Remembrance of Things Past? Albert Schweitzer, the Anxiety of Influence, and the Untidy Jesus of Markan Memory.

THATE, MICHAEL, JAMES

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REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST?
ALBERT SCHWEITZER, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE,
AND THE UNTIDY JESUS OF MARKAN MEMORY

by

Michael J. Thate

THESIS

Submitted to the faculty and committee members
  First Supervisor: Prof. Francis Watson
  Second Supervisor(s): Dr William R. Telford and Dr Lutz Doering
  Internal Examiner: Prof. Gerard Loughlin
  External Examiner: Dr A. K. M. Adam
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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to consider the formation and reception of the historical Jesus genre through a detailed analysis of its “strong poet,” Albert Schweitzer. Though the classification of this thesis is most likely to be designated as Leben Jesu Forschung and the rise of early Christianity, it encompasses several adjacent fields of research: viz., social and literary theories, philosophies of history, biblical studies, critical memory theory, and classical history. Leben Jesu Forschung is therefore a kind of case study for the construction and reception of ideas. Part One suggests, after a sustained engagement with Schweitzer and his constructive project, that his pervading influence is most strongly felt in the underlying assumptions of his method of konsequente Eschatologie. Schweitzer’s concept of konsequente Eschatologie is the singular criterion by which all the material is judged and filtered so as to construct a singular profile of the historical Jesus. It is this desire for a “tidy” Jesus which this thesis attempts to problematize. Part Two attempts a constructive counter proposal by appropriating theories of memory to historical Jesus research and concludes by demonstrating the appropriation of this theory within the Gospel of Mark. I understand the Markan author as evoking Jesus memories and setting them within a narrative framework for the purposes of identity construction and communal direction. As such, we are presented with an “untidy” Jesus of Markan memory.
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DECLARATION

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PART ONE

QUESTIONING THE INFLUENCE(S) OF ALBERT SCHWEITZER
CULTIVATING A CRITICAL, APPRECIATIVE DISTANCE

“The Greatest Man in the World—
that is what some people call Albert Schweitzer, jungle philosopher.”
Life magazine, 6 October 1947

“You are one of the few who combine extraordinary energy and many-sidedness
with the desire to serve man and to lighten his lot. If there were more persons such
as you are, we would never have slid into so dangerous an international situation as
now prevails.”
Albert Einstein letter to Schweitzer
25 September 1938

0.1. A Man of Influence
On the cover of Life magazine’s 6 October 1947 issue stood a picture of a young
Franklin D. Roosevelt aged thirteen. Two years after the death of the four-term
President the fifteen-cent issue ran a cover story on his boyhood letters. Yet tucked
away in the Religion Section, page ninety-five ran with the heading, “The Greatest
Man in the World.” The titular, however, was not in reference to the man who,
though crippled by polio,2 guided America through economic and wartime crises
and from his wheelchair lifted the country from her knees.3 It was in reference to
Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965), the “many-sided” doctor who left fame and fortune
for the jungles of French Equatorial Africa (modern day Gaban) to build his hospital
in Lambaréré. Two years later, TIME magazine would feature the jungle doctor on
its cover of the 11 July 1949 issue, calling him “one of the most extraordinary men of
modern times.” A man who left “a life of achievement behind him which few

2 Though cf. Armond S. Goldman, et. al., "What Was the Cause of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
contemporary men can equal.” In 1953 der gute Doktor was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and in a fitting gesture, he gave the prize money to support the work in Lambaréné and the construction of the new leper colony.4

Schweitzer’s œuvre and influence are as vast as they are profound. Le Grand Docteur was one of the true Renaissance men of the twentieth century:5 musician, physician, philosopher, historian, homme de lettres, and philanthropist.6 And in many of these fields his towering influence persists,7 perhaps none stronger felt than his work as a Neutestamentler in general and on the historical Jesus in particular.8 The 1906 publication of Von Reimarus zu Wrede: Eine Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung along with its subsequent English translation in 1910 is perhaps the most influential work of biblical scholarship in the English language produced in the twentieth century.9 A second German edition was to appear in 1913, covering developments since Wrede and contained significant changes and omissions.10 Wrede no longer marked the end of Schweitzer’s narrative, so the volume was re-titled, Geschichte

4 Not everyone is as favorable to Schweitzer as the above reports. Some accused him of “white-hat imperialism” and suggested Africa would be better without him. See Manuel M. Davenport, “The Moral Paternalism of Albert Schweitzer,” Ethics 84 (1973-74) 116-27.
der Leben-Jesu-Forschung. Yet it was the English translation of the first edition, appearing in 1910 and itself a literary event, which "rapidly acquired a momentum of its own," and captured the imaginations of the English-speaking world with the romantic evocation of Arthurian legends and the Quest of the Holy Grail: The Quest of the Historical Jesus. Though some German influence was felt, the enduring footprint of Schweitzer's enigmatic Jesus, that herald of konsequente Eschatologie,


14. The English translator William Montgomery's inspiration for the title may have sprung from Schweitzer's phrasing of the aim of his Geschichte in his concluding chapter, "Der Ertrag der Leben-Jesu-Forschung," Geschichte1 pp. 396-401; "Schlußbetrachtung," Geschichte2 pp. 631-42. The phrase in question is: "Sie zog aus, um den historischen Jesu zu finden..." Geschichte1 pp. 397 / Geschichte2 p. 631. "Finden," of course, is an irregular transitive verb that means "to find." The English translation, however, is most certainly influenced by various traditions of Queste del Saint Graal stemming from the thirteenth century. On this point, see Watson, "Eschatology and the Twentieth Century;" p. 332.

has been most profoundly imprinted through the first edition, and amongst the Anglophone. This is largely owing to the eighty-seven year span it took for the second edition to be translated into English, a delay Schweitzer himself lamented no doubt owing in part to the considerable obstacles he overcame in its production.

Two of Schweitzer’s biographers contend that it “remains clear that today significant scholarship must reckon with Schweitzer’s position before presenting its

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16 There is, of course, substantial debate about which edition from which to cite in terms of Schweitzer’s constructive agenda. On which, see Carleton Paget, “Schweitzer’s second edition,” and Holladay, “Schweitzer.” Some maintain that the second edition was a completely different book; so, Henning Pleitner, *Das Ende der liberalen Hermeneutik am Beispiel Albert Schweitzers* (TANZ vol. 5; Tübingen: Francke, 1992), particularly, on the importance of the non-existence debate (218 and 217 n. 84). Dennis Nineham, *Explorations in Theology* I (London: SCM Press, 1977) 112. Holladay advances a bit more nuance in suggesting that the second edition is not a new entity entirely; rather, it “is a significantly altered book that reflects a genuine advance in certain aspects of Schweitzer’s construal of Jesus and how Jesus relates to modern culture” (p. 5). Holladay further argues that the edits “strengthen the overall argument” and supersedes the first edition (p. 6). See, too, Carleton Paget, “Schweitzer’s second edition,” p. 7. Though entirely sympathetic and impressed with Holladay’s and Padget’s arguments, because the German edition was not translated into English until the turn of the millennium, and because this section is interested in the influence of Schweitzer, the first edition will be used as the *editio typica*, with only secondary recourse to the 1913 edition. Any discrepancies between the two editions when relevant will be highlighted.

17 There is something of an irony here as “Schweitzer’s text is very much a German narrative: it can only be described as comprehensive insofar as it covers the history of German research on the topic.” Simon J. Gathercole, “The Critical and Dogmatic Agenda of Albert Schweitzer’s *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*,” *Tyndale Bulletin* 51.2 (2000) 261-83; 264. Similar criticisms have been pointed out by John W. Bowman, “The Quest of the Historical Jesus,” *Interpretation* 3 (1949) 188-89; and D. L. Pauls, *The Victorian Lives of Jesus* (Trinity University Monograph Series in Religion vol. VII; San Antonio: Trinity University, 1982) 9-10.


19 See Carleton Paget, “Schweitzer’s second edition,” p. 7 n. 20. This of course is some proof in the favor of the superiority of the second edition. It appears from his correspondence with his wife that as early as 1910 he was considering updating the first edition. Moreover, his so-called “Schlussvorlesung” (29 July 1908) began to demonstrate different emphases than the ending of the first edition. It was not until early 1912, however, that the decision was made to go ahead with a new edition. For the “Schlussvorlesung,” see Erich Grässer and Johann Zürcher, ed., *Albert Schweitzer: Strassburger Vorlesungen* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1998) 543-691; cf. Carleton Paget, “Schweitzer’s second edition,” p. 9.

20 Besides the completion of his psychiatric study of Jesus, considerable medical challenges, angina attacks amongst them, pressed upon the already taxed Schweitzer. For the psychiatric study, see Albert Schweitzer, *Die psychiatrische Beurteilung Jesu. Darstellung und Kritik* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1913); on the challenges surrounding the publication of the second edition, see Carleton Paget, "Schweitzer’s second edition," p. 11.
own.”

Professor Amos Wilder, writing in 1962 as Departmental Head of New Testament Literature at Harvard Divinity School, said as much, suggesting that Schweitzer’s thought created “a new epoch in our understanding of Christian origins.” And though time and texts have accumulated since Schweitzer’s penning of his ideas, “no informed scholarship since has been able to undercut the major contribution here, namely, that Jesus, an alien to our modern ideas and rooted in his own time and place, saw history and the world in terms of the late Jewish apocalyptic eschatology of his background, though he gave this outlook his own creative interpretation.”

More than this, however, Schweitzer gave shape and set the “inventory” of research to the so-called Quest for the historical Jesus; that is, the attempt to discover a singular profile for the historical figure referred to but hidden within the theologically-conceived Gospels. And though he is often raised in literature reviews only to be done away with, Schweitzer continues to dominate the grammar of inquiry. “Not only has Schweitzer determined the way in which the scholarship of

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the nineteenth century [has been] interpreted; he also presides over the twentieth century, as choices he poses takes shape” in contemporary outworkings of his setting of the problem of the life of Jesus.\(^{25}\)

As Max Weber wrote, “ideas become effective forces in history.”\(^{26}\) And the Jesus of Schweitzer’s construction has become a significant idea which has proved a productive force in many contemporary reconstructions.\(^{27}\) N. T. Wright has argued that Schweitzer saw “more clearly than anyone” in the twentieth century, “the fundamental shape of the New Testament jigsaw, and the nature of the problems trying to put it together.”\(^{28}\) This “fundamental shape” was that of an eschatological prophet who expected an imminent end and has been rehearsed by the likes of E. P. Sanders,\(^{29}\) Craig S. Keener,\(^{30}\) John P. Meier,\(^{31}\) Bruce Chilton,\(^{32}\) James Charlesworth.\(^{33}\)

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1993) 80-139; Erich Gräßer, Studien zu Albert Schweitzer: Gesammelte Aufsätze (Beiträge zur Albert-Schweitzer-Forschung vol. 6; ed. Andreas Mühling; Bodenheim: Philo Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997).

Here again I wish to thank Prof. Holladay for a pre-publication copy of his article and granting me permission to cite the references discovered in his work (p. 1 n. 2).


28 See N. T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (Christian Origins and the Question of God; vol. 2; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996) 5. For his constructive proposal of Jesus which is heavily informed by Schweitzer, see pp. 145–654.


James D. G. Dunn, David Flusser, Paula Fredriksen, Dale Allison, and many others. Part of my aim therefore considers the effective force of Schweitzer’s overall project and his central and complex idea of *konsequente Eschatologie* with respect to the problem of historical Jesus studies. Latent within subsequent scholarship’s approval, reworking, or dismissal of Schweitzer’s proposal is the nearly ubiquitous continuation of the assumption undergirding Schweitzer’s method; that is, the determining of a singular hermeneutical key through which to read all the material in order to reconstruct a singular profile. I therefore seek to cultivate an appreciative distance from Schweitzer’s “spell-binding” work in this regard, by problematizing the concept of pure origins and the singular originary, of singular keys and tidy profiles.

### 0.2. Schweitzer’s Tools

This thesis, though in the guise of the historical-Jesus genre, is more of an experimental critique in reception criticism and a test case of varying critical theories. The thesis contains both a deconstructive element and an exploratory constructive element which function to structure the thesis into its two parts: Part One: Questioning the Influence(s) of Albert Schweitzer: Cultivating a Critical,

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34 James D. G. Dunn, *Jesus Remembered* (Christianity in the Making; vol. 1; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003).
37 See the works cited in §4.2.1. below.
39 It should be noted that this “effective force” has had and continues to have significant inroads into some fields of continental philosophy through the likes of Jacob Taubes, *Occidental Eschatology* (trans. David Ratzmok; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009 [1947]); Jacob Taubes, *From Cult to Culture: Fragments toward a Critique of Historical Reason* (trans. Charlotte Elisha Fonrobert and Amir Engel; Stanford Stanford University Press, 2010 [1996]).
Appreciative Distance; and, Part Two: Moving House. The thought behind this structuring is informed by Audre Lorde’s influential 1979 address, “The Master’s Tools will Never Dismantle the Master’s House.” Feminist hermeneutics have significantly developed since the late 70’s, of course, but for structural reasons I summon Lorde’s analysis.

Lorde’s criticisms were largely centered on feminist hermeneutics and their collusion with patriarchal criteria and agendas. In this sense, the master’s tools (criteria) can whittle away at this or that under the name of feminist hermeneutics but can never dismantle the master’s house (patriarchal and dominant readings). Though entirely sympathetic and indeed supportive of Lorde’s claim here, Part One attempts to work with “the master’s tools” in the sense which Schüssler-Fiorenza and Žižek suggest that constructive projects must be situated within—or, better, with respect to—the interpretive record so as to problematize it, hold it accountable, and examine it for strains of domination or marginalizing effects. In other words, though “real change” may not come at the hands of the master’s tools (Lorde), the master’s tools themselves must be examined and held accountable though this accountability does not come by simply ignoring or abandoning the “rubbish heap” of interpretation (Žižek).

44 Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, "The Ethics of Interpretation: Decentering Biblical Scholarship," Journal of Biblical Literature 107 (1988) 3-17; Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, "Text and Reality - Reality as Text: The Problem of a Feminist Social and Historical Reconstruction on the Basis of Texts," Studia Theological 43 (1989) 19-34; Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, But She Said: Feminist Practices of Biblical Interpretation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992); Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins (London: SCM Press 1994); Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Rhetoric and Ethic: The Politics of Biblical Studies (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999); and, especially, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Jesus and the Politics of Interpretation (New York: Continuum, 2000). Žižek’s statements, though present in much of his written work and debates, are most forcefully made in his segment in Astra Taylor’s film, Examined Life (2008). In his written work, for example, though along with his fellow Marxists comrades, Gilles Deleuze and Peter Sloterdijk, Žižek sees “the capitalist framework as an obstacle to fully released productivity,” unlike Deleuze and Sloterdijk who ignore the “obstacle,” Žižek thinks “one should operate within the system of global capitalism” for the obstacle is itself “a positive condition of what it enframes, so that, by abolishing it, we paradoxically lose the very productivity it was obstructing.” Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times (New York: Verso, 2010) 264–65.
Problematizing “Schweitzer’s Tools,” then, is the aim of Part One. It looks at Schweitzer’s criteria and construction which have dominated readings of the historical-Jesus genre with the aim of problematizing the grand architect’s receptive hegemony of the genre. No one else has wielded more influence in terms of the historical framing of the discussion, coloring of vocabulary and phraseology, and impact on the imagination. Despite recent isolated “advances” within the study of the historical Jesus, Schweitzer’s straitjacket of either a thoroughly eschatological Jesus or an entirely skeptical approach to the historical Jesus continues to prohibit these “advances” to move beyond the current impasse in historical-Jesus research. Even more fundamentally, however, his manner and method of singular portraits constructed from singular hermeneutical keys are deemed problematic. Before abandoning Schweitzer’s forced tertium non datur along with its underlying hermeneutical presuppositions, however, they must first be held accountable and critiqued from within if there is any hope to move beyond Schweitzer’s profound influence.

One of the great gains of recent readings of the Jesus material is its return to the political realities surrounding Jesus and their impact on the formation of his mission. Even here Schweitzer’s influence can be felt at least indirectly with his construction of Reimarus.45 Chapter One, “A Spirit of Health or a Goblin Damn’d? The Narrative Function of Reimarus within the Geschichte,” traces a special instance of Schweitzer’s general rhetorical strategy; viz., he is marshaling the history of interpretation into a narrative which sets his own project as the answer to the problem which has long puzzled the genre. Through the insights of narratology, we see that Reimarus functions as Schweitzer’s great hero, and in many respects is constructed by Schweitzer for the purposes of anchoring his own reading as the flowering of Reimarus’ seed of eschatology. Throughout the Geschichte, Reimarus

haunts the movements of subsequent interpretation until his spirit can find rest in Schweitzer’s detailing of *konsequente Eschatologie*. This chapter is significant in that it demonstrates Schweitzer’s rhetorical strategy within the *Geschichte* while unearthing his influences.

Chapter Two, “A Wolf in Wolff’s Clothing? The Quest for the Historical Reimarus,” is a close reading of Reimarus within his own cultural location. Particular emphasis is put on Reimarus as a character within the contested discourse of revealed religion around these times and the role of reason within those debates. Most significant is the distinction between the “Public Reimarus” and the “Private Reimarus.” The “Public Reimarus” was a respected Wolffian scholar in Hamburg; the “Private Reimarus” was hidden in Lessing’s Publication of the so-called *Wolfenbüttler Fragmenten* (1774–78). Though a significant detour in many respects, this chapter is necessary to my argument in that it attempts to situate Reimarus within his day so as to compare him to the construction of Schweitzer in the *Geschichte*. The main point here is that though Schweitzer gets the particulars of Reimarus’ *Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger* correct, his framing of him and this single tract within the wider *Apologie* is quite misleading.

The first two chapters thus reveal Schweitzer’s rhetorical strategy: he has ordered his *Geschichte* in such a way that his construction of *konsequente Eschatologie* receives the starring role in his narrative history. In many respects, the *Geschichte* functions as the literature review that should have been present within his earlier *Skizze* (1901). All previous scholarship is judged by their relation to the early discovery of Reimarus and the fuller detailing of it by Schweitzer; that is, that the thought-world of Jesus was fundamentally eschatological. Chapter Three, “Schweitzer’s Key to All Mythologies: *konsequente Eschatologie*,” sets out to demonstrate Schweitzer’s complex idea of *konsequente Eschatologie* as his singular hermeneutical key which unlocks all the riddles of the historical Jesus. In many respects, Schweitzer’s move here marks the birth of criteria within historical Jesus studies for it is this singular key against which all else is judged as authentic or
spurious and in its place a singular profile is constructed. Schweitzer’s key, however, proves to be an artificial construct and cannot turn the lock of some significant points in Schweitzer’s own reading of the tradition; e.g., the returning of the twelve and the cry of dereliction. Despite its grand claims, konsequente Eschatologie is not the “key to all mythologies” which Schweitzer claimed. The chapter ends with a respectful, but forceful plea for a “critical, appreciative distance” from Schweitzer’s magical dialectic of either a purely eschatological or purely skeptical approach to the historical Jesus and reconstructions of singular profiles.

0.3. Schweitzer’s House
Part Two marks a decisive break in the thesis both structurally and methodologically. We will more properly introduce Part Two below, but a few words here may help guide the reader through Part One. After problematizing “Schweitzer’s tools,” Part Two attempts a whole-scale relocation from “Schweitzer’s house”; that is, Schweitzer’s influence. Part Two, “Moving House,” is an attempt to leave behind this dialectic and the assumption that a singular key will unlock unmediated access to a singular figure’s aims and intentions while taking Dale Allison’s call for more experimental approaches to the material. In Craig Keener’s estimation, talk about the “historical Jesus” invariably centers on the “nature of our sources.” ⁴⁶ Part of Schweitzer’s affect upon subsequent investigation of the historical Jesus appears to be the conviction that a singular figure unmediated by latter church formation can be arrived at if certain criteria are followed. These criteria, of course, have varied over the years, but their initial formulation was set in Schweitzer’s konsequente Eschatologie as a way to highlight and correct the “fateful shifting of perspective” between the historical Jesus and the early Christian post-resurrection memories of him. This approach is problematic, however, in that it reduces the complexities of personal identity to an unhelpful minimum while also neglecting the primary purpose of the Gospel material: viz., early Christian self-definition. The approach adopted in Part Two, therefore, will combine critical

memory theory and postcolonial reading of the material in an attempt to refocus the study of the historical Jesus as early Christian memory politics in the service of identity explication.

Chapter Four, “Forgetting Schweitzer and Remembering Jesus: The Role of Identity in Communal Formation,” drafts the mounting findings of critical memory theory and the role of communal identity formation as a promising way forward in terms of approaching the Jesus material. Here we think about the move from history as lived to history as remembered to history as written through the rubric of communal memory as a promising way forward.

The thesis concludes with a test case of sorts in Mark’s Gospel: “The Untidy Jesus of Markan Memory.” This chapter attempts to further the promising political readings of the historical Jesus—indeed some of which were gestured by Schweitzer himself with respect to his apocalyptic approach—but through the rubric of memory. In this chapter we work backward from the approach in the previous chapter; viz., texts, memories, and events. Though quite disparate at points, together these two parts suggest that there is no singular “key” which can unlock the mysteries of a singular profile for the historical Jesus. Instead we are presented with ways in which early communities constructed their identities by making recourse to the diverse ways in which Jesus was remembered.
CHAPTER ONE
A SPIRIT OF HEALTH OR GOBLIN DAMN'D?
THE NARRATIVE FUNCTION OF REIMARUS WITHIN THE GESCHICHTE

“It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or better, it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back.”

Ludwig Wittgenstein

“We can, at the present day, scarcely imagine the long agony in which the historical view of the life of Jesus came to birth.”

Albert Schweitzer

1.0. Arbitrary Beginnings: Schweitzer’s Construction of Reimarus

Beginnings are naturally arbitrary. Utterances (which include texts) spring from diverse provenances. Questions of causality and origins can tend toward infinite regress and the complex, while the so-called bolt-from-the-blue discoveries are more like coagulations of past inquiry and results bleeding into varying fields of research. The former “certainties” of the past which we now know to be inadequate pictures of reality, still shape and inform “new” discoveries and advances. Though there appear to be clear advances within a knowledge set, sometimes these advances are contested and later in time fit back into the theories they were once thought to have displaced. What is more, offering a summa historica of a certain problem or stream of interpretation-as-discourse is complicated by the

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2 Quest 1 p. 3.
3 George Eliot confided in correspondence that “Beginnings are always troublesome; conclusions are the weak point of most authors,” and that “some of the fault lies in the very nature of a conclusion, which is at best a negation.” If endings are negation then the fitting corollary of the beginning is arbitrary. The narrative “beginning” is not the reference of the Beginning (the “real”), but its representation. See Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction with a New Epilogue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000 [1966]) 174.
4 Here, of course, allusion is made to Bakhtin and Derrida.
5 Within the philosophy of science, this is called “encompassing theory.” See Nancy Ellen Abrams and Joel R. Primack, “Scientific Revolutions in Cosmology: Overthrowing vs. Encompassing,” http://physics.ucsc.edu/cosmo/primack_abrams/htmlformat/SciRevolutionsinCosm.html, accessed 14 March 2011. E.g., “once a scientific field achieves a well-tested foundational theory, further revolutions may be of a different, encompassing kind, in which the newer theory reduces to the old one in appropriate limits.”
combinations and cross-pollination of collective reflection at any given era. Michel Foucault gave considerable attention to these problematics in his "histories" and in his analysis of the possibilities of an historical moment. He was suspicious of narratives of the teleological sort, and, in *The Order of Things*, Foucault draws upon Nietzsche in asking of a text who is speaking, with what particular interests, and by what authority. Edward Said speaks of beginnings not as fresh starts but "disruptions." "Too many old habits, loyalties, and pressures inhibit the substitution of a novel enterprise for an established one." Beginnings tend toward Conclusions and are therefore disruptions of the current with the ideological constructions of the rhetoricity of the author's present.

Committing the history of a problem or interpretation-as-discourse to writing, then, is itself an act of interpretation and arbitrary framing. It is in the asking of the question which both funnels the sources cited and consulted, and shapes the articulation of given solutions and interpretations of the "history" in question. In this sense, the past is always already a product of the present. Albert Schweitzer was aware of these issues when he wrote in the Preface (paratext) to the 1913 Second Edition of his *Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*:

> This work has been criticized in some quarters for being more than a history of research into Jesus and offering a particular view. Against this it may be observed that no one can write the history of a problem and the attempts made so far to resolve it who does not himself adopt a particular attitude to the questions.

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6 It should be noted that nearly all his books are a kind of history. At the Collège de France his choice for the title of his chair was "Professor of the History of Systems of Thought." He did not, however, consider himself to be a "professional historian"; for, as he stated, "nobody is perfect." See Allan Megill, "The Reception of Foucault by Historians," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 58 (1987) 117-41, 117.


9 Cf. Schweitzer, *Aus meinem Leben und Denken* 88. "Wie oft besteht das, was als Fortschritt gilt, darin, daß eine mit Virtuosität argumentierende Ansicht die wirkliche Einsicht für lange außer Gefecht setzt!"

10 Cf. Gareth Stedman Jones, "From Historical Sociology to Theoretical History," *British Journal of Sociology* 27.3 (1976) 295-305, 296. See, too, the recent discussions of "Presentism."

11 Albert Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* (Fortress Classics in Biblical Studies; ed. K. C. Hanson; trans. J. R. Coates W. Montgomery, Susan Cupitt, and John Bowden; Minneapolis:
Literature creates “imagined communities” to this or that cause in part because “there is no one-to-one correspondence between language and external reality.” Writing necessarily “involves a certain degree of bad faith.”\textsuperscript{12} Beginnings are a decisive move in this rhetoricity and reveal the strategic utterances of texts. No historical construction is “politically innocent.” It is “driven by the problems and questions set by the historian in the present.”\textsuperscript{13} To label an historian’s \textit{Ausgangspunkt} as arbitrary is therefore no real criticism. But a critical investigation into the \textit{Ausgangspunkt} and how it converses with the \textit{Endpunkt} not only reveals the rhetorical practices and strategies of the historian, but also the underlying movement of the overall project.\textsuperscript{14} Kermode suggested that the \textit{tick-tock} of the clock is a sort of “model of what we call a plot, an organization that humanizes time by giving it form.”\textsuperscript{15} This \textit{tick} and \textit{tock} can be extended to the relationship between \textit{Ausgangspunkt} and \textit{Endpunkt} in narrative. The negation of the end (\textit{tock}) is set up by the arbitrary construction of the beginning (\textit{tick}). The dialogical exchange with the beginning’s \textit{sense of an ending} and the ending’s \textit{sense of a beginning} can therefore yield not only rhetorical strategies and movement but also the syntactical structuring of the author.

In this chapter we will treat Schweitzer’s \textit{Geschichte}\textsuperscript{1} as narrative, from \textit{das Problem} to \textit{der Ertrag der Leben-Jesu-Forschung}. The move from history to history-as-literature-like has, of course, come under a great degree of suspicion from both

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Fortress Press, 2001) xxxiv. It should be stressed that this is the preface to the second edition. In many respects the comments are rhetorically contingent upon the deep criticisms of Jülicher and others of \textit{Quest}\textsuperscript{1}. Nevertheless, Schweitzer had already hinted as much in his correspondence with his publishers at J. C. B. Mohr in 1905. For a copy of the letter, see Bähr, ed., \textit{Albert Schweitzer: Sein Denken und sein Weg} 14; cf. the excellent analysis of Paget, “Schweitzer’s second edition,” , p. 12. On “paratext” see Gérard Genette, \textit{Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation} (trans. Jane E. Lewin; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
\textsuperscript{14} I leave aside for the moment the opposition between the beginning of the story (\textit{fabula}) and the beginning of its telling (\textit{sjuzet}). Along these lines, see the useful studies in Brian Richardson, ed., \textit{Narrative Beginnings: Theories and Practices} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008).
\textsuperscript{15} Kermode, \textit{Sense of an Ending}, p. 45.
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theorists and historians alike.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, the approach employed here is not itself a judgment of Schweitzer’s historiography—far from it. Schweitzer wanted to situate his constructive proposal (solution) of the historical-Jesus problem both within the forms of past inquiry and in its previous results.

But no one can really understand the problem who has not a clear notion of the way in which it has shaped itself in the course of the investigation; no one can justly criticize, or appraise the value of, new contributions to the study of this subject unless he knows in what forms they have been presented before.\textsuperscript{17}

The trouble for Schweitzer with these previous “\textit{Formen}”\textsuperscript{18} of Lives-of-Jesus was their lack of any evident order. It was a veritable chaos. Schweitzer sees part of his project, then, as “ein Versuch Ordnung in das Chaos der Leben-Jesu zu bringen.”\textsuperscript{19} Schweitzer’s move is to settle on “certain landmarks amid this apparent welter of confusion” in order to deduce a “vague outline” of the “course followed, and the progress made, by the critical study of the life of Jesus.”\textsuperscript{20} This “order” is therefore naturally arbitrary for didactic and pedagogical reasons—to say nothing of the aesthetic and rhetorical.\textsuperscript{21} Schweitzer himself explicitly divides the history of inquiry into two stages: \textit{vor Strauss und nach Strauss}.\textsuperscript{22} Inquiry begins with the \textit{tick} of Reimarus and is answered by the \textit{tock} of konsequente Eschatologie. This is a narratival move: with the \textit{Geschichte}’s raw materials of previous research as they relate to Schweitzer’s chronological division—what he calls the “vague outline” of

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\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Quest}\textsuperscript{1} p. 11.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Geschichte}\textsuperscript{1} p. 11.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Geschichte}\textsuperscript{1} p. 11. Because most of Schweitzer’s work is translated into English, I will make recourse to these translations with only small changes here and there. These alternations will not be noted unless they are significant departures. Moreover, because my primary interest is with the influence of Schweitzer’s \textit{Geschichte}, the 1910 English translation (hereafter \textit{Quest}\textsuperscript{1}) will be the main source.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Quest}\textsuperscript{1} pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Geschichte}\textsuperscript{1} p. 9.
\end{footnotesize}
past inquiry acting as fabula; and the narrative shaping and ordering of this “vague outline” acting as sjuzet. Analyzing the Geschichte as narrative, therefore, appears justifiable in terms of bringing Schweitzer’s narrative logic to light.

In making recourse to fabula and sjuzet, I employ the general insights of basic narratology and various streams of narrative theory. “The field of narratology has produced a great arsenal of distinctions and terms,” so a word or two on what is being imported from this contested approach is in order. Narratology grew out of the Russian formalists, most notably Vladimir Propp, and has been strongly affiliated with structuralism. But as Mieke Bal has stated, one need not “subscribe to a structuralist philosophy in order to assume an instrumental usage of the theory.” The split lemmas of sjuzet and fabula communicate the narrative ordering or telling of the raw materials of that telling. Many have voiced umbrage at this

23 Quest pp. 9–10.
29 Bal, Narratology, p. xiii.
distinction, but the terms are a useful convention in analyzing, in the case of Schweitzer’s *Geschichte*, the differentiation of the raw material of Lives-of-Jesus as they appear in history (*fabula*) and the order and emphases of Schweitzer’s arrangement (*sjuzet*). Recourse to narratology, therefore, is as a “heuristic tool,” without drawing tight distinctions between *fabula* and *sjuzet*, or subscribing to structuralist agendas.

Franz Karl Stanzel and Gérard Genette have furthered narratology with varying emphases on narrative mode and narrative discourse. These insights examine not only *who* is telling the story but also *how* the story is being told. Events, actors, time, and location all constitute the material or elements of the *fabula*. The ordering of these elements produces an effect. The result of these series of decisions regarding the ordering of the elements of the *fabula* is a specific story distinct from other stories, and results in the story’s aspect.

The *Geschichte* is an intriguing text-case owing to Schweitzer’s complicated involvement as author, narrator, and character. The latter two functions are further complicated in that the duration of discourse time and narrative time in the

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31 Bal expands the binomial to a trinomial of *text, story, and fabula*. The fabula is “a series of logically and chronologically related events that are caused or experienced by actors”; the story is a fabula “presented in a certain manner”; and the text is a “structured whole composed of language signs” (*Narratology*, p. 5). This trinomial distinction “does not mean that these layers ‘exist’ independently of one another” (*Narratology*, p. 6). Our interests in Schweitzer is in his *narrative text*; that is, the text “in which a narrative agent tells a story” (*Narratology*, p. 16).


34 For the principles of ordering, see Bal, *Narratology*, pp. 7–8.


36 Again, it must be noted that this is an instrumental usage of the theory. Bal, for example, would be uncomfortable with the inclusion of “author” here. The agent for Bal is not the writer as the writer “withdraws and calls upon a fictitious spokesperson or narrator” (*Narratology*, p. 8).
narration of previous research (−/+). I use *konsequente Eschatologie* here instead of the character “Schweitzer” because Schweitzer the narrator uses the expression as metonymy for the human character. In this sense the narrator can deploy a strategy of precedent as is done with the character of Reimarus, with Schweitzer as the personification and realization of *konsequente Eschatologie*. In this case, the narrative’s frequency is ironically multiple where the event of the discovery (whether known or unknown) of *konsequente Eschatologie* occurs \( n \) times and is narrated \( n \) times. It is ironic in that the event of *konsequente Eschatologie* is functionally singular for the narrator in that its event and narration are idealized in its personification; viz., in the character of Schweitzer. Moreover, the narrator role itself is complicated in its bivocal narration. That is, the voice within the *Geschichte* is intra-diegetic and extra-diegetic; hetero-diegetic and homo-diegetic. And the mood shifts along varying degrees of focalization.

This chapter examines Schweitzer’s *Geschichte* as narration and his deployment of the element of character. In particular, how the *Geschichte* relates to Schweitzer’s formulation of the beginnings of the critical inquiry into the life of Jesus originating with Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768). Schweitzer’s decision to begin with Reimarus is revealing in that it highlights the rhetorical strategies and aspect of his framing of the history of *Leben Jesu Forschung*. Reimarus is right in seeing eschatology as the key to the problem of the historical Jesus but wrong in how he sees eschatology. But Reimarus’ discovery is covered by the dust of subsequent neglect until *konsequente Eschatologie* not only rediscovers the key of the historical Jesus but also corrects the errors of Reimarus’ explication of that key. Reimarus therefore plays a significant rhetorical and structural role in the *Geschichte*. And it is

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37 There is a sense in which the character of “Schweitzer” is split into Schweitzer¹ (representing *Eine Skizze*) and Schweitzer² (representing special material within the *Geschichte*). Nevertheless, we will treat “Schweitzer” as a singular character and even fill out “Schweitzer” with Schweitzer³ at points; that is, *Geschichte*².

38 The narrator here is the linguistic subject, or function; not the person. See Bal, *Narratology*, p. 16.
as such that we will analyze the narrator’s deployment and focalization surrounding one of the lead characters in the Geschichte: Hermann Samuel Reimarus.

1.1. **Schweitzer’s Reimarus**

In the beginning was Reimarus. Or so it was for Schweitzer. The scope of his investigation is von Reimarus zu Wrede. As we will see, Reimarus for Schweitzer is no mere matter of prologue but an integral pivot to a carefully constructed rhetoric. Reimarus comes to the reader as Hamlet’s Ghost, haunting key moments of the narrative. The reader is forced to ask whether he be “a spirit of health or goblin damn’d”? After stating das Problem, Schweitzer begins his “attempt to trace genetically” (genetisch) “the shaping of the problem” of the historical Jesus by giving “a systematic historical account of the critical study of the life of Jesus” (eine systematisch-historische Darstellung der Leben-Jesu-Forschung) as it currently stands. And he begins with Reimarus.

Reimarus as Ausgangspunkt for Schweitzer’s Geschichte is significant in its rhetorical and structural role. Reimarus is important to Schweitzer’s project for four main reasons which set the stage for the rest of the volume. First, Reimarus was an historian (ein Historiker) and represents the first historical-critical investigation into the life of Jesus. By “history,” Schweitzer means less about the consulting of sources from antiquity than he does about value-free inquiry or the was eigentlich gewesen ist of the Leopold von Ranke mold. In other words, Schweitzer’s Reimarus was

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39 Unless otherwise noted, “Schweitzer” will refer to Schweitzer as narrator.
40 Though here, see Wernle, "Review," p. 502, and his comments that the book would have been better titled Von Reimarus zu Schweitzer. See, too, Morgan, "From Reimarus to Sanders," 81.
41 Though there is some debate over which edition is the more tightly woven narrative, it should be noted that the second chapter of Quest¹ (pp. 13-26) remains unchanged in Quest² (pp. 14-26; Geschichte¹/² pp. 13-26 / pp. 13-26).
42 Though many examples could be cited with respect to the early Strauss, Bauer, von Hartmann, Wrede, or even modern theology, consider Bousset feeling “the stern eye of old Reimarus” (Quest¹ p. 265).
44 Geschichte¹/² pp. 1-12; Quest¹/² pp. 1-12 / 1-13.
45 Geschichte¹ p. 12; Quest¹ p. 12.
46 See Henning Graf Reventlow, “Conditions and Presuppositions of Biblical Criticism in Germany in the Period of the Second Empire and Before: The Case of Heinrich Julius Holtzmann," in
loosed from the fetters of dogma and free to look at the historical Jesus and rise of nascent Christianity as it happened. This kind of history championed by the philosophes in the varying theatres of the Enlightenment has been found wanting.47 And, as we will see in the next chapter, Reimarus might have been freed from orthodoxy, but he was certainly not freed from dogma. Second, Reimarus' Jesus was, fundamentally, a preacher of repentance and in no way the founder of a new religion. Schweitzer follows this line in attempting to keep Jesus wholly within the late flowering of apocalyptic Judaism. This serves as the baseline for Schweitzer's methodology in determining what Judaism looked like during Jesus' day. Third, Reimarus understood the messiah in purely political terms and argued that the thought-world of Jesus was fundamentally eschatological. Schweitzer sees this move as Reimarus' blessing and bane. On the one hand, he was fundamentally correct in seeing eschatology as the key to unlocking the problematics of the historical Jesus. But, on the other hand, this was Reimarus' fateful mistake in that he reduces eschatology to a this-worldly regime of the political. Fourth, Reimarus sees the rise of early Christianity as stemming from the fabrication of Jesus' early followers after the messianic failure of Jesus to bring about the kingdom of God. This was a significant move for Reimarus in that he places the historical Jesus and his followers on either side of an unbridgeable gulf after his death. The disciples were hucksters who invented the resurrection and Christianity in order to further their own cause by continuing to live off the charity of former supporters of the Jesus movement. Though Schweitzer does not follow this line, he does employ the logic in what he calls the fateful shift of perspective (eine unbewusste, notwendige perspektivische

Verschiebung). We will need to examine how Schweitzer’s narration of Reimarus develops along these points and then see how his critique of this construction fits within his wider rhetorical agenda.

1.1.1. Reimarus the Historian

Though Schweitzer concedes that Reimarus wrote a polemical piece (Kampfschrift), and was fuelled by a hate so eloquent and a scorn so lofty, Reimarus was no mere pamphleteer ([d]es Reimarus Werk ist kein Pamphlet). He was first and foremost an historian, ahead of his time and subsequently the proper development of historical science to be sure, but an historian nonetheless. More importantly for Schweitzer, Reimarus, “with his thorough-going honesty,” represents the first attempt to form an “historical [historisch] conception of the life of Jesus.” Though Schweitzer names several outliers, he maintains that Reimarus “had no predecessors; neither had he any disciples,” indeed there was “nothing to prepare the world for a work of such power as that of Reimarus.” The Fragmente selected and published by Lessing marked “the first time that a really historical

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49 See, “da es eine Kampfschrift, nicht eine objective historische Studie ist.” Geschicht 1 p. 22; Quest 1 p. 22.
50 Geschicht 1 p.15; Quest 1 p. 15.
51 “Historical science was not at that time sufficiently advanced to lead even the man who had divined the fundamentally eschatological character of the preaching of Jesus onward to the historical solution of the problem; it needed more than a hundred and twenty years to fill the chasm which Reimarus had been forced to bridge with that makeshift hypothesis of his” (Quest 1 p. 23).
52 In a passage relating Lessing and Reimarus, Schweitzer names the former ein Denker, the latter nur ein historiker (Geschicht 1 p. 15).
53 Quest 1 p. 153. Something of the personality of Schweitzer seeps through here, as elsewhere in his skewering of Renan, where he places a premium on honesty and intellectual consistency. See the Introduction of Delbert R. Hillers in Quest 1 p. xii. See, too, his comments in Quest 1 p. 399 regarding the value of what German research has accomplished for the study of the life of Jesus.
54 Quest 1 p. 13.
55 Luther (Quest 1 p. 13), Osiander (Quest 1 p. 13), Hieronymus Xavier (Q 1 p. 14), and Johann Jakob Hess (Q 1 p. 14).
56 Quest 1 p. 26.
57 Quest 1 p. 14.
mind [ein historischer Kopf], thoroughly conversant with the sources, had undertaken the criticism of the tradition.”

Schweitzer is only minimally interested in biography and transmission. His main concern is the appearance of excerpts of Fragmente eines Ungenanntnen, published by G. E. Lessing from 1774–78. Reimarus wrote but did not publish the longer Apologie oder Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes. “Lessing anonymously published excerpts of it, setting off the famous ‘Fragment Dispute’ between Lessing and Hamburg’s senior pastor Johann Melchior Goeze (1717–1786).” Lessing’s greatness, according to Schweitzer, is that he grasped the effects of the criticisms which would call for either the doing away with or the recasting of the idea of revelation. What is more, he “recognized that the introduction of the historical element would transform and deepen rationalism.” Lessing’s flinging the torch of criticism into the house of faith, therefore, served his own project. Of these excerpts, Schweitzer’s demonstrable interest is in the seventh: Vom Zwecke Jesu und

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58 Quest 1. p. 15.
59 “Not much is known about Reimarus. For his contemporaries he had no existence, and it was Strauss who first made his name known in literature.” Quest 1. p. 14; Geschichte 1. p. 14. This is actually a rather misleading portrait of Reimarus. See the excellent essays collected in Martin Mulsow, ed., Between Philology and Radical Enlightenment: Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768) (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 203; Leiden: Brill, 2011). For Schweitzer’s telling the tale of the Fragmente, see Quest 1 pp. 14–16; and, §2.2.1. below.
61 Quest 1. p. 15.
62 This was more or less the charge of Semler’s parable given in his apologue. See Johann Salomo Semler, Beantwortung der Fragmente eines Ungenanntnen ins besondere vom Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger (Halle: 1779). Cf. Quest 1 pp. 15-16.
63 Lessing, of course, separated the question of the historicity of Christian origins from the religious truths to which it bears witness. Cf. Gotthold E. Lessing, Lessing’s Theological Writings: Selections in Translation with an Introductory Essay (trans. Henry Chadwick; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957) 18. Lessing’s rejection of traditional conceptualizations of revelation fueled his separation of history and religious truth. Lessing “saw revelation as a historical process wherein different degrees of insight are produced in various historical communities, each sufficient for the needs of that community at its time and place and each expressed in terms of the level of development of its followers.” It is in this context that his maxim, “accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason” should be understood. On the relation of Lessing to Reimarus, see §22.1.
seiner Jünger. This seventh fragment, “The Aims of Jesus and His Disciples,” is lauded as “not only one of the greatest events in the history of criticism,” but also “a masterpiece of general literature.”

1.1.2. Jesus the Preacher of Repentance

“To all unprejudiced persons it is manifest,” Schweitzer states leading into the following quote from Reimarus, “that Jesus had not the slightest intention of doing away with the Jewish religion and putting another in its place.” Reimarus “formulated the conception that Jesus was not a religious founder and teacher, but purely a preacher.” The preaching of Jesus is therefore Reimarus’ concern. The contents of that preaching contain two phrases but are one in meaning: “Repent,” and “believe the Gospel”—or “repent,” and “the kingdom of heaven is at hand” as it is elsewhere. Though Schweitzer does not elaborate on Reimarus’ exegesis of these phrases, he has plenty to say on the continuity of Jesus’ message with the Judaism of his day. Schweitzer, in relation to Timothée Colani’s study, asks, “Bis zu welchem Grade war Jesus Jude?” For Reimarus, the answer to this question is: all the way down.

Jesus shared the Jewish racial exclusiveness wholly and unreservedly. According to Matt 10:5, he forbade his disciples to declare to the Gentiles the coming of the kingdom of God. Evidently, therefore, his purpose did not embrace them. Had it been otherwise, the hesitation of Peter in Acts 10 and 11, and the necessity of justifying the conversion of Cornelius, would be incomprehensible.

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64 Though he does have high praise for the fourth: “The monograph on the passing of the Israelites through the Red Sea is one of the ablest, wittiest, and most acute which has ever been written.” *Quest* 1 p. 15.
65 *Quest* 1 p. 15.
66 *Quest* 1 p. 17; *Geschichte* 1 p. 17.
67 *Quest* 1 p. 24; *Geschichte* 1 p. 24.
68 *Geschichte* 1 p. 16; *Quest* 1 p. 16.
70 *Geschichte* 1/2 pp. 222/223; *Quest* 1/2 pp. 224/191.
71 *Quest* 1 p. 18.
Moreover, from Matt 5:18 it is clear that Jesus takes his stand upon Torah unreservedly. Jesus’ preaching went “beyond” (jenseits) the Judaism of his day only in that “a new and deeper morality must come into being” (es muß eine neue, tiefere Sittlichkeit erstehen). The former righteousness of the Law is no longer sufficient in the time of the kingdom.

1.1.3. The Fundamentally Eschatological Weltanschauung of Jesus

Schweitzer’s presentation of Reimarus thus far is a picture of a critical historian interested in matters of Christian origins. If one wishes to gain an “historical understanding of Jesus’ teaching,” one must leave behind the catechism and dogmatics, “and go out into a wholly Jewish world of thought (nur auf jüdische Anschauungen ausgehen).” Within this Jewish world of thought Jesus appears wholly at home, “not as the founder of a new religion, but as the final product of the eschatological and apocalyptic thought of Late Judaism.” Because Jesus made no explicit statements about his understanding of the kingdom of God in counter-distinction to the Judaism of his day, so Schweitzer’s Reimarus argues, he must share the same understanding of the kingdom. Because there was no explanation given by either the Baptist or Jesus, so the argument e silentio goes, “Jesus took his stand within the Jewish religion, and accepted its messianic expectations without in any way correcting them.” When Jesus sent out the disciples to proclaim the coming of the kingdom (Matt 10:23), and in all of Jesus’ teaching prior to it, the crowds “would naturally think of the customary meaning of the term and the hopes which attached themselves to it.” What was the customary meaning? That “under the leadership of Jesus, the kingdom of messiah was about to be brought in.” As messiah, Jesus was the son of God. But so were the kings of the covenant-people.
(Bundesvolkes) as well as the nation (Volk) itself. He was thus the son of God in a preeminent sense (in besonderem Sinne), remaining fully “within the limits of humanity” (in den Schranken der Menschlichkeit).\(^80\)

Reimarus marks, for Schweitzer, “the first, and indeed...the only writer who recognized and pointed out that the preaching of Jesus was purely eschatological” (nur eschatologisch).\(^81\) The exact nature of the “contemporary Jewish world of thought,” by Schweitzer’s own admission, was not so straightforward,\(^82\) but Reimarus’ significance is that he drew attention to the eschatological views of Jesus’ contemporaries.\(^83\) It is worth pressing Schweitzer here on how he understands what Reimarus means by the “eschatological view of Jesus’ contemporaries” because, as we shall see, he is clearer on where he disagrees with Reimarus’ use of eschatology as a “destructive principle of criticism” (destruktiv-kritisches Prinzip) than the exact particulars of his own construction.\(^84\)

Eschatology, as far as Schweitzer understands Reimarus, was both earthly and political. The scion of David’s line was expected to appear as the “political deliverer of the nation” (messianischer Befreier des Volkes).\(^85\) The only change Jesus’ preaching made in the religion of Judaism,\(^86\) reports Schweitzer quoting Reimarus, is that the former belief “in a deliverer of Israel who was to come in the future” (einen Erlöser Israels, der da kommen sollte) was now believed to be the “deliverer who was already present” (nun aber glaubten an einen, der schon gekommen sei).\(^87\) The

\(^{80}\) Geschichte\(^1\) p. 17; Quest \(^1\) p. 17.

\(^{81}\) Geschichte\(^1/2\) pp. 238/234; Quest \(^1/2\) pp. 241/200.

\(^{82}\) Quest \(^1\) p. 8.

\(^{83}\) Quest \(^1\) p. 10.

\(^{84}\) Geschichte\(^1/2\) pp. 238/235; Quest \(^1/2\) pp. 241/200.

\(^{85}\) Geschichte\(^1/2\) pp. 20/20; Quest \(^1/2\) pp. 20/20. Though the sense of Montgomery’s translation is correct, it is slightly misleading in that it translates messianischer here in such a way that one would think politisch was the translated adjective.

\(^{86}\) Presumably, the only change in addition to the earlier statements were on the need for a “new and deeper morality.” Cf. Geschichte\(^1\) p. 17; Quest \(^1\) p. 18.

\(^{87}\) Geschichte\(^1/2\) pp. 18/18; Quest \(^1/2\) pp. 18/18.
gospel, therefore, “meant nothing more or less to all who heard it than that, under
the leadership of Jesus, the kingdom of messiah was about to be brought in.”

Many were waiting for the realization of the kingdom of God, so the initial
enthusiasm of the crowds is historically sensible. And, again, since there was no
explication on the part of the Baptist or Jesus to dissuade the crowds of “the
customary meaning” of the terms and hopes associated with them, they readily
“attached themselves” to their customary understanding of the term. The sending
out of the twelve disciples throughout the Judean countryside was understood as an
effort of consolidating resistance, and sparking a popular uprising, against the yoke
of Rome under the banner of Jesus-as-messiah. The “popular uprising,” of course,
never arrived—though twice he believed it was at hand. The first time was at the
sending out of the twelve (Matt 10:23). Convinced that “the people would flock to
him from every quarter and immediately proclaim him messiah,” there was a
significant readjustment called for when the disciples returned. The second time,
Jesus went on the offensive with his messianic overture in Jerusalem. “This change
was due to the non-fulfillment of the promises made in the discourse at the sending
forth of the twelve. He had thought then to let loose the final tribulation and so
compel the coming of the kingdom.” Harkening back to Zechariah and the political
entry upon the colt of an ass, he “arrogates to himself supreme power” and calls for
“open revolt” against the Sanhedrin and Pharisees. The episode reaches its climax
when Jesus closes his “incendiary harangue” in Matt 23. The leaders shall not see
him again until they bow their knee to him as messiah. Again Jesus was
disappointed. The people refused to rise in resistance. The cry of dereliction is

88 Quest 1 p. 17.
89 Quest 1 p. 17.
90 Quest 1 p. 17.
91 Quest 1 p. 17.
92 Quest 1 p. 19.
93 Quest 1 p. 389.
94 Quest 1 p. 19.
95 Quest 1 p. 19. Here there is a connection for Reimarus with Matt 16:28 as well. Jesus
promised “the fulfillment of all messianic hopes before the end of the existing generation” (Quest 1 p. 20).
therefore a cry of shock and anguish, abandonment and surprise. “God had not aided him in his aim and purpose as he had hoped.”96 The cry from the cross reveals the suffering and crucifixion of Jesus was unintended. His intention was “to establish an earthly kingdom and deliver the Jews from political oppression.” In this mission, Jesus had followed the God that failed.97

1.1.4. Christianity as the Fabrication of Jesus’ Followers

The point of Jesus’ failure for the disciples represents a crucial moment in dogmatic history. Nothing prepared them for Jesus’ death. They seemed to evidence a “sensuous hope” of being the rulers of the reconstituted twelve tribes of Israel in their own lifetime (cf. Matt 16:28); a hope of which Jesus never seemed to disabuse them.98 Hints of resurrection language in the mouth of Jesus were therefore retrojections on the part of the disciples lest their messiah appeared as he was: caught off guard.99

There is therefore justification in drawing “an absolute distinction” between the preaching of Jesus and the teaching of the apostles.100 The former expected the imminent political kingdom; the latter made use of an apparent extant two-pronged messianic hope: one political, the other the transformation of the former into the spiritual. “Appearing first in Daniel, this expectation can still be traced in the Apocalypses, in Justin’s ‘Dialogue with Trypho,’ and in certain Rabbinic sayings.”101 Reimarus is especially dependent upon Trypho, according to which, “the messiah is to appear twice; once in human lowliness, the second time upon the clouds of heaven.”102 The first *systema* collapsed upon itself in the mangled body of the failed Jesus-as-messiah. The second became the poetic through which the apostles interpreted and (re)fashioned the expectations and activities of the earthly Jesus.

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96 Quest 1 p. 20.
97 Quest 1 p. 20.
98 Quest 1 p. 20.
99 Quest 1 p. 20.
100 Quest 1 p. 16.
101 Quest 1 p. 20.
102 Quest 1 pp. 20-21.
Resurrection was thus invented as a dogmatic coping mechanism, allowing the apostles to live off the charity of former supporters of the messianic movement (cf. Luke 8:2–3) while transmuting the former expectations of imminent political realization into the hope of the parousia. After dispensing with the empty body, and aided by “the complete disorganization of the Jewish state,” the apostles quickly reconfigured the preaching of Jesus into the rise of early Christianity. Their break with the Torah was not in continuity with Jesus but owing to “the pressure of circumstances.” They abandoned the formerly nationalistic message (cf. Matt 10:5) for a more universal invitation. The so-called institutions of the church are either retrojections (e.g. baptism for its dubious Trinitarian overtones) or reconfigurations of former eschatological acts. The Lord’s Supper, for example, is seen as the pivot upon which the final Paschal Meal of the old order anticipated the Passover of the new kingdom. Moreover, miracles of healing are proofs in the messiah’s pudding, while others “have no basis in fact,” as they are later constructions based upon OT patterns. Jesus “did no really miraculous works; otherwise, the demands for a sign would be incomprehensible.”

The hope of the parousia, then, “was the fundamental thing in primitive Christianity,” while the parousia itself being a dogmatic product of that hope. “Accordingly, the main problem of primitive dogmatics was the delay of the parousia.” As early as 2 Thessalonians, Paul had to deal with the crises of delay and the author of 2 Peter side-stepped the problem entirely with a sophism on temporal relativity from a divine perspective. “Those simple early Christians” were bemused to the point of accepting the variations of dogmatic refitting. “The sole argument which could save the credit of Christianity would be a proof that the

103 Quest 1 p. 21.
104 Quest 1 p. 18.
105 According to Schweitzer’s reading of Reimarus, there is simply no other way to make sense of Acts 10–11 (Quest 1 p. 18).
106 Quest 1 p. 18.
107 Quest 1 p. 19.
108 Quest 1 p. 21.
109 Schweitzer reports, quoting Reimarus, Geschichte 1 p. 21 / Quest 1 p. 22.
parousia had really taken place at the time for which it was announced; and obviously no such proof can be produced.”

110 But in the absence of proof successive generations continued “ever after to feed themselves with empty hopes.”

111 Early Christianity was therefore not an organic development of the teaching of Jesus, but a new creation altogether by the apostles who “were forced out of Judaism and obliged to found a new religion.”

112 “Such,” concludes Schweitzer, “is Reimarus' reconstruction of the history.”

113 As we shall see in the following chapter, the particulars of Schweitzer's construction of Reimarus are more or less accurate. But it is this apparent accuracy which disguises the use and construction of Reimarus within the Geschichte and allows Schweitzer an alibi for the mis-framing of Reimarus. “Mit die theologischen Vermächtnis des Reimarus umzugehen,” then, is clouded by the storm cloud of Schweitzer. For Reimarus is thrust into die Anfänge der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, and given a starring role. What is more, despite the criticisms of some reviewers of the 1906 edition of Von Reimarus zu Wrede regarding the omission of significant contributions from English deists, Schweitzer more or less ignored these criticisms in the second edition of 1913. It seems likely that Schweitzer may have himself been aware of his arbitrary beginnings. Why, then, begin with Reimarus? What rhetorical / structural role did his emplotment achieve?

