics and predispositions to tasks are also being made, with Homans (1958) indirectly referring to the Darwinian notion ‘survival of the fittest’ expressed in Durkheim’s *The Division of Labor in Society* and applying it to organisations into what might be termed ‘Workplace Darwinism’. The suggestion being that employee survival in their particular workplace depends upon their individual characteristics. Clegg, Kornberger and Pitsis (2005) delve further down the Darwinian route in organisations, by indicating that some organisational researchers suggest genetic predispositions for employment. Zweig and Webster (2003) indicate that an individual’s personality might have a bearing on their acceptance of surveillance, and as such could have practical and theoretical implications for designing and acceptance of surveillance systems in the workplace. On the other side of the “nature versus nurture” debate, some suggested a ‘tabula rasa’ attitude (Clegg, Kornberger & Pitsis, 2005, p. 194). It is possible that in the not too distant future, by combining these particular research discussions one could arguably produce a fictitious employee whose working traits conflate inherited personality, with a range of learned behaviours. Thus

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producing an employee who is an amalgam of Darwinism via Durkheim (1964), with elements of learnt behaviours courtesy of Bateson (1942) and Skinner (1960), with community-type teamworking associations drawn from Tönnies (1887). Taking this to its logical conclusion, this ‘hybrid employee’ might have the propensity, and the personality for, working in/managing teams and might also be someone who is more willing to accept workplace surveillance.

Leaving aside the broader philosophical question of whether surveillance per se is right or wrong in principle, Ball (2001) makes the case that the ethics of using performance monitoring and performance monitoring techniques in the workplace cannot be left to simple guidelines of best practice. The claim that performance monitoring is ethical just because ‘best practice’ has been adopted is too narrow an approach (Ball, 2001). Lyon (2001a) also followed the ethical theme and broadened it out suggesting “surveillance systems should be made accountable, and that the accountability should start with the reminder that personal data, however abstract, has effects that are felt by persons” (Lyon, 2001a, p. 180). On a more practical level, Spinello (1997) argued that not only the decision to undertake performance monitoring and the monitoring should be subject to ethical considerations, but that the data, information and the computerised information systems should also be subject to ethical oversight. He also agrees with Ball, that professionalism and codes of conduct are useful tools and adequate starting points, but that both duty and rights based ethical theories should be an integral part of the process.

This chapter provided an overview of the nature of workplace surveillance. It detailed the key concepts associated with workplace surveillance. It identified and sought to resolve some of the semantic complications inherent in the terms ‘surveillance’ and ‘monitoring’ in relation to research in the workplace, where specific meanings are attributed to each work, euphemistically or academically. The theme of tensions and conflicts due to alternative interpretations of surveillance, both inside and outside the workplace resonates throughout this work. A large section of this chapter was devoted to the psychological aspects of workplace appraisals and surveillance. The two sections tie into the discussion on exchange and exchange mechanisms, and the psychological contract. The literature in this and previous chapters leans towards the notion that all observations are surveillance, hence the definitive statement on the use of surveillance.

The following chapter further builds on workplace surveillance and looks specifically at the issues of power typologies, exchange theory, and exchange as part of the employment
relationship. The apparently straightforward elements of exchange and power are sometimes taken for granted, or have implied and sometimes specific meanings; therefore, a fresh perspective is taken of both of these issues in the light of the statement on workplace surveillance.
CHAPTER FOUR

Exchange and Research Questions

The previous chapters offered a broad overview on societal surveillance and a more detailed chapter on workplace surveillance. Between them they outlined the various theories and concepts associated with surveillance. Chapter Two provided the broad overview, while Chapter Three narrowed down the discussion to the subject of this research, that of surveillance in the workplace. Both chapters examined literature on the main theories and conceptualisations; they looked at some of the methods by which surveillance takes place and the means by which it is accomplished.

This Chapter develops the discussion further. It provides a focus for the research and formulates a framework for dealing with the impact of surveillance on individuals in the workplace. It specifically looks at the employment relationship, the role of exchange and psychological strategies of persuasion, including the social structure of organisations and the social implications for individuals at work.

The employment relationship, particularly the psychological contract aspect to it, is an important context through which to assess surveillance. It incorporates aspects of social exchange and for the psychological contract, how the psychology of influence, behaviour, persuasion, and communication feature, thus offering the potential to obtain an enhanced understanding of the impact of workplace surveillance. The notion of taking a social approach historically has close associations with surveillance. Lyon (2001b) identifies that both the
workplace and associated surveillant technologies are shaped by social actors, with social consequences to their actions. In light of this is prudent to examine it through the lens of (social) exchange theory.

There are five sections to this Chapter. The first section looks at the employment relationship, and the psychological contract. The psychological contract is a vital component of the employment relationship, and unlike the employment contract, which has legal implications; the psychological contract is based on the individual perceptions of the parties. The psychological contract and the employment relationship are inextricably linked. The second section reviews social exchange theory from the neoclassical economic exchange of the late nineteenth century, through social exchange theories of the 1960s and 1970s, leading to the more contemporary fusion of social, economic and network exchanges. The third section examines what exchange means in practice as part of the employment relationship and examines the use of power, initially as part of the ‘exchange’ process. It also looks at the importance of power typologies. The fourth section examines the ways in which exchange operates in the workplace. It also suggests why employees, at all levels might undertake resistance or even sabotage. The concluding section draws together the specific research questions that have emerged from both the wider literature and the more focussed discussion.

4.1 The Employment Relationship and the Psychological Contract

The modern employment relationship arguably dates back to the Industrial Revolution. It was not until the turn of the last century that academic, primarily sociological, interest in the area became manifest. Taylor’s Scientific Management had just emerged. Scientific Management broadly assumes there is a crude balance between cost and benefit in the employment relationship. While Braverman (1974) expressed Scientific Management as a relationship where the knowledge of the worker was dissociated from the shop floor and the execution of the skills were placed in the hands of management, thus monopolising knowledge.

Almost as a reaction to Scientific Management, the Human Relations movement developed. Sociologist and organisational theorist Elton Mayo, who questioned the premise of Taylorism, started it. He suggested that recognising workers and employers as human beings and social animals, and by adopting a more cooperative approach organisations and workers would reap more rewards. This approach however is not without its criticisms. It fails to acknowledge the inherent tensions in the employment relationship, preferring instead to assume that both
employers and employees are in potential consensus (Brown, 1988). The Human Relations movement raised the notion of the workplace as a social system. It suggested the workplace was a microcosm of the social system that is society. This functionalist view “frequently led to the much more controversial assumption that consensus and equilibrium are fundamental features of social systems” (Brown, 1988, p. 39). It does however offer the valuable link to understanding the nature of exchange. In the case of Human Relations, the exchange being where employment is viewed as an institutional form through which exchanges take place with other subsystems, and where the employment is the exchange mechanism (exchanging wages for work contribution). Another important aspect of the Human Relations/employment exchange mechanism is the one that exists hierarchically between an employer and a manager, between a manager and another manager, and a manager and their team. The Human Relations notion of employment has been characterised as an ‘import-conversion-export process’, not unlike the transformation processes associated with data and information, or the balancing of inputs and outputs associated with economic exchange equilibria. This research discusses the nature of exchange equilibria in relation to equity and reciprocity later in this chapter.

The holistic ‘systems’ way of conceptualising the social world was popularised by Parsons who identified that the exchanges, at least for individuals, could not be fully reconciled with neoclassical economic exchanges. He dismissed the economic exchange equilibrium of supply and demand, instead he identified that individuals “make choices for a range of different value-driven reasons, and according to a range of social definitions of the situation they found themselves in” (Holton, 1998, p. 99). In contrast, Blau and Homans’ exchange theory was seen as a reaction to Parsons functionalist (or organisational) approach to exchange, Parsons referred to these exchanges as, ‘boundary interchanges with other social groups’ (Zafirovski, 2003). These claims of differences in understanding exchanges are more likely to be representative of a conflict between collectivist and individualist viewpoints, than anything else (Ekeh, 1974).

Jaques proposed the notion that because employers offer, and employees accept a contract, it suggests that in the workplace everyone is accountable to their superiors and that there are no irresolvable conflicts in employment relations (Brown, 1988). Jaques further argued that it was only over a working lifetime that, responsibility, level of work, and pay could be established fairly. This train of thought appears to run counter to Maslow and his ‘hierarchy of prepotency’ (Maslow, 1943), which sought to provide a positive theory of motivation. That said, there is
still some dispute as to whether Maslow’s motivation theory applies to lower level employees (Brown, 1988). This aspect would be of particular interest to Call Centre workers, who are arguably at the lower level.

Whether the employment relationship can be a harmonious one appears to depend more on whether the manager has sufficiently developed social skills and where the balance of power “is not too markedly uneven” (Brown, 1988). Braverman used the cue of power and related it to control, control over knowledge, speed of work, skill levels, and machine pacing. Edwards also identified control, particularly through bureaucratic means, rules, and procedures, close supervision and machine pacing (Edwards, 1979). Some of these themes emerge from this research, particularly in relation to the Call Centre activities of Tulip plc and Roses plc, and the machine pacing in the food production plant of Chestnut plc.

The employment relationship, from a sociological perspective is one made up of complex exchanges and exchange networks. It is not simply a matter of exchanging work for pay, nor is it one where the umbrella of an employment contract adequately deals with all the issues that arise in employment relations. Robinson and Rousseau paradoxically suggested that “Each party only believes that they share the same interpretation of the contract” (1994, p. 246). How managers and workers reconcile the amount of effort (and reward) that the employment requires is sometimes a mystery, unless both parties know what a fair days work is. For workers that are more skilled the amount of effort required to complete a task might be less than for inexperienced workers. Furthermore, would the skilled workers admit to using less effort unless there was some additional financial reward for their skill (knowledge), indeed, is it possible even to measure something so ambiguous and subjective.

In addition, changes in organisational forms have necessitated changes in a key component of traditional employment, the employment contract. As Rubery et al. indicate, “The development of more complex organizational forms ... has implications for both the legal and the socially constituted nature of the employment relationship” (Rubery et al., 2002, p. 645). Using the formal employment contract on its own to determine or bolster workplace practices is perhaps too blunt an approach, and the employment relationship is too complex. Despite over a century of examination into the employment relationship there is still no agreed conceptualisation, or indeed whether such a conceptualisation should ever be expected (Brown, 1988).
Today's workforce appears to be less skilled (at least in a traditional sense), yet they are more likely to be rewarded for their performance on an hourly basis, however, Stinchcombe (In: Brown, 1988, p. 60) argues that, “...rewarding performance from minute to minute is less important. ... Knowledge and intelligence do not vary from one hour to the next but vary greatly over his lifetime.” The current trend in Call Centres and other workplaces to surveil workers minute by minute to ‘improve performance’ appears, on that basis to be short sighted or incorrect.

Some of the theoretical, conceptual, and pragmatic differences between societal surveillance and surveillance in the workplace can be attributed, at least partly, to the contractual nature of employment. When an offer of employment takes place, a contract occurs. The occupational role of an employee is wrapped up in the contract, along with implicit and explicit responsibilities. Legally, the validity of the employment contract is governed on the face of it by contract law however, “The substantive meaning of the contract of employment is not made clear by statute” (Deakin, 2004, p. 203). The precise meanings in an employment contract are largely assumed by the employer and employee such is the number of implicit agreements contained within. However, where there is a legal dispute the contract is largely subject to interpretation under common law i.e. determined by previous case law, custom, and use, rather than any specific piece of legislation, and predominant in such determinations is the ‘mutuality of obligation’ test (Deakin, 2004).

Legally, the employment contract has three elements, all based around the test of ‘mutuality of obligation’. The mutuality of obligation is a reciprocal arrangement where a potential employee offers labour (the choice); and an employer takes up the offer under their set conditions (the control). Where the mutuality falls into difficulty is in the ‘protections and liabilities’ as an employee’s interpretation of this frequently differs from an employer’s interpretation. Signing an employment contract implicitly (and in some cases, explicitly) acknowledges that you will have to give up a degree of privacy, by allowing surveillant activities. As Ouchi and Wilkins explains, “in exchange for pay, an employee gives up autonomy in certain areas to his organizational superiors, thus permitting them to direct his work activities and to monitor his performance” (Ouchi & Wilkins, 1985, p. 838)

In the same way that the employment contract is subject to legal interpretation, the use of surveillance in the workplace is also legally open to interpretation in disputes. There have been suggestions that some surveillance at work might come under the provisions of the Human
Rights Act (1998). This has largely been dismissed, except where the surveillance is covert, as it is only under these circumstances where the ‘expectation of privacy’ (a key element of the Human Rights Act) is missing, or where the surveillance is disproportionate to the possible infringement. In all other instances, employers are free, within the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Telecommunications Lawful Business Practice Regulations 2000, to adopt ‘reasonable’ workplace surveillance.

A key aspect of the employment relationship is however, not written into the employment contract, In addition to the legal contract, implicit within any employment agreement is a social element, referred to as the psychological contract. This psychological contract can be explained as, “individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, regarding terms of an exchange agreement between individuals and their organization” (Rousseau, 1995, p. 9). It is the unwritten agreement of reciprocal elements that surround the formal contractual exchange elements.

In addition to the changes in the legal contracts and the psychological contracts, work environments are also changing. A number of researchers have examined those changes from a number of different angles. Bauman and May (2001) confirm the complex status of the employment contract in the workplace, “Most organizations have written statutes that detail the organizational rules to which members must adhere. This, by default, implies that those areas of members’ lives that are not covered by such rules remain free from organizational interference” (Bauman & May, 2001, p. 47). Organisations have formalized those ‘written statutes’ through the employment contract possibly to the detriment of workplace associations or community. Notwithstanding this, the workers sense of community to each other and the workplace endures through teamwork and virtual teamworking.

It may be that organisational changes necessitate that this social element should be revised for something which “binds members of a firm together in ways radically different from those of the past” (Zuboff, 1995). This research examines some of these changes in the context of the exchange relationship. Paradoxically, the contractual obligations that employers use to bind employees to workplace surveillance do not appear to be reciprocated by the employer, except through the reward mechanism of pay. “Employees have very few legal tools to combat electronic monitoring. ... Consequently, employers can implement monitoring systems in
virtually any manner” (Peters, 1999, p. 153). This raises the spectre of exchange mechanisms linked to the employment relationship, an issue that this research specifically examines.

Interestingly, the employment relationship can extend (officially and unofficially) outside the workplace at the behest of the employer. This study noted indications that organisational interference and influence extends outside of working hours with company mobile phones and BlackBerry’s. It can result, in extremis, in coercion, harassment, and for one interviewee in this study, illness, due to the overuse of a BlackBerry.

The psychological contract, the implicit aspect of the employment relationship emerges from this research with particularly importance. “The psychological contract is about the exchange relationship between employee and employer” (Conway & Briner, 2005). This relationship can be between a manager and a worker, an employer and a manager, or an employer and a worker. The relationship has at its heart an implicit exchange, where one party implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) exchanges something they can provide, with something the other can provide. This unwritten contract is based around the customs, communications or past practices in an organisation, or by way of the mutual predictability of exchanges between individuals (Rousseau, 1995).

The reciprocity involved in the psychological contract is however not typically legally binding; it is sometimes broken or breached. Recently the UK Police Force used words and phrases such as ‘betrayed’ and ‘a breach of faith’ to describe how they felt when the Home Secretary refused to abide by the previously thought binding Police Arbitration Tribunal. They also referred to ‘inept management’ and how the Police felt ‘lost between statistics and reality’\(^\text{26}\).

This case further underlies how one act can cause a complete breakdown in the psychological contract. It also clearly indicates there is a substantial ‘perceptual gap’ between what the Police Force believed to be the meaning of the Police Arbitration Tribunal rulings, and the Government interpretation. This is a clear demonstration of the vital importance to employee relations of the psychological contract.

For individuals, some forms of exchange are manifest in employment and employment practices, with significant nuanced exchanges taking place daily between an individual (manager, supervisor, or worker) and an organisation. The basic (contractual) exchange sees an individual employee exchange their labour for a monetary reward from an organisation or

\(^{26}\) [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7412512.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7412512.stm) [accessed 11 October 2008]
employer. Outwardly, this is a reciprocal arrangement, legally enforced by placing a contractual value on the abilities and work of an individual, in the form of an employment contract, guided under employment law. The contract embodies both economic exchanges and social exchanges (Roehling, 2004). It is important to stress here that it is an ‘apparent’ act of reciprocity. The nature of the exchange relationship is a far more complex affair than it might appear. Unlike the previously discussed legal aspect where ‘mutuality of obligation’ is paramount, what is important for understanding the exchange relationship is that it is the “perception of mutuality” (italics in original, Rousseau, 1998, p. 666) of both the transactional (short-term) and relational (long-term) psychological contract.

In much the same way that the legal interpretation given by Deakin (2004) set out a mutuality of obligation, Herriot (2004) perceives the employer/employee relationship metaphor as a “win-win situation, in which each party meets certain of the other’s needs provided that the other meets certain of theirs” (Herriot, 2001, p. 37). While Deakin (2004) concentrates on ‘legal’ definitions, Herriot concentrates on the psychological aspect of the contract. This draws in individuals’ perceptions and social qualities, which cannot be included accurately in any employment contract. It is also possible that the employment contract can be seen as a metaphor for aspects of the employment relationship such as the mutual obligation or reciprocity involved (Herriot, 2001).

4.2 The Theory of Exchange

The meanings attributed to exchange go far beyond a simple act of giving and receiving. Acts of exchange are everywhere. The exchange might be commercial, financial, social, or personal. In each of those contexts, there can be acts of exchange. Exchange might involve simple acts of bartering, bargaining, or simply walking into a shop and exchanging money for an article. Economically, exchange is ubiquitous. In the commercial world, a typical exchange can be characterised as, ‘A selling a product or service for which B pays something in return’, a simple transaction. Similarly, organisations and organisational hierarchies structurally rely on exchanges to operate successfully between departments and individuals. The marketing department have an exchange relationship with the sales department, who have an exchange relationship with production who in turn relies on an exchange relationship with logistics. The exchange can be as basic as an email communication, or as complicated as a large sales contract for the organisations production facility.
Social exchange theory is similarly ubiquitous, in that “a key tenet of social exchange theory is that human behaviour is in essence an exchange” (Homans, 1961 In: Zafirovski, 2003), as the “interaction between persons is an exchange for goods, material or non-material” (Homans, 1958, p. 597). The social exchange has an assumed reciprocity, although Emerson (1976) suggests that the reciprocal element is not an assumed one, but a required part in bargaining, albeit as part of an exchange ratio of balance to unbalance in terms of the power relationships. Put simply, if the relationship is unbalanced then the exchange ratio \[x/y\] decreases across “continuing transactions until either power is balanced or \(x/y\) [the ratio] has decreased” (Emerson, 1976, p. 354). The act of exchange in a social situation behaviourally suggests a reciprocal act, implicitly or explicitly. Of course, whether the reciprocal act implied in the exchange takes place is another matter. Failure to keep the reciprocal bargain on either side (but particularly in management) creates additional problems for individual trust and trustworthiness as discussed later in this chapter.

Social exchange theory and the economic-behavioural model of exchange are complex philosophical blends. Blau suggested a definition to distinguish between the two,

“A distinction between social and economic exchange is that social exchange engenders diffuse obligations, whereas those in economic exchange are specified. The diffuseness of the obligations implies that large-scale social exchange is not likely to occur unless social bonds rooted in trust have been established. The mutual advantages from the association fortify their social bond. This may appear to be merely a by-product of social exchange, but it is its most important product” (Blau, 2002 In: Zafirovski, 2003)

If we scratch beneath the philosophical surface of exchange, there are yet more complexities, as elements of economic theory, social psychology, and anthropology start to rise to the surface, influencing what exchange means in practice. The influences of economics, psychology, sociology, and anthropology start to dominate the academic meanings behind exchange theory. Understanding how this research situates exchange as part of the employment relationship and the psychological contract can be seen in the following brief history of exchange.
4.2.1 Exchange History

In the late nineteenth century, the German economist Carl Menger when first writing of exchange indicated that “prices are only incidental manifestations of these activities, symptoms of an economic equilibrium between the economies of individuals” (Menger, 1871, p. 191). Menger importantly indicates that for non-economic exchanges, it is the principle of the exchange that drives people to participate. To further illustrate the links between economic and social exchanges, Léon Walras, one of the founding fathers of neoclassical economics, and the person responsible for the backbone of neoclassical economics, ‘the general equilibrium theory’, stated “the whole world may be looked upon as a vast general market made up of diverse special markets where social wealth is bought and sold” (Walras, [1874-77] 1954, p. 84). Contrary then to Emerson’s (1976) assertions on exchange theory, the exchange relationship is therefore, even according to early neoclassical economists, a much broader church than one simply built upon simple ‘price-mediated’ transactions.

It was almost a century later when the early proponents of social exchange theory, Homans (1958) and Blau (1964) came to similar conclusions about the social elements to exchange. In doing so, they extended exchange to social interactions, not just those involving an economic transaction. This was because social exchange is “deduced from economic laws, which are in turn to be deduced from more inclusive natural laws of physical and biological sciences” (Ekeh, 1974, pp. 43-4). For both Blau and Homans, the exchange was in the social ‘market’ and was definitely not price-mediated. The notion that an exchange is more than an economic or entity relationship echoing Menger’s views was proposed by Levi-Strauss, who when quoted in Ekeh said, “it is the exchange which counts not the things exchanged” (Ekeh, 1974, p. 44). The social exchange relationship does not start and finish with the act of exchange as it might do in economics; the social exchange comes before the entity is exchanged, and is independent of it. The use of the term entity here is deliberate, as in social exchanges, the entity, unlike a thing, can be abstract rather than just physical.

Neoclassical economists assert that economic exchange revolves predominantly, although not exclusively, around price mediated processes. That is to say, traditional ‘supply and demand’ where the ‘price’ of a product is dependent upon the ‘supply’ available, set against the demand for a product. It is only when the supply of a particular service or product, is equal to the demand for a product or service, a position known as ‘equilibrium exchange’ is achieved.
The neoclassical economic ideas on exchange are perceived as being highly rational individual decision-making processes, albeit within an idealised sense of ‘market’ where commodities are stripped of their alliances with other benefits (Blau, 1964).

While some acknowledge a historical link to economic exchanges, other disavow it, claiming the issue of price cannot be reconciled in a social environment (Heath, 1976). This is despite the acknowledgement by early economists Menger and Walras, that there are indeed social relationships associated with exchange. Emerson (1976) continued to maintain there were few links between economic exchange and social exchange and distanced himself from linking the two. The difficulty perhaps for Emerson was with the complex notion of social exchange, how to apparently reconcile something so rational and have it apply to irrational social behaviours. Furthermore, how to reconcile the original, almost exclusive, use of the economics of ‘price’ within a social and therefore price-free relationship is not straightforward. When exchange is used economically there are usually fixed or fluctuating rates of exchange, something that Emerson (1976) identified as a key in the complex economic issues surrounding exchange. In the quasi-economic social or workplace context, such ‘rates of exchange’ are of course infinitely variable. They involve the individuals’ ability to bargain based on perceived need, reciprocity, personal exploitation, obedience, and sense of equity.

The actual origins of social exchange as a concept or theory are shrouded in dispute. Homans (1958) claimed that the term social exchange originated in 1925 by the anthropologist Michel Mauss in his book, The Gift. Heath (1976) counters this, claiming that Levi Strauss was first to make an explicit link between the social and exchange. This particular academic dispute appears to be more about the previously mentioned differences between individualist and collectivist traditions of social exchange and the roots of the two traditions rather than one of attribution.

In the academic dispute over who came up with the link between economics and the social and thus provided the origins of the theory, an argument can be made that neither position is completely accurate. By the late 1950s and early 1960s when Blau and Homans work first appeared, the work of the early neoclassical economists Walras and Menger were not translated or generally available. Today, they are well documented and freely available, as are their explicit suggestions of the potential for exchange to go beyond those of simple price-mediated exchanges. As Menger (1871) predates both Mauss and Levi-Strauss, with his specific chapters on ‘Economy and Economic Goods’ and ‘The Theory of Exchange’ in his book, The
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Principles of Economics (Menger, 1871), this argument of who came first is moot. Menger and Walras specifically discussed non-economic goods and of the exchange of non-economic goods. The disputes over who first came up with the term ‘social exchange’ are academic, except perhaps to those who wish to claim the kudos for doing so. Suffice to say, the individualist thinking of Durkheim influenced Homans, and the collectivist French sociologist Levi-Strauss influenced Blau. Thus, it can reasonably be claimed that for different reasons, from different perspectives, both Homans and Blau came up with equally meaningful theories of exchange set in a social context (Ekeh, 1974; Heath, 1976). It was coincidental that they both arrived at similar points at the same time. Neither suffers from what has been termed the Matthew Effect (Merton, 1995), with both obtaining near equal recognition for social exchange theory.

The origins of social exchange theory while rooted in neoclassical economic exchange, are also strongly influenced by anthropological work from the 1920s by Malinowski, who examined social interaction and the mutual exchange of benefit (Molm, 1997). The dilemma of how to reconcile the economic with the social is touched on by both Emerson (1976) and Ekeh (1974). Both suggested an anthropological perspective could reconcile social exchange with ‘economic’ (but not monetary) exchange behaviours, albeit based on research in non-western cultures. The often-cited example for reconciling the dichotomy is Malinowski’s Kula-Ring or Kula-Circle. Malinowski’s anthropological research looked at Kula society, on the Trobriand Islands, off Papua New Guinea. It was here that in the absence of money, transactions were at the same time, social, economic, and cultural. Both Ekeh and Emerson cite the example, although interestingly Emerson, almost as quickly as he suggests it, dismisses the notion that it might be helpful for expanding the use of exchange beyond economics into the complexity of social interactions. To assist his argument, Emerson suggested that the numerous connections of “reward, reinforcement, cost, utility, opportunity, profit, outcome, transaction, payoff” (Emerson, 1976, p. 337) are too complex to be usefully applied. Instead, Emerson pinned his hopes on a vague expectation that a more parsimonious model might someday emerge.

Another part of the exchange puzzle emerges from research in social structure and behaviour in the 1950s, which looked into the roles and behaviours adopted by individuals both in society and at work. It was examined by Firth (1954), Nadel (1957) in The Theory of Social Structure (based on a series of lecture given in London in 1955), and in Goffman’s (1990) seminal work, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (first published in 1956). These works characterise individuals socially and at work, as players of roles, circumscribed by rules and/or conditions.
Similarly, more recently, and pertinent to this research, the workplace has been identified as somewhere that people adopt more sophisticated behaviours, both individually and in concert by “simultaneously conspiring, concealing and struggling” (Tilly, 1991, p. 597).

It is true that in both social situations and at work, individuals naturally adopt a variety of behaviours. These adopted behaviours and roles range from those that they simply give credence to on an ad hoc basis, to others where they embrace the ‘reality’ of the role. Importantly, these behaviours largely reflect the title, label, or position of the role (Goffman, 1990). Organisations, as reflections of society, rely on these responses, or “constancies of behaviour” (Nadel, 1957, p. 20) to run efficiently. The line of thought, that roles played by individual actors’ are associated with specific behaviours, can help shed light on the complex relationships between managers and workers in social exchange, of power (Scott, 2001; Lukes, 2005), equity (Adams, 1963), and control and consent (Ram et al., 2001).

### 4.3 The Practice of Exchange

Blau (1964) when detailing the issue of power in exchange relationships, equates it to the Weberian traditions of submission and compliance. He cites four conditions, which if taken together give no option other than to submit to the power of others and comply with the request for the exchange (Heath, 1976). The conditions are,

- They have no services to offer which the other would like in return.
- They cannot obtain the needed service elsewhere.
- They cannot be coerced to furnish the service.
- They cannot resign themselves to do without the service.

In these circumstances, Blau offers the Weberian theme of ‘power as domination’ being produced in the exchange, specifically where there is a unilateral or one-way exchange, i.e. of benefit to one side only (Heath, 1976). However, exchange relationships are rarely that straightforward, as there is a gamut of nuanced and subtle exchange relationships taking place simultaneously. This is particularly true in the workplace where exchanges are dependent largely on the people between whom the intended exchange takes place. Goffman (1990) made the point that in teamwork situations, at any time, any member of the team has the power to disrupt the team, although for the most part they are bound by a reciprocal familiarity or reciprocal dependence.
The abstract notion of power within an exchange relationship is made up of an intricate set of interrelated elements influential on many different levels. Power in exchanges typically includes, “all kinds of influence between persons and groups, including those exercised in exchange transactions” (Blau, 1964, p. 115). In a negotiated exchange, there are clear bargaining positions on both sides. Such a negotiation is invariably a bilateral arrangement, where the negotiated settlement arrived at benefits one or both parties (Molm, 1997). Even in bilateral exchanges, if the entities exchanged are identical, the value placed upon them by the individuals may be different, and as such, the nature of the transaction and therefore the value/utility of the exchange are different for each party.

Appreciating the nature and type of power relationship in the workplace helps understand why people choose to exchange or not. Understanding that exchange relationships exist and that they will vary depending on the actors involved and their motivations is still sometimes not enough to understand an exchange.

In dyadic exchanges, when both parties identify or have knowledge of (open) the other parties position of equity, an equal profit for both parties (consensual), or “equitable exchange” (Cook & Emerson, 1978, p. 723) will be reached, regardless of any power issues. This position harks back to Menger (1871) and Walras ([1874-77] 1954), echoing as it does in a social context the economic state of equilibrium. If however, the two parties enter into an exchange with no prior knowledge or basis upon which to make the decision to exchange or not (i.e. blind); then the parties will act in a rational rather than a reciprocal basis (Meeker, 1971). By rational, Meeker, suggests a meaning of rational philosophically close to that attributed to Weber, of evaluating the means without regard to ends (Wertrationalität), or using logic to arrive at a decision. In practical terms, this means that where there are two consensual parties exchanging blindly, then power (influence) assumes greater importance. Conversely, in an open (and consensual) dyadic exchange relationship, the parties will quickly find a point of equilibrium or ‘equitable exchange’ thus nullifying power issues. This is confirmed by the ‘principle of least interest’ (Kuhn, 1964), where the party receiving least comparative interest in the transaction has the greater bargaining power. If this proposition is adapted to the workplace, employees (either managers or workers) in blind rather than consensual, one-to-one exchanges who adopt a laissez-faire attitude, will regularly strike a better exchange through this subtle shift in power. As Blau points out “the legitimation of the power of a superior (senior) and the mobilization of opposition to him (or her) also do not occur in dyads” (my insertions, Blau, 1964, p. 32).
Dyadic and bilateral arrangements, although not unheard of, are becoming rarer in contemporary workplaces where teamworking is de rigueur and employees are “formally grouped into different units such as sections, departments and centres” (Furnham, 1997, p. 478). Levinson (1965) alluded to a wider range of dyadic relationships when identifying the role of organisations in people’s lives, who for many are still the social hub of their lives (Levinson, 1965). However, in many other areas organisations have shifted their own reciprocal arrangements. They no longer offer the Japanese model of ‘job for life’ (McCormick, 2007) nor do they offer some form of “paternalistic bureaucracy” (Marx, 1999) or similar paternalistic attitudes associated with Taylorism (Reynolds & Skoro, 1996). Yet on the other side of the relationship, employees still offer unconditionally their side of the contractual arrangement, at least in principle.

These positions are on the face of it contradictory and difficult to reconcile. Akerlof (1984) alludes to this dichotomy by suggesting the labour contract is a “gift exchange” where employers pay inflated wages/salaries in the belief that they expect those workers to “supply more effort than... if wages are just at market clearing” (Akerlof, 1984, p. 79). This position links to the notion that if you were to pay an employee enough money they would be more willing to accept greater surveillance. Studies have shown that the relationship between efficiency or productivity is not always a clear-cut affair, in that even where pay is not seen as a factor sometimes socially busy employees (the ones who might appear to be slacking) are sometimes the most productive (Homans, 1954). As has been argued by the recent banking crisis, for many employees the inflated wages are not a ‘gift exchange’ but a simple ‘gift’.

Although increasingly popular, teamworking has not fully eliminated the dyadic/reciprocal exchange. It has however reduced its use in the workplace. That said, some exchange transactions even in teamworking scenarios still take place on a more individual and discrete basis, albeit usually framed as part of a team activity.

The more common scenario today is of much wider and complex exchange networks (including teamworking). This might consist of,

“...corporate groups having two or more members occupying roles in a consensually defined role system. The other approach involves social structures composed of three or more actors located in positions within a connected network” (Cook & Emerson, 1978, p. 724).
It is also useful to recollect the anthropological connections to teamworking with the work of Malinowski and the Kula-Ring and the integration of ‘the social’ in ‘economic’ exchanges and the relevance for exchange in contemporary employment or psychological contracts.

The alternative to the negotiated exchange is the open reciprocal exchange i.e. one party openly making a non-negotiable offer for an exchange. It is important to recall that in all exchanges, the relevant perceived value of the entities exchanged might be perceived differently by the participants, and even though in these instances the arrangement is performed separately and is non-negotiated, it relies on the ever increasing amount of trust brought with each exchange for its success (Blau, 1964). By relying on the expansion of trust, acts of reciprocal exchange can take place even when there is only some implicit, rather than explicit, negotiation. In the context of the employment relationship for example, a manager might ask an employee to reach a higher sales target. The sales target has a precise and identical intrinsic value for both, but the employee might place less value on achieving the target than the manager. In some instances the employee might try to negotiate an exchange (less likely), or agree to a subtle reciprocal arrangement (more likely), e.g. by accepting the deal might keep the manager happy, and reciprocally they might obtain the day off they would like. The following sub-section details the main forms of reciprocity and indicates how reciprocity influences managers and management.

4.3.1 Reciprocity

The act of reciprocity refers to a common reinforcement by two (or more) parties of each other’s actions. There are two major forms of reciprocity, mutual reciprocity, or directional exchange, and univocal reciprocity or generalised exchange. Mutual reciprocity occurs when ‘A expects to be benefitted by B, if A does something to benefit B’. Where reciprocity occurs in pairs or between two partners, an exclusive arrangement known as a restricted exchange occurs. When there is a reciprocal arrangement that involves more than two people (i.e. a reciprocal exchange network), individuals might reciprocate another person’s action, although not directly towards that person, ‘A gives to B, B gives to C, and C gives back to A’. This form of reciprocity is known as univocal reciprocity or generalised exchange (Ekeh, 1974). Examples of univocal reciprocity occur on the roads every day. When a motorist in traffic allows other motorist to emerge from a side street, the benefitted motorist invariably reciprocates towards other motorists, by allowing other motorists to emerge from side streets.
In a workplace environment, managers typically adopt a blend of both univocal and mutual reciprocity to achieve ongoing cooperation from subordinates and co-workers. Adopting a blend of both the mutual and the univocal approaches to reciprocity is more likely to achieve greater levels of trust (Blau, 1964). Thus, trust and the associated goodwill individual managers build up over time from said reciprocity promotes more harmonious and more productive working relationships. Trust in these instances comes from a history of action and interaction, the meaning is tacitly understood. It is similar to tacit knowledge, in that it is unwritten, experiential, has a knowing aspect, ‘you know who you can trust’, but like tacit knowledge it is “indeterminate in that it... cannot be explicitly stated” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 4). There may well be any number of predictors of trust and trustworthiness, but a simple cognitive approach to trust cannot fully explain the why. For example, a child cannot necessarily explicate why they trust their parent, it a complex of belief issues conflated with attitudes and emotions (Weckert, 2000a). This does not mean you cannot say who you trust, just that the why is often difficult to state.

Caution does need to be exercised in the exchanges, as reciprocal ‘quid pro quo’ relationships can, according to Levi-Strauss, be put to such powerful practical effect as to “crush [individuals] ... under future obligations” (Levi-Strauss In: Blau, 1964, p. 108), thus rendering individuals power-less under the weight of obligation. The inability to repay the obligation further reinforces the superiority/inferiority of the relevant parties. While Blau (1964) makes this anthropological observation in relation to tribal rituals, it also holds a particular truth in organisational contexts. It is well known that managers, in this research and elsewhere, can and do offer both vague and firm promises of future rewards for successful achievement of results. In these circumstances, the action can a) reinforce manager’s seniority of having the ability to make the offer in the first place, and b) place the worker under such obligation that even if they achieve the desired result they further reinforce their seniority. Alternatively, c) any failure to try to achieve the target/achievement is an unspoken admission of the seniority of the manager (Note: Blau describes it as superiority/inferiority issue. This has been modified to seniority in the organisational context).

Using the multifaceted approach to reciprocity is not however without its problems. Both mutual and univocal reciprocity make little or no allowance for any of the parties to use deception as a ploy. Additionally, neither form makes any allowance for uncertainty caused by internal tensions between parties (Kollock, 1994). These internal tensions can place the parties in a state of almost permanent change or flux, so much so that perpetual negotiation or
renegotiation of relationships takes place, something that is exacerbated by the increases in technology in the workplace. Munro (2000, p. 680) implicitly recognised this when he suggested that the “technologies of power are not stable but are mutating”, allowing new forms of social control to emerge.

In the workplace, managers who adopt exclusively or rely solely on mutual reciprocity risk operating a strategy that has a high possibility of failure over time. While advocates of ‘Game Theory’ such as Axelrod (2006) indicate the use of reciprocal behaviours appears to benefit players, empirical research in a number of fields shows the sole use of reciprocity as a managerial tactic cannot alone explain “the deeply rooted emotions and behaviors related to interpersonal commitment that have been empirically observed” (Back & Flache, 2006). In the medium and long-term exclusive reliance on mutual reciprocity can lead to a rupture in the relationship, as over time not all the parties actions are fair and equal, and importantly, are not perceived as being fair and equal, raising the spectre of the influence of power in the relationship. The relationship must also be where “the future has a sufficiently large shadow” (Axelrod, 2006), which given the sometimes transient nature of employment relationships can be a managerial problem. Furthermore the use of mutual reciprocity in Game Theory as the best tactic identifies “the foundation of cooperation is not really trust” (Axelrod, 2006, p. 182). Logically, from Axelrod’s perspective managers who operate on the basis that they will only respond to, or act on, behaviours where there is something in it for them, will struggle to gain trust. Of course, this assumes that managers wish to engender trustworthiness as part of their managerial strategy. Finally, the burgeoning literature on trust repair also suggests that using reciprocity as a single managerial tactic is no without its faults.

Other workers might see the reliance on this one type of behaviour as inequitable or unequal. The condition of status differentiation, where inequality (perceived or real) exists between parties, e.g. between a manager and worker, employer and manager, can also lead to a breakdown in trust among the workforce, and lead to claims of favouritism and bias from others (citing Levi-Strauss (1969), Ekeh, 1974, p. 48). The exception would be when the exchange is strictly one-to-one and exists solely between two parties. In these instances, over time, the condition of exchange equilibrium is achieved, and with it a sense of equality and equity. This can be explained by examining the relative positions of the parties. Both parties will over time develop knowledge of the others position, therefore for both to maximise their respective positions they meet at a point that works for both of them or ‘exchange equilibrium’.
A recurring theme emerging in a number of theories discussed in this study is the movements towards and away from points of equilibrium. Theories using implicit, explicit, or metaphorical points of equilibrium have been identified. From the earlier discussed neoclassical economics of Menger (1871), the general equilibrium theory (Walras, [1874-77] 1954), exchange theory (Blau, 1964), exchange networks (Cook & Emerson, 1978), reciprocity/exchange (Kuhn, 1964; Molm, 1997) and finally, the balance between “self-interest and interdependence” (Lawler & Thye, 1999, p. 217). All demonstrate in one way or another movement towards or away from points of equilibrium, with equilibrium the point where efficiency or effectiveness is maximised.

4.3.2 Coercion

In contrast to other exchanges, coercing an act of exchange contains very little by way of negotiation or reciprocity. While an exchange (of sorts) takes place, it is not one willingly entered into by both sides. As such, a coerced exchange cannot be characterised in the same light as a willing exchange. However, it does not mean that an exchange has not taken place. It has. It is just that the intention or meaning behind the exchange is different from a reciprocal or negotiated exchange.

Reconciling a coercive demand to accomplish a task from the coerced person involves an exchange, but it is built upon the notion that the exchange takes place and no further action is taken. In the senior/subordinate dyad, it would indeed be unusual if a simple request takes place then carried out without any consequences/benefit for either party. In an organisation when a manager (senior) asks a worker/team-member (subordinate) to do something when the manager (or employer) uses coercion or a coercive act, the subordinate might reciprocate in different, less conventional ways. They might accept the coercion and do nothing. They might also univocally reciprocate and use coercion or a coercive act against another worker. It might also be that they respond in the form of resistance (of which more later) at some unspecified time in the future.

Importantly, there does not need to be a direct relationship to the initial disputed request. The act/request/order does not need to be one where the subordinate is actually coerced or one where the senior party actually coerces. The subordinate need only perceive the act as being coercive (see psychological reactance later in this chapter). For example, an employee might perceive the managers or the organisations disciplinary procedures and policies as coercive.
The resultant action is real, despite the initial cause being a perception, and the result might not be related directly to the initial perception.

