The eclipse of empire?: perceptions of the western empire and its rulers in thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century France

Jones, Christopher Neville

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Abstract

Christopher Neville Jones

Thesis Title: The Eclipse of Empire? Perceptions of the Western Empire and its Rulers in Thirteenth- and Early Fourteenth-Century France

Degree: Ph.D. Year of submission: 2003

It has become an axiom of historical research that the decline of the western Empire in the second half of the thirteenth century led to a concomitant decline in subscription to the idea that a ruler might exercise temporal authority beyond the bounds of his kingdom. An increase in the authority exercised by rulers of the western kingdoms and the rediscovery of Aristotelian learning led to a new conception of autonomous states. This thesis tests the validity of this assessment by determining the place occupied by the Empire in French thought. It establishes the factors which formulated perceptions of contemporary rulers of the medieval Empire between Frederick II's accession and the outbreak of the Hundred Years War. It examines the place occupied in French thought by the figure most widely associated with the Empire in France, the Carolingian emperor Charlemagne. It determines French conceptions of the nature of the Empire as an institution, the role that it and its ruler were considered to occupy in the world, and their relationship with the French kingdom.

Rather than base its examination upon the small number of texts traditionally associated by historians with the development of a new political ideology, a broader context is established by using the widest possible source base. The consequence is a portrait of the place occupied by the Empire and its ruler in French thought that differs profoundly from the widely accepted historical model. On one level the Empire and its ruler were considered to differ very little from the French kingdom. Yet, far from abandoning the concept of universal temporal authority, the inhabitants of France also considered the emperor to fulfil a supra-regnal role necessary in a properly ordered Christian society and increasingly conceived of in terms of the leadership of the crusade.
The Eclipse of Empire? Perceptions of the Western Empire and its Rulers in Thirteenth- and Early Fourteenth-Century France

Christopher Neville Jones

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This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. following research conducted in the History Department of the University of Durham.

Year of submission: 2003

- 2 JUN 2004
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Declaration

This thesis is the result of my own work. Material from the published or unpublished work of other historians used in the thesis is credited to the author in the footnote references. The thesis is approximately 100,000 words in length.

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Acknowledgments

I wish first to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Arts and Humanities Research Board of the British Academy, from whom I received a three-year studentship and an overseas field study award. I am also grateful to the Royal Historical Society, who indulged a penchant for European travel, and the SOCRATES-ERASMUS exchange programme of the European Union, who indulged a penchant for living in Paris. I am obliged to the History Department of the University of Durham and to Dr Björn Weiler, both of whom arranged funding which enabled me to expound ideas originating in this thesis at, respectively, the 2003 Leeds International Medieval Congress and the 2003 University of Wales Representations of Power in Medieval Germany conference. I am grateful to the participants at both these conferences and to those at the 2001 Durham Political Identities in Britain and Western Europe conference for their many comments and suggestions.

I am extremely grateful to the Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte, the Mission Historique Française en Allemagne and the British Centre for Historical Research in Germany under whose joint auspices I had the honour to attend a tri-lingual summer school held at Göttingen in 2000, an event which has been formative in the preparation of this thesis. I am obliged to Dr Henri Bresc who calmly simplified unfathomable layers of bureaucracy on my behalf and facilitated a happy year of research at the Université Paris X-Nanterre. I am particularly indebted to Dr Blair Sullivan of the UCLA Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies who kindly accepted my first foray into print and whose benevolence resulted in an invitation to publish a second piece.

The late Master of Grey College, Victor Watts, in addition to being an inspirational friend, was kind enough to read and comment upon parts of this thesis, as were Professor Michael Prestwich, Dr Andy King and Dr Alexandra Luff. I am particularly indebted to Dr Bob Dyson who has been extremely generous in supplying me with copies of manuscripts, his own work and his time. I also appreciate the discussions of this work I have had with Dr Jay Rubenstein, Dr Jeffrey Ashcroft and with Romedio Schmitz-Esser. My general thanks must also be extended to the staff responsible for inter-library loans at the University of Durham library, to the staff of
the British Library and to those of the Bibliothèque nationale, in particular the départements des Manuscrits, division occidentale.

I had the good fortune to be introduced to Dr Neal Stratford who kindly lent me his Paris flat and his extraordinary personal library for a summer, both of which this thesis has benefited from enormously. I am also grateful to Ted and Joby Margadant and to Mira Luethje who have all been kind enough to allow me to fly my banners over their respective Parisian pied-à-terre at one time or another.

Of the many friends with whom I have discussed ideas and whose unerring support I have enjoyed I must make particular mention of, at Durham, Karen Blundell, Beth Hartland, Sally Newton, Keith Waters, Peter Lowe, Ben Dodds and the SCR of Grey College. In Paris: Annick Boulogne, Edna Yahil, Nancy Collins, Becky Pulju, Misgav Har-Peled, Robert Braid and Julien Demade. And somewhere between Paris, London and Göttingen: my sister Vanessa, Marigold Norbye, Katrina Moor, Sally Dixon-Smith, Catherine Rider, Klaus Oschema, Ben Morgan, Carsten Oehme, Thomas Werner, Dave White, Oleg Voskoboinikov, Paul Dryburgh and Martin Cable.

Finally I extend what can only ever be inadequate thanks to Ann, who reminded me how much I enjoy writing. To Len Scales, my indefatigable and much put upon supervisor who has shown unswerving support and encouragement and who has played Herr Settembrini to this poor Hans Castorp for seven years now. And to my mother and father who have always supported and encouraged this odd medieval enterprise. It is from my father that I have inherited a fascination with taking things to pieces in order to see if I can put them back together again.
What uncertainty do we find in printed Histories? They either treading too near on the heeles of truth, that they dare not speake plaine; or els for want of intelligence (things being antiquated) become too obscure and darke! I doe not here repeat anything already published (to the best of my remembrance) and fancy my selfe all along discourseing with you.


It has always been the prerogative of children and half-wits to point out that the emperor has no clothes. But the half-wit remains a half-wit, and the emperor remains an emperor.


Ich sihe wol, daz dem keiser und den wiben mit ein ander niemen gedienen mac. des wil ich in mit saelden län beliben. er hät mich ze in versümet manigen tac.

Abbreviations

Sources

a. Series

Acta Imperii

HD

Layettes

MGH Const.

MGH SS

RHC

RHGF

b. Individual Works

ATF
Baudoin d'Avesnes  Extraits de la Chronique attribuée à Baudoin d'Avesnes, fils de la comtesse Marguerite de Flandre, eds. J. D. Guigniaut and N. de Wailly. RHGF, xxi (Paris, 1855), pp. 159-181.


ContinuatorGF  Anonymous monk of Saint-Denis, Continuation of the chronicle of Géraud de Frachet (1285-1328), Chronicon Girardi de Fracheto et anonyma ejusdem operis continuatio, eds. J. D. Guigniaut and N. de Wailly, RHGF, xxi (Paris, 1855), pp. 7-70.

Continuator(2)GNC  Continuationis Chronici Guillelmi de Nangiaco pars prima (1303-1316), ed. H. Géraud, Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis de 1113 a 1300 avec les continuations de cette chronique de 1300 a 1368 (2 vols., Paris, 1843), i, pp. 327-435.

Continuator(3)GNC  Continuationis Chronici Guillelmi de Nangiaco pars altera (1317-1344), ed. H. Géraud, Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis de 1113 a 1300 avec les continuations de cette chronique de 1300 a 1368 (2 vols., Paris, 1844), ii, pp. 1-178.


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**Secondary Literature**

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<td>BEC</td>
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<td>EHR</td>
<td>English Historical Review.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLF</td>
<td>Histoire littéraire de la France.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neues Archiv</td>
<td>Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere Deutsche Geschichtskunde.</td>
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<td>RH</td>
<td>Revue historique.</td>
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<td>TRHS</td>
<td>Transactions of the Royal Historical Society.</td>
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Introduction

i. Interpretations

In the early 1280s the abbey of Mazan acquired an area to the south of the Vivarais called Berg, an act which led to a series of disputes with the inhabitants of neighbouring Saint-Andéol. The abbey, in search of a protector, concluded an agreement with an agent of the Capetian king Philippe III le Hardi: in return for royal protection the monks agreed to the establishment of an outpost of royal authority, the bastide of Villeneuve-de-Berg.¹ In a little over two decades this was followed by an agreement between Philippe IV le Bel and the bishop of Viviers which established royal authority over the whole of a previously autonomous region.² Located within the broader context of the expansion and consolidation of French royal authority before the outbreak of the Hundred Years War, the case of the Vivarais has been often accorded particular significance because, in common with Lyon and the county of Burgundy, this expansion took place at the expense of the theoretical jurisdiction of the western Empire.³

The consolidation of royal authority has been considered both a catalyst for and an expression of a fundamental change in medieval perceptions of the world. This involved the development of an increasingly strong link between group identities and centralised political entities. 'National' or, to avoid the potentially misleading connotations associated with this word, 'regnal',⁴ identities crystallised in the


kingdoms of England and France in the later part of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth. This development, for some the emergence of nascent states, was fuelled by new legal and philosophical ideas and a decline in the material political authority of the western Empire. The English and French kingdoms were characterised by the emergence of an outlook which denied the validity of any form of supra-regnal authority, in particular that traditionally associated with the papacy and the Empire. Whilst alternative models, based on principles of universalism, continued to exist and to be propagated by men such as Marsilius of Padua, these were now, according to historians such as Lagarde, Ullmann and Stayer, in competition with, and losing ground to, a new conception of how the world should be properly ordered. From Strayer's perspective, for example, this ideology inspired French kings with the desire to define the boundaries of their kingdom. The assertion of royal authority over the Vivarais was therefore an expression of a new political ideology.

This perspective has proved an influential one and continues to be adopted by both specialists in the development of political thought and historians more generally. Its origins lie in the concerns which have fuelled historical research for much of the nineteenth century and a large part of the twentieth. These concerns were intimately connected with determining the origins of the 'nation-state' and thereby

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tracing the lineage of modern political institutions. This research has provoked multiple answers according varying degrees of importance to the events of the thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries. All have in common that whilst they might claim to offer an account of history, they are, in reality, part of what Oexle has described as the histoire d'un problème historique. In this case interest in the origins of the nation-state has acted as a filter through which medieval society has been interpreted. Whilst there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the exploration of the origins of contemporary institutions and attitudes, at the same time such an approach is not necessarily conducive to determining medieval perceptions of the world. By comparing Jakob Burckhardt’s and Ferdinand Tönnies’ attitudes towards the relationship between the individual and society in the middle ages, Oexle illustrates that historical research may be more revealing of nineteenth and twentieth century concerns and mentalities than it is about medieval society.

It is not difficult to recognise today that the approach of historians such as Strayer belong to a particular historical debate. It is equally apparent that the approach adopted by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century scholars, such as Du Chesne and Du Cange, sprang in part from a desire to glorify the kings of France. The distinctiveness of both approaches is discernible with relative ease not because the interests of contemporary society no longer define the historical debate, but because the ‘problem’ with which historians are concerned has changed. Amongst the most

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14 Ibid., pp. 32-34.


influential factors in shaping the new historical debate has been the emergence of supra-national organisations and institutions since 1945. It is not, perhaps, coincidental that Sommerlechner's recent survey of perceptions of Frederick II adopted a pan-European approach rather than choosing to focus upon one particular 'national' group. As Scales has noted, it is difficult not to see in recent considerations of the concept of the medieval nation a reflection of the concerns of the present day. An awareness of the historical discourse of which they are a part, whilst it may not liberate historians from its constraints, does enable at least some re-orientation of focus.

The intention of the present work is, in so far as the sources permit, to address an aspect of a deceptively simple question: how did the inhabitants of France in the thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth century view their world? Two particular facets of this question are to be focused upon. The first is the perception of rulers of the western Empire in a period in which the authority they exercised underwent a dramatic decline. The second concerns conceptions of political structures and the fundamental organisation of society. The past decade has witnessed the curtains begin to be drawn back on these topics. Krynen has sought to illuminate the development of royal ideology in France and in doing so has sought to address attitudes towards the Empire. Yet it must be noted that he has focused primarily upon the evolution of this ideology from the mid-fourteenth century and has been content largely to rely upon many longstanding assumptions for the period prior to this. Chazan has charted the development of conceptions of the Empire and its rulers in one particular strand of universal history written within the confines of certain monastic communities in France. Whilst also focused upon perceptions of the Empire and its rulers, this thesis

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differs fundamentally from Chazan’s work or, for example, from my earlier approach to Pierre Dubois.\textsuperscript{21} this examination of French mentalities is intended, as it were, to throw open the shutters on the whole house, rather than to illuminate a single room and catalogue its contents.

The approach adopted here runs contrary to many of the prevailing currents of contemporary historiography. In particular it is a radical departure from the individual ‘case-study’ methodology pursued by many recent Francophone scholars who have touched upon French attitudes towards the Empire and its rulers. Yet a broader approach is justified by the opportunity it offers to assess the extent to which attitudes may be considered representative and to determine the relationship between particular ideas and mentalities. The intention is to build up a tableau depicting the place occupied by the Empire and its rulers in French thought as a whole. The first element in constructing such a picture is an examination of the immediate concerns responsible for shaping attitudes towards contemporary imperial rulers and would-be rulers, in particular the most conspicuous of these, Frederick II. The second is a reconsideration of the traditional place historians have assigned to Charlemagne in French thought, the most ubiquitous figure connected with the Empire in thirteenth- and early-fourteenth-century France. Subsequently the intention is the elucidation of the fundamental assumptions which formulated attitudes towards imperial rulers and towards the Empire as an institution. In the light of this exploration the final objective is to determine whether any particular factors differentiated the Empire and its rulers from other forms of political organisation and to assess the place both were considered to occupy in Christian society.

ii. Choosing a Perspective

An exploration of perceptions must first establish whose perspective is to be considered. There is little to be gained by superimposing categories if these bear little relation to medieval conceptions. What might be considered the most obvious

\textsuperscript{21} C. N. Jones, ‘Rex Francie in regno suo princeps est’: The Perspective of Pierre Dubois,’ \textit{Comitatus}, xxxiv (2003), 49-87.
solution, the use of contemporary political boundaries, is problematic. Although such boundaries reflect contemporary perceptions of a division, their employment as sole criteria risks imposing arbitrary separations and associations little different from those created by superimposed categories. There seems, for example, little justification for the line Sommerlechner draws in her catalogue of sources between Philippe Mousket and the chronicler patronised by Baudoin d'Avesnes, both of whom wrote in French and drew upon the resources of the abbey of Saint-Denis.22

One solution might be to consider a region of French 'cultural' influence. Yet on one level this could be interpreted to encompass most of western Europe. The architectural style developed in and around Paris during the reign of Louis IX, for example, influenced the design of buildings as diverse as Westminster abbey and Cologne cathedral,23 and reached as far south as the Italian rengo.24 A more limited French 'cultural milieu' may be defined by proposing that 'culture' be understood in the sense of a shared language, customs and subjection to the influence, if not the direct control, of the Capetian-Valois kings. On the basis of such criteria this cultural milieu included not simply the region within the political bounds of the French kingdom but extended beyond it encompassing, for example, the county of Hainaut, technically subject to the jurisdiction of the Empire. A further case would be the town of Metz which, although outside the boundaries of the French kingdom, was populated by French speaking inhabitants who acquired and translated into French one of the most popular Latin works produced within the Île-de-France, Vincent de Beauvais' Speculum historiale.25 This milieu may also be considered to embrace those

22 Sommerlechner, Stupor, pp. 545, 548.


such as Charles d’Anjou, who, although they spent much of their time outside it, were products of a French environment.  

A common vernacular must be considered of particular importance because it fostered the development of a literary culture specific to the French milieu. The existence of this vernacular literary culture provides the most important evidence for an exchange of ideas generated within and limited to this environment. For example, a French text of the *Grandes Chroniques* compilation circulating in the imperial bishopric of Cambrai was based upon a work originally produced in the royal abbey of Saint-Denis. It shared its basic content with a compilation sold to a Norman by Thomas de Maubeuge, the owner of a Parisian *atelier* who actively maintained familial interests in Hainaut. Yet at the same time the circulation of *Grandes Chroniques* compilations was essentially restricted to the northern part of the French kingdom and its immediate surroundings. The fact that a work was written in the universal language of Christian Europe, Latin, removed these linguistic limitations. Yet although certain works, such as the *Speculum historiale*, found a wider audience this was unusual, particular in the case of contemporary historical works: Aubri de Trois-Fontaines’ chronicle and Guillaume de Nangis’ life of Louis IX, for example, appear to have enjoyed extremely limited geographical circulation and many monastic chronicles never reached beyond the walls of their abbeys.

With the exception of English Gascony, the regions south of the Loire were, from the reign of Louis VIII, firmly integrated into the political structure of the Capetian-Valois kingdom. Simultaneously, they were recognised to differ from the northern parts of the kingdom, most strikingly in terms of language and legal practices. These differences were so profound and apparent to contemporaries that they led the inhabitants of the north to develop and impose a conception of unity, embodied in the invention of the term ‘Languedoc’, upon a region united by little beyond a distinctiveness from the north. Interchange certainly took place between

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north and south, possibly the most striking example of which was the appearance of lawyers such as Guillaume de Nogaret in the employ of Philippe IV. Yet there remained a profound cultural divide, symbolised by the absence of tournaments, an important element of northern chivalric culture, from the south and by the absence of a shared literature. In certain cases, such as the northern-French *Grandes Chroniques* and the works of the southern troubadours, this latter might be explained by a difference of language. Yet the infrequency with which, for example, even Latin historical works crossed the Loire, has led Guenee to go so far as to propose that a genre such as ‘history’ enjoyed a fundamentally different place in northern and southern mentalities.\(^{29}\) Differences of language, culture, customs, and, above all, a fundamentally different relationship with the French kings, one defined in the south by recent conquest and the violent suppression of the Albigensian heresy, mitigate against examining the southern regions in conjunction with those of the north. For this reason, with certain exceptions, the regions which previously enjoyed an autonomous existence subject to the Plantagenet dynasty or the Saint-Gilles counts of Toulouse will be excluded from this study, which will focus upon an essentially ‘northern’ French perspective.

Amongst the exceptions from the Languedoc undoubtedly the most important are the Dominicans. Imposed upon the southern region, and under Gregory IX made the corner stone of the Inquisition, the order was dependent upon the support of the papacy and the Capetian-Valois kings in order to maintain its position.\(^{30}\) It is notable not only that the Dominicans were the only group in the southern region to produce a substantial corpus of historical works, but that men such as Géraud de Frachet (b. 25 March 1205; d. 4 October 1271) were educated in Paris\(^{31}\) and others possessed links...
with the court, such as Bernard Gui (d. 30 December 1331), who, in 1331, offered his *Flores chronicorum* to Philippe VI. Beyond the order’s convents the audience for the literary output of these southern Dominicans lay north of the Loire: it was into French, not Occitan, that Gui’s *Flores chronicorum* was translated (ca. 1330; certainly pre-1368), into a French work that his catalogue of French kings was incorporated and it was to the north that diffusion of Géraud’s work was largely confined, its southernmost penetration being the Limousin and the Auvergne. It was at the abbey of Saint-Denis that Géraud’s universal chronicle found its most prolific continuators, first for the period 1268 to 1285, later for the period up to 1328 and finally, in the hands of Richard Lescot, for the years 1328 to 1344.

Whilst the Dominicans may be considered intimately connected with the northern French milieu, it is also necessary to take into account that they possessed links with southern society. Via a Dominican intermediary certain aspects of southern culture might cross the *mur invisible* that Guenée suggested lay just south of the Loire. Bernard Gui, for example, made use of the work of Raymond VII’s chaplain Guillaume de Puylaurens. Both Gui and Géraud de Frachet also drew upon the resources of what was undoubtedly the most important southern centre for historical writing, the abbey of Saint-Martial of Limoges, possessed of one of the largest


34 Ibid., p. 435.


libraries in France. Whilst primarily focused upon what may be considered a northern French cultural milieu there is therefore a case for occasionally stepping slightly beyond this.

iii. The Altered Image?

The view that the thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries were a period in which a new conception of political organisation emerged in the French kingdom is largely a consequence of a traditional, and it may be suggested disproportionate, focus upon certain sources. Most prominent amongst these are the works of French specialists in Roman law, political pamphlets, and works based upon the newly re-discovered Aristotelian philosophy. Whilst indisputably important, it is doubtful whether, given the tendency to examine these works largely in isolation, their proper contexts have been fully appreciated. Consequently, the extent to which the authors’ perceptions have been understood and the degree to which, in any case, they may be considered representative of the northern French cultural milieu may be questioned. Chazan’s recent study of conceptions of Empire in universal histories illustrates one of the problems inherent in the use of a restricted source base: for the period in question it is limited to providing an insight into the perspectives of four members of the regular clergy. The very exercise of writing universal histories, particularly ones which, as here, drew heavily upon a work by an imperial apologist, implied an emphasis upon the Empire and the emperor which may not accurately reflect the place both occupied in contemporary thought. Generalisations based on such an analysis can be misleading. Aware of this, Chazan sought to locate these perspectives within a wider context but did not question traditional conceptions of what this context was.

The key to establishing a broader context does not lie simply in increasing the number of sources studied, but rather, as Esch has suggested, in multiplying the


39 Chazan, L’Empire, pp. 311-722.

40 Ibid., pp. 105-121.
To the traditional works employed in assessing conceptions of political ideas may therefore be added material varying from official documents to sermons, hagiography and stained glass. By far the richest source and the one offering the possibility of surveying a range of perspectives across the northern French milieu, is historical material such as chronicles and annals. In order to use such materials to establish a broader and more representative context, it is necessary that each source be itself properly contextualised. This involves discerning not only the original author’s or patron’s background and intentions but also these same factors with regard to those who re-used sources or parts of sources. It is necessary to recognise, in particular, that what appears novel to the modern academic is, as Guenee emphasised in the case of historical material, of much less importance than the appreciation of the contemporary concerns that shaped the use and presentation of material. As Le Goff noted, in relation to the minstrel of Reims’ Récits, the importance of a text may


43 The need to determine such factors is highlighted by Rech’s recent – and extremely problematic – analysis of the work of the prior of the abbey of Saint-Martial of Limoges, Hélie Autenc (d. 1284). Rech accepts the existence of a ‘Great Chronicle of Limoges,’ a work now considered to be a nineteenth-century construct, an error which is particularly surprising given that he cites two works in his footnotes both of which explicitly disprove the existence of such a ‘Great Chronicle’. Rech’s exploration of the ‘perspective’ of Hélie Autenc is consequently based upon the conflation of two separate chronicles one of which was not even written at Saint-Martial: R. Rech, ‘Charles d’Anjou et le Limousin. La conquête du royaume de Naples chez Hélie Autenc et Géraud de Frachet,’ BEC, clviii (2001), 444-454. As problematic is the failure of Rech’s analysis to take account of the internal divisions in the city of Limoges, divisions which sometimes saw the abbot of Saint-Martial counted amongst the partisans of the English king. The latter factor does much to explain the apparent lack of enthusiasm at Saint-Martial in the 1260s for Charles d’Anjou’s southern Italian victories. Concerning the divisions in Limoges: R. Studd, ‘The ‘Privilegiati’ and the Treaty of Paris, 1259,’ ed. R. H. Bautier, La ‘France anglaise’ au Moyen Age, colloque des historiens médiévistes français et britanniques. Actes du III" Congrès national des sociétés savantes (Poitiers, 1986), Section d’histoire médiévale et de philologie, I (Paris, 1988), pp. 181-182, 183-184, 185-186.

lie not in the facts it conveys but in its author’s perspective. Yet it is not enough simply to establish the context of individual sources: it is indispensable to appreciate their importance relative to each other.

A comparison of manuscript traditions suggests that Bernard Gui’s *Flores chronicorum*, of which sixty-eight copies remain, reached a far wider audience during the period under consideration than, for example, Jean Quidort’s *De potestate regia et papali*, of which one copy exists from the first half of the fourteenth century. Whilst Jean’s work certainly contains novel elements, it is less clear whether they proved influential or that the concerns which stimulated them were widespread ones. In contrast, the dissemination of, for example, *Grandes Chroniques* compilations should provide a clearer indication of attitudes towards the Empire and their development. A limited manuscript tradition is not, however, necessarily an indication that ideas did not reach a wide audience. This is particularly true of works written in the vernacular certain of which may have been conceived with oral presentation specifically in mind, such as the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris, and the prose chronicle of the minstrel of Reims. At the same time, it is necessary to remain aware of the intrinsic limitations connected with even a suitably contextualised source base.


50 RHGF, xxii, p. 88, n. 1.

An illuminated coronation ordo or the attribution of the coronation sword to Charlemagne may provide an insight into intentions connected with elements of the coronation ceremony; but they reveal little about how this symbolism may have been understood, or whether it was understood at all. Elucidating the reception of visual or literary material, or gauging the 'public' response to efforts by the Capetian-Valois kings or others to promote particular perspectives, remains problematic. The sources represent only the outlook of certain literate groups and even here we must avoid assuming that what survives necessarily represents a complete picture. The form in which sources are available to historians compound these difficulties.

The published editions of Philippe Mousket's chronicle illustrate one of the problems connected with available source material. The editors of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica chose to present only the sections of Mousket's chronicle considered to be relevant to the Empire; those of the Recueil des historiens des gaules et de la France were less selective but opted to prepare an edition of the text which began only in 1226. Historians owe an incalculable debt to nineteenth and early-twentieth-century editors. At the same time Mousket's case shows why their editions must be read with an awareness of the positivist criteria of factual originality that were frequently applied to the selection of material within chronicles and, indeed, to the selection of which chronicles would be edited. Yet at least Mousket's work (which survives in only one manuscript) was not subject to a further common editorial practice: the attempt to establish a text approximating to the autograph.

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52 For reflections on the existence and assessment of 'public opinion': B. Guenée, L'opinion publique à la fin du Moyen Âge d'après la <<Chronique de Charles VI>> du Religieux de Saint-Denis (Paris, 2002), pp. 7-17.

53 Esch, 'Chance,' p. 27.


55 MGH SS, xxvi, p. 719.

56 J. -C. Schmitt, 'Une réflexion nécessaire sur le document,' Les Tendances actuelles, p. 43.
Such efforts can be useful, but they neglect the fact that most contemporaries did not have such a text before them. As Melville has noted, the concept of a fixed work does not help the historian to evaluate the reception of ideas. Considering the *Grandes Chroniques* to be a fixed text provides one isolated snapshot view of the Empire and its rulers; understanding the manuscript tradition, in contrast, provides an insight into the fabrication, development and reception of ideas relating to the Empire across northern France and amongst numerous different social groups.

The study of manuscripts, whilst revealing what are effectively new perspectives and highlighting previously unknown aspects of well known works, such as the *mise en pages* of the single extant early-fourteenth-century French translation of *De arte venandi cum avibus*, may also give rise to a false sense of security. The scanned document, laptop and latte disassociate the historian from the context of a source more profoundly than even a display case at the Louvre disassociates *Joyeuse* from the coronation ceremony at Reims. It is necessary to remember that few contemporaries, excepting unusual cases such as Bernard Gui, had more than one source before them, and that they consequently lacked the comparative perspective of the historian and, in particular, the ability to contextualise the elements of a compilation. At the same time, whilst it is necessary to maintain an awareness of such constraints and the elements of distortion they introduce into any analysis, they do not prevent some elucidation of the significance of the Empire and its ruler in French thought.

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58 Ibid., p. 31.
Chapter One

Frederick II – The Conspicuous Emperor

i. Introduction

Prior to the reign of Philippe IV one of very few events that the Benedictines of Saint-Étienne, Caen, took the trouble to record in their Easter Tables was the dispute that took place between the last Hohenstaufen emperor and pope Innocent IV. The interest in Frederick II displayed by these Norman monks was not unusual: Frederick’s dispute with the papacy was often one of very few non-local, and indeed non-ecclesiastical, events deemed worthy of inclusion by many French chroniclers in their accounts. The emperor’s deposition in 1245 seems, in particular, to have been considered an event worthy of recording whether the writer lived in Normandy, the Île-de-France, or the Limousin. Indeed it was often the only event recorded in relation to Frederick or one of very few. The passing of time did little to dampen interest: Géraud de Frachet, writing at Limoges, included an account of Frederick’s deposition in the second recension of his universal history completed in the late 1260s, as did

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1 Ex Chronico Sancti stephani Cadomensi, RHGF, xxiii, p. 492. The original text concluded in 1143; entries were continued in various hands up to 1336: L. Delisle, ‘Annales de Rouen et textes qui en dérivent,’ HLF, xxxii (1898), pp. 200-201.


3 E Chronicis Lirensis monasterii, RHGF, xxiii, p. 469; E Chronicno Girardi ab Arvernia, canonici Claromontensis, et anonyma ejusdem chronici continuatione, circa annum M.CC.LXXXVIII. scripta [hence Abbreviatione Historiae Figuralis], RHGF, xxi, p. 215; E Chronico Rotomagensi [hence annals of Rouen], RHGF, xxiii, p. 338.

4 Chronicon Girardi de Fracheto et anonyma ejusdem operis continuatio, RHGF, xxi, p. 4. Originating in the minor nobility of Limoges, Géraud was prior of the Dominican convents of Limoges, Marseilles and Montpellier and of the province of Provence (1251-1259): Rech, ‘Géraud,’ pp. 422-425. The first recension of his universal history, ending in 1199, was written between 1245 and 1248, the second between 1248 and 1268: ibid., pp. 426, 427, 429. Two MSS of the first remain extant; ten offer a text
Jean de Saint-Victor, compiling his *Memoriale historiarum* in Paris at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Landolpho of Colonna, a canon of Chartres, included a similar note when writing in the 1320s, as did the compilers of the *Grandes Chroniques* prepared at the abbey of Saint-Denis in the mid-1340s.

Frederick has not proved of similar interest to historians of medieval France. Although this is in part because political history has become distinctly unfashionable in France, it is due primarily to the fact that Frederick's relations with Philippe Auguste, Louis VIII and Louis IX are not considered controversial. On the whole there is common agreement that Capetian-Staufer relations were warm following Frederick's accession, in the wake of which a series of alliances were concluded.

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up to 1266, thirteen a version continued to 1268, 1271 or 1273. Of these twenty-five MSS, nineteen date from prior to 1340: Rech, *L'engagement*, pp. 146-147.


7 GCF, vii, p. 110.


10 MGH Const. II, no. 44, p. 55 (19 November 1212, Toul); no. 99, p 125 (November 1223, Catania); no. 290, p. 405 (11 June 1226, Trent); no. 174, p. 215 (May 1232, apud Pordenone); no. 313, pp. 424-425 (29 June 1232, apud Eger).
They remained so until the emperor's marriage to Isabella of England (1235)\(^{11}\) and Frederick's efforts to establish the count of Toulouse, Raymond VII, as an effective counterbalance to Louis' father-in-law, Raymond-Berengar IV, count of Provence,\(^{12}\) led to a gradual loss of cordiality. The decline rapidly worsened when Frederick imprisoned a group of French prelates in 1241.\(^{13}\) The 1240s saw a rapid improvement in relations when Frederick's attempts to secure French mediation in his dispute with Innocent coincided with Louis IX's hopes of enlisting the emperor's logistical support in his planned crusade.\(^{14}\) Only a tendency amongst historians to judge Louis IX's actions in the light of his later reputation for saintliness, an approach which has given rise to the view that the French king pursued a consistent policy of strict neutrality in papal-imperial disputes,\(^{15}\) may be considered questionable. From 1244 it seems probable that Louis' crusading interests led him to seek to pressure the pope into coming to terms with Frederick. In 1250, whilst still in the Holy Land, Louis may even have taken the extraordinary step of despatching his brothers to Lyon in order to attempt to force Innocent to come to terms with the emperor.\(^{16}\)

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\(^{14}\) Kienast, *Deutschland*, iii, pp. 631-638.


Whether a work addressed Frederick or not depended upon the purpose for which it was written. There are therefore a number of works concerned with Louis IX's reign which make no reference to the emperor, such as the hagiographies of Geoffroi de Beaulieu, Guillaume de Chartres and Guillaume de Saint-Pathus. Yet the number of historical and other works which did remark upon the last Hohenstaufen emperor, and particularly upon his deposition, remains striking. Given the prominence accorded to Frederick, establishing an understanding of the factors that determined and influenced how he was perceived is a useful and necessary first step in establishing the place of the western Empire and its ruler in northern French thought.

The recent work of Chazan and Sommerlechner represents the first attempts to analyse northern French attitudes towards Frederick. Chazan's study is limited to four universal histories. In contrast, Sommerlechner's analysis is problematic not because it is consciously limited, but, in part, because of its approach to sources. The chronicle of Guillaume de Puylaurens, sometime chaplain to Raymond VII of Toulouse, should, for example, be considered an exceptional case. Guillaume's work was one of very few non-Dominican works produced in the Languedoc to circulate north of the Loire. Even in the south it does not appear to have enjoyed widespread circulation and in the north it did so only in the form of excerpts

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17 *Vita Ludovici noni, auctore Gaufrido de Belloloco*, *Vita et sancta conversatio piae memoriae Ludovici quondam regis Francorum*, RHGF, xx, pp. 1-27.

18 *De vita et actibus inclytae recordationis regis Francorum Ludovici et de miraculis quae ad ejus sanctitatis declarationem contigerunt, auctore fratre Guillelmo Carnotensi, ordinis praedictorum, ejusdem regis capellano*, RHGF, xx, pp. 27-41.


20 Above, p. 24.


22 One near contemporary MS, written in Toulouse between 1300 and 1330, remains extant. By the early-fifteenth century this had entered a Dominican library: ibid., pp. 15-16.
incorporated by the Dominican Bernard Gui into his own accounts. Consequently, Guillaume’s outlook should not necessarily be accorded the same weight as the views of other, more widely read, writers, and his work should not automatically be considered representative of attitudes in the Languedoc, where the medium of Latin chronicle history appears itself to have been uncommon. More fundamentally, the methodology adopted by Sommerlechner results in perspectives unique to northern France, and to other cultural regions, becoming largely submerged within a wider pan-European portrait. German and Italian perspectives mark the character of this portrait and determine the agenda and depth in which topics are explored. The consequence of this is that there is, for example, no highlighting, and consequently no explanation of, the frequency with which certain aspects of Frederick’s reign, such as his deposition, appear in French sources. In fact, in the years prior to the death of Louis IX, it is possible to distinguish two distinct approaches to Frederick in northern France, one adopted predominantly by churchmen and the other by lay authors.

ii. A Clerical Perspective

The chronicle of the Norman monastery of Lire illustrates a position which appears common to many French clerics prior to 1270. Written most probably in the 1250s, the writer took a particular interest in an aspect of Frederick’s reign which had had local repercussions, that is his 1241 imprisonment of the prelates travelling to Rome. The only other comments concerned the emperor’s deposition and his death.


24 Sommerlechner addressed French material in isolation only in her brief discussion of Landesgeschichtsschreibung. This category encompasses a wide range of works not classed by Sommerlechner as annals, encyclopaedias or universal histories: Stupor, pp. 112-116.

25 Sommerlechner’s discussion of Frederick’s deposition is limited to five French sources: Géraud de Frachet, Guillaume de Nangis, Vincent de Beauvais, the Norman chronicle and Guillaume de Puylaurens: ibid., pp. 193-202.

26 E Chronicis Lirensis monasterii, RHGF, xxiii, p. 468. The archbishop of Rouen and the abbot of Fécamp are named amongst the captives. Three versions of this Benedictine chronicle exist, two of
Whilst the chronicler did make the unusual, and indeed, north of the Loire, unique, suggestion that the emperor attempted to make amends for his misdeeds on his deathbed,\textsuperscript{27} he summed up Frederick's death with the comment that it occurred after: 'multas injurias illatas et damna ecclesiae et religioni facta'.\textsuperscript{28} Whilst hardly a positive portrait of the emperor's reign, yet neither was it an outright condemnation.

The short history of the Latin Empire of Constantinople written by Gautier Cornut (1222-1241), archbishop of Sens, focused upon the transfer of the crown of thorns to France, but touched upon the emperor in passing. Gautier noted the assistance and counsel Frederick offered to those charged with conveying the relics to France in positive terms.\textsuperscript{29} Nevertheless, his portrait of Frederick, written prior to the emperor's deposition, was atypical. An account of Frederick similar to that produced at Lire appeared in the Norman chronicle. Here, in addition to the capture of the prelates, again of local interest, only the initial outbreak of strife between Frederick and the Church and the deposition held the chronicler's attention.\textsuperscript{30} Another account, the annals of Saint-Médard of Soissons, possibly written by the prior of the abbey, Gobert de Coinci, in the 1250s,\textsuperscript{31} tended towards condemning the emperor.

\textsuperscript{27} E Chronicis Lirensis monasterii, RHGF, xxiii, p. 469.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 469.

\textsuperscript{29} Opusculum Galteri Cornuti, archiepiscopi Senonensis, de susceptione Coronae spineae Jesu Christi, RHGF, xxii, p. 30. Written between August 1239, the month in which the passion relics arrived in Sens (Richard, Louis, pp. 150-151), and Gautier's death in 1241.

\textsuperscript{30} E Chronico Normanniae ab anno 1169 ad annum 1259 sive potius 1272, RHGF, xxiii, p. 213. The archbishop of Rouen and the abbot of Fécamp are named amongst the captives.

\textsuperscript{31} Gobert's work probably represents the section from the birth of Christ up until 1241. This was followed by a supplement which concluded in 1261 and which also added some material pre-dating 1241: L. Delisle, 'Chronique ou Annales de Saint-Médard de Soissons,' HLF, xxxii (1898), pp. 235-239.
In the case of the imperial crusade, about which the annalist of Saint-Médard was particularly well informed, the emperor’s recovery of Jerusalem was acknowledged, as was that of the surrounding towns and even the securing of the access roads. Frederick’s establishment of a ten-year truce with the Saracens was also recorded, along with his crown-wearing in the Holy Sepulchre. The annalist noted, however, that all this was achieved through dialogue with the ‘pagans’ and that the emperor left the walls and city unfortified. The annals highlighted that Frederick had been an excommunicate throughout his crusade and that upon his return to Sicily he acted cruelly against the Roman Church, the Templars and the Hospitallers. A negative impression of Frederick was then confirmed by the only other event the annalist chose to record: the outbreak of the 1239 dispute with pope Gregory IX. By failing to note that Frederick and Gregory had quickly come to terms in 1230, the impression was given, either through intention or ignorance, that the emperor had remained excommunicate for considerably longer than in reality was the case. The awfulness of Frederick’s character was underlined by an account of his exiling and expulsion of all manner of clergy.

Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, a contemporary of the annalist of Saint-Médard, was not as selective in the account he gave of the emperor’s reign. Although of possibly German origins, Aubri undoubtedly prepared his chronicle with a French audience in mind. The attention Aubri paid to Frederick was in part due to the genre

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32 Stürner, Friedrich, ii, pp. 130-166.

33 *Ex Annalibus S. Medardi Suessionensibus* [hence annals of Saint-Médard], MGH SS, xxvi, pp. 521-522.

34 Frederick: ‘...per longum tempus excommunicatum anathematizat et tam in spirtualibus quam in temporalibus dampnat’ ibid., p. 522.


36 The bulk of Aubri’s chronicle was written between 1227 and 1240. Minor revisions, which continued the text up to 1241, were made in 1251-1252: Chazan, *L’Empire*, pp. 360-361.

in which he was writing, universal history. It also reflected a greater knowledge of imperial affairs, a consequence of Aubri's geographical proximity to the Empire. The latter allowed the Cistercian author access to libraries in the imperial regions bordering the county of Champagne and may, for example, account for his awareness of Gregory IX's offer of the imperial throne to Robert I d'Artois, an event otherwise unknown in northern France. As the only other sources to refer to this were Matthew Paris and a chronicler based in Cologne it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the story originated in the Rhineland and that it was drawn to Matthew's attention as a consequence of English trading links with the region. In spite of Schmidt-Chazan's suggestion that possible German origins led Aubri to adopt a more positive approach to Frederick, in common with the annalist of Saint-Médard, it was to the emperor's failings as a crusader and the deterioration in his relations with the papacy that Aubri paid particular attention.

The note of scepticism introduced by Aubri's comment that Frederick may or may not actually have been suffering from a genuine illness when he chose to abandon his initial crusading expedition sets the tone for the chronicle as a whole. When it came to the expedition itself, Aubri chose not to specify Frederick's achievements beyond the fact that he had made a treaty with the Sultan and worn his crown in the Holy Sepulchre. Notably absent was any statement to the effect that Frederick had actually recovered Jerusalem. Instead Aubri left his readers with the impression that the treaty with al-Kamil had simply guaranteed pilgrims the right to

38 Ibid., 176-180.

39 ATF, p. 949.

40 *Chron. maj.*, iii, pp. 624-627.

41 *Annales Sancti Pantaleonis Coloniensis*, MGH SS, xxii, p. 539.

42 Schmidt-Chazan, 'Aubri,' 189-190.

visit the city. Although he recorded that many common people welcomed Frederick’s treaty because it allowed them to visit the Holy Sepulchre, this must be seen in the context of the fact that the emperor was noted as remaining excommunicate throughout his crusade, and that his peace was made without the consent of the Patriarch, the Templars or the Hospitallers.44

The events that immediately followed the crusade did little to enhance the emperor’s reputation. The Cistercian author restricted himself to reporting the exchange of letters between Gregory and the patriarch of Jerusalem in which:

...multa dicebat de inhonestis moribus et infidelitate imperatoris, et quomodo vita eius parum distat a vita alicuius Sarraceni.45

It is certainly true that Aubri passed no comment concerning the veracity of these charges, but nor did he attempt to put the emperor’s defence. Frederick’s return from Outremer did not see Aubri censure Jean de Brienne’s papally sponsored invasion of the regno, but he did record Frederick’s exceedingly cruel response to it.46

In common with the chronicler of Lire, Aubri was quite capable of incorporating incidents which might lead to a more positive interpretation of Frederick, an example being the emperor’s participation in the translation of Saint Elizabeth of Thuringia.47 Yet when it came to Frederick’s relations with the papacy there seems little doubt as to which party Aubri consistently considered to be unreasonable and in the wrong. Signs of a rift appeared even before the crusade: Aubri implied that Honorius III’s decision to hand over the administration of parts of Tuscany to Jean de Brienne was a source of grievance to the emperor.48 Although

44 ATF, p. 925.


46 Ibid., p. 925. Sommerlechner has rightly noted that Schmidt-Chazan’s belief that Aubri was an admirer of Frederick and keen to exonerate him from all blame led to a degree of misleading over-interpretation: Stupor, p. 26, n. 89.

47 ATF, p. 939.

48 Ibid., p. 919.
Aubri reported Frederick and Gregory's reconciliation, albeit only through the intervention of the duke of Austria,\(^9\) his approach to the renewal of the dispute in 1239 was idiosyncratic: his entire account was woven around the charges brought against Frederick by the papacy. Although Aubri settled for relating only one of the seventeen charges that he informed his readers had been levelled against the emperor, that one, culled from a papal letter to the archbishop of Sens, was a particularly lurid tale of blasphemy. Aubri accepted this, and the many other un-stated reasons, as quite sufficient justification for the papal decision to excommunicate the emperor.\(^{50}\) The following year Frederick, with no apparent justification, was noted to have committed innumerable evils against the pope.\(^{51}\)

Although their works did not circulate widely, the position common to Aubri,\(^{52}\) the chronicler of the monastery of Lire and the annalist of Saint-Médard, was that adopted by the most influential ecclesiastical work produced in the period. The Dominican Vincent de Beauvais died in 1264, leaving his *Speculum historiale* extant in two recensions, one terminating in 1244 and the other in 1250.\(^{53}\) Popular within Vincent's own order and the Cistercians, fragments of the work survive in over three hundred manuscripts.\(^{54}\) Vincent's selection and portrayal of the events of Frederick's reign clearly indicate where his sympathies lay. The imperial crusade was noted, but Vincent displayed little interest in recording its outcome and laid heavy emphasis

\(^{49}\) Ibid., pp. 926-927.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., p. 944.

\(^{51}\) Ibid, p. 948.

\(^{52}\) Only two near-contemporary MSS of Aubri's chronicle survive; both have their provenance in the Low Countries: Schmidt-Chazan, 'Aubri,' 191-192.

\(^{53}\) The latter was probably completed in 1254: A. Molinier, *Les sources de l'histoire de France des origines aux guerres d'Italie (1494)*, iii, *Les Capétiens, 1180-1328* (Paris, 1903), no. 2524.

\(^{54}\) Chazan, *L'Empire*, p. 377. For a list of 242 MSS containing material indicating that they were once part of non-abridged copies of the *Speculum historiale*: M. -C. Duchenne, G. Guzman, J. Voorbij, 'Une liste des manuscrits du *Speculum historiale* de Vincent de Beauvais,' *Scriptorium*, xli (1987), 289-294. The most common version was edited by the Benedictines of Saint-Vast d'Arras in 1624.
upon the fact that Frederick was disobedient to the Church and had undertaken this venture whilst under sentence of anathema.\footnote{Speculum historiale, bk. xxx, chap. cxxix, p. 1277.} His subsequent interest was in the outbreak of the dispute with Gregory in 1239 which led to the emperor's second excommunication and resulted in the capture and imprisonment of the clerics and cardinals journeying to Rome.\footnote{Ibid., bk. xxx, chap. cxxxviii, p. 1280.} An unrepentant Frederick was later noted as being deposed at Lyon.\footnote{Ibid., bk. xxxi, chap. i, p. 1286.} Here, then, was a tableau of recent history in which Frederick's struggle with the Church was again highlighted and which again painted the emperor as disobedient and ill intentioned. The appearance of this perspective in Vincent's work raises the question of whether it was a view shared beyond ecclesiastical circles.

Vincent was the servant of three masters. His 'commissioning editors' were, as he noted in the first version of his \textit{Libellus apologeticus}, his own order, the Dominicans.\footnote{M. Paulmier-Foucart and S. Lusignan, 'Vincent de Beauvais et l'histoire du \textit{Speculum Maius},' \textit{Journal des Savants}, (1990), 113.} He was also strongly associated with the Cistercians: Vincent spent a decade fulfilling the function of \textit{lector} at the Cistercian abbey of Royaumont and it was the Cistercians who were to play an important part in the distribution of his work.\footnote{Ibid., 117. For a list of Cistercian MSS of Vincent's work: ibid., 119, n. 65.} It was at Royaumont, an institution founded by Blanche de Castille in 1228, that Vincent was to come into contact with his third patron, Louis IX.\footnote{Ibid., 117.} Vincent became a familiar of not only the king but also of the queen, Marguerite de Provence, and of Thibaud, count of Champagne and king of Navarre.\footnote{Ibid., 117.} Although his relations with the latter became somewhat strained, his relationship with Louis appears to have

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item \footnote{Speculum historiale, bk. xxx, chap. cxxix, p. 1277.}
\item \footnote{Ibid., bk. xxx, chap. cxxxviii, p. 1280.}
\item \footnote{Ibid., bk. xxxi, chap. i, p. 1286.}
\item \footnote{M. Paulmier-Foucart and S. Lusignan, 'Vincent de Beauvais et l'histoire du \textit{Speculum Maius},' \textit{Journal des Savants}, (1990), 113.}
\item \footnote{Ibid., 117. For a list of Cistercian MSS of Vincent’s work: ibid., 119, n. 65.}
\item \footnote{Ibid., 117.}
\item \footnote{Ibid., 120.}
\end{thebibliography}
been a close one.\textsuperscript{62} The king was in the habit of attending Vincent’s readings at Royaumont, the Dominican wrote a book of instruction for the future Philippe III and the \textit{Liber consolatorius pro morte amici} in 1260 when Louis' eldest son died.\textsuperscript{63} It was to Louis that, between 1244 and 1246, Vincent addressed the first draft of his partially completed encyclopaedia with an explanatory letter.\textsuperscript{64}

The nature of Louis’ role in the compilation of the \textit{Speculum historiale} remains unclear.\textsuperscript{65} Certainly, from the late-thirteenth century the king became strongly associated with the work\textsuperscript{66} and by the 1330s had come to be regarded as its patron.\textsuperscript{67} Whilst he was not responsible for its commissioning, it has long been recognised that Louis exercised a great deal of interest in Vincent’s project and provided him with the means of accessing libraries he would not otherwise have had the opportunity to use.\textsuperscript{68} Subject to much greater debate has been the question of whether the king exercised any influence over the contents of the compilation.\textsuperscript{69} Recent scholarship has made much progress in resolving this issue: it is clear that Vincent altered the second

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\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 115.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 100.


\textsuperscript{65} Richard, \textit{Louis}, p. 432.

\textsuperscript{66} Louis appears in an illumination incorporated into the prologue of a MS produced in the third quarter of the thirteenth century: Le Goff, \textit{Louis}, plate 15.

\textsuperscript{67} A MS of the French translation (1333) depicted Louis as commanding the work on its first folio: L. Delisle, ‘Exemplaires royaux et princiers du \textit{Miroir Historial} (XIV siècle),’ \textit{Gazette archéologique recueil de monuments de l’antiquité et du moyen-âge}, xi (1886), 89; Paulmier-Foucart/Lusignan, ‘Vincent,’ 122.

\textsuperscript{68} Paulmier-Foucart/Lusignan, ‘Vincent,’ 118.

\textsuperscript{69} Le Goff concluded that the \textit{Speculum} was undertaken ‘probablement’ at Louis’ command and ‘d’une certaine façon’ under royal control: \textit{Louis}, pp. 587-592.
\end{flushleft}
recession of his work to incorporate a number of points of importance to the Capetian dynasty. In particular Vincent modified and inserted André de Marchiennes' account of Hugues Capet's succession and the *reditus regni francorum ad stirpem Caroli imperatoris* concept into later versions of the *Speculum* and into the *De morali principis institutione*, a work prepared for Louis and Thibaud ca. 1259-1261. He suppressed the suggestion that Hugues was a usurper and promoted a conception of the *reditus* favourable to the Capetians. Was it the case then that Vincent's appraisal of Frederick's reign was also tailored to reflect a view approved by the Capetians?

Vincent may have included a number of concepts favourable to Louis, but his work remained an essentially Dominican text. As he himself reminded the king, it was important that the authorities he chose to use were ones which met with the approval of his superiors. The absence of any work in receipt of direct Capetian patronage and which dealt with contemporary history makes it difficult to come to any firm conclusions on this point. Yet it may be possible to see a reflection of a somewhat different approach from that adopted by Vincent, and possibly one more strongly marked by Capetian views, in the *Roman des rois* of the monk Primat (died ca. 1277). The *Roman* was a history of the French kingdom translated into French from Latin histories kept at the abbey of Saint-Denis. Completed ca. 1274 and presented

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72 Paulmier-Foucart/Lusignan, 'Vincent,' 114.


74 Ibid., p. 87.
to Philippe III, it differed from the Speculum historiale in that its prologue suggests that it was almost certainly commissioned directly by the French king. Given the length and complexity of the work, this king was almost certainly Louis rather than Philippe.

Frederick was by no means a central figure in the Roman des rois. It was almost certainly Louis’ intention that the Roman should provide a strong argument in favour of French dynastic continuity. The decision to end the work with Philippe Auguste’s death may even have been chosen with the reditus concept in mind, the aim being to conclude the work at the point at which the line of kings ‘returned’, in the person of Louis VIII, to the race of Charlemagne. Whilst the work was ostensibly one of translation, Primat’s originality lay in his selection of a variety of hitherto independent works, their integration into a uniform text, and the way in which he went about ‘translating’ them from Latin into French. For the later part of Louis’ grandfather’s reign Primat turned to a text by Philippe Auguste’s contemporary and panegyrist, Guillaume le Breton.

Amongst the material Primat chose to include in the Roman was Guillaume’s account of Frederick. Reflecting Frederick’s status as Philippe Auguste’s ally in the conflict with John of England and the emperor Otto IV, Guillaume le Breton’s Gesta

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76 Spiegel, Chronicle, p. 88.


78 Ibid., p. 192.

79 GCF, vi, pp. 294, 297, 299.

80 For this system of alliances: Huffman, Social, pp. 167-220.
Philippi Augusti conveyed, overall, a positive impression of Frederick. It was a portrayal which emphasised the important part played by Philippe in the imperial election, suggesting that the French king had acted as Frederick’s patron. The impression that the Capetians were the patrons as well as the allies of the Hohenstaufen may have been widespread in northern France. Probably written prior to 1223 by a member of the household of Robert VII de Béthune, an anonymous chronicle, essentially favourable to the English, noted not only Frederick’s alliance with Philippe Auguste but also that Frederick’s uncle, Philip of Swabia, had enjoyed success against Otto IV through Philippe’s support. Although the structure of Primat’s work meant that it did not prove necessary for him to consider the later part of Frederick’s reign, it remains the case that the only work of contemporary history that can be directly linked to Louis’ court presented a positive portrait of the emperor.

Guillaume le Breton’s Gesta found an echo beyond Saint-Denis. In fact his comments concerning Philippe’s role in Frederick’s election were incorporated in Vincent’s Speculum historiale, and, beyond the Île-de-France, employed in conjunction with other elements of his account by Aubri de Trois-Fontaines.

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82 Ibid., p. 239.

83 Concerning this chronicle: RHGF, xxiv, pt. ii, pp. 751-753.


86 Ibid., p. 759.

87 Speculum historiale, bk. xxx, chap. i, p. 1237.

88 ATF, pp. 890, 893, 896. Philippe’s ‘patronage’ was also noted by a continuator of Robert de Saint-Michel and an annalist in Rouen: Sommerlechner, Stupor, pp. 20, 184.
Guillaume’s notably different depiction of the Hohenstaufen prince is largely attributable to the fact that his account was written in Louis VIII’s reign, that is before the decline in papal-imperial relations that took place after the election of Gregory IX. Guillaume’s positive emphasis was, however, largely submerged in later works. For Vincent, Aubri and other ecclesiastical writers, the principal interest in Frederick’s reign lay in the decline in his relations with the papacy. This focus, and a certain sympathy for the papal position, almost certainly sprang from the fact that these authors were themselves clerics and naturally inclined to support the spiritual power in a dispute with the secular. At least one writer in the Île-de-France, a French continuator of Guillaume de Tyr’s chronicle, seems not only to have sympathised with the papacy but to have actively undertaken Innocent IV’s defence.

### iii. Hero or Villain?

For the author of the French continuation of the archbishop of Tyr’s chronicle for the years 1229 to 1248, possibly Philippe de Nanteuil, Innocent IV was *vaillant home*. Frederick’s position, in contrast, is evident from one of the continuator’s chapter titles: *De la mauvasité Fedric l’empereur de Alemaingne*. Of the two prominent appearances by the emperor, the first concerned Frederick’s crusade and the second his deposition. The inclusion of the first of these appears a

89. The text edited under the title *Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscrit de Rothelin* is divisible into three distinct sections, each of very different character. The first follows an abridged form of the oriental redaction up to 1229. The second, of French provenance, is a continuation up to 1248. The third, almost certainly a product of the Île-de-France, concludes in 1261: RHC, ii, pp. iv, ix. These three works are consistently conflated by Sommerlechner and placed in the context of *Landesgeschichtsschreibung* relating to Outremer: Stupor, p. 101. Morgan does much to disentangle the relationship of the continuations down to 1232, but makes little attempt to address the Rothelin MS material: M. R. Morgan, *The Chronicle of Ernoul and the Continuations of William of Tyre* (Oxford, 1973), p. 20.

90. RHC, ii, p. ix.


92. Title for chap. xix, ibid., p. 485. The editors indicate that the titles given in the *table des matières* are contemporary.
natural topic for a continuation of the history of Outremer. However, in a chapter which began with a lengthy preamble summing up the terrible evils inflicted by the Saracens on the kingdom of Jerusalem, the continuator, rather than offering any account of the imperial crusade, contented himself by summing up the venture in a brief note of Frederick’s treaty with the Sultan. This treaty allowed the Saracens to continue making their *Mahommeries* in the Holy Sepulchre. Frederick did nothing to restore the churches of the Holy Land nor did he rebuild the walls of Jerusalem. On the contrary, argued the continuator, his relations with the Saracens were so good and he honoured them so much that the pope and other Christians were suspicious that he might actually become a Moslem. Worse still, many said that Frederick simply believed in nothing at all, and his friendship with the Saracens led him to try later to prevent a French crusade led by Thibaud de Champagne.

The other events of Frederick’s reign were dealt with in the context of the chapter devoted to his deposition. This opened with a note of the emperor’s excommunication by Gregory IX and the comment that he had aggrieved not only the pope, but clergy of all kinds and those who supported them everywhere. It went on to offer a lengthy list of Frederick’s many crimes: these included the financial exactions placed upon the clergy, the persecution and imprisonment of the latter, particularly the Franciscans, theft from the Church, the breaking of oaths to the Church, the marriage of his daughter to the Greek emperor, an excommunicate, and the sending of Christian women to the sultan and other miscreants. Not only did Frederick capture and imprison, *villainment et cruelment*, clergy and even cardinals on their way to attend Gregory’s council, he was wholly responsible for the present state of the Holy Land. Frederick’s appearance in the continuator’s account was then, in essence, simply an extended catalogue of crimes against the Church.

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93 Ibid., chap. xix, pp. 525-526.

94 Ibid., p. 526.


96 Rothelin continuation (1229-1248), RHC, ii, chap. xxxvii, pp. 556-560.
The denunciation of Frederick’s achievements as a crusader sprang from the fact that the continuator’s prime objective was to portray the event with which he was principally concerned, the barons’ crusade led by Thibaud de Champagne,97 in the best possible light. The reason for the ferocity with which Frederick’s character and actions were attacked, however, almost certainly has its origins in a further factor. It is, perhaps, no coincidence that this violent condemnation came in a work written in the vernacular. It was the aristocracy that fostered a growth in historical material written in French,98 and it seems probable that whereas ecclesiastical authors were inclined to acquiesce to the papal view of the conflict with Frederick, the same could not necessarily be said of the laity and of the nobility in particular. It seems reasonable to suggest that the continuator’s approach was dictated by a very real need to justify Innocent’s actions to a somewhat sceptical, possibly even hostile, audience. Such an interpretation is supported by the positive portrait of Frederick that emerged in another work intended for the laity, the Récits of the minstrel of Reims.

Like many of his northern French contemporaries the minstrel of Reims’ primary interest did not lie in imperial history. His Récits,99 written in the 1260s,100 focused upon events in the French kingdom and the Holy Land.101 Despite this, and the absence of any reference to the imperial crusade, Frederick dominated chapters twenty-two and twenty-three.102 Like contemporary ecclesiastical accounts, the Récits


99 For the identification of this anonymous work as that of a minstrel and the connection of its author with Reims: Wailly, Récits, pp. v-ix.

100 RHGF, xxii, p. 301.

101 Wailly, Récits, pp. iii-iv. cf. Levine, whose belief that the minstrel pursued a structured tripartite programme almost certainly credits his thought with too great a coherence: R. Levine (trans.), A thirteenth-century minstrel’s chronicle (Récits d’un ménestrel de Reims) (Studies in French Civilization, iv, Lampeter, 1990), p. 3.

102 Récits, chap. xxii, pp. 112-122; chap. xxiii, pp. 122-128.
were selective in depicting the events of Frederick’s reign and did not continue much beyond the first council of Lyon. In the minstrel’s case it was Frederick’s dispute with the Milanese that formed the focus. The emperor was portrayed not as a man who persecuted the Church, but as a man persecuted by the Church, and a ruler betrayed by the pope in particular. The minstrel explicitly pinpointed the excommunication of the Milanese by their bishop as the point at which the emperor’s fortunes changed, up until which:

...furent lonc tans bien ensemble entre lui et la pape, et mout obeissoit à l’église de Rome, et estoit bons jousticieres; et tant faisoit que il estoit cremuz et redouteiz par toutes terres; et pouoit on portoir son gourle plein de deniers sour son bourdon à son col que jà n’eust on garde.

For the minstrel, the problems that ensued could be blamed wholly upon Gregory IX. When a dispute resulted in the murder of a cardinal by a Milanese mob, Frederick had arranged to besiege Milan at papal request. The emperor agreed to act on the condition, quickly agreed to by Gregory, that the pope did not make a separate peace with the Milanese without first consulting him. The Milanese, rapidly realising the hopelessness of their predicament, attempted to negotiate with the emperor. Finding Frederick intransigent, they sought to strike a deal with Gregory, whose Lombard covetousness, according to the dialogue attributed to the Milanese by the minstrel, would be certain to win the pope to their cause. Sure enough, now holding the Milanese pour bons creстиens, Gregory ordered Frederick to raise his siege. Betrayed and angry, but threatened with excommunication, Frederick obeyed and retired to Apulia.

103 Concerning the re-emergence of the Lombard league in the 1230s: Stürner, Friedrich, ii, pp. 266-275, 334-341.
104 Récits, chap. xxii, p. 113.
105 Ibid., pp. 117-118.
106 Ibid, p. 120.
107 Ibid., chap. xxiii, pp. 122-123.
The subsequent decline in relations between the emperor and the pope was attributed to Frederick's attempts to recover the money he had expended on the siege. This process proved so frustrating and the pope so unwilling to compromise that the emperor invaded the papal lands and robbed clerics. This led first to his excommunication by Gregory and eventually to his deposition by Innocent. Throughout his relation of this highly fictionalised account, the minstrel's sympathies can clearly be seen to lie with the emperor. Gregory IX is portrayed as a fickle, rapacious and ultimately untrustworthy pontiff; Innocent is one simply unwilling to listen or render a just decision. Piero delle Vigne, returning from negotiating with the pope at Lyon, is said to have reported to Frederick that: 'ne riens que il proposast ne li valut rien, ne droit ne pot avoit'.

Although the Récits began with an account of events that transpired in Outremer after the death of Godfrey de Bouillon, that is in the early-twelfth century, this robust defence of Frederick II was the first appearance of imperial history in the minstrel's account. This newfound interest finds its most probable explanation in the minstrel's intended audience, the northern French nobility. It seems probable that the minstrel was not so much interested in defending Frederick, who did not appear as an entirely blameless figure and was criticised for not converting the Saracens, his treatment of clerics and churches, his concubines and for impoverishing his lands, as he was in using the emperor's case to highlight papal cupidity and injustices.

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109 Ibid., p. 126.

110 Otto IV featured in an account of Bouvines but, as a consequence of the episodic rather than chronological arrangement of the Récits, this appeared after the sections relating to Frederick: ibid., chap. xxvi-xxvii, pp. 141-152.

111 Ibid., chap. xxiii, p. 127. These charges are not the focus of the minstrel's account and were given as an aside, not as an explanation of the papal sentence.

112 This gives cause to question the traditional judgement that the minstrel's prime interest was simply to entertain by recounting French and crusade-related historical episodes. cf. Le Goff, Louis, p. 377; Sommerlechner, Stupor, p. 99, n. 608.
Such an argument would have well reflected noble hostility to papal financial exactions, an hostility very much in evidence in the mid-thirteenth century.

By fleeing to Lyon Innocent IV had escaped one problem but he quickly had to confront another. Exasperated by papal financial exactions and ecclesiastical interference in areas perceived to be the province of lay jurisdiction, the French barons seem to have sought to use Innocent's proximity to their advantage. They organised a baronial league against the clergy headed by a prominent and important group of French nobles, the duke of Burgundy and the counts of Brittany, Angoulême and Saint-Pol.\footnote{For a statement of the principles of the league: HD, vi, pp. 467-468 (November 1246). This circulated widely enough to have fallen into Matthew Paris' hands: Historia Anglorum, Matthaei Parisiensis, monachi Sancti Albani, Historia Anglorum, ed. F. Madden (3 vols., London, 1866-1869), iii, p. 16. For an example of adhesion to the league: HD, vi, pp. 468-469 (November 1246). Berger, Louis et Innocent, pp. 246-253.}

Whilst fulminating furiously against this league,\footnote{MGH Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum romanorum selectae, ii, no. 269, pp. 201-200 (4 January 1247, Lyon); no. 270, pp. 203-204 (4 January 1247, Lyon).} which he believed, possibly with reason, that Frederick had a hand in sustaining,\footnote{Chron. maj., iv, pp. 593-594. Berger, Louis et Innocent, pp. 248, 251. Kienast did not discuss the possibility of Frederick's involvement or the question of French baronial sympathy for Frederick: Deutschland, iii, p. 612.} Innocent had also to contend with the fact that Louis IX was himself displeased by the same exactions. In 1247 the pope received at least one royal embassy complaining at these\footnote{Chron. maj., vi, no. 60, pp. 99-112. For the authenticity of the statement Matthew Paris attributed to Louis' ambassador and the argument that its sentiments reflected those of Louis himself: G. Campbell, 'The Protest of Saint Louis,' Traditio, xv (1959), 410-412. Campbell dated this embassy to 1247, rather than Matthew's date of 1245: ibid., 405. cf. Labarge, Louis, pp. 91-92.} and it was even rumoured that the king himself had affixed his seal to the baronial grievances and was actively supporting the league.\footnote{A letter sent from Boniface of Savoie to Peter of Savoie: Chron. maj., vi, no. 69, p. 132. Berger believed it unlikely that Louis adhered to the league but thought it probable he agreed to bring baronial grievances before the pope: Louis et Innocent, pp. 248-249.} Innocent had every reason to take this rumour seriously: several French barons, with Louis' support, had previously, in 1235, attempted to take steps to limit ecclesiastical interference in lay
affairs, actions which had drawn vigorous protest from Gregory IX. Writing in French, and therefore for a lay, probably aristocratic but also possibly urban, audience, it was almost certainly the minstrel's intention to use Frederick's reign and deposition to highlight a theme close to the heats of his audience: ecclesiastical abuses committed against laymen. Whilst a defence of the emperor was a by-product, rather than the primary purpose of the Récits' account, it suggests that northern French conceptions of Frederick were not necessarily as negative as those propounded by many clerical authors.

iv. The Emperor and le petit roi?

The French rhyming chronicle of Philippe Mousket offers a further window onto lay perceptions of Frederick, albeit one that does not take into account the emperor's deposition. Ending abruptly with the author's probable death in 1243, Philippe's chronicle provides the perspective of a member of a bourgeois family of Tournai. In common with several contemporary clerics, Philippe drew upon Guillaume le Breton for his account of the early years of Frederick's reign and, as he himself acknowledged, made use of the library of Saint-Denis. In common with

118 Richard, Louis, p. 79.


120 Le Goff, Louis, p. 377.

121 RHGF, xxii, p. 36.

122 Philippe has been previously identified as a bishop of Tournai of the same name (1274-1282): A. Duval, 'Chronique rimée de Philippe Mouskes,' HLF, xix (1838), pp. 861-862. This erroneous belief was convincingly refuted in the nineteenth century (summarised: RHGF, xxii, p. 36), although it persists and can be found in the catalogue of the British Library. The little work undertaken on Mousket is summarised: D. Hoeges, 'Philippe Mousquet,' Lexikon des Mittelalters, vi (1993), c. 876. Sommerlechner appears to be the first to consider Philippe's view of contemporary history.

123 Mousket [MGH], lines 20699-20704.

124 Duval, 'Chronique,' p. 862; Sommerlechner, Stupor, pp. 115-116.
the minstrel of Reims’ *Récits*, however, Philippe’s account lacked any inclination to portray Frederick as the party in the wrong in his dispute with the papacy.

The emperor’s initial decision to postpone his crusade in 1225 was portrayed as justified by the need to deal first with the Sicilian Saracens, in addition to which Philippe devoted much time to detailing the material aid sent to the Holy Land by the emperor in lieu of his presence.\(^{125}\) Whilst Frederick’s first postponement of his crusading vow was accounted for without reference to the papacy, the second was acknowledged to have annoyed Pope Honorius. Philippe offered some mitigation for this by noting the emperor’s intention of first dealing with the problems of Lombardy.\(^{126}\) At the same time, Frederick was said to have ignored papal rights and acted dishonourably in his dealings with Gregory IX, actions which led the latter to call Jean de Brienne to his assistance.\(^{127}\) Two points in Philippe’s account of this first dispute between Gregory and Frederick are particularly noteworthy. Firstly that it was kept at the level of a question concerning territorial rights in the *regno* and the patrimony,\(^{128}\) and secondly that the dispute remained distinct from Philippe’s account of Frederick’s crusade.

A subtle re-arrangement of chronology allowed Philippe to depict the papal-imperial dispute as having been settled before Frederick’s crusade actually began. No mention was made of the emperor’s illness, his return to the *regno*, the subsequent excommunication, and the tumultuous disputes that ensued with the Templars, the Hospitallers and prelates of Outremer when the emperor finally arrived in the Holy Land; nor was there mention of the papal attempt to occupy the *regno* in Frederick’s absence. Although the emperor was said not to have remained long in the Holy Land he was noted, in neutral terms, as having established a ten-year truce with the Sultan

\(^{125}\) Mousket [MGH], 25325-25350. Philippe’s figures, with the exception of the vastly exaggerated number of galleys, reflect the scale and terms of the promises Frederick gave in July 1225: Stürner, *Friedrich*, ii, p. 95.

\(^{126}\) Mousket [MGH], 27097-27112.

\(^{127}\) Mousket [RHGF], 28023-28026.

\(^{128}\) Ibid., 28031-28035.
and as having visited the Holy Sepulchre.\textsuperscript{129} The intention of the truce, to make it possible for pilgrims to visit the Sepulchre, was highlighted.\textsuperscript{130} The only negative comment to be found concerned the walls of Jerusalem, which remained destroyed.\textsuperscript{131} In striking contrast to ecclesiastical writers, Philippe went to great lengths to portray Frederick as a successful crusader and to minimise the impact of the breakdown in his relations with Gregory.

Philippe demonstrated a similar tendency when he chose to minimise the impact and importance of the outbreak of a second dispute between emperor and pope. He produced a remarkably long list of reasons for the emperor’s excommunication,\textsuperscript{132} but these are less condemnatory than they at first appear if taken in isolation. Firstly, the whole dispute is not dealt with as a separate ‘episode’ in the chronicle and so immediately appears less significant.\textsuperscript{133} It is first mentioned in the midst of an account of the departure of the French barons on Thibaud de Champagne’s crusade and is simply inserted to explain why the majority chose to depart from Marseille rather than Sicily.\textsuperscript{134} In addition, several of the charges against Frederick were seriously undermined by much of what Philippe had already recounted. Frederick was clearly depicted as diligently persecuting Saracens in several of the chronicle’s ‘episodes’\textsuperscript{135} and a lengthy ‘episode’ was devoted to

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 28059-28069.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 28063-28064. Sommerlechner, \textit{Stupor}, p. 295.

\textsuperscript{131} ‘Mais li mur ièrent abatu’ Mousket [RHGF], 28065.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 30561-30570.

\textsuperscript{133} Concerning the tendency of vernacular texts, of which Philippe’s is no exception, to present historical accounts using an episodic structure originating in Old French epic literature: Spiegel, ‘Social change,’ 139-140.

\textsuperscript{134} Mousket [RHGF], 30553-30580.

\textsuperscript{135} Mousket [MGH], 23331-23370, 25326-25331.
demonstrating that the deposition of Henry (VII) was justifiable.\textsuperscript{136} The idea that Frederick ignored safe conducts and was somehow trying to undermine the barons’ crusade was shown to be nonsense as the very passage in which the papal charges were recounted ended with Henry II, count of Bar, deciding to ignore general advice and depart from Brindsi anyway\textsuperscript{137}.

Philippe did note the renewal of the sentence of excommunication against Frederick, first by Celestine IV and later by Innocent, but his further comments concerning the papal-imperial dispute were restricted to noting the various attempts made at mediation by Richard of Cornwall and the intransigence of both parties.\textsuperscript{138} Gregory IX actually appeared in a somewhat negative light: the pope refused to allow the succession of Pierre Chalot, Philippe Auguste’s bastard son, to the bishopric of Noyon, because Pierre would not support his anti-imperial stance. This is reported as having infuriated Louis IX, who refused to accept any other candidate.\textsuperscript{139} Philippe’s intention was clearly not to defend the papal cause; yet nor was it to show that Frederick’s actions were wholly justified. Frederick’s position only becomes clear when it is understood in the context of Philippe’s chronicle as a whole.

The proximity of Tournai to the German lands of the Empire almost certainly explains the chronicle’s unusual knowledge and concentration upon contemporary affairs in Cambrai,\textsuperscript{140} Liège,\textsuperscript{141} and Cologne.\textsuperscript{142} Proximity to the German imperial lands may also account, in part, for the attention paid to the activities of Frederick’s

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{136} Concerning Henry: below pp. 193-194.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Mousket [RHGF], 30578-30580. cf. Sommerlechner, \textit{Stupor}, p. 301.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Mousket [RHGF], 30651-30658, 30764-30767.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 30717-30720.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Mousket [MGH], 26101-26132.
\item \textsuperscript{141} Mousket [RHGF], 29652-29854, 30493-30524.
\item \textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 28815-28830, 30789-30813.
\end{itemize}
sons, the German kings Henry (VII)\textsuperscript{143} and Conrad.\textsuperscript{144} Philippe’s concentration upon the Hohenstaufen arose, however, out of more than geographical factors. In particular it sprang from an interest in two themes. The first of these, the crusade, led to the devotion of large numbers of lines to the misadventures of Baldwin, the would-be emperor of Constantinople, and Jean de Brienne. It accounts, to some degree, for Philippe’s interest in Frederick’s activities in the East and for his summary of the state of affairs in the kingdom of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{145} The second theme which led to comment upon Frederick’s activities was curiosity concerning the escapades of the nobility of the northern part of the French kingdom and its environs.

