Taiwan’s democratic progressive party and its mainland china policy

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Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party and Its Mainland China Policy

By

Hung-Chin Wei

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the University of Durham

Department of Politics

1999
Abstract

Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party and Its Mainland China Policy

Hung-chin Wei

Taiwan has successfully changed its political system from dictatorship into a democracy since the end of 1980s. Some people do not like ‘Taiwan’s democracy’ — some candidates get elected by bribery in election, parliamentary fighting, but the majority of the Taiwanese people really enjoy their freedom in their homeland. They do know, at least, they have the right to oppose the government, no one would be shot by the national military force in a demonstration.

The political systems are totally different between Taiwan and Mainland China, one is democracy, another is communism. Even the majority of the Taiwanese people are Chinese in ethnic origin, but their life experience are different over the past 50 years, it is difficult for any side to persuade the other side which one is better.

Some Chinese Taiwanese people believe that they can have a better life, if their homeland—Taiwan can be really independent in the international community. Taiwan’s political opposition built Taiwan’s first opposition party—Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 13 years ago, and with the dream of establishing a new independent country on Taiwan.

The establishment of the DPP is the result of the political opposition movement in Taiwan. Most of the members of the DPP have a strong Taiwanese identity, which is very different from the ruling KMT in Taiwan and the ruling CCP in China. The DPP gains more influence in Taiwan, the uncertainty across the Taiwan Straits increase at the same time. The DPP waited and saw between being the ruling party and establishing an independent country on Taiwan, finally it chose to complete the political aim of replacing the position of the KMT at present.

The purpose of the study is to assess the DPP’s policy-making in its Mainland China
policy. I try to give a full picture of the policy-making process in the party. The most important factor in the formulation of the mainland China policy is the relationship between the factions within the DPP, therefore, I adopt the historical and document review approach on doing this study, and describe how the interaction between the factions worked and how they made the decisions on the policies?

I found that the DPP will insist on its ‘one Taiwan, one China’ policy before becoming the ruling party in Taiwan. However, the DPP’s insistence on the ‘one China, one Taiwan’ policy could bring conflicts across the Taiwan Straits and obstruct the possibility of replacing the ruling KMT’s position. Hence the DPP tried to explain again the party’s Taiwan independence platform, and to ‘purify’ the party’s ideology in order to achieve its present political aim.

Because the cross-Straits relationship is still developing, the DPP’s mainland policy would be affected by various factors across the Taiwan Straits. There is no final text of the DPP’s mainland China policy at present. Therefore, I predict the future development of its China policy could tend in two ways. Firstly, if the cross-Straits exchanges increase, and Beijing reduces its hostility, the DPP’s stand of ‘one Taiwan, one China’ will become more flexible, and it would keep on developing a more perfect China policy. Secondly, if the cross-Straits exchanges decrease, and Beijing increases the force of threatening to Taipei, the DPP’s stand of ‘one Taiwan, one China’ policy will be more radical, even though it would not turn its back on the business affairs.

At the end of this work, I suggest the DPP rethink its insistence on a Taiwanese independence position, this could not break Taiwan’s isolation in international community, but could endanger Taiwan’s security. As the factional fight has reduced the force of the DPP, to condense the powers of the party would be an important issue for the DPP.
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Declaration

This thesis results entirely from my own work and has not been previously offered in candidature for any other degree or diploma.
Acknowledgements

I wish to extend my thanks to my supervisor, Professor David Armstrong, whose comments and supervision provided the basis for my study.

And many thanks to Dr. Christopher Hughes, his suggestions on this study have given me a more clear idea to continue the work.

As a non-English speaker, writing a thesis in English has been a very difficult job for me in the process of doing this study. I am especially indebted to the friends, Andrew Trigger, Margaret, Lily Chen, Hsing-yi Chang, without their helps on proof-reading – it is almost impossible for me to finish the work.

Finally, I would like to give special thanks to my financee, Su-chen Hung, who is still on doing her PhD course in Durham. Her supports both on the ways of spirit and daily life have been encouraging me to pursue a better tomorrow, that’s why I could and did complete the work before our wedding, which will be taken place before the millennium coming.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARATS</td>
<td>Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTSIM</td>
<td>Committee of Taiwan's Sovereignty Independent Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAPA</td>
<td>Formosan Association for Public Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang; Nationalist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>People's Republic of Mongolia</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
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<td>SEF</td>
<td>The Straits Exchange Foundation</td>
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<td>TAIP</td>
<td>Taiwan Independence Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
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Introduction

On 28th September 1986, 138 Tangwai (1) personalities assembled in the partly government-owned Grand Hotel in Taipei and established the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and the government, although declaring this move ‘illegal’, did not take any action.

With this event a new stage, characterised by fully-fledged development of competitive political life, began in Taiwan. (2)

In fact, in the process of the democratic transformation of Taiwan from authoritarian regime to democratic regime in the mid-1980s, (3) the barriers to such development in Taiwan were gradually dismantled.

The foundation of the DPP is the result of the political opposition movement since the 1950s, and also the system of one dominant party was challenged for the first time in Taiwan’s political history. It put pressure on the ruling KMT, pushing the old authoritarian regime to speed up its political reform in Taiwan. (4) Just a little bit earlier than the DPP’s establishment, on the date of 15th July, 1986, the ROC government announced lifting the Emergency Decree, which had been implemented for 37 years from 20th May, 1949.

Later, on 6th December of the same year, National Assembly and Legislative elections took place in Taiwan.

Although, the DPP was ‘illegal’ de jure (The ban on the formation of new political parties will lift later.), people in Taiwan finally could enjoy their rights, which were originally guaranteed by the constitution from that time on. (5) On 21st December 1991, the first direct election for all delegates of the National Assembly by Taiwanese people was held. (6) After the mass retirement of senior Legislators, the election for the Second Legislative Yuan was held in 1992. Since then, the Legislative Yuan has been the most important venue for political wrestling. (7) The Taiwan Provincial governor and mayors for Taipei and Kaohsiung cities have been elected by the people directly from the end of 1994. Political and social developments of Taiwan have moved in the direction of a
pluralistic society. (8) Furthermore, the first-ever popular election for the president in the history of Taiwan was held on 23 March 1996, further advancing the idea of popular sovereignty in Taiwan.

At the same time, the relationship between the two sides of Taiwan Straits started changing. After a separation of 40 years, the late President Chiang Ching-kuo decided to allow citizens to visit their relatives in Mainland China. This policy was officially implemented on 2nd November 1987. The lifting of the ban on visit to the mainland promoted a wave of interest in, and contact with, Mainland China which was known in Taiwan as the ‘mainland craze’. Over a period of 12 years, non-political exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland in the economic and cultural spheres have brought about the closest relations since 100 years ago when Taiwan was separated from the mainland. (9) Taipei’s policy of opening towards the mainland has been described by Peter R. Moody, Jr. as ‘a shrewd double-edged political manoeuvre’. It not only catered to Beijing’s long term needs, but also, through the ‘mainland craze’, put pressure on the DPP and its policy of advocating of Taiwanese independence. Although, the issue of unification versus independence was not solved by the policy of opening, it was the first time Taiwan really faced the mainland problem. (10) However, after Chiang Ching-kuo died on 13th January 1988, vice-president Lee Teng-hui completed the remainder of Chiang’s term in accordance with the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution. Taipei’s Mainland policy started changing.

The ‘mainland craze’ quick spread to the economic field. The mainland’s vast market and low costs have a powerful attraction for investment by Taiwanese enterprises. The ROC government has expressed concern about the growing tide of investment in the Chinese mainland, because the investments entail enormous risk. The investment climate there has deteriorated due to inflation, wage rises, insufficient legal guarantees, and political instability. These factors are detrimental to the development of Taiwan’s economy and Taiwan’s relationship with Mainland China. In 1990, rumours emerged that the government in Taiwan would take steps to dampen the ‘mainland craze’. (11) Later, on 10th January 1994, Premier Lien Chan launched a Southward Investment Strategy, which encourages capital investment in Southern Asia. Then two trips by President Lee Teng-hui and Premier Lien to Southeast Asian countries in 1994 led to the signing of bilateral trade packs with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. (12) Faced with changes in the international situation and the political and economic
situations of Mainland China and Taiwan, the ROC government finally introduced a new guideline for its policy towards Mainland China, the so-called ‘Operating Great Taiwan, Rebuild New China’ policy. It stressed that the ROC government wished to adopt a practical and realistic stance to cross-Straits relations. (13) Later, at the end of 1996, a consensus was reached between the Kuomintang (KMT; Nationalist party), DPP and New Party (NP) that 'The ROC has been a sovereign state since 1912. Following the establishment of the Chinese communist regime in 1949, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits became two equal entities.' (14) It is very clear that the ROC government seeks equal status to the People Republic of China (PRC) government.

I-1. National identity in Taiwan

In the process of Taiwan’s political development, the problem of the national identity within Taiwan’s society began to emerge. According to Wei Sun-hung, ‘In the process of Taiwan democratisation, discussion of the issue of national identity had been prohibited, but now finally have ‘legal space’ within Taiwan’s society. ‘Taiwanese independence’ and ‘Chinese reunification’ have equal status in Taiwan.’ (15) With democratisation in Taiwan, the KMT’s one-party-dominant system was broken. The ruling KMT could not insist on its ‘one China’ policy under which it claimed to be the sole legal government of China. Advocating ‘one China, two political entities’ resulted in the issue of ‘unification or independence’ becoming a matter of concern in Taiwanese society. Conflicts on over this issue arose between the advocates of unification and the advocates of independence.

There are four main ethnic groups in Taiwan – Fukiense, Hakka, Mainlander, and Aboriginal people. They have different mother tongues, but except the aboriginal people, the ancestors of Fukiense, Hakka, and Mainlander were all came from Mainland China at different time.

Chinese settlement in Taiwan dates back as far as the 12th century A.D, but large-scale immigration did not begin until the 17th century during the period of Dutch administration. While the Dutch were colonising Taiwan, China was going through a period of strife. The struggle between the Chinese affecting many people. Consequently, thousands of people, especially from the coastal provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung, began to migrate across the Taiwan Straits to Taiwan. They found the soil of Taiwan
much richer than that of the mainland, and corps grew twice as abundantly. During the twenty years from 1624 to 1644, about 100,000 Chinese people immigrated to Taiwan. (16) They were the ancestors of the Fukiense, Hakka ethnic groups in Taiwan. Normally, in Taiwan, these two groups of people are called the ‘Taiwanese’ whose political attitudes are usually close to keep distance from the Communist China, even some of them might not support to build an independent country in Taiwan, but the majority at least tend maintain the present situation of Taiwan.

Another greater Chinese immigration took place in 1949, when the beaten KMT moved to Taiwan. In 1946, Taiwan’s population was 6.02 million. The population further increased to 7.39 million in 1949, due to the influx of migrants from the Chinese mainland. (17) This part of new immigrants are called the ‘mainlanders’ whose political attitudes are usually close to unite with the Chinese mainland, most of them support the Republic of China, but not the People’s Republic of China. As for some younger generation, their attitude has changed a lot, which is very different from their parents and the older generation.

Political conflict about the issues of unification with China or building an independent country is a serious problem in Taiwan. Different ethnic groups usually have different political attitudes, but most of the time, this is just a stereotype. This problem is usually related to the ethnic problem. About 80% of the 22 million population of Taiwan is a ‘Taiwanese’ group. The aboriginal people are under 365,000 people. Therefore, the allocation of the political resource is not so fair. Political conflicts take place through the issues of ‘unification’ or ‘independence’ which make the problem of national identity more complex.

In this study, for avoiding confusion, I adopt ‘Taiwanese’ to address the citizens of the Republic of China on Taiwan; and adopt ‘Chinese’ to address the citizens of the People’s Republic of China.

I-2. The KMT in Taiwan

Although Taiwan experienced impressive economic growth under the KMT, it saw negligible political change until the mid-1980s. Under President Chiang Kai-shek, the political aim of the ROC was to recover Mainland China, and the ROC government
structure was one for the whole China. Any democratic political demands were met with jail sentences of more than 10 years or even capital punishment.

From 1948 to 1950, the beaten KMT brought its 2 million troops to Taiwan. At that time, Taiwan had a population of 6 million. Taiwan's effective political power has thus far resided with mainlander KMT leaders. This has caused conflicts between the native Taiwanese and the mainlanders (people of mainland Chinese birth or descent), although the KMT made a major effort to integrate Taiwanese into the party. However, even by the late 1970s the party elite remained dominated by mainlanders. The Taiwan Garrison Command also kept a tight grip on society and the military retained an important role against political dissidents.

To some Taiwanese, the constitutional system appeared to be merely a convenient attempt to legitimise and disguise a mainlander dictatorship. This was emphasised by mainlander control of the army and the intelligence agencies.

Due to the fact that mainland-born Chinese have controlled the political institutions in Taiwan, and for historical reasons such as the ‘228 Incident’ of 1947 (18), some native Taiwanese and some of the ruling mainlanders harboured mutual suspicion over the ROC’s policy towards the mainland. The native Taiwanese wondered if Taiwan would be sold out if the rulers abandoned their present stubborn stance and made a deal with the Communist (19) motivated by nostalgia and the consciousness of China as a great nation. Antonio Chiang, publisher of the well-known magazine, The Journalist, in Taipei, pointed out that Taiwanese strongly disliked the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) proposals because they only appeal to the KMT. They talked party to party, and regarded unification as only a ‘family affair’ between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). (20) Furthermore, some of the Taiwanese, who comprise more than 80% of Taiwan’s 21 million population, consider that the ROC government ‘is not truly representative of their wishes and interests, especially in its undue emphasis on Taiwan’s unification, which they see as a ploy by the KMT to monopolise political power _. Nor are they enthusiastic about China’s unification, which they see as an impossible mission under KMT auspices, and a catastrophe if brought about by the Communists’. (21)

The Taiwanese people trusts neither the KMT nor the CCP. As the main political
opposition party in Taiwan, the DPP's view about the future of Taiwan is quite different from the KMT's and the CCP's 'one China' policy. In the DPP's view, the nature of the 'Taiwan problem' is that: 'Taiwan is composed of 21 million residents. It has a totally independent international character, but it has not had the respect from the international society and the international status it deserves.' (22) The DPP not only assails the CCP's insistence that 'Taiwan is a part of China' and rejects its 'one country, two systems' policy (23) as 'imperialist tyranny', but also attacks the KMT's assertion that 'There is no Taiwan problem, but only a China problem' as 'flying in the face of the facts', and the KMT's notion of 'one China, two political entities' as 'deceiving itself and others as well'. (24)

The DPP's view on the 'Taiwan problem' is that Taiwan is an independent country. Therefore it proposes 'one China, one Taiwan' as the framework of its Mainland China policy. The DPP's view is that the Nanking ROC government was overthrown by the CCP in 1949. Since the establishment of the PRC, the PRC has been the sole legal Chinese sovereign government. (25) Furthermore, the PRC took over China's seat at the United Nations (UN) in 1971. That means the 'China problem' has been resolved. According to international law, the PRC succeeds the ROC and becomes the sole legal government of China. (26) But the DPP does not accept that the PRC has sovereignty over Taiwan. The DPP considers that there is no relevant document that has defined the international status of Taiwan, and the PRC also has not ruled Taiwan. Principles of international law, such as 'effective jurisdiction', and democratic principle, such as 'self-determination' and the notion that 'a modern government's sovereignty derives from popular approval' have become the paradigm of the definition of national sovereignty. Therefore, legitimate sovereignty over Taiwan is vested in neither the PRC nor to the ROC. (27)

As described above, the DPP considers that no 'China problem' exists across the Taiwan Straits. According to the principle of self-determination, the DPP also stresses that 'both China problems and Taiwanese problems exist; but Taiwan's problems should be solved by Taiwan, and China's by China.' (28) Therefore, the DPP proclaims that the two sides of the Taiwan Straits should define the cross-Straits relations within the framework of 'Taiwan is Taiwan, China is China' (One China, one Taiwan).

It unilaterally considers that a 'one China, one Taiwan' policy would help both sides to
build ‘a framework of mutual, equal, and stable relations’. (29) To sum up, the DPP’s position is that it considers ‘one China, one Taiwan’ the only and best principle on which to base cross-Straits relations.

I-3. The research method

The cross-Straits relationship is still developing, the DPP’s mainland policy would be affected by various factors across the Taiwan Straits. There is still no final text of the DPP’s mainland China policy at present. The future development of its China policy could tend in two ways. Firstly, if the cross-Straits exchanges increase, and Beijing reduces its hostility, the DPP’s stand of ‘one Taiwan, one China’ will become more flexible, and it would keep on developing a more perfect China policy. Secondly, if the cross-Straits exchanges decrease, and Beijing increases the force of threatening to Taipei, the DPP’s stand of ‘one Taiwan, one China’ policy will be more radical, even though it would not turn its back on the business affairs.

The approach I adopt is a historical and documentary review. Since the DPP is the continuation of the Tangwai political opposition movement, in order to give a full picture of Taiwan’s democratisation, I consider a time period from the 1950s, when the KMT government moved to Taiwan, to the present. After the Chinese Nationalist government move to Taiwan in 1949, the main themes of politics inside Taiwan were closely related to the cross-Straits situation. I divide the political history across the Taiwan Straits into the following four stages:

1). The period of intermittent fighting in the Taiwan Straits (1950 – 1963): According to the KMT’s definition, the ROC on Taiwan is a continuation of the regime which ruled China before 1949. The ROC was forced by the CCP advances to relocate to the island Taiwan, located in the Western Pacific off the eastern coast of Asia. For the KMT and the CCP, the civil war from 1945 to 1949 has never finished. Hence the KMT’s political aim was to recover the mainland’ in the early days. (30) At the same time, the CCP's political aim to Taiwan was to ‘wash Taiwan in blood’ and ‘liberate Taiwan by force’. (31) The democracy was suspended under the ‘Temporary Provision Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion’ (1948). In this period of time, it was almost impossible for people in Taiwan to express political views in opposition to the government. For example, a group of intellectuals and politicians of
mainland origins together with politicians of Taiwanese descent prepared to establish a new political opposition party, the Chinese Democratic Party, in 1960. However, after leading members of this initiative were arrested in September 1960 on charges of not reporting Communist agents, the whole project was abandoned. (32)

2). The cross-Straits cold war period (1964 – 1971): During this period, the two sides across the Taiwan Straits shifted their struggle from actual fighting to the arenas of diplomacy and economy in the international community. Each side tried hard to blockade the other side's avenues to the outside world. A good example is the contest for membership and the right to represent China in the UN during the 1950s and 1960s. It was a war with bullets between the sides. (33) Within Taiwan, the KMT maintained its system of authoritarian rule. But the content and the framework of the ‘one China, one Taiwan’ policy began to take shape among opposition groups. In September 1964, Peng Ming-min, the former head of the Politics Department of Taiwan University, wrote the ‘Taiwanese People’s Self-Help Movement Declaration’. This declaration can be seen as the first document which proclaims ‘one China, one Taiwan’ in Taiwan. Peng was arrested and sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment. But President Chiang Kai-shek granted him an amnesty. Later he escaped, and went into exile for over 20 years till 1991.

3). The period of detente between the Taiwan Straits (1971 – 1986): In October 1971, the PRC took over China’s seat at the UN, and forced the ROC out. In 1970s, the main theme of Beijing’s Taiwan policy was ‘peaceful reunification of Taiwan’. The proposal of ‘one country, two systems’ was put forward during this period. Taipei also quietly modified its declared policy toward Beijing from ‘counterattack and recovering the mainland’, first, in the 1960 and 1970s, to ‘using thirty percent military force and seventy percent political force’ to recover the mainland, and finally in 1980s to ‘reunification of China under the Three Principles of People’. In Taiwan, the Taiwan Christian Presbyterian Church put forward its ‘Statement and Suggestion of National Affairs’ on 29th December 1971. In this statement it stressed that ‘human rights are given by God, and the people have the right to decide their future’. And it also opposed ‘Taiwan’s unification with China’ or ‘Direct negotiation between Taipei and Beijing’. (34) That statement was the first in Taiwan to express something close to demand for self-determination for the island. (35) Later, in August 1977, the Presbyterian Church put forward another statement: a ‘Declaration on Human Rights'.

8
It proclaimed that ‘Taiwan is a new and independent nation’, (36) and tried to prove anthropological and cultural differences between Taiwan and Mainland China.

4). The period of ‘two political entities’ (since 1986): At the end of the 1980s, the KMT launched political reform in Taiwan. Opposition figures formed the DPP in 1986. On the one hand, President Lee Teng-hui’s Taiwanisation policy has encouraged the Taiwanese people to pursue a ‘better’ and more ‘reasonable’ international status for Taiwan. Calls for Taiwan’s independence have become louder. The ROC’s pragmatic diplomacy also challenges the PRC’s ‘one China’ policy. Beijing has never renounced the right to use military force to achieve the aim of unification. On the other hand, in Mainland China, Beijing also started its policy of economic reform. For its economic development, the PRC has to keep the mainland open to the outside world’s capital and technology. Economic contacts began between Taiwan and the mainland. Taiwan, like the Western countries, can provide capital and other wherewithal to the mainland. Some scholars have argued that as long as the PRC concentrates on economic construction, the likelihood of it resorting to military means to resolve the China issue in the short term is reduced because the PRC ‘need a peaceful environment’ to proceed with its modernisation program. (37) But, as Beijing’s launching of military exercises to threaten Taiwan’s presidential election in 1996 indicates, the possibility of the cross-Straits military conflicts has not disappeared. In this period, many events have occurred. For example, in 1991 the DPP formulated its ‘Taiwan independence platform’, which advocated establishing an independent ‘Republic of Taiwan’. Speaking about Taiwanese independence ceased to be a taboo. In the same year, Taipei sent a non-official delegation to the PRC to meet Beijing leaders, the first of its kind since 1949. Later, Taipei set up The Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), and Beijing established the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), to function as intermediary organisations. The two authorised intermediary organisations held two rounds of talks in 1993 and 1995. (38) These events show that the cross-Straits situation has become more complex.

This brief review of the political situation across the Taiwan Straits above provides the background to the formation of Taiwan’s political opposition movement. Because Taiwan’s political opposition movements have traditionally been based on alliances of local political forces, co-operation and struggle between the factions of the DPP have been the main factor affecting the formulation of party policy. Introducing the history of
the transformation of the factions from the Tangwai era to the DPP will also assist in a more clear understanding of the DPP. The sources of materials I use in the research include: 1) official DPP documents such as the DPP Party Platform, records of meetings such as Central Standing Committee, National Congress, and the other important conferences. Some KMT documents are also used. 2) Newspaper and magazine reports from Taiwan, China, and overseas. Press reports can give a clear picture of important events relevant to the research, and can reflect the public opinion at the time the events took place. 3) Interviews with party leaders. These reveal information not found in press reports. 4) Information on election results. These present the real political situation in Taiwan, and enable the policies of the parties to be examined. 5) Public opinion surveys, which can reflect the views of Taiwanese society. 6) Other research on the DPP.

I-4. Purpose of this research

As outlined above, the nature of the cross-Straits relations began to change in the 1980s. The relationship across the Taiwan Straits has changed from one characterised by hostility to one characterised by rapprochement. The means to resolve this issue have also changed from declared intentions to use force to actual peaceful means, and the approach to solving this issue involves not only the notion of unification but also that of independence, as the question of whether Taiwan should unify with the mainland or declare its independence has become a topic of intense debate within the ROC.

As the most important opposition party, the DPP could take the place of the KMT as the ruling party in Taiwan if it wins the support of the majority of Taiwan's residents in national elections in this democratic country. However, Taiwan faces a very special situation in that its international status is unclear. The ruling KMT advocates a 'one country, two political entities' policy, insisting upon seeking an equal status to China; Beijing advocates a 'one country, two systems' policy, insisting that Taiwan is a part of the PRC, The DPP advocates a 'one China, one Taiwan' policy, insisting that Taiwan's sovereignty is independent.

For the DPP, how to build a balance within the triangle relations between the three policies of 'one country, two political entities', 'one country, two systems', and 'one China, one Taiwan' will be the most important issue on its road to becoming the ruling party in Taiwan. Therefore the main aim of the research is to analyse the formulation of
the DPP’s Mainland China policy, and to attempt to predict the possible direction of its policy of the future.

In fact, the DPP has started to ‘soften’ its theme of Taiwanese independence. The Taiwanese independence principle does make it difficult for the DPP to take the place of the KMT. People in Taiwan worry that Taiwan’s independence would provoke a Chinese military attack. Indeed, the CCP’s leaders have stressed more than once that they will not renounce the use of force to achieve unification. (39) According to speeches by CCP leaders and other related materials published since 1970s, Beijing has set five circumstances under which force would be used: (40)

1) An indefinite refusal by Taiwan to enter into negotiations;

2) An attempt by the Soviet Union or other countries to interfere in Taiwan’s affairs and the resolution of the China issue;

3) An attempt by Taipei to develop nuclear weapons;

4) Proclamation of Taiwan as an independent nation;

5) Revolution and chaos occurring within Taiwan.

