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Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity

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Signed: ____________________ (Mark Wildish)

Date: _____________________
Abstract

The primary aim of this thesis is the reconstruction of a development in the history of the philosophy of language, namely an understanding of hieroglyphic Egyptian as a language uniquely adapted to the purposes and concerns of late Platonist metaphysics. There are three main reasons for this particular focus.

First, the primary interest of philological criticism has emphasized the apparent shortcomings of the classical hieroglyphic tradition in light of the success of the modern decipherment endeavour. Though the Greek authors recognize a number of philologically distinctive features, they are primarily interested in contrasting hieroglyphic and Greek semantics. The latter is capable of discursive elaboration of the sapiential content to which the former is non-discursively adapted.

Second, the sole surviving, fully extant essay in the exegesis of Egyptian hieroglyphs, the *Hieroglyphica* of Horapollo can be situated within the broader philosophical project in which the Neoplatonic commentators were engaged. As such, it draws on elements of the distinct traditions of Greek reception of Egyptian wisdom, 4th/5th century pagan revivalism under Christian persecution, and late Platonist logico-metaphysical methodological principles.

Third, the rationale for Neoplatonic use of allegorical interpretation as an exegetical tool is founded on the methodological principle of ‘analytic ascent’ from the phenomena depicted, through the concepts under which they fall, to their intelligible causes. These three stages in the ascent correspond to the three modes of expression of which, according to Greek exegetes, hieroglyphic Egyptian, as composites of material images and intelligible content, is capable.

Horapollo’s *Hieroglyphica*, I argue, maintains a tripartite distinction between linguistic expressions, their meanings, and the objects or name-bearers which they depict and further aligns that distinction with three modes of hieroglyphic expression: representative, semantic, and symbolic. I conclude, therefore, that a procedure of analytic explanatory ascent from empirical observation through discursive reason to metaphysical or cosmological insights is employed in the exegesis of the sapiential content of the hieroglyphs of which it treats.

Mark Wildish
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Introduction

The primary aim of this thesis is the reconstruction of a development in the history of the philosophy of language. The development in question is an understanding of hieroglyphic Egyptian as a language uniquely adapted to the purposes and concerns of late Platonist metaphysics. There are earlier conceptions of the particular superiority of hieroglyphic Egyptian for theological and philosophical purposes, both among the Egyptians themselves and in the Greek philosophical tradition. In the Greek philosophical sources the interest in hieroglyphs probably originates with the Stoic writer Chæremon, but it also appears in Platonic sources, including Plutarch. It is, however, with the specifically Neoplatonic development in the understanding of hieroglyphs that I am concerned here. There are two main reasons for this particular focus. The first is the scholastic and curricular inclinations of many of the representatives of Neoplatonism. This allows for far greater integration of their treatment of hieroglyphic Egyptian not only into philosophical linguistics more generally, but also into the broader philosophical project in which they were engaged. The second reason is that the only Greek text on the subject of hieroglyphs to survive complete, the *Hieroglyphica* of Horapollo, can profitably be read, so I shall argue, in the context of Neoplatonic theorizing about language in general and of hieroglyphics in particular.

I describe the development as taking place in the philosophy of language because it identifies language – in this case, a particular language – as a topic of specific interest for the discipline of philosophy. My interest in that development concerns the philosophical status of that development, its methods and conclusions, and is therefore an essay in the history of philosophy of language. Of course, the reconstruction is to a large extent concerned with what are otherwise essentially historical aspects of the literature of late antiquity on the subject of hieroglyphic Egyptian. However, that concern extends only so far as the historical aspect supports a specifically philosophical interest and this is the basis of the secondary aim of the thesis, namely, an assessment of the presuppositions of the development as reconstructed. In this respect the project has more in common with Frede’s characterization of an earlier ‘doxographical tradition’ in the history of philosophy, than the later developmental tradition he distinguishes from it. On the other hand, it no more presupposes ‘a basic set of philosophical questions’, than it is written ‘from a particular philosophical position’ to which the history of philosophy has led us. Far less does it endorse the idea that ‘philosophical understanding is

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essentially historical’. The project is philosophical, rather, because the historical development was thought by its proponents to do philosophical work, and the judgement I form is a judgement on their reasons for thinking so. In principle, then, the ‘basic set of philosophical questions’ addressed ‘from a particular philosophical position’ are those of the late Platonists themselves.

Chapter One begins by examining the philological criticism which has focussed on the tradition’s apparent congruence or otherwise with the success of the decipherment endeavour. The primary interest of the decipherment endeavour was the reconstruction of the language of ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs. As a result of that endeavour a distinction was drawn between sound-signs and sense-signs into which hieroglyphic texts are typically analyzed. The introduction of this distinction is the product of an independent interest in the phonology and semantics of hieroglyphic Egyptian. It does not inform a purely orthographic analysis of sign-groups which are lexically specific and must be learnt as such. It is in any case impossible systematically to maintain the distinction without qualification and equivocation.

The classical hieroglyphic tradition, even where it recognizes the distinction between hieroglyphic sound-signs and sense-signs, often with not inconsiderable sophistication, is almost exclusively interested in hieroglyphs as sense-signs, not, however, as graphic representations of sense (inhering in speech, ideas, or objects), but in themselves as bearers of sense. The use of Greek to provide a descriptive account of the representative features of hieroglyphs is contingent upon the rôle of the sense-bearing glyphs under description. The rôle hieroglyphs are thought to perform is to bear a particular kind of sense, typically conceived of as sapiential: hieroglyphs do not mediate wisdom representatively, they are themselves instances of wisdom.

Chapter Two addresses further relevant aspects of the historical context, specifically 4th/5th century pagan revivalism under Christian persecution, as plausibly representing the most likely milieu for the composition of these texts and source criticism emphasizing the exegetical content of the texts as deriving from elements of the Greek reception of Egyptian wisdom (Chæremon-Plutarch-Porphyry) on the one hand, and the natural history tradition (Aristotle-Pliny-Ælian) on the other. There are, moreover, reasons for developing a dialectical understanding of this literature in the polemical relationship in which a number of Christian works stand with

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respect to it. We have, for example, the corpus of the Coptic archimandrite Shenoute, especially on the question of the rôle of the generated world in licensing metaphysical speculation about the ungenerated world, and on the heterodox tendencies of pagan heresies in general. Shenoute identifies those tendencies as objectionable for two main reasons: first, the reliance on non-Scriptural sources, and second, the application of allegorizing or sophistical reasoning to those sources. The consequence of this for Shenoute is not merely the propagation of false knowledge, but the perversion of the faith. Certain contemporary heterodox sources, including treatises belonging to the Nagʿ-Ḥammādi corpus, had pre-empted Shenoute’s two-fold objection by arguing that certain written characters (ostensibly the revelation of the Logos for the return of mankind to knowledge of the Father) provide a legitimate understanding of the truth by virtue of each character being a complete thought written by the ungenerated Unity. The apparent impasse between the ‘truth’ of Shenoute’s Christian encounter with scriptural revelation and the ‘falsehood’ of pagan enquiry into what is hidden is therefore mediated through a conception of a posteriori reasoning as a reflex of a priori reasoning.

By contrast, certain pagan revivalists conceived of a form of hieroglyphic exegesis methodologically principled in accordance with late academic Platonist logico-metaphysical conceptions. As composites of material images of sensible particulars and the intelligible content by virtue of which those particulars exist, hieroglyphs as conceived by the Neoplatonists lend themselves to analytic inferential procedures through discursive reason to metaphysical insights. In order, then, to assess the dialectical contribution of pagan revivalism to the polemical engagement with Coptic Christianity and the strategy by which it answers the accusations of rationalist obscurity in the face of scriptural revelation an account of these logico-metaphysical conceptions is necessary.

Chapter Three, therefore, explores various rationales for Neoplatonic use of allegorical interpretation as a means to hieroglyphic exegesis. The aim is to establish hieroglyphics both as a proper topic for philosophical investigation, and as methodologically principled. My argument is that this methodological principle is what legitimizes the ‘analytic ascent’ in hieroglyphic exegesis from the phenomena depicted, through the concepts under which they fall, to their intelligible causes. I begin by outlining the three modes of expression of which, according to the Greek exegetes, hieroglyphic Egyptian is capable. The first, mediated by spoken language, is the capacity to represent sensible phenomena. The second presents those phenomena conceptually, but unmediated by speech. The third presents the intelligible causes of phenomena symbolically or
allegoristically. Neoplatonic semantics develops a tripartite theory of meaningful linguistic expressions and this tripartite account Neoplatonic exegetes explain by reference to a metaphysical framework of sensible phenomena, universal concepts, and intelligible causes to which the three modes of expression of hieroglyphic Egyptian correspond. This is possible because hieroglyphic signs are composites of sensible and intelligible elements which are therefore susceptible to interpretation as material images, as mediating concepts, or as intelligible realities.

Chapter Four examines in detail Horapollo’s *Hieroglyphica*, an interpretative exegesis of almost two hundred hieroglyphs in two books. Horapollo’s *Hieroglyphica* is the sole surviving, fully extant essay in the exegesis of Egyptian hieroglyphs. On the one hand, it draws on elements of the Greek reception of Egyptian wisdom and the natural history tradition as described in Chapter One. As such it has the structure of a dictionary-encyclopaedia hybrid type of secondary literature common in the late Roman and early mediæval periods. This mixed provenance signals a distinguishable purpose and associated methodology: *the interpretation of hieroglyphic signs by means of natural signs*. It is not that originally lexicographical or physiological material have become mutually contaminated (a conclusion dependent on a hypothesis of historical development), but that the subjoining of resources indicates the presence of an increasingly productive hermeneutic.

Moreover, the chapter is intended to provide some lines of argument intended to lend plausibility to the suggestion that the traditional lexicographical or physiological material is deployed in line with the discussion of Neoplatonic semantics and exegetics given in Chapter Three. This is partly established on the basis of historical context: the school in Alexandria in which Horapollo taught in the last third of the fifth century, his family’s ties to the leading Neoplatonic figures of the day (Damascius, Proclus), his persecution as a pagan under Christian auspices, reflecting historically prominent regional tendencies of the kind documented in Chapter Two. In view of this historical context there are, moreover, echoes of various strands of Neoplatonic logical, metaphysical, and hermeneutical thought to be found in scarce, but nonetheless theoretically loaded exegetical details and, perhaps more importantly, in a number of broad structural and methodological features of the text too. The evidence, I conclude, while insufficient to identify the text as conclusively Platonic in motivation or purpose, is sufficiently compelling to preclude any further assessment of its merits or demerits on exclusively Egyptological or pseudo-encyclopaedic grounds.
Chapter One: The Hieroglyphic Tradition

§1. Egyptian Hieroglyphs

In his discussion of the varieties of written Egyptian Gardiner (1927) arranges his remarks according to each of four script-types: hieroglyphic, hieratic, demotic, and Coptic. These types variously connote several phases of the Egyptian language, a range of means and media of production, and the classically familiar distinction of secular or religious use. As a whole the scripts can be found carved or painted on stone (though only hieroglyphic is typically glyphic) or written in ink on papyrus using a reed stylus, and are, broadly speaking, employed either for ritual or literary and administrative purposes.

The Egyptian language exhibits five diachronic variants:

(i) Old Egyptian, used in Dynasties I-VIII, dating 3180 B.C. to 2240 B.C.
(ii) Middle Egyptian, used in Dynasties IX-XI, dating 2240 B.C. to 1990 B.C.
(iii) Late Egyptian, used in Dynasties XVIII-XXIV, dating 1573 B.C. to 715 B.C.
(iv) Demotic, used from Dynasty XXV to the late Roman period, dating 715 B.C. to 470 A.D.
(v) Coptic, used from the 3rd to the 16th centuries.

Middle Egyptian is generally taught as the standard form of the language. Hieroglyphic Egyptian appears during the Archaic period (i.e. under Dynasties I & II), not later than 3000 B.C., and the latest example of hieroglyphic Egyptian at Philae is dated 394 A.D. Egyptian constitutes a branch of the Afro-Asiatic or Hamito-Semitic family of languages, and as such is related not only to Semitic Hebrew, Arabic, Aramaic, and Akkadian, but also the Berber, Chadic, Cushitic, Beja, and Omotic language-groups. In very general terms, this affinity is

Anonymus Rhet., sḥy nfr-nds = The Eloquent Peasant (Rusticus eloquens), 334–338.
shown not only in vocabulary, but in the tendency to effect semantic variation through vowel variation in fixed consonantal stems, reduplication, and affixes.

Hieroglyphics are read either vertically (top to bottom) in columns or horizontally (usually right to left, but occasionally left to right) in rows. The front of a sign (e.g. the faces of signs depicting persons, animals, or birds) faces the beginning of the inscription in which they occur. Generally modern texts read left to right. In an effort to achieve symmetry and to avoid gaps signs are often grouped and read top to bottom within a sequence inscribed in rows.

Hieroglyphic is one of three scripts developed in ancient Egyptian. The other two are: hieratic and enchorial (otherwise known as demotic). Hieratic is a cursive form of hieroglyphic. In other words, it consists of characters freely adapted from the hieroglyphic script which was originally primarily used as a script for inscriptions, rather than use on papyrus. Subsequently, both hieroglyphic and hieratic are found in papyrus manuscripts.

In common with Hebrew and Arabic, Egyptian writing is unpointed, i.e. lacks vowels. The standard reference work on the subject lists 743 signs.

The primary interest of the decipherment endeavour was the reconstruction of the language of ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs. As a result of that endeavour a distinction was drawn between sound-signs (phonograms) and sense-signs (ideograms) into which – for most pedagogical purposes (on which more below) – hieroglyphic texts are analyzed.

The latter comprise 1-, 2-, or 3-consonant signs. There are the twenty-four uniliteral phonograms constituting an alphabet. Because hieroglyphics are unpointed, the consonants are conventionally vocalized using the vowel \( e \) in all cases, except after glottal stops, where \( a \) is used. In addition to uniliteral phonograms (the alphabet), there are also biliteral phonograms (with the phonetic value of two alphabetic consonants), and triliteral phonograms (with the phonetic value of three alphabetic consonants). Uniliteral phonograms are also used as phonetic complements in support of multiliteral signs, specifying one of its component phonetic values. Conversely, multiliteral signs are sometimes used as phonetic determinatives, specifying in a single sign the phonetic value of preceding uniliteral signs.
The types of hieroglyphic phonograms then are the following (signs in parentheses are not pronounced):

1. uniliteral phonogram cf. l in l+n+(yn)+(MAN WITH HAND TO MOUTH) = ‘sentence’, ‘saying’.
2. biliteral phonogram cf. iw in iw+y+r+(HOUSE) = ‘street’.
3. triliteral phonogram cf. nh in nh+(MAN WITH HAND TO MOUTH) = ‘swear’, ‘oath’.
5. (biliteral phonetic determinative) cf. lh in lh+(MAN WITH HAND TO MOUTH) = ‘sentence’, ‘saying’.
6. (triliteral phonetic determinative) cf. lh in lh = ‘moon’.

Ideograms are typically taught as sense- rather than sound-signs. They comprise pictograms, ostensibly depicting the object that is meant by the sign, and ideograms, depicting an object the meaning of the sign for which semantically related to the meaning of the word in which the ideogram appears.

7. pictogram cf. r = (SUN) in r+(STROKE DETERMINATIVE) = ‘sun’.
8. ideogram cf. r = (SUN) in r+(STROKE DETERMINATIVE) = ‘day’.

Associated with these are two further sign types. The first are stroke determinatives. These are a short stroke following pictograms and ideograms indicating that the latter signify individual samples of the item depicted. They are therefore used in distinction to a three stroke sign for plural forms. The second are generic determinatives, typically appearing at the end of hieroglyphic words in Middle Kingdom texts (though most likely the original orthographic form of the word historically), which indicate the general semantic field of preceding phonetically spelled word.

9. (stroke determinative) cf. (STROKE DETERMINATIVE) in r+(STROKE DETERMINATIVE) = ‘sun’.
10. (generic determinative) cf. (PINTAIL DUCK) in s [for z(l)]+t+(PINTAIL DUCK) = ‘pintail duck’.

In any case where a sign is used with no pictographic, ideographic, or determinative value, it is eo ipso a phonogram and a rebus. A sign is a rebus if the word for the item the glyph depicts has a phonetic value in Egyptian which is not being used pictographically or ideographically. If also lexically complete (i.e. forms a complete Egyptian word), it is eo ipso a logogram.
11. *rebus* cf. *hw* [=(NEWBORN BUBALIS OR HARTEBEEST)] in *iwyтр* (HOUSE) = 'street’.

12. *logogram* cf. *s3* [for *z3* = (PINTAIL DUCK)] in *s3* [for *z3* = (PINTAIL DUCK)]-(STROKE DETERMINATIVE)-(SEATED MAN) = 'son’.

Gardiner also lists the following non-standard features of orthography:

i. abbreviations  
ii. graphic transpositions  
iii. transpositions with honorific intent  
iv. monograms  
v. defective and superfluous writings  
vi. group-writing  
vii. determination of compounds  
viii. avoidance of the repetition of like consonantal signs in contiguity  
ix. doubtful readings

The distinction between sound-signs and sense-signs in hieroglyphic Egyptian is a product of the standard process of transliteration, whose object is to preserve in a normalized form only the unreduplicated phonetic information to be found in a hieroglyphic inscription. The transliteration of hieroglyphic Egyptian is not reversible. It is not intended that a transliterated word be reconstructable in accordance with hieroglyphic orthography solely by reference to its transliterated form. Transliteration does not involve one-to-one correspondence with hieroglyphic orthography, but provides the (unpointed and) normalized phonetic value of the hieroglyphs. Hieroglyphic transliterations, in other words, are conceived with the aim of teaching the student how to read, but do not make it possible to write hieroglyphic Egyptian.

To illustrate this, compare the five hieroglyphs constituting standard Middle Egyptian orthography for a word meaning 'strength’, depicting the following objects or name-bearers respectively: a ripple-of-water, a branch, a human-placenta, bread, and a forearm-with-hand-holding-stick. According to the standard account, the first four are phonograms (the second biliteral, with the third and fourth uniliteral phonetic complements

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4 Gardiner sign-inventory references: N35 M3 Aa1 X1 D40.
which spell out the two elements of the preceding bilateral sign) and the fifth an ideogram (in this case, determinative).

A non-Egyptian-speaking reader learns that M3, for example, depicts a branch, which has the phonetic value \(ht\), and means ‘wood’, and determines through syntactic considerations that the phonetic value is here in use. Again, that D40 depicts a forearm-with-hand-holding-stick with a syntactically ideographic or determinative value signifying a class of words concerning force or effort. That is, with phonetically redundant detail appearing between \(<>\), the full sequence reads: \(<\text{ripple-of-water}> (= n = <'water'>) + <\text{branch}> (= ht = <'wood'>) + <\text{human-placenta}> (= <h> = <'placenta'>) + <\text{bread}> (= t = <'bread'>) + <\text{forearm-with-hand-holding-stick}> (= <nht> = <'strong'>), i.e. \(nht = <'strong'>\).

I have outlined above how a non-Egyptian-speaking reader is taught to understand the five hieroglyphs comprising the word for ‘strength’. By contrast, the Egyptian-speaker, for whom the phonetic reading is straightforwardly \(nht\), the question is a matter of spelling. That is to say, what are identified in the Egyptian-language readings of the glyphs are not, then, utterances, concepts, or objects so distinguished, but precisely the (non-arbitrary) Egyptian signs \(n, ht, h, t, and nht\), without having to employ any distinctions as to phonetic or ideographic usage. The answers to the questions, ‘how is the inscription pronounced?’ and ‘what does the inscription mean?’ are in each case the same, namely \(nht\).

The question ‘what does the inscription depict?’; however, is answered by spelling out the inscription sign-by-sign. In English this may be done by assigning sign-references or by describing the item depicted by each sign. For an Egyptian-speaker, however, the spelling of the inscription involves naming the sign, in Egyptian, as follows: \(n, ht, h, t, nht\).

Standard hieroglyphic transliteration does not preserve this feature of hieroglyphic orthography. In order to do so without loss of phonetic information that is preserved by transliteration I shall adopt an augmented method which I shall call ‘transcription’. So, for example, the sequence described above for the Egyptian word for ‘strong’ \((nht)\) is transcribed: \(n-HT-<h>-<<t>-\text{ns}\). This is not intended to be a hypothesis about how in

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1 Thus reversing the use of the terms ‘transliteration’ and ‘transcription’ as applied to Akkadian cuneiform.
2 For a full sample text, transcription, normalized transliteration, and translation see Appendix 1.
fact hieroglyphic texts may historically have been spelled out, only to preserve a sign-for-sign correspondence between text and transcription in the sense in which I here use the term.
§2 Greek Hieroglyphs

Reading, with few exceptions, modern appraisals of their value, one might never suspect the significance of studies of hieroglyphic Egyptian, made in the classical sources. Classical (and in particular Greek) sources of evidence for knowledge and use of hieroglyphs are neither so abundant as to have ensured since Champollion (1822) their preservation from comparative neglect, nor so scarce as to explain the sparse attention they have received in modern classical scholarship.

Linguistic artefacts, like the Rosetta stone, the Flaminian obelisk of Augustus, the obelisk of Constantius in the Circus Maximus, and the Isiac table, as belonging amongst the ‘Greek, Hebrew or Latin translations of hieroglyphic texts’ of which Champollion made use, are not, despite the apparently crucial rôle they play in the pre-nineteenth century studies, of primary interest here (except insofar as both Egyptian and Græco-Roman monumental and literary material can be shown to exemplify principles identified in the classical analyses).

There is also an extensive classical tradition of histories of Egypt and αἰγυπτιακά. Though beginning with Hecataeus of Mileus (550-476 B.C.), the first major historical source is the second book of Herodotus (484-430/425 B.C.), who establishes several of the major themes of subsequent accounts: flora and fauna, monumental architecture, cultic activity &c. Hellanicus of Lesbos (fl. 5th cent. B.C.), Eudoxus of Cnidos (410/408-355/347 B.C.), Lysimachus (360-281 B.C.), Hecataeus of Abdera (fl. 4th cent. B.C.), and Manethon of Sebenytos (fl. 305-285 B.C.) are fragmentary, though elements of this early tradition are in part preserved in the first book of Diodorus Siculus (80-20 B.C.).

The Αἰγυπτιακά of Manethon ought perhaps to be mentioned in particular, insofar as the chronology it contains provided evidence used by Champollion in the decipherment of the royal cartouches. Subsequently there are the works of Apollonius Molon (fl. c.70 B.C.), Strabo (64 B.C.-22 A.D.) Apion (fl. 1st cent. A.D.), Flavius Josephus (fl. c.70 A.D.), and the Roman historians: Gaius Cornelius Tacitus (56-117 A.D.) and Ammianus

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7 See e.g. Deiber, A., (1904) and Van De Walle, B. & Vergote, J., (1943) & (1947); both pay particular attention to the passage from Clement in this context.
8 For which see Pignoria (1605; 1669) and Kircher’s mid-seventeenth century Egyptological works. Despite further a handful of retrospective rehabilitations (see especially Leemans (1835), Van de Walle & Vergote (1945, 1947) and Sbordone (2002)), the ‘imaginative folly’ and ‘fruitless speculations’ of Kircher from 1636 for the next thirty or so years have generally been considered irredeemable by modern Egyptology.
9 According to the biography of Champollion in the Egyptian newspaper الأهرام (‘al-‘ahrām) in the centenary year of decipherment.
10 Even the Greek on the Rosetta stone was likely translated from Egyptian into Greek by an Egyptian (see Harrison, Histos, 1999).
Marcellinus (325-391 A.D.). Despite, however, rather full accounts of several recurring Egyptian themes in the afore-mentioned, only Herodotus and Ammianus provide any substantial information on hieroglyphic Egyptian beyond noting the appearance of the two scripts identifiable.

The evidence for knowledge of Egyptian φωνή and γράμματα respectively, as either attributed to (Pythagoras in Iamblichus) or evidenced by classical authors (e.g. Hermapion in Ammianus), implies a more sophisticated and detailed knowledge of the language than is generally acknowledged. Pythagoras had been credited with knowledge of Egyptian, and specifically Egyptian φωνή, but for particulars concerning the spoken language Herodotus and Plutarch are two of the fuller sources. Typically any material provided concerning the phonetic properties of Egyptian words is confined to proper and common nouns, of which a dozen or so examples can be found in Herodotus, and a further two dozen in Plutarch.

By the time the first references to Egypt appear in classical sources Egypt itself had been subject to multiple periods of non-native control (Libyan, Assyrian, Persian). That this was the case may have influenced the Greek debate about the relative priority of the Egyptians and the Æthiopians, particularly in connection with the origins of writing. The debate as to the precise antiquity and historical circumstances under which writing was invented acknowledged several competing sources: Assyrian, Egyptian, Syrian, Phœnician, and Babylonian. The passage from Diodorus Siculus cited above is of particular interest in this context because not only does he attribute both the origins of letters and also of language itself to Hermes without offering competing accounts, he also employs a very particular (though by no means unique) device for fixing the attribution: the etymology of the name Hermes in his teaching the Greeks the ἐρμηνεία of their thoughts.

From the earliest classical discussions a basic distinction in written Egyptian is observed between ‘sacred letters’ (γράμματα ἱερά) and ‘demotic’ (δημοτικά), that is, ‘two types of letters, both those called sacred and those with the commoner learning’ (γράμματα διετα, τά τε ἱερά καλούμενα καὶ τά κοινοτέρον ἔχοντα τὴν μάθησιν). Greek interest in the written language is almost exclusively focussed on the former, as, for example, in Plutarch: ‘out of sacred letters’ (ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων) and ‘of the letters called hieroglyphic’

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11 Plutarchus Biogr., Phil., De Iside et Osiride, 10.
12 Diogenes Laërtius Biogr., 8.3.
13 E.g. πυριμα in Egyptian is καλὸς κἀγαθός in Greek (Herodotus, 2.143.4); the transcription of the name ‘Ozymandias’ (Diodorus Siculus); Plutarchus Biogr., Phil., De iside et Osiride, pass.
14 Pliny, Natural History, 7.56.
15 Herodotus Hist., 2.36 & Diodorus Siculus, 1.81.4. Both cited in Maréstaing (1913). There is in general a limited range of Greek and Roman terms for a hieroglyphic sign: σημεῖον-signum; γράμματα-litera; σύμβολον; σχῆμα; ἱερογλυφικά; figura; species; simulacrum; ἀγάλματα.
(τῶν γὰρ καλυμένων ἱερογραφικῶν γραμμάτων). If demotic script is little emphasized, however, according to Champollion, both hieroglyphic Egyptian (whether carved or painted) and hieratic Egyptian are to be understood as the γράμματα ἱερά of classical sources.

In the Stromata of Clement of Alexandria, three scripts are distinguished: epistolographic, hieratic, and hieroglyphic. Though the classificatory schema Clement describes is perhaps the most sophisticated in the classical sources, it is also notoriously brief and consequently highly contentious. Several studies have been made intended to establish the relative success or failure of classical accounts of written Egyptian to correspond with the principles and findings of modern Egyptology. Though in general the verdict has not been favourable, both Deiber (1904) and Vergote (1939), for example, have established that several passages do contain a core of substantially well informed observations on genuinely Egyptian linguistic material. Clement is also the first to distinguish three scripts.

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19 Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927), for example, notes ‘the tradition of the classical writers and the early Fathers, whose confused and mutually contradictory statements, if they point anywhere, point in a direction diametrically opposed to the truth’ (p.11). Elements of ‘sane testimony’ (ibid.), Gardiner claims, survive in the historians, but are contrasted with the ‘mystical assertions’, ‘grotesque allegorical reasons’ and ‘fantastic explanations’ of the Greek exegeses.
20 Deiber, Clément d’Alexandrie et l’Égypte (Cairo: l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 1904).
§3. Genres of Exegesis

Based on an analysis of the (typically erratic) arrangement of word-lists such as the *Ramesseum Onomasticon* and the *Onomasticon of Amenope* by category (‘birds, animals, cereals, parts of an ox, geographical names, and the like’) Gardiner draws the conclusion that these texts represent the “first steps in the direction of an Encyclopaedia”. Reporting this conclusion, Fox acknowledges that the Egyptian word-lists are often so arranged, but sees no reason to attribute this fact to a desire on the part of the authors to reflect categorial hierarchies in the phenomena of nature. Though in certain cases the forms of hieroglyphs are in fact related conceptually to the items they depict, a much more likely motivation, Fox argues, is that the *onomastica* were used to teach the writing of hieroglyphs. This would help explain the inclusion of orthographic variants in these texts, and separate entries for synonymous expressions. (As Fox points out, such considerations cannot apply to comparable texts in either Hebrew or Greek where orthographical considerations necessitate completely different kinds of pedagogical provision.) Interest in the *realia* depicted in such lists is a comparatively late phenomenon, typically found in Demotic rather than in hieroglyphic sources. Even here, though the lists are organized by individual sign rather than words in which they commonly appear, a primary focus on orthography is still likely since the texts do not share common organizational themes.

Amongst lexicographical texts a number of forms are possible. It is the Glossary, for example, that provides explanations of abstruse, technical, dialectal, or foreign terms (in Egyptian samples often with bilingual equivalents in Greek or Latin). Kramer, furthermore, distinguishes two main types of ancient glossary: *Gebrauchsglossare* and *Schulglossare*. The former were intended as popular handbooks and for daily use. The latter belonged to the scholarly tradition of lexicography. Within the second group there subsequently developed a further distinction between more complex lexicographical forms such as the *Idiomata* and *Hermeneumata*. The first “always regarded Greek as the norm, [and] listed grammatical differences between the two languages,” whereas the second “had a primarily lexical interest and contained lists of words (such as no. 5 in K.’s collection) and short texts with a literal translation.”

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24 Specifically, logograms and ideographic determinatives; cf. Appendix 1.
25 Cf. also the mediæval Græco-Coptic *scalæ*, or topical word-lists.
Developments towards the provision of explanatory information beyond simple lexical glosses, including semantic, grammatical, or etymological, as well as factual material, represent intermediate cases between the simple glossaries of lexicography proper and the broader philological and exegetical tradition. Sluiter identifies lexicographical texts of this type as belonging to one of several groups of Greek texts constituting the class of secondary literature:

“lexica, paraphrases, the so-called "περί-literature" ("on" specific topics in ancient authors), ἐπιμερισμοί (exhaustive, word-for-word discussions), scholia, ζητήματα / ἀπορήματα / προβλήματα-literature with or without léseiš (sic) (that is, the identification of critical problems in ancient authors, sometimes with "solutions"), Ἀπίτομα (sic), and commentaries (conventionally distinguished by the explicit presence of lómmata (sic) sections of the source-text that are then being explained).”

Moreover, there is a problematic aspect to the assignment of genre to a study at least partly belonging to a discipline responsible for assigning genre (philology) compounded not only by the apparently dual generic affiliation of the text, but also by the fact that it is not at all clear that secondary literature as such enjoyed a recognized status as a separate genre or range of genres within ancient classifications of literary form. Isocrates distinguishes as many prose as poetic τρόποι or ἱδέαι, but does not identify a category relevant in this context. Six prose genres were recognized by Callimachus (c. IIIrd B.C.) in his Πίνακες, including history, oratory, philosophy, and law. A reference in the full title of this work to paideia quite generally may indicate the possibility that grammarians (philologists) might be subsumed under the πίναξ τῶν παντοδαπῶν. Though later works tend to show greater interest in the subject, on the question of the specific sub-genre to which we ought to assign the Hieroglyphica, the text is, however, both explicit and technically precise.

The exegetical themes employed in the interpretation of the hieroglyphic signary by Horapollo are therefore not merely legitimated by virtue of their Egyptian provenance, but in the context of Alexandrian hieroglyphic semiotics, are methodologically justified too. Therefore, even if, as a result of limited evidence for contemporary eidography on secondary forms of literature, difficulties present themselves concerning the

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30 In which ‘registers’ or ‘tables’ of individuals and their works are arranged either by genre or professional affiliation.

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possibility of classifying the *Hieroglyphica* as belonging to a specific *genre*, then still it is possible clearly to identify features of the text more overtly relevant to determining how one should (or indeed how its original readers did) go about reading it. In other words, situating the *Hieroglyphica* in particular lines of historical or generic development entails the imposition of certain artificial limits on the range of historical materials to which the *genre* may be thought applicable, or generic uses to which the material may be put. This results in the failure to recognise the significance of the text’s apparently mixed provenance, which is not as incongruous as it seems, but in fact signals a distinguishable purpose and associated methodology: the *interpretation of hieroglyphic signs by means of natural signs*. It is not that originally lexicographical or paradoxographical material have become mutually contaminated (a conclusion which requires the further hypothesis that the text is the product of a certain of historical development). Rather, the extension (ὑπέταξα) which comprises Book Two of the *Hieroglyphica* of those resources that were utilized in Book One indicates the presence of an increasingly productive hermeneutic. The impact of this would not be felt, therefore, in the development of the methodologies proper to dictionaries and encyclopaedias, *i.e.* definition, translation, or classification, but in semiotically determined *genres*. Upon the issue of a series of printed editions of the text in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it was to the tradition of *emblematics* as exemplified in Valeriano’s *Hieroglyphica* and Alciato’s *Emblemata* that the interpretative methodology of the *Hieroglyphica* thereafter made its extensive contribution.

For practical convenience one might begin a review of the relationship between the Greek hieroglyphic tradition and the Egyptian by considering the range of signs and (in this context) the range of objects they depict (whatever they may signify) according to Gardiner’s sign-list. Here they are arranged in twenty-six categories (A to Aa, excluding J) each designating a group of related concepts: e.g. ‘man and his occupations’ (A), ‘buildings, parts of buildings’ (O), ‘strokes, signs derived from hieratic, geometrical figures’ (Z). In the Greek tradition our first major historical source on the use of hieroglyphs is the second book of Herodotus (484-430/425 B.C.), who establishes several of the major classes of sign found in subsequent accounts: flora and fauna, monumental architecture, cultic activity &c. Similar groupings of hieroglyphic signs can be found in later sources too. Ammianus Marcellinus, for example, notes the vulture, bee, and ‘volucrum ferarumque genera multa [...] et animalium species innumeris multas’, but other groupings also exist. Ultimately, relevant

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32 Horapollo Gramm., *Hieroglyphica* 2.1.5.
33 Herodotus Hist., 2.125.
34 Ammianus Marcellinus, *Rerum gestarum libri*, 17.4; 22.15.
material might include any natural objects or phenomena (divine names, sacred animals, theosophy, comets &c.) thought to be susceptible of being signified in some sense: natural signs, written signs of sounds, or hieroglyphic signs of natural objects.

It seems clear, however, that the hieroglyphic categories found in the Greek sources are not arranged solely according to the orthographic constraints that influenced the Egyptian onomastica. For example, every hieroglyph identified by Clement of Alexandria not only has native Egyptian credentials, but they are cited in two passages in the Stromata reflecting on the symbolic style in philosophy and theology. Nor are these the only references in the Stromata to the explanatory value of a semiology that brings hieroglyphic orthography into alignment with the pursuit of natural science or philosophy. The model of the semiological curriculum (cosmology, moral virtues) has an instructive purpose, which, despite Clement’s assurance that this is how the Egyptians learn their letters is not confined to instruction in exclusively Egyptian practice. More importantly, there is a sense in which the model is justified by the fact that the Egyptians pursue a philosophy of their own (μετίασι γὰρ οἰκείαν τινὰ φιλοσοφίαν Αἰγύπτιοι·). Clement catalogues the subjects covered by this philosophy in a catalogue of thirty-six out of forty-two books which he enumerates in accordance with the order of a certain ceremonial procession. This catalogue of forty-two books comprises: two books of music, four books of astrology, one paideutic and one moschophatic book, ten books concerning Egyptian worship, six medical books, ten ‘hieratic’, and eight with which the sacred scribe must acquaint himself. All but the six medical books are described as ‘containing the whole philosophy of the Egyptians’ (τὴν πᾶσαν Αἰγυπτίων περιεχούσας φιλοσοφίαν).

Next in order the sacred scribe proceeds, with wings on his head, and a book and rule in his hands, in which were writing ink and a reed, with which they write. And he must know what are called hieroglyphics, and about

36 See below: Dionysius Thrax Gramm., Fragmenta 52.1-20 = Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 5.8.45.4 [T202].
37 Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata, 5.4.20.1-21.4 & 5.7.41.1-43.3.
38 Additional reflections by Clement on the relative capacities of the Greek and Egyptian languages for expressing philosophical truth are also found at Stromata 1.21.143.6 & 6.4.35-37.1.
39 Ultimately, a similarly inexact model is still a basic pedagogical tool for learners of hieroglyphic Egyptian.
40 Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata, 6.4.35.2.
41 Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata, 6.4.35-37. The remaining six books are medical.
42 Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 6.4.35-37.
43 Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 6.4.37.3.2-3.
Clement is explicit then that hieroglyphics formed part of the *philosophy* of the Egyptians in a way that even the medical books do not (though the latter might have been expected to be included in a Greek context). In contrast to the earlier Clementian passage alluded to above, which is limited to a demonstration a detailed systematic knowledge of the script for Greek knowledge of hieroglyphic Egyptian, the significance of this later sequence extends as far as legitimising the etymological and allegorical exegeses of hieroglyphs as they appear in the tradition. The questions raised by this distinction between exegesis as textual archaeology and exegesis as textual redeployment are dealt with later, but even if in particular instances hieroglyphs were not used in the symbolic-allegorical manner among the Egyptians themselves, still the exegetical themes reflected genuinely hieroglyphic tradition.

Any general account of hieroglyphic Egyptian offering philological and historical evidence in support of the reading it offers quite properly engages in an inductive method of enquiry with a view to attaining a correct theoretical account of the full complexity of the rules of hieroglyphic orthography. This, briefly put, is the approach employed in the decipherment endeavour, for which the *recovery of the language of ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs* is the principal objective. The sense (if not always the exact meaning) of the vast majority of extant hieroglyphic texts has been put beyond reasonable doubt following precisely this method, the principles of which are, for that reason, no longer in question. What is thought by the classical hieroglyphic tradition, on the other hand, to have been preserved in the specific context of the hieroglyphic signary and texts, is original, primitive, true, or ultimately perfect Egyptian wisdom. The idea is well-attested in the textual tradition of Egyptian wisdom literature itself, though the range of its generality in the classical sources is significantly extended.