An interest in the activities of his local nobility largely accounts for Philippe’s lengthy recitations of the sieges of Milan\textsuperscript{146} and Brescia.\textsuperscript{147} He took particular care, for example, to mention the summoning of the count of Flanders\textsuperscript{148} and François et Flamenc\textsuperscript{149} to serve in these sieges and to detail the activities of Baldwin III, count of Guînes.\textsuperscript{150} Philippe undoubtedly concentrated upon these events at least in part because the participation of the Flemish and northern French nobility meant that he was simply better informed about them than some of Frederick’s other activities. It was a decision which almost certainly also reflected the anticipated interests of a local audience, and possibly even the patronage of a local lord. Local interest did not necessarily lead Frederick to be portrayed in a good light. He was reported as

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\textsuperscript{143} Below, p. 192.
\textsuperscript{144} Mousket [RHGF], 30783-30788, 30951-30958, 31175-31180.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 31157-31170.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 29552-29579, 29887-29956.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 30237-30256.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 29574.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 30033.
\textsuperscript{150} Concerning Baldwin: below, pp. 291-292.
\end{flushright}
threatening both the French and the Flemings in order to enlist their participation. 151 Yet one factor conditioned Philippe’s view of Frederick above all others: the emperor’s relationship with the Capetians.

Philippe’s perspective was one sympathetic to the Capetian dynasty. 152 He viewed the French, as a whole, as having been the principal champions of the Roman Church since the time of Clovis. 153 It was this twin outlook that led him to devote an inordinately large part of his chronicle to a depiction of Louis VIII’s Albigensian crusade. Writing before the events that would come to define Louis IX’s reign, in particular his first crusade, Louis VIII’s untimely death placed Philippe in something of a quandary: a child-king clearly under the thumb of his mother 154 and beset by internecine strife amongst his own barons was far less impressive material. 155 As the successor to a king whose deeds had rivalled those of Dagobert and Charlemagne, le petit roi was something of an anticlimax. 156 This undoubtedly led Philippe to pay particular attention to events beyond the French kingdom but it does not appear to have altered his attitude towards the Capetian dynasty.

Towards the end of his chronicle Philippe offered a violent denunciation of Frederick’s unjust ambitions to submit the entire world to his lordship and the evil this had brought on cleric and layman alike:

Qui del monde et de là entor
Voloit iestre par force sire,
Et par son avoir et par s’ire,
Et par outrage et par boufoit,

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151 Mousket [RHGF], 30036.

152 RHGF, xxii, p. 37.

153 Mousket [MGH], 26601-26608. Lines 26609-26614 suggest that Philippe’s conception of what constituted being ‘French’ did not extend to those south of the Loire.

154 Mousket [RHGF], 28681-28689.

155 For the war against the count of Champagne: ibid., 29122-29195.

156 Ibid., 27861, 27433-27438; for Louis VIII’s extravagant eulogy: ibid., 27518-27542.
This is not isolated criticism. In earlier passages Frederick was accused of bringing the menace of the Tartars down upon Christendom, and harangued for his treatment of the Lombards, the Romans and the clerics captured on their way to Gregory IX’s Roman council.

In the course of the siege of Avignon Louis VIII had, according to Philippe, sent the bishops of Beauvais and Cambrai and the abbot of Saint-Denis to explain his actions to the emperor. Frederick had consequently supported the king against the Albigensian heretics. This was, in Philippe’s opinion, a demonstration of how matters should be: "Frere li rois et l’emperere." The emperor, ki n’i voloit faire desroi, later granted, at Louis IX’s request, a safe conduct for the Latin emperor Baldwin to cross Germany. Frederick’s actions, such as his taking of the cross, could be positive in themselves, but they were never more so than when they favoured a Capetian king. Frederick’s actions might, on occasion, be questionable, but they were positively heinous if directed against either the Capetians or the French more

157 Ibid., 31022-31027.
158 Ibid., 30967-30970.
159 Ibid., 30989-31010.
161 Mousket [MGH], 26093-26138.
162 Ibid., 26139-26141, 26163-26172. Concerning this: below, pp. 282-283.
163 Mousket [MGH], 26161.
164 Mousket [RHGF], 30471-30474.
165 Mousket [MGH], 22795-22798.
generally. It was this particularly lens, a Capetian one rather than a papal one, that coloured Philippe's view of Frederick.

The key to understanding Philippe's violent denunciation of Frederick at the end of his work is his belief that the emperor had betrayed Louis by supporting the alliance formed against the French king in 1242 and 1243 by Raymond of Toulouse, Hugues de Lusignan and Henry III. There may have been some truth in this charge: Frederick's involvement is implied in a letter he received from Henry III. Only after this point and in connection with these events did the chronicle direct its bile at the emperor. Inviting significant comparison with his comments concerning the siege of Avignon, Philippe now chose to depict Frederick as a man who betrayed his brother:

Or oïes del grant traitour,
Com il traitsoit tot entour
Li rois, ki dut iestre ses frère,
Comme de roiaume et d'empère

Philippe's ludicrous comment that Frederick was in fact responsible for the coming of the Tartars and the denunciation of his behaviour towards the Romans, Lombards and the clergy are the 'bookends' to a passage dealing with Frederick's support for the anti-Capetian alliance. It is equally notable that Philippe's vigorous denunciation of Frederick's ambitions was swiftly followed by a reiteration of the emperor's support for Raymond of Toulouse. Philippe's assessment of Frederick

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166 For an account of the 1242/43 war: Le Goff, Louis, pp. 149-157.

167 Mousket [RHGF], 30851-30854.


169 Mousket [RHGF], 30981-30984.

170 Ibid., 30971-30980.

171 Ibid., 31091-31104.
was conditioned, essentially, by the extent to which the emperor could be considered to be upholding the interests of the French king. In common with the minstrel of Reims, Philippe was capable of presenting a positive portrait of Frederick but his intention was not to offer an apologetic for his actions. Whereas for the minstrel Frederick supplied a useful example of ecclesiastical abuses, for Philippe the emperor's activities offered the opportunity to enliven his chronicle after the death of Louis VIII. Philippe did not automatically subscribe to the argument of Guillaume de Tyr's continuator, that Frederick had been a villain, but the emperor's actions were clearly worthy of condemnation when they were directed against the interests of the Capetian dynasty.

v. Conclusion

It seems improbable that Philippe Mousket's image of Frederick remained solely the preserve of its author. Philippe's choice of a rhyming format indicates that the work was intended to be read aloud and the quality of the extant copy suggests that the material enjoyed a certain echo. At the same time the fact that the chronicle survives in only one thirteenth-century manuscript suggests that its circulation was limited, something almost certainly as attributable to the author's choice of a verse medium as to any other factor. In contrast, the vernacular prose portraits of Frederick that appeared in the work of the continuator of Guillaume de Tyr and the Récits of the minstrel of Reims became comparatively well known and remained so in the fourteenth century.

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172 For the shift in aristocratic preference from verse to prose: Spiegel, 'Social change,' 135-137.

173 At least six MSS remain extant, five of which date from the fourteenth century: RHC, ii, pp. xxii-xxiv.

174 Ten MSS remain extant, distributed between London (3), Paris (2), Rouen (2), Brussels (2) and Copenhagen (1), although the original provenance was almost certainly more limited: D. W. Tappan, 'The mss of the Récits d'un Ménestrel de Reims,' Symposium, xxv (1971), 70. Le Goff's judgment that the work was 'très peu connue au Moyen Age' is a relative one: Louis, p. 377.
The great majority of ecclesiastical portraits of Frederick remained, like Philippe Mousket’s work, limited in their circulation, even if this had not been the original intention of their authors. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, for example, had probably hoped that his universal history would become an historical handbook for the Cistercian order.\footnote{Chazan, \textit{L'Empire}, pp. 368-369.} The work that came to occupy this place, however, was the \textit{Speculum historiale} of Vincent de Beauvais. Vincent’s universal history was the ‘success story’ that Aubri’s incomplete work so conspicuously failed to be.\footnote{Chazan suggested a connection between Aubri’s failure to complete his work and his lack of success: ibid., p. 369. I have not encountered any source that made use of Aubri.} Not only did the \textit{Speculum historiale} continue to circulate widely, enjoying probably its greatest popularity around 1320,\footnote{Duchenne, Guzman, Voorbij, ‘Une liste,’ 288.} but it became a key source in northern France, both to writers of history such as Géraud de Frachet, Adam de Clermont, Girard d’Auvergne, Guillaume de Nangis, Jean de Saint-Victor and Bernard Gui,\footnote{Chazan, \textit{L'Empire}, pp. 20-21.} as well as to, amongst others, Jean Quidort.\footnote{Ibid., p. 377.} So popular was it that in the 1330s it was translated into French at the command of Philippe VI’s queen, Jeanne de Bourgogne.\footnote{Lusignan, ‘réception,’ pp. 34-45.} This latter appears to have enjoyed considerable success and copies were to be found in the possession of both Jean II and Charles V.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 40-41. Delisle, ‘Exemplaires,’ 90.} In addition a separate translation circulated in Lorraine in the fourteenth century.\footnote{Lusignan, ‘réception,’ p. 42.}

Yet it would be a mistake to conclude from this that Vincent’s portrait of Frederick as a persecutor of the Church came to dominate the northern French cultural
milieu to the exclusion of all other interpretations. Although as an independent work without continuations Primat’s *Roman des rois* enjoyed a somewhat limited circulation (only three copies remain extant), the work into which it was integrated, the *Grandes Chroniques de France*, reached a much wider readership. The image of Frederick that appeared in this latter was often as different from that painted by Vincent as it was from that originally presented in the *Roman des rois*. Primat’s fellow Dionysians, and the *Grandes Chroniques* traditions which sprang from their work, provide one of the keys to Frederick’s continuing significance in French thought.

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Chapter Two

The Emperor and the Saint

i. Introduction

On 6 August 1297 pope Boniface VIII canonised Louis IX. The process leading up to this had been a slow, complex and, like other canonisation procedures in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries, a highly politicised one. Begun in 1272, it had been pushed forward by Louis' brother, Charles d'Anjou, but only brought to completion under Louis’ grandson, Philippe IV. The transformation of king Louis into saint Louis required the acquiescence and official stamp of the ecclesiastical authorities. If it was to be significant it was equally important that the new cult acquired widespread popularity and acceptance in a world where it would have to compete with numerous, well-established cults and relatively new ones, such as that of Elizabeth of Thuringia. Some within the French cultural milieu chose to attribute an important role to Frederick II in the promotion of the cult of Saint Louis, a decision which was to prove an important factor in the continued prominence of the last Hohenstaufen emperor in late-thirteenth- and early-fourteenth-century French thought.

Whilst the mendicant orders played a significant role in defining the nature of Louis IX’s sanctity, they were not the ‘prime mover’ in efforts to establish the king’s

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4 Le Goff, Louis, pp. 328-344.
sainthood. The transformation had both its origins and fundamental stimulus in French royal policy. This is clearest in the close connections between hagiographical works and the Capetian court. Those written prior to 1297 were composed by Dominicans who had been an intimate part of that court: Louis’ confessor, Geoffroi de Beaulieu, writing between 1272 and 1275, albeit at papal request, and Louis’ chaplain, Guillaume de Chartres, also writing in the 1270s. After 1297 the hagiographies of Marguerite de Provence’s Franciscan confessor, Guillaume de Saint-Pathus (ca. 1302-1303), and of Jean de Joinville (ca. late 1305-October 1309), were the direct products of Capetian patronage. The latter is particularly notable as it was written at the request of Philippe IV’s wife and dedicated to the future Louis X. Philippe IV was particularly keen to promote his grandfather’s cult in order to associate himself with and capitalise upon it. His most striking efforts to foster its growth were the foundation of a Dominican convent at Poissy and a number of sister houses. The cult of Saint Louis was promoted long before the king’s official canonisation.

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5 Ibid., pp. 333-335.


7 Le Goff, Louis, pp. 335-337.


10 Joinville, 1-2, p. 2.


One of the clearest traces of Louis' gradual transformation is to be found in historical works produced after his death. At the heart of this evolving re-imagining of Louis' life was the immensely influential Benedictine abbey of Saint-Denis. The Capetian desire to promote Louis' sanctity coincided with a period in which the historical workshops of Saint-Denis came into full bloom. In the second half of the thirteenth century this gave birth to a huge historical production, the most important part of which was attributable to two men: Primat and Guillaume de Nangis (died ca. 1300). Not only was the abbey fecund, however, it had, since Abbot Suger in the mid-twelfth century, become a centre for royal historiography.

The work produced at Saint-Denis cannot be termed 'official' history in the sense that such a term implies that the monks operated in the capacity of royal officials or that the content was dictated directly by the court. Nevertheless, a number of works, most prominently Primat's Roman des rois, were the result of royal commissions and the monks themselves were keen to write a history favourable to the Capetians and to associate themselves with it, principally with the intention of promoting the importance of their own abbey. In the course of the last quarter of the thirteenth century and the early fourteenth a gradual evolution in Frederick II's image took place in the works being produced by the scriptorium of Saint-Denis. It is an evolution that is of particular importance not simply because the abbey was notable for its close links with the Capetian dynasty but because Dionysian works enjoyed wide diffusion in northern France.


15 Guenée, Histoire, p. 338.

16 Ibid., p. 340.
ii. Saint-Denis and the Creation of an Antithesis

The essence of the Dionysian portrait of Louis IX, and hence of Frederick II, was formulated in two works. The first was Guillaume de Nangis' *Gesta sanctae memoriae Ludovici regis Franciae* (ca. pre-1285), a text which enjoyed some independent circulation but which swiftly became linked to Guillaume's life of Philippe III with which it continued to be copied in the fourteenth century. The second was a universal chronicle, which, according to a continuation for the years 1301-1303, Guillaume de Nangis was responsible for until 1300. Whilst a first recension of this text, largely written before 1297, remains extant in only three manuscripts, a revised version, also ending in 1300 but for which Guillaume may not have been personally responsible, appears to have enjoyed considerable success. Although the choice of Latin for both these works made them predominantly of interest to clerics, the abbey also sought to reach out to a lay audience. The first evidence of this was the vernacular *Roman des rois*. In the late-


19 The two lives share a common preface in two MSS. One is thirteenth-century, and the source for the RHGF edition of both lives; the second is fourteenth-century: L. Delisle, 'Memoire sur les ouvrages de Guillaume de Nangis,' *Memoires de l'Institut national de France Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres*, xxvii, pt. ii (1873), 295.


21 For the identification of the two recensions: Delisle, 'Mémoire,' 297. Géraud, who prepared what remains the standard edition for the years 1113 to 1300 (GNC, i, pp. 1-326), was unaware of the distinction between recensions. The first is identifiable in Géraud's edition as material pertaining to MS 10298-6 (now BN MS fr. 5703).


23 Extant in seventeen MSS at least four of which are fourteenth-century. The provenance of many of these is obscure: at least one remained at Saint-Denis whilst another entered the library of the college of Navarre: Delisle, 'Mémoire,' 316-322.
thirteenth or early-fourteenth century this was followed by a French translation of Guillaume's *Gesta Ludovici*, at least one copy of which came into the possession of a family of knightly status. The abbey's greatest vernacular success was, however, the *Grandes Chroniques de France*.

The *Grandes Chroniques* crystallised in a fixed form only after Charles V (1364-1380) placed its redaction in the hands of his chancellor, Pierre d'Ogremont. Whilst the title is not an anachronism, its application to compilations prepared prior to 1360 has the potential to be misleading. A single title implies the existence of a single text, or of a number of variant versions of, essentially, the same text. In reality, no such text existed but instead what might be best considered as a series of parallel traditions developed, not all of which were controlled by Saint-Denis, but all of which drew upon Dionysian material. A tendency to overlook this stems from the fact, as Guenée noted two decades ago, that very little research has been conducted into pre-1350 *Grandes Chroniques* material. This is a consequence of a tendency amongst historians, evident in Guenée himself, to be primarily interested in Charles V's *Grandes Chroniques* and to consider earlier material as simply 'stages' in the pre-history of a 'definitive' version, rather than as texts in their own right.

The foundation of most 'Grandes Chroniques' was Primat's *Roman des rois*. At some point after 1314 the monks were probably responsible for a revised translation of Guillaume's *Gesta Ludovici*. This translation was employed to

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24 Extant in three MSS. BN MS fr. 4978 contains a note stating that it was the property of 'Bureau de la Rivière, chevalier'. A different hand added: 'Et après à Jehan de la Rivière, et à Jacques': ibid., 296.

25 For consideration of the work post-1360: Guenée, 'Grandes Chroniques,' pp. 201-208.

26 Ibid., p. 198.

27 Ibid., p. 189, n. 2.

28 Brussels, Bibliothèque royale, MS 14561-64 (ca. 1320) is an exception. This contains the *Roman* only up to the reign of Charles le Chauve. Different material was used to continue the work up to the reign of Louis IX. The MS also contains a version of the minstrel of Reims' chronicle. By 1373 it had entered the royal collection, although the original provenance is unclear. Hedeman, *Royal*, p. 203.

continue several copies of the *Roman des rois* prepared for the courtly milieu and appears to have continued to circulate. This translation was itself revised between 1335 and 1340 and incorporated into a *Grandes Chroniques* prepared for Jean, duke of Normandy (1319-1364; king from 1350). The scriptorium then produced an extended continuation of Primat’s work, one which went on to become the base for Charles V’s text, and which included a fourth ‘translation’ of Guillaume’s *Gesta*. The latter was sandwiched between translations of another Dionysian text, the *Gesta Ludovici VIII*, and Guillaume’s *Gesta Philippi Regis Franciae, filii sanctae memoriae regis Ludovici*. This new compilation also contained material for the period from 1285 to 1340 translated largely from the two universal chronicles that had been continued at Saint-Denis, those of Géraud de Frachet and Guillaume de Nangis. This final compilation may have been produced under the direction of Richard Lescot, a monk at Saint-Denis from 1329, and himself responsible for the

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30 Hedeman, *Royal*, pp. 30-31; edited GCF, x. Extant in two pre-1350 MSS: BN MS fr. 2615 (after 1314, probably 1320s), Cambrai, Bibliothèque municipale, MS 682 (1320s). Guéguené appears to have confused this with the first translation of the *Gesta: ‘Grandes Chroniques,’* p. 196.


32 The text is essentially the same as that in BN MS fr. 2615, but incorporates additional passages which had not been previously translated from the Latin. These additions are edited in the footnotes of GCF, x.


34 This version, edited in GCF, vii, was first employed to continue the oldest copy of the *Roman des rois*, Bibliothèque Saint-Geneviève, MS 782.

35 BL Royal 16 G VI appears to be the earliest compilation to contain this: Spiegel, *Chronicle*, p. 119.

36 Edited GCF, viii. Unlike the translation of Guillaume’s *Gesta Ludovici*, there is no evidence to suggest that the translation of the *Gesta Philippi* led an existence separate from the *Grandes Chroniques* compilations.

37 Spiegel, *Chronicle*, pp. 120-122.
continuation of Géraud’s Latin chronicle. From 1344 until the conclusion of Philippe VI’s reign this compilation became a completely independent French work written contemporaneously with the events it described. It seems likely that it was begun in the early or mid-1340s and completed sometime shortly after 1350. By taking no account of the various French translations of the *Gesta Ludovici* and considering the *Grandes Chroniques* only in the form established in the 1340s, Sommerlechner oversimplified the Saint-Denis tradition. The relationship between the extant materials is not nearly as straightforward as Spiegel suggested and must remain subject to considerable conjecture; yet at the same time it offers an important key to assessing the development and reception of images of Frederick II in northern France.

The monks of Saint-Denis sought to paint a portrait of Louis as the perfect Christian king. Essentially, they faced a two-fold difficulty: king Louis could appear to be both less good and less unique than was desirable. He was less unique because, while an important part of his claim to sanctity lay in his crusading activities, the crusade was by no means Louis’ exclusive prerogative. Laymen associated other contemporaries with the crusade, and, as Philippe Mousket’s account demonstrated, they could be impressed by the success of an expedition such as that led by Frederick II. Louis was less good because his relations with the Church had been undeniably strained in the period prior to his first crusade. Philippe Mousket, for example, elaborated on the death of the bishop of Beauvais by noting that the same cleric had placed France under interdict in response to royal reprisals for the killing of a provost. This dispute originated in Louis’ claim to exercise justice in the town of Beauvais and rapidly spread to questions of ecclesiastical rights to exercise excommunication without lay interference. It was a lengthy and serious affair begun


39 Viard, GCF, ix, pp. ii-iv, vi.

40 Spiegel, *Chronicle,* p. 117.

41 Mousket [RHGF], 29166-29200.
in the 1230s and not fully resolved for over a decade. It witnessed two bishops of Beauvais, Milon de Chatillon-Nanteuil (1217-1234) and Godefroy de Clermont-Nesle (1234-1236), place their see under repeated interdicts, the archbishop of Reims place his province under interdict, and Gregory IX even raise the spectre of excommunicating Louis. References to an earlier dispute between the royal government and the episcopate appeared in the annals of the cathedral chapter of Rouen, and in the chronicle of the Benedictine monastery of Saint-Taurin of Évreux in an entry probably made before Louis’ first crusade. These latter referred to two quarrels that broke out in the early years of Louis’ reign and which witnessed the seizure of the archbishop of Rouen’s temporalities. The archbishop retaliated in the first dispute by placing royal lands in his diocese under interdict and in the second, between 1232 and 1234, by employing not only the interdict but also by excommunicating the king’s officials. If Louis was a saint it was quite inappropriate that he should have been engaged in lengthy disputes with archbishops and it was even more inappropriate that his crusade should have been upstaged.

Conceptions of ‘history’ were sufficiently flexible in the twelfth century to allow the complete invention and re-writing of segments of the past. As Guenné has noted, this situation, which had allowed, for example, the Dionysian fabrication of Charlemagne’s voyage to the Holy Land, was to change.

42 O. Pontal, ‘Le différend entre Louis IX et les évêques de Beauvais et ses incidences sur les conciles (1232-1248),’ BEC, cxxiii (1965), 5-34; Richard, Louis, p. 82; Le Goff, Louis, pp. 118-121.

43 RHGF, xxiii, pp. 332-333. The original chronicle ended in 1282. It survives only in copies made at the end of the fifteenth or beginning of the sixteenth century and it is consequently not possible to determine the precise identity of individual annalists and the point at which each left off: Delisle, ‘Annales de Rouen,’ pp. 195-196.

44 E Chronico monasterii Sancti Taurini Ebroicensis, RHGF, xxiii, p. 466. The original text ends in 1240, although the chronicle was then continued in various hands up to 1296. A number of notes also appear to have been added in the early-fourteenth century: V. LeClerc, ‘Chronique de Saint-Taurin d’Évreux,’ HLF, xxi (1847), pp. 769-770. The last entry appears under 1317: L. Delisle, ‘Annales rédigées ou continuées dans une maison de l’ordre de Cluny, puis à Fécamp, à Valmont, à Saint-Taurin d’Évreux, à Braine et à Caen,’ HLF, xxxii (1898), p. 207.


46 Guenné, Histoire, pp. 351-352.
northern France, at least, even by the mid-thirteenth century ‘history’ had become a concept closed to wholesale re-invention. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines was, for example, one of several writers to question elements of Charlemagne’s mythical journey. French writers adopted a more subtle approach to the past: selective editing and exaggeration. These techniques were applied to solve the problem of Louis’ relationship with the Church: the entire dispute with the archbishop of Rouen and his suffragan was simply absent from the pages of Guillaume de Nangis’ *Gesta Ludovici*, absent from his universal history, absent from the French translations of his *Gesta* and absent from *Grandes Chroniques* material.

The Beauvais dispute was not quite so thoroughly expunged. Vincent de Beauvais included an account of it in his *Speculum historiale*. Vincent’s account minimised the conflict by re-telling it purely as a dispute between the bishops and the king, rather than re-counting the wider involvement of the archbishop of Reims and Gregory IX. The fact that the account was included at all is almost certainly a further indication that Vincent’s support for the Capetian dynasty was secondary to his concerns as a cleric. Although the Beauvais dispute is absent from Guillaume de Nangis’ *Gesta* and later material based upon it, it does appear in Guillaume’s universal chronicle. One of Guillaume’s principal sources for the latter was the *Speculum historiale* and Vincent provided Guillaume with his material for this particular incident. It was not, however, reiterated without suitable modification. Firstly, Guillaume considerably shortened the version given in the *Speculum historiale*. He also removed the suggestion that the interdict was put in place for many years and minimised royal involvement by removing Vincent’s explicit statement...
that Godefroy de Clermont-Nesle had pursued his predecessor’s cause against the king. The only other writer to touch upon the dispute was the rabidly anti-clerical minstrel of Reims. The minstrel altered events to exclude the king’s direct involvement, and transformed it into a dispute between Blanche de Castille and Milon. Erasing or re-writing embarrassing episodes from Louis’ life made him a better king, but it did not make him a saint. The problem of establishing his exemplary uniqueness remained.

The most direct way of confirming Louis’ sanctity was to recount his humble lifestyle and commitment to justice. For the hagiographers it also meant adding accounts of his miracles. A further means of demonstrating his distinctiveness was to draw comparisons between his actions and those of others. In the late-thirteenth century the Saint-Denis scriptorium, and Guillaume de Nangis in particular, found that an extremely effective comparison could be established between a saint-king and his antithesis. They found the latter in the person of Frederick II, a ruler of whom laymen already had some suspicions and whose reputation was blackened amongst clerics by his dispute with the papacy. Little exaggeration was needed to paint Frederick as the anti-Louis, merely a high degree of selection and a little carefully chosen interpretation.

Frederick is not by any means absent from Guillaume de Nangis’ Gesta Ludovici, but an account of his crusade does not appear. This absence is carried through into the French translation of Guillaume’s Gesta, and hence into the Grandes Chroniques tradition. Is it really, though, all that surprising that Frederick’s crusade did not feature in what is, after all, an account of the life of Louis IX? The genre of Guillaume’s work does not provide an entirely satisfactory explanation. Several

50 Vincent had stated: ‘...Gaufridus eidem cause contra Regem insistens...’ Speculum historiale, bk. xxx, chap. cxxvii, p. 1279. Guillaume rendered this: ‘...Gaufridus eidem causae insistens...’. The second recension re-integrated the phrase ‘contra Regem’ but with reference to Milon and the appeal he lodged at the papal curia: GNC, i, p. 185.

51 Récits, chap. xx, pp. 93-102.

52 cf. Le Goff, who proposed that Guillaume considered the Old Man of the Mountain ‘l’anti-bon roi, l’anti-Saint Louis’. Frederick ‘...qui, sans être à proprement parler mauvais, est <<douteux>>: Louis, p. 361.
events are included in the *Gesta* which had very little to do with Louis personally, such as Thibaud de Champagne’s crusade and, most notably, Charles d’Anjou’s Sicilian expedition. It is true that these were essentially ‘French’ events that, it might be argued, were included under the broad principle that Guillaume sought to offer praise not just of Louis but of the Capetian dynasty and of the French more generally. This, though, would not account for the lengthy ‘diversions’ devoted to recounting events such as the dispute between Simon de Montfort and Henry III, or other elements of Frederick’s reign, such as his deposition. Why, then, was even a passing reference to the imperial crusade excluded?

Many ecclesiastical writers had proved that it was quite possible to explain away Frederick’s successful capture of Jerusalem and his ten-year truce in a negative light. However, as Aubri de Trois-Fontaines pointed out, for all the condemnation heaped on Frederick’s head by the Church, his actions clearly impressed the common people. The disastrous Egyptian expedition, which resulted in the death of Robert I d’Artois, the capture of Louis, his remaining brothers, and most of his army, furnished a splendid example of Christian suffering, and was one of the pillars upon which Louis’ claims to sainthood rested. Thibaud de Champagne’s 1239 expedition presented little that could detract from Louis’ sainliness: it was as disastrous as the king’s, but not quite so spectacularly so as to evoke comparison with Louis’ sufferings. It remained inescapable, however, that Frederick’s material success was

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55 Ibid., pp. 470-472.

56 GL, pp. 414-418.

57 Ibid., pp. 346-352.

58 ATF, p. 925.

liable to confuse, at the very least, any potential appreciation of Louis’ own ‘achievements’ in the Holy Land.

As Philippe Mousket’s account demonstrates, papal excommunication did little in itself to affect views of Frederick. The emperor’s status as an excommunicate throughout his crusade was not, therefore, the most convincing grounds upon which his achievements could be criticised. Frederick’s recovery of Jerusalem had been dismissed by some on the grounds that the city had been regained through an agreement with the Saracens. An agreement with the Saracens was precisely, though, what Louis had had to make. Frederick’s negotiations were all the more awkward because the accord Louis came to with the Egyptians included amongst its terms an agreement that all Christians captured since the emperor’s truce should be released. The *Gesta* alluded to this whilst ignoring the imperial crusade itself.60 Arguments which condemned Frederick on the grounds he had negotiated with the Saracens risked casting Louis’ own actions in an unfavourable light. There was, additionally, the question of what had been achieved.

Frederick had secured Jerusalem; Louis had had to hand over a city, Damietta, and was forced to pay large sums to buy back not only his own freedom but also that of other Christian prisoners.61 To fail to condemn Frederick’s truce with the Saracens in any account of the imperial crusade would only highlight Louis’ material failures in comparison with Frederick’s achievements. Even before Louis’ death, the minstrel of Reims, who displayed a keen interest in the crusade and was not particularly hostile to Frederick, devoted several chapters to the French king’s venture, but passed over the imperial crusade in silence.62 It was a trend followed after 1270 by almost all French writers with two exceptions. The first was a Benedictine of Sens, Geoffroi de Collon (died ca. 1294),63 whose summing up of Frederick’s expedition could hardly have


been less enthusiastic. Geoffroi's chronicle, which existed in two recensions, did not enjoy the popularity of Dionysian works but certainly seems to have circulated in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries, both at Sens and possibly beyond. The second to refer to Frederick's crusade was Guillaume de Nangis himself.

Guillaume de Nangis' universal chronicle, written in the late 1290s, became well known. In the context of writing a much wider history whose parameters were dictated essentially by the genre of universal history, Guillaume found it necessary to address a topic he had previously chosen simply to ignore. In common with the royal-episcopal dispute at Beauvais this was almost certainly because Guillaume's source, the *Speculum historiale*, gave an account of the crusade. On this occasion Guillaume's solution was to expand upon Vincent's brief version, but in doing so to present not an account of Frederick's crusade but of a crusade in which Frederick had participated. It was Gregory IX who was portrayed as the organiser and inspiration behind the venture and Frederick as simply an unwilling participant. Gregory's

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64 "...relinquens xpiatianis Terre-Sancte maiorem desolationem quam consolationem." Geoffroi de Collon, p. 514.

65 O. Holder-Egger, MGH SS, xxvi, p. 612.

66 The source for Julliot's edition, Bibliothèque municipale de Sens, MS 59, was a late-thirteenth or early-fourteenth-century MS in the possession of the Franciscans of Sens. The fate of an autograph belonging to the abbey of Saint-Pierre-le-Vif is unclear after the seventeenth century, as is that of two other copies, one thirteenth and the other fourteenth-century: Julliot, Geoffroi de Collon, pp. v-xii.

67 Two thirteenth-century copies, their provenance unclear, remain extant in the Vatican library: ibid., pp. xii-xiii.

68 The survival of at least twenty MSS indicates a moderate degree of success. Seven date from prior to 1350: Guenee, *Histoire*, p. 255.

69 Nevertheless, Frederick's crusade is absent from another universal chronicle, the *Memoriale historiarum* of Jean de Saint-Victor: Chazan, *L'Empire*, p. 622.

70 *Speculum historiale*, bk. xxx, chap. cxxix, p. 1277.
instructions that the crusaders assemble at Brindisi are carefully highlighted, twice, and the pope is thereby ascribed the predominant, indeed the only, organisational role in the crusade. Guillaume emphasised that it was necessary for the pope to order Frederick, *qui a longo tempore crucesignatus fuerat*, to set out and the emperor fared little better when he did eventually get under way.

In depicting Frederick as a crusader Guillaume’s use of language, as much as his selective presentation, painted a damning portrait of a secretive, disobedient and deeply untrustworthy man. Frederick earned excommunication by secretly deserting the crusade, an action for which the chronicle seeks to provide no mitigation. His eventual arrival in the Holy Land only reinforced the point: still excommunicate, Frederick, said to be again acting secretly because he was aware the pope had refused to grant him absolution, had himself crowned in Jerusalem. He then left the Holy Sepulchre in the hands of the Saracens and begged the Sultan for a ten-year truce. Compounding his sins, Frederick then returned to Apulia and invaded the lands of the pope, the Hospitallers and the Templars. The portrayal of the imperial crusade by Guillaume de Nangis could not have painted a blacker picture of the emperor.

If his treaty with al-Kamil was inconvenient, Frederick’s relations with the Saracens were not a topic to be entirely forgotten. The portrayal of these relations became one of the cornerstones of the Dionysian portrait of Frederick that emerged after 1270. A prominent feature of Guillaume’s account of the imperial crusade in his universal chronicle was his frequent emphasis upon Frederick’s good relations with the Moslems. The emperor was depicted as negotiating with the Sultan in advance of his crusade and it was for this reason that Gregory is said to have refused Frederick

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71 GNC, i, pp. 178, 180. Guillaume’s chronology for these events is dubious.

72 Ibid., p.178.

73 ‘...imperator furtive ab eis per galeas recedens, Brundusium est reversus ’ ibid., p. 180.

74 Ibid., p. 184.

75 Ibid., pp. 181, 183.
absolution when he arrived in the Holy Land. The theme of Frederick's friendship with the Saracens, evident in pre-1270 works such as the continuation of Guillaume de Tyr, was one that Guillaume de Nangis had already addressed. He devoted a long passage of his *Gesta Ludovici* to the topic as part of the fourth reason for the emperor's condemnation at the council of Lyon: heresy. Guillaume listed not only Frederick's friendship with the Moslems but, echoing Innocent IV's bull of deposition, also the charges that he imitated their way of life and that he had allowed the name of Mohammed to be pronounced in the Holy Sepulchre.

Equally, whilst Frederick's good relations with the Moslems of the East came to the fore, the emperor's rather more turbulent ones with those who lived on the island of Sicily were subject to a process of collective amnesia even more profound than that which had descended upon the imperial crusade. Earlier writers, such as Aubri de Trois-Fontaines and Philippe Mousket, remembered well that Frederick had violently suppressed a rebellion of Sicilian Saracens and forcibly deported the population to Lucera. Again this was a point which, after 1270, was only to find a place in Guillaume de Nangis' universal chronicle, where it was noted simply that Frederick had assembled the Saracens all in one place. More straightforward than the implicit comparison between Frederick's and Louis' attitude towards the Saracens, was Guillaume's juxtaposition of Louis' decision to take the cross with the emperor's deposition. Guillaume's juxtaposition was followed by both the French translation of the *Gesta Ludovici* and by material produced within the Dionysian

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76 Ibid. p. 184.

77 *MGH Const.* II, no. 400, pp. 511-512 (17 July 1245, Lyon).

78 *GL*, pp. 350-352. These comments make oblique references to the iniquities of Frederick's crusade.

79 *ATF*, p. 916; Mousket [MGH], 23331-23370. Philippe also noted Frederick's close relations with the Saracens: Mousket [RHGF], 28631-28633.

80 *GNC*, i, pp. 178-179.

81 *GL*, pp. 344-346.

82 *GL*(fr), pp. 343-347.
Grandes Chroniques tradition. Guillaume's use of this comparative technique has been noted by Chazan, although the fact that it seems to have been taken up by Guillaume, rather than invented by him, has not been remarked upon.

In the second half of the thirteenth century the idea appeared in Normandy in the Norman chronicle and in the chronicle of the abbey of Fécamp, the latter possibly the clearest example of the juxtaposition:

Celebrata est sancto synodus Lugdunensis a domino Innocentio papa III in ecclesia Sancti Johannis, et Fredericus quassatus, et rex Franciae cruce signatus.

It also appeared in Vincent de Beauvais' Speculum historiale, where it was not Louis' taking of the cross but the preaching of his crusade which was juxtaposed with Frederick's deposition. Guillaume de Nangis adopted Vincent's version in his universal chronicle. The course of events was clear: in December 1244 a severe illness had led Louis to take the cross; the following July Frederick had been deposed at Lyon; and then, later in 1245, the papal legate, Eudes de Châteauroux, had been sent to France to organise the preaching of the crusade. Whilst Guillaume and Vincent both preserved this essential order, the Norman chroniclers took the interesting step of inverting events completely and conveyed, as a consequence, the idea that Louis' taking of the Cross was a response to Frederick's deposition. This

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83 GCF, x, pp. 39-44; GCF, vii, pp. 106-110.
84 Chazan, 'Guillaume,' p. 476.
86 E Chronico Fiscannensis coenobii, RHGF, xxiii, p. 430.
87 Speculum historiale, bk. xxxi, chap. i, p. 1286.
88 GNC, i, pp. 198-199.
89 Richard, Louis, pp. 172, 179.
practice was continued in the mid-1320s by Landolpho of Colonna writing at Chartres.\footnote{RHGF, xxiii, p. 195.}

Certainly some accounts, such as the annals of Rouen,\footnote{RHGF, xxiii, pp. 338-339.} seem to have avoided combining the two events, yet the juxtaposition appears to have been a frequent one. The anonymous author of a French chronicle of limited circulation\footnote{The text is represented by only one MS: MGH SS, xxvi, p. 604.} ending in 1286, probably writing in the early years of Philippe IV's reign, chose to sandwich Frederick's deposition between Louis' taking of the cross and his departure for Egypt.\footnote{Chronique anonyme des Rois de France, finissant en M.CC.LXXXVI, RHGF, xxi, p. 82.} Similarly, a juxtaposition of Louis' taking of the Cross with Frederick's deposition appeared in Guillaume de Puylaurens' account\footnote{Guillaume de Puylaurens, p. 188.} and of the deposition and the departure for the crusade in a chronicle of the abbey of Saint-Martial of Limoges.\footnote{Anonymum S. Martialis Chronicon ab anno M. CC. VII. ad ann. M. CCC. XX., p. 131.} Although a series of notes were added to this chronicle after 1309 by contemporary monks of Saint-Martial, the greater part, including these comments, was probably drawn up in 1310 by Simon de Châteauneuf (d. 17 April 1320), a monk of the neighbouring abbey of Saint-Martin.\footnote{Duplès-Agier, Chroniques de Saint-Martial, p. lvi.} Another Limousin chronicler drew the comparison even more explicitly: firstly, he noted that Gregory excommunicated Frederick for impeding the crusade, and then juxtaposed his deposition with the granting of papal permission for the collection of the tenth in France to fund Louis' expedition.\footnote{Ex notis Lemovicensibus, MGH SS, xxvi, p. 437.} The drawing of a comparison between Louis and Frederick was,
therefore, by no means unique to Saint-Denis, but it was at the latter that it was developed to its fullest extent.

Chazan has suggested that in composing his universal chronicle, Guillaume de Nangis sought to juxtapose Louis' and Frederick's actions on a near year-by-year basis. His intention, in her view, was thereby to highlight Louis' 'imperial' qualities and to demonstrate that the French king occupied the position of de facto emperor of Christendom.\footnote{Chazan, 'Guillaume,' pp. 476-477.} Chazan almost certainly goes too far in suggesting that Guillaume intended to draw a direct comparison between specific events other than Louis' crusade and Frederick's deposition. There is, for example, little indication that Guillaume sought to link Frederick's excommunication and alliance with the Sultan with Louis' foundation of Royaumont, even though both occurred at approximately the same time.\footnote{cf. ibid., p. 476.} Guillaume certainly intended that Frederick and Louis were to be compared, but it was their opposed attitudes that he sought to juxtapose more frequently than their specific actions. Moreover, Chazan's explanation of why Guillaume sought to introduce this juxtaposition seems unlikely. This is in large part because the concept appeared not only in Guillaume's universal chronicle, but in his earlier work, the Gesta Ludovici. The Gesta lacked the imperial focus inherent in a universal chronicle founded on the work of Sigebert de Gembloux and, as such, it seems improbable that this earlier use of juxtaposition can be interpreted as an attempt to cast Louis as the successor to imperial rulers that Frederick had failed to be. It seems probable that the comparative technique was imported into the universal chronicle from the Gesta and that its intended function was the same in both cases.

Frederick's role was intended to be an active rather than a passive one in both the Gesta and the chronicle. Guillaume, who may have owed the original inspiration for this model to a Latin chronicle written by Primat,\footnote{The text of this chronicle is no longer extant. Its existence is known only from a fourteenth-century French translation of the section from 1251 to 1277. Primat is identified as the author by the translator: Primat/JV, pp. 5, 63. cf. Le Goff, Louis, p. 349. That the original does not survive and the fact that the translation remains extant in only one MS suggests that neither enjoyed a popularity comparable to that of other Dionysian texts. Guillaume drew upon Primat's chronicle, but it is impossible to know how much he relied upon it prior to 1251: Spiegel, Chronicle, p. 102.} sought to depict a specific
relationship between Louis and Frederick. This relationship was one in which Louis acted as the ultimate defender and protector of the Church and Frederick became its definitive persecutor: the saint-king and his nemesis. Logic led to the idea of confrontation between the two and indeed this is precisely the picture Guillaume painted. The key to understanding why Guillaume sought to create this relationship lies in his basic aim: the promotion of Louis’ sanctity. Frederick then, at least before 1300, was employed to erect an important pillar in the Dionysian ‘case’ for Louis’ sainthood.

The emperor, treated with suspicion even before his excommunication, was considered by French ecclesiastical writers to be an opponent of the papacy and an enemy of the Church more generally. This tendency was as evident after 1270 as before: Geoffroi de Collon, for example, presented Frederick as having been excommunicated in the very year of his coronation for his desire to destroy the Church. Geoffroi implied that the emperor remained in this state until his condemnation by Innocent IV. A further example, written in the first third of the fourteenth century, is the Dominican Bernard Gui’s account of the re-opening of the papal-imperial dispute at the beginning of Innocent’s pontificate. Gui, like Landolpho of Colonna, the latter labelled Romanum satrapam by Marsilius of Padua, was closely associated with the papacy, a factor which probably influenced a continued emphasis upon Frederick’s culpability in both cases. Into this pattern Guillaume de Nangis wove a new thread: the development of Frederick as the active opponent of the French king, the latter the defender of the Church and the pope.

101 Geoffroi de Collon, pp. 506, 512-520.

102 E Floribus chronicorum seu Catalogo Romanorum pontificum, necnon e Chronico regum Francorum, auctore Bernardo Guidonis, episcoopo Lodovensi [hence Flores chronicorum], RHGF, xxi, p. 696.


The first aspect of Guillaume’s approach involved the whole-hearted re-writing of Capetian-Staufer relations prior to 1250. The *Gesta Ludovici VIII’s* Dionysian author had already passed over Frederick’s acquiescence in the siege of Avignon in silence.¹⁰⁵ This latter provided the source from which the omission was incorporated into the Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques* tradition.¹⁰⁶ More strikingly, Guillaume de Nangis pointedly passed over Louis’ efforts, known from papal¹⁰⁷ and imperial correspondence,¹⁰⁸ to negotiate a settlement between Frederick and the papacy. These efforts had been widely known and remarked upon by earlier ecclesiastical and lay writers.¹⁰⁹ This is particularly striking given the attention Guillaume paid to Louis’ efforts to negotiate between the English king and his barons, efforts which similarly ended in failure.¹¹⁰ In fact, the only positive aspect of French relations with Frederick Guillaume retained was the suggestion, originally from Guillaume le Breton’s *Gesta*, that he had been established as emperor through the support of the Capetian dynasty.¹¹¹ This did little to paint Frederick in a better light: in fact, his iniquity appeared all the worse because he had turned against those who had first helped him.

It was not Guillaume’s intention to depict Frederick as an enemy of the French king in the same manner as, for example, Henry III and the French barons who had

¹⁰⁵ Ex Gestis Ludovici VIII. Regis, MGH SS, xxvi, pp. 631-632. The account of the siege was based upon: Speculum historiale, bk. xxx, chap. cxxviii, p. 1276. Vincent’s work and the chronicle of Saint-Martin of Tours formed the primary sources for this short account composed ca. 1286: Spiegel, Chronicle, p. 97.


¹⁰⁷ MGH Epistolae saeculi XIII, ii, no. 257, p. 192 (5 November 1246, Lyon); HD, vi, p. 641 (circa July 1248); pp. 643-644 (August 1248).

¹⁰⁸ HD, vi, pp. 472-474 (end of November 1246); pp. 644-646 (August 1248); pp. 710-713 (March/April 1249).

¹⁰⁹ For example: ATF, p. 944; Récits, chap. xxiii, p. 126; Chron. maj., v, pp. 22-23.

¹¹⁰ GL, pp. 414-416.

¹¹¹ GNC, i, pp. 132, 138.
opposed Louis before his crusade. Thus, Guillaume ignored the rumours that Frederick had participated in the baronial alliance of the early 1240s, rumours which had drawn strong condemnation from Philippe Mousket. The emperor’s opposition to Louis was of a different order entirely and had nothing to do with feudal or territorial disputes. In 1237 the emperor had sought to convocate a conference of Christian princes. Under Guillaume de Nangis’ pen, this proposed meeting became an event staged with the malicious and sole intention of doing harm to Louis. The view appeared first in his *Gesta Ludovici*, later in his universal chronicle and from the former became integral to both the French life of Louis and the Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques*. In the latter it was assigned its own chapter under the title ‘De la trai'son l’empereour Federic’. Sommerlechner was correct to suggest that Guillaume’s depiction of contact between Frederick and Louis was significant and the author’s intention to create a contrast between them. Yet the 1237 incident was intended to show not only that Frederick and Louis were opposed to each other, but that their conflict was elevated above a mere secular dispute. Guillaume, as Chazan has made clear, was at pains to point out that it was only divine intervention which had saved Louis from the evil machinations of the emperor. This depiction of Louis as God’s faithful servant and of Frederick as his malevolent opponent reached its apogee in Guillaume’s version of the emperor’s dispute with the papacy.

The circumstances of 1241, which placed large numbers of transalpine clerics in imperial hands, drew considerable attention. For Norman writers the capture of

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112 Above, p. 57.

113 GL, pp. 324-326; GNC, i, p. 190; GL(fr), pp. 325-327; GCF, x, pp. 18-19; GCF, vii, pp. 71-72.

114 GCF, vii, p. 71.


116 Chazan, ‘Guillaume,’ p. 464. The idea was later abandoned: GCF, vii, p. 72.

117 For example: Mousket [RHGF], 31003-31008; *Speculum historiale*, bk. xxx, chap. cxxviii, p. 1280; *Ex nosis Lemovicensibus*, MGH xxvi, p. 436; Guillaume de Puylaurens, p. 170; Baudoin d’Avesnes, RHGF, xxi, p. 163. Geoffroi de Collon, p. 512, suggested the incident occurred at the beginning of Gregory’s pontificate.
the archbishop of Rouen and the abbot of Fécamp made it a matter of particular local interest. It became the ultimate exemplar for men closely associated with the papal court, such as Bernard Gui, interested in highlighting Frederick’s perfidy. For the majority, the case was a straightforward one of piracy and imprisonment: a Pisan fleet accosted the churchmen as they sailed to Rome; this resulted in the drowning of several prelates whilst the remainder, including the English and French legates, were carted off to imperial prisons in the regno. The Dionysian historians added an additional element to these already charged events: Louis IX.

In the hands of Guillaume de Nangis the dispute became not simply an example of Frederick’s persecution of the Church, but essentially a confrontation between the French king, as its defender, and Frederick, as its persecutor. This approach is strikingly different from the account given by Vincent de Beauvais’ *Speculum historiale* or that offered by the fourteenth-century papal apologist Bernard Gui. The primary interest of both Vincent and Bernard was in the capture of the cardinals and Louis’ involvement is entirely absent. Gui did not even think it worth mentioning that many of the captured prelates were French. For Guillaume, in contrast, the capture of the prelates was simply a prelude to the confrontation between Louis and Frederick, recounted through a series of angry letters. The emperor’s response to Louis’ request that he free the prelates was taken from a genuine imperial letter, but it was truncated by Guillaume to its final rhetorical flourish, giving the impression of arrogance, obstinacy and aggression on Frederick’s part:

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118 E Chronico Normanniae ab anno 1169 ad annum 1259 sive potius 1272, RHGF, xxiii, p. 213; annals of Rouen, RHGF, xxiii, p. 338; E Chronicis Lirensis monasterii, RHGF, xxiii, p. 468.

119 Flores chronicorum, RHGF, xxii, pp. 694-695.

120 Stürner, Friedrich, ii, p. 501.


122 Speculum historiale, bk. xxx, chap. cxxxviii, p. 1280; Flores chronicorum, RHGF, xxii, pp. 694-695.

123 HD, vi, pp. 1-3 (September 1241).
Louis, upon hearing this, *et vehementer admirans*, responded with a long and threatening reply. Passing silently over the fact that it was actually several years before the prelates were freed, Guillaume recorded simply that Frederick met Louis’ request.125 Frederick’s condemnation at Lyon was important to Guillaume but it remained essentially the aftermath to this epic confrontation.

It may be the case, as Chazan suggested, that one of Guillaume’s intentions was to demonstrate that the Hohenstaufen dynasty as a whole were enemies of the Capetians in order to underline solidarity between the kingdoms of France and Naples, in the wake of Charles d’Anjou’s efforts to displace Frederick’s heirs.126 Yet this alone does not account for the complexity inherent in Guillaume’s attempts to depict Frederick as Louis’ antithesis. By highlighting Frederick’s relations with the Moslems and inserting Louis into the emperor’s dispute with the papacy Guillaume was able to fashion a portrait which not only contrasted Frederick’s and Louis’ attitudes towards the Church but presented one as its persecutor and the other as its defender. By exaggerating Frederick’s villainy, Guillaume created an argument for the unique saintliness of his opponent. Louis’ sanctity became founded upon his qualities as a defender of the Church.

Guillaume’s approach was not adopted by Geoffroi de Collon, Landolpho of Colonna, or Bernard Gui, all of whom preferred to maintain centre stage for the papacy. At the same time it was not without influence. Beyond the circulation of Guillaume’s own works and material in the Dionysian tradition, a version of the capture of the prelates clearly based upon Guillaume’s account appeared, for example, in the *Historia satirica regum, regnorum et summorum pontificum*, whose anonymous

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124 GL, p. 332.

125 Ibid., p. 332.

author wrote between 1297 and 1328. Guillaume’s concept enjoyed a mixed reception both within and beyond the walls of Saint-Denis.

iii. Frederick after Guillaume – The Fragmented Image

The changes introduced into the second recension of Guillaume’s universal chronicle did little to alter Frederick’s role. As early as the first decade of the fourteenth century, however, the Dionysian scriptorium appears to have sought to unravel at least some of the elements of the comparative relationship Guillaume had established. The *Gesta Ludovici* had set the final seal upon Frederick’s wickedness by giving a lengthy account of his condemnation at Lyon and the reasons for it. By the early-fourteenth century this material appears to have been regarded as less important. In particular, the third reason for Frederick’s condemnation, his treatment of the prelates in 1241, was abbreviated by Guillaume’s first translator, and the fourth, a lengthy account of the emperor’s heretical dealings with the Saracens and his attitude towards Islam, was truncated to the statement: ‘La quarte cause ce fu heresie, dont il fu prouves et atains’. The *Grandes Chroniques* produced for Jean, duke of Normandy, did append a note summarising the original Latin, but in both the second translation and the version prepared in the 1340s the original translator’s simple summary seems to have remained the norm. These changes had the effect of lessening the contrast Guillaume had originally sought to create between a saint-king and his antithesis.

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127 *Ex Historia satirica regum, regnorum et summorum pontificum ab anonymo auctore ante annum M.CCC.XXVIII. scripta*, RHGF, xxii, p. 12.


129 GCF, x, p. 47, n. 2.

130 GCF, x, p. 47.

131 GCF, vii, p. 110.
The success of Guillaume’s model of Frederick as Louis’ nemesis was limited essentially by two developments. The first and undoubtedly the most important was the triumph of a rather different image of saint Louis to that of Guillaume’s defender of the Church, the image of the mendicant brother favoured and promulgated by the Franciscan and Dominican orders. An example is Guillaume de Saint-Pathus’ panegyric of Louis presented in the form of a sermon.\textsuperscript{132} This image came to the fore and received both papal and Capetian approbation after 1297.\textsuperscript{133} At the same time, changing political concerns forced a more circumspect approach to a key element of Guillaume’s model: Frederick’s relations with the papacy.\textsuperscript{134}

At the heart of Guillaume’s comparative conceit lay a portrait of Louis as the protector of the Church and Frederick as its persecutor. Guillaume created, with some considerable exaggeration and a great deal of selectivity, a black and white distinction between Louis and Frederick, which had a particular focus upon the emperor’s imprisonment of the prelates and his deposition by the pope. In the wake of the problematic relationship that developed between Philippe IV and the papacy in the first years of the fourteenth century this conceit had the potential to evoke unwelcome comparisons. Had not Philippe imprisoned the bishop of Pamiers, Bernard Saisset, entered into open breach with pope Boniface VIII, and been threatened with chastisement, excommunication and deposition?\textsuperscript{135} It is perhaps less than surprising that Guillaume’s translators, working in the shadow of these events, reduced the attention paid to the papal sentence condemning Frederick and the section concerning his imprisonment of prelates. The potential to draw parallels between Philippe and Frederick lay in more than the specific circumstances of the dispute with Boniface.


\textsuperscript{133} Le Goff, \textit{Louis}, pp. 332-333.

\textsuperscript{134} I am grateful to Dr J. Rubenstein of the University of New Mexico with whom I discussed this point.

Could not Philippe also be regarded as a ruler who had delayed the crusade and failed to depart for the East?

That the papal-Hospitaller crusade planned for 1309 was stillborn was in large part due to the fact that Philippe backed out of his commitment to finance it.\textsuperscript{136} While Philippe did not take the Cross until 1313, many considered him to be the leader of a new expedition from as early as the 1290s. This idea appeared with renewed conviction during the pontificate of Clement V and was enshrined in the decisions of the council of Vienne (1311-1312).\textsuperscript{137} The development of the belief that the practical leadership of the crusade rested with the French king may have been something of a two-edged sword. In circumstances where Capetian supporters could claim that the problems of Flanders delayed the crusade,\textsuperscript{138} it is unlikely that Philippe would have wished to be reminded that Frederick had justified his delayed departure for the East on the grounds it was necessary to impose order upon the Lombards. Philippe’s attempt to seize the goods of the order of the Temple was regarded, at least outside France, with a great deal of suspicion;\textsuperscript{139} again it is unlikely that Frederick’s own strained relations with the order would have been a welcome parallel.

On the whole, the beginning of the fourteenth century marks the point at which interest in the last Hohenstaufen emperor began to decline. The trend began to develop even before the turn of the century. The rhyming chronicle of the Parisian abbey of Saint-Magloire, written in the mid-1290s, probably represents a bourgeois perspective formed in the Île-de-France and the Champagne region.\textsuperscript{140} Its author, a monk, possibly originally from Provins, made no mention of even Frederick’s


\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., pp. 145-147, 242.


\textsuperscript{139} Schein, \textit{Fideles}, p. 254.

deposition.\textsuperscript{141} A sample of fourteenth-century works produced in Normandy suggests that, whilst Frederick was still the subject of occasional interest, as in the case of the chronicle of Monte-Sainte-Catherine, Rouen,\textsuperscript{142} he was no longer considered worthy of either great attention or denunciation. The fourteenth-century annals of the monastery of Ouche, for example, had absolutely nothing to say about Frederick.\textsuperscript{143} The last Hohenstaufen emperor was equally absent from Guillaume Guiart’s \textit{La Branche des royaus lingnages} (ca. 1306-1307).\textsuperscript{144} This latter absence is particularly noteworthy because Guillaume, a layman originally from Orléans and an active participant in Philippe IV’s Flemish wars, claimed to base his work upon the chronicles of Saint-Denis.\textsuperscript{145} Yet Frederick was not entirely absent from the works of those who drew upon the abbey’s resources.

In addition to the circulation of the scriptorium’s output, the Saint-Denis library was a much-used resource and its content may be considered more influential than that of the majority of monastic libraries.\textsuperscript{146} In consequence the mark of Guillaume de Nangis’ approach to Frederick can be traced in a large number of works, although, in common with later material produced in the abbey itself, his model of Frederick’s relationship with Louis tended to be deformed or ignored. Jean de Saint-Victor’s \textit{Memoriale historiarum}, which was compiled using Guillaume’s universal history and other resources at Saint-Denis,\textsuperscript{147} provides an example. Written

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Chronique rimée dite de Saint-Magloire}, RHGF, xxii, pp. 81-87. It was used by at least one anonymous mid-fourteenth-century Parisian chronicler: \textit{Chronique anonyme finissant en M.CCC.LVII}, RHGF, xxi, p. 137.

\textsuperscript{142} \textit{E. Chronico sanctae Catharinae de Monte Rotomagi}, RHGF, xxii, pp. 397, 401.

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Ex Uticensis monasterii annalibus et necrologio}, RHGF, xxiii, pp. 480-484.

\textsuperscript{144} \textit{La Branche des Royaus Lingnages, par Guillaume Guiart}, RHGF, xxii, lines 8965-12048 concern Louis IX’s reign.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 40-46.

\textsuperscript{146} Guenée, \textit{Histoire}, p. 255.

\textsuperscript{147} Chazan, \textit{L’Empire}, p. 393.
in the first quarter of the fourteenth century, in addition to the deposition, Jean depicted only Frederick's attempts to ambush Louis and his excommunication in 1239. The latter was noted without explanation and the imprisonment of the clerics was passed over in silence.\textsuperscript{148} Similar instances are to be found in material connected with the \textit{Grandes Chroniques} tradition but produced outside the abbey walls.

The years prior to 1350 witnessed the production of a large number of compilations which employed Primat's \textit{Roman des rois} as their base and which are traditionally considered under the \textit{Grandes Chroniques} umbrella. A number appear to have been the possession of the clergy, such as those owned by the chapter of Chartres and the abbey of Saint-Bertin at Saint-Omer. These latter examples comprised Primat's \textit{Roman}, a life of Louis VIII and a subsequent continuation based upon material specific to each institution.\textsuperscript{149} Primat's text was also the foundation for works owned by members of the high nobility, such as the countess of Artois,\textsuperscript{150} and by laity less highly placed in the social order, such as Jeanne d'Amboise, second wife of Guillaume Flotte, chancellor of France, whom she married between 1339 and 1341.\textsuperscript{151} The majority of these \textit{Roman}-based compilations were products of professional \textit{atelier} run by artisans such as Thomas de Maubeuge. Thomas, originally from Hainaut, enjoyed an active, and well documented, career in Paris between 1313 and 1349.\textsuperscript{152} These compilations were largely continued using material produced in the abbey of Saint-Denis, a factor which has led to the persistent assumption that the

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid, p. 622.

\textsuperscript{149} Chartres, Bibliothèque municipale, 271 (312); Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque municipale, 707. Guenée, '\textit{Grandes Chroniques},' p. 203; Hedeman, \textit{Royal}, p. 191.


\textsuperscript{151} Castres, Bibliothèque municipale [unnumbered] (1330s): Hedeman, \textit{Royal}, pp. 205-206.

\textsuperscript{152} Rouse and Rouse, \textit{Illiterati}, i, pp. 173-178.
*Grandes Chroniques* remained essentially a Dionysian ‘project’ until the mid-fourteenth century.153

In 1292-1293 Guillaume de Nangis had written a brief Latin history of the kings of France, which he himself later translated into French in order, he stated, to provide a guide to the abbey’s tombs.154 Delisle’s decision to classify the continuations of Primat’s *Roman des rois* which did not employ the *Gesta Ludovici* as five families of what he considered to be an amplified French translation of Guillaume’s abbreviated tomb guide,155 probably lies at the heart of the almost certainly erroneous, yet influential, belief that the *Grandes Chroniques* remained strictly under Dionysian direction.156 The *Grandes Chroniques* compilation ordered in 1318 from Thomas de Maubeuge’s *atelier* by Pierre Honoré de Neufchâtel-en-Bray157 illustrates several problems with the traditional assumption.

Pierre Honoré (d. by 1321) was Charles de Valois’ bailli in Alençon, Anjou and Maine, and Chartres, and, after 1319, his agent in the guardianship of the sons of Louis d’Évreux.158 His copy of Primat’s *Roman des rois* appears to have been continued, at least for the reigns of Louis VIII, his son and grandson, using excerpts translated from Guillaume de Nangis’ universal chronicle. This version of translated Dionysian material only appeared in copies produced in Thomas de Maubeuge’s


154 Spiegel, Chronicle, pp. 103-105.


156 Hedeman’s description of material as ‘Guillaume de Nangis’s amplified chronicle for the lives of Louis VIII through Louis IX’ echoes Delisle’s classification: Royal, p. 37.


Whilst it is possible that the Dionysians themselves prepared abbreviated translations of Guillaume’s chronicle, there is little reason to think that they supplied Thomas with this particular version. They had presumably gone to a lot of trouble to translate both Guillaume’s *Gesta Ludovici* and to prepare French versions of his Latin tomb guide. Why not supply Thomas with one of these if a continuation had been requested? A simpler explanation, which would account for this version being specific to manuscripts produced within Thomas’ *atelier*, would be that it was the *atelier* itself that selected and translated certain parts of Guillaume’s Latin chronicle. These excerpts may have been chosen to meet the particular interests of the patron. The absence of a Dionysian guiding hand is further suggested by the fact that these ‘*Grandes Chroniques*’ were sometimes continued using material that did not originate in the abbey. Pierre’s compilation, for example, was expanded beyond 1316 (possibly by Thomas’ *atelier*, but possibly elsewhere) using a translation of Jean de Saint-Victor’s *Memoriale historiarum* for the period after 1316, and, when this ended in 1322, anonymous material (which almost certainly shared a common, but unknown, source with the 1340s Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques*) for the period up to 1329.

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159 Ibid., ii, pp. 173-174. The MSS containing this version are Pierre Honoré’s compilation; Jeanne d’Amboise’s compilation; Brussels, Bibliothèque royale, MS 5 (1330s); Grenoble, Bibliothèque municipale, 407 Rés. Only Honoré’s copy was known to Delisle.


161 cf. ibid., p. 46.

162 Rouse and Rouse, *Illiterati*, i, p. 182. The Rouses do not propose that the *atelier* was responsible for excerpting or translating material.

163 Ibid., i, p. 179.

164 The years 1322-1328 are edited under the misleading title *Continuation anonyme de la chronique de Jean de S. Victor*: RHGF, xxi, pp. 676-689. 1328-1329 are edited: GCF, ix, pp. 330-341.
The existence of a non-Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques* tradition,\textsuperscript{165} of which an anonymous continuation of Primat’s *Roman des rois* ending in 1286 may be the earliest example,\textsuperscript{166} offers an indication of how Guillaume de Nangis’ image of Frederick was received beyond the abbey’s walls. In compiling Pierre Honoré’s *Grandes Chroniques*, for example, Thomas de Maubeuge’s *atelier* retained only one aspect of Guillaume’s portrait of Frederick: an account of the emperor’s request that Louis meet with him at Vaucouleurs.\textsuperscript{167} Thomas’ compiler noted in passing, when discussing Manfred and Conradin,\textsuperscript{168} that Frederick had been deposed, but a lack of any account of Frederick’s deposition, or of the imperial crusade or of the emperor’s imprisonment of the prelates, left the extent of Frederick’s villainy somewhat open to question. Frederick was clearly of little interest to the compiler and, devoid of the context established by Guillaume, his appearances in the account became a mere curiosity.

Was, then, the ultimate result of Guillaume de Nangis’ efforts to do little more than confirm and strengthen suspicion of Frederick’s motivations in northern France, particularly amongst the laity? Another case where the writer drew upon Dionysian sources, Jean de Joinville’s *Livre des saintes paroles et des bons faiz nostre saint roy Looys*,\textsuperscript{169} may suggest that occasionally Guillaume’s basic concept of saint-king and nemesis fell upon more fertile ground. Despite what appears to have been a limited readership,\textsuperscript{170} the *Livre* is of particular importance because, as seneschal of

\textsuperscript{165} Hedeman recognised the existence of an ‘independent’ tradition of production but continued to believe the content remained the preserve of the abbey until the mid-fourteenth century: *Royal*, p. 3. Also: Gueneé, ‘*Grandes Chroniques,*’ p. 196.

\textsuperscript{166} *Chronique anonyme des Rois de France, finissant en M.CC.IXXXVI*, RHGF, xxi, pp. 80-102.

\textsuperscript{167} BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 366\textsuperscript{r}. cf. GNC, i, p. 190.

\textsuperscript{168} BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 371\textsuperscript{r}, 372\textsuperscript{r}.

\textsuperscript{169} Spiegel, *Chronicle*, p. 118.

\textsuperscript{170} Only one fourteenth-century copy remains extant: Monfrin, Joinville, p. xc.
Champagne, its author represents a social stratum rather different from that of the majority of contemporary writers.\footnote{Le Goff, Louis, pp. 474-475. Sommerlechner makes no more than a passing reference to Joinville: Stupor, pp. 11, 114, 248, n. 36.}

Joinville wrote as a man who had lived through Frederick's reign, but also as one who had been influenced by over half a century of hindsight. His condemnation of the Templars, for example, must be at least partially attributable to Philippe IV's attack on the order.\footnote{Joinville, 381-387, pp. 186-190; 511-514, pp. 252-254.} His primary intention was to justify the sanctity of his friend. He was not above criticism of Louis' decisions,\footnote{Ibid., 736, p. 364.} but, whilst he was prepared to depict Louis in a semi-abstract debate over the use of excommunication, like Guillaume de Nangis, he was not inclined to depict the king as the sort of man who engaged in tense stand-offs with the episcopate.\footnote{Ibid., 61-64, pp. 30-32. Joinville's own turbulent relations with the clergy may have led him to include this episode: D. Boutet, 'Y a-t-il une idéologie royale dans la Vie de saint Louis de Joinville?' eds. J. Dufournet and L. Harf, Le prince et son historien, la Vie de saint Louis de Joinville (Paris, 1997), pp. 93-94.}

Frederick occupied a not inconsiderable place in the background of Joinville's account. Two points marked the seneschal's portrayal of the emperor. The first of these was a repeated emphasis upon Frederick's friendship with the Saracens and the second was the suggestion that Frederick had been an enemy both of Louis and of the French more generally. Joinville made it clear that the Saracens held Frederick in high regard. The man who captured him in Egypt asked the seneschal if he was related to the emperor and, when Joinville said that he was, \textit{il me dit que tant m'en amoit il miex}.\footnote{Joinville, 326, p. 160.} Frederick was a man who harboured infidels in his own lands,\footnote{...un Sarrazin qui estoit de la terre l'empereour...' ibid., 321, p. 158.} and who had not only knighted Louis' chief opponent,\footnote{Ibid., 196, p. 96.} but allowed him to quarter his arms with
his own.\footnote{178} This latter hinted at the particularly Dionysian idea of enmity between Frederick and Louis.

Frederick took pains to ensure copies of instructions to his Sicilian officials reached France\footnote{179} and wrote both to Louis\footnote{180} and to Blanche\footnote{181} to inform them that supplies would be made available to Alphonse de Poitiers. Louis himself wrote to thank Frederick for his preparations.\footnote{182} The absence of any reference in Joinville’s Livre to this proffered aid, something a man in his position must surely have had some awareness of, is an indication that Joinville was disinclined to suggest that Frederick’s motives were anything but doubtful. More significant than these omissions is the seneschal’s comment that there was a commonly held suspicion that the imperial envoys who arrived at Acre in 1250, and who claimed to have been charged with the task of negotiating Louis’ release, had actually been sent by the emperor to ensure that the French remained in captivity:

\begin{quote}
Moult de gens distrent que il ne nous feust pas mestier que les messages nous eussent trouvez en la prison, car l’en cuidoit que l’empereur eust envoie ses messages plus pour nous encombrer que pour nous delivrer.\footnote{183}
\end{quote}

This remark was not to be found in the Gesta Ludovici or any other Dionysian source; at the same time, it was an extremely Dionysian interpretation of Frederick’s motivations.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[178] Ibid., 198, p. 98.
\item[179] Layettes, ii, no. 3562, pp. 641-642 (November 1246, Lucera); no. 3563, p. 642 (November 1246, Lucera).
\item[180] HD, vi, pp. 748-450 (July 1249).
\item[181] Ibid., vi, pp. 746-748 (July 1249).
\item[182] Ibid., vi, pp. 500-502 (February/March 1247).
\item[183] Joinville, 443, p. 218.
\end{footnotes}
iv. Alternative Fredericks?

Guillaume de Nangis sought to use Frederick as an exemplar of a bad ruler in order to highlight Louis as a saint-king. It was not the only image of the emperor that developed in the years after 1270. In addition to the portrayal of Frederick as a persecutor of the Church by writers such as Bernard Gui a much more sympathetic depiction emerged in a minority of works. Raymond VII had been one of Frederick’s more enthusiastic supporters. His former chaplain, Guillaume de Puylaurens, provided some mitigation for the emperor’s imprisonment of the clerics in 1241 by noting that Frederick suspected that Gregory had convoked the council to act against him.  

More fundamentally, Guillaume believed that Frederick had repented on his deathbed. This assessment of Frederick’s character did reach a northern French audience, but it did so only in Bernard Gui’s work where its presentation as an aside implied that Guillaume may have been mistaken.

A less than damning account of Frederick was patronised in the north by Baudoin d’Avesnes (1213-1289). This account, which probably drew upon Primat’s Latin chronicle and exists in two recensions, one composed before 1281 and the other before 1284, appeared in Hainaut during the period in which Baudoin acted as guardian for his nephew, the county’s inheritor. A large passage concentrated upon Frederick’s capture of the clerics but nothing was said of any harm done to them and the author underlined, erroneously, that they were released as soon as the time for the council had passed. This moderate attitude may originate in the support Frederick lent the Avesnes dynasty in the 1240s. The emperor was also of interest to one of

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184 Guillaume de Puylaurens, p. 170.

185 Ibid., p. 198.

186 Flores chronicorum, RHGF, xxi, p. 697.


188 Baudoin d’Avesnes, p. 163.

189 RHGF, xxi, p. 167, n. 11.
Baudoin's close relatives, a member of the neighbouring nobility of Champagne, Jean II, lord of Dampierre and of Saint-Dizier (d. 1307).

Jean de Dampierre-Saint-Dizier patronised the translation of Frederick's *De arte venandi cum avibus* into French. Completed in 1310 for Jean's son, Guillaume, *L'art de la chace des oisiaux* is of interest not only because it offers further indication of noble attitudes towards Frederick, but also because it was not produced in a Parisian atelier. Written and illuminated in the southern part of the county of Champagne it was, as Toubert has noted, the product of a milieu connected with the *mouvance capétienne* but which also enjoyed a relative autonomy. The translation was closely based upon a specific manuscript of Frederick's text. This latter, which since 1623 has been conserved in the Vatican library, was almost certainly acquired by the Dampierre family as a consequence of Charles d'Anjou's conquest of the *regno*. The text of the French version made no attempt to conceal the identity of the author. In 'translating' the illuminations, the artist, Simon d'Orléans, depicted the emperor not only as enthroned with crown and sceptre, but with his legs crossed and making a teaching gesture. Does this, then, echo a more positive reputation enjoyed by Frederick comparable to that found in the *Récits* of the minstrel of Reims?

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192 Ibid., p. 387.

193 Ibid., p. 388.

194 Ibid., pp. 389, 395.

195 BN MS fr. 12400, fol. 2. Toubert suggested that Simon (identified from the final folio) followed his Italian exemplar, Vatican Pal. lat. MS 1071, fol. 1", but 'updated' the style: 'Les enluminures,' p. 391.
An indication that this was probably not the case comes from a second illumination, not based on any archetype in the Italian exemplar, in which the crowned and sceptre-wielding Frederick was depicted seated on a throne placed above the body of a fire-breathing dragon.\textsuperscript{196} The connection between Frederick and the dragon was almost certainly intended to convey apocalyptic overtones and was probably a not-so-veiled reference to what was, by 1310, the somewhat dated Joachite belief that Frederick was the Antichrist.\textsuperscript{197} \textit{L'art de la chace des oisiaus} does not seem to have been diffused widely in the first half of the fourteenth century,\textsuperscript{198} something which probably had as much to do with the unwieldy quality of the work and Frederick's idiosyncratic approach to his subject, as the issue of the author's reputation.\textsuperscript{199} Its existence does suggest that a layman, and one who was a committed supporter of Philippe IV in his Flemish campaigns,\textsuperscript{200} might adopt a quite different attitude to Frederick II than that encouraged by the Dionysians.

An eschatological interpretation of Frederick appears to have remained the province of a minority in northern France. The author of the Norman chronicle appears to have been the only French writer before the mid-fourteenth century to connect Frederick's deposition with Joachite interpretations of the Sibylline prophecy:

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\textsuperscript{196} BN MS fr. 12400, fol. 3r. That the ruler depicted here should be identified as Frederick II is suggested strongly by the inclusion, in the right hand column of this folio, of a note identifying the author of the work as \textit{Frederis secons empereres de Rome de Jherusalem et de Sezille roys}.


