National Interests vs. Security and Defence Integration in the EU: A comparative case study of Britain and Germany

CHEN, WEI-FANG

How to cite:

Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
National Interests vs. Security and Defence Integration in the EU: A comparative case study of Britain and Germany

Wei-Fang Chen
School of Government and International Affairs
Durham University

Ph.D. Thesis
2012
I would like to dedicate this thesis to my loving family for their unconditional love and support throughout the course of this thesis.
Acknowledgements

Foremost, I would like to express my deeply sincere gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. Christian Schweiger, for his guidance, assistance, support, patience and immense knowledge during the period of undertaking the research and preparing the viva for this thesis.

I would like to thank Professor Adrian Hyde-Price and Professor John Dumbrell for acting as examiners for the thesis viva and providing valuable and constructive comments to address further research.

I would like to thank the people from the UK Parliament, the German Bundestag, Council of the European Union, and also the European Commission, who offered interviews for this thesis.

I would also like to thank my friend, Dr. Cheng Zhang, for his sincere encouragement and generous assistance during the writing up and submission stage of this thesis. I believe that his kind personality and excellent ability in research will assure him a bright and successful and future.

Last but not the least, I would like to thank my loving family, especially my father Changqi Chen, and my aunt, Shihming Chen, for their full support and inspiring encouragement throughout my study and life.
Declaration

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, nor materials used in support of an application for the award of another degree or qualification to this or another university or educational institution.

Signature: Wei-Fang Chen

Date: 3/July/2012
Copyright

The copyright of this thesis with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without written consent of the author.
Abstract

As institutionalists have assumed, institutions are supposed to shape the behaviours of actors towards collective objectives and better prospects. For this purpose, the EU has established an institutionalised framework for developing security and defence integration. This institutionalised framework not only provides ‘rules of games’ for conducting common security and defence affairs, but is supposed to make member states become socialised and embedded in European integration. However, the role of member states cannot be ignored.

In fact, the institutionalisation process from the EPC to the CSDP is affected by institutionalism and intergovernmentalism. In other words, although the CSDP has an institutionalised framework which offers rules and procedures for member states and EU institutions to implement a common security and defence policy, it also operates on the basis of intergovernmental co-operation. The different effect of institutionalism and intergovernmentalism can also be discovered through analysing the very distinct attitudes of Britain and Germany in this institutionalisation process.

This thesis aims to investigate the institutional development and practice of the security and defence integration of the EU, and examine the role of member states in the process. Britain and Germany are chosen as comparative cases because these two countries have presented quite different preferences and attitudes towards the developments of European integration. This thesis concludes that although the institutionalisation process can affect member states in structuring behaviours and national interests, their political will is nevertheless the most important key to determining whether an institutionalised CSDP can fulfil the collective end of security and defence integration in the EU.
**List of Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects for Crisis Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conducting Capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPU</td>
<td>European Political Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERRF</td>
<td>European Rapid Reaction Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPT</td>
<td>European Union Planning Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPPO</td>
<td>German Police Project Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Military Engagement in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transitional Council in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAF</td>
<td>Operation Allied Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUP</td>
<td>Operation Unified Protector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMG</td>
<td>Political and Military Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QMV</td>
<td>Qualified Majority Voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITCEN</td>
<td>EU Situation Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Socialist Republic of Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
<td>Treaty of Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>UN Interim Administration in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIL</td>
<td>UN Support Mission in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>UN Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUDO</td>
<td>Western Union Defence Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

1.1 An Institutionalised Attempt at Conducting Common Security and Defence Affairs in the EU.................................................................................................................. 1
1.2 Thesis Motivation.................................................................................................................. 3
1.3 Statement of the Problem....................................................................................................... 4
1.4 Research Objectives and Questions..................................................................................... 6
1.5 Thesis Structure (1): Methodology of the Theoretical Framework ......................... 8
   1.5.1 The Perspectives and Restrictions of Functionalism and Neo-functionalism on Explaining Political Integration.................................................................................. 8
   1.5.2 Intergovernmentalism Perspectives Explaining the Political Integration of the EU ................................................................................................................................. 9
   1.5.3 New Institutionalism Perspectives Explaining the Political Integration of the EU ........................................................................................................................................ 12
   1.5.4 Intergovernmentalism and Historical Institutionalism Methodology........... 14
1.6 Thesis Structure (2): Empirical Framework Methodology ........................................ 17
   1.6.1 Investigation of the CSDP Institutional Framework .................................................. 17
   1.6.2 Examination of British and German Roles................................................................. 20
   1.6.3 Evaluation of the EU’s Role in the Kosovo Crisis and the Libyan Crisis........ 24
   1.6.4 Empirical Framework Research Methods ................................................................. 25
1.7 Thesis Contribution ............................................................................................................ 29
1.8 Thesis Overview ................................................................................................................ 31

CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review ....................................................................................... 33

2.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................... 33
2.2 Conceptualising ‘Institution’ and ‘Institutionalisation’ ............................................... 34
   2.2.1 Discriminating between Old Institutionalism and New Institutionalism ....... 34
   2.2.2 Defining ‘Institution’ and ‘Institutionalisation’ ...................................................... 35
   2.2.3 The Theoretical Approach of Historical Institutionalism Being Applied to Study the EU ......................................................................................................................... 41
2.2.4 A Reflection on the Intergovernmental Perspective to Supplement Institutional Analysis Used to Study the EU .................................................................44

2.3 Approaching Security and Defence Integration in the EU ..............................46
  2.3.1 Understanding the External Ambition of the EU via the Formation of the CFSP .................................................................................................................47
  2.3.2 Interpreting the Security Role of the EU ..................................................49
  2.3.3 Considering the CSDP and the Transatlantic Relationship .......................52

2.4 Evaluating the Participation of Member States .............................................54
  2.4.1 The Issue of Member States Developing the CFSP and CSDP .................54
  2.4.2 The British Role in European Integration ..............................................57
  2.4.3 The German Role in European Integration ...........................................59
  2.4.4 Britain and Germany in Common Security and Defence Policy in the EU: Convergence or Divergence? .................................................................62

2.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................64

CHAPTER THREE: A Historical Path of Institutional Development for Security and Defence Integration in Europe ..........................................................67

3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................67

3.2 The Unaccomplished Prospect of Building a Common Defence Policy in Europe: The European Defence Community in the 1950s ...............................70
  3.2.1 Before European Integration: The Arguments after WWII about the Future of Europe .................................................................................................71
  3.2.2 The Incentives to Build a European Defence Community ......................72
  3.2.3 The Elements of the Institutional Framework of the EDC ......................74
  3.2.4 The Implications of the Failure of the EDC ..........................................76

3.3 An Alternative Project for Political Integration: European Political Co-operation in the 1970s .....................................................................................78
  3.3.1 The Origins of an Intergovernmental Framework for the EPC ...............79
  3.3.2 The Elements of the Institutional Framework of the EPC ......................81
  3.3.3 The Implications of the Tindemans Report on European Political Integration ........................................................................................................82
  3.3.4 Evaluate the Institutional Framework of the EPC .................................84

3.4 Towards an Institutionalised Framework: The CFSP and ESDP ....................86
3.4.1 Establishing an Institutionalised Framework for the CFSP ...............87
3.4.2 The Elements of the CFSP Institutional Framework before the Establishment of the ESDP ...............................................................89
3.4.3 Evolution: An Institutionalised Framework for Common Security and Defence Policy ........................................................................92
3.4.4 The Implications of the Institutionalised Framework of the CFSP and ESDP before the Lisbon Treaty .........................................................95
  3.5.1 Improving the Institutionalised Framework of the CSDP ..................98
  3.5.2 Defining Objectives of the CSDP since the Lisbon Treaty .................100
  3.5.3 Implications of the Lisbon Treaty to the CSDP ............................102
3.6 Conclusion .....................................................................................................104

CHAPTER FOUR: Britain and EU Security and Defence Integration .............106
  4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................106
  4.2 Background of Britain’s Policy on the Initial Development of European Integration ....................................................................................109
    4.2.1 Describe Britain’s Foreign Policy Traditions on Europe ..................110
    4.2.2 Britain’s Approach to Reconstruct Europe ........................................112
    4.2.3 Britain’s Shift to European Community ..............................................116
    4.2.4 Britain in the European Political Co-operation ..................................119
  4.3 Britain and an Institutionalised Common Security and Defence Framework .123
    4.3.1 Major’s Engagement in the Maastricht Treaty and the CFSP ..........124
    4.3.2 Blair’s First Term and the Amsterdam Treaty ...................................127
    4.3.3 Blair’s Efforts towards a Common Security and Defence Policy ..........129
  4.4 Britain and the Implementation of a Common Security and Defence Policy .132
    4.4.1 Britain’s Choice on the War on Terror .............................................133
    4.4.2 Britain’s Commitment to Implementing the CSDP ............................134
  4.5 Conclusion .....................................................................................................136

CHAPTER FIVE: Germany and EU Security and Defence Integration ..........139
  5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................139
5.2 Background of Germany’s Policy on the Initial Development of European Integration

5.2.1 German Commitment to Initiate European Integration

5.2.2 West Germany Rearmed and Integrated into NATO

5.2.3 Before the European Political Co-operation: West Germany’s Eastern Policy

5.2.4 West Germany in the European Political Co-operation

5.3 Germany and an Institutionalised Common Security and Defence Framework

5.3.1 Kohl’s Continuing Commitment to European Integration

5.3.2 Germany’s Proposals for the Amsterdam Treaty

5.3.3 Germany’s Transformation in the Common Security and Defence Policy

5.4 Germany and the Implementation of a Common Security and Defence Policy

5.4.1 German’s Choice on the War on Terror

5.4.2 Germany’s Commitment to Implementing the CSDP

5.5 Conclusion

CHAPTER SIX: The Implementation of the CFSP in Resolving the Kosovo Crisis

6.1 Introduction

6.2 The EU in the Kosovo Crisis

6.2.1 Before the Kosovo Crisis: The CFSP Mechanisms

6.2.2 The EU Role in Resolving the Kosovo Crisis

6.2.3 The Influence of the Kosovo Crisis on the CFSP

6.3 Britain’s Role in the Kosovo Crisis

6.3.1 Britain’s Participation in Resolving the Kosovo Crisis

6.3.2 The Implications of the Kosovo Crisis on Britain’s Policy

6.4 Germany’s Role in the Kosovo Crisis

6.4.1 German Participation in Resolving the Kosovo Crisis

6.4.2 The Implications of the Kosovo Crisis on Germany’s Foreign Policy

6.5 Conclusion
CHAPTER SEVEN: The Implementation of the CSDP in Resolving the Libyan Crisis

7.1 Introduction

7.2 The EU in the Libyan Crisis

7.2.1 The CSDP Mechanisms for Tackling Crisis Management Operations

7.2.2 The EU Role in Resolving the Libyan Crisis

7.2.3 Evaluate the Role of EU in the Libyan Crisis

7.3 British Role in the Libyan Crisis

7.3.1 The Policy of the Cameron Government about the Libyan Crisis

7.3.2 British Engagement in the EU in Response to the Libyan Crisis

7.3.3 Evaluate the British Role in the Libyan Crisis

7.4 German Role in the Libyan Crisis

7.4.1 The Policy of the Merkel Government about the Libyan Crisis

7.4.2 German Engagement in the EU in Response to the Libyan Crisis

7.4.3 Evaluate the German Role in the Libyan Crisis

7.5 Conclusion

CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion and Evaluation

8.1 Introduction

8.2 The Implications of Institutional Developments of a Common Security and Defence Policy

8.3 Britain: Still a Reluctant Actor in the EU?

8.4 Germany: Still a Civilian Power in the EU?

8.5 The Impact of Institutionalisation for the Future of the CSDP

Appendix A: Interview Invitation Letter

Appendix B: Anonymous Interview

Appendix C: Rainer Arnold’s Interview

Appendix D: Hans-Peter Bartels’s Interview

Appendix E: Steven Everts’s Interview

Appendix F: David Heathcoat-Amory’s Interview

Appendix G: Andreas Henne’s Interview

Appendix H: Paul Keetch’s Interview
Appendix I: Riina Kionka’s Interview .................................................................270
Appendix J: Pierre Séailles’s Interview...............................................................273
Appendix K: Reis Alda Silveira’s Interview ......................................................277
Appendix L: Brian Toll’s Interview ..................................................................280
References ........................................................................................................284
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 An Institutionalised Attempt at Conducting Common Security and Defence Affairs in the EU

To launch the project of European integration has been a complicated and strenuous task. As one of the most stunning achievements in the twentieth century, the project of the European Union, has attracted much attention around the world. Since to drive the project of integration requires close co-operation and co-ordination among the states participating in it, an institutionalised framework for European integration has been gradually created since the 1950s. During this process, the European Union (EU) has been established with a highly institutionalised system which combines supranational institutions and intergovernmental mechanisms.

European integration started with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the 1950s and now the EU covers very broad issues, including economic and monetary affairs, foreign and security policies and justice and home affairs. More and more institutions have been created to support the increased work of the EU, and a more institutionalised framework contributes to enhancing consistency and consolidation among member states and EU institutions. Meanwhile, the institutionalised framework of the EU would be broadened and deepened through the process of constant integration between member states and institutional actors of the EU.
Regarding European security and defence affairs, an attempt at developing an institutionalised framework is also ongoing in the EU, although compared to the progress that has been made in economic integration, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is nevertheless a relatively young policy area in the EU. The European Political Co-operation (EPC), which was launched in the 1970s, had established an intergovernmental basis for the political and foreign affairs dimension of European integration, and this intergovernmental basis had been applied to the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP; was European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) before the Lisbon Treaty).

The intergovernmental framework is maintained because it encourages member states to participate in security and defence integration, and member states do not have to concede power to a supranational authority. However, in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of common policies, an institutionalised framework is nevertheless important to improve co-ordination and consistency in this policy area. Therefore, since 1999 when the Cologne European Council decided to establish the ESDP, the EU has gradually developed an institutionalised framework for security and defence integration and built deployable military and civilian capability to implement crisis management missions. Besides, the development of the CSDP also creates an opportunity to develop a distinct role to undertake security and defence affairs, especially because the CSDP places an emphasis on the civilian dimension. In order to understand the EU role in world security issues, it is important to explore how the institutionalised framework has been built and how this framework affects the EU in playing this role.
1.2 Thesis Motivation

This thesis aims to investigate the institutional development and practice of the security and defence integration of the EU, and examine the role of member states in the process. It derives from two concerns.

The first concern emerges from this question: ‘How does security and defence integration affect the EU and member states conducting security and defence affairs?’ Security and defence affairs have been the most sensitive concern for nation states because they are crucial parts of sovereignty. Security and defence affair co-operation is therefore usually the most difficult to handle. The sensitivity attached to powerful political issues sometimes leads to the lowest level of co-operation among nation states. However, a more complicated, changed and globalised world encourages nation states to tackle common issues together. Consequently, a new security environment will inevitably push nation states to consider possible co-operation on security and defence affairs. Because the EU is the largest political and economic multilateral institution in the world, if it can play an effective role in security and defence issues it would definitely contribute to world peace and stability. Moreover, member states will have stronger incentives to support the CSDP if the EU is considered a successful and effective mechanism.

The second concern comes from this question: ‘How can an institutionalised framework assist the accomplishment of security and defence integration of the EU?’ Although the CSDP is developed on a basis of intergovernmental co-operation, it also has an institutionalised framework which helps to define the connections between member states and EU institutions, and offers rules and procedures to implement the CSDP. As is argued by Brigid Laffan and also by William Richard Scott, institutions usually provide regulations (laws and institutional mechanisms), a normative system
(values and norms) and a cognitive framework (symbols and identity) (Laffan, 2001; Scott, 2008); therefore, institutions can influence the behaviours of actors (Peters, 2005, pp. 18–19).

Besides, during the institutionalisation process, actors will become more engaged and socialised in this institutionalised framework, because this framework provides a stable and reliable environment for working together. Therefore, as Michael E. Smith has argued, ‘institutionalization improves the prospects for cooperation’ (M. E. Smith, 2004a, p. 18). The process of developing and implementing the CSDP also provides illustrations about how member states utilise the CSDP to tackle security and defence issues, and become involved in this institutionalised framework. However, the socialisation effect will not happen suddenly, and it takes a long-term historical process to enact. Therefore, it is also critical to investigate the historical process of developing an institutionalised CSDP and then to examine how this framework affects EU security and defence integration.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

The institutionalisation of the CSDP originated from the efforts which had been made in respect of the EPC, CFSP and ESDP. Although research on the development of the EPC, CFSP, ESDP and CSDP is abundant, it still lacks substantial discussions about the mutual effect between member states and the development of an institutionalised framework for security and defence integration in the EU.

The relevant research can be considered in three aspects. The first aspect focuses on the external role of the EU in security affairs. Some authors treat the EU as an
international actor and stress how the relationship between the EU and other states or international organisations affects the EU developing a security role (Farrell, 2009; Franklin, 2009; Howorth, 2010; Moens, 2001; Ray & Johnston, 2007; Splidsboel-Hansen, 2002; Toje, 2011). The second deals with the internal relations between EU member states and EU institutions. Some research argues that policy interests, security values and various cultural traditions affect the relations between member states and EU institutions and the development of EU security and defence integration (Bjoerkdahl, 2008; Devine, 2009; Dryburgh, 2010; Gross, 2007; Larsen, 2009; Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra, & Maurer, 2010). The third research strand examines and evaluates the implementation of the CFSP and CSDP on specific issues (Ehrhart, 2006; Holland, 1995; Jasper & Portela, 2010; Justaert & Keukeleire, 2010; Klasnja, 2007; Mattelaer, 2010; Norheim-Martinsen, 2010; Tardy, 2007).

The characteristics of member states cannot be ignored in this process. It is because the EPC, CFSP, ESDP and CSDP are all founded on the basis of intergovernmental co-operation that member states still play a dominant and rather independent role in the processes of institutional development and decision-making. On the other hand, although the connections between member states and EU institutions have been enhanced and present a phenomenon of ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ (H. Wallace, 2005, pp. 87–89), we cannot ignore the fact that these intergovernmental connections are also developed on an institutionalised basis. Because the factors both of intergovernmentalism and of institutionalism exist in the development of EU security and defence integration, it is necessary to accentuate the two factors in relation to relevant historical processes. In other words, in order to understand the development and influence of the CSDP, one has to deal with the institutional factor and the intergovernmental factor at the same time. However, research has to date not been able to present a realistic picture of this phenomenon.
1.4 Research Objectives and Questions

Arguing that the institutionalisation process plays a decisive role in shaping and regulating the behaviours of actors, this thesis will focus on the historical process of developing an institutionalised framework for security and defence integration in the EU. Specifically, in order to clarify the extent to which member states affect or are affected by relevant developments, it will examine British and German cases to explain how national interests of member states are involved in this institutionalisation process.

The most prominent development in security and defence integration in the EU occurred during the 1999 Cologne European Council through the launching of the ESDP (see: Presidency Conclusions, Cologne, 1999) and, at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, through the setting of a target for defence capabilities (see: Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, 1999). The former confirmed the establishment of the ESDP; the latter defined military capability targets of the EU. The foundation of the development of security and defence integration in Europe can, however, be traced back to the 1950s when the European Defence Community (EDC) initiative was proposed. Although the EDC plans were aborted, member states learnt the lesson that supranational frameworks may not be appropriate to the EPC, CFSP, ESDP and CSDP.

In order to probe the origins of security and defence integration in the EU and provide a more comprehensive picture of its implementation and influence, this thesis will start by examining the initial project of the EDC and include the latest developments of the CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty.
Four primary research questions are proposed to understand the development and performance of security and defence integration in the EU:

**Question 1.** *How did the development of security and defence integration emerge from the grand European integration project?* This thesis will investigate the exogenous and endogenous factors that drive this process and explain why an intergovernmental, and also a partially institutionalised approach, was accepted to develop security and defence integration in the EU.

**Question 2.** *Which characteristics of the institutional framework for security and defence integration in the EU can be recognised?* This thesis will clarify the legal and substantial foundations that support the institutional framework of the security and defence integration in the EU, and identify the capabilities and instruments the EU possesses to fulfil its objectives.

**Question 3.** *What are the dynamics between member states and EU institutions in the development of the institutionalised EU security and defence framework?* This thesis will investigate British and German cases and explain how member states participate in and affect relevant developments. The reasons Britain and Germany are chosen as cases will be explained in section 1.6.2.

**Question 4.** *How effective is the operation of the EU’s existing institutional security and defence framework in practice?* This thesis will investigate the performance of the EU in coping with the crisis in Kosovo, which reached a climax in 1999 and resulted in a NATO air campaign from March to June of the same year. The thesis will also examine the crisis that occurred in Libya in 2011, which led to the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in the end of the same year. The reasons for choosing these two events will be explained in section 1.6.3.
The discussions below will illustrate the theoretical and empirical frameworks that the thesis will use, and explain the reasons for choosing those methodological tools.

1.5 Thesis Structure (1): Methodology of the Theoretical Framework

This thesis consists of theoretical and empirical frameworks. In the theoretical framework, this thesis applies intergovernmentalism and institutionalism perspectives to explain the development of security and defence integration in the EU. Although functionalism and neo-functionalism perspectives have been popularly applied to explain the economic integration of the EU, both of these perspectives have restrictions when applying them to explain security and defence affairs integration. An alternative approach is necessary. The section below will introduce the methodology applied in this thesis and explain the reasons for choosing it.

1.5.1 The Perspectives and Restrictions of Functionalism and Neo-functionalism on Explaining Political Integration

Generally speaking, the perspectives of functionalism and neo-functionalism are considered as being able to provide strong explanations for integration in Community affairs (Cini & Borragan, 2010, pp. 71–85; Rosamond, 2000, pp. 31–42, 50–65). The term ‘ramification’, offered by David Mitrany (1966), and the term ‘spill-over’, put forward by Ernst B. Haas (1965), have contributed to illustrating how the effect of integration transfers from one economic sector to another and eventually leads towards deeper economic integration through widespread co-operation in functional affairs.
Although functionalists or neo-functionalists sometimes consider that the role of governments might not be that eminent in the integration of functional and technical co-operation, Haas also admits that the ‘spill-over’ effect would not automatically occur, because certain conditions might be needed to promote further economic integration or even a political unity. The conditions he has mentioned include ‘background conditions’, ‘conditions at the time of economic union’ and ‘process conditions’ (Haas & Schmitter, 1964, p. 711-716), which are applied to explain why the EEC can achieve a consolidated union but others cannot.

Unlike the integration of economic and functional affairs, progress on political integration is even more difficult to explain using the terms ‘ramification’ or ‘spill-over’. Although neo-functionalists believe that ‘political integration is a more or less inevitable side-effect of economic integration’ (Rosamond, ibid., pp. 65–68), political spill-over is hard to reach because it is difficult to persuade national governments to transfer their political authority to a supranational institution. Moreover, the Eurozone crisis signifies that even the pooling of sovereignty in the area of economic policy-making is difficult to achieve, with member states having in the past resisted subjecting themselves under the budgetary rules of the EMU Stability and Growth Pact. Integrating political affairs, especially in the area of defence and security, requires stronger commitment and political will from national governments. Therefore, a special concern with the factor of sovereignty will be accentuated in order to research relevant topics.

### 1.5.2 Intergovernmentalism Perspectives Explaining the Political Integration of the EU

As regards the concern about how national governments achieve consensus on ‘high politics’ issues, intergovernmentalists provide an alternative perspective to explain
those factors driving integration, and also accentuate the dominant role of national governments in the relevant process.

Stanley Hoffmann argues that differences in domestic environments and world views will lead to diverging foreign policies, and that the establishment of a political community will merely deepen these divergences. Moreover, these divergences will cause a fragmented international system, with it being unlikely that a political community will be integrated beyond the nation state (S. Hoffmann, 1966).

Hoffmann’s argument explained why the establishment of the EDC encountered more obstacles than the development of economic integration because member states were reluctant to make concessions on security and defence issues since the differences were difficult to reconcile. However, a pure intergovernmental argument cannot explain why EU member states have been able since the 1990s to improve the convergence of security and defence affairs and work in an institutionalised framework of the CFSP, ESDP and CSDP. Even though, during the period of the EPC, which lacked an institutional framework and did not have the capacity to employ the necessary instruments for member states to have common positions or actions, it was considered as playing a consensus-forming role among member states so as to avoid the ‘humiliating silence of complete inaction’ (Hill, 1992). In other words, nation states are possible to work together to achieve security and defence integration and an institutionalised framework for such purpose is also possible.

In order to clarify the considerable institutional factors that operate in the field of political integration in the EU, Andrew Moravcsik, a liberal intergovernmentalist, offers a moderate approach to explaining why national governments accept co-operation and integration regarding political affairs (Moravcsik, 1997, 1998, 2001). Moravcsik argues that the preferences of states in the process of European integration are mainly determined by the following factors: international
interdependence, opportunities for international economic exchange, and dominant economic interests within domestic societies. Hard bargaining among member states, which is strongly influenced by economic elements, will result in substantive integration outcomes; meanwhile, governments would be strengthened at home if they successfully defend their national preferences in an inter-state bargaining process (Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 3–9; Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 49). Therefore, on the basis of rational choices, Moravcsik tried to explain why governments surrender sovereignty to supranational institutions.

Intergovernmentalism perspectives provide more appreciable arguments for explaining the dominant role of national governments when conducting political integration in the EU. However, the progress of integration does not consist merely of a compromise among states regarding national interests. Although to intergovernmentalists, as Pierson has indicated, the process of European integration is essentially a forum for inter-state bargaining and member states remain the only important actors at the European level (Pierson, 1996, p. 124), the progress of integration is not completely the result of inter-state bargaining. Sometimes member states are affected or disturbed by the external environment. Britain may serve as an example. The Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher did not favour new treaties and legal documents to reform the EC. In a speech delivered on 20 September 1998 at the College of Europe in Bruges in Belgium, she was still opposed to adopting new documents for the EC (Thatcher, 1998, repr. Nelsen & Stubb, 1998, p. 54). However, the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War changed the overall environment in Europe and also in the world. This new situation pushed the succeeding Conservative Prime Minister, John Major, to sign the Maastricht Treaty and take part in building the EU, something unforeseen by Thatcher.
In sum, intergovernmentalists have demonstrated that nation states play predominant roles in the development of political integration in the EU, but they do not have much focus on the role of EU institutions. Since new positions and offices are introduced to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the CSDP, the role of EU institutions cannot be ignored.

1.5.3 New Institutionalism Perspectives Explaining the Political Integration of the EU

The institutional developments and practical implementations of the security and defence integration of the EU represent a long historical process. Member states occupy a dominant position driving this process, with EU institutions also becoming more participative than before in the institutionalised framework to achieve a common security and defence policy. Therefore, to understand EU security and defence integration, besides examining member states, an approach to examine the role of EU institutions is also necessary.

Institutionalism emerges from an interest in institutions structuring the behaviours of individuals towards collective purposes and better ends (Peters, 2005). The first discussions of ‘old’ institutionalism arose during the 1880s and examined the formal institutions and bureaucratic frameworks of US government. At that time, the approach of old institutionalism was applied to studies of comparative politics and formal government institutions and laws. While the behavioural revolution occurred from the 1950s to bring a new research paradigm with a different methodology, ontology and epistemology, old institutionalism, being not theoretical and too descriptive, declined (Peters, ibid., pp. 12–15).

Institutionalism was brought back by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, who emphasised the significance of collective actions and argued that there should be a
reciprocal relationship between collective political actions and socio-economic environments (March & Olsen, 1984). New institutionalism reintroduces a concern about institutions, collective entities and common activities and has been applied popularly to political science (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Shepsle, 1989; Weaver, 1992), international relations (Jupille & Caporaso, 1999; Pierson, 1996, 2000; Ruggie, 1998), economics (North, 1998; Williamson, 1985) and sociology (Achen & Shively, 1995; Scott, 2008). Accordingly, the reason new institutionalism has attracted scholarly attention is that it concentrates on ‘institution’ itself (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, 2001, p. 5).

Three reasons are considered in this thesis for choosing the new institutionalism approach. Firstly, adopting this approach will increase the institutional dimension of EU security and defence integration and complement the intergovernmentalism approach, which has a peculiar preference for national governments. Secondly, because new institutionalism considers institutions as whole entities, it is concerned with reciprocal interactions between institutional frameworks and actors so that it can explain the dynamic development of an institutionalised framework. Thirdly, although when compared to old institutionalism, new institutionalism does not tend to provide so many normative analyses, it is concerned with values shaping individual behaviours and preferences (Peters, 2005., pp. 24–45). Accordingly, this thesis will apply new institutionalism perspectives to explain the historical developments of the institutionalised framework for accomplishing EU security and defence integration.

According to diverse understandings about how institutions exert influence upon individuals, different schools of new institutionalism have been identified by authors (Ansell, 2008; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Hay, 2008; Mackay & Waylen, 2009; Peters, ibid.; Scharpf, 1997), with all institutionalists agreeing that ‘institution matters’ and that ‘institutional configurations have an impact upon political outcomes’ (Rosamond,
2010, pp. 109–113). Nevertheless, because focusing on the historical process of institutional developments and aiming to explain how this process contributes to deepening and broadening EU security and defence integration, this thesis will especially rely on historical institutionalist arguments and examine whether path dependence has happened in this process.

The term ‘path dependence’, coined by Douglass North, it indicates that in political processes, individuals prefer to follow present institutions or patterns instead of creating others because they have invested resources and efforts in present institutions, with this ‘inertia’ pushing them to provide stable support for present institutions (North, 1990). Moreover, Paul Pierson applies the term ‘path dependence’ to explain how decisions in the past have the ‘lock-in’ effect of restraining choices in the future and constraining individuals from withdrawing from present institutions (Pierson, 2000). Pierson also illustrates how short-term decisions undermine member states’ long-term control by introducing the idea of ‘unintended consequence’ (Pierson, 1996, p. 156). The terms ‘path dependence’ and ‘unintended consequences’ refer to similar consequences, where individuals will continue to invest in institutions to maintain the sustainable development of those institutions.

1.5.4 Intergovernmentalism and Historical Institutionalism Methodology

Since influence from institutions on individuals is not boundless, the active role played by individuals cannot be ignored. Regarding the process of developing EU security and defence integration, it still largely depends on the initiatives of member states in establishing and reforming institutional frameworks. However, the Lisbon Treaty has also made some changes, and, especially, increased the capacity of the High Representative to conduct the CSDP and chair the Foreign Affairs Council, including making proposal (Article 18, Title III, The Lisbon Treaty). Although regarding the CFSP and CSDP, the European Council and the Council will still act unanimously
(Article 24, Title V, The Lisbon Treaty), the Treaty offers more space and capability for the High Representative to make progress with the CSDP. Therefore, a mixed intergovernmentalism and historical institutionalism approach will help explain the interactions between member states and EU institutions in the CSDP.

Historical institutionalism arguments will help clarify three key issues involved in the process of developing security and defence integration in the EU, as follows:

- Firstly, how the development of security and defence integration by the EU derives from a long-term historical process of European integration. The development of the CSDP is associated with the EDC, EPC, CFSP and ESDP. Specifically, from the EPC it continues an intergovernmental stream and is still the most crucial characteristic of the framework of the CSDP. Therefore, this thesis will investigate the long-term historical developments from the EDC to the CSDP, and then examine whether path dependence occurs during this process.

- Secondly, why member states provide stable support to develop security and defence integration in the EU. The long-term participation in European integration also enhances the consensus of member states regarding this objective. Therefore, this thesis will explore how member states are motivated to participate in this process and also how they achieve their national interests in this process.

- Thirdly, whether an institutionalised framework of the CSDP will embed member states within this framework and become more dependent on the CSDP when they pursue national interests. This thesis will examine whether member states recognise the CSDP as a primary means for them to tackle relevant issues.

The arguments of intergovernmentalism will contribute to explaining the role of member states, especially Britain and Germany, in the process of conducting and shaping the progress of the security and defence integration of the EU. Two key
issues will be resolved in this thesis by applying the perspectives of intergovernmentalism:

- Firstly, why an intergovernmental model has been maintained since the development of the EPC. Because the implementation of common security and defence policy in the EU largely relies on the political will of member states, it is important to examine the extent to which intergovernmental factors affect achieving EU security and defence policy.
- Secondly, whether individual member states play a specific role in the process of EU security and defence integration. To address this issue, this thesis will discuss British and German roles in this process and examine their influence upon the development and implementation of EU security and defence integration. Especially because Britain and Germany have very distinct attitudes towards military options, it is important to investigate their role in this institutionalisation process. More detailed explanations for choosing these two countries will be presented in section 1.6.2.

This thesis considers that intergovernmentalist and institutionalist perspectives are complementary rather than contradictory because they focus on different dimensions in the process of developing security and defence integration in the EU, instead of being concerned with the same target using different interpretations. Therefore, this thesis will consider the development of EU security and defence integration as a process of compromise between intergovernmental and institutional factors. A mixed intergovernmentalism and historical institutionalism methodology will present a more comprehensive picture about this institutionalised, but also intergovernmental, framework of the CSDP.
1.6 Thesis Structure (2): Empirical Framework Methodology

The arguments above concerning historical institutionalism and intergovernmentalism provide theoretical explanations about how the institutionalisation process enables member states and EU institutions to be embedded in the project of EU security and defence integration. This thesis will also undertake empirical investigations into how the existing institutional framework achieves the EU’s objective implementing a common security and defence policy. Accordingly, in the empirical framework section, this thesis will examine three issues: (1) the existing institutional framework of the CSDP; (2) the participation of Britain and Germany in developing EU security and defence integration; and (3) the implementation of the CFSP and CSDP during the crises in Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011.

1.6.1 Investigation of the CSDP Institutional Framework

A consistent and reliable common security and defence policy depends on the efficient and effective implementation of the CSDP and proper coherence among EU member states and EU institutions. Although there was concern that the three-pillar structure of the EU introduced in the Maastricht Treaty might hinder the EU from exerting consistent and coherent policies (Andersson, 2008; Eeckhout, 2004), an institutionalised framework would help to improve the consistency and coherence of the CSDP.

The structure of the CSDP has a complex institutionalised framework because it not only has an intergovernmental decision-making process but also provides increasing competence to EU institutional actors. The existing institutional framework of the CSDP presents a hierarchical structure which consists of representatives and senior
officials from individual member states, and independent technical and specialised staff. The upper level develops strategic guidelines and decision-making, while the lower level is responsible for carrying out the decisions made by the upper level and providing suggestions and recommendations.

This hierarchical structure represents a model of multi-level governance. The EU institutions regarding the CSDP are allocated to three levels in this hierarchical structure according to their different duties. The top level is that of strategy-making bodies, including the European Council with the President and the Foreign Affairs Council with the High Representative of the Union (HR) for Foreign and Security Policy. They are the most important bodies in the EU as regards defining the CSDP. The middle level is the suggestion- and initiative-proposing bodies, including the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Committee of Permanent Representative (COREPER) under the Foreign Affairs Council. They are charged with providing information and recommendations to the Council to made decisions. The bottom level is policy-supporting bodies, and of course national governments’ administrations, in order to implement the CSDP.

These institutions work together to provide political directions, policy suggestions and situation evaluations for member states. Their work is also supposed to strengthen the connections between member states and the EU. Although, in terms of security and defence affairs, it is unlikely to present the phenomenon of ‘Brusselsisation’ put forward by John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg (1999, pp. 246–249), the implementation of the CSDP should contribute to improving convergence between member states and the EU when undertaking common security and defence issues.

In order to explore the specific roles of different EU institutions in the policy-making process of common security and defence policy in the EU, the researcher conducted
interviews with six senior officials working in this area. However, because one interviewer asked to be anonymous, the information below lists only five of these.

- **Ms Riina Kionka**: the personal representative for human rights (CFSP) of the Secretary General and High Representative Javier Solana. A 20-minute interview was undertaken on 3 November 2009 in Ms Riina Kionka’s office located in the Justus Lipsius Building, Brussels. A record was not available but Ms Riina Kionka permitted being quoted in this thesis.

- **Ms Reis Alda Silveira**: the head of the defence policy and capabilities unit of the Council. A 15-minute interview was undertaken on 5 November 2009 in Ms Reis Alda Silveira’s office located in Avenue de Cortenbergh 158, Brussels. A record was not available but Ms Reis Alda Silveira permitted being quoted in this thesis.

- **Dr Steven Everts**: the personal representative for energy policy of the Secretary General and High Representative Javier Solana. A 20-minute interview was undertaken on 6 November 2009 in Dr Steven Everts’s office located in the Justus Lipsius Building, Brussels. A record was not available but Dr Steven Everts permitted being quoted in this thesis.

- **Mr Pierre Séailles**: was a policy co-ordinator from the security policy unit of the European Commission. A 40-minute phone interview was undertaken on 25 November 2009. A record was not available but Mr Pierre Séailles permitted being quoted in this thesis.

- **Mr Brian Toll**: was a programme manager for CFSP operations in the European Commission. A 40-minute phone interview was undertaken on 2 December 2009. A record was not available but Mr Brian Toll permitted being quoted in this thesis.
1.6.2 Examination of British and German Roles

This thesis will examine the roles of Britain and Germany in the development of EU security and defence integration, and whether their preferences, interests and activities have been affected in this process. Britain and Germany are chosen for this thesis for three reasons. Firstly, because Britain and Germany present distinct motivations towards EU security and defence integration (Longhurst & Miskimmon, 2007), it is important to understand why they have different motivations and whether these differences affect their roles in this process. Especially as regards their attitude towards enhancing the capabilities in order to implement the CSDP, Britain and Germany represent an interesting comparison because Britain has an interest in the military dimension of the CSDP while Germany puts more focus on the civilian dimension.

Britain, on the one hand, has traditionally been an awkward or reluctant actor in European integration. However, because it is a major military power, Britain has a special interest in developing military co-operation. Under the leadership of the Blair Government especially, Britain expressed more enthusiasm for developing EU military capability. Blair argued that Britain should start ‘winning arguments rather than running away’ from Europe (Blair, 1998a). Besides, in Blair’s notable speech in Chicago, he declared the prospect of making Britain a bridge between Europe and America and promised to strengthen EU defence capability in order to enhance the transatlantic alliance (Blair, 1999a). Even though the present Cameron Government has returned to taking a resistant and reserved attitude towards EU affairs, such as vetoing the reform package of the Lisbon Treaty, it also signed a bilateral defence co-operation treaty with France, just as Blair did with France in the St Malo Declaration. No matter whether this treaty may become a framework for further defence integration in the EU, it at least illustrates that Britain has the intention of enhancing defence co-operation with European countries.
Germany, on the other hand, usually has aspirations to develop European integration, and has maintained a commitment to multilateralism and institutionalism since 1949 when the *Westpolitik* policy was introduced. However, where military issues are concerned, Germany is hesitant and more critical. Although Germany supports enhancing capability of the EU in order to implement crisis management operations and has developed the Eurocorps with France, it is not a traditional military power and does not have an ambition to be one. Military issues are not a German priority. Since the end of WWII, Germany has developed the definite characteristic of being a civilian power and is very careful about using military options. The concept of civilian power, developed by Hanns Maull, refers to those the countries which have strong political power but use multilateralism, non-military instruments and peaceful means in pursuit of foreign policies (Maull, 1990, p. 92–93). Although since 1994 Germany is allowed to deploy its military abroad once this is approved by the Bundestag (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfGE 90, 145, 1994), it still does not have the intention of developing a strong military role. This hesitant attitude can be seen in the so-called ‘War on Terror’ against Iraq and in the Libyan crisis.

The second reason is that Britain and Germany are two major member states in the EU, and therefore whether they can achieve consensus is important for the development of the CSDP. Besides, their influence is also presented in relation to affecting agenda-setting or the decision-making process when co-operating with other EU states. For example, Britain has taken a strategy of opting out with Denmark to resist further European integration (Adler-Nissen, 2008), as well as initiatives to develop civilian capabilities to underpin the CSDP by Nordic countries also having support from Britain and Germany (Jakobsen, 2009). Therefore, because both Britain and Germany have political resources to conduct EU defence and security affairs, it is useful to examine how these two countries affect the development of common security and defence policy in the EU.
The third reason is that Britain and Germany are both strong supporters of NATO, and therefore, more than other countries in the EU, these two countries especially have to cope with whether the development of common security and defence policy in the EU undermines transatlantic relations. This is more serious for Britain, because traditionally Britain has a special link with America and does not want to run the risk of weakening it by contributing to developing independent EU military capability. Investigating how Britain and Germany take the NATO factor into account in the process of developing EU security and defence integration will provide important insights into how European countries balance commitments to NATO and the EU in relation to military affairs.

This thesis does not choose France as a case to examine because traditionally France has a similar stance to Britain on military affairs, since both countries yearn to play a strong military role, and firmly insist on their national interests. This also stems from their legacy as colonial powers. Both countries still show a tendency to regard themselves as Great Powers, something which is completely alien to the post-1945 German self-perception. On the other hand, France and Germany shared the same history of European integration, and this offered them a similar experience in the EU. Therefore, the difference between Britain and France, or the difference between France and Germany is not as obvious as the difference between Britain and Germany. Since one of the objectives in this thesis is to examine whether the institutionalisation process affects member states, it is important to compare whether the institutionalisation process improves convergences between Britain and Germany and whether their divergences hinder the development of the CSDP.

Besides, since France can co-operate with Britain or Germany, if these two countries can reach consensus on the same issue, it will be easier to persuade France to join in agreement. The fact cannot be ignored that British–Franco co-operation without Germany, or a Franco–German motor without Britain, is not realistic. In other words,
if Britain and Germany can co-operate, they will face few problems attracting France to join. Then, the ‘Big Three’ together will be very likely to achieve further institutionalisation and progress in security and defence integration in the EU, and this was why the ESDP could produce progressive developments in the early 2000s.

Traditionally, Britain and Germany have different approaches towards European integration, with concern for British–German relations being relatively limited compared to studies on Franco–German or British–French co-operation. Although there was a concern that Britain and Germany should become closer because of existing common interests and policy convergences in the EU (Bulmer, 2007; Grabbe & Munchau, 2002; Turner & Green, 2007), how they responded to the Libyan crisis signifies that the divergences between these two countries are still strong. As a result, it is important to examine whether these divergences will hinder them from further co-operation on security and defence affairs and impact upon the development of CSDP.

In order to explore the specific roles of British and German positions on the development of security and defence integration in the EU, the researcher has undertaken interviews with two British MPs, two German MdBs and one German Bundestag staff member, as follows:

- **Mr David Heathcoat-Amory**: served the Conservative Party in the House of Parliament from 1983 to 2010 and was Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for the Major Government in 1993. A 30-minute interview was undertaken on 14 July 2009 in Mr David Heathcoat-Amory’s parliamentary office in the Westminster Building, London. A record was available and Mr David Heathcoat-Amory permitted being quoted in this thesis.
Mr Paul Keetch: served the Liberal Democratic Party in the House of Parliament from 1997 to 2010 and was the Liberal Democrat spokesman for foreign affairs from 1999 to 2001 and for defence from 1999 to 2005. A 20-minute interview was undertaken on 24 November 2009 at Portcullis House, London. A record was available and Mr David Heathcoat-Amory permitted being quoted in this thesis.

Mr Andreas Henne: political assistant of security policy for Mr Bernd Siebert, who has served with the CDU/CSU in the German Bundestag from 1994 to the present. A 40-minute interview was undertaken on 25 August 2009 in Mr Andreas Henne’s parliamentary office in Berlin. A record was available and Mr Andreas Henne permitted being quoted in this thesis.

Mr Rainer Arnold: has served the SPD in the German Bundestag since 1998. He has been the spokesman for the SPD on defence affairs since 2002. A 30-minute interview was undertaken on 7 September 2009 in Mr Rainer Arnold’s parliamentary office in Berlin. A record was available and Mr Rainer Arnold permitted being quoted in this thesis.

Dr Hans-Peter Bartels: has served the SPD in the German Bundestag since 1998 and is a member of the Defence Committee. A 25-minute interview was undertaken on 3 March 2010 in Dr Hans-Peter Bartels’ parliamentary office in Berlin. A record was available and Dr Hans-Peter Bartels permitted being quoted in this thesis.

1.6.3 Evaluation of the EU’s Role in the Kosovo Crisis and the Libyan Crisis

In evaluating the performance of the EU in implementing the CFSP and CSDP, this thesis will explore how the EU was involved in the 1999 Kosovo crisis and the 2011 Libyan crisis. The Kosovo crisis in this thesis specifically refers to the escalating conflicts between the Serbian Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and armed Albanians forces in Kosovo since late 1998. This case is important
not only because it became a catalyst for the EU to establish the ESDP, but also because it was the first time that Germany was actively involved in a NATO out-of-area combat mission. Accordingly, the Kosovo crisis was a turning point for both the EU and Germany.

The Libyan crisis in this thesis refers to the civil war in Libya, started in February 2011 when Libyan citizens were encouraged by protests in Egypt and Tunisia and held anti-government demonstrations to protest against the long-term dictatorship of Gaddafi, asking for political reform. Regarding this issue, the EU was unable to deploy a crisis management mission other than to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Gaddafi Government. The result showed that although the EU has developed military capability since 1999 and the Lisbon Treaty also provided a more coherent framework for enhancing the external role of the EU, the EU could neither adopt a coherent stance nor take strong action to resolve this crisis. This result also implied that NATO is still prominent in intervening in military situations.

In order to evaluate whether the EU can play an effective role in implementing the CSDP and whether an institutionalised framework of the CSDP will help the EU to implement common security and defence policy, the crisis in Kosovo and Libya will be discussed in this thesis.

1.6.4 Empirical Framework Research Methods

The empirical framework research methods in this thesis will be separated into three parts: historical analysis, documentary survey, and interviews with relevant politicians and officials. The timeline of the research will start from the 1950s when ECSC countries attempted to develop the EDC. Although the EDC was aborted eventually, it had a crucial influence upon the successive development of such
attempts. The timeline for this research will end in October 2011, when Gaddafi died.

Historical analysis is used to unfold the historical developments of the security and defence integration of the EU. This thesis will review the EU archives concerning relevant intergovernmental conferences, treaties, documents and reports that have contributed to establishing and reforming the institutional framework for this system in order to establish a historical context and evaluate its influence on this topic.

The documentary survey relies on two document types. The first-hand materials derive from policy papers, working papers and public statements by leaders, senior officials or members of parliament in Britain and Germany. The second-hand materials consist of academic work to date on this topic. A more specific literature review will be presented in Chapter 2.

Brief information about the people interviewed on this topic is given in sections 1.6.1 and 1.6.2. The following will introduce the process used to prepare for the interviews.

For the purpose of investigating the participation of Britain and Germany in security and defence integration in the EU and the operation of this system, the researcher invited British MPs, German MdBs, MEPs and senior officials of the CSDP to take part in an interview. The background of the researcher and the purpose of this thesis were stated in an invitation letter. Eleven people agreed to be interviewed, the interviews being undertaken from July 2009 to March 2010 in London, Berlin and Brussels. The invitation lists and processes are listed below.
In Britain:

- 17 MPs working on the Foreign Affairs Committee and Defence Committee and with political interests in European affairs and security issues were invited.
- Mr David Heathcoat-Amory for the Conservative Party and Mr Paul Keetch for the Liberal Democratic Party gave face-to-face interviews.
- 8 members working in the UK Permanent Representation to the EU were also invited, but none of them wished to be interviewed.

In Germany:

- 74 MdBs working on the Committee for the Affairs of the European Union, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Defence and with a political interest in European affairs and security issues, were invited.
- Mr Rainer Arnold for the SPD, Dr Hans-Peter Bartels for the SPD and Mr Bernd Siebert’s political assistant Andreas Henne for the CDU/CSU gave face-to-face interviews.
- 4 members working in Germany’s Permanent Representation to the EU were also invited, but none wished to be interviewed.

In the European Parliament:

- 34 British and German MEPs working in the Sub-Committee on Security and Defence in the Foreign Affairs Committee were invited, but none of them wished to be interviewed.
In the CSDP’s institutional bodies:

- 6 personal representatives of the CFSP High Representative were invited. Ms Riina Kionka, working as a personal representative for the SG/HR for human rights in the area of CFSP, and Dr Steven Everts, working as a personal representative for the SG/HR for Energy Policy, gave face-to-face interviews.
- 17 senior officials in the Policy Unit of Departments attached to the Secretary-General/High Representative were invited. Ms Reis Alda Silveira, head of the unit for political and defence capabilities, gave a face-to-face interview.
- 18 senior officials in the Security Policy Unit in the European Commission were invited. Mr Pierre Séailles, policy co-ordinator from the security policy unit of the European Commission, and Mr Brian Toll, programme manager for CFSP operations in the European Commission, consented to phone interviews.
- 12 military staff in the EUMC, EUMS, and EU civil and military planning cell were invited. An anonymous senior staff of civil–military cell gave a face-to-face interview.
- Three chief executives from the European defence agency were invited, but none of them consented to being interviewed.
- The director of the European Union Institute for security studies and the commander of the civilian planning and conduct capability were also invited, but neither wished to be interviewed.