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44 Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., *Stromata*, 6.4.36.1–8.
45 Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., *Stromata* 5.4.20.3–21.3
46 Some are genuinely straightforward: *spelling*, for example. Others are exceedingly complex, as, for example, the ‘sportive’ writing of certain Ptolemaic texts.
47 In the present context, the important feature is the particular Egyptian provenance of the notion of hieroglyphs embodying wisdom. Wisdom literature as such is not conceived of as a collection of adages and homilies intended exclusively as instruction on the ways and means of life in accordance with Amat (truth, justice), but ought to exemplify the principles it espouses. The idea at stake (in wisdom as textual tradition), is that ensures its transmission precisely because in preserved (i.e. written) form. Wisdom does not stand at a remove from the text of which it is the subject. Even as the theme of the literature surrounding it, wisdom is part of the structure of that

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Where knowledge of the original circumstances of Egyptian hieroglyphic usage is in decline, and the reception of the wisdom of ancient Egypt is a dominant concern, the rules historically applied are of less importance than the range of the hieroglyphic signs themselves and the possibilities of their use as an exegetical resource. Neither the approach via Egyptian linguistic practice, nor via later exegetical strategies, however, has satisfactorily clarified the philosophical context (concerning theories of the origins and function of language or of linguistic signification), for either conception. Nor have they provided such independent justification as might be thought necessary for either the deployment of these strategies in explanation of hieroglyphs, or the particular suitability of hieroglyphs for the purposes to which they are put.

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It may be helpful in this context to think of hieroglyphs each as one of several thousand playing cards in a hieroglyphic deck: each card has a face value – how the face values of cards in this hieroglyphic deck are played, however, necessitates an explanation of the rules of any game played with them.
§4. Hieroglyphic Wisdom

Following van Bekkum’s analysis of the emergence of the commentary form in the exegesis of sacred literature. Even as such a precursor, however, it represents a culmination of an exegetical tradition which originated not in textual studies, but in such things as “divine signs, meteorological phenomena, and possibly even oracles” (p. 185). These mirabilia not only provide certain clear parallels with the paradoxographical exegeses, but also indicate a possible rationale for the interpretative methodology. Moreover, this was a possibility concerning which glossography itself was perhaps not unaware. Fragment 52 of the grammarian Dionysius Thrax, for example, appears to point to a ‘conception of semiology as a science that can embrace, not only linguistic, but also natural signs’.

Also Dionysius Thrax, the grammarian, in his book, Respecting the Exposition of the Symbolical Signification in Circles, says expressly, “Some signified actions not by words only, but also by symbols: by words, as is the case of what are called the Delphic maxims, ‘Nothing in excess,’ ‘Know thyself,’ and the like; and by symbols, as the wheel that is turned in the temples of the gods, derived from the Egyptians, and the branches that are given to the worshippers. For the Thracian Orpheus says: ‘Whatever works of branches are a care to men on earth, not one has one fate in the mind, but all things revolve around; and it is not lawful to stand at one point, but each one keeps an equal part of the race as they began.’ The branches either stand as the symbol of the first food, or they are the symbol of certain of the Greek Magical Papyri, in this latter respect particularly, may point to an Egyptian precursor. See PGM II, 1.17-20; PGM III, 1.701; PGM IV, 1.945. And it is on this account that they will have it that the branches are given; and perhaps also that they may know, that as these, on the other hand, are burned, so also they themselves speedily leave this life, and will become fuel for fire.”

52 Dionysius Thrax Gramm., Fragmenta 52.1-20 = Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 5.8,45.4.

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Moreover, not only does the source for the fragment provide a significant link not only to the broader subject of symbolism, but to that of hieroglyphic symbolism in particular, but such a conception of the peculiar suitability of hieroglyphic Egyptian for sacred texts is also fully in accord with Egyptian practice itself, since at this period demotic was in such wide use for administrative purposes that hieroglyphs had become the medium of preference for formulaic and ritualistic use. 53 Egyptian wisdom literature ensures its transmission precisely because it exemplifies mēth, or (truth, justice) preserved in written form. 54

53 See Diodorus Siculus Hist., Bibliotheca historica (lib. 1-20) 3.3.5.
54 Apart from issues of translation arising from the use of loan-words, and issues of ritual power in the alternation between Egyptian and Greek in the PGM & PDM, cf. e.g. Clement Alexanderinus Theol., Stromata 5.7.41.2.1-2: 'Ὅμοια γοῦν τοῖς Ἑβραϊκοῖς κατὰ γε τὴν ἐπίκρυψιν καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑβραίων αἰνίγματα; the distinction conferred upon the king whereby he had access to the secret teachings of the priests is also the topic of Plutarchus Biogr., Phil., De Iside et Osiride, 9.354 B-C: τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπικεκρυμμένης τὰ πολλά; cf. also Corpus Hermeticum Phil., Theol., Fragmenta 23.7.1-9.

For my teacher Hermes often used to say in talk with me when we were alone, and sometimes when Tat was with us, that those who read my writings will think them to be quite simply and clearly written, but those who hold opposite principles to start with will say the style is obscure, and conceals the meaning. And it will be thought still more obscure in time to come, when the Greeks think fit to translate these writings from our tongue into theirs. Translation will greatly distort the sense of the writings, and cause much obscurity. Expressed in our native language, the teaching conveys its meaning clearly; for the very quality of the sounds and the "power" of the Egyptian words has in it the force of the things signified. Therefore, my King, as far as it is in your power, and you are all-powerful, keep the teaching untranslated, in order that secrets so holy may not be revealed to Greeks, and that the Greek mode of speech, with its disdainfulness, and feebleness, and showy tricks of style, may not reduce to impotence the impressive strength of the language, and the cogent force of the words. For the speech of the Greeks, my King, is devoid of power to convince; and the Greek philosophy is nothing but a noise of talk. But our speech is not mere talk; it is an utterance replete with workings.

55 Corpus Hermeticum, ‘Ὅροι Ἀσκληπιοῦ πρὸς Ἀμμώνα βασιλέα 1.5-2.13.
Though a possible objection to the idea is acknowledged in the observation that there are those who will say the style of the Hermetic texts is ‘obscure and conceals the meaning’, the text limits the source of the criticism to ‘those who hold opposite principles to start with’. Seeking the meaning of the words in the original Egyptian language, it is suggested, will remove the obscurity and render the structure of the books ‘quite straightforward and clear’ (ἀπλοντάτη καὶ σαφής). Copenhagen further notes that Derchain recognises an Egyptian-conceived ‘definition of the function of language’ and that Fowden reads ‘evidence of Egyptian linguistic nativism’ in what he calls the ‘conceit’ regarding ineffectual translations from the Egyptian into the Greek language. Nonetheless, strong Platonizing undercurrents inform the contrast between ‘arrogant and showy Greek speech’ (Ὑπερήφανος φράσις ... καὶ ὀσοπερ κεκαλλωπισμένη), on the one hand, as exemplified in Greek philosophy, punningly referred to as ‘the noise of talk’ (φιλοσοφία, λόγων ψόφως), and, on the other hand, ‘the ἡ power of the Egyptian words’ (ἡ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ὁνόματων), which ‘has the force of the things signified’ (ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῶν λεγομένων). Clement too makes the point; nor is he the only patristic source to raise the matter.

The particular power inherent in Egyptian for theological purposes, which both Hermeticism and Neoplatonism endorse, and the doctrine of untranslatability it entails, is at least in part reversed in the corpus of Greek and Demotic magical papyri. These often bilingual texts not only frequently intersperse a predominantly Greek or Demotic sequence with both shorter and longer passages in the other of the two languages, they also impute a ritual power and significance peculiar to Greek itself. In these sequences correctly inflected Greek glosses on the Demotic text are introduced, along with Greek loan-words, suggesting a translation of a Greek original into Demotic preserving magically significant Greek features in order not to undermine the power inherent therein. The Neoplatonic injunction concerning the untranslatability of original languages here actually provides a model for a situation in which Greek is accorded magical priority over Egyptian.

Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity

The corpus of Greek and Demotic magical papyri is of interest in this connection to the extent it exemplifies several of the features of the symbolic method in practice. Three terms from these texts are of particular relevance: σύμβολα μυστικὰ, ἑρμηνεύματα, and συνθήματα. Each reoccurs in the contexts of the endeavour to synthesize the Greek and Egyptian hieroglyphic traditions, the mystery-terminology of Clement’s analysis of hieroglyphs, and the methodology employed in their exegesis in, for example, Iamblichus. The third term, most distinctively, also suggests a connection between the thematic force of the glyphs chosen for exegesis in Clement (and sources) and the formulæ for magical syntheses or compounds, particularly since συνθήματα is also readable as ‘signs’ or ‘tokens’. Not only does the principle involved in both cases seem to involve the same hermeneutic principles, but the ingredients of the compounds (i.e. elements in the syntheses) for the latter correspond, sometimes in specific detail, with hieroglyphs given allegorical symbolic exegesis elsewhere. In one instance actual examples of hieroglyphic script are specified in the context of securing secrecy about what is revealed in initiation into the mysteries by means of what are generally referred to in Demotic as examples of ghōrgter (χαρακτήρ). Of the five glyphs used here, at least four are genuinely Egyptian. They are, in full: (i) a geometric arrow design; (ii) the hpr-scarab; (iii) the wdt-eye; (iv) two sticks crossed; and (v) a sitting dog. The sequence as composed cannot be translated according to standard Egyptian grammar, however, if the sequence is read as a σύμβολον according to the sort of principles applied by Clement, the elements in synthetic combination can be read as establishing (rather than being justified by) their mutual interrelations.

Only two Greek titles specifically concerned with the Egyptian language are extant from the period (the Ἴερογλυφικά of Charaemon and Horapollo respectively) and only one (the latter) survives intact. There is some precedent in the secondary literature for adducing several of the elements of the hieroglyphic traditions as detailed above in an effort to emphasize both the generic affiliations and, in fact, sources of Horapollo’s Hieroglyphica. What is absent from these attempts is an account of the tensions between the common features in which the text shares with the preceding pagan traditions and the contrasting Coptic and Christian response to hieroglyphic Egyptian and its rôle in 5th century Egyptian polemic. The following chapter addresses the possibility of reading the Hieroglyphica, as it were, from without, from the vantage-point of Coptic Christianity, engaged in that polemic as part of a pagan revivalist movement in late 5th century Egypt.

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63 See PGM II, II.17–20; PGM III, I.701; PGM IV, I.945.
64 PGM XII, col.XII, II.402–409.
65 PDM xiv. II.117–149.
Chapter Two: The Coptic-Pagan Controversy

§1 Author and Text

In a counter-petition filed against his estranged wife, a landowner in Phænebythis named Flavius Horapollo, the son of Asclepiades, identifies himself as ‘the clarissimus and eloquent philosopher’:

[Σ201] [Ἕλληνικον ἀλβέλλον παρ εμῷ Ὀραπόλλιλλονς Ἀσκληπιάδου, τοῦ λαμπρο-τάτον καὶ ελλογύλλου φιλοσοφοῦ, κεκτητῆν ἐν Φενεβυθίῳ].

Counter-petition laid by Horapollo, son of Asclepiades, the very renowned and very eloquent philosopher, land-owner in Phænebythis.

Suda Ω 159 records two Horapollones, (usually identified as grandfather and grandson), both grammatici. The elder Horapollo (fl. 408 A.D. - 450 A.D.) of Phænebythis (a village in the Egyptian nome of Panopolis), taught in Alexandria, and afterwards, under Theodosius II, in Constantinople. He was author of an enquiry into sacred enclosures or temples (Τεμενικά), commentaries (ὑπομνήματα) on Sophocles and Alcaeus, and a volume entitled Εἰς Ὅμηρον, the choice of these three authors possibly reflecting an intention to provide a treatment of each of the three genres of tragedy, lyric, and epic.68 A third Horapollo is named in P. Bod. 1.73.3.10 (reign of Heraclius) – here an inhabitant of the Herakliopolite nome.69

The single most important source of biographical information on the younger Horapollo comes from Damascius’ Vita Isidori. In it are charted the philosophical careers of the late 5th and early 6th century Neoplatonists in Athens, Alexandria, Aphrodisias, and Apamea – the diadochi of the aurea catena comprising municipal chair-holders in the Platonic schools and their circle. According to Damascius’ account, the elder Horapollo had two sons, Asclepiades and Heraiscus, under both of whom Isidore studied.70 Flavius Horapollo of Menouthis (fl. 474 A.D. - 491 A.D.) or ‘Psychapollo’,71 was the son of Asclepiades and both the nephew and son-in-law of Heraiscus, with whom he was arrested and tortured under Zeno’s persecution of the pagans.72

Formerly the author of the Hieroglyphica was identified with Horapollo the elder, but subsequent work by

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69 Litinas, N., Hierapollon, the Title of Panos Polis and the Names in –apollon (University of Crete: Workshop of Papyrology and Epigraphy): p.103.
71 Zacharias Mytileneus Rhet., Vita Severi 32.
Maspero\textsuperscript{73} and then Rémordon\textsuperscript{74} have identified Horapollo Νειλώος with the younger man. Kaster thinks the matter ‘uncertain’ and counsels caution, though he goes on to argue that ‘the name “Horapollon” itself makes it virtually certain that H. [i.e. Fl. Horapollo] was a descendant of the gramm. Horapollon’.\textsuperscript{75} On the grounds that postulating a third Horapollo, also belonging to the same family, is perhaps less cautious than accepting an identification with one of the afore-mentioned bearers of the name I follow Maspero and Rémordon, whose analyses of the testimonia of Damascius’ \textit{Vita Isidori} make the identification very likely indeed.

The younger Horapollo continued to maintain the school in Alexandria with which his family had long been associated.\textsuperscript{76} Described as both γραμματικός and φιλόσοφος, it has been supposed\textsuperscript{77} that either some degree of social positioning by means of the deliberate appropriation of philosophical status to set his work apart from ‘mere’ grammar is involved, or, alternatively, that a contrast between professional affiliation and private interest is indicated. On the other hand, I see no reason not to concede that he was in fact both and the purpose of the following is, accordingly, to argue that the claims for his philosophical accomplishment made in the counter-petition is not merely plausible (and not by virtue of the testimonia alone), but also substantive, formally, methodologically, and in terms of exegetical content.

Insofar as the testimonia are concerned, it is known that Heraiscus (the son of the elder Horapollo, and the brother of the younger Horapollo) addressed one of his books to Proclus, who, according to Damascius, apparently had considerable respect for the former’s work.

They say that even Proclus is said to agree that Heraiscus was his superior; for [it is said that] what he himself knew the latter also knew, but [that] what Heraiscus Proclus still did not.

In another passage concerning the death and burial of Heraiscus (Horapollo’s uncle) prepared by Asclepiades (Horapollo’s father), about whom Horapollo also writes in the document quoted in [T201] as one of the pious dead he too had attained sainthood.\textsuperscript{79}


\textsuperscript{74} Rémordon, R., ‘L’Égypte et la suprême résistance au christianisme (Ve-VIIe siècles)’ in \textit{BIFAO} 51 (1952): pp.63-78.


\textsuperscript{77} Zacharias Mytilenaeus Rhet., \textit{Vita Severi} 32; see also Maspéro (1914): pp.178, n.1.

\textsuperscript{78} Damascius Phil., \textit{Vita Isidori} (ap.Photium, Bibl. codd. 181, 242) 107.15-6.
Thus in life something godlike always attended him; and in death, when Asclepiades prepared to render him the honours prescribed for the priests and in particular the garments of Osiris on his body, ineffable figures on the burial cloths immediately shone everywhere, and around them there could be clearly seen the divine forms of visions which distinctly revealed his soul, and so with those gods it now shared its abode.

Postponing for the moment the question of why they are described as ‘ineffable’, it hardly seems conceivable but that the ‘figures’ (διαγράμματα) bathed in light be any other than hieroglyphs and the overall impression of the affiliations and professional commitments of the family and associated school is both philosophical and rhetorical/grammatical, and that in an overtly late Neoplatonic mould as it is characterized by Damascius.

The Hieroglyphics of Horus Apollo Nilous (Ὑροὺ Ἀπόλλωνος Νειλώου Ἱερογλυφικά, Horapollonis Niloi Hieroglyphica) has a print history five hundred years old. The work is a study of hieroglyphic writing comprising the explanations of two hundred and forty meanings of one hundred and eighty-six ‘Egyptian’ hieroglyphs in a series of one hundred and eighty-nine chapters in two books. Though most popular during the sixteenth century, the textual tradition survives through editions once every generation or two into the twentieth century, which saw at least five more, including a new editio optima. All editions have of course focussed principally on the Greek text itself, or on offering a translation of it, more often than not into Latin, though also into French, Italian, English, German, and Spanish.

The first manuscript containing the Hieroglyphica to be brought to European public attention in the Early Modern period was, according to a late subscriptio appearing on folio 75r, bought on the island of Andros in the Ægean in June 1419 by Cristoforo, presbyter of Bundelmonti. It contained three texts. They were: Philostratus’ Vita Apollonii Tyanensis, Horapollo’s Hieroglyphica, and Proclus’ Elementa Physica. The first is written in two different manuscript hands, the latter two texts in a third. In addition to the Vita Apollonii and

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80 P. Cairo, Masp. 3 67295 = BIFAO 11.165-166.
82 On the use of hieroglyphs independently of spoken language see tamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.1.7-11 and Chapter Three, §§.2-3.
83 Damascius Phil., In Phaedonem (versio 1) 172.1-3.
84 See Bibliography (A) (ii).
85 Bibliotheca Laurentiana Medicea, Florentiae: Plutei 69: Codex 27.
the *Elementa Physica*, both of which appear together with the *Hieroglyphica* elsewhere,\(^{85}\) Aristotle’s *Ethica ad Eudemum* also appears as a companion piece in several other manuscripts.\(^{86}\) However, despite the presence of Harpocrate’s *Lexicon* in Bibliotheca Vaticana græc. 871 (perhaps suggestive of an early opinion as to the text’s generic affiliations), in general, the texts associated with the *Hieroglyphica* in the manuscript sources are too varied a miscellany to indicate any judgement as to formal genre characteristics which might have informed the inclusion of the *Hieroglyphica* amongst them. With it were included Pletho’s *Magica eloquia Magorum* in both B. V. græc. 1011 and Bibliotheca Cardinalis Radulphi: Codex 49 and in October 1505 the first printed text of Horapollo was issued in an Aldine edition bound with Ἀσωπ’s *Vita et Fabelæ*, the writings of several other Greek fabulists, and a *Collectio proverbiorum*. Whether or not this may provide some indication of the kinds of associations the text had at that time, it is in general reasonable to suppose that these are precisely the kind of associations that either informed or were developed as part of later judgements as to possible interpretative strategies.\(^{87}\) Even into the modern period we find Gardiner, for example, claiming that the text comprises ‘mystical assertions’, ‘grotesque allegorical reasons’ and ‘fantastic explanations’.\(^{88}\)

In edited versions of the text Book One comprises seventy sections containing seventy hieroglyphs covering one hundred and thirteen meanings; Book Two, one hundred and nineteen sections of one hundred and sixteen glyphs with one hundred and twenty-seven meanings. That these divisions are the work of the editors poses few significant problems in this context since there is little room for doubt as to where each (typically short) explanation, or sequence of explanations, begins and ends.\(^{89}\) In other words, it is unproblematic to observe that the ratio of meanings per glyph is significantly lower in Book Two, where the meaning prefigures the glyph, than in Book One, where the movement is *vice versa*. The chapters of Book One are fewer, though those of Book Two are on the whole briefer. All of which lends weight to the claim of the *incipit* to Book Two, according to which it is largely\(^{90}\) the work of a subsequent editor (called Philip in the *incipit* to Book One) of Horapollo’s original book.

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85 Monacense græc. 419 (the only other c. 14th manuscript) and Bibliotheca Veneta Divi Marci: Codex 391, respectively.

86 E.g., Bibliotheca Laurentiana Medicea, Florentiae: Plutei 81: Codex 15; ibid., Plutei 81: Codex 20; & al.


89 On the structure, uniformity and variation of each section, see below: §2. *The Representative Mode of Hieroglyphic Expression*.

90 Van De Walle & Vergote argue that perhaps the first thirty and last two entries of Book Two may also be original, i.e. predate Philip’s editorial work, on the grounds that they too include evidence of (knowledge of) genuinely Egyptian material; ‘Traduction des Hieroglyphica d’Horapollon’ in *Chronique d’Egypte* 18 (1943): 39-89, 199-239; addenda ibid., 22 (1947): pp. 251-59.
On the one hand, insofar as it exhibits features in common with surviving Egyptian onomastica and Greek or Roman bilingual glossaries, Horapollo’s Hieroglyphica may (as historically has in fact been common) be situated generically within the tradition of historical linguistics. In a related context (also historically conspicuous as an approach to the text) it also exhibits features in common with late Imperial or early mediæval encyclopædias and natural history miscellanies, which, though materially related to the glossaries, can, on the other hand, be situated generically within an exegetical tradition encompassing, for example, the c. 5th–6th encyclopædias of Martianus Capella and Cassiodor, or the Etymologiæ sive Originæ of Isidore of Seville, which, on this view, it prefigures. The long-standing precedent of these approaches has, however, given rise to an apparent incongruity: is the purpose of the text as a matter of fact glosso graphical (and therefore subject to critique arising out of developments within the decipherment project), or encyclopædic and therefore to be assessed purely as a compendium of natural lore? The incongruity of a text half glossary, half encyclopædia is, however, so I shall argue, wholly illusory. It is an illusion that arises precisely because the Hieroglyphica has typically been read as a catalogue of linguistic and physiological claims, on which basis, both as linguistic and natural history, it has been found unsatisfactory.

Since the propositional analysis has failed to clarify the nature of the relationship between the natural and the hieroglyphic material, what I wish to argue instead is that under these circumstances it seems reasonable to look for an interpretation of the text as one which offers an interpretation, rather than a series of claims. The assumption that the Hieroglyphics is as a work of historical linguistics and natural history therefore needs to be reassessed in light of the methodological motivation for its structure. My starting-point for this is that the text is both explicit in its hermeneutic objectives and structurally unambiguous in the application thereof.

There is little rubric or preliminary framing to the text as presented, but there are brief statements at the beginning and end of each of the two books. The incipit to the second book reads:

\[\text{T204} \, \text{ΩΡΑΠΟΛΛΩΝ ΝΕΙΔΟΥ τής τῶν παρ’ Ἁγιτσίως \ ἱερογλυφικῶν γραμμάτων ἐρμηνείας ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ. Διὰ \ δὲ τῆς δευτέρας πραγματείας, περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν λόγων γνήσιο \ παραστήσομαι \ ἀ δὲ καὶ \ ἐκ ἄλλων ἀντιγράφων, \ σύν ἔχοντά \ τινα ἐξήγησιν, ἀναγκαῖας ὑπέταξα.}^{92}\]

The SECOND BOOK OF HORAPOLLO OF THE NILE on the interpretation of the hieroglyphic writings among the Egyptians. Now, in this second treatise I will set forth for you a sound account of the remaining ones which, having no explanation, I have necessarily added from other copies.

92 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 2.1.1–5.
The terms ἑρμηνεία and ἐξήγησις crucially refer to genres of interpretative endeavour.\(^{93}\) An inventory of the hieroglyphic signs explained in the text (and comprising glyphic depictions of items of almost always identifiably Egyptian provenance), arranged according to thematic relationships, provides an index rerum in parallel with the index signorum. Thus the realia fall into the same categories as the hieroglyphic signs they are intended to explain: mammals, birds, fish, cosmological phenomena, as well as man and his occupations.\(^{94}\) The corresponding exegeses, therefore, draw precisely on resources which collate information on the realia the depictions of which the exegeses are intended to explain. However, an investigation designed to determine the extent of the influence of such resources on the exegetical content of the Hieroglyphica, except insofar as this might further support observations on the aggregation of source-materials, will provide only a reconstruction of the line of historical continuity of the content preserved by the text, and not a clarification of the conditions under which they are presented. Specifically in the Hieroglyphica, then, uncovering the underlying principle of exegetic judgement will have to be determined by the precise nature of the relationship between the hieroglyphic signs and natural signs established in the interpretative exegeses themselves, rather than through source-criticism.

The text is certainly very unlikely to have been originally written in Egyptian (even in part), or to have appeared in Egyptian at any subsequent point,\(^{95}\) and the manuscript text itself is in fact in Greek. The attribution by an apparent redactor named Philip of the material treated (mostly in Book One) to Horos Apollon is nonetheless unlikely to be pseudepigraphical – an attempt to establish Egyptian provenance, and hence authorial authority. It is more likely to be a genuine acknowledgement of authorship. Annotations and additions by Philip, clearly indicated as such in the text at the beginning of Book Two, are structurally identifiable elements of the ‘interpretation of hieroglyphic writing among Egyptians’ (τῶν παρ’ Ἀιγυπτίως ἱερογλυφικῶν γραμμάτων ἑρμηνεία).

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\(^{95}\) The possibility that the text was originally published in ‘Egyptian’ (Coptic?) is provided for in the subtitle to Book One, though this may depend on the exact senses of the two aorist verbs used there: ἐξήγησις (‘produced, published’, ‘cited, adduced’) to describe the work of Horapollo himself & μετέφρασε (‘paraphrased, translated’) to describe the work of the editor, Philip; Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 1.1.1–5.
Even if the evidence for the original text having been composed in an earlier form Egyptian is ultimately unconvincing, there is, on the other hand, a two-fold prima facie case for exploring specifically Coptic (as opposed to Ancient Egyptian) corpora, both as a material resource and as a possible compositional environment. First, according to the incipit, the Hieroglyphica which Horapollo published (ἐξήνεγκε) in Egyptian (Αἰγυπτίᾳ φωνῇ). Philip rendered (μετέφρασε) into Greek (εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διάλεκτον). As Gardiner remarks, if meant literally, at a time when neither hieroglyphic, nor even Demotic is in documentary use among the Egyptians, this indicates that the treatise was ‘written probably in Coptic but surviving only in a Greek translation’. If this were the case, then the text would represent de facto evidence of an Egyptian Hieroglyphica in precisely this form.

On the basis of Greek works ascribed to Horapollo in the Suda, Lauth hypothesized that he composed the Hieroglyphica in Coptic before having learnt the Greek of his mature works. The conclusion is, however, perfunctory. While superficially accounting for the dual attribution of the incipit, it explains neither the obviously Greek resources freely and frequently drawn on, nor several instances of Greek etymological word-play incomprehensible in Coptic. The second point is narrower, but more telling of Coptic origins. The Hieroglyphica contains thirteen words designated ‘Egyptian’, of which at least nine have clear Coptic credentials. There are besides three dozen additional Horapollian explanations of hieroglyphs for which Sbordone has adduced Coptic language explanations. Because the thesis that the Hieroglyphica is a Greek translation of a Coptic original depends on a persuasive case to the effect that the author has been misidentified as Flavius Horapollo of Phænebythis, it faces apparently insuperable difficulties of historical context. It is not so much the availability of obvious predecessors in the genre from within the Greek tradition, but the fact that such Coptic material as exists on hieroglyphic Egyptian belongs either to polemical...
Christian texts of the period, condemning their use, or to clearly non-orthodox, but broadly Gnostic alternatives. The pre-Christian tradition of Coptic literature (a phenomenon of the 3rd century), though by no means homogenous, is nonetheless a considerably less fruitful resource for parallel compositions. Had our text then belonged to the overtly Coptic era, and originally been composed in Coptic, it would almost certainly have a Christian text, orthodox or otherwise. There is no trace of the Hieroglyphica showing any such provenance.

Whether accurate knowledge of historical hieroglyphic practice or the (putative) desire on the part of a native Egyptian (Coptic) speaker to recover paganism from advancing Christian influence constitute sufficient grounds for supposing the text was originally written in Coptic is open to serious doubt even without the evidence of the Greek works securely identified as belonging to the œuvres of the elder and junior Horapollones. We have at least partial or occasional precedents in the Greek tradition both for the Egyptological material (in the fragments of an author such as Chæremon), and for the kind of physiological discussion which informs the Hieroglyphica (e.g. the de Historia Animalium of Aristotle, the de Animalibus of Philo, the de Natura Animalium of Ælian, the Naturalis Historia of Pliny, the Oneirocritica of Artemidorus, the Hexaemera of Saints Basil and Ambrose, the peripatetic Physiognomica, and the Physiologus). There is, in other words, more evidence of elements deriving from the Greek hieroglyphic and physiological traditions than from the Coptic material.

Leemans’ commentary on the text and other systematic attempts to distinguish Egyptian hieroglyphic material from material originating in Graeco-Roman sources have identified many of the educational, scientific, encyclopædic, or mythographical sources for the Hieroglyphica. Parallels with the Φυσιολογικά attributed to Manetho and the seven works attributed to the pseudo-Democritean Bolus in the Suda in particular have fostered further historicizing analyses with a particular interest in the question of genre-attribute. Scott, for example, in reference to the literary genre of the Physiologus, notes that:


\[106\]"The many verbal agreements between Horapollo and the Physiologus must have led Sbordone to the erroneous conclusion that the former of these was indebted to the latter, had he not known that Horapollo got most of his stuff from Apion-Chæremon.” Perry, B. E., Review of Physiologus by F. Sbordone in The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 58, No. 4. (1937), pp. 488-496.


“Occasional paradoxographical references are part of the literary discourse of the age, so that e.g. an offhand reference to the phoenix can be made as early as Clement of Rome. There are numerous references in Philo, who devotes a treatise to beasts. But extensive treatment of paradoxographical material in the formative years of Christian theology is unknown.”

It is characteristic of this historicizing tendency, however, to question whether the ‘marvellous’ aspect of the material is original to the natural histories themselves or constitutes an intrusive accretion of paradoxography as an already distinct genre.

“Aristotle has one after another of the Bestiary tales, – of the Eagle, the Hoopoe, the Night-raven, the Hyaena, the Ichneumon and so on. Some fifteen of these are in the *Historia Animalium*, and the curious thing is that they occur in just two places: I find eight in the Ninth Book, between pp. 612 and 630, and seven in the Sixth, between pp. 544 and 589. Are we looking for sources of the Physiologist in Aristotle, or is the Physiologist guiding us towards alien, fabulous, non-Aristotelian parts of the *Natural History*?”

Even if it could be established that Coptic sources exercised some sort of direct linguistic or thematic influence on the text, the same reservations concerning their explanatory value would have to apply. The suggestive, but inconclusive linguistic and generic indications of ‘Copticity’ are, however, bolstered by reference to the works of Horapollo’s counterpart in the ongoing polemical exchange between Coptic Christians and Hellenized pagans in late 5th century Egypt. One of our Coptic sources, Shenoute, was also familiar with the 3rd century Egyptian zoological and allegorical text under the title *Physiologus*. Yet the parallels with the material in Horapollo which might have derived from knowledge of the *Physiologus* within the Coptic tradition also have multiple parallel attestations elsewhere. In particular, the sections dealing with the phoenix and the hyena show close correlation, though the especial value of the Shenoutean corpus for the reconstruction of the Coptic text resides elsewhere, in the passage on the fruit of the sycamore (and possibly also on the honey-bee), both contained in *ad Philosophum Gentilem*.

Again the primary significance of the physiological material for which we have evidence of knowledge on Shenoute’s part is not as source-critical evidence. It is intended by him not merely as a record of empirical

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data, but is deployed as part of a philosophical polemic against the misconception that the generated world can be used as a basis for speculation on the ungenerated world. However the question is resolved, an investigation designed to determine the extent of the influence of physiological sources on the exegetical content of the *Hieroglyphica*, though leading to a reconstruction of the historical line of generic development insofar as it supports observations on the aggregation of source-materials, cannot clarify the use to which that material is put. This is a criticism of source-criticism in general, of course, but the fact that precisely this kind of engagement with Horapollo’s text has (along with philological criticism by Egyptologists) dominated the commentaries means it is a point worth repeating in order to sharpen our eye to the use Horapollo makes of his sources.

With respect to the compositional circumstances of the text, as well as amplifications of, elaborations on, and corrections to its themes and conclusions, commentaries have tended to take one of two lines. One is to offer a philological study of ancient lexicography, the second to adduce parallels for Horapollo’s thought, an exercise that amounts in effect to the production of an eclectic compendium of diverse commonplaces and antiquarian lore. In the case of the first type, retrospective attempts at the rehabilitation of the *Hieroglyphica* as a philologically valid work of lexicography along Egyptological lines have also conceded at least partial philological authority to the work. As a result the text has latterly been recognized as composite, comprising a core of at least partially informed collated observations on genuinely Egyptian material, particularly in the first book, and a later expansion of that material originating in conception and execution with its named editor – Philip – in a doxographical manner, without specific knowledge of Egyptian hieroglyphs. This concession explicitly emphasizes, however, the comparative paucity of genuinely Egyptian hieroglyphic material. It also acknowledges that the standards of correctness to which the *explanations* might have claimed to have adhered may have been irredeemably lost, at least to Egyptologists, subsequent to the publication of Champollion’s system. Even allowing for the dilution of Horapollo’s accurate material by the expansion in Book Two by Philip, there remains a sense in which it is understood that the allegorizing explanations contained in Horapollo’s text had to be abandoned. Even where the meanings of hieroglyphs had been correctly interpreted (or nearly so) by Horapollo, the proper way to explain how they come to mean what they do was the province of the decipherment project, not allegoristic interpretation.
This brings us to the second type of commentary in which the explanations in the *Hieroglyphica* are represented as an extended fabrication based on the glyph-sequences and drawn from a backdrop of Hellenistic antiquarianism – the format of an interpretative treatise used as a blind to conceal its true origins as an imaginative elaboration of popular Egyptological themes. This judgement is founded on the assumption that the Hellenistic picture stands in need of correction in the direction of Egyptology, whereas in fact what is needed is some clarification of how the Hellenistic picture was supposed to be applied to the hieroglyphic material. To this end, and insofar as both the earlier and the later material are only imperfectly understood or represented by the text, there has also recently been an attempt to develop a consideration of the text as a semiotic resource, treating it as a Greek hermeneutic composition partly on Egyptian glyphs, partly on Hellenizing lore, offering hermeneutic strategies for the reception of an unknown written language. The difficulties of the attempt are rooted in the question of what connections there are between the glyphs and what they show or signify. The text itself establishes these connections primarily through the individual explanations, from which a general semiotic model may be derived, within which the specific hieroglyphic variables operate.

Insofar as what is shown or meant by a glyph is interdependent with the form of the explanation one has to give of it, I suggest that the peculiar contribution of the *Hieroglyphica* lies primarily in the way in which it handles its material in establishing these explanations. It is important to understand that in Horapollo, the explanations themselves are not items of arcane significance, but the means whereby the hieroglyphs received their significance. In other words, the explanation does not serve to unlock an arcane meaning hidden in the glyph, but secures that meaning, establishing the glyph as significant. But if this is the case, then the explanations of Horapollo’s glyphs determine in what sense the glyphs are hieroglyphs at all. His work was meant neither to recover ancient Egyptian meanings, nor to address the methodology of such a procedure. Rather the *Hieroglyphica* exemplifies a possible determination of the meanings of hieroglyphs in a line of development from their formal and representational characteristics via a method for establishing their meaningful employment, not a reconstruction from an understanding of their meaningful use of an account of their formal and representational characteristics. My question is, therefore, what the motivations, objectives, and presuppositions of such a methodology in fact are, rather than the question posed by Horapollo’s critics as to whether there has been a failure of judgement in determining a methodology in the first place.

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The application of Egyptology, Greek natural history, and distinctively Renaissance archetypes of iconic language\textsuperscript{114} to the work has undoubtedly contributed to the success of the rehabilitation of the text as the subject of modern scholarly interest. There has, however, been little or no interest in the text’s philosophical presuppositions. The purpose of the following sections is to reconstruct the philosophical context in which it was composed. In addition to the biographical detail given above this will primarily involve determination of specifically internal features of the text’s methodological presuppositions. Once these have been established, it will be possible to examine the text’s explanatory structure of the constituent units of composition, the conception of meaning which that structure entails, and the methodological opportunities that affords.

\textsuperscript{114} The *Hieroglyphica* does not represent a movement towards the hieroglyphic system of Champollion, but towards the hieroglyphic technique of Colonna, Bellini, and Dürer.
§2. The Coptic Corpora

As indicated above one of the relevant aspects of the historical context which might plausibly represent the most likely milieu for the composition of the texts with which I am specifically concerned here is 4th/5th century pagan revivalism under Christian persecution. That the Christian-pagan divide had fallen along linguistic lines is more or less clear in the Coptic designation of the pagans as *nhellyn*, i.e. the intellectual and aristocratic classes of Upper Egypt. Greek-language education separated them from the generally Coptic-speaking population whose allegiances naturally lay with Pachomius, Shenoute, and their successors. For that reason this section focuses on the *corpora* Coptic-language texts representing some of the major sources for the Christian polemic against pagan and heterodox tendencies both within the Coptic tradition itself and within the Greek-language counter-movement.

Coptic, also known as Neo-Egyptian, is the last phase of the Egyptian language. It was in spoken use throughout Egypt from perhaps the 1st century B.C. until the end of the 10th century A.D. with pockets of learned Coptic-use surviving into the 18th century. Varieties of Coptic can be distinguished historically, geographically, and linguistically.

The language is attested in three geographically distinct dialect groups of varying historical longevity: (i) Upper, (ii) Middle, and (iii) Lower Egyptian, comprising (i) (a) Sahidic = Sa’idic = Thebaic (3rd to 14th centuries), (b) Akhmimic, and the sub-dialect (c) Lycopolitan = Subakhmimic = Assiutic (4th to 5th centuries); (ii) (a) Fayyumic = Faiyumic = Bashmuric (3rd to 10th centuries) and (b) Oxyrhynchite = Mesokemic (4th to 5th centuries); and (iii) Bohairic = Memphitic (4th to 17th centuries).

The Coptic lexicon is composed of both Egyptian Coptic and Graeco-Coptic items. The standard reference dictionary records 3,308 Egyptian Coptic entries (not including innumerable derived forms – Coptic is a polysynthetic language). The extent of Greek borrowings into Coptic is undetermined; estimates range from 20% of the vocabulary to as many as 4,000 loans. Cherix’ provisional edition of the *Lexique grec-copte* (2009) lists perhaps 1,000 Greek entries (including derived forms); Förster’s *Wörterbuch der griechischen Wörter in*
koptischen dokumentarischen Texten (2002) lists 2,500. In the 10th and 11th centuries Coptic also acquires Arabic loans (perhaps 500 lemmata). Syntactically Greek has no influence on Coptic and semantic variation occurs even amongst borrowed lexical items.