1.2. Schweitzer's Critique and Rhetorical Strategy

As we shall see, though Schweitzer more or less gets the particulars of Reimarus correct, his framing of him is misleading, and is something of an historical “false

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\begin{array}{ll}
110 & \text{Quest} \text{ } \text{p. } 22. \\
111 & \text{Quest} \text{ } \text{p. } 22. \\
112 & \text{Quest} \text{ } \text{p. } 24 \text{ with p. } 19. \\
113 & \text{Quest} \text{ } \text{p. } 22. \\
114 & \text{August Christian Lundsteen, } Hermann Samuel Reimarus und die Anfänge der Leben-Jesu-Forschung \text{ (Copenhagen: O. C. Olsen, 1939).} \\
115 & \text{Cf. Dietrich Klein, } Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768): Das theologische Werk \text{ (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie; vol. 145; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009) } 7. \\
116 & \text{See Carleton Paget, } "\text{Schweitzer’s second edition," } \text{p. } 13 \text{ and nn. } 47-49.
\end{array}
\]
Reimarus is not the historian of Christian origins that Schweitzer portrays him to be. His was a polemical attempt to destroy, through the aid of Wolffian criteria, Christian revelation. Its apparent form of historical criticism, and subsequent treatment as such within some contexts of reception history, is misleading.\(^{118}\) The *Apologie* is “governed by the categories of natural religion despite its appearance as historical investigation of the origins of the Christian religion.”\(^{119}\) Indeed, there is sufficient proof to suspect that Schweitzer himself did not intend for his “ordering” to be a statement of chronological fact, but of rhetoric.\(^{120}\) Schweitzer’s beginning with Reimarus neglects his awareness of the English deists.\(^{121}\) This leads us to asking why frame Reimarus in the way that he did? Why begin with the professor of oriental languages from Hamburg? In answering this question we will proceed in two stages: first by looking at Schweitzer’s analysis and valuation of Reimarus; and, second, by looking at how his framing of Reimarus fits within and indeed shapes Schweitzer’s wider agenda.

1.2.1. **Analysis and Valuation**

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\(^{117}\) Gathercole, “The Critical and Dogmatic Agenda of Schweitzer’s *Quest*,” 2, p. 69.

\(^{118}\) See, for example, the rather puzzling comments of N. T. Wright: “The icon was in place, and nobody asked whether the Christ it portrayed—and in whose name so much good and ill was done—was at all like the Jesus whom it claimed to represent. Nobody, that is, until Reimarus. Reimarus (1694–1768) was the great iconoclast.” And, “Reimarus, or somebody like him, must be seen, not just as a protestor against Christianity, but, despite his intentions, as a true reformer of it.” And again: “History has shown itself to contain more than the idealists believed it could. It is in this sense that Reimarus was, despite himself, a genuine reformer of the faith.” Wright, *Jesus and the Victory of God* 15, 17, and 18 respectively. Though see his comments on p. 13 which seem to temper the previous quotations.

\(^{119}\) Talbert, “Introduction,” pp. 26–27. See, too, the essays in Martin Mulsow, *Between Philology and Radical Enlightenment*.

\(^{120}\) See, for example, *Geschichte* \(^{1/2}\) pp. 171/173; *Quest* \(^{1/2}\) pp. 171/152. Suspicions are raised in the formulaic introduction of *Buch* with *Aber wie sollte man auch erwarten* [...] and concluding with *könne*. In other words, there appears to be introduced into this statement an element of uncertainty if in fact the Fragments were motivated by concerns of natural religion or, perhaps, genuine historical-critical concerns surrounding Christian origins.

The study of character requires an analysis of the character in question as s/he relates to other characters in the narrative both in terms of opposition and in alliance.\(^\text{122}\) Moreover, with respect to the Geschicht, the narrator uses the literary techniques of repetition, precedent, and compliment as points of emphasis and alignment with respect to the character of konsequente Eschatologie / Schweitzer. Throughout the Geschicht, a fair share of admiration shines forth from Schweitzer’s pages toward the enigmatic Reimarus. At points, Schweitzer waxes poetically about his “historical instinct” (geschichtliche Intuition) and “unfailing instinct” (ein unfehlbares Empfinden) for pregnant texts.\(^\text{123}\) But nowhere does he speak with greater praise than here: “The fact is there are some who are historians by the grace of God, who from their mother’s womb have an instinctive feeling for the real [an den Sinn für die Erfassung des Wirklichen].”\(^\text{124}\) Schweitzer’s allusion here to such scriptural texts as 1 Sam 3:20 and 7:15–17 (cf. Ps 139:13) seem to place Reimarus within a prophetic role—no doubt preparing the way for the fiery baptism of konsequente Eschatologie.

His work is judged to be “perhaps the most splendid achievement in the whole course of the historical investigation of the life of Jesus.”\(^\text{125}\) And as such, it cannot be dismissed with simple labeling of deistic polemics (deistischen Streitschrift),\(^\text{126}\) or ignored as irrelevant.\(^\text{127}\) Moreover, Schweitzer points to the inability of former attempts to dismiss Lessing’s selected Fragmente, Semler’s being chief.\(^\text{128}\) Johann Salomo Semler (1725–91), “the great Halle theologian,”\(^\text{129}\) was among the more

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\(^\text{123}\) Geschicht\(^1\text{/2}\) pp. 24/25; Quest \(^1\text{/2}\) pp. 25/24. The texts referred to are Matt 10:23; 16:28.

\(^\text{124}\) Geschicht\(^1\text{/2}\) pp. 24/25; Quest \(^1\text{/2}\) pp. 25/24.

\(^\text{125}\) Quest \(^1\) pp. 22-23.

\(^\text{126}\) Geschicht\(^1\text{/2}\) pp. 22/23; Quest \(^1\text{/2}\) pp. 22/22. Here we see a rhetorical move on the part of Schweitzer in his insistence of framing Reimarus as an honest and critical historian as opposed to the left-wing Deist he was being presented as in other forms of literature.

\(^\text{127}\) Schweitzer here cites as an example of simple labeling the work of Otto Schmiedel, Die Hauptprobleme der Leben-Jesu-Forschung (Tübingen: 1902). Schmiedel dismissed the Fragments as a “Deistic production” (Quest \(^1\) p. 22).

\(^\text{128}\) Schweitzer also cites Johann Christian Döderlein, Fragmente und Antifragmente (Nuremberg: 1778). See Quest \(^1\) p. 25.

\(^\text{129}\) Quest \(^1\) p. 25.
important of the neologians. Himself a towering historical critic,\textsuperscript{130} and considered by some to be the father of the historical critical study of the bible,\textsuperscript{131} he responded to the appearance of Lessing’s selected \textit{Fragmente} in a manner of “guerrilla warfare,”\textsuperscript{132} addressing each sentence of the \textit{Fragmente}, akin to Origen’s \textit{Contra Celsum},\textsuperscript{133} but in the end incapable of debunking its central claims. Semler’s basic argument was that they cannot be correct owing to its flattening the dual-natured pedagogy of Jesus and his disciples: one sensuous the other spiritual. The narrator rushes to the scene here to defend his complex role as character as well. Semler’s critique is equally felt by Schweitzer the character for it is precisely the latter’s view that is being assailed by Semler. Semler’s narrowly Jewish strand and wide-ranging universal strand are at odds with Schweitzer’s understanding of Jesus as wholly within and contained by the thought-world of first-century Palestine. The greatness of Jesus is in what he does with these thought forms though he is forever chained to them. Semler’s criticism of Reimarus is that Jesus is reduced to a mere Jewish messiah when in fact the scope of his messianism is universal as evidenced in, for example, the Sermon on the Mount. But in a turn of cruel fate, and with somewhat violent imagery, Reimarus “avenged himself on Semler by shaking his faith in historical theology and even in the freedom of science in general,” going so far as giving his approval to the Wöllner edict of 1788 on the regulation of religion.\textsuperscript{134}

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\textsuperscript{130} See, esp., Johann S. Semler, \textit{Abhandlung von freier Untersuchung des Canon} (Texte zur Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte ed. Heinz Scheible; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1967 [1771-75]).
\textsuperscript{131} James C Livingston, \textit{The Enlightenment and the Nineteenth Century} (Modern Christian Thought; vol. 1; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006) 29.
\textsuperscript{132} Quest 1 p. 26.
\end{flushright}
It is evident that the narrator is sympathetic to the animosity felt in the voice of Reimarus, seeing it as a form of courageous deconstruction.135 The “historical truth” (die historische Wahrheit) discovered by Reimarus was to become the scourge of dogmatic confessionalism,136 and for Schweitzer, no matter how bitter the historical truth, religion has nothing to fear.137 “Genuine historical knowledge” (wahre geschichtliche Erkenntnis), far from destroying religion or dogmatics, restores it to the “full freedom of movement.”138 And whatever stands in the way of that movement is rightly met with animosity and impatience.139 Schweitzer thus sees in Reimarus an historical analog to his project of hurling the Jesus of German liberalism upon the pyres of historical criticism.140

Schweitzer sees in Reimarus someone with a “clear perception of the elements of the problem,” and after him the “whole movement of theology down to Johannes Weiss appears retrograde.”141 Jesus was purely a preacher, not the founder of a new religion, and there is therefore a disjunction between the Jesus of history and primitive Christianity. This disjunction in Reimarus is transmuted to what Schweitzer calls “the fateful shift in perspective.”142 That is, after the death of Jesus, the Gospel writers made Jesus the messiah before the messianic age whereas in point of fact he is the messiah-to-be at the messianic age.143 This is a significant move of narration in that Reimarus explodes any sense of continuity between Jesus and his so-called followers after his death. Schweitzer surely does not follow the radical discontinuity of Reimarus, but a soft discontinuity is fundamental to his

135 The key phrase is “Er hat ein Recht, den has in seiner Schrift lodern zu lassen” (Geschichte1 2/2 pp. 22 /2; Quest 1 2/2 pp. 23 /22).
136 Geschicht e1 2/2 pp. 22 /2; Quest 1 2/2 pp. 23 /22.
137 “Die Religion hat also keinen Grund der Auseinandersetzung mit der historischen Wahrheit aus dem Wege gehen zu wollen” Schweitzer, Aus meinem Leben und Denken p. 42; Schweitzer, Life and Thought p. 54.
138 Skizze, p. 97; Mystery, p. 251.
139 There is good reason to suspect that similar sentiments stood behind Schweitzer’s own impatience with respect both to his critics and to the wider spiritualizing posture of German theology.
140 On Schweitzer and his stance against German theology, see Watson, “Eschatology and the Twentieth Century,” 339–44.
141 Quest 1 p. 23.
142 Mystery, pp. 211–12.
143 See §3 below.
methodological concerns. For Schweitzer, it was this “change in perspective” which hid the key of _konsequente Eschatologie_. Moreover, Reimarus brought the narratives of the Synoptics and John together by neglecting the latter. He grasped more clearly and explained more accurately the attitude of Jesus toward the Torah and the subsequent liberty of the disciples to the point that “modern historical science does not need to add a word.” His suspicion surrounding the problematics of the first preaching of the resurrection at Pentecost, and his assumption that a mere emphasis on the eschatological role in Christian origins would not suffice were later validated. A “creative element in the tradition,” consisting of the disciples’ creative retrojection of miracles, the messianic fulfillment of prophecy, and predictions of Passion and resurrection within the Gospel material, as well as the realization that the solution of the problem of the life of Jesus calls for a combination of the methods of both historical and literary criticism, all seem to be met with Schweitzer’s satisfactory approval, and, in various forms of appropriation, are reworked in Schweitzer’s own constructive project.

Schweitzer’s main criticism, however, is the most telling element regarding his literary pragmatics: Reimarus saw the solution to the problem of the life of Jesus—viz., eschatology—in the wrong perspective. “He held that the messianic ideal which dominated the preaching of Jesus was that of the political ruler, the son of David. All his other mistakes are the consequence of this fundamental error.” Though the solution offered is mistaken, his starting point is, beyond question, correct (sind unfehlbar richtig).

He recognized that two systems of messianic expectation were present side by side in late Judaism. He endeavoured to bring them into mutual relations in order to represent the actual movement of the history. In so doing he made the political son-of-David conception, and the apostles, after his death, the apocalyptic system based on Daniel, instead of superimposing one with the son of man, and the ancient prophetic conception might be inscribed within the circumference of the Daniel-descended apocalyptic, and raised

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144 _Quest_ 1 p. 24.
145 _Quest_ 1 p. 23.
146 _Quest_ 1 p. 23.
147 _Geschichte_ 1/2 pp. 23/24; _Quest_ 1/2 pp. 24/23.
Schweitzer thus judges what he read of Lessing’s *Fragmente* of Reimarus’ *Apologie* as the “magnificent overture” which “announced all the *motifs* of the future historical treatment of the life of Jesus” but was sadly neglected, breaking “off with a sudden discord,” remaining “isolated and incomplete,” and leading “to nothing further.” That is, until it was re-awoken by the early Strauss and fully realized by *konsequente Eschatologie*.

1.2.2. *Rhetorical Strategy*

Schweitzer’s high valuation of Reimarus, of course, is in that “he was the first to grasp the fact that the world of thought in which Jesus moved was essentially eschatological.” Though his understanding of eschatology was “primitive” (*primitiv*), and was a “destructive principle of criticism” (*destruktiv-kritisches Prinzip*), his basic stating of the problem was the most articulate until Weiss, whose every word vindicated (*eine Rechtfertigung*) and rehabilitated (*eine Rehabilitierung*) Reimarus as an historian (*des Historikers Reimarus*). For Schweitzer, the canons of great men “are not those who solved the problems, but those who discovered them.”

It was in this clear stating of the problem against which the rest of the history of research was skewered. Strauss, for example, who is heralded earlier as “no mere destroyer of untenable solutions but also the prophet of a coming advance in

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149 *Quest*1 p. 26.  
150 *Quest*1 p. 23.  
152 *Geschichte*1/2 pp. 23/23; *Quest*1/2 pp. 23/23. Montgomery’s translation, “Reimarus as an historical thinker,” misses the rhetorical place of Reimarus within Schweitzer’s historical narrative. It is not that Weiss provided the justification and rehabilitation of Reimarus’ historical ideas or thinking, but that his work vindicated Reimarus the historian *qua* historian and thus his place as the *Ausgangspunkt* in Schweitzer’s tale.  
153 *Quest*1 p. 159. See his similar statements in regards to Dalman, *Quest*1 p. 289. This becomes a mode by which the narrator lauds the characters in the *Geschichte*.  

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knowledge,” becomes the object of scorn for his “feeble compromises” and toning down of eschatology in the third edition of *Das Leben-Jesu*. Keim is cited favorably for his critiquing of Strauss’ “rejecting his own earlier and more correct formula” of eschatology. Keim himself is viewed favorably in so far as he “does justice to the texts” regarding the question of eschatology, though in the end is discarded for allowing “the spiritual elements practically to cancel the eschatological.” He reads Hase and his understanding of Jesus’ dual development as an early airing of eschatological views and a latter more advanced spiritual conception. As the Ghost sets Hamlet in motion, so Reimarus looses *konsequente Eschatologie* as the singular angle of criticism through which the history of interpretation is narrated—judging Colani, Baldensperger, Bousset, and Ehrhard along the way. Friedrich Wilhelm Ghillany (1807–76), for example, author of the *Theologischen Briefe an die Gebildeten der deutschen Nation* (1863), is lauded for introducing the life of Jesus into the Jewish eschatological world of thought. Schweitzer goes so far as to call this work’s placing of the life of Jesus “in the last time,” discussed in his chapter “Neue romanhafte Leben-Jesu,” nothing short of “an historical achievement without parallel” (*ist eine historische Tat ohnegleichen*).

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154 Quest 1 p. 95; see, too. Quest 1 p. 197.
156 Quoted in Quest 1 p. 213.
158 Quest 1 pp. 213.
159 Though in 1876, Hase seems prepared to make eschatology the feature of the last period (Quest 1 p. 215).
160 Quest 1 p. 226.
161 Quest 1 p. 235.
162 Quest 1 pp. 243-50.
163 Quest 1 p. 250.
164 Quest 1 p. 171.
165 *Geschichte* 1/2 pp. 171/172; Quest 1/2 pp. 171/152. Schweitzer continues, “Not less so is the placing of the thought of the passion in its proper eschatological setting as an act of atonement.”
Previous research was misled by the “originality” of Jesus (*der ‘Originalität’ Jesu*),\(^{166}\) when it should have remained within the world of Jewish eschatology. “Only after long and devious wanderings did the study of the subject find the right road again.”\(^{167}\) The right road, of course, being Schweitzerstrasse, and the *Bahn of konsequente Eschatologie* mapped out long ago—though slightly imperfectly—by Reimarus. All of theology from Reimarus up to Weiss and his eschatological solution,\(^{168}\) therefore, “appears retrograde.”\(^{169}\) Weiss “leaves no place in the teaching of Jesus for anything but the single-line traffic of eschatology.”\(^{170}\) But even here Weiss and the eschatological school did not press *die eschatologische Frage* far enough as they considered only Jesus’ preaching. “The final decision of the question” is to be found “in the examination of the whole course of Jesus’ life.”\(^{171}\) As to whether Jesus’ life and mission are dominated by eschatology or that he himself actively refuted it thus becomes the easiest explanation for the connection of events in Jesus’ life, fate, and the expectation of the parousia in the community of his followers. But this course is followed by “few and far between. The average ‘Life of Jesus’ shows in this respect an inconceivable stupidity.”\(^{172}\)

Though Schweitzer is certainly aware of the complexities and pluralism within the history of interpretation,\(^{173}\) the entirety of *Leben Jesu Forschung* is read through the singularity of *die eschatologische Frage*. In this sense, he falls prey to his own criticisms of Weiffenbach: “In the end [his] critical principle proves to be merely a bludgeon with which he goes seal-hunting and clubs the defenseless Synoptic sayings right and left.”\(^{174}\) Only Schweitzer is not hunting seals. He consolidates and

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\(^{166}\) *Geschichte*\(^{1/2}\) pp. 136/140; *Quest*\(^{1/2}\) pp. 136/123.
\(^{167}\) *Quest* \(^{1}\) p. 136.
\(^{168}\) *Quest* \(^{1}\) p. 282.
\(^{169}\) *Quest* \(^{1}\) p. 23.
\(^{170}\) *Quest* \(^{1}\) p. 253.
\(^{171}\) *Quest* \(^{1}\) p. 257; cf., *Quest* \(^{1}\) p. 350.
\(^{172}\) *Quest* \(^{1}\) p. 257.
\(^{173}\) See, e.g., *Quest* \(^{1}\) p. 219.
\(^{174}\) *Quest* \(^{1}\) p. 232.
funnels all past inquiry through die eschatologische Frage, marshalling it against his singular target: modern German liberal theology.\(^{175}\)

### 1.2.3. Dogmatic Agenda

As we saw above, Schweitzer sees in Reimarus a clear historical analog in his criticism of the modern lives of Jesus from the German liberalism of his day. His appearance throughout the Geschichte haunts and judges Schweitzer’s *summa historica* as well as functions as the forerunner to its dénouement.\(^{176}\) But it is in his deployment as judge which concerns us presently. Though Schweitzer seems to laud German theology in stating that its greatest achievement “is the critical investigation of the life of Jesus,”\(^{177}\) this is in fact a latent *attaque au fer* for it is precisely this great achievement which spells the ultimate undoing of dogmatics. German theology attempted to create a new dogmatic, endeavoring “to keep a place for the religious life in the thought of the present; in the study of the life of Jesus it was working for the future.”\(^{178}\)

Against the usual narrative of seeing Schweitzer’s attacking the societal dressing of Jesus with its own garments,\(^{179}\) it is better to see how the subject of Schweitzer’s concern is rather the collapsing of the enduringly-valid and the culturally-conditioned into a singularity. In other words, the modern theology under attack thought Jesus’ teaching can bypass the Jewish eschatological Weltanschauung of its day and travel, without impediment, into the modern world. This was maintained, in large measure, on account of the teachings of Jesus being the “direct expressions of his own religious consciousness.”\(^{180}\) Though aware of the culturally-conditioned eschatology of Jesus’ day they ignored it or actively fought against it, seeking instead

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\(^{176}\) Reimarus appears on pp. 4, 9, 10, 75, 94, 120, 159, 166, 171, 221, 241, 265, 305, 313, 321, 346, 366 in *Geschichte*\(^1\).

\(^{177}\) *Quest* \(^1\) p. 1.

\(^{178}\) *Geschichte*\(^1\) p. 2; *Quest* \(^1\) p. 2.

\(^{179}\) For the proliferation of this misreading, see Watson, “Eschatology and the Twentieth Century,” pp. 339–40.

the enduringly valid, say, in the ethical teaching within the Sermon on the Mount. Schleiermacher, for example, subordinated the culturally-conditioned messianische Bewusstsein to the enduringly-valid Gottesbewusstsein out of which flows his ethical teaching.\(^{181}\) It was this forced duality upon the historical Jesus which Schweitzer attacked with the singularity of konsequente Eschatologie. But Jesus and his teaching do not travel well. “Zwischen unserer Weltanschauung und derjenigen, in welcher er lebte und wirkte, liegt aber eine tiefe, wie es scheint, unüberbrückbare Kluft.”\(^{182}\) The duality of modern theology produced “eine eigentümliche Unlebendigkeit und Zwitterhaftigkeit.”\(^{183}\) Schweitzer’s choice of the term “Zwitterhaftigkeit” is certainly vivid imagery. The root is Zwitter which basically carries the sense of hermaphrodite. For Schweitzer, modern theology’s dual perspective is akin to the hermaphrodite who exhibits both sexes and is therefore confused as to which sexuality to perform.\(^{184}\)

This move is articulated well by Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930) in his popular lectures Das Wesen des Christentums in 1899–1900 at the University of Berlin.\(^{185}\) “More than any other book it represented the spirit of Protestant Liberalism in the decades just prior to World War I.”\(^{186}\) Harnack argued that the teaching of Jesus concerning the kingdom of God was a spiritual force which was operative within the

\(^{181}\) see Watson, “Eschatology and the Twentieth Century,” pp. 342–44.

\(^{182}\) Skizze, p. 97; Mystery, p. 250.

\(^{183}\) Skizze, p. 97.

\(^{184}\) For the issues of sexual performativity and the construction of sexuality and gender as it relates to hermaphrodites within modern medical science, see the fascinating work of Alice Domurat Dreger, Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).


individual and transcended former religious conceptions. Harnack allows for the eschatological and apocalyptic husk, but sees its kernel, or essence, as the rule of the holy God in the hearts of individuals; it is God himself in his power. From this point of view everything that was dramatic in the external and historical sense has vanished; and gone, too, are all the external hopes for the future...the word of God, God himself, is the kingdom. It is not a question of angels and devils, thrones and principalities, but of God and the soul, the soul and its God.

The permanent validity within temporal forms is what he called the gospel of Jesus Christ. “Jesus Christ and his disciples were situated in their day just as we are situated in ours; that is to say, their feelings, their thoughts, their judgments and their efforts were bounded by the horizon and the framework in which their own nation was set and by its condition at the time.” To be human “means to be situated...in an historical environment which in turn is also limited and circumscribed.” Jesus and his followers “only shared the general notions of their time.” Harnack therefore sets his own tertium non datur with respect to the temporality of Jesus and the gospel. “There are only two possibilities here: either the gospel is in all respects identical with its earliest form, in which case it came with its time, and with its time has departed; or else it contains something which, under differing historical forms, is of permanent validity.” It was the “permanent

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189 Harnack states that Jesus’ teaching can be grouped under three headings but each “are of such a nature as to contain the whole, and hence it can be exhibited in its entirety under any of them. First, the kingdom of God and its coming; second, God the Father and the infinite value of the human soul; and, third, the higher righteousness and the commandment of love” (Harnack, *What Is Christianity?* p. 52).
validity” of the gospel which establishes the essence of Christianity. Harnack favors the latter view while Schweitzer appears to subscribe to the former.

Schweitzer maintains that “Jesus ist aber eine übermenschliche Persönlichkeit aus einem Guss,” and modern theology does “violence” (Gewaltthat) in its separating (herauszulösen) Jesus from his age and translating (übersetzen) “his personality into the terms of our modern thought, and to conceive of him as ‘messiah’ and ‘son of God’ outside of the Jewish framework,” often falling into the erroneous habits of early research by reducing these terms to “a spiritualizing” (eine Vergeistigung). This was to modern theology’s own peril. The neglect of die eschatologische Frage as “merely a skirmish with a few unorganized guerillas” turned out to be the advanceguard of the army with which Reimarus was threatening their flank, and which under the leadership of Johannes Weiss was to bring them to so dangerous a pass. And while they were endeavouring to avoid this turning movement they fell into the ambush which Bruno Bauer had laid in their rear: Wrede held up the Markan hypothesis and demanded the pass-word for the theory of the Messianic consciousness and claims of Jesus to which it was acting as convoy.

The millstone of Reimarus which he hung upon the neck of the dogmatics of his age was cast upon the necks of the dogmatics of Schweitzer’s day. Though Otto Pfleiderer in his second edition of Urchristentum recognized the threat and marked “the first advance-guard action of modern theology coming into touch with the troops of Reimarus and Bruno Bauer,” the coup de grâce was finally given by Schweitzer himself. What konsequente Eschatologie has joined together, let no modern theology put asunder.

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195 I say “Schweitzer appears to subscribe to the former” because within his ethical construction of Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben Schweitzer seems to fall prey to his own criticism here in appropriating the enduringly valid of Jesus to the ethical.

196 Skizze, p. 97; Mystery, pp. 250-51.

197 Schweitzer, Aus meinem Leben und Denken p. 30; Schweitzer, Life and Thought p. 37.

198 Geschichte1/2 pp. 220/220; Quest1/2 pp. 221/188. Though the translations of Quest1 and Quest2 read slightly different, the wording is unchanged in Geschichte2 from Geschichte1.

199 Quest1 p. 26.

200 Quest1 p. 313.
For Schweitzer, the canons of great men are lined by those who had a “clear grasp of a single definite problem.”\textsuperscript{201} That “single definite problem,” of course, is *eschatologie* as the key to unlocking the connection between the events into a singular profile of the historical Jesus’ life. “It was the way Schweitzer arranged his history of research that ‘compelled attention.’”\textsuperscript{202} In his critique of the history of research through the singular key of *Eschatologie*, Schweitzer re-structures the history of the problem in such a way that it inevitably leads to his articulation of the solution.\textsuperscript{203} The “hundred and twenty years” of waiting are over,\textsuperscript{204} the “future historian” (*einen kommenden Historiker*) has arrived.\textsuperscript{205} Schweitzer’s “goal was nothing short of a paradigm shift in his discipline.”\textsuperscript{206} In the face of German liberal dogmatics and its stance against eschatology, Schweitzer attempts “to destroy dogmatically what had been re-established critically”: the Jesus-of-relevance in accordance with nineteenth-century German theology.\textsuperscript{207} The order brought forth from the chaos of former lives has a clear beginning (Reimarus), middle (Strauss), and end/goal (*konsequente Eschatologie* as articulated in Weiss and Schweitzer’s own *Skizze*). Progress is evaluated and judged “as the ideas of these three are rediscovered or anticipated.”\textsuperscript{208} Schweitzer, with a prophetic trope, “fuses narratorial hindsight with the impression of a predetermined scheme.”\textsuperscript{209} Indeed the posturing of Renan, the latter Strauss, Schenkel, Weizsäcker and Keim amount to little more than the singular rejection of eschatology and a spiritualization of an “inward kingdom of repentance.”\textsuperscript{210} This move was met head on by Johannes Weiss

\begin{footnotes}
\item[201] *Quest*\textsuperscript{1} p. 9.
\item[202] Gathercole, "The Critical and Dogmatic Agenda of Schweitzer’s *Quest,*" p. 262.
\item[203] This was the substantial criticism of Windisch, Jülicher and Wernle who suspected Schweitzer’s history of the problem of the life of Jesus to be from the singular perspective of *konsequente Eschatologie*. See, esp., Carleton Paget, "Schweitzer’s second edition,” p. 12 n. 44.
\item[204] Cf., *Quest*\textsuperscript{1} p. 23.
\item[205] *Geschichte*\textsuperscript{1/2} pp. 24/25; *Quest*\textsuperscript{1/2} pp. 25/25.
\item[206] Gathercole, "The Critical and Dogmatic Agenda of Schweitzer’s *Quest,*" p. 263.
\item[207] Gathercole, "The Critical and Dogmatic Agenda of Schweitzer’s *Quest,*" p. 263.
\item[208] Gathercole, "The Critical and Dogmatic Agenda of Schweitzer’s *Quest,*" p. 267.
\item[209] Gathercole, "The Critical and Dogmatic Agenda of Schweitzer’s *Quest,*" p. 269.
\item[210] *Quest*\textsuperscript{1} p. 275.
\end{footnotes}
and finally brought to an end by Schweitzer himself. But it was Reimarus who set the plot in motion.

1.3. Conclusion

Schweitzer thus engaged in more than chronicling. He is more than a mere guide through the libraries of Leben Jesu Forschung. He is less Virgil, more Dante, a narrator who has invaded his own narrative and taken up the starring role.

“Schweitzer has intruded into the narrative uninvited,” standing outside the promised sequence of the title. The reader, promised a history-of-research by the subtitle, instead is treated to Schweitzer’s seventy-five page Skizze “smuggled inside an analysis of Wrede’s work.” In drawing attention to his Skizze for a fuller treatment of the litany of questions posed in a footnote tucked away within an examination of der konsequente Skeptizismus und die konsequente Eschatologie, he is guilty of his own criticism of Bousset: “the author’s real opinion is expressed in the footnote.” But it is in his construction and characterization of Reimarus where the narrative movement is most evident. Reimarus, as with Hamlet’s Ghost, sets the plot in motion and leads invariably to the plot’s dénouement. So is Reimarus “a spirit of health or goblin damn’d”? There is no definitive answer as he appears to receive both commendation and condemnation. His appearance is functional. In suggesting that Reimarus’ role in the drama of the critical examination of the life of Jesus was to dig his trowel around the dry bones of fact, collecting them for some future historian, it is evident that, again, Schweitzer has fallen prey to his own criticism: what he went about looking for in the past was not the past but konsequente Eschatologie and himself as its champion in the past. Schweitzer uses

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211 Johannes Weiss, Jesus’ Proclamation of the Kingdom of God (trans. Richard H. Hiers & D. Larrimore Holland; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971 [1892]).
213 Geschichte1 p. 332 n. 1; Quest1 p. 335 n. 1.
214 Quest1 p. 265 though absent from Quest2.
215 Quest1 p. 25.
216 Cf. Geschichte1/2 pp. 28/28; Quest1/2 pp. 28/28.
“Reimarus in the interests of his own point of view.”\textsuperscript{217} As such, Schweitzer’s “architectonic structure” and strategy thus become clear.\textsuperscript{218} He wishes to re-cast the history of inquiry into a new division: vor Eschatologie und nach Eschatologie; or, better, vor Schweitzer und nach Schweitzer. It now falls to us to discover what exactly he meant by Eschatologie,\textsuperscript{219} but before we do that (see §3) we need to demonstrate the assumption which we have been making all along in this chapter: viz., that Schweitzer improperly framed Reimarus.

\textsuperscript{217} Talbert, “Introduction,” p. 40.
\textsuperscript{218} Carleton Paget, “Schweitzer’s second edition,” p. 16.
\textsuperscript{219} It must be maintained that Schweitzer’s (mis)use or construction of Reimarus is not irreducibly connected with his own constructive project. We will examine his own constructive proposal in §3.
CHAPTER TWO
A WOLF IN WOLFF’S CLOTHING?
THE QUEST FOR THE HISTORICAL REIMARUS

“All we are not stares back at what we are.”
W. H. Auden, “Prospero to Ariel”¹

“Tell all the Truth but tell it slant […]
The Truth must dazzle gradually
Or every man be blind.”

Emily Dickinson, “Tell all the Truth”²

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2.0. The Complexities of Historical Identity
It now falls to us to demonstrate what we have assumed in the previous chapter; viz., that though the particulars of Schweitzer’s construction of Reimarus are more or less correct with respect to Lessing’s seventh Fragment, his framing of Reimarus is largely misleading. As we have seen, Reimarus was Schweitzer’s “great hero.”³ He marked for Schweitzer the “magnificent overture in which are announced all the motifs of the future historical treatment of the life of Jesus.”⁴ In the previous chapter we focused on Schweitzer’s construction of Reimarus and his rhetorical function within the narrative of the Geschichte through the critical tools of narratology and literary criticism. An examination of the “historical” Reimarus in comparison with Schweitzer’s construction would seem to be the next logical step. A simple turn to the “historical” Reimarus, however, presents an interesting test case into the complexities of historical identity⁵ for there appear to be as many Reimaruses as

⁴ Quest 1 p. 26.
⁵ The best biographies for Reimarus remain Peter Stemmer, Weissagung und Kritik: Eine Studie zur Hermeneutik bei Hermann Samuel Reimarus (Veröffentlichungen der Jungius-Gesellschaft 48; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983); David F. Strauss, Hermann Samuel Reimarus und seine Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes (Bonn: Emil Strauss, 1877 [1862]); and,
there have been recourses to him. This “battalion of Reimarusus” is complicated by
the nature of the sources and the realities of his multiple mediation. Nearly all of
subsequent scholarship sees Reimarus through the prism of Lessing—who himself
presents his own complications of identity. Lessing, however, only published a
selection of the Apologie which included his own critical commentary. It was the
critical commentary which was in turn appropriated by Kierkegaard, and the
Fragmente themselves were substantially reworked and supplemented by Strauss
who had access to a full manuscript of the Apologie. What is more, the writings
which Reimarus released during his lifetime conceal the critical conclusions he
would draw in the cloistered script of his Apologie. As Charles H. Talbert has
written, there “was a public and a private Reimarus.” Reimarus himself alludes to
his double life in the foreword to his Apologie for which he later appears to
apologize to his wife:

und wie würde die, so in seinen Armen schläft, wenn sie dereinst ihres
Mannes wahre Meynung von dem Christenthum erführe, nach ihrer
Schwachheit, ängstlich thun, und den Herrn Beichtvater anflehen, daß er

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Heinrich Sieveking, “Hermann Samuel Reimarus, 1694-1768,” Zeitschrift des Vereins für
Hamburgische Geschichte 38 (1939) 145-82. Though see the recent collection of excellent essays in

6 The term “battalion of Reimaruses” is informed by the clever phrasing “battalion of
Luthers” from David Steinmetz, “The Superiority of Pre-Critical Exegesis,” Theology Today 37.1
(1980) 27-38, p. 36.

7 For Lessing’s critical commentary and arrangement of his selection of the Fragmente, see
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Siebenter Band: Theologiekritische Schriften I und II (Werke; 8 vols.; ed.
Helmut Göbel; München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1976); Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Lessing: Philosophical
and Theological Writings (trans. H. B. Nisbet; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Hugh
Lessing, see Nisbet, Lessing, pp. 850–64. See, too, §2.2.1. below.

8 On the story of the appearance of the Fragmente, see §2.2.1 below.

9 For Kierkegaard’s recourse to Lessing, see Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific
Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments (trans. Alastair Hannay; Cambridge Cambridge University

10 Strauss, Reimarus.

11 Hermann Samuel Reimarus, Apologie: oder Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer
Gottes (2vols.; ed. Gerhard Alexander; Frankfurt: Insel, 1972). The publication of the Apologie under
the editorial eye of Gerhard Alexander and the commissioning of Joachim-Jungius-Gesellschaft der
Wissenschaften Hamberg did not appear until some two-hundred years after its writing.


It is this “double-life” which both complicates and sheds light on the *Apologie* as we shall see below. A full treatment of the historical and sociological pressures which gave rise to the public and private work of Reimarus and the subsequent theological debates provoked by Lessing cannot be attempted here. Moreover, a complete biography or theologico-philosophy of Reimarus falls beyond the scope of this chapter. Our aim here is simply to challenge Schweitzer’s construction of Reimarus by situating his work within the wider conversations of his day. As we will see, Reimarus was less interested in questions of Christian origins than in the wider philosophical issues of natural religion and the competing metaphysics of reason.

This chapter, then, is divided into two sections: §2.1 *The Public Reimarus*; and, §2.2 *The Private Reimarus*. This distinction, however, presents real problems in that history and identity are not so easily bifurcated. In splitting Reimarus violently into “public” and “private” entities it is important to parse what is intended in each case and what is not. Such a distinction is *not* intended to suggest that public equals fraudulent and that private equals authentic or real. The sources of Reimarus’ self surely comprised both spheres. A more minimalist approach is operative here where *private* will order matters related to the *Apologie* and *public* to his wider œuvre

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which established his reputation as a Wolffian rationalist of the first rank. We will approach these in reverse order.

2.1. The Public Reimarus

Before turning to the wider concerns which informed and framed Reimarus’ work, a word or two of brief biography is required in order to make sense of his refrain from voicing the true nature of his beliefs and to get a sense of his social location. As we will see, the two are deeply related as the reasons for his silence were quite personal and close to home. In this section we will first sketch a brief biography of Reimarus (§2.1.1), then we will suggest an environment in which Reimarus’ self-named publications were constructed (§2.1.2), and conclude with a suggested reading of Reimarus within this environment (§2.1.3).

2.1.1. Reimarus and the Burden of Prestige

Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768) was born and later married into privilege and prestige. Born to Nicolaus Reimarus, a teacher at the Johanneum Academic Gymnasium, and Johanna Wetken, from an old Hamburg family, Reimarus studied theology, ancient languages and philosophy at Jena (1714–16) but grew “more interested in philological and philosophical questions and gave up his theological studies while in Jena.” Reimarus left Jena and pursued his new interests at Wittenberg (1716–19) where he defended a thesis on the precedents of Machiavaellian thought in Machiellismus vor Machiavell. He was accepted to the Wittenberg philosophy faculty in the capacity of Privatdozent in 1719. During the next two years Reimarus took a study leave to tour Holland and England. These years proved crucial in his academic development as it was during this leave that Reimarus was introduced to Jean Le Clerc (1657–1736) and deism.19

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18 Henning Graf Reventlow, From the Enlightenment to the Twentieth Century (History of Biblical Interpretation; vol. 4; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2010) 155.
Reimarus would become a respected professor of oriental languages at Hamburg, a position he was awarded in 1727. While at Hamburg he also lectured on philosophy, mathematics and natural sciences. He authored some thirty-seven different volumes covering various subject such as logic, philosophy and philology. His most significant works in the field of religion were Die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion (1754), and, of course, the posthumous publication of Apologie oder Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes which was first made known as the so-called Wolfenbütteler Fragmenten (1774–78) published by G. E. Lessing. It appears that it was around 1736 when he began work on the Apologie and worked at it up until his death in 1768. Lewis White Beck has argued that Reimarus left the higher academic world because of his uncertainty surrounding the doctrines and debates of Wolff. It was “in a state of indecision” that Reimarus left Wittenberg to join the gymnasium in Hamburg. In any case, the young Reimarus fell under the spell of the physico-theologians Johann Albert Fabricius (1668–1736), the classical philosopher, and the Hebraist Johann Christoph Wolf (1690–1770). The former’s influence had far-reaching affects. Johanna Friederica Fabricius (1707–83) was the daughter of Fabricius and would share a happy forty years of marriage with Reimarus. The influence of his time in England reverberated in the children’s education. He insisted that they be taught English, they owned several pieces of

volumes of Samuel Chandler and James Foster, History of British Deism (8vols.; London: Routledge, 1994).


21 For a listing of the works of Reimarus, see Klein, Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768): Das theologische Werk 286–88.

22 On the textual history of the Apologie, see Talbert, “Introduction,” pp. 18–26. The manuscript Lessing presented to the Duke in 1778 has never been found and the Apologie in its entirety was not published until 1972. The text from which this chapter will quote is Hermann Samuel Reimarus, Fragments (trans. George Wesley Buchanan; London: SCM Press, 1970).


24 On Fabricius, see Erik Petersen, Johann Albert Fabricius: en humanist i Europa (København: Det Kongelige bibliotek, Museum Tusculanum, 1998); and Wilhelm Göttén, Das Jetztlebende Gelehrte Europa (vol. 1; New York: Olms, 1975 [1735]) 43–67.

25 The two were married in 1728. On Reimarus and his personal life and as a family man, see Spalding, The Muse of Hamburg 45–56. The Reimarus family seemed to be happy and H. S. Reimarus was known for his warmth and financial generosity. See ibid., p. 125 n. 51.
English furniture, and he kept an active correspondence with English book traders and significant thinkers.26

Reimarus might well have stayed silent owing to the grand lineage of his family’s name as well as out of respect for his father-in-law. 27 The Reimarus family was one of the oldest in Northern Germany, and could trace their roots back to the middle ages. 28 A public voicing of his Apologie would ruin the prospects for his children, 29 and as a teacher in the Gymnasium, he was “technically an employee of the church and probably enjoyed a pew reservation as part of his compensation.” 30 What is more, though not nearly as intense as their 1769 public dispute, the fiery Pastor Goeze had confronted a close family friend, Julius Gustav Alberti (1723–72), in 1755. This would have seemed the occasion to air his views in the defense of his friend, but Reimarus learned the lesson of timing from Alberti and the orthodox border patrol and decided to stay silent—Goeze, of course, will return later in our narrative.31 From all appearances, Reimarus was a strong Wolffian Christian apologist. Indeed, to the end, Reimarus participated in the worship and sacraments of the Lutheran church, 32 and J. G. Büsch could eulogize Reimarus on the merits of his Christian commitments. 33 As the public Reimarus lay dying, however, the private Reimarus awaited in an intermediate state until Lessing resurrected him.

2.1.2. The Fate of Reason and the Zeitgeist of Reimarus

It is difficult to understand Reimarus without recourse to his times. But even here this simple statement is more complicated than is first apparent. Lessing’s

27 Here there is an interesting parallel with Albrecht Ritschl and his son-in-law, Johannes Weiss. See Chapman, The Coming Crisis 67–71.
publication of the *Fragmente* brought Reimarus into conversations which were not concurrent with those happening during his lifetime—or, at least, in the manner in which these conversations were shaped. Lessing’s use of Reimarus was in the service of his own debates. What will concern us here are those discernable pressures which gave rise to the penning of the *Apologie* as evidenced in his earlier work and not the debates surrounding its publication.\(^{34}\)

Reimarus was set within the twilight of late rationalism and the early momentum of *Aufklärung*, just prior to Kant (1724–1804) and Herder (1744–1803), and the evolving discourse on the relationship between reason and revelation.\(^{35}\)

Propositional revelation was coming under attack in two forms: Pietism and *Aufklärung*.\(^{36}\) The former ranked the inner attestation of the soul above external forms while the latter developed through varying stages.\(^{37}\) For many “freethinkers, *Aufklärer*, and *philosophes*, the new physics of Galileo, Newton, and Huygens had shown that everything in nature is explicable according to a system of mathematical laws, which are transparent to and discovered by reason.”\(^{38}\) These self-evident first principles of reason were appropriated into the “soft” sciences and held sway as the judicator over morality, religion and the state. It was boldly asserted that reason was impartial and universal in its explanatory powers.\(^{39}\) “Toward the close of the eighteenth century, however, all these claims were thrown into question.”\(^{40}\) It was the decline of rationalist metaphysics within the Leibnizian-Wolffian school which

\(^{34}\) On the debates surrounding the publication of the *Fragmente*, see Brown, *Jesus in European Protestant Thought*, pp. 1–56 and the literature cited there. See, too, §2.2.1. below.  
\(^{38}\) Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, p. 10.  
\(^{40}\) Frederick C. Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) 1.
created a vacuum that Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* forcefully filled (1781).41 Kant’s trenchant critique of this rationalism “was only the coup de grace to the rotting edifice of the Leibnizian-Wolffian school.”42 The Kantian critique was met with equal force, however, with the rise of post-Kantian concerns over “the meta-critical problem.”43 Johann Georg Hamann (1730–88) in particular opposed Kant’s adjectival modifier of reinen Vernunft. Reason is embodied in language and action.44 Nevertheless, the seventeenth century’s principle of the harmony of reason and nature was inherited by the eighteenth century.45 The later break with rationalism did not question this harmony but rather sought different ways on how to demonstrate it. Hamann detested the “purism” of reason abstracted from its function in speech and culture.46 This move from reason as a separate faculty to a functionalist understanding as well as his insistence that we must grasp our faculties as a whole in order to grasp the possibility of knowledge left the “one-sided extremes of Leibnizian rationalism or Lockean empiricism” looking rather dated.47 These were the products of the wars over reason.48

The significance of this for our purposes in this chapter is that it places Reimarus within the twilight of rationalism’s attempt to extend the harmony of reason and nature to all spheres of inquiry within a Wolffian system. He “marks the climax of


42 Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, p. 4. The Wolffians did strike back, however, and had a profound influence on later reformulations of Kant and Reinhold and C. G. Bardili. But the Wolffians were most influential in their claim that the principles of logic are “neither subjective nor objective but valid of things-in-general” which anticipated in its own right Hegel’s *Logik* and Schelling’s *Identitätssystem* (*idem.*, p. 225). On the response of the Wolffians to Kant post-1788 in general, see Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, pp. 193–225.


48 A fuller detailing of this complex development is explicated by Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*. 
the Enlightened theology that was the outcome of the philosophy of Wolff.” The rise of philological and historical criticism of scripture in the 1770s drafted the momentum of the natural sciences with Wolffianism entrenching “itself in most of the universities of Protestant Germany.” Wolff himself boasted in *Theologica naturalis* (1737) that his system was a “bulwark against Spinozism.” Wolffians needed to separate themselves from Spinoza because pietists such as Joachim Lange (1670–1744) and Johann Franz Budde (1667–1729) “maintained that Wolff’s rationalism was the slippery slope to the atheism and fatalism of Spinoza.” Until the mid-eighteenth century professors and clerics had to demonstrate their orthodoxy before being awarded with an office; and in practice “this often meant denouncing Spinoza as a heretic.” The danger of Spinoza’s political views were clearly felt by the academic and ecclesiastical establishments in Germany. The *Tractatus theologicus-politicus* (1670) was seen as a challenge to and an undercutting of the basis for which princes were allotted the principle of *cuius regio eius religio* as outlined by the *Augsburger Religions-friede* of 1555. But after the publication of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s (1743–1819) *Briefe über die Lehre von Spinoza* in 1785, and in large measure owing to the reception of Lessing’s work, public opinion of Spinoza shifted from public scorn “to universal admiration” as he became the “very vanguard” of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century.

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51 Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, p. 49.

52 Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, p. 49.

53 Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, p. 49.

54 On attitudes toward Spinoza’s philosophy in Germany, see Hettner, *Geschichte*, pp. 1.34–38; and K. Grunwald, *Spinoza in Deutschland* (Berlin: Calvry, 1897) 45–48.


57 Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, p. 59.
Aufklärung and the champion for the “Protestant Counter-Reformation.” The Tractatus became a manifesto for all radicals who clearly favored their Lutheran heritage of an individual, immediate relationship with God, and, this side of Spinoza, at the same time allowed for the doing away with the unfashionable authority of the bible.

The work of Christian Wolff (1679–1754) was significant in the ramp up to these debates. Wolff turned to the study of mathematics in “his quest for certainty” when he grew unsatisfied with orthodox theology. Wolff eventually wrote a dissertation on the appropriation of mathematical methods to problems in practical philosophy from Leipzig in 1702. His dissertation drew the attention of Leibniz and the two remained in correspondence until Leibniz’s death in 1716. It is mistaken, however, as is often the case, to name Wolff a mere “popularizer of Leibniz.” Though Leibniz seemed to see his work reproduced in Wolff, the latter claimed the greater influence was Thomas Aquinas and railed against the labeling of a Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy by his opponents Budde and Rüdiger as uninformed. It was the appearance of his Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes in 1713 which “made him the leading philosopher in Germany.” Though his philosophy was taught widely in Jena, Tübingen and Königsberg, Thomasius, Rüdiger, Gundling, and Budde opposed him at Halle. The pietists, under the direction of Francke, also opposed his rationalism, but it took the intrigue of the “tobacco cabinet” under Friedrich Wilhelm I (1688–1740) to rid “den berühmten Philosophen” from the flock of Halle. Wolff had forty-eight hours to leave Halle or be executed. His flight to Marburg proved fortuitous in that his works became

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58 Beiser, The Fate of Reason, p. 50. The phrase “Protestant Counter-Reformation” is from Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 148–56.
60 Beck, Early German Philosophy, p. 256.
61 As is the case in Livingston, The Enlightenment and the Nineteenth Century p. 29; and, Talbert, “Introduction,” p. 11.
62 Beck, Early German Philosophy, p. 257.
63 Beck, Early German Philosophy, p. 257.
64 Hettner, Geschichte, p. 1.177.
available throughout the continent as a result, and, combined with the dramatic flight from state persecution, "made him an intellectual hero and brought him European fame...and a patent of nobility." The impact of Wolff was immense.

Frederick the Great (1712–86), upon his ascension in 1740, recalled Wolff from his father’s banishment and placed him in a permanent fellowship within the Berlin Academy. Wolff instead returned to Halle to empty lecture halls but a country filled with his influence. He was given the title of praecceptor Germaniae. Wolff’s legacy was not so much in his original philosophical work, but, as Beck states,

Wolff changed the Catholic and Protestant scholasticism of the Baroque period and the new mathematical methods and natural science of Leibniz and von Tschirnhaus, as well as he understood them, into a conception of philosophy as an omnicompetent instrument of public enlightenment.

What is more, his influence on philosophical terminology was felt even through Kant. Nevertheless, the empty lecture halls awaiting him in Halle proved prescient in that he was a fading star amidst the “low state of philosophy in Germany at that time.”

2.1.3. Reading Reimarus within the Wars of Reason

Reimarus’ scholarly work is therefore situated within these wider conversations. His Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Triebe der Thiere (1760–62), for example, was less about animal behavior than a physical-theological view of the natural world and the questions of teleology which were experiencing a “revival” toward the close of the eighteenth century, particularly with Kant’s attack of Herder and Forster. Though written twenty years before Kant’s influential essay, “Ueber den Gebrauch teleologischen Prinzipien in der Philosophie” (1781), Reimarus’ assumption was

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66 Friedrich Wilhelm I did later regret his hasty move and sought in 1733 to reinstate him—a move which Wolff refused.
that nature appears to act as if it were influenced by purpose. His view of the world was thus "thoroughly teleological."\textsuperscript{70} Kant,\textsuperscript{71} of course, developed the question considerably whereas Reimarus' investigation was more exploratory and demonstrative of earlier presuppositions of teleological models.\textsuperscript{72} Reimarus' interest in teleology is not so much in the defense of the existence of God, but in the establishment of the rationality of the universe and, therefore, natural religion's sufficiency in apprehending it. What is more, the end of the world was viewed as the well-being of every living thing.\textsuperscript{73} Reimarus was a member of the poet Barthold Heinrich Brockes' (1680–1747) circle in Hamburg.\textsuperscript{74} Within this circle, the concept of teleology was pursued in the study of animals as in the case of Reimarus as well as through lithotheology, testaceotheology, or seismotheology.\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Vernunftlehre} (1756) is his theory of logic and \textit{Vindicatio dictorum Veteris Testamenti in Novo allegatorum} (1731) was his attempt as an apologist to defend the prophetic witness of the OT in the formation of traditional Christology. Along with his \textit{Abhandlungen über die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion} (1754), some have suggested that "the separate publication of these works was one of the maneuvers by which he kept from the public his true attitude."\textsuperscript{76} This, however, assumes too much and misses the layered development of Reimarus as a complex thinker.

Christian Wolff’s synthesis of revelation \textit{above} reason and reason as establishing the criteria with which reason is judged was attacked by neology on the one hand,\textsuperscript{77} and

\textsuperscript{70} Erdmann, \textit{History of Philosophy}, p. 2.294.
\textsuperscript{72} Erdmann goes so far as to call Reimarus a “precursor of Kant” (\textit{History of Philosophy}, p. 2.295).
\textsuperscript{75} Cf. Beck, \textit{Early German Philosophy}, p. 294.
\textsuperscript{76} Reventlow, \textit{History of Biblical Interpretation}, p. 4.157.
\textsuperscript{77} The contention of neology was twofold: (1) revelation is real but its content is not different from natural religion; (2) reason is the baseline from which revelation is judged. “The term
rationalism on the other.\textsuperscript{78} The public Reimarus, whose views were set forth in \textit{Die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion} (1754), applied Wolff’s and Leibniz’s theological synthesis against the atheistic materialism of La Mettrie and the pantheism of Spinoza amongst others.\textsuperscript{79} The work was influential in its day, contributing to the evolving system of Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86).\textsuperscript{80} There appears to be an interaction between Mendelssohn and Reimarus over his \textit{Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Triebe der Tiere, hauptsächlich über ihren Kunsttrieb}.\textsuperscript{81} The former acknowledged that his \textit{Phaidon} was heavily influenced by the latter’s \textit{Die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion}.\textsuperscript{82} Mendelssohn was “the last figure in the rationalist metaphysical tradition of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff.”\textsuperscript{83} And what is left latent by these thinkers “is often articulated and defended by Mendelssohn.”\textsuperscript{84}

Apart from a brief aside on the irrationality of the miraculous and therefore their impossibility,\textsuperscript{85} Reimarus appears to be an apologist of the Wolffian ilk intending to show that natural religion and Christianity were complementary, not contradictory.

\textit{Neologie} denotes a movement which reached its zenith in the half-century between 1740 and 1790. In general, the Neologians sought to transcend both orthodoxy and Pietism by restating the Christian faith in the light of modern thought. To them, revelation was a confirmation of the truths of reason. They drew a distinction between religion and theology, and between dogmas and the Bible. In a sense they were pioneers of a moderate biblical criticism, maintaining that Jesus deliberately accommodated his teaching to the beliefs and understandings of his hearers” (Brown, \textit{Jesus in European Protestant Thought}, p. 8; though see generally, pp. 8–16).

\textsuperscript{78} Rationalism agrees with the latter element in Wolff’s thesis but on the basis of it denied the necessity of the former. Reason displaces revelation.

\textsuperscript{79} Here, see Hettner, \textit{Geschichte}, pp. 1.360–73.


\textsuperscript{81} On the issues of classification and drives of life, see Cheung, “Hermann Samuel Reimarus’ Theorie der ‘Lebensarten’ und ‘Triebe.’”


\textsuperscript{83} Beiser, \textit{The Fate of Reason}, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{84} Beiser, \textit{The Fate of Reason}, p. 93. Beck states that Mendelssohn’s “Prize Essay” is the best presentation of Leibnizian-Wolffian epistemology (\textit{Early German Philosophy}, pp. 332–35).

For the public Reimarus, natural religion prepares the way for Christianity. The move from the public Reimarus to the private Reimarus is the move from natural religion as preamble (*preambula*) to Christian faith to natural religion as sufficient in itself. Natural religion is a living knowledge of God acquired through reason. The cosmos is a planned and ordered creation which is discernable through reason. Revelation and positive religion thus become gratuitious. He sees the pursuit of happiness as the goal of human life as established by providence and the immortality of the soul.

2.2. The Private Reimarus

With the benefit of the retrospective glance, Reimarus’ secret did reveal itself in his public works if ever so slightly. If his own account is to be trusted, Reimarus speaks of how his initial doubts of the whole edifice of Christianity began during his childhood. What is more, Reimarus may well have written a rationalist catechism that appeared in Hamburg in 1753 which rivaled the larger catechism which was an orthodox Lutheran version authored by Erdmann Neumeister (1671–1756)—an outspoken opponent of the Patriotic Society which regularly met in the Reimarus home. The smaller catechism was accredited to Friedrich Wagner (1693–1760), but many have suggested it was actually Reimarus’ pen which was responsible. In any case, despite hints within his public works, it was the *Apologie* which collected his private convictions.