The interview questions were all open questions and were designed to investigate the interviewees’ personal experiences of participating in the decision-making process within their own countries or in the EU. The interview questions can be separated into three:
• General questions which aimed at capturing interviewees’ perceptions and interpretations about the institutionalised framework of the CSDP.
• Evaluative questions which aimed at investigating how interviewees recognised the performance of the CSDP.
• Personal prospect questions which aimed at investigating the expectations of the interviewees in terms of whether they had a blueprint to improve an ideal institutional framework for the CSDP and achieve further security and defence integration in the EU.

Most of the interviewees asked to finish within 20–25 minutes, and in most cases, they were not able to answer all the questions. If they did not have enough time to answer all the questions, the general questions were prioritised. The results of the interviews will be analysed using a qualitative method of analysis, according to the content and context of each interviewee’s answers.

1.7 Thesis Contribution

The previous sections describe the current literature on the topic of European security, but the current literature lacks a comprehensive study on the historical developments of security and defence integration in the EU and the effect upon member states. Besides, existing academic works rarely compare the roles of Britain and Germany when analysing British–German relations in this process. Moreover, since the Libyan crisis only happened last year, it still lacks detailed academic references.
Therefore, this thesis aims to fill in the gap in existing academic references by exploring the historical developments of an institutionalised framework for security and defence integration in the EU and examining the participation of Britain and Germany in this process, as well as their participation in Kosovo and in Libyan crisis.

The contributions of this thesis can be clarified in four ways.

Firstly, it provides a historical institutionalism perspective in order to comprehensively explain the developments of security and defence integration in the EU. This investigation forms a fundamental basis for explaining how the process of institutionalisation is shaped by member states and how member states are affected by the result of institutionalisation.

Secondly, this thesis also accentuates intergovernmental factors in this process. As both the effect of institutionalisation and the dominant role played by member states cannot be ignored, this thesis utilises a methodology that incorporates historical institutionalism and intergovernmentalism to explain the mutual influence between member states and institutional developments associated with security and defence integration by the EU.

Thirdly, the interviews provide first-hand information to illustrate the attitudes of member states towards the relevant institutional developments, as well as direct personal experiences of personal working in the EU for the implementation of common security and defence policy.

Fourthly, the research on the Kosovo and Libyan cases provides more substantial and recent evidence about how the performances of the EU in the situations of crisis management and how member states take part in the decision-making process. This
research will also provide evaluations and suggestions for further developments to achieve a more integrated security and defence policy in the EU.

1.8 Thesis Overview

This thesis consists of eight chapters. The remaining chapters can be briefly described as follows.

Chapter 2 is a literature review that examines the results of present studies in relation to the research targets of this thesis, and evaluates their achievements in order to support and refine the objectives of this thesis.

Chapter 3 tackles the historical development of the security and defence integration of the EU by separating this historical process into five stages: (1) the EDC in the 1950s, (2) the EPC from 1970 to 1990, (3) the CFSP in the early 1990s, (4) the ESDP since 1999, and (5) the reform on the CSDP since 2009. By reviewing the historical process, this thesis will explore the factors driving and changing this process.

Chapter 4 presents the British case. This chapter will describe how Britain participates in EU security and defence integration and examine its influence in this process.

Chapter 5 presents the German case. This chapter describes how Germany has transformed itself from a semi-sovereignty position to a leading member in the EU
through taking part in European integration, and examines the role of Germany in the development of EU security and defence integration.

Chapter 6 examines the Kosovo case. It investigates the process of implementing the CFSP mechanisms to resolve this crisis, and evaluates the effectiveness of the CFSP mechanisms in the case.

Chapter 7 describes the Libyan case. It also investigates the participation of EU institutional actors, Britain and Germany, in implementing the CSDP mechanisms in resolving this crisis and evaluates the effectiveness of this case.

Chapter 8 concludes the research results about the British and German roles in the developments of common security and defence policy, evaluates the impact of institutionalisation on the future development of the security and defence integration of the EU, and describes future work.
CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

In order to clarify basic notions and understand academic investigations of this topic to date, this literature review will present the findings of current studies, and examine how current literature resolves the following three questions:

- What does the notion ‘institutionalisation’ mean?
- How should we understand the developments of common security and defence policy in the EU?
- How do member states play their roles in this process?

The first question emerged from the concern about how institutions matter in the political process. Competitive perspectives provide understanding about the effect of institutions upon the behaviours of actors and help to form the fundamental basis that underpins the theoretical framework of this thesis.

The second question originates from the concern about what factors are fundamental in driving the developments of common security and defence policy in the EU, and whether the experiences derived from the EDC, EPC and CFSP before the establishment of the ESDP have an effect upon the developments. Clarifying the factors driving this process will contribute to building an analytical background to explain the long-term historical developments of security and defence integration in the EU.
The third question arises from the concern about how national governments regard European integration and then shape their policies to take part in this project, especially in accordance with the developments of EU security and defence integration. Relevant research will contribute to understanding the input from member states in this process.

2.2 Conceptualising ‘Institution’ and ‘Institutionalisation’

As a theoretical approach to balance a behaviour-oriented perspective in political science and comparative politics studies in the 1950s and 1960s, and to emphasise the influence of collective institutions upon the behaviours of individuals and political processes, new institutionalism has been revived in academic communities since the 1980s.

2.2.1 Discriminating between Old Institutionalism and New Institutionalism

Although they emerge from similar interests in institutions, old institutionalism and new institutionalism concern different research targets. On the one hand, old institutionalism is applied popularly to comparative politics studies and has a specific focus on formal government institutions and laws. Formal institutions and legal frameworks are their main targets. Consequently, old institutionalism provides an approach dealing with legalism, structuralism, holism, historical factors and normative analyses (Peters, 2005, pp. 6–11). On the other hand, to balance the behaviouralism perspective, new institutionalism has been proposed to reaffirm the impact of collective actions. Therefore, compared to that of behaviouralism, the
research emphasis of new institutionalism is on the ‘collective’ rather than the ‘individual’, and compared to old institutionalism, new institutionalism has a more flexible definition of ‘institution’.

New institutionalism raises concerns about institutions, but is not an exclusive approach in political science studies. As was mentioned in the Chapter 1, besides the subject of political science, the new institutionalism approach is also popularly applied to other social science subjects, such as international relations, economics and sociology. However, although new institutionalism raises concerns about institutions, collective entities and common activities, it neither aims to make normative suggestions about political processes nor has theoretical preferences towards specific political issues and forms of co-operation. Theoretically speaking, the new institutionalism approach can be applied to general research topics which have institutional implications. The re-emergence of new institutionalism can be considered an echo of the call by the behavioural revolution for systematic and scientific research approaches, and provides a balanced perspective to accentuate the role of institutions in political processes.

2.2.2 Defining ‘Institution’ and ‘Institutionalisation’

Regarding how institutions matter, it is important to identify what ‘institution’ and ‘institutionalisation’ mean. In political science, the literal meaning of ‘institutionalisation’ refers to dense institutions in a space or region, with the EU considered an area of high institutionalisation (Choi & Caporaso, 2002, pp. 492–493; Gourevitch, 2002, p. 309). Institutionalisation is also defined by Shmuel Eisenstadt in terms of norms, sanctions and organisations being set up as a basis for a large and complex variety of social situations where policies are upheld and applied (cited in Bandelj, 2008, p. 66). Moreover, according to research on political parties, Steven Levitsky discerns that there are three phenomena that can be used to identify
whether institutionalisation occurs: (1) whether electoral organisations become stable, (2) whether values are infused via expanding organisations, and (3) whether rules and procedures within organisations are routinised (Levitsky, 2003, pp. 15–16). According to these definitions, institutionalisation can be referred to as a phenomenon where institutions are centralised in a geopolitical area or a political system that may have an effect on maintaining a stable environment for actors. Of course, how to identify whether the process of institutionalisation is happening largely depends on how an institution is defined.

The term ‘new institutionalism’ is introduced by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. March and Olsen argue that the emphasis on the relative autonomy of political institutions should become the basis for theoretical research to help understand modern politics (March & Olsen, 1984). They consider ‘formal organisations’ and ‘institutions of law and bureaucracy’ as the major actors in modern economic and political systems, and indicate that there is an increasing literature on legislatures, public policymaking, local governments, political entities, nation states and corporatism (ibid., pp. 734–735). Although March and Olsen do not have a specific definition of ‘institution’, their research has an implication for governmental institutions and formal organisations.

The general definition of ‘institution’ is firstly provided by Douglass North, who argues that ‘institutions’ are seen as ‘rules of the game’ of a particular social group, or ‘a set of norms’ to shape behaviour in a social space; therefore institution can define and condition the choices of individuals (North, 1990, p. 3). North’s definition expands the concern of institutionalists to any collective forms that can affect or shape individual behaviours, which has inspired research on the impact of such collective forms upon political outcomes.
Regarding different interests and understanding how institutions matter, there are different schools of new institutionalism. Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor firstly divide diverse arguments on new institutionalism into historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Although they have similar concerns about the impact of institution in political processes, the three schools of new institutionalism define ‘institution’ slightly differently:

- **Rational choice institutionalism**: Rational choice institutionalism research arises from the study of American congressional behaviour and pays more attention to ‘cross-national coalition behaviour, the development of political institutions and the intensity of ethnic conflict’ (Hall & Taylor, ibid., p. 944). Moreover, the rule-bound interactions also encourage individuals to form formal rules and systems (Rosamond, 2000, p. 115). Therefore, the research targets of rational choice institutionalism concentrate on how formal and governmental entities emerge from rational calculations of actors on the basis of a particular purpose, and examine whether institution can meet that purpose. Therefore, institutions will not definitively continue to develop, and they are likely to either succeed or fail.

- **Sociological institutionalism**: Sociological institutionalism breaks down the conceptual divide between ‘institution’ and ‘culture’ and presents the broadest definition among the three schools of an ‘institution’. An institution is defined to indicate ‘not just formal rules, procedures or norms, but the symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide the “frames of meaning” guiding human action’ (Scott, 1994, cited in Hall & Taylor, ibid., p. 947). This definition leads sociological institutionalism research to focus more attention on the cultural and normative dimensions of institutional influence.
• *Historical institutionalism*: Historical institutionalism defines an ‘institution’ as ‘formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity or political economy’ (Hall & Taylor, ibid., p. 938). The definition of an ‘institution’ presented by historical institutionalists is a result of compromise between rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, because the importance of informal rules is admitted but the definition of institution mainly refers to tangible rules or procedures in political systems.

According to different definitions of ‘institution’, the three new institutionalist schools have distinct perspectives in interpreting ‘how institutions matter’. Rational choice institutionalists adopt a hypothesis that human behaviour is based on strategic and rational calculation, arguing that institutions provide a platform for individuals to evaluate the costs and risks of interactions. Accordingly, Hall and Taylor conclude four contributions that the theoretical approach of rational choice institutionalism has made: giving a set of behavioural assumptions that argue that individuals always seek to maximise interests and depend on benefit–cost calculations; alleviating collective action dilemmas in politics; shaping the rational calculations of individuals by providing information and enforcement mechanisms; and explaining how institutions originate from voluntary agreements made by individuals (ibid., pp. 944–945).

Rather than focusing on rational choice thinking, sociological institutionalists accentuate the cultural dimensions of an institution and argue that it provides a moral and cognitive background against which individuals form ideas and beliefs. Hall and Taylor also identified three contributions made by the theoretical framework of sociological institutionalism, including redefining ‘culture’ itself as an institution, borrowing the notion from social constructivism and then illustrating how institutions are able to construct the identities of preferences and interests, and
also applying the idea of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘social appropriateness’ to explain the origins of and changes to institutions (ibid., pp. 947–950). Taking the concept of ‘communicative action’ introduced by Jürgen Habermas, a scholar of the Frankfurt School, as an example, actions by participators are oriented through their acts of understanding, instead of through egocentric calculations of success (Habermas, 1981, cited in Risse, 2000, p. 9). Accordingly, dialogues between actors can be a basis for negotiation in the EU, with progress becoming more likely if actors share a common worldview. By stressing the cultural factors behind an institution, sociological institutionalism arguments provide an alternative to explain under what conditions institutions can maintain long-term developments.

Historical institutionalists, accepting the concepts suggested by rational choice institutionalists and sociological institutionalists, and following historical analyses, contend that history is driven by the developments and practices of institutions. The idea of ‘path dependence’, which applies the physical notion of ‘inertia’, explains why individuals in political processes prefer to follow existing institutions and patterns, rather than creating others. This idea is proposed by North to explain how the force of ‘inertia’ leads individuals to maintain their participation in an existing institution, instead of changing or abolishing it (North, ibid.).

Paul Pierson develops the idea of ‘path dependence’ to explain why institutional development has a persistent characteristic, arguing that the decisions made in the past will have a ‘lock-in’ effect upon the choices made in the future, as well as locking individuals into a special policy development route (Pierson, 1993, 1996, 2000). Historical institutionalists also indicate another feature emerging from institutional developments, called the ‘unanticipated consequence’. This refers to a scenario where ‘the short-term preoccupations of institutional designers have led them to make decisions that undermined long-term member-state control’ (Pierson,
These notions are applied to explain how institutions maintain persistent and stable developments through a long-term historical process.

There are other new institutionalism schools, based on different research concerns. Besides those mentioned above, Guy Peters presents another two, namely normative institutionalism and empirical institutionalism. The former emphasises the normative effect of an institution, while the latter focuses on the impact of governmental institutions upon individuals (Peters, 2005). Moreover, there also exist: actor-centred institutionalism to supplement current structure-oriented discussions (Scharpf, 1997); constructivist institutionalism to explain the innovation, evolution and transformation of institutions (Hay, 2008); network institutionalism to examine how networks shape stable and recurring patterns of behaviours (Ansell, 2008); and feminist institutionalism that emphasises gender factors within institutions (Mackay & Waylen, 2009). The arguments of the different new institutionalism schools illustrate the variety of dimensions associated with institutions and provide distinct understandings about how institutions affect political behaviours and processes.

In summary, different new institutionalisms share a similar basis, that institution has an impact on political processes. Since this thesis concentrates on the influence of the institutionalisation process upon the development of EU security and defence integration, a theoretical approach which emphasises historical factors and considers institutional developments as a persistent and stable process will be a more appropriate approach to explain the research targets of this thesis. Accordingly, historical institutionalism perspectives which have similar concerns with the impact of historical process upon institutional developments are an ideal approach for this thesis.
2.2.3 The Theoretical Approach of Historical Institutionalism Being Applied to Study the EU

The historical institutionalism approach has been applied to the research of European integration and explains why the EU has achieved massive progress on the process of institutional developments. As has been argued, institutional developments have their own historical path, making it difficult for individuals to control or dominate the institutionalisation process. By placing the development of European integration in a larger historical environment and considering this development as a historical process, a theoretical approach that emphasises historical factors may usefully investigate how institutions and institutionalisation affect the progress of European integration and the connections between member states and EU institutions. Research by Anil Awesti, Simon J. Bumer, J. Jupille and J. A. Caporaso, Paul Pierson and Michael E. Smith on this topic has provided the inspiration to tackle this study.

Simon J. Bumer applies a perspective of historical institutionalism and comparative public policy to study how the EU shapes the model of governance (Bulmer, 1994). He is attracted by the rapid growth of institutions in the EU since the mid-1980s, arguing that there is a multi-tiered system emerging in Europe. Bulmer’s research offers a framework of governance regimes by analysing policy-specific or sub-system levels in the EU. He then classifies the distinction between institutions of governance and instruments of governance in the EU in order to distinguish effects that EU institutions may have through different institutional mechanisms. By reviewing the overall institutional framework of the EU and analysing the diverse features of EU institutions, Bulmer’s work confirms that an institutional analysis can appropriately be applied to study the EU.
Jupille and Caporaso also suggest applying the institutionalism approach to EU studies. They distinguish two dimensions of institutional analysis to identify different institutionalist approaches in a fourfold classification. Federalism, spatial analysis and network approaches are classified in the same category with the focus of exogenous institutions and preferences; the rational institutional choice approach concerns endogenous institutions but exogenous preferences; the sociological new institutionalism argument concerns endogenous preferences but exogenous institutions; the structurationism argument considers that both institutions and preferences are endogenous (Jupille & Caporaso, 1999). Jupille and Caporaso’s research contributes to clarifying different institutionalism approaches by reviewing how these approaches define institutions and explain individual behaviours, as well as guaranteeing the legitimacy and appropriateness of applying an institutional analysis to study the EU.

Moreover, Anil Awesti applies an institutionalist perspective to explain how multi-level governance in the EU challenges inter-governmental policy-making (Awesti, 2007). Awesti argues that an analysis of multi-level governance contributes to capturing ‘the institution-dependent nature of polycentric governing in the EU’, and also views the EU as a political system instead of a process of integration; the structure of the EU is therefore considered to be a stable factor in a multi-actor environment (ibid, pp. 2, 5). Moreover, he argues that a historical institutionalist analysis can contribute to explaining how multi-level governance is derived from a process of path dependency, which may deviate from the initial objectives of member states (ibid., pp. 14–15). Awesti’s research identifies the presence of multi-level governance in the EU and also stresses the significance of an institutionalist approach when studying the EU.

Furthermore, applying the notion of ‘historical’, Pierson also applies a historical institutionalism analysis to explain the historical path of development in the EU.
(Pierson, 1996). He argues that political processes and developments are embedded in institutions. Accordingly, he focuses on the long-term consequences of institutional developments and considers it difficult for individual actors to control the entire institutional evolution. Although Pierson considers that member states are usually restrained by path dependence and the unintended consequences of this process in the historical development of the EU, especially in the part of the EC, he does not deny the role of member states. Actually, Pierson admits that member states are still decisive in initiating institutions, but he also highlights the fact that the complex agendas of shared decision-making in the EU undermine exclusive control of member states.

Concerning political integration in the EU, Michael E. Smith provides an inspiration to understand the process of institutionalisation from the EPC to the CFSP (M. E. Smith, 2004a, 2004b). By reviewing the development of the EPC becoming CFSP, Michael Smith argues that co-operation in the field of foreign affairs has been changed from ‘a defensive or passive approach’ to ‘a more positive, proactive one’ (ibid., 2004a, pp. 3–5), and the reason member states agree to break the ‘taboos’ (such as security issues) depends on a long-term process of ‘progressive adaptation in the midst of continuity’ (ibid., 2004b). By reviewing the process of institutionalisation from the EPC to the CFSP, Michael Smith concludes that EU member states become used to co-ordinating their foreign policy and taking joint action via policy adaptation of the EPC and the CFSP practices (ibid., 2004a, p. 123). Michael Smith’s research examines the impact of institutionalisation on the EPC and CFSP, so its analytical framework is an important reference to explain how the institutionalisation of European foreign policy affects EU member states in tackling common foreign affairs.

To summarise, the studies mentioned above not only provide a fundamental basis for identifying diverse focuses of different institutionalist approaches, but they also offer important background knowledge for studying the EU using an institutionalist
perspective. In particular, the literature reviewed in this section has identified the institutional characteristics of the EU and is fundamental for follow-up studies derived from an institutionalist perspective when studying the EU. Although there is little literature regarding the affairs of EU security and defence integration, some notions and analytical frameworks proposed by the current literature are important for this thesis in order to discern the role and impact of EU institutions on this topic.

2.2.4 A Reflection on the Intergovernmental Perspective to Supplement Institutional Analysis Used to Study the EU

The literature on new institutionalism provides a distinct perspective for researchers to consider how institutional dimensions affect individual behaviours and political outcomes, and indeed institutional actors sometimes have superior influence in some policy areas in the EU, especially in Community affairs. However, in the field of security and defence affairs, or regarding internal issues of member states, EU supranational actors do not have much capacity to intervene. Because this thesis investigates the developments of EU security and defence integration where member states are maintaining rather independent sovereignty to conduct the process of institutional developments and policy-making, intergovernmental factors shall be taken into account.

The most notable concern of intergovernmentalists about the development of the EU comes from the liberal intergovernmentalist Andrew Moravcsik. In arguing states are actors and are rational, Moravcsik considers that European integration is a result of a series of rational choices by member states (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009, pp. 68–69). He also argues that the reason states create an institution is based on the consideration of a rational choice about whether an institution can contribute to reaching a ‘collectively superior outcome’ and reducing uncertainty in the behaviours and preferences of states in the future (ibid., p. 72). Since an institution
can provide an ‘information-rich’ environment to reduce the transaction costs associated with transnational co-operation, states will voluntarily participate in intergovernmental bargaining (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 498).

Therefore, Moravcsik does not deny the importance of institution since institution is a result of rational choice by member states, and even admits historical institutionalism can validly explain the occurrence of unintended consequences (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, ibid., p.75). Although intergovernmentalism and institutionalism may be considered to be impossibly united (Puchala, 1999, p. 330), Moravcsik argues that it is still possible to synthesise the liberal institutionalism and historical institutionalism arguments, since both of them share rationalist foundations and historical institutionalism can be an extension of liberal institutionalism rather than an alternative to it (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, ibid., p. 84). This perspective is supported in another way by Michael Smith when he argues that intergovernmentalism should be supplemented by insights into institutionalism (M. E. Smith, 2004a, p. 64).

Indeed, intergovernmentalism and institutionalism perspectives can emphasise different dimensions of the EU and should be supplementary to each other. For example, Wolfgang Wagner applies an institutionalist perspective to explain the intergovernmental framework of the CFSP (Wagner, 2003). He argues that because the CFSP field involves co-ordination and co-operation among member states, there is little need for a supranational institutional framework; on the contrary, an intergovernmental framework with qualified majority voting is more acceptable for the purpose. Moreover, placing European integration within a long-term historical process, Wagner presents how member states share authority with EU supranational actors in order to gain benefits from collective actions and common policies.
To understand developments in EU security and defence integration, both institutional and intergovernmental factors are crucial to help explain this process and its impact. By introducing and reviewing literature on new institutionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism focusing on the EU, a theoretical analytical background for this thesis may be provided.

2.3 Approaching Security and Defence Integration in the EU

The literature review in this section aims to understand how current studies define developments in European common security and defence policy and whether the experiences of learning from the past before the establishment of the ESDP offer insights into the developments of the ESDP and CSDP. Since European countries do not follow the neo-realist John J. Mearsheimer’s prediction about viewing each other as threats which hinder the progress of co-operation after the end of the Cold War (Mearsheimer, 1990, pp. 47-48), but accelerate the expansion of the EU to more political affairs, including security, it is sensible to clarify the factors that drive this process. This will contribute to building an analytical framework and to exploring the empirical background to explain the long-term historical developments associated with EU security and defence integration.

The literature review in this section will undertake three issues in turn: (1) how current literature investigates how an initial institutionalised framework for EU security and defence integration has been built since the establishment of the CFSP; (2) how relevant research examines the attempt of the EU to consolidate a common security and defence policy; and (3) how these studies evaluate the impact of the ESDP/CSDP. The literature review provides a more factual picture for understanding
the historical trajectory associated with developing security and defence integration of the EU.

2.3.1 Understanding the External Ambition of the EU via the Formation of the CFSP

Studies regarding the political integration of the EU have increased gradually in line with the institutional developments of the CFSP, ESDP and CSDP, seeing significant progress since the 1990s. Besides Michael E. Smith’s work mentioned above, Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan also introduce the overall historical developments and institutional frameworks of the CFSP and argue that the CFSP has built a multi-pillar and multilevel system with complicated multilocalional networks to connect member states and EU institutions (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008).

John Peterson and Helene Sjursen collect critical perspectives to examine whether the CFSP is able to underpin the EU so as to be a global actor (Peterson & Sjursen, 1998a). Although, since the establishment of the ESDP in 1999, the EU has gradually strengthened security and defence dimensions, some of their perspectives are still valid for explaining the shortfall of the CSDP. For example, the notion of a capabilities–expectations gap, proposed by Christopher Hill (1998) and developed by John Peterson (1998) in this book, still exists in the CSDP today and hinders the EU from tackling military and defence issues. In the Conclusion chapter, although Sjursen argues that the CFSP may become ‘a pivotal dimension’ in which member states of the EU can define foreign policies, Peterson indicates that none of the authors in this book considers the EU has a ‘truly common or comprehensive foreign policy’ (Peterson & Sjursen, 1998b, pp. 169, 178–179). Take the crisis in Libya as an example. Because the EU was unable to form a coherent position about whether to intervene militarily, it showed that, even with a more institutionalised framework of
the CSDP after the Lisbon Treaty, sometimes EU member states are still unable to overcome divergences.

Regarding the criticism that the EU is unable to speak with one voice, David Allen argues that the biggest obstruction comes from member states because they intend to preserve their authority in making foreign policy (Allen, 1998). Moreover, Sjursen argues that owing to internal divisions, and a lack of commitment towards additional defence budgets and concerning the relationship with America, EU member states do not have a strong political will to develop a security and defence policy for the EU (Sjursen, 1998). Although these perspectives were proposed in 1998, the problems identified still remain unresolved in the CSDP today. It is because member states still reserve rather independence to take part in the CSDP. Besides, EU countries are not willing to increase defence spending, especially when the Eurozone crisis was emerging. Moreover, the transatlantic alliance is still a crucial factor affecting the development of military capabilities of the EU.

Elke Krahmann, Hylke Dukstra and Stephan Keukeleire’s studies concern the more specific institutional dimension of the CFSP. Concerning the multi-centric decision-making process emerging from the establishment of the CFSP and the possibility of developing a multi-level theory, Krahmann examines different multi-level approaches to studying European foreign policy (Krahmann, 2003). This research offers a quantitative measurement of political pressure in order to theorise the multilevel network approach when studying European foreign policy. By concentrating on the inter-institutional relations between the Commission and the EU Council Secretariat, Dukstra argues that although the overall relationship between the two institutions is co-operative, the differences between them inevitably undermine the consistency and effectiveness of the EU to cope with foreign affairs (Dukstra, 2009). Moreover, Keukeleire reviews different aspects of EU diplomacy and argues that the establishment of the ESDP is important to achieve an
effective and credible foreign policy structure (Keukeleire, 2003). All these studies support a more institutionalised framework if the EU attempts to strengthen security and defence dimensions in common policies.

2.3.2 Interpreting the Security Role of the EU

There are some studies that focus more specifically on the development of the ESDP, and raise concerns about how the EU develops a military role and how we should evaluate this role. Regarding the development of a military role for the EU, Anthony King reviews armed forces interactions between Britain, France and Germany and the EU, using a constructivist perspective to argue that a common European military culture is emerging (King, 2006). King argues that by participating in ESDP missions, member states can form common views of a threat and enhance collective will (King, 2005). However, the Libya case signifies that only if member states have common political will towards the same issue would a CSDP mission be launched.

Regarding whether the EU will develop an ethnic discourse to support the ambition of developing common security and defence, Alyson J. K. Bailes suggests that instead of adorning itself with too much normative motivation, the EU should have a more blunt determination and become a real collective defence community (Bailes, 2008). However, member states may not be ready to adopt a strong military role for the EU. For example, Tommi Koivula considers that the development of crisis management capability inevitably enhances a military ethos of the EU, but member states are not fully committed to such a role; therefore, progress in strengthening the military dimension of the ESDP has been limited (Koivula, 2009).

Anne Deighton agrees that the development of a military role in the EU requires an appropriate culture and institutions, but she also considers that such developments largely depend on the political will of member states and the attitude of America
Simon Duke has an even more critical attitude towards the development of the ESDP. Reviewing the unsuccessful experiences of the EDC, Fouchet Plan and the WEU, Duke discusses the diversity of national industries, strategic orientations between member states and unavoidable pressure from America, with the EU being unlikely to achieve its ambition of developing autonomous security and defence capabilities (Duke, 2000).

Although whether to strengthen the military dimension of common security and defence policy in the EU is still controversial, most studies admit the necessity for shaping a more definite security strategy for such policy.

Regarding the possibility of the EU shaping a security strategy, there are popular discussions in the current literature. Sven Bishop and Jan Joel Andersson amass perspectives to examine how the European Security Strategy (ESS, published by the Council in 2003) would assist the EU to tackle new security challenges in a new security environment (Bishop & Andersson, 2008). The ESS is considered to help codify the strategic orientation of the ESDP/CSDP (Bishop, 2008a), enable the EU to define new security threats and enhance a security role (Haine, 2008), support the EU to achieve effective multilateralism in the UN (Gowan, 2008), and underpin the neighbourhood policy of the EU (Danneruther, 2008). Also, the ESS would form a crucial basis for the EU to develop military capabilities (Howorth, 2008) and a common framework through which to negotiate strategic issues with other countries or organisations (Andersson, 2008).

Although the ESS envisages comprehensive elements that the EU requires to develop an effective and efficient ESDP/CSDP, there are few shortfalls in the ESS. For example, the suggestion for the development of strategic partnerships with Japan, China, Canada and India does not make sense (Menotti & Francesca, 2008) and the ESS does not provide mechanisms to improve a more co-ordinated transatlantic
relationship (Kelleher, 2008). Moreover, Asle Toje indicates that the EU is putting by
its ambition of being a great power and returning to multilateralism by reviewing the

Nevertheless, the necessity for and the possibility of developing a consolidated
security strategic culture still exist. It is argued that because the EU is firming up its
crisis management core via the CSDP, the convergence of military institutions of
member states is emerging even though member states still have different national
strategic cultures (Vennesson, Breuer, Franco & Schroeder, 2009). By offering a
comprehensive introduction to the origin, institutional framework and achievements
of the ESDP, Jolyon Howorth also considers that the EU could potentially shape a
strategic culture via the ESDP because such a strategic culture enables supporting
the EU to define and tackle challenges (Howorth, 2007).

Besides the military dimension, there are few discussions regarding the civilian
dimensions of the CSDP. Developing a civilian dimension in the ESDP and CSDP is a
distinctive feature of the EU, but Karen E. Smith argues that the EU will not be called
a civilian power only because it has civilian instruments to fulfil common security and
defence policy; therefore, she considers that the focus will be on what the EU does
instead of what the EU is (K. E. Smith, 2000, 2005). Actually, the EU is working on
co-ordinating military and civilian dimensions in the CSDP after the Lisbon Treaty,
although divergences between member states are still difficult to overcome (Aldis &
Drent, 2008). Concerning how the EU undertakes crisis management via civil–military
co-ordination after the Lisbon Treaty, Nick Hynek considers that the Lisbon Treaty
has provided an effective decision-making procedure and steady leadership for
implementing the CSDP; however, he nevertheless admits the political will of
member states is still the most crucial factor in implementing this system (Hynek,
2011).
According to the literature review in this section, we can conclude that the lack of political will and the diversity of national interests among member states are the two main factors that hinder the EU from forming a coherent common security and defence policy. Although most the literature affirms the emergence of a security strategy or a strategic culture in the EU, via the ESDP or the CSDP, there are competing perspectives on whether the EU should continue to enhance its military role.

2.3.3 Considering the CSDP and the Transatlantic Relationship

The transatlantic relationship occupies an important dimension for European countries when they are considering developing self-security capabilities. American military protection and NATO provided an indispensable assurance for Europe during the Cold War and still have an important role in maintaining security and stability in the world. As a result, developing self-security capabilities in Europe will unavoidably raise concern about whether this determination affects American willingness to defend Europe. As a result, it is also important to take NATO and America issues into consideration in studying EU security and defence integration.

Literature regarding the EU and NATO is abundant. Robert E. Hunter, serving as a US ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998, provides a personal suggestion that the US government should have a more positive attitude towards the ESDP because a close US–EU relationship will contribute to founding NATO–ESDP co-operation and developing a strategic partnership (Hunter, 2002). Rockwell A. Schnabel also applies his empirical experience of being the US Ambassador to the EU from 2001 to 2005, suggesting that Americans pay more attention to the development of the CFSP and ESDP, even though he also calls for more burden-sharing from the EU to defend Europe (Schnabel & Rocca, 2005).
Similarly, Alexander Moens also considers a co-operative relationship between the EU and NATO is possible. Applying a governance perspective, Moens evaluates the impact of the ESDP upon EU–NATO relations and suggests that these two institutions have to tackle some procedures, including decision-making procedures, rules for planning and operations, and the allocation of shared assets, in order to achieve good governance for both NATO and the EU (Moens, 2001).

Other studies share the perspective that the EU will develop more credible capability to enhance the transatlantic alliance (d'Argenson, 2009; Gompert & Larrabee, 1997; Hensel, 2000; S. Hoffmann, 2009; Kagan, 2003). Although Howorth argues that the debate on ‘out of area’ missions by NATO and the development of military forces for the EU may inevitably result in tensions between America and Europe (Howorth, 2003), Bishop maintains that this will not be a zero-sum result since America will have a more capable partner with which to share its burden, which it has demanded for a long time (Bishop, 2008b).

Regarding the EU’s problem of low deployability of ESDP missions, Bishop also suggests that the EU should have a defence transformation via ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’, an achievement that could also become an EU pillar underpinning NATO (Bishop, ibid.). Actually, the lack of military capability and sufficient contributions to defence budgets has been complained about by the former US Secretary of Defence Roberts Gates. By arguing that only five out of twenty eight member states in NATO (America, Britain, France, Greece and Albania) exceed the agreed 2.0 per cent of GDP spending on defence, Gates has called for European countries to resolve this issue of lacking will and defence spending on developing military capabilities (Gates, 2011). Indeed, if the EU has an ambition to be capable of coping with security and defence affairs in the international scene, it will have to make corresponding contributions to defence budgets.
In summary, most studies agree on the significance of such an effort, and consider that the development of common security and defence policy should contribute to a more balanced transatlantic partnership between Europe and America. As a result, the CSDP should be considered a positive stimulus to the transatlantic alliance and support for NATO.

2.4 Evaluating the Participation of Member States

Since the EPC, CFSP, ESDP and CSDP are all developed on an intergovernmental basis, it is crucial to understand how EU member states participate in this process and how they conduct and shape such developments. As this thesis has selected Britain and Germany as case studies, the literature review in this section will focus especially on British and German roles on this topic.

2.4.1 The Issue of Member States Developing the CFSP and CSDP

Discussions of the role of member states in the ESDP or CSDP largely concentrate on the relations between Britain, France and Germany, especially on the Franco-German axis and British–French co-operation. This is not only because Britain, France and Germany are the three major powers in world economic and political affairs but also because they are the largest contributors to EU expenditure. It is recognised that if these three countries can co-operate with each other on the implementation of common security and defence policy, the EU can become more capable of tackling relevant affairs (Hynek, 2011; King, 2005). However, it is worth noting that Germany is usually criticised for its spending of a low percentage of its GDP on defence budgets. Since the mid-1990s, Germany has not spent over 2.0 per
cent of its annual GDP on defence, which is the NATO target; in 2010, Germany only spent 1.4 per cent of its annual GDP on defence, while Britain spent 2.7 per cent and France 2.0 per cent (Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries 1990–2010, in NATO Archive, 2011). A noticeable difference is that the latter two are above the NATO target. This demonstrates that although all three countries are important contributors to EU budgets, Germany does not have as strong a commitment as Britain and France to defence. This difference will be taken into consideration concerning German participation in security and defence integration in the EU.

Concerning the indispensable role of the three countries in European integration, Frederic Merand investigates how military officers in Britain, France and Germany view the development of European defence capabilities, concluding that their opinions are important factors supporting the development of European armed forces (Merand, 2003). Although Josef Janning argues that Britain, France and Germany can be a core coalition to promote common defence in the EU (Janning, 2005), there is not much evidence that the current Conservative–Lib Dem coalition Government in Britain is interested in such a coalition. Regarding this, Charlotte Wagnsson challenges the idea of ‘the EU being a normative power’, arguing that because the major European powers have strong individual ambitions, the EU has difficulty taking rapid and concerted actions during international crises (Wagnsson, 2010).

Some studies have focused on the Franco–German axis (Bloch-Laine, 1999; Cole, 2001; Endow, 2003; Mazzucelli, 1997; Pedersen, 1998; Schild, 2010; Treacher, 2002) and Franco–British co-operation (Chafer & Cumming, 2010; M. Clarke, 2000; Howorth, 2000a; Larsen, 1997). They evaluate the influence of these two co-operative coalitions concerning progress on developing security and defence capabilities in the EU. By and large, attention to the Franco–German axis comes from the long-term partnership of the two countries in driving European integration;
meanwhile, concern about British–French co-operation derives from the 1998 St Malo declaration that formed a basis for creating the ESDP.

Moreover, there is concern about the specific role of Nordic countries in contributing to the civilian dimension of common security and defence policy. Alyson Bailes, Gunilla Herolf and Bengt Sundelius provide a comprehensive investigation into the security role of Denmark, Finland and Sweden in Europe and how Nordic countries have contributed to developing capabilities for civilian crisis management and peace-building, and implementing such operations (Bailes, Herolf, & Sundelius, 2006). Peter Jakobsen also challenges the argument that Britain, France and Germany control the development of common security and defence policy in the EU, arguing that Nordic countries play a significant role in setting agendas, shaping concepts and making large contributions to the ESDP’s civilian missions (Jakobsen, 2009). Their research offers an alternative perspective on how small member states affect the development and implementation of common security and defence policy in the EU.

Compared to the Franco–German axis, British–French co-operation and the Nordic role in the ESDP and CSDP, the British–German relationship is more or less ignored. This is because traditionally Britain and Germany have different approaches towards European integration and security issues, with the connections between them not being that strong. Although policy connections between these two countries regarding the issues of European security have been indicated before (Glee, 1999; Knowles & Thomson-Pottenohm, 2004; Norman, 2004; Schweiger, 2004, 2007, pp. 81–166), since the ‘War on Terror’ against Iraq, their divergences have become more obvious than their convergences, especially on the issue of military intervention in Libya.
2.4.2 The British Role in European Integration

Britain is usually described as an ‘awkward partner’ in European integration. Although Hugo Young has conducted a historical investigation ranging from Winston Churchill to Tony Blair to explain how Britain perceives Europe, predicting that Britain will inevitably adopt the reality of aligning with European countries (H. Young, 1999), Britain still cannot get rid of the image of being ‘reluctant’, ‘awkward’ and ‘semi-detached’ in the EU. Andrew Geddes also investigates Britain’s overall historical processes of integrating with the EU, pointing out that owing to the geopolitical position of the British Isles, the tradition of maintaining a balanced foreign policy, the emergence of the Cold War and the nationalisation programme for British industries in the early 1950s, Britain did not want supranational integration in Europe at the beginning (Geddes, 2004).

There are more studies regarding the reasons behind British European policy. Stephen Wall argues that the different personalities of British prime ministers are a crucial factor influencing how Britain defines its EU policies (Wall, 2008). Andrew Gamble contends that open markets, liberal foreign trade and the special relationship with America are core values that determine British foreign policy, with these traditions also affecting British attitudes towards European integration (Gamble, 1998). By investigating domestic politics disputes over national sovereignty and European issues, Steve Ludlam (1998) and David Baker and David Seawright (1998) explain how the Conservative Party and the Labour Party have tackled the British role in European integration.

Some studies illustrate the impact of EU mechanisms upon the domestic political system in Britain. Colin Pilkington investigates how EC and EU legislation has changed the British Constitution and decision-making process on subjects such as agriculture, farming, the environment and certain social issues (Pilkington, 2001). Ian
Bache and Andrew Jordan also review some works regarding the occurrence of Europeanisation in British domestic politics (Bache & Jordan, 2006), including examining how involvement in European integration has impacted upon the way the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) operates (Allen & Oliver, 2006a) and illustrating why Europeanisation does not change the British stance against the supranational integration of foreign affairs (Allen & Oliver, 2006b).

On the basis of a concern that Britain should drive defence co-operation in the EU, Clara Marina O'Donnell considers that such co-operation will help Britain achieve ‘cost-effectiveness of its defence procurement’ and make Europe become a more serious partner for an Atlantic alliance (O'Donnell, 2009). O'Donnell, although indicating that the present Conservative–Lib Dem Government is more interested in enhancing bilateral co-operation with France than with the whole Union because Britain and France have similar defence budgets and military ambitions (2010a, 2010c), also warns that this intention may undermine the efforts of the EU on defence (2010b).

These competitive perspectives provide various interpretations of British European policy and the British role in European integration. Although traditionally Britain is considered a reluctant or awkward partner in Europe, the results of current studies also demonstrate that it is in Britain’s interests to enhance defence and military co-operation with European countries. No matter whether Britain adopts bilateral co-operation with specific European countries or an integrationist perspective to be more engaged in the CSDP, Britain at least aspires to seek a common approach to security and defence co-operation with Europe.
2.4.3 The German Role in European Integration

Compared to Britain, Germany is a much more engaged partner in European integration. Even after reunification, Germany still maintains its commitment to European integration. How to cope with Germany after WWII was a difficult issue, especially when confrontation between the US and USSR was escalating, when the task of reintegrating Germany into the West became more urgent. Clemens Wurm therefore reviews comprehensive illustrations of how Germany re-entered the West and took part in early European integration (Wurm, 1995c).

Wurm indicates that the ‘German problem’ and ‘the role of France’ were the two main factors launching early European integration (Wurm, 1995a). Werner Abelshauser goes a step further, analysing how the ‘German problem’ drove early European integration, arguing that German participation in the EEC was a result of a political calculation rather than an economic consideration (Abelshauser, 1995). Furthermore, Hanns Jurgen Kusters considers participation in early European integration as a means of getting rid of external controls, getting sovereignty back and regaining international recognition (Kusters, 1995). These discussions illustrate the situation that Germany had to face after WWII and explain the options that Germany had in response to the situation.

German reunification is another issue impacting upon the development of European integration. By reviewing Helmut Kohl’s foreign policy, Thomas Banchoff explains that because of the historical experience of WWII, German Chancellor Kohl viewed European integration as a question of war and peace, believing that Germany has a common fate with Europe. Banchoff also argues that, through expressing loyalty to European integration, Germany was enabled to make assurances to other countries that it would not become a threat to Europe (Banchoff, 1997). As a result, we can conclude that institution here is not only a dependent variable but also an
independent variable. On the one hand, it is utilised by Germany as a means to decrease objections against German reunification, while on the other, it embeds Germany in the framework of European integration.

Douglas Webber also attempts to explain the reason why Germany has kept its commitment to European unity after reunification. He indicates that five constant features can be discerned in German foreign policy: a peaceful and democratic inclination; a multilateralist attitude; being friendly to the neighbourhood; insisting on a democratic republic-based government; and being integrated into numerous alliances, regional and international organisations (Webber, 2001). These features formed a basic foundation underpinning the engagement of a reunited Germany with European integration.

Certain studies focus on the German policy towards military affairs and the development of the CFSP and CSDP. Adrian Hyde-Price considers that the Schröder Government utilised the opportunities arising from the 11 September 2001 attacks to ‘normalise’ the use of forces (Hyde-Price, 2003); however, by examining the attitudes of Britain, France, Germany and Poland on the use of force, he also indicates that Germany is still content to be a civilian power (2004). In order to build a balanced, multipolar order in the world, Hyde-Price suggests that Germany should exert appropriate influence consistent with its power capabilities (2007).

By comparing the competitive perspectives of Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands, Bernhard Stahl, Henning Boekle, Jorg Nadoll and Anna Jonannesdottir classify Germany as Europeanist, and with a more engaged attitude towards developing the CFSP (Stahl, Boekle, Nadoll & Jonannesdottir, 2004). That, as these authors indicate, the German public was sensitive about developing a military role is an issue which still today hinders German governments from accepting larger involvement in military operations.
Although Marco Overhaus argues that Germany is deviating from being a civilian power because of its offering support to create a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) when holding the EU presidency and supporting the War on Terror against Afghanistan, and that Germany has expressed enthusiasm over the pursuit of national interests (Overhaus, 2004), Adrian Hyde-Price (2001) and Hanns W. Maull (2000a, 2000b) consider that Germany has not changed its stance on foreign policy fundamentally. Examining German participation in military combat operations by NATO in Kosovo, they argue that such participation should be viewed as a transformation into a normal civilian power instead of developing a robust military role.

Concerning the German policy in the recent Libyan crisis, Hans Kundnani argues that Germany has transformed itself into a geo-economic power that is reluctant to use military force, but does pursue national interests using its significant economic influence (Kundnani, 2011). However, Thomas Valasek offers a different insight by arguing that German policy in the Libyan crisis is an aberration because it originates out of a domestic concern with regional elections in Germany in March 2011. Since America has announced it will place more emphasis on Asia and the Middle East than Europe, Valasek considers that Germany should and will be more engaged in military co-operation in Europe (Valasek, 2012).

The current literature demonstrates that although Germany is engaged in European integration, it is not committed enough to develop a military CSDP. As has been mentioned, German defence spending has not reached the NATO target of spending at least 2 per cent of annual GDP on defence since the mid-1990s, which signifies that Germany does not have much interest in building up military capabilities. However, since Germany is trying to transform its armed forces to become more professional and modern, it is possible to close the gap between capability and political will. Since July 2011, Germany ended the conscription and compulsory
military services and has transformed its armed forces to professional soldiers, and the Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg of the Merkel Government considered that this reform is necessary to cope with new threats and offer well-trained and educated troops for international peacekeeping missions (Dempsey, 2010). Although it is too early to assert that Germany is committed to a stronger military ambition or becoming a leading power in military affairs, this structural reform of the military system at least is closing the gap so as to fulfil Germany’s military pledge on international peacekeeping missions. Being one of the leading countries in European integration, German attitude towards security and defence integration in the EU will inevitably affect whether the EU is able to develop rapid and concerted mechanisms and respond to international crises.

2.4.4 Britain and Germany in Common Security and Defence Policy in the EU: Convergence or Divergence?

According to the survey conducted by Edward Turner and Simon Green, research concerning the relationship between Britain and Germany largely concentrates on social, fiscal and environmental policies (Turner & Green, 2007); only few studies on the British–German relationship in the CFSP and ESDP.

Generally speaking, the literature concerning the British–German relationship in common security and defence policy can be divided into two perspectives; one considers possible convergence between them, while the other focuses on their divergence. The argument for possible convergence between Britain and Germany was almost made before the effect of the ‘War on Terror’ against Iraq upon the EU and the transatlantic relationship (Bulmer, Jeffery, & Paterson, 2000; Glees, 1999). Even though their arguments do not explain the current British–German relationship, they offer the insight that under favourable conditions these two countries could enjoy close co-operation.
Although Christian Schweiger considered that a British–German working partnership might possibly become the alternative leadership system in the EU (2007, pp. 137–150), since Tony Blair chose to stand with America on the War on Terror against Iraq, Britain has distanced itself from the EU again. This development corresponds to Schweiger’s concern that the inclination of Britain towards America after the Iraq crisis may have undermined the foundation of possible British–German co-operation (2004).

On the other hand, as Britain chose to stand with America on the war in Iraq, the divergence between Britain and Germany, or the EU, has become more marked. Kerry Longhurst and Alister Miskimmon argue that the different responses of Britain and Germany to 11 September 2001, Afghanistan and Iraq not only demonstrate divergence on these issues but also reflect the different strategic cultures behind them (Longhurst & Miskimmon, 2007). Moreover, although the special relationship between America and Britain is perceived to be more important from the British perspective than from the American side (Dumbrell, 2006, 2009), concern about this special relationship inevitably affects British foreign policy towards the EU, as well as the traditional friendship between France and Germany, making the British–German relationship more complicated (Longhurst & Miskimmon, ibid.).

Two recent issues may increase the divergences between Britain and Germany. Concerning the Libyan crisis, Germany clearly still has a different strategic culture from Britain and France, with Germany finding it difficult to join the British–French military ‘avant-garde’ (Grant, 2011c). Besides, concerning the Eurozone crisis, the rejection by the Cameron Government of a new fiscal compact may have resulted in a more isolated status for Britain in the EU (Grant, 2011a). These two issues illustrate that in both military and economic areas, Britain and Germany are more divergent than convergent.
In summary, since Britain chose to stand with America on the War on Terror and implemented ‘liberal interventionism’, declared by Blair in Chicago in 1999, which aimed to protect human values via military intervention (see Ch. 4 for more discussions), the divergence between Britain and Germany has gradually become more apparent, not only because Britain and Germany have different strategic cultures and priorities to resolve security issues but also because Britain has distanced itself from Europe again. This isolation has become more serious in the Cameron Government. Therefore, at present, there is no evidence showing that Britain and Germany can work together to develop the CSDP or enhance military co-operation.

2.5 Conclusion

The literature review in this thesis investigates how the current studies resolve three issues: (1) defining institution and institutionalisation, (2) understanding the development of EU security and defence integration, and (3) evaluating the role of member states in this process.

