The Beginning and Before: Interpreting Creation in Paul and Philo

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The Beginning and Before
Interpreting Creation in Paul and Philo

A thesis accepted
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at Durham University

Jonathan David Worthington

2010
This work is dedicated to

Lynsey,

my most precious gift in this world.

Hebrews 6:10
God’s creative activity in the beginning is important to Paul. Yet Paul’s care for and interpretation of it is often unrecognized, occasionally denied, typically left underdeveloped, and sometimes interpreted wrongly. This thesis approaches Paul as an interpreter of his sacred scriptural texts concerning creation. It compares his reading of creation in 1 and 2 Corinthians and Romans with those more detailed treatments of the same texts by Philo of Alexandria in his commentary on Genesis 1-2, *De Opificio Mundi*. The central thesis is this: Paul’s interpretation of creation, like Philo’s in his commentary, contains three interwoven aspects: the beginning of the world, the beginning of humanity, and God’s intentions before the beginning. Chapter 1, “Before the Beginning?,” explores Philo’s view that God’s pre-creational plan involves an architectural blueprint of the universe which enables goodness and beauty and Paul’s view that it involves a crucified Christ and a glory to which God-lovers are redeemed through conformity with this Christ’s image. There we will demonstrate that for Paul, as for Philo, the Before both affects and is affected by his reading of Genesis’ creation texts. Chapter 2, “The Beginning of the World,” establishes how Philo and Paul consider the ontological nature of heaven, earth, and their inhabitants to be beautiful and glorious due to perfect accord with God’s word, intentions, and desires—i.e., an implicit Before. Chapter 3, “The Beginning of Humanity,” investigates how Philo and Paul set the more particular creation
of humanity within the larger context of the creation of the world, and how recognizing this aids in our own interpretation of some often misunderstood aspects of their views of Adam. God’s pre-creational “purpose” and “desire” is also an integral aspect of both interpreters’ treatments of the creation of humanity. Paul, like Philo, displays three tightly woven strands within his interpretation of the Beginning.
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Introduction

Beginnings are important to Paul. His own beginning in the knowledge of the resurrected Christ granted to him a sense of humility and divinely purposed vigor in life and mission (1 Cor. 15:8-10). He saw the beginning of the Galatians’ faith and life in the Spirit as setting the standard according to which their lives should follow (Gal. 3:2-3). His understanding of the beginning of the Mosaic Law and the beginning of the Abrahamic promise (the Law beginning four centuries after the promise) shaped his understanding of their relationship (Gal. 3:17-19). The beginning of sin and death through Adam’s disobedience in Genesis 3 is clearly important for Paul’s construal of the common human plight and the gracious salvation (Rom. 5:12-21; cf. 1 Cor. 15:21-22). But what about before that fatal introduction of sin into the world (that world from which its inhabitants were supposed to perceive the eternal power and divine nature of their Creator [Rom. 1:20])? Did the ultimate Beginning of all things achieve any import in Paul’s thinking and letter-writing?

This study will focus on Paul’s letters to the Corinthian and Roman Christians. Within those few correspondences alone, Paul quotes, alludes to, and builds upon the beginning of Genesis on numerous occasions. In order to humble the Corinthians, Paul turned to the general themes of God as creative Cause (1 Cor. 11:12c; cf. 2 Cor. 5:18a) and more
specifically of the Father’s causation of creation through Christ (1 Cor. 8:6). Also for the Romans, though in their case with the intention of deepening their understanding of guilt and praise, Paul introduced the general notion that God created all things (Rom. 1:20 and 11:36, respectively).¹ Yet Paul also brought to his readers’ attention God’s more specific creations: of light (2 Cor. 4:6), of seeds and plants (1 Cor. 15:37-38), and of bodies throughout heaven and earth (1 Cor. 15:40) including sun, moon, and stars (1 Cor. 15:41), and fish, birds, and beasts (1 Cor. 15:39). Paul used the language and motifs of the Beginning to explain God’s creation of humans as God’s image (1 Cor. 11:7b; cf. 2 Cor. 4:4), God’s fashioning of Adam from the dust (1 Cor. 15:44-47), and God’s assembling of the human (i.e., Adamic) body (1 Cor. 12:12-26) with its own peculiar flesh (1 Cor. 15:39) and even glory (1 Cor. 15:40b; cf. 11:7-9). It was from the texts of the Beginning that Paul drew the gender-dynamics of difference and interdependence (1 Cor. 11:7-12) as well as the simple ontic nature of sexual union (1 Cor. 6:16). He even offered for both the Corinthians and Romans God’s built-in anthropological principle by which all further humans were propagated according to Adam’s image (1 Cor. 15:48-49; cf. 2 Cor. 3:18; Rom. 8:29).² All of these references to various aspects of the ultimate Beginning are in addition to Paul’s more pronounced and well-known treatment of Adam’s sin and its consequences according to Genesis 3.

These uses of the Beginning (before sin) touch on such important, interconnected themes as Christology, anthropology (including bodily ontology, gender relations, and

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¹ A much more inclusive presentation of the “creation motifs” in Romans 1-8 can be found in Adams, 2000, 153-55; cf. idem, 2002, 19-43.

² Though this principle was first enacted in Gen. 5:3, and thus in one sense has a post-sin origin, Paul initially treats it as a simple matter of human ontology (1 Cor. 15:48a, 49a; see below pp.82-4, 233-37), and thus since it was built by God within the fabric of Adam’s and Eve’s frames before sin, it can legitimately be treated as a pre-sin creation text.
sexual ethics), ecclesiology, and eschatology. By this fact alone it seems that a systemic treatment of Paul’s understanding of creation could have wide ramifications. A more modest observation is if all of these statements are indeed based on Genesis, and we shall argue throughout the study this very point concerning a selection from these texts, then Paul provides comments not only on Genesis 1-2 as a whole and in general, but also on the particular texts of Gen. 1:2-3, 11-12, 14-19, 20-21, 24-25, 26-28, 2:7, 18, 21-23, 24, and 5:3—and that is only within his Corinthian and Roman correspondences! It is tempting to immediately compile all of his treatments of these texts into a Pauline commentary on creation. Our present study takes a step prior to such an endeavor.

This is not an exhaustive study of “Paul’s theology of creation.” Rather, through select passages from those mentioned above and by comparison with the contemporary and formal commentary on Genesis 1-2 written by Philo of Alexandria, we will demonstrate some of Paul’s underlying interpretive tendencies when he employs creational texts, terms, and motifs. Paul has more to say about creation than is often thought, and by comparing his briefer and more scattered comments with Philo’s condensed and developed commentary, more about creation in Paul can be discerned and legitimately compared with Genesis’ creation texts than may be possible by only studying Paul. Though we will certainly draw out both similarities and differences between Paul and Philo, our primary task is more simple.

Our thesis is this: Paul’s interpretation of creation, like Philo’s in his commentary, contains three interwoven aspects: the beginning of the world, the beginning of humanity, and God’s intentions before the beginning. Three basic questions are raised by this assertion and must be answered before we begin. Firstly, how is this study related to
other attempts to understand Paul’s view of creation? Secondly, why are we approaching this fuller treatment of Paul’s understanding of creation via a comparison between his and Philo’s readings? And finally, how will our study of Paul’s and Philo’s three-strand hermeneutic of creation unfold?

1. Recent Treatments of Paul’s View of Creation

Scholars who have commented on Paul’s view of creation in general and/or Paul’s view of Adam in particular have often misconstrued his outlook due to underdeveloped engagement with each of the ways he interprets the protological texts and concepts. The majority of applicable details from these presentations of Paul’s view of creation and of Adam are more effectively engaged throughout our study itself as they typically arise concerning particular texts of Paul (e.g., 1 Cor. 15:45; 2 Cor. 4:4, 6, Rom. 8:29) rather than as systematic treatments of his exegesis of the early texts in Genesis. A few general examples will suffice in demonstrating from different angles that a deeper and broader engagement with Paul’s handling of the creational texts themselves will fill in an existing gap in scholarly discussion.

Though virtually everyone would agree that Paul believed that in fact God did create the world, there has been little attention paid to Paul’s understanding of creation before Genesis 3. As we will see, some say (somewhat casually) that Paul really did not think much about creation and existence prior to sin. Not fitting into that perspective, H. Ridderbos considered creation “fundamental” to Paul’s thinking about sin and the gospel
“even though little separate attention is paid” to the original creation in his letters.\(^3\) In light of the “little separate attention” that Paul supposedly grants to creation, B. Witherington is not surprised that “commentators have often noted how very little Paul has to say about creation or creatures prior to the Fall.”\(^4\) Ridderbos’ modifier “separate” has been dropped, and now it appears that Paul did not say much of anything about creation, even in connection with other doctrines. Apparently in agreement with the commentators, Witherington explains:

> When Paul talks about creation, he is speaking of creation as it now exists, groaning under the burden of futility to which the Fall subjected it. When Paul reflects on the world, he is almost always reflecting on a world gone wrong or a world the form of which is passing away (1 Cor. 7:31).\(^5\)

Due to Paul’s emphasis on the power and pervasiveness of sin, on Adam as sinner, and on “this present age” as evil and passing away, it is indeed tempting to convert the notion that Paul says very little about creation prior to the Fall into the notion that, as Witherington favorably records of the plurality of commentators, Paul “has very little to say about creation.” Twenty years prior to Witherington, J. Reumann had suggested “that Paul’s expectation of an imminent end scarcely made creation a matter of importance to him.”\(^6\) If so, then indeed Paul would likely have very little to say about anything prior to the fundamental event of the universe: Adam’s disobedience.

These few examples represent mere passing comments on Paul’s view of creation. When there has been a greater effort to say more about how Paul construes the creation of the world, attention has typically focused upon two statements in Paul’s undisputed

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\(^3\) Ridderbos, 1975, 105. The term “separate” is unfortunate, for it implies that any attention to creation that is related to another topic is somehow less meaningful. It may tend toward an unwarranted restriction of the Pauline evidence.

\(^4\) Witherington, 1994, 9.


letters: Rom. 4:17c and 1 Cor. 8:6. From 1 Cor. 8:6 it is argued that Paul believed “all things” were created “through Christ” (cf. Col. 1:15-16).\(^7\) From Rom. 4:17c it is argued that he believed God “called non-being into being”—i.e., some sort of *creatio ex nihilo* by divine *fiat*.\(^8\) In our study below we will not discuss either of these texts. 1 Cor. 8:6 is most likely a reference to the source, goal, and mediation of creation (as well as redemption),\(^9\) because it does not betray a treatment of specific texts within the beginning of Genesis. In relation to Rom. 4:17c, (even if this is a reference to creation) it is similarly being too broadly construed to be of relevance for our particular study of Paul’s interpretive moves regarding the text. In my opinion, however, Paul’s statement in Rom. 4:17c about “the God who called non-existing things as existing things” (καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα) is more adequately explained as a gloss of Gen. 17:5 (which Paul just quoted in v.17a), and particularly of God’s use of the perfect tense within that quote. God claimed “I have established [τῇ θείακα] you father of many nations,” though he had not yet actualized even one child (let alone “many nations”). But Abraham believed in this God who “called the non-existent things [sc. no-children and no-nations] as [ὡς] the existent things [sc. the already established ‘many nations’].” Even though Rom. 4:17c is not a reference directly to God’s act of creation, however, God’s assumed enactment of this “call” can certainly be *compared* to a creative act. Indeed in his letter to the Corinthians Paul himself unites childbirth to the creation account of Genesis 1-2, putting both under

\(^7\) E.g., Cox, 2007, 141-61 (on 1 Cor. 8:6), 161-92 (on Col. 1:15-20); Gibbs, 1971, 59-73 (on 1 Cor. 8:6), 94-114 (on Col. 1:15-20).


\(^9\) Contra Murphy-O’Connor, 1978A, 253-67, who argues against a creational understanding of 1 Cor. 8:6 (cf. Kuschel, 1992, esp. 285-91). His treatment has not been well received by many: cf., e.g., Thiselton, 2000, 635-38; Fee, 2006, 90n. 15; Cox, 2005, 172; Dunn, 1998B, 267.
the same rubric of the all-powerful causation of the Creator (1 Cor. 11:12; cf. vv.7-12). Like 1 Cor. 8:6, Rom. 4:17c does not show a treatment of a specific text of Genesis. Therefore, although general ideas about Paul’s view of creation can be either exegeted or derived from these confessions, Paul’s specific reading of the creation text cannot be discerned from either. Yet these have been the most common texts of discussion when contemplating Paul’s general view of creation.

Recently, P. Bouteneff set himself to analyze “how Paul might have understood creation and how that understanding may be derived from aspects of the Hexaemeron [i.e., “six day,” Genesis 1] account.”¹¹ Though he feels unable to attribute to Paul “a fully formed ‘theology of creation’,” Bouteneff does see certain aspects of Paul’s reading of Genesis as highly significant, “groundbreaking,” “seminal.”¹² But on actual analysis of Paul’s understanding of Genesis 1 itself, he too only mentions Rom. 4:17c and 1 Cor. 8:6.¹³ The main significance Bouteneff sees in Paul’s interpretation of creation actually does not have to do with the creation of the world, but with the fallen person of Adam.¹⁴

¹⁰ Ironically, a greater ultimacy of “nothingness” (and God’s effect on it) may be derived from Paul’s use of it in Rom. 4:17c as it is a gloss on Abraham’s situation to which God spoke than could be if this were a direct reference to creation itself. In the ancient world, creation of “non-being into being” typically did not assume an ultimate nihil: see 2 Mac. 7:28a (cf. v.28b and v.23 with v.28a; see below p.120n.11); Plato, Soph. 265c; Philo: Spec. 4.187; Migr. 183; Mos. 2.100 (though cf. Philo’s use of an ultimate “nothing” in Plant. 7; Somn. 1.63-64; Mos. 2.267). So e.g., May, 1994 (on Philo specifically, 9-21); cf. Radice, 2009, 144-45; Schwarz, 2002, 173; Runia, 2001, 152-53 (cf. idem, 1986, 289); Fergusson, 1998, 12; Clifford and Collins, 1992, 13 (cf. Clifford, 1994, 141); Sacks, 1990, 4; Goldstein, 1983, 307; Winston, 1979, 38-40; Wolfson, 1947, 1.300-10. Thus if Rom. 4:17c actually was a reference to creation, we would not know whether “non-being” was ultimate or not, and the context would tempt us toward a non-ultimate “nothing.” But since “non-being things” refer to the absolute non-existence of children which Abraham and Sarah had, God’s relationship to that “non-being” should be seen as more ultimate than in other explicitly creational contexts. Granted, Paul’s reference is still not to the actual activity of God in bringing nations about but to his claim in Gen. 17:5. But Paul surely believes that what gives God’s “call” power is the fact that God then did what he claimed. Thus Paul’s understanding of God’s causation which brings “non-being” into “being” exactly as he claims, which can be derived from Rom. 4:17c, is closer to the full view of creatio ex nihilo than would be discernible if Paul were explicitly speaking of God’s activity in Genesis 1-2.

¹¹ Bouteneff, 2008, 36.
Because of the enormous scope of Bouteneff’s task, he cannot be faulted with treating only a few carefully selected passages in Paul. We single out Bouteneff because his claims of what is desired demonstrate what has been lacking, even though this deficit continues in his own work. He wanted to demonstrate “how Paul might have understood creation” (which he did through 1 Cor. 8:6 and Rom. 4:17c) and “how that may be derived from aspects of the Hexaemeron account.” The latter is certainly desirable, but even Bouteneff’s treatment leaves a wide door of opportunity into which our study will enter in detail. A full-length discussion of Paul’s interpretation of the creation of the world will both modify the broad generalizations regarding Paul’s lack of regard for the original creation and add understanding where it has merely been lacking. In chapter 2, “The Beginning of the World,” we will seek to provide just such a fuller analysis of Paul’s reading of the beginning of the world. This will also have the benefit of providing Paul’s broader hermeneutical framework for his understanding of God’s more particular creation of Adam and humanity.

Some treatments of Paul’s more specific view of Adam (rather than of creation as a whole) sound a similar tone to Reumann’s and Witherington’s mentioned above. While it is true that R. Scroggs (among many others) has offered the brief idea, deduced from Rom. 3:23, that like many of his contemporaries Paul acknowledges a “glory once enjoyed by Adam,” even this verdict is tempered by this perspective: “Taken with the events of Christ and the church, Paul is directly concerned with the new creation which God is bringing to man and the cosmos. He is only secondarily interested in the old

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15 Bouteneff analyzes the “ancient Christian readings of the biblical creation narratives” from the creation texts themselves through their use in OT, early Jewish, and NT writings, through Tertullian, Origen, and the Cappadocian fathers ending with Gregory of Nyssa in the 390s CE.
16 Scroggs, 1966, 73 (cf. 73n.42). Cf. Dunn, 1980, 102: “By virtue of his creation in the image of God [Adam] was given a share in the glory of God, the visible splendor of God’s power as Creator.”
creation which is passing away.”  

What this subordination of interest means for Scroggs comes out in his subsequent approach and then in confession. In practice, when Scroggs expounds the “old creation” he only discusses the post-sin creation, thereby not showing much of an interest himself in Paul’s view of Adam (or creation) before sin. This approach to Paul’s view of Adam is reminiscent of C.K. Barrett’s only a few years prior. Barrett thought it important “to ask what Saul the Jew will have made of the figure of Adam,” but he then began his own search with Paul’s understanding of “the myth of Eden” regarding the “Fall” rather than the prior creation of Adam. Even though Barrett considered his research to have “traced [Paul’s] story from its beginning,” Paul’s “beginning” involved “when Man upset the balance of God’s creation” and how “creation is now perverted and subjected to vanity; the reign of evil beings.” But what about before Adam’s disobedience and introduction of cosmic disaster?

Though Scroggs is surely right that “the context of Paul’s whole theology indicates that the Apostle wrestles mightily with Gen. 1-3,” in practice he, like Barrett, only really looks at Paul’s view of the Adam of Genesis 3 in any depth. Barrett himself had presented not many more than two general statements concerning Paul’s view of Adam before the fall: “Adam was created by God for life,” and Adam had “minor sovereignty” (i.e., over animals). Barrett was clear, however, about what Paul did not claim about the pre-sin Adam: “the first man, Adam, is never said by Paul to bear the image of God.” (This claim was more easily asserted since Barrett judged that 1 Cor.

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18 Barrett, 1962, 92.
20 Scroggs, 1966, 97-98.
22 Barrett, 1962, 88.
23 Ibid.
11:7 was simply “not relevant” to his study of what Paul “will have made of the figure of Adam,” even though that passage is built on the assumption that the man of Genesis 2, Adam, was “God’s image and glory”; see chapter 3). In a similar manner to Barrett, even though Scroggs mentions in passing the glory which Adam must have enjoyed prior to his sin, in confession he is confident of Paul’s attitude toward the pre-sinful Adam:

The Apostle is consistently silent about Adam’s status prior to his sin. The reason for this must be… that Paul knows only Christ as the exhibition of God’s intent for man and thus has nothing to say about what Adam was before the fall or might have been had he not sinned.25

Again, “Nowhere in [Paul’s] Epistles is Adam the perfect man before his sin. Paul knows only the Adam of sin and death.”26 Paul “knows only” the sinful Adam and “knows only” Christ as “the exhibition of God’s intent.” One may wonder if Paul’s ignorance of the pre-sin Adam (i.e., the created Adam) is due to lack of contemplating Genesis 1-2, despite Scroggs’ earlier (unsubstantiated) claim that he can discern in Paul’s letters a “mighty wrestling” with Genesis 1-3, or is due to Paul seeing God’s creation of Adam in Genesis 1-2 as sinful and not exhibiting “God’s intent.” The former is probably the case for Scroggs, though he does not draw out the implications of these bold claims.

A similar analysis of Paul’s view of Adam can be found in S. Kim. Parallel to Barrett and Scroggs, Kim also notices Paul’s primary negativity toward Adam, but he actually does tie this attitude more closely to Paul’s reading of a pre-sin text. Kim writes:

For Paul Adam is always a sinner. For him Adam means simply the fallen first man. He knows no glorious Adam before his fall as some Rabbis fantastically depicted. What Adam was before his fall does not interest him. In contrast to Christ in whom Paul saw the image and glory of God and the eternal life restored, Adam is from the

25 Scroggs, 1966, 91 (emphasis added); cf. p.59.
26 Scroggs, 1966, 100 (emphasis added). Cf. Dunn, 1973, 136 (and 136n.28), though see below.
beginning the fallen Stammvater [i.e., progenitor] of fallen humanity. That is why even in Gen 2.7 Paul can see only the ignoble, weak and mortal Adam.\textsuperscript{27}

Does this mean that Paul saw Gen. 2:7 as God’s creation of a “fallen first man,” a “sinner”? Our main point is that Kim, in harmony with Barrett’s and Scroggs’ regard of the creation of Adam and with Reumann’s and Witherington’s regard of the creation of the world, does not think that Paul “knows” or is “interested in” the pre-sin creation. Paul says (even “knows”) nothing about Adam as a good created human.

J. Dunn argues that “Adam plays a larger role in Paul’s theology than is usually realized…. Adam is a key figure in Paul’s attempt to express his understanding both of Christ and of man.”\textsuperscript{28} Adam-Christology is “one of the principal load-bearing beams in the superstructure of Pauline christology”\textsuperscript{29} with even Paul’s pervasive “in Christ” language being essentially connected to his Adam-Christology.\textsuperscript{30} Dunn writes, “Adam christology can thus be seen to form an extensive feature in Paul’s theology. More importantly, it provides an integrating framework both for Paul’s christology and for his entire gospel.”\textsuperscript{31} In light of this (extreme) importance of Paul’s use of Adam for his theology, it certainly does seem “necessary,” as Dunn argues, “to trace the extent of the Adam motif in Paul if we are to appreciate the force of his Adam christology.”\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{27} Kim, 1980, 264n.1 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{28} Dunn, 1980, 101; affirmed by van Kooten, 2008, 70.
\textsuperscript{29} Dunn, 1998A, 231.
\textsuperscript{31} Dunn, 1998A, 233. Cf. Black (1954): “The Second Adam doctrine provided St Paul with the scaffolding, if not the basic structure, for his redemption and resurrection christology” (173; also quoted with favour by Dunn, 1980, 308n.39).
\textsuperscript{32} Dunn, 1980, 101 (emphasis added).
G. Fee counters that “neither the nature nor the extent of so-called Adam Christology is a matter on which all are agreed.”33 While critical of a “maximalist” recognition of “Adam Christology” represented by Dunn (as well as by N.T. Wright),34 but also of a “minimalist” approach that only sees Adam in Paul’s three explicit uses of his name (1 Cor. 15:21-22, 45-47, and Rom. 5:12-21), Fee dubs his approach “middling” and includes Paul’s references to “image” in 1 Cor. 15:49, 2 Cor. 3:18, 4:4-6, and Rom. 8:29. Fee does claim that Paul’s manner of expression regarding “new creation,” “image of God,” and “second Adam” is “so important” as an aspect of “Pauline soteriology.”35

Yet even Dunn’s “maximalist” and Fee’s “middling” approaches to Paul’s concept of Adam leave a lot to be desired for a treatment of Paul’s understanding of the original creation of humanity. It is not surprising that Fee does not deal with 1 Cor. 11:7-12 at all, for it is protological (and pre-sin) but not Christological and his task is specifically Christological. He does briefly mention a general loss or “distortion” of the divine image by Adam,36 and the only other hint which Fee gives toward Paul’s understanding of the original Adam or creation is his brief statement about 1 Cor. 15:49: “the goal of the first creation will be finally realized in the second,”37 the “ultimate goal of salvation” being “re-creation into the divine image.”38 This may be true, but because this aspect of Fee’s study is not undergirded by much engagement with Paul’s view of the first Adam it leaves a lot of room for a study that is.

33 Fee, 2007, 513. Even more critically, Fee writes of the “overblown emphasis on a so-called Adam Christology” which “goes considerably beyond the biblical account itself and thus takes Paul’s Christology where Paul himself does not go” (272).
35 Fee, 2007, 486.
36 Fee, 2007, 114-19 (on “Jesus as Second Adam” in 1 Corinthians), 486.
37 Fee, 2007, 119. On 2 Cor. 3:18, 4:4, 6 see pp.180-85, and on “Jesus as Second Adam” in Romans see pp.271-72.
38 Fee, 2007, 484-88.
Dunn argues (like Scroggs) that “Paul’s understanding of man as he now is is heavily influenced by the narratives about Adam in Gen. 1-3.”\(^{39}\) Although Dunn had previously and self-consciously followed Scroggs in claiming that “it is the risen Jesus who is the image of God, not any Urmenesch, let alone the first Adam”\(^ {40}\) and that “Adam in Paul is always fallen man,”\(^ {41}\) his subsequent work seems to take more account of the pre-sin Adam in Paul’s writing. Adam is one of Paul’s metaphors for “man’s salvation.”\(^ {42}\) Dunn summarizes that salvation is “the fashioning or reshaping of the believer into the image of God,”\(^ {43}\) and he deduces for Paul’s pre-sin Adam a harmony with and knowledge of God (Rom. 1:18-25),\(^ {44}\) a glory (Rom. 3:23),\(^ {45}\) and an image-bearing (1 Cor. 15:49; 2 Cor. 3:18; Col. 3:10; Eph. 4:24).\(^ {46}\) He almost takes 1 Cor. 11:7 into consideration in relation to this last observation, but he then relegates it to an “untypical” thought of Paul.\(^ {47}\) (Dealing with it in more detail, as we will in chapter 3, actually could have helped Dunn in this particular task of analyzing “the extent of the Adam motif in Paul”). Dunn thus draws out of various Pauline phrases more implications for Paul’s view of the pre-sin Adam than many others had done. Yet Dunn’s claim to have “examined the influence of the creation and fall narratives on Paul’s understanding of man” still leaves significant room for an even fuller treatment of what Paul thinks about God’s creation of Adam, and it certainly allows for deeper exploration of how this aspect of the Beginning relates to Paul’s broader reading of God’s creation of the entire world according to Genesis 1.

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41 Dunn, 1973, 136n.28.
43 Dunn, 1980, 105. Cf. Fee’s “ultimate goal of salvation” as “re-creation into the divine image” (484-88).
46 Dunn, 1980, 105.
47 Dunn, 1980, 105, 308n.31.
Bouteneff’s treatment of Paul’s reading of Genesis 1 turned out to be more limited than the desired engagement with the influence of the Hexaemeron account on Paul’s understanding of creation.\(^{48}\) With Paul’s understanding of Adam too, Bouteneff only briefly explores Paul’s more particular interpretation of Adam as created, dealing only with Paul’s use of Gen. 2:7c in 1 Cor. 15:45. There Bouteneff shows how Paul contrasts the man made from dust with Christ, and he concludes (helpfully) that “our resurrection in immortality is neither bodiless nor ours by right or by nature but is entirely [‘in Christ’].”\(^{49}\) After this one statement, and in line with the emphasis in Barrett, Scroggs, Kim, Dunn, and Fee, Bouteneff mainly treats Paul’s use of Adam as a sinner. Such an emphasis in each interpreter is legitimate enough, for the majority (i.e., two out of three) of Paul’s explicit uses of “Adam” by name (1 Cor. 15:21-22 and Rom. 5:12-21) do treat him as the bringer of the sinful sting of death. But the claims that are then made concerning Paul’s view of Adam based on their incomplete treatments tend to outrun the noted evidence and run in the wrong direction in relation to the wider evidence. To give another example of this last criticism, Bouteneff draws a conclusion that harmonizes with the chorus above concerning Paul’s understanding of the pre-sin beginning in Adam:

\[\text{Rather than Adam being a model or image for humanity or even the first real human being, it is Christ who is both. Christ is the first true human being, and Christ is the image of God and the model for Adam. Indeed, there is no mention of the person of Adam as created in God’s image. Genesis 1:26 and 2:7 are distinct for him: Paul’s Adam is not so much the first human being as he is the first human to sin.}\]

Bouteneff does seem to begin to qualify this last statement, admitting that Paul “sees that the human person is in God’s image (1 Cor. 11:7),” but he immediately counters that even so “Paul does not write of Adam as glorious or image-bearing but, rather, as the

\(^{48}\) Bouteneff, 2008, 36.
\(^{49}\) Bouteneff, 2008, 44; see 43-44.
\(^{50}\) Bouteneff, 2008, 45 (emphasis added).
‘man of dust’ (1 Cor. 15:47)." Bouteneff then adds another falsely dichotomized alternative (used also by Barrett, Scroggs, Dunn, and Kim—see above): rather than Adam being “glorious or image-bearing,” for Paul “it is Christ who is the image of God (Col. 1:15; Heb. 1:3) and to whose image humanity must conform (Rom. 8:29).”

Though it is true that the goal and hope of a Christian is to be conformed to Christ’s “image” and not that of the first Adam (1 Cor. 15:49, see chapter 3), does either Christ’s status as “image of God” or Adam’s status as “man of dust” really imply that Adam, as created, was not “glorious or image-bearing”? This question is answered better by a more robust engagement with Paul’s material that takes into consideration his complex and diversely-related comments.

How is our study related to other attempts to understand Paul’s view of creation? As seen above, some scholars hail the fruitfulness of exploring Paul’s view of the creation of Adam and of the world while others imply that such a pursuit would be futile. The lack of detail in any of these scholars mentioned above regarding Paul’s full treatment of either the beginning of humanity or of the beginning of the world opens the way for the usefulness of the present study. Paul’s language of creation in his Corinthian and Roman letters suggests more than has been previously offered and it corrects or qualifies what many have proposed. Yet it is not only the case that a fuller engagement with Paul’s language of creation will be of such benefit. It is also the case that comparison between Paul’s somewhat scattered textual treatments and the contemporary but more systematic treatments by Philo regarding the same creational texts can help highlight important and intertwined complexities in Paul’s perspectives on creation.

51 Bouteneff, 2008, 45 (emphasis added).
52 Bouteneff, 2008, 45 (emphasis original).
2. Paul as a Reader in Comparison with Philo

The mention of a comparison between Paul’s and Philo’s readings of creation raises our second question: why are we approaching this fuller treatment of Paul’s understanding of creation in such a manner? Studying Paul’s interpretation of scripture is helpful for interpreting his thought. Even regarding the primacy of Christ in Paul’s thought this is so, as F. Watson rightly explains: “In Paul, scripture is not overwhelmed by the light of an autonomous Christ-event needing no scriptural mediation. It is scripture that shapes the contours of the Christ-event.”

This is also certainly true with the texts of Genesis’ Beginning. Even though Christ is much more important to Paul than is Adam, nevertheless Paul can explain Christ as “the last Adam” (1 Cor. 15:45). This is a textual claim as much as a theological one, and it is a virtually meaningless claim without the knowledge of what, for example, “Adam” means. Likewise, when Paul prefaces his description of “light shining” in Christ’s face (and no longer in Moses’ face) with the claim that the One who shines the light is the God who said out of primordial darkness, “Light will shine,” Paul is making a textual claim about who exactly the Corinthians should think is active in their hearts when they turn to this Christ: the very Creator as described in Gen. 1:2-3. For Paul, as well as for Philo, since the Jewish scripture “condition[s] [their] perception of the world” and is “the ‘determinate subtext that plays a constitutive role’ in shaping [their] literary production” as well, a deep engagement with their readings is necessary for discerning their views of reality.

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56 As Watson (2004) writes, “The function of canonical scripture is to enable the interpreter to make sense of the world of contemporary experience, and not simply to assign an ‘original meaning’ to a text: in the end, it is the world rather than the text per se that is the object of interpretation” (5). Watson rightly observes that Paul’s interpretation is a two-way street, “an interaction rather than a unilinear movement”
Concerning the basic matter of comparing Paul and Philo, though it is generally agreed that Philo is important to an understanding of NT interpretation the exact relationship between Philo, Paul, their writings, and some sort of shared background is still contended. Some are criticized for reading Philo (and other ancient Jewish writers) in light of Pauline categories. Others can be faulted with reading Paul in light of Philonic categories that are foreign to Paul. Despite the many explanations of these relationships, one thing that Philo and Paul both clearly demonstrate through their writings is a deep engagement with the same scriptural texts. This common ground will be our focus for comparison. Both interpreters believed that God created the world and humanity, and it was the same text of Genesis which they both read as saying so and

(5), that “the Christ who sheds light on scripture is also and above all the Christ on whom scripture simultaneously sheds its own light” (17; see 14-17). Throughout this study I will demonstrate the reciprocal hermeneutic; my present emphasis on scripture to Christ and reality does not undercut the return direction.

57 A mere sample of recent applicable scholarship will be listed here, but further bibliography and engagement with various studies will be found throughout our study. For Philo as generally important for NT and Pauline studies cf. Hurtado, 2004, 73-92 (on Paul see 75-77); Sterling, 2004, 21-52 (on Paul see 41-43); Nickelsburg, 2004, 53-72 (on NT see 69-70); see also Runia, 1993, 63-86 (on Paul see 66-74).

58 Levison (1988) argues that “‗motifs' of an ‗Adam speculation' or ‗Adam myth' …discerned in Early Judaism” (e.g., by Davies [pp.14-15], Jervell [pp.15-16], Barrett [p.16], Brandenburger [pp.17-18], Scroggs [pp.18-20], Dunn [pp.20-21], Wright [pp.21-23]) “do not exist” (13), and the erroneous perpetuation of this myth is that previous scholars have typically interpreted the Jewish authors through the lenses of Pauline categories (14-23). (This was the basic criticism which Neusner [1978, 177-91, amid a mostly positive review] levelled against Sanders’ Paul and Palestinian Judaism; cf. Watson, 2004, 6-13). In Levison’s estimation, this practice has skewed an understanding of Philo’s concept of Adam, as well as the Adam-theologies of Ben Sira, Jubilees, Josephus, 4 Ezra, etc. Watson (2004) argues that “if there are ambiguities and tensions in the scriptural texts, one would expect a degree of interpretative diversity rather than an almost universal conformity to a single ‗pattern'” (13).

59 For the judgment that it was not Philo or Philonic ideas behind the Paul-Corinthian debate and that such construals misunderstand Paul (and perhaps also Philo) see Schaller, 2004, 42-51 and Hultgren, 2003, 343-57. For some who are thereby criticized for seeing Philonic (or Philonic-type) and/or Platonizing interpretations of reality and Gen. 2:7 (and 1:27) as behind the issue in 1 Cor. 15:45-49 cf. Pearson, 1973 (esp.11-12, 17-21); idem, 1983, 73-89; Horsley, 1976, 269-88; idem, 1977, 224-39; idem, 1978, 203-231 (esp.206-07); Davis, 1984 (esp.49-62); Sellin, 1986, 156-89; Theissen, 1987, 353-67; Sterling, 1995, 355-84; idem, 2004, 41-43. See chapter 3 for more particular critiques of some of these construals of the issue, and particularly regarding van Kooten’s recent (2008) presentation of Paul’s treatment of Gen. 1:27 and 2:7 in a Philonic manner.

60 On the fundamental importance of the scriptures to the Jewish people see Barclay, 1996A, 424-26. Concerning Philo and Paul particularly, Barclay (2006) writes, “The Jewish philosopher Philo and the Jewish apostle Paul were contemporaries whose paths never crossed and whose minds moved within startlingly different frameworks. Both, however, were profoundly engaged in the interpretation of the Jewish Scriptures… [and a] comparison which gives attention to the differences as well as the similarities between these two figures seems well justified” (140).
how. Philo’s commentary on Genesis 1-3, De Opificio Mundi (“Op.”), has a definite emphasis on creation in 1:1-2:7.\(^6^1\) His comments on the text therein are not allegorical (thereby making them easier to compare with Paul’s comments), are from a very similar time period to Paul’s, and are especially discernible as they take the form of an explicit commentary. Philo’s deliberate commentary on God’s creation according to Genesis provides a very helpful foil against which we may compare Paul’s occasional (but not few) comments on the same sacred texts.

There seems to be a general growth in recognition that treating Paul and Philo as readers of shared scripture is a fruitful way to discuss their thoughts, both alone and in comparison.\(^6^2\) F. Watson has recently encouraged and demonstrated the benefits of a “three-way conversation” between Paul, non-Christian Jewish writers (including Philo), and the shared scriptural texts to which each turns in order to understand and explain their world.\(^6^3\) R. Hays has called for greater attention to “Pauline hermeneutical strategies” and has argued for the “study of Paul’s exegesis of scripture” as a healthy way forward in Pauline discussion.\(^6^4\) D. Runia has written that “there is a growing consensus among Philonic scholars that Philo saw himself first and foremost as an exegete of Mosaic scripture, and that a sound way to start understanding him is to begin at the level of his exegetical expositions.”\(^6^5^\)


\(^6^2\) See the helpful approach by Loader, 2004, regarding the issue of sexuality and gender in Philo’s and Paul’s (and the NT’s) reading of the LXX (and especially of Genesis 2).

\(^6^3\) See Watson, 2004, and his method on pp.1-6.

\(^6^4\) Hays, 1995, 85-86.

\(^6^5\) Runia, 1990, XI.72.
neglecting the importance of Philo’s philosophical understanding, \(^{66}\) though it need not be understood in such a manner. Comparing any two exegetes on a particular passage, e.g., G. van Kooten and G. Fee on 1 Cor. 15:45, will at the same time link the two different thinkers as fellow readers of the same text, will show certain commonalities between them, and yet will also bring to light some of the philosophical and theological differences which both bring to the conversation. Toward a similar complex of ends, we place Philo and Paul in conversation over their shared scripture.

With regard to this particular issue of “using” Philo’s perspective as a comparison piece with NT and especially Pauline texts, B. Schaller argues:

If such efforts are to contribute something real to the case, then this requires an approach wherein the textual evidence and its factual peculiarities on both sides are accurately recorded, reflecting existing overlaps and disparities in detail and not hastily constructing relationships of a history-of-religion and tradition-historical nature. \(^{67}\)

Schaller is clear that he is not condemning history-of-religion and tradition-historical approaches to Paul and Philo per se, but his call for certain care in accurately reflecting both Philo and Paul with their own peculiarities is important. \(^{68}\) In light of the very real dangers of illegitimately pressing Philo into Pauline categories and/or Paul into Philonic categories, and since our focus is on Philo and Paul as interpreters of the same sacred text of the Beginning, we will allow their shared scripture to set the structure of our comparison. After drawing to the surface some potential points of interpretation raised by each text itself, we will then present the exegesis of Philo and then of Paul on that

\(^{66}\) See e.g., Berchman, 2000, 49-70.
\(^{67}\) Schaller, 2004, 151 (translation mine).
\(^{68}\) Watson (2004) reflects this similar call, arguing that exegesis of selected non-Pauline Jewish texts “must be carried out with no less care and attention to detail than one devotes to Paul’s own texts,” for they each “fully repay a ‘close reading’, and each has a theological and hermeneutical interest of its own which must be brought to the fore if comparison with the Pauline readings is to be fruitful” (3).
particular creation text. This procedure is clearly attractive regarding Philo’s interpretation of creation, but less so regarding Paul’s. Since we will almost exclusively look at Philo’s commentary on Genesis 1-2, to follow his text’s order is to follow his own order. This will help guard against an “artificial category” being imposed on Philo’s exegesis.

One might question the validity of this approach for Pauline interpretation. Although such an organization automatically has the appeal of producing an orderly view of Paul’s reading of particular biblical creation texts, unlike Philo, Paul is not writing a commentary. His comments occur in different contexts and in a different order from the text. His use of the creation of light from Gen. 1:2-3 comes two verses after his use of the anthropological title from Gen. 1:27, “image of God.” As both of these are in 2 Corinthians (4:4, 6), they both come after Paul’s reading of Gen. 2:7 in 1 Cor. 15:44-47 and Gen. 5:3 in 1 Cor. 15:48-49. While keeping Philo’s voice liberated enough to converse with the texts in the order that he presents them, are we merely binding Paul to an inappropriate and artificial exploration of his “reading” of creation?

No. The text of Genesis sets the “anthropogony” in the larger context and movement of the “cosmogony”—i.e., the more specific texts about the “birth” or creation of the human (Gen. 1:26-28, 2:7, 5:1-3) only come after and in the context of the broader text concerning the “birth” or creation of the cosmos (Gen. 1:1-25; 2:4-6). The general connection in Philo’s and Paul’s day between the broader world and the particular human within it has been highlighted by scholars from many perspectives: e.g., Graeco-Roman philosophical, Jewish apocalyptic, sociological.69 Paul and Philo both demonstrate

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69 There was a general Graeco-Roman trend in connecting cosmos and anthropos: so Martin, 1992, 3-15, 17; cf. Runia, 2001, 227, 254 (cf. idem, 1986, 555); van den Hoek, 2000, 65, 67, 67n.12; Steenburg, 1990,
through their exegesis of Genesis’ creation-texts that there is not merely a conceptual connection but a hermeneutical connection as well. That is, the creation of the more particular humanity takes place in concert with the creation of the broader world. Paul demonstrates this in an especially clear way in 1 Cor. 15:35-49 (though it can also be seen in a slightly different form in 1 Cor. 11:7-12, 2 Cor. 4:4-6, or even Romans 8). There Paul presents God’s creation of heaven and earth and all that is in them (vv.37-41), within which “humans” are but one of the many (vv.39-40), as conceptual prolegomena to his more specific treatment of the creation of Adam (vv.45-47) and the propagation of subsequent humans in Adam’s image (vv.48-49). Like Philo, Paul uses similar language to describe the creation of the world and of humanity according to Genesis. Both readers set the context for their construal of the beginning of humanity as the prior and broader work of God in beginning the world. Hence a comparison of Paul’s and Philo’s exegeses of the same scriptural texts of the Beginning—both of the world (chapter 2 below) and of humanity (chapter 3 below)—will help preserve the integrity of each interpreter’s own treatment of the sacred Word to which they both submit, especially when this conversation is organized according to their shared text.

3. Paul’s and Philo’s Three-Strand Hermeneutic of Creation

As we said at the outset, our thesis is that Paul’s interpretation of creation, like Philo’s, contains three interwoven aspects: the beginning of the world, the beginning of humanity, and God’s intentions before the beginning. Now that we have provided answers to how

102, 104; Sandmel, 1983, 24; Tobin, 1983, 45, 45n.19, 49, 125; Kim, 1980, 191 (on this in Philo see Radice, 2009, 134; idem, 1989, 122). Beker, 1980 and Barrett, 1962 trace out some connections between the human and the world in terms of apocalyptic thought. Adams, 2000, 3-7 summarizes a number of sociological approaches to NT writings which see a close connection between the world and the human.
our study is related to other attempts to understanding Paul’s view of creation of the world and of Adam and to why we are approaching this fuller treatment of Paul’s understanding of creation via a comparison between his and Philo’s readings, we may briefly conclude this introduction to our study with an answer to our third question: “How exactly will our study of Paul’s and Philo’s three-strand hermeneutic of creation unfold?”

As we have seen, many portrayals of Paul’s view (or non-view) of Adam as a created being, and especially of the world as a created thing, are underdeveloped and/or developed in the wrong direction. In chapter 3, “The Beginning of Humanity,” we will offer a more detailed study of how Paul actually interprets the beginning of humanity according to Genesis and in comparison with how Philo does likewise. There we will focus on Philo’s and then Paul’s uses of “the image of God” from Gen. 1:27 (in Op. 69-88 and 134; in 1 Cor. 11:7 and 2 Cor. 4:4), of the creation of the human person particularly as it relates to Gen. 2:7 (in Op. 134-50; in 1 Cor. 11:7-9, 12:12-30, 15:39-40, and 15:44-47), and of the creative principle of the propagation of humanity as the “image” of Adam from Gen. 5:3 (in Op. 145 and QG. 1.81; in 1 Cor. 15:48-49, 2 Cor. 3:18, and Rom. 8:29).

We have spent more time developing the usefulness of this study with regard to Paul’s more specific view of the creation of Adam than to Paul’s more general view of the creation of the world. This is partly because more scholars have set themselves to the former task than to the latter. Another reason for our unbalanced emphasis on humanity rather than the world is because Philo and Paul treat the creation of humanity in more detail than the creation of the world. This may simply be because they are both humans and are both writing to humans, but their anthropological emphases are probably also due
to their shared scripture. It crowns humanity with a peculiar glory and honor that other creatures were not granted. Both Philo and Paul recognize this quality of the Beginning. But an engagement with Paul’s and Philo’s readings of the beginning of humanity is only the final third of our study. As noted, to get to this human beginning, whether in Genesis itself or Philo’s construal or Paul’s, it helps contextually to travel through their understandings of the beginning of the world itself.

Chapter 2, “The Beginning of the World,” will seek to fill in the definite gap in Pauline discussion by setting aside Paul’s general acknowledgment of Christ’s mediation of creation (1 Cor. 8:6) as well as the general statement of God’s relationship to “non-existent things” (Rom. 4:17c) and by focusing on Paul’s treatment of specific texts within Genesis 1. In comparison with Philo’s more elaborate treatment of the beginning of light on day one (Op. 30-35 on Gen. 1:1-5) and the beginning of the rest of the visible cosmos on the second through sixth days (Op. 36-68 on Gen. 1:6-25), we will focus on Paul’s treatment of day one (Gen. 1:2-3) in 2 Cor. 4:6 and of the remainder of God’s creation of heaven and earth (Gen. 1:1-27) in 1 Cor. 15:35-41. Staying focused in chapter 2 on Paul’s and Philo’s readings of the text of Genesis 1 will add significant hermeneutical and theological context to our consideration in chapter 3 of Paul’s and Philo’s more particular readings of God’s creation of Adam as or according to “God’s image,” as the man “of dust,” and as the progenitor of humanity in “his image.”

But thus far we have only mentioned two of Paul’s and Philo’s interlocking strands when interpreting the Beginning—the world and humanity. Like Philo, Paul has a third aspect to his interpretation of creation, and it is this aspect which, arguably, is the tie that binds the other two into one inseparable treatment of creation. As we will see throughout
all three chapters, both Paul and Philo consider what was determined in God’s mind before he created this empirical world to be an important aspect of the Beginning of the world and humanity. In chapters 2 and 3, we will note how both interpreters see behind God’s creative activity a certain “desire” and “purpose” according to which the creation of the world and humanity then began. These are Paul’s and Philo’s implicit testimonies to the Before, i.e., to God’s pre-creative reasoning and intention. Although not explicitly labeled as taking place “before” creation, for Paul as for Philo it is in both the beginning of the world (chapter 2) and the beginning of humanity (chapter 3) that God’s desires and purposes nevertheless function as that which propels God’s creative activity.

But both Paul and Philo also have certain explicit and definable ideas about what else took place in the Creator’s mind before he created the visible world according to the beginning of Genesis. Both interpreters explicitly label these divine plans and determinations as “before” creation. Such overt notions of the Before will occupy us in chapter 1, “Before the Beginning?” There we will analyze Philo’s explicit Before in Op. 16, 26-29, and 129-30 and then Paul’s explicit Before in 1 Cor. 2:7-9 and Rom. 8:29-30. As we will see, it will be tempting to see these Befores in Philo and Paul as merely external impositions onto Genesis of previously formed theories—Philo’s drawn largely from Plato’s Timaeus, Paul’s drawn largely from Prov. 8:22-31 and the Christ-event. Yet there is a peculiar exegetical fact in both interpreters that restrains us from such a conclusion. Both Philo and Paul actually use the language and categories from Genesis to communicate the content of the Before. This fact will constrain us to a detailed examination of how their theories of before creation really are intimately and inseparably bound to their readings of Genesis’ texts of the beginning of creation.
Far from having little to say about the pre-sin Beginning of the world and humanity according to the text of Genesis, Paul’s interpretation of creation proves to be of far more import to him in his explanation of God’s reality than is often realized. This will be seen now as we demonstrate that Paul’s interpretation of creation, like Philo’s in his commentary, contains the three tightly interwoven strands of the beginning of the world, the beginning of humanity, and the implicit and explicit intentions of the Creator before the beginning. And a cord of three strands is not quickly broken.
Chapter 1

BEFORE THE BEGINNING?

In the beginning God existed before he created the world. Was he doing or thinking anything before his voice exploded the void into vibrancy? Did he deliberate over just how fast light should travel? Did he determine exactly how to make trees grow toward sunlight instead of away from it? Did he have any desires for how human history should develop or end? Do such questions even have a place in a study of how two ancient interpreters read and apply the beginning of a book that says, “In the beginning God made…,” with no mention of his previous purpose? Or does Genesis mention God’s pre-creational designs?

When thinking about the Beginning it is certainly natural to ask about the Before. The notable modern physicist Steven Hawking asks in the beginning of *A Brief History of Time*, “What do we know about the universe, and how do we know it? Where did the universe come from, and where is it going? Did the universe have a beginning, and if so, what happened before then?”¹ But this is not only a modern way of thinking about existence. Nearly two-thousand years before, both Paul and Philo considered it important that God thinks before he acts, and that included at creation. What marks this as

¹ Hawking, 1988, 1.
particularly noteworthy for an investigation of each reader’s interpretation of the
Beginning is that it is precisely in the language of the opening chapters of Genesis that
Philo and Paul convey to their respective readers God’s ultimate pre-deliberations. This
suggests (at least) that both men considered God’s pre-creational thoughts to be
connected with his creation according to Genesis. It is our contention in this chapter that
Paul’s concept of God’s intentions in the Before, like Philo’s, has implications for his
interpretation of the Beginning, both of the world and of humanity. The question posed in
the chapter’s title is not only a valid question when analyzing Paul’s and Philo’s
hermeneutics of creation. It is actually vital. The beginning of Genesis casts the minds of
both Philo and Paul into the Before.

The words “In the beginning God…” may themselves prompt questions about the
Before. To observe the obvious, the God who acts within the statement has the privilege
of being in the Before. So Ps. 89:2 (LXX) says, “Before [πρὸ] the mountains were
brought about and the earth and the inhabited-world were formed, from the age until the
age you exist.” In Gen. 1:1 the God who was already there began to act. Before an action
there is often an intention, a deliberation, perhaps even a plan. In his treatment of
Genesis 1, F. Watson writes, “If God’s action is comprehensible to the extent that this

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2 So Wenham, 1987, 12.
by an agent, it is natural and legitimate for the question why? to arise in the reader’s mind, whether or not
the narrative acknowledges the question by providing an explicit answer to it” (145). For God’s act of
creation in Genesis 1 as rooted in intentionality see the comments of Jenson, 1999, 7 on Basil the Great,
_Homilies on the Hexaemeron_ ii.7 and Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theologiae_ i.34.1. However, as Jenson
observes, in Genesis 1 it is not God’s thought _per se_ that creates but God’s spoken word (cf. Martin Luther,
_Lecture on Genesis_ [WA 42], 13:13). Following Luther’s criticism of Aquinas, Jenson says, “God’s act to
create is certainly an act of intellect and will, as the majority tradition has said,” but “it is the kind of such
act that is not enclosed within the subject but takes place as communication” (7). God’s communicative act
of creation is thus not reduced to but is connected to intention.
narrative presupposes, then it should provide indications of his purpose for the reader to develop.4

Around Philo’s and Paul’s day, many writers were musing about this very question of the Before.5 Much in the ancient Jewish discussion was prompted by the text that can be considered the scriptural “mother” of pre-protological contemplation: Prov. 8:22-31.6

Many of these ancient discussions kept their contemplation on Prov. 8:22-31 close to the text of Genesis 1 as well. The specific affiliation between Prov. 8:22-31 and Genesis 1 is relevant for two reasons. Firstly (and generally), Prov. 8:22-31 has been influential in guiding a number of ancient thinkers into thoughts about before the beginning (e.g., Sirach, Wisdom of Solomon, Philo),7 and we will add that this is almost always done in combination with the use of phrases and themes from Genesis 1-2.8 Secondly (and specifically), like the text of Genesis the text of Prov. 8:22-31 and v.23 in particular is common ground for Philo and Paul. For example, Philo quotes it in Ebr. 30-31 and Paul alludes to it in 1 Cor. 2:7 (to be substantiated below). For both interpreters, Prov. 8:23 is important for their interpretation of what took place before the beginning. Both interpreters will also use Genesis’ language to further explain this Before and its effects.

In this chapter we will demonstrate 1) that both Philo and Paul do write about the Before, and 2) that in both interpreters this Before is connected to their interpretation of

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4 Watson, 1994, 145.
5 For the Before in Qumran see Schnabel (1985) on 1QS 3.15-18, where creation accords with God’s “glorious design” which he “established before they existed,” and on 1QH 1.7ff, where “before creating” everything God’s knowledge and wisdom were planning (200; see 200n.209 for more texts and cf. Endo, 2002, 115 for more examples from Qumran). Endo (2002) also lists for the Before elsewhere in ancient Judaism: 1 En. 9:11; 2 En. 25:3; 33:3; 4 Ezra 6:1-6; 7:70; 8:52; 2 Bar 14:17; 54:1; T. Mos 1:12-13, etc. (115). We may add 1 En. 39:11 (“even before the world was created, [God] knew what is forever and what will be from generation to generation”); 46:1-2; 47:3; and 48:3-7 (esp. vv.6-7 which use words such as “hidden,” “before creation,” and “wisdom”; cf. 1 Cor. 2:6-9 below).
6 See Hengel, 1974, 1.153-75. Endo (2002) says that in the contexts of the passages noted above, “Prov 8:22-31 is more or less mentioned” (115).
8 See the discussion in Kugel, 1998, 44-47.
Genesis’ Beginning. Regarding the first, Philo and Paul each explicitly and implicitly testify to the Before. Each reader explains a definite and definable divine plan—either for structural enactment (so Philo) or historical enactment (so Paul)—and this plan is explicitly expressed as being before the beginning. Each reader also incorporates into their explanation of God’s creative activity a certain implicit governing intentionality—a “purpose,” a “desire”—which is logically (but not expressly labelled as) before God’s acts. It is their explicit Befores—the definite plans—that we will analyze in this chapter. Their implicit Befores—God’s purposes and desires because of which he creates—we will reserve for chapters 2 and 3 since they are even more interwoven into the beginning of the world and of humanity. In this first chapter, therefore, we will focus on the presence and content of the explicit Before in Philo’s commentary on Genesis 1 and in Paul’s letters to the Corinthians and Romans. We will also begin to demonstrate that this Before has hermeneutical significance for each man’s interpretation of the Beginning.

The remainder of this dissertation will flesh out more details of this hermeneutical significance regarding the beginning of the world (chapter 2) and the beginning of humanity (chapter 3). To now gain our bearing on Philo’s and Paul’s treatment of Genesis’ Beginning and the Before, we will make a few observations on Prov. 8:22-31 itself and on its connection to Genesis 1.

1. Proverbs 8:22-31 and Before Genesis 1

According to Paul’s and Philo’s notion of the authorship of the scriptural books, Genesis (written by Moses) would have been recorded before Proverbs (written by
Solomon).\(^9\) There is hermeneutical significance to this notion of authorship. Any subsequent scriptural testimonies to creation (e.g., Psalms 24 and 104), and thus Proverbs 8, would most likely be read as referring to the event as it was primarily and initially described in Genesis 1-2. This would be further confirmed if there was shared language. Gen. 1:1-2 LXX says,

In the beginning [ἐν ἀρχῇ] God made [ἐποίησεν] the heaven and the earth [τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν]. And the earth [ἡ γῆ] was invisible and unconstructed [ἀφρατός καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος], and darkness was upon the abyss [τῆς ἁβύσσου], and the Spirit of God was bringing itself upon the water [τοῦ ὀδατος].

In Prov. 3:18-20 we read (with lexical similarities to Genesis underlined) that “wisdom” is

...a tree of life [ζωῆς] to all who hold fast to it, and for those who stay themselves on it, as upon the Lord, [wisdom is] secure. God in wisdom [θεοφίλ] founded the earth [θεμελίωσεν τὴν γῆν], and he prepared the heavens [ητοίμασεν δὲ οὐρανοὺς] in understanding [ἐν φρονήσει]; in discernment [ἐν αἴσθήσει] he burst the abysses [ἀβυσσοὺ], and clouds let flow dew.

Like 3:18-20,\(^10\) Prov. 8:22-31 draws the reader back into the realm of creation in an attempt to show the surpassing greatness (and therefore the desirability) of this particular wisdom. In the quotation from Prov. 8:22-25 (LXX) below, where we have underlined lexical kinship with Genesis 1 and italicized the “before” (πρὸ), “wisdom” says,

The Lord created [ἐκτίσεν] me, the beginning [ἀρχῆν] of his ways for his works. Before the age [πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος] you founded me [ἐθεμελίωσέν με], in the beginning [ἐν ἀρχῇ]. Before the making of the earth [πρὸ τοῦ τῆν γῆν ποιήσας], and before the making of the abysses [πρὸ τοῦ τῶν ἁβύσσων ποιήσας], before the coming forth of the springs of waters [πρὸ…τῶν ὀδατῶν], before [πρὸ] the mountains were placed, and before [πρὸ] all the hills, you bore me.


\(^10\) For the link between Prov. 3:19 and 8:22-31 cf. Scott, 1965, 70-71; Fee, 2007, 611n.42.
Prov. 8:22-25 arguably evokes Gen. 1:1-2. Not only do they share the general theme of creation, but they correspond at a number of lexical points: “beginning,” “in the beginning,” “make,” “the earth,” abyss,” “water.” The simple fact that the Lord “created” wisdom to be “the beginning” of his works (v.22) would probably recall Genesis 1, even though ἐκτισεν and ἀρχή refer to wisdom rather than to “the heavens and the earth.” But what follows in vv. 23-25 even more firmly roots its readers back in the text of Genesis 1, “in the beginning.” Wisdom’s establishment is both “in the beginning” (ἐν ἀρχῇ, v.23b; Gen. 1:1a) and also “before the age” (πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος, v.23a). Though this appears contradictory at first—was wisdom founded before or in the beginning?—the text explains: although wisdom existed “in the beginning” (v.23b), it was actually there “before the making of the earth” (v.24a). When Gen. 1:1 records “in the beginning,” but just before it reports that “God made…the earth,” that is the moment when wisdom was present and set in place. This “time” was also before “the making of the abysses” (v. 24b) and before “the waters” (v. 24c), both of which were already present in Gen. 1:2. It is as if Prov. 8:23-24 asks its readers to contemplate Gen. 1:1b-2, but then to cast their minds still further back, i.e., before the making of those items, before the entire protological process. It was only after God’s wisdom was firmly set that his creative acts transpired as Genesis 1 relays them.

The six references to “before” (πρὸ) in Prov. 8:23-25 are enmeshed in the language of the beginning of Genesis 1. In Prov. 8:26-31 the word “before” ceases to be used, but the theme persists. Wisdom continues her autobiography in relation to creation, and the references remain in the language of Genesis 1 (underlined):

The Lord made [ἐποίησεν] countries and uninhabited places and outermost dwellings of what is under heaven. When he prepared the heaven [ἡτοίμαζεν τὸν οὐράνον] I
was together with him, and also when he separated his throne upon the winds. When he was making [ἐποίη] strong the clouds above, and was fixing the fountains of what is under heaven as certain, and was making [ἐποίη] strong the foundations of the earth [τὰ θεμέλια τῆς γῆς], I was joined beside him. I myself was the one in whom he delighted each day [καθ’ ἡμέραν]. And I rejoiced in his presence all the time when he rejoiced in the inhabited world after completing [συντελέσως] it; and he rejoiced in the sons of men.

Wisdom has already overtly claimed to have πρό-existent before creation (vv.22-25), and now she speaks in a manner closer to the explicit voice of Genesis 1, i.e., what God did in the beginning. Yet she continues to press upon the reader her contemporary presence at those very creative moments recorded first in Genesis 1.

Wisdom was related to God in his creative work, and it was wisdom in whom God delighted. The “daily” delight (perhaps on each of the six “days”) recalls God’s “blessing” upon (Gen. 1:22, 28-30) and appraisal of (1:31) his whole inhabited creation after he “completed” it (συντελέω, 2:1-3). Each day God saw “beauty” in the newly forming world, but after humans were present all things were together “exceedingly beautiful” (Gen. 1:31).\(^\text{11}\) Wisdom recalls that after “completing” (συντελέσως) the inhabited world God “rejoiced” in both it and humanity. Proverbs 8 recalls Genesis 1, being inextricably bound up in its language and themes.\(^\text{12}\)

Unlike a number of psalms which merely relay the protology of Genesis 1 in other words,\(^\text{13}\) and unlike Genesis 1 itself which merely prompts an implicit question of the Before, Proverbs 8 explicitly mentions something about “pre-protology.” Although Proverbs 8 falls short of providing either an actual pre-creational structural plan or program of action, it has given an explicit textual foothold to interpreters who think it

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\(^{11}\) Hengel (1974) sees Proverbs 8, and especially wisdom as God’s “companion” (ἄρμοζομα, 8:30) as communicating purposeful creational “beauty” (1.162).

\(^{12}\) Longman (2006) sees the Hebrew of Prov. 8:22-31 as alluding to Genesis 1 (207).

\(^{13}\) E.g., LXX: Ps. 32:6-9; 94:3-6; 95:5b; 103:1-5.
important to explore God’s character and intention in the Before, and it has kept such interpreters close to the language and text of Genesis 1.

We must be careful not to flatten the “wisdom” of Proverbs 8 into the sole notion of a “pre-existent mediator of creation.” Many scholars assume that “wisdom” in Prov. 8:22-31 as well as in early Jewish texts which build upon it (e.g., Sirach 1 and 24, Baruch 3-4, and Wisdom of Solomon) provides this.\(^{14}\) Though this certainly fits Philo’s use, it is not universally accepted that wisdom should be considered a mediator of creation in Prov. 8:22-31,\(^{15}\) especially in light of how the LXX treats the MT. J. Cook observes that each time the Hebrew seems to attribute creative activity to wisdom (and even this is debated\(^{16}\)) the LXX changes the subject to God, thereby removing any notion of wisdom participating as co-Creatrix.\(^{17}\) While this is probably true of the LXX, it must be tempered since Philo (in *Ebr.* 30-31), using the LXX, interprets wisdom in Prov. 8:22-23 as co-begetter of the world with God the Father. Yet at the same time, it would apparently be possible to employ the theme of Prov. 8:22-31—pre-creational wisdom—without making use of the notion of creation-mediation. As we will see, Paul makes just this move in 1 Cor. 2:7. The text of Prov. 8:22-31 certainly casts the minds of readers into the Before, and it does so in a manner evocative of the text of Genesis 1 itself. But this “wisdom” may take different forms to different readers, albeit always pre-creational (pre-Genesis 1).

\(^{14}\) Lange, 1995, 34. Reiling (1988, 204) and Barbour (1979, 64, 68) are representative, and this description of “wisdom” is given to Philo’s understanding, especially in *Her.* 199 and *Virt.* 62, by e.g., Lorenzen, 2008, 102-03.

\(^{15}\) Fee, 2007, 606-19.

\(^{16}\) Yee, 1992, 91-93; Murphy, 1985, 5.

As we will now demonstrate, both Philo and Paul show an interest in what happened in the Creator’s mind before creation. Both the presence and the content of the Before are discernable in their comments. Both interpreters use an outside text to gain entrance into the Before—the *Timaeus* for Philo, Prov. 8:23 for Paul—but they both then use the language of Genesis’ Beginning to express and apply this Before to their audiences. In the midst of this hermeneutical similarity between Paul and Philo, the depth of their different conclusions emerges regarding what God was actually thinking *before the beginning*. These divine thoughts have interpretive significance for their readings of the Beginning.

### 2. Philo: A Pre-Creational Deliberation For Goodness’ Sake

In a world where scriptural texts, early Jewish writings, and famous philosophies were presenting their thoughts on the Before, Philo joins the discussion. He does so in a similar manner to Prov. 8:22-31. Modern scholars depict God’s “wisdom” in Proverbs 8 as “God’s skills as Creator” which “prove the Lord’s unsurpassed wisdom,” as “the great plan underlying all of reality,” as “God’s wise blueprint,” as God’s “creation-

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18 Regarding philosophy, both Ps.-Plutarch (Aëtius 1.7 at 881B-C) and Philo (Aet. 83) record the “famous argument” that Aristotle is said to have brought against Plato: “what did the god do before he proceeded to create? was he simply idle?” (see Runia, 2001, 113). Plutarch discusses the (disorderly, corporeal, and irrationally motive) condition of matter “before the genesis of the cosmos” (πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως) (*Moralia XIII: On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus* 1014B.8), and defends Plato’s theory of pre-existence by showing that, depending on Plato’s context (in *Phaedrus* [245C.5-246A.2] and *Timaeus* [34B.10-35A.1]), the Soul and even certain “bodies” existed “before the genesis of the cosmos” (πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως) (1016C.6, 1016D.10). Plotinus discusses how the “Mind” existed “before the cosmos” (πρὸ κόσμου) (*On Difficulties About the Soul* [Ennead IV.3], 13.23), how the objects of “the Maker’s” thoughts “must” (δεῖ) exist “before the cosmos” (πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου) (*On Intellect, the Forms, and Being* [Ennead V.9], 5.22), and how people’s souls existed “before the cosmos” (πρὸ κόσμου) and had it in them, at that time, to belong to the universe (*On Providence* [Ennead III.2], 7.24).

19 House, 1998, 64.

20 Kugel, 1998, 44.

21 Fee, 2007, 611.
plan, as the prototype of the world.” Such “wisdom” as in Proverbs 8 “provokes the imagination to conceive of reality as the well-designed world of a divine architect who, by means of wisdom, proportions its components into a harmonious, elegant whole.”

Functioning as God’s “companion” (ἐκμόζονσα), wisdom “guarantees creation’s perfection and purposeful beauty.” These modern scholarly depictions of Prov. 8:22-31 could well have been explanations of Philo’s own creation-theology and interpretation of Genesis 1 and the Before.

Though Philo describes God himself as “before all creation” (πρὸ παντὸς τοῦ γενήτου) and with nothing existing with him, in Ebr. 30-31 he draws special attention to God’s “wisdom” as presented in Prov. 8:22-31. Wisdom is God’s wife, and the cosmos is a child born through God’s union with “wisdom” (ἡ σοφία) and “knowledge” (ἐπιστήμη). Quoting Prov. 8:22-23 as proof, Philo’s wisdom says, “God created me first of his works, and before the age he founded me.” Philo draws attention to this text’s temporal aspect of wisdom, “before the age,” so as to show that “everything” is younger than wisdom as mother and nurse. The supremacy of Philo’s “wisdom” (toward sobriety here) is seen by its presence “before the age,” i.e., according to Prov. 8:23a, and by its association with the Creator at creation.

Throughout his corpus, Philo often connects “wisdom” to creation (often explicitly to the text of Genesis 1) in a similar fashion as had Proverbs 8 before him. Prov. 8:22-31

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22 Rösel, 1994, 82 (translation mine). Rösel claims that Proverbs 8 and the “Platonic presentation of creation” are not necessarily two mutually exclusive schemes (82).
24 Hengel, 1974, 1.162.
25 See Davis, 1984, 52-53 (see 179n.13-14 for more Philonic references).
26 Migr. 183. Cf. Somn. 1.65, where Philo follows his reference to “God, who existed before the world” (§65) with a reference to both “wisdom” and “the divine word” (§66); cf. Mut. 27, 46.
27 Leg. 2.2; cf. Op. 23.
appears to be of some importance to his theology. But it is according to Philo’s commentary on Genesis 1 that God’s “skills as Creator” are seen en force. As Prov. 8:22-31 had presented an ultimately theocentric reading of creation by drawing attention to God via his wisdom, Philo is likewise theocentric. All five doctrines with which Philo will summarize Genesis 1-3 involve God’s own nature and his decisions for creation (see Op. 172.5-9). Prov. 8:22-31 had drawn attention to the Before when “commenting” on Genesis 1. Likewise, in Philo’s commentary on Genesis 1 he delves into the divine thoughts before the age of the visible cosmos in order to show God’s surpassing skillfulness and beauty in creation. For Philo, the existence of God’s ideas according to which creation unfolds are a “necessary prerequisite for the genesis of the world.”