In 1731 there is evidence of Reimarus’ growing disquiet with a purely sacred hermeneutic as well as his developing system of reasonable theology. An

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86 This is more or less suggested in the preface of Reimarus, *Die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion*.
87 See, e.g., *Die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion*, pp. 2.691–766.
88 E.g., the denial of the *possibility* of the miraculous in Reimarus, *Die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion*, pp. 1.587–90.
89 *Apologie*, p. 1.47.
91 See his interesting comments on “tempered reason” in *Apologie*, p. 2.348.
intriguing witness to this growing tension is in his editing of Johann Adolf Hoffmann’s *Neue Erklärung des Buchs Hiob* in 1731–33. Hoffmann’s work was guided by an edifying hermeneutic while Reimarus’ employed “eine vernünftige Hermeneut.” Nevertheless, it is not apparent that he “perceived any irreconcilable differences between biblical hermeneutics and natural theology” at this time. Between 1733 and 1736, however, something led to the penning of the first draft of his *Apologie* where “the explosive potential of a consolidation of the authority of natural reason at the expense of the bible became apparent.” As it happened, 1736 was the year in which his reviews of the so-called *Wertheim Bible*, the work of the young Johann Lorenz Schmidt (1702–49), appeared in the *Hamburgische Berichte von Gelehrten Sachen*. These reviews mark two of the rare public performances where Reimarus manifests some public symptoms of what would later become his private constitution. What is more, there is a subtle change felt between the two reviews from critical and suspicious in the first to supportive in the second which may be owing “to the great efforts of Schmidt and his supporters at Wertheim to refute the accusation of Lange concerning his hostile intentions.” Almut and Paul Spalding have recently argued, judging from the Reimarus family account books, that the young Schmidt may have been employed in the Reimarus


household as a tutor in the 1740s.\textsuperscript{100} There appears to be a kind of relationship between the two dating prior to this tutorship. In any case, in 1737, Reimarus ceased lecturing on the topic of sacred hermeneutics altogether at the Gymnasium illustre but continued his work in biblical antiquities.\textsuperscript{101} This cessation marks a significant departure and turning point for Reimarus as shortly after he ceases buying theological books.\textsuperscript{102} Perhaps, then, 1735–36 marks a halfway house in between the public square of his lectures and the gated walls of the \textit{Apologie}.

The transition from the Reimarus of “Hamburgian and Wittenbergian orthodoxy” to the Reimarus latter revealed in the \textit{Apologie}, however, remains a “process that has not yet been fully understood.”\textsuperscript{103} Peter Stemmer has strongly argued that the move cannot be located to the time of his \textit{peregrinatio academica} through Holland and England.\textsuperscript{104} Jonathan Israel has furthered this contention, calling the \textit{idée fixe} in Reimarus scholarship on English influence “both groundless and highly misleading.”\textsuperscript{105} While Israel stresses the lack of explicit appeal within the \textit{Apologie} to English deists, such an argument misses the way in which many references that were initially worked into the \textit{Apologie} are not ostensibly cited in the final draft.\textsuperscript{106} He states that Jean Le Clerc and the Dutch contexts—though certainly not the main influences—are “more important than the British context.”\textsuperscript{107} This, too, is overstated

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\textsuperscript{101} For the listing of Reimarus' lectures, see Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, \textit{Hermann Samuel Reimarus: Handschriftenverzeichnis und Bibliographie} (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979). See, too, Mulsow, “From Antiquarianism to Bible Criticism?” p. 11.


\textsuperscript{104} Stemmer, \textit{Weissagung und Kritik: Eine Studie zur Hermeneutik bei Hermann Samuel Reimarus} pp. 88ff.; cited first in Mulsow, “From Antiquarianism to Bible Criticism?” p. 3 no. 8.


\textsuperscript{106} For examples, see Mulsow, “From Antiquarianism to Bible Criticism,” p. 14 n. 54.

\textsuperscript{107} Israel, “Philosophical Context,” p. 188.

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as Reimarus would write of Le Clerc in his travel diary that "he seemed to me a little profane" and was suspicious of Le Clerc’s dangerous muddling of *philologia sacra* and *philologia profana*. Israel’s argument, however, is an interesting attempt at seeing a “philosophically coherent whole” which can be read across both the public and private Reimarus. This “whole” for Israel is Reimarus’ “general critique of materialism, purely mechanistic systems, and Spinozism.” Throughout his works, “the primary point for Reimarus was that while God can reveal no more than what is universal and material, philosophy cannot, on that ground, reduce everything to one substance.”

Despite the complexities of Reimarus’ historical location, it is clear that the private Reimarus is revealed in the *Apologie*. It was not until 1814, however, when his son handed a copy of the *Apologie* to the library at Göttingen, that its authorship was finally settled. The reasons for Reimarus’ silence have been speculated as ranging from the former persecution of Schmidt to the delicate family situation regarding his father-in-law, Fabricius. Reimarus gives his own reason, in an early prefiguration of Nietzsche’s “The Madman,” stating that though the time is near he feels it has not yet arrived for his views to be publicized, perhaps patterning himself after Wolff, who was released from banishment in 1743 and whose views were later celebrated and vindicated.

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110 Israel, “Philosophical Context,” p. 188.

111 Israel, “Philosophical Context,” p. 197.

112 See Talbert, “Introduction,” pp. 7–10. Apparently even Reimarus’ wife was never informed of the festering doubts swirling within the “other” man she married. See Sieveking, "Hermann Samuel Reimarus, 1694-1768,” p. 168.

113 The relevant section is, “Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too, were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke into pieces and went out. ‘I have come too early,’ he said then; ‘my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds, though done, still require time to be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than most distant stars—and yet they have done it themselves.’” Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix in Songs* (trans. Walter Kaufmann; New York: Vintage, 1974 [1882]) §125.

114 *Apologie*, p. 1.41, “...bevor sich die Zeiten mehr aufklären.”
2.2.1. *From Halle to Wolfenbüttel: The Story of the Fragmente*

As stated above, it was only shortly before his death that Reimarus’ son, Johann Albert Hinrich Reimarus (1729–1814), willed the final version of the original *Apologie* in 1814 to the City Library of Hamburg,\(^{115}\) and the handwritten copy Reimarus’ friend, the senator Johann Klefeker (1698–1775), had made in 1782 to the University Library of Göttingen.\(^{116}\) Reimarus was finally confirmed as the author of the infamous *Apologie* attested to in Lessing's *Wolfenbütteler Fragmente*. Lessing himself suggested the author of the anonymous *Fragmente* to be Schmidt,\(^{117}\) who fell under persecution for his hand in the translation of the so-called “Wertheimer Bible.”\(^{118}\) But it was Lessing to whom the storm following the publication of the *Fragmente* of the *Apologie* deserves credit. Gerhard Alexander suggests that it was Elise Reimarus (1735–1805) who proved the “crucial link” between the cloistered two-thousand-page manuscript and Lessing’s possession of it.\(^{119}\) Toward the end of Lessing’s time in Hamburg (1767–70) he appears to have become friendly with Elise.\(^{120}\) His move from Hamburg to the Herzog-August-Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel was precipitated by the Duke of Brunswick's hiring him as librarian. In 1772 Lessing was granted permission to publish artifacts from the library without submitting them to the regular censorship. Lessing, of course, misled the public to think that he had discovered the manuscript in the library when in fact he obtained it earlier from Reimarus’ daughter in Hamburg. Perhaps as a gesture of testing the waters, Lessing’s first selection on *Von der Duldung der Deisten* was released through the periodical he founded as librarian in 1774. Without much public protest, he released

\(^{115}\) There was no State or University Library in Hamburg.


\(^{117}\) See the discussion of Paul Spalding, *Seize the Book, Jail the Author: Johann Lorenz Schmidt and Censorship in Eighteenth-Century Germany* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1998).


\(^{120}\) Lessing was employed as dramaturg and adviser at the German National Theatre in Hamburg. Despite his move to Wolfenbüttel in 1770, he was initiated into the Freemasonry in Hamburg in 1771.
five more *Fragmente* in 1777: *Von der Verschreiung der Vernunft auf den Kanzeln; Unmöglichkeit einer Offenbarung, die alle Menschen auf eine gegründete Art glauben könnten; Durchgang der Israeliten durchs Rothe Meer; Dass die Bücher des A. T. nicht geschrieben wurden, eine Religion zu offenbaren; and Ueber die Auferstehungsgeschichte*. What followed was “the greatest controversy in German Protestantism in the eighteenth century, if not since the Reformation era.”

The response to the publication of the *Wolffenbütteler Fragmente* had “a sensational effect on the public of the day.” Numerous reviews and over fifty books and articles appeared in response. Johann Daniel Schumann and Johann Heinrich Ress did not draw the ire or attention from Lessing that his third adversary, Johann Melchior Goeze (1717–86) did. The subsequent exchange embroiled the two in controversy, and produced a “masterpiece of German polemical literature” along the way: Lessing's *Anti-Goeze*. Goeze was chief pastor of the Church of St Catharine in Hamburg and senior representative of the clergy in Hamburg from 1760–70. He issued a series of vitriolic exchanges and postured toward including secular authorities from the Corpus Evangelicorum—the body which represents Protestant interests within the Holy Roman Empire. Other threats came from J. H. Ress of Wolfenbüttel and J. B. Lüderwald, the Lutheran Superintendent in Brunswick. Perhaps sensing that his access to a free press was running short these pressures caused Lessing to publish the final *Fragment*, the infamous *Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger* in 1778. In July of that year “conservative elements at the Brunswick court prevailed upon the reigning Duke to ban Lessing from publishing anything further in the dispute without advance permission of the censor.” Lessing would continue to publish, however, until Lessing’s acid quill aimed at Goeze was finally

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121 See Nisbet’s “Introduction,” in *Lessing: Philosophical and Theological Writings*, p. 8.
122 Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, p. 57.
123 See Nisbet’s “Introduction”, p. 8 n. 11 for references as well as Brown, *Jesus in European Protestant Thought*, pp. 1–56.
124 Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, p. 57.
silenced when the Duke of Brunswick stepped in for the sake of public order. When the Corpus Evangelicorum pushed for punitive measures, the Duke’s son and successor, Charles William Ferdinand (1735–1806), assured that none would be taken.

Lessing had his own complex reasons for publishing selections of the Apologie.127 He was not in agreement with Reimarus on several points,128 and his Fragmente were filled with critical commentary at points which highlight these differences.129 Nevertheless, it was in his obtaining of the Apologie which gave occasion to the airing of his theological views in contradistinction to the two rival extremes of orthodoxy and the neologists. The orthodox position was defended, as we saw, by Goeze and others, while the neologist challenge fell to C. W. F. Walch and J. S. Semler who eventually came into the debate in 1779.130 “According to Lessing, the orthodox overextended the sphere of faith in defending beliefs that could not withstand rational criticism, while the neologists overextended the sphere of reason in trying to justify beliefs whose only basis was historical.”131 It was Reimarus’ Apologie which undercut the foundation of both. For Reimarus the concept of revelation

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127 It should be noted that the Fragmente represent an early draft of a final version that did not become public until 1972. The version which would be published in its entirety in 1972 is a longer and revised version of what Lessing had access and he appears to be unaware of it in his critical commentary. In what follows we will draw from mainly Lessing’s version, but will make recourse to the 1972 version here and there.


129 Some, of course, suggest that his commentary and counter-propositions to Reimarus were intended as mere bromide. See Friedrich Loofs, "Lessings Stellung zum Christentum," Theologische Studien und Kritiken 83 (1913) 31–64.


131 Beiser, The Fate of Reason, p. 57.
which is available for rational acceptance is impossible.\textsuperscript{132} Lessing conceded this point, but “denied that such revelation had ever been required by the orthodox position.”\textsuperscript{133} Lessing also conceded to Reimarus the apparent contradictions in scripture. Nevertheless, these contradictions are not detrimental to divine inspiration. Lessing invents the term “bibliolatry” here in his claim that “the certainty of Christianity does not depend on the putative infallibility of the Bible.”\textsuperscript{134}

The wide ugly ditch is therefore between the historical and metaphysical/theological truth.\textsuperscript{135} Lessing thus saw in Reimarus an opportunity to demonstrate his own view that the truths of scripture are not necessary for the truth of Christianity. As Lessing would state, the “letter is not the spirit, and the bible is not religion, so that objections against the letter, or against the bible, are not \textit{ipso facto} objections against religion.”\textsuperscript{136} Reimarus, Lessing contends, is therefore an embarrassment to the orthodox and neologist, but not to the Christian whose religion is “the proof of the power of the spirit.”\textsuperscript{137}

\subsection*{2.2.2. Radical Conclusions: Reimarus, Wolff and the English Deists}

As mentioned earlier, the reception of Lessing’s work factored in the shift from public scorn to public praise of Spinoza. Lessing saw in the \textit{Apologie} an ally. The \textit{Apologie} was “essentially a critique of positive religion and a defense of natural religion.” Reimarus’ general thesis was “that religion had to be based upon reason alone, and that no rational person could possibly accept the historical record contained in the bible.”\textsuperscript{138} The great irony here is that Reimarus’ public defense of orthodoxy against the \textit{Tractatus} in \textit{Die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen}

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\item[132] Beck, \textit{Early German Philosophy}, p. 294.
\item[133] Beck, \textit{Early German Philosophy}, p. 347.
\item[135] See Nisbet’s edition of Lessing’s \textit{Philosophical and Theological Writings}, p. 87.
\item[136] Quoted in Beiser, \textit{The Fate of Reason}, p. 58.
\item[137] Lessing is nearer to Leibniz than Wolff here. See, Beck, \textit{Early German Philosophy}, p. 348.
\item[138] This argument is from \textit{On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power}. See Lessing, \textit{Lessing’s Theological Writings} 55–60.
\end{enumerate}
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Religion is somewhat reversed in the Apologie which “breathes a Spinozist spirit.” Reimarus was an avid student of Spinoza, and his Apologie was thought of as a “radical, Spinozist Apology.” Lessing was therefore unwittingly furthering the Spinozist pantheist cause through the publication of the Fragmente.

Though part of the purpose of the Apologie was to defend the “rational worshippers of God” from condemnations, it also aimed to guard the rational from the condemnation of the orthodox. “Weil Gott und Unsterblichkeit von Reimarus gepredigt wurde, galt er für einen Bekämpfer der Religionsfeinde.” Nevertheless, the emphasis is surely on the side of the freethinker. “Wir haben in seinen auf Religion und Theologie bezüglichen Schriften eine zwiefache Richtung zu unterscheiden.” The Apologie begins “by condemning those who decry reason in the name of the faith.” His belief in the “natural faculty of reason” coincides with his polemic against the priests of positive religion who dull the natural light of reason by their “pretensions and propaganda.” The Zeitgeist of dogmatism and censure, Reimarus contends, “does not produce Christians, but either hypocrites or victims of priestly and political persecution who are in fact ‘righteous worshippers of God, obedient subjects of their superiors, peaceful and useful citizens of the state, friends of humanity, and lovers of truth and virtue.’” Reimarus would prove neither to be “a consistent disciple of Wolff nor his student.” In many respects he grew “more extreme than Wolff.” For Wolff, revelation supplemented reason but

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139 Beiser, The Fate of Reason, p. 57. See, too, “diese seltsame Ironie” in Hettner, Geschichte, pp. 1.373–74 on the influences and tensions within Reimarus.
140 For a listing of what Reimarus was reading, see n. 253.
143 Hettner, Geschichte, p. 1.373.
144 Hettner, Geschichte, p. 1.360.
145 Beck, Early German Philosophy, p. 295.
146 Beck, Early German Philosophy, p. 296.
147 Quoted in Beck, Early German Philosophy, p. 296.
148 Reventlow, History of Biblical Interpretation, p. 4.156.
149 Reventlow, History of Biblical Interpretation, p. 4.156.
could never supplant it. Reimarus “radicalized this position” where reason became the final arbitrator of all matters of life and practice.

“Die Kritik der christlichen Offenbarung zerfällt bei Reimarus in drei Teile. Erstens Kritik des Alten, zweitens Kritik des Neuen Testaments und drittens Kritik der Hauptsätze des protestantischen Lehrbegriffs.” Reimarus argued that scripture is not divine revelation, but human testimony to divine revelation. In the case of the OT, Reimarus has a “thoroughgoing tendency to condemn morally the humans who appear in the Old Testament as witnesses of revelation.” In other words, how could bearers of revelation not satisfy apparent moral demands? The moral criticism of OT personalities was not unique to Reimarus, and, what is more, he debunked miracle accounts as processes of natural causes or deceitful reports. Reimarus earlier attempted to demonstrate a christological reading of OT prophetic texts in Vindicatio dictorum Veteris Testamenti in Novo allegatorum (1731) but in the Apologie, he follows Anthony Collins (1676–1729) who stated that this christological reading of the OT is dependant upon an allegorical approach which needs to be replaced with a literal-historical reading thus removing the prophetic sense of the OT witness to Christ. “The criticism of Jesus Christ the messiah promised in the Old Testament is one of the main topics” in throughout the Apologie. Throughout the Apologie, there is a passing from a rather moderate analysis in the beginning to a “sharp polemic” in the latter portions.

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150 In this sense, the statement of Hettner is a bit overstated: “ist Reimarus strenger Deist im Sinn Wolfs und Lockes” (Geschichte, p. 1.370).
151 Reventlow, History of Biblical Interpretation, p. 4.156.
152 Hettner, Geschichte, p. 1.364.
154 Reventlow, History of Biblical Interpretation, p. 4.158.
155 See Apologie, p. 1.672.
156 E.g., Pierre Bayle’s (1647–1706) Dictionnaire historique et critique (1692–95) did the same with Abraham and David.
157 The most infamous is of course the Red Sea incident (Apologie pp. 1.299–326).
non-messianic interpretation of the Old Testament throughout\textsuperscript{161} may well be Reimarus’ attempt to demonstrate the “critical potential” in Judaism in the service of dismantling “the Christian dogma of Christ’s divinity.”\textsuperscript{162}

Lessing’s \textit{Fragment} on the resurrection published in 1777\textsuperscript{163} attests to the potential influence of Thomas Woolston on Reimarus. Woolston’s earlier theory was that the disciples had in fact stolen Jesus’ carcass from the tomb.\textsuperscript{164} Reimarus deepens his argument against the resurrection by pointing out the perceived inconsistencies in the four Gospel reports.\textsuperscript{165} Indeed, according to Reimarus, the entire system of Christianity rests on the fabrication of the resurrection and is therefore “groundless.”\textsuperscript{166}

What was new about Reimarus was his “radicalism with which he advanced the consequences of his criticism, extending to a complete rejection of the view that the revelation of Christian faith was based on the bible.”\textsuperscript{167} The private Reimarus held to the replacement of revelation with reason, and extended the claims of Wolff and English deism to radical degrees.\textsuperscript{168} As we saw earlier with Wolff, his aim was to offer a synthesis of all knowledge,\textsuperscript{169} though he spent most of his efforts in the realm of philosophy, or as he called it, “the science of the possibles insofar as they can be.”\textsuperscript{170} And in order for something to be possible, it must meet the criterion of

\textsuperscript{162} Klein, “Reimarus, the Hamburg Jews, and the Messiah,” p. 173.
\textsuperscript{163} Lessing, \textit{Werke}, pp. 7.426–57.
\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Apologie}, pp. 2.198–271.
\textsuperscript{165} Reventlow states that “here for the first time [these contradictions] are expressly mentioned” (\textit{History of Biblical Interpretation}, p. 4.161), though rightly tempers this statement with reference to Reimarus’ near proximity to Thomas Chubb’s earlier work, \textit{The True Gospel of Jesus Christ} (1738).
\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Apologie}, p. 2.306.
\textsuperscript{167} Reventlow, \textit{History of Biblical Interpretation}, p. 4.165.
\textsuperscript{168} On Reimarus and his deism, see Brown, \textit{Jesus in European Protestant Thought}, p. 286 n. 3.
\textsuperscript{169} \textit{History} discerns the bare knowledge of facts; \textit{Philosophy} discovers the reasons things are the way they are; \textit{Mathematics} determines the quantifiable. See Talbert, “Introduction,” p. 12.
\textsuperscript{170} Talbert, “Introduction,” p. 12.
internal consistency—though, of course, possibility does not infer actuality, the existence of entities must be reasoned.

Wolff’s understanding of revelation is that it is possible because God is all-powerful but must be proved necessary and must be free from contradiction. “It cannot contradict either the divine perfections or the laws of nature,” nor can it be internally contradictory.\textsuperscript{171} Wolff, however, does not maintain that these affirmations of natural theology contradict the testimony of scripture. Through the work of Wolff, Reimarus was introduced to John Locke and his triad of propositions:\textsuperscript{172} according to reason, contrary to reason,\textsuperscript{173} and above reason.\textsuperscript{174} From this Locke stated that “Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light, and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties. Revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives that they come from God.”\textsuperscript{175} Wolff contended that revelation could be above reason but never contrary to it and Locke placed reason as the arbiter of revelation’s authenticity.\textsuperscript{176} Reimarus accepted the dual criteria of necessity and consistency in establishing revelation. His treatment of the rise of Christianity attempted to demonstrate the material origins of Christianity and that its confession of revelation fails the second test of internal consistency.

\textsuperscript{173} That is, propositions which fail the test of consistency or the law of contradiction.
\textsuperscript{174} That is, propositions by which reason is unable to discover but are not themselves contradictory.
\textsuperscript{175} Locke, \textit{Essay Concerning Human Understanding}, §4.19.4.
\textsuperscript{176} Cf. John Locke, \textit{The Reasonableness of Christianity with A Discourse of Miracles and part of A Third Letter Concerning Toleration} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958 [1695]).
Another influence upon Reimarus, though perhaps slightly overstated,\textsuperscript{177} were the polemical wars surrounding the English deists John Toland (1670–1722),\textsuperscript{178} Anthony Collins (1676–1729),\textsuperscript{179} and Thomas Woolston (1668–1733).\textsuperscript{180} The English deists were most thoroughly introduced to Germany through the appearance of John Leland’s three-volume anthology, \textit{A View of the Principal Deistical Writers that Have Appeared in England in the Last and Present Century} (1755–56). Latent within the \textit{Fragmente} may well be recourse to Woolston’s attack on miracles, Annet’s exposing the contradictions surrounding the resurrection, and Thomas Chubb’s (1679–1747) claim in \textit{The True Gospel of Jesus Christ Asserted} (1738) that the apostles altered the original preaching of Jesus. It may well have been the English deists which provoked Reimarus to search into the matters himself.\textsuperscript{181} Moreover, Schmidt’s translation of Matthew Tindal’s \textit{Christianity as Old as the Creation} (1730) might have been the seed to Reimarus’ eschatological considerations.\textsuperscript{182} “The common thought of these writings was that Christianity is essentially nothing else than the moral religion of reason, the truth of which is to be apprehended by the universal human reason, and which therefore was originally common to all men, but which has been distorted in later ages by manifold superstition.”\textsuperscript{183} As opposed to the public Reimarus, natural religion for the private Reimarus replaces Christianity. The public Reimarus believed, along with Lessing,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{177} As argued by Israel, “Philosophical Context,” pp. 138–200.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Toland influenced Reimarus in at least three ways: first, revelation is to be judged on the basis of its contents alone with no recourse to revelation above reason; second, the triad test of revelation through usefulness and necessity, intelligibility, and consistent with our common notions; and, third, the simplicity of Jesus was perverted by the early church. See Stephen Daniel, \textit{John Toland: His Mind, Manners and Thought} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984); Robert E. Sullivan, \textit{John Toland and the Deist Controversy: A Study in Adaptations} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
\item \textsuperscript{179} Collins is important for two reasons: he contends Christianity’s allegorical proof from prophecy is no real fulfilment and therefore no real reason for its authenticity; second, he makes mention of the general expectancy of a temporal deliverer. See James O’Higgins, \textit{Anthony Collins the Man and His Works} (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).
\item \textsuperscript{181} See the third chapter of Lundsteen, \textit{Reimarus und die Anfänge}; though we should note Talbert is slightly exaggerated in “Introduction,” p. 18.
\item \textsuperscript{182} See Stephen Lalor, \textit{Matthew Tindal, Freethinker: An Eighteenth-Century Assault on Religion} (London: Continuum, 2006).
\end{itemize}
that humanity could be bettered and that rational religion had a part to play in that betterment. But the private Reimarus held that in order for this betterment to have a chance, “revealed religion must be exposed.”

The public Reimarus held to the Wolffian synthesis; the private Reimarus destroyed it. In a sense it was inevitable. For if reason is the criteria by which revelation is to be judged there is no real basis for a revelation-above-reason. Revelation was grounded by reason. Though we need to temper easy conclusions about dependence and influence, this brief sketch at least demonstrates the philosophical concerns which were swirling about Reimarus’ day and how they—in whatever form—were his preoccupation as opposed to the origins of Christianity as Schweitzer would have led us to believe. They were the frameworks through which Reimarus reasoned and more or less structured his Apologie. And its first appearance within Lessing’s Wolfenbütteler Fragmente sparked no small controversy.

2.2.3. On the Aims of Reimarus: Reading the Final Fragment

This detour into the environment of the complexity of Reimarus was necessary in order to demonstrate just how severely mis-framed he is in the Geschichte. As is the case with most of the characters in the Geschichte, however, Schweitzer’s presentation of the particulars of Reimarus are more or less correct. The driving force behind much of Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger is to drive a wedge between the intentions of the former and the latter: viz., the so-called followers of Jesus constructed a new dogmatism and religion while the former had no desire for

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186 The "structure of Reimarus's treatment of Jesus is governed by the categories of natural religion despite its appearance as a historical investigation of the origins of the Christian religion" (Talbert, "Introduction," p. 27).
187 See Buchanan’s “Introduction,” pp. 10–27; and, Brown, Jesus in European Protestant Thought, pp. 1–16. See, too, the preface of Semler, Beantwortung der Fragmente eines Ungenannten ins besondere vom Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger.
188 In what follows, all references will be made to the translation of Ralph S. Fraser in the Talbert edition.
such a founding.\textsuperscript{189} Reimarus finds “great cause to separate completely what the apostles say in their own writings from that which Jesus himself actually said and taught.”\textsuperscript{190} This was not on account of some mere misunderstanding of Jesus’ essential message.\textsuperscript{191} It was an outright transmutation and reversing of their master’s intention.\textsuperscript{192} “In a word, the apostles strayed completely from their master in their teaching and in their lives, abandoning his religion and his intention and introducing a completely new system.”\textsuperscript{193} After Jesus’ death they abandoned their former hope of Jesus-as-temporal-redeemer.\textsuperscript{194}

Luke 24:21 is an important passage for Reimarus’ reconstruction of the apostles’ “parting of the ways” with their former master for several reasons.\textsuperscript{195} First, argues Reimarus, the text suggests a persistence in their belief of a temporal messiah (cf. Matt 10:7; 19:28; Mk 10:37; Lk 22:30). It “was not a savior of the human race who would expiate the sins of the whole world through his Passion and death, but one who would redeem the people of Israel from temporal servitude, whom they invariably presented in Jesus and of whom they hoped that he would be mighty in words and deeds, so regarded by all the people.”\textsuperscript{196} The disciples did not show at any stage a hope for resurrection.\textsuperscript{197} This was a later product aired at Pentecost.\textsuperscript{198} Second, it seems that all people, not simply a small contingent, understood Jesus in this sense. Third, if these beliefs were present immediately after his death they must have been before as well. And, fourth, this all proves that after the failure of the messiah the apostles drafted a dogmatism of a suffering savior.\textsuperscript{199}

\textsuperscript{189} For Reimarus, Jesus “was born a Jew and intended to remain one” (\textit{Frag.} 1.7).
\textsuperscript{190} \textit{Frag.} 1.3.
\textsuperscript{191} \textit{Frag.} 1.3.
\textsuperscript{192} See \textit{Frag.} 1.19 with respect to the Law, for example. Moreover, Reimarus takes Matt 5:17–20 as clear proof of Jesus’ considering of the Law as enduringly valid, even in the kingdom of heaven/God. For Reimarus, this is “perfectly evident” (\textit{Frag.} 1.19).
\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Frag.} 1.20.
\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Frag.} 1.20.
\textsuperscript{195} See, e.g., \textit{Frag.} 2.26.
\textsuperscript{196} \textit{Frag.} 1.30.
\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Frag.} 1.32.
\textsuperscript{198} On Pentecost, see, \textit{Apologie}, p. 2.350.
\textsuperscript{199} E.g., \textit{Frag.} 1.30.
Despite the early conservatism apparent in the early portions of the *Fragment*, Reimarus sees the Gospels as dogmatically conceived. Doctrine, thus, controls history, and the rise and spread of Christianity are owing to natural explanations (apostolic fraud) as opposed to the supernatural. Jesus was fundamentally a preacher of repentance, and his preaching was connected with the popular imaginary’s conception of the kingdom. “Both these things, the kingdom of heaven and repentance, are so connected that the kingdom is the goal, while repentance is the means or preparation for this kingdom.” The only development from the religion of his day was that he taught “the expected redeemer of Israel had already come” in his person. In this sense, Jesus, in his reforms, did not introduce any supernatural mysteries. The single word which summarizes Jesus’ teaching is therefore “repent,” which functions as a means of preparation for the imminent kingdom (see §1.1.2.).

Reimarus’ understanding of the motivation behind Jesus’ teaching of repentance is more fully elaborated in the *Apologie*. Jesus’ preaching of repentance was preparatory for his deeper agenda of overthrowing the Romans and the Jewish Sanhedrin and establishing himself in their place. His pure vision was “stained and blackened through his intention to become a messiah of the Jews and through the suspicious and seditious measures due to it.” Within Lessing’s *Fragmente*, however, the “imminent kingdom” for Reimarus is the goal of Jesus’ call for

\[\text{References:} \]

200 *Frag.* 1.3.
201 *Frag.* 1.29–30.
202 *Frag.* 1.33.
203 *Frag.* 2.53–60.
204 *Frag.* 1.4 with texts.
205 See *Frag.* 1.4.
206 *Frag.* 1.4.
207 *Frag.* 1.20.
208 *Apologie* pp. 2.39–72.
209 *Frag.* 1.29.
210 See *Apologie* pp. 2.130–35.
211 *Apologie* p. 2.176. The “seditious measures” included associating himself to OT messianic passages, simulation of miracles, and the banding together of commoners against the religious and political authorities. “In the version of the fragments, this criticism is still completely missing” (Reventlow, *History of Biblical Interpretation*, p. 4.163).
212 See, *Frag.* 1.19.
repentance. "The kingdom of heaven for which the repentance thus preached was to be a preparation and a means, and which therefore contained the ultimate purpose of Jesus’ undertaking, is not explained by him at all, neither as to what it is nor what it consists of."²¹³ Therefore it must be understood within the environs in which he moved.²¹⁴ Anyone hearing Jesus’ preaching would have known what it meant: "the messiah would soon appear and that his kingdom would commence," the king would come and "free them from all afflictions and establish a glorious kingdom among them."²¹⁵ Preaching the gospel simply means announcing the messiah is soon to appear and begin his rule. Repentance and call for belief are calls to make oneself ready for the imminent arrival for the messiah who “would be a great temporal king and would establish a powerful kingdom in Jerusalem, whereby he would free them of all servitude and make them masters over other peoples.”²¹⁶ Such, Reimarus argues, “was incontestably the general understanding of the messiah among the Jews.”²¹⁷

In broad strokes, these are the particulars of Reimarus’ construction: a Jesus who believed himself to be the temporal, political messiah who was looking to launch a resistance movement against Rome and the collusion of the Sanhedrin in order to bring the kingdom of heaven to earth; a preacher of repentance who called for a deeper morality and turning away from the hypocrisy of the religious leaders in preparation for the imminent arrival of the kingdom; a failing of the crowds to rise up against their overlords and the consequent failing of the messiahship of Jesus; and the transmutation of “Jesus” into the dogmatic whip of his former followers. Apart from a few trivial points, Schweitzer is near the mark.

As we have seen, however, it is Schweitzer’s framing of Reimarus which is misleading. One gets the sense if one reads Schweitzer before Reimarus that every

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²¹³ Frag. 1.29.
²¹⁴ Kingdom of God and kingdom of heaven for Reimarus are “one and the same.” For his explanation and rationale, see Frag. 1.29.
²¹⁵ Frag. 1.29.
²¹⁶ Frag. 1.30.
²¹⁷ Frag. 1.30.
page of the *Apologie* would be charged with eschatology. This is not the case. Discussion of the kingdom and eschatology only begin at *Frag.* 1.29 and run sporadically throughout. What is more, *Zwecke*, though significantly longer than the other *Fragmente*, is a single fragment within a selection of seven which Lessing published from a manuscript well over two-thousand pages. The ratios tell another story. This is not necessarily to downplay the importance of eschatology within Reimarus’ system—but it is to relativize it. Eschatology—though left undefined in the *Apologie*—became a tool of Reimarus’ refutation of Christ as the spiritual redeemer of humanity through his two antitheses: secular not sacred; particular not universal.\(^{218}\) In other words, anything in the NT that is peculiarly Christian goes beyond natural religion and thus contradicts itself.\(^{219}\) Reimarus, then, is not the historian of Christian origins which he is made out to be. His deeper intention is to contribute to the debates swirling about Germany regarding natural religion. At every turn in the *Apologie* one suspects these deeper aims—though, admittedly, some remain tacit, latent, and unnamed.

In his sustained pitting of Jesus against the Pharisees and religious leaders for their “hypocrisy and sanctimonious” aura,\(^{220}\) and fundamental misinterpretation of religious phenomenon,\(^{221}\) one can hear his own frustration with current religious leaders for their hypocritical and intentional misleading. “My goodness!” laments Reimarus, “How the simple and ignorant allow themselves to be deceived by their leaders who are themselves blind guides! And how easily great mysteries, even an entire religion, have been hammered out and for centuries have chained human reason and conscience from a few obscure words that people do not understand and whose genuine antiquity is extremely doubtful!”\(^{222}\) These “blind guides” (cf. Matt 15:13–14; Lk 6:39–40; *G.Thom.* 34) have constructed institutions which have

\(^{218}\) Reventlow, *History of Biblical Interpretation*, p. 4.163.
\(^{219}\) Reventlow, *History of Biblical Interpretation*, p. 4.163.
\(^{220}\) E.g., *Frag.* 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.19.
\(^{221}\) Cf. *Frag.* 1.5.
\(^{222}\) *Frag.* 1.24.
“nothing at all in common” with NT realities.\footnote{Frag. 1.24.} When Jesus called for repentance and belief in the gospel, he meant nothing more than “believe in the joyful news of the imminent coming of the messiah and his kingdom,” and make oneself ready for this.\footnote{Frag. 1.4.} Jesus proposed no new “mysteries” or dogmas;\footnote{See, generally, Frag. 1.8–28.} his catechism consists of one article: the kingdom of imminence and subsequent repentance.\footnote{Frag. 1.9.} There are no “really new or incomprehensible precepts” to be found in the so-called secrets in Jesus’ teaching (cf. Matt 13:11; Mk 4:11; Lk 8:10).\footnote{Frag. 1.9.} Reimarus laments the accustomed nature amongst so-called Christians who in their understanding of the words faith or gospel, swallow “the whole body of Christian doctrine” and “articles of the Christian faith in their interconnection, the entire catechism and the creed,” and while calling “‘mysteries’ those doctrines that surpass understanding and that are neither to be understood or proved by reason alone.”\footnote{Frag. 1.9.} Reimarus’ exposé of constructed dogmatisms such as the trinity begins with his emptying of divinity from the term son of God.\footnote{See Frag. 1.10–18; Apologie pp. 2.73–96.} Son of God meant no more than one particularly or “especially beloved” of God,\footnote{Frag. 1.12.} and the so-called “union” of God with the son of God (e.g., John 10:31) is nothing more than consensionem animorum, an agreement or union of aim or spirit.\footnote{Frag. 1.18.} Messiah was the exceptional meaning of son of God,\footnote{Frag. 1.12.} and Satan’s temptation in the wilderness consists of the vocation of messiah and God’s favor.\footnote{Frag. 1.12.} This meaning, claims Reimarus, “is so obvious.”\footnote{Frag. 1.12.} But the church has followed the deception of the disciples into twisting the phrase into an “unfounded...
interpretation and system," seeing son of God and son of man as referring to different aspects of his person when they in fact are distributive.

The socio-rhetorical charge behind the accusation of “fraud” is telling here. “Fraud is a verdict arising from prejudice and polemics, so that one person’s religious foundation is another person’s fraud.” Theories of Christianity’s fraudulent origins were discussed in French and German “Enlightenment literature,” but it was Reimarus’ *Apologie* that “changed the situation radically.” Another element which shines through is the notion of the perfectibility of humanity and progress. In this vein, Reimarus could not accept eternal punishment or original sin or anything that went against the Enlightenment’s optimistic anthropology. Reimarus’ Jesus was after a “proper, active character,” and his sermons are “nothing other than moral teachings and duties intended to improve man inwardly.” Throughout *Frag. 1.8–9* for example, there are several instances of Reimarus’ framing Jesus’ preaching within the wider environs of human betterment and progress. The Jewish expectation regarding the advent of the messiah, so Reimarus argues, was contingent upon repentance and betterment. Jesus’ ethical teaching, particularly his “beautiful Sermon on the Mount,” was solely intended for “repentance, conversion, and betterment insofar as these consist of a true inner and upright love of God, of one’s neighbor, and of all that is good.” In short, to better humanity inwardly, and free humanity from the external and hypocritical righteousness of the Pharisees for “better righteousness” of the kingdom.

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235 *Frag. 1.3.*
236 *Frag. 1.13.* This, of course, is in conflict with Schweitzer’s interpretation of son of man within apocalyptic environs, notably Daniel.
239 *Apologie*, pp. 2.451–74.
240 *Frag. 1.6.*
242 *Frag. 1.4.*
243 *Frag. 1.5.*
244 *Frag. 1.6.*
245 *Frag. 1.28.*
The issue of toleration haunts and even causes some tension in Reimarus’ commitments in understanding Jesus as a Jew all the way down. For example, he states Jesus’ universalistic message of the kingdom of God (e.g., Matt 28:19; Mk 16:15) “does not entirely exclude from this hope even those heathen who remain firmly rooted in their imperfect understanding” (e.g. Matt 11:22; Lk 10:14). Later he backpedals in Frag. 1.20. He confesses confusion regarding Matt 10:5–6; 15:24 and Matt 28:19; Mk 16:15. And he sees the Cornelius episode in Acts 10–11 as clear indications of nationalistic prejudice. Yet later he uses the Targum on Micah 4:7 in the favor of a universalistic understanding of the kingdom. Here he is not as clear cut as Schweitzer made him. He is struggling against his method of Jesus-as-Jew, the textual evidence, and his commitments to the Aufklärung virtue of tolerance.

2.3. Conclusions

“Mit dem theologischen Vermächtnis des Reimarus umzugehen, ist eine der bleibenden Aufgaben der Theologie.” To Reimarus, or, perhaps, even more so to Lessing, we owe a debt for questioning the silly scruples of orthodox censorship. But Reimarus can hardly be made out to be the pioneer of either suspicion or first-sighter of eschatology. Semler had earlier commented on the basic eschatological strain in the preaching of Jesus and the early Church. But what is crucial for our purposes is that though eschatology is part of Reimarus’ reading of the historical Jesus, it is hardly the main focus of the final Fragment, the Apologie, or, of course, his wider religious writings. Indeed, the role of eschatology, as August Christian Lundsteen suggests, is not the main point (kein Hauptpunkt) for Reimarus that Schweitzer makes it out to be, “sonder nur als ein nebengeordnetes.” What is more, Semler in his Beantwortung der Fragmente eines Ungenannten (1779) draws

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246 Frag. 1.2.
247 See, Frag. 1.29.
248 Cf., Apologie, pp. 1.133–35.
249 Klein, Reimarus, p. 279.
attention to the “deficiencies of Reimarus’ scholarly equipment,” and viewed his account of Christian origins as suspect.252

In this sense, Reimarus was hardly the innovator that Schweitzer made him out to be. The English deists appear to have influenced Reimarus and it seems he was familiar with their ideas.253 This brief sketch hopes to contribute to other historiographical corrections of the likes of Kümmel who see precedents within English deism,254 Hornig and the fuller elaborations of Semler,255 and others who suggest Edelmann had published similar sentiments some thirty years earlier.256 What is more, though Schweitzer’s construction of Reimarus singled out eschatology as the singular key which unlocks all the mysteries of a singular profile of the historical Jesus, Reimarus does not appear to explicate or give the kind of credence Schweitzer attributes to Reimarus’ project.257 Recourse to the “historical Jesus” was not so much in the service of Christian origins as it was a test case for one’s own philosophical commitments. Questions about the historical Jesus in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in European thought were “as much a history of changing philosophies, theologies, and worldviews, as it [was] of growing refinements in historical techniques.”258

252 Chadwick in Lessing’s Theological Writings, p. 40 n. 2.
257 See Brown, Jesus in European Protestant Thought, p. 6., who extends the charge of raising the issue of eschatology’s importance without giving full credence to it to Schweitzer as well.
258 Brown, Jesus in European Protestant Thought, p. 275.
Our main findings in this chapter have been the social location and wider concerns which informed Reimarus’ complicated œuvre. The great hero of honest inquiry of Schweitzer’s construction when compared with the “historical Reimarus” appears to have clay feet—or different feet altogether. He may well have told the “truth” in the *Apologie*, but when combined with his public works, this “truth-telling” and honest inquiry appear slant. All that he was in the *Apologie* stares back at what he was not in his public works, and, indeed, what he was not in Schweitzer’s construction. Our suspicions in §1 now appear justified. Reimarus was not the historian of Christian origins of Schweitzer’s construction. The rhetorical function of Reimarus within the *Geschichte* was for the airing of Schweitzer’s own views. It now falls to us to examine Schweitzer’s use of eschatology and its function within his reading of the historical Jesus material as a hermeneutical key which serves his reconstruction efforts of a consistent, systematic, and tidy Jesus.
CHAPTER THREE
SCHWEITZER'S KEY TO ALL MYTHOLOGIES:
KONSEQUENTE ESCHATOLOGIE

Don’t get involved in partial problems, but always take flight to where there is a free view over the whole single great problem, even if this view is still not a clear one.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

One often makes a remark and only later sees how true it is.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

3.0. The Key to All Mythologies

As we saw in the previous chapters, Schweitzer constructed Reimarus as the weary traveler along the plains who saw from the distant reaches of the eighteenth century the towering heights of eschatology. After eighteen long centuries of misconception, he was the first to have “an inkling of what eschatology really was,” and drew the attention of scholarship to the eschatological Weltanschauung within first-century Palestine. It was this distance, however, which prevented the range’s full shape from being apprehended. Strauss was another traveler along the plains, who, in his first edition at least, recognized that the thought-world of Jesus was purely eschatology and thus acted as “the prophet of a coming advance in knowledge.” But these two figures suffered the same fate: viz., the constructive element of their discoveries were buried under the rubble of their criticism and hence scholarship and they themselves “failed to realize their full significance.” Schweitzer, however, stood with the full mountain in view, now “in its true form.” From this summit Schweitzer reads himself into the solution of the problem of the historical Jesus, and

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2 Wittgenstein, Notebooks, §10e.
3 Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus 23; Schweitzer, Von Reimarus zu Wrede 23.
4 Quest 1 p. 10.
6 Quest 1 p. 95.
7 Quest 1 p. 120.
8 Quest 1 p. 23.
casts his judgment upon past critical-histories of the life of Jesus in general, and German theological liberalism in particular. The social liberalism of its most articulate proponent, Albrecht Ritschl (1822–1889), for example, centered Jesus within a world-affirming, ethical kingdom. But this Jesus had more in common with a Kantian ethical idealism than the environs of first-century Palestine which was “saturated with eschatology.” Knowledge of the historical Jesus rests in first-century Palestine, not nineteenth-century Germany. We will need to track this claim of contamination as Schweitzer thinks that what he is doing is pure history. He thinks he has arrived at a pure vision of the first-century world without the tainted spectacles of modern thought-forms. As we shall see, however, Schweitzer’s thought is not as “pure” as he constructs it to be.

In any case, together with Johannes Weiss, the son-in-law of Ritschl, Schweitzer’s eschatological scheme effected “una svolta fondamentale,” leaving the purely ethical and spiritual formulations of the kingdom of God in its crosshairs. Though there were former proponents of the eschatological cultural conditioning of the

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9 In the “Preface to the Sixth Edition,” Schweitzer states, “The fundamental problem which stands out more and more clearly in the course of that research is whether Jesus presupposes the notions of later Jewish eschatology about the coming of the kingdom of God and the Messiah, or replaces them with a non-eschatological approach” (Quest p. xxxviii).
11 Quest 1 p. 350.
12 Cf. Quest 2 p. xiii. In this respect, Schweitzer’s target is not merely the liberal and rationalistic schools, but also the purely literary approaches of the likes of Bruno Bauer who thought there was no evidence for an existing eschatological expectation during the time of Jesus (e.g., Quest 2 p. 303). This, of course, would figure significantly in Geschichte along the lines of the historicity of Jesus’ existence. In this respect, even though Schweitzer sees a connection with Wrede’s “solution” and his own in the Skizze (see Quest 2 p. 302), this is the cause of much of Schweitzer’s suspicion of Wrede and the reason for his softening of the connection between the two in Geschichte. See Paget, "Schweitzer’s second edition," pp. 20–37.
13 Weiss, Jesus’ Proclamation of the Kingdom of God.
14 For this reason, it is of note to point out that Weiss did not publish his volume until 1892, three years after the death of Ritschl.
15 Vittorio Subilia, Il Regno Di Dio: Interpretazioni Nel Corso Dei Secoli (Nuovi Studi Teologici; Claudiana: Torino, 1993) 149.
historical Jesus, it was Schweitzer and Weiss who summoned “al terzo grand aut-aut” in scholarship; either thoroughgoing eschatology or skepticism. When Albert Schweitzer reflected in 1933 upon his teaching activities at the University of Strasbourg, he states:

The question of whether Jesus thought eschatologically or not leads therefore to one point: Did he consider himself to be the messiah or not? Anyone who admits that he did must also admit that his ideas and expectations conformed to the eschatological views of late Judaism. Anyone who refuses to recognize this Jewish element in his thought must also refuse to attribute to him any consciousness of being the messiah.

It was while in Strasbourg that the “inspiration for studying the history of research into the life of Jesus” attended Schweitzer after some conversation with students who took a course on the subject from Prof. Spitta and demonstrated an ignorance of previous research. This led to a two-hour weekly lecture throughout the summer of 1905 on the history of historical Jesus research. The result of this summer course would eventually become Von Reimarus zu Wrede (1906). The significance of this detail is that Schweitzer more or less had his mind made up with the publication of Eine Skizze (1901), the second part of his Habilitationschrift, with the Geschichte functioning as both a literature review which situates Eine Skizze and an attempt to highlight his own constructive proposal which had passed without notice. Though the Geschichte is the better known, it is actually his Skizze which is


19 The first alternative was issued by Strauss—either purely historical or purely supernatural. “The second had been worked out by the Tübingen school and Holtzmann: either Synoptic or Johannine. Now came the third: either eschatological or non–eschatological” and hence skeptical (Quest 2 p. 198).

20 Schweitzer, Life and Thought 49; Schweitzer, Aus meinem Leben und Denken 38.

21 Schweitzer, Life and Thought, p. 44.

22 See Kümmel, "Ein Jahrhundert Erforschung der Eschatologie des Neuen Testaments," p. 85. In this respect, one can read between the lines and hear the annoyance on the part of Schweitzer when he writes: “Men who have no qualifications for the task, whose ignorance is nothing less than criminal, who loftily anathematise scientific theology instead of making themselves in some measure...
the best source for his eschatology. Commenting on Schweitzer’s *Das Messianitäts und Leidensgeheimnis: Eine Skizze des Lebens Jesu*, Vittorio Subilla says that it “può essere considerata il manifesto della scuola detta dell’escatologia conseguente o radicale.”23 Nevertheless, the force of Schweitzer’s notion of *konsequente Eschatologie* was largely mediated through the *Geschichte*—in the English-speaking world, at least—so we will use both of these texts together in our analysis of what Schweitzer meant by this concept.

The disparaging elements of historical Jesus research come together for Schweitzer with his discovery of *konsequente Eschatologie*. *Das Problem*24 has been solved with *die Lösung der konsequenten Eschatologie.*25 Thus in the 1950 Preface to the “Sixth Edition” of the *Geschichte*, Schweitzer states, “The historical problem confronting scholarly research into the life of Jesus may be said to be solved in its essentials by the knowledge gained from late-Jewish eschatology.”26 The “momentous decision” of *either eschatology or non-eschatology* is now a foregone conclusion and likely never to be questioned again.27

Explicating what Schweitzer means by *konsequente Eschatologie* presents challenges for the interpreter. For it is not a singular doctrine but the unifying theory which explains everything. Others had seen the key of eschatology but only used it to turn the lock of the gate whereas the key which they possessed could in fact unlock the entire castle.28 In *konsequente Eschatologie* Schweitzer had succeeded precisely where the pedantic scholar, Edward Casaubon, of George Eliot’s *Middlemarch* had

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24 *Geschichte*1/2 pp. 1–12; *Quest*1/2 pp. 1–12.
25 *Geschichte*2 pp. 390–443; *Quest*2 pp. 315–54. Though this chapter is new to *Geschichte*2, the contents are by no means peculiar to it; the concepts appear throughout *Geschichte*1.
26 *Quest*2 p. xli. Emphasis mine.
27 *Quest*2 p. xliii.
28 Cf., *Quest*1 p. 346.
failed: he found the *Key to all Mythologies.*\(^{29}\) Schweitzer’s eschatology was *konsequent* in that it affected *everything.* In this sense, an analysis of his eschatology is to pull apart what coordinates the whole and as a result, in the words of Yeats, “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold.”\(^{30}\) In our systematic descriptions to follow, then, all distinctions made must be understood to be notional, not actual.

### 3.0.1. Dogmatic and Actual History: Schweitzer’s Hermeneutical Key

The significance of *konsequente Eschatologie* for Schweitzer is that it acts as something like a touchstone. In the Preface to the Sixth Edition, Schweitzer states, “Thus only eschatology explains for the first time the oldest tradition about the preaching and conduct of Jesus in matters great and small, and thereby establishes its trustworthiness beyond all conceivable doubt.”\(^{31}\) Schweitzer considers his “contribution” to be the finding of “the eschatological clue, not only to his preaching, but also to his life and work.”\(^{32}\) It is this eschatological clue which acts as a “principle of discrimination,” separating the base metals of modern ideas from the gold of the ancient NT *Weltanschauung.*\(^{33}\) Once this move has been made, it becomes impossible to import modern ideas into Jesus’ *Weltanschauung,* and “then take them back from his as a loan.”\(^{34}\) In Schweitzer’s mind, \[^{d}ie \kappa\rho\iota\alpha\varsigma \text{ ist nun eingeleitet,}\]\(^{35}\) as a compromise between the modern historical and the eschatological Jesus is no longer possible.\(^{36}\)

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\(^{31}\) *Quest*\(^{2}\) p. xli.

\(^{32}\) *Quest*\(^{2}\) p. xxxviii.

\(^{33}\) “Vor der eschatologischen Erkenntnis war die kritische Theologie doch in letzter Linie prinzipiernlos, insofern als sie kein Scheidungsmittel besaß, das moderne und neutestamentlich-antike Gedanken unfehlbar sicher auseinandergelöst hätte” (*Geschichte*\(^{2}\) p. 244 / *Quest*\(^{2}\) p. 209).

\(^{34}\) *Quest*\(^{2}\) p. 209. The main target here appears to be Ritchl, whom Schweitzer accuses of “naivete” with respect to this illicit move from modern ideas to the ancient world and then back again.

\(^{35}\) *Geschichte*\(^{2}\) p. 244.

\(^{36}\) *Geschichte*\(^{2}\) p. 369 / *Quest*\(^{2}\) p. 297.
Schweitzer’s *konsequente Eschatologie* is thus more than theological emphasis, it functions as his principled hermeneutical method, throwing light upon Jesus’ whole public work—as opposed simply to his preaching as Weiss saw. As Bahrndt and Venturini demonstrated in their fictive writings, “the connexion of events” in the life of Jesus has “to be discovered,” as the sources are silent on the character of Jesus’ self-consciousness and aims. Schweitzer believes he found the “inner connection” or “thread of connection” which coordinates the disparaging pieces of Jesus’ activity and teaching together into a singularity. Moreover, *konsequente Eschatologie* allows for the complexities of Jesus’ messianic consciousness to be discovered within his historical activity. For Schweitzer, then, *konsequente Eschatologie* is the one “historically certain element” against which all else is judged, and allows for the tensions of Jesus’ messianism to remain as they are, while revealing a singular portrait of the hidden, historical Jesus.

Schweitzer understood every person within first-century Palestine as figuring themselves “in two entirely different states”: viz., the “pre-messianic age” or the messianic age. It was this “intense theological expectation” which “inspired” and gave rise to Jesus and the movement surrounding him. He was not a man “lost in a world of illusions. He reacted in an absolutely normal fashion to what was said to him, and to the events that concerned him. He was never out of touch with reality.” This “reality” was that of *konsequente Eschatologie*. And it was this dogma of *Eschatologie* which shaped the history of Jesus. *Eschatologie*, then, is simply *dogmatische Geschichte* “which breaks in upon the natural course of history and abrogates it.” The lack of apparent connection within the Gospel sources “is just

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37 *Quest* p. 315.
38 *Quest* p. 47.
39 *Quest* p. 7.
40 The terms “thread of connection” or “inner connection” appear throughout the *Geschichte*. See, for example, *Quest* pp. 6, 7, 10, 47, 257.
41 *Quest* p. 122.
42 *Mystery*, p. 187.
43 *Mystery*, p. 264.
44 *Life and Thought*, p. 109.
45 *Geschichte* p. 391 / *Quest* p. 315.
what is historical” (ist eben das Historische).46 in that the history of Jesus was
determined not by the pressure of external forces, “but by the decisions of Jesus”
which were governed by “dogmatic eschatological considerations.”47 Jesus lived
wholly within dogmatic history which formed the basis for the activity of Jesus
within actual history.48

3.0.2. Schweitzer’s Sources
This poses the problem of sources for Schweitzer. On the one hand Jesus belongs to
the social imaginary of first-century Palestine. But on the other hand, the Gospel
texts are silent (misleading?) when it comes to determining Jesus’ aims and
messianic consciousness. This is owing to an inevitable and unconscious shifting of
perspective (eine unbewusste, notwendige perspektivische Verschiebung)49 which
happened within the early church after the death of Jesus. This “shifting of
perspective” concerned the nature of Jesus’ intentions surrounding the Passion.
After the apparent messianic failure, the early church read its existence into his
atoning death. The print of the early church’s influence upon the Gospel material is
therefore felt. Yet despite this shift and effect, Schweitzer maintains that its
influence “does not go nearly so deep” as many have supposed.50 Though the life of
Jesus “cannot be arrived at by following the arrangement of a single Gospel,”51
Schweitzer adopts a rather conservative attitude toward the material presented in
Mark and Matthew, seeing the Sermon on the Mount, the commission to the twelve,
the eulogy of the Baptist, prophecies of Passion and resurrection, as more or less
“handed down as they were given,”52 and preserving the basis of tradition.53

46 Geschichte1 p. 355 / Quest1 p. 358.
47 Quest1 p. 358.
48 Quest1 p. 359.
49 Mystery, p. 10; Skizze, p. ix.
50 Mystery, p. 8. Here Schweitzer is steering his ship away from the chaotic waters of
Reimarus’ cynicism regarding the early church.
51 Quest2 p. 352.
52 Mystery, pp. 7–8.
53 Geschichte1/2 pp. 391–92 / 444; Quest1/2 pp. 394 /352.
What is more, the early Christians “drew no distinction between their own eschatology” and that of their ancestry. What, then, of the eschatological Weltanschauung of first-century Palestine? As we have already stated, the key to unlocking the riddle of the historical Jesus is konsequente Eschatologie, and the Eschatologie of Jesus and the early church was irreducibly enmeshed with the “Jewish apocalyptic literature of the period between Daniel and the Bar-Cochba rising.” Moreover, during the time of Jesus, Schweitzer sees an unparalleled influence of prophetic eschatology demonstrated in the ethic of repentance and carried through in Baruch and 4 Ezra with “this ethical deepening of apocalyptic.” Schweitzer sees a “great simplification and deepening of eschatology” happening during this period. The apparent “remolding” and “elevation” of the Daniel-Enochic apocalyptic with ancient prophetic hopes reaches a significant stage of development in that the Eschatologie of Jesus and the Baptist are non-contingent. Daniel, for example, is rhetorically contingent upon the religious oppression of Antiochus IV who ruled the Seleucid empire from 175–164 BCE. The Psalms of Solomon arose in response to the civil strife surrounding the presence of Pompey and Roman power in 63 BCE. Fourth Ezra and Baruch were constructed upon the ruins of the Jerusalem temple, laid siege by Titus in 70 ACE. But the “apocalyptic movement in the time of Jesus is not connected with any historical event.” What is remarkable for Schweitzer, then, is that the “apocalyptic enthusiasm” of this period issued not from external events, “but solely by the appearance of two great personalities.” The difficulty here, of course, is that this itself is a form of contingency. The cultural pressure which gave rise to the Baptist and Jesus were themselves the contingencies of “external events.” Schweitzer here does not utilize

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55 Quest1 p. 367.
56 Quest1 p. 368.
57 Quest1 p. 369.
58 Quest1 p. 369.
59 Quest1 pp. 369–70. Schweitzer sees the time between the arrival of the Psalms of Solomon and the arrival of the Baptist as a “decadence of Pharisaism,” where they decline “into an external legalism.”
60 Quest1 p. 370.
his criterion of perspectival shift. In a sequence which foreshadows Bultmann, if the proclaimer becomes the proclaimed, then the contingencies which gave rise to the proclaimer would be collapsed into and obscured by the proclaimed.\textsuperscript{61} This non-utilization is somewhat surprising.