Many of the DPP’s leaders have said that Taiwan does not need to announce the establishment of a new independent country, because it is already an independent country. (41) The DPP’s adjustment of the status of Taiwan’s independence in its platform has caused splits within the party. For example, radical advocators of Taiwan’s independence formed the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP) in October 1996. But it would helpful to the DPP to introduce a more flexible Mainland China policy to the electorate.

I-5. Arrangement of chapters

Introduction: The main purpose of this part is to provide background to the political situation in Taiwan, as the overall basis for the research. I argue that in order to improve its prospects of becoming the ruling party in Taiwan, the DPP will adjust its stance on Taiwanese independence. Its Mainland China policy will become more flexible to match
cross-Straits political reality.

Chapter 1: ‘The Rise of the DPP’. I introduce the foundation of the DPP and a brief history of the political opposition movement. The main purpose of this chapter is to show the DPP’s advocacy of independence for Taiwan is its defining feature. But the stance on independence also limits its growth.

Chapter 2: ‘Factions within the DPP’. I introduce the factions in the party, their history, and how they work within the party. The DPP is composed of people of many different political ideologies, the struggles within the party have limited itself to face up to external political circumstance. With regard to domestic politics, the various factions are able to unite against the KMT. But toward the PRC, they favour various different strategies. The Formosa Faction tends to support negotiating with the PRC, but the New Tide Faction tends to insist on officially establishing an independent state in Taiwan. Therefore, the relationship between the factions within the DPP is a very important factor affecting both the formulation of its Mainland China policy and its future.

Chapter 3: ‘The Formulation of the DPP’s Mainland China Policy’, I introduce the history of the formulation of the DPP’s Mainland China policy, and describe the background to its policy-making process.

Chapter 4: ‘The DPP’s China Policy Symposium in 1998’. The DPP’s 1998 China policy symposium was the first occasion on which the party tried to propose an official Mainland China policy. It also was the first time that the different factions of the party debated and challenge the other’s views. It was a milestone in the history of the DPP. Even after the symposium, the DPP still has not presented an official mainland China policy. Nonetheless, the symposium was helpful in making the different ideas within the factions.

Chapter 5: ‘Conclusion’. I review the previous chapters and make the conclusion that the DPP will ‘soften’ its demand for Taiwan’s independence, because the main aim of the party is to gain election to government. Insistence on pursuing independence for Taiwan would be an obstacle to the DPP gaining office, and would damage the future development of Taiwan.
Footnotes:

(1) As the Emergency Decree restricted the formation of new political parties. The non-KMT political opposition commonly referred to as Tangwai, which means 'party outsiders'. See Tien Hung-mao, 'Taiwan Evolution Toward Democracy: A Historical Perspective', in Denis Fred Simon and Michael Y. M. Kau (eds), Taiwan – Beyond the Economic Miracle (New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992) p. 9; Chao Yung-mau, 'Local Politics on Taiwan: Continuity and Change', in Simon and Kau (eds), Taiwan – Beyond the Economic Miracle, pp. 56-57.


(7) Tien Hung-mao, 'Elections and Taiwan's Democratic Development' in Tien (ed.), 1996, p. 20

(8) Jung Ping-lung and Wu Wen-cheng, 'The Changing Role of the KMT in Taiwan Political System', in Cheng and Haggard (eds.), 1992, p. 89

(9) Chinese Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895 under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Until the surrender of Japan at the ended of World War II, the Allied Forces placed the island under the sovereignty of the Republic of China in accordance with the Cairo Declaration. In 1949, the communists launched and all-out offensive on the Chinese mainland. In October, the KMT government moved to Taipei. The two sides of the Taiwan Straits have been opposed to each other from then to the present time. Since the end of the 1980s, the cross-Straits relations has become more peaceful than ever. For example, between November 1987 and December 1994, more than 6.9 million trips to the mainland were made by residents of Taiwan; total volume of indirect trade surpassed US$43.4 billion; and over 97 million letters and 153 million phone calls were exchanged across the Straits. By the end of this period, more than 25,000 Taiwan enterprises were operating on the mainland, investing an estimated US$22.6 billion and employing tens of thousands of mainland workers. See The Republic of China 1996 Yearbook (Taipei, ROC Government Information Office, 1996) p. 59, p. 60, and p. 109


(15) Wei Sun-hung, The Effects of Taiwan's Democratic Movement on its Mainland China Policy (1988 -1996), (Chiayi, Taiwan, Cheng Chien University, 1997) p.4


(17) The Republic of China 1996 Yearbook, p. 15

(18) See Chapter 1

(19) Tillman Durdin, 'The View From Taiwan', in Asian Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1, September/ October 1980, p. 5


(22) The DPP Headquarters, Taiwan Sovereignty Declaration – Rebuild the cross-Straits Order on the Reality Basis of 'Taiwan is Taiwan, China is China, 2 August 1994, p. 20

(23) In October 1984, Deng Xiaoping used the phrase 'one country, two systems' for the first time before a group of foreign guests
and overseas Chinese from Hong Kong and Marco. Although, 'one country, two systems' was introduced for Hong Kong's status after the British transfer of authority over this colony to the PRC in 1997. According to Beijing, the concept of 'one Country, two systems' did not begin with Hong Kong, but with the issue of Taiwan. Based on the pronouncements of Beijing's leaders and academic works from the PRC, this policy's salient points can be summarised as follows: 1) After China is reunified, people in the area presently controlled by the PRC will follow the socialist system while people in Hong Kong and Taiwan (later on Macao is also included) will continue their capitalist ways of life. 2) Under the 'one country, two systems' principle, Beijing will be the undisputed central government, thus would dictate national defence and foreign policy. Taiwan could be provided with more generous terms than Hong Kong, which at present means Taipei, would maintain the right to retain its army, party and political system after reunification. 3) Beijing stresses that 'one country, two systems' policy is not a measure of expediency or a fraudulent scheme. It has originated from the PRC's developing experience and is not to be changed. Meanwhile, the 'one country, two systems' concept not only satisfies the fundamental principles espoused by the PRC, for example, that there is only one China and that the PRC is the sole representative of the whole Chinese people, but also allows a flexible approach to handling the China issue, that is, it provides a solution to the co-existence of the capitalist and communist systems within China. The Chinese mainland can be a socialist system while Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao remain capitalist. The latter three would in theory not influence the basic nature of the PRC's system but complement it. See Deng Xiaoping, Building Socialism With Special Chinese Characteristics (Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1985) pp. 17-19, pp. 29-33, p. 40, p. 141; Terry Cheng, 'Think-tank Institute Studies Taiwan Links', in South China Morning Post, 2 December 1987, p. 5; 'The Mainland Studies Taiwan's Law', in Wen Wei Po, 11 December 1988, p. 1; Wu Hsin-hsing, Bridging the Strait – Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 23, pp. 30-32

(24) The DPP Headquarters, Taiwan Sovereignty Declaration – Rebuild the cross-Strait Order on the Reality Basis of ‘Taiwan is Taiwan, China is China, pp. 23-26

(25) The DPP Headquarters, Taiwan Sovereignty Declaration – Rebuild the cross-Strait Order on the Reality Basis of ‘Taiwan is Taiwan, China is China, p. 14

(26) The DPP Headquarters, Taiwan Sovereignty Declaration – Rebuild the cross-Strait Order on the Reality Basis of ‘Taiwan is Taiwan, China is China, p. 17

(27) The DPP Headquarters, Taiwan Sovereignty Declaration – Rebuild the cross-Strait Order on the Reality Basis of ‘Taiwan is Taiwan, China is China, pp. 14-19


(29) Chen, ‘Taiwan’s Self-Determination and Beijing's Taiwan Policy’, pp. 27-28

(30) Central Daily News, 2 January 1950, p.1

(31) Wu Hsin-hsing, Bridging The Strait – Taiwan , China, and the Prospects for Reunification (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1994) p.19


(36) The Taiwan Christian Presbyterian Church, Declaration on Human Rights by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, 16 August 1977

(37) Renmin Ribao, 20 April 1985, p. 1


(39) See Li Shenzhi and Zi Zongyun, 'Taiwan In the Next Decade', in Taiwan Studies Quarterly, No. 1, 1988, pp. 3-4


(41) Hsu said, 'The DPP will not announce to build the Republic of Taiwan, if the DPP wins power.' to the press on 3 November
1993 in Taipei. Shih said in the US on 13 September 1996, 'If the DPP wins the presidential election next year (1996), the DPP need not and will not announce Taiwan's independence. And the former director of the DPP's Department of Information and Culture Julian J. Kuo said on 6 September 1998, 'The DPP's position of Taiwanese independence is getting close to the Republic of China.' He meant, Taiwan is already an independent country; radical independence activists advocate 'Taiwan nationalism', but the DPP does not insist on Taiwan nationalism. See 'Statistics China', Open Magazine, No. 106, 5 October 1995, p.7; Kuo, Pain of the DPP's Transformation, pp. 72-73
Chapter 1. The Rise of the Democratic Progressive Party

1-1. Introduction

The DPP is the continuation of Tangwai political opposition movement. The Tangwai movement was tightly related to the history of Taiwan’s democratisation. In the view of some Tangwai politicians, the KMT regime was a colonial government like the Japanese ruling Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. (1) Since the KMT insisted itself was the representative of China, therefore, to strive for the political power was to strive against the colonial KMT and its Chinese consciousness. In other words, the DPP’s opposition to the KMT which inherits Tangwai opposition movement, is based on the anti-Chinese consciousness. The anti-Chinese consciousness is from the bad impression of the KMT’s ruling Taiwan in the early years. For example, the 228 Incident that took place in 1947 had given the Taiwanese older generation an unforgettable scar. From then on, the 228 Incident has become an important factor in Taiwanese Independence Movement. (2)

Because DPP inherited the legacy of anti-Chinese consciousness from Tangwai, naturally it later developed the Taiwanese independence consciousness and turned into a ‘Taiwanese independence party’ when the political environment had been opened totally. But when the independence consciousness has become holy and inviolable, it is difficult for the DPP to face Mainland China and to make a suitable Mainland China policy. The arguments about independence stratagem have become serious within the party. It has been more important than before to build a balance between realising the dream of ‘Republic of Taiwan’ and gaining the support from majority of Taiwanese people who take serious care of Taiwan’s national security in the shadow of China’s threat. The DPP’s independence status should be ‘soften’ to fit the political reality, and in fact, it has been changed gradually already.

1-2. Political situation in Taiwan

1-2-1. The beginning of KMT’s ruling in Taiwan

When World War II ended in 1945, KMT regime on Mainland China took control of
Taiwan from the Japanese, who had ruled the island for 50 years. Four years later, in 1949, the defeated KMT was forced to retreat to Taiwan.

Because of the misgovernment of the ruling KMT, the economic and political problems in Taiwan were serious then. In the evening of February 27, 1947, an old women had been injured while protesting against the expropriation of untaxed cigarettes she was selling Taipei. Later the angry fire had soon spread throughout the island. On March 9, the Nationalist army landed at Keelung. By March, many local leaders had been arrested. And thousands of people died in the incident. 228 Incident took place in 1947, it was just two years after Taiwan's handover to the KMT. It disappointed native Taiwanese very much. They were ruled by the Japanese colonial government for fifty years, from 1895 to 1945. Taiwanese used to fantasise about going back to the motherland China. But the dream was broken. The KMT and the Chinese government disappointed them. Native Taiwanese elite searched their mind for an answer of the future of Taiwan and made a conclusion that Taiwanese independence would be the only political line for Taiwan itself. Three groups, which were affiliated to the Taiwan Independence Movement, were formed in reaction to the 228 Incident. The suppression of the 1947 demonstrations proved to them the dictatorial nature of the KMT regime in Taiwan, a rule that was characterised by the oppression of one group of people, the Taiwanese, by another, the mainlanders. (3) From that time on, Taiwanese independence has become the mainstream of the political opposition movement in Taiwan. DPP's former chairman Hsu Hsin-liang also said in his book The Rising People, 'Taiwan has had a very special history. When the old colonies celebrated with jubilance for being independent from their colonial governments. Taiwan was punished by its colonial government Japan which had governed it for fifty years. It was deprived of the right of self-determination, to be returned to its so-called 'motherland', to have another uncivilised ruling. The 228 Incident and the following era of 'White Terror' had made lots of wrong souls all around Taipei, and made people of the island to be cripples in politics'. (4)

1-2-2. Political opposition movement and political participation in the early years

According to Ger Yeong-kuang's analysis, there are four stages of Taiwan's democratic development: establishment, growth, take-off, and consolidation. (5) In fact, in the opposition's view, the first stage which Ger called 'democratic establishment' from
1949 to 1977 was the ‘dark ages’ in the history of the opposition movement. But KMT opened a door of elections for political participation. Therefore, the opposition started uniting together, and forming the quasi-party opposition group to challenge the ruling KMT’s authority.

The first stage Ger called ‘Establishing a Foundation for Democracy’ and lasted from 1949 to 1977. The KMT used authoritarianism to promote modernisation and maintain its one-party ruling system. It implemented the Emergency Decree in 1949, placing various restrictions and limitations on the people’s rights, which were originally guaranteed by the Constitution. The rights that were temporarily frozen included the freedom of speech, freedom of publication, right of assembly, and freedom of association. But the popular elections started being held in this stage. In July 1950, the government held the first election for county and city councillors. In August and October of that year, the first elections for county magistrates and provincial municipality mayors, chiefs of rural and urban townships, mayors of county municipalities, and chief administrators of districts also took place. The first election for members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly were held in April 1957, and in December 1969, supplementary elections were held in the Taiwan area to elect 15 delegates to the National Assembly, 11 members to Control Yuan. Finally, in order to improve and expand the channels for political participation, the supplementary elections for members of Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly were held in December 1972. (6)

As the Emergency Decree restricted the formation of new political parties, the ruling KMT maintained its majority under a ‘one-dominant-party system’. The Tangwai candidates who sometimes challenged KMT candidates in elections occasionally emerged victorious. For example, the important opposition member who was charged for 8 years imprisonment for ‘Kaohsiung Incident’ in 1979, (7) the second chairman of the DPP Huang Hsin-chieh, was elected as a Legislator in 1969. Political election has been an important channel for the opposition to participate in politics in Taiwan from then. The opposition people have had a stable support from the Taiwanese. (See Table 1 and Table 2.) But participating elections also brought a long-term argument about the views on the political line of the opposition movement. It was the beginning of the formation of the opposition movement. (See Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.)
The KMT sometimes was challenged by the opposition in elections in the early years. But most of the parliamentary seats need not be re-elected regularly, so the KMT could maintain its position of one-dominant-party rule. The turning point was in 1977, when a mass protest in Chungli, a small city in north Taiwan, against an irregularity of vote counting in KMT touched off a serious clash between angry voters and the police. A district police station was burned and a number of casualties were reported. The incident signalled a growing popular disenchantment with the authorities’ conduct in electoral politics. After that, the opposition forces, mainly consisting of indigenous elements, pursued more confrontational tactics and attracted an activist layer fundamentally different in age and political outlook to that of their predecessors. In the local elections that year, opposition candidates won one-quarter of the magistrates’ and mayors’ posts, as well as 30% of seats in the provincial assembly. A new era of a nation-wide opposition movement was drawing.

After the Chungli Incident, although the Emergency Decree was still in effect, restrictions on freedom of speech had been greatly eased. Political magazines began to spring up everywhere. The political competitions during this period focused on the KMT and Tangwai. On 1st June, 1979, Tangwai people established the Taiwan Tangwai People’s Representatives Coalition Office, and the following day they formed the Central Parliamentarians Candidates League. On 24th August, 1979, they set up Formosa Magazine to serve as a common mouthpiece; soon, the magazine was being touted as the ‘magazine for Taiwan’s democratic movement’. The 60 funding members came from a wide range of opposition factions and began setting up islandwide branch offices for Formosa Magazine. All of these actions indicated the formation of a new party. Finally, opposition figures formally announced the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party at the Grand Hotel on 28th September, 1986, marking the end of the second stage of Taiwan’s democratic development.

1-2-3. *Tangwai’s political views*

In the year of 1978, Tangwai people organised Taiwan Tangwai People’s Campaign Committee, the first time they presented the common political statements. From then, in every election, Tangwai people normally organised the campaign committees, and presented the political statements to the public.
In the era of Tangwai, the opposition faction’s political statements focused on problems of political reform to ask for liberalisation and democratisation. (12) Tangwai’s political statements on political opposition movements could be divided into three parts. The first was to ask for liberalisation and democratisation including ‘implement the constitution completely’, ‘resuming the people’s basic rights of civil liberties, freedom of assembly, association, speech, and publication’, ‘stop the political persecution, release the political prisoners’, ‘lift the Emergency Decree’, ‘release the ban of reformation of new political parties’, ‘re-elect all members of the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly’, ‘re-elect all the posts of provincial governor and city mayors’. The second one was Taiwanisation and the Taiwanese independence appeal. For example, they announced ‘oppose the discrimination to native place and native language’, ‘the future of Taiwan should be decided by the people of Taiwan’. In 1985 county magistrates and city mayor elections, they presented the Taiwanese independence political slogan which advocated for self-determination by the Taiwanese people – ‘New political party, New situation, saving Taiwan by self-determination’. The third one was a general appeal to public policies. For example, they asked to ‘launch the National Health Insurance and out-of-work Insurance’, ‘launch the Labour Standards Law’, ‘prevent the public accident, and maintain the good quality of the environment’. (13)

In fact, either to instigate liberalisation, democratisation, or to approach the target of self-determination, Tangwai people’s purpose was to challenge the KMT’s authority, and the consciousness of the greater Chinese nationalism. Therefore, ‘We can say, Tangwai’s political purpose was to overthrow the bad system of KMT regime, and to challenge its greater Chinese consciousness. Therefore, the relationship between the opposition people and the KMT regime during the period of Tangwai was not only an antagonistic one, but also a zero-sum game. The antagonistic relationship between the opposition faction and KMT had not changed after the formation of the DPP’. (14)

1-2-4. The DPP and the Tangwai

Most of the initiators of DPP were the political elite in the Tangwai era, we can say, ‘the formation of DPP was the legacy of the Tangwai political opposition movement’. (15) And not only the political elite but also the main targets of the political movement were included in the DPP’s political statements.
Firstly, to overthrow the KMT and the greater Chinese consciousness was also to be the purpose of DPP. The concrete stand was to be presented on its party platform and the common political statements of the 1986 general elections. On the stand of liberalisation and democratisation, DPP kept on asking KMT ‘to lift the Emergency Decree’, ‘to abolish the Temporary Additional Articles of the Constitution and laws and regulations which are contrary to the Constitution, to implement the spirit of the Constitution’, ‘to re-elect all the members of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, directly elected president’, and ‘to implement the spirit of the Constitution on self-governance for local affairs, directly elected provincial governor and city mayors’.

On the problems of national status and Taiwan’s future, it was still to put ‘self-determination as the base of its inference in the chapter of Basic Programme on its party platform. It stressed that, ‘The future of Taiwan should be determined by all the residents of Taiwan with the mode of freedom, to act on Taiwanese own, widespread fairness and equality. Any government or governments have no right to determine Taiwan’s political status’. In the common political statements of the 1986 general elections, DPP also stated, ‘The future of Taiwan should be determined by all the residents of Taiwan with the mode of widespread, fairness and equality’ as their first article of the common political statements. (16)

Secondly, on the stratagem of DPP, the formation of DPP had not given a great impact to the KMT regime. The transformation of KMT and Taiwan’s politics having come true were due to the DPP’s and the opposition elite’s contention. Therefore, DPP’s stratagem was to contend with the KMT at the beginning of its formation. It raised the ‘parliamentary approach’ and ‘mass demonstration approach’ to challenge the KMT’s authoritarianism.

Thirdly, on the organisation of the DPP, there were two styles— ‘parliamentary approach’ and ‘“mass” or “street” demonstrations’. But the competitions between different ideologies were very intense. (17) The impact between the Formosa Faction which preferred the ‘parliamentary approach’ and the New Tide Faction which preferred the ‘mass demonstration approach’ has gone to a peak at DPP’s Third National Congress in 1988.

1-3. Political context of the formulation of the DPP
Between 1984 and 1986, people started to realise that the authoritarian one-dominant-party of the KMT on Taiwan was un-sustainable. International and domestic factors were contributing to a build-up of pressure for reforming both inside and outside the party. The KMT was faced with the choice of harsher repression or some sort of liberalisation. To the surprise of many, in view of parentage and background, Chiang Ching-kuo chose the path of reform. (18)

Internationally, Washington built the formal diplomatic relation with Beijing in 1979. Deng Xiaoping, the CCP’s late leader who died in 1997, visited Washington and was feted as Time magazine’s ‘man of the year’. China’s image had improved beyond recognition, so that its coaxing words to compatriots on Taiwan seemed winningly reasonable to many. KMT, meanwhile, was locked into its 40-year-old, and now clearly quite forlorn, claim to sovereignty over China. However, the KMT realised that Taiwan still needed the US support for its continued survival. But US-backed dictatorships around the world seemed to be crumbling: the Shah of Iran and Nicaragua’s Somosa in 1979; Morcos in the Philippines in 1986; Chun Doo-hwan in South Korea a year later. The lesson of backing would not be unstinting if the regime failed to meet popular demands for political participation. (19)

At home, KMT was rocked by a series of scandals. Not only did the financial quagmire of the Cathay scandal (20) in 1985 threaten to besmirch the reputation of many of the Party’s most senior figures, but there had been an even worse revelation regarding the country’s intelligence services. In October 1984, Henry Liu, a Chinese American who wrote a critical biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, was murdered in California. It transpired that a top intelligence official conspired with Taiwanese gangsters ‘to teach him a lesson’. Given the KMT’s arrogation to itself of powers beyond not just its own laws, but those of its most important friend, reform seemed a necessity.

Meanwhile, Tangwai opposition people in parliament were maturing as a result of several years of open activity in the Legislative Yuan. If KMT were to keep the electoral majority needed to mitigate the manifest unfairness of its huge numerical preponderance in the Legislature, it would have to clean up its act. The rising living standards on the island, and the exposure to, in particular, American democratic values, made the younger generation less willing to put up with the restrictions of martial law.
Nor did the muzzling of the opposition by occasional arrests, tight media controls and law-suits helped the KMT’s image as a party of the people. (21)

Mid-year 1986 the KMT seemed to heading for an election defeat in November. However, past problems and crises were not as important as they appeared, or were handled deftly. In any case, an election loss was averted. (22) The nation’s most serious problem then was its growing foreign exchange position, resultant of a huge trade surplus. Some observers commenting about the problem said that it was one that most developing nations wish they had. (23)

The ruling KMT also appeared to be taking the coming elections seriously and showed its willingness to adjust to new political realities in order to help its candidates to electoral victory. In March of 1986, KMT held its third plenary session of the party’s 12th Central Standing Committee. The new appointments mirrored progressive changes in the direction of Taiwanisation, democratisation, and a younger leadership of the party. Some even speculated that the older, less flexible and more authoritarian-minded leaders of the party no longer held the balance of power in top party decision making bodies. (24)

A few months later, President Chiang Ching-kuo (also Chairman of the KMT) ordered the formation of a twelve-member committee to study the status of martial law and the ban on the formation of new parties. Studying martial law and the ban of new parties was to find a way to get rid of both and to figure out how the system could best be pushed ahead on the road to further democratisation without evoking political chaos or instability. (25)

On the subject of legalising new parties, Tangwai leaders proposed that they be allowed to have permanent offices countrywide in the form of Tangwai Research Association for Public Policy. Even though Tangwai Research Association for Public Policy was not a ‘party’, but it could co-ordinate party activities during periods when elections were not pending. Furthermore, it did have a platform, such as ‘party’ funds, and a united campaign. In May of 1986, the government, upon the recommendation and support of President Chiang, decided the affirmative action.
Later, *Tangwai* officials, scholars and others held a meeting to discuss the proposals to abolish martial law and to allow the formation of new political parties. The issue was not whether to carry out these decisions, that was viewed as inevitable. Nor were there any really intractable issues between the two sides relative to implementing the proposal.

Because *Tangwai* people were already in a most respectable political party, so the issue of formation of new parties was not so hot. (26) But older KMT officials opposed giving it legal status. The main reason was that if the opposition people form their political party, there might be a danger of party competition. Allowing *Tangwai* people to operate as a party, but without legal status, seemed to be very cautious. (27) Moreover, some *Tangwai* politicians were not enthusiastic about the offer of legal status, since the *Tangwai* was in large part a protest party and winning legal status. Some perceived that it would be a liability rather than an asset in the coming election campaign. The *Tangwai* lack of a base of support in the sense parties in Western countries could identify a region, social class, or other segment of the population that supported the party and rendered it various help. Thus the protest vote was viewed as crucial. (28)

In early June of 1986, four *Tangwai* opposition politicians, including the former Taipei City mayor and which then was Taipei City councillor Chen Shui-bian, Taipei City councillor Lin Cheng-chieh, Huang Tien-fu, and Lee I-yang were jailed for libelling a university professor in an article in *Neo-Formosa Magazine*. Opposition leaders viewed the court action as an attempt to prevent their candidates from running the December election. They charged that the decision was influenced by the KMT.