This section on Philo will unfold in the two stages mentioned above. In Op. 16 and 26-28 Philo discusses the necessity of a pre-creational divine mental plan. Thus we will firstly determine the presence in Philo of an explicit theory of the Before, including its timing and purpose. In §29, Philo highlights the nature of that pre-creational plan, and by this we will secondly discern its content. We must keep in mind throughout that Philo is self-consciously explaining the biblical text. When explicitly discussing the relationship between the Before (God’s noetic paradigm) and the Beginning (God’s creation of the world and of humanity) Philo confesses, “this doctrine is Moses’, not mine” (§25). It will

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29 Radice (2009) observes that “wisdom” played “a role in the creation of the world” in Philo (see Fug. 109; Det. 54) (138-39), but does not mention Proverbs 8; Tobin (1983) does (141). Philo arguably connects the “wisdom” of Prov. 8:22-31 with the text of Genesis 1 in Somn. 2.242, (esp.) Virt. 55-65 (see Laporte, 1976, 104, 115; Tobin, 1983, 141), and (perhaps) Fug. 94-102. Cf. Det. 54. For a slightly different relationship between “wisdom” and Creator/creation in Philo (where it searches beyond creation to the Creator) see Congr. 79; Abr. 68-71 (cf. Her. 96-99); Migr. 36-42 (here Philo quotes Gen. 1:31); Inmut. 160; QG 1.11 (combines elements of Eden and Prov. 8:22-23). Philo’s relation between “wisdom” and creation spans across many of his writings, thus showing itself to be broadly important for Philo’s theology. (For the connection between Wisdom and Logos [which obviously has creational and pre-creational functions] see Tobin, 1983, 63-64; though see 64n.26).

30 So Radice, 1989, 27 (translation mine).
be increasingly discernible throughout this treatment that Philo’s Before and Beginning are hermeneutically connected. Philo’s Before begins in the actual beginning of Genesis 1 and the textual phrase “in the beginning.”

A. The Presence Of A Pre-Creational Plan and the Timaeus of Plato (Op. 16, 26-28)

Philo’s treatment of “In the beginning…” is at odds with many modern commentators on Genesis. Some interpret Gen. 1:1 as presenting the first creative act of God. His creation of light in 1:3 would thus be his second act. Jubilees, 4 Ezra, and Josephus would have concurred with this reading. This would mean that the earth as described in Gen. 1:2 was the way it was initially created by God. A number of modern commentators disagree and treat the words “God created” in Gen. 1:1 as a summary of all of God’s activities in vv.3-31. The first actual creative act would then be found in 1:3. This could easily imply that “the earth” in 1:2 was not created but merely “found” by God, although this is not a necessary implication. The activity “creating” would be a shaping of present material. Along the lines of this second group of scholars, and especially in light of Philo’s engagement with Plato’s creation account in the Timaeus, one might expect

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31 E.g., Kidner, 1967, 44; Sailhamer, 1992, 82n.2. For other notable advocates see the lists in Westermann, 1984, 95 and Wenham, 1987, 13.
32 Jub. 2:2 says, “For on the first day he created the heavens, which are above, and the earth,” either taking מָצָא as “the first day” (Endo, 2002, 14n.6) or else seeing the conclusion “day one” in Gen. 1:5 as summarizing the whole of 1:1-5. Likewise 4 Ez. 6:38 says, “O Lord, you indeed spoke from the beginning of creation, and said on the first day, ‘Let heaven and earth be made,’ and your word accomplished the work,” thus applying aspects of 1:3ff (“Let…”) to the content of 1:1. (See Endo, 2002, 27). In Ant. 1.27, Josephus begins his history by rewording Gen. 1:1-3: “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. But when this [the earth] did not come into sight, but rather was hidden in deep darkness, and a wind moved above its surface, God commanded that there should be light.” The “earth” in Gen. 1:2 was “created” in 1:1. (Cf. Endo, 2002, 35-6; Hartley, 2000, 42). Runia (2001) reminds us that Augustine “interprets the earth in Gen 1:1 as referring to unformed matter created by God as the substrate for the subsequent creation of the physical cosmos” (153; cf. Conf. 12.5-9).
33 E.g., Westermann, 1984, 95; Delitzsch, 1894, 72-81. For other notable advocates see the lists in Westermann, 95 and Wenham, 1987, 12.
34 So Gelander, 1997, 97.
Philo to see in the beginning of Genesis 1 a divine act of “commandeering” what was present in Gen. 1:2 and “forming” it “out of” the chaotic state and “into” the ordered cosmos as it now stands (cf. Tim. 30a).

Speaking anachronistically, Philo has commandeered both of these modern interpretations of his sacred text. In Op. 9, Philo describes God’s act of creation like Plato, as a “setting in motion,” a “shaping,” and an “enlivening” of the otherwise “passive thing” which is, somewhat unlike Plato (Tim. 30a), “of itself lifeless and motionless.”

There Philo sees God’s act of creation as an active “changing” (μετέβαλλεν) of the passive thing “into the most perfect work, even this world.” He then describes the “cosmos” as a city that is “constructed” (κατασκεύαζον, §11.2), perhaps having been influenced by the description of the earth that is present in Gen. 1:2 but “un-constructed” (ἄκατασκεύαστος). Philo appears to have a reading of creation like the second group of modern scholars. Although Philo uses these ideas in his general illustration of creation, in his comments on the actual text of Gen. 1:1-2 Philo does not make such an exegetical

35 Timaeus says, “For God, desiring (βουλήκεις) all things to be good (ἀγαθόν), so far as possible, and thus commandeering (παράλεβον) everything that was visible, which was not in a state of rest but rather moving discordantly and disorderly, led it into order out of the disorder, judging that [order] is always better” (Tim. 30a1-6). Dillon (2004) recognizes Philo’s difference with Plato, mentioning Philo’s alignment with the Stoics (“and very possibly with the later Academy as well”) at this point (104n.21), while Runia (2001) downplays the difference because in §§21-22 Philo’s “disorderly” and “disharmonious” matter is closer to Plato (145). Nevertheless, §§8-9 (at least) are contrary to Plato.

36 Dillon (2004) argues that “the active cause” is not God himself but his Logos (104n.20). Philo’s language could tend toward either interpretation. Philo writes in Migr. 192 about “the mind of the universe” and then explains “that is to say, God.” Therefore, although Philo does not refer to God as “intellect” or “mind” many times (perhaps a dozen; see Runia, 2001, 116), it is better in my opinion to consider “the active cause…the mind of the universe” in Op. 8 a reference to God himself. So too Runia, 2001, 116.

37 In general, Philo has a “predilection for enumerating pairs of contrasted terms in order to illustrate the difference between ἀταξία and τάξις” (Runia, 1986, 147-8). The negative part within these pairs usually take the form of alpha-privative adjectives, just like those found in Gen. 1:2: ἀδόξος καὶ ἄκατασκεύαστος. Runia lists 10 negative adjectives used by Philo in many diverse places to describe the matter before it was “created.” A few terms are taken from Plato himself and some from Middle Platonist authors (147), but Philo’s adjectival practice has as many similarities with Gen. 1:2 as with Plato, who makes the more simple distinction between τάξις and ἀταξία (Tim. 30a5). But it could simply be a piece of Philo’s “rhetorical flair” (Runia, 1986, 148).
move. In the precise place where the second group of modern commentators see in Genesis a method of creation comparable to what Plato envisions—i.e., Gen. 1:2-3 and creation as change from chaos into order—Philo does not read the text as such. Rather, Philo’s exegesis of Gen. 1:1-5 (in §§16, 26-28) is not only in closer harmony with the first group of modern scholars (and Jubilees, 4 Ezra, and Josephus), but, more importantly for our project, his exegesis of 1:1-5 is also a textually-based presentation of the creation, and therefore presence, of a divine plan before the beginning of the visible cosmos.

I. Philo’s Timing of “In the Beginning”: Before the Beginning (Op. 26-28)

The opening words of Philo’s scripture, ἐν ἀρχῇ (Gen. 1:1a) cannot be taken chronologically (§26). For Philo, “In the beginning [ἐν ἀρχῇ] he made [heaven]” should be reconstructed as a statement of sequence: “First [πρῶτον] he made heaven.” Though some modern experts attribute eschatological significance to the text’s “In the beginning” (τῇ ἀρχῇ) instead of “At the first” (τῇ ἀρχῇ or τῇ ἐσχατῇ), and although in the LXX too ἀρχῇ is also often associated with an “end” (τέλος or ἐσχατος) rather than a sequential “second,” “third,” etc., Philo shows that an eschatological move is not an exegetically necessary one. He equates “beginning” and “first.” In light of his principle of the

38 Cf. Sacks, 1990, 4; Wenham, 1987, 15-16; Waltke, 1975, 327-42. For a more radical view of the dangers present in Gen. 1:2 (“the nihilistic powers of chaos,” “the chaos dragon”) which need to be conquered and quelled by God, see Batto, 1992, 16-38, 33. (The association of “deep” [tehom] with the Akkadian “Tiamat” is now typically criticized: see Tsumura, 2005, 14-57; Noort, 2000, 8).
40 For the relation of ἀρχῇ to τέλος see Eccl. 3:11 and Isa. 19:15 (cf. Wis. 7:17; Heb. 7:3; Rev. 21:6; 22:13). For the relation of ἀρχῇ to ἐσχατος see Eccl. 7:8 and 10:13. Rev. 22:13 combines all of these when the Lord self-testifies, ἐγὼ τὸ ἰδίον καὶ τὸ ὄντος, ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὁ ἐσχατος, ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος.
inseparability of time-and-cosmos (or “space-time”), at which we are about to look, even “first” is not a marker of chronology. It connotes order and primacy. Therefore “even if” all things were made simultaneously, Moses would still rightly label things as “first,” “second,” “third,” etc. because of their inherent order (§28.1-2). The notion of order (ontological, not temporal) is essential for Philo’s reading of Genesis’ cosmogonic text.

As was just mentioned, “beginning” can be taken as a non-chronological “first” because of Philo’s space-time theory: “time did not exist before the cosmos” (χρόνος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν πρὸ κόσμου), for “time” is simply “the interval of the cosmos’ movement.” Without a “body” to have measured movement “time” cannot exist. Time can only “come about” (γίνομαι) either at the same time as or after the cosmos (§26.4-5). As S. Hawking has more recently put it, “[T]he concept of time has no meaning before the beginning of the universe.” Perhaps Philo was ahead of his time. Many modern scholars would, if they wrote in Greek, use the word “cosmos” to refer to what is spoken of in Gen. 1:1, saying that the phrase “the heavens and the earth” is used as a hendiadys for “the cosmos.” Philo would not. For Philo “the cosmos” is typically the completed whole, and as such it first appears in Gen. 2:1. Since time and Gen. 2:1 are so

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41 Although Philo may not have talked in the language of “four-dimensional space” (Hawking, 1988, 27), his definition of “time” as the “measured movement” of “bodies” (i.e., three-dimensional spatial objects, see below) causes him to unite space and time in a way that foreshadows what is now referred to as “space-time.”

42 Dillon, 2004, 106.

43 Cf. Leg. 1.2; 2.3; Aet. 52. Nearly 200 years before Philo, as Hengel (1974) points out, Aristobulus (Philo’s Jewish “philosopher” predecessor in Alexandria, preserved in Eusebius, Pr. Ev. 13.12.11f) “attempted to bring the Old Testament conception of the creation of God in time in accord with the Greek idea of the timeless activity of God” (1.166).

44 Hawking, 1988, 9 (though he wrongly attributes the inception of this theory to Augustine).

45 Sacks (1990) says just this (3).


intimately wed, when Philo reads Gen. 1:1-5 and the opening phrase “In the beginning God made” (or “First God made”), the “timing” he sees is “before” (πρό) time began. The text’s “beginning,” which is actually the “before,” simply conveys order.\footnote{See the relationship of Philo’s statements about “the cosmos” in Op. 3 (ὁ σύμπας κόσμος), 13 (ὁ κόσμος [+ ἡμέραις]), and 89 (ὁ σύμπας κόσμος ἐτελειώθη [+ εξάδος]), especially as this last one is intended as an actual rephrasing of Gen. 2:1-2 (καὶ συνεκτελέσθησαν ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος αὐτῶν… ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ ἑκτῃ). Thus in Op. 3, 13, and 89 (to give but a few examples) Philo considers “cosmos” as the completed universe of Gen. 2:1-2 with all its life and adornment, etc. Cf. Aristobulus’ use of πᾶς ὁ κόσμος with “all of the animals and plants,” in Eusebius’ Pr. Ev. 13.12.13 (Hengel, 1974, 1.166; Holladay, 1995). By the term κόσμος, then, Philo is not referring to Gen. 1:1 but rather 2:1.}

It is to further explain the necessity of this principle of order that Philo now takes his readers into the extra-temporal, “pre”-creational mind of God, into the presence of a divine plan. Even if one cannot always see God’s organization of precedence when looking at “the completed things” (τοῖς ἀποτελέσμασιν; cf. Gen. 2:1),\footnote{With such timeless presuppositions, it is actually not surprising that ἀρχή, “beginning” or “chief,” could be equated with a non-temporal πρῶτος, “first [in import].”} it is nonetheless present in the “conceptions,” “thoughts,” or “plans” (ταῖς ἐπινοίαις) of the builder. God’s mental functions are necessary to the idea of creation. It is “only” if creation comes about according to such divine “conceptions” that all the elements of creation “could be precisely arranged, and not deviate from their path or be full of confusion” (§28.6-7).

These divine thoughts not only took place outwith the realm of the temporal and visible cosmos, but they are the reason that the cosmos is orderly. God’s thoughts affect and are therefore logically before the beginning of the visible world. This is their “timing” according to §§26-28.\footnote{Philo often uses the τέλ- lexical family (with various prefixes) to refer to the cosmos as presented in Gen. 2:1: “the heavens and the earth were completed [συνεκτελέσθησαν]” (Op. 89; see n.48 above).} \footnote{When summarizing Plato’s Ideas, Seneca draws particular attention to the prior existence of the Idea of a thing in relation to its created form: a man himself (as if the Idea) exists prior to an artist’s depiction of him (as if the created form) (Ep. 16-21, cf. 58; quoted in full in Tobin, 1983, 116).} In §16, to which we will now turn, Philo reveals the purpose (only part of which is order) of God’s intentions that are (logically) pre-creational.
2. The Purpose of God’s Pre-Creational Intentions: For Goodness’ Sake (Op. 16)

By the time Philo exegeted the phrase “in the beginning” in §§26-28 (see above), he had already rehearsed the situation before the beginning of the cosmos. As early as §13 Philo had mentioned that order was inherent in creation, and he claimed that Genesis’ cosmogonic text gave witness to this. God did not need time to create the cosmos, yet the text says that “in six days the cosmos was crafted” (cf. Gen. 2:1-3). “Six days” are mentioned to denote order. In temporal terms God performs “all things simultaneously,” and this includes not only God’s “commanding” (i.e., “Let there be…”) but also his “thinking” or “intending” (διανοόμενον). Thus even when contemplating more generally God’s creation by fiat in Genesis 1, Philo implies a divine mental activity that propels this creation-by-word. But it is in §16 that Philo actually fills out this cryptic allusion to God’s “intentions” that are logically (not temporally) prior to his creative commands. But in §16, Philo enters into his discussion of God’s mental Before not by mere assumption that thought precedes act, but by use (and modification) of Plato’s creative Timaeus.

In Plato’s creation-account, which has many similarities with Genesis (LXX), Timaeus expresses the necessary pre-conditions for a physical creation to be “beautiful,” καλός. Plato’s Pythagorean character reasons,

Everything which “becomes” [γίγνομενον] must of necessity “become” [γίγνεσθαι] owing to some Cause, for without a cause it is impossible for anything to attain a “becoming” [γένεσιν]. But when the craftsman of any object, in forming its shape and quality, keeps his gaze fixed on that which is uniform, using just such a paradigm [παραδείγματι], the object produced [ἀπεργάζεται] in this way must of necessity be beautiful [καλόν]. But whenever he gazes at the thing which “has become” [τὸ γεγονός] and uses a “created” paradigm [γεννηθέν παραδείγματι], the object thus executed is not beautiful [οὐ καλόν]. (Tim. 28ab)

52 See the comparison of Timaeus and LXX Genesis by Rösel, 1994, 28-58.
If a creation is to result in “beauty,” or “goodness” (καλός), the Creator must look at an uncreated paradigm.\(^{53}\)

During Philo’s exegesis of Gen. 1:1-5 in Op. 16, he uses this passage from the *Timaeus* to explain the logical necessity of a pre-thought out paradigm, and he asserts that in the text of Genesis God enacted such a creative process. For Philo, before God created anything that we see, God himself “understood in advance” (προλαβὼν) the Platonic principle: that “a beautiful copy [μίμημα καλόν] would never come into being without a beautiful paradigm [καλὸν παραδείγματος]” (§16.2). Plato furthered that God set out to create by “purposing [βουληθείς] all things to be good [ἀγαθὸς]” (*Tim*. 30a). So also Philo writes that God, pre-knowing the Platonic principle of “beautiful paradigms,” and before creating this visible world, also “purposed [βουληθείς] to craft” it. He even “stamped out beforehand [προεξετύπω] the noetic world [τὸν νοητὸν].”\(^{54}\) In light of these mental actions of God before creation—i.e., pre-understanding, purposing, and pre-stamping out the noetic—God then “produced” what is corporeal by way of this pre-determined noetic paradigm (§16.5-10). According to Philo, it was necessary for the sake of the quality of “goodness” for God to “think up,” “determine,” and “plan” a detailed design “before” (προ-) the beginning. This expectation is discernibly grounded in (although fundamentally modifying)\(^{55}\) the expectation of the *Timaeus*.

Philo’s explicit point is merely to assert the “beauty” or “goodness” of the cosmos.

Reasoning backwards from this Platonic value judgment, Philo concludes that because...


\(^{54}\) See Leonhardt-Balzer, 2004, 324-44, esp. 327.

\(^{55}\) See below. On a number of occasions Philo clearly alludes to Plato while asserting something that actually differs with him (cf. Philo’s use of *Tim*. 30a in *Op*. 9 and the “movement” versus “no movement” cited above), something that Philo never does with the biblical texts (see Leonhardt-Balzer, 2004, 344).
the visible cosmos is “good” there must have been a “good” paradigm. But whereas Plato had only observation from which to conclude the “beauty” of the visible cosmos, Philo combined this empirical method with something more concrete and, from his perspective, less open to dispute: the authoritative text of Genesis 1. Genesis 1 (LXX) presents καλός as the frequent and prominent descriptor for the aspects of God’s handiwork (vv.4, 8, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25), and the whole sensory-cosmos was finalized as “exceedingly beautiful” (καλὰ λίαν) in v.31. The importance of the word καλός in Genesis 1 (including within “day One,” v.4) seems to have affected Philo’s exegesis (§30, see below), effecting within it not only the confirmation of Plato’s aesthetic judgment, but also an acknowledgement of order within the scriptural cosmogony. As we will see in more detail in our next chapter, the first and paradigmatic portrayal of “goodness” in Genesis 1 is in v.4, the creation of light. When drawing out the seven items created on Day One (in Gen. 1:1-5), Philo gives “special distinction” to “spirit” (πνεῦμα) and “light” (φῶς), the first for a textual reason (it is “of God”; θεοῦ) and for a philosophical/theological reason (it is “most life-giving,” ζωτικότατον), the second for a textual reason: “because [light] is pre-eminently beautiful” (ὑπερβαλλόντως καλὸν) (§30). As Philo had earlier concluded, “what ‘becomes’ beautifully [τὰ καλὰς γενομένα] possess order [τάξιν], for there is no beauty [καλὸν οὐδὲν] in disorder [ἐν ἀταξίᾳ]” (§28). But there is “beauty” in Genesis 1, and a lot of it.

Thus certain textual features in Gen. 1:1-5 convey the presence of order: “in the beginning,” “day One,” and the repeated use of καλός in Genesis 1 (particularly in v.4). For a discussion of the importance of the textual feature “day one” see Tobin, 1992, 112-13.
Philo thinks about the necessity of a “beautiful” divine paradigm, or plan, before the beginning of the visible cosmos. While Philo had introduced an implicit Before into his more general construal of God’s creation by “command,” he introduces his explicit Before in the language of Plato. The Timaeus gave Philo a certain expectation for the Before. Certain features of Genesis’ cosmogonic text prompt Philo to further turn his readers’ attention to this Before. This Before is essential for understanding the Beginning, especially as this Beginning is recounted in Genesis.

To explicitly describe this Before, Philo uses the three words mentioned above that convey divine mental intentions: “pre-understanding” (προλαβών), “purposing” (βουλήθει), and “pre-stamping out” (προεξετυπού) (§16). Although Philo’s priority involves ontological rather than temporal order (§13.1-5), he here uses these three verbs (two having the προ-prefix) in order to cast the minds of his readers back to three closely related divine mental activities that were necessary pre-conditions for God’s creation of “the visible world.” God pre-reasoned (προλαβών) what was needed for “beauty” to appear, God purposed (βουλήθει) to craft the visible world, and God actually pre-made (προεξετυπού) a mental plan. Only after noetically pre-deliberating and pre-determining did God then create the visible world.

It is this third divine activity that, according to Philo, Gen. 1:1-5 relays. Plato appears to be the first to use the imagery of the seal or stamp (τύπος) to explain the

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57 Runia (2001) says of these two προ- prefixed verbs, “Here is a case (cf. Op. 13, 27) where what seems to be temporal precedence actually indicates ontological precedence…. The intelligible cosmos is superior” (137; cf. Dillon, 2004, 106).

58 We must be especially clear here. From one perspective it is only the first two noetic actions that represent Philo’s understanding of before the beginning since the third is what begins in Gen. 1:1. But from the perspective of time and especially of “the visible cosmos,” all three of these aspects of God’s mental preparation did take place before that beginning. It is upon this second perspective that we will now focus and which we will nuance further. It is Philo’s interpretation of God’s thoughts in relation to (and “before,”
creative act, and it is this aspect of the *Timaeus* that Philo here borrows (and modifies). In *Tim*. 39e7 the Creator “produced” (ἀπειργάζετο) all four types of creatures: stars, birds, fish, and land-animals, by “stamping them out [ἀποστυποίμενος] after [πρός] the nature of the paradigm [τοῦ παραδείγματος]” (cf. *Tim*. 50c–d). J. Leonhardt-Balzer explains the typical process of “stamping out” something: “First, it is necessary to carve a seal; only then it can be used on the wax. The creation follows the same pattern. The intelligible world is the seal which is used on the wax of matter so that the perceptible world can be shaped.” In Plato’s reckoning there is no carving of the noetic seal. It is of fundamental importance to Plato that the paradigm be *un*-created and therefore *un*-becoming. The demiurge simply uses the present incorporeal Forms and “stamps out” into the wax of corporeal matter the sense-perceptible object (which now is in the likeness of the seal).

But where Plato conceives of the demiurge as “stamping out” the sense-perceptible cosmos, for Philo it is presently the *noetic* cosmos, the seal or paradigm itself, which God is “pre-stamping” before the beginning of “the visible world.” Using a number of Platonic themes (yet modifying them to better accord with the sacred Mosaic text),

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59 Runia, 2001, 139.
60 Leonhardt-Balzer, 2004, 327.
62 Although using Plato’s language and part of his general principle, Philo actually here undercuts Plato’s fundamental assertion. For Plato, the paradigm must be “un-becoming” (*Tim*. 28a7–b2), and the consequence of a “becoming” paradigm is a created-object that is “not beautiful” (οὐ καλόν). Since Philo’s scripture is adamant that the created world and its parts are “beautiful” (καλόν), one expects Philo to assert the *un*-becomingness of the noetic paradigm. Philo does not, but treats it as created (rightly Radice, 2009, 131–32 [cf. 142–43 and 143n.30]; contra Leonardt-Balzer, 2004, 343). Philo merely says that the reason the product is “beautiful” is because the Creator looked to a “beautiful” paradigm, not repeating Plato’s explicit (and fundamental) “un-becoming” detail. And according to Philo, the paradigm is created: “pre-stamped out,” even “made.” Even if the notion of Philo’s “eternal creation” of the ideas is correct (so Winston, 1979, 593–606; Hillar, 1998), it does not eliminate Philo’s difference from Plato at this point. Though Philo certainly believes in a “timelessness” to creation (so Wedderburn, 1973B, 304, 304n.2; cf. *Leg*. 1.2, 20; *Dec*. 101; *QG* 2.47), and he explicitly qualifies the temporal phrases of the biblical text accordingly (see above), his concept of atempsorality (or eternity) nevertheless does not directly modify the
according to Philo it was necessary for the sake of goodness and order for God to mentally determine a design before the beginning. And so God did, in fact, pre-stamp out just such a paradigm in Gen. 1:1-5.

From Op. 26-28 we have now observed the presence of a pre-creational plan within Philo’s reading of creation, along with its necessity and “timing.” From Op. 16 we have considered the purpose of its presence. For the “goodness” or “beauty” of the cosmos to come about, which it so obviously does in Genesis 1 (and especially in 1:1-5), the presence of a divine mental pre-determination prior to his creation of the visible world is needed. As we will now see, in two particular places in his commentary (§§29 and 129-30) Philo turns to details of the text of Genesis to present the nature and content of this pre-creational deliberation of God.

B. The Content of God’s Pre-Creational Plan: The Invisible and Beautiful Paradigm

(Op. 29 and Op. 129-30)

After having covered some important philosophical and theological preliminaries via the phrase “in the beginning,” Philo directly comments on the first few verses of Genesis. But even within his one commentary on Genesis 1-2 Philo actually gives two different readings of the cosmogonic (and therefore also the anthropogonic) material. He sees two sets of exegetical details testifying to God’s pre-creational determinations: first Gen. 1:1-5 (§29), then Gen. 2:4-5 (§§129-30). In order to fully identify the content of Philo’s explicit Before, and also to adequately understand the hermeneutical implications of this Before, we must show how he gets it from both sets of textual features.

biblically attested nature of the paradigm as “become” and “made.” The created aspect remains even when the temporal aspect does not. Philo opts for the biblical language to the contradiction of the essential point of the Platonic concept.
In §29, Philo does not treat Gen. 1:1 as a summary with vv.2-5 describing the pre-creational situation and first creative act. He rather unites vv.1-5 into a joint-depiction of what he, following the LXX, calls “making” (ποιηματος). Philo thinks that God “made” (εποιηματος) everything found in 1:1-5.63 So Philo writes in §29 (shared-words with Gen. 1:1-5 underlined),

First the Maker made [εποιηματος] the incorporeal heaven [ουρανου άσωματον], and the invisible earth [γην αόρατων], and the idea of air [αερος ιδεαν] and of void [κενον]—of which one he named “darkness” [σκοτος], since air is black by nature, and the other “abyss” [αβυσσον], for the void is very deep and immense—then the incorporeal essence of water [δεκτος άσωματον ουρανον], and of spirit [πνευματος], and, above all, [the incorporeal essence] of the crown that is light [φωτος].

The quality of the content of God’s activity that (logically) precedes his creation of the visible world is noetic. It includes what is “incorporeal” and “invisible,” the “idea(s)” and “incorporeal essence(s).” We will mention two of Philo’s exegetical reasons for treating vv.1-5 as being in God’s thoughts, i.e., noetic.

Self-consciously considering this treatment exegesis (as opposed to eisegesis or imposition), Philo explains that it is vv.1-5 itself (“day One”) that “reports” God’s creation of “the intelligible cosmos” (§15.9). He ties v.1 so closely to v.2 that the adjective “invisible” from v.2 (underlined below) finds its way into Philo’s gloss of v.1.64

It is thus important for his reading of the beginning of the Before:

Gen. 1:1 ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν

Op. 29.1 Πρῶτον ὁ ποιῶν ἐποίησεν οὐρανον ἀσώματον καὶ γῆν αόρατον

63 As Runia (1986) writes, “Philo’s chief solution to the interpretation of [the ambiguity of Gen. 1:1-2 with regard to matter]…is to take the whole of Gen. 1:1-5 as referring to the intelligible world, leaving no room for mention of pre-existent matter” (156). But while this is a solution to this issue of matter with narrow regards to Gen. 1:2, by ruling out the potential of Gen. 1:1 to refer to the creation of matter Philo has merely shifted the question of matter to Gen. 1:6 (see below). But with this shift the text now has no potential explicit reference to any creation of matter.

64 So also Runia, 2001, 164.
The two items added to v.1 are the adjectives “incorporeal” for heaven and “invisible” for earth. It is obvious that Philo gets the “invisible” from v.2—“the earth was invisible and unconstructed” (ἡ γῆ ἦν ἄφρατος καὶ ἄκατασκεύαστος)—and this word-choice by the LXX makes Gen. 1:2 susceptible to Platonic interpretation. But from where does he get the “incorporeality” of heaven (and also of water, spirit, and light)? In v.6 the text says that God created a “firmness” (στερέωμα, “firmament”). When commenting on this in §36, Philo reasons that because it is a “body” (σῶμα) that is “by nature firm” (φύσει στερεόν), the text indicates that beginning in v.6 God creates what is “bodily” (i.e., corporeal, σωματικόν) while before this (i.e., in vv.1-5) God was, obviously, making something body-less, or in-corporeal (ἀσωματον). This is the beginning of the glimpse into the content that Philo sees “in [God’s] mind” before the beginning.

The “incorporeal” quality of vv.1-5, as deduced from v.6, and the explicit “invisibility” of the earth in vv.1-2 place textual ground under Philo’s interpretation of vv.1-5 as the creation of the noetic realm. There certainly are now and were in Philo’s day other ways to interpret these textual features. But these two examples of Philo’s

65 Plato’s Timaeus contrasts the “visible” (ἄφρατόν) and “bodily” (σωματοειδές) cosmos (30a-32b; cf. 36e) with the “invisible” (ἄφρατος) soul (36e; see Rösel, 1994, 32n.19) and later with the “invisible” (ἀόρατον) noetic Form (52a; cf. Plato’s Resp. 529b5 and Soph. 246b7, and Alcinos’ Did. 7.4, each noted in Runia, 2001, 165). Regardless of whether the LXX itself intended it to be Platonic (Rösel, 1994, 33; cf. 28-58 for a number of Rösel’s connections between Plato and LXX) or not (Rösel is criticized by Cook, 2001, 315-29 and Runia, 2001, 165), its description of the earth in such a way is certainly thereby susceptible to such a reading (so Dillon, 2005, 103 and van Kooten, 2005, 155-57, 156n.11 [cf. idem, 2008, 272-73]; Barclay, 1996A, 165; cf. Westermann, 1984, 104; Delitzsch, 1894, 78).

66 Though Philo does not use the term “mind” in Op. 17-20, but rather “within himself” and “in his soul,” that he means “mind” is sufficiently clear from his use of the terms “memory” (μνήμη, §18.3) and “noetic” and is widely accepted (so Radice, 1991, 126-34; Williamson, 1989, 133; cf. Sandmel, 1983, 24).

67 Is a “desolate” (Whto) earth, whether before it is (further) formed (as in Gen. 1:2) or after it is destroyed (as in Jer. 4:23), actually “invisible” in the way that Philo takes it? Wevers (1993) offers that the LXX’s earth was “invisible” or “unseen” inasmuch as “darkness reigned” (1-2; cf. Noort, 2004, 10). This is Josephus’ explanation in Ant. 1.27 and one might compare Philo’s Conf. 172. See further Endo, 2002, 35-36 and Rösel, 1994, 32 (who also adds, like the ancient Theodoret, Quaest in Gen 9, and the modern Runia, 2001, 165, that the covering of water would also have caused the submerged earth to therefore be
exegetical maneuvers, combined with his use of the wording and concept of “made” for the noetic paradigm (a concept which undercuts Plato’s notion of the necessary unbecomingness of the noetic paradigm), demonstrate that the biblical text is itself an important part of Philo’s understanding of the Before. His expectation for the Before may have been aroused (or perhaps merely confirmed) by the Platonic expectation of a pre-creational invisible and good paradigm, but it would be hermeneutically unjust to Philo’s treatment to view him as merely imposing a previous (fully formed) understanding on the text. His concept of the Before is certainly affecting his reading of the Beginning, but it is also being affected by his exegesis of the biblical text.

This plan or blue-print of the cosmos, pre-set in God’s mind, was one of order and was laid down before the beginning for goodness’ sake. The presence and content of the Before in Gen. 1:1-5, combined with the Beginning of the visible cosmos in v.6, color Philo’s reading of the rest of the biblical text. In §§36-68 Philo sets himself to explaining the beginning of the corporeal world according to Gen. 1:6-25 (to be explored below in chapter 2), and in §§69-88 he turns to the beginning of the corporeal humanity according to Gen. 1:26-28 (to be explored below in chapter 3). But later features of the same biblical cosmogony, namely Gen. 2:4-5, cause Philo to rethink how the Before relates to the biblical text. He then re-interprets Genesis 1 (in Op. 129-30). To this re-reading of the Before we will now turn. These final comments on Philo’s exegesis will confirm the presence as well as content of the Before in his interpretation of creation. They will also

“invisible,” 32n.20). Although it used the word “invisible,” the LXX did not have to be interpreted Platonically, even in Philo’s day. But by the same token it easily could be (see n.65 above).

68 See n.62 above.

69 For a criticism of a simplistic hermeneutic of imposition, see Watson’s presentation of the reciprocal hermeneutic (2004, 2-5), especially as it interacts with the hermeneutic of imposition of Barton (1986, 245) on pp.128-29 and 157-58.

70 Williamson, 1989, 132.
confirm that there clearly are hermeneutical and theological implications of God’s pre-deliberations for Philo’s reading of both the beginning of the world as a whole and the beginning of humanity in particular.


The grammar of the LXX of Gen. 2:5 appears awkward at first, but from Philo’s perspective it actually makes sense. In §129, Philo writes (perfectly quoting the LXX of Gen. 2:4-5a):

This is the book of the genesis of heaven and earth when they came about, in the day God made the heaven and the earth and every green thing of the field before it came about upon the earth and all grass of the field before it rose up. (Op. 129)

Although the toledoth-formula of the MT (“These are the generations [נְדוֹתֵּ֑הוּ] of…”) found in Gen. 2:4a functions elsewhere in Genesis as an introduction to what will transpire rather than a review of it, many scholars have nevertheless taken Gen. 2:4a as a summary of Gen. 1:1-2:3. Philo also takes this approach, basically treating it as a

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72 Although most scholars do not follow Wiseman (1936) that every toledoth-formula was a summary, recognizing that most of the formulas do, in fact, introduce and not conclude, many simply make the appeal that 2:4a is different than all the rest. So Hartley, 2000, 35n.1, 51, esp. 55; Dahlberg, 1998, 8, 14; Westermann, 1987, 12; von Rad, 1956, 61. The point should not be missed, however, that this formula introduces not the character himself (e.g., Adam, the sons of Noah, Jacob, etc.) but rather the generations of that character, the formula being “followed by gen. of the progenitor, never of the progeny” (Skinner, 1910, 41). This nature of the formula is often missed by scholars who think that 2:4a cannot be a superscription for chs. 2-4 because they think that toledoth refers to the “origin” of the one mentioned (e.g., von Rad, 1956, 61), or (relatedly) because “the second creation story has little to say about the creation of heavens and earth” (Watson, 1997, 268n.9; cf. e.g., Rösel, 1994, 57). Genesis 2-4 does not need to be about “heaven and earth” itself for the toledoth-formula of 2:4a to introduce it effectively, but rather, as Skinner puts it, “the phrase must describe that which is generated by the heavens and the earth, not the process by which they themselves are generated” (41; emphasis added). Thus for Gen. 2:4a to effectively introduce Genesis 2-4, the latter merely needs to be about Adam’s genesis from the earth (2:7), the curse on the earth because of Adam (3:17), Cain’s curse “from the earth” (4:11), etc.—i.e., the story concerning the “children” of the one whose toledoth is introduced.
“summary” of what has gone before (§129.1-2). Philo goes a step further. Those who take 2:4a as a summary typically take 2:4b and 2:5 as the beginning of the next account (as do those who read 2:4a and 2:4b together). Speaking anachronistically again, Philo amalgamates the two approaches. He reads 2:4a, 2:4b, and 2:5 as the united “summary” of Moses’ “creation account” (τὰ ἐν κοσμοποιήματι). We should not think that Philo is treating 2:4-5 as a summary merely of “day One” (1:1-5), for an allusion to such a particular and distant referent at this point in his commentary would need far more specificity than this brief statement allows. Rather, Philo refers to the entire “book” of creation that now concludes with the summary in 2:4-5, i.e., Gen. 1:1-2:3.

In this summary of Genesis 1 Moses speaks briefly, only relaying God’s “making” of four of all the items found in Genesis 1 and “not dealing with everything in detail.” Yet these function representatively, as indications “of the nature of the whole” (§130). The first two items revisited are “the heaven” and “the earth.” The third and fourth items that “God made”—“greenery” and “grass”—have important modifiers in Gen. 2:5, and it is

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73 Philo here uses the participle ἐπιλογίζομενος, meaning either “concluding” or “reflecting upon” (so Runia, 2001, 311; cf. idem, 1986, 554), and uses the noun ἐπιλογισμός and the verb ἐπιλέγεις in Post. 64-65 when commenting on the same passage. For Runia’s opposed interpretation of this passage (310-11) and my critique of his construal, see my argumentation in chapter 3 below (p.177 and 177n.39).

74 Like Philo, von Rad (1972) sees Gen. 2:4b-7 as one sentence but, contrary to Philo who takes it as the summary of 1:1-2:3, he considers it to be the introduction of Genesis 2:4bff (52). Interestingly, in QG 1.1 Philo takes Gen. 2:4a as an introduction to the following part of the account. In Leg. 1.19-20, it appears to function as the uniting feature of the complex cosmogonic account of Genesis 1-2, referring back to the creation of the “ideas” (Genesis 1) and forward to the creation of the “mind…and sensations which [were] arranged according to the ideas.” For a contemporary reading of Gen. 2:4 as a transitional link between Gen. 1:1-2:3 and Gen. 2:5ff see Stordalen, 1992,163-77.

75 Runia (1986) argues that ἐν κοσμοποιία is “used by Philo as a terminus technicus not so much for the creation itself, but Moses’ account of the creation; cf. Opif. 3, 129, 170, Fug. 178, Abr. 2, 258, QG 1.1” (86).

these modifying phrases in the text upon which Philo rests his new interpretation.\textsuperscript{77} As a summary of all of Gen. 1:1-2:3 the text (quoted above) says:

\begin{verbatim}
God made the heaven
the earth
every green thing of the field before [πρό] it “became”
all grass of the field before [πρό] it rose up
\end{verbatim}

Intrigued by the relationship between “before” (πρό, x2), “making” (ἐποίησεν), and “becoming” (τὸ ἐγέρσθαι), Philo reasons, “Does [Moses] not clearly present here the incorporeal and noetic ideas [τὰς ἀσωμάτους καὶ νοητὰς ἰδέας], which have come about together as seals of the completed sense-perceptible things?” Gen. 2:4-5 refers to the Before. Philo argues from the text and casts it in terms of prior “existence”: “For before [πρῶν] the earth became green, this green itself was existing [ἥν], [Moses] says, in the nature of things, and before [πρῶν] grass rose up in the field, a grass was existing [ἥν] that was not visible [οὐχ ὀρατός]” (§129.9-12).

Gen. 2:4-5 is potentially awkward, but by reading it as a one-sentence statement of the presence and content of the Before it makes sense: God “made” the incorporeal ideas of grass and greenery, which are “not visible” (οὐχ ὀρατός = ἀὁρατός),\textsuperscript{78} and he made them “before” the corporeal grass and greenery “became”—i.e., before the “genesis” of what is visible. Because of Gen. 2:4-5 Philo concludes, “It should be understood that for each of the other things which the senses judge, the elder forms and measures (by which the things that ‘become’ [τὰ γενομένα] are given form and measure) also pre-existed [πρὸς πηρχέ]” (§130).\textsuperscript{79} All of Genesis 1 has now been recast as the Before, for that is

\textsuperscript{77} So Tobin, 1992, 120.
\textsuperscript{78} Runia writes, “It seems obvious that it was not visible because it had not yet risen up. But Philo from his philosophical perspective converts it into ontological non-visibility! Compare the earth that is invisible in Gen 1:2, cited in §29” (Creation, 312).
\textsuperscript{79} Cf. Leg. 1.22; QG 1.2. See Tobin, 1983, 123-25.
what Gen. 2:4-5 explicitly says: “before.” This has hermeneutical consequences for Philo: now the beginning of the corporeal world is in Gen. 2:6 (§§131-33) and the beginning of corporeal humanity is in Gen. 2:7 (§§134-50), each following on in turn from this readjusted Before. This also has (well-known) theological consequences: now the beginning of the visible world and humanity are able to be compared (and contrasted) with the incorporeal and invisible “ideas” of the world (in Genesis 1 in general) and humanity (in 1:26-28 in particular). Philo’s well-known anthropological complexity (his “two-men” scheme) is rooted in his complex cosmogonic interpretations, but these exegetical/theological complexities stem from Philo’s expectation that God thought before he acted, having deliberated before he created. Across his commentary on Genesis 1-2, the Before is a vital element for Philo. God’s pre-creational noetic intentions and pre-set invisible blue-print affect how Philo understands Genesis’ texts of the beginning of the world and humanity. But the Before is also importantly described by these texts.

In summary, we have been exploring two aspects of Philo’s interpretation of the beginning of Genesis: 1) the presence of a theory of God’s deliberations before the visible creation, 2) the content of this pre-creational plan. Philo has a Before, and it is intimately connected to his reading of the Beginning. He implicitly referred to the Before by describing God’s “pre-understanding” and “purposes” because of which he then (simultaneously) created. We will return to comments such as these throughout chapters

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80 Tobin (1983) is right to recognize the close connection between Philo’s interpretation of the world and interpretation of man (122-23), though the direction of influence from anthropogony to cosmogony that Tobin perceives (122-23, 130) should be questioned, not regarding the historical development (which is beside our point), but with regard to Philo. As Philo presents it in Op. 129-50 (and in Leg. 2.12-13ff.), the cosmogonic context provides the rationale for the anthropogonic interpretation, and both are cast as they are due to Philo’s Before.
2 and 3, and these will confirm that for Philo the Before is an interwoven strand throughout his interpretation of the beginning of the world and humanity. Our focus here has been on Philo’s explicit description of the Before. The content of these divine pre-creational thoughts regards the noetic, invisible, incorporeal, and very good blueprint of all things. Philo’s theory of the Before comes in part from his Platonic expectations of such a pre-existent paradigm, and this affects his reading of the biblical beginning. Yet Philo’s Before also reciprocally receives shape and content from the biblical texts themselves.

One cannot engage Philo’s interpretation of creation in his commentary without coming into contact with his theory of the Before, for Gen. 1:1-5 is the Before, and then Genesis 1 is the Before. Philo’s pre-protology is thus intimately wed with his protology, and this is because of the text of Genesis. In light of these aspects of Philo’s hermeneutic of creation—i.e., the Before and its connection with the Beginning—we will now analyze Paul’s language of the Before. Though Paul’s references to and applications of the text of the Beginning in his letters to the Corinthians and the Romans are (obviously) more sparse than Philo’s in his commentary, we do find a similar hermeneutic. We will now focus our attention on the presence of a divine pre-creational deliberation in Paul and on the content of this divine plan. As we proceed in this manner it will also become clear that Paul’s reading of Genesis’ Beginning, like Philo’s, is both affected by and yet also informs his notion of before the beginning.
3. Paul: A Pre-Creational Deliberation For Our Glory

According to Paul, God wisely determined where he would be known, and this was in the cross of Christ. He determined this before creation. Only after such a pre-determination did the creative events transpire according to Genesis 1-2. We see this in 1 Corinthians and Romans, where, in a broadly similar manner to Philo, Paul connects God’s pre-creational deliberations with the creation texts.

Paul criticizes the church of Corinth for following the “wisdom” that is “of this age” (1 Cor. 2:6). Paul’s criticism has been explained in terms of the classic Jewish and Christian eschatological differentiation between “this-age/age-to-come,” stating that his wisdom “belongs to the new creation, not the old.” Though somewhat helpful, such language can also obscure the fact Paul does not here explicitly describe the wisdom he preaches as of “the new creation,” for it was there before the “old” creation. Paul claims:

We speak God’s wisdom in mystery, [a wisdom] which has been hidden, [a wisdom] which God pre-marked out [προσώρισεν] before the ages [πρὸ τῶν οἰκονομίων] unto our glory, which none of the rulers of this age understood. For if they had understood it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory! But rather, just as it has been written, “What things no eye has seen and no ear has heard and into a person’s heart have not entered: what God prepared [ηττώμασεν] for those who love him.” (2:6-9)

As we have seen, many ancients used the phrase “before the age[s]” to express a “time” when God alone existed. Philo drew special attention to God’s self-sufficiency and goodness in the period “before the age” (πρὸ αἰώνος), and he specifies this phrase
as meaning “before the genesis of the cosmos” (πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως). For Paul, God was obviously present “before the ages,” for according to 1 Cor. 2:7 he was actively doing something in this Before. By this divine activity, however, Paul is asserting more than God’s pre-existence. Others attributed to God certain activity “before the age,” and, as we have now seen, Philo had a detailed understanding of this timeless period. Like Philo, Paul also believed God to be engaged in deliberations “before the ages,” though Paul’s concept of what God was planning contains some remarkable differences. After a short discussion concerning our method in approaching Paul’s Before, we will see that he enters the Before through a combination of the text of Prov. 8:23 and his experience of God’s wisdom in Christ, but that it is also the beginning of Genesis that gives further shape and content to exactly what Paul believes God determined before the beginning.

Concerning our present method, 1 Cor. 2:7 and its context will be our primary focus, for there Paul expresses that God “pre”-did something “before the ages.” This statement, building as it is on Prov. 8:23 (and therefore Genesis 1), is the best entrance into both Paul’s Before and its relation to creation. But it does not give the full picture of either. Other passages need to be considered. Three other types of “before”-passages have been used by others in conjunction with 1 Cor. 2:7, but will not be used by us. First, one could

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86 Mut. 27.5; 46.2.
87 E.g., “Even before the world was created [God] knows what is forever and what will be from generation to generation” (1 En. 39.11; cf. Tob. 6:18; 1QS 3:16; Plotinus, Ennead V.9, 5.22). See also 2 Bar. 54:1-5, esp. v.1 (cf. 21:8b).
88 On this type of spiral (or reciprocal) hermeneutic in Paul and Philo see Watson, 2004, 2-5; cf. 127-29, 157-58: “The assumption that interpretation must either reproduce an original meaning or impose a meaning created by the interpreter is hermeneutically naïve” (129; emphasis original).
explore every \( \pi \rho \o\)–prefixed verb that Paul uses. While some of these express the helpful general similarity that God thought “before” he acted—an assumption important for understanding Paul (as well as Philo)—the majority express a “before” that is too narrow to be helpful for our exploration of Paul’s reading of creation and the Before. Second, there are a number of passages in Luke-Acts that may offer parallel thoughts to 1 Cor. 2:7, using Paul’s \( \pi \rho \o \o \i \z \o \) or simply \( \o \i \z \o \) to explain what God has “[pre-]marked out,” some having other similarities as well. This approach has certainly been taken to elucidate what God “pre-marked out” in 1 Cor. 2:7. Most of these “parallels” are most likely helpful. Yet none of these texts is explicit that the timing of this divine activity is before creation, and therefore we will not employ them below. Third, there are other passages in the disputed Pauline letters that host similar language to 1 Cor. 2:7 and which

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89 Paul uses \( \pi \rho \o \)–prefixed verbs over 50 times in his undisputed letters (11 of these being \( \pi \rho \o \pi \h \ε \i \o \), etymologically meaning “to speak beforehand,” only occurring in 1 Cor. 11-14).

90 Within these texts his most common is “I/we said before” (\( \pi \o \l \gamma \omega \)) Rom. 9:29; 2 Cor. 7:3; 13:2 (2x); Gal. 1:9; 5:21 (2x); 1 Th. 3:4; 4:6). Cf. 2 Cor. 9:5 (3x \( \pi \rho \o \)–prefix). In Gal. 3:8 Paul does radicalize temporality by mentioning scripture “having known beforehand” (\( \pi \o \i \delta \i \o \)σ\( \tau \)) and having “preached beforehand” (\( \pi \o \e \u \i \h \i \i \lambda \i \s \o \)σ\( \tau \)). This, however, is also unhelpful for our purposes since the context shows the timing to be in Abraham’s day rather than “before” creation.

91 Dunn (1980) asserts that Luke 22:22, Acts 2:23, 4:27-28, 10:42, and 17:31 should be included as parallels to 1 Cor. 2:7 (234-35), summarizing each of these passages with this one statement: “In each case…what was determined long before in the will of God came to historical actuality in Christ—not, of course, in the sense that Jesus just happened to be the one who fitted the divine specifications, but in the sense that Christ was the one who from the beginning had been pre-ordained for this role” (235, emphasis original). Cf. Fee, 1987, 106n.37.

92 E.g., Schrage (1991) has observed that like 1 Cor. 2:7 each aforementioned passage in Luke-Acts relates to Ps. 2:2 (LXX) and the conspiracy of “the rulers” against “the Christ” (1.253n.181).

93 Allen (1970) sets \( \pi \o \o \i \z \i \i \i \) against the background of Ps. 2:7 as the “decree” of the Son of God (104-08), and this opens the possibility that God’s “[pre-]marking” of Jesus is his resurrection or even the scriptural text itself. A pre-creational decree is not ruled out, however, even if the language comes from Psalm 2. Without arguing the point, Allen asserts that although Paul borrows \( \pi \o \o \i \z \i \i \i \) from the thought world of Psalm 2, it is still to be seen as “a deliberation framed before the world’s foundation” (108). The pre-creational nature of \( \pi \o \o \i \z \o \) in 1 Cor. 2:7 is made explicit by the other modifier \( \pi \o \o \) \( \tau \omega \) \( \alpha \i \o \i \o \) rather than in the verb itself. The same verb in Luke-Acts, while perhaps having the same scriptural roots and probably having the same temporal reference, is not explicitly referring to pre-creation. Without criticizing those who have used these parallels, we will not.
explicitly refer to a time before creation (cf. Eph. 1:4-6; 2 Tim. 1:9; Tit. 1:2). We are restricting our exploration to the Corinthian and Roman correspondences.

One other passage cannot remain unmentioned before we proceed. Paul’s argument in Rom. 9:19-23 is similar to the Luke-Acts passages mentioned above. Paul’s statements in 9:19-23 do pertain to God’s creative activity of “forming” humans. He casts this topic in the imagery of the Potter and clay. Paul’s context is thus creation of a sort and the prophetic metaphor of the Potter itself is often rooted in Genesis 1-2. Paul even uses a προ-compound to describe God’s “vessels of mercy” as “prepared beforehand” (προητούμασεν) “unto glory” (εἰς δόξαν) (9:23). This statement looks remarkably similar to 1 Cor. 2:7-9, especially when Rom. 9:23 is seen in the wake of what Paul just wrote in 8:28-30:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verse</th>
<th>Translation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Cor. 2:7</td>
<td>pre-marked out unto our glory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Cor. 2:9</td>
<td>prepared for those loving him [sc. God]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rom. 8:28-30</td>
<td>pre-marked out for those loving God... and glorified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rom. 9:23</td>
<td>pre-prepared unto glory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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94 So Kammler (2003) parallels 1 Cor. 2:7 with 2 Tim. 1:9; Tit. 1:2; Jn. 17:24; Eph. 1:4; 1 Pet. 1:20; and Jn. 17:5 (211, n.115; behind all of these being πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων in Ps. 54:20) and thus concludes that “the real pre-existence of Christ and the ideal pre-existence of the community... are also implicit in the usage from 1 Cor. 2:7b” (211-12; translation mine).

95 Cf. τὸ πλάσμα, τῷ πλάσαντι, and ἐποίησας in 9:20 with ἐπλάσασθε in Gen. 1:27 and ἐποίησεν in Gen. 1:1, 27.

96 Parallels often given are these: Ps. 2:9; Job 10:8-9; Isa 29:16; 41:25; 45:9; 64:8; Jer 18:1-12; Sir 33:13 (listed by Byrne, 1996, 300). See also Job 38:14; Wis. 13; 15:7; T. Naph. 2:2, 4; 1 QS 11:22 (listed by Moo, 1996, 602n 75). For many more Jewish texts that contrast humans (who are from clay) with the Creator, see Seifrid, 2007, 644-46.

97 Cf. Isa. 45:4-46:13 (esp. 45:7. 12, 18, 46:9-10) with Genesis 1 (and 2:7). This does not seem to be the case in Isa. 29:16 (and Paul quotes Isa. 29:14 in 1 Cor. 1:19), in Isa. 64:8 (and Paul quotes, or shapes his thoughts on, Isa. 64:4 in 1 Cor. 2:9a), and in Jer. 18:4 (which Witherington [2004] thinks Paul is primarily using here, 257). While it is actually not necessary to make a choice from all of these texts as to which Paul is “using” (so Moo, 1996, 602), Paul’s actual language in Rom. 9:18-23 is closest to Isa. 45:9, and Isaiah 45-46 is replete with references to creation in the language of Genesis 1. There are also similarities with Sir. 33:11-13 (so Byrne, 1996, 297-98), and Sirach roots the potter-imagery in the creation of Adam from the earth (v.10; cf. Gen. 2:7). Likewise, Paul’s language is close to Wis. 15:7 (although their message is quite different), and 15:7 is surrounded by the language of Gen. 2:7 (cf. 15:5, 8, 11). Regardless of the precise “background” of Paul’s pottery language in Rom. 9:19-23, it is highly possible that it is closely connected to Genesis 1-2 via the prophetic (or apocryphal) medium.

98 Byrne (1996) also compares Rom. 9:23 with 8:29 and 1 Cor. 2:7 (303).
Although the image of God’s pre-preparation of his vessels in Rom. 9:23 is almost certainly rightly comparable with God’s pre-determination in 1 Cor. 2:7-9, it is not explicitly clear that “beforehand” (προ-) in 9:23 does in fact refer to “before creation.” It could simply refer to being “prepared” by faith during life “for glory” “before” receiving this glory in the eschaton. As with the “[pre]destine” passages in Luke-Acts, so too with Paul’s statement in Rom. 9:23: because it refers only probably but not definitely to God’s deliberations before creation, we will therefore analyze it no further.

99 The two related issues of exegesis and theology cause readers of Rom. 9:23 to construe its timing differently. The emphasis and language of Paul’s argument show that there is no theological problem with understanding 9:23 as pre-creational. The larger context demonstrates this. God’s “purpose according to election” (ἡ κατ᾿ ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις; 9:11b) takes place temporally before (and logically without contemplation of) any ethical practice (9:11a). What comes about in the history of these scriptural characters is not because of human “works” (9:12a) and not due to human “willing [τὸ δικλοντος] or running [τῷ τρέχοντος]” (9:16), but rather (ἀλλὰ; 9:12, 16) because of God’s “calling” (9:12b) and “mercy-ing” (9:16). (Paul’s strong contrasts [οὐ… οὐ…” and] rule out the possibility that the religious lives of these patriarchs were originated by a combination of “God’s call” and his foresight of their future “willing” or “running”—such is not Paul’s concept in these verses). It is God’s purpose (εἰς αὐτῷ τὸ θεό γνωστοῦ ζητήγωρά σε; 9:17) according to his own “willing” (ἐὰν θέλει ἐλεηθεί, ὥστε καὶ θέλει σκληρωθεί; 9:18) that causes things to transpire as they do—whether for mercy or hardness. This divine causative intentionality, especially as God’s “will” (ὅν θέλει) and “plan” (τῶν βουλήματι) relate to human responsibility (9:19), is what prompts Paul to introduce the prophetic concept of the Potter (i.e., Creator) and his freedom to do what he intends with his vessels (i.e., his creations) (9:20-23). This seemingly “hypothetical” notion of divine desire (i.e., “But if God [εἰ δὲδὲ θέος], wanting [Θέλω]…”; 9:22-23) ends up being Paul’s construal of God’s actual “willing” as Paul applies it without a break to “even us” (9:24a). Thus contextual considerations cause us to assume that, for Paul, God’s intentions are prior to and the logical cause of his historical activity, and when these intentions are referred to by the prophetic Potter-Creator imagery they should be seen as pre-creational intentions. Three things can be said in summary about theology, exegesis, and Rom. 9:23. First, nothing theologically in this context would stop Paul from saying that God’s vessels of mercy were “prepared before creation” for glory. Second, there is no real (philosophical) difference with regards to human responsibility whether God’s intentions are placed just prior to the vessels’ historical “willing and running” or are placed prior to creation itself, for Paul sees them in this passage as causative, regardless of their precise timing. And third, yet it remains the case exegetically—and this is the present methodological point—that in Rom. 9:23 Paul does not make it explicit that the temporal moment of God’s “pre-preparation unto glory” was before creation (even if the prophetic-creative metaphor would encourage such a reading), but merely before it happens. Although not criticizing others who have used this passage as a parallel to 1 Cor. 2:7, we will not use it to consider Paul’s thoughts about before creation.

100 According to Witherington (2004): “It is not said that the vessels of mercy are destined for glory beforehand, but that they are prepared for glory beforehand. So the subject is not some pretemporal determination, but rather what ch. 8 has referred to—namely that God did always plan for believers to be conformed to the image of his Son, and during their Christian lives, through the process of being set right and being sanctified, they have been prepared for such a glorious destiny. Thus Paul would be alluding to the process of sanctification here, which has a pretemporal plan behind it” (258-59; emphasis added; cf. Seifrid, 2007, 646).
Even though Paul was not writing a commentary on Genesis for the Corinthians and Romans, this section on Paul can naturally unfold in the same two stages as did the section above concerning Philo’s commentary. Firstly, we will determine the presence in Paul of a theory of the Before, including its timing, purpose, and relation to the textual Beginning. This will be done primarily through an analysis of 1 Cor. 2:7 and Paul’s allusion to Prov. 8:23 (and therefore also Genesis 1 as if in tow). Secondly, we will discern the content of Paul’s Before. This will be done by navigating from 1 Cor. 2:7 (“pre-marked out”...“glory”), through 1 Cor. 15:49 (“glory”...“image”), and ultimately to Rom. 8:29-30 (“pre-marked out”...“image”...“glory”). Our eye will be trained toward the connection between Paul’s Before and the actual scriptural texts of the Beginning. As with Philo, Paul’s connection between Beginning and Before will be confirmed (and fleshed out) in chapters 2 and 3 as we notice that when Paul interprets both the beginning of the world and the beginning of humanity he points his readers to the previous and causative “desire” and “purpose” of God—i.e., to an implicit Before. In this section, however, we will limit our study to Paul’s explicit Before, that is, where he basically writes, “This is what God planned before creation.” When people think of “predestination” in Paul, they probably initially think of Rom. 8:29-30. When that text is read in light of both 1 Cor. 2:7 and 15:49, and below we will argue why it should be, Paul’s wording in Rom. 8:29-30 demonstrates explicitly what was previously implicitly present in 1 Cor. 2:7: Paul reads Genesis’ Beginning in a mutually interpretive manner with before the beginning.
A. The Presence of a Pre-Creational Plan and the Text of Proverbs 8 (1 Cor. 2:7)

As we analyze the presence of the explicit Before in Paul, we will demonstrate three things. First, within 1 Cor. 1:18-2:5 divine causative pre-set intentions are important for Paul’s general sociological interpretation. Second, in 2:7 itself Paul then alludes to Prov. 8:22-31 to ground certain divine intentions before creation itself. Third, the use of Proverbs 8 connects Paul’s Before closely to his interpretation of the text of the Beginning in Genesis. Many of these insights have been either missed completely or have been insufficiently developed in recent scholarly discussion. Over the last century many have searched for the proper “religio-historical background” against which Paul’s Corinthian opponents and/or Paul himself should be understood in 1 Corinthians 1-4.101 Earlier contexts in Gnosticism102 or in the mystery cults103 have now been generally left behind.104 More recent attention has been paid to Graeco-Roman or Jewish rhetorical practices.105 Another group has found fruitful the backdrop of Hellenistic-Jewish

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101 For good summaries see Davis, 1984, 3-5 and Sterling, 1995, 355-56.
102 Pearson (1973) labels the placement of Gnosticism in the background of 1 Cor. 1-4 as “almost standard” for the first seventy years of the 20th century (1). Pearson explains that the Gnostic hypothesis was first posited by Lütgert in 1908, carried forward by Dinkler and Kümmel, but moved en force by Wilckens, Schnithals, and Winter (1-4, 7-9; cf. Davis, 1984 153n. 7).
103 According to Scroggs (1967/68, 38), this was initially argued by Reitzenstein, 1927, 338-40 and further by Wilckens, 1959, 53-8. According to Stuhlmacher (1987, 331), Bultmann (1969) thought it was “certain” that Paul himself was “thinking along the lines of the mystery cults.” This supposition was built especially on Paul’s positive use of μωσῆριον and its revelation to the τελειοί (i.e., the “initiates of the mystery religions”). In a second strand of the applicability of the mystery cults, Sterling (1995) recently argued that the Corinthian opponents, not Paul, had been influenced by the mystery cults and the initiation of the “perfect” (355-84; cf. Welborn, 2005, 215ff).
105 For Graeco-Roman rhetorical practices see Mitchell, 1991, 20-64; Witherington, 1995, 76. For Jewish homiletic patterns see Wuelnner, 1970, 199-204 and Ellis, 1978, 155 (cf. Barbour, 1979, 61-2 and Williams, 2001, 11-14 for more discussion and bibliography). Welborn (2005) sharpens the Graeco-Roman rhetorical setting to the “comic-philosophical tradition” found in the theatre. Martin (1992) culls from Graeco-Roman philosophy, plays, medical texts, etc. a certain ideology found also among the Corinthians, i.e., a thought pattern which split the educated from the non-educated, the social elite from “the masses” (108-17).
wisdom\textsuperscript{106} and/or creation traditions,\textsuperscript{107} especially as represented in the works of Wisdom of Solomon and Philo.\textsuperscript{108} Some of these may still have much to offer.\textsuperscript{109} As important and illuminating as many of these discussions are, neither the religio-historical background to 1 Corinthians 1-4 nor whether Paul is using the language of his opponents or not\textsuperscript{110} have significant bearing on the fact that at a crucial juncture of his argument about “wisdom” Paul points his Corinthian opponents and friends toward God’s determination “before the ages.”\textsuperscript{111} It is that to which we must now turn.

It is typically agreed that Paul’s reference to “predestination” in 1 Cor. 2:7 refers to the “time” before creation.\textsuperscript{112} It is our argument that Paul’s present understanding of the Before is more closely connected to the text of Genesis 1 than has been typically observed, and this connection has hermeneutical and theological implications for his interpretation of creation. As we now begin to approach Paul’s notion of “before the ages” in 1 Cor. 2:7, it is contextually important to notice that in his discussion about “wisdom” in 1:18-2:5 he insists that the Corinthians’ contemporary social experiences are

\textsuperscript{107} Sterling, 1995, 355-84.
\textsuperscript{108} See explicitly Horsley, 1978, 206-07; implicitly (but clearly) in Pearson, 1973, 11-12, 17-21. Cf. Davis, 1984, 49-62. For detailed argumentation against Wisdom of Solomon see Theissen, 1987, 353-67; and against Philo see Sterling, 1995, 355-84. Martin (1992) is careful in his critique of Horsley’s use of Philonic Platonism, writing, “the sort of dualism implied [by Horsley] was not limited in the first century to Platonists, it need not imply a matter/non-matter dichotomy, and the Corinthians need not have come by it via any form of Judaism. Hellenistic Jews such as Philo expressed such dualistic notions for the same reason that many other intellectuals did: it was simply ‘in the air’ in first-century popular philosophy” (272-73n.10).
\textsuperscript{109} Cf. Barbour, 1979, 61-2; Reiling, 1988, 201; Williams, 2001, 10-14.
\textsuperscript{111} What follows may add extra support to a background found in Hellenistic-Jewish creation/wisdom traditions but is not contingent on such a “background.”
themselves the ramifications of God’s own pre-set intentions. This more general feature of Paul’s thought in 1:18-2:5 will lend even more import to his ultimate example in 2:7-9 of God’s determinations that were, in the latter case, explicitly set down before creation itself.

1. The Presence of God’s Pre-Set Intentions (1 Cor. 1:18-2:5, 2:7)

A number of actual situations are already in Paul’s mind when he introduces the Before to the Corinthians, and Paul interprets these social situations through the lens of divinely pre-set intentions. These hermeneutical glasses not only affect Paul’s scriptural interpretation but his sociological interpretation as well. When presenting the gospel, Paul has experienced opposition from both Jews and Gentiles as they reject his message. These rejecters considered “the word of the cross” moronic due to the simple manner in which Paul presented it in Corinth as well as to its cross-shaped content (1:18). Others accepted his message. From Paul’s perspective, those who scoffed at his words (and therefore at the Christ and his cross represented therein) considered themselves to be “wise” in such a rejection. Perhaps they said as much, but Paul read it at least in their attitudes.

But these types of social scenarios (mentioned in 1:18 and developed in 1:22-24), the substance of which Paul thought was infecting the Corinthian church, were for Paul merely manifestations of God’s intentions that he had revealed through Isaiah long before

113 Horsley (1977) sought to correct the neglect of the form of wisdom in Corinth (“of word”) for the sake of the content of wisdom (“Christ crucified”) in most literature through 1977 (224-39). Barbour (1979) then furthered the understanding of the “form” and “content” (60-61).
114 Paul saw the schismatic behavior of the Corinthian Christians (1:10-17), their “boasting” in human wisdom, as sharing important and unfortunate substance with the attitude of the non-Christians who “wisely” called the cruciform truth “foolish.”
(1:19; quoting Isa. 29:14). Isaiah announced that God’s intention (“I will...”) was to “destroy” the “wisdom” of these “wise” people, ironically proving it stupid. As Paul judges the situation, God was presently enacting within Paul’s own time and experiences this pre-set and destructive deliberation (God’s “I will”) within the very act of the “wise” foolishly rejecting the best and most true.  

God had now, definitively in the Christ and socially in the message, made foolish the world’s “wisdom,” just as he pre-announced he would more than 750 years before. Paul sees his present experiences as functions of God’s past determinations.

To further explain God’s pre-intended humiliation of the world’s wisdom, Paul states in 1:21a the general principle that God had also wisely determined beforehand to not be “known” by human “wisdom,” and that, conversely, it was actually “pleasing” to God (and therefore his determination or design) to save through the “stupidity” of the cross those who submitted to the truth and relevance of its proclamation (1:21b). All of this was, according to Paul, desired and decided by God (“in his wisdom”) long before it ever happened in history. In 1:22-24, Paul elaborates on the historical outworking of

115 A γάρ connects v.18 (“The word of the cross is foolish to those perishing”) to v. 19 (“For it has been written, ‘I will destroy the wisdom of the wise...’”). The logic shows that for Paul God’s intention revealed in Isa. 29:14 has come about precisely in the (wrong) opinions of “those perishing” in contrast to the (right) opinions of “those being saved.” God’s pre-announced (and therefore pre-determined) salvific and destructive “power”—saving those who believe while destroying the wisdom of unbelievers—is manifested in the preaching of the cross and in its respective social responses.

116 Paul’s question οὐχὶ ἐγκράτησεν ὁ θεός... (1:20) expects an affirmation. The aorist (ἐγκράτησεν) shows that Paul is thinking of something that God has already done definitively to which the Corinthians may think: “Yes, God has rendered as stupid the world’s wisdom—in the cross and its declaration.”

117 Some more recent critical analyses of the timing of this Isaianic prophecy would, of course, place it much closer in time to Paul than 750 years. The timescale above is expressed from Paul’s own perspective, which would have considered Isaiah prophesying around and during the Assyrian attack on Jerusalem (c. 722 BCE; cf. Isaiah 36-37). Since we are trying to discern Paul’s opinions, the date above is more helpful.

118 This is the logic of Paul’s “For since” (ἐπειδή γάρ, 1:21).

119 The meaning of the difficult phrase εἰν τῷ σοφίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ cannot be discerned by grammar alone. See Wedderburn, 1973A, 132-34. The reading above is a valid understanding of the grammar, and it comports well with the context of God’s intentionality. Even within the diverse readings of this phrase (see Thielson, 2000, 167-69), a common assumption is that it denotes some sort of intentionality of God. Davis (1984) rewords εἰν τῷ σοφίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ as “the plan of God as a whole” (92).