Derived from the notions of institution and institutionalisation, the literature review has compared diverse definitions from different schools of new institutionalism, especially historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. By accepting a compromise position between rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, historical institutionalists define institutions as formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions, with this definition providing an appropriate context for this thesis to tackle relevant issues.
Moreover, historical institutionalists introduced the idea of path dependence and unanticipated consequences, which will contribute to exploring how long-term historical processes impact upon the behaviours of individuals. However, the perspective of intergovernmentalists cannot be ignored. This thesis argues that intergovernmental and institutional factors are not totally contradictory. Especially in the field of the CSDP, because it not only maintains the intergovernmental decision-making process but has also gradually formed an institutionalised framework, it is important to take both the perspectives of institutionalism and intergovernmentalism into consideration.

As regards understanding the development of the ESDP and CSDP, although there are suspicions in terms of a consistent common security and defence policy in the EU, coherence is gradually enhanced through the institutionalisation process. The imbalances between expectations and capabilities have been improved since the establishment of the ESDP in 1999. Most studies also agree on the significance of such efforts and consider that the current development of the CSDP should contribute to a more balanced transatlantic partnership between Europe and America. However, the lack of political will and diversity of national interests among member states still hinder the EU from shaping a real coherent CSDP.

The literature review on British and German roles shows that these two countries have quite different attitudes towards European integration and also EU security and defence integration. Regarding the general direction towards European integration, Germany is much more committed than Britain; however, concerning the development of a military role for the EU, Germany is hesitant about playing an eminent role. These differences definitely affect these countries’ political will in the development of EU security and defence integration. Therefore, it is important to examine whether these differences are fundamental and difficult to overcome, or whether it is possible to find a compromise between them.
The literature review offers a comprehensive illustration, comparison and evaluation of the achievements of current studies and underpins the theoretical and empirical background of this thesis. The next chapter will start to review the historical process of building an institutionalised framework for EU security and defence integration, and then present how the institutionalisation process in this policy area has emerged.
CHAPTER THREE
A Historical Path of Institutional Development for Security and Defence Integration in Europe

3.1 Introduction

As Mark Aspinwall and Gerald Schnider have argued, institutions can shape political actions and consequences instead of merely mirroring social activities and rational competitions among different actors (Aspinwall & Schnider, 2001, p. 2). Also, institutions are considered to support actors to achieve collective purposes and better ends (Peters, 2005, p. 5). Accordingly, institutional arrangements are supposed to contribute to offering a reliable environment for actors to consolidate relations and also provide applicable instruments and measures for them to stabilise co-operation. Regarding the initiative to drive European integration in the 1950s', it aimed to establish an institutional framework in order to achieve a collective objective, which was peace.

Since then, institutions have provided a stable environment for European integration to make progress. More specifically, the EU has been described as an area of high-institutionalisation (Choi & Caporaso, 2002, pp. 492-493; Gourevitch, 2002, p. 309), and treaties also provide frameworks to define how institutions work and how member states interact within these frameworks (Rosamond, 2010, p. 109).

Because institutions and the institutionalisation process affect the development of European integration and embed member states within these frameworks, it is
important to understand how this historical process emerged and how and why specific frameworks were chosen for different policy areas. Especially regarding the research topic of this thesis, it is important to explore why an institutional and also an intergovernmental framework has been chosen for security and defence integration in the EU.

European integration originated from the aspiration to rebuild peace in Europe. There were two main arguments proposed for this purpose. One was based on the idea of federalism and aimed to establish a federal Europe (Middleton, 1969); therefore, surrendering all sovereignty to a supranational institution should be acceptable. Accordingly, the process of European integration could be a top-down process and directed by a supranational organisation (Harrison, 1974, pp. 44–45; Pistone, 1998, pp. 85–92, cited in Rosamond, 2000, pp. 23–31).

The other argument was based on the idea of functionalism and accepted a partial limitation to the exercise of sovereignty vis-à-vis a supranational authority by arguing that the process of European integration should go through functional and technical co-operation in order to reach consensus for further integration (Mitrany, 1966, 1975, cited in Rosamond, 2000, pp. 31–42). Therefore, European integration should be a bottom-up process; also, people might shift loyalty from nation states to functional organisations (Taylor, 1990, pp. 125–138). These discussions inspired certain proposals for reconstructing post-war peace in Europe and had been applied to the ECSC and economic integration.

Security and defence integration is more difficult to achieve because it is more likely to involve national sovereignty and ‘high politics’ issues that are sensitive for nation states. Therefore, before the launch of the EPC, integration in the EC was mainly concentrated on economic affairs. Even in the EPC, it did not involve substantial security or defence issues, although it did provide a crucial basis for the
development of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has attempted to develop an institutionalised framework for common foreign and security policy; moreover, from the establishment of the ESDP in 1999, a more specific focus has been placed on developing common security and defence in the EU.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that a series of treaty reforms from the mid-1990s to the Lisbon Treaty has enhanced the development of a more institutionalised CSDP, it has not changed the intergovernmental nature of this policy area. EU member states are usually reluctant to render competence for supranational actors to intervene in the CSDP. However, this framework is an important foundation for co-operation between member states. At least in the field of common foreign policy, it is considered that EU member states have adopted a more positive and proactive approach (M. E. Smith, 2004a, 2004b). Although the CSDP is a relatively new policy area in the EU, it is related to a long-term historical process taking place since the failure of the EDC, and this historical process nevertheless contributes to shaping the institutionalisation process of EU security and defence policy.

This chapter will review the historical process of developing security and defence integration by the EU member states, from the very first initiative of the EDC to the latest developments in the Lisbon Treaty, and then find out the implications of institutional and intergovernmental factors in this process. The EDC is not ignored, because it was a major attempt to institutionalise security and defence at the supranational level, although it was not approved by the French Parliament. The investigation of the history of building an institutionalised framework for security and defence integration is expected to clarify how institutional and intergovernmental factors affect each other during this process.
3.2 The Unaccomplished Prospect of Building a Common Defence Policy in Europe: The European Defence Community in the 1950s

Discussions about which approach would be more appropriate for undertaking European integration and rebuilding peace in Europe were popular in the early post-war years. As has been mentioned, whether Europe needed a federal project to change the status quo fundamentally or should adopt a moderate approach was a controversial issue. These discussions were important because they affected the institutional choice of launching European integration. Then, a supranational project was adopted to establish the ECSC and develop economic integration.

On the other hand, the failure of the EDC inspired further thinking about whether the supranational approach was the only way to achieve European integration. The EDC was supposed to integrate the armed forces of ECSC member states, in order to become a consolidated pillar in NATO to defend Europe. It aimed to have a similar framework with the ECSC, and therefore military forces were concentrated under common institutions of the EDC; in other words, member states were only allowed to maintain very limited independence on security and defence affairs. However, because the French Parliament did not approve the EDC Treaty, this supranational project was abolished in the end. Although Europe might present a different picture if the EDC could be accomplished, the failure of the EDC nevertheless signified there should be an alternative approach rather than a supranational framework for progressing European integration.
3.2.1 Before European Integration: The Arguments after WWII about the Future of Europe

The very first proposal for building a federal European nation was proposed by Richard Nikolaus Graf Coudenhove Kalergi in his book *Pan-Europa* in 1923. Kalergi encouraged transnational Pan-European movements and this led to the establishment of a non-governmental organisation, ‘the Pan-European Union’, in the 1920s. The proposal to build a united Europe was then promoted by the French Prime Minister Aristide Briand, a European federalist Altiero Spinelli and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Accordingly, Briand had asked for the building of a European nation at the League of Nations; Spinelli’s argument led to the development of the Union of European Federalists in 1946 (Spinelli and Rossi, 1941, repr. in Nelsen & Stubb, 1998); Churchill’s speech at Zurich University in 1946, which called for a ‘United States of Europe’, contributed to establishing the Council of Europe in 1949 (Churchill, 1946, repr. in Nelsen & Stubb, 1998). However, both the Pan-European Union and the Union of European Federalists are non-governmental organisations, while the Council of Europe is a mainly a political forum for member states and has not developed an institutionalised framework. Besides, the idea of building a united country in Europe is too idealistic and radical to be accepted by European countries. Nevertheless, their proposals had encouraged people to try to find more solutions for the future of Europe in the early post-war years.

Instead of advocacy for the building of ‘one’ country in Europe, there was another argument that considered the fulfilment of a united Europe might be achieved by gradual integration among European countries. Inspired by the French politician Jean Monnet, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman called for the establishment of a high authority for the common management of the coal and steel industries in France and Germany. This notable proposal was known as the ‘Schuman Declaration’
and eventually contributed to the building of the ECSC in 1951 (Schuman, 1950, repr. in Nelsen & Stubb, 1998).

Besides France and West Germany, the original ECSC also included Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The founding member states of the ECSC were referred to as ‘the Six’, which were compared to the ‘Seven’ in the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). Although the ECSC only involved the integration of the coal and steel industries by the members, it was a fundamental step towards further European integration projects afterwards. Meanwhile, this was the first time that European countries had accepted a supranational management to control their domestic affairs, and it then became a cornerstone for a peaceful, stable and prosperous environment in Europe. However, the failure of the EDC signified that the supranational approach could not be a general approach to apply to all policy areas in European integration, and this was why security and defence integration would have a different destiny from that of the ECSC.

3.2.2 The Incentives to Build a European Defence Community

The EDC was proposed under a specific situation, when West and East started to confront each other and German rearmament was still an unresolved issue. There were three factors promoting the development of the EDC. The escalating confrontation between West and East during the Cold War in the early 1950s, especially the outbreak of the Korean War, changed the policy of the US, which decided to rearm Germany (Fursdon, 1980, pp. 67–72; Soutou, 1994, p. 109). Accordingly, America and Britain firstly addressed this issue and allowed Germany to rearm (Costigliola, 1992, p. 48).

Besides, regarding the demand from the US for more defence contributions from Europe, Western European countries had to search for a solution (Schmidt, 1995, pp.
Concerning this situation, France had to re-evaluate policy on Germany rearmament and accepted Germany as part of the West, even though France was reluctant to make a concession to German status (Creswell & Trachtenberg, 2003, pp. 5–7).

Moreover, Adenauer’s Westpolitik policy also contributed to Germany taking part in the setting of the EDC. According to a report published by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1951, this indicated that the reason West Germany did not favour rearmament in the early post-war years was that it was considered that rearming Germany might irritate the Soviet Union or hinder a divided Germany from becoming unified (CIA, 1951). However, escalating confrontation between the West and the East inspired Adenauer to undertake his Westpolitik foreign policy, and encouraged West Germany to be integrated in the economic and military systems of the West (Abelshauser, 1995).

Because West Germany was established in the same year as the creation of NATO, it did not become a member of NATO immediately. An alternative to integrating West Germany into Western defence system was nevertheless necessary. A proposal regarding the establishment of the EDC and the development of a European army was made by the French Prime Minister René Pleven in 1950, finally leading to the signing of the Treaty Instituting the European Defence Community (the EDC Treaty) by the Six in 1952.

By placing security and defence forces of member states under a supranational institution, the EDC aimed at full integration of defence affairs. In the preamble of the EDC Treaty, it was stated:
‘Considering the fullest possible integration ... of the human and material elements of their Defence Forces assembled within a supra-national European organisation to be the best means for the attainment of this aim with the necessary speed and efficiency’. (Preamble to the EDC Treaty, repr. in Hill & K. Smith, 2000, p. 16).

Being the first attempt at developing a supranational institution for security and defence integration in Europe, the EDC signified a revolution, in that nation states make concession for the first time to a supranational framework for tackling security and defence affairs. Although the EDC had never been fulfilled because the EDC Treaty had been disapproved by the French Parliament in 1954, the Six had learned a lesson that supranational security and defence integration was not feasible if nation states lacked commitment. This unsuccessful experience with the EDC exactly illustrated that compared to economic integration, security and defence integration obviously required more political will from national governments.

3.2.3 The Elements of the Institutional Framework of the EDC

The institutional framework of the EDC was similar to the framework of the ECSC, which placed the management of coal and steel industries under a supranational High Authority. Consequently, under the management of common institutions, the EDC aimed to manage common armed forces and budgets (Article 1, The EDC Treaty). There were three elements identified in the institutional framework of the EDC.

Firstly, the EDC was conducted by common institutions, including a Council of Ministers, a Common Assembly, a Commissariat and a Court of Justice (Article 8, The EDC Treaty), and had a juridical personality to represent member states on the international scene and intervene in the national legal bodies of member states (Article 7, The EDC Treaty). In other words, the EDC was superior to national
governments. Therefore, member states were constrained from exerting independent competence on security and defence issues. Because common institutions of the EDC were authorised to manage security and defence affairs for member states, if the EDC Treaty had entered into force, common defence would feasibly have been achieved within a short period. However, even in terms of economic integration, it had to start from the common management of the coal and steel industries. It was impossible to achieve security and defence integration in one step.

Secondly, EDC member states would have been deprived of recruiting or maintaining national armed forces (Article 9, The EDC Treaty). It was a revolutionary move for sovereign nation states. If the EDC Treaty had entered into force, member states would have been asked to place their national armed forces under the arrangement of the EDC. Also, the EDC’s European Defence Forces would have had to wear the same uniform (Article 15, The EDC Treaty). Therefore, they would have become a real European army instead of a member states’ army.

Thirdly, the EDC Treaty created a link with NATO. The Supreme Commander of NATO would be authorised to ensure that European Defence Forces were capable of carrying out mandates; meanwhile, NATO might issue technical directives to the EDC according to the military competence of NATO (Article 18, The EDC Treaty). Since West Germany had not joined NATO until 1955, the link between the EDC and NATO would contribute to integrating West Germany into the whole Western defence system. Besides, this link would prevent a rearmed Germany from becoming a military threat to the West (Schmidt, 1995, p. 146).

Accordingly, the development of European Defence Forces would not undermine NATO but strengthen it. In a tripartite declaration signed with France in 1952, America and Britain also supported the development of the EDC because the EDC
was considered as contributing to the joint defence of NATO (Trachtenberg, 1999, p. 121). The British Government made another declaration in 1954 to reiterate the policy that it would enhance co-operation with the EDC in terms of common security and defence issues (Hovey, 1955, pp. 329–330).

The three elements above describe the status, operation and connection of the EDC within the European security environment. Under this institutional framework, Western Europe would have been consolidated and counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Because the EDC was not merely a traditional military coalition and would act using common forces under a central commander authority, it was more like a single military power that integrated all the military resources and materials of the Six.

3.2.4 The Implications of the Failure of the EDC

Although the EDC originated with the French Prime Minister Pleven’s proposal, the Treaty did not win a majority in the French Parliament in 1954, with 250 voting in favour and 319 against (Fauvet, 1957, p. 162). Actually, when Pleven’s idea was proposed it was not favoured by the French public, and even Pleven knew the Treaty would be very unlikely to win support in the Parliament (Fursdon, 1980, pp. 87–88). Indeed, this proposal was produced in response to pressure from the Americans calling for the rapid rearmament of West Germany (Creswell & Trachtenberg, 2003, pp. 7, 22); therefore, it was not what France aspired to by itself.

According to Matrin Dedman’s analysis, three reasons explain why the French Parliament rejected the EDC Treaty. Firstly, the leader of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1955, Georgy Malenkov, was considered more moderate than Stalin. The threat from the Soviet Union was alleviated, with the development of the EDC becoming not particularly urgent for France. Secondly, Dedman argued that public opinion in
France viewed the EDC as providing access for Germany to be rearmed and French people still could not reach consensus about the issue of German rearmament at that time. Thirdly, France was still stuck in the Indo–China war, so the Government did not pay much attention to propagating the EDC and pushing for ratification of the Treaty (Dedman, 1996, pp. 83–87). Raymond Aron also considered that the Indo–China war in 1954 was an important argument against the EDC since many French senior military staff were away for the war (Aron, 1957, p. 16).

After the French Parliament rejected the EDC Treaty, the EDC became an unaccomplished project for common defence. The failure of the EDC signified that national governments would be very unlikely to make concessions on security and defence affairs under a supranational framework. It is compatible with the arguments of intergovernmentalism that nation states would only agree to such concessions when the situation was very necessary. Meanwhile, the economic integration model could not be simply copied for security and defence affairs. In other words, a ‘spill-over’ effect would not happen from economic integration to security and defence integration because these involve distinct policy areas and have different implications for nation states. As was argued by Steven Everts, economic integration started from very specific and functional affairs in Europe; however, security and defence policy is not a functional thing, and therefore the ‘spill-over’ would not happen in this policy area (Everts, 2009).

The failure of the EDC also illustrated the importance of political will regarding institutional developments. It has been argued that the development of institutions shall come after member states have achieved consolidated opinions (Heathcoat-Amory, 2009); in other words, institutions cannot be developed without any consensus or common opinions. Although, according to sociological arguments, institutions may help construct the identities of preferences and interests (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 947–950), if member states are not committed to working in an
institutional framework, there will be no chance of such construction occurring. Sometimes even though member states have made a commitment to an institutional framework, they are unable to ensure complete fulfilment of their commitments; needless to say in a case like the EDC, France was sceptical about this issue, and therefore the EDC had no possibility of being accepted.

Since the Schuman plan did not work to develop security and defence integration, an alternative approach was required. Meanwhile, the failure of the EDC also became a crucial reference for further efforts in this policy area. Since the development of the EPC accepted an intergovernmental approach, and this approach has been applied to develop the CFSP, ESDP and CSDP, an intergovernmental path in EU security and defence integration has been gradually confirmed.

3.3 An Alternative Project for Political Integration: European Political Co-operation in the 1970s

The most important lesson learned from the EDC is that a supranational institutional framework is rarely adopted by nation states when conducting key political issues, especially for security and defence affairs. Since West Germany was incorporated into the Western defence system by joining NATO in 1955, the Six thus concentrated their attention on economic integration, including building a common market in Europe, which saw significant progress in the 1950s and 1960s. The ambition for security and defence integration in Europe was left aside.
Attention to enhance political co-operation for further political integration in Europe was raised in the late 1960s and mainly due to EC member states being unable to form a coherent position in response to the Six-Day War between Israel and Arabic countries in 1967. Three lessons that the EC countries learnt from the experience of the response to the Six-Day War were identified by Michael E. Smith: (1) lack of a single voice for EC countries, (2) lack of a mechanism to form common positions, and (3) lack of a consensus about what form such a mechanism should take (M. E. Smith, 2004a, p. 63). These frustrations led EC member states to recognise the necessity for making progress on political integration.

3.3.1 The Origins of an Intergovernmental Framework for the EPC

The US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asked a famous question: ‘Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?’ This remark signified that Europe presented a fragmented picture of individual national governments, rather than a coherent image. In order to improve this situation, at the 1969 Hague Summit meeting EC member states reaffirmed their determination to carry out political objectives (Conclusions of the Hague Summit, adopted in 1969). For that purpose, two official reports were adopted, the 1970 Luxembourg Report and the 1973 Copenhagen Report.

Proposing as it did initiatives for the EPC, the Luxembourg Report identified three objectives of the EPC: (1) building better mutual understanding on international issues through regular exchanges of information and consultations; (2) enhancing the solidarity of member states by co-ordinating their positions; and (3) undertaking common actions (Luxembourg Report, adopted in 1970). According to the Luxembourg Report, the operation of such political co-operation was based on regular meetings by the Foreign Ministers of EC countries and irregular summit meetings by the heads of governments. A Political Committee was also built to assist the Foreign Minister meetings.
As soon as the Luxembourg Report was adopted, the first Ministerial meeting of the EPC was held in November 1970 in Munich. It was the first time that Foreign Ministers of the Six had met together on such an occasion; they discussed the situation in the Middle East and also CSCE issues during the meeting (First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers Conference on Political Union, 1970). Although this meeting did not reach substantial conclusions on common positions or actions, it signified that the EPC could become an effective platform for improving the convergence of policies among member states (Nuttall, 1992, pp. 55–58). The Luxembourg Report did not ask EC counties to implement the conclusions of Foreign Minister meetings, thus providing a more flexible environment for member states to join the negotiations.

The Copenhagen Report provided supplementary instructions and suggestions about the EPC’s operations. Accordingly, the report increased EC Foreign Minister meetings and Political Committee meetings; also, it said some technical bodies should be built, including a group of correspondents, working parties, medium- and long-term studies and a communication system; besides, the Presidency of the Council might propose initiatives for the EPC (Copenhagen Report, adopted in 1973).

The Luxembourg and Copenhagen reports offered an initial framework for member states to have intergovernmental co-operation. It was considered that the EPC had an intergovernmental framework because of the effect of Gaullism. As David Allen and William Wallace have argued, the impact from the failure of the 1962 Fouchet plan and the Community crisis in 1965–1966 (also known as the empty chair crisis caused by de Gaulle) had not faded away in the early days of initiating the EPC (Allen & W. Wallace, 1982, pp. 29–30). This unfavourable atmosphere for close co-operation was unable to offer the EPC a formal or institutionalised framework. However, this ‘loose, non-binding and modest formula’ with a process of ‘developing
trust’ was supposed to form common opinions and consensus among member states (Wessels, 1982, p. 17).

### 3.3.2 The Elements of the Institutional Framework of the EPC

Regarding the institutional framework of the EPC, there are also three internal elements. Firstly, because the EPC was based on the Luxembourg and the Copenhagen reports, it did not belong to the supranational structure of the EC. Therefore, the EPC was described as ‘decentralised, loosely structured’, and its scope as being ‘extremely limited’ (Ifestos, 1987, p. 208). Even though it had an ambitious objective of developing common positions and actions, it did not have a strong institutional framework to support it at the beginning. However, by the end of the 1980s, the EPC had become an extensive, evolving network working on diplomatic issues (W. Wallace, 2005, pp. 434–435). The practice of the EPC was thus considered to be able to reshape and reinforce the habits of national diplomats by providing joint training courses, personnel exchanges and the sharing of embassy facilities in other countries (W. Wallace, ibid.).

Secondly, the creation of the European Council enhanced the intergovernmental basis of the EPC even more. In the 1974 Paris Summit, the Heads of Governments of the EC decided to meet three times a year, accompanied by Foreign Ministers, and established a ‘President-in-Office’ to be the spokesman for member states on the international scene (Conclusions of the Paris Summit, adopted in 1974). Therefore, since 1975, the Heads of Governments of the EC have met regularly in the European Council to discuss both EEC and EPC issues. Because the European Council became de facto the highest body of the EEC and EPC by defining ‘the basic strategic line guiding Community activity’ (Bonvicini, 1982, p. 35), it was held to reinforce the intergovernmental framework of the EC (Ifestos, 1987, p. 186).
Thirdly, the entry of Britain, Denmark and Ireland in 1973 to the EC also enlarged the participation of the EPC. Since then, the ‘Big Three’ in Europe have been included in the grand project of European integration and had given EPC discussions more comprehensive representation by Western Europe. Although Britain never favoured creating a new institutional framework for European integration nor supported a supranational system for political affairs, its participation was important for the EC and EPC because of its major economic and political influence throughout the world.

Even though it lacked substantial contributions to define formal common positions or actions, the EPC at least offered a forum for EC countries to consult in political affairs. Disapproval of the Tindemans Report at the 1976 Hague European Council demonstrated that member states were not prepared to offer a more institutionalised or centralised framework for the EPC.

3.3.3 The Implications of the Tindemans Report on European Political Integration

Owing to the lack of a formal and legal institutional framework for the EPC, there was demand in the EC for the strengthening of the institutional framework of the EPC at the 1974 Paris Summit meeting. Accordingly, the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans was charged with drawing up a proposal by the end of 1975 to improve the existing framework of the EC and the EPC, and he also aimed to achieve further European integration. Tindemans proposed an overall plan in 1975 that covered all aspects of European integration, including the external relations of Europe, economic and social policies, and the establishment of the European Union (The Tindemans Report, proposed in 1975).

In terms of reforming the EPC, the Tindemans Report suggested that there should be a single decision-making centre in the Council so that the Council would be able to
undertake all aspects of issues. Consequently, the Council would decide security and
defence issues and member states would have to implement Council decisions. Also,
Tindemans advocated a European foreign policy because this would consolidate the
transatlantic alliance. However, the Hague European Council in 1976 did not make a
clear commitment to adopt this (Conclusions of the Hague European Council,
adopted in 1976).

The Tindemans Report attempted to give the EPC legal status and merge it with the
EC, which would undermine an existing intergovernmental basis; however, member
states were not ready for ‘a rapid move forward’, nor did the outside environment
urge certain member states to make changes; therefore, no definite commitment
was made to implement the Report (Hill & K. Smith, 2000, p. 100). Besides, severe
economic recession in the early 1970s also affected the political will of EC countries
to consider a new institutional framework for grand integration.

The unsuccessful experiences of the EDC and the Tindemans Report illustrated how
member states had been hesitant about adopting a supranational project for
political integration. Also, the unaccomplished effort of the Tindemans Report
demonstrated that only when basic integration had been completed could there be a
European foreign policy (Andreatta, 2005, p. 23). This consequence was consistent
with the reason why the EDC did not succeed. Only when member states have
enough political will would a major institutional reform be possible. Although Gianni
Bonvicini (1982) and William Wallace (1982) recognised that there were increasing
interactions between member states and EC institutions in terms of foreign affairs,
and suggested the EPC reform, it cannot be ignored that no significant change had
been made for improving the framework of the EPC until the establishment of the
Maastricht Treaty. Actually, before the Single European Act (SEA) incorporated the
EPC into the treaty framework of the EC (Title I, Title III, SEA), the EPC did not even
have a formal or legal basis in the EC.
3.3.4 Evaluate the Institutional Framework of the EPC

As Kissinger’s question suggests, Europe was still unable to build a coherent and consolidated image via the EPC machinery. Christopher Hill reviewed the performance of the EPC regarding international crises from the 1973 October War to the 1991 Yugoslavian crisis, concluding that on most occasions EC countries had been unable to formulate active and coherent actions via the EPC machinery (Hill, 1992, pp. 139–145). Hill argued that although the EPC prevented EC countries from complete inaction, it lacked appropriate resources for EC countries to take firm, decisive and dramatic actions. The EPC had to depend mainly on the commitment of member states, but it was not a stable factor (Edwards, 2005, p. 52). Since consensus might not be automatically produced from informal consultations, if EC member states aimed to form common positions and actions and develop a political community eventually, a more institutionalised framework with effective mechanisms for co-ordination and implementation would be necessary, rather than the EPC. It is because an institutional framework may not lead to common positions or actions definitely, but it may encourage member states to build consensus.

By and large, if the EPC was expected to be a mechanism which could make common foreign policy, it was not qualified, because it usually failed to promote any substantial convergence of attitudes by EC member states (W. Wallace, 2005, p. 435). However, if the EPC was considered a forum which would consolidate common opinions and increase convergences among member states, it did its work.

Because the EPC had an intergovernmental framework, which was different from the Community, it had to develop its own functions; also, although it did not have legal or formal status, it had developed its own networks (Nuttall, 1992, pp. 1–29). Member states therefore had to ‘learn by doing’ in this process, and tried to build another model for political integration. Since institutions can provide an
‘information-rich’ environment (Moravcsik, 1993; Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009), the EPC at least offered an environment in which member states could have consultations and information-exchange. This being considered the first step for member states to work towards a political union (Edwards, 2005, p. 41), the EPC had an important role in increasing ‘inter-state cooperation’ and searching for ‘common-denominator solutions’ for European countries (Ifestos, 1987, p. 208). This positive result would lay the foundation for further political integration.

Besides, as Michael E. Smith stated, the EPC did contribute to information-sharing among member states (M. E. Smith, 2004a, pp. 42–43). Increasing information-sharing was essential for accumulating mutual understanding and forming consensus that could lead to the further institutional development of political integration. Consequently, although the EPC lacked an efficient decision-making process and effective mechanisms for intergovernmental co-ordination, this flexible structure encouraged member states to ‘accumulate an increasing body of common positions’, and ultimately would create conditions for ‘qualitative changes into new integrative dimension’ (Wessels, cited in Ifestos, 1987, p. 210). Therefore, following the intergovernmental model of the EPC, the Maastricht Treaty established the CFSP, which maintained the regular Council meetings as being the major decision-making body but with a more institutionalised framework to connect member states and the EU.
3.4 Towards an Institutionalised Framework: The CFSP and ESDP

The determination to form common positions and actions in Europe on external political affairs was repeatedly confirmed in the 1970 Luxembourg Report, the 1973 Copenhagen Report and the 1986 Single European Act. The EPC was launched for this purpose; however, it did not finally achieve the objective of forming common positions and actions. Therefore, the idea of building a European Union was readdressed by Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission, in a speech in Bruges in 1989. Delors called for ‘a radical change’ and ‘a new political initiative’ because the existing institutional framework of the EC had not been enough to respond to new situations in the world (Delors, 1989, repr. in Nelsen & Stubb, 1998, pp. 55–68). Indeed, the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the security and economic environment in the world, and urged the EC countries to make a major change to the existing institutional framework for European integration.

For the purpose of reforming the existing institutional framework of the EC and also preparing for a political union in Europe, there were several proposals made by individual EU member states before the Maastricht Treaty. Although a unified supranational framework for the whole union was proposed by Belgium, it was not adopted in the end. The Maastricht Treaty created a pillar structure, which established the CFSP, with an intergovernmental framework and unanimous voting rule to make decisions. The Maastricht Treaty did not offer EU supranational institutional actors the capacity to intervene in the CFSP, but the original idea of the Treaty was to create an even closer Union (Preamble to the Maastricht Treaty, 1992).
3.4.1 Establishing an Institutionalised Framework for the CFSP

Before the Maastricht Treaty was signed, several proposals were put forward by individual EC national governments. Belgium firstly proposed advancing the capacity of the Commission, applying qualified majority voting to all areas of the Council and strengthening the role of the European Parliament to intervene in Council decisions (Vanhoonacker, 1992, pp. 40–42). France and Germany supported Belgium’s proposal and sent a letter jointly to the Irish Presidency of the EC to call for intergovernmental conferences. In this joint letter, France and West Germany desired to ‘strengthen the democratic legitimation of the Union, render its institutions more efficiency, ensure unity and coherence of the union’s economic, monetary and political action, and define and implement a common foreign and security policy (repr. in Vanhoonacker, ibid., p. 276). Italy and the Netherlands also made their proposals, with a draft treaty being decided during the 1991 Luxembourg Presidency.

In the 1990 Rome European Council, EC member states agreed to begin two intergovernmental conferences aiming to build a Political Union and an Economic and Monetary Union. In terms of a Political Union, the Presidency Conclusion of this meeting stated that EC member states had reached consensus on developing a common foreign and security policy and agreed to increase ‘the coherence, speed and effectiveness of the Community’s international action’ (Presidency Conclusions of the Rome European Council, adopted in 1990). In the 1991 Luxembourg European Council, a draft treaty proposed by Luxembourg to establish a European Union with a three-pillar framework was adopted by EC member states. This draft treaty introduced a basic framework for the Union; regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy, EC countries agreed that the CFSP would cover all questions relating to security and ensured that a European defence identity would contribute to

The Maastricht Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993. The Treaty not only established the European Union as replacing the previous framework of the EC and EPC, but also expanded into more policy areas with a reformed institutional structure. Instead of having a unified decision-making framework, the Treaty had a compromise structure, with three-pillar arrangements for the EU to satisfy different requirements in distinct policy areas. This three-pillar structure was considered to be a bridge connecting two competing models of institutional governance: a supranational system and intergovernmental co-operation (Andersson, 2008, p.124).

As regards the matter of the CFSP in the Treaty, it was applied to intergovernmental co-operation. Although the European Council and the Council were charged with defining the CFSP, they had to act unanimously. Therefore, EU member states still maintained independence on agenda-setting and decision-making in the CFSP, but had a formal and institutional framework for implementing the policy.

Although the Maastricht Treaty did not actually provide much space for EU supranational institutional actors, such as the Commission or the European Parliament, to intervene in the CFSP, and member states still maintained the right to veto policy initiatives (Cini & Borragan, 2010, p. 244), the significance of the Treaty was that it provided a definite decision-making process for forming common positions and joint actions, two instruments that were supposed to be an indispensable means whereby the EU could shape a unified image on the international scene.
3.4.2 The Elements of the CFSP Institutional Framework before the Establishment of the ESDP

The Maastricht Treaty provided an initial framework for the EU to conduct the CFSP. Although it was objected that it could not effectively close the capabilities–expectations gap, especially because EU countries had ambitious expectations of conducting foreign and security affairs but with limited mechanisms of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty (Hill, 1998; Peterson, 1998), the Maastricht Treaty at least provided a basic foundation for later treaty reforms. Therefore, it could be viewed as a turning point that EU foreign and security integration began an institutionalised stage. Although, under the Maastricht Treaty, member states generally mainly concentrated on forming a European foreign policy and rarely involved security and defence dimensions, the Treaty nevertheless offered a basic framework for further reform, which meant member states could expand their activities by reforming this intergovernmental framework instead of creating a new one. Therefore, it is important to identify the elements contained within the Maastricht Treaty regarding the conducting of foreign and security affairs.

Firstly, the Council of Ministers (the Council) was granted decision-making authority on the basis of guidelines from the European Council; member states had to implement decisions made by the Council (Article J.2, J.3, The Maastricht Treaty). Both the European Council and the Council in the Treaty were intergovernmental mechanisms because of unanimous voting being applied, but member states were liable to implement Council decisions. This ensured that Council decisions would be implemented and therefore enhanced policy consistency between member states and the EU. As a result, compared to the EPC, the CFSP had a relatively formalised and institutionalised framework to create more possibilities for ‘common’ activities on relevant issues.
Although the Amsterdam Treaty introduced ‘constructive abstentions’ and qualified majority voting (QMV) to the Council in order to improve efficiency in the decision-making process of the CFSP, this procedure would not be applied to matters that had military or defence implications (Article J.13, The Amsterdam Treaty). In other words, this procedure did not change the intergovernmental basis, but did offer flexibility in deciding non-military and non-defence affairs.

Secondly, common positions (Article J.2, The Maastricht Treaty) and joint actions (Article J.3, The Maastricht Treaty) were introduced to implement the CFSP. They are still crucial in order for the EU to impose diplomatic means and contribute to forming a unified image on the international scene. The objective of forming common positions and joint actions actually originated from the EPC, but the EPC did not have applicable mechanisms or definite procedures to fulfil it. The provisions for common positions and joint actions in the Maastricht Treaty offered the EU a legal basis to impose sanctions; meanwhile, to impose such sanctions would increase the connections between the CFSP and Community affairs (Hill, 1998, p. 28). The increasing connections would encourage the EU to improve internal consistency, and then achieve a more coherent institutional framework.

The Maastricht Treaty ensured an intergovernmental framework for member states to conduct foreign and security affairs, and this framework was considered a structure in favour of member states (Milward & Sorensen, 1993, p. 19). When member states applied common positions and joint actions to impose economic sanctions, there would be a need to co-ordinate and co-operate with the Commission, and this would increase connections with the Community pillar. However, the Maastricht Treaty did not create a post to connect the Council and the Community; actually, in the Council, member states were fragmented units and lacked a unified representative. Concerning this problem, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced a High Representative to the CFSP and a Secretary General to the Council
in order to formulate, prepare and implement Council decisions (Article J.16, The Amsterdam Treaty) and also to assist the Presidency (Article J.8, The Amsterdam Treaty). These two new posts would not only contribute to co-ordination between EU member states for more effective implementation but also increase the coherence of the CFSP by providing ‘one phone number to call’ in Europe (Andersson, 2008, p. 125).

Another problem with the CFSP framework under the Maastricht Treaty was that it did not provide exact definitions for CFSP objectives and CFSP missions. This was supposed to be left to the European Council to define (Article J.8, The Maastricht Treaty). However, because the EU had not produced a document for defining security strategy until 2003, this block left the CFSP without a definite objective regarding undertaking certain kinds of missions. In order to fill this gap, the Amsterdam Treaty incorporated the WEU into the EU (Article J.7, The Amsterdam Treaty), and also the Petersberg tasks (Protocol on Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty).

The Petersberg tasks, which were defined by the 1992 Petersberg Declaration, referred to conflict prevention and crisis management missions which included ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management and peace-making’ (The Petersberg Declaration, adopted in 1992). This incorporation was meaningful because it enabled the EU to become more focused on certain situations that would involve it. Meanwhile, the Peterbergs tasks, which contained a special emphasis on crisis management missions and humanitarian tasks, also become a blueprint when the EU was considering developing military and civilian capability under the ESDP.
3.4.3 Evolution: An Institutionalised Framework for Common Security and Defence Policy

The outbreak of the civil war in the Balkans in the early 1990s resulted in a serious regional crisis for almost ten years. Because the theatre of war was so close to Central Europe, there was pressure for EU countries to take action. The Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos had argued that this should be the time for Europe to resolve this issue because it was European’s problem, not anyone else’s (cited in C. J. Smith, 1996, p. 1); meanwhile, the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, also argued that the Yugoslav crisis was a European issue and should be resolved by Europeans (cited in Roberts, 1996, p. 183). However, the result nevertheless highlighted the fact that the EU lacked political will and also military capability to resolve a serious security situation (Soetendorp, 1999, p. 140). When the crisis in Kosovo became uncontrolled in the late 1990s and NATO finally intervened with an air campaign, EU countries finally made a determination to remedy the shortfall in political will and military capability.

In order to enable the EU to take part in security and defence missions, and accomplish the goal of common security and defence, also inspired by British–French defence co-operation (St Malo Declaration, adopted in 1998), the 1999 Cologne European Council appointed Javier Solanna, the former Secretary-General of NATO, as the High Representative for the CFSP and developed the ESDP (Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, adopted in 1999).

As a sub-policy area, the ESDP was under the structure of the CFSP and had a special focus on security and defence affairs. In the 1999 Helsinki European Council, EU member states determined to build up military capability for the implementation of the Petersberg tasks and adopted the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003, which set military targets for implementing ESDP missions (Presidency Conclusion of the Helsinki
European Council, adopted in 1999). Thereafter, more headline goals were adopted in order to improve capability to undertake security and defence affairs: the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (adopted in 2004), the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (adopted in 2007) and the Headline Goal 2010 (adopted in 2004).

Meanwhile, two documents for defining European security strategy were adopted: (1) European Security Strategy (ESS, published in 2003), and (2) the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (published in 2008). The former was also considered the first EU document to identify challenges and threats in Europe, and to define the strategic objectives of the EU (Gowan, 2008, pp. 42–61; Haine, 2008, pp. 21–41; Howorth, 2008, pp. 81–102); therefore the ESDP would have more specific and definite objectives concerning how to achieve common security and defence in the EU.

The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy 2008 was an assessment report that re-evaluated the security environment and addressed new threats in Europe, including cyber security, energy security and climate change. The security threats defined by the report involved non-traditional security threats which signified that, besides a military dimension, the EU also placed emphasis on a civilian dimension in order to accentuate the civilian role of the EU in security and defence issues.

The decision-making process and institutional framework of the ESDP did not differ from the CFSP’s. Actually, after the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU did not make major adjustments to the institutional framework of the CFSP or ESDP until the Lisbon Treaty. However, after the establishment of the ESDP, the EU focused more attention on the substantial reform of military and civilian capability. Concerning the military dimension, according to the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003, the EU will be able to deploy a European Rapid Response Force (ERRF), amounting to between 50,000 to
60,000 troops within sixty days, and such a deployment will last at least one year (Helsinki Headline Goal 2003, adopted in 1999). Besides, according to the Headline Goal 2010, the EU has developed the concept of ‘battle groups’ since 2005 for offering more responsive forces in a short timescale to crisis management operations. Each battle group consists of 1,500 soldiers and can be ready to deploy on a four-month operation within ten days. The EU maintains two battle groups on standby (Headline Goal 2010, adopted in 2004).

Concerning the civilian dimension, according to the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 the EU has identified six priority sectors for civilian crisis management missions: police, rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, monitoring missions, and support for EU special representatives. Therefore, the components of civilian capabilities include police forces, prosecutors, judges, prison officers, civil administrative staff, customs officials, human rights experts, civil protection and disaster relief agents, assessment and co-ordination teams, and intervention teams. The human resources of these components basically depend on the commitment of member states (Civilian Headline Goal 2008, adopted in 2004).

The framework of the ESDP provided deployable capability for the EU to implement ESDP missions. However, because the capability was based on voluntary co-operation from member states, it largely depended on whether member states were able to fulfill their commitment to the ESDP; meanwhile, whether member state were willing to maintain their commitment depended on what issues and situations they were facing. Political will was an unstable factor affecting the fulfilment of the ESDP. Therefore, without enough political will, even if the EU already has deployable military capability, it will still be unable to play a serious role in security and defence affairs (Deighton, 2002).
3.4.4 The Implications of the Institutionalised Framework of the CFSP and ESDP before the Lisbon Treaty

Compared to the EPC, the CFSP is considered to be able to enhance security and defence co-operation via its institutionalised framework (Sjursen, 1998, pp. 99–101). This framework is also considered a presentation of ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’, which is different from the Community Method because it involves a direct circle of national governments (H. Wallace, 2005, pp. 87–89). Although, before the establishment of the ESDP, the EU merely relied on imposing diplomatic or economic sanctions to implement common positions and joint actions, this framework offered a stable environment for member states to co-operate. Nevertheless, the Maastricht Treaty only built a weak institutional framework, especially compared to the framework of the Community pillar (F. Cameron, 1998, pp. 59–76; Peterson, 1998, pp. 7–11; M. E. Smith, 1996, p. 2).

The establishment of the ESDP nevertheless strengthened the capability of the EU in terms of security and defence dimensions. Therefore, since the first EU mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003, the EU has launched 24 CSDP missions: 16 are civilian missions, 7 are military, and the last combines civilian and military responsibilities (see: EU Operations, Overview, 2012).

The institutionalised framework from the CFSP to the ESDP before the Lisbon Treaty also showed that an intergovernmental path had been strengthened through the continuing practices of member states. This is what historical institutionalists argue that institutional developments would follow the physical notion of ‘inertia’ instead of changing or abolishing it (Hall & Taylor, 1996; North, 1990). The path of institutional developments of the CFSP and ESDP followed the intergovernmental framework of the EPC, and became a stronger institutional framework. This process...
certainly enhanced the intergovernmentalism and institutionalism characteristics of this framework at the same time.

Besides, through continuing practices, the shortcomings of this framework would gradually emerge and then member states could know how to reform it, something they had not expected when they established this framework. This learning process also strengthened the existing institutional basis and would improve it (Peters, 2005, pp. 33–34). For example, when the Maastricht Treaty built the CFSP it only had a vague aim, and no one knew what common foreign and security policy meant or what common defence would be. When common positions and joint actions became increasingly important mechanisms for the CFSP, member states realised the necessity to give the CFSP a more concrete context. Therefore, the WEU and the Petersberg tasks were incorporated into the EU. Moreover, when a necessity for connecting the Council and the Community was emerging, member states also realised that they needed a person who could represent their opinions and build a coherent image for the EU, and then this idea led to the introduction of the High Representative. The development of military and civilian capability also follows this learning-by-doing process, and this process is still ongoing.

By and large, before the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP and ESDP already had an institutionalised framework combining vertical and horizontal dimensions, which contributed to the EU in pursuing the policy goals of the CFSP and ESDP (Andersson, 2008, p.124). A vertical system, indicating the hierarchical relations in CFSP and ESDP institutions, ensures efficiency and consistency in the decision-making and policy-implementation process. The horizontal connection networks, referring to non-hierarchical and informal connections between member states and the EU through day-by-day routines or informal meetings, help to exchange information and consolidate opinions (Andersson, ibid.). These frameworks offered an institutionalised environment for member states and EU institutions to have
intensive interactions, and these intensive interactions are considered to be able to shape common ideas and values (Everts, 2009). Although, in the field of defence affairs, it would be difficult to form common ideas through informal interactions or day-by-day routines, the framework of the CFSP and ESDP nevertheless offered a place where member states, EU institutions and technical experts could fully associate with each other (Silveira, 2009).


The most important incentive to drive EU member states to reform the treaty frameworks in the 2000s originated from the enlargement project, which made the EU have a larger participation of 27 member states, and the existing framework was unable to implement efficient and fair decision-making in response to this change. The result of enlargement in the EU was considered to increase the diversity of the EU and might undermine the consensus which had formed before the enlargement (Heathcoat-Amory, 2009). Therefore, in order to tackle this situation, a reform was needed to ensure the enlarged European Union could still function well (Church & Phinnemore, 2010). The Lisbon Treaty was proposed in response to an enlarged Union. In the field of common security and defence affairs, the Lisbon Treaty has not only renamed the ESDP to the CSDP but also has adjusted the institutional framework to achieve a more efficient and effective common security and defence policy on the international scene.
3.5.1 Improving the Institutionalised Framework of the CSDP

The Treaty Establishing a Constitution (European Constitution) originated after more than ten years of deliberation on institutional reforms after the Maastricht Treaty, and to ensure that the EU would still function after enlargement incorporating new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. The European Constitution was signed in 2004 in Rome and aimed at consolidating previous EU treaties into one single document to provide a more coherent and consistent institutional framework to cover all EU policy fields (European Constitution, signed in 2004). However, the European Constitution was rejected by two referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005. Consequently, the Lisbon Treaty was under the German Council Presidency in 2007 to replace the European Constitution with some amendments. The Lisbon Treaty has now completed all the processes of ratification and it entered into force on 1 December 2009.

The Lisbon Treaty did not maintain the three-pillar framework established by the Maastricht Treaty. It placed all three pillars under the single framework of the European Union, while still applying different decision-making rules to different policy areas (Church & Phinnemore, ibid.). The most important reform of the Lisbon Treaty involving the CSDP is to strengthen the role of the President of the European Council and the High Representative. The President of the European Council (the President) becomes a permanent position elected by the European Council, via qualified majority voting, and has a two-and-half-year term that is renewable once (Article 15, The Lisbon Treaty). The new President is expected to raise the consistent profile of the EU in international affairs, and Herman Van Rompuy, a former Belgium Prime Minister, is appointed as the first President of the European Council from 1 December 2009.
The capacity of the Foreign Affairs Council and High Representative has been increased in the Lisbon Treaty. It has been considered a ‘big change’ to the Council (Kionka, 2009). The High Representative now has the capacity to make proposals in the Council and chair the Foreign Affairs Council, and is also the Vice-President of the Commission at the same time (Article 18, The Lisbon Treaty). Besides, the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) is supposed to assist the High Representative to monitor international situations, prepare Council meetings, initiate proposals, and implement Council decisions (Article 27.3, The Lisbon Treaty). Because the creation of the EEAS increases the independence and capability of the High Representative, it is considered a phenomenon of Brusselsisation (Rosamond, 2010, p. 251). Catherine Ashton, a former UK European Trade Commissioner, was appointed as the new High Representative on 1 December 2009.

Also, the status of the European Defence Agency (EDA) is strengthened in the Lisbon Treaty. Accordingly, the EDA is charged with the authority to identify the objectives of military capability of member states, and evaluate whether member states need to improve them (Article 45, The Lisbon Treaty). Before the Lisbon Treaty, the capability targets were negotiated and decided by the Council. The Lisbon Treaty offers the EDA authority to improve capability targets of EU member states, and therefore will assist the improvement of CSDP capability.

Although the Lisbon Treaty has offered the EU a ‘legal personality’ that enables the EU to have treaty-making power and rights during missions (Schoutheete & Andoura, 2007), the EU has not been authorised to present this legal personality in all situations, especially regarding security and defence affairs (Piris, 2010, pp. 86–88). Taking the Libyan crisis as an example, although the High Representative Catherine Ashton had attempted to provide a coherent EU image on this issue, she could not bypass member states in taking major decisions unless authorised by the Council. Therefore, if member states still lack the political will to implement the CSDP, the
Lisbon Treaty will not really make the EU more effective when responding to international crises (Blockmans & Wessel, 2009, p. 47).

### 3.5.2 Defining Objectives of the CSDP since the Lisbon Treaty

Besides adjusting the framework of the CSDP, the Lisbon Treaty also codified the content of CSDP missions into the treaty framework. Accordingly, the EU will be able to undertake five CSDP missions: (1) joint disarmament operations; (2) humanitarian and rescue tasks; (3) military advice and assistance tasks; (4) conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; and (5) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, such as peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation (Article 43.1, The Lisbon Treaty). This content is broader than the Petersberg tasks because it increases joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation. It signifies that the EU has become more ambitious in undertaking military operations of CSDP missions.

The Lisbon Treaty does not set general standards about when and how to launch a CSDP mission. This is because each mission has different situations and aims (Séailles, 2009); meanwhile, member states would not be committed to supporting any CSDP missions because they also have to evaluate each mission case by case (Keetch, 2009). Nevertheless, although the Lisbon Treaty does not build general procedures about how to assure contributions from member states, this broader definition offers a legitimate basis for member states to apply in case they have political will to intervene in relevant situations. Besides, the Lisbon Treaty makes it clear that member states also have to make civilian capabilities available together with military capabilities (Article 43.2, The Lisbon Treaty). This provision strengthens the civilian dimension of the CSDP, and also enhances the civilian role that the EU has pursued since the early 2000s.
Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty introduces a project for permanent structured co-operation in the EU (Article 42.6, Article 46, The Lisbon Treaty). This project allows some of the member states of the EU to establish permanent structured co-operation just between themselves in order to fulfil important criteria in defence affairs by making more binding commitments on military capabilities. Although it provides a more flexible approach to achieving higher security and defence integration and some member states of the EU have expressed interest, this project has not yet been fulfilled.