In August of 1986, *Tangwai People’s Representatives’ Association for the Study of Public Policy* organised a rally in Taipei, attracting 50,000 participants and speculators. The gathering was attended by the executive director of the US National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. That gave the impression that the US supported *Tangwai People’s Representatives’ Association for the Study of Public Policy* and an end to the ban on political parties. In fact, some perceived this as a sign of US pressure on the government to ‘open up’ the coming election. (29)
Later in early September, 1986, Lin Cheng-chieh appeared at the steps of the Presidential Office Building, and in front of a large crowd, smashed a black clock (in Chinese language, the clock means a homonym of end or final), signifying that he had the attitude with the government. This became the cause of several days of demonstrations in Taipei and other large cities in Taiwan that attracted large numbers of people. (30)

On 9th September, protesters in Taipei formed a large street march – the first led by the opposition since the ‘Kaohsiung Incident’ in 1979. The march attracted even more participants and spectators and seemed to inject both unity and enthusiasm into the opposition movement. It also appeared to enhance public support for Tangwai politicians. Meanwhile, the government’s contention that the court decisions against Tangwai notables were not influenced by any other branch of the government or the ruling KMT, though true, was not very convincing. (31) This encouraged the opposition people to scale new heights. On 28th September of 1986 – without further consultations with the KMT, the government, or Chiang Ching-kuo’s committee – 138 Tangwai politicians, after a meeting at the Grand Hotel in Taipei, announced that they had decided to form the Democratic Progressive Party. The announcement was provocative inasmuch as it was still illegal to form a new party. Yet it seemed apparent to almost everyone that the ban on new parties would be lifted and that the DPP’s ‘crime’ was one of simply acting prematurely – which was not very serious. It was also obvious that the Tangwai made this move (rather than continuing discussions with the committee) in order to avoid the perception that it was a creation of the KMT or was born out of Tangwai-KMT co-operation. (32)

After the formation of DPP, KMT started its transformation actively. Chiang Ching-kuo declared that the Emergency Decree to be lifted and that the ban of the new political parties’ formation to be released. (33)

On 8th November, 1986, Yu Ching, an important leader of the DPP, told Japanese reporters that the DPP had a membership of 2,500 and expected to grow to 100,000 in less than a year. (34) He declared the DPP’s objective was to ‘break KMT one-party monopoly rule and build a welfare society after the Western European model.’ He also said the DPP stood for ‘self-determination’ and wanted Taiwan to be readmitted into the UN.
On 10th November, the DPP announced its party organisation and leadership. Oddly, the DPP was structured after Leninist organisational principles. Opposition politicians of Tangwai movement had long pointed out the KMT 'hypocrisy' because of structuring the ruling party after these 'communist' tenets of party organisation. Apparently the opposition people were not impressed with the organisational structures of the Western political parties. They had studied various party structures (including those in the US) but ostensibly considered unity and party discipline too important to adopt the organisational structures of any of them. (35)

Chiang Peng-chien, a relatively little-known member of the Legislative Yuan, was elected first term chairman of the DPP in what appeared to be a close and divisive vote. Yu Ching and several others were in contention. Observers said the decision was a compromise and that the DPP's most well-known and most charismatic leader (meaning Yu) was not picked to head the DPP because of factional in-fighting. Many called Chiang's appointment a mistake. A serious party spilt seemed in the offing. (36)

Because those involved realised that party unity was a sine qua non to compete successfully in the December election, a formal spilt was avoided. And party unity, at least on the surface, was retained.

President Chiang announced that the DPP was a 'legal' party. But three conditions must be met: agree to abide by the Constitution, renounce communism, and defy supporting independence. Three conditions did not seem onerous. The opposition has long supported the Constitution. It had criticised the KMT for not upholding it. Few Tangwai politicians had ever to support communism. But the DPP had been critical of the Taiwan Independence Movement activities in the US and Japan and eschewed direct contacts with the Movement in either place. (37)

The DPP, however, refused to accept the three conditions. Because the new party did not want to give the impression that it was colluding, or even cooperating, with the KMT. The new party sought to make difference between itself and the KMT. The DPP openly challenged the KMT's policy of 'recovering' the mainland instead of calling for separation from the People's Republic of China. Its party charter even contained a 'plank' which stated that the future of Taiwan should be 'decided by the residents of Taiwan'.

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In any event, the lines were being drawn between the ruling KMT and the opposition DPP on several important issues. Polarisation was not so serious, however, as to make the election process unworkable. Most wanted the system to work. Moreover it was clear the DPP was going to participate in the election as a party, even though legal status was yet to be granted. Blocking its participation would hurt Taiwan’s political development and send the wrong signals domestically and internationally. (38)

Finally, in the 1986 December election, the ruling KMT won 59 of 73 seats in the Legislative Yuan and 68 of 157 in the National Assembly. The opposition alliance, which was for the first time to use the new title of the DPP, captured 12 seats in the Legislative Yuan and 11 in the National Assembly.

The new party continued to challenge the KMT and pushed it towards democratisation. The Emergency Decree was lifted on 15th July 1987. Then in November 1987 the KMT declared that Taiwanese people would be allowed to visit relatives in Mainland China, and in January 1988 that the registration of new newspapers would be accepted. The political policy was gradually liberalising its policies. But the Senior Parliamentarians were still in the Parliaments. The regime was taken by the KMT. Therefore, the democratisation of Taiwan had not come true before the total renewal of the central parliamentary bodies in 1992. (See Table 3.)

1-4. The rise of Taiwanese identity

Indeed, the rise of the DPP has accelerated the rise of Taiwanese identity. But the KMT’s policy of Taiwanisation is also a very important factor of the rising Taiwanese identity. Especially, Lee Teng-hui’s efforts on pushing the Taiwanisation policy do open a new era in Taiwan’s history.

In 1984, President Chiang chose a reformist vice-president, Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese native, who was not seen at the time as a serious candidate for the succession. He was a popular academic and technocrat. But people thought that the successor would have to be a mainlander. When Chiang Ching-kuo died in January 1988, Lee Teng-hui took over, in accordance with the Constitution. He was still seen by many as a stopgap, and as an improbable candidate for Chiang’s other post, the Chairmanship of the KMT. Conservative forces were rumoured to be rallying around the frail figure of Chiang Kai-
shek’s widow, the nonagenarian Soong May-ling, who had returned from the US for the centenary celebrations for her husband in 1986. However, with the backing of the reformists now in the majority of KMT hierarchy, as well as the key tacit support of the military Chief of Staff, General Hau Pei-tsun, Lee was soon made acting Chairman of the KMT, and was confirmed in the post at its 13th National Congress in July. Despite the alleged weakness of his own position, Lee Teng-hui was soon to show himself intent on pursuing reform with even greater gusto than his predecessor.

In April 1994, Lee accepted an interview with a Japanese scholar. He stated his view of ‘the sadness of Taiwanese’. He said the KMT was a ‘regime from external’. Later, he emerged the ideas of ‘Taiwanese identity’, such as ‘ROC on Taiwan’, ‘New Taiwanese People’, ‘Popular Sovereignty’. Therefore, Beijing started firmly believing that Lee Teng-hui was advocating Taiwanese independence. In the island, native Taiwanese and some Taiwanese independence activists placed certain expectations of Lee. They thought that Lee could be pushing the establishment of an independent country on Taiwan. In the 1996 presidential election, ‘There were almost 40% changed their political position from supporting the DPP’s Peng Ming-min, turning to support Lee Teng-hui. They “give up Peng, support Lee”’. (39)

Obviously, the rise of Lee Teng-hui has given the traditional opposition a serious trial. The DPP faced the challenge from both the transformation of the KMT and Taiwan’s political democratisation. The KMT’s localisation has changed itself into a ‘Taiwan KMT’, not an alien regime any more. The DPP has been introspecting the traditional view of Taiwanese independence. The opposition people proclaimed ‘self-determination’. As an editor of the opposition magazine said, ‘we can not say “independence” here, because we still can be put in jail. So we say “self-determination”. That means the people in Taiwan have the right to choose their future.’ (40) But the rule of the game has been changed. On 15 May 1992, Article 100 of the Criminal Code of the ROC was amended to legalise the expression as well as the idea of Taiwanese independence within the scope of freedom of speech. The problem now is inside the DPP. Different views on the issue of Taiwanese independence have brought a series of factional infighting, and even caused the division of the party.

What is Taiwanese independence? Chang Chun-hong, the third term general-secretary of the DPP, defined the meaning of ‘Today’s Taiwan Independence Movement’:
First, Taiwanese independence refers to the demarcation between Mainland China and Taiwan, the latter of which refuses to be ruled by the Communist mainland regime. Secondly, Taiwanese independence means the master of Taiwan should be the majority of indigenous Taiwanese. Thirdly, Taiwanese independence connotes the democratisation of all of Taiwan’s politics. Only through democracy can the Taiwanese eventually and eternally become the ‘Master of Taiwan’. And fourthly, Taiwanese independence means striving for Taiwan’s international status, identity, and dignity. (41)

Chang said that points 1 and 2 have actually been realised. Taiwan in fact is de facto independence under KMT rule. In other words, the KMT as well as the DPP, both do not wish Taiwan to be reunified with the CCP. What the KMT has done in past years is to build a KMT-style Taiwanese independence state (that is, the so-called ‘B-type Taiwanese independence’). (42)

The emergence of the Taiwan Independence Movement could be roughly divided into three stages with each stage reflecting the political environment, both within and outside of Taiwan at various times. (43)

The 228 Incident in 1947 and the misgovernment of the ruling KMT in Taiwan in the 1940s highlighted the first stage of the Taiwan Independence Movement. Taiwan dissidents escaped overseas after the 228 Incident. This incident sowed the seeds of discord and hatred between the expatriate mainlanders and the indigenous Taiwanese and became the principal cause of the Taiwan Independence Movement at this stage to overthrow the expatriated KMT regime.

In the second stage, before 1980, the Taiwan Independence Movement was motivated by the KMT’s authoritarian rule and the mainlanders’ continuous monopoly of political power. The KMT for its part espoused its ‘legitimacy theory’, that meant its Parliament represented the whole of China. It refused to hold a complete re-election, abolish martial law and stop depriving people of their constitutional rights. Dissidents were arrested and persecuted including those who involved in the case of Lei Chen (44) and the Kaohsiung Incident. All of these circumstances further upset the indigenous Taiwanese. The main purpose of the Taiwan Independence Movement at this stage was to promote the democratisation of Taiwan in the face of strict KMT rule, and to oppose
the PRC's incorporation schemes. Although under the KMT's authoritarian rule the Taiwanese were restricted from political participation, they did enjoy an improved economic life, a benefit that has relaxed, to some extent, their discontent with the KMT.

After the 1980s, the Taiwan Independence Movement had entered into the third stage. More democratic policies have been introduced by the KMT. Democratisation has improved relations between the KMT and dissident Taiwanese. For example, martial law was lifted, and this resulted in the formation of political parties including the DPP. Further, the bans on freedom of the press was lifted, Taiwan had 28 newspapers. At present Taiwan has 300 registered newspapers. (45)

Nevertheless, as Chang Chun-hong has said the goals of the Taiwan Independence Movement have not been fully realised in his definition to Taiwanese independence. The task of democratisation in Taiwan needs further improvement and perfecting. The most urgent task is to reintroduce the 'newly-packaged' Taiwan with a popularly elected government into international society and to secure the nation's recognition from other countries. Therefore, Chang has argued, if the KMT intended to eliminate the voice of Taiwanese independence, it should immediately institute true democracy rather than repress the independence movement. He said that only by implementing democracy could Taiwan obtain the world's sympathy and support, and increase the possibility of Taiwan's return to the international community. (46)

In other words, the current stage sees the Taiwan Independence Movement pushing the KMT to implement democracy in the domestic arena while pursuing Taiwan's return to global society in the international arena. Antonio Chiang, publisher of a liberal and non-KMT-owned weekly magazine called The Journalist, pointed out, 'Sure, some (Taiwan) people believe in Taiwanese independence, but for most people independence is just a code word for more democracy. Independence is a very vague, ambiguous word. It is not a legal term in Taiwan anyway. There's a psychological and emotional attachment to that term. And a political one, of course'. (47)

The above discussion indicates how the concept and nature of the Taiwan Independence Movement has been transformed since the 1940s. This movement has its merits in that it has stimulated the development of Taiwan's democratic politics. This democratisation is vital for the lengthy peaceful reign of the ROC government, and serves as a model to
influence the PRC as well. To the KMT, the Taiwan Independence Movement is not a completely disadvantageous entity, despite the fact that the Taiwan Independence Movement has challenged the ROC’s legitimacy. For example, the KMT could use the Taiwan Independence Movement as the expression of public opinion and a reason for incorporating with the mainland. As well, the Taiwan Independence Movement provides a counter to Beijing’s isolation strategy. Taipei has so far never explicitly advocated the idea of Taiwanese independence. However, any relaxation of Taipei’s policy toward the Taiwan Independence Movement might lead Beijing to worry that Taipei will side with the movement and seek Taiwan’s independence. Under this circumstance, Taipei’s foreign policy would become far less responsive to Beijing. Taipei can let Beijing understand that would generate political problems for the ruling KMT, and might boost the prospects and the power of the Taiwan Independence Movement in Taiwan. This situation would be obviously disadvantageous to both Taipei and Beijing. Hence, both the CCP and the KMT, from this viewpoint, would appear to share a common interest in preventing Taiwan’s independence from becoming a reality.

1-5. The Setback of the Taiwan Independence Movement

1-5-1. The 1991 National Assembly elections

The DPP continued to bring into prominence of the Taiwanese independence issue. The KMT, however, did not resort to using the law against Taiwanese independence. But in 1991 National Assembly elections, Taiwanese people used their votes to express the attitude toward Taiwan’s independence. In 1991 December elections campaign period, the KMT told people that Taiwan’s independence would bring disaster to Taiwan because the PRC would attack Taiwan, if necessary, to stop any move toward formal independence.

The KMT’s strategy apparently paid off. The DPP in the 1991 National Assembly Election, because of its vehemently separatist stance, only acquired 23.94% of votes in the elections while the KMT parlayed that dread of uncertainty into a 71.17% landslide at the polls. Noteworthy, even Lin Cho-shui, the leader of the New Tide faction and radical independence activist, failed in the elections. There was no doubt that the result of this election was not only a setback of the DPP but also a blow to the Taiwan
Independence Movement. In an interview with the New York Times, Hsu Hsin-liang, the former chairman of the DPP, admitted that the ‘cause of Taiwanese independence’ scared off voters in December’s 1991 National Assembly Election and led to the failure of the DPP platform. (48)

1-5-2. The 1996 presidential election

The DPP has known that the Taiwanese independence issue was a ‘poison’ to the elections in Taiwan today. But it was almost impossible for the DPP to avoid touching the independence issue in the first directly electing presidential election. Especially, the DPP’s candidate Peng Ming-min was a radical Taiwanese independence advocator. He handed out a ‘Taiwanese people self-rescue declaration’ to advocate Taiwanese independence in 1964. For that he was arrested and jailed, and has had 8 years imprisonment. But later he was released by the special pardon from the president. In 1970, he escaped for Sweden, then went to the US, and started to go into exile until 1992. (49)

Peng beat Hsu Hsin-liang in the DPP’s presidential preliminary selection. Later in the formal campaign, Peng’s campaign headquarters vetoed the ideas of ‘Great Reconciliation, Great Coalition’ (50) as the campaign slogan, and used ‘Peace, Sanctity, Taiwanese President’ which with a strong significance of Taiwanese independence was used instead’. (51)

The result of the first popular presidential election was a great blow to the advocates of independence. KMT’s Lee Teng-hui won 54% of the vote, but Peng gained just 21%. That was the lowest support in the history of elections for the DPP.

The presidential election has aggravated the in-fighting within the DPP. The radical Taiwanese independence advocators started their plan for establishing the new party. On 9th April, 1996, Peng declared the formation of ‘The Nation Building Union of Taiwan’ (NBUT), and he censured that the DPP’s status on Taiwanese independence is unswerving. Later, the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP) whose members were from the DPP’s radical independence advocators was formed formally on October. (52)
On 7th May, 1996, a group of the DPP’s younger generation issued ‘The Younger Generation’s Platform of Taiwanese Independence Movement’ to stress ‘Taiwanese independence was not a sacred duty, but a realisable political view’, ‘Taiwanese independence was not the only political aim, but a road to realise the social reform’, ‘It was not certainly to use ‘Taiwan’ as the National name of the new nation. To change the name, the national flag, and the national theme are not the main purposes of the Taiwan Independence Movement’. The younger generation stressed ‘Taiwanese independence is not the DPP’s or any political organ’s private property, but the public property of Taiwanese people’ meaning that the Taiwan Independence Movement has exceeded the scopes of the political parties. It hinted ‘Taiwanese sovereign independence’, and ‘it is not necessary to declare Taiwanese independence’. It is an expansion of the new Taiwanese independence discourse. (53)

The meaning of the DPP younger generation’s view on Taiwanese independence was that most of the Taiwanese have been tired of the arguments on the independence issue. Since then, the DPP has become a ‘broker party’ (54) whose main political aim is to win the election. Even though the division of the political opposition has weaken the forces of the DPP, it is good for it to use its power in making political policy but not to waste time on the arguments of ‘reunification’ of ‘independence’.

1-6. Conclusion

The history of Taiwan’s opposition movement has gone through the era of anti-KMT regime, and the era of fighting for democracy. For the political opposition, the most important political activities are to nominate the candidates for the elections. As we can see from the results of the elections in Taiwan, the DPP normally maintain about 30% of the support in each election. In local-level elections, it can win more than high-level elections, but it is difficult for it to defeat the KMT in higher level elections. For example, in 1986, 1991, and 1996 National Assembly elections, the DPP only won the support of 19%, 24%, and 30%. Because the main function of the National Assembly is to amend the Constitution, it involves the issues of national identity. The DPP’s insistence on Taiwanese independence gives the Taiwanese people the worry about changing the present situation of ROC. So it is difficult for the party to win the elections. But people in Taiwan still wish to have a strong opposition power to balance the ruling KMT. So on local-level issues, the DPP could win the support of the people. They could
even beat the ruling KMT. For example, in 1997 County Magistrates’ and City Mayors’ elections, DPP won 12 seats of the 21 countries and cities, and won 43% of the support. First time for it to surpass the KMT in the election. (See Table 4 and Table 5.) The leaders of the DPP have seen the trend. For example, on 9th September, 1996, because the radical Taiwanese independence activists were preparing to organise the TAIP, and they continued criticising the DPP have given up its position of Taiwanese independence. Julian J. Kuo, the former director of the DPP’s Department of Information and Culture presented a statement stating that through the process of Taiwan’s democratisation, the DPP has started its adjustment of the political line, and has developed the New Taiwan Independence Movement which was different from the traditional Taiwan Independence Movement. (55) After Kuo’s statement, on September 11, the former chairman of the DPP, Shih Ming-teh said to the leaders of the TAIP, ‘Other than the military revolution, the only way to realise independence and the establishment of a new country is through the existent political system’. (56) It is clear, some Taiwanese politicians have changed their political attitude on Taiwanese independence issue. Even though they were active Taiwanese independence advocates, but they has adjusted their attitudes to face the political reality

Since then, democratisation and the KMT’s process of Taiwanisation have been carried out. (57) There are two political problems in Taiwan now. The first one is to maintain the achievement of democratisation. The second one is to face the threat of China. The DPP’s decision in finding out the problems is to take the regime of Taiwan through the elections. For matching most of the Taiwanese people’s wish, the DPP would not insist to achieve the aim of Taiwan’s independence de jure, but to seek the possibility of de facto independence.

Footnotes:
(1) Shih Ming, Four Hundred Years’ History of Taiwan, (San Jose, USA, Paradise Culture Associates, 1980) pp. 695-1182
(2) In the evening of February 27, 1947, an old women had been injured while protesting against the expropriation of untaxed cigarettes she was selling in the Taiping Ting section of Taipei. The public was deeply angered when a passerby was shot in the commotion and the assailant was given in a nearby police station. Later the angry fire had soon spread throughout the island. On March 9, the 21st division of the Nationalist army landed at Keelung. By March, many local leaders had been arrested. And thousands of people died in the incident. See Shih, Four Hundred Years’ History of Taiwan, pp. 749-798; Christopher Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese nationalism – National identity and status in international society (London, Routledge, 1997) pp. 25-26; Alan M. Wachman, 'Competing Identities', in Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.), The Other Taiwan – 1945 to the Present (New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994) pp. 46-48; Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Meyers, and Wei Wou, A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991
The ROC's two parliamentary bodies are the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. The National Assembly's primary function is to amend the ROC constitution, while the Legislative Yuan is the major law-making body. The Control Yuan is the highest control body of the state. The constitution of 1947 and the elected members of the three representative organs of the Republic, the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan, formed the core of a concept used by the Nationalists to assert the fa-tung, legitimacy of their rule, against growing criticisms. For the political situation in Taiwan, however, maintaining fa-lung implied serious limitations on the scope of legal political activities. On the one hand, governmental policies were oriented towards the needs of an idea China. On the other hand, it led to the ossification of the membership of these representative organs, which continued to include those selected in the 1948 election. See Halbeisen, 'In Search of a New Political Order? Political reform in Taiwan' pp. 75-78, pp. 80-82; A Brief Introduction to the Republic of China (Taipei, ROC Government Informational Office, June 1996) pp. 12-13.

(7) In 1978-79, the authorities broke up several scheduled public meetings of the opposition, and on December 9, 1979, the police clashed with the demonstrators in a Human Rights Day rally in Kaohsiung. Soon thereafter, the authorities arrested the staff of Formosa Magazine and other opposition activists who organized the rally, charging them with a plot to overthrow the government. Eight key opposition figures were given long jail terms, ranging from twelve years to life imprisonment. They have been released one by one in recent years, and most of them are again active in politics, leading the opposition. See Parris H. Chang, 'The Changing Nature of Taiwan's Politics', in Denis Fred Simon and Michael Y. M. Kau (eds.), Taiwan - Beyond the Economic Miracle (New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992) pp. 26-27, p. 41.

(8) In early February of 1985, Taiwan's worst economic scandal exploded. More than NT$7 billion of the 10th Credit Cooperative bank's loans were made through irregular practices and officials suspected most of the sum went to the bank's chairman, Legislator Tsai Chen-chou (US$1 : NT$40). The control Yuan, the highest control organ of the ROC, discovered that lending irregularities by the 10th Cooperative went back at least as far as 1983, but the Ministry of Finance took no measures to stop the illegal practice until the scandal surfaced in February of 1985. Even though Tsai Chen-chou was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment and fined NT$10 million, the exposure of the scandal had left the Tsai family conglomerate more than 10 billion NT dollars in debt and the number of victims of the scandal headed for possible bankruptcy was estimated at over 100,000. Moreover, Hsu Li-teh the minister of economic affairs resigned in March. Tsai Chen-chou later died in jail. See The China Post, 14 February 1985, p. 12, and 6 March 1985, p. 12.
(27) Copper, Taiwan’s Recent Elections: Fulfilling The Democratic Promise, p. 48
(28) Copper, Taiwan’s Recent Elections: Fulfilling The Democratic Promise, p. 48
(31) Mooney, ‘Opposition in the Street’, p. 18
(32) Copper, Taiwan’s Recent Elections: Fulfilling The Democratic Promise, pp. 49-50
(33) See Daniel Southerland, ‘Taiwan President to Propose End to Island’s Martial’, Washington Post, 8 October 1986, p. 3
(35) Copper, Taiwan’s Recent Elections: Fulfilling The Democratic Promise, pp. 50-51
(38) Copper, Taiwan’s Recent Elections: Fulfilling The Democratic Promise, pp. 52
(42) This term ironically has been labelled on the KMT by elements of the Taiwan Independence Movement who argue that, although the KMT has constantly opposed the idea of Taiwan’s independence, the KMT is in fact practising the idea of the independence of Taiwan. These elements within the Taiwan Independence Movement label their movement as the ‘A-type’ Taiwanese independence.
(43) Wu Hsin-hsing, Bridging The Strait – Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 204
(44) Lei Chen, a liberal mainland, a KMT member, and a close colleague of Chiang Kai-shek, published the Free China magazine to promote democracy and later attempted to organise the China Democratic Party in 1960. These actions resulted in his being imprisoned for many years. See Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese nationalism – National identity and status in international society, p. 33; Chang, 'The Changing Nature of Taiwan's Politics', pp. 26-27
(46) Chang, ‘On Taiwanese Independence’
(49) See Peng Ming-min's autobiography A Taste of Freedom – Memories of A Formosan Independence Leader (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972)
(50) In the end of 1995, the DPP presented a series of new policies which tried to reduce the conflicts between the arguments of independence and reunification. The chairman Shih Ming-teh said in US, “If the DPP take the regime, it would not and needs not to announce Taiwanese independence. Later Shih invited the New Party's representatives which were reunification advocators had a cup of 'Great Reconciliation coffee'. And the DPP Central Committee decided, 'If the DPP's candidate wins the presidential election, he will invite the other parties' people to organise a 'Great Coalition Government'. But the DPP's activities of 'Great Reconciliation, Great Coalition' were inspired animosity from the radical independence advocator in it. See ‘Statistics China’, Open Magazine, No. 106, 5 October 1995, p. 7; Kuo, Pain of the DPP's Transformation, pp. 79-87
(51) Kuo, Pain of the DPP’s Transformation, p. 284
(52) Most of the members of the NBUT have joint the TAIP, its chairman Peng Ming-min remained his place in the DPP, but has gone far away from the power centre.
(53) Kuo, Pain of the DPP’s Transformation, pp. 77-78
(55) Kuo, Pain of the DPP’s Transformation, p. 98
(56) Kuo, Pain of the DPP’s Transformation, p. 98
Chapter 2. Factions within the Democratic Progressive Party

2-1. Introduction

During its founding period, the DPP was a grand alliance of various groups. The party’s organisational structure emphasised conflicts between those factions. Due to the special nature of the relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan, a period of conflict is an unavoidable stage in the development process for Taiwanese political powers who want to stand in the forefront of Taiwan’s future. Considering the reason above, factions must attempt to take a leadership position by insisting on their policies and ideology in conflicts with others. A clear and strong political stance can attract potential members from other factions. (1)

2-2. Development of the political opposition factions in Tangwai era

A study of the factions in the DPP must start by examining the reorganisation and development of the original local political forces during the Tangwai period. (2) This refers to the period which started in April 1977. At that time, Huang Hsin-chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang were trying to unite local political forces in order to reorganise them into an alliance. Opposition faction began to organise following the Chungli Incident of 1977. Before the Chungli Incident, opposition factions shares very small aims, policies and ideologies opposed to the KMT’s autocracy, but they competed against each other for political influence. However, because the Chungli Incident provided the power to oppose the KMT, it was a key point in the process of changing the autocracy to democracy. For this reason it was possible for opposition factions to compete with each other in terms of political philosophy and policies from then on. The reason why opposition factions did not confront each other at that moment is that they had a weak political influence.