The oldest Coptic texts, written as early as the 1st century B.C. and as late as the 5th century A.D. (but primarily between the 1st and 3rd centuries) are the Old Coptic magical texts. Shortly thereafter (between the 2nd and 4th centuries) appear the first translations of the bible into Coptic, contemporary with Gnostic and Gnostic-Christian works. At the end of the 3rd century Manichaean texts begin to be translated into Coptic, at which point appear the Patristic translations, apocrypha, and homilies.

Coptic literature proper, i.e. non-magical, untranslated texts, originally composed in Coptic, begins in the 3rd and 4th centuries with Hierax, Pachomius, Antony, Shenoute, and Besa. There follows the polemical literature after Chalcedon and Damians until the Arab conquest. The classical period of the patristic translations and hagiographic literature (8th to 12th centuries) is contemporary with the cyclical panegyrica and vitae which are succeeded by the synaxarial systematization.

Shenoute (c. 346 A.D. – 466 A.D., scrib. 388 A.D. – 466 A.D.) was the archimandrite of the White Monastery in Atripe (opposite Panopolis – modern Akhmim – on the western Nile) responsible for mounting an attack on the otherwise unknown local deity Petbe. He also organized the destruction of the remaining pagan temple in Atripe, whose adherents had, in the preceding half century maintained a vigorous resistance to the advancing Christian influence. At one point the archimandrite and two brother monks travelled ’in secrecy by night’ to the house of Gessius in Šmin (down river from the White Monastery), entered, and removed ’idols’ which they took to the riverside and destroyed. Gessius is the addressee of several of Shenoute’s works. He may be the same iatro-philosopher at whose house Heraiscus sheltered upon his release from similar persecution.

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117 Förster, H., Wörterbuch der griechischen Wörter in koptischen dokumentarischen Texten (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002).
120 Like Macarius against Kothos at the temple in Antaioipolis, and Apa Moïse at the temple of Apollo at Abydos.
122 As had also been the case in Alexandria: see Rémondon, R., ’L’Égypte et la suprême résistance au christianisme (Ve-VIIe siècles)’ in Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale 51 (1952): pp. 63-78.
The other main Coptic-language resource for present purposes is the Nagʿ-Ḥammādi corpus. The library of thirteen codices consists of fifty-three treatises of a broadly Gnostic character, discovered near ancient Chenoboskion on the west bank of the Nile in Upper Egypt. The treatises are neither uniform in scholastic character, nor attributable as a whole to any group unified along principled doctrinal lines, which is to say it is a syncretic collection. Various typologies emerge, both in terms of dialect and doctrinal affiliation. Most of the texts are in Sahidic, though often display a Subakhmimic colouring (the dialect used for the remaining texts). Many are Christian, mostly heterodox (but not exclusively); others are not; nor does the distinction map neatly onto sub-classifications. Apart from Platonist and Hermetic treatises, there appear a large number of Sethian (or Ophite) texts, a comparably large number of Valentinian texts, as well as Thomasine and Basilidian examples.

This complex of scholastic divisions and the syncretistic overlappings poses several major methodological problems. Shenoute is unquestionably writing within orthodox Pachomian Coptic Christian doctrinal parameters. The affiliations of his polemical targets and those of the various texts of the Nagʿ-Ḥammādi corpus are considerably less clear. The Melitians (non-Pachomian cœnobitics), Origenists (Evagrian Christologists), and Arians (heterousians) are specifically singled out as antagonists in Shenoute. We also know that Shenoute was familiar with Thomasine presentations of gospel sayings and perhaps also Syrian Valentinian material found in The Gospel of Philip. Both his Pachomian affiliation and the correspondence of his floruit with the presumed date of the burial of the Nagʿ-Ḥammādi texts make Shenoute a very significant secondary resource for these scholastic currents.

The difficulty remains, however, that in many cases of heterodox doctrine primary sources are often only identifiable through secondary (usually patristic) sources. More problematic still is the fact that even in those cases where affiliation of a text is fairly well established, individual points of doctrine are perhaps less so. Insofar as the problem at hand is the nature of the Coptic Christian objection to the use of hieroglyphs, or, conversely, the Gnostic-Hermetic inclination to adopt them, particular references within texts broadly characterizable in these terms do not ensure that the objections or inclinations themselves are similarly identifiable. That these mutually antagonist attitudes not only exist, but are also theoretically informed, is,

125 The identity of the group responsible for their collation and the reasons for their burial will be considered below in an effort to bring their contents into the broader context of Coptic literature of the period.

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however, both demonstrable and pertinent to questions of motivation for the production of an exegetical manual of hieroglyphs.

The Shenoutean corpus of Sahidic Coptic is itself the single most important source of literature in that language. As a result of recent work by Emmel the corpus is now recognized as falling into three components: the Canons (ΚΑΝΩΝ), Discourses, and Letters comprising individual works called ‘epistles’ (ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ), ‘treatises’ or ‘discourses’ (ΛΟΓΟΣ), and ‘sermons’ (ΕΞΙΣΘΗΣΗ or ΚΑΘΩΣΘΗΣΗ). I shall be concerned with three texts in particular: in Loco Ædis Spiritus Immundi, contra Origenistas et Gnosticos, and ad Philosophum Gentilem.

A Monastic Invective against Egyptian Hieroglyphs is of obvious and direct specific, but also general interest here. The text appears to have been a sermon delivered on the conversion of a pagan temple into a Christian church ‘sometime after 431’.

And if previously it is prescriptions for murdering man’s soul (ψυχή) that are therein, written with blood and not with ink alone – there is nothing else portrayed for them except the likeness of the snakes and scorpions, the dogs and cats, the crocodiles and frogs, the foxes, the other reptiles, the beasts (θηρίον) and birds, the cattle, etc.; furthermore, the likeness of the sun and the moon and all the rest, all their things being nonsense and humbug – and where these are, it is the soul (ψυχή) – saving scriptures (γραφή) of life that will henceforth come to be therein, fulfilling the word of God, with His name inscribed for them and His son Jesus Christ (Χριστός) and all His angels (ἄγγελος), righteous (δίκαιος) men and saints (portrayed), that everywhere what is therein may give instruction

127 Emmel, S., Shenoute’s Literary Corpus (2 voll.) (Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, voll.599-600, subsidia tom. 111-112) (Lovanii: in Ædibus Peeters, 2004).
129 ΗΜΟΙΟΙ ΗΝΤΕΡΓΕΙΟΡΩΣ = I Am Amazed = contra Origenistas et Gnosticos (W54, Discourses 7, Work 5) = DQ [1]-[ca. 148]; DS [ca. 60]-222i.ii.11; DT [between 82 and 87]-[between 88 and 163] (lection); HB [1]-[ca. 150]; XE [ca. 127]-[ca. 263]; XN [wanting, except for the incipit in the table of contents, 2700.19]; YU [1]-[ca. 128]; ZN frg. 1; Vienna inc. 54. Orlandi, T., (ed. & trans.), Shenute contro Origenistas: testo con introduzione e traduzione (Roma: C.I.M., 1985).
130 ΕΙΣΙΣΘΗΣΗ ΑΝΩΣΙΣΘΗΣΗΟΥ = As I Sat on a Mountain = ad Philosophum Gentilem (T21, from Discourses 1, 2, or 3?) = cod. A (HB 227-240), cod. C (XN 259-270), cod. D (HB 305-306) = No. 18 (pp.44-62), ad Philosophum Gentilem. Leipoldt, J., with the assistance of Crum, W. E., Sinthii Archimandrius Vita et Opera Omnia. 3 volumes (numbers 1, 3, and 4). Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, volumes 41, 42, and 73 (Copt. 1 [= II.2.T], 2 [= II.4.T], 5 [= II.5.T]). París: Imprimerie nationale. 1906-1913.
concerning every good thing (ἀγαθόν), especially (μᾶλλον δὲ) purity. And how will he not become pure?133

The first point made in the passage is that though hieroglyphs are demonized as ‘prescriptions for murdering man’s soul’ (ζημιομενος ιερογλυφης ψῦχην προμει), ‘written with blood and not with ink alone’ (πέφρατω εὐεργής χορηγος αὐτὸ οὐκ οὔπόθελκλαι ἀν Ματαλάκ), the invective of the passage is not merely rhetorical. The situation can be rectified, according to the passage, not merely by the destruction of the offending tableaux, but by replacing them with scriptural alternatives. For Shenoute, it is not primarily that hieroglyphs are an offence to Christian sensibilities qua script (even a script ‘written in blood’ rather than ink), nor even that the meaning of the inscriptions is contrary to Christian doctrine (though that is undoubtedly true too), but that hieroglyphic inscriptions as such ‘murder the soul’ (πειρατέας ψῡχη), whereas ‘the scriptures of life’ (περσατής ἰωνας) ‘give the soul life’ (περιτανης ψῡχη).

Nonetheless, the passage does lend support to the impression that the very use of hieroglyphic script is in itself anathema. Though ‘there is nothing else portrayed for them except the likeness’ (μικέλατ τὸν εἴονος ιερογλυφης) of a range of creatures and celestial bodies, neither does the piece contribute only the usual details that can be found in the more schematic Graeco-Roman accounts. In fact, it is precisely the fact that hieroglyphs are likenesses of creatures and celestial bodies that explains Shenoute’s characterization of them as ‘murdering the soul’.

In order to develop the implication that the connection between hieroglyphic script and the created world is of itself profane, we have to look elsewhere in the Shenoutean corpus. Doctrinally by far the most important text for this purpose is contra Origenistas et Gnosticos, in which Shenoute attacks the heretics with particular reference to their books, the ‘apocrypha’ (μανοπραφων). Of specific concern are their doctrines concerning:

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132 Sinuthius Theol., ἐπια ἄστικης ἰερογλυφής = 'At the site of a shrine to an unclean spirit (Apud ædem spiritus immundi) = A monastic invective against Egyptian hieroglyphs (Invectio monachica contra hieroglyphica Egyptia) (Acephalous work A6), TY 3.1.25–4.1.14.
the plurality of worlds; the work of the Son, the value of suffering, against magic; the Pascha; the Father and the Son; souls; Christ's conception; the Eucharist; the resurrection of the body; God and the stars; and the four elements.�134

For (γάρ) every book outside the Scriptures (γραφή), both (εἴτε) those | of the pagans (Ελλην) and (εἴτε) those of any atheist people (ἐθνος), and (εἴτε) those | of the heretics (αἱρετικός) – some impure spirits (πνεῦμα) are in them. And | also the apocrypha (ἀπόκρυφος), even if the name of God is named | in them or they say some right things, do the errors, | all which are written in them, ruin also the good things. | Aren't their words like those we have | referred to before which are now written in the apocrypha (ἀπόκρυφος)? They say | of God the Almighty (παντοκράτωρ) that he is the one who runs in the orbit (δρόμος) of the sun, | and that the full moon augments (αὐξάνειν) the trees and the animals. || O what impiety (ἀσεβής)! Indeed, is it not an impiety (ἀσεβής) to say that the God of the | all runs in the sun and grows in the moon? | Is it not he who causes it to run in its own service (λειτουργία) in | its own order, and moreover the moon becomes full in its own | order? || Isn't the moon the one which makes the plants and the animals grow. Don't | they all grow (αὐξάνειν) out of the work of God. | Isn't he the one who makes | shine all the stars (ἀστήρ) according to their place (κατὰ μέρος), like they say, | which are the reasons (ἀφορμή) to serve the creature. || But (ἀλλά) the Scriptures (γραφή) oppose their foolishness. For (γάρ) the sun and | the moon and the stars and the days and the nights and the winds and | the clouds and the whole creation do not move by themselves, but (ἀλλά) | receive energy (ἐνεργεῖν) from his order, without him moving; | he in whom we move too, as is written: | “for (γάρ) in him we are and we move”. ||

The nature of the connection is spelled out as the ‘impiety’ (ματαιεῖος) of the ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα), whereby ‘the errors, all which are written in them, ruin also the good things’ (ἵππευς ἢπειρος τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ἐφοῦ τακοῦ ἢπειρος ὠνα ἐκκλησίας). Furthermore, the association of ‘God the Almighty’ (εἰπούτε παντοκράτωρ) with

135 Sinuthius Theol., Ἰησοῦν ἐνέπαφεν = I am amazed = Contra Origenistas et Gnosticos (W54, Discourses 7, Work 5), HB 39.2–41.1; 0384-8.
'the orbit of the sun, and that the full moon augments the trees and the animals’ (πεδρομοκ μπρο αυς χε ημου αυς επαταλε ειμίν αυς αν λτηοουτε) are, according to Shenoute, ‘reasons to serve the creature’ (ναφροκ μπροκ μπουκιν) of he who is responsible for their creation. The movement of the sun and moon cannot for Shenoute be accounted for within the generated world, but requires motive force from the Creator. They further deny the resurrection, claiming that the body is formed out of and will dissolve back into the four elements. Here, Shenoute argues, they commit two errors. First, the claim that the body is created out of all four elements and not out of earth alone. Second, the failure to acknowledge that the living soul is breathed into the body by the omnipotent Lord.

The issue reaches decisive momentum in Shenoute’s polemical development against the doctrine of the generation of the Son. The history of the controversy is complex, but the doctrine Shenoute here attacks constitutes one major thread. According to the doctrine of the twofold stage theory of the generation, the Logos existed from eternity in God, and was subsequently, prior to the creation of the world, generated as a distinct personal being. This is the view as taught by Tertullian, Lactantius and others (with parallels in Philo). The alternative account is the single stage theory according to which the generation of the Logos was from eternity. This is the view taught by Irenæus and, Shenoute’s treatise notwithstanding, Origen. The fundamental Origenist misconception (as ascribed) is that for them ‘there was a moment in which the Logos itself of God did not exist … before being generated’ (τοι ναροκ πλογοκ μπουκαντ αυτονοκει μνυρε ενουναν αν … ηπατοτζνοκ). Or, put another way, ‘He is one of those who are generated and who are created’ (ονι ην εν κεντουζκ μνουκ αν κεντουζκτυ μνουκ). These false doctrines are founded on what is for Shenoute the crucial error of the pagans: the appeal to the ontology of the generated to understand that of the ungenerated world. Paganism undoes the Christian doctrine of the distinction of God into persons, whether ‘from eternity’ (Irenæus, Origen, & al.) or generated prior to the creation of the world as a distinct personal being (Philo, Justin Martyr, Tatian, & al.). As noted above, the former single stage account appears as a major polemical target in Shenoute’s contra Origenistas (as well as the Origenist pagans opposed there).

136 Ibid., §§.0401-0403.
Several themes and techniques here overlap. The difficulty of disentangling them is in part due to Shenoute’s habit (alluded to above) of employing techniques familiar from the hermeneutical endeavours that he criticizes when practiced by pagans in, for example, in ad Philosophum Gentilem, he concludes that pagans impute obscurantism to the Holy Spirit with the claim that certain scriptural truths are only available through allegorical interpretation (εὐαλλαγμοί).  

He does not scruple, however, to compare the presence of pagans within the church to a creature that walks the earth prevailing over one that flies.

As I sat on a mountain, the one who says these things said, I saw an animal (ζώον) in the air (ἀήρ) attacking another animal (ζώον) on the ground. I rejoiced greatly that the one which flew had strength over the one which walks on the earth. But after a while the animal (ζώον) which is on the ground turns on the one which flies and overcame it and was master over it.

He develops criticisms of pagan prayer by developing analogies between it and purely physiologically conditioned responses of creatures:

If then the heretic (αἱρετικός) and the pagan (Ἕλλην) spread their hands or hold them up in the pretense (ὑπόκρισις) that they are praying, look, the fowl themselves do this many times spreading their wings.

He also brings out pagan weakness by alluding to Pharaoh’s susceptibility to the least of creatures in the course of the biblical plagues with which he is beset. The beneficence of the Christian, on the other hand, can be compared with the solicitude of the honey-bee. The honey-bee is sought out by men as Christians

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141 Ibid., p.45.
142 Sinuthius Theol., ἔθιμος αὐθικάς σημειώσεως = As I sat on a mountain = Ad philosopum gentilem (T21, from Discourses 1, 2, or 3?), HB 261/2; 18.44.18-23.
143 Leipoldt, J., with the assistance of Crum, W. E., Sinuthii Archimandritae Vita et Opera Omnia. 3 volumes (numbered 1, 3, and 4). Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, volumes 41, 42, and 73 (Copt. 1 [= II.2.T], 2 [= II.4.T], 5 [= II.5.T]). Paris: Imprimerie nationale. 1906-1913. 18.262.45.3-6.
144 Sinuthius Theol., ἔθιμος αὐθικάς σημειώσεως = As I sat on a mountain = Ad philosopum gentilem (T21, from Discourses 1, 2, or 3?), HB 262; 18.45.3-6.
145 Sinuthius Theol., ἔθιμος αὐθικάς σημειώσεως = As I sat on a mountain = Ad philosopum gentilem (T21, from Discourses 1, 2, or 3?), HB 262; 18.232.50.
146 Sinuthius Theol., ἔθιμος αὐθικάς σημειώσεως = As I sat on a mountain = Ad philosopum gentilem (T21, from Discourses 1, 2, or 3?), HB 262; 18.264.45.27-266.47.2.
are sought out by the angels; the bee resembles its parents which descend from the sky as the Christian resembles his Creator whose spirit descends from the heavens.

If then (δέ) anyone wants to consult a pagan (Ἕλλην) or (ἡ) a heretic (αἱρετικός) about something, let him ask this animal (ζωόν) being the least (ἐλάχιστόν) which there is, whose nature (φύσις) is to move its head down and up, and which little children ask laughing and crying out saying: is the water coming? Some are even of this kind, who go to the places of asking (oracle) and those who are like them. But (δέ) still the one who wants to censure them on account of their multitude of words, that they say things which are false in their knowledge of lies, let him say to them thus: that he who asks the frogs whether the water is coming as those who joke are accustomed to say, that they croak on the banks of the places of flowing water. What does this achieve? Let servants of the word (λόγος) for riches reproach you. They say that those who see are those who will ask the blind about the ways; or (ἡ) the light the one that will ask darkness (κακόν) about the light; or men the ones who will ask beasts on account of mysteries (μυστήριον) and that which is hidden of god; on account of this th is voice knows you for the beasts of ignorance. You have become like them. Thus they say that man in honouring his knowledge did not know and are like the unknowing beasts and are made like them. Or (ἡ) a marvel in the presence of heaven that the ones who bring (φορεῖν) knowledge make knowledge on their shores, as it is written, mock you; thus again they who grieve for you that the demons mock you, since you do not know that you are stupid.

It is clear that he accusations of sophistical (πετουχοφιζε) and allegorical (εὐαλληνυρεί) obscurities (εαυ τίκας εν ηνεμευε) are meant to imply that there is no possibility of consulting 'the usual range of creatures and celestial bodies' in search of knowledge of 'mysteries and that which is hidden of god' (ετβεγενμυστήριον μηνεποοπι ιτεπιθυντε). What the Greek conception obscures (according to

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147 Sinuthius Theol., EIAHMOQ ΔΑΝΚ ΑΙΩΝΟΥΣΟΤΟΥ = As I sat on a mountain = Ad philosophum gentilem (T21, from Discourses 1, 2, or 37), XN 230/1; 18.49.8–31.


Mark Wildish
Shenoute) is the difference between ‘faith and doctrine which saves and knowledge which is perfect’ (τηςτικς αὐτὸς ἐπιστήμης μὴ ἴσως ἐπιστήμης ἰσότης) and ‘knowledge of lies and doctrine which perverts’ (ἱσότης ἀπὸς ἐπιστήμης ἀπόκρυψης). What separates the Christian and the pagan, in other words, is the difference not between truth and falsehood as determined by the reasonings of Greek sophistry and allegory, but dialectically between Shenoute’s Christian encounter with scriptural ‘revelation’ (διαθήκη) and the pagan rationalist enquiry into ‘what is hidden’ (ἀποκρύψης).

As mentioned above, the main source of a counter-current to the orthodox Coptic Christian response to the hieroglyphic tradition can be found in several Coptic sources of a Gnostic character which lend support for a heterodox conception of both Christology and hieroglyphic possibilities within an Egyptian monastic environment. That environment may also have been mediated through Evagrian influences. Though Evagrian material was originally Greek, the tradition would, in light of Shenoute’s polemic, appear to have survived in Coptic. Both Young (1970) and Orlandi (1982) have proposed that the historical environment and literary career of Shenoute may in fact further mediate that counter-current. If the proposal can be taken at face value, two important texts for this purpose belong amongst the Nag Hammādi Codices. They are ‘the Gospel of Truth’ (περὶ ἀλήθειας ἡμών) and ‘the Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth’ (πρὸς τὴν ἀποκρύψην ἦπειρον).

The former exists in two versions in the Nag Hammādi corpus, the first, almost complete in the Upper Egyptian Coptic dialect of Subakhmimic (= Lycopolitan = Assiutic) as the third of five titles contained in codex I (the Jung Foundation Codex), the second in fragments, in Sahidic (= Sa’idic = Thebaic) as the second of three titles contained in codex XII. Its relation to the Valentinian text of the same name, mentioned by Irenaeus

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152 Irenaeus Theol., Adversus Haereses, 3.11.9.
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uncertain, though ‘the general Valentinian affinities of codex I’ make it seem likely it is the same text in a Coptic translation of a Greek original composed between 140 and 180 A.D.¹⁵³

The relatively short text (running from p.16 to p.43 of codex I) is in general concerned with ‘the oblivion of error’ (†η τήν ἑκατοντήν) and its remedy ‘through the mercies of the Father, the hidden mystery, Jesus, the Christ’ (ἐν τήν ἑκατοντήν ητέ πνεύμαντα τήν ἑκατοντήν ητέ πνεύμαντα τήν ἑκατοντήν ητέ πνεύμαντα).¹⁵⁴ The relevant passage in the present context reads as follows:¹⁵⁵

This is the knowledge of the living book, which he revealed to the æons (αἰών) at the end as his letters, revealing how they are not places (τόπος) of voices nor (οὐδέ) are they letters lacking sound, so that one might read them and think of something empty, but (ἀλλά) they are letters of the truth, which they alone speak who know them. Each letter is a complete «thought», each letter is like a complete book, since they are letters written by the Unity, the Father having written them for the æons (αἰών), in order that by means of his letters they should know the Father.

Several features distinguish an interest in written characters entirely distinct from, if not immune to, the criticisms levelled at their use in Shenoute. That these written characters are ostensibly the revelation of the

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Logos for the return of mankind to knowledge of the Father need not detract from the point. The signal contribution is the development of a conception of how the characters legitimize an understanding of the truth as denied in the Shenoutean critique, namely, by virtue of each letter being a complete thought (‘ἔστω ἡ γραφή τοῦ ζωῆς’), written by the Unity (‘Ἄγγελος ᾿ΑΒΑΛ ὈΤΟΤΟΣ / Ν ὈΤΙΤΟΤΟΣ’). Shenoute’s objection to allegorical and sophistical reasonings on higher matters through items belonging to the lower world is not then obviated, but bolstered by appeal to an explanatory principle justifying the procedure. In The Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth the procedure itself is clearly highlighted, but lacks the principled justification.

“My <son>, write the language of the book on steles (στήλη) of turquoise (καλάινος). My son, it is proper to write this book on steles (στήλη) of turquoise (καλάινος), in hieroglyphic characters. For (γάρ) Mind (νοῦς) himself has become overseer (ἐπίσκοπος) of these. Therefore, I command (κελεύειν) that this teaching be carved on stone, and that you place it in my sanctuary. Eight guardians (φύλαξ) guard it with [...]. The males on the one hand (μέν) on the right are frog-faced (πρόσωπόν), and (δέ) the females on the left are cat-faced (πρόσωπόν). And put a square milk (γάλα) stone at the base (πλάξ) of the turquoise (καλάινος) tablets (τετράγωνον), and write the name on the azure (καλάινος) on the base (πλάξ) of the stone tablet in hieroglyphic characters. My son, you will do this when I am in Virgo (παρθένος), and the sun is in the first half of the day, and fifteen degrees have passed by me.” “My father, everything that you say I will do eagerly.”

The character of this discourse, between Hermes Trismegistus and an initiate, exhibits features notably familiar from other Greek-language hermetic and Platonic texts, for example, Poimandres, particularly in its astronomical emphasis. Perhaps for that reason, as well as the premise that the initiate has already advanced
through the lower levels of spiritual ascent, no immediate justification is felt to be requisite. Nonetheless, a reason is given for writing the book specifically in hieroglyphic characters: ‘for Mind himself has become overseer of these’ (‘πνοετα ὢταλφς ἠταπ / γνωςτικος της’).
§3. The Pagan Response

As argued above, the crucial Coptic Christian objection brought against pagan textual exegesis was directed against the latter’s reliance on reason either as the sole source, or as the sole criterion of truth. What grounds the Christian accusation of sophism (πετυοσοφίζει), allegory (ἐαλληγορεῖ), and rationalized obscurantism (ἐαπρ ΚΑΙΕ οΙ ΝΕΥΣΕΥΣ) was an imputed relativism in the decisive emphasis cultivated Hellenism had placed on the process of reflection and ratiocination (λόγος). Specifically, the speculative application of allusion (αἰνίττεσθαι) and allegory (ἀλληγορεῖν) to empirical phenomena in pursuit of ungenerated first causes was particularly unacceptable. This is prima facie a difficult objection to understand given the extensive use of the same exegetical techniques on the part of the Christians themselves. However, the Christian objection to pagan employment of those techniques was established on two related and in this context decisively Christian observations. First, the undue limitation placed by pagan rationalism on assumptions that could be made about divine agency within the natural order, since the rejection of revelation was at the same time a rejection of the idea that god might do anything which could be understood only through revelation. Second, the related problem that inference from observations in the sensible world to ideas about the intelligible might lead to speculations which were at positively at odds with the truth about god.

Porphyry is especially forceful in addressing specific aspects of the Christian critique of pagan rationalism as a means to understanding, both by means of a sustained counterattack in Contra Christianos and through the defence of pagan superiority over Christian appropriation of pagan allegoristic in De philosophia ex oraculis. It is not only that the accusation reflected back onto the Christians themselves, who clearly made extensive use of allegoristic exegeses of biblical passages, especially, in the Alexandrian context, in Clement and Origen. Rather, in so doing, the allegorical method had been misapplied in reference to unsuitable texts, fruitlessly or unclearly applied in its reliance on revelation where reason alone had failed to reveal the allegorical meaning of the passage, or applied with rationally unacceptable results. In neither the Christian nor the pagan cases, however, did the objections rest on the use of allegory or allusion as such. On both sides the focus is on the material to which the interpretative procedure is applied. Each thought the other’s texts were incapable of

161 Sinuthius Theol., ἰμανοσοφίζει = I am amazed = Contra Origenistas et Gnósticos (WS4, Discourses 7, Work 5), HB 39.2–41.1: §.0331; §.0403.
supporting the metaphysical load placed on them, but the results were both superfluous to and at odds with, respectively, scripturally revealed or rationally defensible truths.

The hieroglyphic tradition was routinely seen as premissed on a form of allegorical or allusive interpretation, and was to that extent susceptible to the same objections. Several representatives of the various schools of late Platonism address, both directly and indirectly, themes emerging from the hieroglyphic tradition that preceded it. The nature of those schools’ interest in that tradition and its part in a broader engagement in theosophical speculation was a matter remarked upon even within late Platonism itself. The engagement with theosophical topics was seen as a development alongside the strictly philosophical subjects, but prioritized in the activities of the Syrian school under the momentum provided by Iamblichus. It was this reversal of emphasis that particularly distinguished the latter from the Roman school that had preceded it and was to influence the Alexandrian and Athenian schools which followed.

\[\text{T213}\] οἱ μὲν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν προτιμῶσιν, ὡς Πορφύριος καὶ Πλοῦτος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ φιλόσοφοι ὡς δὲ τὴν ἱερατικὴν, ὡς ἵλαμβλίχος καὶ Συριανὸς καὶ Πρόκλος καὶ οἱ ἱερατικοὶ πάντες.163

Some prefer philosophy, as Porphyry and Plotinus, and many other philosophers; but others [prefer] the hieratic art, such as Iamblichus and Syrianus and Proclus and all those who are sacerdotal.

Whether this is an accurate picture of one kind of difference between schools or not, one especial advantage of late Platonism for the understanding of the hieroglyphic tradition is nevertheless its position at the end of the broader development of Platonism quite generally. The consequent prospect of both an overview and synthesis of preceding developments is possible, in fact, in large part due to a curricular feature across which those themes are distributed. The themes in question are classifiable into the three parts: physiology, logic, and theology. Inquiring into natural causes and phenomena, the physiological part looks to material originating in hieroglyphic Egyptian from the perspective of Græco-Egyptian cultural and natural history. For the inquiry into the processes of discursive reasoning, the logical part looks to hieroglyphic Egyptian from the perspective of the rational relations between language, mind, and world. The theological part looks to the unity, origin, and efficacy of hieroglyphic wisdom on the subject of the gods and cosmology.

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163 Damascius Phil., *In Phaedonem* (versio 1) 172.1–3.
The question, therefore, with which the following sections are concerned is how these three parts of the curriculum are related to each in such a way as to account for both the rôle played by theosophical speculation in general, and hieroglyphic exegesis in particular. The aim is to establish the Egyptizing philosophical subjects both as proper topics for philosophical investigation and as consciously addressing the Christian accusations of sophistical and allegorical obscurity. Part Two examines aspects of semantic theory which may be thought to account for how and what hieroglyphic signs signify as well as the relationship between what is signified and both the natural phenomena they depict and the causes of them. Part Three aligns this semantic account with an independently characterizable metaphysical substrate. This provides both a justificatory framework for the semantic account and a methodological principle legitimizing hieroglyphic exegetical procedure. Thereby hieroglyphic signs are established as depictions of realia of Egyptian provenance reflecting, in the phenomena of nature, categorial hierarchies which might be thought to legitimize inference to primary (or secondary) causes of those phenomena. Part Four addresses the question of the sense in which the interpretation of hieroglyphs either preserves or fails to preserve the intellectual content of the hieroglyph it explains by virtue of aligning the two elements (glyph and exegesis) with the categorial hierarchies described in Part Three.

Porphyry had maintained a threefold distinction of Egyptian script:

Porphyryus Phil., Vita Pythagoræ 11.9–12.4.

Porphyryus Phil., Enneades 5.8.6.10-11. The suggestion originates in a note to a translation of the passage made by Малеванский (see Плотин. Сочинения. Плотин в русских переводах (СПб: 1995)).

In Egypt he conversed with the priests and learned their wisdom, and the speech of the Egyptians, and the three different types of letters, epistolographic, hieroglyphic, and symbolic, some used with primary significance mimetically, others used with allegorical significance allusively; and he learnt something more about the gods.

The epistolographic may be supposed to be a reference either to the demotic (δημοτικά) or to the hieratic script (ἱερατικά). If the latter, then Porphyry does not recognise hieratic as cursive hieroglyphic. Uniquely in the Greek exegeses, however, Plotinus does note a script-variation in the form of ‘a representation in something else, already unfolded and speaking it discursively’ (εἴδωλον ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐξειλιγμένον ἤδη, καὶ λέγον αὐτό ἐν διεξόδῳ). If hieratic and elements of demotic script can be described as (dis)cursive hieroglyphic, then the distinctive feature of hieroglyphic in the narrow sense must be conceived of as bound to the media
or means of their production. Insofar as the crucial feature of the hieroglyphic characters is their transparency as depictions of sensible phenomena, a feature lost in the cursive development of hieroglyphs in the demotic and hieratic scripts, Plotinus specifically ties the hieroglyphic usage to the availability of the meaning of the glyph in its depictive immediacy.

Porphyry's threefold distinction (τρισσὰς διαφορὰς) is arranged, using τε ... καὶ to separate the epistolographic from both the hieroglyphic and symbolic uses, such that the two-part explanatory comment that follows can only refer to the latter two types. Although the primary distinction is between epistolographic and non-epistolographic types of script, there is no reason to suppose that the secondary distinction between script 'used with primary significance representatively' (τῶν μὲν κοινολογομένων κατὰ μίμησιν) and 'used with allegorical significance allusively' (τῶν δὲ ἀλληγορομένων κατὰ τινας αἰνιγμούς) correspond to the hieroglyphic and symbolic uses respectively. What is crucial in Porphyry's classification is that hieroglyphic signs may be used in two ways: (i) in virtue of their mimetic aspect and (ii) in virtue of their allusive aspect. The term 'hieroglyphic' is, in this sense, applied in a manner consistent with Plotinus' usage as described below. The Porphyrian division of primary (or mimetic) and symbolic (or allegorical) modes of expression involves not only a clearly distinct use of the notion of symbolism to refer not to phonetic orthography, but to a new relation, independent of the depictive functions of hieroglyphs, which is referred to as allusive.

Egyptian writing, then, is capable of three modes of expression. The first it shares with Greek, namely, the capacity to render the spoken language. The second is depictive, capable of signifying its meaning transparently, that is, without recourse to the medium of the spoken language. The third is allusive, susceptible of allegorical interpretation. On the face of it this is a straightforward claim about how the Egyptians used their scripts. I shall, however, argue that these distinctions are in fact theoretically motivated by a specific conception of semantics, which is in turn justified by Platonic metaphysical distinctions. Both the semantic and metaphysical basis for the Porphyrian model of hieroglyphics had wide currency in Neoplatonic thought and were significantly developed by Iamblichus and given scholastic expression in Proclus. In the following chapter, therefore, I develop an account of: first, Neoplatonic semantic theory quite generally; second, the rôle of semantic theory within the broader metaphysical framework to which it belonged; and, third, the interpretative methodology applied on the basis of that framework to the specific understanding of Egyptian hieroglyphs current amongst the Neoplatonic exegetes.
Chapter Three: Neoplatonic Hieroglyphics

§1. Semantics

The primary occasion for the Neoplatonic commentators’ interest in semantics is the controversy over the σκοπός of the Categoriæ. The controversy can be summarized as follows. There are three major readings of the aim or purpose of the Categoriæ according to whether the subject being addressed is construed as realities (πράγματα), linguistic expressions (φωναί), or concepts (νοηματα). As presented by, for example, Iamblichus,166 these readings need not, however, be understood to be mutually exclusive and in fact a unified account is precisely what is required. A version of the view that a unified conception of the σκοπός of the Categoriæ had become canonical by for later Neoplatonists in the form: ‘the subject of the Categoriæ concerns expressions in so far as they signify objects, through the medium of concepts’ (ἔστιν ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν Κατηγοριῶν περὶ φωνῶν σημαινοντῶν πράγματα διὰ μέσων νοημάτων).167 The reason the semantic question is materially implicated in the σκοπός question is that this canonical expression of the solution to the latter is formulated in terms of the solution to the former. The relationship between the three possible answers to the question of the subject-matter of the Categoriæ is a semantic relationship. Linguistic expressions signify objects and that semantic relation is mediated through concepts. This solution to the σκοπός question was neither universally accepted, nor univocally understood. The primary point of controversy is the mediation of concepts (νοηματα) between linguistic expressions (φωναί) and realities (πράγματα). Further controversies arise concerning what exactly ‘concepts’ and ‘realities’ are. Moreover, the attribution of the various proposals attested is a similarly vexed issue. Nor is the identification of scholastic divisions on the matter, even where possible, clearly desirable.168

It is at any rate clear that the idea that two kinds of thing are signified by linguistic expressions (φωναί), one direct, the other indirect – i.e. concepts (νοηματα) and objects (πράγματα) respectively – is the Aristotelian view as presented at the opening of De interpretatione.169 The main alternative solution excluded the mediating

166 Iamblichus apud Olympiodorus Phil., Prolegomena 19.36-20.12.
169 Aristoteles Phil. De interpretatione 16a1ff.

ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, και τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ και ὡσπερ ὡσεὶ γράμματα πάντα τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναί αὐτὰ ἀπ’ ἕννεποι τὰ αὐτά σημαίνει ἀπὸ τῶν γράμματος, ταυτὰ πάντα παθήματα τῆς φυσῆς, καὶ ὧν ταύτα ἰμμοιματα πράγματα ἤδη ταύτα.

Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of – actual things – are also the same.
role of concepts. Thirdly, in the course of his synthesis of the preceding traditions Simplicius further specifies a crucial link establishing the precise relationship between the direct and indirect significata of linguistic expressions, which he attributes to 'members of the Academy' (οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας).

The first question facing those who believe in the mediating role of concepts is the motivation for introducing them between words and things. According to the standard account, for Porphyry the primary significance of words derives from a 'first imposition of expressions' (τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων) signifying things directly. This is followed by a 'second imposition' (τῆς δευτέρας θέσεως) concerning the use of terms for parts of language, e.g. noun (ὄνομα) and verb/adjective (ὁμήμα). Here is his account of the origins of significant language.

So I claim that once man himself came to be denotative and significative of things that are present he came to name and denote each thing by means of the voice. And for him the first use of expressions came to stand for each of the things through certain utterances and expressions, and in accordance with the relation of utterances to things he called a certain thing a seat, this a man, this a dog, this the sun, and again this colour white, this black, and this number, this size, and this two cubits, this three cubits, and so he assigned to each thing expressions and names significant and indicative of them through such sounds of the voice.

The crucial feature of this account is that first-imposition expressions signify things directly without the aid of mediating concepts. One possible explanation for the absence of concepts from the account might be that it derives from Stoic rather than Aristotelian sources. Another possible explanation is that first- and second-imposition expressions may be thought to provide a systematic distinction between the τόποι of the Categoriae and De interpretatione: simple expressions (ἄπλαὶ φωναῖ) and the first synthesis of simple expressions (τῆς πρώτης συνθέσεως τῶν ἀπλῶν φωνῶν) as constituents of assertion (ἀπόφασις) respectively – followed by a

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173 Porphyry Phil. In Aristotelis categorias exposito per interrogationem et responsionem 4.1.57.20-29.

174 Porphyry Phil., In Aristotelis categorias exposito per interrogationem et responsionem, 4.1.57.20-29.


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second synthesis in συλλογισμός as the topic of *Analytica priora*.

