

Durham E-Theses

Sociobiology, universal Darwinism and their transcendence: An investigation of the history, philosophy and critique of Darwinian paradigms, especially gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism, and their types of reductionism towards a theory of the evolution of evolutionary processes, evolutionary freedom and ecological idealism

Sydow, Momme von

How to cite:

Sydow, Momme von (2001) *Sociobiology, universal Darwinism and their transcendence: An investigation of the history, philosophy and critique of Darwinian paradigms, especially gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism, and their types of reductionism towards a theory of the evolution of evolutionary processes, evolutionary freedom and ecological idealism*, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3769/>

Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a [link](#) is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the [full Durham E-Theses policy](#) for further details.

Academic Support Office, The Palatine Centre, Durham University, Stockton Road, Durham, DH1 3LE
e-mail: e-theses.admin@durham.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
<http://etheses.dur.ac.uk>

Dissertation for a PhD in Philosophy

Sociobiology, Universal Darwinism and Their Transcendence

An Investigation of
The History, Philosophy and Critique of Darwinian Paradigms,
especially Gene-Darwinism, Process-Darwinism,
and Their Types of Reductionism
Towards
A Theory of the Evolution of Evolutionary Processes,
Evolutionary Freedom and Ecological Idealism

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published in any form, including Electronic and the Internet, without the author's prior written consent. All information derived from this thesis must be acknowledged appropriately.

Dissertation submitted

by

Momme von Sydow

2001



Supervisor: Professor Dr. David Knight

Submitter: Momme v. Sydow, Obere Wilhelmstraße 20, D-53225 Bonn, Germany,

Telephone: 00 49-228-46 30 66; e-mail: Momme@von-Sydow.de; web: www.philos.de

19 SEP 2001

“The progress of biology and psychology has probably been checked by the uncritical assumption of half-truths. If science is not to degenerate into a medley of ad hoc hypotheses, it must become philosophical and must enter into a thorough criticism of its own foundations.”

A. N. Whitehead. *Science and the Modern World* (1926/1925), p. 25

Momme v. Sydow

Sociobiology, Universal Darwinism and Their Transcendence

(PhD-Dissertation, University of Durham, Department of Philosophy, 2001)

An investigation of the history, philosophy and critique of Darwinian paradigms, especially gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism and their types of reductionism — towards a theory of the evolution of evolutionary processes, evolutionary freedom and ecological idealism

Based on a review of different Darwinian paradigms, particularly sociobiology, this work, both, historically and philosophically, develops a metaphysic of *gene-Darwinism* and *process-Darwinism*, and then criticises and transcends these Darwinian paradigms in order to achieve a truly *evolutionary theory of evolution*.

Part I introduces essential aspects of current sociobiology as the original challenge to this investigation. The claim of some sociobiologists that ethics should become biologized in a gene-egoistic way, is shown to be tied to certain biological views, which ethically lead to problematic results.

In part II a historical investigation into sociobiology and Darwinism in general provides us, as 'historical epistemology', with a deeper understanding of the structure and background of these approaches. Gene-Darwinism, which presently dominates sociobiology and is linked to Dawkins' selfish gene view of evolution, is compared to Darwin's Darwinism and the evolutionary synthesis and becomes defined more strictly. An account of the external history of Darwinism and its subparadigms shows how cultural intellectual presuppositions, like Malthusianism or the Newtonian concept of the unchangeable laws of nature, also influenced biological theory construction.

In part III universal 'process-Darwinism' is elaborated based on the historical interaction of Darwinism with non-biological subject areas. Building blocks for this are found in psychology, the theory of science and economics. Additionally, a metaphysical argument for the universality of process-Darwinism, linked to Hume's and Popper's problem of induction, is proposed.

In part IV gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism are criticised. Gene-Darwinism—despite its merits—is challenged as being one-sided in advocating 'gene-atomism', 'germ-line reductionism' and 'process-monism'. My alternative proposals develop and try to unify different criticisms often found. In respect of gene-atomism I advocate a many-level approach, opposing the necessary radical selfishness of single genes. I develop the concept of higher-level genes, propose a concept of systemic selection, which may stabilise group properties, without relying on permanent group selection and extend the applicability of a certain group selectionist model generally to small open groups. Proposals of mine linked to the critique of germ-line reductionism are: 'exformation', phenotypes as evolutionary factors and a field theoretic understanding of *causa formalis* (resembling Aristotelian hylemorphism). Finally the process-monism of gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism and, if defined strictly, Darwinism in general is criticised. I argue that our ontology and ethics would be improved by replacing the Newtonian-Paleyian deist metaphor of an eternal and unchangeable law of nature, which lies at the very heart of Darwinism, by a truly evolutionary understanding of evolution where new processes may gain a certain autonomy. All this results in a view that I call 'ecological idealism', which, although still very much based on Darwinism, clearly transcends a Darwinian world view.

Keywords: Philosophy and History of Biology, universal Darwinism, Sociobiology, gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism; problem of induction; critique of Darwinism; tautology; reductionism; exformation; hylemorphism; autoselection; evolution of evolutionary processes; autonomy, Ecological Idealism.

Preface

It is a daring task for a single author to embark on an interdisciplinary inquiry dealing with Darwinism historically, biologically and philosophically. Even more so if one finally proposes a critique of assumptions central to current Darwinian paradigms. An interdisciplinary work is difficult particularly since the fields of research are often specialised. It requires some devotion to gain a mere overview of, for example, only the works published on a certain aspect of the historical person of Darwin, or on a certain dispute in the present day philosophy of biology. Yet, despite this side lesson, I consider it a genuine task of philosophy to undertake such broad interdisciplinary investigations.

My thoughts on this matter, naturally, underwent a kind of evolution, therefore I will give a short, somewhat personal, account, of how I came to my present interdisciplinary interest of research.

Some years ago, a friend of mine, Sita v. Richthoven, at that time student at Oxford, gave me Richard Dawkins' book *The Selfish Gene* as a present. Since then I have been engaged with topics in the field of sociobiology—sometimes well into my dreams. It became immediately clear to me that this provocative book bore on many philosophical topics and not until later I realised that the book itself ought to be philosophically criticised as well.

Although studying philosophy at the University of Bonn, I was also interested in biological questions and took a subsidiary subject in evolutionary biology. Philosophy at the University of Bonn focused mainly on a canon of great philosophers from Plato, via Kant to Hegel. Subversive authors, like Nietzsche, have scarcely been read. Although I was in search for a more modern approach to philosophy and for a while was attracted by the sharp accuracy of analytical philosophy (U. Nortmann), I know now, with hindsight, that it was helpful for me to be forced to get a bit more acquainted also with some traditional continental philosophers. I think, I have only been able to resist some of the implications of gene-Darwinism due to the critical preparation I received through reading Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Parallel to my studies in philosophy I was doing a second full course of study in psychology. Through these diverse pursuits the structural similarities between the Darwinian process of mutation and selection and Thorndike's psychological approach of trial-and-error learning became apparent to me.

At Durham University I had been given the opportunity to write an MA thesis that treated topics in the field of gene-Darwinism. I have then been granted permission to upgrade the work to the present PhD-dissertation. While I was working on the topics I became increasingly aware of the fact that a metaphysic of Darwinism is present in many other subject areas as well, such as the theory of science or economics. My supervisor, Professor Dr. David Knight, particularly helped me very much to understand and to investigate the historical backgrounds of Darwinian paradigms. The historical study provided the basis from which to work out differences between Darwinian paradigms and from which to

detect the conceptual biases in Universal Darwinism in general. This in turn had a huge impact on my systematic work on the critique of universal gene-Darwinism and universal process-Darwinism.

Despite all concerns with biology and other subject areas this work is methodologically still mainly a philosophical one, especially in part four. Although I have done my best to understand the different subject areas in question, the broad scope of this work has, I am afraid, the disadvantage of not treating all broached discourses in the depth I would have liked to. But, after all, I think it would be worse to neglect the 'one long argument' running through the different chapters.

My greatest debt is to the authors who I have read, friend and foe alike. Their texts alone have made my further work possible. I should like especially to mention two authors: R. Dawkins and, in the later course of my work, D. Dennett. Their writings inspired me, although in many respects I finally came to totally different or even opposing conclusions. But a dialectical understanding demonstrates that radical intellectual opponents enable us to realise the differences of our own position and to finally achieve a synthesis. Although I mainly tried to radicalise and then transcend gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism from within, I, of course, also owe much to their critics, who—whether I realised it or not—have paved the way for most of my arguments and who encouraged me that a different approach is needed and might become elaborated.

More directly I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Professor Dr. David Knight, for his constantly patient, supportive and most friendly help! His advice, his corrections and his encouragement helped me substantially to prepare this complex work. I am also in debt to Dr. Soran Reader (also with the Department of Philosophy, Durham), who discussed some topics of the work with me. I am also pleased that I was given the opportunity for a dialogue with M. Midgley and a brief word with D. Dennett. I am also thankful to the German *Heinrich-Böll Stiftung*, the *Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst* and the *Kölner Gymnasial- und Studienstiftung* whose scholarships made my stay at Durham and this work possible.

I particularly want to thank my father, Friedrich v. Sydow, for having taught me a love of truth early on, and currently for proof reading a large part of the work with his own logical rigour and linguistic sensitivity. Personal debts can never be adequately acknowledged. But I also want to thank my mother, Anne, who has always supported this project and has given me the optimism to finish it.

Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the help and advice of some critically-minded friends: Paul Ambelton, Matthew Eddy, Fiona Pierce, Bill Pollard, Jennifer Smith, Sandra Többe, Rob Talbot and Alistair Wright. They have discussed certain aspects of the thesis with me, have supported me to overcome my German English or have helped me to believe in something else than Universal Darwinism.

Although I am, of course, responsible for the final line of argument myself, the rational stimulations, the linguistic help and the moral support were an indispensable precondition for finishing this work.

Momme v.Sydow, Bonn / Durham, 2000

Table of Contents

<i>Abstract</i>	3
<i>Preface</i>	4
<hr/>	
INTRODUCTION: NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE	9
<i>Nature of Philosophy and Its Relation to Science</i>	10
a) Philosophy as Metaphysics?	10
b) Metaphysics Entrenched in Science	11
c) Science as Philosophy and Art	12
d) Dialogue between Philosophy and Science	13
<i>Philosophy of Nature — Universal Darwinism and Its Transcendence</i>	14
a) Philosophy of Nature Facing the Ecological Crisis	15
b) The Glory and Poverty of Sociobiology and Gene-Darwinism — The Need for a Third Way	17
c) Process-Darwinism — Its Radicalisation and Its Critique	22
d) From Darwinism to an Evolutionary Theory of Evolution	24
e) Darwinism and Religion	33
<hr/>	
PART I: SOCIOBIOLOGY AND ITS ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS	37
CHAPTER 1: THE BIOLOGICAL THEORY OF SOCIOBIOLOGY	39
1.1 <i>Two Basic Postulates</i>	41
a) Postulate of ‘Selfish’ Genes as the Only Units of Evolution	41
b) Postulate of Genetic Determinism	42
1.2 <i>Theories of the Evolution of Apparent Altruism — Sociobiological Theorems?</i>	43
a) The Theory of Kin Selection	44
b) The Theory of Reciprocal ‘Altruism’	46
CHAPTER 2: ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS? — THE MORALITY OF THE GENE?	47
2.1 <i>The Morality of Sociobiology?— ‘The Currency Used in the Casino of Evolution is Survival’</i>	48
2.2 <i>Different Philosophical Attitudes Towards Sociobiology</i>	54
a) Philosophical Criticism of the Sociobiological Paradigm	54
b) Support of Sociobiology as a General Framework of Ontology and Ethics	57
2.3 <i>Meme ‘Altruisms’? — A Further Extension of the Sociobiological Paradigm</i>	60
a) Memes — A Limited Comeback of the Idea of Logos	60
b) Problems of the Extended Genetic-Memetic Approach as a Basis for Ethics	63
2.4 <i>Naturalistic Fallacy?</i>	65
2.5 <i>The Need for a New Paradigm in Biology</i>	69
<hr/>	
PART II: THE UNFOLDING OF LOGOS IN REGARD TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTIONS OF ‘PHYSIS’ AND DARWINISM	71
CHAPTER 3: PRE-DARWINIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTIONS OF NATURE	76
3.1 <i>The Ancient Views of φύσις — Nature as Organism</i>	76
a) From Myth to the Pre-Socratics — the Development of Basic Notions	77
b) Platonism — Physis as ‘Techne’	78
c) Aristotelianism — Physis as ‘Autopoiesis’	79
3.2 <i>Medieval Philosophy — the Divine De-Enchantment of Nature</i>	80
a) The World as ‘Machina Mundi’	81
b) The Human as ‘Alter Deus’	82
c) Universalia — from Realism to Nominalism	82
3.3 <i>Modern Philosophy — Nature as Clockwork, Creator as Watchmaker</i>	82
a) The Rise of Science — the Alter Deus Explores the Clockwork of God: Copernicus, Bacon, Newton	83
b) Humanism — the Alter Deus Replaced the Christian Deus	84
c) Descartes and Kant — Dualism of Human Freedom and the Clockwork of Nature	86
d) Idealism and Romanticism — the Dynamic Trial of a Unification	89
3.4 <i>The Rise of Biology as Science — Torn Between Eternal Form and Evolution</i>	94
a) Hierarchical Taxonomy Instead of ‘Scala Naturae’ — Linnaeus	95
b) (Romanticising) Materialistic Biology — Buffon, Lamarck	96

c) Transcendental and Essentialist Biology — Cuvier, (early) Owen, Agassiz.....	98
d) Romantic Biology — Oken, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, (late) Owen.....	102
e) Conclusion: Overview of the Preceding Three Schools.....	104
CHAPTER 4: INTERNAL LOGIC OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES — FROM DARWIN TO DAWKINS.....	107
4.1 <i>From Darwin to Weismann — the Birth of Darwinism.....</i>	<i>110</i>
a) Darwin — Not a Darwinist in the Strict Sense.....	110
b) Darwin's Biological Theory — Focus on the Individual Organism.....	113
c) Darwin's Descent of Man — Social-Darwinism?.....	115
d) Neo-Darwinism: Weismann Turns Darwin's Theory into 'Darwinism'.....	121
4.2 <i>Darwinism on Its Deathbed.....</i>	<i>124</i>
4.3 <i>Evolutionary Synthesis.....</i>	<i>126</i>
a) First Phase — Synthesis of Genetics and Population Statistics.....	128
b) Second Phase — Population Structure and Macroscopic Mechanisms.....	130
c) Evolutionary Factors and the Importance of Populations.....	132
4.4 <i>'Sociobiology' as Gene-Darwinism — a New Synthesis?.....</i>	<i>140</i>
a) Germ-Line Reductionism.....	141
b) Gene-Atomism.....	142
c) Darwinian Process Monism.....	143
4.5 <i>Criticism — a Better Synthesis in Sight?.....</i>	<i>145</i>
a) New Views in Micro- and Macrobiology.....	147
b) A Multilevel Synthesis — Darwinism versus Developmentalism?.....	152
CHAPTER 5: THE EXTERNAL HISTORY OF DARWINISM — FROM WHIG BIOLOGY TO NEOLIBERAL BIOLOGY?.....	160
5.1 <i>Darwin — A Malthusian Synthesis of Romantic and Newtonian Thought.....</i>	<i>162</i>
a) Romanticism and Romanticising Materialism.....	163
b) The Impact of Newtonism — Darwin's Process-Monism.....	168
c) Thomas Malthus, Adam Smith — Influence of Economic Thought and Practice.....	173
d) God — a Blind and Brute Creator?.....	182
5.2 <i>Evolutionary Synthesis — Thermodynamics and the Philosophical 'Zeitgeist'.....</i>	<i>184</i>
a) The Influence of Thermodynamics.....	184
b) Impact of the Philosophical 'Zeitgeist' and the Development of Logical Positivism and Logical Atomism?.....	185
5.3 <i>Gene-Darwinism—Reductionism Generalised.....</i>	<i>191</i>
a) The Different Biological Legacies of the Schools of Evolutionary Biology.....	192
b) A Mised Neo-Romantic Aspiration for Unification and Interdisciplinarity.....	193
c) 'Naturalistic Turn' — Reductionism and Materialism in Philosophy.....	196
d) 'Import' of Economical Concepts — Gene Capitalism?.....	197
<i>Summary: Biology as 'Geisteswissenschaft'?</i>	<i>201</i>
PART III: UNIVERSAL DARWINISM.....	203
CHAPTER 6: DARWINIAN METAPHYSICS—BIOLOGISTIC AND PROCESS DARWINISM.....	205
6.1 <i>Problem of Induction—Necessity of Blind Variation & External Elimination?.....</i>	<i>207</i>
a) Darwinism Seen as Universal Principle.....	207
b) The Problem of Induction (Hume and Popper).....	208
c) Towards a Critique of a Falsificationist Necessity of Universal Darwinism.....	210
6.2 <i>Biologistic Darwinism — Gene-Darwinism as its Prototype.....</i>	<i>213</i>
6.3 <i>Universal Process Darwinism — a New Alkahest.....</i>	<i>214</i>
CHAPTER 7: PROCESS DARWINISM IN PARTICULAR SUBJECT AREAS.....	218
7.1 <i>Darwinian Epistemologies and Darwinian Philosophies of Science.....</i>	<i>218</i>
a) Darwinian Biological Epistemology and Darwinian Process Epistemology.....	218
b) Operant Conditioning — Learning as Darwinian Process?.....	224
c) Popper's Falsificationism — Science as Darwinian Process?.....	229
7.2 <i>Other Components of Process Darwinism.....</i>	<i>231</i>
a) Antibodies and Neurons.....	231
b) Darwinian Economics?.....	232
CONCLUSION — THE UNIVERSAL WAR OF ENTITIES.....	235

PART IV: TRANSCENDENCE OF GENE-DARWINISM AND PROCESS DARWINISM ..	237
CHAPTER 8: TRANSCENDENCE OF SUBSTANCE REDUCTIONISM	240
8.1 <i>Problems of Physicalism and Reductionism in General</i>	240
a) The Difference between Explanation and (Downward) Reduction	240
b) Problems of Modern Physicalism with Traditional Materialism	241
c) Logical Problems of the Modern Understanding of Substance — Is a Tree a Million Matches?	243
d) The Inconsistency between Biologism and Physicalism — Genes or Information instead of Quarks?	250
8.2 <i>Genetic Reductionism I: Gene Atomistic Reductionism and Its Transcendence</i>	258
a) Gene Atomism — an Empty or a Wrong Claim	259
b) Higher Genetic Units—also Despite the Meiotic Shuffle	262
c) Top-Down Causation and High-Level Genes at Different Loci	266
d) The Fallacy of Claiming Gene-Atomism Tautologically	271
e) Higher Level Properties of Different Organisms — Four Possibilities to Achieve the Good of the Group	278
f) Stable Synergetic Properties and Selection above Groups — Species and Ecosystems	293
8.3 <i>Genetic Reductionism II: Germ-Line Reductionism and Its Transcendence</i>	303
a) Germ-Line Reductionism — the Strong Interpretation of the Weismann Barrier	303
b) Information, Exformation and the Phenotype as Evolutionary Factor	307
(1.) The General Concept of Exformation	307
(2.) Exformation and the Stuffness of the Phenotype	309
(3.) The Phenotype Interpreting the Genotype	311
(4.) Stuffness and Inner Dynamics of the Phenotype	312
(5.) The Phenotype as Evolutionary Factor in Its Own Right	313
c) Forms, Fields and the Concept of an External Memory	314
d) A Partial Revival of Morphological Taxonomy?	320
CHAPTER 9: TRANSCENDENCE OF PROCESS REDUCTIONISM	324
9.1 <i>Inconsistencies and Tautologies of a Darwinian Mono-Mechanistic Metaphysic</i>	327
a) Inconsistencies of Different Levels of Multi-Level Darwinism	327
b) On the Tautological Basis of Pan-Adaptationism	330
c) On the Tautological Basis of Pan-Selectionism	340
9.2 <i>Re-Defining the Notions of Darwinism and Lamarckism</i>	348
a) A Strict Definition of Darwinism	348
b) A Spectrum Between Darwinism and ‘Lamarckism’	350
9.3 <i>Towards Radical Evolutionism — the Evolution of Evolutionary Mechanisms</i>	353
a) Synthesis instead of Pure Diversification of Information — The First Criterion for a Darwinian Process	354
b) Directed Variation rather than Blind Variation — Discussion of the Second Criterion	358
(1.) Not Blind by Definition	361
(2.) Different Types of Variation	364
(3.) Is there an Adaptive Variation?	366
(4.) Adaptive Variation as Reaction to the Environment?	379
(5.) Summary and Conclusion	381
c) From Hetero-Selection to Auto-Selection — Discussion of the Third Criterion	384
(1.) Darwinian Externalism	384
(2.) Opportunistic Response to the Moment?	386
(3.) Autoselection and Autonomy	387
d) The Evolution of Evolutionary Mechanisms	395
(1.) The Necessity of a Concept of an Evolution of Evolutionary Mechanisms	395
(2.) Process Emergence, Circularity and Autonomy	398
CHAPTER 10: TOWARDS THE TRANSCENDENCE OF SELFISHNESS	406
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK — TOWARDS ECOLOGICAL IDEALISM	414
BIBLIOGRAPHY	424
INDEX	440

Introduction: Nature of Philosophy and Philosophy of Nature

This work proposes and elaborates a Philosophy of Nature which, although influenced by Darwinism, finally transcends Darwinism. I am particularly concerned with gene-Darwinism (☞ pp. 36 f., 140 f., 191 f., 213 f.) and process-Darwinism (☞ pp. 203 f.) and I do first radicalise and develop these approaches before criticising them from within (☞ pp. 237 f.). Nature itself is always transcending itself, not only in its evolutionary products but—as I shall argue—also in its evolutionary rules; likewise theories have, besides external pressures, also an inherent and even more advanced tendency to transcend themselves.¹ The work started as an investigation into what I call ‘gene-Darwinism’ in order to challenge its atomism, determinism and process reductionism. But I found Darwinian tenets also in other sciences, like psychology, theory of science, and economics; Darwinism has long become a universal world view. This universalised and radicalised approach finally led me to criticise Darwinism in general. Although Darwinism has undeniably led to profound insights, it—understood in a strict way (since it has been interpreted in many ways)—is essentially process-monistic, often even directly defined by natural selection.

The process monism at the heart of Darwinism (☞ pp. 107, 143, 214, 348) has sometimes been concealed. For example the apparent Darwinian paradigm of the evolutionary synthesis appears partly to be pluralistic and not monistic. But one may question whether the synthesis is thoroughly Darwinian or whether the synthesis is essentially causally pluralistic. However, gene-Darwinism is more pronounced in these matters than the benevolent evolutionary synthesis.

Darwinism, in principle still in a Paleyian-Newtonian manner, advocates one eternal law of nature, simple, predetermined and invariant. As will be shown, scholarship in the history of science has long revealed that the way from natural theology to natural selection was not too far. Although rendering the world to be evolutionary, the Darwinian explanation itself has remained static. (One may regard it as an atavism from a materialistically misunderstood Platonism.) Evolution itself is not evolving. I propose to replace this metaphysic by a more flexible and truly evolutionary picture of evolution and the partial freedom of evolutionary mechanisms.

I do not intend to propose a strict antithesis to all aspects of Darwinism or a concept of evolution completely purged from Darwinism. I want to make much use of original Darwinian concepts and take it, for example, that variational evolution is an indispensable theory. Nevertheless I shall argue that the outlined mono-mechanistic picture, central to the Darwinian paradigm, is ill-conceived. The proposed interpretative paradigm shift would show many biological concepts in a new light, but of course would need to incorporate the knowledge, which has partly been accumulated under the regime of Darwinism, in a similar way to which Darwinism incorporated originally non-Darwinian Mendelism. Perhaps, it is only of secondary importance whether the resulting, partly Darwinian view would still be called

¹ See also: H. Jonas. *Organismus und Freiheit* (1994/1973/1966), p. 20.

‘Darwinian’ or not. If a moderate paradigm shift would be achieved, the relationship to the social sciences might also become one of cooperation instead one of mutual mistrust.

A philosopher, who dares to challenge a metaphor or a concept which is central to science, presupposes a certain understanding of the nature of philosophy and its relation to science as well. Philosophy of nature and nature of philosophy are in many respects interrelated.

In this introduction hence I first give an account of my understanding of the nature of philosophy and its relation to science. I then outline and comment on my main proposals for a philosophy of nature. I also clarify that this work is indeed build on Darwinism, but is still intended as a critique of Darwinism. Here I can not give a detailed account of my argumentation, but I sketch the main line of argument.

Nature of Philosophy and Its Relation to Science

a) Philosophy as Metaphysics?

Metaphysical questions have been increasingly disapproved of by a tradition reaching from Hume, Kant to early Wittgenstein and the adherents of logical positivism. The Cartesian mind-body dualism combined with a focus on a subjective epistemological starting point has alienated Hume and Kant from traditional metaphysics. Moreover, the sciences successfully investigate the ‘book of nature’ now by experiment and microscope, rendering traditional metaphysics obsolete and revealing a different often materialist and atomistic view of nature (☞ pp. 84 f.). The critique of metaphysics served to get rid of endless metaphysical disputes, and replaced them with the more successful sciences. Another reason for the critique of metaphysics was “to make room for faith”², since the only possible metaphysic in the light of science would presumably have been a materialistic one. Kant still managed to reconcile the Newtonian world of matter in motion with strong individually binding ethics. He refuted traditional metaphysics but also made the rational subject the basis both of theoretical and practical knowledge.