In 1979, when the centre of power in the opposition faction moved away from Huang Hsin-chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang, the real Tangwai faction was founded. In 1969, Supplementary Legislator Huang Hsin-chieh (3) and his comrades, established Formosan Magazine. In 1972, Supplementary Legislator Kang Ning-hsiang gained the support of new rising intellectuals to operate the Eighties Magazine. During this period,
Huang and Hang competed with each other in terms of their political philosophy. Huang's line was a radical mass line with an aggressive attitude; Kang's was more moderate. (4) Huang was ahead in this competition until the Kaoshiung Incident of 1979. Huang's organisation almost disintegrated when most of its leading members were imprisoned.

After the Kaoshiung Incident, Kang made himself as the central power of Tangwai by reorganising the original Tangwai factions and new local political forces. The members were: family members of victims of the Kaoshiung Incident, defence lawyers of victims, elected representative and government officials: Fei Hsi-ping (Senior Legislator), Huang Huang-hsiung (Supplementary Legislator), Yu Ching (Member of Control Yuan), Yu Cheng Yueh-yung (Taiwan Provincial Assemblyman), Chiu Lien-hui (Pingtung County Magistrate), etc._.

Because of the supplementary elections to the Legislative Yuan, Control Yuan, and local elections took place in 1980, Tangwai forces recovered a bit from Kaohsiung Incident by gaining the seats in the elections. ( See Chapter 1, Table 2) During this recovery, the leading forces within Tangwai adopted Kang's political line for a time. However, as the factions within Tangwai grew stronger, they developed different political opinions about the understanding of the KMT's ruling nature, political aims of the opposition movement, political philosophy, and the future of Taiwan. (5)

In fact, the Tangwai organisation in the 1981 and 1983 elections showed clearly that the Tangwai's reorganisation were still in the pattern of alliance between local political forces and the Tangwai elected representatives, as had been established in 1977. The Tangwai Candidates' Campaign Committee which was organised by Tangwai's Central parliamentarians in October 1981, and the Tangwai Central Campaign Committee which was set up in September 1983, both attempted to give the priority on nomination to the incumbent representatives. The essence of their operation was based on the cooperation of different political forces within Tangwai, and organisations constructed only provided political structures for communication and negotiation among different political forces. (6) Although the Tangwai at that time can be considered as an embryonic form of political party, and it operated exactly like a political party for nominating candidates, its power structure was still based around several politically powerful individuals instead of operating democratically.

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For the reasons outlined above, a group of the radical opposition did not want the opposition resources to be monopolised by the elected representatives, they launched a campaign to ‘criticise Kang’ in 1982, in order to redesigning the political rule of Tangwai. This campaign focused on three points: 1) ‘obstruction’ versus ‘negotiation’; 2) ‘reforming the system’ versus ‘reforming from within the system’; 3) ‘the mass line’ versus ‘the parliamentary line’. (7) The group of people had three sets of members: the Kaohsiung Incident victims’ relatives, defence lawyers and non-Tangwai younger generation members. The leading exponent was Hsu Jung-shu and the editors at her Shen Keng (Cultivation) Magazine, such as Wu Nai-jen, Chiu Yi-jen, Lin Cho-shui, Lin Cheng-Chien, etc._. (8)

During this campaign, the younger generation suspected Hsu Jung-shu’s political status was swerving, and this was the main reason for the break between her and the non-Tangwai younger generation. Lin Cheng-chien set up the Chien Chin (Progress) Weekly after his political views diverged from those of Hsu Jung-shu. Subsequently, in 1983, he and his fellows organised the Progress Faction. Around the end of 1983, Wu Nai-jen, Chiu Yi-jen, Lin Cho-shui, and non-Tangwai younger generation figures organised the New Tide Magazine, this was the first appearance of the New Tide Faction. (9) During the supplementary elections for members of the Legislative Yuan at the end of the same year, because of the complainants about the right to nominate the candidates for the elections which was usually controlled by the elected representatives, the non-Tangwai younger generation organised Association of Tangwai’s Editors and Writers, nine days before the Tangwai Central Campaign Committee was set up. After that, Lin Cheng-chien had a disagreement about the future of Taiwan with the members of the ‘Association of Tangwai’s Editors and Writers’, then left the association and organised his own faction. Following the 1983 supplementary elections to the Legislative Yuan, Tangwai elected representatives (including Hsu Jung-shu) organised the Tangwai People’s Representatives’ Association for the Study of Public Policy in May 1984. The political fights between factions within Tangwai started, and lasting within the DPP. (10)

According to the analyses above, we can make three points as follows.

Firstly, The factional fight between the opposition has begun in the Tangwai era. It began at the time of the 1977 local elections. The serious conflicts between the factions
took place in 1982. But the mutual opposition factions were born in 1979. Later in 1984, the organisations of the factions were more mature.

Secondly, the arguments on political lines and ideologies related to political power pursuing. The opposition figures could change their positions between different factions. Factions could be reorganised.

Thirdly, before the foundation of the DPP on 28th September 1986, Tangwai political forces were divided into four factions: 1) New Tide Faction originated from Association of Tangwa's Editors and Writers and New Tide Magazine; 2) Kang and Supra-Factions that composed of the members of Tangwai People’s Representatives’ Association for the Study of Public Policy and elected representatives and local government officers; 3) Progress Faction which was led by Lin Cheng-chieh, his political status tended to Formosa Faction; 4) Formosa Faction which composed of the victims’ relatives and defence lawyers of Kaohsiung Incident. (11)

2-3. The relationship between factions within the DPP

The relationship between the factions in the DPP is quite different now than in the initial stage. This change was brought about by competition and reorganisation. The factions at each plenary party congress were as follows: First Congress: the New Tide Faction, the Kang Faction and the Supra-Faction, the Progress Faction and the Formosa Faction; Second Congress: the New Tide Faction, the Kang Faction and the Supra-Faction, the Progress Faction and the Formosa Faction; Third Congress: the New Tide Faction, middle Factions and the Formosa Faction; Fourth Congress: the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction; Fifth Congress: the New Tide Faction, middle Factions, the World United Formosans for Independence and the Formosa Faction; Sixth Congress: the New Tide Faction, the Justice Alliance, the Welfare State Alliance, the World United Formosans for Independence and the Formosa Faction. Each of the above factions has its own leaders, separate structure and different political views.

Reviewing the development of above factions of the DPP can provide an explanation of political power distribution between the factions, and would be helpful for understanding the making of Mainland China policy under the structure of ‘one China, one Taiwan’ policy. In the following discourses, I am going to follow the times of the
party congresses to describe the development of the factional relationship within the DPP.

2-3-1. The DPP's First National Congress and the Second National Congress (November 1986 – November 1987)

During this period the Kang Faction, the Supra-Faction and the New Tide Faction were the main force in the party, and could therefore have an important influence on the state of affairs within the party. Because most members of Kang Faction and Supra-Faction were elected representatives who usually focused on the administration affairs and had little interest in party affairs, New Tide Faction could gain political power by controlling the Party Organising Committee, and co-operating with Hsieh Chang-ting and his supporters. The New Tide Faction and Kang Faction had a balance of power in the party. Later in the first term chairman election, the New Tide Faction helped Chiang Peng-chien to gain the post of chairman of the DPP; for he New Tide Faction this was the first step towards controlling the party.

As the Formosa Faction, its political force was still weak because the leaders, Huang Hsin-chien and Chang Chun-hong were still in jail, and Hsu Hsin-liang having been blacklisted by the KMT government, was still staying in the US. (12)

Such a faction, without a leader or a clear structure, could not compete with the Kang Faction, the Supra-Faction and the New Tide Faction. The Progress Faction, as the ally of the Formosa Faction, was also weak.

2-3-2. The DPP's Second to the Fourth National Congress (November 1987 – October 1991)

On 30th May, 1987, Huang Hsin-chien and Chang Chun-hong were released from jail, and then they reorganised the Formosa Faction. Huang and Chang attracted new members to the Formosa Faction, which grew quickly, and gained 11 seats (as against 4 previously) on the second Executive Committee and 4 seats (none previously) on the second Central Standing Committee. Yao Chia-wen gained the chairmanship, again due to the support of the New Tide Faction. The main controlling power was still in the hands of the New Tide Faction. The New Tide Faction’s seats on the second Executive Committee were reduced from 13 to 7, and its seats on the second Central Standing
Committee from 7 to 5. The Kang Faction and middle Factions’ places also reduced from 11 to 10 on the Executive Committee, and from 6 to 4 on the Central Standing Committee. (13) During the Second Congress, the factions within DPP were divided into three political groups and competed with each other. Comparing the situations at the First Congress and the Second Congress, the character of change was: the influence of elected representatives at the central and local government levels was growing, and becoming the mainstream of the party; the influence of the New Tide Faction, the Kang Faction and the Supra-Faction was diminishing. (14)

In March of 1988, after Huang Hsin-chien and Chang Chun-hong joined the DPP, the Kang Faction and the Supra-Faction were starting to disintegrate, and their members were accepted by the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction. Huang’s and Chang’s activities put the main focus within the DPP on reorganisation. In order to claim controlling power over party posts, the political line, and policy-making, the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction debated the theory and implementation of several important political issues. The most prominent disputes were over the final result of treatment about the future of Taiwan and the relationship between Taiwan and China. For example, on 26th August 1988, Yao Chia-wen (New Tide Faction), Chang Chun-hong (Formosa Faction), both published their opinions about ‘Sovereignty and Democratisation’ in the China Times. Yao expressed the view that the purpose of emphasising the independent sovereignty of Taiwan was to present the facts, that Taiwan is an independent country; and that the issues of Taiwan’s sovereignty and the democratisation in Taiwan should be solved together. Chang’s opinion was that the basis of the DPP’s philosophy should transcend the issue of ‘unification and independence’, which only wasted the DPP’s resource; furthermore, the democratisation in Taiwan was more important than to independence, and should be given greater priority in the initial stage. (15)

There were two factors for the emergence of the dispute over the choice of political philosophies. The first one was about the third term chairman election. The Formosa Faction was in a hot competition with the New Tide Faction in the election. The second factor was about the competition between the new factions which just moved their headquarters to Taiwan, and the old factions. The World United Formosans for Independence and the World Formosan Association, and the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), gradually moved their headquarters to Taiwan from the
beginning of 1990s, which expanded the competition for power between the various factions of the DPP. The first two above organisations held similar views to the New Tide Faction; the second two held similar views with Formosa Faction. (16) Therefore, the ‘Homeland Visits Campaign’ organised by overseas organisations and the conference in Taiwan of World Formosan Association, both presented the combination of different political philosophies of the above two overseas Taiwanese independence groups and the DPP’s New Tide Faction and Formosa Faction. (17) During the period of power struggle between the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction, Lin Cheng-Chien, the leader of Progress Faction, supported the Formosa Faction’s Huang Hsin-chien in the party’s third term chairman election. Lin wrote an open letter to Chairman Yao Chia-wen clearly showed that he stood on the side of the Formosa Faction and overseas organisation. He challenged Yao’s political philosophies, including over use the mass political line; insistence on Taiwan’s independence would damage cross-Straits relations; and the relationship between the DPP and overseas Taiwanese organisation was too close. (18)

2-3-3. The DPP’s Fifth National Congress (Since October 1991)

During the period of the Third and Fourth Congress, when Huang Hsin-chien was the chairman, the Formosa Faction controlled more than half the seats on the Executive Committee and the Central Standing Committee, and therefore had great influence in the DPP. The New Tide Faction became the ‘opposition’ faction. To prepare for the next round of competition, the New Tide Faction organised ‘The New Tide Office’ outside the DPP, in order to organise and train people at the grass-roots level. Furthermore, they continually criticise the Formosa Faction. Faced with the obstruction and criticism of the New Tide Faction, the Formosa Faction organised ‘The Hsu Hsin-liang Office’ to criticise the New Tide Faction in return. (19)

However, after the 1991 third plenary session of the DPP’s Fourth Central Committee, because the World United Formosans for Independence moved its headquarters to Taiwan, the deployment of factions changed structurally. At the same time, the ruling KMT launched a series of political reforms, Taiwan’s political system began to change from autocracy to the democracy, and the development of the economy towards internationalisation and liberalisation. Taiwanese overseas independence organisations began to pay more attention to Taiwan. They tried to build their base in Taiwan legally,
and to escape the limitations imposed by the government. One notable case among them was the World United Formosans for Independence, which declared the establishment of 'Taiwan Headquarters' which it planned to move to Taiwan. (20) Led by the New Tide Faction, DPP factions which supported alliances with overseas independence organisations prepared for these organisations' 'Homeland Visits Campaign'. Furthermore, New Tide Faction wanted to make the DPP support for the *World United Formosans for Independence* conditionally on an undertaking not to use armed force. (21)

Although the guiding principles, political lines, and strategies of New Tide Faction and World United Formosans for Independence appeared similar, differences of attitude could still be found between them. The World United Formosans for Independence had a more radical attitude on Taiwanese independence than the New Tide Faction. They could be seen as the members of 'Taiwanese Independence fundamentalism'. Also, the World United Formosans for Independence's adopted the 'Armed revolutionary' line, was different from New Tide Faction's 'Peoples' revolutionary' line. (22)

In fact, the relationship between the two factions was 'neither hostile nor friendly', and could be described one of 'nervous co-operation'. Co-operation based on negotiation between those two factions might reduce the nervousness, but they were still in competition for political power within the party, and as the result, they would demand the re-distribution of the right of political power in the future. (23)

2-3-4. The DPP's Sixth National Congress (Since October 1992)

The era of control by factions was symbolised by the multiple factions present during the Sixth Nation Congress. Not only did the New Tide Faction and the Formosa Factions each present candidates for the chairmanship, but several alliances of other factions also put forward candidates.

Shih Ming-teh, supported by the New Tide Faction, the Welfare State Alliance, and the World United Formosans for Independence and Justice Alliance, win the sixth term chairmanship election.

Because the Formosa Faction still maintained superiority in the Executive Committee and the Central Standing Committee, it was the largest faction within the DPP even
after its candidate failed to be elected the sixth term chairman. Seats on the Executive Committee and the Central Standing Committee held by the various factions were: Formosa Faction (12:4), New Tide Faction (6:2), Welfare State Alliance (4:3), Justice Alliance (3:1), and the World United Formosans for Independence (2:1). (24)

2-4. Conclusion

According to the description above, the DPP’s factions and the relationships between them were in a continuous state of development. Development usually progressed around the competition between the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction. After the Fifth National Congress, a situation of multi-factional leadership emerged, which was largely based on the rivalry between the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction. Not only the factions but also the political views and political lines were changed during the process of the DPP’s development. In the general term, the Formosa Faction has moved towards the KMT’s model; the New Tide Faction has moved towards the Formosa Faction’s model; the World United Formosans for Independence try to progress by following New Tide Faction’s model; and the Welfare State Alliance and the Justice Alliance have both tried to survive in competition with the other factions. The original conception of ‘reform with the system’ was not only adopted by the Formosa Faction and Kang’s or Supra-Factions’, but also accepted by the New Tide Faction and the World United Formosans for Independence.

Footnotes:

(2) The original meaning of Tangwai was to call the non-KMT politicians. After Huang Hsin-chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang had become well-known. They had used the phrase of Tangwai frequently. From that time on, Tangwai came to be used particularly in the non-KMT’s political opposition people. See Lee Hsiao-feng, ‘The Historical Review of the Political Reform Movement for the Opposition Force’, in To See Through the Party Formation of Tangwai (Taipei, Feng Yun Platform Publishing Co., 1 December 1986) p. 70
(3) Since the KMT regime has continued to proclaim itself the sole legitimate Chinese government, political institutions established in the mainland in 1947 are all maintained in Taiwan. Members of the three chambers of the national parliament, through a 1954 interpretation of the Constitution by the ROC’s Supreme Court, have lifetime tenure. In 1947, parliament members came from every province in China including Taiwan province. Allocation of parliamentary seats for each province (except for the Control Yuan) were based on the population of each province. Taiwan, because of its small population, claimed few seats. However, when the ROC government moved to Taiwan in 1949, this situation became unfair to Taiwanese. In order to placate Taiwanese people and to resolve the problem of the decrease of members, mainly because of natural deaths, of the mainlander-dominated parliament, ‘supplementary seats’ were created for Taiwanese so that more Taiwanese delegates could be elected to the parliament. Elections have been held for this purpose many times since 1969 under The Statute for Elections and By-Elections of National Level Elective Officials in the Free Areas. Although these supplementary elections have pumped some new blood into the parliament, the situation is still far from satisfactory to Taiwanese people. The percentage of Taiwan-elected members in the parliament in merely 14% of the
total number of deputies now serving in the parliament. See 'Ruling Kuomintang to Study Four Issues', The Free China Journal, 19 May 1986, p. 1; The Independence Evening Post, 29 October 1987, p. 2; Wu Hsin-hsing, Bridging The Strait-- Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 204-209


(7). Huang Teh-fu, The Democratic Progressive Party and Taiwan's Political Democratization (Taipei, Shih Ying Publishing Co, April 1993) pp. 75

(8). Chang Feng-san, 'Brief Introduction of the DPP's Factons', in Taiwan Studies Quarterly, No. 3, 1994, p. 53; Huang, The Democratic Progressive Party and Taiwan's Political Democratisation, pp. 77-79


(10). Wu Nai-teh, 'The Second Line of the Opposition Career-- From Tangwai to the DPP's Intra-Division' in New Tide, No. 16, August 1990

(11). Huang, The Democratic Progressive Party and Taiwan's Political Democratisation, p. 76


(14). Nan Ming, '"After the KMT's 13th National Congress", Please see the DPP's 3rd National Congress -- The Analysis of the Inside Story of the Struggle within the DPP', in Nineties, September 1988, p. 36; also see Nan Ming, '"After the DPP's 3rd National Congress, in Nineties, December 1988, pp. 31-33

(15). Chen, 'The DPP Has No Condition to Break UP -- To Discuss the Problem of the Political Lines among Yao Chia-wen, Chang Chun-hong, and Lin Cheng-chiieh', pp. 7-8

(16). Nan Ming, '"After the KMT's 13th National Congress", Please see the DPP's 3rd National Congress -- The Analysis of the Inside Story of the Struggle within the DPP', p. 36

(17). Chen, 'The DPP Has No Condition to Break UP -- To Discuss the Problem of the Political Lines among Yao Chia-wen, Chang Chun-hong, and Lin Cheng-chiieh'; and also see Nan Ming, ""After the KMT's 13th National Congress", Please see the DPP's 3rd National Congress -- The Analysis of the Inside Story of the Struggle within the DPP"


(19). Formosa Faction stressed that the purpose of Hsu Hsin-liang Office is to raise the competitive power of the DPP. New Tide Faction stressed that the purpose of The New Tide Office is to provide the service for Taiwanese independence, strengthen the mass political line, and unite the weakening group to do the people's peaceful revolution. See The Independence Morning Post, 11 November 1990, p. 2


(21). During the period of the 3rd session plenary of the DPP's 4th National Congress, New Tide Faction's overture suggested that the DPP should ask government to abolish the Black List. This was preparing for the opening political activity of the overseas Taiwan independent groups to come back Taiwan. The overture had caused argument in the party. Finally the meeting passed Hsieh Cheng-ting's amendment proposal that the DPP supports World United Formosans for Independence coming home, but 'World United Formosans for Independence has to announce to give up the line of military revolution. Because World United Formosans for Independence had advocated the line of military revolution ran counter to the rule of the party's platform -- 'The DPP does not use the military revolution line', See Democratic Progressive News, No. 68, 15 May 1991, p. 2


(24). China Times, 1 May 1994, p. 4
Chapter 3. The Formulation of the Democratic Progressive Party’s Mainland China Policy

3-1. Introduction

The establishment of the DPP was the result of a long term political opposition movement. It is better to look at it as an alliance of separate political opposition organisations than to regard it as a political organisation which has its special political consciousness. According to the earlier discussion in chapter 2, members of the opposition factions or groups in 'Tangwai' era had no consensus about issues like economics, politics and the future of the nation. The only consensus within the opposition people was to oppose to the KMT’s 'one-dominant-party system'. The situation remains after the establishment of the DPP. The factional fight always affected the party’s policy making and political line. The party’s policy about Mainland China was influenced by the competition mentioned above during its shaping and developing process.

The purpose of this chapter is to research the shaping and developing of the DPP’s Mainland China policy. The area of research covers the party platform, party constitution, and the process of designing of the Mainland China policy, and the party’s policy on political reform. To achieve this purpose, the foundation of the DPP’s Mainland China policy should be related to the relocation of the relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan. Based on the development of the party’s platform, the process can be divided into three parts: 1) the period of self-determination by residents of Taiwan; 2) the period of claiming the independence of Taiwanese sovereignty; 3) the period of calling for the establishment of an independent state on Taiwan. Dividing the process in this way shows a clear progression from an unclear situation to the ‘quasi-two states and two governments’ concept, and at last to the ‘two-states and two-governments’ policy.

3-2. The period of calls for self-determination by its residents of Taiwan (November 1986 – November 1987)

3-2-1. The formulation of the 1986’s party platform
In the early stage of the founding of the DPP, the party platform combined both Taiwan's and China's ideologies. The terms, which related to the Chinese consciousness, like 'China's territory Taiwan' or the 'ROC', all replaced by the word 'Taiwan', also when mentioned about Taiwan's residents, the term of 'Taiwanese people' was used quite often instead of 'Chinese people' in the party platform. Even though it could not yet be identified as 'Taiwanese independence consciousness', doubtless, it has presented a very strong consciousness of Taiwan. The 1986 party platform also considered the 1947 constitution of the ROC; this was the only part of the platform, which conceded the 'Chinese system', and showed a little bit of Chinese consciousness. (1) A very important point was, neither the goal of state unification nor the goal of Taiwanese independence, which were put into the platform. So the DPP could not be considered as a party with the consciousness of 'separating territory'.

However, the party platform emphasized that 'the future of Taiwan should be determined by the residents of Taiwan themselves'. But there were many different ideas in the party about the questions of 'under which kind of situation', 'by which kind of way', and 'which kind of future' should the Taiwanese exercise the right of self-determination. (2) During the period of the founding of the DPP, Kang and Supra-Faction, Formosa Faction, Progress Faction, and the New Tide Faction were the main factions. Kang and Supra-Faction tended to 'self-determination approach'; Progress Faction favoured more the option of 'unification', but did not oppose the 'self-determination approach'; the New Tide Faction strongly proclaimed an independent Taiwan. Because Kang and Supra-Faction, Formosa Faction, and Progress Faction held comparative advantages over the others, this made the plank of the party platform tend towards to the approach of self-determination on the 'Taiwan problem'. The option of the self-determination approach at least can release the pressure of conflict among the 'independence factions' and the 'unification factions' inside the DPP, as the result of the fact that self-determination includes not only independence but also unification.

In fact, the DPP declared several times that self-determination was not the same as 'Taiwanese independence'. Independence was just one option of self-determination. Self-determination emphasised the procedure more than the result. However, the definition of self-determination was unclear. It meant that different factions were unable to achieve an agreement. The New Tide Faction thought that 'the right of self-determination for the residents of Taiwan' meant Taiwanese independence. Compared
with the New Tide Faction's understanding, Formosa Faction, Kang and Supra-Faction, and Progress Faction perceived self-determination and Taiwanese independence were different. (3) So the factions achieved consensus in some parts of 'self-determination' through negotiation. 'Self-determination' became a political strategy and a temporary declaration.

3-2-2. The formulation of the 1987's Mainland China policy

Despite its support of the eventual independence of Taiwan, the DPP's Mainland China policy plank of its platform advocates in the short-term the normalisation of the relations between Taiwan and Mainland China through exchanges and contacts on the basis of peaceful coexistence and competition.