Coercion as part of an exchange relationship is complex. It introduces into the exchange relationship the element of power and linkages to power relationships and power typologies. When the concept of power is introduced into the exchange relationship, it substantially alters it. Power, in the context of exchange is according to Blau, the exercise of all kinds of influence between individuals and groups where one induces others to accede to their wishes by rewarding them for doing so (Blau, 1964). This description of power was made nearly a decade before work by Foucault (1977) and Lukes (2005), both of whom helped redefine the academic interpretation of the nature of power. This study has already introduced both Foucauldian and Lukesian perspectives on power. It will not dwell too much on either in this chapter. Instead, this chapter will concentrate on the more relevant area for this study of power typologies (French & Raven, 1958; Weber, 1964; Raven, 1999). The power typologies of French, Raven and to a slightly lesser extent Weber are, in the context of exchange, particularly relevant.

Managers seek to balance exchange strategies, within their group of contemporaries, other managers, teams of workers, and employers, they simultaneously coordinate a blend of mutual and univocal reciprocal exchanges, occasionally interrupted by an act of coerced exchange. Too much coercion and managers lose their credibility to use reciprocity in the future, and thus inequity ensues and trust (where it existed) and trustworthiness diminishes.

### 4.3.3 Power Typologies

Blau indicated the work of Max Weber was a key influence for him. He did this by introducing a chapter on the subject of influence using Weber’s concept of Power (\textit{Macht}) (Blau, 1964, p. 116). The use of the term runs slightly against original translations of Weber who used the word \textit{Macht} to describe ‘power’, the general understanding of which is that \textit{Macht} means power as used as an active verb rather than passive noun, or ‘Might’ (Clegg, Courpasson & Phillips, 2006). Translations of Weber suggest that he considered domination as acceptable, even desirable, although an alternative and preferable term instead of domination might be Weber’s associated term \textit{Herrschaft}, meaning authority or “legitimate non-coercive rule” (Clegg, Courpasson & Phillips, 2006, p. 103). Power (\textit{Herrschaft}) might have been a better chapter title for Blau, given that the particular chapter was about exerting influence. The translated term for influence, (\textit{Einfluß/Einfluss}) is also closer in meaning to \textit{Herrschaft} than it is.
to *Macht*. Semantic distinctions aside, it can be assumed the meaning Blau possibly wished to convey is that influence rather than any other manifestation of power is more appropriate in the use of exchange.

Weber famously detailed several power types. They followed the theme he introduced with the use of *Herrschaft* and the close association with ‘legitimate forms’ of domination. Weber identified three types of legitimate authority, *traditional, charisma, and legal/rational* (Weber, 1964). These types remain particularly influential even today.

Raven (1999) followed up the Weberian power typology of charisma and the issue of ‘authority’ and expressed it in terms of religion and religious power figures. Both Raven (1999) and French and Raven (1958) indicate that power types can be *legitimate* (clearly further alluding to the influence of Weber and the notion of *Herrschaft*). A legitimate typology is based on a structural relationship between an influencing agent and target. In these instances, the power relationship takes on a different hue. It is legitimised in several ways. It is power based on position or authority, relying on obedience, as also demonstrated in the unethical and extreme example of obedience from Milgram (1963). Similarly, legitimate power based on acts of *reciprocity*, as in Gouldner’s (1960) ‘norm of reciprocity’, are commonly attributed to the psychological aspect of the employment contract, where influencing agents [managers/employers] adopt ‘quid pro quo’ or reciprocal relationships when dealing with the target [worker/manager] (Guest, 2004). Legitimate power can also be where influencing agents [managers/employers] use *responsibility or dependence*, a ‘we need to do it this way’, and ‘I am relying on you to do it for me’ attitude (Raven, 1999). Invoking the assistance of co-workers, the power of *third parties*, can also be a useful power strategy (as opposed to a specific typology), especially when combined with power typologies.

The strategy of incorporating peer pressure from co-workers, as recognised in teams or teamworking, can also act as a catalyst to increase [self] monitoring effectiveness (Townsend, 2005). How managers exert the various blends of power typologies and exchange mechanisms involves a complex set of behaviours. Many organisations are bureaucratic at their heart and use conventional strategic forms of management, using participative or autocratic forms of leadership. Komaki (1986), identified many of the successful traits in her psychologically based behavioural OSTI taxonomy i.e. what aspects divide marginal from highly successful managers. Blends of these strategies and typologies can be indentified in a number of organisations. Key to understanding transformational, charismatic, or transactional, forms of leadership and
management is an appreciation of the exchange, reciprocal or otherwise, nature of management.

Transactional Leadership i.e. leadership that relies on contingent reward and exceptional style (Bass & Avolio, 1991) is popular in Call Centre type operations. The style is more prevalent in the highly performance rated environment of the Call Centre as it relies on the leaders “willingness and ability to reward subordinates who keep up their end of the bargain” (Brehm, Kassin & Fein, 2002, p. 496). This can be characterised as, management by exception, where the leader does not seek to alter working methods as long as performance goals are met (Arnold, Robertson & Cooper, 1991)

On the other hand, according to Podsakoff, Mackenzie et al. (1990), Transformational Leadership relies on trust between the manager and the ‘follower’. Furthermore, because the followers feel trust and respect for their leaders, they are motivated to do more for them (Yukl, 1989). Yukl (1989) offers a subtle link back to Weber’s power typology by describing the use of ‘charisma’ as a positive managerial trait. In doing so, he provides another association to an aspect of the exchange relationship in management. The reciprocal nature of this type of leadership also relates back to earlier discussions on exchange and the use of managerial power typologies in the workplace. In slight contrast to Bass and Avolio, Yukl sees Transformational Leadership as referring “to the process of influencing major changes in the attitudes and assumptions of organization members and building commitment for the organization’s mission, objectives, and strategies” (Yukl, 1989, p. 269).

The association of trust to Transactional Leadership behaviours is also well known. In these behaviours the specific exchange concentrates on leaders rewarding a followers efforts (Podsakoff et al., 1990). However, therein lies the dichotomy, trustworthiness is a valuable long-term leadership trait within what may be perceived by employees [particularly in Call Centres] to be a short-term relationship (Grant, 1999). Kruglanski (1970) agreed, and further identified that untrustworthiness and distrust can be associated with supervisors by subordinates who are closely surveilled. Perhaps a defining concept is the specific nature of power typology or exchange, rather than trust in these particular relationships.

More specific linkages to exchange relationships in both transformational leadership and transactional leadership, can be identified in Podsakoff, MacKenzie et al. (1990) in their discussion on dyadic relationships. They discuss the school of thought that indicates that transformational leadership is perhaps one of style over substance and “that instead of
thinking of a leader’s style in a general sense, it is better to look at the dyadic exchange relationship between a leader and a particular subordinate” (Podsakoff et al., 1990, p. 31). The specific nature of the dyadic exchange relationship and the role trust plays was something that Cook and Emerson (1978) looked at. Interestingly, Cook and Emerson identified that the trust element in dyads is not centred on a stylistic element of leadership as seen in the charismatic element that works in transformational leadership. Instead, trust is built on the actual exchange. They identified that the exchange itself is responsible for the building of trust between the parties, rather than the specific actions or leadership styles of one or other of the parties.

In these instances, trust is more to do with trustworthiness of the individual rather than being trustful of the situation, i.e. trust in the individual not our attitudes to trust in general, it is cognitive instead of non-cognitive (Becker, 1996). It also is suggested by Weckert (2000b) that in some instances the surveillance/monitoring is an organisational mechanism with which individuals cooperate with or accede to, thus offering the illusion of or a substitute for trust. Although somewhat surprisingly there is some literature that argues that where there is more surveillance there can be greater trust, at least where the social utility is greater by accepting the surveillance than not (Weckert, 2000a; Calhoun et al., 2002). Calhoun et al. (2002) draw on work by Olson (1971) to indicate how where the social utility of collectively acting rationally offers greater reward. It can make more sense when the workforce accepts surveillance rather than resisting. For example, where the surveillance [the social utility] is deemed to be of nuisance or little real value to the organisation, or “where the social loss might outweigh the economic gain” (Olson, 1971, p. 60). Weckert (2000a, p. 246) develops the perspective further suggesting that from a cognitive view of trust “the more monitoring the greater the trust, simply because beliefs and expectations about the employees’ behaviour will be justifiably stronger.” This type of trust owes much to ‘equitable exchanges’ (Cook & Emerson, 1978) or ‘mutual reciprocity’ (Ekeh, 1974). Paradoxically, in situations where there is maximum surveillance, in say a maximum security prison, trust is hard to find (Weckert, 2000a). Although, I would argue that even in these instances, like Cook and Emerson (1978) indicate, it is more to do with the exchange that takes place than the marginal utility of trust or attitudes to trust/trustworthiness.

With his “expanded Power/Interaction model of personal influence” Raven (1999, p. 164), gave a fuller understanding of the types of power expressed in social life and crucially applied it to organisations. Raven (1999) advanced several typologies of power, identifying five types;
coercive, reward, legitimate (with several sub-categories), expert, and reference. This particular work built upon earlier joint work on power typologies (French & Raven, 1958). Raven also mentions informational power as a base for power, although he noted that this was socially independent.

This thesis concentrates on the power types of coercive, reward, and legitimate, as Raven did not believe the power types of ‘expert’ and ‘reference’ necessarily required surveillance to be effective, and as such, regardless of their merits, the discussion on these two is limited in this work. Hales (2001) adds to the typologies of French and Raven (1958) and Raven (1999) by suggesting the power resource as well as the typology is equally as important. He identifies four such resources,

- **Physical power**, the capacity to harm others
- **Economic power**, to mean the power of money
- **Normative power**, meaning power over beliefs, values, and meanings
- **Knowledge power**, power associated with a specific administrative or technical skill – not dissimilar to Raven’s expert typology.

Expert and reference power typologies are according to Raven, valuable bases of power. For expert, the display of diplomas and memberships seen in solicitors’ offices are a good example. Whereas for reference or referent power, invoking the notion of ‘that’s the way that [insert name of revered person] would want you to do it’ could possibly work as a mild form of coercion. For Raven regardless of how valuable such power typologies are, and regardless of how they might be used in some organisations, neither expert nor reference power are directly affected by the use of surveillance. Unlike the legitimate power typologies that rely in one form or another, on surveillance (or monitoring) to be effective.

An argument can be made that experts, and therefore expert power, are susceptible to workplace surveillance as much as other workers and typologies are. One needs look no further than the UK Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) for academics to see workplace surveillance of experts in operation. Although in the context of power typologies, Raven, French, and Hales, all view the power associated with an expert as being where individuals conform to others based on their superior knowledge. Hales does differ slightly by further associating expert power with a resource as well as a typology, which might in specific circumstances compromise the relationship with surveillance. For this research, there was
arguably only one interviewee who might be classed as an ‘expert’ in the sense Hales suggested.

The study of coercion in exchange relationships and exchange networks was earlier touched upon as being an important aspect. There is however, a subtle distinction between coercion as an element of exchange, and coercive power. Coercive power can be distinguished as an overt threat where “individuals exert power over others in organizations partly through mechanisms of reward and partly through sanction” (Stanton & Stam, 2003, p. 157). In the workplace, managers or employers employ variations of coercion. For example, rewarding Call Centre operatives who meet quality or performance targets, or coercing operatives who fail to meet targets with implicit or explicit threats to their employment. This is on the face of it, power based on the premise, ‘I know what you are doing and how well you are doing it’. However, the exercise of power based on the twinned concepts of reward and coercion, are only part of the ‘power’ tools available for management or employers. Raven argued that regardless of whether the basis of the power is centred on coercive power, or the flip-side to it, that of reward power, both of which can be seen in the example above, they are “specifically dependent on acts of surveillance” (Raven, 1999, p. 164).

In the power typologies discussed, there are elements of both control and consent. Control by the manager/employer over individual workers’ performances or activities, and consent by the manager/worker to achieve acceptable levels of outputs or attaining prescribed targets. The control aspect of the relationship, particularly between a manager(s) and a worker(s), or manager(s) and employer, are complex as they draw on numerous external and internal factors. Some of which are potentially unmanageable regardless of your position in the hierarchy of organisation. Control for example, can be manifest in the day-to-day interactions between actors, perhaps built into the workplace holistically or culturally, in the processes, language, actions, and terms of service – Perrow’s so-called “third-order controls” (cited in Weick, 2001, p. 77). Weick saw such controls as being integral to the running of an organisation.

Managers can also enrol the customer as a “mechanism for controlling employees’ efforts” (Edwards, 2003, p. 350). Although for one of the participant organisations in the research, this was a step too far in their 360° appraisal system. Personal interaction in the form of workplace gossiping is also a particularly strong source of interpersonal or relational power according to Kurland and Pelled (2000), although both these sources can be usefully used as part of other
control strategies. Edwards (1979) refers to other forms of control being embedded in the bureaucratic, social, and organisational structure of the workplace. He indicates that these forms of control are built into the job, job categories, work rules, promotion procedures, discipline, wage scales, and definitions of responsibilities. Edwards (1979) goes on to suggest that these bureaucratic controls establish the primary basis for control in the workplace.

Bradshaw-Camball and Murray (1991) also speak of how the use of different forms of verbal communication in a workplace setting can also bring about a deeper understanding of the structures of power and control in organisations. This view further reinforces the social exchange aspect of control. Anthropologists also examined the way organisations work as a group of people who “equip themselves materially and adopt rules of status and rules of performance from carrying out their activities and satisfying certain needs” (Firth, 1954, p. 9). Thus indicating the structural controls in the workplace are not new to academics.

4.4 Exchange in the Workplace

The conventional starting point for an exchange is that ‘A has something that B wants’; for example, the university wishes to educate, for which the student pays tuition fees (in part) to be educated. Both willingly enter into the exchange because it offers more utility than any other option currently available to them. Within these simple exchanges, there are a number of direct and indirect exchanges taking place in this example. There are the direct exchange relationships between the University (as employer) and a Lecturer (the employee), between a Lecturer and a Student, and between the Student and the University (via tuition fees). There also exist direct relationships between the University and the many external funding bodies, commercial and research of all colours. There are also the indirect exchanges between Student and Student, and Lecturer and Lecturer, between the University and the RAE, and the Research Councils and the Student and the Research Councils.

While in the direct exchanges both sides are arguably better off after the exchange, they are however, not necessarily better off than they might have been if the exchange had not taken place (Heath, 1976). That is to say, in the specific example above, if the student chooses not to go to University they are not necessarily better off for not attending or for not listening to a lecturer. Equally, for a lecturer who may at some point ply their trade elsewhere. At its most basic level, each side has something the other wants and any arrangement entered into is nominally a voluntary one.
Another, less conventional exchange (particularly in the workplace) is where ‘A wants to give something to B’, what would conventionally be referred to as a gift. When ‘A offers a gift’ (or bribe), two alternative interpretations are possible, 1) something might be expected in return, a typical quid pro quo with the roles reversed, as in Akerlof’s “partial gift exchange” (1982, p. 543), as in a typical employment relationship, or 2) nothing is expected in return. In the first instance, the exchange is not immediately explicit or tangible (an immediate request to exchange an entity for another does not fit the premise of wanting to ‘give’ something. It is a simple rephrasing of ‘A has something B wants’). In the second instance, if nothing is expected in return, an altruistic act, in which case no exchange takes place, except perhaps in an abstract sense where, goodwill, trust, or social bonding might be involved. An example of this type of exchange emerged in Homans work on ‘Cash Posters’ where workers were required to undertake a minimum of 300 transactions per hour, no bonus payments were in effect. It served workers no purpose to exceed the 300 level, yet the average shift worker produced 353, thus ‘gifting’ the employer 53 transactions for no apparent reason (Homans, 1954).

Akerlof (1982) referred to the employment (labour) contract as a ‘partial gift exchange’ where workers without threat of redundancy or disciplinary action will still exceed working expectations. He sought to explain the partial gift exchange in the strict economic terms of a pure market exchange. However, he concluded that,

“In gift exchange, buyers may be willing to pay more than the minimum at which they can purchase a commodity or factor service because of the effect of the terms of exchange on the norms. Similarly, sellers may be willing to accept less than the maximum at which they can sell a commodity or factor service because of the effects of the terms of exchange on the norms” (Akerlof, 1982, p. 568).

While not all human interactions require or involve an explicit exchange, be it social, behavioural, or economic, invisible knots bind the exchanges to the wider society. For instance, in the workplace, one could not expect an employee to undertake an illegal act just because an employer or a manager says they should do it. As Mauss (In: Ekeh, 1974) points out, all exchange processes are imbued with a morality both independent and outside of the actual exchange. This applies to any form of exchange, reciprocal or even coerced. Gouldner (1960) in his ‘norm of reciprocity’ exemplifies how these knots bind interpersonal relationships, lending credence and a shape to that relationship.
4.4.1 Equity

Highly influential on an individual’s perceptions of an exchange, particularly in the workplace, is whether it is equitable. The legitimate power of equity, as in Adam’s (1963) equity theory, draws on the notion that employees (and employers) in the labour market wish for, ‘a fair days work for a fair days pay’. Although Edwards (1979) considers that this is a somewhat fallacious argument, unless of course, you really know for each individual what a fair days work really is. In his original research, Adams used a number of experiments to identify inequity. These experiments concentrated on wage inequity, in part because of their importance, but also because of the “availability of methods to measure the marginal utility of wages” (Adams, 1963, p. 422). Adams deliberately stopped short of looking at the more complex relationships instead he chose to concentrate on money as one of, “the simpler aspects of inequity” (Adams, 1963, p. 422). Although Adams (1963) was at pains to indicate that the exchange taking place was not purely an economic one, and that fairness and perceptions of fairness are more important. On the other side of the equity exchange, for the Person, (the one who gauges whether equity exists in the exchange), Adams placed a more eclectic mix of education, sex, intelligence, training, skills, social status, and importantly the amount of effort put into the work.

Adams initial skewing towards pay inequity rather than the so-called ‘higher order’ inequities, led to a concentration by future researchers on applying pay equity as the obvious means of control and power in the manager/worker relationship (Akerlof, 1984). Yet, Herzberg’s (1968) motivators and hygiene model indicates that salary comes particularly low down as a motivating factor for managers. For some managers, achievement, recognition, responsibility, advancement, and the work itself, often play a more important role than pay (Herzberg, 1968; Nicholson, 2003). In circumstances where other factors dominate, the effect on equity/inequity could be stark, in that the plea of a ‘fair days work for a fair days pay’ is reduced considerably. Nevertheless, when the other factors are taken into account by the Person, equity can still exist, but only when the Person believes that their input to the exchange, balances the outputs of the exchange.

On the issue of financial reward, individuals will sometimes take lower paid employment or no pay at all if the reward is for example, more experience. Indeed, the American system of internship works on such a basis. However, inequity theory is not without its critics. Goodman
and Friedman (1971) indicate that lowering employee self-esteem might have more of a role to play in any behavioural changes rather than to any feelings of equity. Research by Oz, Glass and Behling (1999) does suggest that electronic surveillance should be used more equitably across all levels of employee, managers, supervisors, and workers. This finding was argued as evidence of equity theory in action. It claimed that employees saw universal (managers and workers) electronic monitoring of the workforce as more equitable. Of course, it did not deal with the issue of whether it was right to monitor employees in the first place, and if it was not right, whether employees might resist.

### 4.4.2 Resistance/Reactance

Workplace surveillance differs from social surveillance in the multiplicity of overt and covert acts of resistance available to those surveilled. As a society, we can resist surveillance and the power associated with it, there is however limited scope for resistance available to a society. Whereas in the workplace, resistance has become a way for employees to exert power, by using, “the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point” (Foucault In: Dreyfus, Rabinow & Foucault, 1983, p. 208). In the workplace, acts of resistance are manifold. They would typically range from outright sabotage to absenteeism (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999), and from theft to excessive computer game playing (Botan & Vorvoreanu, 2000).

As a guide to workplace surveillance, if an employee perceives that any surveillance undertaken by management is inequitable, he or she, might adjust or compensate their behaviour, or “find a way to beat the surveillance” (Botan & Vorvoreanu, 2000). This echoes an earlier reference by Kruglanski (1970), who suggests employees might double-cross or get back at supervisors. This perception of inequity is not in these instances an economic consideration it is one of fairness.

As suggested earlier in the chapter, there is a possibility that by increasing the financial reward (perhaps excessively) it might mollify any discontent. The offer of rewards or inducements after the event would not necessarily eliminate the initial feelings engendered, although it would dampen them down. Ford Motor Company tried such inducements with the offer of ‘$5 a day’ wage; the scheme was initially popular however, there were strict conditions linked to the plan. There was a 50/50 split of pay and performance bonus and all workers had to comply
with enforcement of a no drinking and no gambling policy\(^27\) (not unlike schemes operated by Rowntree, Cadbury, and Lever in the UK). In addition, all workers should become ‘Americanized’ and learn English, due in part to the high numbers of immigrant workers. Over time, resentment (resistance) to the scheme built up, because of the severe working practices and an inability to unionise, and the failure by Ford to increase the $5 a day across all factories (almost a decade later $5 was still the going rate\(^28\)). Of course, another way for a worker to resolve the issue of discontent might be to resist, misbehave, or leave. Homans and Akerlof also showed, that the ‘partial gift exchange’ might actually work to an employer’s advantage with workers (there is no reason to believe that managers would not be equally as susceptible to partial gift exchanges) to increase productivity.

The notion of resistance to the different forms of exchange and exchange relationships has thus far only been suggested. For example, the perception, or reality, that an employee, at any level, is being coerced into doing something can lead them to believe themselves restricted in their possible responses. They are nonetheless motivated to respond in some way, and do so against the perceived restriction. This is resistance. The notion of resistance is complex; when used, the term can describe a range of activities. It can describe opposition, abuse, control, objecting, violence, and silence. In the workplace, it can describe, “working slowly, feigning sickness, wearing particular types of clothing, or stealing from one’s employer” (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004, p. 536). Resistance can be individual or collective, widespread or local, coordinated or uncoordinated. What all resistance has in common is a target and an action (opposing). It can be high profile or low profile. Indeed it can be so low profile and innocuous as to go unnoticed by all except the protagonists. For example, the theft of a company car would be noticed; however, the theft of a paperclip or a rubber band would more than likely go unnoticed. The theft of company time due to tardiness might go unnoticed for weeks in some organisations, particularly by senior management. In contrast, in some organisations the lateness and attendance of workers is strictly surveilled and that information could be used to take disciplinary action against the worker. Comparing the two examples, in one instance the resistance was observable but not acted upon, and in the other it was observable (by managers and by computer) and acted upon by the more powerful.

\(^{27}\) [http://www.michigan.gov/hal/0,1607,7-160-17451_18670_18793-53441--00.html] [accessed 6 September 2008]

\(^{28}\) [http://hamptonroads.com/node/67531] [accessed 7 September 2008]
Sociologically, resistance in the workplace can be seen as an attempt to wrest (or rebalance) control away from the employer/manager whether the action is “verbal, cognitive or physical” (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004, p. 536). Psychologically or behaviourally, resistance can be seen as a manifestation of Brehm’s (1966) theory of ‘psychological reactance’. Brehm’s (1966) theory of psychological reactance proposes that when a person has had their choices removed, and in seeking to introduce control back into the situation, acts accordingly, i.e. they resist. In an exchange, especially a coerced exchange, psychological reactance can engender motivations where either party can interpret the action negatively, perhaps because it makes them feel unduly obligated, or it reduces their perceptions of individual freedom (Organ, 1974). Employees who regularly over-fulfil their job requirements i.e. undertake more work than their job description requires, without recognition for it, will over time feel “overwhelmed, exhausted, frustrated, cynical, and angry” (Maslach and Leiter, 1999 In: Van Dyne & Butler Ellis, 2005, p. 190). Indeed, the higher the feeling of reactance the more individuals feel they need to re-establish feelings of control over the threatened loss of freedom (Van Dyne & Butler Ellis, 2005).

Psychological reactance is the reaction that occurs when an attempt is made to rebalance the perceived unfairness of any situation that reduces the number of behavioural alternatives available to any party, at any one time. Relating it to this study, if an exchange, regardless of whether it is a reciprocal or coercive, involves negative perceptions from either side, ‘psychological reactance’ or resistance to the event can occur. The first stage of reactance (the perception), is where the individual perceives the occurrence as being unfair, unjust, or unreasonable. Almost in tandem to the first stage, the second stage commences, (the acceptance), this is where a decision is taken by the individual that this event is indeed unfair/unjust. At some stage afterwards (the precise timing of which could be several hours, days, or even weeks), the third stage (the action), takes place and the decision to rebalance, and how to rebalance, takes place. The precise timing of when the rebalancing activity will take place is not at this stage identified, just the notion that some form of rebalancing will occur. Brehm specifically linked reactance to the workplace by identifying workplace relationships as an area where behavioural freedoms can be eliminated through threats of punishment or loss of reward (Brehm, 1966).

Psychological reactance is further described as “…a motivational state directed toward the re-establishment of the behaviours which have been eliminated or threatened with elimination. … by whatever means are available and appropriate” (underscoring added, Brehm, 1966, p. 9).
Bringing the notion of psychological reactance more closely into this research, Organ (1974) indicated that surveillance is a parameter that critically influences perceptions of manipulation in an exchange situation. Crucially, in a high surveillance environment, there is an adverse perception that any exchange taking place is substantially different than in low surveillance situations, or as Organ puts it,

“the dynamics of the social exchange process in the superior-subordinate dyad depend on such situational variables as extent of surveillance and, by inference, the perceptual and attributional processes of the subordinate as they are affected by such variables” (Organ, 1974, p. 140).

Reactance can also take place when the perceived elimination of a freedom (by which is meant: free choices to behave in a particular way) even if that perceived injustice/freedom elimination “…has nothing to do with him, personally” (Brehm, 1966, p. 17). Resistance (as a possible result of the reactance) can equally apply to the actions of managers as well as workers. There is no discernable difference in the perceptions of a manager to a negative exchange, than any other employee, either between either them and their line manager or their employer, or between them and other employees. There are both clear links and alluded links to psychological reactance in a number of psychological experiments, such as Milgram’s (1963) ethically discredited obedience experiments, and the repeat of the Stamford prison experiments conducted by Zimbardo/BBC television29. The recent film The Wave [Die Welle] (2008), similarly sought to demonstrate the malleability of children, based loosely on a presumed authentic classroom experiment in 1967. The results of a number of experiments indicate that workgroups, supervisors, and individuals will freely undertake and justify tasks/roles previously thought to be objectionable. Somewhat similarly, albeit considerably less extreme, a state of psychological reactance occurs when employees assume and complete tasks not thought within their normal remit of the individual/group. This is especially true when no formal recognition for the task is made (Van Dyne & Butler Ellis, 2005). Psychological reactance also includes “Self-perceptions as well as subjective beliefs about personal abrogation of freedom” (Van Dyne & Butler Ellis, 2005, p. 190). If the threat is perceived as being personally relevant, the link between the threat and psychological reactance will be stronger, especially if the threat is “important, salient, broad, and ongoing” (Van Dyne & Butler Ellis, 2005).

How managers in this research behave to the suggested incidence of psychological reactance and resistance is addressed in Chapter Seven.

4.4.3 Community

This closing sub-section looks at why the creation of communities in the workplace by way of teamworking (and virtual teamworking), is a relevant part of the exchange process. Etzioni (2000, p. 188), indicates that simply having “a shared set of norms and values” or where there is a web of relationships criss-crossing and reinforcing each other is sufficient to be called a community. In its simplest sense, a community is, "... a group in which individuals come together based on an obligation to one another, or as a group in which individuals come together to be one in purpose" (Rothaermel & Sugiyama, 2001, p. 298). Etzioni qualifies his own comments by suggesting that aggregations of people do not necessarily imply a community in the material world, therefore one should not conclude that aggregations (albeit larger) of people in a virtual world (e.g. virtual teamworking) should automatically be termed as community, unless the aggregations meet the prerequisites of community. That is, “...the aggregation only becomes a community, if they perceive it to be so” (Ward, 1999, p. 96). Teamworking in organisations can be described as a group of individuals coming together with a common purpose. A team can therefore reasonably be said to be a transitory or transient version of community, brought together to achieve an aim.

Conventional workplace communities are associated with one of the traditional meaning of community, as provided by Tönnies (1887). He wrote of Gemeinschaft (communities) being of mind, blood, and particularly locality. Clearly, the latter association is the more likely, although it is not unheard of for families to work for the same employer. Communities are more likely to ally themselves to a shared goal/s and a wider enrichment of society, the former would find common ground in most workplaces, unlike the latter. The suggestion that community plays a valuable role in the workplace is easy to see, as communities either in the workplace or in the wider society are more likely to involve themselves in reciprocal exchanges, and exchange processes, although they are not necessarily a prerequisite.

Places of work are often referred to as communities, even those that are conducted remotely and disparate, as in teleworking or virtual teamworking. In those circumstances, a classification in keeping with Webber’s ‘communities without propinquity’ (Calhoun, 1998; Driskell & Lyon, 2002) is particularly apt. Some organisations talk of their workplace as a community or family,
as do some workers. Managers frequently embrace the idea of community in order to produce results. Indeed some human resource practitioners talk of creating a ‘global workplace community’.\(^{30}\) By which they mean, a community created where it is in everyone’s interests to engender a culture that actively embraces Etzioni’s norms and values, rather than the old-fashioned rural sense of community Tönnies bemoaned losing. Some of the organisations that ‘engineer cultures’ (Ezzy, 2001), are heavily dependent on technology, nonetheless, they can still be subject to resistance to the corporate culture that has been engineered. Workers will, like Tönnies before them, baulk at a simulacrum of community, as it is engineered in such a way as to diminish a relevant component of Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft, that of trust.

### 4.5 Research Questions

A number of themes emerged from the literature review. However, there are two major themes standing out. Both themes have a single sub-theme, the themes and sub-themes are linked to the nature of the employment relationship and the psychological contract. Coyle-Shapiro and Conway argue that our current understanding of the employment relationship was “… too simplistic and reductionist” (Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2005). They went on to indicate that too much empirical research assumed that an exchange takes place. This study seeks to correct that assumption, in that this research clearly identifies the nature of the exchange. The research specifically looks at the exchanges that take place for managers, either in day-to-day management involving surveillance, or in appraisal systems. The exchange taking place in this research might be between the manager and their team, or between the manager and their own line manager/employer.

The first theme is associated with the subtleties and intricacies of the locus of control fashioned by workplace surveillance and its impact on the psychological contract aspect of the employment relationship. This is an important first theme as it provides understanding of the role that the surveillance mechanisms have on their locus of control, and how managers in this research manage. What emerges is a picture of the manager whose authority and ability to manage is under threat, not from colleagues, but from the mountain of quantitative and computer generated measurements.

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This section of analysis draws on aspects of social psychology and particularly psychological reactance to help understand the manager's reactions. The associated themes closely revolve around the role of surveillance in management today. Managers are pivotal in the psychological aspect of the employment contract; being both a donor and recipient. Equally, managers are increasingly reliant on computer generated quantitative data or performance management gathered using computers. It is appropriate that the role of the current business manager should be researched. This research takes a fresh look at the impact surveillance and the amounts of quantitative data generated by the surveillance have on the role of the manager. It asks, whether there is a perception from managers that their abilities are being undermined by the increasing reliance of quantitative measures.

In addition to the managers control over themselves, some of the organisations in this research actively sought to encourage (through the managers) surveillance and control over employee’s behaviours, albeit with a claimed view to creating a more efficient and productive organisation. Bogard (2006) makes this point, that the smoothest form of control is not just an efficient one, but a pre-efficient one, “...that is, it eliminates problems before they emerge, absolutely, before they even have the chance to become problems. This is hyper control, the ultimate resolution to the problem of efficiency” (Bogard, 2006, p. 60: italics in original). Edwards (1979) also drew together aspects of behavioural control and modification in his Polaroid case study, saying that it is “...the intensification of work, through the mechanism of rewarding behavior relevant to the control system, rather than simply to the work itself, that imposes the new behavior requirements on workers” (Edwards, 1979, p. 148). During the course of the research, it emerged that this type of control was being exerted. Several of the organisations in the research included behaviour modification as determinants in annual appraisals. This activity influences the psychological aspect of the employment relationship, as managers both subject, and are subjected to this type of surveillance.

The second theme revolves around network exchange relationships. It deals with how managers react and interact with more than one person. Cook and Emerson (1978) identified where there is power (influence) used in any unbalanced exchange relationship (between employer and manager or manager/supervisor and worker) then the outcome will be one of “pronounced inequity” (Cook & Emerson, 1978, p. 728). They noted that when the participants in the exchange were cognisant of the value of the exchange, regardless of the power (influence) used, they were able to manipulate the situation to obviate power thereby obtaining a more equitable exchange. When individuals were aware of how important an
exchange is for someone, they are able to manipulate the situation much in the same way as has been seen in dyadic relationships, a specific example of Kuhn’s principle of least interest (Kuhn, 1964).

The research examines perceived inequity and how the inequity is resolved. In these exchange relationships, just how do managers manifest their inequity of their perceived injustice of having to manage based on a computer-generated set of performance indicators. Coyle-Shapiro and Conway (2005), indicate that there is less understanding of how social exchange evolves over time and how exchange networks operate in larger organisations. They go on to suggest that social psychology might go some of the way to explain the phenomena. A great deal has been made in this chapter and the previous chapter of the psychology of surveillance and of the psychological aspects to appraisals. In both cases, light can be thrown on the findings using the lens of exchange. Some of the questions the research seeks to answer, are, what is the specific impact for managers? Has the plethora of quantitative data altered how managers exchange? What is the impact of surveillance/monitoring on managers, and has it increased resistance? Are managers simply resistant to the uses and impact of the technology, perhaps seeing it as substituting their knowledge for the knowledge embedded in technological solutions?

The specific research questions for this study are as follows,

1. What is the impact of workplace surveillance and the use of quantitative performance measures on how managers manage?
2. What is the nature of the exchange relationship in light of question one?
3. In light of questions one and question two, what forms of resistance, if any, do managers undertake to seek to re-balance any perceptions of inequity/inequality?
4. How can we better understand how managers react?

This chapter has sought to enlighten the reader on aspects on two linked and vital components of this study. Firstly, the subtleties and complexities of exchange and the importance exchange plays in the workplace as part of both the psychological contract and the wider employment relationship. Second, it sought to create an understanding of the manager’s relationship towards exchange through power typologies; it also identified how individual managers perceptions of inequity can result in resistance via reactance. By examining these themes through the lens of exchange, this research seeks to answer the questions.
The following chapter will detail the methodology that underpins this research. It will also specify the precise methods employed to obtain the answers to the research questions. It sets out how the organisations were selected and the negotiation processes. It will detail ontological and epistemological outlooks and theoretical perspectives. It concludes by looking at the organisations, the interviewees, and the methods of coding and analysis.
CHAPTER FIVE

Methodology

The research questions stated in Chapter Four revolve around the impact of surveillance and surveillance activities on the exchange relationships of managers. To achieve answers to these questions requires robust research methods and a sound methodology. This chapter discusses the philosophical and strategic methodology, the data collection methods, and the data analysis. It examines some of the more challenging areas of data collection by looking at telephoned qualitative research interviews. In terms of data collection, it demonstrates why the qualitative interview is believed to be the most appropriate single method for this research and how using this method provided a quality and richness of data that would be hard to find elsewhere. As Kvale (1996) suggests, if you want to understand how people understand their world, you should talk to them.

The methodology for this study follows in the tradition of numerous academic texts in seeking to add to the accumulated knowledge and the deeper interpretation and understanding of conceptual issues. Importantly, the methodology (as a strategy) is consistent with a number of other works in surveillance studies. The chapter links together the elements of epistemology, theoretical perspective, methodology (as a research strategy), and methods. It aims to conform to the requirements identified by Hart: that it establishes a command of the research processes, concepts and ideas. It also shows there is a logic and rationale to the research, demonstrating that all the positions revealed are consistent with each other, and there is an
understanding of the role each of the processes has in bringing the research study to a successful conclusion (Hart, 1998). Meeting these requirements also helps ensure the outcomes of the research are sound and convincing.

The link between ‘exchange’ and philosophy date back to the works of Hobbes and Locke in the mid-late 17th century. Hobbes referred to a social contract or covenant within which individual’s trade “a measure of unrestrained freedom for a measure of security” (Rigney, 2001, p. 105). Reconciling this dilemma of how much freedom to give for a measure of security is an ongoing philosophical debate for both exchange and surveillance.

The chapter is divided into four sections. It commences with a brief exposition on the initial steps of the study. This is followed by some comments on the reliability and validity of the findings provides a sound academic basis for this chapter. There follows a discussion on subjectivity and reflexivity and the impact both make, not just to the research data, but also to the research as a whole. The discussion provides a philosophical explication on how the research is imbued with reflexive thinking, and how for researchers the act of self-reflection is “often claimed as a methodological virtue and source of superior insight, perspicacity or awareness” (Lynch, 2000, p. 26). It then sets out the epistemological and ontological positions, followed by the theoretical perspective. Two smaller sub-sections look at the reasons behind the research and identify any axiological concerns. In the third sub-section, there is a description of the primary data collection methods, followed by a detailed discussion on how to conduct successfully telephoned semi-structured interviews. The next section profiles the organisations and individuals involved in the research, looks at the formulation of the interview questions, the data gathering, and how the interviews were transcribed, coded, and analysed. The final section links into the exchange and psychological aspects, thus providing the final pieces in the methodological puzzle.

Despite the wide range of individual participants and the number of organisations involved in the study, the research does not claim to be totally representative of all businesses or organisation in the UK. Nor does it claim to be fully representative of the positions of all managers in the UK. What it can and does provide is a representative snapshot, across a mixed segment of industries from the UK. Eisenhardt and Graebner suggest that theoretical sampling takes place as it “means that cases are selected because they are particularly suitable for illuminating and extending relationships” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 27). That is arguably the case here. The findings that emerge in this research are consistent throughout.
Thus demonstrating that the sampling method is robust, and second, that managers from different industries and different sectors express the same doubts and inadequacies about their roles at work, and the impact of surveillance in the workplace.

5.1 First Steps

The first step on the research process is “a human thought” (Remenyi, 2002, p. 38). All other research processes and choices follow from this initial thought. The processes should, according to Crotty (2003), all fit together as a set of interlinked sections. The theory of knowledge should be embedded in the theoretical perspective, which in turn should be reflected in the methodology, and the methods used to achieve a successful outcome should be consistent with the methodology.

Neuman identifies it is a sequence consisting of seven steps (2000). It starts with the research topic, leading to the research question, followed by the design of the study. Neuman suggests pausing at this point to allow a number of iterations to finalise the research design. Then, once the design is completed, the data collection process commences, followed by the analysis and interpretation. The conclusion to all these processes is the synthesis and dissemination of the findings by informing others of the outcomes of the thesis by publication.

This research broadly follows Neuman’s outline, only deviating from the sequence during the data collection phase. A hiatus in the data collection of around a month provided a period of reflection and contemplation to redefine and refocus questions. Kvale (1996) suggests that such a period of reflection is a useful tool for researchers. The period also allowed some preliminary analysis to take place.

This chapter demonstrates the reliability of the results by identifying that in different organisations, different managers, some at different levels of seniority, all express broadly similar opinions regardless of their own circumstances. Indeed, the similarity of expressions even extended to the use of the same language and terms in different organisations. Developing reliability in the research can be achieved by using multiple case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989), multiple case studies act as a basis for recognising patterns of relationships, and that case studies “emphasise the rich real-world context” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Others cite how the transparency of a project is a useful mechanism for reliability (Silverman, 2006). In this research, transparency extended to the neutrality of the questioning. Although
questioning remained neutral wherever possible, there was in some interviews an almost tacit acknowledgment or impression that the ‘elephant in the room’ (i.e. the subject of surveillance) had become evident.

In addition to ensuring the reliability of the research, steps were taken to ensure its validity. The use of the constant comparative method is something Silverman (2006), citing Peräkylä, suggests is an appropriate method of validating qualitative research, particularly recorded interviews. In this instance, it was achieved by comparing the preliminary data from one organisation, for arguments sake, Roses plc, to the completed data in another organisation, say Tulip plc, then comparing Tulip plc, to Chestnut plc on an ongoing basis. The validity of the research is further underpinned by Searle’s argument, cited again by Silverman (2006), of making sure there were accurate recording of observations and verbatim accounts of what people say. In practice, this meant that a comprehensive contemporaneous written and spoken research diary containing notes was kept, and that the listening and transcription of audio was checked and rechecked. These practices lend further credence to validation and authentication processes.

Some social scientists seek to understand the social world by conducting research without affecting the social world that they are investigating. Others deliberately seek to alter it. Like the subjects of their study, researchers interpret their world through a lens that is coloured by their own Lebenswelt or ‘lifeworld’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Researchers should be aware of their philosophical positioning, as without this subjective knowledge, the value of several other processes is devalued.