Logical positivism too, largely renounced (traditional) metaphysics. Although the self-image of logical positivism was that it represented an anti-metaphysical attitude, there is today a tendency to accept that logical positivism also itself introduced a certain metaphysics, presented, for example, in Carnap’s *Der Logische Aufbau der Welt*.³ This has been pointed out both by naturalists, who have radicalised the anti-metaphysical attitude of logical positivism, or by advocates of a renaissance of metaphysics, who regard metaphysics—for the good or for the bad—to be indispensable. Recently, analytic philosophers, too, still endeavouring to keep a distance from obscure speculations, have argued metaphysics to be possible, distinct from truth about logical possibility and distinct from the question of the mere actual.⁴

² I. Kant. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. p. B XXX. ☞ footnote 237.

³ H. Putnam. *Reichenbach’s Metaphysical Picture* (1996/1991), pp. 100-101.

⁴ E. g.: J. Lowe. *The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time* (1998).

Without wanting to commit myself here to a certain specific methodology, I think that *sophia*, wisdom, and hence philosophy—despite a necessary basis in empirical investigations—, will and ought to always strive for a metaphysic at least in the sense of a general architectonic knowledge which necessarily transcends—to an of course limited extent—‘the given’ incorporating both theoretical and practical knowledge. This work is roughly located between analytical philosophy and philosophy which is interested in whole systems. In style it is rather analytic, for example meticulously scrutinising the notion of Darwinism. Nevertheless this work is intended to contribute to a larger system of thought and reintroduces some tenets which have been dominant in certain ‘continental’ traditions, like for example the concept of hylemorphism.

Postmodernism, in claiming the end of metaphysics (and of politics and of history alike), has, I think, left a vacuum, which—despite other intentions—had partly been filled by implicitly or explicitly Darwinian theories. A large part of this work tries to make the individualistic—or even sub-individualistic—Darwinian metaphysic explicit and to render them disputable. In the absence of an explicit metaphysic, an implicit one, which is not open to discussion, is often adopted. Metaphysics may only be a framework—as even postmodernism is—which allows and guarantees a plurality of views. I consider at least such a general framework or metaphysics necessary.

b) *Metaphysics Entrenched in Science*

In the positivist tradition, it has often been assumed that science ought to be and mostly is metaphysically neutral and value free. Of course, I approve of the ideal of scientific findings being objectively or at least in some sense inter-subjectively testable instead of being committed to the idiosyncratic values of a certain group. But I think one has to be aware that scientific findings are actually not completely free from metaphysical commitments. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno pointed out that especially the seeming neutrality of enlightenment is ‘more metaphysical than metaphysics’ itself.⁵ The history of science and the philosophical critique of positivism has revealed that even science is pervaded by assumptions not (directly) verifiable or falsifiable, which, if general in character, may be called metaphysical. This does not mean that metaphysical questions are totally separated from empirical ones. Empirical evidence and metaphysics are difficult to disentangle. Nevertheless science has not only an empirical, but also a partly autonomous theoretical or even metaphysical aspect.

Even in physics, often regarded as prototypic science, concepts are not always directly testable. At least after the concepts have been established, some become tacitly assumed presumptions for further experimental investigations. For example, in particle physics it would be, in principle, possible to abandon the—well established—fundamental concept of energy conservation, instead of being forced to accept the existence of certain fundamental particles. The history of physics, though of course in part

⁵ M. Horkheimer, T. W. Adorno. *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (1944/1969), p. 29.

empirical, is also the history of metaphysical commitments. Even Newton's *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica*—not only because of its title—appears to be based in a certain philosophical discourse.⁶ There are philosophical differences between the concept of idealised mass points and modern field theoretic approaches.⁷ Science is theory-laden and, in its more general structure, philosophy-laden. The best scientists and philosophers were also metaphysicians. Whether they would welcome this or not, Darwin, Dawkins and Dennett are metaphysicians^{8 930}. Although the empirical side (induction, anomalies, etc.) play a role in paradigm shifts, it can be shown that to some extent theoretical and metaphysical considerations are also crucial.

Moreover some scientific approaches claim universal validity, as explicit systems of metaphysics have also done. It has been claimed that gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism was not only empirically true, but was a conceptual and metaphysical necessity (☞ pp. 205).

The metaphysical questions we find in the sciences are sometimes new and closely related to recent empirical findings. In the present work, concerned with gene-Darwinism, I shall discuss, for example, how germ-line reductionism and gene-atomism are closely linked to empirical findings (though, I think, not strictly implied by them). Nevertheless many questions which arise in the course of my investigation surprisingly refer to old disputes in philosophy: the dispute about universalia, the problem of induction, discussions concerning notions of substance, reduction, explanation, supervenience, form and tautology. I do not think, this proves that there was only one *philosophia perennis*, but philosophers of biology in my opinion are still not sufficiently aware of the resemblances of some of their specific disputes with disputes in other periods or in other subject areas.

c) *Science as Philosophy and Art*

Science, I am convinced, ought to actively face the challenge that it is in part, albeit of course not completely, also philosophy, a *Geisteswissenschaft*, an art.

It is often—I think wrongly—assumed that metaphysics in science rendered science irrational. I think the opposite is true, the absence of an explicit metaphysic renders science irrational. Only in its absence will basic assumptions be adopted without a rational discussion, and paradigm shifts will indeed be something irrational. The most dangerous ideology is that ideology which we only implicitly adopt, since it can neither be discussed nor criticised. Metaphysical considerations in science (and in philosophy), in my understanding, are the attempt to treat basic theoretical questions in a rational way. Similarly, theory of science and epistemology may improve the self-reflection of science.

Histories of science, philosophy and ideas ought to make implicit scientific assumptions explicit and thereby reveal the relations of such assumptions to other fields of knowledge. For example expressed in terms of hermeneutics, sciences find themselves 'thrown' in given historical situations with given

⁶ G. Böhme. *Philosophische Grundlagen der Newtonschen Mechanik*. In: *Ende des Baconischen Zeitalters* (1993/1989).

⁷ C. F. v. Weizsäcker. *Aufbau der Physik* (1985), pp. 219 f.

'horizons'. Historical hermeneutic has long argued that we can improve our understanding of a given situation if it is understood to be embedded in its history.⁸ This general idea, also found in other schools of thought, is I think also partly applicable to biology. In the present work the intellectual history of biology shows that biology, besides its undeniable inner and empirical necessities, is also embedded in a larger culture (☞ pp. 160 f., particularly pp. 201 f.).

The systematic philosophical discussion of scientific questions which are of general concern, should do more than just consider the top-down consistency. Although I regard empirical evidence as important, theories are not simply refuted by a single counterexample (falsification); theoretical support, I think, is and ought to be taken into account as well. Moreover, it can not be taken for granted that knowledge of lower ontological layers is truer than knowledge of higher ones. Physics, though concerned with the lower stratum, is no more true than biology, biology no more true than sociology. Top-down consistency is definitely important, but overall consistency would be a much better criterion for truth.

This view implies that in science, besides the dominating empirical and inner argumentative necessities, ethical concerns sometimes ought to play a role. Only then reason becomes the right reason or, as the ancients called it, *orthos logos*, *recta ratio*. In this sense, a general 'hermeneutics of nature' is needed.⁹ Provided that scientific theories are often underdetermined, the responsibility of the scientist becomes apparent. Particularly philosophers of nature, ought to take also the more general concerns of other subject areas and ethics into consideration.

d) *Dialogue between Philosophy and Science*

I do not go so far as to claim that the way back to a pure metaphysics were free. Just as science is, and partly ought to be, concerned with metaphysical questions, philosophy too ought to reflect empirical evidence. Although, I think, a first person account and even radical phenomenological reduction abstracting from the actual world, are legitimate and necessary sources of knowledge, philosophy also has to face the 'facts' of the 'external' world. Philosophy indeed has to take the sciences, but also art and religion, into consideration.

Neither is philosophy reducible to science, nor science reducible to philosophy. It appears to me, however, that both subject areas are mutually dependent on each other. As science justly claims to be relevant for philosophy, so too philosophers may deal with the philosophical aspects of science. Although science is even partly political, it would be dangerous and simply wrong to argue that science *is* politics. Science also has its own inner empirical and theoretical approach to truth. But, in my perspective, the philosophy of science is not restricted to the analyses of sense data or observation

⁸ Generally: H.-G. Gadamer. *Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik* (1960/1990), pp. 270 f.; see also: M. Heidegger. *Sein und Zeit* (1926/1993).

⁹ E. g.: F. J. Wetz. *Hermeneutik der Natur - Hermeneutik des Universums* (1995).

protocols, but also has to try carefully to treat theories in a broader context than is mostly done by the specialised sciences themselves.

Any philosopher who, with interest in present matters, advocates a Platonic, Aristotelian, Thomistic, Hegelian or Whiteheadian ontology of course implicitly challenges current sciences. I think, such challenges should be made explicit and should take the alternatives of the relevant sciences into account. In this work I propose some, one might say, Aristotelian concepts, and develop them in the context of current scientific disputes.

Of course the proposals made by philosophers of nature will never be infallible and may be proved wrong by empirical or theoretical arguments. But after the long period of positivism, it still needs to be stressed that scientists too are not infallible in questions concerning the (spiritual) interpretation of science. Philosophy and science should, therefore, enter into a closer dialogue.

Of course, „[n]othing signaled the emancipation of science from religion and philosophy more definitely than the Darwinian revolution“¹⁰ But the separation of science and the arts, especially the tribal opposition of sociobiology and sociology, has wasted many resources and sometimes paralysed both sides. Sociobiology became the antidiscipline of the social sciences, not only because of the ignorance of the social scientists, but, I am convinced, also because of the one-sidedness of some aspects of the biological approach. If rather different metaphors were adopted in biology, the results of biology will easier be received in the social sciences as well.

Philosophy of Nature — Universal Darwinism and Its Transcendence

My view of the *nature of philosophy* and its relation to science is that any approach to nature must partly be philosophical. It forms an essential background assumption for rendering paradigm shifts and philosophical reasoning in this field possible. Nevertheless, my treatment of the *philosophy of nature* does not start to develop a possibly Aristotelian antithesis to Darwinism, but, despite my inspiration by some canonical philosophers, I start with an immanent discussion of Darwinian paradigms. I even try to purge these paradigms from all other components and try to deepen their metaphysical foundation. Yet, I also argue that gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism and indeed Darwinism in general are pointing beyond themselves and could be transcended. I believe that only after reaching the bottom of the Darwinian abyss, one can climb upwards again.

In the remaining introduction, I shall firstly outline the background of the ecological crisis and its relation to the present investigation. Then I sketch my investigation itself, subsequently discussing gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism and Darwinism in general. This introduction, of course, will not anticipate my full argumentation. In each of these three sections I shall give a short outline of the chapters which are concerned with the corresponding topics (☞ especially the section on gene-Darwinism). Moreover, I shall clarify my research motivation and my resulting position. Finally, I shall touch upon the relationship between Darwinism and religion.

¹⁰ E. Mayr. *Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 14.

Although I argue that gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism and in some respects even Darwinism in general ought to be transcended, I do not intend to propose an antithesis, but rather a synthesis or a third way. I shall veritably accept and also radicalise some aspects of these Darwinian approaches. My position could be characterised by steering a middle course between atomism and holism in regard of evolutionary units. With regard to evolutionary processes I, likewise, intend to steer a course between the unchangeable blindness of natural selection and the preordained omniscient unfolding of nature. Although I want to make use of the approaches, I intend to transcend the Darwinian concept of an unchangeably cruel and wasteful law of nature, equally valid for bacteria as for humans, and replace it with an understanding of nature emphasising the evolution of new evolutionary processes.

a) *Philosophy of Nature Facing the Ecological Crisis*

Any philosophy ought to face the problems of its age. Since at least the 1970s, the global ecological crisis and the need for global, local and political changes had become apparent.¹¹ It was soon understood that there is not only a need for technical improvements and political laws restricting environmental pollution, but also for improving our ethics to complement and to give a foundation to these projects.¹² It has been argued that utilitarianism is linked to capitalism and egoism—despite its altruistic claims—, and hence to an exploitive attitude also towards nature. Likewise the Judaeo-Christian tradition has been accused, because of its anthropocentrism, to have basically an exploitive attitude towards nature (L. White²¹⁵). Both these very different philosophies were discussed as the cultural causes of the environmental crisis. Since then ecological revisions of ethics have come on the agenda too. It has even been claimed that philosophy in general (including also metaphysics, ontology and especially philosophy of nature) ought to become a ‘philosophy of the ecological crisis’.¹³ The reformers differed as to whether only a modification of traditional approaches or a whole new approach is needed. In any case most authors have emphasised that one should integrate points, like the following in an ecologically refined system of ethics and philosophy: Our unity with our environment, the human responsibility for the biological and social environment and for future generations, and hence the need for a sustainable development.

Could sociobiology or gene-Darwinism also be seen as part of the ecological movement? Sociobiology also gained influence during the 1970s and some proponents of sociobiology indeed have been concerned with questions of biodiversity.¹⁴ The sociobiological emphasis on the biological underpinnings of human behaviour also coheres—in some aspects—with the ecologists’ general concern

¹¹ E. g.: D. L. Meadows et. al. *The Limits of Growth* (1972); E. U. v. Weizsäcker. *Erdpolitik* (1990/1989); H. Diefenbacher, U Ratsch. *Verelendung durch Naturzerstörung* (1992); A. Gore. *Earth in the Balance — Ecology and Human Spirit* (1992).

¹² E. g.: D. Cooper, J. A. Palmer (ed.): *The Environment in Question. Ethics and Global Issues* (1992); K. S. Shrader-Frechette (ed.). *Environmental Ethics* (1981/1988).

¹³ V. Höfle. *Philosophie der ökologischen Krise* (1991/1994).

with the biological sphere. In its gene-Darwinian version especially, sociobiology stresses the non-transcendable animal character of humans and seems to explain the ruthless exploitation of the Earth, the environmental crisis, the exponential Malthusian population explosion and the limits of growth. The sub-individualist stress of gene-Darwinism somehow not only radicalises Darwinian individualism, but undermines it as well, since the genic continuity to the future is stressed.

But whereas gene-Darwinism is reductionistic, stressing the not restrainable egoism of each selfish gene and denying the causal relevance of any superstructure, the ecological movement in a holistic way has always stressed the oneness of the ecosystem, the human responsibility for the whole spaceship earth and cultural changeability as basis for a cultural and ethical reform.

I shall show that gene-Darwinism has roots differing from those of the ecological movement. It drew from some reductionistic or atomistic currents in biology and in philosophy from that time and may have, with some metaphors, been inspired by a Thatcherite understanding of capitalism (☹ pp. 191 f.).

Gene-Darwinians does not only regard egoism as a metaphysical principle, but as the only political solution to the ecological and social crisis¹⁵. Opposed to this, several theological, conservative, communitarian and socialist moral philosophers and also deep ecologists have advocated instead the necessity of a new morality and regard the crisis as partly being a result of the ‘ruthless application of the atheistic egoistic materialism’ or of ‘the capitalist veneration of the mammon’. The *Zeitgeist* of the gene-egoistic paradigm is regarded not as the solution but as the very cause of the problem. I take the view that M. Midgley, although sometimes quite polemic, has always been right in her basic impression: “In this situation telling people that they are essentially Chicago gangsters is not just false and confused, but monstrously irresponsible.”¹⁶ I shall argue in chapter 2 that, although an acknowledgement of certain egoist tendencies may be crucial, pure gene-Darwinism leaves no room to formulate an ethics, not even an ethics of moderate egoism (☹ pp. 47 f.).

A simple antagonism of opposed views does not lead us far in my opinion. I argue mainly against gene-Darwinism, because I think it is presently gaining a predominance that is too unbalanced. The dark sides of human nature need to become acknowledged, but, I think, only as far as we leave open a possibility for higher aspirations as well. Generally, as will become apparent in the next sections, only a metaphysics which is ‘realistic’ and ‘idealistic’ enough to be a true theory, will in my opinion provide a broad enough basis to solve the pressing ecological and social environmental problems.

¹⁴ E. O. Wilson. *Biophilia* (1984); *The Diversity of Life* (1992).

¹⁵ T. Mohr. *Zwischen genetischer Statik und Dynamik der Lebensbedingungen* (1996).

¹⁶ M. Midgley. *Gene-juggling* (1979), p. 455.

b) The Glory and Poverty of Sociobiology and Gene-Darwinism — The Need for a Third Way

It is one objective of this work to clarify the essence of the biological paradigm which can be found to dominate sociobiology. This sociobiological paradigm (not equivalent to the sociobiological discipline) will in the course of the work be more strictly defined as 'gene-Darwinism'. The central notion of this paradigm is 'the selfish gene', which has been made famous—or notorious—by the Oxford Professor of the Public Understanding of Science, Richard Dawkins.¹⁷

Outline of the chapters concerned particularly with gene-Darwinism. In chapter 1 I give a first account of the biological discipline of sociobiology and its main associated theories. Already in this introductory chapter I cast doubt on whether the theories of kin selection and of reciprocal altruism, mostly treated as direct implications of the selfish-gene view of evolution, can be regarded as parts of a pure version of gene-Darwinism. I think, that although gene-Darwinism was a necessary precondition for these theories, it is not a sufficient one in itself.

In chapter 2 the ethical implications of gene-Darwinism are made apparent. Gene-Darwinism is a universal ontology and claims to biologise ethics. In the social construction of such ethical 'implications' many more theories actually play a role. Nevertheless, I try to develop the purest possible version of such an ethics. Besides an outline of some philosophical critiques, I show that even apparent proponents of an ethics based on a selfish-gene view of evolution actually shrink back from drawing extreme gene-Darwinian conclusions. Instead they implicitly adopt additional premisses from other traditions as well. It will be shown why gene-Darwinism appears ethically unsatisfactory, providing us with a motive for a further historical and philosophical investigation.

In chapter 3, the first chapter of the historical part II, light is shed on the historical background to Darwinism in general (☉ introductory section on Darwinism in general).

In chapter 4, I distinguish between the inner-biological differences firstly of Darwin's Darwinism, secondly of the evolutionary synthesis and thirdly of gene-Darwinism. It becomes apparent that all these largely Darwinian paradigms are far from being monolithic. Providing Darwinism is strictly defined, one may unexpectedly challenge the assumption that the evolutionary synthesis is as thoroughly Darwinian as one might otherwise conceive. This can be done not because the evolutionary synthesis has historically drawn from non-Darwinian Mendelism, but because in what I call the 'second phase of the synthesis' (Mayr, Dobzhansky etc.), an atomistic or individualistic view of evolution has partly been abandoned and gene-interactions and the importance of gene-pools. As a result, a certain autonomy of macroevolution and salutatory speciation became accepted as central aspects of evolution. However, in

¹⁷ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89).

contrast to the other paradigms, a deeper understanding of gene-Darwinism is acquired and I go on characterising gene-Darwinism by its gene-atomism, its germ-line reductionism and its process-monism.

In chapter 5 an account of the external history of these mainly Darwinian paradigms is given and possible external roots of gene-Darwinism are proposed. This shows these paradigms as partly a social construct and hence a particularly appropriate object for philosophical critique.

Part III is concerned with Universal Darwinism. Based on the historical investigation in chapters 6 and 7, a generalised process-Darwinian approach is proposed (\Rightarrow next section). Here gene-Darwinism is only briefly mentioned as a prototype of the other type of universal Darwinism, biologicistic Darwinism.

In part IV gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism and Darwinism are criticised in general. In order to do this, I distinguish substance and process reductionism.

In chapter 8 different types of substance reductionism are criticised; these are downward reduction in general, gene-atomism and germ-line reductionism. Firstly, I show that a thoroughly downward reductionist position is in any case an incoherent epistemological (or ontological) approach. As an alternative a heuristics of interacting epistemological-ontological levels appears reasonable.

Secondly, I oppose the view that gene-atomism is a necessary result of the meiotic shuffle and propose the (probabilistic) existence of higher units which render genes less selfish than one would assume otherwise. Opposed to the gene-Darwinian assumption that single genes (relatively short bits of DNA) are the only possible units of selection, I propose the concept of probabilistic higher-level genes at different loci in single organisms which, under certain conditions, are shown to have evolutionary stability. I also discuss conditions in which this whole may become subverted. Upon this basis the fallacy of claiming gene-atomism in a tautological way is discussed, which in my view plays a vital role in immunising the gene-atomistic research program (although not officially claimed). Furthermore, the difference between loci and alleles is scrutinised. In opposition to gene-Darwinism I propose a spectrum of different ways in which the good of a group may be achieved with and without group selection. What I consider to be the most interesting proposal is what I call 'systemic individual selection'. It is based on the interactive effects of genes at several loci of different organisms, which are potentially shown to lead to a stabilisation of properties which are good for the group. If such properties are in place, it is shown that this mechanism can stabilise them against egoistic subversion without group selection. Although this process is based on natural selection, it leads to a certain autonomy of adaptation to an external environment which is important for the concept of 'autoselection', which I propose later. When discussing group selection in structured populations, I largely follow Sober's and D. S. Wilson's model, but I add a proposal which I think could strongly extend the applicability of this basic model. In regard to the selection of whole groups and species selection I point out that, if they are combined with systemic individual selection, properties for the good of the group or for the good of species may be evolutionarily stable without requiring the permanent selection of whole groups or species. (Although I have

not elaborated upon this, such a combination also appears imaginable to me in regard to group selection in structured populations.) As the last item here, I outline some ideas, about why one also has to accept the existence of (some) ecological wholes in their own right, which, by processes which one may call ecological selection, may under certain conditions also be stable against the subversion of 'selfish' species.

Thirdly, germ-line reductionism—the claim that phenotypes are the mere vehicles of genes—is criticised, although I do, at least, accept Weismann's barrier as a working hypothesis. I argue that phenotypes (organisms, groups and populations) are not only based on in-formation, but on ex-formation as well. Phenotypes are not reducible to the germ-line, but instead they themselves constrain or direct the pathways evolution could take. Hence the morphology of phenotypes has to be regarded as an evolutionary factor as well. Above that, these structures (or forms) may interact and co-evolve with other structures of their kind. Somewhat speculatively, I argue that these structures could probabilistically be regarded as mutually dependent fields that influence each other. In this context I introduce the terms 'exformation' and 'external memory', which are reminiscent perhaps of Aristotelian hylemorphism. Since morphology is, in my view, causally relevant and could (at least in a certain limited sense) be stored as exformation outside of the informational germ-line of a certain organism in question, it would in my view be wrong to consider phenotypes as mere vehicles.

In chapter 9 Darwinian process-monism which is equally present in gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism and Darwinism in general is criticised (☹ next sections).

In chapter 10 a short critique of the principle of entity egoism is given. Finally, based on the foregoing investigation, I propose an alternative approach which I call 'ecological idealism'.

In the following, only a few annotations are given in advance to sketch my intentions and my resulting ambivalent attitude towards gene-Darwinism.

Gene-Darwinism is in many respects the purest Darwinism ever. In regard to evolutionary substances or units, gene-Darwinism, as we shall see, radicalises the individualist downward reduction of Darwin's Darwinism, which now focuses exclusively on the smallest thinkable unit of evolution, the single selfish gene. Weismann's barrier, in any case essential to neo-Darwinism, is now interpreted—in opposition to proponents of the evolutionary synthesis—in a way that renders phenotypes mere 'vehicles' of selfish genes. In regard to evolutionary processes, gene-Darwinism radicalises Darwin's research programme of process reductionism (which Darwin himself did not carry through) and now focuses exclusively on the simplest thinkable evolutionary process, that of natural selection (blind-variation-and-external-elimination) and evolutionary gradualism. "Anywhere in the universe, is Darwinian selection. [...] Never were so many facts explained by so few assumptions".¹⁸ Apart from different tendencies in sociobiology, pure gene-Darwinism has also radicalised the Darwinian concept of

inner-specific struggle, a struggle which now even takes place within organisms. In contrast, the ‘benevolent’ evolutionary synthesis did not focus especially on inner-specific struggle. To gene-Darwinism even communication is understood as shifty manipulation and pitiless exploitation. Even behind marvellous love-songs the grimaces of egoistic genes are lurking. Finally, gene-Darwinism advocates a biologicistic world view and biologisation of ethics and the social sciences more pronounced than that of Darwin himself.

The gene-Darwinian understanding of nature, where selfish genes are the only heroes in the Valhalla of eternal vicious fight and slaughter, may be regarded as abominable from the outset. But one has to concede that gene-Darwinism (or rather sociobiology in general) has been remarkably successful in explaining otherwise mysterious aspects of animal and human behaviour: parent ‘investment’, incest taboo, the battle of the sexes and sexual bimorphism, the undermining of social group behaviour, etc. A simplified condemnation of all aspects of gene-Darwinism would not be justified. One has to disentangle the valuable from the non-valuable aspects of that approach, and we should try to understand why the problematic aspects had such an appeal. I think both gene-Darwinians and their critics capture parts of the overall picture—they are all right and they are all wrong.

I myself even radicalise gene-Darwinism, arguing that the idea of a selfish replicator can be understood as a basis of all other aspects of gene-Darwinism (although, at the same time, also pointing beyond gene-Darwinism). I do also accept the gene-Darwinian tenets of competition between single genes, the relevance of biological instincts for culture and the importance of natural selection for evolution (at least if natural selection is defined broadly).

But I argue that gene-Darwinian metaphysics’ veneration of selfish genes, ubiquitous blind and wasteful natural selection and its biologicistic interpretation of culture go too far. A more balanced third way is proposed in this work. The focus on single selfish genes has to be balanced by an acknowledgement of gene-interactions and larger regulative systems as well. The exclusive focus on information (the germ-line) has to be supplemented by the emphasis on structural necessities and what I call ‘exformation’. The exclusive focus on competition has to be balanced by incorporating cooperation not as a somehow resulting epiphenomenon but an essential aspect of evolution. The concept of an eternally cruel mechanism, which does itself not evolve, has to be replaced by the unfolding of mechanisms with a certain autonomy of their own (☞ introductory section on Darwinism in general). The acknowledgement of human biological inclinations and instincts, even of something like rape, ought to be balanced by an approach which leaves appropriate room for education and cultural improvement. Biology and culture do not play against each other in a zero-sum game, biology enables culture, and

¹⁸ R. Dawkins. *River Out of Eden* (1995), xi.

cultural values also have top down effects on our biology (e. g. via our choice of sexual partners); hence it is problematic to speak of a purely biologically given side of the human constitution.