In the period of Tangwai, because Taiwan then was under the KMT's one-party authoritarian rule, neither the moderate factions nor the radical factions was vocal on the issue of Taiwanese independence: they all did not want to challenge the KMT's 'one China' policy. The two groups both advocated building the relationship of 'three-links' (direct transportation, telecommunication, and investment links) with China. But that did not mean that they wanted to take the road of unification with China. They just opposed the KMT's policy of 'Three Nos' (no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise with Beijing) and Beijing's Taiwan policy of 'three links and four exchanges'. (4) The Tangwai people's opposition policy to both the KMT and Beijing was essential for Taiwan to reduce its isolation in the international society then.

On 13th October 1987, the DPP at its Central Standing Committee Meeting passed the resolution entitled 'The Current Stage's Mainland China Policy of the DPP'. It stated that 'the future of Taiwan should be decided by the people of Taiwan'. (5) The important points of this resolution were: 1) People should be allowed to travel freely between Taiwan and the mainland, to visit relatives, to travel, to look for relatives, and also to freely exchange postal and telecommunication services, and to sweep their ancestors' tombs. 2) Contacts between individuals in the fields of culture, academic affairs, arts, technology and science, sports and economics should be processed on a basis of equality between Taiwan and Mainland China. 3) Both Taiwan and the mainland should abolish the policy of the use of force against each other. They should stop the infiltration of covert operations agents within each other's territories, and end
hostile political propaganda. By so doing, the relations between Taiwan and the mainland accordingly could be promoted from the stage of peaceful competition to the stage of peaceful negotiation, and mutual recognition. 4) The DPP’s Mainland China policy would be divided into two stages. In the short term, Taiwan and the mainland should conduct the exchanges on an unofficial basis, while in the long term the two sides of the Taiwan Straits should hold political negotiations. Such negotiations, however, could only be held after the completion of Taiwan’s parliamentary reform.

In April 1989, the DPP further elaborated on its mainland policy based on the above-mentioned four points. (6)

3-3. The period of claiming the independence of Taiwan’s sovereignty

3-3-1. The party’s policy-making

Because of increasing independence claims inside the DPP during 1987, the DPP officially decided to write the article of ‘The People of Taiwan have the right to pursue Taiwanese independence’ into the party platform at the 7th plenary session of the party’s First Central Committee on 2nd November 1987. Some members of the Executive Committee said that writing it into the party platform could increase the conflict between the DPP and KMT. They suggested that they could just make a resolution and pass it in the National Congress instead of writing it into the party platform. Then first the pressure of decision making on the DPP Headquarters could be eased, second the competition between moderate factions and radical factions could be calmed down. Furthermore, more consideration of the Taiwanese independence issue could be given widely inside the party and among Taiwan’s society than before. Then, Yao Chia-wen (New Tide Faction) made a draft proposal and passed it in the Second Congress, which was written with the purpose of declaring that the people have the right to pursue independence, although this proposal left open which way – like the ‘German Model’, ‘Singapore Model’, ‘One country, Two governments’, ‘Great Chinese Federation’, even including Beijing’s ‘One country, two systems’, – might provide a suitable model for Taiwan. But the principle of self-determination had already been changed to ‘People have the right to claim independence of Taiwan’, which meant that the DPP’s political pursuit of Taiwanese independence was becoming more and more strong.
3-3-2. The formulation the ‘417 resolution’

The ‘417 Resolution’ was passed in the first contemporary meeting of the party’s Second National Congress, which was held in April 1988. It was an alternative to the plan of writing ‘The People of Taiwan have the right to pursue Taiwan’s independence’ article into the party platform (also called the proposal of ‘Taiwanese independence outline of the party platform’). To trace to it source, the making of the proposal of ‘Taiwanese independence outline of the party platform’ was the result of the factional fight within the party. (7)

On 17th April, a meeting was held to discuss the amendment of the party platform. The Formosa Faction’s Yu Tan-fa disagreed with writing ‘The People of Taiwan have the right to pursue Taiwan’s independence’ into the party platform. Kang and Supra-Faction’s Kang Ning-hsiang submitted an alternative proposal and suggested to shelve the original proposal. But the proposal of ‘Taiwanese independence outline of the party platform’ has won the support of the majority of the members of the party, the New Tide Faction insisted to adopt the original one. After a long arguing, Hsieh Chang-ting and the New Tide Faction’s Chiu I-jen, Hung Chi-chang, and Wu Nai-jen, they submitted the second alternative proposal: The DPP would advocate Taiwan’s independence if the following four conditions occurred. (8) 1) if the KMT unilaterally embarked on talks with the CCP; 2) if the KMT betrayed the Taiwan people’s interests; 3) if the PRC forcefully reunified Taiwan; 4) if the KMT does not sincerely attempt to bring about a genuine democracy.

This resolution obviously reflected the DPP’s deep mistrust of the KMT. The DPP attempted to take a pre-emptive action to prevent a ‘sell-out’ of the Taiwanese by the KMT and the CCP. It was an elastic resolution. This resolution did reveal the DPP’s ulterior motive to promote Taiwan’s independence through means of indirect expression. However, it could be interpreted that the DPP was so indirect about its pro-independence leanings because of the tense political atmosphere and the situation in Taiwan at this time right after the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988. (9)

3-3-3. The formulation the 1989’s Mainland China policy
In July 1988, the DPP set up a group called ‘The Mainland Policy Research Group’, which was for handling the newest situation of the relationship between the Taiwan Straits after the ROC government allowed Taiwan’s residents to visit their relatives in Mainland China. The members of the group consisted of Fu Cheng (Kang’s and Supra-Faction), Chang Chun-hong and Chen Shui-bian (Formosa Faction), Yang Tsu-chun (Progress Faction), and Lu Hsiu-i (New Tide Faction). In the group, the alliance of Kang’s and Supra-Faction, Formosa Faction, Progress Faction, and the other side which was the New Tide Faction usually held different views on some issues. The main points about the relations between the Taiwan Straits that had been expressed by the members of the group were three: 1) The arguments about reunification and independence: the first three factions thought it should give up the argument of reunification or independence on handling the Taiwan Straits relationship; but the New Tide Faction thought the relationship between the two sides should be framed as a relationship of ‘country to country’; 2) The arguments about the exchanges of the economics and trade: the first three factions held an open attitude to this issue, but the New Tide Faction held a conservative attitude; 3) The arguments on the contacts with the CCP: the first three factions encouraged the members of the party to visit Mainland China, but the New Tide Faction opposed the DPP visiting the mainland. Although there were arguments among the faction on the above three issues, almost all factions had tried to deny the ROC’s policy on proclaiming sovereignty over the mainland. (10)

According to the faction’s membership, and the power of every faction at that time, Formosa Faction, Progress Faction, Kang’s and Supra-Faction were comparatively stronger than others. Therefore, the mainland policy, which was formed in 1989, reflected the opinions of the stronger factions.

Firstly, the 1989 Mainland China policy did not identify the relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan as a ‘country to country’ one. And it inadvertently leaked that the current situation of the relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan was in a state of civil war, which meant that it gave tacit consent to ‘One China’. (11)

Secondly, the document implied that there was ‘one country, but two reciprocal governments’. It has been mentioned above that the document gave tacit consent to ‘One China’, however, at the same time, it regarded the CCP to give up ‘One China’ policy. Therefore, the meaning of the ‘One China’ in that document is ambiguous, it did
not say that was the ROC, or the PRC, (12) furthermore it could be considered to represent both of them.

3-3-4. The formulation of the ‘1007 Resolution’

On 26th September 1990, the leaders of New Tide Faction and Formosa Faction signed a proposal, put forward by the ex-chairman, Yao Chia-wen, called ‘our sovereignty does not include the territories of the PRC and People’s Republic of Mongolia (PRM)’. This proposal included six reasons and three resolutions. It asked the government publicly to declare that the sovereignty of the ROC did not include the territories of PRC and PRM and also suggested the PRC recognised Taiwan’s sovereignty. The purpose of putting forward this proposal for the New Tide Faction was to enhance their independence position inside the DPP and submit it to the second session of the party’s Fourth Central Committee, which might accept the independence position of New Tide Faction in the meeting and turned it into the DPP’s policy.

The original draft of the proposal which was submitted by the New Tide Faction combined both Chen Shui-bian’s and Hsieh Chang-ting’s opinions, and then it was modified literally. For example, ‘sovereignty’ was changed into ‘exact sovereignty’, and ‘territory’ was deleted in order to avoid any legal sanction, which might be caused by the advocacy of Taiwanese independence. (13)

After the ‘1007 Resolution’ was adopted, the New Tide Faction further suggested setting up the ‘Committee of Taiwan’s Sovereignty Independent Movement’ (CTSIM) in order to implement the resolution and promote the independence movement by a political organisation. Because the Formosa Faction purposely gave way to the New Tide Faction, the CTSIM finally was established in the party. (14)

The passing of the ‘1007 Resolution’ and the founding of the CTSIM provided such a change that the Formosa Faction considered ways of avoiding the party’s breakup, and opposing the ruling KMT. And the Formosa Faction’s deliberations let the New Tide Faction’s idealistic Taiwanese independence requirement to take the place of Formosa Faction’s ‘de facto Taiwan’s independence’ that means Taiwan’s sovereign independence is to maintain the present status of Taiwan. From that time on, the New Tide Faction’s view of Taiwanese independence has become the main stream in the
3-3-5. The formulation of the Democratic Charter

Before the National Affair Conference took place in June 1990, (15) the DPP prepared the Democratic Charter in advance, and was going to submit in the meeting.

The Democratic Charter included three provisions about the Mainland China-Taiwan relationship. It used the ‘quasi-two countries and two governments’ to define the two sides relationship, and adhered to the principle of International Law and Security Rule. Based on the above principles, the DPP expressed its view about the Mainland China-Taiwan relationship as follows: 1) oppose the PRC claim over the sovereignty of Taiwan; 2) both sides should respect each other's sovereignty and its power of governing; 3) the communication between two governments should follow the International Law and regular procedures; 4) the exchanges and co-operation between two sides should respect each other’s domestic law. (16)

3-3-6. The DPP’s Legislative Group: the formulation of the Law of Relationship with Mainland China

On 24th October, 1990, the ‘New Parliamentary Research Office’ that was organised by the New Tide Faction’s Legislators presented the ‘Law of Relationship with Mainland China’ to respond to the ‘Statute Governing the Relations Between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area’, which was adopted by the ROC Ministry of Justice. The making of the New Parliamentary Research Office’s ‘Law of Relationship with Mainland China’ was based on three foundations: 1) In terms of exact sovereignty, Taiwan is an independent country of Mainland China. 2) The PRC is a special ‘foreign country’, the relations between the ROC and PRC is different from the relations with the other countries. 3) Taiwan’s national profits and security should be put into the first place, and the cross-Straits affairs should be supervised by the Parliament. (17)

After the New Tide Faction presented its ‘Law of Relationship with Mainland China’, the Formosa Faction’s Legislator Chen Shui-bian presented the faction’s ‘The Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the PRC and the ROC’ on 30th October of the same year. The treaty adduced the Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in 1972. The purpose of the New Tide Faction was to use the ‘German model’ to define the Mainland China-Taiwan relationship, and tried to define the relationship of the two sides of Taiwan Straits into a ‘two Chinas’ model. (18)

Eventually, the DPP’s Legislators combined the ‘Law of Relationship with Mainland China’ and the ‘The Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the PRC and the ROC’, then presented the DPP Legislative Group’s edition of ‘The Draft of the Law of Relationship Between Mainland China and Taiwan’. The main body of the draft was based on the New Parliamentary Office’s edition, and absorbed many ideas of the Chen Shui-bian’s edition. At the same time, it also accepted Progress Faction’s Lin Cheng-chien’s amendment proposal that had a strong trend of unification with the mainland. The main characteristics of the DPP Legislative group’s ‘The Draft of the Law of Relationship Between Mainland China and Taiwan’ were:

1) Considering the PRC as a hostile ‘quasi-foreign nation’, this draft of the law is the operating plan before the conflict has been reduced and the Basic Treaty has been signed up by the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. (Article 1 of the draft of the law.)

2) The motive of the draft of the law departs from the concept of ‘Taiwan common destiny’, based on the view of ‘exact sovereignty’, the intermediary organisation should be considered as quasi-official, and supervised by the organs of people’s representative.

3) The relations between Taiwan and Mainland China apply international law, but the PRM is not included.

4) The trade between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits should require official permits.

3-4. The period of proclaiming the establishment of an independent state on Taiwan

3-4-1. Process of the formulation of ‘Taiwan Independence Platform’

After the ‘417 Resolution’, the pro-independence activists in Taiwan further expedited
the task of realizing Taiwan's independence. Several factors encouraged the tendencies of the Taiwan Independence Movement. Lee Teng-hui has become the first Taiwan-born President. This event brought great jubilation to some Taiwanese. The pro-independence activists intended to utilize this Taiwanese consciousness to promote Taiwan’s independence. As far as the pro-independence activists were concerned, the unification of Germany, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the emergence of independent Baltic states, and Beijing’s approval of the admission of the two Koreas to the UN have made the unthinkable much more tenable. The biggest factor behind the Taiwanese independence surge is the opening up of politics in Taiwan. Most restrictions on free speech and the press have been lifted. The December 1991 elections for the National Assembly would be the first in which all the seats would be contested by candidates from Taiwan. In Spring 1992, the 3,250 seat National Assembly would re-examine and no doubt revise the 1947 ROC Constitution that defined Taiwan as a part of China. Both the DPP and the pro-independence activists intended to make the December 1991 election a referendum on independence. (19)

On 25th August, 1991, the DPP held its People’s Conference for the Instituting of a Constitution. During the session of the conference, the meeting delegates passed the constitutional draft for ‘The Republic of Taiwan’. (20) In October 1991, during the party’s 5th National Congress, a clause for the creation of a separate ‘Republic of Taiwan’ and ‘Taiwanese independence’ was presented by the New Tide Faction’s Lin Cho-shui that was included in the DPP’s party platform for the December 1991 elections to the National Assembly. (21)

On 12th August, the Formosa Faction lost the competence of the election for the Executive Committee. That made the faction follow the ideas of the pro-independence party representatives. Hsu Hsin-liang, showed a quite different attitude than before to support the proposal of building the Republic of Taiwan. Hsu said that the DPP’s nature is a ‘Taiwanese independence party’. The party’s aim is to build an official independent country on Taiwan. The only argument within the party was about when would be the best time for introducing a formal title of the new country? Since the constitutional draft for the ‘Republic of Taiwan’ has been accepted by the party, therefore, the amendment proposal for the party platform should be passed as soon as possible. (22) The candidate for the party chairman’s election, Shih Ming-teh, who was supported by the New Tide Faction, also supported Lin’s proposal. (23) Furthermore, for winning the post of the
chairman, although some members of Formosa Faction opposed Lin’s proposal, they still agreed to the New Tide Faction’s idea of writing the Taiwanese independence article into the party platform in this congress. At last, after a series of intense arguments, the meeting unanimously adopted Chen Shui-bian’s (Formosa Faction) amendment proposal for the guiding principle of the party’s platform.

Moreover, the factions of the DPP also achieved an agreement that the former use of the term ‘CCP’ in the party platform would be replaced by ‘PRC’. This clearly described the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits as a relationship of two sovereign states, but not two equal governments or two equal political entities in the structure of ‘one country’. At this moment, the argument about democracy or independence, which one has the priory in Taiwan’s future, ended with a consideration that the mainland policy should put independence onto the first place. The ‘Taiwan independence platform’ has finally become the highest guiding principle for the design of the party’s Mainland China policy.

3-4-2. The formulation of the 1992 ‘Guidelines for China policy’

In May 1992, the DPP organised the ‘Mainland China Policy Studying Group’ to respond to the rapid developing relations between the Taiwan Straits, and the arguments for the definition of ‘one China’ within the KMT. This group composed of three members of Formosa Faction (Chen Chung-hsin, Yang Huang Mei-hsin, Hsu Ming-teh), two members of New Tide Faction (Chiu I-jen, Yao Chia-wen), and middle faction (Chen Shih-meng). (24)

The ‘Mainland China Policy Studying Group’ published three parts of the draft of the ‘Plan for the Current Stage Cross-Straits Relations and China Policy’ – ‘Guidelines’, ‘The Principle in Politics’, and ‘The Specialised Organisation for the Cross-Straits Relations’. As for the parts of ‘Trade and Investment’ and ‘Culture and Society’, because of the different views within the different factions, the group decided to publish them after more discussion and communication. (25) There were some points worth taking notice of. ‘The sovereignty of Taiwan is independent, and does not belong to the PRC, Taiwan’s sovereignty does not include Mainland China and Mongolia, the government of the PRC is the only legal government of Mainland China, (26) this definition not only considered the sovereignty of the ROC does not cover Mainland
China and Mongolia, but also considered that both the ROC and the PRC have no rights to claim Taiwan’s sovereignty. In other words, it used ‘one China, one Taiwan’ as the definition of the Cross-Straits relations. This mainland policy was deeply influenced by the ‘Taiwan independence platform’. Furthermore, the draft of the China policy did not take the stand of asking ‘the KMT and the CCP to both to give up their insistence on “one China” policy’, but argued ‘against the KMT government’s wrong policy of “one China”’ instead. And it also suggested to ‘use the international stratagem of “one China, one Taiwan” to search for the international space for living’. (27)

So, all the evidences above provide a clear view that the pro-independence activists within the DPP not only worried about trade, but also social, and cultural communications between the Taiwan Straits. They were afraid that the cross-Straits exchanges would hurt the development of ‘one China, one Taiwan’.

3-5. Conclusion

To sum up the discussions above, the following are the main points of the relationship among the factional politics in the DPP and the party platform, and the mainland policy and the views on constitutional reform:

1. During the three periods of the development of the DPP’s Mainland China policy, because of the rise of the factor of independence, the party’s mainland policy has tended to be conservative, and the definition of the relationship thus evolved gradually towards ‘one China, one Taiwan’.

2. Reviewing the development of the making of the party’s platform and the making of the resolutions, the concept of self-determination was changing. The meaning of self-determination was given by the stronger political force. And later it made the view of pro-independence activists rising gradually in the party.

3. In the DPP, people who advocated unification, some by the reason of death or illness (Fu Cheng), some by reason of accident (Yu Tan-fa), or by losing competence with others, left the party. This made the force of those who advocated unification become more and more weak, finally the power of pro-independence has been raising in the party.
4. The DPP used the model of making resolutions (‘Taiwanese people have the right to pursue Taiwan’s independence’, ‘417 Resolution’, and ‘1007 Resolution’) to cease the arguments about writing a Taiwanese independence article into the party’s platform. They used a compromise policy to make a balance between the arguments for independence and unification, and the political reality that proclaiming Taiwan independence would cause the political tension.

The background to the DPP’s compromise policy was as follows: On the one hand, the policymaking centre of the party was usually paralysed by factional fights. On the other hand, the Progress Faction’s Lin Cheng-chien supported Huang Hsin-chieh and Chang Chun-hong when they reintegrated and reorganised the Formosa Faction. The strength of the Formosa Faction then started growing rapidly. And because of the Formosa Faction’s opposition and the middle factions’ coordination, the party deferred the process of writing the article of ‘Taiwanese independence’ into the party platform. This also reduced the likelihood of conflicts over the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty between the KMT and the DPP.

5. The balance of political power among the factions can influence the development of policy. The range of influences can be judged by examining the structure of the ‘Mainland China Policy Studying Group’. The seats in the group depended on each faction’s force. For example, in the period of self-determination by residents of Taiwan, the Kang Faction was the most powerful in the party, so it had 3 seats in the policy making group. In the period of claiming the independence of Taiwan’s sovereignty, Formosa Faction and New Tide Faction were equal in achievement, so both had 5 seats in the group. In the period of proclaiming the establishment of an independent state on Taiwan, the force of Formosa Faction was getting weaker, the number of its seats then reduced in the group, and it even had no place in the ‘Cross-Straits Relations Group’, which was organised in March 1993.

6. During a certain period of time, the main ideas of designing mainland China policy usually came from the strongest faction, and then became the ‘consensus’ of the whole party. But it does not mean that the party’s policy revealed totally the will of the main stream faction. Consequently, there were a series of ‘decision making’ by the factions behind the process of the policy making. And the ‘decision making’ usually came from the factional fight.
7. The argument about the political issue usually related to political force. Factions sometime changed their political theme to pursue political force. Under some conditions, they would accept other faction’s view and exchange their political profits, for example, in the case of the passing of the ‘Taiwan independence platform’, Formosa Faction and New Tide Faction compromised, because both of them wanted to gain the post in the party. Or, the main factions sometimes tried to avoid conflict, which could cause the party’s breakup. They would accept the other side’s opinion temporarily and then delay the implementation, for example, the setting up of the CTSIM.

8. Although different factions have different views on policy making, this does not mean that all the members of a certain faction can unite under a common idea of policy. For example, Welfare State Alliance and Justice Alliance are both organised by the members which have different views on some policies. But in the cases of the Formosa Faction and New Tide Faction, both of their members share a common view on certain issues. In addition, under special circumstances, different factions could share the same political view with one another. Even sometimes they would co-operate with the others temporarily, but it did not mean that the different factions would unite. The rule was that even if different factions could share the same political opinion with others, they would still want to share political power to fit their own faction’s profit. For example, in the cases of New Tide Faction and World United Formosans for Independence, they are both radical Taiwanese independence advocates, but competition still exists between them.

Footnotes:

(1). Tan Chi-chiang, ‘Want Democracy, but Do not Want Separate – Review Taiwan DPP’s Separatism’, in Ming Bao, 24-25 November 1986, p. 24; and see Tan, ‘Entanglement between Taiwan Complex and China Complex’ – Secondly Review Taiwan DPP’s Party Platform’, in Ming Bao, 3-4 December 1986, p. 25


(3). Huang Teh-fu, The Democratic Progressive Party and Taiwan’s Political Democratization (Taipei, Shih Ying Publishing Co., April 1993) pp. 118-121

(4). On 1 January 1979 the PRC and the US established full diplomatic relations. At the same time, Beijing intensified its ‘peaceful offensives’ toward Taipei and adopted a ‘Message to Compatriots in Taiwan’ under the name of Standing Committee of the Fifth National People’s Congress. These events were the prelude to new policies toward the ROC, and marked a new era in the relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. In the message, Beijing stressed that the unification of China is ‘consonant with popular sentiment and general trend of development’ of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. The message suggests that the two sides should directly conduct ‘three links’ and ‘four exchanges’ in academic, cultural, sporting, and technological endeavours. Beijing also announced at the same time the cessation of shelling of the offshore islands still in the hands of the ROC to show its sincerity concerning to the peaceful resolution of the China issue in another message. See ‘Message to Compatriots in Taiwan’, in Beijing Review, 5 January 1979, pp. 16-17; also see ‘Shelling of Quemoy and Other Islands Stopped’, in Beijing Review, 5 January
1979, p. 4

(5) 'The Current Stage of the Mainland China Policy of the DPP', *Democratic Progressive News*, No. 34, 17-23 October 1987, p. 1


(7) Lu, 'Analysing the Making and Formulation of DPP’s Policy from 417 resolution', p. 78

(8) See *China Times*, 18 April 1988, p. 2

(9) Wu Hsin-hsing, *Bridging the Strait — Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification* (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 238

(10) See the DPP Public Policy Research Centre, ‘The first meeting’s record of The DPP Mainland China Policy Research Group, 13 June 1988, and ‘The second meeting’s record of The DPP Mainland China Policy Research Group, 20 June 1988, and the summary record of the four public hearing meetings that provided by the DPP Public Policy Research Centre


(12) Shao, 'The Contradictory between the DPP’s Consciousness of Unification and Independence’

(13) *China Times*, 8 October 1990, p. 3

(14) Formosa Faction seemed want to get around participating the discussion of the proposal. Formosa Faction’s members of the party Central Standing Committee, Lin Wen-lang, Yu Ching, and Chang Chun-hong all absent. Yu Chen Yun-yin and Hsu Kuo-tai had left before the discussion of that proposal. The meeting then just the chairman Huang Hsin-chieh and 4 New Tide Faction’s Central Standing members stayed in the meeting. The proposal finally has been passed. See *China Times*, 15 November 1990, p. 3; and *China Times*, 16 November 1990, p. 2

(15) The ROC President Lee Teng-hui announced the setting up of the National Affair Conference which was to represent a wide range of opinions and interests on Taiwan and it was to look at the whole question of political reform. The conference took place between 28 June and 4 1990. The participants rang from those who supported Taiwanese independence to those who advocated immediate unify with the PRC. The National Affairs Conference secretariat held a number of formal sessions to work out the ground rules for the conference. It was agreed that issues that might endanger security such as unification and independence would be kept off the agenda. There was also agreement that the Temporary Provisions (Temporary Provisions Effective during the period of Mobilisation for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion) should be ended. There was also agreement that the constitutional system should be revised rather than replaced and there was a preference for the retention of the fivefold division of powers as set out in the Nanjing constitution, which was adopted in 1946 in Nanjing, Mainland China. A further element of democracy was endorsed with support for the direct election of the governor of Taiwan and the mayorships of Taipei and Kaohsiung. See Keith Maguire, *The Rise of Modern Taiwan* (Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1998) pp. 90-91

(16) 'Review the DPP’s Democratic Great Charter, in United Daily News, 8 June 1990, p. 2


(19) Wu, *Bridging the Strait — Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification*, p. 238

(20) See *China Times*, 26 August 1991, p. 7

(21) See *China Times*, 14 August 1991, p. 2

(22) Weng Su-hwa, 'Raising the National Title of Republic of Taiwan – The Different Views between Hsu Hsin-liang and Hsih Ming-teh', in The Independence Morning Post, 26 August 1991; and Weng Su-hwa, 'Hsu Hsin-liang: The DPP's Nature is a Taiwanese independence party', in *The Independence Morning Post*, 27 September 1991, p. 3

(23) *Democratic Progressive News*, No. 77, 1 October 1991, p. 1

(24) *Taiwan Times*, 21 May 1992, p. 3


(26) *The Independence Morning Post*, 2 September 1992, p. 2

(27) *The Independence Morning Post*, 2 September 1992, p. 2

4-1. Introduction

After its victory in the 1997 local elections, the DPP was believed to be heading towards becoming the governing party of Taiwan’s central government. According to the political environment, the KMT’s impetus is decreasing; support to Lee Teng-hui, KMT’s chairman, dropped to 47% after the 1997 elections. That was the first time that Lee’s support went below 50% since he entered politics. (1) The significance of the fact is the possibility that the DPP may overhaul the KMT in the near future, and later gain the overall official governing power in Taiwan. But on the road to becoming the formal governing party, it needs first to present a suitable China policy, which can convince the Taiwanese people that the DPP is capable of undertaking the task of negotiating with Beijing. For the DPP, making a new China policy is not only a current strategy if it is to be a responsible party, but also a key for it to open the door for becoming the ruling party in the future.