To summarise, the Lisbon Treaty has not changed the intergovernmental decision-making process of the CSDP but has increased the role of EU institutions. Member states are still the dominant factors to influence the CSDP and can still lobby the EU to input national interests. The institutionalisation process in EU security and defence integration has built a framework that maintains the intergovernmental basis, but also increases the institutionalised feature. As was mentioned above, the Lisbon Treaty is the result of learning-by-doing, which means member states realise the shortcomings of institutions through continuing practice and participation. In other words, the more member states take part, the more they will know how to improve this framework. This is what institutionalists called the ‘reciprocal relationship’ or the ‘reciprocal link’ between institutional developments and the habit of member states in co-operating to achieve joint objectives (March & Olsen, 1984; M. E. Smith, 2004a, p. 17). Once they are used to this link, co-ordination, consistency and coherence can happen for member states and the EU. As Séailles, a senior staff for security policy in the EU, has stated, ‘practicing the CSDP will help to build a better institutional framework and help member states to learn from the past’ (2009). Therefore, if member states continue the practice of the CSDP, they are supposed to become more embedded in this framework and contribute to a path for further institutional developments and the institutionalisation process of the CSDP.
3.5.3 Implications of the Lisbon Treaty to the CSDP

The Lisbon Treaty provides a more definite institutional framework for implementing the CSDP. Especially for the High Representative, the Treaty offers a whole executive team to plan and implement policies for this post. The EU institutions now have a definite role in participating in the CSDP, and the bureaucratic system in the CSDP also becomes more organised and institutionalised. Take as an example the EEAS, which has been considered as representing a major step whereby the EU can become an international actor (Vanhoonacker & Reslow, 2010). The framework of the EEAS has the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS); also, under the PSC and EUMS, the EEAS also has a Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), EUMC, EUMS, CIVCOM, a Civil & Military Planning Department (CMPD), a Political and Military Group (PMG), Civilian Planning and Conducting Capabilities (CPCC) and a EU Operations Centre.

Accordingly, the EEAS has already become a massive and complicated bureaucratic system. However, will the phenomenon of ‘Brusselsisation’ increase the psychological distance between member states and the EU? Britain, especially, because it already felt distanced from the EU (Heathcoat-Amory, 2009), would definitely not welcome a supranational or Brusselsised CSDP. Similar opinions were shared by the German MdBs interviewed in this thesis in arguing that Brussels should not intervene in CSDP decision-making because the EU is not a ‘real’ state (Arnold, 2009; Bartels, 2010; Henne, 2009). There is a generally sceptical feeling among Europeans towards the EU (Séailles, 2009). Regarding this, the EU and member states are considered to have responsibility for the isolated feeling between people and EU issues (Kionka, 2009), and therefore both of them have to resolve this dilemma, namely, how to maintain an efficient and effective framework for the CSDP and ensure the most participation from member states at the same time.
In addition, the Lisbon Treaty introduces the new President of the European Council and the High Representative for the foreign affairs and security policy. These new positions are supposed to enhance the leadership of EU institutions in the CSDP, and they would have more equal status to work with member states.

As Ashton herself stated in an interview with the Fletcher Forum, she aimed to develop a team relationship with foreign ministers of member states (Ashton, 2011a, p. 9). Although aspiring towards an ambitious goal, Ashton is criticised for being incapable of playing a leading role. For example, when she came to the European Parliament for the first time, she was criticised for her vague rhetoric and lack of ‘lucid presentation of priority’; one MEP even said: ‘the Parliament did not want her to be an ambassador for 27 foreign ministers’ (Traynor, 2010). Joylon Howorth considers that Van Rompuy or Ashton, lacking ambition and experience, are still unable to provide a strong leadership for the EU to improve its role on the international stage (Howorth, 2011).

Moreover, as mentioned above, the Lisbon Treaty does not resolve the problem of how to make sure member states maintain reliable contributions to CSDP missions. Although member states are committed to implementing CSDP missions, sometimes the EU encounters the problem of understaffing, even in the field of civilian missions. It is argued by the people interviewed that because most civilian staff are not working for national governments or the EU, it is impossible to force them to take part in CSDP missions (Anonymous, 2009; Toll, 2009). In terms of the military dimension, the Eurozone crisis led member states to cut defend budgets. EU countries had cut military spending ‘by an amount equivalent to the entire annual defence budget of Germany’ since 2008 (Valasek, 2011c). This would inevitably affect their political will to maintain full commitment to the CSDP. Although it was also argued that the result might encourage member states to poll and share military resources (Valasek, 2011a, 2011d), this austerity will inevitably have a short-term
impact on the political will of member states in contributing to launching CSDP missions.

3.6 Conclusion

The establishment of an institution is considered to create ‘information-rich’ grounds for actors, and the transparency of the decision-making process will also be increased thereby; therefore, trust among actors will be gained more easily when they work in an institution together and positive-sum bargains are more likely to happen (Rosamond, 2000, p. 204). However, because an institution is created by rationalists and their rational decisions (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 940, 944–946; Pollack, 2004, pp. 138, 141; 2005, pp. 19–22), national governments will only agree to transfer their sovereignty to supranational authority after prudent consideration.

Especially regarding security and defence affairs, national governments may agree to act together, but they are unlikely to accept a supranational authority for conducting their defence and security. As was argued by Heathcoat-Amory, ‘the development of the European security policy will be based on intergovernmental co-operation; a supranational framework is not preferable for our Conservative Party’ (Heathcoat-Amory, 2009). Actually, no British MPs or German MdBs interviewed for this thesis preferred a supranational framework for conducting security and defence affairs. Even though it has been more than fifty years since the failure of the EDC, there is no significant sign that EU member states would accept a supranational framework for security and defence policy.
Certainly, this intergovernmental framework signifies the decisive role played by EU member states in the CSDP decision-making. Although the reforms made in the Lisbon Treaty are supposed to improve co-ordination and coherence between member states and the EU and also help implement the CSDP, this framework still largely depends on member states’ co-operation. Political will is still the most crucial factor in deciding whether the CSDP can achieve common security and defence in Europe.

Nevertheless, a framework which maintains the intergovernmental basis but ensures efficient institutions is acceptable both to member states and EU institutions, because it at least offers an environment in which they can work for relevant issues (Anonymous, 2009; Bartels, 2010; Séailles, 2009). The process of institutionalisation of EU security and defence integration, from the EPC, CFSP and ESDP to the CSDP, has illustrated this consequence. A more concrete context for objectives, mission targets and work-sharing arrangements is gradually defined in this framework. This process also demonstrates how, via constant participation and practice in the institutionalisation process, member states are able to get more involved in this system and may become more used to utilising the instruments within this framework to achieve common objectives.

Concerning the influence of political will upon the implementation of a common security and defence policy, it is important to investigate the criteria of member states in this institutionalisation process. As Britain and Germany are two of important member states in the EU and have fundamentally different attitudes towards military and defence issues, it is useful to compare their policies vis-à-vis security and defence integration issues in this framework and examine whether they are able to co-operate to promote further integration. Accordingly, the next two chapters will discuss British and German examples.
CHAPTER FOUR
Britain and EU Security and Defence Integration

4.1 Introduction

The role of Britain in the process of European integration is controversial. Sometimes it is described as ‘one of reluctance’, ‘awkwardness’ and ‘semi-detachment’ (Geddes, 2004, p. 1), and one prioritising the ‘special relationship’ with America (Gamble, 1998; George, 1998). Although there was a concern about whether this special relationship would cease owing to the end of the Cold War, John Dumbrell indicates the War on Terror offers a new impetus to make these two countries become closer (Dumbrell, 2004); however, Dumbrell also argues that this special relationship is more emphasised by the British than by the Americans (Dumbrell, 2006, 2009). Nevertheless, the concern about the special relationship with America inevitably affects British foreign policy and the policy on European affairs.

Besides the concern about the special relationship with America, the UK has traditionally showed distance towards the affairs of the European continent. The idea of building a ‘United States of Europe’ was promoted by the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (Churchill, 1946, repr. in Nelsen & Stubb, 1998); however, Churchill did not include Britain in this novel European federation. Actually, what Churchill called for was a united country in the European continent, and then any war between France and Germany would become impossible. Indeed, for Churchill, Britain had its own dreams and tasks, and therefore Britain was ‘with Europe’ instead of ‘being part of Europe’ (Pilkington, 2001, pp. 2–3).
Being a global Empire over hundreds of years, Britain is used to planning its foreign policy from the perspective of global politics. Although the history of Empire has faded, the legacy stays. Therefore, British foreign policy is affected by three concentric circles, the Atlantic alliance, Europe, and the British Commonwealth (Pilkington, ibid.). The UK Conservative MP David Heathcoat-Amory has also indicated that Britain has universal interests. The special relationship with America is the most important, followed by the British Commonwealth and then is Europe. Heathcoat-Amory considered the EU as being more a link to connect the UK and the world (Heathcoat-Amory, 2009). This typically British opinion originated from a history of empire, and still influences the UK’s foreign policy today.

Viewing itself as having a particular presence in global politics, Britain did not restrain itself from being a regional power in Europe after WWII and still attempted to maintain flexibility in foreign policy and exert influence in the world. This attitude hindered Britain from taking part in the establishment of ECSC. As a result, Britain missed the chance to shape the initial stage of institutionalised European integration, but did not realise it at the beginning. Although Britain changed its mind and applied for accession to the EC since the early 1960s, as the Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan argued, in the 1960s the major concern of British foreign policy was still on trade relations with the Commonwealth countries (Pilkington, ibid., p. 12). Macmillan’s opinion was corresponding to the tradition: ‘be with Europe but not of Europe.’ Nevertheless, when Prime Minister Edward Heath signed the Treaty of Accession to join the EC from 1973, Britain also became one participator of European integration.

Britain’s accession to the EC signified that it took a more pragmatic attitude towards economic integration in Europe, but it also created a difference between Britain and the Six about integration. Margaret Thatcher’s speech at the College of Europe in Bruges may serve as an example. Thatcher had argued that Britain favoured
intergovernmental co-operation instead of concentrating power at a European centre, and therefore the EC should be a ‘family of nations’ rather than a European super-state; she was also opposed to adopting new treaty frameworks for European integration (Thatcher, 1988; repr. in Nelsen & Stubb, 1998). This attitude of rejecting the adoption of new treaty frameworks still exists in British EU policy today. The Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron rejecting changes to reform the Lisbon Treaty, which was proposed for resolving the Eurozone crisis at the end of 2011, is an example. Cameron considered that this would undermine the City of London which was an important part of the British economy (C. Walker, 2011). This signified that UK governments are very sensitive about national interests and this firm stance usually makes Britain reluctant to make concessions in the process of European economic integration.

On the other hand, being a major military power in the world, Britain has its military ambitions. Therefore, as opposed to having a prudent attitude towards supranational integration on the European community, Britain is more interested in developing security and defence co-operation in Europe. However, even though Britain has made efforts to establish an intergovernmental framework for the CFSP and develop the ESDP to accomplish common defence, it cannot be concluded simply that Britain is fully engaged in the framework of the EU. Although people may argue Tony Blair’s pro-European policy presented a policy shift towards the EU, his proactive attitude towards European integration only happened in his first term. Since he chose to stand with America on the ‘War on Terror’, Britain distanced itself again from the European Continent. Besides, Britain seems to prefer to enhance bilateral defence co-operation with individual partner countries rather than promote deepening of the CSDP (O’Donnell, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). The evidence can be found in Britain signing the treaties for enhancing bilateral defence co-operation with France in 2010; also, Britain co-operated with France to lead the multi-state coalition in the military mission in Libya. Therefore the determination of Britain to improve
the institutional framework of security and defence integration of the EU is not assured.

This chapter will explore the role of Britain in security and defence integration in the EU and examine how national interests affect British choices in this process. Accordingly, it will explain the factors resulting in the hesitant and cautious attitude of Britain towards European integration and the institutionalised framework of the EU. Also, this chapter will analyse why Britain has a preference for military co-operation and how this preference affects Britain taking part in EU security and defence integration. More specific discussions about the role of Britain in the Kosovo crisis and the Libyan crisis will be presented in Chapters 6 and 7.

4.2 Background of Britain's Policy on the Initial Development of European Integration

Britain was neither a founding member of the ECSC nor part of the EC until 1973 when the Community completed its first enlargement. Since the Six signed the Treaty of Paris in 1951 to establish the ECSC, from then until Britain signed the Treaty of Rome to become a member of the EC in 1973 had been over twenty years. In other words, Britain was absent from the initial progress of European integration for some two decades.

One reason Britain did not take part in initiating the ECSC was because Britain defined itself as having a special role in world politics. The development of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), initiated by Britain, may be seen as a British
approach differing from the prospect of the EC on economic integration in Europe. Another reason to delay the participation of Britain in European integration was the veto imposed twice by the French President, Charles de Gaulle, on British applications. Britain had made applications to the EC in 1961 and 1967, but both were rejected by de Gaulle, in 1963 and 1967. Actually, when de Gaulle was in office as the French President from 1959 to 1968, Britain had no chance of being adopted as a member of the EC.

The absence of participation for decades has inevitably resulted in Britain feeling distanced from European integration and became not that committed to it. This distanced feeling still exists nowadays in British politics. For example, in the campaign for the 2010 General Election, David Cameron, when he was still the leader of the opposition, had promised a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty before it came into force if the Conservative Party won the election (D. Cameron, 2009). It was not the first time that Britain had attempted to overturn the existing institutional framework of European integration. There was a referendum in 1975 on whether to leave the EC, which was launched by the Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Although the result showed the majority of the British public supported staying in the EC (Gay, 2011), it nevertheless signified that European integration was a controversial issue for Britain.

4.2.1 Describe Britain’s Foreign Policy Traditions on Europe

Having the largest colonial empire in the world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Britain used to define its foreign policy from a global perspective. As a result, for Britain, Europe was not the first priority in its foreign policy. At that time, Britain’s attention was largely concentrated on consolidating its empire; even though the influence of the Empire had declined after two World Wars, interests in the Commonwealth nations still occupied much attention in Britain’s foreign policy.
Generally speaking, there are three main factors that have traditionally influenced Britain’s foreign policy in undertaking European affairs. Firstly, in the past Britain did not assume itself to be part of Europe. Britain is geographically distant from the European continent, and this distance results in a psychological distance of the British people from Europe. Take Winston Churchill’s speech in 1946, which called for a United States of Europe, for example. This idea aimed at helping France and Germany to reach reconciliation, but this proposal did not include Britain itself. Churchill argued that ‘we British have our own Commonwealth of Nations’, and Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, America and the Soviet Russia would support this ‘new Europe’ (Churchill, ibid.). This speech implied two things. Firstly, Britain viewed itself as one of the Great Powers. Secondly, Britain saw the special connection with the Commonwealth as a priority. Therefore, Britain’s national interest in foreign policy in the early 1950s was made on the basis of ‘a continuing belief in Britain’s world role’ (P. Morris, 1996, p. 125). Occupied with a ‘traditional globalist orientation’ in the early post-war years (George, 1991, p. 34), Britain, with its policy of locating itself as a global power rather than a regional European power, lacked interest in the regional project of supranational European integration. This policy did not change until the end of the 1950s.

Secondly, Britain was suspicious about the European continent because of the long history of war in Europe. Therefore, Britain used to believe that maintaining flexibility in foreign policy was a fundamental approach to protect the freedom of Britain, and also Europe. In 1988 in Bruges, Thatcher described the history of Europe as ‘a series of interminable wars and quarrels’, and said, ‘we British have a special way contributed to Europe’; she also believed Britain had a responsibility to ‘prevent Europe from falling under the dominance of a single power’ (Thatcher, ibid.). She put Britain in a special position: it was not part of the European continent, but still maintained some connections. Thatcher’s perspective explained to some extent why Britain was used to take a cautious and distanced attitude towards European affairs.
Moreover, the proposal of establishing a supranational institution to manage industries of coal and steel in Europe was not favoured by either the Labour Party or the Conservative Party in Britain. For the Conservative Party, Britain’s future depended on three international circles of influence, the Commonwealth, America and Europe, and then Britain would not ‘pledge the latter at the expense of the other two’ (P. Morris, ibid.). The Labour Party won the General Election in 1945 because of being expected to resolve the problem of high unemployment and economic depression; therefore the Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, undertook a series of social welfare policies, such as creating the National Health Service, and programmes for nationalising industries such as coal, gas and the railway system. Given this situation, the Labour Government would not favour to transfer authority to another supranational institution in Europe.

4.2.2 Britain’s Approach to Reconstruct Europe

In spite of being absent from the initial programme for European economic integration, Britain was not indifferent to European affairs. As Thatcher stated, Britain had its way of contributing to Europe. Supporting the establishment of EFTA and NATO were the two ways in which Britain could contribute to promoting economic development and stabilising security environment in Europe.

Because the Conservative Party had a preference for free trade rather than for joining a close economic union, the ideas of the ECSC and the Common Market were not so attractive to it. This was not only due to lack of interest in a project of economic integration with strong political implications; also, Britain was reluctant to join a common agricultural policy. However, after winning the General Election in 1951 the Conservative Government also recognised the necessity of forming an economic mechanism to promote free trade. The frustration resulting from the Suez crisis gave Britain more impulse to review a worldwide interest strategy because in
the 1950s the British Empire was declining while America and the Soviet Union were rising (Hyam, 2007, pp. 221–240; S. C. Smith, 2007; Sorby, 2002). This situation pushed the Conservative Government to ‘work more closely with Europe’ (Eden, 1956, cited in Newman, 1997, p. 10). The application to the EEC in 1961 was therefore considered a recognition of this necessity (Parr, 2006).

Britain also worried that, if it kept on standing outside of Europe, the EEC would become too dominant in Europe. By saying that ‘what I chiefly fear ... is the Common Market coming into being and the Free Trade Area never following’ (Macmillan, 1971, cited in J. W. Young, 2000, p. 53), Macmillan addressed the concern that it would be incompatible with Britain’s national interests if Europe could not build a free trade area. Therefore, in order to avoid being marginalised from Europe and also to promote the development of the FTA, Macmillan signed the treaty to form a European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with six other European countries in 1959.

EFTA was the fulfilment of Britain’s idea for free trade. Compared to the Common Market, which aimed to establish a close economic union via supranational institutions, EFTA did not have strong political or integrationist implications but had the objective of building a low-tariff common market (Pilkington, 2001, p. 12). Besides, EFTA did not include common agriculture policy because that would undermine the existing trade relationship with the Commonwealth. By and large, EFTA and the EEC were two different approaches between the EEC Six and the EFTA Seven to further economic integration. More specifically, these two approaches represented different perspectives between Britain and France towards the economic and political future of Europe (Wurm, 1995b). Therefore, the history of European integration before the 1990s was more like a history of Anglo-French differences over the issues, including supranational integration or intergovernmental co-operation, EFTA or the EEC, British accession to the EC, the EC’s budget problem, and the common agricultural policy.
EFTA was claimed by Macmillan to ‘form a basis for negotiating a comprehensive European settlement’ (Wurm, ibid., p.62). In other words, the Macmillan Government did not give up the attempt at establishing a pan-European free trade area. However, EFTA neither became a basis for incorporating the EEC nor was able to compete with the EEC. The EEC experienced fast economic growth, which made Britain become a supplicant to the EEC and pushed it to review its traditional thinking of ‘imperial supremacy’ (Newman, 1997, pp. 12–14). Britain’s growing share of exports to the EEC (from 19.0 per cent in 1962 to 24.7 per cent in 1973) signified that the EEC/EC was becoming a more important market (Rollings, 2007, p. 26), and so joining the EC became more and more unavoidable.

Besides, there were divergences inside the EFTA Seven as well. EFTA did not reach a consensus on agriculture and fishery co-operation at any time in the 1960s. The only significant success achieved by EFTA in the 1960s was building free trade in industrial products in 1966. The decision by Britain to charge 30 per cent import tax also irritated other EFTA member states, especially Scandinavian countries (Archer, 1976). Since the progress of EFTA of accomplishing a free trade area was slow, Britain had to consider whether to compromise with the EEC.

Moreover, America also pressed Britain to take part in the EEC. The US warned that ‘the special relationship would decline if Britain did not join the EEC’ (Middlemas, 1990, cited in J. W. Young, 2000, p. 66). Britain also worried that ‘the Americans will think more and more of the Six as the group which they have to consult in Europe’ (Greenwood, 1992, cited in Newman, 1997, p. 15). Under American pressure and also for economic incentives, Britain made its first application to the EEC in 1961. Britain’s application to the EEC was a fundamental policy shift because it implied the UK would adopt a supranational form for the achievement of economic integration, which was once considered to be incompatible with the national interests of Britain (Newman, ibid.). Therefore, the policy change of Britain in applying to the EEC may
be interpreted as a redefinition and evolution of national interests from the perspective of worldwide interests to more pragmatic, realistic and regional thinking.

In terms of the development of European security system, in the early years after WWII, the Labour Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin had between 1945 and 1947 proposed an idea of building a political, economic and military bloc in Europe. This proposal was also based on a consideration of national interests because it would strengthen Britain’s role as a global power; meanwhile, the proposal was also made in response to the absence of a firm promise from Americans to defend Europe (Dedman, 1996, pp. 35–37). As the relationship between the West and the East deteriorated and the US made a promise to defend Europe, this proposal was left aside. Especially when the Soviet Union was able to make nuclear weapons from 1949, development of independent military forces by European countries became more unrealistic.

When the initiative of the EDC was proposed, Britain was still outside the group of the Six. Although it signed a Treaty of Association with the EDC, it did not mean to contribute to a European army. Britain already made a commitment to NATO, and could be protected by NATO and America. It would be not necessary to join the EDC. Therefore, signing this Association treaty was more like a connection between Britain and the Six. Actually, the three Foreign Ministers from the mid-1940s to mid-1950s, Ernest Bevin, Herbert Morrison and Anthony Eden, had expressed similar concern that Britain would not contribute to developing a European army because this effort might result in American withdrawal from protecting Europe (Dedman, ibid., pp. 76–79). Nevertheless, the signature could be considered for the purpose that Britain would not become marginalised in this framework if the EDC were finally achieved.
4.2.3 Britain’s Shift to European Community

Because it realised a more realistic policy was needed, rather than a strategy of global interest, in response to the declining influence of British Empire, the Macmillan Government changed policy and made the first application to the EEC in 1961. In the meeting between the EEC Six and Britain in October 1961 in Paris, the British representative, Edward Heath (also British Prime Minister from 1970 to 1974), admitted that the economic and political achievements of the EEC was one of the attractive factors for Britain in applying for accession (Heath, 1961). However, because Britain attempted to ensure the access of the Commonwealth to the British market and called for special consideration for British agricultural policy during negotiations with the EEC Six, it was criticised for lack of commitment to the EEC, especially because de Gaulle considered the UK a ‘Trojan horse’ in Europe (Chopra, 1974, p. 278) which would open the gates to US influence and Anglo-Saxon capitalism.

In a press conference on 14 January 1963, de Gaulle considered that if the EEC Six compromised with the UK and accepted special requests made by Britain, this would undermine the consensus foundation which had been made by the Six; also, de Gaulle was concerned such compromise would increase divergences in the Community, which would then become ‘a colossal Atlantic community under American dependence and direction, and which quickly absorbed the community of Europe’ (de Gaulle, 1963). Since accession to membership had to be agreed by the Six unanimously, de Gaulle’s opposition halted Britain’s first application.

Another application was submitted by the Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1967, but was rejected again by de Gaulle for similar reasons. In another press conference on 27 November 1967, de Gaulle argued that since the economic system and interests between Britain and the Six were still incompatible, he would offer
only Britain associate member status with the EC rather than full membership; meanwhile, at this time de Gaulle was still concerned about the impact of the UK–US special relationship on the Community (de Gaulle, 1967). It was not surprising that this statement had provoked the Labour Government. In a press conference on 29 November 1967, Wilson spurned every reason asserted by de Gaulle for rejecting Britain’s application and complained, ‘those who rely on a static concept in a rapidly moving world are themselves backwards’ (Wilson, 1967). Regardless of gaining support from other EC countries, Britain could not win accession to the EC without the consent of France.

After Georges Pompidou replaced Charles de Gaulle as President from May 1969, the position of France regarding UK application became more flexible; Britain finally found its own chance to enter the EC. In June 1970, Britain and three other applicant countries were able to start the first ministerial meeting with the Six in Luxembourg; after one and a half years, Britain, Denmark and Ireland signed the Treaty of Rome in 1971 and the first enlargement in the history of European integration was completed. It was worth noting that although Norway finished the negotiations with the Six and signed the Treaty of Accession, the result of the public referendum did not favour the Treaty; therefore, the first enlargement of the EC only included Britain, Denmark and Ireland.

In fact, when Britain chose a wait-and-see strategy in the 1950s regarding the initial development of the ECSC and the Common Market, it did not expect this project would meet with great success in the 1960s, nor did it foresee its application would be blocked for more than ten years by France. For Britain, this was an unintended consequence. Therefore, it was considered that ‘the refusal to enter talks on the Schuman Plan’ was ‘the most critical of the lost opportunities for Great Britain to lead Europe’ (Nutting, 1960, cited in J. W. Young, 2000, p. 48). This absence also made Britain unable to share in common working practices or mutual commitment.
to the Community. Because it underestimated the achievement of economic integration by the Six and the consequences of being absent from this project might be, Britain had to adopt most provisions made by the Six, which it might not have favoured.

Take the budget issue, for example. The budgetary framework agreed by the Six at the Hague summit in 1969 set a framework to decide national contributions to the EC budget. Under this budgetary framework, Britain would become the second biggest contributor, just behind West Germany, to the EC budget, and would not be paid much back in agricultural subsidies (Godley, 1980). In the 1971 White Paper, Prime Minister Heath admitted that there were some disadvantages to membership that Britain had to tolerate, the high amount of contributions to the EC budget, £300 million a year, being one of them (Geddes, 2004, p. 70). In order to build a more balanced budget framework, Britain had to take almost ten years to resolve this issue, from 1975 to 1984. In the 1984 Fontainebleau European Council meeting, a final settlement of the contribution plan named ‘The UK’s Correction’ was agreed to cut Britain’s contributions after 1985, and this was essentially the British rebate that Thatcher negotiated for the UK (Mattelaer, 2010).

Moreover, the concept of path dependence can also be applied to explain why de Gaulle rejected Britain’s application. One of the reasons de Gaulle rejected Britain’s application was that its accession to the Common Market might undermine existing agreements and institutional framework made by the Six. Indeed, the founding members, which had invested time and resources to build an institutional framework, would be inclined to maintain the sustainable development of this framework. Since the accession of Britain to the EC would inevitably ‘break what existed’ (de Gaulle, 1967), de Gaulle had to take a more cautious attitude towards this issue. This attitude helps explain that actors have a tendency to maintain the
sustainability and consistency of an institution and this tendency may lead to the result of ‘path dependence’ and affect the future of this institution.

Nevertheless, the case of Britain’s accession to the EC also demonstrated how national interests affected this process. De Gaulle not only rejected Britain because this could undermine the cohesion of the Six, but also worried that its accession could weaken the leading role of France in the Community. On the other hand, Britain changed policy and applied to the Common Market because it recognised this was a favourable option for economic development, and Britain should not be excluded from the Common Market for too long. This event has illustrated that since national governments play a dominant role in the process of institutional developments, including initiating an institution, changing it, reforming it or abandoning it, whether the development of an institutional framework is compatible with national interests inevitably affects the participation of governments.

4.2.4 Britain in the European Political Co-operation

Regarding the project of EPC, Britain did not express much aspiration for it or any project of political integration in Europe at the beginning. As Macmillan stated, for him the EEC was mainly ‘an intergovernmental co-operative economic entity’ (cited in Gowland & Turner, 2000, p. 98). Macmillan’s words implied two things. Firstly, the EEC was not expected by Britain to work for political purposes; secondly, the EEC was expected to work on the principle of intergovernmental co-operation instead of a supranational approach.

Similarly, in the visit to the Council of Europe on 23 January 1967, when answering the question from the Italian Vice-President of the Consultative Assembly, Montini, about whether Britain was in favour of political integration, the Labour Prime Minister Wilson said this option was acceptable for Britain. However, referring to the
question about ‘the political future of Europe’ from the Belgium representative Struye, Wilson only promised Britain would talk with the Six once they discussed British entry into the EC (Merand, 2003). Wilson’s statement implied that he was not in accord with the Six, which had a strong aspiration for political integration in Europe.

Certainly, the main factor to attract Britain into the EEC/EC was the economic incentive, and therefore much of Britain’s attention was concentrated on this topic. However, the dissatisfaction about the unbalanced budgetary framework and disappointment with the possible economic benefits accruing from membership of the EC also led to a referendum in 1975, which was the first referendum in Britain’s history and was calling for reopening of negotiations about the Treaty of Accession. The result showed 67 per cent of British people in favour of EC membership, but on only a 65 per cent turnout of the registered electorate (Gay, 2011). The issue of an unbalanced budgetary framework and Britain’s contributions to the EC also triggered public dissatisfaction, and this issue, from the mid-1970s to 1984, made the relationship between Britain and other EC members tense (Godley, 1980). Nevertheless, this budgetary issue had two implications. Firstly, institutions were not unchangeable, but might take longer to change than to establish. Secondly, national interests were proven again to be a major consideration for national governments in making a commitment to an institutional framework.

In order to alleviate negative sentiment from other EC members towards Britain because of the budget issue, Thatcher had tried to show good intentions regarding the development of the EPC. In a speech to the European Parliament on 16 December 1981, Thatcher admitted that co-ordination of foreign policies through the EPC was essential for the EC to be ‘a force of stability’ in the world; the EPC was thus considered as representing a ‘single and coherent’ European approach for undertaking international affairs (Lak, 1992, p. 41). However, Thatcher did not make
a clear promise regarding whether Britain aspired to a real common foreign policy in Europe.

Besides, Thatcher appreciated the special relationship with America much more than prime ministers before her had done. Since the menace of the Soviet Union still existed and NATO was the only military mechanism capable of confronting the Soviet Union, Britain had to ensure the presence of America and NATO on the European continent. This concern constrained Britain to make a serious commitment to developing common security or defence in Europe. Moreover, Thatcher had a good personal connection with the American President Ronald Reagan. Both were conservative realists, and this connection even enhanced the special relationship with America and consolidated Britain’s support for NATO; therefore, Thatcher did not have an ambition to reform the EPC to develop a more centralised framework (Lak, ibid., p. 47). Although emphasising a ‘maximum of consistency’, Britain’s draft for reforming the EPC, proposed in the 1985 Milan European Council meeting, was a relatively moderate proposal which preferred to maintain the status quo and rejected extending the capacity of the Commission in the EPC (Lak, ibid.).

Compared to Britain’s draft, the drafts proposed by Italy, the Netherlands, France and Germany were more ambitious. These drafts aimed to increase consistency between the EPC and the EC, for example by setting a General Secretariat staffed by European officials to ensure continuity and consistency of the EPC and the EC (Franco-German version), allowing all EC Ministerial Councils tackling EPC matters (the Netherlands version), and establishing a General Affairs Council to pursue ‘one and the same external policy’ (Italian version) (Lak, ibid., pp. 47–48). However, because of lacking consensus, the Single European Act (SEA), which signed in 1986, only codified the procedures of the EPC into the EC, although the establishment of a Secretariat General charged with supporting the Presidency improved connections between the EPC and the Commission.
In a speech delivered in 1988 in Bruges, Thatcher expressed her preference for intergovernmental co-operation by arguing ‘co-operation between sovereign states should be the best approach for a European Community’; she also emphasised the reluctance to adopt new treaties since ‘the North Atlantic Treaty, the revised Brussels Treaty and the Treaty of Rome were capable of tackling the future developments of the Community’ (Thatcher, ibid.). This statement signified that Britain maintained a very cautious attitude towards making a new commitment to European integration. Although Thatcher did not favour establishing a new framework for European integration, the reunification of two German states and the end of the Cold War pushed European countries to rethink the future of Europe. Therefore, the succeeding Conservative Prime Minister, John Major (1990–1997), had to adopt a more moderate and pragmatic policy for the establishment of a European Union.

Major was originally opposed to building a federal Europe. Nevertheless he made a promise to put Britain ‘at the heart of Europe’ on signing a new treaty (Wester, 1992, pp. 197–198). Referring to the conclusion made in the 1991 Luxembourg European Council meeting which adopted a new draft treaty for the European Union, Major said he welcomed the new draft treaty and the three-pillared approach because this meant ‘some things are done on the basis of Community treaties and others on the basis of intergovernmental action outside the Treaty of Rome’; he also considered that a common foreign and security policy would enhance the Atlantic Alliance (Miskimmon, 2001).

Major’s statement signified that it was not in Britain’s national interests to expand the supranational framework to other policy areas of the EU. Therefore, Britain would not adopt a supranational framework in the field of security and defence affairs or expand the competence of the Commission to this field. Also, Major assumed the development of the common foreign and security policy would
enhance relations between the EU and NATO or America. This stance implied Britain would not accept any attempt which would undermine Britain’s promise to NATO or transatlantic relations. Basically, Major’s stance was consistent with other British prime ministers’.

The commitments to NATO and intergovernmentalism are two of the most important principles Britain has when it is considering developing security and defence integration in Europe. These commitments are consistent with Britain’s traditional foreign policy, which has a special focus on the UK–US special relationship and also maintains a rather independent position in Europe. Although these two commitments are not something new for Britain, they are becoming more lucid and definite in the process of Britain taking part in European integration. The more Britain takes part in this process, the more it knows what is compatible with its national interests. Therefore, for Britain, the institutionalisation process of European integration is also a learning process, and in this process Britain can learn and shape its path in protecting or pursuing national interests. This was why these two commitments were reiterated and strengthened by British governments in the developments of the CFSP, ESDP and CSDP.

4.3 Britain and an Institutionalised Common Security and Defence Framework

The change in the global security environment from the late 1980s urged the member states of the EC to play a more active political role in the world. The post-Cold War environment constituted a relatively peaceful security environment in the global context for Europe to pursue a European view of security, especially
because France always aspired to an alternative security approach to NATO (Menon, 1995, p. 22). Meanwhile, German reunification also strengthened the commitment of European countries to staying in the project of European integration in order to ensure that the reunited Germany was embedded in Europe and would not become another threat. Besides, because the EPC was unable to provide effective mechanism for member states to have a common position or act promptly in response to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (Edwards, 1992), a more efficient and effective common approach was needed to improve the capabilities of European countries in response to international crises or urgent situations. These factors created favourable conditions for the Maastricht Treaty to be adopted, and also pushed British governments to accept this reform.

4.3.1 Major’s Engagement in the Maastricht Treaty and the CFSP

The Maastricht Treaty was signed by the Conservative Government led by John Major on behalf of Britain. For Major, it was not realistic to block the negotiations for a new treaty and new framework for European integration. He did not want to repeat the failure of being absent from the initial process of the ECSC and the EEC, which more or less undermined the leading role of Britain in undertaking Community affairs. Also, Major was described as someone who lacked ‘ideological commitment’ (J. W. Young, 2000, p. 151) and therefore would find it possible to adopt a more flexible approach in undertaking EU affairs.

When explaining the stance of the Government on the Maastricht Treaty to Parliament, Major argued that ‘it is in Britain’s interests to continue to be at the heart of the European Community and able to shape its future’; he also stated that to avoid ‘the development of a federal Europe’ and develop ‘a European security policy compatible with NATO and co-operation in foreign policy’ were in the long-term interests of Britain (Major, 1991). This statement signified that the Major
Government would adopt a co-operative attitude towards the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of the EU.

The principles of the Major Government regarding the development of the CFSP did not change. A supranational framework was unacceptable, and such development should not undermine or weaken the role of NATO in Europe. This principle was also argued by Foreign Minister Malcolm Sinclair, who stated, ‘introducing mechanisms such as majority voting would weaken Europe’s voice and lead to acrimony and disunity’ (Sinclair, 1991). Sinclair also argued that NATO would be the priority of Britain for common defence in Europe in saying that the government would ‘make sure any European defence dimension does not weaken but reinforces NATO in which we already have a tried and tested common defence policy’ (Sinclair, ibid.).

Similar principles are still kept nowadays and stated by two UK MPs in the interviews for this thesis. Heathcoat-Amory, who was also Foreign Minister in the Major Government in 1993, insisted that NATO should be the primary military organisation for European security and that the development of European security policy should be based on intergovernmental co-operation (Heathcoat-Amory, 2009). Paul Keetch, who was a Liberal Democrat MP, also stated that NATO should not be replaced by the CSDP or EU forces (Keetch, 2009). Indeed, they had shared a consensus about the basis of intergovernmental co-operation for common security and defence policy in the EU and the primary role of NATO; even when the pro-European Prime Minister Blair initiated the ESDP, he did not intend to introduce a supranational framework for common security and defence affairs, because he called for the EU to be a ‘superpower’, but not a ‘superstate’ (Blair, 2000).

Because of the consideration of national interests, Britain inserted these principles into the Maastricht Treaty. Lynda Chalker, the Minister for Overseas Development, stated that there were two objectives of Britain regarding the CFSP. Firstly, Britain
would keep the CFSP outside the Treaty of Rome and maintain the intergovernmental framework. Secondly, Britain would ensure that decisions in the CFSP were made unanimously (Chalker, 1993). Besides, Chalker argued that it was the British Government’s aim to insert Article J.4.4 into the Maastricht Treaty in order to ensure Britain’s commitment to NATO would not be undermined by the implementation of the CFSP (Chalker, ibid.). Article J.4.4 asked that the Treaty should ‘respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty’ (Article J.4.4, The Maastricht Treaty).

Because the Treaty maintained an intergovernmental basis for the CFSP, and did not intend to develop an independent European security capability, these became crucial foundations for gaining support from Parliament. On 20 May 1993, the House of Commons approved the Maastricht Treaty with 292 votes in favour and 112 against (Hansard, vol. 225, cc381–471); two months later the House of Lords also approved the Treaty with 141 votes in favour and 29 against (Hansard, vol. 548, cc602–701).

Although the Major Government argued that it had done much to ensure the Maastricht Treaty was compatible with Britain’s national interests, the Government still encountered much opposition from the Conservative Party and the public. On the one hand, Thatcher and the Conservative MP Teddy Taylor had called for a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty; although the Treaty was approved by Parliament in the end, a tiny victory in the confidence vote on 23 July 1993 implied Major’s leadership was challenged (D. Baker, Gamble, & Ludlam, 1994).

On the other hand, according to a survey made by the European Commission in 1996 to identify public opinion in 15 member states, compared to the average of 65.8 per cent in fifteen member states, only 51.2 per cent of the British people questioned favoured developing a common foreign policy with non-EU countries. Also,
compared to the average 59.6 per cent of fifteen member states, only 47.6 per cent of the British people questioned favoured a common military and defence policy (Kernic, Callaghan, & Manigart, 2002, pp. 34–38). Besides, according to another survey made by the Commission in 1996, only 37 per cent of the British people questioned considered the membership of the EU a good thing for Britain (Eurobarometer Surveys, 1996). The results of these surveys showed that the general public of Britain did not have much enthusiasm for the CFSP or the idea of common defence and security.

The reasons why the British people lacked enthusiasm for the CFSP stemmed from two concerns. Firstly, too much involvement in developing independent European security and defence capabilities might undermine the existing transatlantic security relationship, since this connection had been seen as a cornerstone of American security guarantee since the end of the WWII (Sjursen, 1998, p. 107); besides, further institutionalisation of the CFSP might result in more national sovereignty being transferred to Brussels and EU institutions (H. Smith, 1998, p. 154). Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty maintained an intergovernmental basis and also ensured that participation in the CFSP would not affect the commitment of Britain to NATO. These were the results of Britain’s ‘input’. By participating in forming a treaty, Britain could play a leading role and shape the institutional framework in order to ensure this framework (output) would be compatible with Britain’s national interest.

4.3.2 Blair’s First Term and the Amsterdam Treaty

When the Labour Party won the 1997 General Election, its leader, Tony Blair, became Prime Minister to replace John Major. The Blair Government was described as a ‘New Labour’ Government because Blair promised to undertake a revolutionary approach in both internal and external affairs (Applebaum, 1997; A. Gray, 1998; A. Gray & Jenkins, 1998; Thompson, 1998). Regarding the EU and the development of
the CFSP, Blair also took a more engaged and active attitude than the Conservative Party or his Labour predecessors in the 1960s and 1970s.

The first task for the Blair Government was the Amsterdam Treaty. In the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), a few issues about the CFSP were discussed, including expanding majority rule to the CFSP and improving connections between member states and the Union. However, Britain did not favour adopting majority voting or a supranational structure to define the CFSP because this was not compatible with the intergovernmental principle.

A White Paper published by the Major Government clearly stated the stance of Britain in the 1996 IGC regarding reforming the institutional framework of the CFSP (UK White Paper, 1996). Stephen George indicated that there were three principles the Major Government adhered to in negotiating the 1996 IGC: (1) maintaining the intergovernmental framework, (2) a basis of consensus and unanimity, and (3) a representative for the Council. These principles were also shared by the Labour Party (George, 1996), and were consistent with Britain’s long-term stance on the EU and European integration, which was not changed.

Take the QMV issue for example. As the Labour MP Tessa Blackstone argued, although the Labour Party would agree to apply the QMV to the areas of social, regional, industrial and environment policy in order to prepare the enlargement project, it would not adopt QMV to be applied to the CFSP or JHA affairs (Blackstone, 1996). Although the QMV was still applied to some parts of the CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty, especially procedural matters, nevertheless there was no ‘wide-scale extension’ and it should not be applied to decisions with defence or military implications (Article J.13, The Amsterdam Treaty). Nevertheless, such an extension still invoked opposition in Parliament.
In response to the Opposition, the Foreign Minister of the Blair Government Doug Henderson had explained that the Government had made efforts to ensure such an extension would have an emergency brake, which was ‘the veto mechanism’, to allow any member state that ‘opposes a specific flexibility proposal’ to ‘veto it by bringing it back to the Council’ (Henderson, 1998). This stance was supported by the Liberal Democrat MP Menzies Campbell, who was Foreign Affairs spokesman for the Liberal Democrats from 1997 to 2006. He affirmed that since ‘foreign and security as a whole remains intergovernmental’ and member states maintained the capacity to reject CFSP decisions, this would be acceptable to Britain (Campbell, 1997). The Blair Government and supporters tried to persuade others that the Amsterdam Treaty was not incompatible with British national interests.

Moreover, this was a consensus in Britain that to agree the extension of QMV to some policy areas of the EU, including the CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty, was necessary in response to the coming enlargement project. The Labour MP Mike Gapes argued that ‘it is impossible to have any enlargement of the European Union without extending QMV to make the Union work effectively’ (Gapes, 1997), which illustrated that for Britain to adopt QMV to be applied to the CFSP was a necessary compromise. Indeed, a more efficient decision-making procedure was necessary in response to an enlarged EU and the Blair Government also supported enlarging the Union to East and South Europe.

4.3.3 Blair’s Efforts towards a Common Security and Defence Policy

There was another crucial decision made in Blair’s first term about EU security and defence integration, which was the launch of a common security and defence policy in Europe to develop EU military and defence capabilities. This was the most important decision made by Blair to improve the institutionalised framework and achieve the objective of common defence and security in Europe.
On 4 December 1998, Blair signed the St Malo Declaration with the French President Jacques Chirac and promised to enhance military co-operation between Britain and France. Although the St Malo Declaration was signed for British–French bilateral military co-operation, it became a foundation for the EU to develop the ESDP. The notable speech made by Blair in Chicago declared Blair’s ambition to develop a European defence capability. Blair argued that the ultimate objective of such development was to improve the contribution of Europe to NATO (Blair, 1999b). This objective was actually consistent with Britain’s commitment to NATO and the transatlantic alliance. Accordingly, the principle ‘without prejudice to actions by NATO’ was confirmed by the conclusions of the 1999 Cologne Council, which adopted the decision to develop the ESDP (Presidency Conclusions of Cologne European Council, adopted in 1999).

Regarding the concern that the St Malo Declaration, and developing armed capabilities in the EU, might undermine Britain’s commitment to NATO, Blair explained to Parliament why the Government had decided to sign the declaration with France. He argued: ‘strengthening European defence capability will, I believe, strengthen NATO’ (Blair, 1998b). This statement illustrated that Blair did not intend to develop an alternative military mechanism in Europe to replace NATO. Because there was always a voice within the EU to call for improving the security and defence capabilities of the EU, Blair suggested that the smartest thing for Britain to do was ‘not to pretend that that debate is not happening’, but that Britain should ‘get in there and shape it so that we act in a way that is consistent with NATO and do not allow the agenda to be set by those who want to undermine NATO’ (Blair, ibid.).

Blair’s support for the establishment of the ESDP and the EU Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) was also part of a new doctrine of liberal interventionism which he outlined in Chicago. He argued that Europe and the international community as a whole had a moral obligation to intervene when human rights were under threat (Blair, 1999a).
This argument implied military means could be a measure to accomplish humanitarian values. Therefore, Britain’s military intervention in Kosovo was considered a practice of liberal interventionism (Daddow, 2009), and Britain’s contributions to the ERRF, including 12,500 troops, 18 ships and 72 combat planes, would also be viewed as implementing this doctrine (Miskimmon, 2005, p. 103).

Tony Blair is described as ‘the most instinctively pro-European Prime Minister since Edward Heath’ (Stephens, 2003, p. 253, cited in Dryburgh, 2010, p. 257), and is also considered a key figure in launching the ESDP (Howorth, 2000b, p.383). Indeed, because of Blair’s support in his first term, an institutionalised framework for the ESDP was able to gain the support from the British public and to be established. This framework would enable the EU to fulfil the objective of common defence and security. Besides, taking a co-operative attitude towards EU affairs enabled Britain to become a link between Europe and America so as to consolidate the special relationship with America and enhance the leading role of Britain in the EU at the same time.

This pro-European position should not be seen as an entire shift of Britain’s policy to the EU, however, because Blair did not abandon the intergovernmental principle and also rejected undermining the commitment to NATO. The difference between the Blair Government and its predecessors was that the Blair Government adopted a co-operative policy rather than a resistant attitude in leading and shaping the process of developing the EU, which was essentially still compatible with Britain’s national interests. Besides, it is worth noting that Blair signed the joint declaration for bilateral military co-operation with France before he committed to the development of the ESDP; this signified that bilateral and non-institutional framework is the priority for Britain.
Because the Cameron Government also sought for bilateral defence co-operation with France rather than doing this through the framework of the EU (Gomis, 2011; O’Donnell, 2011a, 2011b), it has demonstrated that Britain does not view the EU or CSDP as the sole framework for building co-operation. Although it has military capability and the ambition of playing a more decisive role in the international scene, Britain prefers to maintain flexibility and independence so as to choose the more favourable model in pursuit of its national interests.

Since Britain is very sensitive about its national interests and the special relationship with America is its priority here, it is not surprising that Blair chose to stand with America on the ‘War on Terror’. There were serious disputes among member states of the EU about whether to take part in the War on Terror; this divergence inevitably had an impact on the coherence of the transatlantic alliance and also affected the political will of Britain to continue developing the ESDP.

4.4 Britain and the Implementation of a Common Security and Defence Policy

The institutional developments of EU security and defence integration began to make substantial progress from the early 2000s. However, Britain did not continue an engaged policy towards these developments after the Blair Government became inclined to America on the war against Iraq. Since then, Britain has not continued building a close relationship with EU partners.
4.4.1 Britain’s Choice on the War on Terror

When the events of 11 September happened, European countries expressed much sympathy and strong condolences to America so as to support American determination to combat terrorism. Wolfgang Ischinger, German Ambassador to the US, had noted that ‘the EU is the United States’ strongest support in the war on terrorism’ (Ischinger, cited in Golino, 2002, p. 63). In his speech declaring the War on Terror on 20 September 2001, the American President George W. Bush also appreciated the support from Europe and the rest of world; Bush especially cherished Blair’s support by arguing that America ‘has no truer friend than Great Britain’ (Bush, 2001). In the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan from October 2001, European countries did provide credible military support to America, especially Britain, France, Germany and Italy (Golino, 2002, pp. 64–66). However, when America extended the War on Terror to Iraq and the Saddam Hussein regime in March 2003, France and Germany took a critical attitude to the American decision.

Because Britain continued support for America, and the EU member states in Eastern Europe also supported a hard line against Saddam Hussein, the divergence between member states on this issue became more serious. Therefore, it was argued that ‘if the war in Iraq has proven anything, it’s that the EU’s members do not have a common foreign policy’ (Dowd, 2004, p. 66). Blair also admitted that there were ‘deep divisions over the coalition action’ and ‘not that all of European opinion is one way’ (Blair, 2003b). These divisions, however, did not push Blair to just leave or completely ignore the development of the ESDP.