This whole work is a long argument to justify such a more balanced position. And here I may mention that misleading headlines like ‘Gene for Intelligence/Criminality/Homosexuality Found’ appear to me to be linked to a myth of the gene which is also supported by gene-Darwinism, with its tendency to neglect the complex system of gene-interactions and ‘exformation’.

Also the great expectations for the Human Genome Project, have in my view partly been vexed by that myth. Of course the sequencing of human DNA has been a landmark in biological research, the effects on medicine and on society (gene tests, etc.) are to be seen. Nevertheless the mere sequencing of DNA does not at all imply—what can often be read—that we have understood the DNA. Such a claim is as naive as to assume that the hieroglyphs of ancient Egypt were understood at the moment of copying them down. An understanding of the genome requires a deeper understanding of developmental biology, the organismic metabolism and its environmental interaction (exformation) as well. Although, geneticists, I hope, are aware of these limitations, I am actually not sure about the cursorily informed politicians responsible for public funds and the larger public.

The growing influence of gene-Darwinism seems to be the final victory of a crude materialist monism, neither caring for the actual complexity of the world nor for ethical values. I think this will prove to be a Pyrrhic victory. Its apparent one-sidedness naturally elicits critique. Further, I shall argue that gene-Darwinism even itself bears the germs to transcend itself. Here I mention only two examples. Firstly, gene-Darwinism, although normally interpreted as a pinnacle of materialism, in my opinion also involves the inherent tendency to shift the emphasis from matter to information, or to form (*eidos*). This in turn may undermine its own reductionist positions. Secondly, although gene-Darwinism, as mentioned, can indeed be regarded as the pinnacle of Darwinism, its rather active understanding of the selfish gene undermines the passive Darwinian understanding of the organism as a mere object of an external environmental selection, which is also an assumption equally at the very heart of gene-Darwinism.

Since a theory is always an abstraction from reality (and something through which we only perceive reality), it is, in part, also a theoretical and philosophical decision what concepts we put at the very heart of our theories. I argue that the focus of gene-Darwinism only on genes as evolutionary units and only on natural selection as an evolutionary process is one-sided. Some sociobiologists have tried, for example, by using concepts from game theory, to extend strict gene-Darwinism, starting to shift its emphasis from competition to cooperation. In my opinion, these approaches which seek out conditions with which to render larger systems stable, should be interpreted as being concerned with transcending gene-Darwinism. Despite my sympathy for such modifications, I think Dawkins expresses the gene-Darwinian philosophy more thoroughly: “Fundamentally, all that we have a right to expect from our theory is a battleground of replicators, jostling, jockeying, fighting for a future in the genetic hereafter.”¹⁹ Although single genes are the simplest conceivable objects of evolution and natural selection is the simplest conceivable evolutionary mechanism, I think, that if higher levels of organisation, cooperation and slightly less wasteful mechanisms could be shown to exist, they should — if possible—not be regarded as mere side-effects, but as parts of the paradigmatic core of our ontology.

¹⁹ *Idem. The Selfish Gene* (1989), p. 256.

c) *Process-Darwinism — Its Radicalisation and Its Critique*

A spectre is haunting the intellectual world—the spectre of Darwinism. Darwin himself predicted: “My theory would give zest to [...] metaphysics”²⁰. But Darwin would be astonished at what paths his theory has taken, not only in regard of gene-Darwinism, but also of what I shall call ‘process-Darwinism’, found in many sciences without own obvious link to biological Darwinism.

The term ‘Darwinism’ is usually understood as a certain biological theory, but, it appears justifiable to call processes on different ontological levels Darwinian processes, if they are analogous to natural selection (the central mechanism of biological Darwinism). ‘Process-Darwinism’ denotes radical approaches to whole subject areas or even to philosophy as such. These exclusively allow Darwinian processes to be seen as evolutionary mechanisms or, more generally, as processes of knowledge acquisition.

In this section of the introduction I give an **outline only of those chapters concerned with Darwinian processes and process-Darwinism, particularly in non-biological subject areas.**

In chapter 2 I deal mainly with the ethics of gene-Darwinism. But in this context Dawkins’ idea of a meme is introduced which is a general process-Darwinian trial-and-error approach to the cultural evolution of concepts and practices. I first try to extend this view by proposing analogous processes to biological kin selection and reciprocal altruism on the meme level. I then point out limitations of this atomistic and purely Darwinian understanding of the history of ideas. It shall also be shown that the assumed autonomy of memes, which I aim to support myself, is incoherent with pure gene-Darwinism. Additionally, it is shown that even this considerably extended two level theory does not seem to provide enough ground for a satisfying ethics.

In part II, chapter 4, I describe in which way different Darwinian paradigms have historically focused on different levels of selection. Furthermore, I outline a biological multi-level approach, developed in opposition to gene-Darwinism, which in one version is clearly process-Darwinian. In chapter 5, the interaction of the discussed paradigms with their general intellectual environments is elaborated, shedding light on the structural similarities of biological Darwinism with theories in other subject areas which are treated in the following part.

In part III we turn to universal process-Darwinism itself and mainly try to develop a positive account of this world view. It shall become apparent that the Darwinian turn of Western intellectual history is more profound than often assumed and, likewise, affects subject areas which were in part developed in opposition to biological Darwinism.

In chapter 6 I am concerned with developing a process-Darwinian metaphysics. Firstly, it is shown that there are advocates of process-Darwinism, who not only claim that Darwinian processes on several

²⁰ Ch. Darwin. *Notebook B* (ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. p. 228.

ontological levels are supported empirically, but who appear to regard process-Darwinism as a universal principle.

Secondly, I try to explain and deepen this assumption myself by developing an explicit metaphysical justification. Evolutionary processes in the biotic world as well as in culture are treated in this context as processes of knowledge acquisition. Therefore the epistemological problem of induction (Hume) appears to be applicable to these (originally) ontological questions as well. In my view, process-Darwinism is linked to a Popperian negative ‘solution’ of the problem of induction, i. e. to the actual denial of induction. This appears to be the case, although Popper, who was himself influenced by Darwinism, still took a critical stance towards Darwinism. However, provided one accepted a Popperian negative solution to the problem of induction, I shall derive two properties that any exploratory process would necessarily have to have and which I shall later regard to be defining aspects of Darwinism, the blindness of trials and the externality of selection.

Thirdly, I shall in turn indicate a possible critique of such a metaphysical foundation. Therefore I distinguish the following two claims. The first claim is that an exploratory process (like an organism or a theory) which does not ‘know’ anything about a certain situation, is necessarily blind. This is true since blindness here is defined by not knowing anything about a situation. But this tautological truth has of course never been denied by inductivists. A more appropriate inductivist proposition would be for example “we are not blind, but there are bottom-up processes, internal processes of refinement of information and predictions about not yet observed instances; and all three epistemological-ontological methods could (under certain conditions) be justified”. I shall regard this second more truly inductivist proposition—despite its problems—to be valid as well. Hence, I deny the premiss that the problem of induction can only be ‘solved’ negatively, and there is no need for the conclusion I have proposed. In spite of my critical attitude towards its metaphysical foundation, I shall continue expounding process-Darwinism as a new alkahest (the hypothetical universal solvent sought by alchemists). Authors like Dennett and Hull will be mentioned and I shall work out why the notion of a replicator is logically at the very heart of Darwinism (thus pointing beyond their position).

In chapter 7 I discuss process-Darwinian approaches found in particular subject areas. It will be shown that the psychological theory of operant conditioning, a theory of trial and error, can be interpreted as being process-Darwinian. Likewise, I go on to show that also Popper’s falsificationist approach to the development of scientific theories, the process of conjecture and refutation, can be understood as being process-Darwinian. I shall also point to other process-Darwinian parallels, for example those in immunology and economics. In some of these different disciplines, one can not only reveal the presence of Darwinian processes or even process-Darwinism, but also the corresponding critical formulations, which may support or complement each other. The adaptationism of operant conditioning and of falsificationism, has been criticised along similar lines as that of Darwinism. Moreover, in psychology, for example, the cognitive turn has introduced a multitude of processes,

replacing the process monism of operant conditioning. Compared with gene-Darwinism, universal process-Darwinism—if justifiable—would appear preferable; nevertheless, it still places an emphasis on a universal war of entities and an assumed complete blindness of evolution. A metaphysical system regarding any evolutionary process as being unchangeable blind may in principle exclude the concept of sustainability. Jonas has pointed out that in his view any ethics which cares for sustainability makes the precondition of a possibility of a certain predictability of the future.²¹

In part IV, chapter 9 I scrutinise and criticise many different aspects of Darwinian processes. The first section addresses the problem that actually proposed process-Darwinian theories in different subject areas are often inconsistent with each other. Since process-Darwinism is in the same way as biological Darwinism based on the concept of natural selection, I outline the remaining sections of chapter 9 together with my general critique of biological Darwinism below in section d of this introduction.

d) *From Darwinism to an Evolutionary Theory of Evolution*

In this section I outline the chapters that are related to my critique of processes reductionism found in gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism and, I think, in Darwinism in general.

On the whole, I aim to contribute to the *transcendence of the static Darwinian understanding of evolution* and replace it with a truly evolutionary understanding of evolution itself. I argue that the essence of pure Darwinism is the theory of evolution by natural selection, understood as a given and unchangeable law of nature, a law of blind variation and environmental elimination. Without disapproving of all aspects of his “view of life”, as Darwin called it, I shall challenge the philosophy of Darwinism by emphasising that the process of evolution, in biology and culture, has not been condemned to stay as blind, cruel and wasteful as it was in the beginning.

I shall argue that the essentially static process-monism of Darwinism, particularly visible in gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism, is closely tied to the deist Newtonian understanding of the world as being ruled by a set of simple basic, eternal and universal laws of nature. The essence of this view goes back to Darwin.

In his early notebook B he wrote: „Astronomers might formerly have said that God ordered, each planet to move in its particular destiny. — In same manner God orders each animal created with certain form in certain country, but how much more simple, & sublime power let attraction act according to certain laws such are inevitable consequen let animal be created, then by the fixed laws of generation, such will be their successors.—”²²

Like “Newton, Darwin wanted a theory that had a universal character, applicable to *all* aspects of *all* living organisms including man and his ‘higher faculties’”²³. This approach was influenced by Herschel, Lyell and the theologian Paley, writers who argued for static or preordained laws of nature.

²¹ H. Jonas. *Prinzip Verantwortung* (1984/1978), pp. 37-38

²² Ch. Darwin. *Notebook B* (ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. p. 101.

²³ S. Schweber. *The Wider British Context in Darwin's Theorizing* (1985), p. 39, also p. 49.

Paley also seems to have influenced Darwin's adaptationism and, likewise, Lyell Darwin's gradualism (☉ pp. 168 f.). Paradoxically the concept of the unchangeability of the laws of nature goes back to the originally Platonic-Christian idea of *machina mundi* (☉ pp. 81 f.). But Darwin's pious transformation of central aspects of natural theology into his own theory of natural selection resulted (taken as a radicalised Malthusian world view) in something like a principle of the unchangeability of cruelty and wastefulness, and rendered a benevolent God impossible.

As argued earlier, scientific theories can have certain theoretical degrees of freedom with which to interpret 'given facts'. I stress that the Darwinian interpretation of evolution, particularly its process monism, ought to and could become transcended. I argue that a theory of an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms, in which mechanisms may become semi-autonomous, would be a more appropriate interpretation of biological and, even more so, cultural evolution, than the picture of a pitiless unmodifiable rule of natural selection.

Despite advocating a different picture of evolution, I want to stress that I do not intend to propose a full blown antithesis to Darwinism, but, since still making abundant use of Darwinian concepts, rather a *third way*. In order to find a golden mean (*aurea mediocratas*) between the recently radicalised understanding of Darwinism and its numerous and partly also radical critics, I think one needs to achieve a synthesis by drawing from both extremes rather than ignoring them. In two previous sections I outlined such a middle position in regard to evolutionary objects, likewise I intend to achieve such a position in regard to processes. In my opinion it would be naive to neglect all Darwinian aspects of being completely. This is in my view not only valid for ontology but, as far as its background is concerned, also for ethics. But, I think one therefore does not need to advocate a Darwinian metaphysics, a pan-Darwinian ontology or even only a pan-Darwinian biology. The facts and sub-theories accumulated to support Darwinian processes are, of course, not simply fancy, but rather need to be transformed or to be seen in a different light, just as the newer Fisherian Darwinism of the 1930s and 1940s (☉ pp. 128 f.) historically integrated the opposed non-Darwinian theory of Mendelism. Also main terms used in Darwinism have actually been coined by ardent opponents of Darwinism, for instance 'genetics' by Bateson, 'genotype' by Johannsen and 'adaptive radiation' by Osborn.

Furthermore, I think one should keep in mind that well established theories might also become reinterpreted, at least in the way that Newtonism has become transformed by modern physics. Indeed I consider Darwin as the 'Newton of a blade of grass' (an expression early coined by Kant), and am convinced that an 'Einstein of a blade of grass' is still to come.

Mentioning physics refers to more than to a mere example of a historical paradigm shift. The proposal of this work of an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms is in three respects analogous to some developments in modern physics. Basically, the Darwinian understanding of organismic evolution has been interpreted in close analogy to the passive Newtonian understanding of inert matter directed by gravitation (☉ for example Depew and Weber, pp. 172 f.). Alternatively my proposal, as outlined earlier, firstly supports a field theoretic understanding of organisms, replacing an atomic and corpuscular understanding of the gene. Secondly, I regard evolutionary processes not as something completely external, but partly created by the evolutionary entities themselves, in a way following the Einsteinian stress that also the external

conditions of a physical process, i. e. time and space, are not simply given, but dependent on the physical objects themselves. (Already Leibniz argued that space must be based on the relations among bodies.) Thirdly, a truly evolutionary theory of evolution must stress that the laws of evolution are not simply given, but do themselves evolve, similar to the way that physical laws and forces are today not simply taken as statically given, but understood to have evolved in time.

(The first and second point of my proposals may remind the reader of the Aristotelian tradition, indeed Pierre Duhem actually worked out many parallels between modern physics and Aristotelian physics.)

Before coming to outline the specific chapters related to the detection and transcendence of Darwinian process monism, I think I should give a justification for my preliminary **definition of Darwinism**, which I will fully elaborate upon later (☞ particularly pp. 107 f., 153 f., 348 f.). The definition or re-definition of terms is particularly important, since I am not working empirically but theoretically and I am concerned with the interpretation of facts, rather than their production. The act of de-fining, of drawing the line between thesis and antithesis, is not merely a matter of speaking, a *flatus vocis*, but determines which aspects are to be emphasised and which are to be neglected.

Our evaluation of what is called 'Darwinism' is, of course, a function of what we mean by this term; and the meaning of this term has not only changed historically, but authors still differ in their present usage. In regard to evolutionary processes, natural selection is mostly accepted as the paradigmatic core of Darwinism. Other tenets partly linked to a pure understanding of natural selection are, for example, gradualism, individualism or more generally a 'view of life' banishing purpose, direction and spirit.²⁴

Natural selection is undoubtedly central to Darwinism, but it has been questioned whether Darwinism tends towards a basic advocacy of process-monism or a limited process pluralism. Whereas A. Weismann purged Darwinism from every other aspect, thereby claiming to reveal its true essence, G. Romanes emphasised, on the contrary, that Darwinism is essentially pluralistic in character.

Darwin's Victorian Darwinism was not only formulated in a guarded way, but was indeed partly more pluralistic than most Darwinian approaches since. Darwin himself adopted a straight-forward Lamarckian theory of acquired characters as an integral part of his theory. However, today's Darwinians, in many respects differing with Darwin himself, and even most critics of Darwinism (myself included) would not dare to argue in such a traditional Lamarckian way.

Nevertheless, in a modified way, both positions can also be found today, gene-Darwinians, like Dawkins, have even radicalised Weismann's neo-Darwinism as the only true Darwinism, whereas, for example, J. Gould and some other critics of ultra-Darwinism have advocated a pluralistic understanding of Darwinism, allowing for and requiring other evolutionary factors apart from natural selection.²⁵

Although I follow and partly radicalise Gould's stress on evolutionary process-pluralism, in regard to the definition of Darwinism, I agree with Weismann and Dawkins in stressing strict process-monism as the core of Darwinism. But in regard to the definition I have several reasons to follow those, who I aim to oppose, as far as their understanding of evolution is concerned.

²⁴ E. g. S. J. Gould. *Ever since Darwin* (1991/1973), pp. 12-13.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 268 f.

Firstly, the term ‘Darwinism’ underwent historical transformations. Present Darwinian theories in many respects differ from Darwin’s Darwinism (☉ pp. 110 f.). Weismann’s barrier, the strictly blind character of all variation, and, at least concerning gene-Darwinism, the strict process reductionism have become defining aspects of Darwinism in general.

Secondly, I critically evaluate the larger claims of present Darwinism, denying true ethics (☉ pp. 48 f.), purpose and spirit. They are, I think, mostly tied to a radical interpretation of Darwinism. Since I expect that this radical Darwinism can be shown to be wrong, I am in favour of a strict—but still appropriate—definition of Darwinism in general, in order to make it as clear as possible that these more general claims are wrong.

Thirdly, a strict interpretation of Darwinism and natural selection would focus on what had been new in Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Additionally, such a definition would reveal the beautifully simple essence of Darwinism, which was understandably emphasised by the gene-Darwinians. Furthermore, a strict definition, would be fair to what may be regarded as the essential remaining message of theories of alternative research traditions, advocating less blind and wasteful—though not necessarily Lamarckian—views of life. Hence, a strict definition, which considers the historical background, in my opinion would do justice to the essence of both Darwinism and its alternative research traditions.

Fourthly, I aim at a strict definition of Darwinism and natural selection, in order to disentangle the tautological aspects of Darwinism from its non-tautological falsifiable ones (☉ pp. 348 f.).

Fifthly, Darwinism today has become widely applied not only in biology, but also in many other sciences as well (☉ pp. 218 f.). Therefore it has become again an important task to specify its meaning, thereby enabling a further theoretical development. In order to make the, in my opinion concealed, evolution of evolutionary mechanisms theoretically visible, I aim at improving the resolution of the relevant concepts and shall in the course of this work achieve a strict definition of Darwinian processes and of Darwinism in general.

I realise that one perhaps might not accept these arguments favouring a strict definition of Darwinism. If I myself were convinced of the suitability of a broad definition of Darwinism, like “a theory of evolution in which the variation of evolutionary entities and their survival plays an important role”, I should, of course, be a Darwinian, a biological one and also a cultural one. As I pointed out already, I am in some respects actually more Darwinian than Darwin himself.

But I am not mainly concerned with definitions. Stressing an evolution of the evolutionary mechanism and the active role of evolving entities is primary to me, the meaning of the term ‘Darwinism’ is secondary. If one adopted a broad definition of Darwinism, this work would not be understood as a critique of Darwinism in general, but still as a critique of process-monism, which is at least often found in Darwinism.

There are also reasons why one may want to adopt a very wide notion of Darwinism, besides wanting to immunise Darwinism against criticism. One may want to honour Darwin by naming the valid theory of evolution (and of metaphysics) after him, since Darwin indeed has the merit to have been the first to stress the importance of variation and blindness in evolution (but not the concept of evolution itself ☉ pp. 94 f.) and to propose a simple algorithm leading mechanically to evolution. Another reason may be the beauty of the assumption that the whole of evolution has one very simple unified explanation, unified under the name 'Darwinism'. One also might not dare to break with a currently accepted tradition, which in so many respects turned out to be right. Or it may, likewise, be useful to claim an important person like Darwin as one's own predecessor. Furthermore, there may also be ideological reasons, for example if one were to regard competition as still being too much neglected in our present world view.

But normally Darwinism is in fact understood as strictly implying several tenets, which I indeed should like to criticise: 'the survival of the fittest' (☉ 9.1 a), the exclusive evolutionary importance of natural selection (☉ 9.1 b), or that there is no role for synthesis as well (☉ 9.3 a), that it is reasonable to regard variation as being invariably blind (☉ 9.3 b), that selection is best understood as always being an external and opportunistic response to the moment (☉ 9.3 c), that it is reasonable to regard the evolutionary process as itself unchangeable without new autonomous mechanisms coming into being, changing the course of evolution (☉ 9.3 d) and finally a world view of competition, biological determination, and the denial of a purpose beyond survival and egoistic reproduction. If only one of these claims is understood to be a defining aspect of Darwinism, then my work should indeed also be understood as a critique of Darwinism in general.

Since I regard most of these previously mentioned claims as cardinal to approaches with an Darwinian self-image, I do regard my philosophical view of life—despite debts to Darwinism—as being critical of Darwinism or at least of its common interpretation. In particular, its stress on an unchangeable blind and externally given law of nature shall be challenged.

Outline of the chapters relevant to Darwinian process monism and its transcendence. Chapter 3, on the pre-Darwinian history of biology partly provides the larger background for the concept of eternal laws, in a way leading back to the notion of a *machina mundi*, the world machine ruled by the eternal ideas of God.

In chapter 4 I provide a preliminary working definition of Darwinism, based on natural selection, forming the intersection of the subsequently treated sub-paradigms of Darwin's Darwinism, the evolutionary synthesis and gene-Darwinism. We will follow the history of more or less process-reductionist paradigms, finally expounding the process-monism of gene-Darwinism.

In chapter 5 the cultural background to Darwinian sub-paradigms is discussed. Darwin's background is of particular importance. I shall interpret Darwin's approach as a Malthusian synthesis of the often neglected pre-Darwinian romantic (or romanticising materialist) evolutionism and of the Newtonian mechanistic understanding of nature as law-based matter in motion.

Process-Darwinism both as a collection of theories found in many other subject areas besides biology and as a metaphysic are treated in chapters 6 and 7. This has been outlined in the preceding section and here it should merely be annotated that process-Darwinism has actually been defined by Darwinian process-reductionism.

Chapter 9 is particularly concerned with the different aspects of Darwinian process reductionism, their critique and transcendence. (Chapter 8 is concerned with different types of genetic reductionism and has been outlined earlier.) Chapter 9 is philosophical and partly speculative; in order to reach a 'distant argumentative (local) optimum', a certain degree of speculation might sometimes be warranted. Here I only outline the topics discussed, since a summary of the results, particularly of the critical chapters, can be found at the end of this work.

At the beginning of chapter 9, I discuss the possible tautological aspects of Darwinism. Instead of discussing one tautology, I distinguish two types: pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism. I shall come to the conclusion that Darwinism, although definitely not wholly tautological, indeed makes use of tautological definitions and thereby partly immunises itself against criticism.

I then shall propose a stricter definition of Darwinism and natural selection, purged of all tautological aspects. Moreover, my definition, as already mentioned, is designed to unveil changes in the evolutionary mechanism itself. Natural selection is now strictly defined as the two-step process of blind-variation-and-external-elimination. I propose a scale of approaches between the strictly Darwinian pole of a blind, wasteful, unchangeable, passive and adaptationist evolution, and a Lamarckian or Okenian pole, stressing a directed, non-wasteful, changing and active unfolding of evolution. I personally oppose both radical positions and discard for example the traditional Lamarckian understanding, which denied the importance of variation completely. But I equally turn against a strictly Darwinian, or better Dawkinsian, understanding of biological or cultural evolution.

In the course of chapter 9 I discuss several aspects of my strict definition, trying in detail to falsify pan-Darwinism. I mainly deal with biological Darwinism, which is more advanced than the cultural one and hence, in a way, a more powerful enemy. Firstly, I challenge the understanding that the phenomenon of sexual reproduction can not be regarded as true synthesis.

Secondly, I discuss the Darwinian tenet of the blindness of all variation. I argue in a detailed way that one has to interpret the known facts in a way that renders directed variation possible and actually appearing (particularly if starting from an originally Darwinian viewpoint). Moreover, it is argued that one may easily conceive certain kinds of adaptive variation as a reaction to the environment.

Thirdly, I challenge the view that selection is always external (natural) and always an opportunistic response to the moment. It will be argued that 'hetero-selection' might be replaced by 'auto-selection'. The spirit of such a claim is, I think, as close to an active unfolding of organisms as to a passive Darwinian understanding of evolution as an adaptation to a given environment.

Finally, I shall discuss in which way we may conceive that evolutionary processes come into being and gain a certain freedom from their original basis of pure natural selection. I consider circularity or self-referentiality as a criterion for the emergence of new processes, a concept which, in a way, goes back to Kant. I shall argue that processes changing the blindness and cause of evolution could gain a certain autonomy. (I actually distinguish two types of autonomy which can be involved.)

In chapter 10 I am concerned with the transcendence of selfishness and at the end of the work I outline the resulting metaphysical picture I should propose as an alternative to metaphysical Darwinism.

The resulting **picture of the evolution of evolutionary processes** differs considerably from the Darwinian picture of one eternal and universal mechanism or algorithm (Dennett) of evolution. Even so, I employ mechanisms, which have also been employed by Darwinians, but my interpretation of these mechanisms shall differ.