Though Porphyry does seem to have eschewed any consideration of intermediaries in the nature of concepts between expressions and objects, at least insofar as he took the former to stand for (παραστήσαι) the latter in the first imposition, he nonetheless makes it clear that the theory of both first and second imposition of names is independent of the question of predication. To predicate is to ‘call something in accordance with something signified’. A predicate expression does not then signify a thing directly, for predication would then be to call a thing in accordance with itself. In the case of Porphyry too, then, it becomes clear that two kinds of thing are signified by linguistic expressions, one in accordance with first imposition, another through predication.

Regarding predication, the *Categoriæ* had drawn a distinction as follows: ‘of things’ (τῶν ὄντων) ‘some are said of a subject, but are not in any subject’ (τὰ μὲν καθ’ ὑποκειμένων τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἐστιν) and ‘others are in a subject but are not said of any subject’ (τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἐστι, καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται). As an example of the latter, Aristotle gives ‘the individual white’ (τὸ τι λευκὸν), which ‘is in a subject, the body’ (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἐστι τῷ σώματι) ‘for all colour is in a body’ (ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι), ‘but is not said of any subject’ (καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται). White (τὸ λευκὸν), we further learn, because it is ‘what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in’ (ὅ ἐν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον αδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ὧ ἐστίν), is a ‘qualification’ (ποιόν).

In specifying the subject of the *Categoriæ* Porphyry’s account had been explicit in distinguishing such individuals as ‘white’ and their corresponding verbal expressions – which are ‘practically infinite in number’ (ἀπειρὰ μὲν σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ πρᾶγματα καὶ αἱ λέξεις κατὰ ἀριθμόν). Nevertheless, ‘the list of ten genera under which the infinity of beings and expressions that signify them are found to be included’ (ἡ ἀπειρία τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν σημαινουσῶν αὐτὰ λέξεων εἰς δέκα γένη εὕρηται περιλαμβανομένη εἰς τὸ γράφεσθαι) comprehends both subjects and their qualifications and what is said of them.
By virtue of the correspondence of the ten genera of being and the ten genera of predication, for Porphyry, Aristotle is justified in naming the work *Categoriae* insofar as he is concerned with simple expressions directly significant of things ‘according to each genus’ (κατὰ γένος ἢκαστον).

Every simple significant expression when it is spoken and said of the thing signified is said to be a predicate. For example if there is a thing which is this stone which is being shown, and which we are touching or looking at, when we say of it, ‘This is a stone’, the expression ‘stone’ is a predicate, for it signifies a thing of such a kind and is spoken of the thing being shown.

That is, a predicate expression is described as *applying* to the object indicated and *signifying* the kind of thing it is.\(^{186}\) Having identified the former (i.e. the indicated object) as an ‘individual’ (τὸδὲ τι), which is ‘particular’ (καθ’ ἢκαστον) in continuity with the Aristotelian account, the latter (i.e. the kind of thing signified) as ‘the thing in common for thought’ (τὸ κοινῇ τῇ διάνοιᾷ), i.e. a universal. The point is not only to distinguish universals from particulars, but also to qualify the relation involved as explicitly a relation in thought.\(^{187}\) In the case of predication, then, in addition to the terminology of individuals and particulars, the explicit relation in thought indicates the presence of a conceptual component to semantics.

\(^{184}\) Porphyrius Phil., *In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem* 4.1.56.8-13.

\(^{185}\) Porphyrius Phil., *In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem* 4.1.58.9-20.

\(^{186}\) Porphyrius Phil., *In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem* 4.1.91.1-5.

\(^{187}\) Porphyrius Phil., *In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem* 4.1.91.1-5.
Now we are in position to reconcile the apparent discontinuity of an account of direct signification of things through simple expressions and the account of predication. The first imposition relation between expressions and things qualified as a second-imposition relation in thought is, as such, the relation between significant expressions and the ten genera of things of such a kind. First imposition signifiers signify particulars by directly naming them; predicative signifiers directly signify universals, i.e. what is common in thought.

This is not to say, however, that Porphyry envisaged two ways to signify particulars: one directly through the first imposition and the other indirectly through predication. On the contrary, insofar as a predicative statement is composed of a syntactic subject (ὄνομα) and a syntactic predicate (ῥῆμα), it is predicative statements that make use of two types of signification. In the case of the subject we have direct signification of the particular of which the predication is made by naming it and in the case of the predicate we have directly signified universals predicatable of those particulars. In other words, the notion of semantics as exclusively constrained by the theory of the first imposition of names not only presupposes that the semantic rôle that is attributable to concepts is confined to mediating the naming relation, but also that meaning as such is univalent. Neither constraint appears to be supported by the text. What we have instead is an account of signification sensitive to the variety of rôles played by linguistic expressions and to the variety of their respective relations to the objects or states of affairs of which they speak.

For that reason, though I describe the controversy over the σκοπός of the Categoriæ as the primary occasion for the Neoplatonic commentators’ interest in semantics, it ought to be emphasized that Neoplatonic interest in (and theorization of) semantics is by no means confined to just those semantic relations that may be thought to be directly relevant to the σκοπός question alone. Nonetheless, the question of how precisely the bipartite account as presented by Porphyry and the tripartite account as presented by, for example, Iamblichus can be reconciled in a unified account remains unanswered. Moreover, the further question of how precisely particulars directly signified in the first imposition of names are related to the universals under which they fall and which are directly signified in predication is taken up by Iamblichus apud Simplicius.189

189 Simplicius Phil. In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.53.9-18.
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an through are, δακταλίας ἂντον καὶ τὰς ἐπί τῶν γένεων ὀρίσμων οὐδὲν, ὡσπερ πρὸς τὴν λευκὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀμελεῖον ταύτην ἐστὶν τῷ λευκοῖς βότρυσις φέρειν, κατὰ ἀνάφοραν τῆν ἐπὶ τὸν καρπὸν, ὀδός αὐτῆς καλομένης. περὶ δὲ τοίοῦ ἐν τῷ Μετὰ τὰ πυθικὰ αἰκῆσι διώρισεν Ἀριστοτέλης. νῦν δὲ κοινότερον κερδηθαί τὰς σημανίας, ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄτινα λέγομεν τοὺς ὑκερμοῦς ἐκ γένους εἶναι καὶ διαφορῶν, σοὶ κυρίως τὸ γένος ἐνιαύθα λαμβάνοντες, ἀλλὰ ἀντὶ τῆς πτώσεως, ἣς ἐξηγητικὸν ἔστιν τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ γενικοῦ.

Here we not only have the familiar Aristotelian distinction between ‘the [whiteness] on the fruit’ (τὴν [λευκὴν] ἐπὶ τὸν καρπὸν) and ‘being white’ (τὸ λευκὸν εἶναι), but also a specification of the relation between the two. The former is a particular, the latter is the particular’s participation in a universal. Furthermore, the relation of participation in the generic (μετέχειν τοῦ γενικοῦ) is, in a primary sense, the relation of ‘case’ (πτώσεως), not genus, because definition by genus and differentiae would otherwise define the very thing in accordance with which it defines. That is, the same problems that arise in an account of predication as signifying a thing directly applies to definition by genus and differentiae, namely circularity in the case of true definition and the consequent impossibility of false definition.

Attributing further reflection on ‘cases’ (πτώσεως) to unspecified ‘members of the Academy’ (οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας) – evidently Platonists, given the contrast with ‘members of the Stoa’ (οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς)\(^{191}\) – Simplicius clarifies their relation to both particulars and universals.\(^{192}\)

[Τ306] ἐκάλουν δὲ τὴν ποιήτην καὶ ἔχει οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔξερεν ἡς ἔχει ἐκτα ἐκάλουν, ὡσπερ τὰ ἐνοικία μεθεκτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ μετέχεσα καὶ τὰς πτώσεις τευχτὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ τυχανεσθαι καταγρηματα καὶ συμβάματα ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβιβηκέναι.\(^{193}\) Those from the Stoa also called the property a disposition, but those from the Academy called dispositions ‘things to possess’ from being possessed, and concepts ‘things to participate in’ from being participated in, and the cases ‘things to have’ from being had, and predicates ‘accidents’ too from following upon them.

So predicates are neither particular properties nor dispositions, which are ‘things to possess’ (ἐκτά), nor universal concepts, which are ‘things to participate in’ (μεθεκτά). But nor are predicates the cases themselves, which are ‘things to have’ (τευχτά), i.e. what particulars have as a result of participating in universals. Rather

\(^{190}\) Simplicius Phil., In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.53.9–18.


\(^{192}\) Simplicius Phil. In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.209.10–14.

\(^{193}\) Simplicius Phil., In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.209.10–14.

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they are ‘accidents’ (συμβάματα) by virtue of ‘following upon’ (συμβεβηκέναι) the former through their participation in the latter and thereby falling under predicatable concepts.

Porphyry’s theory of the first imposition of names, according to which the phenomena of nature are representatively signified by the direct application of names, defines the intelligibility of linguistic terms prerequisite for predication. In reception of Aristotle’s *Categoriæ* a second type of signification is described by Porphyry, conceptually mediated in predication. A linguistic expression (φωνῆ or λέξις) is composed of a noun (δόμα) and a verb or an adjective (δήμα). In representational signification the object is to identify features of the phenomenal world in order to establish the terms used in predication as meaningful at all. Such an expression directly signifies a factual condition (πράγμα) composed of a particular individual (τόδε τι) and property (ποιόν), which is an attribute (ἕκτον). The expression is further classified by genus in the form of a predicative statement (κατηγόρημα) indicating the universal (τὸ καθόλου), which is an incident (μεθεκτόν). Insofar as a predicate is thereby predicatable of a particular it is an accident (σύμβαμα), and what we indicate by means of a predicate is that by falling under a universal the particular has a case (πτῶσις), which is a resultant (τευκτόν). In predicative signification the object is to make a statement about features of the phenomenal world by virtue of terms established as meaningfully identifiable as the objects they are through the first imposition of names.

The first type of signification signifies particulars and their composition in factual conditions. It is a bipartite theory according to which words directly signify things without the mediation of concepts. In this the representative semantic relation contrasts with the conceptual semantic relation of the second type of signification. The latter is a tripartite theory, whereby words directly signify concepts and thereby, indirectly things. In the version of the theory as developed by Iamblichus *apud* Simplicius, the relationship between linguistic expressions and what they signify is given greater precision. According to this version, words (φωναί) signify neither common concepts (νοήματα), nor particular things (πράγματα), but particular things insofar as they fall under common concepts. Insofar as particular things fall under common concepts they are specified as cases (πτῶσεις) and resultants (τευκτά). Far from being mutually exclusive, the tripartite theory is dependent on the bipartite theory for the meaningfulness of the terms predicated. The meaningfulness of terms used in predication is indefeasible, whereas predications are verifiable or falsifiable by reference to the sensible world, but indefeasible by reference to the thoughts which they express. Type one directly signifies
things; type two directly signifies thoughts. It is in this sense that type one provides a physiological account of meaning and type two, a logical account of meaning. But there is a third type of signification, for which a metaphysical explanation is given, upon which both types one and two are causally dependent and to which it is possible to reason from them. This is the subject of the next section.
§2. Metaphysics

Plotinus thinks the *Categories* a work of metaphysics concerning realities (πράγματα), on which reading he offers substantial criticism of Aristotle in ‘On the genera of being’ (Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος). Each reality, however, is not the particular (καθ’ ἐκαστὸν) individual (τὸ ἑνὶ τι) of Porphyry’s account, but the substance of the thing itself (τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τῆς οὐσίας). In a well-known passage in ‘On intelligible beauty’ (Περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ κάλλους) Plotinus states that there is an individual hieroglyphic image for each thing (ἐν ἑκαστοῦ πράγματος ἄγαλμα) by which ‘to present the way there in truth’ (τὴν ἑκεῖ οὐ διέξοδον ἐμφῆναι).

Also the wise of Egypt seem to me, whether understanding by precise knowledge or by nature, concerning those things which they wanted to show through wisdom, to use not arguments and premisses with regular types of letters nor those imitating utterances and articulations of propositions, but by writing images and engraving on the temples one each for each object thus to present the exposition of that thing, for each image is a particular knowledge and wisdom and a unified entity and not discursive reason or will.

Each hieroglyphic image is a unified and particular entity in itself (ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἀθρόον) and a particular instance of knowledge and wisdom (τὰς καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία ἑκαστὸν ἐστίν ἄγαλμα) . This use of hieroglyphs is furthermore without recourse to the use of discursive reason (διανόησις) and its typical expression in ‘arguments and premisses’ (λόγους καὶ προτάσεις) and writing which imitates ‘utterances and articulations of propositions’ (φωνὰς καὶ προφορὰς ἀξιωμάτων), but preserves the ontology of its object, which allows one to grasp the substrate (ὑποκείμενον) in its totality (ἀθρόον).

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194 Plotinus Phil., *Enneades* 6.1-3 = *Tractates* 39.1-3/42-4: Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος πρῶτον οὗ ἡ ἀρχή περὶ τῶν ὄντων πόσαι, καὶ τίνες; Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος δεύτερον οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ τῶν ὄντων πόσα, καὶ τίνα; Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος τρίτον οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ τῶν ὄντων πόσα, καὶ ὅτι ἐν θέαι τοῦ νοητοῦ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ ὂν ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον δεύτερον· οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ ὂν ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον δεύτερον· οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ ὂν ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον δεύτερον.

195 Plotinus Phil., *Enneades* 6.5.30-31 = *Tractate* 22.2/23: Ἐν τῷ τὸν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐν ἃμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον δεύτερον οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐν ἃμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον δεύτερον.

196 Plotinus Phil., *Enneades* 5.8 = *Tractate* 28/31: Περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ κάλλους οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐπεὶ δέ ως φανερόν τὸν ἓν ἔδωκε τὸ νοητὸν - a commentary on *Plato Phil.* Phaedrus 246d-247e.

197 Plotinus Phil., *Enneades* 5.8.6-19.
The hieroglyphic example provided there is a specific instance of the general principle that ‘a certain wisdom fashions all the things that are made, whether works of art or natural’ (πάντα δὴ τὰ γινόμενα, εἶτε τεχνητὰ εἶτε φυσικὰ εἶν, σοφία τις ποιεῖ). The wisdom of the artist guides the production of the work. The artist himself is also generated (γεγένηται) in accordance with the wisdom of nature. This principle in nature (λόγον ἐν τῇ φύσει) is either ‘of itself’ (ἐξ αὑτοῦ) or is generated by the further principle of intellect (ὁ νοῦς ἐγέννησε τὴν σοφίαν).²₀₀

This distinction between ‘discursive’ (διανόησις) and ‘intellective’ (νοοῦ) thought is intended to overcome the objection to the Platonic doctrine of Forms levelled by means of the Third Man Argument, but also responds to the sceptical objections to which the Stoic position appeared to lend itself.²₀₁ The Stoic position is liable to sceptical objections because it relies on the idea that the distinctive faculty of the soul is discursive reason. That is, insofar as the conceptual apparatus for discursive reason is the product of repeated exposure to the causal influence of objects on the soul resulting in the formation of concepts organized as experience, some further condition or criterion is required by which to judge whether or not the evidential relation itself might reasonably be inferred. To that extent the objects of (Stoic) discursive reason are external to itself and therefore liable to the standard sceptical objections concerning the possibility of establishing any non-recursive connection between what is observed in perception as evidence on the basis of which inferences about objects might be made. In order to preserve the possibility of knowledge, Platonists argue that knowledge is by (non-material) intellect and of intelligibles with which it can be identical.²₀² Plotinus’ account explicitly focuses on the significative possibilities of hieroglyphic language for such intelligibles – as distinct from language concerning the sensible world. His aim appears to be to secure a form of non-discursive language which will advertise the fact (against potential sceptical objections) that knowledge is not based on sense-perception.²₀³ The third strand of my argument, then, concerns the relationship between ‘intellective’ (νοερά) and ‘discursive’ (διανοητική) thought as treated in the Aristotelian reflections of Porphyrian semantics.

²₀₀ Plotinus Phil., Enneades 5.8.5.
²₀² νοοῦ must know the essence (τὸ τί) of its objects rather than merely its quality (τὸ ποῖόν τι). This is possible because ‘real truth consists in agreement not with another but with itself, and it says nothing else beside itself, and is what it says and says what it is’ (ἡ ὄντως ἀλήθεια οὐ συμφωνοῦσα ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἑαυτῇ, καὶ οὐδὲν παρ' αὑτήν, άλλο λέγει, «ἄλλον δέ λέγει», καὶ ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ ἐστι, τόστοι καὶ λέγει). See Plotinus Phil., Enneades 5.5.2.18-20. Cf. Wallis, R. T., ‘Nous as Experience’ in Harris, R. B., (ed.), The Significance of Neoplatonism (Albany: New York, 1976). See also Rappe, S., Reading Neoplatonism: Nondiscursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Porphyry, and Damascius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
An obvious objection is that the possibility of non-discursive thought expressed through hieroglyphs is excluded precisely by virtue of the sensible nature of the hieroglyphs themselves. If hieroglyphs are not to be subject to sceptical objections based on causal relations between world and language inhering in discursive thought, then there is an apparent need for some possibility of synthesizing hieroglyphs with the objects of ‘intelllective’ (νοερά) thought which accommodates their materiality within a broader framework.  

One possible answer to this might be not to allow Plotinus’ reflections on discursive and intellective language to form part of the analysis of the Categoriæ at all, by reading Aristotle as offering an exclusively semantic as opposed to metaphysical account. Porphyry may then have deliberately omitted any introduction of the Forms into his semantics in order to leave room for the possibility of the synthesis of the Aristotelian account with the Platonic. One way to achieve this is by characterizing the Platonic endeavour as proceeding from the intelligible to the sensible and the Aristotelian endeavour as proceeding from the sensible to the intelligible, the causal-semantic sequence φωνή - νόημα - πρᾶγμα can be brought into correspondence with the Neoplatonic hypostases τὸ ψυχικόν - τὸ νοερόν - τὸ θείον. In so doing, the possibility of situating hieroglyphics in an intermediate (rather than terminal) position and thus attributing to them a mediating rôle in the process is provided for along lines I describe below.

Within the context of an exclusively logical topic, for example, Iamblichus’ discussion of the Aristotelian categories allows for the mediation of concepts (νοηματα) between expressions (φωναὶ) and realities (πρᾶγματα). These three elements, however, constitute in Iamblichus a tripartite account of universals (τὰ καθόλου), not the controversial subject-matter of Aristotle’s text. Each element is the proper subject of three distinct disciplines, namely: logic, physiology, and theology respectively; and each part of the account is mapped onto the canonical tripartite account of the subject-matter of the Categoriæ.

If then for him the topic is about genera, as it is said, once again logic examines not things before the many (for that is the subject of theology), nor things in the many (for this is the subject of physiology), but concepts which are over

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206 See Ammonius Phil., In Aristotelis librum de interpretatione commentarius 24.24-9.
the many and posterior, how for him will the topic not be about concepts here, if at any rate logic is the business at hand?

Accordingly, (i) expressions are ‘in the many’ (ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς) and are the subject of physiology, (ii) concepts are ‘over the many’ (ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς) and the subject of logic, and (iii) realities are ‘before the many’ (πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν) and the subject of theology. It is against this background that the peculiar significative possibilities of hieroglyphic language (as attested by Iamblichus, Plotinus, and Porphyry) is considered.

The correspondences are not, however, entirely transparent. One might have expected, for instance, that the ‘realities’ of the tripartite account, which were the objects signified by utterances through the medium of concepts, would be classified as items ‘in the many’, i.e. the particulars of the Porphyrian account. On the other hand, on the standard tripartite account expressions too are particulars, a complication Iamblichus’ proposal resolves by juxtaposition of the Platonic ‘top-down’ account – i.e., by identifying realities with intelligible rather than sensible objects, proceeding from the intelligible to the sensible.

Not one opinion then has arisen concerning the subject-matter of the Categories, as many as actual objects have established; these are three, whether realities, concepts, or expressions, and realities are produced from god, concepts by the mind, and expressions by the soul.

Thereby a characteristically Neoplatonic hierarchical ontology is developed such that it is expressions that are ‘by the soul’ (ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς), concepts are ‘by the mind’ (ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ), and realities are ‘from god’ (θεόθεν). Porphyry’s Aristotelian account, by virtue of being purely ‘logical’, only deals with the first two levels of the ontological hierarchy: both expressions (φωναί) and objects (πράγματα) in that account are ‘in the many’ and concepts (νοήματα) are ‘over the many’. It is the Platonic account that supplies realities (πράγματα), which are ‘before the many’.

The position attributed by Simplicius and Olympiodorus to Iamblichus and outlined above appears at first sight to present a radical departure from the Porphyrian semantic account, not merely (if one is committed to

208 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.1.1-2.5; Plotinus Phil. Enneades 5.8.5; Porphyrius Phil. Vita Pythagoræ 11.9-12.4.
attributing to him a bipartite semantics) by conceding a mediating role to concepts (which, as I shall argue, is neither necessary, nor justified), but also by contributing a further layer of ‘intellective interpretation’ (νοερὰ θεωρία) in order to establish the possibility of an exegesis of the metaphysical substrate of the lower ontological orders. The sources, however, emphasize both continuity and complementarity.

He reasoned that the logical (λογικὸς) account (attributed to Porphyry) stands in need of correction for its emphasis on ‘the utterances by the soul’ (ἀi δὲ φωναὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς), which are ‘in the many’ (ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς) and ‘the work of natural science’ (φυσιολογίας γὰρ τοῦ). The conceptual (ἐννοηματικὸς) account (attributed to Alexander), similarly needs correction, for its emphasis on ‘the concepts by the mind’ (τὰ δὲ νοημάτα ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ), which are ‘over the many’ (ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς) and ‘posterior’ (ὑπερεργενη). The third, divine (θεῖος) account (attributed to Herminus) needs correction for emphasizing ‘realities’ (πράγματα), which are ‘from god’ (θεόθεν) and ‘before the many’ (πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν), which is ‘the work of theology’ (θεολογίας γὰρ ἐργον τοῦτο). After this the divine Iamblichus himself set down a prolix treatise in this book, in many respects following what Porphyry had said even using the same expression, selecting some of these sections more strictly by restricting verbosity against objections as in lectures, and everywhere imposing intellective theory almost to every chapter and adding something else useful to the treatise.

The crucial manoeuvre here is not merely to treat the tripartite structure as indicative of a tripartite ontology, but to treat the correspondence as a methodological principle for the exegesis of its metaphysical implications.

The more problematic aspect of Iamblichus’ procedure lies in how to explain how universals as post rem predicables can have an intermediary rôle to play between realities and utterances, since they are explicitly posterior to the latter. The answer seems to lie in the apparent two-fold sense attributed to universals which appears to have given rise to the problem of the subject-matter of the Categoriae originally. Predicable post rem concepts are indeed posterior to the common properties of individuals, but what explains the fact they are predicable is itself prior to the predicable. The presupposition that Aristotelian universals were conceived of as counterparts to Platonic Forms, performing the same explanatory work as the Forms (namely explaining

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210 Simplicius Phil., in Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.2.9–15.
211 Olympiodorus Phil., Prolegomena 18.25–19.36.
the predicability of common properties), is one reason that the ‘problem of universals’ was taken to be a problem of differing accounts of universals as such at all.\(^{212}\) However, a distinction between Forms as explanatory of the participation of numerically distinct individuals in common properties and predicable universals as ‘that which is predicated in common’ (τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον)\(^{213}\) would seem to be not only a genuinely viable option in the development of the Neoplatonic harmonization of the two, but is in fact explicitly argued. Nor is it simply a matter of making attempt not to attribute to the latter the explanatory function of the former, but instead a rôle complementary to it. In order to preclude the objection that the explanatory rôle performed by the former is complicated by the relation of participation, ‘that which participates’ (τὸ μετέχον), (2) ‘that which is participated in’ (τὸ μετεχόμενον), and (3) ‘that which is unparticipated’ (τὸ ἀμέθεκτον) are further distinguished.\(^{214}\)

If, then, universals are distinct from both Forms and particulars, how might Iamblichus align the three such that concepts might mediate realities and utterances?

Every whole is either a whole-before-the-parts, a whole-of-the-parts, or a whole-in-the-part. For either the form of each thing is surveyed in its cause, and we call that which subsists in its cause a whole prior to parts, because it presupsts in the cause, or it is seen in the parts which participate of it. And this in a twofold respect: for it is either seen in all the parts together, and this is a whole consisting of parts, any of which being absent diminishes the whole, — or, it is seen in each of the parts, so that the part likewise becomes by participation a whole; which makes the part to be a whole partially. The whole, therefore, which is according to reality consists of parts; but the whole which is prior to parts is according to cause. And the whole which is in a part is according to participation: for this, likewise, according to an ultimate diminution or remission is a whole so far as it imitates the whole which consists of parts, since it is not any casual part, but that which is capable of being assimilated to a


\(^{213}\) Aristoteles Phil., Metaphysica 1003a11.

\(^{214}\) Proclus Phil., Instituto theologica 67.1-14. Cf. Simplicius Phil., In Aristotelis categoriarum commentarium 8.82.35-83.10; Asclepius Phil., In Aristotelis metaphysicorum libros A-Z commentaria 433.9-436.6; Porphyrius Phil., In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem 90.30-91.18; Ammonius Phil., In Porphyrii isagogen sive quinque vocees 41.1-42.26; 68.25-69.2.
whole of which the parts likewise are wholes.216

An Aristotelian universal, in this context, is ‘a whole consisting of parts’ (τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ὄλον) in contrast both to the Platonic Form, which is ‘a whole prior to parts’ (ὅλον ἐκεῖνο πρὸ τῶν μερῶν), and the particular, a ‘part <that> becomes by participation a whole’ (τὸ μέρος κατὰ μεθέξειν τοῦ ὄλου <ὅλου> γεγονότος). In this case a particular, i.e. a part which becomes by participation a whole, participates in a universal, i.e. a whole consisting of parts, and the Form, i.e. a whole prior to parts, is unparticipated (ἀμέθεκτον). The difficulty addressed here is the apparent irreconcilability of immanence and transcendence of the Forms alluded to above.217 It depends, however, on a conception of participated universals as both a posteriori abstractions from particulars and a priori Forms causally determinative of those particulars.

The Neoplatonic solution to this apparent incommensurability between the dual conception of participated universals lies in the rôle of the former in ‘procession’ (πρόοδος) and of the latter in ‘reversion’ (ἐπιστροφή).218 The standard conception of dialectic among late Platonists was that it had four branches: definition (ἄριστη), division (διαιρετική), demonstration (ἀποδεικτική), and analysis (ἀναλυτική).219 Division is to ‘make the one into many’ (τὸ ἓν πολλὰ ποιεῖν); definition is to ‘collect many into one’ (τὰ πολλὰ συνάγειν εἰς ἕν).220 These two are then converse procedures. Demonstration ‘begins from causes and primary things’ (ἀπὸ αἰτίων καὶ πρώτων ἀρχηγῶν); analysis ‘begins from effects and secondary things’ (ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτιατῶν καὶ δευτέρων ἀρχηγῶν), ‘for analysis is nothing if not the converse of demonstration’ (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστιν ἀνάλυσις, εἰ μὴ ἀπόδειξις ἀντεστραμμένη).221 Analysis, that is, ‘concerns what is consequent to first principles’ (περὶ δὲ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς) and ‘traces the desired result back to an acknowledged principle’ (ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν ὁμολογουμένην ἀνάγοσα τὸ ζητούμενον).222

[Τ312] Ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτην μίαν καὶ ὄλην μέθοδον αἱ τέτταρες τελεύτων δονάζεις, ὄριστη, καὶ διαιρετική, καὶ ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ἀναλυτική καὶ γὰρ ὅπου μὲν διελεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ ὡς ἀπὸ ἕνὸς μέρους "γεγονότος" γεγονότος τοῦτο (<τὸ) ἄρχεται, ἢ μὲν διελεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ ὡς ἀπὸ ἕνος μέρους ἀνάγοσα τὸ ζητούμενον. Under this single and complete method the four functions operate, division, and definition, and demonstration, and analysis; for also here on the one hand it is necessary to...

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217 Aristotle, Metaphysika 990b27-34.
219 See Proclus Phil., In Platonis Parmenidem 982.19-30; 1003.6-29; Syrianus Phil., In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria 3.30-33; Elias Phil., In Porphyrii isagogen 37.9-11; Damascius Phil., In Philebus 54.1; Simplicius Phil., In Aristotelis libros de anima commentaria [Sp.?] (fort. auctore Prisciano Lydo) 11.9.33-37; Ammonius Phil., In Porphyrii isagogen sive quinque voces 34-24-25; David Phil., In Porphyrii isagogen commentarium 88.8-9; Ioannes Philoponus Phil., In Aristotelis analytica priora commentaria 13.2.307.5-8.
221 Elias Phil., In Porphyrii isagogen 37.17.23.
222 Proclus Phil., In primum Euclidis elementorum librum commentarii 57.23; 211.20-21.
In analysis, then, starting with assertions about what is consequent to first principles – i.e. observable particulars – one proceeds upwards to acknowledged principles or accessory causes. This species of analysis proceeding from effects to causes is therefore distinct from Aristotelian conceptions of syllogistic analysis, being the characteristically Platonic process of ascent from the sensible to the intelligible. Strictly speaking in hieroglyphic exegesis ascent through analysis is from the sensible particular to the intellective content of the glyphs, which content is presumably to be thought of as an accessory cause, the first principles being the unified intelligible thoughts. In line with Iamblichean precedent, then, exegetical procedure is (i) to abstract from sensible phenomena to universal concepts, (ii) by analogy or allusion, (iii) by virtue of pre-eminent examples of Forms for the possibility of unified thought. The objects of Platonist interest are precisely those objects which legitimize the application of the procedure itself (Forms), rather than the items to which the procedure is applied (particulars), or the results of applying the procedure (predicables).

There might be thought to be some difficulty concerning how reversion can be fully realized if the productive principle is ‘more perfect’ (τελειότερα) than its effect. In other words, how can analysis be possible if the starting-point of the ascent is a state of ontological subordination or inferiority, specifically as deficient in
distinguish either as from one genus to species, or as from the whole to different parts, or otherwise in any way whatever; and on the other hand there one must divide, both to know the differences of the things divided and those of the dividers according to each order of being; for to be divided is possible both from species and from matter and through both; but elsewhere to demonstrate, and here the necessity is to distinguish differences of causes; for otherwise the causes of things implicated in matter and otherwise one must assume things not material, otherwise things moved, and otherwise things unmodified; and elsewhere it is necessary to analyse as far as the first things; for also the descent from what is sought to other things sometimes analytically comes to the causes, other times to the accessory causes, sometimes to both; with respect to these it is necessary to examine not incidentally the use of the method, because it is the proposal or the farthest point, or the last among the things that are, or having a middle order.

223 Proclus Phil., In Platonis Parmenidem 1003.6-29.
224 Proclus Phil., Institutio theologica 36.2.
The question is specifically addressed in a doctrine, which Olympiodorus attributes to Iamblichus, apparently undoing the earlier Neoplatonic doctrine of decreasing ἐνέργεια as emanation from the One approaches matter.

The divine Iamblichus does not distinguish the higher things from the lower things by the greater exchange (for all things come down even as far as matter; for it is a doctrine, from which anything that begins to operate not cease even as far as the last things; for if it is also stronger, but balance is able through the onwards distension to come into being with respect to the weaker thing), but distinguishes [them] by the keener exchange of the higher things. For we rather give up that than even life, and rather living than thinking.

Procession explicitly entails no diminishment of the productive principle. Olympiodorus’ Iamblichean doctrine of ‘balance’ (ἀντανίσωσις) makes this possible without decreasing activity (ἐνέργεια) through ‘distension’ (διαστάσις) of ‘the stronger’ (ἰσχυρότερον) to ‘the weaker’ (ἀσθενέστερον), also referred to as ‘exchange’ (μετάδοσις) of ‘the higher things’ (τὰ ὑψηλότερα) and ‘the lower things’ (τὰ κοιλότερα). Everything, he argues, descends as far as matter (πάντα γὰρ ἄχρι τῆς ὑλῆς κάτεισι·). If emanation from the Neoplatonic One does not entail decreasing activity with proximity to the sensible realm, but extends whole as far as matter, then matter preserves ἐνέργεια undiminished and therefore the bridge between the divine, conceptual, and material is traversable in both directions without loss. The tripartite Iamblichean ontology thereby describes a situation in which analysis undertaken on the basis of the work of natural science can result in a fully ‘energetic’ account of conceptual movements in the soul, on which further basis it can also result in an equally fully ‘energetic’ account of divine realities. It is possible to apply intellective interpretation to the work of natural science unattenuated precisely because the latter is continuous with and complementary to the former, specifically in terms of balance of activity. On this account semantic theory is a matter of interest to Iamblichus not merely because it lends itself to being subsumed under the broader metaphysical framework within which he is operating, but precisely because properly conceived it presents a means of rational ascent to the first principles upon which meaning depends.

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225 Olympiodorus Phil., In Platonis Alcibiadem commentarii 110.13–111.2.
226 Proclus Phil., Institutionum theologica 26.1–2: Πᾶν τὸ παρακτικὸν αἴτιον μένον αὐτὸ ἀρ' ἑαυτοῦ παράγει τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς.
§3. Interpretation

There are then two main traditions of interpretation of the semantics of the Neoplatonic Aristotelian commentators. They are: (i) a bipartite theory according to which words directly signify things without the mediation of concepts; and (ii) a tripartite theory whereby words directly signify concepts and thereby, indirectly, things. Simplicius explicitly seeks to unify the two traditions, a possibility which Porphyry had already provided for, and cites otherwise unidentified Academicians (οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας) to the effect that words signify neither concepts, nor things, but things insofar as they fall under concepts, which are cases and resultants. I have also outlined a distinctively Iamblichean strategy of mapping a tripartite Neoplatonic ontology of universals onto the tripartite semantic theory. This is a development of a thought one element of which we already find in Plotinus, who conceived of hieroglyphic ἀγάλματα as non-discursively presenting (ἐμφηναι) particular (intelligible) truths as a unified whole. Finally, Iamblichus’ introduction of intellective interpretation (νοερὰ θεωρία), directed towards a theology to complement the physiological and logical accounts he finds in his predecessors, was investigated to establish the kind of metaphysical knowledge such hieroglyphic language might be thought to afford.

Inferential argumentation from the phenomena of the generated world via analysis is a key concern of Neoplatonic hieroglyphic exegesis insofar as empirical observations explain why linguistic items bear the meanings they do, rather than license inferences about what they might mean. The relation between sign and object depicted (and therefore referred to in explanation of the meaning of the sign) is not conceptually mediated (but parastatically, or representatively), therefore the empirical veridicality of a predicatable attribute in its application to the object depicted, explains not the meaning of the glyph, but why it is the glyph bears the meaning it does. There is, then, no requirement for a Neoplatonic commitment to an evidence-based inferential semantics in which it is the meanings of glyphs (or linguistic expressions more generally), rather than the reasons explaining why they do so, which are inferred.

As I argued above, natural history cannot be used to explain why it is that certain hieroglyphic signs mean what they do (in the sense of providing a causal account of meaning), it can, however, be adduced to explain that the meanings of hieroglyphic signs are in fact what they are. If natural history has explanatory value in

\[\text{I.e. Platonists. Simplicius Phil. In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.209.11.}\]
this second sense, can not one also infer from natural history the significance of glyphs otherwise not understood? That is, can the understanding of the fact that certain linguistic items have known meanings (provided by a natural-historical resource such as Aristotle or Ælian) license an increasingly productive hermeneutic for establishing the meaning of signs with previously unknown meanings (without, that is, thereby being committed to a causal account of meaning)? The answer to this question depends on the extent to which this further commits the exegete to the correspondence of the observations provided in explanation of hieroglyphs with factual conditions. If, that is, those observations are, at least in principle, falsifiable, the validity of the explanation of the meaning of signs may be thought susceptible to a critical objection. If the observational evidence is susceptible of being falsified, any inference drawn from it lacks an intrinsic mark of veridicality. No doubt if the predicability of a given attribute were falsified, the semantic relation too would likely, but not necessarily, lapse. On the other hand, if the explanation of the meaning of a hieroglyphic sign is dependent upon the formal properties of the glyph itself, namely that it depicts such-and-such an item, it is the glyph and not the object it depicts that licenses the inference that its meaning can be explained in terms of that which it depicts.

The logico-metaphysical picture resulting from the above may briefly be spelled out as follows. Written language differs from spoken language by virtue of medium alone.228 Spoken language differs from thought as the actualization of a potentiality for articulation or utterance. Predicative thought is causally effected by the phenomena of the sensible world (and therefore posterior to it), but by virtue of the prior relation of participation of the sensible in the intelligible.

Even given a sufficiently well-developed account of the various types of relations described above (between the sign in question, what it depicts, what it signifies, and how it informs the associated exegetical procedure), one outstanding question remains: the nature and content of the allusive or enigmatic function of hieroglyphs. The tradition of hieroglyphic exegesis is not an innovation on Neoplatonism’s part. Van der Horst (1987) and Le Boulluec (1981) have correspondingly noted extensive exegetical parallels for the exegeses of Porphyry and Iamblichus in Clement and Plutarch before that, suggestive of a common source in Chæremon, who, it is supposed, was most likely first to have identified the exegetical possibilities peculiar to

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228 See Barnes, J., ‘Meaning, Saying, Thinking’ in Döring, K. & Ebert, Th. (edd.) Dialektiker und Stoker: zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1993).
the Egyptian material.²²⁹ Chæremon is typically identified by three epithets: ἱερογραμματεύς, φιλόσοφος, and Στωϊκός. That the latter is an appropriate designation is apparent from the typically Stoic exegetical strategy of employing a ‘natural theory of the gods’ (φυσικὸς λόγος περὶ θεῶν),²³⁰ and conceiving ‘in general everything as referring to physical things’ (διὸς πάντα εἰς τὰ φυσικὰ).²³¹ This might naturally be expected to encounter some doctrinal resistance amongst Platonists and just such doctrinal differences are perhaps most explicit in Porphyry’s reconsideration of Chæremon. The latter had, for example, advanced a physical-astral conception of divinity²³² rejected by Porphyry²³³ on Platonizing grounds (perhaps signifying a change in Porphyry’s attitude to Chæremon)²³⁴ but paralleled by two passages from the Stroma on the subject of hieroglyphs and at least one passage from the Hieroglyphica, collected by Van der Horst among the fragmenta dubia of Chæremon.²³⁵

On the one hand, Porphyry himself elaborates extensively on thematic depictions of Egyptian-provenanced realia in the treatise Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων: girdle, sceptre, royal wing, egg; feet joined together, robe of many colours, golden sphere; and man embarked on a ship set on a crocodile. Divine names, sacred animals, comets, &c. are all covered, as is any natural object or phenomenon thought to be susceptible of being signified or signifying in some sense: natural signs, written signs of sounds, or hieroglyphic signs of natural objects.