Blair recognised that by staying in this system Britain could protect its national interests from being undermined. Accordingly, Blair argued, ‘if Britain opted out of the policy that would not get rid of it. It would just go forward without British participation’ (Blair, 2003c). Actually, Blair did not want to repeat the failure
represented by absence from the initial development of economic integration, because it had led to a diminution of Britain’s influence in Europe. Also, Blair had a dream to make Britain become a bridge connecting Europe and America. This dream was proposed in the speech in Chicago in 1999 by Blair and reiterated again in Birmingham in 2001 (Blair, 2001). However, since America and some European countries (France and Germany especially) were so divergent on this issue, it became unlikely that Blair could be a bridge between them.

These divisions inevitably impacted on Britain’s enthusiasm to host initiatives to develop the ESDP. Besides, although Blair’s choice of standing firmly with America on the issue of the Iraq war had consolidated the UK–US special relationship, it also distanced Britain from France and Germany. Blair’s choice implied that the special relationship with America was still the top priority of Britain’s policy, especially on security and military affairs. Because the foreign policy of Britain was very close to America’s, if Europe and America had a serious dispute it would make Britain become difficult to mediate between the US and Europe.

4.4.2 Britain’s Commitment to Implementing the CSDP

Although the War on Terror had gained a great deal of British attention in military affairs and had made Britain not that enthusiastic to take a progressive initiative on the ESDP, Britain was unlikely to reject an existing framework, otherwise it might run the risk of losing a say in the system. Since an institutionalised framework of the ESDP had been established from 1999 and a series of headline goals for defining capabilities-targets had gradually been adopted, Britain still continued its commitment to implementing the ESDP. Therefore, despite divisions over the Iraq war, there was still some progress made by Britain through the co-operation with France in the EU.
For example, in the four military ESDP missions in Africa, Britain and France were the most important contributors assisting in peacekeeping and training African peacekeepers (Chafer & Cumming, 2010, pp. 1134–1142). The EDA was also established in 2003 by a British–French joint proposal in order to ‘complement and reinforce NATO capability improvement work; and therefore, the EDA should generate better targeted and more cost-effective capabilities for ESDP’ (Blair, 2003a). Besides, Britain had co-operated with France to make a joint proposal for building EU battle groups. Up to now, Britain had committed to organising two battle groups, in 2008 and 2010 (Lindstrom, 2007, p. 88), and it will prepare another battle group with Sweden in the second half of 2013.

Regarding the Lisbon Treaty, the intergovernmental principle and the role of NATO in the new framework of the CSDP were still the most eminent concerns for Britain. In terms of the influence that the Lisbon Treaty might have upon NATO, the Brown Government assured Parliament that ‘NATO will remain the cornerstone of the United Kingdom defence policy and the only organisation for collective defence in Europe’ (Scott, 2008, p. 89). The Lib Dem MP Paul Keetch also stated in an interview for this thesis that Britain would support the EU to develop military capability as long as this would not undermine NATO (Keetch, 2009). Actually, the Brown Government did not change the principles regarding Britain referring CSDP issues, but Brown took a more ‘calm’ attitude. Therefore, Brown was considered as having a low international profile and as drawing back from the leading role played by Blair in the EU (Shepherd, 2010, pp. 53–55).

The current Cameron Government has a more critical attitude towards EU issues. For example, regarding the proposal by France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain for establishing an EU military headquarters, the Foreign Minister William Hague stated that the Government would not agree to this because more creation would only distract member states from concentrating on utilising existing frameworks (Hague,
2011b). Besides, France, Germany and Poland had made a joint proposal about increasing the scope of common funding for EU battle groups (Rettman, 2010), but this proposal was unfavoured by Britain as well. Gerald Howarth, the Minister for International Security Strategy in the Cameron Government, claimed that the Government was opposed to such common funding (Howarth, 2011). This is because increasing common funding of the CSDP will increase the authority of EU institutions in Brussels in military affairs, and this development would undermine the intergovernmental foundation.

4.5 Conclusion

Being an influential military power in the EU, Britain has a credible capability of playing an eminent role in security and defence affairs if it has strong political will as well. Traditionally, Britain had not identified Europe as its top priority in its foreign policy, since it aimed at maintaining a leading role in the British Commonwealth and the special relationship with America. Because economic integration in Europe made much progress, Britain had to adopt a pragmatic and engaged policy towards European integration. In other words, although Britain did not favour a supranational framework, this was the compromise Britain had to make for membership of the EC.

Regarding the development of security and defence integration in the EU, an intergovernmental framework which will not undermine the primary role of NATO is Britain’s principle. Therefore, any proposal for changing the intergovernmental basis or introducing an alternative to replace NATO will be unacceptable for Britain. Even the Blair Government, which had been considered the most pro-European
administration in Britain’s history, did not change this principle. In order to avoid the
development of the CFSP, ESDP and CSDP from being incompatible with this principle, these British Prime Ministers, John Major, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, had all offered assurances that this principle had been included in relevant articles of the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty, the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty.

The pro-European policy undertaken by Blair in his first term should not be interpreted as a shift in Britain’s EU policy because Blair did not change the stance regarding the intergovernmental framework and NATO. Besides, generally speaking Britain has the ability and political will to undertake military co-operation with European countries if such co-operation will enhance the military influence of Britain and underpin the transatlantic alliance. That was why Blair signed the St Malo Declaration with Chirac, and also why Cameron agreed with Sarkozy to enhance the sharing of defence capabilities. These efforts imply military co-operation is compatible with Britain’s national interests, but Britain prefers a simple intergovernmental approach.

Although the Lisbon Treaty maintains an intergovernmental basis for the CSDP, this framework more or less constrained member states to adopt a decision efficiently and make progress. Indeed, it is difficult to overcome the divergences between 27 member states and reach consensus on an issue. Especially regarding an urgent situation like the Libyan crisis, Britain will prefer a more flexible approach to ensure the Government is able to take actions in the shortest time.

Nevertheless, Britain still has to fulfil its commitment to the existing institutionalised framework of the CSDP. As Blair stated, even without the participation of Britain this system may still go forward, and then Britain will run the risk of being marginalised. Only by keeping on taking part in this system can Britain shape favourable conditions and protect its national interests. Britain’s case also illustrated that an
institutionalised framework would more or less have a ‘lock-in’ effect upon actors; member states may be not fully committed to implementing their promises, but such a framework would cost more to leave it. Therefore, Britain might reduce its participation in the CSDP if via this framework it is not able to achieve its national interests, but it would not totally abandon this system.
CHAPTER FIVE
Germany and EU Security and Defence Integration

5.1 Introduction

Germany has presented a role model for European integration. This image derives from its long-term participation in and commitment to a united Europe. Its history of excessive nationalism under the National Socialists and the resulting occupation by the Allied Powers after 1945 restrained Germany’s national sovereignty and the ability of its political leaders to pursue self-interest. Especially in the early post-war years, four victorious powers had made a common and fundamental point to Germany: ‘Germany should never again be an independently-acting great power’ (Krieger, 1994). Afterwards, Germany was technically divided when the three Western Allies allowed the creation of the West German Federal Republic (West Germany) in 1949 and the communist German Democratic Republic (East Germany) was founded in the territory occupied by the Soviet Union in the same year. Although America, Britain and France agreed to end military occupation in West Germany and signed the Deutschlandvertrag treaty in 1952, which entered into force from 1955, it did not change the consequence of the division of Germany; this was because this treaty did not give West Germany full sovereignty, especially regarding the issues of German reunification and negotiation of a peace treaty for a united Germany (Kusters, 1995, pp. 58–59).

For Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of West Germany, the early post-war years were ‘a struggle to regain sovereignty and achieve equality in the international system’ (Erb, 2003, p. 23). In order to alleviate the impact of this situation, Adenauer
undertook the *Westpolitik* policy in order to be fully engaged with the West. This policy relied on the logic that Germany’s interests were fully compatible with the Western powers’; therefore, if they trusted Germany enough, they would wish to dismantle the discriminatory status of Germany and accept Germany as a genuine partner (Paterson, 1996, p. 53). The *Westpolitik* policy led the Adenauer Government to adopt a multilateral policy, which was considered the ‘other side of the coin’ of the *Westpolitik* policy. Therefore, from 1949 to 1955, the Adenauer Government focused on maintaining close relations with America and France (D. B. Smith, 1990b, p. 159) and integrated West Germany into all major West alliances and multilateral organisations, including the European Community and NATO (Webber, 2001, p. 3).

Although the *Westpolitik* policy was opposed by Kurt Schumacher and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) because it was considered to hinder German reunification (Hanrieder, 1967, cited in Erb, ibid., p. 25), since Adenauer stayed Chancellor between 1949 and 1961, this signified that the *Westpolitik* policy was supported by the German people (Schweiger, 2007, p. 46). Even when Willy Brandt, the SPD Chancellor of West Germany from 1969 to 1974, pursued a new policy towards the East, West Germany still anchored itself firmly with the West (D. B. Smith, 1990c, p. 223).

The commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism did not change after Germany completed reunification. That is because, through its long-term participation in European integration, this commitment has been embedded in German national interests. It is also believed that integration into Western institutions has transformed German attitudes towards politics and government; therefore, national interests would be pursued by using soft power within co-operative institutional frameworks (Erb, ibid., p. 104). Accordingly, Helmut Kohl, the Chancellor who led the divided Germany to complete reunification in 1990, had stated in a speech to the Bundestag that Germany would continue its commitment
to economic integration, and also work for political integration in Europe (Kohl, 1989). Since then, Germany has kept its commitment to taking part in forming institutionalised framework for the CFSP, ESDP and the CSDP, and active participation in this process also enables Germany to consolidate its leading role in the EU.

This chapter will review the historical process of how Germany has been involved in security and defence integration in Europe and examine how Germany shapes this process. Firstly, this chapter will unfold how Germany became integrated into the West’s security system in the early post-war years. Secondly, it will discuss the German role in the EPC. Thirdly, this chapter will analyse how a reunited Germany led the EU to fulfil its efforts to build common security and defence. Meanwhile, this chapter will explore how Germany has been transformed as a civilian power and how it has exported this character to the development of the CFSP, ESDP and CSDP as well.

5.2 Background of Germany’s Policy on the Initial Development of European Integration

When West Germany was established, on 23 May 1949, it still suffered from semi-sovereignty status because it was still occupied by the Allied forces of America, Britain and France. In order to overcome this situation, the first Chancellor of West Germany, Adenauer, introduced the Westpolitik policy in order to regain the trust of the West. The Westpolitik policy also led Germany to advocate institutionalism and multilateralism, and then participate in the project of European integration. As presented by Konrad Adenauer, participation in European integration was not only
for economic interests, but was also based on a desire for political stability (Abelshauser, 1995, p. 29). A co-operative image would help Germany to be trusted by the West and develop full sovereignty. Especially in the early post-war years, to reach reconciliation with the Western countries and France most of all was an urgent task for Germany (Miskimmon, 2001, pp. 84–85).

On the basis of the *Westpolitik* policy, the foreign policy of West Germany was described as having three characteristics: multilateral orientation, civilian character, and Euro-centrism (Webber, 2001, pp. 3–5). Via these features, West Germany established the image of being a peaceful and reliable partner for the West. In order to fulfil the *Westpolitik* policy, on the one hand West Germany echoed the Schuman Declaration in 1951, which advocated building a common market for the coal and steel industries (Schuman, 1950, repr. in Nelsen & Stubb, 1998, pp. 13–14), and then contributed to establishing the ECSC in 1951; this was followed by the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, to build a EEC. On the other hand, to obtain security assurances from the West, West Germany integrated with NATO after 1955.

### 5.2.1 German Commitment to Initiate European Integration

Taking account of the escalating tension between the West and the East, there was not much space for European countries to adopt a ‘middle way’ policy. Although the SPD proposed a neutral foreign policy (Hacke, 1997, p. 47, cited in Schweiger, 2007, p. 46), this proposal was not favoured by the German people, who were looking for stability, and the Western countries (Erb, 2003, p. 25). However, the contending views represented by Adenauer and Schumacher should be seen as different political judgements about which option would help Germany to get rid of external constraints rather than as different ideologies or national aspirations (Krieger, 1994, p. 157). Because Adenauer realised the fact that West Germany’s future relied on
the relations with the West (Kay, 1998, p. 55), he released the most sincerity to take part in international institutions.

The contribution to the ECSC was a commitment made by West Germany to demonstrate that it was willing to be engaged in Europe. Meanwhile, by asking for equal terms of entry into the ECSC, West Germany alleviated restrictions on its sovereignty in the ECSC. The ECSC created the Franco–German alliance, and this co-operation was considered the basis of European peace and prosperity since 1950 (Dedman, 1996, p. 63), which would make any war between France and Germany become not only unthinkable but also ‘materially’ impossible (Diebold, 1959, p. 1, cited in Erb, ibid., p. 26).

Following the ECSC, there was another proposal made by France which aimed to integrate the military resources of West European countries and build the EDC. The Deutschlandvertrag (the Allied–German Contractual Agreement) was signed in 1952 to give West Germany ‘full power over its domestic and foreign affairs’, if the EDC came into force (Erb, ibid., p. 76). Therefore, the proposal to build the EDC was welcome by West Germany since it was an opportunity to regain sovereignty. Besides, Adenauer considered that by playing a leading role in European integration West Germany would ‘have a good chance to impress the stamp of a Christian ideology on the making of Europe’ (Adenauer, 1952, cited in Kusters, 1995, p. 62), in contrast to socialism.

The EDC Treaty was signed on 27 May 1952 and ratified by the Bundestag of West Germany on 19 May 1953, with 225 votes in favour against 165 opposed (Patton, 1999, p. 52). Meanwhile, the result in the General Election for the Bundestag on 6 September 1953 also signified the majority of German people supported the leadership of the Adenauer Government and the policy of Westpolitik. In this General Election, the CDU/CSU parliamentary group gained 244 seats, and compared
to the previous election result, it gained 105 extra seats while the SPD merely gained 20 (Roegele, 1954). However, because the EDC Treaty was rejected by the French Parliament in 1954, the West had to look for an alternative to engage West Germany in the Western security and defence framework, and the consequence was to incorporate West Germany into NATO. Nevertheless, although the EDC was not accomplished, West Germany had proved its commitment to the West again in the process of building the EDC.

5.2.2 West Germany Rearmed and Integrated into NATO

Being the most successful security alliance ever, NATO had provided security assurance for Western Europe to resist the threat from the Soviet Union over the Cold War period. The original goal of NATO was for a dual strategy of containment, which was not only to contain the Soviet Union, but also to prevent Germany from becoming militaristic again. As the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay said bluntly that NATO was established to ‘keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’ (Ismay, cited in Manea, 2010). Hence, when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949, West Germany was not part of NATO since West Germany was only founded that year.

Things changed when West Germany was formed one month after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, and then how to help a disarmed free German country to survive and protect it from the threat of the Soviet Union became important to the West. Accordingly, it was argued that neither the Soviet Union nor America could afford the luxury of maintaining their demilitarised German territories (Fischer, 2001, p. 148, cited in Maruzsa, 2011, p. 291). The EDC was supposed to resolve the issue of German rearmament, but then this was rejected by France. The defeat of the EDC was therefore considered as a door opened for West Germany to NATO, and Britain
and France realised they had to accept this possibility because this was the necessary price of American support for defending Europe (Erb, ibid., p. 29).

After the EDC Treaty was disapproved by the French Parliament on 30 August 1954, the Nine-Power meeting in London held on 28 September 1954 invited West Germany to join NATO, and the Western allies would end their occupation of German territories (Final Act of Nine-Power Meeting, 1954). Since then, West Germany had equality in security affairs. At the conclusion of this meeting, West Germany also made a commitment that it would not produce atomic, biological or chemical weapons and offensive weapons, including missiles, mines, warships and bombers, unless requested by NATO, and this compromise was basically made to ease anxiety from NATO member states about a rearmed West Germany. West Germany was incorporated into NATO since 1955 and most restrictions imposed from the end of WWII were dismantled. Although the military occupation did not end completely, because West Germany agreed that Allied troops would remain stationed on its territory as part of a NATO security guarantee in case of an attack by the Soviet Union, it nevertheless became a de facto sovereignty country.

Besides, West Germany, together with Italy and the signatory states of the Treaty of Brussels, was incorporated into the Western European Union (WEU) by the modified Treaty of Brussels signing on 23 October 1954. This treaty was originally signed in 1948. The conclusion made on 21 October 1954 in the Nine-Powers meeting held in Paris by America, the Benelux Countries, Britain, Canada, France, West Germany and Italy confirmed that the Western allies would end the occupation of West Germany, and also reached agreement to invite West Germany and Italy to join the WEU (Conclusions of Nine-Power Meeting in Paris, 1954). However, although the WEU was established for the building of a collective defence system through intergovernmental collaboration and therefore would enable West Germany to contribute to defending Europe, in the end it did not become a serious military
mechanism. West Germany attempted to develop the WEU for co-ordinating foreign and defence policies, but this idea was objected to by America, Britain and France. American did not favour according the WEU strong political implications, while Britain and France viewed the WEU only as a controlling agency for arms production (Schmidt, 1995, p. 159).

We can conclude that through the Westpolitik policy, West Germany embedded itself into the Western economic and military systems, and this enabled it to gain economic progress from the project of European economic integration and obtain security assurances from NATO and America. This signified the success of the Westpolitik policy. Meanwhile, by taking part in multilateral institutions in the West, West Germany also contributed to the post-war Western Europe process, which was characterised as one of ‘deep integration’, and then a multilateral framework for resolving the ‘German problem’ was established; eventually Germany even ‘conflated’ its interests with European interests (Hyde-Price, 2000, pp. 80, 124). Indeed, this process had started to shape West Germany and made it become more ‘civilian’, because the Westpolitik policy was utilising a multilateral and institutional approach to pursue West German self-interests. Adenauer adopted this approach in order to participate in and shape European integration, but in the end Germany was also shaped by the consequence of European integration. Besides, long-term participation in European integration not only gave Germany an equal opportunity to work with Western countries (Kusters, 1995, p. 76), but also it became able to export its domestic state structure and federal ideas to institutional frameworks eventually (L. Hoffmann & Shaw, 2004; Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, pp. 40–47), which strengthened the leading role of Germany in these institution-building processes.
5.2.3 Before the European Political Co-operation: West Germany’s Eastern Policy

The commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism encouraged West Germany to take part in institution-building processes in Europe. In the security and defence context, although West Germany had become a NATO member in 1955, it was still willing to develop other security mechanisms in Europe. It was believed that participation in more multilateral institutions would be a ‘safe’ way to increase its influence in Europe. Therefore, a project for Franco–German military co-operation was agreed on 22 January 1963 in Paris by Adenauer and the French President Charles de Gaulle. This project covered the fields of cultural, political, economic and foreign and defence affairs, and provided institutionalised procedures for regular official meetings at different levels between the two governments (Joint Franco-German Declaration, 1963). However, because France and West Germany had a dispute over Britain’s accession to the Community and also over NATO’s primary raison d’être of defending Europe (Chopra, 1974, pp. 150–152), this bilateral co-operation project merely concentrated on information and personnel exchanges (J. L. Clarke, 1988, p. 77).

The aspiration of enhancing political co-operation in the Community was growing as economic integration had made significant progress. Besides, the ‘empty chair’ crisis in the Community also triggered the concern that developing political integration in Europe was inevitable. In 1965, de Gaulle pursued the ‘policy of the empty chair’ for half a year in order to maintain the veto of national governments in the Council of Ministers. The ‘empty chair’ crisis was criticised by the SPD (Moeller, 1996, p. 37) and also illustrated the fact that ‘the creation of economic control authorities without the corresponding formation of a political union would, in the long run, discredit the integration plan’ worried about by Jean Monnet and Konrad Adenauer (Loth, 1995, pp. 215–216). Moreover, the inability to form a coherent position in
response to the Six-Day War between Israel and Arab countries in 1967 also urged EC countries to work for closer political co-operation. Furthermore, the change in German foreign policy since the Brandt Government also offered an incentive for EC countries to develop a political framework to ensure German commitment to European integration.

As the détente between America and the Soviet Union continued since the mid-1960s, the relationship between the West and the East eased, and this offered a chance for West Germany to rethink the Westpolitik policy and the Hallstein doctrine. The Hallstein doctrine was a principle of Adenauer’s foreign policy which referred to a non-recognition policy regarding East Germany and avoided diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe (W. G. Gray, 2007, pp. 80–86). Although Adenauer aimed to isolate East Germany, this doctrine inevitably affected the space and flexibility of West Germany’s foreign policy.

In order to create a favourable environment for German reunification, the SPD had maintained a preference for a closer relationship with the East. When the CDU/CSU and the SPD reached consensus about ‘Germany’s Western identity’ in the 1960s (Erb, ibid., pp. 34–41; D.B. Smith, 1990d, p. 199), the SPD also committed to the Westpolitik policy, but promised to develop relationships with the East. When Willy Brandt was elected Chancellor of the SPD/FDP coalition government from 1969 to 1974, he advocated the Ostpolitik policy, based on the idea that building closer relations between two German states was not necessarily anti-Western (Erb, ibid., p. 43). Accordingly, the Brandt Government recognised the status quo of a divided Germany, although it did not accept the German Democratic Republic as a state under international law (Hacker, 1995, cited in Schweiger, 2007, p. 49); the Government also signed treaties with Moscow, Warsaw and Prague from 1970 to 1973 in order to release long-term tensions between West Germany and the East.
Compared to the Westpolitik policy, which was held to be an inflexible pro-Western position, the Ostpolitik policy accomplished Brandt’s idea of coping with the issue of ‘one nation in two states’ (Brandt, 1969) by normalising the relationship with East Germany and increasing interactions and mutual understanding. The Ostpolitik policy enabled West Germany to gain more autonomy to undertake foreign policy (Schweigler, 1975, pp. 135-137; D. B. Smith, 1990a, p. 162). However, it invoked some criticisms from the CDU because it was argued that this policy might undermine relations with the Western allies and therefore attempted to object to the ratification of the Treaty of Moscow in the Bundestag (Erb, ibid., pp. 44–46). Besides, the Ostpolitik policy was considered to encourage West Germany to pursue national self-interest instead of European commitments (Kinsky, 1971).

Actually, the Ostpolitik policy would strengthen West Germany’s commitment to the West, because it did not want to be accused of ‘reverting to Germany’s old position’ (Erb, ibid., p. 48), and would contribute to a real détente between the West and the East and then build a more stable environment in Europe (Fink & Schaefer, 2009, pp. 1–6). In order to cope with the concern arising from domestic politics and the Western allies about the Ostpolitik policy, Brandt had given assurances that the Ostpolitik policy would not undermine the government’s commitment to the West. In his speech in the Bundestag in 1969, Brandt emphasised the indispensable role of NATO for defending Europe (Brandt, ibid.); also, at the SPD conference in May 1970, Brandt reiterated support for and participation in the EC, and even promised to co-operate on foreign and security policies (Moeller, 1996, p. 39).

5.2.4 West Germany in the European Political Co-operation

In order to express determination for continuing the European integration progress, at the 1969 Hague summit Brandt declared that he would support the first enlargement of the EC, the launch of the EPC, and institutional reforms for the EC
Besides, in the address to the European Parliament, Brandt expressed his aspiration to achieve the unification of Europe, and he also argued that the EPC should be a tentative step towards wider consultations between EC member states (Brandt, 1973, repr. in European Political Cooperation (EPC), 1988, pp. 312–315). Walter Scheel, the Foreign Minister in the Brandt Government, called for the EC to undertake a pragmatic and progressive approach for taking joint actions in order to maintain an influential status in the world (Scheel, 1973, repr. in ibid., pp. 310–312). These promises fixed West Germany within the multilateral and institutional frameworks of the EC, and then West Germany was still firmly anchored within European integration.

By claiming a ‘less ideological and more pragmatic’ policy than the Brandt Government, although the succeeding SPD Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, promised to continue the Ostpolitik policy, he would do that ‘without illusions’ (Schweigler, 1975, pp. 139–140). This signified that Schmidt took a more cautious attitude towards the Ostpolitik policy, because the international economic system was facing change in the early 1970s since the oil crisis had led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods System; meanwhile, the EC was occupied with coping with its first enlargement and launching its first institutional reforms since the mid-1970s, including direct elections to the European Parliament from 1979, establishing the European Monetary System (EMS), and adjusting the budgetary framework. Either Schmidt’s Germany or other European countries were too distracted to work out a more detailed plan for political integration.

Besides, the aspiration of the West German public towards reunification was not that strong in the early 1970s. A public poll conducted in 1973 showed that only 23 per cent of West Germans considered German reunification more important than the unification of Europe, while 65 per cent considered the unification of Europe more important than German reunification (Moeller, ibid., p. 36). Therefore, to
pursue German reunification was not a priority for the Schmidt Government; a stable and pragmatic approach for the future was for Germany more realistic.

The commitment to institutionalism continued becoming an essential element for the Schmidt Government. This commitment was reflected in the support to the Tindemans Report by West Germany. The Schmidt Government accepted the overall objective of the Tindemans Report in 1976, but called for a more democratic framework for the European Union (Moeller, ibid., p. 39). Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Foreign Minister for the Schmidt and the Kohl Government, also stated a common foreign policy in Europe with broader fields and higher degree of common action should be achieved by expanding the EPC in the statement on direct election for the European Parliament (Genscher, 1976, repr. in *European Political Cooperation (EPC)*, ibid., pp. 315–318).

The commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism was also insisted by the Kohl and CDU/CSU Government, which won the General Election in 1982. The commitment to European integration, stemming from Adenauer’s *Westpolitik* policy, was strengthened by Kohl, who argued that he would follow the legacy left by Adenauer (Kohl, 1975, p. 5, cited in Paterson, 1996, p. 55). Under the German Presidency in 1983, Genscher also promised West Germany would maintain the commitment to the EC and EPC and promoted the joint proposal by West Germany and Italy for the ‘European Act’ and European unification; moreover, he declared that the Government aimed at strengthening the EPC in the field of security affairs for further political unification (Genscher, 1983, repr. in *European Political Cooperation (EPC)*, ibid., pp. 321–324). Genscher’s statement was echoed by Kohl in his speech at the signing of the Solemn Declaration in 1983 (Genscher, repr. in ibid., pp. 324–326), and reiterated by Genscher himself on other occasions, including at the European Parliament in 1983, the Institute of European Policy in 1985, and the University of Salamanca in 1986 (repr. in ibid., pp. 326–327, 344–349, 359–368).
These public speeches signified that West Germany was completely embedded in the framework of European integration, or at least the Government attempted to show it had been embedded in this framework. Moreover, the Kohl Government pursued further political integration, and the result would expand West Germany’s influence from an economic to a political dimension.

In addition to the commitment to European integration, Kohl also emphasised the core basis of the Franco-German relationship in the process of driving European integration, and the friendship between Kohl and the French President François Mitterrand also contributed to this relationship (Paterson, 1996, pp. 55–56). A joint proposal for a Draft Treaty on European Union was proposed by France and West Germany which advocated increasing the capacity of supranational actors and introducing a majority to the Council (The Draft Treaty, proposed in 1984). Although this proposal was not adopted by the 1985 European Council in Milan (Presidency Conclusions of Milan European Council, adopted in 1985), it encouraged other member states of the EC to propose other projects for building the European Union.

5.3 Germany and an Institutionalised Common Security and Defence Framework

German reunification and the end of the Cold War not only changed the international environment but also offered a new incentive for European integration. In this respect, although NATO played the most decisive role in the Cold War in protecting Western Europe, as the Warsaw Pact was disbanded in 1991 the presence of NATO in Europe was inevitably discussed, including the possibility of replacing NATO with a new pan-European security organisation (e.g. the OCSE) (J. Clarke,
1993-1994; Heisbourg, 1992; Kenny, 1991; Schake, 1998; Wallander, 2000), and the call for reforming the EC also emerged since the 1980s. In other words, both NATO and the EC faced a stage of transformation after the end of the Cold War.

In order to fulfil its commitment to European integration, Germany contributed to the development of European integration and an institutionalised common security and defence framework in the EU, and played a leading role in this process. The interactions between German participation and the development of European integration therefore accomplished a ‘reciprocal’ link. As institutionalists have argued, a reciprocal relationship between actions and external environment would not only make the environment become stable, but also ensure that the actors would maintain their contributions to this environment (March & Olsen, 1984; M. E. Smith, 2004a, p. 17).

5.3.1 Kohl’s Continuing Commitment to European Integration

When the Unification Treaty entered into force on 3 October 1990, two German states became united. However, the reunited status and the end of the Cold War raised the ‘Germany questions’ again (Webber, 2001, pp. 5–6). Since the reunited Germany was questioned by its EC partners about whether it would continue its commitment to European integration (Rummel, 1996), in order to ease those worries Kohl had reiterated that the determination of Germany regarding European integration and NATO would be irreversible (Morgan, 1993, pp. 93–112, cited in Cole, 1998, pp.125–126). Besides, the conclusions made in the 1989 Strasbourg European Council also confirmed that EC countries decided to accelerate the process of building a European Union (Presidency Conclusions of the Strasbourg European Council, adopted in 1989). Therefore, maintaining a commitment to multilateralism, institutionalism, European integration and NATO continued to be an essential
foundation for the Kohl Government so as to gain the agreement of the Western Allies for the German states to reunite.

The commitment of the reunited Germany to European integration was confirmed by Kohl’s words: European unity is a ‘question of war and peace’ and German unity and European unity are ‘two sides of the same coin’ (Kohl, cited in Banchoff, 1997, p. 61). Although the Cold War has ended and the confrontation between the West and the East does not exist, the characteristics of being a multilateral actor, a civilian power, and maintaining an institutionalist inclination coming from the policy of Westpolitik, had not been changed in Germany’s foreign policy, and underpinned the Kohl Government to promote a more ambitious project for European integration (Denison, 2001, p. 159).

Accordingly, since 1990 Kohl and the Federal Minister Genscher had declared repeatedly that Germany was ready for an entire political union in the EC and called for other member states to follow it (Beuter, 1994, p. 87). Kohl’s position on creating a political and economic European Union was also supported by the French President Mitterrand (Erb, ibid., p. 126). Actually, Mitterrand also wanted the reunited Germany to be deeply embedded in the framework of European integration (Bozo, 2009, pp. 83–110). The Franco-German motor led to the establishment of the European Union and also became an important basis for further institutional reforms of the EU.

A joint letter from Kohl and Mitterrand was sent to the Irish Presidency of the Council on 19 April 1990 to call for intergovernmental conferences for building a European Monetary Union (EMU) and a European Political Union (EPU) (Beuter, 1994, pp. 87–88; Hagland, 1995, p. 555; Wijnbergen, 1992, p. 58); also, an initiative for the Eurocorps was proposed at the Franco-German Summit in La Rochelle on 21–22 May 1992 (Hagland, 1995, p. 559). Although the proposal for the Eurocorps was
not accepted under the framework of the Maastricht Treaty, the Eurocorps was still established in Strasbourg in 1992 by France and Germany; Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg joined respectively. The idea of the Eurocorps was to improve citizens’ security on the basis of European citizenship (Anderson, 1994), and therefore it was a transnational and supranational initiative which connected internal police institutions with the whole social-economic environment in Europe (N. Walker, 1994).

The significance of Germany developing the Eurocorps was that it was the first time that Germany had suggested establishing a supranational European police agency which aimed at building common capability to combat drug barons and organised international crime (Paterson, 1996, p. 57). This proposal was supposed to break traditional territorial boundaries between member states, and therefore it would be a revolution on internal security affairs. However, this proposal was not really fulfilled by member states. The Eurocorps did not develop a supranational framework in the end. It now has become a headquarters to prepare and deploy humanitarian operations for NATO and the EU.

The Maastricht Treaty mentioned the objective of forming a common defence policy (Article J.4, The Maastricht Treaty). However, if the EU countries attempted to develop full independent security and defence forces, this risked causing tensions between America and Europe (Janes, 2008, p. 4; Miskimmon, 2001, pp. 91, 95). For example, according to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, America would not welcome the EU ‘duplicating existing NATO efforts, decoupling European defence from NATO and discriminating against states who are members of NATO but not of the EU’ (cited in Orakhelashvili, 2011, p. 145). Therefore, although Kohl favoured a more integrated structure for the CFSP, he decided to share a similar opinion with Britain that the EU would not replace NATO (Hagland, 1995, p. 564).
Moreover, although Kohl was willing to maintain the commitment to institutionalism and building an institutionalised framework for the EU, including the CFSP, he did not have much aspiration to develop a military role for Germany. The commitment to institutionalism, multilateralism and even supranationalism has transformed Germany into a civilian power. A civilian power, as defined by Hanns W. Maull, refers to a state that accepts co-operation with others in pursuit of external aims; it would therefore focus on non-military and economic means to ensure national objectives with military power were left as a last resort; also, it is willing to develop supranational frameworks to cope with international issues (Maull, 1990, pp. 92–93). Accordingly, a civilian power has three features. Firstly, it is a power with political, economic and military capability. Secondly, it would utilise non-military means to accomplish its objectives first, regardless of having military capability. Thirdly, it is not only a co-operationist, but also would not reject supranationalism. According to these criteria, Germany is usually considered a civilian power, and the principle of being a civilian power inevitably affects the political will of Germany to take part in military missions.

Although the Franco–German motor was relaunched for the development of the Eurocorps, which was supposed an ambitious project for consolidating internal security in Europe, the Kohl Government did not make further commitment to build European security and defence capability. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in 1994 the German Constitutional Court issued a ruling to allow the German government to deploy troops outside the area of NATO under the mandate of the UN, but the German government has to be explicitly approved by the German Parliament before each deployment (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfGE 90, 145, 1994). This decision removed the restriction on the German government taking part in overseas operations and was a crucial basis for Germany to shape an active security role in the international scene. However, it did not fundamentally change the principle of Germany being a civilian power.
5.3.2 Germany’s Proposals for the Amsterdam Treaty

In the process of negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty, Germany was eager to reform a more efficient decision-making process in order to implement the CFSP effectively. For example, the Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel had called for qualified majority voting on all aspects of the EU’s affairs (German Basic Points to the IGC, 1996). A more comprehensive statement of Germany’s suggestions to reform the CFSP was presented in its White Paper (German White Paper to the IGC, ibid.).

According to the White Paper, Germany repeated the necessity for expanding majority voting to define the CFSP in order to create an efficient decision-making process and effective implementation; besides, Germany also expressed the stance of integrating the WEU into the EU in order to strengthen the defence basis of the CFSP. Moreover, both France and Germany called for a permanent supranational body to ensure the implementation of the CFSP. It is worth noting that the CDU/CSU document, which was included in this White Paper, called for intensifying Franco–German co-operation to reform the framework of the field of the CFSP and internal policy, which intended to drive further integration for the CFSP and internal affairs via a Franco–German motor. Even today, the co-operation between France and Germany is still considered a crucial force for driving the development of European integration (Henne, 2009). However, regardless of the efforts of developing the CFSP, the Kohl Government did not intend to undermine the role of NATO because it stated repeatedly that NATO was an indispensable presence for European security. The necessity of developing the capability of the CFSP in order to share responsibility for the transatlantic alliance was also mentioned in the White Paper.

Most proposals from the Kohl Government regarding the reform of the CFSP in the 1996 IGC were adopted in the Amsterdam Treaty. For example, the qualified majority had been expanded in the CFSP decision-making process and brought into
the constructive abstention (Article J.13, The Amsterdam Treaty); the WEU was incorporated into the EU as an integral part (Article J.4, The Amsterdam Treaty); and a High Representative for the CFSP (Article J.16, The Amsterdam Treaty) and a policy planning and early warning unit (Declaration to the Final Act on the Establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit, The Amsterdam Treaty) were introduced.

The high achievement of German proposals for CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty implied that Germany had played a leading role in the process of negotiations for making the Amsterdam Treaty. However, Germany’s foreign policy was not considered that of a normal member state of the CFSP in the 1990s because it concentrated more on ‘normative non-military issues’ (Rummel, 1996, p. 58). Although the policy of the reunited Germany was described as having characteristics including multilateralism and a focus on co-operative institution-building, human rights and international law, these characteristics were unable to offer definite objectives for Germany in response to international crisis. After Gerhard Schröder had been elected in 1998, the crisis in the Kosovo gave Germany a new incentive to clarify the role Germany should play in security and defence affairs.

5.3.3 Germany’s Transformation in the Common Security and Defence Policy

When the SPD leader Gerhard Schröder was elected Chancellor from 1998, the Red–Green government formed by the SPD and the Green Party offered a favourable condition for Germany to define and transform the security role. The young generation of the Red–Green coalition government placed an emphasis on human rights and more focus on national self-interest (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000).

Take German participation in the NATO mission, Operation Allied Force (OAF), in Kosovo as an example. The Green Foreign Minister asserted that this decision was
made according to a humanitarian consideration (Fischer, 1999); in other words, to utilise military means to protect values such as human rights became a considerable option for Germany. Because German participation in the OAF was the first time a military mission had been deployed outside German territory since the end of WWII, it was described as a watershed in German foreign policy and a defining moment (Miskimmon, 2009, p. 561). Since December 2001, Germany has also taken part in the NATO mission in Afghanistan: the International Military Engagement in Afghanistan (ISAF). The mission of ISAF was the first time that Germany sent its ground troops outside its territory to implement military actions. According to the Military Balance Report published by International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2012, in 2011 Germany still maintained 5,150 troops for ISAF and offered a Headquarters (Military Balance, 2012, p. 120); also, during the period of the Libyan crisis, Germany had decided to take part in the AWACS mission in Afghanistan in order to share the work with NATO countries (Westerwelle, 2011d).

The increasing participation in NATO and EU missions since the Kosovo crisis addressed a concern as to whether Germany would still be a civilian power following the end of the Cold War; also, people were concerned about whether Germany had begun to focus more on the pursuit of national interests than on maintaining multilateralist enthusiasm (Overhaus, 2004, p. 1). Regardless of these scepticisms, Miskimmon considered that since Germany still lacked the political will to undertake high-intensity military deployments since the participation that the Kosovo crisis had invoked, the principle of the use of force maintained continuity instead of producing change (Miskimmon, 2009). Similarly, Harnisch, Maull and Hyde-Price also argued that because the participation of Germany in Kosovo was shaped by norms and beliefs rather than material interests and did not change the commitment to multilateralism and the Western allies, Germany still maintained the role of being a civilian power (Harnisch & Maull, 2001; Hyde-Price, 2001).
The participation in Kosovo and the Afghanistan mission also strengthened the connections between Germany and NATO and showed the commitment to the Atlantic alliance. On the one hand, in terms of taking part in Operation Allied Force, the Schröder Government argued that the support to NATO and the West should be seen as a support for Western values (Erb, 2003, pp. 170–171); on the other hand, the participation in ISAF not only enhanced solidarity with America, but also was a further step to ‘normalise’ the use of force on the international scene (Gross, 2007, pp. 511–512). Besides, increasing demands from NATO and the EU also asked Germany to contribute more efforts to international crisis management operations and also pressed Germany to take more part in allied missions; these requests also led Germany to develop ‘shared goals’ and ‘collective mechanisms’ to achieve national goals (King, 2006, pp. 271–273).

By and large, the Kosovo crisis was not only an important impetus for the EU to make more efforts on security and defence affairs, but was a more important event for Germany in adjusting its role on security and defence affairs. This was because this event pushed Germany to reconsider how to shape the future of the EU and how Germany should contribute to this future (Miskimmon, 2001, p. 93). If the EU would play a more important role in world affairs, it would not only need a coherent foreign policy, but also require credible capability to back up the foreign policy. However, whether to build greater capability especially needed the input of political will from all the ‘Big Three’, that is Britain, France and Germany.

Indeed, although the ESDP had been established from the 1999 Cologne European Council, it did not ensure a new policy area would be fulfilled absolutely, because this still depends on whether the Big Three would implement their political will and how such implementation might lead other EU countries to follow them. When the ESDP was launched at the beginning, the leaders of the Big Three did offer strong political will to implement it, and therefore, the procedure for implementation and a
target of military capability were soon confirmed in the 1999 Helsinki European Council. As the development of the ESDP became more detailed and focused, the divergences of perspectives on security and defence affairs were becoming more obvious between Germany and other two countries. Germany still insisted on a civilian path, which was especially stressed by a German parliamentary member interviewed in this thesis (Henne, 2009). Therefore, although Germany made a commitment at the 1999 Cologne European Council to develop the ESDP, it was not fully committed to a military path. Henne argues that this is because the consequences of WWI and WWII made the German people prefer not to develop strong military force in the EU (Henne, ibid.).

Therefore, rather than arguing that Germany has changed the terms for the use of force, military participation in the OAF and ISAF will be seen as a realisation of the commitment to the West and human rights since the concern for humanitarian issues is one of the essential elements in Germany’s foreign policy. Also, because these military deployments were undertaken under multilateral and institutional frameworks, they were still compatible with Germany’s long-term commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism. Germany did not adjust the principle of multilateralism and institutionalism.

This argument was shared by two SPD MdBs in the interviews for this thesis. Hans Peter-Bartels argued that ‘Germany does not want to go special ways and does not want to go somewhere alone’ (Bartels, 2010). What he meant was that any military deployment of Germany would only apply to collective objectives by multilateral institutions. Rainer Arnold also emphasised that ‘we do not want to go anywhere alone’ (Arnold, 2009). Therefore, the deployment of Germany troops would only follow the decisions of the UN, NATO or the EU. Germany would not initiate a military mission ‘only for a German purpose’. Accordingly, once these military deployments were undertaken under multilateral and institutional frameworks, they
would be still compatible with Germany’s long-term commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism.

To summarise, although Germany has become more ‘assertive’, it is still adhered to a framework of multilateral institutions (Denison, 2001, p. 161). Meanwhile, even though Germany adopts greater flexibility in the use of military forces, it does not actually prefer to play a military role. For example, in 2010, compared to Britain and France, which deployed around 31,000 and 15,000 armies abroad, Germany only deployed some 6,700 troops for multilateral operations (Military Balance Report, 2011). However, although the lower amount signifies that Germany is not as willing as Britain or France to play military role and send German troops to carry out missions, Germany still makes substantial contributions when it comes to international policing efforts. Take German participation in the NATO mission KFOR in Kosovo as an example. In 2011, Germany contributed 1,451 troops for the KFOR policing mission, which was still the most important part in Europe (Military Balance Report, 2012).

5.4 Germany and the Implementation of a Common Security and Defence Policy

Since the NATO missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, Germany has started to deploy troops abroad to take part in military operations, but there is no significant sign that Germany has transformed itself into a robust military power. Actually, Germany still maintains a self-restricting principle in terms of the ‘use of force’. Even after the war against Iraq in which Germany co-operated with France in the EU more closely, Germany did not make any more commitment to improving military and civilian
capability in substantial ways. Unlike Britain, Germany seems to have a preference for reforming institutional frameworks of the EU and ESDP/CSDP, but it rarely presents a definite objective regarding what it can commit to ESDP/CSDP missions, especially ESDP/CSDP military missions.

**5.4.1 German’s Choice on the War on Terror**

Like Britain, Germany is also committed to the transatlantic alliance and has admitted the prominent role of NATO in European security. However, unlike Britain’s, the commitment of Germany to the transatlantic alliance and NATO was on the basis of the *Westpolitik* policy rather than emphasising the transatlantic special relationship. Therefore, Germany would not reject developing common security and defence capability in the EU so long as such efforts were undertaken within a multilateral framework.

Since the development of the ESDP was compatible with Germany’s long-term commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism, when it held the presidency of the European Council in 1999 it behaved proactively to integrate the bilateral military co-operation of Britain and France under the St Malo Declaration into the multilateral framework of the EU (Overhaus, 2004, p. 555). The development of the ESDP offered Germany a platform to play a bigger role in coping with security crises within an institutionalised and multilateral framework, but it did not have to militarise itself.

When 11 September happened in 2001, Schröder behaved actively and worked with Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair to seek public support to combat terrorism; in the war against Afghanistan, Germany offered 3,900 troops, an amount just next to Britain’s, and military assets as well (Golino, 2002, pp. 62–63, 65). The current troop contribution of Germany to the NATO mission ISAF in Afghanistan is about 4,818,
which constitutes the biggest German military deployment abroad at the present moment (see: ISAF introduction, NATO website). However, when the War on Terror extended to Iraq, the serious dispute over this issue led to ‘the biggest chill’ in relations between America and Germany since the end of WWII (Erb, ibid., p. 204).

It was argued that the reason Germany did not choose to stand with America on the war against Iraq was the concern with domestic elections (Erb, ibid., pp. 204–240), but the humanitarian concern should not be ignored. This issue also divided the EU into two camps, and these divisions therefore undermined the co-operation between the Big Three. The result not only led Britain to become more inclined to America, but also made Germany put more concentration on the EU civilian missions.

5.4.2 Germany’s Commitment to Implementing the CSDP

The process of the institutionalisation of the CFSP, ESDP and the CSDP not only makes this system become mature and more capable, but has also anchored member states within this system. Henne had stated that the process of institutionalisation has helped Germany become more engaged in Europe (Henne, 2009). The process of institutionalisation embedded Germany in the grand framework of the EU, but by taking part in this process Germany can also shape this framework. Accordingly, not only could the development of the ESDP and CSDP become a reliable framework of multilateral institution for member states to develop security and defence integration, but, through participating in the institution-building process, Germany would also be able to promote civilian ideas. For example, according to Irlenkauser’s analysis, in the European Security Strategy it emphasised the civilian aspects of security threats and defined principles for the use of force, things which stemmed from Germany’s concerns (Irlenkauser, 2004, pp. 7–14).
Regarding military affairs of the EU, Germany still maintains a cautious attitude. All the CDU/CSU and SPD MdBs who were interviewed for this thesis expressed similar opinions. Although the SPD was considering a proposal to develop a European Army and had made a position paper in 2007, this proposal mainly focused on reforming existing frameworks of the ESDP in order to make it become more efficient and coherent. These suggestions included establishing European Air Transport, setting the Council of Defence Ministers, and building a European Parliament defence committee, a European Military Academy, and a Baltic Naval Headquarters (SPD Position Paper, 2007), which only involved institutional reforms rather than building up military capability. Accordingly, this proposal, although with an ambitious title, 'On the Way to a European Army', it did not have a definite aim to build common force or development strong military equipment.

In terms of battle groups, although none of the EU battle groups has been deployed up to now, Germany had committed to five EU battle groups since 2007 to 2011 (Lindstrom, 2007, p. 88); another battle group will be prepared by France, Germany and Poland in 2013 (EUbusiness, 2011). The reason Germany is more willing to provide battle groups is that battle groups would only involve small-scale combat missions and would not last for too long a period. In the interview, Henne also mentioned that at the moment the EU is still unable to tackle a long-term mission, and it is not a German priority to develop military capability; he argued that since most serious security threats stem from political rather than military causes, the EU should focus more on political and civilian dimensions in the development of common security and defence policy (Henne, ibid.). Henne's argument illustrates that participation in military missions does not change the civilian character of Germany. The reluctance to take part in military missions or utilise military means to resolve crises still affects Germany’s foreign policy.
Actually, although Germany is making progress in improving its military capability, including terminating the conscription system since 2011 and building a modern and professional military, these efforts have not met allies’ expectations. Germany aims to provide 10,000 troops and wants to participate in peace-building or peacekeeping missions, but Britain and France plan to deploy 30,000 troops (Ishinger, 2012, p. 57). Meanwhile, according to the latest Military Balance Report, the defence budget of Germany for 2012 is €30.9 billion, while France’s is €40.2 billion and Britain’s €39 billion (Military Balance, 2012). This demonstrates that Germany still does not have enough political will to express its political weight in sharing military responsibilities with its allies.

In the civilian perspective, Germany has less reservation about taking part in these matters, because doing so is compatible with the civilian principle. Therefore, Germany has played a more prominent role in civilian missions. For example, in Afghanistan, Germany had a German Political Project Office (GPPO), to assist local policing training, from 2002 to 2005 (Chivvis, 2010, p. 17). In Kosovo, Germany also offered civilian assistance to the mission EULEX Kosovo; in 2009 there were 141 German staff deployed for the mission, but the amount was next to that of France, Italy and Romania (Chivvis, ibid., p. 35). However, Germany was still criticised for not being willing to play a more effective role in crisis management missions, especially regarding taking part in combat (Chivvis, ibid., p. 45).

The lack of sufficient contributions of personnel to civilian missions might be because the administrative structure of Germany still lacks co-ordination. As Bartels explains, because Germany is a federal country, the federal government can only call for volunteers from the Länder (states) instead of compelling them to provide contributions; therefore, Germany is not like Britain and France, which have more authority to convene civilian contributions (Bartels, 2010). Moreover, Germany has a complex federal executive decision-making system for security policy. The
multilateral framework between the cabinet, the Federal Security Council, the Foreign Office and the Defence Ministry sometimes require the Chancellor to be more capable of improving co-ordination. Therefore, it was argued that a more coherent framework should be built in order to help the Chancellor to be more responsive to crises and fulfil commitments (Lothar, 2001).