\textsuperscript{198} Only three other (fifteenth-century) copies remain extant: B. Van de Abeele, 'Inspirations orientales et destinées occidentales du \textit{De arte venandi cum avibus} de Frédéric II,' ed. E. Menestò, \textit{Federico II e le nuove culture} (Atti del XXXI Convegno storico internazionale Todi, 9-12 ottobre 1994) (Spoleto, 1995), p. 384, n. 70.

\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., pp. 386-389.

\textsuperscript{200} Toubert, 'Les enluminures,' p. 398.
In hoc Imperium Romanum cessasse videtur, secundum prophetiam, ut dicitur, Sibyllae, quae ait: *Post nullus.*

These comments may have been inspired by the account of Frederick and his children interpolated into the twelfth-century prophecy of the Erythraean Sibyl by a Sicilian follower of Joachim of Fiore between 1250 and 1254. While another of those influenced by Joachim's prophecies, the Franciscan Jean de Roquetaillade, appears, in the 1340s and 1350s, to have been the first French writer to explicitly identify Frederick II and his descendants with the Antichrist, eschatological considerations may have influenced Vincent de Beauvais' earlier decision to conclude his *Speculum historiale*, after summarising Frederick’s reign, with a discussion of the coming of the Antichrist. Although Vincent was extremely influential, this particular concept does not appear to have met with great success amongst those who used the *Speculum historiale*. It found no resonance, for example, in the Saint-Denis scriptorium. Yet it was not entirely overlooked: it appeared, for example, in the *Flores* of Adam de Clermont.

Adam de Clermont’s case is particularly revealing. His patron was the bishop of Clermont, Gui de la Tour du Pin (bishop from 1250, d. 1286). Like Vincent, Gui

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201 *E Chronico Normanniae ab anno 1169 ad annum 1259 sive potius 1272*, RHGF, xxiii, p. 214. Rech suggested that Géraud de Frachet also took an interest in Sibylline prophecy: *L'engagement*, p. 145. His view is open to question: below, pp. 149-150.


206 Adam, ‘...clerico domini episcopi Claromontensis...’, completed his work prior to 1270: Nadeau ‘Deux abrégés,’ p. 437.
was a Dominican and it seems likely that, although its impact was greatest amongst the Franciscans, the inclusion of this apocalyptic theme in the works of Vincent and Adam reflected a particularly mendicant concern with Joachite prophecy. Adam, for example, took a particular interest in Joachim’s followers. Equally, Joachim was of interest to Jean de Mailly (died ca. 1254-1260), a Dominican at the Metz convent. As Lerner noted, the period 1247 to 1260 was one of intense Joachimism which produced a great deal of anti-imperial feeling. Beyond the case of Jean de Dampierre-Saint-Dizier and the mooted appearance of the theme in Vincent’s Speculum and Adam’s chronicle, thirteenth-century copies of which were to be found at Notre-Dame de Paris and the Carmelite convent of Clermont, there are few indications that an eschatological interpretation of Frederick’s reign spread outside the mendicant orders in France. One possible case is the circulation of an account of the coming of the Antichrist as part of a French compilation commissioned by un grant baron de France (ca. 1326-1328), later revised and expanded by its original author.


208 McGinn, Visions, pp. 159-160.

209 Concerning the impact of Joachite ideas within the Dominican order: Reeves, Influence of Prophecy, pp. 161-174.

210 RHGF, xxi, p. 78, n. 12.


213 Three further MSS are fourteenth-century, one of which belonged to the abbey of Saint-Amand, Sanderus: P. Fournier, ‘Adam de Clermont,’ eds. J. Balteau, M. Barroux and M. Prevost, Dictionnaire de biographie française (Paris, 1933), i, col. 481.

This latter drew upon Vincent’s work but, notably, was probably originally of Dominican authorship. There is little to suggest that the association of Frederick with apocalyptic themes gained widespread acceptance: the Cistercian Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, for example, went so far, when discussing Frederick’s initial abandonment of his crusade, to cite and dismiss a Franciscan prophecy concerning the coming of the Antichrist.

v. Conclusion

History was, as Guenée has argued, something which the majority of literate members of society rarely knew from acquaintance with more than one text. In consequence, the image of the last Hohenstaufen emperor amongst literate inhabitants of northern France was largely dependent upon the individual text they had before them. The perpetuation of the emperor’s presence in the first half of the fourteenth century was, particularly amongst the laity, due in large part to the earlier efforts of Guillaume de Nangis: the Grandes Chroniques compilations which drew upon his work frequently included material relating to Frederick and disseminated this from the Île-de-France to Normandy, to Cambrai and as far as the duchy of Brabant. Amongst the non-literate, memory of the emperor almost certainly faded faster. Although an image of Frederick was preserved in some works conceived with oral

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216 Surprenant, ‘petites chroniques,’ pp. 448, 454.

217 ATF, p. 920. For Aubri’s attitude to prophecy: Chazan, L’Empire, pp. 673-674.

218 Guenée, Histoire, pp. 324-328.

presentation in mind, such as the chronicle of Philippe Mousket and the *Récits* of the minstrel of Reims, others, such as the chronicles of Guillaume Guiart and Saint-Magloire, simply took less or no interest in the emperor.

The multiple images of Frederick which developed in northern France were the consequence of the multiple contexts in which he was considered. The minstrel of Reims and Guillaume de Nangis both developed conceptions intimately connected with concerns specific to the northern French environment, in the case of the minstrel, the distaste of the French baronage for ecclesiastical interference in secular affairs and in the case of Guillaume, the aim of promoting Louis IX’s sanctity. In contrast, Bernard Gui and Vincent de Beauvais disseminated an image particularly sympathetic to a papal perspective and Simon d’Orléans infused the emperor with Joachite eschatological expectations. The differences between these concerns led to dissimilar and even contradictory portraits of the Staufer emperor.

For many across northern France, such as Pierre Honoré, Frederick would have remained little more than a name, albeit one associated with what seems to have been universal suspicion. At the same time Frederick’s deposition, if not of interest to the compilers of Pierre Honoré’s *Grandes Chroniques*, was still a topic which attracted widespread attention in France. There seems little amongst the immediate concerns of northern French writers to explain this extraordinary interest and why, particularly, the topic was considered worthy of remark by many who otherwise displayed little interest in the Empire and its rulers. Although Frederick’s successors did not enjoy the last Hohenstaufen emperor’s notoriety, certain events connected with their reigns attracted similarly surprising levels of interest in northern France.
Chapter Three

After Frederick – Allies and Enemies

i. Introduction

Contemporary events in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth-century Empire were rarely of interest to French writers. Whilst the northern Italian imperial lands received some little attention, largely in consequence of Philippe de Valois activities in the peninsula in the 1320s,"1 only in one or two rare instances were specific events that took place in the German lands of the Empire considered worthy of remark. Unique to the Dionysian Grandes Chroniques prepared in the 1340s, the report of a massacre of Jews in Magdeburg was an exceptional case; 2 Girard d’Auvergne’s account of the appearance of a pretender claiming to be Frederick II and his subsequent burning by Rudolf of Habsburg was similarly unusual. 3

Girard d’Auvergne’s account of the pseudo-Frederick was probably a reference to the pretender who first appeared in Cologne in 1284, became established in Neuss, and was later burnt for heresy. 4 Girard prepared the first draft of his abbreviated history for the abbot of Cluny, Ives de Vergi (or de Poison) (1257-1274) in 1272, 5 but he also enjoyed, like Adam de Clermont, the patronage of Gui de la Tour du Pin: whilst begun at Clement IV’s request, Girard’s Historia figuralis was

1 Below, pp. 127-128.

2 GCF, viii, pp. 192-193.

3 Abbreviatione Historiae Figuralis (continuation to 1288), RHGF, xxi, p. 219.


completed at Gui’s. It may be the Dominican bishop of Clermont’s interest in apocalyptic themes that gave rise to the inclusion of Frederick’s ‘resurrection’ in a later draft of Girard’s history. This account remained unique amongst French sources and of limited circulation although, as the single extant manuscript of his *Historia figuralis* was probably written in northern France and possibly belonged to the abbey of Saint-Martin, Tournai, Girard’s influence may have reached beyond the Auvergne.

The Empire and its rulers did not pique the curiosity of Guillaume Guiart, nor that of the anonymous authors, writing contemporary to the events they described, of at least one of the chronicles prepared at Saint-Martial of Limoges, nor that of several anonymous chronicles written in the mid-fourteenth century. When these authors chose to address events beyond their own locality most turned their focus upon England and the Flemish war. The annalist of the Norman abbey of Ouche, for example, had much to say concerning the death of Simon de Montfort and the reign of Edward I, but did not trouble to note the election of the emperor Henry VII. Whilst

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8 Delisle, ‘Girard,’ 239. The *Historia* remains unedited.

9 *La Branche des Royaus Lignages*, RHGF, xxii, 12049-21510.


12 Extant in one MS and probably Parisian: *Chronique anonyme finissant en M.CCC.LVI*, RHGF, xxii, pp. 137-140. Also: *Ex anonymo regum Franciae chronico, circa annum M.CCC.XLII scripto*, RHGF, xxii, pp. 16-21.

13 *Ex Uticensis monasterii annalibus et necrologio*, RHGF, xxiii, pp. 481, 483.
limited in the accounts they offered of events within the Empire, French sources were not entirely devoid of references to would-be imperial rulers after Frederick II.

For writers of universal histories, such as Guillaume de Nangis and Jean de Saint-Victor, there was a self-evident reason, connected with the genre in which they were writing, for the inclusion of material relating to the rulers of the German lands of the Empire. It is less clear why these rulers should have proved of interest to many other writers and why some, in particular, received considerable attention. Undoubtedly, some explanation lies in a desire to recount the interaction of these rulers with the Capetian-Valois kings, yet such an explanation seems inadequate when it becomes clear that such interaction is the least prominent feature of the majority of accounts. With the exception of Chazan’s study, limited to four universal histories, northern French attitudes to these rulers remain essentially unexplored. With the exception of William of Holland, and to a lesser extent Ludwig of Bavaria, these rulers did not enjoy the multiple images, and in many cases the longevity, in northern French thought of their Hohenstaufen predecessor. Yet in common with Frederick II, perceptions of these rulers were, in most cases, largely shaped by factors specific to the northern French environment. A further similarity shared with the last Staufer emperor was the important role played by the abbey of Saint-Denis in formulating certain of these images and, consequently, their frequent connection with the interests of the Capetian-Valois kings.

ii. Innocent’s Men

Little doubt can exist concerning contemporary Capetian attitudes towards the anti-kings, Heinrich Raspe, landgrave of Thuringia, and William, count of Holland, promoted through the auspices of Innocent IV in the wake of the council of Lyon. The brevity of Heinrich’s reign (22 May 1246 – 16 February 1247) might be

14 M. E. Franke, Kaiser Heinrich VII. im Spiegel der Historiographie: Eine faktenkritische und quellenkundliche Untersuchung ausgewählter Geschichtsschreiber der ersten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts (Forschungen zur Kaiser- und Papstgeschichte des Mittelalters, 9, Cologne-Vienna, 1992) is limited to Henry VII’s portrayal in German and Italian sources.

15 Stürner, Friedrich, ii, pp. 553-554, 567.
considered sufficient reason to account for the lack of extant evidence of relations with the Capetian court.\textsuperscript{16} A similar absence of evidence for relations between the Capetians and William is more surprising as the count laid claim to the kingship of the Romans for over eight years (3 October 1247 – 28 January 1256).

Whilst some material concerning William appears in the *Layettes du Trésor des chartes* this largely relates to the county of Burgundy and it seems probable that it entered the royal archives only after the county’s acquisition by Philippe de Poitiers.\textsuperscript{17} Although William termed Louis *karissimo fratri et amico nostro* in two letters in 1249, this phrase may reflect reality less than it does an attempt by William to impress the imperial audience to whom he was writing.\textsuperscript{18} Both letters concerned the county of Namur and revised the settlement Louis had negotiated with Marguerite de Flandre in 1246.\textsuperscript{19} Louis, in Cyprus in 1249, took no part in this revision and notably returned to the principles of his 1246 settlement when, after William’s death, he negotiated the *Dit de Péronne* (24 September 1256).\textsuperscript{20} The striking feature of these years is the evidence for Louis IX’s and Blanche de Castille’s continued recognition of the Hohenstaufen.

Not only did Louis make numerous efforts to negotiate a settlement between Innocent IV and Frederick,\textsuperscript{21} he agreed in 1247, at the emperor’s request, to respect


\textsuperscript{17} *Layettes*, iii, no. 3934, p. 123; no. 3935, pp. 123-124; no. 3958, p. 141; no. 4186, pp. 250-251; no. 4187, p. 251; no. 4188, pp. 251-252. William’s grant of the duchy of Méranie to Friedrich, burgrave of Nürnberg was connected with affairs in the county: ibid., no. 3746, pp. 56-57; Richard, *Louis*, p. 342.

\textsuperscript{18} MGH, *Dip. reg. et imp. Germ.*, xviii, pt. i, no. 88, pp. 126-128 (27 April 1249, Mainz); no. 89, pp. 128-129 (27 April 1249, Mainz).


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., pp. 333, 337.

\textsuperscript{21} Above, p. 80.
the rights of both Frederick and his son, Conrad, in the kingdom of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{22} Once in Palestine Louis did not fulfil Frederick’s request to re-instate the officials who had been chased out of castles and towns in 1243,\textsuperscript{23} but he did little to undermine Hohenstaufen claims. According to Joinville, when the French were asked by their Egyptian captors if they were willing to hand over the fortresses of the barons of Outremer, the count of Brittany responded, ‘que il n’i avoit pouoir, car en les tenoit de l’empereor d’Alemaingne qui lor vivoit’.\textsuperscript{24} In 1251 Blanche, regent in Louis’ absence, strongly supported by many French barons, forbade the participation of French knights in the crusade that the pope was attempting to foster against Conrad in northern Germany.\textsuperscript{25} When Innocent offered the Sicilian crown to Charles d’Anjou in early 1252, Louis’ brother was dissuaded from accepting it and from leading a crusade to displace Conrad in Sicily.\textsuperscript{26}

The reluctance of the Capetians to support Innocent’s policies in 1251 and 1252 almost certainly had its roots primarily in a desire to avoid diverting potential resources from Louis’ crusade, yet it is striking that it was only after the death of Conrad (d. 1254) that there is even a suggestion that the Capetians accorded William a degree of recognition. Louis’ \textit{Dit de Péronne} settlement, in which Jean and Baudoin d’Avesnes agreed to renounce any rights that they had been invested with in Namur by the German king, implicitly acknowledged William’s position.\textsuperscript{27} A more substantial suggestion that good relations existed between Louis and William comes from the minstrel of Reims who reported that Charles d’Anjou was advised:

\textsuperscript{22} HD, vi, p. 501 (February/March, 1247).
\textsuperscript{23} Richard, \textit{Louis}, p. 244.
\textsuperscript{24} Joinville, 336, pp. 164-165.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Layettes}, iii, no. 4292, pp. 324-325.
...il a amour entre le roi de France, vostre frere, et entre le roi d'Alemaingne
[William]: si ne seroit mie avenant que vous commencissiez la melee ne brasissiez
l'aliance.  

Given the notorious factual unreliability of the minstrel,²⁹ that the words *ne brasissiez l'aliance* are absent from at least one version of the *Récits*, and the absence of any further evidence, the warmth of these relations may be doubted.³⁰

The enthusiasm with which certain lay and ecclesiastical writers addressed Heinrich’s and William’s reigns differed markedly from the attitude displayed by Louis and Blanche. Lay writers, in particular, focused a good deal of attention upon William. This interest issued specifically from the count of Holland’s deep involvement in a particular regional dispute. The chronicle prepared under the patronage of Baudoin d’Avesnes noted William’s election and his early efforts to establish himself,³¹ his violent dispute with Marguerite de Flandre over the lordship of Walcheren and the islands of Zeeland,³² and his death at the hands of the Frisians.³³ One of the most striking elements of this account is the effort the chronicler took to emphasise William’s legitimacy.

Although the initial unwillingness of the electoral princes to participate in the papal plan to replace Frederick II and the continued resistance of many, including the town of Aachen, were highlighted, Baudoin’s chronicler made clear that William was elected by *la plus grant partie des prinches*.³⁴ This stands in marked contrast with the election of the erroneously identified, but in any case short-lived, *frere landegrave de

²⁹ Levine, *Minstrel*, pp. 3-5.
³¹ Baudoin d’Avesnes, p. 171.
³² Ibid., pp. 174-175.
³³ Ibid., p. 175. Absent, like the dispute with Marguerite, from certain MSS.
³⁴ Ibid., p. 171.
Duringhes who was elected only by the prelates. Any lingering doubts concerning William's legitimacy were dispelled by the writer's decision to include the phrase, 'La mort l'empereur Fedri, et le regne le conte Guillaume de Hollande', in the title of his chapter. Given that the chronicler's attitude towards Frederick had been generally positive, indeed even this chapter title might be interpreted to suggest that William's reign began only after Frederick's death, his attitude to the rights of Frederick's son seems somewhat paradoxical.

The Avesnes dynasty certainly had cause to be grateful to Frederick: he had found in favour of their legitimacy and supported Jean and Baudoin in the face of the attempts of their estranged mother, Marguerite de Flandre, to disinherit them. They also possessed good reasons for defending William's legitimacy. Jean d'Avesnes, count of Hainaut until his death in 1257, had married William's sister. Once king of the Romans, William had strongly supported the Avesnes: in July 1252, having deprived Marguerite de Flandre of all her imperial fiefs, William invested the same fiefs in Jean. It is even possible that William had intended to designate Jean as his successor in the Empire. It is in this context, where William had proved the strongest advocate of Avesnes interests, that the emphasis placed upon his rights should be seen, particularly when he exercised them as king of the Romans in his dispute with Marguerite: 'Mais puis que li quens Guillaumes fut esleus a roi, il ne voloit obeir a la contesse de Flandres'.

An incident that Baudoin's chronicler did not choose to touch upon was the confrontation between William and Charles d'Anjou. By enfeoffing Charles d'Anjou

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35 Ibid. p. 171. For the importance of election by a majority: below, pp. 326-327.
36 Baudoin d'Avesnes, p. 171.
37 Above, p. 94.
38 RHGF, xxi, p. 167, n. 11.
40 Baudoin d'Avesnes, p. 174.
with the county of Hainaut, Marguerite de Flandre had hoped to reassert her authority over the region. Although Charles successfully overran the county and evicted the Avesnes brothers he found himself, in April-May 1254, confronted by a large army assembled by William. After a tense stand-off William appears to have backed down.\textsuperscript{41} It is possible that Baudoin’s chronicler passed over the incident in silence both because Charles’ successful occupation of the county was particularly galling for the Avesnes and because it did not show their protector at his most effective. This incident, however, formed the core of an account of William’s activities written a decade earlier by the minstrel of Reims.\textsuperscript{42}

Differing views of the Avesnes acted as the point from which two distinct recensions of the minstrel’s \textit{Récits} developed. The original work appears to have condemned the Avesnes, and thus William who had lent them his support. A revision in approximately 1295 made strenuous efforts to modify the portrait of Jean d’Avesnes, in particular by erasing an allegorical chapter and re-writing his death.\textsuperscript{43} These efforts also resulted in a more positive portrait of William’s intervention in Hainaut and of his own death, the latter now summed up: \textit{dont ce fu damages}, rather than dismissed as \textit{ainsi gaingne qui mal brace}.\textsuperscript{44} This revised version appears to have enjoyed the greater success\textsuperscript{45} and its portrait of William was perpetuated by the \textit{Anciennes chroniques de Flandres} which appears to have employed this version as a source in the mid- to late-fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{46} William’s claim to the Roman

\textsuperscript{41} C. Duvivier, \textit{Les influences francaise et germanique en Belgique au XII\textsuperscript{e} siecle. La querelle des d’Avesnes et des Dampierre jusqu’a la mort de Jean d’Avesnes (1257)} (2 vols., Brussels-Paris, 1894), i, pp. 235-251; Richard, \textit{Louis}, pp. 331-332.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Recits}, chap. xxxvii-xl, pp. 202-223.

\textsuperscript{43} Tappan, ‘mss,’ 74.

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Recits}, chap. xxxix, p. 220.

\textsuperscript{45} Six out of ten extant MSS give the pro-Avesnes version: Tappan, ‘mss,’ 73.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Extraits d’une chronique anonyme intitulee Anciennes chroniques de Flandre}, RHGF, xxii, pp. 338-341.
kingship, although implicitly accepted, remained somewhat tangential to both traditions and Heinrich Raspe found no place in either. It was amongst clerical writers that, for reasons altogether unconnected with the Avesnes, Heinrich’s and William’s position was addressed more directly.

An interest in either Heinrich or William remained rare amongst French writers. The note of William’s siege of Aachen that appears in the thirteenth-century account preserved in BN MS français 17203, possibly of Parisian provenance and connected with the abbey of Saint-Germain-des-Près, is, for example, unusual. Nevertheless, for those who sought to uphold the papal position in the struggle with the Hohenstaufen, the legitimacy of both anti-kings was never in question. These included, in the fourteenth century, the papal familiar Bernard Gui and, earlier, in the 1270s, those in the employ of Gui de la Tour du Pin. The efforts of the bishop of Clermont to establish an historical school seem to have been made with at least the partial intention of ingratiating himself with Gregory X. Girard d’Auvergne highlighted the election and succession of both anti-kings in the wake of Frederick’s deposition. For Adam de Clermont, another of Bishop Gui’s protégés, matters were similarly clear cut: Frederick was condemned and Heinrich elected in his place and later succeeded by William. Frederick’s displacement was reinforced not simply by the note of Heinrich’s and William’s succession but by the simple yet powerful use of

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47 O. Holder-Egger, MGH SS, xxvi, p. 610.

48 *Fragment anonyme du XIIe siècle*, RHGF, xxiii, p. 135.

49 *Flores chronicorum*, RHGF, xxi, p. 696.


51 Ibid., p. 437. Adam de Clermont’s chronicle was dedicated to Gregory X in 1271. Girard d’Auvergne dedicated his *Historia figuralis* to Gregory in the following year: Delisle, ‘Girard,’ 236.

52 *Abbreviatioe Historiae Figuralis*, RHGF, xxi, p. 215.

53 RHGF, xxi, p. 78. Adam’s misdating of Henry’s reign to four years was certainly the source for the same mistake in Girard’s work and may also explain Bernard Gui’s similar error.
William's reign to date the death of the former emperor: 'Regnante vero Wilekino de Hollandia, obiit Fredericus'. A second group for whom Heinrich and William were difficult to ignore were the compilers of universal history, although even amongst these writers at least one, Géraud de Frachet, seems to have taken little interest in either.

Amongst northern French compilers of universal history, only Guillaume de Nangis accorded unconditional support akin to that of pro-papal writers to the men Innocent had chosen to replace Frederick. A clear sign of Guillaume's position was the decision to adopt both Heinrich's and William's 'imperial' years in his system of dating. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, Vincent de Beauvais, Jean de Mailly, Geoffroi de Collon and Jean de Saint-Victor, although they acknowledged the succession of the anti-kings, offered less enthusiastic endorsement. Vincent implied that Heinrich's position was different from that of Frederick: although Heinrich was elected *cum assensu et favore summi Pontificis*, this period remained, for Vincent, one of imperial vacancy and William's reign was simply ignored. Vincent's contemporary and fellow Dominican, Jean de Mailly, recorded both Frederick's deposition and the election of first Heinrich and later William. Chazan has suggested, however, that Jean's personal circumstances, as an inhabitant of Metz, led him to adopt a non-committal air. Metz was divided in the papal-imperial dispute: the city itself

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54 RHGF, xxi, p. 79.

55 GNC, i, pp. 199, 201.


57 When Aubri revised his text in the 1250s he interpolated a note that Elisabeth of Brunswick was the wife of 'Guilelmi Romanorum regis' and that Heinrich had been elected *in regem Romanorum* respectively, ATF, pp. 870, 950.

58 *Speculum historiale*, bk. xxxi, chap. i, p. 1286.

supported Frederick but its bishop had declared himself in favour of the pope.\textsuperscript{60} Geoffroi de Collon appears to have adopted a similarly ambiguous attitude although for less obvious reasons.\textsuperscript{61} Jean de Saint-Victor drew attention to the fact that Heinrich’s succession had not been by the consent of the princes, something which he considered a necessary part of the mechanism for the proper selection of a ruler of the Empire.\textsuperscript{62}

The recognition Guillaume de Nangis accorded to both Heinrich and William was almost certainly the fruit of his desire to vilify Frederick II rather than any particular desire to uphold Innocent’s actions. Guillaume’s decision to include a note of the elections of both anti-kings in the \textit{Gesta Ludovici}, events which might otherwise be considered somewhat anomalous in a life of Louis IX, seems best accounted for by their indirect contribution to further highlighting Frederick’s defiance of the papacy.\textsuperscript{63} The first recension of Guillaume’s universal chronicle did little more than repeat his earlier comments. Guillaume’s approach proved influential in the Saint-Denis scriptorium: the \textit{Gesta}’s comments were incorporated first into its French translation,\textsuperscript{64} and later into several Dionysian \textit{Grandes Chroniques}.\textsuperscript{65} That the compilers of Pierre Honoré’s \textit{Grandes Chroniques} chose to exclude Guillaume’s notices concerning Heinrich and William is an indication of both disinterest in the anti-kings and possibly a further sign that Frederick’s vilification was a theme of less

\textsuperscript{60} Chazan, ‘Jean de Mailly,’ 229. Chazan questioned whether it is appropriate to classify Jean’s work as universal history: ibid., 233.

\textsuperscript{61} Geoffroi de Collon, p. 520.

\textsuperscript{62} Chazan, \textit{L’Empire}, p. 632, n. 237; below, p. 326. The absence of a critical edition of this part of the \textit{Memoriale} makes it difficult to judge Jean’s attitude to William.

\textsuperscript{63} GL, pp. 352, 354.

\textsuperscript{64} GL(fr), pp. 353, 355.

\textsuperscript{65} GCF, x, pp. 49, 52; GCF, vii, pp. 112, 116-117. Guillaume’s confusion of Heinrich’s name with his title of landgrave in both his \textit{Gesta Ludovici} and his universal history was carried forward into later Dionysian works. Primat, in contrast, when translating Rigord’s account of the death of Philip of Swabia noted: ‘...uns cuens palatins, qui en langue d’alemant est apelez Endegraves,’ GCF, vi, pp. 281-282.
interest beyond the abbey. It seems likely that this exclusion stemmed from a conscious decision: material relating to both anti-kings was readily available in the compilers’ probable source, Guillaume’s universal chronicle. Whilst its interest in Heinrich remained limited, the Saint-Denis scriptorium produced two versions of the count of Holland’s reign.

Primat included a long account of the confrontation that took place between Charles d’Anjou and William in his Latin chronicle. Guillaume, who wrote within a decade of Primat’s death and used his fellow Dionysian’s Latin chronicle as a source for both his *Gesta Ludovici* and the first recension of his universal chronicle, chose to pass over this incident in silence. Guillaume retained a brief note of Charles’ occupation of Hainaut in his *Gesta* but only as an aside inserted into a later incident. Guillaume’s brief comment concerning Charles’ Hainaut venture made no reference to William. The impression that the latter had had no role in events was strengthened by Guillaume’s decision to give a notice of William’s death some time before discussing the Angevin occupation of the county. The explanation for this particular piece of selective presentation lay, most probably, in a desire to avoid giving a full account of what was an embarrassing incident for Charles and to avoid casting one of Frederick’s opponents in a negative light. Guillaume’s version was incorporated into French accounts produced and popularised by Saint-Denis, although Primat’s

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66 Primat/JV, pp. 11-12.


68 In Géraud’s edition Guillaume’s chronicle includes an account of Charles’ attempted annexation and his confrontation with William: GNC, i, pp. 212-214. This account is common to all but one of the extant MSS used by Géraud: ibid., p. 212, n. 1. This exception (BN MS fr. 5703) was considered by Delisle to be representative of the first recension: ‘Mémoire,’ 297.

69 GL, pp. 390-392.

70 Ibid., p. 390.

71 GL(fr), pp. 391-393; GCF, x, pp. 97-99. Charles’ involvement in Hainaut was further reduced in GCF, vii, pp. 178-181.
version continued to circulate in the second recension of Guillaume’s universal
chronicle and in a translation of Primat’s Latin chronicle prepared in the second
quarter of the fourteenth century by a Hospitaller of Saint-Jacques du Haut-Pas, Jean
de (or du) Vignay, at the request of Philippe VI’s queen, Jeanne de Bourgogne.

Heinrich Raspe and William of Holland received very little attention from
writers in northern France. Heinrich’s short reign was endorsed by papal apologists
and Guillaume de Nangis and noted by the majority of those who compiled universal
histories. For most in the northern French milieu, if Heinrich was anything at all, it
was probably the slightly ambiguous figure of the Speculum historiale. William was a
slightly different case. Although for many he would have been cast in much the same
light as Heinrich, for the lay audiences of the Récits of the minstrel, Primat’s
chronicle and the chronicle of Baudoin d’Avesnes he would have been a much more
prominent figure. To the audiences of such works, William would have appeared
either the heroic champion of the Avesnes or, as he would have been for Jeanne de
Bourgogne, the villainous opponent of Charles d’Anjou.

iii. Richard of Cornwall and the Castilian Prism

It is rare to come across a topic, least of all one connected with the Empire, in
which an essentially uniform view predominated in France; the case of Richard of
Cornwall’s kingship, therefore, requires particular explanation. Between 1257 and his
death in 1272, Richard’s claim to rule the Empire was contested by Alfonso X of
Castile, yet when Alfonso was mentioned at all in the French cultural milieu he was
roundly dismissed as a usurper. That it was quite possible to construe events
differently is evident from, for example, the work of Ptolemy of Lucca, yet, almost

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72 GNC, i, pp. 212-214.

73 This was intended as a continuation of a translation of Vincent de Beauvais’ Speculum historiale. Jean continued the work, using later Dionysian sources, up to 1285: RHGF, xxiii, p. 5.

74 Historia Ecclesiastica, ed. L. A. Muratori, Rerum Italicarum scriptores, xi (Milan, 1727), bk. XXII, chap. xv, c. 1149.
without exception, Richard was considered by northern French writers to be the legitimate ruler of the German lands of the Empire.

This widespread and unequivocal attitude towards Richard is evident from several points. The great majority of works, even those whose interest in the Empire after the fall of the Hohenstaufen was strictly limited, accorded the count of Cornwall the title *rex Alemannie* or *rois d'Alemaingne*. Many accounts, some of whose authors did not trouble even to record Richard's election, employed such titles when discussing his involvement in events that had little or nothing to do with the Empire. Such was the case for the minstrel of Reims when discussing Louis IX's marriage to Marguerite de Provence, and in the Ouche account of the battle of Lewes. Similarly, the chronicler of Saint-Martin of Limoges employed the title in his account of the 1259 treaty of Paris. Moreover, for those who took some interest in imperial affairs the disputed election of 1257 was largely a non-event: the great majority recorded only Richard's election. Most telling of all is the fact that of those who did mention the double election, whether their works were pro-papal, such as Bernard Gui's *Flores*, products of the scriptorium of Saint-Denis or of Limoges, all suggested that it was Richard who had succeeded in establishing himself.

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75 *Récits*, chap. xxxiv, p. 183.


78 For example: *E Chronico Normanniae ab anno 1169 ad annum 1259 sive potius 1272*, RHGF, xxiii, p. 216; Adam de Clermont, RHGF, xxi, p. 78; Guillaume de Puylaurens, p. 174; *Chronique anonyme des Rois de France, finissant en M.CC.LXXXVI*, RHGF, xxi, p. 84; GL, pp. 392, 412; GL(fr), pp. 393, 413; GCF, x, pp. 100, 126.

79 *Flores historiarum*, RHGF, xxi, pp. 699, 702. Gui did not dismiss Alfonso's claims but his frequent use of Richard's title left the reader in little doubt that it was Richard to whom Rudolf of Habsburg succeeded. Girard d'Avvergne noted the double election with the comment: '...sed Richardo praevalente...' *Abbreivatione Historiae Figuralis*, RHGF, xxi, p. 215.

80 Guillaume de Nangis, in his universal chronicle, ignored Alfonso's claims after Richard's death and declared the period between this latter and the election of Rudolf to be one of vacancy: Chazan, *L'Empire*, pp. 424, 426. Guillaume also noted that it was Richard who had been crowned at Aachen: GNC, i, p. 214. For the importance of coronation at Aachen: below, pp. 316-318.
Amongst the very few exceptions not to imply that Richard had been the successful candidate were Geoffroi de Collon, for whom, although he wrote in the 1290s, the double election proved to be the last imperial event considered worthy of remark,\(^8^2\) and the 1340s Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques*, whose less than enthusiastic endorsement of Richard may be explained by anti-English sentiment on the eve of the Hundred Years War.\(^8^3\) Only two writers gave any indication that Alfonso continued to pursue his candidature after the election. A chronicle written at Saint-Martin of Limoges noted that in 1274 Alfonso wished to travel to Lyon to negotiate with Gregory X over the question of the Empire but was forbidden from entering armed into the French kingdom by Philippe III and the pope.\(^8^4\) Bernard Gui noted that Gregory met the *rex Castellae* at Beaucaire and convinced him to give up his claims.\(^8^5\)

Several reasons lie behind this peculiar unanimity. One case, that of Baudoin d’Avesnes’ chronicler,\(^8^6\) is explained by the fact that Jean and Baudoin d’Avesnes had been amongst Richard’s principle supporters.\(^8^7\) More generally the consensus reflects the fact that while Alfonso failed to establish his presence in the German lands of the Empire, Richard spent considerable time there and, at least at the beginning of his

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\(^8^1\) *...electus est in regem Alamanie Ricardus...sed a minori parte electus, quia ab alia parte electus est rex Castelle; sed Ricardus eodem anno coronatur Aquisgrani.* *Ex notis Lemovicensibus*, MGH SS, xxvi, p. 437.

\(^8^2\) Geoffroi de Collon, pp. 520-522.

\(^8^3\) *GCF*, vii, pp. 217-218.

\(^8^4\) *Ex notis S. Martini Lemovicensibus*, MGH SS, xxvi, p. 439.

\(^8^5\) *Flores chronicorum*, RHGF, xxi, p. 703.

\(^8^6\) Baudoin d’Avesnes, pp. 170-171; 175-176. Richard would have appeared the undisputed king to most readers: the MS tradition incorporating the counter-election enjoyed only a limited circulation.

reign, enjoyed widespread acceptance in the regions bordering the French kingdom.\textsuperscript{88} The reality of Richard’s kingship was fleeting however, something that was recognised by at least one Norman writer,\textsuperscript{89} and this reason alone does not, therefore, account for the fidelity shown to him by later writers. It is all the more surprising when it is considered that several French barons, including the count of Flanders and the duke of Burgundy, openly favoured Alfonso’s candidature.\textsuperscript{90} Hugues IV of Burgundy, for example, met with the Castilian king whilst on pilgrimage to Compostella and received a rent of ten thousand maravedís (21 September 1258). The following year Alfonso bestowed upon him the guardianship of the city of Besançon (18 October 1259).\textsuperscript{91} Louis’ own position is less clear, and there is no indication that he supported either candidate, although it is quite likely that he too favoured Alfonso at first.\textsuperscript{92}

The key to understanding Richard’s success almost certainly lies in Alfonso’s failings. In 1269 Louis IX had married his daughter, Blanche, to Alfonso’s eldest son, Fernando de la Cerda. In August 1275 Fernando died and rather than endorse the succession of his La Cerda grandchildren, Alfonso, after some hesitation, chose to uphold the rights of their uncle, Sancho. Philippe III was not prepared to accept this casual disinheritance of his nephews and the La Cerda problem continued to sour Franco-Castilian relations throughout the next decade, coming close to open conflict.


\textsuperscript{89} \textit{E Chronico Normanniae ab anno 1169 ad annum 1259 sive potius 1272}, RHGF, xxiii, p. 216.

\textsuperscript{90} Richard, \textit{Louis}, p. 339.

\textsuperscript{91} Although there is no evidence Alfonso bestowed on him the title of imperial vicar in the kingdom of Arles: J. Richard, \textit{Les ducs de Bourgogne et la formation du duché du XI\textsuperscript{e} au XIV\textsuperscript{e} siècle} (Publications de l’Université de Dijon, xii, Paris, 1954), p. 218.

in late 1276, when Philippe brought a large army to the Pyrenees. The question of the conflict over the La Cerda inheritance appeared in multiple accounts, none of which depicted Alfonso as anything more than king of Spain. It seems almost certain that it was the animosity generated by Alfonso’s attempt to disinherit the La Cerda children that led to his condemnation and the dismissal of any consideration of his imperial candidature by French writers long into the fourteenth century.

iv. Through an English Prism? Perspectives on German Rulers after Richard

The reigns of William of Holland and Richard of Cornwall provide examples of an astonishing lack of interest on the part of French writers in the affairs of the Empire. When William was discussed it was usually because of his role in the Avesnes-Dampierre dispute; when the spotlight turned upon Richard it was because, as Henry III’s brother, he was constantly brought to the foreground by the complications of Anglo-French affairs. This would tend to suggest that matters relating to the Empire in the post-Hohenstaufen world only became of interest to French writers when they touched upon issues which impacted directly upon the French kingdom. An examination of the period between the death of Richard and the election of Charles of Moravia, later the emperor Charles IV, would seem to imply, however, that such parochialism was not always the case. Those writing in France before the reign of Jean II chose to give accounts of many matters relating to the Empire between 1272 and 1346 that had little directly to do with the French kingdom; in addition they chose not to remark upon a number of topics that did.

Absent from the pages of chronicles produced in France before 1350 are any references to Capetian attempts to obtain the imperial crown. This is all the more


surprising when it is remembered that whilst it is unlikely, despite speculation to the contrary, that efforts were made to place a Capetian candidate on the imperial throne between 1274 and 1307, at least four such attempts were certainly made before the election of Charles of Moravia. In one case, the candidature of Philippe IV’s son, Philippe de Poitiers, in 1313, this silence might be attributed to the apparent abandonment of the plan at its earliest stages: this potential candidature is known only from a brief note of a discussion that took place in the royal council. Equally, it seems probable that all parties, in particularly pope Gregory X, deliberately sought to keep the 1273 candidature of Philippe III a closely guarded secret. The failure of any commentator to note the candidature of Charles de Valois in 1308 or that of Charles IV le Bel in 1324 is less explicable. Both appear to have reached an advanced stage and involved complex negotiations, factors which would have made secrecy difficult to maintain. Charles de Valois’ candidature, for example, resulted in a plethora of letters and embassies and the expenditure of vast sums of borrowed money. Charles le Bel’s candidacy was conducted through the means of a similarly large-scale diplomatic offensive.

The 1308 venture, at least, was clearly not a well-kept secret: the contemporary Florentine, Giovanni Villani, gave a lengthy, if somewhat inaccurate,

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97 C. N. Jones, ‘“...mais totpor le servise Deu”? Philippe III le Hardi, Charles d’Anjou and the 1273/74 Imperial Candidature,’ Viator, xxxiv (2003), 210, 227.

98 For the correspondence of Philippe, Charles and Clement V, respectively: MGH Const. IV, no. 239-242, pp. 203-206; no. 243-244, pp. 206-208; no. 246-249, pp. 210-214.


100 Zeller, ‘Rois,’ 300-301; Roscheck, ‘Französische,’ pp. 142-177.
account of it\textsuperscript{101} and a fourteenth-century Italian glossator of Géraud de Frachet even appears to have been aware of the 1273 candidature.\textsuperscript{102} It is worth noting that, even though it was declined, the simple fact that Gregory IX had offered the imperial throne to Louis IX’s brother, Robert I d’Artois, became known in England, France and the Rhineland,\textsuperscript{103} and, although he pursued it with very little vigour, Edward III’s 1348 candidature was known to several English chroniclers.\textsuperscript{104} Why then should the author of the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris, almost certainly a member of Charles de Valois’ own household,\textsuperscript{105} fail to refer to Charles’ pursuit of the title in 1308?

That a man with limited access to the court and very much on the political periphery,\textsuperscript{106} the lawyer from Coutances and indefatigable pamphleteer Pierre Dubois, should propose first Charles de Valois\textsuperscript{107} and later Philippe IV\textsuperscript{108} as imperial candidates, suggests that the idea of a Capetian emperor was one which had at least some currency amongst contemporaries. Such an idea is supported by the suggestion

\begin{enumerate}
\item Above, p. 36.
\item H. S. Offler, ‘England and Germany at the beginning of the Hundred Years’ War,’ \textit{EHR}, liv (1939), 630.
\item \textit{De recup.}, chap. 116, p. 104.
\item \textit{Pro facto Terre Sancte}, MGH Const. IV, no. 245 [hence \textit{Pro facto}], pp. 208-210.
\end{enumerate}
of a member of the arts faculty of the university of Paris, Jean de Jandun, that Charles le Bel would be ideally suited to rule the world.\(^{109}\) That a Cistercian living in Champagne had chosen to record even the mere offer of the imperial crown to Robert I d’Artois,\(^{110}\) serves only to underline the striking absence from the northern French environment of accounts of what were, during the early years of the fourteenth century, active Capetian efforts to obtain the imperial throne. Some explanation may lie in the desire of certain writers, particular those with a connection to the court such as the Dionysians, to avoid giving accounts of failed Capetian projects. Yet this absence remains peculiar and is compounded by two further distinctive features of French chronicles: their view of Capetian relations with German rulers and would-be rulers after 1272 and a shift that took place in the reporting of imperial affairs after 1308.

The Capetians enjoyed turbulent relations, at best, with the German king Rudolf of Habsburg (1273-1291) and his son, Albrecht (1298-1308). Philippe III’s relations with the former were strained by the events of the 1273-1274 imperial election\(^{111}\) and on occasion even strayed into open conflict.\(^{112}\) It is possible that Rudolf and Philippe may have met in late 1275,\(^ {113}\) although relations appear only to have warmed when Gregory X took steps to reconcile Rudolf with Philippe’s uncle, Charles d’Anjou, in 1276. Even then relations continued to be aggravated by the intrigues of Philippe’s mother, Marguerite de Provence, who, in the summer of 1278, encouraged a plan by which Rudolf would marry his son, Hartmann, to Edward I’s

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\(^{110}\) ATF, p. 949.


\(^{112}\) Jones, ‘Philippe,’ 215.

daughter, Joanna, and impose Hartmann as effective ruler of the kingdom of Arles to the cost of Charles d'Anjou. This explosive situation was only diffused by Nicholas III's revival of Gregory X's plan that the kingdom of Arles be reconstituted to the benefit of the Angevins and the death of Hartmann.

Albrecht's relations with Philippe IV, which began with an alliance brought about through mutual hostility to Adolf of Nassau (1292-1298), quickly soured after the outbreak of Philippe's dispute with Boniface VIII. A growing entente between Albrecht and Boniface, which culminated in papal confirmation of Albrecht as king of the Romans on 30 April 1303, led Philippe to enter into an anti-Habsburg alliance with the king of Bohemia. Yet hardly any of the turbulence of Capetian-Habsburg relations was reflected in the pages of French chronicles, and, notably, none at all was reflected in pages produced within the Capetian orbit of the Île-de-France. Only the chronicle of Saint-Martin of Limoges noted the conflict between Rudolf and Philippe III. It is striking that an acrimonious conflict between Philippe IV and Albrecht of Habsburg's successor evoked similarly little interest on the French page, whilst the violently discordant relations between Philippe and Adolf of Nassau resonated strongly.

On 15 November 1308, count Henry VII of Luxembourg was elected to the Empire in preference to Philippe IV's brother, Charles de Valois, becoming, with his imperial coronation in Rome in 1312, the emperor Henry VII (1308-1313). Philippe's


115 Fournier, Le royaume, pp. 229-255; Resmini, Das Arealat, pp. 149-174; Dunbabin, Charles, p. 139.

116 Leroux, Recherches, p. 97.

117 Paravicini Bagliani, Boniface, pp. 340-342.

118 Leroux, Recherches, pp. 113-119; Lizerand, Clément, p. 165.

119 Ex notis S. Martini Lemovicensibus, MGH SS, xxvi, p. 439. Boniface VIII's plan to crown Albrecht emperor was noted in only three accounts: below, pp. 224-225.
response was to pursue, at least from 1310\textsuperscript{120} and possibly even from as early as 1308,\textsuperscript{121} a consistent policy intended to frustrate Henry’s plans at every opportunity. Philippe vigorously sought to prevent Henry’s coronation, and when this proved unfeasible, at least to delay it.\textsuperscript{122} In return for abandoning his call for a posthumous trial of Boniface VIII, Philippe secured Clement V’s aid in wrecking a plan for an alliance between the Sicilian king, Robert d’Anjou, and the new emperor, a plan which had originally emanated from the papal curia itself.\textsuperscript{123} A combination of negotiations with, and pressure on, Clement also enabled Philippe to wring an ‘alliance’ from Henry, one which delayed the homage Philippe’s son, Philippe de Poitiers, owed Henry for the imperial county of Burgundy and guaranteed imperial neutrality in the Flanders dispute.\textsuperscript{124} Simultaneously, Philippe’s agents entered into active negotiations with the Guelfs opposing Henry’s descent into Italy.\textsuperscript{125} They were also able to convince the pope to abandon his initial plans to support Henry in his confrontation with Robert d’Anjou in 1312: papal letters, already sealed, ordering Robert’s brother, Jean, duke of Duras (d. 1335), to leave Rome remained undispatched after three members of the Capetian dynasty appeared before the pope to plead the Angevin case.\textsuperscript{126} In common with their treatment of Capetian-Habsburg relations, French chroniclers said nothing of this strained state of affairs. At the same

\textsuperscript{120} W. M. Bowsky, Henry VII in Italy: The Conflict of Empire and City-State, 1310-1313 (Nebraska, 1960), p. 20. A report by Aragonese envoys suggests that Philippe was attempting to prevent the coronation as early as April 1309: Lizerand, Clément, p. 187, n. 1.

\textsuperscript{121} E. Welvert, ‘Philippe le Bel et la maison de Luxembourg,’ BEC, xliv (1884), 186.

\textsuperscript{122} MGH Const. IV, no. 467, p. 413 (9 December 1310); no. 515, p. 475 (19 January 1311). Lizerand, Clément, pp. 226-228; W. M. Bowsky, ‘Clement V and the Emperor-Elect,’ Medievalia et Humanistica, xii (1958), 60; Bowsky, Henry, pp. 107, 109; Favier, Philippe, p. 418.

\textsuperscript{123} Lizerand, Clément, pp. 222-226; Bowsky, ‘Clement,’ 54, 63; Bowsky, Henry, pp. 23-24, 121; Favier, Philippe, pp. 421-423.

\textsuperscript{124} Lizerand, Clément, pp. 235-249; Favier, Philippe, pp. 423-424.

\textsuperscript{125} Lizerand, Clément, pp. 229, 246; Bowsky, Henry, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{126} Bowsky, Henry, p. 156.
time, the presentation of both Henry and those who claimed the imperial throne after his death, Friedrich der Schöne (d. 1330) and Ludwig of Bavaria (d. 1347), differed from that of Friedrich’s father, Albrecht, or his grandfather, Rudolf.

It was not simply that the tense relations between the Habsburgs and the Capetians were overlooked: Rudolf and Albrecht attracted little attention in northern France more generally. Rudolf rarely received more than notices of his election and death, the latter frequently mentioned only as a preface to Adolf’s accession. The chronicler of Baudoin d’Avesnes was near unique in touching upon the wider aspects of Rudolf’s reign, and unique amongst French sources in recounting his dispute with Ottokar of Bohemia. Albrecht could claim little better, although in addition to his election and murder his meeting with Philippe IV at Quatrevaux and the marriage of his son to Philippe’s sister, Blanche de France, received particular attention. In contrast, aspects of Adolf of Nassau’s reign, Henry’s Romzug and Ludwig’s lengthy attempts to secure his claims on the imperial throne were the subject of extensive accounts.

127 Abbreviatio Historiae Figuralis, RHGF, xxi, p. 218; Baudoin d’Avesnes, p. 176; Ex notis S. Martini Lemovicensibus, MGH SS, xxvi, p. 439; GNC, i, p. 244; Flores chronicorum, RHGF, xxi, p. 702; GCF, vii, p. 257, where a passing reference appears in an account of the battle of Tagliacozzo.


129 Baudoin d’Avesnes, p. 176.

130 GNC, i, p. 304; Extraits d’une chronique anonyme française, finissant en M.CCC.VIII, RHGF, xxi, p. 135; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 17; Flores chronicorum, RHGF, xxi, p. 711; annals of Rouen (continuation, 1282-1343), RHGF, xxiii, p. 346; GCF, viii, p. 180.

131 Continuator(2)GNC, i, pp. 370-372; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 32; Flores chronicorum, RHGF, xxi, p. 717; annals of Rouen (continuation, 1282-1343), RHGF, xxiii, p. 347; GCF, viii, p. 265. Only one account noted his death without stating he was murdered: JSV, p. 650.

132 GNC, i, pp. 308, 310; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], pp. 17-18; GCF, viii, pp. 186-187, 190. The meeting but not the marriage is noted: Fragment d’une chronique anonyme, finissant en M.CCC.XXVIII, et continuée jusqu’en M.CCC.XL, puis jusqu’en M.CCC.LXXXIII, RHGF, xxi, p. 147. The marriage but not the meeting: JSV, p. 635.
The attention paid to certain German rulers, particularly in those accounts that were produced in, or were influenced by, the scriptorium of Saint-Denis, was not incidental. It reflected, at least in part, the political concerns of the day in much the same way that the depictions of William of Holland and Richard of Cornwall did. Amongst these concerns, one of the most important was the position adopted by claimants to the German kingship in the Anglo-French dispute, which re-erupted in the 1290s and continued sporadically before reaching its apogee in the events of the Hundred Years War. It was this factor which played an important part in determining the reputation of Adolf of Nassau and to a lesser extent that of Ludwig of Bavaria.

Writing in the late 1290s, one of Adolf’s contemporaries, Guillaume de Nangis, summed him up as: ‘miles in armis strenuus, sed non multum locuples.’\(^\text{133}\) In the following decade, Pierre Dubois’ comments concerning interference in the electoral system may have reflected a common belief that Adolf’s precarious financial situation had left him open to manipulation.\(^\text{134}\) This was not an entirely inaccurate assessment given the part the archbishop of Cologne, Siegfried von Westerburg, had played in Adolf’s election.\(^\text{135}\) Bernard Gui, amongst others, was inclined to see Adolf as a particularly weak ruler.\(^\text{136}\) In the course of the fourteenth century criticism of Adolf appears to have grown.

The version of the \textit{Grandes Chroniques} prepared at Saint-Denis in the opening years of the Hundred Years War incorporated Guillaume’s comments that Edward I had bought Adolf’s support, but that the latter found himself deserted by his allies and unable to fulfil his agreements.\(^\text{137}\) At the same time the \textit{Grandes Chroniques} compilers expanded the account, transforming Adolf into an almost comical figure. A

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\(^{133}\) GNC, i, p. 279.

\(^{134}\) Jones, ‘Dubois,’ 61.


\(^{136}\) ‘...sed in potentia non multum...’ \textit{Flores chronicorum}, RHGF, xxi, p. 709. Also: \textit{Extraits d’une chronique anonyme française, finissant en M.CCC.VIII}, RHGF, xxi, p. 133.

\(^{137}\) GNC, i, p. 287-288. Also: ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 12.
long incident was recounted in which Adolf attempted to secure the return of lands that he considered had been encroached upon by the French. His demands were met by a letter, *qui moult estoit grande*, but which, on the advice of Robert II d'Artois and the royal council, contained merely the dismissive phrase *Troup alemant*. Whilst an exchange of letters between Philippe and Adolf certainly took place over this issue, there is little to suggest that Philippe's response was quite so extreme. In fact, given the remarkable similarity between Philippe's response and that attributed by the twelfth-century writer Walter Map to Louis VI, the Dionysian account probably had a literary, rather than an historical, basis.

To augment their portrait of an *imbécile cupide* the Dionysians suggested that the ineffective Adolf, having found himself unable to offer Edward any practical support, later came to terms with Philippe. It is unclear whether, in reality, Adolf actually allowed Philippe to buy him out of his English alliance, although this was certainly an interpretation being given to events on the eve of the Hundred Years War, in, for example, a report of the actions of Philippe's agent Musciatto dei Francesi (known as Mouche). The Saint-Denis scriptorium depicted Adolf not simply as an

138 GCF, viii, pp. 158-160. Powicke misunderstood this account and suggested that the response was delivered to Philippe rather than to Adolf: M. Powicke, *The Thirteenth Century 1216-1307* (2nd edition, Oxford, 1962), p. 660. The editors of the *Anciennes chroniques de Flandre*, which incorporated a version of the insulting phrase, suggested that its sense in the *Grandes Chroniques* was 'cela est trop allemand': RHGF, xxii, p. 359, n. 4. The sense of this in English may be best conveyed by a phrase such as: 'typically German' or 'very German'. cf. R. Fawtier, 'Un incident diplomatique franco-allemand au temps de Philippe le Bel,' *Annaire-bulletin de la société de l'histoire de France années 1946-1947* (1948), 33, n. 3.

139 MGH Const. III, no. 524, p. 501 (31 August 1294, Nuremberg); no. 527, pp. 502-503 (9 March 1295, Paris). Adolf's letter dated 31 October 1294, Maubeuge, is preserved only in the French version given in the *Grandes Chroniques*.

140 Fawtier, 'Un incident diplomatique,' 34-35.

141 The phrase is Jean Favier's: *Philippe*, pp. 303-305. Favier's impression of Adolf is precisely that intended by the *Grandes Chroniques*.

142 GCF, viii, p. 160. There is no evidence for the chronicler's claim that the peace was to be based upon Adolf's marriage to Philippe's sister, a possible confusion with later arrangements made with Albrecht.

143 MGH Const. III, no. 645, pp. 631-635. This document was originally dated to 1298-1301: F. Funck-Brentano, 'Document pour servir à l'histoire des relations de la France avec l'Angleterre et
enemy, but as a particularly weak and hapless one. There was, the monks appear to have sought to suggest, very little to fear from Anglo-German alliances. The Dionysian account proved influential in the late-fourteenth century, even if the abbey’s take on events did not. A version stripped of references to Adolf’s alliance with the English and many of its negative connotations was incorporated in the Anciennes chroniques de Flandre and it formed the base for an anonymous account in which many French princes were said to have criticised Philippe’s behaviour for its lack of wisdom. The Dionysian approach adopted in the 1340s probably had much to do with a new Anglo-German alliance formed in the 1330s.

Ludwig of Bavaria’s appointment of Edward III as imperial vicar in 1338, a grant intended both to secure the adhesion of Edward’s allies in the Low Countries in preparation for an invasion of France, and to facilitate the re-assertion of Ludwig’s authority in the region, drew the derisive comment from the Saint-Denis scriptorium that few obeyed Edward in his new capacity. Edward’s ally was roundly condemned and labelled only as the duke of Bavaria qui se tenoit pour emperere and who fust notoirement escommenié. These sentiments were echoed in


144 RHGF, xxii, p. 350.

145 Extrait d’une chronique anonyme finissant en M.CCC.LXXX, RHGF, xxi, p. 127.


147 Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 160; Lescot, pp. 46-47; GCF, ix, p. 167.

148 GCF, ix, p. 167. A similar wording is common to all Saint-Denis accounts.
Ludwig was certainly the subject of frequent condemnation. He was regularly associated with, and depicted as a supporter of, an extreme interpretation of the doctrine of absolute poverty espoused by the deposed Franciscan minister-general Michael of Cesena. John XXII’s condemnation of this doctrine does not seem to have been seriously questioned in northern France, possibly because, unlike the pope’s later theological faux pas concerning the beatific vision, his arguments concerning poverty, which were of a primarily legal nature, may have aroused little controversy amongst the theologians of the university of Paris. Ludwig and the Michaelists were depicted as acting together, were condemned together and Ludwig’s plan to call a council to denounce John XXII as a heretic for his attack on Franciscan doctrine was highlighted. The 1340s Grandes Chroniques also included a passage which chronologically rearranged events to imply Ludwig’s support for the Franciscans was one of the original reasons for his papal condemnation. The charges were undoubtedly founded on the fact that Michael and a group of leading Franciscan rebels, welcome or not, chose to flee to Ludwig’s court at Pisa in September 1328. Ludwig’s relationship with the northern Italian Ghibellines also aroused disapproval, although probably as much because Matteo Visconti and his

149 Ex Annalium Rotomagensium continuationibus [hence annals of Rouen (continuation, 1282-1343)], MGH SS, xxvi, p. 506. The RHGF edition is preferable to that of the MGH (the MGH edits only extracts), but is continued only up to 1328.


151 Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 96, 109, 120; Lescot, pp. 8, 14; GCF, ix, pp. 93, 106.

152 ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], pp. 51-52; Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 17; GCF, viii, pp. 344-345.

153 GCF, ix, pp. 39-40.

154 ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 49; GCF, viii, p. 339.
sons had been responsible for the humiliating, and widely remarked upon, defeat of Philippe de Valois during his Italian venture, as for the stated reason, that the Visconti had been condemned for heresy. When it came to other issues, however, some authors condemned the duke of Bavaria, whilst the accounts emanating from the Saint-Denis scriptorium often adopted a much more neutral position.

The Dionysians sought to extricate Ludwig from controversy, particularly in his dealings with duo filii diaboli, Marsilius of Padua and Jean de Jandun. Following the Dionysian account, Ludwig took Marsilius and Jean under his protection in 1326 but condemned their views as heretical, well aware that to do otherwise would donroit au pape voie par quoy il procederoit contre li. A similar case concerned the antipope, Nicholas V, set up by Ludwig in Rome. For the Dionysians, Ludwig played no part in the election of the antipope, which was entirely the consequence of the machinations of certain filii diaboli, again almost certainly a veiled reference to Marsilius and Jean. It was even suggested that Ludwig might have been opposed to the election. In contrast, the continuation of the annals of Rouen and the

155 JSV, pp. 672-673; Grandes Chroniques (Maubeuge/Honoré version), BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 403r; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], pp. 52-53, 55; Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 28-29; GCF, viii, pp. 347-348, 356-357.


157 GCF, xi, pp. 58-60. Also: ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 68; Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 74-76. Guillaume's third continuator recounted an earlier meeting in 1318. Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 14-15. This latter probably did take place: C. N. Jones, "A Game of Strange Alliances? The Context and Purpose of Marsilius of Padua's Defensor pacis' (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Durham, 1999), pp. 28-29. Its omission from later works may have been because it did not note Ludwig's condemnation of the pair's views.


160 Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 87-88; Lescot, pp. 1-2; GCF, ix, pp. 75-76.

161 MGH SS, xxvi, p. 505.
compilers of Pierre Honoré's *Grandes Chroniques* vested full responsibility in Ludwig: 'et ainssi fu en sainte Yglise scime et descorde par le mauvais conseil de cel Loys.' 162 The Dionysians certainly noted that Ludwig, like Adolf, had thought better of his English alliance and changed sides in the hope that Philippe VI would negotiate his reconciliation with the pope.163 Yet Dionysian ambiguity towards the duke of Bavaria arose fundamentally out of Valois attitudes towards John XXII and, in particular, towards John of Bohemia.

v. Through the Prism of John of Bohemia? Henry VII and Ludwig of Bavaria

It was Pope John XXII (1316-1334) who had first condemned Ludwig's imperial candidature, and Ludwig's struggle with the papacy was one of the most prominent features of French accounts of his activities.164 Yet, from a French perspective, John himself became a far more controversial figure than the duke of Bavaria. In November 1331 and January 1332 the pope preached a series of sermons concerned with the beatific vision. The pope's view, that the souls of even saints were unable to attain this blessed state before Judgment Day, was condemned in no uncertain terms by the theology faculty of the university of Paris. This condemnation was given the official support of the court when Philippe VI hosted an assembly at Vincennes on 19 December 1333.165 At the latter, twenty-nine masters made clear

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162 *Grandes Chroniques* (Maubeuge/Honoré version), GCF, ix, pp. 337, 339.

163 GCF, ix, p. 234. Offler suggested that Ludwig was under few illusions concerning the possibility of a negotiated reconciliation but sought a French alliance to acquire a freehand in Italy: 'England,' 618-624. The ‘off-message’ continuation of the annals of Rouen, less concerned than the Saint-Denis scriptorium with painting Valois policy in a good light, suggested that Philippe had hindered an earlier attempt by Ludwig to reconcile himself with Benedict XII: MGH SS, xxvi, p. 506.

164 ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], pp. 51-52, 64, 68; Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 14-15, 17, 59, 74-76, 96, 109, 116, 120; annals of Rouen (continuation, 1282-1343), RHGF, xxiii, p. 349; annals of Rouen (continuation, 1282-1343), MGH SS, xxvi, p. 506; Lescot, pp. 8, 11, 14; GCF, viii, pp. 344-345; ibid., ix, pp. 37-40, 58-60, 93, 106, 117, 120.

their extreme reservations regarding John’s doctrine and, in January 1334, despatched a request to the curia pressing the pope to ratify their view as the correct one.\textsuperscript{166}

Despite a deathbed recantation on 3 December 1334 and a statement in favour of the university’s position, John’s views were not to be forgotten or forgiven by the Saint-Denis scriptorium. Richard Lescot, for example, commented on John’s view:

\textit{Quod dictum scandalizavit multos, verumptamen magis creditur opinative quam cum assertione dixisse quoniam hoc esset hereticum asserere, quod qui assereret debet pro infidei et heretico judicari.}\textsuperscript{167}

It is therefore less surprising that the attitude towards Ludwig adopted by those accounts written in the shadow of the court and the university was somewhat nuanced: Ludwig might be justly condemned for his support of the Michaelists, yet to condemn him entirely placed John in a rather better light than might be desirable. Instead, Ludwig was presented as neither entirely unreasonable nor entirely heretical and John’s failure to resolve his dispute with him could appear to be just another example of the pope’s bad judgment. In this context it is notable that no French writer remarked upon the renewal of Ludwig’s condemnation by John’s successors. The decisive factor in the duke of Bavaria’s portrayal, however, was his relationship with the king of Bohemia.

The election to the imperial throne, in 1308, of John of Bohemia’s father, count Henry of Luxembourg, had brought to an end a short period of close Capetian-Luxembourg relations, the most conspicuous consequences of which had been Henry’s support for Philippe IV in his dispute with Boniface VIII\textsuperscript{168} and the election of Henry’s brother, Baldwin, to the see of Trier.\textsuperscript{169} Whilst Philippe V le Long’s


\textsuperscript{167} Lescot, pp. 26, 30-32, 36. Also: Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 135-136; GCF, ix, pp. 128, 135-137, 146, 328.

\textsuperscript{168} Welvert, ‘Philippe,’ 182.

relations with John did not extend beyond one French embassy (of unknown outcome) in 1321, the reign of Charles IV le Bel witnessed a growing rapprochement. The first clear sign of this was the marriage of John’s sister, Marie, to the last Capetian king. Further indications are evident in the joint pilgrimage to Rocamadour undertaken by Charles and John in 1323, and John’s decision to rename his son, Wenceslas, as Charles, and to place him under the care of his new namesake. Although Marie’s death in 1324 may have been followed by a dip in Franco-Luxembourg relations, the second quarter of the fourteenth century saw the establishment of a unique relationship between John and Philippe VI.

John was more than simply an ally to the first Valois king; he became Philippe’s leading councillor and his most powerful military supporter. The closeness of Valois-Luxembourg ties was evident from the very beginning of Philippe’s reign: in February 1328, Philippe, at the moment when he took up residence in the Palais de la Cité, bestowed the Valois’ principal Parisian residence, the Hôtel de Nesle, upon John. It was compounded and symbolised by the establishment of a series of dynastic ties in the 1330s: the marriages, in 1332, of John’s son to Philippe’s sister, Blanche de Valois, and of Philippe’s heir, the future Jean II, to Bonne de Luxembourg, and, in December 1334, of John himself, to Béatrice, daughter of Louis de Bourbon, grandson of Louis IX. The essence of the new relationship was enshrined in the January 1332 treaty of Fontainebleau and reached its formal apogee.

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172 Ibid., pp. 64-67.

173 Ibid., p. 67.

174 Ibid., p. 71.
in the appointment of John as the king's lieutenant in the Languedoc (30 November 1338).\textsuperscript{175}

This newfound closeness, and the fact that it did not escape contemporaries, is enshrined in an illumination introducing a collection of notes, compiled in 1336, concerned with Robert III d'Artois. Here, in a full-page illumination of Robert's 1332 trial,\textsuperscript{176} John, clearly identifiable by his blazon, is depicted as more than simply one of the king's counsellors (fig. 1). Like Philippe's cousin, Philippe d'Évreux, king of Navarre, John was elevated above the peers of France, both lay and ecclesiastical, by his royal rank. Strikingly, however, Philippe d'Évreux is depicted sitting behind and to the left of John, from where he addressed Philippe VI with one hand placed upon John's shoulder. The latter is, consequently, not only the closest figure to the Valois king, but also the only lay figure with an unmediated connection to him. This is reinforced by the fact that while Philippe addressed himself to both kings it is John's hand gesture alone, not that of Philippe d'Évreux, that effectively forms the connection between Philippe VI and the lay peers.\textsuperscript{177} The king of Bohemia's dramatic death on the fields of Crécy masked any hint that this close relationship was beginning to show signs of strain in the early 1340s.\textsuperscript{178}

Yet John had been not simply Philippe's closest ally; he had been also Ludwig's. John's relationship with the duke of Bavaria was a chequered one: Ludwig's most stalwart supporter prior to the battle of Mühldorf, their relationship became increasingly strained after 1323, initially over the question of the margraviate of Brandenburg, and later over the Tyrol. Mutual hostility continued to simmer until John did homage for his imperial lands for the first time in 1339. This reconciliation

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., pp. 71, 74.
\textsuperscript{176} J. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 'Le procès de Robert d'Artois,' \textit{Bulletins de l'Académie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} series, x (1860), 641-669; xi (1861), 107-125; R. Cazelles, \textit{La société politique et la crise de la royauté sous Philippe de Valois} (Paris, 1958), pp. 75-105.
\textsuperscript{177} BN MS fr. 18437, fol. 2. John's appearance here has been noted but not been fully appreciated: cf. J. Petit, \textit{Luxembourg dans les Grandes Chroniques de France} (Luxembourg, 1982), p. 89; Margue, 'Jean,' p. 77.
\textsuperscript{178} Margue, 'Jean,' pp. 83-86.
Fig. 1 – Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS français 18437, fol. 2r
was short-lived and a definitive split came in 1341, again over the question of the Tyrolian inheritance.\textsuperscript{179} If French attitudes towards the duke of Bavaria, particularly those developed in the Saint-Denis tradition, are to be properly understood, it is through the prism of a largely positive disposition towards John that they must be viewed.\textsuperscript{180}

The dispute between Ludwig and Friedrich der Schöne over their competing claims to the imperial throne\textsuperscript{181} received much attention from French writers.\textsuperscript{182} John’s peculiar status as an ally of both Philippe and Ludwig helps to clarify a number of points. Firstly, it explains why those writing after the late 1320s, whilst making clear their view that the duke of Bavaria’s dispute with John XXII disqualified him from legitimately claiming the imperial title, implicitly accepted that he, and not Friedrich, had been duly elected in 1314. Although French sources tended to continue to refer to both disputants as ‘dukes’ and Ludwig was never accredited with the imperial title,\textsuperscript{183} later writers emphasised that it was the duke of Bavaria who had been chosen by the majority of the electors. For example, whilst Guillaume de Nangis’ second continuator, writing before 1317, noted only that the election had been divided,\textsuperscript{184} Guillaume’s third continuator added a new version of events in which

\textsuperscript{179} For Luxembourg-Wittelsbach relations: M. Pauly, ‘Jean de Luxembourg et l’Empire germanique,’ \textit{Un itinéraire européen}, pp. 29-50.


\textsuperscript{181} Thomas, \textit{Ludwig}, pp. 43-69.

\textsuperscript{182} Continuator(2)GNC, i, p. 411; \textit{Grandes Chroniques} (Maubeuge/Honoré version), RHGF, xxi, p. 684; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], pp. 41-42, 49, 53, 60, 62, 67-68; Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 6-8, 22, 45, 53-54, 73-74; annals of Rouen (continuation, 1282-1343), RHGF, xxiii, p. 348; GCF, viii, p. 349; ibid., ix, pp. 16, 29-30, 57-58.

\textsuperscript{183} For example: ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], pp 62, 64, 67, 68; GCF, ix, p. 29. The description \textit{Bajoariae or de Baviere} and phrases such as ‘qui pro imperatore tunc temporis se gerebat’ (Lescot, p. 47) were not uncommon.

\textsuperscript{184} Continuator(2)GNC, i, p. 411.
it was made clear that Ludwig had received the majority of the vote.\textsuperscript{185} It was Ludwig's argument that he had been elected peaceably and was therefore entitled to papal benediction, that found a place in the \textit{Grandes Chroniques},\textsuperscript{186} and Ludwig, even before the 1330s, who was perceived to have undergone the correct inaugural ceremonies at the correct location.\textsuperscript{187} Only the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris, begun in late 1312 or early 1313 (after which it was written near-contemporaneously to the events it described),\textsuperscript{188} noted the brief candidatures\textsuperscript{189} of Louis de Nevers\textsuperscript{190} and Guillaume de Hainaut-Holland.\textsuperscript{191} Only Jean de Saint-Victor\textsuperscript{192} alluded to John of Bohemia's own failed imperial candidature.\textsuperscript{193}

With certain clear reservations French historians chose to consider Ludwig the German ruler much as they had considered Richard of Cornwall the duly constituted German ruler. This requires some explanation because, as in Richard's case, there existed a perfectly credible alternative candidate, Friedrich, to whom sympathy might have been accorded. Although Ludwig's legitimacy was not endorsed in the way that Richard's was, and no writer was actively prepared to defend

\textsuperscript{185} Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 6. Both versions appeared in ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], pp. 41-42, 49; neither in the 1340s \textit{Grandes Chroniques}.

\textsuperscript{186} GCF, viii, p. 344.

\textsuperscript{187} Continuator(2)GNC, i, p. 411; Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 6-7; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], pp. 41-42, 49. Below, p. 316.

\textsuperscript{188} Dunbabin, 'Metrical,' 235.

\textsuperscript{189} H. S. Lucas, 'The Low Countries and the Disputed Imperial Election of 1314,' \textit{Speculum}, xxii (1946), 75-87, 87-94.

\textsuperscript{190} Geffroy de Paris, lines 5341-5344.

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 5345-5348.

\textsuperscript{192} JSV, p. 658.

\textsuperscript{193} Lucas, 'Low Countries,' 94-96; Pauly, 'Jean,' pp. 33-35.
the duke of Bavaria’s claims, Dionysian writers, in particular, extended an extraordinary degree of tolerance to him and made every effort to provide him with ‘mitigating circumstances’. The primary reason lay, quite simply, in the fact that *ot le duc de Baviere de sa partie le roy de Boesme*.

Whatever Ludwig’s faults, Friedrich’s must have been decidedly worse, because it was Friedrich that John ‘heroically’ defeated at the battle of Mühldorf. A depiction of John as the victor at Mühldorf itself owed much to the imagination of the Saint-Denis scriptorium: in reality Ludwig owed his victory more to the burgrave of Nuremberg and Friedrich’s bad tactics. Yet not only were accounts of the battle chiefly a description of the great benefits that accrued to John as a consequence of the victory, but the desire to emphasise the king of Bohemia’s good character explains why Friedrich was denounced as being in league with the Saracens. In contrast, the non-Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques* compilation of Pierre Honore, completed before the blossoming of Valois-Luxembourg relations in the 1330s, did not note John’s participation at Mühldorf, made no reference to Saracens amongst Friedrich’s supporters, and was, on the whole, much less favourable to Ludwig.

John’s decision to pursue his own independent Italian policy in the wake of Ludwig’s *Romzug*, and his concomitant break with the would-be emperor, lie at the heart of a sudden Dionysian loss of interest in the duke of Bavaria. With exception

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194 From an account of the battle of Mühldorf: GCF, ix, p. 29.

195 ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 62; Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 53-54; GCF, ix, pp. 29-30. cf. Petit’s view that John failed to emerge as an heroic figure in the *Grandes Chroniques: Luxembourg*, pp. 188-189.

196 Pauly, ‘Jean,’ p. 46.

197 ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 62. Also: Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 53; GCF, ix, p. 29. A second version of the battle which did not mention John also appeared in: ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 49; Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 7-8.

198 RHGF, xxi, p. 684. Whilst not found in Latin Dionysian sources this has similarities with GCF, ix, p. 37. The Maubeuge/Honore compilation suggested that John undertook a mythical crusade in 1328: GCF, ix, pp. 334-335.

made for condemning Ludwig's alliance with Edward III, the Wittelsbach simply faded from the French page at this point: as the 1340s Dionysian Grandes Chroniques put it when noting John's entry into Italy: 'Et depuis lors commença moult la fortune dudit Baviere à decroistre, et ne parloit-on mais pou ou noient de lui.'\textsuperscript{200}

The consequences of a desire to render a positive portrayal of the king of Bohemia provide a partial explanation for a further aspect of the northern French approach to imperial rulers in the first half of the fourteenth century. The genealogy of Charles IV's wife, Marie, was by no means ignored even before the emergence of Philippe VI's close relationship with John of Bohemia: her familial relations with Henry VII and John were noted by the compilers of Pierre Honoré's Grandes Chroniques\textsuperscript{201} and in what appears to have been a fragment of a Grandes Chroniques text for the years 1322-1323 appended to a collection of judgments given in the Norman Exchequer.\textsuperscript{202} That Henry VII had been the father of John and Marie de Luxembourg, and grandfather of Bonne de Luxembourg, became, under Dionysian pens, a key element in the construction of an exulted past which would not only provide a genealogy fitting to the wives of Charles le Bel and the future Jean II,\textsuperscript{203} but glorify Philippe VI's friend.