120 Thielson, 2000, 167.
these divine pre-determinations, and he highlights two particulars of the aforementioned social scenarios:

1) 1:22-23a  Jews seek signs
Greetings seek wisdom

2) 1:23b-24  Scandal to Jews
Stupid to Greeks

We preach Christ crucified
God’s power and
God’s wisdom to those called
(whether Jews or Greeks)

These concrete events that Paul is describing, focusing first on the contrasting content that was desired/delivered (1:22-23a) and then on the contrasting responses to the content (1:23b-24), may be comparable to the social exchanges later recorded in the gospels and Acts. Temporally and causatively behind these social realities of seeking/presenting and rejecting/accepting, Paul saw a divine (and wise) purpose and pleasure according to which he interprets the situations.

The remarks above are attempting to make explicit Paul’s implicit interpretive grid that affects even his “reading” of the social happenings that surround him and the Corinthians. Throughout 1 Cor. 1:18-25, Paul has been interpreting the entire theological issue of “wisdom,” with all of its social correlates, through a lens in which a divine pre-deliberation determines certain concrete and historical happenstances. As Paul then continues in 1:26-31 to view contemporary circumstances in light of God’s causative preset intentions, he there effortlessly mentions the more personal circumstances of the Corinthian believers. He places even their own “calling” within the structure of divine intent. God “chose” and “called” those who were foolish, weak, and “nothing” (1:26-31).

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121 See Mt. 12:38; Jn. 6:30. Cf. Mt. 16:1; Mk. 8:11; Lk. 11:15-16; (maybe 23:8); Jn. 2:18; (see Jesus’ comment at Jn. 4:48); 12:18. Thiselton, 2000, 170. The issue in Corinth, according to both 1 Cor. 1 (1:23a) and Acts 18 (cf. vv.5 and 27-28), was the identity of the Christ. So Thiselton, 2000, 171; Robertson and Plummer, 1911, 22 (see the nuanced treatment of the Corinthian issue in Barbour, 1979, 60-61). Cf. Stuhlmacher, 1987, 335.
Paul avers that God intended these choices for a purpose: “in order that (ἵνα, x3) he might shame and nullify those who were wise, strong, and “something.” God also intended his selection “so that” (ὅπως) he might silence all inappropriate boasting (v.29). God made Christ become the benefit to those whom he “chose” and “called,” “in order that” (ἵνα) the injunction in Jer. 9:24 would be established: “The one boasting in the Lord, let him boast” (v.30). Thus God’s “election,” “calling,” and Christological blessing of certain types of people were, for Paul, further concrete fulfilsments of God’s previous (and causative) intentions (1:26-31).122 Behind each of these social and personal moments, Paul saw a complex and wise divine intent, part of which was announced by Isaiah, part by Jeremiah, but all pre-established by God.

With this hermeneutical structure in the foreground of our minds we will now analyze 2:7. In 2:7, Paul uncovers the roots of “God’s wisdom” as having been planted before creation. As Philo had used “pre-understood,” “purposed,” “pre-stamped out,” and “before” to express God’s deliberative actions before the beginning,123 so Paul also uses

122 It is important to notice in this context that Paul understands God’s “calling” as a divine action which takes place in history while being based upon God’s previously made decisions and intentions. Eskola (1998) states about the verb προφητεύω that “the act of election can be found in the call of God” (177; emphasis added). Eskola explicitly treats “predestination” as “an historical act” (173) rather than as a “temporal predestination” (177) which occurred “before the beginning of ‘history’” (173). Yet regardless of the reason God “predestined”—and it is on the reason that this aspect of the classic distinction between Arminianism and Calvinism is founded, neither of which are at issue in my present treatment—Eskola’s construal is clearly at odds with my argument concerning the timing of Paul’s “predestination” and the causative nature of what preceded God’s historical “call.” Restricting “predestination” to an event within gospel proclamation enables Eskola to say that according to Paul “all people,” that is “the descendants of Adam,” “have been predestined” (176). Eskola deduces this from the fact that Paul wants all descendants of Adam to hear the gospel proclaimed (177). But in Eskola’s desire to be “universal,” he actually flattens Paul’s use of the important terms—“calling,” “election,” “predestination”—and his logic falls short of Paul’s actual wording. In 1 Cor. 1:26-31, Paul considers it important that God does not “elect” and “call” all the descendants of Adam, but only certain types of people. Paul also shows (implicitly in 1:18, 22-24) that he certainly proclaims the gospel to all—universally and indiscriminately—while yet still insisting that God is not thereby “electing” or “calling” everyone universally or indiscriminately. Paul’s language of “election” and “calling” in 1 Cor. 1-2 does not comport with Eskola’s use of Paul’s language of “election” and “calling” in Rom. 8 (173-77), which he also reads into “election” in 1 Cor. 2:7 (179).

123 Cf. προφητεύω, βουληθείς, προφητεύω, and πρόπρόσω (above).
the prefix “pre-” (προ-) and the preposition “before” (πρό) to describe something that God previously did. God “marked out beforehand” (προορισε) a wisdom, and he did his “before the ages” (πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων). According to Paul, God did this for a purpose, or toward a certain end: “unto” or “for our glory” (εἰς δόξαν ἡμῶν, v.7). As he claims in v.9, God “prepared” things “for those who love him.” For Paul, God does things such as “mark out” and “prepare” before he historically enacts these purposes.

Throughout all of 1:18-2:5, and then especially in 2:7, Paul “reads” the concrete social interactions as functions of God’s pre-set intentionality. We cannot say that God’s pre-set “will” in 1:18-2:5 was set down before creation, since our only glimpse within this pericope at its timing is in its announcement in the prophets. But regardless of its timing, the same basic principle that God pre-sets intentions that he then manifests in a future time and space is at play in 2:7, though there it is brought to an explicit and radical point of temporality when Paul explains that God marked out his “wisdom” not merely “beforehand” generally, nor even in the prophets’ time specifically, but actually “before the ages.” But when exactly is this “before,” and how does it relate to the actual creation-texts?

124 Eskola (1998) downplays the temporality of the προ-prefix in Rom. 8:29-30 (170-71, 173n. 29). This certainly cannot be maintained in an analysis of 1 Cor. 2:7, which reinforces the προ-prefix with the additional phrase πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων. In a more sound methodological move, the temporality of 1 Cor. 2:7 sheds light on the potential of the προ-prefix in Rom. 8:29-30 (repeated 3x) to retain an assumed temporality. Discussing the importance of God’s “purpose” for Paul, and its determinative effect in Paul’s life, Dunn (1998B) notes, “Note the frequency of προ- (‘before’) words attributed to God in [Rom. 8-11]—Rom. 8.28-29; 9.11, 23; 11.2; also 1 Cor. 2.7; Gal. 2.8; Eph. 1.5, 11; 2.10; 3.11” (40n.64).


126 Brown, 1958, 437. Ben Sira also says that it is only “by [God’s] gift” that God “supplies” wisdom “to those who love him” (τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτῷ, 1:10); cf. 1 Cor. 2:9d, 12, and 4:7.
2. The Timing and Text(s) of “Before the Ages”: Prov. 8:23, Genesis 1, and Before (1 Cor. 2:7)

As we have noted above, most scholars simply assume that by “before the ages” Paul means something like “before the foundation of the world” or “before creation,” and this is certainly true.127 Most do not ask from where Paul got this idea of a predestined wisdom, let alone how this fact of pre-creationally ordained wisdom might be related to his reading of the creation-text of Genesis. Many have paralleled various aspects of 1 Cor. 2:6-8 with scriptural or other texts,128 but few link the actual phrase “before the ages” to an actual scriptural text.129 Some have posited a more general “(Hellenistic) Jewish wisdom tradition” behind 1 Corinthians 1-4,130 and Prov. 8:22-31 is usually recognized as foundational and influential in such a “wisdom tradition.”131 But it has only

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128 For example, one can compare προορίζω in 2:7 and its antithesis to “the rulers” in 2:6-8 with the anointing of the Christ and the raging “rulers” in Psalm 2 (Allen, 1970, 107; cf. Schrage, 1991, 1.253n.181); the title “Lord of glory” in 2:8 with the same title throughout 1 Enoch and with the question and answer posed to “the rulers” in Psalm 23 (LXX), “Who is the King of glory, the Lord” (a psalm that Paul will quote in 10:26). See the many references in Kammler, 2003, 214, n.130; cf. Williams, 2001, 166, n.52. One can compare the ignorance of “the rulers” in 2:8 with their lack of wisdom in Bar. 3:16 (Williams, 2001, 166, n.53); the revelation of “wisdom” and “mystery” by the “Spirit” in 2:6-8, 10-11 with the revelation of “wisdom” and “mystery” in Dan. 2:19-23 (Williams, 2001, 166-68; see the qualification of this “possible echo” in Ciampa and Rosner, 2007, 701-02) and this revelation by the “Holy Spirit” in Wis. 9:17 (Theissen, 1987, 353n. 1). While each of these may provide some insightful parallels for certain aspects of Paul’s thinking in 2:6-16 and beyond, we will narrow our attention to the temporal, conceptual, and textual framework of Paul’s phrase “before the ages.”

129 Kammler (2003) connects Paul’s phrase πρὸ τῶν ἁγγελιῶν to the identical phrase in Ps. 54:20 (211, n.115), but Paul is speaking of something more precise than the “Gottesprädikation” in Ps. 54:20 will in itself warrant.

130 For example, some see the tradition behind the Corinthians (Horsley, 1977, 225), some see it behind Paul himself (Pearson, 1973, 27, 101n.4; Theissen, 1987, 353-67), and others see it as more broadly present (Sterling, 1995, 355-84; without mention of Prov. 8:22-31 [et par.] at 367-76, esp. 371).

131 According to Hengel (1974, quoting von Rad), “that ‘powerful conception of world and salvation history’” that was begun by Prov. 8:22-31 (and Job 28) and developed by Sirach 24 “tenaciously influenced not only the Palestinian haggada but also the Alexandrian philosophy of religion”—began with Aristobulus (c.170 BCE) and “culminated in Philo” (1.163, 166)—“and was itself of decisive significance for the development of christology” (1.162). Cf. Whybray, 1965, 12; Skehan, 1979, 365-79; Murphy, 1985, 3-11 (esp. 10-11); Harrington, 1996; Alexander, 2002, 236-38 (though, contra Alexander concerning a tension between Job 28 and Prov. 8; they are in tension with each other inasmuch as two sides of one coin could be considered such).
seldom been noticed that Paul most likely has this passage itself in mind in 2:7. When recognized, this is rarely traced out effectively, sometimes in the wrong direction. G. Theissen notices that there was a “mythical being” in Proverbs 8, but he argues that it is the more developed “Jewish wisdom tradition” on which Paul draws. He describes correspondences (and divergences) between 1 Cor. 1:18-2:16 and Wisdom of Solomon 8-10 specifically, and Wisdom of Solomon at large, but does not further mention Prov.

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133 Barbour (1979) thinks that Paul “no doubt draws to some extent on Jewish wisdom-traditions” (62) and says that “there is then at least an indirect reference [in 1 Cor. 1:21] to the wisdom of God in creation portrayed in differing ways by Job 28; Prov 8; Sir 1,24; Baruch 3-4 and Sap Sal” (64). Barbour is careful to nuance that “wisdom is not being hypostatized here” (64). Barbour then argues concerning 2:6-16, “We have accepted as indubitable the general hypothesis that Paul identified Jesus, at least in some measure and for certain purposes, with the wisdom of God present with him or active alongside him or on his behalf in creation and in history, as we see her especially in Prov, Sir, Baruch and Sap Sal,” but quickly qualifies, “But it is not clear that this identification has played any very large part in 1 Cor 1 and 2, although it undoubtedly lies in the background” (68). Barbour has in mind 1 Cor. 8:6 and Col. 1:15-20; Phil. 2:6-11; and “possibly” 1 Cor. 10:4 and Rom. 10:6-8, but not 1 Cor. 2:7 (68). Barbour has directly correlated wisdom as found in Prov. 8:22ff with a “wisdom-christology” that speaks of Christ as co-Creator. Granted, such was and is a typical way to speak of “wisdom” in Prov. 8:22-31, as the “pre-existent mediator of creation” (Lange, 1995, 34), though it is not universally accepted that “wisdom” in Prov. 8:22-31 is such a mediator of creation (Murphy, 1985, 5; Yee, 1992, 91-93), especially not as it is presented in the LXX of Prov. 8:22-31 (see Cook, 1997, 224, 246; applied to wisdom-christology in Jobes, 2000, 226-50, 231-32). Reiling (1988) questions whether “we have to understand this wisdom as a οὐφία-Christology,” that is, “a christology after the model of the personified wisdom of Prov. 8:22-25; 9:1-6; 4:6-9 and its elaboration in Wis and Sir” (204). He thinks not, but he is still functioning with an unnecessary one-to-one relationship (such as Barbour’s) between the type of “personified wisdom” in contemporary scholarly “wisdom-christology” and the wisdom personified in Prov. 8:22-25. Reiling is rightly critical of a “personified wisdom” Christology in 1 Cor. 2:7 yet has wrongly dropped Prov. 8:22ff from discussion. Confirming Prov. 8:22-31 behind Paul’s statement about wisdom in 2:7 is not necessarily a whole-sale acceptance of the type of “οὐφία-christology” in modern discussions, and the mere fact that Jesus is not portrayed as the mediator of creation in 2:7 does not weaken the presence of Prov. 8:23 behind 2:7. While I am not denying to wisdom in Prov. 8:22-31 a role in creation, and while I am certainly not denying to Paul the notion of Jesus as mediator of creation (e.g., 1 Cor. 8:6; cf. Col. 1:15-16), it remains the case that one can refer to wisdom as it is in Prov. 8:22-31 without referring to the notion of such a “pre-existent mediator of creation,” and that Paul has done just this in 1 Cor. 2:7.

134 Theissen, 1987, 353n. 1. So Theissen writes that although Paul “restructure[ed the] traditional framework of interpretation” (360), Paul “unmistakenly presupposes wisdom traditions of the type of Wisdom of Solomon” (358). Scroggs (1967/68) argues: “The teaching in 1 Cor. 2:6-16 is derived directly from the context of Jewish and Christian apocalyptic-wisdom theology,” and he argues at length for Paul’s direct dependence on Wis. 9:9-18 (48-54) and other “apocalyptic-wisdom” texts (37-48). He does not mention Prov. 8:22-31. Granted, Proverbs 8 would not be classified under the sub-category of “apocalyptic” in the wisdom genre, but Paul’s blending of wisdom language with apocalyptic language
While there are points of contact between 1 Corinthians 1-4 and Wisdom of Solomon, and while it is helpful to recognize that Wisdom 9 itself blends together Genesis 1 and Proverbs 8 (see below), it is significant that Wisdom of Solomon lacks the phrase πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος from Prov. 8:23. From where did Paul get the particular idea that wisdom was “before the ages”? Paul’s contemplation of the character of God’s “wisdom” somehow brought him into contact with this temporal expression, and this is most readily explicable as the influence of Prov. 8:23 itself. When we compare Prov. 8:22-23 and 1 Cor. 2:7 (for clarity’s sake replacing the referents to wisdom in both passages—“me,” “which”—with “wisdom”) we see important similarities:

| Prov. 8:22 | Lord created [wisdom] the beginning of his ways for his works |
| 8:23 | he founded [wisdom] before the age (in the beginning) |
| 1 Cor. 2:7 | God pre-marked out [wisdom] before the ages for our glory |

Both Proverbs and Paul are discussing what God actively did to “wisdom,” both describe this act as taking place “before the age(s),” both present “wisdom” as directed “for”

surely does not disqualify Prov. 8:22-31 from the possibility of having a direct and authoritative influence on Paul.

Theissen (1987) does later use similar language to describe 1 Cor. 2:7 as he had Proverbs 8. I.e., in 2:7 Paul shows a connection between “the historical cross” and “the mythically conceived pre-existence of divine wisdom” (376; emphasis added), but Proverbs 8 is not actually mentioned again.

Cf. Wis. 6:22 and 1 Cor. 2:6-8a for a parallel not mentioned by Theissen but which could have helped his argument.

Wisdom of Solomon certainly bases much of his explanation of wisdom on Prov. 8:22-31 (cf. Wis. 6:22 with Prov. 8:22-23), but it does not use the phrase “before the age(s).” That is significant for our present discussion.

Contra Whybray (1965) who, for no legitimate reason, sees a connection between Paul and Proverbs 8 only as mediated through later wisdom writings (12).

Why did Paul use the plural “ages” while Prov. 8:23 (and others who quoted/glossed it) used the singular “age”? Plural “ages” was certainly used in the OT, occasionally of God’s pre-existence (Ps. 54:20; cf. Sir. 36:17), and in one of the typical phrases for (future) “eternity”: “unto the ages” (εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας or εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τῶν αἰώνων; cf. over 40x in the longer Greek of Daniel). In Eccl. 1:10 there are plural past “ages.” When one compares Philo’s use of “before the age” from Prov. 8:23 in, e.g., Ebr. 31 or Mut. 12, one sees only “our age” (τῷ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς αἰῶνι) and “the [age] before the age” (τῷ πρὸ αἰῶνος) (Mut. 12; Ebr. 31), and thus a fundamental difference with Paul, for whom exist “this [present evil] age” (τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου; cf. Gal. 1:4), “the ages” (τῶν αἰῶνων; 1 Cor. 10:11), “[the ages to come]” (τοῖς αἰῶναῖς τοῖς ἐπερχομένοις), cf. Eph. 2:7], and “before the ages” (πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων). Philo’s and Paul’s similar handling of this phrase to prove the validity of the “wisdom” that they themselves teach (Philo’s use being from Prov. 8:23), yet with different numbered “age(s)” therein, indicates that Paul’s plurality is most likely tied
(εἰς) a beneficial purpose, and both present wisdom as such so as to make their form of “wisdom” more attractive and desirable to their readers. Now, by remembering how Prov. 8:22-31 is itself evocative of Genesis 1 and by briefly seeing how a few ancient Jewish interpreters explicitly linked the two passages, we will demonstrate that these textual and conceptual correspondences between 1 Cor. 2:7 and Prov. 8:23 imply that Paul’s idea of God’s pre-determination and destination of “wisdom” is connected closely to the actual text of Genesis 1.

Through the phrase “before the age” (πρὸ τοῦ κίνησις), Prov. 8:23 expressed that God’s wisdom was firmly established and present with him “before” (πρό, 6x in vv. 23-25) the earth or anything else was made. Proverbs 8 is evocative of Genesis 1.141 Recalling a few examples will suffice. The temporal description “in the beginning” (ἐν ἀρχῇ) is immediately obvious (cf. v.23 and Gen. 1:1). The enigmatic temporal marker “before the age” is immediately explained in v.24 as “before” (πρό) the “making” of “the earth” (cf. Gen. 1:1), πρό the “making” of “the abysses” (cf. Gen. 1:2a), and πρό the proceeding of the fountains of “the waters” (cf. Gen. 1:2c). Verses 27-29 discuss God’s “preparation” (ἐτόπιμαζω) of “the heaven” (cf. Gen. 1:1, 6-8, 14-19) and his “making” strong the foundations of “the earth” (cf. Gen. 1:1, 9-10). When having Prov. 8:22-31 in mind, it is difficult to believe that Paul, or any such interpreter, would not also have had in mind the text of Genesis 1. But this “belief” is not merely a logical supposition, for blending Prov. 8:22-31 (especially v.23) and Genesis 1 was common before and during Paul’s time.


to his apocalypticism, i.e., his understanding of the dramatic in-breaking of the new creation proleptically in Christ (and thus the overlap of the two creations/ages). This is most likely what affected his gloss of the “age” in Prov. 8:23.
In Sirach 24, wisdom is placed in her cosmic and cosmogonic setting, having “come from the mouth of the Most High” and “cover[ing] the earth” as a mist (24:3). This is reminiscent to many of the speech of God in Genesis 1 and of the Spirit of God hovering over the face of the waters in 1:2 (cf. also Gen. 2:6). Wisdom explores “the circle of heaven” and “the depth of abysses” (24:5), recalling two of the realms of Gen. 1:1-2 that were also mentioned in Proverbs 8. After finally finding a home “in Jacob,” “in Israel” (24:8), the pre-eminence (and desirability) of this wisdom is expressed in the language of Prov. 8:23 where she says about her relationship to “the Creator of all things”: “Before the age [πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος], from the beginning [ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς] he created me [ἐκτισέν με], and until the age [ἐκος αἰῶνος] I will surely not cease” (24:9). Not creation in general, and not “wisdom” in general, but specifically the texts of Genesis 1 and Proverbs 8 are brought together as mutually interpretive.

In a similar manner, Wisdom of Solomon conveys the desirability of the wisdom taught by “Solomon” by inserting a reference to Proverbs 8 into a discussion of creation in the language of Genesis 1. In the prayer in Wisdom 9, God is the one “who made [ποιήσας] all things by your word [ἐν λόγῳ σου]” (v.1; cf. Gen. 1:3ff) and who

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143 Skehan, 1979, 377.
144 Despite the reticence of Conzelmann (1971 [ET], 235, n.27 [= 1964, 228, n.27]) to see Genesis 1 behind Sirach 24, it is now typically agreed that there are indeed “strong echoes” of Genesis 1 there (Skehan, 1979, 376-7; Skehan and Di Lella, 1987, 333; see n.142 above). Sirach also presents a reading of Genesis 1 in 42:15-43:33. This reading has numerous lexical correspondences with Genesis 1 (particularly with Gen. 1:14-19 in Sir. 43:1-10), and it is a theocentric reading: God’s “making” (ἐποίησεν) of all things presents God’s “glory” (42:17, 25; 43:28), “great is the Lord who made it” (μέγας κύριος ὁ ποιήσας αὐτόν, 43:5), and “in summary: He is all” (συντέλεια λόγων τὸ πᾶν ἐστιν αὐτός). It should also be noted, especially in preparation for what we will see in Paul, that in Sir. 42:21 we find the mention of God’s “wisdom” (τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ). God’s wisdom does not have as active a role in chs. 42-43 as it did in ch. 24, and neither is it here personified, but a phrase that had been used of wisdom in 24:9 (πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος…[καὶ ἐκ αἰῶνος]), there intentionally taken from Prov. 8:22-23, is in 42:21 applied to God himself: “he is before the age and unto the age” (ἐστὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος καὶ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα). As Philo and Paul both do, so also Ben Sira presents a theologically-focussed reading of Genesis 1, and Prov. 8:23 is closely allled with this reading.
“constructed man [κατασκευάσας ἀνθρωπον] in your wisdom [τῇ σοφίᾳ σου] in order that he might rule [δεσπόζῃ] over the creatures you made” (v.2; cf. Gen. 1:26-28).

“Solomon’s” contemplation of his task of making the temple in correspondence with the “holy tabernacle” that was “pre-prepared [προστειμασας] from the beginning [αὕτη ἀρχής]” (v.8; cf. ἐν ἀρχῇ in Gen. 1:1) leads him to desire the “wisdom” that “was with [God]” (μετὰ σοῦ), that “knew [God’s] works,” and that was “beside [God] when [he] made the cosmos [ὅτε ἐσόϊετο τὸν κόσμον]” (v.9; cf. Prov. 8:22-31). After considering his desperate need for wisdom (and for God to grant wisdom by the Holy Spirit) (vv.10-18), he immediately thinks of wisdom’s work in restoring Adam from his fall (10:1). Thus Wisdom of Solomon inserts Prov. 8:22-31 into a scenario built upon God’s designs not merely in creation in general, but specifically according to Genesis 1.

Likewise, Baruch makes his “wisdom” more desirable by relating God’s “finding” of it to the timing of creation and the text of Genesis 1. In Baruch 3, Israel has abandoned “wisdom” (vv.9-13) and is commanded to find her (vv.14-15). But no one knows wisdom (vv.16-23) and the giants (from Genesis 6) were destroyed for not having it (vv.24-28). All appears hopeless (vv.29-31; quoting Deut. 30:11-14) until Baruch says:

The one knowing all things knows [wisdom]; he found her with his understanding. The one constructing the earth [ὁ κατασκευάσας τὴν γῆν] unto the period of ages [εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα χρόνων] filled it with four-footed beasts [κτήμων τετραπόδων]. The one sending the light [τὸ φῶς] and it goes, he called it and it listened to him in trembling. (vv.32-34)

Though this passage is slightly less explicit than the other passages, it is the contemplation of “wisdom” and of God’s “knowledge” of it, especially of God’s “finding” of it (cf. Prov. 8:22-23), that prompts the discussion of God’s good creation as

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145 Also cf. “prepared” (ἡτοιμαζέων) in Prov. 8:27 and “pre-prepared” (προστειμασας) in Rom. 9:23.
expressed in the language of Genesis 1. The two texts appear to walk hand-in-hand through the mind of yet another interpreter.

Aristobulus, Philo’s Alexandrian predecessor in “Jewish-philosophy” (c. 170 BCE), in whom are “intermingled,” according to M. Hengel, “Jewish-Palestinian and Pythagorean-Platonic and Stoic conceptions,”\(^\text{147}\) inserts “wisdom” into a discussion of Genesis 1. This is not wisdom in general, nor is it creation in general, but specifically wisdom and creation as they are found in Prov. 8:22-25 and Genesis 1.\(^\text{148}\) Aristobulus mentions God’s gift of rest on the seventh day and God’s “genesis of light” on the first day—two obvious references to Genesis 1. He then links “wisdom” with light, citing “some members of the Peripatetic school,” and claims that Solomon (i.e., in Prov. 8:22-31) had more beautifully presented the creation of wisdom “before heaven and earth.” Solomon’s account thus corresponds to the account in Genesis 1, since light came about before sky and earth. As with the others, the combination of Prov. 8:22-31 and Genesis 1 has served to show the surpassing worth of the wisdom proclaimed by the writer.

As we have already seen, Philo himself blends Genesis 1 with Proverbs 8.\(^\text{149}\) His language of creation in Ebr. 30-31, into which he introduces Prov. 8:22-23, is similar to his typical cosmogonic expression in De Opificio Mundi, which is directly tied to Genesis 1. He there specifically quotes 8:22-23a and the phrase “before the age” (πρὸ τοῦ ἀιῶνος). Yet again, this functions to present God and his wisdom (represented in Philo’s own wise perspective on sobriety) as validated and desirable precisely because of the cohabitation of this wisdom with God at (before and in) creation.


\(^{149}\) For comparisons between Aristobulus’ interpretation of the creation narrative and Philo’s interpretation see Tobin, 1983, 50-55.
By Paul’s day and within his atmosphere of scriptural interpretation there was a natural and well-worn link between Prov. 8:22-31 and Genesis 1. In each writer observed above it was the specific text of Prov. 8:22-31 and the specific text of Genesis 1 that were mutually evocative. The actual phrase “before the age” (8:23) was not only the frequent textual focal point, but was also virtually synonymous with “before creation as described by Genesis 1.” Prov. 8:23 had hermeneutical implications for Genesis 1. Paul’s concept and language closely correspond with Prov. 8:22-23. Like each of these other authors and like Proverbs 8 itself, Paul’s purpose is to show the surpassing greatness of “God’s wisdom” over against the wisdom of “the rulers,” “humans,” and “the world.” He does this by claiming that God in some way delineated (cf. “founded,” “begat,” “created,” “found,” “pre-marked out”) his own wisdom “before the ages.” In light of Paul’s own language and purpose in 2:7, and in light of the general hermeneutical practice of Paul’s contemporary scripture-interpreters, two conclusions are appropriate. One, Paul has Prov. 8:22-31 in mind. Two, Paul’s interpretation of Genesis 1 will have been affected.

At this point it is merely an assumption, albeit a strong one, that Paul’s Before is connected to his reading of Genesis’ creation texts. We will now confirm that this is indeed the case. But while displaying that Paul’s Before is hermeneutically related to his Beginning, we also must mark out precisely what elements Paul’s Before contains. We will now define the content of Paul’s Before more specifically than merely “God’s wisdom.” We can do this because Paul himself does, and he ultimately uses the beginning of Genesis to help him.
Paul sees Christ, his crucifixion, and a plurality of benefits as having been “marked out by God” before the beginning and “prepared” for those who love God. These can be gleaned from Paul’s presentation of the Before in 1 Cor. 2:7-9 and context. That this Before was connected to Paul’s interpretation of Genesis’ Beginning has been left as a strong plausibility, but when we turn below to Paul’s other explicit presentation of the Before in Rom. 8:29-30, especially as this is seen in light of Paul’s argument in 1 Cor. 15:49, it will become evident that not only has the Before affected his reading of the Beginning, but that the text of the Beginning has mutually granted content to his Before. To accurately see Paul’s hermeneutic we must now move from within 1 Corinthians 1-2, through 1 Corinthians 15, and into Romans 8 with our eye focused on the content of Paul’s Before and its relation to creation.

1. Paul’s First Presentation of the Before: the Pre-Determined Mediator, Means, and Goal of Glory (1 Cor. 1:24, 30, and 2:7, 9)

An interpreter of 1 Corinthians faces an exegetical challenge when posing the question, “What is the content of God’s pre-determined wisdom?” For in the very pericope where Paul turns to explain that he and his companions do teach wisdom (2:6-16), his references to what this wisdom actually is are elusive. What is the wisdom that God “pre-determined unto our glory” (v.7)? What exactly was unknown to the rulers (v.8) and unknowable to general humanity (v. 9a-b), while “prepared for those who love God” (v.9c) and made known to believers by the Spirit (v.10)? What “things” have been

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150 So Barbour, 1979, 66.
“freely given to us” (v.12)? Paul continuously refers to this plurality of “things” which have their referent back in “God’s wisdom” in 2:6-7, but after announcing there that he does speak a pre-creationally determined wisdom, Paul does not define its content more specifically. Paul’s lack of explicitness in 2:6-16 has frustrated some, but explaining the content of God’s wisdom is outwith Paul’s scope in 2:6-16. This does not mean, however, that we are at the proverbial impasse. Part of Paul’s silence rests on the fact that he has already made clear what “God’s wisdom” is. This he did in 1:18-2:5.

We have already discerned a unified theme underlying both 1:18-2:5 and 2:6-16, that God’s pre-set and “wise” intentions have historical and social ramifications. Both of Paul’s references to “God’s wisdom” are further unified, not least in that in each subsection of his argument Paul draws an intimate connection between “God’s wisdom” and the “crucifixion.” Also, underlying the whole discussion in 1:18-2:16 Paul understands “God’s wisdom” (whether in 1:18-2:5 or in 2:6-16) and its benefits as having its source in

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153 Contra Davis (1984) who argues that Paul’s task in 2:6-9 is to “define carefully the wisdom which he speaks” (88). Paul’s narrow purpose in 2:6-7 is to assert that he does teach a wisdom, and his general purpose in 2:6-16 is to establish the unknowability of this wisdom apart from God’s Spirit. Neither of these purposes necessitate specifying its content, and he does not so specify.
155 The precise nature of the unity between the two references to “God’s wisdom” remains vague enough to allow differences in the details of Paul’s teaching to general Christians and to the “mature,” as if the differences between an introduction to theology and a higher level class. If there is any difference it should be conceived of quantitatively (the detail shared), not qualitatively (the subject matter—e.g., Christ).
156 The precise nature of the connection between “God’s wisdom” and “crucified the Lord of glory” in 2:7-8 is more difficult to pin down than the mere fact that they are connected. Although the difference in title between “Christ” in 1 Cor. 1:23-24 and “Lord of glory” in 2:7-8 may be significant, this neither negates nor dulls the fact that there is a connection between “God’s wisdom” and the “crucifixion” in both 1:23-24 and 2:7-8.
God and its destination in the benefit of believers (cf. 1:30; 2:7, 9-10). By 2:6-16, Paul seems to feel that he has already successfully conveyed the content of God’s wisdom. This divinely pre-marked out wisdom is “Christ Jesus” (1:30), “a Christ who was crucified” (1:24),\(^{157}\) the Christ-event.\(^{158}\)

It seems obvious to most scholars, although not all, that “God’s wisdom” in 2:7 is equivalent to “God’s wisdom” in “Christ crucified” from 1:24, 30.\(^{159}\) The Christ and his crucifixion is the historical enactment and “realization” of God’s pre-creational and wise intention to destroy the “wisdom” of those who boast in non-cruciform human wisdom.

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\(^{157}\) In both 1:24 and 1:30, the two passages where Paul explicitly relates “Christ” and “wisdom,” it is not a pre-existence that Paul has in mind but the historical manifestation in the man Jesus. This is especially the force of “became” in 1:30. In 8:6 Paul will certainly attribute creative agency to Christ. Although others were doing something like this with “wisdom” or “word,” and though in 8:6 Paul may have in mind “wisdom” as creation-mediator, Paul does not explicitly relate “wisdom” to this pre-existent and creative Christ in 8:6. The only place where Paul explicitly discusses “wisdom” as pre-existing and relates it to Christ in some way—1 Cor. 2:7 and context—he does not have a co-creative hypostasis or personification in mind. The relation of 1 Cor. 2:7 to Prov. 8:23 above (especially as this relates so closely to 1:24, 30) adds another (different) dimension to the continuing debate about Paul’s “wisdom-Christology.”

\(^{158}\) Barbour, 1979, 71. The apparent differentiation between two different “wisdoms,” one to all Christians and another to the “mature,” has kept some scholars from importing the content of “God’s wisdom” in 1:18ff into “God’s wisdom” in 2:6ff (Agourides, 1980, 102 in response to Wilckens’ change of opinion in 1980, 501-37). Barbour (1979) warns well that “a premature fusion or confusion of the different types of language with one another [sc. “God’s wisdom” in 1 Cor. 1:18-2:5 and “God’s wisdom” in 2:6-16] or with utterances of Pauline theology in general will fail to reveal the complex nature of the language-event which they jointly constitute and of the Christ-event to which they refer. Either the cross [sc. “God’s wisdom” in 1:18-2:5] will be submerged in the universality of the myth or the cosmic significance of the myth [sc. “God’s wisdom” in 2:6-16] will be lost in a concentration on the strange foolishness of God which the word of the cross proclaims” (71). While this warning is helpful in that it preserves the important nuances in each of Paul’s sections, it is still possible to acknowledge that “God’s wisdom” in both stages of Paul’s “language-event” refers to Christ-crucified-for-our-salvation-and-glory while in the first Paul focuses on its apparent foolishness and in the second Paul focuses upon its cosmic and pre-temporal origin.

\(^{159}\) Witherington, 1995, 127 (cf. idem, 1994, 302). Robertson and Plummer (1911) say, “The ‘wisdom’ is ‘Christ crucified’ (i.18-24), fore-ordained by God (Acts iv.28; Eph. iii.11) for the salvation of men. It was no afterthought or change of plan, as Theodoret remarks, but was fore-ordained ἀνωθὲν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς” (38-39). Bornkamm (1967) calls this “pre-temporal council” of God “the divine will to save fulfilled in the crucifixion of Christ” (4.819-20). Hays (1997) writes, “The content of the wisdom of God, which makes human wisdom look ridiculous, is precisely the cross” (40; cf. Welborn, 2005, 215). Kremer (1997) explains, “Jesus’ death on the cross is also not about the epitome of the powerlessness of Christ or God,” as the non-Christian Corinthians believed and as the Christian Corinthians were demonstrating, but rather it was about what God had decided “before the beginning of the aeons” (58; translation mine). Wilckens (1971) had said, “Almost all exegetes take the οὐφαία of 2:6f to refer to God’s plan of salvation” (7.519n.382), but he criticizes this treatment of οὐφαία by saying it is out of place in the Jewish apocalyptic use of οὐφαία (7.503ff) and in the use of οὐφαία in “the Greek sphere” (7.467-76). Since in 1 Corinthians 1-2 Paul is in the process of challenging the notions of οὐφαία among “the Jews” and “the Greeks,” it might be even more surprising if his view had fit comfortably into their schemes!
Thus H.-C. Kammler identifies “God’s wisdom” in 1:18-2:5 with “God’s wisdom” in 2:6-16 and concludes that 2:7 itself “implies” that the cross-event, with its destination in the glorification of believers, was God’s eternal and original purpose of salvation. B. Witherington simply claims: “Christ crucified was what God planned before the foundation of the world.” In 2:7, Paul claims that God “pre-marked out” the Christ and his crucifixion “before the ages” and “unto our glory.”

There is one more detail that has implications for our project of seeing Paul’s relation of the Before to the texts of the Beginning: the shift from the singularity of “wisdom” in 2:2-8 to the plurality of “things” in 2:9-16. Part of this shift may be due to the text Paul quotes here (whatever the text may be; cf. Isa. 64:3 [LXX]). Regardless of the reason for his pluralizing, Paul does not see a conflict between the plural and the singular “wisdom.” He even continues to use plurals throughout 2:10-16, even though the revelation by the Spirit continues to refer back to the “wisdom” which “has been hidden.” It seems as though it is not merely “Christ” or “Christ crucified” that God “prepared” for those who love him, but something of a plurality of benefits. Whatever the exact referents (perhaps righteousness, sanctification, and redemption), and Paul does not

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162 Garland (2003) sees εἰκονίζω in v. 9 as explanatory of προοιμίζω in v. 7 (98). Below is a chart begun by Fee, 1987, 107, and slightly elaborated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>v. 9</th>
<th>line 1: “What eye did not see and ear did not hear and did not enter into the heart of man”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>line 2:</td>
<td>“None of the rulers of this age understood [God’s wisdom]”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 3:</td>
<td>“What God prepared for those loving him” (“for God has revealed it to us by the Spirit”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 4:</td>
<td>“a wisdom which God predestined before the ages for our glory”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

165 The three benefits of Christ—righteousness, sanctification, redemption—can be described as a plurality of benefits coming from the Christ and his crucifixion regardless of precisely how they relate to
find it imperative to disclose these details in 2:6-16, it is important to observe this plurality, for in his later letter to the Romans Paul will make explicit a plurality of things which he refers to as “pre-marked out.” It may be impossible to connect these with certainty, but it is perhaps those blessings later mentioned to the Romans which Paul foreshadows in the plurality of preparations here mentioned to the Corinthians. God had intentions before the beginning and these were not simple but manifold. Regarding the content of God’s pre-creational wisdom which, as in Prov. 8:22, Paul sees as beneficial “unto” God’s works, they involve a) at the center the death of his Christ “for us” and b) the equally pre-creational benefits and ultimate glory of the community of God-lovers.

We have now seen in Paul’s first presentation of the Before both the presence and timing of God’s pre-creational deliberations, as well as (part of) the content of this plan. The part of the content of the Before that Paul reveals in 1 Cor. 2:7 has to do with the end of God’s pre-determination—glory and benefit “for” believers—and with the particular pre-determined mediator and means of this glory—Christ and him crucified. Paul’s second presentation of the Before, in Rom. 8:29-30, reveals an even greater robustness to Paul’s theory of God’s pre-creational determinations. Paul ties this presentation of the Before directly to the textual Beginning according to Genesis. This was expected based on his use of Prov. 8:23 and its evocation of Genesis 1. In Rom. 8:29-30, Paul combines his own reading of Prov. 8:23 from 1 Cor. 2:7 with his own reading of Gen. 5:3 from 1 Cor. 15:49. He there sees the eschatological enactment of the protological principle of “image”-bearing as something that God “marked out” before the protological enactment.

“wisdom,” whether appositional to “wisdom” (so Fee, 2007, 106n.63), appositional to “you” (so Witherington, 1994, 310-11; criticized by Fee, 2007, 106n.63), or additional to “wisdom.”
2. Paul’s Second Presentation of the Before: the Method and Members from Image to Glory (1 Cor. 15:49 and Rom. 8:29-30)

Paul uncovered the pre-creational roots of God’s wisdom in 1 Cor. 2:7; he unveils its eschatological fruit in 1 Cor. 15:35-49. In 1 Cor. 2:7, Paul does not explain how this pre-set “glory” will actually come to those for whom Christ was crucified according to the pre-creational desire and wisdom of God. In 1 Cor. 15:35-49, though not explicitly mentioning the Before Paul explains the eschatological reception of the pre-set telos (“glory,” along with many other benefits), and he does so in the language of Genesis’ Beginning. Our hypothesis above, based on Paul’s use of Prov. 8:23 in 1 Cor. 2:7, has been that his interpretation of creation will have been affected by his Before in a similar hermeneutical manner that we found in Philo (and others). Paul’s use of Genesis’ protological texts in 1 Cor. 15:35-49 (and especially his use of Gen. 5:3 in v.49) will add more credence to this logical assumption. In Rom. 8:29 our assumption will be truly confirmed.

1 Corinthians 15 and Romans 8 are connected to 1 Cor. 2:7 by most commentators, especially due to the word “glory” and Paul’s re-use of “pre-marked out”

168 E.g., resurrection in incorruptibility, glory, power (1 Cor. 15:42-43), a Spiritual and heavenly body (vv.44-49), a change into incorruptibility and immortality (vv.52-54), and victory (vv.54-57).
169 So Robertson and Plummer, 1911, 38; Héring, 1962, 18; Barrett, 1968, 71; Pearson, 1973, 34; Schrage, 1991, 1.252 and n.171; Kremer, 1997, 58; Thiselton, 2000, 243, 245; Kammler, 2003, 212, n.118; Garland, 2003, 95-96 (Senft, 1979, 49-50 connects the nullification of the “rulers”; Bornkamm, 1967, 4.819-20 connects “mystery”). We may add that the creation’s problem of “corruption” (φθορά, Rom. 8:21; 1 Cor. 15:42) is remedied by the appearance of “glory” (δόξα, Rom. 8:21; 1 Cor. 15:43), specifically the δόξαν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι εἰς τήματα (Rom. 8:18), i.e., εἰς δόξαν ἡμῶν (1 Cor. 2:7), ηainen δόξαν (1 Cor. 15:43), who have been “changed” from τὸ φθέρων into ἀφθεροῖαν (1 Cor. 15:52-54). As Beker (1980) puts it, “The future glory will wipe out the contradictions of the present” (365).
In fact, Rom. 8:29-30 appears to be Paul’s bringing together of the concepts, wording, and scriptural argumentation of 1 Cor. 2:7 and 1 Cor. 15:42-49 into one breath: 171:

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<th>Origin</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Cor. 2:7 discusses</td>
<td>προορίζω</td>
<td>(eschat.) δόξα</td>
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<td>1 Cor. 15 discusses</td>
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<td>via εἰκόνα (Gen. 5:3)</td>
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<td>Rom. 8:29-30 unites</td>
<td>προορίζω</td>
<td>(eschat.) δοξάζω</td>
<td>via εἰκόνα (Gen. 5:3)</td>
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In all three passages “glory” is one of a plurality of benefits received in the end. 172 In all three Jesus and his followers are described in similar terms to each other. 173 In all three Paul employs creation motifs. We have explored the creation motif in 1 Cor. 2:7: pre-Genesis 1 based on Prov. 8:23. We will now briefly mention such protological motifs in 1 Corinthians 15 and Romans 8 (a fuller treatment being reserved for chapters 2 and 3 below), and this will effectively set the context for our understanding of Paul’s re-use of the Before in Rom. 8:29-30.

In 1 Cor. 15:35-49, Paul’s argument unfolds in two parts. The first is based upon the beginning of the world according to Genesis 1 where Paul highlights God’s original desire for diverse bodily structures (15:38-41). The second is based upon allusions to and a quotation from the beginning of humanity according to Genesis 2 and 5 (15:42-49).

171 Similarly Bruce, 1971, 38; Dunn, 1988, 1.483.
172 Käsemann (1980) does not see “glorified” in Rom. 8:30 as received in the future (244). Lorenzen (2008) does (210-11). Jewett (2004) considers the aorist in Rom. 8:30 to convey “the initial evidence of this glory that will one day fill the creation (cf. 2 Cor. 3:18)” (34). Paul certainly has eschatological “glory” in mind in 8:17-21, and his language there of “co-inheriting,” “co-suffering,” and being “co-glorified” have a special family resemblance with his use of “co-forms” and “image” in 8:29, a process which is begun with God’s “pre-knowing” and “pre-marking” and completed with “glorification.”
173 Paul’s description of the method of glory-attainment—i.e., bearing/conforming to the εἰκόνα of Jesus (1 Cor. 15:49; Rom. 8:29)—has affinities with Paul’s shared-description in 1 Cor. 2:7-8 of both “us” and “the Lord” with the modifier “glory” (cf. Welborn, 2005, 216; Fee, 1987, 106; Conzelmann, 1975, 63n.63; Scroggs, 1967/68, 46, n.3).
Paul makes the protology and its eschatological re-enactment, both of which he develops in vv.37-47, applicable to contemporary people in vv.48-49. To do this he employs the protological principle inaugurated in Gen. 5:3:

**Gen. 5:3**  
*Adam* lived 230 years and gave birth according to his appearance [κατὰ τὴν ἱδέαν αὐτοῦ] and according to his image [κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ], and he called his name Seth.

**1 Cor. 15:49**  
And just as we bore the image [τὴν εἰκόνα] of the dust-one [sc. “the first man *Adam*”], also we will bear the image [τὴν εἰκόνα] of the heaven-one [sc. “the last *Adam*,” “the second man”].

In v.49a Paul summarizes Gen. 5:3 (cf. v.48a), and in v.49b (cf. v.48b) he recapitulates it for the eschaton. The implication is that the eschatological “glory” (and other benefits, in vv.42-44) which belongs to the resurrected “heavenly” nature of the last Adam is made applicable to this last Adam’s family through the re-enactment of the protological principle. This connection between protology and eschatology is relatively straightforward.

In Romans 8, Paul maintains his previous understanding just mentioned, but he reveals another dimension. The eschatological “glory” is again “for those who love God” (8:28; cf. 1 Cor. 2:9),\(^\text{174}\) and as Prov. 8:22 itself had made clear the ultimate aim of God’s activity is “for” the whole of God’s created works (Rom. 8:18-22). This “glory” (and other benefits) is attained by Christ’s family through the method of “image”-conformation (borrowed from 1 Cor. 15:49b):

**Rom. 8:29-30**  
“Because whom he foreknew [προέγνω], he also pre-marked out [προορίσευν] [for them] to be conformed to [συμμόρφωσις] the image [τῆς εἰκόνος] of his Son so that he might be the firstborn among many siblings.”\(^\text{175}\)


\(^{175}\) Seeing Gen. 5:3 behind Rom. 8:29 see Eskola, 1998, 171-72 and Heil, 2005, 234. For the more general recognition of “the Adam story” behind Paul’s “image” language in Rom. 8:29 cf. e.g., Cranfield, 1975,
Paul claims that the method of “image”-sharing found in the text of the beginning (Gen. 5:3) was itself “pre-marked out” (προώρισεν). The “pre-marking” in 1 Cor. 2:7-9 is not identical with the “pre-marking” in Rom. 8:29-30, however, and the difference adds to our understanding of the content of Paul’s Before.

In Rom. 8:30, what is “pre-marked out” is not Jesus himself, nor his cross, nor even God’s “wisdom”; it is people: “whom he marked out beforehand.” Paul is not arguing merely that those who accepted God’s previously marked out way to glory (i.e., Jesus crucified) he also called, but rather “those whom he pre-marked out he also called….“

Paul’s Before contains not only the mediator (Christ) and means (crucified) of “our glory” (1 Cor. 2:7), but also the members or participants of this glory whom God will subsequently call, justify, and glorify (Rom. 8:30).

Lastly, in Rom. 8:29 Paul envisions God’s bringing of the pre-destined glory from the pre-set cross of the pre-determined Christ to the pre-delineated members as achieved through a “pre-marked out” method or mode. Using a series of προ-prefixed verbs, Paul presents what God was doing before the beginning: God “pre-knew” (προέγνω), God “pre-marked out” (προώρισεν). Whereas the direct object of God’s foreknowledge are

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1.432; Käsemann, 1980, 244-45; Ziesler, 1989, 227; Byrne, 1996, 272-73; Witherington, 2004, 230. Collins (1999) writes: “The exhortation [sc. in 1 Cor. 15:49] harks back to the biblical tradition according to which the descendants of Adam bear his image (Gen. 5:3). This is combined with the notion that humans are created in the image of God (Gen. 1:27)” (572). For a similar passing reference to Gen. 5:3 but then a reversion back to Gen. 1:27 see Sterling, 2004, 42. Paul’s language is closer to Gen. 5:3 than 1:27, and this is important, but the main implications of this will be reserved for chapter 3.


177 Thiselton (2000) warns against importing “two thousand years of philosophical tradition” into God’s “predestination,” thereby “imposing” a supposed fixity on the mode by which the goal is reached” (242). In 1 Cor. 2:7 not only is the goal of glory fixed but so is “Christ crucified.” In Rom. 8:29-30 Paul adds the fixed mode of “image”-sharing, even fixing “those” who would receive this glorious goal. As we have mentioned before, however, there is still room to debate what Paul sees as the reason or even criteria for God’s pre-creational marking of “those whom” he so marks—but that discussion falls outwith our present purposes.
people (οὗς, 8:29a), in a similar manner as in Rom. 11:2. The direct object in v. 29b that God “marked out” for these people is actually the quality of “co-formity” (σύμμορφος), i.e. sharing the form of “the image” (ἡ εἰκών) of God’s Son.

The point should not be missed that it is the *eschatological enacting* of the protological principle that actually pre-dates the original Beginning itself. That is, Paul claims that the “shared-forms” of Jesus’ “image” were what God determined—“pre-

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178 Both Witherington (2004) and Eskola (1998) refer προγινώσκω in 8:29 to its use in 11:2, but they both miss different aspects of the impact of this relationship. Witherington denies that relational (i.e., covenantal) “knowing” could be part of προγινώσκω in 8:29 because of the pre-temporal nature of the word: it is not possible to have a relationship with someone who does not yet exist (228n.25). Therefore “fore-know” must refer to God’s knowledge of a future fact about these non-existent people: “that they would respond to the call of God in love” (229n.28; emphasis added). Therefore in 11:2 God can “foreknow” Israel without this guaranteeing any individual salvation (229-30). Yet Witherington does not apply his definition of “foreknow” to 11:2 as he did in 8:29. Paul does not merely believe that God knew certain facts about Israel beforehand but that he actually made Israel to be what they are out of “nothing” (so Rom. 4:17), not merely (fore-)knowing what they would become but making them such. From Paul’s point of view the inception of Israel, to say that God “fore-knew” Israel (11:2) is undoubtedly more than saying that God knew some fact about their future (which is true about any people—not just Israel). Why not interpret “fore-know” in 8:30 in such a robust manner? Eskola, on the other hand, recognizes the “covenantal” nuance of the Hebraic concept of “know” (170; cf. Dunn, 1988, 482). But Eskola does not consider the temporal prefix of προγινώσκω (or of προορίζω) to be of importance (contra Witherington), and this equation of προ-γινώσκω with γινώσκω works well for Eskola’s theology. But he thereby flattens Paul’s way of relating Israel to God. As Eskola acknowledges, Paul’s use of “foreknow” is based on the OT, especially Gen. 18:15 and Jer. 1:5 (170n.15). Yet both of those passages have important temporal and even causal connotations (see the perfect יָדַעְתִּֽנֹ [MT] and pluperfect יָדֹעַ [LXX] in Gen. 18:19; see the explicitly telling temporal nature of God’s relational “know” of Jeremiah: תַּכְלָּֽת יָדַעְתִּֽנֹ לְפֶה הַנָּעָרָֽתִּים [MT] and the especially striking interplay in LXX Jer. 1:5 between the aorist “formed” [cf. Gen. 2:7] and the pre-“formed” present “I know”: πρὸ τοῦ με πλάσαι αὐτῷ κοσμίζων [cf. Gen., Jer., and 1 Cor. 2:7] and the pre-“formed” present “I know” (against the evidence of Gen. 11:2) and neglect the (pre-)temporal nature of the προ-prefix (against the evidence of Gen., Jer., and 1 Cor. 2:7) and thus end up at Witherington’s and Eskola’s theological construct. But it is better to see that Eskola helpfully recognizes the OT conceptual background of Paul’s use of (προγινώσκω in Rom. 8:29 and 11:2 (although not realizing the full weight of his own insight), and Witherington helpfully recognizes the (pre-)temporal nature of this “know” (though not realizing the OT ability of God to relate to creatures that do not yet exist).

179 Considering “form” and “image” to be mutually interpretive, Lorenzen (2008) sees Paul referring to “the outward” (i.e., “bodily”) “appearance of Christ” (207-08; cf. Michaelis, 1968, VI.877n.37). This criticizes an exegetical rendering of 8:29 as regarding “God’s image, which is his Son” (as in Dunn, 1988, 1.483; Hughes, 1989, 27). Though Lorenzen does not think that the “Adam-Christ-typology” is in Paul’s mind in Rom. 8:29-30, she not only acknowledges it as a possibility but helpfully adds that “if the thought of Adam-Christ-typology is present, it would be—as in 1 Corinthians 15—not primarily Gen. 1:26f but 5:1-3 that is in the background” (210n.54; translation mine). This is a helpful recognition, and we will develop it in chapter 3.
marked out”—before the beginning. With this statement in v.29, our reasonable assumption above concerning a connection between Paul’s Before and his interpretation of the Beginning is truly confirmed. Paul has re-employed the protological principle of Gen. 5:3 from 1 Cor. 15:49—Adam’s family sharing his “image”—but not to explain protology (as in 15:49a) nor even merely eschatology (as in 15:49b). He uses the text of Genesis’ creation to explain more of the content of what God had determined before the creation of Adam’s “image” or even the world.

In summary, when Paul reads the Beginning of his scriptures he sees a Before. This ultimate Before consists of a wise and divine “preparation,” a pre-delineation that is intended to result in the “glory” of God’s Son’s family who “love God.” Through their pre-determined glory an incorruptible freedom comes to the whole creation itself (Rom. 8:21). Paul’s notion of the Before is thoroughly Christocentric. This does not mean that Christ himself was the only object of God’s pre-determination, but rather that the plurality of God’s determinations before the beginning each are related to the pre-determined Christ. The content of Paul’s Before includes as of first importance the mediator and means of a pre-delineated glory: the Christ and his crucifixion. It is also the members of the glory and the actual method of its attainment that Paul considers to be “pre-marked out” by God before the beginning of the ages. The pre-determined method toward glorification is conformation to the very “image” of God’s Son (Rom. 8:29), the

180 Cranfield, 1975, 1.432.
182 P. Jewett (1985) asks, “Does the problem consist in the fact that many have misunderstood the object of predestination, that when they should have thought of the object of election as Christ, the Chosen Servant of the Lord, they have instead thought of a fixed number of individuals…?” (2). Though all objects of “predestination” are somehow related to Christ, we can see from only 1 Corinthians and Romans that Paul saw a complex of “objects” marked out by God before creation.
“heavenly man” (and “last Adam,” 1 Cor. 15:49), the “Lord of glory” (1 Cor. 2:8). Within this multiplicity of divine pre-deliberations we can boldly affirm that Paul had a notion of the Before, and this Before is Christocentric.

1 Corinthians 2, 15, and Romans 8 together unveil in Paul not only a particular way of thinking about the Before, but also a way of interpreting scripture. Paul weaves together a tapestry of thoughts concerning protology, eschatology, Christology, doxology, the telos of believers, and our likeness with Jesus in glory, each of which are connected to what Paul sees as “marked out” by God before the creation of the world. But these are not abstract assumptions disconnected from the texts of his scripture. Paul connects these aspects of the Before to Prov. 8:22-31 and to the creation texts of Genesis. As we have already begun to see, and as will be explored further in the remainder of our study, just as Philo displays a reading of the Beginning and the Before in which both function in dynamic reciprocal relation to each other, so does Paul.

4. COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS: PHILO AND PAUL ON BEFORE THE BEGINNING

Throughout this chapter we have noticed a number of similarities in Philo’s and Paul’s interpretations of creation. Both took aspects of texts outwith Genesis but similar to it—Philo using the Timaeus, Paul using Proverbs 8—to begin to fix their eyes on God’s mental and causative pre-protology. Both took empirical observation—Philo seeing the world’s beauty around him, Paul seeing the risen Christ who had been crucified—and then further developed their respective Befores by combining the texts and these experiences. Thus both connected the Before to Genesis itself, reading the Beginning in
light of their perceived Before. Philo thus exegeted the necessity of a “good” and noetic paradigm of the cosmos’ structure; Paul thus exegeted the “wise” intentions of God that result in both “good” and “glory” (and “freedom”) for God-lovers and the whole creation. Neither Philo nor Paul, however, simply imposed a pre-defined pre-protology onto Genesis’ protological texts. Their interpretations of Genesis also shaped their understandings of the Before. There exists a broad hermeneutical similarity between these two interpreters.

Both interpreters also display a theocentric emphasis to the Before. It is God’s skillfulness as Creator that Philo highlights by drawing attention to his pre-set intentions and pre-deliberations. Philo boasts in God for his creative genius. For Paul, God is the pre-Intender who deserves our boasts. God is the one who marked out in the Before not only the ultimate goal of goodness and freedom for creation but also a whole host of salvific benefits for people who love God. In one way, this theocentric emphasis of both interpreters is to be expected, for the textual object of each man’s exegesis—the beginning of Genesis—is itself theologically oriented, emphasizing the God who creates the cosmos and humanity. It stresses the superior word of God and enforces that things continue to happen “in this manner” in which he decided.

Within these broad hermeneutical and theological similarities, however, we must also acknowledge differences between Philo and Paul, and it is precisely in light of their similarities that these differences can be refined appropriately. In both schemes God’s preparatory deliberations are causative—another similarity—but for Philo God’s plan causes a beautiful architectural and structural triumph in humans and the world, while for Paul God’s plan causes a historical and cruciform triumph for humans and the world.
Both emphases can be seen in Genesis 1ff, for there God causally initiates both ontic structure and historic direction. Each of these facets of the beginning of Genesis comes out especially clearly when read in light of either Plato’s “paradigmatic” structure or Proverbs’ destiny of “unto his works.” We should be careful not to relegate structure to Philo’s interpretation of creation alone, for as we will see in chapter 2 it is the differentiated ontological structure of bodies on which Paul focuses in 1 Cor. 15:38-41. It would be equally inappropriate to relegate historical-enactment to Paul’s interpretation of creation alone, for it is of chief theological import for Philo that God’s creativity is intimately wed to his providential and continuous caring for his creation (e.g., in Op. 9-11 and 171-72). But regarding the specific aspect of their explicit Befores, the type of effect enacted in creation because of God’s pre-deliberations does have this different focus for each interpreter: Philo’s ontic structural focus, Paul’s historical redemptive focus.

Many people in Paul’s and Philo’s day were gazing into the Before. While Philo is confident that due to God’s intentions before creation the physical world would turn out structurally “good,” Paul is confident that due to God’s intentions before creation all things in history (even suffering) will turn out “for good” and “for glory” for those who love God and who were purposefully called. While for Philo God’s pre-determination did not directly affect historical moments, it did affect the outcome of the physical creative process, making it beautiful, even making possible a goal toward which to aspire and to which people could attain. Paul saw in God’s Before God’s Son coming in a flesh that was to be crucified for the benefits of believers, and he saw a pre-determined people receiving pre-determined glory through a pre-determined conformation to God’s Son’s image. Lest we forget the primary argument of this chapter, however, it should be
reasserted that Paul’s language of the Before, just like with this first strand of Philo’s hermeneutic of creation, has been seamlessly intertwined with his reading of the Beginning. This hermeneutical similarity does not deny their difference. The core to each Before is still aeons apart, and these Befores will affect the remainder of their readings of Genesis’ texts concerning the beginning of the world and the beginning of humanity.

Our understanding of Paul’s theology of the Before has been sharpened by comparison with Philo’s, especially as each “theology” is analyzed as a reading of shared texts. Paul’s Before reflects God’s wise pre-creational planning as a revelational and redemptive purposing of what God would do with this creation once it had been created (and after it had been subjected to the slavery of sin, death, and corruption). For Paul, God revealed part of his nature (his eternal power and divinity) through the things that he created (Rom. 1:20). But before he created such things, God had wisely determined that a more full knowledge of himself would be only in his Son, in the crucifixion of this Lord of glory, and in the gift of shared-glory to those whom he marked for conformity with what would be—in time, space, history, and resurrection—his Son’s “image.” Then God created the world, the human, and the propagation of the “image” to humanity as recorded in the beginning of Genesis.
Chapter 2

The Beginning of the World

God said, “Let there become…,” and the universe became. In the beginning of Genesis, God’s voice and word quickly commands attention.¹ Though other themes are certainly important in Genesis 1,² the fact that “every day begins with God speaking”³ can imply that creation “is about [God] first of all,”⁴ even about his powerful and effective intentions.⁵ Within the text God’s imperatives abound, and these naturally imply his desire.⁶ God’s “intelligence and volition”⁷ prompt his effective word, the latter being the “outward expression” or “realization” of his “deliberately formed purpose.”⁸

In chapter 1 we saw how Paul’s understanding of God’s mental activity in the Before was, like Philo’s, intimately related with the textual Beginning. Though their Befores had roots in texts outwith Genesis, they were not merely imposed onto the text from previously held and disassociated metaphysical speculations, but were reciprocally

¹ Cf. Ps. 32:8-9 (LXX), which uses language of Genesis 1 to highlight God’s effective and trustworthy word. See Currid, 1997, 61 (he also compares with Genesis 1 “the logos doctrine” of ancient Egyptian cosmogonies, 60-61; 61n.58, 62-63).
² E.g., order, blessing, and land: so Sailhamer, 1992, 81-2.
³ Van Wolde, 1996A, 22.
⁴ Kidner, 1967, 43.
⁷ Skinner, 1910, 7.
affecting and affected by their interpretations of the textual features themselves. Yet since our focus was on Philo’s and Paul’s understandings of the Before, we only received a few glimpses of how these reciprocal affects took shape. As the title to our chapter suggests, our focus now will be on the beginning of the world. One aspect of Paul’s and Philo’s interpretations of this cosmic Beginning is the implicit Before of God’s desires and purposes. This chapter therefore has two purposes. It will bring to light more details than are typically observed about Paul’s interpretation of the creation of the world in comparison with Philo’s. It will also further explore and then confirm the interrelatedness of the Beginning (of the world) and Before in the interpretations of both readers.

We will now approach Philo’s and Paul’s treatments of the beginning of the world in two stages, first regarding day one and the creation of light (Gen. 1:2-5), then regarding the second through sixth days and the creation of all else within heaven and earth (Gen. 1:6-31). First, however, both stages will together be introduced with a few comments on Genesis 1 itself.

1. GENESIS 1, GOD’S SOVEREIGN DESIRE, AND THE WORLD’S GOODNESS

The first divine words in the Bible are elegant in their simplicity and powerful in their effect: “God said, ‘Let there be light’, and there was light” (1:3). God’s voice pierces the silent darkness, and light appears ex nihilo. As a whole, Genesis 1 does not present creation monolithically. It is not merely by God’s word or only ex nihilo. Creation is performed by a combination of God’s bare “commands”—which themselves

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9 Though Sacks (1990) is critical of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in Genesis 1, he recognizes it in 1:3 (4); cf. K. Mathews, 1996, 129; Haffner, 1995, 47.
“immediately produce the desired effect” — of God’s craftsmanship as “Maker,” and of God’s employment of “mediators” such as the water or earth. This complex of creative methods arises irregularly in the text, but harmoniously. Though these different models of divine creativity are distinct, they are nonetheless unified by the grammatical similarity which precedes and introduces them all, beginning in 1:3: “And God said….”

The resultant phrase, “And it came about, light” (יָכַלְכָּלַם, καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς), is paradigmatic for the repeated phrase throughout the rest of the account, “and it came about in this manner” (יָכַלְכָּלַם, καὶ ἐγένετο οὐτῶς). The grammatical pattern begun in v.3, where the thing summoned by God (“light”) is exactly what comes into being (“light”), remains structurally the same in the successive statements:

“And God said, ‘Let light…’ → and it came about, light’
“And God said, ‘Let [X,Y,Z]…’ → and it came about in this manner”

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10 E.g., light, dry land. Watson, 1994, 140-41. Noort (2005) remarks that in Genesis 1 יָכַלְכָּלַם “claims that the word of Elohim is carried out in such a way that the result is in conformity with that word” (8).
11 E.g., firmament, luminaries, humankind. Watson, 1994, 141. MT hosts seven enactments (what Watson calls “fabrications”) in which God is the specified actor. LXX adds a perfective statement after God’s volition in v.9a thereby producing a perfect balance of God speaking and of things happening just as God speaks them (see Cook, 1982, 25-36, esp. 28-30). (Concerning the possible hermeneutical motivations for the LXX’s changes to the Hebrew, see Rösel, 1994; critiqued by Cook, 2001, 322-28).
12 E.g., vegetation, sea creatures, living creatures. Watson, 1994, 142.
13 E.g., in Gen. 1:24 God commands “the earth” to participate in “bringing up” animals, but in v.25 God is the one who “makes” the animals with no mention of the earth’s participation. Yet in between these two statements the text records that “it came about in this manner,” thus presenting irregularity without tension.
14 Watson (1994) writes, “Grammatical similarity (‘Let there be…’ (יָכַלְכָּלַם)) conceals the presence of different models of divine action” (141). My statement above, intentionally borrowing Watson’s language, is focusing on a different (mutually inclusive) issue. The diversity remains, while it is also true that, as Watson himself writes, “the coming into being of an entity is always preceded by a divine word” (141).
15 Cf. MT 6x and LXX 7x; v.3 is grammatically (and thus thematically) paradigmatic for vv.6-7, 9, 11, 14-15, [LXX 20], 24, 29-30. The six-fold repetition of the first יָכַלְכָּלַם-phrase suggests that the MT meant for the latter six to be interpreted in light of v.3, thus making an “even” seven יָכַלְכָּלַם-phrases. Noort (2005) helpfully highlights the thematic comparison (11), but the equivalence is more profound than a mere comparison. Wenham (1987) thus hits the mark when calling the subsequent fulfillment formulas an “exact echo” of the one in v.3, and concludes that this “emphasizes the total fulfillment of the divine word” (18).
16 Westermann, 1984, 41.
The only change is that the fulfillment clause becomes general, i.e., “it came about,” to allow for exact repetition regardless of its precise created referent (whether firmament, plants/seeds, luminaries, etc.). Throughout the narrative, starting in v.3 and shaped by v.3, what came about was what God desired.

The same type of programmatic and paradigmatic significance is also evident between God’s value-judgment in v.4, “And God saw the light [הַלַוְיָה, קָאִי אֲלֹהֵי אֲדֹנָי], that it was good [כִּי כְּרָתְפֹה, וַתִּקָּלַו],” and the oft-repeated but shorter phrase, “And God saw [הַלַוְיָה, קָאִי אֲלֹהֵי] that it was good [כִּי כְּרָתְפֹה, וַתִּקָּלַו].”17 This aesthetic pattern is finally and climactically repeated in the conclusion: “God saw [הַלַוְיָה, קָאִי אֲלֹהֵי] all that he had made, and behold, it was exceedingly good [כִּי כְּרָתְפֹה, וַתִּקָּלַו].”18

Thus the wording of Gen. 1:3-4 is hermeneutically significant for the rest of the cosmogony. Just as what “came about” on day one was exactly what God commanded and was ontologically “good,” so each time these phrases are repeated throughout the account the reader is reminded of the initial phrase and therefore of the exact, immediate, and good fulfillment of God’s will and word.19 These two statements in “day one” thus

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17 Cf. v. 4 with vv.[LXX 8.] 10, 12, 18, 21, 25.
18 V.31 uses the direct object in the way of v.4 (contra Noort, 2005, 8).
19 So Westermann, 1984, 41; Gelander, 1997, 95; Watson, 1994, 140-41. Contra Parker (2005), who interprets הָローֹ (445-47; contrary to its typical use as an adverb of manner [BDB, 4573]: cf. Judg. 6:38, 40; LXX 2 Ki. 7:20; 15:12) and its irregular use in Genesis 1 (443-45, 447) as presenting a god whose will and words are not perfectly obeyed, with ontology being “more differentiated than [God had] planned” (451). (Noort, 2000, 12 and 18 draws similar theological conclusions from the narrative of Genesis 2). As we will see below, Parker’s reading of Genesis 1 has less affinities with Philo’s and Paul’s interpretations than it does with certain “third century gnostic tractates,” with the early second-century heretic Saturninus (as described in Irenaeus’ Adversus haereses 1.24.1-2), and with Menander (as described in Irenaeus Haer. 1.23.1, 5)—all three of whom, according to Thielman (2005), “apparently believed that the created world
stand out from the rest as a paradigm stands out from its model, and yet at the same time are integrally inseparable as a paradigm is with its model. Gen. 1:3-4 opens to the reader two of the major themes which are repetitively confirmed throughout Genesis 1 as a whole: the sovereignty of the Creator’s action and desire, and the accordingly ontic goodness of his creation. Paul, like Philo in his commentary, makes much of both of these themes as he also interprets the same beginning of light according to Gen. 1:2-5 and the same beginning of the rest of the world according to Gen. 1:6-31.