In any case, fundamental for Schweitzer was to place Jesus within his eschatological “nest.”\textsuperscript{62} Schweitzer cites the appearance of Adolf Hilgenfeld’s \textit{Jüdische Apokalyptik} (1857) and Dillmann’s \textit{Henoch} (1851) as making known the fundamental characteristics (\textit{Grundzüge}) of Jewish apocalyptic and establishing the so-called Jewish Pseudepigrapha as “representative documents of the last stage of Jewish thought.”\textsuperscript{63} Historically considered (\textit{Geschichtlich betrachtet}),\textsuperscript{64} then, the Baptist, Jesus, and Paul are “simply the culminating manifestations of Jewish apocalyptic thought.”\textsuperscript{65} Mark, Matthew and the writings of Paul therefore are “the best sources for the Jewish eschatology of the time of Jesus.”\textsuperscript{66}

3.0.3. 	extit{Schweitzer’s Method}

Here we begin to feel a bit of a tension.\textsuperscript{67} Schweitzer states that since the work of Hilgenfeld and Dillmann, the fundamental characteristics of Jewish apocalyptic were


\textsuperscript{62} Wittgenstein suggested that “What a believer ‘believes is not a single proposition, but a system of propositions (light dawns gradually over the whole).’” This is his concept of “nest.” What then is Jesus’ nest? Of what story or stories did he find himself a part? What did his “nest” allow him to become? These are all determined, in Schweitzer’s mind, by the eschatological environment of his day. On “nest,” see, Wittgenstein, \textit{On Certainty} §141. See, too, Alisdair Maclntyre, \textit{After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory} (London: Duckworth, 1985) 216.

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Geschichte}\textsuperscript{1/2} pp. 221 / 222; \textit{Quest}\textsuperscript{1/2} pp. 223 / 190.

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Geschichte}\textsuperscript{1} p. 364; \textit{Quest}\textsuperscript{1} p. 367.

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Quest}\textsuperscript{1} p. 367; Albert Schweitzer, \textit{Mystik des Apostels Paulus} (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1931); and the English translation, Albert Schweitzer, \textit{The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle} (trans. William Montgomery; Baltimore: John’s Hopkins University Press, 1998 [1931]).

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Quest}\textsuperscript{1} p. 368. We will bracket out his discussion of Paul here owing both to space limitations and because of his insistence that with the death of Jesus and the rise of early Christianity there was a de-Christianizing of eschatology. On Schweitzer and Paul in general, see now James Carleton Paget, "Schweitzer and Paul," \textit{JSNT} 33.3 (2011) 223–56.

revealed. This is significant for Schweitzer because much of his reading of the Gospel material is backed by the confident assertion that Jesus’ eschatology is "the apocalyptic of the book of Daniel." But he also states, rather baldly, that "no clear answer can be given" regarding the nature of the contemporary Jewish Weltanschauung at the time of Jesus. Schweitzer is confident about the form of messianic expectation within the prophets, the apocalyptic vision of Daniel, Enoch, Psalms of Solomon, Fourth Ezra and Baruch, but it is the "popular form" (Volksgut) which eludes the interpreter. “We know only the form of eschatology which meets us in the Gospels and in the Pauline epistles.” In other words, the expressions of eschatology within the early Christian community.

Jewish eschatology, in other words, has a “great gap” so long as it is conceived of apart from the Gospels and the Pauline material. The “true historian” (Der richtige Historiker) will therefore begin with the material of the Gospels and Paul in order to understand the Volksgut of Jesus’ day. That is, “bringing the details of the discourses of Jesus into an eschatological system” and from this system bring the “disconnected events” into an history of his public life. The contextual back-stories of Daniel, Enoch, and the Psalms of Solomon as well as the fore-stories of Baruch and Fourth Ezra are important, but “it is impossible to over-emphasize the uniqueness of the point of view from which the eschatology of the time of the Baptist, of Jesus, and of Paul presents itself to us.” Though Schweitzer stresses the importance of understanding apocalyptic texts, they are functionally ignored in his constructive proposal. In a methodological sleight of hand, it is his version of

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68 The discussion of apocalyptic, of course, has since been dramatically furthered as have the rigors of various methodologies. The aim in this section, therefore, is not to take anachronistic cheap shots at Schweitzer, but simply to explicate and to test the consistency of his method.  
69 Mystery, pp. 114–15.  
70 Quest1 p. 8.  
71 Geschichte1 p. 8; Quest1 p. 8.  
72 Quest1 p. 8.  
73 Cf. “Eine, in deren Mitte ein großes Loch ist, weil die Hauptepoche mit den Dokumenten, die sich darauf beziehen, darin fehlt.” Geschichte1 p. 364; Quest1 p. 368.  
74 Geschichte1 p. 364; Quest1 p. 368.  
75 Quest1 p. 368.  
76 Quest1 p. 368.
3.1. The Preaching of Jesus

As we noted above, Schweitzer saw his contribution to be the discovery of “the eschatological clue, not only to Jesus’ preaching, but also to his life and work.”\(^{77}\) As he would later state in his memoirs, “I show that his thought, word, and action were based on his expectation that the end of the world was near and that the kingdom of God would be revealed.”\(^{78}\) Everything is transposed into the key of eschatology.\(^{79}\) Though here we focus on the subject of his preaching it must be remembered that Schweitzer sees both Jesus’ preaching and activity in symbiotic relation. They are epexegetical of each other. It must also be stressed that die Predigt Jesu for Schweitzer does not envisage merely sermonizing, teaching, philosophizing, or the like. Words receive their meaning from their pragmatic function within a sentence, and, as we shall see, die Predigt for Schweitzer connotes something like “summons” or “proclamation.” Jesus’ preaching was contingent on and colored by the eschatological environs of his day and the secret of the kingdom of God (e.g., Mark 4:11; τὸ μυστήριον τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ θεοῦ).\(^{80}\) This “contingency” was never forced upon Jesus from “outward experiences,” but, from the beginning, was the very “base of his preaching.”\(^{81}\) From the outset of the baptism, Jesus’ proclamation stemmed from the fertile soil of the “late-Jewish eschatological world of ideas,”\(^{82}\) which affected people with the “hourly expecting” of the kingdom’s arrival.\(^{83}\) And with every appearance he proclaims the kingdom and its prerequisites.\(^{84}\)

3.1.1. The Gift of the Imminent Kingdom

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\(^{77}\) *Quest*\(^2\)* p. xxxviii.  
\(^{78}\) *Life and Thought*, p. 38.  
\(^{79}\) This is Schweitzer’s departure from the literary approaches and that of Johannes Weiss who left the horizons of eschatology just short of his activity.  
\(^{80}\) Cf. *Quest*\(^1\)* p. 394.  
\(^{81}\) *Mystery*, p. 87.  
\(^{82}\) *Quest*\(^2\)* p. 314.  
\(^{83}\) *Quest*\(^1\)* p. 386.  
\(^{84}\) *Quest*\(^2\)* p. 321.
Central to Schweitzer’s understanding of the secret of the kingdom is that its arrival is near, it is a gift, and that it relativizes current temporal realities. The kingdom was secret precisely because its content and terms were kept from those outside (τοῖς ἔξω) and revealed to those within Jesus’ inner circle (cf. Mark 4.11). Jesus preached “the near approach of the kingdom of God.”85 Its realization was his mission.86

Schweitzer connects the harvest season with the arrival of the kingdom “not only symbolically or analogically, but also really and temporarily.”87 The crowds are therefore urged to watch not only for the harvest of their crops, but also for the kingdom of God.88 “The same God who through his mysterious power in nature brings the harvest to pass will also bring to pass the kingdom of God.”89 His preaching therefore calls for a making ready, a “moral renewal,” which stands in “a necessary but inexplicable” connection with the kingdom’s arrival.90 The parables about sowing suggest that there is “somehow or other” a connection with the “eschatological preaching of repentance which had begun by the Baptist.”91 Jesus shares the belief with the Baptist that the time was near for the world and the elect to be raised into a “supernatural state.”92 Jesus makes no distinction between the messianic kingdom and eternal glory; he sees “both as a single entity.”93 The kingdom is therefore wholly future.94 This forms the substance of Jesus’ preaching and parabolic discourse:95 “read in the harvest which is ripening upon earth what is being prepared in heaven!”96 The later parables of the tenants (Matt 21:33–46); the wedding feast (Matt 22:1–14); the watchful servants (Matt 24:42–47); the ten

85 Mystery, p. 189.
86 Mystery, p. 61.
87 Quest² p. 325.
88 Mystery, p. 110.
89 Mystery, p. 110.
90 Mystery, p. 110.
91 Quest² pp. 325–26.
92 Quest² pp. 316–17.
93 Quest² p. 248.
94 Quest¹ p. 239; Mystery, p. 107.
95 “Wie auf die Saat die Ernte folgt, ohne dass jemand sagen kann, wie es zuging, so wird auf Jesu Predigt hin das Reich Gottes in Macht sich einstellen” (Skizze, p. 25). Walter Lowrie translates this as the kingdom of God as “sequel” to Jesus’ preaching (Mystery, p. 109).
96 Quest¹ pp. 325–26.
virgins (Matt 25:1–13); and the talents (Matt 25:14–30) all suggest that only those who prepare for its arrival through moral conduct will be included.\(^97\) The forgiveness of sins mentioned by the Baptist is “proleptic” in that it will be realized at the judgment.\(^98\) The secret therefore turns to summons in Matt 10:27 where the disciples are called to shout from the rooftops that the kingdom is “now, at harvest time.” The former times of the “is near” (\textit{ist nahe}) will soon give way to the “is here” (\textit{ist da}).\(^99\) The Now (\textit{das Jetzt}) is only for a moment longer; then the Then (\textit{das Dann}).\(^100\)

If the kingdom is wholly future and near, the schematics of the transition from Now (\textit{Jetzt}) to Then (\textit{Dann}) become valuable leverage for present rule and ordering. It is this politics of the middler-moment which becomes the contested sphere within Judaism. Does the arrival of the kingdom consist of a \textit{wrestling from} or a \textit{waiting for}?

Schweitzer makes recourse here to the early Strauss and his \textit{tertium quid} as opposed to the either/or of spiritual or political messianic aspirations of Jesus. The move of Strauss was to conceive of the contingency of the kingdom’s arrival not in terms of human agency but of divine intervention (\textit{überirdische Intervention}). This marks for Schweitzer one of the most significant contributions to “a real understanding” (\textit{wirklichen Erfassung}) of the eschatological riddle.\(^101\) On the one hand, Jesus dismissed the politics of the zealots and their posture of \textit{wrestling from}. On the other hand, his \textit{waiting for} was of an entirely different sort than the inactivity of some of his contemporaries.\(^102\) Though Jesus “did not propose to bring about any arbitrary action of his own,” and “left it to his heavenly Father” to bring about this “catastrophic change” (\textit{Katastrophe}) within this middler-moment,\(^103\) his was an

\(^{97}\) \textit{Mystery}, p. 124.
\(^{98}\) \textit{Quest}² p. 340.
\(^{99}\) \textit{Geschichte}² p. 405; \textit{Quest}² p. 326.
\(^{100}\) \textit{Geschichte}² p. 393; \textit{Quest}² p. 317.
\(^{101}\) \textit{Geschichte}¹ p. 91; \textit{Quest}¹ p. 92.
\(^{102}\) Schweitzer calls this the “waiting messiah of the Rabbis” (\textit{Quest}³ p. 254).
\(^{103}\) \textit{Geschichte}¹ p. 91; \textit{Quest}¹ p. 93.
active passivity, a making-ready-for the arrival of the kingdom. The politics of both these alternatives is therefore problematized.

There is therefore a doubly-polemical edge about Jesus’ posture toward the imminence of the kingdom. On the one hand all claims toward human agency toward ushering in the kingdom are undercut at their base. The kingdom’s arrival is given, not grabbed. On the other hand it is to come. This leads invariably to the relativization of temporal ordering and revaluation of values (eine Umwertung der Werte). Schweitzer’s language and idea of the revaluation of values here is quite similar to and certainly influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). Here we see an example of Schweitzer working with (fashionable) concepts in the reconceptualization of the past. In any case, any sense or suggestion of the kingdom’s presence in Jesus’ teaching therefore “is not to be understood as implying an anti-eschatological acceptance of the world, but merely as a phenomenon indicative of the extreme tension” of his eschatological consciousness. The texture of the Jetzt and the Dann runs through all of Jesus’ work and words. Because of the Dann, the Jetzt of social status and empire are negated.

This, sadly, is an underdeveloped thought in Schweitzer’s work. He seems to distance himself from Reimarus on the grounds of the political but fails to realize

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104 Quest1 p. 93.
105 Geschichte2 p. 393; Quest2 p. 317.
107 Quest1 p. 249.
that he himself is engaged in a *kind* of political reading of Jesus.\textsuperscript{109} We see this especially in his understanding of the role of suffering and service in Jesus’ consciousness and teaching. Earthly rule ([i]rdisches Herrschen),\textsuperscript{110} with its reliance upon force, “is an emanation of the power of ungodliness.”\textsuperscript{111} Authority within the kingdom of God signifies an “emanation from the divine power.” The rule of the Jetzt is destroyed (*vernichtet ist*) by the authority of the Dann.\textsuperscript{112} It is thus the suffering and service of Jesus which keeps him from the “contamination of earthly rule.”\textsuperscript{113} They represent the “moral means of acquiring and confirming the messianic authority to which he is designated.”\textsuperscript{114} Serving and reigning in the mind of Jesus are thus chronologically and logically connected. The aeons are split with the mention of the nearness of the kingdom, and the lowly “position of humble service” in the Jetzt of earthly rule by force testifies to its own doom within the Dann when “earthly force is done away” (*wenn die irdische Gewalt aufhört*).\textsuperscript{115} Due attention to the “now and then” (*jetzt und dann*) within Jesus’ preaching reveal the “descending stages of service corresponding to the ascending stages of rule.”\textsuperscript{116} Herod in his Palace or Caesar on his throne or Caiaphas in his temple are therefore elided with a temporal indifference within the middler-moment.

Schweitzer sees a tension in “the particularism of the preaching of the kingdom and the universalism of its consummation.”\textsuperscript{117} The kingdom is universalistic in that it stems from a “cosmic act” (*kosmische Akt*) “by which God awakes unto glory the righteous of all times and of all peoples.”\textsuperscript{118} But this universalism is dependent upon the particularity of the kingdom’s approach forced by the “moral renewal of the contemporaries of Jesus.” Salvation, in the last, comes out of Israel (cf. Ps 14:7;

\textsuperscript{109} See Bammel, “The Revolution Theory from Reimars to Brandon,” 11–68.
\textsuperscript{110} *Mystery*, p. 77; *Skizze*, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{111} *Mystery*, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{112} *Mystery*, p. 77; *Skizze*, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{113} *Mystery*, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{114} *Mystery*, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{115} *Mystery*, p. 74; *Skizze*, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{116} *Mystery*, p. 75; *Skizze*, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{117} *Mystery*, p. 118.
\textsuperscript{118} *Skizze*, p. 30; *Mystery*, p. 118.
This tension is part of the secret of the kingdom of God, and it is within this tension that the universalism of empire is bettered by the universalism of the kingdom while at the same time contested by its particularity. Sadly, Schweitzer never develops these themes.

3.1.2. Making Ready for the Kingdom: Repentance

The transition from the Now (Jetzt) to the Then (Dann) becomes the play of space in the earthly activity of Jesus. But what was Jesus’ relation to this transition? Johannes Weiss (1863–1914) negated the modern view of Jesus as founding a kingdom with his “eschatological insight” that Jesus’ relation to its arrival was a posture of waiting. Weiss maintained that the preaching of Jesus must be understood from an eschatological standpoint. His essay, *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*, though published in 1892, was not translated into English until 1971 and therefore did not make as much of an impact in the English-speaking world as Schweitzer did. Many scholars have commented on the superiority of Weiss’ scholarship in its rigor. Even so, his thought is largely mediated through the *Geschichte*. Schweitzer of course sees problems with an eschatological approach being extended only to the preaching of Jesus, but Weiss’ reasons for doing so were largely rhetorically contingent upon the earlier vocational ethical perspective of his father-in-law, Albrecht Ritschl. Weiss maintained that the kingdom for Jesus was wholly future and dependant upon divine initiation instead of ethical moral renewal. Moreover, Jesus was the *future* messiah who would be revealed as such in the future.

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119 *Mystery*, p. 118.
120 *Mystery*, p. 118. Schweitzer states, “They ought to have the presentiment that the moral renewal in consequence of his preaching stands in a necessary but inexplicable connection with the dawning of the kingdom of God. The same God who through his mysterious power in nature brings the harvest to pass will also bring to pass the kingdom of God” (*Mystery*, p. 110).
121 *Quest*, p. 357.
122 The 1892 edition was subsequently revised and expanded in 1900 but this edition has yet to be translated.
reign of God—an insight revealed to him at his baptism. It is precisely the notion of "kingdom" which Weiss is attempting to rescue from modern theological contamination. He asked whether modern theology could "issue the old coinage at a new rate of exchange?" Weiss, for his part, seemed unenthused on the prospect of success. Schweitzer positions himself in line with the early Strauss and Weiss here, but parses this waiting not as inactivity but as exerting "an active influence upon the kingdom of God" (eine Aktivität auf das Reich Gottes ausübt). Jesus' mission was a making ready for, a preparation. It consisted of one "article of instruction": repentance.

When the Baptist appeared he preached βάπτισμα μετανοιάς εἰς ἄφεσιν ἀμαρτίων (Mark 1:4). His call for repentance was based upon the imminence of the kingdom: μετανοεῖτε, ἣγγικεν γὰρ ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν (Matt 3:1). Repentance therefore consists of believing "in the nearness of the kingdom." A key text for Schweitzer in this respect is Matt 11:12, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν Ἰωάννου τοῦ βαπτιστοῦ ἕως ἥρτι ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν βιάζεται καὶ βιασταί ἀρπάζουσιν αὐτήν. Jesus and the Baptist, however, are not the βιασταί. In this sense they were not among those who were "working at the coming of the kingdom." It is, rather, the "host of penitents" (die Schar der Bußenden) which wrings it from God "so that it may now come at any moment."

The βιασταί, then, are those whose repentance and moral renewal act like "a pressure which is exerted in order to compel its appearance." These Promethean

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126 Weiss, Jesus' Proclamation, p. 114. This view is altered in the second edition, however, where it appears that Weiss thought Jesus envisioned a future ruler would be made manifest in the kingdom.
127 Weiss, Jesus' Proclamation, p. 59. Here we hear an unmistakable echo to Reimarus as discussed in §2.2.3. and §1.1.2.
128 Weiss, Jesus' Proclamation, p. 60.
129 Weiss, Jesus' Proclamation, p. 135.
130 Quest p. 357; Geschichte p. 354.
131 Mystery, p. 89. Here we hear explicit echoes to Reimarus.
132 Mystery, p. 89.
133 Schweitzer maintains that "the full difficulties of this passage are first exhibited by Johannes Weiss (Quest p. 266).
134 Quest p. 357; Geschichte p. 355.
penitents take the kingdom by force by putting “into practice the moral renewal. They draw it with power down to earth.” It is only through “humiliation and the meek service” in the Jetzt that one is “prepared to reign” in the Dann. Repentance and service act as a “hidden transcript,” then, by which earthly rule is relativized in the “moral renewal of the circle” gathered around Jesus. The preaching of Jesus was the bold declaration that the end was near and the urgent call to make oneself ready for its coming by repentance and through this repentance to hasten its approach. His preaching is the enlisting of the “violent” to take the kingdom by the force of moral renewal. There is a slight tension felt here in that earlier we saw Schweitzer use the early Strauss in seeing the arrival of the kingdom not by means of human agency but by divine intervention (überirdische Intervention). This move marked for Schweitzer one of the more significant contributions to the eschatological riddle. Is Schweitzer simply re-naming human agency as the “morally-renewed circle” which effects the coming of the kingdom? It appears so.

Fundamental to the tension of the Jetzt and the Dann is a sense of one’s security within the latter owing to its relativizing effects upon the former. The assurance of one’s membership within the future community “in a time of eschatological expectation demanded some kind of security for the future of which the earnest could be possessed in the present.” In this sense, confessions of election fall into accord. Schweitzer sees within the traditions of “sign and seal” in Psalms of Solomon, Paul, Revelation, and the Shepherd of Hermas, the reasonable assumption that similar ideas “will be found in some form or other in the eschatological teaching of the Baptist and Jesus.” He finds them in the moral

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135 Mystery, p. 112.
136 Mystery, p. 268.
138 Geschichte1 p. 91; Quest1 p. 92.
140 Quest1 p. 378.
141 E.g., Ezek 9; Ps Sol 15:8; Gal 6:17; 2 Cor 4:10; Rev 9:4–5; 8:16; 14:1; 20:4; and throughout Hermas.
142 Quest1 p. 378.
activity of the community of faith. Because Jesus’ moral teaching was “preparation for the kingdom of God,” the exercise of his moral teaching demonstrates the quality of belonging to the coming kingdom. Their deeds are not a matter of getting in or even staying in, but of knowing that they are already within the community of the end time. In other words, their deeds demonstrate and testify to their election.

In order to understand this Synoptical scheme properly, “one must have in mind” this prophetic sense of μετάνοια within the early prophets of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah, with its “emphasis upon the new moral life.” They are seen as “dominated by the thought of a condition of perfection which God will bring to pass through the Judgment.” The prophetic literature understood this as the Day of the Lord; the Synoptics as the dawn of the kingdom. Repentance thus “makes one meet for the kingdom of God,” as only the righteous are welcome or fit for its arrival. As in the prophets, then, the relation between moral reform and the transition into the Dann is “not that of a mere temporal sequence, but it rests upon a supernatural causal connection” (kein rein zeitliches, sondern es beruht auf einem übernatürlichen kausalen Zusammenhang).

3.1.3. Making Ready for the Kingdom: Interimsethik

As we saw earlier, suffering and service are a sort of “moral means” (sittliche Bewährung) by which Jesus both acquires and confirms his “messianic authority to which he is designated.” But these means do not become the morality of the

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143 Mystery, p. 39.
144 Quest, p. 355.
145 Quest, p. 354.
146 Mystery, pp. 94–95.
147 Mystery, p. 95.
148 Mystery, p. 95.
149 Mystery, p. 95.
150 Mystery, p. 113; Skizze, p. 27.
151 Mystery, p. 77; Skizze, p. 10.
kingdom. The kingdom is super-moral (übersittlichen). How then are the ethics of Jesus' moral teaching consistent with his expectation of an imminent end? Schweitzer thinks of Jesus enmeshed within a matrix of thought which "anticipated the imminent end of the world," and "had not considered the existence of a community after his death." Moreover, the teaching of Jesus "was purely and exclusively world-renouncing." This is where Schweitzer sees the question of whether Jesus' preaching of the kingdom was wholly eschatological or not is at its sharpest: viz., in his ethical teaching.

The concurrence in Jesus of an ethical with an eschatological line of thought has always constituted one of the most difficult problems of New Testament study. How can two such different views of the world, in part diametrically opposed to one another, be united in one process of thought?

Schweitzer answers this question in his articulation of Interimsethik. Jesus was the "ethical master promised by the prophets." And, like his secret, Jesus' "whole ethical outlook" was "ruled by the contrast of" Jetzt and Dann. But in "sovereign style, Jesus effects the synthesis of the apocalyptic of Daniel" and the ethics of the earlier prophets. The ethics of the early prophets are transfigured into the condition of the "moral conversion of Israel" which brings about "the final state of glory." In this sense, his ethics are not eschatological (eschatologische Ethik); rather,

Schweitzer states, "Ist aber Dienen nicht die Sittlichkeit des Gottesreiches, so operiert Jesu Leidensvorstellung auch nicht mit dem darauf beruhenden Begriff des Gottesreichs als der sich vollendenden ethischen Gemeinschaft, sondern mit einer übersittlichen Grösse, nämlich mit der eschatologischen Reichsvorstellung" (Skizze, p. 10; Mystery p. 77). Lowrie translates "einer übersittlichen Grösse" as "a super-moral entity" (cf. his translation of "Das Reich Gottes als ethische Grösse im Leidensgedanken," Mystery, p. 12). Große, here, can mean "greatness" in the figurative sense, or height, or quantity in the mathematical sense. Here again we hear echoes of Nietzsche.
his eschatology is ethical (ethische Eschatologie). For if one begins with the ethical and seeks to understand the eschatological s/he is bound for failure. The opposite course is required. This is the secret of the kingdom of God.

Jesus preaches and works a “higher morality” (höhere Sittlichkeit) by which he prepares a moral community to hasten the kingdom’s return. Within his Beatitudes, for example, the “poor in spirit, the meek, those that endure suffering, those that hunger and thirst after righteousness, the merciful, the pure in heart, the peacemakers,” are blessed precisely because by these actions they demonstrate “they are destined for the kingdom.” It is behind this “ethical preaching” that the secret of the kingdom looms. The “performance of the individual” within the community’s accomplishment of a “moral renewal in preparation for the kingdom,” hastens the supernatural realization of the kingdom. “Thus individual and social ethics blend in the great secret.” It is in this mingling that the “moral renewal” forces the kingdom’s return. Jesus’ ethics are “absolutely dependent upon this eschatology.” Every “moral-religious performance” (sittlich-religiöse Bethätigung) is labor (Arbeit) for the coming kingdom. They “make one meet for” entrance into and bearing rule within the kingdom of God. Here again, we feel the tension of Schweitzer and issues of human agency.

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163 Mystery, p. 256; Skizze, p. 100.
164 Mystery, pp. 93–94.
165 Mystery, p. 256.
166 Mystery, p. 255; Skizze, p. 99.
168 Mystery, p. 255.
169 Mystery, p. 255.
170 Mystery, p. 255. It is with some hesitation and reluctance that Schweitzer feels in admitting “the eschatological idea of the kingdom of God lay at the basis of Jesus’ preaching from beginning to end, since then one cannot explain how the new moral community which he formed about himself was in his thought organically connected with the kingdom which was supernaturally to appear” (Mystery, p. 104).
171 Mystery, p. 256.
172 Mystery, p. 122.
173 Mystery, p. 122; Skizze, p. 32.
174 Mystery, p. 97.
175 See above.
In a very real sense, however, his *Interimsethik* is no ethic at all, or, at least, it is a “special ethic” with a fast approaching spoil date. The Sermon on the Mount and the Beatitudes are instances of *Interimsethik* in that they “define the moral disposition which justifies admission,” and demonstrate the *Jetzt* and *Dann* nature of the kingdom where service now will lead to rule later. *Interimsethik* stresses the “immediateness of the transition from the condition of moral renewal into the super-moral perfection of the kingdom of God.” This “expected state of perfection” does not share the assumption of modern ethics, latent or tacit as it may be, that “the conflict between good and evil must go on forever, as belonging constantly to the nature of the ethical.” Schweitzer understands *Interimsethik* as the obliteration of this binary and moves the ethical “beyond the borders of good and evil.” This is the point of the later parables like the so-called Pearl of Great Price (Matt 13:44–46). It is the quality of the pearl, which represents the *Dann* of the kingdom, which allows for the quality of the field, which represents the *Jetzt*, to be utterly relativized. The ethic of Jesus, then, is one in which in the *Dann* frees one from the world and prepares one to enter “unimpeded into the kingdom.” His ethics are of a “completely negative” character, and, as such, “not so much an ethic as a penitential discipline.”

It is precisely as a non-ethic which makes Schweitzer’s formulation doubley radical. In one sense it blurs the boundary markers of national identities. In Torah observance, for example, “Jesus did not declare himself either for or against it. "He

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176 Quest¹ p. 354.
177 Mystery, p. 96.
178 Mystery, p. 97. Schweitzer stresses the “significance of humility and service in expectation of the kingdom of God” in that they constitute the “fundamental law” of *Intermsethik* (Mystery, p. 76).
179 “die Unmittelbarkeit des Uebergangs aus dem Zustande der sittlichen Erneuerung in den der übersittlichen Vollendung des Gottesreiches handelt” (Skizze, p. 20; Mystery, p. 99).
180 Mystery, p. 103.
182 Quest¹ p. 240.
recognized it simply as an existing fact without binding himself to it."\textsuperscript{183} His "real concern" was not the Torah but the perfection of morality within the new morality. The former was "holy and inviolable" only insofar as it pointed to the latter.\textsuperscript{184} The Torah was preparatory "for the expected estate of glory."\textsuperscript{185} This "accomplished condition," however, is both "super-legal" and "super-ethical" (\textit{übergesetzlich und überethisch}).\textsuperscript{186} The "higher righteousness" of Jesus' proclamation transcends the temporal fixity of Torah,\textsuperscript{187} while synthesizing "the spirit of the letter of the Law" within \textit{Interimsethik} in order to make one ready for the kingdom's arrival.\textsuperscript{188}

What is true for the Law, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, applies to the terrestrial in general: "all earthly rule is done away, as well as the earthly human nature itself."\textsuperscript{189} Herod and Caesar are "simply earthly," and therefore exer ters of godless domination. The dawn of God's dominion means an abrupt end to theirs.\textsuperscript{190} Jesus' mere mention of this nearness is a catalyst by which a revolution of expectancy is borne within the moral community; viz., the "violent." It is the nature of this expectancy which relativizes "all earthly institutions, conditions, and benefits." They belong to the \textit{Jetzt} and will either be extinguished or sublimated in the \textit{Dann}.\textsuperscript{191} Here again, despite his disassociations with political formulations of Jesus' ministry, his reading of the kingdom's affect upon the terrestrial is a profound politics of a similar sort. One might even call it an ironic "spiritualizing" of politics. Ironic, that is, in the sense that for all Schweitzer's railing against the spiritualizing of past \textit{Leben Jesu Forschung}, precisely where one would expect an historical assessment of the political environment of the first century and the complex system of Roman hegemony, the historical is functionally replaced by a kind of spiritual brush to the side of what he calls "godless domination" and metaphysical moves on the doing away of earthly
human nature. This, of course, is not necessarily a criticism of Schweitzer’s move—in fact, the unfortunate reality is that he leaves it underdeveloped—but the move is suspicious when read within his bold claims that what he is doing is pure history with little recourse made to the political historical realities of the day.

Moreover, Schweitzer’s “pure history,” despite protestations to the contrary, is heavily influenced by modern forms of thought. This, of course, is no sin—that is, unless one accuses others of losing the purely historical and claim to recover it by returning to the first century. As Schweitzer stated, the aim of Eine Skizze was to present Jesus in his “overwhelming heroic greatness and to impress it upon the modern age and upon the modern theology.” Though certainly present in Geschichte¹, Geschichte² furthers this sentiment in the concluding reflections where, though “coming to us as one unknown,” Jesus is “retained as a kind of good-willed Nietzschean Übermensch.” The moves of Schweitzer here seem to be guided by a similar impulse in discovering the enduringly valid within the Jesus material but guided by a different unity. Gräßer, for example, sees Jesus-as-alien to be the key move in Schweitzer’s work so that his cultural conditionality could be left behind with the ultimate significance of the “person of Jesus” and his überirdische Persönlichkeit being retained. Within this movement some peculiar tensions are raised. On the one hand, as we have mentioned throughout, Schweitzer is not the pure historian that he is constructing himself to be. For if the complexities of the first-century environs of Palestine are where the historical Jesus is to be found one would suspect at least some recourse would be made to contiguous texts of that era. For example, Josephus is a glaring omission within both the Skizze and the Geschichte. What is more, for as much as Schweitzer talks about the fundamental

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¹ Schweitzer was engaged in a wider social understanding and construction of “history.” Cf., e.g., Pleitner, Das Ende der liberalen Hermeneutik, pp. 1–15 and 180–205; and, Lannert, Die Wiederentdeckung der neutestamentlichen Eschatologie durch Johannes Weiss.
² “[D]er modernen Zeit und der modernen Dogmatik die Gestalt Jesu in ihrer überwältigenden heroischen Grösse vor die Seele zu führen” (Skizze, p. 109; Mystery, p. 274).
³ Quest¹ p. 403; Quest² p. 487.
⁴ Chapman, The Coming Crisis, p. 75.
⁵ Gräßer, Albert Schweitzer als Theologe 79. See, too, Nineham, Explorations in Theology, p. 129.
eschatological and apocalyptic context of the first century, there are scant quotations of or even allusions to relevant literature.\(^{197}\) R. H. Charles laid into the “bizarreness” and “cocksureness” of Schweitzer’s generalizations which are built upon “untempered mortar” and a “halting knowledge of apocalyptic.”\(^{198}\) And, as \textit{konsequent} as his \textit{Eschatologie} is, Schweitzer himself does not use it as the positive tool of reconstruction as he suggests he would in the shadow of Reimarus’ instrument of deconstruction. In this sense, as Sydney Ahlstrom states, Schweitzer “founded a school of biblical interpretation which he never joined.”\(^{199}\)

What is guiding Schweitzer then? Throughout the \textit{Skizze} and the \textit{Geschichte(n)} Schweitzer demonstrates an interest in the great personality of Jesus. The echo of Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881) and the cult of the heroic here is quite strong.\(^{200}\) The impact of Carlyle’s \textit{On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History} (1841) was great and its influence reached Wilhelm Bousset.\(^{201}\) Schweitzer himself labels Bousset’s work as “inspired by the spirit of Carlyle” in that it “vindicates the original force of a great Personality against the attempt to dissolve it into a congeries of contemporary conceptions.”\(^{202}\) Yet Schweitzer himself appears to be attempting to recapture the “mighty original genius” of Jesus for the restoration of German theology.\(^{203}\) Such a move appears equally “inspired by the spirit of Carlyle,”\(^{204}\) despite Schweitzer’s implicit rejection of this.\(^{205}\)

\(^{197}\) Schweitzer appears to make an attempt at correcting this oversight in Schweitzer, \textit{The Kingdom of God and Primitive Christianity}, pp. 1–67.

\(^{198}\) The comments were made before the general assembly of the 1910 Church Congress. See C. Dunkley, ed., \textit{The Official Report of the Church Congress Held at Cambridge} (London: George Allen, 1910) 74.

\(^{199}\) Sydney E. Ahlstrom, “Continental Influence on American Christian Thought Since World War I,” \textit{American Society of Church History 27.3} (1958) 256–72, 262. Though here he seems to associate the language of George Tyrrell’s accusation of Harnack peering down the well of history only to see himself in the reflection with Schweitzer.


\(^{202}\) \textit{Quest} 1 p. 249.

\(^{203}\) \textit{Quest} 1 pp. 2 and 1.

\(^{204}\) On Carlyle, see John Morrow, \textit{Thomas Carlyle} (London: Continuum, 2006).

\(^{205}\) “Carlyle’s \textit{On Heroes and Hero-Worship} is not a profound book” \textit{Life and Thought}, p. 89.
What is more, Schweitzer demonstrates considerable recourse to Nietzsche here.\footnote{206} The familiarity of Schweitzer with Nietzsche before \textit{Eine Skizze} and the \textit{Geschichte} is beyond question. As early as 1899 in Berlin he was exposed to Nietzsche's work from the philosophical lectures of Georg Simmel (1858–1918) who was interested in Nietzsche's notion of self-transcendence.\footnote{207} But Nietzsche's influence was wide and considerable enough that Schweitzer would certainly have been familiar with his work or ideas before then.\footnote{208} In any case, B. H. Streeter has detected this Nietzschean trace and stated that Schweitzer “himself cannot quite escape the charge of modernizing, and that his own boldly-outlined portrait [of the historical Jesus] is a little like the Superman of Nietzsche dressed in Galilean robes.”\footnote{209} This has led Henning Pleitner to suggest Schweitzer was less of an historian and more of a metaphysician, and indeed nearer the liberalism he critiques than is often noted.\footnote{210} Indeed, as we have seen scattered throughout, there appears to be a slight Nietzschean subtext to Schweitzer's project. But again, this is no real criticism of strategy but a criticism of consistency with one's stated agenda.

\section*{3.2. The Performance of Jesus}

In the previous section we looked at Schweitzer's understanding of the content of Jesus' preaching. In this section we will look at the role of Jesus' activities within the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \footnotesize See Brabazon, \textit{Albert Schweitzer: A Biography} 86.
\item \footnotesize On the influence and legacy of Nietzsche in Germany, see Steven E. Aschheim, \textit{The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890–1990} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}

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schema of *konsequente Eschatologie*. Schweitzer, to remind ourselves, sees his contribution to scholarship to be the application of eschatological to the entirety of Jesus’ earthly ministry. Whereas other contributions stop short at his preaching, Schweitzer’s was *konsequent*. The split we are making between preaching and performance is therefore arbitrary in many respects. Preaching is a kind of performance just as performance is a kind of preaching. Our splitting of the two are therefore analytical in purpose—though, of course, Schweitzer himself can make the distinction of thoughts, words, and actions.\(^211\) We now turn to the activity of Jesus, the performance.

Central for Schweitzer’s reconstruction of Jesus’ earthly life is the Gospel of Mark. In Schweitzer’s reading of Mark, Jesus’ public ministry lasted just short a harvest year;\(^212\) and is “limited to the last months of his existence on earth.”\(^213\) The sum of his activity may be counted in terms of weeks. The first period extends from seedtime to harvest and the second consists of his days in Jerusalem. “Nature was God’s clock.”\(^214\) The coming of the kingdom of God, for Schweitzer, is not only symbolically or analogically connected with the harvest, but also temporally.\(^215\) The harvest was to give an “eager eschatological hope” for the culmination of the kingdom.\(^216\) Jesus’ earthly activity is an eschatological hastening, a setting in motion of the “eschatological development of history” so as to “introduce the supra-mundane phase of the eschatological drama.”\(^217\) The analogical and temporal parallelism completes itself with the assumption that the Baptist began in the spring, and, according to Matt 9:37–38, Jesus expected a “rich harvest” when the disciples were commissioned. “It seems like a final expression of thought contained in the parables about the seed and its promise, and finds its most natural

\(^{211}\) *Life and Thought*, p. 38.
\(^{212}\) Schweitzer’s reason for this is that there is only one Passover journey mentioned in Mark. From this datum he confidently asserts, “we may conclude that no other Passover fell within the period of Jesus’ activity as a teacher” (*Quest*\(^1\) p. 351).
\(^{213}\) *Mystery*, p. 253.
\(^{214}\) *Mystery*, p. 256.
\(^{215}\) *Quest*\(^1\) pp. 356–57.
\(^{216}\) *Quest*\(^1\) p. 357.
\(^{217}\) *Quest*\(^1\) p. 371.
explanation in the supposition that the harvest was actually at hand."\textsuperscript{218} Jesus, therefore, expected the "dawn of the kingdom" at harvest time.\textsuperscript{219}

Karl August von Hase (1800–90) was the first to distinguish between the two periods within Jesus’ earthly activity.\textsuperscript{220} Schweitzer accepts this dual-period approach, but rails against the developmental theories which see Jesus first beginning with an ethical outlook and then in the second period, by way of defeat, adopting an eschatological view. In the first period, so the theory goes, the “purely ethical view” consisted of Jesus “looking for the realization of the kingdom of God through the spread and perfection of the moral-religious society which he was undertaking to establish.” But his message was not received, and owing to the mounting opposition, “the eschatological conception forced itself upon him.” The initial “religious-ethical ideal” had to be reconfigured as contingent upon “a cosmic catastrophe” in which God’s omnipotence would vindicate and culminate Jesus’ initial activity.\textsuperscript{221}

Schweitzer cannot accept this. He sees from beginning to end that “Jesus’ ministry counted only upon the eschatological realization of the kingdom.”\textsuperscript{222} Moreover, Schweitzer turns this logic against itself in seeing the two-stage theory of Jesus’ activity as consisting of a fortunate Galilean period followed by a time of defeat. The assumption behind this is “historically untenable,” and the wrong way around.\textsuperscript{223} For in the so-called fortunate period, controversies surrounded his healing ministry (Mark 2:1–12); he was criticized for his views of fasting (Mark 2:18–22) and his activity on the Sabbath (2:23–28). Already in Mark’s third chapter, his life is at risk (Mark 3:6). His prophetic call went unrecognized in his hometown (Mark 6:1–6), his

\textsuperscript{218} \textit{Quest} p. 357.
\textsuperscript{219} Schweitzer states, “If this genuinely ‘historical’ interpretation of the mystery of the kingdom of God is correct, Jesus must have expected the coming of the kingdom at harvest time. And that is just what he did expect” (\textit{Quest} p. 358). Here we see a bit of what he accused Brandt; viz., turning his if into an historical fact (\textit{Quest} p. 258).
\textsuperscript{220} \textit{Quest} pp. 61, 214–15.
\textsuperscript{221} \textit{Mystery}, pp. 85–86.
\textsuperscript{222} \textit{Mystery}, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{223} \textit{Mystery}, p. 81.
family called him mad (Mark 3:20–22, 31–35), the religious authorities stymied his every move charging him as being in league with Satan (Mark 3:23–30), and the crowds failed to understand his message. “Such are the well known events of the successful period.” For Schweitzer, the successes only began with the commissioning of the twelve.

3.2.1. The Commissioning of the Twelve

The hinge upon which the dual-stage of Jesus’ earthly activity turns is the commissioning of the twelve (Matt 10:1–42; Mark 6:6b–13). Jesus expects that the kingdom’s arrival is at the doorstep, and the “parousia of the son of man, which is logically and temporally identical with the dawn of the kingdom, will take place before they have completed a hasty journey through the cities of Israel to announce it.” The so-called “success” of the first period is actually misappropriated: successes really “first begin with the mission of the twelve.” The very fact that twelve are chosen suggests symbolic and indeed dogmatic significance. “He chooses them as those who are destined to hurl the firebrands into the world, and are afterwards, as those who have been the comrades of the unrecognized messiah, before he came to his kingdom, to be his associates in ruling and judging it.”

The twelve were sent out to give “a flying proclamation throughout Israel.” As teachers their doctrine was singular: the kingdom of God was near. This nearness called for repentance and the warning of judgment. And as such, he “intimated to the disciples as he sent them upon their mission that the son of man would appear before they had gone through all the cities of Israel” (Matt 10:23). The disciples were endowed with authority over the demonic (Matt 10:1) and were to “give the

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224 Mystery, p. 65.
226 Quest^2 p. 327.
227 Mystery, p. 66.
228 Cf. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, p. 96.
229 Quest^1 p. 371.
231 Mystery, p. 90.
last blow” to evil.\textsuperscript{233} Schweitzer sees a strong connection with the persecution texts (Matt 10:16–25; 26–33; 34–39) and the commissioning of the twelve. Mark reports a scant and hurried sequence of Jesus commissioning the disciples (6:7–11), offering a brief summary of their exploits (6:12–13), and then immediately follows with the murdering of the Baptist at the hands of secular authorities (6:14–29). Matthew significantly expands the commissioning with respect to warnings of coming persecutions and the charge to persevere until the end (Matt 10:16–42). These warnings and persecutions are enacted with the near referent of the Baptist first in prison (Matt 11:2–19) and then with reports of his death (Matt 14:1–12). In other words, the messianic woes and threats of persecution spelled out in Matt 10:16–39 were about real-time happenings, not an envisioned future when Jesus would depart from their company.

These so-called messianic woes, then, represent the “last uprisings of the world.” The twelve are sent out “as the men of violence who are to deal the last blow.”\textsuperscript{234} The moral renewal had not hastened the Endzeit so the commissioning was Jesus’ “last effort for bringing about the kingdom.”\textsuperscript{235} The disciples returned, enthusiastic and triumphant in many respects, but the kingdom did not come. Time kept marching on. This failure to launch is the “first eschatological delay and postponement” and became “momentous for the fate of the Gospel tradition.”\textsuperscript{236} This episode is unintelligible apart from the eschatological environs of expectancy, and subsequent tradition has been blinded by this oversight. The report of the twelve was that “all was ready.” The failure of the kingdom’s arrival did not equate to a failure of the disciples. The power of evil appeared to be wounded as the evil spirits were subject to their authority (cf. Mark 6:13). The crowds continued to grow in their expectancy—as evidenced by the multitude texts (e.g., Mark 6:30–44; 8:1–10)—but the kingdom delayed.

\textsuperscript{233} Mystery, p. 257.  
\textsuperscript{234} Mystery, p. 144.  
\textsuperscript{235} Mystery, p. 261.  
\textsuperscript{236} Mystery, p. 264.
The so-called miracle of the feeding of the five thousand has been “distorted into miracle” (Mark 6:30–44).\textsuperscript{237} It was instead a “cultus-meal” improvised by Jesus along the seashore as a foretaste of the messianic banquet.\textsuperscript{238} The gathering of the crowd thus takes on “an eschatological character.” It was an act of his messianic consciousness that replaced the customary and mundane with “a sacred ceremonial meal.”\textsuperscript{239} The meal was intended to be shared with his disciples in solitude (Mark 6:31). When the disciples returned to report their triumph (Mark 6:30) it came immediately upon news of the Baptist’s death (Mark 6:14–29).

This presented a problem within Jesus’ mind. The promise of Matt 10:23 remained awkwardly unfulfilled at the disciples’ return. “The actual history disavowed the dogmatic history.”\textsuperscript{240} Jesus urgently needed to retreat and come to an understanding of two historical happenings. Why was his designate as Forerunner murdered by secular authorities before the “messianic time” arrived? And why was the kingdom still slow in appearing despite “the tokens of its dawning” being present?\textsuperscript{241} It was this failure to launch which marks the first “historical” occurrence for Jesus; “the central event which closed the former period of his activity and gave the coming period a new character.”\textsuperscript{242} The answer comes from the scriptures: God brings about the kingdom without the general Affliction.\textsuperscript{243}

Before turning to Schweitzer’s “answer” we must consider the problem a bit more. Schweitzer’s move here raises at least three tensions and one possible embarrassment for konsequente Eschatologie. First, Schweitzer is proposing a kind of development by a different name. As we will see below, Schweitzer is careful to guard against developmental theories within Jesus’ messianic consciousness.\textsuperscript{244}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{237} Mystery, p. 170.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Mystery, p. 171.
\item \textsuperscript{239} Mystery, p. 172.
\item \textsuperscript{240} Quest\textsuperscript{1} p. 359.
\item \textsuperscript{241} Mystery, p. 265.
\item \textsuperscript{242} Quest\textsuperscript{1} p. 359.
\item \textsuperscript{243} Mystery, pp. 265–66.
\item \textsuperscript{244} Mystery, pp. 223–24; Quest\textsuperscript{1} p. 388.
\end{itemize}
From his baptism to his crucifixion his consciousness was the same. But the deployment of strategy is significantly altered with the return of the disciples. Second, again we see a rather loose alliance with the early Strauss and Weiss along the lines of agency. Jesus appears to be forcing the hand of the kingdom’s arrival through the gathering of the host of penitents and the commissioning of the twelve. Third, and perhaps slightly embarrassing for *konsequente Eschatologie*, Schweitzer does not seem bothered by the fact that not only did the twelve return—did not Jesus say that they would *not return*?—but that they returned to *Jesus before the kingdom arrived*. The failure of the kingdom’s arrival with the return of the disciples is a critical embarrassment for the Jesus of *konsequente Eschatologie*. Nothing is unlocked with Schweitzer’s key here apart from a development in the strategy of Jesus’ messianic vocation—which would seem integral to a development in Jesus’ messianic consciousness. In any case, just as the kingdom failed to launch with the return of the twelve, Schweitzer’ *konsequente Eschatologie* fails to deliver precisely where it needs to do so.

3.2.2. *Healings and Exorcisms*

Schweitzer’s “answer” to this tension is with his peculiar reading of the tribulation. Before looking at how the *general Affliction* was going to be avoided, it is important to understand the role of healings and exorcisms within Jesus’ ministry and the deputy authority given to the disciples in their commissioning. The disciples were not sent on a mission of kingdom “extension” but one of announcing its hurried arrival. Signs and wonders, naturally, come under the double-view of *Jetzt* and *Dann*.

Schweitzer understands that “miracles had nothing to do with the messiah, since no one expected the messiah to come as an earthly miracle-worker in the present age.” Miracles were instead a sign of the Forerunner (cf. Mal 4:5; Joel 2:37). “The

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245 *Quest*¹ p. 239.
246 *Mystery*, p. 256.
247 *Quest*¹ p. 372.
Forerunner without miracles in an unmiraculous age was therefore unthinkable.\textsuperscript{248} The assumption of messianic significance of miracles within John, for example, demonstrate for Schweitzer a loss of the eschatological perspective.\textsuperscript{249} But “genuine eschatology” excludes any messianic interpretation of the miracles.\textsuperscript{250} They function as exhibitions of mercy “intended to awaken repentance,” or indications of the nearness of the kingdom’s arrival (e.g. Matt 12:28).\textsuperscript{251} They are connected not with the messiah but with the kingdom.\textsuperscript{252}

The disciples’ reporting of their authority over unclean spirits (Matt 10:1) are signs by which they “are to perceive that the power of ungodliness is coming to an end and the morning-glow of the kingdom of God already dawns.”\textsuperscript{253} This deputy authority is an expression of Jesus’ own miraculous work which signifies “the binding of the power of ungodliness and rendering it harmless.”\textsuperscript{254} As was the case of repentance and ethics, exorcisms and healings stand in a “causal relation” with the kingdom’s arrival. Jesus in this sense is the “man of violence” who through his assault of the empire of evil “compels the approach of the kingdom.”\textsuperscript{255} It is in the binding of this evil when its dominion will crumble. In this sense the disciples are endowed with authority over evil to deliver its death knell.\textsuperscript{256} These “signs” signified a nearness more than the purely temporal and chronological. “By his victory over the demons he was conscious of influencing the coming of it.”\textsuperscript{257}

These demonstrations represent for Schweitzer the “only sense in which Jesus thinks of the kingdom as present.” These outliers function as challenges to the

\textsuperscript{248} Mystery, p. 141. 
\textsuperscript{249} Quest\textsuperscript{1} pp. 347–48. 
\textsuperscript{250} Quest\textsuperscript{1} pp. 347–48. 
\textsuperscript{251} Quest\textsuperscript{1} pp. 347–48. 
\textsuperscript{252} Quest\textsuperscript{1} p. 348. 
\textsuperscript{253} Mystery, p. 89. 
\textsuperscript{254} Mystery, p. 144. 
\textsuperscript{255} Cf. Mystery, p. 144. This statement here needs to be held in tension with his comments regarding how Jesus and the Baptist are not the men of violence referred to in Matt 11:12 but instead gather a “host of penitents” who are the violent ones. Cf. Quest\textsuperscript{1} p. 357; Geschichte\textsuperscript{1} p. 355 cited earlier. 
\textsuperscript{256} Mystery, p. 144. 
\textsuperscript{257} Mystery, p. 143.
Pharisees precisely on this ground (Matt 12:25–28)—the kingdom of God is present in Jesus’ teaching and activity and therefore poses a serious challenge to the Pharisees’ objection of Jesus’ teaching and activity.\textsuperscript{258} This activity is not a mode of establishing but an expression of arrival, recognizing the “paralysis of the kingdom of Satan.”\textsuperscript{259} This bald admission by Schweitzer does not seem to trouble him as much as it should. Even a singular instance in the face of a theory which claims to be \textit{konsequent} is problematic.\textsuperscript{260} Schweitzer’s hermeneutical criterion for discerning what is historical and what is not seems to lose traction with this admission. Perhaps a denial of this passage’s historical veracity would have been in order. Nevertheless, this singular admission is a significant stumbling block for \textit{konsequente Eschatologie} and calls into question its ability to deal with other related texts.

3.2.3. \textit{The Victorious Funeral Procession}

Even though the disciples appeared to be triumphant in their mission and the effects of the loosening of evil’s tyranny was demonstrated in the healings and exorcisms, the kingdom delayed. Why this failure to launch? This is more of a problem than Schweitzer allows. His singular key cannot turn the stubborn lock of the disciples’ return. Though Schweitzer sees a consistency in the vocational aim of Jesus, he concedes a pointed shift of emphasis after the commissioning of the twelve. It was after the first “historical” occurrence of the failure for the kingdom to arrive after the disciples’ return which led Jesus to a refocus of mission.

This refocusing centered on his relationship to the great Affliction. “A time of unheard of affliction must precede the coming of the kingdom. Out of these woes the messiah will be brought to birth.”\textsuperscript{261} These afflictions are “the last desperate attack of the powers of this world at enmity with God, which shall sweep like a flood over

\begin{footnotes}
\item[258] \textit{Quest}, p. 239.
\item[259] \textit{Quest}, p. 239.
\item[260] That is not to say detrimental, but it is certainly a problem which Schweitzer brushes over.
\item[261] \textit{Mystery}, p. 219.
\end{footnotes}
those who in expectation of the kingdom represent the divine power in the godless world.”262 It was while in solitude, reflecting on the return of the twelve and the death of the Baptist, that Jesus became convinced that the general Affliction was going to be replaced with his own personal affliction. It was through his affliction that his death becomes substitutionary. His own personal affliction substitutes for the general Affliction. In this sense, ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἠλθεν διακονηθήναι ἀλλὰ διακονήσαι καὶ δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λίτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν (Mark 10:45).

The polemical edge to this reading is directed against past scholarship which saw the public ministry of Jesus as a revelation of the present-ness of the kingdom as “a dispensation of the forgiveness of sin or as the morally developing society.”263 But in Jesus’ death, Schweitzer sees “a real significance.”264 The great fact of delay on the heels of the disciples’ return led Jesus to the startling realization: it was his great affliction—in lieu of the failure of the general Affliction to arrive—which would constrain the kingdom to arrive.265 Jesus therefore begins his journey to Jerusalem, “the second period” of his public ministry,266 as a “funeral march to victory.”267

The single event of the so-called triumphal entry (Mark 11:1–11; Matt 21:1–11; Lk 19:28–44) is split between the secret of Jesus’ messianic consciousness and the expectation of the crowd. The crowds meet him with great excitement and expectation for the kingdom’s arrival,268 but they recognize him not as the messiah but the Forerunner, ὁ προφήτης Ἰησοῦς ὁ ἀπὸ Ναζαρέτ τῆς Γαλιλαίας (Matt 21:11). In other words, not as the messiah but as Elijah. His “entrance into Jerusalem, therefore, was an ovation not to the messiah but to the Forerunner.”269 Yet Jesus made messianic preparations for his entry. The entry therefore betrays messianic

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262 Mystery, p. 220.
263 Mystery, p. 82.
264 Mystery, p. 82.
265 Mystery, p. 234.
266 Mystery, p. 268.
268 Mystery, p. 268.
269 Mystery, p. 158.
features. His riding in on the ass was not owing to physical fatigue but his messianic consciousness which intended secretly to fulfill Zech 9:9. As with the sending forth of the disciples, the explanation of the Baptist’s true identity, and at the feeding of the multitude, Jesus’ messianic consciousness reveals itself in his actions—this time in his entry into Jerusalem. The entry was messianic for Jesus, not for the crowds. Dogmatic history is driving actual historical events.