In that sense subjectivity can be seen as a complex understanding of the ways in which relations between sometimes conflicting and contradictory positions are reconciled (Walkerdine, Lucey & Melody, 2002). It is not simply a case of the researcher being aware of personal influences. All human actors have purposive characteristics, that is not to say that researchers intentionally commence their research with “definite goals consciously held in mind during the course of their activities” (Giddens, 2002, p. 233). To do so pre-supposes even at an unconscious level, that researchers set out thinking about the intended and unintended consequences of their research. The complex nature of how these positions are reconciled makes that type of reasoning redundant.
In contrast, the act of being self-reflective is different from subjectivity in that it is a personal act. It refers to the process of a researcher reflecting on the ways in which personal beliefs, values, and experiences affect the research. Self-reflection in research should be both a statement of intent and a demonstration of competence (Giddens, 1976). It is therefore vital that the researcher deliberately adopts a neutral position, seeking whenever possible not to influence the world that they are investigating. As Weick indicates, reflection involves two distinct guises, the promotion of wisdom, and an articulation of the ‘big picture’ (Weick, 2001). Given the potentially contentious nature of this research, an initial awareness of the issues is a large stride towards neutrality. An awareness of the influence a researcher might have on the research could be classed as epistemological reflexivity, being the wider way in which a researcher influences the research. This contrasts with the philosophical positioning of subjectivity as a more impersonal, pragmatic and deliberate act.

Reflexivity, on the other hand, is an important and practical tool in the workbench of a qualitative researcher. It has been defined thus, “Reflexivity involves reflecting on the way in which research is carried out and understanding how the process of doing research shapes its outcomes” (Hardy, Phillips & Clegg, 2001, p. 533). Although, reflexivity can be a double-edged sword, some researchers see it as a way to enhance the objectivity of their research. Whereas others interpret the same processes as ones that can undermine the objectivity of the research (Lynch, 2000). Reflexivity should be an ongoing experience, and as such could be characterised as a journey, rather than an arrival.

Given this study’s research area, the circular and iterative processes involved in reflexive thinking are fittingly played out and echoed in a number of organisational and management theories. This is most notable in double-loop (Argyris & Schon, 1978) and triple-loop learning (Flood and Romme, 1996, In: Romme & Van Witteloostuijn, 1999). Nonaka and Takeuchi’s ‘Knowledge Spiral’ (1995), which is derived from Japanese management techniques, is another iterative process, one that seeks to counter Weber’s (1964) ‘top-down’ hierarchical and Taylor’s Scientific Management (2005) models of knowledge creation and dissemination, thus providing a ‘middle-up-down’ approach, that plays on the recursive aspects of organisational learning.

The iterations seen in knowledge spirals, double loop or triple loop learning are arguably based on early theoretical work by Bateson (1942), who argued that learning processes fall into either proto-learning, where the learning process is a simple one, as in learning by rote, or
deutero-learning, which is the more complex, secondary form of learning. The more relevant of these two types is deutero-learning, where the actors begin “learning to learn” (Bateson, 2000, p. 166), anticipating and dealing with forthcoming actions and events by learning from past experience. This learning style goes beyond simple or proto-learning, and draws on experiential and tacit knowledge to make decisions. This particular line of thinking resonates strongly as ‘knowing what you know’ and reflecting on it, goes to the heart of being self-reflective.

This study carefully considered aspects where personal bias might colour the research, from its inception through to its completion. For instance, in the course of constructing the initial access letter, a number of changes to the phrasing took place to avoid any possibility of misinterpretation, particularly in relation to the inclusion or use of the words surveillance and monitoring. While changes to the phrasing and use of these words is at one level a pragmatic one, “Because surveillance brings to mind images of spies, coercion and Big Brother in the public imagination, characterizing a particular practice as ‘surveillance’ at the outset of our research can be counterproductive in terms of securing research access” (Ball & Haggerty, 2005, p. 134). At another level, by deliberately avoiding the use of words like surveillance and monitoring in a contact letter, it might pre-empt or avoid altogether the accidental introduction of bias by the organisation at a later date, if they subsequently agreed access.

In any qualitative research, there is invariably a great deal of rewording and reworking of interview questions before the interviews commence as part of the normal honing process. In this research, some additional reworking of questions took place during the interviewing phase. Questions that appeared perfectly reasonable on paper, when used in earnest required reworking to comply with organisational and cultural norms and language. Utilising the correct local and appropriate terms for each organisation, was one area where changes were made.

From the outset, this researcher sought to eliminate the possibility of bias by initially amending the content in letters and revising interview questions ‘on the hoof’. The participating organisations were given some guidance for providing a non-biased and representative sample. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate bias altogether. In this study, the organisations were asked to give assurances that the sample they provided would be representative. Nonetheless, it had to be taken on trust that the individuals selected by the organisations were not chosen deliberately to represent a particular viewpoint of the organisation. Similarly, it is always unknown to what extent, if any, that primary data contains
bias, perhaps introduced by a rogue interviewee or by someone averse to the process of selection by an employer as an interviewee. As Lynch puts it, any “person can deliberately set out to mislead others” (Lynch, 2000, p. 46). It is not believed that any sample bias was introduced, nor did any ‘sabotage’ of the data take place.

### 5.1.1 Ontology and Epistemology

The following brief sub-section examines the ontological and epistemological perspectives. The former relates to what we know, and the latter refers to the discovery of knowledge, the ‘how we know what we know’ and the means by which we know it.

The ontological position in this study is the one that best reflects the social reality of the primary research. It borrows from the “reflexive social science writer” position indicated by Watson when he wrote of organisational dialogues (Watson, 1995, p. 811). It relies on the assumptions that the discourse, knowledge, views, and understandings of individuals create their own social reality. In the case of Watson, using analysis to “relate the arguments to issues and debates in the existing literature” (Watson, 1995, p. 808). In this research, that meant drawing on a range of techniques to identify the key discourses that emerged in this study, those of the contemporary roles of a manager, and the impact (positive and negative) of surveillance in the workplace.

Watson’s notion of ‘strategic exchange’ plays an important role in understanding the data. The strategic exchange perspective is a way of examining “individual and social human life in a way which draws on a range of ideas from social theory” (Watson, 1994, p. 25). Watson makes a link between the process-rational perspective for organisations and strategic exchange for understanding the human actions of managers. These positions are also fully consistent with the analysis.

Frequently spoken of in the same breath as the ontology, is the epistemology. In this study, it is that of constructionism. Constructionism proposes that “meaning is not discovered but constructed” (Crotty, 2003, p. 42). It emphasises the way in which individuals socially construct reality, as Berger and Luckmann state “man produces reality and therefore produces himself” (Berger & Luckmann, 1991, p. 204). The difference between ontology and epistemology can best be summed up as the difference between the “what is” (ontology) and the “what it means to know” (epistemology) (Crotty, 2003, p. 10).
Underpinning the epistemology of constructionism is the theoretical perspective of interpretivism, which, at a commonsense level, is simply interpreting the data generated in the study. Interpretation permeates a range of activities in the study, from interpretation of the literature and the interview data, to the analysis. An example drawn from the research illustrates this very point. During an interview, an interviewee might ask for a set of window blinds to be closed. The meaning behind such a simple request would only be available to those present at the time. One interpretation might be that it was a simple request for shade from the sun. Another might be to keep the interviewee’s presence hidden, or for some other reason associated with personal privacy. All the possibilities are feasible, and all depending on the context are perfectly reasonable. Each request requires an interpretation based on individual circumstances. This is not a hypothetical situation. They took place during the interview phase in this research. In one instance the request to close the blinds was to keep the sun out of someone’s eyes, in another instance, closing the blinds was for personal privacy, while in another occasion the interviewee did not wish colleagues to know they were an interview subject. Thus, in this one example, determining the true meaning is entirely dependent on the context. The reality or truth of the meaning is only available to the participant and to a marginally lesser extent, the interviewer. The interpretivist approach thus permits individual researchers to form a greater understanding with the ‘insider’ knowledge from all the available data, than an ‘outsider’ with another theoretical perspective could from the same raw data (Merton, 1972).

Black contends that the accuracy of reality can only be estimated, as “…we can have no access to ‘the truth’ about, for example, justice, or morality, or the self. Rather our notions of these ‘truths’ are instead conditioned by various social structures: our history, culture, ideology” (Black, 2002, p. 167). The notion that there is a social ‘reality’ sits comfortably within the epistemological position of this study. The epistemological lens of interpretive constructionism expects multiple interpretations of the same event and that they can all be equally true, as “the meanings are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world they are interpreting” (Crotty, 2003, p. 43). Rubin and Rubin follow the theme of social reality indicating that interviews are like any social action constitutive, where the reality described can be different depending who does the telling, and that the reality in that instance is only true for that person (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). The truth is rarely, if ever, out there waiting to be discovered. That said, it matters less what the wider ‘truth’ is in this instance, as an individuals’ own truth is more important, even when there are conflicting or multiple versions of the same
event (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). This is a clear manifestation of the Thomas Theorem which states, “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Merton, 1995, p. 380).

To understand and illustrate the closeness of the ties between the epistemology of interpretivism and the theoretical perspective of constructionism a brief historical perspective should prove illuminating. Interpretivism is linked strongly to the work of Weber (1964), who contrasted the notions of Verstehen (understanding) and Erklären (explaining). Contrasting as it does the qualitative (interpretive) and the quantitative (explicative) (Crotty, 2003). The same point was perhaps made more explicitly in earlier work by Dilthey, who, cited by Harrington (2001), made distinctions between Verstehen - the process by which we interpret the signs expressed in texts, and Hermeneutics - the understanding of the texts being interpreted. In essence, in order to start to understand the data, one has to empathise or identify with it. As Weber eloquently says, “One need not have been Caesar in order to understand Caesar” (Weber, 1964, p. 90). Weick (2007) makes a similar point indicating that understanding and making sense of the richness of the data can be enhanced by the reading of it.

Associated with the interpretivist approach to understanding the data is the application of reasoning. For researchers, there are three principal frameworks of reasoning (Crotty, 2003, pp. 180-1). The first framework is deductive reasoning, where facts are deduced using a top-down approach, from the starting point of a theory and then retrospectively applying it to the data. The second framework is abductive reasoning. This framework proposes ‘where A explains B better than any other alternative, therefore A must be appropriate’. It potentially offers for some researchers, the best elements of both inductive and deductive reasoning. The third and final framework is inductive reasoning. This uses a bottom-up approach where there is a scaffolding of the arguments based on the data. From the data, patterns surface, and a tentative hypothesis emerges. This in turn leads to a set of conclusions or theory.

Neither the ‘top-down’ application of deductive reasoning, where the starting point is a theory, moving to a hypothesis, which is then tested via prediction and observation (Marshall, 1998), nor the simultaneous development of abductive reasoning are the most appropriate method of reasoning for this type of research (Crotty, 2003). Instead, this study concentrates on using ‘bottom-up’ inductive reasoning, which in contrast to deductive reasoning is where the theory comes last. This research sought to examine surveillance and the exchanges associated with it from a managerial perspective. The manager’s role is one complexly bound
by any number of exchanges and determining the impact of surveillance on managers needed an open mind to what might emerge from the data. Adopting a top-down approach would have required a completely different approach, and it might arguably have made the research open to criticisms of determinism. The main premise of the inductive argument is that it is built upon the data (in the case of this research, the literature, and the interviews). Aspects of inductive reasoning can be seen in the data collection and analysis. The process of identifying the right questions to ask based on piloted questions and how rooted the conclusions are to the majority on the data are prima facie examples of inductive reasoning.

Eisenhardt (1989), drawing on influences from Glaser and Strauss and a Grounded Theory approach, argued that it is “the intimate connection between reality that permits the development of a testable, relevant, and valid theory” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 532). Although, the direct and positive associations Eisenhardt made to Grounded Theory in 1989 have in a subsequent article been rescinded. Her subsequent allusions to Grounded Theory have softened, acknowledging that the ‘Grounded Theory’ she originally referred to, could mean simply “observing patterns within systematically collecting empirical data” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). This softer approach is a preferable one, as it suggests that the patterns are the key rather than a strict adherence to a theoretical position.

5.1.2 Axiological Concerns

Closely linked to issues of methodological reasoning are axiological considerations (personal values, ethics, and morals). All researchers have axiological positions, core belief systems and a guiding set of personal principles or values. The individual researcher’s moral values, ethics, and ethical behaviour guide how they undertake their studies. These considerations influence decisions somewhat like a hidden hand, they are always there, helping determine unseen, which actions are personally acceptable and which are not.

The most visible aspect of axiological concerns of any research is in the ethics and ethical codes applied to the study. These codes are not always fixed and immutable they are sometimes fluid and dynamic. At different stages of the process, individual researchers will draw on personal beliefs and an understanding of right and wrong. It would for instance, have been completely unethical in this study to mislead any interview subject about consent or recording the interview. Yet in some research studies, such practices can be ethically justified. Equally, the disclosure by an interviewee about possible illegal acts, whilst unanticipated
would require a researcher to call into question their ethical positioning. This like the incident with the blinds, is not a hypothetical dilemma, this incident also took place during the course of an interview. A participant disclosed that dubious (potentially illegal/fraudulent) acts were taking place without the knowledge of senior management. In this instance, do I as the researcher disclose this knowledge and betray the confidentiality agreement, without which it is probable that the initial disclosure would not have occurred? Durham University and the Economic and Social Research Council (the research funding body) provide guidelines for interviewing. The guidelines cover issues such as consent, confidentiality, anonymity, and data security. There is also a reliance on personal ethics, doing the right thing for the research. In this occasion, I also took advice from both my supervisors. In the end, no action was deemed necessary. It was decided that any second-hand disclosure made about internal incidents, were under the terms of the interview agreement confidential and anonymous, and would have to be respected. To do otherwise would breach any ethical considerations for conducting the interview. It would also be nigh on impossible to verify the accuracy of the claims.

The final ethical act a researcher undertakes for their research is to ensure that faithful and accurate quotations from the research and the wider literature are used, and that any quotes used represent the views of the interviewee or the academic rather than selectively attributing or misrepresenting attitudes or opinions. Rigorously adopting this practice further lends validity to the study.

Ethical issues surrounding the participation of the interviewee and their personal role in the organisation can also be a concern. In some of the organisations visited in this research, the individual worker or manager appeared guided by some sort of “ethic of self-preservation” (Irvin, 2002, p. 359), aware that they needed to remain ‘on message’ for some organisational greater good. This might be because they were suspicious of the research, suspicious of me, or even of the request to participate. There were two notable examples in this study of interviewee suspicion. The first took place in Privet, the second in Chestnut plc. In the Privet example, the interviewee halted the interview after a few minutes, as they believed that I was a management stooge, intent on making them redundant. It was only after much persuasion that the interview continued. However, the damage was done and the interview was not of great use. In the case of Chestnut plc, several workers commented on a ‘fake’ research study previously undertaken at the plant. This previous study was claimed by senior management to be legitimate ostensibly for academic purposes, but in reality, it was a management ploy to gather workers opinions on future changes. In Chestnut plc, a quick Google check was able to
validate my claims of independence. Nonetheless, despite these two extreme situations, both of which were resolved, the misgivings some interviewees had provided an interesting insight into their working lives. In one instance, it reflected a deeper desire to control knowledge and power for organisational/managerial benefit. The controlling aspect of management was something explored by Stewart (1989).

5.2 Primary Data Collection Methods

The collection of primary data for this study was always going to be problematical. The subject matter does not easily lend itself to obtaining access permissions. There were several potential problems. Some related to the use of the terms involved e.g. surveillance and monitoring. Ball and Haggerty (2005) note that the term performance management frequently replaces more contentious terms in research access negotiations. Constructing a letter that convinces a cross-section of organisations across industry sectors to participate in the research was always going to be a complex affair. All the organisations contacted for participation in this study had different structures, motives, and reasons for potentially agreeing or refusing access.

Maximising access arrangements for this research therefore required adopting a comprehensive and inclusive strategy. This was achieved by first undertaking comprehensive research on the prospective organisations to identify the right sort of organisation, i.e. ones that offered interesting reasons and potential surveillance scenarios, one need look no further than to the two organisations of Tulip plc and Roses plc, both of whom run Call Centre operations. Second, and importantly, it was vital to identify the correct managerial level and the correct individual with whom to send the initial contact letter. Sending the research request letter to the wrongly named, titled or addressed person, or sending it hierarchically too low, or too high a level would also send the wrong signals. It might also suggest a lack of research into the organisation.

Preliminary research identified an initial set of 38 organisations as potential sources for participation. These organisations ranged from casinos, airlines, transport companies, telecommunication companies, and food-processing operations through to local authorities, arms-length public sector and other public sector organisations. After completing the final version of the letter, something that took several weeks of drafting and re-drafting, a mail merge of the list of organisations and individuals was set up. Importantly, a full list of the direct line telephone number for the named contact was also set up for possible follow-up.
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During the late summer of 2006, a mailing from this first list took place. In the two weeks subsequent to the sending of the research request letter, the response was disappointingly poor with only two replies, both being outright rejections.

Of the remaining 36 organisations, follow-up telephone contact commenced after two weeks. It was at this point that the value of identifying a direct line telephone number for the right person, proved its worth. Contact was made with all the remaining 36 organisations by a follow-up phone call. Following the outcome of these calls, a decision to pursue actively for access nine organisations took place. The opportunity to pursue all of the other organisations was available; however, only those that responded most positively to the follow-up call, and met the study sample criteria were targeted. This approach to theoretical sampling is recognised as being particularly useful in empirical research. Using multiple cases provides a stronger base for the theory and enables comparisons to clarify whether a particular finding is idiosyncratic or is replicated in several cases. It also makes any empirical evidence more compelling and theoretically robust due to its variety (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).

The negotiations with each of the nine organisations were different. In some instances, negotiations commenced immediately during the initial telephone conversation. Whereas in others, additional meetings, emails, and telephone calls were required before negotiations successfully concluded. Unfortunately, for one of the nine organisations, timing proved an insurmountable issue and despite over six month’s negotiations, regrettably a decision not to pursue the matter any further was agreed jointly. For one other organisation, the issue of access, although agreed in principle, faltered, as they were unable to agree meaningful compensation with the heavily unionised workforce. Nonetheless, the remaining seven organisations offered a meaningful spread across business sectors. On 28 September 2006, a solitary pilot interview took place, and due to an agreed stipulation by Roses plc during the negotiations, within a few days the first set of interviews started.

The unanticipated speed with which access negotiations with the largest organisation were completed, following a request made by them for a particularly brief lead-in period, meant that only the single pilot interview took place before the primary data collection commenced. In an ideal world, it would have been better to undertake several pilot interviews before commencing the primary interviews. Given that the research timetable is according to Buchanan et al (In: Bryman & Bell, 2003) one that can take weeks or months, it was completely
unexpected that following the initial contact letter, and two telephone calls, one of which was with a personal assistant to make the appointment, access would be agreed so easily.

Nonetheless, the single pilot interview provided a useful assessment of the way in which the questions flowed, allowing a number of potentially thorny issues to be trialled, and for the most part rejected, from the study. Some of the more contentious questions, in terms of use of language, were deliberately raised in a direct fashion during the pilot interview to gauge the interviewee’s response. The result was that the questions were substantially reworked and raised much more obliquely in the final interviews, in the belief that a more circumspect approach might prove more illuminating. This proved to be the case. All of the more complex issues under additional consideration were adequately resolved at this stage before the main study commenced.

5.2.1 Data Collection

Qualitative researchers compromise on many levels. Researchers might compromise their sample in terms of numbers or gender, whereas for others it might be by age or ethnicity (Mason, 2002b). In this study, there was no researcher control over the age, sex, gender, or ethnicity of any of the participants. Some research might consider issues of gender, age, and ethnicity to be important. For this study, it was not a concern. By leaving the decision as to the precise make-up of the sample to the organisations, it removed the possibility of introducing researcher bias. Several organisations asked for specific guidance on the make-up of the sample during negotiations. The only guidance given was that it should be representative and of sufficient size. It is conceivable, but unlikely, given the responses, that any of the organisations might inadvertently have introduced their own bias. That is not to say that there is a possibility that organisations could have introduced bias if they so wished to do so.

The strategy of providing only generic guidance to all the organisations might not result in a perfectly representative sample. Nonetheless, it did provide a sample that is as good as might be expected. Furthermore, it allowed the researcher to concentrate on the range of issues based solely on individual’s experiences, rather than worry about whether they were representative in terms of age, gender, sex, or ethnic balance.

The primary form of data collection in this research study is that of the personal qualitative semi-structured interview. This form of data collection is far less structured that that of
surveys, questionnaires, or even focus groups. The qualitative interview is “the most common and one of the most important data gathering tools” (Myers & Newman, 2007, p. 3). It remains an enlightening way of gathering research data. It is essentially a structured conversation, a dialogue with a purpose, or an attempt by an interviewer to engage actively with an interviewee “around relevant issues, topics, and experiences” (Mason, 2002a, p. 225).

The initial interview questions were formulated over a period of several weeks. They were finalised in advance of the start of primary data gathering, although they were constantly subject to minor revision and review as the interviews progressed. This method echoes advice from Bryman (2001) who identifies nine iterative steps for formulating interview questions. These processes are also mirrored in several approaches, including learning processes, which similarly suggest constant reappraisal in light of any additional data gathered (Bateson, 1942).

Researchers undertaking large research projects containing high numbers of qualitative semi-structured interviews will also be familiar with the need for constant and ongoing reappraisal of questions and questioning in light of different responses. Indeed, Kvale highlights the use of spontaneous follow-up questions as they may open up “a whole complex of topics important to the subject” (Kvale, 1996, p. 133). He also suggests interviewers should actively probe and interpret interviewee’s answers in a way that would be impossible to plan or achieve preemptively prior to the interview. Similarly, Gerson and Horowitz (2002) suggest always leaving room in the interview “… to discover the unexpected and uncover the unknown” (Gerson & Horowitz, 2002, p. 204).

In conducting interviews, it is also worth recalling Becker and Geer’s (1969) comments that interview participants who are familiar with interviews, interviewing, and interview techniques might reduce the efficacy of questions, or might even affect or colour the responses (Becker & Geer, 1969). They went on to further pour cold water on the researchers hope that good questioning would always elicit good responses, stating “Frequently, people do not tell an interviewer all the things they might want to know” (Becker & Geer, 1969, p. 326). This study shows that the observations and interpretations gathered in the interviews, regardless of whether conducted face-to-face or over the telephone, are reliable in terms of both quality and consistency, with few exceptions. In addition, there is constancy in the responses between organisations/managers, and considering the differences in the means and methods of electronic surveillance across the organisations, the data strongly suggests harmony when determining the impact of surveillance on managers.
Conducting qualitative research interviewing should wherever possible, mimic an ordinary conversation. The interviews should build on the communication skills we learn in childhood (Kvale, 1996). The fundamental communicating skills learnt from a young age are typically associated with the conventions or signals adopted in conversations. Some of these skills are rudimentary, others more sophisticated. These signals if interpreted correctly can become useful weapons in an interviewer’s armoury. Politicians and salespeople, both noted for their powers of persuasion, adopt different strategies to persuade. Politicians adopt complex rhetorical devices. Salespeople also adopt rhetorical and benign interpretations of Socratic devices to persuade (Lund, 1979). The skills of the interview and interviewer are demonstrated in this research by the way in which telephoned semi-structured qualitative research interviews, notoriously difficult to conduct and prolong, lasted typically as long as the face-to-face interviews, and provided an equally rich source of data.

In this study, around 80% of the interviews conducted were face-to-face, with around 20% taking place over the telephone. At first, there were no specific plans to conduct telephoned qualitative semi-structured interviews. The use of the telephoned interviews only emerged from the geographically diverse locations of some of the organisations and the interview participants. It was neither practical nor possible to conduct all the interviews face-to-face. A decision was made to conduct interviews over the telephone. The majority of the telephoned interviews were conducted in the same single organisation.

The interview sample were primarily managers a high proportion of whom were in their first managerial role, with typically with less than five years experience in their role, these managers accounted for around 70% of all managerial interviewees. Although, a reasonable number were second and third time managers with over five years experience, and in many cases over ten years experience in management, accounting for around 30% of all managerial interviewees. It should additionally be noted that all the managers in Sunflower plc*31 were at a senior level, with over ten years experience and many managerial and supervisory roles behind them, all within their chosen industry. Similarly, the majority of managers in Lilac* had experience in many managerial roles. There were also a number of noteworthy hierarchical exceptions within some of the organisations, in Roses plc,* one interviewee was at senior executive level (Head of Business Division), in Tulip plc,* three executives (just below Head of Department) were interviewed, and in Daffodil plc,* there were two [unrecorded] director-

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31 All names marked with * are pseudonyms assigned to specific organisations where research took place
level interviews. These exceptions aside, the vast majority of interviews were at what would typically be referred to as being at middle management level. As such, the core of the sample can reasonably be said to be at the level that accounts for the majority of managers in organisations.

The techniques and problems when conducting face-to-face interviews are well known. Good interviewing, either face-to-face or even over the telephone, is not simply about employing a generic set of skills or techniques, such as the mechanics of how to ask a question and how to listen to a response. It is about understanding the position of the interviewee, and how they might illuminate the research, it is also about creating the best conditions for the “construction of meaningful knowledge” (Mason, 2002a, p. 227). These techniques are well documented and as such will not be rehearsed separately here. Nonetheless, there are clearly overlapping areas for successfully conducting face-to-face and telephoned interviews. It would therefore be both helpful and informative to discuss in some detail the different techniques required for telephoned interviews, and the similarities between the two interviewing techniques that go to produce a meaningful and complete dataset.

An examination of the literature on qualitative interviewing suggests an implicit assumption that it naturally takes place face-to-face. Journals and books about interviewing are explicitly and implicitly mindful of observations of the physical. Kvale (1996), in a book devoted solely to interviews and interviewing makes no specific mention of telephoned qualitative interviewing. Rather, he makes oblique mentions, which could arguably be interpreted to apply to telephoned interviews; even so, these oblique referrals are to the general processes involved rather than the methods. Both Mason (2002a) and Alvesson (2003), when writing about qualitative interviews also ignore telephoned interviews by automatically referring to observed indicators. Similarly, Rubin and Rubin (2005), in a book again devoted to qualitative interviewing, spend only two pages addressing the difficulties and issues associated with conducting telephoned interviews.

Part of this concentration on face-to-face interviewing might be because conducting interviews over the telephone for qualitative purposes is not undertaken very often. There is a perceived wisdom that a face-to-face qualitative interview rather than a telephone interview is preferable (Gillham, 2000). Books and articles on interviewing, even by well-known researchers frequently make an implicit assumption that qualitative interviews take place face-to-face, whereas telephone interviews are for quantitative research or surveys (Neuman,
2000). This may in part be due to the concern that telephoned interviews make the normal introductory casual small talk more difficult (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Although, it has been suggested that because of the very absence of non-verbal forms of communication or paralanguage (head-nodding, gestures etc.), research over the telephone should be of particular interest to researchers (Schegloff, 1968).

It has also been suggested that the issues of time, access and safety are key reasons for undertaking telephoned interviews rather than face-to-face. The cost of conducting telephoned interviews is also cited as a reason for using telephoned interviews. In this study, the only real concern was access, although, a single interview was undertaken by telephone due to an unforeseen breakdown in travel arrangements due to rapidly deteriorating weather.

As mentioned earlier, semi-structured telephoned interviews for academic purposes are not undertaken regularly. A simple search of two of the most comprehensive academic databases, Swetswise and EBSCO, reveals that there were only 72 research papers that openly contained keywords ‘semi structured telephone interviews’ as the main or secondary method, or one of the methods employed. In addition, even in the small number of research papers examined, the numbers of actual interviews conducted was limited and the interviews were invariably used as a way to add strength to other research methods (Tawse & Keogh, 1998; Loan-Clarke et al., 2000; Westhues & Einwiller, 2006). Another analysis of qualitative research interviews, telephoned and face-to-face, by Myers and Newman (2007) in the period 2001-2005, further suggests that descriptions of the processes and methods of qualitative interviews are rarely discussed in research papers. Their analysis was based on a random selection of papers in a range of top quality management and information journals. Their assumption is that the techniques involved and discussion on any problems or issues would by definition, also be lacking.

There is the suggestion that convenience for the participant might make telephoned interviews more likely. With an additional perception that telephoned interviews are likely to be shorter might also be a factor, at least on the respondents side (Stephens, 2007). For the interviewer, in both the telephoned and the face-to-face interview, the aim however, is the same. To gather data through, “a human interaction in which knowledge evolves through dialogue” (Kvale, 1996, p. 125). At no stage in this research was it considered that the telephoned interview might be shorter for whatever reason. The length of a telephone interview and a face-to-face interview was determined solely on the dialogue. In no instance
was the time spent felt to be an issue on either side. Indeed, if anything, some of the telephoned interviews were more successful, occasionally running for over an hour and in two cases an initial interview of over an hour, with offers made by the interviewees of additional interviews (Interviewee #8+9 Telephoned, #14+15 Telephoned). In those cases, there were two additional, albeit slightly shorter, interviews undertaken to gather all the relevant information, amounting to nearly two hours in total for each.

While telephoned interviews only constituting a small part of this study, some of the issues associated with successfully conducting them require separate consideration. The methods and mechanics of how to conduct successfully telephoned interviews are rarely, if ever, considered. According to Stephens (2007, p. 209), there is no “standard reference work” on conducting telephoned interviews. Stephens nonetheless skirts round the ‘how to’ conduct telephoned interview, instead preferring to describe the logistics for the interviewer. This involves becoming comfortable beforehand, arranging notes, and ensuring the physical space for both interviewer and interviewee is appropriate. The same logistical considerations would also apply to face-to-face interviews.

The appearances of both parties and their physical proximity are important for face-to-face interviews (Gillham, 2000; Neuman, 2000). Additionally, in the case of the typical face-to-face interview (a single interviewer and a single interviewee), both participants will use a blend of non-verbal signals or paralanguage (the pitch, tone, intonation, and cadence of the voice), and facial expressions, eye contact, head nods, gestures and other body language, or kinesics. Paralanguage is helpful in determining turn-taking and repair (Silverman, 2006), and cues and sequencing (Schegloff, 1968). These aspects, while helpful in conducting face-to-face interviews, take on even more importance in telephoned interviews.

Significantly, in face-to-face qualitative interviews the interviewee will signal a great deal of subtle information through various forms of body language. The amount of actual communication that takes place solely using body language is difficult to quantify, although estimates suggest it consists of anything between 35% and 90% of all communication. Interviewees might ‘roll their eyes’ in reference to a colleague, an organisational position, or a particular stance on a subject. The face-to-face interviewer would pick up the subtle visual indicators, and as these signals are decoded, additional questions can be posed to obtain elaboration. On the other hand, paralanguage provides only a fraction of the meaningful signalled data for the face-to-face interview. The majority would arguably come from kinesics.
However, even the apparently limited data of paralanguage proves particularly helpful when conducting the telephoned interview. In telephoned qualitative interviews, there is no body language to interpret, no facial gestures to help determine any emphasis or added meaning. The interviewer has to learn to rely on other much more subtle signals, which, if identified early in the interview, can provide a much richer experience than perhaps might be expected.

What Stephens, and others, fail to disclose are the mechanics of how to undertake the actual interview where there are obvious limitations with the absence of visual cues and body language. While Nesbit and Seeger (2007) suggest that this should not be a concern, as they discovered very little difference between results in telephoned and face-to-face interviews, they undermine their own argument by citing small-scale and brief quantitative telephoned research as justification for such a broad statement. This study discusses some of the insights that help make telephoned semi-structured interviews successful.

The mechanics of conducting an interview over the telephone are complex, relying in part on learnt cultural and technological behaviours (how we use the telephone) and in many respects requires researchers to trust their intuition. The absence of body language in conversations over the telephone for both interviewer and interviewee removes a large proportion of the usual interviewing information, yet both interviewee and researcher still manage to follow sequences of knowing when to speak and when to pause, much in the same way that they do in face-to-face communication (Schegloff, 1968). Some of the additional signals in telephone conversations draws on work completed by Sacks and Schegloff on conversational analysis (Wooffitt, 2005). The work on conversational analysis sets out how verbal utterances by one party or the other require or obligate a response. This might be as direct as asking an interviewer question, “What is your position in the organisation?” which is immediately followed by a silence – to allow a response. Alternatively, from the interviewee who responds to the question but ends it with “is that answer OK?” In the first example, the question followed by the silence requires a response from the interviewee, whereas in the second the answer followed by the question requires a response from the interviewer.

Borrowing a term from conversation analysis (CA) these ‘adjacency pairs’ (question/answer, offer/acceptance, request/acceptance, or greeting/greeting), are verbal signals for one party to speak and the other to stop/respond or vice-versa. Schegloff noted that in telephone conversations the sequencing is far more distinct, and that cultural conventions associated solely with the telephone make for more pronounced summons/answer (SA) and
question/answer (QA) sequences. This aspect is the key to conducting a successful telephoned interview, as during this initial period of conversational openings a researcher can gain the insight into how to conduct the interview to maximise success. In this research, I was able to listen to the pauses, cadence, tone, and pitch of the interviewee and seek to use that information to gauge the difference between when the interviewee is pausing, perhaps to think about a question or answer, and what is a normal pause in the interviewee’s regular speech pattern. In the absence of any visual signals from either side, the interviewer and interviewee must rely on a variety of paralanguage signals, and personal intuition, to achieve success. The more subtle linguistic or communication skills demonstrated by pitch, tone and the various umm’s, err’s, and mmm’s, are ‘verbal’ equivalents of the nod, eye or hand gesture for the telephone interviewer. Interviewers should appropriate these signals for their benefit to improve the quality of their interviewing.

By applying the same techniques to face-to-face interviewing, researchers should be able to obtain good quality interviews. It clearly makes sense to use the appropriate techniques for the interview type. Researchers should always listen to the cadence and speech patterns of interviewees. In addition, when conducting face-to-face interviews observing the visual cues, the head nods, the eye movements, the hand gestures, and making sense of them will help the researcher elicit far more information from the interview than one who ignores, or concentrates on the unspoken elements.

Another ‘verbal’ technique used to elicit good responses in both face-to-face and telephone interviews, was in the limited use of Socratic inquiry. The term Socratic inquiry is frequently taken to mean questioning in such a way as to enlighten the respondent. It is often discussed as a teaching technique. For this research, it was applied slightly differently. It was limited to the linguistic use of Kipling’s serving men of “What and Where and When and How and Why and Who” (Kipling, The Elephant Child, cited In: Lund, 1979) used in questions to elicit meaningful responses. In this way, it is a benign technique of listening,\(^\text{32}\) which is a key component in any interview. It was in that context that it was applied in informal unrecorded access negotiations with Roses plc (*Telephoned\(^\text{32}\)) and Daffodil plc (*Telephoned\(^\text{32}\)). It was used in the interviews as an addendum to the many other interviewing techniques. Non-verbal techniques in conjunction with Socratic inquiry, such as silence, or long pauses in the interview are also

used to good effect. The combination of Socratic Inquiry, silences and pause techniques are regularly and successfully combined by salespeople for closing a sale (Lund, 1979).

This chapter has spent some time discussing interviews and interviewing, particularly telephoned interviews. It explained how this researcher maximised success over the telephone and face-to-face. It is therefore reasonable to conclude given the success of the interviews, that this research study can realistically claim that the combination of telephone and face-to-face interviews does provide a dataset of similar results, despite requiring two completely different approaches and two different skill sets.

5.3 Research Profile

To ensure further the confidentiality of all of the participant organisations, and therefore the participants, I assigned a pseudonym to each of the organisations. I have used the names of flowers, plants, and trees to disguise the identity of the various organisations in the research. No interviewee is referred to by name, only by a number, in addition telephone interviews will be endorsed with *Telephoned*, to differentiate them from face-to-face interviews. To further guarantee confidentiality an additional process of anonymisation also occurred.

The practices of employment relations differs in the size and type of organisation (Kersley et al., 2004). This research study sought to collect a balanced cross-sectional view of employment relationships by gathering data across a broad spectrum of UK industries, both public and private.

Organisation One (Roses plc)

The pseudonym assigned to the first organisation is Roses plc. Roses plc is an international communications-based organisation. It is listed in the FTSE 100, with a turnover last year in excess of £20bn. Roses plc, are the largest of the organisations involved, and they also contributed the largest number of participants. The interviews in Roses plc consisted solely of managers. The level of managers ranged from those at a junior level recently promoted, to senior managers with over 20 years service. The managers in Roses plc were also spread across a number of internal business divisions. A high proportion of the interviewees were either directly involved in managing Call Centres, or Call Centre teams, or had previous experience of the Call Centre environment. The number of people each manager managed ranged from department to department although the average was between ten to twenty individuals.
There were exceptions, with one particular senior manager managing an entire business division. In their case, they managed managers. The numerical breakdown of participants was that 23 interviewees took place, all were managers, and all (with one earlier highlighted exception) classed as being ‘middle management’.

**Organisation Two (Tulip plc)**

The pseudonym assigned to the second organisation is Tulip plc. Tulip plc is a world leader in technology. It is listed on the UK FTSE top 100 constituents with a turnover in excess of £1bn and a market capitalisation of over £2bn. The organisation comprises of a number of business divisions with offices and subsidiaries around the world. Some of the interviews in this organisation took place via telephone. These were a small number of managers from one of the overseas divisions and two in other parts of the UK. The interviewees consisted of a cross section of the managerial workforce, including a number of managers directly managing Call Centres or Call Centre teams. There were a slightly higher percentage of the interviewees than in Roses plc employed in other departments. Numerically, the breakdown was that there were 22 interviewees, 19 of whom were managers (including 3 at more senior executive level), and 3 were non-management.

**Organisation Three (Chestnut plc)**

The third organisation has Chestnut plc as its pseudonym. It has its Head Office based outside of the UK. However, it has a strong presence in the UK with a number of food production plants dotted around the UK. Last year Chestnut plc had its turnover increase to over £3bn (£4.5bn), with a market capitalisation of around the same figure. Chestnut plc is the only non-UK owned organisation in the research. It has a worldwide profile through the prominence in its portfolio of well-known food product brands. Chestnut plc were the only organisation to provide shop-floor workers, supervisors, as well as managers. The split was around 30% managers, 30% supervisors, and 40% shop-floor workers. In numerical terms, this meant there were 20 interviewees, of whom 6 were managers, 6 were supervisors, and 8 were shop-floor workers.

**Organisation Four (Sunflower plc)**

The fourth organisation I will refer to as Sunflower plc. Sunflower plc just fails to make the FTSE 100 index, but comfortably makes it into top half of the FTSE 250 index. The turnover last year was just over £500m. Sunflower plc comprises of a number of business divisions, all of
which are associated to leisure, entertainment, and gaming, with all the interviewees coming from one of the gaming divisions. All the participants were of a senior management level with semi-autonomous fiscal responsibilities for their location. The interviews were wide ranging and lasted for nearly twice as long as in other organisations. This was partly due to an additional research brief agreed as part of the access negotiations. All 10 managers in Sunflower plc were senior managers, each with in excess of five years managerial experience.

Organisation Five (Daffodil plc)

The fifth organization, hereafter referred to as Daffodil plc, is positioned just outside of the FTSE 250 index. The group portfolio of companies if combined (valuing the group at close to £750m) would place it comfortably in the middle of the FTSE 250 index. Daffodil plc are part of a service, leisure, retail and property group, which is rapidly expanding around the UK and is making inroads internationally. All of the participants were situated in a single location, although informal, substantial and unrecorded background interviews took place at director level. All the participants in this organisation were departmental managers in their own right, and all regularly undertook overall management of the operation on a duty rota shift. There were only 6 interviewees in this organisation, although all were departmental managers, all had less than 5 years experience in their respective positions.

Organisation Six (Privet)

The sixth and final private organisation (currently owned primarily through a European company), I shall refer to this organisation as Privet. It is the smallest of the organisations by market capitalisation and is substantially owned by European backers although its operations are fully contained within the UK. There is a minor financial interest to Privet in the UK, held by a combination of local organisations. The participant interviewees were quite inclusive comprising of senior and middle management to manual/semi-skilled/skilled supervisor/shift-leaders. The organisation is located on a large site just outside a major North-East England city. Privet provided 13 interviewees, with 9 arguably in some sort of supervisory position (although for some the title suggested more supervision than actually took place), and 3 who were manual workers.

Organisation Seven (Lilac)

Lilac is the pseudonym attributed to organisation seven. Lilac is only public body in the research study. It has a turnover of in excess of £50m, which would place it at the lower end of
publicly funded bodies. While the importance of obtaining the public service management view is valuable, the connections to Privet make Lilac an important contributor. All the interviewees in Lilac were either senior or executive level managers. Privet provided 12 interviewees and one of the broadest ranges of supervisory/managerial experience (along with Roses plc), with managers experience ranging from less than a year to over 20 years.