In the period that followed the establishment of Philippe de Valois and John's close ties, the praise of the Luxembourg dynasty appears to have become one of the


\textsuperscript{201} RHGF, xxi, p. 677.

\textsuperscript{202} Grandes Chroniques (Rouen Version), RHGF, xxi, p. 677, n. 7. The editors description (RHGF, xxi, p. 677) is inadequate and it has not proved possible to identify the MS. Samaran suggested that it may be a loose-leaf not included in the catalogue of the Archives départementales of Seine-Maritime: C. Samaran, 'Jean de Saint-Victor, chroniqueur,' HLF, xli (1981), p. 22. Equally, it may pertain to a MS in the Bibliothèque municipale of Rouen.

\textsuperscript{203} Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 40; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 58; GCF, ix, pp. 4, 31.

\textsuperscript{204} Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 133; Lescot, p. 29; GCF, ix, p. 132.
basic tenets of the Saint-Denis scriptorium. For example, when translating the list, given by Guillaume de Nangis in his _Gesta Philippi_, of those who took part in Philippe III's war against Alfonso X, the 1340s _Grandes Chroniques_ took care to 'rectify' Guillaume's 'omission' of the count of Luxembourg, Henry V (1247-1281). Similarly, the version of the battle of Wörtingen (5 June 1288), offered by the _Grandes Chroniques_, which witnessed the death of count Henry VI and his brothers, was much expanded from that given by Guillaume in his universal history, and now featured an extended Luxembourg genealogy. In such a context it is not surprising to find Henry's claim to the imperial title unquestioned and lengthy accounts given of his descent into Italy and imperial coronation.

It became appropriate that past Franco-Luxembourg relations, in reality only firmly established in the late 1320s, should be depicted in the best possible light. It was in this spirit that the candidature of Charles de Valois in 1308, the often-tense relations between Philippe IV and Henry, particularly the former's support for his Angevin relation Robert d'Anjou, and the breakdown in relations between Clement and Henry, were simply 'forgotten'. Only a passing reference was made to Clement's decision to annul Henry's sentence against Robert, the pope otherwise being depicted throughout as the emperor's firm supporter. Robert d'Anjou, in contrast, became the focus of opposition to Henry. The Saint-Denis continuator of Géraud de Frachet even aired the rumour that the king of Sicily might have been

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205 Petit noted that the dynastic rapprochement contributed to a positive portrayal of Henry in the _Grandes chroniques: Luxembourg_, p. 188. His view that this was also a form of covert criticism of Philippe IV seems improbable: ibid., p. 187.


208 ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], pp. 35, 36, 38; GCF, viii, pp. 266-269, 279, 281-283, 286.


210 ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 39; GCF, viii, pp. 290-291.
responsible for Henry’s death by poisoning, although he also noted that if Henry’s
death was not the result of a fever he believed the Florentines the more likely
culprits.\textsuperscript{211} Whilst refraining from passing overt judgement on the dispute, Dionysian
sympathy could distinctly be seen to lie with Henry. It was \textit{duel et pitié} that the \textit{preu, hardi, chevalereux et très noble} Henry, whose \textit{bonté et...valeur croissoient de jour en jour}, had died, because: ‘s’il eust gueres plus vescu, il eust conquis toute Ytalie et
mise toute souz sa puissance et seignourie.’\textsuperscript{212}

This failure to support Robert d’Anjou, the head of a Capetian cadet branch,
might seem, at first glance, a little paradoxical. To some extent it demonstrates the
lengths Dionysian writers were prepared to go to in order to paint a positive portrait of
Henry’s character. At the same time it is also almost certainly a reflection of a certain
coolness in Angevin-Valois relations. Contamine has suggested that a degree of
misunderstanding between Robert and Philippe existed from as early as the latter’s
failed Italian expedition in the 1320s.\textsuperscript{213} A decade later, Robert was clearly irked by
the Valois king’s willingness to allow French lords to participate in John of
Bohemia’s Italian venture and he was simply infuriated when Philippe agreed to ‘buy
out’ John’s claims to the city of Lucca. In addition, it is unlikely that Robert looked
favourably upon plans which would have seen the French king become overlord of
the kingdom of Arles.\textsuperscript{214} Large Provençal contingents were notable by their absence
from the battles Philippe fought in the 1340s;\textsuperscript{215} it is, perhaps, less than surprising that

\textsuperscript{211} ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 39. Also: GCF, viii, pp. 291-292. cf. \textit{Fragment d’une chronique
anonyme, finissant en M.CCC.XXVIII, et continuée jusqu’en M.CCC.XL, puis jusqu’en
M.CCC.LXXXIII}, RHGF, xxi, pp. 150-151.

\textsuperscript{212} GCF, viii, p. 292.

\textsuperscript{213} P. Contamine, ‘À l’ombre des fleurs de lis. Les rapports entre les rois de France Valois et les
Angevins de Naples et de Provence (1320-1382),’ eds. N. –Y. Tonnerre and E. Verry, \textit{Les princes
angevins du XIII\textsuperscript{e} au XV\textsuperscript{e} siècle. Un destin européen. (Actes des journées d’étude des 15 et 16 juin 2001
organisées par l’université d’Angers et les Archives départementales de Maine-et-Loire)} (Rennes,

\textsuperscript{214} Fournier, \textit{Le royaume}, pp. 401-402.

\textsuperscript{215} Contamine, ‘l’ombre,’ p. 121.
a sense of familial solidarity was equally absent from pages written at Saint-Denis in the course of Philippe’s reign.

It is possible that Valois attitudes towards the Luxembourg influenced French writers beyond Saint-Denis in their approach to, and decision to include, accounts of Henry’s reign. For example, neither the continuator of the annals of Rouen\(^{216}\) nor Landolpho of Colonna\(^{217}\) mentioned Henry’s dispute with Philippe or Robert, whilst both recorded Henry’s relations with Clement only in positive terms. Bernard Gui may provide a further, more complex, example. In 1331, the year in which Gui presented the final version of his *Flores chronicorum* to Philippe VI, an outright condemnation of either Henry or Ludwig would have been, from a Valois perspective, politically insensitive. However, Gui’s long-standing and close association with the papacy, particularly with John XXII, would have made it difficult for him to do anything but record such a condemnation. This apparent impasse may explain Gui’s decision to include the details of Henry’s reign only up until the latter began to encounter resistance in Lombardy.\(^{218}\) Further events relating to the Empire, including Henry’s dispute with Robert, the ensuing decline in relations with Clement, and Ludwig’s dispute with pope John, were simply passed over in silence. Whilst Valois-Luxembourg relations may explain much concerning the depiction of Henry VII and Ludwig, they leave a number of important questions unanswered.

vi. Conclusion

Between 1315 and 1320 the satirical *Roman de Fauvel*, written originally by Gervais du Bus (d. 1338), a notary in Philippe IV’s chancery and chaplain to

\(^{216}\) RHGF, xxiii, pp. 347, 348.

\(^{217}\) RHGF, xxiii, pp. 197-198.

Enguerran de Marigny,\textsuperscript{219} was transformed into a critique of Philippe's government, and of de Marigny in particular, by Raoul Chaillou de Pestain (d. 1336-1337).\textsuperscript{220} Into the margins of the royal manuscript containing Raoul's version, a work commissioned under Louis X le Hutin (1314-1316) and completed for Philippe V, a poem was glossed in which the Dominicans were violently denounced for poisoning:

\begin{verbatim}
...rectorem mundi mire,
Florum florem,
Henricum imperatorem\textsuperscript{221}
\end{verbatim}

How is the poet's positive presentation of Henry to be explained? The same question may be asked of another text incorporated into this royal manuscript, the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris.\textsuperscript{222} Here the Angevin-Luxembourg dispute formed an important thread in which Henry was portrayed in positive terms\textsuperscript{223} and in which the emperor's poisoning was essentially accepted without question.\textsuperscript{224} The latter point is particular important as Collard has suggested that an acceptance of the idea that Henry was poisoned tended to be associated with writers favourable to the emperor, often pro-imperialists.\textsuperscript{225}


\textsuperscript{220} Avril, \textit{L'Art au temps des rois maudits}, no. 193, p. 288.

\textsuperscript{221} BN MS fr. 146, fol. 2', ed. G. Paris, 'Le roman de Fauvel,' \textit{HLF}, xxxii (1898), pp. 149-150.

\textsuperscript{222} Composed originally as an independent work this survives only as an 'edited' version in BN MS fr. 146: Dunbabin, 'Metrical,' pp. 235, 238, 246.


\textsuperscript{224} Geffroy de Paris, 5234-5308.

Attitudes towards the Avesnes dynasty, towards Alfonso X of Castile, Anglo-German relations and Valois-Luxembourg relations do much to explain the attention paid to certain rulers and would-be rulers of the Empire and the nature of this attention. Yet later Valois-Luxembourg relations, for example, do little to explain why the second continuator of Guillaume de Nangis, whose work, a product of the Saint-Denis scriptorium completed by 1317, gave a detailed and largely favourable account of Henry's election and negotiations with Clement, his descent into Italy and Roman coronation and his struggle with Robert. Nor do they account for the concern over Henry's reign taken by a number of other writers before the 1330s such as Jean de Saint-Victor, or the note made of the imperial election by Simon de Châteauneuf. Similarly they do little to account for the details of Ludwig's Romzug given in Dionysian and other sources, such as Pierre Honoré's compilation and the annals of Rouen, a venture in which John of Bohemia did not participate. A more complete explanation of attitudes towards Henry and Ludwig, in common with an explanation of the prominence accorded to Frederick II's deposition and the tendency to ignore the strained relations between the Capetians and the Habsburgs, lies beyond the concerns raised by specific contemporary issues, such as Valois-Luxembourg relations or the promotion of Louis IX's sanctity.

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226 Continuator(2)GNC, i, pp. 370-371, 372.

227 Ibid., pp. 381-382, 385-387, 392-394.

228 Ibid., pp. 394, 397-398 (the source for much of the material employed in later Dionysian texts).

229 JSV, pp. 652, 654, 655-656, 657-658. Jean reported the rumour that Henry had been poisoned but noted that this had been questioned: ibid., p. 657.

230 Anonymum S. Martialis Chronicon ab anno M. CC. VII. ad ann. M. CCC. XX., p. 144. Henry is not actually named.

231 ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 69; Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 82, 86-88, 113; Lescot, pp. 1-2, 17, 19, 22; GCF, viii, p. 339; ibid., ix, pp. 64-65, 75-76, 112-113.

232 GCF, ix, pp. 337, 339.

233 MGH SS, xxvi, p. 505.
Chapter Four

Charlemagne – The Ubiquitous Emperor

i. Introduction

If the last Hohenstaufen emperor was the most conspicuous of contemporary rulers of the Empire on the French page, the mark he left upon the mental landscape of northern France was insignificant in comparison to that made by the first Carolingian emperor. Charlemagne saturated northern French culture. An omnipresent figure, the Frankish emperor appeared in material as varied as the stained glass at Chartres, the praise heaped upon Louis VIII by Philippe Mousket, Louis IX’s representations to Innocent IV, a sermon preached in the course of Philippe IV’s Flanders campaign, and the statues of the Grand’salle of the Palais de la Cité. To understand the place occupied by Charlemagne in French thought is therefore to understand perceptions of the figure most prominently associated with the Empire in thirteenth- and early-fourteenth-century France. This prominence arose as a consequence of multiple factors, but the most important was undoubtedly connected with the problem of proving the legitimacy of the Capetian dynasty.

Although the last Carolingian, Louis V, died childless, the Capetian kings did not succeed altogether neatly to their predecessors. Hugues Capet certainly established himself as king in 987, but he did so only through the imprisonment of two rivals who had much better dynastic claims on the crown, Charles de Lorraine, uncle of Louis V, and Charles’ son, Louis.¹ For the first Capetian kings this was not felt to be a problem to which it was necessary to devote great energy: their preoccupation remained that of maintaining their tenuous position as the effective rulers of the Île-de-France region.² Yet the quandary was one with which the Capetian

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kings themselves, and those within the northern French cultural milieu more widely, came increasingly to struggle. From Philippe Auguste's reign the Capetians and their supporters offered a vigorous defence of the new dynasty's right to the French crown.

It was not enough that Philippe Auguste and Louis VIII should consolidate and expand Capetian influence, or even, indeed, that the dynasty should produce a saint in the form of Louis IX. It was equally necessary that it should be demonstrated that Hugues Capet had not disenfranchised the Carolingians. The prominence that a role in validating the legitimacy of the Capetian dynasty accorded to Charlemagne and other Carolingian emperors raises the question of how their imperial status was perceived in France. In particular, it raises the issue of how the Capetian-Valois kings' own relationship with the contemporary Empire was perceived in the light of their predecessors' possession of the imperial title.

ii. The Carolingians and Capetian Legitimacy

In 800 Charlemagne had acquired the title of western Roman emperor. From the point at which, by the treaty of Verdun (843), the Frankish king's empire was divided into three parts by his descendants, the imperial title enjoyed a varied fate until it was seized upon by Otto I in 962 and became the possession of first the Saxon, and later the Salian and Hohenstaufen dynasties. The Carolingians, and Charlemagne in particular, enjoyed a no less varied fate, yoked as they became to the promotion of a wide spectrum of causes, a process which continues today and is exemplified by the 'Charlemagne prize'. In the Empire, this involved, most strikingly, the canonisation (1165) of Charlemagne by Frederick Barbarossa (1152-1189), and the Carolingian


4 Concerning the development of the imperial idea under the Saxon and succeeding dynasties: B. Arnold, *Medieval Germany, 500-1300: A Political Interpretation* (Basingstoke, 1997), pp. 78-107.

emperor's gradual integration into the genealogies of many princely houses. In France, Charlemagne was transformed from an essentially literary hero into an important component of the later Capetians efforts to establish their legitimacy.

Despite the practical consolidation of Capetian kingship, Hugues Capet's displacement of Louis V and his heirs left a lingering sensitivity to the precariousness of the theoretical foundations of the new dynasty. As Guenée has suggested, in a world where novelty was unacceptable, historical argument was the medium through which the present could be justified adequately. Consequently it was an historical argument for dynastic continuity which became the foundation stone of Capetian legitimacy. The process was less straightforward than has often been assumed and the traditional interpretation, summed up in Schramm's theory of *renovatio imperii Karoli magni*, has been recently thrown into some doubt. Charlemagne's reception was neither as positive nor as uniform as it has been often considered. As Sivité has highlighted, Gilles le Parisien used Charlemagne as a device for criticising Philippe Auguste and a member of Philippe Auguste's own inner circle, Étienne de Gaillardon, attacked the idea of the *reditus regni francorum ad stirpem Caroli imperatoris* and promoted Philippe himself as the founder of a new dynasty.

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9 The numbering of French kings, first introduced systematically by Primat and later by Guillaume de Nangis and Bernard Gui, was itself adopted with the intention of reinforcing an argument for the continuity of French kingship: A. -M. Lamarrigue, 'La rédaction d'un catalogue des rois de France. Guillaume de Nangis et Bernard Gui,' *Saint-Denis et la royauté*, pp. 481-492.


12 Ibid., pp. 77-79, 205.
Nevertheless, Charlemagne, and the Carolingians more generally, were employed first, from Philippe Auguste’s reign, in an argument for the *reditus*,¹³ and later, during Philippe IV’s reign, as part of a quite opposed, if not altogether accepted, argument for the unbroken succession of French kingship.

The desire to establish a satisfactory defence of dynastic legitimacy clearly had a profound influence upon the French court and led to acts such as the rearrangement of the royal tomb layout at Saint-Denis. Louis IX, with the intention of demonstrating that the Carolingian and Capetian dynasties had been brought together in the person of Louis VIII, was the first to conduct such a rearrangement.¹⁴ In 1306 Philippe IV repeated this exercise with the intention of erasing the pattern established by his grandfather and hence any suggestion that there had been any dynastic break in the line of French kings.¹⁵ These ideas impacted upon the French cultural milieu more widely through the spread of works which sought to uphold the Capetian argument.

Louis’ contemporaries Primat¹⁶ and Vincent de Beauvais¹⁷ both featured the *reditus* concept in their work. Equally, the Dionysians, in particular, appear to have made every effort to co-operate with Philippe IV’s attempt to erase the concept: the idea of the *reditus* incorporated into the first recension of Guillaume de Nangis’


¹⁶ Guenée, *'Grandes Chroniques,'* pp. 192-194.

¹⁷ Above, p. 41.
universal chronicle was largely shown to be an irrelevance in the second recension and was later discredited altogether in a work commissioned by Philippe himself and written by one of Guillaume’s fellow Dionysians, Ives.\textsuperscript{18} Philippe’s new interpretation may also explain why the \textit{reditus} concept was omitted from several versions of Vincent de Beauvais’ \textit{Speculum historiale}\textsuperscript{19} and why Jean de Saint-Victor, writing before 1308, discounted the necessity of the \textit{reditus} by arguing in favour of the succession of Pepin and Hugues Capet through the female line.\textsuperscript{20}

The idea of erasing the \textit{reditus} concept may well have been Philippe IV’s personal obsession.\textsuperscript{21} In part it was probably a response to the insinuations of illegitimacy levelled at him by Bernard Saisset, bishop of Pamiers.\textsuperscript{22} More fundamentally, it was also almost certainly a reaction to the rather better claims upon Carolingian descent that were the good fortune of his stepmother, Marie de Brabant, and her children.\textsuperscript{23} Philippe’s approach was probably less attractive to Philippe V, Charles IV and the first Valois kings, for whom, given the circumstances surrounding their accessions, an argument based upon female succession was particularly unwelcome. It is perhaps not coincidental that the version of the Dionysian \textit{Grandes Chroniques} prepared for the future Jean II and the revised version of the 1340s retained the \textit{reditus} concept as it appeared in the \textit{Gesta Ludovici VIII}, whose summary of the idea was drawn from Vincent’s \textit{Speculum}.\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{19} Brown, ‘Prince is Father,’ 315, n. 114.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Tractatus} (2), p. 256.

\textsuperscript{21} A further example specific to Philippe’s reign is the unbroken list of names on a head-reliquary of Louis IX commissioned by the king: Brown, ‘La généalogie,’ p. 205.

\textsuperscript{22} Brown, ‘Prince is Father,’ 313.

\textsuperscript{23} Brown, ‘La généalogie,’ p. 206.

\textsuperscript{24} GCF, vii, pp. 3, 4-8.
iii. The Imperial Past: Inheritance or Irrelevance?

In a now classic thèse, Robert Folz formulated an idea which has become axiomatic to modern historical analysis of French attitudes towards Charlemagne. Folz believed that French interest in Charlemagne automatically contributed to an interest in the Empire, provided an important stimulus and justification for ventures such as the French imperial candidatures, and was important fuel for arguments in favour of the independence of the French kingdom from the Empire.\(^{25}\) The late-thirteenth century did indeed see the link between Charlemagne and the Empire strongly emphasised and, as a consequence, a link drawn between the Capetian dynasty and the Empire, yet, as Folz himself made clear, these connections were drawn not in northern France but by the Italian Guelfs, stimulated by Charles d'Anjou's conquest of the regno.\(^ {26}\)

One manuscript of Andrew of Hungary's account of Charles d'Anjou's southern Italian victory, in which Charles was depicted as a second Charlemagne sent to recover the goods of the Empire, is almost the sole testament to the introduction of this Guelf concept into northern France.\(^ {27}\) Andrew's *Descriptio victorie*, written in the early 1270s, is certainly worthy of inclusion in a study of French attitudes:\(^ {28}\) dedicated to Charles d'Anjou's nephew, Pierre d'Alençon (d. 1284), it was almost certainly conceived with the intention of defending the legitimacy of Charles' actions before a northern French audience.\(^ {29}\) Yet Andrew, a former chaplain to two kings of Hungary,


\(^{26}\) Folz, *Souvenir*, pp. 298-304.

\(^{27}\) Andreae Ungari *descriptio victoriae a Karolo Provinciae comite reportatae* [hence Andrew of Hungary], MGH SS, xxvi, pp. 561, 562-563. Andrew's Charlemagne imagery is analysed: Folz, *Souvenir*, pp. 300-301.

\(^{28}\) Sommerlechner catalogued Andrew amongst 'French' sources: *Stupor*, p. 546.

was a man who had not been shaped by the sensitivities of the northern French environment and the extent to which his view may be considered representative may be questioned. Rech has proposed that a writer who may be much more firmly situated within the French environment, the Dominican Géraud de Frachet, whose universal chronicle proved influential within the scriptorium of Saint-Denis, developed a comparison between Charlemagne and Charles in essence similar to that developed by the Guelfs.\(^\text{30}\)

Alone, neither Géraud’s universal chronicle nor his short history of Aquitaine draw a clear connection between Charles and Charlemagne. Rech’s argument hinges upon interpreting both works in the light of a third treatise concerned with Sibylline prophecy. This latter appears in a manuscript originally copied in Italy and in the possession of Charles d’Anjou’s doctor, Jean de Nesles.\(^\text{31}\) Whilst Géraud certainly addressed a copy of his universal chronicle to Charles it is unclear whether the Sibylline material was included by the original author, as Rech appears to have believed, or whether, as seems more probable in the circumstances, it was added by Guelf copyists to the Italian manuscript in order to create precisely their preferred interpretation. The latter view would appear to be reinforced by the fact that the Sibylline material is largely absent from French copies of Géraud’s work, appearing in only one thirteenth-century French manuscript.\(^\text{32}\) The provenance of this latter — presently at Angers, the administrative centre of the county of Anjou — suggests that it too was connected with Angevin patronage,\(^\text{33}\) although the precise relationship


\(^\text{32}\) Angers, Bibliothèque municipale, MS 668: Rech, ‘Charles d’Anjou et le Limousin,’ 462. The combination of texts also appears in one fourteenth-century MS: Reims, Bibliothèque municipale, MS 1458. Dating: H. Loriquet, *Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques des départements, Reims – xxxix* (Paris, 1904), ii, part i, p. 680. As the text in the Reims MS offers, with the exception of one line, hardly any variation from that in the Angers MS (Rech, ‘Charles d’Anjou et le Limousin,’ 466) the former is presumably a copy of the latter.

\(^\text{33}\) It is possible that in the course of the fourteenth century the MS may have been at Poitiers: Rech, ‘Charles d’Anjou et le Limousin,’ 467.
between Jean de Nesles' manuscript and that at Angers remains unclear. Nevertheless, it is striking that the Sibylline material was associated with a relatively small number of copies of Géraud's chronicle and that the relationship between the Sibylline text and the chronicle is, even in these copies, much less straightforward than Rech suggests. It would appear, therefore, that, on the whole, there is little evidence to support the assertion that the prophecy of the coming of an emperor descended from Charlemagne, which the Italian Guelfs associated with Charles d'Anjou, "se trouva, depuis lors, à l'arrière-plan des candidatures françaises à l'Empire". Folz's assumption, that the inhabitants of northern France drew the same conclusions as those of the Italian peninsula, remains unproven. In fact, it takes little account of the reasons why Charlemagne and the Carolingians became important in thirteenth- and early-fourteenth-century France.

French writers did not fail to recognise that Charlemagne had become emperor. It is clear that this was both well known and important. Not only did historical writers, such as Philippe Mousket, Primat, and Vincent de Beauvais, offer accounts of Charlemagne's reign that were disproportionately long in comparison to other entries, but they also tended to truncate the thirty years of his Frankish kingship (768-800) at the expense of his comparatively brief reign as

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34 Rech's article concentrates upon BN MS lat. 5005 A. It does not attempt to establish how this latter is related to the Angers MS. The similarity between the contents of both MSS (ibid., 466-467) suggests that there is some connection between the two.

35 Following the list of contents given by Rech (ibid., 466-467) the Sibylline prophecy was separated from Géraud's chronicle by a considerable quantity of other material in both the Angers and BN MSS. Rech does not attempt to account for this.

36 Folz, L'idée, p. 179.

37 Morrissey noted that of the 31,000 octosyllables comprising Mousket's chronicle, 10,000 were devoted to Charlemagne: L'Empereur, p. 126.

38 Only book one of the section relating to Charlemagne in the Roman des rois dealt with the period prior to 800: GCF, iii, pp. 1-89. cf. post-imperial coronation material: ibid., pp. 90-302.

39 Morrissey, L'Empereur, p. 133.
emperor (800-814). Pierre Honoré’s *Grandes Chroniques* exemplifies these trends in its cycle of illuminations: not only were considerably more illuminations dedicated to Charlemagne’s reign than any other (ten in comparison to the next largest distribution which was four for Louis IX), but the majority concerned the period after the imperial coronation. At the same time, it was rare for a French source to allow it to be forgotten that the Carolingian emperors had also been kings of France.

The imperial title possessed by Charlemagne and a certain number of his descendants (normally restricted to Charlemagne’s son, Louis le Pieux, and grandson, Charles le Chauve), was portrayed, particularly in the Saint-Denis tradition, as simply an adjunct to French kingship. Changes adopted within the Dionysian scriptorium suggest that in the course of the thirteenth-century it became increasingly desirable to emphasise this point. Philippe Auguste’s contemporary, Rigord (died ca. 1210), chose to record a list of French rulers in his history of Philippe’s reign qualifying Carolingian rulers only with their imperial titles:

\[...qui Pipinum regem, qui Karolum Magnum imperatorem, qui Ludovicum Pium imperatorem, qui Karolum Calvum imperatorem.\]

In the course of incorporating this material into his *Roman des rois*, Rigord’s Dionysian successor, Primat, ‘translated’ this list with an emphasis upon the fact that the Carolingians may have been emperors but they were firstly kings of France:

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41 Louis was clearly recognised as Charlemagne’s son by contemporaries, for example: *Tractatus* (2), pp. 236, 270. Despite this, at least one writer became confused and appears to have been under the impression that Otto I (912-973) was Charlemagne’s son: *Quaestio disputata in utramque partem, pro et contra pontificiam potestatem* [hence *Quaestio*], ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson, *Three Royalist Tracts, 1296-1302. Antequam essent clerici; Disputatio inter Clericum et Militem; Quaestio in utramque partem* (Bristol, 1999), p. 57.

42 One French account stated explicitly that up until the year of writing, 1330, no French king had been emperor since Charles le Chauve: Couderc, ‘Manuel,’ p. 425.

Despite a concentration upon Charlemagne’s ‘imperial years’, his importance lay not in any claim against, or even on, the Empire that might be derived from his imperial title. It was that Charlemagne and later Carolingians were perceived to have been kings of France that was of fundamental importance: it was a factor which, effectively, eclipsed and subordinated any other characteristics. The importance of the imperial title lay solely in the fact that it enhanced their magnificence as ancestors of the French king.

A number of factors reinforce this interpretation of the significance of the imperial attributes of the Carolingians, and those of Charlemagne in particular, in French thought. One of the most striking is the latter’s visual depiction. It has been recently suggested that contemporaries did not associate any precise or fixed characteristics with the imperial regalia. It seems probable that in the northern French cultural milieu this regalia did, however, come to be defined by at least one particular distinctive feature. In northern France the ‘closed’ crown, that is a circlet surmounted by, most commonly, one longitudinal arch, appears to have become uniquely associated with the imperial office from at least the twelfth century. It was this form of crown that the illuminator of Pierre Honore’s Grandes Chroniques depicted when instructed by the atelier of Thomas de Maubeuge to illustrate le couronne empereale.

It was quite possible for the imperial crown to be represented in a variety of different forms. An example is to be found in the depiction of an emperor in the

44 GCF, vi, p. 140. Why Primat believed Pepin to have been an emperor remains unclear.


46 Guenée, L’Occident, p. 145.

47 Fig. 2, BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 147. In several instances extremely precise instructions for illuminations are preserved in the lower parts of the folio. Transcription: Hedeman, Royal, p. 250.
Fig. 2 – Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS français 10132, fol. 147v
opening illumination of a manuscript of Gratian’s *Decretum*, manufactured in Paris in 1288-1289 and bought by a certain Guillaume, who obtained his license in canon law in 1290. This illumination featured a crown that was quite different from that produced by Pierre Honoré’s illuminator, in that it was much more elaborate, and possibly even depicted as double-arched; simultaneously, though, it preserved an essentially ‘closed’ characteristic. 48 One notable exception, the illumination of Frederick II in Jean de Dampierre-Saint-Dizier’s *L’art de la chace des oisius*, where the emperor was depicted wearing an open crown, is probably attributable to Simon d’Orléan’s Italian exemplar. 49 A ‘closed’ characteristic does not appear to have been associated with the crowns of kings: 50 when instructed to illustrate a *roy* Thomas de Maubeuge’s illuminator depicted a figure wearing an open crown. 51

Pierre Honoré’s *Grandes Chroniques* depicted Charlemagne sporting a ‘closed’ crown both before his imperial coronation, 52 during the coronation ceremony 53 and on a number of other instances. 54 At the same time, the *atelier* felt quite at liberty to dispense with the closed crown in a number of illuminations relating

48 Tours, Bibliothèque municipale, MS 558. For this illumination: Avril, *L’Art au temps des rois maudits*, no. 184, p. 278.


50 Nineteenth-century restoration leaves it difficult to determine the original intentions in the case of the emperor Constantine’s crown in the mid-thirteenth-century stained glass of the Sainte-Chapelle: first level of the first lancet of the *vitrail de l’histoire des reliques de la Passion*.

51 Fig. 3, BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 155v. Transcription: Hedeman, *Royal*, p. 250.

52 Fig. 4, BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 132v. Placed at the opening of bk. i, chap. i of the Charlemagne material, this illumination is intended to illustrate an episode from bk. i, chap. ii: Hedeman, *Royal*, p. 249. This illumination is particularly notable for its inclusion of a globe surmounted by a cross, a symbol only ever adopted, albeit briefly, by one post-Carolingian French king, Robert le Pieux (996-1031). This may be a second ‘distinctive characteristic’ of French conceptions of the imperial *regalia*. I am grateful to Romedio Schmitz-Esser of the Universität Innsbruck with whom I discussed this point.

53 Fig. 2, BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 147v.

54 BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 174v. Fol. 159v features an emperor but this is intended to be Constantine: Hedeman, *Royal*, p. 250.
Fig. 3 – Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS. franzais 10132, fol. 155v
Fig. 4 – Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS français 10132, fol. 132v
to events after the imperial coronation. A century earlier, as Lautier has noted, the artists responsible for the Charlemagne stained glass cycle in the north-eastern intermediate radial chapel of the cathedral of Chartres chose similarly to vary between a ‘royal’ and ‘imperial’ crown when depicting the emperor. The artist responsible for the Charlemagne illumination which introduced Jean Bodel’s (d. 1210) La chanson des Saxons, in a collection of poetry prepared for Philippe III’s queen, Marie de Brabant (d. 1321) between 1280 and 1300, also felt able to dispense with the imperial crown. In this latter Charlemagne was depicted clothed in the fleur-de-lys and crowned by angels with an open crown. Charlemagne’s imperial office was not, therefore, something which French illuminators felt it necessary to emphasise constantly. It could even, as in the latter case, be dispensed with altogether. Though clearly important, it was less fundamental than the fact that Charlemagne had been a French king. The position of these illuminators seems to have reflected that of thirteenth- and early-fourteenth-century French kings themselves, who made little effort to claim any imperial association through the Carolingians.

From the early-fifteenth century an alternate conception of the imperial crown, a quasi-pontifical affair involving a bonnet, seems to have flourished in France. Pinoteau has suggested that evidence for this is to be found as early as the first quarter of the thirteenth century in the bas-relief situated below the statue of a pope in the

55 Fig. 3, BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 155v. Also: fol. 160v; fol. 165v where Hedeman identified the emperor as Constantine (Royal, p. 250) which suggests Charlemagne was depicted only as a king; fol. 168v, where Charlemagne, identifiable by instructions to the illuminator, is depicted as a king sleeping.


decoration of the _portail de la Vierge_ of Notre-Dame de Paris\(^5\) and in the Charlemagne window at the cathedral of Chartres.\(^6\) One of the medallions that make up the latter appears to depict the depositing of a reliquary,\(^6\) in the form of such a bonnet-crown, at Aachen by Charlemagne.\(^6\) It should be noted, however, that here, as in several other scenes, Charlemagne himself was depicted wearing a crown closed by an arch.\(^6\) The medallion in which Charlemagne was offered relics by the Greek emperor Constantine is a particularly striking example: whilst Charlemagne wears an arch-crown, Constantine, in contrast, appears to be depicted wearing a bonnet-crown.\(^6\)

Whether or not Pinoteau is correct,\(^6\) there are no signs that the Capetian-Valois kings made any efforts to associate themselves explicitly with a bonnet-crown, or any other distinctively ‘imperial’ crown, before, at least, the mid-fourteenth century. The first case of such an association, according to Pinoteau, was the appearance of a bonnet-crown on money issued by Jean II.\(^6\) More striking was the

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61 For the identification of this particular scene as the donation of relics rather than the depositing of a crown at Saint-Denis: Maines, ‘Charlemagne Window,’ 807, n. 21.

62 For this medallion: Lautier, ‘Les vitraux,’ 35, fig. 31.


64 Lautier, ‘Les vitraux,’ 34, fig. 30.


66 Pinoteau, ‘L’ancienne,’ pp. 411 (fig. 16), 416.
sceptre of Charlemagne commissioned by Charles V, which featured a crown closed by arches surmounted by a cross.\textsuperscript{67} Equally, it was only under Charles V, keen to associate himself with the 'author' of the Salic law,\textsuperscript{68} that another element of the Charlemagne myth intimately connected with the Carolingian's imperial status, his sainthood, received explicit royal patronage.\textsuperscript{69} The first reference to the existence of an 'imperial' crown amongst the royal \textit{regalia} occurred in a royal charter of 1340 listing items temporarily borrowed from Saint-Denis for financial reasons.\textsuperscript{70} Philippe VI's intentions should not, though, necessarily be viewed in the same light as his grandson's conscious efforts to evoke imperial associations.

\textbf{iv. The Carolingians and Saint-Denis}

Philippe VI de Valois' belief that he possessed an imperial crown was almost certainly an impression left by Dionysian sleight of hand, rather than any direct intention on Philippe's part to lay claim to an 'imperial' inheritance.\textsuperscript{71} It is in Dionysian efforts to promote the importance of their abbey that a second reason for the prominence of Charlemagne in France prior to 1350 is to be found, a reason that was developed in parallel to, yet interconnected with, Capetian-Valois attempts to justify the legitimacy of their kingship. Charlemagne and the Carolingians offered the Dionysians multiple opportunities for promoting their own importance. It was, for example, in the vein of furthering their association with the ruling dynasty that an


\textsuperscript{69} Folz, 'Aspects,' pp. 77-99.

\textsuperscript{70} (10 June 1340, Noyon): Pinoteau, 'L'ancienne,' p. 410, n. 39.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p. 409.
anonymous life of Louis IX written after 1297\textsuperscript{72} stated that Louis had renewed the special relationship between the monastery and the French kings as it had been established by Charlemagne.\textsuperscript{73} This ‘renewal’ had its foundations in a less subtle Dionysian scheme: the attribution to Charlemagne of a series of forged diplomas produced in the abbey in the twelfth century.\textsuperscript{74} The Carolingians, and Charlemagne in particular, were also of importance because they were considered the patrons of the Passion relics held by the abbey.

The Dionysians had sought to promote their association with the king-emperor even before the Capetians themselves had taken great interest in him. The Descriptio qualiter Karolus Magnus clavum et coronam Domini a Constantinopoli Aquisgrani detulerit (ca. 1080) and the Historia Karoli Magni et Rotholandi (1130-1140), the latter more commonly known as the Pseudo-Turpin, both products of the abbey, are illustrative examples.\textsuperscript{75} Between them, these two texts fabricated the essence of Charlemagne’s legendary journey to the Holy Land and an important version of his Spanish crusade. Their influence was enormous: Philippe Mousket, for example, drew heavily on the Pseudo-Turpin\textsuperscript{76} and together they provided the bulk of the narrative depicted in the Charlemagne cycle at Chartres.\textsuperscript{77}

In the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the abbey succeeded in establishing the possession of the regalia as one of its prerogatives.\textsuperscript{78} The most spectacular example of Dionysian efforts to forge a link with the Carolingian emperor

\textsuperscript{72} Spiegel, \textit{Chronicle}, pp. 112-113.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Gesta sancti Ludovici noni, francorum regis, auctore monacho Sancti Dionysii, anonymo}, RHGF, xx, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{74} Folz, \textit{Le couronnement}, p. 252.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., pp. 250-252.

\textsuperscript{76} Morrissey, \textit{L’Empereur}, p. 127.

\textsuperscript{77} Maines, ‘Charlemagne Window,’ 803-804.

\textsuperscript{78} Schramm, \textit{Der König}, i, pp. 131-144.
was the assimilation of an element of this *regalia*, the coronation sword, with Charlemagne’s legendary sword, *Joyeuse*. Normally attributed to Guillaume de Nangis’ account of the 1271 coronation, it is clear that Guillaume adopted this assimilation from Primat’s Latin chronicle.\(^{79}\) Primat had earlier interpolated the idea into the section of his *Roman de rois* ‘translated’ from Rigord.\(^{80}\) This dates the assimilation to the 1270s, a decade earlier than has been previously assumed.\(^{81}\)

Although tenth or eleventh century in its oldest parts, the origins of the sword were clearly sufficiently obscure for it to be attributable to Charlemagne.

In the 1260s Louis IX had been well aware that the crowns he deposited at Saint-Denis had been manufactured for his grandfather.\(^{82}\) It seems probable that Philippe Auguste had remodelled aspects of the coronation sword at the same time as he had these crowns manufactured.\(^{83}\) The resulting stylistic similarity may have made it easy to associate crowns with sword, and, in any case, it seems unlikely that the Dionysians would have hesitated greatly to associate a further item in their possession with the Carolingian emperor.\(^{84}\) It may be speculated that the monks themselves added the bonnet with the intention of compensating for the absence of a longitudinal

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\(^{79}\) Primat referred to Charlemagne only as *roy* in this part of his account: Primat/IV, p. 89. Guillaume de Nangis altered this to ‘...regis Franciae et imperatoris Romanorum...’ *Gesta Philippi*, RHGF, xx, p. 488; GCF, viii, p. 39.


\(^{82}\) Pinoteau, ‘L’ancienne,’ p. 407, n. 34. No clear account exists of the appearance of these crowns, which are no longer extant.

\(^{83}\) Presently in the Louvre, elements of the sword date to the late-twelfth or early-thirteenth century: D. Gaborit-Chopin, ‘Épée de Charlemagne et fourreau,’ *Le trésor*, pp. 204, 206. The view that the upper part of the scabbard was redesigned at the same time seems less likely: ibid., p. 208. cf. Pinoteau, ‘L’ancienne,’ p. 410.

\(^{84}\) The earliest evidence for the epithet *de Charlemagne* being applied to any French crown dates from 1517: Pinoteau, ‘L’ancienne,’ p. 397, n. 16.
arch and thereby strengthening the association with Charlemagne. Such a modification might have encouraged Philippe VI in his conviction that he owned an ‘imperial’ crown.

Dionysian efforts extended beyond Charlemagne and largely account for the attention paid to another Carolingian emperor, Charles le Chauve (823-877; emperor 875-877). Pierre Honoré’s *Grandes Chroniques* echoed its source, Primat’s *Roman des rois*, in devoting considerable space to Charlemagne’s grandson and attached more importance to Charles’ reign than most, according it two illuminations. The attention Primat had focused upon Charles is explained by the Dionysian desire to promote the fact that he had transferred part of the relics of the Passion from Aachen, where they had been deposited by Charlemagne, to Saint-Denis. Guillaume de Nangis and later Dionysian compilers highlighted this point by inserting the episode of the theft of the Holy Nail from their abbey into accounts of the life of Louis IX. Another case in which both Charlemagne and Charles le Chauve were drawn to northern French attention may be similarly explained. The part played by Charlemagne and his grandson in the transfer of relics associated with the Virgin to Chartres provides at least a partial explanation for aspects of the cathedral’s stained glass cycle. The Charlemagne cycle may be read as an authentication of the *chemise* of the Virgin, the cathedral’s chief relic: it provides an account of the *chemise*’s initial translation from Constantinople to Aachen. The use of an arch-crown in a depiction

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85. GCF, iv, pp. 161-259.

86. BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 220r (a battle); fol. 233v (vision of Heaven and Hell).

87. GL, p. 320, where Charles was termed: ‘...regis Franciae et imperatoris Romani...’

88. GL(fr), p. 321, where Charles was: ‘...roy de France et empereur de Roume...’; GCF, x, pp. 12-14.

of the Virgin\textsuperscript{90} may have been intended to represent a link with Charles le Chauve, who translated the \textit{chemise} a second time bringing it to Chartres.\textsuperscript{91}

The truncation of the episode of the theft of the Holy Nail\textsuperscript{92} at a time when the \textit{Grandes Chroniques} compilation was re-organised under closer royal supervision, a re-organisation which witnessed the removal of many episodes connected with the promotion of purely Dionysian interests,\textsuperscript{93} serves to highlight the monks' original intentions in including material relating to Charles le Chauve. The Dionysian compilers of the 1340s \textit{Grandes Chroniques} would still incorporate into their account of the English attack on Rueil (1346) a passing reference to their receipt of Carolingian patronage in the remark that the monastery owned a house at Rueil given to them by \textit{Charles le Chauve roy et emperere}.\textsuperscript{94} At the same time, the monks were quick to add a comment which rendered the Carolingian emperor relevant to the Valois kings: Philippe VI was the first French king since Charles, \textit{qu fu roy et emperere}, to come to Saint-Denis armed and prepared for battle, a statement which underlined the continuity of French kingship and affirmed Philippe de Valois' place in a long line of kings.\textsuperscript{95}

The prime interest of the Dionysians lay in associating themselves with magnificent donors who could authenticate their relics, and in promoting their privileged relationship with the French kings. This interest coincided with, and largely abetted, the Capetian-Valois dynasty's own interest in self-authentication.\textsuperscript{96} Whilst

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\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 31, fig. 27.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{92} GCF, vii, p. 63.
\textsuperscript{93} Guenee, 'Grandes Chroniques,' p. 197.
\textsuperscript{94} GCF, ix, pp. 275-276.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., p. 277.
\textsuperscript{96} As Philippe IV discovered, royal and Dionysian interests did not always complement each other so neatly. The monks proved themselves one of very few groups to resist Philippe successfully when the king attempted to arrange the translation of Louis IX's body to the Sainte-Chapelle: E. A. R. Brown,
\end{footnotesize}
the imperial title might underline the magnificence of both Charlemagne and his grandson, neither the Dionysians nor the Capetian-Valois kings demonstrated an interest in deducing further attributions or authority from it. In fact the apparent absence of attempts to exploit the fact that Charlemagne and his descendants had been emperors, particularly with regard to the French kings’ own relationship with the contemporary Empire, is perhaps the most striking aspect of the Carolingian imperial connection.

v. Le roi Carlemainne

Charlemagne is noticeably absent from the reasons Charles d’Anjou put forward in the summer of 1273 to attempt to convince his nephew, Philippe III, to pursue his imperial candidature. Where the Carolingian did appear in argument it was firmly within the context of French kingship. Examples include the 1246 baronial manifesto against clerical abuses and the 1247 Protest of Saint Louis, both cases where Charlemagne’s imperial title was omitted altogether. He appeared similarly in a sermon preached at some time after the battle of Courtrai (11 July 1302), during either Philippe IV’s reign or that of one his sons. Here Charlemagne was listed alongside Clovis, Childeric III and Louis IX, as simply one of the holy kings of France, and even given as an example, placed alongside Pepin III and Philippe Auguste, of a French king who had fought against malicious emperors. The Latin verse closing

97 MGH Const. III, no. 618, pp. 585-588. Folz noted this absence but argued ‘...on reconnaît très facilement les thèmes liés traditionnellement au souvenir de l’empereur.’ Souvenir, p. 306.

98 HD, vi, p. 467 (November 1246).

99 ‘...Karolus Magnus et multi reges Francorum post ipsum...’ Chron. maj., vi, no. 60, p. 110.

100 The traditional dating (1302) has been recently questioned: N. Housley, Documents on the Later Crusades, 1274-1580 (London, 1996), p. 31, n. 1.

101 ‘Un sermon prononcé pendant la guerre de Flandre,’ 169.
Ives de Saint-Denis' chronicle, a work commissioned by Philippe IV and presented to Philippe V in 1317, similarly listed Charlemagne alongside Clovis, but, again, only in the context of the line of French kings from whom Philippe was descended. Criticism of Louis X ascribed to the French barons by the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris similarly made no use of the imperial title and implied that Charlemagne was a French king in much the same way as Philippe Auguste, Louis VIII, Louis IX and Philippe III were. The Norman lawyer, Pierre Dubois, offers the clearest evidence of a tendency to view Charlemagne primarily in terms of his relationship with French kingship.

Dubois, the writer to discuss at greatest length the possibility of a French acquisition of the Empire, exemplifies the place occupied by Charlemagne in French thought. References to the Carolingian emperor are not infrequent in Dubois' works and were formulated by two factors. The first was the author's training as a lawyer. This undoubtedly explains his exceptional association of Charlemagne with Germanos in his tract Pro facto Terre Sancte, as his wording was simply a virtually verbatim citation of the decretal Venerabilem. This case, where Dubois noted that the Empire had been translated from the Greeks to the Germans in the person of Charlemagne, and his description of Charlemagne as romanus imperator in De recuperatione, make it clear that he was well aware of the Carolingian's imperial connections. Nevertheless, a second factor played a more fundamental role in defining his view: his understanding of Charlemagne as an historical figure.

102 Pars Ultima Chronici anno M.CCC.XVII. a Guillelmo Scoto, Sancti Dionysii Monacho, Conscripti, RHGF, xxi, p. 211. These lines, but not, as the editors believed, the chronicle as a whole, may be attributed to Guillaume L'Escot: Spiegel, Chronicle, pp. 113-115.

103 Geffroy de Paris, 6475-6683.

104 Pro facto, p. 209.

105 X 1.6.34. Concerning Dubois' fidelity to the wording of this decretal: Jones, 'Dubois,' 79.

106 De recup., chap. 141, p. 130.
In suggesting that the Carolingian emperor had taken the land route to the Holy Land, Dubois accepted the common assumption, propagated at the time by, amongst others, Primat’s *Roman des rois*, that Charlemagne had undertaken a crusade to Jerusalem. He similarly accepted that Charlemagne had conquered Spain, and his unquestioning assertion that the Carolingian emperor had lived for over a hundred years was based on another commonplace. Given that Dubois’ view was derived largely from contemporary historical conceptions, the fact that Charlemagne had become emperor was undoubtedly of importance to him. This importance is reflected in his belief that Charlemagne had accomplished more in the few brief years he spent as emperor than he had done throughout the rest of his reign, a statement which closely reflected the structure of the presentation of Charlemagne’s life in contemporary historical works. Yet the fact that Charlemagne had become emperor appears not to have led Dubois to draw conclusions about the nature of the past or present relationship between the French kingdom and the Empire. There is equally an absence of any suggestion in his works that Charlemagne’s imperial office had conferred upon him any additional temporal authority.

Dubois’ most direct use of a Charlemagne-based argument occurred in an attack upon Boniface VIII’s claims to temporal superiority. Here Dubois cited pope Hadrian’s alleged grant to the Carolingian of, amongst other benefits, the right to collate to prebends and the fruits of vacant benefices. Dubois almost certainly

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108 GCF, iii, pp. 172-173. Whilst the subject of a certain degree of criticism in the thirteenth century, this myth was largely accepted: Chazan, ‘Les lieux de la critique,’ pp. 35-36.


111 *De recup.*, chap. 141, p. 130.

112 *Deliberatio Magistri Petri de Bosco Advocati Regalium causarum Balliviae Constantien et Procuratoris Universitatis eiusdem loci, super agendis ab excellentissimo Principe et Domino, domino*
believed that it was in his capacity as king of France, not as emperor, that Charlemagne had received this grant. It was, according to the accounts of both Primat\textsuperscript{113} and Vincent de Beauvais,\textsuperscript{114} a benefit that had been bestowed upon Charlemagne prior to his imperial coronation. Although Dubois made no reference to it, the idea of *translatio studii* is illustrative of a second instance in which contemporaries probably regarded any connection with Charlemagne as one primarily marked by the Carolingian’s status as king of France, rather than as emperor.

Charlemagne’s translation of *studium* to France, something held first by the Greeks and later by the Romans, occurred, according to Vincent de Beauvais,\textsuperscript{115} prior to his imperial coronation. It was clearly an activity performed by a French king. Primat, in contrast, chose to broach this topic after Charlemagne had become emperor, yet to describe Primat’s account as a ‘translation’ is something of a misnomer as what the Dionysian described is in no way akin to that recounted in Vincent’s *Speculum*. For Primat it was simply the case that Charlemagne had increased learning at Paris and throughout the French kingdom so that the centre of wisdom had now come to be at Paris, as it had once been at Athens and Rome.\textsuperscript{116} Primat’s comments highlight a Dionysian lack of enthusiasm for the idea of a link between *translatio studii* and Charlemagne.

Primat had raised the topic of *translatio studii*, making no reference to Charlemagne, in the prologue to his *Roman des rois*.\textsuperscript{117} Similarly, the *Gesta Philippo, Dei gratia Francorum Rege, Contra Epistolam Papae Romani, inter caetera continentem haec verba: Scire te volumus...* [hence *Deliberatio*], ed. P. Dupuy, *Histoire du differend d’entre le pape Boniface VIII et Philippes le Bel roy de France* (Paris, 1655), p. 45. Jones, ‘Dubois,’ 70, n. 76.

\textsuperscript{113} GCF, iii, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{114} *Speculum historiale*, bk. xxiii, chap. clxviii, p. 958; chap. clxx, p. 959.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., bk. xxiii, chap. clxxiii, p. 960.

\textsuperscript{116} GCF, iii, bk. iii, chap. iii, pp. 157-158.

\textsuperscript{117} GCF, i, prologue, pp. 5-6.
Ludovici,\textsuperscript{118} its first translation,\textsuperscript{119} at least one version of the Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques*\textsuperscript{120} and the first recension of Guillaume de Nangis’ universal chronicle,\textsuperscript{121} all of which discussed *translatio studii*, made no reference to the involvement of Charlemagne. The case of Guillaume’s universal chronicle is particularly striking as he drew upon Vincent’s *Speculum*. This absence is explained by a radically different interpretation of *translatio studii*, one that had little to do with Charlemagne, the Empire or even Rome more generally.\textsuperscript{122}

An element integral to the Dionysian texts was that *studium* had originally been brought to France along with Christianity by Dionysius the Areopagite, the Greek saint mistakenly conflated by the Dionysians with their own patron.\textsuperscript{123} Thus to promote the *translatio studii* was, for the Dionysians, to promote another aspect of their own importance. The attribution of a role to Charlemagne, *roy de France et emperiere de Romme*, in later accounts produced both beyond the abbey, such as Pierre Honoré’s *Grandes Chroniques*,\textsuperscript{124} and within it, such as the second recension of Guillaume’s chronicle,\textsuperscript{125} probably reflects the development of two themes.

Vincent had expanded his account of the *translatio* in his second recension, the time at which he also integrated the *reditus* concept. As Lusignan has noted the two are probably linked: Vincent almost certainly intended to reinforce a connection

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} GL, p. 320.
\item \textsuperscript{119} GL(fr), pp. 319-321.
\item \textsuperscript{120} GCF, x, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{121} GNC, i, pp. 182-183.
\item \textsuperscript{122} cf. ‘...la *translatio studii* a incontestablement une résonance impériale.’ Chazan, *L’Empire*, p. 528.
\item \textsuperscript{123} S. Lusignan, ‘L’Université de Paris comme composante de l’identité du royaume de France: étude sur le thème de la *translatio studii*,’ *Identité régionale*, pp. 62-63.
\item \textsuperscript{124} BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 365’.
\item \textsuperscript{125} GNC, i, pp. 182-183.
\end{itemize}
between Charlemagne and the French kingdom and thus a dynastic connection between Capetians and Carolingians. The idea that Charlemagne was responsible for the *translatio* was also, in essence, the nascence of the idea that the Carolingian emperor had founded the University of Paris. The promotion of such an idea offered the Parisian masters the opportunity to establish their autonomy and the idea that they enjoyed the direct patronage of the Capetian-Valois kings. It may be the case, as Chazan suggested, that for Vincent, in common with those responsible for the second recension of Guillaume’s chronicle and Jean de Saint-Victor, the *translatio studii* and Hadrian’s grant were considered to presage a *translatio imperii*. Yet for most in France this was probably a secondary consideration if it was a consideration at all: it seems probable that both were primarily connected with Charlemagne’s status as French king, rather than the fact that he had later become emperor.

That the environment of northern France formulated not only the ‘facts’ of Carolingian history for Pierre Dubois, but also his more general conception, is evident from his frequent tendency to exclude references to Charlemagne’s ‘imperial’ context. This is clearest in his regular omission of the imperial title, an omission particularly striking in two cases where Charlemagne featured alongside Frederick Barbarossa to whom Dubois did attribute the imperial title. What Dubois *was* keen to emphasis, particularly in the works he seems to have intended specifically for the consumption


127 Ibid., pp. 63-65.

128 The omission of a Charlemagne connection from the first recension, and from the Dionysian tradition more generally, is not noted in Chazan’s discussion: *L’Empire*, pp. 515-516.

129 Ibid., pp. 515-517, 528-529, 531-532.

130 *Summaria*, pp. 10, 17; *Deliberatio*, p. 45; *De recup.*, chap. 2, p. 5; chap. 26, p. 18; chap. 104, p. 88; chap. 116, p. 106; *Pro facto*, p. 209.

131 *De recup.*, chap. 104, p. 88; *Pro facto*, p. 209.
of the Capetian court, was that Charlemagne was the predecessor, indeed the lineal ancestor, of the contemporary king of France, Philippe IV. That Charlemagne had become emperor was certainly viewed as contributing to his magnificence, and this was worthy of mention, but the important factor remained that he had been a king of France.

The iconographical programme adopted when Philippe le Bel embarked upon the renovation of the Palais de la Cité (ca. 1296) was marked by two factors characteristic of his reign. The first was the desire, most evident in his attitude towards his saintly grandfather, to elevate Capetian kingship above the mere temporal. In the Palais this factor led to the adoption of influences drawn from episcopal and papal sources. These were apparent in the ground plan, which incorporated features such as a walled garden, and the cycle of statues included in the Grand’salle. The latter are likely to have been inspired by the pontifical portraits painted under pope Nicholas III. The second factor was the later-Capetian desire to reinforce the idea that French succession had been, from its debut, uninterrupted. It was this second factor which led Philippe to reconstruct the principal entrance of the Palais in the manner of the imperial residence at Aachen, and, in further reference to the latter, to import black marble from Germany to adorn the two places where he would be seen most frequently, the entrance steps and the long table of the

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132 Concerning Dubois’ tendency to tailor his works to their intended audiences: Jones, ‘Dubois,’ 55-58.

133 Summaria, pp. 10, 17; Deliberatio, p. 45; De recup., chap. 116, p. 106.

134 Davis’ proposition that the incorporation of classical features had their origins in a papal model is to be preferred to his suggestion that they were intended to emulate aspects of imperial Rome: M. T. Davis, ‘Les visages du roi: les projets d’architecture de Philippe le Bel,’ eds. D. Gaborit-Chopin and F. Avril, 1300...L’art au temps de Philippe le Bel, Actes du colloque international Galeries nationales du Grand Palais 24 et 25 juin 1998 (Rencontres de l’école du Louvre, Paris, 2001), pp. 194-195.

135 At least one contemporary French writer remarked upon the construction of a walled garden during Nicholas III’s renovation of the papal palace: Geoffroi de Collon, pp. 550-551.

Grand’salle (ca. 1301-1315). Both were done with the intention not of laying claim to any ‘imperial’ agenda, but of strengthening the dynastic connection at the point where it was weakest: the Carolingian-Capetian intersection. These features were a comment upon the rows of statues of kings that were intended to line the Grand’salle (fig. 5). They emphasised that these statues represented one cohesive French dynasty.

The Grand’salle would provide the location for the transaction of much royal business and the backdrop to the most regular public appearances of the king. Its public nature may have seemed the perfect setting in which to present a dramatic argument for dynastic continuity. The plaques that accompanied the statues of the Grand’salle, their text known only from a sixteenth-century transcription, left no doubt that the Capetian-Valois kings had little intention of forgetting that Charlemagne, his son and grandson, had been emperors. At the same time they emphasised, like the Saint-Denis scriptorium (whose system for numbering kings they may have adopted), that, first and foremost, the Carolingians had been kings of France: Charlemagne was described as Roy, obtint l’Empire des Romains, after whom Louis and Charles le Chauve each regna Roy et Empereur.

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138 The Grand’salle was destroyed by fire in 1618. Its interior disposition is known from an engraving by Jacques I Androuet du Cerceau (1580): Paris, BN, Estampes, Vx 15, p. 269 (1155). The statues were first described by Jean de Jandun in 1322/23: U. Bennert, ‘Art et propagande politique sous Philippe IV le Bel: le cycle des rois de France dans la Grand’salle du Palais de la Cité,’ Revue de l’art, xcvii (1992), 46.

139 Bennert, ‘Art,’ 55-56. For the order in which the kings were represented: ibid., 47, 50-51.

140 Ibid., 47.

141 Ibid., 50.

142 Cited from: ibid., appendix, 59. The dating of the plaques is unclear, although it seems improbable that they were completed before the death of Philippe in 1314. This may explain why, rather than following Philippe’s preference for erasing dynastic divisions, they highlight the idea of three distinct French dynasties.
Fig. 5 – Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Estampes, Vx 15, p. 269 (1155)
vi. Conclusion

There is every indication that the approach adopted in the Palais de la Cité and by Pierre Dubois was not an exclusively late-thirteenth-century phenomenon or one confined to the Île-de-France. Writing in the 1240s in Tournai, for example, Philippe Mousket tended to speak of Charlemagne purely in terms of French kingship and employed descriptions such as the *roi Carlemainne*.\(^{143}\) Equally, the Dominican Géraud de Frachet, writing his history of Aquitaine in the 1260s in Limoges, excluded Charlemagne's imperial title and presented him essentially in a context of French kingship.\(^{144}\) Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, who included Frederick II's claim that Charlemagne was his predecessor, was distinctly unusual amongst northern French writers in implying a link between Charlemagne and the contemporary Empire.\(^{145}\)

The statues of the Palais de la Cité commissioned by Philippe IV exemplified northern French attitudes towards Charlemagne and his descendants. These give little indication that an interest in the Carolingians, which from a royal perspective arose largely out of a desire to establish the legitimacy of the Capetian-Valois dynasty, automatically led to a concomitant interest in the Empire. The same may be said of the interest in the dynasty fostered by ecclesiastical institutions, whose aims lay essentially in employing the Carolingians as a means of authenticating their relics and of associating themselves with the Capetian-Valois kings. The poet Rutebeuf offers evidence of a further role attributed to Charlemagne by certain of the inhabitants of late-thirteenth-century France. Nevertheless, in common with ecclesiastical institutions such as Chartres and Saint-Denis and the French kings themselves, it is unlikely that Rutebeuf intended his readers and listeners to draw a connection between the Carolingians, the Capetian-Valois kings and the contemporary Empire.

Little is known of Rutebeuf beyond the fact that his origins almost certainly lay in the Champagne region and that the bulk of his work is attributable to the years

\(^{143}\) Mousket [MGH], 27059.


\(^{145}\) ATF, p. 919.
before 1277. Folz, echoed recently by Rech, suggested that the comparison Rutebeuf drew between Charlemagne and Charles d’Anjou in his poem *Le dit de Pouille* (written after 28 June 1265; before 26 February 1266) is comparable with that sketched by the Guelf pens of the Italian peninsula. For Folz it represented evidence of a northern French tendency to cast the count of Anjou in the role of a new Charlemagne. In conquering southern Italy, Charles could be seen to imitate the Carolingian emperor both as a crusader and as a defender of the Church. From these two themes ‘les partisans de Charles d’Anjou arrivent tout naturellement à l’idée d’Empire.’

*Le dit de Pouille* is one of only three of the fifty-six poems attributed to Rutebeuf to refer to Charlemagne. In verse six Rutebeuf did indeed draw a comparison between Charlemagne and Charles as crusaders by referring to the count’s enemies by the names of the Saracens who, in the *Chanson d’Aspremont*, were said to have opposed the Carolingian emperor. Yet the comparison was not an entirely straightforward one. Charles d’Anjou was indeed a king who shared his name with Charlemagne and who faced a plethora of Saracens, but Rutebeuf was keen to highlight a fundamental difference between the two: Charles lacked Charlemagne’s companion, a Roland:

\[
\text{Trop at contre le roi d’Yaumons et d’Agoulans;}
\text{Il at non li rois Charles, or li faut des Rollans.}\]

Neither of the other two poems to refer to Charlemagne associated him with Charles d’Anjou, but both contained an element similar to that which appeared in *Le dit de Pouille*, ii, p. 308. The poem survives in only one late-thirteenth-century compilation: BN MS fr. 1635.

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149 Folz, *Souvenir*, p. 301.

150 *Le dit de Pouille*, Rutebeuf, ii, p. 308. The poem survives in only one late-thirteenth-century compilation: BN MS fr. 1635.
dit de Pouille. In his earlier *La complainte de Constantinople* (written after May 1262; probably before the end of 1262) Rutebeuf had made use of Charlemagne in a savage critique of the state of French chivalry, a critique directed at Louis IX in particular. A similarly critical air is attached to Charlemagne’s appearance in *La complainte de la sainte église* (ca. after 1285) where the author laments the absence of Charlemagne and Roland from contemporary France. *Le dit de Pouille* was intended to rally participation in Charles’ Sicilian venture. In light of the approach Rutebeuf adopted to Charlemagne in his other works, his comment that Charles lacked a Roland can be considered both as a criticism of French knighthood and as part of an attempt to convince French knights to go to Charles’ aid. In all three poems Charlemagne and his companions appear as chivalric models. Rutebeuf’s intention was to highlight that, for the most part, contemporary French knights were failing to imitate these models adequately. In none of these three poems was any attempt made to establish a connection between Charlemagne and the Empire. In *Le dit de Pouille* Rutebeuf’s intention was to suggest that Charles d’Anjou was imitating this chivalric model and to encourage others to do so. There is little to suggest, as Folz believed, that Rutebeuf considered Charles to be reclaiming a Carolingian imperial inheritance.

The nature of the concerns that dictated approaches to the Carolingian kings explains why, with the notable exception of the tract *Disputatio inter Clericum et Militem*, few arguments extrapolated from the imperial status associated with several of these Carolingian rulers emerged in thirteenth- and early-fourteenth-century France. In consequence, there is little to support, for example, Krynen’s assertion that Charlemagne’s association with the Empire played an important part in stimulating

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153 *La complainte de la sainte église* (*Vie du Monde*), Rutebeuf, ii, p. 450, verse iv. The poem survives in five MSS: two dating from the late-thirteenth century (BN MSS fr. 1635, 1553); three from the early-fourteenth century (BN MSS fr. 24432, 25545, 12483). The attribution of this work to Rutebeuf remains questionable.

154 Below, pp. 230-231.
the attribution of juridical concepts associated with imperial authority to the French king, a view whose origin lies, essentially, in an acceptance of the Folz thèse.\footnote{Krynen, \textit{L'Empire}, pp. 386-387.}

This would suggest that the French imperial candidatures of the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries originated from a quite different impetus than that of recovering a Carolingian ‘imperial’ inheritance. It seems unlikely that the candidatures were simply the product of circumstance and opportunity. It is more probable that the motivation that lay behind them was connected with the same factors that led Dubois and others to regard the fact that Charlemagne had become emperor as something which contributed to his magnificence and the \textit{Grandes Chroniques}, a work devoted to the history of the French kings, to give peculiar prominence to the Romzüge of Henry VII and Ludwig of Bavaria.
Chapter Five

Through the Looking Glass

i. Introduction

Concern with Capetian dynastic legitimacy was not the only consideration beyond immediate issues such as Valois-Luxembourg relations to formulate attitudes towards imperial rulers in northern France. The need to prove Capetian dynastic legitimacy arose out of fundamental conceptions of how the world should be properly ordered. Other concerns which arose as a consequence of these notions similarly influenced views of and approaches to the Empire and its rulers. The reception enjoyed by Jacques de Révigny’s proposed justification for the disenfranchisement of the Hohenstaufen offers an instructive example of the effect these concerns could have upon French attitudes.

Jacques de Révigny (d. 1296), an Orléanais jurist, dismissed the legitimacy of Frederick II’s children on the basis of a legal argument: Frederick had been an heretic and consequently his children could not succeed him. Jacques himself admitted that the question of filial disinherintance was, in legal terms, not uncontroversial, and noted that some jurists held a different view to his own.¹ Yet, even so, it is striking that this convenient legal justification for the disinherintance of Frederick’s offspring, an action in which Louis IX’s brother, Charles d’Anjou, and many other French lords had actively participated, resonated so little in France. Only one account written north of the Loire appears to have embraced Jacques’ argument wholeheartedly: an anonymous French chronicle of almost certainly limited circulation, written in the closing years of the thirteenth century, offered it as justification for the disinherintance of Frederick’s son, Conrad,² and his grandson, Conradin.³ Only a partial echo of


² Chronique anonyme des Rois de France, finissant en M.CC.LXXXVI, RHGF, xxi, p. 89.
Jacques' argument appeared elsewhere: the chronicler of Saint-Martin of Limoges suggested that many were surprised by Charles' disinheritance of the children of the Sicilian king Manfred, yet the count of Anjou's actions were justifiable because Manfred had been an heretic. At the same time the Limousin chronicler believed that Manfred had disinherited the regno's true inheritor, Conradin.4

The view that heresy could result in the permanent disinheretance of a dynasty contradicted a number of widely held assumptions in northern France concerning rulership and inheritance. Jacques de Révigny's argument might be legally acceptable and might even have reflected papal reasoning but it remained contrary to fundamental precepts of French culture. Considerations and judgments amongst northern French writers, particularly but not exclusively lay writers, were informed by the norms of the culture of which they were a part. Conceptions of the nature of inheritance and the mechanisms through which it operated played a particularly important role, on one level at least, in moulding perceptions of imperial rulers, would-be rulers, and the imperial institution.

ii. The Inalienability of Inheritance

In 1245, at the council of Lyon, Innocent IV deposed Frederick II from all his crowns and went on to declare that Frederick and his entire family were unfit to rule anyone.5 Not only did Louis IX and Blanche de Castille remain on good terms with Frederick and Conrad after Innocent's proclamation,6 but their approach to the Hohenstaufen was marked by the apparent decision simply to ignore the venomous

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3 Ibid., p. 90.

4 Ex notis S. Martini Lemovicensibus, MGH SS, xxvi, p. 438.

5 Stürner, Friedrich, ii, pp. 533-539.

6 Above, pp. 104-105.
bulls issuing from the papal chancery. At the same time, whilst an alliance was discussed between Frederick and Louis, the papal pronouncements seem to have deterred the French king from entering into any formal agreement. Nevertheless, if Louis was not entirely indifferent to Innocent's denunciations, his chancery would still choose to open a letter in 1247 with the phrase 'Excellentissimo et karissimo amico suo Friderico' and employ all the titles of which Innocent had so recently deprived Frederick. Henry III, writing to a non-excommunicate emperor, who shortly before had been his brother-in-law, was not nearly so obsequious.

Dealings with Gregory IX in the late 1220s almost certainly informed Louis' approach to Frederick's later misfortunes and cautioned him against accepting papal proclamations entirely at their face value. In July 1229, for example, Gregory wrote a letter to Louis denouncing the truce Frederick had established with the Islamic ruler al-Kamil and the emperor's general failings as a crusader. In a letter written to the bishop of Paris a few months later, Gregory accused Frederick of cheating both God and the Church and dismissed his crusading activities as a failure, roundly condemning him for treating with the Saracens. Yet only a year later Gregory could


8 HD, vi, p. 502 (February/March 1247).

9 Huillard-Breholles, 'Relations diplomatiques,' p. cccxi.

10 HD, vi, p. 501 (February/March 1247).

11 Ibid., vi, p. 906 (8 January 1243, apud Bordeaux).


13 HD, iii, pp. 147-150 (18 July 1229, Perugia).

14 MGH Epistolae saeculi XIII, i, no. 404, pp. 323-333 (30 September 1229, Perugia).
write to Louis describing a meal he had taken with Frederick and referring to the emperor in glowing terms.\textsuperscript{15}

Louis and Blanche had good reasons, connected with the needs of Louis’ crusade, for paying little heed to Innocent’s sentence of deposition in the late 1240s. They had been equally unwilling in late 1239 to cooperate with Gregory IX’s proposal that Frederick be replaced with Louis’ eldest brother Robert I d’Artois.\textsuperscript{16} Aubri de Trois-Fontaines singled out Blanche, in particular, as having discouraged acceptance of the papal plan.\textsuperscript{17} A general dislike of ecclesiastical interference in lay affairs, an attitude prevalent amongst the French baronage and which Louis himself had displayed signs of,\textsuperscript{18} almost certainly played a part in this decision. At the same time, the Capetian stance, both in 1239 and in the late 1240s, was probably also a reflection of a more fundamental aversion to the idea of the permanent disinheritance of a dynasty.

Disinheritance was itself by no means considered to be a theoretical impossibility. Joinville’s account of the reasoning Louis offered for his decision to restore Henry III to certain of the continental lands confiscated from his father, John, suggests that Louis regarded the permanent forfeiture of a fief as an indisputably valid legal practice. To the argument of his counsellors that John’s fiefs had been confiscated by a valid judgment respondi le roy que il savoit bien que le roy d’Angleterre n’i avoit droit.\textsuperscript{19} Nevertheless, there was a considerable difference between the theory of feudal law and its practice. The very magnanimity of the 1259 treaty of Paris, by which Louis came to terms with Henry over the confiscated lands, suggests that the French king was unwilling to see even Plantagenet rights abrogated

\textsuperscript{15} HD, iii, pp. 228-229 (September 1230). Also: MGH Epistolae saeculi XIII, i, no. 419, pp. 338-339 (September/October 1230).

\textsuperscript{16} Berger, Louis et Innocent, pp. 3-5; Kienast, Deutschland, iii, p. 610, n. 1741.

\textsuperscript{17} ATF, p. 949 (under 1241).

\textsuperscript{18} Above, pp. 49-50.

\textsuperscript{19} Joinville, 65, p. 32; 679, p. 338.
completely. In the cautious reply Louis had made in 1249 to the request by Henry FitzIsabella, Frederick’s son by Henry III’s sister, the French king had in fact already hinted that he was at least willing to consider English claims.\textsuperscript{20} Both Primat\textsuperscript{21} and Guillaume de Nangis,\textsuperscript{22} whilst noting that John had been justly deprived of his lands, suggested that Louis sought a settlement with Henry in 1259 because his grandfather’s actions troubled the French king’s conscience. The minstrel of Reims stated not only that Louis’ conscience pricked him but that it had been suggested to the king that John had been entitled to the return of his lands if he had shown due contrition and that the same was true of his son.\textsuperscript{23} The clearest suggestion that the Capetians were uncomfortable with the idea of permanently disinheritting a dynasty is, however, to be found in their attitude towards the Saint-Gilles counts of Toulouse.

Whilst Raymond VII’s father might have died an unrepentant heretic, his own faith have remained somewhat questionable, and he himself have been frequently excommunicated, none of these things were perceived to justify permanently dispossessing him of all his lands and titles. In 1232, less than four years after imposing the treaty of Paris-Meaux upon Raymond, Louis IX and Blanche actively petitioned Gregory IX to return the lands confiscated from Raymond and given over to the papacy under the terms of the treaty.\textsuperscript{24} In May 1234, in the face of Gregory’s repeated refusal to cooperate,\textsuperscript{25} Louis chose to withdraw military support from the

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Chron. maj.}, v, p. 71.

\textsuperscript{21} Primat/JV, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{22} GL, p. 412. Repeated in GL(fr), p. 413; GCF, x, pp. 125-126, but absent from accounts of the 1259 negotiations in later works: GNC, i, p. 220; GCF, vii, p. 208.

\textsuperscript{23} ‘...mais se li rois Jehans ou si oir vousissent venir au roi, et li requissent saisine de leur terre parmi droit faisant, et amender les deffautes par le jugement de pers, il la deust ravoir.’ \textit{Recits}, chap. xliii, p. 235.


papal administrators of these lands, effectively leaving them open to reoccupation by Raymond. A degree of chastisement was acceptable, but the Capetians seem, ultimately, to have been uncomfortable with one of the guiding principles of the thirteenth-century papacy established under Innocent III: that a ruler's spiritual misdemeanours could lead to the ecclesiastical authorities depriving him permanently of his right to temporal rulership. Such temporal possessions, as Louis' own barons argued in their anti-clerical manifesto, were not acquired through clerics but won by the sword.

Frederick himself seems to have recognised the prevalence of this attitude in France. Amongst the several letters he addressed to the French baronage seeking to sway opinion in his favour, one in particular is striking. The emperor chose to put the case for the established legitimacy of the house of Hohenstaufen as rulers of the Empire:

...quibusdam ex eis Romanum imperium quod a Stoffensi domo longevi jam temporis diuturnitate divertere dedidicit et regna nostra predecessorum nostrorum quesita sanguinibus...