‘The Democratic Progressive Party’s China Policy Symposium’ which was held by the DPP Headquarters took place from February 13th to 15th, 1998 in Taipei. This was the first time the DPP held a formal meeting to discuss the relations between Taiwan and Mainland China. On the one hand, the meeting was replying to the needs to constitute a formal China policy from outside the political environment; on the other hand, it was also aiming to lay the foundation for becoming the governing party, and giving a chance for the different factions that hold different opinions on China policy in the DPP to exchange and discuss their ideas with one another.

Apart from facing the situation of possibly becoming the governing party, the DPP’s 1998 China policy symposium was also the product of gaining political power within the party between different factions, especially focused on the factional fight between the two main factions—the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction.

In the meeting, the Formosa Faction introduced a ‘contact’ policy— ‘advance-west
boldly'—, and encouraged the overall exchanges between the Taiwan Straits. The New Tide Faction held a different view on the Mainland China policy: their 'uncompromising' policy—'base-strengthening and advance-west gradually'—and stood for limiting the exchanges between the Taiwan Straits.

After three days of hot debating, the DPP reached a compromise. They combined the 'advance-west boldly' policy and the 'base-strengthening and advance-west gradually' policy into a 'base-strengthening and advance-west' policy. However, this reconciliatory agreement did not really to be realised in the party. Arguments over the Mainland China policy are still an issue within the party.

4-2. What are the 'advance-west boldly' and the 'base-strengthening and advance-west gradually' policies?

Taiwan is located off the eastern coast of Asia in the Western Pacific. Its western neighbor is Mainland China—the most potential market in the world today. The two sides of the Taiwan Straits are still confronting each other on politics. But it is impossible for Taiwan to ignore China's economic potential. How to make a suitable policy on the cross-Straits affairs that can ensure Taiwan's national security and economic development concurrently is a big issue for the DPP. Because the different factions hold different stands, they have different judgments on the situation of the cross-Straits; therefore their views differ on the China policy.

In the DPP, the Formosa and the New Tide have both devoted time and research on Mainland China policy. Early in 1995, when attending the DPP’s presidential preliminary election, Hsu Hsin-liang, former chairman of the DPP and important leader of the Formosa Faction, published The Rising People expanding his ideas on how to operate the mainland's market. He advocated the division of the economic affairs from the political affairs, and the 'advance-west boldly' policy. But his ideas were rejected by the main stream of the Taiwan independence groups within the DPP. As a consequence, Hsu paid the price of losing the campaign for the presidential preliminary election of the DPP. The New Tide is the faction which strictly insists that Taiwan should be independent from Mainland China. They advocated a 'no contact', 'no negotiation' policy with Beijing in the early years. Recently, they have slightly changed their attitude into 'base-strengthening'. Because of their lack of faith in Beijing, however, their
position on keeping their distance from Beijing has remained unchanged.

What are the ‘advance-west boldly’ and the ‘base-strengthening and advance-west gradually’ policies? In brief, ‘advance-west boldly’ entails a compromising and contact policy. The Formosa wants to raise the economic issues instead of the political issues to reduce the possibility of conflicts in the Taiwan Straits. Taiwan needs to use its economic and cultural merits to invest China’s market as soon as possible. ‘Base-strengthening and advance-west gradually’ however is an uncompromising and opposing policy. The New Tide still insists that China is Taiwan’s biggest enemy; political problems need solving before any economic issue may be raised. As a result, Taiwan needs to ensure a relative autonomy from China’s market.

4-2-1. The ‘advance-west boldly’ policy

The Formosa’s approach to the China policy is the ‘advance-west boldly’ policy. ‘West’ is China. The ‘advance-west boldly’ policy aims to encourage the Taiwanese people to operate in the Chinese economic market. With regards to politics, it wishes to negotiate with Beijing, and to use a conciliation policy instead of a confrontation one.

Concerning the ‘advance-west boldly’ policy, the Formosa considers that the Cold War is over, a new international order is emerging, and international economic co-operation has replaced political conflicts. Hsu Hsin-liang considers, if Taiwan insists on confronting China, it will isolate itself from the international community, and the pressure exercised by international forces will only get stronger as a result. Taiwan needs to avoid isolation, and thus needs to join the international main stream— and not challenge the international reality nor challenge Beijing, and not advocate Taiwanese independence. With respect to the economic strategy, Taiwan needs to invest in the largest market in the world – China – in order to spur the upgrading of Taiwan’s industries. (2)

On the issue of the international situation, the Formosa believes that the international pressure pushing Taipei to negotiate with Beijing will keep on increasing. If Taipei does not give a positive reply, its position in the international community will be more and more difficult. (3)
Julian J. Kuo, a member of the Formosa, points out that isolation from the international community would generate an even bigger crisis for Taiwan. Playing a key role and helping create the agenda in the process of China's joining the new international order is a chance for Taiwan to seek a living space in the international community for the future. Furthermore, in the process of Taiwan's joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Taiwan should negotiate with China the issue of direct transportation with Mainland China. Kuo considers, however, that opening the door to three-links to Mainland China is not a prerequisite for Taiwan's entering the WTO, but on the other hand making a compromise with China in advance can only benefit Taiwan. (4)

Kuo adds, that the China-US co-operation will touch sensitive issues, such as how to set the military powers in Asia yet, Taiwan will not get a voice on these issues; time is not a factor on Taiwan's side. (5)

On the international and the cross-Straits economic relations, the Formosa considers that Taiwan should use three-links to release the pressure coming from the international community. (6)

On the arguments on Taiwan's sovereignty and on the negotiations with Mainland China, Hsu Hsin-liang advocates avoiding the arguments on the sovereignty issue and raising the economic negotiations instead of the political negotiations. Chou Po-lun, a member of the Progress Faction, a branch of the Formosa, considers that the two sides of the Taiwan Straits have firstly to admit that there are disagreements on Taiwan's sovereignty; then only can the two sides start to negotiate on other issues. (7)

On the developing strategy of the cross-Straits' trade, because investing in the developing China is a good opportunity for Taiwan's economics, the Formosa considers that Taiwan should 'advance-west' first, then come back to get the strength of 'base-strengthening'. (8)

On the economic relations between Mainland China and Taiwan, the Formosa considers that the economic affairs between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits are dependent on each other, that China needs Taiwan's capital and industrial techniques, and that Taiwan needs China's labour and market. Therefore the 'advance-west boldly' policy would not incur drawbacks for Taiwan's industrial development. (9)
4-2-2. The ‘base-strengthening and advance-west gradually’ policy

The New Tide’s approach to the China policy is the ‘base-strengthening and advance-west gradually’ policy. Their attitude towards the China policy entails an uncompromising policy. They consider that China is a potential enemy of Taiwan. Even Taiwan can not ignore the big Chinese market. But Taiwan still needs to protect its national security. The first need is to adopt a ‘base-strengthening and advance-west gradually’ policy regarding economics and politics; then only would it be possible to ‘advance-west’.

With regards to the ‘base-strengthening and advance-west gradually’ policy, the New Tide does not believe in the formation of a new international order under the international compromise reached after the Cold War. The present international situation mixes both compromises and conflicts at the same time, hence any danger for Taiwan would not come from isolation, but rather from a lack of national identity. If Taiwan insists on investing in China’s market, the Taiwanese identity may become subverted, and Taiwan’s international status would be lowered. The New Tide does not consider the international pressure on Taiwan as being serious; because the Western countries still strive to contain the Communist China, Taiwan remains useful to the Western world. For Taiwan itself, the most important thing is to upgrade its industries, not to invest in China’s market, it also has to avoid getting too close to China, because China is a tremendous market— if it does, it will be at risk of being absorbed by China’s market.

On the issue of the international situation, the New Tide considers that the new international order has not been completed, and that international transmutations in the future will be varied. Taipei needs not put itself under pressure. (10)

In the New Tide’s opinion, negotiating with China should be objected to the pressure of time. For example, on the issue of entering the WTO, Legislator Lai Ching-lin stresses that there is no precondition on the issue of Taiwan’s entering the WTO, and that it is not necessary for Taiwan to negotiate with China on the issues of three-links in advance. The three-links issue should not be mixed with the issue of entering the WTO. (11)

The New Tide’s Legislator Lin Cho-shui says that Taiwan should show good will to
China. At the same time, Taiwan still needs to show its determination in order to maintain its equal and independent political position and also the needs for defence against China. Taiwan simply needs to give a clear-cut signal with a good will of its wish to have talks and to negotiate on specific functional issues. (12)

Lai Ching-lin considers ill-founded the Formosa’s judgement on the US-China relations after the Clinton-Jiang’s talks in 1997. The Formosa’s position on China and the US building ‘the strategic talks’ or ‘the constructive strategic partnership’ is too pessimistic. The New Tide’s analysis of the new international frame is that the US and Japan will strategically unify in order to stop China’s military expansion in the Asia-Pacific region in the Post-Cold War era. The US especially need to maintain the existence of Taiwan in order to impede on China’s expansion. Only if the Chinese force increases to the point that it is strong enough to break the balance will Taiwan’s security be at risk. The New Tide’s analysis reveals that Taiwan’s strategic position is more important than ever before under the US containment policy to China. (13)

On the international and the cross-Straits economic relations, the New Tide considers that Taiwan needs to negotiate with China, but the negotiation should not be done under any pressure. (14)

On the arguments on Taiwan’s sovereignty and negotiations with Mainland China, Lin Cho-shui advocates building a ‘cross-Straits platform’ which would provide a bridge for dialogue between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. The two sides can start talks about the issue on the sovereignty through the platform, and negotiate on general affairs but do not need to be involved in the sovereignty issue. (15)

On the developing strategy of the cross-Straits’ trade, the New Tide considers that Taiwan should ‘base-strengthen’ first, and then only will it achieve enough strength to ‘advance-west’. (16)

On the economic relations between Mainland China and Taiwan, in the New Tide’s view, if Taiwan’s products over-rely on China’s market, this restrain Taiwan’s industrial development. Therefore Taiwan should target its market onto the whole world. (17)
In fact, the difference between the ‘advance-west boldly’ and the ‘base-strengthening and advance-west gradually’ policies is caused by the different judgements of the two factions on the economic situation. The New Tide’s view is that Taiwan has been the largest investor in China’s market in the world. Therefore, it is not necessary for Taiwan to match Beijing’s ‘two-sides trick’ of ‘using economics, compelling politics’ and ‘dividing economics from politics’. They believe that the ‘advance-west boldly’ policy fails to see the issue of Taiwan’s national security. They believe that the Taiwanese government should adopt an ‘advance-south’ policy, encouraging Taiwanese businessmen to invest the Southeast Asian market instead of ‘advancing-west’. (18)

4-2-3. Consensus between the ‘advance-west boldly’ and the ‘base-strengthening and advance-west gradually’ policies

The two main factions have different opinions in many ways. But there are still some consensuses between them.

1) On the issues of the international situation, the Formosa and the New Tide both agree that a new international economic order is forming under the lead of the US. (19)

2) On the international and the cross-Straits economic relations, the Formosa and the New Tide both agree that there is pressure from the international community. (20)

3) On the arguments on Taiwan’s sovereignty and negotiations with Mainland China, the factions have reached the consensus that Taiwan’s sovereignty is independent from China, and that it is not negotiable. (21)

4) On the developing strategy to the cross-Straits’ trade, the consensus within the DPP is that both ‘advance-west’ and ‘base-strengthening’ are necessary processes for Taiwan to face Mainland China’s market. Their difference of opinion only lies on which should come first. (22)

5) On the economic relations between Mainland China and Taiwan, the factions hold the same view that it is inevitable for Mainland China and Taiwan to interact economically. (23)

4-3-1. Background

The factional fight within the DPP has lasted for a long time. As we can see from the party’s history, policy-making in the party is a process of fighting and compromising. The party’s 1998 China policy is but another example of policy-making within the party.

After he led the party to win the 1997 elections, Hsu Hsin-liang, former chairman of the DPP and important leader of the Formosa Faction, announced that he would step down from the campaign for the 9th chairman of the DPP. Hsu is aiming for the position of president. Creating a new prospect on the cross-straits relations has given him a chance to accumulate his counters in the campaign for the 2nd presidential election in 2000. (24) He was very well prepared. His book The Rising People was published in 1995. This is the first book which gives a systematic account of all projects and analyses on matters relating to the mainland policy in the DPP.

The New Tide Faction has nonetheless gained good experience in co-operating with the Formosa Faction in handling the party machine in recent years, and the relationship between the two factions is better than ever before, although there remain differences in their approaches to governing. The New Tide insists that the DPP alone should govern the central government, while in the Formosa’s view, the DPP has not had the experience to rule the central government, so it needs to form a coalition government with the KMT. With regard to Mainland China policy, there is also a big difference between the two major factions. The New Tide’s ‘base-strengthening and advance-west gradually’ policy will try to limit Taiwan’s investment in Mainland China. (25) But in the view of Formosa’s ‘advance-west boldly’ policy, Mainland China’s market is tremendous, and Taiwan has no choice but to invest in it in order to gain a better position on the market. If Taiwan does not do so, it will soon lose its economic superiority in the world, and its political position will then be more endangered than it is at present. (26)

As for the former Taipei mayor Chen Shui-bian, the most powerful figure in the DPP at present, he adopts the strategy of avoiding to get directly involved in the arguments
about China policy. He did not join the meeting to give his support to Hsu Hsin-liang, who will be his powerful competitor for the 2000 presidential election in the DPP. However, the Legislator Shen Fu-hsiung, a member of the Justice Alliance that is led by Chen Shui-bian, joined the symposium to present the view of his faction. Though Shen himself did not show a very clear idea about the China policy, he attacked Hsu’s ideas ruthlessly in the symposium. Shen’s attempt to downplay Hsu was very clear. Overall, he was just the representative of the Justice Alliance at the symposium. It was quite clear that the Justice Alliance did not have any general idea about the China policy. Chen Shui-bian’s view on the China policy is not clear either. On the one hand, he opposes ‘three-links’ (direct transportation, telecommunications, and investment links with Mainland China) with Mainland China right away, but at the same time, he does not object to negotiate with Beijing on the issue of ‘three-links.’ Actually, his view on Mainland China policy is not so different from Hsu’s. He simply does not wish to see the DPP involved in this troublesome issue at the moment. Expressing a clear idea on Mainland China policy is not sensible for Chen now, for a faulty step may affect his prospects in the campaign of the 2nd presidential election in 2000.

The other factions, including the Welfare State Alliance, led by Shieh Chang-ting— the incumbent Kaohsiung city mayor who was elected in 1998— and the World United Formosa for Independence, do not agree with Hsu Hsin-liang’s ‘advance-west boldly’ policy either. They take the opposite attitude to the Formosa. Therefore, the main theme of the DPP’s China policy symposium was to debate the Formosa’s ‘advance-west boldly’ policy versus the New Tide’s ‘base-strengthening and advance-west gradually’ policy. The other factions supported the New Tide, and objected to the Formosa.

4-3-2. Process and conclusion

There were three main topics in the DPP’s China policy symposium (27):

1) The effect of the Post-Cold War order of international politics on the Taiwan-China cross-Straits relations;

2) The cross-Straits commerce and trade policies and regulations;

3) The development of the cross-Straits trade relations, and the policies to address the
challenges of entering the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

The Formosa Faction that advocates the ‘advance-west boldly’ policy and the New Tide Faction which advocates the ‘base-strengthening and advance-west gradually’ policy had a very hot debate at the meeting. The distinctions in their views were caused by different judgements and views of the political situation. (28)

The two main factions, the Formosa and the New Tide, both raised many reasons in support of their views on China policy. However, their strategies seemed diametrically opposite. The most important reason is that because their attitudes on the issue of Taiwanese independence are in agreement, they adopt different analyses on their China policy.

What is Taiwan independence? There are thousands of definitions. The radical fundamentalists of the Taiwan Independence Movement believe that Taiwan should change the national flag and the official national title. They do not see Taiwan as an independent country. Taiwan should officially announce its independence to the international community. (29) The moderates’ view is to keep the present social structure in Taiwan. Chen Wen-chien, the ex-director of the DPP’s Department of Information and Culture, said that Taiwanese independence would maintain the present situation and life style in Taiwan, and confirm and protect this situation. (30) Moreover, the Formosa considers that Taiwan ‘has been independent’, and that the DPP’s task is to protect independent Taiwan. (31) But the New Tide’s aim is closer to building an official state – the Republic of Taiwan. In 1991, it was because of the insistence of the New Tide that the Taiwanese independence article was put onto the party platform. The New Tide wants to build an official state, and the Formosa only wants to preserve the present situation. Their different opinions on Taiwanese independence therefore have led to differing views on the China policy, and the frame of the policy.

To a very large degree, Taiwan’s lifeline is economic activity. The DPP’s factions know it very well. However, the problem is that Taiwan cannot avoid becoming China’s trading partner, and Taiwan and China are still on opposite sides in politics. For the DPP, it is difficult to agree on a policy on economic affairs without getting into political arguments. The factions which are closer to the position in favour of Taiwan independence, such as the New Tide, advocate limiting Taiwanese businessmen’s
economic activities in China; but the factions which are not so obstinate on the issue of Taiwanese independence, such as the Formosa, are prone to a division between the economic affairs and the political affairs.

Hsieh Chang-ting from the Welfare Alliance considers neither the ‘advance-west boldly’ nor the ‘base-strengthening and advance-west gradually’ options. The Taiwanese government should control them both by economic means, and evaluate the ensuing effects; then it should be able to make an overall policy on practising a planned, safe, and subjective economic interchange between the cross-straits. (32)

The Formosa Legislator Chang Chun-hong points out that Taiwan knows the international community better than China. At the same time, it also knows China better than the world. If Taiwan cannot play a key role in the process of China’s modernisation, it will be very difficult for Taiwan to establish a better position in the international community. (33)

On the judgements of the future of China’s economic development, all the factions of the DPP hold the same view that China’s economic growth rate will decrease, although the future of its market will remain good. The Formosa considers that China’s market is unstable and uncertain, and therefore not safe for investment. But from now on till the year 2000, China is still the best market in the developing countries, and Taiwan must seize the opportunity to get a good place in this market. However, the New Tide admits that it is difficult to ban the cross-straits economic activities, and some of Taiwan’s industries, such as high-tech industry, have to be restricted to go into China. They encourage the service industry to enter China’s market instead. (34)

Although the different factions held different views on many issues, they still had a strong consensus on ‘expanding the common ideas, narrowing the deviations’. (35) Based on the needs of the general goal — to be the ruling party —, the leaders of the different factions always adjusted their views in time to work out a joining point between the different opinions.

On 14th February, the second day of the meeting, Hsu Hsin-liang adjusted his view on ‘the two sides of the Taiwan Straits negotiate on the issues of three-links’ to ‘the overall cross-straits negotiating’. He pointed out that the strategy is to set the economic and
social interactions as the principal axis, and to take care of the issues of general affairs at the same time. The New Tide’s leader Chiou I-jen accepted Hsu’s view on ‘the overall cross-Straits negotiating.’ He said: ‘Chairman Hsu’s view is quite close to the New Tide’s’, and ‘Chairman Hsu has created the possibility of negotiating with China on everything.’ As a result, the two main opposing factions expressed their good will to each other, and the consensus thus went higher. On 15th February, Hsu Hsin-liang dropped his insistence on ‘advance-west boldly’, and changed the title into ‘planned advance-west’ policy. Because Hsu was willing to accept second best, he won more support in the DPP. For example, Hsu Yang-ming from the Justice Alliance said in the meeting that he opposed the ‘advance-west boldly’ policy at first, because he did not know how bold it would be? yet after discussion, he inferred that Hsu Hsin-liang’s ‘advance-west’ policy was not so acute, and that people might accept his views after explanation. (36)

Based on the ‘base-strengthening and advance-west’ principle, the conclusions of the DPP’s 1998 China policy symposium summed up three points (37):

Firstly, the basic principles of the Taiwan-China two sided negotiation were ‘opposing negotiating with China under the one China principle’: ‘Taiwan’s sovereignty should not become the subject of the cross-Straits negotiation’.

Secondly, on the exchanges between Taiwan and China, the DPP reached a consensus on ‘creating the two sides exchanges in many ways’, ‘diversifying the topics of negotiation’, ‘adding the channels of talking and negotiating machinery’, and ‘the negotiating topics should not to be separated’.

Thirdly, on the economic principle, the DPP had a consensus on ‘raising the base-strengthening and advance-west instead of the KMT’s policy of ‘no hurry, be patient’”.

4-3-3. Feedback and blind spots

Looking back at the DPP’s 1998 China policy symposium, it did not come to a really meaningful conclusion on its Mainland China policy, and did not work out a reliable China policy after a three days meeting either, but it achieved a positive effect for the DPP’s future development.
Firstly, after the three days meeting, the DPP's stereo-typed image 'just with doctrinaireism, but without any idea on China policy' had changed a lot in the eyes of the public. People started to doubt whether the KMT's Mainland China policy was reliable or not. (38) Even some mainland Chinese scholars like Shu Fu-tong, Professor of Taiwan Research Department at Beijing University, said 'the DPP's debating of its China policy was through a democratic process, it had a positive effect in it. The Mainland China's department of Taiwanese affairs has to enhance communications with the factions of the DPP.....' (39)

Secondly, the DPP created a new possibility in processing the different views within the party at the meeting. They used rational debating instead of vicious struggles among the different factions. The DPP demonstrated good political communicating skills to the Taiwanese society, especially as since the foundation of the DPP in 1986, there had been many arguments along with the development of the party caused by the factions' struggles. Undoubtedly, this was a milestone in the DPP's history which processed a successful rational and open debate.

Thirdly, the DPP's Mainland China policy debate stimulated its competitors, the KMT and the New Party, to re-consider their Mainland China policy. Some KMT's members wished to make the party's ambiguous China policy clearer. The New Party wanted to re-consider the party's China policy, going to far as having some members raised the new idea of 'one China, two states', which was a big mutation in the New Party's position of reunification. (40)

Although, in general, the DPP's 1998 China policy debate gained some positive feedback from the public, there remained some blind spots which needed breaking through, the main one being the DPP's insistence on Taiwanese independence. Because of its lack of faith in China and its insistence on the party's Taiwanese independence platform, there was no argument over the political topic of Taiwan's sovereign independence in the DPP. It is inconceivable for the DPP to treat Taiwan's sovereignty as a subject of negotiation. In the DPP, the notion of 'Taiwan's sovereignty independence' is unmoveable and can not be challenged. When the party's heavy weight Legislator Shih Ming-teh introduced the possibility that the two sides of the Taiwan Straits could organise a 'Greater Chinese Common Wealth' to the DPP in the
China policy symposium, he immediately became the target of attacks. It was clear that
the DPP’s position on the issue of Taiwanese sovereignty is not flexible. (41)

For Beijing too, the idea that ‘Taiwan is a part of China’ is non-negotiable. The DPP
and Beijing almost have no chance to have talks with each other if the two sides can not
make a concession on their insistences. If the DPP can not create a space for negotiation
with Beijing, even if it introduces an official China policy to the Taiwanese people, the
policy remains but a castle in the air.