Regarding this issue, an inter-ministerial Action Plan was adopted in 2004 in order to improve cross-sector co-operation between government and civil-society levels on civilian crisis-prevention missions (Action Plan, 2004). However, this action plan did not really work as expected, and mainly became a forum for information exchange. Jacobs argued that this was because both Schröder and Merkel preferred to maintain the status quo of limited and ad-hoc co-ordination (Jacobs, 2011). Concerning Germany as a federal country, it would be difficult to improve inter-sector, inter-departmental or inter-ministerial co-ordination effectively, and usually more time is needed to co-ordinate with Länder and to gain their contributions to civilian missions.

5.5 Conclusion

The Westpolitik policy has contributed to transforming Germany to becoming committed to institutionalism and multilateralism. This commitment anchored Germany in NATO and the European Community over the period of the Cold War. Even after the reunification, Germany still maintained this commitment. The military participation in Kosovo and Afghanistan signified that Germany started to adjust itself to take more part in military operations led by NATO or EU. Although Germany is becoming more assertive and more comfortable in pursuing its national interests,
the processes of institutionalisation have embedded Germany in this multilateral and institutionalised framework; more specifically speaking, the processes of institutionalisation and integration have made German interests and European interests become compatible, especially because Federal Germany can be seen as having emerged from and grown up with the development of European integration.

As the EU attempted to make more efforts to develop a credible security and defence role in the international scene, Germany also supported this grand direction. However, regarding strengthening the military context of the ESDP/CSDP, especially requested by Britain and France, Germany behaved hesitantly. Its defeat-history distanced Germany from military matters since the end of WWII; the commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism even strengthened its image of being a civilian power. Therefore, Germany’s commitment to common security and defence policy in the EU or even NATO should be viewed as coming from the commitment to multilateralism and institutionalism, and such participation should be taken as an accomplishment to this commitment.

When the Lisbon Treaty came into force on 1 December 2009, the EU was slipping into a Eurozone crisis. As the crisis worsened, it occupied much of the attention of member states of the EU, especially France and Germany. The leading role in resolving the Eurozone crisis caused Germany to be praised as an ‘unquestioned master of Europe’ (Grant, 2011b). However, compared to its leading role in resolving economic issues, Germany’s role in military affairs is declining.

The abstention from approving the decision made in UNSCR 1973 to implement a no-fly zone in Libya, and its refusal to take part in military actions in Libya, signified that Germany still lacked the political will to be committed to military operations by using force. Although Germany has sent abroad deployment since Kosovo, German armed forces rarely take part in combat; this stance not only undermines the utility
of German deployment, but also weakens the whole CSDP (Grant, 2009). Indeed, without German commitment to CSDP missions, the EU is definitely unable to form a common position or action, just as happened in the Libyan crisis.

Actually, Germany can play a role in balancing the development of defence capability in the EU. According to Valasek’s argument, Britain and France have strong military capability and focus more on the military dimension of the CSDP, but other EU countries do not have such capability or strong intentions. Germany has the ability to develop a military role if it has the political will, and meanwhile has a special interest in the civilian dimension of the CSDP. Therefore, Germany’s support will contribute to the CSDP becoming more consolidated (Valasek, 2011b). Concerning Germany being the biggest economic power in the EU with the biggest population and the most influential politics, how Germany would define its military role is decisive for the development of the CSDP (Valasek, 2012). Besides, the necessity of enhancing CSDP capability is growing since America made the decision to retrench its participation in Europe or Africa. In response to this situation, Germany is also asked for more definite and substantial contributions to the military capability of the CSDP (Ischinger, 2012). However, the commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism will not automatically cause Germany to develop an active role in military affairs.

The German case in participating in the security and defence framework in Europe has provided an illustration that how the institutionalisation process has embedded Germany in an institutional and multilateral framework and has made Germany continue to make efforts to construct this framework. The commitment to multilateralism and institutionalism also leads Germany to define itself as a civilian power and have a strict principle in terms of the use of forces, thus affecting German participation in military missions. The following chapters will discuss Britain and Germany’s roles in resolving the Kosovo crisis and the Libyan crisis, and analyse how
these two countries pursue national interests and implement their security commitments.
CHAPTER SIX
The Implementation of the CFSP in Resolving the Kosovo Crisis

6.1 Introduction

In 1946, Kosovo became one of autonomous provinces in the Socialist Republic of Serbia (SR), which was a constituent country of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The Kosovo issue emerged from the territorial dispute between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo because Albanians were the ethnic majority in Kosovo, but Serbs wanted to maintain a dominant position. This dispute became more serious in the late 1980s when the President of the SFRY, Slobodan Milosevic, amended the Constitution and reduced the autonomy of Kosovo. In response to this situation, the Kosovo Albanians unilaterally declared the independence of Kosovo from 1990 and tensions between the Kosovo Albanians and the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) gradually escalated.

The Kosovo crisis in this thesis refers to the escalating conflicts between the Albanian opposite forces, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and the Yugoslav government from 1998. Regarding this situation, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1160 to impose an arms embargo against FRY on 31 March 1998 (S/RES/1160, 1998). On 23 September 1998, the UN Security Council adopted another resolution to call for a ceasefire in Kosovo and asked the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to have a ‘meaningful’ dialogue (S/RES/1199, 1998).
According to UNSCR 1199, NATO threatened to launch air strikes and then the government of the FRY agreed to sign the NATO–Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement on 15 October 1998 in order to establish an air surveillance system. This agreement was endorsed by the UN Security Council on 24 October 1998 (S/RES/1203, 1998). However, the situation in Kosovo became serious again at the beginning of 1999. After the Milosevic regime refused to sign a peace agreement with the Kosovo Albania leadership and stepped up military repression in Kosovo, the Secretary Council of NATO, Javier Solana, announced NATO would initiate air operations in the FRY in order to press the Milosevic regime to compromise (Solana, 1999). The NATO mission Operation Allied Force (OAF) was therefore launched from 23 March to 10 June 1999. The UN Security Council adopted the Resolution to deploy international civil and security missions in Kosovo under the mandate of the UN (S/RES/1244, 1998), and then the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO mission KFOR started to operate from June 1999.

The responses undertaken by the EU to the Kosovo crisis mostly concentrated on economic or diplomatic sanctions and did not control the fighting in Kosovo effectively. Although the EU had developed an institutionalised framework for the CFSP since the Maastricht Treaty, during the period of the Kosovo crisis the EU still lacked deployable capacity to resolve the situation. This frustrating experience encouraged EU member states to improve the capability of the EU to take part in security and defence issues.

Because the Kosovo crisis has been considered as providing a crucial impetus for the EU to develop an security role in the international scene (Shepherd, 2009), and also because the NATO military mission OAF (Operation Allied Force) has encouraged the EU to develop complementary military capability (Cottey, 2009, p. 600), it is important to examine how the Kosovo crisis led to this reform. To develop military capability in the EU was not a conceivable issue before the Kosovo crisis because it
was too controversial an issue to be discussed (Duke, 1999), especially because it involved the solidarity of the transatlantic relationship. However, since the US also expected Europe to play a more important role in its own territory, it encouraged European countries to make determination for the development of a serious security role of the EU (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 56; Shepherd, 2009, pp. 515–516).

The Kosovo crisis had significance for both Britain and Germany. It was considered that the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair used this situation to practise ‘liberal interventionism’ (Daddow, 2009). In a speech made in Chicago in 1999, Blair defended the legitimacy of the NATO mission OAF by asserting it was a ‘just war’ (Blair, 1999c). Regarding the EU being incapable in the Kosovo crisis, Blair also urged the development of the ESDP, which had been considered a change in Britain’s foreign and security policy (Shepherd, ibid., p. 515). However, Blair’s pro-European attitude and support for the ESDP should be interpreted as originating from the intention to strengthen the transatlantic alliance (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, ibid.), because in the War on Terror against Iraq in 2003, Britain’s ambition regarding the ESDP had declined. Nevertheless, the framework of the ESDP has been established, and the institutionalisation process also launched. In other words, according to the historical institutionalist’s term ‘path dependence’ (Pierson, 2000), a path for the common security and defence policy in the EU has started.

For Germany, the Kosovo crisis also signified a modification of foreign and security policy. German participation in the OAF was the first time Germany had intervened in a military combat mission outside NATO territory since the end of WWII, and this participation was a breakthrough for German participation in multilateral military missions. Also, what happened to the Balkans since the end of the Cold War also pushed Germany to rethink its traditional stance of the use of force (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, ibid., Longhurst, 2004; Maull, 2000a, 2000b). Therefore, under the
multilateral and institutional framework of the EU and NATO, reflection regarding the use of force led Germany to transform its role on security affairs in the world.

This chapter aims to evaluate the EU actions in resolving the Kosovo crisis. It will investigate how the EU utilised CFSP mechanisms to cope with the Kosovo crisis and analyse how the crisis affected the development of the ESDP. The role of Britain and Germany will also be discussed. It is because especially for Britain and Germany, the Kosovo crisis provided an opportunity to modify their policy on the development of EU security and defence integration.

6.2 The EU in the Kosovo Crisis

The three-pillar structure of the EU was supposed to bridge two competing models of institutional governance: the supranational system and intergovernmental co-operation (Andersson, 2008, p.124). The former was applied to the affairs of the Community, which had a supranational framework and made decisions on the basis of majority voting; the latter was applied to the CFSP and JHA (Justice and Home Affairs, renamed Political and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters since 2003), which had an intergovernmental framework and made decisions on the basis of unanimous agreement.

The CFSP was considered to have a more coherent and rationalised policy process, stronger legal binding on member states, and a more authoritative decision-making process, and therefore provide greater autonomy to EU institutional actors than the EPC (M. E. Smith, 2004a, p. 177). Compared to the EPC, the CFSP maintained an intergovernmental basis but had an institutionalised framework, which enabled EU
member states and institutional actors to work at the European level. Therefore, the CFSP signified a compromise between intergovernmentalism and institutionalism in order to ensure participation from member states on the one hand and an efficient institutional framework on the other.

The Amsterdam Treaty entered into force on since 1 May 1999 and provided some reforms for the institutional framework of the CFSP. However, when the EU started to address the Kosovo crisis in 1998, the Treaty was still at the stage of ratification. The CFSP mechanisms that the EU could apply in the Kosovo crisis were provided by the Maastricht Treaty. This section will explore how the EU applied the CFSP mechanisms in the Kosovo crisis and evaluate EU performance.

6.2.1 Before the Kosovo Crisis: The CFSP Mechanisms

The Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 1993, stated in the preamble that the EU aimed to fulfil a common policy for foreign and security affairs and eventually build common defence (the Preamble, The Maastricht Treaty). The procedures of common positions (Title V, Article J.2, The Maastricht Treaty) and joint actions (Title V, Article J.3, The Maastricht Treaty) were introduced in the Maastricht Treaty and were the main mechanisms for the EU to implement the CFSP. However, the Maastricht Treaty did not offer definite objectives for implementing the CFSP, but left this issue to be defined by the European Council and the Council of Ministers (Title V, Article J.8, The Maastricht Treaty).

The Maastricht Treaty offered an initial institutional framework for EU member states to implement the CFSP. Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty indicated that all questions relating to security were included in the CFSP; however, it did not have clear instructions about how and when to launch this procedure, and EU supranational actors had no capacity to intervene in CFSP issues. Therefore, it could
only rely on the political will of EU member states to fulfil it. Theoretically, the EU did not have deployable capability until the Amsterdam Treaty integrating the WEU (Title V, Article J.7, The Amsterdam Treaty), which aimed to strengthen the security and defence dimension of the CFSP. However, even though after incorporating the WEU, the EU did not really develop corresponding capability for undertaking targeted missions.

Compared to the EPC’s, however, the institutional framework of the CFSP was considered to contribute to enhancing security and defence co-operation (Sjursen, 1998, pp. 99–101). The first common position decided by the Council was on 22 November 1993, just three weeks after the enforcement of the Maastricht Treaty, and was to reduce economic relations with Libya (Council Decision, 93/614/CFSP) in order to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 883 (S/RES/883, 1993). Since then, the Council adopted around 300 common positions and joint actions in the international scene until the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty. Although the large number of common positions and joint actions adopted demonstrated that EU member states had an ambition to establish a consolidated image for the EU, these common positions and joint actions mostly involved diplomatic and economic instruments. Because of a lack of deployable capability, no missions abroad were deployed by the EU before the establishment of the ESDP; therefore, the CFSP was criticised for being a weak institutional framework, especially when compared to the Community pillar (F. Cameron, 1998, pp. 59–76; Peterson, 1998, pp. 7–11; M. E. Smith, 1996, p. 2).

By and large, the Maastricht Treaty provided a preliminary institutional framework for the EU to cope with CFSP issues. Although it did not have an efficient decision-making process and effective mechanisms, it at least offered a basic institutionalised environment for EU member states to negotiate and work together
under a common framework. However, this framework was not capable enough of tackling a serious conflict situation like Kosovo.

6.2.2 The EU Role in Resolving the Kosovo Crisis

The measures undertaken by the EU to resolve the Kosovo crisis were common positions and joint actions, which mainly concentrated on political solutions to press the Milosevic Government to make compromise on the Kosovo issue. As the situation in Kosovo deteriorated after mid-1998, the Council adopted a common position (Council decision, 98/240/CFSP) on 19 March 1998, which was to impose an arms embargo and travel ban against the FRY and listed senior Yugoslavia officials in order to press the Milosevic Government to end the violent suppression of Kosovo Albanians. More economic sanctions were adopted to press more political pressures against the Milosevic Government before the NATO mission OAF, including freezing the foreign financial assets of the FRY (Council decision, 98/326/CFSP), prohibiting new investments in Serbia (Council decision, 98/374/CFSP), a flight ban between the EU and FRY (Council decision, 98/426/CFSP), and more visa bans against Yugoslavia officials (Council decision, 98/725/CFSP).

Although the EU attempted a peaceful solution for the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership, the political actions undertaken by the EU did not have much effect in pressing the Milosevic regime to make concessions. Compared to the strong stance taken by NATO in threatening to launch military operations even without a UN mandate, the EU could only rely on diplomatic measures, and also lacked association with NATO to cope with this issue. During the period of the NATO mission OAF, the EU still continued to impose more sanctions against the FRY, including a petrol ban (Council decision, 1999/273/CFSP), more economic restrictions and a visa ban on more officials of the FRY government (Council decision, 1999/318/CFSP). However,
these political measures did not have much effect in alleviating the conflict in Kosovo.

Actually, the EU addressed the Kosovo issue from an early stage. By 1996, the EU had adopted 22 declarations, decisions and joint actions of the CFSP referring to Kosovo (H. Baker, Huberty, & Wohlmyer, 2006, p. 100). The large amount of Council decisions demonstrated that EU member states had an ambition to play an eminent role via imposing CFSP measures. Besides, the EU had imposed an arms embargo against the FRY one year before the NATO mission OAF. However, these efforts did not have much effect in controlling the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. Therefore, it was considered that without the back-up of military force, it would be difficult to make progress on diplomatic efforts (Duke, 1999, p. 5; Latawski & Smith, 2002, p. 217); that was the reason why the EU was unable to play an effective role in resolving the Kosovo crisis.

Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty did not have procedures for the EU to develop or convene military forces; as a result, under the framework of the Maastricht Treaty the CFSP actually lacked a security and defence dimension. Although the Amsterdam Treaty integrated the WEU (Title V, Article J.7, The Amsterdam Treaty), introduced a High Representative (Title V, Article J.16, The Amsterdam Treaty) and also constructive abstention and QMV to the CFSP (Title V, Article J.13, The Amsterdam Treaty), these reforms did not work in resolving the Kosovo crisis since the Treaty did not enter into force until May 1999.

Nevertheless, the EU was not totally incapable of tackling the Kosovo crisis. It exerted its influence and capability in another way, especially on a civilian aspect. In other words, although the EU failed to play a hard role, it became a significant actor to assist post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo. The first ESDP civilian mission to Kosovo, the EU Planning Team (EUPT), was launched in 2006 (Council decision,
2006/304/CFSP) in order to prepare future crisis management operations in this area. In 2008, the Council decided to deploy another civilian ESDP mission to Kosovo, the EULEX Kosovo (Council decision, 2008/124/CFSP), in order to assist the local government to enhance the system of the rule of law, especially in the fields of police, judiciary and customs.

The EULEX Kosovo has been considered the ‘most ambitious’ civilian mission for the EU because it has been not only the largest civilian CSDP mission, but also the first integrated mission consisting of policing, justice and customs staff (Chivvis, 2010, pp. 31–42; Gross, 2008, pp. 324–325). Moreover, the mission EULEX Kosovo has offered a learning approach for the EU because it covers a full spectrum of the rule of law which may improve integration between different components of civilian mechanisms (Ioannides, 2010, p. 45). Through the deployment of the EULEX Kosovo, the EU demonstrated its ability to cope with post-confliction reconstruction. However, the reason that the EU would contribute so much effort to Kosovo was out of geopolitical considerations (Anonymous, 2009); therefore, the achievement in the mission EULEX Kosovo cannot be simply concluded that the EU is completely capable of tackling civilian CSDP operations or CFSP missions.

6.2.3 The Influence of the Kosovo Crisis on the CFSP

The Balkans has been considered the back-yard of Europe, and therefore what happened to this region would be, so to speak, an examination to test the crisis management capability of the EU and also the effectiveness of the CFSP (Muguruza, 2003, p. 234). However, although it seemed to have the determination to resolve the Balkans issue, the EU did not have applicable mechanisms to undertake security and defence affairs. The Maastricht Treaty included the scope of security and defence under the framework of the CFSP, but EU member states mainly utilised this framework for forming a common foreign policy because the common positions and
joint actions which had been made before the establishment of the ESDP only involved diplomatic measures and lacked military or security implications. This was because the Maastricht Treaty did not provide rules or procedures for EU member states to launch military actions.

When reviewing the process of resolving the conflicts in Kosovo, the EU was unable to play a prominent role. Although the Kosovo crisis was considered a ‘wake-up call’ for the EU to fulfil its international responsibility (Soetendorp, ibid., p. 238), the EU lacked effective mechanisms to end the conflicts in Kosovo eventually. In the Cardiff European Council held on 15–16 June 1998, EU member states had addressed the Kosovo issue and threatened to launch ‘a much stronger response’ if Milosevic failed to undertake political solutions to resolve the Kosovo issue (Presidency Conclusions of the Cardiff European Council, adopted in 1998), but apparently the EU was unable to carry out this determination.

More specifically speaking, it was not only a shortfall in crisis management capability; it was also a shortfall of the commitment of EU member states to tackle the international crisis. As has been indicated by Adam Roberts, although individual EU member states took part in the OAF, even including Germany, 85 per cent of the effective force for this operation was supplied by the US (Roberts, 1999, p. 119); therefore, to improve burden-sharing for the transatlantic alliance became more inevitable for the EU. The Kosovo crisis not only offered an impetus for the EU to reform its institutional framework in order to cope with crisis management, but also helped NATO expand its security role beyond traditional defence alliance (Cottey, 2009). As a result, both the EU and NATO had an opportunity to transform their security role on the international scene.

In summary, the lack of capacity to present an effective role when tackling the Kosovo crisis pushed EU member states to make a commitment to the ESDP. In the
1999 Cologne European Council, EU member states determined to enhance security and defence capability, and then in the 1999 Helsinki European Council, member states adopted military headline goal and planned to achieve it by 2003. From 2003 to January 2012, the EU had undertaken 24 CSDP missions, 16 of which were civilian missions. This amount has signified that the EU has a special focus on civilian missions, even though it is able to call for military contributions from member states now. This result also reflects the fact that the divergences of EU member states about whether the EU should involve more military operations are still obvious. Considering the role of member states in this process, the next two sections will discuss Britain and Germany’s role in the Kosovo crisis.

6.3 Britain’s Role in the Kosovo Crisis

Tony Blair and the ‘New Labour’ government from 1997 to 2007 were once considered as having a different stance on British EU policy (Latawski & M. A. Smith, 2002), because they had a more flexible and negotiable policy than the ‘old’ Labour Party and the Conservative Party regarding EU affairs. To integrate security and defence capability in Europe, Blair signed the St Malo Declaration with the French President, Jacques Chirac, in 1998 in order to strengthen European defence co-operation, which became the fundamental basis for the establishment of the ESDP. Besides the Chicago speech, in his address made in Warsaw Blair again called for developing the EU to become a ‘superpower’ (Blair, 2000). His proactive attitude made Britain play a leading role in developing the ESDP. However, Blair’s EU policy in his first term was more a flexible adjustment than a substantial shift, because the transatlantic alliance was still Britain’s priority during Blair’s leadership. The efforts he made to the ESDP had become an indispensable basis for the ESDP nevertheless.
6.3.1 Britain’s Participation in Resolving the Kosovo Crisis

Tony Blair’s policy towards the Kosovo crisis was described as a practice of ‘liberal interventionism’ (Daddow, 2009, p. 548), which applied an interventionist approach to the implementation of norms, values or beliefs. According to the 1999 Chicago speech, Blair addressed the concern about the anti-humanitarian situation happening in Kosovo and also defended the NATO military operation OAF by arguing that, once NATO failed in Kosovo, it would be difficult to stop the next dictator (Blair, 1999b). Although Blair’s proactive attitude towards the Kosovo crisis and NATO mission was considered as originating from a commitment to human rights and a consideration to avoid the government making another failure in Bosnia (Keohane, 2000), it was also compatible with the principle in Britain’s foreign policy, the transatlantic alliance and British leading role in international issues.

When Blair announced the decision in the House of Commons on 23 March 1999 that the Labour government would contribute to the NATO mission in the FRY (Blair, 1999c), he put the emphasis on a humanitarian consideration, and this stance gained the most support in Parliament, although few were concerned as to whether the NATO mission would really achieve the alliance’s objective in the end (Brazier, 1999; Tapsell, 1999), whether the NATO mission would cause a more serious human rights crisis (Benn, 1999; Campbell, 1999; Mahon, 1999), or whether ground troops should be deployed to complement air strikes (Mcnamara, 1999). Generally speaking, Blair did not encounter serious opposition in Parliament, and most MPs gave the Government support; even the Leader of the Opposition, William Hague, supported this decision (Hague, 1999), which Blair described as a ‘united view’ (Blair, 1999c).

It is worth noting that in this debate there was no discussion about what role the EU should play in the Kosovo crisis; this was because the EU did not have the credibility to resolve a fighting situation like Kosovo. However, the unsuccessful experience of
the EU in resolving the Kosovo crisis also offered Blair an opportunity to shape a security and defence role for the EU. In the House of Commons on 26 April 1999, Blair reiterated the stance he made in the Chicago speech that he would support the development of stronger EU capability in order to strengthen the transatlantic alliance; he also indicated that through resource sharing, the EU and NATO could become compatible (Blair, 1999d). This policy gained support from the Conservative MP Ian Taylor, who argued that the EU should develop its own sufficient capability instead of relying on NATO or America, in case there should be a situation in which America would not become involved; Taylor also implied Britain should put more efforts in the EU in order to shape favourable policies for Britain (I. Taylor, 1999). In order to promote the ESDP, the Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon also explained that, through driving the development of the ESDP, Britain would be able to play a leading role in the ESDP and also strengthen NATO (Hoon, 1999).

In summary, although Blair argued that the military involvement in the Kosovo crisis originated from a humanitarian consideration, it was also the result of pursuing national interests. It was argued that Britain had a proactive attitude to develop the ESDP owing to two motivations, influence and leadership; especially because Britain did not join the Euro, it had to find other grounds to avoid being marginalised (Latawski & Smith, 2002, p. 218). On the one hand, the contribution to the NATO mission in the FRY would consolidate the transatlantic alliance and also strengthen the NATO role in crisis management. Both were in Britain’s long-term interests. On the other hand, Britain’s international role would – not only for Britain, but also for Blair’s leadership – be strengthened by taking part in the NATO mission and leading the development of the EU. Therefore, the Kosovo crisis became a chance for Britain to break the EU taboo on developing military capability.
6.3.2 The Implications of the Kosovo Crisis on Britain's Policy

Blair was described as ‘the most instinctively pro-European Prime Minister since Edward Heath’ (Stephens, 2001, p. 67, cited in Geddes, 2004, p. 88), and also considered a young and ‘modernising’ leader of the Labour Party (Fella, 2002, p. 1). Therefore, Blair had to establish a distinctive and strong image which would consolidate his, and Labour’s, leadership. Moreover, foreign policy was usually viewed as Britain’s strength, because it had a qualified diplomatic service and capable military (Grant, 2002, p. 39); accordingly, if the Blair Government attempted to exert Britain’s influence, foreign affairs would be an ideal ground.

In the process of resolving the Kosovo crisis, besides taking part in the NATO mission OAF, Britain also provided financial and technical assistance to Kosovo. According to the statement made by the International Development Secretary, Clare Short, in April 1999 the Government had allocated £20 million to humanitarian assistance for the Kosovo refugees and also contributed around £15 million for the EU to the mission in Macedonia and Albania; besides, Britain helped with local reconstruction in Kosovo (Short, 1999).

The Kosovo crisis, being a ‘storm-cloud’, highlighted the fact that the EU was incapable of tackling crisis management situations, and therefore gave Blair an opportunity to reform the institutional framework of the EU (Howorth, 2007, p. 53), moreover shaping a leading role for Britain (Miskimmon, 2005, p. 103). Therefore, Britain’s promise to build up EU military capability was an important factor to underpin the development of the ESDP. In order to fulfil the military targets decided in the Helsinki Headline Goal, Britain made a commitment to offering 12,500 troops, 18 ships and 72 combat planes to the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) (Miskimmon, ibid.).
Another implication resulting from the Kosovo crisis to Britain was that this event offered Britain an opportunity to become the ‘bridge’ between America and Europe. As he stated in the Chicago speech, Blair presented the prospect of being a bridge in the transatlantic alliance. In a speech made in Birmingham in 2001, Blair reiterated the prospect of bridging America and Europe by asserting that the UK had both economic and political influence and the UK–US friendship was also ‘an asset’ for European countries (Blair, 2001). What Blair had presented was an ambitious objective, because he attempted to be completely engaged in a ‘united Europe’ and also worked closely with America. However, this expectation faded when Blair chose to stand with America on the War on Terror, which demonstrated that, regarding military affairs, America was a more important partner for Britain (Miskimmon, 2005, p. 96).

In summary, on the one hand, through playing a proactive role in the Kosovo crisis and being committed to OAF, Britain consolidated the transatlantic alliance; on the other hand, after the OAF, Britain drove the development of the ESDP which strengthened Britain’s leading role in this process. Along with France and Germany, it was the first time that the Big Three had a consensus to develop EU military capability, and then achieve substantial progress on the ESDP. However, what already happened to Britain in the War on Terror against Iraq already proved what Howorth had predicted in 2000, that because the US and the EU had different policy approaches to military affairs Britain had to ‘make a clear choice about belonging’ (Howorth, 2000b, p. 395).
6.4 Germany’s Role in the Kosovo Crisis

Germany’s participation in the NATO mission OAF had attracted much attention because it was the first time that the Federal government had deployed the military abroad, and it also was the first challenge that the newly elected Red–Green coalition government had to undertake. Because of its geopolitical position compared to Britain, the deteriorating situation in Kosovo was a more serious issue for Germany. Besides, because of the significance in German’s foreign and security policy, OAF was described as still the high water in terms of the transition of German security and defence policy since the end of the Cold War (Miskimmon, 2009, p. 561).

6.4.1 German Participation in Resolving the Kosovo Crisis

Regarding the first out-of-area NATO mission OAF, the SPD Chancellor Schröder and the Green Foreign Minister Fischer not only supported it, but also committed to taking part in the NATO crisis management mission KFOR (Erb, 2003, p. 168). Fischer supported OAF on the basis of protecting human rights, and his support was especially important for the Red–Green coalition government to participate in OAF; this was because the German Green Party had a pacifist tradition and rejected nationalism (Rudig, 1996, pp. 260–266). Although it was also indicated that between 1992 and 2005 the Green Party had transformed itself into an ‘engaged pacifist’ organisation which accepted the limited the use of force (D. Brunstetter & S. Brunstetter, 2011), this transformation was a supportive factor for Germany to adjust the terms of the use of force.

Fischer explained that the reason the coalition government decided to participate in military intervention in Kosovo was humanitarian considerations (Fischer, 1999). He
argued that the war in Kosovo had taken place since 1992 and had already caused massive casualties. He went even further to call it a new European Holocaust, and this was the reason why the Green Party was no longer a protest party on this issue. However, he also declared that he did not change the principles which rejected war and Auschwitz, genocide and fascism (ibid.). Fischer’s statement defended the stance of the coalition government that military intervention in Kosovo was not incompatible with Green traditions or with Germany.

Schröder also expressed a similar concern for terminating the anti-humanitarian situation in Kosovo by arguing that Germany ‘cannot stand back and accept massive human rights violation’ (Schröder, 1999, p. 33, cited in Erb, ibid., p. 171). This stance was supported by the German public. According to a poll survey undertaken by Forsa in March 1999, 58 per cent of Germans believed German participation in OAF was compatible with the unified role of Germany in international politics, and 52 per cent of Germans agreed such participation should be continued even though German soldiers died in this mission (Forsa poll, 1999, p. 52, cited in Baumann & Hellmann, 2001, p. 77). Therefore, 71 per cent of SPD members and 68 per cent of Green members supported Germany taking part in OAF (Erb, ibid., p. 174), by offering four Tornado aircrafts stationed in Piacenza (Longhurst, 2004, p. 71).

Besides, Germany also took part in the NATO crisis management operation KFOR in Kosovo beginning in June 1999. This decision was approved by the Bundestag with a vote of 505 in favour and 24 against (Erb, ibid.) and the Bundestag promised around 8,000 troops to take part in KFOR (Longhurst, ibid., p. 76). According to the latest military balance report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Germany still maintains around 1,451 troops and still contributes the most of all European countries to implementing the KFOR (Military Balance, 2012).
6.4.2 The Implications of the Kosovo Crisis on Germany’s Foreign Policy

German participation in OAF attracted much attention because it had already renounced the use of force for the purpose of national interests for decades; therefore, this participation indicated an evolution of German foreign policy, especially for the concept of the use of force (Longhurst, ibid., pp. 69–73). The Westpolitik policy introduced by the first Federal Chancellor Adenauer had shaped Germany to embrace the commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism, and then transformed Germany into a civilian power. Because of the civilian principle, even since the end of the Cold War Germany rejected deploying troops to Iraq or Bosnia (Rummel, 1996, p. 53). Therefore, the most important implication of the Kosovo crisis to Germany was that it encouraged Germany to adjust the terms of the use of force.

Besides, the Kosovo crisis also led Germany to support the development of the ESDP and to strengthen EU military capability. The former Defence Minister, Lothar Ruhl, had made a statement before the 1999 Helsinki European Council by calling for the modernisation of European armed forces and defence capability (Ruhl, 1999). He argued that the EU should improve the capability to deploy armed forces ‘not only within Europe, but also outside of Europe at greater distances from their home bases’, and therefore EU could really share a burden with NATO and enhance EU presence within NATO. Ruhl’s argument was based on the concern that the EU should be able to tackle security and military issues for the case if the US would not get involved.

Nevertheless, the participation in OAF and the efforts to develop the ESDP should not be interpreted as meaning that Germany had changed the principle of being a civilian power. Actually, during the period of OAF, Germany did not give up diplomatic efforts to search for a peaceful resolution, since it undertook a ‘dual-track
approach’ which combined military commitment to OAF and diplomatic efforts in order to avert military actions; also, Fischer had called for a twenty-four-hour break in bombing in the FRY (Longhurst, 2004, p. 72).

The continuing diplomatic efforts of Germany signified that, even though taking part in NATO military intervention, Germany did not ignore non-military options. As has been indicated by a German MdB, Germany supported the EU playing a more important role in military affairs instead of only depending on the US, especially in situations like the Balkans crisis, because Europe should be defended by Europeans (Arnold, 2009), however, Germany would also be thought to be very careful when considering military options (Bartels, 2010). Accordingly, German participation in OAF should not be considered a fundamental policy shift, especially because Germany still had restrictions about the willingness and ability to deploy high-intensity military missions (Miskimmon, 2009, p. 562). As a result, after the Kosovo crisis, Germany still considered it maintained the continuity of being a civilian power (Hyde-Price, 2000, 2001, 2004; Maull, 2000a, 2000b), and had a special interest in fostering the civilian dimension of the ESDP (Crevi, 2009, p. 22).

6.5 Conclusion

The Kosovo crisis signified a transformation to the development of EU security and defence policy. This is because if the EU attempted to become more prominent in security and defence affairs, strong military capability would still be required (Silveira, 2009). Since the two European Council held in 1999 in Cologne and Helsinki, the development of the ESDP has made some progress, especially in the aspect of building deployable capabilities to implement ESDP missions.
Besides the development of ERRF, the EU also aimed to have two battle groups stand by in order to provide rapid response for small-scale crisis management missions; each battle group consists of 1,500 corps and can be ready within five to ten days to deploy for a mission of 30 to 120 days (Lindstrom, 2007, pp. 12–16). Up to now, except for Denmark, all member states of the EU have contributed to form the battle groups. However, member states did not fully accomplish their commitment to offering battle groups. It was indicated by the Council that only one battle group had been confirmed for the first semester of 2012 (Council conclusions on CSDP, adopted 2011); this situation also occurred in 2009. Moreover, according to the schedule up to 2014, there are still not enough battle groups promised by member states (C. Major & Molling, 2011, p. 36). These shortfalls illustrate that even though member states of the EU have made commitment to enhancing CSDP capabilities, sometimes they do not have strong enough political will to maintain their commitment.

In the civilian dimension, the EU also has an ambitious goal. It aims at developing capabilities for assisting with police missions, establishing the rule of law system, developing civil administration order, protecting civilians, contributing to monitoring missions, and supporting EU special representatives. For the purpose, the PSC has made a plan to develop such capabilities, endorsed by the Council on 13 December 2010 (Council conclusions on Civilian CSDP capabilities, adopted in 2011). According to this plan, the EU will prepare around a dozen CSDP civilian missions, including *inter alia* police, rule-of-law, civilian administration, civil protection, security sector reform, and observation missions of varying formats, including in rapid-response situations, together with a major mission (possibly up to 3,000 experts) which could last several years.

More specifically, this plan has called for contributions to these civilian operations, including a policing operation which aims to provide more than 5,000 police officers’,
and also ‘up to 1400 can be deployed in less than 30 days’; for the mission of strengthening the rule of law, member states have pledged to provide 631 prosecutors, judges or prison officers; for the civilian administration mission, member states have committed to providing 565 staff; for the civil protection mission, 579 civil protection experts and 4,445 staff for intervention teams have been promised by member states; for the monitoring mission, member states have committed 505 personnel. However, the shortfall still exists in the civilian dimension, especially for policing forces (ibid.).

For Britain, the Kosovo crisis was an opportunity to urge the development of the ESDP, and then shape a leading role of Britain in the EU and in the transatlantic alliance which would achieve the objective asserted by Blair to become a bridge between America and Europe. The institutional framework of the ESDP was also compatible with Britain’s principles on the development of security and defence integration in the EU, which were insisting on an intergovernmental basis and maintaining prominent role of NATO. However, the divisions on the War on Terror in the EU and in the transatlantic alliance signified this bridge strategy might not work when Europe and America had a serious dispute on the same issue and both of them were not negotiable. Therefore, Britain went back to its traditional stance of standing with America, and did not maintain an initiative role in promoting the ESDP and CSDP. In the process of resolving the Libyan crisis, the Cameron Government mainly relied on NATO or bilateral co-operation with France to undertake military intervention, and did not consider the EU as an option.

For Germany, the Kosovo crisis was also an important opportunity because since then Germany transformed itself to become a ‘normal’ civilian power. In other words, Germany became less resistant to use military options in order to implement diplomatic objectives (Bulmer & Paterson, 2010). However, Germany did not abandon a civilian stance, even though it took part in the development of the ESDP
and CSDP. Germany still had special interests in strengthening the civilian dimension of common security and defence policy. Moreover, it maintained a critical and cautious attitude towards military options. Therefore, both in the ‘War on Terror’ against Iraq and in the Libyan crisis, Germany was hesitant or even rejected endorsing military actions. More discussion of Britain and Germany’s stance in the Libyan crisis will be presented in the next chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN

The Implementation of the CSDP in Resolving the Libyan Crisis

7.1 Introduction

Libya is a country located in North Africa and is bound on the east by Egypt, on the south–east by Sudan, on the south by Chad and Niger, and on the west by Algeria and Tunisia. Libya was governed by Muammar Gaddafi under the Libyan Arab Republic from 1969 to 1977 and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya from 1977 to 2011. Inspired by the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt starting from the end of 2010, there were large–scale anti-government demonstrations in Libya from February 2011 to protest against the forty-two-year dictatorship of the Gaddafi regime. Since the unrest soon spread to the capital city Tripoli and caused turbulence, Gaddafi, the leader of this country, demanded to suppress the uprisings by violent means.

In response to the violently suppression undertaken in Libya, the UN Security Council (UNSC) first made a press statement on 22 February 2011 to condemn the violence and use of force against civilians and called for the Gaddafi Government to make an immediate end of such violent instruments, have dialogue with the Libyan people, and lift restrictions on the media (SC/10180, AFR/2120). On 26 February 2011, the UNSC adopted the 1970 resolution and decided to undertake some measures to impose sanctions against the Gaddafi regime, including referring the situation in Libya after 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), imposing an arms embargo and travel ban, and freezing foreign assets controlled by the Gaddafi regime; besides, the resolution also calls for humanitarian
assistance in Libya and establishes a new sanctions committee in order to monitor the implementation of these sanctions and report to the UNSC (S/RES/1970/2011).

Soon after the UNSCR 1970 was adopted, the Opposition in Libya formed the National Transitional Council (NTC) on 27 February 2011 in Benghazi, the second largest city in Libya located on the Mediterranean Sea. On 5 March 2011, the NTC announced itself to be the only legitimate government to represent the Libyan people and the state. On 10 March 2011, France became the first country to recognise the NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. Because the situation of violently attacking the Libyan citizens did not improve, one week after French recognition of the NTC the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973. Besides maintaining the sanctions in Resolution 1970, Resolution 1973 aimed to create a no-fly zone and ban all flights in the airspace of Libya. As a result, member states of the UN were requested to act nationally or through regional mechanisms to protect Libyan civilians and implement the no-fly zone (S/RES/1973/2011). Resolution 1973 became a resort for the international community to launch military actions against the Gaddafi regime. Accordingly, a series of military interventions were launched on 19 March 2011 through a multi-state coalition of America, Britain, France, Canada, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Denmark and Norway, and then NATO took over the responsibility for military actions from 31 March 2011 (mission name: Operation Unified Protector). After several months of confrontations, the NTC gradually controlled the situation and was given a seat in the UN General Assembly on 16 September 2011. Since then the NTC, governed by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, has obtained comprehensive recognition from the international community with the aim of building a constitutional democratic country with an elected government in Libya. The Gaddafi regime officially ended when the previous leader of Libya, Gaddafi, died in a conflict on 20 October 2011.
After the frustration caused by inability in the Kosovo crisis, the EU has, since 1999, when the ESDP was launched, contributed many efforts to developing military and civilian capabilities for crisis management. Besides, the Lisbon Treaty which entered into force since 1 December 2009 accepted some reforms for the CSDP in order to consolidate the existing institutional framework. The reforms included introducing new positions for the President of the European Council and the High Representative, and also establishing a body named the European External Action Service (EEAS) for assisting the High Representative’s work. The institutional framework of the CSDP thus becomes even more institutionalised since the role of institutional actors of the EU is accentuated. As a result, the Libyan crisis can be viewed as an opportunity for the EU to examine whether the institutional framework of the CSDP is able to tackle crisis management now.

Compared to NATO which led military interventions during the period of the Libyan crisis, however, the EU had proved again that it was unable to cope with such crises via the mechanisms of the CSDP. On 20 February 2011, Catherine Ashton made a statement to condemn the violent repression in Libya (Ashton, 2011b); Herman Van Rompuy’s statement was made on 23 February 2011 and merely promised the EU would continue the neighbourhood policy of helping with this region (Van Rompuy, 2011). Although both the High Representative Catherine Ashton and the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy made statements soon after the uprising spread to Tripoli and expressed their concern about the situation in Libya, their statements did not involve any substantial determination to intervene in the crisis. Indeed, except for implementing the UNSC 1970 Resolution, the member states of the EU could not form a coherent and consistent common position on whether to undertake rapid and robust actions to cope with this conflicting situation. Moreover, the EU could not even form a common position on whether to recognise the NTC as a legitimate government in Libya.
Actually, the division within the EU regarding the Libyan crisis can be easily observed from the different attitudes taken by Britain, France and Germany. On the one hand, because of geopolitical and economic considerations, France was not only the first country to recognise the NTC, but was also keen to intervene in the crisis via military means. Britain was also interested in offering military forces to intervene in Libya for the implementation of the UNSC 1973 Resolution, and this strong position might lift the reputation of the Cameron Government. On the other hand, Germany was reluctant to take part in multi-state coalition and did not contribute to military attacks of NATO. Moreover, when voting for the UNSC 1973 Resolution, Germany abstained from voting for the UNSC 1973 Resolution, which signified Germany did not favour military intervention in Libya.

This chapter aims to evaluate the EU performance in resolving the Libyan crisis. It derives from investigating how the EU tackles this crisis and examining whether the reformed framework of the CSDP has influence on the capabilities of the EU to undertake crisis management operations. Besides, the role of Britain and Germany will also be discussed in this chapter. Especially because Britain and Germany have distinct attitudes from each other, it is important to explore why they have different attitudes towards this issue and how these differences influence the EU role in the Libyan crisis.

7.2 The EU in the Libyan Crisis

Since the 1999 Cologne Council decided to establish the ESDP, the military and civilian capabilities of the EU have been largely improved through the implementation of a series of headline goals. Although the missions of the
ESDP/CSDP largely depend on intergovernmental voluntary co-operation from member states, the EU has rapidly developed a high profile for crisis management operations. These missions are located in the Balkan region, Africa, the Middle East and Asia, and this signifies the ambition of the EU to become a global player. Accordingly, this section will explore whether the improvement of institutional frameworks and deployable capabilities contributes to the ability of the EU to cope with crisis management operations, and evaluate the performance of the EU in dealing with the Libyan crisis.

7.2.1 The CSDP Mechanisms for Tackling Crisis Management Operations

Before investigating the actions that the EU took in the Libyan crisis, it is essential to introduce the mechanisms that the EU can rely on in response to international crises. A series of reforms since the 1999 Cologne council until the Lisbon Treaty aims to create a more institutionalised and systematic framework for the CSDP and has enabled the CSDP to become more applicable to crisis management operations. According to the existing institutional framework of the CSDP, there is a set of mechanisms and procedures for the EU to tackle CSDP-related issues.

Firstly, the decision-making bodies in the EU which are charged with CSDP-related issues can be separated into three levels: strategy-making bodies, suggestion/initiative-proposing bodies, and policy-supporting bodies. The strategy-making bodies include the President of the European Council and the High Representative. The new roles of the President and the High Representative introduced by the Lisbon Treaty are expected to enhance the capacities of the EU in response to external relations and international crises. Both of them can address CFSP and CSDP-related issues on behalf of the EU and represent the EU speaking with one voice on the international scene (Article 15, 18, The Lisbon Treaty). Since Herman Van Rompuy is appointed for the first President and Catherine Ashton is
appointed for the first High Representative, how they exert their authorities and responsibilities is decisive in determining the development and influence of these positions in the future.

The suggestion/initiative-proposing bodies include the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Article 27.3, The Lisbon Treaty), the Political and Security Committee (PSC) (Article 38, The Lisbon Treaty) and the Committee of Permanent Representative (COREPER) (Article 16.7, The Lisbon Treaty). They are built for the purpose of providing policy-planning suggestions and decision-implementing supervisions. The EEAS and the PSC especially are responsible for assisting the work of the High Representative and the Foreign Affairs Council; meanwhile, when crisis occurs, the PSC is charged with political control on the situation in order to avoid the EU being powerless in response to urgent situations.

Besides, there are some policy-supporting bodies subordinated to the EEAS and PSC for crisis management situations or operations, including the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), EUMC, EUMS, CIVCOM, the Civil & Military Planning Department (CMPD), the Political and Military Group (PMG), the Civilian Planning and Conducting Capabilities (CPCC), and the EU Operations Centre. These institutions are responsible for providing more detailed information and advice to help the EEAS and PSC define situations and make decisions; meanwhile, they also assist with carrying out or monitoring the implementation of CSDP missions.

Secondly, regarding the instruments applicable to responding to crises, the Lisbon Treaty simplifies the names of common positions and joint actions to ‘positions’ and ‘actions’, but they still belong to the scope of co-decision (Article 25, 28, The Lisbon Treaty). Accordingly, the High Representative and any member states can make proposals or initiatives referring to the CFSP to the Council (Article 27.1, The Lisbon Treaty); and meanwhile, if they require a rapid decision, the High Representative can
convene an extraordinary Council meeting within forty-eight hours (Article 30.2, The Lisbon Treaty). Qualified majority voting and constructive abstention are maintained but may not apply to the decisions with military or defence implications (Article 31, The Lisbon Treaty).

The most important change in the Lisbon Treaty for the Council is that the Foreign Affairs Council is separated from the previous General Affairs and External Relations Council and becomes independent (Article 12.5, The Lisbon Treaty) and the High Representative will chair the Foreign Affairs Council (Article 18.3, 27, The Lisbon Treaty). Although by and large the procedures for adopting a Union position or action do not have much change, the authority of the High Representative is enhanced. Also, the High Representative is also the Vice-President in the Commission (Article 17.4, 18.4, The Lisbon Treaty), and this dual responsibility will increase more possibilities to improve the coordination between the Council and the Commission.

The institutional framework above provides necessary procedures about how to decide and implement a CSDP mission. In terms of deployable capability for implement common foreign and security affairs, as introduced in the Chapter three, the EU already has European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) and two standby battle groups for military actions. When the crisis in Libya became serious, the EU actually had two standby battle groups; the one was from Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Austria, and Lithuania, while the other one was from Nordic countries (C. Major & Molling, 2011, p. 36). However, member states did not agree to deploy these battle-groups to Libya. Although EU battle groups have become ready for deployment since 2007, they have not been deployed to any crisis management situations so far.
In the civilian dimension, the EU also aims to prepare about 12 CSDP medium civilian missions and one major mission (possibly up to 3000 experts and could last for several years) at the same time. Besides, for policing operations, member states are asked to provide more than 5000 police officers and up to 1400 can be deployed in less than 30 days. There are other civilian staffs have been promised by member states for civilian CSDP missions (ESDP, Civilian Aspects, 2009).

To summarise, the EU has already established an institutionalised framework for common security and defence policy because it has a definite decision-making procedure and hierarchical administrative system, and also it has deployable capability. This framework is supposed to make the EU become more responsive if the international situations are required. However, in the Libyan crisis the EU still lacked rapid, strong and consistent actions to resolve the situation and once again looked towards NATO for military crisis resolution. It signified that the present institutionalised framework is not capable of overcoming the divergences of national interests and security policies. As a result, it is useful to explore how the consideration of national interests affects the implementation of the CSDP on crisis management.

7.2.2 The EU Role in Resolving the Libyan Crisis

Generally speaking, the actions of the EU to the Libyan crisis were undertaken basically according to the UNSCR 1970 and 1973, and mainly concentrated on diplomatic and economic sanctions. Although during the period of the Libyan crisis, there were lots of discussions inside the EU via the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council, the EU did not agree to have a crisis management operation in Libya till the end.
Since the Lisbon Treaty vests the High Representative with competence to co-ordinate different attitudes between member states and to propose initiatives to the Foreign Affairs Council, the High Representative plays a critical role in encouraging member states to adopt decisions for the EU to form positions and take actions. After the outbreak of the Libyan crisis, the High Representative Catherine Ashton made the first statement on 20 February 2011 on behalf of the EU to condemn the Libyan government, call for an immediate end to attacks against civilians and ask the Libyan government for national dialogue with their people (Ashton, 2011b). However, this statement did not make any promise that what actions the EU would take. A brief statement was made by the Chairman of the PSC Olof Skoog after a PSC meeting on 23 February 2011 while Skoog made a commitment that the EU would take further measures in Libya (Skoog, 2011). However, he did not make a definite promise about EU actions, either.

Soon after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1970, on 28 February 2011 the High Representative and the President of the Commission had a joint proposal for implementing the Resolution. The Council then adopted a decision to impose an arms embargo, a ban on exports of internal repression equipment, a travel ban and economic restrictions to the Gaddafi regime involved in violent repression against civilians in Libya (2011/137/CFSP).