3.3. The Complexities of Messiahship

The preaching and performance of Jesus demonstrate the complexities of messiahship. “If Jesus really regarded himself as messiah, how comes it that he acted as if he were not messiah?” It is through this question that Schweitzer explicates the mystery of Jesus’ messiahship. He takes as his point of departure Wrede’s mis-assortment of the circle of mysteries. For Wrede, the inner-circle of mystery which coordinates everything is the messianic secret. But there is a second mystery missed by Wrede that has nothing to do with messianism as such but with the kingdom of God. Wrede’s mistake, Schweitzer contends, “consists in endeavoring by violent methods to subsume the more general, the mystery of the kingdom of God, under the more special, the mystery of the messiahship, instead of inserting the latter as the smaller circle, within the wider, the secret of the kingdom of God.”

For Schweitzer, the messiah was an expression and function within the kingdom. And, as we have seen, since Jesus preached a future kingdom, his messianic understanding must be future as well. What is more, just as the eschatological understanding of the kingdom was wholly within a first-century Palestinian imaginary, so also was the messiah. Jesus’ messiahship was completely within the “popular conception” (volkstümliche Anschauung). And the “Jewish messiah is

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270 Quest 1 pp. 393–94.
271 Quest 1 p. 394.
272 Mystery, p. 4.
273 Quest 1 p. 349.
274 Mystery, p. 135.
275 Mystery, p. 210; Skizze, p. 76.
essentially a glorious being who shall appear in the last time.” The “late-Jewish eschatology” of the day saw the messiah as a “supernatural ruler of the supernatural kingdom of God.” The messianic titular, therefore, is supernatural and future in aspect. In this sense, Jesus was the “future messiah” (der kommende Messias), convinced that “only at the appearance of the messianic kingdom,” will he be “manifested as the messiah” (als der Messias offenbar werden wird). And though for Schweitzer the messiah is entirely future within the future-kingdom, in all Jesus’ acts and speech-acts, “the messianic consciousness shines forth.” These “deeds of Jesus’ messianic consciousness” (Taten des messianischen Selbstbewußtseins Jesu) are not “messianic functions” as such, but the authoritative self-reference in, say, the Sermon on the Mount or the Beatitudes, that hint he thought of himself as the messiah designate.

3.3.1. Jesus’ Relationship to the Baptist

As we saw earlier, the crowds welcomed Jesus to Jerusalem as the Forerunner. When Jesus identifies the Baptist as Elijah (Matt 11:14–15), he “was the first and the only person who attributed this office to him.” At the time, the crowds were not in expectation of the messiah, but the Forerunner. And the people understood Jesus to be the “one who announces the imminent coming of the kingdom of God.” It was not until the confession before the Council and Caiaphas that his messianic secret became known (Matt 26:57–68). It is this plurality of perception regarding the relationship of Jesus and the Baptist, then, that needs to be addressed. There are

276 Quest1 p. 387.
277 Quest2 p. xlv.
278 Quest2 pp. xxxviii, xxxix.
279 Quest2 p. 338; Geschichte2 p. 421.
280 Life and Thought, p. 39; Leben und Denken, p. 31.
281 “Und doch blitzt überall aus seinem Reden und Tun das messianische Selbstbewußtsein heraus” (Geschichte1 p. 369; Quest1 p. 372).
282 Geschichte1 p. 369.
283 Quest1 p. 239.
284 Quest1 p. 372.
285 Quest1 p. 373.
286 Quest1 p. 374.
287 Life and Thought, p. 39.
288 Mystery, p. 163.
at least three perspectives in view: that of the crowd, that of the Baptist, and that of Jesus himself.

One could suspect Schweitzer of reductionism in his treatment of the crowds, but by it he more or less means popular expectation. The crowds could not have thought the Baptist was the Forerunner, according to Schweitzer, for at least three reasons: he did not describe himself as such; he performed no miracle; and, finally, he himself pointed to the coming of the Forerunner. Schweitzer contends that the miraculous was expectant as contemporaneous with the Forerunner (cf. Mal 4:5; Joel 2:37). “The Forerunner without miracles in an unmiraculous age was therefore unthinkable.” The Baptist performed no signs and wonders while Jesus did. “He was only a natural man without any evidence of supernatural power.” The Baptist, then, was seen as one who preached the nearness of the kingdom, while Jesus was seen as the one who confirmed its nearness with signs and wonders. The baptism unto repentance and the offer of the forgiveness of sins by the Baptist was a proleptic realization of eschatological reality: a sign in the present of that which will be made manifest at the Judgment.

Even for John his self-understanding seems unspectacular. At the baptism scene, he states,

Ἐγὼ μὲν ὑμᾶς βαπτίζω ἐν ὁδατί εἰς μετάνοιαν, ὁ δὲ ὅπισω μου ἔρχομενος ἱσχυρότερός μού ἔστιν, σὺν τῷ καθάπεν ἐκείνῳ ὑμᾶς βαπτίζει ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πυρί· οὐ τὸ πτύων ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ διακαθαρίζει τὴν ἀλωνα αὐτοῦ καὶ συνάξει τὸν σῖτον αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν ἀποθήκην, τὸ δὲ ἄχυρον κατακαίσει πυρὶ ἄσβεστῳ (Matt 3:11–12).

Schweitzer sees a hint here in the claim that John expected Jesus to carry on a baptism ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πυρί (v.11). John’s consisted of water, Jesus’ was to be of fire. But this “cannot apply to the messiah” Schweitzer contends because

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289 Quest¹ p. 374.
290 Mystery, p. 141.
291 Quest¹ p. 374.
292 Mystery, p. 141.
293 Quest² p. 340.
nowhere is the messiah expected to baptize. This unfortunate literalism confuses the referent of the symbolism. It is not the baptism *qua* baptism that is being compared but the activities of the two *qua* ministry.\textsuperscript{294} In other words, Jesus’ ministry is an altogether different entity. But for John, according to Schweitzer, ὅ δὲ ὁ πίσω μου ἐρχόμενος (Matt 3:11) is not the messiah but the Elijah figure of the last days.

Only for Jesus was John the Elijah figure of the last days. This, of course, was a “necessary inference” from his messianic consciousness.\textsuperscript{295} The disciples are let in on this secret when after the transfiguration scene (Mark 9:2–8) they ask why the scribes say Elijah must come first (Mark 9:11). Jesus informs them that the Baptist was the Elijah of the last day, “with whose appearance the hand of the world clock nears the fateful hour.”\textsuperscript{296} In this revelation Jesus unveiled “almost the whole mystery of the kingdom of God, and nearly disclosed the secret of his messiahship.”\textsuperscript{297} This eschatological office of the Baptist, then, is a construct of Jesus’ messianic consciousness.\textsuperscript{298} This naming is yet another example for Schweitzer of Jesus dragging and forcing eschatological events “into the framework of the actual occurrences.”\textsuperscript{299} Dogmatic history is yet again determining actual history.

From an eschatological standpoint, the Baptist as Elijah was as unrecognizable as the messiahship of Jesus. The two were mutually informing. The Baptist had to be the Forerunner because Jesus was the messiah. And Jesus could only claim to be the messiah because the Forerunner had made ready his appearance.\textsuperscript{300} The distinguishing mark between the two is Jesus’ “consciousness of being the messiah”

\textsuperscript{294} One thinks here of the aside from Samuel Taylor Coleridge, “It is among the miseries of the present age that it recognizes no medium between literal and metaphorical” Samual Taylor Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria: Or, Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions and Two Lay Sermons* (Elbron Classics Series; Boston: Adamant Media Corporation, 2004 [1817]) 322.
\textsuperscript{295} *Mystery*, p. 147.
\textsuperscript{296} *Mystery*, p. 150.
\textsuperscript{297} *Quest*\textsuperscript{1} p. 375.
\textsuperscript{298} *Quest*\textsuperscript{1} p. 376.
\textsuperscript{299} *Quest*\textsuperscript{1} p. 376.
\textsuperscript{300} *Quest*\textsuperscript{1} p. 383.
which awoke at his baptism. But this being is a becoming. The “messiahship which he claims is not a present office; its exercise belongs to the future.” Schweitzer’s understanding of the epiphenomenon of this “conscious awakening” is not discussed but we get a hint of how Schweitzer understands this in his treatment of the Davidic genealogies of Matt 1:1–17 and Lk 2:23–31. Though these chronologies were drafted later and are most likely historically spurious, it does not necessarily follow that Jesus’ family did not have Davidic lineage. In the so-called triumphal entry there seems to be a presupposition of possessing Davidic lineage. Schweitzer sees it as “conceivable up to a point that an outstanding religious personality of Davidic descent could see himself as the chosen one.” It is therefore time “to consider seriously whether it was not rather Jesus who held himself to be the messiah because he was descended from David.” Though we have no record of how Jesus came to see himself as the messiah, Schweitzer does think we are not without some traces. These are the traces of Jesus’ messianic consciousness.

3.3.2. The Secret of Jesus’ Messianic Consciousness

Schweitzer states that we possess “no psychology” of Jesus. Wrede is certainly in the background here who was deeply suspicious of any attempt at “recovering” the a psychology of Jesus. As Wrede states, whatever “is alleged to be psychology amounts to an accumulation of partly arbitrary and partly inconceivable assumptions called in to help out in the emergency.” In other words, psychology tends to be the deus ex machina of interpretive impasse. Though in fundamental agreement with Wrede here, this does not prevent Schweitzer from attempting to explicate what might have been Jesus’ messianic consciousness. Indeed, despite his rude dismissal of Schleiermacher, Schweitzer shares his insistence that external events are less

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301 *Quest* 1 p. 383.
302 *Quest* 1 p. 317.
303 *Quest* 1 p. 395.
304 *Quest* 1 p. 319.
305 *Quest* 1 p. 319.
306 *Quest* 1 p. 8.
308 *Quest* 1 pp. 58–67.
significant to the inscape of psychological happenings. Jesus’ actions are prompted by his messianic consciousness, and this consciousness “underlay all the while his preaching of the kingdom of God.” The complexities of Jesus’ messianic consciousness for Schweitzer become his means of critically retrieving the dogmatic history of Jesus which has been covered by the fateful shift of perspective. That is, at his baptism “the secret of his existence was disclosed to him—namely, that he was the one whom God had destined to be the messiah.” Why Jesus kept this designation secret “cannot be answered with any accuracy.” But part of the reason is that the secret of his existence remained secretive “not merely because he had forbidden it to be spoken,” but because by its very nature it was secret. This “nature,” of course, is as such because its realization is wholly future. His messianic consciousness is difficult to grasp by terms such as “identity, continuity, and potentiality” as “none of these modern conceptions can render the consciousness of Jesus as the disciples understood it.” It cannot be illustrated or explained. Only the eschatological view can be explained. The sources “assert that Jesus felt himself to be the messiah; and yet from their presentation of his life it does not appear that he ever publicly claimed to be so.”

The difficulty for us in understanding this problem is in our inability to inhabit the tensive nest of Jetzt und Dann. This state of double consciousness functions as a critical agenda to shed light on the problems of Jesus’ messiahship. With this double consciousness it is possible to “conjecture what kind of messianic consciousness his must have been.” And from this move Schweitzer thinks he can deduce from Jesus’

309 On Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics and his grammatical and psychological interpretation, see Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy; trans. Andrew Bowie; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

310 Mystery, p. 172.
311 Mystery, p. 127.
313 Quest p. 319
314 Mystery, p. 186.
315 Mystery, p. 186.
316 Quest p. 367.
317 Quest p. 7.
activity underlying aims and agendas.\textsuperscript{319} He was a messiah “who during his public ministry would not be one, did not need to be, and might not be, for the sake of fulfilling his mission!”\textsuperscript{320} This secret of Jesus messianic consciousness “created alike the events and their connexion.”\textsuperscript{321} To understand this secret, then, “is to understand his life.”\textsuperscript{322}

An example of this history-creation of Jesus’ messianic consciousness is seen in the so-called miraculous feeding stories (e.g., Mark 6:30–44). The supper by the lake has been “distorted into a miracle,”\textsuperscript{323} when it was instead a “veiled eschatological sacrament,”\textsuperscript{324} and became the “sacrament of the eschatological community.”\textsuperscript{325} As the future messiah the meal is transformed, without the crowd’s knowledge, by the messianic consciousness of Jesus into a proleptic realization of the eschatological reality of the messianic feast.\textsuperscript{326}

The complexities of Jesus’ messiahship are furthered within the sources in that they were composed this side of the “fateful shifting of perspective.”\textsuperscript{327} That is, after the death of Jesus, the Gospel writers made Jesus the messiah before the messianic age. “Gospel history” was understood from this point of view and therefore shrouds the secret further.\textsuperscript{328} The messiahship of which Jesus became aware at his baptism was “not a possession, nor a mere object of expectation.” It was within the eschatological conception that it was an implied “matter of course” that he would become what he was “destined” to be.\textsuperscript{329} There could therefore be no self-claiming of “I am the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{319}{Quest\textsuperscript{1} p. 8; Quest\textsuperscript{2} p. 334.}
\footnotetext{320}{Mystery, pp. 134–35.}
\footnotetext{321}{Quest\textsuperscript{1} p. 395.}
\footnotetext{322}{Mystery, p. 6.}
\footnotetext{323}{Mystery, p. 170.}
\footnotetext{324}{Quest\textsuperscript{1} p. 379.}
\footnotetext{325}{Quest\textsuperscript{1} p. 381.}
\footnotetext{326}{Quest\textsuperscript{1} p. 376.}
\footnotetext{327}{Mystery, pp. 211–12.}
\footnotetext{328}{Mystery, p. 214.}
\footnotetext{329}{Mystery, p. 223.}
\end{footnotes}
messiah”;

only actions which sprung from a messianic consciousness which was “futuristic.” Jesus was not yet what he was to be: “the messiah that is to be.”

After the revelation of the messianic secret at the baptism (Mark 1:9–11; Matt 3:13–17), the sharing of this secret is always connected with conditions of “great eschatological excitement” such as the transfiguration. But in order to make the narrative of the transfiguration coherent—that is, as being a revelation of Jesus’ messiahship—Schweitzer rearranges the sequence of the transfiguration with the confession at Caesarea Philippi. Schweitzer seeks the trace of this literary rearrangement in Mark 7:37 where Jesus “is suddenly transferred from the north to Decapolis” and in Mark 8:14ff. which refer to the two feedings of the multitude. Peter’s declaration to Jesus’ of σὺ εἶ ὁ χριστός (Mark 8:29) as it currently stands is anachronistic. The original Sitz im Leben of the transfiguration belongs within his days in Bethsaida, “and originally followed immediately upon the crossing of the lake, after the feeding of the multitude.” It was after the six days of being surrounded by the crowds that the transfiguration occurred instead of the six days after the confession at Caesarea Philippi as it currently stands. If this is the case, the difficulties of Peter’s confession “are cleared up in a moment.” Peter confesses who Jesus “really is.” The transfiguration has been handed down to us “in the form of a miracle-tale,” when in reality it is “nothing else but the revelation of the secret of messiahship to the three.” Prior to this, no one recognized him as such. Outliers such as Matt 9:27–31; 12:23; 14:33; 15:22 “are peculiar to Matthew and

330 Mystery, p. 201.
331 Mystery, p. 188
332 Mystery, p. 185.
334 E.g., Quest² p. 316.
335 Mystery, p. 182.
336 Quest¹ p. 383. Elsewhere Schweitzer calls this discovery as “one of the greatest advances in the study of the subject” (Quest¹ p. 220).
337 Quest¹ p. 385.
339 Quest¹ p. 385.
341 Mystery, pp. 180–81.
342 Mystery, p. 128.
belong to a secondary literary stratum” and bear no importance for the history of Jesus—“but a great deal for the history of the history of Jesus.”\textsuperscript{343} Other outliers such as the declarations of the demoniacs are unproblematic as they were ignored by the people as the stuff of crazy-talk (e.g., Mark 1:24, 57; 3:11),\textsuperscript{344} and his use of the son of man language was done in such a way that no one “could suppose that he assumed for himself the dignity of the son of man in Daniel.”\textsuperscript{345} Jesus’ messianic secret was not voluntarily shared, then; rather, “it was wrung from him by the pressure of events.”\textsuperscript{346} Schweitzer’s rearrangement here feels less like a turn of the master key of \textit{konsequente Eschatologie} than it does the wielding of an Alexandrian sword which cuts through knotty textual problems instead of untying them.

In any case, Schweitzer’s construction of the messianic consciousness is polemical in that he is careful to guard against developmental theories of an evolving awareness in favor of the constancy of Jesus’ messianic consciousness. This is particularly the case in his understanding of the Passion. His “character did not undergo an ‘evolution’ through the acceptance” of this idea—it was there from beginning to end.\textsuperscript{347} As we have seen, however, there are several stages at which development creeps into Schweitzer’s construction of Jesus’ vocational strategies and aims.

Schweitzer’s strategy around this perceived tension is that the meaning of the Passion within Jesus’ messianic consciousness has been blurred by the shifting of perspective. As we have seen, Schweitzer makes recourse to this strategy at several key points. According to the eschatological view, the cross was “merely a transitional event.”\textsuperscript{348} The cross-event, within the memory of the early church, however, shifted from the transitional moment to the central fact of Christianity and proved “fatal to the early Christian eschatology.”\textsuperscript{349} From “Paul to Ritschl,” then, the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{343} Mystery, p. 129.  
\textsuperscript{344} Mystery, p. 129.  
\textsuperscript{345} Mystery, p. 130.  
\textsuperscript{346} Quest, p. 386.  
\textsuperscript{347} Mystery, pp. 223–24; Quest, p. 388.  
\textsuperscript{348} Mystery, p. 248.  
\textsuperscript{349} Mystery, p. 245.  
}
“significance of the Passion” is lost because such theologies “proceed upon an entirely different assumption” than was present within the messianic consciousness.\textsuperscript{350} Jesus sets his death in a “temporal-causal connection” with the eschatological realization of the kingdom.\textsuperscript{351} His Passion was not of the ethical mold of modern theology, but “hyper-ethical” (\textit{überethische}).\textsuperscript{352} Schweitzer is concerned in \textit{Eine Skizze} with “why Jesus now suddenly counts his death necessary, and in what sense he conceives it as a saving act.”\textsuperscript{353} Wrede saw the resolve to suffer and die as dogmatic and therefore unhistorical; \textit{konsequente Eschatologie}, however, sees this as historical precisely because it is dogmatic.\textsuperscript{354}

Schweitzer maintains that the “Synoptical texts do not explain how the idea of the Passion forced itself upon Jesus and what it meant to him.”\textsuperscript{355} And it appears that Jesus himself struggled with its realization. If, as we saw, the Passion was part of the messianic consciousness from the beginning, why the wavering in Gethsemane (Mark 14:32–42; Matt 26:36–46)? The necessity of his death is “grounded in dogma” not external forces. But above the “dogmatic eschatological necessity,” stands “the omnipotence of God, which is bound by no limitations.”\textsuperscript{356} Schweitzer therefore sees the hesitancy “grounded in the divine will itself,”\textsuperscript{357} and places “the messianic drama” (\textit{messianische Drama})\textsuperscript{358} within a wider “divine drama” (\textit{göttliche Drama}).\textsuperscript{359} Here again, sadly, Schweitzer’s thought is not developed.

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{350}] \textit{Mystery}, p. 244. It is important in this sense for Schweitzer to guard against alleged Paulinisms within the Synoptic tradition regarding the Passion. In his view, no such influence can be seen (\textit{Mystery}, pp. 70–73).
\item[\textsuperscript{351}] \textit{Mystery}, p. 80. Schweitzer calls the placing of the thought of the Passion within “its proper eschatological setting as an act of atonement” nothing less than “an historical achievement without parallel” (\textit{Quest} p. 171).
\item[\textsuperscript{352}] \textit{Mystery}, pp. 81–82; \textit{Skizze}, p. 12.
\item[\textsuperscript{353}] \textit{Mystery}, p. 3.
\item[\textsuperscript{354}] \textit{Quest} p. 387.
\item[\textsuperscript{355}] \textit{Mystery}, p. 59.
\item[\textsuperscript{356}] \textit{Quest} p. 392.
\item[\textsuperscript{357}] \textit{Mystery}, p. 227.
\item[\textsuperscript{358}] \textit{Mystery}, p. 227; \textit{Skizze}, p. 85.
\item[\textsuperscript{359}] \textit{Mystery}, p. 226; \textit{Skizze}, p. 84.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The so-called betrayal of Jesus therefore is not a sign of external forces exerting their control, but part of the wider messianic drama within the divine drama. The betrayal itself was the betrayal of Jesus’ messianic secret by Peter and Judas:360 Peter making known the secret to the wider twelve at Caesarea Philippi (Mark 8:27–30; Matt 16:13–20);361 and Judas to the high priest.362 The sudden possession of the messianic secret at the trial of Jesus was the condemnation of Jesus-as-messiah “although he never appeared in that role.”363 Jesus was crucified, but, again, his death was not outside of his control. As we saw earlier, Schweitzer sees Jesus’ journey to Jerusalem as a victorious funeral march.

Why then did Jesus go to the capital to die? Schweitzer here introduces the broader conception of the Great Affliction into Jesus’ messianic consciousness.364 The tribulation was to precede the appearing of the son of man.365 Jesus could not discuss the appearing or revelation of himself as the son of man without first warning his disciples of the eschatological tribulation which must precede it.366 “The kingdom could not come until the debt which weighted upon the world was discharged.”367 Tribulation and judgment were to precede the kingdom.368 It was therefore a “maxim” during this period “that whosoever would reign with the coming messiah must suffer with Jesus.”369 All must pass through the messianic woes, the “time of unheard of affliction.”370 The preaching of the kingdom therefore “brought into sharp prominence the thought of the Affliction of the last times.”371

360 Cf. Quest¹ pp. 386, 396.
361 Schweitzer would understand Matt 16:23 as Peter’s forcing of Jesus’ messianism—to–be into the present.
362 Quest¹ p. 396.
363 Mystery, p. 218.
364 For an excellent study along these lines, see Brant Pitre, Jesus, the Tribulation, and the End of the Exile: Restoration Eschatology and the Origin of the Atonement (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005).
365 Cf. Quest¹ p. 362.
366 Quest¹ p. 386.
367 Quest¹ p. 390.
368 Quest¹ p. 240.
370 Mystery, p. 219. Schweitzer states, “in no other wise could the events of the last times be imagined.”
Against the majority understanding of seeing the persecutions which Jesus speaks as occurring after his death—which Schweitzer considers as “totally false”—the disciples “must bear with him before the dawn of the kingdom.” This “last desperate attack of the powers of this world” will “sweep in like a flood over those who in expectation of the kingdom represent the divine power in the godless world.” The woes precede the kingdom. The time of πειρασμός is not “individual psychological temptation,” but “the final insurrection of the power of this world.” This is reflected in the “purely eschatological character” of the first three and final three petitions of the Lord’s Prayer. This Affliction also assumed atonement “because God requires of the adherents of the kingdom a satisfaction for their transgressions in this aeon.” They must be morally purified.

Earlier we saw how Schweitzer railed against developmental views within Jesus’ messianic consciousness especially with respect to the Passion. According to Schweitzer, the Passion was in Jesus’ mind from the beginning. But within this constancy there appears to be a measure of development in the move from the general to the particular with respect to the Great Affliction within Jesus’ messianic consciousness. That is, the sense of the general Affliction of the moral community is transformed into the particular affliction of Jesus so that atonement can return to the general moral community. The space in which this movement occurs is the relationality of affliction and atonement. “According to the Passion idea of the first period, the believers must suffer along with the messiah; according to that of the second, he was resolved to endure the Affliction for them.” This development was owing to the “non-fulfillment” of the initial promises behind the commissioning of

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373 Mystery, p. 220.
374 E.g., Mystery, pp. 91–92.
375 Quest1 p. 364.
376 Mystery, p. 90.
378 Mystery, p. 258.
379 Mystery, pp. 76–78. Here Schweitzer closely associates eschatology and election. On the relation of these two elements within Schweitzer’s thought, see Quest2 pp. 339–40.
380 See, e.g., Mystery, p. 223.
381 Mystery, p. 246.
the twelve. He had thought this move would “let loose the final tribulation and so compel the coming of the kingdom.”³⁸² His departure from Galilee was his departure from the conviction that the “movement of repentance” had been sufficient for the forcing of the final Affliction.³⁸³ It was in the stubborn delay of the Affliction to arrive—the Affliction which precedes the kingdom—which caused Jesus to turn to the scriptures and recognize himself in the suffering servant of Isaiah.³⁸⁴ As did the Baptist, he must suffer at the hands of the “secular authority as a malefactor in the sight of all the people.”³⁸⁵ Jesus’ idea of the Passion thus becomes “completely absorbed in that of Deutero-Isaiah.”³⁸⁶ He was to force the Affliction to come so that the kingdom would come speedily after.³⁸⁷ He is to endure the iniquity of others as an atonement which would make ready the kingdom’s arrival. This is the secret of the Passion.³⁸⁸ His confrontation of world powers and the Great Affliction in the stead of the moral community is so that they can be exempted from “the trial of suffering.”³⁸⁹ The petition of καὶ μὴ εἰσενέγκης ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν (Matt 6:13a), therefore, is fulfilled in his passion.³⁹⁰ Schweitzer sees no precedent for this messianic maneuvering in Judaism. “It first arises with the self-consciousness of Jesus.³⁹¹ “The coming of the kingdom of God with power is dependent upon the atonement which Jesus performs. That is substantially the secret of the Passion.”³⁹² His journey to the capital was therefore “a pilgrimage to death, not to the Passover.”³⁹³ It was this confrontation which was “the deliberate bringing down of

³⁸² Quest¹ p. 389.
³⁸³ Quest¹ p. 389.
³⁸⁴ Mystery, p. 236.
³⁸⁵ Mystery, p. 266.
³⁸⁶ Mystery, p. 238.
³⁸⁷ Quest¹ p. 381.
³⁸⁸ Mystery, pp. 235, 238.
³⁹⁰ Mystery, pp. 240–41.
³⁹¹ Quest¹ p. 387.
³⁹² Mystery, p. 83.
³⁹³ Quest¹ p. 391 n.1. Schweitzer sees a substantial dividing-line within historical Jesus scholarship along this point: did Jesus go to Jerusalem to work or to die? Schweitzer favors the latter option, following Wrede and Weisse.
death upon himself.”394 The secret of the Passion therefore furthers and transforms the secret of the kingdom.395


In the section on the secret of suffering in my *Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung* (2nd and subsequent editions, pp. 435–437. A shorter and earlier version can be found in *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, pp. 387–389), I still believed that in the pre-Messianic tribulation a load of guilt that encumbered the world and was delaying the coming of the kingdom could be expiated by believers, and that Jesus therefore, in accordance with the servant passages, regarded his vicarious sacrifice as an atonement. As the result of further study of late Jewish eschatology and the thought of Jesus on his passion, I find that I can no longer endorse this view.396

Our interests throughout this thesis have had less to do with Schweitzer’s development than in presenting his ideas which have accrued a profound influence in subsequent scholarship. But tucked away in a small footnote in Schweitzer’s last religious work is evidence of Schweitzer’s own realization and admission that his earlier work was not as informed by the sources of the second temple period as was the Gospel material forced into a system of his own devising.

Returning to the Schweitzer of the *Geschichte* and the *Skizze*, it is difficult to know what exactly to make of Schweitzer’s understanding of the death of Jesus and its relationship to resurrection. He does state that with it “a new world era dawned.”397 The cross also represents a kind of failure as well. As we saw earlier with the return of the twelve, the cry of dereliction is another potential embarrassment for *konsequente Eschatologie*. Schweitzer’s method here cannot account for these two failures. If Jesus’ death was a moment of transition why despair while still alive? Was it not his death which was going to usher in the arrival of the kingdom? Again, at a crucial point the singular key of *konsequente Eschatologie* cannot turn the lock. If

394 *Quest* p. 392.
395 *Mystery*, p. 125.
397 *Mystery*, p. 213.
these crucial passages were moments of transition, why is it that the disciples returned before the kingdom arrived? And why did Jesus not endure to the end?

Schweitzer reconfigures the death of Jesus and his cry of dereliction as a great Unsieg which becomes Sieg through Schweitzer’s understanding of resurrection. Schweitzer sees the resurrection as the catalyst for the fateful shift in perspective of the early church. The risen Jesus “produced a sudden revolution in his disciples’ conception of him.” In this sense, it was, as Wrede saw, “the real messianic event in the life of Jesus.” The Markan narrative was constructed from the “impulse to give a messianic form to the earthly life of Jesus.” But in its proper eschatological setting, resurrection represents the bridge from the Jetzt to the Dann—that is, the realization of the new condition of things. It is no singular act but “a complex occurrence.” The realizing of Jesus as the son of man, the resurrection of the dead, and the translation of the earthly into the realm of perfection “take place simultaneously, and are one and the same act.”

This “complex occurrence” is retrospective with respect to the resurrection of the dead. “Jesus’ glance is directed backward” in this respect as “the kingdom is composed of the generations which have already gone down to the grave and which are now to be awakened unto a state of perfection.” It is erroneous to connect Jesus’ thought of the kingdom “as directed toward the future as if it had to do with subsequent generations.” It was the translation of past generations as fit for the arrival of the kingdom. Therefore “all generations of the world are lifted out of their temporal sequence and placed before God’s judgment as contemporaries” (e.g., Mark 12:1–12). They are “one collective whole.” The resurrection in this sense

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398 Quest, p. 339.
399 Quest, p. 339.
400 Mystery, p. 208.
401 Quest, p. 366 n. 1.
402 Quest, p. 366.
403 Mystery, p. 102.
404 Mystery, p. 205.
405 Mystery, p. 205.
is “the mode in which the transformation of the whole form of existence was accomplished upon those who had already succumbed to death.” The kingdom’s arrival necessitates “an incomparably higher estate” than the present form of earthly existence. By some “higher power” (eine höhere Macht)—a phrase which Schweitzer leaves vague—the “mode of existence” is transformed into a “new form of existence” which is “the messianic mode of being.”406 Being that is “appropriate” for the kingdom.407 Apart from this “metamorphosis,” a “vivid eschatological expectation” is impossible to conceive. “The resurrection is only a special case of this metamorphosis, the form in which the new condition of things is realized in the case of those who are already dead.”408

As part of the “complex occurrence” of resurrection, it also represents the moment where Jesus is to be revealed as the son of man.409 It is only from the moment of resurrection that the “historical Jesus laid claim” to messiahship.410 It is the “messianic event” which signaled the arrival of the kingdom,411 and revealed Jesus to be the messiah.412 Jesus therefore makes no distinction between his resurrection and his parousia.413 They are “one and the same thing.”414 It is at this point where an intriguing discussion of Schweitzer’s thought emerges. What did Jesus expect at the end? Was it the end of the world or simply the world as we know it? In some respects both are emanations of each other. But here we must press Schweitzer to see if he saw in Jesus’ messianic consciousness an expectation of the end of the space-time universe or a transformation of it. As we should come to expect with Schweitzer, there is no simple answer.

406 Mystery, p. 206; Skizze, p. 74.
408 Quest, p. 366.
413 Quest, p. 346 n.1.
414 Quest, p. 366 n.1.
In several places Schweitzer speaks of a “cosmic catastrophe,” through which, for example, “moral criteria are to be abolished.” The kingdom of God is "super-moral." The tearing of the temple and the accompanying earthquakes are seen as "signs of the end of the world." The appearing of the messiah is in conjunction with "the great crisis," which is "the supernatural drama which the world awaits." The kingdom rises out of “a cosmic act,” or “the great catastrophe," and everyone was on the lookout of “the approaching catastrophe." In Schweitzer’s mind, Jesus expected “the end of the world,” and, following Strauss, trusted his Father to bring about this “catastrophic change.” He did not expect "the existence of a community after his death." In this sense, it seems that Schweitzer expects the destruction of space-time.

Schweitzer also sees at the advent of the kingdom that the rulers and powers of this age, and “earthly human nature itself,” are “done away.” And at the cross “a new world-era dawned.” The resurrection is the moment where the current “mode of existence” is suddenly “transformed into another.” This judgment brings about “a condition of perfection,” a “future aeon.” The resurrection is a complex action in which “the new condition of things is realized” through a “metamorphosis.” This “time of the end” is when “the supernatural eschatological course of history will break through into the natural course.” A time when the present world is

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415 Mystery, pp. 101–02.
416 Mystery, p. 102.
417 Mystery, p. 213.
418 Mystery, p. 139.
419 Mystery, p. 118.
420 Mystery, p. 115.
421 Mystery, p. 81.
422 Life and Thought, pp. 38, 55.
423 Quest1 p. 93.
424 Quest2 p. 335.
425 Mystery, p. 269.
426 Mystery, p. 213.
427 Mystery, p. 208.
428 Mystery, p. 95.
429 Mystery, p. 74.
430 Quest1 p. 366.
431 Quest1 p. 362.
“transformed into something supra-mundane,”432 where “the present era passes into the age to come.”433 From these texts, it appears that Schweitzer has in mind a “metamorphosis” of the world as opposed to its destruction.

3.3.3. The Secret of the Son of Man
The term “son of man,” is, for Schweitzer, of central concern with respect to Jesus’ messianic consciousness. Every messianic designation that is attributed to him is corrected and reinterpreted with this phrase.434 The “problem which became most prominent of all the problems raised by eschatology was the question concerning the son of man.” Schweitzer sees in this, however, titular freight for anyone to smuggle their own views of the messiah and call it “son of man.”435 As early as Strauss, the problem of the son of man is seen as the central problem regarding questions of messianism and eschatology.436 For behind it rests the issue of the temporality of Jesus’ messianic claims.437

The son of man for Schweitzer is a purely eschatological and future role which Jesus is to be revealed as fulfilling at the resurrection. The appearing as the son of man signifies “the dawning of the kingdom of God with power.”438 It is “futuristic in character,” referring to the time when Jesus appears as judge.439 In the era of the Jetzt, then, Jesus and the son of man are “two entirely distinct personalities.”440 Outliers such as Matt 8:20; 11:19; 12:32, 40; 13:38, 41; 16:13—if they are historical—mean nothing more than “man.”441 And the sayings which place on the lips of Jesus “son of man” as an expression of self-designation are owing to the

432 Quest1 p. 348.
433 Quest1 p. 283.
434 Mystery, p. 190.
435 Quest1 p. 267.
436 Quest1 p. 94.
437 Quest1 p. 280.
438 Mystery, p. 88.
439 Mystery, p. 191.
440 Mystery, p. 191.
441 Mystery, p. 195.
“shifting of perspective.” These first-person references represent a secondary stratum. Moreover, only those passages which demonstrate “the influence of the apocalyptic reference to the son of man in Daniel” are historical. All others are “unhistorical.” Jesus’ taking of this designation from Daniel therefore becomes an issue of *Quellenkritik*. Schweitzer here makes recourse to Weiss and the early Strauss in stating that the “son-of-man problem” has been solved. Only those passages which are used in the apocalyptic sense of Daniel are authentic.

For his hearers, Jesus and the son of man remained “two entirely distinct personalities.” But to those to whom the secret of the kingdom has been given, there is an “absolute solidarity” between the two. It was *in the kingdom* that the son of man would be *manifested as Jesus*. When the “present era passes into the age to come,” Jesus would possess this position. Jesus’ revelation at Caesarea Philippi therefore consists of his revelation of the nature of the “personal relationship he stands to with the coming son of man.” The problem of the son of man for Schweitzer is therefore “elucidated.” It was “a solemn title which he adopted when in great moments of his life he spoke about himself to the initiated as the future messiah.” It was a title specific to an “episode of the messianic drama.” Jesus never spoke of *coming again*; only of *the coming of the son of man*; or of his coming as the son of man.

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442 *Mystery*, p. 196.
443 *Mystery*, p. 198; cf. *Quest*¹ p. 286.
444 *Mystery*, p. 199.
446 *Quest*¹ p. 283.
448 *Mystery*, p. 192.
449 *Mystery*, p. 136.
450 *Quest*¹ p. 94.
451 *Quest*¹ p. 283.
452 *Mystery*, p. 192.
454 *Mystery*, p. 200.
455 *Mystery*, p. 80
456 Here again we see no real exegesis of the relevant texts in Daniel. Schweitzer does, however, provide a reading of Daniel in his later *Reich Gottes und Christentum*, pp. 25–32.
3.4. *Jetzt und Dann: Putting Eschatology Back Together Again*

Schweitzer’s notion of *konsequente Eschatologie* is a hermeneutics of recovery. It is through eschatology which Schweitzer seeks to discover eschatology. This circular understanding of *konsequente Eschatologie* represents the one “historically certain element” against which all else is judged, and by which the singularity of Jesus can be discovered. It was the loss of eschatology which requires *konsequente Eschatologie* in order to discern elements of Gospel material which are the results of the fateful shift of perspective.

The loss of eschatology in Schweitzer’s mind stems from a couple of factors. The first is the “abolition of the causal connection” between Jesus’ death and the realization of the kingdom. This led to the flattening of the distinction between the *Jetzt* and *Dann* nature of Jesus’ messianic consciousness. Moreover, within Jesus’ death itself, the eschatology of the early church was “dechristianized” (*entchristlicht*). In his Passion he seeks to bring “ordinary history to a close,” taking upon himself the Afflication. This “wheel of the world” which he had hoped to turn by this action of atonement turned against him. “Instead of bringing the eschatological conditions,” these conditions were destroyed as he himself was.

Whatever the case may be for Schweitzer, one thing is clear: “the world continued to exist.” Jesus died and cried out in dereliction, “despairing of bringing in the new heaven and the new earth.” His death was his defeat. But this defeat sets loose “liberating and life-giving influence” in the transformation of the slow-dying of the civilization of the ancient world with the early Christian dogma of immortality. It was this victory through defeat which Jesus set loose upon the world. But in order to

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457 *Quest*¹ p. 122.
458 *Mystery*, p. 245.
459 See, e.g., *Mystery*, pp. 75, 143, 186–87; *Quest*¹ p. 243.
460 *Mystery*, p. 245; *Skizze* p. 94; cf., too, *Mystery*, p. 247; *Skizze*, p. 95.
461 *Quest*¹ pp. 370–71. This famous passage, of course, is not in *Quest*² which is the subject of Holladay’s essay. Though the passage is removed from the second edition, the thought is still there.
462 *Quest*¹ p. 3.
463 *Quest*¹ p. 255.
464 *Quest*¹ p. 255.
arrive at this truly historical understanding of the historical Jesus, Schweitzer contends, we must make the choice between either the purely eschatological or the uneschatological. The complexities of Jesus’ messiahship are therefore to be found either in the literary fiction of the earliest Evangelists “or on the ground of a purely eschatological messianic conception.” This is the point at which Schweitzer leaves us both in terms of rhetorical force and in the structural ordering of the Geschichte. There is either the eschatological solution which takes the Markan account, inconsistencies and all, as genuine history and retains the elements of Jesus’ messianic consciousness; or there is the literary solution which sees the whole enterprise as the interpolations of later Evangelists and therefore “strikes out the messianic claim altogether from the historical life of Jesus.” If you remove the flower from its soil it will wither. If Jesus is “wrenched loose from the soil of eschatology” he is no longer historical. You are left either with a thoroughgoing eschatology or a thoroughgoing skepticism: Tertium non datur.

As we have seen with respect to the return of the twelve and in the cry of dereliction, however, konsequente Eschatologie is weak precisely where it needs to be strong. The singular key appears to be a fake as it cannot unlock two of the biggest puzzles in the konsequente Eschatologie schema and his reading of key texts such as the return of the twelve, his confrontation with the Pharisees and claim that the kingdom of God is present in his life and ministry, and his cry of dereliction hence become incoherent. What is more, we have seen how Schweitzer is heavily influenced by current intellectual trends (particularly Nietzsche) as opposed to the purity of his disinterested historical agenda. With respect to Strauss’ first Life of Jesus, Schweitzer asks in Strauss’ defense, “Whoever discovered a true principle without pressing its application too far?” Elsewhere, with respect to Schleiermacher, he states that it is difficult to “avoid being caught in the coils of that

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465 Mystery, p. 86.
466 Quest 1 p. 398.
467 Quest 1 p. 337.
468 Quest 1 p. 401.
469 Quest 1 p. 337.
470 Quest 1 p. 85.
magical dialectic." So it is with konsequente Eschatologie and the “magical dialectic” of Schweitzer. Though appreciative of his genius, it is in his citing of the “singular mountain” of konsequente Eschatologie and its path to it which has influenced generations of Questers. As we shall argue in Part Two, however, there is no single mountain (or key) to discover. Schweitzer’s singular mountain of eschatologie and his elegant reconstruction of a singular historical Jesus out of that discovery turns out to be but one peak within a sprawling mountain range. It is time we move on from this tertium non datur of Schweitzer, allowing for some appreciative, critical distance from this enchanted Leben und Denken.472

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471 Quest, p. 63.
"A century after Schweitzer’s survey of life-of-Jesus scholarship was transformed into a “quest of the historical Jesus” for the benefit of English-speaking readers, there is a need for critical distance from this spell-binding work. If the spell is broken, it may become clear that the crucial issue is not “the historical Jesus” in abstraction, but rather the question how Jesus as an empirical figure is received and interpreted within the early Christian communities, a process that issues in the production of gospel literature and, later, in the great divide between the canonical and the noncanonical. On that model, the historical Jesus would no longer be separable from the textuality of the gospels, as though a real, uninterpreted Jesus could be detached from his representations. In the end, the “consistent eschatology” hypothesis is false because it attempts to answer the wrong question."
PART TWO
MOVING HOUSE

“The ‘true’ histories of the past uncover the buried potentialities of the present.”

Paul Ricoeur

0.1. A Path Well Travelled, A Quest Grown Weary

We now come to the sudden turn in this thesis from analyzing Schweitzer’s tools to advocating for a whole-scale relocation from Schweitzer’s house; viz., his persistent influence. We have labored in Part One to narrate Schweitzer’s remarkably efficient system and test its claims to cover and explain everything. Though it may be the case that “no scholar accepts Schweitzer’s presentation of Jesus’ apocalyptic conduct,” the underlying assumptions of his presentation are almost unanimously followed: viz., the establishing of criteria (singular key) against which all material is read and from which a singular reconstructed profile of the “historical Jesus” is constructed. A testimony to his persistent influence is the impact of his ideas latent even within the wider criticisms of his solution of konsequente Eschatologie. Even the likes of the Jesus Seminar and its poetic statesmen, Marcus Borg and John Dominic Crossan, seem to be stuck on the other side of Schweitzer’s dialectic: Wrede’s skepticism.

4 Here Allison is right on the mark in Dale C. Allison, Constructing Jesus: Memory, Imagination, and History (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010) 134–35.
One of the foremost scholars of the last twenty-five years on the historical Jesus, Dale C. Allison, Jr., recently lamented the unsatisfactory results produced by the canons of traditional criteria. He even calls for the need not for the refinement of these criteria but their marginalization and the deployment of experimental approaches. Ironically, Allison is perhaps the greatest champion of the eschatological reading of Jesus. Perhaps part of Allison’s disillusionment with the canons of past criteria is owing to the fact that his question is still stuck in Schweitzer’s forced *tertium non datur*: is Jesus an eschatological prophet or not? Here Allison falls within the paradigm set by Johannes Weiss and Schweitzer and their search for a singular hermeneutical key which will lead us to a tidy profile of Jesus. Moreover, he refocuses the *tertium non datur* of Schweitzer to new extremes: “our choice is not between an apocalyptic Jesus and some other Jesus; it is between an apocalyptic Jesus and no Jesus at all.” What is more, Allison’s picture of Jesus, though rigorous, clever, and certainly compelling, appears still to be dominated by the latent assumption that this singular key will unlock the door to the room of mysteries which contains the singular, tidy portrait of the enigmatic Nazarene. It appears we cannot quite shirk the shadows of Schweitzer’s structuring.

0.2. The Anxiety of Influence

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8 Allison, *Constructing Jesus*, p. 31.

9 Allison, *Constructing Jesus*, pp. 46–47.

10 He does distance himself from some of his earlier strong statements regarding his earlier endorsement of Schweitzer’s *konsequente Eschatologie*. See *Constructing Jesus*, p. 134 n. 461.
In what follows I do not sound a death knell for the genre of historical Jesus research as some have but merely lobby for its experimental retooling. Harold Bloom’s early criticism on the poem argued that the poetry process is largely the struggle between old and new, novice and master. The young poet must “misread” the “strong poets” of the past in order to “clear imaginative space” so as to overcome the anxiety of influence.\footnote{Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997 [1973]).} It is this “imaginative space” which allows the ephebe to create, thereby resisting the strong poets of the past and the pull to become their derivatives.

Regardless of what one thinks of Bloom’s criticism, his imagery is powerful when read into the aims of this research. Schweitzer is a “strong poet” when it comes to historical Jesus scholarship—perhaps the strongest. His influence is everywhere felt whether or not his construction is met with approval. Our attempt to escape his influence and to “clear imaginative space” for new and exploratory approaches to the material, however, is not a move of disregard. It is actually a tip-of-the-cap to his enduring genius. It is because of his genius that we must move away from his dominance lest our own constructions become merely derivative to his. Schweitzer presented an elegant hermeneutic which in turn produced a near seamless portrait of the historical Jesus. But beauty is not truth and elegance can be misleading when applied to the wrong set of material. The identity of the historical figure of Jesus is too complicated by cultural distance, too enmeshed with the identities of his early followers, too impartially attested to in the historical record and within the manuscript evidience, too unruly to be systematized. The Gospels are tidy narratives which attest to an untidy past. It is the assumption of a Weltformel when it comes to a singular profile of the historical figure where the anxiety of Schweitzer’s influence is most acutely felt within historical Jesus scholarship. Part Two (“Moving House”), then, attempts to “clear imaginative space” for future work on the historical Jesus by moving away from singular keys and tidy profiles. It aims to move away from Schweitzer’s strong gravitational pull.
0.3. The Contours of this “Imaginative Space”

The final two chapters of the thesis attempt to move beyond the strong force of Schweitzer’s influence. Chapter Four, “Forgetting Schweitzer and Remembering Jesus: The Role of Memory in Communal Formation,” drafts the mounting findings of critical memory theory and the role of communal identity formation as a promising way forward in terms of (re)approaching the Jesus material. In this chapter we think about the dynamics of movement through and between events, memories, and texts. Three scholars have produced significant volumes of late in this respect: Dale Allison, Richard Bauckham, and Jens Schröter. Significant space is dedicated to each of these projects as some of their findings are both appropriated and distanced. Though there are many reasons to be suspicious of memory theory, an epistemologically chastened and hermeneutically informed version of memory theory proves an interesting and promising way forward in terms of (re)approaching the Jesus material as it allows for new questions altogether: e.g., how did early communities form themselves around shared remembrances of Jesus? Once these sorts of questions are allowed, many other promising questions follow: e.g., questions of a canon of memories surrounding the Jesus material in early Christian interpretation; the dexterity of early Christian memory across competing communities; the allowance for “apocryphal” material as witnesses to the communal memories of the historical figure; the polemical rub with other communities of memory; and, new considerations on the fusion of christology and anthropology. These questions will not be explored fully in this chapter but simply alluded to as the potential products of this new approach to the question of the historical Jesus. The main focus will be to detail the ways in which memory theory problematizes concepts of pure origins and the singularity of the originary. In this sense, we consider how the singular subject of Jesus was represented in pluralistic perspective; how the narratives of the later Gospels made recourse to the memory cluster in order to apply varying and distinct modes of Jesus’ words and actions to the needs of the community.
The thesis concludes with a test case of sorts in Mark’s Gospel: “The Untidy Jesus of Markan Memory.” In the previous chapter we thought about the dynamics of movement through and between events, memories, and texts. In this chapter we consider this dynamic in reverse: texts, memories, and events. Following the suggested proposal of Elizabeth A. Clark—and the insights gleaned from Allison, Bauckham, and Schröter in the previous chapter—we consider the rhetoricity of texts and their ideologies as part of the historical process. Here we take the single example of Mark as an early Christian redactor of remembrances who made recourse to the memory cluster of Jesus for the purposes of communal concerns. I argue for a move away from singularities and pure origins to multiplicity and the “contaminated” as we consider the untidy Jesus which is represented in Mark. What in the past might have made possible the traces which now remain in the Markan text and what might have been the social pressures and conditions which may have guided its production? These are our guiding questions as we employ a “hermeneutic of relevance” to the Jesus material. We suggest that Mark employed memories of Jesus in diverse ways for the purpose of communal direction and identity. As such, we get a picture of how an early Christian “author” made recourse to the memory cluster through the detection of ways in which Jesus is portrayed as teacher, healer, and martyr for the gospel of God while tentatively suggesting a Sitz im Leben of the need to configure early Christian identity with respect to life on the colony and in the aggressive shadows of the synagogue. In configuring Mark as a kind of witness to the past, then, we can detect refracted images of the untidy Jesus of Markan memory.

Schweitzer and his ménage have reigned supreme over the very inquiry of the Quest since its inception. This reign has indeed produced stunning portraits and useful historical tools. Yet despite these great advances—and, perhaps, even because of them—the Master’s Tools must be set aside for a whole-scale relocation from the Master’s House if for nothing else than to create a space in which new mistakes can be made. In so doing it may be that new tools will be constructed which can better approach the hermeneutical and epistemological challenges presented by the
sources themselves. It is the wager of Part Two that memory presents a promising step forward—or, at least, a few corrective steps backward.
CHAPTER FOUR
FORGETTING SCHWEITZER AND REMEMBERING JESUS
THE ROLE OF MEMORY IN COMMUNAL IDENTITY AND FORMATION

“The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”
William Faulkner

“Memory can be many things.”
Samuel Byrskog

4.0. Mapping a New Way
It does not take too much reading in the literature to feel the mounting sense of frustration and, in some cases, despair which has taken hold of writings within the genre which Schweitzer framed. What then of the Quest? Have we finally reached the back wall of Martin Kähler’s “blind alley?” Has the Quest yet again collapsed under the weight of its own critical reconstructions? Has its construction of historical Jesuses produced the butchery lamented by William Wordsworth (1770-1850)?

Our meddling intellect
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things—
We murder to dissect.3

Though Kähler was nothing if not suspicious of the Quest,4 latent within his trenchant criticisms are something of an implicit affirmation:

I regard the entire Life-of-Jesus movement as a blind alley. A blind alley usually has something alluring about it, or no one would enter it in the first place. It usually appears to be a section of the right road, or no one would hit

upon it at all. In other words, we cannot reject this movement without understanding what is legitimate in it.5

Kähler’s implicit affirmation of the Life-of Jesus movement appears to be in its attempt to set the “Bible against an abstract dogmatism.”6 In their own ways, both Reimarus and Strauss saw historical kernels within the husk of the Gospel form, but William Wrede (1859–1906), that maven of suspicion, was doubtful of even this assertion. In 1901 he published his Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien where he argued that the “person of Jesus is dogmatically conceived,” and the Gospels, Mark in particular, no longer offer an “historical view of the real life of Jesus,” thus belonging to the “history of dogma.”7

The conviction of this thesis is that such radical skepticism is unwarranted. As Rudolf Bultmann saw, however, “there can be no question of discarding historical criticism. But we must understand its true significance.”8 Käsemann, following his Doktorvater, stated that the “issue today is not whether criticism is right, but where it is to stop.”9 The line of this demarcation, of course, is hotly contested. From the very beginning the Jesus of the Canonical Gospels was interpreted from “faith convictions,”10 and we have “access to none other than to Jesus as he was remembered” within these faith convictions.11 The early stories recorded in the Gospels “about Jesus tend to be sparse; circumstantial details are occasional,

5 Kähler, The So-Called Historical Jesus, p. 46, emphasis added.
6 Kähler, The So-Called Historical Jesus, p. 46.
adjectives less than abundant.” They themselves demonstrate narrative strategies in the service of reconstruction on the part of the “authors.” The drive to “get behind” these strategies to a singular script and a singular subject is natural enough but as David Parker has argued, the dual quest for a “single original text of the Gospels” which is “driven by the same forces that have sought a single original saying of Jesus behind the different texts of different Gospels” is “dubious.” Jens Schröter, with a touch of understatement, suggests that such an approach to the Jesus tradition is not so much unjustified as the question is in need of transformation. Though more or less dead in explicit articulation, this sort of positivism still haunts current explorations in its vocabulary and posing of questions. It is the very status quaestionis therefore which is in need of re-focusing.

To label the Quest a failure for its inability to “get behind” these faith convictions or dogmatic constructions and produce “objective results,” however, is a hasty charge. As our technologies and tools of inquiry grow in sophistication, the object of measurement grows in accordant complication and complexity—or, at least, in our realization of its complexity. As has often been pointed out within the spheres of the philosophy of science, though no adequate demarcation criteria have yet been formulated, it does not follow that none can be formulated. These so-called “failures” of the Quest of the historical Jesus, then, are the “failures” of a diagnostician, the careful dialectical sorting through necessary and sufficient conditions. What follows therefore is not a condemnation of all that has gone before but an attempt to recast the Quest through the experimental rubric of memory; transforming the approach to the Gospel sources from a storehouse of

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14 Schröter, ”Jesus and the Canon,” p. 121.
15 Jeffrey L. Kasser, Philosophy of Science (Chantilly, VA: The Teaching Company, 2006) 17.
logia to a collection and construction of memories—both individual and communal. In the following chapter we will consider ideologies of narrative as itself a kind of witness to theological history but here we are concerned with the dynamics of movement from and between events, meaning, and texts. We have been the prisoner of our own questions in many respects when it comes to the question of the historical Jesus. Questions need rephrasing when it comes to this complex social and ideological history. A new map is needed.  

4.1. A Walk Down Memory Lane: Theory of Promise or More of the Same?

Before progressing, however, we must place this approach under the searching question of whether it is a theory of promise or is it simply the repackaging of more of the same. In a slightly different context, Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923) laid bare the criticisms of Theodor Zahn (1838–1933) regarding the historical critical method by stating that Zahn “has merely matched results with results, rather than method with method.”  

For Troeltsch, “all the animadversions against the historical method have represented only checks upon it or corrections of particular results, but no viable alternative.”  

Any move away from standard approaches to the historical Jesus should therefore be held with some suspicion as to whether they are simply matching “results with results” instead of offering viable alternatives at the level of method, epistemology, and the hermeneutical task. At the moment there appears to be a “contemporary fascination” with memory, and memory studies “are presently much in vogue” in the humanities and social sciences.  

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17 These words reflect the thoughts of Jan Assmann form a slightly different context. See Jan Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory (trans. Rodney Livingstone; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006) 75.  
considering if critical memory theory is a method of promise or more of the same by any other word.\footnote{22}

Why not, for example, use the terminology of “tradition”? Jan Assmann and Aleida Assmann are right to shy away from the concept, “arguing that it overemphasizes the elements of continuity and evolutionary progression.”\footnote{23} Moreover the concept does not reveal its meaning in any transparent way.\footnote{24} What is more, though using the term “tradition” in his summation, Jens Schröter states that, “from its earliest attestation,” the Jesus tradition

was not oriented toward the preservation of original sayings of Jesus and the recording of their wording. Rather, from the very beginning the teaching of Jesus is found in a variety of receptions, variable in language and elastic in extent. The Jesus tradition is thus, from the time of its earliest attestation, a free and living tradition, and therefore the idea of a fixed, authoritative form of that tradition must be abandoned.\footnote{25}

 Tradition is not “thick”—or, indeed, flexible—enough. Our project of rehabilitation, therefore, follows the dual hermeneutical task of Paul Ricoeur. It is a critical task in doing away with idols by countering self-deception through a hermeneutic of suspicion. It is also a movement of retrieval in its attention to the symbols, metaphors, narratives, and other texts through openness and listening.\footnote{26} Hermeneutics, for Ricoeur, is “animated by this double motivation: willingness to suspect, willingness to listen; vow of rigor, vow of obedience. In our time we have not finished doing away with idols and we have barely begun to listen to symbols.”\footnote{27}

\footnote{24 Aleida Assmann, \textit{Zeit und Tradition: Kulturelle Strategien der Dauer} (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999).}
\footnote{25 Schröter, “Jesus and the Canon,” p. 116.}
\footnote{27 Ricoeur, \textit{Freud and Philosophy}, p. 27.}
Though Ricoeur speaks of a “post-critical faith” or a “second naïveté,” it is necessary to keep both postures in mind here vis-à-vis critical memory theory in the service of historical-Jesus research. We must doubt, we must believe.