All the interview participants fall loosely into three categories, inexperienced managers (with less than five years experience), experienced managers (more than five years), and manual or clerical workers. Within the body of interviews, as previously noted, several were more senior (hierarchically), and where these interviewees were used in the research, it is identified accordingly. A potential issue for some reading this thesis might be how to compare managers across different organisations and organisational cultures. This was not a concern during the analysis. It is a reasonable assumption that even given the different nature of their respective businesses, to compare an inexperienced manager from Roses plc, with an inexperienced manager from Tulip plc, or the attitude of an experienced Tulip plc manager with a similarly experienced Lilac manager is fair. The views and opinions expressed by each manager, while arguably socially constructed, in part by their organisations, are not so diverse as to be irreconcilable. It is reasonable to compare the thoughts of an inexperienced manager managing a team of 8-10, in a Call Centre, to the thoughts of an inexperienced manager of a similar sized production line shift in a food-processing plant. Throughout the research, all the comparisons were on a broadly like-for-like basis wherever possible, except when a difference associated with the manager’s level of experience highlighted a particular point. In these instances, readers are advised accordingly.

The original list of 38 companies was put together based on a range of criteria. Some organisations were identified because of the abundance of workplace surveillance, others because of the intensity of the surveillance. The list of organisations that final negotiations were entered into was in part based on the range or business sectors, but also because of the relation to certain working practices and performances, or their use of surveillant technology e.g. Roses plc, and Tulip plc both operating Call Centres. For others, it was the degree of overall employee observation, Chestnut plc, Daffodil plc, and Sunflower plc. Privet and Lilac were contacted to compare performance monitoring following their history and close associations to public bodies.
The numbers of organisations and individuals involved in this research necessitated that some grouping of organisations based around the types of surveillance was needed to help make sense of the data. In Chapter Six, the discussion centres on comparisons between organisations that share several key themes. The first group, Tulip plc and Roses plc, both operate Call Centre operations and therefore appear closely aligned. The initial contact made to both these companies intended to compare similar surveillant operations, although it transpired that while the operations were similar their management/surveillance were almost at opposites, thus making comparisons far more interesting. The second group of Chestnut plc, Sunflower plc, and Daffodil plc, are all associated to food production/leisure, and are typically not seen as being at the electronic cutting edge of surveillance. However, the level of surveillance in intensity is close to the levels of the Call Centre operations. The final group in Chapter Six, brings together a present and former public sector operations which have in recent years become a sector more target driven and therefore more surveillant in outlook.

In Chapter Seven, the focus shifts away from the operational/surveillance associations moving towards associations driven by the social exchange mechanisms and the close associations provided in each of the organisations by the psychological contract (Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2005). They identify that the associations between social exchange and the psychological contract for research purposes can be categorised into “The content of the exchange”, “The process of the exchange” and “The parties to the exchange”. In this research, Process includes the use of Appraisals, and across all of the organisations, the exchange process is one that has similarities across all the organisations. It deals with the actual or perceived inducements offered/accepted as part of the exchange relationship. The section on Content and Parties pulls together how the exchange relationship is one that is personal to the parties and how they characterise the exchange, and thus the relationship, be that between a manager and employer or manager and team worker.

5.3.1 Interview Questions and Structure

A great deal of preparation time was spent on the interview questions. The reason for this is simple, a good questioning process is one that is as enquiring as possible without suggesting or offering any prejudices or options, “The essence of the question is the opening up, and keeping open of possibilities” (Gadamer, 1975, p. 266). Getting the questions and the structure right is crucial to uncovering rich data. For this study, the questioning in the interviews
regardless of whether it was face-to-face or by telephone, was essentially the same, in that a semi-structured approach was determined as being the best one to elicit good quality data. Interviews of this type are structured around a specific range of questions with ‘improvised’ follow-up questions asked to glean further data from the participant. The questions and questioning is not just a way of eliciting general information, they are also a way to gain specific answers. Importantly, they are also a way for the interviewer to establish and maintain control over the interview processes.

For this study, the interviews were conducted in a very easygoing, conversational style, with the primary aim to put interviewees at ease. Active encouragement was given when interviewees went ‘off message’ as these segments occasionally proved to be the most enlightening. This did not mean that the interviews lacked structure, far from it. While the term semi-structured describes interviews of this type, it does not mean that the interviews required less preparation or organisation. Indeed, there was a great deal of preparation, and a deep knowledge of the underlying questions and the questioning structure was needed for the interview process.

It is interesting to note that it has been suggested that eliciting information by way of a (job) interview is in itself seen as a form of psychological contract (DeCormier & Jackson, 1999). The semi-structured nature of the interviews also called for a greater degree of flexibility from the interviewer than would be expected in a totally structured interview. A projected interview response structure was pre-planned and prepared for, or at least as much as could be planned, so that that when the participant gave a response that was unexpected, as interviewees are prone to do (Mason, 2002a), some questions could be asked. To assist this process, a number of flow charts were prepared and memorised for this eventuality. I therefore felt equipped and prepared to go down an unanticipated avenue without appearing as though the interview flow was disrupted. The challenge was to make the pre-planned appear spontaneous and natural.

This approach acknowledges that both parties are individuals and that a relationship, albeit a transient one, needs to exist in order to maximise the usefulness of the interview. This style borrows heavily from an interpretive constructionist philosophy, and a dynamic style of interviewing that Rubin and Rubin refer to as “responsive interviewing” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 30).

The advantages in using a semi-structured approach and an easygoing attitude increase the likelihood of building up trust, or at least trust as a notion of “cooperation” or “confidence”
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(Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). This helps ensure the participant is likely to feel more at ease and that the interview can become much more conversational in tone and therefore increase the likelihood of quality content, something Kvale calls “empathetic listening” (Kvale, 1996, p. 135). It requires skilled handling, intensive listening skills, and precise timing to tailor follow-up questions to the participant. Kvale (1996) goes on to say that, good quality questioning involves constant interpretation and reinterpretation based on the responses. The individual skills and expertise of the semi-structured interviewer can enhance data gathering abilities. They also help build a rapport with the interviewee allowing a combination of free-association responses far more so than with more structured questioning (Mason, 2002a). Occasionally in this study, some participants were more open and effusive, and required little direct questioning, with simple prompts replacing direct questioning.

There are some downsides to this approach. Despite all the preparation, it could not alleviate or prepare me for constraints outside my control, such as structural time limitations, and limitations around the “agendas and assumptions of both interviewer and interviewee” (Mason, 2002a, p. 231). On these points, a simple awareness of them and having the flexibility to deal with them is all that could be achieved.

5.3.2 Data Gathering

The primary data for the research came from the seven listed organisations across the United Kingdom. As previously discussed, the organisations in this research ranged from FTSE 100 companies with tens of thousands of employees, several had a turnover in excess of 1 billion pounds (GBP), to operations with less than 300 employees. The research consisted of 109 qualitative semi-structured interviews, involving 106 discrete participants, conducted in both the public and private sector in late 2006 and early 2007.

In social research, who or what can be studied holds almost no bounds, Babbie (2004) identifies that the subjects will typically fall into one of three types or units of analysis; individuals, organisations, and groups. He went on to claim that using these specific units of analysis works best in nomothetic, quantitative studies rather than ideographic, qualitative research. According to Crotty (2003), Weber blurs the distinctions between nomothetic and ideographic, and also between social and natural science research, so as to become almost indistinguishable or interchangeable on certain research projects. In this research whilst the sample is drawn from groups, the level of analysis is at the individual level. The individuals
concerned can all be characterised in terms of what they do, or their membership of a particular group (i.e. managers or management), thus, “... the ‘thing’ whose characteristics we are seeking to describe or explain – is the individual” (Babbie, 2004, p. 95). This is particularly appropriate given the particularly personal aspect of an exchange relationship.

The theoretical unit of analysis in this research is the exchange processes and the level of analysis, is a manager. The decision to focus on managers as the level of analysis is because it was believed that it would enable this research to fill a gap in the literature. By combining the level of analysis and unit of analysis, it could provide findings that would illuminate the previously identified gap.

Of the 106 interview participants, 91 were of managerial/supervisory level (85.85%) and 15 were non-managerial (14.15%). There were several unrecorded interviews; none of whose contribution was directly used in this study, although their input helped frame some localised questioning. All the interviews forming part of this research were digitally recorded and all were conducted with the expressed permission of the participant. Both the interviewees and the organisations were granted anonymity and confidentiality in accordance with ESRC guidelines, which state that, “The confidentiality of information supplied by research subjects and the anonymity of respondents must be respected.” In addition, Durham University’s and the ESRC’s ethical codes were also adhered to at all stages. As explained earlier, all ethical, anonymity and confidentiality concerns were personally guaranteed. The security and integrity of the data, once digitally recorded was protected by the use of a password-protected computer, with a backup on an external encrypted drive.

5.3.3 Transcription and Analysis

The protocol used in the transcription of the data was simple verbatim, i.e. transcribed with a level of detail that was appropriate to the analysis, and importantly was ‘true’ to the original recording. This meant that when punctuation was added it was checked to ensure the transcription reflected the intention of the interviewee (for sample quotes used in the thesis the audio transcription was subject to additional rigour to ensure ‘interpretative accuracy’). The transcription protocol did not include any additional notations nor was it believed necessary to adopt either of the more time-consuming and complicated transcription protocols suggested by Fairclough (citing Schenkein, 2003) and Titscher, Jenner, Wodak and Vetter (2000). Both of these examples suggest the extensive use of alternative symbols such as
single and double brackets and parentheses to indicate pauses, extraneous noise, or unclear passages. In this research, the recordings were digitally recorded initially and time stamped when transcribed with F4audio, thus any re-analysis or re-listening of excerpts relied solely on the actual recording, rather than the use of any additional notations. As such, additional transcription protocols were unnecessary on this occasion.

According to Miles and Huberman (citing Tesch (1990), 1994) analysing qualitative research can be divided into four broad families or groups, the Characteristics of Language, the Discovery of Regularities, the Comprehension of the Meanings of the Texts, and Reflection. Each of these groups identifies a number of sub-groups associated with the main group or primary research interest. Uncovering the ‘truth’ of any research will rely on a blend of the qualitative research groups or sub-groups.

This research study draws on elements of the ‘characteristics of language’, the cultural sub-group and a modicum of symbolic interactionism (for other cultural aspects). This research does not delve too much into the ‘meanings of the texts’ group, or undertake any analysis based on ‘reflection’ or the ‘discovery of regularities’ groupings. What this study seeks to demonstrate is that the blend of theories and methods used form a consistent and unified whole, enabling the study to stand up to theoretical, empirical, conceptual, and methodological examination.

The blending of methods of analysis is an attempt to understand the nuances of the individual participant responses, whether the responses allude to the organisation, the processes, or the text. The use of exchange, links it as a general concept, to the “strategic exchange” approach of interpreting discourse (Watson, 1994). For this study, the interplay between managers and workers, and managers and managers, provides the detail of the ongoing struggle to cope and survive seen in any human interaction. Central to this is the notion of exchange, “the symbolic and the abstract, the material and the concrete” (Watson, 1994, p. 26). The strategic exchanges Watson refers to are not limited to a manager effecting the mere reciprocal one of exchanging work for pay, but are much wider, guided by the broader managerial purpose which is shaped by the “interests purposes and projects” (Watson, 1994, p. 26) of those who engage in them. A large part of the analysis draws on understanding how managers react in the ways that they do. The use of power typologies, the wider notion of exchange, and the psychological contract are, as has been identified, to a greater or lesser degree influenced by
psychological theories, including psychological reactance, behavioural locus of control, and social facilitation. Hence, a more subtle and nuanced approach is required.

The tools for building the analysis are not restricted to the actual data; they also include daily research diaries, self-memos, and some contemporaneous digital recordings made immediately after completing interviews. This was particularly helpful when interviewing night-shift workers at Chestnut plc. These tools, in addition to the actual data, potentially open up a richer understanding of the research (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).

The coding process this research adopted is based on “template analysis” (King, 2004). However, template analysis also refers to a way of thematically analysing qualitative data. Thus, the use of template analysis describes both the coding and analysis. The relevance of psychology in understanding both appraisals and surveillance, using an framework which takes much of its influence from Stanton’s (2000) framework, combined with the strong influence of the behavioural locus of control (Rotter, 1966; Spector, 1982; Zimbardo, 1988; Furnham, 1997), requires an appropriate coding and analytical framework. A number of psychological works have used template analysis as the primary method of analysis. Given that, the post hoc identification of template analysis seems apt as the primary form of both the coding and the analysis. While template analysis is often associated with positivistic positions, it is also deemed appropriate for a “contextual constructivist position” (King, 2004, p. 256). In these circumstances, the coding reliability is according to King irrelevant, instead the reflexivity of the researcher, the richness of the description and the differing perspectives are the important requirements (King, 2004).

The initial part of template analysis (the coding) is a standalone process (although forming an intrinsic part of the wider ‘template analysis’ process). King (2004), describes the process thus, the researcher initially produces a hierarchical set of codes (‘templates’), which represent themes identified in the textual data, not unlike some of the early processes in thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The initial themes are defined a priori. The a priori coding is subsequently added to and informed by personal experience, academic literature, and anecdotal and informed evidence to provide a second level of code (King, 2004). The revised codes were subject to modification, in some cases deleted or added to as the data developed, when new themes and associations emerged. A fully coded sample transcript is available as Appendix Six.
The initial coding process commenced with the themes from the initial questions. The higher order codes (templates) are the main questions, with lower order coding developed from subsidiary questions and probing. This type of coding strategy is often described as being a three step process of “open coding”, “axial coding”, and “selective coding” (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2006, pp. 499-501). While the three terms are appropriate for describing the mechanics of the coding, I refrain from using these terms to describe the coding process adopted. The reason for this is to avoid any possible misinterpretation or erroneous association with Grounded Theory, with which these terms are frequently associated (Bryman & Bell, 2003; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2006). While the coding processes are broadly the same, I argue it would technically be wrong to use terms associated with an approach I do not use.

For this research, the terms of first, second and third pass are used. The ‘first pass’ is distinguished by being an a priori pass through the data. A second pass through the data, one that concentrates on being a descriptive pass though the data allowing new codes and themes to emerge, follows this. It clusters together linked concepts into a meaningful set of themes. The three-part process concludes with pattern codes which is typically identified by being the last pass through the data, which draws out further examples of the themes that emerged from earlier coding (Neuman, 2000).

In practice, the first pass draws on the originally proposed set of questions; in these areas, many of the initial questions were couched in the language of communication, what are the methods preferred, the choices, methods actually employed, reasoning, etc. For example, what forms of technology do you use, or, why do you prefer to use email, how do you determine training considerations? Each of these questions is an open question associated with communication, and the responses might link (and often did) to the possibility of taking the discussion into areas of workplace surveillance, exchange mechanisms etc.. A full breakdown of the initially proposed questions is provided in Appendix Four. The use of the term communication traces back to the initial letter of contact (Appendix Three), the terminology of which is influenced by the very nature of the complex meanings associated to monitoring or surveillance (Ball & Haggerty, 2005).
From this initial pass, a second pass produced eleven overlapping themes (where the primary overlapped areas included Surveillance and Management), Behaviours (Technologically related, and Performance related), Technology, Language, Exchange Processes, Performance Management (Behavioural Performance), and Power.

Once contemporary observations, notes, personal recordings, and eventually transcripts are evaluated, the template was systematically revised, inserting new and more relevant codes as appropriate, deleting old codes, or narrowing the focus of the research data to a more precise one (King, 2004). In this instance, the use of Power as a wider Foucauldian notion was honed and renamed to the more relevant and precise Power Typologies, similarly, the importance of Technology as the enabler of the surveillance, was downplayed as richer data emerged, as was the specific theme of Language, which was helpful only to contextualise the different organisations. The final template, albeit constrained by time and the limitations of inexperience, provided sufficient opportunities for illuminating the issues. While a strong argument can be made that given more time and unlimited analysis an ideal ‘template’ might be produced, the one that eventually emerged was perfectly acceptable and fit for purpose.

Template analysis is a highly flexible approach, particularly for the inexperienced. It “works well in studies which seek to examine the perspectives of different groups in an organisational setting” (King, 2004, p. 268). The disadvantage to using template analysis both as coding and analysis is that it perhaps lacks the history and background academic literature (and arguably therefore the rigour) of discourse analysis or grounded theory. While it is claimed to be quite a structured method, the opportunities for being too open to the data and losing some of the structure do exist. The coding process allowed the data to be analysed fully in a methodical fashion, all the while maintaining the flexibility to add to any of the codes should the need arise. The way in which it was developed and completed is consistent with both King’s (2004) specific notions and Miles and Huberman’s (1994) wider work on coding practices.

How the coding linked to the analysis and was used to make sense of the subsequent interviews was by the intermittent sorting of the codes. The practice of developing and sorting the codes looking for repetitions, similarities and differences, and using a process referred to as cutting and sorting, which “involves identifying quotes or expressions that seem somehow important” (Ryan & Bernard, 2003, p. 94). By regularly re-examining the texts on this basis a uniform and applicable set of codes emerged.
5.4 Exchange Theory/Psychology

This study uses the key lens of Exchange Theory to help explain the impact that the use of surveillance and the uses to which surveillance is put, has on managers and supervisors. It is recognised that exchange theory is particularly valuable for understanding the employment relationship (Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2005). The use of exchange and exchange theory guides the understanding. The exploration of specific aspects of exchange will take the reader on a journey that goes from Adams Theory of Inequity (Adams, 1963) to Blau’s exchange and power (Blau, 1964) via Molm’s use of coercion and social exchange (Molm, 1997). Chapter Seven contains examples that draw on psychological aspects in the appraisal process as well as Brehm’s psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 1966), as it is seen as particularly useful to understand the employment relationship (Van Dyne & Butler Ellis, 2005). In addition, there are examples that further illustrate the impact of psychology and psychological theories throughout the findings.

The theoretical and analytical frameworks strengthen and enhance the interpretation of the data. The specific impact of psychology on the appraisal process and the psychology of workplace surveillance added to the exchange perspective bring a much-needed synergy to the research. The use of the lens of exchange provides a sound methodological structure that facilitates a more enriching comprehension of the data. The justification for using the lens of exchange as the focus of analysis can be seen in the previous chapter. The links of organisations, managers and the employment relationship to exchange and the process-rational approach were made explicitly by Watson (2002). He noted “there is a basic process of exchange in the employment relationship” (2002, p. 62) and “management is a strategic matter” (2002, p. 68). This view coupled with the discussion in the previous chapter regarding how managers use various strategic (as a plan) forms of exchange to manage. For example, managers bargain using reciprocity, manipulate using coercion, and persuade using both. The substantial sections in Chapter Three on the impact of psychology on the appraisal process and on the psychology of workplace surveillance, provide a link to the psychological contract, a key exchange relationship. These links and their associations to workplace surveillance provide a sound basis for the analysis. As detailed earlier, the manager is an active (and on occasion passive) participant in a number of exchange relationships at hierarchical, organisational, and personal levels. The breadth of quantitative data gathered from the managers in the organisations in this research provides a rich seam of exemplar surveillance data. The
application and implementation of appraisals and performance measurement as mechanisms of surveillance, with the strong links to psychology literature, provides evidence of the importance of psychology as an appropriate perspective. The analysis also draws on elements of Stanton’s surveillance framework, and the behavioural locus of control on managerial perceptions has been identified post hoc, as also helping frame the analysis.

In conclusion, the overall methodology sits well within the basis constructs of any qualitative research study. The epistemology (constructionism) informs the theoretical perspective (interpretivism), which in turn sits behind the actual methods of data collection (interviews) and the analysis through the primary lens of exchange.

This chapter set out the methods and the methodology for this research. It detailed how the data was gathered, and why the semi-structured qualitative interview is the best method for this type of research. It also spent some time discussing the effectiveness of the telephoned interview, not least because of the lack of literature on the subject, but also because of the importance of the interviews to the overall findings. The chapter went on to provided a précised sketch of the organisations involved, the pseudonyms assigned to them, and gave a brief overview of the interviewees from each organisation. It then outlined how the interviews were transcribed, coded, and analysed.

The next two chapters (Chapter Six and Seven) offer some of the findings. Chapter Six will deal with the managers overall perceptions to workplace surveillance, and Chapter Seven delves more deeply into the reasons behind why managers behave the way they do linked to the exchanges taking place. The large amounts of data generated by this study naturally meant that a degree of selection took place. It would have been impractical to use sample data from every one of the interviews. However, the study has used representative examples and quotations to illustrate the issues and findings. In spite of the large numbers of participants in this research, the data collection process remains one that is inherently selective “you cannot get it all” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, pp. 55-6).
CHAPTER SIX

Findings: Surveillance

This section of the thesis deals with the findings and analysis of the primary data. It consists of two major chapters. The first of the two chapters details the general findings in relation to workplace surveillance. The second chapter analyses in more detail the findings in relation to exchange relationships including the psychological contract and the employment relationship.

This chapter examines manager’s views on a range of surveillance activities. Their perceptions of the general use of workplace surveillance fall into two areas, the intensity of organisational performance management and the expectations and requirement by employers, to apply and use the performance management information.

The structure of this part of the findings is arranged by bracketing the research findings into defined groups of organisations, comparing, and contrasting (where appropriate) the nature of the surveillance. The first group puts together two organisations both of whom operate Call Centres, but have diametrically opposing approaches to performance management within their respective Call Centre. The second group examines organisations linked by their vertically integrated associations to the leisure industry. In the third and final group, the study compares how organisations with historical associations to the public sector manage to reconcile private sector attitudes to workplace surveillance in new flatter hierarchical management frameworks.
The first group examined consists of Roses plc and Tulip plc. Both organisations are heavily involved in Call Centre work, in neither case is it their core business, both organisations take divergent strategic approaches to the use and application of, electronic performance management to achieve higher productivity. Contrasting views on the use of electronic performance data are present, in one case heavily using electronic performance data, and the other disavowing its use. The analysis looks at how surveillance influences managers and the management of teams of workers, making the contrast between the two organisations particularly engaging.

The second group in this section places together Chestnut plc, Sunflower plc, and Daffodil plc. This grouping is linked by loose associations to the leisure/catering industry, including food, beverage, and service viewpoints. These industries in the past have been largely dependent on visual forms of surveillance, i.e. individual managers and supervisors visually watching and overseeing workers. The specific interest in this group revolves around the uses of surveillance technology to augment previous visual surveillance activities.

The third grouping places Privet and Lilac together. Both Privet and Lilac have links with hierarchical/bureaucratic management practices, in one case through direct association to public service (Lilac), and in the other through historical associations to public service (Privet). This grouping was particularly interesting, as both Lilac and Privet have sought a more efficient ‘private sector’ type approach in recent years, both demonstrated striking similarities to private sector operations in the types and perceptions towards workplace surveillance.

The findings in this chapter reinforce the dystopic suggestions on the impact of surveillance on work practices. This is particularly true when looking at the intensity and frequency of the surveillance in Groups One and Two. The types of surveillance taking place in the organisations in Group Three while perhaps less intensive and less frequent, appears to have little impact on altering negative perceptions of the managers to surveillance compared to the first two groups. Their perceptions despite being less frequently surveilled and with comparatively less intensity bear strong resemblances to the perceptions of managers in both Groups One and Two.

In all three groups, the managers are concerned about the uses to which they are expected to put workplace and performance monitoring. Views were expressed that strongly suggest that managers, far from feeling empowered by the mass of information on team or individual performance, were in fact, feeling less empowered, in some cases disempowered, and on
occasion they employed subtle, and sometimes less subtle forms of misbehaviour or resistance. This led me to coin the term of a “Performance Intermediary Executive” (PIE) to describe managers in this position. It appears to sum up succinctly and provide a more appropriate meaning to their employment.

6.1 Group One

In UK Call Centres, and those operated by UK based companies, a range of well-documented and intrusive workplace surveillance options are employed. These include when and for how long toilet breaks are taken: the pace of the work required throughout the day, and individual call handing length. The notion that measuring everything that can be measured is something frequently associated to Call Centres. This negative perspective was a common one amongst managers in this study.

While the ability to surveil everything is technically achievable in contemporary workplaces, it moves the surveillance in organisations into the realms of omniscience, with all the pejorative terminology associated with it. For many in this research, particularly those of Roses plc and Sunflower plc, the dystopically surveillant workplace suggested by Zuboff and others, has already arrived.

The ability to measure the previously immeasurable is potentially changing/re-shaping the modern workplace. Managers and workers are subject to ever more sophisticated performance monitoring software, using computers that are ever more powerful, and technological devices that pervade contemporary workplaces. As one manager from Roses plc indicated,

“There’s a lot of measurements in place, and I’m sure you’ll agree, that the objective behind the measurement is sometimes lost. It’s because we can measure it we’re going to measure it, because we can.”

(Roses plc Interviewee #15 Telephoned, October 2006)

Echoing Marx’s ‘everything that moves’ scenario, this single quote succinctly demonstrates the inherent dichotomies for many managers in the twenty-first century. On one hand, it acknowledges the plethora of measures in workplaces. While on the other hand there is an absence of awareness of the uses to which the measures are put. There is no
acknowledgement of any operational, tactical, or importantly, strategic (long-term) thinking behind the measures from the organisation. The notion of surveillance with no real objective or with a lost objective is reminiscent of the Ministry of Truth’s ‘Records Department’ in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, where records were changed to comply with the ‘truth’ of the day.

It also sounds reminiscent of Drucker’s dictum ‘You can’t manage what you can’t measure.’ However, Drucker’s idealised dictum is not a complete reflection of how quantitative performance management should work in practice. Many managers in a range of industries manage on a solely qualitative basis. Some are rarely, if ever, able to obtain quantitative measures of performance. Managers in marketing, advertising, arts and media, and software companies exercise their qualitative judgement in preference to, or in the absence of, quantitative measures every day. They are no less successful businesses for that apparent limitation.

**Roses Plc**

Managers in Roses plc identified that quantitative measurement has become increasingly important to both the organisation and how the managers manage. In Roses plc, managers, even those not in the highly monitored environments of Call Centres, are increasingly called upon to manage according to prescribed quantitative measures, thus managers are reduced to managing processes according to performance data rather than managing people. The preponderance of quantitative measures also extends to the managers themselves, with managers having their own managerial performance and managerial success judged against their own discrete set of quantitative measurements.

In the face of such a paradox, one could assume that managers might reject the amount of managerial surveillance; they are after all, one of the guardians in this electronic Panopticon. Yet, managers’ in Roses plc would actively seek out yet more data/information, which in turn required even more surveillance. The requests were made in the knowledge that the data/information is available upon request. When asked why this takes place, another interviewee based in a Call Centre rather resignedly told me, “…because we can.” This sort of reaction brings to mind psychological reactance, of which more in Chapter Seven.

The source of the additional data for Roses plc Call Centre managers comes from the so-called ‘independence’ of an in-house marketer, who provides Call Centre managers with more
‘meaningful’ data. The primary reason given by managers for their reliance on such data is that
the surveys comprise of quantified data, and that using quantified data is perhaps easier to
work with than relying on more personalised people management. That might be true, but it
certainly requires less management skill and less managerial knowledge. This is despite some
of the same managers asserting that they prefer to manage people rather than processes.
However, the marketing manager who conducts the tests indicated that contrary to the local
managers’ assertions, the Call Centre managers actually place great store on the results of his
‘quantified’ surveys, and regularly place additional requests for them. This was a sign of how
some Call Centre managers would actively seek out negative feedback loops (the ECFP -
External Customer Feedback Process), in addition to performance measurements on their
computer ‘Dashboards’\(^{33}\). This managerial action is another example of applying cybernetic
control theory, which as a result, creates further self-regulation. There are also shades of
another type of operant behaviour reinforcer.

“I frequently get calls for people who have a team of 24 people and say
only 12 of them have had an ECFP (External Customer Feedback Process)
this month so how am I going to write up the others. I reply that it’s not
the purpose of the ECFP; it’s great that these people have the customer
feedback, but it’s not a prescriptive tool. ... part of their job is to listen to
the call and their manager give feedback on it rather than having to wait
all the time for the customer to give some feedback as part of their job and
they should be getting on with it.”

(Roses plc Interviewee #22\(^{\text{Telephoned}}\): November 2006)

There was the clear sense in the interviews that managers, some of whom were managing
teams of 20, and in some cases upwards of 40 telephone operatives, believe it impractical to
manage everyone well (or at least as well as some might like). This might help explain their
fondness for the quantitative measures. Managers perceived the use of performance
measurement in binary or Manichaean terms, with managers being either for them, or against
them, or as all good or all bad.

“There are two views within [Roses plc] one senior manager said to me that if
you can’t measure it how can you manage it? And another that relied on a

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\(^{33}\) Dashboard: a real-time electronic display that enables Call Centre managers to measure proactively customer
demand, operative availability, and work pacing.
simple question, would you recommend me to your friends. And if they said yes, that was a tick in the box and the guy was happy. If they said no, find out why they said no and that was his only measure.”

(Roses plc Interviewee #17 *Telephoned: October 2006)

Yet, for some managers, it was not all measures and measurement and no people management. For some of the managers in Roses plc the quantitative measurements were perceived as bureaucratic performance measurements, ultimately used as a tool for control; control by the manager over the worker, and control by Roses plc over the manager. From those interviewed there is little belief that the means and methods of measurement in place at Roses plc actually help managers to achieve any of the other aspects of their managerial role, those of a planner, leader, or organiser.

A group of managers, primarily those of a certain generation, saw the potential for the demise of what they considered important aspects of the job. As a senior manager, with many years experience of managing large teams in Call Centres put it:

“The problem is you start doing all those processes, measurements and things, in place and you get so involved in that. ... But you then can’t do your job because everything has to be monitored so closely so where we’re trying to produce 700 reports in a month if you then having to do all the performance checks and balances the whole time... then it can be counter-productive”

(Roses plc Interviewee #18 *Telephoned: October 2006)

A sizable number of managers held that particularly negative viewpoint. Of the managers who had more than five years experience, it was an opinion almost universally held. Why this might be the case I can only speculate, but it might be down to an individual manager’s experience, age, gender, or perhaps an instrumentalist behavioural locus of control. Based on the interviews, it is my opinion that a high proportion of managers were also perhaps less resigned to the dystopic outcomes or at least less cynical, and still holding out for the possibility of being able to manage people, rather than be totally reliant on quantitative measures. I am not convinced that it is wrong for managers to hold out some hope that they can defeat (resist) the system. Although I do not believe that managers are right to behave like Luddites to turn back
change. Change will continue, and managers much like King Canute before them, will not be able to turn back the metaphorical tides.

Managers were also suspicious of the amount of work involved in dealing with measurement data, some of which they argued appeared to diminish, de-professionalize, or fragment their role.

As these two self-aware managers stated:

“One of the challenges that I have as a manager, you would expect it is my role to manage. So I should be taking all of these various imports that is coming in from various systems, talking to my guys looking at the various things that they are involved in and then making a judgement call on who is doing a good job and who is not doing a good job. But what I find is I’m managed, almost exclusively these days, on which boxes in our particular system I’d ticked.”

(Roses plc Interviewee #15 *Telephoned: October 2006)

“I sometimes think though, certain people in certain places, try to make sense of some of these things and before you know where we are we’ve gone too far and we end up analysing the backside off this stuff, because as you know you can end up analysing too much of these figures.”

(Roses plc Interviewee #17 *Telephoned: October 2006)

Comments such as these led directly to the construction of the notion of the Performance Intermediary Executive (PIE), a term I use to describe disempowered, disenchanted, and disillusioned managers. In these comments, managers betray the tendency for organisations to pursue quantitative measurement at all costs, leaving them to make decisions based not on their own observations, but on the electronic observations of a computer based performance system, or as Interviewee #15*Telephoned says, “on which boxes in our particular system I’d ticked.” In the following quotation, the manager additionally suggests that the propensity for measurement in Roses plc might be counter-productive; also implying that it is about altering workplace behaviours.
This is a particular bugbear for me; it’s probably because I’m not a measurements kind of person. But, for people who, you know, love that kind of thing I suppose it helps, it helps them in their work, but to me I think it’s a kind of a distraction. We all have, all managers in [Roses plc] have [these measurements]... I’m not convinced that they necessarily drive the right behaviours or what is really needed by the company.

(Roses plc Interviewee #23 *Telephoned*, November 2006)

Conversely, a much more inexperienced manager when asked about the usefulness of the ECFP (External Customer Feedback Process) surveys and other measures indicated that it was not true that the abundance of measures was managing them. Instead, they saw it as an opportunity to target their resources in the direction of failing operatives.

“If you’re managing a team of 12, and 11 of them are getting good scores, it is so transparent if one is getting just negative scores at least you know where to direct your resources.”

(Roses plc Interviewee #24 *Telephoned*, November 2006)

During the course of the interview, the manager responsible for the comment confided that they found managing their team using performance measures particularly overwhelming, in terms of quantity. It therefore came as no surprise they saw any indicators that saved time as being valuable. It also confirms psychological and sociological literature, which suggests that managers who do not collect their own surveillance data, rather become reliant on other sources (in this case the in-house marketing tool, ECFP), minimise the emphasis placed on their own subjective judgements.

Based on the selection of quotes from Roses plc managers, it is a reasonable question given the two identified outlooks on the usefulness of the performance data, to ask whether there is any discernable difference between the approaches of the managers. For the first two, on one side, some managers use figures they perceive as having little value, but use them nonetheless. Whereas on the other side, there are manager’s who are not keen on the use of performance data, but see a value in the figures for potentially making their life easier. Included in the section of managers who dislike using the data, but use it anyway, are those who openly ‘resist’ the use of performance data, instead preferring to rely on their own judgement and experience to determine who is performing successfully. These managers are
firmly in the minority, even within this group, with a suggestion that they consist primarily of very experienced managers and with an additional leaning towards women managers.

Arguably, that there is no real difference between the two sides’ perspectives. Rather than opposing each other, they demonstrate a different perspective to the same issue.

It can further be argued that both managerial perspectives exhibit behaviours produced by the notion of control that has been constrained, confined, and moulded into conformity by panoptic surveillance. Equally, it could be that they are just managers with different locus of control exhibiting these same characteristics. Managers with self-belief in their abilities will rely more on self (i.e. their ability to manage people without the benefit of external measures), than managers who see success as more reliant on external factors (i.e. the external performance data that they have no control over).

This situation both demonstrates and reinforces the dichotomous influence of surveillance, producing at the same time a situation where the same initial action (the surveillance) can produce opposite and (un)equal reactions. It is also possible to see these acts, obtaining additional quantitative performance measurements, employing a variety of unofficial means of measurement, as minor examples of resistance. Managers were clearly either resisting or overly embracing the notion of managing by the indicator, both positions in their own way exhibiting resistance, albeit coming from different positions.

Managers who themselves feel surveilled or watched might also exhibit negative behaviours, they too might become ‘less enthusiastic, more stressed, and less productive’ in how they manage. For some managers, that is the reality. The additional factor here is that the managers in Roses plc, and in other organisations in this study, while understanding that surveillance of them and the wider workforce takes place, they are uncomfortable with aspects of how their employers/line managers expect them to apply and use the surveillance data.

A number of operational similarities exist between Tulip plc and Roses plc. Both organisations operate Call Centres, although in both cases Call Centres are not the mainstay of their operations, for both organisations it is a service, a contact point between them and their customer.
Tulip Plc

Roses plc and Tulip plc are competitors in one section of their operations. However, Tulip plc, in contrast to Roses plc, have decided to buck the trend of moving towards ever more measurement, and have made a conscious decision to deliberately move away from the quantitative measurement of performance, particularly in the Call Centre operations, thus differentiating them from Roses plc. Instead, they are refocusing their Call Centre operations on the use of qualitative measurements of performance and subjectively managing people.

The changes at Tulip plc centre on a specific move away from electronic measures in their Call Centre operations and a return to qualitative measures of performance. Managers are instead being asked to rely on their knowledge of their team personnel and their personal and managerial expertise. There are noticeable reverse engineered echoes of Zuboff’s notion of embedding knowledge and expertise in the software and hardware of computers and information systems evident here.

It was confided to me that the previously relied upon ‘Dashboard’\(^\text{34}\) of quantitative measures seen on Call Centre managers’ computers, while hidden from general view, with its use prohibited, was still running quietly in the background. This was to enable senior managers to identify whether the qualitative management approach was working. This was in part due to regulatory issues, but also ironically, as a means of measuring quantitatively the results of a qualitative management processes. It remains to be seen whether the changes will be permanent or whether they will be reversed. The indications given to me are that the changes are there to stay, unless that is, over the medium-long time they were not delivering superior results. The timing of this shift in emphasis in measurement proved particularly fortuitous for the research study, in that the interviews took place in Tulip plc while it was still in a state of flux from what was a major change in how their Call Centres and the wider organisation operated.

The initial promise of the change was that it would encourage managers at Tulip plc to observe operatives at work, and to communicate face-to-face with them, rather than rely on the Dashboard. This caused a number of problems for some of the managers, as the research demonstrates. Other managers however, embraced the changes and the managerial freedoms

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\(^{34}\) Dashboard: a real-time electronic display that enables Call Centre managers to measure proactively customer demand, operative availability, and work pacing.
it engendered. Paradoxically, some once confident managers were less able to cope with the reduction/elimination of the quantitative measures.

The changes involve a major upheaval in the operations and organisational culture of Tulip plc. Nonetheless, the findings regarding workplace surveillance from the interviews at Tulip plc were remarkably consistent with those from Roses plc who have a completely different type of operation and culture. In Tulip plc, like at Roses plc, the vast majority of managers fell into two distinct but opposing camps, with managers who openly resist making up the numbers. The first camp has managers see the use of quantitative performance data as a way to make their role as manager easier, and the second, has those who see quantitative performance data as diminishing their role as manager. The breakdown in terms of percentages was around the same (26% Roses plc vs. 23% Tulip plc, around one manager in four). While not a majority in either case, a sizable minority express a preference for using quantitative measures of performance. Why this might be the case, is something of a mystery. It is possible the training, experience, gender, and age of the manager could be responsible for the view. Equally, the organisational culture and historical managerial preferences might play a role. As proposed for Roses plc, a good argument can be made that the real difference could be in the different locus of control. Alternatively, a combination of these factors might be responsible.

What is known is that the key differentiator between Roses plc and Tulip plc is they are adopting diametrically opposing view on the organisational and cultural application of qualitative performance data. While in Roses plc, there was a perception that yet more measurement (organisationally or managerially driven) was the force behind improving performance. The constant demand for yet more measurement in Roses plc strongly echoes Taylorist approaches and Scientific Management. Contrast that with the cultural/managerial view in Tulip plc, where the opposite is true. The emphasis in Tulip plc is on using qualitative measures of performance and psychological approaches to management.

Tulip plc’s encouragement of psychological approaches to management, including Transformational Leadership suggests a wider emphasis on workplace psychology and psychological aspects to management, including persuading managers to manage using “gut instincts” (Tulip plc Interviewee #69: January 2007). Taken together, it hints at the importance of choosing (either employing or promoting) instrumentalist managers over fatalist managers. It might also explain the thinking behind the recently introduced lengthy pre-employment processes, including psychometric testing before joining Tulip plc. It would be a sensible
decision to ‘weed out’ fatalist managers, if the organisation were reducing access to performance measures and adopting a more psychological approach to management. Of course, there is also the possibility that the choices are simply pragmatic business ones with Tulip plc adopting a different approach in order to achieve a unique selling point, either for workers or customers, thus differentiating themselves amongst any number of remarkably similar Call Centre type operations. This might be due to the low financial cost of introducing software/hardware for workplace surveillance, which has dropped considerably in recent years, thus making it readily available to all Call Centre operations.

The quotes in this section might at first glance appear to contradict those in Roses plc. Yet, those appearances can be deceptive. In Roses plc, managers some rebelled (resisted) and ignored the use of quantitative data, preferring instead qualitative measures. In Tulip plc, the reverse is true. A limited number of managers expressed a preference for quantitative measures and actively sought out the old types of measurement over qualitative measures. Some even expressed a profound sense of loss when left without their ‘Dashboard’ to help them manage.

“Some of them still can’t cope with that, [the lack of quantitative measures] they still need a ‘Dashboard’ in front of them to sit down with an individual and say you are not performing.

They’re uncomfortable sitting down and saying, I’ve noticed a few things. You don’t seem to be engaged, are there any issues, what do you like best about your job, what is it that motivates you, when you come into work, and that gut feeling is that you’ve seen them up at the coffee machine every five minutes so they’ll be chatting on, or you’ll catch them on the Internet. They seem to think that you’ve only done two hours talk time – why. Rather than, this is what I’ve observed, this is what I’ve seen … [long pause], it’s very difficult to some of them.”

(Tulip plc Interviewee #81: January 2007)

This above comment aptly demonstrates differences in the managerial culture surrounding the use of performance data and performance measures in Tulip plc, which contrasts the approach seen in Roses plc. The quote identifies that certain managers when freed from using electronic
performance data can struggle to manage without the performance data in front of them, as Interviewee #81 understandably says, “It’s very difficult for some of them.”