²³⁰ Chæremon Hist. et Phil., Fragmenta 12.
²³¹ Chæremon Hist. et Phil., Fragmenta 5.
²³⁴ With parallels in fragm. 6 = Eusebius Theol., Scr. Eccl., Præparatio Evangelica 3.9.15), fragm. 7 (= Eusebius Theol., Scr. Eccl., Præparatio Evangelica 3.13.8), fragm. 8 (= Porphyry Phil., Epistula ad Anebonem 2.15), and fragm. 9 = Iamblichus Phil., De mysterior 8.4) where Iamblichus claims that the Solmeschiaca are Hermetic writings, though claiming Chæremon is opposed to astrology. For the use of the decans of the zodiac as explanations of gods, cf. Egyptian astrological calendars, possibly of Babylonian origin.
²³⁵ Fragment 17D (= Porphyry Phil., Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων = Eusebius Præparatio Evangelica 3.11.45-13.2) shows additional parallels with fragm. 5 (= Porphyry Phil., Epistula ad Anebonem 2.12.13 = Eusebius Theol., Scr. Eccl., Præparatio Evangelica 3.4.1-2), fragm. 21D (= Porphyry Phil., De abstinentia 4.9 = Eusebius Theol., Scr. Eccl., Præparatio Evangelica 3.4.8-14), 25D (= Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica), and 26D (= Joannes Tzetzes Gramm., Poeta, Chilades 12.723-736), as well as test. 9 (= Porphyry Phil., Contra Christianos fragm. 39). Fragment 12 (= Tzetzes Exegesis in Iliadem 1.97) also shows parallels with fragm. 21D and 25D in addition to 19D (= Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 5.7.41-43) and 200 (= Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 5.4.20-21).
²³⁶ Porphyry Phil., Epistula ad Anebonem 2.12b.1-5.
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They symbolize the sun by a man embarked on a ship which is set upon a crocodile. The ship indicates the sun’s movement in a liquid element, the crocodile the potable water in which the sun moves. Thus they symbolize that the sun accomplishes his revolution through air that is liquid and sweet.

However, a crucial Platonic distinction, on the basis of which Porphyry rejects what he sees as the reductive physicalism of his Stoic predecessor, is preserved in the explicit denial that the physiological material as such is the direct object of Egyptian theosophical speculation.

But that they do not believe the animals to be gods but made them the images and symbols of the gods is apparent from the fact that in many places they bring up bulls for the gods at their festivals in the sacred months and in their religious services and sacrifice them. For they consecrate bulls to the sun and the moon.

For Porphyry, then, it is not the ‘images and symbols’ in themselves that are the objects of theological interest, but what they are images and symbols of. On the contrary, in the presumably generalizable cases of bulls what these images and symbols represent and symbolize are immune to the variability one finds in the images themselves. This distinction consequently enables Porphyry to argue that the names of the gods in various languages are simply variant expressions of the same divine reality, a doctrine which Iamblichus would later strenuously oppose.

Demeter has the same power among the Greeks as Isis among the Egyptians, and also Kore and Dionysus among the Greeks the same power as Isis among the Egyptians.

Though motivated, then, by the unacceptability of the Stoic analysis in accordance with which the gods are interpreted in the strictly physical terms of their representation, it is not, however, allegorical interpretation as such that Porphyry rejects. Instead it is the application of those exegetical techniques without the guidance of the appropriate metaphysical τέλος of the philosophical endeavour, namely an interpretation

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238 Porphyry Phil., Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων 10.18–21.
239 Porphyry Phil., Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων 10.81–5.
240 Porphyry Phil., Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων, 10.28–30.
observing properly Platonic criteria for an exegesis of the structure and genesis of the cosmos. It was necessary to conceive of allegorical interpretation in such a way as to preserve the individual ontological identities of the object to be interpreted and the object of which it is interpreted as being an allegory. This is because it was the respective ontological statuses of these objects upon which the allegorical reinterpretation of the culturally Egyptian material is dependent for its relevance.\footnote{For which we have the explicit and directly comparable ‘Middle’ Platonic precedent of Plutarch’s interpretation of various elements of Egyptian religion and their relation to theosophical speculation. Cf. Brench, F. E., “‘Isis is a Greek Word’.” Plutarch’s Allegorization of Egyptian Religion, Jiménez, A.P., López, J.G. & Aguilar, R.M., (edd.), Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles in Actas del V Congreso Internacional de la I.P.S. (Madrid-Cuenca, 1999): pp.227-237 & Richter, ‘Plutarch on Isis and Osiris: Text, Cult, and Cultural Appropriation’, Transactions of the American Philological Association 131 (2001): pp.191-216.}

Iamblichus opposed any form of syncretism in the exegetical endeavour.

[\text{T318]} \text{Άλλ' ό ἀκόουν, φης, πρός τά σημανόμενα ἀφορά, ὡστε αὐτάρκης ἢ αὐτή μένουσα ἐννοια, κάν ὅποιονόν ὑπάρχη τοὺς καταφαίνεται.} Τὸ δ’ ὅ τι τοιούτον ἐστιν οἶνον ὧν προσεοικότα, καί τοῖς λόγιοις ἢ ἀλλ’ ἂν ἂν ἂν. ἐν τούτο ἂν ἂν, ἡ τῆς αἰσθητῆς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εἰ ὑπάρχῃ ἢ ὧν τοῖς ἀλλ’ ἂν ἂν} εἰ ὧν τοῖς ἀλλ’ ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσφιλέστερα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἂν. \text{εὐλόγως} ἐστιν οἷον σὐ

As applied to hieroglyphic Egyptian the conception at stake is the textual tradition of recorded ‘perfect speech’ (\text{mēt-nfīr}), capable of a divine power or efficacy missing in, for example, Greek. The theme of the particular superiority of Egyptian over Greek (and of texts in the original language to translations) as the language of theology is in this sense far from incidental to the Neoplatonic project.\footnote{Clarke, E. C., Dillon, J., & Hershbell, J. P., Iamblichus: On the Mysteries (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003).} Iamblichus explains that the origin of Egyptian symbolism lies in a desire born of Egyptian native superiority to inferior peoples to

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\text{“But,” so you say, “a listener looks to the meaning, so surely all that matters is that the conception remains the same, whatever the kind of words used.” But the situation is not as you suppose. For if the names were established by convention, then it would not matter whether some were used instead of others. But if they are dependent on the nature of real beings, then those that are better adapted to this will be more precious to the gods. It is therefore evident from this that the language of sacred peoples is preferred to that of other men, and with good reason. For the names do not exactly preserve the same meaning when they are translated; rather, there are certain idioms in every nation that are impossible to express in the language of another. Moreover, even if one were to translate them, this would not preserve their same power. For the barbarian names possess weightiness and great precision, participating in less ambiguity, variability and multiplicity of expression. For all these reasons, then, they are adapted to the superior beings.”}^{233}

\footnote{Porphyrius Phil., \text{Epistula ad Anebonem} 2.10a.4-6.}
provide a mode of initiation into the mysteries through symbols. The particular form of ‘the terms that are unintelligible’ (τὰ ἄσημα ὀνόματα), identified as the language of the priests and the speech of the gods, must, for Iamblichus, remain untranslated because it preserves the most archaic, i.e. primitive and original form of a visible manifestation of the divine – the ideal being the intelligible manifestation of divinity in silence. For that reason conventionally determined concepts, which vary as such from people to people and from time to time, create ambiguity unsuitable for the superior purpose of forming concepts of the divine. To call such terms ‘unutterable and barbarous’ (τῶν ὀνομάτων τῶν τε ἀφθέγκτων καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων) is a trait of the Egyptian peasantry, who do not exhibit the superiority of those Egyptians who first were allotted communion with the gods.

To suppose, then, that the emphasis placed on the need to interpret hieroglyphs is explained as a consequence of a prior commitment to reading allegorical symbolism into Egyptian inscriptions and by tracing that commitment back either to earlier Christian-Gnostic or Jewish-Alexandrine tradition is to beg the question. In providing instruction in the interpretation of hieroglyphs neither Iamblichus nor the tradition more generally entertains any scruples in spelling out the esoteric meaning of hieroglyphic symbols. It cannot be maintained, therefore, that the need for interpretation arises simply from a desire attributed to the Egyptian scribes to preclude the possibility of profanation of doctrine by its being accessible to the uninitiated. Clearly, this may be one type of motivation, and Iamblichus is explicit that Egyptian αἰνήματα do serve a concealing function. On the other hand, if initiatic secrecy were merely a matter of receiving proper instruction then esotericism could not be other than than a contingent feature.

[7319] Τῆς δ’ αὐτῆς θεοσόφου Μούσης κάκεινα δεῖται εἰς τὴν διάλεκτον τὰ ἀπορίματα· πρότερον δέ οὐ βούλθημαι τῶν Ἀιγυπτίων τὸν τρόπον τῆς θεολογίας διερμηνεύσαι· οὕτω γάρ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὴν δημιουργίαν τῶν θεῶν μιμούμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ τῶν μυστικῶν καὶ ἀποκεφαμεύμενων καὶ ἀφανῶν νοῆσαι εἰκόνας τινὰς διὰ συμβόλων ἑκαρίνουσιν, ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις τῶν ἐμφανέν ἐιδέσει τῶν ἀφανές λόγως διὰ συμβόλων τρόπον τινὰ ἀπετυπώσατο, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν θεῶν δημιουργία τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ἱδεῶν διὰ τῶν φανερῶν εἰκόνων λόγως· εἰκότως καὶ αὐτοὶ σὲ πρόσφοροι αὐτῆς τρόπον τῆς κεκρυμμένης ἐν τοῖς συμβόλοις μυσταγωγίας προφέροντον. The following difficulties require the same theosophical Muse for their solution, but first of all, I would like to explain to you the mode of theology practised by the Egyptians. For these people, imitating the nature of the universe and the demiurhic power of the gods, display certain signs of mystical, arcane and invisible intellections by means of symbols, just as nature copies the unseen principles in visible forms through some mode of symbolism, and the creative activity of the gods indicates

246 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.1.17-11: ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις τῶν ἐμφανεστών εἴδει τῶν ἀφανείς λόγως διὰ συμβόλων τρόπον τινὰ ἀπετυπώσατο, ἢ δὲ τῶν θεῶν δημιουργία τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ἱδεών διὰ τῶν φανερῶν εἰκόνων ἑκαρίνουσιν. ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν θεῶν δημιουργία τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ἱδεών διὰ τῶν φανερῶν εἰκόνων ἑκαρίνουσιν.

247 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.5.57-58.

248 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.1.13-16: εἰκότως καὶ αὐτοὶ σὲ πρόσφοροι αὐτῆς τρόπον τῆς κεκρυμμένης ἐν τοῖς συμβόλοις μυσταγωγίας προφέροντον.
But hieroglyphic ἀγάλματα afford, Iamblichus enthusiastically obliges, specifically employing the intellective interpretative method to do so.

[Τ320] Ἀκούει δὴ ὁ οὐν καὶ σὸν κατὰ τὸν τῶν Ἀἰγυπτίων νοῦν τῆς τῶν συμβόλων νοεράν διεμήνευσιν, ἁφεὶς μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς φαντασίας καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς εἰδωλον αὐτῶν τῶν συμβολικῶν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν νοερὰν ἀλήθειαιν ἐαυτὸν ἐπαναγαγών. 

The answer to the question of the necessity of interpretation, then, can be discovered, I suggest, in the nature of the objects of theological or metaphysical language and thought. If what is elemental in language can also be assumed to be original, then some attempt to recover ancient linguistic elements might be expected to work as a route to original understanding of the natural appropriacy and divine power of names in denoting their objects.

Though Plotinus had not provided any exegesis of the ‘particular knowledge and wisdom’ (τις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία) hieroglyphic ἀγάλματα afford, Iamblichus enthusiastically obliges, specifically employing the intellective interpretative method to do so.

Hear, therefore, the intellective interpretation of the symbols, according to Egyptian thought: banish the image of the symbolic things themselves, which depends on imagination and hearsay, and raise yourself up towards the intellectual truth.

He introduces three samples of hieroglyphic exegesis. By ‘mud’ (ἰλύς) is denoted ‘everything corporeally-formed and material’ (τὸ σωματοειδὲς πᾶν καὶ ὁλικὸν), which is nonetheless not sensible itself, but intelligible: ‘the originating cause of the elements and of all the powers relating to the elements, which subsisted before in correspondence to a foundation’ (τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν περὶ τοῖς στοιχείως δυνάμεων παπών ἀρχηγὸν αἰτίων ἐν πυθμένος λόγῳ προϋποκείμενον). Secondly, by ‘sitting above the lotus-blossom’ (τὸ ἑπὶ λωτῶ καθέζεσθαι) is denoted exaltation above the ἰλύς since, in common with the motion of the mind, lotus leaves are circular – the uniform principle of life for Pythagoreans and Hermes alike. Third, by ‘one sailing in a boat’ (ὁ δ’ ἐπὶ πλοίου ναυτιλλόμενος) is denoted ‘the power that directs the world’ (τὴν διακυβερνῶσαν τὸν κόσμον ἐπικράτειαν) as does god, who ‘from above, imparts without division from the first principles of Nature, the first-operative

249 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.1.1–16.
250 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.2.1–7.
causes of motions’ (ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν τῆς φύσεως τὰς πρωτογραφούσις αἰτίας τῶν κινήσεων ἀμεριστῶς ἐνδίδωσι).

How does the process of intellective interpretation achieve its contribution to an understanding of hieroglyphs and how is it developed from the tripartite conception of universals? On a Porphyrian logical (λογικός) account, the tripartition would distinguish, the particular (e.g. a particular large thing), the Aristotelian universal (the predicatable ‘largeness’), and the Platonic Form (largeness itself). However, Iamblichus’ example, ‘mud’ (ἰλύς), is not interpreted as a particular sample of mud, the concept ‘mud’, and mud itself. One possible avenue of explanation lies in the phrase ‘the image of the symbols themselves’ (εἴδωλον αὐτῶν τῶν συμβολικῶν). Though a hieroglyph is an image, it is a symbolic image, so that it is the symbol of which it is an image to which the interpretation applies, not any material particular – neither the image itself, nor the thing it depicts. If, then, the exegesis provides the ‘intellective’ content of the symbol, then the image of the symbol is an image of that ‘intellective’ content.

On Porphyry’s account, the image of mud just is the written form of the utterance ‘mud’, the meaning (i.e. conceptual content) of which is mud, referring to particular mud, which participates in the intelligible Form of mud. As a symbol, however, standing in need of interpretation, it is not the logical relationship between the three ‘universals’ that is explained in intellective interpretation, but the metaphysical relationship between the originating cause of materiality and material particulars. The difference between the Greek word (ἰλύς) and the Egyptian image is precisely that the former is an image of a linguistic expression, i.e. a particular, whereas the image of a symbol in the form of a hieroglyph is an image of the ‘intellectual’ content that constitutes the symbol. If linguistic utterances, then, constitute an appropriate medium with which to give expression to the phenomena of sensible phenomena, how is it, one might ask, that the appropriate medium with which to give expression to intelligible objects is hieroglyphics?

The gifts proper to incorporeal life, Iamblichus tells us, are themselves intellectual: virtue and wisdom. These are appropriate offerings to ‘those gods that are in and of themselves uniform’ (τοὺς αὐτούς καθ’ ἑαυτούς μονοειδεῖς ἄντας). Similarly, ‘natural forces’ (φυσικάς δυνάμεις) are appropriate for ‘a mode of worship which is
suited to nature’ (τὴν θρησκείαν ... τῇ φύσει πρόσφορον).\textsuperscript{252} Finally, there is the intermediate form of theurgic operation, appropriate to which are intermediate offerings.

The distinction appears to be that, while the ‘goods of the soul’ are properly immaterial and linguistic utterances are properly material, hieroglyphs are quite literally ‘compounds’ (συνθήματα) of the two, intellectual content and material images.\textsuperscript{254} As such, hieroglyphs are the appropriate medium for intermediate theurgic operations directed towards ‘the intermediate entities’ (τοῖς γε μέσοις). The ‘intellectual’ content of the symbol, therefore, is only one constituent part of it. Hieroglyphs are also properly material.

For all rational knowledge, inasmuch as it grasps intelligible notions and consists in acts of intellection, is knowledge of real existents and apprehends truth by an organ which is itself a real existent; but the gods are beyond all existents. Accordingly the divine is an object neither of opinion nor of discursive reason nor yet of intellection: for all that exists is either sensible, and therefore an object of opinion; or true Being, and therefore an object of intellection; or of intermediate rank, at once Being and thing of process, and therefore object of discursive reason.

On this reading, then, non-hieroglyphic language is not ‘discursive’ (διανοητική) at all, but ‘conjectural’ (δοξαστική) and hieroglyphic Egyptian is not ‘intellectual’ (νοερά), but ‘discursive’ (διανοητική). The reason hieroglyphs are amenable to ‘intellective interpretation’ (νοερὰ θεωρία) is that they are themselves ‘discursive’ (διανοητικά), i.e. ‘at once Being and thing of process’ (άμα καὶ γενητόν), unlike Greek, which is purely ‘sensible’ (αἰσθητική), i.e. ‘an object of opinion’ (δοξαστή), though one might presumably apply the

\textsuperscript{252} Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 5.19.11–17.
\textsuperscript{253} Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 5.19.22–28.
\textsuperscript{254} Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 6.6.2.
\textsuperscript{255} Proclus Phil., Institutio theologica 123.5-11.
‘analytic function’ (ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς) of dialectic to Greek such that it ‘sometimes analytically comes to the causes, other times to the accessory causes, sometimes to both’ (τοτὲ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ αἰτία γίγνεται ἀναλυτικῶς, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ συναίτια, τοτέ δὲ ὡς ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα).\(^{256}\)

Whether ‘discursive’ is an appropriate translation of διανοητική in this context is perhaps a moot point. If it seems desirable to preserve discursive content for Greek or any other non-hieroglyphic language in the standard sense of that word, the distinction can simply be clarified in terms of the prior intelligibility requisite for what I have called a posteriori predicative thought above. This a posteriori predicative thought is just that kind of thought in which claims are made about sensible phenomena with a priori intelligibility, i.e. it is doxastic (δοξαστική) in the standard (non-technical) sense. Dianoetic thought is, then, just that thought that is made possible through intelligibility, i.e. the grasping of phenomena as intelligible, as opposed to doxastic thought which is capable of predicative conjecture concerning sensible phenomena by virtue of the a priori intelligibility grasped in dianoesis. Hieroglyphic Egyptian differs from orthographic Greek by virtue not merely of imitating the thought posterior to sensible phenomena, but by virtue not merely of imitating its dianoetic intelligibility, namely that which explains the possibility of a posteriori predicative thought.

The hieratic aspect of the De mysteriis is, then, fully assimilated to Neoplatonic philosophical preoccupations more generally, despite Damascius’ claim that the hieratic and philosophical aspects are contrastive.\(^{257}\) Nor, it would seem, is the development of such assimilation a feature confined to the later pagan Platonists to whom he attributes it. Porphyry, who, according to Damascius, prefers philosophy, had himself been explicit on the point that the various levels of divinity necessitated their appropriate levels of worship. He had, in fact, characterized this appropriacy particularly in terms of linguistic appropriacy in the case of both ‘the god who is above all things’ (θεῶ μὲν τῷ ἐπὶ πάσαιν), for whom ‘neither vocal language nor internal speech is appropriate’ (οὐδὲ λόγος τούτῳ ὁ κατὰ φωνῆν ὑκεῖος),\(^{258}\) and the ‘intelligible gods’ (νοητοῖς δὲ θεοῖς), to whom

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\(^{256}\) For an example of the converse procedure whereby higher entities think on successively lower ontological levels, cf. Numenius Phil., Fragmenta 22=Proclus Phil., In Platonis Timaeum commentaria 1.303.27-32: Νουμήνιος δὲ τὸν μὲν πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ ‘ὅ ἐστι ζῷον’ τάττει καί φησιν ἐν προσχρήσει τοῦ δευτέρου νοεῖν, τὸν δὲ δεύτερον κατὰ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τοῦτον αὖ ἐν προσχρήσει τοῦ τρίτου δημιουργεῖν, τὸν δὲ τρίτον κατὰ τὸν διανοούμενον.

\(^{257}\) Damascius Phil., In Phaedonem (versio 1) 172.1-3.

\(^{258}\) Porphyrius Phil., De abstinentia 2.34.3-10.
'hymns recited orally are also to be offered' (τὴν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου ὑμνῳδίαν προσθετέον).\(^{259}\) To the lower order material offerings, such as meat and drink, are appropriate.\(^{260}\)

In contrast to the Greek word, which is an image of a doxastically available state of affairs, a hieroglyph is then an image of a dianoetic symbol. If, however, the dianoetic content of a hieroglyph is expressible in an exegesis in Greek, then the question arises as to why the hieroglyph was originally necessary to express that content. As we have already seen, hieroglyphs are 'compounds' (συνθήματα), part material image and part intellectual content in contrast to the wholly material medium of Greek linguistic expressions. The dianoetic component of the hieroglyph has doxastic implications, which the Greek can express and which is causally dependent on the dianoetic content, but the Greek exegesis of the intellectual content of a hieroglyph preserves only the content of the symbol, and only in doxastic form. In providing the intellective interpretation of a hieroglyph Iamblichus then supplies a doxastic and dependent account of what a hieroglyph delivers dianoetically at a higher order of ontological integrity. The Greek is no substitute for the Egyptian insofar as it necessarily lacks the ability to provide the ontological insight of the original of which it is a purely logical interpretation. Intellective interpretation in this sense is not an interpretation which is itself intellective, but an interpretation of the intellective content which properly belongs to the hieroglyph it interprets.

Parallel with my earlier efforts to situate the Hieroglyphica within the twin Egyptian and Hellenic hieroglyphic traditions, it is essential here to undertake a detailed reading of Horapollo’s text in the context of Neoplatonic semantic theory as characterized above, and this in fact informs the broader purpose of the argument presented here. Attempts to rehabilitate the Ἴερογλυφικά of Horapollo\(^{261}\) as a serious object of study have produced detailed and valuable contributions to late or post-Hellenistic, early Egyptological, and Renaissance studies alike. In situating the text in these particular lines of historical development, however, the understanding of semantics the text exhibits – partly in content, but also structurally – has, I think, been unduly neglected. By examining in particular the method of interpreting the meaning of hieroglyphic signs by reference to facts concerning the phenomena they depict the following chapter is intended to redress that neglect in light of the foregoing discussion.

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259 Porphyrius Phil., De abstinentia 2.34.14-16.
260 Porphyrius Phil., De abstinentia 2.42.1-12.
§1. Introduction

Several material and explanatory parallels exist between the Ιερογλυφικά of Charémon and Horapollo, fragmentary and intact respectively, as well as between both and the broader Greek tradition of hieroglyphic exegesis examined in Chapter One. The subjects of Egyptian theosophy (or better, Egyptizing philosophy), which included ‘Egyptian animal worship, theology, iconography, symbolism and hieroglyphics’, had been subjects addressed not only in Alexandria (Charémon, Clement), but also in Chaerônia (Plutarch), Rome (Porphyry), and Apameia (Iamblichus).

Even in the Egyptian philosophical subjects they [i.e. Heraicus and Asclepiades] took Isidore with them as a collaborator and fellow-seeker after the truly sacred truth which lies hidden in the depths.

It is with this emphasis on hieroglyphics as belonging amongst ‘the Egyptian philosophical subjects’ (rā Aîγυπτια φιλοσοφήματα) in late Platonism that the dual attribution to Horapollo of the titles γραμματικός and φιλόσοφος develops a significance that extends beyond the explanatory content and structure of the Hieroglyphica. It is, therefore, in light of a plausible philosophical context for the composition of the Hieroglyphica that the following sections are intended to address the question of the extent to which Horapollo’s text exemplifies, or otherwise elucidates two main issues. First, the conception of meaning current amongst Neoplatonists at the time and place of the text’s composition. This is motivated by what I take to be the uncontroversial observation that a text intended to provide explanations of the meaning of a series of hieroglyphs exhibits, explicitly or otherwise, some conception of what constitutes an explanation of meaning. Second, how such a conception of the explanation of meaning bears upon the reception of the hieroglyphic wisdom the glyphs themselves— in the context of the Neoplatonic interest in the Egyptian

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262 Cf. Charémon Hist. et Phil., Fragm. 12 (= Joannes Tzetzes Gramm. et Poeta, Exegetis in Iliadem 1.97) and Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 1.3,7,10,19,25, 62,169; Charémon Fragm. 17D = Porphyrius Phil., Ἡπέι ἀγαλματῶν fragm. 10 (= Eusebius Præparatio Evangelica 3.11.45-13.2) and Horapollo, Hieroglyphica, 1.169; Charémon Fragm. 19D (= Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 5.7.41-43) and Horapollo, Hieroglyphica, 1.44; Charémon Hist. et Phil., Fragm. 20D (= Clemens, Stromata 5.4.20.3-21.3) and Horapollo, Hieroglyphica, 1.10.


264 Plotinus’ extended commentary on Phædrus 246d-247e in treatise V of the Enneads, also explicitly appealing to hieroglyphic Egyptian, will further serve more clearly to orient a discussion of the philosophical foundations of Horapollo’s metaphysics.

philosophical subjects – are thought to offer. It was, after all, in this respect in particular that both pagan exegesis in general and hieroglyphic exegesis in particular had been the object of Christian critique.

I am, above all, concerned to demonstrate that Horapollonian hieroglyphs plausibly serve as occasions to venture a methodologically principled essay consistent with the late Platonist philosophy of meaning and its metaphysical presuppositions as characterized by, for example, Iamblichus’ doctrine of ‘intellective interpretation’ (νοερὰ θεωρία).\footnote{Iamblichus Phil., \textit{De mysteriis} 7.2.1–7.} To this end in this chapter I develop an understanding of the various senses in which Horapollonian hieroglyphs conform with three modes of meaning of which hieroglyphic writing was traditionally and uniquely thought to be capable.\footnote{Excluding the ‘epistolographic’ (ἐπιστολογραφικός), in which mode Greek too operates.}

My argument has been that the interpretation of hieroglyphs is structured on the methodological principle of ‘analytic ascent’ from the phenomena depicted, through the concepts under which they fall, to their intelligible causes. On the basis of this account I conclude that these three stages in the ascent correspond to the three modes of expression of which, according to Neoplatonic exegetes such as Porphyry, hieroglyphic Egyptian is capable. I also conclude that as composites of material images of sensible particulars and the intelligible content by virtue of which those particulars exist, Neoplatonic hieroglyphs lend themselves to analytic inferential procedures through discursive reason to metaphysical insights.

Section 2, therefore, first of all examines the members of the Horapollonian signary as representative of or directly depicting natural phenomena unmediated either by spoken language or other preconditions. This is then used in section 3 as a basis for developing a picture of a semantic theory that may plausibly be thought to inform the explanatory claim in operation, a claim according to which glyphs, unmediated by speech, signify concepts, under which natural phenomena fall, rather than representing those phenomena themselves. Section 4 presents an account of the various possible rationales for a Neoplatonic understanding of allegorical interpretation as a means to their exegesis whereby the intelligible causes of phenomena are presented symbolically or allegoristically. Finally, in section 5, I address those issues arising from the Neoplatonists’ method of hieroglyphic exegesis related to the plausibility of establishing Horapollo’s hieroglyphics as a proper topic for metaphysical investigation.

\footnote{Excluding the ‘epistolographic’ (ἐπιστολογραφικός), in which mode Greek too operates.}
§2. The Representative Mode

The physiological interest of the Hieroglyphica is the most familiar of its curricular components. The text draws freely on Greek natural history and Egyptian cultural ethnography not only in its choice of hieroglyphs, but also in its explanation of the meanings of those glyphs. These physiological and cultural resources, of course, exercise a thematic emphasis on the generated realm, a feature to which the language employed draws particular attention. Horapollo also makes extensive use of cognates of γένεσις (generation): eighty-four occurrences altogether – eleven in section headings. Apart the structurally critical terms γράφω (concerning means or media of production of the glyphs) and ονομαίνω (concerning performative aspects in use or function) and respective cognates, ‘generation’ is in this way not merely a prominent topic, but the only topic either textually explicit (as above) or thematically implicit (as in the examples of spontaneous generation or cosmological elements) throughout both books. Nonetheless, the rôle this thematic emphasis on the realm of becoming occupies in the Hieroglyphica differs from the use of the same or related material in the context of a treatise on physiology or physics as such. Both in view of the self-identification of the Hieroglyphica as ἐρμηνεία, whereby it is presumably methodologically motivated, and in view of the fact that the material is cited in an explanatory capacity (rather than that which is to be explained), it will be necessary to clarify the techniques the use of which distinguishes its interpretative methodology from the mere collation of Egyptian hieroglyphs with Greek physiological material concerning the items they depict.

My aim, then, is to demonstrate that Horapollo does not merely provide a one-for-one correspondence or parallel between a hieroglyphic sign and a natural phenomenon by cross-referenced analogies, nor the development of a systematic or exhaustive excursus on a subject suggested by the item glyphically depicted. If Horapollo had been interested merely in compiling theological, astronomical, and natural historical ὑπομνήματα, as a work of comparative and historical empiricism (no matter how fantastic or unverifiable), it would have sufficed for him to note such correspondences and analogies. But as ἐρμηνεία it must, and of course does, involve recognizable figures of reasoning for the exegeses provided. To that end, I begin with a

268 These include nine nouns, seven zero-prefixed (γενεά, γένεσις, γενέτειρα, γέννησις, γόνος, γονεύς, γόνος) plus two prefixed (ἀρχαιόγονος, συγγένεια); seven adjectives, two zero-prefixed (γεννητικός, γόνιμος) plus five prefixed (ἀρρενογόνος, αὐτογενής, μονογενής, πολύγονος); and five verbs, three zero-prefixed (γεννάω, γίγνομαι, γονάω) plus two prefixed (παραγίγνομαι, περιγίγνομαι).
269 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 2.44 [Πῶς δηλοῦσι σφῆκας].
270 See Appendix 2.
closer look at the structure of the individual lemmata with a view to identifying the elements of which they are composed and a perspicuous presentation of the interrelations between them.

Each lemma of the *Hieroglyphica* consists of three first-order elements: sign, meaning, and explanation. The signs are written (γράφω), drawn (ζωγραφέω), hieratically carved (ἱερογλυφέω), applied (προστίθημι), or arranged (τάσσω), and are in this respect specified by reference to their production. Explanations are introduced by any of several causal conjunctions (γάρ, διότι (or διὰ τὸ), ἐπειδή, ἐπειδήπερ, ἐπεὶ) or by a prepositional or adverbial phrase (ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ὀνόματος ἑρμηνείας, ἑρμηνευθέν). Variously, both the sign-user and the sign itself are described as writing (γράφω), drawing (ζωγραφεῖ), or saying (λέγω) what they mean, in addition to the rarer alternatives alluding to (ἀινίσσομαι), acknowledging (νομίζω), indicating (μηνύω), exhibiting (ἐμφαίνω), and adumbrating (σκιάζω). The terms for the function of the glyphs that are most common by far are make known (δηλόω) and signify (σημαίνω).

The arrangement of these elements in the structure of an entry can take one of two forms, depending on whether several glyphs will be identified as having a single meaning, or vice versa. In the majority of cases, the following form predominates: (i) the significandum is followed by (ii) a participial phrase (σημαίνοντες, γράφοντες, δηλοῦντες, &c.) governing it, then (iii) the hieroglyph itself, followed by (iv) the means or mode of its production (γραφοῦσιν, ζωγραφοῦσιν), and finally, (v) a clause introduced by a causal conjunction (γάρ, διότι, ἐπειδή, ἐπεὶ) providing the reason or logical link between the first and the second terms.

[Τ402] Πῶς αἰῶνα σημαίνουσιν. Αἰῶνα σημαίνοντες, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην γράφουσι, διὰ τὸ αἰώνια εἶναι στοιχεῖα. [How they signify eternity]. To denote Eternity they depict the Sun and Moon, because their elements are eternal.

In a minority of cases the structure is reversed: (i) the hieroglyph is followed by (ii) a passive participial phrase (ζωγράφομενον, γράφομενος) denoting the means or mode of production, then (iii) the significandum, followed by (iv) δηλοῖ, σημαίνει, &c. governing it, often (though not always) followed by (v) a causal clause.

[Τ403] Πῶς διαμονὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν σημαίνουσιν. Ὅτοι ὀστᾶ ὅτοι ζωγραφούσιν διαμονὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν σημαίνει, [How they signify permanency and safety]. The bone of a quail when delineated symbolizes permanency and safety;

272 First-order because, as I will show, considerable second-order analysis is required (and some second-order detail is explicitly provided).
273 See, e.g., Horapollo Gramm., *Hieroglyphica*: αἰνιττόμενοι (1.2,59); νομίζοντες καὶ μηνύοντες (1.61); ἑρμηνεύοντες (1.70).
διότι δυσπαθές ἐστι τὸ τοῦ ζῴου ὀστοῦν. 276 because the bone of this animal is difficult to be affected.

The distribution of these two main variations in arrangement in general marks the main distinguishing features of the entries as presented in the two books of which the Hieroglyphica is comprised. Immediately following the incipit of Book Two we have a sequence of thirty lemmata following the second type of arrangement. The significance of this variation at this point in the text is perhaps best brought out by the incipit itself. At face value, the text from this point on will include 'a sound account of what remains' (περὶ τῶν λαπιῶν τὸν λόγον ὑμᾶ) which is contrasted with 'things from other copies, which do not have any exegesis, I have necessarily added' (ἀ δὲ καὶ ἄλλων ἀντιγράφων, οὐκ ἔχοντά τινα ἐξήγησιν, ἀναγκαίως ὑπέταξα). In other words, we have a distinction made between material thought by 'Philip' to belong to the original material presented by Horapollo and additional material added by the editor himself, which may or may not be original. As noted by subsequent (contemporary) editors of the text,277 these first thirty comments, like many of the hieroglyphs cited in Book One, contain signs for which genuinely hieroglyphic Egyptian antecedents can be found. Notwithstanding the switch in structural arrangement, then, the Egyptological evidence actually strengthens the case for the assumption that these constitute 'what remains' (τῶν λαπιῶν) of the originally Horapollonian material. The subsequent switch back to the original arrangement and glyphs apparently unattested in the Egyptian record, then, marks the beginning of the supplementary material.

There are two uses of the word σημεῖον in the text, and five instances of its occurrence, all in Book One. 278 In three instances Horapollo uses σημεῖον in the sense of what I shall call a natural sign: 'the lion ... when asleep keeps them (eyes) open, which is a sign of watching.' (ὁ λέων ... κοιμώμενος δὲ, ἀνεῳγότας τούτους (ὀφθαλμοὺς) ἔχει, ὀπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ φυλάσσειν σημεῖον) at 1.19. In this sense a sign is an indication of something in the nature of the item (in these cases, creatures) depicted (cf. a wet nose as a sign of good health in a dog) without reference to what the depiction of that indication in a hieroglyphic sign means. 1.49 and 1.70 are similarly natural signs in this sense – the first, the Oryx scraping the ground with its hooves,279 the second, ‘many other signs subsisting in the nature of crocodiles’ (Ἱκανῶν δὲ καὶ ἄλλων ὑπαρχόντων σημείων ἐν τῇ τῶν κροκοδείλων φύσε). On two occasions he also uses the word in the sense of hieroglyphic sign: ‘to signify the terrible they make use of the same sign’ (Φοβερόν δὲ σημαίνοντες, τῷ αὐτῷ χρῶντα σημεῖο) at 1.20. 1.50 is another signum

276 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 2.10.
278 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.19,20,49,50,70.
279 Zoologically, a sign symptomatic of a range of social, dietary, and environmental sources of distress and discomfort; hieroglyphically, a sign of 'impurity' (ἀκαθαρσία).
hieroglyphicum: 'they also make use of the same sign when they would want to write discernment,' (τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ σημεῖῳ χρῶνται καὶ κρίσιν θέλοντες γράψαι). Each hieroglyphic sign furthermore bears a 'form' (σχῆμα), which is to say the character as written, for example, 'a cynocephalus … standing upright, and raising its hands to heaven' (κυνοκέφαλον … ἐστῶτα καὶ τὰς χεῖρας εἰς οὐρανὸν ἐπαίροντα), or 'the form of the moon' (σελήνης σχῆμα).

The chapter headings indiscriminately describe either what is meant by the glyph under consideration or how the 'Egyptians' signify some particular feature of broadly physiological interest, but the reader is in no doubt that the section is concerned with both, without direct indication of the method of juxtaposition of the two. In this section I raise the following question concerning the dual use of the term σημεῖον as hieroglyphic sign and natural sign: how are the written signs related to the objects they depict? In order to answer this question we first need to be clear about how linguistic samples (written or spoken) and features of the world (objects or facts) might be conceived of as related at all and in what sense, or under what circumstances the relation between the two is specifically semantic.

Even if the Egyptological and polemical credentials of the Hieroglyphica can be salvaged, one feature likely still to provoke concern for modern readers is the apparent implausibility of many of the explanations Horapollo provides for the meanings he assigns to the hieroglyphs described. amongst readers who conceive of the semantic relation as one in which the meaning of a glyph is explained by the truth-conditions of propositions about the features of the world supposed to be depicted by it, this concern might be abated by reflecting on the state of empirical research at the time the text was composed, at least to the extent of forgiving the perceived error if not actually according it credence. If we have discovered, for example, that lions do not in fact sleep with their eyes open, then perhaps we should concede that a hieroglyphic sign depicting a lion cannot after all signify vigilance. One alternative, however, would be to argue that Horapollonian semantics is not about reference in this way at all, but about inference – namely the inferences one can draw from empirical data as depicted by the formal features of hieroglyphs as to the meanings of those glyphs, whether or not the data itself happens to be true. And there is the further possibility that Horapollonian meanings are neither exclusively referential, nor exclusively inferential – a possibility I explore in the following section.

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280 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.15,66.
Finally, there is a fourth possibility: that the signs achieve their meaning by symbolising or allegorising – a possibility also explored in the final section.