Now, the view that direct communication with China should be avoided is shed by most
members of the DPP. By adopting such a position, the DPP’s approach to China policy
seems to be based on a frame of ‘no China exists’. For example, the main theme of the
1998 China policy symposium was ‘the effect of the Post-Cold War order of
international politics on Taiwan-China cross-Straits relations’. Yet almost no faction
gave a clear statement that was relevant to China’s internal affairs. The debating was
wishful thinking. Because of the DPP’s obstinate position and unwillingness to face the
reality of China, they did not touch the issues concerning the two sides’ international
spaces and the competition on foreign relations; they set the precondition that
‘Taiwanese sovereignty can not to be raised as a negotiating subject’, which is instead
impossible for Beijing to accept. A China policy which has no ‘China’ in it remains like
a political announcement. A China policy without a real plan of action could be a
catastrophe for the DPP and for the 22 million Taiwanese people.

Moreover, the approach of the DPP to the China policy is constrained by its
departmentalism. The title ‘China policy’ used in the symposium conveyed a clear
signal that the Taiwanese position is opposed to the Chinese position, which was an
extension of the DPP’s view on Taiwanese independence. This means that a talk
between the DPP and China is simply out of question. There is a fear that the DPP’s
China policy can only function as a political announcement but not as a real action. (42)

On examining Taiwan’s developing situation, the DPP’s analysis lacked understanding
of economics and industry especially. In the debates, there were no discussions on the
factors of Taiwan’s economic development in the past; for example, what have been the
effects on Taiwan’s economics of the long-lasted opposition between the two sides of
the Taiwan Straits? what will be the different effects on the cross-Straits relations of the
different selected policies in the future? (43) Most discussions were concerned with debating matters like ‘Taiwan needs to do this or that....’, ‘Taiwan should to do this or that....’, but there was no argument providing real evidence, and the process and the conclusion of the debates were both too rough. The so-called ‘advance-west boldly’ and ‘base-strengthening and advance-west gradually’, or ‘base-strengthening and advance-west’ policies resemble a game of philology with little meaningful reality.

On its judgement of the international situation, the DPP’s view was also too narrow-minded. It seems that the different views on the international situation did not matter to the DPP’s factions; rather they focused on the US as the only international factor which could affect the cross-Straits relations. It seems that it did not occur to the DPP that the views and actions of China, Japan, Russia, and also of all the notions around the Pacific and in Asia will have very important effects on the cross-Straits relations. (44)

Altogether, there were numerous of blind spots in the DPP’s 1998 China policy symposium, fully reflecting traces of political announcements and struggles among the factions. However, this was the first time that the DPP stepped foot on the area of the cross-Straits affairs and faced the cross-Straits reality. Balancing gains and losses, the DPP gained more than it lost, because it demonstrated good political communicating skills. However, it took the DPP too long to set up a reliable cross-Straits policy.

4-4. Conclusion

Basically, the factional fight within the DPP has always mainly happened between the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction; this is reflected in political ideologies, radical Taiwanese independence group and moderate self-determinative group, since the foundation of the party in 1986. Traditionally, only the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction try to work out the mainland policy. Generally speaking, the Formosa Faction resembles an interest group, it is not solidly organised, and its political ideology is ambiguous. Individual views within the faction differ greatly. The representative opinions tend to be the main leaders’ — Huang Hsin-chieh, Hsu Hsin-liang, Chang Chun-hong, Julian J. Kuo, and Chen Chung-hsin. The New Tide Faction is better organised than the Formosa Faction. Their political ideology is clearer and individual views within the faction are close. (45)
The arguments between the two main factions in the DPP can be classified into four main points.

The first argument is about the background and the developmental motivation of Taiwan’s independent consciousness.

In the Formosa Faction’s view, firstly, the formation of Taiwan’s independent consciousness originates from its past, for instance from the previously unhappy experience of unification with Mainland China, in 1945. After the 228 Incident, Taiwan’s independent consciousness grew among native Taiwanese people. Secondly, the ruling KMT had delayed the process of political reform in Taiwan by using the sovereignty of China as an excuse. Furthermore, the ‘Tiananmen Square Incident’ strengthened the Taiwanese people’s wish to gain independence. (46) In other words, the early years of Taiwan’s independent consciousness relate to an anti-KMT and an anti-Chinese consciousness. Yet, the recent renewal in Taiwan’s independent consciousness was caused by the frustration of democratic reform and the fear of Beijing’s military threat. (47)

In the New Tide Faction’s view, firstly, the ruling regimes in the history of Taiwan all came from outside. Their purpose was colonial, and the ruling policies were oppressing. The Chinese KMT regime’s feudalistic ideas were not compatible with Taiwan, which had modernised during Japanese ruling. Therefore, the 228 Incident was historically inevitable. (48) Hence, the New Tide Faction considers that the formation of Taiwan’s independent consciousness springs from long term considerations in the evolution of Taiwan’s history. Taiwanese people wants to break off the relations with the Chinese culture and historical control, and set their own avenue to development. This view is close to ‘Taiwanese Nationalism’. (49) Secondly, the mainlanders composed the KMT. Its ruling policy was authoritarianism, which came from China. Based on the principle of ‘people’s sovereignty’, the ROC’s system should be given up, and a new political order suiting the reality of Taiwan should be established. (50) Thirdly, it considers that the KMT’s ‘one China’ policy means fighting for China’s sovereignty with the CCP. Taiwan would thus be suppressed by the PRC in the international community. If Taiwan advocates ‘one China, one Taiwan’ policy instead, it may help releasing the tension existing in the cross-Straits relations.
The second argument is about the priority between ‘Democracy’ and ‘Independence’.

The Formosa Faction considers making effort for a democratic reform. It hopes to achieve the building of an independent country through amending the ROC’s constitutional system. The Taiwanese democratic movement should use self-governance and democracy as content of its policy. If it gains independence only but neglects democracy, the aim of independence can be achieved through democracy; yet independence does not entail democracy. Therefore, the Formosa Faction considers the priority at this stage is to be the ruling of the regime, so that it can then re-establish sovereignty.

In the New Tide Faction’s view, Taiwanese democracy can only be achieved via sovereignty. The mission of Taiwanese independence should therefore be completed first.

The third argument is on the mainland policy.

In the New Tide Faction’s consideration, ‘sovereignty’ takes priority over the ‘regime’. That is why the faction does it best to advocate Taiwanese independence. In their opinion: (51)

While China has not completed their mission of modernisation, Beijing has no power to attack Taiwan. Time is limited, but this remains the best time for advocating Taiwanese independence. In other words, the New Tide Faction considers that if Beijing owns enough power, even if Taiwan does not announce its independence, it would still attack Taiwan. Therefore, Taiwan should announce its independence before Beijing’s power has been established, thus for concretising its international status. (52)

In the Formosa Faction’s consideration, time is on the side of ‘Taiwan residents’ self-determination’. Since the modernisation of China has been launched, Taiwan has a chance to unite with Hong Kong and the seashore provinces of China to affect Beijing’s policy making. It wishes for the development of China’s society; economic would then generate political development. Taiwan could use the chance to get involved in China’s internal politics and use its contradiction to protect Taiwan’s security and independence. (53) Based on the approach above, the Formosa Faction considers that Taiwan’s
economic developing strategy is encouraging cross-Straits economic exchanges and investment in Mainland China, thus transforming Taiwan’s economic power into the political influence. (54)

The fourth argument is about the cross-Straits economic exchanges and investments. The Formosa Faction considers that the Taiwan’s enterprise to go west is inevitable. By expanding the cross-Straits exchanges, and letting the economics of the two sides depend more on each other, Taiwan’s security would gain more safeguards. This is the best way to set the issue of ‘Taiwanese people’s self-determination’ internationalisation. They also suggest that the two sides can learn from the experience of the EEC’s integration. In a first step, Taiwan can unite with Singapore, Hong Kong, and China’s seashore provinces to build a ‘South China Sea Economic Community’. In a second step, Taiwan may then invite Japan and China to join the group to build an ‘East Asian Economic Community’ or an ‘Asian Economic Community’. They wish that this kind of economic community could finally be transformed into a political community, which, like the EEC, would be transformed from a confederation into a federal state. (55)

Therefore, the main points of the Formosa Faction’s cross-Straits economic and trade policy are: (56)

1) The two sides of the Taiwan Straits should for the time-being shelve the problems which cannot be solved in the short term, for example, the problem of sovereignty; 2) Given that the economic and trade exchanges cannot be stopped, the two sides need not limit their activities by policies or laws; 3) Taiwan’s security has priority in the mainland policy. Yet in the era of the Post-Cold War, security is not only for defence, but also a need for deepening the dependence between the two sides; 4) Taiwan’s capital should unite with the world’s and China’s capitals, and the Chinese powerful organisations (including central government, local governments, and state-owned companies) to invest in Mainland China; 5) Taiwan should use its merits, and its historical, cultural, and linguistic ties with the mainland in order to play bridging role between international enterprises and China.

The New Tide Faction opposes the Formosa Faction’s ‘advance-west’ policy. In their view, Taiwan’s investment would help the Chinese economic reform; at the same time, if Taiwan’s economics over-depend on the China, this would endanger the force of
Taiwanese independence. The faction objects to the formation of an economic circle which would include Taiwan and China’s seashore provinces. It considers that this idea to ‘underestimate’ the competitive relations between the two sides and to ‘overestimate’ the opinions on how to solve the Taiwan problem is different within the CCP. (57) Moreover, the Formosa Faction wanting to transplant the EEC experience is also criticised by the New Tide Faction. Firstly, Beijing’s policy of ‘one country, two systems’ treats Taiwan as a province of China, whereas the members of the EEC are independent sovereign countries. Secondly, the political and economic situations and relations among the European countries are very similar and close, whereas the two sides of the Taiwan Straits are rather different. Thirdly, the European countries have integrated a community that can benefit all its members, whereas Taiwan and China do not share common benefits at this moment. (58) They stress that making a mainland policy should always put Taiwan’s national security in the foreground, and secondly it should maintain Taiwan’s economic interests. (59)

There are at least four different views on Mainland China policy between the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction. Yet they do have a common consensus. As we can see from the process of the formation of the party’s Mainland China policy, the intensity of the Taiwanese independence movement has grown stronger. The Formosa Faction’s ‘exact Taiwan independence’ policy is being swallowed by the New Tide’s ‘new nation’ policy step by step. The party’s mainland policy therefore comes closer to the New Tide Faction’s approach.

Firstly, on the political affairs, the party uses ‘one China, one Taiwan’ as the framework of the cross-Straits relations. They advocate building a ‘Republic of Taiwan’ through plebiscite. They do not oppose the two sides of the Taiwan Straits in order to take the negotiation on matters of a business nature, but they object to the ‘one China’ principle.

Secondly, the party considers internationalising the Taiwan problem, using the ‘one China, one Taiwan’ policy as a strategy to seek a living space in the international community. Both factions oppose the ‘one China’ policy. They advocate entering international organisations under the title of Taiwan. They disagree with using the title of ROC, which bears the implicit meaning of China’s sovereignty. They also advocate the two sides signing a ‘treaty of reciprocal non-aggression’.
Thirdly, the DPP advocates abolishing The National Unification Council from the ROC government. They object to the status of unification. Yet, if the title of The National Unification Council is changed into a neutral one, then the DPP would accept it. Members of the organisations taking the responsibility of the mainland affairs, such as the SEF and the Mainland Affairs Council, should be selected on the principle of proportional representation, which based on the party’s force.

Fourthly, both factions advocate the liberalisation and internationalisation of Taiwan’s economics, and wish to see international forces introduced in order to strengthen Taiwan’s security. They both oppose introduce the mainland’s workers into Taiwan. (60) The two sides of the Taiwan Straits should sign an agreement to protect activities involving investment.

Fifthly, the cross-Straits affairs should be managed under the structure of the international law. The party does not object to exchanges between the Taiwan Straits under the condition that Taiwan’s security be protected.

From the above analyses, we can see that the main difference between the Formosa and the New Tide resides in the issue over the cross-Straits economic and trade relations. The two factions have different views on the three-links, direct-shipping, and investing in the Chinese market. (61) These differences originate in the different bases for their assumptions on the cross-Straits relations. If the voice of ‘Taiwan independence’ gets louder, economic nationalism may surpass economic liberalism. The party’s position may come close to limit the cross-Straits exchanges. Yet, as Taiwanese businessmen go to invest in the Chinese market more and more, working out a balance between the political affairs and the economic affairs will be likely to become a big issue for the DPP.

Footnotes:
(1) The public opinion poll taken from the China Times on 1 December 1997. See China Times, 2 December 1997, p. 4
(6) Lin, 'China Policy of “Base-Strengthening and Advance-West gradually”'


(8) Lin, 'China Policy of “Base-Strengthening and Advance-West gradually”'

(9) China Times, 12 February 1998, p. 4

(10) Lin, 'China Policy of “Base-Strengthening and Advance-West gradually”'


(14) Lin, 'China Policy of “Base-Strengthening and Advance-West gradually”'


(16) Lin, 'China Policy of “Base-Strengthening and Advance-West gradually”'

(17) China Times, 12 February 1998, p. 4

(18) Lin, 'China Policy of “Base-Strengthening and Advance-West gradually”'

(19) Lin, 'China Policy of “Base-Strengthening and Advance-West gradually”'

(20) Lin, 'China Policy of “Base-Strengthening and Advance-West gradually”'


(22) Lin, 'China Policy of “Base-Strengthening and Advance-West gradually”'

(23) China Times, 12 February 1998, p. 4


(25) Lin, 'China Policy of “Base-Strengthening and Advance-West gradually”'


(29) Chin Chung, “The DPP Challenges Lee Teng-hui – An Interview with the Former Director of the DPP’s Department of Information and Culture Miss Chen Wen-chien”, in Open, July 1996, p. 67


(31) Lin, ‘China Policy of “Base-Strengthening and Advance-West gradually”’


(36) China Times, 16 February 1998, p. 2

(37) The researcher organised the materials and made the points.


(39) China Times, 16 February 1998, p. 2

(40) China Times, 16 February 1998, p. 2


(42) Shih Chi-ping, ‘This is a Respected First Step’, in Business Weekly, February 23, 1998, p. 33

(43) Shih, ‘This is a Respected First Step’, in Business Weekly, February 23, 1998, p. 33

(44) Shih, ‘This is a Respected First Step’, in Business Weekly, February 23, 1998, p. 33


(51) Chiu I-jen, ‘Do not use Taiwanese People as China’s Tribute? – Interrogate Chang Chun-hong’s speech about “There is No Unification Group in Taiwan”’, in New Tide, No. 1, 20 February 1989, p. 6
(52) New Tide Faction’s leader Wu Nai-jen said, ‘Will the CCP gives up military attack Taiwan if we do not proclaim Taiwan independence?’, and other leaders of the faction, like Jiang Peng-chien, Lin Cho-shui, and Chiu I-jen all agree with him. See China Times, 9 June 1991, P. 2; also see Democratic Progressive News, ‘There is No Cause and Effect Relations between Taiwan Independence and CCP Attack Taiwan’, No. 62, 15 February 1991, p. 1
(55) Democratic Progressive News, ‘There is No Unification Group in Taiwan – An interview to the DPP’s Secretary General Chang Chun-hong’, 21-27 January 1989, p. 3; see Lee, ‘Mainland Policy and Cross-Strait Relations Research’, p. 342; also see United Daily News, 1 July 1990, p. 3; and Chang, ‘Taiwan’s Crisis and Turning Point’ p. 216
(57) China Times, 5 October 1990, p. 2
(61) China Times, 21 September 1991, p. 4

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Chapter 5. Conclusion

On 28th September 1986, Taiwan’s opposition broke the ban on the formation of new political parties, and they formally established the Democratic Progressive Party. In November of the same year, the DPP adopted ‘the future of Taiwan should be decided by the residents of Taiwan’ as a slogan into the party platform. In November 1987, the 2nd National Congress of the party adopted the resolution that the ‘Taiwanese people have the right to stand for Taiwanese independence’. In April 1988, the DPP adopted ‘417 resolution’ which stands for ‘Taiwan’s sovereign independence’. Moreover, it proclaimed that the DPP would advocate Taiwan’s independence under the situation of ‘Four Ifs’. In October 1990, the DPP adopted ‘1007 resolution’ which proclaimed ‘Our country’s sovereignty does not include the territories of the People’s Republic of China and People’s Republic of Mongolia’. In August 1991, the independent activists were inspired by international factors, such as the break-up of the Soviet Union. The DPP united with the other opposition forces to hold a People’s Conference to institute a Constitution which was adopted as that of the ‘Republic of Taiwan’. In October of the same year, the party’s 5th National Congress adopted as their aim ‘to build an independent sovereign Republic of Taiwan’.

From the process of the formulation of the DPP’s party platform or resolutions, we can discover that the DPP’s intention of building a new nation has become more and more clear. This intention of Taiwanese independence affected the making of the party’s Mainland China policy. The first step is to define the cross-Straits relations under the framework of ‘one China, one Taiwan’, especially after the article: ‘Building an independent sovereign Republic of Taiwan’ was written into the party platform, the framework of ‘one China, one Taiwan’ has been confirmed. It has become the DPP’s guideline of Mainland China policy.

Briefly, the DPP criticises both the KMT’s and the CCP’s policies on the cross-Straits relations. The KMT’s status of Chinese nationalism and unification and the CCP’s status of proclaiming sovereignty over Taiwan are both unrealistic. The DPP considers that its Mainland China policy is to admit both the communist regime as the sole legal authority in China. The policy can deepen the comprehension of the real situation
between the Taiwan Straits. (1)

Indeed, ‘Taiwanese independence’ is the most sensitive issue across the Taiwan Straits. The CCP has set five preconditions about its using force to attack Taiwan. One of them is ‘Proclamation of Taiwan as an independent nation’. (See the chapter of Introduction) On the KMT’s status, it wants to maintain its ruling position in Taiwan, so to maintain the present situation of ‘one country, two political entities’ between the Taiwan Straits is in accordance with its needs. Any movement that attempt to change the present situation between the straits including to proclaim independence would hurt the ruling position of the KMT.

In the process of expanding its political force, the DPP has been trying to find a balance between ‘establishing an independent country’ and ‘becoming the ruling party’. In fact, the DPP has started to ‘soften’ its theme of ‘Taiwanese independence’. In the analysis of chapter 3, we can realise that, the radical view of Taiwanese independence has been removed gradually from the majority view. The establishment of the TAIP and the declaration that is presented by the younger generation of the DPP both indicate that Taiwanese independence would not be the DPP’s political aim at least at this moment. (See Chapter 3)

5-1. The finding of the research

In the beginning of this work, I have raised the argument that because the DPP’s present political aim is to become the ruling party in Taiwan, it will adjust its Taiwanese independence stand, and its Mainland China policy will become more flexible to match the cross-Straits political reality.

In the first chapter ‘The Rise of the DPP’, I introduced the foundation of the DPP and the development of the political opposition movement in Taiwan. During this time, the independence consciousness was formed by the ruling KMT’s misgovernment. The occurrence of the 228 Incident in 1947 was a very important factor in the development of the Taiwan Independence Movement. Later, the KMT opened the door to political participation. The opposition have used the opportunity of participating in elections to expand their forces. Before 1986, the opposition used the title of ‘Tangwai’ to unite their forces. In 1986, the main characters of the opposition formed the DPP, which is
the first native opposition political party in Taiwan since 1949.

The DPP is the continuation of the Tangwai political opposition movement. It has used its formal title while expanding its political influence since 1986. The political reform started at President Chiang Ching-kuo’s later years. His policies of ‘Taiwanisation’ and ‘allowing Taiwanese residents to visit their relatives on the mainland’ has produced changes to the political picture of Taiwan – the Taiwanese consciousness in Taiwan has been increasing, and the relations between the Taiwan Straits has improved. The DPP’s political force is growing rapidly because Taiwanese identity in Taiwan has increased; at the same time, the exchanges between the Straits increased more rapid than before. The DPP wants to complete the political aim of taking the place of the ruling KMT, but it still needs to take care of the development of the cross-Straits reality. As a political dream, the independence of Taiwan is the ultimate goal of the DPP, but when and how to achieve this is of vital importance.

The relationship between the factions within the DPP is a very important factor in effecting its Mainland China policy and its future. In the second chapter ‘The Factions in the DPP’, I introduced the factions in the party, their history, and how they work in the party. The DPP is composed of many different political ideologies, the struggles within the party having limited themselves to face the external political circumstances. As regards internal political affairs, the different factions can be united in an anti-KMT stance. But to face the PRC, the strategies are variable. The Formosa Faction tends towards negotiating with the PRC, but the New Tide Faction insists on building an official independent state in Taiwan.

According to the analysis in chapter 2, the competition between the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction is the main theme of the party’s development. After the Fifth National Congress, the situation of multi-factional leading appeared and was based on the competition between Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction. Not only the organisations of the factions but also the political views and political philosophies were changed during the process of the DPP’s development. But it appears that the factions of the party have all cut back on their political attitudes. In a general view, the Formosa Faction’s stand has moved closer to the KMT’s; the New Tide Faction’s stand has moved to the Formosa Faction’s; the World United Formosans for Independence tried to progress by following New Tide Faction’s model; Warfare State Alliance and the
Justice Alliance both tried to survive under the pressure of other factions. The idea of ‘reform within the system’ that advocated by the Formosa Faction and Kang or Supra-Factions was also accepted by the other factions. For example, the radical factions such as the New Tide Faction and the World United Formosans for Independence have both given up the revolutionary line in proclaiming the establishment of a new independent country on Taiwan.

In the third chapter ‘The Formulation of the DPP’s Mainland China Policy’, I introduced the history of the formulation of the DPP’s Mainland China policy, and gave the background of the process of its policy-making. I divided the process of the development of the party’s platform into three parts: 1) the period of self-determination by the residents of Taiwan; 2) the period of claiming the independence of Taiwanese sovereignty; and 3) the period of calling for the establishment of an independent state of Taiwan. It showed the development of the policy-making. In the first step, the situation was still unclear; in the second step, the party’s attitude tended to a ‘quasi-two states and two governments’ policy; and eventually to the ‘two-states and two-governments’ policy.

Reviewing the discussions in chapter 3, relationship between the factions with in the DPP; its party platform; the policy-making the mainland policy; and the views on constitutional reform can be summed up into following points:

1. During the three periods of the development of the DPP’s Mainland China policy mentioned above, and because of the rise of the force of independence activists, the party’s mainland policy has tended to be conservative, and the defining relationship gradually evolved towards ‘one China, one Taiwan’.

2. Examining all the processes of the development of the DPP’s party platform and its resolutions, it became clear that the concept of self-determination was changing alongside the political power balance inside the DPP, and later it promoted the view of pro-independence which was rising gradually in the party.

3. Within the political power structure inside the DPP, some people who advocated unification left the party for different reasons. This made the position of those advocating unification progressively more weak, until finally the power of pro-
independence views could not be restricted in the party.

4. The three Resolutions ('Taiwanese people have the right to pursue Taiwan’s independence', '417 resolution', and '1007 resolution') have special meanings for the DPP’s stand for independence. On the one hand, the policy-making of the party was usually paralysed by factional disagreements. On the other hand, because Huang Hsin-chieh and Chang Chun-hong reintegrated and reorganised the Formosa Faction, and gained the help from the Progress Faction. The force of the Formosa Faction was growing rapidly. Because of the Formosa Faction’s opposition and the middle Factions’ collaboration, the party deferred the process of writing the articles of ‘Taiwanese independence’ into the party platform. This also reduced the possibility of conflicts over the problem of Taiwan’s sovereignty between the KMT and the DPP.

5. The balance of forces between the factions within the party affected the development of policy. The range of influences can be judged by examining the structure of the ‘Mainland China Policy Study Group’. The number of seats for individual factions was allocated according to the power of the faction.

6. During a certain period of time, in the design of the DPP’s mainland policy, the main ideas usually came from the strongest faction, and then became the ‘consensus’ of the whole party. But it does not mean that the party’s policy totally revealed the will of the main stream faction. Consequently, after competing, the process of any policy making involved a series of ‘decision making’ by the factions.

7. The argument about the issue of policy usually related to political power. Factions sometime pursued power by changing their political theme, and accepting other faction’s views as the condition for exchange, like the case of the passing of the ‘Taiwan independence platform’, or, the main factions sometimes tried to avoid becoming overheated causing conflict, which could cause the break-up of the party. They would accept an opponent’s opinion temporarily and then delay the implementation, like the setting up of the CTSIM.

8. Although different factions have different views on policy making, this does not mean that all their members were unified under a consensus on policy-making. In addition, under special circumstances, different factions could share the same political
view with one another. Sometimes they even would co-operate with the others temporarily, but it did not mean that all of them would unite. The rule was that even if different factions could share the same political opinion as others, they would still want to share political power to fit their own group’s benefit.

The fourth chapter is ‘The DPP’s China Policy Symposium in 1998’. The DPP’s 1998 China policy symposium was the first time the party tried to raise an official Mainland China policy. It was also the first time for the different factions of the party to debate and challenge the other’s views. It was a milestone in the history of the DPP.

After its victory in the 1997 local elections, many people believe that the DPP is heading towards becoming the governing party of the central government of Taiwan. According to the political environment, the KMT’s impetus is decreasing, the DPP’s influence is increasing. The DPP has to prepare thoroughly to be able to take the KMT’s ruling position. To present their Mainland China policy is one of the most important issues for the party.