2. THE GOD WHO SPOKE LIGHT: PHILE AND PAUL ON GENESIS 1:2-5

Philo and Paul each treat God’s creation of light as something special. Even after its prominent beginning in Gen. 1:3-5, according to their shared scripture (as our notes below show) light continues to play an important part in Jewish history, cultic practice, and lawful piety. God’s being and actions are often associated with or characterized by light. “Light” and “glory” shine from the Lord’s face. The association between light and God certainly has a cosmogonic dimension—e.g., he created it—but often also describes his historical accomplishments on behalf of

was essentially an imperfect place, mired in the inept fabrications of the god described in the early chapters of Genesis” (411; see 410-11). Watson’s interpretation of “good” as “a conformity between the final product and the original intention” (1994, 145-46) is much closer to Paul’s and Philo’s concept, in which God willed and spoke and all things happened exactly in that manner.

20 E.g., Ex. 10:23; Est. 8:16; cf. 2 Mac. 1:32.
21 E.g., Ex. 27:20; 35:14; 39:16; Lev. 24:2; Num. 4:16; 2 Chr. 4:20; Eze. 42:7; cf. 1 Mac. 1:21; 2 Mac. 1:32.
22 For the law as a light and personal piety as light, e.g., LXX Ps. 118:105; Prov. 4:18; 6:23; Isa. 26:9; 58:8, 10; cf. Sir. 24:27 (and 24:32, both in the context of 24:23ff); Wis. 18:4; Bar. 4:1-2 (see also 1 Jn. 1:7; 2:9-10).
23 E.g., 2 Sam. 23:4; LXX Ps. 35:10; 103:2; Job 37:3, 11, 21-22; Isa. 2:5; 51:5; 60:1-3, 19-20; Dan. 2:22; Hos. 6:5; Hab. 3:4, 11; cf. Sir. 50:29; Bar. 5:9 (see also Jam. 1:17; 1 Tim. 6:16; 1 Jn. 1:5).
24 See especially Num. 6:25; cf. LXX Ps. 4:7; Ps. 30:17; 66:1; 79:4; 8, 20; 88:16; 118:135. The facial shining is connected to “mercy” in Num. 6:25 and to “salvation” in LXX Ps. 30:17; 79:4; 8, 20.
25 For God’s creation of light: LXX Ps. 135:7; 148:3 (cf. vv. 5-6); Job 37:15 (φῶς τοιχίας ἐκ σκότους); Isa. 45:7 (ὁ κατασκευάσας φῶς καὶ τοιχίας σκότος); Jer. 10:12-13; 28:15-16 (= 51:15-16 MT); 38:36 (=
people. Light was associated with the illumination of “knowledge” or “wisdom,” itself occasionally salvific. This last feature of the light-motif had correlates within the formal and popular philosophical discussions of the Graeco-Roman world.

Not surprisingly, light became invaluable for communicating the nature of God’s understanding, his “wisdom.” For example, in Wisdom of Solomon God’s “wisdom” has “untiring brightness” (7:10) and this “worker of all things” is the “eternal light” which, as such, is cosmic (7:27; 8:1), salvific (7:27), and even had been revealed to Israel during the Egyptian plagues (Ex. 10:21-23) as a forerunner to “the incorruptible light of the law” (τὸ ἀφθαρτὸν νόμου φῶς) for eternity (Wis. 18:4b).

Within such a context where so many scriptural, religious, and philosophical concepts offered the significance of light, both Philo (in Op. 30-35) and Paul (in 2 Cor. 4:6) turn their audiences to God’s creation of light as described in Gen. 1:2-5. We will demonstrate that Paul, like Philo, emphasizes God’s creative voice, connects God’s cosmogonic shining to God’s salvific illumination, and displays a hermeneutical tendency to emphasize God himself within these two all-important activities. Within these

31:35 MT); cf. Bar. 3:33. For God’s new creation of light see Isa. 42:16 (ποιήσω αὐτοῖς τὸ οὐκόσι έλξ φῶς).

26 For “salvific” acts characterized by light: 2 Sam. 22:29; LXX Ps. 17:29; 36:6; 42:3; 96:11; 111:4; 138:11-12; Prov. 13:9; 20:27; Job 29:3; Isa. 9:1; 30:26; 42:6, 16; 49:6; 50:10; 51:4-5; 53:11; 58:10; 62:1; Mic. 7:8-9; cf. Pss.Sol. 3:12 (see also Lk. 1:79; Eph. 5:8; Col. 1:12-13; 1 Pet. 2:9).

27 See LXX Ps. 88:16; 118:130. (Cf. Philo: Op. 53-54; Plant. 40; Paul: Rom. 2:17-20).


30 “Light” and “wisdom” are not explicitly connected much within Philo’s and Paul’s scripture, but cf. Eccl. 2:13; 8:1; and Dan. 2:22 where God “knows” (γνωρίζω) both what is in darkness and what is “in the light” (τὰ ἐν τῷ φῶς) (cf. Luke 8:17). Philo writes (in a cosmogonic context) “wisdom itself is splendor and light” (QG. 1.7).

31 Cf. Prov. 8:22-31 and Genesis 1.

32 On Wis. 7:25-31 see Goodenough, 1935, 268-76.

33 See Davis, 1984, 49-62.
similarities, Paul and Philo show different understandings of how the light of Gen. 1:2-5 relates to its bodily encapsulation.

**A. PHILO’S READING OF GENESIS 1:2-5: A SPECIAL LIGHT, ITS BODILY DIMMING (**Op. 30-35)

God himself is the transcendent light, unsurpassable in essence. But he also created light. Philo often dwells on the nature of created light, and more often than not he turns to Genesis 1 to do so. Within many of these discussions, Philo also often transitions from various aspects of Genesis 1 and particularly Gen. 1:2-5 to personal experience and ethics. Within his commentary specifically, God spoke his wisdom and thereby “made” the incorporeal paradigm of light in Gen. 1:3-5, an invisible light that would serve as a paradigm for all light-bearing bodies in Gen. 1:14-19. Yet although it is cosmic and cosmogonic, God’s light is not thereby only transcendent and distant. Elsewhere Philo explains his own experience of personal study in terms of God giving (or withholding) “light” and “sight” (Migr. 34-35). God is a personally sovereign Illuminator as well as a cosmically sovereign one. We will now investigate Philo’s exegesis of Gen. 1:3-5,

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34 Philo often characterizes God himself as light, typically using it to illustrate his unsurpassableness: Ebr. 37-45, esp. 44 (surpassing other gods); Somn. 1.72; cf. 65-71, 83-84 (surpassing his assistants); Spec. 1.36-37 (surpassing all light).

35 In Migr. 38-42, Philo moves from God’s “wisdom” in Gen. 1:31 to personal experience of the “light” of “wisdom.” In Spec. 4.186-196, which is not only relatable to Tim. 53ab (so Dillon, 2005, 99) and Tim. 30a (so Runia, 2001, 117; idem, 1986, 140-48, 451-52), but has also been affected by Genesis 1 (so Runia, 2001, 145-46; Leonhardt-Balzer, 2004, 335, 343) more profoundly than is typically realized, Philo moves from God’s activity of bringing “light out of darkness” (in Gen. 1:2-3) to the desired activity of rulers in bringing good out of bad situations (cf. van Kooten, 2008, 195-96; Runia, 1986, 146). In Abr. 156-63, Philo connects God’s purpose in Gen. 1:3-5 and 1:14-19 as being “for sight” with the human ability to cosmically contemplate through “wisdom.” It is a more typical practice of Philo to move from the cosmogonic text to personal experience, especially via the motif of “light.”

36 Cf. Op. 31; Migr. 40-42; Plant. 27 (light as divine revelation). So Radice, 2009, 139; see Lorenzen (2008) for more on Philo’s links between “light” and “understanding” and “wisdom” (77-80, 97-100).

37 For Philo’s combination of “light” and “sight” see, e.g., Spec. 1.54 (cf. LXX Ps. 35:10; 2 Cor. 4:4); van Kooten, 2005, 160-61.
particularly noting his hermeneutical move from this text and its transcendent light to the personal experience of illumination.

Four textual features were decisive in Philo’s reading of Gen. 1:1-5 as the noetic Before, and they set the stage for Philo’s exegesis of the light of vv.3-5 in §§30-35. The textual label “day one” (Gen. 1:5)—the day within which light is produced (vv.3-5)—testifies to uniqueness (“one-ness”) and therefore the ideal realm (§15). An ideal realm is expected anyway, for only with a “beautiful” Before can the product be “beautiful” (§16), which the world clearly is in Genesis 1, and light clearly is in v.4. Only an incorporeal paradigm is “invisible,” which the “earth” of day one is (v.2) (§29). And only a corporeal product is “firm,” which all things subsequent to light are (vv.6-31) (cf. §§36, 51). Within this construal of day one, the “light” of Gen. 1:3 is obviously “the incorporeal essence of light” (§29). Out of the seven incorporeal elements that God “made” in vv.1-3, Moses set “special distinction” on “spirit” in v.2, calling it “of God,” and on “light” in v.4, specifying that it was “surpassingly beautiful” (ὑπερβαλλόντως καλὸν) (§30). For Philo, this textual light “out-shines [λαμπρότερον] and out-radiates [αὐγοειδέστερον] the ‘visible’."

Combining details of v.2 (“invisible”) and v.3 (God’s creative speech), Philo explains that “that ‘invisible’ [ἄόρατον] and noetic light has become an image [εἰκῶν] of the divine word [θείου λόγου] which communicated [διερμηνεύσωμεν] its genesis” (§31). Plato would not have appreciated Philo’s description of this noetic light as having “become” (γέγονεν) and as having “genesis” (τὴν γένεσιν), but Philo’s sacred text

38 See Spec. 3.180: the “unit” is the “image” of “the first Cause”; the number two, being divisible, is an image of “the divisible matter that is worked upon” (cf. Leg. 1.3). See Radice, 2009, 132; Leonhardt-Balzer, 2004, 343; Tobin, 1983, 60, 97-98.
39 See Abr. 156; Leonhardt-Balzer, 2004, 343.
40 Radice, 2009, 132.
compels him to consider it so. What it “became” was “an image” of God’s causative word, a word which “communicated its genesis.” This divine communication of light’s beginning, as elsewhere in Philo’s writings, derives from the paradigmatic phrase “And God said…” in Gen. 1:3.41

A slightly different nuance is presented in Somn. 1.75. There Philo describes God himself as “light” (quoting LXX Ps. 26:1) and thus as the divine “paradigm” for light. He qualifies this, saying that God is actually the “paradigm of the paradigm,” since the incorporeal light of Gen. 1:3 is actually the paradigm for corporeal lights (those mentioned in Gen. 1:14-19, cited in Somn. 1.85-86).42 But Philo then identifies this incorporeal light with God’s own “most perfect word.” In Op. 31, on the other hand, the light is not identical with God’s word but is its “image.” However, due to the fluidity of Philo’s language and concepts (which we will see more in our third chapter regarding “image” in Gen. 1:27), the difference between these two relationships between “light” and “word” is actually more perceived than real.44 In Op. 17-20, the noetic cosmos (the Before) is located in God’s word just as a mental blueprint of a city is in the architect’s mind, but in §§24-25 the noetic cosmos is God’s word (λόγος) just as the mental city-plan

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41 Radice (2009) writes that the repeated phrase, “And God said…and there was” led “Alexandrian exegetes” “to give particular emphasis to the relationship that exists between the word of God (logos) and the act of creation” (137; cf. van Kooten, 2005, 154; Cox, 2005, 18; Runia, 2001, 143; Leonhardt-Balzer, 2004, 343). More generally on Philo’s Logos see also Tobin, 1992, 117-19 and Runia, 1986, 438-51.

42 That in Somn. 1.75 Philo has the specific text of Gen. 1:3-5 in mind should be clear from his combination of “word,” “light,” and “created.” This is confirmed when Philo then quotes Gen. 1:4. Concerning the likeness of the sun to God, Philo may have in the back of his mind, e.g., Plato’s Rep. 509a (so van Kooten, 2008, 183), Proclus’ Hymn to Helios 1.33-35 (ibid., 94-95), and/or Plutarch’s To an Uneducated Ruler 780e-f (ibid., 97). Yet even if these texts are behind him, Philo himself explicitly traces out the symbolism biblically and cosmogonically, actually citing Psalm 26 and Genesis 1.


44 Runia (2001) offers that Op. 31 may be corrupt (168). This is probably unnecessary in light of the fluidity of some of Philo’s concepts. Leonhardt-Balzer’s description of Philo’s use of metaphor and simile in Op. 15-25 warns against pressing Philo’s language too far (2004, 324-44).
is (ἐστι) the architect’s mental activity (κογιομός). Philo also does not use “image” uniformly either within Op. 15-25 or in his broader corpus.

The text of Gen. 1:3 can stimulate either interpretation, word as light (so Somn. 1.75) and light as “image” of word (so Op. 31). When God opened his mouth in Gen. 1:3, what was produced? Some may answer “light” while others “word” for God spoke and light happened. The common theme of both of Philo’s readings of Gen. 1:3 is that light is produced by none other than God’s own word. C. Westermann posits that Genesis 1 “is colored and determined by the words ‘and God spoke…and it was so’.” As had the whole text of Genesis 1, but particularly 1:3, Philo draws special attention to the sovereignty of God’s word in the paradigmatic creation of light.

Philo’s purpose in Op. 30-35, however, is actually not to elucidate the relationship between light and word. His main task is to relate Gen. 1:3-5 to 1:14-19. The relationship between Gen. 1:3 and 1:14-19 and thus how there can be light without light-bearing bodies can be (and has been) explored from different perspectives: scientific, semantic, etc. Philo reasons that the “light” of 1:3 is “a bodiless and noetic paradigm” for the sun and other heavenly luminaries. It is a “super-heavenly star” (ὑπέρουράνιος

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45 See Radice, 2009, 143.
46 In Op. 17, εἰκών is unphilosophical; in the broader context εἰκών and its conceptual partners (§16: ἀπεικόνισμα; §18: ἀγάλμα [ἀγάλματοφορέω]; §18: εἴδωλα; §25: εἰκόν x4) are philosophical. Cf. how in Abr. 153 Philo does not use “image” in the manner of paradigm-product, but merely to convey that someone knows the soul’s emotions by looking at the eyes (e.g., tears = sadness, etc.). See Siegert, 2009, 184 (cf. Leg. 3.101; Dec. 105); Berchman, 2000, 62 (though Plato’s notion of a mirror in Tim. 45b-46b is unhelpful here).
47 Westermann, 1984, 41.
48 He relates “light” to “word” only in §31.1-3, while he mentions the paradigmatic relationship between light and luminaries in §30.5-8, §31.3-11, §33.1-2, and §34.6-10. Cf. Spec. 1.279.
\(\dot{\omega}στηρ\), the “all-radiance” (\(\pi\alpha\nuαυγη\)) (§31).\(^{50}\) It is “before” (πρό) the sun (§33) and the “fountain” of all sense-perceptible stars (§31).\(^{51}\)

Philo furthers this paradigmatic relationship with a slight elaboration: “That unmixed and pure radiance [\(\tau\eta\zeta\ \dot{\alpha}μι\gammaο\upsilon\zeta\ \kappaαλι\ \kappaα\thetaαρα\zeta\ \alphaυγη\zeta\)] is dimmed when it begins to change according to the transition from the noetic to the sense-perceptible” (§31.8-10). Philo’s reason recalls an earlier statement concerning God: God himself lessened his gifts and graces “toward the abilities of the beneficiaries” (§23), the noetic light accommodated “according to each [luminary’s] ability” (§31).\(^{52}\) The greater is naturally diminished so as to accommodate the lesser. Yet Philo’s accommodation of the noetic to the inability of the sensory goes one step further than does God’s own accommodation even to the noetic realm. The “dimming” happens “for none of the objects in the sense-perceptible realm is absolutely pure [\(\epsilonι\lambdaλικρινε\zeta\)]” (§31.11).\(^{53}\) While Philo could speak of the ontic differentiation between God and the noetic realm without treating the noetic as thereby less than absolute purity (cf. Aet. 1), Philo could only speak of the noetic light as an “unmixed and clean radiance” and as “absolutely pure” before its unavoidable “dimming” when it took on bodily form.\(^{54}\)

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\(^{50}\) Cf. Wis. 7:26. On the comparison of Philo and Wisdom generally see Winston, 1979, 59-63, and particularly on this word “radiance” see Tobin, 1983, 85-86.

\(^{51}\) In Plato, the incorporeal soul contemplates and ascends to “the super-heavenly place” (\(\iota\pi\rhoερου\alpha\nuανιοσ\ \tauο\piο\zeta\)) “in pure radiance” (ἐν αυγη καθαρη) (Phdr. 250c4; also presented by Runia, 2001, 169). Philo is also about to use the phrase “pure radiance” (καθαραζ αυγης).

\(^{52}\) See Runia, 2001, 169.

\(^{53}\) Cf. Wis. 7:25. “Absolutely pure” (\(\epsilonι\lambdaλικρινε\zeta\)) is often used of motives and morals that are unmixed with anything false (Louw and Nida, 1988, 88.41-42 [p.747]; cf. 1 Cor. 5:8; 2 Cor. 1:12, 17; Phil. 1:10; 2 Pt. 3:1).

\(^{54}\) Cf. Deus 3. For Philo’s general denigration of (cosmic) matter see Spec. 1.329. Radice (2009) speaks of the Logos as being “able to redeem the world itself from the negativity that association with matter inflicts upon it” (138). For Philo, the negativity of anthropological flesh is set within the broader cosmological context of the negativity of matter. As we will see below regarding Paul’s difference with Philo at this point, this is also one broad difference between Philo and the Gospel of John, again regarding light (van Kooten, 2005, 151-56), for in John there is no hint of dimming when “the true light” (also associated with Genesis 1) “became flesh” (cf. 1:1-5, 14; 3:19; 8:12; 9:5; 12:46).
In Op. 33, Philo then calls the darkness of 1:4b-5 light’s “adversary” (τὸ ἀντίπαλον). Though Philo does not always treat darkness as negative,55 he often does see it as contrary to God, whether the darkness is cosmological and pre-creational (e.g., Spec. 4.187) or anthropological and ethical (e.g., Spec. 1.54; Deus 3). In such contexts, and often closely associated with Gen. 1:3-5 and 1:14-19, God’s “light” is helpful for a person’s virtuous living,57 even being a remedy to the darkness of sin.58 While treating the “darkness” of Gen. 1:4-5 in his commentary, he also treats God’s light as salvific, but in a slightly different manner. Fortunately for the creation, God “knew well” (εὖ εἰδότως) the “natural contrariety” between light and darkness. Thus God’s “separation” of light and dark in Gen. 1:4b is God’s pre-emptive rescue of the cosmos. God moderated light and darkness (§33) by causing them to peacefully introduce each other through the boundaries “evening” and “morning” (Gen. 1:5b) (§§33-34). Due to what God knew before he created, not only can Philo deduce that both light and darkness are, as D. Runia writes, “firmly under the control of the creator,”59 but the manner in which God then created can be interpreted in light of this pre-understanding. God created as he did for a purpose. What is more, due to God’s pre- or fore-knowledge creation itself is, in a manner, a form of salvation.

To complete his reading of Gen. 1:3-5, Philo lastly forms an inclusio with his introduction to the incorporeal and noetic “day one” from §§15-16. Thus he reminds his

55 Cf. Mos. 1.158 and 2.70 (Thrall, 1973, 149), which are on Ex. 34:29 (cf. the “darkness” covering the mountain in Ex. 19:16; 20:21; Deut. 4:11), and Post. 14-15 with Philo’s treatment of the invisibility and darkness of Gen. 1:1-2 in Op. 29-32.
56 Waltke (1975) treats the “darkness” of Gen. 1:2 as “contrary to God” (327-42). For “darkness” as negative see Eccl. 2:13; Amos 5:18-20; Jer. 4:23; 13:16; Eze. 32:7-8; cf. Acts 26:18; 2 Cor. 6:14; 1 Th. 5:5; Eph. 5:8-9; Col. 1:12-13. Plutarch (Table-talk 670B) says Egyptians considered darkness superior to light (see van Kooten, 2005, 161).
57 E.g., Somn. 1.85-86.
58 Cf. Somn. 1.82, 91; Virt. 164; Deus 131-35.
readers that the light, darkness, evening, and morning about which he had just been writing are incorporeal and noetic realities (§34.6-9; cf. §16), and he points out again that in the text itself “the Maker ‘called’” (ὁ ποιῶν ἐκάλεσε) the new measure of time “day One.” Having brought back into the foreground the nature of the Before—especially emphasizing the God who pre-knows, acts accordingly, and pre-emptively rescues—Philo has set the stage nicely for the transition to corporeal creation and for his reading of the other five days of creation in Gen. 1:6-31.

In summary, Philo sees God’s creation of light as not only the perfect paradigm but also as a beneficent precaution. In many of Philo’s discussions on light, one can find an engagement with Gen. 1:3-5 (and 1:14-19) either implicitly or explicitly. Hermeneutically, Philo moves naturally from text to experience, from the beginning of light to personal illumination. Two recurring hermeneutical maneuvers can be highlighted, both within Philo’s exegesis of Gen. 1:3-5 itself and also as he moves from this text to human experience. One recurring move regards theocentricity. From Philo’s exegesis it emerges that God is the unifying factor in each “shining.” The God who spoke into existence the cosmic light of Gen. 1:3-5 is the same God who anthropically illuminated at creation and illuminates in present experience. The second recurring move involves Philo’s tri-level ontology. God is the model of the noetic and it is the model of the corporeal. God surpasses the noetic in ontic essence even more than it surpasses the corporeal. Yet while both God and the noetic light remain “absolutely pure,” the bodily containment of light necessary dims its noetic source in impurity. We will now observe how Paul makes a similar hermeneutical move from text to experience. He even bases

60 Frick, 1999, 4.
this transition on a similar theocentricity concerning the one God who is active in both creative and salvific shining. Yet for Paul, the light of God’s glory has in no way been dimmed when shining in the face of a particular corporeal body.

B. Paul’s Reading of Genesis 1:2-5: A Special Light, Its Facial Glory (2 Cor. 4:6)

For Paul, as for Philo, God’s “shining” of light in Gen. 1:2-5 is something special. It is also paradigmatic for subsequent shinings that God will accomplish. As Philo had found a combination of God’s creation of light and God’s personal illumination important, so too Paul in 2 Cor. 4:6 finds in God’s creative shining of light a ready motif for describing the experience in which God “shone” his glory into believers’ hearts.61 In Paul’s scripture not only is God himself often described by “light,”62 but light often portrays specifically “the glory of the Lord” (e.g., Isa. 60:1; Eze. 1:26-28), especially located in his face (Num. 6:25). When Moses stood face-to-face with this Lord (Ex. 33:11), his own human “face” would visibly display the reflected divine glory as if a mirror of it (Ex. 34:29-35). Moses becoming a “light-bearer” himself.63 But for Paul, the “glory” which Moses truly displayed had been eclipsed by a surpassing glory in the “face” of another (2 Cor. 3:7-4:6).64 As Philo had compared the light of Gen. 1:3 to the embodied light of 1:14-19 and then to the inward personal experience of divineillumination, so too Paul moves from

61 2 Cor. 4:6 is probably Paul’s “theological reflection” on his conversion (so Witherington, 1994, 233; cf. Vorholt, 2008, 211-24; Segal, 1990, 61-67), yet generalized to encompass “our” heart. In 1 Corinthians, Paul highlights “seeing” Jesus: “I have seen [ἔχων ἰησοῦ] Jesus” (1 Cor. 9:1), “Jesus was seen [ἀφήνοι] by me” (1 Cor. 15:8 [cf. vv.5-7]), and in 2 Cor. 4:6 itself Paul combines: “light,” “shining,” and “glory.” In Acts Paul combines (according to Luke): “light,” “shining,” and “glory” as he “saw” (ἐπέλαμψεν) the Lord (cf. 9:3; 22:11; 26:13; see Vorholt, 2008, 215; Harris, 2005, 336-37; Watson, 1997, 283-84; Kim, 1980, 5ff, 229). Hubbard (2002) observes that Paul’s language of darkness-to-light for conversion is “typical transfer symbolism” found in various rites of passage, and that such symbolism is also typically conjoined with cosmogonic imagery (159-60; see below).
63 Noort, 2005, 17; Watson, 2004, 293; Thrall, 1994, 1.243; Richardson, 1994, 158.
the text of light’s beginning to an embodied display of glorious illumination and then to
the divine shine of personal and inward experience.

In 2 Cor. 4:6 Paul writes, “The God who said out of darkness, ‘Light will shine’, himself shone in our hearts to give the illumination of the knowledge of God’s glory in the face of Jesus Christ.” As P. Minear writes, “Paul viewed the moment of a person’s conversion as marking the first day of creation, when God commanded light to shine out of darkness.” One can compare the more obvious similarities between 2 Cor. 4:6 and Gen. 1:2-3 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gen. 1:2-3</th>
<th>2 Cor. 4:6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Darkness [σκότος] was over the deep</td>
<td>2 Cor. 4:6 out of darkness [ἐκ σκότους]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And God said [ἐπέν ὁ θεός]</td>
<td>It is the God who said [ὁ θεός ὅ εἰπών]...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Let light come about” [γεννηθῆσαι φῶς]</td>
<td>“Light will shine” [φῶς λάμψει]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And light came about [ἐγένετο φῶς]</td>
<td>he shone...light [ὅς ἐλάμψεν... φωτισμόν]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Paul’s wording is quite evocative of Genesis. At the same time, the divine word which Paul records—“Light will shine” (4:6a)—has a more prophetic tone than seems obvious in the divine imperative of Genesis. It is therefore tempting to see “he shone...light” (4:6b) as the direct fulfilment of “Light will shine.” Yet while between the last two clauses of Gen. 1:3 there is immediate fulfilment, between Paul’s last two clauses there is a lengthy historical gap. The best way for us to avoid the opposite errors of denying the clear allusion to Gen. 1:3 and of treating it as a mere allusion to 1:3 is to briefly comment on each of Paul’s phrases in 4:6 in the order in which he wrote them.

“The God who said....” Although many OT texts speak of God’s causation (or promise) of light out of darkness, not all draw attention to the sovereignty of God’s

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66 Concerning the original creation of light cf. Job 37:15 and Isa. 45:7. Concerning the light-motif subsequent to the original creation: judgment is often seen as God’s de-creation of light—removing the sun and moon of Gen. 1:14-19, even the light of Gen. 1:3 itself (Jer. 4:23; 13:16; Eze. 32:7-8; cf. Mk. 13:24-
word as does Gen. 1:3. This effective word was also central to Philo’s interpretation of Gen. 1:3. For Paul too, his theocentric introduction, “The God who said…‘Light’” (ὁ θεὸς ὁ εἴρησεν…φῶς), is the clearest indication that Paul is intentionally casting the minds of his readers back to the beginning where “God said…‘Light’” (εἴρησεν ὁ θεὸς…φῶς), thus evoking Gen. 1:2-3. This is especially the case as it closely follows his application of Gen. 1:27 in v.4. Recognizing the power of the divine speech will help us avoid the error of “abandoning” Gen. 1:3 as Paul’s referent and turning to an alternative text, such as Isa. 9:1 (in which God is not the speaker).

“...out of darkness....” Many texts in Paul’s scripture, whether referring to God’s original creation of light or to a re-creation of light as salvation, reflect a scenario like

25)—while salvation is then often re-creation—re-entering light and life into darkness and death. So, although people walk “in darkness” (ἐν σκοτεινως) and dwell “in the shadow of death” (σκοτεινως θανατου), the prophet announces that “light will shine [φῶς λάμψηι] upon them” (Isa. 9:1). God promises, “I will make [ποιήσω] for them the darkness into light [τὸ σκότος εἰς φῶς]” (Isa. 42:16). This re-creation of light can even be non-solar and non-lunar, reflecting the situation in Gen. 1:3-13 where light existed before and without luminaries. In Isaiah 59-60, God’s people will themselves be “enlightened” (φωτιζονται), not by sun or moon but by “the light” (τὸ φῶς), i.e., “the glory of the Lord” (ἡ δόξα κυρίου), the Lord himself being their “everlasting light” (φῶς αἰώνιον) through the presence of his Spirit (see Isa. 59:21-60:21; cf. Rev. 20:22-25).

67 Meyer (2009) calls this verbal correspondence between “said” in Gen. 1:3 and 2 Cor. 4:6 “too close to be coincidental” (109n.161; cf. Hubbard, 2002, 160).


70 Contra Collange, 1972, 138-39. Isa. 9:1 (LXX), which is often offered as another source for Paul’s wording here (e.g., esp. Collange, 1972, 138-39; cf. Meyer, 2009, 108-09; Harris, 2005, 334n.95; Matera, 2003, 104; Hubbard, 2002, 160; Hays, 1993, 152-53; Stockhausen, 1989, 160n 21), does not in itself provide the divine speech motif in the way that Genesis 1 does. In Isaiah 9, it is the prophet’s own words which promise the people who were in darkness: “A light will shine upon you!” The addressees of Isa. 9:1-6 LXX are difficult to follow, but it is Isaiah himself speaking throughout: announcing the light to “the people” in v.1, then speaking to God in v.2, then speaking in general (i.e., about the people and about the Lord—both in third person) in vv.3-4, and then among the people as one of the “us” in vv.5-6: “A child has been born to us...,” thereby obviously not God’s speech. Although it is certainly possible that Paul could cast any scripture as God’s speech (e.g., as “God’s word”), a connection with God’s overt speaking in relation to light and darkness in Gen. 1:3 is certainly a more ready conceptual link with Paul’s statement, “the God who said” in 4:6a than is Isa. 9:1. This is not an argument that Isa. 9:1 is not part of what is behind Paul’s statement in 2 Cor. 4:6a, especially the wording “light will shine,” which below I also suggest as present, but this observation of divine speech is the strongest argument against Collange’s “abandonment” of Gen. 1:3 as being behind 2 Cor. 4:6a.
that in Gen. 1:2-3: there was or is a darkness over which God proved and proves to be sovereign.\(^{71}\) Paul does likewise, for it is “out of darkness” that God’s voice sounds toward light.\(^{72}\) This cosmic scenario assumed by Paul’s picture of God’s voice should grant hope to his contemporary Corinthians since not even the power of “the god of this age,” who presently exerts this power by bringing dark blindness onto the minds of unbelievers (4:4), can prevent the God who created light out of the original darkness from granting illumination to such minds and hearts now (4:6).\(^{73}\) Paul knows from the text of creation that it is out of the heart of darkness that the Creator’s glorious light can shine.

“...‘Light will shine’...” When turning the Corinthians (yet again) to the text of the Beginning, why did Paul not simply quote God as recorded: “Let light come about”? The word “shine” (\(\lambda\dot{a}m\pi\omega\)) itself can naturally draw to mind what light did in Genesis 1.\(^{74}\) Philo himself had glossed the specific text of Gen. 1:3 as this light “shining” (\(\lambda\alpha\mu\pi\rho\dot{o}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\)) and “radiating” (\(\epsilon\upsilon\gamma\rho\epsilon\delta\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\)) (\(\text{Op. 30}\)), and Paul here combines this as light “shining” (\(\lambda\dot{a}m\pi\psi\epsilon\iota\), v.6) with “radiating” (\(\epsilon\upsilon\gamma\mu\alpha\sigma\omicron\iota\), v.4). Paul reworded God’s speech with a slightly prophetic nuance.\(^{75}\) It seems to ring more of a promise for the future than

\(^{71}\) See note 66 above.
\(^{72}\) So Meyer, 2009, 108.
\(^{73}\) Matera, 2003, 103.
\(^{74}\) Cf. Sirach’s “glory... shining... illuminating” (\(\delta\acute{o}\zeta\dot{e}... \epsilon\kappa\lambda\dot{a}m\pi\omega\dot{o}... \phi\omega\tilde{t}\zeta\zeta\omicron\nu\), 43:8-9) with Paul’s “shone... illumination... of the glory” (\(\epsilon\lambda\mu\phi\iota\epsilon\nu... \phi\omega\tau\iota\sigma\iota\mu\omicron\dot{e}... \tau\acute{h}\dot{e}... \delta\acute{o}\acute{e}r\acute{e}\iota\)) in 2 Cor. 4:6 (above). This comment in Sirach 43 is clearly a reference to Gen. 1:14-19 (see vv.1-10; Tigchelaar, 2005, 37, 37-39; cf. Thiselton, 2000, 1268-69).
\(^{75}\) Concerning the prophetic ring to Paul’s record of God’s word, Isa. 9:1 (LXX) speaks of how “light will shine upon you” (\(\phi\omega\zeta... \lambda\alpha\mu\phi\iota\epsilon\upsilon\delta\acute{e}\pi\iota\dot{h}\iota\omicron\iota\dot{c}\iota\)) in the arrival of the person of the Messiah in vv.5-6. Though the light motif itself was dropped after v.1, and is thus not directly connected to the Messianic mention, Paul shares the focus on “the Christ” and directly connects him to the light shining in human hearts. Yet as mentioned above, Isa. 9:1 does not offer the motif of divine speech that is central to Paul’s statement in 4:6a and evocative of Gen. 1:3. We should be wary of attempts to set Isaiah and Genesis against each other as mutually exclusive “sources” of Paul’s thought (well said in Meyer, 2009, 109n.161), especially due to the seemingly widespread hermeneutic in ancient Judaism (and certainly in Paul) which assumed the accord of all scriptures (van der Horst, 2006, 114-27; Kugel, 1998, 14-19). Genesis and Isaiah both show profound influence on Paul’s thought, especially for debates with the Corinthians. Our first assumption should be that Paul has a “mutually interpretive” hermeneutic (so Stockhausen, 1989, 60), especially where
of a simple pronouncement, though this distinction is somewhat inappropriate, even for Gen. 1:3. It is as if Paul treats the creative word as pending until its enactment in Christian hearts. It would have been obvious to the Corinthians that the initial fulfilment of God’s voiced desire occurred in the beginning when light originally shone. The same effect would have been accomplished had Paul said something like: “God said, ‘Let there be light’, and there was light in our hearts.” The latter appears to directly fulfil the former, but by evoking the creation account it is clear that this is not exactly the case. Paul has created an intimate connection between God’s speech in the beginning and the Christian experience in the end.

For both Genesis 1 and Paul, God’s desired action (Genesis 1: “become light,” Paul: “shine light”) is followed by an enactment that mirrors God’s desire (Genesis 1: “light became,” Paul: “light was shone”). As in Genesis itself, for Paul there is a direct correlation between what God speaks and what comes about. Perhaps encouraged by Isaiah, who not only links darkness and light in 9:1 but who elsewhere announces salvation in the language and conceptuality of Genesis 1-2, Paul presents God’s creative shining as a paradigm for the subsequent salvific shining. He uses the theme of creation

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words and phrases are exchanged such as here (161; cf. Hays, 1993, 152-53). Thus without denying their original origin and assumed fulfillment in the beginning, Paul nevertheless sets the creative words of God in a slightly enhanced prophetic (Isaianic) tone.

Future indicatives (such as in 2 Cor. 4:6a) can function as imperatives (cf. Lev. 19:18; so Harris, 2005, 334), and this in itself blurs the line between a “futuristic” statement such as prophecy and an effective imperative such as in God’s creation. Within the Pentateuch, the aorist imperatives of γίνομαι in Gen. 1:3 (γένηθήω), 6 (γένηθήω), and 14 (γένηθήσομαι) are comparable with other records of prophetic pronouncements: e.g., Gen. 9:27 (γένηθήω), 49:17 (γένηθήω), and Ex. 9:9 (γένηθήω) (for interest cf. Ex. 10:21-22 [γένηθήω σκότος...καὶ ἐγένετο σκότος] with Gen. 1:3 [γένηθήω φῶς καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς]). According to Paul’s view of Mosaic authorship of the whole Pentateuch, Genesis 1 and prophecy would likely cohere more closely for him than for many modern scholars. (This limits the assumption of Collange, 1972, 139, that the change of aorist imperative to a future indicative in v.4:6a somehow distances Paul’s statement from Gen. 1:3).

E.g., Isa. 45:7-8 (see below; cf. Isa. 43:1a and 44:2: ὁ θεός ὁ ποιήσας... ὁ πλάσας).
to give meaning, emphasis, and a theocentric source to the Christ-follower’s experience of heart-illumination.⁷⁸

Yet even this construal of creation as paradigm for salvation does not quite take full account of Paul’s language, for Paul also seems to use the salvifically charged words from Isaiah to express God’s creation of light (v.6a). Yet before we therefore construe Paul’s understanding of Gen. 1:3 as itself “salvific” or “redemptive,”⁷⁹ we should recognize that the “Isaianic” phrase is only salvific by association. There is nothing inherently “salvific” about the words “light will shine.” Such a choice gloss of Gen. 1:3 hints that this very God of the original shining of light also had something to do with the Isaianic promise of salvation by light. This relationship between creation and salvation as distinct yet related actions would be confirmed if Paul’s focus were actually on the actor himself rather than directly on the actions. And this is precisely Paul’s explicit emphasis. He turns his readers toward “the God who” spoke and shone light. That Creator has indeed now again shone (re-creationally, salvifically) in our dark and blinded hearts (just as Isaiah foretold).

This explanation of Paul’s choice of wording sharpens our focus on the central element of Paul’s reading of Gen. 1:2-3. What unites creation and salvation for Paul, here centered around the motif of light, is not the nature of both events as creational-salvific (for 2 Cor. 4:6 does not convey creation itself as redemptive) but rather the fact that both are acts of the same God.⁸⁰ As was done by many others, Paul demonstrated the

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⁷⁸ So Becker, 1993, 77 (“the calling experienced is the repetition of the beginning of creation”); Hubbard, 2002, 160.
⁷⁹ As Stockhausen (1989) does (161), though her notion of “mutual interpretation” is a good first stage in understanding Paul’s hermeneutical dynamics here (and elsewhere) (160n 21, 161 [cf. p.60]; cf. Meyer, 2009, 109).
⁸⁰ Harris, 2005, 335; Childs, 1992, 392. This emphasis on the God and Lord of both creation and redemption as the tie that binds them together is a major thesis of Gibbs, 1971, though he approaches the
connection between creation and salvation by his use of a theocentric substantival participle in 4:6a, “the God who said” (ὁ θεὸς ὁ εἶπών). Paul confirms his emphasis on God himself by his use of the relative pronoun “who” (ὁς, “he,” “himself”) in 4:6b. Even when referring to the inward and anthropic illumination Paul does not speak of a light abstractly shining on people (as does Isa. 9:1), but of the Creator himself who actively shone it (as in Gen. 1:3): “the God who said... himself [ὁς] shone.” In this sense it is not even actually God’s word upon which Paul has brought focus, though the speech of God is an explicit part of Paul’s reading of Gen. 1:3. In his construal of the creation of light there is no danger of God’s word taking on a quasi-disconnected identity from God, a conclusion toward which some of Philo’s language can tend. God’s word is vital, but it is precisely because it is from “the God who said” it that it holds significance.

Within the situation of darkness and blindness (4:4, 6a; cf. Gen. 1:2; Isa. 9:1a), for Paul the important thing is “the God who....” God’s character as Creator was of central importance to Philo, having enabled him to apply God’s actions in creation to

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issue through an analysis of different texts: Rom. 8:19-23, 38-39; Rom. 5:12-21; 1 Cor. 8:6; Phil. 2:6-11; Col. 1:15-20; and Eph. 1:3-14.

Psalm 145 (LXX) uses the language of Genesis 1 to set covenant/salvation in creation-language, and it uses substantival participles to explain the God of both activities: “the God of Jacob” (v.5 = election/salvation) is “the one who made [τὸν ποιήσαντα] the heaven and the earth, the sea and all that is in them” (v.6 = creation; cf. Gen. 1:1, 6-10, 20-24) and is “the one who makes [ποιῶν] justice for those wronged,” etc. (vv.7-9 = salvation). The later divine event of personal covenantal aid is cast in the language of the former divine event of creation: “the one who made...makes,” thus granting a better understanding of the salvific event as well as the God who accomplished it. This is the same method Isaiah 45 (LXX) takes to emphasize God in both creation and salvation/election: although “darkness” (σκότος) was engulfing “the unconstructed earth” (ἡ γῆ...ἀκατασκευαστος) in Gen. 1:2, nonetheless God is “the one who constructed light [ὁ κατασκευάσας φῶς] and who made darkness [καὶ ποιήσας σκότος]” (v.7 = creation), and is “the one who created” Israel (ὁ κτίσας αὐ, v.8 = covenant/salvation; cf. Isa. 43:1a; 44:2; 2 Mac. 1:24-25 [see Childs, 1992, 387-88]). This participial presentation of “the God who” expresses both his creative and salvific acts through creational terms. Likewise, other early Christians (as recorded by Luke) used substantival participles to focus their prayer upon “the God who,” and they began with creation: “the one who made [ὁ ποιήσας] the heaven and the earth [cf. Gen. 1:1] and the sea [cf. Gen. 1:9-10] and all that is in them [cf. Gen. 1:11-13, 14-19, 20-27], the one who said [ὁ...εἶπών] through the mouth of our father David by the Holy Spirit...” (vv.24-25; see Noort on this feature of other prayers, 2000, 2; cf. Job 10:8-9). 2 Cor. 4:6 is comparable.
contemporary experience and even salvation.\textsuperscript{82} In 2 Cor. 4:6, Paul moves from the same starting point and in a similar direction. It is the God of creation whose being and act give to Paul the structure and heightened significance for his communication of this same God’s subsequent redemptive actions in Christ. Below we will see a similar trend in Paul’s reading of Gen. 1:6-31 in 1 Cor. 15:37-41, where he uses the sacred text’s protological conceptuality—the “word-field of creation”\textsuperscript{83}—to apply the fundamental concept of God as Creator in the beginning to a description of the resurrection of the dead in the end.

A few items may be drawn out in summary of Paul’s reading of Gen. 1:2-5, especially in light of Philo’s commentary on these verses. For Paul, as for Philo, God’s “shining” of light in Gen. 1:2-5 is something special. As we saw above, Gen. 1:3 provides a paradigm of God’s sovereign will and word according to which the beginning of the rest of the world followed. As it had been for Philo, for Paul this beginning of light is paradigmatic for subsequent shinings that God will accomplish. Philo related the shining of Gen. 1:2-3 to the subsequent textual shining of heavenly bodies in Gen. 1:14-19. The beginning of light was the ontological paradigm for necessarily dimmer luminaries. Paul related Gen. 1:2-3 to the subsequent shining, but Paul’s was the historical shining in the hearts of believers who recognized God’s glory in the risen body of Jesus. For him, the beginning of light was the conceptual paradigm for glorious Christian illumination.

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Aet.} 1: “In every uncertain and important business it is proper to invoke God, because he is the good Creator of the world, and because nothing is uncertain with him who is possessed of the most accurate knowledge of all things” (Yonge’s translation); cf. Frick, 1999, 1-4.

\textsuperscript{83} Usami, 1976, 480n.45.
For Paul, as for Philo, there is an intimate relationship between the text of Gen. 1:2-5 and personal illumination, and for both interpreters the connection between text and experience was primarily theological: God is the actor in both events. In the beginning of light, God’s word is both prominent and sovereign for Paul as it had been for Philo. For Philo, this theocentricity primarily involved God’s fore-knowledge and wisdom, and it was according to this that he created light beautifully in the beginning—thereby preemptively saving humanity from darkness by this as well as by his anthropogenic gift of mental illumination—and continues to save by shining on those who repent. For Paul, his theocentricity involves “the God who” both created light by word and saves by light through Paul’s preaching (which he also relates to “God’s word,” 2 Cor. 4:2) about the glorious face of Jesus Christ, the Lord.

In spite of (and in light of) all these hermeneutical similarities between Philo and Paul, two fundamental differences have emerged. First, for Philo God’s salvation by light was sometimes (though not always) God’s ontological-intellectual gift to humans at creation itself. For Paul, although God’s salvation by light similarly took place within humans (in their hearts, toward knowledge), it was divinely performed not ontologically at creation but in a subsequent (explicitly post-Mosaic) historical act. These hermeneutical bents in each interpreter are reminiscent of what we saw in our former chapter, where Philo saw the Before as an ontologically perfect blue-print of the universe while Paul saw it as pre-marked out historically salvific events.

Second, for Philo the pure ontological radiance of Gen. 1:3, i.e., the “image” of God’s word, began to dim when it descended into bodily form (in sun, moon, and stars) just as God’s “salvific” luminescence is dimmed to the extent that it is blended with flesh and its
bodily desires. For Paul, however, there is no trace of dimming when the God who spoke light into being in Gen. 1:3 shines another light through the face of Jesus, i.e., the “image” of God, even though this “face” is corporeal. For Paul, the Jesus in whom the Creator of light shines his glory is therefore not a faceless reflector of eternal light, as if Paul referred to a radiating from an un-embodied glory unsullied by this physical world. This physical (even crucified, though resurrected) embodiment of God’s glory is so un-dimming of the original light that Paul can portray his dawning in human hearts _almost_ as if it is the actual divine enactment of the initial divine word in the beginning.

In 2 Cor. 4:6, as well as in 1 Cor. 15:35-49 (see below), we receive a glimpse of the general principle to which scholars often refer: eschatology mirrors protology. While some have seen eschatology (or at least teleology) within Genesis 1 itself, we are primarily interested in the hermeneutical outworking of this basic outlook. Judging in greater detail how the Beginning (in connection with the Before) is interpreted gives greater clarity to how exactly the Beginning gives to Paul his “framework,” “format,” or “model” for contemplating and understanding something about the End. The hermeneutical direction is clear for Paul. That is, “the original creation provides the conceptuality for describing the new creation,” not the other way around. Many scholars focus on Paul’s description of the new creation. Our present study, especially in comparison with Philo’s commentary, is sharpening our understanding of the first half of

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84 Watson, 1997, 282; Minear, 1994, 74. Cf. also 1 Cor. 11:12c with 2 Cor. 5:17-18.
87 Hardy, 1997, 110-11.
Paul’s dynamic: his interpretation of the “original creation.” It is not left behind because of the new but actually provides a maintained conceptuality for the new.

3. SIX DAYS OF ONTIC ORDER AND DIVINE DESIGN: PHILO AND PAUL ON GENESIS 1:6-31

As we saw above, Gen. 1:3 and 4 opened to the reader two of the major themes of Genesis 1 as a whole. The Creator is sovereign in his action and desire as he summons and makes what he wants. His creation is ontologically good due to its exact correspondence with his desire. Gen. 1:3 had established a direct (and syntactically paradigmatic) connection between God’s word and its fulfilment, and this is followed in the second to sixth days. For example, God’s second voiced volition, “Let there be a firmness” (v.6a), is followed by a fulfilment clause, “And it happened in this manner” (v.6c). This is then followed by God’s own enactment, “And God made the firmness” (v.7). This portrayal of God’s first post-light creation (and the rest are similar if not identical) strongly reinforces the notion from vv.3-4 that God’s action does indeed directly fulfil his word and therefore desire.

As we now turn to Philo’s treatement of this beginning of the world and then to Paul’s, we will notice that both interpreters draw out each of these major creational themes. In our previous chapter we analyzed Philo’s and Paul’s explicit statements about what God was thinking “before” he created, and we drew attention to a few of the ways that their theories of the Before affected (and yet were also affected by) their readings of the Beginning. As we now focus on each interpreter’s reading of the post-light beginning of the world, we will notice that both the commentator and the apostle continue to draw
attention to God’s purposes and desires because of which he created the world as he did. Both interpreters see within Genesis 1 a theocentrically grounded and therefore good ontology. A main aspect of this theocentrism, for both readers, is the divine Before that initiates the world in the Beginning.

A. Philo’s Reading of Genesis 1:6-31 (Op. 36-68)

Since the “transition from intelligible to sense-perceptible” necessarily causes a “dimming” in the incorporeal light, one might expect Philo to present a darker reading of Gen. 1:6-31, the creation of the ontologically less pure corporeality. Yet his interpretation of vv.6-31 is very positive. Philo certainly has an anthropocentric slant to creation, yet he reads the corporeal creation positively primarily because it is God’s creation. Throughout vv.6-31, Philo focuses upon God: his character, fore-sight, decision-making perfection; in short, God’s wisdom. God knows what he is doing, and that makes all of the peculiarities of Genesis 1 “good.”

1. The Second Day, Philo on Genesis 1:6-8 (Op. 36-37)

On the second day God created a firmament. While the Hebrew word “expanse” (סְלָעָה) v.6 may have portrayed God as a divine “metal-worker,” “solidity” is not necessarily inherent in the term. But the LXX’s use of “firmament” (στέφωμα)
solidifies the “heaven” of vv.6-8 as something “firm.” Philo finds in the word “firmness” the initiation of the world of sense perception (vv. 6-31, according to his first reading in §§13-128), as opposed to the noetic, incorporeal world of the Ideas (vv.1-5). Looking “toward” (πρός) that incorporeal paradigm of vv.1-5, “the Craftsman” begins the sense-perceptible cosmos in v.6 by making the corporeal heaven ([§36.1-3]. The “firmness” (στερεώμα) is obviously corporeal (σωματικόν) because the body (τὸ σῶμα) is “by nature firm [φύσει στερεόν].” Some modern scholars have difficulty relating “heaven” in 1:1 to “heaven” in 1:6-8 and thus treat v.1 as an overarching summary and vv.6-8 as the actual creation. Philo also differentiates the two textual “heavens,” but his resolution is ontological rather than literary: bodiless vs. body rather than introduction vs. body.

94 This choice could be due to Egyptian cosmogonic influence (Currid, 1997, 64), or perhaps to Platonism (cf. Tim. 31b; Rösel, 1994, 36, 82; yet since Plato sees “earth” as inherent in “firmness” [στερεόν, Tim. 31b7-8] while Gen. 1:6-8 refers specifically to “heaven,” this latter option is not as viable).

95 In our previous chapter we saw that Philo’s exegesis of Gen. 2:4-5 (Op. 129-30) causes him to backtrack over his own previous interpretation of Genesis 1 and re-read Genesis 1 as a whole to be the incorporeal paradigm. Unfortunately, he does not re-comment on the “firmness” of 1:6.

96 “Toward the paradigm” is Platonic (cf. Tim. 28a-29a), but is part of a larger (and later) philosophic system of prepositional metaphysics (see Cox, 2005, 49-51, 49n.49, 51n.54). On Philo’s own prepositional metaphysic see Cher. 124-27 (no mention of “toward which”) and Prov. 1.23 (replaces “because of which” with “toward which”); Leg. 3.96, Fug. 12, and Somn. 2.45 where the Logos is both paradigm and instrument; cf. Cher. 28; Sacr. 8; Deus 57; Conf. 62; Migr. 6; Fug. 95; Spec. 1.81. On the key texts on prepositional metaphysics cf. Aristotle (e.g., Met. 7.7; Phys. 2.3-9; cf. Met. A 3, 983b 7, as cited in Norden, 1923, 242n. 2; cf. Tobin, 1983, 68-69n.39), Middle Platonism (cf. Sterling, 1997, 220-21; Siegert, 2009, 184, 184n.23; Runia, 1986, 171-74; Tobin, 1983, 67-71), and Seneca (van Kooten, 2003, 123-24; Tobin, 1983, 68n.37; Cox, 2005, 51-52).

97 In Tim. 31b, “the becoming thing” is necessarily (δέ) “body-like” (σωματικοῦ), “visible” (ὁρατόν), and “tangible” (ἀπτόν) (31b5), but nothing is “tangible” without “firmness” (στερεό), and “firmness” (στερεῶν) must have “earth” (31b7-8). This relationship between “firmness” and the “body-like” cosmos may be behind Philo’s ontological assumption that “this sense-perceptible and body-like [σωματοειδῆ] thing” is appropriately called “firmness” [στερεώμα] (36.10-11), yet, as noted above, Plato assumes “earth” is a necessary constituent of “firmness,” while Philo here deals with heaven. Also, as we look ahead to Paul’s use of “dusty” versus “heavenly” in 1 Cor. 15:45-49, in light of Philo’s labels of “corporeal” for “heaven,” one would need to be careful indeed to legitimately use a material-immaterial dichotomy when differentiating “earth”/“earthly” from “heaven”/“heavenly” (so Martin, 1992, 3-15, esp. 13-14).

In §36, Philo sees it as “correct” and “suitable” that the Craftsman names this heaven “Firmness” (§36.6, 11; cf. Gen. 1:8), because it is bodily and distinguished from the noetic.likewise, God’s label of this firmness as “heaven” is “a highly appropriate title” (§37), for οὐφανός accurately conveys the thing’s character. This divine quality of knowing and acting in perfect propriety, here only subtly presented, becomes more hermeneutically prominent in Philo’s exegesis of the third day of creation in vv.9-13.

2. The Third Day, Philo on Genesis 1:9-13 (Op. 38-44)

The third day contains two creative acts. In vv.9-10 God forms dry land. In vv.11-13 God calls forth plants, fruit, and seeds. We will look at each in turn.

a. On vv.9-10: Primordial Ooze and Good Land (Op. 38-39)

When the sacred text says, “Let the waters be gathered…and let the dry land be seen” (v.9), it may seem natural to picture a primeval ocean. Many ancient cosmogonies understood the primordial earth to have been enveloped in or characterized by water: Mesopotamian (e.g., Tiamat and Apsu in the Babylonian Enuma Elish),\(^{100}\) Egyptian (e.g., Ptah, who is Nun [primordial waters], in the Shabakah Stone of Memphite theology),\(^{101}\) Canaanite (e.g., Yamm in the Ugaritic Baal cycle),\(^{102}\) and Grecian (e.g., Okeanos in Homer’s Iliad).\(^{103}\) Whether Genesis 1 itself borrowed from any of these has long been

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99 It is sometimes difficult to know whether Philo commends God for using a particular word or Moses for recording it in such a way. Here, however, the Demiurge is the subject of “made,” and there is no reason to assume a switch of subjects. (So also Runia, 2001, 175; though cf. 176).
102 Currid, 1997, 54n.8.
103 Bremmer, 2004, 76.
debated in modern scholarship, but in his commentary Philo somewhat distances Genesis from such conceptions. He was certainly aware of such construals, and he related that certain Stoics considered primordial “chaos” as water (Aet. 18). Some reasoned, according to Philo, that the name “Chaos” (χάος) derived from “what is poured out” (χύσις = χέω). Philo differs.

In Op. 38, Philo does not treat the pre-formed state in this manner, as simply water, but more as a mass of paste-like mud. Since the text specifies that dry land (ἡ ἔρημος) was to appear, perhaps some sort of wet land—mud or paste—was already visible. Philo calls this biblical situation “indistinct” (ἀδιάκριτον) and “formless” (ἀμορφον) (§38.7). These α-privative descriptors of this “primal ooze or mud” remind us of Philo’s description of the “pre-cosmic chaos” in §§8-9 and 21-22, which themselves are reminiscent of “many Greek cosmogonic accounts,” Plato himself, and Genesis 1. Such Philonic descriptions of creation have prompted debates similar to those which focus more generally on Genesis 1, early Jewish writings, and early Christianity and search for the relationship between creatio ex nihilo and creation from pre-existent matter.

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107 In §9 “the passive thing” is “soul-less” (ἀψυχον) and “un-moving” (ἀκίνητον) and in §22 the “substance which of itself had no beauty” is “un-ordered” (ἀτακτος), “quality-less” (ἀποικος), “soul-less” (ἀψυχος), “dis-similar” (ἀνόμοιος), “inconsistent” (ἐπεροιότης), “non-adjusted” (ἀνφυμοςτια), “dis-harmonious” (ἀσυμφωνιας). Cf. Tim. 30a: “disorderly motion” (κυνοίμενον…ἀτάκτως) and “disorder” (ἀπαξίας); 53ab: “the dissimilar things” (τὰ ἀνομοστατα) (Dillon, 2004, 99). Cf. Gen. 1:2: “in-visible” (άορας) and “un-organized” (ἀκατακεκλινως) (cf. Spec. 4.187, which is closer to Genesis 1 [creation by word, “light out of darkness,” “likeness”] than is often realized). Runia (2001) relates Philo’s comment to “many Greek cosmogonic accounts” (181). Creation therefore often takes the form of “division.” The beginning of Diodorus Siculus’ cosmogonic account, Universal History (quoted in Runia, 181), is in this way strikingly similar to an ancient Chinese cosmogony called Huai Nan Tzu (quoted in Lee, 1993, 191, n.6). Cf. also Philo’s Her. 134-35, where the “divisions” are reminiscent of Genesis 1 (Radice, 2009, 139).
108 Some assert a general absence of creatio ex nihilo in Genesis 1, early Judaism, or early Christianity: e.g., Schwarz, 2002, 173; Ferguson, 1998, 12; May, 1994; Clifford and Collins, 1992, 13 (cf. Clifford,
think Genesis 1 explains the origin of the watery mass while others do not. Some see a similar debate among ancient Jews themselves, e.g., between Wis. 11:17 (God’s hand “created [κτίσωσα] the world out of formless matter [ἐξ ἀμόρφου ἔλης]”) and 2 Mac. 7:28 (“it was out of non-being [ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων] that God made [ἐποίησεν] these things”).

This context is relevant not least because in Op. 38 Philo writes that in Gen. 1:9 “the entire [body of] water had been poured out [ἀνεκέχυτο] into all the earth.” If the (Philonically recorded) Stoic equivalence between “chaos” (χάος) and water (χῦσις, i.e., that which is poured out, χέω) lies behind Philo’s use of the same verb for what God did in v.9, then it is helpful to note how in Aet. 17-18 Philo uses a combination of Hesiod’s Theogony 116-17 and Gen. 1:1-2 to prove that the water of “Chaos” had been “created” (equating his γενητός with Hesiod’s γένετος’).

Although in Op. 38 Philo does not treat the water of Gen. 1:1-2 itself in the same way as he did in Aet. 17-18 (for he sees the water of 1:1-2 as the incorporeal essence of water, see Op. 29), by glossing God’s action toward corporeal water in 1:9 with the pluperfect, “had been poured out,” Philo implies that in Op. he can picture such primordial (corporeal) “water”/mud as not always existing as such.

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111 On Wis. 11:17 as pre-existent matter see, e.g., Clifford/Collins, 1992, 13; Goldstein, 1983, 307; Winston, 1979, 38. On 2 Mac. 7:28a as creatio ex nihilo see e.g., Schwarz, 2002, 172; Mathews, 1996, 141n. 117; Moo, 1996, 282; Haffner, 1995, 45-46; Jordan, 1979, 122-28; Skinner, 1910, 15; Origen, Commentarius in Johannem I.17.103 and De principiis ii.1.5. Yet 2 Mac. 7:28a is probably not creatio ex nihilo in its full sense. When one sees that “the race of humans” (τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος) in 7:28b came about “in the manner of” (οὕτω) v.28a and that in v.23 the text says that God “formed” (ὁ πλάσας) “the genesis of man” (ἀνθρώπου γένεσιν) (cf. Gen. 2:7), then “non-being” in v.28a is conceptually synonymous with “dust of the earth.”

112 That Philo reads Hesiod as asserting chaos “became,” and was thus “created,” is obscured by Whitaker’s translation (“First Chaos was”) and Yonge’s translation (“First Chaos did rule”).
This passage certainly does not resolve all questions regarding Philo’s attitude toward primordial matter. When the “pouring” happened is unanswerable, but more important are by whom and what the result was. The answer to the first is obviously God, since Philo uses a “divine passive” to convey this. But it might be significant that the “becoming” of the “indistinct” and “formless” ooze (§38) was the result of the divine “outpouring.” Not only is this indistinct and amorphous (chaos-esque) passive mass no challenge to God’s ontic uniqueness, but in §38 divine action preceded it.

Although Philo’s elaborations sometimes stray from the text, he is here more atuned to the nuances of the sacred text than at first meets the eye. Throughout §§38-39, Philo incorporates words and phrases from the LXX into his comments, for example:

- **LXX 1:9**: And God said, Let the water be gathered into one place. Let the dry land be seen.
  - **Op. 38**: God commands the water to be gathered into one place. The dry land to appear.

Even Philo’s specification of “the water” of v.9 as “salt water,” “sweet moisture,” “veins,” “rivers,” and “springs,” which is so obviously an elaboration, is prompted by v.10 where the singular “water” of v.9 (x2 LXX) is extended into the plural “systems of the waters” (τὰ συστήματα τῶν ὕδατών). It is within this textually stimulated and shaped...

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113 Runia (2001) compares Philo’s verb “poured out” (ἀνεκχέω) with his description of the flood in Abr. 42-44; Mos. 2.63; QG 2.18, 19 (181). Philo uses a similar passive in each of these parallels to relate that each “pouring out” is by God, hence they function as “divine passives.” The biblical account itself uses two passives in Gen. 7:11 to explain the flood (quoted by Philo in QG 2.18). Behind Philo’s passives, as drawn out explicitly in Abr. 42-44, lie the pre-determinations of God.

114 In Op. 38, the entire water “had been poured out...so as to be” (ἀνεκέκχεσθαι ὡς εἶναι) swamps and mud. In §§8-9 and 21-22 (cf. Spec. 1.327-29) Philo’s illustrations merely assume an already present mass that God commandeered so as to “make” it into order, and based on §38 (and Aet. 18-19) one may wonder whether Philo envisioned divine action in the background in the other passages as well.

115 Immediately following Philo’s description of the pre-shaped mass in Op. 21-22, Philo specifically draws attention to God’s status as the One unequivicated Being: “With no one as counselor—for who else was there?—relying only on himself...” (see Leonhardt-Balzer, 2004, 336-37).

set of comments that Philo then portrays God, as we will now see, as the active cause who both fore-knows and preventatively protects his work.

In Genesis 1, the creation is almost totally passive. The only activity attributed to the earth (i.e., “produce,” v.12) is solely in response to God’s command (v.11). Philo downplays the participation of the earth in vv.10-12 so that even the earth’s sprouting in v.12 he takes as something that God himself does: “God caused to grow [ὁ θεός… ἀνέφυεν] all kinds of trees” (Op. 40.6; cf. 42.2). In §§8-9, Philo had offered what is typically referred to as the doctrine of the two principles: the active or efficacious cause (τὸ δραστήριον αἴτιον) and the passive object (τὸ παθητῶν). While implicitly (but undoubtedly) connecting these principles with contemporary “philosophy,” in §8 Philo is explicit that the two principles derive from Moses, specifically from Genesis 1. Thus the biblical creation account can be read as the interaction of two things: “God” and “the heavens and the earth” (cf. Gen. 1:1). At vv.9-10, Philo heightens the activeness of God and the passiveness of the earth by downplaying what little activity the earth has been attributed.

Yet it is not only God’s activeness that is important to Philo, but God’s pre-active purposefulness as well. In his comments on vv.9-10, Philo expresses God’s purpose or

117 For a balanced description of the earth as “co-creatrix” and yet its ultimate subservience to God and his word see Noort, 2000, 8-9; Seebass, 1996, 71-72.
118 Despite this discrepancy, Philo remains close to the text in a number of ways. 1) He soon concedes an active participation of the earth as she “gives birth to” (τίκτει) all the things sown (§43). (This confirms that in §§40 and 42 Philo has a particular bent toward theocentric interpretation). 2) He has God “command” (κελεύω) the earth, mimicking the imperative of v.11. 3) In v.12 the earth “produced” (ἐξήργασεν, aorist of ἐκφέρω), and Philo writes that the earth was “to bear greenery” (χλοφόρειν) and “to bear grain” (σταχυφόρειν), possibly basing the φόρεω- compounds on ἐκφέρω from v.12. 4) Philo explicitly uses the LXX’s βοστάνη and χόρτος: God sent “pastures [βοστάνας]” and “well-grassed [ἐχορτάς] plains.” See Runia, 2001, 183.
119 Radice (2009) considers this Stoic in origin (130). After reviewing the scholarly evidence from the Stoics, Aristotelians, and Platonists, Runia (2001) concludes that because Philo emphasizes “the transcendence of the active cause,” emphasizes creation, and alludes to Plato’s Timaeus, we should assume about Philo’s doctrine that “the basic thought here is Platonist,” though “formulated with some reference to Stoic and Aristotelian terminology” (115; cf. 122).
“telos” in at least six ways. First, salt water was “about to cause barrenness to crops and trees,” yet God “commanded” it to be “gathered.” This is not explicitly purposive, but Philo presents the creative act as God pre-empting the potential damage in a kind of rescue for fruitfulness. Second, sweet moisture “was left behind” “for the sake of [εἰς] preservation.” Through the “glue” that came about from God’s out-pouring, Philo then draws attention to the third and fourth interrelated divine purposes: he left moisture “for the sake of” (ὑπέρ + genitive) the land not becoming dried up (thus unproductive) and “so that” (ὁπως) like a mother the earth could provide food and drink for the coming plants. Fifth, “for this reason” (διό, i.e., the maternal reason just mentioned) God “flooded [the earth’s] veins like breasts.” Sixth, God also “extended invisible moisture-bearing capillaries throughout the rich and fertile soil” (i.e., “the systems of waters” in Gen. 1:10), each creatively enacted “toward” (πρὸς) the end-goal of crops’ “unreserved plenitude.” Purposes lie behind God’s manner of creation in vv.9-10. Thus God “ordered” (διατάξαται) what he then labels “earth” and “sea” (cf. Gen. 1:10ab). For Philo, what God thought before the beginning is inherent to the text of the Beginning.

b. On vv.11-13: The Illustration of the Seed (Op. 40-44)

God now “begins to ornament” (διακοσμεῖν ἀρχεται) the earth (§40). Philo elaborates on v.12 in three ways. The trees were immediately and fully laden with mature fruit (§40.8-10; cf. “mature” [τελείαν] in §42.3). This is miraculous, for it is contrary to

120 This idea of “glue” was a “fairly typical scientific idea” (Runia, 2001, 182).
121 Cf. the “teleological approach” to cosmogony taken by Pliny in Natural History 2.166: “The intention of the artificer of nature must have been to unite earth and water in a mutual embrace, earth opening her bosom and water penetrating her entire frame by means of a network of veins…” (quoted in Runia, 2001, 182). Cf. Op. 131 (see below p.178 and n.41); Plant. 10.
122 Philo’s term διακοσμέω probably not only comes from philosophical cosmogonies (cf. e.g., Plato’s Tim. 37d5; Ps.-Aristotle’s Mund. 2, 392b12) but also from the influence of Gen. 2:1 (Runia, 2001, 183).
the natural and observable botanical process (§41.1-20).123 Behind this miraculous process it is as though there were present a “painter’s knowledge” (§41.21-22).124 Then in §42, Philo returns to the text to emphasize the “maturity” of the fruit and the presence of the “seeds.” The LXX of vv.11-12 places more emphasis on “the seeds” than did the MT. It draws noticeable attention to their activity of “seeding” (σπείρων σπέρμα),125 and it focuses upon their nature as “according to kind and according to likeness” (κατὰ γένος καὶ καθ’ ὁμοιότητα). Philo demonstrates in two basic ways that the realized teleology (τελείαν, i.e., “maturity”) of the fruit of v.12 is divinely purposeful. It is “for” (εἰς) the immediate use/enjoyment of the forthcoming living beings (§42.4-6).126 It is “toward [πρὸς] the eternal genesis of what is similar [τῶν ὁμοίων]” (§43.6-7), i.e., these mature fruit immediately contained “the seed-substances” (τὰ σπερματικὰ ὀφθαλία) in which exists the potential of endless self-propagation. Concerning this spermatic principle, Philo reasons:

For God purposed [ἐβουλήθη] nature to run a course, immortalizing [ἀπαξενάτικων] the kinds [τὰ γένη], and granting to them eternity [ἀνατολήν]. Therefore he also led and spurred on the beginning [ἀρχήν] toward the end [πρὸς τέλος], and he made the end [τέλος] to bend back around upon the beginning [ἐπὶ ἀρχήν]. For out of the plant comes the fruit just as [ὡς] out of the beginning [ἐξ ἀρχῆς] comes the end [τέλος], and out of fruit comes the seed which contains the plant in itself again just as [ὡς] out of the end [ἐκ τέλους] comes the beginning [ἀρχή]. (Op. 44)

Philo uses an ontological principle of reality, one which appears to have been well known since he does not defend or explain it, to elucidate what God did in the text. Nature contains a beginning and an end that are mutually perpetual. Thus there exists in nature

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123 Philo’s “scientific” elaboration on the botanical processes (cast as exegesis) compares with e.g., Pearce, 1969, 85-93, who presents a modern scientific interpretation of Genesis 1. Pearce and Philo both seek to demonstrate accurate correspondences between Genesis 1 and contemporary theory.
124 Berchman (2000) argues that aestheticism is central to Philo’s “philosophy” (49-70).
125 On the strange grammar see Wevers, 1993, 6 and 6n.21.
126 Cf. Aet. 63.
“the eternal genesis of likenesses” (§43), and that is precisely what Moses meant by “according to kind” (4x in vv.11-12) and “according to likeness” (2x). On the third day of creation God established this principle, thus fixing an “immortalizing” and “eternity” of “the kinds” (§44).