I take sexual selection as an example, a concept introduced by Darwin later in his life, as being concerned with the evolution of man and tried to moderate his original position (☞ pp. 115 f.). My interpretation of that concept contradicts the spirit at least of present Darwinian process-monism. Sexual selection—almost totally neglected by the evolutionary synthesis—again became an academic topic under the sway of gene-Darwinism. On the whole, gene-Darwinians have understood sexual selection as being reducible to the natural selection of genes. Contrarily, I shall regard sexual selection as a process in its own right. Although it itself is based on lower processes, like natural selection, sexual selection does not remain identical with these processes, and is no mere short-cut or acceleration of natural selection. In this work, sexual selection is understood not only as an adaptation, but also as a new evolutionary process, a new mode of evolution, changing the direction of evolution itself. A new process changes the ‘evolutionary landscapes’ at various levels of organisation. According to my ‘view of life’ there are no mere *adaptive* landscapes, expressing the fit to an external environment, but *evolutionary* landscapes, themselves partly created by the evolutionary entity and process concerned. It will be shown that sexual selection can under certain conditions retain its direction, even if natural selection counter-selects. Hence, a new process can gain a certain autonomy from natural selection. Such autonomous tendencies may have led, for example, to the enormous antlers of deer, but also may have played a role in tendencies most of us would regard as more positive, like the evolution of the biological basis of human morals.

Palaeontology, but also genetics, is full of adaptations, which could also be understood as new evolutionary mechanisms, changing not only the speed but also the course of evolution. Similarly, for example, the evolutionary synthesis is a treasure-house of mechanisms, which mono-mechanistic gene-Darwinism, as we shall see, has started to neglect. We may also, for example, think of the human plasticity, which combined with sexual selection builds a feedback loop, in a way producing variation in response to experiences and values.

Back to biology itself, we may, for example, think of numerous mechanisms linked to species (sexually interbreeding populations), like sexual recombination, isolation, genetic drift, founder effect etc. Gene-Darwinism consequently largely denied the existence of species and subpopulations, in the sense of regarding them and the corresponding mechanisms as reducible to single selfish genes and natural selection. In contrast, I also advocate the existence of entities above the level of single selfish

genes (☉ two sections before). The ‘invention’ of species and the corresponding evolutionary mechanisms enabled that the evolutionary process could cross valleys and could reach new peaks on the evolutionary landscape. But again these new mechanisms also change the evolutionary landscapes; properties of organisms, like inner-specific coherence or cooperation, impossible before, now become evolutionary possible or even probable.

Although opposing gene-Darwinism, I want to make use of the processes discussed in sociobiology, like reciprocal altruism. But I do not interpret these processes as being fully reducible to gene-selection. For example, an evolutionarily stable strategy of reciprocal altruism, has certain preconditions on the level of the population as well (☉ p. 46). Although built on a gene-Darwinian basis, I should regard even such a strategy itself as an evolutionary process, transcending gene selection.

I am not concerned with giving an account specifically dealing with the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms, but I intend to render such an account generally as being conceptually possible. Treating processes not merely as adaptations, but as things which themselves influence the course of evolution, changes them from only objects of evolution to being partly subjects of evolution as well.

Although, for methodological purposes, I distinguish between evolutionary processes and evolutionary objects, it also becomes apparent that this distinction is ontologically not reasonable. I shall take a *Whiteheadian stance* and regard objects as processes and, *vice versa*, processes as objects. Species for example, are not only evolutionary objects, but, as I have indicated, could be understood to be evolutionary processes as well. The same is valid for selfish atomistic replicators, the most simple conceivable evolutionary objects, linked to the most simple ‘atomistic’ process of natural selection (☉ p. 216).

But if a Whiteheadian identity of objects and processes is taken seriously, it would not be warranted if one accepted the emergence of new entities and denied the emergence of new processes. In this respect gene-Darwinism is indeed consistent in also denying higher evolutionary processes above natural selection as it is denying the existence of higher evolutionary objects above selfish genes. But I argue that it is also consistent (and preferable) when, in chapter 8 gene-Darwinian object-reductionism and in chapter 9, gene-Darwinian process reductionism are criticised. In both chapters a top-down causation is advocated; in chapter 8, reducing the necessary selfishness of genes, in chapter 9 reducing the necessary blindness of evolutionary processes.

In chapter 8, as outlined earlier, I not only attack gene-atomism and advocate the reality of larger genic units, but also criticise germ-line reductionism and advocate the reality (causal relevance) of *phenotypes*, for example, of organisms, groups and even of ecosystems. What does this mean in the light of an evolution of evolutionary processes understood in a Whiteheadian way? I suppose it follows that phenotypes have to be regarded in a way as being evolutionary processes themselves. They indeed do play a role in determining the course of evolution. There is a developmental logic; certain body-plans bear certain possibilities and constraints for future evolution, hence they, so to speak, direct evolution. (As mentioned earlier, I shall also propose another exformational, field theoretic justification for a

revival of morphology or Aristotelian *causa formalis*.) According to such a view, Darwinism, and particularly gene-Darwinism, was wrong in regarding phenotypes as mere vehicles of genes and not as evolutionary factors themselves. Hence, research on a morphological ‘logic’ was largely discarded (but see the recent endeavours for example of Goodwin and Webster, in taking up this research tradition²⁶, ⇨ pp. 156 f.). Although I do not want to rely exclusively on that tradition and think that the supported understanding of phenotypes would also challenge the view of evolution as simply adaptation instead of stressing a developmental ‘logic’ to evolution (I think, this corresponds to what Gould and Vrba called ‘exaptation’). This also supports my view that the evolutionary process as a whole is not externally and eternally given, but at least partly a function of evolution itself. The evolutionary process itself is both *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* (⇨ p. 79).

If evolution is understood as a process of knowledge acquisition—apart from the differences between the biological and cultural level—I, so to speak, oppose a mere correspondence theory of evolution, and try to supplement it by a coherence theory. In this respect I could be placed between Darwinism and idealist biology. Furthermore, I try, on the biological level, to refute strict falsificationism and a mere trial-and-error metaphysic of knowledge acquisition.

I shall argue that even in biology, there is no simple eternal and externally given law of evolution relentlessly ruling the world. Although the Darwinian process in my view is indeed the simplest evolutionary algorithm conceivable, I argue that evolution transcends natural selection in its strictest sense and that evolution itself evolves.

The focus on simple explanations, as favoured as the *via moderna*, particularly since William Ockham, has many advantages, a simple explanation as such is definitely preferable to a complicated one. But, independent of the positive intentions of advocates of this principle (also of Ockham), this could also lead and has lead to ‘terrible simplifications’.²⁷ Like some other critics of Darwinism, I believe that Darwinism will either not survive or will be strongly modified by the necessary transition from the “sciences of simplicity” to the “science of complexity”²⁸ (⇨ also p. 157).

On the whole, I think, it makes a difference whether the essence of evolution is understood to be selfish atomic replicators, struggling in an unchangeable pitiless process of natural selection, or whether the essence of evolution is understood as the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms, where entities may partly become subjects instead of mere objects of evolution and the blindness and selfishness on relevant explanatory levels can be reduced.

In regard to its *cultural consequences*, an idea of an evolution of evolutionary processes is not prone simply to transfer the picture of unchangeable ‘natural’ Darwinian process to politics. It will rather become easier to conceive a certain autonomy of culture, if we were used to the idea of processes gaining a certain autonomy from biology. (Nevertheless, still echoing Descartes’ and Snow’s dualism, I regard thought, language and ethics as the most distinctive human capacities.)

²⁶ G. Webster; B. Goodwin. *Form and Transformation. Generative and Relational Principles in Biology* (1996).

²⁷ E. g.: A. Ch. v. Guttenberg. *Biologie als Weltanschauung* (1967), pp. 25, 35, 51.

²⁸ D. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), p. 18.

This, of course, does not mean that we can learn nothing from evolution, but the proposed ontology would have different leanings and would, I hope, imply a more cautious procedure.

Our general view of life is often in a simplified way taken as a metaphor for culture. Whether we regard this as irrational or not, we have to consider its effect when concerned with topics of larger relevance. Social laws, easily associated with laws of nature, would according to the proposed view presumably not be taken as eternally given, but as being improvable. Also my theory of exformation would stress that we have almost no fixed nature at all, but that existent biological inclinations are moulded by the environment, and in the case of humans to a strong extent by themselves. Furthermore, steering a middle course between atomism and holism, my approach, I hope, could neither serve as a justification for an unrestrained laissez-faire economics nor for a totalitarian theory neglecting the individual. If anything is suggested by this view of life, I think it is the relatively active role of the evolutionary subject and the improbability of the evolutionary process transcending the blind struggle for life. Finally, this view in its spirit would, I think, oppose the claim of the end of philosophy as well as politics.

In this sense, this work could be taken as a manifesto that evolution should be taken more seriously than Darwinism. Evolution may be primordially ruled by something quite close to blind and wasteful natural selection, but evolution is the process with the inherent possibility or even tendency to—at least partly—transcend this blind wastefulness, enabling sustainability and the autonomy of higher aspirations. It is not only genes, organisms, populations, species and even ecosystems that are evolving, but also the very process of evolution itself.

e) *Darwinism and Religion*

Despite its own religious sources, Darwinism, ever since Darwin, had a problematic relationship with religion. This work is not committed to a certain religion or even to religion as such, nonetheless my proposed view of life, I think, renders a moderately religious world view as being at least possible. I shall not consider the substantial differences between the world's religions. Although actually focusing on Christianity, I mainly aim to achieve a view of life which transcends the philosophy of a mere egoistic struggle for life, as found in some radical accounts of Darwinism. Still, my vindication of freedom may well not only make room for metaphysics, but for faith as well.

Darwinism is, I argue, neither philosophically nor religiously neutral. As mentioned earlier, Darwin himself was influenced by Paley's adaptationism and the partly deist belief of his time in the existence of universal and eternal laws of nature (☞ pp. 168 f.). Nevertheless, Darwin, who had earlier aimed at becoming an Anglican priest, had difficulties—as becomes apparent from his notebooks—in coming to terms with the materialist and atheist (or at least agnostic) inclinations of his own Malthusian explanation of evolution (☞ pp. 182 f.).

The theological reception of what has been called Darwinism appears to me to be historically a quite complicated matter. The anecdote of the opposition of Bishop S. Wilberforce³⁴¹ (the son of the abolitionist and philanthropist W. Wilberforce) to Huxley's support of Darwinism, is well known. On the other hand, some Victorian Darwinians, like the American biologist Asa Gray, tried to harmonise what he called 'Darwinism' with religion. Here we face the problem of the historically varying definition of Darwinism. I think that most of the self-proclaimed Victorian 'Darwinians' are, at least from the

present viewpoint, ‘pseudo-Darwinians’.²⁹ I shall give reason for the view, that it is appropriate to regard random variation and natural elimination as the true core of Darwinism (also from Darwin’s perspective, but particularly in hindsight). Moreover the emphasis on the universality and eternity of natural selection as unchangeable law of nature is, I argue, central to Darwinism. Darwin, after reading Malthus, scribbled in his notebook: “since the world began, the causes of population & depopulation have been probably as constant as any of the laws of nature with which we are acquainted.”³⁰ By transforming the Malthusian concept into his concept of natural selection, Darwin, I argue, involuntarily introduced something like the rather diabolic principle of a conservation of cruelty and wastefulness. “To prevent the recurrence of misery, is, alas! Beyond the power of man.”³¹ Darwinism in this sense, does not, if taken as a world view, harmonise with the belief in a benevolent Creator. In this sense, I think, Darwinism could indeed be understood as a paradigmatic example of modern materialism, in the age-old struggle between a teleological and mechanistic *Weltanschauung*, which played a role in some of the most disastrous developments of our century.³²

Contrary to its rather critical stance towards religion, Darwinism, particularly gene-Darwinism, itself became almost a religion. Darwinism became worshipped as the “universal solvent”³³. Darwinian processes have replaced God as universally explaining ubiquitous adaptation. Gould has pointed out that such ‘explanations’ are often post-hoc “just-so-stories”. But Darwinism as world view does not only claim to explain everything, but appears also to have the inclination to justify, as worldly theodicy, not only the cruelty of nature, but of society as well. Is not the elimination of the weak and wounded, or, for example, at least unemployment a natural necessity? In any case the God of thorough gene-Darwinism is at best a ‘blind watchmaker’.³⁴ He is worse than Descartes’ deceitful demon. If “there is only one Creator who made the tiger and the lamb, the cheetah and the gazelle, what is He playing at? Is he a sadist who enjoys spectator blood sports?”³⁵ Particularly gene-Darwinism claims that even human love and sexuality can in principle be completely understood in gene-egoist terms. The evolutionary synthesis has at least left the possibility of an authentic care for groups, and thereby, we may say, the Gnostic hope that in a bad or ignorant world, there are at least sparks of what we may regard as good. With radical gene-Darwinism this understanding collapses into an in a way diabolic understanding of an essentially not improvable world of egoism and struggle. Although during some periods materialistic and atheistic correction may be needed, this radical view, in my opinion, at any rate overstates the case.

²⁹ Cf. P. Bowler, ☉ esp. footnote 387.

³⁰ Ch. Darwin. *Notebook E* (ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. p. 3.

³¹ Th. R. Malthus. *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798), p. 98 (☉ also footnote 690).

³² R. Nachtwey. *Der Irrweg des Darwinismus* (1959), Kap. 1, 6, 7, 8. A. Ch. v. Guttenberg. *Biologie als Weltanschauung* (1967), e.g. pp. 27, 35, 53.

³³ D. Dennett. *Darwin’s Dangerous Idea* (1995), p. 521.

³⁴ R. Dawkins. *The Blind Watchmaker* (1986).

³⁵ *Idem*. *River out of Eden* (1995), p. 109.

My proposal of the evolution of evolutionary processes does allow a more positive understanding of nature. Favouring the autonomy of new evolutionary processes, one may in a Manichaeic Gnostic way argue that at least spirit is ruled by God. But, I think, in principle the argument goes further, and is open to a 'Christian' interpretation of evolution, giving the whole of evolution a more positive understanding. "It is the Lord of all Creation". If creation were understood as an eternally, equally wasteful and cruel process, this would be cynical. But if the process of evolution itself is understood as an ongoing *creatio continua*, stressing a certain freedom of lower processes and the possibility (and perhaps tendency) to reduce wastefulness and cruelty, a Christian interpretation of our nature, may become viable.

God understood along the lines of ecological idealism is taking part in the world and is unfolding the world and itself, more in the way of process theology, of *creatio continua* than of deist theology. Whether the transcendence is in an Aristotelian way still completely coming from within and hence starting immanently, or whether there is a Platonic background of eternally pre-established forms, which are only reached in time, is open to dispute. In any case God and the Good is always transcending the actual and humans could be understood as the main earthly agents of this process of God's self-expression.

I suppose it would also be consistent with a proper Christian understanding of the history of ideas, not to regard current gene-Darwinians as mere enemies (though actually Christianity has often treated those of different faiths badly), but as proponents of a view pointing beyond itself. Even the Devil is nothing but a fallen angel.

Though indeed considering the religious possibilities of my proposed view of life, I of course do not intend to take a naive religious view, ignoring science. I, for example, differ widely with evangelical literalist *creationism*, which seems to take the Genesis as an observation protocol. Proponents of such a view appear to me to be sometimes not only scientifically antediluvian holdouts, but surprisingly their literal reading of the bible epistemologically in my view resembles the naive position of materialists who simply believe in the 'given' material of science, the so-called facts or sense data.

On the one hand, I, of course, do respect and even share the intuitive distaste of many educated people in accepting some aspects of the evolutionary theory, particularly of gene-Darwinism and the application of its unscrupulous egoist and materialist philosophy to ethics. Hence, I regard literalism, partly, as an understandable, albeit wrong, overreaction against the, in my view also inadequate, Darwinian world view. I also share the belief that the Bible or more generally Christian religion and philosophy is part of the positive core of occidental culture (though, for example, its anthropocentrism might need a modification). Christianity and other religious communities (apart from lunatics or profit makers) may inspire us to gain a deeper understanding of our nature and our purpose.

On the other hand, I am convinced of the importance of high scientific standards. As pointed out before, scientific research and metaphysical considerations (including perhaps also religious considerations) ought to be mutually inspiring, each contains the other, and each has its own scope for

action.³⁶ Corresponding to my methodological position, I do not challenge the theory of evolution as such, as literalists have done, since it appears to me that overwhelming evidence proves its truth. This is, I am convinced, the case, albeit the taxonomic school of cladists has shed serious scientific doubt on the adequacy of our construction of evolutionary trees. Further, I accept moderate approaches in the animal rights movement (in this respect even the writings of P. Singer). Nevertheless, we should be aware that theories are complex scientific and also cultural constructions, and hence I regard it as legitimate to aim at modifying the current Darwinian *interpretation* of evolution.

The originally positive belief in one universal and eternal law of God, transformed into the belief of a universal and eternal rule of blind-variation-and-external-elimination, provides us with a wrong metaphysical picture. As mentioned, this does not mean that I am critical of all aspects of Darwinism. But, I am convinced that particularly, if taken as a world view, competition has to be balanced by cooperation, blindness by sight, wastefulness by sustainability. The acceptance of a sub-individual evolutionary level, ought to be complemented by supra-individual levels and in some respect by a defence of the substantiality of the individual organism itself. Biological determinism ought to be balanced by the notion of autonomy, an acceptance of our biological nature by an acceptance of the importance of our cultural second nature and, finally, the eternity of the evolutionary mechanism has to be replaced by a philosophy of an evolution of the evolutionary process itself. I think, only if such a balanced and perhaps more optimistic account became accepted, it would become possible to acknowledge the true aspects of Darwinism and even Dawkinsism, in the social sciences too.

Although the Christian concept of nature has been for long under the sway of a misconceived Platonism, resulting in deism and finally in the Darwinian claim to the unchangeability of a blind and cruel universal law of nature, I think Christian thought and other religions are in principle open to the, one should think, preferable idea of the evolution of evolutionary processes and the tradition of process theology and *Creatio continua*.

An Outlook. It would be hubris to hope that a PhD-dissertation like this could even serve as a prolegomena for the paradigm shift which I want to support in this work. But in many historiographic, biological and philosophical texts I found theoretical germs of a similar intention. Hence, I am optimistic that a proper *tractatus biologico-philosophicus* with a full elaboration of ecological idealism will soon be written.

³⁶ Cf.: John Paul II. *Fides et Ratio* (1998), § 17.

Part I: Sociobiology and Its Ethical Implications

"We do not have a science of nature, we have a science of our descriptions of nature."

W. Heisenberg, 1960, p. 209

The notion of sociobiology seems to refer in a fairly neutral manner to an existing *subject matter*, like, for example, biochemistry. Such a subject matter apparently could be defined in two ways. Firstly, it could refer to the science (*logos*) concerned with group behaviour (*socio*) of living beings (*bios*). Secondly, it could refer to a sociology or aspect of sociology, which tries to contribute to an explanation of human social behaviour by analysing its biological or evolutionary basis.³⁷ From my point of view it would be preferable to use the term 'biosociology' to refer to the second meaning, to distinguish these two meanings. However, the actual usage of 'sociobiology' includes biosociology and sociobiology in the narrow sense.

Besides these neutral meanings the term 'sociobiology' is also often used to denote a *school of thought*, which at this point might be roughly signified by the selfish-gene point of view.³⁸ In this first part, in chapter 1, a provisional biological characterisation of this paradigm is given and, in chapter 2, its ethical inclinations or implication are considered. The present part has an introductory character, where we (largely) start with sociobiology as it has normally been presented in the last decades, largely excluding philosophical discussions. Later, when we have gained a deeper historical and metaphysical understanding of different Darwinian paradigms, we will be able to more clearly contrast this paradigm against the discipline.

In the second historical part of this work, the paradigm will be contrasted to other Darwinian paradigms (internal history) and understood based on their intellectual background (external history). In the third part on the systematic philosophy of universal Darwinism, the essence of the sociobiological paradigm will be elaborated more clearly. In the fourth part the found principles, i. e. gene-atomism, germ-line reductionism and Darwinian process monism will be criticised.³⁹

The distinction of a—largely indisputable—subject area on the one hand and a—disputable—paradigm of sociobiology on the other hand entails that not necessarily all scientists who work in the subject area advocate the paradigm. In regard to the biosociological application of sociobiology especially its application to ethics, but also in regard to biological theories, the opinions of biologists indeed diverge almost as widely as the opinions of philosophers do.⁴⁰ Moreover, even biologists who are normally treated as advocates of sociobiology as paradigm, sometimes stray from the path of virtue. R. Dawkins, for example, has called E. O. Wilson, who is one of the founding fathers of sociobiology, as the last advocate of 'the *old benevolent regime*'.⁴¹ Furthermore, some theories which normally are regarded as

³⁷ Another generally possible meaning of this term would be the sociological, cultural study of the intellectual background of biology. That such a usage appears almost absurd, in principle shows how unbalanced the present usage is. ↻ pp. 202.

³⁸ Nevertheless the term 'sociobiology' has sometimes been used even in an almost opposite holistic sense: e. g. E. Jantsch. *Die Selbstorganisation des Universums* (1979/88), pp. 193 f., 102-104.

³⁹ ↻ pp. 140, 191, 207, 258, 303, 324.

⁴⁰ ↻ pp. 57 f., 145 f.

⁴¹ Wilson, although already incorporating a genes view of evolution into his synthesis, still also sustains the concept of group selection, ↻ footnote 43. Because of this, Dawkins excludes Wilson's tome from the new sociobiological paradigm altogether. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), pp. 56, 193. Wilson in turn regards Dawkins approach as reductionistic. See: Dawkins. *In Defence of Selfish Genes* (1981), p. 573.

directly following from the selfish-gene viewpoint, such as the concept of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, could, in my opinion, also be interpreted in contradiction to this paradigm (☹ p. 46).

However, an introduction of the biological and ethical phenomenon of sociobiology will be given here, and I will only begin to distinguish between the discipline and the paradigm, which in its pure version will later be defined as 'gene-Darwinism' (☹ pp. 140 f.).

Chapter 1: The Biological Theory of Sociobiology⁴²

The impressive tome *Sociobiology, The New Synthesis*, published in 1975 by Edward O. Wilson (* 1929), is often regarded as the first comprehensive manifesto of the sociobiology. In this work Wilson, an American entomologist who had earlier published important works on ants, incorporates concepts like kin selection and reciprocal altruism into a generalised account of animal and human group behaviour.

In regard to his biological theory Wilson is in fact still much more guarded than others following in his wake. But because he coined the term 'sociobiology' and because it was he who, in a recognised textbook, started to put an emphasis on concepts, which are associated with the selfish-gene viewpoint of evolution, it is reasonable to regard him—maybe not as the first proponent—but as one of the main founding fathers of the sociobiological paradigm.

Wilson stands somewhere between the sociobiological paradigm, which I equate with 'Dawkinsism', the radical gene's viewpoint of evolution, and the synthetic theory, focusing on population biology. Wilson still argues in a more holistic way and still for example discusses the possibility of group selection.⁴³ Nevertheless there are passages where Wilson sounds like a thorough gene-Darwinian.⁴⁴ In contrast to Wilson, Dawkins⁴⁵ and many spokesmen of today's sociobiological paradigm⁴⁶ have more clearly banished that level of selection from the realm of scientific respectability.

Nevertheless, Wilson had already laid down the biosociological research programme in its most radical version, claiming that sociology should be reduced to biology. Because of his claims to 'biologicize' culture and even ethics,⁴⁷ and the change in the biological emphasis, which he at least co-

⁴² Some aspects of the first part have been treated in an older unpublished paper of mine. Nevertheless, many aspects and quotations, have been added. *Soziobiologie und Utilitarismus* (1993).

⁴³ E. O. Wilson. *Sociobiology* (1975), e. g. pp. 7, 106-117, and ☹ footnote 41.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, e. g. p. 3. Wilson with regard to humans, in *On Human Nature* estimates group selection as unimportant and regards selfishness of single genes and individuals as the sole driving force of the present society, pp. 155-156, 158-159, 164.

⁴⁵ Dawkins contests the existence of genomes or populations (groups). *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), ☹ footnote 57. Although *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89) is generally more guarded, pp. 38, 61, 105-106, 108-9, 116, he still keeps up this position, pp. 4, 114-115, 191 f. His position in *River out of Eden* (1995) in this aspect of his theory is even less clear, but he still does not renounce his old claims, ☹ footnote 566.

⁴⁶ See e. g. E. Voland, P. Winkler. *Aspekte der Homimisation aus Sicht der Soziobiologie* (1990), pp. 9-54.

⁴⁷ E. O. Wilson. *Sociobiology* (1975), p. 562, ☹ footnote 71.

provoked, this new current was on the one hand soon singled out for criticism,⁴⁸ and on the other hand also gained strong influence, even for example in psychology⁴⁹ or in philosophy^{50 51}.

Richard Dawkins (* 1941), an Oxford biologist and widely-read writer of popular science, has not only popularised these theories, but he has been much more marked in his atomistic zeal. Whereas Wilson only adopted the selfish-gene viewpoint as one important *additional* possible explanation, Dawkins in *The Selfish Gene* (1976) radicalised, simplified or purified this approach by advocating the selfish-gene view as the one and only type of biological explanation of evolution. Many biologists (and laypersons) have followed in Dawkins' footsteps. Although Dawkins did not publish substantial collections of empirical evidence, as Wilson or Darwin did, he has contributed—one may provocatively say, as metaphysician—to the clarification and generalisation of some central biological notions. Dawkins is treated here as a main proponent of sociobiology as paradigm, because he radicalises and purifies central sociobiological concepts and completely focused on the concept of the selfish gene.

Nevertheless, Dawkins in two respects has left the core of the sociobiological paradigm or what I am going to call gene-Darwinism. Firstly, he has expressed his creed of an independence of the cultural—memetic—sphere.⁵² Secondly, in the *Extended Phenotype* he has conceded at least some limitations of his original approach.⁵² Despite this, Dawkins still generally insists on an approach almost exclusively based on the notion of the selfish gene.⁵⁴⁵

Dawkins' selfish-gene view of evolution, normally combined with Wilson's reductive attitude to culture stated in *Sociobiology*, moulded sociobiology, so that this view is not only regarded as the sociobiological paradigm, but almost the only proper treatment of the sociobiological subject matter.