It demonstrates the nature of Tulip plc managers aptly. Not just the understanding tone displayed by Interviewee #81, but in the general tenor of a number of interviews. Tulip plc encourage managers to identify more with their teams and visually and benignly watch workers (rather than rely on electronically generated performance data), to get to know what motivates employees, and to get the best out of them.

In Tulip plc, one of the individuals interviewed, indicated that the wider issue of trust was perhaps at the heart of performance surveillance. Where there is continual electronic surveillance there is an implied lack of trust, and by implication, when there is less reliance on performance measures, there is more trust.

“It’s kind of a respect thing as well, where you’ve got an environment where you’re very much on the targets all the time and things like that. You don’t give people any leeway so then it feels like there is a lack of trust for the employees. ...I think you’ll never get away from that in a call centre or contact centre it’s sort of an integral part of it. Otherwise, somebody might not be doing their job and we might not know about it. But here they don’t question the statistics, and the numbers so much they just say how you doing, was the customer happy, did they get the right answer? But at the end of the day we get paid for giving the right answer.”

(Tulip plc Interviewee #78: January 2007)

This perception of trust is tied to the one extending beyond the local manager/worker relationship. It moves it to the wider trust relationship of the employment relationship and the reciprocal nature of the payment by an organisation, for a service (i.e. their labour), from an employee.

What starts to emerge from comparing Roses plc and Tulip plc is a picture of two organisations that have taken opposing views of how to improve service in their respective organisations. Roses plc has gone down the popular, familiar, and financially less risky path of Call Centres operations, by relying on more and more electronic performance measurement data. In contrast, Tulip plc is going against typical Call Centre performance ideologies by hiding any quantitative data from the Call Centre managers.
On the face of it, Tulip plc’s approach to workplace surveillance would seem to be preferable. However, there are two potentially major obstacles. First, some inexperienced managers appear reticent to be disconnected from their Dashboard, and second, if the changes made at Tulip plc do not deliver improvements on performance compared to industry norms, there is a possibility that a return to quantitative measures might take place.

A senior manager in Tulip plc has previously expressed the difficulties some managers had in losing access to their ‘Dashboard’. The same senior manager from the earlier quote succinctly encapsulated the way that they perceive Tulip plc’s Call Centre operations, when they said,

“We have free-range hens rather than battery hens, people manage themselves on a day on day basis”

(Tulip plc Interviewee #81: January 2007)

This use of the metaphor of workers in Call Centres being battery or free-range hens is an assumed reference to a set of advertisements used for an online insurance company, Swiftcover, where call centre operatives are characterised as hens. However, what it also does is to suggest how this manager sees his team, albeit in a benign rather than malicious way. It is debateable whether this manager was being deliberately condescending or hurtful. My belief is that he was trying to express in a pragmatic or misplaced jokey way, that there is a perception that Call Centre operatives are hens, and if that was the perception, then their hens were the best looked after hens in the business. However, I accept there is a possibility that the comments might actually be indicative of their feelings towards their team or the wider perceptions of the job.

A similar degree of pragmatism was also present in the manager’s attitude to the round up of daily measurement, the annual appraisal.

“With any call centre it sometimes a problem with appraisals, how do you judge someone who takes calls all day and speaks to customers all-day, with someone who takes calls all day and speaks to customers. It’s the same job! And yeah you can probably judge certainly the quality and listen to them to see how they do and things like that. It’s very much difficult to quantify I suppose to work out who deserves what level of pay rise and pay structure and things like that, when really everyone is doing the same job.”
“…I’ve been busy all year, but it just comes down to the numbers”

(Tulip plc Interviewee #81: January 2007)

This approach is on one hand a refreshingly honest appreciation of how annual appraisals operate in an environment where one good telephone operative has become almost indistinguishable from another good telephone operative. It does however suggest on the other that some managers are prone to put similar appraisals down for a range of people due to their failure to differentiate between team members. How this affects the good employee (or manager), who sees getting a similar appraisal to a less talented one, can be counterproductive for all concerned in both the short and the long term.

By abandoning technological means of performance measurement, does not mean that Tulip plc have become an organisation of Luddites. Far from it, Tulip plc is adopting a number of technological solutions to improve performance. They, like Roses plc, are pioneering the comprehensive use of Interactive Voice Response (IVR) to improve customer service. In Roses plc, the IVR technology was introduced primarily for customer feedback purposes, i.e. after the call has been concluded. It can be characterised as a back-end approach. The assumption in Tulip plc is that IVR will assist in customer routing to the operative, i.e. before an operative answers the call; i.e. a front-end approach.

This is a somewhat anomalous approach for Tulip plc, given the feedback mechanisms they employ, which according to one manager are overused.

“Feedback, feedback, feedback, feedback, change, change, change, change. I think sometimes we need to stop, let’s change, give it a go, let’s reflect upon it, and if we need to change again, then great.”

(Tulip plc, Interviewee #87: February 2007)

Unfortunately, this manager and others in Tulip plc do not see a strategic approach to the changes. This mirrors similar sentiments expresses in Roses plc. Organisationally, both Tulip plc and Roses plc appear to favour organisational inertia, which when strategies are pushed through, organisational inertia (from employees) prevents further change occurring. In these instances, the managers are the source of inertia; surveillant strategies are being used simply because they are possible. In Roses plc, the intensity of the surveillance and the necessity for it is questioned, whereas in Tulip plc, the reasoning for the surveillance and its use is questioned.
Reinforcing this opinion, are the words of a senior manager who is charged with implementing some of the changes.

“HR, great function that it is, can be a little bit silo-ed and they don’t necessarily understand and or know what’s going on in detail or how people are feeling on a day-to-day basis.”

(Tulip plc, Interviewee #86: February 2007)

They went on to critique how introducing new frameworks, particularly those involving change and changes in the levels of Call Centre surveillance were sometimes not communicated as well as perhaps they could have been. Refreshingly, there was some reflexivity and honesty in the response, although they noted that some managers were less than enamoured with spreading the message of change, perhaps due to their own personal insecurities over losing the Dashboard.

In this instance, the communication of the reason for the change was left to individual managers, which is where the plan broke down. One of the main issues was that managers were patchy at best about how they communicated the messages. There was some acknowledgement of legitimate reasons why this might be the case, a bad night’s sleep before an important meeting or ill health for example. There was also the real concern that managers were being deliberately obdurate as a reaction to losing the Dashboard. This type of response can be linked directly to psychological reactance and misbehaviour. Nonetheless, there was some awareness or appreciation of a more general management malaise or failure to engage with the message.

These miscommunications/misbehaviours are of particular relevance to this study, as they confirm managerial perceptions of the exchange relationship, not just the lack of univocal and mutual reciprocity, which as previously discussed can lead to ruptures in relationships, but hints at a wider breakdown in the exchange relationship between employer and manager, and manager and other employees. There is no suggestion that managers are lacking in ability, far from it, several managers are of a particularly high calibre, experienced and successful in Call Centre management. This disconnection/rupture has occurred, for several managers, in part because of the recent changes, and in part, because of how other issues are communicated to the wider workforce.
“They’re very touchy-feely, it’s very important that everybody is in the right mindset, so communication-wise there’s a huge amount spent on that. But then, it has parts of the business that work completely ‘in silo’ as far as I can see. … Which is worrying.”

(Tulip plc, Interviewee #87: February 2007)

Despite the claims of a more touchy-feely organisation, there are still assumptions made about aspects of the business, particularly in relation to telephone-based workers. Call Centre workers were characterised as being,

“Quite rigidly managed and have KPI’s [Key Performance Indicator’s], in busy periods they don’t have time to read their emails. And because the [emails] are not pitched in a way they would understand, they don’t necessarily understand the messages or what it means to them or how it links into anything”

(Tulip plc, Interviewee #86: February 2007)

There is in this quote a suggestion or an inadvertent slight on the abilities of the Call Centre workers. This possibility is discussed later in reference to a similar comment in Chestnut plc. What this quote does do, is to betray the notion that despite all the talk of being more in touch, there are still people who perceive Call Centre workers, even within their own organisation, as being too busy to read or understand emails or comprehend the wider corporate perspective. It may be just a display of some inter-organisational rivalry, although subsequent comments relating to a lack of “networking opportunities”, and just wanting “to sit somewhere else rather than at their desk during lunch”, do hint at an unintentional ‘them and us’ mentality. The notion of a ‘them and us’ mentality is a notion similarly present in relation to Chestnut plc, and discussed using a specific example. Ironically, in this instance the earlier discussed ‘Cash Posters’ research, identified that social activity and networking opportunities were strongly correlated to good work performance, so while interviewee #86, appears to be discussing a lack of ambition from the Call Centre employees, they might have accidentally stumbled upon one reason for poorly performing workers.

A recent problematical product launch and ongoing concerns about how organisational changes were communicated, further calls into question the psychological contract and the exchange relationship between on one hand the managers, and on the other, the organisation.
“I think there's a responsibility on a manager to question if they don’t understand the message and to get the support”

(Tulip plc, Interviewee #87: February 2007)

A great many managers in both organisations had little knowledge of the jobs forecasting or planning (except on an ad hoc basis), they seldom coordinated with other departmental managers, and as in Roses plc, were all too often reduced to performance intermediaries, controlling and commanding almost exclusively on the algorithmic whims of a computer and a software program. For Tulip plc, there was an added complication with the recent reduction of performance measurements. This did offer the hope that it would lead to a more empowered form of management, for some, the change was perhaps a change too far.

Roses plc and Tulip plc took divergent approaches to maximising performance; yet the results of the research in both organisations are remarkably similar. In Roses plc, managers baulked at the propensity to use computer generated quantitative performance measures. While on the other side of the coin, managers in Tulip plc, baulked at the loss of the quantitative measures. Yet, both sides indulged in resistance to the different types of surveillance in place, and both sides contained proponents of the system. For Tulip plc, there was too little quantitative measurement for some managers, whereas in Roses plc, there was too much reliance on quantitative measurement. Equally, both appeared concerned about the use of, or lack of, technology and/or a strategy in the process.

6.2 Group Two

The second group of organisations consists of three organisations, Chestnut plc, Sunflower plc, and Daffodil plc. The three organisations all have in common the theme of leisure and catering. Chestnut plc is a transnational food-processing organisation with a number of well-known brands in its portfolio of companies. The vast majority of these brands, although not exclusively, are associated with catering food and beverages or consumer food production. Sunflower plc are a major arm of an established leisure group of companies, encompassing a complete range of leisure activities from bars, restaurants, live entertainment, and gaming. Daffodil plc are part of a luxury international hotel, restaurant, and property group with interests in many countries around the world.
A cursory examination of the type of surveillance activities in Call Centres (Group One) compared to those in other workplaces (Groups Two and Three) might suggest that as they are nowhere near as electronically surveillant, and as such the results would be substantially different. While it is true that there is limited scope to electronically measure or monitor individual performance as in a Call Centre, and then make that information available an hour-by-hour minute-by-minute basis in real time throughout the day. Surprisingly in some departments in both organisations, it was sometimes available on an hour-by-hour basis for several tasks in the organisations.

In the interviews with managers and in Chestnut plc with production or ‘shop-floor’ workers, they all conveyed similar feelings and sentiments to the managers in Call Centres, bemoaning the loss of control and their ability to manage (or in the case of the production workers the lack of the managers ability to manage them). By dint of the number of interview participants in some of the organisations in this group the discussion is limited. Nevertheless, the interviews were generally consistent with the more detailed observations and comments made by those in Roses plc and Tulip plc.

Despite all the attention given to the new electronic surveillance techniques in Call Centres with allusions to ‘dark satanic mills,’ ‘electronic sweat shops,’ and ‘customer service factories,’ the ‘traditional’ surveillance in old-fashioned production line factories never really went away. The Taylorist notion of Scientific Management and the mass-production lines of Ford’s factories of the 1910s, perceived by some as the epitome of twentieth-century workplace surveillance, were significant because the surveillance took place in typical industrial factories.

Nonetheless, the reality is that much of twentieth century industrial surveillance occurs in workspaces little changed from Bentham’s day, through the industrial and post-industrial revolution. That was until the advent of the Call Centre, which has become in recent years the orthodoxy for gauging contemporary surveillance.

**Chestnut Plc**

Chestnut plc is a worldwide leader in food production and processing. The research was conducted in one of a number of food-processing plants, which are dotted around the UK. It supplies the major UK retail supermarkets with both their own-brand processed food products, and its own widely recognised food brands. Chestnut plc was one of the few organisations who
made workers across all levels available for interview including, production, supervisory, administration, and management. This provided an opportunity to gauge not just managers perspective, but also the perspective from supervisory and production workers. The measurement of performance in Chestnut plc, although different in terms of what it measures and how it measures it, is equally as intense (if not more so) than in the Call Centre environment. Based on interviews with production workers, the equivalent to Call Centre telephone operatives, the working environment and conditions in production are as intense, although physically they are much more demanding on the worker, than in any of the Call Centres.

To illustrate the differences between administrative workers and factory workers at Chestnut plc, production workers were referred to as working ‘below’ and administrative staff as working ‘above’. This is partly because of the uneven geographical surface of the site; the production workers work a few steps (2-3 feet) below the offices. Nonetheless, the use of the terms ‘above’ and ‘below’ was symptomatic of the working relationships on the site. The production staff did not mix with the administrative (office) employees, except during breaks when production workers endured lengthy delays, caused they believed, by priority being given to the office employees in the canteen. Yet, the terms were accepted as the norm by both administrative and production line workers. This sort of language clearly had an effect on these workers, as they felt inferior to the office employees almost because of the language. Thus providing another example of how the employment relationship is damaged.

Instead of electronically measuring individual performance, as in Call Centres, the measurement (some of which was electronically based through the production machinery) was just part of the production process, with claims that it was only there for external traceability purposes and for Health and Safety. The notion that it was just for external customers’ traceability was shown to be patently untrue as according to several production workers, supervisors regularly used the surveillance aspect to trace issues back to specific workers, then use it to discipline individuals and for more general disciplinary purposes.

“For example, I know a young girl who doesn’t stand up to herself she marked the book and she ticked a label that she shouldn’t have done. Now she never had no bother before and they took her in the office and gave her a final warning, not a first warning but a final warning.”

(Chestnut plc, Interview #52b *Production*: February 2007)
This interview (along with one other in Chestnut plc) had two participants (#52a/52b). I suspected there might be some concerns vis a vis talking openly. It transpired there was some genuine suspicion. Several months earlier, a ‘researcher’ came into Chestnut plc and spoke to employees on the production side. The ‘researcher’ turned out according to several workers, to be in the employ of Chestnut plc. This lent some credence to their initial suspicions of me. Fortunately, I managed to ascertain this information about the ‘fake’ researcher early in the first production interview. I was therefore able in both instances to advise them if they felt uncomfortable with any of the issues raised by me or importantly by the other participant, they could ask to move the discussion on or conclude the interview.

It was also important to understand that in this large workforce, some workers might not know each other, or importantly their views, and therefore they might feel uncomfortable expressing them freely. This made it even more revealing when they decided to disclose the depth to which supervisors and managers used ‘traceability’ (or surveillance) for coercive purposes.

“They do use traceability to kick butt… I’ve been in another department and I know how it’s used”

(Chestnut plc, Interview# 52a *Production: February 2007)

All the managers were aware of the need for traceability and monitoring (Chestnut plc’s euphemism, for surveillance), although usually couched in the language of ‘that’s what the customer wants’ and ‘that’s how we do it’, rather than overtly discussed as a tool for discipline.

“If the customer wants a paper-based tracing system then that’s what we give them, if they want electronic, we would train people up”

(Chestnut plc, Interview# 53 *Supervisor: February 2007)

How the managers and supervisors used traceability to augment disciplinary procedures was in some instances something they welcomed as in the above quote from a supervisor, although the earlier quote about how they use traceability to “kick butt” and to discipline individuals handing out a “final warning” are indicative of a perceptual gap of the psychological contract.
Unlike in Call Centres, the electronic surveillance mechanisms in Chestnut plc were not immediately apparent. There was no computer Dashboard for a manager to gauge individual performances on. There were no overt Orwellian signage, “several calls in the queue” or “average call length is 340 seconds” to chivvy workers along. No signage intended to improve performance throughout the day, no electronic counting of times workers went to the toilet, or how often they took coffee breaks, as in a Call Centre. For the production workers in Chestnut plc, having the ability to take many toilet breaks in a day is a luxury not afforded them. There was only two times a day to take a toilet break, which also included their tea break and meal break. A number of the mechanisms for improving productivity for Chestnut plc were built structurally into the working conditions. For example, the number of breaks was recently contractually reduced from three to two; and the productivity notices (speed) were built into the machinery, although workers were aware subconsciously of the machine speed.

As an outsider, the surveillance appeared to be many things, yet there was a real sense particularly from the production workers was that the surveillance was at best, subtle and nuanced, with many aspects not even being perceived as surveillance. The surveillance could be seen as overt and coercive, as in the disciplinary examples given by Interviewee 52a 

Production. Although the perceived subtle and nuanced was from an outsiders perspective, not particularly subtle or nuanced. This highlights the perceptual gap that exists between workers, supervisors, and managers. The coercive nature of some of the relationships between supervisors and shop floor workers is complex, as it involves not just direct exchange relationships between individuals, but also relationships affected by structural factors built into the working environment.

What was striking during the interviews was the apparent acceptance by all parties, not just production workers, that many of the surveillant practices were acceptable. Again, from an outsider’s perspective, the surveillance simply appeared to be a technologically updated version of Taylorism. To illustrate the point, several of the production workers openly discussed the issue of how the organisation timed the breaks and how the procedures involved in taking breaks were complex and arduous.

“Your break starts when you leave the floor, you have to come out, take your overalls off, hang your wellies up, go the other side, put your own shoes on, take off your hat etc, go through the department up to the canteen. …We can
relax for about 8 minutes out of 30 and you might have to stand in a queue for 5 minutes to get a bacon sandwich. And we have a canteen that is very small and because everyone takes their break at the same times, there are people who take their break standing up against the wall. Then you have to go through all the redressing on the way back”

(Chestnut plc, Interview# 52a/52b *Production: February 2007)

According to the interviewees, managers saw this as a trivial complaint, but it was an important one for the workers especially given the physical demands of the production line

“Only two half-hour breaks in 12 hours. You sometimes work four hours without a break at minus 2 degrees standing in the same place” (#52b)

“When it was too bad, they used to let you go for a quick cup of tea, they’re making out they’re doing you a favour – they’re not, it’s the law” (#52a)

“We used to get three 20 minute breaks in every 12 hour shift, but as part of a pay deal it was reduced to two 30 minute breaks. Now the vote included the whole factory, but the only ones who’s breaks were affected were ours – everyone voted on our breaks” (#52b) “...It might seem unimportant to you, but when it’s cold, you’re getting warmer three times a day instead of two” (#52b).

“But, the reason they did it was so that they could stop production twice instead of three times”

(Chestnut plc, Interview# 52a/52b *Production: February 2007)

In this instance, the workers at Chestnut plc feel they have no control whatsoever. Using the example of breaks and toilet visits is appropriate. In Call Centres, they would be monitored electronically with workers potentially disciplined at some point later. In this instance, the monitoring is also strictly controlled, and it is all the more intrusive by reducing the number of times operatives can visit the toilet. Organisational control is in that instance, overt and coercive, leading to similar ruptures in the employment relationship, where the exchange relationship for these workers was rewritten, ironically with the consent and approval of their
fellow workers through a factory-wide pay deal linked to several conditions in the factory area. UK Trade Unions have recently raised this same issue in other similar production facilities.35

This research, by interviewing individuals from a production environment, has provided the opportunity to look at how surveillance in industrial production facilities has evolved. The advances in computers and computer-based systems affect industrial factories (plants), in some respects mimics the concerns of Zuboff's paper mill plants from 20 years ago. In other respects, the automation, that eliminated workers in Zuboff's work, has still not fully entered the workplace of Chestnut plc. Although, if it were possible to eliminate workers altogether from the production plant, by fully automating it would be done in the name of efficiency, albeit after embedding the knowledge of the current production workers into any computer systems. The production line workers in Chestnut plc who openly admitted that they physically couldn't work any harder, or any faster, were concerned that both supervisors and managers wanted higher production and higher performance. They believed such improvements would not be humanly possible. On that basis, the next performance advancement must be for more automation and less bodies in the factory.

Despite all the criticisms of the systems and the conditions, the workers echoed comments made in other organisations by managers; the bottom line they felt was always the same.

"We're there to get to work out"

(Chestnut plc, Interview# 52a *Production*: February 2007)

"We have terminated people for just not meeting performance figures after 'performance reviews'"

(Chestnut plc, Interview# 53 *Admin Supervisor*: February 2007)

In this quotation (#53), a ‘performance review’ is a different animal to an appraisal. The ‘performance review’ for the production workers appears to be a euphemism for a ‘you aren’t working hard enough or fast enough’ meeting with line managers. The coercive nature of the review is unmistakeable, directly linked to surveillance on the production line. The aim appears to be to further alienate and diminish the employment relationship for these workers; this type of meeting does not take place for workers ‘above’ i.e. in administration/clerical or

management areas. In other ‘above’ areas of Chestnut plc, they have a regular and normal appraisal format with meetings every 3 months.

Closely allied to the ‘performance review’ was the timing and attendance system. This was ostensibly a computer-based clocking-on system, although for the majority of managers it remained a paper and pen system, in part due to a lack of knowledge of the system despite several attempts at training. The system required managers on a daily basis, to OK any ‘anomalies’ (another Chestnut plc euphemism, this time for lateness or poor attendance) for payroll purposes. The advanced facilities of Chestnut plc’s system echoes, albeit to a lesser degree, the perceptions to the appraisal system Sunflower plc introduced (which is discussed later in the next sub-section). Interviewee #45 claimed that there are a number of advanced facilities in Chestnut plc’s attendance system available to managers to help them to understand lateness and poor attendance (i.e. to understand who the good performers are in their teams, and who are the ‘dead wood’). The managers were for whatever reason, not using any of the functions, preferring instead to use a pen and paper.

The production line workers at Chestnut plc were in many cases concerned about management styles and an appreciation by managers/supervisors of the work they were doing, and the use of surveillance. Surprisingly, when the supervisors were interviewed, while they indicated different styles of management, they indicated that there were no issues of surveillance. Why this might be the case could be due to a normalising effect of the Panoptic surveillance. Their behaviour (the acceptance of the surveillance as normal), is in keeping with such effects, it might also be that fatalist managers (ones who are more accepting of quantitative measures and eschew subjective observations), rather than instrumentalist managers, are employed to manage the production line by Chestnut plc. This would make sense, as the production managers/supervisors were highly reliant on the speed of production figures to gauge individual performance. The importance of production speed was made clear judging by the frequency of meetings, with at least one, and sometimes two or three meetings being held on production output every shift. The irony is that the supervisors (like the managers at Roses plc) are also surveilled, perhaps even more so, hence Bentham’s term quis custodiet ipsos custodies – who guards the guardians. In this instance, the behaviourally normalised supervisors do not appear to recognise a different form of surveillance (electronic, rather than structural or visual), either on their team or on themselves.
Findings: Surveillance

Sunflower Plc

The next organisation in this section is Sunflower plc. They are part of a much larger leisure and gaming organisation. All the managers interviewed managed the gaming and leisure operations of their site semi-autonomously. Sunflower plc turned out to be particularly illuminating, with the experienced and highly skilled senior managers again expressing the same concerns as in the other organisations, in spite of the highly intrusive surveillant working environment.

The reason for the initial concern revolved around access negotiations hinging on the production of a report for Sunflower plc on a new computer based appraisal system, and as such, large parts of the interviews were conducted with that aim in mind. Nevertheless, there was more than sufficient in the way of responses to these issues that overlapped into the focus of the research to make their responses relevant.

The results showed that the interviews served to reinforce the findings from the other organisations. They identified similar trends to those in all of the other organisations especially regarding disempowerment. There were some very telling interviews in the context of the research. Indeed, some of the more startling quotes in the entire study came from a manager in Sunflower plc. Perhaps, the most telling exchange was in relation to the overt nature of the surveillance in the workplace. The level of overt surveillance carried out by this organisation on its workforce through CCTV and hidden microphones went beyond anything any of the other organisations in terms of scope or intensity.

“We have cameras everywhere! There’s cameras on all the tables, overview cameras, we’ve got cameras outside, in staff areas, so there are cameras everywhere.”

(Sunflower plc, Interviewee #62: November 2006)

This is a prime example of what the public would call ‘Big Brother’ type activities. The manager expressed as much, and was fully aware of how it could be interpreted “I would imagine that there are people in head office or more remote would see it as such, but locally it is a positive thing” (#62). The use by Sunflower plc of CCTV cameras to surveil people at work is much more intensive than in say a supermarket or retail environment. For example, in one reception area of one of the establishments (around 25 feet by 12 feet), there were at least six clearly visible
CCTV cameras and a number of hidden microphones, with three sets of operator controlled security doors. Paradoxically, as I observed customers arriving, I was surprised that they did not appear to notice them or to express any concerns with them. Whether this is another example of normalised behaviour, as it was for the employees, or simply due to familiarity or apathy is unknown.

Anyone fortunate enough to see behind the scenes of this organisation is met by a bank of monitors all being recorded directly onto computer hard drives.

“We measure efficiency here as you know in terms of performance on the tables, and that table over there is linked to the automatic gaming. It is the most important table in the building.”

(Sunflower plc, Interviewee #58: November 2006)

Importantly in this organisation, not only are there high numbers of CCTV cameras, but there are also high numbers of listening devices. These are primarily microphones built into and around the workspaces. The reason given for this was to aid the employee in customer disputes, although the result for employees was to act as an operant behaviour reinforcer. Although when the workers forget the operant effect, they are reminded all too quickly and easily.

For example, listening in to private employee conversations does not fit the criterion of aiding customer disputes, as the following quote aptly demonstrates.

“What makes you think you can have a private conversation, you’re at work”

(Sunflower plc, Interviewee #58: November 2006)

This quote is striking. It betrays the lack of concern for workers privacy at work. It also suggests the notion that no one deserves privacy at work. It also reminds workers that they are recorded and observed, lest they forget. The reality of this incident emerged in a discussion on annual appraisal, and the sort of information being used to determine appraisals, which begs the question, what other overheard conversations (or CCTV surveillance) were being used to determine employee suitability for increased reward and promotion. The CCTV was used occasionally to determine if a particular employee was having a good night, so that they could be moved to the ‘high-rollers’ (and electronically duplicated) table.
Paradoxically, the same person who was responsible for the quote on private conversations, made an equally insightful quote, relating to the skill required where there are a great many electronic measures used.

“In fact, if anything, with something done electronically you need more skills because, you know, you can have a nasty problem there”

(Sunflower plc, Interviewee #58: November 2006)

On one hand, the interviewee understands the need to be more careful in managing individuals, yet on the other, they betray a complete lack of awareness of the nature of the surveillance. Furthermore, listening in to private conversations could be against UK employment law.

As indicated earlier, a key factor in obtaining access in this organisation was the need for an examination into the effectiveness of the new electronic annual appraisal system. The reason behind the new electronic appraisal system was ostensibly to make savings from a previous paper-based system.

“It took an administrator, around three months to collate and put together the feedback reports, and one or two meeting rooms were booked out. ...Because of all the paperwork involved”

(Sunflower plc, Interview #67: March 2007)

However, digging a little bit beneath the surface, there is another, much more significant aspect. It demonstrated how the electronic appraisal system appeared to conflate efficiency savings with surveillant activities. The appraisal system was not something the organisation or the managers discussed as being surveillant per se, they understood it more as an acceptable addendum to the process, or that the surveillance was an acceptable face of the process. Nonetheless, there were some, who expressed concerns,

“What are you going to do with this information (from the appraisals), I think there is always a bit of fear, isn’t there, that Big Brother is watching you and all the rest of it”

(Sunflower plc, Interview #67: March 2007)
Other managers dismissed many of the concerns about Big Brother, so it is possible that these were the idle rantings of a rogue manager. However, while managers on the ground dismissed them, they were borne out by the identification of an organisational hidden agenda. In an interview with the manager responsible for rolling out the new electronic appraisal system, a number of key facts regarding additional features of the system emerged.

“From a company perspective it’s a fantastic way for us, obviously we don’t go into this detail with the people who are using it, what we can do with the data is phenomenal”

(Sunflower plc, Interview #67: March 2007)

This lent a lie to all the mollifying words intended to help managers understand the use and purpose of the system. How the organisation might apply this quantification of qualitative and personal measures derived by this system in the future made for interesting listening. Hearing how the objectified and quantified measures of personal performance takes place as an acceptable thing, “we are being measured and monitored in a much closer manner” is a worrying trend.

The perception is that it is not just permissible, but acceptable even in such an intrusive way in the workplace reflects and goes beyond earlier comments by managers in Roses plc and Tulip plc. A key aspect of casino work relevant to an individual’s performance is their ability to perform and interact in front of an audience. Accurately determining this relies on a managers (and customers) subjective judgement, unfortunately, Sunflower plc decided against having any customer input or subjective (by way of example or ability to expand on any answer) feedback in the appraisal system. There was scope in the system for additional comments to be made, although they were anonymous, thus diminishing the strength of the comments, if a manager makes a comment it should possibly carry more weight than one made by a co-worker.

Despite all the talk of additional features and the benefits of the system, there was a clear understanding that the system was going to be limited in its scope as this quote demonstrates.

“We don’t need to know the person outside of here (work)”

(Sunflower plc, Interview #67: March 2007)
This quote and the one above also raise the question of the exchange that takes place in the employment relationship. The performance appraisal is used ostensibly as a mechanism to enhance performance and a way to identify skills and develop training. The psychological contract that exists between (in this instance) a manager and their line manager/HR Department is undermined. Several managers specifically mentions “Big Brother,” “Monitoring” and “Surveillance” in relation to possible adverse uses of the data gathered on individuals during the appraisal process. In this instance, the appraisal system as the exchange has different and slightly more sinister undertones for both parties. The employee suspects that something suspicious might be going on, the employer denies this, yet confirms it to an outside party, but claims justification by only withholding the data until the workforce will accept its use. In this instance, by denying managers personal control over the system while simultaneously pretending to give control over the system is likely to lead to a breach of the psychological contract, and disempower and alienate managers who might previously have not believed they were disempowered.

**Daffodil Plc**

Daffodil plc is the third and the smallest organisation in this group. Daffodil plc provided the smallest number of interviewees for the study. Nonetheless, despite only interviewing six participants it was noticeable that as managers they reflected a similar set of concerns to those both to the larger participant organisations and to the group. The individual circumstances were different, but the issues of managerial disempowerment, surveillance, and the influence of behavioural locus of control were made equally as well as in the larger interviewee groups. In the specific example of the work-supplied mobile phone, the point was actually made better than in some.

The key similarity to the first grouping was in relation to the amounts of quantitative information made available to them on a daily basis. The information, perceived by many to be of little or no use to them, was believed to be inappropriate to their management of their department. Nearly all felt the information, while interesting, was more than was required to do their job.

> “I see my role as one of shielding the guys from the financial stuff, as they really don’t need to know”
“...If you don’t give somebody a reason to do something, then they won’t do it”

(Daffodil plc, Interviewee #105: March 2007)

This manager deliberately sought to resist the use of quantitative data, not just shielding their team from the figures, but also actively encouraging improved performance through customer reward (i.e. tipping) which would they believed improve the quantitative data, but the spin off being a happier, more productive, and better workforce.

Another manager (Daffodil plc, #105), provided perhaps the best example of inappropriate and ineffective management. Daffodil plc interviewee #105 provided a fitting explanation for not having a company phone. In a high number of interviews across all the participant organisations, the company mobile phone was seen as a burden, or an additional tool for surveillance. Medically its overuse, as identified earlier, was a problem for a Tulip plc employee. The apocryphal tale of the senior manager seen on television watching a golf tournament, phoned by their employer, seen answering the phone, but still denying their presence at the tournament is one that has been told to this author since the early days of mobile phones in the 1980s. The following quote discussing the apparently benign issuance of a company mobile phone, illustrates all too clearly the perceived negative impact for managers. In this instance, through function creep, a deeper more sinister use of the company mobile phone was identified.

“It’s a necessary evil ... they’ll phone me at home. It’s like a stamp, you’ve been branded. It’s like I’ve sold my soul to the Devil. ...They can phone me anytime”

(Daffodil plc, Interview #105: March 2007)

The manager (Daffodil plc, #108) for whom the company phone became the ‘mark of the Devil’ (a term previously and coincidentally similarly ascribed to the surveillant uses of RFID tags) related how he was contacted by phone, at night, at home, on his day off, to undertake simple maintenance work. Another manager Daffodil plc #103, related the ease with which certain managers would abuse the system; the example they cited, was to get someone “to change a light bulb”
“It sound stupid, but it happened, that’s why we have maintenance now working until 7-8 o’clock (am to pm), in case we need something doing”

(Daffodil plc, Interview #103: March 2007)

Ironically, and presumably because of their expressed concerns over being contacted late at night, at home, on their day off, the manager in question (Daffodil plc, #105) met with more senior management and a solution was proposed. Unfortunately, the solution was that the maintenance coverage the department offers to the organisation increased. They now have to work longer hours, thus potentially (but not always) avoiding phone calls late at night.

The outcome in this instance was that when covert surveillance and control was challenged, it became intrusive and coercive, bearing in mind that the manager with the phone was legitimately querying how other managers abused their position and ability to contact him. The nature of the surveillance and control from an organisational perspective changed, becoming overt and gentle. The organisation response when faced with someone querying workplace surveillance (although that was never the case) was to make the surveillance part of the solution, rather than part of the problem. The organisation’s management signally failed to recognise the managers’ perspective, seeing it not as a problem for the manager telephoned on their day off, instead seeing it as a problem for the organisation and that the organisational problem, rather than the individual problem, needed to be resolved. The resolution was to make the surveillance acceptable for them, ignoring the employee. In this case, the manager who raised the query has become worse off with a personal cost of more awkward hours for everyone in the team. Interestingly, the causes of the surveillance remain, in the guise of the unnecessary phone calls and the unreasonable expectations of other managers.

This has severely affected this manager’s employment relationship, not just between himself and his employer, but also between himself and his fellow managers. The manager feels let down that the other managers, particularly the manager of the team member who called him at home to change a light bulb, who didn’t accept that they were being unreasonable to call him at home. He also feels that as the employer changed the terms and conditions of service, on a whim as he saw it, he no longer feels as valued. Even the appraisal did not recognise the work he and his team put in. The perception of ‘Maintenance’ is that it’s a thankless task, “it’s never a good appraisal” (#108), which links to the nature of the wider exchange relationship.
An unrecorded interview in this organisation provided a clear illustration of how technology in the guise of the company mobile phone in contrast to the example above, has normalised a particularly very senior manager’s behaviour. The BlackBerry smartphone is de rigueur for senior managers and the management tool of choice for communication. It is very different from the simple company mobile phone (as given to #105) or beeper/pager. At the conclusion of the unrecorded interview, around 9.30-10.00 in the evening, the senior manager indicated to me that they would be returning to their hotel room to check email and messages, and this would restart as soon as they woke in the morning, and continue throughout the day as they returned to head office by train.

Two very different examples and two very different results yet, the technology behind the hardware are the same in both cases. One manager had ‘sold their soul to the devil’ whereas the other saw the intrusion into their life as a business necessity. This normalising effect particularly in the use of mobile phones was repeated in nearly all the organisations to varying degrees.

6.3 Group Three

The third group of organisations, Privet and Lilac, have an economic/financial association to each other going back several decades. While in recent years, the financial strength of the association has diminished. The nature of the current financial relationship is considerably different, although the economic ties remain albeit diminished. Lilac and other local organisations, now own less than 50% of their previous holding in Privet. The current relationship is that Lilac is a minor shareholder in Privet. It also has no direct involvement in the day-to-day running of the organisation. This change has also meant that the influence of Lilac in terms of organisational culture is also much reduced, although not fully eliminated. Indeed, the cultures of both of the organisations have over the last few years moved away from the previously more bureaucratic or role culture, to that of the more commercial network organisation, or task culture.

The change in the organisational culture and the emergence of a commercial attitude, for want of a better phrase, has made a huge difference to both organisations. It is primarily for this reason that a decision to link the discussion on the interviews of the two organisations was made. Doing so allows an examination of how divergent, if at all, the two organisations have become in terms of workplace surveillance. The analysis regarding both Lilac and Privet is
limited in comparison to the other groups. This is due to the fewer number of interviewees. Nonetheless, what emerges from both these organisations highlights the same issues as previously discussed in the other groups.

Privet is an organisation based in Northern England with strong associations to the local community. Following changes in management and a major corporate and financial restructuring, Privet has sought to place itself at the top of UK organisations in its business sector.

As in Sunflower plc, the interviews at Privet were not limited to managers, as they included several team workers. Interviewing team members in Privet provided valuable insights into how managers and their respective management styles were perceived internally, as well as externally when compared to those in Lilac. The inclusion of interviews of team workers in Privet helped balance managerial perceptions of their own successes. The findings/analysis of the interviews from Privet nonetheless concentrates on managers, although an occasional confirmatory (or contradictory) excerpt to aid the overall picture is included.

The first day of interviews in Privet took place in a single department. The department relies strongly on teams and teamworking between colleagues in order to be effective. The managers interviewed from this department were all without exception internally promoted; this resulted in a more closely-knit working environment, something that was also helped by the geographical location, which was some distance from the main premises of Privet.

It quickly became apparent that a number of manager’s in Privet struggled to come to terms with the new organisational ethos and the newly acquired ‘freedoms’ associated with different ownership. One of the interviews concisely demonstrated how they are still coming to terms with the ways senior management gather and expect them to use performance monitoring,

“It’s a tricky one because it’s still very much in its infancy”

(Privet, Interviewee #102: November 2006)

All that said there is still within Privet a gap between what senior managers would like to do with surveillance systems and what they are doing. Much of this centres on introducing online productivity notices, which allows employees at all levels to see how the organisation is doing. This has particular importance for the organisation because all employees receive bonuses based on the organisation’s overall performance. This aspect is crucial, as it provides one key
difference between Privet and Lilac. Privet has the ability to pay bonuses based on performance, whereas Lilac has no such ability. It was a mechanism to boost employee productivity when only a few years ago no such scheme existed. This mechanism is reminiscent of the electronic notice boards in Call Centre. It worked by placing on the opening page of the intranet, a simple graphical display of how close to monthly target the organisation was, coupled with a statement of how near they were to bonus payments.

There were also claims made by the workers that they manipulated departmental bonuses without the knowledge of management. In spite of performance targets being set by senior managers at a level that was apparently only occasionally attainable, one shift of workers was regularly able to reach the target. How they managed to do this, was by mirroring exactly the work practice known in the last century as ‘soldiering’. It recognises that workers react in ways that do not rely on complex exchanges where managers seek to coerce performance improvements. Instead, a blend of reciprocity, community (in this case teamwork), and a simple exchange is wrapped up in the term ‘soldiering’. In Privet, it is not just an act of resistance, but resistance bound to workplace psychology i.e. the resistance is directed against the managerial demands, linked to a negative feedback loop and operant behaviour.

The following two interview quotes are from the same Interviewee (#93) and indicates that surveillance needed to be done in order to improve standards. Although the first quote doesn’t appear to see anything wrong with surveillance.

“*I expect to be monitored, because if I’m doing a certain thing wrong, I’m going to carry on doing it wrong, until somebody tells me, and I think that’s where we’re lacking. I can’t speak for the company, but that’s where I see a big negative, we’re not monitored. And if we’re not monitored to a standard.... I monitor my lads, but for all teams we ain’t got that yet.*”

(Privet, Interviewee #93: November 2006)

“*We’re making big changes, it’s took a long time, let’s get a bit of paperwork in place, it covers wor [our] back, but it doesn’t do the job for the staff....We do the monitoring, but we give it a different name, assessor of training.*”

(Privet, Interviewee #93: November 2006)
The second quote sees the surveillance slightly differently. For Interviewee #93, the surveillance encompasses several things. It is a mechanism for them to ensure they comply with workplace regulations and a way for them to ‘monitor’ their team. However, it is also a throwback to the role of time and motion studies and even earlier to Scientific Management, except he refers to the surveilling agent as the ‘assessor of training’.

Much of the surveillance in place at Privet relies on the use of CCTV, as there are a number of high security areas frequently physically patrolled and visually surveilled. However, that did not stop the workers from resisting the surveillance. In one incident related to me, a new set of CCTV cameras were installed in a previously unmonitored area. The first thing that the workers did was to identify the range of the CCTV cameras by seeing how far the cameras moved as they sidled gradually across an area. Once they had identified the range of the camera and the blind spot, they were able to take time off by standing in the blind spot that was free from CCTV surveillance. For these workers it was about rebalancing a perceived inequity. The installation of another CCTV camera was an unnecessary intrusion into how they work (the issue of the reason for the installation was ostensibly a security issue). This simple act of resistance to one additional camera took on a completely new meaning for the workers, their perception of security was not diminished, and by resisting, they did not reduce the security. The action was to rebalance their working conditions following the installation of one more piece of surveillance in their working lives.