But as much as making a general ontological claim about the nature of beginning (ἀρχή) and end (τέλος) and a textual claim about seeds, fruit, and kinds, Philo is making a theological claim. “God purposed [ἐβουλήθη] …and therefore he led [γῆ] and he spurred on [ἐπέσπευδε]…and he made [ποιεῖ] to bend back around.” This is reminiscent of Philo’s point in Aet. 13-19. There he bases the indestructibility (ἀφθαρσία) of the cosmos upon God’s “providence” (πρόνοια), and he argues this by quoting Tim. 41ab, where Plato guarantees the cosmos’ (and the gods’) indestructibility solely on the basis of God’s “will” and “purpose” (ἐθέλοντος… ἐθέλεν… τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσως). Philo then proves the antiquity of both Plato’s “indestructibility” theory as well as Hesiod’s “creation” theory (mentioned above) by quoting Gen. 1:1, alluding to Gen. 1:14-19, and glossing Gen. 8:22—the last of which guarantees cosmic eternality due to God’s promise.

Within his commentary on Genesis 1 itself, Philo has already written about the Before: God “purposed” (βουλήθης) the construction of this visible world and therefore pre-stamped out the noetic world (Op. 16). Now, in his direct comments on Gen. 1:11-13 in §44, Philo re-introduces the creative “purpose” of God, this time seeing them in God’s

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127 C.f. Her. 113-22, where Philo again uses seeds and plants to exalt the primary causal work of God in “natural” agriculture over the secondary cause of the one who sows (cf. §§115, 117, 119; Leg. 1.5-7). This theocentric understanding of agriculture will find a correlate in Paul (cf. 1 Cor. 3:6-7 and 15:37-38, below).

128 For a similar reading of Genesis 1 (in this aspect) see Batto, 1992, 32.

129 Plato had emphasized God’s “purpose”: the demiurge “purposed” (ἐβουλήθη) the cosmos to be like himself (Tim. 29e), “purposing” (βουλήθης) that all things should be good and useful (Tim. 30a), “purposing” (βουλήθης) to make the cosmos resemble (ὁμοιόσαμι) the most beautiful (καλλίστῳ) and most perfect (τέλεῳ) thing, the intelligible paradigm (Tim. 30d [the cosmos being “most like” (ὁμοιότατον) the noetic realm both as a whole and also “according to its parts” (κατὰ γένος), Tim. 30c]).

ontological structuring of the botanical processes in the Beginning of the visible world. God knew exactly what the world would need. The individual decisions he made on the third day (as on the second) testify to his surpassing wisdom and intentionality. Because of this wisdom, God pre-emptively saved the cosmos, as he had done through light on day one, this time from death and dissolution. From the Beginning onward, based on the Before, God granted an ontologically self-perpetuating “immortality” to the world.


God created the luminaries. The fact that light itself (and plants) preceded heavenly luminaries in Genesis 1 easily stimulates various attempts to relate the text’s truth-claims to present scientific standards. Some are not bothered by the text’s order. U. Cassuto writes, “The existence of light before the creation of luminaries does not, of course, present any difficulty, for we are all familiar with light that does not emanate from the heavenly bodies, e.g., lightning.” From an implicitly theological angle, G. von Rad reasons,

Perhaps the remarkable distinction between the creation of light and the creation of the stars has something to do with this emphasis on their creatureliness. The stars are in no way creators of light, but only mediating bearers of a light that was there without them and before them.

S. Gelander gives an explicitly theological explanation: “God is altogether independent in His relations with nature and its laws.” Philo knows the oddity of pre-solar plants (cf. Op. 45, 47), but neither sun-less plants nor bodiless light truly concerns him regarding the

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133 Von Rad, 1956, 54.

134 Gelander, 1997, 98.
seeming disorder of vv.14-19.\textsuperscript{135} In §§45-46, at which we will now look, Philo presents his theological reason for the textual delay in presenting heaven’s adornment. In §§53-61, toward which we will then turn, he presents God’s teleological purposes for the luminaries.\textsuperscript{136}

a. The Theological Delay of the Luminaries (Op. 45-46)

To validate the perceived discrepancy in the concept of proper order, Philo yet again builds his cosmogonic reading on God’s fore-thought, perfect knowledge, and supreme ability. By making stars after plants, God pre-emptively facilitates trust in and awe for his independent and all-powerful Self. While elsewhere Philo speculates on both the intellectual and essential nature of celestial bodies,\textsuperscript{137} the latter of which he is particularly unsure,\textsuperscript{138} here Philo sets aside all such speculation for the sake of making evident the Mosaic emphasis on theocentric dominion. The delay of heaven’s adornments was textually established “for proof” (εἰς ἔνδειξιν) of God’s “most evident power of rulership” (§45.5-6). Humans were going to tend toward idolatry of the created order by attributing the “causes” (αἰτίας) of seasonal plant-growth to the heavenly bodies themselves. Although Philo admits that attributing causation to stars is somewhat

\textsuperscript{135} Because Philo presents Gen. 1:1-5 as the paradigmatic Before, there actually is no corporeal light that precedes its embodiment. Because all creative acts are actually occurring simultaneously (§§13-14, 67), plants do not technically precede the sun.

\textsuperscript{136} Because §§53-61 is an arithmological excursus that is relatively disconnected from the biblical text, it is unhelpful for our purposes. On it see Runia, 2001, 187-88.

\textsuperscript{137} Sometimes Philo calls stars “rational” (Plant. 7, 12; cf. Gig. 8; Somn. 1.135; so Conzelmann, 1975, 282n.23; Runia, 2001, 240). According to Runia (2001): “Some early Greek philosophers such as Anaxagoras and Democritus regarded the heavenly bodies as masses of solid matter, but from Plato and Aristotle onwards it was generally accepted that they were living beings whose superior intelligence could be deduced from their perfect movements” (240). In Spec. 1.66, however, Philo associates the heavens with the sanctuary of the temple (as here in Op. 55) and regards the angels as (obviously rational) priests and the stars as (seemingly a-rational?) “dedicatory objects.”

\textsuperscript{138} See Spec. 1.39. He records a vast array of opinions in Somn. 1.21-24, 53-54.
“reasonable,” the danger is that people will show too much admiration for the phenomena and thus “believe in” or “put their trust in” (πιστεύουσι) them rather than God. God’s “sovereignty” as Creator, Cause, and primary object of trust is at stake.

But according to Philo, just as God had “understood in advance” (προλαβον) the (semi-)Platonic principle that “a good copy would never come into being without a good paradigm” (§16; see chapter 1), so too now God “understood in advance” (προλαβον) this coming human trend. Just as on the third day, as Philo reads it, God had foreseen the potential infertility of the earth and creation was thus a kind of pre-emptive rescue from natural disaster, so too in this fourth day, as Philo reads it, God’s fore-knowledge considers coming human impiety as well. Creation thus transpires according to Gen. 1:14-19 because of God’s pre-established intent of pre-empting false trust. The all-powerful God intentionally demonstrated that he does not need “his heavenly offspring” and that they are “not autonomous” in their rule (οὐ ἄυτοκρατεῖς). It is God himself who, like a charioteer, “leads [all natural processes] however he wants [ frags ], each according to law and justice” (§46.10-11; cf. §46.6 [ ὁταν αὐτῷ δοκῇ]). All things are

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139 For Philo’s use of “reasonable” (εὐλογον) as well as “persuasive” (πεπιθανά) and “likely” (εἰκότα) cf. Dillon, 1977, 52-69; Runia, 2001, 189. Philo can see some validity in attributing some sort of causation to stars. He labels stars as visible “gods” (Spec. 1.19; cf. Op. 27; Spec. 1.209; 2.165; Radice, 2009, 129; Runia, 2001, 160, 208) and attributes to them predictive nature (van Kooten, 2003, 28; but note that Philo’s statements subsequently quoted by van Kooten [Op. 56-57, 58-59, 59-60; Aet. 19; Spec. 1.92] merely show that the events are pre-announced rather than “influenced” or “determined” by the movement of the stars as van Kooten explains). Von Rad (1956) is emphatic that the notion that “time was determined by the cyclical course of the stars” was “ancient Oriental,” “not Old Testament!” (54), but cf. Philo’s treatment in Leg. 1.8. Regardless of Philo’s often heightened language for stars, they must be relegated to secondary causes (Spec. 1.16-19; Migr. 178-94) and God alone is primary cause (Spec. 3.180). God alone is to be worshiped, even in the context of astronomy (Op. 45-46; Spec. 1.13-20; Prov. 1.77-88; cf. Spec. 1.59-63; Her. 97; Migr. 181; see Runia, 2001, 160, 205).

140 See Runia, 2001, 189.

141 Cf. Conf. 174, where stars and angels follow their “leader,” God, “in obedience to the principles of law and justice.” Radice (2009) posits that God is not himself bound to “law and justice,” for miracles break just such laws (130).
“possible for God.”142 According to Philo, the dignity of God’s rule is “the reason on account of which the earth sprouted first,” before heavenly lights were made (§47.1-2).

b. The Teleological Ends of the Luminaries (Op. 53-61)

Philo’s grounding of ontology on theology continues (although more subtly) through the remainder of the fourth day. After his arithmological excursus whereby “four” is considered perfect for “the Maker to adorn [διεκόσμει] the heaven” with “the most God-like adornment [κόσμω]” (§§47-52),143 Philo reminds his readers of light’s ontic perfection (§53.4) by relating God’s fore-knowledge to God’s creative act. “Knowing” (εἰδος) that “of existing things light is best,” God “was shining” it (απεφαινεν; cf. Gen. 1:14-15 [ωστε φαινειν]) as the instrument of sight, the best of the senses (§53.5-7).144 This knowledgeable shining has blessed mankind with many “good things.” The greatest is “philosophy,” the love of wisdom (§53.23-24), through which humans “feast” on the majestic “dance” of the luminaries, asking unanswerable questions of existence (§54).145

When Philo begins to explain the purpose of the luminaries, he thinks of them mainly from the perspective of their “benefits” to and “usefulness” for humans,146 earning what Runia calls Philo’s “fundamental anthropocentric approach” to the fourth day.147

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142 “All things” does not include evil (Agr. 129; Mut. 30), so Radice, 2009, 130.
143 Again it appears that Gen. 2:1 has influenced Philo’s concept of creation.
144 Cf. Abr. 156-63, where Philo again glorifies “sight” through exegetical points from Gen. 1:4 (§156) and Gen. 1:14 (§158).
145 For Philo, philosophia is “the preparatory science for sophia, which includes the contemplation of the cosmos and God’s theoretical and moral revelation to Israel” (Berchman, 2000, 58 [cf. 51, 51n.6]; following and summarizing Malingrey, 1961). Cf. Somn. 1.21-24, 53-54; Spec. 1.39.
146 Cf. χρειαν τε και ωφελειαν in §56.2, το χρησιμοτατον in §60.4, and ωφελειας in §61.2.
147 Runia (2001) points out Philo’s “anthropocentric bias of the treatise” generally (204, 211), as well as his “strong anthropocentric emphasis” and “fundamental anthropocentric approach” to the fourth day specifically (197, 204, 206). He qualifies this: “Philo does not fully take over Plato’s strong anthropocentric emphasis,” he “prefers to emphasize the magnificence and munificence of God as creator,” keeping such affinities with Hellenism “within strict bounds because of Philo’s prevailing Jewish theocentrism” (199).
luminaries are for humans. Yet Philo’s teleological approach incorporates a source as well as a goal, subsuming both under purpose.

Concerning the (anthropocentric) goal, Philo lists three aspects that follow the LXX: 1) to be for illumination (τοῦ φωσφορεῖν), 2) for times (καιρῶν), 3) for days, months, and years (ἡμερῶν, μηνῶν, ἐνυαύτῶν) (§55.7-11; cf. Gen. 1:14-15 and Philo’s consecutive exposition in §§58-59). Each of these are anthropocentric, but Philo introduces these goals by way of their (theocentric) source (and inherent purpose): God “crafted the sensory heavenly bodies…for the sake of many things [πολλῶν χάριν]” (§55.4, 7-9), i.e., those listed in the text. Likewise, the sun’s role as “a great king” is due to the fact that “the Father gave [ἀνεδίδου]” to it “the power over the day.” Thus Philo sees within the specific textual statement that “God made” the “great” light for “rulership” over the day in 1:16 the general theme that cosmological structure is due to the Creator’s cosmogonic gift. Even the stars, which Genesis 1 hardly mentions but which play such an important role in the cosmic religion of the Chaldeans and Greeks (particularly the Alexandrians), Philo subordinates to the one God’s sovereign allotment.

Although Philo has read the astronomical benefits as mainly oriented toward coming humanity, he concludes the fourth day with both a cosmic and theocentric emphasis:

I am sure that there are many others [ἐκ. benefits, ὀφελεῖας] which are unclear to us—for not everything is known to the mortal race—but which contribute to the preservation of the whole [τοῦ ὅλου]. These, along with the ordinances and laws [θεσμοί καὶ νόμοις] that God immovably marked out [ἀριστεροίν] in the universe, are

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But Philo’s theocentrism has even more profoundly affected his exegesis of Genesis 1 than even Runia exhibits.

148 Gen. 1:16 is ambiguous whether God merely made the stars “also” (καὶ), thus only assigning “rule” to the two “greater lights,” or whether God made the stars unto rulership “also.” Philo clarifies the textual ambiguity: they share the moon’s dominion (§56; cf. Spec. 1.13-14). This is empirically evident to Philo and connects Genesis 1 more closely to the cosmic religion(s) of Philo’s contemporaries.

149 Frick, 1999, 119.
certainly and in every way manifested together as having been completed [ἐπιτελεῖσθαι]. (§61)

As Runia notes, Philo’s summary has been influenced by both “the command structure of Genesis 1” and “the Greek philosophical notion of a rational order which is embodied in the cosmos as the product of a divine intelligence.”¹⁵⁰ According to the LXX, the fourth day reveals more purpose clauses than any other day. There are eight repetitions of the teleological εἰς (“for”), two of the purposive ὅστε (“so that”), and five infinitives of intent (“to…”). Accordingly, for Philo the heavens “have come about” (γεγόνασιν)¹⁵¹ for many purposes: “in order that” (ίνα, §58.1-2), “so that” (ὅπως, §58.3), “for” (εἰς, §59.5), and “toward” (πρός, §60.1) benefits for both humans and the world. Sun, moon, and stars may have appeared to many of Philo’s contemporaries as controlling the destiny of life. But Philo stands upon the text of the fourth day and proclaims that it is God himself who “marked out” (ὁρισεν) the natural and immovable laws,¹⁵² along with their teleological benefits.


Earth and heaven “having been arrayed” (διακοσμήσαντων) with appropriate “ornaments” (κόσμων), God “undertook to form the lives of the mortal beings” (§62.1-4). God began by “making” (ποιήσεν) aquatic beings (cf. ἐποίησεν, Gen. 1:21), but only

¹⁵² Cf. Plant. 8: “It is the eternal law of the everlasting God which is the most supporting and firm foundation of the universe” (cf. §10). (Plant. 2-4 had explained creation in phrases similar to those in Op., and are thus evocative of Genesis 1 itself).
after “deeming” (νομίσας) “five” to be perfect for living beings (§62.4-6). Yet again, God “considered” before he “made.”

Although Philo’s comments on the fifth day are brief, he nevertheless draws out a few important features of the text. Philo sees that “living things” (ζωοίς) and “ensouled things” (ἐμψυχοι) were made on the “fifth” day (cf. ψυχόν ζωσόν, Gen. 1:20-21) and have “five” senses. By this correspondence Philo demonstrates a divinely established ontological principle of sense-perception. “The Maker distributed [προσέκαμεν] to each [ἐκάστη] of the senses its own [ἵδιον] special material and criterion by which to judge what it notices” (§62.9-11), e.g., colors for sight, sounds for hearing. Other than the number five, this seems to have no textual basis. Nevertheless, Philo again sees in the text an ontology based on theocentric sovereignty. Philo’s principle is not merely “to each [ἐκάστη] their own [ἵδιον],” although this is ontologically true, but is more particularly “God distributes to each their own.” Philo’s principle captures both the general emphasis in Genesis 1 of God’s causation as well as the particular principle in vv.20-23 of order through categorization: “according to kind.”

In the MT of Gen. 1:20 God says, “Let the waters swarm...,” and v.21 responds, “And God created...” Thus the MT of v.21 does what Philo had done with v.12, dimishing the water’s participation by highlighting God’s own enactment. In the LXX of v.20, however, after God says, “Let the waters lead forth...,” v.21 responds, “And God made... which the waters led forth.” The LXX followed the MT’s emphasis on God’s own enactment (v.21a), but added the water’s participation too (v.21b). Interestingly, in §63.1-

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153 We must keep in mind that, for Philo, God’s “thinking” and his “acting” are “simultaneous” (Op. 13; see Wedderburn, 1973B, 305; Lorenzen, 2008, 161-62n.77), and therefore our constant use of “before” is, like Philo’s, meant logically (even causatively), not temporally.

Philo resembles the MT (not intentionally) when he writes that God “commands [κελεύει] all kinds of fish and sea-creatures to be constituted...,” adding that God “proceeded to form [διεπλάττετο]...” (cf. §63.16). Philo again emphasizes God’s activity, even to the neglect of v.21b (LXX).

Gen. 1:21 specifies “according to kinds” about both water creatures and birds. As with the seeds, Philo concentrates on the “kinds” and the similarity/diversity this entails. The “kinds” (γένη) of fish and sea-monsters involve “differing” (διαφέροντα) sizes and structures (§63.2-3). For example, fish differ from fish since “in various [ἐν ἄλλοις] seas various types [ἄλλα] are found.” (As we will see below, Paul uses similar language to describe God’s desired diversity within the cosmos.) According to Philo’s reading of the fifth day, all “kinds” of fish and birds are suitably different from each other, to each thing God gives its own particularly suited qualities (cf. Plant. 11-15), and God’s actions are “reasonable” (εἰκότως).

5. The Sixth Day, Philo on Genesis 1:24-26 (Op. 64-68)

“Now that water and air had received the kinds [τὰ γένη] of living beings that were appropriate to them,” God again “was calling [ἐκάλει] the earth unto the production [εἰς τὴν γένεσιν] of the parts that had been left outstanding” (§64.3). Philo quotes Gen. 1:24 (“Let the earth lead out...”), substituting “beasts” (κτήμα) for the text’s “living beings” (ψυχῆς ζώσαν) and the more specific “according to each kind” (καθ’ ἐκαστον γένος) for “according to kind” (κατὰ γένος) (§64.6-7). Although Philo only uses the word...

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155 These creatures “differed” in their ποιότηταν, “qualities.” Runia, 2001, 214: “Philo has noted the zoological term γένος (kind or genus) in the biblical text... [which] allows him to relate the Mosaic account to philosophical discussions on the distribution of genera of living beings in the cosmos.”

156 For the cosmogonic “call” see Spec. 4.187; cf. Bar. 3:32-35.
γένος once in this section, he accurately reflects the text’s further emphasis on diversification (which the text conveys through repeating κατὰ γένος 5x).

Philo now fully presents the earth’s active response to God’s imperative: “And the earth immediately released what it had been commanded,” that is, creatures “differing” (διαφέροντα) in build, strength, and purpose (§64.7-10). Interestingly, while in his comments on the previous places in the text where the water or earth were bid to action he downplayed this, this time his emphasis on the active and immediate response of the earth has no correlate in the text. In vv.24-25, “God made” (v.25) in response to his own imperative (v.24). Regardless of such details, the general pattern of his exegesis of this type of textual feature is to treat God’s call and activity as primary, and the response of the stuff as secondary, if active at all. When the passive thing does act, as here, it is following the orders of its sovereign, the wise and all-knowing God.

Before commenting on the beginning of humanity, Philo wishes to recapitulate the “zoogony” (ζωογονίαν), showing its “all-beautiful” (πάγκαλος) “chain of sequence,” organizing it by levels of “ensoulment” (ἐμψυχή) (§65). Concerning fish: “of the ensouled beings” fish are least, having “more bodily [σωματικής] than soulish substance [ψυχικής ούσιας],” thus being “in a manner somewhat living [ζωα] yet not living [οὐ ζωα],” as “moving soul-less beings” (κινητὰ ἄψυχα). In truth, “the soul-like thing” (τοῦ ψυχοειδοῦς) has merely been “sown” (παρασπαρέντος) in them to preserve their bodies, acting like salt to slow down their “decay” (φθείρουντο) (§66.1-7). Concerning birds and land-animals: they have “better sense-perception” than fish, and “through their construction they manifest more clearly the distinctive quality of being soulish [τῆς

157 I.e., the “origin of life” or “birth of the animal realm” (Runia, 2001, 62).
Concerning “the human”: God “made [ἐποίει] the human [τῶν ἀνθρώπων] over all [ἐπὶ πᾶσιν]” (§66.11; cf. §65.1). Whitaker (Loeb) translates “over all” as “to crown all,” justified by Runia as reflecting the “ascending” nature of the sequence, with humans as the ontological “climax of the creative acts.”

Humanity received “mind” (νοῦν) as a choice gift, “a sort of soul [ψυχή] of the soul [ψυχής]” (§66.11-15).

The Craftsman employed the process of order and ascension in “the genesis of everything,” developing life from foam-like “seed” (τὸ σπέρμα), to firmness (στήριξι = στέρεον/στερέωμα), to movement (κίνησιν), to life-formation (ζωοπλαστεῖ; cf. Gen. 2:19), to the distribution of “moist substance” into the body-parts and “spiritual [substance]” (τὴν πνευματικὴν) into the soul. The last gives nourishment and sense perception (§67). The order of creation transpired as it did because God “deemed to form [διαπλάττειν ἐδοξέ]” fish to humans, least to greatest, with land-creatures and birds in between (§68). Now that Philo has shown the zoogonic (indeed the whole cosmogonic) account to be according to God’s logically prior “consideration” of order, differentiation, and propriety, he is ready to turn to Genesis’ first anthropogenic text, Gen. 1:26-28 (§§69-88), to which we will turn in our next chapter.

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158 Runia, 2001, 216. Philo’s language of “over all” (ἐπὶ πᾶσιν) may also reflect the influence of Ps. 8:6b-7, where God “placed [κατέστησεν] humanity “over [ἐπὶ]” the works of his hands, and God “subjected all things [πάντα ὑπέταξεν] under his feet.” Philo seems to read Ps. 8:6-7 into Gen. 1:28 at Op. 84-85 (so Borgen, 1995, 369-89; cf. Runia, 2001, 256).

159 “Reason” [ὁ λογισμός], which is linked to moral capacity, Philo defers until §§69-75. In Deus 47-48, God’s gift of mind to the otherwise animal human is a gift of liberation, i.e., freedom from the “necessity” to which mindless lower animals are bound. With liberation comes moral responsibility to act in such a way—to choose to move in such a way—that “does honor to its Liberator” as if a “grateful freedman” (see Winston, 1983, 181-195, 182; cf. Runia, 2001, 240).
6. Summary of Philo’s Beginning of the World

Throughout his reading of the beginning of the world, Philo repeatedly draws attention to two things: God’s sovereign activity (both in “call” and in enactment), and God’s “pre”-creational understanding (because of which he created as he did). Because creation is based upon God’s fore-thought, Philo continues to portray creation as a pre-emptive rescue, whether from natural dissolution or from coming human wickedness. As we have seen in brief above and as we will see further in our next chapter, Philo interprets the beginning of “all things in the cosmos” anthropocentrically, as what God “pre-prepared” (προητομάσατο) for humanity according to his previous “purpose” (βουλήθεις) (§§77-78). Yet even this human-oriented aim of creation Philo sets within the context of its ultimately theocentric cause and prior purpose. Though this Before has been exhibited in a slightly more implicit form than what we analyzed in our former chapter, it is in a similar manner that what God thought and purposed before the beginning propels and shapes Philo’s actual interpretation of the beginning of the world (Gen. 1:6-31). Yet it is the text of the cosmic Beginning that gave rise to this implicit Before, having provided its form and having even furthered its content. We will now see a broadly similar hermeneutical pattern in Paul’s reading of the Beginning of the world.

B. Paul’s Reading of Genesis 1:6-31 (1 Cor. 15:35-41)

Within the Corinthian church some said, “Resurrection of corpses does not exist” (v.12). More particular queries involved: “How are the corpses raised?,” “In what bodies do they come?” (v.35). Paul thinks that these questions can be answered, satisfactorily,

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160 The second question narrows the first, bringing more specificity to the central issue: the body (Morissette, 1972B, 227; Fee, 1987, 780).
if not exhaustively. He gives a partial answer in v.37 to the latter question: “In the coming body,” but a more direct answer in v.44: “a Spiritual body is raised.” To facilitate his answer concerning the resurrection he introduces in vv.36-49 numerous themes and words from the beginning of Genesis, both from the creation of the world generally (see below) and from the creation of humanity specifically (see chapter 3). Most scholars recognize that Paul’s use of creation in this argument is important, though opposite conclusions concerning his theology of resurrection are put forward precisely due to what is perceived to be his understanding of creation.

For example, J. Becker and N.T. Wright both consider Paul’s references to creation fundamental to 1 Cor. 15:36-49. Both even consider Paul’s general view of creation to be *ex nihilo* (largely based on Rom. 4:17). Yet Becker’s view of Paul’s *creatio* as *ex nihilo* is an important reason why he considers Paul’s view of resurrection to be *ex nihilo* as well. God needs no “left-overs” to initiate resurrection. He rather leaves the corpses (“Adam’s entourage”) in the grave while crafting new bodies from nothing. Wright’s

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161 See Collins, 1999, 564; Lambrecht, 1982, 512; Usami, 1076, 483. De Boer (1988) helpfully adds that Paul gives a “double answer” to his questions from v.35: “The dead will be raised *incorruptible*” (v.52) with ‘a spiritual body’ (v.44a)” (128). We will be focusing on the answer in v.44 for this one is tied more closely to Paul’s interpretation of Genesis. My capitalization of “Spiritual” above reflects a deliberate exegetical decision (and therefore theological position) contrary to, e.g., D. Martin (1992), who assumes that πνευμα and πνευματικόν in 1 Cor. 15 refer to the anthropological “composition of pneuma with sarx and psyche having been sloughed off along the way” (126). Because Paul believes that Christians have become “one πνευμα” with Christ (1 Cor. 6:17), it is certainly difficult to always discern when he refers to the ethereal substance of the human πνευμα (e.g., 2:11a; 14:14) or to the working and character of the divine πνευμα (e.g., 2:11b; 12:4). As I will argue more fully in chapter 3, in 1 Cor. 15 πνευμα and πνευματικόν refer to the theological “presence, power, and transforming activity of the Holy Spirit” (so Thiselton, 2006B, 342-43 [idem, 2006A, 283; idem, 2000, 1276-77]; Wright, 2003, 350, 352; Schreiner, 2001, 458; Moffatt, 1938, 259-60; Vos, 1930, 166-67; Robertson and Plummer, 1911, 372).

162 This includes scholars who disagree substantially on what Paul says concerning the resurrection, but who still consider creation a fundamental aspect of his argument: e.g., Becker, 2007, 165; Wright, 2003, 313, 340; idem, 2006, 28; Collins, 1999, 537; Muddiman, 1994, 135; Conzelmann, 1975, 281.


164 Becker, 2007, 165, 167, 168; Wright, 2002, 498. For a brief critique of this use of Rom. 4:17 see above pp.5-7 and notes.

165 Becker, 2007, 165-168 (cf. Conzelmann, 1975, 281; Martin, 1992, 130; Thiselton, 2000, 1267; and see Moiser’s discussion of earlier scholars holding similar views [1992, 10-30, esp. 22]).
view of Paul’s *creatio* extends past its quality as *ex nihilo* and focuses upon the “goodness” of the physical creation. Thus he considers it “simply unthinkable” that Paul would have conceived of the graves remaining full. Simply recognizing *that* creation is an important ingredient in Paul’s argument about resurrected bodies obviously does not solve all of the issues. The fact that this recognition is so common but understood and theologically applied toward such divergent ends certainly confirms the importance of our further study of *how* Paul interprets creation, particularly in 1 Corinthians 15.

Criticizing the Corinthian denial as “ignorance [ἀγνώσια] of God” (v.34), Paul implies that the answer to the question concerning eschatological ontology is closely associated with the proper understanding of God. They ignorantly rejected the existence of resurrection for they could not fathom its “how” and “in what body,” but they failed to take into account the God of Genesis 1. Deniers are unthinking “fools” (ἀφρων) (v.35), and Paul’s label “fools,” while “generally associated with one who fails to recognize the creative power of God,” would cut to the heart of a community obsessed with “wisdom.” In response to this ignorance of the divine ability and technique, Paul presents God’s creativity in the world as prolegomena to resurrected bodily ontology. The Beginning proves to be a major influence on Paul’s understanding

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169 Asher, 2000, 78. Asher writes that Paul’s use of ἀφρων “operates on two levels: the first level is the rhetorical use of the appellative to dismiss the objection of a foolish and un[n]formed [sic] student, and the second is to anticipate his argument from creation in vv.36b-38” (78).
171 Morissette (1972B) sees “the intervention of the Creator” in v.38a (“God gives”) (220), though the term “intervention” is not quite strong enough for Paul’s argumentation.
of salvation and the End (cf. 2 Cor. 4:6, above), in this instance of the “how” and “in what body” of the new life.\textsuperscript{172}

In vv.36-43, Paul presents cosmic and cosmogonic prolegomena, “preparing the way” for his anthropological answer in v.44 and for its anthropogenic explanation in vv.45-49.\textsuperscript{173} Paul’s basic logic is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>v.35</th>
<th>Question(s): How are the dead raised? In what bodies do they come?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>vv.36-43</td>
<td>Prolegomena: Consider God’s cosmic structuring based on Genesis 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v.44a</td>
<td>Answer: A <em>psychikon</em> body is sown, a <em>pneumatikon</em> body raised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vv.44b-49</td>
<td>Explanation: Cf. Gen. 2:7/5:3 with Jesus’ resurrection/application.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Concerning the prolegomena itself, Paul begins with an appeal in vv.36-41 to the present structure of the cosmos based on God’s activity and on his intentions at creation. In vv.42-43 he will draw God’s creative power into direct relationship (“in this manner”) with his resurrecting power.\textsuperscript{174} (Because that shifts from the general world to particular humanity we will defer discussion of it to chapter 3). We will now see how Paul’s “argument from creation”\textsuperscript{175} in vv.36-41 is based on his reading of the initial text of Genesis. Although our purpose is not to settle the (deep-rooted) debate concerning the resurrection mentioned above, what follows may produce a side-benefit of ruling out certain arguments that arise from improper readings of Paul’s present argument from creation. Primarily what will emerge from the following investigation is a similar two-sided treatment of God’s creation of the world in Paul as we found in Philo: cosmic ontology is good, and this is because of the action and desire of the Creator. In vv.36-38a, Paul sows the seed of this theocentric ontology. In vv.38b-41, he draws out its cosmic

\textsuperscript{172} Watson, 1997, 282; Probst, 1991, 344; Moffatt, 1938, 261.  
\textsuperscript{173} Héring, 1962, 173.  
\textsuperscript{174} So also Asher, 2001, 107-08; idem, 2000, 78.  
\textsuperscript{175} Senft, 1979, 204-10.
scope and preparatory implications for the resurrection, and he does so through the themes and language of Genesis 1.

1. “Sowing the Seed” of God’s Creative Power (1 Cor. 15:36-38a)

After quoting the Corinthian queries regarding the coming of resurrected “bodies” (v.35), Paul writes,

Fool! What you yourself sow is not made alive unless it dies. And what you sow, it is not the body that will come about that you sow, but rather a naked kernel (perhaps of wheat or of something else). And God gives to it a body just as he wanted, and to each of the seeds its own body. (vv.36-38)

The “sowing” of a “seed” helps Paul posit two present ontological principles in vv.36-37, which he then bases on divine action in v.38a and intent in v.38b. In light of this theocentric construal of nature, he then refines his main ontological point in v.38c.

Concerning the two ontological principles in vv.36-37, the nature of the “thing” (ὁ) sown is to be “made alive” after it has “died” (v.36), and its nature is to have a different “body” when it comes back to life (v.37). Thus far Paul has not specified the cause of either ontological principle, whether life-from-death or bodily change. Both are obviously from God (especially in light of 1 Cor. 3:6-7), but theology is not his point in these two opening statements of the analogy. In vv.36-37, Paul’s principal point is ontological.\(^{176}\)

\(^{176}\) Some have been led by Paul’s emphatic positioning of the “you” (σὺ) in v.36 to conclude that Paul is primarily contrasting agencies (as he had in 3:6-7): “you sow... but God gives the body” (so Asher, 2001, 108n.9; Morissette, 1972B, 221, 228; Simon, 1959, 149). Yet the emphasis on “you” is adequately accounted for as Paul’s appeal to their own common (and obvious) knowledge: “Your own knowledge of something as common as agricultural demonstrates a thing going from death to life” (Lockwood, 2000, 585-86; Morris, 1987, 219). Although “you” is the subject of the introductory (but subordinate) clause (“what you yourself sow”), the actual subject of the main clause (and the point of the main clause) is “what”/“it”: “What you yourself sow—it is not made alive unless it dies.” While it is true that Paul is not ultimately intending to base the ontological principle of life-from-death on “the innate capacity of the seed” (rightly Asher, 2001, 108n.9), and true that the passive in v.36 is a “divine passive” (Asher, 2001, ad loc.; Minear, 1994, 73; Kistemaker, 1993, 567; Morris, 1987, 219), and true that Paul’s statement has nothing to do with some “necessity” of death as a “precondition” for eschatological life (contra Morissette, 1972B, 221) for not all will die (v.51; rightly Garland, 2003, 728; Asher, 2001, 107; Thiselton, 2000, 1264;
This makes sense since he is answering an ontological question: “in what body” do raised corpses come? But Paul does not stop at the ontological, but shifts into the theological.

In v.38a, Paul introduces the theological foundation of these two ontic realities. J. Asher labels the overall point of vv.36-38 “the will and activity of God in creation.”

Paul’s point is actually double-edged: 1) ontological differentiation of bodies (vv.37, 38c), 2) by the will and activity of God in creation (as well as in providence, see below) (v.38ab). For Paul, the structure of nature with its ontological differentiations and theological causation functions as prolegomena to a proper understanding of the final resurrection.

Verse 38 is of pivotal importance for Paul’s prolegomena in vv.36-41, and in that pivot Paul’s timing is important. In v.38a, Paul shifts from the ontology of v.37 to theology proper. He turns from the nature of the seed’s body (as it is set in contrast to the [plant-] body of the future) to what one might call the creative activity of God, i.e., “God gives to it a body.” But this refers to activity which God does presently (δἰδωμιν), thus not directly referring to what he did in the beginning. This “giving” is certainly a creative act inasmuch as it involves causing growth, life, and change within nature. It is therefore of one character with God’s “making” in Genesis 1, particularly in vv.11-12, except that in Paul’s reference the recipient of the “body” is a “seed” which already exists. God’s

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177 Conzelmann, 1975, 281n.12), it is still the case that his point in vv.36-37 concerns ontology (two facts about the “what”), not causation/agency. (He will introduce agency in v.38). (For an example of someone who is contrasting the causation of the divine sower to that of the human sower in agriculture, see Philo’s Post. 170-71; cf. §175b).

178 Thiselton (2000) judges: “The use of ἰδιον σῶμα, ‘its own particular body’…, ranks almost equally in emphasis with ‘God’. The key phrase remains ‘God gives to it a body just as he purposed,’ but the second principle is that of contrast, differentiation, and variety which simultaneously promotes a continuity of identity” (1265).

179 Morissette, 1972B, 221.

180 So N. Watson, 1992, 175; Simon, 1959, 149.
“giving” is not his creation of the seed itself, but rather the seasonal gift of what Paul called in v.37 “the body that will come about” (τὸ σῶμα τὸ γεννησόμενον). This is a divinely caused present-day agricultural event rather than the third-day creational event itself.

Paul’s sowing-analogy from vv.36-38a demonstrates three things: 1) an ontological principle similar to resurrection (v.36), 2) the ontological principle of body differentiation (v.37), and 3) God’s causative agency in present-day providential creativity (v.38a). In the remainder of v.38, however, Paul bases all of this, especially numbers two (present body-differentiation) and three (present divine causation), on the original creation. He does so by rooting it in God’s past intention as found in Genesis 1 (v.38b) and by expressing this theocentric ontology as if writing a commentary on Gen. 1:11-12 (v.38c). As we will now see, in v.38bc Paul subtly relates the future (the body that will be, v.37) and present (God’s continual cosmic providence, v.38a) to God’s past intentions in the creation of all things.

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181 Fee, 1987, 782.
182 Cf. God’s present agricultural “causing growth” in 1 Cor. 3:6-7.
183 Some scholars overemphasize v.36 and neglect v.37 (e.g., Kim, 2008, 94; cf. 92-95), when v.37 is what Paul actually develops (so Fee, 1987, 781; Lockwood, 2000, 586, 588). V.36 introduces agriculture in the language of resurrection, and Paul will again use “making alive” (ζωοποιεῖν) in v.45 (a verb which can “call to mind the original creation” [Collins, 1999, 551; cf. 2 Ki. 5:7 and Neh. 9:6] and which is typical Pauline language for the divine gift of eschatological life, particularly through resurrection: see 1 Cor. 15:22; 2 Cor. 3:6; Gal. 3:21; Rom. 4:17; 8:11; cf. Ps. 70:20b; Jn. 5:21, 1 Pet. 3:18 [de Boer, 1988, 113]). For more complexities in the use of ζωοποιεῖν, see Judg. 21:14; Eccl. 7:12; Job 36:6; cf. Ps. 70:20a; Jn. 6:63-65 [de Boer, ibid., 221n.88]). Though tempting to highlight v.36 due to its close connection with resurrection language and concept, Paul’s main ontological point that is developed in vv.35-41 is from v.37 (rightly Vos, 1930, 180).
184 Paul’s unification of providence and creation as both “God giving” has a broad affinity with Philo’s unification of creation and providence as God always “making” (Leg. 1.5; Mut. 27-28; see Radice, 2009, 130, 139). This is not to say that Paul believes in creatio continua, but that Paul sees correspondence (not identity) between God’s activity in the beginning and God’s continued rule over nature. (Cf. Philo’s notion of God as the architect of the human mind originally and at every birth: Plant. 31). What Paul reveals here in v.38 is that he sees a close connection between God’s providential activity in nature and God’s creational design as displayed in Genesis 1.
and in vv.38bc-41 he begins to word it all—both theology and ontology—in accordance with the themes and language of Genesis 1.

2. The Second – Sixth Days: Paul’s Cosmology According to Genesis 1 (1 Cor. 15:38b-41)

In vv.38-41 Paul alludes to Genesis 1 in two ways: he conveys its themes and he employs its language. In v.38bc, Paul condenses and conveys two dominant themes of Genesis 1: a) theological intentions are enacted, and therefore b) ontological differentiation comes about. Even there some of his language sounds like a commentary on the biblical text. In vv.39-41, Paul uses the language of Genesis 1 to broaden this ontological comment about seeds/plants into a fully cosmic perspective about the bodily adornments of heaven and earth. His focus is present ontology, but his expressions make clear that under it all he is still assuming the creative activity and desire of God as set out in the beginning of Genesis.

a. The Third Day (Gen. 1:11-13): Two Themes of Genesis 1 (v.38bc)

As we just observed, in v.38ab Paul’s timing is important: “God gives to [the seed] a body just as he wanted.” In contrast to the present “giving” in v.38a, the aorist “wanted” (ἡθελησεν) in v.38b refers to what God “willed,” “purposed,” “determined,” or “chose” to do in the past, and it is right to consider this as being at creation as recorded in Genesis 1. Paul refers in v.38b and v.38c to two of the major themes found in Genesis 1, and

even his words share certain affinities with Gen. 1:11-12 and with later treatments of
Genesis 1 in general and of Gen. 1:11-12 in particular.

Concerning Paul’s shared themes with the biblical text, the exact correspondence of
ontology with God’s voiced desires as well as the ontic differentiation of seeds can be
easily drawn out of Gen. 1:11-12. In Paul’s statement, what exactly God “desired” before
his “gift” of creation (“God gives to the seed a body just as he desired…”) is
particularized by the ontological phrase in v.38c: “to each [ἐκάστῳ] of the seeds its own
[ἰδίῳ] body.” Paul’s reflection of major themes of Gen. 1:11 can be seen below:

Gen. 1:11 reads: In 1 Cor. 15:38bc Paul writes:

God said…  God gives…
…and in happened in this manner  … just as he desired

seeding seeds  to each of the seeds
according to kind and  its own body
according to likeness  (whether wheat, etc.)

Paul is thinking specifically of kinds of seeds: “whether of wheat or something else”
(v.37c). God grants to each seed its own body according to kind. Scholars often note

but in accordance with his past decree in creation, by which the propagation of life on earth was determined
from the beginning (Gen 1:11, 12)” (1264-65). Cf. Robertson and Plummer, 1911, 370; Kistemaker, 1993,
568; Lockwood, 2000, 583-84, 586. Some English translations miss the significance of the aorist: e.g.,
NAB, NKJV, NLT; cf. TEV, as do some commentators: e.g., explicitly Ellingworth and Hatton, 1994, at
15.38; implicitly Moffatt, 1938, 257. Vos (1930) objects to the reading I put forward above, saying, “The
Past Tense in the Greek ‘as it pleased Him,’ might seem to suggest a reference to the creative appointment
of the ‘bodies’ of things. But in connection with the Present Tense ‘gives’ this is little likely” (179n.4).
However, as we will develop below, a present tense “gives” can indicate God’s providential activity while
still based upon God’s past tense “desired,” and this is very likely.

186 The plural helps confirm this: Thiselton (2000) writes (quoting Grimm-Thayer, 583), “It is important
to note that ‘the singular [of σπόρω] is used collectively’ of grains or kernels sown; hence when the plural
occurs (as here) it often denotes kinds of seeds. English offers parallels in such words as cheese or fruit
where novelists will often write of cheeses or fruits to denote a bountiful provision of kinds of fruit and
types of cheese” (1265; emphasis mixed original and added).
that Paul has Gen. 1:11-12 in mind, though this reference is not developed as much as it could be.

For a careful reader of the LXX (but perhaps especially for one who also knows the Hebrew), the additions, modifications, and awkward wording of the Greek of Gen. 1:11-12 would likely cause both “seeds” and the theme of similarity/differentiation of “kinds” to stand out. Philo displayed such exegetical focus in Op. 44 (cf. §§62, 64; see above and further below). Paul not only writes of the present-day “sowing” (σπέιρεις) of “seeds” (τῶν σπερμάτων) (cf. σπειρον σπέρμα in Gen. 1:11-12), but he presses upon the Corinthians that it is God who makes the future [plant-] body, giving to “each of the [kinds of] seeds” (ἐκάστῳ τῶν σπερμάτων) “its own body” (ἰδιόν σῶμα). There are slight differences, however, between Paul’s point regarding seeds and plants, Philo’s point regarding the “seeds” of Gen. 1:11-12, and the point of vv.11-12 itself. In the biblical text one finds “plants yielding seeds.” In Philo one finds “plants yielding fruit [the end] which yield seeds [the beginning] which yield plants [etc.],” i.e., the divinely purposes (ἐβουληθή) and granted cyclical self-preservation unto “immortality” (ἀπαθανατίζων) (Op. 44). In Paul one finds “seeds yielding plants,” i.e., the divinely desired (ἐθέλησεν) and granted end-body coming out of the beginning-body. For Paul, the end of the actual process for which he employs the analogy of God’s creation of plants from seeds is

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188 Three of the LXX’s modifications of the Hebrew of vv.11-12 would make it probable that these verses would stand out in an interpreter’s mind. 1) The LXX adds the phrase “and according to likeness” to “according to kind,” repeating it in both verses. 2) The LXX assimilates v.11 to v.12 (see Cook, 2001, 321, 324; Rösel, 1994, 42) so that the phrase “according to kind and according to likeness” modifies the “seeding seed” rather than the fruit in both verses (see Wevers, 1993, 7). 3) The LXX uses the “unusual construction” σπειρον σπέρμα, “seeding seed” (Wevers, 1993, 6), which later translators, such as Aquila, attempted to “smooth out” (Wevers, 6n.21; cf. Rösel, 1994, 41). Because of its awkward nature it was easy for an interpreter’s attention to be drawn to the seeds.

189 Collins, 1999, 563-64; cf. 566n.38.
“immortality” (ἀθανασίαν) and “incorruptibility” (ἀφθαρσίαν) (vv.52-54), as it had been for Philo, but for Paul this is due not to ontological self-perpetuation effected by God at the beginning, but to the ontic “change” effected by God in the end.¹⁹⁰

Such ontology comes about in perfect accord with God’s desires, and this is the other major theme in which Paul (in v.38) and Genesis 1 accord. We have already seen how such a theme can be easily drawn from Genesis 1 itself.¹⁹¹ Through an example in a psalm and one in Philo we will now see that such an interpretive move—whether regarding creation in general (the psalm) or a commentary on Genesis 1 in particular (Philo)—was being made both before and contemporarily with Paul. Speaking of creation in general, Ps. 134:6 LXX makes explicit what is obvious but implicit in Genesis 1: “All things—as much as he desired [ὁσα ἡθησεν]—the Lord made [ἐποιήσεν] in heaven and in earth.”¹⁹² From Paul’s perspective, this statement itself could be seen as a later commentary on Genesis 1. It presents the same notion that Paul develops in 1 Cor. 15:38-41 of a previous “desire” according to which God makes the cosmos. Likewise, as we saw above, in Philo’s commentary he saw in God’s creation of the “seed” in Gen. 1:11-12 that God “purposed” (ἐβούληθη) seeds, plants, and general reality to be structured in a specific way (Op. 44). Philo extended this theme and wording to Gen. 1:20-23 wherein God granted “to each” (ἐκάστῳ) kind of being “its own” (ἰδιόν) qualities and characteristics (§62), and

¹⁹⁰ Philo can also attribute the perpetual “incorruptibility” (ἀφθαρσία; cf. 1 Cor. 15:52-54) of the cosmos not to God’s initial ontic structuring but to his perpetual “providence” (Aet. 13-19; Dec. 58; Frick, 1999, 91-94, 102-08; Runia, 1986, 152, 241-42; though cf. Plant. 8-10). But in this particular reading of Gen. 1:11-12 (Op. 44)—the textual point of contact with Paul—when Philo expresses a pattern of plants-seeds that mirrors broader reality—as Paul also does—the difference summarized above between Philo’s and Paul’s approaches emerges as a true picture of one of their differences, even if not the full picture.

¹⁹¹ See above pp.93-96. So Westermann, 1984, 41; Delitzsch, 1894, 71. As we noted at the outset of this chapter, Parker (2005) takes a different approach to the phrase “and it happened in this manner” (443-51), and thus ends up at a different interpretation of Genesis 1 than both Philo and Paul, where creation is “more differentiated than (God had) planned” (451).

they became structured in that manner. For Paul, God “desired” (ἡθέλησεν) seeds, plants, and general reality to be structured in a specific way (1 Cor. 15:38), “granting” “to each” (ἐκάστῳ) seed “its own” (τὸν) body. Paul will also extend this theme to the existence of various types of flesh and glory in heaven and earth (vv.39-41). God created particular bodies in Genesis 1, and the resurrection of corpses happens “in this manner” (οὕτως).193

Facilitating Paul’s seed-analogy in vv.37-38 is a reading of Gen. 1:11-13 that emphasizes ontic difference based on divine desire and causation. He uses this to begin presenting an ontological principle that bodies, both present (like a seed) and future (like a plant), can be different than each other. This Gen. 1:11-12-shaped ontology is not applicable to the queries about the somatic ontology of the resurrection by expressing some notion that there is something inherent in the natural order that organically grows new human bodies out of the “seed” of the old, as if God had built that type of immortality and resurrection into the nature of created bodies. That is not Paul’s point. Gen. 1:11-12 is applicable to resurrection-ontology because God’s creative pattern, established in Genesis 1 but constantly enacted in the present, is that he himself “gives” the bodies according to his own purpose. These bodies are appropriate according to their (divinely determined) kinds. Yet Paul does not move directly from the seed-analogy to the resurrection. In the next stage of his creative prolegomena to the resurrection, vv.39-41, Paul will extend this ontological point about botanical body-differentiation to the entire cosmos, and he will do this in the language of the second – sixth days of Genesis 1.

193 Harrisville (1987) draws out well the importance of the direct correspondence between creation and resurrection according to Paul’s concept of the divine “will” (275-76).
b. The Other Days: The Language of Genesis 1 (vv.39-41)

Paul transitions, almost abruptly (i.e., with no “and,” “but,” etc.), from explaining an ontic diversity which God gives among plants to now explaining an ontic diversity throughout the entire cosmos. He asserts:

Not all flesh is the same flesh, but rather one for humans, and another flesh for beasts, and another flesh for birds, and another for fish. And there are bodies that are in heaven and bodies that are on earth. But there is one glory for the ones in heaven, and there is another for the ones on earth. There is one glory for the sun, and another glory for the moon, and another glory for the stars; for a star differs from a star in glory. (15:39-41)

It would be difficult to argue that Paul is not still assuming that God’s “giving” and “desire” are behind these various diversities as they were behind Paul’s botanical theory. Indeed, his entire use of cosmological ontic diversity (vv.39-41) as the setting for God’s sure ability to raise the dead in changed bodies and glories (vv.42ff) rests on the assumption that v.38 governs vv.39-41. It is God who “gives” diverse fleshes and glories not only to seeds and plants but to all of these “bodies” according to his previous “desire.”

Now all “bodies” in heaven and earth are distinguished from each other, each according to their own kind, whether in “flesh” or in “glory.”

Although there are recognizable similarities between Paul’s cosmological expression in vv.39-41 and what was “philosophical[ly] commonplace” in his day, and these could be fruitfully explored, it is the case that the text of Genesis 1 also, perhaps even primarily, lies behind this particular cosmological description. Paul not only often

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194 For v.38 lying underneath vv.39-41 see e.g., Thiselton, 2000, 1265; Harrisville, 1987, 275; Morris, 1985, 220; Vos, 1930, 181.
195 Martin, 1992, 125.
196 So Collins, 1999, 563-64. The key features of the “philosophical commonplace” that Martin (1992) sees in 1 Cor. 15:39-41 are 1) “different kinds of creatures exist in different cosmic realms,” 2) “each occupying a body appropriate to its own realm,” and 3) each “composed of substances derived from that realm” (125). The Genesis-text itself can be arguably presented as God creating realms (i.e., heaven, water and air, earth) on days two and three (1:6-13) and then filling those realms with appropriate beings or
supports his arguments with scripture, but he has already used and will continue to use texts from Genesis 1-5 in this specific argument in 1 Corinthians 15.197 There is an impressive array of recent scholars who recognize not merely that Paul refers to creation in general, but that Paul’s cosmology in vv.39-41 is connected to the text of Genesis 1.198 But as was the case with v.38 specifically, so too with vv.39-41 this recognition of Paul’s textual influence could be aided by a more detailed exploration of how Paul reads the text.

We have already seen that in v.38 Paul wrote of God’s present activity (διδωσιν) which caused ontology to come about in exact accord with (καθος) his past intentions and desires (ἠθέλησεν), and we have even explored the affinities of such an explanation with both Gen. 1:11-12 itself and with commentaries on the biblical account. In vv.39-41, Paul describes the bodily differentiations that he presently sees on earth and in the heavens. His direct point is ontological, expanding his own botanical statement from v.38c to the bodies (i.e., stars for the heavens, fish and birds for the water and air, beasts and humans for the earth). It even presents (in a limited way) the various beings as produced out of their respective realms (fish [and birds] from water, beasts and humans from earth). Radice (1989) argues that this is precisely Philo’s structure in Op.: creating realms, filling them with appropriate bodies (117-23, esp. 120, 122). Thus the “philosophical commonplace” described by Martin above (1992, 125) not only has affinities with the structural and essential presentation in Genesis 1, but this structure to Genesis 1 seems to have been recognized by Philo in such a way that he could employ more technical philosophical language and motifs than Paul within a commentary that has the primary goal of explaining the biblical text. Is it not probable that Paul, though expressing his cosmology in terms and ideas consistent with “philosophical commonplace,” nevertheless had (even primarily) the text of Genesis 1 facilitating his communication?

197 In 1 Corinthians 15, Paul has already referenced Genesis 3 in vv.21-22 and Ps. 8:7 LXX (cf. Gen. 1:26-28) in vv.24-28, and he will shortly quote and expound Gen. 2:7 in vv.45-47, and allude to Gen. 5:3 in vv.48-49. See Wright, 2003, 313. In a slightly different but related manner, Scott (1997) argues: “Like most Jews of his day, Paul derived his conception of the world [the imago mundi] from the Table-of-Nations tradition based on Genesis 10” (381). If untrue, our point remains; but if true then there is another concrete example of an aspect of Paul’s cosmology derived from the formative chapters of Genesis.

cosmos. But the inseparable correlate of “to each their own” is God’s desire and then activity. Although Paul’s mention of present “fleshes” (v.39) may refer to God’s present providential causation (as with plants, so with animals), his mention of the heavenly bodies assumes that his concept of God’s action (e.g., “giving”) includes what took place in the beginning itself (Gen. 1:14-19), for that was the origin of the sun, moon, and stars. But regardless of Paul’s exact timing of God’s “giving” of the fleshes and glories in vv.39-41, underlying all of God’s cosmic body-giving is the theocentric principle that God caused this differentiated ontology to come about in exact accord with (καθός) his past intentions and desires (ὑθέλησεν), i.e., from Genesis 1. This is an implicit reminder that for Paul, as for Philo in his commentary on Genesis 1, what God thought and desired before the beginning is an interwoven aspect of Paul’s interpretation of the text of the Beginning. We will now analyze Paul’s cosmic theological ontology in light of his language from each of the remaining days of Genesis 1.

i. The Fifth and Sixth Days: Paul’s Zoology in Light of Gen. 1:20-27 (v.39)

According to Genesis 1, God’s organization of his creatures according to their own kinds did not stop with the seeds. It is repeated many times over (and seemingly with gathering intensity) that the different creatures—fish (ἰχθυός), birds (πετείνων), beasts (κτήνως), and creeping things (ἐρπετόν)—are each “according to kind” (κατὰ γένος).199 As we will see in further detail in our next chapter, even humanity (ἄνθρωπος) is set apart from these other animals according to a different kind: i.e., “according to the image and likeness of God.” The oft-repeated phrase in Genesis 1, “according to kind,” in itself

199 After “according to kind” (and “according to likeness”) occurs 4x on day three, it occurs 2x on day five and 5x on day six (not including “according to image” and “according to likeness” in 1:26).
emphasizes similarity, but when read in context wherein each matches its own kind the implicit cumulative force is differentiation as well. Paul writes,

God gives to [a seed] a [plant-]body just as he wanted, and to each [ἐκάστῳ] kind of seed its own body [ἴδιον σῶμα]. Not all flesh is the same flesh, but rather: one for humans [ἄλλη ἄνθρωπον], another flesh for beasts [ἄλλη σὰρξ κτηνῶν], another flesh for birds [ἄλλη σὰρξ πτηνῶν], and another for fish [ἄλλη ἱχθύων]. (vv.38-39)

Paul’s language and point are reminiscent of Philo’s as he had read Gen. 1:20-25. In Op. 63-64, Philo interpreted God’s command to the “kinds” (γένη) of animals as involving “differing” (διαφέρουται, x2) habitats, sizes, structural qualities, strengths, and capacities. Philo highlighted ontological differences. Paul reads Gen. 1:20-25 using similar words as Philo for the animals (cf. Paul’s κτήνος, πτηνός, ἱχθύς with Philo’s ἱχθύς, πτηνός, κτήνος).

Paul even “differentiates” similarly: compare Paul’s διαφέρω (v.41) with Philo’s διαφέρω and Paul’s “one [ἄλλη]… another [ἄλλη]” (v.39) with Philo’s “one [ἄλλα]… another [ἄλλα].” Also like Philo, Paul’s explicit claim in v.39 is ontological.

By the parallels mentioned above we are by no means asserting that Paul was in any way dependent on Philo. Rather, the strong correlations of language and theme demonstrate that Paul’s cosmological expressions in vv.39-41 are not able to be differentiated from those of a formal commentary on Genesis 1 from an interpreter from the same time-period and scriptural background. Paul’s “descending hierarchy”\textsuperscript{200} of creatures in v.39 carries forward Paul’s prolegomena to his answer about the ontology of resurrection-bodies. It does so as the double-edged point of Genesis 1: ontology (to each body its own flesh, according to kind) based on theology (God’s action according to his

\textsuperscript{200} Martin, 1992, 125; cf. Kistemaker, 1993, 570; Usami, 1976, 482n.50; Robertson and Plummer, 1911, 370. This presents the opposite order (descending rather than ascending) but similar structure (hierarchy of complexities) to the biblical text’s order (see also Philo’s Op. 64-68; Radice, 1989, 122).
“freely willed determination”). In v.40 Paul extends these earthy examples to the heavens.

ii. The Second Day: Paul’s Cosmology in Light of Gen. 1:6-8, 9-10 (v.40)

While still focusing on “bodies” in v.40, Paul now differentiates between those “in heaven” and those “on earth.” Paul writes:

And there are bodies in heaven [σώματα ἐπουράνια] and bodies on earth [σώματα ἐπίγεια]. But the glory of those in heaven [τῶν ἐπουράνιων] is of one kind [ἐτέρα], while that of those on earth [τῶν ἐπίγειων] is of another kind [ἐτέρα]. (v.40)

Genesis 1 opens with God’s creation of “heaven and earth” (v.1). It continues with God making “the heaven” firm (vv.6-8) and “the earth” dry (vv.9-10). God then fills the heaven with distinguishable lights (vv.14-19) and fills the earth with kind-specific beings (vv.20-27). By the end of the account, “the heaven” and “the earth” were completed along with “all their adornment” (πᾶς ὁ κόσμος αὐτῶν) (2:1). Paul sees “bodies” in the two cosmic realms (v.40a). This implies that for Paul the two realms are not only distinguishable but also appropriate for their own kinds of bodies.

In v.40b Paul makes it explicit that the realm-specific bodies are different (ἐτέρος) from each other, this time not in substance (such as “flesh”) but in “glory.” It should not be missed that Paul considers the “earthly bodies” (those of Gen. 1:20-27) to have “glory,” and this is so as they are presently observable. In chapter 3 we will draw out some important implications from Paul’s concept here, particularly as he applies the word

201 Lockwood, 2000, 586.
202 Fee (1987) presents in a chiastic structuring of vv.39-41 that this particular contrast is very important to Paul’s prolegomena (783; cf. Collins, 1999, 565).
“glory” to “humans” among the rest. Here we will focus more generally on this label which Paul grants to all of the “bodies” in the cosmos.

Of those commentators who do more than reword Paul’s statement, there is disagreement concerning its implications for Paul’s thought. J. Héring judges Paul’s choice of doxa for “heavenly bodies” in v.40 to have been “unfortunate” since it “accidentally carries with it (15:40b) the use of ‘doxa’ for earthly bodies too.” But was Paul so bound by parallelisms that he would write something with which he himself actually disagreed? A. Thiselton considers that “any supposed difficulty about ascribing splendor or glory to the bodies of those who live on the earth” is “overcome” by understanding “glory” as what is “wonderful,” “full of splendor,” “what makes something weighty or impressive,” a “source of elation,” a “source of delight.”

S. Kistemaker writes, “The brilliance of the celestial luminaries is awe-inspiring, yet the majesty of the mountains and forests cannot be underestimated. Each has a luster of its own.” N.T. Wright construes “glory” as the “proper dignity, reputation and honor” of the created bodies as they fulfil their appropriate functions. Regardless of the exact nuance, Paul demonstrates in v.40b that he has a very positive image of the created world.

Part of the difficulty with finding in v.40b a comparison of bodies in heaven and on earth where both have “glory,” is that almost within the next breath Paul compares the body that “is sown” (clearly those mentioned in v.39, though focusing specifically on

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204 Some merely reword Paul: e.g., Fee (1987) writes, “in this argument, even though the earthly body must die, it is not without its own glory” (783-84; cf. Morris, 1987, 221; Sellin, 1986, 220)
205 Héring, 1962, 174-75.
206 Thiselton, 2000, 1270.
207 Kistemaker, 1993, 571. Vos (1930) speaks of “flesh” and “glory” in vv.39-41 in terms of “quality” and “appearance” (179).
208 Wright, 2003, 345.
“humans”) with the body that “is raised.” There he finds only the latter to be “in glory” while the former are “in dishonor” (vv.42b-43). Both comparisons concern bodily ontology, and one might think that such a body can either have “glory” (v.40) or be “in dishonor” (v.43). Yet while the first comparison between “bodies” on earth and in heaven (v.40b) is done within the context of this present “first” creation, the second comparison (vv.42b-43 [through v.49]) is done across an eschatological divide. Within the first comparison (v.40), the bodies within both cosmic realms have “glory,” though “different.” Within the second comparison (vv.42-49), the bodies of the age initiated by Genesis 1 have no honor compared to the glory of the new creation age initiated by the resurrection.

Paul employs a similar hermeneutic in 2 Cor. 3:10-4:6 (see chapter 3 for further analysis). Though Ex. 34:29 recorded that Moses’ face “has been glorified” (δεδοξαστα), in 2 Cor. 3:10 Paul writes that Moses’ face (as well as his ministry of Law) “has not been glorified” (οὐ δεδοξαστα). Only apparently contradictory, though, Paul’s statement is functioning within a hermeneutic of comparison similar to that in 1 Cor. 15:42-49. When referring to Ex. 34:29 on its own, Paul actually wrote clearly that Moses and his ministry did come “in glory” (ἐν δόξῃ) (3:7) and that he (and it) actually “had been glorified” (δεδοξασμένον) (v.10).209 Within a comparison between Moses’ ministry and the ministry of the new covenant in Jesus, however, Paul writes the otherwise internally contradictory statement that “the thing which had been glorified has not been glorified [οὐ δεδοξαστα τὸ δεδοξασμένον] on account of this: the surpassing glory [τῇ ὑπερβαλλόντι δόξῃ].” Paul can—again to the Corinthians—legitimately attribute something positive (even

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“glory”) to one thing based on what God had done in the past—the law through Moses, the creation of the world and humanity—and yet immediately also deprive the same thing of its quality (“it has not been glorified,” “it is sown in dishonor”) when comparing it with the thing that is greater still.

We return now to 1 Cor. 15:40 and Paul’s depiction of the diverse “glories” within heaven and earth and all their adorning “bodies.” Paul’s eschatological polarity is greater than his cosmic divide between heaven and earth. When thinking about cosmology based on Genesis 1 itself, Paul sees a “glory,” a beauty, an exceeding goodness among all of the God-determined and -given bodies in heaven and earth. Even the bodies on earth have such a glory that, although different from those in heaven, they retain their honor even when compared to the brilliance of the heavenly luminaries. Yet when Paul considers these “bodies” in comparison with what will “be raised,” then the God-given glory becomes no glory. The present bodies cannot be favorably compared to the surpassing glory of the coming body. These hermeneutical observations are significant for understanding Paul’s reading of Genesis 1 as well as his broader theology. But the main point that he is making in v.40 regards differentiation: “bodies” in heaven and earth are different. Though both have “glory,” their “glories” are different. This differentiation regarding God-given “glories” is a significant part of Paul’s cosmic prolegomena to the resurrection of corpses, corpses which will themselves be raised with a different “glory.”

iii. The Fourth Day: Paul’s Astronomy in Light of Gen. 1:14-19 (v.41)

In v.41, Paul turns his eyes solely to the heavens and describes the present diversified “glories” of the various “bodies” therein. The sun, moon, and stars “differ” (διαφέρειν)
from each other. Philo himself had catalogued the diverse brightnesses of sun, moon, and stars. He knew that many contemporaries speculated about the substances and functions of heaven and the heavenly bodies, some considering them as “masses of solid matter,” but more (following Plato and Aristotle) regarding them as “living beings whose superior intellect could be derived from their perfect movements.” Philo sometimes (though hesitantly) demonstrated this second perspective. By his and Paul’s day, lovers of a particular type of wisdom still wondered whether there were only five elements from which the entire cosmos was composed, or whether “heaven and the heavenly bodies” had a “peculiar and separate nature of their own,” “differing from the rest of the world” through kinship with the divine. Philo considered there to be no consensus.