There are of course many more important authors who played a role in the creation of the 'new synthesis' of sociobiology. Some of them will be mentioned in the course of this work. At this point only some selected books should be mentioned, written by biologists often for a larger audience:

One influential early book, which tried to prove that group selection could play no significant role in evolution, was George C. Williams' *Adaptation and Natural Selection. A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought* (1966).

Dawkins, here treated as the main spokesman of the sociobiological paradigm, has published some other popular books besides *The Selfish Gene* (1976), which no doubt was his most important manifesto. In the *The Extended Phenotype* (1982), a more academic book, he defends his positions only slightly more guarded and additionally works out the concept of the extended phenotype. In *The Blind Watchmaker* (1986), published a decade after *The Selfish Gene*, Dawkins even argued that Darwinism is not only actually, but in principle, the only possible theory of evolution. Darwinism has replaced the deist concept of a Godlike watchmaker. Other books of Dawkins, also written in Dawkins' gifted style of popular science, are *The River Out of Eden* (1995), *Climbing Mount Improbable* (1996) and *Unweaving the Rainbow* (1998).

Wilson's main general contribution besides *Sociobiology* (1975) was *Genes, Mind and Culture* (1981), co-published together with the physicist Charles J. Lumsden. There he advocated a more guarded position of co-evolution of culture and genes. Wilson's most influential popular book was *On Human Nature* (1979), where he almost as radically as in sociobiology favours a biological understanding of human society. *Consilience* (1998) is a rather literary and more guarded book.

In Germany W. Wickler's *Die Biologie der Zehn Gebote* (1975) and *Das Prinzip Eigennutz* (1981, with U. Seibt) had some impact. Wickler is the successor of K. Lorenz as head of the *Max-Planck Institut* for ethology in Seewiesen.

⁴⁸ ↪ e. g. pp. 54 f., 145 f.

⁴⁹ E. g. H. Plotkin. *Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge* (1994). J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, J. Tooby. *The Adapted Mind* (1992, but ↪ footnote 857), ↪ pp. 218 f.

⁵⁰ E. g. D. Dennett. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995).

⁵¹ ↪ interaction of the Darwinian sub-paradigms with other fields and Process Darwinism, pp. 160 ff., 202 ff.

⁵² R. Dawkins. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), chapter 3, esp. p. 35. The concept of the 'Extended Phenotype' itself may not only be regarded as a radicalisation of this paradigm, but in some respects as transcending the replicator-vehicle ideology, see esp. Chapter 4, 12, 13.

Today there are a huge number of scientific and popular works in this field. Moreover, the issues raised by sociobiology, partly treated in this work, have been a vivid area of discussion in the expanding field of philosophy of biology. ⁵³

1.1 Two Basic Postulates

Within the paradigm of sociobiology I think two partly implicit basic postulates or presuppositions have to be distinguished. I think one may call them basic postulates, since they are mostly starting points of argumentation and they are normally not challenged within the paradigm itself. Nevertheless they are in my view not necessary strict fundamental principles. Firstly, as will be worked out later, the founders of this paradigm had some deeper reasons to adopt these postulates; secondly, it will be shown that these concepts are central, but not elementary, and, thirdly, we will also provide reasons to challenge these concepts.

But as a first characterisation of this theory these postulates seem to be basic and important enough to provide a starting point for our further investigation.

a) *Postulate of 'Selfish' Genes as the Only Units of Evolution*

The concept of the 'selfish gene' is, in my view, the most central concept of the sociobiological paradigm and the later developed concept of 'gene-Darwinism' will be build around this notion. The reductive attitude towards culture, which we outline as second postulate in the next section, might in many cases be due to the general reductive stance *within* biology, largely expressed by the first postulate.

G. C. Williams had launched an attack against any concept of group selection in 1966,⁵³ turning especially against the far going proposals of V. C. Wynne-Edwards.⁵⁴ Williams urged that the burden of proof would rest with group selection and that, in fact, apparent group adaptations could better be construed in terms of individual adaptations. Group altruism, he holds, was completely reducible to the individual inclusive fitness. Inclusive fitness, introduced earlier by W. D. Hamilton, extends the original notion of fitness and includes positive effects on relatives as well. Though Williams argues enthusiastically for explanatory individualism, one may assume from this that the concept of inclusive fitness had already left an individualist biology behind, pointing in the direction of a more radical, sub-individualistic, gene-based evolutionary biology. A selfish-gene viewpoint seems to have been implicitly present to some extent in the texts of Hamilton⁵⁵ and R. L. Trivers in particular (☉ p. 44 f.), but only Dawkins coined and popularised the metaphorical phrase in his book *The Selfish Gene*.⁵⁶

⁵³ G. C. Williams. *Adaptation and Natural Selection* (1966).

⁵⁴ V. C. Wynne-Edwards argued that populations appear to regulate their sizes sometimes to levels well below the momentaneous environment's carrying capacity. *Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour* (1962).

⁵⁵ But Hamilton has not been an exclusive gene-Darwinian, since he, in certain cases, still acknowledged group selection. Cf.: E. Sober, D. S. Wilson; *Onto Others* (1998), p. 42, ☉ footnote 1001.

⁵⁶ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89). According to Dawkins the general founding of this view could be attributed to W. D. Hamilton. But Dawkins argues that it has been he himself who had drawn the final conclusions of this approach and had abandoned even the notion of inclusive fitness still related to the ontological level of the individual. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), pp. 61-62.

The selfish gene postulate is that only *single* genes, not whole genomes⁵⁷, organisms or species, are the entities which are selected.⁵⁸ Single genes, which in this approach are the only persisting replicators, build up phenotypes. Sometimes the notion of a phenotype is—I think consequently—extended to include an organism's behaviour and its products, like a bower-bird's bower or a human's house.⁵⁹ Phenotypes or extended phenotypes are regarded as mere means of the survival of single genes: they are ephemeral 'survival machines'⁶⁰. Accordingly *we* are regarded to be 'survival machines', or puppets of our genes, which have only the one 'goal': the replication of our genes.

It should be noted that the notion 'gene' is defined not simply as a nucleotide or sequence of nucleotides. Dawkins uses the word gene to mean "a genetic unit that is small enough to last for a large number of generations and to be distributed around in the form of many copies"⁶¹. A gene is defined by its immortality or lastingness, and not by its physical properties.⁶²

Dawkins, like Williams, has dismissed concepts like group selection and group altruism. According to Dawkins, "'altruistic groups' will be over-run by selfish individuals"⁶³. Altruistic groups were not evolutionarily stable and hence would not evolve. Like "Chicago gangsters, our genes have survived, in some cases for millions of years, in a highly competitive world. This entitles us to expect certain qualities in our genes. I shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness. This gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual behaviour."⁶⁴

The postulate of selfish genes will later be discussed in a refined version, under the headlines of gene-atomism, germ line reductionism and Darwinian process monism.³⁹

b) *Postulate of Genetic Determinism*

Based on the first postulate, the sociobiological paradigm comes to the conclusion (or starts with the premiss) that organisms, and also human beings, are to a great extent determined by their genes.

The atomistic aspect of the selfish gene view of evolution definitely has reinforced the tendency in science (and even more in the tabloid press) to use terms like 'gene for homosexuality' in a simplifying way. Dawkins conceded that talk about genes which is indispensable to him may lead to simplifying misinterpretations. Moreover, he distanced himself from that type of genetic determinism which denies the ontogenetic variability and flexibility of gene-expressions.⁶⁵

⁵⁷ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), pp. 24 f.; G. C. Williams. *Adaptation and Natural Selection* (1966), e. g. p. 57.

⁵⁸ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), pp. 7, 33, 39, 40, 55.

⁵⁹ *Idem*. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89).

⁶⁰ *Idem*. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), pp. 48 ff.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 32.

⁶² I will argue that the notion of a gene already involves the—non-materialistic— notion of form or information (☞ p. 250 f.) and I will show that some other aspects of such a definition are problematic (☞ p. 259).

⁶³ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 8.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 2.

⁶⁵ R. Dawkins. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), pp. 9-29. See also reply of M. Midgley. *Selfish Genes and Social Darwinism* (1983), pp. 366-367.

Nevertheless, it has been argued, that even if the variability and flexibility of the phenotype and behaviour of organisms is taken into account, most sociobiologists still stress that humans and other animals are determined by genes in their general conditions as well as in their special inclinations.⁶⁶ I think such a charge is largely justified, due to the fact that the concept that organisms are mere vehicles of their genes is central to the sociobiological paradigm. Culture is also often regarded as part of our extended phenotype and hence understandable as only serving the survival of each individual's selfish genes. (Despite such extreme claims, some sociobiologists have argued with less hubris.⁶⁷)

However, in its strong version the sociobiological paradigm is the "uncompromising application of evolutionary theory to all aspects of human existence"⁶⁸. Culture is largely either seen as an epiphenomenon, or as being reducible to biology and hence also based on natural selection and the survival of the fittest. Some, for example, have argued that consciousness is a 'real but evolutionarily irrelevant property of a system'⁶⁹. Others, like Wilson, advocated that basis of our emotions, which "are consulted by philosophers who wish to intuit the standards of good and evil", are the hypothalamus and limbic system, also formed by natural selection.⁷⁰

Hence, Wilson urged that "the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologized."⁷¹ According to such a position, "the humanities and social sciences shrink to specialised branches of biology; history, biography, and fiction are the research protocols of human ethology; and anthropology and sociology together constitute the sociobiology of a single primate species."⁷²

This war cry of downward reductionism, seems to me to be especially linked with what I will later call germ-line reductionism. But also gene-atomism and Darwinian mono-Mechanicism contribute to this reductionist stance.³⁹

In chapter 2 we will take a closer look at the ethical consequences of the sociobiological paradigm.

1.2 Theories of the Evolution of Apparent Altruism — Sociobiological Theorems?

We will now introduce two explanations, which based on the postulates of the sociobiological paradigm, should explain phenotypic 'altruism' in terms of egoism at the genotypic level of the single 'selfish' genes.

The **metaphorical notions** of the 'selfishness' (Dawkins) or 'morality' of the gene (Wilson) in the present context do of course not imply any conscious intention of genes. Selfishness and morality are defined in a 'behaviouristic' sense in regard to evolutionary outcomes.⁷³

⁶⁶ E. g. S. J. Gould. *Ever since Darwin* (1991/1973), pp. 253 f.

⁶⁷ Although Dawkins belongs to the most radical gene-determinists in the sense of denying the causal relevance of the phenotypic vehicles, his concept of memes may indeed not necessarily imply gene-determinism (though I think that for an alternative interpretation another framework would be preferable). ➤ pp. 60 f., footnote 165.

⁶⁸ E. O. Wilson. *On Human Nature* (1995/1978), p. x.

⁶⁹ H. Mohr. *Freiheit und die biologische Natur des Menschen* (1984), p. 48 (my transl.). Mohr in fact regrets this result.

⁷⁰ E. O. Wilson. *Sociobiology* (1975), p. 3.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 562.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 547.

⁷³ R. Dawkins. *In Defence of Selfish Genes* (1981), pp. 557-558.

M. Midgley has objected that "Genes cannot be selfish or unselfish, any more than atoms can be jealous, elephants abstract or biscuits teleological."⁷⁴ I agree that the notion of selfishness in a psychological context is commonly used in an conscious intentionalist and not in a consequentialist sense. Nevertheless I am not sure if this forbids a metaphorical application of these notions within biology and hence I will not rest my own criticism on a linguistic criticism of this sort.⁷⁵

According to this paradigm the behaviour of a phenotypic 'survival machine', if seemingly altruistic, could be explained based on genetic determinism and genetic egoism. This behaviour would not, for example, be explained as a property of a larger group or gene pool, as has been done by the evolutionary synthesis (⇒ pp. 126 f.). Genes are regarded to be the only appropriate units of explanation. In the following sections I want to introduce the theories which are often advocated together with the selfish-genes approach to explain apparently altruistic behaviour: the theory of kin-selection and the theory of reciprocal 'altruism'.

Advocates of the selfish-gene view of evolution have to treat these theories as something like theorems. In rough analogy to mathematical usage, theorems are propositions which deductively follow from basic mathematical axioms or postulates. From the postulates of 'selfish genes as the only existing entities' and 'natural selection as the only existing evolutionary process' (⇒ p. 107) the following theorems should follow and should be reducible to them (⇒ following pages and pp. 140 f., 213 f.).

Although it would indeed be beautiful if these theories were deducible and reducible theorems, I doubt that this is the case. In my opinion even these theories are not theorems but may constitute a partly autonomous level of explanation, based, for example, on additional starting conditions.

In the following sections I will briefly mention some arguments supporting the view, that the theories may have a partly autonomous character and are not reducible theorems. Generally, it may seem surprising that I want to disentangle theories, which build almost the core of a paradigm, from the very basic postulates of that paradigm. In my view such a procedure could be legitimate. It has also been applied by Darwinism itself. Darwinism came to incorporate Mendelian genetics as a central plank of its theoretical corpus, although this theory was built as bulwark against Darwinism in the first place. One may turn the force of a theory against a world-view from which it has derived. We may in principle use theories which seemed to support the sociobiological paradigm to criticise this paradigm itself.⁷⁶

However this may be, in the following I mainly introduce the theories as if they were theorems exclusively based on the basic postulates of the sociobiological paradigm.

a) *The Theory of Kin Selection*

The wording 'kin selection' was coined by the influential English biologist J. Maynard Smith⁷⁷, but some of the relevant concepts had been developed earlier by W. D. Hamilton. The basic idea of the theory of kin selection is, from a gene-Darwinian viewpoint, that it has an equal survival value for a gene to 'support' an *identical* other gene as to 'support' itself.

⁷⁴ M. Midgley. *Gene-juggling* (1979), p. 439, *Selfish Genes and Social Darwinism* (1983), pp. 368-372. (⇒ footnote 124.)

⁷⁵ On the difference of psychological (or: vernacular) and evolutionary altruism and the problems of the metaphor of altruism in evolutionary biology, see: D. S. Wilson. *Definitions of Altruism and Selfishness*. (1998/1992). E. Sober. *What Is Evolutionary Altruism?* (1998/1988), pp. 460-462.

⁷⁶ ⇒ also pp. 250 f., 388.

⁷⁷ J. Maynard Smith. *Group selection and kin selection* (1964), pp. 1145-1147.

By 'supporting the other organism, the information a gene has, does not survive in the gene itself, but in the different identical copy (☉ p. 250). This 'altruism' is evolutionarily stable, because the gene which has been helped to survive will still carry the information to 'help' its identical copy.

For diploid organisms, like humans, there is generally a probability of 50% for genes that parents pass them on to their direct descendants. Genes of grandparents and grandchildren have only a probability of 25% to be shared with the person in question. This probability is expressed by kin-coefficient r (Figure 1).




Figure 1: The kin-coefficient r plays a central role in the theory of kin selection, r is a measure of the relatedness of two organisms. From the 'gene's viewpoint' it reflects the likelihood of a gene being present in another organism. The figure is valid for diploid organisms (like human beings). The thickness of the arrows indicates the probability for a gene of the focused organism ('I') to be transferred in a symbolised process of replication also of specific relatives. (See: R. Alexander, *Darwinism and Human Affairs*, 1979)

Behaviour which is phenotypically 'altruistic' could, according to this theory, only spread within a population if the following inequality, named after the biologist William D. Hamilton⁷⁸, is fulfilled:

$$c_1 < r_{1,2} \times b_2$$

For an 'altruistic' organism (1) the costs (c) have to be lower than the benefit (b) for the organism which receives help (2), multiplied by the probability for the genetic relatedness of the two organisms (r).⁷⁹

Dawkins, as advocate of a radical selfish-gene view of evolution, consistently proposed to

give up the term 'kin selection', pointing to the reducibility of kin selection to gene selection. "If we accept neo-Darwinian gene-selectionism, kin selection necessarily follows."⁸⁰

⁷⁸ W. D. Hamilton. *The genetical evolution of social behaviour* (1964), pp. 1-16, 17-32.

⁷⁹ See e. g. E. Voland, P. Winkler, *Aspekte der Homimisation aus Sicht der Soziobiologie* (1990).

⁸⁰ R. Dawkins. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), pp. 67, 62.; ☉ footnotes 556, 826.

Opposed to Dawkins, E. O. Wilson still propounded the theory of *kin selection* under the heading of group selection. Wilson has objected that group selection is not always reducible to gene-selection, whereas group selection is anathema to Dawkinsian Darwinism.⁸¹ (I do not know whether Wilson has explicitly defended the irreducibility of kin selection.)

But as is largely ignored by gene-Darwinians also Hamilton himself in his later publications rather tended to a multilevel interpretation of his concept of inclusive fitness.⁸¹

b) *The Theory of Reciprocal 'Altruism'*

The second sociobiological theory which explains apparent 'altruistic' behaviour is based on the principle of reciprocity. Robert L. Trivers coined the term 'reciprocal altruism'.⁸² Behaviour which is phenotypically 'altruistic' can only be developed, if the altruist also profits by it. An 'altruistic' individual or gene will only survive, if it finally supports other individuals or genes in order to support itself.

Hamilton and Axelrod have shown that, under certain conditions, reciprocal 'altruism' may evolve and will not easily be invaded by organisms or genes with 'cheating' strategies. Reciprocal altruism is hence an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)—a concept generally introduced by Maynard Smith.⁸³

In my opinion, it could be doubted whether the concepts of ESSs and, specifically, of reciprocal altruism can smoothly be integrated into a radical selfish-gene view, as adherents of this view propose.

Even if taken for granted that ESSs work on single genes, in my view, one need not to advocate an ontology which denies the reality of all higher entities above these single genes. In my opinion the concept of an ESS is better regarded as supporting the approach of emerging evolutionary mechanisms, opposed to what I will call gene-Darwinism.

The evolution of an ESS, for instance of reciprocal altruism, needs certain additional, non-reducible, preconditions beyond the existence of selfish genes. Besides, for example, the ability to 'recognise' co-operators, a minimum proportion of genes favouring the strategy of reciprocal altruism have to be in place. These starting conditions will firstly often be achieved only by mechanisms on the population level, like the founder effect (☞ pp. 132 f.); secondly an ESS could itself be interpreted as a mechanism working on the level of the population as a whole. The frequency dependency of an ESS implies that an individual strategy depends on what the majority of the population is doing. But if a population determines the individual gene—not vice versa—than it would be inappropriate to claim that evolution is only the result of single genes and not at least partly the result of properties of whole gene pools as well. Provided suitable starting conditions, genes in a population following a certain ESS will acquire different properties, e. g. will be less selfish than genes in a different population. In my view this is clearly at odds with the radical selfish-gene view of evolution. (☞ also pp. 241 f., 258 f.)

My view is in accordance with J. L. Mackie, who also interpreted the concept of an ESS as an irreducible mechanism in its own right.⁸⁴ This position is in my opinion justified, although the radical gene-Darwinist Dawkins, has welcomed Maynard Smith' theory. Also Maynard Smith himself, according to autobiographic notes, has increasingly tended to a reductionist approach. Nevertheless, he is still relatively open for a more holistic approach and, I speculate, if not pressed to decide between reductionism and holism, Maynard Smith would prefer a middle course.⁸⁵ At least his theory, as we have seen, can be interpreted in this way. Surprisingly even Dawkins, as he dealt with more pressing quarrels, once did not clearly oppose the interpretation of an ESS as group selection.⁸⁶ However, I agree with Mackie that such an interpretation would undermine Dawkins' strictly gene-Darwinian approach.

In any case, at least from the viewpoint of a paradigm based solely on selfish genes, all forms of co-operative or 'altruistic' behaviour are only derived from the 'selfishness' on the level of single genes.

⁸¹ W. D. Hamilton. *Innate social aptitudes in man* (1975). ☞ footnote 1001.

⁸² R. L. Trivers. *The evolution of reciprocal altruism* (1971), pp. 35-57.

⁸³ W. D. Hamilton, R. Axelrod. *The Evolution of Cooperation* (1981). J. Maynard Smith. *Evolution and the Theory of Games* (1982). See e. g. the concise overview of A. Rosenberg. *Altruism* (1992/1998), pp. 453-458.

⁸⁴ J. L. Mackie. *Law of the Jungle: Moral Alternatives and Principles of Evolution* (1978), pp. 460-463.

⁸⁵ See: J. Maynard Smith. *Shaping Life* (1998), pp. 42-45.

⁸⁶ R. Dawkins. *In Defence of Selfish Genes* (1981), pp. 563-564.

Chapter 2: Ethical Implications? — The Morality of the Gene?

Many—albeit not all—sociobiologists have explicitly drawn, or have been inclined to draw, ethical conclusions from their often deterministic and atomistic views on human nature. Wilson in his book *Sociobiology* claimed that ethics ought to become ‘biologized’.⁸⁷ ‘The Morality of the Gene’, the title of the first chapter of that book, became the credo of a whole bio-ethical research programme. Many following in Wilson’s wake advocated an even less ‘benevolent’ and more pronounced gene-Darwinian biology.⁸⁸

In this chapter the subsequent topics will briefly be treated. First, I will try to outline central ethical conclusions which seem to follow if we accepted the premiss of the sociobiological paradigm as an exhaustive biological basis for ethics. We will confine ourselves to the basic assumptions of this paradigm. In this case I think that the resulting ‘ethics’ must be formulated in biological terms, that is, they must focus on genetic or individual competition and must advocate only one value—that of survival.

Secondly, it will be shown that the claim that sociobiology could serve as a sufficient basis for all our ethical considerations has in fact been treated in a highly controversial way. Both in biology and in philosophy the biological assumptions and the way ethical conclusions are drawn have been challenged. It appears to me that many apparent proponents of a sociobiological ethics still actually use concepts from quite different traditions, partly contradicting pure gene-Darwinism.

Thirdly, based on some of these proposals, I develop an extended version of the sociobiological approach to moral behaviour, which is still similar in spirit, though it is a trial to overcome some of the most pressing problems of an ethics solely based on gene-Darwinism. Here Dawkins’ notion of *memes* is taken seriously. Moreover, I apply the structure of the concepts of kin-selection and reciprocal ‘altruism’ to this meme concept. However, despite these strong modifications, the ‘ethical implications’ of this strongly modified theory will still fall short of traditional standards of ethics.

Fourthly, Moore’s concept of a ‘naturalistic fallacy’ will be considered. Moore objects logically to the assumption of any evolutionary ethics that somehow normative conclusions could be drawn from descriptive propositions. Even if Moore was right, the problem remains that gene-Darwinism as universal ontology would still leave almost no room for an alternative foundation of ethics.

Concludingly, reasons will be given for embarking on our historical and systematic journey in search of alternative biological and metaphysical concepts as the basis for a different ontology and ethics.

⁸⁷ E. O. Wilson. *Sociobiology* (1975), p. 562, ↗ footnote 71. On Wilson’s sociobiological approach towards ethics see also: *On Human Nature* (1978/95); M. Ruse, E. O. Wilson. *Moral Philosophy as applied Science* (1986).

⁸⁸ On Wilson’s position compared with radical gene-Darwinians ↗ footnotes 41, 43-46. On gene-Darwinism ↗ pp. 191 f.

2.1 The Moral of Sociobiology? —‘The Currency Used in the Casino of Evolution is Survival’

I will now, as a thought experiment, outline what a morality based purely on the sociobiological paradigm may look like. Given that the biological premises of this paradigm were a true and exhaustive account of the relevant parts of evolutionary biology, what ‘ethical’ conclusions would have to be drawn? It is of course difficult to answer this question, because the approaches of the supporters of a sociobiological ethics differ widely (☞ p. 57).

Bayertz, for example, distinguishes approaches in how far they regard themselves as an exclusive basis for ethics. In accordance with him I will argue that the strong version, which is based solely on the sociobiological paradigm, is not capable of formulating a satisfying ethics. In any case, concerning the strong version I will mostly use the term ‘morality’, to refer to the *description* of values and behaviour, instead of ‘ethics’, denoting the *prescriptive* normative discipline, because it is obviously questionable whether a descriptive science, and especially gene-Darwinism, could itself provide prescriptive standards (on the problem of the natural fallacy, ☞ pp. 65 f.).⁸⁹ The weak version, which only claims to explain the evolutionary roots of morality, but which does accept a certain freedom as basis of our moral decisions, is much less interesting, though I would not call it trivial.⁹⁰

In any case I think the main problem of the weak version is a different one. The weak version, and particularly its claim of an only biologically informed, but still autonomous ethics, could not be warranted on purely gene-Darwinian grounds. The concept of autonomy is even in contradiction with a strict interpretation of gene-Darwinism.⁹¹ An extension of the biological or metaphysical basis of gene-Darwinism (something which we will aim at in this work) would be needed to render a ‘gene-ethics’ with a certain autonomy possible (☞ p. 49).

I here try to confine myself to the central features of the sociobiological paradigm and hence sketch an as pure and as strong version of a corresponding morality as possible.

Radical proponents of the sociobiological paradigm regard morals essentially as a mere biological adaptation in human evolution and hence as a topic which has to be treated by biology. The sociobiological paradigm, or gene-Darwinism, provides us with a specific framework of how morals could be interpreted. Such an interpretation would in any case—whether supposedly normative or not—, if accepted, influence our morals; even if gene-Darwinism would claim that there is no morality at all, that truly unselfish altruism or an honest appeal to other higher moral principles, like justice or equality, is

⁸⁹ Alternatively one may use the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘meta-ethics’.

⁹⁰ K. Bayertz. *Evolution und Ethik. Größe und Grenzen eines philos. Forschungsprogramms* (1993), pp. 24-33. P. Kitcher has distinguished—and criticised—four ways to biologicize ethics. *Vier Arten, die Ethik zu biologisieren* (1993).

⁹¹ Similarly e. g.: K. Bayertz. *Autonomie und Biologie* (1993), pp. 334, 336, 337, 347. On naturalist theories of evolution in general: H. Krings. *Sokrates überlebt. Zum Verhältnis von Evolution und Geschichte* (1984), p. 174.

neither evolutionarily viable nor evolutionarily justifiable. As in the case of Nietzsche, a non-ethics may, of course, influence our actual moral attitudes.