4.1.1 Locating and Defining Memory Studies

Our posture to the past “has become one of the key issues of modern cultural studies and ‘memory’ its leading term.” The interconnectivity of memory and retrievals of the “past” has often been pointed out. As Paul Ricoeur stated, memory is the “womb of history,” and at every stage of the historiographical process is the whole process of memory. In 1947, Jacob Taubes wrote in his Abendländische Eschatologie:

Memory is the foundation of history. Because without it present, past, and future would be cut off forever. Historical knowledge is an act of memory. The outward objective event is internalized by memory: man recalls within himself the depths of time. […] The memory is the organ which embeds man into history. Memory mirrors the confrontation of time and eternity on the battlefield of history and recalls the final victory of eternity. That is why memory is an eschatological area, a powerful force in the drama of eschatology.

The development of memory as its own field of study, however, is a more recent phenomenon. Memory studies, to be sure, are by no means “a unified, coherent field.” Moreover, it is difficult to locate the thread of its beginnings. But no one can deny the place of importance and influence of Maurice Halbwachs (1877–

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the “godfather” of modern critical memory theory. Halbwachs, himself a student of Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), developed his later articulation of his theory of social memory and collective memory in reference to the “memories” of the early Christians of the landscape of Palestine.

His works on the “social frameworks of memory” are viewed as the “theoretical anchor for all memoriologists.” Memory, for Halbwachs, could not be reduced to its neural foundation. Memory is a “social phenomenon” whose contents and usage are determined through interaction with others in “language, action, communication, and by our emotional ties to the configurations of our social existence.” His claim was that “the idea of an individual memory, absolutely separate from social memory, is an abstraction almost devoid of meaning.” Halbwachs was suspicious of “the individualism of early twentieth-century psychology” and formulated “a theory of collective memory that subordinated the individual to the collective.” Memories are “formed through dialogue within social groups, and as such the memory of the greatest number or the most powerful subgroup becomes the official memory of the collective.” Halbwachs complemented the phrase “we are what we remember” with “we are what we belong to,” decisively expanding this narrow notion of memory by showing its social

36 Moshenska, “Working with Memory,” p. 34.
37 In this instance, the comments are only half correct in Doron Mendels, “Societies of Memory in the Graeco-Roman World,” in Memory in the Bible and Antiquity (ed. Stephen C. Barton Loren T. Stuckenbruck, Benjamin G. Wold; WUNT 212; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007) 143. Halbwachs had worked on these issues in germ in his earlier work.
39 Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, p. 1. Aleida Assmann has further suggested that there needs to be a distinction between “functional memory” and “stored memory.” See Assmann, Erinnerungsräume, pp. 130–45.
Individual memory is a social fact; it develops by socialization and communication. Communities shape and pattern their collective identity through shared remembrances and it is within this shared remembrance—and, indeed, shared forgetting—that the socialized individual “remembers” their identity. His work was not without its detractors, however, as his collective memory schema subordinated the individual “to the extent that the individual is almost entirely irrelevant.” How might one move beyond this cultural determinist view of collective memory to an understanding of the role of the individual subject? Even here, however, there is an unfortunate either/or forced in much of the literature between Halbwachs’ model of the individual as a “passive automaton” and the “idea that memory can exist at a purely individual level unmediated by cultural influences.” Part of the problem is with this sort of continuum thinking: viz., a sliding scale of individual and societal influences. Individuals make up societies and whole societies shape individuals. There is an asymmetrical relationship of the individual within society where subjects—though fixed within that culture—are open to an infinite array of assemblings. Like the eighty-eight keys on a piano, culture is not necessarily a restrictive force. Within the configuration of this “limiting” is the potential for any number of possible compositions and expressions.

Jan Assmann has emphasized “that the past is always mediated by socially constructed memory, so that a pristine past is simply not recoverable from archivally understood sources.” Moreover, since “memory is also integrally

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43 Jill Price, who “suffers” from hyperthymestic syndrome, spoke to Diane Sawyer in a 20/20 interview on 9 May 2008 and made the interesting comment of how we survive and find happiness by what we edit and choose to forget. Price is an interesting example in the way identity is constructed not only through what is remembered but also what is edited and forgotten—intentionally or otherwise. See Jill Price, The Woman Who Can’t Forget: The Extraordinary Story of Living with the Most Remarkable Memory Known to Science (New York: Free Press, 2009).
44 Moshenska, "Working with Memory," p. 35.
45 Moshenska, "Working with Memory," p. 36.
46 Moshenska, "Working with Memory," p. 36.
connected with social identity, often of whole societies, the investigation of history is better understood as one aspect of a wider-ranging process of constructed cultural memory.”

It is this interplay between past and present within socio-cultural contexts which frames the discussion of cultural memory. Against the implication that there are communities that are not imagined but based on some kind of "hard" essential realia such as family, clan, tribe and so on, Benedict Anderson defines nations as “imagined communities.” Assmann suggests that all “collective identities are imagined. It is not 'blood' or 'descent' as such that keep a group together but the shared consciousness of it, the idea of common descent.”

Along this respect, the individual “may be defined as the juncture of two dimensions”: the social and the temporal.

What then keeps groups together? Halbwachs suggests emotion, communautés affectives; though Assmann does not devalue “emotion,” he is keen on the role of “symbolization,” of “symbolic forms” in the sense of Ernst Cassirer. “Memory as a means of orientation has to be understood as a faculty of remembering and of forgetting.” And this remembering and forgetting is conscripted into ritual and symbols, and into memory’s cognitive translation of elective experiences into memory artifacts. The human being as animal sociale, or Aristotle’s zoon politikon “is


50 Assmann, "Form as a Mnemonic Device,” p. 67.

51 Assmann, "Form as a Mnemonic Device,” p. 68.


53 Assmann, "Form as a Mnemonic Device,” p. 68.
not so much the emotional but the symbol-using animal.” And it is this notion of symbol which “forces us to transcend the frames of body and consciousness and to take into account the whole range of cultural expression, of texts, images, and actions, as carriers or representations of memory and identity expressive of time, selfhood, and belonging.”

People derive their identities in part from shared remembrances. This “social memory” in turn “provides them with an image of their past and a design for their future.” Social memory is “an expression of collective experience,” ordering and orientating the past and defining aspirations for the future. Olick and Robbins define social memory studies as “a general rubric for inquiry into the varieties of forms through which we are shaped by the past, conscious and unconscious, public and private, material and communicative, consensual and challenged.” This is near Assmann’s “cultural memory,” summed up by Jonker as “the sum of the memories which a society needs to emulate its past and from which it derives its identity.”

Key to understanding social memory is the phenomenon called localization.

In this process, mental images associated with the past are anchored to specific mental frames of reference. By themselves these images are abstract and incomplete until they are set firmly within a context of meaning. These contexts (or frames) of meaning form fragmentary ideas into complete and unified memories. Functionally, this process reinforces images associated with the past by localizing them within contexts that are meaningful and intelligible to the present train of thought.

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54 Assmann, "Form as a Mnemonic Device," p. 68.
55 Assmann, "Form as a Mnemonic Device," p. 68.
57 Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory, p. 25.
The key development in all of this work is in memory’s functional role as a mechanism of temporal ordering. The past is given a narrative shape, the future is formed by communal directives and hopes, and the present is therefore constructed through social structuring. The past is the product of the present and thus “malleable.” Memory narratives are therefore “to some extent constructed in relation to social or cultural forces.” As such, these constructed memory narratives not only reflect social location but also reveal personal and collective strategies “often in opposition to the national or other collective memory.” A tertium quid is needed, then, to bridge these two poles, “taking into account the role of individual agents.” Moshenska suggests that the “clearest and most influential attempt to chart” this tertium quid is from the war memorial study of Winter and Sivan. In their study, the notion of a collective memory is rejected in favor of “collective remembrance,” which they define as the “activity of individuals coming together in public to recall the past.” There is also a needed distinction between active and passive recollection. Active memory establishes a “middle ground between the individual and collective,” which has been characterized as intersubjective; “focusing on the interaction of individuals at [the] small-scale community level.”

Individuals engage in the remembering process qua individuals in relation to the

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62 Moshenska, "Working with Memory," p. 34.
63 Cf. the study of Fried who states that memory’s presentation of incidents from the past tend to be highly selective and subjective in manner. See, Johannes Fried, *Der Schleier der Erinnerung: Grundzüge einer historischen Memorik* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2004).
69 Moshenska, "Working with Memory," p. 36.
world in interaction with the collective. Though the individual remembers, memory is “more than just a personal act.”

4.1.2. Suspicions and Cautions of the Use of Memory Theory

The use of memory theory is not without its critics. Apart from the usual hecklers of New Testament scholars’ (ab)use of sociological and anthropological methods, the fashionable increase of memory studies “has been ascribed to the emergence of post-colonialism; the crises of modernity and post-modernity; the decline of ‘actual’ memory; the decline of historicism; a response to the traumas of two World Wars and the Holocaust; and the emergence of identity politics.” Kerwin Klein states that former discourse on “folk history or popular history or oral history or public history or even myth” is now replaced by “memory as a metahistorical category that subsumes all these various terms.” He suggests that it may serve a “therapeutic alternative to historical discourse” which “has slowly and painfully withered under the assault of various anti-foundational epistemologies.”

Far from seeing this “flexibility” as a boon, many see its spanning of the disciplines of the arts, humanities and social sciences as well as aspects of medicine and the biological sciences, as its bane. Memory’s danger is presented in its very “seductiveness, and consequently in the sloppy employment of the term, in the relapse into gnomic metaphor and supine idealism, tempered sometimes with a strong dose of mysticism.” It is “a nonparadigmatic, transdisciplinary, centerless

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70 Misztal, Theories of Social Remembering pp. 6, 11, 12.
74 Klein, "On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse," p. 145.
76 Bell, "Mythscapes," p. 71.
enterprise; a "largely meaningless term increasingly co-opted as socio-political capital" for this or that power base. There appear to be many "interpenetrating social and cognitive processes" which get broad-brush-stroked as memory. Duncan Bell, for instance, has attempted to place this “memory boom” under suspicion while arguing for a social agency approach. It is the raising of memory to “the role of a meta-theoretical trope” which has caused the ire of many. The varying social practices, cognitive processes and configurative strategies are subsumed with their “contradictory forces and tensions of history and politics” by a singular name. In short, it has become a term “under-theorized and yet grossly over-employed.”

The concept of memory might also be a clever cover to dodge the difficult questions of historicity. What is more, though seen as a natural methodological complement of oral culture, the problem is that though there has been great work done on oral culture and societies, the oral period of Jesus remains difficult for us to imagine. As Jan Vansina stated in his authoritative study of oral cultures, the one general rule of oral tradition is that there are no general rules. The relationship between faithful

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79 Bell, "Mythscapes," p. 65.
80 Bell, "Mythscapes," p. 65. The Social agency approach for which he advocates is that of E. Sivan and J. Winter, ed., War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) esp. 1–39. See, too, the employment of this method in J. Winter, Remembering War.
82 Bell, "Mythscapes," p. 74.
83 This criticism, though leveled against narrative critical approaches, could be applied to critical memory theory as well. On the critique of narrative criticism, see Dunn, A New Perspective on Jesus, p. 21.
preservation of the past must be investigated on a case by case basis. Memory capacities “vary not only from person to person but also from place to place and from time to time.” What is more, it is always “hazardous to move from psychological studies of moderns to historical conclusions about ancients.” The science of cognition and the psychological reflection on cognitive science is evolving as new evidence comes to light. Offering definitive pronouncements on what memory is and how it works, therefore, should cause us some level of caution in proceeding. In setting memory as the object of study there is a “risk of naturalizing the very phenomenon whose heightened presence or salience is in need of investigation.” Methodologically speaking, for many memory critics, plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. If we are going to employ the concept of memory in this research it is therefore appropriate to define and explicate our usage of this conflicted term.

4.1.3. Appropriations and Alterations of Memory Theory for this Research
Though sympathetic with many of the suspicions of memory studies articulated above—and indeed critical of some of the studies which have appropriated memory theories unreflectively to Jesus and the Gospels—there are plenty of advantages for applying a form of the method to this research as a viable alternative to the current status within historical Jesus scholarship. The dangers of memory’s over-determination as well its amorphous employment to mean and catch everything are certainly to be avoided. Part of the attractive quality, however, of thinking about memory with respect to the historical figure of Jesus and the Gospels which evoke him is owing to the generational gap between his death and the rise of the Gospel tradition. Though there are certainly no simple answers concerning the origins of a

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87 Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985) 42. I am grateful to Prof. Richard Bauckham for directing me to this reference.
Gospel tradition and its witness to the historical figure of Jesus,\textsuperscript{91} memory can offer a promising, nuanced approach in making sense of the dynamics of Gospel tradition(s).\textsuperscript{92}

An early attempt to configure the relationality of this space was the rise of the \textit{Formgeschichtliche Schule}.\textsuperscript{93} Though following the lead from Old Testament scholars such as Hermann Gunkel and Hugo Gressmann,\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Formgeschichtliche} influence was mediated particularly through the articulations of Karl Ludwig Schmidt,\textsuperscript{95} Martin Dibelius,\textsuperscript{96} and Rudolf Bultmann.\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Formgeschichte} was not naïve to the role of memory within the development of the Gospel tradition but it was certainly antiquated in its understanding of the complex phenomenon.\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Formgeschichte} “conceived of memory narrowly” on the model of recollections which did not match with the narratives of Gospel traditions.\textsuperscript{99} In the work of Schmidt’s \textit{Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu} (1919), for example, Mark is seen as adding an artificial framework

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\textsuperscript{94} See, e.g., James C. Livingston and Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, \textit{The Twentieth Century} (Modern Christian Thought; vol. 2; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006) 15–17.

\textsuperscript{95} Karl Ludwig Schmidt, \textit{Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu: Literarkritische Untersuchungen zur ältesten Jesusüberlieferung} (Berlin: Trowitzsch, 1919).

\textsuperscript{96} Martin Dibelius, \textit{Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums} (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1919); Martin Dibelius, \textit{From Tradition to Gospel} (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1934 [1919]).


\textsuperscript{98} It should be noted that Halbwachs was active during the time of \textit{Formgeschichte} and vice versa.

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that links and unites the various forms of preexistent Gospel material within the oral tradition. In this scenario, memory and tradition are incommensurable as the former are buried underneath the multiple layers, or stages, of the latter.\footnote{Rudolf Bultmann, *Jesus and Word* (trans. Louise Pettibone; New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958 [1926]) 125–26.}

Tradition was thus a move guided by social realities and communal concerns of early communities away from “authentic” memories.\footnote{See, e.g, R. H. Lightfoot, *History and Interpretation in the Gospels* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1935) 30–31.} The *Sitze im Leben*, for Bultmann at least, provide not only the frameworks in which the Gospel tradition takes shape but also “the primary gerative force behind those traditions.”\footnote{Alan Kirk and Tom Thatcher, "Jesus Tradition as Social Memory," in *Memory, Tradition, and Text: Uses of the Past in Early Christianity* (ed. Alan Kirk; Semeia Studies 52; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005) 30. That is to say, which Gattung (form) each unit would take: the paradigm, the tale, the legend, the passion story, the myth. See Richard Bauckham, *Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006) 244.} The task, therefore, of the form critic is to move back through the various levels and stages of tradition, sifting through the dross of spurious memories in search for the nugget of authentic memory; hence the recourse to the criterion of dissimilarity for disciples of Bultmann (such as Käsemann) bent on historical-Jesus research.\footnote{Ernst Käsemann, "The Problem of the Historical Jesus," in *Essays on New Testament Themes* (Studies in Biblical Theology; London SCM, 1964); Kelber states that the preoccupation for Bultmann was authenticating memories about Jesus. See Kelber, "Memory’s Desire," p. 65. This should be nuanced a bit, however, as Bultmann was rather guarded about any historical information preserved in the Gospel material. The persistence of Jesus traditions was owing to the pragmatic needs of the early Church. His was the Jesus of the *kerygma*, not of history in the first instance. See, e.g., Bultmann, *Jesus and Word*, p. 8.}

This may well inform why memory studies, as we noted above, though widely appropriated across the range of humanities are surprisingly sparse within New Testament scholarship.\footnote{Kelber, "Memory’s Desire," pp. 58–59.} This is most likely owing to the hangover of certain forms of *Formgeschichte*. Birger Gerhardsson was one of the first respondents to the dominant theory of *Formgeschichte* with a prescient counterproposal of memory.\footnote{On the contribution of Gerhardsson in general, see Byrskog, "Introduction," pp. 4–17.} Memory within *Formgeschichte* had been viewed as a contaminant but Gerhardsson raised memory to “the crucial operational role in the origins and transmission of
tradition.” The shortcomings of Formgeschichte have been pointed out on numerous occasions and need not detain us here, but its fundamental assumption of an original form (die ursprüngliche Form) is what needs to be underscored as problematic. According to memory theory, there is simply “no single original to be varied.” In like manner, any concept of “tradition” cannot be understood as a singular or static phenomenon but “is characterized by variability, while retaining stable, mnemonic markers as facilitators of remembering.” It is within this dated paradigm that the debates of the last few centuries over the historical reliability of this or that episode in the Gospels gets played out with the conflict invariably “centering on the relative distance between the original memories of Jesus and the documents that are now available.” Though few still follow Bultmann and other form critics, its assumptions within the dynamics of oral transmission in the movement from historical figure to Gospel text is still widely operable—even in its critics.

The approach adopted here is similar to Formgeschichte in that both understand the societal pressures and communal concerns as significant factors both within the rehearsing of a community’s past and in their shaping of texts to reflect these strategies. But the two approaches diverge significantly at the level of the artificial wedge Formgeschichte posits between memory and the “past” and its search for the originary. The approach here suggests that the past is shaped, sacralized, and

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110 Thatcher, "Jesus Tradition as Social Memory," p. 26
interpreted through commemoration while still being a kind of witness to the past. Collective memory recognizes the communal fashioning and cultivating of foundational memory clusters as they are communicated and performed within the community.112 There are cognitive social, and cultural dynamics to memory which are at work in the formation of a tradition as an artifact of the memory cluster. The memory cluster is the “perpetually mutating repository for the representation of the past for the purposes of the present.”113 Tradition and memory, therefore, cannot be pried apart. The former is the “indissoluble, irreducibly complex artifact of the continual negotiation and semantic interpenetration of present social realities and memorialized pasts.”114 Though not without its ambiguities, memory theory provides a useful framework for assessing the development and transformations of the Gospel tradition in “terms of the constitutive orientation of the Jesus-communities to a commemorated past,”115 and intersects quite well with key issues of so-called Christian “origins” and historical Jesus scholarship.116

A helpful grid, appropriated largely from the work of Jan Assmann, in terms of the move from empirical event to text and a community’s commemoration of the process may be in order.117 The community’s foundational memories first circulate through face-to-face interactions. This communicative dynamic was fueled by initial participants. This process of communicative memory extends from the lifetime of the foundational memory to the last of the participants. After the passing of the last event-participants of the foundational memories a crisis of memory occurs. There is a composite or cluster of memories which then move into the lived and shared experiences of small groups which form around these participant remembrances. This gives rise to cultural memory. Varying cultural and social pressures give rise to competing versions of memory or the threat of the oblivion of communal

113 Bell, “Mythscapes,” p. 66.
114 Kirk and Thatcher, "Jesus Tradition as Social Memory," p. 33.
116 See Kirk and Thatcher, "Jesus Tradition as Social Memory," p. 25.
117 For what follows, see generally, Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory pp. 1–121.
remembrance which in turn give rise to a new set of crises of memory. Authoritative memories are thus established through commemoration in “an effort to fix the meaning and purpose...in an enduring form;”\textsuperscript{118} that is, in an authoritative text. Here, however, we should perhaps guard a bit from overstating the case made by Savage with respect to war monuments and the dynamics operative in the Markan Gospel. If there is any truth to the reports of Quadratus in his \textit{Apology}, as late as 100CE initial participants were still living (cf. \textit{Hist. Eccl.} 4.3.1–2). The disappearance of these participants is therefore only part of the process as the Markan Gospel was considerably earlier. A significant factor that is often overlooked in this regard is the role scripture played both as a site of contested claim as well as a source for identity construction—both in terms of continuity and discontinuity with the heritages of Judaism.\textsuperscript{119}

A text, therefore, is an artifactual form of cultural memory or an “extended context” of tradition.\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Tradition} is the community’s “deposit of its formative narratives and normative wisdom,” and thus the “artifactual manifestation of its cultural memory.”\textsuperscript{121} Tradition cannot be seen as a singular or fixed phenomenon. Some have made the comparison of tradition with a living river that shifts its bed as it ebbs and flows. As a “tradition” shifts its bed, some texts and memories within the memory cluster are forgotten while others added or reformulated. They get “expanded, shortened, re-written, and anthologized in a constant flux. Gradually, the center and the periphery become identifiable structures. Because of their

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} Here we depart from Kirk who states that the sphere of oral transmission of the tradition “is a \textit{synchronic} space defined by a community’s generational life-cycle.” Issues of \textit{generational succession} trigger a “crisis in tradition.” Within this pattern of thought, the Gospels can be conceived of as “artifacts of this crisis of memory triggered by generational succession in the Jesus movement” (Kirk, “Memory Theory and Jesus Research,” p. 1.839). In my view this overlooks the role in which scripture played in the process of self identification. I am grateful to Dr Wendy E. S. North for a lively conversation regarding some of these dynamics.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Kirk, "Memory Theory and Jesus Research," p. 1.829.
\end{itemize}
importance, certain texts acquire central status,” eventually embodying normative and formative value. 122 These structures however themselves shift. “The activity of memory in articulating the past is unceasing because it takes place within the social frameworks of the ever-shifting present.” 123 The move from memory cluster to text is therefore best viewed “als eine Veränderung im Überlieferungsprozeß.” 124

Cultural memory “investigates the conditions that enable” these texts to be “established and handed down.” 125 For some theorists, constructions of the past are no more than projections of ideological compounds and rhetorical strategies of present negotiations. 126 There is of course no “royal road to the historical Jesus,” 127 but the Scylla of constructivism and the Charybdis of passivity with respect to memory approaches are polarities which need to be avoided altogether. Moreover, the failings of human memory within memory experiments are hardly relevant to this research. 128 Dominic Crossan makes recourse to the experiments of Frederic Bartlett which show how human memory “is normally exceedingly subject to error.” 129 Crossan builds on Bartlett in order to problematize memory’s recall of the past. 130 There is a corrective here that is worth noting: memories of the past are

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122 Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, p. 40.
125 Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, p. ix.
never full presentations of the past.  

“Thanks to their very gappiness, memories can be considered pastiches of the past—never its full spatial re-presentation.”

Nevertheless, we again make reference to Allison’s caution regarding the hazardous move from psychological studies of moderns to historical conclusions about antiquity. Even more to the point, the difficulty with relying too much on Bartlett’s experiments and others like them is that the scenarios with which they are observing and the phenomenon of the Jesus-tradition are incommensurate groups. An oral tradition is set up to counter—or, at least, account for—the failings and fraudulences of human memory. Memories become conventionalized or schematized which refer to the “rapid reduction of diffusely complex experiences to stereotyped forms and scripts that acts as mnemonic mechanisms for their reproduction as memory.” Moreover, though memory can exert a sense of creativity in the memorial process, it remains “enmeshed in its origins even when it seems to be functioning independently of them” retaining “a commitment to truth concerning the past, a truth that reflects the specificity of the past even if it need not offer an exact likeness of it.” The cognitive operations of memory such as “economy of presentation, compounding, temporally indeterminate framing, and schematizing in a typology of forms” tie memory clusters to a sense of the past without wildly recreating at whim. These all “correspond to characteristic features of the synoptic tradition.” Indeed the Gospel genre is a culturally-inculcated pattern for organization, a cultural script which serves as a cognitive aid to memory.

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133 Allison, Constructing Jesus, p. 27.
136 Casey, Remembering, pp. 280–83.
The failings and frailties of human memory are also accounted for through the act of commemoration and its signification of the past. “Drawing upon all the symbolic resources of culture, memory infuses past events with meaning; it converts them into symbolic forms artificed to be bearers of the truth, moral judgments, and norms perceived to be immanent in the actual empirical events.” 138 Within the Jesus tradition, the influx of communal concerns with memories of actual words and activities of the historical figure are always already present at every stage of the memory process. The Gospels cannot be brute history because brute history is without meaning. Meaning is assigned to the past through its commemoration in the present. Within the Jesus tradition “the past is marked and represented in such a way as to enable it to exercise culture-symbolic power for the tradent communities.” 139 In other words, the so-called historical Jesus and Christ of faith are fused and infect every memory within the memory cluster and every aspect of the Jesus tradition. Communal interests and retrospective historicizing, however, are not incommensurable with an historical dynamic within the Jesus tradition. 140

Though the product of the politically contested valuations of the 1980s, for example, the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington D.C. cannot be excluded from saying something about the Vietnam War itself. 141 The opposite is the case. The “changing, even conflicting, interpretations of landmark events evident in these commemorative enterprises amount to the reverberative effects of foundational events into new social contexts and thus are historically informative in their own right.” 142 The Gospel tradition, similarly, has a relationship with the empirical past which is mediated by commemoration. 143 They are the results of communities drawing from the “deep pools of early Christian memory” by way of negotiating their relationship to the historical figure of Jesus and his Wirkungsgeschichte and

their own socio-cultural realities. Jesus was thus represented “through multiple acts of remembering that semantically fused the present situations of the respective communities” with relevant memories from the memory cluster and were borne out in commemorative practices without being swallowed up entirely by the other.

What “is at issue is the question of the relationship between the witness to Jesus Christ found in the New Testament and the activity of the earthly Jesus,” as well as the “relationship between oral Jesus traditions and their being committed to writing.” Here, however, we must exercise caution with respect to making simplistic claims about orality. It is important not to underestimate the written at the expense of the oral. Communication throughout the Roman empire consisted of both the scopic and the inscriptural. Moreover, discoveries from the so-called Vindolanda Tablets and Oxyrhynchus papyri attest that written communication was actually quite prevalent in matters great and small. To suggest that the ancient world was a world of orality is therefore a bit naïve and overstated. Moreover, citing literacy studies of antiquity which estimate the number of people who could read, write, or do both at somewhere between 5% percent and rising as high as 15%

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145 Kirk and Thatcher, “Jesus Tradition as Social Memory,” p. 33.


for the elite is deeply problematic. How can this possibly be known? Even so, though sharing the cautions of Sanders noted earlier, it is worth considering the transmission of memory through traditional conceptions of oral studies. The cultivation of memory is particularly emphasized in oral cultures. Though again, we must be suspicious of overstatement, some have suggested that "there remained a bias toward orality and oral memory in the first-century world." The recorded tales of the capacities of individual memory in antiquity are astounding, and even if such memory moguls were sparse in the early church, "it requires far less exceptional communal memory to have preserved the basic substance of Jesus' message and the direction of his ministry." Moreover, remembering a teacher's sayings was expected of disciples. "Both attributed and unattributed maxims were memorized and passed on for centuries even in elementary educational settings."


154 Keener, The Historical Jesus of the Gospels, p. 141. See, for example, Pliny Ep. 2.3.3; 6.11.2; cf. 6.2.2.; Seneca, Controv. 1 pref.17–18.


156 Though I see a fundamental problematization of pure origins on account of memory theory, I do not wish to move so far away from something like the past and drift into the currents of pure constructivism.

James Dunn gives five broad characteristics of oral transmission that are worth considering. First, oral performance is not like reading a literary text. It is evanescent, an event. Tied up with this is the phenomenon of second orality; that is, a written text is “known only through oral performance of the text.” Second, oral tradition is communal in character, with the “performance” being heard “within the community’s ‘horizon of expectation.’” Third, in the oral community there would be one or more who were recognized as having primary responsibility for maintaining and performing the community’s tradition—what E. A. Havelock calls “an oral ‘encyclopedia’ of social habit and custom-law and convention.” Fourth, oral tradition subverts the idea of an original version. And, fifth, oral tradition is a combination of fixity and flexibility, of stability and diversity.

Jesus most likely “used some sayings on more than one occasion, just as most speakers do.” The search for the original saying or source, then, is further complicated. But the Gospels seem to contain “representative samples of enough kinds of sayings” to suggest a common pattern. Yet can we speak at all of a “collective memory” in the societies of antiquity without being accused of using an artificial expression? Perhaps one should rather think of common events, common matters or even common experiences which may have been known within a community. “Memory of such matters is not necessarily collective, although the objects or events that were common to the society may be so.” This is what Pierre Nora has termed lieux de mémoire. “The past that is not gone but is perceived as eternal presence” creates what Nora called milieux de mémoire, “the real

158 Dunn, A New Perspective on Jesus, pp. 46–56.
160 Dunn, A New Perspective on Jesus, p. 47.
161 Dunn, A New Perspective on Jesus, p. 95.
162 Havelock, The Muse Learns to Write, pp. 57–58.
164 Though not sharing his confidence in the “high degree of historical probability,” see Keener, The Historical Jesus of the Gospels, p. 155; cf. Schröter, Erinnerung, passim.
165 Mendels, "Societies of Memory in the Graeco-Roman World,” p. 144.
environments of memory."\textsuperscript{167} Ritual and the \textit{milieux de mémoire} have vanished and we are left with only sites which remind us of the past, \textit{lieux de mémoire}. It is therefore not retrieval or repetition of the past but its representation, "a meaningful entity of a real or imagined kind, which has become a symbolic element of a given community as a result of human will or the effect of time."\textsuperscript{168} It is therefore worth considering the historical figure, his actions and words and the discernable aims of these interactions, as the \textit{lieu(x) de memoire} of early Christian reflection (see further, §5.1.1.).

4.2. Examples of Use in Similar Studies

Though memory studies have been fashionably catching on across the humanities, its impact upon NT scholarship has been sparse.\textsuperscript{169} The concept of memory has been applied to various strands within biblical studies,\textsuperscript{170} and there has been some pioneering work done by Birger Gerhardsson and Werner Kelber,\textsuperscript{171} but its appropriation within Gospel studies and historical Jesus research is still in its infancy.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{167} See Aronold-de Simine, ed., \textit{Memory Traces}, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{170} E.g., Yosef H. Yerushalmi, \textit{Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory} (Philadelphia: University of Washington Press, 1982); Michael A. Signer, ed., \textit{Memory and History in Christianity and Judaism} (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001); John W. Rogerson, \textit{A Theology of the Old Testament: Cultural Memory, Communication and Being Human} (Lond: SPCK, 2009) 13–41; and, of course, within Jan Assmann’s own field of Egyptology, Assmann, \textit{Moses the Egyptian} pp. 1–54. See, too, the essays collected in Kirk and Thatcher’s recent edited volume which as a whole "outline a research agenda for memory-oriented analysis of the beginnings of Christianity and its literature." Kirk and Thatcher, "Jesus Tradition as Social Memory," p. 22.
There is certainly broad consensus that the Gospels contain some form of blurred reminiscence in the sense that early communities were not interested in a kind of von Rankean Jesus, but an historically significant Jesus for the communities which bore witness to him. The broad consensus, however, ends here as there is no clear or precise way in determining the extent of this blurred reminiscence. This is the key debate within contemporary memory studies and several studies have worked through sketches for ways forward. Some scholars advocate a strong correlation between memory and history and argue for the Gospels as ancient biography. Others allow for communal concerns to shape the material while still retaining an element of witness to historical material. Whatever the merits of his particular argument might be, Alan Kirk, for example, argues that the construction of Q was an artifact of commemoration in response to Jesus’ crucifixion in an act of ritualized political violence. It was through commemorative keying that the community transformed this trauma into a meaningful event by fusing it with foundational

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174 Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism* 15-16.


176 Kirk, of course, is aware that most see little theological reflection on Jesus’ death in Q. Nevertheless, it seems an uphill battle to argue for a commemoration of something when commemorating an act usually tends toward the naming of that act. In any case, Kirk does represent someone who is working hard at the methodological level of memory and also thinking about its appropriations in texts. Though on Q, see Francis Watson, “Q as Hypothesis: A Study in Methodology,” *NTS* 55.4 (2009) 397–415.
themes and tropes within the heritages of Judaism. April DeConick, in a similar vein, argues that the texts of the Gospel of Thomas are the result of a retooling of apocalyptic traditions from earlier eschatological emphases to a more mythical basis in order to cope with the trauma of Jesus’ failed return.

In a rather different move, Crossan balances the rise of early Christianity against his convictions of the frailties and faults of human memory. He sees the Gospel material as supported by the understructure of the interface between memory and tradition through three movements. First, the retention of original Jesus materials; second, the development of these materials according to social need and pressure; and, third, the creation of totally new materials. Burton Mack operates fully within the last of these three movements when he suggests that there are no authentic materials going back to the historical Jesus and places significant stress on the social formation of the Gospel communities which were engaged in mythmaking. The Gospel accounts are not “the mistaken and embellished memories of the historical person, but the myth of origin imagined by early Christians seriously engaged in their social experiments.”

The early Christians, according to Mack, had no interest in an historical Jesus. Within these conflicting reports on the relationship between salient pasts and present social realities and the role of memory it is worth looking in detail at three case studies which will add to our own picture developed in §4.1.3.: Dale Allison, Jr., Richard Bauckham, and Jens Schröter.

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179 Crossan, The Birth of Christianity, p. xiii.

By his own count, Allison’s latest book, *Constructing Jesus*, is his fourth and final attempt to make sense of the “hypnotic” problem of the historical Jesus. The book is as fascinating for its chronicling of Allison’s own development as it is for the contents inside. Those who have followed his work will notice that it, along with his earlier *The Historical Christ and the Theological Jesus* and various recent articles along the way, marks a significant departure and dissatisfaction with the canons of criteria which adjudicate this or that bit of material as “authentic.” Allison’s growing conviction is “that the means that most scholars have employed and continue to employ for constructing the historical Jesus are too flimsy to endure, or at least too flimsy for [himself] to countenance any longer.”

Allison has moved into what he considers as the promising stream of memory studies as a tool for making sense of the Gospels as authentic sources of Jesus material. Though he does not enter into a sustained discussion of what the Gospels are, his wider concern is to explore them as gathered remembrances which are “neither innocent nor objective.” That is, “memories are a function of self-interest” and a significant step in the process of making sense of self-identity. Allison works with contemporary memory studies and advances nine theses which serve to unsettle any sense of the stability of memory and how memory is always in the service of meaning-making and orientation in the present.

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185 For a methodological analysis of Allison prior to this development, see Joel Willitts, “Presuppositions and Procedures in the Study of the ‘Historical Jesus’: Or, Why I Decided Not to be a ‘Historical Jesus’ Scholar,” *JSFH* 3.1 (2005) 61–108, pp. 95–100.


187 Allison, *Constructing Jesus*, p. x.


1. To recollect is not to play back a tape.\textsuperscript{192}

2. Information after the fact often becomes incorporated by memory into the historical happenings. There are clear cases where people “remember” events that actually did not happen.\textsuperscript{193}

3. Humans tend to project present circumstances and biases onto past experiences, thus assimilating our former selves with our current selves.\textsuperscript{194}

4. Memories tend to become less distinct as the time after the event increases.\textsuperscript{195}

5. Memories are subject to sequential displacement.\textsuperscript{196}

6. Individuals shape memories into meaningful narratives which further their agendas.\textsuperscript{197} They help preserve “a meaningful sense of self-identity.”\textsuperscript{198} Similar to the ways we take on different roles within different situations, so too we shape our memories according to the varied contexts in which we find ourselves.\textsuperscript{199}

7. Memories are regulated by canon; that is, approved memories live on while unapproved remembrances are systematically forgotten.\textsuperscript{200}

8. As in the case of the canonical Gospels, memory becomes story and narrative conventions inescapably sculpt their formation and result.\textsuperscript{201}

9. Even the most vivid memories are often “decidedly inaccurate.”\textsuperscript{202}

Though we might well be wary here of a high confidence in people remembering now as they always have in the past,\textsuperscript{203} or from context to context,\textsuperscript{204} Allison is surely correct in pointing out the deficiencies and fallibility of human memory. The emphasis, however, seems slightly misplaced when considering the social forces of

\textsuperscript{192} Allison, \textit{Constructing Jesus}, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{193} Allison, \textit{Constructing Jesus}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{194} Allison, \textit{Constructing Jesus}, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{195} Allison, \textit{Constructing Jesus}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{196} Allison, \textit{Constructing Jesus}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{197} Memories are “transmuted re-creations,” part of “our continued efforts to make coherence of our own lives, to synthesize past and present so as to face the future” Steven Rose, \textit{The Making of Memory: From Molecules to Mind} (New York: Doubleday, 1992) 307.
\textsuperscript{199} Allison, \textit{Constructing Jesus}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{201} Allison, \textit{Constructing Jesus}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{202} Allison, \textit{Constructing Jesus}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{203} Though see Allison, \textit{Constructing Jesus}, p. 222 n. 1 and pp. 253–54.
\textsuperscript{204} E.g., remembering what you had for breakfast this morning is not the same activity as remembering the congregational hymns or prayers of your youth. Memory can function differently from activity to activity.
memory at work within the Gospels as communal remembrances for communal formation. As we saw above, oral tradition was not unaware of the failings and fraudulences of human memory and thus had failsafe measures to protect a community’s formative communal memory. Nevertheless, there is here a step forward, or, at least, a step away from the textual impasse of this or that saying or event going back to the historical Jesus. Allison favors attention to the “larger pattern” of material, and formulations of “recurrent attestation.” In other words, attention to “a topic or motif or type of story [which] reappears again and again throughout the tradition.” In Allison’s mind, “we are more likely to find the historical Jesus in the repeating patterns that run throughout the tradition than in the individual sayings and stories.” Again, Allison’s approach is laudable for its rigor and sense. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see what exactly changed in terms of his earlier reconstructions other than a few tempered “maybes” or “perhapses” inserted along the way. Though Allison’s work is certainly a welcome advance which problematizes the simple theories on reception and transmission, for all his fury and fervor it is difficult to notice any real results in terms of conclusions of the historical or theological sort. In the end, memory serves a rather fiduciary approach in taking the Gospel sources as reliable memories of his previous constructions of the historical Jesus.

This is seen most clearly in the application of his theory of recurrent attestation within the Gospel material. Allison represents the best case for reading Jesus as a prophetic figure dominated by apocalyptic expectations. Allison aligns himself

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205 Though see Allison, Constructing Jesus, p. 25 n. 101.
206 Allison, Constructing Jesus, p. 10.
207 Allison, Constructing Jesus, p. 19.
208 Allison, Constructing Jesus, p. 20.
209 Allison, Constructing Jesus, p. 20.
210 Allison, Constructing Jesus, p. 23.
211 See, especially, pp. 31–220.
within the paradigm set by Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer, and refocuses the *tertium non datur* of Schweitzer to new extremes: “our choice is not between an apocalyptic Jesus and some other Jesus; it is between an apocalyptic Jesus and no Jesus at all.”

Allison’s survey of the literature is, as is always the case with his work, exhaustive, creative, and rigorous. He sees the pertinent apocalyptic material as “sufficiently abundant” and that a removal of it from any construction of the historical Jesus could only be fueled by a “thoroughly skeptical” approach to the “mnemonic competence of the tradition.”

Eschatological remains are too early and pervasive in the fossil record of the tradition for any other story to be told without “tearing him from his century.”

This is all surely probable, but to read *everything* through eschatology leads the evidence away from subtler concerns. For example, Allison is certainly correct in pointing out that the early Jewish imaginary was dominated by the geographic conviction that the world emanates from Jerusalem and that the end-time scenario would be played out there. But Allison reads this as evidence that the early followers of Jesus, who were generally northerners, relocated to Jerusalem because they expected an imminent end and wanted to be at the center of the party. This may well be true, but such a reading misses the strategic missiological subtleties of this relocation. If the missional vocation consisted of the Jew first (e.g., Matt 10:6; 15:24) and Jewish restoration, it would make sense to relocate the movement to the *omphalos* of Judaism (indeed, the world!): viz., Jerusalem and her temple (e.g., Isa 2:2; Mic 4:1; Zech 14:10; Ezek 38:12 [LXX]; 1 Enoch 26:1–3; Jub 8:19; Sib. Or. 5:251).

In other words, this move would not be only eschatological but also

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213 E.g., Allison, *Constructing Jesus*, p. 31.
214 Allison, *Constructing Jesus*, pp. 46–47.
215 Allison, *Constructing Jesus*, p. 47. The allusion to Wrede is unmistakable here.
216 Allison (*Constructing Jesus*, p. 47) is here citing Walter E. Bundy, *The Religion of Jesus* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928) 123.
217 For textual support, see Allison, *Constructing Jesus*, p. 51.
strategic. Backed by his recent foray into the vast literature on millenarian movements, Allison attempts to temper his earlier statements on the *tertium non datur* by stating that eschatological movements are "never reducible to their eschatologies." He even states, rather astutely, that others outside the eschatological approach such as Marcus Borg reproduce the errors of Schweitzer by reading *everything* either as for or against eschatology. But if he wants to contend that "Weiss and Schweitzer set us on the right path," that path cannot be removed from their own cartography. Others before Schweitzer pointed out the eschatological currents within the Gospel material (e.g., Semler and others), but Schweitzer raised these "currents" to the singular criterion of judging material as authentic or blurred by the church's "shifting of perspective" this side of the Easter event. Allison is keen on pointing out that mental boundaries are not so fixed and can handle "contradictory" notions. He even states, rather brilliantly, that there is nothing "in the tradition—besides the person of Jesus himself—that coordinates everything." But functionally, after all of these concessions and fine-tunings, he re-coordinates all apocalyptic outliers within the tradition as *eschatological*; a kind of apocalyptic without apocalyptic. Under this line of thought, why not simply call Jesus a sage of subversive wisdom who occasionally draws on apocalyptic themes or one who freely floats in and out of the apocalyptic milieu as best serves his needs? His earlier configuration of memory could have allowed for the dexterity of Jesus’ mission to be irreducible to singular descriptions.

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221 Allison, *Constructing Jesus*, p. 134.


224 Allison, *Constructing Jesus*, p. 135.

Allison’s understanding of Jesus’ vocation is that “Jesus thought of himself as a king, destined to take center stage in God’s eschatological drama.” But this kingship was in terms of a messias designatus: “he saw kingship as a hope or a destiny, not an accomplishment.” Wrapped up with this is an intriguing set of reflections on the problematic son of man sayings. Though he remains noncommittal, Allison ponders Jesus’ third-person reference to the son of man and the possibility of its unity with his own person through a reading of heavenly doubles. The precedent is certainly present across varying traditions and the thought seems to hold together ideas which otherwise seem in tension: e.g., preexistence, the future son of man sayings, and traditions of Jesus having an earthly twin (e.g., Acts Thom. 1, 11, 31, 34–35, 39, 45 57, 147–53). This move produces a model for reading thematic descriptions of Jesus across traditions both canonical and not as witnesses to the deep fund of the memory cluster while calling for serious attention to be given to the exalted views of Jesus originating with himself.

Though the discourses of Jesus in the Gospels may contain “secondary elaborations, artificial composites made up of what were once much smaller pieces,” some of the texts in the Synoptics lay beyond this generalization. In other words, simply because the Synoptics place sermons or longer speeches on his lips does not necessarily mean that they are inauthentic. What is more, Allison renders the dichotomy of either “prophecy historicized” or “history remembered” as an inadequate rendering of the scripturalizing tendencies in the Passion accounts. The appearance of scriptural quotations and themes at the Passion does not disqualify it from being counted as authentic memory. “A memory can be told in

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226 Allison, Constructing Jesus, p. 288.
227 Allison, Constructing Jesus, p. 290.
228 Allison, Constructing Jesus, pp. 293–303.
229 Allison, Constructing Jesus, pp. 300–03.
230 Allison, Constructing Jesus, p. 304.
231 Allison, Constructing Jesus, p. 308.
many languages, including the language of scripture.”233 What is more, Allison sees Jesus as going to his death with purpose and intention.234 The underlying assumption guiding his reworked project is that the Evangelists were working with traditions informed by the past.235 Here he flirts with the genre question and aims to demonstrate that, regardless of whatever we make of the Gospels, “our Synoptic writers thought that they were reconfiguring memories of Jesus, not inventing theological tales.”236 Nevertheless, “the evangelists, it appears, [were] far more interested in the practical and theological meanings of their stories than in literal facticity.”237

Intriguingly, Allison closes his book precisely where Schweitzer begins his *Geschichte*: viz., in stating the negative nature of the quest for the historical Jesus.238 Nevertheless, his project represents a significant model for reading the Gospels as witnesses to memories within the memory cluster of the historical figure Jesus. As such they can be set as a denominator from which to test recurrent patterns of memories across traditions as potentially originating from the memory cluster, as well as configure theological constructions informed by the scriptural process as a form of historical reflection.

**4.2.2. The Jesus of Eyewitness Testimony: Richard Bauckham**

One of the more significant and fresh attempts to work with the Gospels as sources for the historical Jesus within the last several years has been the project of Richard Bauckham.239 It is significant for the purposes of this chapter, then, to situate the approach adopted here both with Bauckham’s project and against it. But first we

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234 Allison, *Constructing Jesus*, p. 433.
237 Allison, *Constructing Jesus*, p. 442.
should explicate the dynamics of his movement between the Gospel material and their relationship to the historical Jesus.

Right away Bauckham presents us with terminological decisions: viz., what do we mean by the “historical Jesus?” Bauckham is suspicious of minimalistic pictures and instead attempts to portray the Gospels as faithful witnesses to Jesus. They are faithful in the sense that the information is “not merely accurate but faithful to the meaning and demands of what is attested.” As with any other era of history, “the Jesus who lived in first-century Palestine is knowable only through the evidence that has survived.” The former “methodological skepticism” of subjecting the Gospels to ruthlessly “objective” scrutiny is, ironically, a Gospel writing of its own sort, an attempt “to provide an alternative to the Gospel’s construction of Jesus.” Methodological skepticism produces a different Jesus than the Jesus at the center of the Christian faith. According to Bauckham, Christian faith trusts these texts as the means through which the “real Jesus” is encountered, “and it is hard to see how Christian faith and theology can work with a radically distrusting attitude to the Gospels.”

The question becomes for Bauckham: are the constructions of critical historical methods better reports than those of the Gospels? Bauckham demurs and suggests instead the category of “testimony” as the best way forward; that is, the

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240 On the fidelity of testimony to past events, see the intriguing and highly sensitive treatment of deep memory, limit experiences, and the reception of testimony in his comparison with holocaust reports and the Gospels in Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, pp. 490–504. Bauckham is somewhat dependent on Ricoeur and his concept of “uniquely unique events” in Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, p. 3.188; and his later reflections on events “at the limit” of experience and representation. For the later, see Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, pp. 175, 254, 255, 258, 498. Ricoeur is himself dependent on the introductory remarks of Saul Friedlander, ed., Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the 'Final Solution' (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) 8.

241 Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, p. 505.

242 Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, p. 2.

243 Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, p. 3.

244 Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, p. 2.

245 Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, p. 2.

246 Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, p. 4.
kind of historiography the Gospels are is testimony.\textsuperscript{247} Testimony is considered to be both an historically and theologically appropriate category for approaching the Gospels as a kind of history.\textsuperscript{248} As such, the Gospel accounts ask to be trusted.\textsuperscript{249} This trusting is not “an irrational act” but the “rationally appropriate” response to authentic testimony.\textsuperscript{250} Here Bauckham is near Frank Kermode’s concept of rational reading. We are to read texts for what they are.\textsuperscript{251} Testimony is at the basis of history and knowledge,\textsuperscript{252} therefore, theologically speaking, the concept allows the Gospels to be read in a proper historical and theological way,\textsuperscript{253} and in the end offering “access to the real Jesus.”\textsuperscript{254}

Fundamental to Bauckham’s constructive proposal is his suspicion of the presupposition of \textit{Formgeschichte} that traditions about Jesus reached the Gospel writers at a late stage of the oral process.\textsuperscript{255} He sees a “personal link of the Jesus tradition with particular tradents” with the Gospels themselves written “within living memory of the events they recount.”\textsuperscript{256} As such, eyewitnesses and their witness is what the Jesus tradition preserved. In the background of this statement are the works of Samuel Byrskog and Bauckham’s own exegesis of the bishop of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{247} Bauckham, \textit{Jesus and the Eyewitnesses}, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{248} Bauckham, \textit{Jesus and the Eyewitnesses}, p. 437.
\item \textsuperscript{249} There is here a remarkable similarity between Bauckham and Joseph Ratzinger’s emphatic statement, “I trust the Gospels.” See Pope Benedict XVI (Joseph Ratzinger), \textit{Jesus of Nazareth} (trans. Adrian J. Walker; New York: Doubleday Religion, 2007) xxii.
\item \textsuperscript{250} Bauckham, \textit{Jesus and the Eyewitnesses}, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{251} Cf. Kermode, \textit{The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction with a New Epilogue} 103. Kermode, in this context, is discussing myth. “If we treat them [myths] as something other than they are we are yielding to irrationalism; we are committing an error against which the intellectual history of our century should certainly have warned us.”
\item \textsuperscript{252} Bauckham relies heavily on the three phases of the historian’s work explicated by Ricoeur, \textit{Memory, History, Forgetting}. For his interaction with Ricoeur’s triad, see Bauckham, \textit{Jesus and the Eyewitnesses}, pp. 487–90.
\item \textsuperscript{253} Bauckham, \textit{Jesus and the Eyewitnesses}, pp. 5–6.
\item \textsuperscript{254} Bauckham, \textit{Jesus and the Eyewitnesses}, pp. 473, 505.
\item \textsuperscript{255} Bauckham, \textit{Jesus and the Eyewitnesses}, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{256} Bauckham, \textit{Jesus and the Eyewitnesses}, p. 7. Here Bauckham follows the work of Byrskog, \textit{Story as History}.
\end{itemize}

These “eyewitnesses” populate the Gospel material both in name and anonymity.258 Throughout the period up to the composition of the Gospels traditions were associated with and tied to “named and known eyewitnesses,” and indeed remained “the authoritative guarantors” of the traditions which continued to be told.259 These eyewitness testimonies, when taken together or, in some cases, on their own encompass “the whole course of Jesus’ story.”260 An example of this is seen in Bauckham’s notion of the eyewitness *inclusio* in Mark’s Gospel. The first named disciple in the Markan material is Simon and indeed the second is named in association to Simon: Καὶ παράγων παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν τῆς Γαλιλαίας εἶδεν Σίμωνα καὶ ἄνδρέαν τὸν ἀδελφὸν Σίμωνος (Mark 1:16). It is the reference to Σίμων καὶ ἄνδρέαν τὸν ἀδελφὸν Σίμωνος which Bauckham sees as significant as elsewhere the doubling does not occur with respect to other fraternal pairings—with the exception of 3:17 and 5:37. Σίμων, of course, is changed to Σίμωνι Πέτρον in 3:16 and occurs at the end of Mark’s narrative in 16:7. Bauckham sees these two references as a framing technique, “suggesting that Peter is the witness whose testimony includes the whole story.”261 He sees this pattern repeated in John’s Gospel with respect to the Beloved Disciple,262 in Luke’s Gospel with respect to women,263 and as a literary motif employed in classical writers such as Lucian’s *Alexander*,264 and Porphyry’s *Life of Plotinus*.265 In doing so, he counters the

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259 Bauckham, *Jesus and the Eyewitnesses*, p. 93.


prevailing view of not seeing high importance to eyewitnesses since they remained unnamed. Bauckham contends, however, through such narrative subtleties as inclusio, “the Gospels do have their own literary ways of indicating their eyewitness sources,”266 and suggests that points of anonymity serve a host of wider strategic purposes, including safety.267

The dynamics of movement from the historical figure of Jesus to the Gospel material are therefore guided by the testimony of eyewitnesses in which both memorization and individual note-taking played a part.268 Bauckham is confident in the capability of oral transmission’s integrity to the eyewitness testimony over time as they remained “accessible sources and authoritative guarantors of their own testimony throughout the period between Jesus and the writing of the Gospels.”269 In this sense the Jesus tradition was a “formal controlled tradition in which the eyewitnesses played an important part.”270 Though Bauckham is wary of drawing generalizations from oral societies and forcing them onto the Gospel material,271 he has little problem stating that distinctions between “tales” and “historical accounts,” as described by Jan Vansina,272 refute “all claims that Gospel scholars, from the form critics onward, have made to the effect that early Christians, in the transmission of Jesus traditions, would not have made any distinction between the past time of the history of Jesus and their own present because oral societies and their traditions do

265 Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, pp. 137–45.
266 Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, p. 147.
268 See Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, pp. 280–89. See too, pp. 305–10.
269 Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, p. 241.
270 Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, p. 264. “Formal controlled tradition” is the category of K. E. Bailey which refers to tradition that has a “clearly identified teacher,” students, and “block of traditional material that is being passed on from one to the other.” See Kenneth E. Bailey, “Informal Controlled Oral Tradition and the Synoptic Gospels ” Themelios 20 (1995) 4–11; and Kenneth E. Bailey, Jesus Through Middle Eastern Eyes: Cultural Studies in the Gospels (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008). Bauckham tinkers a bit with this definition and states that his use of “formal” is intended to communicate “specific practices employed to ensure that tradition was faithfully handed on from a qualified traditioner to others” (p. 264).
271 See Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, pp. 271–73.
not make such distinctions.”273 Here Bauckham obliterates any easy *homeostasis* which might exist between a society and its traditions to the point where they cannot refer to anything except the present situations of the community.274 For Bauckham, the early Christians retained the history of Jesus by remembering his earthly activity in order to know and follow the living Christ. Though this may be true to some extent, the issue is not whether *any* distinctions between the past time of the historical Jesus and the present time of the communities would have been made *but the extent to which these distinctions were made*. In other words, the issue is not if there were distinctions or if there were not distinctions made between the past and present but *to what extent* these distinctions were made and observed.

Bauckham’s recourse to Eugene Lemcio is intriguing in this regard. Bauckham judges Lemcio’s study to have amply demonstrated “that the Gospel writers distinguished the time of Jesus’ past history from their own present.”275 Lemcio suggests that the Gospel writers employed terminology appropriate to Jesus’ era and not that of the early church. And in instances where words were common to both eras they receive emphasis and nuance in accordance with the perspective or idiom of the telling. He concludes by stating that kerygmatic “expressions of ‘faith’ found outside of the gospels were not projected back onto the narrative.”276 This, however, is an improper leap between premises. Terminological “fidelity” or distinction does not necessarily equal *actual* distinction. Bauckham has to brush aside the few outliers to this claim,277 but states that the Gospels as *bioi* entail a “real sense of the past as past and an intention to distinguish the past from the present.”278 Here again, though viewing the Gospels as *bioi* may certainly be appropriate at some level,279 the issue appears to be one of distinctiveness but not

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274 See, too, Byrskog, *Story as History*, pp. 131–33.
279 See, esp., Burridge, *What are the Gospels?*
separateness when it comes to pasts and presents. In other words, there may well be a sense of the past, but it is only a sense. Notions of past and present, though perhaps distinct from one another, cannot be easily separated.