Compared to these few examples of roughly contemporary astronomical speculation, Paul’s own rather simple statement about the sun, moon, and stars “differing” in “glory” seems to share few affinities. He may have had an opinion on the substances of stars, but this is inaccessible from what he writes here, foreign to his present intent. Paul writes,

The glory of those [bodies] in heaven is of one kind, while that of those on earth is different. There is one glory of the sun [ἡλίου], and another glory of the moon [σελήνης], and another glory of the stars [ἀστέρων]; for star [ἀστήρ] differs from star [ἀστέρος] in glory. In this manner also is the resurrection of the corpses. (vv.40b-42a)

While Paul had differentiated between the structural “substances” of the earthly bodies according to their kinds (to each their own “flesh”), and so a differentiation between

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210 E.g., Somn. 116.
211 Somn. 1.21-24, 53-54.
212 Runia, 2001, 240.
213 See Plant. 7, 12; cf. Gig. 8; Somn. 1.135 (Conzelmann, 1975, 282n.23; Runia, 2001, 240); though see Spec. 1.66.
214 Abr. 162-63.
215 Somn. 1.21-24, 53-54.
substances of the “heavenly bodies” could have fit well into his present goal, he decides
to shift attention from “substance” to “form.”217 Because the category of “glory” is so
important to Paul’s concept of the resurrected life of Christ and (in the future) of Christ’s
followers—even considering “our glory” to have been pre-marked out “for” believers
before the creation of the sun, moon, and stars—thus the Creator’s ability to grant any
form of “glory” he so desired is also an important principle to institute alongside that of
God’s differentiation of fleshly substances.218

Though Paul’s presentation of the heavenly bodies could have arisen merely from
popular understanding and/or simple observation,219 it is difficult to conclude that his
understanding is thereby disconnected from his interpretation of the sacred text of the
Beginning. It is probable that here too Paul’s wording has been shaped by Genesis 1.220
Gen. 1:14-19 relates God speaking, making, and setting “the luminaries in the firmness of
heaven [τοῦ οὐρανοῦ].” Perhaps originally for polemical reasons, Genesis 1 does not give

217 Thiselton, 2000, 1269.
219 Martin (1992) is “impressed” with “how similar Paul’s arguments” in vv.40-41 are to “the
assumptions underwriting ‘astral soul’ theory in popular philosophy” (126). In that theory, “What human
beings have in common with heavenly bodies [sc. stars] is, in Paul’s system, incorporation as a ‘pneumatic
body’—that is, a body composed only of pneuma with sarx and psyche having been sloughed off along the
way” (126). To arrive at this conclusion, Martin makes at least two types of exegetical errors. First, he
wrongly compares “Hellenistic folklore” with the resurrection idea of Dan. 12:3 (cf. 2 Bar. 51:10; Wis. 3:7)
(118, 274n.57). In Hellenistic folklore people “become” stars while it appears that Daniel (et par.) uses a
simile to say that people will rise to “shine like lights” rather than, as Martin construes it, “becoming” stars
(rightly Nickelsburg, 1981, 89, 285; wrongly Johnston, 2002, 231 [who makes Martin’s mistake, but about
Egyptian astral anthropology]). (Paul appears to use Danielic language with the simile in Phil. 2:15). The
Danielic text(s) and Paul (Phil. 2:15; 1 Cor. 15:41) speak of form/function (“shining like”) while Martin
and Johnston (and their Graeco-Roman/Egyptian star “parallels”) speak of substance (“becoming stars”).
See Thiselton, 2000, 1269 for a helpful critique of Martin. Second, it is pneuma-as-substance that Martin
sees in common between the resurrected bodies in 15:44-46 (which are also “from heaven” in vv.47-49)
and “the bodies in heaven” in vv.40-41 (126). But Paul never calls the sun, moon, and stars pneumatic, and
if pneuma is divine presence and activity in vv.44-46 (so Thiselton, 2000, 1276-77; et al., see above
p.137n.161) then Martin’s theory cannot stand at this point either.
220 So Becker, 2007, 164; Wright, 2003, 341; Furnish, 1999, 113; Sellin, 1986, 220n.26; Lambrecht,
1982, 524n.68.
these the names “sun” or “moon.”\textsuperscript{221} Paul names the sun, moon, and stars (as had Sir. 43:1-10 when commenting on Gen. 1:14-19, see below), and he then compares them by their different “glories.” The manner in which Genesis itself names them thereby relates the luminaries to each other as well, for it calls them “the greater light,” “the lesser light,” and then only passingly references God’s creation of “also the stars.” Thus the text differentiates between these bodies according to form (size) and/or function or appearance (brightness).\textsuperscript{222} Paul’s assumed relationship between “glory” and “light” (which he will employ in the context of a comment on Gen. 1:2-3 in 2 Cor. 4:6) is transparent here as he describes the “greater” and “lesser” and “also the stars” as differing according to “glory.”\textsuperscript{223}

The effect is that Paul’s astronomical conclusion says little more than what would be obvious to any Corinthians who might look up into the heavens on a clear night. And yet his comments are not thereby less related to his reading of Gen. 1:14-19.\textsuperscript{224} Sirach 43 seamlessly stitches together what is plainly visible “in the firmament of heaven” concerning “sun,” “moon,” and “stars” with words and concepts clearly drawn from Gen.

\textsuperscript{221} So some suggest this is an implicit critique of the astral-worship of surrounding peoples: e.g., von Rad, 1956, 53-54; Westermann, 1984, 127; Carmichael, 1996, 3-4; Noort, 2000, 9 (and 9nn.47-48). Gelander (1997) is skeptical (98). Cf. Tigchelaar, 2005, 31-32, 32nn.3-6. Such astral worship was a real concern in Philo’s day as well (\textit{Conf.} 173).

\textsuperscript{222} Like Paul, Gen. 1:14-19 does not engage the question of substance.

\textsuperscript{223} Paul often employs (as do others) the concept of “glory” in a more weighty manner than mere brightness, as in 2 Cor. 3:7-4:6, though it is also important that he does associate (as do others) “glory” with light and brightness (cf. Sir. 43:8-9). So Thiselton, 2000, 1270; cf. Wright, 2003, 345. Against Wright, concerning 1 Cor. 15:40-41 there is no need to choose “‘honor’, ‘reputation’, ‘proper dignity’” \textit{rather than} “luminosity, brightness,” or splendor simply because the latter do not fit Paul’s statement about “earthly bodies” (v.40b). The word δόξα can contain each nuance without needing to differentiate sharply and can be used rhetorically with different nuances in the same context. Paul does both. Wright is right, however, that “it is of course the proper dignity, reputation and honor of the sun that it should shine brightly, and of the stars that they should twinkle in their own appropriate manner” (345). But in light of the blending in Sirach 43 of “glory,” “shining,” “illuminating,” \textit{and} the appropriate function of the heavenly bodies according to God’s word/command—especially as this is found within an application of Gen. 1:14-19 (see below)—we should be careful about separating the nuances of glory-as-function from glory-as-brightness in Paul’s discussion which is also built on Gen. 1:14-19.

\textsuperscript{224} Collins, 1999, 567nn.40-41.
He does this to convey the stars as the “glory” of heaven, and the heavenly bodies display “glory” (δόξα) through both their “shining” and their proper obedience to God’s “words” in Genesis 1. By Paul’s day it was feasible (to say the least) to speak of the “glory” of the sun, moon, and stars in line with empirical observation and simultaneously to also craft this around Gen. 1:14-19.

In 1 Cor. 15:37-41, Paul presents his cosmological theory of body-differentiation. He focuses on the ontological qualities of fleshes and glories. He shaped this “reading” of the cosmos around his reading of the beginning of the world according to Genesis. For Paul the existence of the diverse bodies in heaven and on earth, according to Genesis 1, are based on God’s action which itself perfectly accords with his previous desire. Paul now writes, “In this manner is the resurrection of the corpses” (v.42a). This prolegomenon of the Beginning of the world according to Genesis has prepared the way for Paul’s answer to the questions of resurrection-ontology. Yet Paul does not leave Genesis behind when moving from prolegomena to direct answer. Even the resurrection-ontology Paul will explain by turning the Corinthians again to the Beginning, more specifically to the Beginning of humanity, still according to Genesis.

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225 Certain affinities between Sirach 43 and Gen. 1:14-19 are noticed by Tigchelaar, 2005, 37, 37-39 (concerning the Hebrew) and Thiselton, 2000, 1268-69. The affinities in the Greek of 43:1-10 are extensive. E.g., within this discussion of the function of the “sun” (vv.2-5), “moon” (vv.6-8), and “stars” (vv.9-10) in “the firmness of heaven” (σταρεώματα οὐρανοῦ, vv.2, 8), each of which the Lord “made” (ποιήσας) and then directed with his “words” (cf. vv.5, 10), Sirach speaks of this adorned heavenly realm offering “a vision of glory,” where “the beauty of heaven [καλός οὐρανὸς] is the glory of the stars [δόξα θατρών], an adornment giving light [κόσμος φωτίζων] in the highest places of the Lord” (v.9).

226 Hays (1997) writes, “The reference to heavenly bodies might also have helped the philosophically inclined Corinthians make better sense of the concept of a resurrection body. It was a common belief in the ancient world that the human soul and/or mind was made of the same ethereal stuff as the celestial bodies and that the soul would return to the stars after death” (271; see Martin, 1992, 118, 126 and Johnston, 2002, 231, critiqued above). Hays continues, “Paul, of course, did not share this view, but his description of heavenly ‘bodies’ that possess varying degrees of glory could help his readers conceptualize a future glorified body unlike the bodies we now know” (271; cf. Lockwood, 2000, 587, 587n.8).
3. Summary of Paul’s Beginning of the World

To answer the objection to the resurrection of dead human bodies, Paul has not presented a general credo of creation, but rather the specific examples of body-construction in Genesis 1. Such an understanding of Paul’s interpretation of the Beginning of the world as presented above has certain implications. One to which we will draw concluding attention is the matter which we introduced at the start of this section. To import something like creatio ex nihilo into 1 Cor. 15:35-49 simply because Paul employs “creation” in his argument, and to therefore deduce a resurrection ex nihilo which leaves the old bodies in the tombs and starts from scratch, is to misunderstand how Paul himself reads and applies “creation” to the Corinthian query of resurrection. J. Becker (among others) is certainly right that the (primary) “bridge of continuity” between the first and last bodies is “the power of the Creator.” This can be seen explicitly in v.38 and implicitly undergirding vv.39-41. But for Paul this power manifested in different ways. It was displayed in the creation of heavenly bodies (v.41), which was ex nihilo (see Gen. 1:14-19). It came in the creation of earthly animals (v.39), which were from water and dust of the earth (see Gen. 1:20-27). God’s power also entered in the continual gift of plant-bodies out of seeds (vv.37-38), which is not creatio ex nihilo (cf. Gen. 1:11-12). But if Paul’s understanding of creation in 1 Cor. 15:37-41 (and 42-49) cannot be simply construed as creatio ex nihilo (as Genesis 1 cannot), then what can be concluded or ruled out regarding the parallel action of the Creator in the resurrection of corpses?

227 Such general statements (“creeds”) of creation can be found in 1 Cor. 8:6; 2 Cor. 5:18; Rom. 11:36.
Our present purposes are limited to interpreting the Beginning and Before in Paul, so that question must remain merely posited. What is applicable to determine is that the ontological characteristics of the original creation—whether their diverse fleshy substances or their diverse forms, appearances, and/or functions as glorious—were for Paul set in place by God’s own activity and in perfect accord with his desires enacted in Genesis 1. And in that manner is the resurrection of the nekroi as well as the “change” of still-living bodies into the bodies that will come about.\(^{230}\)

For Paul, not only is “the God who” spoke light into the darkness in Gen. 1:2-5 (2 Cor. 4:6a) the same God “who” shines the converting light of Christ’s glory into our hearts (4:6b), but one cannot fully understand even the anthropology of the End without first understanding the ontology of the entire cosmos in the Beginning. This is particularly so since the resurrection is and will be accomplished by the God whose activity and fore-desire were presented in Gen. 1:6-31. Now the Corinthians are primed to understand the humanity of the End. Yet as we will see in our final chapter, the End still does not leave behind either the Beginning or the Before, for Paul casts the End in the language and conceptuality of both.

4. COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS: PHILO AND PAUL ON THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD

Within the text of Genesis 1 itself, the creation of light is of a special sort. It is paradigmatic for the other creative events by virtue of its theocentric emphasis on the fulfilment of God’s word (v.3), and by virtue of its “beautiful” portrayal of the product’s

ontological character (v.4). In the light of Gen. 1:2-5, 1:6-31 carries forward this double project, presenting an ontology of goodness according to the sovereign and divine word, act, and (assumed) previous intentions. Philo and Paul set apart the light of Gen. 1:2-5 for particular use. Each interpreter retains the text’s theocentric focus by recounting the shinings of the God who acted in both creation and salvation. Philo sometimes sees the ontological-intellectual structure of light at creation as itself being a pre-emptive salvation, and he presents the ontological structure of corporeality as necessarily dimming the incorporeal light through its less-pure embodiment of it. Paul also relates the light of God’s creative *fiat* on day one to salvific illumination, but he does so by the subsequent historical activity of the same Creator rather than as inherent in creation. And for Paul, the Creator’s light is in no way dimmed by association with a body, or more particularly a face.

The two interpreters share mainly similarities regarding their interpretations of the rest of the world’s Beginning (Gen. 1:6-31). Throughout this creation, Philo draws attention to two themes: 1) God’s sovereign activity (his “call” and his own enactments, sometimes despite God’s use of created mediators in Genesis 1), and 2) the propriety of the ontic order with each being having its own particular qualities. Encompassing both themes by an implicit Before, Philo drew repeated attention to God’s previous fore-knowledge, understanding, and “purpose.” Philo’s Before—i.e., God’s mental determinations and purposes *before* the beginning—continues to affect his interpretation of creation. The beginning of the world, however, has also continued to affect Philo’s Before: the text of Genesis 1 itself, not only vv.1-5 but vv.6-31 as well, is precisely what speaks to Philo of God’s fore-sight, knowledge, and wisdom because of which he created as he did. Philo’s
treatment of the creation of the world continues to have a reciprocal interplay between the
Beginning and Before.

Paul draws attention to the same two themes of Gen. 1:6-31: 1) God’s sovereign
activity (his “giving” of bodies), and 2) the ontic diversity of these bodies with each body
having its own particular quality of flesh and glory. By drawing attention to God’s
previous “desire” according to which ontic structure and glory had genesis, Paul
undergirded and united both of these themes with his implicit Before. Paul’s Before—i.e.,
God’s mental markings and desires before the beginning—continues to affect his
interpretation of creation. Yet for Paul, as for Philo, the beginning of the world has also
continued to affect Paul’s Before: the text of Genesis 1 itself is exactly what speaks to
Paul of God’s “desire” because of which he “gives” and gave heaven and earth their
bodily adornments just as he did. Like Philo, Paul’s treatment of the creation of the world
continues a mutual interplay between the Beginning and Before.

The hermeneutic of both interpreters involves theocentric ontology. They each glory in
the particularities of the cosmic structure while having an overarching and undergirding
faith in the sovereign Creator’s creational purposes and desires for humanity’s good.
Before turning to the beginning of humanity, both Philo and Paul find it necessary (or at
least helpful) to move through the beginning of the world according to Genesis. This
observation is perhaps even more profound regarding Paul’s understanding of the
Beginning, for unlike Philo he was not bound by a technical commentary to follow the
text’s order. At points Paul’s comments do resemble a formal commentary. Yet such
movement from broader cosmos to more particular humanity was his own idea, we might
say. Regardless of literary constraints and freedoms, Paul, like Philo, reads this
Beginning theocentrically. Like Philo, Paul’s comments revolve around the divine pre-creational intentions. Like Philo, Paul had an understanding of the beginning of the world which focused on God’s sovereign call, word, and previous purpose (the Before). For Paul, as for Philo, this interpretation of creation sets the scene for his reading of the beginning of humanity in Gen. 1:26-28, 2:7, and 5:3.
Chapter 3

THE BEGINNING OF HUMANITY

“When I look at the heavens, the works of your fingers—the moon and stars which you founded—what is a human that you would remember him or the son of a human that you care for him? … You crowned him with glory and honor and placed him over the works of your hands, subjecting all things under his feet!” (Ps. 8:3-6). The creation of humanity according to Genesis is immeasurably important for the anthropology of both Philo and Paul. But the particular texts are not isolated texts, either in Genesis itself or in Philo’s or Paul’s interpretations and applications of them. Even in the quotation from Psalm 8 above, the contemplation of God’s creation of humanity—with its royal “glory and honor”—is set within the larger framework of God’s creation of the heavens, the earth, and all that is in them. This is the same in both Paul and Philo, perhaps better known in Philo’s writings1 but nonetheless present in Paul’s as well. Psalm 8 even assumes behind God’s creation of humanity a certain divine consideration and thought. For Paul and Philo also, God’s intentions, purposes, and desires because of which he

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1 As Tobin (1992) observes, “each of these two interpretations of the creation of the world [in Philo] has a parallel interpretation of the creation of man” (122), and he furthers that “these two interpretations of the creation of man are intimately interwoven with the two interpretations of the creation of the world” (125). Below we will flesh out this interwoven nature of Philo’s Beginning, and we will add the third (or first) strand (i.e., the Before) to the “interwoven” cord which Tobin helpfully observes.
created humanity as he did in the Beginning are an integral part of the interpretation of human origins.

There is a peculiar complexity regarding the beginning(s) of humanity, and it will quickly become clear how complex the hermeneutic of creation really is for both Philo and Paul. Paul’s interpretation of creation, like Philo’s in his formal commentary, contains three interwoven aspects. We have already analyzed the beginning of the world (chapter 2) and God’s intentions in the Before (chapter 1), taking special notice of how Paul, like Philo, sees these as intimately woven together like two strands of one cord. But there is also a beginning of humanity, and it is difficult to overestimate its importance for both interpreters. According to their shared scripture, humankind begins according to “the image of God” (Gen. 1:27) and with Adam formed as a living soul out of dust (Gen. 2:7). Humanity is then propelled forward according to the “image” of Adam (Gen. 5:3). We will now explore this final aspect—this third strand—of Philo’s and Paul’s three-strand interpretations of creation.

1. **The Image of God: Genesis 1:27**

God’s creative activity climaxes when he crafts a creature like himself. Humanity is begun, and it is “according to God’s image.” God’s causative and voiced volition (“Let us make humanity”) is again prominent. The prior world and the particular humanity are together “made” according to God’s spoken will. With humanity as the crowning touch and ruler of creation, the beauty of God’s former products has become “exceedingly good” (v.31).
Though the precise phrase “image of God” is limited in Philo’s and Paul’s scripture (Gen. 1:26 and 27, 5:1, and 9:6), the idea is anthropologically fundamental. It provides the first description of humanity in the wake of which all other depictions occur. We may emphasize its interpretive potential for Philo and Paul by noting that throughout their scripture the word “image” (whether נראות or εἰκὼν) was certainly repeated. It typically referred to an artistic depiction of someone’s or something’s appearance.\(^2\) There was a mirror-like relationship between an “image” and the one imaged,\(^3\) and thus a nuance of manifestation or revelation is related in that (minimally) by looking at an “image” something was known about the one portrayed.

Throughout the ancient Near East, “image” was also often connected to the dominion of a god or king who would place his statue (“image”) in a city so as to remind those beholding it of his absent self yet present dominion (Wis. 14:17).\(^4\) The “image” hopefully conveyed something of the king’s (or god’s) splendour, beauty, riches, power, impressiveness: his glory.\(^5\) Conversely, if the image looked dishonorable (e.g., was dirty), this reflected poorly on the reputation of the king or god. The “image of God” in Genesis

\(^2\) The word נראות only occurs 17 times in the Hebrew scriptures, is most often translated by the LXX as εἰκὼν, but is translated in Num. 33:52 and 2 Chr. 23:17 by “the idols” (τὰ εἰδωλικα). εἰκὼν and εἰκὼν refer to metal figures (Num. 33:52), cast models of tumors and mice (1 Sam. 6:5, 11), physical representations of the otherwise invisible Baal (2 Ki. 11:18; 2 Chr. 23:17), “images of abomination” (Ezek. 7:20), physical (gold and silver) representations of males (Ezek 16:17; Hos. 13:2), pictorial presentations of Chaldeans (Ezek. 23:14), and pagan gods (Amos 5:26). In the Psalms, נראות is somewhat different, like “shadows” or dreams (e.g., Ps. 73 [72 LXX]:20). In Daniel 2-3, εἰκὼν is used at least ten times to refer to a statue, whether in Nebuchadnezzar’s dream or of Nebuchadnezzar’s golden self to which all were to bow and worship. The legitimate common denominator understands “image” as a physical and/or visible representation of someone/thing which (in some way) stands in for the actual being (cf. Wis. 14:15).

\(^3\) Schüle, 2005, 4-5, 9-11; Thielson, 2000, 834-37; Matthey, 1996, 168-69 (169n.206); Wenham, 1987, 29-32; Westermann, 1984, 147-55; Conzelmann, 1975, 187-88. For the use of “mirror” with “image” see e.g., Wis. 7:26 and 2 Cor. 3:18 (Watson, 1997, 301n.7); cf. Philo’s Leg. 3.95-99 with 3.100-01 (Siegert, 2009, 184).


\(^5\) For such attributes as “glory” see Jewett, 2004, 33.
I can easily be read in this manner, especially because the text explicitly expresses the function of humanity so defined as “to rule” over God’s works (vv.26, 28). The creative Sovereign’s “statue” in Genesis 1 was living, breathing humanity,⁶ functioning as God’s vicegerents or ruling stewards in and over the earth within which he had created them.⁷

A certain fluidity within the “image” concept is hermeneutically significant. This openness to various interpretations can be illustrated well in statues and coins which portray the face or form of a king. (These illustrations are encouraged as both were related to Gen. 1:27 in Philo’s and Paul’s day).⁸ The statue itself can be conveyed as the king’s “image,” if it resembles and/or is intended to represent him. Yet the king’s own appearance can be called his “image,” and this implies the statue is merely according to the image. Likewise (though adding complexity), one might compare Gen. 1:27 to a coin on which is imprinted a king’s face.⁹ Now three potentials arise: the coin itself can be the king’s image,ⁱ⁰ can be according to (thus like but distinct from) the image (i.e., the king’s own appearance), or can even be related to the king through the stamp which impressed the king’s image upon it.¹¹ When the third relationship is in view, three tiers exist which accord with each other: the face, the stamp, the coin. Any could legitimately be called an

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⁷ Moltmann, 1985, 224.
⁸ The synoptic gospels use “image” (ἐικόνα) of Caesars picture stamped on a coin and compare it with humanity’s relationship with God (obviously as his “image”): cf. Matt. 22:20-21; Mk. 12:16-17; Lk. 20:24-25 (Nguyen, 2008, 177-78n.128). Likewise, Hillel was attributed with the direct comparison between the statue of a god and himself in light of Gen. 1:27 (Lv. Rabba 34 [130d] in Str.-Bil. [1922-28], 1.654-55; McCasland, 1950, 92).
⁹ On the ancient process of stamping “images” on coins see Philo’s Her. 181. For Philo’s direct comparison of this to Gen. 1:27 see Leg. 3.95-96; Plant. 18-20. For “stamping out” as creation (in matter) see Plato’s Tim. 39e7, 50c-d (Leonhardt-Balzer, 2004, 327) and Philo’s Op. 25. (In Op. 16 “stamping” creates the noetic world, in Leg. 1.32 the noetic human). The example in the gospels of “image” and “coin” (noted above) adds the nuance of ownership to the concept of “image” from Gen. 1:27: the one “imaged” (Caesar, God) has a certain claim on the “image” (coin, humans).
¹⁰ Thus Jesus says about the denarius not “whose image is this according to?” but rather “whose image is this [τίνος ἐικόνα ἀνέθη]?” (Matt. 22:20).
¹¹ As Dunn (1998A) writes: the word image “can denote both the image on the rubber stamp and the image that the stamp puts on the page” (238).
“image” while any could also legitimately be distanced from the actual “image.” There is great flexibility in both sacred and profane usages of “image” (εἰκών).

Thus when 1:27 presents humanity “according to” God’s “image,” there may be three related but distinct tiers (human – image – God) or perhaps two (human – God’s appearance). As with the statue, humanity could even be identified as God’s “image” even though the text does not explicitly do such. Philo and Paul exploit or assume different nuances of the text’s flexible “image” and “accord.” While analyzing this, we will concurrently explore how important it is for each reader’s interpretation of humanity that this particular Beginning is contextualized within the broader Beginning of the world and even God’s Before.

A. Philo’s Reading of Genesis 1:27

Philo’s reading of Gen. 1:26-28, his “anthropological base-text,” is important for his anthropology though very complex.12 Humanity’s “likeness” with God, which could be considered his basic conception,13 is not direct, certainly not bodily (but rather regarding the mind),14 and yet the structure of the body God nevertheless crafted to be helpful in the

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12 For a good summary see Jervell, 1960, 51-53.
13 Op. 69.4, 71 (see below).
14 Likeness as indirect: QG. 2.62; Somn. 1.73-75; as non-bodily: Op. 69.5-7. The God-human likeness regards “mind” (νοῦς: Op. 69.8ff), “reasoning” (λογισμός, Abr. 41; Spec. 3.83), and “word” (λόγος, Op. 24-25, 139, 146; Leg. 3.96; Spec. 3.207). As Philo interprets Gen. 1:27, the anthropological “mind” (νοῦς), “rational nature” (φύσις λογική), and “reasoning” (λόγος) is a “copy” (μίμημα), “resemblance” (ἀπεικόνισμα), and “image” (εἰκών) of the archetype, i.e., God (e.g., Det. 83), by virtue of being not merely a “fragment” (ἀπόσπασμα) of the “soul of the universe” (e.g., Mut. 223a), i.e., of the divine nature (e.g., Op. 146; Leg. 3.161; Det. 90; Somn. 1.34), but “more piously” (because it is Moses’ language) being a “copy that resembles [ἐκμαγείον ἐμφερέτ] the “divine image [εἰκόνας θείου]” (e.g., Mut. 223b). See Hay, 2004, 137. For other ancient Jewish interpretations of divine-human likeness as “reason” cf. Sir. 17:7 and 4Q504 (according to van Kooten, 2008, 8-9, 16, 35, 37, 46-47). On Philo’s impact on early Christian interpreters of Gen. 1:27 see Watson, 1997, 277-78; van Kooten, 2008, 9, 47 (though van Kooten, 43, also points to some early Christian reactions against an exclusively intellectual reading, esp. in Irenaeus and Tertullian, 38-44). Cf. Kugel, 1998, 81-82. Part and parcel with Philo’s bent toward “virtue” and “practical spirituality,” both of which are directly connected to his treatment of Gen. 1:27 as “reason,” is his
pursuit of wisdom, contemplation, and thus virtue. Philo’s commentary presents some of his complexities in condensed form.

His exposition arrives at Gen. 1:26-28 in Op. 69, but after having finished treating it in §88 he nevertheless returns to and re-interprets it in §134. In his first reading (§§69-88), Philo treats the human as having a corporeal and composite nature: a “human body” and a “mind” (§69; cf. §82). He is among those “earth-born” (γηγενές) (§69) and is “the beginning-born [human] of our race” (τὸν ἀρχηγέτην τοῦ γένους) (§79). Later Philo will label the human of 2:7 with these same titles: “earth-born” (γηγενής), “the beginning-born [human] of our whole race” (ὁ παντὸς τοῦ γένους ἠμῶν ἀρχηγέτης) (§§134-36). Within that context Philo calls the human of 1:27 “vastly different” from him of 2:7, not least because the former is “non-bodily” (§134)! Many have noted such (corpus-wide) inconsistencies in Philo’s interpretation of Gen. 1:27.

While his commentary illustrates well Philo’s wider complexity, it also provides within its one fluid exposition of the text two applications of one basic hermeneutical move, first in §§13-128 and then in §§129-50. Noticing this helps make sense of his two vastly different construals of the human of 1:27. We will now explore both of Philo’s readings of 1:27 within his one commentary, especially noting the interwoven relatedness between each construal and its respective cosmic Beginning and Before.

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1. Philo’s First Reading of Genesis 1:27 (Op. 69-88)

Although unpopular in some present scholarship, it was not uncommon for Jewish interpreters to take Gen. 1:27 and 2:7 as a combined reference to the father of humanity. Philo makes such a blend his own in *Op. 69-88*. He can do this here (though not in §134) because he is interpreting the cosmic setting of Gen. 1:6-31 (and thus the anthropic 1:27) as the “firm,” “bodily,” and therefore sense-perceptible creation. Gen. 1:27 is harmoniously and consistently nestled (with borrowed features of the clearly sensible 2:7) within his larger hermeneutical context of the cosmic Beginning and the Before in §§13-128. We will now highlight two aspects of Philo’s beginning of empirical humanity in Gen. 1:27: humanity’s “image” and “resemblance” with God in §§69-71, and God’s pre-set purpose and forethought in §§77-82.


It is “good” (καλός) to label “the human” as does 1:27 since “nothing earth-born [*γονευέτρισι*] bears more resemblance [*ἐμφέρεστερον*] to God than a human.” It is the “earth-
born,” sense-perceptible person—not “the mind of man”\textsuperscript{23} nor “the ideal man”\textsuperscript{24}—whom Philo here corresponds with God.\textsuperscript{25} This epithet “earth-born” is assumed from Gen. 2:7.\textsuperscript{26} Such an assumption is easy to make, for the animals in 1:24-25 (cf. \textit{Op.} 64) came out of earth, and if one knows that animals in 2:19 and the human in 2:7 did likewise, then to deduce that the human of 1:27 is earth-born is a ready exegetical move. Within Philo’s hermeneutical flow, this deduction is natural.\textsuperscript{27}

Philo’s primary concern regarding humanity’s Beginning surfaces immediately, when instead of initiating his treatment with v.26, “Let us make...,” he rather quotes the text as a conglomeration of v.27 (καί τοίς άνθρωποις) and v.26 (καί ήμισθός ὁ ἄνθρωπος). Thus temporarily bypassing God’s “us” (v.26a),\textsuperscript{28} Philo begins his interpretation with the “image of God” and humanity’s “Becoming” as such, both technically from v.27. The “resemblance” (ἐμφάσεις) Philo sees between the human and God is of first importance. But what is it?

“Resemblance” is emphatically not in the body (§69.5-7) but rather in “the mind, which rules the soul” (§69.7-8). Though this betrays “the strong influence of Greek philosophy on Philo’s thought,”\textsuperscript{29} the text of Genesis is itself somewhat open to this

\textsuperscript{23} Cona Wolfson, 1947, 1.310.
\textsuperscript{24} Contra Radice, 1989, 122.
\textsuperscript{25} Rightly Runia, 2001, 224 (cf. 254). It is easy to miss this if one (esegetically) anticipates Philo’s cosmogonic (and therefore anthropogonic) perspective in \textit{Op.} 129-50, which is different than the perspective here in \textit{Op.} 13-128.
\textsuperscript{26} Runia, 2001, 224, 254.
\textsuperscript{27} This is not the case in \textit{Leg.} 2.12-13, where Philo distances not only the man of 1:27 from 2:7 but also the animals of 1:24 from 2:19. But there Philo’s hermeneutical approach to Genesis 1-2 is identical to his perspective in \textit{Op.} 129ff, not \textit{Op.} 64-128.
\textsuperscript{28} Philo extracts the “our” because of the theological confusion it introduces. Across his work, the main feature that v.26 draws to Philo’s mind is the word “us” (Baer, 1970, 23n.1) and thus the need to defend not only God’s monotheism (\textit{Conf.} 170), but even more regularly God’s supposed participation with evil (cf. \textit{Conf.} 168-82; \textit{Mut.} 27-32; \textit{Fug.} 68-72). Cf. Plato’s \textit{Tim.} 41a-44d. See Tobin, 1983, 29-30 (29nn.15-16), 36-55, 58; Runia, 1986, 243-44; van Kooten, 2008, 49. Philo will return to this very type of theodicy in §§72-75, but he chooses to begin his comments against the order of the text.
\textsuperscript{29} Runia, 2001, 224.
emphasis, even if only through deduction. While plants and animals exist “according to [their own] kind” (κατὰ γένος), humanity exists as “according to [κατ'] God’s image” and “likeness.” Philo glosses these two anthropogenic κατα-constructions with the term “kinship” or “shared-kind” (συγγενείας), which has a lexical link with “kind” (γένος) (underscored). Accord with God (being his “kind”) and non-accord with plants and animals can facilitate defining God-likeness through human difference with other creatures. Intelligence and/or moral capacity is then a ready comparison.30

After comparing the mind (as “image”) to a “statue” of a god, which our bodies parade around on our shoulders (§69.8-12), Philo shifts his analogy to focus on what is alike between God and humans.31 The human mind functions toward the person as God functions toward the cosmos: as its “sovereign” (ἡγεμόν in §69.12; cf. §69.8). Philo compares qualities which God and the human mind share. Both are “invisible” yet “see all things.” Both have an “unclear substance” yet “perceive [καταλαμβάνων] the substances of others.” (This use of the λαμβάνω-compound for “perceiving” [καταλαμβάνων] is reminiscent of his description of how God “pre-perceives” [προλαβόν; §§16, 45], though for God this perception was before the beginning). The human mind

30 For a modern equivalent see McCasland, 1950, 89-90, and for some exegetical roots of such modern readings see Jónsson, 1988, 33-43. Intellect is also a common point of distinction between human and animal in Greek philosophy (Runia, 2001, 324).

31 Above we mentioned how the “three-tiered” understanding of “image” (human – image – God), which the flexibility of the image-concept allows, was how Philo understood the text. In Op. 69, however, Philo compares the human directly to God. But the seemingly two-tiered image-reality in Op. 69 (human mind – God’s mind, with no mediating Word/image; cf. Op. 69.4, 71.11-15; Abr. 41; Fug. 63; and cf. Op. 146; Det. 86-87; Abr. 41; Virt. 204-05) is in no tension with Philo’s otherwise (and more fundamental) three-tiered image-reality in e.g., Op. 25 (so Radice, 1989, 122; van den Hoek, 2000, 69; Runia, 2001, 224-25; contra Tobin, 1983, 51). The man of 1:27 is not himself technically “the image of God”: cf. Her. 231 (Tobin, 1983, 57-59, 96-97; van Kooten, 2008, 366-67); Leg. 3.96 (van Kooten, 2008, 50-51); QG. 2.62. Philo can use both structures at once (cf. Spec. 3.83, 207), for if B looks like A, and C looks like B, it is not illegitimate to say directly that C looks like A even if this likeness is not actually immediate.
“resembles” or “images” the divine Mind as each “searches [διερευνώμενος] the things in the nature of others” (§69.14-19).  

b. God’s Foresight in Humanity’s Tardiness (Op. 77-78 and 82)

Even though humans resemble God, since they are created last are they not therefore inferior to the rest of creation? In §§77-88, Philo offers multiple reasons refuting such an assumption. While §§69-71 dealt largely with the ontology of the human as resemblor (“image”) of God, §§77-88 mainly deal with humanity’s position and role in relation to the cosmos. In the latter sections, Philo emphasizes God’s wisdom, forethought, and purpose that lie behind the God-given relationship between humanity and world. We receive a clear glimpse in §§77-78 and 82 of the three interwoven strands in Philo’s creation-hermeneutic.

In §§77-78, Philo offers his first explanation for man’s tardiness on the scene of creation:

God, after giving a portion [μεταδόως] to man of his kinship [τῆς αὐτοῦ συγγενείας], that is, of reasoning [τῆς λογικῆς]—which was the best of gifts [δωρεών]—he did not begrudge him the other [gifts]. Rather, as for the living being who dwells closest and is most loved, he pre-prepared [προτομάσω] all things in the cosmos, having purposed [βουληθείς] for his coming that not one thing be missing of what is toward the means of living [πρὸς τὸ ζήν] and the means of living well [τὸ εὖ ζήν]. (§77.7-13)

Creation is for humanity. “Living” refers to “supplies” like a “feast” (i.e., the food of Gen. 1:11-13 and the entertainment of the animals in 1:20-25; cf. §§77.13-18, 78). “Living well” refers to “contemplation of heavenly things” like a “spectacle” (i.e., the stars of 1:14-19 that stimulate philosophy; cf. §§77.13-18, 78). As one modern scientist

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32 Cf. Det. 87-90 with Op. 70-71 (see also Plato’s “flight of the soul” in Phaed. 246a-249d).
has said, “The more I examine the universe and the details of its architecture, the more evidence I find that the universe in some sense must have known we were coming.”

From one perspective, Philo’s reading could certainly be called an anthropocentric view of creation. But Philo initiates this description with (and subordinates it under) the God who “gives” the ontological structure of things as a “gift.” After drawing brief attention to the chief gift, “reason,” Philo reintroduces the Before. God “did not grudge” or “envy” (ἐφθάνησεν) and therefore he preemptively gave generously to humans through his acts of creation. In Op. 21, God made everything because, being good, “he did not grudge [ἐφθάνησεν] a share in his own excellent nature to an existence which has of itself nothing beautiful” (cf. Tim. 29e). For Philo, God’s pre-creative motivation regarding the more specific creation of humanity (Op. 77) is the mirror-image of his more general construal of creation of the world (Op. 21).

Likewise, God acted in creation according to what he was “purposing” (βουληθείς). By this Philo unites this interpretation of 1:26-28 with the beginning of the world and with his explicit Before. Concerning the Beginning of the world, in Gen. 1:11-13 “God purposed [ἐβουλήθη]… and therefore led… spurred on… and made” (§44). Concerning the Before, because God was “purposing” (βουληθείς) he therefore “pre-stamped out” (προεξετύπω) what existed in the divine mind before the visible world came about (§16). Concerning the Beginning of humanity, because “God purposed” (βουληθείς) he therefore “pre-prepared” (προητομάσατο) the world (cf. “pre-made ready” [προευτρεπίσατο] in §78.10) for human arrival. Here Philo’s “pre-preparation” refers to God’s activity within

33 Freeman Dyson, quoted with permission by Polkinghorne, 1994, 76.
34 On the “anthropocentric” interpretation of creation in Ben Sira, the wisdom tradition, and “earlier biblical material” see Harrington, 1996, 263-76, esp. 270 (cf. Lampe, 1964, 449-51).
35 Cf. Paul’s language of God “giving” (δίδωσιν) cosmic ontology in 1 Cor. 15:38.
Genesis 1 rather than to the ultimate Before, creating all sense-perceptible things before and with a view toward humanity. Yet Philo’s theological principle accords with his ultimate Before. God creates according to his “purpose.” He does so for the “good” of the one in mind, whether that be the entire world or the specific humanity, whom God will then place over all.\(^{36}\)

In §82, Philo gives his third explanation of why humanity was created last. As with so much of his interpretation of the creation of the world as well as humanity, Philo again begins with God’s thinking:

> God, after considering \(\delta \iota \omega \nu \sigma \theta \iota \epsilon \iota \varsigma\) to cause harmony as necessary and most loving, he made \(\epsilon \iota \sigma \iota \iota \epsilon \iota \) the beginning heaven \(\alpha \rho \chi \iota \nu \omicron \rho \alpha \iota \omicron \nu\) and the end man \(\tau \epsilon \lambda \omicron \alpha \nu \theta \iota \rho \omicron \omicron \iota \omicron\), the one the most perfect of the incorruptible things \(\tau \omicron \omicron \gamma \iota \gamma \iota \epsilon \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \varsigma \kappa \alpha \iota \phi \theta \alpha \tau \tau \omicron \varsigma \omicron\), among sense-perception, the other the best of the earth-born and corruptible things \(\tau \omicron \omicron \gamma \iota \gamma \iota \epsilon \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \varsigma \kappa \alpha \iota \phi \theta \alpha \tau \tau \omicron \varsigma \omicron\), a miniature heaven \(\beta \rho \alpha \chi \iota \nu \omicron \rho \alpha \iota \omicron \nu\). (§82)\(^{38}\)

Philo strengthens this comparison between heaven and human by describing the human as “bearing as a statue \(\alpha \gamma \alpha \lambda \mu \alpha \tau \omega \phi \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \alpha \tau\) many star-like natures within himself, that is, art and knowledge and the famous theories that accord with each virtue.” God’s forethought and consideration caused perfect symmetry in the created world. The heaven with its astral dances is closely related to the human with its mental revolutions. The Beginning of the world is intimately related to the Beginning of humanity, even to the

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\(^{36}\) Philo uses the language of humanity being “over all” \(\varepsilon \pi \iota \omicron \pi \alpha \sigma \iota \omicron\) in \(\text{Op.} 65.1, 66.11\). In \(\text{Op.} 83-88\), he will connect this with the “dominion” of Gen. 1:28. It is possible that he uses the preposition “over” based on Ps. 8:6b-7, where God “placed \(\kappa \alpha \theta \iota \sigma \tau \omicron \alpha \varsigma\)” humanity “over \(\varepsilon \pi \iota\)” the works of his hands, and God “subjected all things \(\pi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \ \upsilon \delta \eta \varepsilon \alpha \iota \varsigma \varsigma\) under his feet.” This possibility is strengthened when in §§84-85 Philo explains Gen. 1:28 in the language of Ps. 8:6-7: God “placed \(\kappa \alpha \theta \iota \sigma \tau \omicron \alpha \varsigma\) him as king” of all sub-lunar living beings, “subjecting all things \(\pi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \ \upsilon \delta \eta \varepsilon \alpha \iota \varsigma \varsigma\) to him” (though exempting “the heavenly beings,” like Ps. 8:6a). (So Borgen, 1995, 369-89; cf. Runia, 2001, 256).

\(^{37}\) This means to “think through” something, to “consider.” Cf. Gen. 8:21: “The Lord God, after considering \(\delta \iota \omega \nu \sigma \theta \iota \epsilon \iota \varsigma\), said, ‘I will not add to the curse on the earth’.”

\(^{38}\) Cf. \(\text{Tim.} 27a5-6\): Critias says that because Timaeus is the best astronomer he will therefore speak appropriately, “beginning \(\alpha \rho \xi \omega \mu \omicron \nu\) from the genesis of the cosmos \(\alpha \rho \omikron \tau \varsigma \delta \omicron \mu \omicron \gamma \iota \nu \pi \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron\) and ending \(\tau \epsilon \lambda \omicron \nu \tau \alpha \) at the nature of man \(\epsilon \iota \varsigma \alpha \nu \theta \iota \rho \omicron \omicron \iota \omicron\).” Socrates heartily approves. Cf. \(\text{Praem.} 1\) (see Runia, 2001, 253).
“earth-born” human of Gen. 1:27, and this is so because of the pre-creational divine design, i.e., the Before.

Within Philo’s first hermeneutical structure (§§13-128) he has presented an interpretation of the sacred text of 1:27 that intertwines the beginning of humanity with the beginning of the world and with God’s intentions before creation. When Philo returns to 1:27 in §134, he will again have the same three interwoven hermeneutical strands of creation, but his entire perspective will have shifted. This shift creates a re-reading of 1:27 that is “vastly different” than what we have just seen.


In §§129-30, Philo’s exposition reaches Gen. 2:4b-5. As we saw in chapter 1, he labels this a “summary” of all of Genesis 1.39 Because of this text, he claims that everything preceding 2:4-5 is summarized well in condensed form in 2:4-5, which is all about the Before. Genesis 1 has now been re-construed as the creation of the invisible, noetic realm, i.e., what “pre-exists” in the “Before” (πρό [2x], πρίν [2x], προ-ὑπὲρχε). Though this marks a substantial shift in his reading of Genesis 1, Philo still employs the same three-strand hermeneutic as he had in §§13-128. He sees a textually attested Before (§§129-30; cf. §§13-35), applies it to the beginning of the world (§§131-33; cf. §§36-68), then to the beginning of humanity (§§134-35; cf. §§69-88).40 But now Philo has

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39 See above pp.51-54. In §129, Philo uses the participle ἐπιλογίζομενος, meaning either “concluding” or “reflecting upon” (so Runia, 2001, 311), and uses the noun ἐπιλόγος and the verb ἐπιλέγω in Post. 64-65 when commenting on the same passage. Runia distances Op. 129 from Post. 64-65, treating the former as “reflecting upon”: “a reflection on the creation account as it has been so far presented” (310, cf. 311; contra Tobin, 1983, 123-24, 170-71). I see it as a re-construal of all of Genesis 1 in a different way than has been presented thus far. Both construals are valid syntactically, but Runia’s is less able to explain what Philo is about to say of the “man” of Gen. 1:27 in §134.

40 Baer, 1970, 29 and Loader, 2004, 60 recognize these three aspects but do not trace out the implications as I am doing. Tobin (1992) asserts that a previous anthropogonic interpretation which contrasted Gen. 2:7
cosmogonies and anthropogonies to interpret (Genesis 1 and 2), which he did not have in his first read-through. These must be related, both for the world and for humanity.

a. Philo’s Re-Reading of the Beginning of the World (Op. 131-33)

In §§131-33, Philo shows how the beginning of the sense-perceptible world, now found in Gen. 2:6 rather than 1:6, displays the same sequence as the creation of the noetic world (i.e., now Genesis 1). Philo writes: “Keeping to the sequence of the creation and carefully observing the connection between what follows and what has gone before, [Moses] next says: ‘and a spring went up out of the earth and watered all the face of the earth’ (Gen. 2:6)” (§131.1-4). The sensible world (i.e., Genesis 2) begins to take shape in perfect accord with the noetic world (i.e., Genesis 1).

Many modern scholars keep Genesis 1 distant from Genesis 2, in source as well as in language and concept. Philo does not. He discusses the prominence of water in 2:6, he informs his readers of Graeco-Roman thought on the primordial element of water, and he reminds them of the earlier Mosaic thought on the systems of the primordial water in Gen. 1:9-10. By using words and motifs both from Genesis 1 itself and from his own construal of it earlier in his commentary, Philo models Gen. 2:6 on 1:9-10. This perspective of harmony is itself in agreement with his own explanation in Op. 16.9-10 of the harmonious correspondence between noetic cosmos (the Before) and sensible cosmos (the Beginning). With his perspective on Genesis 1 now shifted by 2:4-5 (before the

with 1:27 gave rise to a cosmogonic interpretation which needed to relocate the shift from noetic world to sensory world from 1:6 to 2:4-5 (126-27). Our point concerns Philo’s hermeneutic rather than historical development of causation. Philo’s own interpretation in Op. moves from cosmogony to anthropogony instead of anthropogony to cosmogony.

beginning) and set in motion by 2:6 (the beginning of the sensory world), Philo is nearly prepared to interpret the second anthropogenic text, Gen. 2:7 (the beginning of sensory humanity). But he must first deal with the re-construal of Gen. 1:27, which used to refer to sensory humanity but now refers to the beginning of noetic humanity in the Before.

b. Philo’s Re-Reading of the Beginning of Humanity (Op. 134)

In §§134-35, Philo turns from the world to the human. While the (very brief) cosmogony of Genesis 2 had been in perfect harmony with that of Genesis 1, the anthropogeny of Genesis 2 stands in contrast to that of Genesis 1. Within this context of contrast (§134.4-7a), where there is a “vast difference” between the two humans, we will now look at Philo’s re-reading of 1:27 in §134, only later turning to his reading-in-contrast of 2:7 in §135.

Concerning the two humans Philo writes:

For the one formed [ὁ διαπλασθείς] is a sense-perceptible object [αἰσθητός], already having quality [ποιότης], consisting of body and soul [ἐκ σῶματος καὶ ψυχῆς], man or woman [ἄνδρα ἢ γυνῆ], by nature mortal [φύσει θνητός]. The one according to the image [ὁ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα] is a kind of idea [ἰδέα τις] or genus [γένος] or seal [σφραγίς], noetic [νοητός], incorporeal [ἀσώματος], neither male nor female [οὐτ’ ἄρρεν οὔτε θῆλυ], incorruptible by nature [ἄφθαρτος φύσει]. (§134.7b-11)

Philo’s description of the man of 2:7 as “consisting of body and soul” resembles his description of the man of 1:27 in Op. 69-88 as being “earth-born” and having “a human body” and “mind,” though he now says that the man of 1:27 is “incorporeal” or “without body.” Philo has re-construed the human of 1:27 as the “incorporeal,” “noetic” “idea” of humanity.

Philo’s three-strand hermeneutic with its two outworkings from the text is most helpful at this point. Runia asks, “How does the exegesis here [sc. in Op. 134-35] relate
to the explanation of Gen 1:27 in terms of the *nous* in §69-71?\textsuperscript{42} R.A. Baer thought that explaining the noetic man of 1:27 in §134 as the “Idea” (i.e., Platonic paradigm) of the sensory man of 2:7 was incorrect because such a construal “presupposes an interpretation of Gen. 1:27 and 2:7 inconsistent with Philo’s interpretations of these verses elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{43} To remove the contradiction he treated the “man according to the image” in both §69 and §134 as sensory man’s rational mind.\textsuperscript{44} Though this may “remov[e] any contradiction,” it equates “man” and “mind” in a way that Philo did not in §69 (who mentioned both but did not equate them),\textsuperscript{45} and it cannot explain Philo’s language of “man” (not mind) as “noetic,” “incorporeal,” and “seal” in §134. These terms are Philo’s own language for the Before (cf. “noetic,” “incorporeal,” and “seal” in *Op.* 16-35).\textsuperscript{46} Here in §134, the man of 1:27 is the “Idea,” i.e., the paradigm of the empirical man of 2:7. The contradiction not only remains, but it has actually been sharpened by Philo’s consistent use of terms in his respective passages concerning the Before.\textsuperscript{47} Since the Before has shifted from 1:1-5 to Genesis 1 as a whole, it makes good sense why he would now apply his terms of the Before to the human of 1:27. Recognition of Philo’s hermeneutical perspective admittedly does not remedy the “contradiction” (it is a fundamental part of

\textsuperscript{42} Runia, 2001, 322.

\textsuperscript{43} Baer, 1970, 22.

\textsuperscript{44} Baer, 1970, 30.

\textsuperscript{45} In §69, the man’s mind is imaged after God, but the man is not the mind. In §135, Philo’s mention of “mind” does not allow us to equate it with the “man” of 1:27. In fact, in §135 Philo neither mentions nor alludes to 1:27, for he has turned away from the contrast between these “vastly different” men and has begun to focus attention on the two parts of “the human being”, i.e., the one formed in 2:7ab.

\textsuperscript{46} Philo’s use of “seal” for the “man” of 1:27 is especially illuminating, for it is “usually a technical term for the relation between model and copy” (Runia, 2001, 323). See Tobin, 1993, 122-23. Cf. *Leg.* 1.31-32; *QG* 1.4, 8a, 2.56.

\textsuperscript{47} Runia, 2001, 321-25.
the contradiction!), but it does make better sense out of each of these texts within Philo’s overall commentary.\(^{48}\)

As we mentioned in chapter 1, the authoritative text of Gen. 1:1-5 (“And God ‘made’...”) provided Philo with some of the content of his Before, even causing him to claim that the pre-protological cosmos had “Become” (Op. 29). This was something Plato said could not be (Tim. 28ab), but Philo’s text constrained him. In the same manner, the text of 1:27 (“And God ‘made’...”) causes Philo to offer a “Becoming” idea of humanity (Op. 134.7), and this was something Middle Platonists could not do.\(^{49}\) According to Philo, there has not only been a “becoming” in the noetic beginning of the world, but this is matched by a “becoming” in the noetic beginning of humanity.

3. Summary of Philo’s Reading of Genesis 1:27

Philo presents one three-strand hermeneutic of creation, though he exhibits this in two distinct and mutually exclusive ways. (1) The Before that Philo sees in Gen. 1:1-5 sets off (2) his “first reading” of the Beginning of the empirical world accordingly, which in turn sets the context for (3) his interpretation of the Beginning of empirical humanity. Then Philo subsequently sees (1) this same Before in Gen. 2:4b-5—causing him to retrospectively construe all of Genesis 1 as the Before—which sets off (2) his “second reading” of the cosmic Beginning in 2:6, which in turn re-sets the context for (3) his re-interpretation of Gen. 1:26-28 and then the anthropic Beginning in 2:7.

\(^{48}\) Perhaps it recognizes in Philo a higher degree of consistency on a larger scale.

\(^{49}\) The notion of a noetic paradigm of humanity is technically absent in Plato’s anthropogenic account in the Timaeus (40d-47e) (so Wolfson, 1947, 1.213, 307, 389-90; Baer, 1970, 22n.3; Tobin, 1983, 114). In Middle Platonic thought, however, Arius Didymus, a first century B.C.E. Alexandrian, clearly follows Plato’s condemnation of any “Becoming” (γεγονός) of the noetic paradigm, but expands it to the noetic human: “there is a certain conception of man...un-become [ἀγένητον] and imperishable [ἀφθαρτον]” (On the Doctrines of Plato, preserved in Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 11.23; see Tobin, 1983, 114-18; idem, 1992, 125).
The shared starting point of this doubly-employed three-strand interpretation of creation is his expectation of the Before, and its textual presence (in two places) grants the structure to his two cosmogonic and thus anthropogonic readings. One of Philo’s dominant and recurring interpretive tendencies within each strand and within both of their implementations is to give a primacy to God’s activity, specifically as this creative activity is based upon God’s previous purpose and forethought. And the aim of both readings is ultimately the same: theological praise and anthropological virtue.

B. PAUL’S READING OF GENESIS 1:27

Paul explicitly refers to “God’s image” only twice in 1 and 2 Corinthians and Romans: 1 Cor. 11:7 and 2 Cor. 4:4. In the former, God’s “image” is neither God’s Word nor the human mind, but rather simply “a man” (ανήρ) (11:7b). He is not “according to” another “image” but himself presently “exists” (ὑπάρχων) as “God’s image and glory” (εικὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ). Paul follows this statement with multiple references to Genesis’ broader human beginnings (vv.7-12b) and with a concluding reference to the origin of all things (v.12c). In his second use of Gen. 1:27, “the image of God” presently “is” (ἔστω) Jesus (2 Cor. 4:4), and as such he reflects “God’s glory” (4:6). As in 1 Cor. 11:7-12, here too Paul transitions naturally from this reference to human beginnings (v.4) to a reference to the broader Beginning (v.6).

In both instances Paul, like Philo, interrelates 1:27 with the creation of the world. Like Philo, what undergirds both of Paul’s uses of 1:27 is theocentric causation. As Philo had read but then re-read 1:27 from the retrospective perspective of a later human (the created

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50 1 Cor. 11:8 is on Gen. 2:21-23 and v.9 is on 2:18; v.12a is on Gen. 2:21-23 again, and v.12b on Gen. 4:1 (Watson, 2000A, 79) and commonly observed childbirth (Scroggs, 1972; Gundry-Volf, 1997, 162).
Adam), Paul presents one application of 1:27 in 1 Cor. 11:7 and then a different one in 2 Cor. 4:4, and the second is from the retrospective perspective of a later human (the resurrected Jesus). Unlike Philo, Paul’s retrospection does not deny his previous understanding. Regarding each application of 1:27, after first analyzing “image” and “glory” within the argument, we will then focus on the cosmic and hermeneutical perspective that shapes Paul’s anthropic application within that context.

1. Paul’s First Application of Genesis 1:27: Man, the Image and Glory of God (1 Cor. 11:7-12)

In 1 Cor. 11:7-12, Paul combines Gen. 1:27 and Genesis 2 to explain certain aspects of bi-gendered anthropology and therefore worship-practice. Paul’s initial “ought” for “a man” is based on him “being the image and glory of God” (v.7). After analyzing “glory,” “image,” and their relation to creation, we will demonstrate that God’s intentions because of which he crafted the man and woman as he did are assumed just under the surface.

a. Paul’s Application of the Beginning of Humanity (1 Cor. 11:7-12b)

One of Paul’s main threads in 1 Cor. 11:2-16 is “glory,” and in vv.7-12 this “glory” is cast as an original and inherent part of anthropology. It is first set within its protological framework as Paul inserts it into the textual designation “image of God” (v.7b). Paul is mainly concerned with what is “proper” (πρέπον) for “meaningful worship,” especially with what will produce “glory” (δόξα) within this Christian context rather than “shame”

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(αἰσχρόν) and “dishonor” (ἀτυμία) (see vv.4-7).\(^{53}\) J. Gundry-Volf writes, “Paul’s main point is that man and woman are both the glory of another and therefore both have an obligation not to cause shame to their ‘heads’.”\(^{54}\) She specifies: “since they are the glory of different persons… they must use different means to avoid shaming their ‘heads’.”\(^{55}\) The difference in respective “glory” is due to the Beginning of men and women according to Genesis 1-2.\(^{56}\) As well as being different (vv.7-9), and therefore needing to perform the same worship differently (vv.4-6, 10), women and men are nevertheless also “essentially related” as a non-autonomous people (v.11).\(^{57}\) Even this Paul bases on origins (v.12).

In v.3 Paul sets the entire issue of “heads” within an explicitly Christian framework. Twice in vv.4-12 he reminds them of their specifically Christian setting: e.g., “while praying or prophesying” (vv.4-5), “in the Lord” (v.11c). Yet when he actually argues the principles themselves (difference-of-method in vv.7-10, non-autonomy-of-being in vv.11-12), he writes as if simple protology satisfies his argument.\(^{58}\) Even his principle of

\(^{53}\) For the setting of 1 Cor. 11:2-16 within the Graeco-Roman “shame/honor society” of Corinth see Gundry-Volf, 1997, 152-53, 157, 169.


\(^{55}\) Ibid. Cf. Thiselton, 2000, 837. Recognition of the difference in what each gender “should” do (ὁφείλετε carrying “moral overtones” [Fee, 1987, 514n.8; Conzelmann, 1975, 188n.77]), should not veil the essential similarity of activity that Paul is encouraging (and modifying): both masculine and feminine “praying or prophesying.” By positively modifying their practice, Paul is actively trying to keep both women and men participating in this divine – human communication (Watson, 2000B, 525-28), albeit in “proper” manners.

\(^{56}\) That vv.7-10 (about Genesis 1-2) prove vv.4-6 (about distinction of praxis-method) see Fee, 1987, 513; Gundry-Volf, 1997, 153.

\(^{57}\) Schrage, 1991, 2.512 (“essentially related”), 517-18 (“togetherness, interrelating”). The relationship between vv.8-9 and vv.11-12 has been variously construed. Though a major part of his overall purpose of 1 Corinthians is to bridge schisms (see 1:10-11ff), the particular argument of vv.7-9 is meant, within that context, to (re)inforce particular distinctions, those based on Genesis 1-2. Thus vv.11-12 neither correct vv.8-9 (contra Schrage, 1991) nor repeat vv.8-9 (contra McGinn, 1996); they counter potential false conclusions drawn from vv.8-9 (so Stuckenbruck, 2001).

\(^{58}\) Paul uses the same basic type of argumentation in vv.11-12 as in vv.7-10. His grammatically positive principle (what each gender “is,” vv.7-10) functions as true within a Christian-specific setting, but it is true because of how God “created” their respective physical natures (v.8) and vocations (v.9). His grammatically negative principle (what each gender “is not,” vv.11-12) functions as true within a Christian-specific setting, but it also is true because of how their respective physical natures were brought about
gender non-autonomy (v.11), which is often itself labelled as “eschatological” or “new,” Paul supports or illustrates not with “eschatological” facts or Christological realities but rather with the mechanical origins of men and women divinely built into the physical nature of humans in the Beginning. Thus throughout vv.7-12, Paul applies to Christ’s eschatological community of Corinth the explicitly protological realities of gender difference yet non-autonomy established in the Beginning.

Within this context, Paul’s very first use of human origins is a slightly modified form of the very first textual description of “the human”: “the image and glory of God” (v.7b; Gen. 1:27). Two observations must be developed: 1) Paul does not use the text’s preposition (“according to,” κατά) but may have been influenced by it, and 2) by seeing glory (δόξα) in Genesis 2 and inserting it within “image of God,” Paul presents contemporary “man” in a specifically Adamic manner.

Concerning the preposition, Paul does not refer explicitly to κατά. It may still have influenced his portrayal of men and women in v.7, though not in a Philonic way. For (v.12a) or reproduced (v.12b) by God (v.12c). Though disagreeing on how good this is, many recognize that Paul is arguing that creation affects church-activity in vv.7-10: Watson, 2000B, 530, 532; cf. 529-33; Thiselton, 2000, 837; Gundry-Volf, 1997, 157; Hooker, 1964/65, 411. Though some also recognize that in v.12 Paul uses creation/physical origins as a proof or “analogy” of v.11 (so Watson, 2000A, 79; Gundry-Volf, 1997, 162; Scroggs, 1972), the full implications of such argumentation have often been missed. The principle of v.11 itself is consistent with v.12—whether minimally as “analogy” (so Watson, 2000B, 523; Gundry-Volf, 1997, 160-64, 170; Schrage, 1991, 2.519) or maximally as “proof” (typical of γὰρ)—and v.12 is the non-Christian-specific principle of non-autonomy-via-physical-origins. I.e., Paul says that a non-Christian-specific principle is (still) the case “in” (not “because of”) the Lord. The eschatological setting for the protological(ly-consistent) principle should not be confused with the nature of the principle itself.

59 E.g., Watson 2000B, 532-33; Scroggs, 1972, 301; Jaubert, 1971/72, 429.
61 Not everyone considered the preposition as important as did Philo: see Wis. 2:23 (see McCasland, 1950, 91).
62 Rightly Hultgren, 2003, 369; Peerbolte, 2000, 84; Schrage, 1991, 2.509-10; Scroggs, 1966, 68-69. Contra van Kooten, 2008, 52, 54, 216-17 (and Cranfield, 1975, 1.432). Though van Kooten (2008) sometimes helpfully acknowledges that Paul says “man is the image of God” (e.g., 163, 202, 216; emphasis original), when constructing his broader Pauline anthropology regarding “God’s image” he typically downplays 11:7 and moves quickly to man’s assimilation to God via Christ as the actual image (199-218;
example, in Genesis 2 God’s expressed purpose (“I will…”) was for the woman to “accord” with man (κατ’ αὐτὸν, Gen. 2:18), to be “like him” (ὁμοιός αὐτῷ, 2:20),63 and to function in an explicitly man-ward way, i.e., as a “helper” who was “for him” (αὐτῷ) (2:18). Paul summarizes: the woman was “created for the man,” i.e., she is “the glory of man.” This “glory” is an Edenic theme. In Gen. 1:26-27 (and Genesis 2—for Paul they refer to the same man), God’s expressed purpose (“Let us…”) was for the “him” to “accord” with God (κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ),64 to be “like” God (καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν), and to function in a specifically God-ward way, i.e., to fulfill his appointment before his “Command”-er and without reference to a woman (who did not yet exist) (2:15-16). Paul summarizes: the man was “not created for the woman” (implied “but rather for God”), i.e., he is “the glory of God.”

Such textual references may have affected Paul’s gender-descriptions so that respective accord and vocational purpose enable and require respective “glory” (rather than “dishonor”). When Paul calls the Corinthian “man” the “image and glory of God,” he refers to the specifically Adamic nature of accord/likeness with God and vocation for God as created by God in the beginning. The accord/likeness with God which Paul seems to have in mind here is not quite the moral/cognitive accord found in Eph. 4:24 and Col.

cf. 69-81, 88-91; cf. Luz, 1969, 41-46). There is no evidence in 1-2 Corinthians (or Romans) that behind Paul’s references to “image” lies a Philonic-type use of the κατά-concept whereby empirical man is distinguished from the actual (metaphysical) image, who is the pre-incarnate Jesus. This is a spurious reading of 2 Cor. 4:4 (and Rom. 8:29; see below: pp.189-96 [and 240-45]). It also downplays Paul’s two-tier presentation of “man” as “God’s image” in 1 Cor. 11:7 (and of Christ as “God’s image” in 2 Cor. 4:4, see below). (1 Cor. 11:3 should not be imported into vv.7-9 as counter-evidence of a three-tiered system whereby “man” is only “image” via Christ the true image. Paul’s logic of vv.7-9 functions immediately from Genesis 1-2 and the first Adam and Eve to contemporary women and men. To import v.3 into this part of his argument would be to confuse Paul’s own revealed logic for the sake of a seemingly neater system). Paul’s related concept of “assimilation” (1 Cor. 15:49; 2 Cor. 3:18; Rom. 8:29), which van Kooten construes as the Philonic three-tiered “image”-concept (50-57, 217, cf. 54) and attributes (partly) to the κατά (without evidence; 216-17), is better construed as Paul’s use of Gen. 5:3 (with evidence; see below on pp.233-47).

64 Cf. Eph. 4:24: “the man who was created according to God [κατὰ θεόν].”
3:10 (cf. Gen. 3:22: “Adam has become as one of us knowing good and evil”), though it is not thereby contrary to it. His nuance in 1 Cor. 11:7 is closer to the accord, mentioned above, that is shared between a statue (“image”) and its referent (a king or god). Due to accord and likeness, the image reflects to others the king’s/god’s qualities while also reflecting on the referent’s reputation. To this imagery we will now return.

Paul’s reference to God’s “image” and “glory” is Adamic. He is dealing with the way men and women look regarding their heads. It is not about clothing or outward appearance per se which Paul cares, but about the “shame” and “dishonor” versus “glory” and “honor” with which these religio-cultural symbols were wed. For Paul, the actual appearance of the “image” could bring glory and honor or shame and dishonor to God. The reciprocal communication of attributes and reputation between the image/statue and the one portrayed is not far off from Paul’s point. In one direction, an “image” manifested the one imaged, so that the qualities of the absent king (perhaps primarily his glory) were (supposed to be) reflected in his statue. Seeing the image was to know the absent (or invisible) one.65 In the other direction, the quality of the image’s appearance reflected on the king by drawing certain connotations to viewers’ minds—for better (glory and honor) or worse (shame and dishonor). Paul’s argument functions on the assumption that the qualities and appearance of the “image” are supposed to reflect the qualities and do inevitably reflect on the reputation of the one imaged.66 Because of the way Paul sees the man’s Beginning having taken shape, specifically as “God’s image” in Gen. 1:27 and

66. Feuillet (1973) explains that when “glory of God” (and also “of man”) in 1 Cor. 11:7 is taken as an objective genitive, it can convey the “power of his attributes… of [his] pomp, splendour, wealth, etc.” (161; cf. Thielston, 2000, 835). When taken as a subjective genitive, “glory of God” (or “of man”) may refer to God (or man) “receiving honor,” “credit,” or “pride” from the one who “is” their “glory” (Feuillet, 161; cf. Jaubert, 1971/72, 423, 425-26; cf. Prov. 11:16). Though I rarely opt for plenary readings, such may do the most justice in this context to the fluidity of both “glory” and genitive constructions, especially in light of the two-directional communication within this “image”-concept.
generally as his “glory” in Genesis 2, “God’s honor depends on the man’s.”

If the image’s (man’s) appearance is shameful during his public revelation of God (“while prophesying”) or during his public communication with God (“while praying”), a certain inappropriate connotation is unavoidably cast onto the one imaged by him in that state, i.e., onto the Creator from whom are all things.

b. Paul’s Cosmogonic Perspective (1 Cor. 11:12c)

Paul ultimately reduces the entire ontological discussion of beginnings to a theological statement of origins: “But all things are from God” (v.12c). This statement encompasses the ontological “woman from man” (Gen. 2:21-23) in v.12a and thus also v.8. It thus also includes the purposive “woman for man” (Gen. 2:18) in v.9 since vv.8-9 together form the label “man’s glory” (v.7c). “All things” therefore also takes in the status and function of man as “God’s image and glory” (Gen. 1:27 and Genesis 2) in v.7b since this is the backdrop for woman in v.7c-9. And it directly explains the ontological birth of “man through woman” (Gen. 4:1-until-now) in v.12b. The ontological and ethical relationships within the human Beginning are important, and they have their import primarily because they are “from” the Creator.

This confession of ultimate divine causality accords with Paul’s cosmogonic interpretation elsewhere. As we saw in chapter 2, he reads the beginning of the world theocentrically. God’s causation is therefore applicable not merely for describing the past but also as governing our understanding of present historical events such as agriculture (1 Cor. 15:37-38) and here childbirth (11:12b). The beginning of light provides an understanding of present gospel events, for it is “the God who” did both that is primary.

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67 Gundry-Volf, 1997, 158.
God gives bodies to plants from seeds, to sun, moon, and stars, to women out of men, and to men through women. God grants ontological “glory” (15:40-41) and relational glory and honor (11:7-9). For Paul, the protological texts which describe this causative God can therefore be elicited to encourage the perpetuation of relational “glory” instead of “shame.” In 1 Cor. 11:7-12, Paul submits the various aspects of the textual and empirical beginning of humanity (initiated with 1:27) under this all-encompassing and theocentric confession of the Beginning.

In summary, within the Lord Jesus’ worshiping community, men and women should perform their shared worship in different manners, yet not as genders autonomous from the other. For Paul both their different manners and their non-autonomous relatedness are the case because of Genesis’ anthropogenic texts, first among which is Gen. 1:27. From this first application of 1:27 we may deduce that Paul considered the initial human, Adam, to not merely think like God, as Philo had it, but to himself be the visible reflector of God’s glory to those watching. As such he also was to bring a reputation of honor rather than shame to God by worshiping him according to the Creator’s intent. Not only does Paul assume behind the particular creation of Adam as “God’s image and glory” God’s previous intent (a kind of implicit Before), but he also sets this application of Gen. 1:27 within the broader context of God’s cosmic causation—like three intertwined strands.