An orthodox believer of gene-Darwinism, purged of all other components, would in my opinion act as a prudent ultra-egoist. He would indeed cooperate as long there is a profit. But he or she would of course whenever possible avoid to help the weak and wounded. The gene-Darwinian would not even try to be a 'fair egoist', as, for example, envisioned by Adam Smith. A radical gene-Darwinian would betray, exploit and kill, whenever a profit is expected and no punishment or retaliation is to be feared. Morals, like many other features of our social life, would mainly be regarded as means of some genes manipulating organisms build by competing genes.⁹² In principle there would be no justice at all, only different strategies of reproduction. Who wants to blame the cuckoo in the nest, who wants to blame the rapist following his specific strategy of reproduction? Blunt gene-Darwinism indeed has to be taken seriously! If this approach is taken to its conclusions it would free the rapist from his bad conscience—the only remaining emotional problem would be his fear of being caught. Subjectively we would be able to condemn the rapist, but in principle, if the austere metaphysical starting point of gene-Darwinism is not extended, the rapist would be as right as those who would condemn him. The judge of course may see this differently, but this would not be a question of justice, but one of power. The rapist would differ from the judge only in the regard that the rapist is not powerful enough to enforce his own reproductive strategy. Accordingly, morality and justice would not only be understood to be somehow influenced by power structures—as they definitely are—, but would themselves simply be power structures, without leaving the possibility of claiming that these structures are not just. On the battleground of reproduction, justice would be regarded to be completely reducible to the will to power.

Definitely most sociobiologists, and even many radical gene-Darwinians, have proposed sociobiological ethics with higher ethical intentions. Some have argued that we have to take the selfish essence of humans into account, to solve the most pressing global demographic, ecological and social problems.⁹³ I do indeed agree that an ethics is needed, which also acknowledges our 'lower' all too human inclinations. I would even concede that on first sight I find the radical nature of this approach highly stimulating and positively provocative. But taken to its conclusions, it appears to me to be utterly wrong and even dangerous to deny all higher values, like justice, truth, happiness and cultural refinement, leaving *nothing but* the selfish genes' bleak tactics in the unrestrainable struggle for life.

This situation refers us back to the mentioned problem of the weak version of 'gene-ethics'. In my view it is not the problem to acknowledge a certain egoistic tendency (of genes or of individual humans), if some room is left for higher aspirations. But it is indeed a problem of gene-Darwinism, that it is com-

⁹² E. Voland. *Moral durch Manipulation? Ein evolutionäres Szenario* (1996), pp. 1119-1122. See: R. Dawkins. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), chap. 5.; R. Dawkins, J. R. Krebs. *Animal signals: information or manipulation?* (1978).

⁹³ E. g.: Th. Mohr. *Zwischen genetischer Statik und Dynamik der Lebensbedingungen* (1996), p. 1115. Even M. Ruse and E. O. Wilson in *Moral Philosophy as Applied Science* (1986), p. 192, were interested in improving the possibility for human long-term survival, though Darwinism itself in principle is only concerned with blind momentary survival.

pletely gene-reductive and by definition unstratified. Unless this paradigm is not extended, it will have the tendency of disavowing any state of justice on a higher level. There is, for example, no built-in concept of the equality of genes in the struggle for life. Why should there be one? An order to structure this struggle would necessitate a principle on a meta-level (e. g. an a prioric principle or a social contract of genes), a level which in my view is radically denied by the very essence of pure gene-Darwinism.

Without discussing these complex matters in detail, I at this point only want to distinguish three pivotal aspects of a strict application of the sociobiological paradigm to morals.

Firstly, the sociobiological paradigm claims to ‘biologicize’ ethics.^{71, 145} Either a biological basis for ethics should be provided, or—according to the strong gene-Darwinian version, on which we concentrate—ethics should even be formulated in biological terms (☉ pp. 42 f.). According to the strong version, culture is understood as a part of the biological process. Correspondingly ethics would be understood as a specialised branch of biology of a single primate species.⁷² Despite its complexity and plasticity the biological phenomenon of culture is, according to the specific evolutionary theory employed, simply an adaptation evolved by natural selection.

Although I also consider it to be honourable to strive to bridge the old gap between the two cultures, this is done here exclusively in a ‘bottom up way’. Ethics gets ‘biologized’ from below. What was traditionally the ‘higher’ realm of freedom is simply explained by the ‘lower’ processes of biology.

Such morality would not be based on freedom in the traditional sense, since the human subject and the ‘I’ would be regarded as a product of genes and environment or even as a ‘vehicle’ of genes.⁹⁴ And a vehicle is not free, it is an object instead of a subject.⁹⁵

E. O. Wilson argues that our emotions, upon which we base our moral thought, are formed in the limbic system and the hypothalamus. These brain structures “evolved by natural selection”, hence our morals evolved by natural selection.^{96. ☉151}

Even if culture is understood as not being directly controlled by the genes, any renunciation of an advantage in reproduction, by emancipation from “the biological imperative to maximise the genetic fitness”, will be immediately punished and eliminated by natural selection of the seemingly ‘free’ behaviour would again directly be put under a more specific control of the genes.⁹⁷ Wilson: “Can the cultural evolution of higher ethical values gain a direction and momentum of its own and completely

⁹⁴ See: G. Vollmer. *Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer evolutionären Ethik* (1993), pp. 125-126.

⁹⁵ E. g.: K. Bayertz. *Autonomie und Biologie* (1993), p. 346. M. Weingarten. *Organismen, Objekte oder Subjekte?* (1993).

⁹⁶ E. O. Wilson. *Sociobiology* (1975), p. 3, *On Human Nature* (1978), p. 6.

P. Kitcher in *Vier Arten, die Ethik zu ‘biologisieren’* (1993), pp. 225, 228 f., has pointed out, that this argument—against the intentions of Wilson—would also absurdly render mathematics, biology and other sciences to be reducible to natural selection. Kitcher also challenged the assumption that ethics could completely be understood in terms of emotional reaction. I will not engage in detail in this specifically ethical discussion, but I will criticise the biological paradigm itself, ☉ part IV.

⁹⁷ E. Voland, P. Winkler. *Aspekte der Hominisation aus Sicht der Soziobiologie* (1990), p. 19, quoting H. Markl, *Natur und Geschichte* (1983, my transl.). The term ‘biological imperative’ has also been used e. g. by E. O. Wilson, *On Human Nature* (1995/1978), p. 166.

replace genetic evolution? I think not. The genes hold culture on a leash. [...]” Culture is the “circuitous technique by which human genetic material has been and will be kept intact. Morality has no other demonstrable ultimate function.”⁹⁸

Proponents of this approach hence promote a ‘Darwinian history’, or better ‘Dawkinsian-Wilsonian history’. To them for example wealth concentration “must once have been (or must still be) the means to a reproductive end. No other currency counts in natural selection.”⁹⁹

As pure gene-Darwinism biologically denies the existence of any higher strata above selfish genes, it as interdisciplinary approach denies the autonomy of culture.

This differs from a weaker approach which only advocates the existence of biological inclinations, not *constraining*, but *creating* or *enabling* culture.¹⁰⁰ As mentioned, I think—despite my sympathy for such a view—that such a freedom of culture could not be warranted solely on gene-Darwinian grounds.

Secondly, the sociobiological paradigm focuses on competition. It is a main tenet of the sociobiological paradigm that all altruistic phenomena have to be explained by ‘egoism’ on the level of the genes (☞ pp. 41, 140, 258 f.).

Nature is red in tooth and claw more than ever before; even proponents agree that a special unsentimental dog eat dog language came to dominate the new paradigm.¹⁰¹ “Fundamentally, all that we have a right to expect from our theory is a battleground of replicators, jostling, jockeying, fighting for a future in the genetic hereafter.”¹⁰² Consistently it has been argued that “so long as DNA is passed on, it does not matter who or what gets hurt in the process. It is better for the genes of Darwin’s ichneumon wasp that the caterpillar should be alive, and therefore fresh, when it is eaten, no matter what the cost in suffering. Genes don’t care about suffering, because they don’t care about anything.” Generally the “Universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference. [...] DNA neither cares nor knows. DNA just is.”¹⁰³ And one had to complete the manifesto of biological nihilism with: ‘DNA just is all there is.’ — The rest are vehicles or extended phenotypes, which are in any case only means to promote the ruthless selfish interests of single genes.

In a purely gene-Darwinian approach, morality is to be understood as manipulation of phenotypes by some genes to the disadvantage of others.⁹² Following the message of this paradigm one may rape, betray and kill without any feeling of guilt—one only should not get caught (☞ above). I think the main result for morals would be that saints (and anyone pursuing something beyond gene-egoism) would be considered to be either fools, lunatics or sanctimonious hypocrites. An excellent excuse for not pursuing higher aims! The remaining morality would be non-moral. Leaving the problem of the naturalistic

⁹⁸ E. O. Wilson. *On Human Nature* (1995/1978), p. 167.

⁹⁹ M. Ridley. *The Red Queen* (1995/1993), p. 242.

¹⁰⁰ E. g.: L. Cosmides, J. Tooby. *The Psychological Foundations of Culture* (1992), p. 39, ☞ also footnote 857.

¹⁰¹ R. Dawkins. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), p. 56.

¹⁰² *Idem*. *The Selfish Gene* (1989), p. 256.

fallacy aside, the most direct moral result would either be a condemnation of morals or the veneration of competition, without the least constraint.

Although, I think, such a tendency would actually follow, the view would not strictly logically be implied. Because even these nasty conclusions are based on the traditional assumption that morality should serve the common good. But why in a gene-Darwinian metaphysics should not one gene morally exploit other genes? If everything is 'allowed' even morality would be allowed—and by definition always interpreted as an exploitation.

I have conceded that some sociobiologists intended to make the egoistic tendencies explicit to transcend them at least in a limited way (⊖ above). Nevertheless, I think, it is inconsistent for pure gene-Darwinians to argue suddenly on the level of the whole or in terms of long term development, since the central claim is that it is an eternal biological (and thus social) law that there neither is (or can be) a larger whole nor a care for evolution in the long term.

Another more conclusive objection to my radical conclusions is that, if we grant that kin-selection and reciprocal altruism are parts of pure gene-Darwinism—an assumption which could be questioned¹⁰⁴—then at least the support of the closest relatives and of cooperating partners—as long as a future utility is expected—is in evolutionary terms 'reasonable' and may actually be fostered by this ontological view.¹⁰⁵

However, the focus of this paradigm and hence of a resulting morality is on the struggle for life, gene against gene, and, as an approximation, individual against individual.¹⁰⁶

Thirdly, according to the sociobiological paradigm there is only one 'currency'—survival (⊖ also firstly above). Dawkins states: "The currency used in the casino of evolution is survival, strictly gene survival, but for many purposes individual survival is a reasonable approximation."¹⁰⁷ Correspondingly Dawkins argued that all utility functions of all living bodies reduce to one. "Darwinian theory tells us that all survival is just a means to the end of gene propagation". "God's utility function" is maximising DNA survival.¹⁰⁸

Organisms and human individuals are regarded as mere vehicles, serving normally nothing else than the survival of those genes which constructed them. I think the focus on (gene-)survival may be the most important aspect of this approach if applied to ethics: E. O. Wilson concedes it as an unpleasant unavoidable result that "no species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history."¹⁰⁹ Hence it is the 'biological imperative to maximise the genetic fitness'⁹⁷ or to maximise the probability of surviving in future generations in as many copies as possible. It could be

¹⁰³ *Idem. River out of Eden* (1995), pp. 131, 133.

¹⁰⁴ ⊖ pp. 43 f., esp. p. 46.

¹⁰⁵ G. Vollmer stresses these positive aspects. *Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer evolutionären Ethik* (1993), p. 127.

¹⁰⁶ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 2.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁰⁸ R. Dawkins. *River Out of Eden* (1995), pp. 104-106, 124.

¹⁰⁹ E. O. Wilson. *On Human Nature* (1978/95), p. 2.

doubted whether this view, if it dominated common ‘morals’, would lead to a sustainable population development. (Imagine what the rich would do, if they adopted this moral.)

However, gene-Darwinism appears to know only one commandment, one moral principle. This commandment—like Christian natural law—is equally descriptive and normative; it claims to be an empirically found description of what we are essentially aiming at. Though essentialistic, the content of this commandment of course utterly differs from traditional approaches: “Thou shalt survive in the struggle for life.” More precisely: “Thou shalt strive to maximise the replication of thy genes with all thy means and thou shalt not ever have any scruples towards thy neighbours in achieving this purpose.”

The principle of survival or gene replication would replace traditional religious and philosophical principles and values, like love, piety, goodness, benevolence, *eudaimonia*, happiness, courage, justice, duty, respect, beauty and truthfulness. Hence this concept of morals or ethics generally contradicts most philosophical schools of ethics from Platonism, Aristotelianism, Kantianism¹¹⁰ to hedonism and utilitarianism. In particular it is in stark contrast to any form of ethics based on freedom or on rational consideration of what is good. Any intentionalism also seems utterly opposed to this approach. But a consequentialist act-utilitarian ethics which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers of people is clearly at odds with a gene-Darwinian ethics. Why care for happiness? Why care for others? Also, the refinement of culture or living conditions would have no intrinsic value. A gene-Darwinian ‘survival ethics’ appears at least in some regards to be consistent with Hobbes’ moral philosophy built only on self-love (though Hobbes also adopted a theory of social contracts) or with Nietzsche focusing on the ‘value for life’ and struggling against Christian ‘slave morality’.

It should be noted that a gene-Darwinian survival ethics is not concerned with the survival of groups, the survival of the whole species, or the survival of the idea of goodness. The only ‘normative’ purpose of evolution there is, is the unchangeable tendency to survive, especially of those genes acting as maximally selfish as possible. It is doubtful whether on such a basis only a general survival ethics could be built. “In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won’t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. [...] DNA neither cares nor knows. DNA just is. And we dance to its music.”¹¹¹

Though aspects of our daily *Lebenswelt* might have already supported the development of this paradigm (☛ pp. 191 f.), it is apparent that an ethics or a moral focusing on biology, competition and survival would in turn completely change our *Lebenswelt*. Although many questions will be left open, it seems obvious how such an approach would effect our treatment of the weak and wounded, who might not have much to offer in an ethics which is at best based on reciprocity. Even if promoters of an ‘ethics’, which is purely based on the sociobiological paradigm, might surpass my imagination in their

¹¹⁰ In the light of Kant’s own writings, a biologicistic interpretation of his *a priori* appears to be inappropriate.

¹¹¹ R. Dawkins. *River out of Eden* (1995), p. 133.

ability to develop a more complex and satisfying moral system, how would such an 'ethics', focusing only on biology, competition and survival, if popularised affect our lives?

2.2 Different Philosophical Attitudes Towards Sociobiology

There is a broad range of different views evaluating the claim of a 'sociobiologization' of ethics.

Here I do not review the long controversial history of evolutionary ethics (e. g. H. Spencer, J. Huxley or P. T. de Chardin); I rather confine myself to proposals made in the present context of the rise of the gene-Darwinian paradigm (on its historical background ⇨ part II).

Disputes have arisen as well in regard to the biological premisses of the sociobiological paradigm as in regard to the way ethical conclusions are drawn from this biological approach.¹¹² Here I shall mainly be concerned with the former more basic dispute, that is whether the strict sociobiological paradigm is regarded to be the only possible biological theory on which an ethics might be based. Later I shall discuss the problem that gene-Darwinian ethics has often been accused of committing a naturalistic fallacy when deriving ethical norms from biological 'facts' (⇨ pp. 65 f.). First, I shall sketch how some philosophers have criticised this approach. Secondly, I shall outline the positions of some other philosophers who apparently support sociobiological ethics, to point out that even they are not pure gene-Darwinians, but had to extend this paradigm, if they wanted to justify their often relatively moderate ethical conclusions.

a) *Philosophical Criticism of the Sociobiological Paradigm*

Within the mainstream of philosophy, sociobiology as a whole and particularly what I called 'sociobiological paradigm' (gene-Darwinism) is still often simply ignored. This may be interpreted as the strongest possible criticism. Indeed many philosophers regard the claim that ethics is a branch of evolutionary biology as too absurd to merit a considerable response.¹¹³

Nevertheless, since a 'naturalistic turn' took place in analytic philosophy (⇨ p. 196) it has become more acceptable to import models from biology also in the context of traditional epistemological or logical questions. Besides the rise of an explicit evolutionary epistemology, it generally became acceptable, for example, to mention, without further qualification, that complex human capacities simply evolved by 'natural selection'¹¹⁴, neglecting any structural argumentation, any closer scrutiny of the evolutionary process, any culture-gene-interaction (for example via sexual selection) etc.!

Moreover the flourishing field of philosophy of biology was established, partly owing to the increasing influence of gene-Darwinism. Philosophically this discipline has mainly grown out of analytic philosophy and is now discussing biological questions in depth, though usually still in isolation from

¹¹² See e. g. the anthologies: K. Bayertz (ed.), *Evolution und Ethik* (1993). W. Lütterfelds (ed.), *Evolutionäre Ethik zwischen Naturalismus und Idealismus* (1993). A. L. Caplan (ed.), *The Sociobiology Debate* (1978).

¹¹³ P. Singer mentions this as the dominant attitude: *The Expanding Circle* (1981), p. XI.

¹¹⁴ E. g.: W. v. Quine, *Epistemology Naturalised* (1968/1969), p. 90. *On Popper's Negative Methodology* (1974), p. 219.

other branches of philosophy. Some philosophers have embraced the sociobiological paradigm, others, partly in meticulous work, have shown difficulties of this paradigm. However, ignoring sociobiology has become difficult, as even critics conceded, because philosophers “cannot really complain if somebody tries to fill the vacuum they leave”¹¹⁵.

While some ignored the sociobiological paradigm, others met it with a broad range of explicit criticism. This spectrum ranges from approaches with a totally different metaphysical background to the discussion of single biological topics. Here only a first introduction to some objections made by philosophers can be given.

One group has insisted on a neo-Aristotelian, or even neo-Thomistic approach, within philosophy and biology. In Germany especially the philosophers Robert Spaemann and Reinhard Löw have formulated a harsh criticism of the sociobiological paradigm and of Darwinism in general, arguing radically in favour of a rehabilitation of a teleological view of nature.¹¹⁶ Philosophers not directly interested in evolutionary theory, have also proposed a rehabilitation of the Aristotelian *causa formalis*, for example to solve the mind-body problem, understood as a built-in problem of a Cartesian understanding of matter.¹¹⁷

Some philosophers have also stressed that a theory of evolution which is to lead to acceptable ethical results must incorporate the concept of freedom from the outset.¹¹⁸ Some steps in a formulation of such a theory were made by Hans Jonas.¹¹⁹ Also, for example, Anthony O’Hear argued against the gene-Darwinian claim that evolutionary ethics, evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary aesthetics could give an exhaustive account of the true, the good and the beautiful. The rational human being could to a certain extent transcend its biological roots.¹²⁰ Although O’Hear regards an exclusively sociobiological approach to human nature as inconsistent with his position, he focuses on defending traditional values in the cultural sphere, instead of challenging in detail the contradicting biological theory itself.¹²¹ (Beginning from the other end, but I think with the same goal, I will confine myself mainly to the discussion of the biological basis.) For example Nagel also argued that an application of evolutionary theory in the field of culture is not acceptable.¹²²

Critics often turned against the (neo-)Darwinian passive understanding of evolution. They criticised the fact that organisms were understood as mere vehicles and also opposed the emphasis on an

¹¹⁵ M. Midgley. *Beast and Man* (1978/1995), p. xl.

¹¹⁶ A PhD-thesis of R. Isak gives an excellent overview of their theories concerning evolution: *Evolutionismus und Teleologie: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem teleologischen Denken Robert Spaemanns und Reinhard Löws [...]* (1990/1991). Republished as: *Evolution ohne Ziel?* (1992), pp. 53-186.

¹¹⁷ E. g.: M. McGinn. *Real Things and the Mind Body Problem* (1999, unpubl.).

¹¹⁸ P. Koslowski, Ph. Kreuzer, R. Löw (ed.). *Evolution und Freiheit* (1984).

¹¹⁹ H. Jonas. *Evolution und Freiheit* (1984). *Organismus und Freiheit. Ansätze zu einer philosophischen Biologie* (1973/1994), e. g. pp. 17 f.

¹²⁰ A. O’Hear. *Beyond Evolution. Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation* (1997). Also: *Has the Theory of Evolution any Relevance to Philosophy?* (1987).

¹²¹ A. O’Hear. *Beyond Evolution* (1997), p. 141.

¹²² T. Nagel. *The View from Nowhere* (1986), pp. 78-82.

adaptation to an externally given environment. Instead they tried to reinterpret organisms rather as subjects than as objects of evolution. A merely reactive understanding of phenotypes ignored the creative, form-giving and spontaneous activity of these evolutionary agents. Recently, for example, the German philosopher Weingarten wrote a book on this topic.¹²³ Within the influential Anglo-American philosophy of biology, for example, David Hull criticised the gene-Darwinian vehicle view of organisms (despite, I think, taking adaptationism and some other metaphysical tenets of gene-Darwinism on board, ☞ pp. 217 f.) The general philosophical criticism of the passive understanding of organisms has been influenced by the work of many historians of science and some biologists, like Gould, Lewontin and Goodwin (☞ pp. 145 f.).

Many critics did not advocate the need for a general change in the predominantly Darwinian evolutionary theory, but only tried to excoriate the sociobiological paradigm. Mary Midgley, for example, has on the one hand always emphasized the evolutionary nature of man, on the other hand she has trenchantly resisted the claim to biologise ethics along egoistic gene-Darwinian lines and in several publications vividly opposed the ‘gene-atomism’ (☞ pp. 106 f.) of today’s sociobiology.¹²⁴ In *Beast and Man* (1978) she based her own account on the work of the Nobel laureates K. Lorenz and N. Tinbergen, who have rather favoured an approach focusing on populations, regarding truly altruistic behaviour as a usual inner specific trait. Midgley has considered this approach to be consistent with her emphasis on the irreducibility and plurality of motives.¹²⁵

Within the philosophy of biology detailed analyses of specific biological problems, especially of the sociobiological paradigm, have been made.¹²⁶ The unit of selection became the most discussed and controversial topic, considering whether genes, organisms, gene-pools, groups, species or ecosystems might be the relevant entities of evolution. Hull and Ghiselin, for example, have early advocated that species and not only genes may also be regarded as evolutionary ‘individuals’.^{☞ 843} The philosopher Elliott Sober (often allied with the biologist David Sloan Wilson) has also opposed Dawkins’ thesis that the gene is the one and only unit of selection and alternatively advocated the possibility of certain group selectionist models and the possibility of a true altruism on a biological basis.¹²⁷ In philosophy of

¹²³ M. Weingarten. *Organismen—Objekte oder Subjekte der Evolution* (1993).

¹²⁴ M. Midgley. *Beast and Man* (1995/78), pp. xvi-xxii (revised edition), 89-103, 128-134. In a discussion in the *Journal of Philosophy* Midgley in *Gene-juggling* (1979) formulated one of the most acrimonious critiques of R. Dawkins’ *Selfish Gene* (1976). She reacted to an article of J. L. Mackie’s, *Law of the Jungle* (1978), which she understood to be Dawkinsian (though this could be seen differently, ☞ p. 46). R. Dawkins keenly struck back in his article *In Defence of Selfish Genes* (1981), which in turn was answered by Midgley in the more guarded but still critical article *Selfish Genes and Social Darwinism* (1983). Midgley’s recent book with the ambiguous title *The Ethical Primate* (1995/94) is rather concerned with more general topics; but in regard of sociobiology she still maintains her objections, pp. 71-91.

¹²⁵ M. Midgley. *Beast and Man* (1995/78); on her biological position: pp. xv (revised edition), 19, 23, 138 (also: *The Ethical Primate* (1995/94), pp. 130-132); on her understanding of motives: pp. 16, 105-115, 134, 142, 152, 168.

¹²⁶ See e. g. the anthologies: D. L. Hull, M. Ruse (ed.). *The Philosophy of Biology* (1998); C. Allen, M. Bekoff, G. Lauder (ed.). *Nature’s Purposes. Analyses of Function and Design in Biology* (1998); D. S. Bendall (ed.). *Evolution from Molecules to Men* (1983); U. J. Jensen, R. Harré, (ed.). *The Philosophy of Evolution* (1981); M. Ruse (ed.). *What the Philosophy of Biology is* (1989); A. L. Caplan (ed.), *The Sociobiology Debate* (1978). See also: E. Lloyd. *The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory* (1988/1994).

¹²⁷ E. g.: E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. *Unto Others* (1998), E. Sober. *What is Evolutionary Altruism* (1998/1988).

biology also many other aspects were scrutinised, whether they are present in or absent from the sociobiological paradigm. Some keywords have been: adaptation, altruism, development, function and progress. A crucial objection to Darwinism has always been that some central propositions have been seen as formulated in a circular way¹²⁸.

Since there is a rising flood of literature in all specialised areas of philosophy of biology, it would not be possible for me, treating as well the history as the philosophy of this topic, to consider all relevant sources in each field on my own. Nevertheless, I shall come back to some of these topics during the further work in much more detail. In this section only some objections are being mentioned to show that gene-Darwinism is not above criticism.