I begin, then, by elaborating on the nature of the relationship between natural signs and the hieroglyphs in explanation of which they are cited. In a general sense the relationship is perfectly clear. The Horapollonian index of signs is *eo ipso* an index of these natural items because hieroglyphs *depi*t natural items (which include, for these purposes, artefacts, numerals, &c.). None of the examples provided by the text, however, are directly *pictographic* of their meaning. In the following text (2.82), for example, had the glyph of a lioness meant ‘lioness’, no further explanation of the meaning of the glyph would have been necessary.

Instead, to *write* or *draw* a glyph of a lioness is said to *show* or *mean* a woman who has given birth once. Therefore it is the observation, claim, or convention that a lioness gives birth only once that is used to establish that a woman who has given birth once can be signified by a glyph of a lioness. The connection between the sign and what it depicts differs from the connection between the sign and what it means. The connection between a glyph of a lioness and the animal itself is the fact that a lioness, or a glyph showing a lioness, can be used to teach us what the word ‘lioness’ means (via, for example, an ostensive definition). Since either the depiction or the item depicted may be used for the same purpose, namely to explain what ‘lioness’ means, the glyph may be substituted for the animal it depicts. The connection between the glyph and its meaning, on the other hand, is mediated by the explanation.

In any account of the relation between a glyph (which depicts an object) and the meaning of that glyph, the proper application of the glyph pivots around how the sign is used to signify. (This is set out in the causal clause of the lemma.) One possibility is that this relationship should be seen in the light of debates over the rôle of signs as *evidence* or *grounds* for inferential argumentation, particularly in the context of scientific methodology. On this reading it is part of Horapollo’s method to treat the form of the glyph, i.e. its depicting such-and-such an item, as something like the minor premiss of a syllogism, with the explanation.

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281 Horapollo Gramm., *Hieroglyphica*, 2.82.
acting as the major premiss. Together, they license an inference to the meaning of that glyph. So, for example:

[Γ405] [Πῶς διαμονὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν σημαίνουσιν]. Ὄρνιος ὀστὸν ὰγραφοῦμενον διαμονὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν σημαίνει, ὅτι δυσπαθεῖς ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ ζώου ὀστὸν. 284

[How they signify endurance and stability]. The bone of a quail when drawn signifies endurance and stability; because the bone of this animal is impassive.

Allowing for conversion between the terms δυσπάθεια and διαμονή καὶ ἀσφάλεια, the lemma might be formalized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minor Premiss</th>
<th>Major Premiss</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A glyph of a quail-bone signifies the properties of a quail-bone.</td>
<td>The properties of a quail-bone are impassivity.</td>
<td>Therefore, a glyph of a quail-bone signifies impassivity (i.e. endurance and stability).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This kind of formalization is constrained, however, by the necessity of supplying in a wide range of cases one or more intermediate inferential steps, for example, the commonly occurring assumption that a glyph depicting a non-human creature exhibiting certain properties signifies a human exhibiting the same properties.

[Γ406] [Τί μελαιαν περιστερὰν]. Γυναῖκα χήραν ἐπιμείνασαν ἕως ὅτου τὸν θετόντας σημαίνει, περιστερὰν μελαιαν ἰωγραφοῦσιν· αὕτη γὰρ σπαίνεται ἐπέρω ἀνδρὶ, ἐὼς σῷ χρεῖσθαι. 285

[What a black dove]. When they would signify a woman who remains a widow till death, they draw a black dove; for this (bird) does not have intercourse with another male from the time that it is widowed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minor Premiss</th>
<th>Major Premiss</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A glyph of a black dove signifies the properties of a black dove.</td>
<td>The properties of a black dove are remaining a widow till death.</td>
<td>Therefore, a glyph of a black dove signifies remaining a widow till death.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This ‘inferential model’ of meaning suggests the possibility of inference not only from the sign to its meaning, but also from given meanings to appropriate signs to express those meanings, as a productive method for supplementing the signary. 286 If this is right, it may shed some light on the process of editorial addition to the

283 Cf. an example of inference on a similarly physiological theme at Aristoteles Phil., Analytica Priora 70a10 ff.
284 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 2.10.
285 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 2.32.
286 The structural switch can perhaps more plausibly explained than by reference to their being sourced ‘from other copies’ (ὡ δὲ καὶ εἴ άλλων ἀντιγράφων) by supposing a corresponding shift in editorial method, namely, to the invention hieroglyphs whose meanings can then be explained by reference to pre-existing zoological observations.
range of glyphs included in the text alluded to in the *incipit* to Book Two. The variety of inferential applications available through the use of signs may therefore indicate logical reasons for variations in the exegetical strategies the *Hieroglyphica* exhibits.

Even if this is the case, however, the question again arises as to what extent this might further commit Horapollo to the correspondence of the observations provided in explanation of hieroglyphs with factual conditions. Sbordone notes:

Horap. ha ragione quando dichiara che siffatte decorazioni si facevano συμβολικῶς; ha torto invece dal momento che pone a base del simbolo una pretesa φύσις di conio ellenistico.\(^{287}\)

Horap. was right when he says that such decorations were συμβολικῶς; but was wrong since he placed at the base of the symbol a claimed φύσις of Hellenistic coinage.

If the physiological observations adduced as ætiological explanations are, at least in principle, falsifiable, then not only might the status of the inferred meaning of signs may be thought susceptible to philological objections of the kind with which Sbordone is concerned, but also to the objection that if the evidence of a sign can be shown to be false, any inference drawn from it, even if valid, will be unsound, and, therefore, incapable of expressing the meaning the explanation supplies. What is more, the explanation, which serves as the middle terms between sign and inference, also relies on empirical claims which might turn out to be true or false. Here too is an opportunity for the inference to fail.

One possible answer to this problem can be developed by examining a few of the more-or-less opaque lemmata. Consider, for example, the case of 2.34, where a connection is established between ants and origanum used as an insect-repellent:

\[\text{[Τ407]} \quad \text{[Τί δηλοῦσιν ὀρίγανον ἱερογλυφοῦντες]. Λεῖψιν μυρμήκων βουλόμενοι σημῆναι, ὀρίγανον ἱερογλυφοῦσιν· αὕτη γὰρ ποιεῖ λεῖπειν τοὺς μύρμηκας, ἀποτιθεμένη ἐν τόπῳ ὁπόθεν ἐξέρχονται.}\(^{288}\)

\[\text{[What they show sacredly carving origanum]. When they want to signify the departure of ants, they sacredly carve \text{‘origanum’}. For if it is laid down in a place out of which ants come, it makes them leave.}\]


\(^{288}\) Horapollo Gramm., *Hieroglyphica* 2.34.
Here, the explanation of the meaning of the hieroglyph depicting origanum is clearly causal. The reason why a glyph of origanum means ‘the departure of ants’ (λείψις μυρμήκων) is that origanum ‘makes ants leave’ (ποιεῖ λείπειν τοὺς μύρμηκας).

Or, again, in 1.38, where the connection is between writing tools and writing:

[Πῶς ἀιγύπτια γράμματα]. Αἰγύπτια δὲ γράμματα δηλοῦντες, ἢ ἱερογραμματέα, ἢ πέρας, μέλαν καὶ κόσκινον καὶ σχοινίον ἱοραφώσαν. αἰγύπτια μὲν γράμματα διὰ τὸ τούτοις πάντα παρ᾽ Αἰγυπτίων τὰ γραφόμενα ἐκτελεῖσθαι: σχοινίῳ γάρ γράφουσι καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ.289

[How Egyptian writing]. To show Egyptian writing, or a sacred scribe, or a boundary, they depict ink, a sieve, and a reed. All writing among the Egyptians is accomplished by means of these things; for they write with a reed and nothing else.

In this example, there is also a clearly marked causal connection between writing implements and writing: ‘by means of these things all writings among the Egyptians are executed’ (διὰ τὸ τούτοις πάντα παρ᾽ Αἰγυπτίως τὰ γραφόμενα ἐκτελεῖσθαι). In the first example, the causal explanation that origanum has insect-repelling properties, i.e. that origanum is a reason that ants leave (or a cause of their leaving), is itself introduced in order to explain (i.e. clarify) the semantic connection between causing ants to leave and the absence of ants.

In the second example, however, ink, sieve, and reed are connected to writing both as writing implements (where the emphasis is on the fact that, qua implements, they are causally effective in the production of writing), but also as implements for writing (where the emphasis is on the fact that what they are causally effective in producing is writing). In each of these cases two types of connection are established by the explanation between the glyph and its meaning. The difference between the two kinds of connection is that whereas qua effects (writing; the departure of ants) are symptomatic of their respective causes (ink, sieve, and reed; origanum), it is criterial of the characters depicting these causes meaning ‘writing’ and ‘the departure of ants’ that the items depicted be causes of the effects signified. The production of writing is symptomatic of the use of writing tools (there is a causal relation between the two), but it is criterial of their being writing tools that what they serve to produce is writing. Insofar as the causal relation between the two serves to explain the conceptual relation, the former is, as such, not identical with the latter. The distinction can be brought out in another way using the first example too. Although ants may, as a matter of fact, not leave a place in which there is origanum, despite its being in fact a reason for them to do so, there is no question of the ‘origanum’

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289 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.38.
hieroglyph meaning ‘the departure of ants’ in a sense that does not preclude their still being present. The causal link, in other words, is defeasible; the conceptual link is not.

The strength of claims concerning the meaning of glyphs by inference is not then exclusively a matter of determining whether the inference is sound (based on true premises). Indeed, the truth of the claims made is not clearly the basis for the explanatory of the meaning of the glyph at all. If it were not the case, for example, that Egyptian scribes wrote with ink and reed, the explanation that a glyph depicting ink and a reed signified Egyptian writing could not in fact do any explanatory work. But the only explanatory work the natural fact can do in the event of its being true is that of explaining why it is that the glyphic depiction of Egyptian writing tools is in fact in use as a sign signifying writing. Similarly, even if it were the case that ants avoided places in which origanum was to be found, an explanation in terms of origanum repelling ants merely explains why the glyph bears the meaning it in fact does, rather than that the meaning the glyph signifies is in fact ‘the departure of ants’.

In other words, the absence in the text of examples that I described above as ‘pictographic’ is not a consequence of Horapollo being committed to a theory of meaning dependent on the existence of causal links between the item depicted by the glyph and what it signifies. Although such causal links do not feature in the case of ‘pictographic’ hieroglyphs (which are amenable to explanations in terms of ostensive definition), even in those cases where a causal explanation is available its purpose is to explain the semantic relation between a glyph and its meaning. For that reason causal explanations cannot be essential features of explanations of the meaning of hieroglyphs at all, even to the extent that they are amenable to them. Though he employs a method in accordance with which the meaning of glyphs is explained through objects of comparison, namely those items (largely of Egyptological provenance) depicted by the glyphs, in this respect he need not be understood to be reliant on the plausibility of his observations in artefactual and natural history for the semantic purposes to which he puts them. In other words, if the relevant beliefs about things turned out to be false, that would not necessitate the use of a different glyph to signify the same meaning; it would only require our leaning on different justifications for glyphs bearing the meanings they do (perhaps including explanations involving purely ostensive definitions).
Inferential procedures from empirical observations do not, then, establish the semantic content of a glyph, but only explain the origins of or reasons for the signary as appropriate to bear the meanings they do. They therefore do not establish a commitment on Horapollo’s part to an evidence-based theory of meaning. Upon seeing the hieroglyphic sign – in the case of 1.70, the tail of a crocodile (κροκοδείλου οὐρὰν) – one is licensed by what has so often been observed in connection with crocodiles’ tails generally, namely, the cause of ἀφανίσις and the destruction of seized prey, to understand a semantic relation between ‘disappearance’ (ἀφανίσις) and ‘shadow’ (σκότος) which is quite independent of the natural historical facts. Therefore, a glyph of a crocodile’s tail can be used to signify σκότος.290 Similarly, in 2.38, in explanation of why a glyph depicting a lion tearing its cubs to pieces signifies immoderate anger, the natural fact that lion-cub bones emit fire when struck is cited. However, it is the connection drawn between fire and anger291 that legitimizes the inference from the natural fact that lion-cub bones emit fire when struck to the conclusion that a glyph depicting a lion tearing its cubs to pieces signifies immoderate anger.

To illustrate the difficulty in certain cases of seeing in what sense an explanation actually explains the meaning of a glyph at all, 1.61 presents an instructive case. In this case the verb μηνύουσι, a legalistic term meaning to ‘make a disclosure, lay an information against’ is used to describe the function of the glyph. Though μηνύοντες syntactically corresponds to δηλοῦντες elsewhere in the text, the rôle of the explanation in establishing the reason for the sign (the serpent and in the middle a great palace) to signify its meaning (a cosmic ruler) is less straightforward.

[Πῶς μηνύουσι κοσμοκράτορα]. Πάλιν δὲ τὸν βασιλέα κοσμοκράτορα νομίζοντες καὶ μηνύοντες, αὐτὸν μὲν δὲν ἐξ ἔμφασιν, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ αὐτοῦ οἶκον μέγαν δεικνύονταν εὐλόγως· ὁ γὰρ βασίλειος οἶκος παραύ, τοι<τέστι κρατῶν> ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ.292

[How they disclose the cosmic ruler]. Again when they would indicate and disclose the cosmic ruler, they draw the same serpent, and in the middle of it they show a large house, and with reason: for the royal abode [signifies] the pharaoh, that is he who rules in the cosmos.

In order to understand the explanation as an explanation, the reader must recall that the serpent had been associated with the cosmos in 1.2 by virtue of a formal resemblance between the scales of a serpent and the image of the stars against the background of the sky. However, attention is also drawn to the conceptual relation between the dwelling of a ruler and its inhabitant. What we have, therefore, is the conjunction of the

290 According to the LSJ: ‘in Il. always of the darkness of death’.
291 Brought out in the Greek by the words πῦρ and πυρέττειν; in English perhaps flame/enflame, blaze/blaze up, or flare, flare up (the operative notion being a self-propagating nature common to both fire and immeasurable or extreme anger).
292 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.61.
two types of explanatory element, one empirical, the other conceptual. The first provides a hypothetical rationalization as to why the hieroglyph is to be understood as signifying *cosmos-ruler*, while the latter draws attention to the formal and semantic relations (between a serpent and the cosmos, a pharaoh and his royal abode) upon which the hypothetical rationalization is premised.

Both the glyphs and their meanings often display a composite structure formally supporting this analysis. The recognition that explanations are composite in this way, comprising discrete categorical elements, of why signs signifying their meanings and of what their meanings are, establishes not only that natural facts are conceived of as a hieroglyphic resource, but also that it is the semantic content of the glyph that provides the inferential warrant from that resource to an explanation of why the glyph has that particular semantic content. The explanatory momentum, in other words, is not from resource to meaning, but *vice versa*. Though the possibilities afforded by such a conception of ἱερογλυφικά are not explicitly exploited in the text of the first book, as an organizing principle it nonetheless constitutes a mnemonic apparatus for learning ‘hieroglyphic’ writing and a *technique* (explicitly employed in the second book) for generating further combinations derived from those resources.

A relatively direct statement of the means of composition occurs in 1.70 where the author notes that: ‘there are plenty of other signs in the nature of crocodiles’ (Ἱκανῶν δὲ καὶ ἀλλῶν ὑπαρχότων σημείων, ἐν τῇ τῶν κροκοδείλων φύσει). There is no predetermined range of meanings in need of signs, nor any predetermined range of signs in need of meanings. Where the sign is of genuinely Egyptian provenance, its referent (and possibly its meaning) is sourced there, but it becomes apparent that Book Two is less rich in interpretative scope than its predecessor. The lines of thought connecting the explanation to the meaning are clearer because the convention of natural history adduced can be presented in order to establish the form of the sign, rather than Horapollo having to reconstruct a line of inference from a natural fact to an existing sign. If one is working from a resource stipulating a finite range of features pertaining to a zoomorphic referent, then a pre-existing sign or its given meaning may fall outside that range necessitating an imaginative or inventive reconstruction.

It is perhaps for that reason the average number of meanings per glyph in Book One is much greater than in Book Two. For fifty more signs (two-thirds as many again) in the second book, there are only fourteen more
meanings (one-eighth as many again). This disparity between the two books then does seem likely to be a direct consequence of the method applied. The author of Book One must apply the zoological details of his Hellenistic-Alexandrian natural history sources to the glyphs of his Egyptian source without any guarantee that the two are complementary in the way the author of Book Two is at liberty to ensure. When providing the additional explanations of the second book the author-editor Philip, by virtue of not being constrained by a pre-existing range of historically Egyptian hieroglyphs which are to be explained, is free to suggest new hieroglyphic signs on the basis of information from the natural history sources which can be used to explain how such new signs might have the meanings he attributes to them.
§3. The Semantic Mode

The claim of this section – plausibly motivated by the general historical context outlined in chapter three – is that Horapollonian semantics involves distinctions between linguistic expressions (λέξεις), their meanings (σημαινόμενα or λεγόμενα), and the objects or name-bearers (πράγματα) to which they refer. This claim is developed independently of my view of how Horapollo uses natural signs as evidence or grounds for inferential argumentation. (The relationship between these features and the Neoplatonic (specifically Iamblichean) theory of meaning, which itself exhibits both Peripatetic and Stoic features, will be the subject of part three.)

My question is how Horapollo’s explanations establish a relation between the item depicted by the sign and its semantic content and this, in turn, involves some discussion of the problem of how to understand what kind of things Horapollonian meanings are.

For Horapollo, πράγματα are not what is signified by λέξεις, in the sense that even if he maintains that a relation of representation between the two holds, this is nevertheless not the semantic (sign-meaning) relation. There might, however, still be a stronger sense in which signs represent objects. One sense in which this might be possible is that the substitution of a glyph for what it depicts may invoke an essentialist conception of ostensive definition, such that, even if the relation between Horapollonian signs and objects is representative, rather than semantic, still perhaps it exhibits a linguistic naturalism (as opposed to conventionalism).

According to the version of linguistic naturalism espoused by Cratylus in Plato’s dialogue of that name linguistic forms – primarily nouns – must bear a mimetic relationship to the nominatum. Thus, objective natures are attributed to names. (A corollary of this is that there is an objective expertise of naming postulated for employing and deploying names accurately.) Each name, insofar as it is composed of elements, is significant because each element has significance: for example, the hardness of a consonant, for example, mimetically contributes ‘hardness’ as a semantic component of the word in which it is used. On the basis of

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this hypothesis of descriptive content, compound names are given an analysis in terms of atomic names, which themselves are derived from imitative primary sounds (letters).294

Thus etymology establishes the mimetic relationship between language (names) and reality (the Form of names), but not knowledge of things in themselves, without which, even if sounds/letters are etymological elements of natural names, convention might still determine the actual (if not ideal) use of names. The possibility of etymological exegesis of the phonetic elements of speech, and consequently the literal elements of writing, does not depend, then, on reading mimesis as the hypothesis that this is how language historically developed. If we are then to assume the possibility that the historical development of the actual use of names might, in the absence of knowledge of things in themselves, be determined by convention, rather than naturalism, it is the rather the permanence and singularity of the objects of philosophical thought (τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα καὶ πεφυκότα), and not simply the correspondence of each sound to a discrete element of reality as established by the etymological method, that is thought to justify the etymological enterprise as furnishing reliable analyses. The usefulness of etymology, then, is constrained by the requirement of just such independent knowledge. One alternative to reading the Cratylus here as offering a substantive account of the historical development of language is to read the etymological passages of the Cratylus as an explanation of etymological method itself, rather than of specific insights to be gained by its application. If those passages are just such an illustration of the employment of a particular technique for analyzing words, rather than of any results it might in practice reach, then perhaps there is similar scope for an understanding of the πρῶτα στοιχεῖα of, for example, Clement’s hieroglyphic analysis too as implying independent epistemological objectives which are otherwise absent from the purely philologically-orientated Egyptological reading to which it is typically submitted.

What evidence do we have in Horapollo for linguistic naturalism of this sort and what are the possible epistemological constraints on its application? The first of two key lemmata is 1.70.

[Πῶς σκιάζουσι σκότος]. Σκότος δὲ λέγοντες, κροκοδείλου οὐκ ζωγραφοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ σὺκ ἄλλως εἰς ἀφανισμὸν καὶ ἀπάλειςιν φέρει ὁ κροκόδειλος, οὐ ἐὰν λάβηται ζώον, εἰ μὴ τῇ σφρᾷ τῇ ἑκατον διαπληκτίσας ἄτονον παρασκευάζεις ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ μέρει ἢ τοῦ κροκόδειλου ἵδυχος

[How they adumbrate darkness]. To say darkness, they draw the tail of a crocodile, for by no other means does the crocodile bring about the darkness of death and destruction of whichever animal it may have caught, 294 Plato Phil., Cratylus 386d-397b. See Sedley, Plato’s Cratylus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): ch.6, §.2.
Though the glyph of a crocodile-tail could be used to teach someone what the word 'crocodile-tail' means, just as pointing at a crocodile-tail can, i.e. by ostensive definition, examples from Horapollo in fact here maintain a distinction between what is directly named and what is indirectly signified precisely because the glyph does service for the nominatum. Since it as it were stands in for the thing that it names, it cannot be said to 'signify' that thing. Horapollonian hieroglyphic instruction, therefore, takes place both ostensively in one sense and discursively in another, through the specification of predicatable attributes. The predicatable attributes of a serpent in Horapollo include 'variegation', 'heaviness', and 'smoothness'. (Alternatively, by virtue of sharing identically predicatable attributes in an extended discursive sense (in this case, cyclical temporality), a serpent-sign can be used to mean 'cosmos'.)\textsuperscript{296} By virtue of its predicatable attributes, then, a serpent-sign can also be used to mean 'variegated', 'heavy', or 'smooth', but only by virtue of the serpent-sign itself being variegated. Each sign, therefore, insofar as it is composed of predicatable attributes it has in common with the object depicted, is significant because each element exists in the nature of the phenomenon itself: for example, something 'subsisting in the nature of crocodiles' (ὑπαρχόντων... ἐν τῇ τῶν κροκοδείλων φύσει), variegation in the nature of the serpent, contributing, by mimesis 'variegation' as a semantic component of the glyph in which it is depicted.

The second of the two key lemmata, 1. 27, however, draws a further distinction which suggests an alternative theoretical influence on the text.\textsuperscript{297}

\textsuperscript{295} Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.70.1–6.

\textsuperscript{296} Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.2. [Πῶς κόσμον].

\textsuperscript{297} On the non-semantic aspects of which cf. nam et oculi nimirum argentati, quemadmodum animo affecto simus, loquentur (Marcus Tullius Cicero, de Legibus, 1.27); neque ulla ex parte (quam ex oculis) maiora animi indicia ... homini maxime ... profecto in oculis animus habitat ... oculi ceu vasa quaedam visibilem eius parter accipiant atque tramittunt (Gaius Plinius Secundus, Naturalis Historia, 11.145–6).
Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity

Mark Wildish

298 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.27.1–8.

299 Cf. Ammonius Phil., in Aristotelis librum de interpretatione commentarius, 48.31: περὶ δὲ τοῦ δύο μόνα εἴδη τῶν σημαντικῶν εἶναι φωνῶν, ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα, τὸ μὲν ὑπάρξεων δηλωτικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργειῶν ή παθῶν, ὡς κοινῶς ῥώματε πράξεις.

γλώσσαν καὶ χεῖρα ὑποκάτω γράφοντι, τῇ μὲν γλώσσῃ τὰ πρωτεύα του λόγου φέρειν δεδουλώσεις, τῇ δὲ χείρι, ως τὰ τῆς γλώσσης βουλήματα ἀνεφούση, τὰ δεύτερα.298

speech is expressed in words in a different way by Egyptians]. And to signify speaking differently they draw a tongue and a hand beneath, giving the primary features of speech to the tongue to produce, and the secondary features to the hand, as effecting the intentions of the tongue.

The crucial contribution here is the claim that there are ‘movements of the soul’ (τῆς ψυχῆς κινήματα) in accordance with which utterances (λόγοι) change. This raises two further questions, namely, (iii) how are utterances related to movements of the soul, and (iv) how are movements of the soul related to factual conditions?

As noted above, the two most prominent terms used of Horapollonian hieroglyphic signs in their signifying capacity are δηλώ and σημαίνω. The two terms are not applied in such a way as to distinguish what is directly named and what indirectly signified respectively.299 The first of these two lemmata, however, tells us how written signs are related to the objects they depict: namely, via shared predicatable attributes. We can now look for specific evidence presented by the Horapollonian text indicating, if not explicit theoretical statements, then at least familiar assumptions with which to answer the second set of questions as to what kind of relations obtain between language and thought. Insofar as utterances (λόγοι) are ‘brought about entirely of the soul (τελείως τῆς ψυχῆς), changing in accordance with its movements (κινήματα) we have a conception of linguistic expressions as also corresponding to the internal λόγος of the soul.

In the absence of any evidence of an historically Egyptian account of any relationship of correspondence between linguistic expressions and movements of the soul it may safely be inferred that the correspondence is not an otherwise unattested report of an Egyptian belief, but Horapollo’s own explanation of why it is that the Egyptians assign the various features of speech to the tongue and the eyes. That being the case, Horapollo offers a rare indication of an at least partially theorized account of language, involving at least two possible kinds of relation: first, a representational relation between written sign and object depicted, and second, a relation between sign and movements of the soul. If, as I have described it, Horapollo’s lemmata consist of the three elements of glyph, meaning, and the item depicted by the glyph (in terms of the properties of which the
meaning is explained), then a plausible interpretation of the non-representational correspondence between sign and movements of the soul is that it describes a semantic relation.

The *Hieroglyphica* makes several reference to speech (τὸ λέγειν), usually, as already noted, to identify the activity of the sign-user through the use of the sign.\(^{300}\) Not only might a given sign (σημεῖον) either show (δηλοῖ) or signify (σημαίνει) its meaning, then, but, in using a particular glyph, the scribes may also signify (σημαίνουσι) that meaning in a number of senses (αἰνιττόμενοι, μηνύοντες, νομίζοντες, &c.), suggestive not only of a variety of explanatory techniques, but also of formal and informal settings in which they may be applied.\(^{301}\) That Horapollo has something like this type of explanation for the semantic relation in mind is a view supported by the unique application of the term συμβολικῶς to the ὁ λέων … κοιμώμενος δὲ, ἀνεῳγότας τούτους (ὀφθαλμοὺς) ἔχει in 1.19.

In other words, because a lion sleeps with open eyes, which is a natural sign of watchfulness, a depiction of a lion is a hieroglyphic sign of watchfulness. But the setting of lions as guards is symbolic. One point which Horapollo does not spell out in this passage is what precisely the mark of distinction between a sign and a symbol is. Presumably it is uncontroversial to point out that there would be a difference between a sacred enclosure whose entrance is guarded by a lion and a sacred enclosure at the entrance of which is a sign of a lion such that only the latter could reasonably be described as symbolic in any sense. So, what exactly is the relationship between a sign and that which it depicts, that which it signifies, and anything which it might symbolize? A lion that sleeps with open eyes might be a sign of vigilance in two senses: (a) in the sense that it is indicative of vigilance by virtue of referring to it—which a sign of a lion could do equally well; or (b) in the sense that it is indicative of vigilance by virtue of such a lion exercising or demonstrating vigilance. The temptation is to emphasize the vigilance exercised by an actual lion, and the impassiveness of a lion-sign, so


\(^{301}\) As, for example, by the legalistic connotations of μηνύοντες ‘make a disclosure, lay an information against’ noted above.

that, in the case of an actual lion being set as a guard, sleeping with open eyes is a natural sign that lions are vigilant. But the Horapollian lion (a depiction of a lion sleeping with open eyes) is a sign of vigilance only because actual lions sleep with open eyes (and so are vigilant). But in this case, it is difficult to imagine, if lions are supposed in fact to be vigilant, that the setting of lions ὡς φύλακας might be symbolic. Under what circumstances, then, might one describe the carved image or sign of a lion as a symbol? The answer seems to be that if τοῦ φυλάσσειν σημεῖον means that sleeping with open eyes is a sign of vigilance exhibited by lions, then to set images or signs of lions as guards is symbolic, since it is used to enact the rôle which the thing it depicts plays under ordinary (i.e. non-symbolic) conditions.

I have, then, distinguished three senses in which a sign (or a symbol) signifies (or symbolizes) for Horapollo. In the first sense, we have natural signs, which are symptomatic of conditions, dispositions, or qualities that reside in the nature of the item depicted. These natural signs are, secondly, cited as explanations of the meanings of hieroglyphic signs, which are visual descriptions of natural signs, signifying that of which the latter are symptomatic. Thirdly, there are symbolic uses of hieroglyphic signs in which the sign is used under those circumstances in which the natural sign is used non-symbolically.

Accordingly, the differences between the three types, or senses, of ‘sign’ are reflected in the terminology used to describe their respective functions. When the text states that a particular σημεῖον (hieroglyphic) δηλοῖ or σημαίνει its meaning, that sign is characterized as indicative of the meaning, not as exhibiting or displaying the quality (for example) which it means, as a natural σημεῖον does. For Horapollo (or Philip), the symbolic use of hieroglyphs is distinguished from both the representational use and the semantic use. Not only is the meaning not the same as what is depicted – i.e. the meaning of a sign is not that to which the sign refers (if it were, the meaning of hieroglyph 1.19 would be lion sleeping with open eyes, not on guard), but also what is symbolized by the fact that the Egyptians ‘employed lions as guards’ (λέοντας ὡς φύλακας παρειλήφασιν) is distinct from what a lion-sign signifies because it is neither the hieroglyphic sign, nor its referent that is symbolic (though the former is significant), but the employment or application (παράληψις) of images of lions as guards.

Whether lions do sleep with open eyes or not does not affect the specifically semantic relation between the hieroglyph and its meaning (i.e. vigilance), only the choice of glyph to bear that significance because the
emphasis in the causal clause explaining the meaning of the glyph is not on the fact that it is a lion sleeping with open eyes, but on the fact that it is a lion sleeping with open eyes. Lions were said at one time to sleep with open eyes. For that reason, a lion, or an image or sign of a lion was used to mean vigilance. Now the connection between sleeping with open eyes and vigilance is internal to the two, by which I do not mean someone or something sleeping with open eyes is in fact vigilant (they are in fact asleep), but that vigilance might be indicated by the image of someone (something) sleeping with open eyes: not a demonstration of vigilance, but nonetheless illustrative of vigilance. Because lions (whether factually or conventionally) sleep with open eyes, a lion (or the image of one) can (grammatically, logically) be used to mean or signify vigilance. But it is hard to see why, if lions are in fact or by convention vigilant, this use is of itself symbolic, since in that case, lions are literally, not symbolically, vigilant. If, on the other hand, Egyptians set not lions (the beasts), but figures or signs of lions as guards to sacred enclosures, then the symbolism is clear, because a sign is not literally vigilant, even if that of which it is a sign is.

A sign, a character, or a pictogram is symbolic depending on how it is used, not by virtue of simply depicting something, or by being a sign signifying something. The sign of a lion certainly shows a lion, but what it signifies (in this case) is vigilance. If the placement of a lion (as opposed to a sign depicting a lion) is symbolic, then the use of the signs as such cannot be conceived of as symbolic in the same (if any) sense. In 1.19 the lion might be considered somewhat misleading to a reader unacquainted with Plutarch or Ælian, but the connection between sleeping with open eyes and vigilance is clear: one cannot know if something that sleeps with open eyes is asleep or not, and one is forced to assume vigilance. One cannot, however, assume vigilance of a sign. A guard might wear the badge of a lion to signify his profession, but to post the badge as guard is symbolic, and presupposes a further pragmatic context wherein the use of the hieroglyphic badge is situated and employed. No other instance of such a context is explicitly provided within the Ἱερογλυφικά, but having established a pragmatic component to the use of hieroglyphs, several facets of symbolic usage in this sense are adduced.

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303 Plutarchus Biogr., Phil., Quaestiones convivales 670c3: ὑπολάματη τὰ ὀμματα καθεύδοντος; Claudius Aelianus Soph., De natura animalium 5.39.9-10: κρείττων ὑπνοι λέων ἐστιν ἀγρυπνῶν ἀεὶ.
§4. The Symbolic Mode

As I have argued in the previous section, there is, then, a third consistent sense in which Horapollonian hieroglyphs are given exegeses neither as representative (i.e. in their capacity as depictions of natural phenomena), nor as legitimizing semantic links.

[Γ413] [Πῶς κόσμον]. Κόσμον βουλόμενοι γράφαι, ὅφιν ἐις ἔκθεσιν τὴν ἑαυτῷ ἑσθίον οὐράν, ἐστιγμένον φολίθω ποικίλαις, διά μὲν τὸν φολίθων ἀνυμίτωμεν τοὺς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ άστέρας, βαρύτατον δὲ τῷ θεῷ καθάρω καὶ ἡ γῆ, λειότατον δὲ ὡσπερ ὃδωρ· καθ' ἐκαστὸν δὲ ἐναυτὸν τὸ γῆρας ἀφείς, ἀποδύεται, καθ' ὃ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἑαυτῶν ἐναυσίος χρόνος, ἐναλλαγὴν ποιούμενος, νεάζει· τῷ δὲ ὡς τροφῇ χρῆσθαι τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι σημαίνει τὸ πάντα ὅσα ἐκ τῆς θείας προνοίας ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γεννᾶται, ταῦτα πάλιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν εἰς αὐτὰ λαμβάνειν. 304

[How the universe]. When they want to write the universe, they depict a serpent speckled with variegated scales, eating its own tail; by the scales alluding to the stars in the universe. The animal is also very heavy, as is the earth, and very slippery, like water: moreover, it every year sheds its skin and thus loses old age, as in the universe the annual period causes a change, and is renewed. And using its own body for food signifies that all things whatsoever, that are generated by divine providence in the universe, undergo a diminution into the same things again.

The figure of the serpent alludes (αἰνιττόμενο) to two qualities (heaviness, smoothness) of elements of the cosmos; the variegated scales allude to the stars in the cosmos; the serpent of which this is a figure alludes, through the natural fact of shedding skin in rejuvenation and devouring its own tail, either to the principle of the cyclical temporality of the cosmos, or to the reciprocal nature of growth and decay within the cosmos. The feature that characterizes the three elements as allusive, as opposed to representative or semantic, is that the details depicted by the glyph neither directly signify the natural phenomena depicted, nor are they criterially related to them in such a way as to legitimize inference from those phenomena to the meaning of the depicted elements. What is consistently allusive in this mode of hieroglyphic expression is the use of features belonging to the observed natural phenomena as depicted by the glyphs themselves not as criterial of the conceptual content of the glyph (as in the case of the semantic mode of hieroglyphic expression), but as conceptually performed by the glyph itself. In other words, it is not the rôle that natural phenomena play in the semiotic mode of expression in explaining the meanings of the hieroglyphs that depict them (whether pre-existing or invented) that I shall distinguish with the terms symbolic, allusive, or enigmatic (αἰνιγματικός). It is rather the performative rôle of the glyphs in the capacity those natural phenomena ordinarily occupy that so characterizes them.

304 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 1.2.
The symbolic technique, then, is premissed both on a hieroglyph depicting a natural phenomenon, and on a shared semantic relation between the relevant phenomenon and its depiction. In other words, it depends for its viability as a symbol on both the representative and semantic modes of expression described above. However, it is not, qua symbol, directly concerned with depicting a natural phenomenon, or with a shared meaning between the phenomenon depicted and the glyph. Rather it establishes the glyph as symbolically fulfilling the condition met by the phenomenon in non-symbolic circumstances.

To clarify with a few examples: the connection between the figure of a moon and a month[^305] is not only empirically observable, but semantic. What is meant by ‘moon’ is that celestial body by which one measures the course of a month, not, for example, the body during the eclipse of which baboons decline to eat.[^306] In other words, one way of explaining what ‘moon’ means is to specify its relationship with the duration of a month. This is the semantic relation upon which depends the second mode of hieroglyphic expression. A bee, on the other hand, signifying ‘a people obedient to their king’ (λαὸν πειθήνιον βασιλεῖ)[^307] is not eusocial by definition, but by nature; one doesn’t identify a bee by whether it lives in a eusocial colony with a dominant reproductive female and it is possible to identify a eusocial species without specifying that it is a bee. In the first example, the explanation specifies criterial conditions under which the item may be called a moon, whereas, in the second, it is merely symptomatic of the bee that it is eusocial: its hierarchical social arrangements can be inferred from its depicted form or natural condition, but these are not defining characteristics. In other cases, however, the relevant point of comparison between a sign and the phenomenon it depicts, which in the semantic mode of expression identifies its meaning, in the symbolic mode identifies a natural feature of the phenomenon depicted as a feature of the glyph itself. When ‘appropriated’ (παρειλήφασι) in its capacity as displaying this natural feature a glyph is being used in the symbolic mode (συμβολικῶς).

Though examples in which the natural properties or qualities of the phenomena depicted by hieroglyphs are emphasized (usually by virtue of the absence of any elaboration of how those feature are to be construed as establishing specifically semantic links) are far more frequent in the second book than the first. This is possibly a result of the fact that Philip’s additions are no longer constrained by the predetermined features of

genuinely Egyptian signs, thereby allowing for a diversification of natural features that constitute the possible symbolic range of the hieroglyphic resource. On the other hand, the same brevity of explanation excludes any explicit statement to the effect that these glyphs have specifically symbolic uses of the type found in the ‘lion’s head’ glyph. Nonetheless, these passages occupy the long Hellenizing sequence in Book Two and constitute a kind of catalogue of traits and occupations which brings emphasis to bear on key moral, social, and human themes relying on particularly zoomorphic signs. In this respect the ‘catalogue’ is recognizably in the vein of the latter tradition of allegorical and more clearly emblematic hieroglyphic exegeses

[Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.19.1–5.]

[How a man who cures himself by an oracle]. When they want to signify a man who cures himself by an oracle, they depict a wood-pigeon carrying a laurel-branch; for this bird, when it is unwell, places a branch of laurel in its nest, and recovers.

So, for example, in 2.46, an oracle is to a man what a laurel-leaf is to a dove, i.e. a cure. The cure is the point of comparison then assigned criterial significance for the symbolic meaning of the glyph, but is not itself the meaning. A glyph depicting a dove carrying a laurel-leaf, by virtue of the curative properties of both laurel-leaves and oracles, signifies a man who cures himself by an oracle.