2. Paul’s Second Application of Genesis 1:27: Christ, the Image of God (2 Cor. 4:4-6)

Paul presents the language of Gen. 1:27 in a second place, again to the Corinthians. “The light of the gospel of the glory of the Christ, who is the image of God [ὁ οίκτιστος] ̣
shines into hearts of darkness (2 Cor. 4:4). Paul and his companions
preach “Jesus Christ, Lord” (v.5). This is the crucified and risen one who has a ministry
of life by his Spirit. They declare this gospel, i.e., “God’s word,” as servants for the
Corinthians “because” it is the Creator of light who shines his “glory” in “the face of
Jesus Christ” (v.6). As the very “image of God,” this “face” surpasses and therefore
replaces Moses’ face, which had previously and legitimately shone as a reflection of the
Lord’s glory (2 Cor. 3:7-10; cf. Ex. 34:29). As in 1 Cor. 11:7, here the “image” is
related to God’s “glory.” In this latter passage, as in the former, the “image of God” is a
person whose actions and appearance reflect on God even while also reflecting his glory.
This latter use of the same biblical designation is again applied within a broader reference
to the cosmic Beginning, but this cosmic Beginning is paralleled to another Beginning
that provides the hermeneutical context for understanding how Paul’s re-application of
1:27 is not at odds with his first application.

a. Paul’s Re-Application of the Beginning of Humanity (2 Cor. 4:4)

In 2 Cor. 4:4, as in 1 Cor. 11:7, Paul does not use the biblical preposition “according
to”: Jesus simply “is” God’s image. Based upon this feature of this text (though
neglecting or downplaying the same feature of 1 Cor. 11:7), some have placed Christ in
eternity as “God’s image,” even in Gen. 1:27 as the image “according to” whom the first

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68 Nguyen, 2008, argues, “Scholars generally have not given much attention to the magnitude of the
phrase ἐν προσώπῳ Χριστοῦ in 4.6, which climactically concludes Paul’s use of the Moses narrative and
constitutes a high point for his πρόσωπον – καρδία contrast in 3.1-4.6” (180).

69 In 2 Cor. 4:4-6 (as well as in 3:18) there is a “causative relationship” between “image” and “glory” (so
Jaubert, 1971/72, 422). It is confusing to say that “glory” means “reflection” or “manifestation” (contra
Scroggs, 1972, 299n.43; rightly Feuillet, 1973, 159-60) as if “glory” was synonymous with “image” (contra
Hanson, 1980A, 7; rightly Scroggs, 1972, 299n.44). As Steenburg (1988) writes, “Doxa is not the
appearance or visible form of Yahweh but the splendor that hides him and yet manifests his nature and/or
presence” (80).
Adam was created (like Philo’s Word). Others give a similar metaphysical reading, but relate Paul’s reference less to the text of Gen. 1:27 and more generally to statements imported from outwith this pericope (e.g., 1 Cor. 8:6 and/or 11:3, Col. 1:15 and/or Phil. 2:6, or even Wis. 7:26). But there is no textual reason, apart from the “parallels” just noted, to regard Paul’s reference to Jesus as “image of God” in 2 Cor. 4:4 as a display of “metaphysical speculation” or as a reference to Christ’s pre-human nature and/or function. Paul is presenting Jesus as someone who is historically after Moses, having a human “face” that replaces Moses’. Thus not only is 4:4 like Paul’s own use of “image of God” in 1 Cor. 11:7 in that he identifies the “image” with the referent directly and immediately, but the referent in both passages is a human as the image. Jesus as “image of God” is not only the “apprehensibility of God” generally, but is more particularly the place where, like in Moses’ face but in a far surpassing way, “God himself, the invisible, is known,” even the “visibility of God.”

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71 So e.g., Conzelmann, 1975, 183-84, 187 (183n.27) and Collins, 1999, 405-06 (van Kooten [2008] also sees these as parallel [216-17, 274-75]). See Conzelmann’s comparison between 1 Cor. 8:6 and 11:3 with “Greek philosophy (Platonism and the Stoa)” and “Hellenistic Judaism,” most prominent among which is Philo” (183-84), and van Kooten’s language of “second God,” which he borrows from Alcinous (pp.154-58), applies to Philo’s Logos (pp.158, 181-99), and then to Paul’s Christ (pp.158, 199-218).
72 So e.g., Harris, 2005, 330-31; Mathews, 1996, 171; Hanson, 1980A, 10, 22-23.
74 So Ridderbos, 1975, 70-71; Luz, 1969, 43. Watson (1997) criticizes paralleling 2 Cor. 4:4 with such “metaphysical speculation,” which is quite out of Paul’s intention in 2 Cor. 3-4 (301n.6). Kim (1980) argues that Wisdom’s “wisdom” and Philo’s “word” are much more “visible” than our classification “metaphysical” might allow (219-20; cf. word as “appearance” in Leg. 1.43 and wisdom as the wilderness cloud/fire in Wis. 10:17). Watson’s observation still holds in that Paul’s Jesus, especially as portrayed in 1 Cor. 15 (as last Adam) and in 2 Cor. 4 (as the “image of God” with a “face”), is as such a much different type of “image” than are the semi-hypostacized and only somewhat “visible” images of Wisdom and Philo. Hanson, 1980A, 22-23.
76 Hanson, 1980A, 22-23. Because Hanson imports Col. 1:15 and Phil. 2:6 into 2 Cor. 4:4, thereby expanding “image” in 4:4 to include Christ’s eternality, he is less comfortable with Christ as “the visibility of God” than is Paul, who comfortably relates “image” to Christ’s human “face.”
According to S. Kim, Paul saw Christ as “the image of God” in the Damascus theophany and subsequently interpreted him both as “the image of God” in pre-existent creation-mediation (like Philo’s Logos and Wisdom’s wisdom = “Wisdom-Christology”) and as “the image of God” in human Adamic form (= “Adam-Christology”). This dual-sided εἰκόνα-Christology enables Kim to be more flexible with his language regarding when exactly Christ was “the image of God” in Paul’s general theology. Thus Kim also considers that “both the elements derived from Wisdom-Christology and those from Adam-Christology are often found together in the passages where Paul speaks of Christ as the εἰκόνα of God and of our transformation into that image.”

He applies this to 2 Cor. 3:18-4:6: “Christ as the εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ is the revelation of God (2 Cor 4.4-6), i.e., the embodiment of Wisdom, but as such he is also the Last Adam who has recovered the divine image so that we may be transformed into his image (2 Cor 3.18) and become a new creature (2 Cor 4.6).” Kim defines Wisdom-Christology as “oriented to Christ’s functions in creation and revelation” and Adam-Christology as “oriented to his functions in eschatology as the Last Adam.” The aspect of “Wisdom-Christology” that Kim recognizes in 2 Cor. 4:4 is thus “the revelation of God.” But “revelation” is a concept equally at home in a fully anthropological notion of “image” drawn from Gen. 1:27 (so 1 Cor. 11:7): God is known (i.e., revealed) wrongly when his “image” appears inappropriately. There is thus no exegetical reason to see a combination of both aspects

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78 For the fundamental importance of both Adamic and Wisdom aspects to Paul’s Christology see Dunn, 1998A, 231-38. For a plenary reading of “image” in 2 Cor. 4:4 (as both Adamic and metaphysical)—even if not fully accepting Kim’s explanation of how it came about—see Harris, 2005, 330-31; Matera, 2003, 102; Thrall, 1994, 1.310-11 (cf. Ridderbos, 1975, 69-72; Black, 1954, 174-75, 179).
80 Kim, 1980, 267.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 144.
of Christology in 2 Cor. 4:4, for each nuance is effectively explained in an Adamic manner.

Thus “face” is a very important feature of Paul’s understanding of “the image of God.”83 Paul’s presentation of Christ as “the image of God” in 2 Cor. 4:4 has to do with the incarnate, human, risen, and glorified “Jesus Christ, Lord.” Found between references to assimilation with the “image” by “the Spirit” (3:18; cf. 1 Cor. 15:45, 49) and to God’s initial creation (4:6; cf. 1 Cor. 15:37-41), this passage should be compared with 1 Cor. 15:35-49 before the others which are typically imported as “parallels” (see above). For the Corinthians Paul had already linked “the image and glory of God” with Adam (1 Cor. 11:7-9) and had already described Jesus as “second human”/“last Adam” (1 Cor. 15:45-47, and “life-making Spirit”) who conveys his benefits through assimilation with his own “image” (15:48-49). To them Paul now describes the Christ with the glorious face as “the image of God” and explains the Spirit who transforms his followers into his own “image.” We would need a lot of compelling evidence to define Jesus Christ the Lord in 2 Cor. 4:4 in a non-Adamic way.84 So R. Scroggs writes,

No hesitation need exist in understanding εἰκών τοῦ θεοῦ to be an affirmation by Paul that his Lord is the regained humanity God intended to exist at creation…. Christ as image of God clearly describes eschatological humanity.85

Although Paul considered Christ as an eternal being who aided in creation itself (e.g., 1 Cor. 8:6; cf. 10:4),86 there is nothing in 2 Cor. 4:4 or the surrounding context that gives

83 See Nguyen, 2008, 173-94, esp. 179-80, 182-84: “As with the case of εἰκών, the usage of πρόσωπον in the Old Testament shows that Paul is using the phrase προσώπῳ Χριστοῦ in 4.6 to convey Christ as the visible representation of the invisible presence of God” (181). Cf. Steenburg (1990) on the connection between “face,” “image,” and Gen. 1:27 in The Life of Adam and Eve 13: “‘Face’ relates more specifically to physical, visual appearance” (96-97).
85 Scroggs, 1966, 99 (emphasis original).
evidence that such is Paul’s meaning there. Due to the grammatical similarity of 2 Cor. 4:4 with 1 Cor. 11:7 (“is,” no preposition) and Paul’s connection between “image” and “face” (as a post-Mosaic face and ministry that surpasses the former Mosaic face and ministry), we have no reason to conclude that Paul is referring to Christ as pre-existent, metaphysical, and transcendent when calling him “the image of God.” In 2 Cor. 4:4, “image of God” is a (neo-) anthropogenic title such as “last Adam.” The second original human, like the first original human before him, is “the image of God.” As such, to know Jesus is to know God. To “see” the glorious face of Christ within the spiritual darkness is to recognize the glory of the Creator of light, the glory that has surpassed that which was formerly revealed in Moses’ face and ministry, the glory which has even surpassed that of the original beginning of humanity (see below).

b. Paul’s Cosmogonic Perspectives (2 Cor. 4:6)

Paul ultimately turns attention to the God whose “image” Christ is, and this broader perspective helps us understand his hermeneutic concerning Gen. 1:27. As in the Beginning, darkness has no real power (even at the hands of “the god of this age”) when the God of the Beginning decides to illuminate again in a new act of creative “shining.” It is from the perspective of this new act that Paul mentions the facial “image of God.”

In a manner broadly like Philo, Paul has two cosmogonic contexts within which to understand anthropology, and, like Philo, the perspective from which he is looking matters. Both creations are comparable for Paul: both have “bodies,” “glories,” an “Adam,” “light,” and even the propagation of that Adam’s “image” to his family. These

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two comparable cosmic and anthropic perspectives enable Paul to apply the God-intended title of the first Adam from Gen. 1:27 to both the men in Corinth (1 Cor. 11:7-10) and to Christ (2 Cor. 4:4) without the two contradicting. In 2 Cor. 4:6a, Paul refers to the original creation (of light), but in v.6b he seamlessly shifts to the new creation (of light). These two creations are similar: both are “shinings,” both presuppose “darkness,” both are even accomplished by God’s word proclaimed in the darkness. But it is from the perspective of the old that Paul labels “men” as “image of God” while from the perspective of the new that Paul mentions Christ as such.

Though in 1 Cor. 11:7-12 it was certainly the eschatological (new) community whom Paul directed, within that context he was applying to them only the original creation (Gen. 1:27, 2:7-23, 4:1, and Genesis 1-2 in general; see above). From that perspective and within that hermeneutical context he applies to men the “image and glory of God” (perhaps as Gen. 9:6 had): they should act a certain way because by nature they and God are mutually understood due to the “image” concept. This remains the case, even within the Christian community, simply because they are as human as was Adam. In 2 Corinthians 4, however, Paul has both the original creation and the new creation in mind. They are connected, but it is specifically God’s redemptive (new) shining into blinded hearts in v.6b that displays his glory in Christ’s “face,” and it is this face and glory which should be recognized as God’s glorious “image” (v.4). Paul is not claiming here that it was during the original creation of light that Christ was “God’s image” (i.e., within Gen. 1:27 itself). Paul’s application of the label from Gen. 1:27 to Christ is situated within the

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87 Cf. “the God who said” (4:6a) with “the light of the gospel” (4:4b) which Paul has just labeled as “God’s word” (4:1-3).

context of the *new* creation, the newly shone light of divine glory—post-Adam and, importantly, post-Moses. It is from *that* cosmic perspective that Paul looks at Christ as “the image of God” in 2 Cor. 4:4.

The implication of this discussion of Paul’s two creational perspectives is that Paul had only one *reading* of the text. The initial man of creation was the image and glory of God. Within Paul’s broadest possible context of God’s all-encompassing creative causation—including protology and eschatology—he can apply the original (Adamic) God-given title/nature of “image of God,” taken from Gen. 1:27, to the Corinthian man as a physical and functional man and yet also to Christ as initial human of the new creation—the last Adam.

3. **Summary of Paul’s Reading of Genesis 1:27, in Comparison with Philo’s Readings**

Paul’s hermeneutical contexts within which each of his presentations of Gen. 1:27 are found, like Philo’s, have an impact on how he applies the text. Paul considers the original creation of humanity (as recorded in the text) to carry the certain anthropological principles by which he then shapes Christian worship in 1 Cor. 11:7-10 and 11-12. Paul equates “the image of God” with the Corinthian “man” (not with mind, nor Word or Wisdom, nor even Christ), and while this may surprise some, it makes sense within Paul’s broader perspective concerning creation in this pericope. Verses 8-9 and 12 make clear that Paul has the original, not new, creation in mind. He approaches this church-issue from the perspective of an aspect of this original creation (gender) that remains importantly real in the Lord.\(^8^9\) Therefore his reference to the image as simply a man—a

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\(^8^9\) Paul’s hermeneutical move from protological text to contemporary (Christian) practice should not be surprising. He makes the same move when explaining sex in 1 Cor. 6:16. There he stated dogmatically that
man with the same flesh, bones, and God-ward calling that Adam had in Genesis 1-2, as well as with the same responsibility to reflect and reflect on God appropriately—fits well within this broader context of God’s original (and intentional) creation of “all things.”

For Paul, however, as for Philo, a detail which came after Gen. 1:27 caused him to re-apply Gen. 1:27 (2 Cor. 4:4). Unlike Philo, Paul’s detail was not textual (though is certainly testified to and explained by many texts), but rather historical and personal: the resurrected Jesus Christ. This future “detail” caused Paul to see a new beginning to the world and to humanity. As Philo had analyzed Gen. 1:27 in retrospective relation to the man who came (textually) second, i.e., Adam, so too Paul looks back at the anthropological titles applied to the first Adam in Genesis 1-2 and he reads them in relation to the man who came (historically) second, i.e., Jesus. As Philo’s two interpretations of the “human” (whether sensory or noetic) are of one accord with his two broader hermeneutical perspectives on the beginning of the world (whether sensory or noetic), so too Paul’s two applications of the more specific text of the beginning of humanity (whether new or original) consistently follows on from his two perspectives on the cosmic Beginning (whether new or original).

Yet while Philo’s readings are technically two different construals of the exact same text, Paul’s readings are technically two different applications of the one construal of the text. Philo is attempting in both places to explain who the actual “human” is within the text, first the sensible one and then the noetic one. But both cannot be the actual human of the text at the same time. Paul, however, is in neither place attempting to say either

“the one ‘clinging’ to a prostitute is one body [with her].” That is simply the ontological nature of sex whether one is in the Lord or not. Paul knows this ontology because his Bible tells him so: Gen. 2:24. Certain aspects of ontology are derivable from God’s creation and they continue to be applicable to modern people, even Christians.
that the Corinthian “man” or that “Christ” actually is the one spoken of in Gen. 1:27 itself. For Paul, the first Adam holds that honor. Rather, Paul construes contemporary people, whether the Corinthian man or the resurrected Jesus, in accord with the title granted to the original human in Gen. 1:27.

From Paul’s two applications of 1:27 we can construct his construal of the original text itself. Adam was created to be a kind of presentation (or mirror-image) of God, specifically of God’s glory. The way Adam presented himself would also have reflected on God as the behavior and appearance of a statue (or even child) reflects on the honor or shame of the king (or even parent). It is certainly vital for Paul’s broader theology and anthropology that the original “image of God” actually and grievously shamed the Creator. Yet also important for Paul is that Adam’s offspring (men, at least), merely by virtue of being human images of God like their father, continue to either display or veil God’s glory and to either cast back a shameful or honorable reputation on their Creator who made Adam (and therefore them) to be his image. Likewise, Christ as the last Adam, second human, first person of the new creation through resurrected life-by-Spirit, is the “image of God.” As such he makes the glory of God known and his actions and appearance also reflect on God. Although the resurrected Jesus shares this basic Adamic (and even Mosaic) method of mirror-imaging God, Jesus’ face images God’s glory more clearly than had Moses with the glorious face, and even more radiantly than had the divinely hand-crafted man of dust.
2. THE MAN OF DUST: GENESIS 2:7

Whether turning to 1:27 or 2:7 to form and refine one’s anthropology, each text is preceded by and set within the broader context of “heaven and earth,” and within the more particular context of an “earth” that is primed for human life. This “life” is itself a dominant theme of Genesis 2-3. God’s formation of “the human” as “dust from the earth” (2:7a) can be compared with the production of an ornate clay pot—beautiful in design, but not living. But God “inbreathes” into the formation’s “face” (2:7b). As “image of God” had been the essential description of humanity in 1:27, in this second text the essential description of humanity is found in v.7c: “and the human turned into a living being.” Made possible by God’s “breath of life” (πνεῦμα ζωῆς), this new person is “a soul that lives” (ψυχή ζωής). The subsequent narrative confirms the centrality of “life” (and death) for this human Beginning.

There could be seen in 2:7 itself, especially in light of the drama which unfolds, a hint of potential negativity (or at least weakness) concerning the newly crafted human. When Adam is condemned to death, his “return to dust” is not portrayed as some aspect of him with which he was created being stripped away. Though death is sometimes portrayed in subsequent scripture as such, i.e., as God’s sovereign removal of “Spirit,” “spirit,” and/or

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91 Cf. Gen. 1:9-13, 20-25 with 2:5-6. Von Rad (1956) drew attention to the shared chaos-to-life motif in Genesis 1 and 2 (74). Yet he inappropriately distinguishes between water in Gen.2 (“the assisting element of creation”) and in Gen.1 (“the enemy of creation”) (75), for in 1:20-21 God calls the water to assist him in creation. For our purposes it does not matter that many scholars have had difficulty relating the cosmic setting in Gen. 2:6 to that in Gen. 1:1-25. Both cosmic settings precede the anthropogony (Gen. 1:26 and 2:7), and neither Philo nor Paul struggle to relate 2:6 to Genesis 1. Philo places Gen. 2:6 in harmony with Genesis 1 (Op. 131-33; cf. Op. 38-39), while Paul sets Gen. 2:7 (in 1 Cor. 15:45-47) within a cosmic context drawn mainly from Genesis 1 (15:37-41), thus apparently seeing no tension.
92 “The tree of life” is central (2:9), “death” is promised (2:17), and “depart into the earth” is pronounced (3:19). God bars the first man (along with his wife, and thus also any future progeny) from “the tree of life” and therefore from any possibility of “living forever” (3:22).
“breath” (as de-creation), in this initial narrative the nuance implies that Adam’s body-as-created dies because he is deprived of the extrinsic aid of the tree of “eternal life” from which he (and his wife, and future progeny) was divinely barred due to sin. As he was constructed in 2:7 there was an ability to corrupt or decay, for immortality would have been his not intrinsically but only had his created nature been supplemented by God-given “fruit” of eternal life.

When one considers the human of 2:7 there is room to rejoice in the God-given breath and in the God-formed body that live in united animation as “living soul,” but there may also be the nagging wariness that the absence of what God provides means inevitable lifeless dust. But subsequent texts which highlight the human’s de-creational return to dust (e.g., Job 34, Psalm 103 LXX) are viewing dust and life from the subsequent perspective where death is a clear and present reality. Within its creational context itself, especially in light of the divine will and word of Genesis 1 that brings everything (including humanity) into “exceeding goodness,” God’s formation of this particular human is most naturally understood as precisely what the Creator desired and


94 Gen. 3:22: λάβῃ τοῦ ζώου τῆς ζωῆς καὶ φέγγη καὶ ζήσεται εἰς τὸν αἰώνα. It is exegetically unnecessary to present death in Genesis 3 as of a different nature from death in Genesis 5 (contra Minear, 1994, 68, [and can have poor effects on an interpretation of Paul: 78-79]).

purposed for him to be at that moment. Despite (retrospective) hints within Gen. 2:7 of weakness and potential decay, someone’s interpretation of this text will probably remain in positive motion unless acted upon by an outside source. Philo and Paul demonstrate precisely this double-edged hermeneutic. Each shows two perspectives on Gen. 2:7—one positive, one negative—and for each the negative reading is due to comparison of it with an outside source.

A. Philo’s Reading of Genesis 2:7

Gen. 2:7 gives to (and confirms within) Philo deep and dualistic convictions which are “the backbone of his anthropological views.” 96 This dualism encompasses cosmology (the noetic – sensory divide), anthropology (the mind – body composition), and ethics (virtue according to mind/image – vice according to flesh/senses). 97 Within his anthropological dualism, the human mind takes the place of primacy in 2:7, just as it had in 1:27. But while Philo often merges these two texts of human beginnings and emphasizes the human mind and its divine origin, 98 in Op. 134-35 Philo intentionally distances 2:7 from 1:27 (as we saw above), and describes a “vast difference” between the two humans.

Within his one commentary, Philo has two construals of Gen. 2:7. One reading of this corporeal man is somewhat negative (§§134-35), while the other reading of the corporeal

97 Levison, 1988, 86. Philo uses the designation “consisting of body and soul” as a general anthropological statement in e.g., Spec. 2.64; Cher. 113; Sacr. 126; Ebr. 69; Conf. 62; Gig. 33 (Runia, 2001, 325). On ethics see Plant. 44-46 (Tobin, 1983, 136-37).
98 When Philo blends 1:27 and 2:7 (e.g., Leg. 3.95-96; Det. 80-90; Plant. 14-27; Her. 230-31; Mut. 223; Spec. 1.80-81, 171; 3.83, 208; QG 2.62), it is typical that the “mind” or “reasoning soul” becomes a dominant feature of discussion (so Loader, 2004, 60, 64n.84; Jervell, 1960, 51-53; McCasland, 1950, 92-93). Thus the human mind/rationality images God’s rationality (λογισμός) and Word (λόγος) (Gen. 1:27) and also receives the inbreathed “divine spirit” (2:7) (so Baer, 1970, 25-26).
man is highly positive (§§136-50). Two hermeneutical perspectives prompt the differing qualities of Philo’s two construals of 2:7, and this will be similar for Paul. When reading Gen. 2:7 on its own, Philo interprets its human positively. When reading 2:7 in comparison with an outside source, in Philo’s case Gen. 1:27 and the human therein, he reads 2:7 negatively.


In §134, Philo reintroduces the person “according to the image of God” into his comments on Gen. 2:7. Philo’s hermeneutic is one of comparison, and when compared, a “vast difference” is found between the humans:

The one “formed” is a sense-perceptible object, already sharing in quality, consisting of body and soul, man or woman, by nature mortal [φύσει θνητός] (Gen. 2:7). The one “according to the image” is a kind of idea or genus or seal, noetic, incorporeal, neither male nor female, incorruptible by nature [ἡφασματικός φύσει] (Gen. 1:27). (§134.7b-11)

By calling the human of 2:7 “by nature mortal” (φύσει θνητός), and especially by contrasting this “mortality” with the “incorruptibility” (ἡφασματικός) of the bodiless human of 1:27, Philo’s nuance to “mortality” conveys a death that is the end of a wasting away, a decaying that is common to all material and “qualitatively” definable things.99 Philo sees in the human body, as constructed in Gen. 2:7, an inevitable propensity to dissipate to dust since immortality and incorruptibility are not inherent to bodily structure.100

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99 Cf. Congr. 20; Cher. 14. “Qualitatively definable” (i.e., “sharing in quality,” ποιότητας) refers to having “distinguished characteristics” (van den Hoek, 2000, 68), i.e., to the “accidental properties necessarily possessed by things that are sense-perceptible and corporeal” (Runia, 2001, 325). Philo often uses the ἀποικοποιήσεως contrast for the things before and after God’s creative ordering (cf. Op. 21-22, 63; Spec. 4.187).

100 In Leg. 1.31-35 (hermeneutically comparable to Op. 129ff, not to Op. 13-128), the composite Adam in Gen. 2:7 is further denigrat ed as both body and mind are seen as “corruptible” (ὑπηρθός), yet God’s breath is seen as a benevolent rescue—granting ethical “zeal for virtue”—and as a heightening of moral responsibility.
Elsewhere Philo more explicitly describes what about the body is negative, or rather, potentially (and probably) negative.\textsuperscript{101} Here he focuses on the corruptibility and mortality of its nature as physical.

In §135, Philo attends more particularly to the man of 2:7 himself. He no longer mentions the man of 1:27, though he is still functioning within his general hermeneutic of comparison. Philo summarizes Moses: “the structure of the individual man—the object of sense—is a composite one [σύνθετον]: both out of earthly stuff [ἐκ γεώδους οὐσίας] and of divine spirit [πνεύματος θείου].” By focusing on the human “structure” (ἡ κατασκευή) of 2:7a, Philo implies similarity with a vessel (= σκεύος) such as pottery. Combined with this earthy vessel is “divine spirit.”\textsuperscript{102} This may seem more theologically loaded than the actual wording of 2:7b allows—“breath of life” (πνοή ζωῆς)—and elsewhere Philo does show discomfort reading “breath” as “spirit.”\textsuperscript{103} Yet “spirit” was an important part of

\textsuperscript{101}Philos sometimes portrays matter as inherently tied to wickedness (Spec. 1.329; Radice, 2009, 138, 143), and therefore the body is too (Plant. 42-43; cf. Leg. 1.42, 88). The mind’s knowledge is certainly limited simply by being tied to the mortal body (Mut. 219). More properly, however, a “composite” nature grants the potential for wickedness (van den Hoek, 2000, 66; Loader, 2004, 63; cf. Somn. 1.68-69 and Leg. 1.92, 95), the body being a “road to wickedness” (Conf. 179). Vice is not the necessary consequence of bodily existence. Sometimes Philo writes of God’s creation of the body as positive, co-working with the mind to guide contemplation away from the earthly and perishable and into the heavenly and imperishable realm (cf. Det. 84-85: Plant. 16-17). Yet the body is full of contrary desires (Plant. 43), and the mind can and will go either way because of the “impressions” made on it like on wax (Fug. 69-70; Mut. 30-31). Neither bodiless nor mindless beings are morally culpable (Conf. 177), but humans, created in Gen. 2:7 as composite beings, have the propensity for virtue and vice (Conf. 176-78; QG. 1.5; Leg. 2.22-24). Yet as practice shows, vice through uncontrolled passions is the more prominent human way, and this was enabled by the material body shaped out of dust in the beginning.

\textsuperscript{102}A unity between cosmogony and anthropogony can be seen in Philo’s Stoic-like pneumatology: cf. Op. 30, 131.21, 135, and Leg. 1.31ff with Gen. 1:2 (cosmogonic pneuma); see Praem. 144 (pneuma as a biological force); see Fug. 134 (pneuma as anthropogenic). Radice (2009) connects the pneumatology in Stoicism (141), Genesis 1-2 (141-42), and Philo (142 and 142n.28) (cf. Runia, 2001, 316-17).

Philo’s anthropology, and as is proven by so many others (both ancient and modern) it is easy to see it in 2:7b.\textsuperscript{104}

Providing further details regarding the composite nature of this first sense-perceptible human, Philo writes:

For the body [τὸ ἀοματ] has Become by the Designer taking dust [χοῦν] and molding [διαπλάσκωκντος] a human form out of it [μορφὴν ἀνθρωποῦμην εξ αύτοῦ] (Gen. 2:7a). But the soul [τὴν ψυχὴν] was from nothing out of all Becoming things, but rather from the Father and Ruler of all.

One could point out with von Rad that the “soul” (ψυχὴν) in 2:7c refers to what the human, both body (v.7a) and breath (v.7b), “becomes” and not to a particular non-becoming aspect of him.\textsuperscript{105} In other contexts Philo writes about “soul” as being more akin to general “life.” Here Philo may have a slightly polemical edge when reducing “soul” to that aspect of the human which contrasts with “body,” perhaps attempting to keep the human “soul” from becoming too materialistic. It is not “Becoming,” but rather has divine origin.\textsuperscript{106}

Philo takes this opportunity to elaborate on the “soul,” or “that which God inbreathed”:

For that which he inbreathed [ἐνεφύσεως] was nothing other than a divine spirit [πνεῦμα αἴειν], a settlement that migrated here from that blessed and happy nature for the benefit of our race [ἐς τῷ ὑφελείᾳ τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν],\textsuperscript{107} in order that [ἵνα] even if it

\textsuperscript{104} See above p.200n.93. Many scholars merely assert or assume synonymity between “breath” and “spirit” (which is saying too much, though there certainly was overlap): cf. e.g., Dupont, 1960, 172; Sellin, 1986, 92 (cf. 79-90).

\textsuperscript{105} Von Rad, 1956, 75. Cf. Gen. 1:20, 21, 24, 30.

\textsuperscript{106} Stoic anthropology often identified divine-breath with human-soul (Levison, 1988, 70, 210n.38). In Op. 135, Philo seems to join the Stoics by describing “breath of life” as “divine spirit” and by calling this inbreathing the human ψυχὴ (cf. QG. 1.4). Yet his non-materialistic treatment of “soul” in this anthropologically fundamental text curbs pantheistic tendencies. Cf. Plant. 14-27: conceding a Stoic somatology, he then uses 1:27 and 2:7 to prove the soul is not akin to “air” (which Becomes) but to God (“image of God,” breath from God). (See Tobin, 1983, 90). Due to the flexibility of the word “soul,” even within the scriptures, Philo could have a broader theological legitimacy for this reading even if he has missed the particular nuance to “soul” and “living soul” in Gen. 2:7 itself.

\textsuperscript{107} The “divine spirit” is described similarly in Op. 146; Det. 90; Spec. 4.123 (Tobin, 1983, 110).
is mortal [θνητόν] in respect of the visible part [τῆν δρατήν μερίδα], it may in respect of its invisible part [τῆν ἀόρατον] be made immortal [ἀθανατίζηται]. Hence it may with propriety be said that man is the borderland between mortal and immortal nature, partaking of each so far as is needful.  

Philo thus construes the man of Gen. 2:7 in a composite manner: partly positive and partly negative. The good and immortal element is his God-inspired soul, and this was given for the purpose (ἰνα) and telos (ἐπὶ) of human blessedness despite their physical bodies.

Philo sees in this tripartite text a body (v.7a), a divine breath/spirit (v.7b), and a soul (v.7c), and he presents this textual human in mixed light. The mind (“invisible,” like the noetic cosmos) is very positive and receives the divine and creative Spirit, while the body (“visible,” like the sensory cosmos) is (potentially) very negative. The body of 2:7 is not yet wicked, but certainly weak, mortal, corruptible, and primed for downfall. In the very next breath, however, Philo seems to change his tune and laud “this first man”—i.e., this same “earthborn one, the ancestor of our entire race”—as “most

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108 Philo does not specify at this point why this dualism is “proper” and “needful,” but elsewhere he does: 1) to preserve God’s dignity as separate from evil (Conf. 175-79; Fug. 69-70, 71-72; cf. Mut. 30-31), 2) to ensure humanity’s moral accountability (Plant. 45; Conf. 177-78).

109 According to Pearson (1973), many ancient Jews used Gen. 2:7 (particularly 2:7b) as a “proof text” for man’s immortality (20; cf. Philo [17-20], Wisdom of Solomon [20-21]), yet the opposite at Qumran (21-23).

110 See Philo’s cosmogonic use of “invisible” in Op. 12, 29 (Gen.1:2) and in Op. 129 (Gen.2:4-5).

111 Plato uses “visible” for sensory and “invisible” for Idea: Tim. 30a, 31b, 32b, 36e, 52a; cf. Resp. 529b5 and Soph. 246b7 with Alcineus’ Did. 7.4 (noted in Runia, 2001, 165). Cf. Rösel, 1994, 32n.19.

112 Philo’s labels “invisible” and “visible” reflect the general unity in Philo’s theology between cosmos/cosmogony and ἀνθρώπος/anthropogony (see e.g., Op. 82 [151]; Post. 58; Her. 88, 155; Ahr. 71; Migr. 220; Mos. 2.127, 135; Prov. 1.40) and in his reading of Genesis 1-2 in particular (so Radice, 2009, 134; idem, 1989, 122). This cosmos-ἀνθρώπος similarity is generally Graeco-Roman (so Martin, 1992, 3-15, 17; cf. Runia, 2001, 227, 254 [cf. idem, 1986, 555]; van den Hoek, 2000, 65, 67, 67n.12; Steenburg, 1990, 102, 104; Sandmel, 1983, 24; Tobin, 1983, 45, 45n.19, 49, 125; Kim, 1980, 191).

excellent” (ἀριστοτές), as “in truth beautiful and good” (ὁ ἀληθείᾳ καλὸς καὶ ἅγαθός), even having such excellence in “both soul and also body.”

2. Philo’s Positive Reading: “First Man” per se (Op. 136-50)

The ontic beauty presented in Gen. 2:7 (§§136-41) leads Philo to the contemplation of virtue (§§142-50). The “first human” represents the Stoic “world-citizen” (κοσμοπολίτης), a title granted in Op. 3 to the one who follows the Mosaic Law (and “the world,” as the two are in harmony). As the first cosmopolitan he is both great in virtue and therefore representative of the importance of virtue. But this “first man” is wonderful not only in soul but in body as well.

In §§136-38, the beauty of the man’s body becomes Philo’s focus, and it is attributed to God’s ability. In §139, the beauty of his soul is proven by reuniting the language of 1:27 with 2:7. In §§140-44, the unsurpassableness of this man to all subsequent humans (particularly in body but also in cognitive capabilities and rulership) is demonstrated. In §§145-46, Philo deals with the theme that will become our concern later in this chapter: the likeness of subsequent humanity to the first human. In §147, Philo describes how the first man (and humanity in general) was at home in all four elements of the cosmos. Finally, in §§148-50 Philo moves to Gen. 2:19—Adam’s “naming” of the animals—where the theme of “king” and “dominion” from 1:26-28 resurfaces. We will now attend to Philo’s defense of the goodness of Adam’s body (§§136-138), to the beginning of Philo’s defense of the goodness of Adam’s soul (§139), and to how Philo, while commenting on Gen. 2:7 from his positive perspective, yet again assumes the intimate

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114 See Levison, 1988, 70-72.
relationship between the three strands of creation: the beginning of the world, the beginning of humanity, and God’s intentions before the beginning.

In §136, Philo navigates away from his description of the human of 2:7 in comparison with the human of 1:27. He continues his exegesis of 2:7 but now approaches its human *per se*. With this hermeneutical shift, his anthropological description takes a decidedly positive turn in §§136-47. “That” man whose body he had just described in a degrading tone (§§134-35) is “most excellent” in “body” (§136.1-3), is “in truth beautiful and good” (§136.6), and has “good form” (εἴσορφίαν) of body (§136.7).

Three textual features prove the goodness of Adam’s “body,” and here again we see the interwoven character of Philo’s three strands of his creation-hermeneutic. First, when God separated the waters and rose up the ground (Gen. 1:9-10; cf. *Op.* 38-39 and 131-33), the result was pure and flawless clay that was ready to be molded (§136.8-13). (This highlights Philo’s connection between the Beginning of world and of humanity). Second, Philo sees the reason for God’s election of the purest clay: he chose it because (γὰρ) it was to be suitable as

a dwelling-place or sacred temple... for the reasonable soul, which man was to carry as a statue [ἄγιαλματοφόρήσειν], of all statues the most Godlike [ἄγιαλμάτων τὸ θεοειδέστατον]. (§§137.8-10)

This ontic purity of the material Philo sets within the context of God’s forethought. God did not rush his choice of materials, but selected what was “the best” (τὸ βέλτιστον), all the while looking “toward what was best for the structure” (πρὸς τὴν κατασκευὴν μέλιστα) (§137.5-7). (This highlights Philo’s assumption that God’s pre-creative intentions govern both aspects of the Beginning).

115 For Philo, the human’s “reasonable soul” was the thing that most represented God (cf. *Op.* 69), as a statue represents a god or king, and thus Philo likens the human body to a sacred temple that houses the statue(s) of God or the gods.
Philo’s third proof of the beauty of Adam’s body is self-admittedly “incomparably stronger” than the former two (§138.1-2):

The Craftsman was good [ἐγαθός], as well as in all else, in understanding to bring it about that each of the parts of the body [ἑκαστὸν τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν] should have in itself individually [ιδίας καθ’ αὐτό] its due proportions, and should also be harmoniously fitted with accuracy toward the fellowship of the whole. And together with this symmetry [of the parts], God formed over [προσεπλάττε] the body good-flesh [εὐσάρκις], and adorned it with good-color [εὐχροιαν], purposing [βουλόμενος] the first man to be the most beautiful [καλλιστὸν] to behold. (§138.2-10)

The Creator’s “goodness,” which had motivated him to create a “beautiful” world (§21), likewise motivates his creation of a “beautiful” human. God’s skill and “understanding” is unsurpassed in both cosmogony and anthropogony, here granting an aesthetically pleasing appearance to “the first man” and also what is mechanically proper and symmetrical. Due to God’s design, body parts function harmoniously toward the whole body’s “fellowship.” (In 1 Cor. 12:12-30, Paul will show a similar description of God’s creation of the human body; see below). Philo again subordinates ontic perfection under what God was pre-creational “purposing” (βουλόμενος).

In Op. 139, Philo turns to the surpassing nature of Adam’s soul. After having sharply separated the two humans as “vastly different” in §134, Philo now explains that “when God inbreathed [ἐμπνεύσαντα] into the man’s face” (2:7b) it was then that “the human became an image and copy of [God’s own Word].” We should not deduce from this statement that Philo makes 1:27 and 2:7 “the same event.” The noetic realm (now found in Gen. 1:1-2:5) and the sensory realm (now found in 2:6ff) are not identical, though they are compatible. In principle, the sensory realm’s component parts match the

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116 Cf. Virt. 203.
118 Contra Bouteneff, 2008, 30.
noetic realm’s (§§18-19). Thus the two texts (1:27 and 2:7) do correspond.\footnote{Radice, 2009, 134.} When God breathes into the human face the sensory human “becomes” an “image” and “copy” of God’s “word”; this is a mirror-image of how the ideal human of 1:27 is “made” (incorporeally) according to God’s “image” (Word). Since the Adam of 2:7 has “the ruling mind in the soul” he can here be identified as an “image” (ἀπεικόνισμα) of God’s word.\footnote{Cf. Virt. 204-05.} Thus according to Philo’s reading of Gen. 2:7 per se, the granted “soul” as well as the chosen and formed “body” are each of superior quality. This is due to the divine forethought and purpose. The “good” creation of Adam parallels God’s creation of the world and mirrors God’s Before.

3. Summary of Philo’s Reading of Genesis 2:7

Philo presents two readings of Gen. 2:7. In one Adam is cast negatively, in the other positively. Both presentations have equally legitimate exegesis when the text is viewed from different perspectives. Philo’s interpretation of Gen. 2:7 when viewed in itself is very positive, the human being glorious in body and soul (mind), especially due to God’s design. Yet when Philo’s perspective is acted upon by an outside source—by the text of 1:27 and the human therein—his interpretation of 2:7 as viewed in comparison presents a human that is less than the ultimate good. We will now see a similar trend in Paul.

B. Paul’s Reading of Genesis 2:7

Paul has two portrayals of Adam as the first created human. Like Philo, one is positive and one negative. As we saw in our introduction to this entire study, these are often
overshadowed, even completely concealed, in the presence of Paul’s primary depiction of Adam as Sinner. For example, R. Scroggs writes, “Nowhere in [Paul’s] Epistles is Adam the perfect man before his sin. Paul knows only the Adam of sin and death.”¹²¹ This basic view is reflected by many Pauline scholars.

Yet Paul has a more complex reading of the man of Genesis 2 than is represented by quotations such as Scroggs’. Paul quotes Gen. 2:7 only in 1 Cor. 15:45, and we will analyze this “negative” reading of creation in the most depth below. But before this quotation, Paul has already and in the same letter built anthropological principles on God’s creation of the human on three occasions: 11:7-9, 12:12-30, and 15:39-40. Comparing these three texts, especially in light of both Paul’s own reading of the beginning of the world (see chapter 2) and Philo’s more detailed treatment of 2:7 (see above), will help illuminate Paul’s positive reading of the creation of Adam. Since Paul not only displays both his positive and negative readings within the same letter (cf. 11:7-9 and 15:45-47), but even within the same argument (cf. 15:39-40 and 15:45-47), we must specifically attend to his hermeneutic that enables and even prompts this seeming discrepancy. Paul’s construal of the human of 2:7 per se is positive, and like Philo’s it remains such until acted upon by an outside source.

1. Paul’s Positive Reading: a Glorious Adam per se (1 Cor. 11:7-9, 12:12-30, 15:39-40)

It has been well rehearsed in Pauline studies the way in which many of Paul’s contemporary Jewish interpreters attributed “glory” to Adam,¹²² “portraying the ‘beauty’

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¹²¹ Scroggs, 1966, 100 (emphasis added); cf. 59, 91. See also Dunn, 1973, 136 and 136n.28.
¹²² For positive and negative construals of Adam in scripture and ancient Judaism see Scroggs, 1966, 1-58 (esp. 23-29 and 47-49 for Adam as glorious; cf idem, 1972, 299n.44). Cf. Bouteneff, 2008, 26; van Kooten, 2008, 15-26 (specifically on “Adam’s glory” in Qumran); Kim, 1980, 186-93 (in a presentation of
of Adam prior to the fall.” Paul also writes of the “glory” of the beginning of humanity (1 Cor.11:7-9 and 15:39-40) and of the perfection of the human body as knit together according to God’s desire (12:12-30).

a. Adam as God’s Original “Image and Glory” (1 Cor. 11:7-9)

The man of Genesis 2 is Paul’s template according to which he can call the “man” of the Corinthian church “the image and glory” of God. Many scholars notice that Paul here blends the language of Genesis 1 and Genesis 2, but the implications are often not drawn. As we have observed, some even deny “glory” to Adam in Paul’s thinking. Yet his argumentation surrounding v.7b makes little sense if he is not assuming that Adam himself was “the image and glory of God” when created. Since we have already exegeted this passage more fully above, here we will be very brief and pointed.

Paul’s description of man as “God’s glory” is set in comparison with woman as “man’s glory.” Woman is “man’s glory” because of Genesis 2, and specifically because her physical nature was derived “from” man and her vocation was divinely intended “for” the man. The natural deduction is that Paul also derives man as “God’s glory” from Genesis 2, perhaps even from the converse textual facts that man was “not” physically derived from woman (but was more immediately from God [and the earth]) and that man

Wedderburn’s research from Adam and Christ, 66-112); Jaubert, 1971/72, 422 and 422nn.3-5; Hooker, 1964/65, 411. Martin (1983) even wrote “What Paul had learned at the feet of Gamaliel about the ‘glory’ of the first Adam… he transferred to the last Adam” (119).

123 Thielson, 2000, 1288.
was “not” vocationally “for” woman (but was immediately for God).\footnote{Fee (1987) writes that Paul’s addition of “God’s glory” to the “man” who is “God’s image” is “Paul’s own reflection on the creation of man” (515). Man as “God’s glory” may also be fuelled by an understanding of man’s “dominion” in Gen. 1:26,28 as God’s “crowning him with glory and honor” from Ps. 8:6-9. Dunn (1998A) posits that Ps. 8:4-6 is “the key text for Adam christology” (232; cf. idem, 1980, 108ff). Many ancients blended Gen. 1:26-28 with Ps. 8:6-9: cf. Philo’s Op. 84-85 (Borgen, 1995, 369-89; Runia, 2001, 256); 4Q418 81.1-3 (Stuckenbruck, 2002, 248); Sib. Or. 8.442-45 (Steenburg, 1990, 97); 2 Enoch 31.3. Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotian replaced κατακυριεύσασε in Gen. 1:28 with ὑποσάξατε (probably from Ps. 8:7) (Göttingen, “Genesis,” 81; Runia, 2001, 256). Concerning the modern blending of Ps. 8:6-9 with Gen. 1:26-28: Kraus, 1993, 180, 183-84; cf. van Kooten, 2008, 6; Wright, 2003, 313; Adams, 2000, 144; Watson, 1997, 294-98; Mathews, 1996, 170-72; Bird, 1995, 8-9, 12; Minear, 1994, 79-80; Childs, 1992, 112-13; Wenham, 1987, 30; Westermann, 1987, 11; Harris, 1980, 2121a; Padgett, 1983, 81; Kim, 1983, 159-60; Jaubert, 1971/72, 422n.3; vonRad, 1956, 56. Paul himself alludes to Ps. 8:7b in an Adamic context in 1 Cor. 15:21-22, 27 (Morissette, 1972A, 327n.10; Lambrecht, 1982, 506-12, 514, 524n.68), thus making it a more concrete possibility that his understanding of Gen. 1:26-28 had actually been affected by the latter text. In this particular context (1 Cor. 11:7-9), Paul primarily connects “glory” to Genesis 2, even if he has been affected by Ps. 8.} Regardless of the exact textual stimulus for describing man as “God’s glory,” Paul’s combination of this with the clear reference to Gen. 1:27 (“image of God”) confirms that it is indeed the actual protological “man” as described by the texts of Genesis 1-2 whom Paul regards as “the image and glory of God.” The implication for Paul’s reading of the beginning of humanity according to Genesis 1-2 is that the “man” out of whom and for whom the woman was created—i.e., Adam—was the original “image and glory of God.”\footnote{Barrett (1962) wrote that Adam himself “is never said by Paul to bear the image of God” (88; cf. Bouteneff, 2008, 45, 47). Paul virtually did in 1 Cor. 11:7-9, but not by name. Why not? Genesis 2 itself twice dropped the otherwise regular name “Adam” and used “[the] man” (vv.18, 24), both when speaking of a general principle of man as man (as template for all subsequent men). Paul similarly applies the anthropogony here: it is Adam as “man” that is particularly important, but it is nonetheless importantly Adam in vv.8-9.} Paul’s logic makes little sense if he, like so many who explain his thoughts, would have claimed to know only the Adam of sin and death and always as fallen man.

b. Adam’s “Flesh” and Earthly “Body” as having “Glory” (1 Cor. 15:39-40)

Within the immediate context of his quotation of Gen. 2:7 (1 Cor. 15:45), Paul mentions the “flesh” of “humans” as well as of animals, birds, and fish (v.39). This is a
cosmological statement about the present observable world in all of its multiplicity. But these descriptions of bodily flesh are built upon God’s creative activity of “giving,” and this according to God’s past cosmogonic “desire” (v.38, see chapter 2). Even though it is primarily Genesis 1 on which Paul is grounding his cosmology in vv.36-41, and so one might properly consider Paul’s reference to “humans” in v.39 as a reference to Gen. 1:27, Paul considers 1:27 and 2:7 as two mutually interpretive references to the creation of the one first-man (cf. 1 Cor. 11:7-9, above). This implies that for Paul the “flesh” of “humans” is as it is because of Gen. 2:7 as well as 1:27. Indeed, 2:7 may be even have been more informative for Paul’s present expression at this point simply because it explicitly refers to God’s crafting of the human’s body (2:7a), with “flesh” mentioned in 2:21, 23. Human flesh in 15:39 cannot be separated from Paul’s understanding that it was precisely the first man, Adam, to whom this was “given” by God according to the divine “desire.”

Paul then refers to this “flesh” of “humans” (as well as animals, birds, and fish) under the heading of “bodies on earth” (v.40a), and to such “bodies” he attributes “glory” (v.40b). Paul does not say that the “bodies in heaven” have glory while the “bodies on earth” do not. “Glory” is the shared identity of all “bodies” in heaven and earth. Paul sees “glory” in the physical forms of beasts, birds, and fish as well as in the human form. Since Paul refers to “humans” in plurality, “glory” encompasses all humans that come

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129 Vos, 1930, 180.
131 Gundry-Volf (1994) writes, “Perhaps modern biblical scholarship, by disjoining Gen. 1.1-2.4a and 2.4-3.24 into separately authored accounts with distinct language, dynamics and intentions, has blocked the way to the ancients’ view of creation and fall as interwoven, mutually interpreting biblical narratives” (110; thus making comments such as Collins, 1999, 570n.45 unhelpful).
133 Lorenzen (2008) discusses how Paul may and may not be using “glory,” e.g., as light, or honor, or beauty, or brilliance (157n.54).
134 So Lorenzen, 2008, 155; Asher, 2000, 105n.38.
“out of” Adam and “through” Eve (see 1 Cor. 11:12, where “glory” is again a dominant theme). All are fellow glory-bearers with the “heavenly bodies” by virtue of God’s creative “desire.” The implication of vv.39-40: for Paul, this divine gift of “glory” to the human body and flesh was initiated at God’s creation of Adam.

One final particular observation and implication should be made. When Paul attributes “glory” to the “earthly bodies” (v.40b), he refers to “bodies” and “fleshes” as they were created but not when they were created. That is, Paul is writing about the present and observable cosmos: i.e., God presently “gives” bodies, there presently “are” bodies, they presently “differ” in glory. Paul considers humans (et al.) to presently have some sort of “glory” even within the present “fallen” context of death-by-sin.135 This “glory” describes their ontic bodily and fleshly structure and substance as creations, this was set in place by God in Gen. 2:7 “just as he desired,” and their quality as “creations” (and therefore as “glorious”) is not annulled by sin.

Paul again builds present ontological (even anthropological) principles on a positive appraisal of the beginning of humanity in Adam. This is even set within the broader context of the glory of the whole world’s beginning and according to God’s pre-creational desire—yet again, as if three strands of one interwoven cord. As we will now see, between the “glories” of 1 Cor. 11:7 and 15:39-40 Paul discusses God’s creative arrangement of the human body (12:12-30). He does not mention “glory,” but he does highlight the perfection with which God situated and composed the body and, again, this is “just as he desired.”

135 We cannot forget that underlying the entire discussion in 1 Corinthians 15 is the reality of “death” (“resurrection of corpses”) and that the sting of this enemy is sin (so Lorenzen [2008] offers 15:17 and 56 when making the same point [148n.22], and I will add 15:3). This observation does not undercut our discussion of Paul’s use of pre-sin creation. Even as the cosmos groans under its sin-infested tenants, it as well as the tenants still are God’s creation and as such are crafted gloriously.
c. God’s “Desired” Construction of the Original Human Body, the World, and the Church: Comparing 1 Cor. 11:7-12 and 15:37-42 with 12:12-30

In 12:1-30, Paul argues that “just as” within the human body’s structure there exist differences and yet also interdependence, “also in the same manner” is it within the redeemed “body of Christ,” i.e., “the church.” This should already evoke 1 Cor. 11:7-12. In 12:12, Paul initiates both principles with a chiastic statement:

The body is one [τὸ σῶμα ἐν ἑστὶν],
and it has many members [μέλη πολλά],
and though all the members [πᾶντα τὰ μέλη] of the body are many [πολλά],
it is one body [ἐν ἑστὶν σῶμα].

In vv.14-20, Paul highlights the necessary differences among the body parts based on the fact that “God set/arranged the members [ὁ θεὸς ἐθέτο τὰ μέλη], each one of them in the body [ἐν ἑκάστῳ αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι], just as he desired [καθὼς ἠθέλησεν]” (v.18). In vv.21-26, he then emphasizes the interdependence of body-parts based on the fact that “God blended/mixed together [ὁ θεὸς συνεκέρασεν] the body, having given [δόως]...

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136 Cf. Rom. 12:3-8. Martin (1992) demonstrates how common the body-society comparison was not only in Paul’s Graeco-Roman context but “as far back as 900 B.C.E.” and “through the Middle Ages” and “into modern political theory,” displayed geographically “from India, Iran, and Russia, as well as from the ancient Mediterranean” (268n.13; see 87-96). By claiming that in 1 Cor. 12:12-30 we can discern Paul’s reading of Gen. 2:7, I am not denying Martin’s common-sense/cultural connections. As Philo demonstrates, a use of philosophical ideas (formal and popular) culled from various non-scripture sources does not diminish the influence of scripture—he is writing a commentary specifically on scripture! If Paul were asked when the body was constructed in the fashion he is describing, and from where he gets his particularly theocentric construal of it, would he not say Gen. 2:7? The affirmative is confirmed by the language he uses for the various creative acts of God which he often explicitly connects to the textual details of Genesis’ beginning (e.g., in 1 Cor. 11 and 15).

137 For the comparison between the “interdependence” of 1 Cor. 11:11-12 and that of 12:21 (as well as of 7:3-4) see Watson, 2000B, 523-24 (cf. Peerbolte, 2000, 80). Thiselton (2000) draws a connection between 1 Cor. 11 and 12-14 and Paul’s dual argumentation for both “unity and diversity” (803), the same recognition we will demonstrate in slightly different fashion.
excessive honor to the [part] lacking” (v.24). In vv.27-30, Paul returns to the first principle of differences, this time applying it to the new “body,” basing its structure on the fact that “God set/arranged [ἐθετὸ ὁ θεὸς] in the church” the various gifted-roles (v.28). Paul has already stressed that this arrangement of diverse gifts was due to the Spirit’s “distributing” (διαίρων) of them within the church “to each his own” (ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ), “just as he purposes” (καθὼς βούλεται) (12:11).

For Paul, individual “members” or parts of the created individual body (and of the redeemed body) must function individually as they are divinely intended while also as a unit toward the harmony of the whole. This construal of the created human body is strikingly similar to what Philo had written as a direct commentary on God’s activity in Gen. 2:7a: in God’s knowledge he caused “each of the parts of the body [ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοῦ σῶματος μερῶν] to have in itself individually [ἰδίᾳ καθ’ αὐτό] its due proportions” as well as “to also be harmoniously fitted with accuracy toward the fellowship of the whole” (Op. 138.2-10). Philo even subsumed this dual-sided ontic design of Adam’s body under God’s “purpose” (βουλόμενος). Paul not only draws express attention to the same two principles, but he also (repeatedly) submits this whole anthropic design to God’s “desire” (ἡθελησεν) and “purpose” (βουλεταὶ). Paul’s statements in 1 Cor. 12:12-30 about God’s creation of the human body could be placed into a contemporary and formal commentary on Genesis, specifically at Gen. 2:7a, and no reader could tell the difference.

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138 In vv.22-26 his language is so evocative of socio-ecclesial issues on which he has already confronted the Corinthians—e.g., cf. 12:25 with 1:10—that he may as well be explicitly applying this interdependence to the “body of Christ” (so Martin, 1992, 94-96), but it is the body-as-created to which he directly refers.
139 Cf. Philo’s “purposing” (βουλόμενος) in his comments on Gen. 2:7a (Op. 138, above and below).
140 So Martin, 1992, 94. Penner and Vander Stichele (2005) concede a similar point with regard to Paul’s argument in 1 Cor. 11:11-12, that “the ‘body’ as a whole stands to gain from proper ‘bodily’ comportment all around, both sexes included” (231).
The deduction that Gen. 2:7a itself has impacted Paul’s description of the creation of the human body is strengthened when we compare Paul’s statement in, e.g., 1 Cor. 12:18 with his portrayal of the beginning of the world in 15:38.\textsuperscript{141}

But God arranged [ὁ θεὸς ἔθετο] the members, each [ἐκαστὸν] one of them in the body, just as he desired [καθὼς ἡθέλησεν]” (12:18)

But God gives [ὁ θεὸς δίδωσιν] to it a body just as he desired [καθὼς ἡθέλησεν], and to each [ἐκαστῷ] of the seeds its own body” (15:38).

For the creation of the human body in 12:18, Paul uses two aorists, “arranged… desired,” while for the whole cosmos (most directly a seed) in 15:38 he uses a present and an aorist, “gives… desired.” The significance of Paul’s timing in 15:38-41 we have seen: present cosmology accords with God’s past (cosmogonic) desire. This is similar to 12:12 where Paul uses the present tense (“is,” “has,” “being”) to describe present anthropology.

In 12:18, however, Paul has in mind not only God’s past “desire” according to which present anthropology exists, but actually God’s past structuring (“he arranged,” ἔθετο) of the human body according to this past intent (“just as he desired,” ἡθέλησεν). The actual events of God’s original creation, i.e., Gen. 2:7 (and 2:21-22), seem closer to Paul’s mind than we typically think.

We will now set out in the chart on the following page some of the most applicable motifs found in 1 Cor. 15:37-42, 12:12-30, and 11:7-12. Paul’s three strands of his creation-hermeneutic are clearly present:

Two conclusions regarding 1 Cor. 11:7-9, 12:12-30, and 15:37-41 should be clear:

Paul’s three strands of creation are thoroughly interwoven, and the creation of Adam himself in Gen. 2:7 is very positive, even glorious. Paul’s positive portrayals of 2:7 are functionally the mirror-image of his portrayal of God’s causative “giving” and pre-creative “desire” enacted in the beginning of the whole world (1 Cor. 15:38-41). When thinking about the creation of Adam per se, Paul sees Adam’s body as knit together by God with all parts functioning appropriately and in harmony according to God’s desires. Adam’s body perfectly accorded with God’s purpose. Adam was glorious, even in his flesh. Yet in 1 Cor. 15:45-47 Paul refers again to the creation of Adam, overtly
interpreting Gen. 2:7, but this time to highlight something negative about him and those who bear his image.

2. Paul’s Negative Reading: The Inglorious Adam in Comparison (1 Cor. 15:44b-47)

Paul suddenly shifts from the Beginning to the End: “In this manner is the resurrection of corpses” (1 Cor. 15:42a). In vv.42b-44, Paul initiates a comparison between resurrection existence—“raised” in “incorruptibility” (ἀφθαρσία), “glory” (δόξα), and “power” (δύναμις)—and pre-resurrection existence—“sown” in “corruptibility” (ψωφρα), “dishonor” (ἀτιμία), “weakness” (ἀσθένεια). Does Paul’s view of Adam, after all, undercut the anthropology in Psalm 8? There, by virtue of God’s creation, “glory” was not merely the goal for humanity but humanity actually and presently exists as “crowned with glory and honor [δόξῃ καὶ τιμῇ]” (Ps. 8:6)?

Now casting in “dishonor” what he himself had just attributed with “glory,” and now reserving “glory” instead for what is “raised,” Paul would seem to be suddenly devaluing creation.

Even if one interprets vv.42b-43 as sinful existence rather than created existence, the tension in Paul remains felt when he describes what is “sown” as not only corruptible, dishonorable, and weak, but also as a “soulish body” (σῶμα ψυχικόν) (v.44a). This last

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142 Dunn (1980) talks about Ps. 8:6 in terms of “God’s purpose and intention for adam/man,” “God’s plan for man,” what was “intended for man/Adam in the beginning” (109-10), but these are not strong enough statements. In Ps. 8:6 “man” actually was existing as “crowned with glory and honor,” the way Paul discusses humanity in 1 Cor. 15:39-40 (cf. 11:7b).

143 It is notoriously difficult to tell whether corruptible-dishonorable-weak describes the body-as-created or the body-in-sin. The interpretive difficulty is felt when “sowing” in vv.42b-43 is construed in such diverse ways by scholars: burial (de Boer, 1988, 131; Talbert, 2002, 126; Kistemaker, 1993, 567; Harrisville, 1987, 274; Lockwood, 2000, 588; criticized by Asher, 2001, 110 and Garland, 2003, 732), procreation (Moffatt, 1938, 259), existence in general (Conzelmann, 1975, ad loc.; Lindemann, 1997, 162; criticized by Asher, 2001, 102, 107-11 and Garland, 2003, 733), a non-creational combination of these (Fee, 1987, 784 [cf. 784n.39]; Minear, 1994, 70-73), or creation itself (Beker, 1980, 222; Asher, 2001, 101-02). Concerning our limited argument: Paul’s perspective has changed from creation per se (vv.37-41) to a comparison between a resurrection-state (vv.42-43) and a pre-resurrection state which seamlessly transitions into and therefore includes (to say the least) creation in vv.44-47.
description Paul explicitly derives from God’s creation of Adam in Gen. 2:7 as a “living soul” (ψυχήν ζῶσαν) (v.45a). By directly contrasting this Adamic-body-as-created with the “Spiritual body” (σώμα πνευματικόν, v.44b),\textsuperscript{144} derived most likely from his own reception of this raised Jesus’ “life-making Spirit” (πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν) (v.45b),\textsuperscript{145} Paul is now fully entrenched in the \textit{comparison} between Gen.2:7-bodies and resurrected-bodies. Paul’s highly positive reading of Adam in Gen. 2:7 has been recast negatively due to his comparison of it with an outside source, with another human.\textsuperscript{146}

Within this perspective of comparison (vv.44-47), Paul underscores two particular features of Adam’s own bodily nature due to God’s formation of him in Gen. 2:7. Paul first draws attention to the fact that this first Adam “became” a “soul” (ψυχήν) (v.45a; Gen. 2:7c).\textsuperscript{147} Rather than contrasting “body” and “soul” (as Philo had done in \textit{Op.} 138),\textsuperscript{148} Paul more closely reflects the text’s body + breath = “soul” by merely calling Adam’s “body” itself “soulish.” Paul here shows an interest in describing the whole

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{144} Paul uses \textit{pneumatikon} to describe something like the “presence, power, and transforming activity of the Holy Spirit” (so Thiselton, 2006A, 283 [\textit{idem}, 2006B, 242-43; \textit{idem}, 2000, 1276-77]; cf. Wright, 2003, 350, 352; Schreiner, 2001, 458; Dunn, 1998B; Scruggs, 1966, 66-68 [though I find Scruggs’ “non-corporeal” nature of the resurrected body unpersuasive]; Moffatt, 1938, 259-60; Robertson and Plummer, 1911, 372) rather than to describe some anthropological substance which everyone has but the resurrected beings have more of or have more purely or perfectly (so e.g., Martin, 1992, 126; van Kooten, 2008, 298-312). Capitalizing “Spiritual” even as we capitalize “Spirit” helps avoid confusion (cf. Vos, 1930, 166-67).
\item \textsuperscript{146} Upon “closer examination,” Lorenzen (2008) writes, “Paul does not negatively judge the creation in itself, but only devalues creation in comparison with the eschatological”; she points to the “glory” of the “earthly body” in “v.39” to demonstrate this (148n.22; translation mine).
\item \textsuperscript{147} On Paul’s “additions” to Gen. 2:7c (i.e., “first” and “Adam”) cf. Göttingen, 84; Wevers, 1993, 25n.20; Thiselton, 2000, 1281; Stanley, 1992, 208-09.
\item \textsuperscript{148} Paul can use “soul” in a more anthropologically partite manner (e.g., 1 Th. 5:23), but that should not be imported into 15:44-49 (just as Philo’s broader use of “soul” as “living being” was not to be imported into his partite use of “soul” in \textit{Op.} 138, see above p.204).
\end{itemize}
person, and particularly the person’s “body,” as existing according to the “becoming" of Adam in Gen. 2:7. “Soulish body” is functionally equivalent to “the Adamic body,” or (more accurately) “the created-Adamic-body.”

But Paul thinks that more of Gen. 2:7 can help answer “in what type of body the resurrected people will come.” After temporally separating the soulish body (which was first) from the Spiritual body (which followed), rather than the other way around (v.46), Paul adds that “the first man was out of the earth [ἐκ γῆς], a dusty being [χοικός]” (v.47a). This clearly reiterates Gen. 2:7a.149 Like the LXX, Paul relates the (first) human to the “earth” with a preposition, “out of,” but to the “dust” without a preposition. By placing the two accusative nouns—“the human” and “dust”—in such an unspecified relationship, the text practically identifies the two with each other.150 The “human” virtually is “dust from the earth.” Paul confirms this very identity by using the substantival adjective “dusty” (χοικός; cf. ὁ χοικός in vv.48, 49): “the human” merely is the substance: “a dust-being” (χοικός).

Paul has drawn an anthropology of the created person from Gen. 2:7a and 2:7c, clearly emphasizing the “body” since he is answering questions concerning the “type of bodies” in which corpses will return. But what about the “breath of life”? Does Paul not exegete Gen. 2:7b? Quite differently than Philo, Paul’s only reference to anything like a “spirit” or “breath” in this treatment of the text is to what makes the first Adam different from the last.151 C.K. Barrett is right to write that Jesus is “what his predecessor was not—namely,

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150 “Dust” in LXX is probably an “accusative of material” (Wevers, 1993, 24).
151 It is unnecessary to deduce that because Paul had Gen. 2:7a and 2:7c in mind he “thus” had 2:7b in mind (contra Sterling, 1995, 359).
The first Adam became a “soul that lives” (ψυχήν ζῶσαν) while the last Adam became the “Spirit that life-makes” (πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν) (v.45b). As can be seen even from these two descriptions, Paul deliberately shapes his depiction of Christ’s being-as-resurrected around Adam’s being-as-created. He even makes Christ’s ἐσχατο-logical “becoming” grammatically dependent on Adam’s πρωτο-logical “becoming”:

Gen. 2:7c  ἐγένετο ὁ ἀνθρωπός εἰς ψυχήν ζῶσαν
1 Cor. 15:45a2  ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἀνθρωπός ἸΑΔήμ εἰς ψυχήν ζῶσαν
1 Cor. 15:45b  ὁ ἐσχατος ἸΑΔήμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν

The reference to the “Spirit that life-makes” (πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν), though certainly reminiscent of God’s “breath of life” in 2:7b (πνοήν ζωῆς) (and comparable with it in a limited way), Paul has deliberately expressed not as an actual reference to Gen. 2:7b, but as a contrastive comparison with what the first Adam “became” in 2:7c. That is, while first-Adam and last-Adam both “became” something which has to do with “life,” at both points (the something and the life) the Adams are different. Instead of being “soul”

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152 Barrett, 1962, 74.
153 Many connect Paul’s “life-giving Spirit” with the “breath of life” in Gen. 2:7b: Hultgren, 2003, 361; Fee, 1987, 789-90; Sellin, 1986, 92 (cf. 79-90); Lambrecht, 1982, 525n.74; Wilckens, 1979, 531; Usami, 1976, 486; Pearson, 1972, 24 (cf. 16-17); Morissette, 1972B, 223; Dupont, 1960, 172; Moffatt, 1938, 264. Mixed with this somewhat legitimate observation, however, is the false deduction that Paul saw Jesus’ “becoming” within or at least announced within Gen. 2:7. Paul’s use of πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν very well could have a nod toward the notion that the Spirit was active within the cosmogony (Gen. 1:2) and the anthropogony (2:7b), but this is no more than an acknowledgment that it is the same Spirit who is active in resurrection as was active in the first creation. (As such this is different from [though not in tension with] 1 Cor. 8:6 [contra Moffatt, 1938, 264]—in 8:6 Christ was creative, in 15:45b the Spirit, with whom Christ would “become” associated at his resurrection, was himself creative [so Sellin, 1986, 79n.9]). The construal of Fee (2006) is noteworthy: “Even though the content of Paul’s second line [sc. v.45b] is neither present nor inferred in the Genesis text, it nonetheless reflects the language of the prior clause in the Septuagint, ‘and [God] breathed into his face the breath of life [πνοήν ζωῆς]’. Now in speaking about Christ, Paul makes a play on this language. The one who will ‘breathe’ new life into these mortal bodies—with life-giving πνεῦμα (as in Ezek 37:14)—and thus make them immortal is none other than the risen Christ himself” (118). This is attractive and may indeed capture a clever nuance in Paul’s expression, but we should keep in mind that this is hardly Paul’s point in v.45. Paul intends to describe the parallel/contrast between Adam’s bodily creation and Christ’s bodily resurrection: the seed body (created in Adam, having to do with being a living soul) and the coming plant body (resurrected in Christ, having to do with the eschatological Spirit). In v.45b Paul overtly and intentionally expresses the proleptic eschatological “becoming” and “body” in (contrastive) parallel to Gen. 2:7c. “Spirit that life-makes” is most directly shaped according to “soul that lives,” though the Spirit whom the raised Jesus “becomes” may very well have been active in both events.
like first-Adam, last-Adam is “Spirit.” Instead of being “living” like first-Adam, last-Adam is “life-making.”