It is notable that his letter to the French barons appears to be the only instance in which Frederick made use of an argument which suggested that Hohenstaufen rights to the Empire could be equated with dynastic inheritance. This is all the more striking as his usage, in which 'house' was associated with a specific lineage, appears to have been unusual: it was more common for the term to be associated with the most


27 Innocent's personal position was probably less clear cut than the Fourth Lateran Council's rulings concerning Raymond VI: J. Sayers, Innocent III, Leader of Europe 1198-1216 (London, 1994), pp. 160-162.

28 HD, vi, pp. 467-468 (November 1246).

29 Ibid., vi, pp. 514-518 (April 1247, Parma).
important title possessed by a family.\textsuperscript{30} It is extremely unlikely that this idea reflected Frederick’s own conception of imperial authority and its origins,\textsuperscript{31} informed, almost certainly, by a combination of the neo-Roman imperialism developed in Frederick Barbarossa’s court and the Byzantine despotism of Roger II.\textsuperscript{32} Faced by an increasingly intractable pontiff, however, the emperor effectively invited the French baronage to view himself and his family in the same light as they viewed themselves.\textsuperscript{33} There is good reason to think that Frederick had not misjudged his audience and that the Hohenstaufen were considered a dynasty which possessed rights based upon the same principles as those applied to the Plantagenet and Saint-Gilles dynasties or, indeed, to the Capetians themselves; what is less clear is whether such dynastic principles were considered applicable in the specific case of the Empire.

iii. The Hohenstaufen – A Dynasty like any Other?

Charles d’Anjou’s 1266 expedition to displace Manfred of Hohenstaufen from the southern Italian \textit{regno} was a venture proposed and blessed by the Church. Its participants, as the various popes who promoted it were frequently keen to point out, were effectively crusaders.\textsuperscript{34} Papal policy encountered resistance from several quarters and particularly from the French clergy who were made to bear the brunt of


\textsuperscript{32} For a recent summary of these influences: W. Stürner, \textit{Friedrich II}, i, \textit{Die Königsherrschaft in Sizilien und Deutschland 1194-1220} (Darmstadt, 1992), pp. 1-40.


\textsuperscript{34} N. Housley, \textit{The Italian Crusades. The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Powers, 1254-1343} (2\textsuperscript{nd} edition, Oxford, 1986), pp. 35-70.
the costs through ecclesiastical taxes. To justify a crusade which could be accused of diverting resources from the Holy Land it was necessary to vilify Manfred. The proof lay in two themes, often discussed in close proximity to each other, particularly by Dionysian writers: Manfred’s mistreatment of the Church and the succour he gave to Saracens from whom he subsequently obtained support.

Other accusations levelled at Manfred included heresy and the murder of his own father. Amongst French sources, the latter charge remained unique to Bernard Gui, who had probably encountered the idea in Italy – where it was common – in the course of 1317, the year he spent there in papal service. More striking is the fact that very few writers levelled charges of heresy against Manfred, and, as one of them was Primat, it is notable, that the idea was not taken up by the Dionysian scriptorium. Heresy, like mistreatment of the Church and alliances with Saracens, certainly

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37 Primat/JV, p. 23; Baudoin d’Avesnes, p. 172, Chronique anonyeme des Rois de France, finissant en M.CC.LXXXVI, RHGF, xxi, p. 87; Grandes Chroniques (Maubeuge/Honoré version), BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 371; GCF, x, p. 135.


40 Flores chronicorum, RHGF, xxi, p. 697.

41 For Manfred’s alleged patricide in the accounts Brunetto Latini and Giovanni Villani: Sommerlechner, Stupor, pp. 465-466.

42 Guenee, Entre, p. 69.
illustrated Manfred’s villainy, yet there existed a more fundamental reason why his removal was considered unquestionably justified in France. This latter enjoyed wide circulation and had little to do with papal crusading arguments. It explains why the compilers of Pierre Honoré’s *Grandes Chroniques* felt perfectly at liberty to ignore Manfred’s fraternisation with the Saracens, even though the point was readily available in their probable source, Guillaume de Nangis’ universal chronicle.

Manfred differed in one fundamental respect from Frederick and Conrad, or indeed from members of a family that had been equally vilified, that of Saint-Gilles: Manfred was a bastard. It is not coincidental that his illegitimacy was a point that writers and compilers within the northern French cultural milieu noted with near unanimity. This was true whether a work originated in Normandy, Flanders and the northern part of the kingdom, the Île-de-France, or further south as the product of predominantly Dominican influences. The idea was common to chronicles of limited circulation and to the most widely known vernacular texts to issue from the Dionysian scriptorium. Its importance is emphasised by the fact that although the point was missing from Guillaume de Nangis’ *Gesta Ludovici*, it was scrupulously integrated in the first translation of the *Gesta* and included by

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43 *E Chronico Normanniae ab anno 1169 ad annum 1259 sive potius 1272*, RHGF, xxiii, p. 216; annals of Rouen, RHGF, xxiii, p. 340.

44 Baudoin d’Avesnes, p. 172.

45 The minstrel of Reims confused the kingdoms of Sicily and Jerusalem and claimed one of Frederick’s illegitimate sons seized the latter: *Récits*, chap. xxiii, p. 128.


48 For example: *Chronique anonyme des Rois de France, finissant en M.CC.LXXXVI*, RHGF, xxi, p. 86.


50 GL(fr), p. 413.
Guillaume himself in his later universal chronicle.\textsuperscript{51} Charles d’Anjou’s conquest of the \textit{regno} was not unimportant in Guillaume’s \textit{Gesta},\textsuperscript{52} but the Dionysian school appears to have recognised a need to include what came to be regarded as an important justification for Charles’ actions.

Legitimate descent was, from a French perspective, of fundamental importance if the succession to rights, such as a crown, was to be considered valid. It was, for example, one of the factors dictating which rulers could be included in lists of French kings. Bernard Gui discounted Louis III from his list on the grounds that he had been a bastard.\textsuperscript{53} Simon d’Orléans, illuminating Jean de Dampierre-Saint-Dizier’s \textit{L’art de la chace des oisiaus}, depicted Manfred seated upon a throne but without a crown. By choosing to depart from Manfred’s portrayal in his Italian exemplar, Simon drew a striking contrast with Frederick whom he depicted crowned on the same folio.\textsuperscript{54} Simon’s point was clear: Manfred, unlike Frederick, was not a valid king. To be illegitimate was to be near bereft of a claim upon a father’s inheritance. Manfred may have been an oppressor of the Church and a friend of the infidel, but in France it was his illegitimacy, a factor omitted from very few accounts,\textsuperscript{55} that came to form the real core of the justification for his deposition and replacement.

Manfred’s position was determined by a French understanding of the mechanisms by which dynastic inheritance operated. This led to the conclusion that it was permissible to disenfranchise him because he \textit{ne tenoit pas le roiaume par raison}


\textsuperscript{52} Chazan, ‘Guillaume,’ pp. 468-470, 476.

\textsuperscript{53} Lamarrigue, ‘Redaction,’ p. 490.

\textsuperscript{54} BN MS fr. 12400, fol. 2'; cf. Vatican Pal. lat. 1071, fol. 1'; Toubert, ‘Les enluminures,’ p. 409, fig. 1. Simon did depict Manfred wearing a crown, but in a much less striking image buried in the text: BN MS fr. 12400, fol. 86', illuminated initial.

\textsuperscript{55} That Andrew of Hungary drew no difference between Conrad and Manfred underlines that this issue was of particular concern to those formed by the French cultural milieu.
If Manfred could claim anything at all, it was the somewhat nebulous status of ‘prince of Tarento’, the provision made for him in Frederick’s will.\(^{57}\) Canon law permitted, and indeed encouraged, small bequests to illegitimate children,\(^{58}\) although it is possible that the only French writer who seems to have recognised Manfred’s possession of this title, Guillaume de Nangis,\(^{59}\) did so because it was accorded some acknowledgment by Innocent IV and Alexander IV.\(^{60}\) The tendency to view the Hohenstaufen through a prism of French attitudes towards inheritance was by no means restricted solely to the justification of Manfred’s disenfranchisement.

The kingdom of Jerusalem was clearly recognised by both lay\(^ {61}\) and ecclesiastical\(^ {62}\) writers in France to be the hereditary patrimony of the Hohenstaufen. Despite the claim that the *regno* was a fief whose disposal lay wholly in papal hands,\(^ {63}\) the same assumption appears to have often been made with regard to the Sicilian kingdom, particularly by lay writers. The minstrel of Reims, for example, regarded the *regno* as consisting of three kingdoms that Frederick held *de son heritage*.\(^ {64}\) The assumption by many that the *regno* was also part of a Hohenstaufen

\(^{56}\) *Chronique anonyme des Rois de France, finissant en M.CC.LXXXVI*, RHGF, xxi, p. 89.

\(^{57}\) Stürner, *Friedrich*, ii, p. 588.


\(^{59}\) GL, p. 412; *Gesta Philippi*, RHGF, xx, p. 516.


\(^{61}\) Mousket [MGH], 23477-23488; *Récits*, chap. xxiii, p. 123.

\(^{62}\) ATF, p. 913; GNC, i, p. 169.

\(^{63}\) For the background to these claims: Abulafia, *Frederick*, pp. 11-62; Stürner, *Friedrich*, i, pp. 15-33.

\(^{64}\) *Récits*, chap. xxii, pp. 112-113. Also: Baudoin d’Avesnes, p. 171.
'patrimony' almost certainly accounts for the emphasis placed upon Manfred's status as a bastard in accounts of his removal. It may also explain why Charles d'Anjou's 1268 victory over Conradin at the battle of Tagliacozzo, as spectacular as that he won over Manfred at Benevento, found, with the exception of Geoffroi de Collon's account, far less prominence on the French page. It could even disappear altogether from accounts that otherwise took an active interest in Charles d'Anjou's conquest of the regno.

It has been suggested that in deciding whether or not to permit his brother to accept the papal offer to displace Manfred, Louis IX was primarily concerned with the claims of Henry III's son, Edmund, to the regno, and that Louis had envisioned a settlement with Henry which would have subsidised an English invasion of Sicily. The 1259 treaty of Paris made provision for a two-year subsidy to pay for five hundred knights who would be used for the service of God, and of the Church, and to the profit of the kingdom of England. When pope Alexander IV had suggested the inclusion of such a clause to Henry III it is certain that both the English king and the pope had had the Sicilian business firmly in mind. Yet the clause, as it appeared in


66 Geoffroi de Collon, pp. 534, 538.

67 For example: Andrew of Hungary, MGH SS, xxvi; annals of Rouen, RHGF, xxiii, p. 340; Ex continuatione Gestorum episcoporum Autissiodorenium, MGH SS, xxvi, p. 586; Chronique rimée dite de Saint-Magloire, RHGF, xxii, 98-111; E Chronico monasterii Sancti Taurini Ebroicensis, RHGF, xxiii, p. 467; Ex Uticensis monasterii annalibus et necrologio, RHGF, xxiii, p. 481; Anonymum S. Martialis Chronicon ab anno M. CC. VII. ad ann. M. CCC. XX., p. 133; Landolpho of Colonna, RHGF, xxiii, pp. 196-197; Ex Annalibus monasterii Sancti Wandregisili, RHGF, xxiii, p. 425; E Chronico sanctae Catharinae de Monte Rotomagi, RHGF, xxiii, p. 405.

68 Berg, 'Manfred,' 131-132.

69 Richard, Louis, p. 462.


71 Powicke, Thirteenth Century, p. 124.
the treaty, was open to rather different interpretations: the minstrel of Reims, for example, understood it, albeit in a rather garbled form, to concern the Holy Land.\(^{72}\) It should not automatically be assumed that by agreeing to include the clause Louis intended to indicate support for Henry’s Sicilian scheme.\(^{73}\) Such an interpretation seems particularly unlikely in light of the annulment of the papal grant of Sicily to Edmund in December 1258.\(^{74}\) A report sent to Urban IV between October and December 1262\(^ {75}\) by the notary Alberto, the man charged by the pope with broaching the question of removing Manfred to the French king, certainly mentioned Louis’ concern for Edmund’s rights. It also suggested, however, that the king was particularly concerned that Conradin’s rights would be ignored.\(^{76}\) If it was Conradin whom Manfred had disinherited through his usurpation of the Sicilian throne, as Dionysian\(^ {77}\) and a number of other writers\(^ {78}\) suggested, Conradin’s own displacement became harder to justify. Conradin’s disinheriance could be adequately accounted for only by those who considered him to be rebelling against the Church, such as Adam

\(^{72}\) *Récits*, chap. xliii, p. 236.


\(^{74}\) Runciman, *Sicilian*, p. 63.


\(^{76}\) Raynaldus, *Annales ecclesiastici an anno MCXCVIII ubi desinit Cardinalis Baronius* (Lucca, 1748), iii, p. 90. Berg passed over in silence the prominent place Alberto accorded to Conradin in Louis’ doubts.


\(^{78}\) Geoffroi de Collon, pp. 526-528; *Grandes Chroniques* (Maubeuge/Honoré version), BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 372; *Ex notis S. Martini Lemovicensibus*, MGH SS, xxvi, p. 438.
de Clermont and Girard d'Auvergne, or by wholeheartedly embracing Jacques de Révigny's legal explanation that Frederick's crimes had disinherited his heirs.

Geoffroi de Collon's forthright statement that Conradin's execution was his own fault because he had threatened to do the same to Charles d'Anjou if he had won was unusual. At the same time it reflects an apparently widespread inability amongst French writers to find an adequate justification for the execution. Doubts raised in relation to Conradin's position may explain the attempts by many of those who chose to recount his death, particularly the Dionysians, to absolve Charles of direct responsibility by attributing the decision to royal lawyers, advisers, or even the citizens of Naples.

The son of the count of Flanders was said to have become so angry at the condemnation of a nobleman that, in front of King Charles, he killed the notary who read the sentence. Although almost certainly apocryphal, Ricordano Malispini's account of Robert de Béthune's actions may have captured the shocked reaction of northern France to an act which had permanently disinherited a family of its

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79 RHGF, xxi, p. 79.

80 Abbreviatioine Historiae Figuralis, RHGF, xxi, pp. 216-217.

81 Chronique anonyme des Rois de France, finissant en M.CC.LXXXVI, RHGF, xxi, p. 90.

82 Geoffroi de Collon, p. 538.


84 GNC, i, p. 234.

85 GCF, vii, p. 258.

86 Storia fiorentina di Ricordano Malispini col seguito de Giacotto Malispini dalla edificazione di Firenze sino all'anno 1286, ed. V. Follini (Florence, 1816), chap. cc, p. 167.

87 At least one detail is clearly false: the notary, Robert of Bari, was alive after 1268: A. Huillard-Bréholles, 'Nouvelles Recherches sur la mort de Conradin et sur son véritable héritier,' L'Investigateur, cxtiv (1851), 10.
patrimony. The position of the Hohenstaufen in the *regno* appears to have been interpreted, at least by some, in terms of French dynastic conceptions; there is every indication that the position of the dynasty in the German lands of the Empire was considered in similar terms.

iv. The Hohenstaufen – A German Dynasty?

Conrad of Hohenstaufen’s rule of the imperial lands north of the Alps did not attract great attention in France. The one incident to become well known, largely because it was noted by Vincent de Beauvais and later proved of interest to the Dionysians, was the crusade which Innocent IV launched against him. The fifteen-year reign of Conrad’s brother, Henry (VII), as king of Germany (1220-1235) – a reign which ended with Henry’s deposition and death – similarly failed to elicit substantial comment. When Henry found his way onto the French page it was most often in a note of his coronation or in inaccurate accounts of his death. Although the latter was by his own hand and, contrary to most French views, occurred in 1242, lurid versions of Henry’s fate occasionally appeared in France. Thus Geoffroi de Collon interpreted Henry’s imprisonment as a consequence of his refusal to consent to Frederick’s evil, and on at least three occasions it was suggested that

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88 *Speculum historiale*, bk. xxi, chap. i, p. 1286.


92 GNC, i, p. 169.

93 GL, p. 382; GL(fr), p. 383; GCF, vii, pp. 159-160. For the death of a son of Frederick who remained unnamed: GCF, x, p. 86.


Frederick had actually murdered his eldest son, a rumour by no means exclusive to France. Only Henry's contemporaries, Philippe Mousket and Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, showed any substantial interest in his activities.

Aubri noted Henry's meeting with Louis VIII at Vaucouleurs, Gregory IX's attempt in 1230 to depose him in the course of the dispute that took place during Frederick's crusade, the diet held at Frankfurt am Main in 1234, and Henry's rebellion, deposition and death. Philippe offered more detail, including three notices of Henry's coronation, his marriage to Margaret of Austria, and a lengthy account of his deposition and death. In his account of the latter Philippe included the rumour that Henry had been murdered by his father whilst in prison. The proximity of both writers to the German lands of the Empire almost certainly explains their unusual interest in Henry, but they share a further common characteristic. Henry's deposition was a point Aubri and Philippe felt required some explanation and

96 GNC, i, p. 206; Geoffroi de Collon, p. 514; Flores chronicorum, RHGF, xxi, p. 697.

97 Bernard Gui, for example, borrowed his account from Martin of Troppau: Sommerlechner, Stupor, p. 456.

98 ATF, p. 914.

99 Ibid., p. 926.

100 Ibid., pp. 933-934.

101 Ibid., p. 937.

102 Mousket [MGH], 23311-23318; Mousket [RHGF], 27839-27850; 28070-28075.

103 Mousket [RHGF], 28113-28116.

104 Ibid, 28357-28680. Henry's deposition is again noted: 30567-30568.

105 Ibid., 31171-31174.
it is notable that both, writing for a French audience, settled upon the same explanation.

Whilst Aubri gave an account of Henry's rebellion and conspiracy against his father,\(^{106}\) there is some indication that the Cistercian author did not consider this alone to provide sufficient reason to justify the enormity of Henry's punishment. Philippe Mousket does not even seem to have regarded the rebellion, an account of which is absent from his chronicle, as having anything to do with Henry's removal. For both Aubri and Philippe the real justification lay in the fact that Henry was not Frederick's son. This idea appeared in Aubri's account in a note where it was said that Frederick had denied he was Henry's father and consequently deposed him: "Qui negans ipsum esse filium suum, deposuit eum de regno".\(^{107}\) The same theme led to one of the most remarkable episodes in Philippe Mousket's chronicle,\(^{108}\) an episode which casts important light upon the application of French dynastic principles to the Hohenstaufen.

According to Philippe, Henry (VII)'s deposition was a consequence of a deception perpetrated by Frederick's first wife, Constance of Aragon (1183-1222). Constance witnessed the death of her own son shortly after his birth and in order to avoid displeasing Frederick, whom the empress knew to be desperately desirous of a male heir, she arranged to substitute another baby for the dead child.\(^{109}\) Frederick was completely taken in by this switch, and his son's paternity remained a secret until long after Constance's death and Henry's establishment as king in Germany. When the emperor became aware of what had happened, by means of Constance's aged confessor, Henry was removed. Philippe made it clear that the emperor now possessed a legitimate son, Conrad, by Isabella de Brienne, with whom he could be replaced.\(^{110}\)

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\(^{106}\) ATF, p. 937.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., p. 937.

\(^{108}\) Sommerlechner appears to be the first to note this episode: *Stupor*, pp. 454-455, 545. She noted the appearance of a similar idea in Aubri's chronicle: ibid., p. 454, n. 389.

\(^{109}\) Mousket [RHGF], 28399-28540.

\(^{110}\) Ibid., 28563-28602.
For Philippe the fact that Henry was not Frederick's son, natural or otherwise, was at the heart of his unsuitability to be king. He informed his audience that even as a boy Henry:

...gros estoit, cors et maufès,  
Comme vilains ki porte fès,

and that it therefore seemed clear to many that he was not the emperor's son:

Et bien disoient li plusior,  
Qu'aînc ne fu fius d'empereor.

The details of the story would seem to owe much to Philippe's imagination. If he was drawing upon a source for these events it is one that appears to have left no other tangible traces. Yet it is striking that, for both Aubri and Philippe, Henry (VII)'s deposition could only be made palatable by an argument that he was not a member of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. Rebellion against his father was not enough to disenfranchise him: it was necessary to show that Henry was a changeling. Both accounts suggest that Henry's position in the German lands of the Empire was interpreted in the light of the principles applied in France to dynastic succession. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines' phrase 'a tempore quo Franci vel Teuthonici optinuerunt dinastiam imperii,'\(^\text{112}\) employed to introduce a discussion of imperial coronation practices, suggests that Frederick II, in his appeal to the French barons, was right to believe that these same principles were considered applicable not just to the rulership of the German lands but to the Empire itself. The clearest indication that this was the case comes from an account of the death of Conradin.

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\(^{111}\) Ibid., 28537-28540.

\(^{112}\) ATF, p. 903.
v. The Lineage of the Eagle

The Dionysian Primat, recounting Conradin's ignominious fate in his Latin chronicle, noted that many believed that if Frederick's grandson had been successful in the *regno* his supporters would have quickly gone on to make him emperor.\(^{113}\) Although Guillaume de Nangis did not choose to include these specific comments in his *Gesta Ludovici*, he did note in his universal chronicle that in the course of his journey south Conradin had been received in Rome following imperial custom.\(^{114}\) Guillaume's comments were retained in the early-fourteenth century by the compilers of Pierre Honoré's *Grandes Chroniques*, who noted that Conradin was *receus enguise emperial* upon his arrival in Rome.\(^{115}\) The question, however, is not whether Conradin was believed to have wished to pursue a claim to the Empire, but whether he was considered to have a right to it.

In speaking of the dynasty that came to an end in the person of Conradin, Primat chose to speak not of the end of the Hohenstaufen dynasty, nor of a Sicilian dynasty, nor even of a dynasty of those who had persecuted the Church. Rather, he spoke of the end of the lineage of the eagle, a phrase translated by Jean de Vignay, in the 1330s, as: 'le lignage de l'aigre estoit affine par mort de Corradin'.\(^{116}\) Primat also noted that if Conradin had lived he would have been, in Jean de Vignay's words, *chef du lignage de l'aigle*.\(^{117}\) This latter phrase did not appear in the *Gesta Ludovici*, but Guillaume de Nangis did retain Primat's comment concerning the end of the lineage of the eagle.\(^{118}\)

\(^{113}\) Primat/IV, p. 38.

\(^{114}\) GNC, i, p. 234, probably based upon Géraud de Frachet.

\(^{115}\) BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 372'.

\(^{116}\) Primat/IV, p. 37.

\(^{117}\) Ibid., p. 37.

\(^{118}\) '...quoniam in Corradini morte fuit ibi genus aquilae terminatum.' GL, p. 438.
The eagle was the emblem most clearly associated with the Empire in thirteenth-century France. Adenet le Roi (d. 1297), Primat’s contemporary, was minstrel first at the court of Brabant, later, from 1270, at the court of Flanders, and finally in the employ of Marie de Brabant, wife of Philippe III. When, around 1275, Adenet sought to depict the écu of Charlemagne, he settled upon fleur-de-lys in combination with black eagles, a coat of arms which continued to be attributed to the Carolingian emperor in both France and Germany until the Renaissance.\(^{119}\) In his Philippide Guillaume le Breton had noted that Philippe Auguste had sent the imperial eagle captured from the emperor Otto IV at the battle of Bouvines to Frederick.\(^{120}\) Guillaume had also used the capture of the imperial eagle to symbolise Philippe’s defeat of Otto in his Gesta Philippi Augusti.\(^{121}\) Primat was certainly aware of these connotations, as it was Primat himself who had translated Guillaume’s Gesta, including the phrase relating to the eagle, for the section of his Roman des rois recounting Philippe Auguste’s reign.\(^{122}\)

Primat’s choice of phrase appears to have been unusual. The near contemporary Italian Ricordano Malispini, for example, spoke of Conradin’s death as the end of the house of Swabia, the Case di Soavia.\(^{123}\) The only non-Dionysian French writer to remark upon Conradin’s death as the end of a line, Adam de Clermont, chose the much less dramatic phrase that with his death perit tota progenies Frederici.\(^{124}\) The latter sentiments were similar to those expressed by the author of the Annales breves Wormatienses or the Italian Brunetto Latini, both of whom spoke of the end of

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\(^{119}\) Guenée, L’Occident, p. 128.

\(^{120}\) Philippide, ed. H. –F. Delaborde, Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, ii, bk. xii, lines 47-49.

\(^{121}\) Guillaume le Breton, Gesta Philippi Augusti, Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, i, p. 285.

\(^{122}\) GCF, vi, p. 348.

\(^{123}\) Storia fiorentina, chap. cc, p. 167.

\(^{124}\) RHGF, xxi, p. 79.
the lineage of the emperor Frederick.¹²⁵ Primat’s usage can only have been intended to associate the Hohenstaufen with the Empire. The implication was that Conradin, from Primat’s perspective, could be considered the last of a specifically ‘imperial’ dynasty. Whilst Primat’s wording re-emerged in Jean de Vignay’s translation and echoed in Guillaume’s *Gesta*, it is notable that it vanished from other Dionysian projects.¹²⁶ The reason for the omission may lie in an assumption that this ‘imperial’ dynasty was considered to differ little from other dynasties. In consequence, there may have existed a deep-seated unease with its permanent disinheritance, a sentiment increased by the fact that the party responsible was a Capetian.

vi. An Heir to the Hohenstaufen?

The suggestion that the inhabitants of northern France could consider the Empire to be the patrimony of the Hohenstaufen dynasty seems, at first glance, improbable. The selection of an imperial ruler was, after all, based upon the elective, rather than the hereditary, principle. This system, if not the precise mechanism by which it operated, was well known in France. In the 1240s, Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, for example, referred to Frederick II’s election by the German barons.¹²⁷ Writing in the 1280s Guillaume de Nangis noted the election of Rudolf of Habsburg¹²⁸ and, in the early-fourteenth century, Jean de Saint-Victor that of Henry VII.¹²⁹ The 1340s Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques* described the establishment of the system by which *I prince seculier esleu par les electeurs d’Alemaigne* was instituted to rule the western Empire.¹³⁰ A later chapter will examine French views of the origins of this system and


¹²⁷ ATF, p. 893.

¹²⁸ *Gesta Philippi*, RHGF, xx, p. 492.

¹²⁹ JSV, p. 652.

¹³⁰ GCF, ix, p. 38.
its specific relationship with the imperial office, but for the moment the question to be considered concerns its interpretation at a more immediate and practical level.

There is, firstly, a difficulty in labelling French perceptions of the method used to select an imperial ruler as exclusively 'elective'. This is immediately apparent from Philippe Mousket’s rhyming chronicle. Philippe considered Henry (VII)’s legitimacy an important issue not simply because it related to the rule of the German imperial lands but because he believed that Frederick wished to establish a new custom, that is the hereditary transmission of the Empire. This should not necessarily be interpreted to mean that Philippe considered Frederick to be engaged in a bold attempt to do away with the elective system. The key to understanding Philippe’s view lies in the nature of Frederick’s ‘new’ custom: its ‘newness’ was a relative one. Frederick was actually trying to re-establish something which had once existed but had not done so for a long time:

Quar lorn tans eut, jel sai de voir,
N’ala l’Empires d’oir en oir,
Jusques à cest empereour [Frederick]

In the wake of the chaos of the Staufer-Welf dispute of the early-thirteenth century, Philippe had seen Frederick seeking to establish a new imperial dynasty in place of:

Que ço u qu’il ont fait par tençon
Et par commune eslection,

His perspective was by no means unique; in fact, the idea of re-establishing not simply a ruler of the imperial lands but an imperial dynasty is a frequently

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131 Below, chapter eight.

132 Mousket [RHGF], 28512, 28502-28508.

133 Ibid., 28429-28431.

134 Ibid., 28505-28506.
encountered subtext in French accounts of post-Staufer imperial aspirants. That this subtext is not apparent in accounts of Heinrich Raspe’s and William of Holland’s reigns, but only appears after the death of Conradin, may be a further reflection of a deep-seated unease with the disinheritance of the Hohenstaufen.

Henry d’Alemagne, son of Richard of Cornwall, was a fleeting figure on the French page, but one point about him aroused particular interest. The aftermath of the 1270 crusade saw Philippe III, Charles d’Anjou and Henry, the latter returning to England via Gascony on his cousin Edward’s instructions, arrive at Viterbo in the Spring of 1271. On the 13 March Philippe wrote to Richard to inform him of the events that were to so excite the interest of French chroniclers: earlier that day, Simon and Gui de Montfort had burst into a church in which Henry had been hearing Mass and stabbed him to death, claiming it as revenge for the death of their father at the battle of Evesham.135

An examination of the late-thirteenth-century Dionysian accounts reveals one of the possible motives which led to an interest in Henry’s death. Following Primat, Henry had journeyed to Viterbo with the intention of convincing a new pope to grant him le royaume d’Allemagne, que son père avait pourris.136 This explanation of Henry’s presence in Viterbo ignored his participation in the aborted crusade of 1270. It was almost certainly offered, in conjunction with Primat’s very definite statement that Henry arrived before Philippe,137 with the intention of physically distancing the Capetians from Henry and thereby also distancing them from even the slightest insinuation of involvement in the murder. At the same time, it was a distinctly peculiar explanation for Henry’s presence, not only because there was a papal vacancy, Gregory X not being elected until March 1272, but also because Richard was not only alive and well in spring 1271 but himself still laying claim to the German kingship, something he would continue to do until his death on 2 April 1272.

135 Denholm-Young, Richard, pp. 150-151.

136 Primat/JV, p. 86. In the MS ‘d’Allemagne’ reads ‘d’Engleterre’, which may be corrected from Guillaume’s Latin.

137 Ibid., p. 86. cf. Flores chronicorum and Reges francorum, RHGF, xxi, p. 701.
Primat, writing in the mid-1270s, would surely have been aware of all these points. The approach of Primat's fellow Dionysian, Guillaume de Nangis, suggests that Primat may have chosen to offer this particular explanation for a specific reason.

Guillaume de Nangis took up Primat's explanation of Henry's journey in both his *Gesta Philippi* and his universal chronicle. However, he expanded upon the original account by strengthening the connection between Henry and the German kingdom. Whereas Primat had termed Henry simply *filz du conte Richart*, Guillaume altered this passage, first to note that Henry had been the son of *quondam regis Alemanniae* and then, in the 1290s, when writing his universal chronicle, to describe Henry as *dictus de Alemannia, filius Richardi regis Alemanniae defuncti*. Primat differed from Guillaume in that he made no mention of Richard's candidature or his German kingship anywhere in his chronicle. His reasons were probably two-fold. Although a firm supporter of Charles d'Anjou, Primat appears to have been acutely aware of Conradin's claims on his imperial 'inheritance'. That Conradin had been very much alive at the time of Richard's election may account, to some extent, for his silence. More fundamentally, unlike many later writers, Primat displayed little interest in emphasising that the king of Castile had not acquired the German kingship. While the La Cerda dispute was very much an unresolved issue at the time he wrote, there is little in his chronicle to indicate the overt hostility towards Alfonso X apparent in later Dionysians works. Primat would even include an account of Castilian participation in Louis IX's 1270 crusade, comments, as de Wailly noted, later omitted by Guillaume de Nangis. Highlighting the fact that it had been

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138 *Gesta Philippi*, RHGF, xx, p. 484.

139 GNC, i, p. 241.

140 Primat/JV, p. 86.

141 *Gesta Philippi*, RHGF, xx, p. 484.

142 GNC, i, p. 241.

143 Primat/JV, p. 47.
Richard who had succeeded to the German kingship almost certainly had much to do with the La Cerda affair for Guillaume de Nangis, but in choosing to add emphasis to the point when relating the murder of Richard’s son his intention appears to have been to build upon an idea embryonic in Primat’s account. That idea was that Henry’s claim to the German kingdom was based upon the principle of heredity.

That Guillaume’s purpose was deliberately to cast Henry as Richard’s heir to the German kingdom is an interpretation strengthened by two aspects of the approach he adopted towards Henry in his universal chronicle. One is the striking parallel drawn between the English king and his son, on the one hand, and Richard, rex Alemanniae, and Henry on the other. The battle of Lewes (14 May 1264) saw the capture of both regem Henricum ac Eduardum and regem Richardum et Henricum.\footnote{144}{GNC, i, p. 225.} Henry, then, was placed on the same plane as his cousin. Was not he too to be seen as the heir to a kingdom? More striking still, however, was Guillaume’s extraordinary decision to pre-date Richard’s death to 1268,\footnote{145}{Ibid., p. 235.} a chronological quirk which enabled Henry’s visit to Viterbo to be seen in a very distinctive light. It was now clear that Henry was not simply seeking a kingdom upon which his father had had a claim: he was seeking his inheritance. Guillaume’s intention, and most probably Primat’s, was to imply that Richard had possessed rights over the German kingdom which had passed from father to son. From this perspective the emphasis placed upon Henry’s reasons for going to Viterbo might be regarded as more than simply the backdrop to the relation of a sensational episode: Henry’s murder might be seen to represent the failure of the first post-Staufer imperial dynasty to become established. The Dionysians may have regarded it as a failure which contrasted strongly with, and thereby highlighted, the dynastic success of the Capetians, one of the signs of the particular favour bestowed upon the French kingdom.

Those beyond the Saint-Denis scriptorium, less driven by the Capetian agenda of Primat and Guillaume de Nangis, did not draw the connection between Henry and the Empire with the same Dionysian deftness. Yet the continued interest shown in the event and the frequent description of Henry in terms of being the son of the king of
Germany may indicate that the perception of Henry as Richard’s successor was a
common subtext in many accounts, whether they were written in Normandy,\textsuperscript{146}
Limoges\textsuperscript{147} or the Languedoc.\textsuperscript{148} Although Henry’s death continued to elicit
occasional interest the popularity of the episode appears to have waned: the compiler
of Pierre Honoré’s \textit{Grandes Chroniques} chose, for example, to omit any account of
Henry’s murder even though it was present in Guillaume de Nangis’ universal
chronicle. By the mid-fourteenth century even the Dionysian scriptorium seems to
have taken less interest in the topic: Henry’s reasons for going to Viterbo disappeared
from the 1340s \textit{Grandes Chroniques}.\textsuperscript{149} This decline in interest may be the
consequence of the new dynastic issues raised by first the Habsburgs at the end of the
thirteenth century and later by the house of Luxembourg.

Arranged at Quatrevaux in 1299, the marriage of Albrecht of Habsburg’s son,
Rudolf, to Philippe IV’s sister, Blanche, offered the opportunity for the establishment
of a new dynasty in the Empire, a point highlighted by Pierre Dubois writing in
1300.\textsuperscript{150} Writing before the late-1320s, Jean de Saint-Victor would suggest that
French agreement to the marriage had required the consent of the German princes to
the principle that the heirs of Rudolf and Blanche would inherit the German
kingdom.\textsuperscript{151} For a few brief years, prior to the Boniface VIII crisis and the death of
Blanche and her child (1305), this marriage offered the possibility of the creation of a

\textsuperscript{146} \textit{E Chronico Normanniae ab anno 1169 ad annum 1259 sive potius 1272}, RHGF, xxiii, p. 211; annals of Rouen, RHGF, xxiii, p. 341; \textit{E Chronico sanctae Catharinae de Monte Rotomagi}, RHGF, xxiii, p. 405.

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Ex notis S. Martini Lemovicensibus}, MGH SS, xxvi., p. 438; \textit{Anonymum S. Martialis Chronicon ab anno M. CC. VII. ad ann. M. CCC. XX.}, p. 132. The latter listed \textit{Enricus, rex Alamannie} amongst Simon de Montfort’s captives.

\textsuperscript{148} Guillaume de Puylaurens, p. 210; \textit{Abbreviatioe Historiae Fignralis}, RHGF, xxi, p. 217; \textit{Flores chronicorum} and \textit{Reges francorum}, RHGF, xx, p. 701.

\textsuperscript{149} GCF, viii, pp. 31-32.

\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Summaria}, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{151} JSV, p. 635.
new imperial dynasty linked to the Capetians themselves. Both Guillaume de Nangis' *Gesta Philippi* and his universal chronicle were written in a period of relatively good relations between the Habsburgs and the Capetians, after the collapse of Marguerite de Provence's attempts to involve Rudolf in a plan to loosen Charles d'Anjou's grip on Provence and before the Bonifacian debacle. Anticipation of a new Habsburg-Capetian imperial dynasty may account, to some extent at least, for Guillaume's decision to censor Albrecht's father's more strained relations with Philippe III and possibly even Philippe's 1273 imperial candidature, omissions carried forward into accounts that made use of his work.

In the years before the emergence of the Valois-Luxembourg alliance of the 1330s, some French writers appear to have clung with tenacity to the idea that the Habsburgs possessed rights to the Empire. Of particular note, due to its connection with the court, is the only extant version of the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris, prepared as part of a compilation intended for Philippe V. This settled upon Albrecht of Habsburg's second son, Friedrich der Schöne, 'king of Austria', as the legitimate successor to the Luxembourg emperor Henry VII:

\[\text{En cel an fu en Alemaingne} \\
\text{Un roy nouviau, qui que s'em plaingne,} \\
\text{Et ce fu le roy d'Otheriche,...} \\
\text{De touz fu la chose ordenee} \\
\text{Qu'a lui la coronne donnee} \\
\text{Seroit et qu'il en fu seingnor.}\]

This passage was probably an example of the sort of censorship and alteration that Dunbabin has suggested the royal compilers applied to the original text of the metrical chronicle. The wording as it appears in the royal compilation is peculiar: Austria was, after all, a duchy rather than a kingdom. If the original author had, however, intended to speak of Henry VII's son succeeding him the word 'Bohemia' need only be substituted for *Otheriche* and much more sense is made of this passage and the subsequent description of Henry's successor as:

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152 Geffroy de Paris, 5771-5777.

153 Dunbabin, 'Metrical,' p. 238.
The emperor referred to in line 5778 was almost certainly intended, by the original author, to be Henry VII, an important figure in the metrical chronicle, rather than Albrecht, who does not otherwise appear and was never, in any case, actually crowned emperor. The insertion of Friedrich’s ‘succession’ into the royal text serves to highlight a continuing attachment to the idea of the Habsburgs as the ‘imperial’ dynasty.

A similar perception of the Habsburgs may have led Jean de Saint-Victor to consider Adolf of Nassau a usurper, one whose election had ‘interrupted’ the establishment of the Habsburg succession by temporarily displacing Albrecht. Jean’s *Memoriale historiarum* made no mention of Adolf. This omission is particularly notable as Jean made use of Guillaume de Nangis’ universal chronicle and followed it attentively from 1285 up until 1294-95. In addition, the second version of Jean’s introductory treatise artificially prolonged Albrecht’s reign to thirteen years, possibly with the intention of implying that the Habsburg rule of the German imperial lands had been uninterrupted since the accession of Rudolf in 1273.

Belief that the Habsburgs possessed a right to succeed in the Empire was not a sentiment that long outlived the emergence of the Valois-Luxembourg alliance. The Dionysians, possibly as a consequence of their close relations with the court, appear to have taken particular pains to discredit the Austrian dynasty. Suspicion of the Habsburgs was doubtless fanned by the oft-repeated rumours that Blanche and her

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154 Geffroy de Paris, 5778-5779.


child had been poisoned. The 1340s Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques* added fuel to this rumour by declaring that Duke Rudolf himself had carried out the deed. The compilers also appear to have sought to suggest, by weaving an account of Albrecht’s father’s support for Conradin into their ‘translation’ of the *Gesta Philippi*, that, from the very beginning, the dynasty had been notorious enemies of the Capetians. In this inserted episode the elder Rudolf, described as *uns des plus grans anemis le roy* (Charles d’Anjou), had been captured after taking part in the battle of Tagliacozzo but escaped with the assistance of a traitor. The vilification of the Habsburgs was contemporaneous with the emergence of a portrait of John of Bohemia which depicted him as heir, not only to Henry’s county of Luxembourg, but also to his father’s imperial claims. It was as Henry’s son, not Ludwig’s ally, that he was welcomed into Italy: so pleased were the Italian Ghibellines when they knew him to be *Henrici Pii imperatoris ultimo defuncti filium*, that they threw off their loyalty to Ludwig and submitted to John. There seems little room in these approaches to imperial succession for an elective principle, yet French writers were not only aware of the elective system, but also of the inhabitants of the Empire’s attachment to it.

vii. Electing a Dynasty

Jean de Saint-Victor, when discussing the aftermath of the death of Henry VII, noted that John of Bohemia was elected to the German kingdom because it did not seem that the latter ought to be treated as descending by hereditary right:

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158 Continuator(2)GNC, i, p. 346; JSV, p. 644; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 25.

159 GCF, viii, p. 243.


161 GCF, vii, p. 257.

162 Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 123. Also: Lescot, p. 24; GCF, ix, p. 122.
As Pierre Dubois, well aware of the imperial electors’ attachment to their rights, took pains to point out, this attitude was clearly mistaken: the elective system was precisely what was wrong with the Empire because it led to instability and strife. Was the French approach, then, to recognise the existence of the elective system but to believe, simply, that it ought to be replaced? On one level this is certainly true and reflects a longstanding belief in the superiority of hereditary kingship. Matthew Paris caught the spirit, if not the precise words, when he stated that Louis IX’s nuncios rejected the papal offer of the imperial throne to Robert I d’Artois on the grounds that to be the king of France, *quern linea regii sanguinis provexit*, was more excellent than to be an emperor, *quern sola provehit electio voluntaria*, and that it would suffice for Robert to be the brother of such a king. Yet on another level election was viewed as fundamentally important in France.

When the Parisian atelier of Thomas de Maubeuge came to draft Pierre Honoré’s *Grandes Chroniques* they prefaced a detailed *table des matières* with a short index specific to Pierre’s manuscript. On the left of each page of this index was given a list of numbers corresponding to a system of pagination applied to the manuscript as a whole. To the right of these numbers were placed a series of intermittent and brief notes. The intention appears to have been to produce an easy-to-use guide to events considered important. One of the themes accorded greatest

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163 JSV, p. 658.


165 *De recup.*, chap. 13, p. 12.

166 *Chron. maj.*, iii, pp. 626-627.

167 BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 1r-6r. This follows on directly from a note giving details of the MS’s production.

168 The MS has been cut down and some of these numbers have disappeared but many remain visible or partially visible in the top right hand corners.
prominence by the compilers was the idea that three distinct, albeit, following Primat, connected dynasties, had succeeded to the French throne. This idea was incorporated into the very structure of Pierre's *Grandes Chroniques* in the system of pagination adopted. The majority of notes included in the index were written in black ink, but a small number were written in red. These rubricated events were confined, essentially, to marking the point at which a new dynasty succeeded, first the Carolingians and later the Capetians. If Pierre should have been curious to know the origins of the latter dynasty, he would have found the relevant page in his index beside the note: 'De hue chapet qui fu fet par election...' The idea was not an isolated one. Visitors to the Grand'salle of the Palais de la Cité, the most visible statement of French dynastic continuity, would have encountered two instances of election. Amongst the plaques used to label the statues of the kings of France they would have found the note that Pepin, although *de la lignée de Clotaire second*, like Hugues Capet, *fut esleu Roy*. Here, then, is the kernel of the French perception of election: it was the mechanism by which a dynasty was founded.

There is strong evidence to suggest that a late-thirteenth- and early-fourteenth-century French conception of the role of an elective mechanism in the selection of a French dynasty was superimposed upon the Empire. Jean de Saint-Victor noted that the election of Henry VII was made by *paribus Alamanniae*. Jean chose these words with care: when discussing the election of Henry VI he had outlined a system in which twelve peers of the Empire selected the ruler. As Chazan has noted, this

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169 Each folio was given an individual number and a second number, either 'I', 'II' or 'III'. 'II' appears for the first time at the accession of Pepin (fol. 128r). At the accession of Hugues Capet the number is unclear but within a few folios had changed from 'II' to 'III' (fol. 258r). This system was clearly intended to denote the three dynasties, an interpretation supported by the fact that the individual pagination recommenced from 'I' in both the index and on the individual folios with each change of 'dynastic' number. Concerning the origins of this system: Hedeman, *Royal*, p. 37.

170 BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 4r.

171 Cited from: Bennert, 'Art,' appendix, 59.

172 JSV, p. 654.

idea of imperial ‘peers’, which had no bearing upon reality, was one clearly drawn from a French milieu.\textsuperscript{174}

From Philippe Auguste’s reign, the ‘peers of France’, a literary invention with its foundations in the \textit{chanson de geste} of Charlemagne, had acquired increasing prominence in French thought.\textsuperscript{175} This prominence was exemplified by the development of a role for the peers in the coronation ceremony. Whilst they first played a part in the actual ceremony in either 1223 or 1226,\textsuperscript{176} the first evidence that they were attributed a role comes from the early-thirteenth-century coronation \textit{ordo} of Reims. In an \textit{ordo} produced for the bishop of Châlons\textsuperscript{177} in the mid-thirteenth century,\textsuperscript{178} as in the earlier \textit{ordo} of Reims,\textsuperscript{179} the peers were described as supporting the crown immediately after it had been placed upon the head of the king by the archbishop of Reims:

\begin{quote}
Qua imposita, omnes pares tam clerici quam laici manum apponunt corone et eam undique sustentant.\textsuperscript{180}
\end{quote}

\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{175} F. Lot, ‘Quelques mots sur l’origine des pairs de France,’ \textit{RH}, civ (1894), 50-51; Schramm, \textit{Der König}, i, pp. 171-176.
\item\textsuperscript{176} Le Goff, ‘Coronation,’ p. 49.
\item\textsuperscript{177} J. -C. Bonne, ‘The Manuscript of the Ordo of 1250 and its Illuminations,’ \textit{Coronations: Medieval and Early Modern Monarchic Ritual}, p. 58.
\item\textsuperscript{179} Concerning the relationship between the two \textit{ordos}. É. Palazzo, ‘La liturgie du sacre,’ \textit{Le sacre}, pp. 40-41.
\end{enumerate}
Although neither ordo was actually employed in a coronation ceremony, both texts are important because they outline what were considered to be the necessary components of such a ceremony. The Châlons ordo is of particular note because it was translated into French at the end of the thirteenth century and thus made available to a lay audience.\footnote{Bonne, ‘Ordo of 1250,’ p. 56.}

Two factors could have led to the involvement of the peers being interpreted rather differently from the original intentions of the author of either ordo. Firstly, the layout of the Châlons ordo’s illuminations gave particular prominence to the ‘coronation’ by the peers: the act featured in a quarter of a full-page illumination accompanying the relevant text,\footnote{Le sacre, plate ix.} whereas the archiepiscopal coronation appeared several folios later and was confined to an initial.\footnote{Ibid., plate xiii.} A second significant point is that the coronation ceremony was an essentially visual event and neither ordo envisioned explanatory speech to accompany this particular act. These factors could have led to the interpretation, by those ‘reading’ the illuminations of the Châlons text or who were witness to the ceremony itself, that the peers participated in the bestowal of royal authority or at least acted to confirm it. Whilst such an interpretation would have been doubtless anathema to the Capetian-Valois kings, it seems reasonable to question whether the ritual would have been interpreted by all contemporaries with the clarity of Le Goff, who viewed the inclusion of the peers as clearly the participation and submission of the great feudal lords to royal power.\footnote{Le Goff, ‘Structure,’ p. 23.} The prominence accorded in the first illumination to the ecclesiastical peers, who dominated the image leaving room for only one lay peer, is particularly striking and may even indicate an intentionally misleading subtext designed to emphasise the
important role played by the Church – and, perhaps, by one peer in particular, the bishop of Châlons – in the creation of a new king.\textsuperscript{185}

Whilst Capetian dynastic success assigned to the peers a largely symbolic role, the minstrel of Reims' account of the decisive part they played in the 'selection' of Louis VII, whom the minstrel erroneously believed to be a younger son,\textsuperscript{186} suggests that they became conceived of as the appropriate regulators of matters of succession if necessity should arise. The development of such ideas in France and their application to the western Empire was probably fuelled by the foundation of an hereditary dynasty in the conquered Greek Empire. The dynasty's founder, Baudoin de Flandre, described himself to Innocent III as having been elected by twelve 'peers'. Baudoin's letter became well known in France: it was cited by Aubri de Trois-Fontaines and Vincent de Beauvais,\textsuperscript{187} the latter's \textit{Speculum historiale} an important source for Jean de Saint-Victor.\textsuperscript{188} Primat's \textit{Roman des rois} referred to \textit{li François eslurent le conte Baudoin} by the counsel of the duke of Venice, princes, clergy and people \textit{et par l'assentement des barons de l'empire}.\textsuperscript{189}

It may be suggested that, from the perspective of northern France, what was supposed to happen in the Empire was an election by 'peers' which would 're-establish' an hereditary imperial dynasty. Election was not thought to be unique to the Empire; it was a system fundamental to the proper exercise of temporal authority. The frequency of imperial elections was simply a consequence of the failure of any one dynasty to become properly established. This occurred either because, like the nascent Plantagenet dynasty, they died out, or, like the Habsburgs, and to some extent Adolf's one man dynasty, because their fortunes declined when they turned against the Capetians.

\textsuperscript{185} cf. J. -C. Bonne, 'Images du sacre,' \textit{Le sacre}, p. 176.

\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Récits}, chap. i, pp. 2-3.


\textsuperscript{189} GCF, vi, p. 268. cf. GNC, i, p. 123.
viii. Conclusion

The prolonged absence of an emperor from the European stage and the disappearance of effective imperial rule in the form it had been practised by the Hohenstaufen certainly did not exorcise imperial rulers from French thought. Frederick II, for example, was a figure equally, if not more, important in France at the beginning of the fourteenth century as at the time of his death. Interest in imperial rulers arose from, and was defined by, contemporary concerns, such as promoting the sanctity of Louis IX, by broader concerns, such as the promotion of Capetian-Valois legitimacy or the authentication of relics, and by more fundamental ideas concerning how the world was perceived to be structured. Northern French conceptions of rulership as an institution inextricably linked with dynastic inheritance, and in particular an understanding of the mechanisms by which the succession of dynasties were governed, were superimposed upon the contemporary Empire and its ruler. Both were defined and considered in the light of French practices.

For the inhabitants of northern France, the Empire became, on one level at least, a distorted reflection of the French kingdom. By following the fortunes of imperial rulers and would-be rulers French writers were charting efforts to re-establish the world as it ought to be ordered. The consistent failure of any new dynasty to establish itself in the Empire contrasted markedly with Capetian dynastic success in France. This latter success was in no way altered by the accession of the first Valois kings, who, from a Valois perspective, represented a continuation of the Capetian dynasty rather than any dynastic rupture. In consequence, in recounting imperial succession French writers were simultaneously witnessing a salutary reminder, of particular importance to those closely associated with French kings, of the divine favour bestowed upon the French kingdom. Yet if principles of dynastic inheritance could be applied to the Empire, does this mean that the Empire was not considered to differ from a kingdom or, indeed, other forms of 'inheritance'? This elicits the further, interconnected, question of whether the emperor himself was considered in France to be little more than a king or whether he was thought to possess a unique role in a properly ordered Christian society.
Chapter Six

Dominus mundi?

i. Introduction

On the day of his imperial coronation in Rome the emperor Henry VII addressed an encyclical letter to the bishops and rulers of Christendom in which he declared that all men and all kingdoms ought to be subject to the Roman Empire. Whilst a theory of supreme temporal authority had underpinned the ideology of Frederick II, such a strident challenge to the independent self-government of the western kingdoms had not issued from the imperial court since Frederick Barbarossa’s chancellor, Rainald von Dassel, had, at the Diet of Dole in 1162, declared all other kings to be mere provinciarum reges. The circumstances in which Henry formulated such an exalted view of his new office remain unclear. There is little to indicate that the count of Luxembourg entered upon his Romzug with such precise conceptions. It seems probable that this particular idea was the product of Ghibelline and other enthusiastic pro-imperialist influences. The most prominent of those to proffer such an elevated view of imperial authority to the emperor-elect as he journeyed through northern Italy was the exiled Florentine, Dante Alighieri. What is clear, however, is that Henry’s letter was not well received.

The imperial encyclical elicited a frank reply from Philippe le Bel. Citing Henry’s claims, Philippe responded that the kingdom of France had neither had, nor

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recognised, a superior in temporal matters since the time of Christ no matter who the
reigning emperor might have been. The king went on to note the great surprise
elicited by Henry's decision to send a copy of his encyclical to the city of Lyon. The
emperor had addressed the citizens as if they were imperial vassals, yet the latter
'semper fuerunt notorie in et de regno Francie et prestante Domino sunt et erunt.'

Philippe's reply to Henry's encyclical highlighted two issues of immediate
relevance in the thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth century which led certain of
the inhabitants of northern France to analyse the nature and the extent of imperial
overlordship. The first, which elicited a dismissive response from Philippe and is the
subject of this chapter, concerned whether the king of France, specifically, was
subject to imperial authority and whether the kingdom of France, in particular, was
part of, or subject to, the Empire. The second topic, on which Philippe offered his
view in the case of the citizens of Lyon, and which will be considered in the following
chapter, concerned the precise western limits of imperial jurisdiction, that is the
material extent of the emperor's authority in regions of the Empire adjacent to the
Capetian-Valois kingdom. It is through the responses elicited by these two issues that
northern French views of the claims of Henry VII, and of the nature of the Empire as
an institution, can be properly understood.

ii. The Jurists - Imperial Authority as a Legal Technicality

The question of whether kings were or should be subject to the emperor was
debated energetically in the early-fourteenth century. This debate was, however,
largely confined to southern Italy and the papal court. It arose out of Henry VII's
attempts to depose Robert d'Anjou from his Sicilian crown and the emperor's
judgment that his opponent was guilty of treason and should be condemned to death.
Henry's supporters, and particularly his lawyers, argued that, as emperor, Henry had
every right to do this; Robert's own lawyers and those of Clement V vigorously
denied it. Neither side seems to have garnered active partisans in Capetian, or later

4 MGH Const. IV, no. 811, p. 813 (July/August 1312).

Valois, France. In fact, both before and after the Luxembourg-Angevin dispute, Philippe IV's reply to Henry's coronation encyclical remained the only text produced in northern France to be composed primarily with the intention of addressing the question of the relationship between emperors and kings.

Whilst the question of whether the emperor exercised temporal authority over the kingdom of France may not have been addressed directly, French specialists in Roman law had been raising it indirectly since at least the middle of the thirteenth century. The problem that confronted the jurists was not whether the king was subject to the emperor, but rather, as Pennington has made clear, the relationship between the king, his subjects and the law. An interest in this relationship led to the practical problem of how Roman legal principles and concepts might be applied in a northern French context. For the Roman jurists two issues arose which necessitated defining the French king's relationship with the law. The first of these was the desire to rationalise theory, that is the Corpus iuris civilis, the emperor Justinian's codification of Roman law, with practice. In the north 'practice' meant the customary law which predominated in territory directly subject to Capetian-Valois authority and in neighbouring lordships such as Metz. One approach to this problem, exemplified by the Coutumes de Clermont en Beauvaisis (1283) compiled by the royal bailli Philippe de Beaumanoir (d. 1296), was the codification of the coutumes following the Roman model. Another was the attempt by jurists such as Jacques de Révigny to explain the

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7 'In [Jacques de Révigny's] mind were French problems that had to be solved with Roman law...' Bezemer, Jacques, p. ix.


9 Concerning the impact of Roman legal principles upon Philippe's work: Bellomo, Common, p. 104; Sivery, Philippe, pp. 308-313.

10 Regarding the impact of Roman law upon other codifications of customs: Krynen, L'Empire, p. 77.
relationship between the coutumes and the Roman code. Jacques, for example, tended to view customs, in the regions where they were applied, as superior to Roman law, but the latter as something which might be resorted to when custom failed to provide a solution. These efforts gave rise to practical questions: where did the authority lie to resolve problems that arose when elements of customary law contradicted Roman legal principles? What institution possessed the necessary legitimate authority to modify or abrogate either customary or Roman law?

The second issue was the attempt by jurists such as Jean de Blanot (died ca. 1281) and Pierre de Mornay, advisers, respectively, to Hugues IV of Burgundy, and to Philippe III and Philippe IV, to deploy Roman legal principles in the interests of their patrons. This raised the question of the place occupied by the French king and his officials, not to mention the barons, their vassals and other elements of the feudal hierarchy, within the Roman legal framework. Any attempt to apply Roman principles to existing situations in France could prove problematic: Jacques de Révigny, for example, concluded that provosts must be guilty of homicide because their Roman ‘equivalent’, the defensor civitatis, lacked the authority to condemn people to death. Attempts to situate Roman legal thought within the pre-existent northern French legal structure and efforts to apply Roman legal principles to contemporary circumstances brought Roman jurists in France to confront a fundamental and thorny problem: whether or not the French king could be equated with the princeps of Roman law.

The equation of the French king with the princeps facilitated the application of Roman legal principles within the French kingdom, enabling, in theory, the alteration or derogation of material within the Roman code, but, more fundamentally, enabling

11 Bezemer, Jacques, pp. 6-8.
12 Ibid., pp. 85-86.
14 Pennington, Prince, p. 99.
15 Bezemer, Jacques, pp. 67-68.
the legitimate alteration or derogation of *coutumes*, and indeed the promulgation of new ones. In his 1256 commentary *Libellus super Institutionum titulum De actionibus*, Jean de Blanot removed royal power from the private sphere and placed it firmly in the public.\(^{16}\) French jurists generally came to agree upon the principle Jean established,\(^{17}\) *rex Francie in regno suo princeps est*, a tag which became a staple of legal circles, though there is little to suggest it enjoyed more popular diffusion before the mid-fourteenth century. It is, for example, notably absent from chronicles written before 1350. The *Grandes Chroniques* provides an illustrative case: it was only in a version prepared after 1380 that the tag appeared in the episode recounting Adolf of Nassau’s challenge to Philippe IV.\(^{18}\)

Whilst it enabled the assimilation of royal authority to imperial, the legal tag did not clarify the question of the king’s relationship with the emperor. Jean de Blanot had assimilated royal power to imperial power, yet the two were not identical: the king exercised his authority within the kingdom, the emperor his over the entire world.\(^{19}\) The question of whether the French king was subject to the emperor or not was simply not a problem that Jean sought to resolve. His reasoning did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the French kingdom was outside or separate from the Empire: the implication, although Jean himself did not elucidate it, was that the kingdom was more akin to a self-governing allod contained within the Empire.\(^{20}\)

In 1202 pope Innocent III had issued *Per venerabilem* in which he had declared that *rex ipse [Franciae] superiorem in temporalibus minime recognoscat.*\(^{21}\)

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\(^{16}\) Boulet-Sautel, ‘Jean,’ pp. 61-62. The relevant sections of the *Libellus* are edited: ibid., pp. 66-68.

\(^{17}\) Krynen, *L’Empire*, p. 79.


\(^{19}\) Boulet-Sautel, ‘Jean,’ p. 65.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., pp. 65-66.

\(^{21}\) X 4.17.13.
For jurists such as Jean de Blanot this particular decretal provided an extremely useful argument in their attempts to assimilate the king's authority to that of the Roman princeps. At the same time it raised a further question which concerned precisely how Innocent was to be interpreted on this matter. Had he meant that the king recognised no superior but that this was simply the *de facto* situation, or had he meant that the king recognised no superior as of right, that is *de iure*? For a number of canonists, most prominent amongst whom was Innocent IV, *Per venerabilem* meant that not simply France, but all kingdoms, were *de iure* independent of the Empire. It is notable, though, that many French jurists were not particularly enamoured of Innocent IV's view.

The sympathies of Jacques de Révigny lay with Philippe IV. In 1294 Jacques placed Verdun, his own bishopric, under interdict when the citizens chose to offer support to Edward I. Jacques' own position in the city became so difficult as a consequence of his support for the Capetians that he was forced to flee. Yet, paradoxically, Jacques' view of the nature of the French king's relationship with the emperor is unlikely to have been one that endeared him to Philippe. Writing ca. 1270, when still a professor of law at Orléans, Jacques had been quite clear that the independence of the French king, or any other king, could only ever be a *de facto* state. More than this, he seems to have believed that, in theory, at least, the emperor's authority extended over the French kingdom in practical matters. For Post, Jacques was 'merely engaging in a play of ideas' when he suggested that the emperor might grant a French province, Orléans, immunity from a clerical tenth granted to the French king by the pope. Whilst it is unlikely that Jacques considered it would be

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22 Boulet-Sautel, 'Jean,' p. 63.


25 Ibid., p. 97.

possible, in practice, for an emperor to grant such a privilege, there is little reason to
suppose that he considered that, *de iure*, if the emperor did make such a law it would
not be a valid one.

Jacques was not alone or even unusual in taking the view that the
independence enjoyed by French kings was merely *de facto*. Even royal advisers such
as Pierre de Mornay and Pierre de Belleperche echoed his opinion. Equally, it
appeared in the 1330s in a series of *additiones* that the jurist Pierre Jame d’Aurillac
(d. after 1351) prepared to his work on procedures. The latter differed from Jacques
in that he did not believe that law made by emperors who did not rule over France
was valid in the French kingdom, or that the French were subject to the Roman people
or to the emperor. At the same time, this does not necessarily imply that he considered
the independence enjoyed by the French to be *de iure*. These jurists recognised the
temporal superiority of the emperor, even if they were of the opinion that it was of
little practical consequence.

The perspective of the jurists was formed by a series of common assumptions,
the most important of which was that the *Corpus iuris civilis* was the foundation stone
of their thought. The *Corpus iuris civilis* conceived of the world in terms of a
hierarchical structure of temporal authority which culminated in the emperor. This
structure militated against any argument for *de iure* independence. The relationship
between the French king and the Roman legal code could not, from the perspective of
the jurists, be the same as that which existed between the *princeps*, that is the
emperor, and the code. The king was *not* the equal of the emperor in this context; he
was bound by the code in a way that the emperor was not. If Roman law principles
such as the *Lex Iulia majestatis* were applicable to the French king it was, as Jacques


de Révigny noted, not because he was princeps but because he was the magistrate of the prince. Jacques explained that this was the case because France was not only at one time under the Empire but had often been so.31

Whilst a fundamental inequality between king and emperor was founded upon the basic tenets of the jurists’ principal source, this was not necessarily problematic. The question of whether or not the French king was subject to the emperor was not central to the problems that jurists such as Jacques de Révigny were attempting to solve, just as it had not been central to Jean de Blanot. It was not necessary to ascertain anything more than that the French king could be assimilated to the role of princeps with regard to the application of the Corpus iuris civilis within the exclusive context of the French kingdom.

It is difficult to determine how influential the outlook adopted by the jurists came to be in northern France. The widespread contempt in which Roman legal practitioners seem to have been held, expressed, for example, in the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris,32 must raise some initial doubts concerning the significance contemporaries attached to their views. It was certainly quite possible for jurist opinions to be at odds with those held more generally, as has been seen in the case of Jacques de Révigny’s attitude towards the disinheritance of the Hohenstaufen. It seems unlikely that many sections of French society began with the same basic assumptions as the jurists, that is, principally, that the Roman legal code was the only valid law.33 It is true, as Bellomo has noted, that the ecclesiastical and civil juridical systems of western Europe as a whole operated upon procedures and concepts essentially derived from Roman jurisprudence. This was true even in regions such as northern France, where the civil system had no direct recourse to the Corpus iuris

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31 Ibid., pp. 473-474. Nevertheless, Post did not think that Jacques could have believed that France was subject to the Empire in his own day.


33 For the masters of Orléans, Toulouse and Montpellier, ‘...il n’y a de droit que le droit romain, et de lois que romaines. Les autres règles sociales n’expriment que des pratiques de fait...’ Krynen, L’Empire, p. 75.
Yet such fundamental principles are less relevant than contemporary perceptions of the relationship between Roman law and society.

The circumstances which elicited Honorius III's 1219 bull *Super speculam*, which forbade the teaching of Roman law at Paris, have been the subject of controversy since the late-nineteenth century. The view that it was a papal concession to a Capetian desire to check the potential 'external' threat posed by Roman law to the exercise of royal authority presumes that, like the jurists, the Capetian kings recognised the innate superiority of Roman law. It also presumes that, unlike the jurists, their prime concern was with its potential to subordinate French royal authority to that of the emperor. There is much to suggest that the first of these presumptions is inaccurate and that the second did not become a source of active concern until specific circumstances drew it to the attention of the royal government, and northern French society more generally, in the late-thirteenth century. As Krynen has pointed out in the case of *Super speculam*, there are no indications that Philippe Auguste played any part in the pope's decision and there is every reason to believe that Honorius was pursuing his own agenda, one motivated by a desire to preserve the integrity of theological studies at Paris. The most persuasive evidence in favour of this interpretation is the fact that the Capetians did nothing to deter the foundation of a law school at Orléans. This is not to say that the Capetian-Valois kings did not consider Roman law to be problematic. There is little, however, to suggest that they perceived the problem to lie in a theoretical threat that arose out of speculation concerning their relationship with the emperor. Rather, Roman law was intimately connected with the difficulties they faced in asserting royal authority over the southern lands annexed to the French kingdom by Louis VIII.

The Languedoc might have been forcibly integrated into the French kingdom, but it remained culturally, linguistically and even, to some extent, politically a

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separate and troublesome entity. The serious rebellion, led by Roger-Bernard III, count of Foix, with which Philippe III was confronted in 1271-1272 is illustrative of the region's instability. In order to exercise effective control it was necessary firmly to establish royal authority. To do this it became vital to demonstrate to the inhabitants that their pre-existing customs were dependent upon the king for their legitimacy and validity. In 1333, for example, the inhabitants of the seneschalty of Carcassone refused to pay a subsidy requested for the knighting of the future Jean II on the grounds that custom, *ius scriptum*, exempted them from such payments. Such behaviour was not, in itself, unacceptable to the Capetian-Valois kings. However, it was necessary that at the same time the inhabitants recognise that their right to this exemption ultimately derived from the king. Philippe VI affirmed this in 1347 by issuing an ordonnance which confirmed that the seneschalty of Carcassone was subject to *ius scriptum*. In essence the Capetian-Valois kings sought to promote a particular view of the legal system, one in which *ius scriptum* was seen to exist on the same level as any other customary code. This had a fundamental effect upon royal attitudes towards Roman law because it was upon the latter that *ius scriptum* was based.

Louis IX's 1254 ordonnance sent to the seneschal of Beaucaire and Philippe IV's 1312 instructions regulating the study of law at Orléans encapsulate a royal attitude towards the Roman legal code which did not begin from the jurists' premise that the *Corpus iuris civilis* was the only valid law. Louis declared that custom based upon Roman law was to be applied not because the king was in any way forced to allow it but because he saw no need, for the moment, to change it; Philippe noted that his ancestors had permitted the use of *ius scriptum* but that the kingdom was

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38 Rigaudière, 'La royauté,' 893.

39 Ibid., 893. An approach pursued since at least the mid-thirteenth century: ibid., 888-889.

40 '...quo casu jura scripta quibus utuntur ab antiquo volumus observari, non quod eorum obliget nos auctoritas seu astringat, setquia mores eorum in hac parte ad presens non duximus immutandas.' Ordonnance of July 1254 in favour of the inhabitants of Beaucaire and Nîmes, cited from: ibid., 889, n. 14.
principally regulated by customs. Roman-law-based custom might be applied as a law of first instance in some regions, but this usage continued only on the sufferance of the king. Indeed, in 1278 Philippe III even went so far as to forbid lawyers from employing Roman-law-based argument where coutumes were observed.

The emphasis which French kings placed upon Roman law as merely one set of customs amongst many, a set from which the king might dispense if he thought necessary, was intended to impress the nature of royal authority upon a turbulent southern society. Acts such as Louis' 1254 ordonnance and Philippe's 1312 regulations were not intended as attacks upon a perceived 'imperial' legal system that the kings feared might be used to subvert their authority. Rather, they were intended to affirm royal authority over what were considered to be local usages which might otherwise escape their control. The problem of the relationship between the king and the emperor, a topic which was of peripheral interest even to the jurists, arose only when Roman law was considered to be a benchmark by which other laws were judged. If it was not considered to be such a benchmark, and it seems unlikely that any but the jurists considered it so in northern France, the problem simply did not arise. It would only be necessary to confront the issue of the potential subordination of the French king to the emperor on Roman legal grounds if such subordination were to be proposed. Neither Frederick II, nor his predecessors, although they made much use of the language of world rulership, sought to put such a case: their concern focused upon the struggle with the papacy. Whilst the majority of Frederick's successors were too pre-occupied with asserting their authority over the German lands of the Empire to concern themselves with asserting it over anyone else, there did arise a need to consider Roman legal arguments for imperial overlordship in the late-thirteenth century, yet this need had little to do with the Empire directly.

41 Ibid., 890.

42 Ibid., 891.

iii. Beating Boniface – The Case for French Exemption

In most probably the late spring or summer of 1302 the tract now commonly known as the *Quaestio in utramque partem* took to task those jurists who believed that the independence of the French king could only ever be *de facto*:

\[
\text{Si dicas quod, etsi non recognoscat, tamen de iure deberet, respondemus per interemptionem quod non debet...} \quad 45
\]

The author, possibly himself a jurist, was by no means alone in arguing that the independence of the French king was *de iure*. Slightly earlier, the author of *Disputatio inter Clericum et Militem* (ca. 1296-1297), almost certainly a lawyer and a layman, had addressed the jurists’ perennial problem of the king’s relationship with the law and argued that if the king, *qui est summus*, could not change and promulgate new laws then no one could, because there is no superior over the king. Between 1320 and 1340 the French jurist Jean Faure noted that whilst *imperator fundatus erat olim de jure communi in omni orbe*, this was no longer the case and that today he did not believe that the emperor could exercise his authority *de iure* beyond certain limits.

An argument in favour of *de iure* independence from the Empire, pioneered as it had been by the canonists, was by no means the novel invention of these writers. However, a question which had remained something of a technicality for jurists, such

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45 *Quaestio*, p. 80.


as Jacques de Révigny, was brought into sharp focus in northern France by the events of the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries. Between 1296 and 1303 a need arose to prove the independence of the French king and his kingdom from imperial authority. Paradoxically the circumstances that gave rise to this requirement involved the Empire and its would-be ruler, Albrecht of Habsburg, only indirectly.

The first quarrel between Philippe IV and pope Boniface VIII broke out in 1296 but was quickly resolved in the following year. It arose over the issue of Philippe's attempts to tax the French clergy in order to pay for his war against Edward I and the Flemings.\(^50\) The second and more serious dispute, which was sparked by the king's arrest of Bernard Saisset in 1301, ended only with Boniface's death in 1303.\(^51\) At the centre of both disagreements lay the question of the relationship between temporal and spiritual power. Papal apologists argued forcibly in favour of the complete subjection of the temporal power to the spiritual. Most prominent amongst them was the archbishop of Bourges, Giles of Rome, who argued, in his *De ecclesiastica potestate* (1301/02), not only that spiritual power was of greater dignity than temporal but that the former also pre-dated the latter.\(^52\) This theoretical argument was not the only weapon in the papal arsenal.

Regardless of whether or not the relationship between the powers outlined by Giles of Rome were to be accepted, papal apologists could argue that France and its king were, in any case, subject to a superior form of temporal authority. The possessor of this latter might act at papal behest to curb Philippe's impudence. At the height of the second dispute Boniface took the first steps towards proving precisely this point by endorsing the imperial candidature of Albrecht of Habsburg.\(^53\) The continuator of

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\(^52\) *Aegidius Romanus de ecclesiastica potestate*, ed. R. Scholz (Weimar, 1929; reprinted Aalen, 1961).

the annals of Rouen,\textsuperscript{54} an anonymous account written in Boulogne,\textsuperscript{55} and Bernard Gui,\textsuperscript{56} a man very much in a position to understand papal policy, all interpreted Boniface's endorsement as something specifically intended to harm Philippe. These three accounts, written independently of each other, suggest that there was little room in France for misunderstanding the papal argument. For those who wished to defend Philippe it was therefore necessary to prove not only the independence (if not the parity) of spiritual and temporal power but also the independence of Philippe's authority from the claims made by the papacy on behalf of the emperor.

Despite the proliferation of arguments in favour of \textit{de iure} independence, the position remained one that specialists in Roman law found difficult to endorse wholeheartedly. In part, the problem almost certainly lay in the fact that it was not possible simply to appropriate the arguments originally produced by canon lawyers: canonists who favoured \textit{de iure} independence, such as the Englishman Alanus,\textsuperscript{57} writing in the early-thirteenth century, and later Innocent IV, had also tended to argue for ultimate papal supremacy in temporal matters. Simultaneously, the same factor which had shaped the thought of Jean de Blanot and Jacques de Révigny, the nature of the \textit{Corpus iuris civilis}, made \textit{de iure} independence a difficult concept to accept.