The same structure is present in 2.49, where a city is to a man dwelling safely what a stone is to an eagle’s nest holding safely, i.e. security. Therefore, a glyph of an eagle carrying a stone signifies a man who dwells securely in a city. Again, in 2.50: a (long-eared feathered) bustard is, when a horse sees it, what a man is, when closely pursued by another, i.e. weak. Therefore, a glyph of a bustard and a horse signifies a weak man persecuted by a stronger. Three things are established here: (1) that the glyph depicts a horse and a bustard; (2) that the natural fact of a bustard taking flight on seeing a horse signifies weakness; (3) that the depiction of a bustard taking flight upon seeing a horse signifies the weakness of a man pursued by another. These three elements – sign, natural fact, and symbol – are significant in distinct senses. The glyph signifies the natural phenomenon descriptively; the natural phenomenon signifies the point of comparison symptomatically; the semantic link between the hieroglyphic sign and the natural phenomenon, i.e. the weak confronted with the strong, through

309 Within which tradition the Hieroglyphica, Sive De Sacris Aegyptiorum aliarmaque gentium litteris of Ioannes Pierius Valerianus Bellunensis (Basel: 1556) and Emblemata libellus by Giovanni Andrea Alciato (Augsburg: 1531) are early successors of Horapollo.
310 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 2.46.
the recontextualization of the sign from the perspective of natural history to that of ethics, signifies the symbolic meaning of the glyph. In other words, had 2.50 read: “When they want to signify the weak confronted with the strong, they draw a bustard in flight upon seeing a horse”, there would be little if any grounds for doubt as to the appropriate analysis: the glyph is a depiction, or visual description, of a natural and typical indication of the meaning the weak confronted with the strong. Therefore, the natural reading may be reconstructed as follows: “When they want to signify a man in a weak condition and pursued by another (stronger) man [i.e. a particular instance of the weak confronted with the strong], they draw a bustard in flight upon seeing [because it is weaker than] a horse.”

Similarly, in 2.52, flight to a featherless bat is what a headlong rush is to a weak man: rash.

\[\text{[T415] Πῶς ἄνθρωπον δηλοῦσι ἀσθενῆ καὶ προπετευόμενον. Ἄνθρωπον ἀσθενῆ καὶ προπετευόμενον βουλόμενοι σημῆναι, νυκτερίδα ζωγραφοῦσιν ἐκείνη γάρ, μὴ ἔχουσα πτερά, ἐπιταται.}^{311}\]

[How they show a man who is weak and audacious]. When they want to signify a man who is weak and audacious, they portray a bat, for it flies without having any feathers.

2.48, for which Leemans’ text lacks chapter numeration in the Greek, is more difficult to read in this way.

\[\text{[T416] Πῶς ἄνδρα μὴ ἔχοντα χολήν, ἀλλ’ ἀφ’ ἑτέρου δεχόμενον. Ἄνδρα μὴ ἔχοντα χολήν αὐτοφυῶς, ἀλλ’ ἀφ’ ἑτέρου δεχόμενον γράφοντες, περιστερὰν ζωγραφοῦσιν, ἔχουσαν τὰ ὀπίσθια ὀρθὰ ἐν ἐκείνοις γὰρ τὴν χολήν ἐξελ.}^{312}\]

[How a man who has no bile but receives it from another]. When they write a man who has naturally no bile but receives it from another, they depict a dove with her hind parts erect; for in them she has her bile.

A man without bile naturally is, when receiving it from another, what a dove is, with upright hind-parts, in which it has bile. In other words, a man not inclined to anger naturally, but who is incited to anger by another is to be compared to a dove which (1.57) is not choleric, but has bile in its tail,\(^{313}\) which it generically holds erect (indicating the presence of the otherwise foreign bile?).

The sequence continues with 2.53. Here, only the barest distinction between ‘meaning/showing’ and ‘writing/drawing’ is observed (… βουλόμενοι ζωγραφῆσαι, … ζωγραφοῦσιν), marked solely by aspect.

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\(^{311}\) Horapollo Gramm., *Hieroglyphica*, 2.52.

\(^{312}\) Horapollo Gramm., *Hieroglyphica*, 2.48.

\(^{313}\) Cf. Aristoteles Phil., *Historia Animalium*. 2.15.
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[1314] [Πῶς γυναῖκα θηλάζουσαν, καὶ καλῶς ἀνατρέφουσαν]. Γυναῖκα θηλάζουσαν, καὶ καλῶς ἀνατρέφουσαν βουλόμενοι ζωγραφῆσαι, νυκτερίδα πάλιν ἔχουσαν ὀδόντας καὶ μαστοὺς ζωγραφοῦσιν αὐτή γάρ, μόνη τῶν ἄλλων πτηνῶν, ὀδόντας καὶ μαστοὺς ἔχει.134

[How a woman suckling and bringing up her children well]. When they want to write a woman suckling and bringing up her children well, they again depict a bat with teeth and breasts; for this is the only one of the winged creatures which has teeth and breasts.

The sense of the elements themselves: teeth and breasts are to a bat what giving suck is to a woman, i.e. tokens of good-nursing, provides an equally minimal distinction to the referents of sign and meaning, and the overall contribution is little more than the alignment of bat and woman, neither foregrounded in such a way as to specify the priority of one over the other, except by the aspect-marker: they imperfectively draw a bat, when they perfectly want to draw a woman &c. Other chapters, on the other hand, use the imperfective in both clauses.

The unique contribution of these kinds of exegeses in the Hieroglyphica was recognized by Champollion himself:

il est aisé de voir que l’ouvrage d’Horapollon se rapporte bien plus spécialement à l’explication des images dont se composaient les anaglyphs, qu’aux éléments ou caractères de l’écriture hiéroglyphiques proprement dite: le titre si vague de ce livre, Ἱερογλυφικὰ [sculptures sacrées ou gravures sacrées], est la seule cause de la méprise.135

it is easy to see that the work of Horapollo relates more specifically to the explanation of images which are composed of anaglyphs, than to elements or characters of hieroglyphic writing itself: the vague title of this book, Ἱερογλυφικὰ [sacred sculptures or sacred engravings], is the sole cause of the mistake.

In the context of a discussion of Clement of Alexandria’s treatment of hieroglyphic Egyptian Vergote136 offers several possible explanations for the distinctive characteristics of ἀνάγλυφα (i.e. ornaments or inscriptions carved in low relief) used in theologized myths in the praises of kings employing details of Egyptian orthography, which appeal to morpho-syntactically marked hieroglyphic practice, contra the explanations of his predecessors, Maréstaing, Dulaurier, and Deiber. The latter had, by contrast, conceived of these anaglyphs as exhibiting formal differences associated with glyphic practice in bas-reliefs in particular, in which not all that is depicted is grammatically marked script, but includes the depiction of items as compositional elements in scenic tableaux without playing a specifically morpho-phonological or morpho-syntactic rôle. In this respect his predecessors were undoubtedly closer to the mark.

134 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 2.53.
135 Cited in Sbordone, 2002, p.XI.
The Greek conception of symbolic hieroglyphs in general, standing in need of interpretation (ἑρμηνεία), and Horapollo’s conception in particular, is exactly the situation we are faced with in the tableaux of Egyptian bas-reliefs. The relationship between the two elements of script and tableau is characterized by the fact that the script supplies the interpretation of the tableau; the relationship between glyph and explanation in the exegetical sources is characterized by the fact that it is the explanation that supplies the interpretation of the glyph. Though both may fairly be described as allegorical, the glyphs for which the Greek exegesis supplies the interpretation are not semantically determined according to the same principles as the morphosyntactically marked Greek sequences. Neither the script in the tableaux, nor the explanation in the exegeses themselves is subject to further interpretation. That is because the Greek exegesis is not susceptible of interpretation precisely insofar as it serves as the explanation of the meaning of the glyph.

The contention here, however, is not to deny the Horapollonian glyphs the status of hieroglyphic writing on the grounds that they resemble historically Egyptian anaglyphs more than the phonetic and ideographic models of decipherment. Symbolic Horapollonian hieroglyphs are rather to be explained as symbols precisely in virtue of being representative signs depicting referents which are specifically capable of use symbolically, in the context of the particular aims and structural elements of the text, because presented as bearing semantic content. That is, against a background of what might be called the natural language of signs, the hieratic intent of the glyphs not only does not preclude them from semantic analysis, but in fact depends on that very possibility.

Such a language has occupied prominent positions in philosophical linguistics in more than one historical setting, but is ultimately a Greek conception. The signs, insofar as they are signs at all, must be capable of being understood, which of course means they are also capable of being misunderstood, which is why their applications, their uses, are dependent on the explanations provided. The use of a glyph to signify a quality (vid. the non-Egyptian material informing most of Book Two), tropologically, so to speak, is nonetheless distinct from the use of the same glyph as symbolizing that quality, which is the manner in which what Horapollo describes as symbolic representations proceed.
The aims and presuppositions of the *Hieroglyphica* differ not in detail, but in kind from the endeavour of decipherment. The unique and original contribution of the text is precisely the technique for producing either a sign-resource, or a range of tropic significance, through natural facts used to define semantic content. Dempsey in Merkel & Debus\(^{317}\) misconstrues the importance of this point while simultaneously making several crucial observations on the development of Renaissance interest in hieroglyphics. Wishing to ease the emphasis placed on the Horapollo manuscripts in explanation of later developments in the area, he writes that the *Hieroglyphica* ‘contained no statement of the linguistic or pictographic principles of hieroglyphs, no grammar or syntax’. As demonstrated above, the informing linguistic principles are embedded in the structure of the work; the meaning of a sign is circumscribed by the account given of it, not by otherwise unstated grammatical considerations. On the other hand, there does appear to be some basis upon which to attribute to Horapollo an elementary conception of hieroglyphic grammar in the availability of a number of compound signs:

1.1 ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην (sun and moon)
1.12 κάνθαρον καὶ γύπα (beetle [scarab] and vulture)
1.22 θυματήρα καιόμενον καὶ ἐπάνω καρδίαν (burning censer and heart above it)
1.27 γλῶσσαν καὶ Íφαλμόν (tongue and bloodshot eye)
1.38 μέλαν καὶ κόσκινον καὶ σχοινίον (ink and sieve and reed)
1.43 πῦρ καὶ ὀδωρ (fire and water)
1.59 ὄφιν κοσμειδῶς ἐσχηματισμένον, οὗ τὴν οὐρὰν ἐν τῷ στόματι, τὸ δὲ ὅνομα τοῦ βασιλέως ἐν μέσῳ τῶ ἐλλύματι (serpent represented as cosmos, with its tail in its mouth and name of king written in middle of coils)
1.61 ὄφιν ἐν μένῳ δὲ αὐτοῦ ὀίκον μέγαν (serpent and in middle great palace)
2.35 σκορπίων καὶ κριόδειλον (a scorpion and a crocodile)
2.43 ὀφίναι καὶ ἵππον (a horse and a bustard)
2.51 στρουθίων καὶ γλάύκα (a sparrow and a dog-fish)
2.64 μύρμηκα καὶ πτερὰ νυκτερίδος (an ant and bat’s wings)
2.74 λύκον καὶ λίθον (a wolf and a stone)
2.75 λέοντας καὶ δάδας (lions and torches)
2.85 ἐλέφαντα καὶ κριόν (an elephant and a ram)
2.86 ἐλέφαντα μετὰ χοίρου (an elephant with a pig)
2.87 ἐλέφαντα καὶ σπινθήρα (a deer and a viper)
2.91 ἐλέφαντα μετὰ αὐλητοῦ ἀνθρώπου (a deer and a flute-player)
2.93 ἐλέφαντα καὶ ἀδιάφορον τὴν βοτάνην (an owl and some maiden-hair)
2.106 κόραβον καὶ κριόδειλον (a spiny lobster and an octopus)
2.108 πίνναν καὶ καρκίνον μικρόν (an oyster and a crab)

Several elements of these do have semantic content in isolation, ‘moon’, ‘scarab’, and ‘serpent’, for example. Also, the juxtaposition of independently meaningful elements with other elements (whose meaning is not on the whole otherwise specifically explained), does seem to entail some form of operative grammatical distinction, either as a form of morphological inflection, or in terms of syntactical/clausal construction. The clearest example of this is the ‘moon’ hieroglyph, which in isolation means ‘month’ and in combination with the ‘sun’ hieroglyph means ‘eternity’. It is difficult to envisage here the addition of the ‘sun’ hieroglyph as performing any determinately morphological, as opposed to syntactical work. The addition of the ‘sun’ glyph appears to establish a syntactical relation since it functions at the very least as an external modifier of the meaning of the ‘moon’ glyph. However, the modification it entails clearly belongs to the same semantic field as the ‘moon’ glyph in isolation (i.e. both ‘head’ and modifier have a temporal meaning). In that sense the connection between ‘moon’ and ‘sun and moon’ correlates better with that between ‘month’ and ‘months’, than between ‘moon’ and ‘moons’. Whether construed as a morphological or a syntactic feature, however, compositionality of glyphs in Horapollo evidently is capable of marking semantic variation and to that extent (however underdeveloped in the text) exhibits grammaticality.

The use of natural signs in this way, as a semiotic resource, itself, however, indicates an underlying principle of exegetic judgement whereby hieroglyphic signs are semantically analogous to natural signs. The agreement in significance between the formal properties of the glyph and the predicatable properties of the item depicted without corresponding intermediate instances establishes those properties themselves as both factual and logical conditions under which hieroglyphs are capable of the third, symbolic mode of expression. To predicate of a serpent, or the glyph of a serpent, that it is smooth or speckled is to describe the natural properties of the creature; to explain the meaning of a serpent-sign by reference to smoothness or speckling is to define the use of that sign as a precondition for its predicative use in reference to natural facts. What is almost completely absent in the Hieroglyphica is linguistic context. No hieroglyphic inscription is adduced which might be examined in the light of its exegeses, and consequently no predicative uses of a hieroglyphic sign is in evidence.

The status of the natural fact as such is not, semantically speaking, relevant to the viability of the hieroglyphic sign in its symbolic sense. Cats, for example, do not always land on their feet after a fall, but the

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318 E.g. ‘moon’ 1.4, 66; ‘scarab’ 1.10, 2,41; ‘serpent’ 1.45, 60, 62, 63, 64.
currency of the notion legitimizes the picture of a cat landing on its feet as a sign of stability or balance. Philip might have written in this case: when they want to signify a man who regains his balance after losing it, they draw a cat, for a cat, when it falls, lands on its feet. On this reading of symbolic glyphs, the claim that hieroglyphic sign of a sparrow on fire (2.115) is used to mean a fecund man, can be restated as: the sign depicts a natural indication of fecundity. On Horapollo’s use of the term ‘symbolic’, on the other hand, and in contrast to his use of the term ‘allusive’, is the claim that the signs themselves are used indicatively. Kissing a loved one may be considered a natural sign of affection, but there is nothing symbolic in the act as such. Kissing the photograph of a loved one, however, while a sign of my affection for the loved one shown in the photograph, is nonetheless a symbolic kiss. Using the photograph, on the other hand, simply to identify the loved one, does not render the former symbolic, merely visually representative.

Read purely as a catalogue of signs, the Hieroglyphica does not put the signs to any symbolic use in the Horapollonian sense, but merely notes that they depict certain natural signs and can therefore be used allusively or symbolically in the broader sense. In general, what we have in the text is not an attempt to decipher the historical values of Egyptian hieroglyphics, but an attempt to interpret the meanings of hieroglyphic signs by means of natural signs. An investigation to determine the extent of the influence of Aristotelian natural history on the structure of the Hieroglyphica, except insofar as this might further support observations on categorically composite elements (vid. sup. on 2.38), or on inherited paradoxography (vid. sup. on 2.48), as source-analysis will provide only a reconstruction of an historical line of development of philosophical linguistics, not a clarification of the conditions under which it is presented in Horapollo and the conditions are precisely those which juxtapose hieroglyphic signs and natural signs.
§5. Horapollonian Metaphysics

In the absence of any explicitly addressed Christian objection the difficulties of establishing a strong form of the claim that Horapollo is working to produce a polemical tool for use against Coptic suppression are, I think, insurmountable. Even the weaker claim that the *Hieroglyphica* is a specifically Neoplatonic work is underdetermined by the available evidence. On the other hand, on the basis of broadly historical considerations the composition of the text within a pagan revivalist movement in late fifth century Egypt does seem likely and given both the linguistic subject-matter and the theosophical and Egyptizing interests of a number of Platonists of the period, evidence of some influence of that context on a text by a self-declared philosopher might reasonably be expected. At the very least investigating elements of that context serves as a useful heuristic strategy by which to assess the text’s own explanatory strategies.

More important, perhaps, is the fact that hieroglyphic exegeses from sources less controversially aligned with Neoplatonic interests and commitments are occasionally identical in detail. We have, for example, several examples of hieroglyphic exegesis in Photius’ report of Damascius.319

[Τ418] οἱ ἱπποπόταμοι ἄδικον ζῷον, οἴνω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ιερογλυφικοῖς γράμμασιν ἀδικίαν δηλοῖ· τὸν γὰρ πατέρα ἀποκτείνας βιάζεται τὴν μητέρα.320 The hippopotamus is an unjust animal, hence in hieroglyphic characters it means injustice, for it kills its father and does violence to its mother.

[Τ419] τὰς δώδεκα ὥρας ἡ αἴλουρος διακρίνει, νύκτας καὶ ἡμέρας οὐροῦσα καθ’ ἑκάστην αἱ, δίκην ὀργάνον τινὸς ὀφονομονοῦσα.321 The cat marks the twelve hours by always urinating in each one both day and night, telling the hour like an instrument.

[Τ420] ὁ ὄρυξ τὸ ζῷον παρανύμενος ἀνατέλλειν διασημαίνει τὴν Σῶθιν.322 By sneezing the oryx signifies the rising of Sirius.

Each of these three explanations of the meanings of hieroglyphic characters have parallels or variants in Horapollo.

Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.56.1-7.
134 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.10.19-20.
135 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.49.1-7.
136 Plutarchus Biogr., Phil., De Iside et Osiride, 32.

and ungrateful man, they depict two claws of an hippopotamus turned downwards. For when this animal has arrived at its prime it contests its father by fighting, to try which is the stronger, and should the father give way he cedes him terrain and consorts with its mother, permitting him to live; but if his father should not permit the union with his mother, he kills him, being the stronger and more vigorous of the two.

For they say that the male cat changes the shape of the pupils of his eyes according to the course of the sun.

[How they show impurity]. To denote impurity, they delineate an Oryx (a species of wild goat), because when the moon rises, this animal looks intently towards the goddess and raises an outcry, ... And it acts in the same manner at the rising of the divine star the sun.

The suggestive introduction in Photius, immediately after a sequence of examples from which the above are excerpted, of the figure of Heraiscus, Horapollo’s uncle, is unlikely to be a direct line of transmission of material from shared sources. The differences in details between the three parallel examples, as well as earlier parallels to the first in Plutarch,136 makes the plausible explanation a generic interest in Alexandrian philosophical circles in precisely the Egyptizing philosophical subjects alluded to by Damascius.

For that reason the question of whether there are background Hellenized metaphysical presuppositions that the Hieroglyphica might reflect is not implausible. For example, concerning the two rival conceptions of the ungenerated world which are explicitly at stake in the Christian critique itself, in the absence of revelation, so the objection goes, what means can there be by which the ungenerated world that is such an important part of Platonic as well as Christian metaphysics may be known? I shall argue that this is a question addressed by the Hieroglyphica – at least indirectly – insofar as Horapollo provides us with a number of examples of hieroglyphs whose exegesis invoke instances of immutability, eternity, self-sufficiency, and unity.
The clearest examples are those hieroglyphs whose meanings include Egyptian or Graeco-Roman deities: Isis, Ares, Aphrodite, Athene, and Hephaistus. There are also several culturally neutral glyphs with meanings involving immutability or eternity: a god, something sublime, the soul, foreknowledge, the cosmic god, a cosmic ruler, a king ruling part of the cosmos, the almighty, a man’s soul, the infinite. Whereas most of the examples of glyphs with meanings related to the divine occur in Book One, we have seen in the previous section that Book Two includes a long catalogue of virtues and vices: temperance, the permanent and steadfast, impiety, an initiate. In each case, of course, the phenomenon the glyph depicts is a natural phenomenon, occurring within the generated, sensible world.

The claim that the elements (the sun and the moon), or certain species of serpent, are eternal is necessarily problematic for Christianity as belonging to the generated – and therefore temporally finite – world. Nothing within the cosmos, including celestial bodies, is eternal. Indeed, all Platonists (Christian or otherwise) would consider everything within the cosmos ‘part of the generated world’, even if they thought that it was everlasting. It seems, however, that Horapollo’s understanding is to agree that the universe is both ‘part of the generated world’ and eternal, though in a qualified sense.

Horapollo, Hieroglyphica 1.3,6,8,11,12. Horapollo, Hieroglyphica 1.6,7,8,11,13,61,63,64; 2.1,29. Furthermore, in Iamblichus’ hieroglyphic exegeses the gifts proper to the incorporeal life are intellectual: virtue and wisdom. Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 5.19–22.

Sinuthius Theol., [I am amazed = Contra Origenistas et Gnosticos (W54, Discourses 7, Work 5), HB 39.2–41.1; 0384–8.}
Here 'the stars in the universe' (τοὺς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀστέρας) belong among things ‘generated by divine providence in the universe’ (οὐκ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐνιαυτῷ, ἢ τὸν πέντε ἀριθμόν, ἀστέρα

eating its own tail; by the scales alluding to the stars in the universe. The animal is also very heavy, as is the earth, and very slippery, like water: moreover, it every year sheds its skin and thus loses old age, as in the universe the annual period causes a change, and is renewed. And using its own body for food signifies that all things whatsoever, that are generated by divine providence in the universe, undergo a diminution into the same things again.

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Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.2.1-8.
Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.3.1-11.
The answer appears to be – in line with standard Platonist doctrine – that he envisages the eternity and divinity at issue as encosmic (ἐγκόσμιον), but subject to supracosmic governance. In this it is not inconceivable that Proclus had some influence on Horapollo. Specifically, the expression ‘encosmic god’ (θεὸν ... ἐγκόσμιον) is likely evidence of just such influence. The term appears sparsely in Greek, occurring perhaps only two dozen times in a dozen authors outside Proclus and Damascius and three times that often in Proclus alone. Whether the term so used is specifically an innovation of Proclus or not, it is clearly characteristic of the fifth century Neoplatonism of Alexandria and Athens, though the family connection with Proclus through Heraiscus and Damascius through Horapollo himself would seem to the most economical basis upon which to locate the source of influence.

One answer to the question of what kind of objects of interest are at play in the Hieroglyphica might be precisely those objects discernible through the application of the exegetical procedures concerned. The concern might still arise, however, that this is equally likely to be the case even if it were not uniformly Platonic objects at which we arrived. As a matter of fact, in one or two places what we do arrive at appears to support a Stoic interpretation.

[The one who governs all things]. They signify one who governs all things by depicting again the perfection of the same animal, again depicting the entire serpent: for amongst them it is the spirit that pervades the universe.

The ‘Almighty’ (παντοκράτωρ) cannot be observed, or depicted, directly, so it is signified, namely by glyph depicting the ‘perfection’ (τελείωσις) of the ‘entire serpent’ (ὁλόκληρον ὄφιν). The expression ‘the spirit that pervades the universe’ (τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου τὸ διῆκόν ἐστι πνεῦμα) in particular might make one suppose a Stoic

135 Cf., e.g., Synesius Phil., De insomniis 14.40; Sallustius Phil., De deis et mundo 6.1.3-4; Hermias Phil., in Platonis Phaedrum scholia 132.25, 167.23, 171.34, 172.4, 260.22; Hierocles Phil., In aureum carmen 1.1.4, 11.32.12; Syrianus Phil., in Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria 25.11, 41.14; Simplicius Phil., in Aristotelis quattuor libros de caelo commentaria 7.117.16; Joannes Philoponus Phil., De aeternitate mundi 603.27, 604.4; De opificio mundi 252.18.
136 Proclus Phil., Theologia Platonica passim.; In Platonis rem publicam commentarii passim.; In Platonis Parmenidem passim.; In Platonis Timaeum commentaria passim.; Damascius Phil., De principiis 1.255.13, 1.268.14, &c.; In Parmenidem 10.5, 94.13, 137.21, &c.; In Phaedonem (versio 1) 478.1; In Phaedonem (versio 2) 95.1.
137 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.64.1–3.
influence, since the Stoics talk about god in precisely these terms. Similar material with apparent Stoic credentials appears elsewhere in Book One. The problem with such a supposition, however, is that on its own it is insufficient for determining how the author used and understood terminology which is prima facie Stoic (in the case of τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου τὸ διῆκόν ἐστι πνεῦμα), or Platonist (in the case of θεὸν ... ἐγκόσμιον).

It is, however, the analytic process itself that demands a Platonist reading of the metaphysical status of the object. If Horapollo’s exegetical procedure is (i) to infer, in his extension of the hieroglyphic semantic range, from sensible phenomena to eternal realities, (ii) by analogy or allusion, (iii) to provide pre-eminent examples of metaphysical objects for contemplation, then he is not motivated in his use of physiological data or otherwise empirical observations on material artefacts or cultural practices by an independent interest in recording those observations. The reason for their inclusion is, however, connected with the fact that they are nonetheless empirically accessible items. Derivable from the sensible particulars, and therefore amenable to discursive reason hieroglyphs are hierarchically intermediate items which lend themselves to analytic inferential procedures to conceptual and metaphysical content. Again in line with standard Platonist practice, then, the procedure involves the incorporation of originally Stoic material not as a concession to Stoic interpretation in strictly physical terms in preference to Platonist alternatives, observing objective metaphysical determinants, but in order to allocate it both its proper place and its proper function in the Platonist ontology. On this reading, the proper place and function of the ‘encosmic god’ (θεὸν ... ἐγκόσμιον) is within the sensible realm. The ‘star’ hieroglyph signifies a reality that remains an explicitly cosmic entity.

If on this reading the encosmic realities signified by the hieroglyph of a star are then to be understood as secondary causes, then under the appropriate interpretation and in its application according to the guidance of a broader metaphysical objective, the ultimate objects of the explanatory exegesis ought to be understood as those first causes which are not cosmic entities at all, but supracosmic.

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[339] Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.2: ‘all things whatsoever, that are generated by divine providence in the world, undergo a corruption into it again’ (πάντα ὅσα ἐκ τῆς θείας προνοίας ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γεγονότα πάλιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν εἰς αὑτήν λαμβάνειν).  
[340] Cf. Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride 45.369A, though he more than once argues favourably on that basis himself (De Iside et Osiride 40.367C; 41.367E).
The relevant objective, which I described in chapter three, is that of the (post-lamblichean) Neoplatonic conception of the nature of the relationship between the physical realm and the intelligible, according to which emanation from the Neoplatonic One does not decrease with proximity to the sensible realm, but extends as far as matter. As a consequence of matter itself being a product of emanation there is a sense in which the bridge between the divine, conceptual, and physiological is provided for unattenuated, which helps to explain how entities in the physical world can be used to provoke thought about the latter. Within such a methodology the possibility of applying intellective interpretations to the work of natural science is precisely entailed by the latter’s continuity with and complementarity to the conceptual and metaphysically causal realities on which they depend for their being.

The question here, however, is how we might know whether ‘the Pantocrator’ is in fact supracosmic and not itself encosmic. We can identify two points that allow for an understanding of ‘Pantocrator’ as a supracosmic entity. First, it is the serpent depicted by the hieroglyph that amongst the Egyptians is identified as ‘the spirit that pervades the universe’ (παρ’ αὐτοῖς τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου τὸ διῆκόν ἐστι πνεῦμα). The hieroglyph depicting the serpent, on the other hand, signifies not the encosmic spirit the image of the complete serpent (ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ζώου τελειώσεως) depicts, but a third item, namely ‘the Pantocrator’. On its own, this still requires us to suppose that it is not only on the grounds of plausible historical context that Horapollo’s glyph, meaning, and object triad might plausibly be aligned with the Neoplatonic tripartite conception of expression (λέξις), thought (νόημα), and reality (πρᾶγμα). On the other hand, without the presupposition of such a division we have no explanation for either the exegetical procedure the exhibited in the Hieroglyphica quite generally, or for the specific exegetical example in which the distinction of an encosmic deity is offered. The second point concerns the distinction involved in using the term ‘encosmic’ itself. That distinction, as per the sources from which it appears to be derived, is standardly used to highlight the familiar Platonic distinction between, on the one hand, the cosmic governance of the course of the ‘natural order of the cosmos’ (τὴν τοῦ κόσμου οἰκονομίαν) by the ‘encosmic god’ and, on the other, the supracosmic governance, here of ‘the Pantocrator’.

That Horapollo does in fact envisage an extra- or supracosmic principle is also attested in another of the early lemmata of Book One. In his account of why the Egyptians depict a scarab to signify ‘generation’ (γένεσιν) Horapollo explains that on the twenty-ninth day after a scarab has buried a ball of ox-dung there is a conjunction of the moon and sun ‘as well as the generation of the cosmos’ (ἐτὶ τε καὶ γένεσιν κόσμου).
Furthermore, the generation of the cosmos occupies a position in a hierarchically arranged encosmic generation of the genus of scarabs for which it is explicitly the model.

[Hieroglyphica 1.10.1-29] (How an only begotten). To denote an only-begotten, or generation, or a father, or the world, or a man, they depict a scarab. And [they signify by this] an only-begotten, because it is a self-produced creature, being unconceived by a female; for the generation of it is unique as follows: when the male wants to procreate, he takes dung of an ox, and shapes it into a spherical form like the world; he then rolls it from the hinder parts from the rising to the setting, and looks himself towards the east, in order to he may impart to it the form of the world; (for that is borne from the east wind to west wind, while the course of the stars is from the west wind to the east wind): then, having dug a hole, it puts this sphere in the earth for twenty-eight days, (for in so many days the moon circulates through the twelve signs of the zodiac). By thus remaining under the moon, the genus of scarabs is brought to life; and on the twenty-ninth day after having opened the sphere, it throws it into water, (for it recognizes that on that day there is a conjunction of the moon and sun, as well as the generation of the cosmos). From [the sphere] thus opened in the water, the creatures, that is the scarabs, come forth. [The scarab also signifies] generation, for the reason before mentioned – and a father, because the scarab is generated by a father only – and the world, because in its generation it is made in the form of the world – and a man, because there is no female kind among them. Also there are three species of scarabs, the first like a cat, and illuminated by rays, which species they have consecrated to the sun on account of this correspondence: for they say that the male cat changes [the shape of] the pupils of his eyes according to the course of the sun: for in the morning at the rising of the god, they are dilated, and in the middle of the day become round, and when the sun is about to set appear less brilliant, whence, also, the statue of the god in Heliopolis is in the form of a cat. Every scarab also has thirty toes, corresponding with the thirty days of the month, during which the rising sun [moon?] fulfills its course. The second species is two-horned and in the form of a bull, which is consecrated to the moon; whence the children of the
Egyptians say, that the celestial bull is the exaltation of this goddess. The third species is one-horned and in the form of an ibis, which they regard as consecrated to Hermes [Thoth], like the ibis-bird.

The Horapollonian hieroglyph of a dung-beetle\textsuperscript{344} might mean, first, in accordance with the representative mode of hieroglyphic expression, \textit{Scarabæus pilularius}; second, conceptually, the predicable attribute ‘self-begotten’; or, third, allusively, by virtue of a shared predicable attribute, a rolling, circular passage, a periodic generative capacity, ‘the sun’.\textsuperscript{345} That the predicate be equally predicable of both scarab-sign and scarab also explains why in the catalogue of virtues and vices occupying the bulk of Book Two the subject depicted by the sign can uniformly be explained as ‘man’ or ‘woman’, of whom the identified attribute of the subject depicted is predicable. There is no figurative meaning involved at all (as Champollion outlined and moderns presuppose) in the sense of employing metonymy or synecdoche. It is \textit{the same} predicate that is at stake, whether it occurs in the object/name-bearer, the propositional content of the explanation, or the sign itself. To allude (\textit{αἰνίσσομαι}) in Horapollo is indirect only insofar as the relationship is theorized as we find it in 1.27. It is direct in terms of equality of sign-resource, a point made explicit at the end of Book One where Horapollo does not simply correlate one to the other, but identifies hieroglyphic signs with natural signs. This single example spans the empirical, semantic, and metaphysical: (i) the empirically accessible item, \textit{Scarabæus pilularius}, and (ii) the conceptual content, ‘self-begotten’. In the case of ‘the sun’ the item is clearly itself empirically accessible, but Horapollo is here also concerned with the meaning ‘self-begotten’, not the sun itself, which makes it conceptual, and therefore universal, rather than particular. Finally, there is the metaphysical principle which is allusively signified, namely, a ‘periodic generative capacity’. A hieroglyph for Horapollo is not the sensible object it depicts for perception, the conceptual content it signifies for thought, nor the first cause upon which the former are dependent – not, that is, unmixedly. Hieroglyphic writing is composite, and as such, a symbol in precisely the etymological sense.

\textsuperscript{344} Horapollo Gramm., \textit{Hieroglyphica} 1.10. [Πῶς μονογενές].

\textsuperscript{345} Cf. above, Horapollo Gramm., \textit{Hieroglyphica} 2.46. [Πῶς ἄνθρωπον ἰατρεύοντα ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ χρησμὸς]; 2.49. [Πῶς ἄνθρωπον ἀσφαλῶς οἰκοῦντα πόλιν]; 2.50. [Πῶς ἄνθρωπον ἀσθενῶς ἔχοντα, καὶ ὑφ’ ἑτέρου καταδιωκόμενον]; 2.52. [Πῶς ἄνθρωπον δηλοῦσιν ἀσθενῆ καὶ προπετευόμενον]; 2.53. [Πῶς γυναῖκα θηλάζουσαν, καὶ καλῶς ἀνατρέφονταν].
Conclusion

I began by setting out an objective to be met in the course of the preceding chapters, namely, a reconstruction of a development in the history of philosophical linguistics on the subject of hieroglyphic Egyptian as a language uniquely adapted to the purposes and concerns of late Platonist metaphysics.

By way of situating this reconstruction I began by describing the relationship between the standard philological account of hieroglyphs as theorized within Egyptology and the broader classical Greek tradition of hieroglyphic interpretation. The use of hieroglyphic Egyptian in the latter tradition was not conceived of as a purely orthographical expedient, extrinsic to the purposes of the material which it was employed to record, but, on the contrary, as constitutive of those purposes. Exegesis of hieroglyphs in Greek was legitimate because the purpose of the Greek glosses was precisely exegetical, not liturgical (or theurgic) as the original use of the glyphs had been. This difference in use was explained in terms of the metaphysical possibilities provided for by the doxastic, dianoetic, or intellectual properties of the scripts themselves, but insofar as they are explanations, the facts that are explained are precisely the use of the scripts for their respectively secular and religious purposes. The decisive characteristic of hieroglyphic Egyptian which motivated the tradition’s explanatory endeavour, in other words, was not, as with modern historical and philological inquiries, the script’s relation to the morpho-syntactical substrate, but its sapiential function.

For that reason, within the framework of the contrast between the classical and Egyptological purposes in examining hieroglyphs, the absence from the Greek accounts of sustained philological observations in favour of a symbolic or allegoristic conception of Egyptian hieroglyphs is neither an accidental feature of those accounts, conditioned by a declining understanding of their historical use, nor an obstacle to a developed hieroglyphic semantics. In fact, the absence of philological form from symbolic or allegoristic Egyptian hieroglyphics is both explicitly acknowledged as a classificatory feature, distinctly characterized by its function, and given independent theoretical justification. Crucially, from the historical and philological perspective, as such the account also answers to features of genuinely Egyptian inscriptive practice.

Coptic Christians, including, prominently, Shenoute had raised objections to the pagan revivalist practice of exploiting hieroglyphs for the purpose of deriving metaphysical truths. The force of those objections is,
however, somewhat obscured by the Christian propensity for employing variations on the very hermeneutical strategies that Shenoute, for example, takes pains to discredit when practiced by pagans. This propensity may nevertheless be legitimized by either or both of two considerations. First is the direction of argumentative momentum from prior causes to posterior effects, contrary to the practice of his pagan interlocutors. Insofar as pagan allegory reasons from posterior effects to prior causes it is liable (so the Christian objection runs) to arrive at extra-Scriptural – and to that extent potentially erroneous – first principles. Within that context, however, the two procedures are not conceived of as dichotomous, but as opposite poles of the same axis equally accessible αἰτίας λογισμῷ. Pagan practice might still, then, be methodologically sound, but suspect on substantive doctrinal grounds. The second possible legitimizing consideration is Shenoute’s use of the contentious hermeneutical strategies in the context of dialectical polemic, such that allegoristic reasoning is not employed in propria persona, but rather as a dialectical technique deployed to highlight errors and improprieties within paganism on the latter’s own terms. If this is at the root of Shenoute’s accusations of sophistry and allegorical obscurity on the part of the Hellenizing pagans, the contention that Horapollo’s Hieroglyphica is developed in an environment responsive to Christian objections would have to address not only substantive accusations of doctrinal error, but also the implied dialectical charge of methodological inadequacy.

The pagan account of the methodological adequacy of its exegetical procedure is as follows. Neoplatonic linguistic theory develops in two stages, each deriving from Porphyrian reflection on Aristotelian texts. The first stage includes a bipartite theory of ‘nominal assignment’ (ὀνομασία), ‘the first imposition of expressions’ (τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων), in which names (broadly construed) are directly assigned to objects. This first imposition is complemented by an open-ended theory of ‘second imposition’ (τῆς δευτέρας θέσεως), in which terms for ‘forms of linguistic expression’ (σχήματα λέξεως) are directly assigned to the linguistic expressions assigned in the first imposition. The second stage is a tripartite theory whereby ‘any simple significant expression is spoken and said of the thing signified’ (πᾶσα ἀπλὴ λέξις σημαντικῆ ὑπὲρ καὶ λεξῆ); through the medium of concepts (νοηματα). To this tripartite analysis corresponds a tripartite theory of modes of hieroglyphic expression via ‘three different types of letters’ (γραμμάτων δὲ τρισσάς διαφοράς), namely, as we learn from Proclus, ‘doxastic’ (δοξαστική), ‘discursive’ (διανοητική), and ‘intellective’ (νοερά). The first, mediated by spoken language, is the capacity to represent
sensible phenomena. The second presents those phenomena conceptually, unmediated by speech. The third presents the intelligible causes of phenomena symbolically or allegorically.