The implication for Paul’s reading of Gen. 2:7 can be put conversely: the Adamic body-as-created was not created with the “Spiritual” (nor “heavenly”) quality which Paul associates only with the resurrection/“becoming” of the last Adam.\(^{154}\) Though Paul considers the first Adam to have been created perfectly (i.e., flawlessly), Paul does not consider Adam to have been the perfect (i.e., full) human, even at his creation.\(^{155}\) To use Paul’s own metaphor: as a seed is what it is intended to be for the time of its planting while yet also lacking the qualities of the future plant, so also due to his (God-intended) creation Adam yet also lacked what God pre-intended for the eschatological age of Jesus’ resurrection and Spirit.

Because Paul crafts his statements about the eschatologically resurrected human(ity) around the textual language and conceptuality of the protologically created human(ity),

\(^{154}\) Paul’s reference to Christ as “life-making Spirit” in v.45 is close to his other references to the divine Spirit (cf. “Spirit of God” in Rom. 8:9 and 2 Cor. 3:3 with “Spirit of Christ” in Rom. 8:9 and Phil. 1:19) which Christians “received” not at creation but in redemption (Gal. 3:2, 14; cf. 1 Cor. 2:12-14; 3:16; 6:11, 19-20; 12:3, 13). This “Spirit” is not to be confused with the anthropological “spirit” of Stoic and Aristotelian psychology (which Runia describes [2001, 326-37]; cf. Usami, 1976, 486). Paul’s reference to the resurrected Christ who “became” the Spirit should not be reduced to a reference to Christ “possessing” the “restoration of man’s pneuma” with which Adam had been created (contra van Kooten, 2008, 270; cf. 269-70, 279). A by-product of the eschatological gift of the divine Spirit may be the restoration of the human “spirit” to a wholeness that had been marred, but that would be a deduction that is not in Paul’s purview in 1 Cor. 15:45-49. For Paul, Adam may have been created with a human spirit, and he most likely was (see 1 Th. 5:23), but he was not created with the divine Spirit of the eschaton. (Sterling’s deduction of what the Corinthians must have believed [1995, 372] looks surprisingly similar to what van Kooten thinks Paul is arguing).

\(^{155}\) The language of “perfection” comes from Scroggs, 1966, 100 and Dunn, 1973, 136n.28. Neither recognize that it should be understood in two different ways (as above). Both therefore deny too much by saying that only Christ was the “perfect” realization of God’s purpose. For Paul, Adam was the true or faultless realization of God’s “purpose” for the beginning while he was not the full realization of God’s “purpose” for the end. Relatedly, Scroggs argues, “The question whether the new creation is ‘simply’ a return to the conditions of the original creation, or whether it indicates something superior, probably would not have occurred to Paul” (62). Scroggs falsely understands that if Paul had argued that the End is better than the Beginning (which I argue that he does) this would be equivalent to claiming that “God’s intention at creation was inferior” (62), and this is unacceptable. Indeed, Paul would not have accepted such an interpretation either—the seed is precisely what God “desired” it to be for its particular role—but he still saw the plant as better.
similarities between original and new emerge. Both bodies “became” due to two acts of the same God. Both acts bring life from non-life, whether from lifeless dust or lifeless corpses. Both “becomings” are “bodily” in nature. Both bodies are associated with an “Adam” at their respective beginnings. Yet despite these many similarities which arise from Paul’s present use of the beginning of humanity to explain its fulfilment in the new Adam, the dissimilarities are Paul’s main point. Within Paul’s hermeneutic of comparison, Paul sees in Gen. 2:7 God’s creation of Adam’s “soulish body” and the otherwise “glorious” bodily frame being merely “dusty” and (intentionally) without the “Spiritual” or “heavenly” glory. The latter was reserved for the last Adam and his family that would bear his image.

3. Summary of Paul’s Reading of Genesis 2:7, in Comparison with Philo’s Reading

It is tempting to see a difference between the positive atmosphere of Gen. 2:7 within Genesis 1-2 and yet the negative construal of it by Paul in 1 Cor. 15:44-47, and thereby distance Paul from the text. It is true that Genesis 1-2 generally and 2:7 specifically present themselves as God’s original design for world and humanity. Paul agrees and represents this in 1 Cor. 11:7-12, 12:12-30, and 15:39-40 concerning the beginning of humanity and in 15:38-41 concerning the beginning of the world. Yet the creation of Adam within Genesis 2 does not necessarily claim to be the end-all of God’s creative design for humans. The text even presents a possibility of “eternal life” which is not yet

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156 Paul will do this again with Jesus in 2 Cor. 4:4 (see above pp.189-96). Cf. 2 Cor. 4:6 for his same hermeneutical practice regarding the protological light and the eschatological gospel (see pp.105-15).
158 E.g., Schmid (1959) wrote that “through the contrast with πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν the biblical phrase “ψυχή ζώον receives in Paul the meaning of the inferior, limited, transient, which in the Genesis corpus it does not have” (171; translation mine).
possessed by Adam, even being extrinsic to his created nature. Gen. 2:7 is the beginning. It is a seed, exactly as God intended it for a beginning. And how is one to interpret the seed of the Beginning after having the plant of the End appear to him? Such a comparison between seed and plant is the precise setting for understanding Paul’s “devaluing” of the creation of Adam.159

Regarding the exegesis of Gen. 2:7, Paul and Philo have many similarities. Both view Adam positively when viewing 2:7 per se. Both view Adam negatively when in comparison with another human who exceeds him. For both readers the better human is associated with “immortality” and “incorruptibility,” while Adam is associated with “mortality” and “corruptibility.” An important difference begins to emerge when we recognize that Philo’s human of comparison is the earlier textual one of Gen. 1:27 while Paul’s is the later historical one of the resurrection and Spirit. In incorporeal and ideal perfection Philo’s surpassing human ontologically overshadows the composite form of Gen. 2:7. In bodiless incorruptibility and immortality he transcends both, never tasting either. Paul’s surpassing human was ideal in perfection while corporeal. He also ontologically overshadows the dusty form of Gen. 2:7, but this was because prior to his bodily incorruptibility and immortality he had already taken the sting of death “for our sins” and had come out the other side in “victory.” Philo portrays the “divine spirit” as the intrinsic creational gift of mind that enabled Adam to accord with the surpassing human as images of God’s Word. The “Spirit” of Paul’s second human is the extrinsic eschatological gift by whom this last Adam will make alive those who bear his, rather than the first Adam’s, “image.” This eschatological gift fulfills the third text of humanity’s Beginning, Gen. 5:3.

3. The Image of Adam: Genesis 5:3

Gen. 5:1-3 evokes both the broader context of the beginning of the world and especially the more narrow beginning of humanity in both 1:26-28 and 2:7.160 Yet it also expands the understanding of humanity within this context.161 “When Adam had lived 230 years, he bore a child according to his appearance [κατὰ τὴν ἴδεαν αὐτοῦ] and according to his image [κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ]” (Gen. 5:3). This statement is not about the first human, nor even about the first progeny, but it develops the “image” motif in a further creational direction. It portrays the propagation of the newly initiated human existence as something that is, for better or worse, like Adam.

It is possible to imply from Gen. 5:1-3 a transfer of “God’s image” from “Adam” (v.1) to his descendants (v.3).162 As becomes clear from Gen. 9:6, the creation of the human “in God’s image” is presently applicable to the subjects of a now violent (un-paradisiacal) world,163 and this applicability is most likely available due to Gen. 5:3.164

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160 Concerning the evocation of the cosmogonic Gen. 1-2:3.4 in 5:1-3, cf. 5:1b with 2:4c (Wallace, 1990, 21). Concerning the evocation of the anthropogonic 1:26-28 and 2:7 in 5:1-3, cf. 5:1a with 2:4a, “image of God” in 1:26-27ab and 5:1c, “male and female” in 1:27c and 5:2a, “blessed” in 1:28 and 5:2b, and “Adam” in Genesis 2 and 5:1b (Noort, 2000, 8). Wallace sees a source-critical unification of “J and P material” in Gen. 5:1b-2, 3ab-b (20-24; contra the source-critical bifurcation of Gen. 1 and 5 from 2-4 in e.g., Noort, 2000, 7-8; Minear, 1994, 68-69). What concerns us is less the authorship of these various pieces of Genesis 1-5 and more the mere notion that they do appear to be (intentionally) connected to each other (so Wallace). How much more may this appear the case for Paul or Philo, who assume the single authorship of Moses for Genesis 1-5? On the theological implications of seeing Gen. 5:1-3 as reflecting Gen. 1 and Gen. 2-4 see Wallace, 1990, 21 (cf. 24).

161 Von Rad (1956) considers Gen. 5:1-3 as a “theological expan[sion]” of 1:26-28 (69); cf. Noort, 2000, 8. Gen. 5:3 retains the double-κατὰ method of describing humanity from 1:26, replacing “according to likeness” (καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν) with “according to appearance” (κατὰ τὴν ἴδεαν) but retaining “according to [the] image” (κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα). Gen. 5:3 also shifts these features from “the human” to “Adam,” i.e., the man of Gen. 2:7ff.


163 So Hoekema, 1986, 17 (cf. Wallace, 1990, 22). Hoekema criticizes scholars such as Schilder (1947) and Berkouwer (1962) for forfeiting the logic of Gen. 9:6 by saying that man has totally lost God’s image but may retrieve it again if redeemed (17-18).

164 Von Rad (1954) writes that “the reader’s interest in this testimony [sc. to “the image of God” in 1:27] is assured only by this supplement [sc. in Gen. 5:3], for without this addition the reference to a primeval man in God’s image would be a meaningless mythologumenon” (69). In The Life of Adam and Eve (Latin version), Eve calls Seth “the image of God” (Vita 37.3; cf. Apocalypse 10.3, 12.1-2), presumably based on
Gen. 5:3 can also imply the mere fact of qualitative (even physical) resemblance between Adam and his offspring. They are born according to his appearance and image. Gen. 5:3 seems to have affected some early religious writings from Jewish, Christian, and Gnostic sources.

Two questions naturally arise. Since it is Seth who bears Adam’s “appearance” and “image,” does this imply that Cain (and Abel) did not? In a related query, is it good or bad to be “according to” Adam’s “image”? Philo raises the first question. Both Philo and Paul assume answers to the second question. Regarding the second, Gen. 5:3 provides interpretive-fodder in two directions. Looking backwards, the text connects “Adam” (whose “image” is passed along) to the pre-sin texts of Genesis 1-2, and particularly to the “image of God” that Adam bore (vv.1-2). This creates a positive setting for understanding Adam’s image in v.3. But looking forward, a prominent resemblance between Adam himself in 5:3-5 and his subsequent progeny was the morbid conclusion “and he died” (5:5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 27, 31; cf. 9:29; 11:11, 13a, 13b, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 28, 32). As is clear from the parenthetical references, “death” in the genealogies

the implicit logic of Gen. 5:1-3 (van Kooten, ibid., 30-31; though van Kooten does not mention Gen. 5:3; cf. Leivison, 1988, 185).

165 McCasland, 1950, 89.

166 In Pseudo-Philo’s Biblical Antiquities, Hannah says, “I have prayed before God that I do not… die without having my own image” (50:7) (see van Kooten, 2008, 10, who calls this “reminiscent of Gen 5.3”). In 1 Enoch 106, an expectation underlies Lamech’s response to Noah’s appearance that a son should be “the form” (τῶν) and “image” (εἰκὼν) of his father, being “like” (ὁμοίως) humans (106.5-6, 10-12). There the principle (and “image”-language) of Gen. 5:3 functions as a kind of litmus test of fatherhood (van Kooten, ibid., 11-13, though he does not mention affinities with Gen. 5:3). The “Gnostic” Valentinianism of Theodotus found in Clement of Alexandria’s Excerpta ex Theodoto (in Book VII of Stromateis) calls Cain “irrational,” “dusty” (χολίκος), and “according to the image” (Gen. 1:26), calls Abel “rational and just,” “psychical” (ψυχικός), and “according to the likeness of God” (Gen. 1:26), and calls Seth “spiritual” (πνευματικός) and “according to the Form [κατὰ Ἰδέαν]” (Gen. 5:3) (quoted, discussed, and attributed to 5:3 in Dillon, 1990, 73; cf. van Kooten, 2008, 307, 307n.51; Wedderburn, 1971, 85). This clearly calls to mind Paul’s language and discussion in 1 Cor. 15:45-49 (van Kooten calling this “particular acquaintance with Paul,” 307) and Dillon argues that it has some points of contact with Philo as well. This last text strengthens our own contention that in 1 Cor. 15:44-49 Paul was indeed employing Gen. 5:3, for this early reading of Paul appeared to take 5:3 as Paul’s base-text.
initiated by Adam and his “image” is textually oppressive in its repetition. While “walking with God” granted escape once, this was not for Seth as the initial “image”-bearer (who had even “called on the name of the Lord”). The text does not explicitly say, “and he died because he was in Adam’s image.” But death is certainly a shared-likeness with Adam, and bearing his image is no remedy to the problem. Textual features could cast positive or negative light around the propagation of Adam’s “image.”

As we will now see, Philo opts for a positive reading, both physically and ethically. Paul, as one might expect, sees the principle of Gen. 5:3 itself as positive. It helps Paul explain the relationship between the last Adam and his family. Yet the actual “image” of the first Adam Paul sees as problematic. Using something like an interwoven three-strand cord, Paul explains that the “image” at the beginning of humanity is to be discarded as old clothing in favor of the new clothing of God’s pre-creationally intended “image” of the last Adam, and it is precisely this anthropogonic principle of bearing an Adam’s image that results in glorious freedom for the whole cosmos.

A. PHILO’S READING OF GENESIS 5:3

When not comparing Adam to the ideal human of 1:27, Philo attributes great nobility to Adam. This nobility—of body and mind—Philo applies to the imitator of Adam’s perfection. This nobility takes two forms for Philo: ontological Adam-like nobility and ethical Adam-like nobility. The first is comparable to the principle of Gen. 5:3, the second Philo explicitly draws from this text of humanity’s Beginning.
1. Ontological Adam-like Nobility (Op. 145)

The general theme of like-producing-like is prominent in Genesis’ cosmogony in the oft-repeated phrase “according to kind,” and Philo drew attention to this.\textsuperscript{167} M. Kline calls Gen. 5:3 “the equivalent in human procreation of the phrase ‘after its kind’ which is used for plant and animal reproduction and of course refers to resemblance.”\textsuperscript{168} On a number of occasions Philo presents the general principle that parents produce children “like” them, and as this is often set in the context of likeness with the first human/couple, Gen. 5:3 itself may not be too far away.\textsuperscript{169}

In Op. 145, a passage in which Philo defends the “beauty” (κάλλος) of both Adam’s “body and soul,” he reasons about Adam’s offspring:

The descendants (τῶς ἀνθρώπους) of that [human], necessarily sharing in appearance (ἰδέες), still preserved the marks (τῶς τύπους), even if obscure, of the kinship (τῆς συγγενείας) with the fore-father. (§145; cf. §§136, 140-41)

“What is this kinship [or shared-kind]?” Philo asks. He answers by describing Adam’s descendants in a manner that reflects his earlier exegesis of the creation of Adam himself.

“Every human” (πᾶς ἀνθρώπος)

is allied to the divine word [λόγῳ θεῷ] according to [their] understanding [κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν], having become a casting or fragment or radiance of the blessed nature (cf. §§71, 139). And also [every human is allied] to all the world [ἀπαντᾷ τῷ κόσμῳ] according to the structure of the body [κατὰ δὲ τὴν σώματος κατασκευήν] (cf. §135). For he [sc. every human] has been compounded out of the same things [as the cosmos]: earth and water and air and fire, each of the elements having contributed its due part toward the completion of a most self-sufficient material (cf. §137), which it was necessary for the Craftsman to take so that he might fashion this visible image [τὴν ὑπατὴν ταύτην εἰκόνα]. (§145)

\textsuperscript{167} Cf. Op. 43-44 (on Gen. 1:11-12), 63 (on Gen. 1:20-24), 64 (on Gen. 1:24-25).
\textsuperscript{168} Kline, 1980, 23n.34.
\textsuperscript{169} E.g., Leg. 1.10; Her. 164.
Philo’s description of the “shared-kind” with Adam parallels the motif and method of Gen. 5:3. In 5:3, Adam is related to God according to his “image” (ἐικόνα, v.1) while Adam’s descendants are related to him according to his “image” (ἐικόνα, v.3). Similarly, here Philo writes of Adam’s descendants as having “shared-kind” with him (συγγενείας, §145) after having just written of Adam as having “shared-kind” with God (συγγενής, §144). Descendants mimic Adam as Adam mimics God.

Philo’s use of “appearance” (ἰδέας) renders it possible that 5:3 itself has stamped an impression on Philo’s mind.¹⁷⁰ By the word ἱδέα Philo may simply mean Adam’s physical “appearance” (i.e., what is seen: εἶδον, ἱδεῖν). Yet he may be referring more technically (Platonically) to the “idea” according to which Adam became the molded cast or impression,¹⁷¹ i.e., the human of 1:27 who (in this context of Philo’s second reading) is the “idea” (ἰδέα) or “genus” or “seal” (§134). Philo describes Adam’s descendants as “sharing in idea/appearance” (μετέχοντας ἱδέας) and as still bearing “the impressions” (τοῦς τύπους), though faint. In Genesis 5, Seth is according to Adam’s “idea” and “image” (v.3), which accords with “the image of God” (5:1), which Philo sees as the divine Word. Thus Philo calls their minds a “casting” (ἐκμαγεῖον, §146)—as if “the imprint made in a soft material like wax by a seal or mold”¹⁷²—of the same divine Word according to which the original earth-born human’s mind had become an “image and imitation [ἀπεικόνισμα καὶ μίμημα]” (§139), an accurate “casting [ἐκμαγείον]” with a clear “impression [τύπου]” (§71). Gen. 5:3 may itself be in the background of Op. 145,

¹⁷⁰ Runia (1986) posits that “a text such as Gen. 5:3 could have taught Philo to associate ἱδέα and εἰκών” (163n.23; following Willms, 1935, 77).
¹⁷¹ Levison, 1988, 87.
for the theme and even language are similar. Regardless of the precise origin, however, Philo judges it as important for subsequent humanity to have ontological Adam-likeness.

2. Ethical Adam-like Nobility (QG 1.81)

Philo elsewhere does demonstrate a specific awareness of the features of Adam’s genealogy in Genesis 5, even displaying an anthropological/ethical analysis of it. Thus when in Questions and Answers on Genesis Philo presents an explicit interpretation of Gen. 5:3 itself, and he does so in an ethical rather than ontological manner, it is not surprising. Philo does not take 5:3 to be about a general principle of propagation but about a deeper anthropological truth. In QG 1.81 Philo asks, “Why, in the genealogy of Adam, does [Moses/scripture] no longer mention Cain, but Seth, who, it says, was made according to his appearance and form?” Philo answers that due to Cain’s violence (which violated reason and order), he therefore is not presented by scripture as deserving to be either “successor of his earthly father” or “the beginning of later generations.” Gen. 5:3 highlights for Philo the honorable status of sonship, particularly that of first-born. It dubs Seth, rather than first-born Cain, as “successor,” a position of prominence concerning the one who will take over when the present person vacates the role. Being the wicked man that he is, Cain is effectively erased by Moses from having any part in Adamic humanity, and Seth becomes Adam’s first-born successor.

Philo sees Seth, in contrast to Cain, as deservedly bearing the mantel from Adam in leading forth the rest of humanity, i.e., being Adam’s image-bearer and successor:

Thus it is not casually or idly that [scripture] says that he [sc. Seth] was made according to his father’s appearance and form, in reprobation of the elder [brother]

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173 See Philo’s ethical, even theocentric, contemplation on and application of Seth’s genealogy through Abraham to Moses, culled from Gen. 4:25 and chs. 5, 11, and 1 Ch. 6, in Post. 170-85.
who, because of his foul homicide, bears within himself nothing of his father either in body or in soul. Thus [scripture] separated him and divided him from his kin, but to the other [sc. Seth] he apportioned and gave a part of the honor of the eldest.\footnote{Loeb’s translation, with minor changes.}

Because of Cain’s gross immorality he “bears within himself nothing of his father either in body or in soul.” Philo’s addition of “body” is probably a rhetorical heightening of the completeness of Cain’s unworthiness and unlikeness in relation to Adam, who at his creation was the most “beautiful” of all time “in both body and soul” (see above).

As Philo sees it, bearing Adam’s image is good, even “honorable,” and it is precisely Cain’s ethics that disqualify him from receiving such an honor. Throughout his comments on Genesis 2-3, Philo continues to word anthropological realities that directly belong to the textual Adam—whether good or very bad—as belonging to a plurality of humans.\footnote{Concerning “toil” as a curse: Op. 167 (cf. 79-81); cf. Virt. 205. Concerning “slavery” to passions: Op. 165, 167; cf. Deus 111; Spec. 4.188. Concerning even “death” of the soul: Leg. 1.105-06.} These applications of Adamic language to contemporary people assume that when we act like Adam we look like Adam.

3. Summary of Philo’s Reading of Genesis 5:3

For Philo, being “in Adam’s image” is a good thing, even an honorable label to wear. Philo reads Gen. 5:3 in a positive way, and this is not without exegetical warrant. Even after Adam’s and Eve’s disobedience, curse, and exile (Genesis 3), and after the portrayal of their descendants’ spiralling violently out of control (Genesis 4), Gen. 5:1-2 asks us to remember the original design of the “Adam” (Gen. 2:7ff) of “God’s image” (Gen. 1:27), and 5:3 applies this Adam’s “image” to his progeny. For Philo, ontologically “every human” still bears the beautiful “marks” of Adam’s “idea” or “appearance,” but ethically not every human is in Adam’s “image.” Some are disqualified due to their wickedness.
B. Paul’s Reading of Genesis 5:3

Paul first introduces Adam as the model for his subsequent family in 1 Cor. 15:48-49. Though its form will differ slightly due to context, he reintroduces this same basic Adamic notion in 2 Cor. 3:18 and in Rom. 8:29 (combined with the Before). Though there is little doubt that 1 Cor. 15:49, 2 Cor. 3:18, and Rom. 8:29 are intimately related to each other, the influence of Gen. 5:3 on Paul’s three statements has not received proper attention. In his recent monograph, *Paul’s Anthropology in Context*, G. van Kooten argues that ancient Judaism “offers no real analogy for the modeling of believers on the paradigm of Adam, in this way becoming similar to him.” We will argue that Gen. 5:3 gives Paul his basic concept of assimilation to the initial human found in 1 and 2 Corinthians and Romans, as well as his essential wording: “image.” Recognizing the influence of Gen. 5:3 on Paul deepens our understanding of Paul’s interpretation of conformity to Christ. Paul structures this according to another principle of the Beginning (and even the Before). Thus recognizing Gen. 5:3 in Paul also furthers our knowledge of his three-strand interpretation of creation.

1. The “Image” of Adamic Ontology (1 Cor. 15:48-49)

When Paul mentions bearing the “image” of Adam in 1 Cor. 15:49, he has already been working within the broader context of the beginning of the world (15:37-41), and he

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176 See e.g., Fee, 2006, 180-85; Matera, 2003, 102; Dunn, 1998A, 237-38 (*idem*, 1988, 1.483); Moo, 1996, 534-35 and nn.152, 154; Sellin, 1986, 190-91; Michaelis, 1968, 877n.37; Scroggs, 1966, 69; Black, 1954, 175; McCasland, 1950, 88. The commentators who compare each of these three passages to the one on which they are commenting is legion. A notable exception is Käsemann, 1980, 244 (see below). Even though the semantic overlap between Gen. 5:3 and 1 Cor. 15:48-49, 2 Cor. 3:18, and Rom. 8:29 is only “image” (though Paul’s three passages share “glory” among themselves), the conceptual parallels are strong.

177 Van Kooten, 2008, 206. For van Kooten’s supplement to this lack see below.
has already been describing the beginning of humanity in “Adam,” the “living soul,” the “dust-being” (15:42-47). In vv.48-49, Paul extends Adam’s created nature to his descendants. They are ontologically like him: “we bore his image.” This is not an allusion to Gen. 1:27, as if Paul were relating Adam’s descendants to God. He is describing their bodily likeness with Adam himself, as in Gen. 5:3.

When treating 1 Cor. 15:49, G. van Kooten has recently offered a greater emphasis on Paul’s own emphasis: assimilation to Christ himself. Yet by missing how one of the texts of “ancient Judaism” (i.e., Genesis) actually does “offer a real analogy for the modeling of believers on the paradigm of Adam, in this way becoming similar to him” (i.e., Gen. 5:3), van Kooten constructs a “necessary background” that shares more affinities with Philo’s treatment of Gen. 1:27 than with Paul’s actual argument. He “supplements” the “insufficient” ancient Jewish background with a Graeco-Roman

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179 Rightly Lorenzen, 2008, 161; Schaller, 2004, 148n.26; Collins, 1999, 572n.49; Lambrecht, 1982, 512-14; Usami, 1976, 488. See Fee’s note about N.T. Wright’s observation in an oral presentation, that “a second Adam became necessary in part because the first Adam gave birth to a son ‘in his own image’ (Gen. 5:1 [sic])” (2006, 487n.14). Lindemann (1997) posits the possibility of v.49 being a reference to Gen. 5:3 or 1:27, and his own comments on v.48 should have allowed him to be more confident that it is primarily 5:3 with which Paul was working (165). One implication of recognizing 5:3 and not 1:27 behind v.49 is, as Lorenzen (2008) has shown, there is no reason to think that Paul is contrasting Gen. 2:7 to 1:27 (in whichever sequence he might place them): contra Theissen, 1987, 361-62 (criticized by Lindemann, 1997, 156); contra Sellin, 1986, 94 (criticized by Lorenzen, 2008, 161n.75). Schaller (2004) points out that even if Paul is alluding to Gen. 1:27 in v.49, since he applies “image” to both Adam and Christ this in itself renders Sellin’s direct comparison between Philo’s two-men and Paul’s two-men unfounded (148). We have already seen in 1 Cor. 11:7-9 that Paul treats 1:27 and 2:7 as references to the same creation of Adam. That observation combined with his use of Gen. 5:3 in 1 Cor. 15:49 render discussion about the relationship between 2:7 and 1:27 in 1 Cor. 15:45-49 unfounded.

180 Sometimes van Kooten (2008) maintains Paul’s language of Adam’s image (e.g., 71-72, 86, 113), though more often he conflates it with God’s (cf. 92, 114, 200, 202-03, 205-06, etc.), even calling v.49 a reference to Gen. 1:27 (271). His two references to Gen. 5:3 (pp.2, 10) do not refer to Paul’s passages.


182 Ibid., 219.
philosophical context “from Plato to Plotinus.” Accordingly, Paul treats Christ as “the second God” who, like Philo’s Word, “acts as a model for assimilation to God.” Van Kooten writes: “It is this language of becoming like a particular god that—to my knowledge—provides the best explanation for Paul’s view about Christ-believers sharing the image and forms of Christ and becoming like him.” This imports a faulty view of how Christ was “the image of God” in 2 Cor. 4:4 backwards into 1 Cor. 15:49, treating Christ as metaphysical “image” the way Philo treats Word as “image” (see above). It also misses how Paul treats the “image” of Adam/Christ in vv.48-49.

Yet merely recognizing a reference to Gen. 5:3 does not necessarily clarify what Paul means in vv.48-49. As we saw above, it is easy to interpret Adam’s “image” in 5:3 as a reference to the “image” which Adam bore, i.e., “God’s image” (5:1-2). From this perspective, saying that one bears “Adam’s image” might actually mean that he, e.g., Seth or the murder victims in Gen. 9:6, was born according to God’s image. This basically treats a reference to 5:3 as a reference to 1:27, and many scholars would feel justified in their interpretation of 1 Cor. 15:49. But this is not the only way to interpret

183 Ibid., 125. Plato writes: “there is nothing so like him [sc. God: αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον] as the one who becomes most nearly perfect in righteousness,” Theaetetus 176c; “by virtue to be likened to God [ὁμοίωσθαι θεῷ],” Republic 613a-b; cf. Phaedrus 253a-b (van Kooten, ibid., 129-32). Tobin (1983) explains the “likeness of assimilation to God” (ὁμοίωσεις θεῷ), e.g., in Plato’s Theaetetus 176b as “the standard Middle Platonic formulation of the purpose of life, the goal of ethics” (18). Van Kooten adds between Plato and Plotinus Plutarch’s Antonius 75.6 (133) and Alcinous (154-58), the latter of whom he applies most directly to Philo (158, 181-99; cf. Black, 1954, 172n.1) and then in a similar way to Paul (158, 199-218).

184 Van Kooten, 2008, 133.

185 Van Kooten, 2008, 133.

186 See our note above for some scholars who see Gen. 1:27 behind Paul’s use of “image” (p.234n.178). Van Kooten (2008) writes that in 1 Cor. 15:49 Paul “speaks of human beings carrying the image of God: first the distorted image of the first Adam, which is only in a remote sense still an image of God, but subsequently the image of the second Adam” (73). One could specifically interpret Paul’s genitival phrase “image of…” epegegetically (Hughes, 1989, 27—concerning Rom. 8:29; cf. Dunn, 1988, 1.483; Scroggs, 1966, 69-70), and end up at the same theological conclusion (but see below). Ridderbos (1975) parenthetically notes Gen. 5:3 as a possible referent in v.49, but mainly develops the link with Gen. 1:27 (72-73).
Gen. 5:3. When Philo explicitly treated 5:3, he did not interpret it in this way (see *QG* 1.81, above). He considered Seth as being *like Adam* without specific likeness to God in view. Within the text itself, when “image” is seen in light of the previous description of Adam’s son in 5:3, “according to his appearance” (τῆν ἰδέαν), it is also possible to interpret 5:3 as conveying (simplistically) that Seth looked like Adam. To put it slightly less physically, Adam’s son had the same qualities as his father: like father, like son.  

This latter construal of bearing Adam’s “image” is Paul’s in 1 Cor. 15:49. That Paul principally means “like father, like son” rather than “like God” is made clear from his introduction to v.49 in v.48. As “the dusty one” is such (οὐς), so too (τοῖς καί) are “the dusty ones” (v.48a). Paul has in mind Adam’s bodily construction. Philo had demonstrated the solidarity between Adam and his descendants by describing them in terms and labels drawn from the texts concerning Adam’s own life and existence, including his creation in Gen. 2:7. Similarly, in v.48 Paul draws a parallel between the initial man and his followers. Like Philo, he uses the textual terms and labels from Adam’s creation in Gen. 2:7 (“soulish,” “dusty”) to describe Adam’s descendants: like him they also are “soulish” and “dusty.”

Based on this build-up in v.48, when Paul then uses the language of bearing “the image” of this “dusty one” (i.e., Adam) in v.49, he means by Adam’s “image” something roughly like his “appearance” (e.g., like κατὰ τῆν ἰδέαν αὐτοῦ). In response to the query, “In what type of body will the resurrected corpses come?” (v.35), part of Paul’s

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187 See e.g., Wenham, 1987, 30; Klines, 1980, 23n.34; McCasland, 1950, 89.
188 For something in the Graeco-Roman popular or technical philosophy to be a “real analogy” with 1 Cor. 15:48-49, it *must* be about humans sharing the same bodily constitution as the human from whom it is derived. Otherwise it fails to help illuminate Paul. Kim (1980) recognizes a “‘material’ connotation” as well as “the sense of ‘likeness’” in Paul’s use of “image” in 1 Cor. 15:49 (219), though he does not mention Gen. 5:3. He does, however, rightly apply this to 2 Cor. 4:4 (and Col. 1:15): “the conception of Christ as the εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ… clearly conveys the sense that Christ is the (visible, therefore material) manifestation of (the invisible) God” (219). Cf. Dunn, 1980, 127.
purpose in vv.42-49 is to highlight what the God-given ontology of our pre-resurrected bodies has been like due to the creation of Adam. In parallel to this—but in a far surpassing way, and based upon this protological principle of family resemblance with Adam—Paul grants to the Corinthians glimpses of what the God-given ontology of our resurrected bodies will be like due to the resurrection of the last Adam and the propagation of his “image.”

2. The Glory of the New Adamic “Image” (2 Cor. 3:18)

In 2 Cor. 3:18, Paul writes that by beholding the Lord’s glory as in a mirror, Christians are “transformed into the same image” (τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα). Paul again sets “image” in terms of “glory.” Here in 2 Corinthians 3, however, Paul writes nothing about the original Adam as he had in 1 Cor. 15:48a, 49a. In context, he is discussing Exodus 34 and Moses’ shining face which reflected the Lord’s glory when receiving and delivering the law. It is true that he then employs the texts of the beginning of humanity (4:4) and of the world (4:6), and one might wonder exactly when in his Mosaic discussion Genesis’ protological texts entered his mind. When he writes of being transformed into the same “image” as “the glory of the Lord,” does Paul actually have the principle of Gen. 5:3 in mind?

Despite the absence of Genesis in 2 Corinthians 3, there exists a natural connection between Exodus 34 and Gen. 1:27. Moses’ face transformed into glory as he reflected

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189 Lorenzen (2008), having recognized Paul’s reference to Gen. 5:3 rather than 1:27 (e.g., pp.161, 178), writes that all of the terms from 1 Cor. 15:42-48 (glory, incorruptibility, immortality, power, Spiritual) “describe the properties of both the resurrection-body of Christ and of his followers. The wearing of the εἰκόνα of the heavenly one [sc. in 1 Cor. 15:49] therefore refers to ‘the bodily identity between Christ and his followers’” (196; translation mine).

190 On the “conceptual background” that has been offered for Paul’s notion of transformation to Christ-likeness in 2 Cor. 3:18 see Thrall, 1994, 1.294-95.

191 Among all of the “conceptual backgrounds” mentioned by Thrall (1994) for Paul’s transformation into Christ-likeness in 3:18, she highlights that the Moses narrative of Exodus 34 gave natural rise to the notions
God’s glory (3:7; cf. Ex. 34:29-30). Moses was a mirror-image (such as a statue, coin, picture, or mirror itself) of the Lord’s glory insofar as he accurately conveyed something about the Lord from whose presence he was emerging. For the onlookers, to look at Moses’ face was to know something true about the Lord, specifically his “glory.” This is a similar concept to 1 Cor. 11:7, which is clearly associated with and arising from Gen. 1:27 and Genesis 2. There the manner in which the “image” appeared (i.e., covering or not covering a man’s head) gave to on-lookers a certain impression of the one imaged (God), either for “shame” and “dishonor” or, as intended, for “glory.” The “image” motif in 2 Cor. 3:18, though not immediately arising from a reading of Genesis but from Exodus 34, is nevertheless of one conceptual piece with Paul’s “image” motif as drawn from the beginning of Genesis (cf. a few verses later in 4:4).

As such, Moses’ bearing of “the glory of the Lord” in his face is reminiscent of Paul’s reading of Gen. 1:27 (“image [and glory] of God”). But above we likened 2 Cor. 3:18 to Paul’s application of Gen. 5:3, which in 1 Cor. 15:48-49 we somewhat distanced from Gen. 1:27 as reflecting Adam’s (and therefore Christ’s) nature and appearance more specifically than God’s. Are we merely running in circles?

Paul’s subsequent references in 2 Cor. 4:4 (“Christ, the image of God”) and 4:6 (“the glory of God” in the “face of Christ”) clarify 3:18 (“image” of “the glory of the Lord”). When one looks at “the glory of the Lord” a certain “image” is seen, as if the form in a mirror. It is in accordance with that image into which those looking are transformed. Even if “the Lord” in 3:18 refers more generally to Yahweh as in Exodus 34 rather than

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of “mirror,” “glory,” “transformation,” and “image” (1.294; cf. Lorenzen, 2008, 166n.102). In 1 Corinthians, each of these concepts is related to creation (Gen. 1:27 and 5:3).

Concerning the “glory” that arose from Moses’ face-to-face (mirror-like) encounter with the Lord see Watson, 2004, 293; Thrall, 1994, 1.243; Richardson, 1994, 158.

Segal, 1990, 60.
specifically to “Jesus Christ, Lord” (2 Cor. 4:5), what is “the same image” as that Lord’s “glory” but Jesus? He is the (new Adamic) “image of God” who reveals in his resurrected “face” the “glory” of the God who spoke creation into being. In this sense, though Paul’s theme in 4:4 is certainly culled from Gen. 1:27, his statement in 3:18 really is more directly related to Gen. 5:3 than to 1:27, for “the same image” into which Christians are transformed is the mid-way point between the Creator-Lord and those who are transformed into the “image” of his glory.

Before one jumps too quickly to Philo’s concept of human assimilation to God through the incorporeal “second God,” the Word, or to Wisdom’s incorporeal “wisdom,” the “face” of God’s “image” in Paul should keep our attention on the human “image of God,” and therefore on Paul’s employment of Gen. 5:3 to convey our assimilation to Christ’s “image” even as he is the Adamic “image of God.” Here he reflects both readings of Genesis 5 mentioned above. The family of Adam (beginning with Seth) was the “image” of Adam (5:3), who himself was the “image of God” (5:1; 1:27), and therefore Seth (and subsequent humans in Gen. 9:6 [and in 1 Cor. 11:7b]) could be likened to God via Adam. In 1 Cor. 15:48-49, Paul did not have God-likeness in mind but only Adamic-likeness. Here in 2 Cor. 3:18, Paul has combined these two themes more explicitly. As Moses was likened to the Lord as an image of glory, so also Christians are

194 For the association between 3:18, 4:4, and 4:6 and the conclusion thereupon that the “image” to which Christians are conformed is Jesus cf. Meyer, 2009, 101n.138; Nguyen, 2008, 176-77; Fee, 2006, 180-85 (cf. idem, 1994, 317-18); Matera, 2003, 102; Watson, 1997, 301n.7; Thrall, 1994, 1.283; Hays, 1993, 153; Kim, 1980, 232. It is through “unveiled beholding” that believers see the mirror-“image” of “the glory of the Lord” (3:18) while unbelievers are “veiled” and “blinded” to “the glory of Christ, who is the image of God” and in whose “face” shines “the glory of God” (4:4-6).

195 Fee (2006) argues that “the impetus for the language in this case [sc. in 4:4] lies not with Christ as the second Adam but with the mirror imagery that Paul uses in 3:18, which in turn holds the three sentences [sc. 3:18, 4:4, 6] together” (184). As I posited above, it is the Moses narrative (a natural correlate being the mirror-motif, hence Fee) that prompts 3:18, but something prompts the clear Adam/creation-language in 4:4-6, and it is precisely in 3:18 where the Moses/mirror imagery prompts Gen. 5:3 and conformity with the “image” of Jesus—and this is a “second Adam” theme. Thus Fee concludes that “lying behind the present passage is a new-creation theology” (184).
likened to the glory of the Creator,\textsuperscript{196} but still only through looking like the one who is, within the new ministry of the Spirit and within the new creation of light, the Creator’s “image” of glory.

Once Paul has introduced in 2 Cor. 3:18 the “transformation” by “the Lord, the Spirit”\textsuperscript{197} into the “image” of the seminal person of the “new,”\textsuperscript{198} there follows a cord of interwoven beginnings and new beginnings (4:4, 6). Each is cast in the language and conceptuality from the Beginning. Though Paul’s context had not been directly about the creation, his approach was similar to his hermeneutic of creation elsewhere. He argued about a former person (and event and ministry) to whom God had given “glory” but whom God had overshadowed by a subsequent person (and event and ministry) whose surpassing “glory” eclipsed the former into non-glory. In this context of comparison, it is the latter “image” who is “the appropriate goal for the Christians’ transformation of identity,”\textsuperscript{199} who is the “goal of (human-) history.”\textsuperscript{200} According to Rom. 8:29, this was “marked out” before history.

3. The New Adamic “Image,” the Cosmos, and the Before (Rom. 8:29)

It is well known that Paul discusses “predestination” in Rom. 8:29-30. But it is important for us to discuss more than this theological topic. There are hermeneutical issues involved as well.\textsuperscript{201} To establish the surety of hope, that despite the present

\textsuperscript{197} Cf. 1 Cor. 15:45, 51-52.
\textsuperscript{198} Cf. 1 Cor. 15:49.
\textsuperscript{199} Nguyen, 2008, 182.
\textsuperscript{200} Lindemann, 1997, 163.
\textsuperscript{201} Thus though it is true that “foreknew” and “pre-marked out” do “speak of God’s purpose prior to the creative acts of Genesis 1” (Reymond, 1998, 711; contra Eskola, 1998, 165-77, esp. 170-71, 173, 175n.34), this does not say enough. The fact that Paul uses the text’s word “image” (and concept of similitude with
suffering “all things” really do work together “for good” for “those who love God,” i.e., for “those being called according to [God’s] purpose” (Rom. 8:28), Paul turns the Roman Christians to the Beginning and (especially) Before:

Those whom [God] pre-knew [προέγνω], [for them] he also pre-marked out [προωρίσας] to be conformed to the image of his Son [συμμόρφως τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ] so that he would be firstborn [πρωτότοκον] among many brothers. And whom he pre-marked out [προωρίσας], these he also called… justified… and glorified [ἐδόξασεν]. (8:29-30)

Paul builds his central statement of the Before on the principle of the Beginning, which in 1 Cor. 15:48-49 he had drawn from Gen. 5:3. Many recognize certain elements of the Adamic protology behind Paul’s reference to “image” in v.29, especially since this statement follows closely on the heels of Paul’s use of Genesis 1-3 in vv.19-23.202 “God’s Son” has an “image,” i.e., an appearance, and those who become his family members share the form (defining characteristics) of this “image.”203 As in 1 Cor. 15:49, here Paul is not attempting to compare people to God, although such a relationship could be deduced,204 but is attempting to liken certain people to the qualities of the preeminent “brother.”205

Adam) within his presentation of the content of this “prior purpose” confirms that a hermeneutical investigation would be illuminating.


203 Lorenzen (2008) considers “form” and “image” to be mutually interpretive, together referring to “the outward” (i.e., “bodily”) “appearance of Christ” (207-08; cf. Michaelis, 1968, 877n.37). This is a criticism of the epexegetical rendering of 8:29 (as in Dunn, 1988, 1.483; Hughes, 1989, 27).

204 As do Byrne, 1996, 272-73 and Dunn, 1988, 1.483-84.

205 Lorenzen (2008) does not think that the “Adam-Christ-typology” is in Paul’s mind, though she acknowledges that it is a possibility. She is careful to add, however, that “if the thought of Adam-Christ-typology is present, it would be—as in 1 Corinthians 15—not primarily Gen. 1:26f but 5:1-3 that is in the background” (210n.54; translation mine). This is a helpful recognition, and we will develop it below. Concerning Paul’s language of “brothers” in 8:29, Paul’s switch from the father/son imagery of Gen. 5:3 (and 1 Cor. 15:49) to that of siblings in Rom. 8:29 may cause confusion (e.g., cf. Byrne, 1996, 153, 269, and 272-73). Käsemann (1980), however, helpfully mentions Heb. 2:11ff in which “the Son creates sons and recognizes them as brothers” (245). He says, “We obviously have here the established tradition of the
Paul’s use of Gen. 5:3 is again based upon a positive appraisal of the protological principle. This should not be overlooked. Bearing the “image” of an Adam is not itself negative, even though Paul sees a negative outworking of it from the beginning until now. Paul does not criticize or deny the principle, even using it in 1 Cor. 15:49b and 2 Cor. 3:18 to describe the glorious and heavenly assimilation of believers to the head of their new creation and covenant. It is this same principle that Paul re-employs again here in Rom. 8:29 to show that, as D. Moo summarizes, “it is God’s purpose to imprint on all those who belong to Christ the ‘image’ of the ‘second Adam’.206

Yet again Paul’s application of Gen. 5:3 takes a slightly different form than it had in its other two variations. In both 1 Corinthians 15 and 2 Corinthians 3, Paul’s application of the creational theme of assimilation to Adam had differed slightly due to context. Rom. 8:29 is no different. Regarding 1 Cor. 15:49, within the context of exegesis of creation and Adam himself Paul labeled Jesus as “the last Adam.” Regarding 2 Cor. 3:18, where Paul’s argument involved the Moses-story of the glorious Lord’s reflective presence, Paul labeled Jesus the “image” of “the glory of the Lord” and then “the image of God.” By the time v.29 appears in Romans 8, Paul has already been arguing that Christ’s followers are “God’s children” (τέκνα θεοῦ, 8:16). They are “sons of God” (υἱοί θεοῦ, v.14) who are “co-heirs” with him (συγκληρονόμοι) and who will be “co-glorified” with him (συνδοξάσχομεν) if they first “co-suffer” with him (συμπάσχομεν) (8:17). In v.29, it is not surprising that he casts the basic principle of Gen. 5:3 as “co-formity” (σύμμορφος) with the image of God’s “Son” (τὸν υἱὸν). This contextual difference should

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206 Moo, 1996, 534n.151.
not cause us to lose sight of its referent in the anthropogenic text of Genesis. This is especially since among some of Paul’s contemporaries, there was a close connection between Adam, his descendants, and being considered “children,” “sons,” or “offspring” of the Creator, particularly when the texts of Genesis’ beginning are in mind, and especially Genesis 5. For example, Luke referred to Adam as “son of God” (υἱός... τοῦ θεοῦ) while implementing the genealogy from Genesis 5 (Luke 3:38). Philo himself considered Seth’s placement in Adam’s lineage as “image” testimony to his new status as successor and firstborn son. Paul’s own use of “Son” (and “sonship”) in Rom. 8:29 is a most appropriate title for an Adam.

In something of a similar interpretation of Gen. 5:3 to Philo’s, in Rom. 8:29 Paul portrays the rights of “inheritance” coming to the one who is conformed to the “image” of the “Son of God.” God’s “Son” thereby becomes “firstborn” while those conformed to his Son’s image are “co-heirs” with him as those who “will be co-glorified” with him (8:17; cf. 8:30). Paul has yet again added a nuance to his timing of the Adamic “image”-bearing. In 1 Cor. 15:49 it was in the future. In 2 Cor. 3:18 it had a predominantly present

207 Seebaß, 1975, 84-87 finds Luke’s reference in 3:38 similar to Paul’s quotation of Aratus in Acts 17:28 (85). In Acts 17:24-28, Luke also presents Paul as arguing (in similar language to 1 Cor. 15:35-49) from the beginning of the world (“the God who made the cosmos [ὁ θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας τὸν κόσμον] and all that is in it”) to the beginning of Adamic humanity (“gives [δίδωσι] to all life [ζωήν] and breath [πνεύμα] and all things... having made out of one [human] [ἐκ ἕνου] all nations of humans”) and God’s sovereignty over all nations (“having marked out [ἀποκατέστησε] where and how long they should live), to general humanity as “offspring of God” (γένος...τοῦ θεοῦ). Cf. Klines, 1980, 23n.33.

208 Cf. Mathews, 1996, 170; Klines, 1980, 23 (mentioning Rom. 8:29 in 23n.34); McCasland, 1950, 98 (comparing “son” [of God] and “image” with Philo [92-93] and Epictetus [96]). This does not deny that “sonship” (υἱόθεσιάς, 8:15) appears connected to what had been given to Israel (ὁ υἱόθεσία, Rom. 9:4) (so Lorenzen, 2008, 211; Dunn, 1988, 1.467).

209 On a slightly different comparison between Philo (Conf. 146) and Rom. 8:29 see Siegert, 2009, 187.
aspect. Here in Rom. 8:29, the actual act of conformity is perhaps present\textsuperscript{210} and certainly (also) future.\textsuperscript{211} But Paul now adds another dimension—the Before.

The process of Gen. 5:3 itself was “marked out” (ὄριζω) by God “before” (προ-) creation. Paul is not claiming here that God merely thought through the mechanics of progeny-production before enacting it in Adam and Seth. It is the conformity of God-lovers to the last Adam, God’s Son, that Paul here claims to have been set out before Gen. 5:3—before creation in Gen. 1:1, in fact.

In our first chapter, we saw that Paul’s use of “pre-marked out” (προκρισεν) referred to the specific “time” before creation. This was certainly clear in 1 Cor. 2:7 where Paul used this word in an allusion to Prov. 8:23 and to the “wisdom” that God established before Gen. 1:1-2. The actual shape of Rom. 8:29 looks as if Paul took his idea concerning Prov. 8:23 from 1 Cor. 2:7 and blended it with his idea concerning Gen. 5:3 from 1 Cor. 15:49.\textsuperscript{212} Thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 Cor. 2:7 discusses</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Means of Attainment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ὄφειλεν</td>
<td>προκρισεν</td>
<td>(eschat.) δοκιμασθεὶς</td>
<td>via εἰκόνα (Gen. 5:3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Cor. 15 discusses</td>
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<td>(eschat.) δοξαζείτω</td>
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<td>Then</td>
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<td>via εἰκόνα (Gen. 5:3)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rom. 8:29-30 unites</td>
<td>προκρισεν</td>
<td>(eschat.) δοξαζείτω</td>
<td>via εἰκόνα (Gen. 5:3)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

In 1 Corinthians, God’s pre-creational determinations (2:7; cf. Prov. 8:23) were written in a different context than was the method of its attainment (15:49; cf. Gen. 5:3). In Romans, these two concepts are compressed into the same statement. Paul has expanded his reference to God’s pre-creational plan. It is no longer only the crucifixion of the last Adam that was marked out before the first Adam was created (1 Cor. 2:7), but it is the

\textsuperscript{210} E.g., Kásemann, 1980, 244.
\textsuperscript{211} E.g., Lorenzen, 2008, 210-11. Jewett (2004) considers the aorist in Rom. 8:30 to convey “the initial evidence of this glory that will one day fill the creation (cf. 2 Cor. 3:18)” (34).
\textsuperscript{212} Cf. Bruce, 1971, 38; Dunn, 1988, 1.483.
Gen. 5:3-process itself (Rom. 8:29) as well as the recipients of this “image” (8:30) which and whom Paul sees in God’s wise determination before the beginning. “Glory” has also been expanded from the benefit of “us” to its benefit to the whole cosmos.

In Prov. 8:22-23, God’s wisdom was marked out “for [the benefit of] his works” (ἐν γνώσει ἀνδρόν). In Romans 8, Paul portrays the pre-marked out recipients of the glory that God destined before the beginning as themselves something of mediators of a cosmic and glorious freedom. The benefit of God’s created works, i.e., “freedom” from the slavery of corruptibility, comes when “the glory of God’s children,” the “sons of God,” are “revealed.” When Paul applies the principle of Gen. 5:3 in v.29, he is already thinking about all of creation, particularly as it appears in the broader text of creation (Genesis 1-2) and fall (Genesis 3).²¹³

Here Paul shows an intertwining of the three strands in his interpretation of creation. Paul grants hope by way of conformity with the image of the Son of God. This process is rooted in a scope of hope that is no less cosmic and cosmogonic than Genesis 1 and Proverbs 8.²¹⁴ Then Paul casts the Before in the language of the Beginning. The cosmic hope comes to all God’s created works through the glory of God’s children who were pre-creationally marked out to receive their glory through the pre-creationally marked out method which God subsequently initiated in Gen. 5:3.

²¹³ It is easy to merely mention Genesis 3 since Paul specifically refers to God’s curse on the earth due to Adam’s disobedience (Gen. 3:17-19). Only by sweat and hard work will the earth produce and Paul takes this as a struggle for the earth as much as for humans (Rom. 8:20). But Paul has more of the Beginning in mind, referring not merely to “the earth” (as in Gen. 3) but to “the creation” (ἡ κτίσις, i.e., the actual act of God in the beginning [cf. Rom. 1:20; see J. Moo, 2008, 75-77 and 75n.6]), and assuming behind his description of the burdened cosmos a time when it had been free from the slavery of corruptibility (i.e., in Gen. 1-2).

²¹⁴ “Cosmic” should not be confused with indiscriminate. As Jewett (2004) argues, “creation” in Romans 8 excludes “non-Christian believers” and “the angelic forces” that are opposed to God (35n.45)
4. Summary of Paul’s Reading of Genesis 5:3, in Comparison with Philo’s Readings

Gen. 5:3 furthers the understanding of humanity’s beginnings. This furtherance could be in terms of Adam’s progeny bearing the otherwise inaccessible “image of God” that had been given to Adam. Paul gives a hint of this in 2 Cor. 3:18 where the goal is a reflection of God’s glory, but this is only accessible through conformity with his “image”—not Moses, nor even Adam, but the resurrected Jesus. The anthropological furtherance provided by Gen. 5:3 can also be seen in terms of likeness with Adam himself—humanity “modeled on the paradigm of Adam.” This seemed to be Philo’s trend, to compare subsequent humanity with Adam in ontological body and soul. In a broadly similar way, Paul draws upon Gen. 5:3 in such a way in 1 Cor. 15:48a and 49a, reasoning that Adam’s family is “such as” he was in terms of appearance or bodily structure (v.48a), bearing his “image” of dust (v.49a). Paul extends this in vv.48b, 49b to “the last Adam” and to his subsequent family.

To explain something about the resurrection of the body to Corinthians who have questioned it, Paul firstly turns them to the cosmogonic “desire” and causative action of God in Genesis 1 regarding diverse bodies, fleshes, and glories (vv.37-41). He then points out the created nature of soulish dustiness of the first human, Adam, in Gen. 2:7 (vv.45-47). He thirdly guides their skeptical thinking to contemplate the original principle of the first Adam’s relationship to subsequent humanity in Gen. 5:3 (vv.48-49). Though the contexts of 2 Corinthians 3 and Romans 8 are different, and Paul’s language of Gen. 5:3 is slightly recast accordingly, Paul mimics his own hermeneutic by setting this same anthropogenetic principle of the new beginning within the grander scope of the God who created light and who cares for the freedom of his whole creation. He will free all of his
creation through this very process whereby God-lovers bear the “image” of the glory of the Son of God, the last Adam. For Paul, the anthropological principle of Gen. 5:3 provides both despair, which sees the first man as connected to his subsequent family, but also hope, which recognizes the glory, power, incorruptibility, and immortality of the second first-man as fitted-clothing shared with his subsequent family. Unlike with Philo’s treatment, their honor is not like Seth’s, who found it in mirroring the ethics of the Adam of Genesis 5, but rather in mirroring the suffering and then glory of the Adam who was crucified for their sins and raised for their glory. And it was both this latter Adam and conformity to his “image” that were pre-creationally determined for the glory of those who love his Father and for the freedom of his Father’s creation.

**4. Comparisons and Conclusions: Philo and Paul on the Beginning of Humanity**

The texts of the beginning of humanity—Gen. 1:27, 2:7, and 5:3—are immeasurably important for the anthropology of both Philo and Paul. But they are not isolated texts, either in Genesis itself or in Philo’s or Paul’s interpretations and applications of them. These texts are mutually interpretive. Sometimes Philo interprets them together, sometimes he opposes them to each other. Paul always treats them as one. The texts are also set within the grander narrative of Genesis 1-5: creation of everything (Genesis 1), creation of Adam and Eve (Genesis 2), the story of Adam and his sons (Genesis 3-4), and the future of Adam’s descendants (Genesis 5). Both Philo and Paul fit their readings of Genesis’ human beginnings within the larger structure of Genesis’ cosmic beginning. Recognition of this hermeneutic helped us interpret their complex readings of the texts.
For Philo, Adam himself is virtuous and perfect in mind and body. For Paul, all “bodies” on earth have “glory,” and man in particular still reflects on God’s reputation as his “image and glory.” Both Philo and Paul consider the body of Adam to have been perfectly knit together by the divine Craftsman, molded in harmony of parts in perfect accord with God’s previous “desire” and “purpose.” For both Philo and Paul this previous divine “purpose” and “desire” also created the entire world. But both Philo and Paul also display a negative interpretation of the creation of Adam when comparing him with the Other, whether the bodiless and textual human of the Idealized Gen. 1:27 (so Philo) or the embodied human Jesus of the resurrection and life-making Spirit (so Paul).

For some communities their hope for the future was for “the human situation following Genesis 3” to “be restored to the situation of Genesis 1.”215 Some craved the return of “all the glory of Adam.”216 For Philo, Cain was deprived of the honor of the “image” and “appearance” of Adam because he was ethically nothing like that first-formed father of the earth, and one aspect of hope lies in mimicking that first cosmopolitan. For Paul, God-lovers who look to Christ, the last Adam, are not hoping for a return to such dust—even though he had been truly glorious and divinely arranged dust. Paul does believe that they are looking for all the glory of an Adam, but they are looking for movement into the Adam of the Beyond. They look beyond the grave to the image and glory of a new “Adam,” the image which itself, along with its Adam, his progeny, their conformation to him, and their shared glory with him were all intended and marked out by the Creator before the beginning and for the freedom of the world.

215 Minear, 1994, 78.
216 On “all the glory of Adam” in Qumran literature see van Kooten, 2008, 15-27.
Conclusion

Paul’s interpretation of creation in 1 and 2 Corinthians and Romans, like Philo’s in his commentary on Genesis 1-2, contains three interwoven aspects: the beginning of the world, the beginning of humanity, and God’s intentions before the beginning. Paul not only has an explicit Before, but its content is connected to his understanding of the Beginning according to Genesis. This has become especially clear as we have compared Paul’s briefer comments with those more full treatments of the same creation-texts by Philo in his formal commentary. Philo perceives the Before to be an ontic structural design for the beauty of the world and humanity. Paul perceives the Before to be a salvific historical design for the freedom of the world through the cross-shaped glory of Christ-like humanity.

Our main task above has not been to present a full outworking of Paul’s and Philo’s theologies of the Beginning and Before. We have certainly not refrained from such comparisons and contrasts. These are very important implications of our study, and they can be reviewed in the appropriate sections in each chapter above. Our primary task has been somewhat more modest in its scope: to lay bare the interwoven nature of the Before and the Beginning in the apostle Paul as in the commentator Philo. As we have seen, Philo’s interpretation of the beginning of Genesis was certainly informed by a notion of God’s intentions before the creation of the sense-perceptible realm, and this Before was
significantly shaped according to Plato’s *Timaeus*, and yet his reading of the Beginning was not subject to merely an imposition of a fully formed presupposition but also helped shape and fill out his Before. Thus Philo could claim that the “pre-existent” noetic paradigm was “made” and “became,” and this claim was because his scripture (Gen. 1:1 and 2:5, respectively), not Plato, told him so. For Paul, also, his interpretation of the protological text was certainly informed by a notion of God’s wise intentions before creation, and this Before was significantly shaped according to Prov. 8:22-31, but his reading of the Beginning also added shape and content to his communication of God’s Before. Thus Paul could claim that God had not merely “marked out” a general “wisdom” before creation, but that God had “pre-marked out” family for the “pre-marked out” last Adam and had “pre-marked out” the manner of conformity with that Adam’s “image”—expressing the Before in the wording and motifs of the Beginning (e.g., Gen. 5:3). For Paul, as for Philo, the Before and the text of the Beginning were reciprocally interpretive, interlocked themes within his thoughts on creation.

Also in a manner similar to Philo’s fuller treatment of the text of Genesis, Paul treated the creation of the whole world according to Genesis as the appropriate setting for the creation of the more particular humanity according to Genesis. Their cosmic perspectives even helped us interpret some of their more difficult discussions of the creation of humanity, e.g., regarding who the “image of God” is, how good or bad Adam was by virtue of his creation, and why there was flexibility for both interpreters regarding Adam’s glory. These two aspects of the Beginning itself—cosmic and anthropic—are also tightly wound together.
We also demonstrated that God’s intentions before creation—e.g., his “purposes” and “desires”—become manifest for both interpreters not only in certain explicit statements (analyzed in chapter 1), but also implicitly throughout the whole of their respective interpretations of the beginning of the world (analyzed in chapter 2) and the beginning of humanity (analyzed in chapter 3). Thus it is the case that Paul, like Philo, displays three interconnected facets to his interpretation of creation. Like an interwoven cord not easily unraveled is Paul’s reading of the Beginning and Before.

There are theological implications of Paul’s interpretation of creation. Though these implications are not part of what we set out to establish in this project, two particular theological implications nonetheless will be interesting to present here at the end—or is it now the beyond—of our study of Paul’s Beginning and Before. The first regards Paul’s more specific relationship between the first and last Adams. The second concerns Paul’s application of the Beginning in general.

At various points in the history of Christian thought a certain construal of Paul’s relationship between Adam and Christ has been repeated. This understanding places Christ as the “model” for Adam,1 “the anthropology of Christ” as “primary and prior to that of Adam,”2 the first Adam as “the imitation of the second”3 and “made in the image of the incarnate Christ.”4 Paul’s concept of the Before—that Jesus’ crucifixion, and therefore obviously his human nature, was marked out by God before he created the first human (Adam)—could seem to confirm these interpretations of Paul. It is worthwhile to

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1 Nicholas Cabasilas (14th century), *The Life in Christ* 6.91-94; as quoted in Bouteneff, 2008, 176 and as followed by Bouteneff, 45 (who there also quotes Barth, 1962, 46-47 as support). See also Haffner, 1995, 139-40 on the relationship between Jesus’ incarnation and the Fall according to John Duns Scotus (1266 – 1308 CE).
4 Irenaeus’s interpretation of Rom. 5:14 as summarized by Bouteneff, 2008, 176.
notice that this construal of Paul’s relationship between Jesus and Adam, while seeming to have affirmation in Paul’s language of “pre-destination,” actually reverses Paul’s main method of argumentation.

Most of these perspectives are arguing from Rom. 5:14: “Adam is a ‘type’ \(\tau\upsilon\pi\omicron\varsigma\) of the coming one.” That statement, as is well known, could be taken to mean that Adam was the “impression” of the prior stamp who is Christ, or that Adam was the prior “example” of the particular aspect of the human Christ’s mission that Paul is discussing. The presentation of Paul’s Christ-Adam thought cited above opts for the first construal. We did not analyze Rom. 5:12-21 since it has to do with Paul’s understanding of Adam as a sinner rather than with the pre-sin creation. Yet in each of Paul’s uses of creation at which we looked throughout our study, Paul does not define Adam as anything like a “pre-Christ.” The portrayals cited above would seem to suggest that such was Paul’s thought regarding Adam, defining Adam in a Christic manner, as if one could not understand the anthropology of Adam without first and necessarily understanding that of the incarnate Christ. Paul’s movement of language and conceptuality goes the other direction. Adam was originally “Adam” for Paul, and he then explains Christ as the last “Adam.” As Adam was first the “image of God,” so the risen (post-Mosaic) Christ is the “image of God.” As Adam “became” something that had to do with life in the beginning (i.e., a soul that lives), so Christ “became” something that has to do with life in the end (i.e., a Spirit that life-makes). These are each Adamic words and concepts—“Adam,” “image,” “became”—that Paul employs to explain something about Jesus.

Though there is still room to debate both what Paul meant in Rom. 5:14 and how to convey the panorama of Pauline thought in a systematic way, Paul’s more typical
dynamic of portraying Christ in *Adamic* categories and language, and not the other way around, is hardly best conveyed by saying that for Paul “Christ was the model for Adam,” etc. As F. Watson argues, “In Paul, scripture is not overwhelmed by the light of an autonomous Christ-event needing no scriptural mediation. It is scripture that shapes the contours of the Christ-event.”

Though Watson was not referring to Paul’s use of the scriptural creation account, what we have seen above confirms that even in these instances Paul uses the scriptural Adamic (and more broadly creational) texts to “shape the contours” of Christ as last “Adam” and of our assimilation to his “image.”

Though the raised Jesus is certainly different than the created Adam in many respects—perhaps as a plant in comparison with a seed—and though it is important that Paul does not portray Christ in *only* Adamic words and motifs, Paul’s movement of understanding does not have him teaching the Corinthians that Christ is the model of Adam. Even though Paul saw Christ’s (crucified) humanity in God’s wisdom before creation, Paul’s actual practice of describing Jesus by way of Adamic texts rather than the other way around should have a different impact on how Pauline discussion of Christology takes shape than has sometimes been the case.

A second theological implication that can be posited here in the “beyond” of our study regards Paul’s broader use of creation language. As we noted at the outset, little systematic study of Paul’s interpretation of creation has been attempted. Some of the writing that has touched on the topic—typically narrowed to Adam and almost exclusively concerning Adam as sinner—has taken Paul’s thoughts in the wrong

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6 With regards to Paul’s basic hermeneutical practice of the beginning of humanity, the texts concerning Adam’s beginning are, using the words of Hays (1989), some of “the ‘determinate subtext[s] that play a constitutive role’ in shaping [Paul’s] literary production” about Christ (18).
direction. This most often has been due to insufficient engagement with the appropriate data in Paul and sometimes also due to inappropriate comparisons between Paul and Philo. One reason given for Paul’s supposed lack of “knowledge” of or “interest” in the creation of the world, as well as in the (pre-sin) creation of Adam, is Paul’s vested interest in Christ and the new creation. These Pauline interests supposedly rendered contemplation on and discussion of the “old” nearly pointless. It often followed that, according to Paul, Adam was not God’s image and glory and he did not display God’s “intent.” Christ alone bears those honors while Adam is “only” the bringer of sin and death. Because the world is simply “passing away” due to Adam’s sin and the dawning End in Christ, the “old” was really only of secondary importance for Paul who therefore had very little to say about it.

Our simple list of passages in 1 and 2 Corinthians and Romans where Paul refers to creation, as laid out in the very beginning of this study, should have automatically cast doubt on these suppositions that Paul’s understanding of sin and the end somehow preclude a deep reflection on pre-sin creation as something important to maintain. Indeed, as our study has demonstrated from three different (interwoven) angles, it is precisely within the contexts of his discussion of sin, death, and the End in Christ that Paul most readily introduces the original creation of the world and humanity. It is in Paul’s response to the blinding effects of “the god of this world” on those who are perishing as well as to the vain glory of clinging to an eclipsed ministry of condemnation and death that Paul presents his truly glorious Christology according to the beginning of humanity (“image of God”) and the beginning of the world (“God said out of darkness, ‘Light will shine’”) (2

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7 So Reumann’s (and Aymer’s) and Witherington’s more passing comments.
8 So the fuller statements of e.g., Scroggs, Kim, (earlier Dunn), Bouteneff.
Cor. 4:4-6). It is precisely within the context of Paul’s acknowledgment of the fatality and corruption of sin on the human (1 Corinthians 15) and on the world (Romans 8) that he most intensely employs and applies Genesis’ language and motifs concerning the world’s and humanity’s Beginning. Far from having the End render needless or unimportant Paul’s contemplation on the Beginning, it is precisely because God has begun the End that Paul repeatedly turns the Corinthians and Romans to contemplate God’s original Beginning of the world and humanity and even God’s Before.

Beginnings were generally important for Paul, but the Beginning showed itself to have a special and abiding quality for Paul’s theology. He interprets it as the divinely “desired” structure according to which the End had been marked out by the Creator before the Beginning began. For Paul, the Creator’s giving of “bodies” and “glories” is not left behind. Neither are God’s “shining” of “light,” nor the actual name “Adam,” nor the God-intended title “image of God,” nor the propagation of an Adam’s own “image” to his family left behind in the Beginning. All of these titles and concepts are protological—from the Beginning—but by them Paul expresses the Beyond. Because Paul employs these as descriptions and qualities of the End in Christ, should we conclude that the Beginning was of little value for him or that he did not contemplate it in any depth? μὴ γένοιτο!

Paul’s interpretation of creation, like Philo’s in his commentary, intimately intertwines God’s pre-creational desire and purpose with the beginning of the world and the beginning of humanity according to Genesis. Paul was so compelled by the beauty of the Beginning that he often cast even his Christocentric eschatology in its words and motifs. Yet although Paul expresses the End as the Beginning, Paul’s hope is not a return to the
Beginning *per se*. “What does new creation look like?” one might ask. One could hear Paul answer, “It looks like old creation, *only more so.*”9 Paul’s hope is an arrival beyond the Beginning to the “more so,” to a scene of glory for humans and therefore freedom for the world, a glory which by God’s original and wise design had not yet been experienced even in the Beginning. Forever like God’s design in the Beginning, however, this Beyond takes shape just as God had always desired, just as the Creator had wisely marked out for his crucified and resurrected Son and thus for his family *before* the Beginning.

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9 Bartlett, 2000, 232 (emphasis added).
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