Basically, the factional fight within the DPP has mainly happened between the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction, also the two ideologies of political lines – the radical Taiwanese independence group and the moderate self-determinative group, since the foundation of the party in 1986. Traditionally only the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction tried to work out their the mainland policy.

The arguments between the two main factions in the DPP can be classified into four main points: 1): the background and the developmental motivation of Taiwanese independent consciousness; 2): the priority between ‘democracy’ and ‘independence’; 3): the mainland policy; 4): the cross-Straits economic exchanges and investments.

The Formosa Faction’s position is close to accepting the present situation regarding the Taiwan Straits. They advocate to increase the exchanges between the straits. Their attitude on the national identity tends to admit the system of the ROC, Taiwan is an independent country de facto. But the New Tide Faction considers national security of Taiwan the most important issue, so does not encourage the exchanges between the straits to increase too rapidly. They consider that Taiwan is not completely independent de jure. The establishment of an official Republic of Taiwan is the political aim that
leaves room for doubt for the DPP. But the New Tide Faction has given up the revolutionary line, and accepts completion of the mission for political reform under the present political system of the ROC.

To sum up, even if the DPP inherits the Tangwai's anti-Chinese consciousness, later writing the Taiwanese independence article into their party platform, and would therefore become a ‘Taiwanese independence party’. As for becoming the ruling party in Taiwan, the DPP has noticed the reality across the Taiwan Straits, it has softened its insistence on Taiwanese independence. ‘Taiwanese independence’ is still a political aim of the DPP, but it is indeed not its priority anymore.

5-2. The future development of the DPP’s Mainland China policy

Since, the DPP’s stand on the cross-Straits relations has been confirmed as ‘one China, one Taiwan’, it has put the DPP itself into a dilemma. At home, the people still have the worry of the Taiwan independent status. On the relations between the Taiwan Straits, the DPP’s Mainland China policy is attacked from both sides of the CCP’s ‘one country, two systems’ and the KMT’s ‘one China, two equal political entities’. But, in the framework of the relation between the Taiwan Straits, the DPP could become the force assisting the KMT on maintaining the present status of Taiwan. The KMT would accompany the DPP to negotiate with the CCP for rejecting the CCP’s negotiating proposal of ‘party to party’. At the same time, the DPP also could become the CCP’s factor for promoting three-links in the game between the Straits. The DPP would be the balance force between the KMT and the CCP. (2) Therefore, analysing the DPP’s Mainland China policy from the angle of its political position, it will insist its ‘one Taiwan, one China’ policy before becoming the ruling party of Taiwan. Firstly, because ‘one Taiwan, one China’ is totally different to the KMT’s policy. Even if other political ideas of the DPP are absorbed by the KMT, it can still maintain the Taiwan independent stand. Secondly, since the KMT’s official Mainland China policy is to unify with the mainland, the DPP temporarily stands for independence which is a useful card to confront Beijing’s ‘one China’ stand in the cross-Straits competitive game.

The cross-Straits exchanges have become more and more frequent. The DPP’s China policy has to include business natural and functional matters. If the DPP wants to show the difference of its China policy from the KMT’s, insistence on its ‘one Taiwan, one
China’ stand is necessary in the stage before setting up the regime. Therefore, before the DPP takes the place of the KMT’s ruling position, it will maintain its ‘one Taiwan, one China’ stand.

But the DPP’s insistence on ‘one China, one Taiwan’ policy has also confused it. The DPP’s task at the present stage is to become the ruling party. Hsu Hsin-liang has even said with lofty aspiration, ‘the DPP will become the ruling party before the 21st century.’ Since it lost in the 1998 Legislative elections, the last hope for it will be in the 2000 presidential election. But Hsu has predicted earlier results as well, ‘if the DPP can not present a clear statement on national security, it will not win the 1998 Legislative elections and 2000 presidential elections.’ (3) Hsu stressed if Taiwanese people do not trust the DPP with the capability to take the responsibility for national security, the DPP will forever be an opposition party. (4) Hence the DPP needs to take part in a coalition government to win the people’s confidence, and to explain again the party’s Taiwan independence platform to reduce the possibility of the cross-Straits conflict.

The development of the DPP’s China policy in the future could tend two ways. Firstly, if the exchanges across the Taiwan Straits increases, and Beijing reduces its hostility, the DPP’s stand of ‘one Taiwan, one China’ will become more flexible, and it would keep on developing a more perfect China policy. Secondly, if the exchanges across the Taiwan Straits decreases, and Beijing increases the force of threatening to Taipei, the DPP’s stand of ‘one Taiwan, one China’ policy will be more radical, even though it would not turn its back on the business affairs. (5)

As for the sections referring to business nature and function in its China policy, it would tend to the developments as follows:

1. The organisation, which is in charge of China policy of the DPP, would gradually become a permanent one.

The DPP’s organisation, which was in charge of China policy came into being caused by the variable demand. It normally was an informal one. For example, the ‘China Policy Research Team’ (1987 and 1988), the ‘China Policy Study Team’ (1992), the ‘Cross-Straits Relations Team’ (March 1993), and the ‘Team of Chinese Affairs’ (October 1993) were all temporary organisations. Then in December 1993, the
‘Committee of Chinese Affairs’ became a formal organisation which was in charge of the work of China policy in the DPP. Now the title of it has been changed into the ‘Department of Chinese Affairs’ up till the present day. (6)

2. The level of DPP contact with Mainland China will go higher gradually.

The DPP’s Central Standing Committee made a resolution which ‘does not oppose’ members of the party visiting Mainland China personally in 1988. The DPP’s National Assembly Delegates Group made a resolution and encouraged members of the party to visit Mainland China in person. In March 1993, to deal with the Koo-Wang talks, the party made a further resolution which ‘does not prohibit’ its members to visit Mainland China personally. Moreover in July 1993, it allowed the Welfare State Alliance to visit Mainland China. (7)

However, the possibility of the DPP using its formal title to visit the mainland is very unlikely. (8) On one hand, it is for maintaining its strong position for criticising the contacts or talks between the KMT and the CCP, and reduce the speed of the cross-Straits exchanges. On the other hand, Beijing’s stand at present is they just want to contact the DPP’s member personally. If the DPP still insists on its Taiwanese independence stand, Beijing would not accept the formal mission of the party. In fact, before the ‘Taiwan independence platform’ was adopted, Beijing had to deal with the DPP or the other radical independence groups on their own merits. Beijing has sought Formosa Faction’s favour. They wished to unite with the Formosa Faction to suppress the New Tide Faction. But Beijing’s leaders also wished to change New Tide Faction and other radical independence groups’ attitudes. At the same time, they wished to build further relations with New Tide Faction. (9) However, ‘Taiwan independence platform’ has been adopted by the party in 1991, in the long term Beijing would refuse to communicate with the leaders of the DPP. And putting the members of the DPP’s Central Standing Committee onto the ‘black list’, does not allow them to visit the mainland. (10)

3. Participating in the formal process of policy making and the organisation, which is in charge of the cross-Straits affairs actively.

4. The level of making Mainland China policy will tend to be wider and more accurate.
5. Maintaining the present situation of the cross-Straits business, natural and functional exchanges, would not regress.

The Formosa Faction’s attitude on the cross-Straits exchanges usually has an open mind. The Welfare Alliance’s attitude has come closer to the Formosa’s after visiting the mainland. Meriting attention, the radical legislators of the DPP have presented their ‘The Political Outlines of Mainland China Policy’ with an attitude which is close to Formosa’s and the Welfare Alliance’s views. (11) Hence, the DPP’s stand on the cross-Straits exchanges would not stay firmly in place.

5-3. Effects on the cross-Straits relations under the structure of ‘one Taiwan, one China’

On 2nd December 1989, several elections took place in Taiwan. They were the elections of the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan Provincial Assembly, Taipei and Kaohsiung city councils, and county and city mayors.

Just before the campaign period started, 32 DPP candidates belonging to the New Tide Faction, which advocated or supported Taiwanese independence, announced the formation of the ‘New Country Alliance’ and called for a new constitution and the election by Taiwan’s electorate of all members of Taiwan’s elected bodies in government. This pushed the independence issue further to the forefront of the campaign and underscored the challenge of the issue to the government and the KMT – and to Beijing. (12) On the eve of the elections (from 27th October to 30th November), Beijing strongly attacked the Taiwanese independence stand through its propaganda teams for at least 8 times. (13) From March to October 1991, Beijing had spoken of ‘military attack against Taiwan’ 17 times, 3 times a month on average, but in only half a month just after the DPP adopted the Taiwanese independence article for its platform, Beijing mentioned ‘military attack against Taiwan’ 6 times. (14) This shows that the DPP’s Taiwanese independence speech had caused Beijing’s hostility. It would harm the cross-Straits relations.

The DPP’s Taiwanese independence speech would cause the raising of the cross-Straits conflicts. But in the Taiwanese people’s consideration, Beijing’s unreasonable actions which harmed the cross-Straits peace would be more serious than the Taiwanese
independence appeal. For example, 29% of the Taiwanese people thought that the two sides of the Taiwan Straits had hostility to each other when the DPP adopted the ‘1007 resolution’. (15) But ‘before Tienanmen Square Incident took place’ (in 1989) were 42%; ‘after Tienanmen Square Incident took place’ were 52%; ‘the first Chiu-Tang talk’ were 35% (16); Beijing presented ‘Taiwan Problem and China’s reunification White Paper’ were 42%. (17) Therefore, general comments on the whole situation of the Taiwan Straits, even though the DPP’s Taiwan independent stand could raise the hostility of the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. But Beijing’s actions would be the most important factor on whether the cross-Straits relations lead to moderation or conflict.

However, the parts of the DPP’s China policy which involve the natural and functional cross-Straits business matters will encourage moderation in cross-Straits relations. For example, it advocated ‘stop the cross-Straits opposition, and realise the two-sides peaceful competition’, but it did not mention the problems of sovereignty and politics. Moreover, its Mainland China policy which was adopted in 1987 and 1989, advocated that it should ‘spread out the exchanges of academic, cultural, sports, and technical skills, and direct transportation, telecommunications, and investment links actively and with initiative’. Then in the 1990 ‘Democratic Great Charter’, it also advocated the encouragement of the exchanges in the economic, cultural, academic, religious, and sporting fields. The DPP has used ‘one China, one Taiwan’ to define the cross-Straits relations gradually. But in advocating the realisation of restrictions on the cross-Straits exchanges, permitting the people of two sides to visit each other freely, and creating equal and beneficial relations, the DPP would be helpful in reducing the tenseness of the cross-Straits relations.

5-4. Rethink the DPP’s Mainland China policy

The DPP’s definition of ‘one China’ is the ‘People’s Republic of China’, but not the ‘Republic of China’ with the central government in Taipei. The People’s Republic of China whose capital in Beijing is the sole legal ruling government of China has been a consensus in international society. The PRC, instead of the ROC, has become China’s legal regime since 1949. The CCP is the sole ruling party of China. (18) Therefore ROC has lost its legality, the ROC on Taiwan is like an international orphan, a new name – ‘Taiwan’ is quite meaningful. A new national title of ‘Taiwan’ is a clearer and proper political appellation than ‘ROC’.
In Beijing’s thinking, there is no ‘China problem’ but only a ‘Taiwan problem’. The ‘Taiwan problem’ is a Chinese internal affair, (19) because it denies the legality of the ROC, and insists Taiwan is a part of China. International society accepts Beijing’s status. Hence, using the title of Taiwan instead of ROC is not helpful for Taiwan itself to re-enter the international organisations. Moreover it may cause the danger of Beijing’s military actions.

The DPP advocates using the title of Taiwan to re-enter the international society, and to establish a ‘Republic of Taiwan’ through a plebiscite of Taiwan’s residents. But could the DPP’s idea come true? it is really a big problem. Beijing opposes Taiwanese independence, but sometime connives at Taiwan doing some international activities under the present political structure. If Taiwan changes its political situation to build a ‘Republic of Taiwan’, it might cause Beijing to blockade Taiwan’s living space in international society. Under Beijing’s overall political and economical attacks, is the situation for Taiwan better than today? It needs to ponder it deeply.

Moreover, since the DPP defines the relations between Taiwan and Mainland China as an international relationship but not a domestic relationship. So it tries to divide the ‘Taiwan problem’ from the framework of ‘one China’, and then make it an international affair. But to internationalise the ‘Taiwan problem’, Taiwan has to maintain its economic powers and combine the benefits of Taiwan and western countries together. As a result, the countries which have close beneficial ties with Taiwan would possibly share the pressure from Beijing.

Moreover, China is on the road of progressing, especially in the area of economics. According to the World Bank statistics, in 1979, the PRC’s GNP per capita was US$260, placing it 102nd on a list of 124 countries. (20) Deng Xiaoping has admitted this poverty by saying that ‘we belong to the category of poor countries in this world’. (21) He told the leaders of the PRC that ‘we should ponder the question: what have we really done for the people?’ (22) At the same time, Deng seems to have understood that if the PRC remains in poverty, the appeal of reunification with Taiwan would be less convincing and ultimately unsuccessful. He therefore pledges that the PRC will match Taiwan’s thriving economy in the future. (23) The economic development of the PRC in a long term could generate an adverse situation for the ROC. As Beijing will become more wealthy in the future when – and if – Beijing quadruples its annual GNP to
US$1,000 billion by the year 2000, (24) Deng has pointed out 'if we allocate one percent of US$1,000 to national defence, that means $10 billion; five percent means $50 billion. With $10 billion we could accomplish much, and it would be easy to upgrade our military equipment. (25) A more powerful PRC in terms of military strength would certainly become more difficult for Taiwan to resist if Beijing decided to use force against Taiwan regardless of the cost.

The above comment by Beijing’s leader has, to some extent, revealed the connection between the PRC’s economic development and Beijing’s strategy to resolve the Taiwan problem. Whether Beijing can successfully achieve its ambitious goals of economic development remains to be seen. (26) This strategy combines both courting the Taiwanese and enhancing the PRC’s capability and power to take over Taiwan by force.

5-5. Condense the powers of the party

The DPP’s ideas of the mainland policy have exceeded the KMT’s in the early days. (27) But it dropped behind the KMT later because of the struggles of different political lines within the party. For example, in October 1987, the DPP appealed to establish a ‘Chinese Affairs Department’ in the central government. But the Executive Yuan has not established the Mainland Affairs Council till January 1991. The Hsu Hsin-liang Office has also advocated giving up the old views which treated the CCP as a revolutionary group in 1990, and raised his ideas of advocating the two sides of the Taiwan Straits to give up the arguments about sovereignty for the time-being. The two sides could start their talks on the problems of exchange. But the KMT has not renewed the definition that the CCP was a revolutionary group until it ended in May 1991 when President Lee Teng-hui proclaimed the Period of National Mobilisation for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion had ended. Then on August 1993, the Mainland Affairs Council advocated ‘promotion of the about Mainland China policy, and froze the arguments of sovereignty’. (28)

Even though, the DPP’s Mainland China policy had more progressive ideas than the KMT’s, the radical Taiwan independent views raised later, then made its stand on mainland policy become conservative. (29)

Lots of arguments on the party’s political line have happened in the past few years. For
example, the former mayor of Taipei Chen Shui-bian opposed the former chairman Shih Ming-teh’s and Hsu Hsin-liang’s ‘Great Reconciliation, Great Coalition’ ideas. (30) In 1996, the radical independence advocators finally formed a new party – TAIP. In 1997, because of having different views on constitutional revision, the liberal scholars broke up with the DPP. More and more elite left the DPP. The former chairman Hsu Hsin-liang proclaimed that he would not run as party chairman for a consecutive term under the pressure of the arguments on the party’s political stance.

The transformation of the DPP caused a great pain. The loss of the 1998 Legislative elections was a significant example of this, since the DPP has given up the anti-ROC political line and turned towards the electoral line instead. (31) To ‘purify’ the party’s organisation would help the DPP to condense its strengths on attaining power. It is helpful for the party to condense them to face the challenges both from the internal and external political circumstances.

Footnotes:

(6). See Chapter 4
(7). Lee, The Analysis of The DPP’s China Policy, p. 460)
(8). Chiu I-jen has visited China’s Fukien province when still in the position of Secretary General of the party in the beginning of 1998. Even though it was a ‘personal visit’. It still has caused critique from the radical members of the party.
(10) ‘Explore the DPP’s Role and Policy on the Cross-Straits Relations’, in China Times, 3 May 1993, p. 4
(11). Taiwan Times, 9 February 1994, p. 2
(14). See “The Analysis of the CCP’s so-called “Do not Give Up to Use Military to Attack Taiwan”’, (Taipei, ROC Government Information Office, April 1994)
(15). See Chapter 4
(16). The preparatory talk for Koo-Wang talks which took place in 1993, the two sides were the Straits Exchange Foundation / Secretary General Chiu Jing-yi (Taiwan) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits Vice Chairman Tang Shu-pei (Mainland China).

(18) 'The DPP's Clan and Culture Policy -- Plural Clan Relations and Culture' (Taipei, The DPP Headquarters, August 1993) p. 58

(19) Central Office of Taiwan Affairs of the PRC State Council, 'Taiwan Problem and China's Unification', 31 August 1993, pp. 6-7


(22) 'The DDP and the Development of the Cross-Straits Relations', paper presented at Hong Kong Chinese-Language University's '90s International Relations Academic Seminar, 15-16 July 1992, p.143


(26) Wu Hsin-hsing, Bridging the Strait - Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1994)p.45


(28) Kuo, Pain of the DPP's Transformation, pp. 108-112

(29) Kuo, Pain of the DPP's Transformation, pp. 112-118

(30) See Chapter 1

(31) Kuo, Pain of the DPP's Transformation, p. 3

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Appendix

Table 1. Percentage of votes won by KMT and non-KMT candidates in the elections for county magistrates, city mayors, and Taiwan Province Assembly members, prior to formation of the DPP.

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>56</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td>1985</td>
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*Except Taipei & Kaohsiung cities
Table 2: Percentage of votes won by KMT and non-KMT candidates in the elections for legislators and National Assembly delegates, prior to formation of the DPP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Legislators</th>
<th>Non-KMT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party affiliation</td>
<td>Seats &amp; Votes won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>No. of seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>44</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Offices</th>
<th>Taiwan Provincial Assembly members</th>
<th>Seats &amp; Votes won</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
<th>% of seats</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
<th>% of seats</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
</tr>
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<td>1969</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>1980</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 29, 1986</td>
<td>The third plenary session of the KMT’s 12th Central Committee is held in which a consensus on political reforms is reached.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 9, 1986</td>
<td>The KMT’s Central Standing Committee establishes a 12-member subcommittee responsible for studying six major issues: lifting the Emergency Decree, allowing the establishment of new political parties, parliamentary reform, providing a legal basis for local self-governance, social security, and reforming party affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 15, 1986</td>
<td>The KMT’s Central Standing Committee decides to give priority to two issues: lifting both the Emergency Decree and the ban on the formation of new political parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 23, 1987</td>
<td>The Legislature passes the third reading of the National Security Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 15, 1987</td>
<td>The Emergency Decree is lifted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2, 1987</td>
<td>People are officially allowed to visit relatives on the mainland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1, 1988</td>
<td>Registration for new newspapers commences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 11, 1988</td>
<td>The Legislature passes the third reading of the Law on Assembly and Parades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 3, 1988</td>
<td>The KMT’s Central Standing Committee passes the four principles of the Regulations on the Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 7, 1988</td>
<td>The KMT’s 13th National Congress is held, in which five items on the agenda are passed including the ‘Current Mainland Policy’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 20, 1989</td>
<td>The Legislature passes the third reading of the Law on Civic Organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 26, 1989</td>
<td>The Legislature passes the third reading of the amendments to the Election and Recall Law and the Law on the Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 18, 1990</td>
<td>The KMT’s Central Standing Committee passes a three-stage plan to thoroughly implement the Regulations on the Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 20, 1990</td>
<td>President Lee Teng-hui is sworn in as the ROC’s eighth-item president. In his inaugural address, he specifies the schedule for political reforms: 1) the Period of National Mobilisation for Suppression for the Communist Rebellion shall be ended in accordance with the law in shortest possible time; and 2) all issues concerning national representative organs, local self-governance, and the government system shall be resolved by constitutional amendment with two years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 1991</td>
<td>The Period of National Mobilisation for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion is ended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 21, 1991</td>
<td>The election for the delegates to the Second National Assembly is held. The KMT wins nearly 72% of the votes and 79% of the seats, while the DPP garners 24% of the votes and nearly 19% of the seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March – May 1992</td>
<td>The National Assembly starts the second round of constitutional revision, which stipulates the president is to be elected by universal suffrage. Also, the terms of office for the president of the republic and delegates to the National Assembly are reduced to four years; the Control Yuan becomes a quasi-judicial organ; the National Assembly is empowered to confirm members of the Control Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Judicial Yuan who are nominated by the president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 19, 1992</td>
<td>The election for the Second Legislative Yuan is held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 18, 1993</td>
<td>The KMT's 14th National Congress elects President Lee Teng-hui as party chairman for a consecutive term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 3, 1994</td>
<td>The elections for Taiwan provincial governor and mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung cities are held. The ruling KMT wins the gubernatorial and Kaohsiung mayoral elections, and the DPP, the Taipei mayoral seat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1995</td>
<td>The second session of the KMT's 14th National Congress decides to let party representatives determine the party's presidential candidate. Lee Teng-hui is nominated to run for the ROC's ninth-term president. Vice chairman Lin Yang-kang announces that he will run for presidency by obtaining a petition signed by the people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2, 1995</td>
<td>During the election of the Third Legislative Yuan, the KMT wins 85 of the 164 seats, the DPP 54, the New Party 21, and independent candidates four. This is a surprise as it was speculated that none of the parties would obtain a majority of the seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 23, 1996</td>
<td>The first-ever popular election of the president is held. The KMT candidate Lee Teng-hui wins the election with 54% of the vote.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From the reports of China Times, United Daily News and Central Daily News.
Table 4: Percentage of votes won by KMT, DPP, and NP candidates in the elections for county magistrates, city mayors, National Assembly delegates, and legislators, after the formation of the DPP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>County Magistrates &amp; city mayors***</td>
<td>KMT No. of seats</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of votes</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP No. of seats</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6**</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of votes</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Assembly delegates</td>
<td>KMT No. of seats</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>183</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of votes</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP No. of seats</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>75</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of votes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NP No. of seats</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Legislators</td>
<td>KMT No. of seats</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>102*</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP No. of seats</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of votes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NP No. of seats</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of votes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ROC Ministry of the Interior

* Some KMT legislators renounced their party affiliation and joined with Ju Gaujeng of the Social Democratic Party to form the New Party. Since the NP won 7 seats in the Second Legislative Yuan, the number of KMT legislators naturally fell.

** The mayor of Chiayi City, Chang Wen-ying, is not included in the figure for she has no party affiliation, but her political view is close to the DPP's.

*** Except Taipei & Kaohsiung cities.
Table 5: Major election results in recent years (% of Votes won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989 Legislative Yuan members</td>
<td>60.10</td>
<td>28.20</td>
<td>11.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 County Magistrates &amp; city mayors</td>
<td>52.67</td>
<td>38.34</td>
<td>8.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989 Taiwan Provincial Assembly members</td>
<td>62.10</td>
<td>25.60</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989 Taipei City councillors</td>
<td>69.20</td>
<td>23.40</td>
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<td>7.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989 Kaohsiung City councillors</td>
<td>62.60</td>
<td>21.00</td>
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<td>16.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991 National Assembly delegates</td>
<td>71.17</td>
<td>23.94</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.89</td>
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<td>1992 Legislative Yuan members</td>
<td>61.67</td>
<td>36.09</td>
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<td>2.24</td>
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<td>1993 County Magistrates &amp; city mayors</td>
<td>47.47</td>
<td>41.03</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>8.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994 Taiwan Provincial Assembly members</td>
<td>60.76</td>
<td>29.11</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>7.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994 Taipei City councillors</td>
<td>38.46</td>
<td>34.62</td>
<td>21.15</td>
<td>5.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994 Kaohsiung City councillors</td>
<td>52.27</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>18.18</td>
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<td>1994 Taiwan provincial governor</td>
<td>52.05</td>
<td>39.42</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>0.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994 Taipei City mayors</td>
<td>25.90</td>
<td>43.70</td>
<td>30.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994 Kaohsiung City mayors</td>
<td>54.50</td>
<td>39.30</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 Legislative Yuan members</td>
<td>49.92</td>
<td>35.95</td>
<td>14.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996 National Assembly delegates</td>
<td>49.68</td>
<td>29.85</td>
<td>13.67</td>
<td>6.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997 County Magistrates &amp; city mayors</td>
<td>42.12</td>
<td>43.32</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>13.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 County Municipality mayors, Township magistrates</td>
<td>55.07</td>
<td>18.74</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>25.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 County &amp; city councillors</td>
<td>48.92</td>
<td>15.83</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>32.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998 Taipei City mayor</td>
<td>51.13</td>
<td>45.91</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1998 Kaohsiung City mayor</td>
<td>48.13</td>
<td>48.71</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>2.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998 Legislative Yuan members</td>
<td>46.43</td>
<td>29.56</td>
<td>7.06</td>
<td>16.95</td>
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</table>

Source: ROC Ministry of the Interior
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