Bauckham considers potential sociological explanations, but maintains that actual history is referred to owing to it being religiously relevant. He states that though social models are advantageous in some respects they are inappropriate when it comes to the Gospels because the early church was “less concerned with self-identity than with salvation.” Though there is a strong caution which should be heeded in guarding from importing modern understandings of identity back onto former communities, the opposing of these two notions is rather unfortunate. Even if this were the case amongst the early Christians—viz., that they were less interested with “individual identity” than they were with salvation—it suffers from the ironic oversight that this would be a kind of explication or description of their identity.

Bauckham does helpfully distinguish three categories within the memory process: first, the social dimension of individual eyewitness recollection; second, the shared recollections of the group or the “fund of memories” (this is near to what we have been calling the memory cluster); and, finally, collective memory. Central to his concerns is his contention that the first movement was never swallowed up within the third but maintained its distinctiveness throughout. “The incorporation of the testimony of the eyewitnesses into the Gospels insured the permanence of that identity.” Nevertheless, Christianity continued to find “fresh discovery of the relevance of the story of Jesus to new circumstances” through the constant

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280 E.g., Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*.
283 See, e.g., the functional demonstration of this in Taylor, *Sources of the Self*.
284 Bauckham struggles under this tension by stating that the two notions are closely related. But this is nuance applied too late. See Bauckham, *Jesus and the Eyewitnesses*, p. 277.
negotiation of past and present.287 Here is where the social appears to be swallowed up in the individual eyewitnesses for Bauckham. He himself, following Papias to some degree,288 admits that “Mark may well have arranged some of this material and created connections between stories.”289 As many have pointed out, some features in the Passion narrative reflect situations within the Jerusalem church around 40–50 C.E.290 And Bauckham later states that memories “must be told in forms corresponding to socially available schemata if those who tell their memories are to be successful in communicating with others.”291 What is more, story scripts are “infinitely flexible.”292 How can there not be, then, a blurring of past and present in both directions? In some instances, then, there appears to be the trading of the naïve positivism of former historicist convictions regarding the recovery of the events of Jesus’ ministry for the acceptance of eyewitness testimony as the key to the “real” Jesus. One may also quibble with the appropriateness of “eyewitness” as a term of description. Surely witnessing an event implies more than the visual.

Nevertheless, Bauckham offers a significant way forward in making sense of the dynamics of movement from the historical figure of Jesus to the written Gospels and the role early participants may have played in that process. Though I see the whole process as infused with memory and the Jesus traditions being retrofitted with communal concerns and interests of relevance, Bauckham is correct in highlighting the “historical moment” within what Ricoeur called the “prophetic moment.”293 He also reconfigures the Gospels as witnesses to a kind of history; a history which asks

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287 Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, p. 318.
288 For Bauckham’s interaction with Papias and the issue of order, see Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, pp. 15–21; and, Bauckham, “Papias and Polycrates on the Origin of the Fourth Gospel.”
289 Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, p. 183; though see, pp. 230–35.
291 Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, pp. 346–47.
292 Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, p. 347.
to be received through a dialectic of “trust and critical assessment.” Though perhaps his project remains too firmly within the first phase of trust as well as placing too high a valuation on what he calls “eyewitnesses” throughout the process, he does point out the value of the Gospels as *historically relevant* texts which were preserved on account of their formative influence upon the Jesus movement. What is more, he also raises the issue which has been advocated for quite fiercely in some historical Jesus scholarship especially within more conservative approaches to the material: viz., the assumption that the Jesus attested to in the Gospels is the Jesus we should be satisfied with investigating. Our next scholar, Jens Schröter, puts his finger on this overlapping of language games even more astutely and it is to his project we now turn.

4.2.3. *The Jesus of Reception: Jens Schröter*

The relationality between Gospel formation and the historical Jesus is a point of connection between Bauckham’s *Jesus of the Eyewitnesses* and Jens Schröter’s wider work. Schröter considers Bauckham’s book to be “an outstanding study of the

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early Jesus tradition and the origin of the Gospels," but separates himself from it along three broadly overlapping axes.

The first is along the lines of the semantic and literary. In earshot of Wrede and Schmidt, Schröter states that "the Gospels are linguistically and compositionally coherent narratives that develop the meaning of Jesus' activity and fate in the form of 'narrative Christologies'." The category of "eyewitness" can therefore contribute to the early processes of transmission but not to the actual Gospel formation itself. The Gospels were "theological interpretations of the early Jesus traditions in the light of early Christian confession." These "theological interpretations" occur within the genre-specific movements of the Gospel authors. Though, for example, within Mark's Gospel these framing elements encapsulate an interpretive move, this move does not mean that Mark's narrative construction is useless in the recovery of information about Jesus.

Fundamental to Schröter's project is his distinction between history and the past as such. The act of writing a history entails the looking to the past from the present's perspective of meaningful interpretation. The past's representation as history is

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296 Jens Schröter, "The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony? A Critical Examination of Richard Bauckham's Jesus and the Eyewitnesses," JSNT 31.2 (2008) 195–209, p. 207. There are some spheres of overlap with Bauckham and Schröter but we will not draw them out here. One interesting challenge which Schröter poses to historical Jesus scholars is why their constructions should be trusted (as more historical) than those in the Gospels (e.g., Schröter, "Von der Historizität der Evangelien: Ein Beitrag zur gegenwärtigen Diskussion um den historischen Jesus," passim).


299 Here, see Willitts, "Presuppositions and Procedures in the Study of the 'Historical Jesus': Or, Why I Decided Not to be a 'Historical Jesus' Scholar," pp. 61–108. Willitts is cautious in seeing too fine a wedge between history and theology as the former does not by some alleged necessity exclude the latter.

therefore always already colored by the present in terms of its assigning meaning
and notions of the meaningful. Schröter argues that a reception-based
historiography, therefore, must first consider the written sources as earlier received
contexts such as an oral tradition are irrecoverable. This construction of the
enmeshment of event and interpretation therefore presents both a significant
challenge to and extension of Bauckham’s project. Schröter shares some of
Bauckham’s concern regarding the easy movement of the form critics between text
and communities but along entirely different lines. Schröter contends that all
persons, events, sayings, emotions, and so on, are socially, culturally and
ideologically embedded and emploted. The Gospels are narratives which re-
present a past reality. An interest in the historical Jesus must work within the
Wirkungsgeschichte which his event had upon those who constructed memories
about him. The remembrances of Jesus set within story form therefore cannot be
deconstructed as a means of approaching the “real” Jesus. If historical construction
re-presents the dynamics of event and story (remembrance), then contemporary
portraits of Jesus cannot easily discount the narrative representations present
within the Gospels. Historical reconstructions, rather, must relate to the Gospel
narrative representations while being reconfigured within the rubric of relevant
epistemologies. This movement does not lead to a “real” Jesus encrypted within the
Gospel material but an historical construction which claims plausibility within the
confines of current epistemologies.

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301 Though Schröter engages with several theorists, important along these lines is the work
of the cultural and historical theorist Jörn Rüsen. See, generally, Jörn Rüsen, *Geschichte im
Kulturprozess* (Köln: Böhlau, 2002); Jörn Rüsen, *Historische Orientierung: über die Arbeit des
Geschichtsbewusstseins, sich in der Zeit zurechtzufinden* (Köln: Böhlau, 1994); Jörn Rüsen,
*Zerbrechende Zeit: Über den Sinn der Geschichte* (Köln: Böhlau, 2001); Jörn Rüsen, *Kultur macht Sinn:
Orientierung zwischen Gestern und Morgen* (Weimar: Böhlau, 2006); Jörn Rüsen, ed., *Western


303 See, e.g., Schröter, *Jesus und der Anfänge der Christologie*.

304 Schröter, “Von der Historizität der Evangelien: Ein Beitrag zur gegenwärtigen Diskussion
um den historischen Jesus,” largely follows Paul Ricoeur along these lines.

305 Schröter, “Von der Historizität der Evangelien: Ein Beitrag zur gegenwärtigen Diskussion
um den historischen Jesus,” pp. 205–06.
Schröter offers an informed hermeneutical sensitivity to the discussion, and challenges historical Jesus research to consider the dynamics of social memory within early Christianity. The so-called Quest, then, is less an historical commitment to the recovery of Jesus as he was, as it is a “vergegenwärtigende Erinnerung an Jesus im Sinne der Orientierung und Identitätsbildung in der Gegenwart.”

The event of Jesus—that is, the whole which encompasses his actions, words, emotions, self-understanding(s), relationality, and so on—“could be recounted in early Christianity in quite different ways.” These different modes of recollection raise serious challenges regarding the demarcation of these remembrances as historical and reliable on the one hand, and secondary and later legendary traditions on the other. Without this distinction being made, “legendary stories in the New Testament Gospels and the apocryphal Gospels would gain the same status as those accounts that are fundamental for a historical description of Jesus’ activity.” The varities of traditions within the canonical Gospel material itself—e.g., the birth stories in Matt 1–2 and Lk 1–2, and so on—may well be owing in the first instance “to interpretations of Jesus’ activity in different historical situations and from various theological perspectives.” Even within the context of the Gospels, then, interpretation must occur before easy pronouncements of original recollection or authentic eyewitness accounts can be issued. The role of theology, he contends, is to highlight the various Jesus images (Jesusdarstellungen), while balancing the

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spurious from the possible and also guarding the dexterity of these images within early Christian remembrance in the context of existential orientation.\(^{313}\)

An example of this move is carried out in the story of Bartimaeus (Mark 10:46–52). Schröter allows for the possibility of named persons within the Gospel record of, for example, individuals who experienced healing or exorcism and as a result became part of the Jesus movement as bearers of the “concerned traditions.”\(^{314}\) As such, Bartimaeus may have reported his encounter to others who in turn passed on his story to other Christian communities or emplotted it within other stories of Jesus’ power within the wider early Christian mission. In this way the story became an example of Jesus’ wider healing ministry and was incorporated into a general meaning which extended beyond the single event. Mark’s citation of the story, then, is colored by this transmission history of at least some forty years,\(^{315}\) and “reworked according to his own literary style and incorporated [into] his composition of the story of Jesus.”\(^{316}\) The varying stages of the move from initial participant of the original event to “the translation into Greek and as a type of Jesus’ healing ministry” as well as Mark’s incorporation of it into his Gospel through literary and compositional strategies forever make it “impossible to detect an original form or early version of the story.”\(^{317}\) In other words, named or anonymous allusions to “witnesses” within the Gospel material cannot be separated from the transmission process “and their linguistic and compositional integration into the Gospels’ narratives.”\(^{318}\) What is more, these cluttered episodes were formed according to genre-specific conventions and interpreted through a theological framework, and


\(^{316}\) Schröter, “Critical Examination,” p. 203.

\(^{317}\) Schröter, “Critical Examination,” p. 203.

\(^{318}\) Schröter, “Critical Examination,” p. 203.
integrated into the particular perspective of Mark. In this way, the realities of historical events and early traditions of these events as well as their shaping and theological interpretation at later stages cannot be “played off against each other.”

As such, Bartimaeus’ initial response is grafted into Mark’s wider narrative construction of Jesus. There thus appears to be a narratival emphasis which offers an historical “keying” or centering to the early Jesus movement. The Gospel tradition is thus “the unfolding of its reception of the various images of Jesus within differing contexts.” Each act of reception constitutes a discrete episode within that history, affected by the configuration of social and cultural variables inhering in the respective situations. A quest for the historical Jesus, then, must take as its starting point the reception of his preaching within the early Christian texts. Here we may press Schröter with Schweitzer’s criticism of Weiss—why stop short of Jesus’ activity? In any case, “Schröter’s approach is predicated upon both the autonomous semantic vigor of the constitutive past and the effect of the present social realities that give particular refraction to that past, as well as upon the recognition that the past is accessible only inferentially through those refractions.” Working through Mark, Q, and G.Thom., Schröter exegetes the reception of common tradition within these three texts which gestures toward traces of the social contexts of each reception. Traits both common in the tradition after reception is accounted for as well as the acts of reception themselves “become the basis for drawing inferences about the contours of the past that exerts a charged influence upon all three reception contexts.” Every act within the dynamics of

320 Schröter, “Critical Examination,” p. 204.
tradition is an act of memory and enmeshed with semantic interaction. The benefit of Schröter’s approach is its employment of these interactions in order to draw inferences about Jesus as opposed to being pitted against each other.

The second significant feature of Schröter’s work has to do with the dynamics of oral transmission and testimony. As suggested in the previous paragraph, Schröter sees the dynamics of oral tradition as a far more complex process. He problematizes former criteria of a literary orientation through the rubric of cultural memory.\textsuperscript{326} As a point of distinction, Bauckham’s nuanced comparison between Holocaust survivors and “eyewitness” reports within the Gospel material presupposes a kind of priority in terms of neglect with respect to outsider perspectives. With respect to the survivors of the brutalities of the death camps, there can be no denying that their recounts of the past “deserve the highest respect,” and, by extension, if there are indeed “eyewitness” testimonies informing Gospel composition these deserve likewise. But it is self-evidently the case that, as with Holocaust survivors, “they cannot serve as the only relevant or authoritative sources for a history of German National Socialism.” So with “eyewitnesses” to the events of Jesus, \textit{mutatis mutandis}.\textsuperscript{327}

Eyewitness testimony is rather a very specific historical source whose characteristic is that it derives directly from people who were personally involved in the events. When it is included into the description of a certain period of history, this characteristic has to be considered critically and brought into relation with other sources. It would be by no means plausible, however, to argue that eyewitness testimony has by itself a privileged position among historical sources.\textsuperscript{328}

Testimony is therefore no clear path to the historical reality of Jesus for the Gospels themselves offer their own linguistic and compositional strategies and peculiarities which suggest that even these “testimonies” were thoroughly reworked. Relying on or making recourse to testimony within the process of historical investigation is

\textsuperscript{327} Schröter, “Critical Examination,” p. 205.
\textsuperscript{328} Schröter, “Critical Examination,” p. 205.
surely a valid move, but “trusting” Bauckham’s eyewitness testimony because it is eyewitness testimony is an historical fallacy which masks a host of political and ideological presuppositions. As we saw with Bauckham above, the gestures of desire explicated by scholars of a certain theological persuasion tend toward power plays in this regard. James Dunn, for example, states emphatically that it is “Jesus himself the believer wants to encounter, not someone dressed up in robes borrowed from philosophy.” And, again, that any “secondary elaboration will simply detract from Jesus’ own testimony.” It is therefore the “disciple-making, faith-creating impact of Jesus [that] should be a fundamental given and an indispensable starting point for any quest for the Jesus from whom Christianity originated.” Dunn suggests that searching for a “nonfaith Jesus” other than the Jesus of the Gospels is a fallacy.

But the option is not between a “faith Jesus” and a “nonfaith Jesus.” Any construction of Jesus is “faithed.” It is the interpretation of extant elements and their assimilation into the contextual sketches of the historian which brings the remnants of the past to life. Jesus is always a social construction, and statements of the “real” Jesus need to be held with suspicion. It is therefore foundational to ask ourselves in which sphere we are seeking Jesus: the sphere of Christian confession or within the

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330 Dunn, A New Perspective on Jesus, p. 11.

331 Dunn, A New Perspective on Jesus, pp. 11–12. This, I imagine, is an attempted rendering of the more literate phrasing of George Steiner: "...all commentary is itself an act of exile." George Steiner, Real Presences (London: Faber and Faber, 1989) 40.

332 Dunn, A New Perspective on Jesus, p. 16.

333 Dunn, A New Perspective on Jesus, p. 22.


sphere of a kind of ecumenism between the artificial boundary of the former with historical science.

The event and the interpretation(s) of that event must be distinguished. But the boundaries between the two are specious. All representations of the events of Jesus’ life are distanciated from the events which they represent. The Gospel tradition represents the continual negotiation and semantic engagement with the community’s current social pressures and its memorialized past in the person and event of Jesus. The two remain inseparable without swallowing up the other or making the other epiphenomenal. This approach “is predicated upon the semantic vigor of the constitutive past and the effect of present social realities that give particular refractions to that past, as well as upon recognition that the past is accessible only through those refractions.” As such, though we should be cautious about extrapolating traces of the event from the effects of its interpretation, to talk about the historical Jesus is to talk about the acts of his reception.

Along these lines one should not confuse issues of composition history of a text with tradition history.

Daß die Frage nach den Anfängen der Jesusüberlieferung von der Lösung des synoptischen Problems zu unterscheiden ist, ist weithin anerkannt und wird durch das hier Dargelegte noch einmal unterstrichen. Frühe Stufen der

343 One should note here his comments on the differences between Q and $G$.Thom., see Schröter, Erinnerung, pp. 459–86. He suggests that Q has a traditional-historical compositional relationship to Mark and that this relationship can be read as evidence that both works build on a common basis for the interpretation of the events of Jesus. Jens Schröter, "The Son of Man as the Representative of God’s Kingdom: On the Interpretation of Jesus in Mark and Q," in Jesus, Mark and Q: The Teaching of Jesus and its Earliest Records (ed. Michael Labahn and Andreas Schmidt; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001) 152; see, too, Jens Schröter, "Die Bedeutung der Q-Überlieferungen für die Interpretation der frühen Jesusüberlieferung," ZNW 94 (2003) 38–67. Moreover, he argues that Q should be treated as singular whole as opposed to easy divisions into strata.
Jesusüberlieferung können sich in verschiedenen, kanonisch ebenso wie apokryph gewordenen Schriften finden.344

The appropriation of the Jesus tradition is therefore a negotiation by which the current realities were interpreted with reference to the person of Jesus.345 “The commemorated past—the memory of Jesus as cultivated by the various communities—was deployed and redeployed in typical situations and new settings.” The cultural pressures of the present reciprocally react within the commemoration of the past. Tradition is thus the “abbreviation for the countless transactions between sacralized past and actual present vital to the life of the a community.”346 Schröter understands Gospel traditions to be the entangled product of the remembering of Jesus in changing contexts of reception. One cannot speak about an historical Jesus apart from acts of reception; that is, “how Jesus was remembered in the various social and historical contexts of the early communities.”347 The more plausible way forward therefore would be attempting to understand both memory and the present factors of reception as reciprocally determining elements which should be portrayed in their reciprocal inter-connection.348

A third significant element is in contrast to the model of testimony as advocated by Bauckham’s which potentially promotes “an uncritical view” of the Gospel writings as fiduciary scripts instead of texts which need to be critically scrutinized.349 Here there is the fruitful possibility of incorporating outside sources within the historical Jesus project such as G.Thom.350 or other non-Synoptic sources.351 Schröter contends

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346 Kirk and Thatcher, "Jesus Tradition as Social Memory," p. 33.
that the logic flowing from the Council of Laodicea (363) and Athanasius’ Easter Letter of 367 suggests that the distinction made between “canonized writings handed down and attested as divine” (τὰ κανονιζόμενα καὶ παραδοθέντα πιστευθέντα τε θεία εναὶ βιβλία) from the “so-called apocrypha” (οἱ λεγόμενοι ἀπόκρυφοι) is set “within the context of the developments through which early Christianity secured its own identity.” The “question of accepting or rejecting a writing always arose when it was already in use in some community or other,” and was inseparable from identity formation. As such, he leaves open the possibility that “writings condemned as heretical may contain historically valuable information.” What is more intriguing is his suggestion that writings in the second century—such as Papyrus Egerton 2, Gospel of Peter, Gospel of Thomas, and Gospel of Mary—“presuppose already-existing stories about Jesus but are not bound to them, either in their language or in the interpretation of their content.”

Schröter is suspicious of the assumption that logia are historically more stable or reliable than narratives about Jesus. The strong plausibility of the Synoptics’ reconstruction of Jesus, however, is not owing to their status of canonical testimony as such, but that they “die frühesten narrativen Verarbeitungen des Wirkens und Geschicks Jesu darstellen und zugleich einen historisch bewahrenden Charakter

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354 Schröter, “Jesus and the Canon,” p. 117.


358 On challenges which canon present the historical Jesus, see Schröter, “Jesus and the Canon,” pp. 104–22.
besitzen." Indeed, though suitable for gesturing toward traces of older traditions, G.Thom., for example, as a collection of logia instead of a Gospel narrative might well suggest it is less suitable for source information on the historical Jesus.

Nevertheless, if G.Thom. or other non-Synoptic sources are to be presented within the project of the historical Jesus, individual sayings should be read on their own account as potential memory traces.

This does not mean that Schröter equates Gos.Thom. with other Synoptic portraits. Far from it. The former should be relativized somewhat by the latter because of its detaching Jesus from earlier earthly activity.

Für eine historische Jesusdarstellung ist eine Schrift wie das Gos. Thom. somit deshalb als sekundär zu betrachten, weil es zum einen zeitlich nach den synoptischen Evangelien und dem JohEv anzusetzen ist, zum anderen nicht an einer Einzeichnung Jesu in seinen historischen, kulturellen und geographischen Kontext interessiert ist.

In other words, there is a relative disinterest on the part of G.Thom. to locate Jesus within his historical nest as it exhibits more interpretive appropriation than signs of preservation. Significant for the Jesus tradition is its attempt to preserve remembrances—whether originating from the memory cluster or related to it in some other developed way—of Jesus within his contextual environs.

Nevertheless, the very “threefold character” of the Synoptic picture of Jesus suggests an “acknowledgment of plurality as the theologically appropriate form of the memory of Jesus” while at the same time establishing “the boundary conditions for the elaboration of historically plausible and substantially appropriate affirmations.

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about the historical Jesus.”

The value in extracanonical pictures of Jesus is thus not in “its ability to alter an image of Jesus derived from the first-century writings. Rather, it illustrates constellations and controversies of the second and third centuries in which different ways of relating to Jesus were being separated from one another.”

Though we may take issue with his notions of the sekundär and how it assumes perhaps too much in terms of dating, sources, and the production of texts, the work of Schröter represents a sufficiently rigorous approach which takes into consideration the methodological and hermeneutical challenges in thinking about the historical Jesus. He has articulated a way forward in which both the narrative function of the Gospel material is itself a testimony to early memory configurations of the historical Jesus and a way in which non-Synoptic material may be incorporated into the process of reconstruction efforts. Moreover, he has properly problematized false dichotomies between faithfully receiving the testimony of the Gospels and critically engaging with the material.

4.3. Concluding Reflections on the Potential Benefits of this Approach

The studies referred to throughout §4.2. together with the approach outlined in §4.1.3. presents a significant methodological alternative in approaching the study of the historical Jesus. Though I must again refer back to the cautions and skepticisms articulated above (§4.1.2.), it is worth noting several lines of research within which questions of the nature of Gospels and historical Jesus genres could receive benefits from adopting the approach outlined above.

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364 Labahn, "The Non-Synoptic Jesus: An Introduction to John, Paul, Thomas, and Other Outsiders of the Jesus Quest," p. 3.1996.


366 Note Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 736 nn. 128, 131.
4.3.1. *A Proper Problematization of the Quest*

First and foremost, memory problematizes any conception of a pure Christian origins and historical Jesus by adding methodological complication to the core datum of research. The historical figure Jesus as a singular subject expressed himself in a complicated deployment of words, actions, emotions, and relational dynamics. These all received variation in accordance with his own internal development and the variegated deployment of phrasings over time owing to varying rhetorical contingencies. Moreover, some of his communication was intended for “insiders” and some for “outsiders.” And there was a sense in which these boundaries were somewhat porous and often crossed. Memories would therefore be blurred on account of these crossings. After his death there was a crisis in memory as described above. His followers returned to the memory cluster and to the scriptures which were in turn compounded by social processes of remembering, transmission, and transmutation into cultural memory (e.g., Lk 24:6; Jn 15:20; 16:4). Moreover, memory raises the problematics of time as it “blurs distinctions among memories of similar events, compounding them into generic memories with representational, emblematic functions.”

Every single act of communication within the memory process is therefore complicated and entangled. Historical events cannot be separated from their *Wirkungsgeschichte*: that is, their effect and impact upon the trajectories of story which they set in motion. History is not the rediscovery of the past but its re-presentation. Any attempt to arrive at a real past is interrupted by Lessing’s insurmountable ditch. Memory does not present a bridge over these troubled waters but charts another course entirely.

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369 Assmann, *Religion and Cultural Memory*, p. 94.
Memory was self-evidently already at work within Jesus’ own lifetime and with those who were in contact with him. Rather intriguingly, memory allows space for the intersecting of the early Jesus community and the historical figure Jesus mutually to inform one another at their formative levels (e.g., Matt 15:22–28). Moreover, his admirers and adversaries must have been talking about him during his lifetime. “Why imagine that the widespread curiosity on display in so many of the apocryphal Gospels was utterly alien to Jesus’ own contemporaries? Notoriety after death usually follows notoriety before death.” These swirling memories within the memory cluster makes good sense of the great confusion and misunderstanding that surrounded Jesus’ activity and teaching which were later developed into theological motifs. The conflicting reports of who Jesus was (e.g., Matt 16:13–17) are evidence to more of the same. Memory fills the spaces between Jesus’ public appearances with a narrative sense of expectation, hope, frustration, confusion, and, eventually, murderous anger.

As such, memory problematizes Schweitzer’s legacy of a tidy systematic approach in which much of historical Jesus scholarship continues to operate in its aim to present a unified, coherent picture of a singular historical figure against which all else is re-coordinated and retrofitted. Every rational system must reckon with the barrier of the irrational. And historical Jesus scholarship has often operated as a rational

\[\text{\textsuperscript{370}}\] Along these lines, see the interesting argument of Bruce Chilton, Rabbi Jesus: An Intimate Biography (New York: Doubleday, 2002) 3–22; and Scot McKnight, “Calling Jesus Mamzer,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 1.1 (2003) 73-103.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{371}}\] Allison, Constructing Jesus, p. 25.


\[\text{\textsuperscript{373}}\] Georg von Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein: Studien über marxistische Dialektik (Berlin: 1923) 126.
system against which the *irrational* is named spurious or inauthentic. The problem with this approach is that it has produced any number of Jesuses.\textsuperscript{374} There is the eschatological prophet, the Galilean guru, the wandering magician, the messiah of the end of days, the progressive rabbi, Jewish sage, political revolutionary, co-conspirator with the Essene countermovement, itinerant preacher, exorcist, the collective conscious of the community historicized, theologian of the marginalized, peasant artisan, Torah-observant Pharisee, Cynic philosopher, socioeconomic reformer, eschatological agent, and even God incarnate.\textsuperscript{375} Burton Mack is representative of the field when he states that "none of the profiles proposed for the historical Jesus can account for all of the movements, ideologies, and mythic figures of Jesus that dot the early Christian social-scape."\textsuperscript{376} The case can be made, however, that all of these threads are in fact aspects of the way in which Jesus is portrayed across the Gospel genre and are testimony to the varying strategies Jesus employed as needed. Trouble occurs when any one of them is raised to the level of coordinating principle or paradigmatic scene.\textsuperscript{377} Cultural memory, on the contrary, "encompasses the age-old, out-of-the-way, and discarded" as well as the "heretical, subversive, and disowned."\textsuperscript{378} Memory theory rejects the strong influence of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{376} Mack, *The Christian Myth*, p. 35. Mack goes on to list the varying levels and the Jesus to which they bear testimony: Q1 (cynic-like sage), Q2 (a prophet of apocalyptic judgment), Thomas (Gnostic spirit), the parables (spinner of tales), pre-Markan pronouncement stories (lawyer for the defense), pre-Markan miracle stories (exorcist and healer), Paul (messiah and cosmic lord), Mark (son of God appearing as messiah, crucified and will return as son of man), John (reflection of God in creation and history), Matthew (legislator of divine law), Hebrews (a cosmic high priest), Luke (the perfect righteous man). "Not only are these ways of imagining Jesus incompatible with one another, they cannot be accounted for as the embellishments of the memories of as single historical person no matter how influential" (p. 36).
\item \textsuperscript{377} "Paradigmatic scenes" as a concept of analysis has an intellectual history ranging from early Classical scholars, their mediation by Robert Alter of "type-scenes" in the biblical material, and within the work of Rodney Needham. Most recently, Douglas Davies has developed the concept "to describe events whose motifs enshrine prime ideas or the core commitments of a group." See Douglas J. Davies, *Joseph Smith, Jesus, and Satanic Opposition: Atonement, Evil and the Mormon Vision* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010) 15–16; see, too, Douglas J. Davies, *Emotion, Identity, and Religion: Hope, Reciprocity, and Otherness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) passim.
\item \textsuperscript{378} Assmann, *Religion and Cultural Memory*, p. 27.
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Schweitzer and the quest for a tidy Jesus, thus allowing for the singular subject to be viewed in pluralistic perspective.

4.3.2. Widening the Sphere of Investigation

Somewhat related, at the level of cultural theory’s encompassing of the “heretical and subversive,”\(^{379}\) or at Derrida’s concept of the archive,\(^{380}\) the non-canonical Gospels should be allowed to speak to the dexterity of memory within early Christianity’s memory cluster. This is not to say that all texts are equal in standing in terms of their historical reliability as witnesses to empirical events. “Cultural memory is complex, pluralistic, and labyrinthine; it encompasses a quantity of bonding memories and group identities that differ in time and place and draws its dynamism from these tensions and contradictions.”\(^{381}\) But it does suggest that the previous excluded extra-canonical sayings within the Jesus material can be reviewed along the lines of memory patterns and types which may amplify and challenge canonical portraits.\(^{382}\) Tradition varieties arise out of social and cultural pressures and variables wherein the tradition itself is enacted and performed.\(^{383}\) There may be adequate explanations for the unity across the Jesus tradition as there may be for its remarkable diversity but both together presents a significant challenge. Memory is capable of at least coping with these challenges as events carry significant diversity within communities and indeed across communities.\(^{384}\)

\(^{379}\) Assmann, *Religion and Cultural Memory*, p. 27.


\(^{381}\) Assmann, *Religion and Cultural Memory*, p. 29.


\(^{384}\) See the excellent development of this idea in Janet S. K. Watson, *Fighting Different Wars: Experience, Memory, and the First World War in Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
It would also allow for Paul to be included as an early instance of appropriating memories of Jesus from within the memory cluster which best serves theological, ecclesiological, missiological, and political strategies. To say that Paul is not interested in the historical figure of Jesus is to miss the point entirely. He assumes the figure and recasts the Jesus tradition as appropriated within the rhetorical contingency of his ecclesial strategies.\footnote{David E. Aune, "Jesus Tradition and the Pauline Letters," in Jesus in Memory: Traditions in Oral and Scribal Perspectives (ed. Werner H. Kelber and Samuel Byrskog; Waco: Baylor University Press, 2009) 63–68; Peter Pokorný, "Words of Jesus in Paul: On the Theology and Praxis of the Jesus Tradition," in Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus (ed. Tom Holmén and Stanley E. Porter; Leiden: Brill, 2011) 43.437–68; and Labahn, "The Non-Synoptic Jesus: An Introduction to John, Paul, Thomas, and Other Outsiders of the Jesus Quest," pp. 3.1936–52.}

The authority of Jesus’ teaching from the beginning “was understood as a tradition that was to be interpreted in terms of different situations, consequently expandable, and variable in its wording. The earliest indications of this are in Paul, who from time to time refers explicitly to the authority of the Lord.”\footnote{Schröter, “Jesus and Canon,” p. 108; cf. Schröter, "Anfänge der Jesusüberlieferung: Überlieferungsgeschichtliche Beobachtungen zu einem Bereich urchristlicher Theologiegeschichte," pp. 58–70.}


This would also have an effect on other adjacent fields. There have been intriguing findings and advances within the world of text criticism which could be corroborated with this approach as well. A former tenet of textual criticism was that the older a textual variant was the more authentic it would be. The goal of textual criticism was construed as reconstructing the earliest manuscript. Kurt Aland, for example, stated that the edition prepared by the Institut für neutestamentliche Textforschung in Münster and the United Bible Society “could be regarded as having
achieved the goal of establishing the original Greek of the New Testament.” This approach, however, has come under severe scrutiny by David C. Parker, Eldon J. Epp, and others. If memory is allowed to problematize the concept of a singular original form, then text-critical variants could be reworked as variants of the memory tradition—or, better, testimonies to memory patterns within the fledgling communities. “In refocusing the discipline away from the so-called original text toward the papyrological evidence, Parker and Epp have succeeded in facilitating new access to the early Jesus tradition.” The key insight of the papyrological Jesus tradition is in its “considerable fluidity.”

4.3.3. Theological Resonances

A move from the textual approaches of Jesus’ understanding of the heritages of Israel and the Judaism(s) of his day are also reopened through the rubric of memory. Within the world of literary criticism, there have arisen fields of discourse surrounding the intertextuality of memory. That is, “a textual repository of memories from other texts that models itself on the ways in which we ourselves are constructed by traditions, unconsciously shaped by the voices and echoes of mythic paradigms we may not even be aware of.” As Leopold Bloom says in Joyce’s *Ulysses*, “Never know whose thoughts you’re chewing.” The same, *mutatis mutandis*, must be affirmed for Jesus and the Gospel writers. There are to be sure clear strategies evident within the written Gospels at the linguistic level which evoke the textual traditions of Israel. Even more of these evocations are opened


390 Parker, Living Text of the Gospels.


393 Though at points a bit overstated (e.g., p. 183), see Kelber, “Conclusions: The Work of Birger Gerhardsson in Perspective,” p. 204.


when the intertextuality of memory is allowed both at the level of explicit
intentionality and unintentional “chewing.” The Gospel texts are therefore to be
mined for words, enactments, and mannerisms which tap into the heritages of
Israel. What is more, practices and presences of those outside the formulations of
Judaism which may otherwise be absent owing to a lack of textual support may well
be operative if the move toward a more memory-based approach is adopted.

Theological resonances could also be worked out with respect to the early Jesus
communities—which were primarily made up of Jews—along with their memory
clusters of Jesus, and the heritages of Israel. The deep tones of memory at work
within the Hebrew Bible are self-evident, as are the repeated refrains not to
forget. These memories were often called upon at times of resistance to opposing
hegemonies as an attempt to locate their own identities according to the narrative
dynamics of belief in the one God. The inheritance of these traditions within the
eyear followers of Jesus began to get reworked around a Christological key in its
correlation of the remembering of Jesus with and as the divine identity (e.g., in the
latter formulations of 2 Tim 2:8).

Memory opens up a vast subversive potential within the configuration of the early
Jesus communities with respect to the role of memory within the construction of
communal identity. Cultural memory is the inclusion and exclusion of memories
from the memory cluster which best suit the purposes of this community. And it is in
the configuration of precisely these memories which subvert other ordering
remembrances—be they those of other early Jesus communities, antagonists of the
Jesus communities within their social settings, or larger, indifferent imperial bodies
too big to notice. Related to this is the fusion of remembrances of the historical
figure of Jesus and the self-definition of the community. In other words, memory

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396 See the interesting reflections in Taubes, Occidental Eschatology pp. 14–15. See, too,
Brevard S. Childs, Memory and Tradition in Israel (London: SCM Press, 1962). See, too, Rolf Rendtorff,
397 See Deut 4:9, 23, 31; 6:12; 8:11, 14, 19; 9:7; 25:19; 1 Sam 1:11; 2 Kgs 17:38; Prov 3:1; 4:5; Sir 37:6.
allows for the fusion of Christology and ecclesiology to occur within the early understanding of identity in varying communities. These threads will be traced and tested in our next chapter on the Gospel of Mark as our test case. Our central preoccupation, however, will be applying the way memory problematizes the underlying assumption of Schweitzer’s conceptions of the pure originary and subsequent notions of tidy reconstructions of the historical Jesus.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE UNTIDY JESUS OF MARKAN MEMORY

“A good wit will make use of anything.” William Shakespeare

5.0. Putting Theory to Work

In this chapter we attempt to employ the experimental method sketched in the previous chapter while also taking seriously both the narrative dynamics of Mark as well as the occasional nature of the Gospel’s communal dynamics as witnesses to something like the past—or, perhaps better, its resource(s) from the past; viz., Jesus memories. In the last chapter we saw how memory problematizes Schweitzer’s legacy of a tidy systematic approach in which much of historical Jesus scholarship still operates as it aims at presenting a unified, coherent picture of a singular historical figure against which all else is re-coordinated and retrofitted. This desire for a “tidy” Jesus is problematic, however, in that it tends to coordinate the many to the one in ways which end in marginalizing subtler concerns of the evangelists. It also overly simplifies the complexities of identity by reducing all actions to a consistency that may not be present as well as the ways in which memory contaminates the historical process.²

In the previous chapter we considered the dynamics of the movement from history as lived, history as remembered, and history as written. In the present chapter we

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² Think, for example, of the difficulty in answering the question, “Who was Abraham Lincoln?” Was he a champion of civil rights ahead of his time? A political expedient who used the slavery issue for his political advantage? A racial bigot less interested in issues of emancipation than in big government? Even with a relatively recent example it is clear that “identity” is a complicated process which rejects reductionistic representations. The point here is that consistency or unifying vision is the construct of biographers not historical personages. On the complexities of Lincoln, see Ronald C. White, A. Lincoln: A Biography (New York: Random House, 2010); and, Eric Foner, The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011).
will move backwards from this progression. We will start with our single test case of the Markan text and, conscious of the spaces of memory which infect every part of the tradition process, attempt to offer some reflections on the varieties of manner in which Jesus might have lived as Mark reconstructs his Jesus based upon its relevance for the community. In so doing we reject notions of pure origins and the “uncontaminated” originary, and problematize the construction of “tidy” Jesuses based upon decoded aims and objectives. As we saw with Schweitzer, discerning these “aims” can no doubt be part of the historical process and produce interesting findings, but to collapse all of the material onto the reconstruction of these efforts marginalizes subtler aspects of Jesus’ identity and his representation. The varying “roles” in which Jesus appears to have acted—e.g., as discussed in this chapter: teacher, healer, and martyr—demonstrate how this irreducible plurality of and in Jesus is incompatible with Schweitzer’s persistent influence of a desire for singularity. It is in the reconstruction of a “tidy” Jesus where we feel the force of Schweitzer as “strong poet” most. In this chapter, then, we seek to break the anxiety of Schweitzer’s influence by considering the untidy Jesus of Markan memory.

5.0.1. Communal Formation and Refraction

The Gospel of Mark is not a witness to the historical Jesus in the first instance but of early Christianity in statu nascendi. In that sense it cannot be reduced to mere bios. That is not to say that the early communities wrote themselves into the script and constructed Jesus as a personification of their communal crises. It is, however, to

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5 Even if Mark is the “earliest” Gospel this does not give us direct or even “better” access to the historical Jesus. Our selection of Mark as a test case is as much ad hoc as it is about parody. To consider the Synoptics together is to be guided by the similar presuppositions of harmonization. The aim here is simply to focus on the provincial concerns of authors and their hermeneutics of relevance with respect to the memory cluster of the remembered Jesus.

6 Though see the reasoned arguments of Dirk Frickenschmidt, Evangelium als Biographie: Die vier Evangelien im Rahmer antiker Erzählkunst (Tübingen: Francke, 1997). See, too, Burridge, What Are the Gospels?
suggest that Jesus was written into their communal crises. In other words, it was the remembered Jesus refracted through a hermeneutic of relevance which we encounter in the Markan script for the purposes of identity construction and communal ordering and direction. “Mark uses his narrative to construct a worldview for his audience.” Once we get this the right way around, we can read the Gospels as a kind of witness to what Jesus’ ministry might have been like. Even here, however, the communal configuration of the Gospel stories is part of the ministry of Jesus. Representations are never to be confused with reference. As with the contemporary interpretive process so with the Markan “interpretation” of the life of Jesus: cultural position and local interest are not some “variable which can be isolated and then treated.” Schweitzer’s desire to get behind the “fateful shifting of perspective” enmeshed within the text is symptomatic of the drive for singularity and not shared in this approach. Work on the “historical Jesus” must be attuned to the communal dynamics located within the act of Reading.

As suggested earlier by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre and others within the Annales movement, history-writing grows out of present questions and concerns. “History

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7 Paraphrasing James Kloppenberg, Clark states that “all human inquiry arises out of communities of inquiry that control the terms of the discourse.” Clark, History, Theory, Text, p. 40.


10 Following the linguistic turn in philosophies of history, previous conceptions of reference and representation have become unsettled by revising our understandings of language and its relation to the world around us. See Clark, History, Theory, Text. See, too, the dispelling with the “magical theory of reference” in Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 15.


is never for itself; it is always for someone.” Reading the text as *interested history* or ideological construction, however, is not averse to saying something about previous happenings which may be embedded in narratives. Mark must be read for what it is: an embedded narrative of communal interests. This narration is not innocent but “deeply implicated in ideological construction.” The memory cluster, as we have been calling it in §4, has been affected by the interests of the Markan redactor of remembrances at the level of its representation. The Markan narrative cannot give us access or pure reference to the memory cluster but is itself a witness to how early Christian writers made recourse to the memory cluster for the purposes of identity construction and communal direction. Taking this embedded ideology and the role of the “author” seriously, therefore, can serve the historical task by considering the ways in which narratives embed a fusion of horizons (*Horizontverschmelzung*) between the narration of past events and the communities for whom they are being narrated. An act of historical playfulness concerns itself with prowling along the margins of this fusion and within their zones of silence. In this sense, there are winks and playful gestures beyond the closed textual system. The Quest, then, building upon our discussion in §4, can be reconceived as considering “what is no longer” (viz., the historical Jesus) by examining the textual

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14 On narratives as ideology, see White, *Metahistory*. “White claimed that every work of history has embedded within itself a metahistory insofar as the author has already chosen, well before the so-called writing stage, the tropological mode in which the book is to be composed. And this prefiguration is not some incidental embellishment, but shapes the entire narrative from start to finish” (Clark, *History, Theory, Text*, p. 99).


20 Intriguingly, Saussure himself suggested that language is only one system of signs among many which construct social life. See Clark, *History, Theory, Text*, p. 46 and p. 225 n. 40.
artifacts for traces of what made their very presence possible.\footnote{Michel de Certeau, \textit{L’Absent de l’histoire} (Repères sciences humaines et idéologies 4; Tours: Mame, 1972) 153–67. See, generally, Clark, \textit{History, Theory, Text}, pp. 119–24.} This would fund a significant departure from the quest for pure origins and singularity and allow for multiplicity, the \textit{untidy} and the "polluted."\footnote{Michel de Certeau has suggested that the historical impulse should reconfigure itself away from matters of "origins" and into successive stages of loss. See Michel de Certeau, \textit{The Writing of History} (trans. Tom Conley; New York: Columbia University Press, 1988 [1975]) 19–55, esp. p. 22.} With Derrida, we see no pure originary but texts (in the general sense) as enmeshed within overlapping environments and "touched" or contaminated by other texts.\footnote{Jacques Derrida, \textit{Dissemination} (trans. Barbara Johnson; London: Continuum, 2004 [1972]) 356–62.}

A significant force with which must be reckoned is the role of "context" or milieu. As we have suggested, one of the fundamental impacts of Schweitzer upon the Quest has been in its drive for singularity. An example of this is manifested in the search "for a \textit{distinctive} Jesus, distinctive in the sense of a Jesus \textit{different} from his environment";\footnote{Dunn, \textit{A New Perspective on Jesus} 58. Even here, however, we hear echoes of the search for misleading singularities.} in other words, a singular, distinct Jesus different from a singular originary. The motivating factors behind this approach can sometimes be owing to the anti-semitic and racially-charged cases of finding a “white Jesus against a black background.”\footnote{Fiorenza, \textit{Jesus and the Politics of Interpretation} 124; note, too, the various studies cited on anti-Semitism. Cf. Grant, \textit{White Women’s Christ and Black Women’s Jesus: Feminist Christology and Womanist Response}.} In any case, the motivations for this move are informed by a profound misunderstanding of the way culture opens up possibilities for new expressions. What James S. Shapiro said of Shakespeare is equally true of the historical figure of Jesus, “Shakespeare’s appeal is universal precisely because he saw so deeply into the great questions of his day.”\footnote{James S. Shapiro, \textit{A Year in the Life of William Shakespeare: 1599} (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2005) xii-xiii. Karl Barth said as much about the historical figure of Jesus. “It is as a man of his time, and not otherwise, that he is the Lord of time. We should lose Jesus as the Lord of all time if we ignored him as a man in his own time. It is in this history—the history which is inseparable from his temporality—that the man Jesus lies and is the eternal salvation of all men in their different times.” Karl Barth, \textit{Church Dogmatics} (trans. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1936-1970) III/2, 440-41.}
One’s identity is not necessarily confined by culture. As Wittgenstein suggested, “What a believer ‘believes is not a single proposition, but a system of propositions.”27 This is his concept of “nest.” What then is Jesus’ nest? Of what story or stories did he find himself a part?28 What did his “nest” allow him to become? Kähler was right to see the undeniability of how Old Testament and Hebrew thought-forms have conditioned Jesus’ outlook.29 But even here we are presented with many different ways of expressing Jewish identity. Moreover, deeply connected with the memory process must be the role of Israel’s scripture. Yet here again we are confronted with diverse ways in which Jews were reading the scriptures in antiquity. Instead of looking for a marginal Jew or a singular, distinctive Jesus, then, it might be worth therefore pondering what Pannenberg termed “a radical Jew”30 and the pluriform ways in which this could be expressed.

The search for the milieu or context of Jesus, therefore, is well worth continuing.31 What from the “past made possible the traces that now remain, what were the conditions of their production?”32 Though the “inscape” of the historical figure is forever lost to us,33 his “landscape,” is yielding interesting patternings of possible ways of being Jewish in the first-century world.34 As Nils Dahl stated, “whatever

27 Wittgenstein, On Certainty §141.
28 MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 216.
33 The term “inscape” is from Gerard Manley Hopkins and is an appropriation of John Duns Scotus’s doctrine of *haecceitas* which refers to the essential quality of a thing. See Gerard Manley Hopkins, The Major Works: Including All the Poems and Selected Prose (Oxford World’s Classics; ed. Catherine Phillips; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 2.
expands our knowledge of the environment of Jesus (Palestinian Judaism) indirectly extends our knowledge of the historical Jesus himself.”35 This milieu, however, is a complex web of interactions both in terms of a variety of expressions of Judaism mixing with variegated “Hellenisms.”36 The various expressions of Judaism during the days of Jesus reveal a movement that was self-critical and intra-polemical from the first. It is worth considering Jesus within this sprawling set of possibilities as opposed to looking for vague instances of dissimilarity.37 There were a variety of Judaisms,38 and these varieties produced a series of fresh tellings and expressions of what it meant to be “Jewish.”39 particularly through the reading of the Hebrew scriptures.


35 Nils A. Dahl, "The Problem of the Historical Jesus," in Jesus the Christ: The Historical Origins of Christological Doctrine (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991 [1962]) 81-111. Though Dahl's focus here is on the Palestinian setting, we hasten to add that life within the Roman empire is significant as well.


Yet “context” is never a politically neutral term nor can it be absolutely
determined. 40 What is more, the usual “returns” to the thoughtworlds of second
temple Judaism or the culture of Palestine are problematic in its naïve (arrogant?)
colonial assertion that such moves are fluid. The “originary” is always already “open
to translation so that it can never be said to have a totalized prior moment of being
or meaning—an essence.” Cultures are constituted “in relation to that otherness
internal to their own symbol-forming activity which makes them decentered
structures.” 41 Culture in all its forms is in the continual “process of hybridity.” 42 But
when chastened, context, or the “social environment of the text,” 43 allows space both
for considering “linguistic representation” and can gesture toward “the social forces
at work in these constructions.” 44 The previous configurations of the Quest asked
interesting questions but these questions were themselves not asked by the texts
examined and are therefore in some senses at least unanswerable. When taking the
aforementioned into consideration, however, we can detect hints of life outside the
text (see fig. 1 below).

40 See the essay “Signature, Event, Context,” in Peggy Kamuf, ed., A Derrida Reader: Reading
41 Homi K. Bhabha, “The Third Space: Interview with Homi Bhabha,” in Identity, Community,
Culture, Difference (ed. Jonathan Rutherford; London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990) 210. See, too,
42 Bhabha, “The Third Space,” p. 211.
43 See, e.g., the work of Gabrielle M. Spiegel, The Past as Text: The Theory and Practice of
Medieval Historiography (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Gabrielle M. Spiegel,
Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn (London: Routledge,
2005); and Clark, History, Theory, Text, pp. 156–186.
44 Clark, History, Theory, Text, p. 181.
The context of Mark, then, is “polluted” by representations of the environments in which Jesus lived and refracted through the community’s interest and *Sitz im Leben*. Date, provenance, and other matters are therefore of importance but cannot be reduced to litmus tests for the contextual makeup of Mark as a sure guide to the historical Jesus.  

The past and the present are embedded at every level. Useful still is considering Roman or Syrian locale, yet Jewish influence and presence in Rome and Roman presence in Judea and Syria are realities which must be kept in focus. If the date is post-70, the fate of the Jews and the Jewish War would have been known throughout the empire owing to the processional of Titus (*B.J.* 7.37–40, 139–46) and the issuing of the *Judaea capta* coins. If it were pre-70CE there were significant populations of Jews living in the Diaspora which would cause some familiarity. Rome itself had a prolific propaganda machinery that could communicate far and

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wide so its influence was felt far beyond the capital.\textsuperscript{49} What is more, the Jews had been administered by an ambitious king eager to curry the favor of Rome through his aggressive architectural programs.\textsuperscript{50} The same is true for the Galilee under the reign of Herod Antipas during the time of Jesus—not least in Jesus’ close proximity to Sepphoris and Caesarea Philippi.\textsuperscript{51} The shadows of empire enveloped and affected Jewish particularity. In what follows, then, we offer cautious observations which could be applied to multiple settings.\textsuperscript{52}

5.0.2. The Political Shape of Memory
As we have argued above, both in §4 and §5.0.1., the process of memory contains within itself a political dynamic.\textsuperscript{53} It is precisely these memories which have been preserved through their ascendancy at the expense of other dissident voices through ritualized remembering and systematized forgetting.\textsuperscript{54} The act of remembering contains within itself a reflex of “counter-present remembering” (\textit{kontrapräsentische Erinnerung}).\textsuperscript{55} With respect to the Markan text, a world is


\textsuperscript{51} On Antipas, see Morten Hørning Jensen, \textit{Herod Antipas in Galilee: The Literary and Archaeological Sources on the Reign of Herod Antipas and Its Socio-Economic Impact on Galilee} (WUNT/II 215; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006).

\textsuperscript{52} I tend toward a pre- though near-70CE dating and a Syrian or Galilean provenance.


\textsuperscript{54} This language and thought reflects that of Duncan Bell in a different yet related context of the national myth. See Bell, “Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity,” p. 73.

narrated in a way which differs from its surrounding mappings. At one level this is testimony to an uneasy habitation within imperial cosmology and cartography. At another, it is witness to the polemical maneuvering of inheriting the mantel of the people of God and rival readings of the scriptures of Israel. Here we take an additional step beyond seeing the Gospel of Mark as not only a representation of the past but also an intervention of the present. The αρχή of Mark’s Gospel is less of a “fresh start” than a “disruption.” This “disruption” matches the “uneasy habitation” within the larger cultural systems mentioned above: viz., Jewish expressions and expectations and life on the Roman colony. The community’s articulation of itself destabilizes the dominant narrative or competing narratives. The act of “narration exemplifies one of the basic ways in which we represent the world and the language of beginnings and endings, of turning points and crises and climaxes, is coimplicated with this mode of representation to so great a degree that our image of our own lives must be deeply narrational.” Memory politics instill acts of remembrance with an intentionality which is “purposefully used to form and stabilize social groups and their identities.”

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56 Here I note the impressive work of Anatha Portier-Young, Apocalypse against Empire: Theologies of Resistance in Early Judaism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011). Portier-Young does not deal with Mark but demonstrates a way of reading classical texts with social theoretical sensibilities with respect to “colonies” living within the cosmologies of imperial ordering.


58 In a similar move within Latin literature, see Habinek, The Politics of Latin Literature 3.


62 Danto, Narration and Knowledge p. xiii; cf., pp. 342–63. Worth noting, too, is the potential disruption of the “Roman obsession with time” with the Markan telling of its own time. On the “Roman obsession with time,” see Denis Feeney, Caesar’s Calendar: Ancient Time and the Beginnings of History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).

63 Aronold-de Simine, ed., Memory Traces: 1989 and the Question of German Cultural Identity 17. With respect to the repression of memory and the role of memory as a tool for resistance within a
Within the model of cultural memory articulated in §4, that which is remembered contains within itself a pushing of “other things into the background.”64 with the community’s collective memories open to politicized forms of remembering.65 In this sense, Mark’s representation and redaction of the memory cluster is a “polemical act of self-definition.”66 The “past” becomes a contested site where its various appropriations are made in order to legitimize particular sociopolitical agendas and ideologies.67 Interpretations—in this case, of the scriptures of Israel, the memory cluster, and life on the colony—are therefore political acts.68 The Markan construction of Jesus as well as his representation of the memory cluster can therefore be seen “as a counter-hegemonic site of resistance, a space of political opposition.”69 In this sense, we actually see Schweitzer’s promising yet underdeveloped political theology alluded to in §3.1.1. enhanced through memory theory. The political shape of Markan memories is significant for what follows both in terms of its relation to the heritage(s) of Judaism and its direction for life on the colony.70


64 Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory 3.
66 Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, p. 77, referring to the process of canonization.
67 Ideology, in this sense, is seen as “an action-orientated thought-structure that, in its endeavour to stifle debate over possible political alternatives—to close down reasoned discussion over how best to live—tries instead to decontest the essentially contested concepts which structure political discourse.” Bell, “Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity,” p. 74. See, too, Michael Freedeen, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford University Press, 1996).
69 Bell, “Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity,” p. 65; Duncan S. A. Bell, “Anarchy, Power, and Death: Contemporary Political Realism as Ideology,” Journal of Political Ideologies 7.2 (2002) 21–39. These words, of course, have no reference to Mark’s Gospel, but the concept is entirely relevant to my reading of what “Mark” is doing at the level of identity construction and communal ordering.
70 With the phrase “life on the colony,” I am intending to invoke the work of Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkely: University of California Press, 2001). On Mark in postcolonial perspective, see Donald Senior, "With Swords and Clubs: The Setting of Mark's Community and His
5.0.3.  *Singular Subject in Pluralistic Perspective*

Throughout the history of interpretation, several profiles of Jesus have been put forward.⁷¹ John Reumann has organized a dozen or so profiles:⁷² the apocalyptic messiah; the great teacher; the existentialist rabbi; the church’s resurrected Lord; the prophetic suffering-servant messiah of Isaiah 53; the Essene-like Teacher of Righteousness; the sacred mushroom(!); the Nazorean scheming messiah; the political revolutionist; the pacifist; the proto Marxist-atheists; the romantically involved proto-feminist; the magician; the Hasidic *tsaddiq* Jew.⁷³ It is likely that aspects of some of these profiles reflect the memory cluster to some capacity. The influence of the Markan redactor of remembrances can be felt at points in which various “portraits” emerge as a result of hermeneutical relevance with respect to the process of contextualization.⁷⁴ Playing off these various “portraits” against each other in the service of an overarching coherency begs “many questions of definition” and represents “false dichotomies.”⁷⁵ There is, of course, a balance that must be struck between investigating individual texts and locating them within properly

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⁷² See, for example, the very thorough outlining of “Profile of a Prophet” in Wright, *Jesus and the Victory of God* 145–474. For the epistemological and hermeneutical grounding of this “profile,” see Wright, *The New Testament and the People of God* 1–144. Cf. the list of competing profiles in Beilby, “The Quest for the Historical Jesus: An Introduction,” 53.


limited paradigms, but the drive for singularity and pure origins needs to be questioned. Here we follow Keith Jenkins and his dirge for the “death of centres.”