Also in **biology** there is a range of positions, which have challenged the strict interpretation of the sociobiological paradigm and inspired and encouraged the philosophical proposals. Some biologists of the evolutionary synthesis, like E. Mayr, have opposed the *Selfish Gene*'s point of view, and have advocated that species and whole populations are the unit of macro-evolution.¹²⁹

Especially S. J. Gould and R. Lewontin argued in favour of macroevolution and against pan-adaptationism.¹³⁰ Their critique of 'ultra-Darwinism' became almost a critique of Darwinism in general. Gould and Eldredge in their palaeontological theory of punctuated equilibrium emphasised an independence of macroevolution and a rather saltatory view of evolution.¹³¹ Gould, like also Lewontin, turned against the idea of genetic determination, favouring an idea of potentiality.¹³²

B. Goodwin and his research group even favour a totally different approach of 'rational morphology'.¹³³ This approach openly resembles a rather romantic or transcendental framework in biology (☞ pp. 96 f.).

Later on a more detailed description of alternative biological approaches will be given (☞ pp. 145 f.).

Though some philosophical (and biological) criticism might indeed have been formulated in an ill-considered way, it seems to be mistaken to dismiss all basic criticism from the outset as a reaction of those "over-excited by political misunderstanding"¹³⁴.

b) *Support of Sociobiology as a General Framework of Ontology and Ethics*

There is also a spectrum of supporters of a sociobiological paradigm, consistently advocating its relevance for ethics. I have given a radical account of a gene-Darwinian ethics above, inspired mainly from writings of some biological proponents of the sociobiological paradigm.

But philosophers too have tried to face the scientific 'facts' and to build up an ontology and an ethics out of these elements. I will here mention only three influential examples.¹³⁵

Daniel Dennett in *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995) takes a radical Darwinian and Dawkinsian stance. In some passages of this book he also warns us that Darwin's idea might be dangerous and that some authors may overemphasise a biological determinism, where a cultural explanation would be more

¹²⁸ ☞ literature in footnote 1069.

¹²⁹ E. Mayr. E. g.: *Animal Species and Evolution* (1963), p. 621. *One long Argument* (1991), p. 145.

¹³⁰ S. J. Gould; R. C. Lewontin. *The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm* (1979).

¹³¹ S. J. Gould, N. Eldredge. *Punctuated Equilibria* (1977).

¹³² E. g.: S. J. Gould. *Ever since Darwin* (1991/1973), pp. 251 f.

¹³³ B. Goodwin, G. Webster, J. Wayne-Smith. *The 'evolutionary paradigm' and constructional biology* (1992).
G. Webster, B. Goodwin. *Form and Transformation* (1996).

¹³⁴ R. Dawkins. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 61.

adequate.¹³⁶ Nonetheless, Dennett in many respects favours a biological explanation and an approach to culture which in regard of the employed processes is likewise Darwinian itself.¹³⁷ At least in this sense he radically draws the conclusion that to him there is “no denying, at this point, that Darwin’s idea is a universal solvent, capable of cutting right to the heart of everything in sight.”¹³⁸

Peter Singer in his book *The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology* (1981) initially almost totally accepts the ontological background of the sociobiological paradigm.¹³⁹ But then Singer argued (reminiscent of Moore’s argumentation) that there is an unbridgeability of facts and values. To him, ethical decisions still have to be based on reason and are only informed by sociobiology.¹⁴⁰

Although I finally do agree with Singer in his belief of a certain independence of reason, I think, as indicated earlier, that this conviction could not be warranted solely on the basis of the sociobiological paradigm. If the reductionism of the sociobiological paradigm were taken seriously, how would one defend the claim of a true autonomy of reason?

Singer gives the example of the autonomous decision of foster parents to bring up children from a poor economic and social background (pp. 170 f.).

I agree that a photo of these children may indeed mobilise our tribal instincts to help them. Even following the sociobiological paradigm it would be possible that we have such impulses. According to this paradigm such emotional inclinations to help people we are acquainted with, could evolve only in groups of very close relatives. Still, at first it may seem possible to build a more universally orientated ethics on such basic tendencies of behaviour.

But foster parents who have become gene-Darwinians, would, I think, abandon their old benevolent views. Understanding themselves now as ‘gene machines’ they would come to the conclusion that their former impulse to help poor children one is acquainted with today does not lead to the maximal reproduction of their own genes. So why should they now still trust their ‘misled feelings’ or such ‘non-adaptive side-effects’? In my opinion, they—thinking of cuckoos in the nest—would not the least be motivated to continue their involvement as foster parents.

Hence, I think Singer implicitly combines sociobiological premisses with premisses from other traditions, advocating freedom of rationality. According to gene-Darwinian metaphysics genes build the only relevant strata. This sociobiological paradigm would interpret rationality as another part of the organismic vehicle, serving nothing else than the replication of selfish genes. In such a framework I consider it as impossible to suddenly claim an independence of reason. No ‘logic of justice’ moulds rationality, but only the selfish interests of genes. Despite some affinity with Singer’s compromise between the sociobiological paradigm and freedom of rationality, on gene-Darwinian grounds I do not think that his position could be warranted.

In my opinion the possibility of emergent and independent properties needs to be already built into the core of our ontology (☞ part IV).

¹³⁵ I do not discuss Richards’ benevolent evolutionary ethics, since it is not gene-Darwinian. R. J. Richards. *Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior* (1987). Critically see also: M. Ruse. *Evolutionary Ethics* (1995), pp. 273-280.

¹³⁶ D. Dennett. *Darwin’s Dangerous Idea* (1995), pp. 485-493.

¹³⁷ In his inner-biological attitude he is clearly a gene-Darwinian, nevertheless he should rather be seen as an advocate of what I will later discuss as ‘Process Darwinism’ (☞ pp. 214 f.).

¹³⁸ D. Dennett. *Darwin’s Dangerous Idea* (1995), p. 521.

¹³⁹ I have to concede that Singer briefly mentions the possibility of group selection. *Expanding Circle* (1981), pp. 18-22.

¹⁴⁰ P. Singer. *The Expanding Circle* (1981), pp. 77, 90 f.; Singer’s ‘inner logic of ethical thinking’ here might even remind us of the idealist concept of an inner logic of the unfolding of reason.

Michael Ruse has influentially argued that Darwinism, and especially the sociobiological paradigm, has to be taken seriously.¹⁴¹ Although Ruse in principle would also allow different levels of understanding above genes and although he even admits that the ‘overall perspective of sociobiologists’ has hidden metaphysical or ideologically commitments towards methodological reductionism, he finally takes a stance in favour of an exclusive focus on genic selection. Instead of criticising gene-selection as one-sided, he argues that it has turned out to be a highly fruitful scientific strategy.¹⁴² Upon discussing cases of objective epistemic scientific standards which had ruled out a cultural bias Ruse mentions—one-sidedly—group selectionist models.¹⁴³ Ruse even regards himself as an ‘ultra-Darwinian’, who takes “adaptation to be the all-pervasive fact” and “natural selection to be the beginning and the end of causation”.¹⁴⁴

Though Ruse appears to be one of the most thorough advocates also of an application of the sociobiological paradigms to ethics, I think, he recently tried—at least half-heartedly—to moderate some of the radical conclusions I have indicated above (☹ pp. 48 f.).

Ruse radically advocates that “ethics is an adaptation, put in place by our genes as selected in the struggle for life, to aid each and every one of us individually”.¹⁴⁵ There is neither ideal mathematical moral truth nor “extrasomatic moral truth”. Instead “moral premises [...] are the result of an idiosyncratic genetic history”. In this sense ethics, according to Ruse “is without justification”, but a “collective illusion of our genes”.¹⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Ruse argues that “biology shows that internal moral premises do exist”, they are feelings about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ “in fact brought about by ultimately biological processes.”¹⁴⁷

In some paragraphs Ruse appears to argue that on this basis a universal moral might be build, which forbids killing and even commands to love your neighbour as yourself.¹⁴⁸ Such a strong ethical claim could, I think, not at all be warranted, if Ruse truly would base morals solely on the sociobiological paradigm, exclusively centred around egoistic survival. A thorough gene-Darwinian would have to argue that a truly benevolent attitude towards groups does not any more serve ones gene’s survival—as we do not only live in groups of close relatives. Hence, nothing would speak against dropping a benevolent attitude (apart from hypocrisy). Even Ruse, in a slightly different context, states that it will weaken our morality if we find out that the genes have only deceived us into thinking that there is an objective morality.¹⁴⁹

Ruse may have felt this inconsistency and in *Evolutionary Ethics* (1995) it seems to me that he has implicitly slightly modified his biological starting point. Though still an adaptationist, he almost seems in some passages to have become a constructivist (still with Darwinian leanings), stressing not the adaptation of evolutionary lines to an external environment, but an inner dynamics of the communities themselves.¹⁵⁰ Though I support such a view, I think that this is in contradiction to gene-Darwinism and even to the core of what came to be known today as Darwinism in general (☹ pp. 107, 348 f.). Ruse, historically versed, has himself often described the essence of Darwinism, also in the case of human evolution, to be ‘natural selection’.¹⁵¹

Hence it seems that Ruse may implicitly partly have adopted an extended biological basis too.

¹⁴¹ M. Ruse. *Taking Darwin Seriously* (1986).

¹⁴² M. Ruse. *Sociobiology and Reductionism* (1989), pp. 59-60, 64-65, 78-79. Also: *Mystery of Mysteries. Is Evolution a Social Construction* (1999), pp. 128-129.

¹⁴³ M. Ruse. *Mystery of Mysteries. Is Evolution a Social Construction* (1999), esp. Chap. 12, esp. p. 249. Though Ruse keeps almost silent on external motivation of Dawkins, he conceded that not only Gould’s and Lewontin’s position and style, but also Wilson’s may be culturally based. Chap. 7-9, esp. p. 191. See also *Being Mean to Steve* (2000).

¹⁴⁴ M. Ruse. *David Hull through two decades* (1989), p. 9, see also p. 11.

¹⁴⁵ M. Ruse. *Evolutionary Ethics* (1995), p. 257; also: M. Ruse; E. O. Wilson. *Moral Philosophy as Applied Science* (1986), p. 173.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, (1986), p. 173, also pp. 186, 187; (1995), pp. 257, 268, also p. 291.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, (1986), pp. 174, 179.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, (1995), pp. 257, 287, 264. Rather relativistic statements: pp. 271, 290-291.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, (1986), p. 179; (1995), p. 257.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, (1995), pp. 290-291.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, (1986), pp. 174, 175, 176, 187.

In conclusion, even apparent proponents of a sociobiological ethics appear to use concepts which are in contradiction with strict gene-Darwinism (☹ also pp. 140, 213).

In the next section I shall try to develop an approach which already clearly transcends gene-Darwinism, though still following a similar line of argument. It should render the ethically slightly more moderate conceptions of some apparent proponents of gene-Darwinism, like Dennett, understandable. Moreover, I shall try to extend the extended version as far as possible, to find out how a more satisfying account of ethics might be achieved.

2.3 Meme ‘Altruisms’? — A Further Extension of the Sociobiological Paradigm

a) *Memes — A Limited Comeback of the Idea of Logos*

In this section the concept of memes will be introduced and I shall additionally propose two memetic mechanisms. Finally I will access the ethical implications of this now truly extended approach.

As has been seen, conventional sociobiology tries to reduce apparent biological forms of ‘altruism’ to the concept of genetic ‘egoism’, dismissing for example group altruism. Conceding that we regard kin selection (☹ p. 44) and reciprocal ‘altruism’ (☹ p. 46) as theorems of gene-Darwinism—which I have questioned—, at least these two forms of egoistic apparent ‘altruism’ are theoretically viable.

Dawkins in *The Selfish Gene* has briefly introduced another basic concept, that of so called **memes**.¹⁵² Memes—analogueous to genes—are replicators on the cultural level, “the smallest elements that replicate themselves with reliability and fecundity.” They are bits of knowledge, of human practices or, I think, could be objectified in an object. They jump from brain to brain or can be photocopied. Memes are defined as standing in competition and as evolving solely by natural selection.¹⁵³

Although the concept of a meme (‘the meme of a meme’) seems not to be very common in sociobiology, it has become a prolific replicator in the texts of philosophers, like D. Hull¹⁵⁴, or D. Dennett¹⁵⁵, and psychologists, like H. Plotkin.¹⁵⁶

Although its history is often completely ignored, the aspects of the concept *meme*, (seemingly) stressing an independence of a higher level of information, are very old. The meme of a meme has a much longer history than its new name. Its history reaches back at least two and a half thousand years to the concept of *nous* (partly also to the concept of *logos*), presumably best translated with *spirit*, also in an individualistic sense with *mind*. Note the same etymology of *mind* and *meme*. Germanic *muni* meant spirit (I always liked that my own forename “*Momme*” should derive from this venerable word) and is related to Greek *mimneskein*, French *même* and English *mind*, *memory* and *meme*. *Nous* often

¹⁵² R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), chapter 11, pp. 189-201, *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), pp. 110-2.

¹⁵³ D. Dennett. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995), pp. 344-345.

¹⁵⁴ E. g.: D. Hull. *The Metaphysics of Evolution* (1989), p. 7.

¹⁵⁵ D. Dennett. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995), pp. 341-370.

referred to the largely independent inherent process of culture, to the history of ideas (*eidōs* in its nominalist or realist sense).

In Plato's *Theatetus* and *Symposium* thoughts are understood to be the children of the soul and philosophy has much to do with the difficulties of pregnancy. In Christian philosophy spirit (lat.: *spiritus*) has been linked to theism, spirit proper (*spiritus rectus*) was individually and supra-individually directed towards God, as in Greek philosophy *nous* and *logos* were not only opposed to nature (*physis*), but were often conceived as a process of teleological rational unfolding. Though *nous* also was understood in the sense of static Platonic ideas, which could be grasped by individuals, also neo-Platonic influences (as in the reception of Aristotle) seem to have contributed to more dynamic and collective interpretation.

To the Hegelians—here resembling neo-Platonists—philosophy as a whole is centred around the notion of spirit (*Geist*). *Geist* to Hegel is processual, already in nature but mainly in history. Hegel distinguishes between the subjective spirit, focusing on individual reflective processes, the objective spirit, focusing on the supra-individual historical reflective processes, and finally the absolute spirit, reflecting freely on the highest values and the process of reflection itself.

At the turn of the 20th century Dilthey tried to re-establish the concept of a cultural objective spirit (*objektiver Geist*). Ideas can be objectified for example also in architecture. In the following cultural philosophical movement the label *objektiver Geist* was shortened to *Geist* again, but was still concerned not with individual psychology but intellectual and cultural history. Correspondingly, becoming a true person was understood as adopting culture, as the cultivation of mind. Despite the rise of biologism at the time of the Nazis, the notions of *Geisteswissenschaften* and *Naturwissenschaften* in German still refer to the academic disciplines either concerned with nature or with spirit (culture).

However, one need not to be Hegelian to argue that there is a history of ideas; the history of ideas, though young as academic discipline, has in any case since long been an accepted part of philosophy and history.

Though Dawkins' concept of a meme resembles the old concept of *nous* or spirit in claiming a process of cultural transmission of immaterial information¹⁵⁷, it strongly differs in other respects.

Firstly, the original notion of *nous* is narrowed down by the notion of memes, abandoning its rational, normative and teleological connotations. However, this is often done by modern authors.

Secondly, memes are often conceived in an atomistic way as totally separate, stable and independent entities. (Moreover they are often understood as genotypes distinguishable from their phenotypes.)

Thirdly, memes are 'selfish' memes, only 'aiming at' their self-reproduction and developing mechanistically in a strictly Darwinian way by blind variation and external selection, resulting in differential survival and hence in a tree of conceptual decent.¹⁵⁸

Most aspects, especially those mentioned in the second and third point, have been criticised.¹⁵⁹ For example, it might be difficult, as a truly Darwinian theory, to replace all phenomena of intellectual synthesis by processes of selection.

However, provided such a memetic extension of sociobiology would be able to claim the independence of the cultural level, it would—though still partly Darwinian and Dawkinsian—clearly transcend, and I think improve, the biologicistic gene-Darwinian research programme. In my terminology it would not be gene-Darwinism any more but the simplest type of Universal Process Darwinism.¹⁶⁰ The concept of memes seems to reintroduce an independence of culture, on which the sociobiological

¹⁵⁶ H. Plotkin. *Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge* (1994), pp. 215-27, esp. p. 218.

¹⁵⁷ Note how closely the term *information* resemblances the Greek term *eidōs*, form; ☞ also pp. 250 f., 307 f.

¹⁵⁸ ☞ I later provide a metaphysical justification of such a view, which I later will refute again, pp. 207 f.

¹⁵⁹ E. g.: D. Holdcroft, H. Lewis. *Memes, Minds and Evolution* (2000).

¹⁶⁰ ☞ the sections on the historical parallels of Darwinism with other subject areas (pp. 160 f.), on Universal Process Darwinism (pp. 214 f.) and on the critique of process reductionism (pp. 324 f.).

paradigm actually had declared war. A ontological dualism would be revived in new terms; in a sense Descartes enters through the back door.

But I think it would be consequent to even go one step further. I want to add two types of apparent ‘altruism’ of individual humans based on memetic ‘egoism’. Although I have not found this proposal elsewhere, it is so obvious, that I imagine that it will presumably have been introduced by someone else before me.¹⁶¹

Although memetic kin selection and memetic reciprocal ‘altruism’ *almost* follow from the viewpoint of ‘selfish memes’, I would stress, as I have done for the biological stratum, that it needs further conditions to effect these additional processes (starting conditions, recognition of kinship or similarity etc.).

Types of ‘Altruism’ Based on Memetic ‘Egoism’	
<i>Meme-‘Altruism’ based on Relatedness or Similarity</i>	Corresponding to kin selection on the biological level, memes might ‘egoistically’ support their relatives in the same brain or in different brains, if they were identical (or similar enough). One might formulate a mathematical inequality analogous to Hamilton’s (\Rightarrow p. 45), where memes would replace genes. One might even go one step further. In principle one may think of <i>Meme-Similarity Altruism</i> , where also similarity replaces relatedness. But one should note that this would transcend the Darwinian stress on the only branching line of descent without synthesis. In either case, information would support a copy of itself outside of itself. I think some phenomena indeed seem to be explainable with this proposal. In academia, for example, the support of adherents of the same school.
<i>Reciprocal Meme-‘Altruism’</i>	Corresponding to genetic reciprocal altruism, this theory would predict reciprocal ‘egoistic’ support of memes. Analogous to the biological problem this could only evolve in a meme pool where reciprocal altruism of some sort becomes an evolutionarily stable strategy and is not overrun by concepts, which do not reciprocate the support.

Comparatively to gene-Darwinism the memetic reintroduction of the concept of *nous* and its refinement above appears to me to be a positive development. Many intellectual phenomena may already be explainable in this theory with its beautifully simple structure. However, in the next section it will become apparent that the ethical results and premisses of even this extended version have to be considered critically.

When later I will criticise this conception in detail in order to transcend it, I do not mean that I oppose these concepts completely. I can well imagine that they turn out to be fruitful. I even tend to integrate them—with modifications—into my own ontological proposal. But I will show that it is utterly wrong to take atomistic Darwinism, whether genetic or memetic to be a complete metaphysics, directing theoretical and practical reason. Instead my approach will neither be atomistic nor holistic and will also be built around the metaphor not of an unchanging eternal Darwinian law of nature, but of the evolution of semi-autonomous evolutionary processes.

¹⁶¹ See M. v. Sydow. *Evolutionismus und Utilitarismus* (1993), pp. 25-26. I also supported ‘group selectionist’ conceptual ‘altruism’. At that time I did not realise that this would not be in line with the atomism dominating the discussed view.

b) *Problems of the Extended Genetic-Memetic Approach as a Basis for Ethics*

Though we seemingly have left gene monism behind us, I am going to argue now, that the meme conception is not reconcilable with strict gene-Darwinism, even if restricted to the biological sphere. Moreover, I shall argue that even if this were possible, this approach—without further modifications—would still deteriorate common morals to a tactic to best ensure the survival of one's genes and memes. I think this will be the case because it only partly changes the first and second of the outlined tendencies of a purely gene-Darwinian ethics (☞ p. 50).

Firstly, the meme-concept initially seems to overcome biological determinism. Even Dawkins indicates in *The Selfish Gene* that he regards an independence of the memetic level to be possible.¹⁶² I would of course appreciate the concept of a certain independence of *nous* or culture, and in this regard, I think, we may indeed gain some insights from some aspects of this approach. Nevertheless, in two regards such a belief appears to be inconsistent even only with inner-biological gene-Darwinism.

a) Gene-Darwinism itself is an enterprise of thorough downward reduction. I will later distinguish its gene-atomism, its germ-line reductionism and its process reductionism (☞ pp. 140). Within a generally (downward) reductive paradigm it will be implausible suddenly to justify an autonomy of higher levels.¹⁶³ Within the individual, selfish genes would be regarded to be more basic than memes (though I think this is not necessarily so). Memes will be understood to replicate only at mercy of these genes. This would for example imply that humans still would seldom propose something which does not directly serve their gene's survival. Since the concept of an inner logic of memes is also completely alien to this merely selectionist account (apart from my proposals above), memes, like other organismic organs, would still mainly be understood as being vehicles for genes in their struggle for life. Human communication would still be regarded to be at the service of the genes, corresponding to Dawkins' and Krebs' understanding of "all of animal communication as manipulation of signal-receiver by signal-sender"¹⁶⁴. At this point it seems that one is forced to join the advocates of orthodox gene-Darwinism, who reproach Dawkins for being inconsistent and a turncoat if he asserts an autonomy of memes.¹⁶⁵

Nevertheless, if we neglected the utterly downward reductionist framework, I think, it would be possible to argue that even the simple process of natural selection could in principle 'bring life' into the ontological level of concepts. However, in my opinion there is no reason to assume that life has been restricted to this simple process. But because the whole topic of autonomy has normally not been elaborated in this context and as it is indeed difficult to advocate autonomy in the reductionist spirit of gene-Darwinism, I consider this meme concept on a mere gene-Darwinian basis not yet stable.

¹⁶² R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), pp. 191-3, 201, 331; *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), pp. 110-2.

¹⁶³ See e. g.: K. Bayertz. *Autonomie und Biologie* (1993), p. 336.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹⁶⁵ R. Dawkins. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), p. 110.

b) I find this conception is also unstable the other way round. If indeed a certain cultural autonomy could be claimed—as I think—, it would undermine the radical gene-Darwinian polemics in human biology.

If downward reductionism would generally be weakened by introducing another level, it would—despite specifically biological problems (☹ pp. 258 f.)—also become more questionable within biology.

In addition, human phylogenesis would have to be conceived differently. The polemics that our emotional system and our limbic system evolved by ‘natural selection’, would then be regarded to be an unwarranted and dangerous simplification. In my view our emotional system seems to have partly evolved by cultural ‘selection’, mostly via sexual selection, rather than by natural selection. Moreover, in this context the strict Darwinian concept of selection may have to be challenged. But allowing for some cultural influence on gene survival, our genes would not necessarily be as selfish as they might be, since they also are in part moulded by culture. The resulting view would indeed be utterly different from the popularised selfish gene biology.¹⁶⁶

In summary, it will be at least difficult on inner-biologically gene-Darwinian grounds to sustain the independence of memes. However, if this were be possible, gene-Darwinism would be undermined. (We already see a tendency of gene-Darwinism to transcend itself.)

Moreover, as far as biological determinism might be reduced, another problem would arise. One of the main motivations to develop evolutionary naturalism has been the hope of resolving the modern epistemological problem of truth and reference, dominating philosophy since Descartes, by an objective theory of correspondence. But as far as an independence of the meme-level would be conceded, evolutionary epistemology would need to become a historical epistemology (which I consider necessary). But, in this case the traditional epistemological problem would arise again. Independent as the historical cultural level would be, one would again lose the correspondence of the appearances to the things in themselves, which one hoped to gain by the concept of adaptation. Accordingly, already today the discourse on evolutionary epistemology, is starting to reduplicate the whole range of traditional epistemological positions, from realism to non-realism.¹⁶⁷ I think that the Darwinian inspiration in this discourse ought to be and will be melted with conceptions of different, even idealistic, traditions. A new synthesis needs to be reached.¹⁶⁸

Secondly, competition would still be the only basic driving force of biological and cultural evolution. Certainly, the extended meme approach leaves more room for cooperation on the level of individuals. Nevertheless, cooperation would still not be based on the notion of the good, but would be pursued only to reproduce ones own genes and memes maximally, regardless of their content. The utterly competitive emphasis would still be due to the atomism and process-Darwinism dominating this approach. It will be

¹⁶⁶ E. O. Wilson *On Human Nature* (1978/95). Wilson together with C. J. Lumsden in a more profound work. *Genes, Mind, and Culture* (1981), appear to have advocated a less one-sided approach of the co-evolution of genes and memes.

¹⁶⁷ On evolutionary epistemology and Universal Darwinian Processism, ☹ pp. 202 f.

D. T. Campbell and K. Lorenz introduced the notion of *hypothetical realism*, which has found many followers: K. Lorenz. *Die Rückseite des Spiegels* (1973), pp. 17-20, 303. G. Vollmer. *Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie* (1975), pp. 34-40; *Was können wir wissen? Band 1* (1988), pp. 285-290; R. G. Meyers. *Evolution as a ground for realism* (1990); R. Millikan, *Language, White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice* (1993) [Quoted in B. Pollard. *The Nature of Rule-Following* (1996)]. Recently non-realist positions have been formulated. E. g.: D. Campbell. *Epistemological Roles for selection theory* (1990); M. Ruse. *Does Evolutionary Epistemology Imply Realism?* (1990).

¹⁶⁸ ☹ also p. 406.

shown in this work that the radicalness of this emphasis is to be challenged even within the biotic stratum and, of course, even more in the cultural stratum.¹⁶⁹

In the further text I shall sometimes make use of the word *logoi*. *Logoi* as the Greek diminutive form of the old philosophical notion of *logos* should denote concepts or theories with a certain life of their own, but not to be interpreted in a radically atomistic and Darwinian way.