The speech made by Ashton on 9 March 2011 at the European Parliament argued that there were two immediate priorities of the EU, referring to the Libyan crisis. The first was to cope with the humanitarian crisis and assist with evacuating European citizens from Libya (Ashton, 2011c). Accordingly, the Commission allocated €30 million for humanitarian assistance in Libya, and the EEAS assisted in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (MIC) from 23 February 2011 for the evacuation of EU citizens. The second priority was to end the violent situation in Libya and ensure the people who were violating international law would be prosecuted for their crimes.
Correspondingly, the EEAS sent a fact-finding mission to Libya led by Agostino Miozzo, Managing Director for Crisis Response, on 6–7 March 2011 to observe the local humanitarian situation and assess whether it would be necessary to deploy a CSDP mission to Libya.

This speech had two implications. Firstly, because Ashton had sent a fact-finding mission to Libya, it implied she was considering deploying an EU mission in Libya. Secondly, the Commission was more responsive than the Council to address this problem because the Commission had a supranational framework and be easier to make decisions more efficiently.

An extraordinary Council meeting was convened by Ashton on 10 March, and an extraordinary European Council meeting was also held on 11 March. However, neither of the meetings made a concrete promise that the EU would have a crisis management mission in Libya. In a brief statement made before the Council meeting, although Ashton mentioned there was a discussion about building a no-fly zone in Libya, she merely promised that the EU might impose economic sanctions against the Gaddafi regime (Ashton, 2011d). Concerning the UN Security Resolution 1973, the Council meeting on 21 March only concluded that the EU would implement the resolution ‘in a different way’ (Council Conclusions, 2011). Besides, the meeting of the European Council on 24–25 March 2011 was merely committed to ‘a political solution’ (European Council Conclusions, 2011). Accordingly, neither the Council nor the European Council adopted a decision to have a crisis management operation in Libya and insisted non-military measures to resolve this issue.

A military operation (EUFOR Libya) was adopted by the Council on 1 April for humanitarian assistance (2011/210/CFSP). EUFOR Libya was set up for a small scale and short-term operation in order to assist evacuation tasks and ensure safe delivery of humanitarian resources. However, EUFOR Libya was a standby operation rather
than an autonomous action, because it would only operate under the request of the UN. The UN actually did not make such request till the end of the crisis. The stance that the EU would only have a military mission in Libya under the UN mandate was also made clear by Ashton, even though such a military mission was for a humanitarian purpose (Ashton, 2011e).

More economic and diplomatic restrictions were adopted to implement the Council decision 2011/137/CFSP from March to August 2011; however, no crisis management operation had been decided. As the situation in Libya became calm, the UN Security Council accepted Resolution 2009 on 16 September 2011 in order to start a three-month reconstruction project in Libya named ‘UN Support Mission in Libya’ (UNSMIL) and exempted partly sanctions (S/RES/2009/2011). Following this resolution, the EU also started to lift part of the sanctions against Libya.

To summarise, although the EU expressed deep concern about the Libya issue, it was unable to address crisis management in Libya. Although both Ashton and Van Rompuy reiterated the stance that Gaddafi had to relinquish authority, the EU did not have corresponding military actions to underpin its stance. What the EU did in the crisis in Libya was not different from what it did in the crisis in Kosovo, because it still relied on non-military measures. The EUFOR Libya was the only CSDP mission agreed by the EU for Libya, but it did not really carry out the responsibilities since the UN did not make such a mandate.

7.2.3 Evaluate the Role of EU in the Libyan Crisis

From the frustrating experiences in conducting the Kosovo crisis, in the 1999 Cologne European Council and under the initiative of the German Presidency, EU member states made a declaration to develop ‘the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO’. Accordingly, three elements of this determination could be identified. Firstly, the EU should be able to undertake autonomous external actions. Secondly, such actions should be accompanied with credible military capabilities and appropriate procedures. Thirdly, such developments should not undermine the presence of NATO. The three elements could serve as criteria by which to examine whether the EU had achieved the objective of the Cologne European Council.

In terms of whether the EU would be able to undertake autonomous external actions, it depended on two conditions, which were if there were proper procedures and if there were corresponding capability. As was mentioned in the previous section, the EU had established an institutionalised and organised policy-making process for implementing common security and defence affairs. Once the Council adopted a common decision, member states and EU institutions would be liable to implement the decision. Besides the capability contributions from member states, the EEAS, PSC and other policy-supporting bodies would have to provide political control, strategic direction and monitoring during the period of implementation. This framework ensured that the EU would have technical and administrative assistance in order to undertake a CSDP mission.

Besides, regarding the relationship with NATO, the EU had made a joint declaration with NATO on 16 December 2002 in order to develop a permanent co-operation framework called ‘Berlin Plus’ for crisis management operations. The ‘Berlin Plus’ included three elements: allowing the EU access to NATO planning, having European command in NATO, and allowing the EU to use NATO assets and capabilities (EU–NATO Declaration, 2002). Accordingly, a NATO permanent military liaison team has been built at the EU Military Staff (EUMS) since November 2005 and an EU cell has been set up at SHAPE (NATO’s strategic command for operations in Belgium) from March 2006. The ‘Berlin Plus’ aimed to build a co-operative and complementary
relationship between NATO and the EU and then avoid possible conflicts between these two institutions.

Then, why did the EU still fail to play a military role in the Libyan crisis? Ashton was expected to play a proactive role and she considered herself able to do this. As she herself stated, one of her priorities as High Representative was to create a ‘new diplomatic service that is genuinely Europe on the ground’ (Ashton, 2011a, p. 5). Indeed, Ashton did consider a military option since she sent a fact-finding group to Libya at a very early stage of the crisis, but she could not persuade member states to accept such option in the end. What she did during the process of resolving the crisis was basically to reiterate that the EU did not support the Gaddafi regime any more, but the EU did not provide a more credible method for implementing this aim.

Because the new High Representative was expected to accomplish a lot, when Ashton did not play this role as well as expected she was blamed more for her weak personality. When Ashton came to the European Parliament for the first time, she was criticised for her vague rhetoric and lack of ‘lucid presentation of priority’ (Traynor, 2010). Although it was definitely a difficult task to co-ordinate divisions of 27 member states of the EU and form a coherent foreign policy, Ashton was still considered to be responsible for this result because she lacked diplomatic experience and ambition (Brady, 2012).

Since Britain and France led a multi-state coalition for military intervention in Libya, this illustrated that at least these two leading member states favoured undertaking military actions in resolving the Libyan crisis. However, because Germany did not support a military operation in Libya, the Council could not consent to military intervention. The Libya case signified that Britain and France were more likely to find a similar stance on taking military actions, and the coherent political will of these three countries was still the crucial factor affecting whether the EU could play a
military role in crisis management operations. The next two sections will discuss the British and German cases in the crisis and analyse their positions and actions in this event.

7.3 British Role in the Libyan Crisis

Being one of the three largest contributors to defence affairs in the EU and also the crucial motor for promoting the development of the ESDP, Britain basically has a motive for playing an active role in security and defence affairs. Therefore, in the crisis in Libya, Britain took a proactive attitude towards military intervention.

7.3.1 The Policy of the Cameron Government about the Libyan Crisis

Referring to the emerging crisis in Libya, both Cameron and the Foreign Minister William Hague declared that the UK would take every step and action to resolve the situation. According to the speech made by the Cameron on 28 February at the House of Commons, four principles were concluded which guided Britain to define the policy towards the situation in Libya. Firstly, ensure the safety of British citizens in Libya. As Foreign Secretary William Hague stated that the safety of British nationals remained the top priority for the British Government (Hague, 2011a). Secondly, isolate the Gaddafi regime. Therefore, before the EU adopted the Council decision 2011/137/CFSP, Britain had decided to freeze the assets of the Gaddafi regime in the UK and impose an arms embargo. Thirdly, continue the humanitarian concern for Libya. This humanitarian resort was utilised by the Cameron Government as a rationale for undertaking military intervention. Fourthly, offer necessary support for the Libyan people for political reform (D. Cameron, 2011a).
For building a no-fly zone in Libya, Britain led the multi-state coalition with France from 19 March 2011. Although some MPs raised a concern that such military actions should have had support or involvement from the Arab League, this decision nevertheless received absolutely majority support in the UK Parliament. In a vote on 21 March 2011, the House of Commons approved the decision to undertake military intervention in Libya in order to fulfil UNSCR 1973, with 557 votes in favour and 13 votes against (Hansard, House of Commons, 2011).

7.3.2 British Engagement in the EU in Response to the Libyan Crisis

For resolving the crisis in Libya, Cameron co-operated with France soon and depended on NATO to take over military actions. He did not expect the EU to play a military role. As Cameron said in the Commons debate on 14 March, ‘the EU is not a military alliance and there is always hesitation about discussing military options’ (D. Cameron, 2011b). This statement meant that even after more than ten-year developments of building up military capability, the EU was not considered able to play a military role. Meanwhile, this statement also showed that EU member states usually did not have consensus about military issues and even did not want to discuss it.

Since Cameron did not consider that the EU could play a military role in Libya, and also NATO had taken over military intervention from the end of March, Britain did not have to push the EU to shoulder this role. However, Britain expected the EU to increase sanctions against Gaddafi, because the collaboration of 27 EU countries should largely increase pressure on the regime. Regarding this issue, Britain had frozen £12 billion Libyan assets in the UK in March in order to implement Council decisions about economic sanctions against Libya. However, obviously the Foreign Minister Hague was not satisfied with the reserved position taken by the EU so as to ask the EU to take ‘bold and ambitious’ policies (Hague, 2011b). It seemed that,
although Britain recognised that the EU was unable to play a military role, it still expected the EU to become more influential in international situations.

Britain expelled the Libyan Ambassador to the UK on 1 May 2011, and on 4–5 June 2011, Hague and the International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell visited Benghazi where the base of the NTC was. On 27 July 2011, Britain agreed to recognise the NTC as the sole legitimate government in Libya and expelled other Libyan diplomats from the Gaddafi regime on the same day. This decision signified that the situation in Libya was gradually put under control by the NTC and that Britain was considering building the relationship with the new government in Libya.

On the basis of the UN Security Council resolutions, there were three approaches that Britain undertook in resolving the crisis in Libya. Firstly, Britain depended on the multi-state coalition and NATO to undertake military actions. Secondly, Britain utilised the EU to impose political and economic sanctions. Thirdly, in order to consolidate greater consensus in international community, Britain also conducted a contact group which consisted of countries from Europe, North America, the Middle East, North Africa and Asia in order to find a diplomatic solution.

It was clearly that except for imposing economic and diplomatic sanctions, Britain was unable to push the EU and also did not expect it to decide a crisis management operation in Libya. Although Britain admitted the sanctions imposed by the EU were important to isolate the Gaddafi regime, the non-military measures were not as effective as the military means in implementing the objectives of the Government, which was to terminate Gaddafi’s authority. Although the EU had developed frameworks to decide and implement crisis management missions, it was still difficult to form a consensus among 27 member states for such actions. Besides, because the Eurozone countries were occupied by economic difficulties resulting from the Greek debit crisis, they did not have enough political will to invest in an
expansive military action in Libya. Consequently, similarly to what Britain did in the crisis in Kosovo, it still depended on NATO to carry out the military operation.

7.3.3 Evaluate the British Role in the Libyan Crisis

It is significant to analyse the motivations that encouraged the Cameron Government to take a proactive and strong attitude towards the Libyan crisis. This thesis has argued that besides a serious concern with the anti-humanitarian situation in Libya, there were at least five factors affecting British policy on this issue. Firstly, the Government was swayed by a geopolitical consideration. As Cameron argued, it was not in Britain’s interest to see ‘a failed pariah state festered on Europe’s southern border’ (D. Cameron, 2011b). Since Libya was located on Europe’s southern border, an unstable Libya would be a potential security threat to the Mediterranean area and the European continent. Also, it would have an impact on the implementation of EU neighbourhood policy.

Secondly, the Cameron Government did not view the Libyan crisis as a single event. The situation in Libya was critical as regards its neighbourhood region, especially Egypt and Tunisia. Because both of these countries had just undergone a revolution and were still engaged in a reconstruction process, their transitional governments were too vulnerable to bear external pressures. If the situation in Libya had continued to deteriorate, it might have resulted in instability in Egypt, Tunisia, and possibly Algeria or other countries around this region, and have caused a more serious regional crisis.

Thirdly, the Cameron Government viewed this issue as an opportunity for this region to complete political reform. The Government considered that what happened in North Africa might spread to other regions and especially inspire the Middle East to take up peaceful movements for political change. As Cameron again stated, it was in
Britain’s national interest ‘to see the growth of open societies and the building blocks of democracy in North Africa and the Middle East’ (D. Cameron, ibid.). Hague also stated that if the countries of the Middle East area turn into democracies with open economies, ‘the gain for the British security and prosperity will be enormous’ (Hague, 2011c). Therefore, assisting Libya and other North Africa countries to establish a democratic and constitutional regime was considered to help peaceful transformation in the Middle East, and this transformation was compatible with Britain’s national interests.

Fourthly, Britain could increase its influence as a great power via demonstrating the political will and capability to resolve the Libyan crisis. For example, the Conservative MP James Morris offered his support to the government intervention in Libya because he considered that Britain ‘must be as flexible and co-operative as possible to protect its national interest’ and such effort would balance the unipolar influence from America (J. Morris, 2011). It is also considered that the military intervention in Libya demonstrated British ambition to ‘maintain an activist role’ on the international scene (Harvey, 2011). Although Britain did not intend to challenge the American power and still emphasised the UK–US special relationship, it still had the ambition of being a great power.

Fifthly, people considered that Cameron might follow Tony Blair’s statement in the Chicago speech in 1999 about the doctrine of ‘liberal interventionism’ because Cameron also called for more international intervention, endorsed by the UN, in order to ‘spread peace, prosperity, democracy and vitally security’ in his first speech to the UN General Assembly on 22 September 2011 (d’Ancona, 2011; Swaine, 2011). Accordingly, Cameron also expressed interest in improving human rights or other values through coercive measures; however, a warning was given by a journalist Con Coughlin that Cameron’s attempt could cause an opposite result (Coughlin, 2011). Although it was still unclear whether Cameron was really following Blair’s ‘liberal
interventionism’ and how it would affect the Conservative–Lib Dem Government to shape foreign policy, this stance had attracted some attention and discussions in British domestic politics.

These factors had inspired Britain to play a prominent role in the Libyan crisis, and Britain had already demonstrated its ability to resolve the issue and achieved its objectives indeed. However, it is important to raise the question of why the EU, even with the strong support from Britain and France, could not take ‘bold and ambitious’ measures in response to the Libyan crisis. Since the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council generally act with unanimity, especially on the issues with military and defence implications, whether member states can reach consensus would become an indispensable foundation for the EU deciding on a military operation. Therefore, it is important to investigate why Germany was opposed to military intervention in Libya and whether this opposition was consistent with German commitment to EU common security and defence.

7.4 German Role in the Libyan Crisis

The decision to develop the ESDP was supported by the German Presidency in the 1999 Cologne European Council. However, compared to Britain and France, the driving force from Germany to develop the ESDP was not as pre-eminent as Britain and France. By defining itself as a civilian power, Germany behaved prudently and hesitantly in the face of military issues. The ‘tamed power’ inclination (Katzenstein, 1997) encouraged Germany to follow an institutionalism and multilateralism tradition and ensured the institutionalised progress in European integration.
However, even though Germany did not have much military ambition, Germany still maintained commitment to multilateral military operations.

Take the NATO missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan for example. The air strikes launched by NATO on 30 March 1999 against the FRY were the first time that Germany took part in a military operation of NATO since it joined NATO. Not only providing aircraft, Germany also offered air bases in its territory for the operation. Besides, since December 2001, Germany has been taking part in the NATO mission in Afghanistan, the International Military Engagement in Afghanistan (ISAF). It was the first time that Germany sent its ground troops outside its territory to implement an international mission, and Germany is still playing a leading role within the ISAF in northern Afghanistan (see: German Engagement in ISAF, 2012). These two examples signify that Germany is not aloof itself from implementing military responsibility, and is also willing to play a role in a military mission if that is necessary.

According to the latest Military Balance Report, in 2011 Germany still maintained 5,150 troops in Afghanistan for the mission ISAF; also, during the period of the Libyan crisis, Germany decided to deploy an AWACS mission to support ISAF; in KFOR, there were still 1,451 Germany troops deployed there in 2011 (Military Balance, 2012). Moreover, as was mentioned in Chapter 2, Germany has abandoned the conscription system and is transforming its military to become more modern and professional. These contributions signify that regardless of its civilian character, Germany is trying to fulfil military commitment if it is required. Then, why did Germany behave so reluctantly regarding military intervention in the Libyan crisis?

In the crisis in Libya, Germany neither took part in the multi-state coalition nor contributed to the military actions of NATO; moreover, Germany did not favour the joint proposal made by Britain and France of establishing a no-fly zone, and then abstained in the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1973. Compared to the
proactive attitude of Britain and France to resolve the Libyan crisis with strong and effective measures, the attitude of the German government was relatively cautious and conservative.

7.4.1 The Policy of the Merkel Government about the Libyan Crisis

Regarding the emergence of the Libyan crisis, to evacuate German nationals was the top priority of the government. In the interview invited by Deutschlandfunk on 25 February 2011, which was also the day before the UN Security Council Resolution 1970 was adopted, the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle declared that the Government would ‘take every possible step’ to evacuate German people and foreigners, including by military means; however, Westerwelle also promised that military means would only be applied to the evacuation task in this case (Westerwelle, 2011a). Utilising military means to implement this task at least meant the German government was very concerned about this issue.

Another priority of Germany was to impose sanctions on the Gaddafi regime due to its seriously violating human rights in Libya. The German President Christian Wulff had censured Gaddafi by describing him as a ‘psychopath’, ‘terrorising his own people’, and such behaviour was ‘terrorism by the state’; Wulff also urged the EU to ‘prove its capacity to take action and make constructive offers’ (Wulff, 2011). In the same interview mentioned above, Westerwelle also made a complaint that the EU had been too hesitant about making a decision on Libya, but meanwhile he rejected a military option for resolving the situation in Libya (Westerwelle, ibid.). This statement offered an important reference by which to understand how Germany conducted the policy on coping with this issue. Because in the interview Westerwelle did not promise the possibility of imposing an arms embargo on Libya, this implied that Germany had been careful about undertaking actions which have military implications.
The German position on resolving the Libyan crisis became clearer as the situation became more serious. The government would be committed to placing more sanctions on the Gaddafi regime, but it would not promise military intervention. Therefore, although asserting that Germany would be ‘a strong advocate for robust sanctions’ against Libya, it did not consider alternatives other than imposing political and economic restrictions on Gaddafi and his government (Westerwelle, 2011b, 2011c). One of the reasons Germany did not promise a military mission, as mentioned by Westerwelle in these statements, was that Germany worried such action might invoke criticisms from the Arabic countries.

Regarding the proposal of establishing a no-fly zone, Westerwelle considered it would result in more problems because it involved military intervention, and that was what Germany resisted (Westerwelle, 2011c). Because Germany made it clear that it would not send German troops to Libya, this meant Germany would neither join the multi-state coalition nor take part in NATO mission. In order to share the burden of NATO, Germany decided to deploy AWACS surveillance planes and crews in Afghanistan. This decision was like a political exchange for obtaining understanding from Germany’s allies with the decision of avoiding involvement in military operations in Libya. As the Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière stated, the decision to approve the deployment of the AWACS mission was a ‘political sign of our solidarity with the alliance’ (Maizière, 2011). This brief statement implied that an increased German contribution to the mission in Afghanistan should fix relations with Germany’s allies if Germany’s rejection of taking part in military action in Libya had made them unhappy. A similar intention was presented by Westerwelle (Westerwelle, 2011d).

It was doubtless that Germany was concerned with the anti-humanitarian crisis in Libya and paid great attention to the situation change, but meanwhile Germany also saw that what happened to Libya was a process of revolution in the North African
region. Therefore, out of concern about the reactions of the whole Arab world, Germany took a more prudent and cautious attitude to military options. In the statements mentioned above, Westerwelle repeatedly stressed that military actions might cause an unexpected outcome and resulted in a more serious crisis.

Besides, Germany had a special concern about civilian causalities resulting from military operations. By defining itself as a civilian power, Germany preferred to avoid involving a strong military role and this principle has been embedded in German foreign policy. Therefore, it usually favoured civilian resolutions rather than military options. Since the Merkel Government considered the enforcement of no-fly zone in Libya could not absolutely avoid civilian causalities, such a decision had to be made very cautiously.

In the process of resolving Libya, Germany played a supportive role and focused on its position on providing humanitarian assistance and imposing more sanctions on the Gaddafi regime. Regardless of those efforts, the Merkel Government was inevitably criticised as being incapable of taking effective measures with speedy actions to stop the continuing violence in Libya or drive out Gaddafi.

### 7.4.2 German Engagement in the EU in Response to the Libyan Crisis

German disapproval of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 had caused another division in the EU since the Iraq war. However, in the War on Terror against Iraq, France and Germany had a united position, but this time they split. Although both the French President, Sarkozy, and the British Prime Minister, Cameron, did not to publicly complain to Germany about its disapproval of Resolution 1973, possibly because military intervention in Libya was a sensitive issue, the lack of solidarity among EU member states was nevertheless exposed.
The British Labour MP Mike Gapes indicated that there were four groups in the UN Security Council on resolving the Libyan crisis. The first contained Britain and France, which advocated military intervention in Libya from a very early beginning; the second was America, which also supported military intervention but was not as enthusiastic as the first group; then the third group consisted of four countries in Africa and the Middle East which basically supported the military intervention; and the fourth group included China, Russia, Germany, Brazil and India (Gapes, 2011). Accordingly, Germany was assigned to the group which traditionally did not choose to stand by the West. Gapes’s statement implied that Germany was considered not to have fulfilled its commitment to co-ordinate with its allies on this issue.

In order to decrease the impact of the abstention for Resolution 1973, Germany provided larger support to impose more sanctions against the Gaddafi regime. In the Council meeting on 21 March and the European Council meeting on 24–25 March, Germany promoted extending the sanctions to more persons, and also oil companies, related to the Gaddafi regime (2011/178/CFSP). It was a small change in the German policy towards Libya, because one month previously, in the interview with Deutschlandfunk, Westerwelle still did not want to promise that Germany would launch oil sanctions (Westerwelle, 2011a)

Germany did not support NATO or a multi-state coalition, but it supported the CSDP mission EUFOR Libya made by Council decision 2011/210/CFSP. Nevertheless, EUFOR Libya did not oppose the non-military stance held by the government. This was because EUFOR Libya aimed for a humanitarian intention instead of combat missions. Meanwhile, because EUFOR Libya would only operate under a mandate of the UN, it would have a stronger basis of legitimacy.
7.4.3 Evaluate the German Role in the Libyan crisis

As stated by German Foreign Minister, peace policy is still one of the top foreign policy principles of the Merkel Government (Westerwelle, 2010). Although the ‘peace policy’ is a vague term, Westerwelle explained that German foreign policy still maintained a multilateral approach and preferred non-military means for issues including non-proliferation, disarmament, and humanitarian tasks, and areas including the Middle East, Iran and the Balkans (Westerwelle, ibid.). However, Germany did not abandon its commitment to develop the CSDP. One of five operation headquarters for military missions of the CSDP is located in Potsdam. In June 2011, Germany also made a commitment to preparing another EU battle group in 2013 with France and Poland. Meanwhile, since 2010, Germany has advocated again for building an EU permanent operation headquarters for the CSDP (Hynek, 2011). These efforts have demonstrated that Germany is committed to the institutionalised framework of the EU, even for military objectives; however, when addressing security and defence situations, civilian methods are still preferable to military measures.

Evidence can be found in the process of resolving the Libyan crisis, where Germany largely depended on economic and political sanctions to restrain the Gaddafi regime. Nevertheless, imposing sanctions was not an effective approach to halt violence or deprive Gaddafi of authority immediately. Political solutions usually take more time to have influence and change the situation. Also, former German Defence Minister Volker Ruhe mentioned that the disapproval of the no-fly zone was ‘a serious mistake of historic dimensions’ because it eroded the long-term tradition originating from Adenauer to commit to Western allies (Ruhe, 2011). Accordingly, regardless of whether Germany was willing to take part in a military mission, the disapproval of the no-fly zone was considered an unnecessary move.
Nevertheless, the policy of no military intervention in Libya had gained support from the German public. According to a poll survey conducted after the German regional election on 20 March 2011, 61 per cent of the German people agreed with the policy of no military intervention in Libya (Rousseau, 2011). Another poll survey conducted by Harris Interactive for the Financial Times in June 2011 also demonstrated that the German people did not support extending military intervention by NATO in Libya (Blitz, 2011). The result that showed less than 20 per cent of Germans said that they would support the bombing of non-military targets or the deployment of ground troops from Germany.

To summarise, compared to Britain, Germany did not choose a military option to resolve the Libyan crisis owing to its civilian tradition, humanitarian concern, and consideration about the potential risks of such options. Therefore, Germany insisted on a political resolution in Libya and only committed to economic and diplomatic sanctions against the Gaddafi regime. The lack of German support on military intervention this time not only signified it was still difficult for EU member states to form consensus on controversial issue in a short time, but also highlighted the fact that much divergence about security and defence affairs still existed among EU member states. Besides, Germany’s stance also matters – after all, it is one of the leading member states of the EU.

7.5 Conclusion

Since the previous leader of Libya Muammar Gaddafi died on 20 October 2011 and ended the dictatorial regime of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and NATO finished the operation in Libya at the end of October 2011, Libya formally began a new stage to
undertake political reform. Reviewing the process of resolving the Libyan crisis, the Western countries have contributed major efforts to stabilise the situation, not only on the military side but also on the civilian side. However, regarding whether to have a military resolution in Libya, Germany had a different opinion from Britain and France, so that such a decision was not adopted by the EU. Then, what impact would the divergence among member states have upon the development of security and defence integration in the EU? Also, will the failure to decide on a joint military mission in Libya decrease the military role of the EU in the future?

As in the crisis in Kosovo, the EU merely depended on non-military measures in resolving the Libyan crisis. However, the situation in Libya was different from the situation in Kosovo. It was because the EU had developed deployable procedures and capability since the Kosovo crisis, but was still unable to resolve such a crisis. Although the CSDP has developed a set of more applicable procedures and instruments with a gradually institutionalised framework, member states nevertheless have a dominant role in the decision-making process. Because the decision-making process in the CSDP is basically based on unanimity and consensus, especially on the matters which have military implications, regarding very controversial issues or uncertain situations, member states may not determine an ambitious project. The Libyan crisis took place in a context where the local environment was very unstable and any crisis management intervention there would inevitably have to be prepared for combat against violent forces; therefore, member states of the EU found it was still difficult to have consensus about whether to adopt a military option to control the situation even with a developed CSDP.

If it is the objective to manage crisis from the very early beginning, however, it inevitably has to run the risk of uncertainty. Since joint disarmament operations and tasks of combat forces in crisis management are two of the five types of CSDP missions that the EU aims at undertaking, it cannot avoid the uncertainty and risk
involved in completing such missions. Therefore, the problem this time is not about whether the EU has developed enough capabilities to undertake CSDP missions but is more about whether EU member states have developed the consolidated political will to fulfil this ambition. An institutionalised framework may help with such consolidation, but such an effect is still limited. Especially, the divergent responses of Britain, France and Germany to resolve the Libyan crisis actually demonstrate that the EU has not formed such consolidation.

In fact, compared to economic issues, nation states overcome more difficulties in converging on security and defence policies and take longer to overcome their divergences. Take Britain and Germany for example. Although both of them are committed to the missions in the EU and NATO, they have very different traditions and attitudes towards military involvement. On the one hand, Britain had a glorious imperial history all over the world and doubtless it still has an ambition to play an important role in military affairs; on the other hand, Germany has embraced civilian and non-military principles for more than half a century, and the public is used to resist military concepts. Since the development of the CSDP only begins from the late 1990s, it is not surprising that member states of the EU have not accumulated enough consensus about whether and how to conduct a military action in response to an urgent crisis.

The divisions among member states in the Libyan crisis inevitably undermine the profile of the EU of forming a single voice on the international stage. Although EU member states will not just abandon the efforts to develop a common and security policy because of this frustration, they will have to make consensus and have a clearer definition about what they really expect to achieve and what they really can do. Although member states now have recognised that the EU has a prominent role on the international stage and in building an organised and institutionalised framework for achieving such an ambition, they still require more specific mission
targets for achieving this ambition. Unlike the situation in Kosovo, this is not about lacking an institutional framework, but about whether EU member states have enough political will to work this framework well.

Nevertheless, frustration at the Libyan crisis could be an impulse for member states to develop more consolidated concepts. Also, in response to American retrenchment and possible decreasing of its focus on Europe, the EU has to enhance defence capability in case there were a situation where the EU needs to get involved but the US does not want to. Although because of the Eurozone crisis, European countries are attempting to cut defence budgets dramatically, as Heisbourg suggested (2012), the austerity of defence budgets and American retrenchment may also push them to work out a more economic efficient approach to spend defence budgets, which may possibly promote the development of common defence.

For example, Britain and France have agreed to build a joint military force and share equipment and nuclear missile centres since November 2011; other countries of the EU are also working on other plans for defence co-operation. Although such co-operation is outside the EU framework for now, it still has the possibility of becoming a foundation for the EU to develop a more consolidated security and defence policy. As Ben Jones (2011) has argued, the close military co-operation between Britain and France has a chance to form ‘a new engine for European defence’, although it may also imply that Britain and France will leave the framework of the CSDP straightaway (O’Donnell, 2011b). Which direction the future development of security and defence integration of the EU will be taken is a question which it is too early to answer since the British–French military co-operation has just been launched and it takes time to examine what impact this co-operation will have upon the CSDP. More importantly, the German attitude is crucial. If Germany is more committed to military issues, the British–French
co-operation framework will become a foundation for further developments of the CSDP.

To summarise, there are some lessons that EU member states can learn from the Libyan crisis. Firstly, member states of the EU have to reach consensus on which situations the EU will contribute to military operations in. Once member states have reached consensus about conducting a military operation, the existing institutional framework of the CSDP can provide credible support to fulfil such a decision. Besides, member states need to form a more definite objective about how to carry out a military role. A definite objective will help member states to define the situation, so as to decide whether to intervene. Moreover, the EU requires more reliable mechanisms to resolve the situation when deadlock happens. To achieve this objective, it may be not necessary to establish a new framework, but the new President and the High Representative have to play a more decisive role in co-ordinating different opinions of member states.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion and Evaluation

8.1 Introduction

Deriving from a concern over whether an institutionalised framework would contribute to security and defence integration in the EU, and whether the institutionalisation process of forming a common foreign and security policy shapes the national interests and policies of member states, this thesis has investigated how the historical process of institutional developments of a EU security and defence policy has been driven, and examines the role of Britain and Germany in this process. Four research questions have been addressed in Chapter 1, and the answers are presented below. These questions are: ‘How did the development of security and defence integration emerge from the grand European integration project?’, ‘What characteristics of the institutional frameworks for EU security and defence integration can be recognised?’, ‘What are the dynamics between member states and EU institutions in the development of an institutionalised EU security and defence framework?’, and ‘How effective is this framework?’. In sections 8.2–8.5, these questions will be answered individually.

As was introduced in Chapter 2, institutions are considered to promote and shape collective actions by offering rules of games. Therefore, an institutional framework would attract actors to participate in and work for common objectives. Moreover, keeping on practising institutions will not only contribute to further institutionalisation, but will also help actors become embedded in these frameworks. It will result in mutually strengthened consequences. However, does this consequence also happen to the process of developing security and defence
integration in the EU? What does the process of institutionalisation contribute to the formation of a common EU security and defence policy?

8.2 The Implications of Institutional Developments of a Common Security and Defence Policy

Reviewing the historical process of forming a common security and defence policy in the EU, Chapter 3 aimed to answer how this framework developed and what characteristics of this framework can be identified. Chapter 3 has illustrated that how security and defence integration in Europe started from basic and informal political co-operation, and then developed an institutionalised framework since the Maastricht Treaty. This is an institutionalised framework, but also maintains intergovernmental features.

The efforts of undertaking security and defence integration in the EU started much later than economic integration, but developed an alternative differing from a supranational approach. When the EPC was launched in the 1970s, it did not have legal status, nor did it have a formal framework. Although it provided a flexible environment for member states to develop an intergovernmental model and examine how to make this model work, the EPC had limited influence upon political integration because of an informal and loose framework.

As was outlined in the 1970 Luxembourg Report, the objectives of the EPC included improving mutual understanding, co-ordinating positions of member states and promoting common actions. If the EPC was considered as being a platform to
improve mutual understanding between member states, it did offer a working place; if the EPC was expected to form common positions and actions, it did not work as well as expected. Although the foreign ministers of EC member states met regularly, they did not meet frequently. Two to four meetings per year would not really improve convergences. Nevertheless, from the experiences of developing the EPC, member states gradually explored how to refine an intergovernmental approach in order to achieve further political integration, and this process became an indispensable foundation for the establishment of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Maastricht Treaty offered an institutional framework for member states to conduct foreign affairs, security issues and even a common defence policy. Within this framework, there were procedures for making common positions and joint actions and regulating relations between member states and EU institutions. The framework of the CFSP created by the Maastricht Treaty was the first institutionalised framework for member states to achieve the aspirations for political integration, although it still had shortfalls. It was because the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty did not offer a context about CFSP missions, nor did it have a permanent intermediate position which could help co-ordination between member states and the EU. This work was conducted by the rotating presidency of the Council, and therefore, it largely depended on ambitions and capabilities of different member states. The situation had not been changed until the Amsterdam Treaty which introduced a High Representative to work for the purpose. The shortfall in capability was exposed clearly when the EU responded to the crisis in Kosovo. Consequently, the ESDP was established at the 1999 Cologne European Council, which became a framework for the EU to build capability for security and defence missions.

Nevertheless, the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty signified that an initial institutionalised framework for conducting common foreign and security affairs was
built and accepted by member states. This framework presented two characteristics, intergovernmentalism and institutionalism. An intergovernmental framework was maintained to ensure each member state had equal legal status during the decision-making process; an institutionalised framework was developed to improve co-ordination and coherence between member states and EU institutions, and also to improve efficiency and effectiveness of common decisions. As member states and EU institutions continued practising this framework, the path of intergovernmentalism and institutionalism had been strengthened. It is not only a learning process, but also a process of institution-acceptance. If member states believe institutions can achieve their national interests, they will offer more support to further institutionalisation of this framework.

Investigating the institutional developments from the EPC, CFSP, ESDP to CSDP in this thesis, we can find that Britain and Germany also have different extents of expectations towards institutional developments in this policy area. This is because both of them had or still have a belief that a more institutionalised framework is compatible with their national interests and will contribute to achieving their objectives. During this process, Britain and Germany also have chance to become clearer about what they expect from this framework and then shape this framework to be compatible with their expectations.

Nevertheless, the institutionalisation process of EU security and defence integration has produced a different extent of influence upon Britain and Germany. Britain has been closer to intergovernmentalism, while Germany has a stronger inclination towards institutionalism. These two inclinations are not incompatible as both countries could still work together, even if they take different approaches, but these differences inevitably affect their engagement with the EU framework. Their different attitudes are associated with historical reasons, the states’ status in the international community, and different definitions of national interests. These
factors determine what commitment they would like to make to the institutional framework which is oriented towards the development of a common security and defence policy.

8.3 Britain: Still a Reluctant Actor in the EU?

Chapter 4 has investigated the British role in the process of institutionalising a common security and defence policy and examined whether this process affects Britain’s preferences and national interests. Although absent from the initial stage of economic integration, Britain participated in the EPC when the EPC started to operate. This meant that Britain did not have to accept an established framework, and this was a favourable condition for Britain to participate in the process of shaping the framework of the EPC.

Because no member states knew at the beginning how the EPC would become and how far it would go in the end, member states had to try to learn what would be the best options for them and for this framework. Britain’s principles about the form of political integration in the EU were also formed through this process. Accordingly, Britain’s two principles, which are insistence on intergovernmental framework and maintaining the primary presence of NATO in Europe, are gradually developed in this process. These two principles are not new to Britain because they are consistent with Britain’s traditions of foreign policy, but they become more definite when the institutional framework becomes more detailed and focused on security and defence dimensions.
The worldwide view inspired Britain to play a global role, especially in the early post-war years. This world-view perspective had been adjusted when Britain’s global influence declined since the 1950s and then made Britain become more engaged in Europe. However, Britain still wanted to maintain an independent role in the process of European integration and rejected to expand the supranational framework to the policy areas outside the Rome Treaty. This stance has made Britain insist on intergovernmentalism because it would ensure that Britain maintains its independence in the decision-making process and would not be contravened by a decision made by the majority.

The support for NATO originates from the UK–US special relationship. As was introduced in Chapter 4, the special relationship has been a crucial element in Britain’s foreign policy since WWII, and therefore maintaining the solidarity of the transatlantic alliance has been Britain’s priority. Although even a pro-European leader like Blair, who attempted to conduct a ‘bridge strategy’ which would make Britain occupy a key position to connect America and Europe, when he had to make a choice between them, still chose to stand with America. It signified that the UK–US special relationship was irreplaceable.

Meanwhile, because it insists on the primary role of NATO in European security, Britain will not support the EU in developing an independent military role if this would undermine the presence of NATO. Therefore, Britain’s commitment to the common security and defence policy is conditional and not fully engaged. For Britain, the security role of the EU is also limited. It does not expect that the EU would become as effective as NATO when undertaking crisis management operations. As Cameron said in the process of resolving the crisis in Libya, he did not consider the EU as a military alliance. Although Britain has attempted deepening defence co-operation with France, this co-operation is developed on a bilateral framework
and there is no sign so far that it will become a foundation for the EU to move towards the deepening of its common security and defence capabilities.

The isolated sentiment of Britain is not only presented on common security and defence affairs, but also expressed in the whole structure of the EU. Because Britain did not join the initial stage of forming the ECSC and common market, it accepted a framework which had been decided by other countries. Moreover, Britain’s unfavourable attitude towards the deepening of integration that diminished its influence in the EU after it had joined in 1973. Although in the field of political integration Britain has full autonomy to shape an institutional framework, this isolated sentiment is hardly alleviated.

This absence also resulted in the consequence that the institutionalisation process had limited influence upon Britain. Therefore, Britain adopts a flexible strategy when taking part in developing the common security and defence policy. On the one hand, when this development is compatible with Britain’s objectives and national interests, Britain will support it. Take Blair’s advocacy for building the ESDP and enhancing military capability of the EU as an example, it was because this proposal underpinned Blair’s prospect which aimed to consolidate the leading role of Britain in European integration, and make Britain a bridge between America and Europe. On the other hand, when Britain has a better choice, it will go for the alternative – as happened in the process of resolving the crisis in Libya, when NATO and America could provide support for military actions, and Cameron just utilised NATO framework instead of calling for EU participation.

Nevertheless, the institutionalisation process from the CFSP to CSDP helps Britain make clear that what it can expect from the EU when conducting security and defence affairs; also, Britain would realise that, if it has the political will, it can play a leading role in further institutional developments. For example, Britain had inserted
the two principles in the CFSP, ESDP, and CSDP and ensured that these developments maintained intergovernmental framework and would not undermine NATO. Moreover, if Britain aspires to enhancing its global influence, the EU is still a possible platform for it in playing a balancing role between two continents.

8.4 Germany: Still a Civilian Power in the EU?

Germany has presented a distinct picture from the case in Britain. Reviewing the historical process of German participation in European integration in Chapter 5 has signified that the institutionalisation process has a much stronger influence on Germany, and therefore, Germany has a much more committed attitude towards European integration than Britain. Each time Germany attempted to pursue more political space and national interests, it would make more commitments to developing institutions. Adenauer’s Westpolitik policy started German engagement in institutionalism and multilateralism. This commitment not only embedded Germany in the West, but also contributed to stability, prosperity and peace in West Germany.

When Brandt pursued the Ostpolitik policy, he also ensured that Ostpolitik would not undermine German commitment to Western institutions, and contributed more efforts to reform the EC, including the launch of the EPC. When Helmut Kohl secured German reunification, Germany became even more committed to European integration, and therefore the European Union was established. This process demonstrated that each time the institutional framework of European integration had major reforms, Germany played a crucial role and offered an indispensable impulse. Meanwhile, because the institutionalisation process of European
integration is strongly associated with Germany’s destiny in Europe, German interests and the institutional developments of European integration are fully compatible. To quote Kohl’s words, Germany and European integration can actually be viewed as ‘two sides of one coin’.

The continuing commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism has also resulted in another consequence in Germany. Germany has transformed itself to become a civilian country since the end of WWII, and after its influence increased, it became a civilian power. Because of defining itself as a civilian power, Germany does not consider that building up its military is a priority to achieve its interests. It would rather search for diplomatic and economic options. Therefore, although Germany participated in the NATO mission in Kosovo and Afghanistan, it did not give up non-military efforts for a peace resolution. Also like the response to Libya, the Merkel Government insisted on a political solution and rejected sending any troops or involving itself in military actions led by Britain and France and supported by America and NATO. German abstention on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 actually in a way marked a retreat from the position which had been adopted under the Red–Green coalition, which was full acceptance of German international responsibility rather than abstention.

This does not mean that Germany is not committed to developing a common security and defence policy. Germany supported the British–French proposal to develop the ESDP and supported it in German Presidency in the Cologne European Council. Besides, Germany also contributed towards implementing ESDP/CSDP missions, especially civilian ones. In terms of EU battle groups, from 2007 to 2011 Germany had committed to five, while Britain had two and France had three. Moreover, Germany will prepare another battle group with France and Poland for the first half of 2013, and also has proposed building permanent headquarters for EU
crisis management operations. The evidence shows that Germany is committed to the institutional framework of the ESDP and CSDP.

Besides, Germany is transforming its military. The conscription system terminated in 2011, and Germany has aimed to build a more professional and modern military structure which would not only increase efficiency in defence spending, but also improve German participation in multilateral military operations. It signifies that Germany is trying to alleviate hesitance and reluctance to undertake military operation, and share more burdens with allies if that is necessary.

It is important to mention that, regarding security and defence issues, Germany nevertheless has a civilian focus, and therefore civilian measures and non-military options are Germany’s first choices when facing a crisis or urgent situations. Germany is still cautious about military actions and doubts whether they represent the best way of achieving political outcomes. In other words, Germany is committed to the ESDP and CSDP, but is not fully committed to military operations. Different situations would lead to different considerations on a case-by-case basis. For example, the crisis in Kosovo was described by German Foreign Minister Fischer as a holocaust, and therefore Germany decided to participate in military intervention. The crisis in Libya was defined as a process of political reform, and therefore Germany preferred a ‘wait-and-see’ strategy and did not support military intervention in Libya at a very early stage, although it was a controversial decision and widely criticised in the German Bundestag.

The influence of the institutionalisation process of European integration on Germany is much stronger than on Britain. However, Germany is committed to developing and implementing the institutional framework of the ESDP and the CSDP rather than supporting the EU to play a strong military role. Therefore, as regards the context about what a common security and defence policy should be and when it should be
applied, Germany sometimes has different views from other member states. At least in the crisis in Libya, Britain and Germany have not reached a consensus about whether this was a crisis management situation in which EU military mechanisms should get involved. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that if the EU is expected to play a role on security and defence affairs, it cannot merely rely on civilian mechanisms. Especially with crisis management situations, if the EU is expected to conduct these situations it cannot avoid undertaking military mechanisms, and it needs the support of Germany.

8.5 The Impact of Institutionalisation for the Future of the CSDP

This thesis has concluded that the framework for undertaking common security and defence affairs in the EU has become increasingly institutionalised. Especially in the Lisbon Treaty, a diplomatic service has been created. The EU now has an organised, bureaucratic team which can offer administrative resources for EU institutions to prepare and implement the CSDP. Besides, the EU has built up military and civilian capabilities. Although these capabilities still need to be improved, these presences would avoid the EU from inaction. However, even though it is an institutionalised framework, it also has an intergovernmental characteristic. Therefore, it requires member states to maintain their political will to implement this framework. If the implication of the Kosovo crisis is that an institutionalised framework was necessary for the EU to build up capability and conduct security and defence affairs, and then the lesson from the Libyan crisis is that even an institutionalised framework has been developed, political will is still the most important issue to affect the achievements of the CSDP.
The Eurozone crisis led EU countries to cut defence spending, and this result is likely to affect the contributions of member states to common security and defence affairs. However, this could be the impulse for further defence co-operation as well. As was mentioned in previous chapters, defence austerity may promote defence co-operation between member states in order to achieve more efficiency defence spending. Besides, as was stated in a speech to the Australia Parliament in November 2011 by the US President Obama, the US is cutting its defence budget except to the Asia Pacific because this area is a top priority for America over the coming decade. Since Obama has declared that the US will put more focus on Asia instead of Europe, this decision may become a new impulse for EU countries to consolidate political will and improve their capacity to defend themselves.

The institutionalisation process from the EPC, CFSP, ESDP to CSDP does affect and shape the behaviours and policies of member states; however, this process is also affected and shaped by member states. Therefore, the factor of national interests is nevertheless crucial to affect whether this framework can work effectively. An institutionalised framework can promote mutual understanding and consensus-building, but this does not mean that this framework will definitely produce this outcome. Besides, the institutionalisation process requires long-term practice and then it is possible to affect member states. Member states spent more than twenty years on the EPC before they accepted the CFSP, and this illustrated that political integration would be an even more long-term process to be achieved. The development of the ESDP and CSDP has been just over ten years, and member states are still working to make this framework become more capable in order to fulfil the expectations of member states. Especially regarding security and defence issues, which are at the heart of national sovereignty, the objective of forming a common security and defence will not be achieved rapidly and likely to be determined by state preferences for the foreseeable future.
Appendix A

Interview Invitation Letter

Dear Mr /Miss XXX:

I am writing this letter to kindly request a 30-minute interview for PhD research.

I am doing a Doctorate at the School of Government & International Affairs in Durham University in the UK. The topic of my thesis is to investigate EU security and defence integration and explore how member states and EU institutions interact with each other in the institutionalisation process. I have chosen to examine Britain and Germany. In order to collect firsthand information on this topic, my research requires interviews the people who work for this area.

I learned that you have participated in these fields for a long time. Due to your great deal of experience and knowledge for this topic, I would like to request an interview with you. If you would be kind enough to have an interview on this topic, please contact me for arranging an interview. In the case where you would like to take part in my research but your schedule prevents a face-to-face meeting, I would be grateful if you could spare some time for a telephone interview.

I look forward to a reply at your earliest convenience.
Yours sincerely,

Wei-Fang (Florence) Chen

PhD student in the SGIA, Durham University

Email: Confidential

Phone: Confidential

Address: Confidential
Appendix B
Anonymous Interview

Anonymous, Senior staff in the Civil-Military Cell

Date: 17 November 2009
Time: A.M. 09.30-10.15
Place: Avenue de Cortenbergh 150, European Union Military Staff in Brussels
Record device was not permitted in the interview.
The interviewee asked to be anonymous in the thesis.

Q1. How would you describe the institutional framework of the CSDP?

- Efficient and effective implementation of the CSDP largely depends on whether member states have political will or not. The present institutional framework of the CSDP has provided procedures for operations. However, how to coordinate different opinions and policies amongst member states will affect results of negotiations. Since unanimity is necessary in the decision-making process of the CSDP, to have co-operation from all member states is needed to make decisions in the CSDP. Although member states know that they have to build consensus for making decisions in the CSDP, sometimes some member states have strong positions, so are difficult to make compromise. If member states have political will to do something, it will be very easy to make a decision. It is case by case.
• In the civilian aspect, the main challenge is to provide enough police. The EU is undertaking 10 civilian missions at the moment, and member states are the major source to provide police, judicial officials, and other professional staff. They are not full-time employees for the EU, so they have to suspend their job for a while if they are going to support EU missions. Therefore, it is very difficult to find sufficient, qualified and willing staff to take part in the CSDP missions.

• In the military aspect, the main challenge is money. It is very expensive to afford a military operation, and member states have to pay for it if they are going to participate in. Like the CSDP mission in Chad, the EU deployed 3,000 forces. Such is a big cost.

• It is important to have a comprehensive plan for CSDP missions. It is necessary to integrate overall approaches, and merge civilian and military dimensions. A comprehensive project for CSDP missions is our next objective. Meanwhile, we have to resolve the financial problem of the CSDP. At the moment, common costs are very limited and only used for routine and administrative matters. The expenses of CSDP missions are shared by member states. Therefore, an expensive mission will decrease the interest of member states to take part in.

Q2. How would you evaluate the military ambition of the EU?