In some respects, the differences between Lilac and Privet, at least in terms of management were not foreseen. The initial assumptions were that Privet would be much more commercially aware and sensitive to the needs of the market. While this was in part true, what was not anticipated was how that difference manifested itself. Managers in Privet were seeking to introduce a new way of thinking amongst teams of workers, the mechanisms for doing this were as interviewee #102 suggested still in their infancy. That however, did not stop some from thinking that performance measurement was not active but passive, with many managers and team workers failing to appreciate (at least openly) the depth of surveillance that the permanent CCTV had, under its guise of security enhancement.

The other organisation in this group is Lilac. Lilac is a public sector organisation; it has strong links to the community and a very hierarchical organisational structure. It is the smallest organisation in terms of spending although it has a prominent part in the everyday lives of the residents of one of the North East’s cities. For the organisation, there have been a number of
major changes forced upon them in the last ten years due to a number of initiatives and policy
changes from national Government.

“I wonder whether it [the appraisal system] really works, I’m yet to be
convinced; as are a lot of other staff.”

(Lilac, Interviewee #28: November 2006)

Lilac, unlike Privet, was not able to operate a bonus scheme as a way of encouraging or
improving performance. Furthermore, some of the managers did not believe such systems
would work.

“I don’t think we got the culture right to be honest we have a history of
nationally agreed pay rates, quite fixed, I have my doubts in terms of quality
whether bonuses work in terms of this sector.”

(Lilac, Interviewee #26: November 2006)

Despite the talk that financial bonuses would not work, it was well known that some aspects of
Lilac were incentivised with early finishes being offered to some employees and flexible
timekeeping (Flexitime) being in operation for administrative and clerical staff. The suggestion
that a financial exchange would not work would appear to be inconsistent with the notion that
other exchanges in the employment relationship clearly work.

This chapter has set out how some managers believed that the electronic workplace
surveillance was the acceptable face of performance management whereas for other they
believed it to be a step too far and abrogated their ability to manage. From this snapshot
opinion, it would be sensible to speculate that the truth lies for many managers somewhere in
the middle. However, that view does not reflect the position seen in the research. All the
managers interviewed, including a newly promoted manager in Roses plc who thought
monitoring was a good thing, “In a way that was quite good, because ... it made people think,
hang on, everything is monitored.” were aware of the role and the impact that the electronic
performance measures had on their ability to manage. Even managers who were in favour in
principal of surveillance at work were concerned about the impact it had on their ability to
manage. Clearly, the less experienced managers believed that the use of performance
management tools, and the surveillance that was used, just “because they could” simply
supplemented their inexperience, as an addendum to the missing managerial skill set. In those
circumstances, organisations would argue that they are helping inexperienced managers get up to speed quicker. However, more experienced managers argued that by ignoring and contemptuously regarding the data they were actually able to manage their teams better. This might be a reflection on their abilities, age, experience, or gender. It might be that the more experienced managers perceive more control than do less-experienced managers. It might also be that positive experiences lend themselves to a particular locus of control, particularly where inexperience is a factor. Female managers were also slightly more interested in managing people than relying on quantitative measures, although further research would be required.

Whichever way you look at the data in this area from this research there is clearly an impact on managers. This chapter has demonstrated that the impact is invariably a negative one, although even in the positive interpretations put on the surveillance, there is a suspicion that there is unease with the methods. However, because it makes their lives easier then they can live with the consequences. As one manager specifically put it without a hint of concern about the impact on employee privacy, “obviously everything’s monitored.” The same manager went on to detail how, when Roses plc’s internet browsing monitoring system identified an example of mildly inappropriate browsing behaviour, the employee concerned was “let go” i.e. sacked. Whether this shows this particular manager and others like them in a bad light is debateable. Are they just taking a pragmatic approach to management and toeing the company line, or are they taking the easy way out and abdicating their managerial responsibilities, only time and experience will provide that answer. There is another possible alternative that managers were just following set organisational procedures.

The subsequent chapter moves the discussion on. Having identified that managers in the research are affected by the uses of workplace surveillance, understanding why managers behave in the ways that they do can be examined. It takes a closer look at the theories lying behind the reactions to electronic workplace surveillance, paying particular attention to psychological reactance, resistance, and the psychological and exchange elements of the employment relationship and the psychological contract.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Findings: Exchange Relationship

Taking the lead from Chapter Six, this chapter builds on the previously made general, theoretical, and conceptual points about the impact electronic workplace surveillance has on managers, and examines them in more detail. It follows up on the broader concerns about workplace surveillance. Chapter Six looked at a number of incidences that described how acts of surveillance affected managers, and how influential these incidences are to the way managers manage. This chapter discusses some of the theoretical bases associated with the psychology of surveillance, exchange relationships, and appraisals and discusses what might lie behind why managers might behave in these ways.

The findings and analysis in this chapter seeks to use, adopt, and embrace a range of theories to help understand the research data. The approach in this chapter follows a framework for theory building. Key to this process is the ability to draw together multiple theories and theoretical approaches from the literature into a coherent whole. Sections of this chapter are devoted to elucidating on a number of theories previously discussed in Chapters Three and Four. In particular, the role of exchange, appraisals, and psychology within the employment relationship and surveillance are explored.

In Chapter Six, the general reactions to workplace surveillance in the seven organisations was examined after having been grouped together by association. In this Chapter, the analysis is themed into three areas; process, parties, and content. These areas have been highlighted as
being particularly relevant when examining the employment relationship. The first, process, relates to the actual processes involved. This theme makes up the bulk of the analysis as it can encompass and influences many of the elements of both parties and content. It contains two sub-sections, the first sub-section examines appraisals, and the second sub-section examines processes when seen as variance and contingency. The second and third themes of content and parties are grouped together. The reasons for this make-up are outlined in Chapter Four.

The second element is parties, which simply relates to the parties to the exchange, whether within a dyadic or a networked exchange relationship. There is a distinct difference between the implicit nature of the dyadic employee-organisation, manager-employee relationship, and the explicit and complex networked organisation relationship, particularly in teams and teamworking. In the one-to-one relationship, a manager negotiates with an individual worker; this type of successful exchange strategy will invariably be a negotiated bilateral one with both sides agreeing to a mutual benefit outcome. In a networked relationship, the strategies involved are more complex. Not just because of the numbers of actors involved, but also because of the complexity of the connections in the exchange and the different types of reciprocity (see Chapter Four).

This Chapter will incorporate these themes to illustrate resistance, sabotage, and breach of the psychological contract. Several researchers claimed that the predominant methods by which data in this area are gathered is quantitative. In particular, they highlighted the use of questionnaires for data gathering. In contrast, this study is able to provide a new angle, by undertaking qualitative research highlighting the same themes of resistance and breach of the psychological contract.

The employment relationship is one characterised by a number of paradoxes. One paradox can be seen in the role of human resource management (HRM) and in its associations with unanticipated consequences (See Chapter Four). This chapter contains sections that illustrate how managers pursue sharing power in practice, with managers facing up to the control paradox. How seeking to identify and use electronic surveillance effectively, can be reconciled with their side of the psychological contract as part of the employment relationship.

The previous Chapter indicated that managers would sometimes seek to resolve that particular paradox independently, and sometimes arbitrarily, either by ‘managing’ workers aided and/or abetted almost exclusively by the management information systems (MIS) and Key Performance Indicators (KPI’s), or conversely, using the management information systems
(MIS) and Key Performance Indicators (KPI's) to manage the workers. The managers in these examples sought to quantitatively micromanage performance, and often failed to succeed.

In many workplaces, a manager or an employer will seek comprehensive control of the worker, their working environment, and their routines; the practice of Scientific Management is grounded in that notion. Yet, research carried out late in the twentieth century suggested that managers actually have little control in this area. In the electronically surveilled workplace of the twenty-first century, that position seemed somewhat dated, at least on a certain superficial level. The notion that the line manager has no direct responsibility for productivity targets or performance is true for the organisations in this research, as invariably targets come from a much higher level of management. It also contradicts some of this research study’s findings especially how locally the use of electronic surveillance is used to specifically and directly to control employees. These claims cannot accurately reflect the accepted wisdom and historical precedence of the roles good managers or management perform.

7.1 Process

This study identified illustrations of the differences in the perception of the meaning of the psychological contract between the manager/employer and manager/worker. The “perceptual gap” i.e. the difference between an employee’s perception of what they believe has been agreed vis à vis the psychological contract (their obligations) and the employers perception of their obligations. The difference in perception strikes at the heart of the ambiguity present in every psychological contract. That is not to say that because the beliefs and perceptions are different on each side that the contract is not present or enforceable, far from it. Both parties regardless of the differences in perception hold the psychological contract in high regard. This can be seen in the application of the psychological contract by both parties to reinforce (or weaken) work practices, management, and employee relations.

At a micro level, trade unions and employers frequently speak of real or perceived broken promises in pay negotiations/disputes. While at a macro level, individual workers and trade union officials speak of a lack of respect and of being devalued.

Similarly, in this study, managers and workers in each of the organisation felt a gap existed between their perception of the employment relationship and the managers and employers perception of the employment relationship.
“We’re just a commodity, we’re not a person. We’re a commodity there just to get the job done, just to get that work out through the door, that’s all we are; we’re not people in our own right.”

(Chestnut plc, Interviewee #52a: February 2007)

The perception here is that this interviewee felt their employment status had become commodified, and thus devalued, was not a solitary instance. The above example comes from a team member in a factory. In contrast, in the example below, the same sentiments come from a senior manager in a Call Centre environment. The two employees are at opposite ends of the spread of interviewees, and arguably, at different ends in their perceptions of the employment relationship, yet both indicate a similar sense of worthlessness and express a feeling of being cheapened by their employer.

“It’s a tough business to work in, you’re a commodity, the day that you don’t deliver your numbers, is the day you’re out. Okay, that’s the harsh reality of it.”

(Tulip plc, Interviewee #81: January 2007)

Some might argue that the two comments are perhaps indicative of a more general malaise towards the organisation by the two interviewees. Yet, both the individuals had been working for their respective employer for many years, and neither indicated during the interview that they were likely to leave or considering leaving. There was nothing in the interviews to indicate so much dissatisfaction with the situation that leaving was on the cards. In hindsight, it might have been useful to identify whether either interviewee had specifically thought about leaving or whether they were prepared to accept the status quo indefinitely. Both of them appear to have accepted the reality of working for their relevant organisations.

Both interviewee #81 and #52 have earlier in this thesis indicated their awareness of the negative role workplace surveillance plays. These indications of a depersonalised and de-professionalised manager and a worker with low self-esteem, perhaps even self-deprecating in their perception of the situation are not isolated. Across all of the organisations, the meanings of the processes and their worth to their respective employer were called into question. These quotes echo the feelings of many managers (and workers) in other organisations in this research about the types of implicit organisational control used on a daily basis, and lack of personal control.
There is a strong suspicion that where workplace surveillance is perceived as intrusive, or where its application is abused, or unwarranted, then workers at all levels will feel disheartened. In many of the instances, trust in the organisation or their own line manager is reduced. Not just because there is a lack of, or diminution in, trustworthiness of the individual as a person, but that the wider institution of trust has been devalued. Trust in these instances is particularly fragile, as something built up over time can be brought down by a single act of deception. It does not necessarily mean that the trust in the individual or their trustworthiness has been completely devalued, for if it were that would mean that the agent who loses trust would be able to extract a better exchange. That is clearly not happening. It is more likely that the trustworthiness of the behaviour has been reduced, something that was discussed in both Chapter Four and Chapter Six.

The reciprocal aspect of the exchange process within the employment relationship has managers asking whether the ‘quid pro quo’ is fair and equitable. Managers can and do take action to rebalance this equation and on occasion, these actions can be extreme. Instead of adopting a professional approach to work, managers can slip into the opposite, by being amateurish and sometimes by being deceitful. Managers whose professional abilities have been compromised can feel power-less. In those circumstances, they can and do adopt alternative, or as in the following case, misleading, approaches to managing teams.

“There’s very little ...that you can actually sort of promise the staff, reward wise, you can’t say, well I want you to reach these targets, 1, 2, 3, 4, and if you do there’ll be a bonus in it for you. You just can’t do that. So a lot of the more junior staff don’t see the rewards at the end of any targets set in the PDR (personal development review). So it’s up to you as a manager to sort of work your way round that. In my position, you have to sort of forge the team identity so yes they are individuals and treat them as such, but they are also part of a team and everybody works for each other, it sounds corny but that’s the way you have to play it.”

(Lilac, Interviewee #35: November 2006)

On the face of it, interviewee #35 appears to adopt a pragmatic approach to the problem that they have. The manager has little scope to offer reward, so a little white lie goes a long way as, ‘that’s the way you have to play it’. However, behind the apparent pragmatism in the approach lies deceit. The manager is in a position where their duplicitous behaviour is accepted or
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justified, at least to themselves, simply to keep workers onboard. Why the manager does this can only be speculated upon, is it for the employer’s benefit, for themselves, or for the workers. Probably in reality, there are aspects of each. Either way, the manager compromises their position on all.

How and why managers’ cope with taking actions that are clearly ethically/morally dubious and outdated, is unknown, nonetheless somehow the manager appears to justify those actions. As identified earlier, the result on workers if they find out the action is deceitful may be demoralizing, and a complete loss of trust in the individual may result. It also calls into question the fairness of the exchange the manager feels they have to operate, between them and their manager/employer and between them and their team, as well as the potential loss of individual trust.

A section of Chapter Four, explored ‘psychological reactance’ and how it might be applied to some of the reactions of individuals. Under those circumstances, individuals who perceive their behavioural freedom constrained can react in a way that enables them to try to re-establish control of the situation. In the above example, Interviewee #35 feels the freedom to reward employees is restricted. Therefore, to re-establish control over the situation they offer workers ‘fake’ rewards, yet, by doing so they risk eliminating the workers sense of trust in them and undermining or breaching the psychological contract.

It was earlier identified that in relationships in the workplace environment (for example between employer/employee), individuals might baulk at actions or responsibilities they are required to do. This in turn manifests itself by the individual behaving in such a way as to endeavour to regain control over their situation. The motivational state is dependent on the belief or perception of the individual concerned to engage in the practice or particular behaviour. Thus, even if an employee is aware of a wider injustice, one not directly affecting them, they might still react as though they were the injured party.

This can be seen in the following quote, where a manager, when faced with a situation where their ability to behave is constrained by a system, manipulates the system to re-establish control. This re-establishment of control is also reminiscent of the behaviours of an Instrumentalist (locus of control) manager.

“What I find happens quite a lot is that people are targeted to achieve something whether it be call handling time or whatever. They achieve that
target, now some people on the other hand will always err on the side of caution and not quite make it and when asked why they didn't make it they say I know full well that if I make that target next year that's going to be higher! But that's playing the game. ... The prime example is one of headcount, where you've got agency people on your books that you don't have to give notice to, you can quite literally sack them the night before. If you're over a headcount on the 31st of March you sack a few, quote what your head count is at that time, and you bring them back on the first of April. Because then, you made your target.”

(Roses plc, Interviewee #17 Telephoned: October 2006)

In this quote, the manager alludes to colleagues (and probably about themselves as well), who, when set a specific target that they perceive to be unattainable, will manipulate and abuse the system to provide the illusion of success. Of course, in the example cited, the success is transitory. The manager has achieved the target albeit for a fleeting amount of time. The target was reached. The manager achieved. At what cost for both the manager and the employer. The surveillance system was for the organisation a momentary success, but the system was out-maneuvred by the manager who manipulated it to achieve success. There is resistance to the system and the organisation, and further resistance to the requirement by being set to work that way, and to being forced to work to these specific targets.

This can also be illustrated on a much wider scale. If managers believed they are unable to manage in the way they wished, perhaps by the coerced (by senior management or an employer) or the passive acceptance of MIS/KPI's the manager might adopt a course of action to re-establish a sense of control of the situation. The manager either directly engages in actions that go against the perceived prevailing elimination, or perceived threat of elimination, of a freedom, or by reinforcing the perceived behavioural freedom under threat.

Psychological reactance goes much deeper than individual reactions. There can be an over compensation of tasks due to an excessive sense of obligation, it can signal loyalty and commitment towards the employer. Employees, at whatever level, frequently justify to themselves that going the 'extra mile' is a sign of being dedicated or professional at their job. However, the over compensation by excessively performing tasks can never be truly compensated for, thus building up the potential, at least initially, for resentment.
In the latter stages of the resentment (or sometimes earlier if the obligation is particularly excessive), phase two/three of the psychological reactance may take place (see Chapter Five). Several managers in this research appeared to be going ‘the extra mile’ by taking work home, or spending additional unpaid time at work to accomplish tasks.

Leaving aside the issue of how localised performances and performance systems are obfuscated by managers, the way in which the overall performance or excessive performance of an individual is judged, is typically, through an annual appraisal. Judging the performance of somebody who is already working in excess of the contracted requirements creates problems, not least in appraisals or appraisal systems. The range of opportunities for resistance when conducting appraisals, or when using appraisals as a mechanism of surveillance, coupled with the impact of low-level resistance is detailed next.

7.1.1 Appraisals

The appraisal or appraisal system is bound to and influenced by many concepts such as, psychological reactance social facilitation, and evaluation apprehension, particularly in those organisations where ‘job creep’ occurs. The use of workplace appraisals or assessments is for many organisations a once a year examination of an individual’s work. For the organisations in this study, it meant a customary look at an individual’s work on at least a three-monthly basis and in some cases monthly. These interim reports would then be rolled up into a more comprehensive annual or bi-annual report. At least, that was the stated position.

For many it was an ongoing procedure,

“By the time you get round to it [the annual appraisal], you could almost have written it yourself, and that’s the way it should be. ...you have it as you need to have it”

(Roses plc, Interviewee #24 Telephoned: November 2006).

Yet for others, the process was one fraught with difficulty, trying to identify good performance regardless of the amounts of surveillance and the surveillance systems put in place. This further alludes to the problems in conducting appraisals, particularly when managers rely on quantitative data. In these instances, it is all too easy to see how managers might use the give
all the same appraisal or relying on personal favourites, or differentiating by giving better appraisals to the workers they like.

“What any call centre is sometimes a problem with appraisals. And yeah you can probably judge certainly the quality and listen to them to see how they do and things like that. It’s very much difficult to quantify I suppose, to work out who deserves what level of pay rise and pay structure and things like that, when really everyone is doing the same job.”

(Tulip plc, Interviewee # 84: January 2007)

This is the source of an organisational paradox, many employers/managers use on a daily basis, complex, and in some cases, relatively expensive, surveillance and performance management systems that claim to enhance performance. Many of these systems have inherent concerns and problems to do with privacy and surveillance. The Call Centre Dashboard is dependent on electronic surveillance to provide minute-by-minute breakdown of individual call handler performance. Similarly, the CCTV in Sunflower plc is used for performance surveillance, as is the traceability in Chestnut plc. All of these mechanisms are used for daily surveillance, and are the source of data for monthly and annual appraisals to determine employee progress. Employers and employees persevere with and increasingly rely on quantitative measurement using surveillance technology. Even the organisations who seek to use prescribed qualitative organisational behaviours quantify them based on workplace surveillance. However, the appraisal system, the main instrument for officially measuring overall employee performance and effectiveness is such a blunt instrument, unable according to this manager, to differentiate adequately between employees. They also, somewhat surprisingly given the organisation, hint at the further quantification of the individual’s performance, rather than looking at the quality of the individual.

Another concern over the value of appraisals was seen in the link to the use of quantitative measures, which also draws on the previously made concern relating to the bluntness of the tool bearing in mind the stated accuracy of the performance management and the weight attributed to the daily surveillance and performance indicators.

“If you try to do appraisals by numbers or management by numbers, you hit a lowest common denominator”.

(Sunflower plc, Interviewee #58: November 2006)
Some managers were simply unsure about the appraisal process and the effectiveness of having one completed on them by their own line manager. This quote aptly demonstrates how a manager, who according to the interviewee, does not have good people skills, fails to convey any confidence in the process or the person, a perfect example of evaluation apprehension. This in turn produces the negative effects of social facilitation.

“I don’t know how they work, I do know that a report gets produced for my line manager and things like that. I get on very, very well with my line manager but [they are] not a particularly good people person. And so even if we did get a report saying [name of subject] was particularly stressed I am not sure how he would react and what he would do anyway”

(Roses plc, Interviewee #11 *Telephoned: November 2006)

Visualising reactance in a workplace as part of the appraisal process can be understood as a result of the requirement of an agent to survey a behaviour constantly. This brings home the importance of reactance to workplaces and the employment relationship where there is daily and ongoing workplace surveillance, regardless of whether the ongoing surveillance is via performance management or appraisal. When employers or managers seek to restrict, constrain, or moderate behaviour (in either a positive or a negative way), or where they eliminate or threaten to eliminate a choice, there is the possibility for reactance. Brehm (1966) does not differentiate between the reactions to different types of surveillance, only that if the penalty for the elimination of the freedom/behaviour is severe, then less surveillance would be needed than if the penalty was milder. In this study, this could mean that if a manager felt that the freedom to manage the way they wished was being restricted by the use of surveillance or performance monitoring, and they felt this was particularly important, then the amount (intensity) of surveillance required to induce the feelings of reactance need not be large. The resultant resistance, misbehaviour, or sabotage will vary in intensity depending on the individual.

The corollary to this would be in already high surveillance workplaces, where reactance would be more likely to occur simply because choices would already have been eliminated. Thus, if managers in these workplaces were unable to choose to manage their way due to already pre-existing workplace constraints and there were additional (lesser) surveillance mechanisms to ensure they weren’t able to choose a course of action, then reactance and/or resistance could
still be more likely to take place. This is particularly true if the manager felt the elimination of the freedom/behaviour was of sufficient importance.

The impact psychological reactance has on the employment relationship is important. There are clear links to psychological reactance and the employment relationship, and especially the psychological contract. Equally, there are links to psychological reactance as a reaction to workplace surveillance. These are complex relationships. Surveillance causes reactance, reactance damages the employment relationship, and the employment relationship when damaged can cause reactance.

The real value of an appraisal was often called into question. Interviewee #63 was scathing about the overall usefulness of their appraisal system “I don’t think we’ve ever found a good appraisal system” (Interviewee #63) and rejected the value of personal appraisals, “I don’t think I’ve ever got anything from any appraisal, if I’m honest” (Interviewee #63). They were however honest enough to appreciate and understand the surveillant aspect of the system, “They are monitoring you I suppose, but I don’t mind that” (Interviewee #63). This apparent conflict for Interviewee #63 is perplexing. The lack of concern for the surveillant aspects of an appraisal system is somewhat puzzling given the lack of a sound business case for the surveillance and the disproportionately high number of CCTV cameras and hidden microphones in Interviewee #63’s workplace. Equally, the potential to place these examples all under the remit of evaluation apprehension or social facilitation is clear. There is a distinct lack of confidence in either the person or the process, thus further disempowering or disenfranchising the manager from the process.

The following lengthy quotation provides an example of where a manager has a freedom threatened (the threat is to the ability of the manager to provide a genuine appraisal). Their concern is that so many colleagues abuse and manipulate the system for their own ends. This manager having been on the receiving end of the abuses is clearly resentful of their colleagues, but also indicates the failings with the system in their organisation.

“It’s easier for a manager to put down a good performance appraisal than a bad performance appraisal that’s when I think the whole process across the business... why is it that managers who have these different approach maybe I’m just tougher on people I don’t know. You’ve got some people who will go through it thoroughly and are others who just write two or three lines and that’s it. It also means I can get rid of them off the group because if you’ve got
a good appraisal you’re not going to get onto another group if you’ve got a poor appraisal and you’re stuck with them if you do that. … It’s your responsibility you get the performance improved, you certainly don’t pass the buck, I know because I’ve been on the receiving end of that. It is extremely difficult, because you’re then managing someone whose performance is just not up to it. You’re having to manage that sort of conflict and it’s all down to the previous manager.”

(Roses plc Interviewee #11*Telephoned: November 2006)

This manager appears quite enlightened, well aware of the potential pitfalls personally and professionally to the appraisal system. Nonetheless, it is perfectly plausible that as a response to these negative feelings, employees will often utilise the concept of voice proactively, i.e. speaking up against the perceived injustice. That voice might call for direct action against the system, even by managers. It can further lead to some becoming alienated. It may also result in less high profile action, perhaps by a manager incorrectly using or as in the above case, with managers abusing the appraisal system.

This manager also believes that they go a bit further than most other managers do by using the system correctly and to its full potential. When they compare themselves to others, there is a sense of having gone the extra mile. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this creates its own set of problems. In brief, when a particular behaviour is threatened, or eliminated altogether, the desire for that behaviour increases pro rata, resulting in individuals resisting the loss of freedom, or in some cases actively engaging in the very behaviour under threat. In the case above, the manager is aware that others abuse the system. Nonetheless, they do not join in the abuse but adhere even firmer to the system.

When undertaking appraisals, resisting the system can evoke a chain effect not unlike a univocal exchange affecting complete teams of workers. One employee might experience job creep; another employee might subsequently feel that their own position is under threat, and therefore might, over-fulfil in turn their job description. This could continue throughout a team of workers all working more than required for no reward, other than a perverse but nonetheless perceived sense of survival. In other words, improving employee pay to such a level that workers perceive their pay to more than a just reward, offsets any perceived unfairness associated with ‘job creep’ or indeed surveillance. This may help explain why highly
paid managers see surveillance as more acceptable than lower paid workers, as their reward is sufficiently high to offset the potential cost of any surveillance.

Managers under high surveillance might believe that their surveillance level is acceptable or necessary, and therefore might over compensate, indulge in, or be prepared to accept even more intrusive team member surveillance. Presumably, on the basis that if you pay me enough I will accept conditions of service that lesser paid workers would not accept. Hence the comment from a Roses plc manager who openly accepted that surveillance was required as “we need to know your life” (Interviewee #16 Telephoned) for their product to succeed. Another Roses plc manager appeared to recognise the reality of all the surveillance.

“I know that the team I've been running, their customer satisfaction scores are all added up and I get the overall one out of the whole lot it's for me to drive them on to get better sales if we can, because mine then improve. ... When it gets down to my boss, or should I say my bosses boss, they're allocated a pot of money which has got to satisfy all the pay awards, both annual pay award and bonus, based on criteria that the business gives based on criteria which used to be all sorts of things whether we reach so-and-so score etc. But ultimately it comes down to a pot and it could come down that we only have thousand pounds between say 500 people.”

(Roses plc, Interviewee #17 Telephoned: December 2006)

The signal from this senior manager is that while the system is intended to reward good performing managers and good performing workers the reality is that even more senior managers have already decided on the size of the pot of money available to reward performance. Therefore, regardless of your performance, or as a manager, your team’s performance and despite all the surveillance put in place to monitor performance (with the claimed promise of reward) individual performance improvement could not be rewarded. Which further begs the question, why all the surveillance? If the raison être for employer’s surveilling workers is to improve performance, it is reasonable to ask in this instance, where is the incentive for employees, at all levels, to improve performance if the reward process is compromised?

Echoing the disciplinary practices of Chestnut plc, in using surveillance for disciplinary purposes, a senior manager at Sunflower plc, who openly acknowledged they work in a highly
surveilled environment, also saw nothing wrong in using the surveillance against workers for disciplinary purposes. Another example in the research identified that concerns were expressed over employee reward mechanisms. The system and the leadership expressed in the system had degenerated to such an extent that for many employees customer service was almost non-existent, as a result, the reward system failed them, which in turn led to poorer customer service. Further evidence that could question why have the surveillance if the promised rewards for having it are non-existent?

There is broad agreement between employers and employees in the perception as to what constitutes the exchange relationship and how it operates. When a [potential] employee applies for a job and an employer employs them, there is an assumption of a ‘good fit’, there is however, always a gap in the obligations involved, echoing the ‘perceptual gap’ in the nature of the employment relationship and the psychological contract. This research demonstrates that a poor ‘fit’ with the employer negatively influences some manager’s performance. The results are not uniform; they do not affect all managers in the same way. This research can say however that a poor fit affects the performance of a sufficient number of managers, which however large or small the numbers does diminish the overall performance of the organisation.

In fact, the situation on the ground is in places much worse. It is not just a poor fit; there are huge negative responses to workplace surveillance, and not just from managers who have to work with the system, but also towards managers who deal with the fallout.

“They hate it, they hate that measurement, they see their measurements that they should hit targets or not it doesn't matter, they see the destination is the most important thing rather than the journey. No, they hate it, hate it, hate it. It’s a bone of contention with all sales staff.

(Tulip plc, Interviewee #81: October 2006)

What made this quote even more telling is that it came from a senior manager in Tulip plc, the organisation that was adopting a new strategy of forsaking such measures. Given the quantification of performance, and the allusions to Foucault, one can understand why.

“Everyone in Tulip plc has key performance indicators so they're judged against their call time and the calls they make. so on a daily basis, they have
to make 100 calls and have a call time of three hours. three times a day they receive their call times to enable them to self monitor.”

(Tulip plc, Interviewee #81: October 2006)

Paradoxically, the same manager also indicated the lengths to which operatives went to resist the surveillance that remained in place.

“There's ways they can get round making those calls. They can dial their own mobile, they can dial their home number and sit just letting it ring if they know that not one there, knowing that that's 3 1/2 minutes off their call time. They know they can't make personal calls while they're on the department they would let me know if they wanted to make a personal call so I know if I'm listening to that call it is a personal one.”

(Tulip plc, Interviewee #81: October 2006)

The knowledge that managers will listen in to telephone calls, ostensibly to improve performance and quality, can act as an operant behaviour reinforcer for the operatives. Simply knowing that someone might listen into a call, acts in the same way as the electronic notice board, or the hidden microphones in Sunflower plc.

As mentioned earlier, the typical way that organisations conceptualised workplace surveillance processes in this research, was to echo ‘Scientific Management’ assigning targets wherever possible, or to surveil everything in order to gather information thereby obtaining a measurement for setting a subsequent target.

“We've lots of targets call handling time is certainly one of them we've also got targets around quality making sure that calls are answered properly, and in a quality manner, we've got targets around attendance, and occupancy, and adherence target, making sure that people are where they're meant to be when they're meant to be and following schedules.”

(Roses plc, Interviewee #10 *Telephoned: October 2006)

In these quotes, we see the dichotomy of applying performance management using Key Performance Indicators (KPI’s) to determine efficiency or effectiveness “The problem with KPI's ... is that they only measure what can be measured” (Roses plc, Interview #14 *Telephoned
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October 2006). This always assumes that the right quantitative measures are being measured. The other concern for a customer would be that the chosen measures appear to pay little heed to quality.

“Their call is timed, how long they spent talking to the customer, how long they spend wrapping up the call, because that's heavily targeted, ... I can monitor how many interactions or how many jobs someone's done. I can monitor the outcomes of those jobs that don't result in a call back, didn't result in a referral, did it result in the fault being fully resolved, did result in the customer leaving the company.

(Roses plc, Interviewee #18: October 2006)

In the first instance (Interviewee #10); the manager saw the measures as helpful within a workplace context, although towards the end the nature of the surveillance took a different turn with mentions of attendance and occupancy. By occupancy, they meant whether they were at their cubicle/pod/workstation. In the case of the second (Interviewee #18), the interviewee initially indicated that there was limited electronic surveillance for them, “I don't have a lot of electronic measures” (Interviewee #18). This particular manager was apparently unsure of the amounts of electronic surveillance used in Roses plc, only equating electronic surveillance with the swipe-ID Card used to gain entry to the building. It was only later in the interview after exploring the types of information interviewee #18 used on a daily basis did it start to dawn on them just how much surveillance took place.

As indicated in Chapter Three (3.2), managers who rely on performance data being fed to them are more likely to be marginally effective than managers who are proactive and obtain their own surveillance data. As this manager is not even aware of the levels of surveillance in terms of performance data, it comes as no surprise that this manager was so disempowered and demoralised as to turn up for work after drinking and playing cards in a casino for most of the night (by their own admission). These two examples demonstrate the breadth of electronic measures taking place, and while both these examples are from Roses plc, it should be noted that similar examples of surveillance could be obtained from other organisations in the study.

In both instances the wealth of data generated and used by them appeared to be a set of useful tools to help them do their jobs. However, senior managers with much more experience and maturity with using (and adopting their management style) to this type of data, suggested
that the link between the electronic surveillance data and improving performance was dubious at best,

“Some of the best teams I’ve had are people that, to be quite honest, have not been measured in an, shall we say, ‘intensive way’, but more in an ‘extensive way’. But, they know what the common goal is, they know the way to get there, and they just get there.”

(Roses plc, Interviewee #17 Telephoned: October 2006)

Even in supposedly less intensive surveillance workplaces such as Lilac and Privet, senior managers saw the use of electronic measurement as driving the wrong responses,

“It’s managing to the indicator ... and not managing to the needs of the service, because the two aren’t necessarily the same. You have this raft of stuff coming down from [senior management] which you have to hit before you do anything else”.

(Lilac, Interviewee #35: November 2006)

There was a genuine difference of opinion on the way forward from managers. A great many believed the growing reliance on electronic measures of performance and the wider context of workplace surveillance, was inhibiting their role and function as managers. Others recognised this was a problem, and sought to resolve it themselves by simply resisting the processes. Without delving too deeply into the ages and experience of the managers, there was a perception that managers experienced in managing without the aid of electronic measures resisted the model of electronic measures, one they perceived as somewhat arbitrary (by which they meant quantitative rather than qualitative) to determine real performance. There was also a suspicion that women were perhaps more perceptive in these matters as well.

“I find you can’t just do it on figures alone. ... You can’t measure the quality of an activity in my opinion, and you can’t manage that effectively”

(Roses plc, Interviewee #15 Telephoned: November 2006)

“I don’t think you need any further electronic stuff to help me do my job, there’s an element of we’ve got these electronic performance indicators of
what's going on but there's also still got to be an element of you know your people and you've got to speak to them and is using all the tools together.”

(Roses plc, Interviewee #15* Telephoned: November 2006)

“Someone can look good on paper but they may not be as good as other advisers. You can look brilliant on paper and have a fantastic call time, but when you actually listen to them on the call... someone who was not as good on paper can actually be better. ... There could be improvements on how they actually performance manage advisers.”

(Roses plc, Interviewee #3: November 2006)

In a stated worst-case scenario, some managers believed that operatives could be working just to the measure that they completely lose sight of the purpose of the job. The following quote demonstrates the inherent difficulty and frustration in ‘managing to the indicator’,

“But there is problems with that, the information ‘Johnny’ has given. ‘Johnny could come across as the most competent person, and the customer could think yes Johnny is great. And you’re immediately thinking, but ‘Johnny’ could be a raving incompetent and not do anything he says he’s going to do, and only a couple of days or so later when you ever find it is too late, or will you ever find out that ‘Johnny’ didn't do a god dammed thing.”

(Roses plc, Interviewee #24* Telephoned: November 2006)

7.2 Content and Parties

The final brief section comprises of the themes of content and parties. The first part, content, deals with the actual, or perceived, inducements offered/accepted as part of the exchange relationship. It examines amongst other attributes, the weight attributed to the inducement, which will differ depending on your position. Organisations frequently attribute a high weighting to training, witnessed by the high profile attributed to the training assessor in Privet. However, it is claimed that training is “rightfully” seen by employers as a ‘cost’ – on the basis that an employer would implement such training with an expectation of increased performance, rather than as a ‘reward.’ Conversely, an employee might see training as a ‘reward’ as there is an expectation of improved capabilities after training, and therefore
improved future employment prospects. In these instances, harking back to exchange theory, employers and some employees will naturally either believe, or perceive, the economic or social utility of the exchange differently.

When a manager is overwhelmed with data and targets before embarking on the day-to-day work, it smacks of a top down approach; it does not consider the needs of the manager to implement them. The top down approach of centralised targets containing no leeway for local initiatives is, according to managers, completely disempowering. This further erodes the psychological contract between employer and manager.

In an authoritative or positional sense, managers are typically the ones with power in the manager-employee relationship. For a manager, that power is in part based around the structural relationship between themselves and the worker, it is not generally perceived by the manager as being between themselves and the employer. In Roses plc, managers are all too aware that for the employer there is a financial bottom line to their work contribution.

“I work on the assumption, or principal that everything that we’re measured on has an objective. To help me get my target to help [Roses plc] achieve revenue numbers, therefore, hopefully, the share price will go up, greater dividend, and all the shareholders will be happy. That's my simplistic view, however what happens is that we find in the organisation that there's two parameters of measurement one is measuring activity, and quantity and the other one is measuring quality. The former is very easy the latter is very difficult so I find myself measured I could almost say virtually on a daily basis on the former. Which is, what are you doing, how much you doing, are you filling the right boxes in.

(Roses plc, Interviewee #12*: Telephoned: November 2006)

The literature identified that surveillance can unbalance the equity exchange relationship, and that it can influence the employment relationship. Surveillance at work can increase the power and control managers have over others; similarly for managers using surveillance information/data, particularly when they perceive the surveillance as counterproductive, it has the potential to affect adversely the exchange relationship. Some might even argue that there are tensions expressed by managers over the use of the performance figures are examples of subtle forms of managerial resistance. The quote might also suggest how an Instrumentalist
manager (Interviewee #12), seeks to reconcile how on one hand, how they are currently being asked to manage, with on the other, the desire to manage in the way they want to. The example above suggests almost at an ongoing system of daily appraisal, under the guise of performance measurement.

Managers thus face a double blow to their perception of equity. The exchange relationship between the manager and their team is compromised if they see themselves managing to the figures not managing the people. The psychological contract between the manager and their team is also potentially at risk of rupture. Additionally, the manager as sees the relationship between themselves and their employer/senior manager also being adversely altered by the constraint of using surveillance tools and quantitative performance data, this is particularly true when their perception of such tools is generally negative.

As far as the second sub-section, parties, is concerned, research on exchange and the employment relationship has to date concentrated on the notion that it involves a dyadic relationship. This is for a number of reasons, not least because research data on dyads is more easily gathered and that considering organisations as single entities with which to interact, is a simpler and more pragmatic solution.

The use of dyadic relationships as the primary form of interaction in organisations is also gradually being eroded due to the popularity of teams and teamworking. That is not to say that one-to-one interactions even within teams are unknown, just that in teams and teamwork their application is reduced. Organisational theorists have investigated the interactions between employees and employers. These events occur in organisations every day, in any number of complex and simultaneous exchange interactions. Employees and employers interact and exchange in ways that will influence other events, so much so that it becomes impossible to isolate individual interactions, thus providing further weight to an interdependence theory.

This chapter suggests a widespread perception that the balance is for now tilted against both manager and worker. The imbalance is believed to be due to the amounts of workplace surveillance and the associated amounts of direct and indirect surveillance required for quantitative data measurement, regardless of whether the performance data is good or bad, relevant or irrelevant.
This chapter detailed how managers feel about the loss of control in managing, it proposed how this can be reconciled by looking at a manager's locus of control, or the use of the incidence of psychological reactance and inequity to help explain the incidence of resistance and misbehaviour. In this chapter, the misbehaviour and resistance ranged from abusing sales and personnel targets, to an underlying and widespread distrust of the mechanisms of workplace surveillance.

The following chapter draws together the research findings offers some concluding thoughts and suggests some opportunities for future research.
The impact of the use of electronic surveillance and performance measures in the workplace is profound. Contemporary managers face a number of dilemmas and dichotomies. In modern workplaces, managers have to deal with being both the surveiller and the surveilled. They also have to reconcile the demands of having to do their job using amounts of data and information that only a few years ago would have been thought impractical to work with, and impossible to gather. This thesis has examined some of the concerns raised by the use of workplace surveillance, particularly electronic workplace surveillance. It has looked specifically at the impact these issues have had on the managers from an exchange/employment relationship perspective.

The initial thinking behind this research was to illuminate the impact of electronic workplace based surveillance. Previous research has looked at a number of aspects of surveillance both in society and in the workplace. Hitherto, while research had concentrated on the processes and mechanisms of surveillance, less research has considered the impact of workplace surveillance on exchange relationships. Coyle-Shapiro and Conway (2005), indicated that more research looking into workplace surveillance as an aspect of the employment relationship was needed. Here then was an opportunity to build upon previous research and to generate data and information to fill this gap in the literature.
The research has sought to understand the role of managers and the impact electronic workplace surveillance had on them from a precise viewpoint. It was believed that in this instance, examining the employment relationship from an exchange theory perspective would prove illuminating. Taking this initial lens as a starting point was the inspiration that lay behind the contribution of this thesis.

8.1 Introduction

Social exchange theory was originally proposed in the late 1950s and early 1960s, primarily by Homans (1958) and Blau (1964), although the influences for social exchange had been around a great deal longer. Exchange theory tried to understand the dynamics of work groups and leadership (Blau, 1964). However, the problem at the time was that the work of a manager from the 1960s was beginning to be re-evaluated (Sayles, 1964; Mintzberg, 1971). Furthermore, workplaces in the 1960s were technologically completely different for both workers and managers to those of today. The notion of a personal computer on every desk, was the stuff of science fiction (Bush, 1945), computers at the time required entire buildings or at least floors in buildings. The computing giants of Microsoft and Apple did not surface until the mid 1970s. Prior to then, the mainframe computer and IBM was king.