It is notable that amongst those who chose to argue in favour of \textit{de iure} independence few could find legal grounds on which to do so. Jean Faure, for example, could only attribute it to divine dispensation.\textsuperscript{58} The \textit{Quaestio in utramque partem}\textsuperscript{59} and the \textit{Disputatio inter Clericum et Militem}\textsuperscript{60} settled upon historical

\begin{footnotes}
\item[54] MGH SS, xxvi, p. 347.
\item[55] \textit{Extraits d'une chronique anonyme française, finissant en M.CCC.VIII}, RHGF, xxi, p. 136. Certainly compiled before Philippe IV's death, although the one extant MS was copied as much as a century later: RHGF, xxi, pp. 130-131.
\item[56] \textit{Reges francorum}, RHGF, xxi, p. 713.
\item[57] Post, \textit{Studies}, pp. 464-466.
\item[58] 'Hodie vero verum cum divisum sit imperium Dei permissione...' \textit{Codicis breviarum}, cited from: Chazan, \textit{L'Empire}, p. 654, n. 74.
\item[59] \textit{Quaestio}, p. 80.
\end{footnotes}
justifications. Some, such as Pierre Dubois, who chose to speak not only of the independence of the French king, but also noted the existence of other princes and cities which did not recognise any temporal superior, simply refrained from addressing the question of whether, in legal terms, the independence they enjoyed was strictly legitimate. If finding a legal justification of *de iure* independence proved difficult, it was less problematic to find a legal argument which justified the specific exemption of the French kingdom and its ruler from what, otherwise, was tacitly acknowledged to be the universal temporal jurisdiction exercised by the emperor. Such arguments arose specifically in response to papal claims based upon the so-called *Donation of Constantine*. Although frequently questioned, the *Donation* was generally accepted until, in the first half of the fifteenth century, Lorenzo Valla succeeded in demonstrating it to be a forgery.

Whilst it might appear somewhat at odds with the papal claim to possess temporal authority on the theological grounds outlined by Giles of Rome, the idea that Constantine had handed over the temporal authority he possessed as emperor to pope Sylvester was an argument with too great a potential value to be simply ignored

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60 Disputatio, pp. 40-41.


62 De recup., chap. 12, p. 11, chap. 52, p. 44, chap. 106, p. 90.


64 The text of the *Donation* with which contemporaries would have been most familiar was Dist. 96, c. 13; Dist. 96, c. 14. For example: Quaestio de potestate papae (Rex pacificus)/ An Enquiry into the Power of the Pope. A Critical Edition and Translation [hence Rex pacificus], ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson (Lampeter, 1999), p. 37.


66 This did not go unnoticed by contemporaries: ‘...si ex institutione divina papa dicit se esse dominum omnium temporalium, quae necessitas est dicere quod ex donatione Constantini...?’ Quaestio, p. 104.
by papal apologists. Most notably, James of Viterbo, writing in spring or summer of 1302, wrestled with the problems presented by the Donation in his De regimine christiano. In common with Boniface VIII’s plan to set up an imperial candidate, the Donation offered an alternative avenue by which the papacy might exert temporal authority over the French king. Unlike the plan to elevate Albrecht it had the distinct advantage of placing this authority directly in the hands of the pope. This dangerous potential led to widespread attempts in the first decade of the fourteenth century to refute the papal interpretation of Constantine’s act, no doubt stimulated not only by James of Viterbo but, in particular, by Boniface’s restatement of the Donation’s principles in the bull Fundamenta.

The Donation could, it was suggested, simply be discounted as invalid on the legal grounds that Constantine had possessed neither the authority to make it nor the ability to bind his successors by its terms. Even if the validity of the act were to be accepted, French writers could find three reasons why it did not provide the papacy with adequate grounds to claim temporal authority over the French kingdom. One was to suggest that the Donation was limited. This, for example, was one argument offered in the Quaestio in utramque partem, whose author noted that the only thing Constantine had given over to the papacy was the city of Rome. Jean Quidort and Pierre Dubois, although they appear to have regarded the Donation as slightly more

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69 Vit° 1.6.17.


71 Quaestio, p. 104.

72 De potestate, chap. xxi, pp. 243-244.

73 ‘...et les autres saïncs Apostoiles, ne les autres, iusques au temps dudit Boniface, ne demanderent onques Seignerie, fors en ce que Constantins donna à l’Eglise.’ Supplication, p. 216. For Dubois this consisted of Rome, the Tuscan march and the southern Italian regno: Summaria, p. 12.
extensive, were similarly of the opinion that Constantine's gift had been limited. The anonymous *Rex pacificus* took a similar view. This latter was possibly produced as a formal summary of the views of the Paris masters on the Franco-papal dispute. Whilst several of its arguments are markedly similar to those employed in the *Quaestio* and by Jean Quidort the precise relationship between these three texts remains unclear and it is probably going too far to attribute both anonymous works to Jean.

Preferred by Dubois, a second reason was the legal principle of prescription. France had not been subject to the Empire for at least one hundred years. In consequence, even if the *Donation* had been valid, the operation of the prescriptive mechanism in Roman law meant that the French kingdom was exempt from imperial, and consequently papal, authority. Indeed, to emphasis this point Dubois noted that French kings had enjoyed freedom from the Empire for over a thousand years. Although it was taken up by a number of authors, prescription was not a wholly satisfactory argument: as some jurists suggested, amongst them Pierre de Belleperche (d. 1308), it could be argued that prescription could not run against the Empire. It was possibly for this reason that many writers, with the notable exception of Dubois, chose to add to their legal arguments an 'historical' justification for French exemption.

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74 *Rex pacificus*, p. 37.


76 Ibid., p. xvi.


78 *Deliberatio*, p. 46; *Supplication*, p. 218.


80 Post, *Studies*, p. 475.
Primat’s *Roman des rois* was probably one of the most influential of several accounts to construct a Trojan ancestry for the contemporary inhabitants of France. This idea, which rested on a belief that the population of France formed an homogeneous unit with a common ancestry, was probably fostered by a growing sense of regnal solidarity produced, in part, by the expansion of effective royal government. The importance of this origin myth is underlined by, for example, the prefacing of Primat’s *Roman des rois* in Pierre Honoré’s compilation with an illumination, unusually large for the manuscript, depicting the sack of Troy. The *Quaestio in utramque partem* was one of several tracts to argue that these Trojan origins offered a basis for exemption from imperial authority. The Trojan ancestors of the French, it was suggested, had never been subject to the Empire’s authority and in particular had refused to pay tribute to the emperor Valentinian. Their descendants could not, therefore, be affected by Constantine’s donation. Yet this approach was no less problematic than many legal arguments.

Whilst Primat recounted that the Franks had refused to pay tribute to the emperor Valentinian and gone on to defeat a Roman army, he also noted that they had, like all other nations, originally been subject to Rome and paid tribute. For Jean

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81 GCF, i, pp. 9-18.


84 BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 19r. Placed at the head of Primat’s general prologue, for the flight from Troy: fol. 20r-22r.


86 GCF, i, p. 15.

87 Ibid., pp. 17-18.

88 Ibid., p. 12.
de Saint-Victor, writing before 1308, not only were the descendants of the Trojans forced originally to submit to the Empire by the son of the emperor Constantine, but they were then soundly beaten by the emperor Valentinian when they later refused to pay tribute. This was, Jean noted, according to Sigebert de Gembloux; the Franks fared little better, however, in an alternate version of their origins attributed by Jean to Hugues de Saint-Victor: according to Hugues the Franks had been subject to the Roman Empire and paid tribute like other nations. The inclusion of these versions greatly expanded upon an earlier account of French origins given by Jean, yet even this latter had contained the idea that the Franks had paid tribute to the Romans and that they had been chased from Sycambria when they rebelled. Whilst a sermon preached in order to rally support for Philippe IV’s war with the Flemings could give a version of Sigebert’s account which left out the idea that the Franks had been defeated by the Romans, the existence of interpretations such as Jean’s may explain the emergence of several alternative ‘historical’ justifications for French independence.

The Knight of the Disputatio inter Clericum et Militem, whilst not concerned specifically with the Donation, was equally intent upon frustrating any ecclesiastical argument that the authority of the French king was subordinate to that of the emperor. He argued that the French king was not subject to imperial laws on the grounds that his kingdom had been separated from the Empire by fraternal division amongst Charlemagne’s grandsons, so that:

89 Tractatus (2), p. 248.

90 Ibid., p. 250.

91 Ibid., p. 254.


93 ‘Un sermon prononcé pendant la guerre de Flandre,’ 171.
...quidquid ergo privilegii et dignitatis retinet imperii nomen in parte una, hoc regnum Franciae tenet in alia.  

Trojan descent led the author of the Flanders sermon to establish this equality on a more profound basis: the French were *fratres romani imperii*. Other historical arguments for French exemption included the suggestion that the Franks had held the Empire prior to the Germans and the argument employed by Philippe IV’s own chancery, that the kingdom of France had been free of imperial authority since the time of Christ.

The argument put forward by Philippe’s chancery suggests that either the royal clerks were equating the Trojan-Sycambrian ancestors of the French with the kingdom of France, or, that this was the work of a clerk whose grasp of history was not all that it might have been: contemporary chroniclers, such as Primat, were clear that the French kingdom had not existed at the time of Christ. Nevertheless, study of the most reliable histories, would, as the Knight put it, reveal, seemingly paradoxically, that the kingdom of France was part of the Empire, most noble in standing, separated from it by equal division and distinguished by equal dignity and authority. Whether historical or legal all these justifications shared a common point. They did not argue against the idea that the emperor exercised a form of universal temporal authority; they simply asserted a special case which exempted the French kingdom from this authority.


95 ‘Un sermon prononcé pendant la guerre de Flandre,’ 170.

96 *Quaestio*, pp. 60-62.

97 MGH Const. IV, no. 811, p. 813 (July/August 1312).

98 *Disputatio*, p. 40.
The recognition of the theoretical universality of the emperor's temporal jurisdiction, with the provision that it did not apply to France, seems to have been regarded as a satisfactory rebuttal of papal-imperial arguments by many, not least Philippe IV's own chancery. Several of the inhabitants of northern France seem to have found this reasoning inadequate. Whilst these latter might sometimes repeat the arguments for French exemption, as did Jean Quidort, they also challenged the fundamental principle that had led to the development of such arguments. Was the existence of a universal temporal authority really necessary for the proper ordering of the world and, even if such an authority came into existence, was it anything more than an arbitrary and transient institution?

iv. Jean Quidort – An Alternative to Exemption?

A particularly distinctive feature not only of Philippe's dispute with Boniface but of the first decade of the fourteenth century as a whole were the lengths the king, either on his own initiative or that of his advisers, went to in order to secure support. When embroiled in his bitter quarrel with Innocent IV, Frederick II had, to little ultimate effect, sought to win over his fellow rulers. Rather than turn to other kings, Philippe looked to his own subjects and in particular to certain social groups. Philippe's government was undoubtedly keen to associate its actions with the nobility and the higher clergy, but it was also keen to secure the endorsement of less traditional channels of potential support. Philippe's advisers went to great lengths to disseminate the royal perspective to one such group, the populations of the towns, through the holding of the Estates General. Philippe's advisers were not content merely to ensure that their message was imparted: their intention was to secure the


100 For example: MGH Const. II, no. 262, pp. 360-366; no. 265, pp. 371-372.

active endorsement of those to whom it was addressed. This was particularly true of a second group, the masters of the university of Paris, whose developing reputation for representing orthodoxy probably made securing their support of greater practical importance than even that of the townsmen.\footnote{Menache, ‘La naissance,’ 307-308.}

In June 1303 a large proportion of the masters of the university proclaimed their support for the king in a petition which called for the arraignment of Boniface VIII before a general council.\footnote{Paravicini Bagliani, \textit{Boniface}, p. 367.} Amongst the signatories was a Dominican master of theology, Jean Quidort.\footnote{F. A. Cunningham, ‘The ‘Real Distinction’ in John Quidort,’ \textit{Journal of the History of Philosophy}, viii (1970), 13.} \textit{De potestate regia et papali}, the lengthy scholarly tract prepared by Jean most probably between December 1301 and November 1302,\footnote{J. A. Watt, \textit{On Royal and Papal Power} (Toronto, 1971), pp. 27-28.} was by no means a political pamphlet akin to the outpourings of, for example, Pierre Dubois. Jean’s precise intentions have been the subject of recent debate. Like his fellow Dominican, Vincent de Beauvais, it seems likely that the interests of his order played an important role in shaping the structure of his writings. In Jean’s case these interests involved the defence of Dominican conceptions of the nature of property and Christ’s royalty against those promoted by the Franciscans.\footnote{J. Coleman, ‘The Dominican political theory of John of Paris in its context,’ ed. D. Wood, \textit{Studies in Church History, Subsidia}, 9, \textit{The Church and Sovereignty c.590-1918. Essays in honour of Michael Wilks} (Oxford, 1991), pp. 187-223.} Whilst it seems unlikely that the tract, or possibly series of tracts,\footnote{Ibid., p. 188.} was written with the sole intention of defending Philippe’s position,\footnote{cf. Krynen, \textit{L’Empire}, p. 96.} Jean was certainly interested in the dispute between king and pope. In particular, there are too many references to the events of the second Philippe-Boniface dispute scattered throughout the work to make...
Coleman’s view that Jean was primarily concerned with the mendicant dispute and a proposed re-dating of the bulk of the work to 1297-1298 appear convincing.\textsuperscript{109} Jean certainly tended to limit royal power,\textsuperscript{110} yet on the whole, whilst not inclined to the extremes of certain royal and papal supporters,\textsuperscript{111} his outlook favours the royal perspective on the relationship between spiritual and temporal power rather than the papal.\textsuperscript{112} The twenty-first chapter of \textit{De potestate}, in particular, contained a lengthy refutation of the applicability of the \textit{Donation of Constantine} to France. This rebuttal was not Jean’s only contribution to Philippe’s defence.

The most striking feature of \textit{De potestate}, or, perhaps more accurately the feature that has most struck modern historians and political theorists, is the explanation Jean offered for the origins and nature of temporal power. Jean’s conception was based upon principles drawn from Aristotle’s re-discovered \textit{Politics} (available in a Latin translation by William of Moerbeke by the first half of 1265). This was mediated through the thought of another Dominican, Thomas Aquinas, although Jean’s view of the relationship between the spiritual and temporal powers differed profoundly from that of Aquinas.\textsuperscript{113} \textit{De potestate} proposed that the temporal power was not simply an unfortunate consequence of the Fall, rather it was an institution which contributed to enabling man to live virtuously. Consequently Jean was led to consider how temporal power could best be exercised. His reflections on this problem were summed up in the concluding remarks to his discussion of the


\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., pp. 213-214.

\textsuperscript{111} For a recent example of the judgment that Jean represented a \textit{via media}: J. P. Canning, \textit{A History of Medieval Political Thought 350-1450} (London, 1996), p. 145.

\textsuperscript{112} Krynen, \textit{L’Empire}, pp. 94-95.

Donation of Constantine: ‘Melius est tamen plures in pluribus regnis dominari quam unum toti mundo.’

A preference for a world composed of multiple autonomous kingdoms rather than for subjection to one universal empire was an argument Jean had developed in the third chapter of *De potestate*. His view, that ‘non sic autem fideles laici habent ex iure divino quod subsint uni supremo monarche in temporalibus,’ was based on multiple points. It was partly justified by the difference between spiritual and temporal power. Whilst it was both possible and necessary that there should exist one ruler in spiritual matters this was simply not the case in temporal affairs. For example, the communal nature of ecclesiastical property justified a single spiritual ruler; lay property, as it was neither acquired nor held communally, did not necessitate such a ruler. Fundamentally, multiple rulers were justified and necessary because of the diversity of both men and the climates in which they lived:

Sed possunt secundum diversitatem climatum et linguarum et conditionum hominum esse diversi modi vivendi et diverse politie...

and because *quod virtuosum est in una gente non est virtuosum in alia*. In fact the existence of one ruler was positively detrimental to living virtuously: ‘tempore imperatorum nunquam fuit mundus in tanta pace quanta fuit postea et ante.’

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114 *De potestate*, chap. xxi, p. 247.

115 Ibid., chap. iii, p. 180.

116 Ibid., chap. iii, pp. 180-181.

117 Ibid., chap. iii, p. 181.

118 Ibid., chap. iii, p. 181.

119 Ibid., chap. iii, p. 181.

120 Ibid., chap. xxi, p. 247.
Stimulated by Philippe's dispute with Boniface, Jean's *De potestate* appears to have provided a definitive answer to questions concerning not simply the relationship between France and the Empire, but also the nature of the Empire itself. Jean's case was not for a special exemption based on historical or legal reasons: it challenged the very idea that a universal ruler in temporal matters was either a good thing or a necessity. Jean's conclusions have been very often presented as the culmination of developments begun by the canonists and continued by the jurists. They have been an important factor in forming the 'general consensus' of historians, as summarised by Black that, 'internationalism was on the decline, and membership of a national or local unit was what increasingly counted.' The question must be asked, though, whether Jean's contemporaries paid as much attention to his *De potestate* as historians have done. In other words, was anyone actually listening to Jean Quidort and if they were did they accept, or even understand, what he had to say?

v. Jean Quidort's Perspective: A Success?

Jean Quidort enjoyed a reputation for holding somewhat heterodox opinions. It was in consequence of this reputation that it was 1303 before he was admitted to the theology faculty of the university of Paris. His stay there was a short one: within a year his views on the Eucharist had resulted in his being censured by a commission headed by none other than Giles of Rome. This dispute, and Jean's death in 1306 whilst on his way to Rome to protest his case at the curia, caught the imagination of both Jean de Saint-Victor, who may even have been witness to Giles' inquiry, and the Dionysians, whose interest was no doubt piqued by the presence of Bertraud


122 Black, *Political Thought*, p. 87.

123 Roensch, *Thomistic*, p. 144.

124 JSV, p. 645.

de Saint-Denis, *praecellens doctor*, amongst those who deprived Jean of his right to teach and forbade him to ever speak on the subject of the Eucharist again.\(^{126}\) Evident as early as the 1290s, when he produced his *Correctorium 'Circa'* largely in order to defend his orthodoxy,\(^{127}\) Jean’s tendency to court controversy gives an initial cause to question the extent to which his conception of temporal authority and the place of the Empire within it was a popular one or one which gained acceptance.

Jean’s *De potestate* did not remain unknown to contemporaries: it was employed by his fellow Dominican, and the sometime patriarch of Jerusalem, Pierre de la Palud (d. 1342), when, as a master at the university of Paris, Pierre wrote his *De potestate papae* (ca. 1317).\(^{128}\) Jean’s work may also have marked the thought of another French Dominican, Guillaume de Peyre de Godin (d. 1326).\(^{129}\) Nevertheless, whether as a consequence of the length and complexity of *De potestate*, the air of controversy that dogged the heels of its author, or some other factor, there is little indication that Jean was read widely before the Great Schism, the period responsible for the greater part of the manuscript tradition.\(^{130}\) Jean’s *De potestate* appears to have enjoyed only an extremely limited circulation in the first half of the fourteenth century.\(^{131}\) Only one extant manuscript of the work dates from this period\(^{132}\) and the

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\(^{126}\) Continuator(2)GNC, i, pp. 347-348; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 25.

\(^{127}\) Cunningham, ‘Real Distinction,’ 16.


\(^{131}\) Cf. Chazan’s view that it was *un réel succès: L’Empire*, p. 489. Whilst it is possible the *De potestate* influenced Pierre de Cuignières in 1329, this is by no means as clear-cut as Chazan implied: cf. Leclercq, *l’ecclésiologie*, p. 152.

\(^{132}\) BN MS lat. 18288 (containing only *De potestate*). The provenance prior to its entry into the collection of Notre-Dame de Paris is unclear: Leclercq, *l’ecclésiologie*, p. 168.
tract left no trace in contemporary library catalogues. Yet it is not simply that Jean was not read: there is also evidence to suggest that other Aristotelian scholars in France, indeed in the university of Paris, developed a conception of the world quite different from that propounded in De potestate.

It is striking that even those who undoubtedly perused Jean's De potestate appear to have been reluctant to endorse certain of its arguments wholeheartedly. Pierre de la Palud, for example, chose to argue that the Roman Empire had lost its legitimacy when Arian emperors had begun to persecute Catholics. In doing so Pierre departed from Jean's view of the Empire, suggesting that prior to this persecution the Empire had been not only a legitimate institution, but, because it established peace, a necessary one. Similarly, in seeking to demonstrate the independence of the French kingdom from the Empire, Pierre, a man trained in canon and civil law as well as theology, did not draw upon Jean Quidort's Aristotelian arguments but chose instead to argue a case for French exemption from imperial authority based primarily upon prescription. Indeed, Pierre went to great lengths to highlight that French kings had acted in good faith in order to demonstrate that the operation of the prescriptive mechanism should be considered valid in their particular case.

In the generation of masters that succeeded Jean Quidort's own at the university of Paris, Jean de Jandun, a member of the arts faculty, offers a clear example of the failure of the world view propounded in Jean's De potestate to gain enthusiastic support. Writing his Tractatus de Laudibus Parisius in 1323, a whimsical work almost certainly intended to endear him to Charles le Bel, Jean declared that monarchicum totius orbis dominium pertained to illustriSSimis et precellentissimis

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133 Ibid., pp. 151-152.


135 Ibid., p. 165.

136 Ibid., p. 168.
Francie regibus. Jean de Jandun was certainly well acquainted with Aristotle and may even have prepared a commentary on the Politics. Yet Jean’s reading of Aristotle did not lead him to conclude that the idea of a universal Empire was one to be dispensed with, just as it did not lead his friend Marsilius of Padua, almost certainly another product of the arts faculty and certainly a man steeped in Parisian-Aristotelian thought, to such conclusions. Nevertheless, while it is not possible to demonstrate the direct influence of De potestate beyond a rather limited impact within the Dominican order, there is evidence to suggest that the conception of the natural order of the world as a plurality of kingdoms was not exclusive to Jean Quidort.

In the first half of his De recuperatione, a work prepared for Edward I and Clement V, Pierre Dubois expounded an argument which came to conclusions very similar to those put forward in De potestate, albeit imbued with the lawyer from Coutances’ characteristic flair for the dramatic:

Modo non est homo sane mentis, ut credo, qui estimare verisimiliter posset in hoc fine seculorum fieri posse quod esset totius mondi [sic], quoad temporalia, solus unus monarcha qui omnia regeret, cui tanquam superiori omnes obedirent.

If there were to be a tendency towards such overlordship the result would almost certainly be guerre, seditiones et dissensiones infinita. It is not impossible that Dubois acquired this opinion from reading Jean’s De potestate. It seems more

137 Tractatus de Laudibus Parisius, p. 60.


139 Jones, ‘Marsilius,’ pp. 21-54.

140 Jones, ‘Dubois,’ 56, n. 28; 60, n. 37.

141 De recup., chap. 63, p. 54.

142 Ibid., chap. 63, p. 54. Also: Deliberatio, pp. 46-47.

143 Jones, ‘Dubois,’ 62, n. 49.
probable, however, that he was regurgitating ideas originally encountered in the arts faculty of the university of Paris, where he was a student sometime between 1269 and 1274.\textsuperscript{144} It is unlikely that he acquired this idea from Aristotle’s \textit{Politics} directly, as the text never formed part of the official reading in the arts faculty.\textsuperscript{145} It is more probable that he encountered such concepts in lectures or, possibly, from one of the various commentaries concerning the \textit{Politics} that circulated in the faculty.\textsuperscript{146} The question is not, however, where Dubois acquired this idea, so much as whether he had properly understood or accepted its implications.

Writing exclusively for Philippe IV some five or so years before, Dubois viewed matters somewhat differently. Although on historical grounds he considered that a universal empire had never actually existed,\textsuperscript{147} Dubois did not think it impossible that universal temporal rule might be established. As a consequence of a favourable astronomical alignment over Paris, it would, Dubois had argued, be beneficial for the whole world to be subject to the French king.\textsuperscript{148} He did not regard this as at all impractical: it was perfectly possible for Philippe to rule the greater part of the world through the use of his relatives and others. Should the king be at all concerned by the difficulties such a plan presented Dubois assured him: ‘ymmo legitur nonnullos Romanos imperatores sic quam plura mundi regna et climata gubernasse.’\textsuperscript{149} His continued adherence to this view is testified to by his suggestion

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 50, n. 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{145} H. Rashdall, \textit{The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages}, eds. F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden (2\textsuperscript{nd} edition, 3 vols., Oxford, 1936), i, p. 447.
  \item \textsuperscript{146} Jones, ‘Marsilius,’ pp. 42-44.
  \item \textsuperscript{147} \textit{Deliberatio}, p. 45; \textit{Supplication}, p. 218; \textit{De recup.}, chap. 63, p. 54.
  \item \textsuperscript{148} \textit{Summaria}, p. 11.
  \item \textsuperscript{149} Ibid., p. 19.
\end{itemize}
in the second part of *De recuperatione* that Philippe consult his earlier work on the topic.\(^{150}\)

An explanation for the apparent contradiction lies, at least in part, in the pragmatic approach of Dubois to the requirements of different audiences. A lengthy French occupation of Gascony having only ended in 1303,\(^{151}\) it would, for example, have been tactful to reassure Edward I that the distances separating peoples, local differences, and man’s natural inclination towards strife, necessitated different rulers. Equally, whilst clearly the suggestion would have grossly offended Edward, the idea of establishing a French hegemony was one calculated to endear Dubois to the Capetians. Yet it also seems probable that the philosophical argument put to the English king and the pope, whilst convenient, did not derive from Dubois’ fundamental conception of how the world should be properly ordered. Firstly, it seems improbable, given his tendency to cite with approval two figures with completely disparate philosophical positions, his former lecturers Thomas Aquinas and Siger de Brabant, that Dubois had fully understood the philosophical argument he appropriated in the first part of *De recuperatione*.\(^{152}\) Secondly, even if he had understood the wider implications of Aristotelian philosophy in the sense that Jean Quidort had understood them, these philosophical principles were not, essentially, the factor responsible for shaping Dubois’ thought.

Jean Quidort, although a theologian, chose to cite legal arguments in support of his view that the French king was not subject to imperial authority. At the same time, his use of such arguments was relatively restricted and confined largely to repeating points that had been established by the jurists. The basic tenets upon which Jean’s thought were founded were not legal arguments but a philosophical conception of the structure of the world. This is clearest from the fact that, ultimately, his

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\(^{150}\) *De recup.*, chap. 120, pp. 113-114.


\(^{152}\) Brandt, *Recovery*, pp. 43-44. As Sághy has recently highlighted, the erroneous view that Dubois was a ‘...profound political philosopher...’ is still widely held: M. Sághy, ‘Crusade and Nationalism: Pierre Dubois, the Holy Land, and French Hegemony,’ eds. Z. Hunyadi and J. Laszlovszky, *The Crusades and the Military Orders. Expanding the Frontiers of Medieval Latin Christianity* (Budapest, 2001), p. 44.
dismissal of the legal case in favour of subjection to the Empire was not based upon legal arguments but upon philosophical ones. Dubois, although a lawyer, cited arguments derived from Aristotelian philosophy. His use of them, however, was as limited and as restricted as Jean Quidort's use of legal argument. Given Dubois' profession, it is perhaps less than surprising that he generally exhibited a marked preference for legal arguments. For example, the essence of his case in the Deliberatio was that Boniface had violated laws relating to property. Similarly, the plan he proposed to Philippe IV in his Summaria brevis for curbing ecclesiastical encroachments upon lay jurisdiction was essentially based upon the technicalities of prescription. It may be suggested that it was upon legal conceptions, not philosophical ones, that Dubois' thought in general had its foundations.

The most persuasive proof that Dubois' conception of the world was underpinned by the Corpus iuris civilis rather than the Politics was the fact that he was unable to imagine a properly ordered world in which there did not exist a supreme arbiter of temporal affairs who was also responsible for the reform of secular law even if, for practical reasons, he envisioned this authority to be vested in the papacy rather than the emperor. The problem of proving the independence of the French king from imperial authority was no exception: it was upon Dubois' understanding of the legal mechanism of prescription, a mechanism which gave rise to a special case for French exemption, that his view rested, not upon Aristotelian ideas. Someone who appears to have applied the implications of Aristotelianism to

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153 De potestate, chap. xxi, p. 247.


155 Krynen, L'Empire, pp. 254-255.

156 Jones, 'Dubois,' 82-87.

157 cf. Krynen's judgment: 'Soit qu'il se manifeste sans détour, soit qu'il autorise la quête de nouveaux arguments de <<raison>>, l'aristétélisme constitue le support doctrinal essentiel des défenseurs de Philippe le Bel.' L'Empire, p. 93.
his thought more fully than Dubois, but not in quite the same sense as Jean Quidort, was the historian, Jean de Saint-Victor.

Although the abbey of Saint-Victor enjoyed close links with the university,\textsuperscript{158} the author of the \textit{Memoriale historiarum} was almost certainly a special case. Guyot-Bachy has proposed that the knowledge of the university displayed by Jean de Saint-Victor, in particular of its debates and its masters, indicates that his attachment to the institution was of a very personal nature.\textsuperscript{159} Chazan has gone further and suggested that he may even be identifiable with a contemporary member of the theology faculty.\textsuperscript{160} Whether or not this latter is the case it does seem probable, given his knowledge of the work of Giles of Rome, that he was, at the very least, the pupil of the man whose ideas Jean Quidort had vigorously debunked.\textsuperscript{161} It is notable that Jean de Saint-Victor cited all the works composed by Giles during the period in which the latter taught at Paris (1285-1295). It may also be significant that, from 1292, Giles, as the prior-general of the Hermits of Saint-Augustine, was the Victorins’ close neighbour.\textsuperscript{162} The re-discovered Aristotle, as important to Giles as it was to Jean Quidort,\textsuperscript{163} seems to have left its mark upon Jean de Saint-Victor’s perception of the Empire. Like his contemporaries, Jean’s outlook also appears to have been marked by the political upheaval of the first decade of the fourteenth century.

When Jean began the redaction of the \textit{Memoriale} in approximately 1302\textsuperscript{164} he prefaced his work with a short treatise on the origins of kingdoms. This original

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{158} Guyot-Bachy/Poirel, \textit{Traité}, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Guyot-Bachy, \textit{Memoriale}, pp. 100-111.
\item \textsuperscript{161} Guyot-Bachy, \textit{Memoriale}, pp. 102-103.
\item \textsuperscript{162} Ibid., p. 103.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Guyot-Bachy/Poirel, \textit{Traité}, p. 17.
\end{itemize}
introduction, although it probably enjoyed some small circulation, survives in only one manuscript dating from the first third of the fourteenth century.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 13-14.} Probably after 1307,\footnote{Schmidt-Chazan, ‘L'idee,’ p. 302, n. 6.} but undoubtedly before May 1308, a \textit{terminus ad quem} established by the absence of references to Henry VII and the comment that Albrecht of Habsburg was presently reigning,\footnote{Tractatus (2), p. 236.} Jean came to the decision to re-write completely and expand his work. Jean had noted in his first introduction that he intended the \textit{Memoriale} to be of particular use to those who sought a guide to the period between Julius Caesar, according to Jean the first Roman emperor, and the present day.\footnote{Tractatus (1), p. 72. The title is unique to the MS tradition of the second version of the \textit{Memoriale}; Schmidt-Chazan, ‘L'idee,’ p. 301, n. 4. It is employed here to facilitate reference to the Guyot-Bachy edition.} The second version of the \textit{Memoriale} was, he claimed, still to concentrate upon history from Caesar,\footnote{Tractatus (2), pp. 116, 280.} but its new introduction set the contents in a rather different context. Jean’s original prologue had given a brief sketch of the development of kingdoms from the Flood up until the foundation of Rome and a few short histories of the origins of certain peoples, including the Franks. The \textit{Tractatus de divisione regnorum}, with which he now prefaced the work, gave a series of geographical descriptions and snapshot histories of a much-expanded list of kingdoms, histories which he now continued up to his own day. The most striking feature of this new version was the changed approach Jean adopted to the Roman Empire.

In his original prologue Jean had sketched the history of the kingdom he termed that of the Latins or the Albans (named after the town of Alba Longa founded by Ascanius the first king after Aeneas) up until the inception of the \textit{regnum Romanorum}. The latter replaced the former at the time of Romulus' foundation of
Rome. The *Memoriale* appeared, then, to be conceived as a universal history following the intellectual model established in the chronicle of the early-twelveth-century monk of Liège, Sigebert de Gembloux, Jean’s principal source. Here the necessity of the existence of the Roman Empire was a central theme. The Roman Empire became the central axis of temporal affairs, the ‘history of the Empire’ becoming, in effect, synonymous with ‘history’. This was the approach adopted by earlier writers who had used Sigebert’s chronicle as a base, both those writing prior to Frederick II’s deposition, such as Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, for whom the idea was reinforced by the use of Otto of Freising, and those writing after it, such as Vincent de Beauvais and Guillaume de Nangis.

The *Tractatus de divisione regnorum* deliberately sought to wreck Sigebert’s vision of history. It was not simply that it extended Jean’s account beyond the foundation of the *regnum Romanorum*. More fundamentally, Jean considered the history of the Roman Empire to have concluded. The *Tractatus* rounded off its new summary of Roman history with a tally of the number of years the Empire had lasted and when precisely it had come to an end:

\[ \text{...durans abhinc usque ad deposicionem F[r]ederici annis MCCXCI, et in summa a principio regni, scilicet primo anno Iani, usque ad annum ultimum Frederici sub regibus Latinis, Albanis, Silviis, Romanis consulibus et imperatoribus cucurrit per annos circiter II}^{66} \text{DLXXII.}\]

Jean added to this, not only a sketch of the kingdoms and political units which had arisen since the time of Christ, in spite of the existence of the Empire, a theme

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170 *Tractatus* (1), p. 82.


172 Aubri’s use of Otto was unique in northern France: ibid., pp. 672-675.

173 Ibid., pp. 687, 691.

174 Ibid., pp. 692-696.

possibly embryonic in the original prologue, but also comments relating to those which had led an independent existence since the end of the Empire, most notably Germany. Jean's point was simple: the Roman Empire was no different from the empire of Alexander. Both had begun and both had ended. Both were part of the continuous process of the *divisio regnorum*.

The influence of Isidore of Seville's work upon Jean's *Tractatus* is marked. This was not the result of an encounter with a new source; Jean had used Isidore when preparing his first prologue. Rather, it was a case of reading an old source in the light of revised intentions. Amongst the extracts taken from Isidore that Jean integrated into the second version of his prologue were a series of sketches of the geographies and climates of kingdoms, an example being that he added to his notice concerned with the kingdom of Spain. A desire to illustrate the climates of individual kingdoms probably shared a common origin with Jean's concept of *divisio regnorum*. It may have been intended to provide tangible evidence of the existence of multiple climates in support of the Aristotelian proposition, highlighted by Jean Quidort and Pierre Dubois, that such diversity necessitated multiple rulers.

It seems probable, given Jean's connection with the university of Paris, that it was an outlook based upon Aristotelian concepts that facilitated his break with Sigebert's theory of history and his development of a world view in which a single ruler in temporal affairs was no longer necessary. At the same time Jean did not adopt one of the basic tenets of Jean Quidort's Aristotelianism, that is that the exercise of temporal authority was natural and could lead men to live virtuously. After the Flood, certain men, the stronger, usurped lordship over others and, taking the name 'king',

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176 Guyot-Bachy/Poiriel, *Traité*, p. 54.

177 *Tractatus* (2), p. 236.


179 Ibid., p. 45.

made these others submit to their authority: *Hoc autem fecit ambicio, non natura.*\(^{181}\) This underlines the problem of overstating Jean Quidort’s influence.\(^{182}\) The Victorin again differed from the Dominican in that he was not opposed to the existence of empires.

Jean de Saint-Victor pointed out that many previously independent peoples, such as the Burgundians,\(^{183}\) had come under the domination of the French. Kingdoms which extended their authority at the expense of other kingdoms or peoples did not, in Jean’s view, necessarily contradict the natural order of the world\(^{184}\) and there is little reason to think, as Guyot-Bachy did, that he tacitly denied that the Capetians might become universal rulers.\(^{185}\) Even were such a universal empire to come into existence, however, it would simply be the creation of yet another chronologically finite kingdom which might, at a later date, come to be divided. In fact, Jean appears to have differed from another writer who drew upon Aristotelian ideas, Pierre Dubois, in that he believed that at one point the Roman Empire had been universal and that the whole world, including the Franks, had been subject to it.\(^{186}\) More fundamentally, Jean parted company with Jean Quidort in that he believed that, for theological reasons, such universal rule had once been necessary. Chazan has plausibly suggested that, in Jean de Saint-Victor’s view, the Roman Empire had had a role to play in the history of salvation: it established universal peace at the time of the birth of Christ and enabled the spread of the Church. This function fulfilled it again became subject to the same principles as other kingdoms and began to be divided.\(^{187}\) The question

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\(^{181}\) *Tractatus* (2), p. 122.

\(^{182}\) cf. Guyot-Bachy, *Memoriale*, p. 411. It seems unlikely that Jean wrote his *Tractatus* ‘...après avoir eu connaissance des thèses de Jean de Paris [Quidort]...’

\(^{183}\) *Tractatus* (2), p. 262.


\(^{186}\) Schmidt-Chazan, ‘L’idée,’ p. 304.

remains, though, as to why Jean de Saint-Victor had, in the first place, felt it necessary to demolish the traditional pre-eminence accorded to the Empire by writers of universal history, a pre-eminence to which there is every indication, given the structure of his first prologue, that he himself originally subscribed.

Pierre Dubois and various pamphleteers had resolved the potential problems posed by the French king’s relationship with the emperor by establishing complex legal and historical arguments for French exemption from imperial authority. These authors had been led to address this issue by the efforts made by the papacy in the course of the dispute between Boniface and Philippe to use imperial authority as a tool for subduing the French king. Although Guyot-Bachy believed that the Bonifacian dispute left only *un écho lointain* in the *Memoriale*, it seems extremely probable that it was the same circumstances that stimulated Jean de Saint-Victor, between 1302 and 1307, to re-assess the position that the Empire would occupy in his history.

That Jean dissented from the papal position is suggested by the absence of the *De ecclesiastica potestate* from the list he gave of Giles of Rome’s works. In a list which otherwise tended towards being exhaustive, such a striking omission was, as Guyot-Bachy suggested, likely to have reflected a divergence of views. It is possible that Jean’s position was inspired by the abbot of Saint-Victor, Guillaume de Rebais (1302-1311), a signatory to the act calling for the arraignment of the pope and himself present at the 24 June 1303 assembly held in the gardens of the Louvre at which royal officers denounced the pope in no uncertain terms. It is unlikely that, as Jean’s abbot, Guillaume did not play some role in the decision to re-start the *Memoriale*.

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189 Ibid., p. 408.

190 Concerning Guillaume’s career: ibid., pp. 82-84.

In a turbulent atmosphere, in which Philippe’s decision to arrest the Templars drew an angry reaction from Clement V, as did royal plans to continue the vendetta against the now deceased Boniface, Jean de Saint-Victor drafted a second version of his prologue to demonstrate that there existed no *de iure* temporal authority superior to that of the French king, and in particular that the old papal argument that Philippe might be reprimanded by an emperor carried no weight. Like the solution proffered by Jean Quidort, Jean de Saint-Victor’s was a more radical answer to the problem than that adopted by Dubois or the anonymous pamphleteers. The Victorin’s understanding of history meant that there was no need to establish the existence of an ‘exemption clause’ for the French kingdom.

Jean freely admitted that he had no knowledge of the origins or end of the kingdom of Germany, except in so much as these related to the kingdom of the Romans. Yet if the line of emperors had ended, that of German kings had not. The single characteristic Jean felt it necessary to emphasize in relation to these latter was that, whatever else they might be, they were not Roman emperors:

Postquam tamen imperium Romanorum defecit deposito Frederico, fuerunt Alemannie reges, sed non imperatores Romani...

The question of France being subject to the Empire in the present day on legal grounds therefore became irrelevant: since the deposition of Frederick II, there was simply no longer a Roman Empire. Even if it had still existed, the fact that the ancestors of the French had once been subject to the Empire, an unavoidable necessity that had enabled the birth of Christ, would have in no way implied that they continued to be so in the present day. Henry VII’s election within months of the completion of

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193 cf. ‘Parce que son objectif n’est pas d’écrire une œuvre de propagande [in comparison with Jean Quidort], il ne met nommément en cause ni le pape ni l’empereur.’ Guyot-Bachy, *Memoriale*, p. 409.


195 Ibid., p. 236.
the *Tractatus* was an unforeseen event which clearly disrupted certain key elements in Jean’s portrait. Whilst Henry’s reign, which Jean went on to chronicle in his *Memoriale*, would have almost certainly led to further changes if the prologue had been re-drafted, it did not change Jean’s fundamental point: empires, although perfectly valid institutions while they existed, were, with the exception of the Roman Empire at the time of Christ, quite arbitrary affairs.

The circulation of Jean’s *Tractatus* was greater than that enjoyed by the work of Jean Quidort and Pierre Dubois (all of whose works survive in no more than one copy), or by the *Quaestio in utramque partem* (only one contemporary copy of which remains extant), *Disputatio inter Clericum et Militem* and *Rex pacificus*. At the same time the popularity of the *Memoriale* appears to have been limited. Whilst, in part, this was the consequence of several practical factors, it may also be questioned whether Jean’s perspective, or indeed many of the other arguments born essentially of the dispute between Philippe and Boniface, gained widespread acceptance. Notably, even those who made use of the *Memoriale*, such as the compilers of Thomas de Maubeuge’s *atelier*, do not seem too have taken great interest in Jean’s vision of history. Thomas’ compilers adapted and translated only the small portion of Jean’s text relevant to contemporary history with the intention of completing Pierre Honoré’s *Grandes Chroniques*. The attitude adopted by the same compilers towards the *Donation of Constantine* is also instructive.

196 *Summarius* in one fifteenth-century MS: BN MS lat. 6222 c, *De recuperatione* in one fourteenth-century MS: Vatican Library, reg. lat. MS 1642; the remainder in the royal register BN MS lat. 10919. Jones, ‘Dubois,’ 51, n. 11; 58, n. 31, 32.

197 Prior to 1318, preserved in a collection by Pierre d’Étampes, Philippe IV’s keeper of the royal archives. All other copies are late-fourteenth- or fifteenth-century: Dyson, *Tracts*, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.

198 Earliest MSS date from the late-fourteenth century: ibid., pp. xxii.


200 Of twelve pre-sixteenth century MSS of the second version of the *Memoriale* only five are fourteenth-century: Samaran, ‘Jean,’ pp. 27-31; Guyot-Bachy/Poirel, *Traité*, p. 63.

In 1300 Pierre Dubois had seen the *Donation* as a useful instrument by which the authority of the French king might be expanded.\textsuperscript{202} By 1302 circumstances had forced Dubois to approach the topic from the rather different perspective of defending the French king’s independence.\textsuperscript{203} The complete absence of the *Donation* from his second attempt to elucidate an all-encompassing scheme for the expansion of royal authority, the second part of *De recuperatione*, suggests that in the light of the Bonifacian quarrel Dubois had simply come to consider that Constantine’s grant had become more trouble than it was worth.\textsuperscript{204} This attitude does not seem to have lasted long beyond the aftermath of the Franco-papal dispute. Pierre Honoré’s *Grandes Chroniques* referred, for example, to Constantine’s donation of *l’Empire a possider a touz jours* in its account of John XXII’s case against Ludwig of Bavaria.\textsuperscript{205} Such references were by no means exclusive to the non-Dionysian tradition.

The version of the *Grandes Chroniques* prepared at the abbey in the 1340s made use of the *Donation* not only in its account of John’s case against Ludwig\textsuperscript{206} but also to justify Charles d’Anjou’s conquest of Sicily.\textsuperscript{207} Although the scriptorium did, in the former case, feel it necessary to qualify Constantine’s gift as *parties d’Occident*, this was hardly the *Quaestio in utramque partem*’s vigorous attack upon the *Donation*’s very validity or Jean de Saint-Victor’s proposal that the act was strictly limited to the Lateran and the city of Rome.\textsuperscript{208}

Whether they were members of the Parisian *ateliers*, preparing works for the nobility and their officials, or of the Dionysian scriptorium, drafting a version of

\textsuperscript{202} *Summaria*, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{203} *Deliberatio*, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{204} Jones, ‘Dubois,’ 68-69.

\textsuperscript{205} RHGF, xxi, p. 684.

\textsuperscript{206} GCF, ix, pp. 37-38.

\textsuperscript{207} GCF, vii, p. 233.

\textsuperscript{208} Chazan, *L’Empire*, p. 507.
history better suited to the royal perspective of the day, fourteenth-century compilers of the *Grandes Chroniques*, and presumably their audiences, clearly found little to object to in the *Donation*. The reason was simply that once the shadow of the Bonifacian dispute had passed the controversy that surrounded the *Donation* similarly dissipated: it could be employed in multiple contexts without the tedious necessity of proving that it did not apply to France. Whilst the arguments produced by the Franco-papal dispute clearly continued to influence some in northern France, such as Jean Faure, this revival in the use of the *Donation* appears emblematic of the limited extent to which they impacted upon wider perceptions in the French cultural milieu.

vi. Conclusion

There is little reason to believe that, for the majority of the inhabitants of northern France, the essence of Henry VII’s claim to be lord of the world would have been considered unacceptable provided one condition was met. As Philippe IV made clear in his reply to Henry’s coronation encyclical, the point that mattered was that imperial jurisdiction should not be considered to extend over the kingdom of France. It was quite possible therefore that imperial jurisdiction might be considered to extend, *de iure* at least, over the rest of the world. Such a view would have found a particularly sympathetic audience amongst French jurists. The problem with adopting a solution of the sort Jean Quidort or Jean de Saint-Victor proposed was that to do so would deprive the French kingdom of one its claims to uniqueness, a parity with an otherwise unique institution, the Roman Empire. Yet, at the same time, the Empire was clearly considered to be similar to a kingdom in the sense that the practical temporal jurisdiction of its ruler was finite.

As will be seen in the following chapter, a conception of the Empire as a limited territorial institution was not a view that had originated in the course of Philippe IV’s dispute with the pope, but one which had underpinned French perceptions of the Empire throughout the thirteenth century. It may be suggested that the Bonifacian dispute of 1296-1303 lent new clarity to this perspective but that, in fact, it changed French conceptions of the Empire and its ruler very little. At the same time, as Pierre Dubois and indeed Jean de Saint-Victor aptly demonstrated, the idea that a universal temporal authority was perceived to have a role to play in a properly
ordered world was a persistent one. In the case of the Empire and its ruler this role was not necessarily connected with the exercise of universal temporal jurisdiction. In consequence, the perception of the Empire as an institution of finite temporal jurisdiction did not, for the majority of the inhabitants of northern France, necessarily preclude the emperor remaining *dominus mundi*.
Chapter Seven

Limits

i. Introduction

In 1254, in the course of returning from the crusade, Joinville had noted Louis IX’s reluctance to disembark at Hyères in the county of Provence. Opposed by his queen and council, the king responded that he would not leave his ship jeusques a tant que il venroit a Aigue Morte, qui estoit en sa terre. Eventually, the king decided to back down and await horses a venir en France. The lengthy notice Joinville devoted to this episode suggests that he considered it important and an example of Louis’ saintliness. The king had compromised a point of principle because of his concern for the safety of his wife and children. Louis’ lack of enthusiasm is all the more striking because Provence was his brother’s county and could hardly be considered hostile territory. Three generations of Angevin counts and the passing of almost a century did little to modify an acute awareness of the distinction between the French kingdom and the county of Provence. In giving an account of Philippe VI’s visit to Marseille, which took place in the course of the king’s tour of the Languedoc in the 1330s, the Dionysian Richard Lescot, followed by the abbey’s 1340s Grandes Chroniques, highlighted that the inhabitants received the king with great reverence and honour although they were not under his seigneurie.

Amongst the arguments offered in favour of French autonomy, the author of Rex pacificus included the idea that imperial authority came to an end at a defined, 

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1 Joinville, 652, p. 324.

2 Ibid., 655, p. 324.

3 Ibid., 654, p. 324.

fixed and longstanding border with the French kingdom. The idea that certain regions were *in imperio* was by no means unique to *Rex pacificus*, a treatise produced in the midst of the Bonifacian controversy, and was a commonplace throughout the first half of the fourteenth century. Such terminology was to be found in a *pouillé* (an account of ecclesiastical goods) for the diocese of Reims compiled between 1303 and 1312, in an account of the 1346 tenth for the same diocese, in the 1320 *Livre de la Droiture de Donchery*, and in *L’Estat de la Comté de Rethel*, compiled between 1351 and 1364.

Jean de Saint-Victor, followed by the 1340s Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques*, made use of the phrases *in imperio* and *en l’Empire*, respectively, in geographical descriptions of a county. Under 1339, the *Grandes Chroniques* spoke of Philippe VI having missed the opportunity to confront Edward III on one occasion *comme il [Philippe] ne vousist pas entrer es termes de l’Empire*.

The recognition of a division between kingdom and Empire was as evident in the thirteenth century as in the fourteenth. If the status of Provence was a case over which few doubts arose, the question of what precisely could be considered to be *in imperio* and what could be regarded as *in regno* became increasingly contentious in the course of the thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries. The solutions found to justify the practical expansion of French authority at the expense of that claimed by rulers of the Empire, and the principles upon which these solutions were based,

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5 '...immo, sunt certi limites, et fuerunt a tempore ex quo non extat memoria, per quos regnum et imperium dividuntur.' *Rex pacificus*, p. 37.


7 JSV, p. 673.

8 GCF, viii, p. 355.

9 GCF, ix, p. 172.

10 Primat’s suggestion that Charles d’Anjou had done homage to Philippe III for Provence is anomalous: Primat/JV, p. 61.
provide a further window onto French perceptions of the nature of the Empire as an institution.

ii. Finding Boundaries

The origin and general definition of the boundaries of the French kingdom, and indeed of any other kingdoms, was not the subject of great consideration in France. Jean de Saint-Victor’s concept of *divisio regnorum* implied that such boundaries were established, and changed, arbitrarily. This view may have been endorsed to some extent by the French baronage, who, in their 1246 complaint against ecclesiastical abuses, had argued that the kingdom had been acquired not through any legal mechanism or ecclesiastical concession but through brute force and warfare.\(^{11}\) The *Disputatio inter Clericum et Militem* gave no indication of the precise location of present boundaries, but it implied, somewhat differently, that, at least in the particular case of the French kingdom and the Empire, these had not been established arbitrarily but by agreement. This point was implicit in the link that the Knight drew between the present *termini* of France and the Empire and the division agreed by Charlemagne’s grandsons.\(^{12}\) The idea that boundaries were settled by agreement was probably a viewpoint that was more widely accepted than that adopted by Louis IX’s incensed barons or Jean de Saint-Victor.

Contemporary conceptions of boundaries were informed by the perceived limits of jurisdiction, rather than economic, military or cultural considerations.\(^{13}\) When contemplated in their widest sense, the borders of the French kingdom, that is the ultimate extent of the jurisdiction exercised by the French king, tended to be defined in terms of rivers or at least considered to follow the guidelines offered by rivers. Guillaume de Nangis, for example, echoed by later Dionysian writers,

\(^{11}\) HD, vi, pp. 467-468 (November 1246).

\(^{12}\) *Disputatio*, p. 42.

conceived the boundary between the French kingdom and the Empire in his own day to be defined by the Meuse. The idea that the Rhône acted as a boundary appeared in Bernard Gui’s account of the death of Clement V, who died:

...apud Rocham Mauran, quod est castrum regni Franciae super Rodanum, in finibus regni sui.

Subsequently, the pope’s body was transported *ultra Rodanum, extra regnum Franciae*. Returning from the crusade via Provence, it was only when Louis IX arrived at Beaucaire, situated on the right bank of the Rhône, that Joinville felt able to take leave of the king, who was now *en sa terre et en son pooir*. Jean de Saint-Victor did not attempt to define the contemporary extent of the French kingdom but, following Hugues de Saint-Victor, noted that the original kingdom of the Franks was delimited by two rivers, the Loire and the Meuse. It may be added that in Jean’s view this Frankish kingdom was by no means concomitant with ‘Gaul’, an essentially geographical rather than political unit, which in the east extended up to the Rhine.

The efforts of nineteenth-century cartographers, such as Collinet, to draw precise ‘frontier’ lines upon a map of medieval Europe were frustrated by the fact that maps, understood in their modern sense as precision instruments, were an alien concept in medieval France. Although Fawtier probably goes too far in suggesting that, beyond a tally of revenues and rights, French kings can have had little conception of what they ruled before the first precision map was drawn in 1472, he

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14 GNC, i, p. 308; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 18; GCF, viii, pp. 186-187.

15 *Flores chronicorum*, RHGF, xxi, p. 724.

16 Joinville, 663, p. 330.


18 Ibid., p. 238.

was almost certainly correct to note that precise ‘frontier’ lines had little to do with the way in which the king conceived of the regions over which he exercised authority. At the same time it seems probable that the inhabitants of northern France understood the limits of the French kingdom in terms of precise and definable points. It may be the case, as Dion suggested, that certain inhabitants in border regions were content that an air of vagueness should cloud the issue of who, precisely, exercised jurisdiction over them; it is unlikely that they questioned whether precise points defining the limits of this jurisdiction existed.

Dion believed that prelates stimulated a process which, if it had remained uninterrupted, would have gradually led to the establishment of precise boundaries. Instead, the interests of the lay nobility frustrated this and led border areas to remain regions in which no clearly defined jurisdiction existed. The use of the phrase *en la marche d'Alemaigne* by the 1340s Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques*, when describing the location of a castle, certainly suggests that some degree of uncertainty prevailed concerning the location of the boundary between France and the Empire. Yet it seems unlikely that even a fractious nobility questioned the principle that either their own territories, or the kingdom as a whole, possessed fixed boundaries. As Richard has convincingly demonstrated in the case of the duchy of Burgundy, the lay nobility conceived of jurisdiction as something which, rather than emanating from a centre and gradually becoming weaker as it radiated outwards, existed with equal vigour


23 Ibid., pp. 43, 45.

24 GCF, viii, p. 355.

within a given region which was defined at its limits by a series of precise points.\(^\text{26}\) These points tended to be defined only where communities met and not in sparsely populated areas.\(^\text{27}\) The problem of establishing the extent of safe-conducts and tolls at the end of the eleventh and early-twelfth century, for example, led to the emergence of such points which represented the limits and confluence of the jurisdictions exercised by the dukes of Burgundy and the counts of Champagne and Bar.\(^\text{28}\) Similarly, there is evidence that a conception of the border between France and the Empire as a series of fixed points existed at least as early as the first quarter of the thirteenth century.

In 1263 two *enquêtes*, one concerned with the origin of salt taxes and the other with royal rights more generally, were ordered by Louis IX and conducted along the course of the Rhône by the treasurer of Évreux.\(^\text{29}\) These establish not simply that the Rhône itself was regarded as a boundary between France and the Empire, but that this boundary was perceived to exist at a precise point, normally the centre of the river unless it was adjusted to take account of islands, which were generally divided up according to which bank they were closest too.\(^\text{30}\) Particularly striking were the findings that in 1226 Louis VIII had ordered Raymond de Loubières and Bertrand de Luc to destroy the bridge of Saint-Bénézet. This act of demolition was only carried out up to the church from which the bridge took its name. Witnesses were categorical that the reason for this very calculated approach to destruction was that while Louis' wished to emphasis his rights, at the same time, the king wanted to make clear that he


\(^{27}\) Schlesser, 'Frontiers,' 166.

\(^{28}\) Richard, 'Conduit,' 100.

\(^{29}\) These enquiries remain unedited but are analysed: J. de Romefort, 'Le Rhône de l'Ardèche à la Mer, frontière des Capétiens au XIIIᵉ siècle,' *RH*, clxxxi (1929), 74-89.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 85. Until the nineteenth century the banks continued to be termed *Riau* and *Empi:* Dion, *Les frontières*, p. 82.
had no intention of innovating in the Empire. The part of the bridge Louis ordered
destroyed lay in regno; the other part, left intact, was in imperio. The idea that a
division lay in the centre of a river was not unique to the Languedoc. The inhabitants
of the region in the vicinity of Verdun, questioned in 1288 by enquêteurs despatched
by Rudolf of Habsburg, gave a remarkably similar account of the logic that lay behind
the half-demolition of bridges during periods of strife between the inhabitants of the
counties of Champagne and Bar.

The idea that the dividing point between two jurisdictions lay equidistant
between two points was not restricted to cases involving the banks of rivers and the
centre of bridges. The account of Albert von Stade, written shortly after the mid-
thirteenth century, provides evidence for a case in the north of the kingdom, in the
region of Hainaut, where a stone placed on a road in the centre of a village was noted
to mark a dividing point between the kingdom and the Empire. This idea may have
been, as de Romefort argued, reinforced by Roman legal concepts of boundaries. At
its roots there probably lay a conception of meeting places as points equidistant from
two centres of power, the same conception which led contemporaries to choose
Quatrevaux, on the road between Toul and Vaucouleurs, as a meeting place between
king and emperor.

These fixed points were only defined when political, economic or other
reasons made such definition desirable or necessary. One such occasion arose in 1299

31 "...a dicta ecclesia ultra est pons de Imperio, citra vero est de Regno; et idcirco non fecit dirui ultra
ecclesiam Sancti Benedicti, in signum hujus quod nichil debebat innovare in Imperio..." cited from:
Romefort, 'Rhone,' 83, n. 3.

32 "...cil de Champengne les pons fais sor le dit ru de Bienme defirent plusors fois la moitiei par devers
aus, et l'autre moitiei par desai devers Verdun lassoient entiere, por ce que elle estoit de l'empire.'
MGH Const. III, no. 410, p. 393 (25 May 1288).

33 Annales Stadenses auctore Alberto, MGH SS, xvi, p. 336. I am grateful to Dr Scales who drew my
attention to this passage, which appears to be the earliest evidence for the use of stones to delineate the
division between the kingdom and Empire.

34 Romefort, 'Rhône,' 85.

35 Dion, Les frontières, pp. 23-32.
when the negotiations surrounding the marriage of Albrecht of Habsburg's son to Blanche de France appear to have led to a decision to establish a series of stone markers at the point where royal jurisdiction ended and imperial began. The establishment of these markers is known only from testimony given to an enquiry in 1390 which stated that the stones had been planted in the presence of Philippe and Albrecht afin que chacun sçeuist ses droits et les extrémités de son pays. According to the enquêteurs their witnesses declared that the stones faisoient division du royalmè et de l'empire. The markers crossed the Val-de-l'One (Quatrevaux) beginning at the Meuse, not far from Verdun, and proceeded until Traveron and Brixey. Yet the circumstances which led to clarifications of the border between France and the Empire frequently did not involve the Empire or its rulers directly.

It was economic considerations that led to the enquêtes which carefully delimited the extent of imperial and French jurisdiction along the course of the Rhône, just as it had been primarily economic considerations, connected, in particular, with the fairs of Champagne, that had led to the delineation of boundaries between the duchy of Burgundy and the counties of Champagne and Bar. The enquiries conducted by the treasurer of Évreux sprang from an attempt to establish the extent of royal rights in the face of long-standing Provençal encroachments upon revenues formerly owed to the count of Toulouse, but, under the terms of the 1229 treaty of Paris-Meaux, acquired by the king. In the course of an investigation into Louis IX's rights and those of the present count of Provence, Charles d'Anjou, the treasurer came to a number of conclusions concerning the limits of the kingdom and the Empire.

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36 Cited from: ibid., p. 84.

37 Leroux, Recherches, p. 108, n. 2.

38 Richard, 'Conduit,' 100.

39 Romefort, 'Rhône,' 74.
These latter were incidental and were made simply because the bounds of the Empire were considered to be concomitant with those of the county of Provence.  

A further case which had implications for the definition of the Franco-imperial border involved the ruler of the Empire more directly but grew, essentially, from a quarrel that broke out in 1286 between the count of Bar and the abbot of Beaulieu-en-Argonne. The original cause of this dispute remains unknown but it resulted in two enquêtes, one launched by Philippe IV in 1287, which led the parlement held at All Saints to determine that Beaulieu-en-Argonne was in regno Francie et de regno, and one commissioned by Rudolf on 3 March 1288, which determined the opposite. In the course of attempting to resolve matters, these enquiries built up a snapshot of local perceptions of the extent of French and imperial jurisdiction. Rudolf endorsed the findings of his enquêteurs as an accurate account of the Franco-imperial border, a judgment confirmed first by Adolf of Nassau and later by Albrecht of Habsburg. 

A particularly striking aspect of the findings of the 1288 enquête was the frequent claim made by the local inhabitants that the officials of the French king had sought to exercise their authority beyond the limits of the French kingdom. To the

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40 Schlesser noted that discussion of boundaries between kingdom and Empire in the twelfth century tended to be incidental to disputes which focused upon the boundaries of the great fiefs: 'Frontiers,' 170.

41 J. Havet, 'La frontière d'empire dans l'Argonne enquête faite par ordre de Rodolphe de Habsbourg à Verdun, en mai 1288,' BEC, xlii (1881), 383-387.

42 Ibid., 384. The enquête is not extant: ibid., 393.

43 Written in French and conducted by a canon of Liège, Anselme de Porroie, and two knights, Hartmann von Ratzenhausen and Eberhard von Landsberg. Eighty-four witnesses were interviewed in Verdun (14 – 25 May 1288): ibid., 385-386. The original text of the enquête, acquired by the count of Bar, and a fifteenth-century copy remain extant. Edited: Havet, 'La frontière,' 405-428, MGH Const. III, no. 410, pp. 392-405.

44 MGH Const. III, no. 411, pp. 405-406 (12 October 1289, Strasbourg).

45 Ibid., no. 528, p. 503 (21 March 1295, Frankfurt).

46 MGH Const. IV, no. 81, p. 62 (6 December 1299, Toul).
allegation that Philippe IV was the first French king to claim guardianship of the abbey of Beaulieu-en-Argonne, it was added that, excepting those kings of France who had also been emperors, Philippe III had been the first to attempt to exert authority over another abbey, that of Montfaucon. It was also asserted that sergeants of the French king had made demands even in the city of Verdun itself, a city which, according to one of its citizens, Richards li Grenetiers, had never been subject to the French king and whose citizens had always obeyed their bishop and the German king.

That the Capetian-Valois kings encroached upon regions theoretically subject to imperial authority was certainly the opinion of the Empire’s rulers. If Philippe IV’s response to Henry VII’s coronation encyclical accurately reflects the contents of the letter Henry had sent to Lyon, then the emperor had almost certainly intended to remind the citizens where their true loyalty lay. Henry’s predecessors had taken more direct measures: on 26 April 1278 Rudolf informed the inhabitants of Besançon that he was aware that the king of France had attempted to corrupt their loyalty to the Empire. He exhorted and menaced them to resist these influences. He later wrote directly to Philippe III to complain at the behaviour of French officers in the Vivarais. Adolf of Nassau was the most vocal in such complaints, which formed the

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47 For example: MGH Const. III, no. 410, pp. 394, 397.

48 ‘...se il ne fuit impereires et roys de France...’ ibid., p. 397. Also: ibid., p. 398. This separation between ‘emperor’ and ‘king’ echoes contemporary Dionysian usage, although the latter normally placed the royal title before the imperial.

49 Ibid., p. 397.

50 Ibid., p. 400.

51 G. Lizerand, ‘Philippe le Bel et l’empire au temps de Rodolphe de Habsbourg (1285-1291),’ RH, cxlii (1923), 172. Alternatively dated to 1277: Langlois, Philippe, p. 85; Leclère, Les rapports, p. 55. Previously, I have mistakenly interpreted Langlois to mean that the letter was addressed to Philippe III: Jones, ‘Philippe,’ 218. It has not proved possible to locate the source cited by Langlois, Leclère and Lizerand: Chifflet, Vesuntio, civitas imperialis, i, pp. 229-230.

52 Acta Imperii, no. 53, pp. 33-34 (1284-1285).
excuse for his alliance with Edward I. Would-be imperial rulers were not alone in their assessment: it was shared by contemporary popes.

On 9 November 1265 Clement IV complained at Louis IX’s infringement of imperial rights in the bishopric of Viviers: Clement himself had carried out an enquête in the bishopric before becoming pope and had observed not only the imperial standards used by past bishops but that all privileges of the bishop and chapter emanated from the emperor and not the French king. Gregory X reiterated these complaints to Philippe III. In 1290 Nicholas IV sent two cardinals to Philippe IV to repeat the complaints made by Nicholas III in 1279 concerning the abuses of royal officials in the imperial archbishopric of Lyon. In the same year Nicholas IV wrote to Rudolf noting that Philippe had been accused of going beyond the limits of his kingdom. After becoming pope, Benedetto Caetani, one of the papal envoys sent to Philippe in 1290, similarly complained of the French king’s intrusions, not only in the Lyonnaise, in the bull Ausculta fili (5 December 1301), but also in the county of Burgundy, in the bull Ineffabilis amor (September 1296). It was clearly in the interest of popes, who lay claim to a right to administer the Empire’s temporalities

53 Above, pp. 124-125.

54 Lizerand, ‘Philippe,’ 186.

55 Ibid., 186-187.

56 Ibid., 181.


58 MGH Const. Ill, no. 452, pp. 438-439 (3 July 1290, Orvieto).


during an imperial vacancy, to defend the idea that territories lay within the Empire. More recently, the historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have joined medieval popes and would-be imperial rulers in regarding this period as the beginning of a French policy of expansion.  

Historians have tended to absolve Louis IX of complicity, and to see in Philippe III's reign the revival of a perceived expansionist policy pursued by Philippe Auguste. This policy reached its apotheosis in the reign of Philippe IV, whose actions have been situated firmly within the context of *le grand plan d'hégémonie capétienne* by Favier, author of the standard Francophone work concerned with Philippe's reign. Although the ultimate aims of this 'plan' have been much debated, few have doubted that it existed. Fewer still have questioned whether it was pursued continuously and consciously. Strayer, probably the most influential Anglophone exponent of this outlook, viewed Philippe IV as engaged in 'a deliberate attempt to work out a theory of the proper boundaries of France.' As Lizerand, one of the few to question the continuity of this French 'policy', pointed out, the interpretation of this expansion as a conscious plan rests heavily upon a questionable interpretation of Philippe IV's character. It is undoubtedly true that French authority expanded eastward in this period, and that such expansion was, from a papal-imperial perspective, the consequence of 'encroachments'. Whether or not the product of a conscious plan, it must be questioned whether, within northern France, this expansion was regarded as being at the expense of imperial authority.


64 Lizerand, 'Philippe,' 190-191.

iii. Expansion or Consolidation?

The precise nature of the document known as *Antequam essent clerici* remains unclear. It has often been regarded as a letter, or at least a draft letter, from Philippe IV to Boniface VIII, composed between August 1296 and July 1297. One of its arguments, possibly intended as a response to the papal claims put in the bull *Ineffabilis amor*, is of particular note. The author claimed that the *rex Theutoniae*, that is Adolf of Nassau, had no reason to complain concerning the county of Burgundy: as a consequence of Adolf’s proud mistrust and the open war he had waged against Philippe, the French had been led to take possession of the county for themselves. This was an optimistic, not to say rather inaccurate, assessment of affairs as the French continued to face strong resistance from a baronial league until 1301. The argument, essentially one for legitimacy through conquest, echoed the tone of the baronial complaint put to the papacy in 1246. That this was not felt to be a convincing argument seems evident from the fact that it was not frequently repeated. In the case of Burgundy, in particular, even Philippe appears to have tacitly recognised imperial prerogatives over the county. The latter is all the more notable because he did so after having brought the region firmly to heel. Reflecting, perhaps, a further facet of the deep-seated discomfort that appears to have existed in the northern French milieu with the idea of irrevocable disinheritance or disenfranchisement, a rather different justification for the expansion of French authority appears to have gained prevalence.

The second point that Philippe IV had put to Henry VII, in his response to the emperor’s coronation encyclical, was that Lyon lay within the boundaries of the kingdom of France. In the mid-thirteenth century the city had been clearly regarded as

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68 Redoutey, ‘Franche-Comté,’ pp. 210-212.

69 Ibid., pp. 212-215.
extra regno. It was as a consequence of Louis IX’s apparent refusal to allow Innocent IV asylum in France that the pope had been led to take up residence there. Writing in the 1280s, Guillaume de Nangis had implied that Innocent had fled to France to escape Frederick’s tyranny, but the Dionysian made no claim that Lyon itself lay within the kingdom. Equally, no suggestion to this effect appeared in his *Gesta Philippi* when he commented on the meeting that took place between pope Gregory X and Philippe III in the city in 1274. Recounting this latter, Guillaume noted that after the meeting Philippe left knights in the city to protect both Gregory and the forthcoming council.  

The compilers of the 1340s Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques* ‘translated’ this with the additional comment that Innocent:

...eust III fors chastiaux et defensables en son commandement, qui sont des apartenances de la seigneurie du roiaume de France, assis assës près de la cité de Lyons.

The *Grandes Chroniques* retained Guillaume’s statement that Philippe *retourna en France* after meeting Gregory, but the compilers included the clear suggestion that at least a region in close proximity to the city pertained to the kingdom. The *Grandes Chroniques*’ version of the events of 1310, adapted from earlier Dionysian sources, which depicted *ceulz de Lyons se rebellerent contre le roy de France*, can only have fortified the impression that the French king possessed rights in the Lyonnaise, and, indeed, implied, as did the version given by Jean de Saint-Victor, that these rights extended over the city of Lyon itself.

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73 Continuator(2)GNC, i, p. 380; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 34.

74 GCF, viii, p. 278. cf. ibid., pp. 276-277.

75 JSV, p. 655.
The idea that the Lyonnaise was a part of the French kingdom met with a mixed reception. Some, such as the compilers of Pierre Honoré's *Grandes Chroniques*, who, for example, passed over the second council of Lyon in silence, simply appear to have taken less interest in the topic than the Dionysians. Others, most strikingly Bernard Gui, gave an account of the events of 1310 that was unrecognisable from that produced at Saint-Denis. Gui made no suggestion that Lyon pertained to the French kingdom and suggested that Philippe had effectively annexed it by pressuring the archbishop. Although Gui clearly remained unconvinced, there was almost certainly a good reason why not only the Dionysians and Jean de Saint-Victor, but also the Capetian-Valois kings themselves, could conceive not only of Lyon, but many other regions over which they came to exert authority, as, in fact, long-standing dependencies of the French kingdom.

When, by the 1259 treaty of Paris, Louis IX came to terms with the English king, he defended the agreement to his barons, according to Joinville, with the argument: 'pour ce que il [Henry III] n'estoit pas mon home, si en entre en mon houmage.' Henry was to do homage not only for the lands returned to him but also for his duchy of Gascony and all his continental possessions. Louis had, effectively, succeeded in transforming an alod into a fief, and a formerly independent lord into his vassal. Although Louis' particular achievement was spectacular the essence of what he had done was not particularly unusual. The adoption of a similar approach enabled the dukes of Burgundy to gain considerable influence within the county of Burgundy. Particularly illustrative of such transformations was the case, from the Venaissin, of the lordship of Agoult de Sault. Carrying out an *enquête* for Alphonse

76 BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 374v. cf. GNC, i, pp. 244-245.


78 Joinville, 65, p. 32; 678-679, p. 338.


de Poitiers, Guy Foulquois, the future Clement IV, came to the conclusion that this land had never been held from anyone. In 1291 the lord of the region, Isnard d’Entrevennes, did homage to Charles II d’Anjou, declaring that although he had never held the lordship from anyone he henceforth wished to do so from the count of Provence.

In less than half a century the Angevin counts had succeeded in transforming an otherwise independent allodial holding into a fief. If, nevertheless, the lordship turned out not to be an alod after all there was no question in the minds of those who drew up the 1291 agreement whose vassal Isnard’s predecessors must once have been: the emperor’s. In other words it was simply assumed that, alod or fief, the lordship lay within the Empire, just as the duchy of Gascony, alod or fief, was indisputably within the French kingdom. There is much to suggest that the Capetian-Valois kings frequently viewed so-called encroachments upon the Empire not, as Strayer supposed, as the annexation of lordships previously subject to the Empire, but as part of a process of consolidation of royal authority over hitherto independent allods within the French kingdom. This is particular clear in some of the more notorious cases, such as the Lyonnaise and the Vivarais.

Agreements of pariage were acts which associated someone in the exercise of a jurisdiction previously the exclusive prerogative of another. They were most frequently made between a temporal lord and a weaker ecclesiastical one, although on occasion weaker temporal lords might also seek to associate their authority with a more powerful lord or be forced to do so. They were by no means the unique tool of royal government, and were employed by lords such as the counts of Champagne and Savoie and the duke of Lorraine. From Alphonse de Poitiers’ accession to the

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81 Layettes, v, no. 673, pp. 224-225 (before 1257).


83 Ibid., 210.

84 Gallet, Les traités, p. 72.

85 Respectively: ibid., pp. 38, 67, 64.
county of Toulouse, they became a particularly favoured means of establishing Capetian authority in the Languedoc. The agreement concluded by Philippe IV with the bishop of Viviers in 1307 was the culmination of a long series of Capetian encroachments upon episcopal authority, begun under Louis IX, but which had gained momentum with the act of pariage made between Philippe III and the abbey of Mazan. This was part of a much wider pattern of pariage negotiations in the region, which saw agreements made with the bishops of Le Puy, Mende, Cahors and Limoges, a context frequently ignored by historians who have considered Viviers only in the context of encroachments upon imperial territory.

The treasurer of Évreux's enquiry of 1263 illustrates that the bishop of Viviers sought to capitalise upon his claim to be an imperial vassal and that, equally, royal officials and supporters were unwilling to accept it. In 1259 the bishop, claiming his diocese was in imperial territory, had attempted to set up his own ferry service across the Rhône upstream from the ferry at Pont-Saint-Esprit whose revenues belonged to the king. The lord of Uzès reported that he had dismissed these claims and forced the bishop to abandon his plans by seizing and smashing his boat. The pariage concluded with the bishop of Viviers was a special case, yet the factor that differentiated it from other such accords was that Philippe IV was satisfied with extracting an agreement from the bishop which was not really a pariage at all. As far

86 Ibid., pp. 70-110.
87 Ibid., pp. 109-110.
88 Langlois, Philippe, p. 185.
89 Régné, 'La première étape,' 181-199; Resmini, Das Arelat, pp. 307-318.
91 For example: Leroux, Recherches, p. 122; Strayer, Philip, p. 353.
92 Romefort, 'Rhône,' 78.
as the king was concerned the bishop could be left to his own devices: the only important point was that he recognised royal authority. 93 A proposed ‘pariage’ which offered striking similarities with that made in relation to the Vivarais were the agreements known as the Philippines, provisionally worked out with the archbishop of Lyon, Louis de Villars (1301-1308), between 1306 and 1307.