• I do not think it is necessary to do that. Because we already have the NATO. If we develop a strong military force in the EU, it will cost too much, and will become a duplicate of the NATO. I do not think we will have more benefits if we develop an EU force. The EU has to rely on member states and made
decisions case by case. Member states will not agree to deploy forces to a
place where they are not going to be involved. We have established the CSDP
since 2000 and it is operated by joint wills of member states. The operation
of the CSDP does not merely depend on voluntary co-operation of member
states but is also referred to political reality in the EU.

- Whether member states agree to involve in a situation depends on their
  political wills and capabilities. Africa was colonised by European countries,
  and still has relations of political, economic and historical interests with
  Europe. These special relations between Africa and Europe increase political
  wills of the EU countries to take part in African affairs. Balkan is also priority
  for the EU because of geopolitical relations. Moreover, the member states
  with more political resources and higher GDP will be more capable and more
  willing to devote in an CSDP mission. (For example, Germany afforded 23 per
  cent of expenses of CSDP missions.) Although six EU countries: Finland,
  Austria, Ireland, Switzerland, Cyprus, and Malta are not NATO members, they
  fully support CSDP missions. France, Belgium, and Germany are also keen to
  devote in CSDP missions.

Q3. How would you describe the process of take a CSDP mission?

- The UN is the most important partner for the EU to undertake international
  missions. Therefore the EU keeps good connection and close relationship
  with the UN to discuss how to cooperate with each other when respond to a
  crisis situation. How to keep a closer co-operation with the UN and support
  UN missions are very important to the EU.

- After a mission is finished, CSDP bodies (like our cell), have to evaluate the
  mission. It is a learning process. Politically speaking, successful experiences
  from missions will encourage member states to devote more efforts in CSDP
  missions. For example, the establishment of a ‘Battle Group’ in the CSDP is
learned from previous experiences. How to keep the EU learning from CSDP missions is also crucial for the development of the CSDP.

- EU countries have different concerns about security affairs. For example, Finland devotes its defence forces in three aspects: defend territory, undertake civilian operations, and participate in international crisis management. Unlike Finland, Sweden does not devote defence forces so much in protecting its territory, but contribute more efforts in international crisis management. Because every EU countries have different concerns about security affairs, it is not easy to make a common decision for employ a CSDP mission.

**Q4. How do you address the problems of implementing CSDP mission?**

- When there are many independent participants take part in the same area, it is difficult to make decisions because of the lack of shared views/objectives amongst different participants.
- It is difficult to have an extremely efficient procedure in the CSDP because of the lack of over-arching body to make coherent decisions.
- Although how to cooperate together, coordinate procedures, and implement more efficiently are time-consuming, they are very important issues for the EU to undertake security integration.
- There is no international mechanism yet to incorporate all participants. Even within the UN, there are independent units/agencies instead of a whole team. It is difficult to establish a consolidated system.
Q5. How would you evaluate the performance of the CSDP?

- It is very difficult to build a more efficient and consolidated decision-making process because there are too many participants taking part in this process.
- Political will with member states to integrate security affairs is not enough; therefore CSDP bodies have to continue to produce papers to persuade member states to agree further integration or devote more resources to CSDP missions.
- The European Commission cannot play an active role nor has more authority in the decision-making process.
- Decisions about whether to deploy military forces in an area have to be made decisions by member states.
- Intergovernmental approach is still the best way to undertake CSDP affairs. Because member states take part in CSDP missions voluntarily, they will have stronger promise to finish the missions.
- But, in my opinion, the influence of the CSDP upon the public is very little. CSDP is not a big issue for European people, because the decisions and implementations of the CSDP are dominated by political elites instead of general public people.
Appendix C

Rainer Arnold’s Interview

German MdB for the Social Democratic Party since 1998 and is also the Spokesman for the SPD on defence affairs since 2002

Date: 7 September 2009
Time: P.M. 13.00-13.30
Phone Interview
Record device is available in the interview.

Q1. How would you describe the SPD role when taking part in security and defence integration in the EU?

- My party the SPD has been driven to deepen European security policy. We just produced a paper for building European army. That is the vision which we are trying to make in the Bundestag. We did that step by step for many parts. Like one part would be build army. We and the EU work together for this. We are consolidating on this issue in order to cooperate. It will save a lot of money because no country can have an army to do everything. There is already working in the aerospace sector. We also want to do this on land troops and navy. In my opinion, the SPD is stronger in forwarding this issue. Other parties in the Bundestag see more problems and they discuss the problems more than they actually move. Although there is a vision it will not end in ten years. It will take a long time.
Q2. How would you describe the present security environment for the EU and evaluate whether the institutional framework of the CSDP is capable of tackling security challenges?

- All the key threats identified by the document European Security Strategy have much depth and weight to cope with except for the organised crime because you cannot fight against organised crime with military means. For Germany, Afghanistan is the most important issue. Of course not only for Germany but also for the NATO. If we fail in Afghanistan, it will be terrible for Pakistan. There are also issues in African, like the Horn of Africa or Africa as the whole.

- For example, in my opinion it is known what has to be done in Afghanistan, but many states do not act following the knowledge. Everybody knows what should be done in Afghanistan now, but many states do not do enough. There are forty two states having military forces in Afghanistan but only eighteen states with civilian tasks.

- The experience in former Yugoslavia with NATO arms up to now does work and the strategy in Kosovo is going well. We think we have solved the problem in Kosovo with the NATO. Of course the situation in Afghanistan is different, but the NATO is the only organisation capable of solving this problem.

- The EU still cannot tackle these problems without the help of America either in financially or strategically. The EU does not have enough financial support, member states do not have enough troops, and they do not have enough hardware and they are not politically determined enough. Also, it is our target to get the same weight with America.

- The EU has operation head goals. Although there are some other minor forces, like the German-French brigades, they are rather small operation forces. However, there is no alternative for the EU to replace the present
voluntary co-operation from member states. If German troops are sent to somewhere, it has to be decided by the parliament. The Lisbon Treaty also asks military operations have to decided and agreed by all of the member states of the EU. It is not only from foreign politics but also from defence politics. You can only imagine that this may be changed when the European Parliament has enough power to decide it, but at the present the European Parliament is not very powerful.

- For every member states, they have different cultures. For example, France and England still think they are superpowers. But as you know, England is not a superpower anymore but this thought is still deeply in their mind. France is the same. It is of course to make all the member states to gather together and get them to follow one strategy. The French and English see their armies as national means; they would use their armies nationally. For Germany, we do not want to go anywhere alone; we will only go with such as NATO ISAF or KFOR or other international operations.

Q3. How would you describe German participation in the development of security and defence integration in the EU?

- The most important objective for Germany is to build trust with the East European partners; as long as they do not trust us, they will be more likely to do along with NATO rather than with EU. We have operation headquarter in Potsdam and this headquarter can lead EU missions. Also, Germany can suggest what the EU can do or develop together. One example is developing the strategy for air transport by the EU together because it is very expansive and satellite system as well. It is very important since not many countries can actually do this. Maybe England and France can, but not other European countries.
• We have not had a poll about whether the public is opposed European military, but if the German public is asked: do we want to be engaged more in the EU military or more in the NATO, Germany will probably vote for the EU. However, in my opinion, as long as the European Parliament is still very weak, I do not want such power is concentrated by Brussels and make Belgium become head of Europe and deploy German soldiers to somewhere. At the moment, German soldiers can only be deployed by the Bundestag, and it is very important key in our politics. We will not give away to Brussels as long as the European Parliament is still in a very weak position.

• At the moment, in the field of security and defence affairs in the EU, Brussels is still very weak and Brussels has no right to decide these affairs. We need some time for the European public to see and recognise it is European politics, not only from one or some states in Europe. Once people can recognise and accept it, people will decide to give the European Parliament more power concerning the security and defence policy in the EU.

• The Lisbon Treaty is still on the process of ratification. After it enters into force, it will need couples of years to practice. Therefore, within this period, we probably will not have other project to reform the EU. In my opinion, a supranational framework for the CFSP and CSDP may be possible but it probably will not happen when I am alive. For future generations, it is possible, but it will be a very very long way. However, it is a vision there. At the moment, we are working on small and concrete steps for this vision. It can be very small steps. As long as the direction is right, we do not care about even only small steps can be made.

• In my opinion, the Balkan crisis makes European countries find out they were unable to solve European problems on their own and drive European countries to develop security and defence capabilities. It is the EU has to make Europe secure; not Russians or Americans. It is not a competition to NATO or to America, although American politics intends to split Europe into Central Europe, East Europe and the rest of Europe.
In my opinion, German people have no deficit to European identity. We are Europeans. Germans will have a common identity to Europe via successful experiences in European integration. If the success can be seen, it will strengthen the identity from Germans to Europe and the EU.
Q1. How would you describe the German policy when taking part in security and defence integration of the EU?

- Germany has a special history and the citizens of Germany are more distant to use military power than the UK and the US are. They are very anti-war and do not want to be seen that Germans like war because of WWI and WWII. In Germany, our people do not love military.

- Germany does not want to go special ways and does not want to go somewhere alone. Germany does not mind to act with other countries together. Since Germany needs to be a partner of Europe and our constitution says Germany is willing to be part of multilateral system for peace. We are on member of three peace systems: the UN, NATO and EU. We want to take part in all their actions where and when we can. But we do not like to take military actions.

- The SPD has a political vision to unify different European armies to one EU army in the future, maybe in next twenty years. Although the CDU/CSU does not say they want to have this, I think they will not make opposition against
Mrs Chancellor said: I don’t know, maybe it is a good idea. I think it is not a very controversial issue in Bundestag. We said we want a European army in the future and the people from the CDU/CSU do not oppose to that.

Q2. How would you describe the development of the CSDP?

- The EU is capable of taking some military operations independently, but it depends on how big the mission is. Like the problem in the Balkans, the EU will be asked firstly to solve this problem but we cannot do all of this.

- We are now in Kosovo for a NATO mission KFOR which had 65000 troops at the beginning in 1999. Now there have 10000 troops. On the other side, a civilian side, we have European civilian mission to help Kosovo. Germany provides judges, general administrative staff, polices and civil experts. There is more than one thousand civilian staff from EU states in Kosovo now. The KFOR was important, but now it is not as important as the beginning. We have to do more on the other side, like ruling of law and the EU can do this.

- Germany is a federal country. We have sixteen states (Lander). The federal government can call for Lander to call for volunteers for civilian mission, but the federal government cannot force Lander to provide those people. This situation is more complicated in Germany than in Britain because British government only has one level.

- For the CSDP, the question is not about if the EU has capabilities or not. It is more about common planning in armed forces. We have national planning, but we do not have realistic EU planning. Each mission has different situations and need different capabilities. We have to know what each mission needs and then member states of the EU will offer capabilities. It is not a real problem for the EU to do military works without Americans. But it is a more political question about will the EU do it well and in what situations the EU should make intervention. Each political crisis has military option and
other options. I think Europe will be able to act with military, but we will want to solve the problem with other options first, like diplomatic solutions, economic sanctions. For us, the use of military power is the last option and we will do that on the first minute. Maybe it is the difference between philosophies of international politics between the US and European thinking.

- You can have institutional reforms, but the EU is not a state, not like the US or a country which has an entity on its own. I think member states will always have conflicts with EU institutions but it is much better than that we European countries have conflicts with each other. In the EU we can always get consensus. Maybe it takes much time to make progress, but in the EU we can have European discussions and European process.

Q3. How would you describe the relationship between the NATO and the CSDP of the EU?

- We are very carefully to military options, but we want Europe to be able to do military things instead of only the US. We must have capabilities for European actions. Before that we only had the NATO. We need the EU to have independent military capabilities, but the EU cannot do this for against the NATO. In Balkans, the EU use Berlin-plus to work with the NATO. It is an exercise for the EU to develop more capabilities. I think it is also interest in Americans that Europe becomes capable to do these missions.
Appendix E

Steven Everts’s Interview

Personal Representative for Energy Policy of the SG/HR Javier Solana

Date: 6 November 2009
Time: A.M. 9.00-9.20
Place: Justus Lipsius Building, Headquarters of the Council of the European Union in Brussels
Record device is not permitted in the interview.

Q1. How would you describe your work involving in the CSDP?

- I have worked for the Javier Solana in this position since 1st January 2009. Before this, I worked in the private office for Javier Solana. The work of our office mainly focuses on external issues. Internal energy issues are conducted by the Commission. Our focus in the area is world-wide, and our target is to keep the channels safe to deliver gas or patrol.

- There are two difficulties in tackling energy issues in the EU. The one is that the EU states have various starting positions and priority areas. We have to coordinate different opinions and interests and it is very though. The other is, although the Europe is an open market for energy business, energy issues could be a political issue as well. Inside the Europe, it is a free market, and energy companies are independent from local governments. However, energy companies have to keep good relationship with local governments,
and sometimes, local governments controlled the business of energy which will make situation even tougher.

Q2. Would you describe the framework to implement the CSDP?

- I think we do not obtain enough resources to do our work. The situation to tackle the energy issue outside the Europe is more difficult than that is inside the Europe. Most resources and attentions were occupied by the Commission. The Council only played a supportive role, not an active role, for member states to tackle the energy issue. However, although the present institutional framework does not give us enough power and resources, it does provide flexibility for us to do our work. Also, after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the Council will have greater consistency and coherence to tackle energy affairs.

Q3. How would you describe the relationship between member states and the EU in the CSDP?

- I think the intensive interactions amongst EU institutions and member states are able to shape common ideas and values for them. Although the decisions in the field of the CFSP are basically made by consensus and sometime it is difficult to make consensus, a common sense has been gradually built up in the EU in the process of institutionalisation in the CFSP. Besides, according to the speech by Javier Solana, the process of institutionalisation should have affected behaviours and policies of member states.
Q4. How would you evaluate the development of the CSDP?

- I don’t think the spill-over effect will happen in the field of CFSP. The spill-over effect in the European Economic Community started from functional co-operation. There was a necessity to build an internal market, so we had to remove internal tariffs and carried out other regulations. Then we had to tackle monetary stability, so we developed an EMU mechanism and created Euros. All these affairs were interconnected and had functionally connected. But the European countries did not set a goal to develop a common trade policy, because it was a too vague picture. The integration in the field of economic affairs started from a very specific and functional point inside the Europe, and it was for resolving internal problems. However, the effect of security integration will be expressed outside the Europe. In the field of CSDP, we only have ambitions, but we have no specific goals and necessity to develop an external foreign and security policy. To pursue a common security policy is not a functional affair, so the spill-over effect will not happen within the CSDP. I would like to say, in the field of CSFP, it is still in the process of policy-learning.
Appendix F

David Heathcoat-Amory’s Interview

*British MP of the Conservative Party from 1983 to 2010 and was also the Foreign Minister in 1993*

Date: 14 July 2009

Time: A.M. 11.30-12.00

Place: MP David Heathcoat-Amory’s parliament office in the Westminster Building, London

Record device was unavailable in the interview.

---

Q1. How would you describe the Britain’s policy in the development of the CSDP?

- The development of the European security policy shall be based on intergovernmental co-operation; our conservative will not support for a supranational framework for European security policy. Security policy has to be decided by our member states, our governments.

- The UK has universal interests, and the EU is one part of these interests. The EU is mainly a link to connect the UK and the World. Because we Britain have universal interests, we will not only focus on European affairs. It is important for Britain to maintain the special relationship with America, which is the most important one. And then we look after our British Commonwealth because we still have interests and connections in the Commonwealth. For us, the EU is more like a link to connect the UK and the world.
• There are many approaches or ways to for us to reach co-operation. We don’t only depend on the EU institutions and we don’t think the EU institutions will always reach co-operation.

• Actually in the EU, only the UK and France are able to deploy troops or military forces. Germany is not unreliable factor. They are not committed enough to deploy military forces.

• The CSDP is one part in the Britain’s foreign and security policy. We will participate in and help it, but we will not put all our efforts on it. We Britain decide our foreign and security policy independently; we don’t have to depend on the EU to implement our policy.

• Our Conservative Party takes a more critical thinking towards the European security policy. If we win the general election next year and form our government, we will not follow the Labour party’s policy.

Q2. How would you evaluate influence of the development of the CSDP upon member states?

• I don’t think the institutional developments of the EU will improve or enhance common identity of member states towards the EU in the end. We should have consensus first and then we establish institutional framework of the CSDP. Institutional framework should go after consensus. We should not build a framework first and then ask member states to form common identity. It is a wrong way. Besides, I think the enlargement of the EU will increase diversities amongst member states and these diversities may undermine the existing consensus before the enlargement.

• I think the EU has to pay more attention on the isolated sentiment between the Headquarters in Brussels and the public. Especially for the UK and Ireland.
Q3. How would you describe the relationship between NATO and the CSDP?

- I think the NATO is the primary military mechanism for European security; the EU shouldn’t and will not replace the military role of the NATO in Europe.
Appendix G
Andreas Henne’s Interview

Political Assistant of Security Policy for Mr. Bernd Siebert, who is a CDU/CSU MP in the German Bundestag since 1994 and was a spokesman for defence policy from 2005-2009

Date: 25 August 2009
Time: A.M. 10.00-10.40
Place: MP Bernd Siebert’s parliament office in Unter den Linden, Berlin
Record device is permitted in the interview.

Q1. Could you describe your work in the Bundestag?

- I was a police officer then I joined in the Army in 1986 as a general staff officer. After the general staff course finished, I served in Kosovo war. After that, I worked in the Ministry of Defence in Boon and Berlin, and then I was ‘hijacked’ for this job here, for the defence policy, foreign affairs, and security issues for the CDU/CSU.

Q2. Could you describe the policy of the CDU/CSU to the CSDP?

- It’s very interesting. Tomorrow we will have an appointment with French colleague to talk about the aspect of security affairs in Europe. The France position is that we need a strong European pillar in NATO. They are looking
forward more engagement in NATO because they think France is not heavy enough for the role that Sarkozy wants.

- For France, they need more influence and security methods in the world, and I think they see the NATO is the best way to get more influence. Now they wish we (Germany) will be a strong partner for France to support them to become heavier in the NATO. In fact, for us, NATO first is ok, and after that is European security policy and European bases. Our aspect is NATO should be the best security engagement of Germany.

- At now, I think the greatest problem is organised crimes in Europe. We use a European police structure to cope with this problem and with little bit military forces to protect our south frame to North African area. But from my point of view, in Italy and Spain, they are still having serious problems to fight organised crimes. I think the most serious security threat in Germany comes from political issues, not military issues. We are middle of the Europe so we do not have border problems. When we look to the east, there is Poland between Germany and Russia; when we look to the south, there are other countries between Africa and Germany. We are a continent state and it is quite comfortable to stay here. But we cannot shift all issues to our neighbours, and we have to help with them. So we have sent some police forces to Brussels to coordinate organised crimes issues, but not for military matters.

**Q3. How would you describe Germany’s policy in the CSDP?**

- In Germany, we have a problem in general. WWI and WWII pissed off our people very much and they hate wars. That is the reason why I think we
should look at on civilian aspect more than on military aspect for conflict management issues. In Germany, I think, people might support European forces, but they are not friends for strong armies. When you ask Germans whether they like strong armies, they will answer: ‘NO’. We do not need an army for fight. Also, I think we will not have a strong German army or support a strong European army and so on. Leaders in our party would like to have more power on their own hands, so they would not like to shift some power to the Europe, EU, or other European joint common projects and so on. I cannot see who in my party will support a strong European army. The EU security policy is more like political matters than military issues. I think to a strong European army will not be efficient because we (European countries) have different interests, nationalities, and political situations.

Q4. How would you describe the relationship between Germany and the EU regarding the CSDP?

- Germany has some people in Brussels to deal with common security affairs. They meet up frequently to prepare meetings and create policy plans, but in fact, basically it is head of governments to lead the way to decide European issues. The job of institutions in Brussels is producing papers. Important security policies are made in Deutscher Bundestag or in Paris, not in Brussels. The EU has a structure to make common security policy, but this structure could not work probably. Security policies are still the policies of chiefs of executive, like Merkel, Sarkozy, and Gordon Brown.
Q5. How do you evaluate the implementation of the CSDP?

- I think it is not easy to stabilise a country or make good governance. We can see the situation in Somalia. The first engagement was not so successful. I think Afghanistan is another good example. Now we (the EU) are not so concentrating on military aspects. We need a comprehensive approach. For example, we are successful in Bosnia and Herzegovina. When military mission is nearly in the end, the EU, as a civil power, will help local government to rebuild the country. From a German point of view, we look on civilian aspect more than on military aspect.

- It is a common problem in the EU structure that the power to make decisions is controlled by member states. The EU is not really a democratic system. The European Parliament is not strong enough to against member states or to influence the decision-making process. Tomorrow we will have a Bundestag meeting to discuss the Lisbon Treaty and laws of the EU. Our opinion is that we must hold the most power and competence in Bundestag and not shift too much competence to the European Parliament.

- The performance of the CSDP was Very well. Take the mission in Congo for example. After the mission was completed, the situation in Congo became unstable as before. They had an election, but they are having civil war again. It is not a good result, I think. Atlanta is a more successful mission, and we have some good results on it. We spoiled pirate’s jobs, and we keep a secure corridor for civil ships. But as I said, we do not have enough power to do this for a long time, and we need American’s help. We need India and China’s help as well, I think. Although India and China are not our allies, they are great nations in world market. I think they must help us to tackle the pirate problem.
Q6. How would you describe the Franco-German relations in the CSDP?

- From our point of view, in the European continent, France and Germany are the two strongest partners and two strongest countries. We are also the motive of some developments in the EU and European security policy. When we have the same way, we think European continent will follow us. From our point of view, when we have a strong European security pillar, Italy, Spain and so on will follow us. When we have a strong NATO pillar, it’s the same way. I think we need security capabilities in the EU, but the problem is that there will become double-headed with NATO capabilities. The main problem is we do not have enough units and military parts to support both. Only supporting the EU or the NATO, always the same. There are two heads, one EU head and one NATO head. When we are in a NATO mission, we use the NATO head and do the NATO job. It is the same in the EU. We have a Congo mission in 2006, which was an EU mandated mission, but we used NATO forces to do it.

Q7. How would you describe the relationship between NATO and the CSDP?

- I think it is the British position to make EU security capabilities become a junior part of NATO. It could be worked. But from our position, we are not a junior part of the NATO. We are a member of the NATO. I think it is a parallel relationship between the EU and NATO. The EU, of course is more on the European focus and more about European security matters. If we have capabilities to do this in the EU, we should do it in the EU. If we have not enough capabilities, then we need NATO. For example, in Balkan, Europe cannot do the job without America and NATO in Kosovo war. We are not able to cope with that alone, and then we need NATO or America. It is a German perspective. From our history, it is very necessary to have a strong
relationship with the USA, and we are also a good partner with France and the Great Britain. Of course, after 2005, the relations were not good because of the Iraq War. But I think we are on a good way now and will become better. Mr. Schröder and Mr. Bush had good level of communication, and I think Mr. Obama and Mrs. Merkel have good communication as well. This is the reason that I cannot say which is more important. But the EU and NATO are necessary.

• Our problem is we are not able to build up another structure which is parallel to the NATO structure. We have created the NATO already, so that were are not able to create a second similar structure.

• Take the mission in Somalia for example. The problem is how long the support will last. If it is half year, we can do it. But in fact, such as the mission in Somalia, we are using NATO-headed forces. Atlanta will be transferred to a NATO mission because we cannot afford it. We think we need a UN mandate and NATO forces to do this job. We need power of the NATO and the power of Americans. It is quite clear. When we want to handle this problem, perhaps we must have an aerial operation in Somalia, but Germany is not able to cope with this problem. We do not have enough air forces, enough army forces, but most of them are engaged in Afghanistan. We have some ships though, because we need ships for the mission in Afghanistan. But it will be too much for Germany if it last for a long time. This is the reason why we need the NATO. For a long-term engagement, we need the power of the NATO. Germany has a strong relationship with Americans. They help us now, and we hope they can also do that in the future.
Q8. How do you think the process of institutionalisation in the EU affect the participation of Germany in EU affairs?

- In fact, I think the process of institutionalisation in the EU will encourage the participation of Germany. It helps Germany to be more engaged in Europe. Although we are not as good as France or Britain to push our interest to EU structures, the present structures in the EU are really good for Germany to find compromises. From our point of view, through the process of pushing European and German interests in these structures, we can find compromises with other states. From our history, because we are in the middle of Europe, we must find compromises with our neighbours, not resort to conflicts to deal with problems.

- I think these structures also help other member states to be more engaged in the European integration. However, the problem is Britain has different point of views on many issues, such as financial crisis, Afghanistan issues, and Euro matters. We really have no idea what they want. I think the UK should have more engagement in the Europe, because it is a more successful approach for the UK than keeping a special relationship with the US. In fact, Britain and America have disputes in some areas, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, on business issues. Britain does not have the power of Euros to secure their financial system. I think they will have really serious problem in the near future. When we look at Ireland, they have support from the EU, so the hit to the financial system in Ireland was not so hurt. I think the EU should be attractive for the UK. You must feed cows first then get milk back. You have to pay something to the EU, and then you can ask something back. So I think the UK should be more engaged in the EU.
Q9. Do you think the CSDP shall be reformed to be more effective?

- I do not think so. As I mentioned before, security affairs are not the priority for Germany to be engaged in the EU. We only look at business, trade, and inner security matters, such as police issues. Military and security issues are not our priorities. It is not the best way we should have. We are only looking for compromises, and this structure produces compromises, Germany is one of the EU states, and we have some profits from the EU. From the German side, the system now is good. It is not necessary for Germany to support an institutional reform for military and security affairs in the EU.
Appendix H

Paul Keetch’s Interview

British MP for the Liberal and Democratic Party from 1997 to 2010

Date: 24 November 2009
Time: P.M. 10.30-10.50
Phone Interview
Record device is available in the interview.

Q1. How would you describe the existing institutional framework of the CSDP?

- Any form of European foreign, security or defence policy has to be credible which means it has to be able to match the literature of the words with the abilities to deploy the forces on the ground and do the job you want to do. That is true when you are talking about anti-piracy operations in Africa or when you are talking about the peacekeeping missions in Balkans.
- One of the problems is being with the European forces deployment. The EU does not actually match the abilities to necessary fights and keep peace on the ground. We have seen the example on Afghanistan where certain European forces have restrictions on military activities they can perform in war situations. The reality is it may be going to be war situations. If you are going to keep the peace, you need to have ability to project forces sometimes. And at the moment very often the European forces do not have that ability.
- The EU has to keep reassessing the security situation in Europe. The forces that have your disposal need to be as mobile flexible as possible to meet the challenges can change, even when you are involved in an operation. Iraq is a good example of this whereby you start in a high extensive warfare that two
armies are fighting with each other, so you have to be very quickly to move to a situation and an urgency operation. It is certainly that the UK did not change our posture quickly enough in Iraq to meet those change circumstances. So, you know, what is required on the ground can change daily and you need flexibility to do that. Certainly the security objectives of the EU and the concerns they have should also be changed quickly as well.

Q2. How would you describe the British policy towards the security and defence integration in the EU?

- So I think the British government would want to see is that is there going to be an EU peacekeeping mission. That mission is backed up with forces if required to make the mission work.
- We support the EU to develop such capabilities as long as there is no duplication as what the NATO is doing; also as long as it does not in any way try to pretend that it is a replacement for NATO. I do not see the European Common Security and Defence Policy as being a replacement to the transatlantic alliance. I see it as being an ability for Europe to act if necessary alone when the United States would not or could not want to get involved in such peacekeeping missions. I do not see the CSDP as a replacement for the transatlantic alliance and I did not see that any EU forces as being any kinds of replacement for the NATO.
- No sensible government is going to be committed to armed forces open endedly to support any EU operations no matter where it might be. We are not going to do that and there is no sensible government would do that. Every mission has to be looked down its merits and every country has the right to say: yes, we want to participate in that mission or we do not. From my point of view, the key and absolute imperative is that mission has to be credible. I mean it has to have military capabilities to do what you expect to
that mission to do; but certainly I would not be committed to supporting any EU mission whatever it is and I do not believe any British politician would.

- You cannot force any countries to participate in military operations. The EU would have to persuade countries that whether there is a military mission we are supporting. If we are going to send British troops to support a particular mission, we have to be convinced that those troops are properly led and properly equipped and the troops are going to be with properly led and properly equipped to do the tasks we ask them to do.

- I will certainly be very cautious about the development of the CSDP military forces. A lot of evidences we have suggest that European missions are not prepared to go as far as it ought to be. The fact is if you are going to keep the peace, you have to be prepared in certain circumstances to fight. That is unfortunately a factual thing. If you are trying to keep the peace between warring groups and make the groups not fight again, the EU has to be prepared if there is necessary to be engaged in conflicts with the groups to regain the peace. Sometimes peacekeeping requires an ability to fight. Therefore, it is not just about policing or being nice to people; you do have to have the capabilities if it is required to impose peace or in order to keep the peace. Sometimes, European nations have not always been prepared to do that.

- For Britain, terrorism is certainly the most serious security challenge at the moment and the most key important security objective for the UK government is the protection of the UK homeland from terrorist attack. That is why we are in Afghanistan and that is why we continue to look very carefully at anti-terrorism operations in the UK. We need participation of our friends in Europe.

- I think the EU and its institutions support the UK government to fight the terrorism. But I think in the EU you need to see that individual member states need to participate in that security as well. Some of them do very well.
There is no EU intelligence service and certainly the British intelligence will not be prepared to share with the EU or every EU countries. That will be ridiculous. I think it should be retained as an independent intelligence service and nation by nation and state by state. In the end, the anti-terrorism operations will be done by those states cooperating with other nation states. Where that changes is where the EU decides collectively that it wants to send the forces or troops or ships to the Horn of Africa for anti-piracy. The EU can do that, it should be able to do that, and it has to have the ships to do that. That is kind of things that the EU should be cooperating to do more.

Q3. How you evaluate the efforts of the EU to develop a strong CSDP?

- I think some countries in the world have got historical reasons to be concerned about war fighting operations. Germany and Japan are two examples and they are reluctant to put their own forces to conflict situations. Other countries just have generally passive approach to these issues and they will not choose to fight. That is fine and great, but do not expect other countries to be more robust, like Britain. Do not expect us to send our troops and sacrifice our troops if you are prepared to do that.
- The principle is I absolutely support the EU to develop such capabilities. What we need to see is how it is working in practice. The EU has to develop more co-operation, needs to train more and needs to have greater interoperability between the forces there. It needs certainly to support logistic terms. I mean if you combine all the European armies together, it will be bigger than the United States armies; therefore, we need be serious about logistic supports, the communications between various forces, training together, getting to know each other and working together. Once that begins to happen, I think the EU forces will become more credible and it has to do that by working together in the fields. That is why I am so disappointed with some European
countries which are not polling their weights in the NATO mission in Afghanistan.

- You can have the best institutions and the best procedures, but if individual soldier on the ground is not prepared when there is necessary to fight, then the whole thing collapses. Therefore, yes, you need institutions and you also need political acceptance from politicians or sometimes they will put their soldiers in harmed way.

- I do not believe that the EU will have an independent European army and we are not support that.

- What kinds of missions have to be done by the EU or by nation states does depend on different situations. Like the anti-terrorism actions in Birmingham of Manchester, these actions should be done by the British government rather than the EU. If there are links to other countries, like the United States, Germany or other countries, yes we should be talking to those governments. But that is not something that the EU has ability to get involved.

- The CSDP will work where the EU countries want to work together. But I do not think the practice of the CSDP will affect the British security and defence policy. Britain can decide by itself when it decides to be got involved the situations it wants to get involved. The British government decided to go to Afghanistan and Iraq and the British government decided to do some NATO missions. These decisions are not affected by the EU decisions.

- The national security and defence policy of the UK and the security priorities of the UK may not be the same to the priorities of every member states of the EU. The CSDP can only be a common European foreign policy when all of the nation states agree to it. When they agree to it, then there has to have mechanisms to bring military forces to support that. I have no objection against that at all. But it is not Britain’s job or France or Germany’s job to push that policy to that direction. I think if there are some countries are trying to do that, they will get resistance from other countries.
Q4. How would you describe the relationship between the NATO and the CSDP of the EU?

- The NATO is an organisation that includes the United States and Canada. It is conceivable that it may be at some point in the future there will be a mission that the EU might want to do which the NATO would not want to do. So therefore it is perfectly logic for that an EU ability to deploy peacekeeping forces if it wants to do; separating from what the NATO wants to do. But that does not mean it is a replacement of the NATO peacekeeping abilities to do that.

- Take anti-terrorism for example. It does not to be the EU role and it still remains the priority of national governments. I would not want to the British anti-terrorism policy run by the EU or run by the NATO that the British government does. Yes, we cooperate with other EU partners and we cooperate with the EU institutions, but very often the anti-terrorism issues are done by state issues.
Appendix I

Riina Kionka’s Interview

*Personal Representative for Human Rights (CFSP) of the SG/HR Javier Solana*

Date: 3 November 2009
Time: A.M. 11.00-11.20
Place: Justus Lipsius Building, Headquarters of the Council of the European Union in Brussels

Record device is not permitted in the interview.

Q1. How would you describe your work involving the CSDP?

- I have worked in this office since January 2007. Before I came to here, I have worked for the affairs of human rights for a long time. I am now is personal representative for the Secretary General and High Representative.

- In the present institutional framework, there are two heads in the Council: Secretary General and High Representative. It means I have two bosses, and we are in charge of different aspects to carry out human rights affairs. However, once the Lisbon Treaty is in operation, it will merge these two positions, and it will make the work become easier. The Lisbon Treaty will make a big change in the institutional framework in the Council, and there will definitely have a section for human rights, I am not sure whether I will still be the head of this section or there will have a new head though. This institutional reform will increase consistency and coherence of the Council,
and then it will contribute to fulfilling the common values and goals, such as human rights, in the EU.

Q2. How would evaluate the efforts of the EU to protect human rights in the framework of the CSDP?

- The affairs of human right in the EU will become more important and prior after the Lisbon Treaty enters into force. There are two reasons. The first reason is that human right is one of the four values that the Treaty on the European Union committed to protecting in the field of the CFSP (the other three are democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms). The commitment to protect the value of human rights has been codified in the Lisbon Treaty. In other words, it has been written down already, so the commitment is a text with legal status now. The second reason is in the European Convention on Human Rights, it also states that to promote human rights is one of the prior missions in the EU. Citizens are able to complain to the EU through domestic channels. Human right is definitely one aspect of European security policy as well, although the EU has other focuses for the CFSP, such as economic or political issues.

Q3. How would you evaluate the performance of the EU to promote human rights?

- The issue of human rights has not obtained enough attentions. We do not have enough political resources. In my opinion, besides developing the economic power, we also have to focus on other fields of policies and keep good connection with member states. Since in most situations, the EU is still a stable and capable approach of tackling conflicts and crisis situations. Therefore, we have to be patient towards the development of the CSDP and
cannot give up, although it takes long time to achieve our objectives. It is still a long way to go.

Q4. How would you describe the relationship between member states and the EU regarding the CSDP?

- I think we have to educate people to be more familiar with the policies and developments in the EU. Once they do so, the isolated feeling will be improved. Also, they should have greater sense of responsibility towards the European integration. The issue of isolated feeling is a dual responsibility. The one is the EU institutions and member states have to educate the European people; the other is the general public have to pay more attentions to the EU affairs, at least, be keener to vote for the European Parliament.

- However, I do not think we have to enhance authority of the European Parliament. There will be no mechanism in the institutional framework of the EU to balance the power of the European Parliament. It does not exist in an organic connection between the European Parliament and the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council, or the European Parliament and member states. When the authority of the European Parliament becomes over-weighted and deviated from common expectations, there will be no instrument or mechanism to make it stop. As the result, if the European Parliament becomes too dominant while there is no mechanism to balance it, it will cause a crisis that is the lack of democracy in the decision-making process in the EU.
Appendix J

Pierre Séailles’s Interview

*Policy Coordinator in the Relex A4, Security Policy Unit in the European Commission*

Date: 25 November 2009

Time: P.M. 18.30-19.10

Phone Interview

Record device is not available in the interview.

---

**Q1. How would you describe the present institutional system of the ESDP to undertake security and defence integration?**

- The unity is still limited. The framework of the CSFP is still limited to undertake military missions.
- Progress is quite limited. It is disappointing.
- Member states are the main factors to influence the operation of the CFSP. The operation of the CFSP largely depends on the co-operation of member states.
- In many occasions, member states can lobby the EU to accept their national interests.
- Because decisions have to be made by unanimity, member states can easily block the decision-making process. It makes the whole system become fragile. This decision-making process did not change in the Lisbon Treaty.
- In general, Europeans do not fully trust the EU. Euro-sceptic.
- Although since 1993, regular meetings between member states and the EU have made some progress and the CFSP has been changed a bit, the change is not significant, it is more coordinated than before though.
Q2. In your opinion, how would you evaluate the present institutional framework of the CSDP capable of coping with the challenges of the present security environment?

- I think the security environment and the security challenges to the EU are not very different since then. However, member states are too ambitious, but sometimes their ambitions are not realistic. Meanwhile, the political will of member states is an important factor to affect the operation of the CFSP.

- The present CSDP framework has a right combination to combine military and civilian instruments. However, in Afghanistan, we deployed too many military forces, but too less civilian instruments. I think the present institutional framework is ok, although the political will of member states is still not sure.

- To launch a CSDP mission needs a clear, reasonable and realistic mandate. It is very important. At present, to develop fully independent military capabilities is not achievable. It is very important to have a clear and realistic mandate to undertake EU missions.

- I think strong military forces are not always necessary for the EU. We have to find right tools but we do not have only one standard for the purpose. No mission is the same, since every mission has different conditions and objectives. We have to find right combination of military and civilian instruments in right time. That is why we require a planning unit to make right decision. Planning must be very careful. From the last week, we start to plan for a crisis management unit, but it is still in an initiative stage.

- My work involves CSDP missions. We provide suggestions and make proposals about what contributions the EU may offer, but the final decision will be decided by the Council. The Council will also decide how to implement missions. The Council and the Commission have very different procedures to implement decisions.
In reality, it is rather important whether the Council support a CSDP mission. However, traditionally and theoretically, the Commission does not favour an intergovernmental framework. Both the PSC and COREPER are Council bodies. The COREPER directly belongs to member states, but the PSC plays larger role in the CSDP. Therefore sometimes these two bodies may have some competitions with each other, although things are much better now. Officially speaking, a supranational framework may be helpful, but it has to be decided by the public, maybe a referendum in the EU. Because the matters of the CSDP are very close issues to national sovereignty, it is difficult to develop a supranational framework for the CSDP. Nevertheless, an intergovernmental framework is better than nothing.

The EU has to improve capabilities for the CSDP, but the political will of member states is still the capital. European countries are decreasing defence budgets because not many security threats are not perceived by member states and European citizens, the European public are not feeling necessary to push their governments and political parties to change policies.

Q3. How will you evaluate the relations between the EU and NATO?

The Berlin Plus works for the co-operation between the EU and NATO. However, this co-operation only occupies small portions in the CSDP missions. At the present, only in Bosnia and Herzegovina the EU and NATO have co-operation via the Berlin Plus. Until now, there is still no sign that a proposal will be made to improve this mechanism.

Q4. How will you evaluate the long-term development in the EU for security and defence integration?
• It is possible to form common culture in the CSDP. We are not developing institutions and mechanisms only for common political positions and common military actions. Keeping on practice the CSDP will help to build better institutional framework and help member states to learn from the past; meanwhile, practice can contribute to improve understanding and acceptable of member states to conduct the CSDP.

• The Lisbon Treaty is a milestone for the EU since the Maastricht Treaty so that there will be no new treaties in the EU at least within ten years.

• Of course the Lisbon Treaty will improve the implementation of the CSDP. However, since the Treaty has not entered into force yet, it is not clear how much it will improve to the CSDP. The Lisbon Treaty creates an External Action Service; however, in my opinion the extent of the Treaty to improve the framework of the CSDP is still limited.
Appendix K

Reis Alda Silveira’s Interview

Head of Unit in the General Secretariat – DG E VIII – Defence Issues (Defence Policy and Capabilities Unit)

Date: 5 November 2009
Time: P.M. 15.30-15.45
Place: Avenue de Cortenbergh 158, Office of the Unit on Political and Defence Capabilities in Brussels
Record device is not permitted in the interview.

Q1. How would you describe your work involving the CSDP?

- My work basically involved in all of the processes in the field of the CSDP, including agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy-implementing. Our work is separated into two parts; the one is routine affairs, and the other is making papers and proposing proposals for ministerial meetings.

Q2. How would you describe the development of the CSDP?

- In the field of defence and security, the decisions are made on the premise of strict compromise from member states. Various opinions and positions amongst member states have to be negotiated and compromised, and then decisions can be made. As the result, shaping common ideas or pursuing common values through informal connections is not plausible in the field of defence and security policy.
• However, the decision-making process in the field of the CSDP is not merely a forum for intergovernmental negotiations. Member states, EU institution, and technical experts are all fully associated with each other, and we work and share information together. I think the policy-making process in the field of the CSDP is an arrangement between intergovernmental forum and supranational system.

Q3. How would you evaluate whether the development of the CSDP affected member states’ policy?

• In my opinion, I do not think the process of institutionalisation of the CSDP will affect EU states to make security policies. ‘Spill-over’ will only happen in the Community. As I just said, the decisions of the CSDP are made on the premise of compromise of member states, so decisions are involved in various positions and interests amongst different member states. Basically speaking, member states play dominant roles in the decision-making process, and retain most of the competence to make decisions. Because the decisions of the CSDP are made by EU countries according to their different positions and interests rather than the consequence of ‘spill-over’. EU states are more influential to affect the institutional development of the CSDP than EU institutions. The process of institutionalisation only has limited influence upon the way that EU states define and pursue their security policies and interest.

Q4. What is your opinion about strengthening military role of the EU?

• I think the EU should do that. Strong and centralised forces will support a coherent and credible European security policy. If the EU wants to be more
prominent in security affairs, strong security forces of the EU are required. However, member states are not prepared to accept such a plan for building strong military forces. It will take time for member states to make consensus for building common forces. We have to do that step by step to make progressive result.
Appendix L
Brian Toll’s Interview

Programme Manager of the DG External Relations (CFSP Operations) in the European Commission

Date: 2 December 2009
Time: P.M. 14.00-14.40
Phone Interview
Record device is not available in the interview.

Q1. How would you describe the present institutional system of the CSDP to undertake security and defence integration?

- The Maastricht Treaty built a three pillar structure for the EU. In my personal view, the spotlight is focused why the three-pillar structure is gone since the Lisbon Treaty.

- At present, most missions of the CSDP encounter the problem of ‘under-staffed’. Most civilian missions do not have enough staff to implement missions. More police forces are required for CSDP missions. However, it is difficult to persuade civilian staff of member states to contribute to such missions, because some of them do not belong to any governmental department. They are detached from governments.

- Besides, working level is another problem. Especially on the situation to carry out an out-of-area mission, people are required to have enough language skill for communication. Although the EU will call for contributions, it is implemented on the basis of voluntary participation from member states. Sometimes Switzerland and Turkey make some contributions to the civilian
operations, but in most situations such contributions come from member states.

- The EU has arranged many training programmes for better implementation of civilian missions of the CSDP. For example, in Kosovo we have large training programmes which involve the Council and the General Secretariat. Since every state has different training standards for their civilian staff, training programmes can help those staff to be integrated into civilian missions.

Q2. In your opinion, how would you evaluate the present institutional framework of the CSDP capable of coping with the challenges of the present security environment?

- Basically, the Council and the General Secretariat will define situation. The Commission help to identify potential problems in order to reduce mission costs for the EU.

- There are four levels in the framework of the EU involving deciding a CSDP mission. The top level is the High Representative. Under the High Representative are crisis management operation commanders (they are also under the Secretary General). They are responsible for providing devices and supports to implement CSDP missions. The third one consists of policy units which are responsible for suggesting right amounts and right people to implement missions. Then the Council Secretary will provide political information and intelligence and assess levels of risks. The PSC, the EU Military Committee and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capabilities are the three policy planning bodies related to the CSDP missions the most.

- The Commission also take part in external relations, especially on the financial aspect. The Commission has full financial responsibilities and involves in everything about money. Although the Maastricht Treaty
constrained the role of the Commission to actively take part in the CFSP, the Commission does a less but better job to help the implementation of the CFSP and CSDP.

• The Council is responsible for the EU to define a security strategy for the EU. The Commission may have some influence, but does not have decisive power. At the present the EU does not have a universal rule about under what conditions it will intervene in a situation. There is not an overall framework for CSDP missions. It is case by case and depends on different situations on each case. Each mission has specific procedures, needed information and requirements.

• Under the Lisbon Treaty, there will be an External Action Service. Once the Treaty enters into force, this institution will help to improve the coherence of the CSDP. The Commission is charged with all the affairs related to the Community; regarding the affairs related to the CFSP and CSDP, the Commission only plays a role for advice and monitor. The Commission is happy to help with the implementation of the CFSP and CSDP. In my opinion, there is no major conflict between the Commission and the Council to cope with CFSP and CSDP affairs.

Q3. How would you evaluate the present institutional framework of the CSDP?

• The most serious problem for the implementation of the CSDP is still the lack of available people for it. The EU is still not having staff and human resources on its own. Whether to cope with a crisis needs to be decided by the Council. Budget is also an issue.

• In my opinion, I am not very satisfied with the implementation of the CSDP up to now. Many CSDP missions are launched, but not all of them have good performance. The mandate to a CSDP mission needs to set an end date, clear structure and definite objectives. For example, in the mission in Georgia, the
EU requires to have better strategic planning. Political strategic planning needs to be done more. The EU should be more careful and have much more serious thinking about these things before launching a CSDP mission, including how to achieve objectives, how to implement, and when and how to move out. For example, before deciding a CSDP mission, the EU has to know whether it will be a long-term or short-term mission and it depends on whether the situation is complicated or not. These factors are important to decide whether the EU will complete a CSDP mission successfully.

- Besides, the successful implementation of CSDP missions depends on the political will of member states. Planning unit has to ensure the EU will have enough people to carry out CSDP missions.

- Generally speaking, the EU has major influence upon economic affairs. The NATO plays a better role on military affairs. The Commission does not involve military affairs of the EU. In the field of the CFSP and CSDP, member states should increase their involvement, identify what the resources can be utilised, and assess situations more precisely.
References

Interviews:


Journal Articles:


Hoffmann, S. (1966). Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe. *Daedalus, 95*(3), 862-915.


Books:


Institutionalism'. London: Continuum.


Soetendorp, B. (1999). Foreign Policy in the European Union: Theory, History and


**Book Sections:**


Contemporary Background. In D. Allen, R. Rummel & W. Wessels (Eds.),


Andersson, J. J. (2008). The European Security Strategy and the Continuing Search for
Coherence. In S. Biscop & J. J. Andersson (Eds.), The EU and the European

Hill & M. Smith (Eds.), International Relations and the European Union. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.

(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. USA: Oxford University
Press.

France Defeats EDC. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

Mapping the Field. In M. D. Aspinwall & G. Schnider (Eds.), The Rules of
Integration: Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.

& S. Vanhonoacker (Eds.), The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: Issues,

Trend. In S. Bishop & J. J. Andersson (Eds.), The EU and the European Security

Bloch-Laine, A. (1999). Franco-German Cooperation in Foreign Affairs, Security and
Defence. In D. Webber (Ed.), The Franco-German Relationship in the EU (pp.

of Coordination. In D. Allen, R. Rummel & W. Wessels (Eds.), European


Ioannides, I. (2010). EU Civilian Capabilities and Cooperation with the Military Sector. In E. Greco, N. Pirozzi & S. Silvestri (Eds.), *EU Crisis Management: Institutions*


Speeches/Public Statements:


http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/5b5d0d35-4266-49bc-b770-b24826858e1f/publishable_en.pdf


http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110321/debtext/110321-0003.htm


http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110719/debtext/110719-0001.htm

http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/9/3/d990219a-8ad0-4758-946f-cb2ddd05b3c0/publishable_en.pdf


http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1999/apr/26/kosovo-2#column_15w


http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-040e.htm

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1999/mar/23/kosovo#S6CV0328P0_19990323_HOC_128


Documents Published by the EU:

1969. Conclusions of the 1969 Hague Summit, Meeting of Heads of State or Government of the Member States on 1-2 December. Retrieved 1 January 2012, from CVCE Archive: 


http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/284c9784-9bd2-472b-b704-ba4bb1f3122d/en;jsessionid=4897F5BB52D0B085F4718D2EAB8B2DF2

http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/6/20/125b87f2-7022-4594-a3db-6bdd9a4022b1/publishable_en.pdf


January 2012, from European Parliament Archive:


1998. 98/326/CFSP: Common Position of 7 May 1998 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the freezing of funds held abroad by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Serbian Governments. Retrieved 1 January 2012, from:


UN Security Council Resolutions:


Newspaper/Magazine Articles:


**Other Online Resources:**


http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/judgments/bverfg/v940309.htm