In the early 1980s, Attewell (1987) and Zuboff (1982; 1988) started examining the introduction to computers in the workplace. Zuboff examined the impact of computers in the workplace, in her seminal work, *In the Age of the Smart Machine*. Interestingly, some of her observations and the observations of her interviewee’s are as relevant today as they were then.

Social exchange theory briefly resurfaced in the late 1970s, but research was in a social context rather than in relation to the workplace. It was not until the 1990s when academics started looking to the issues of control in the workplace associated with new technology did the notion of exchange theory actively start to re-appear. Some of this research touched upon control and consent, others looked at power and technology (James & Callahan, 1990; Ottensmeyer & Heroux, 1991; Star, 1991; Aiello, 1993; Griffiths, 1993; Mansell, 1993; Walsham, 1993; Jermier, Knights & Nord, 1994), several hinted at some exchange relationship, but rarely did they make explicit connections at that stage.

It is not until the mid-late 1990s that exchange theory started to be seen as an important part of working environments primarily as part of the employment relationship and the
psychological contract (Rousseau, 1995). This resurfacing was intermittent at best, often with associations only appearing obliquely. It was not until around the turn of the twenty-first century that a body of works started directly examining the links between exchange theory, the employment relationship, power typologies, psychological contracts, and psychological reactance. This research sought to pull together the various strands within the context of electronic workplace surveillance, and using the lens of exchange to focus it.

Of course, the concept of workplace surveillance is not new. It has been in existence in one form or another almost since time immemorial. The means and the mechanisms for workplace surveillance are constantly shifting. The key difference between this research and the research undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s into workplace surveillance is that this study incorporates the pervasive and permissive use of electronic surveillance and electronic measures of performance.

Today, there are echoes of Scientific Management or Taylorist approaches to workplace surveillance/performance management reappearing, accompanied by a re-emergence of resistance issues. Organisations are once again seeking to control employees’ bodies to increase efficiency and productivity. In efforts to counteract these controls, this research identified that workers and managers are indulging in various forms of misbehaviour, including the frequently cited ‘soldiering’ to obstruct efficiencies (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Taylor, 2005 [1911]). Employees might accomplish soldiering by withholding knowledge about their job, or ‘fiddle’ the system (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999). Workplace misbehaviour in this research included at least one specific example of soldiering. Misbehaviour was illustrated in a variety of other ways. For example, the manipulation of team bonuses for manual workers who used their intimate knowledge of workplace systems was identified in Privet. Other examples of misbehaviour from this research were provided by managers who manoeuvred worker employment levels to meet employee number targets, through to managers accepting time wasting (see Chapters Six and Seven).

The rapidly changing nature of workplace surveillance through the lens of exchange makes it worthy of investigation. The literature associated with exchange theory identified that there were clear links with both economic and social exchange theory, the employment relationship, power, power typologies, psychological contracts, and psychological reactance. These links do not appear to have been made before in one place to the best of my knowledge. Coyle-Shapiro, Shore, Taylor and Tetrick (2005) edited a collection of work that drew together
several, but not all of the elements together. In the opening chapter, Coyle-Shapiro and Conway suggested the dynamics of the exchange was worthy of further investigation. This study sought to bring these elements together under the shell of electronic workplace surveillance.

In addition, by predominantly interviewing managers, the research acquired a distinct and discrete research dataset, which provided the final linking piece of the puzzle for an original contribution. The initial thinking behind the thesis was to identify the impact electronic surveillance had in the workplace. The intention was to examine how this surveillance affected individual’s day-to-day working. During the course of access negotiations, the focus shifted towards managers rather than workers. This proved a serendipitous shift affording the possibility of providing a potentially more engaging study from a different source (i.e. managers), thus giving an alternative perspective to the impact of electronic workplace surveillance. On the test of whether this research moves knowledge forward, it can rightly claim to be a new and valid contribution to knowledge. The major contribution can best be characterised as identifying how managers are increasingly required to manage using [surveillance associated] quantitative measures, with an accompanying reduction in their ability to utilise conventional people management skills. I have coined the term of a Performance Intermediary Executive (PIE) to denote managers in this position. A further test of whether it provides a distinct contribution to the body of knowledge can also reasonably be met.

This research gathered qualitative data that looked at the manager’s perception of workplace surveillance, and analysed it from an employment relationship/exchange perspective, something that thus far appears to have eluded current research (Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2005). This perspective links together aspects of social psychology in the form of psychological reactance, the psychological contract, social exchange theory through the notions of the employment relationship, equity, and power typologies. The conclusions drawn from this research provide a better understanding of the impact electronic workplace surveillance have on the modern manager.

8.2 Conclusions

The analysis of the data is in two chapters. The first, Chapter Six, took quite a broad overview of the managers’ perceptions of surveillance. It covered managerial perceptions to electronic
surveillance and performance management. The second, Chapter Seven, narrowed down the field more precisely, looking in part at appraisal systems as a means of surveillance and further sought to understand why managers behaved in the ways that they do to excessive or intrusive electronic surveillance.

It was initially unknown what would emerge from this research study. The questioning was therefore deliberately kept neutral. Early into the study, two major themes emerged directly from the data. The first theme to emerge was linked to understanding how electronic workplace surveillance perceptually affected the managers’ ability to manage, how it influenced the way in which they work and manage people. What emerges from this theme is that a significant number of managers are struggling at work by being increasingly asked to manage based on workplace surveillance rather than their acquired or innate people skills. I have dubbed managers in these circumstances as Performance Intermediary Executives (PIE). Unusually, a number of managers expressed a converse view; ironically, they were also struggling to manage, except they struggled due to a denial of performance data. They too are Performance Intermediary Executives, albeit still struggling in spite of (or because of) being weaned off accessing performance data. In addition, a significantly smaller section ignores or treats with contempt the performance data preferring instead to use their innate management skills.

The second key theme, covered in Chapter Seven, emerges from the nature of exchange relationships, in particular the modern trend towards network exchange relationships within the employment relationship. The chapter detailed how these relationships are affected by workplace surveillance and suggested theoretical perspectives that might help explain why managers behave and react (resist) in the way that they do. The insights from the themes illuminated a number of paths, criss-crossing several key areas. The analysis demonstrated a number of important findings and was able to link the themes together.

Chapter Six looked at the surveillance associated with performance management and performance measurement. The chapter took quite a broad look at the types of surveillance in the workplace for the managers in the study. A great deal of time in this chapter was spent examining five of the organisations, Roses plc and Tulip plc, and Chestnut plc, Sunflower plc and Daffodil plc. This was due to the higher numbers of participants providing the bulk of the data. The concentration on these organisations was also merited due to the amounts of electronic surveillance and measurement that occurred in these organisations. The vast
majority of the managers in these organisations felt pressured, directly and indirectly, to manage using electronically generated quantitative information to accomplish their managerial tasks, in particular, the management of their teams. Interestingly, the findings were mirrored across all the organisations, including those arguably less intrusively electronically surveilled.

There is nothing wrong from a business perspective to improve worker performance. For all the participant organisations, in many ways it makes sound business sense to gain or garner acceptance of any workplace surveillance, in much the same way that the organisations seek to engender a particular work culture or ethic. Organisations desire a workforce that accepts surveillance as part of the job, when and where in their opinion, surveillance is critical to the success of the business. However, many organisations wrongly appear to equate surveillance with improved performance. This research shows there is a clear and considerable downside to this argument.

It was noticeable that a distinct difference existed in the perception between what constituted surveillance and workplace performance monitoring for the interviewees. The complex academic differences were discussed at the start of this thesis. With few exceptions, the picture from the interviews is equally as complex, interviewees regarded surveillance as being more associated with, or related to, societal acts of observation. Acts of surveillance were perceived as being more intrusive, and therefore not immediately associated with the workplace. The exception was for crossover technologies such as CCTV, which were generally received as being negative both inside the workplace and in society. Conversely, acts that I, and other academics, would consider workplace surveillance were not perceived as surveillance, but as monitoring and therefore generally thought of as more benign. It is possible this could be more to do with the language and culture associated to their particular workplace, the organisational language and that these were examples of ‘third order controls’ (Perrow, 1986), which could easily be an alternative influencing factor to explain the divergent opinions.

In the majority of the interviews, the company line on surveillance was the one initially expressed, that surveillance, at least in the context of the labour/employment relationship, was perceived as the acceptable face of measurement. In some instances managers offered a simple restatement of the often made argument about ever increasing surveillance in society.
and in the workplace, which is that ‘if you’re doing nothing wrong then what do you have to worry about’.

Delving deeper into the data, it was evident that the use of electronic surveillance clearly influences how managers manage. Some of the effects were perceived as positive, as in the convenience of using the computer ‘Dashboard’ to manage teams of Call Centre workers. There was the accompanying perception from some, that the additional quantitative measures of performance made managing easier for these managers, particularly those with large teams. Unfortunately, the majority of ways in which surveillance influenced behaviours and the managers’ ability to manage was perceived to be negative, or if not directly seen as negative, had negative connotations. The fact that the claimed positive side of surveillance required additional and more intensive surveillance on the workforce, and therefore ironically on the managers, appeared lost on them.

The research posed four questions

1. What is the impact of workplace surveillance and the use of quantitative performance measures on how managers manage?
2. What is the nature of the exchange relationship in light of question one?
3. In light of questions one and question two, what forms of resistance, if any, do managers undertake to seek to re-balance any perceptions of inequity/inequality?
4. How can we better understand how managers react?

Based on the various interactions and knowledge of each of the organisations the overall impact of surveillance and the use of quantitative measure are substantial. The increased use of quantitative performance measures is one that will continue to grow in popularity with organisations. The research saw no abatement in this trend, or in how managers might resist their use, indeed newer, less experienced managers, appeared to welcome its use. The increased use of electronic and quantitative performance measures has had an impact on managers and management.

How managers might resist is a far more complex issue. The research identified a number of examples of passive and active resistance, along the continuum of misbehaviours identified by Ackroyd and Thompson (1999). There did not appear to be any concerted effort to resist, more that individual managers believed their ability to manage is being put at risk, and along with it,
the various exchange relationships between themselves and colleagues and themselves and
their team.

In the end, managers always have, and always will, adapt to new trends, whether it was to
Taylorism, or the influences of Japanese management (Sewell, 1996; van den Broek, Callahan &
Thompson, 2004). Managers in this research have also seen their roles change, accompanied
by a gradual diminishing of their sphere of influence in day-to-day events and in their ability to
manage people. These changes have not taken place over the period of a few weeks or
months, but years, as Zuboff (in Marx, 1990, p. 20) says, “the future creeps in on small feet
...we do not suddenly awaken to a brave new world”.

8.2.1 The Performance Intermediary Executive (PIE)

Management parallels to labour practices drawn from previous academics research can be
identified in this research. There are paradoxical similarities between the perceptions of
managers and how their areas of competence and skill are being eroded and fragmented,
much in the same way that Braverman (1974) identified for machinists in the face of better
machinery, and Edwards did for Polaroid workers (Edwards, 1979). Attewell (1987) made the
point that that these strategies can enhance managerial control. However, a major difference
between Braverman’s (1974) work and this research, is that for Braverman the issue of
deskilling was made in relation to ordinary workers. In his case study, the main beneficiaries
are the managers. The irony for this research is that those affected by the same strategies
today are the managers. Braverman’s deskilling of the workers has now crept up several levels
of management. In this research, it is apparent that the managers (while perhaps not deskilled
per se), are certainly victims of a form of de-professionalization.

Zuboff (1988) also pre-empted the issues of de-professionalization and deskilling by alluding to
the notion that managers might eventually become beholden to computers and computer-
based measures. In her book, In the Age of the Smart Machine (1988), Zuboff suggested that
managers’ knowledge, like the knowledge of workers before them, could become embedded
into computer systems. An argument can be made that this is a technological variation to
Scientific Management. In this instance instead of managers controlling knowledge, and
thereby the worker, the computer controls the knowledge and therefore the manager. Like
workers before them, this course of action might render managers redundant or at least make
them endure harsher working conditions.
The research findings showed that despite the mass of new surveillance technology involved in performance management in the various workplaces, managers do try to adapt to the changes, in some cases better than in others. The change to the almost ubiquitous use of electronic surveillance measures of performance, did not sit well with a great many managers. Equally, a much smaller number of managers were able to say or demonstrate they were fully adopting, or even comfortable with the changes. There was nonetheless, ample disquiet from all bar a few managers about this shift. Most managers cited the reduction in their ability to manage, or an organisational over-reliance on quantitative data for them to manage to the measure at the expense of everything else. Indeed, such were the numbers of managers exhibiting symptoms of loss of control and erosion of their skill base, I coined a more appropriate term for these managers. Instead of referring to them as a manager, I refer to them as a “Performance Intermediary Executive” or PIE, where ‘performance is everything’.

The constant introduction of more and ‘better’ or ‘smarter’ performance measures, with the claim of improved measurement techniques does de-professionalize managers and diminishes their management skills thus providing further justification for my nomenclature of the PIE.

The notion of the PIE as a term or a concept to describe contemporary managers goes to the heart of a tension between two different views. First, that organisations seek to maximise productivity and performance (Edwards, 1979) and second, that good managers manage people using a range of interpersonal skills (Robbins, 2005). There is nothing inherently wrong with either assumption, when they are in balance. However, when one has dominance over the other i.e. the organisation’s view dominates the managers, and in doing so stops the manager from managing the ways they might wish, alternatively, when a manager has little regard for the performance of the organisation, the organisation can (and frequently does) fail because of poor management. In the first view seen in this research, managers are required to manage based almost exclusively on electronic surveillance via, in the case of Call Centres, the use of the computer Dashboard or by performance measures reinforced by electronic notice boards. Alternatively, as in the case of Chestnut plc, whose similar reliance on performance measurement on the shop floor with the use of traceability (reinforced by machine speed), or in the case of Sunflower plc, the extensive use of a range of surveillance mechanisms and quantitative performance measures from Head Office, irrespective that these managers were claimed to be working semi-autonomously. Equally, in Lilac, there was pressure coming down from National Government for managers to meet performance figures, again, regardless of local issues.
It is particularly important to note that the notion of the PIE, for now, does not appear to apply to good managers. Good quality managers, as the research showed, remain, almost stubbornly, inured to the onset of pressure, technological, organisational, or hierarchical, to the use of surveillance and quantitative measures foisted upon them. In many cases, the good managers simply ignored them; others simply paid lip service to the surveillance and quantitative measurements enough to appease their line managers or more senior managers.

The ‘tipping point’ for managers to become a PIE comes from the inexperienced (regardless of how good) managers and the experienced manager who have risen to managerial positions by dint of natural progression or promoted by being in the right place at the right time rather than on sheer managerial ability. Both these groups appear to have resigned themselves to using quantitative measures as the key indicator of someone’s ability rather than relying on their personal ability. Some of these managers permitted themselves to be willing stooges for the sake of an easy life, whereas others believed that the use of quantitative measures were acceptable and helped them manage, without realising that such measures were a crutch to cover their own inadequacies. In Tulip plc, they decided to abandon such measurements and freed the managers to manage people based on their instincts, natural abilities of leadership, and interpersonal skills. Yet, rather than being an exercise that freed all managers from the shackles of quantitative measures that bound their managerial abilities, instead the less good/more inexperienced managers reverted to being PIE’s longing for the safety of the Dashboard and other quantitative measures. The good news for Tulip plc is that the good managers and the more experienced managers relished the freedoms from being a PIE.

There is in addition to the two distinctions of PIE (the inexperienced/poor quality and the reluctant/diffident), a very small section of managers (perhaps a sub-group of the managers who dislike using the data, but use it anyway), who ‘resist’ the use of performance data. Instead, they prefer to rely on their own judgement and experience to determine who is performing successfully. These managers are much in the minority, consisting primarily of experienced managers with an additional leaning towards women managers. All that said, for the PIE and non-PIE alike, the more subtle application and reliance of quantitative performance measures in the appraisal processes or the use of behavioural measures as a way of measuring an individual’s performance appeared to go unnoticed even by the more experienced managers. The picture like much of surveillance is therefore not completely clear or straightforward. Are the conventionally ‘good’ managers slowly influenced by systems outside of their control, or are they managers who are on the fringe, who in day-to-day
activities manage well, but either by dint of being overloaded or for want of an easy life sometimes accept the road more travelled. Equally, it is not known whether the managers conducting the appraisal uses the quantitative measures on appraisals as a once a year nod to their usefulness, or because the system does not permit them any alternative. Whichever is right, these are questions for the future.

There are a number of possible reasons for some of these appraisal activities, some of which were discussed in Chapter Three. Perhaps it is a leadership style issue, the Halo, Crony or Doppelganger effect, or simply the nature of the appraisal system. Either way, I am not convinced that a good day-to-day manager gets everything right all the time and the fact that they are less good in one area (i.e. in this instance, by being reliant on the measures they typically avoid every day for one process), is necessarily wrong. As Grint indicates, the important aspect of the appraisal is not the use of all the measures, but the discussion between the appraiser and the appraised, how the manager ticks the appropriate boxes to get to that position should be marginally less of a concern.

Interestingly, there was an acknowledgement from a section, albeit a very small section of managers who thought that overtly intrusive electronic forms of surveillance could be categorised as a good thing. This point of view came from a cross section of managers, and could not be associated to the group of managers with the nomenclature of PIE (there is an underlying assumption that PIE still sees themselves as people managers, unlike this small group, who are the antithesis to the group who resist the surveillance). This is not a welcome sign from an employment perspective. It is a concern to this researcher that managers, even a small number, should believe that surveillance that is more hostile and intrusive in its nature equates to being a good thing. It suggests that these managers’ behaviours have become normalized, as Foucault indicated, they would be in a panoptic environment. Each of the concerns associated with the PIE, the loss of control, the inability to manage the way they might wish, the potential for resistance, the use of surveillant measures, all directly or indirectly impact on the exchange relationships in the workplace. Managers interact less well with their team, with fellow managers and importantly with their employer. Thus risking producing a managerial workforce that is disillusioned and disempowered, who can only demonstrate initiative and professionalism in their job within tightly constrained organisationally determined parameters. The links to the exchange processes are elaborated on in the next sub-section.
8.2.2 Surveillance, Resistance, and Appraisals

It was striking that managers and workers generally appear to have become both compliant and self-disciplined, often accepting their lot without question, as shown by Interviewee #14 and Interviewee #23 amongst others. It further suggests that there is a degree of “anticipatory conformity” (Zuboff, 1988, p. 346) also taking place. The suspicion that employees at all levels conform to anticipated norms of behaviour suggests that workplace surveillance, has in many of the organisations in this study, possibly achieved the organisational goal, of being able to provoke or engender changes in employee behaviour almost on demand. The concentration on measuring pre-defined behaviours in annual appraisals by both Roses plc and Tulip plc appears to confirm this aim. The behavioural traits of motivation, leadership, performance, job perception, turnover, and satisfaction link managers to this research through the collective notion of the behavioural locus of control (Instrumentalist and Fatalist). The influence of this notion extends into the areas of personal equity, fairness, reciprocity, and personal satisfaction. The exchange processes between a manager and their employer, the manager and peer managers, and between the manager and their team, are a complex of behaviours encompassed by the use of a locus of control.

Some of the other changes wrought by the introduction and use of electronic surveillance are different to the subtle and progressive organisational alterations in the past. These changes are profound, in that they are, according to this research, producing transformations in management and management behaviour. No longer are managers using reciprocity to influence and manage others, instead some of them have come to accept that obedience by following whatever their computer (Dashboard or surveillance software) tells them to do is somehow acceptable, and cannot be called into question. Such behavioural changes while unwanted are not new, as evidenced in work from Milgram (1963), and The Stanford Prison Experiments from the 1970s. For some managers managing this way has become their personal manifestation of Weber’s ‘iron-cage of bureaucracy’. It has led managers in this research to question their role as a manager. This was particularly true of experienced and female managers. It has for them also queried and compromised their exchange relationships with co-workers, colleagues, and employers. Their reliance on people management skills were eroded and being replaced by the organisational requirement to rely on computer software and spreadsheets. This can be directly associated to the aspect of locus of control influenced
by motivation and satisfaction, because, if a manager has less satisfaction or motivation in their job, their locus of control is profoundly affected.

Managers (and others) expressed concerns in all the organisations about the impact of the systems and processes used to perform surveillance. The concerns were widespread and ranged from, at one extreme, the perceived surveillant nature of the mechanism to, at the other extreme, questioning the general effectiveness of ‘performance monitoring’ systems. The concerns about the effectiveness/usefulness of the systems were particularly notable regarding appraisal system/s and computer performance monitoring systems. These concerns were wide-ranging; a number mentioned “Big Brother”, “Monitoring”, (used as a pejorative term) and “Surveillance” in relation to possible adverse uses of the data gathered during for day-to-day performance monitoring and its subsequent use in the appraisal process (of which more further on in this chapter).

The strategy of employing ever more workplace surveillance fails to consider the human aspect. Neither managers nor workers can I believe ever become completely inured to workplace surveillance; its influence on behaviour is intense on so many levels (they might forget it is there, which is a very different concept). In Chapter Six, it was shown that the reliance on electronic performance measures creates problems for managers and their ability to manage in the way that they might wish. In Chapter Seven, I detailed how the reactions induced by changes in the employment relationship can cause psychological reactance, managers resist, and the resistance reduces productivity and thus overall performance – the very thing organisations seek to improve.

It was previously thought that the equitable balance of inputs (time/effort) for outputs (salary, recognition) was not under threat. It was therefore surprising that a great many managers expressed varying degrees of dissatisfaction, directly and indirectly, with the equitable nature of the exchange. In particular, the research identified a high proportion of managers have a low sense of personal equity in addition to feeling undervalued professionally. That is to say, the inputs they give to the job, the ‘fair days work,’ the time, the effort, loyalty, does not reflect the outputs, the pay, recognition, responsibility that they signed-up for in their contract. This is a vital concern particularly for managers, in that managers by and large, do not hold pay in the same esteem as perhaps lower grade workers do (Herzberg, 1968; Mintzberg, 1971). The notion that managers should be the allowed to manage, as the “symphony orchestra conductor” (Sayles, 1964, p. 162), or the ‘improvising jazz musician’
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(Weick, 1998) is one keenly felt. Of course, this relies on the premise that the manager is actually capable of ‘conducting’ or ‘improvising’. For some managers in the research the inequity was evidenced simply by the expressed dissatisfaction with the inability to ‘improvise’ or ‘conduct’ as they wished. The locus of control, particularly where the managers concerned are Instrumentalists is directly and negatively impacted, as these managers are both a cause and a consequence of success (Furnham, 1997). Where managers are Fatalist in outlook, the loss of recognition or a lower expectation of equity has less impact on them as they believe the working environment is outside their control anyway.

For other managers the dissatisfaction manifested itself in both its degree and in its nature. For them it was clearly rooted in the manifold incidences of overt resistance. The research identified acts of resistance and misbehaviour at several levels. Each act can be placed somewhere on a broadly based ‘resistance continuum’, with mild misbehaviour at one end and active sabotage at the other. At the mild misbehaviour end of the continuum, a manager simply rejecting the usefulness of the quantitative measures available to them is an act of resistance, as in the examples of Interviewee #23, #15. Similarly, and at the other end of the resistance continuum, managers can actively sabotage the workplace environment, by the tacit/explicit approval of dubious acts designed to undermine their fellow workers or the organisation. For example, the claims of deliberately manipulating the system made by Interviewee #35, #17 or by the [deliberate] distortions of the appraisal system by several managers. For other managers, the dissatisfaction was far more subtle. A simple sign of unease, a note of frustration, or other mild signs of discontent about the widespread use of surveillance were also present. Typically, lost productivity, for one reason or another, is representative of the disjuncture.

F. W. Taylor (2005) argued how workplace resistance can be characterised through incidences of soldiering. Botan and Vorvoreanu (2000) further suggested resistance might be linked to inequity. Workplace surveillance could also be linked to misbehaviour as both a cause and an effect (Stanton & Stam, 2006). All of the above are reasonable claims to make. The part inequity plays in the workplace (Adams, 1963), coupled with of exchange theory (Homans, 1958; Blau, 1964) and other more contemporary interpretations of exchange (Stanton & Stam, 2003) are inextricably linked to actions and reactions, where surveillance is the action and resistance is the reaction. These actions and reactions can also be linked to workplace surveillance power issues, regardless of whether the resistance is related to panoptic normalisation (Foucault, 1977) or power typologies (French & Raven, 1958; Raven, 1999),
which Hales (2001) subsequently added to. How some of these factors combine to adversely affect employment relationships is suggested by Stanton and Weiss (2000). They identified incidences of the manipulation of systems and a “plethora of new types of unproductive and even counter-productive behaviours” (Stanton & Weiss, 2000, p. 433). Whether this is because individuals seek to rebalance a flawed system is unknown. It would however make some psychological sense for Instrumentalist managers to seek to rebalance what they perceive as a flawed system, particularly one they see as inequitable. It is still resistance, albeit benignly intentioned. Such a view is entirely consistent with Stanton and Weiss. They also accept the possibility of unproductive and counter-productive behaviour from workers because of additional surveillance, why then should not similar behaviours from managers or supervisors for the same reasons occur. I see no difference between a manager’s resistance and a workers resistance, the means and mechanisms may well be different but it is the same act. The difference however is, as it is for the surveillance, in the intention (Lyon, 1994; Lyon, 2001b).

Paradoxically, organisations who seek to gain acceptance of more workplace surveillance by including employees, at all levels, in discussions about introducing surveillance may not always increase or improve employee perceptions of fairness either (Alder, 2001). It may be that employers find that resistance to surveillance is the norm and that no matter what they do; some will always see it as unfair.

This research suggested a connection to resistance for the various actions and reactions, by rediscovering links to psychological reactance through the psychological contract and the employment relationship (Van Dyne & Butler Ellis, 2005). The feeling of a significant loss of managerial control due to the amounts of surveillance, either generated for them or about them, further leads to feelings of inequity, which produces a range of behavioural changes. The feeling of inequity manifested differently, for some it was that their position was undermined, thus undermining their employment relationships hierarchically horizontally and vertically. For others, the perceptions of inequity were aimed towards the systems and mechanisms used by them (and ultimately against them).

There is a tortuous path leading from feelings of inequity to a loss of a manager’s locus of control via psychological reactance, to rebalancing acts involving simple misbehaviour and potentially onwards to outright resistance or sabotage. The avenues leading to misbehaviour and resistance are more complex than the simple reciprocal one of ‘A does something to B and B reacts’. The complexity of relationships in the contemporary workplace creates a mélange of interconnections that are difficult to either unpick or knit together into one single unifying
unit. Brehm’s theory of psychological reactance informs us that regardless of whether the feelings are perceived or real, the stronger or more intense the feeling, the more intense the reaction against the perceived injustice. It makes little difference whether the perceived injustice is one perceived to be against himself or herself or against a fellow worker. Aspects of generalised reciprocity, exchange, and psychological reactance are exhibited in a range of workplace misbehaviours.

One area that particularly highlighted managerial misbehaviour was in the completion of annual appraisals. Annual appraisals incorporate various forms of workplace surveillance, thus the association between an appraisal and surveillance is clear. Some managers took their responsibilities particularly seriously, and took their work home to do a more thorough job (Interviewee #1*Telephoned). Some abused the system and used it for overtly disciplinary purposes as in Chestnut plc, whereas others just manipulated the system to make their own lives easier as evidenced by a number of managers in Roses plc and Sunflower plc. These subtle forms of resistance can trace their roots back to fairness, psychological reactance, issues of trust, and job creep. Anyone working in excess of the stated employment terms, such as a manager taking work home as with Interviewee #1, invariably builds up resentment towards their employer/employment with workers believing there are too many demands put upon them during their work hours. The result could be resistance or misbehaviour. Similarly, managers can indulge overtly or covertly in behaviours that distort the appraisal process, favouring colleagues they like, or using what is termed as the Veblen Effect, as suggested by Interviewee’s #84 (Tulip plc) and #58 (Sunflower plc). This effect is where managers give deliberately uniform appraisals regardless of ability or performance, ending up with a set of workers who are all at, or around, the lowest common denominator.

A good appraisal system, formal and informal, should be a mechanism for personal and/or professional improvement, to recognise talent and help identify individual training requirements. They should be a means of reasonably measuring performance and of identifying ways to improve performance through development and training. However, this research illustrated that managers saw the process of appraising junior team members as a mundane task to be completed. Such an approach fails to meet any measure of fairness, in either the system or the individual manager, in either case for the appraised person in this case for Interviewee #11, resentment, even resistance, is clearly already building up against both colleagues and the system.
Unfortunately, these instances of resentment/resistance were not isolated, a significant number of managers displayed subtle signs of misbehaviour related to appraisals in general. A high proportion of managers adopted strategies for completing annual appraisals that betrayed a nonchalance and distain for the entire process. Commonly attributed phrases used to describe appraisal systems reflected and reinforced negative perceptions to them – “It was too complicated” and “all the documentation was a chore.” Some were even less complimentary, describing systems “that just didn’t work” and that appraisals “disguised worker failings and poor employees.” While others just wanted an appraisal mechanism that was “not confusing” and “a system that works”. This echoes what Metz says about the appraisal process, that despite numerous revisions and iterations, “why can’t we get it right” (Metz, 1988, p. 47). Some went even further in the appraisals making promises they knew when they made them, they would be unable to keep (Interviewee #28). In this research managers exploited appraisal processes for professional benefit (i.e. exploiting the system to make their lives easier). Regrettably, in many cases the apparently well-meaning and expensive appraisal processes failed to live up to expectations, in part, due to managerial distortions and misbehaviour.

For many of the organisations in this research there is a clear scope, and in some cases a clear intention, to further use and analyse appraisal data for surveillant purposes. Sunflower plc and to a lesser extent Tulip plc indicated that the data gathered for/from appraisals can be used smarter and can help garner a better understanding of individual workers. How this particular data might be used in the future was unclear, although Sunflower plc did provide a dystopic insight by suggesting that they would be able to do considerably more with the data, but only when the organisations cultural climate is right. In contrast to Sunflower plc, both Roses plc and Tulip plc appeared to concentrate on measuring employee behaviours rather than performance and abilities in the appraisal, although Tulip plc also concentrated more on pre-employment and psychometric testing. In both cases, the reconstructed data used in the appraisal forms the primary method of determining job suitability. In Sunflower plc the data is created from the ticks in the electronic boxes, and for Tulip plc in the use of early and subsequent psychometric data, which positively reinforces traits of current successful managers.

Much has been made throughout this research about individual’s perceptions and the perceptions of managers. It is methodologically and substantively one thing to identify that something is empirically the case, and quite another to explain it. This study utilises the
Thomas Theorem to justify the certainty with which the interpretations made in this research are valid. The Thomas Theorem states, “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Merton, 1995, p. 380) or put another way by Mead (In: Merton, 1995, p. 383), “If a thing is not recognized as true, then it does not function as true in the community”. Thus, if individual managers perceive a situation as real (to them) then the consequences of their perceptions will be equally as real. A manager perceiving workplace surveillance as intrusive will believe it so, and any reaction based on the perception will be real in its consequences, regardless of the accuracy of the original thought. This further validates why psychological reactance is a logical step to misbehaviour.

A final organic rather than revolutionary development from the research was to reinforce, or restate, various findings emerging from research monographs, books, and articles about the many different characteristics and elements of surveillance from the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. While this research was different in nature and context from many of the earlier studies, the impact of surveillance in the workplace on the human condition, and the conclusions and questions raised are strikingly similar to those raised in the past despite the discrete approach and different sample profile of this study.

8.3 Implications

There is no single overarching conclusion identified in the study, in the same way that there is no grand theory. What the research does is to identify a number of linked conclusions. The overall picture painted by this research is not a stable one, nor is it a simple binary one. Surveillance is a complex of behaviours. In this research it ranged from overt and hostile surveillance (in the food processing business of Chestnut plc, for example), to the contested terrain between management, workers, and customers in the call centres of Roses plc and Tulip plc (with customers wanting enough resource to be allocated to solving their problems, whereas, managers were focussed more on sweating human assets).

Similarly, worker resistance to the surveillance was often subtle (in the soldiering seen in Privet) and for some far-reaching (in the negative reactions to the change to people management from a reliance on computer Dashboards in Tulip plc). The research determined that the differences relate strongly to the levels of knowledge still in the workforce as opposed to the embedded technologies. This was exemplified in Roses plc. Experienced managers ignored their performance management spreadsheet or Dashboard, instead relying on their...
innate people skills and managerial skills built up through experience. It was also in the manual labour teams in Privet who were able to exploit their skills base and knowledge to achieve regularly, what were for other less experienced teams, almost unattainable targets. In Chestnut plc, when resistance occurred the organisational solution proved more problematical. Where hostility or resistance affected productivity, increased automation in the food processing eliminated the hostile surveillance, simply because the staff would not be as necessary. In Chestnut plc, workers exchanged resistance for redundancy or dismissal.

In the Call Centres of Roses plc and Tulip plc, it was clear that attempts to automate managerial knowledge were reaching a limit beyond which customer service was reduced. The Call Centre customer has became increasingly dissatisfied with service quality, hence Tulip plc’s attempt to move away from automating knowledge, attempting to reinvigorate managers by removing their electronic crutch of the Dashboard of control. The movement to a less surveillant form of managerial control by Tulip plc does highlight the business case for the consumers desire to speak quickly to a human rather than go through endless IVR automated responses. Almost in recognition of a dislike of these systems, they are becoming subject to consumer resistance. A number of web sites already publish ways to get quickly through to a human voice in IVR systems. Regrettably, for Tulip plc, it appears it might be an extensive experimental illusion, using smoke and mirrors to obviate the surveillance data from less senior managers. Nevertheless, in both cases the use of electronic control systems is resisted.

In this research, managers in all the organisations, directly and indirectly operated a blend of both networked exchange and dyadic exchange relationships. In typical day-to-day operations, managers use blends of coercion, reciprocity, and legitimate types of power to maintain or assert managerial control. Different managers adopted various approaches depending on the task. Similarly, managers were also on the receiving end of coercion, reciprocity, and legitimate types of power from their line manager or employer. On one hand, this is a dyadic relationship and as such, one where over time there should be a balancing of the exchange where a point of equilibrium is reached (arguably the best solution). However, managers increasingly are in positions where their relationship with a line manager/employer is replaced by a quasi-relationship with surveillance mechanisms and performance management, framed by software and hardware technological solutions. There has been a gradual erosion of the pretence of dyadic relationships and exchange networks, replaced by a fixed and immutable,

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technological relationship with a computer and an unbending set of rules and figures parachuted in at the behest of the employer.

This relationship has shifted from a bilateral dyadic relationship where equilibrium occurs, to an unbalanced exchange where the primary interaction is with computer-generated figures. In these circumstances, genuine bilateral negotiation is not possible anymore. Managers in their exchanges with workers are also liable to suffer ‘pronounced inequity’ in these dealings because of their use of power/influence (perceived or real). Managers are in a difficult situation. They have become susceptible to the same issues of equity that were once the sole domain of workers, and they no longer have the exchange relationships required for equilibrium at their disposal. This further strengthens my designation that managers in these circumstances are PIE-persons.

Over time, workplace surveillance has become accepted and adapted, with new and improved euphemisms adopted to disguise their true meanings, at first from the workers, and now from the managers. In the past the term ‘performance management’ was re-inscribed to effect etymological distance from workplace surveillance (Sewell, 1999). Today, newer terms emerge, ‘traceability’ (Daffodil plc) and the ‘ECFP’ (External Customer Feedback Process) from Roses plc. Both terms represent surveillance in different guises. More complex and cheaper computer technology is placing inexperienced managers on a career path that manages to sidestep the development of key people and management skills. Instead, it makes them reliant on an algorithmic and digitised version of management culled from the inferior but more easily programmed knowledge of other managers.

Much was made at the outset of this thesis as to which word was the most appropriate to use. A decision to use surveillance throughout was made, the findings from this research justify that choice, as Botan and Vorvoreanu (2000) stated [surveillance], “... refers to a relationship between some authority and those whose behaviour it wishes to control.” This research has shown manifold examples where it is manifestly about some authority seeking to control behaviour.

As the twenty-first century unfolds the use of technology by way of computers, and computer-aided systems to gauge performance is increasing almost exponentially. The completely automated workforce is creeping ever closer. Both Roses plc and Tulip plc are investing in the use of IVR. Tulip plc is also heavily involved in pre-employment vetting to tie in with their goal of adopting transformational management theories. Chestnut plc are on the lookout for faster
machines, and with a workforce already working at 100% capacity, the only increases in productivity can be made by further automation, eliminating the production component that cannot work any faster. Similarly, Sunflower plc has unveiled a computerised appraisal system that they claim, revolutionise employment selection and a Human Resource-centric management of managers. In all these examples, the use of technology helps frame the surveillance, either in the present or in some cases in the not too distant future.

8.4 Limitations and Future Research

The research data, while providing a number of interesting findings also raised issues that might benefit from further research. The research data suggests, albeit at an abstracted level, that there might be a correlation between the amount and speed of information (sometimes erroneously referred to as data and information overload) and changes in certain patterns of management and subsequent resistance to those patterns of management. Managers illustrated the potential links when discussing the usefulness of data given today, compared to the usefulness of data in the past.

Further research might also extend into looking at whether the age/training/gender of the manager is a factor in the perceived usefulness of the surveillance data. In addition, looking at whether the manager has an Instrumentalist or Fatalist locus of control affects their views on surveillance might be worthwhile investigating. There were several interviews where managers with tens of year’s experience believed that they knew better than the data the employees that were performing best. Perhaps there is something in Tulip plc’s experiment to eliminate the day-to-day Dashboard performance information from managers after all. Researching managers in the context of whether they are Instrumentalist or Fatalist and whether that makes a difference to their attitudes to workplace surveillance would also be worthwhile pursuing.

This research was as with any research bounded by limitations, the primary limitation was time, and therefore numbers, of both organisations and interviewees – although it is doubtful whether much more could reasonably be analysed and managed in the timescale.

In the end, what emerged was a number of issues that will influence managers and management for many years I suspect. Yet, throughout all the interviews, I came to realise that electronic workplace surveillance is not intrinsically a bad thing or a good thing. It is not in
itself dangerous, similarly, it is not always harmless. Surveillance anywhere and particularly in the workplace cannot be considered in such simple binary terms. There are always going to be circumstances where more surveillance or more intensive monitoring is perceived as good. For example, in the gated communities of the United States (Monahan, 2006), where more surveillance equates to the perception of more safety. Equally, there will always be instances where the perceptions as to the levels of surveillance are that it is too intrusive and overwhelming. In the end, it is unlikely that agreement either between academics or in the workplace can ever be reached on exactly at what point the acceptable level for electronic workplace surveillance, regardless of the effects on individuals really is. Perhaps, an acceptable level of workplace surveillance, like beauty, remains in the eye of the beholder.
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Etzioni, A. (2000), 'Creating Good Communities and Good Societies', *Contemporary Sociology*, vol. 29, no. 1.


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References


## Appendix One

### Appendix 1 - Adapted Union/Taylor Model (Westin/OTA, 1986/1987)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model/Question</th>
<th>Is monitoring constant or intermittent?</th>
<th>Can employees see their own records?</th>
<th>Can employees challenge, explain or correct records?</th>
<th>Does the employee or the machine pace the work?</th>
<th>Do employees understand performance criteria and use of information?</th>
<th>Are quotas set on an individual or group basis?</th>
<th>Are quotas fair, allowing work at a reasonable pace?</th>
<th>Is pay standard or based on performance?</th>
<th>What happens to employees falling short of quota?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union Model</strong></td>
<td>Individual performance sampling</td>
<td>All data available to employee</td>
<td>Known procedure for challenging records</td>
<td>Employee can pace work</td>
<td><em>Omitted from table in original</em></td>
<td>Group production quotes</td>
<td>Quality problem factors recognised</td>
<td>Standard pay</td>
<td>Individual shortfall leads to training or group discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Taylor Model</strong></td>
<td>Constant machine monitoring</td>
<td>Data not readily available</td>
<td>No procedure for challenge</td>
<td>Machine-paced work</td>
<td><em>Omitted from table in original</em></td>
<td>Individual quotes</td>
<td>Quantity/speed standard</td>
<td>Piecework pay or bonus</td>
<td>Individual shortfall leads to discipline</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Electronic Surveillance Model (based on this research)</strong></td>
<td>Both constant and intermittent</td>
<td>Selective data available permanently</td>
<td>Belief in the relatability of the computer</td>
<td>Both self-paced (and targeted) invasively paced to 100% human capacity.</td>
<td>Employees understand need for quotas and understand what is collected. However, they do not understand what is done with the data.</td>
<td>Quotas are set on a combined group and/or individual basis or a business division system.</td>
<td>There is both human and machine pacing. In many cases, these are constantly subject to reappraisal on an hourly/daily basis.</td>
<td>Standard pay combined with performance. Where standard is ineffectively linked to electronically gathered performance targets</td>
<td>When targets/quotas not met, training first, and then discipline, or in some cases simply discipline</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Privacy related issues**

**Employment relationship issues**

Fair work – Fair Pay - Fair Performance Evaluation
Appendix Two

Appendix 2 - [Tanton (2000)] Framework depicting employee reactions to monitoring

![Diagram showing employee reactions to monitoring](image-url)
I am writing in relation to a research project I am presently conducting for a PhD at the University of Durham. The UK’s Economic and Social Research Council fund the project, which involves my working together with Dr. Peter Hamilton and Prof. Michael Blakemore. The research examines the impact that the Internet and corporate networks have on the relationships between management, staff and customers. I am particularly interested in the challenges that contemporary electronic communication systems pose to both management and staff.