Schweitzer’s influence is acutely felt in the Quest’s preoccupation with singularities and pure origins—e.g., background, profile, unifying vision and aim, and so on—and is that which Part Two seeks to problematize. As alluded to in §5.0.1., Derrida’s dispensing of the pure originary is central to our appropriations from memory theory in §4. At one level, the Jesus represented within the constructed world of the Gospel writers is a character who can be scrutinized as a literary phenomenon. In this sense, levels of singularity may come into play in terms of characterization or “a-theology-of” approach, yet even here there is considerable breadth and variation within the tradition. This emplotted Jesus, however, cannot be confused with the historical Jesus. Narrative is the unity which masks the many distinct ways in which Jesus was remembered. Yet even within the narrative of the Gospel of Mark Jesus is presented in diverse ways (see §5.2 below). “The principal difficulty in attempting to classify or categorize Jesus is that he exhibited characteristics of several categories and the categories themselves overlap.” The challenge is to

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77 Jenkins, *Re-Thinking History*, p. 71.
78 For a survey of the criteria by which this singularity is determined, see John P. Meier, “Basic Methodology in the Quest for the Historical Jesus,” in *Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus* (ed. Tom Holmén and Stanley E. Porter; Leiden: Brill, 2011) 1.291–332. He labels them in order of importance as follows: embarrassment, discontinuity, multiple attestation in sources of forms, coherence, and Jesus’ rejection and execution” (p. 1.330).
79 It should be noted that these “profiles” are not discovered in the text but constructed from the text. In a similar vein, see the comments on historical “facts” in Jacques Le Goff, *Histoire et mémoire* (Paris: Seuil, 1988).
80 Even here, however, within fictive worlds complex characters contain their own multiplicity if only at the level of strategic deployment for the purposes of attaining their singular agenda.
81 Cf. the words of John Kloppenborg, commenting on the manner in which “scholars move from the isolation of authentic Jesus materials to the synthetic effort to produce a coherent portrait. This involves many decisions that are functions of theoretical, conceptual, or ideological commitments.” Kloppenborg, “Sources, Methods and Discursive Locations in the Quest of the Historical Jesus,” p. 1.275.
examine these presentations for traces of ways in which Jesus might have lived while allowing for the *untidy* nature of memory and the complexities of identity.

5.1. **Christic Community and Ritual Christ**

In Figure 1 above, the attempt is made to illustrate what has been suggested in the argument of this chapter thus far. Within the Markan text, we can see hints and gestures away from the text both in the direction of the community and traces of the untidy remembrances of the "historical" Jesus within the memory cluster. These gestures are represented by the shaded portions which overlap with the Markan text. Dibelius and other form critics were correct to note the seeming artificiality of the frameworks presented within the Gospel material. But these “frameworks” suggest ways in which early communities conceived of themselves and the ways in which they appropriated remembrances of Jesus from the memory cluster. These “frameworks” provide traces and gestures which hint at *Sitze im Leben* outside of the framework with respect to something like the historical Jesus and the community’s life on the colony.

Examples of these are ways in which Mark’s text looks beyond itself (e.g., 2:20; 8:38; 91; 13:1–37; 14:62), and the ways in which Mark retains an interest in the distinctions between narrated time and the time of narrator. The Markan Gospel is an interpretation of the *Sitz im Leben* of the narrator’s audience through an interpretation and creative deployment of the untidy Jesus of Markan memory. Mark as narrative thus attunes the reader to the various strategies, characters and aspects of Jesus’ activity (traces of the past) as well as their impact on and relevance

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83 It must be noted that it is only from the shaded portions of the overlap in Figure 1 that we *conjecture* the form of outlying circles. For all we know, they could be something else entirely.


85 Cf. Schröter, "The Gospel of Mark," p. 273. We will consider these in some detail in §5.1.3.

86 See, e.g., in 1:5 where the eyes of the whole region are drawn to the particularity of the narrative: πᾶσα ἡ οἰκουμένη καὶ Ιερουσαλήμ διατίται πάντες. Elsewhere on Mark’s retaining the particularities of narrative time, see, e.g., 1:9, 14, 16, 21, 28, 39; 2:1, 13; 3:7–8; 4:1; 5:1, 20, 22; 6:14–29, 53; 7:24, 31; 8:15, 22, 27; 9:30, 33; 10:1, 32; 11:1, 12, 15, 27; 13:3.
for the present (gestures of communal interests and concerns). Mark responds to communal challenges with “a narrative about the reign of God,” enacted by and now ritually relocated in the remembered Jesus. In at least two places the narrator invades the narrative to address the readers directly (7:2–3; 13:14). At other times the narrator does so indirectly to explain (note the Latinisms of 12:42; 15:16) and editorialize (5:41, 42[?]; 6:17; 7:2–4, 19, 34; 15:34, 42). We can also sense aspects of the text which are aimed at communal direction in terms of coping with absence and persevering amidst persecution (see §5.1.2.). Doubtless there are further ways in which the text playfully hints outside of itself (e.g., 5:19–20; 10:46–52; 14:9, 51–52; 15:21?) but such resonances are lost to us. But we can figure traces of the past both in the ways in which Jesus is characterized (see §5.2.) as well as in some of the narrative techniques within the Markan text—e.g., the so-called summary statements (Sammelberichte).

5.1.1. Ritual and lieu(x) de mémoire

In §4.1.3. we suggested that it may be worth considering the remembered Jesus as a lieu de mémoire. Within the system of Pierre Nora's lieux de mémoire, the “past that is not gone but is perceived as eternal presence” creates what Nora called milieux de mémoire, “the real environments of memory.” When ritual and the milieux de mémoire have vanished we are left with only sites which remind us of the past: lieux

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89 See, esp., Robert H. Gundry, Mark: A Commentary on His Apology for the Cross (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans) 1044.
90 It is intriguing to note the instances where precisely where we would guess such explanations would be present they are in fact absent (e.g., 1:44–45; 5:25; 10:1–12; 14:1, 36; 15:6).
92 Nora, Realms of Memory.
93 See Aronold-de Simine, ed., Memory Traces, p. 8.
de mémoire. As such these lieux are not retrievals or repetitions of the past but representations, “a meaningful entity of a real or imagined kind, which has become a symbolic element of a given community as a result of human will or the effect of time.”

In considering the remembered Jesus as the lieu(x) de mémoire of early Christian reflection, however, we need to articulate what we intend as well as make some necessary adjustments to Nora’s usage.

First, Nora argued that memory and history are separate and distinct phenomena and he demonstrates a noticeable antagonism toward the latter. History for Nora is purely construction and lieux de mémoire are artificial and deliberate fabrications which replace “real” and “true” living memory. They exist in order to “stop time” and “block the work of forgetting” and preserve the “will to remember.” Second, Nora sees these lieux de mémoire as non-universal and an entirely modern phenomena. In this sense, a charge of anachronism could be leveled against our usage here.

Central to our appropriation of Nora’s concept, however, is the way in which he figures lieux de mémoire as the points where cultural memory “crystallizes and secretes itself.” In this sense, Jesus as a lieu de mémoire is the point at which the community both centers and performs its ritual identity. Within the sphere of this social function identities are formed, expressed, and reinforced. In the Markan text, the figure of Jesus has become a place where the community’s identity is both crystallized and communicated. In a sense, he has become ritualized.

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96 Nora, “Between Memory and History,” p. 19.
97 Nora, “Between Memory and History,” p. 7.
5.1.2. The Sociolinguistic Location of Christ and Community

The fusion of horizons (Horizontverschmelzung) embedded within the Markan narrative is further descriptive of the communal ritualization of Christ and the ritual performance of the community. In this sense, the text becomes effectual upon the community both in terms of ethical direction and in its centering of identity. With Schröter, we see the historical process as being “conceived as a creative act of remembering the past for the purpose of establishing identity in the present.”

Establishing these sociolinguistic affects upon the community is, in part, a strategic maneuver to play around the edges of the traces of the past and gestures for communal direction. We will consider the aspects of communal direction in the next section (§5.1.3.) while focusing further on the centering of identity and recourse to the ritual Jesus in what follows.

Mark makes recourse to the memory cluster and (re)orders existing memories of Jesus to shape communal consciousness. Following Mark’s narrative strategy, therefore, reveals wider communal directives and the ways in which the narrator centers communal identity. Many have noted the apparent inclusio in Mark’s Gospel with the dual appearance of σχίζω at the beginning of Jesus’ earthly ministry (1:10) and at its conclusion (15:38), as well as the centering effect of the transfiguration sequence (9:2–13). Beyond the mere lexical connections there are several suggestive thematic parallels: the heavens splitting, the presence of the spirit, allusions to Elijah, and a voice declaring Jesus’ sonship (we will return to these below).

These “apocalyptic moments” suggest a narrative strategy peculiar to the Markan material, with stress placed on the baptism of Jesus, as both Matthew (3:16) and Luke (3:21) use ἀνοίγω which was more often used “to express the idea of the heaven(s) opening for theophanic, epiphanic, or revelatory purposes” (Isa 63:19 LXX; Ezek 1:1 LXX; Hermas, Vis. 1.1:4; T. Levi 2:6; 18:6; Cf. 2 Bar. 22:1; Apoc. Abr.

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There appear to be several themes working together at once but we will concentrate on the Markan conception of divine presence. As Samuel Terrien has argued, this concept of divine presence "stands at the center of biblical faith." The cultic symbol system of Israel was constructed to manage and tend to God’s elusive presence. "The erection of the tent and the ark in the wilderness, the sanctuaries in Canaan, and the temple in Jerusalem testified to the elusiveness of theophany and vision and stressed the paradox of a hiddenness which was not an absence."

There are, however, several strands of both canonical (e.g. Ps 74:9), non-canonical (T. Benj. 2:2; 2 Apoc Bar 85:3; 1 Mac 4:4; 9:27; 14:41), and rabbinical material (b. Sanh. 11a; cf. Tanhuma on Num 8:2) which suggest the time leading up to the turn of the century was covered by silent skies. The divine threats of covenantal discipline and departure were being carried out against the adulterous people who had chased after other gods and sought the voice of other portents (Lev 26:14–46; Deut 28–30). God’s covenantal communication had thus ceased, with the heavens vaulted behind as glory exits stage left (Ezek 8–11; cf. Jos. Ag. Ap. 1.41). Yet even within an exilic book like Jeremiah, God declares, “Do I not fill heaven and earth?” (Jer 23:24). Presence and absence in this sense, therefore, must always be modified with the adjective covenantal.

Even before the purported silence, however, the “fall from full presence to representation” as Derrida might have called it, had already occurred with the phenomenon of language itself. With our mythic parents’ lust for unmediated knowledge, we were exiled from God’s full presence, with the light from the garden of God now refracted into a dark forêt de symboles. For Derrida, the symbol, or

103 Collins, Mark, p. 148.
107 I am grateful to Prof. Paul Fides who forced me to this distinction with his critical comments at the Critical Theory Conference held at Oxford University in 2010.
“the sign is always a sign of the Fall.”\textsuperscript{109} And Augustine spoke of humanity’s exile in a \textit{regio dissimilitudinis} (a land of unlikeness).\textsuperscript{110} A theology of Mark or of any sort, therefore, “is always a study of signs,” as “it is only after the Fall that a theology is needed.” Presence “is for us an \textit{absent} presence, and so any theology, whatever else it is, must also be a semiology.”\textsuperscript{111}

With the tearing of the heavens—what Joel Marcus has called “this gracious gash in the universe”\textsuperscript{112}—Mark signals the Isaianic longing for God’s covenantal return to his people in the process of becoming.

\begin{quote}
Oh, that you would rend the heavens and come down (Isa 64:1 ET)
\vspace{0.25cm}
ולא ישבו שלמה (Isa 63:19 MT)
\vspace{0.25cm}
ἐὰν ἀνοίξῃ τὸν οὐρανὸν (Isa 63:19 LXX)
\end{quote}

Indeed, there seems to be strong resonance between the Isaianic new exodus and Mark in general,\textsuperscript{113} and Isa 63:11–64:1 and Mark 1:10 in particular.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
A coming up from / through the water & Isa 63:11 & Mk 1:10 \\
\hline
Endowment of the Holy Spirit & Isa 63:11, 14 & Mk 1:10 \\
\hline
Ripping of the Heavens & Isa 64:1 & Mk 1:10 \\
\hline
Divine Descent & Isa 64:1 & Mk 1:10 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111} Hart, \textit{Trespass of the Sign}, pp. 6–7.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Marcus, \textit{Mark 1–8}, p. 165.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Cf. Rikki Watts, \textit{Isaiah’s New Exodus and Mark} (WUNT 88; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The tearing of the heavens is a common motif of revelation at which God gives at turning points in the history of the covenantal people (Ezek 1:1; 3 Macc 6:18; Acts 7:56; 10:11; Rev 4:11; 19:11; Herm. V.1,1,4; Jos. As. 142). As Karl Barth says, revelation “means the giving of signs,”\(^{114}\) and with the revelation of Jesus as Ἴησοῦ Χριστοῦ ὑιός θεός (1:2) and ὁ ἄγιος τοῦ θεοῦ (1:24), the former trespass of the sign—the original transgressing of the שמים (Gen 1:26–27)—is healed, signifying for Mark a return of covenantal presence. Moreover, as the Markan Jesus was coming up out of the water (ἐναβαίνειν ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος, 1:10), the vaulted skies are opened, and divine speech returns (φωνὴ ἐγένετο ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν, 1:11a):

You are my beloved son, in you I am well pleased (Mark 1:11b)

σὺ εἶ ὁ υἱὸς μου ὁ ἄγαπητός, ἐν σοί εὐδόκησα (Mark 1:11b).

He is presented as both the new Adam and the renewed Israel (cf. Exod 4.22; Jer 31.9; Hos 11.1). The one who triumphs in the wilderness and over the Tempter precisely where his forerunners had failed (cf. Mark 1:12). He is thus the new human, “the faithful [image and] sign of God,” as the Pauline School would later call it (cf. Col 1:15).\(^{115}\) And with his last breath (ἐξεπνευσεν, 15:37) the veil of the sanctuary is torn from top to bottom (τὸ καταπέτασμα τοῦ ναοῦ ἐσχίσθη εἰς δύο ἀπὸ ἀνοθεν ἔως κάτω, 15.3)—which I take to be the inner veil (Exod 26:31–35; Lev 16:2; m. Yoma 5.1)—letting loose God’s radiant presence upon the earth.\(^{116}\) Josephus mentions that the innermost part of the tabernacle “was an imitation of heaven” (Ant. 3.6.4 §§122-23),\(^{117}\) so there appears to be a movement of God’s presence breaking in at the baptism and out at the crucifixion.

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\(^{114}\) Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/2, 52.

\(^{115}\) Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, p. 4.

\(^{116}\) This, of course, is a disputed point. For those who see the curtain (τὸ καταπέτασμα τοῦ ναοῦ) as referring to the outer veil (Exod 26:37; 38:18; Num 3:26; Letter of Aristeas 86), see, Theodor Zahn, Das Evangelium des Matthäus (KNT1; Leipzig: Deichert, 1910) 713–14; and the others listed in Collins, Mark, p. 760 n. 279.

\(^{117}\) Collins, Mark, p. 759. Josephus also mentions how the outer veil symbolized the heavens as well (B.J. 5.5.4 §§212-14). In favor of the outer veil referent, see the clever argument of David Ulansey, "The Heavenly Veil Torn: Mark’s Cosmic ‘Inclusio’," SBL 110.1 (1991) 123–25.
In any case, the return of the covenantal dwelling of God with his people, for which had long been anticipated (e.g., Ps 18; 144; Hab 3; cf. T. Lev. 5.2; T. Jud. 22.2; T. Zeb. 9.8; T. Naph. 8.3), has broken into the silent planet, with the radiance of the ancient glory spilling out from behind the drawn curtain. And the strands of tradition which spoke of this revelation to all nations and their worship of the creator God are realized with the confession of the centurion: ἀληθῶς ὦ τος ὁ ἀνθρωπος υἱὸς θεοῦ ἦν (15:39). 118 To quote Rumi, “Praise is simply drawing back the curtains / to let his qualities in.”119

So, whereas for Judaism “Sinai stands at the mythic core of religious memory”120—this is the fugue which Isaiah plays—Mark fashions his Gospel so as to position Jesus as the ritual core upon which the divine descends at Jesus’ baptism and breaks forth from the holy of holies at his crucifixion.121 The covenantal absence of divine presence is reversed with the manifestation of “return” in the enactment of Jesus, making way for a presence for all: Jew, Gentile, even the Roman centurion, whose confession—which could just as easily have been an imperial salute to Caesar—now centers on the Galilean’s mangled body.122 This particularity is in fact Mark’s ironic universalism where the ritual relocation of εἷς ὁ θεός is recast around Jesus himself (2:7).


121 One thinks again of Rumi’s line: Moses, the inner light of revelation, lit up the top of Sinai, but the mountain could not hold that light. Rumi, Selected Poems, taken from the poem “Sexual Urgency, What a Woman’s Laughter Can Do, and the Nature of True Virility,” 58.

122 For an interesting analysis—though somewhat conjectural at points—of the Markan Gospel as heard by Roman audiences with respect to the Son of God, see Peppard, The Son of God in the Roman World. For Peppard’s analysis of Mark, see pp. 86–131. On the Roman centurion’s confession, see p. 130.
5.1.3. **Communal Direction**

The force of this ironic universalism is in its comforting the community through suffering (e.g., 4:17; 8:34–37; 10:39; 13:12–13) through an absence which is not absence. There have been numerous studies, of course, which focus on the impact of the historical figure of Jesus on both peoples and institutions, but it is worth considering the figure of Jesus in terms of the wider Jesus movement, “focusing on the early movement inspired by the historical figure of Jesus and focusing on the people itself as the locus of G*d's power and presence.”

Fiorenza, following the work of Rita Nakashima Brock and Catherine Keller, has spoken of “wider christologies,” which denote “a steering away from the romantic hero conception” of the messiah which was central to Schweitzer's project and instead pictures Jesus as one who “learns and is empowered” and situates “christic reality in the relationships themselves.” With these approaches in mind, something startling happens for the Reader: they become the star of the Markan Script, and themselves become the missing ending / new beginning of Mark’s Gospel.

The crescendo of possibility that was growing throughout Mark is interrupted with the first prediction of impending suffering (cf. 8:27–10:45). The discussion of the disciples’ own crosses which they must bear (8:34–37) follows immediately upon the first passion prediction (8:31–33); the discussion of who will be the first and the last (9:33–37) follows upon the second (9:31–32); and the teaching of the one who wishes to be first must be a servant (10:31, 35–45) envelops the third (10:33–34). “Jesus’ way of tribulation thus becomes the paradigm for the community of his followers.”

But this interruption slows to a sudden stall with a new absence. For as the young man (νεανίσκον, 16:5) informed the two women: Ἰησοῦν ὄρθείτε τὸν

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123 Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her*, p. 120.
At first reading this seems to be a tragic reversal of fortunes. The descent which brought presence (1:10) seems cancelled out by the ascent which appears to leave a howling and frightening absence (16:6, 8). The charge to return to Galilee (16:7), however, escorts the Reader back to where it all began: from the region of Galilee, on the shores of the Jordan (1:9). And with the second read, the Reader is now descended upon by divine presence, is led into the wilderness to be tested, and is challenged to be the ideal disciple / community in lieu of the inscribed misunderstandings. The Markan Pentecost is therefore in the Reading itself; where the Reader becomes the anointed one (messiah) at the River Jordan.

The thematic parallels mentioned earlier between the Baptism, Transfiguration, and Crucifixion scenes now grow astounding in their deviations: The divine voice from heaven at the Baptism (1:11) and at the Transfiguration (9:7) is now placed on the lips of Jesus at the Crucifixion (15:34), and the divine declaration of Jesus’ sonship at the Baptism (1:11) and Transfiguration (9:7) is placed on the lips of the centurion (15:39).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Baptism</strong></th>
<th><strong>Transfiguration</strong></th>
<th><strong>Crucifixion</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavens torn and spirit descends (1:10)</td>
<td>Cloud descends (9:7)</td>
<td>Veil torn and darkness spreads (15:38, 33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Elijah figure (1:4–8, 9)</td>
<td>Presence of Elijah figure (9:4, 11–13)</td>
<td>Elijah’s name mentioned (15:35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice from heaven (1:11)</td>
<td>Voice from the cloud (9:7)</td>
<td>Jesus’ loud voice from the cross (15:34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration of Jesus’ divine sonship (1:11)</td>
<td>Reaffirmation of Jesus’ divine sonship (9:7)</td>
<td>Confession of Jesus’ divine sonship (15:39)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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127 That is, in the ritual performance.  
128 Again, in the ritual performance.
This is the shocking discovery for the daring Reader: Jesus has become “divine”—or, the ritual core—and the Community has become christic.\textsuperscript{129} And so the community participates within the christic sphere and (re)enacts God’s-presence-to-the-world. It is in and through the return to Galilee that the community sees and meets their “failed messiah” (16:7). It is there the people of God participate with the Spirit in the re-membering of Jesus, the enacted presence of God, and perform this presence within the public square and to the watching world, this time stopping short of the fear and silence of 16:8.\textsuperscript{130}

Within the shifting imaginaries and sacred places which constitute the blurred moments between the narrated time of Jesus and the time of the community—what Schweitzer saw as the “fateful shifting of perspectives”—divine presence remains inchoate, and there is need for “age-specific personifications of God.”\textsuperscript{131} In this space of co-presence, the enactment of Jesus is recapitulated by the community where divine presence becomes a “givenness-by adumbration.”\textsuperscript{132} The sense of felt absence is therefore no absence at all and their sufferings are in fact testimony that they are faithfully performing the christic ritual. To quote Rumi again, “We do act, and yet everything we do / is God’s creative action.”\textsuperscript{133}

5.2. Jesus in Pluralistic Perspective

So far in this chapter we have looked at the ways in which narrative can be configured as a kind of witness to something like the past. Central to our investigation has been acknowledging the ideological nature of narratives as part of the historical-Jesus process without attempting to separate materials by processes which are guided by the illusory and illegitimate assumptions of the pure originary.

\textsuperscript{129} The fusion of Christ and community may also be reflected theologically in the call of the disciples (3:14–19) styled after the Elijah’s calling of Elisha (1 Kgs 19:19–21). In this sense, the stability of the prophetic office is not only maintained but its fruit increases with the shifting from Elijah to Elisha. In this sense, the absence of Jesus turns out for the benefit of the community.

\textsuperscript{130} Incidentally, this appears to be internal evidence for favoring a Galilean provenance.

\textsuperscript{131} Cf. Fishbane, \textit{Sacred Attunement}, p. 3.


What interested the foregoing discussion was locating what in the past made possible the traces which now remain as well as the social pressures and conditions which guided their production and how these processes were embedded within narratives.  

When it comes to Mark, some look to the so-called *Hoheitstitel* as an entrée into the material. Though such studies are useful and certainly interesting, the *Hoheitstitel* are not fixed concepts in Jewish literature but receive their meaning through their function in a given text—in our case through Mark’s literary strategies. As such, Jesus is not the messiah—or any of the other elevated titles—but the messiah is Jesus. That is, the *Hoheitstitel* are reworked so as to accord with Jesus through Mark’s scriptural exegesis. These points of ritual confession within the Markan community are revealing but may not be the best places from which to begin. The remaining summary takes its cue from the *Sammelberichte* which inform a general pattern of what Jesus’ activities consisted: viz., teaching and healing. We will also look at the way in which Mark presents Jesus’ conceiving of his end as martyr. We will now turn to the Markan narrative by exploiting its ideology for traces of the past and

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ways in which the untidy Jesus of Markan memory has been refracted through communal concerns of surrounding aggression and coping with absence.

5.2.1. Jesus as Teacher

In our preceding discussion we have suggested that complicit with the memory process of the Markan “author” is the role scripture played within the community’s constructed identity. There is an eagerness to maintain a continuity with the scriptures of Israel. Mark’s reading of scripture, however, was not the only reading—indeed, it was a minority reading deviating from those remaining within Jewish traditions and perhaps surrounding communities. This rival reading of scripture within the Markan community located its validation within its construction of Jesus as a reader and teacher of Israel’s scriptures. Jesus as a reader of Israel’s scriptures is an interesting study in its own right, but what concerns us here are the forces which gave rise to its encoding within the Markan narrative. In other words, what was it in the past that made possible the traces which now remain in the Markan material and what were the social pressures and conditions which guided their production? Here I suggest we can comfortably see traces of Jesus-as-teacher, and, with a bit less certainty, the community’s distancing itself from the synagogue.

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138 Many have made this observation before in seeing Jesus as a Sage or "rabbi." E.g., Vernon K. Robbins, Jesus the Teacher: A Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation of Mark (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984); Rainer Riesner, Jesus als Lehrer (WUNT II 7; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1981); and, especially, Bruce D. Chilton, A Galilean Rabbi and His Bible: Jesus’ Use of the Interpreted Scripture of His Time (GNS 8; Wilmington: Glazier, 1984); Bruce D. Chilton, Profiles of a Rabbi: Synoptic Opportunities in Reading about Jesus (BJS 177; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989); Bruce Chilton, Rabbi Jesus: An Intimate Biography: The Jewish Life and Teaching that Inspired Christianity (New York: Doubleday, 2000); Ben Witherington, Jesus the Sage: The Pilgrimage of Wisdom (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994).
Though there does appear to be evidence that Jesus understood himself in some prophetic sense (6:4; though cf. 1:38; 14:14), and it appears that "some" (τινες) of the leaders of Israel (14:53) understood Jesus to have at least the reputation of being a prophet (cf., 14:65), the predominant role in which Jesus is presented in Mark is that of teacher (cf. 10:1). Though it is also uncertain if “teaching” and “preaching” should be kept distinct, Jesus’ designation as διδάσκαλος should not be reduced to or established by the appearance of its lexeme. A casual read of Mark reveals the prevalence of Jesus’ reputation as a teacher (e.g., 1:22) voiced both by insiders (4:38; 9:38; 10:35; 13:1), outsiders (10:17–22; 12:13, 19) and those somewhere in between (5:35; 9:17).

On four occasions Jesus is referred to as “rabbi” (ῥαββί / רבי or ραββουνί / רבנוי): once by Bartimaeus (10:51), twice by Peter (9:5; 11:21), and another by Judas (14:45). Interestingly, none of these ascriptions of Jesus as “rabbi” are salutary. One is by a man who cannot see, two are from the lips of the disciple who most personifies their confusion and who will eventually deny him three times (14:66–72), and the final address is from the betraying lips of Judas (14:45). It may well be that Mark is attempting to distance the concept of rabbi from his construction of Jesus from that which remains in other traditions (e.g., Matt 23:8; John 1:38; 3:2; 20:16). What is more, the appearance of his μαθηταί (e.g., 2:15, 16, 18, 23; 3:7, 9; 4:34; 5:31, etc.) suggests he had a kind of school of learners (cf. m. ‘Abot 1:1, 11; 2:8; 5:12; 6:6). Mark often presents Jesus as teaching in the synagogue (1:21, 39; 6:2), and he is often in pointed disputes about readings of scripture (e.g., 7:1–13; 10:2–9,

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140 See Collins, Mark, pp. 80–84.

141 For Jesus “preaching,” see 1:14, 39; 2:2; and, 6:12 (where the disciples are preaching).

In this respect, the incident in Capernaum regarding Jesus' setting up a child (παιδίον) before his disciples to demonstrate kingdom priority (9:33–37), the blessing of the children (παιδία) in the Judean house (10:13–16), and in the addressing of his disciples as “children” (τέκνα) following the interaction with the rich man (10:24) may be further allusions to the role which Jesus plays within Markan ideology concerning the synagogue.

The history of the synagogue is complex, but it appears to have “crystallized” in the second temple period and readily “became the communal center of each Jewish settlement.” The entire range of communal needs and societal functions were met and performed within its structure. Jesus’ teaching and activity in the synagogue

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143 Though likely constructed as a polemic in Mark these sorts of interactions were well at home within rabbinical debates and discussions about scripture (b. Sabb. 97a; b. Ketub. 81b; 111a–b; b. Qid. 22a, 40a, 81b).

144 Cf., too, Mark 2:5.

145 Philo speaks of children being taught both the written law and the oral customs (Life of Moses 1.215–16; Embassy to Gaius 115; 210; On Planting 114; On the Preliminary Studies, passim), Josephus further details the instruction of children, and according to a later addition to Pirqē 'Abot, boys began memorizing Leviticus at age five, the Mishnah at ten, and the Talmud at fifteen (5:21). It is impossible to know what precisely was being taught during the time of Jesus. Nevertheless, worth comparing is James L. Crenshaw, Education in Ancient Israel: Across the Deadening Silence (Anchor Yale Bible Reference Library; New Haven Yale University Press, 1998); Moshe Aberbach, Jewish Education and History: Continuity, Crisis and Change (Routledge Jewish Studies Series; trans. David Aberbach; London: Routledge, 2009 [1982]); Nathan Drazin, History of Jewish Education from 515 BCE to 200 CE (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1940); Eliezer Ebner, Elementary Education in Ancient Israel during the Tannaitic Period (10–220 CE) (New York: Bloch, 1956); Beate Ego and Helmut Merkel, ed., Religiöses Lernen in der biblischen, frühjüdischen und frühchristlichen Überlieferung (WUNT 180; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005); and Shemuel Safrai, "Education and the Study of Torah,” in The Jewish People in the First Century (ed. Shemuel Safrai and M. Stern; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1976).


therefore makes good historical sense. The way in which Mark refracts this activity through communal concerns, however, is striking. There may well be an instance of ritual relocation at work in the various places where Jesus calls together the crowds or disciples (7:14–16; 8:34; 10:42; 12:43). That is, the range of communal focus and operation is now occurring in or around Jesus’ authority as opposed to the synagogue. This faint possibility is most evident in Jesus’ argument with the Pharisees and scribes about classifications of purity within elder traditions (7:1–13). In 7:1, the Pharisees “gathered together toward him” (συνάγονται πρὸς αὐτόν) and after the dispute, Jesus calls the people around him (προσκαλεσάμενος, 7:14) in order to instruct them in contradistinction to the views of the Pharisees and scribes (7:14–16). Following this revision session, Jesus “enters a house” (εἰσῆλθεν εἰς οἶκον) to instruct the disciples privately (7:17–23). Could this be a cryptic allusion to the ritual relocation from the synagogue to the later gatherings around the authority of Jesus in house churches? This would make good sense of the social pressures and conditions which may have guided their textual production. There are, of course, plenty of uncertainties which could swallow up this reading so it must remain tentative and issues of teaching in the temple must also be taken into consideration (11:17; 12:35, 38, 43; 13:1; 14:49).

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148 Cf. the impressive study on issues of tradition and law by Meier, Law and Love.
149 Jesus uses such forceful language as ἀκούστε μου πάντες καὶ σύνετε. οὐδὲν ἐστιν ἔξωθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐξορθολόγειν εἰς αὐτὸν ὃ δύναται κοινωνεῖν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐξορθολογεῖν ἐστίν τὰ κοινωνεῖν τὸν ἀνθρώπον.
151 On Jesus and the temple in Mark, see the extensive literature listed in William R. Telford, Writing on the Gospel of Mark (Guides to Advanced Biblical Research 1; Blandford Forum: Deo Publishing, 2009) 374–76.
What is more, the precise nature of what Jesus taught seems surprisingly uncertain. Mark frames the teaching of Jesus with the programmatic statement of his entry into Galilee where he κηρύσσων τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ θεοῦ (1:14). The contents of this preaching are explicated as πεπλήρωσα τὸ καφῶς καὶ ἤγγικεν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ· μετανοεῖτε καὶ πιστεύετε ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ (1:15). Elsewhere, however, the contents are left absent (1:39; 2:13; 4:1–2; 6:2, 6; 10:1; 14:49) or general (1:21; 2:2; 4:1–2). It is apparent that he often taught in parables to outsiders (3:23; 4:2, 33–34), and there is a decided focus on his disciples after 8:31, especially with respect to his impending death (8:31–34; 9:30–31; 10:32–34; cf. 2:20; 13:5).

5.2.2. Jesus as Healer

Interestingly, the healing and exorcist activities of Jesus is a point at which Schweitzer himself feels a tension within his tidy reconstruction (see §3.2.2.). The healing activity of Jesus as represented in Mark consists of exorcisms, physical restorations, miracles of nature, and miracles of provision. In what follows we consider all these activities as healing in the general sense as the lines between them were fluid in antiquity. As such, the practice of these arts “was omnipresent

152 Though the kingdom of God is clearly a key theme within Mark and other traditions concerning Jesus, it is often raised to unhelpful meta-levels. On the massive literature on kingdom of God in Mark, see the meticulous listing of Telford, Writing on the Gospel of Mark pp. 349–56.


154 E.g., Quest p. 239.

155 Mark 1:21–28, 32–34, 39; 3:11; 5:1–20; 6:7, 13; 7:25; 9:14–29; cf. also the authority to exorcise demons given to the disciples (3:15); the dispute with the scribes from Jerusalem about his exorcisms being empowered by Satan (3:22–27); and, “someone” casting out demons in Jesus’ name who was not part of the disciples’ inner-unit (9:38).


158 Mark 6:30–44; 8:1–10.

in classical antiquity.”¹⁶⁰ It appears that any charismatic personality could be considered a magician: e.g., Apollonius of Tyana, Plotinus, Libaniu¹⁶¹ and even Moses (e.g., Acts of the Apostles 7:22; Pliny the Elder, Natural History XXX.11).¹⁶² It is difficult to deny that Jesus was at least thought of as being a wonder worker¹⁶³ as is evidenced by his reputation as such reaching Herod Antipas (3:23) and the charges leveled against him by the scribes from Jerusalem (6:14–16) who appear to be accusing him of false prophecy and leading the people astray (Deut 13:1–11).¹⁶⁴ With respect to Jesus’ miracles, “no uniform assessment” existed,¹⁶⁵ as did no


¹⁶³ These charges also appear to be leveled against Jesus in the second century from Jewish critics (e.g., Justin Martyr, Dial. Tryph. 69.7; b. Sanh. 43a, 107b). See Evans, "Types and Identities of Jesus," p. 2.1231. Interestingly, non-Christian texts allude to exorcisms in Jesus’ name (PGM IV.3019–20) as do non-Christian Jewish texts (e.g., b. Hullin 2:22; cf. b. Sanh. 43a; b. Gittin 57a, ms M). These references I owe to Evans, "Types and Identities of Jesus," p. 2.1235.

¹⁶⁴ Evans, "Types and Identities of Jesus," p. 2.1229.
discernable method. With respect to physical healings, sometimes he made physical contact (1:29–31, 40–42; 3:10; 5:25–34; 6:2, 5, 53–56; 7:31–37; 8:22–26) and sometimes he does not appear to do so (2:2–12; 3:1–5; 5:21–24, 35–43; 10:46–52).\textsuperscript{166} The method of his exorcisms appears to be consistently that of rebuking and commanding (1:21–28; 5:1–20; 7:25; 9:14–29).\textsuperscript{167} This is quite different than the more elaborate adjurations and rituals attested to in apotropaic texts in such places as Josephus,\textsuperscript{168} Preisendanz’s \textit{Papyri Graecae Magicae},\textsuperscript{169} and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{170}

That Jesus was a kind of healer is hard to dispute but the reaches of and meanings assigned to it are difficult to determine. His physical contact with the “unclean,” for example (1:40–42; 5:1–20; 25–32), seems rife with communal refraction\textsuperscript{171} with respect to early Christian negotiations with Jewish \textit{halakhah}.\textsuperscript{172} In some instances, we see ritual relocation taking place where Jesus is performing the activities once performed by God.\textsuperscript{173} At other points it seems that Mark is presenting Jesus in line

\begin{footnotes}\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{166} Some are also undetermined (1:32–34).
\textsuperscript{167} Though see 6:13.
\textsuperscript{168} See, e.g., Ant. 8:46–49 and the incantations of Eleazar which are attributed to king Solomon (cf. T. Sol. 1:6). The traditions of Solomon as an exorcist are widespread in antiquity (esp. T. Sol.) though it is difficult to know where the precedent begins. See Lindija Novakovic, \textit{Messiah, the Healer of the Sick} (WUNT II 170; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003) 96–108. I suggest 1 Kgs 2:27 may be a likely candidate—where Solomon “expelled” (MT: תָּרָך; LXX: ἐκέκαμος) Abiathar from the priesthood—along with his purported wisdom (1 Kgs 4:29–34).
\textsuperscript{170} E.g., the prayers in such apotropaic texts as Jub. 6:1–7; 12:19–20; \textit{Aramaic Levi Document} 3:4–9; 11QPs\textsuperscript{s}col. 19, 24). Worth noting, too, are the incantation texts of 4Q560; 11Q11; 8Q5. Cf., too, the narrative depictions of exorcisms in 1QapGen 20:28–29. See, Esther Eshel and Daniel C. Harlow, "Demons and Exorcism," in \textit{The Eerdmans Dictionary of Early Judaism} (ed. John J. Collins and Daniel C. Harlow; Grand Rapids; Eerdmans, 2010) 311–33.
\textsuperscript{171} This is not to say that traces of the past are not present within these activities. See, e.g., Susan Haber, "A Woman's Touch: Feminist Encounters with the Hemorrhaging Woman in Mark 5:24–34," \textit{JSNT} 26.3 (2003) 171–92; Sanders, \textit{Judaism}, pp. 380–412; Paula Fredriksen, "Did Jesus Oppose the Purity Laws," \textit{BR} 11.3 (1990) 20–25, 42–47; Thomas Kazen, \textit{Jesus and Purity Halakhah: Was Jesus Indifferent to Impurity?} (Coniectanea Biblica New Testament 38; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2002).
\textsuperscript{173} This is especially the case with 4:35–41 and 6:45–52 (cf. Pss. 89:9–10; 104:7; 107:25–29; Job 26:11–12).
\end{footnotes}
with the prophetic activities of Israel’s past heroes.\textsuperscript{174} And in other places it appears that there is a social interest for human flourishing and well-being.\textsuperscript{175}

The first exorcism is perhaps most relevant for our purposes (1:21–28). In 1:21 we see that Jesus went into Capernaum and taught in the synagogue on the Sabbath (τοῖς σάββασιν εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὴν συναγωγήν ἐδίδασκεν).\textsuperscript{176} In v. 22 we are introduced for the first time to the issue of “authority” (ἐξουσία).\textsuperscript{177} The ἐξουσία present in the teaching of Jesus in the synagogue is set against the comparable absence of it in the scribes (οὐχ ὡς οἱ γραμματεῖς, v. 23). Immediately following this statement a man with an impure spirit (πνεύματι ἀκαθάρτῳ) confronts Jesus in the synagogue. This presents at least two significant challenges to the synagogue and its caretakers. First, impurity is present; and, second, it is the authority of Jesus which is able to heal the man which highlights the felt impotence of the synagogue.\textsuperscript{178} The man with an impure spirit (πνεύματι ἀκαθάρτῳ) who was present in the synagogue names Jesus as the true locus of purity and holiness: ὁ ἁγιὸς τοῦ θεοῦ. All present were amazed (ἐθαμβήθησαν ἀπαντεῖς v. 27) and a dispute ensues (συζητεῖν) regarding this “new teaching” (διδαχή καὶ νη). The unit rounds itself off nicely with a return to the issue of ἐξουσία (v. 27) and in v. 29 we are met with the jarring: Καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ τῆς συναγωγῆς ἐξελθόντες ἠλθον εἰς

\textsuperscript{174}See 6:30–44 and 8:1–10 with the Elijah / Elisha cycles in Kings.


\textsuperscript{176}On the programmatic function of this text, see John Chijioke Iwe, Jesus in the Synagogue of Capernaum: The Pericope and Its Programmatic Character for the Gospel of Mark. An Exegetico-Theological Study of Mk 1:21–28 (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1999).

\textsuperscript{177}See Mark 1:27; 2:10; 3:15; 6:7; 11:28, 29, 33; 13:34; cf., 6:2; 7:37.

\textsuperscript{178}See, too, 1:39; 3:1–5.
Though we must exercise caution, it appears that ἐξοσώσα has departed from the synagogue and entered the house gatherings.

What is more, after the rejection by his own in 6:4 Jesus never again enters a synagogue—indeed, the remaining two occurrences of συναγωγή deal with judgment and the threat of the people of God being beaten in their walls (12:39; 13:9 respectively). “Wherever Jesus goes now, the house replaces the synagogue as the architectural setting for teaching; the questioning disciples replacing the accusing scribes as listeners (7:17; 9:28, 33; 10:10); the new community has a new ‘gathering place’.” The former architectural mode of the synagogue is overshadowed by the architectural marker of the house throughout Mark’s Gospel as the latter takes over the former in its societal function. This makes socio-rhetorical sense in that after the destruction of the temple in 70CE the synagogue would gradually replace the temple in terms of the locus for Torah study. And if it was written before 70ACE, the synagogue was central to communal dynamics in any case. Could this be another cryptic allusion to and defense of the ritual relocation of authority from the synagogue to the gathering in Jesus’ name in the house churches? We see this elsewhere in, for example, 5:21–43, where Jesus heals the daughter of Jairus, who is ὁ ἄχιστον γάζων, not in the synagogue but in the house of the ruler of the synagogue. Though strictly conjecture such a reading makes good sense of the social pressures and conditions which may have guided Mark’s textual (ideological) production.

5.2.3. Jesus as Martyr

179 Elizabeth Struthers Malbon, Narrative Space and Mythic Meaning in Mark (Biblical Seminar 13; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991) 118.
180 Malbon, Narrative Space and Mythic Meaning in Mark, p. 131.
181 See, generally, Malbon, Space and Mythic Meaning in Mark, pp. 117–20; 131–36. Though much of this chapter was written before reading Malbon, I am happy to find her elegant corroborative voice at least on the margins of the reading advocated for here.
182 Note 5:35 with v. 38.
If Jesus lived it is most likely he also died. Here, however, strong likelihoods cease. Did Jesus go to Jerusalem with the intent of dying a “meaningful” death? Was he taken off guard? What significance did he attach to his death—or, better, what significance did Mark attach to it? Mark is careful to make clear that Jesus’ death is not fundamentally the result of alien aggression but is in fact part of a wider plan which is in continuity with the scriptures of Israel. Lest it appear Jesus is caught off guard—though strict warnings are made to the betrayer—the act is enveloped into a deeper story: ὥσπερ μὲν υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑπάγει καθὼς γέγορασται περὶ αὐτοῦ (14:21). When Jesus questioned his arresters why he was not taken into custody earlier in the temple when he was teaching “day after day” (καθ’ ἡμέραν ἡμην, 14:49), we are told that this was the case ἵνα πληρωθῶσιν αἱ γραφαί. Mark drops hints of the coming suffering before the break in 8:31 (e.g., 2:20; 4:17), but after 8:31 there is a decided shift of emphasis on impending persecution in general and on the death of Jesus in particular. What is more, while giving the climactic third pronouncement that the son of man will suffer (8:31; 9:30–32; 10:32–34), Jesus sets a new tone in the geopolitical maneuverings of his wandering band: ἵνα ἀναβαίνομεν εἰς Ἰεροσόλυμα (v. 33). This shift as we saw in §3.2.3. and §3.3.2 even stretches Schweitzer’s tightly formulated reconstruction as there appears to be a real sense of development in Jesus’ “messianic consciousness.” In any case, the three pronouncements differ slightly but are structurally similar.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text</th>
<th>The necessity of the son of man Suffering</th>
<th>Betrayal and rejection by temple leadership</th>
<th>Coming vindication on the third day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:31</td>
<td>δεὶ τον υἱόν του ἀνθρώπου πολλά</td>
<td>καὶ ἀποδοκιμασθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων</td>
<td>καὶ μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

183 Owing to space, I leave here the discussions of the Passion narratives and salvific understandings of Jesus’ death for another study. For the substantial bibliography on the topic, see Telford, Writing on the Gospel of Mark, pp. 516–28. See, too, the recent monograph of Scot McKnight, Jesus and His Death: Historiography, the Historical Jesus, and Atonement Theory (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2005). See, too, Peter G. Bolt, Jesus’ Defeat of Death: Persuading Mark’s Early Readers (SNTS 125; Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2004). It is worth noting, however, that though some texts reveal Jesus’ death as atoning (10:45; 14:22–24, 36) there also appear to be some texts which hint at an atonement without the cross (1:21–28, 32; 2:1–12; 5:1–20).

Mark presents a tension alongside scriptural necessity and Jesus’ own intention with the way in which various parties are accused of acts of betrayal. It appears that everyone is implicated (see chart below), but Mark is particularly pointed against the Jewish leadership. On three different occasions we read that Pharisees (8:11; 10:2) and the Pharisees with the Herodians (12:15) come “to test” (πειράζειν) Jesus and find ways to implicate him in Sabbath breaking (3:1–6) and treason against or collusion with Caesar (12:13–17). The intratextual echo of πειράζειν with 1:13 is hard to miss: καὶ ἂν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ τεσσεράκοντα ἡμέρας πειραζόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ σατάνα. The precise meaning and identity of σατάνας is, of course, complex. Nevertheless, the figure is often characterized as one who

<table>
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<tr>
<th>παθεῖν</th>
<th>καὶ τῶν ἀρχιερέων καὶ τῶν γραμματέων καὶ ἀποκτανθήναι</th>
<th>ἀναστῆναι</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παραδίδεται εἰς χέιρας ἀνθρώπων</td>
<td>καὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν αὐτὸν</td>
<td>καὶ ἀποκτανθεῖς μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἀναστήσεται</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παραδοθήσεται τοῖς ἀρχιερεῖσιν καὶ τοῖς γραμματεύσιν</td>
<td>καὶ κατακρινοῦσιν αὐτὸν θανάτῳ καὶ παραδώσουσιν αὐτὸν τοῖς έθνεσιν καὶ ἐμπαιζοῦσιν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐμπτύσουσιν αὐτῷ καὶ μαστιγώσουσιν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν</td>
<td>καὶ μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἀναστήσεται</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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185 On the Jewish leaders in Mark, see, e.g., Michael J. Cook, *Mark’s Treatment of the Jewish Leaders* (Leiden: Brill, 1978). Note, too, Martin Goodman, *The Ruling Class of Judaea: The Origins of the Jewish Revolt against Rome AD 66–70* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) esp. 27–133. It should be noted that though responsible reading should attend to the ethical dimensions of its hearing the strong intra-polemical tones in Mark may well be owing to genuine disputes within Judaisms. The difficulty is when the use of such disputes are co-opted to further ideological agendas which marginalize communities in contemporary geopolitical discourse.

186 The irony present here is that with the religious leaders associating, or in league, with the Herodians (3:6; 12:13), Pilate (15:1–15), and apparently Satan (1:13), they prove to be keeping far more questionable company than they accuse Jesus of consorting with early in his ministry (cf. 2:16). The words of Christopher Hitchens in this respect are quite apt: “Those who try to condemn or embarrass you by the company you keep will usually be found to be in very poor company themselves; in any case, they are, as I was once taught to say, tackling the man and not the ball.” Christopher Hitchens, *Letters to a Young Contrarian* (New York: Basic Books, 2005) 135.

187 The first unquestioned references to σατάνας as the celestial nemesis of God occur in the second century BCE (*Jub.* 23:29; *As. Mos.* 10:1). On the complicated history of Satan, see Michael J. Thate, “Paul at the Ball: *Ecclesia Victor* and the Cosmic Defeat of Personified Evil in Romans 16:20,” in *Paul’s World* (ed. Stanley E. Porter; Pauline Studies 4; Leiden: Brill Academic, 2008) 151–70; Archie
leads astray. This association of the religious leaders and “satan”—the arch-deceiver of the people of God—is likely owing to this charge initially falling on Jesus (cf. 6:14–16). Whereas historically it may have been that Jesus was charged with leading the people astray and the religious leaders performed their duty in warning the public against him, it is now their teaching and influence of which the people of God must be weary (cf. 8:15; 12:38).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Betrayed</th>
<th>Betrayer</th>
<th>To Whom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:14a</td>
<td>John</td>
<td>παραδοθῆναι unclear</td>
<td>Herod Antipas and Herodias (6:14–29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:31</td>
<td>Son of man</td>
<td>παραδίδοται unclear</td>
<td>Into the hands of men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:33a</td>
<td>Son of man</td>
<td>παραδοθησαται unclear</td>
<td>To the chief priests and the scribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:33b</td>
<td>Son of man</td>
<td>παραδόσασθαι the chief priests and scribes</td>
<td>To the Gentiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:10</td>
<td>Jesus</td>
<td>παραδοθησαι Judas</td>
<td>To the chief priests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:18</td>
<td>Son of man</td>
<td>παραδίδοσει Judas (3:19)</td>
<td>Object is unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:41</td>
<td>Son of man</td>
<td>παραδίδοται Judas (3:19)</td>
<td>Object is unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:44</td>
<td>Son of man</td>
<td>παραδίδοσει Judas</td>
<td>Into the hands of sinners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:10</td>
<td>Jesus</td>
<td>παραδεδωκαν chief priests, the elders, scribes, and the whole council (όλον τό συνέδριον)</td>
<td>To Pilate out of envy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


188 E.g., 1QH 4:6; 45:3; 1QSa 1:8; T. Job 3:6; 6:1–8:3. Elsewhere, Belial is the one who corrupts the children of light (1QM 17:5–6) and leads them astray (CD 5:18; 1QS 3:21; T. Reu. 4:7; Liv. Pro. 4:6). Mastema is also referred to as leading hosts which lead people astray (Jub. 10:8). It is likely that most of these occurrences collapsed into other forms such as σατανᾶς or διάβολος (though see 2 Cor 6:14–7:1).
What is more, this tension of necessity and culpability is refracted through communal concerns, and, as we would expect given our comments above in §5.2.1 and §5.2.2, early Christian identity vis-à-vis the synagogue. We see this most clearly in 13:9–13. As was the case with Jesus (see chart above) there is betrayal which the community suffers, presumably at the hands of those nearest them (v. 12), where they are betrayed to councils (παραδώσωσιν ὑμᾶς εἰς συνέδρια, v. 9) and betrayed to trials (ὅταν ἄγωσιν ὑμᾶς παραδίδοντες, v. 11). The sites of these betrayals and beatings will occur εἰς συναγωγάς (v. 9) and on account of Jesus’ sake (ἐνεκεν ἐμοῦ) as εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς (v. 9). This is a kind of re-performance of the council scene in 14:53–65 where μαρτύρια (vv. 55, 56, 59) and ψευδομαρτύρια (vv. 56, 57) are contrasted.

The community is thus presented as the gathered witnesses to the authority of Jesus in the face of coming persecutions and abuses. The lengths and limits of the “human capacity to withstand suffering and abuse” are as remarkable as they are lamentable. In this sense, it is interesting to consider, as Barrington Moore Jr. has done, “under what conditions and why do human beings cease to put up with it;”\(^{189}\) or, in this case, how suffering can be transformed into a discourse of resistance. “Bare life” thus becomes “the one place for both the organization” of the aggressor’s “power” and the persecuted’s “emancipation from it.”\(^{190}\) That is, “bare life” becomes the locus of resistance for those who would deny the sovereign power of those in rule.\(^{191}\) The acceptance of martyrdom can therefore become the embodiment of counter-discourses and practices which “testify to the radical relocation of power from earth to heaven” and from empire and Caesar—or in this case, the

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\(^{191}\) On this paragraph I have been greatly helped by Portier-Young, *Apocalypse against Empire*, pp. 23–24.
synagogue—to God, Christ, and community.\(^{192}\) In enduring the creation of “absolute pain,” the vulnerable body names the ruling authority’s creation of absolute power as fictive.\(^{193}\) Martyrdom enacts God’s sphere of sovereignty in the scope of the everyday.\(^{194}\) The weapons of the strong are thus turned on themselves in this ironic reversal of weakness turned strength and strength turned weakness.

As the gathered community of witnesses, Mark thus presents a reenactment of the unsettling presence of Jesus. But Mark is careful in distancing Jesus from violent forms of resistance and perhaps correcting improper associations of Jesus with zealot factions.\(^{195}\) Jesus is not a ληστής (14:48). His resistance is counter to the murderous brigand Barabbas μετὰ τῶν στασιαστῶν δεδεμένος οἴτινες ἐν τῇ στάσει φόνον πεποίηκεσαν (15:7). The revolutionaries even revile and reject Jesus (15:32). Indeed, in a subtle Markan twist, the chief priests are pictured as ἄνέσεισαν τὸν ὀχλον ἵνα μᾶλλον τὸν Βαραββᾶν ἀπολύσῃ αὐτοῖς (15:11). Jesus is removed from associations with the λησταί while the religious leaders are made to be comrades. The leaders appear to be placed in the company of the revolutionaries while Jesus’ death was in the service of other ends.

Considering Jesus as “martyr” begs the question to which cause he had aligned himself. We have seen that Mark is careful to correct opinion on Jesus’ association with the zealots. Of course using the term “martyr” is somewhat anachronistic as it was first used as a terminus technicus in early Christian writings (e.g. Martyrdom of Polycarp 1:1; 2:1; 14:2). Yet faithful witnesses to Jewish identity in the face of foreign aggression are well attested in Jewish tradition (e.g., Dan 3; 6; 2 Macc 6:18–

\(^{192}\) Cf. Portier-Young, Apocalypse against Empire, p. 13.


\(^{194}\) See, generally, the intriguing work of Candida R. Moss, The Other Christs: Imitating Jesus in Ancient Christian Ideologies of Martyrdom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). She concludes her fine work by warning against seeing a singular ideology of martyrdom (p. 176). I realize I am close to reading a singularity of ideology into martyrdom but I am simply gesturing toward a specific instance of a general reading while acknowledging full well the heterogeneity of martyrdom.

\(^{195}\) The classical text still remains that of Martin Hengel, The Zealots: Investigations into the Jewish Freedom Movement in the Period from Herod I until 70AD (trans. David Smith; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989).
Using the term “martyr” as a term of analysis, therefore, is warranted. Elsewhere the Maccabean “martyrs” suffered for the purity of God’s laws which were violated by overlords and compromising religious leaders (2 Macc 4:7–10:9; 4 Macc 4–18). The prayers of the martyrs hint at a kind of atonement for the people (2 Macc 7:33, 37–38; 4 Macc 6:28–29; 9:24; 12:17; 17:20–22). What is more, their pronouncements of vindication produce an interesting precedent for discourse on the resurrection (2 Mac 7; cf. 4 Macc 18:17).

It is difficult to know for sure the “cause(s)” which led Jesus to be crucified, but it is clear the Markan community remembered Jesus’ death as meaningful. His guiding motivations might well have been a radical fidelity for τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ θεοῦ (cf. 1:14), and as an enacted pronouncement of τὸ εὐαγγέλιον as described by the herald of Isaiah: ἵνα ὁ θεος ὑμῶν (40:9; cf. 52:7). Building upon our findings in §5.1.2. and §5.1.3, we can see hints of Jesus’ concern for the realization of the presence of God. It also appears that Mark refracted Jesus’ “martyrdom” through traditions of the so-called suffering servant (Isa 52:13–53:12). In this case, we see another instance of a ritual relocation from Jesus’ radical observance of the purity of the gospel of God for the people of God, and calls to persevere and watch for the vindication of the son of man (e.g., 13:24–37).

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5.3. Conclusion

It would be tempting to raise any one of these three topoi to the level of coordinating principle. This was Schweitzer’s key move as “strong poet”: viz., establish a singular hermeneutical key and then coordinate all else into a singular, tidy profile. Our aim, however, has been to demonstrate the diverse ways Jesus is presented within Mark’s Gospel for the purposes of communal concerns. Singular profiles and labels negate the complex and interesting potential of the untidy Jesus. This hermeneutics of relevance allows us to see how an early Christian author made recourse to the memory cluster for the purposes of communal identity construction. “A good wit will make use of anything,” and the Markan redactor did just that in terms of making recourse to the memory cluster for the purposes of identity construction and direction. In asking what in the past made possible the traces which now remain in the Markan text as well as the social pressures and conditions which guided its production, fresh possibilities open themselves. From the former “zones of silence” we can now detect faint whispers from the margins on ways in which Jesus might have lived as teacher and healer and died as a martyr for the gospel of God. They also tentatively gesture a Sitz im Leben of life on the colony and in the aggressive shadows of the synagogue. The particulars of each of these points, of course, need chapter-length attention in their own right but our concerns have been more methodological and hermeneutical. In configuring the Markan narrative as a kind of witness to the past, then, we can detect the refracted images of the untidy Jesus of Markan memory.

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