These three forms of meaningful hieroglyphic expression are possible, according to the Neoplatonic account I have argued for, because of the availability of a metaphysical framework to support the tripartite analysis. Doxastic predications accordingly concern and are intelligible by virtue of empirically accessible states of affairs; in discursive thought one grasps particulars as intelligibly expressible by virtue of falling under universal concepts; and in intellective thought the first causes are intelligibly expressible. The specifically hieroglyphic expression of this tripartite metaphysics is possible because hieroglyphic signs are themselves composites of sensible and intelligible elements which are therefore susceptible to interpretation as material images, as mediating concepts, or as intelligible realities.

The claim then is that the three modes of hieroglyphic expression – ‘epistolographic, hieroglyphic, and symbolic’ (ἐπιστολογραφικῶν τε καὶ ἱερογλυφικῶν καὶ συμβολικῶν) – signify neither three purely formal markers, nor three means of articulating exclusively predicative significance, but three distinct modes of expression as such, corresponding to three metaphysically discrete realms susceptible of linguistic expression by those means. A physiologist might then appropriately employ epistolographic Egyptian with its capacity to render the spoken language to express doxastic thought with predicative significance concerning sensible phenomena. A logician would use (Porphyrian) hieroglyphic Egyptian with its capacity to render discursive thought through universal concepts. Thirdly, a theologian (metaphysician) would use symbolic Egyptian with allegorical significance to express intellective thought concerning intelligible realities.

Though the text of the Hieroglyphica does not offer any explanatory hypotheses of a kind which explicitly address, for example, Iamblichus’ theoretical considerations of how hieroglyphs might be thought to bear sapiential significance by means of similar independent or analytically simple principles, I have argued that it does reflect other features of Neoplatonic analysis and exegesis. First, it uncontroversially maintains the tripartite distinction between linguistic expressions, their meanings, and the objects or name-bearers which they depict. Second, I have argued that the distinction is further aligned with three modes of hieroglyphic expression: representative, semantic, and symbolic. Third, in certain cases a procedure of principled (if not systematic) analytic explanatory ascent from empirical observation through discursive reason to
metaphysical or cosmological insights is arguably employed in the exegesis of the sapiential content of the hieroglyphs.

The historical argument intended to address the possibility of situating the *Hieroglyphica* in the broader hieroglyphic tradition on which it might be thought to depend, either generically or as a resource for specific exegetical content, is not, however, conclusive evidence of specifically Neoplatonic philosophical commitments. Though at various points I have in fact suggested that certain aspects of Neoplatonic theory cited as parallel to those in the *Hieroglyphica* are matters of historical contiguity, these cannot on their own establish direct historical influence on the presuppositions of the latter. They do, however, exhibit a number of formal similarities which justify the possibility of reading the *Hieroglyphica* with a view not to descriptive clarifications or explanatory hypotheses it offers *ad intra*, but to its reflection of broader methodological commitments *ad extra*. For that reason drawing as far as possible on points of comparison from at least minimally plausible historical influences is instructive in emphasizing that an account informed by independent semantic and metaphysical concerns may highlight the relevance of the hermeneutic concerns of the text over and above (but also in contrast to) its purely historical interest in the sequence of developments resulting in the decipherment of hieroglyphic Egyptian according to strictly philological criteria.
Appendix 1: Text, transcription, transliteration, normalization, and translation for the ‘marriage’ scarab of Amenhotep III (UC12259).

\[\text{Text}\]^{166}

\[\text{Transcription}\]

\[\text{Transliteration}\]^{167}

\[\text{Text and transcription read top-right to bottom-left.}\]

\[\text{”nh hr k3 nht m hi m3t}\]

\[\text{nbty s mn <n> m3it h p } h\text{mnt w s g r h } h\text{bti t}n t\]

\[\text{hr-nbw } s3 s h\text{wlt t } h\text{wlt hmnt nsw bity nb } t3 t3\]

\[\text{r } h\text{ nb m3t s3 r } i \text{ mn <n> htp h}k3 w3st di ”nh}\]

\[\text{nsw hm t wr <r> t ti y } ”\text{nh ti r n n t } s\]

\[\text{y w i z hm t wr n n t mwt s t w}\]

\[\text{i i } ”\text{hm t wr n n w <r> <n> n ht } h<\text>\]

\[\text{t } n } ”\text{t s hbl } s\text{ frsw y } ”\text{r k(3) w fr(3) w}\]

\[\text{y } ”\text{mnt h w n } h(3)\]

\[\text{r (y) n (3) ”mnt h w}\]

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166 Text and transcription read top-right to bottom-left.
167 ”nh = phonogram/logogram
" = phonetic complement
<n> = syllable marker
raised = ideographic determinative
lowered = phonetic determinative
[Normalization]

\[ Hr \text{ n\textbar} K^3\text{-nht } H^3\text{-m-m\textbar}t \]
\[ nbty \text{ Smn-hpw } sgr\text{-t\textbar}wy \]
\[ Hr\text{-}nbw \text{ c\text{-}hp\textbar}hwi-Sttyw } nsw\text{-}bity \text{ nb } t\text{\textbar}wy \]
\[ Nb\text{-}m\text{\textbar}t-R^3 \text{ s\text{-}R^c } Imn\text{-}htp \text{ h}^k\text{-}W^3\text{st } di \text{ 5\textbar}h \]
\[ hmt\text{-}nsw \text{ wrt } Tiy \text{ n\textbar}h.ti \text{ rn } n \text{ it=}s \]
\[ Ywi3 \text{ rn } n \text{ mwt=}s \text{ Tw=} \]
\[ i3 \text{ hmt } pw \text{ nt } nsw \text{ nht } \]
\[ t\text{\textbar}s=f } rsy \text{ r } Kr \]
\[ y \text{ mhty Nh=} \]
\[ rn \]

[Translation]

Living Horus mighty bull appearing in truth;
two-ladies establishing laws, pacifying the two lands
golden Horus great of strength, smiting the Asiatics, dual king, lord of the two lands,
lord of the justice of Ra, son of Ra, Amenhotep, ruler of Thebes, given life.
The great wife of the king Tiy, may she live. The name of her father is
Yuia, the name of her mother is Tju-ia. She is the wife of the mighty king
whose southern boundary is at Kara-y, whose northern is at Naha-rin.
## Appendix 2: Horapollonian Hieroglyphs and their Meanings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CH.</th>
<th>Glyphs</th>
<th>Meanings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>ήλιον καὶ σελήνην (the sun and the moon); δὲν ἔχειν τὴν οὐρὰν ὑπὸ τὸ λοιπὸν σῶμα κρυπτομένην (a serpent with its tail concealed by the rest of its body)</td>
<td>αἰῶνα (eternity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>ὅτεν τὴν ἔκαστον ἔδιοιτα σοῦν, ἐξετημένον φολίαν πασχάλας (a serpent devouring its own tail, marked with variegated scales)</td>
<td>κόσμον (the universe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>ἵλεον, τούτῃ γυναῖκα (Isis, that is a woman)</td>
<td>ἐνιαυτόν (the year); τὴν θείαν (the goddess [Isis])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>βάϊν (a branch); σελήνην ἐπεστράμμένη εἰς τὸ κάτω (the moon with its horns turned downward)</td>
<td>μῆνα (the month)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>τέταρτον ἀρούρας (the fourth part of an aroura)</td>
<td>τὸ ἐνιστάμενον ἔτος (the current year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>ἱέρακα (a hawk)</td>
<td>θεία (a god); θάφος (something sublime); τανταύθον (something lowly); ὑπεροχή (superiority); ἁλικά (blood); νίκη (victory); Ἄρα (Ares); Ἀφροδίτη (Aphrodite)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>ὁ ἱέραξ (the hawk)</td>
<td>ψυχή (the soul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>δύο ἱέρακας (two hawks [the male, the female])</td>
<td>Ἄρα καὶ Ἀφροδίτη (Ares and Aphrodite)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>δύο κορώνας (two crows)</td>
<td>γάμον (marriage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>κάνθαρον (a scarab)</td>
<td>μονογενές (the only begotten); γένεσιν (birth); πατέρα (a father); κόσμον (the world); ἄνδρα (man)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>γυναῖκα (a vulture)</td>
<td>μητέρα (a mother); βλέπει (sight); ἅρμα (boundaries); προγνώσεις (foreknowledge); ἐνιαυτόν (the year); αἰαῖν (the heavens); ἀθηνᾶ (Athene); Ἡραν (Hera); δραχμὰς δύο (two drachmas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Glyphs</td>
<td>Meanings</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.12</td>
<td>κάνθαρον καὶ γύπα (a beetle [scarab] and a vulture); γύπα καὶ κάνθαρον (a vulture and a beetle)</td>
<td>γῆρατον (Hephaistos); Ἀθηνᾶ (Athene)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.13</td>
<td>ἄστέρα (a star)</td>
<td>θεόν ἐγκόσμιον (the cosmic God); εἴσωμένην (fate); τῶν πέντε ἀριθμῶν (the number 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.14</td>
<td>κοινοκέφαλον (a baboon)</td>
<td>σελήνην (the moon); οἰκουμένην (the inhabited earth); γράμματα (letters); ιερέα (a priest); ὀργήν (anger); κόλυμβον (a diver)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.15</td>
<td>κοινοκέφαλον σχήματι τοιῷδε· ἑστῶτα καὶ τὰς χεῖρας εἰς οὐρανὸν (a baboon, but in this way: standing, with its hands raised to heaven and a crown on its head)</td>
<td>Θεὸν ἐγκόσμιον (the cosmic God); εἴσωμένην (fate); τῶν πέντε ἀριθμῶν (the number 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.16</td>
<td>κοινοκέφαλον καθήμενον ζῷον (the baboon, but seated)</td>
<td>ισημερίας δύο (the two equinoxes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.17</td>
<td>λέοντα (a lion)</td>
<td>θυμὸν (spiritedness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.18</td>
<td>λέοντα (a lion); τρεῖς ὑδρίας μεγάλας (three great water-jars); οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν ὕδωρ ἀναβλύζουσαν (water gushing forth over heaven and earth)</td>
<td>Νείλου ἀνάβασιν (the rising of the Nile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.19</td>
<td>λέοντα (a lion); τρεῖς ὑδρίας μεγάλας (three great water-jars); οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν ὕδωρ ἀναβλύζουσαν (water gushing forth over heaven and earth)</td>
<td>Νείλου ἀνάβασιν (the rising of the Nile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.20</td>
<td>λέοντα (a lion); τρεῖς ὑδρίας μεγάλας (three great water-jars); οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν ὕδωρ ἀναβλύζουσαν (water gushing forth over heaven and earth)</td>
<td>Νείλου ἀνάβασιν (the rising of the Nile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.21</td>
<td>λέοντα (a lion); τρεῖς ὑδρίας μεγάλας (three great water-jars); οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν ὕδωρ ἀναβλύζουσαν (water gushing forth over heaven and earth)</td>
<td>Νείλου ἀνάβασιν (the rising of the Nile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.22</td>
<td>βάτραχον (a frog)</td>
<td>ἐνύφημα (ancient descent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.23</td>
<td>βάτραχον (a frog)</td>
<td>ἐνύφημα (ancient descent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.24</td>
<td>λαγωὸν (a hare)</td>
<td>λαγωὸν (a hare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.25</td>
<td>λαγωὸν (a hare)</td>
<td>λαγωὸν (a hare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.26</td>
<td>γλῶσσαν καὶ ὑφαιμον ὀφθαλμόν (a tongue and a bloodshot eye)</td>
<td>τὸ λέγειν (speech)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.27</td>
<td>γλῶσσαν καὶ ὑφαιμον ὀφθαλμόν (a tongue and a bloodshot eye)</td>
<td>τὸ λέγειν (speech)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.28</td>
<td>ἄρθρον, ἄριθμον, ἀριθμόν (the number 1095, which is the number of a triennium)</td>
<td>ἄρθρον, ἄριθμον, ἀριθμόν (the number 1095, which is the number of a triennium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.29</td>
<td>ἄρθρον, ἄριθμον, ἀριθμόν (the number 1095, which is the number of a triennium)</td>
<td>ἄρθρον, ἄριθμον, ἀριθμόν (the number 1095, which is the number of a triennium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.30</td>
<td>παπύρου δέσμην (a bundle of papyri)</td>
<td>παπύρου δέσμην (a bundle of papyri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.31</td>
<td>παπύρου δέσμην (a bundle of papyri)</td>
<td>παπύρου δέσμην (a bundle of papyri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.32</td>
<td>παπύρου δέσμην (a bundle of papyri)</td>
<td>παπύρου δέσμην (a bundle of papyri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.33</td>
<td>παπύρου δέσμην (a bundle of papyri)</td>
<td>παπύρου δέσμην (a bundle of papyri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.34</td>
<td>φοίνικα τὸ ὄρνεον (the phœnix)</td>
<td>ψυχήν ἐνταῦθα πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβουσαν (the soul delaying here a long time); πλῆμμαρ (a flood)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.35</td>
<td>φοίνικα τὸ ὄρνεον (the phœnix)</td>
<td>ψυχήν ἐνταῦθα πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβουσαν (the soul delaying here a long time); πλῆμμαρ (a flood)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cl.</td>
<td>Glyphs</td>
<td>Meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>ἴβιν (an ibis)</td>
<td>καρδίαν (the heart)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>σφαίραν ἄδισον βάλλοντα (the heavens dropping dew)</td>
<td>σωσείαν (education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>μέλαν καὶ κόσκινον καὶ σχοινίον (ink, and a sieve and a reed)</td>
<td>αἰγύπτια γράμματα (Egyptian letters); ιερογραμματέα (a scribe); πέρας (a limit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>κύνα (a dog)</td>
<td>εἰχαταν ἢ καὶ μόσος (the lawless or abominable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>τῷ κυνὶ καὶ βασιλικὴν στολὴν παρακειμένην (the royal stole beside the dog, who is naked)</td>
<td>αρχὴν ἢ δικαστὴν (a magistrate or judge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>φύλακα σκότας (a house-guard)</td>
<td>πυρὸς καὶ ὕδωρ (fire and water)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>ἄνθρωπον τὰς ὥρας ἐσθίοντα (a man eating the hours)</td>
<td>ἄρχημα (gratitude)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>τράγον (a goat)</td>
<td>ἀνοῖγμα (a mouth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>σφόνα (an ant)</td>
<td>ἀφανισμόν (disappearance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>μεγαλόπεκα (a vulpanser [Chenopolex])</td>
<td>μυῖαν (a mouse)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>τὸν ὄφιν κοσμοειδῶς ἐσχηματισμένον, οὗ τὴν οὐρὰν ἐν τῷ στόματι ποιοῦσι, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα τοῦ βασιλέως ἐν μέσῳ τῷ ἔλλυματι (a serpent represented as the cosmos, with its tail in its mouth and the name of the king written in the middle of the coils)</td>
<td>βασιλέα φύλακα (the king as guardian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH.</td>
<td>Glyphs</td>
<td>Meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.61</td>
<td>αὐτὸν ὄφιν ἐν μέσῳ δὲ αὐτοῦ οἶκον μέγαν (a serpent and in the middle a great palace)</td>
<td>κοσμοκράτορα (a cosmic ruler)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.62</td>
<td>μέλισσαν (a bee)</td>
<td>κοσμοκράτορα (the people obedient to the king)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.63</td>
<td>ημετερον ὄφιν (a serpent cut in half)</td>
<td>βασιλέα μέρους κόσμου κρατοῦντα (the king ruling part of the cosmos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.64</td>
<td>τὸν ἀλκαλδεύον ὄφιν (a complete serpent)</td>
<td>ζαντοκράτορα (the almighty (pantocrator))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.65</td>
<td>διὸ πόδας ἀνθρώπου ἐν ὑδάτι (two human feet in water)</td>
<td>γναφέα (a fuller)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.66</td>
<td>σελήνης σχῆμα (the figure of a moon)</td>
<td>μῆνα (a month)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.67</td>
<td>κροκόδειλον (a crocodile)</td>
<td>ιστία (a plunderer); κολπάξιον (a fecund man); μανίδομον (a madman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.68</td>
<td>δύο ὀφθαλμοὺς κροκοδείλου (two crocodile's eyes)</td>
<td>ἀνατολὴν (the rising [sun])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.69</td>
<td>κροκόδειλον κεκυφότα (a crocodile hunched up)</td>
<td>δύσιν (a sunset)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.70</td>
<td>κροκοδείλου οὐρὰν (the tail of a crocodile)</td>
<td>σκότος (shadows)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.1</td>
<td>ἀστέρα (a star)</td>
<td>ἀστέρα (a god); δείλην (twilight); νύκτα (night); χρόνον (time); ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου (a man's soul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.2</td>
<td>ἀετοῦ νεοσσόν (an eagle's chick)</td>
<td>&lt;πόλυγον&gt; (a fecund man); μαίνομεν (a madman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.3</td>
<td>δύο πόδας συνηγμένους καὶ βεβηκότας (two feet together and standing)</td>
<td>δρόμον ἡ λίου τὸν ἐν ταῖς χειμερίαις τροπαῖς (the course of the sun at the winter solstice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.4</td>
<td>ἄνθρωπου καρδίαν φάρυγγος ἠρτημένην (a man's heart hanging from his gullet)</td>
<td>ἄγαθοῦ ἀνθρώπου στόμα (the mouth of a good man)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.5</td>
<td>χεῖρες ἡ μὲν ὅπλον κρατοῦσα, ἡ δὲ τόξον (a man's hands, one of them holding a shield and the other a bow)</td>
<td>πολέμου στόμα (the jaws of battle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.6</td>
<td>δάκτυλον (a finger)</td>
<td>Άνθρωπου στόμαχον (a man's stomach)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.7</td>
<td>αἰδοῖον χειρὶ κρατούμενον (a penis pressed by a hand)</td>
<td>σωφροσύνην ἀνθρώπου (temperance in a man)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.8</td>
<td>Ἄνθη ἀνεμώνης (an anemone flower)</td>
<td>νόσον (human disease)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.9</td>
<td>τὸ νωτιαῖον ὀστοῦν (a spine)</td>
<td>σώφρον (the brain); στάσιν (masculinity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.10</td>
<td>ὄρυγος ὀστοῦν (a quail's bone)</td>
<td>διαμονὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν (the permanent and steadfast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.11</td>
<td>ἄνθρωποι δύο δεξιούμενοι (two men in an attitude of greeting)</td>
<td>διαμονὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν (the permanent and steadfast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.12</td>
<td>ἄνθρωπος καθωπλισμένος καὶ τοξεύων (a man in armour shooting an arrow)</td>
<td>διαμονὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν (the permanent and steadfast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.13</td>
<td>ἄνθρωπος δάκτυλος (a man's finger)</td>
<td>διαμονὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν (the permanent and steadfast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.14</td>
<td>Ἑλίῳ κατὰ φύσιν συν ἀντία μετὰ ἄλοιπον ὄνομα τετειμένου (a solar disk with stars, and the disk is cut in two)</td>
<td>&lt;δίκες&gt; (the anatolydian ιέρας ἐπί μετείραυν θέους ἄνδρους (a hawk rising towards the gods); ιέρας διατεταμένας τὰς πτέρυγας ἐν ἀέρι ὀν τετειμένας ξένου (a hawk with its wings expanded in the air)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.15</td>
<td>&lt;δὲ&gt; τὴν ἀνατολὴν ἱερὰ ἐπί μετείραυν θέους ἄνδρους (a hawk rising towards the gods); ιερὰς διατεταμένας τὰς πτέρυγας ἐν ἀέρι ὀν τετειμένας ξένου (a hawk with its wings expanded in the air)</td>
<td>διαμονὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν (the permanent and steadfast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.16</td>
<td>καπνὸς εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀναβαίνων (smoke mounting towards heaven)</td>
<td>πῦρ (fire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.17</td>
<td>βοῶς ἄρρενος κέρας (a bull's horn)</td>
<td>&lt;ἐργα&gt; (work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLYPHS</td>
<td>MEANINGS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>--------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| II.18  | βοὸς θηλείας κέρας  
(a cow's horns) | ποινήν  
(punishment) |
| II.19  | προσομή σῶν μαχαίρα  
(the bust with a sword) | ἀνοούσητα  
(impotence) |
| II.20  | ὀραν  
(an ear) | ἄφωνον  
(arean) |
| II.21  | Σαλβος κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν βλαστάνει τὰ κέρατα  
(a stag's horns) | πολλήχωνα  
(a long space of time) |
| II.22  | λίκως ἀπεστραμμένος  
(a wolf turning back);  
κύων ἀπεστραμμένος  
(a dog [turning back]) | ἀποφεύγειν  
(escape) |
| II.23  | άκοι  
(an ear) | μέλλον ἔργον  
(future work) |
| II.24  | σφῆς ἀετοπτῆς  
(a hawk in flight);  
αἷμα κροκόδειλον βλαπτικὸν  
(a poisonous blood of a crocodile) | βλαπτικόν  
(murderer) |
| II.25  | νυκτικόραξ  
(the night-owl) | ἀφύνεις θάνατον  
(a sudden death) |
| II.26  | παγίς καὶ φιλλα  
(word and leaves);  
πτερὸν ἀέρα  
(winged air);  
πτερὸν ἀέρα  
(winged air) | παλαιότητα  
(a very old) |
| II.27  | λέον καὶ αἰετα  
(a stag's horns) | παλαιόπινα  
(a signature) |
| II.28  | γράμματα ἑπτά, ἐν δύο δακτύλοις περιεχόμενα  
(seven letters surrounded by two fingers) | ἀτετοῦ  
(infinite);  
μοῖσαν  
(a muse);  
μοῖσαν  
(fate) |
| II.29  | γράμματα ἑπτά, ἐν δύο δακτύλοις περιεχόμενα  
(seven letters surrounded by two fingers) | ἀτετοῦ  
(infinite);  
μοῖσαν  
(a muse);  
μοῖσαν  
(fate) |
| II.30  | γραμμή ὀρθή μία ἀριστερὰ  
(a line superimposed on another) | τῶν ἑφεδρῶν γυναῖκα  
(a woman who has borne male infants) |
| II.31  | χελώνα  
(a turtle) | ἀναγεννήσης κτῆσιν γονικὴν  
(a widow remaining faithful to death) |
| II.32  | γεννήσασαν περιστέραν  
(a signed book) | ἀναζωοῦσα  
(a swan);  
αἰχμαλώτους  
(a winged air);  
ὐάν  
(a son) |
| II.33  | ἐγκεῖναι  
(a weasel) | ἀνδρῶν ἀθετεῖν καὶ μὴ δυνηθέντα ἐαυτῷ ἐμφανίσειν, διὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπικεκαμμένα  
(a man who is weak and unable to take care of himself, but is dependent on others) |
| II.34  | ἐριγισκόν τόσον  
(escapement) | ἀναγεννήσης κτῆσιν γονικὴν  
(a widow remaining faithful to death) |
| II.35  | κοροδήλου καὶ κροκόδειλον  
(a scorpion and a crocodile) | ἀνθρώπου ἡλιακῆς ἀκτίνος πυρέξαντα  
(a man dead from a sunstroke) |
| II.36  | γελίδη  
(a marten) | ἀνθρώπου ἡλιακῆς ἀκτίνος πυρέξαντα  
(a man dead from a sunstroke) |
| II.37  | τεντονεὺς  
(a pig) | ἀνθρώπου ἡλιακῆς ἀκτίνος πυρέξαντα  
(a man dead from a sunstroke) |
| II.38  | μεῖνα γραφέων εξοπλήσσοντας τοὺς ᾗς ἀνδρους  
(a man at war with another) | θυμὸν ἄμετρον, ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτου πυρέττειν τὸν θυμούμενον  
(unmeasurable anger, as if the spirits were in a fever from it) |
| II.39  | γαληνὸς  
(a swan) | γυναῖκα  
(a woman who has acted like a man) |
| II.40  | χαρώνους πολυχρόνια  
(a lute),  
μοῖσαν  
(a muse);  
μοῖσαν  
(fate) |
| II.41  | γαληνὸς  
(a lute) | γυναῖκα  
(a woman who has acted like a man) |
| II.42  | ηἰμίνων  
(a male) | γυναῖκα  
(a woman who has acted like a man) |
| II.43  | ταινίῳ ἐν τῇ ἄραμα τῇ νείπτειν,  
(a bull facing the left);  
ταινίῳ ἐν τῇ ἄραμα τῇ νείπτειν  
(a bull facing the right) | γυναῖκα  
(a woman who has borne male infants);  
γυναῖκα  
(a woman who has borne male infants) |
| II.44  | νεκρὸν ἔπεμπ  
(a dead horse) | σφῆκας  
(wasps) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CH.</th>
<th>Glyphs</th>
<th>Meanings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II.45</td>
<td>ῖπον πατοῦσαν λύκον</td>
<td>a woman has aborted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.46</td>
<td>φῶναν κρατοῦσαν φύλλον δάρνης</td>
<td>a pigeon holding a laurel-leaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.47</td>
<td>σκιώρας</td>
<td>a goat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.48</td>
<td>παρετεμετῶν ἴσχυναν τὰ ὀπίσθα ὀρθά</td>
<td>a man who has been cured by the answer of an oracle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.49</td>
<td>αἰτέων λύκον βακταίωντα</td>
<td>a wolf who lives safely in a city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.50</td>
<td>αἰτέα καὶ τέταν (a sparrow and a dog)</td>
<td>a weak man pursued by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.51</td>
<td>στρεφοῦν καὶ γλαῦκα</td>
<td>a man fleeing to his patron and not being aided by him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.52</td>
<td>νυκτερίδα (a bat)</td>
<td>a bat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.53</td>
<td>νυκτερίδα πάλιν ἴσχυναν δύο καὶ μαστοὺς</td>
<td>a woman giving suck and nursing her children well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.54</td>
<td>τρευνή (a turtle-dove)</td>
<td>a woman who hates her husband and plots his death, and mates with him only through flattery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.55</td>
<td>τεττή (a cicada)</td>
<td>a man prevented from committing suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.56</td>
<td>αἰτέων (an eagle)</td>
<td>a king living in retirement and giving no pity to those in fault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.57</td>
<td>φῶνα κὸν ὄρνους (the phoenix)</td>
<td>a long-enduring restoration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.58</td>
<td>παλαριά (a stork)</td>
<td>a sparrow and a dog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.59</td>
<td>ἤν (a viper)</td>
<td>a man in fever cured by himself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.60</td>
<td>ἤν (a viper)</td>
<td>a man who lives by playing the flute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.61</td>
<td>βασιλέα (a basilisk)</td>
<td>a man who lives by playing the flute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.62</td>
<td>σελαμάδορ (a salamander)</td>
<td>a man who is worsted by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.63</td>
<td>αἰπαίλοκα (a mole)</td>
<td>a man who stays indecisive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.64</td>
<td>μῆμα καὶ πετερ νυκτερίδος (an ant and bat's wings)</td>
<td>a man who is worsted by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.65</td>
<td>κατάουρα (a beaver)</td>
<td>a man who is worsted by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.66</td>
<td>πῖθηνον ἵστατα ὑπὸ ἔπενθεν μικρὸν πῖθηνον (a monkey with a little monkey behind him)</td>
<td>a man who is worsted by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.67</td>
<td>πῖθηνον σιανθέντα (a monkey urinating)</td>
<td>a man who is worsted by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.68</td>
<td>αἰγά (a goat)</td>
<td>a man who is worsted by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.69</td>
<td>ὄμαν (a hyena)</td>
<td>a man who is worsted by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.70</td>
<td>δοῦ δεματων, ὄν τὸ μὲν ὀπίσθ' ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο παράδεισα (two skins, one of which is a hyena-skin, the other a leopard-skin)</td>
<td>a man who is worsted by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.71</td>
<td>ὄμαν εἰπε τὰ δεξιά στραφεὶν (a hyena facing the right)</td>
<td>a man who is worsted by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.72</td>
<td>δήμα οἰνίνς (a hyena-skin)</td>
<td>a man who is worsted by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.73</td>
<td>λύκον ἀπελευσαντα τὸ ὄρνων τῆς σιαρά (a wolf who has lost the tip of his tail)</td>
<td>a man who is worsted by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.74</td>
<td>λύκον καὶ λύκον (a wolf and a stone)</td>
<td>a wolf who is worsted by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.75</td>
<td>λέωνας καὶ δεξα (lions and torches)</td>
<td>a man who is worsted by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.76</td>
<td>λέοντα πιθηκον τρώγοντα (a lion devouring a monkey)</td>
<td>a man who is worsted by another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GYLPHS</td>
<td>MEANINGS</td>
<td></td>
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<td>--------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.77</td>
<td>a bull girl with wild firs</td>
<td>a man made temperate by recent misfortunes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.78</td>
<td>a bull with his right knee bound</td>
<td>a man who kills sheep and goats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.79</td>
<td>a spiny lobster and an octopus</td>
<td>a strong man sensitive to what is expedient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.80</td>
<td>a crocodile with an ibis feather on his head</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.81</td>
<td>a spiny lobster and a shameless man</td>
<td>a spiny lobster and an octopus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.82</td>
<td>a crocodile</td>
<td>a strong man sensitive to what is expedient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.83</td>
<td>a pregnant she-bear</td>
<td>a woman who has conceived once</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.84</td>
<td>a camel</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.85</td>
<td>a camel and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.86</td>
<td>an elephant with a pig</td>
<td>a woman who has prepared his own tomb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.87</td>
<td>a deer and a viper</td>
<td>a man who has dwelt in evil and concealed his own evil, so that it is not known to his intimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.88</td>
<td>an elephant burying his tusks</td>
<td>a man who has prepared his own tomb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.89</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.90</td>
<td>a leopard</td>
<td>a man who has prepared his own tomb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.91</td>
<td>a man with wild figs</td>
<td>a man who has dwelt in evil and concealed his own evil, so that it is not known to his intimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.92</td>
<td>a crocodile and an octopus</td>
<td>a man who has dwelt in evil and concealed his own evil, so that it is not known to his intimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.93</td>
<td>an elephant and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.94</td>
<td>a man with wild figs</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.95</td>
<td>a spiny lobster and an octopus</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.96</td>
<td>an elephant and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.97</td>
<td>an elephant and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.98</td>
<td>an elephant and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.99</td>
<td>an elephant and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.100</td>
<td>an elephant and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.101</td>
<td>an elephant and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.102</td>
<td>an elephant and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.103</td>
<td>an elephant and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.104</td>
<td>an elephant and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.105</td>
<td>an elephant and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.106</td>
<td>an elephant and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.107</td>
<td>an elephant and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.108</td>
<td>an elephant and a ram</td>
<td>a king fleeing from folly and intemperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH.</td>
<td>Glyphs</td>
<td>Meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.109</td>
<td>σκάρον</td>
<td>(a scarus [fish])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.110</td>
<td>ἕκλαυν γελεύν</td>
<td>(a glutton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.111</td>
<td>σμύραν ἱέθνη</td>
<td>(a lamprey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.112</td>
<td>τραγώνα περιπεπληγμένη ἄγκίστρῳ</td>
<td>(a roach caught in a hook)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.113</td>
<td>παλύσαδα</td>
<td>(an octopus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.114</td>
<td>σπηίαν</td>
<td>(a squid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.115</td>
<td>στρειδθέν πυργίτην</td>
<td>(a sparrow on fire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.116</td>
<td>λόραν</td>
<td>(a lyre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.117</td>
<td>σύραγγα</td>
<td>(the pipes of Pan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.118</td>
<td>στρειθθαμβηθέν πτερόν</td>
<td>(an ostrich-wing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.119</td>
<td>χεῖρα αὐθωναυού</td>
<td>(a man's hand)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Thematic Grouping of Horapollonian Hieroglyphs.

The text exhibits thematic groupings of the glyph-sequences it presents. The glyphs themselves fall into one or more of several broad categories (as derived from Gardiner's sign-list) as follows:

**Mammals (46 signs)**
I.14,15,16,17,21,26,39,40,46,48,49,50,56
II.20,22(x2),33,37,38,42,43(x2),44,45,50,52,53,63,65,66,67,68,69,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,82,83,87,88,90,100

**Parts of Mammals (18 signs)**
I.15,18,19,20,23,46,47
II.17,18,21,53,64,70,72,73,78,84,88

**Birds (38 signs)**
I.6,7,8,9,11,12,34,35,36,51,54,55,57
II.2,15,25,31,32,36,39,40,48,49,50,51,54,56,57,89,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,115

**Parts of Birds (5 signs)**
II.10,48,81,96,118

**Fishes and Parts of Fishes (15 signs)**
I.44

**Amphibious Animals, Reptiles, &c. (16 signs)**
I.1,2,25,45,59,60,61,63,64
II.59,60,61,62,87,101,102

**Invertebrata and Lesser Animals (12 signs)**
I.10,12,12,51,52,62
II.24,35,41,47,55,64

**Parts of the Human Body (13 signs)**
I.22,24,31,65
II.3,4,5,7,9,13,19,29,119

**Man and his occupations (12 signs)**
I.23,41,42,58
II.4,5,11,12(x2),13,91,119

**Woman and female deity (1 sign)**
I.3

**Trees and Plants (6 signs)**
I.1
II.8,34,46,77,93

**Sky, Earth, Water (14 signs)**
I.1,5,13,21,29,37,43,58,65,66
II.1,14,16,115

**Writing, Music, Strokes, Geometrical Figures, &c. (12 signs)**
The distribution of meanings across the signs listed above is, in one sense, more difficult to classify. This is due not only to the homogeneity of the explanations provided (especially in Book Two), but presumably also to the fact that the meanings of glyphs are precisely not constrained by the finite range of items they depict. Nonetheless, the two-hundred and forty meanings given can be broadly grouped as follows:

**People, their professions and qualities**

I.10(x3),11,14,23,25,38,39(x4),40,41,42,53,59,60,62,63,65,67(x3)  
II.12,14,32,33,35,36,37,39,40,41,42,43(x2),45,46,48,49,50,51,52,53,54(x2) ,55,56,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,93,94,96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119  

**Qualities, parts, and occupations**

I.6(x4),7,9,10,11(x4),14(x2),17,18,19,20,24,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34(x2),35,36,38(x2),39(x3),43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,54(x3),55,56,57,58(x2)  
II.1,2(x2),3,4,5,6,7,8,9(x2),10,11,17,18,19,22,23,24,25,26,28,29(x3),30,31,34,38,44,47,58,92,95  

**Deities**

I.3,6(x3),8,11(x2),12(x2),13,61,64  
II.1  

**Celestial or natural phenomena**

I.2,10,11,13,14(x2),15(x2),16,21,22,68,69,70  
II.15,16  

**Measurement and the parts of language**

I.1,3,4,5,11(x2),13,14,37,38,66  
II.1(x3),2,13,20,21,27,57  

The following forty-three glyphs (something less than a quarter) are more or less correctly identified as Egyptian signs:

I.1 ὃ φιν ἔχον τὴν οὐρὰν ὑπὸ τὸ λοιπὸν σῶμα κρυπτομένην (a serpent with its tail concealed by the rest of its body)  
I.1 ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην (the sun and the moon)  
I.2 ὃ φιν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐσθίοντα υπὲρ, ἐστιγμένον φολίσι ποικίλαις (a serpent devouring its own tail, marked with variegated scales)  
I.3 Ἰσιν, τουτέστι γυναῖκα (Isis, that is a woman)  
I.4 βάϊν (a branch)  
I.4 σελήνην ἐπεστραμμένην εἰς τὸ κάτω (moon with its horns turned downward)  
I.5 τέταρτον ἀρούρας (fourth part of aroura)  

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Specifically, phonological information on Egyptian in the text is more limited again.\textsuperscript{348}

\textsuperscript{348} See Appendix 3 below.
Appendix 4: The Coptic Content of the Hieroglyphica.

1. ἀμβρής (I, 38): <ἀμβρίζειν> θεραπεύειν ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, n.b. ἄμμορής.

2. βαί (I, 7): ΒΑΙ ὃσον, ΠΕΘ ΒΑΙ, lord of spirit(s), DM 28 1, gloss. βαί = ψυχή, acc. to Horapollo I vii. Cf? above, ΒΑΙ owl as soul, also in gnostic name ΒΑΙ ΠΧΩΟΧ, spirit of darkness (Erman Aegypt. Relig. 250) & in βαίνεφωθ Glos 405 (v εφωτ), cf. AZ 62 35.

3. βαιθ (I, 7): see notes to items 2. & 5.

4. βαίς (I, 3, 4): ba (bae, bai, bei, beii, boi) nn m, once f = βαίον, branch of date-palm.

5. ἑθ (I, 7): έθ (έτ), έθν (έτε, έθο, ήτ, εθν); pl έτε (έτ); -HT in compounds; nn m, heart, mind: καρδία; νοῦς; διάνοια; ψυχή.

6. κουκοῦρας (I, 55): κακούπατ (κακουπατ, κουκουφ), κουκουφ, nn m f, hoopoe.

7. μεισί (I, 59): μείς, μηνός, ὁ, nom. sg.

8. Νοῦν (I, 21): ΝΟΥΝ nn m, abyss of hell, depth of earth, sea, f νοῦν; Ναῦν; ἄβυσσος; βάθος; βοθός.

9. οὐαίε (I, 29): οὔτε (-Ν, οὔτε, -ι, -ι(-Η), οὖθ(Η)τ, -ΝΟΥ) vb intr be distant, far-reaching: μακρόνειν;

10. οὐράιον (I, 1): ρρο (ρρο, ρρο, οὔτο, ρρα, ερρα, ερα, ρρο, ερο, οὔτο), pl ρρου (ερρου, ερου, ρρου, ρρα(ε), οὔτου) nn m f king, queen: βασιλεύς; βασιλέως; βασιλέα; βασίλευς; βασίλεα; βασίλεος.


12. σβῶ (I, 38): σβω (σβω), pl σβούτε (-σβούτε, σβάτε, σβούτε, σβούτι, σβούτι, σβάτι) nn f doctrine, teaching: διδασκαλία; διδακτία; νοεία; επιστήμη.

13. Σῶθις (I, 3): Numenius Phil., Fragmenta, Fragment 31, line 41; Porphyrius Phil., De antro nympharum, Section 24, line 3; Hephaestion Astral., Apotelesmatica, Page 66, line 7, Page 142, line 19, Page 179, line 23.

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350 Novum Testamentum, Epistula Pauli ad Timotheum ii, 3.8.2.
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