Specific areas of interest for the research include:

- Investigating the trend towards the use of electronic data in performance management and annual appraisals.
- Exploring how employment relations are affected by electronic communications.
- Studying how organizations reconcile the relevant workplace legislation with the need to maintain data integrity, undertake data auditing, and data monitoring.

While the research will contribute to academic theory and practice, there is another aim and that is to provide strong learning lessons and impart knowledge to the business world.

It is anticipated that there will be research outcomes that can directly benefit organization such as yours. These would include obtaining a better understanding of the people, processes and practices involved when adapting or undertaking a range of technology-based information or communication solutions.

I would be extremely grateful if it would be possible to arrange a meeting or, failing this, a telephone appointment in connection with the above. To that end, please advise me if this would be convenient.

Yours sincerely,

Simon Reilly

Dr. Peter Hamilton p.m.hamilton@durham.ac.uk
Prof. Michael Blakemore michael.blakemore@durham.ac.uk
Simon Reilly s.m.reilly@durham.ac.uk
Appendices

Appendix Four

Interview Questions

General Questions

- What can you tell me about the sort of performance management (indicators) that takes place in (your company) – what are the ones that involve you (or your team if manager?
- How would you characterise electronic performance management? Can you describe it for me?
- How would you characterise visual performance management? Can you give word/words to describe it?
- What are the differences for you between the two?
- Have you ever been asked for your input into any performance indicators?
- Tell me about are the main forms of electronic communication used by your organization?
- Tell me about the criteria used for judging whether you do a good job?
- Tell me about the sort of quantitative data used to manage you? How do you feel about that?
- Every workplace has its own jargon and language – could you give some examples
- Do you use IM (quite popular apparently) how do you use it?
- How do you feel about the sort of monitoring that takes place?
- I noticed cctv on the way in to see you – is there much of that on site? Is security important – have you had training on that aspect.
- For call-centre people – what data is recorded on you/your work?
- Are you aware of any issues of employees breaking any rules – how was it handled?

Impact of the Internet

- Do you have concerns about the use of email, the intranet (security/safety).
- What policies are there in place if any to prevent you emailing documents off the premises?
- Do you have a computer "Acceptable Use" policy document?

Corporate Networks

- How do you interact with the intranet, and what do you use it for?
- How is information about you and your job conveyed to you? (Email, in person, via blogs, wiki, intranet)?
- How do you feel about that?
- Do you have any concerns about the use of blogs/wiki/ or corporate intranet/collaborative tools?
- How well do your co-workers follow protocols or procedures in regard to information systems?

Electronic Communication Systems

- Are you a fan of email or other electronic mediums?
Are there any agreements on the uses of technology in your organization? For example; internet access, email, telephony, VOIP, video conferencing?

Do you think that your company use too much technology to evaluate your performance?

How well do you communicate with fellow workers? And what range of tools do you use to accomplish this?

How do the range of methods of communication that take place in your workplace affect you? Do you have a preference for communication?

**Use of electronic data in performance management**

What do you think are the advantages of electronic communication systems?

How does your manager keep you abreast of how you perform at work?

Would you welcome the use of more performance related data? Would it make your job easier/better?

How do you feel about the shift (or the potential shift) towards using quantitative data in annual appraisals, as opposed to qualitative data?

How comprehensively are performance related issues relayed to you? (both good news and bad).

**Employment relations (Managing people) affected by electronic data.**

What, effect, if any, do you think electronic communication systems have on how you manage people in the organisation?

How well do you think technology is used in the measuring of performance in your organization? Is there too much?

Can you give details of the appraisal mechanisms in place. Can you explain what forms of data/information are used in this process.

How do you use this information in appraisals?

Is there a mechanism whereby all employees can access data on them? This would include not only all personal data, but all work data including email, use/abuse, internet access, and wiki or blog contributions?

How well does your manager communicate any performance issues to you? Is this related to the amount of data he/she has or is it down to personal characteristics?

How is your training need assessed?

Do you have any security concerns about any information you create or use?

**Legislation and data monitoring, auditing integrity (Legal Representative Available in one organisation.**

What discussions, if any, regarding data security, data integrity or data monitoring, have taken place in your workplace?

Do you know what data auditing, data integrity or data monitoring takes place in your organization?

Who is responsible for data integrity, data auditing and associated legislation in your organization? Does it matter to you.

Do you have any questions for me?
## Appendix Five

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<tr>
<th>First Pass Code</th>
<th>Theme 1</th>
<th>Theme 2</th>
<th>Theme 3</th>
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<td>EXPRO</td>
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<td>ER: Psychological</td>
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<td>CS: Trust</td>
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<td>TECH:BEHAV</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS: Email/Workplace Communication</td>
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Appendices
## Appendix Six

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Body (inc. Bold and Red)</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Focused observations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simon:</td>
<td>First of all if I could ask you to tell me a little bit about yourself, all I know is you have a name and the fact that you are a manager within ROSES PLC Retail.</td>
<td>IS:KM, IS:POW</td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>#27:</td>
<td>Right I joined ROSES PLC in 1971 as a 16 year old apprentice and I have been here ever since. I have worked in [unclear] engineering side all the way through apprenticeship to working out in yellow vans. All sorts of managerial roles on the engineering side and then moving across to the call centre side or more customer service side, whereupon I started doing management information stuff. I then moved on and did all sorts of project management stuff and currently I have just finished doing the business programme which I set up and all that sort of stuff and the governance. Now I have just recently been moved onto doing some EOI work for ROSES PLC which makes us compliant to the outside industry. So that's a pocket history of what I've been doing so far.</td>
<td>IS:KM, ER:ER, ER:PSY</td>
<td>Knowledge, and management Some exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simon:</td>
<td>Is there anything you haven't done?</td>
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<tr>
<td>#27:</td>
<td>Not too much. Not too much within ROSES PLC which is a <strong>good thing from a ROSES PLC</strong> perspective and why I've never left in as much as there <strong>is so much that ROSES PLC does cover that I can actually change</strong> what I do and all that within the company.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simon:</td>
<td>It's this argument that says when you've got so much knowledge you keep it in the organisation.</td>
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<td>#27:</td>
<td>Well that's very true and of course things are now <strong>changing</strong> what with this <strong>age</strong> thing and that sort of stuff people are beginning to realise that having that sort of <strong>experience</strong> and <strong>expertise</strong> is something that actually <strong>benefits the company</strong> and steps are now being taken to <strong>keep that within the company</strong>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simon:</td>
<td>It is being held as one of the arguments with this sort of thing with the legislation, it's actually</td>
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brought to the fore people thinking "Well actually people of more than ten years experience do bring a huge amount to an inordinate number of organisations."

I think you are absolutely right the only trouble is now, what I find is the world seems to revolve continuously on a serve fewer basis, a lot of the stuff that comes up now I have seen in different, similar but slightly different guise maybe fifteen years ago, ten years ago, whatever and it does tend to go around and obviously there is lots of influences for that but it’s quite weird sometimes. Quite weird.

If I could start off with some general questions if I may. Drawing on all of your experience within ROSES PLC, in terms of the performance management and performance management indicators that you have either used or have been applied to you, can you tell me something about the sort of things that you have experienced or you are currently experiencing?

Performance management, we are talking about what? Annual performance markings?

Starting off, I will go onto the annual appraisals and what have you but initially it would be the sort of thing, obviously from what you say you’ve done some stuff in some of the call handling centres, they obviously have different ideas of the sort of performance indicators then you would have in perhaps engineering capacity. It’s actually to get, because I’ve been speaking to a range of people across ROSES PLC, to get some idea as to the range of indicators that they draw on. Everything from the call should be answered within a certain time etc.

It depends on one where you are coming from on this Simon, now obviously in the call centre environment, performance measures are around quantity and quality. They are actually dealing with incoming calls, a lot of their stuff is around the number of calls they are expected to answer in a given working day, the time spent on each call which I always find slightly sad I have to say. That’s not the view the Americans take in their call centres because they are more driven by the

| #27: Simon | PM:MEA | Critique of management |
| CS:APP, PM:APP | Performance measure |
| IS:QQ, CS:SM, PM:SM, ER:MO | Identify quality and quantity – call centre stuff electronic recording etc |
Simon: actual, shall we say financial performance measures. They can tend to stay on calls as long as they like providing they end up with $10,000 worth of sales. We tend not to work that way, we tend in this country to the call handling time you’ve probably heard of before, essentially a call is answered, they’re generally the quantity type stuff and then that’s just on the sales element. Repair, number of calls answered and the same sort of stuff but they are slightly different calls. Billing would be similar but their work is number of complaints going through and all that sort of stuff. So they are the things from a call centre perspective which we are on the periphery of and a lot of our projects that we put in then we actually have to make sure that they dovetail into all their particular performance measures that there are at this moment in time.

From an individual point of view we’ve got a number of measures that we run at this moment in time which revolve around our system called Clarity which is where we log all our projects on. There are certain things about having certain documentation in place, there is trying to reach the implementation date and how far you are off on that. There is customer satisfaction scores which we send out customer satisfaction surveys to our operational, to our end users and other people and we ask them to score us on an individual basis from one to five where one is good and five is rubbish and we collect most of those particular comments as well, give them the opportunity to comment on those as well. Then it is just like an overview of those sorts of stuff though I suppose probably what you would have come across before much of the stuff across the piece is one of cost, quality and time I suppose, much of the usual things you will come across, all broken down.

I sometimes think though that certain people in certain places actually then start trying to make sense of some of these things and before you know where we are we’ve gone too far and we end up analysing the backside off of stuff because as you probably know you can go too far on these measures. Find yourself coming backwards.

This is the particular area I am interested in, one of the particular areas that I’m interested in is whether

| PM:FIN | Financial bottom line |
| PM:MEA, PM:QQ | Managing to the clock for workers, quantity and numbers for all - no mention of quality |
| PM:MEA, PM:LIS | Numbers again |
| PM:POW, PM:APP, PM:SM | ECDM, Technology, behaviour, management |
| PM:PER | Appraisals, quaunts, management, surveillance, exchanges |
or not because something can be measured whether or not we should use that measure to do X, Y or Z.

There are two trains of thought on this I remember in some things that I’ve picked up on the way through ROSES PLC, there is one Senior Manager who said "If you can’t measure it how can you manage it?" and that was one view and then I know there is, I can’t remember who it said, who only ever asked one question to customers and that was "Would you recommend me to your friends?" If they said "Yes" that was a tick in the box and the guy was happy, the whole company. If they said "No" then okay, why not, find out why. That was his own measure, end of story. There are some good things on both sides in that sort of stuff and I think probably the truth lies somewhere between the two.

I’ve spoken to a number of people within ROSES PLC and even the ones who actually have, who are currently working in the say the call centre environment, there is a huge disparity in "Well we’ve got all of these but I like to manage the people."

You are absolutely right.

And in some cases it's "Well I’ve got all of these things and it tells me all sorts of things, it tells me whether or not the call was managed perfectly" whether in other words, did they get a tick in the box that said "You said sorry.” Did we get a tick in the box that said "You offered this particular service?” Did we get a tick in the box? And yet the customer could listen to that and come away when you do the customer satisfaction surveys, the customer can be extremely unhappy because the person they were speaking to just didn’t sound bothered.

Absolutely right and from a personal point of view I daresay you have the same, all sorts of people stopping you in the High Street and ringing you up and all that sort of stuff, a lot of all that depends on how I feel at that particular point in time. A lot of it feels, sometimes I could be playful shall we say and I’m thinking about exit polls on elections and

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<th>PM:POW, PM:MEA, PM:TRU, PM:MAN</th>
<th>Psychological contract, Taylorism, culture, behaviours, management psychological contract</th>
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<tr>
<td>PM:MAN ER:EM, ER:MAN</td>
<td>Management, electronic, personal, qualitative, exchange, quantitative, psychological contract</td>
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<td>My comment, but agrees. ER:MAN, PM:MAN</td>
<td>Psychological contract, quantitative and qualitative measures</td>
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stuff like that. A lot of it really and truly I find to be subjective. I don't know, it depends, in the main I presume we all suffer from the old marketing term inertia and provided the world's okay with us we are okay. If we have something that is extreme then we may go one way, may go t'other way. But I honestly do believe that I think we within ROSES PLC but I daresay it's just the same with other companies, there is obviously, I personally think there is too many in the way of quantitative measures and not enough around the qualitative.

And people measures shall we say, around "Are we giving our people what they need to do the job?" specifically. We have the, you've probably heard ROSES PLC has the customer care surveys and all that sort of stuff, various pieces of analysis done on that, we are expected to act upon them if our results are way off the mark and all that sort of stuff. But I will be quite candid, I think there is some fundamental questions that are asked in that and answered in that that should be addressed and for all sorts of reasons aren't addressed because they don't want to address them. They have obviously got their own drivers for that, one presumes we have one in there about pay for example, do we think we are paid enough in comparison to outside staff; we always get a bad result on that. Now that maybe just the nature of people saying "Well you know" that's just how it is and they feel that they should let us address that, I don't know, I don't know whether there is any truth in that.

What I do feel and I will be quite candid with you within ROSES PLC again you might have better knowledge than I Simon, is within ROSES PLC because ROSES PLC is what it is, our money for example or the way we work as individuals although compared with outside people you are not compared fairly. I have had experience with people who have left ROSES PLC and gone elsewhere or people that I have been long term friends with and if they are given a job to do to push a broom they push a broom. They don't do anything else, they don't shine the floor, they don't go and get the polish, they push a broom and they get paid a wage for doing that. With ROSES PLC we push a broom but then we are expected to polish the floor, get the polish and tell them how we smooth it.
| Simon: | So the **comparison is not completely accurate** I find, and that's just one thing on that particular subject, we won't go any further. Anyway does that help? Yes it does. It's one of the things that when you were just talking about the outside, about the different departments that you've actually worked in and you will have experienced a whole range of measures, some of them you will have seen firsthand and thought "Is this helping me to manage these people?" "Is it actually helping these people to do a better job if they feel that the most important factor is whether or not I say sorry within five seconds, whether or not I offer the alternative of can we contact you on another number?" If people start to believe that that's how they are judged as individuals in a workplace environment, because the nature of the fact we are human beings, if that is how someone is going to measure me then that's what I will do. **And yet the self same people, self same managers will make contact, call contact centre themselves and they will think somebody has said to me, there is nothing worse than ringing one and you know that someone is just going through the motions and whether or not you know it or not you know fine well that they are thinking "I've got to get onto the next customer soon."**

**Absolutely right.**

And people are aware of that and yet we all say that this is awful and "Oh God I can't stand this and I can't stand that" there is nothing worse than having to press one and then press two and then press three. I'm thinking you are telling me this and yet that is exactly what is in place and that you are telling me that the drivers to ensure that you manage your team correctly are the same ones that you almost are aware of, there is a part of you that is aware that you don't even like that when you are aware of it when you are doing something yourself. I'm finding this quite a difficult one to reconcile because there is a growing trend toward finding things "**Well if we can measure that then we can apply that and if we can apply that then maybe we can make something more productive.**"

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<th>#27:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Simon:</td>
<td>ER:MAN, ER:EQU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lengthy from me, but agrees with me!</td>
<td>PM:LIS, PM, MEA, PM:PER, ER:MO</td>
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<td>Equity, management, power, employment relationship</td>
<td>Measures</td>
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Simon: I think you are absolutely right Simon and without any forethought they will do that. My view of the world when it comes to measures and that is to get to the bottom of why things are either wrong or right. And it should be used both ways. I don’t think that we do that really and truly and as you say, people saying sorry and being measured on that, is slightly superior I find. But what should be being used is why does the person have to say sorry? What is the instigator of that person being in that situation when they have to be sorry? Take it backwards and go backwards and someone’s dropped off somewhere why has that dropped off? And so on. And it may be right the back there that someone has taken a wrong address or not taken the right product or, there’s been a skit in an aerial or some system or whatever and that’s the issue that needs to be addressed, not whether the person says sorry or not because that’s a result of what’s happened...

If you say to somebody who is not just with ROSES PLC, but if you’ve ever had call to ring somebody and they say "I’m really sorry on behalf of whoever” and you say to them "Well what are you sorry for?" and it’s "Well" and it’s almost a sort of thing "Well I don’t know, it says in my script I’ve got to say sorry." Why am I saying, I’m not really sure, I’m saying sorry on behalf of the company. For what? You are saying sorry and you don’t quite know why you are saying sorry or at this stage, because you have to say sorry within 15 seconds of the start of the call, before you know any of the details.

You are saying sorry for something that you don’t know what it is, you wouldn’t do that in a normal conversation, you wouldn’t do that if you were face to face, you wouldn’t go into somewhere and say I’m really sorry we done this, you would think “Well why are you apologising, you don’t know what you’ve done yet?” It might not even be your fault.

And invariably it won’t be that’s the trouble you see because we have our people sitting there, they do all those sorts of things and they are just as you rightly say Simon, saying sorry on behalf of the company. Which is a sad situation to be in really and truly, that they have got to feel or been told to say that. What we should be saying is "Okay we understand your problem, we know what the answer is, we know how to get round it and I can
### Simon:

**Assurance**

**#27:**

Assure you it is not going to happen again because we have taken the necessary action...

There is the word that I must admit it is one that is starting to come across, it’s this idea that we will resolve this. Now I personally I quite like that. Somebody is screaming because when you say you are going to resolve it that means that you are in a position to actually do it rather than just saying "Well we will see what we can do" you want to speak to somebody and in doing that of course it empowers your employees.

---

### #27:

That is the exact word that has been bandied around in ROSES PLC for a number of years, **empowerment**. Even now after many, many years of hearing that I’m still not sure that we’ve actually empowered our people although we are probably in a better situation that we were some ten years ago. **I still don't think we've got to that** and the trouble is that what we are finding now, what we - has anybody talked to you about scorecards?

A few people have indicated that they work on the scorecard approach to "I have my targets and they are X, Y and Z."

---

### Simon:

**#27:**

Although the **scorecards** and it's generally a management thing and they are, although the **scorecards are probably a good thing because it enables you to manage whether you are managers on a specific item and that sort of stuff**, what it actually creates as you just alluded to there, is it creates **an agenda for the individual**. And if that person really wants to achieve their **stretch target**, **we will give them their scorecard** then they have really got to **concentrate on those particular things to the exclusion maybe of some of the other things that other people have got**.

Of course the other people that are pressing on because they they've got those things in their scorecard and before you know where you are and it really does worry me to be quite honest, we are all working our own scorecard, you like to think that they were all aligned and enable each other but you can bet your life they don't. And we are all working to the same agendas and before you know where you are whereas before you may have been able to get something to a resolution because everybody wants to do the same thing people say.
"Well I'm not doing that because it's going against my scorecard."

Why should I do that? I've got my scorecard, I've got my measures.

Absolutely right.

I am going to meet my five key things for this year, I'm on target to meet them, I know what that means at the end of the year, I need to just forget about everything else and concentrate on that. So the worst possible example is the one that's taken place just last week where the North Wales Police force are now under investigation because they had, I can't remember the investigating body. Whoever investigates the police they found that last year, in October of last year they had achieved their targets for drug arrests so in October of last year they stopped arresting people for drug offences.

That's what happens. **When you think about it that is just nature because that's what we do.**

Someone says these are the five things you are going to be judged on, it's a variation on the, we can judge these things electronically and we can have them come up on my computer and it will tell me whether or not you are saying all the right things, whether your call is lasting an average of 206 seconds and whether or not it's this, this and this. But it's exactly the same, these more flexible measures via a scorecard are equally as onerous and equally as ambiguous as some of the other ones because you lose something.

Absolutely right. And on the other hand Simon again, **what I have found happened quite a lot if the people are targeted to achieve something**, whether it be call handling time or whatever it might be and as you say North Wales Police. **They achieve that target, now some people on the other hand will always not just quite make it and they say well why don't they, you just can't make it, "I know full well if I make that target this year, next year that's going to be higher or lower" depending on which way it happens to be. "I just come in just under, just over depending on what it is." And that's playing the game again.**
Drawing on that an experience from myself from 20 odd years ago, now you speak to sales reps and when I was working in administrative manager and that's the sort of feedback they, "We don't want to get, if we go over we want to literally go over just on the very last day, having really pushed really hard," but they would keep orders back, they would make it look as thought they had really worked their socks off for the last week of the entire quarter or whatever.

Prime example of that is one of head count where you've got agency people on your books that you don't have to give notice to you can quite literally sack them the night before. If you are over headcount on the 31st March, you sack a few, quote what your headcount is and you bring them back on on the 1st April. Same people because you have made your target. Now these are all the things that obviously probably everybody uses, every manager uses to do their bits and pieces but it's playing the game I suppose, the statistical game.

Of course every manager who has these indicators on his team or whatever also has probably, they probably have a scorecard system or they may well have indicators themselves that they are not even aware of.

Absolutely right.

It's been indicated to me and genuinely believe that the person who said it to me didn't believe that this was applied to them and they said "Right I have my targets, I've got this, this and this and what I do is that I provide all of this information that I have on my team and I judge my team on that. I don't have that sort of thing going on on me but I am judged on the performance of my team." And I'm thinking well if you are being judged on how you manage your team and the key indicators, the ones that you are passing up the line to your line manager, then you are being judged on exactly the same ones yourself.

Well it's got to be naïve of him to think it wasn't to be quite honest, it's got to be that and to be honest
if you're going to do that sort of stuff, salesmen, you were saying about salesmen, you have your agents out there, you have your area manager and then your whatever it is and then they all get added up and whatever. I know that the team I've just been running, their customer satisfaction scores are all added up and I get an overall one out of the whole lot. So it's for me to drive them on to get better targets if we can because then mine improve and so on and so forth.

Moving on slightly to what you started off at the very beginning about the annual roll up or appraisal system. Are you responsible for conducting appraisals?

Yes.

And how do you find that procedure?

We've got a reasonably good one I have to say in our particular team because as you heard me say we send out customer satisfaction surveys and we encourage people to put remarks down. Now I get those in on an as and when basis as projects close off and I keep those and I also keep the comments. We've got a set of criteria, capabilities as well that we actually are supposed to record against for the actual annual reporting and I ask people, because we have regular one to ones with these people on a monthly basis, for them if they have anything come in from a customer or something above and beyond what you might get on satisfaction scores to send me a copy of these, good and bad and I keep them throughout the year. At the end of the year I am then supposed to sit down and assess these people against these capabilities on not only a verbal way by capturing and regurgitating this stuff that's been sent to me but also on a measurement sort of thing. That's to enable a score, an overall score and we do these scorings now on a quarterly basis as well, but at the end of the year a score of between one and five where five is why are they still employed on ROSES PLC and one well, this is God. Now that's fine and I do mine, I do all my people, I balance it against one another, how they grew, I take into consideration the work and the comments, the perception of their customers and...
Simon: #27: my perception of them in as much what they have done in the way of quantity and quality and I give them a score.

We then have a levelling meeting where my peer, my colleagues and I and my boss and we sit down and we compare Joe and Joan and Fred with George and all that sort of stuff and we out turn on every meeting. But I would like to say that we come out, based on the criteria that we are all using which should be the same, we come out on the level playing field and a good overall sort of score for the very, very good and the good and the not so good.

Oh that I could say that.

I thought that when you said, "There's a big but coming in here."

Oh that I could say that. Because that is how it should work and to a certain extent it does work that way but because we have performance related pay, because the way that they allocate the money within ROSES PLC gets top down, when it actually gets down to my boss or should we say my boss's boss, they are allocated a pot of money which has got to satisfy all the pay awards, both annual pay awards and also bonus. Based on criteria that business is, I think it used to be all sorts of things; it's whether we achieve so and so scores as a company and all that.

But ultimately it comes down to a pot and it could come down that we've only got £1,000 between I don't know how many people is in my boss's boss division, say that there is 500 people, there is £1,000. Doesn't leave a lot does it when you come to think of it, and of course because they allocate a certain percentage to each particular mark like one you are entitled to I can't remember what it is now, say it's 20% of your annual salary maximum, if you are getting [?? 0:27:03]. Two is only 10%, three is only 5%. By the time they do the facts and the figures and that sort of stuff, what actually really does happen is "Oh we've got an awful lot of two's here...."

We can't afford twos.

We can't afford two's so unfortunately we've got to bump those people down from twos to threes.
Simon: because the figures add up. And to my mind that can’t be right. That cannot be right but that’s the way it’s done. Now again I don’t know how that, you may know more than I Simon, but I don’t know how that can...

Well it kind of sits in something somebody else said to me. They saw their job wasn’t about, I said "Generally in terms of managing the people" and he said "I’m not interested within a certain category I am only interested in..." he was relaying to me what he felt he was being asked to do and he was just to be judged on the variances. He said "There is a huge bundle in the middle that I don’t need to concern myself with."

What they are after really is a bell jar with one on the left, five on the right they want the bell jar in the middle of that of around about threes, that's what they are after and that's what the money is allocated on. What that boils down to is that you can’t have so many twos, you can’t have too many fives, it’s got to be around about three to be good. But I think a lot of people within ROSES PLC are disadvantaged by this financial level of marking when really and truly everybody in the world knows that they should probably be a two, I don't know many people that have got a one in ROSES PLC in my whole life to be quite honest and I think it is probably just as much a millstone as having a five.

But I know people that had two and at one time we used to sub categorise twos to two ones and two twos and threes to three one and three two, so a lot of people who you think and everybody would agree would probably be a two one or a two two, said "No we can’t do that" and also what is taken into consideration and must stop now is of course people that have been on the job a long time and over some many years have gained pay awards and that sort of thing are on a reasonable amount of money.

And that’s just been ruled illegal hasn’t it?

Exactly so they have got to be very careful about that now but I know for a fact that that was actually done as well "That person’s a two, we give them a two if they weren’t on X amount of money, but they are on X amount of money so we will have to
And then of course you run up against thing that the people who may have worked their socks off over the course of the entire year and they have, at your request, they have provided you with excellent feedback perhaps from their customers and everyone who says you have done a superb job, you've done X, Y and Z and they are looking and thinking "You know what? This year I have worked my socks off" and they go to you and they go through their annual appraisal thinking this is going to be absolutely superb and you tell them that they've done a good job and then you go away and you meet with the other managers and lo and behold it's "Oh God you've had loads of people do a good job this year as well." "Oh God what the hell do we do now?"

And to a certain extent Simon that is going to happen because ROSES PLC over many a year, if this was being done properly I would have no problem with that because over a period of many years ROSES PLC has been reducing from 250,000 people down to 120 and probably less now, so it is a shrinking pool and the idea of what good is would obviously rise because there is less people in the business and I have got no problem with that and that's how it should be. But it does gall me when people are disadvantaged because one they earn too much in the first place and two because we've only got a small pot to begin with.

At one time with ROSES PLC we deferred by the way with doing what they call bottom up appraisals, we did that once.

And how did you find it?

We found it at the lower level, because at that time I was a first line manager, pretty good but by the time it all added up and everything went all up there it frightened the senior managers to death. Absolutely frightened the senior managers to death and they just stopped it, didn't happen again, never happened again because I think the comments weren't good, I think the pay awards were way over the top for what they wanted so it never happened again.
Now in saying all that I understand there is not an infinite pot of money and all that sort of stuff but there has got to be a better way of doing it than we are doing it at this moment in time. What that is, I don't know.

I think that some of it is going to be driven, there are early signs and trends starting to develop to do with shifting some of the measures that traditionally would be a manager would just observe how someone is doing their job and think "Well they do a good job" but there are things coming out and things happening in software that companies are looking at now and thinking "Actually we can use that software to help us to do whatever" and in doing so it enables you to have a more tightly controlled workforce.

Now the bottom line as a company is that helps us, it helps the employee, it helps them to become more aware of what they are doing and that's why we are doing it. But it also helps us because it makes us more productive or it means that we can eliminate a position that previously was done by five people, we can now put a computer in there and only two people. And ultimately those sorts of things are started, if they can see in it, it's like your man who said if you can measure it, and I think some of those things...

I have concerns about a new piece of software that Microsoft are introducing at the end of the year, their new version of Office and it's a part of that called Groove which is where they have virtual workspaces which on the face of it is quite good for if you are working in a team and you are working simultaneously on a document this virtual workspace ensures that everyone is working on the most up to date one and you are not forever sending out emails saying "Johnny has changed this what do you all think? Joan has changed that what do you all think?" It's a case of the changes all take place and anyone can work on it. The problem with that is that of course you can see as a manager who is working on what, when they are working on it and how they are contributing.

Absolutely right and we have a system that we use for project management called Clarity where all the documents are kept up there, you book them out in essence, work on, you put them back in again and everybody can see them. Everything to do with the

Quantitative and measurement,
| Simon: | project, time, cost, quality the whole thing is all on the one system and that's the system we use Clarity for, it's a very similar sort of thing I have to say. Fundamentally I think it is very good the only trouble I find with it that you end up doing more paperwork because you've got to do the paperwork if you see what I mean. That said that's how it should be but again it's back to how ROSES PLC work, instead of just having one project to do and finishing it go onto the next one, we are all running with fours, fives... And of course a thing from a managers point of view is of course you can see who is contributing and you can see I suppose the argument would be from a business context, if you can see that Johnny is working on the technical documents and he is not contributing to other documents, then what you do is target Johnny towards some of the more technical projects and you target him towards things that are seen as he is more able to contribute. But of course the down side to that is that some companies might say "Well why aren't you contributing to these other ones? You are part of that team you should be doing that" But of course as you no doubt know there are people within teams who maybe don't contribute in that tangible way, there are people who contribute in a very different way and it is not something that you can put your finger on.

The PM:QQ, PM:DAT, PM:MAN, ER:MAN, ER:ER, PM:MEA, PM:MEAS

#27: | I think you are right but then a good manager of a team would utilise the person's skills in appropriate ways. I think the trick of a good manager is someone who gets the best out of their team with the skills that they've got and the restrictions on those skills...

Regardless of what sort of indicators that...

The PM:MEAS

Simon: | Absolutely right. Some of the best teams I've had are people that to be quite honest, that have not been measured in an intensive way but more of an extensive way but they know what their common goal is they know how they should get there and they just get there.

And if someone was actually to analyse in great

The PM:MEAS

#27: | How managers manage

The PM:MEAS

Measurement and management
detail one particular part of that team, they would probably turn round and say "You know what, I'm not quite sure what they did but when you take everyone together it works, it's in the same way if we could all pick the same football team we probably wouldn't come up with the same football team, but there are people in every team and you think "What on earth do they do?" and it may well be just down to the leadership qualities and that may well be that the manager who knows his team, who knows that Johnny might not be the best on the non technical stuff but I need him there because he works well with Joan who does the other bits and pieces and they work together well to help Bobby do something and if I keep those three together they all work together as part of the team.

You are right Simon and you know, **this role I do and have done for many years now in project management, people say to me "What does a project management do?" and I might say "I am the glue, I just glue everything together", that's what I do as a project manager because project managers do just glue it altogether.** I can't be a subject matter expert on anything because I haven't got enough knowledge of that but I connect... That's why we have specialists and experts.

But **I glue those experts together** and hopefully I end up with a successful project team to deliver what is required. I find it a miracle to be quite honest but there we are.

For your project do you solve, is it the Clarity thing or do you use Project at all, Microsoft Project?

I am a Microsoft Project person and I have to say that I feel very comfortable in using that. If I got to some of the proprietary, some of the outside customers, providers of project management training a lot of them don't like Microsoft Project... No, there is Prince is quite popular one.

Yes and other bits and pieces. I am a Microsoft Project person, our Clarity system, ironically when you actually got to what they call the workbench part of it which is where the plans are really and
truly it's Microsoft Project is a different name, they've stolen all of it really and truly. So I haven't got a problem with that.

Microsoft were quite, I worked for a company not that long ago and they essentially they went to Microsoft, paid an inordinate sum of money for Microsoft to essentially provide them with what looked like a customised way of doing things. But essentially, beneath it all it was a variation, I think it was an Access Database so that literally once you got beyond what was the initial user interface, behind it all was a very, very sophisticated database that Microsoft designed specifically for this company but essentially the people who were administrating it said "It's an Access database" but there is no way you would look at that and think that was what it was. That's part and parcel of what Microsoft do to make it look completely different for everybody.

Absolutely and that's what makes them a successful company you see.

Like you I am a big fan of Microsoft, I think possibly on this Groove thing, I think that it's a useful tool and the new version of Office, some of the new things look amazing but this new tool, I think they have jumped on the bandwagon of these blogs and wikis perhaps a bit too soon, but it remains to be seen. It may well be that a lot of companies find it incredibly useful because team working is seen as, it's very fashionable. Lets everybody work in teams. And maybe it will prove to be useful but I have concerns that some companies might look at it and just take from it in the same way that they do with things like the internet browsing where we can see exactly what someone has done and who is spending four hours on the internet and what have you. There is scope there for it to be used in a completely different way to the way it is intended.

Well anything can be abused I suppose, really and truly.

Are you still okay for time?

Soon actually. About another ten minutes would be good.
| Simon: | Okay I will try and get through some of these other areas. You use Clarity obviously is that part of the intranet? |
| #27: | Yes it is. |
| Simon: | And do you use other parts of the intranet for anything or is it just a case "I use Clarity, that's within that, that's it." |
| #27: | No there is all sorts of things, ROSES PLC obviously being the purveyor of Broadband and internet and all that sort of stuff, we use lots of stuff on their live link, we use where we have lots of stuff on that and obviously we use the proprietary stuff like Net Meeting, [?? 0:42:07] meeting, all that sort of stuff because it is all intranet based. We try to more and more now instead of develop systems that are stand alone systems we try and have web based stuff. Various of those that we try and work through projects or use, all sorts of bases and standing data bases and all that sort of stuff… |
| Simon: | Do you find, in terms of day to day you actually use it quite a lot for a whole range of things. |
| #27: | Absolutely right. If I was to be honest I do use the internet but to be perfectly frank I use the internet for my own personal use, it's the intranet that I use almost daily. |
| Simon: | In terms of the communication is your team a fairly disparate team, spread around…? |
| #27: | All over the country. |
| Simon: | So the main forms of communication for you within that team are…? |
| #27: | **Telephone** wherever possible. **Email obviously, we've got instant messenger as well which I use a lot.** We don't use other things than that but that's about it really. |
| Simon: | Are you a Blackberry user? |
| #27: | **I don't use a Blackberry no. I've not been given** |
Simon: one and I don't want one to be quite honest with you.

In terms of email are you a fan of it or do you feel it's over used, under used?

Personally I think it is the route of a lot of people going off with the collie wobbles and I've had it happen. A number of times people were either on leave, whether it be annual leave or sick leave and Saturday night, Sunday morning comes around and they start thinking "Oh dear I've got to go work on Monday." And it's not the fact that they've got to go to work on Monday they know full well, even though they may have put things like out of office and say I'm not in and please ring these people but they are going to turn up to between four and six hundred emails. And that's bloody daunting when you get into work and you've got to deal with those.

Now again if you are a strong minded sort of person you will allocate two days to deal with that before you start kicking anything off. But they have still got to be addressed messages have got to be dealt with and I do think they do affect people adversely, have done.

I think it's becoming all too easy now with email to, whereas before you used fax machines and you sent a fax to maybe one or two people because they were the key people that had the input to it. It is so easy now just to send stuff off, and I do it, I have to say I do it myself. When a piece of information comes to me and I think to myself "Does the team need to know it or just individuals, bugger it I will send it to the whole team and then they've got it." I just crash it out. Now some people say "That's got nothing to do with me" so all I'm doing is bunging up their email inbox.

On the other hand I know people who have got round that and they've put a few rules in and said "Don't put anything on to me that's copied to me" which is fine but all of a sudden something they should be reading ain't there.

Where they've put in a rule themselves that says unless it is directly to me put it in this separate folder marked miscellaneous. It's only if it is to me that it actually goes in and the worst case I've ever been aware of is someone who received regularly around a thousand emails a day.
Simon: Christ almighty.

And that was through her PA, now 90% of them she literally, she was head of research for a large company and it was head of research worldwide and literally she got an email that said the progress they'd made on this particular thing on this day because of things to do with that had to be tracked in case there was patents put in place or what have you. She said "Literally most of them I open and then go close and the rule says put it off into this folder and I only need to read maybe the first line." But she said that was four, five hours our of her day gone. Every single day gone.

That's right and the thing is that then she needs to make those four hours up probably, so all of a sudden she's not doing an eight hour day or a seven and a half hour day or whatever it might be...

Simon: This was long enough ago that pocket PCs and PDAs were just coming out and she actually, she probably now is a Blackberry user but she would take her PDA home and when she got home she would draft emails and then she would connect it to her laptop and then send them all off and she would be working into the evening.

Exactly right and then her work life balance then starts being affected adversely and this does happen and this is why it is and this is why I think we get more and more people going off with stress related problems now than we ever did. I would really attribute it directly to email I have to say. I try not to bung up people's email in tray but I am sure I do. I try and when I come in in the morning I try and work through in a methodical fashion through emails and get rid of them as best I can, ones that I don't even know and all that sort of stuff and I try not to have sort of things hanging around too long on email I have to say. But of course when you are off you can’t keep on top of it so it does get bunged up so yes I am both a fan of email and I'm not.

Simon: It's a good tool if used judiciously and that people are aware of the etiquette and the rules of when you should and shouldn't use email, spending 20
minutes, half an hour constructing a really complicated email and then having everybody that you sent it to ring you to say "I'm not quite sure what you meant by that?" and then you say "It's to do with this" and they go "Oh right, okay I didn't quite get that from the email".

I try and keep my emails to at best a dozen lines and then people will read that, a dozen lines fills the screen and that's it, no more because people do not read it. I know I don't read it, I start speed reading it, scanning it whatever you want to call it but then the lines start mixing each other, I can't be bothered to read this.

And you lose interest. If it's an attachment, and in attachment form you have to look at that, print it out and look at that whenever rather than me reading something and then thinking "I'm going to have to ring them because I'm not sure what they mean" and you ring them and you spend 30 seconds on there and you think it would have been easier, instead of you spending 20 minutes, to ring the five people and spend a minute on the phone to each of them and say "By the way I've sent you a copy of the documents."

But as you say some people, I think it's still, it's only ten years old, it's still maturing. We're very good at speaking to people and communicating in that way but email is something that we are still learning about I think.

I think you're right. I'm a much bigger fan I have to say of instant messenger because, especially when I am on calls and stuff like that. If I need some instant information I can just IM people "What's this filler?" and of course it is, it is just a sentence, tell me about so and so. Is this happening? What about that? And they say "Good, Bad" and the same sort of response comes back, it's a text type stuff you are getting through and you can get that information instantly to hand and of course...

And people do do it instantly.

Absolutely right, and of course we don't travel now as much as we used to and you will probably be getting on to this, we don't travel as much as we used to, we do a lot more in the way of conference
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<th>CS:EMW</th>
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<td><strong>calls, we do a lot more in the way of live meetings, net meetings</strong> and that sort of stuff and that's good. Periodically we meet up and see people face to face but you <strong>don't need to do it all the time and we use instant messenger to then collaborate</strong> whilst that's all happening and sometimes in a positive way, sometimes &quot;That person's talking rubbish&quot; but it's a good tool and you can still interact [?? 0:50:44] and that's good and as I say I am a <strong>great fan of IM to be quite honest</strong>.</td>
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<td>Simon:</td>
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<td>Can I thank you very much I realise that you are running up against whatever you have to do and unfortunately I have another interview to do as well. Can I thank you very much indeed for your time, it's been most informative. Would you have a problem if I tried to arrange something to discuss when I've done some analysis, maybe spend fifteen minutes?</td>
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<td>#27:</td>
<td>No that would be great to see some follow up on it.</td>
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<td>Simon:</td>
<td>THAT would be great. Thank you very much indeed for your help. I will stick a note to contact you maybe in a couple of week's time and we will try and arrange something.</td>
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<td>#27:</td>
<td>Yes, great.</td>
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<td>Simon:</td>
<td>That's brilliant, thank you very much indeed.</td>
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<td>#27:</td>
<td>Cheers Simon.</td>
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<td>Simon:</td>
<td>Thanks a lot.</td>
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<tr>
<td>#27:</td>
<td>Bye.</td>
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| Simon: | Bye.