Under the terms of the Philippines, as they were originally conceived, Louis de Villars would have suffered a diminution of his authority, but one which would have been of material benefit not to the king but to Louis’ own chapter. What the Philippines effectively established was that jurisdiction pertained to the church of Lyon but was exercised by permission of the king. 94 A royal gardiateur would remain in the city but the jurisdiction he had previously exercised would be reduced and he would become only a symbol of royal authority. 95 Whilst two of Louis de Villars predecessors, Henri de Villars and Pierre de Tarentaise, had done homage to the king, they had only done so under protest, claiming that they were not obliged to do so. 96 The essence of the archbishop’s obligation under the Philippines was to recognise the king’s suzerainty and to do homage. That the Philippines were not implemented and that the archbishopric was effectively occupied by French troops was largely the consequence of the refusal of Louis’ successor, Pierre de Savoie (1308-1332), to implement the agreement and to do homage. Like the archbishop’s flight from Paris shortly beforehand, Pierre’s expulsion of the royal garrison from Saint-Just in 1310 appears to have been a panicked reaction to Guillaume de Nogaret’s demand for this homage. 97 It provided Philippe with a good excuse to take action to settle matters, but the installation of direct royal government over Lyon had almost certainly never been the king’s intention.

93 Gallet, Les traités, p. 110, n. 293.

94 Galland, Deux archevêchés, pp. 594-597.

95 Ibid., p. 595.

96 Respectively: ibid., pp. 590, 581.

97 Ibid., pp. 598-601.
It is remarkable how quickly the Capetian-Valois kings were willing to waive the harsh agreement that had been imposed upon Pierre de Savoie after his humiliating defeat. In 1312 the archbishop, under house arrest in Paris, had been forced to give up control of virtually all his temporalities in the city of Lyon and its dependencies in a far harsher pariage agreement than those made with the bishops of Le Puy, Mende or Viviers. In 1320 Philippe V simply returned authority to Pierre after he had established that the archbishop was willing to be more cooperative. Although they were clearly marked by Philippe IV’s characteristic heavy-handedness, there is little to distinguish the principle involved in the agreements made with the archbishop of Lyon and the bishop of Viviers from that made between Louis IX and Henry III in 1259. The interest of the king in all these cases was not to take control of the lands of previously independent lords but primarily to establish suzerainty over them. A further similarity is that neither Philippe nor Louis, the latter with one exception, sought to claim any authority over lands that were possessed by their new vassals but which could be considered to be extra regnum.

Even when a much riled Philippe IV forced Pierre de Savoie to come to terms in 1312 the agreement concluded specifically maintained the archbishop’s right to make war freely on the left banks of the Saône and the Rhône. Similarly, no objections were raised in 1324 when Pierre wished to lead an army into imperial lands to assist his cousin, the count of Savoie. It may be suggested that the interests of Capetian-Valois kings did not lie in extending their theoretical authority over all the

98 Ibid., p. 602.

99 Ibid., pp. 604-605.


101 Galland, Deux archevêchés, p. 602.

102 Ibid., p. 608.
lands subject to the archbishop of Lyon, just certain ones which could be claimed to lie within the French kingdom. They were intent not upon annexing ‘imperial’ lands, but in asserting suzerainty over regions that they considered to be in regno. A similar approach was apparent in Philippe IV’s dealings with the counts of Hainaut and Bar, and in those of Charles IV and Philippe VI with the archbishop and chapter of Vienne.

In 1290 Jean II d’Avesnes, count of Hainaut, did homage to Philippe IV for the Ostrevant region. Jean agreed to do this with some initial reluctance and only after Philippe had agreed that an enquiry would be established to look into certain contested areas. The king recognised that Jean had done homage; at the same time he explicitly undertook to understand this to exclude any areas that the enquiry might later establish lay outside the French kingdom. As was to be the case in the Lyonnaise, the impression given, and quite possibly the genuine conviction of the king, was not that French authority was being expanded at the expense of the Empire but that it was being consolidated within the kingdom. That Philippe’s actions were dictated by this principle and that he was particularly keen to avoid any suggestion that he was engaged in arbitrary acts of annexation is indicated by the circumstances surrounding French intervention in a dispute between the count of Hainaut and the citizens of Valenciennes.

Philippe was conspicuously absent from the first dispute that broke out between the townsmen and the count. Whilst Jean II clearly believed that he held Valenciennes from the emperor and directed his own appeal to the imperial court, the townsmen, on the occasion of this first dispute, sought to enlist the assistance of the son of the count of Flanders and the pope. The king’s intervention in a second dispute attracted much contemporary interest and was by no means lacking in controversy. One anonymous account noted that it was only through his intervention in 1292 that Philippe had acquired lordship of the town which he tint comme se elle

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103 Lizerand, ‘Philippe,’ 163-164.


105 Lizerand, ‘Philippe,’ 165-166.
fust sienne. Even the Dionysians were uncertain about Philippe’s position but tended to suggest that the king’s intervention was justified by the fact that at least the guardianship of the churches of the town lay in his hands.

The claim that the French king exercised any sort of guardianship over the town of Valenciennes was certainly, in reality, an encroachment upon imperial territory. The justification for this claim appears to have been supplied by the citizens themselves at the time of the second dispute with Jean. Keen to enlist a powerful supporter, envoys were dispatched to the French court bearing a dossier containing a series of charters (accompanied by French translations) designed to prove that the city of Valenciennes pertained to the French kingdom. Philippe’s claim to have a right of intervention was founded upon the argument outlined in the mémoire summing up the citizens case: ‘ils sont et ont esté de très-anchien temps, et lor ville de vostre royaume de Franche.’ Philippe had not sought to intervene before he was presented with a credible excuse for doing so and that excuse was, in essence, that he had always had the right to intervene if he chose to because the town was a part of his kingdom.

Henry, count of Bar, had been one of the few lords to offer Edward I active support in the 1290s. Following his defeat and imprisonment by the French, a settlement was forced upon Henry in 1301. Yet this settlement required only that the count recognise that he was the king’s vassal for what became known as the Barrois mouvant, that is the region held by the count on the ‘French’ bank of the Meuse. This territory, it was suggested, was an alod for which the count had never done homage, even to the emperor. This was not an act of annexation so much as it

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106 Extraits d’une chronique anonyme française, finissant en M.CCC.VIII, RHGF, xxi, p. 133.

107 GNC, i, pp. 278-279, 281, ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], pp. 10, 11; Ives de Saint-Denis, RHGF, xxi, p. 203, GCF, viii, pp. 146-147, 149-150.

108 The preamble is edited: Boutaric, France, p. 386, n. 1.

109 Favier, Philippe, p. 299.

was an assertion of suzerainty over a free allod that might plausibly be considered, on the grounds of river boundaries, to lie within the French kingdom.

The view that certain territories lay within the bounds of the French kingdom appears to have similarly dictated Philippe VI's dealings with the archbishop and chapter of Vienne and the dauphin. Philippe sought to establish a pariage with the archbishop for Sainte-Colombe between 1333 and 1335, an arrangement, probably originally proposed by Charles le Bel, that envisioned the archbishop holding the moitié of the town in fief from the king and doing homage regularly. This would have given Philippe a foothold in a town directly across the Rhône from the city of Vienne. When the archbishop proved reluctant to cooperate Philippe took the striking step, in 1335, of ordering his officials to occupy Sainte-Colombe anyway. It was made clear to the archbishop and, indeed, to the dauphin, that royal officials were more than entitled to act on the right bank of the Rhône, with or without the archbishop or the dauphin's cooperation. At the same time no claim was made to authority over lands on the left bank.

That Capetian-Valois encroachments were perceived to be the establishment of royal authority over allods or, in the case of the Ostrevant, fiefs, considered to lie in regno, was an impression abetted in several cases by those 'encroached' upon. Jean II does not appear to have questioned that the count of Hainaut owed homage to the French king for something and had done homage to Philippe III in 1285; rather he disputed precisely what that something was. Louis de Villars may even have cooperated with Guillaume de Plaisians in suppressing evidence that suggested the existence of an imperial claim to Lyon. With some notable, but ultimately

111 Galland, Deux archevêchés, pp. 614-615.
112 Ibid., pp. 617-621.
113 Ibid., p. 620.
114 Boutaric, France, p. 385.
115 Lizerand, 'Philippe,' 163.
116 Galland, Deux archevêchés, pp. 593-594.
pragmatic exceptions, such as the city of Lyon itself, which spread across both banks of the Saône, the extent of these ‘French’ lands was normally defined by river boundaries. This may explain why the extension of royal authority over Valenciennes, which straddled the Scheldt, appears to have raised comment and elicited a justification from the Dionysians, whilst the question of to whom the overlordship of the Vivarais ultimately belonged was, like the lordship of Agoult de Sault, never considered to be particularly controversial, despite papal-imperial protests. This interpretation is further suggested by the attitude of French kings towards the exercise of authority in territories that could be considered to be extra regnum.

iv. One Step Beyond?

Returning from the abortive crusade of 1270, Philippe III chose to travel overland through the Italian peninsula. The course of his journey brought him to the city of Milan, where according to Primat, writing less than six years after the event, the king was magnificently received by the city’s inhabitants. Philippe was conducted juxta au palès royal where he was offered gifts and the lordship of the city. For reasons that were explained to the Milanese by the royal clerk Foulques de Laon, but not elaborated by Primat, Philippe, although he knew bien l’onneur et la cour[toi]sie done him, refused both the gifts and the citizens’ request that he take their city under his guardianship. Although Foulques’ participation was removed, this account was retained and elaborated by Guillaume de Nangis and later incorporated into the


118 Primat/IV, p. 87.

119 Ibid., p. 87.

120 Gesta Philippi, RHGF, xx, p. 486.
Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques*, for whose compilers, like Primat, this episode was almost certainly symbolic of the prestige enjoyed by the French king.\(^{121}\)

Regardless of whether or not Philippe really did impress them, the Milanese overtures were almost certainly motivated by a desire to establish a counterbalance to the power of Charles d’Anjou in the peninsula: in the wake of Tagliacozzo, whilst keen to remain on good terms with Charles, they wished to avoid a loss of independence.\(^{122}\) It is likely that Philippe refused primarily because he had no wish to impede his uncle’s activities in Lombardy. At the same time his decision was probably also influenced by a number of secondary considerations. One was geographical: it would have been difficult for Philippe to exercise any effective authority over the city. A second may have been the knowledge that the ultimate lordship of Milan lay with someone else, the emperor. Although this factor clearly did not restrain Capetian-Valois kings from exercising authority in regions considered to be *in imperio*, a recognition that ultimate suzerainty lay with someone other than themselves seems to have marked their attitude to doing so.

In 1276 Rudolf of Habsburg, at the request of the abbot of Orval, wrote to Philippe III asking that the French king take the abbey of Orval in the diocese of Trier under his protection.\(^{123}\) Rudolf did the same on 16 November 1281, this time requesting that Philippe undertake the protection of the bishop and bishopric of Toul because he himself was unable to do so.\(^{124}\) Sivery is only the most recent to see in the German king’s actions Rudolf’s own contribution to the *politique capétienne de grignotage de l’Empire*.\(^{125}\) He echoes Heller’s judgment, made over a century ago,

\(^{121}\) GCF, viii, p. 34.

\(^{122}\) Dunbabin, *Charles*, pp. 79-80.


\(^{125}\) Sivery, *Philippe*, p. 263.
that this was a sign of the bankruptcy of the Empire, and as Lizerand put it, a sign of Rudolf's *grande imprudence*. Like Leroux, Lizerand believed this policy stemmed from the reconciliation arranged between Rudolf and Philippe by the papacy. Historians have almost certainly underestimated Rudolf. It is unlikely that he viewed these acts as a diminution of his authority. Instead, they were probably intended, given the less than ideal circumstances with which he was confronted, as a means of confirming it. Rudolf was not, after all, giving away imperial rights: rather, he was pre-empting any possible usurpation by conferring them.

It is remarkable how little Philippe III and his son sought to profit from their apparent good fortune. In fact, they took so little interest that within a few years the guardianship over the bishopric of Toul was transferred out of Capetian hands to the duke of Lorraine (1 October 1286), apparently without any French protest being raised. Unlike the Lyonnaise or the Vivarais, the latter a case in which Rudolf wrote directly to Philippe III protesting against French excesses, in the case of Toul the Capetians had been provided by the papally-accredited administrator of the Empire, if not an emperor, with an indisputable right to intervene. This was precisely the problem: any authority French kings might exert over Toul implied a recognition that this authority had been received from the emperor-elect. From this perspective there would have been little at odds with the preferred opinion of contemporary jurists like Jacques de Révigny, that the French king, like all kings, was a magistrate of the emperor. It is probable that a desire to avoid actions that might lead to such an interpretation, that is that the French king was subordinate to imperial authority, explains the willingness of the Capetians to allow the guardianship of Toul to escape

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126 Lizerand, 'Philippe,' 166.


128 Lizerand, 'Philippe,' 166-167.

129 *Acta Imperii*, no. 53, pp. 33-34.

130 Above, pp. 218-219.
their control. Rudolf’s ‘commission’ meant that there could be no question of acquiring outright lordship of the town without resorting to an argument based upon conquest, one which the inhabitants of northern France appear to have been reluctant to embrace. Yet Toul did not escape Philippe IV’s attention entirely. Strayer correctly noted that this was a case in which Philippe successfully increased his authority, but he took little interest in the factors which lay behind the way in which this came about.\textsuperscript{131}

In 1289 Guillaume de Hangest, \textit{bailli} of Chaumont, took under his protection the goods of the chapter of the church of Saint-Étienne de Toul at Void, Vacon, Naives, Bovée-la-Grande, Troussey and Ourches, on behalf of the count of Champagne. Two points concerning this are noteworthy: firstly, that in 1289 the count of Champagne was none other than Philippe IV himself and, secondly, that all the properties named were on the left bank of the Meuse, a point clearly recognised. Philippe received into his guardianship ‘toutes les villes, que li doiens et li chapitres…ont par desai la Meuze’.\textsuperscript{132} Initially this arrangement was made for only three years but it was first extended and then made a guardianship for life.\textsuperscript{133} This offers a further case which suggests that Capetian interest lay, essentially, in consolidating authority over what was perceived, or at least could be plausibly construed, to lie \textit{in regno}, and which, in this case, could be considered to be alodial: the chapter claimed to hold these towns \textit{franchement et quitement de Deu}.\textsuperscript{134} It is also a further example of an imperial lord co-operating with the extension of royal authority by recognising that part of their lands lay within the French kingdom. In November 1291 Conrad, bishop of Toul, consented to the French king exercising guardianship over the towns of the chapter of Toul \textit{qui sunt de lai la Meuze, et sunt de}

\textsuperscript{131} Strayer, \textit{Philip}, p. 350.


\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Acta Imperii}, no. 73, pp. 50-51; no. 74, pp. 51-52; no. 75, p. 52. Lizerand, ‘Philippe,’ 167.

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Acta Imperii}, no. 62, p. 40.
Yet by bestowing the guardianship upon Philippe III Rudolf appeared to have established firmly that Toul itself was *in imperio*.

In November 1300 the citizens of Toul offered Philippe le Bel another option. Rudolf might have bestowed upon Philippe's father the guardianship of the bishop and bishopric, but the citizens now declared that they were neither subject to their bishop nor to the chapter of Toul. More fundamentally they considered themselves to be of *franche condition* and not to owe feudal obligations to anyone, in particular the German king. They claimed to have always chosen their own guardian without the consent of the German king, the bishop, the chapter or anyone else. The citizens' declaration was less than ideal. In offering Philippe and his successors the perpetual guardianship of their city, they added the condition that they not be required to act against the emperor or their bishop. The citizens clearly intended to cover all eventualities, but the fact that they did not specify any rights that the German king, the bishop, the chapter or anyone else, actually possessed with regard to the city of Toul, offered the French king a means of legitimately exercising authority over the city which could be interpreted neither as a usurpation of imperial jurisdiction nor as the exercise of authority on behalf of the emperor. The importance attached by French kings to being able to exercise authority unencumbered by either of these issues is illustrated by a less surmountable case.

That the Comtat-Venaissin lay irrefutably *in imperio* was a factor which almost certainly contributed to Philippe III relinquishing the most extensive territorial acquisition to come into royal hands on the east bank of the Rhône before the county of Provence in 1481. The Comtat, known also as the Marquisate of Provence, was a political unit approximating to the territory between the eastern bank of the Rhône and the Alps, and stretching from the Durance in the south to the Isère in the north.
Originally the possession of Raymond VII, count of Toulouse, the Venaissin had passed, at Raymond’s death in 1249, into the hands of Alphonse de Poitiers. With Alphonse’s own death, in 1271, Philippe III lost no time in taking control of the region and obtaining homage from its inhabitants. In February 1274 the king transferred virtually the whole of the Venaissin to the papacy in a little over two weeks. Philippe was ultimately motivated by his hope of obtaining Gregory X’s support for his imperial candidature. It is remarkable, however, especially as Philippe’s reign witnessed concerted efforts to extend royal authority in peripheral areas, that such authority was given up so quickly and, more striking still, so conclusively, in the one such region where it appears to have been most firmly entrenched.

Papal claims to the Venaissin, Raymond VII’s lands in Imperio ultra Rodanum, were based upon the terms of the treaty of Paris-Meaux. Although there were good reasons why this part of the treaty might be considered to have been invalidated, the circumstances in which this had occurred were problematic. Unease with the idea of permanently disinheriting Raymond had almost certainly led Louis IX to refuse to support papal claims in the 1230s and, faced only by protesting pontiffs, the count of Toulouse had re-occupied the Venaissin in 1236. His actions were legitimised by Frederick II who, in 1234, had re-enfeoffed Raymond with his lands across the Rhône. From a Capetian perspective, tacitly accepting this re-

139 Fornery, Histoire, i, pp. 211-213.


141 Jones, ‘Philippe,’ 222.

142 Layettes, ii, no. 1992, p. 150 (12 April 1229, Paris); Fornery, Histoire, ii, no. vii, p. 379.

143 Above, pp. 181-182.


145 Layettes, ii, no. 2509, pp. 270-271 (September 1234, Montefiascone).
enfeoffment was extremely convenient: it meant that Jeanne de Toulouse, Raymond’s daughter, had legitimately inherited the Venaissin and brought these lands, as well as the county of Toulouse, to her husband, Alphonse de Poitiers. When events in 1274 did not transpire quite as Philippe had hoped, the papal tiara of the new occupant of the Venaissin rendered any question of simply re-occupying the region out of the question. That Philippe and his immediate successors also refrained from pursuing any form of litigation over the issue is probably explained by the recognition that even if this were to prove successful it could only do so by establishing that the French king was the inheritor of an imperial fief. Yet, as in the case of Toul, there was an exception.

At Orange, on 16 February 1274, the papal commissioners sent to obtain oaths of fidelity and to receive the Comtat from the king, demanded that the seneschal of Beaucaire’s delegate, Raymond Bossicon, surrender into their hands the moitié of the city of Avignon. Raymond refused this request on the basis that he could not act without explicit orders from the seneschal. This was not a temporary administrative check: Philippe never handed Avignon, or at least his lordship of part of it, over to the pope and in 1277 confirmed the city’s privileges.

In 1226 Louis VIII had been acutely aware that Avignon was an imperial city. Although Frederick II, immersed in the problems generated by the Lombard league, could have done little to intervene when Louis lay siege to the city, his son, Henry (VII), en route to the Imperial diet summoned to meet at Cremona, was, due to the machinations of the Milanese, becalmed on the frontiers of the kingdom of Arles

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146 Jones, ‘Philippe,’ 220-221.
147 Fornery, Histoire, i, pp. 220-221.
148 Fournier, Le royaume, p. 221; Leclère, Les rapports, p. 41.
149 Fornery, Histoire, i, p. 225.
accompanied by a conspicuously large army. In an effort to allay this potential problem Louis, the papal legate and the French barons dispatched explanatory letters to Frederick. These offered an apologetic which placed the blame for the siege upon the city’s recalcitrant, heretical inhabitants and ascribed Louis’ actions wholly to the initiative of the papal legate and his duty to extirpate heretics. A second piece of lightening diplomacy resulted in Henry’s ratification of an alliance, originally concluded with Frederick in 1223, a few days after the beginning of the siege.

Philippe Mousket, writing in the 1240s, had no doubt that Avignon was an imperial city. To his account of the excuses Louis VIII offered to Frederick II, he added that although Charlemagne had conquered Avignon, the city had not been incorporated into the French kingdom and the Carolingian had retained only France in his domain. By the time the minstrel of Reims came to recount the siege in the 1260s, Avignon, despite being a city situated entirely on the left bank of the Rhône, had begun to be considered, at least by some, to be a rebellious ‘French’ city. A tendency to at least ignore Avignon’s imperial status was already apparent in Philippe Mousket’s own day. The most influential of Philippe’s contemporaries to adopt this position was undoubtedly Vincent de Beauvais whose account was utilised by

151 Stürner, Friedrich, ii, p. 106.

152 Only the barons’ letter remains extant: Layettes, ii, no. 1789, pp. 87-89.


154 Mousket [MGH], 26164-26165.

155 Ibid., 27125-27128.

156 ‘...cil d’Avingnon estoient revelei contre lui [Louis]...’ Récits, chap. xxxii, p. 171.

157 For example: ATF, p. 917.

158 Speculum historiale, bk. xxx, chap. cxxviii, p. 1276.
Dionysian writers and transmitted via this intermediary to, for example, Thomas de Maubeuge’s atelier.

Although Philippe IV ceded his rights over Avignon to the count of Provence in 1291, the evidence of French chroniclers suggests that the city had come, by the last third of the thirteenth century, to enjoy the reputation of being in regno. It is this perception, perhaps, that explains why Philippe III felt that he had reasonable justification for retaining hold of his rights in the city, despite the findings of the 1263 enquiry of the treasurer of Évreux which had suggested Avignon was extra regnum. To exercise authority over the Comtat-Venaissin itself and other areas indisputably in imperio would have required an arbitrary act which Philippe and his successors do not seem to have been willing to contemplate. The attitude of French kings towards territories which could not be considered to be within the boundaries of their kingdom appears, then, to confirm that imperial jurisdiction was considered to be something which could not simply be ignored. If such considerations prevented Capetian-Valois kings from attempting to establish their direct authority over regions in imperio, it did not prevent them from attempting to exert influence over these regions or over imperial lords.

v. Extending Influence

Contemporary French writers did not note that their kings annexed large swathes of imperial territory in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries. The majority of these writers almost certainly did not believe that the Capetian-Valois kings were doing any more than consolidating their authority over the French kingdom. Whilst the exertion of French authority over territories considered to be in regno, such as Valenciennes, Lyon and Avignon, were mentioned frequently, not one northern French chronicler made reference to an instance in which a French king

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159 GNC, i, p. 175; GCF, vii, p. 22-23.

160 BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 363r-363v.

161 Runciman, Sicilian, p. 267.
occupied territory collectively recognised to be in imperio, such as the Comtat-Venaissin. Rather, by a simple inversion, it was imperial lords who could be seen to invade and occupy parts of the French kingdom, an example being the case of the count of Bar and the lands of the abbey of Beaulieu-en-Argonne.\textsuperscript{162} The increasing influence that French kings came to exercise over these same imperial lords was something which did attract the attention of French writers, especially those who enjoyed a close relationship with the court.

Chroniclers and hagiographers devoted much attention to the peacemaking activities of Capetian-Valois kings especially when they touched upon imperial vassals. Joinville, for example, noted the peace made between Jean de Chalon and the count of Burgundy\textsuperscript{163} and between the counts of Bar and Luxembourg\textsuperscript{164} by Louis IX.\textsuperscript{165} Philippe V's decision, in 1318, to send the constable Gaucher de Châtillon to settle the dispute between the count of Bar, the citizens of Verdun, the bishop of Verdun and the latter's brother, Gobert VI d'Aspremont,\textsuperscript{166} was noted by Jean de Saint-Victor\textsuperscript{167} and the Dionysians. Whilst the 1340s Grandes Chroniques,\textsuperscript{168} like the Victorin, portrayed Philippe's intervention as an act of arbitration, some accounts produced in the abbey\textsuperscript{169} noted that the king was able to intervene because he held the guardianship of Verdun. The scriptorium may have felt this latter claim justified, as in the earlier case of Valenciennes, on the grounds that an argument existed that Verdun

\textsuperscript{162} GNC, i, p. 298; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 15; GCF, viii, pp. 172-173.

\textsuperscript{163} Joinville, 680, p. 340.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 682, p. 340.

\textsuperscript{165} Also: Guillaume de Saint-Pathus, Vie, chap. ix, pp. 73-74.

\textsuperscript{166} Lehugeur, Philippe le Long, i, pp. 235-238.

\textsuperscript{167} JSV, pp. 667-668.

\textsuperscript{168} GCF, viii, pp. 342-343.

\textsuperscript{169} ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 51; Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 12.
lay within the limits of the French kingdom. Philippe V himself had asserted this in December 1318. The Dionysians also noted that during Charles IV’s reign the dauphin and the count of Savoie came to Paris to try to resolve a dispute. In addition the scriptorium gave an account of the efforts made by Philippe VI to arbitrate a quarrel in the 1330s involving plusseurs grans personnes d’Alemaigne, including John of Bohemia, the duke of Brabant, the bishop of Liège and the count of Bar, as well as noting Philippe’s ultimately futile efforts to resolve matters in the county of Burgundy. The scriptorium was even able to find, with what must have been considerable effort, an occasion on which the bellicose Philippe IV had negotiated a peaceful settlement, a dispute in 1305 between the duke of Brabant and Henry of Luxembourg.

In the face of much baronial criticism, one of the grounds upon which Louis IX was said to have justified his decision to arbitrate his neighbours’ disputes was that it prevented alliances being formed against him. Acts of arbitration also enabled the French king to promote his prestige and expand his influence. As Joinville put it, those between whom the king arbitrated l’amoient...et obéissoient. In common with efforts to assert suzerainty over allods considered to be within the kingdom, the

170 Lehugeur, *Philippe le Long*, i, p. 239, n. 2. Philippe’s agreement with the townsmen was to defend them against all except the emperor: ibid., p. 239, n. 1.

171 Continuator(2)GNC, ii, pp. 80-81; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 69. cf. GCF, ix, p. 64.

172 Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 140-141; Lescot, p. 34; GCF, ix, pp. 139-140.

173 Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 151; Lescot, pp. 40-41; GCF, ix, pp. 124-125, 153-155.

174 Continuator(2)GNC, i, p. 348; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 25; GCF, viii, p. 246. Attributed not simply to Philippe but also to his barons: JSV, p. 644.

175 Joinville, 683, p. 340.


promotion of Capetian-Valois influence through acts of arbitration was by no means an approach directed exclusively at the Empire. In fact, probably the most notorious piece of arbitration, like the most spectacular assertion of suzerainty, involved England rather than the Empire. This was the attempt by Louis IX to arbitrate between Simon de Montfort and Henry III, efforts which, in 1264, culminated in the Mise of Amiens. Although well known to English chroniclers, the Mise was entirely absent from French accounts, something which may reflect either its confusion with the much remarked upon negotiations of the previous summer at Boulogne or a simple desire to avoid giving an account of one of Louis' more spectacular failures. Whether arbitration involved imperial princes or not such acts were distinguished by a number of common principles.

Even when it was not the disputing princes themselves who solicited acts of arbitration, as was the case in 1266 when Clement IV requested Louis IX arbitrate a dispute between the counts of Bar and Luxembourg, both the implementation and legitimacy of the king's judgments rested upon the consent of the parties involved to abide by his decision. The importance of mutual consent in the Bar-Luxembourg dispute, for example, is clear from the fact that Louis only delivered his judgment after Thibaud de Bar had agreed to co-operate. It is notable that Louis' final settlement in 1268 excluded the unpredictable bishop of Metz, Guillaume de Trainel, who had used the lull of the peace negotiations to invade the territories of both the duke of Lorraine and the count of Bar. Another example of the importance attached

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181 Abel, 'Louis,' p. 149.

182 The judgment is edited: ibid., pp. 152-154, 156-157.

183 Ibid., pp. 162-164.
to such consent is the inclusion of the letters of appeal and authorisation that Louis received from both Henry III and the English barons in the preface to the *Mise of Amiens*.  

Louis and his successors certainly sought to ensure that their judgments would be respected. In 1268, for example, Louis, possibly with the memory of Simon de Montfort’s failure to keep his promises in 1264 in mind, only consented to intervene after extracting a large number of guarantees and penalty clauses to ensure that all parties would agree to his decision. Henry of Luxembourg alone agreed to pay 30,000 *livres* to the French king and a similar amount to Guy de Dampierre should he fail to execute the royal judgment. Yet the Capetian-Valois kings did not, and could not as Louis was made aware in 1263, claim any right to be able to impose their decisions, even when such acts of arbitration involved lords who might simultaneously hold lands within the French kingdom. As a consequence these acts of arbitration remained essentially private arrangements. Although they often took place in the vacuum created by the disappearance of effective imperial rule, they replaced it only in practice, not in theory. The same may be said of other practices by which French authority was expanded over the Empire.

Philippe IV extended his father’s habit of granting money fiefs to imperial lords. Amongst others he increased the amount paid to the duke of Lorraine (1287) and bestowed money fiefs upon the duke of Brabant (1304), the counts of Luxembourg (1294) and Savoie (1304), the archbishop of Cologne (1301) and

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185 Abel, ‘Louis,’ p. 150.

186 Above, p. 272, n. 100.


188 Ibid., p. 349.

189 Ibid., p. 348.

the bishop of Liège (1304). These fiefs had a practical purpose in that they enabled the king to pre-empt the possibility that the English might again, as they had done most recently in the 1290s, seek to buy military support amongst the lords of the region to the north and east of the French kingdom. This was almost certainly the reason for buying off the archbishop of Cologne, who in 1294 had promised to bring a cavalry force numbering a thousand to Edward I’s aid. Establishing the support of these lords became particularly important in the early 1300s when the question of Flanders was yet to be resolved fully.

Although these arrangements represent to some degree the practical extension of royal authority over imperial lords they were problematic. This point is illustrated by the agreements which Philippe made with the bishops of Metz and Verdun. Philippe bought Burchard of Metz’s support in 1296, but the bishop’s death necessitated negotiating a new agreement with his successor. In 1304 it was necessary to enlist the support of the bishop of Liège in an attempt to conclude an agreement with yet another new bishop, Renaud de Bar. The problems of such personal arrangements are clear from the case of Verdun. An agreement made with bishop Probus in 1305 was invalidated by his death later that year and his successor chose to conclude an arrangement with Albrecht of Habsburg rather than Philippe. The most striking case is almost certainly that of the Luxembourg brothers, Henry and

191 Ibid., p. 122.

192 Ibid., p. 120.


194 Ibid. p. 387.

195 Strayer, Philip, p. 350.

196 Leroux, Recherches, p. 120.

197 Strayer, Philip, p. 350.
Baldwin, who demonstrated in 1308 that such arrangements bought little by way of loyalty.

Chroniclers thought it particularly worth remarking upon when imperial lords, enfeoffed with Capetian-Valois money or not, took up arms on the part of the king. The participation of these lords in campaigns such as Philippe III's abortive Castilian venture,\textsuperscript{198} or Philippe VI's Flemish war,\textsuperscript{199} or, most spectacularly, the battle of Crécy, where the Dionysians began their list of those killed with John of Bohemia,\textsuperscript{200} was a clear sign of French prestige. At the same time this participation remained the consequence of personal arrangements. The duke of Brabant, for example, participated in Philippe III's Castilian expedition because, as an anonymous chronicler noted, he was the brother of the queen, Marie de Brabant.\textsuperscript{201} Imperial lords such as the duke were involved not simply in various disputes but in the wider aspects of the chivalric culture of northern France, exemplified by their participation in tournaments,\textsuperscript{202} yet the principles which governed their relationship with the Capetian-Valois kings differed fundamentally from those which governed the relations between the king and those considered to be French barons, such as, from 1315,\textsuperscript{203} the archbishop of Lyon. The Capetian-Valois kings did much in practice to undermine the relationship between imperial princes and their nominal rulers but they did little in theory.

\textsuperscript{198} Gesta Philippi, RHGF, xx, p. 504; Chronique anonyme des Rois de France, finissant en M.CC.LXXXVI, RHGF, xxi, p. 93; GCF, viii, p. 65.

\textsuperscript{199} GCF, ix, p. 84.

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., p. 283.

\textsuperscript{201} Chronique anonyme des Rois de France, finissant en M.CC.LXXXVI, RHGF, xxi, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{202} J. Bumke, Hofische Kultur: Literatur und Gesellschaft im hohen Mittelalter (Munich, 1986), chapter 2. Louis IX's decision to ban tournaments within France led to the increased participation of French lords in those held in the imperial lands bordering the kingdom: Vale, Princely Court, pp. 188-194.

\textsuperscript{203} Galland, Deux archevêches, p. 605.
The counts of Guînes were recognised to be vassals of the counts of Flanders, but it was less than clear whether their lands lay in 'French' Flanders or 'imperial' Flanders and, consequently, whether they were rear-vassals of the king or the emperor. In 1212 Philippe Auguste had appeared to settle the matter by treating count Arnoul II (1206-1220/21) as a French vassal and his participation alongside Philippe at Bouvines did not escape the notice of at least one contemporary chronicler. In the mid-1230s count Baldwin III (1220/21-1245/47) attempted to use this to his advantage. According to Philippe Mousket, the count was keen to escape Frederick II's summons commanding imperial vassals to participate in the siege of Milan. Baldwin appears to have hoped that Louis would levy an objection to his participation but when he asked leave of the king to answer the summons, Louis granted it, much, it seems, to Baldwin's consternation. Bereft of his excuse the count had little choice but to depart and hope that his delay would be overlooked.

In light of the rapid decline in Franco-imperial relations that had occurred as a result of Frederick's marriage to Henry III's sister, Isabella, in 1235, the permission that Louis granted to Baldwin requires some explanation. To some extent, it may lie

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204 Concerning the question of what could be considered 'imperial' Flanders: F. Lot, 'La frontière de la France et de l'Empire sur le cours inférieur de l'Escaut du IXᵉ au XIIIᵉ siècle,' BEC, lxxi (1910), 5-32.


206 Ibid., p. 62.

207 Extrait d'une chronique française des rois de France, par un anonyme de Béthune, RHGF, xxiv, pt. ii, p. 768.

208 Mousket [RHGF], 29575-29577.

209 Ibid., 29927-29932.

210 Ibid., 30071-30078.

211 Above, p. 31.
in the fact that the count of Guines was a notorious English supporter\textsuperscript{212} and Louis cannot but have been glad to be rid of him. There is cause to believe that matters were not quite this straightforward. Louis had simultaneously raised no objection to the participation of Raymond of Toulouse in Frederick’s siege.\textsuperscript{213} Raymond was clearly Louis’ vassal, but he was also Frederick’s vassal for the Comtat-Venaissin, and it was most probably this factor that led to the French king’s acquiescence in Raymond’s participation at Milan.

Frederick had every right to expect Raymond’s attendance at Milan; it is possible that Louis believed that the same applied to Baldwin. Philippe Mousket’s account implied that Louis had recognised Baldwin to be his vassal, yet the king’s willingness to allow him to answer the imperial summons suggests that Louis also considered Baldwin to be under some obligation to the Empire. If so, the king was unwilling to permit the count to use his French vassalage as an excuse to avoid his imperial obligations. Louis, in effect, recognised the legitimacy of imperial jurisdiction, even in a case where its very existence was debatable. Is this recognition remarkable, though, given that Louis can have had, despite the English marriage, little reason to want to offend Frederick? The emperor was at the height of his powers in the mid-1230s, and Baldwin, if not Raymond, was, after all, something of a non-entity.

According to the minstrel of Reims, Louis displayed a similar concern that imperial jurisdiction be respected when he came to consider his brother’s occupation of the county of Hainaut in 1254, four years after Frederick’s death. The French king concluded that Charles d’Anjou ne la tenoit pas asseiz rainablement, because he had occupied the county without the permission of its souverain seigneur.\textsuperscript{214} The latter, de cui on la tenoit, was clearly the German king and Charles, although he had been supported and enfeoffed by Marguerite de Flandre, was not considered by Louis to hold the county legitimately because he did so sans lui [the German king] faire

\textsuperscript{212} Chanteux-Vasseur, \textit{Étude géographique}, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{213} Richard, \textit{Louis}, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{214} \textit{Récits}, chap. xl, p. 223.
This respect for imperial rights and jurisdiction was not unique to Louis, or, at least, to the portraits painted of him by the lay writers Philippe Mousket and the minstrel of Reims.

Louis VIII had anticipated the possibility that his Albigensian crusade might lead him to impinge upon territories in imperio long before he arrived before the walls of Avignon. In order to pre-empt the problems that might result, the king had imposed upon Honorius III the condition that the pope should arrange the emperor's consent to precisely the sort of punitive action in which Louis became involved in 1226. Whilst there is little to suggest that Louis' anticipatory efforts proved successful, they illustrate, like the letters dispatched during the siege, a recognition that imperial jurisdiction could not simply be ignored and that infractions of it must at least be excused. A similar regard for imperial prerogatives can be found in the 1290s in the policies adopted by none other than Philippe IV.

Philippe hoped to establish his son, Philippe de Poitiers, as the inheritor of the county of Burgundy through a marriage to Jeanne de Bourgogne, daughter of count Otto IV. Jeanne's right to inherit the county was strongly contested by a league of Burgundian nobles. As part of the negotiations that led up to their meeting at Quatrevaux, Albrecht of Habsburg agreed to hear Jeanne's case and permitted Philippe to advise her. Philippe not only went to the trouble of obtaining this agreement, but ensured that Albrecht confirmed these provisions when they met. The French chancery even seems to have opened a special inventory whose function, in part, appears to have been to keep track of material relating to the case. These

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215 Ibid., p. 223.

216 Clause nine, Petito ad Papam pro Rege cum ibit in Albigesium contra haereticos, RHGF, xix, p. 751; Petit-Dutaillis, Louis, no. 81, p. 460 (February 1224).

217 Redoutey, 'Franche-Comté,' pp. 208, 213.

218 MGH Const. IV, no. 77, p. 60; no. 78, pp. 60-61; no. 79, p. 61 (5 September 1299, Strasbourg).

219 Ibid., no. 86, p. 66; no. 87, pp. 66-67; no. 88, p. 67 (8 December 1299, Quatrevaux).

220 Labelled: 'In quodam rotulo, itemque: forma compromissi regis Romanorum Alberti et regis Francie cum quibusdam aliis tangentibus domicellam Burgundie': ibid., no. 1257, pp. 1399-1400.
actions suggest that the French king recognised that this was a matter that could only be settled legitimately in Albrecht’s court, not his own.

Philippe took these steps in spite of the fact that an inventory of the state of comital fiefs and their value, prepared in 1295 as part of count Otto’s preparations for the sale of his county and confirmed, point by point, by a royal enquêteur in January 1296, had argued that the county was essentially a free allod. This report had underlined that only certain rights, such as the guardianship of merchant routes and the churches of Besançon were held from the emperor.221 Whilst keen to avoid or delay the homage owed to Henry VII by his son,222 Philippe never failed to recognise that this homage was owed in principle.223 The county was consistently treated as distinct from the kingdom in royal accounts and in 1306 Jews were not expelled from it when they were expelled from France.224 Philippe de Poitiers, once he became king, explicitly stated that he wished to avoid doing homage to the emperor for his fief and in 1317, whilst taking steps to maintain practical control over the county, handed the actual title over to his wife.225 The use of the phrase Burgundia imperiali by an anonymous chronicler writing at Caen in the mid-fourteenth century226 suggests that Philippe and his son were not alone in adopting the attitude that the county remained very much within the imperial mouvance. Despite this regard for imperial rights, equally apparent in the installation of Philippe VI’s son, the future Jean II, as


222 Strayer, Philip, p. 355.

223 Redoutey, 'Franche-Comté,' p. 216.

224 Ibid., p. 216, n. 80.

225 Lehugeur, Philippe le Long, i, pp. 220-222.

226 E chronico anonymi Cadomensis ad annum M.CCC.XLIII perducto, RHGF, xxii, p. 23.
dauphine of Vienne, the legitimate expansion of the jurisdiction of the French king at the expense of that exercised by the emperor was not inconceivable.

vi. Negotiating Expansion?

The acquisition of the imperial throne by a member of the Capetian-Valois dynasty would not, in itself, alter the relationship between the French kingdom and the Empire. The brief union of the crowns of France and Navarre illustrates that such unions were considered to be essentially matters of personal inheritance. Acquired by Philippe IV, who held Navarre through his wife, Jeanne de Champagne, the crown of Navarre passed to Philippe's son, the future Louis X, with Jeanne's death in 1305. With the accession of the Valois kings, Navarre ceased to be held in conjunction with the French crown and passed instead to Louis X's daughter, Jeanne. That a union of the imperial and French crowns would be considered similarly is suggested by the fact that several Carolingian rulers were considered to have possessed the Empire as an adjunct to the French kingdom which in no way altered their status as kings of France.

That the Carolingian union of French and imperial crowns was interpreted in terms of personal inheritance, and that any potential future union would be considered similarly, is suggested by the tendency in northern France to apply French norms governing dynastic inheritance to the Empire. That any such union was personal and did not alter the integrity of kingdom or Empire was certainly the opinion of the citizens of Valenciennes, who made clear to Philippe IV that even when kings of France had been emperors in the past as, according to the citizens, Lothar had been, the kingdom and Empire had remained distinct: the king-emperor palloient ou royaume comme roy et en l'empire comme empereur. The idea of actually expanding the limits of the kingdom, as opposed to accumulating additional crowns, was infrequently considered. It seems probable that those who did consider it believed that for such expansion to take place legitimately it would be necessary for certain

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227 Galland, Deux archevêchés, pp. 622-623.

228 Cited from: Boutaric, France, p. 386, n. 1.
conditions to be met. The most important of these was the agreement of all the parties involved.

The meeting that took place between Philippe IV and Albrecht of Habsburg on 8 December 1299 largely formalised agreements that had been worked out several months earlier, for the most part at Neufchâteau, and which had already received preliminary endorsement. These included a peace treaty between the two rulers and an agreement to hold an enquiry into the precise location of boundaries. The latter confirmed the decision, taken at Neufchâteau in June 1299 and confirmed by Albrecht in August, to appoint a committee of four to six persons to judge contested border questions, excluding those relating to Burgundy. The meeting also confirmed the proposed marriage between Blanche and Rudolf. The first formal steps towards this had been taken in June and draft proposals had been agreed by Philippe and Albrecht in August. It also dealt with the question of Burgundy by confirming Jeanne de Bourgogne’s right to bring litigation before Albrecht’s court. Only one significant act, a donation made by Albrecht to his son and prospective


230 MGH Const. IV, no. 82, p. 63. Albrecht’s preliminary endorsement: ibid., no. 76, pp. 59-60 (5 September 1299, Strasbourg).

231 Ibid., no. 83, pp. 63-64.


233 MGH Const. IV, no. 72, p. 56.

234 Ibid., no. 84, pp. 64-65; no. 85, pp. 65-66.

235 Leroux, Recherches, p. 100.

236 MGH Const. IV, no. 74. p. 58.

237 Ibid., no. 86, p. 66; no. 87, pp. 66-67; no. 88, p. 67. Originally issued by Albrecht: ibid., no. 77, p. 60; no. 78, pp. 60-61; no. 79, p. 61 (5 September 1299, Strasbourg).
daughter-in-law, appears wholly original to this apparently carefully coordinated encounter.\textsuperscript{238}

The purpose of the Quatrevaux meeting was almost certainly to cement publicly a dynastic alliance which, from Albrecht’s point of view, would stabilise his dynasty, and from Philippe’s, create a new zone of Capetian dynastic influence.\textsuperscript{239} Albrecht himself had sought a marriage alliance with the Capetians as early as 1295.\textsuperscript{240} This dynastic purpose is emphasised in the centrepiece of the Quatrevaux meeting, the peace accord concluded between the two rulers. The promises made in the accord would bind Albrecht’s heirs as they would Philippe’s.\textsuperscript{241} The parallel drawn between Albrecht’s heirs and those of Philippe, in connection with the absence of any reference to the elective nature of imperial rule, conveyed the impression that those who would succeed Albrecht in the Empire would be his descendants just as Philippe’s descendants would succeed him in the French kingdom. This was, in essence, a statement of an alliance between two dynasties rather than simply between two kings.

It has been suggested that Quatrevaux may have had a second purpose. Leroux argued that Albrecht and Philippe must have come to a secret arrangement which envisioned the former handing over large swathes of imperial territory to the latter.\textsuperscript{242} Although most subsequent historians have tended to adopt a more cautious note,\textsuperscript{243} many have accepted that there may have been an informal agreement on Albrecht’s

\textsuperscript{238} Y. Lanher, ‘Le dossier d’Albert d’Autriche aux Archives et à la Bibliothèque Nationales de Paris,’ Sonderabdruck aus der Festschrift des Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchivs, i (1949), no. 15, p. 443.

\textsuperscript{239} cf. Fournier, Le royaume, p. 314.

\textsuperscript{240} Lanher, ‘dossier,’ no. 18, p. 444 (6 March 1295, Vienna).

\textsuperscript{241} ‘...pro nobis nostrisque heredibus, successoribus in Romano regno nobis succedentibus predicto regi Francie suisque heredibus, successoribus in regno Francie succedentibus...’ MGH Const. IV, no. 82, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{242} Leroux, Recherches, pp. 104, 106-109.

\textsuperscript{243} Stayer, Philip, p. 352, considered it ‘likely’ that Albrecht accepted the Meuse as a boundary at Quatrevaux.
part to such an arrangement or at least an understanding that the Habsburgs would make no attempt to interfere in the extension of Capetian authority over western imperial lands.\textsuperscript{244}

The French chancery took pains to draw up a list of the agreements made in the lead up to Quatrevaux, those actually concluded at the meeting, and those made in its wake.\textsuperscript{245} Whilst it is not possible to determine the precise content of some of the letters they included in their list, none of the descriptions indicate that any contained an agreement to Philippe's acquisition of imperial lands on the western bank of the Rhine. It seems unlikely that even the most negligent scribe would have overlooked documentation relating to such an important subject if such documentation had existed. Albrecht's and Philippe's apparent participation in a ceremony which witnessed the laying of border markers,\textsuperscript{246} and the fact that two days before meeting the French king Albrecht confirmed the findings of his father's 1288 border enquiry,\textsuperscript{247} mitigate against such an agreement.

The basis for Leroux's conviction that there had been a secret arrangement was a rumour that seems to have gained rapid currency in France. Guillaume de Nangis noted that in addition to confirming an alliance, Albrecht, with the German barons and prelates, agreed that the authority of the French king, which presently reached up to the Meuse, should be extended up to the Rhine:

\textit{...concessum fuisse dicitur quod regum Franciae potestatis suae terminus, qui solum usque ad Mosam fluvium se extendunt, usque ad fluenta Rheni fluminis dilataret...}\textsuperscript{248}

\textsuperscript{244} For example: Boutaric, \textit{France}, pp. 399-400; Fournier, \textit{Le royaume}, pp. 316-317.

\textsuperscript{245} Labelled 'Inventarium litterarum Aleman. regis.' MGH Const. IV, no. 91, p. 70.

\textsuperscript{246} Above, pp. 260-261.

\textsuperscript{247} MGH Const. IV, no. 81, p. 62 (6 December 1299, Toul).

\textsuperscript{248} GNC, i, p. 308.
Guillaume, who died in 1300, must have written his account within a few months of the meeting having taken place. That he misplaced the encounter to Vaucouleurs, misdated it by a week to 30 November, and passed over in silence most of what had been agreed, casts some doubts upon the accuracy of his account. Yet it is more likely Guillaume reported, rather than invented, the rumour of Albrecht's concession: at approximately the same time as Guillaume was writing, Pierre Dubois reported a similar suggestion in a work intended for the king, his *Summaria brevis* (1300).

Dubois did not specify precisely where and when the agreement, which he considered to have been made in return for French support for the Habsburg dynasty, was concluded. Dubois' version, which he recounted with the note that it was not his own idea but something that was said, was more extensive than that given by Guillaume. In addition to the land on the right bank of the Rhine, Dubois believed the agreement had included the kingdom of Arles and Lombardy, an area, in sum, that would extend from the southern sea to the northern:

...ut dicitur, supremum dominium regni Arelatensis et terrarum citra Rinum Coloniensem et Lombardiam a mare meridionali usque septentrionale existentium...

Little effort appears to have been made to dispel this rumour: Dubois was still under the impression that such an agreement had been made five years later. In his *De recuperatione* Dubois noted that it was said to have been agreed that the king would at least acquire lordship over the counties of Provence and Savoie, and imperial rights in Lombardy, Genoa and, erroneously, as contemporary emperors did not exercise jurisdiction there, Venice. However, he now appeared slightly less certain that the lands to the west of the Rhine would be included. Although it was by no means

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249 The rumour Albrecht had ceded the kingdom of Arles appeared in at least one German chronicle: Fournier, *Le royaume*, p. 315.

250 *Summaria*, p. 5.

251 *De recup.*, chap. 116, p. 104.
integral to all accounts given of the meeting at Quatrevaux, the essence of Guillaume de Nangis’ version, albeit in a slightly re-worded form, appeared in the Dionysian continuation of Géraud de Frachet’s chronicle, from which it was translated into the scriptorium’s most successful work, the 1340s Grandes Chroniques and appeared similarly in the earlier text compiled for Pierre Honore.

The possibility that a transfer of lands may have been discussed is supported not only by the proliferation of rumours but also by the declaration of a group of German prelates, led by the archbishops of Cologne and Mainz, that they would refuse to consent to any alienations arranged at the Quatrevaux meeting. This protest and the refusal, despite Jean de Saint-Victor’s convictions to the contrary, of the ecclesiastical electors to consent to the proposed marriage, were probably intended to frustrate the possible transformation of the German kingship into an hereditary possession. Yet some suggestion that Albrecht may have contemplated alienating the region on the west bank of the Rhine comes from the involvement of the bishops of Toul, Cambrai and Liège in the protest. The desire to allay the fears of these prelates may explain why Albrecht chose to confirm the 1288 Franco-

252 For example: Fragment d’une chronique anonyme, finissant en M.CCC.XXVIII, et continuée jusqu’en M.CCC.XL, puis jusqu’en M.CCC.LXXXIII, RHGF, xxii, p. 147, where the meeting is misplaced to Vaucouleurs but its purpose noted only as pour faire alienees.

253 ContinuatoGF[1285-1328], pp. 17-18. Like Guillaume this misplaced the meeting to Vaucouleurs, but dated it to adventum domini.


255 BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 384'-384'. That the dating here resembles that employed in the continuation of Géraud de Frachet suggests a textual relationship. This is anomalous if the traditional dating for the latter is accepted. It may be that the two share a common, no longer extant, source.

256 MGH Const. IV, no. 80, pp. 61-62 (5 December 1299, Toul).

257 JSV, p. 635.

258 Fournier, Le royaume, p. 317.

259 MGH Const. IV, no. 80, pp. 61-62.
imperial border enquiry the day after the episcopal protest was issued. True, false or simply stillborn, the supposed Quatrevaux agreement is extremely informative.

The rumours reported by both Guillaume de Nangis and Pierre Dubois offer further confirmation that general boundaries were considered to follow the guidelines offered by rivers. As Dubois noted the French king's authority would extend over *totam terram sitam citra Rinum Coloniensem*. Fundamentally, this extension of French authority would occur through the cooperation of the German king. The importance attached to consent is highlighted by the emphasis placed upon the participation of the German prelates and barons in both Dionysian and non-Dionysian traditions of the *Grandes Chroniques*.

John of Bohemia, in 1332-1333, conceived a plan which was almost certainly founded upon similar principles to that rumoured after 1299. In return for Philippe VI's support in displacing Ludwig of Bavaria from the German throne, John offered to cede to Philippe the kingdom of Arles and the bishopric of Cambrai. Although it was ultimately brought to nothing through the strenuous efforts of Robert d'Anjou, if such a plan had been enacted it would have seen an expansion of the boundaries of the French kingdom based upon the consent of all the parties involved. When this did not prove possible Philippe, as is illustrated by the case of the archbishopric of Vienne and the purchase of the Dauphiné, continued to respect the principle that the region on the left bank of the Rhône lay *in imperio*. It was possible to conceive of the expansion of the French kingdom; yet this necessitated the active co-operation of the ruler of the Empire if it was to be acceptable. Legitimacy, in this case, was a product of collective consent.

260 Ibid., no. 81, p. 62.

261 *De recup.*, chap. 116, p. 104.

262 GNC, i, p. 308; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 18; GCF, viii, p. 186.

263 BN MS fr. 10132, fol. 384r.

264 Fournier, *Le royaume*, pp. 391-405; Margue, 'Jean,' p. 83; Contamine, 'l’ombre,' p. 120.

vii. Conclusion

The Capetian-Valois kings were indisputably intent upon extending their influence over the lords in neighbouring regions and their efforts to do this proved more and more successful. Yet, contrary to Strayer's belief, many of Philippe IV's contemporaries in northern France, perhaps even the king himself, would have been as horrified as Rudolf of Habsburg at the suggestion that the French king aimed to extend his authority at the expense of the Empire. Philippe's actions were dramatic, but they were conceived, not as the annexation of imperial allods or fiefs and their integration into the French kingdom, but as acts by which French allods and French fiefs were to be consolidated and brought more firmly under royal control. Little but the intensity with which it was pursued divided Philippe's approach from that of his grandfather or his immediate successors.

The Capetian-Valois kings avoided the exercise of authority over lordships where it was not possible to establish 'proof' that they pertained to the French kingdom because, in part, to do so would imply that the French king was dependent upon and hence subordinate to the emperor. Even if, like count Otto IV, an imperial lord should claim to hold a free allod, his lordship remained within the bounds of imperial jurisdiction and the authority that the French kings were able to exercise with regard to it was limited. Such an attitude was probably encouraged by the imperial princes themselves: Otto was something of an exception, as, for the most part, imperial princes can have had little inclination to see the weak theoretical claims of rulers such as Richard of Cornwall replaced with the powerful hand of the Capetian-Valois kings.

The attitude of French kings arose as a consequence of the perspective that the Empire was not simply a territorially limited institution, but one whose boundaries were imbued with a theoretical near-immutability, alterable only by obtaining common consent. This conception almost certainly reflected another facet of a concern with the idea of disenfranchisement. This latter made it difficult to justify any act that could be perceived to ignore the pre-existent rights of the emperor. Again the Empire can be seen to have been conceived as a slightly distorted reflection of the French kingdom: the emperor, like the French king, ruled over a limited, though theoretically precisely defined, territorial entity. At the same time the imperial office
was perceived to differ profoundly from that of a king. From a French perspective the emperor, and to a lesser extent the Empire, were considered to exist to fulfil specific and unique functions in a properly ordered Christian society.
Chapter Eight

An Imperial Vocation?

i. Introduction

The Empire was not universal, nor was the temporal authority of its rulers all-encompassing. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries it was conceived in terms of a territorially limited political unit incorporating a number of kingdoms, conspicuous amongst which was Lombardy, particularly prominent in accounts of Henry VII’s Romzug. Amongst the other kingdoms it embraced was Bohemia, whose inhabitants were noted by Jean de Saint-Victor, with a number of others, as having become subject to German kings and emperors despite once having had their own kings. A third element in this composite was the kingdom of Arles. In spite of the efforts made by popes Nicholas III and Clement V to reconstitute this kingdom to the benefit of the Angevins – and by John of Bohemia to reconstitute it to the benefit of Philippe VI – the kingdom was rarely referred to by French writers. The tendency to overlook

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2 Tractatus (2), p. 238.


5 Fournier, Le royaume, pp. 391-405.

6 A rare example. Summaria, p. 5.
the kingdom of Arles was probably a consequence of the obscurity into which it had slipped, a fact highlighted by John of Saxony when writing to Rudolf of Habsburg.\(^7\)

Although a composite of several distinct kingdoms, it was not automatically the case that 'crowns' should become subsumed within the Empire. In the course of noting Frederick II’s condemnation by Gregory IX, the annalist of Saint-Médard of Soissons, in addition to describing Frederick as Roman emperor, simultaneously considered him to be king of Lombardy, Germany, Apulia, Sicily and Jerusalem.\(^8\) In particular, kingdoms which were the pre-existent patrimony of those who obtained the imperial throne, such as France in the case of Charlemagne, or Sicily in the case of Frederick II, habitually remained distinct, as did those acquired subsequent to imperial accession, such as Jerusalem in the case of the Hohenstaufen. Louis IX, for example, chose, when addressing Frederick in 1247, to term him both Roman emperor and king of Jerusalem and Sicily.\(^9\) The Empire possessed precise boundaries, even if their exact location remained unclear and along the length of its western frontier became, with increasing frequency, a source of contention.

Whilst possessed of temporal jurisdiction over multiple kingdoms, possibly even the whole of the west, excluding the kingdom of France, the emperor differed little, at first glance, from other kings. In fact, in many ways he appears as a slightly distorted image of French kingship. In practice it was recognised that the imperial princes elected each new ruler. Yet succession in the Empire was considered to be governed by dynastic principles not dissimilar to those which defined legitimate succession in the French kingdom and which were perceived to apply to the laity more generally. The temporal authority exercised by rulers of the Empire was considered to be in essence hereditary and in principle inalienable.

Such a sketch of French perceptions remains incomplete. It does not explain several aspects of the depiction of the Empire and its rulers in the French cultural milieu. Most conspicuous amongst these unexplained features are the levels of interest.

\(^7\) MGH Const. III, no. 258, p. 253 (5 September 1281).

\(^8\) MGH SS, xxvi, p. 522.

\(^9\) HD, vi, p. 501 (February/March 1247).
evoked by the deposition of Frederick II and by the Romžuge of Henry VII and Ludwig of Bavaria. Even allowing for Guillaume de Nangis' efforts to vilify the last Hohenstaufen emperor and the reflected warmth of Valois-Luxembourg relations in assessments of Henry's and Ludwig's Italian enterprises, the attention paid to these particular events remains extraordinary. It stands in marked contrast with French attitudes towards other would-be rulers of the Empire and to the lack of interest in, for example, Innocent IV's decision, taken a week after condemning Frederick, to deprive Sancho II of Portugal of the right to administer his kingdom (if not technically to depose him).\(^{10}\)

The metrical chronicle traditionally attributed to Geffroy de Paris characterised what Henry VII had acceded to upon his election as la hautesce of the Empire.\(^{11}\) Seventy years earlier Louis IX had considered the Empire in similar terms. Frederick II's imprisonment of the French prelates travelling to the papal council summoned to meet in Rome in 1241 was an incident far more damaging to Capetian-Staufer relations than even the English marriage of 1235.\(^{12}\) Yet even when Louis protested at Frederick's actions in the strongest possible terms, he recognised that up to his own time his ancestors had honoured a distinctive and elevated quality inherent in the Empire and professed that he himself intended to continue to do so.\(^{13}\) Louis' sentiments echoed in Dionysian pages. A version of his letter was incorporated into the Gesta Ludovici by Guillaume de Nangis\(^ {14}\) and the Gesta's translator noted that French kings ont tousjourz ame et honnore la solemnel hautesce de lempire de Roume.\(^ {15}\) The latter comments were included in the version of the Grandes


\(^{11}\) Geffroy de Paris, 3746-3747.

\(^{12}\) Labarge, Louis, p. 85; Le Goff, Louis, p. 164; Stürner, Friedrich, ii, p. 508.

\(^{13}\) '...honorem imperii et sublimitatem zelaverint...' HD, vi, p. 18 (end of 1241).

\(^{14}\) GL, p. 332.

\(^{15}\) GL(fr), p. 333.
Chroniques owned by, amongst others, the future Jean II\textsuperscript{16} and that prepared in the abbey in the 1340s.\textsuperscript{17} It may be suggested that it was this *hautesce* or, as Jean de Saint-Victor described what Henry VII was permitted to obtain, the dignity of the Empire,\textsuperscript{18} which differentiated the Empire from other kingdoms and provoked interest in the deposition of Frederick II and in the *Romzüge* of Henry and Ludwig. What, though, was the purpose of this dignity and how did it relate to the western emperor’s role as the ruler of the limited territorial Empire?

ii. A German Kingdom and a German Empire?

When Henry VII died, according to the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris, *il perdi royaume et empire*\textsuperscript{19} A tendency to separate the German kingdom from the Empire was not uncommon in the northern French cultural milieu. It was apparent, for example, in the annals of Saint-Médard, probably written in the 1250s, which noted Frederick’s possession of the kingdom of *Alemanie* separately and alongside the fact that Frederick was emperor of the Romans.\textsuperscript{20} Such a separation was implicit in the Dionysian continuator of Géraud de Frachet’s note of Ludwig of Bavaria’s claim that he was *rex Alemannorum et imperator Romanorum*.\textsuperscript{21} This phrase is remarkably reminiscent of the tendency of the abbey of Saint-Denis, and other sources in France, to separate the French kingdom from the Empire when discussing Carolingian emperors, particularly Charlemagne. French perceptions of the

\textsuperscript{16} GCF, x, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{17} GCF, vii, p. 84.

\textsuperscript{18} ‘...Imperii dignitatem...’ JSV, p. 654.

\textsuperscript{19} Geffroy de Paris, 5241.

\textsuperscript{20} MGH SS, xxvi, p. 522.

\textsuperscript{21} ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 69.
relationship between German kingship and the rulership of the Empire appear, however, to have been rather less clear-cut than the sharp distinction drawn between the Carolingians as kings of France and as emperors. For example, the idea of two distinct entities, but not a simple separation between German kingdom and Empire, was apparent in Primat's description of Frederick Barbarossa as *empereres de Rome et d'Alemagne*, a depiction incorporated into most versions of the *Grandes Chroniques*.\(^{22}\) Despite the frequent separation of 'Roman' and 'German' elements in French sources, it is, at first glance, difficult to discern any distinctive characteristics attached to the various titles applied to rulers of the Empire.

Rather than follow the wording adopted by Géraud's continuator, Guillaume de Nangis' third continuator noted that Ludwig, duke of Bavaria, made use of the title *rex Alemannorum*.\(^{23}\) In contrast the later *Grandes Chroniques*, when translating this passage, opted for 'se faisoit [appeler] emperere des Romains',\(^ {24}\) and in an earlier passage noted that Ludwig had styled himself *roy de Romains* in his letters.\(^ {25}\) The apparently interchangeable nature of all these titles is, perhaps, most clearly exemplified by Pierre Honoré's version of the *Grandes Chroniques*, according to which Ludwig:

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\ldots \text{se fist couronner et appeler roi d'Alemaigne, et usurpa les droits de l'Empire, et se}
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\[
\text{fist nommer en ses lettres roys des Romainz Auguste.}\(^ {26}\)
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That one title could simply be substituted for the other is again suggested by the practices of the archivists of the French court. The latter could label Albrecht of Habsburg 'king of Germany' in the general labelling and individual entries of one

\(^{22}\) GCF, vi, p. 201.

\(^{23}\) '...se regem Alemannorum publice nominans...' Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 82.

\(^{24}\) GCF, ix, p. 64.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., p. 38.

\(^{26}\) RHGF, xxi, p. 684. cf. GCF, ix, p. 38.
inventory of his letters, whilst employing the label 'regis Romanorum' when compiling a second inventory containing French translations of Albrecht's epistles.

Although the German rulers styled themselves *rex Romanorum* from their coronation, the use of the title *rex Alemanniae, roi d'Alemain* or a variant upon it, was, without doubt, the most frequent recourse of chroniclers and pamphleteers in France. The title *rex Theutoniae*, though much less common, was also occasionally employed. At the same time the application of a title involving a 'Roman' element to the ruler of the Empire was by no means uncommon in France. Undoubtedly in many cases the inclusion of a Roman element reflected the normal usage employed by both the German court and the papal curia, the clear influence of the former apparent from the references made in the *Grandes Chroniques* to the style adopted by Ludwig in his letters. Yet although at first glance the titles *rex Alemanniae* and *rex Romanorum* might appear interchangeable, it seems probable that they were not considered to be identical in France.

That the annalist of Saint-Médard was not alone in intimating that the Empire was not to be equated with the German kingdom and that the title 'emperor' was not simply an alternative for 'king of Germany' is suggested by the tendency to employ two titles, one Roman the other German, simultaneously. This tendency is highlighted by Bernard Gui, whose near-obsessive pedantry led him to oversee multiple recensions of his *Flores* and *Reges francorum*. Gui noted that Rudolf of Habsburg

27 MGH Const. IV, no. 91, p. 70.

28 Ibid., no. 1257, p. 1400.

29 For example: *Antequam essent clerici*, p. 8; GNC, i, p. 138; *Flores chronicorum*, RHGF, xxi, pp. 696, 712. Primat characterised the Germans present at the battle of Benevento as *Alemans de Teuthonique*: Primat/IV, pp. 27-28.

30 For example: MGH Const. III, no. 625, p. 600 (27 June 1298, Rome).


32 *Flores chronicorum*, RHGF, xxi, p. 702.
and Henry VII were each elected in regem Alamanniae et Romanorum, that Heinrich Raspe and William of Holland were each rex Theutoniae et Romanorum and that Albrecht was rex Alamanniae et Romanorum. This dual usage almost certainly reflected a perception in France that the German kingship was separate from a second office. This separation is evident in attitudes towards the status of would-be imperial rulers in the aftermath of Frederick II’s deposition.

Whilst Vincent de Beauvais appears to have regarded the period after Frederick’s deposition as one of imperial vacancy, he recognised the succession of a German king: Heinrich Raspe was rex Alemaniae. The existence of an imperial vacancy was less ambiguous in two later accounts which drew upon Vincent’s Speculum historiale. Adam de Clermont, in a version of his Flores which implied that Heinrich Raspe had been elected to Empire, may have believed this vacancy lasted only briefly. An alternate version of Adam’s work undoubtedly considered that the vacancy, implied to be the first to occur since Caesar, continued up to 1270, the time at which Adam was preparing his compilation:


33 Ibid., p. 718.
34 Ibid., p. 696.
36 Chazan, L’Empire, p. 632.
37 Speculum historiale, bk. xxxi, chap. i, p. 1286.
38 ‘Landegravius Thuringiae ...in imperatorem eligitur...’ RHGF, xxi, p. 78.
39 Ibid., p. 78.
40 The MS tradition may represent a Flores, extant in eight copies, and a separate Speculum gestorum mundi, composed simultaneously and extant in five copies: Nadeau ‘Deux abrégés,’ pp. 422-437.
This appears to be the position Adam favoured in the version he dedicated to Gregory X, as the introduction he prepared for the pontiff suggested that the third part of his work would recount the events that had transpired in the period of imperial vacancy, that is from the first year of Frederick II’s condemnation up to 1270. Girard d’Auvergne appears to have taken up a similar position to that Adam, a fellow member of the Clermont scriptorium, adopted when writing for Gregory. Girard prefaced his account of the deposition of Frederick II with the stark statement: *Hic vacat Romanum Imperium.* He made no suggestion that this period of vacancy had ended and in recounting the reigns of Heinrich, William and Richard, Girard explicitly qualified the latter two as kings of Germany, as did Adam. Whilst he did not subscribe to an imperial vacancy so much as a total cessation of the Empire, Jean de Saint-Victor, in his *Tractatus de divisione regnorum,* made it equally clear that there was a distinction between Frederick and the rulers that came after him: since the death of the last Hohenstaufen emperor there had been six *Alemannie reges, sed non imperatores Romani.*

In the 1240s Philippe Mousket had depicted German kingship as an authority which the emperor was able to exercise directly but which he was also able to bestow whilst in no way diminishing his own imperial status. Frederick II was counselled:

...qu’il envoierait
En Alemagne, et si feroit

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41 RHGF, xxi, p. 78, n. 5.

42 '...gesta vacationis Imperii a primo anno condemnationis dicti Frederici usque ad annum Domini M.CC.LXX... ' ibid., p. 77.

43 *Abbreviatione Historiae Figuralis,* RHGF, xxi, p. 215.


When making Henry (VII) king transpired to be something of an error of judgment, Frederick removed his son, symbolically placing the German crown back upon his own head and taking the kingdom back into his own hands:

L'emperères prist la couronne.
Sour son cief l'a mise pour voir...
L'emperères s'en est alés,
Et li roiaumes est remés
En sa main

Yet despite this apparent separation of German kingdom and Empire, the latter appears, from a northern French perspective, to have been imprinted with a particularly German character.

Rulers such as Henry VI and Frederick II were frequently referred to as the *empereres d'Alemagne*. The *Quaestio in utramque partem* used the phrase ‘emperor of the Germans’ to describe Otto I. Pierre Dubois, whilst he generally separated the German kingdom and king from the Empire and its ruler, could also speak of the *imperator Alemanniae* or *regnum et imperium Alemannie* as could Aubri de Trois-

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46 Mousket [RHGF], 28547-28549.
47 Ibid., 28644-28645, 28671-28673.
50 ‘...imperatore Theutonicorum...’ *Quaestio*, p. 57.
51 Jones, ‘Dubois,’ 74-75.
52 *Deliberatio*, p. 46.
53 *De recup.*, chap. 116, p. 104.
Fontaines and the author of the *Quaestio in utramque partem*.\(^{55}\) The Empire and its ruler were therefore rooted firmly within a German context. The western Empire, in the sense that it was an empire associated with a particular people or territory, was by no means considered to be a unique institution in thirteenth- and early-fourteenth-century France. Contemporaries also recognised the simultaneous existence of at least two other institutions which could be qualified as empires. One was the 'Persian' empire of the Khwârizm: several contemporary *empereurs de Perse*, the shâhs of the Khwârizmien inhabitants of Iran, appeared in Joinville's account of Louis IX's first crusade.\(^ {56}\) More conspicuous was the Latin Empire of Constantinople sometimes referred to in France as the *imperium romaniae*,\(^ {57}\) but more commonly by a variation on *l'empire de Costantinoble.*\(^ {58}\)

Jean de Saint-Victor, at the time he wrote his *Tractatus*, may well have considered a German empire to be precisely what the Roman Empire had become and the German kings to have simply succeeded to the emperors. Yet Jean was notably uncertain about the origins of the German kingdom\(^ {59}\) and in the part of his *Memoriale* concerned with Henry VII, written at least five years after the *Tractatus*, noted at one point that Henry was *rex Alemanniae* whilst simultaneously labelling him with the phrase 'in imperatorem Romanum electus'.\(^ {60}\) Despite the German character of the western Empire, a distinction in French thought between it and the German kingdom

\(^{54}\) ATF, p. 914.

\(^{55}\) *Quaestio*, p. 56.

\(^{56}\) Joinville, 486, pp. 238-240.

\(^{57}\) *Opusculum Galleri Cornuti, archiepiscopi Senonensis, de susceptione Coronae spineae Jesu Christi*, RHGF, xxii, p. 29.


\(^{59}\) *Tractatus* (2), p. 236.

\(^{60}\) JSV, p. 654.
was underlined by the fact that although the Empire was presently the possession of the Germans it was clear that this had not always been the case.

As the *Quaestio in utramque partem* noted, the Franks had held the Empire before the Germans. Nor was it clear that the German acquisition of the Empire should be regarded as definitive. This point was underlined by Charles d'Anjou, Pierre Dubois and Jean de Jandun, as well as by several French kings, all of whom suggested or implied that the Empire might be translated to the French. Implicit in any such translation was the appropriation of jurisdiction over the German kingdom, to which exponents of such a plan, such as Philippe III's envoy to Gregory X in 1273 or Dubois, added a series of peripheral benefits, such as jurisdiction over northern Italy. The German kingdom was considered to be the most substantial component of the western Empire in territorial terms, yet the chief characteristic of the Empire was not its German quality, which was perceived to be essentially transitory.

iii. The Roman Connection and the Papacy

On one level the contemporary western empire held by the Germans had a relationship with the Roman Empire in that it was considered, in territorial terms, to be equivalent to the western portion of that empire. Following Vincent de Beauvais, the western Roman Empire had been bestowed on pope Sylvester by Constantine and subsequently transferred to Charlemagne by the pope's successor. Alternatively, as Jean de Saint-Victor suggested, a separation between eastern and western parts of the Roman Empire had occurred when Charlemagne took control of its western portion. In either case the eastern part of the Roman Empire continued to exist under its own

61 *Quaestio*, p. 60.

62 MGH Const. III, no. 618, p. 586, argument III.

63 *De recup.*, chap. 116, p. 104; *Pro facto*, p. 209.


65 Ibid., pp. 531-535.
emperor.\textsuperscript{66} At the same time French conceptions of the association between the contemporary western Empire and the Roman Empire extended beyond the view that one had succeeded to part of the territory of the other. The western Empire, even though its ruler was not perceived to exercise a temporal jurisdiction equivalent in extent to that exercised by the emperors of Antiquity, was not considered to be a successor so much as the continuation of the Roman Empire. The importance of the ‘Roman’ quality of the western Empire and the nature of the relationship between the imperial office and German kingship are clearest in French conceptions of the procedure by which an imperial ruler was constituted.

The installation of a ruler in the western Empire was regarded in France as a process which took place in three distinct stages, each of which culminated in a coronation ceremony. A portrait of this three-fold process was outlined in full in several accounts which dealt with the \textit{Romztüge} of Henry VII and Ludwig of Bavaria and in part by numerous other works. There was a remarkable level of agreement regarding the central elements of the process. Whilst the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris\textsuperscript{67} and a note added to a manuscript of the \textit{Memoriale historiarum}\textsuperscript{68} mistakenly referred to a silver crown\textsuperscript{69} and Guillaume de Nangis’ third continuator noted the use of a specific diadem,\textsuperscript{70} few references were made to any \textit{regalia} associated with the first of these ceremonies. Equally limited were references to the ceremony’s procedures. Guillaume de Nangis’ third continuator was, for example, unusual in noting that Ludwig of Bavaria was crowned whilst seated on the throne of Charlemagne.\textsuperscript{71} At the same time the first ceremony possessed a fundamental feature: it should take place in the city of Aachen.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., pp. 526, 533.

\textsuperscript{67} Geffroy de Paris, 3759, 3763.

\textsuperscript{68} JSV, p. 655, n. 9.

\textsuperscript{69} Below, pp. 329-330.

\textsuperscript{70} Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p. 6.
Aachen was a recurring feature of French accounts of the first coronation ceremony and one which reflected contemporary German practice. The city was specified as the site for the ceremony whether an account was produced in the early years of the thirteenth century, such as that of the anonymous of Béthune,\textsuperscript{72} in the mid-century, such as those of Philippe Mousket,\textsuperscript{73} the minstrel of Reims\textsuperscript{74} and Primat's \emph{Roman des rois},\textsuperscript{75} or in the mid-fourteenth century, such as the 1340s Dionysian \emph{Grandes Chroniques}.\textsuperscript{76} So important was this location that Philippe Mousket could refer to the German ruler as the \textit{rois d'Ais}.\textsuperscript{77} Guillaume de Nangis noted that whilst Frederick II was originally crowned at Mainz he was later recrowned at Aachen,\textsuperscript{78} where, according to Guillaume's third continuator, it was customary for German kings to be crowned.\textsuperscript{79} That Richard of Cornwall had secured coronation at Aachen was thought worthy of note and was probably an important factor in confirming the northern French decision to favour his candidature in preference to that of Alfonso X.\textsuperscript{80} The unique exception amongst northern French accounts was the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris, whose author

\textsuperscript{72} RHGF, xxiv, pt. ii, p. 759.

\textsuperscript{73} Mousket [MGH], 23317.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Récits}, chap. xxii, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{75} GCF, vi, p. 242.

\textsuperscript{76} GCF, viii, p. 267.

\textsuperscript{77} Mousket [RHGF], 30955.

\textsuperscript{78} GNC, i, pp. 138, 149-150.

\textsuperscript{79} Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 6-7.

\textsuperscript{80} GNC, i, p. 214; \textit{Ex notis Lemovicensibus}, MGH SS, xxvi, p. 437.
suggested that Henry VII was crowned at Cologne. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines made some attempt to explain the significance of Aachen in the 1240s. According to Aubri, the Aachen coronation was an expression of reverence for Charlemagne: it became a *consuetudo quasi lex* inviolably observed that prior to Roman coronation a king was crowned at Aachen:

...et hoc fit propter reverentiam et maiestatem Karoli Magni, cuius corpus requiescit ibidem.

A belief that a coronation ceremony, if it was to be legitimate, should take place in a specific location probably reflected, to some extent, the strong association of the French coronation ceremony with one particular city, Reims. Rémoise locations played an integral part in thirteenth-century conceptions of the French coronation. A further aspect of French practice may explain the lack of interest taken by French writers in the claims of the archbishops of Cologne to a traditional right to crown the German king, claims which thirteenth-century archbishops were keen to capitalise upon. Although the crowning of French kings was normally the prerogative of the archbishop of Reims, the rite was considered to be perfectly valid if performed by someone else. Louis IX’s coronation by the bishop of Soissons, for example, was well known. This would explain why the minstrel of Reims did not seem particularly perturbed when he gave an account of a ceremony in which the archbishop of Trier was given responsibility for crowning Frederick II.

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81 Geffroy de Paris, 3763.

82 ATF, p. 903.


86 *Récits*, chap. xxii, p. 113.
The completion of this first ceremony created, from a northern French perspective, a legitimate rex Alemanniae. It was not necessary that this ruler should undergo any further ceremony for him to be recognised as a legitimate king who possessed the authority, for example, to contract alliances, such as those arranged in 1299 at Quatrevaux. The Aachen coronation possessed a second significance. It was, as Aubri de Trois-Fontaines explained, a necessary preliminary step in seeking Roman coronation. Henry (VII) was crowned at Aachen, as Philippe Mousket noted, pour aprèis lui [Frederick] tenir l'empere. Coronation at Aachen, therefore, was considered to bestow both the German kingship and a claim upon the Empire. It is possible that the belief that the Aachen ceremony comprised two distinctive elements accounts for the frequent tendency amongst French writers to separate the titles rex Alemanniae and rex Romanorum.

If the Aachen coronation was the first and essential step on the road to acquisition of the imperial title, the Romzug of Henry VII brought an intermediary step to the forefront of French thought: coronation in northern Italy. This second coronation captured the interest of Henry’s contemporaries such as the author of the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris, Jean de Saint-Victor and Guillaume de Nangis’ second continuator. The ceremony was also noted by Bernard Gui and later Dionysians, whose interest was probably fortified by Ludwig of

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87 ATF, p. 903.

88 Mousket [MGH], 23318.

89 Geffroy de Paris, 3808-3811.

90 JSV, p. 655.

91 Continuator(2)GNC, i, p. 381.

92 Flores chronicorum, RHGF, xxi, p. 720.

93 ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 35; GCF, viii, pp. 267-268.
Bavaria’s Italian odyssey. Again, this ceremony was associated with a specific city, in this case Milan. It differed from the Aachen ceremony in that it involved a very specific element of regalia, the iron crown. The 1340s Dionysian Grandes Chroniques, although it suggested that the inhabitants of Milan l’appellerent Auguste, noted that it was as a consequence of this coronation that Henry VII became roy de Lombardie. In contrast, the majority of French writers gave no indication of a new title or authority to which the candidate acceded to or, in Ludwig’s case, claimed to accede to. One account that appears to have differed from the interpretation offered by the later Grandes Chroniques was that of Jean de Saint-Victor. Jean implied that it was from his coronation at Milan that Henry could lay claim to the imperial title:

Hoc anno...fuit Henricus rex Alamanniae, et jam imperator vocatus, Mediolani, prout imperatorum moris est, coronatus.

For Jean, Henry was already emperor when he arrived in Rome and received a third crown: ‘Eodem anno, venit imperator Romam, corona aurea coronandus.’ Jean’s opinion appears to have been shared by the third continuator of Guillaume de Nangis, who noted that at Milan Ludwig in imperatorem corona ferrea coronatur.

The Memoriale historiarum and Guillaume’s continuator were unusual and the majority of writers, none of whom accredited Ludwig with an imperial title, chose not to apply such a title to Henry until his Roman coronation. The application of the imperial title to rulers of the lands of the western Empire was, with certain exceptions, such as Guillaume de Nangis’ qualification of Philip of Swabia as imperatorem

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94 Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 82; Lescot, p. 1; GCF, ix, p. 75.

95 Geffroy de Paris, 3767; Continuator(2)GNC, i, p. 381; JSV, p. 655, n. 9, ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 35; Flores chronicorum, RHGF, xxi, p. 720, Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 82; GCF, ix, p. 75.

96 GCF, viii, p. 268.

97 JSV, p. 655.

98 Ibid., p. 655.

99 Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 82.
Alemanniae, generally restricted to those who underwent this third coronation ceremony in Rome. The continuation of the annals of Rouen did indeed note the death of the 'emperor' Rudolf of Habsburg, but as the title was not applied to either Adolf or Albrecht, this usage probably arose as a result of a misunderstanding. Although no French author gave any clear indication of what precisely was conferred, beyond the imperial title itself, the Roman ceremony was frequently noted in the cases of Ludwig of Bavaria and Henry VII. Jean de Saint-Victor and the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris, as had been the case in their descriptions of the Aachen ceremony, mistakenly believed that the Roman coronation involved a specific item of regalia, a crown made from a particular metal, in this case gold. Most French accounts referred to the crown without any specific description or termed it imperialis diademate or dyademe emperial, a description which, in a northern French context, almost certainly implied the use of a closed crown. An assumption that the ceremony would normally be conducted by the pope probably explains the continuator of the annals of Rouen's belief that Ludwig of Bavaria

100 GNC, i, pp. 114, 125, 129. This probably arose from Guillaume's use of Rigord.

101 RHGF, xxiii, p. 346.

102 Continuator(3)GNC, ii, pp. 86-87; Lescot, p. 1; annals of Rouen (continuation, 1282-1343), MGH SS, xxvi, p. 505; GCF, ix, p. 75.

103 JSV, p. 655.

104 Geffroy de Paris, 3770.

105 Below, pp. 329-330.

106 Continuator(2)GNC, i, p. 393.

107 GCF, viii, p. 286.

created an anti-pope specifically in order to have himself crowned. Papal involvement was not considered indispensable, however, and the fact that Clement V had despatched three cardinals to perform Henry’s coronation whilst frequently noted, particularly by the Dionysians, was almost certainly not considered to have altered the legitimacy of the ceremony.

A tendency amongst French writers to separate the German and Roman elements of western imperial rule suggests that the imperial title was not considered to be necessary to legitimise a candidate’s possession of the German kingship. Is it, then, the case that a further coronation was considered necessary if the German king were to exercise legitimate jurisdiction beyond the German kingdom? Kantorowicz suggested that it was during the period after the end of Hohenstaufen rule that the idea first developed in Burgundy and Italy that a rex Romanorum lacked authority beyond Germany before his Roman coronation. That he lacked authority in Italy before at least coronation in Milan certainly appears to have been the position adopted by the 1340s Dionysian Grandes Chroniques and this may also explain Jean de Saint-Victor and Guillaume de Nangis’ third continuator’s view that it was at this point that the German king became an emperor. These French accounts do not appear to have been greatly marked by the arguments of certain Neapolitan jurists in the fourteenth century that suggested that the pre- and post-Roman-coronation ruler exercised the same rights, a principle outlined by the German princes themselves in 1338. An assumption that a second coronation bestowed a form of extra-regnal authority, would not, however, account for the necessity of a third ceremony. Nor, more fundamentally, would it account for the distinctively Roman character that this was considered to confer upon the western Empire. Further light is shed on this problem

109 MGH SS, xxvi, p. 505.

110 Continuator(2)GNC, i, p. 393; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 39; GCF, viii, p. 286. Also: Landolpho of Colonna, RHGF, xxiii, p. 198.


112 Ibid., pp. 326-327.
by examining the sources from which the German king-emperor was considered to
derive his authority.

The system by which the ruler of the western Empire was selected involved
election by the German magnates. In the course of the thirteenth and the first half of
the fourteenth century, it became established that electoral authority was vested in a
college consisting of seven of these magnates, three ecclesiastical and four lay.

There is little doubt that the inhabitants of France accepted the principle that the
German ruler was established by the German magnates through an elective
mechanism. Although echoed by Primat and Guillaume de Nangis, Guillaume le
Breton's suggestion that the Romans played a part in the electoral process does
not appear to have been particularly influential. At least one writer to make use of
Guillaume's *Gesta Philippi Augusti* simply removed the reference to the participation
of the Romans and spoke only of Otto IV's election as being against the will of the
French king and without the assent of the magnates of the Empire.

To some extent the development of French thought appears to reflect the
gradual evolution of the electoral body. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines and Guillaume de
Nangis, for example, spoke only of the selection of a candidate by the *barones
Alemannie*, in the case of Frederick II, and the *electores*, in the case of Richard and
Alfonso. By the early-fourteenth century this rather vague usage had crystallised

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113 Concerning the formation of the college: Bayley, *German College of Electors*.

114 Above, p. 197.

115 GCF, vi, p. 294.

116 GNC, i, p. 132.

117 *Gesta Philippi Augusti, Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton*, i, p. 236.

118 ATF, p. 890.

119 Ibid., p. 893; GNC, i, p. 138.

120 GNC, i, p. 214.
into an electoral college. For Jean de Saint-Victor this body, conceived in terms of supposed French practice, was composed of twelve German peers. Jean’s contemporary Pierre Dubois, in contrast, believed, in 1308, that the college was composed of *tres archiepiscopos et quatuor duces seu comites*. Later in the fourteenth century, Guillaume de Nangis’ third continuator and the Dionysian continuator of Géraud de Frachet outlined a similar structure involving three archbishops, correctly labelled as those of Cologne, Trier and Mainz, and three dukes. Although this level of detail appears to have escaped the Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques*, these accounts suggest that there was an awareness of the general composition of the contemporary electoral college in the Île-de-France if not elsewhere.

If Charles d’Anjou referred only to Philippe III’s need to gain the support of *un poi d’Alemans* in his attempt to encourage his nephew to pursue his 1273 imperial candidature, it is clear that, at least by the reign of Philippe IV, the French court was aware that the electoral process involved specific magnates, amongst whom were the archbishop of Cologne and the king of Bohemia. Although the court was clearly aware of the latter’s involvement in the electoral process, it is notable, given the interest in John of Bohemia, that this was apparently unknown to French writers

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121 Above, pp. 207-208.

122 *Pro facto*, p. 209.

123 Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 6.

124 ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 49.

125 MGH Const. III, no. 618, para. 6, p. 588, argument XIII. Charles may have sought to bribe the archbishop of Trier: Langlois, *Philippe*, p. 68.

126 MGH Const. IV, no. 247, pp. 211-212 (July 1308, Poitiers). Letter from Raymund, cardinal-deacon of Sancte Marie Nove, to the archbishop of Cologne concerning the 1308 election. This letter is found in BN MS lat. 10919, a royal register.

127 Ibid., no. 239, pp. 203-204 (20 May 1308, Poitiers); no. 240, pp. 204-205 (9 June 1308, Poitiers).
more generally. This lacuna highlights the rather vague terms with which the lay electors were labelled by Dubois and the Dionysians, a sharp contrast to the precision that was applied to their ecclesiastical counterparts, something that suggests a degree of uncertainty concerning the identities of the lay participants prevailed. Whilst the German magnates clearly played an important role in the establishment of any ruler of the western Empire, in an apparent paradox, they were simultaneously considered to be dispensable.

The German electoral college derived its authority from the papacy. This was either, as the compilers of the Dionysian *Grandes Chroniques*¹²⁸ and those of Pierre Honoré’s version¹²⁹ suggested, because Constantine’s donation of the Empire to the pope had been followed by the institution of the German electors whose purpose was to select a candidate to present to the papacy for approval, or, as Pierre Dubois argued, because the pope had founded the electoral college at the time he had transferred the Empire to Charlemagne.¹³⁰ The source for the idea promoted by various traditions of the *Grandes Chroniques* remains unclear. Dubois’ view, remarkably similar to that outlined by Boniface VIII in 1303 when he confirmed Albrecht as king of the Romans,¹³¹ was based upon the interpretation of Innocent’s III’s bull *Venerabilem* in light of contemporary circumstances.¹³² In either case the pope possessed an authority which allowed him, as Charles d’Anjou implied in the 1270s, simply to override the wishes of the Germans in the selection of an imperial

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¹²⁸ GCF, ix, p. 37.

¹²⁹ RHGF, xxi, p. 684.

¹³⁰ Pro facto, p. 209.


¹³² Jones, ‘Dubois,’ 81.
candidate, or, as Dubois suggested, to suspend the rights of the electors altogether.

Papal approval was the key to a successful candidature and the necessity of such approval was stressed throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, whether the writer was Philippe Mousket, considering the appointment of Henry (VII), the minstrel of Reims discussing Frederick II, Primat, Pierre Dubois airing the possibility of Philippe IV’s candidature, or the Dionysian Grandes Chroniques, in the case of Henry VII. As the Dionysians put it when discussing John XXII’s reasons for refusing to acknowledge Ludwig’s candidature: ‘le pape le doit confermer et li enjoindre l’office et l’administracion de l’Empire.’ Et non autrement, added the compilers of Pierre Honoré’s text. It was, as the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris put it, the pope who fist et crea empereeur. Even Ludwig of Bavaria, according to the Dionysians, was shocked by and unwilling

133 MGH Const. III, no. 618, para. 6, p. 588, argument XIII.

134 Pro facto, p. 209.

135 Mousket [MGH], 23313, 23324.

136 Récits, chap. xxii, p. 113.

137 GCF, vi, p. 297.

138 Pro facto, pp. 208-209.

139 GCF, viii, p. 266.


141 RHGF, xxi, p. 684.

142 Geffroy de Paris, 3685.
to accept the heretical suggestion that the Empire was not dependant upon the papacy.  

Several writers, both lay and ecclesiastical, were explicit that the pope played a role not simply in creating the emperor but in the initial constitution of the German king. The minstrel of Reims, for example, noted that Frederick II *fu esleuz des barons d’Alemaingne à roi d’Alemaingne par la grace la pape.* The chronicler of Sainte-Catherine-de-Monte noted the death of Heinrich Raspe *qui a papa Innocentio fuerat electus in regem Alemanniae.* Some manuscripts of Jean de Saint-Victor’s *Memoriale* even included the erroneous assertion that Henry VII had received initial consecration by the pope at Poitiers. Yet, for all the emphasis placed upon the necessity of papal consent, the role of the electors continued to be perceived to be an important one.

Philippe Mousket felt it worthy of note that Henry (VII) *fu couronnés sans contredire.* According to Jean de Saint-Victor, Heinrich Raspe failed to become properly established as ruler of the Empire at least in part because he was not elected following the proper custom: despite papal approval and his election by the three ecclesiastical electors, Heinrich was not elected by *omnibus illis ad quos electio de consuetudine pertinebat.* Following contemporary imperial practice, enshrined in the Golden Bull of 1356, a majority of electoral votes was considered sufficient endorsement for a candidate. That he could claim to have obtained a majority of the

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143 Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 74-76; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 68; GCF, ix, pp. 58-60.

144 *Récits,* chap. xxii, p. 113.

145 RHGF, xxiii, p. 400.

146 JSV, p. 654, n. 2.

147 Mousket [MGH], 23316.


149 MGH Const. XI, p. 576.
votes was noted in the case of Ludwig of Bavaria\textsuperscript{150} and, in conjunction with other factors, probably confirmed a tendency to favour his candidature in preference to that of Friedrich der Schöne. Although one Limousin author implied, when relating the case of Richard of Cornwall, that the assent of the majority of the electors was less important than coronation at Aachen,\textsuperscript{151} as Jean de Saint-Victor made clear, when discussing Heinrich Raspe’s failed accession, the participation of the electors was considered important if the necessary rites were to be observed correctly.\textsuperscript{152} It is possible that the importance attached to the role of the electors stemmed from fundamental assumptions about the nature of German kingship.

It seems probable that the German magnates occupied a double role in French thought. They were, as Primat put it, quite literally, \textit{li baron d’Alemagne et de l’empire}.\textsuperscript{153} On one level their role was considered to involve the selection of a German king, just as the French peers would in certain cases select a French king. On a second level the German electors had been constituted by the papacy to choose a candidate for a distinct office. This latter, for the present at least, was held in conjunction with the German kingship but was not equivalent to it. With papal approval, the German king selected by the electors obtained the kingship of the Romans, which bestowed a right to receive the imperial crown in Rome at the convenience of the papacy. In the post-Staufer era, when German kings consistently failed to accede to the Roman emperorship, it was not the case that the latter was rendered an irrelevancy in northern France. Almost certainly stimulated by the fact that the German kingship and the Roman emperorship ceased automatically to be conflated after the mid-thirteenth century, the notion of a distinct Roman office, intimately connected with the papacy, appears instead to have crystallised in French thought.

\textsuperscript{150} Continuator(3)GNC, ii, p. 6; ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 49.

\textsuperscript{151} Ex notis Lemovicensibus, MGH SS, xxvi, p. 437.

\textsuperscript{152} Chazan, \textit{L’Empire}, p. 632, n. 237.

\textsuperscript{153} GCF, vi, p. 297.
iv. The Roman Emperor and the Empire of Christianity

Recounting the ecclesiastical councils assembled in 1291 and 1292 to discuss what was to be done to recover the Holy Land, Guillaume de Nangis concluded with a comment concerning the preaching of the cross in toto Christianitatis imperio. Four decades later his successors in the scriptorium of Saint-Denis rendered his remark as a reference to l'empire de crestinenté. These comments are evidence of the continuing assumption in the French cultural milieu that Christian society could be considered in terms of a universal institution. What is less clear is whether this universal institution was characterised by anything other than a spiritual quality. If it was also envisioned as a unity on a temporal level, this raises questions concerning its relationship with the western empire and the papally-approved Roman emperor. The early-fourteenth-century lawyer Pierre Dubois provides one perspective on both these issues.

For Dubois, a universal institution encompassing all Christians, or at least all Christians obedient to the Roman Church, the respublica christicolarum, retained a Roman character and could be described as respublica romanorum. This was not simply a question of the unity of Christian society in spiritual terms but also, to some extent, on a temporal level. Dubois did not envision the western emperor exercising a universal jurisdiction within this Roman commonwealth. At the same time, whilst he chose to invest it in the papacy, he did believe in the existence of a supreme

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154 Schein, Fideles, pp. 135-138.

155 GNC, i, p. 279.


157 De recup., chap. 99, p. 81.

158 Ibid., chap. 96, p. 77.

159 Jones, 'Dubois,' 84, n. 131, 133. cf. Rivière, Le problème, p. 348.
temporal authority, both for the reform of secular law\textsuperscript{160} and in the arbitration of disputes between rulers.\textsuperscript{161} It seems unlikely that Dubois was alone in conceiving of this Christian empire as characterised by a Roman quality or in believing it to be more than simply a spiritual union.

Dubois was a lawyer and his view that some form of universal temporal authority was a necessity if the world was to be properly organised was an axiom which undoubtedly originated in the fact that the \textit{Corpus iuris civilis} remained the benchmark of his thought. For other inhabitants of northern France the continued existence of the Roman Empire, even if it was not automatically considered to be universal, was necessitated by eschatological considerations. In the universal histories of Aubri de Trois-Fontaines,\textsuperscript{162} Vincent de Beauvais\textsuperscript{163} and Guillaume de Nangis,\textsuperscript{164} the Roman Empire continued to occupy the central role assigned to it by Sigebert de Gembloux. It was the final empire of the book of Daniel and its continued existence, even when vacant, held in check the coming of the Antichrist and the end of the world. A similar conception may have informed the thought of Bernard Gui, who clearly believed the history of the Roman Empire continued in his own day.\textsuperscript{165} The essence of this view may well have permeated beyond the erudite Latin circles of the compilers of universal history.

In the book of Daniel gold, silver and iron had been three of the materials which made up the statue in king Nebuchadnezzar's dream: gold forming the head, silver the chest and arms, and iron the legs.\textsuperscript{166} The statue was a common landmark on

\textsuperscript{160} Jones, 'Dubois,' 84-85.

\textsuperscript{161} \textit{De recup.}, chap. 12, p. 12. Jones, 'Dubois,' 82-83.

\textsuperscript{162} Chazan, \textit{L'Empire}, pp. 672-673.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p. 687.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., p. 691.

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Littera fratris Bernardi Guidonis, ordinis Praedicatorum, ad papam}, RHGF, xxi, p. 691; Prologue to the \textit{Flores chronicorum}, ibid., p. 693.

\textsuperscript{166} Daniel 2:31-35.
the mental landscape of the medieval west, and prominent examples of its employment in the early-fourteenth century include the works of Dante and Marsilius of Padua. The decision by the author of the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris to complement the iron crown of Lombardy with two additional crowns of silver, for Germany, and gold, for Rome, may well have been intended to echo this imagery and quite possibly sprang from the assumption that the Roman Empire to which Henry VII succeeded was the final empire of the prophecy. Despite the fact that he had effectively reduced the Roman Empire to the status of any other kingdom in his Tractatus, Jean de Saint-Victor’s decision to describe the Roman crown as one of gold in his Memoriale may have echoed a similar eschatological interpretation. Whether or not this was true in Jean’s case, the interpolation into a manuscript of the Memoriale of a description of Henry VII’s three crowns in terms similar to those employed by the author of the metrical chronicle, a text which Jean himself may have used, suggests that the association may have been widely held.

Pierre Dubois could conceive of a supra-regnal Roman Christian commonwealth which required a universal temporal authority but in which aspects of this authority were vested not in the emperor but in the pope. Yet for Dubois the emperor was not by any means an irrelevance. He exercised temporal jurisdiction within the sphere of the limited territorial Empire, a jurisdiction similar to that exercised by any other secular ruler within his kingdom and which the pope was


169 Geffroy de Paris, 3759-3760.

170 JSV, p. 655.

171 Ibid., p. 655, n. 9.

obliged to respect. In the mid-thirteenth century Philippe Mousket had shared the view that the western emperor fulfilled the function of a limited temporal ruler but differed from Dubois in suggesting that the authority he exercised was an effective stewardship on behalf of the papacy. Constantine had donated l'empire de Roume et tot l'estre to pope Sylvester. In common with Vincent de Beauvais, Philippe believed it was impractical that the pope should govern this himself and so he had constituted an emperor, effectively a papal vassal (ses om liges), to exercise jurisdiction over the 'west' in his place. Philippe gave little indication of what this region of imperial jurisdiction constituted, although his description of the kingdom and Empire as 'brothers' suggests that in the present day he did not consider it to include France.

Whilst it is possible that there continued to be a belief in northern France that an aspect of the emperor's authority consisted in the exercise of temporal jurisdiction on behalf of the pope, an increasingly limited understanding of the Donation of Constantine certainly deprived this of any universal aspect and may even have limited it to northern Italy or even simply the city of Rome. At the same time, it seems likely that a number of quite different temporal functions, which its incumbent performed both within and beyond the limited territorial Empire, distinguished the imperial office from that of other kings.

According to the author of the metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris, Henry VII:

...maintenir sa guerre
Que pais en puist venir en terre. 177


174 Chazan, L'Empire, pp. 506, 526.

175 Mousket [RHGF], 30903-30906, 30930-30938.

176 Ibid., 30981-30984.

177 Geffroy de Paris, 3705-3706.
It seems probable that some in France regarded the ability to establish peace, or at least peace within the Empire (conceived as a territorially limited institution), as one of the essential tasks of an imperial ruler. This attitude was not exclusive to northern France: the ability to establish peace within the Empire had been highlighted as one of the necessary qualities of any potential imperial candidate by Bruno, bishop of Olmütz, in advice offered to the 1274 council of Lyon. The establishment of peace as an imperial duty was a theme highlighted by Henry VII in his coronation encyclical. For Jean de Saint-Victor, the Roman Empire, by establishing universal peace at the time of Christ and subsequently enabling the transmission of the Christian message, had acted as an instrument of divine providence. That Jean did not consider Henry VII to be an emperor in the same sense as those who had reigned between Caesar and Frederick II was indicated by the fact that, unlike his predecessors, Henry's name did not appear in the upper margin of manuscripts of the *Memoriale* qualified as 'Roman emperor'. The reason for this exclusion, as Chazan suggested, almost certainly lay in Henry's failure to reign in peace, a point which Jean also highlighted as one of the reasons for Heinrich Raspe's failure to become properly established as an imperial ruler.

The idea that the emperor existed to establish peace in the world was entrenched in the thought of Sigebert de Gembloux and was a theme which echoed

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178 MGH Const. III, no. 621, pp. 594-595 (12 July 1274, Prague).

179 MGH Const. IV, no. 801, p. 802 (29 June 1312, Rome).


181 Ibid., p. 698.

182 Ibid., pp. 697-699.

183 '...et non in pace...' cited from: ibid., p. 632, n. 237.

184 Ibid., p. 639.
in Aubri de Trois-Fontaines' universal chronicle in the 1240s. By the early-fourteenth century, the northern French environment was more sensitive to the concept of the exercise of supra-regnal authority. It was almost certainly this factor that led Pierre Dubois to vest the position of universal arbiter in the pope rather than the emperor or any other temporal ruler. It is certainly true that writers such as Guillaume de Nangis highlighted the efforts of French kings to formulate peace between their neighbours. Yet there is little to indicate that, as Chazan believed, these were attempts to portray French kings as successors to an exclusively imperial role. It seems probable that the French kings themselves regarded these negotiations as personal arrangements and there is little to suggest that commentators in France considered them to be more than an indication of Capetian-Valois prestige. In this context it is particularly striking that in Guillaume's universal chronicle, where Chazan believed the author's intention was to portray Louis IX as the emperor that Frederick II had failed to be, the king's efforts to negotiate between fractious imperial princes in the 1260s did not in fact find a place.

In 1202, in the bull Venerabilem, Innocent III had outlined his own view of the function of the imperial office: the emperor existed to defend the Church. It was the failure of the Greek emperor to fulfil this task adequately that had led Innocent's predecessor to transfer the Empire to Charlemagne. Innocent's theory, incorporated into canon law, was not overlooked in France. In 1308, in his explanation of how Philippe IV might acquire the imperial throne, Pierre Dubois underlined that the

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185 Ibid., pp. 669-670.

186 Jones, 'Dubois,' 85-86.


188 Chazan, 'Guillaume,' pp. 476-477; Chazan, L'Empire, pp. 688-689.

189 GNC, i, pp. 211-237. Though highlighted by Chazan, even Louis' peacemaking in Hainaut (1250s) is actually absent from the first recension of Guillaume's universal chronicle, excluded by conscious decision: above, p. 112.

emperor had a role to play in the defence of the Church.\textsuperscript{191} It must be noted that Dubois' virtually verbatim repetition of the argument outlined in \textit{Venerabilem} was, almost certainly, primarily intended to convince Innocent's successor, Clement V, to participate in Dubois' scheme by presenting the pope with an argument based wholly upon the papacy's own pronouncements.\textsuperscript{192} Yet there is further evidence to suggest that the defence of the Church was, at least in part, considered to be the emperor's function: in the justification they offered for John XXII's right to examine the suitability of Ludwig of Bavaria, both the 1340s Dionysian \textit{Grandes Chroniques} \textsuperscript{193} and Pierre Honoré's version\textsuperscript{194} suggested that it was necessary to determine whether an imperial candidate possessed the intention to \textit{garder et deffendre de tout son pooir les drois de l'Eglise}.

Numerous French kings were highlighted in the thirteenth and early-fourteenth century as defenders of popes confronted by malevolent emperors. Pepin III, for example, was said, in a sermon preached in the early-fourteenth century, to have fought against an emperor and restored the pope's sight and person to Rome, whilst the same text noted that Charlemagne had defended the Church against an emperor.\textsuperscript{195} The most striking case was probably that of Louis IX, at least in the version of his relationship with Frederick II depicted by Guillaume de Nangis. This should not necessarily be interpreted as an indication that these kings, by defending either the papacy or the Church more generally, were considered by contemporaries to be fulfilling an exclusively 'imperial' vocation.\textsuperscript{196} Rather, this particular emphasis

\textsuperscript{191} \textit{Pro facto}, p. 209.

\textsuperscript{192} Jones, 'Dubois,' 79.

\textsuperscript{193} GCF, ix, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{194} RHGF, xxi, p. 684.

\textsuperscript{195} 'Un sermon prononce pendant la guerre de Flandre,' 169.

\textsuperscript{196} cf. Chazan's view that Vincent de Beauvais, Guillaume de Nangis and Jean de Saint-Victor highlighted such behaviour in order to suggest that the French king had become the \textit{de facto} emperor: Chazan, 'Guillaume,' pp. 465, 479; Chazan, \textit{L'Empire}, pp. 685-686, 688, 699-701.
should more probably be seen in the context of the developing belief, given particular impetus under Philippe IV, that the French king and the French kingdom occupied a uniquely elevated position in Christian society. This position was symbolised by a series of attributes considered in France to exemplify the uniqueness of French kingship: anointment with chrism sent directly from Heaven, the ability to cure scrofula, and descent, after the canonisation of Louis IX, from a line of saints.\footnote{J. R. Strayer, 'France: The Holy Land, the Chosen People, and the Most Christian King,' \textit{Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History. Essays by Joseph R. Strayer} (Princeton, 1971), pp. 300-314.}

A conception of the French king as defender of the Church almost certainly played a part in the nascent concept that he was uniquely deserving of the epithet \textit{rex christianissimus}. At the same time, as this particular title did not become exclusively associated with any ruler or office before the late-fourteenth century,\footnote{J. Krynen, 'Rex Christianissimus. A medieval theme at the roots of French absolutism,' \textit{History and Anthropology}, iv (1989), 81; Krynen, \textit{L'Empire}, 345-346.} it seems unlikely that its application to Louis IX by Guillaume de Nangis and Vincent de Beauvais was intended to imply that Louis was fulfilling an exclusively 'imperial' role.\footnote{cf. Chazan, 'Guillaume,' pp. 466-468; Chazan, \textit{L'Empire}, p. 685.} Yet it seems probable that the inhabitants of the French milieu continued to connect the role of the western emperor with the defence of the Church before 1350. This probably differed from the general protection ascribed to the French king in that the emperor's vocation was associated with one clearly defined aspect of this defence.

v. The Imperial Crusader

Following the fall of Acre, the last Christian outpost in the east, Nicholas IV summoned ecclesiastical councils to meet across western Europe. These were requested to offer advice on the steps that might be taken within \textit{l'empire de crestienté} (in the words of the Dionysians) in order to recover the Holy Land. There are several common threads in the advice offered to the pontiff. Many of the councils stipulated the need for the general pacification of Europe.\footnote{Schein, \textit{Fideles}, p. 135.} Several, including at least one
beyond the boundaries of the French kingdom (the council of Milan), stipulated that no future crusading expedition should take place unless led by the king of France or a Frenchman.²⁰¹ A further unifying strand, and one articulated by at least two of the councils that met in northern France, as well as that held at Lyon, was a call for the election of an emperor prior to any new crusade.²⁰²

In the same year as the clerics gathered to discuss the fate of Acre, Adolf of Nassau argued that his commitment to the Holy Land made him a particularly suitable imperial candidate.²⁰³ The association of the imperial office with the crusade was not a new development of the 1290s: twenty years earlier Bruno of Olmütz had intimated to Gregory X that Ottokar of Bohemia's imperial candidature rested in part upon his abilities as a crusader.²⁰⁴ Rudolf of Habsburg,²⁰⁵ Albrecht²⁰⁶ and Henry VII²⁰⁷ all stressed that a duty of their office lay in liberating the Holy Land. With the pontificate of Clement V the papacy itself also began to draw a direct connection between the imperial office and the crusade, rather than simply regarding a desire to participate in the crusade as an admirable personal quality in a prospective candidate.²⁰⁸

²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 137.


²⁰³ MGH Const. III., no. 474, pp. 460-463 (27 April 1292, Andernach).


²⁰⁵ Weiler, ‘Negotium,’ 28-29.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 29.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 30.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 29.
Shortly after the murder of Albrecht of Habsburg, Philippe IV despatched two letters to the king of Bohemia. Both were intended to prepare the ground for the imperial candidature of Philippe’s brother, Charles de Valois. In the second, Philippe recommended that Henry of Bohemia (1307-1310) and his fellow electors should elect Charles, who was:

...perutilem ac zelum habentem fervidum ad exaltationem fidei catholice et promotionem negotii Terre Sancte.\(^{209}\)

The first letter, which did not specifically mention Charles’ candidature, drew the same link between the crusade and the imperial office.\(^{210}\) A second point common to both letters was the emphasis they placed upon the idea that the election was to be made \textit{ad utilitatem totius rei publice}.\(^{211}\) The opening years of the fourteenth century therefore witnessed the French king declare that the election of a new imperial candidate was something which concerned the whole of the Christian commonwealth and indicate that the role of an imperial incumbent was primarily linked to the recovery of the Holy Land. That this attitude was neither novel nor simply one proclaimed in a public arena is suggested by the circumstances surrounding Philippe III’s imperial candidature forty years earlier.

In the summer of 1273 Gregory X declared privately that if God willed it nothing would give him greater joy than to see Philippe III elected emperor.\(^{212}\) At the same time Gregory remained evasive, and refused to provide Philippe’s envoy with a clear response to the king’s request for papal endorsement of his candidature.\(^{213}\) Nevertheless, Philippe and Charles d’Anjou almost certainly came to believe in the

\(^{209}\) MGH Const. IV, no. 240, p. 205 (9 June 1308, Poitiers).

\(^{210}\) Ibid., no. 239, pp. 203-204 (20 May 1308, Poitiers).

\(^{211}\) Ibid., no. 239, p. 204; no. 240, pp. 204-205.

\(^{212}\) MGH Const. III, no. 618, para. 4, p. 587.

\(^{213}\) Ibid., para. 4, p. 587.
months that followed that Gregory not only took the candidature seriously, but favoured it. This conviction led Philippe, in early 1274, without any objection being raised by his uncle, to hand over control of the Comtat-Venaissin to the pope. The reasons why the Capetians should have made this apparently extraordinary assumption almost certainly lie in the nature of Franco-papal relations in the second half of 1273. The most striking feature of these relations was the pope’s emphasis upon Philippe’s role as the future leader of a crusade.

In late August 1273, shortly after receiving Philippe’s embassy, the pope had written to the French king to agree to Philippe’s plan to send an exploratory force to the east in order to determine its present state. Philippe was almost certainly responding to an earlier papal exhortation to come to the aid of the Holy Land until proper provision could be made in the general council. In the course of the following months the pope did more than simply ask that Philippe send military support; he asked him also to consider the planning of a future venture. Implicit in this correspondence was the suggestion that the pope considered Philippe to have a special responsibility in the task of recovering the Holy Land. It was the fact that this particular responsibility was associated with the imperial office, not simply with his position as king of France, that almost certainly convinced Philippe that his candidature had received Gregory’s unofficial endorsement.

A connection between the needs of the crusade and the acquisition of the imperial throne was precisely the point that lay at the heart of the fifteen arguments Charles d’Anjou had submitted to his nephew in order to convince him to continue to pursue his candidature. Although Charles’ own motivations for promoting Philippe’s candidature lay largely in a desire to retain practical control of northern


\[\text{215} \quad \text{Reg. Greg. X, no. 811, p. 339 (August 1273, Santa Croce).}\]

\[\text{216} \quad \text{Ibid., no. 813, p. 340 (10 December 1273, Lyon).}\]

\[\text{217} \quad \text{Preserved with Philippe’s envoy’s report of his meeting with Gregory: Archives nationales, J. 318, no. 79. Edited: MGH Const. III, no. 618, para. 6, pp. 587-588. Concerning the neglect of these arguments by historians: Jones, ‘Philippe,’ 223-224.}\]
Italy,\textsuperscript{218} without any doubt, both he and his advisers believed that the most likely argument to convince Philippe would be one based upon the practical benefits which a French acquisition of the Empire would bring to a future crusade. In this vein, the first eight reasons offered were not directly concerned with the Empire. Instead Philippe’s obligation to do the service of God, and to obtain earthly honours not for their own sake but for this higher purpose, was stressed.\textsuperscript{219} This purpose, the service of God, was interpreted, through the use of Philippe’s ancestors as examples,\textsuperscript{220} to be the recovery of the Holy Land. Philippe was, Charles suggested, more obliged to do this than his predecessors, partly because more is asked of the son of a good man than of a bad one and such a man is capable of more,\textsuperscript{221} and partly because of the many benefits he had been given.\textsuperscript{222} It was in order properly to fulfil these crusading obligations that Philippe should seek to become emperor. The connection drawn between the Empire and the crusade was not unique to the Capetian dynasty: it reflected a belief widely held in northern France.

A thread which ran through the works in which Pierre Dubois chose to address the question of the recovery of the Holy Land\textsuperscript{223} was the assumption that the bearer of the imperial title possessed a particular responsibility to contribute to the venture. This was not to say that other Christian rulers did not also bear this burden, but that the emperor had crusading obligations in excess of those incumbent upon his fellow

\textsuperscript{218} Jones, ‘Philippe,’ 213.

\textsuperscript{219} MGH Const. III, no. 618, para. 6, p. 587, arguments I, II.

\textsuperscript{220} Ibid., para. 6, p. 587, arg. III.

\textsuperscript{221} Ibid., para. 6, p. 588, arg. V.

\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., para. 6, p. 588, arg. VI.

rulers. This idea was implied in part one of *De recuperatione*, where Dubois noted that the emperor-elect should furnish an annual subsidy, in the form of a large number of troops for the benefit of the Holy Land for as long as is necessary.\(^{224}\) The idea that the emperor has such a specific function is made explicit in *Pro facto Terre Sancte*: whatever else might characterise the emperor, it was his role as a leader in the Holy Land that Dubois chose to highlight in the speech he intended Clement V browbeat the imperial electors with.\(^{225}\) Whatever involvement other princes may choose to have, Dubois simply assumed that the ruler of the Empire would be involved in crusading projects.\(^{226}\)

Frederick Barbarossa was a model crusader whose actions Dubois considered worthy of being held up to Philippe IV for imitation.\(^{227}\) Dubois was not alone in his positive assessment of Barbarossa. Despite a recognition of Frederick’s often strained relationship with the papacy,\(^{228}\) Guillaume de Nangis and Jean de Saint-Victor accorded him magnificent eulogies in which it was said of him: ‘post Karolum Magnum parem gestorum magnificentia vix habuerit’.\(^{229}\) Aubri de Trois-Fontaines similarly compared him to Charlemagne\(^{230}\) and although he received less effusive praise in Primat’s *Roman des rois* he was still termed *li granz Frederis*.\(^{231}\) According to the anonymous of Béthune, his death was: ‘une des plus grans dolors qui en cel point peust estre avenue à la crestienté’.\(^{232}\) It was almost certainly Barbarossa’s

\(^{224}\) *De recup.*, chap. 13, p. 13.

\(^{225}\) *Pro facto*, p. 209.

\(^{226}\) *De recup.*, chap. 14, p. 13; chap. 104, p. 89.

\(^{227}\) Ibid., chap. 104, p. 88; *Pro facto*, p. 209.

\(^{228}\) GNC, i, pp. 56, 58, 60-61.

\(^{229}\) Ibid., p. 98. From the chronicle of Robert d’Auxerre: Chazan, *L’Empire*, p. 667.


\(^{231}\) GCF, vi, p. 201.
reputation as a crusader, and in particular the fact that he had died whilst travelling to the Holy Land,\footnote{RHGF, xxiv, pt. ii, p. 755.} that led to the continued repetition of such glowing eulogies. Barbarossa’s depiction by Dubois creates a strong impression that his crusading activities were intimately connected with his occupancy of the imperial office.

Dubois believed that Barbarossa had been the penultimate emperor.\footnote{Pro facto, p. 209.} This was a peculiar view given that, since Frederick’s death in 1190, three emperors had been elected, crowned by the pope, and generally, at least for a time, accepted. Two of Barbarossa’s successors, Henry VI and Otto IV, had not actively participated in the crusade. Frederick II had undertaken what was undoubtedly the most successful thirteenth-century expedition, yet the fact that he had been an excommunicate throughout would almost certainly have led Dubois, who had a particular horror of excommunication and recommended against its use in all but the most extreme cases,\footnote{De recup., chap. 4, p. 8.} to discount his activities. In fact, given the frequency with which the last Hohenstaufen crusade was omitted from contemporary accounts, Dubois may not even have been aware that Frederick had liberated Jerusalem.\footnote{Above, pp. 72-73.} Rather than any of these three, Dubois seems to have considered Barbarossa’s true successor to have been Louis IX, whom, he described as having willingly accepted the Empire in a pamphlet intended to encourage Philippe IV to seek the Empire for himself:

\begin{center}
...quod dominus rex [Philippe IV]...de facili posset inspecto statu moderno acquirere pro se et heredibus suis Romanum imperium, quod sanctus Ludovicus sic libenter acceptasset...\footnote{Pro facto, pp. 208-209.}
\end{center}

What both Louis and Barbarossa had in common was that they had participated in, and ultimately died on, crusade.

Although Frederick II's crusade disappeared from the pages of the majority of accounts written in France after the mid-thirteenth century, the interest shown in it by writers in the 1240s, such as the annalist of Saint-Médard, Aubri de Trois-Fontaines and Philippe Mousket, may indicate not simply an interest in the crusading movement, but provide further evidence of an association of the crusade with the imperial office. If such a direct connection was perceived to exist even at this early date it would also explain Philippe Mousket's comments concerning criticism of Frederick's failure to come to the aid of the Christian army, led by Jean de Brienne, which had laid siege to Damietta:

\[
\text{Quar a lui [Frederick] s'estoit attendue}
\text{De s'ourcourre crestientés}
\text{Des le jour k'il fu couronnés}
\]

It may be the case, as Weiler has suggested, that Frederick himself came to view his duty to liberate the Holy Land as a personal one, based upon his kingship of Jerusalem, rather than any attribute of his imperial office. Yet this would not suffice to explain Philippe's view of Frederick's particular responsibility to aid the

238 MGH SS, xxvi, pp. 521-522.
239 ATF, p. 925.
240 Mousket [RHGF], 28059-28069.
243 Mousket [MGH], 23355-23370.
244 Weiler, 'Negotium,' 27.
 crusaders at Damietta: the siege took place some years before Frederick’s marriage to Isabella de Brienne, a fact of which Philippe, who followed the marriage negotiations in detail, was certainly aware. More plausible is the possibility that Philippe considered Frederick’s responsibility to stem only from the oath to go on crusade that he had taken on the day of his coronation. Yet this does not seem to account entirely for the expectation that Frederick would rescue Jean de Brienne’s expedition. Philippe clearly did not consider Frederick to have failed to carry out his personal vow by not participating in the fifth crusade: it was only after the loss of Damietta that the pope set a two year deadline for the emperor’s departure to the East, and it seemed to Philippe that there existed acceptable reasons why even this should be extended.

The perception that there existed a link between the crusade and the imperial office may also have contributed, in conjunction with a degree of political expediency, to the enthusiastic endorsement Richard of Cornwall’s kingship received in France. Richard had firmly established his credentials as a crusader in the Holy Land and was held in particularly high regard in France because he had come to the rescue of the beleaguered French expedition that had set out shortly before his own. Unlike Frederick II, Richard was frequently found on the French page in the context of the crusade. A connection between the crusade and the imperial office was almost certainly established and cemented in the French cultural milieu by an understanding of the career of one particular crusader and occupant of the imperial throne.

245 Mousket [MGH], 23457-23488, 26835-26844.

246 Ibid., 23369-23370.

247 Ibid., 25325-25350.


249 Mousket [RHGF], 30621-30627; ATF, p. 948; Rothelin continuation (1229-1248), RHC, ii, chap. xxxvi, pp. 555-556; Chronique anonyme des Rois de France, finissant en M.CC.LXXXVI, RHGF, xxi, p. 82; GNC, i, p. 192; GL(fr), pp. 331-333; GCF, x, p. 24; GCF, vii, p. 79.
Under the later Capetians there was an increased focus upon the fact that Charlemagne had been a king of France; yet the time he had spent as emperor was by no means forgotten or considered unimportant. Pierre Dubois almost certainly reflected a common opinion when he noted that in the few short years that Charlemagne spent as emperor he achieved more than in all the prior years of his kingship. The key to understanding the significance of the imperial title lies precisely in what it was that Charlemagne was considered to have achieved in these years. Guillaume de Nangis and Jean de Saint-Victor had compared the greatness of Barbarossa’s deeds to those of Charlemagne in their eulogies of Frederick. It was equally Charlemagne whom Dubois chose to uphold alongside Barbarossa as the historical figure whose actions were most worthy of imitation by future crusaders. It is not coincidental that the most striking of Charlemagne’s achievements in the period after his imperial coronation was his leadership of not one but two successful crusades.

A sermon preached in the early years of the fourteenth century noted that Charlemagne had conquered the lands of the infidel. This comment was qualified with the note that whilst Charlemagne had defended the Church earlier in his reign, after receiving the senatorial dignity, his defeat of the infidel occurred only after he had become emperor. Like Dubois’ comments, this echoed a perception of Charlemagne’s reign defined by the belief that it was only after receiving the imperial crown that he had successfully led the crusades which had recovered the Holy Land and Spain. Such a conception of Charlemagne’s reign was integral to two of the most influential and widely read versions of Carolingian history produced in northern France in the thirteenth century. Frequently copied, read by Jean Quidort amongst

250 Above, pp. 150-151.
251 De recup., chap. 141, p. 130.
252 Ibid., chap. 104, p. 88; Pro facto, p. 209.
253 ‘...et postea, imperator effectus, terras infidelium acquisivit.’ ‘Un sermon prononcé pendant la guerre de Flandre,’ 169.
others, and the base text for compilers such as Adam de Clermont and Girard d’Auvergne, the first of these, written in Latin in the 1240s and 1250s, was Vincent de Beauvais’ *Speculum historiale*. The second, written in French in the 1270s, was Primat’s *Roman des rois*, the primary source for both Dionysian and non-Dionysian traditions of the *Grandes Chroniques*. That the success of Charlemagne’s crusades was considered to be strongly associated with his acquisition of the imperial diadem is further suggested by Guillaume de Nangis’ attempt to revise the order of events adopted by Vincent and Primat.

Vincent and Primat had placed Charlemagne’s crusades after his imperial coronation, following the *Descripition qualiter Karolus Magnus clavum et coronam Domini a Constantinopoli Aquisgrani detulerit*, for the crusade to the Holy Land, and the Pseudo-Turpin, for that to Spain. Guillaume, compiling his universal chronicle in the 1290s, employed the same sources, but, as Chazan has noted, altered the dating of events to suggest that both crusades occurred before the imperial coronation. He was followed in this by Jean de Saint-Victor, whose *Memoriale* drew heavily upon Guillaume’s universal chronicle. Guillaume’s approach was almost certainly dictated by a desire to establish Charlemagne’s most successful crusading ventures within the context of French kingship, and thereby to promote the uniqueness, sanctity and superiority of that kingship. The particular problem that Guillaume perceived to exist in allowing these events to continue to be dated to the period after 800 can only have been the fact that Charlemagne was traditionally considered to have accomplished them as emperor rather than as king of France. This suggests that Guillaume was reacting against a common belief and deliberately attempting to

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dissociate the idea of the crusade from a contemporary association with imperial leadership.

Although there is some indication that the link between the crusade and imperial leadership may have existed at an earlier date, the reason for the development of a particularly strong connection from the mid-thirteenth century is likely to have been a consequence of the series of disasters that had beset French expeditions throughout the thirteenth century. The triumphant conquest of Constantinople in 1204 was rapidly followed by failure at Damietta, the decimation of the baronial crusade in the 1240s, the defeat and capture of Louis IX in 1250, the collapse of the 1270 expedition in the wake of Louis’ death, the catastrophic failure of the Aragonese crusade which cost Philippe III his life, and, finally, the general impotence of the West in the face of the loss of first Constantinople and later Acre. Whilst these setbacks could be attributed to a variety of reasons, they stood in stark contrast to the success of Charlemagne’s ventures. There is little reason to doubt that many contemporaries believed that the leadership of any future crusade lay with the French king; at the same time, in order to ensure that such a venture possessed the best possible chances of success, that king needed the additional benefits that came from acquisition of the imperial title.

The emperor was fundamental to the crusade: he was the papal functionary whose task, in a properly ordered society, was to defend the Christian empire by subjugating its external enemies. It was for this specific purpose that he was considered to possess a form of supra-regnal temporal authority. The nature of this authority was outlined most clearly by Charles d’Anjou in the advice which he addressed to Philippe III. The kingdom of France was but one kingdom. Philippe, Charles argued, ought to acquire the Empire, because by doing so he would gain an authority over all the knights of the world. As emperor, Philippe would acquire the


259 ‘Mais se il estoit anpereres, il porroit coeillir chevaliere de par tot le monde.’ MGH Const. III, no. 618, para. 6, p. 588, arg. IX.
ability to lead and organise an army capable of doing what his father had so spectacularly failed to do.

The possibility of establishing a cadet branch of the Capetian dynasty in Germany undeniably appealed to Philippe IV. The marriage arranged between Philippe's sister and Rudolf of Habsburg at Quatrevaux had appeared to offer a key to achieving this. Almost certainly inspired by a desire to avoid a repetition of Adolf of Nassau's alliance with Edward I, Philippe pursued the Habsburg marriage with some tenacity in 1299. After the death of Blanche and her child brought a definitive end to the alliance with the Habsburgs, which had already begun to dissolve during the Bonifacian dispute, the election of either Charles de Valois or Philippe de Poitiers was almost certainly considered an alternative, more direct, means of asserting influence over the territorial Empire. Such attitudes appear reflected in the development of Pierre Dubois' ideas. In 1300 Dubois considered that the only means by which authority might be exercised over Germany was by influencing the dynasty founded through Blanche. Free of the constraint imposed by the need to respect the rights of Blanche's child, Dubois' De recuperatione proposed negotiating the installation of Charles de Valois as the head of a new German dynasty. Yet it is probable that when seeking the imperial throne for his brother and his son, Philippe also had in mind another aspect of the counsel Charles d'Anjou had offered his father.

If the French king, or at least in Philippe IV's case his close relative, were not to become emperor, this would, according to Charles d'Anjou, actually endanger the success of a future expedition to the Holy Land. In such a case Charles had foreseen that, at best, there would be inevitable conflicts over the leadership of the crusade and, at worst, an emperor opposed to either the Church or to the French king might ruin the whole enterprise. There is little reason to doubt the sincerity and commitment of French kings, particularly Philippe IV, to the crusade. The ideological factor that

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260 Summaria, p. 19

261 De recup., chap. 116, p. 104.

262 MGH Const. III, no. 618, para. 6, p. 588, arg. XI.

263 Schein, Fideles, pp. 266-268; N. Housley, The Later Crusades, 1274-1580: from Lyons to Alcazar (Oxford, 1992). For the propaganda value associated with taking the crusade seriously: S. Schein,
inspired Capetian efforts to acquire the imperial throne involved the attachment of a symbolic and practical importance to the imperial office as a prerequisite for success in any future crusading venture.

vi. Conclusion

The western Empire was, on one level, a territorial unit of limited jurisdiction whose ruler differed little from a king. The most substantial component of the composite territorial Empire was the German kingdom. By coronation in either Milan or Rome the German king might obtain territorial jurisdiction beyond the German kingdom. The emperor-king might also obtain a unique form of universal supra-regnal temporal authority. This latter was indisputably in the gift of the papacy and imbued with a Roman character. The emperor, as a functionary of the Roman church, was created in order to perform a task necessary to the existence of a properly ordered Christian society. His role did not involve the exercise of universal temporal jurisdiction but it did imbue the Roman emperor with a dignity which elevated him above other kings.

The function performed by the western emperor was commonly, but not exclusively, associated with the leadership of the crusade. An alternative function was suggested in Jean Quidort's *De potestate regia et papali*. The cognisance of temporal crimes, Jean informed his readers, belonged to the secular prince. If the pope were to commit a temporal crime it would be quite correct for a temporal ruler to chastise him for it, yet Jean also noted that the primary right (*primum ius*) to do this would lie with the emperor. Jean was occasionally in the habit of employing the term 'emperor' to mean any secular ruler. Yet his comment that this primary right was the

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264 *De potestate*, chap. xiii, p. 214.

possession of the emperor if there were one, the example he gave of the emperor Henry III’s deposition of three popes in 1046, and his remark that the emperor performed this task non solum canonica sed imperiali censura, when taken together, leave little doubt that Jean intended to be quite specific in this case.

The emperor acted, for Jean Quidort, as the ultimate check upon papal abuses. This disciplinary role was possible because for Jean the emperor’s authority did not derive solely from the pope. The transfer of the Empire to Charlemagne was not, in Jean’s view, carried out by the pope alone: he emphasised the important role played by the acclamation of the populace and, a feature which differentiated the emperor from a king, the participation of the army. Jean was, in many ways, the ultimate exponent of a world order which retained little place for universal temporal authority. Yet even he continued to conceive of the western emperor as fulfilling a function distinct from that of other temporal rulers, and of the emperor exercising an authority throughout the whole world when other kings exercised it only within their kingdoms. It was the perception that the western emperor performed a unique and necessary role that led chroniclers to pay such attention to the deposition of Frederick II and the Romzüge of Henry VII and Ludwig of Bavaria.

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266 Ibid., chap. xiii, p. 214, also chap. xviii, p. 230.

267 Ibid., chap. xiii, p. 215.

268 Ibid., chap. xv, p. 222.

269 '...rex est in hoc caput regni sui et imperator monarcha si fuerit est caput mundi.' Ibid., chap. xviii, p. 230.
Conclusion

The Eclipse of Empire?

The intention of this thesis has been to explore an aspect of how the world was perceived by the inhabitants of northern France. Its central concern has been to determine the place occupied by the western Empire and its rulers in French thought at a time which witnessed a decline in the material authority exercised by imperial rulers and a concomitant increase in that exercised by French kings. It has sought to determine attitudes towards individual rulers and would-be rulers of the Empire as well as exploring the more fundamental conceptions which shaped views of the Empire as an institution. One of its aims has been to test the validity of the oft-repeated assumption, one which has underpinned the work of historians such as Strayer, that this was an era which witnessed the definitive abandonment of a political ideology associated with universalism in favour of one connected with a new concept of independent nation-states. Was it the case that the escalating power and prestige of the expanding, centralised western kingdoms gave rise to a view that rendered anachronistic and irrelevant a rather different conception of the world, one associated with an institution whose increasingly weak and ineffective rulers sat perched precariously upon a powder keg of fractious and self-interested princes?

In assessing French views of the Empire there has been a conscious attempt to depart from according undue prominence to the sources traditionally associated with the development of a new political ideology, such as the work of the theologian Jean Quidort. It is only possibly to understand the significance of the ideas developed in such texts if they are first situated within their proper context. It has been particularly necessary to remain aware of the potential pitfalls of seeing novelty where none existed or attributing unwarranted significance to novelty where it did exist. In part this has been accomplished by avoiding consideration of the first decade of the fourteenth century, or even the whole of Philippe IV’s reign, in isolation. More fundamentally it has been achieved by establishing a broader perspective based upon a wider source base. Such a source base is more representative of the different facets
of opinion that existed and evolved in northern France and provides a much clearer indication of the place the Empire occupied in contemporary thought.

The portrait of the Empire that emerges is remarkably different from that which has previously dominated historical research. An emphasis was certainly placed upon the idea that the French king did not recognise any temporal superior in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries. This emphasis was almost certainly stimulated by the dispute between Boniface VIII and Philippe IV. It is unlikely, for example, to be coincidental that an anonymous Dionysian writer chose to integrate Innocent III’s comment that the French king recognised no temporal superior but God (taken from the decretal *Per venerabilem*) into an account of a life of Louis IX written after 1297.\(^1\) At the same time it is equally clear that alongside this emphasis an importance continued to be attached to forms of supra-regnal temporal authority. Yet this importance has been largely brushed aside by historians overly attached to a belief that this period witnessed the birth of the nation-state.

The most striking form of supra-regnal temporal authority to find a place in French thought was that attributed to the western emperor, yet the exercise of such authority was not the emperor’s exclusive prerogative. Pierre Dubois, considered by some the herald of the modern state,\(^2\) believed, like Charles d’Anjou, that the emperor was the natural leader of any crusading expedition. Simultaneously Dubois also conceived of a properly ordered world as one in which the pope exercised supreme authority over secular law and acted as the supreme arbiter of temporal disputes amongst otherwise autonomous rulers.\(^3\) A continued adherence to the principle that there existed forms of supra-regnal temporal authority and a belief that the unity of Christian society was more than simply of a spiritual nature, casts serious doubts upon

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\(^1\) *Gesta sancti Ludovici noni, francorum regis, auctore monacho Sancti Dionysii, anonymo*, RHGF, xx, p. 52.


\(^3\) Jones, ‘Dubois,’ 82-84.
the view that this period witnessed the birth of the concept of the independent ‘nation-state’.

An emphasis upon the autonomy of the French kingdom did not negate subscription to principles of universalism. Nor did it mean that imperial rights were simply something that could be ignored. Denton has recently noted that whilst historians have been apt to portray the Bonifacian dispute as a struggle between an emerging nation-state and traditional papal rights, it is more probable that contemporaries regarded it as novel papal claims infringing upon traditional royal rights. It was, similarly, a belief that traditional royal rights were being ignored and infringed that justified the assertion of Capetian-Valois suzerainty over allods and fiefs on the fringes of the French kingdom. Neither French kings nor the inhabitants of northern France subscribed to a new political ideology which encouraged the establishment of an effective border for the French kingdom by a process of systematically annexing formerly imperial territory. The Capetian-Valois kings were certainly intent upon expanding their influence but they had no wish to innovate in the Empire. The policies pursued by kings such as Philippe IV were considered to be ones of recovering and consolidating pre-existent royal rights. Philippe IV regarded the Empire in much the same way as Louis VIII had done or Philippe VI would do: it was a limited territorial entity composed of several kingdoms possessing fixed boundaries within which the emperor exercised a legitimate jurisdiction that could not be ignored.

As the limited territorial Empire reflected the French kingdom so too, on one level, did the imperial ruler reflect the French king. There was a clear recognition in France that an electoral college had been instituted to select a candidate who the pope must approve if he were to become emperor. Yet succession to the rule of the territorial Empire was also considered to be regulated by the same dynastic model that was applied in France to the nobility and to French kings themselves. Each new imperial candidate was the potential founder of an hereditary dynasty and his selection was by a mechanism similar to that which would be applied in the French kingdom in a case where the ruling house became extinct. Associated with this dynastic model was a strong aversion to the principle of permanent disinheritance,

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4 Denton, ‘Heresy,’ p. 147.
itself almost certainly fuelled by the sensitivity of Capetian-Valois kings to the question of their own right to the French crown. It was not, as historians such as Strayer believed, the development of a new ideology based upon Aristotelian and Roman legal principles that dictated attitudes in northern France towards the Empire and its ruler. Instead it was an understanding of the proper structure of the world based, in part, on a continued belief in the need for a form of supra-regnal temporal authority and in part on the superimposition of French norms upon an imperial context.

Whilst the material authority of the Capetian-Valois kings increased exponentially, it is striking that attitudes towards the nature of the Empire and its ruler changed very little: the former continued to be conceived as a limited territorial unit, the latter as an office associated both with rule of the territorial Empire and with the exercise of a form of supra-regnal temporal authority. Where change does appear to have taken place is in a strengthening of the connection between the imperial office and the papacy. This may have been stimulated by the role played by Innocent IV in removing the last effective emperor, Frederick II; it certainly reflected the claims of contemporary pontiffs to possess the ultimate right to decide upon the suitability of imperial candidates. In addition there was an increasing association of the imperial office with the crusading movement. This specialised interpretation of the emperor's role as a defender of the Church was probably stimulated by the fact that the prolonged imperial vacancy coincided with a series of French crusading disasters and a number of dramatic losses in Outremer.

The importance attached to the imperial office was not the only factor to bring the Empire and its rulers to the forefront of French thought in the years after 1250. The longevity enjoyed by Frederick II, for example, was connected with a series of other interests, such as highlighting ecclesiastical abuses. Whilst interest in the last Hohenstaufen emperor began to fade after 1300 he continued to feature as a persecutor of the papacy in widely diffused works such as Vincent de Beauvais' Speculum historiale. Vincent and many of his fellow Dominicans may even have considered Frederick to be connected with Joachite eschatological expectations. Frederick was also cast as the antithesis of Saint Louis by Guillaume de Nangis, although Guillaume's carefully constructed portrait swiftly became diluted by both his fellow Dionysians and those who made use of their work.
Frederick’s successors were less conspicuous but by no means absent from French thought. Although Franco-imperial interaction was rarely remarked upon, attitudes towards would-be rulers of the Empire were frequently determined by factors connected with the interests of the Capetian-Valois kings. In choosing between Richard of Cornwall and Alfonso X, for example, the inhabitants of France expressed a preference for Richard not simply because he was an accredited crusader but because Alfonso’s disinheritance of the La Cerda children made the Castilian king a particularly detestable figure. Similarly, John of Bohemia’s friendship with Philippe VI confirmed a tendency to favour John’s father, the papally accredited emperor Henry VII. In combination with a somewhat sceptical assessment of pope John XXII’s orthodoxy, this factor also led to a tendency to extend a degree of toleration to John of Bohemia’s erstwhile ally, Ludwig of Bavaria. Yet one of the most important factors to bring the Empire to French attention was not connected with either contemporary rulers of the Empire or the important role attributed to the imperial office.

The most ubiquitous figure linked to the Empire in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century France was Charlemagne. The Carolingian emperor and his descendants offered ecclesiastical institutions the opportunity to authenticate their relics and the Capetian-Valois dynasty the opportunity to authenticate themselves. That the Carolingians had possessed the imperial diadem was clearly important, yet the nature of this importance has been widely misinterpreted. In particular, in connection with a failure to appreciate fully the contemporary French understanding of the nature of the imperial office, it has led historians to misconstrue the ideology that lay behind the attempts by French kings to obtain the imperial throne.

There is every reason to suppose that the German kingship and the imperial office existed as separate entities in French thought and there is little to indicate that Charlemagne, *roy de France et emperiere de Romme*, was ever considered to have been *rex Alemannorum et imperator Romanorum*. The Capetian-Valois kings were almost certainly not considered, and did not consider themselves, to have any prior claim on a ‘German’ inheritance. Their interest lay in proving that they were the inheritors to Charlemagne as kings of France. Although the possession of the imperial office could become associated with a particular family it could not be considered dynastic inheritance in the manner of the territorial Empire: it remained something
that lay in the gift of the papacy. It was almost certainly an association between the possession of the imperial title and the successful prosecution of the crusade that provided the ideological spur behind Capetian imperial candidatures, not, as Folz believed, the idea of recovering a Carolingian inheritance. Although it became well-known in the second half of the fourteenth century, a further potential ideological spur, the belief that the Last Emperor would be a descendant of the line of Pepin, did not become prevalent in France until the idea was aired in the 1350s in the Joachite-inspired eschatological writings of the French Franciscan Jean de Roquetaillade.5

The most important reason why none of these French imperial candidatures appeared in accounts written in northern France is almost certainly because they failed to amount to anything. Another reason is that certain writers, such as Guillaume de Nangis and later Dionysians, would have considered them, with hindsight, to conflict with the impression that they wished to convey of relations between the Capetian-Valois dynasty and contemporary imperial rulers, or potential rulers, such as the Habsburgs or John of Bohemia. Yet there is perhaps a third reason. The failure of the French dynasty to obtain the imperial throne was more than simply a personal or a dynastic failure; it was a sign of failure on a more dramatic scale. By choosing to avoid alluding to these candidatures French writers chose not to include a reference to a sign that their kings lacked the divine favour that would have bestowed upon them the temporal leadership of Christendom.

The metrical chronicle attributed to Geffroy de Paris offers an illustration of the place occupied by the emperor in French thought which may be considered more representative than the impression obtained by a secluded reading of Jean Quidort. It is a portrait that stripped the emperor of universal government but which continued to consider his office imbued with a unique authority. The metrical chronicle was almost certainly, as Dunbabin has convincingly argued, primarily written with the intention of highlighting a perceived inversion of the natural order of the world.6 From the chronicler’s perspective this inversion of the natural order was a phenomenon exemplified by an inexcusable social mobility which broke down the proper order of

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society. The chronicle’s extensive account of the emperor Henry VII’s reign has not proved of great interest to historians and Dunbabin’s article proves no exception. Yet it may be suggested that, on multiple levels, the chronicle’s account of the emperor’s activities was intended to illustrate a further example of the inversion of the natural order.

Overshadowed from its very beginning by unpromising signs in the heavens, Henry’s reign was depicted as an unremitting series of disasters. Even in what should have been a moment of triumph, Henry’s Roman coronation, la chose torna autrement. If, as seems likely, the original author was a member of Charles de Valois’ household, Henry himself probably represented the first sign that things were not as they should be. By highlighting Henry’s brief reign and many misfortunes the chronicler probably intended to imply that by failing to favour Charles de Valois’ own imperial candidature in 1308 the pope had made the wrong choice. Yet the chronicler’s account of Henry’s reign also illustrated, on another level, his general theme that the world was not as it should be. Henry’s relationship with the Sicilian king Robert d’Anjou was central to this.

Henry’s reign was essentially an account of the relentless opposition offered by Robert and his allies, the northern Italian cities, to all the emperor’s plans. In reality it had been Robert’s brother, Jean, who had perturbed Henry’s entry into Rome and the subsequent coronation ceremony. Jean’s involvement was known to the metrical chronicler’s contemporary, the continuator of Guillaume de Nangis’ chronicle. Disregarding this factual inconvenience, the metrical chronicle depicted a

7 Ibid., p. 239.

8 Geffroy de Paris, 3669-3682.

9 Ibid., 4410.

10 Dunbabin, ‘Metrical,’ pp. 241-244.

11 Bowsky, Henry, p. 156.

12 Continuator(2)GNC, i, pp. 392-393. Also: ContinuatorGF[1285-1328], p. 38.
confrontation between Robert himself and the new emperor within the city of Rome. This conflict highlighted a further inversion of the natural order, the emperor’s weakness in his own city, but it was also the culmination of Robert’s resistance to Henry, a resistance manifest from the moment at which the count of Luxembourg’s candidature had been confirmed by the pope.

Robert was a king in his own right: he was not without superior but that superior was not Henry. In response to the emperor’s request that he do homage for the regno, Robert had argued that his possession of the Sicilian kingdom was legitimate because his ancestors par armes ot la terre acquise on behalf of the Church. The chronicler suggested that Robert considered the regno to have once been a part of the Empire but believed it had been separated from it when Frederick II rebelled against the Church. The Sicilian king did not consider, as the chronicler noted, that he held anything of Henry and he did not believe that his homage was owed to anyone but the pope. Although an argument based upon legitimisation through conquest was unusual it was not unknown in France, where, for all the unease with the disinherittance of Conradin, the installation of the Angevin dynasty at Naples was enthusiastically endorsed. There is little in the metrical chronicle to suggest that Robert’s claim was in any way an illegitimate or unreasonable one. At the same time the chronicler gave an extremely sympathetic portrait of the Luxembourg emperor.

Henry was presented as a pious and heroic figure, described as a riche et noble poingneeur, who par bonte et prouece obtained the Empire. Murdered by his own

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13 'Le roys estoit a Romme fort/ Plus de genz que l’empereor,' Geoffroy de Paris, 4414-4415.

14 Ibid., 3729-3744.

15 Ibid., 3914.

16 Ibid., 3915-3917.

17 Ibid., 3905-3934.

18 Ibid., 3686, 3691.
confessor, perhaps the ultimate inversion of the natural order of the world, the emperor only died because he refused to vomit up the poisoned but consecrated host. His Romzug was carried out with the constant support of the Church and no mention was made of either the dispute with Philippe IV or with Clement V. Although Robert was portrayed as fearful of Henry’s intentions from the moment of his selection the chronicler did not suggest that Henry regarded the Sicilian kingdom as something wrongfully usurped by the Angevins and his intentions were not portrayed, either before or after his imperial coronation, as being the annexation of the southern Italian regno. There was not even mention made of the sentence of deposition and condemnation passed against Robert.

The metrical chronicle’s account of Henry’s conflict with Robert implied that there was something intrinsically wrong with the belligerent Sicilian king’s defiance of the pious and heroic emperor. This favourable portrait of Henry was not a consequence of the Valois-Luxembourg rapprochement. In fact the original author began his account in the final years of Philippe IV’s reign at a point when Capetian-Luxembourg relations had reached a nadir. Despite an apparent sympathy for Habsburgs claims the ‘editors’ who incorporated this account into a royal manuscript during Philippe V’s reign do not appear to have felt it necessary to omit or alter the original author’s presentation of Henry. The dispute between Robert and the emperor illustrated that the world was not as it should be. Yet this was not because Robert was a vassal rebelling against his lord. Henry might have martyred himself for le droit of his Empire, but this right was clearly not universal temporal overlordship. Yet Henry had received the hautece of the Empire. From a northern French

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19 Ibid., 5234-5308.

20 Ibid., 5283-5285.

21 ‘un cardonnal avecques lui/ Tozjors avoit,...’ ibid., 3799-3800.

22 Above, pp. 203-204.

23 Geffroy de Paris, 3697-3698.

24 Ibid., 3692, 3746.
perspective this latter was a dignity which elevated him above other kings and enabled him to perform a necessary task. By resisting Henry, Robert defied the social order and frustrated the re-establishment of one of the corner stones of a properly ordered Christian society. The attention devoted to the dispute between Henry and Robert reflected the importance the metrical chronicler and those who made use of his work attached to this particular inversion of the natural order.

The eclipse of Empire in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries is indeed a reality, but one largely restricted to the minds of modern historians. The inhabitants of France could conceive of a world in which the emperor no longer exercised universal temporal jurisdiction and the Roman Empire was no longer an institution associated with universal government. Indeed they had conceived of such a world long before Aristotle’s *Politics* was read in the schools. Yet a form of universal temporal authority associated with the Roman emperor remained fundamental to the existence of a properly ordered Christian society. This was true even for Jean Quidort, who viewed the emperor as having a primary responsibility for the correction of papal abuses. As a consequence of the long vacancy that took place after the death of Frederick II it was certainly possible to imagine the world without an emperor, but such a world was, from a French perspective, hardly the best of all possible worlds.
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