In regard to the **third point**, the only measure which exists for Darwinism, for genes and memes alike, is short term survival (☉ pp. 348). The notion of sustainability is, I think, opposed to a Darwinian concept of evolution, which in principle only cares for the moment (☉ pp. 386 f.). The concept of the unchangeable blindness of this process will also be challenged in this work (☉ pp. 361 f.).

Moreover the notion of goodness is completely missing, as there are no 'higher' levels at all. There is no intrinsic good. Each entity *de facto* simply strives for its own survival. Only a few philosophers will resist committing a naturalistic fallacy, whereas common sense would, I think, simply conclude that each entity essentially strives and thus ought to strive for survival (☉ p. 65). The Thou (e. g. in the sense of Buber) or the Other (e. g. in the sense of Levinas) has in this conception no intrinsic value at all (☉ pp. 406 f.), as far as it does not benefit the survival or the reproduction of the entity in question. Based on the 'principle of egoism' living entities are defined by a caring for themselves, altruism by definition is explained by egoism.

Despite the improvements of the extended gene-meme theory (of which I will make use in my own ontological proposal), I think it is not yet possible to build a satisfying ethical system on these still atomistic and Darwinian grounds. The meme concept seems to be most helpful to overcome biologism, but I think it is actually inconsistent with biological gene-Darwinism, the main object of investigation in this work. Even if it would be possible to formulate a non-biologistic meme theory compatible with gene-Darwinism, I think the mainly competitive spirit focusing only on survival would still exacerbate morals.

2.4 Naturalistic Fallacy?

Because not having achieved an ontology which is consistent with inner-biological gene-Darwinism and with traditional higher ethical aspirations, we turn to the question whether a descriptive science could anyhow provide normative ethical standards.

Many sociobiologists recoil from drawing ethical conclusions from their biological theory and have resisted Wilson's harsh claim that ethics should become a branch of evolutionary theory. The ethical implications are too much in contradiction with ethical common sense. For example, would there be any reason to care for the bodily or mentally incapable? Even Dawkins states: "I am not advocating a morality based on evolution" and in a footnote he distances himself from "the government of the new

¹⁶⁹ For my critique of gene-atomism, ☉ pp. 259 f.; on the melting of ideas, ☉ e. g. p. 354. Also process reductionism and

right, which has elevated meanness and selfishness to the status of ideology".¹⁷⁰ P. Singer, who, as we have seen, advocates a comparatively moderate ethics only somehow informed by biology, distances himself from bridging the "gap between facts and values"¹⁷¹.

The accusation of committing a 'naturalistic fallacy' has been the most common objection to a naturalisation of ethics. The Cambridge philosopher H. Sidgwick initiated objections against Spencer's naturalistic ethics¹⁷². But only Sidgwick's disciple G. E. Moore in his *Principia Ethica* fully elaborated the objection to any naturalistic fallacy (even also to Sidgwick's hedonism).¹⁷³

To Moore the predicate *good* could not be reduced to another term, like *more evolved*, or *pleasure*. To him the notion *good* is simple, unanalysable and indefinable.¹⁷⁴ Although we are here only concerned with evolutionary ethics, it should be noted that Moore considers any definition of *good* by another notion a *naturalistic fallacy*.

From the viewpoint of analyses of language based on formal logic, Moore's line of argument appears to be valid beyond all doubt: from a descriptive 'is' or 'is-not' premises it is not possible to draw prescriptive 'ought to' or 'ought not to' conclusions.

But against the background of other ontologies also different views have been and, I think, could be proposed. The separation of *is* and *ought* refers back to I. Kant's¹⁷⁵—and already D. Hume's¹⁷⁶—distinction of *Praktischer Vernunft* and *Theoretischer Vernunft*. In a way it might be traced back to R. Descartes, and to the earlier concepts of a free *alter deus*, and a determined *machina mundi* (☉ pp. 80 f.). I think, besides logical reasons, Kantians were inclined to stress this distinction, to secure ethics from Newtonian physics, increasingly interpreted in a materialistic way. Kantians, though adopting Newtonism in a transformed aprioric sense, could still found ethics on subjective freedom. Nevertheless, Kant in his *Critique of Judgement* tried to unify the separated parts of reason (☉ p. 86).

But the history of philosophy shows approaches where the *is* and the *ought* are not disconnected from the outset—though they are still something different. If human aims, discourses, structural or logical necessities are taken into account, one might be entitled to draw conclusions from the 'is' to the 'ought', because the 'ought' might be already part of the 'is'.¹⁷⁷ Advocates of natural law (like Plato, Aristotle or Aquinas) partly advocated such a position.¹⁷⁸ I think in their writings we do not find the clear dichotomy of description and prescription; in their approach the 'descriptive-normative essence' of

the missing concept of the good is linked to this approach, ☉ pp. 324, 406.

¹⁷⁰ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1989/76), p. 2, 267-268.

¹⁷¹ P. Singer. *The Expanding Circle. Ethics and Sociobiology* (1981), p. 77.

¹⁷² R. J. Richards. *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior* (1987), pp. 322-323. Also: G. E. Moore. *Principia Ethica* (1994/1903), pp. 113 f..

¹⁷³ G. E. Moore. *Principia Ethica* (1994/1903), directly on Spencer sections 29-35, on Sidgwick section 36 f..

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid*, sections 5-14, 23-24.

¹⁷⁵ I. Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason*, (1787/1781) and *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788).

¹⁷⁶ D. Hume. *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), III. i. 1. (pp. 455 ff.).

¹⁷⁷ If there are autonomous tendencies in the 'is', then, I think, also Moor's concept of the intrinsic good has not to be denied. I am proposing an approach similar to such a position. ☉ also pp. 406, 414.

human beings is to be good or to strive to be close to God. Despite this difference with Moore, these authors would nevertheless strongly agree with him, that we cannot simply identify the term 'good' with the way (our) nature actually works.¹⁷⁹

Today those who want to circumvent the logical problems and to join the descriptive and normative realm have to face the problem that on the descriptive side Darwinian biology (instead of Newtonian physics) is holding centre-stage. But the evolutionary record indeed makes clear, that the ought—or at least the knowing of the ought—was not always given, but has to have come into being. Correspondingly some supporters of evolutionary ethics have tried to show that the boarder between normative and descriptive proposition is not impermeable. For example Vollmer argued that facts inform us what ethical statements are possible: concerning the debate on equal rights and duties we could not claim that men equally ought to bear children as women do.¹⁸⁰

However, in the **framework of the sociobiological paradigm** itself, the logical argument against the natural fallacy could not that easily be dismissed, because an approach of this kind is normally understood to be a materialistic one, which abandons any truly normative aspects inherent in the ontology itself (linked to its denial of *causa formalis* and *causa finalis*). Hence, Moore's objections cannot easily be circumvented by starting with an ontology which is itself normatively laden.

Also Moore's resort of regarding the predicate good as something 'simple, unanalysable and undefinable' is not open to sociobiology. In their reductive framework everything has to be explained in terms of gene survival; an emergent autonomous property of intrinsic goodness could not exist. Moreover an exclusively sociobiological paradigm, does not allow for an *inner logic* of rationality, an autonomy of reason or our own emergent purposes within culture.

There are thus only two unpromising ways open to the followers of an exclusively sociobiological metaphysics:

a) The abandoning of ethics. In evolutionary theory there is—strictly speaking—only an 'is'; an 'ought to' simply does not exist. Hence there would be neither a naturalistic fallacy nor an ethics at all.

Dawkins has argued against the "unspoken but never justified implication that since science is unable to answer 'why' questions, there must be some other discipline that *is* qualified to answer them."¹⁸¹

(Eve Marie Engels, I think correctly, has pointed out that the early advocate of an evolutionary ethics, Spencer, did not commit the naturalistic fallacy, since he is not interested in the intrinsic good anyway.¹⁸²)

An abandoning of ethics would not carry the burden of a Darwinian 'biological imperative'. Still one may ask what else would fill the ethical vacuum if only a sociobiological 'is' remains.

¹⁷⁸ See e. g. J. M. Finnis *natural law* in *Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (1995), pp. 606-607.

¹⁷⁹ G. E. Moore's position: *Principia Ethica* (1994/1903), section 34.

¹⁸⁰ G. Vollmer. *Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer evolutionären Ethik* (1993), 123-125.

¹⁸¹ R. Dawkins. *River out of Eden* (1995), p. 95.

¹⁸² E.-M. Engels. *Herbert Spencers Moralwissenschaft - Ethik oder Sozialtechnik* (1993), p. 272.

The practical difference to a 'biological imperative' might be that we would not tend to eradicate any non-adaptive side-effects of our nature, still we would by no means neither combat the process of natural evolution—as T. H. Huxley has demanded¹⁸³—nor try to channel this process to get more ethical.

b) An evolutionary morality. The other unpromising possibility for gene-Darwinians is to assume—paradoxically quite similar to the mentioned pre-modern conceptions—that there is no gap between the 'is' and the 'ought' and hence no naturalistic fallacy. Here, 'is' and 'ought to' are related, even more directly than in traditional natural law, that is, if also the 'ought to' developed in evolution only by the mechanism of natural selection, the seemingly independent 'ought to' is in the end an 'is'. At the first sight this may sound relatively hopeful, since we would be able to keep our moral beliefs. But this argumentation could in principle be continued in three ways, from which only the last one is in my opinion viable for radical gene-Darwinians.

Firstly, one may argue that all moral tenets are justified, simply because we hold them; they evolved and hence have proved to be evolutionarily stable. Similar to the position of having no ethics at all, one would only care whether a moral actually exists and evolutionary theory would not contribute anything to the evaluation of these found morals. We would not have lost that much, but we would not have won much either. In any case, I think it is not possible to design an evolutionary theory which remains totally neutral. Gene-Darwinism is definitely not neutral. It would change e. g. the moral attitudes of foster parents (☉ pp. 48 f). Gene-Darwinism as highly reductive theory, which does not render morals as entities or truth of his own but only as means, would focus on optimising their assumed essence of evolution and not such mere means (☉ third point).

Secondly, one may identify a descriptive-normative tendency in evolution. In classical terminology, one tries to identify the 'essence' either of evolution in general or of a part of evolutionary history, e. g. of human evolution. Julian Huxley thought that progressive integration is the proper characterisation of human evolution. Recently, R. Richards, abstracting from an actual proposal of how society would work best, has proposed that men in their normal "structured context" essentially strive "to enhance the community good" and hence "each ought to act altruistically."¹⁸³ Richards' proposal would indeed in its result reconcile evolutionary ethics with a Kantian ethics (by which Richards is obviously influenced). However, this way is not open to gene-Darwinians, who regard the care for the community good at best as an evolutionary side effect.

The third possibility, I think, is the only one open to strict gene-Darwinians. They would have to claim that Evolution has only one essence: gene-survival. (Though Mayr was correct in arguing that species essentialism has been abandoned by Darwinism in general, it is one of the main claims of this work that Darwinism is still essentialistic in regard of evolutionary processes.) Accordingly we would have to follow the 'biological or selectionist imperative' and multiply our genes by any means.

¹⁸³ R. J. Richards. *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior* (1987), pp. 613, 620, 622.

In conclusion, the two ways of how a gene-Darwinian (or only a memetic selectionist) approach to ethics can circumvent a naturalistic fallacy, are either to abandon ethics or to consider the 'ought' to be already present in the 'is'. I have argued that the latter evolutionary ethics, though in principle open for other values as well, would on a merely gene-Darwinian basis lead to a veneration of gene-competition and to the biological imperative to replicate by any means.

2.5 The Need for a New Paradigm in Biology

From the common sense view the above ethical or non-ethical consequences of gene-Darwinism seem to me untenable. But the reference to common sense may appear to be only a too weak argument. I think there are also other epistemological reasons to look for a different ontological basis for ethics. I think there are three epistemological reasons to aim at a new paradigm within biology:¹⁸⁴

The first reason for taking a critical look at these still comparatively new theories is the lack of their **consistency with theories from other subject areas and paradigms**. Though we shall see that Darwinism has strongly influenced other subject areas (☞ pp. 160 f., 218 f.), gene-Darwinism or the outlined refined theory is not yet totally predominant in our universe of discourse. These theories claim to be universal and are at odds with many well established theoretical and ethical persuasions we have. We, as mentioned, may believe in a search for 'just' ethical principles or may hold that individual persons or groups are not only epiphenomenal and ephemeral, "like clouds in the sky or dust-storms in the desert."¹⁸⁵

Sociobiology itself, of course, wants to achieve a consistent unification of different subject areas, and it is not possible to judge only from the inconsistency with other theories that this approach itself needs to be refined. E. O. Wilson: "It may not be too much to say that sociology and the other social sciences, as well as the humanities, are the last branches of biology waiting to be included in the Modern Synthesis."¹⁸⁶ But if the theory makes such strong claims we do have the duty of scrutinising this theory as critically as possible. Of course, the argument of a lack of consistency with other important theories is only valid for those people which still hold theories which are at odds with the sociobiological paradigm.

Secondly, a lack of **consistency to empirical 'facts'**, or better 'phenomena', is a criterion which makes us search for new approaches. This argument is linked with the first one, because the existence of many alternative theories indicate that there are also many phenomena which may be interpreted more appropriately by them. We may have experienced an inner necessity of rational argumentation. Or we may think of the behaviour of Mother Teresa or simply the daily behaviour of opening the doors to one

¹⁸⁴ Discussing the underlying epistemological theory which is implicitly present in these claims would lead too far. It is a mixture of coherence theory and correspondence theory, which may explain itself if one reads the outline of ecological idealism (☞ pp. 414 f.).

¹⁸⁵ ☞ footnote 1015.

¹⁸⁶ E. O. Wilson. *Sociobiology* (1975), p. 4.

another (in situations where direct reciprocity could not be assumed). Such 'facts' might urge us to seek for other explanations or at least extensions of this theory.

I did not mean to imply by the last examples that being ethical always presumes to be altruistic. (Kantian ethics does not necessarily require one to give a drunken beggar all ones belongings.) However, the assumption of an inner logic of justice is excluded by gene-Darwinism.

Adherents of the sociobiological paradigm might still object that these facts are also in some indirect way explainable in terms of there own.

The third point is a possible lack of **consistency within the theory itself**. We have already seen an example how an extended meme theory may undermine biological gene-Darwinism. An argument based on consistency seems to me a stronger argument than the foregoing one. A militant proponent of the sociobiological paradigm could not immunise him- or herself against inconsistencies which may arise from the own logic of this theory itself. In this work I mainly try to transcend gene-Darwinism from within (☺ pp. 237 f.).

For discussing possible problems of this paradigm we have to first understand the underlying philosophical structure of these paradigms.

Dawkins wrote that "philosophy and the subjects known as 'humanities' are still taught almost as if Darwin had never lived. No doubt this will change in time."¹⁸⁷ Although I agree with this to a certain extent, I also think the same statement could be stated the other way round: 'Biology including especially sociobiology, and many other sciences are still taught almost as if they do not had any historical roots and made any philosophical presumptions. No doubt this will change in time.'

¹⁸⁷ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 1

Part II: The Unfolding of Logos in Regard to the Philosophical Conceptions of 'Physis' and Darwinism

Each succeeding age discovers that the primary classifications of its predecessors will not work. In this way a doubt is thrown upon all formulations of laws of Nature which assume these classifications as firm starting points. A problem arises. Philosophy is the search for its solution.

A. N. Whitehead. *Nature and Life* (1934), p. 10.

In our search for a formulation of a new biological paradigm, I will in this part discuss the scientific and cultural construction of the sociobiological paradigm and of Darwinism in general, and trace the development of its background assumptions through history.

Science is in the present treatment rather regarded as a process of construction than a process of discovery.¹⁸⁸ In my opinion it is through such an understanding that the history of science becomes more than a necrology and hagiography, potentially not only describing science, but inspiring it as well.

To understand science as a process of construction criticises the 'myth of the given'. Even if we employ a notion of a *thing in itself* in a Kantian way, we could never have direct access to these 'things'; our sensibility is always interacting with our understanding. Logical positivism has been criticised that observations are always—at least to a certain degree—theory-laden. Nevertheless the construction view of theories also has its dangers: construction might be misinterpreted as opening the way for arbitrary interpretations. But a proper understanding of construction, in my opinion, also acknowledges constructional constraints and an inner logic of empirical, methodological, theoretical and ethical considerations. (☞ pp. 11 f.)

Such an approach to the history of science and philosophy seeks to give a deeper historical-genetic understanding of the discussed theories and also to reveal constructional alternatives.

This in one way 'evolutionary' approach takes not only biology but also culture seriously. The historical enterprise is not in a vicious but in a virtuous circle linked to our systematic position: we will only understand the systematics of our theories on the basis of their history; and we will only understand history on the basis of the systematics of our theories.¹⁸⁹

Within the history of science—and therefore also within the history of biology—two general approaches can be distinguished.¹⁹⁰

On the one hand, there is a position, called **internalism**, often held by scientists working as historians in their own field. This position focuses on developments *within* a certain theory or a certain science. The approaches of advocates of internalism (like E. Mayr¹⁹¹ or in some respects Th. Kuhn¹⁹²) may

¹⁸⁸ See, e. g., P. Bowler. *Charles Darwin* (1990), Chapter 'The Problem of Interpretation'; *Evolution* (1984), pp. 341-342.

¹⁸⁹ My understanding of history of science ought to be coherent with my systematic considerations and with my general approach of 'ecological idealism' (☞ e. g. pp. 421 f.).

¹⁹⁰ Similar: E. Mayr. *One Long Argument* (1991), p. 39. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 13.

¹⁹¹ The zoologist Ernst Mayr, one of the founders of the so-called evolutionary synthesis, is one of the most profound historians of biology, with a *mainly* internalist viewpoint. Although he accepts the externalist explanation of why Darwinism had been refuted in the beginning, he is much more guarded in applying this approach to the explanation of the rise of Darwinism (Mayr, 1991, p. 39 f., 1983, p. 33). His main historical work is *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982). A popularised short, but still informative, book is *One Long Argument* (1991).

¹⁹² Thomas S. Kuhn's book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) is in some respects not classifiable as a work of internalism. His theory left an explanatory gap why paradigm shifts actually take place, and hence may even mark a trend of historiography to external approaches, trying to close this gap. Moreover, Kuhn himself has often been understood as calling attention to factors, like the scientific community, which are at least external to the theory in question. Nevertheless, Kuhn himself is mainly concerned with inner-scientific explanations and the scientific community, which are part of the science in question and in this sense internal.

differ strongly, not at least because the internal-external distinction is a relative one. A treatment could be internal or external in regard either to a specific theory or to a whole scientific discipline in question.

The stronger version of internalism, which focuses only on aspects within the range of a theory itself, discusses the empirical or logical evidence of a theory, its predictive power or the rise of explanatory problems. The weaker version additionally covers aspects, which are external to a theory, but internal to the relevant science, like the role of the scientific community and the inner consistency within a science as a whole.

On the other hand, there is a position called **externalism**, which emphasises that any scientific theory and subject is embedded in and determined by its more general intellectual and cultural context. This position is primarily held by historians, sociologists and philosophers working in the field of history of science. Within this second approach we have again to distinguish between two notions of 'context': One group of the historians of science rather focuses on the socio-economic, the other rather on the intellectual context of a theory. In practice of course, most externalist historians will adopt neither of these idealised extreme positions, but could be placed somewhere between these extreme positions.

a) The social historians of science (e. g. A. Desmond, R. Young) emphasise the *socio-economic* context and will often have a more sociological background. Some base their investigation on a certain social-psychological or historical theory (for example a Marxist position); others, without referring to an explicit theory, try to reconstruct in detail the whole objective (or even subjective) *Lebenswelt* of a scientist in question (for example A. Desmond, J. R. Moore in their biography on *Darwin*¹⁹³).

This approach has achieved that in history of science also sociology and economics have to be taken seriously. Nevertheless, advocates of a socio-economic approach go too far in my view, if they implicitly or explicitly adopt a reductive view in regard of theories, according to which theories would have no own reality, but would be a mere epiphenomenal superstructure built on a given socio-economic basis, like individual or class interests.

b) On the other hand there are historians of thought (e. g. J. C. Greene¹⁹⁴ or, I think, P. Bowler), who focus mainly on the *intellectual* context of certain concepts. This is based on the two assumptions that knowledge is not a mere *epiphenomenon*, and that the different parts of knowledge or human *logos* interact with one another. The tradition of world views, into which a scientist is 'thrown', determines or at least influences the way he or she builds up theories and experiments and thus perceives the World. Theories are regarded as both affecting and being effected by the temper of an age. Within this framework historians again have very different approaches. They may be for example implicit or explicit followers of Fichte, Schelling or Hegel, and will focus on the unifying logic within the whole logos or what these philosophers called 'Spirit'. Or they might e. g. be influenced by very different 'postmodern' philosophers, like Derrida and Foucault, who similarly focus on 'discourses' shaped by a general 'episteme' of a time.

¹⁹³ A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), see pp. xvi-xviii.

¹⁹⁴ John C. Greene tries in *Science, Ideology, and World View* (1981) to show the impact of ideology and World Views on the Darwinian Revolution. In the essay *The Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural Selection* (first publ. 1971) he outlined his methodology in contrast to the one of Th. S. Kuhn.

Today it becomes more and more difficult to distinguish these approaches and indeed it seems to be fruitful to regard the opposed internal and (the two) external approaches to history of science not as exclusive, but as complementary. In my view, especially in phases of scientific revolution, both internal and external reasons for the process of scientific construction have to be taken into account. This would imply that on the one hand history in general and on the other hand the history of a certain science or theory—for example of evolutionary theory—are essentially interwoven with each other. History, according to this position, only can be understood by looking at the partly autonomous subhistories; and the partly autonomous subhistories are only understandable by relating them to history as a whole.¹⁹⁵ In the following my historical investigation will proceed according to these lines.

This position might mirror some **metaphysical assumptions**, which at this point should not be discussed, but only made explicit. In my opinion, theories neither can completely be separated from the history as a whole, nor is there an all-embracing homogeneous history, without different sub-currents with their own inner dynamics. Strictly speaking there is no isolated theory, no part of logos (*logoi*), no unrelated 'Sprachspiel', no discourse totally on its own; but neither is there a completely homogeneous temper of an age, a completely consistent *Zeitgeist*, *logos* or 'episteme'. The difficult task in regard to the historical whole-part problem is to formulate a sound middle position.

In regard to epistemological or ontological part-whole problems I would and will later on in more detail advocate a similar middle position. The *epistemological part-whole problem*, could be exemplified by Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit¹⁹⁶. This ambiguous picture shows, I think, that the extreme epistemological positions are both one-sided: a) If there were only 'sense data' as the complete inductive basis for our (bottom-up) perception, then we would not be able to switch voluntarily between the perception of a duck or a rabbit. If our perceptions the other way round were exclusively based (in a top-down way) on an abstract concept of a duck or a rabbit, it would be possible to see say an elephant without any more difficulty than we have in seeing a duck or a rabbit. Quite obviously (but still not accepted by all philosophical directions) a middle position has to be found, which of course still leaves the difficult problem of formulating such a position. But, for example, already I. Kant favoured a balanced solution to the epistemological part-whole problem: "Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind."¹⁹⁷ I will later develop at detail a metaphysical stance where wholes and parts are interacting and base this on a field conception, similar to the antique view of hylemorphism.¹⁹⁸

Consequently, in **this part** of this work both approaches to the history of biology, the internalist and the externalist approach, will be treated:

In **chapter 4** of this part '**From Darwin to Dawkins**' the *internal* logic of the theories of Darwinism will be explored. I will support the hypothesis, that there have been certain distinct, but minor, paradigm-shifts *within* the main theory of Darwinism, and I will thus challenge the assumption often found in popular science that Darwinism is a monolithic and unchangeable theory. I will try to show how, with these subparadigms, central notions (like 'gene', 'unit of selection', 'species' and other 'taxa' etc.) underwent a change of meaning, largely due to the general character of these paradigms.

In **chapter 5**, on '**Darwinism—from Whig Biology to Neoliberal Biology?**', a survey of the external influences *on* Darwinism and of those external influences originating *from* Darwinism will be

¹⁹⁵ It has been stated that the romantic view of history is similar to such an approach: 'The development of the natural sciences is genetic, possesses an internal logic and depends on economic and social factors. Internal and external dimensions do not have to be mutually exclusive.' D. v. Engelhardt. *Historical consciousness in the German Romantic Naturforschung* (1990).

¹⁹⁶ L. Wittgenstein. *Philosophical Investigations (Philosophische Untersuchungen)*. 1976 (1958/1953), p. 194.

¹⁹⁷ I. Kant. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. p. A 51/B 75. ("Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.")

¹⁹⁸ ↻ In part IV, chapter 8, I shall oppose substance (pp. 240 f.) and process reductionism (pp. 324 f.) and I shall advocate holism, top down causation (pp. 266 f.) and exformation (pp. 307 f.). I think that the criticised reductionist proposals are one-sidedness. However, I intend to pursue a middle course between atomism and holism.

given. I shall try to show that Darwinism and Dawkinsism are not only a reactions empirical 'facts', but also partly influenced by other theories and world views. For example, it is broadly acknowledged that Darwin was influenced by Malthus and the classical liberal economic theories. Without denying the importance of a moderately socio-economic account, this chapter mainly focuses on the *intellectual* external history.

Based on the explored historical interrelations of Darwinism with other academic disciplines, I am in the following part, in chapter 6 and 7, going to develop systematically what I call 'Universal Darwinism' and especially 'Process-Darwinism'.

Before the different Darwinian subparadigms are described, in regard to their internal and external history, in the **chapter 3** on the '**Unfolding of the pre-Darwinian Philosophical Conceptions of 'Nature''** a sketch will be given of the philosophical traditions on which modern biology is built, or from which it has distanced itself. In this chapter internal and external history are not separable, because biology still is quite directly part of the general intellectual and philosophical development.

Chapter 3: Unfolding of the Pre-Darwinian Philosophical Conceptions of Nature

If a biologist today, at the turn of the twentieth century, were to work e. g. within a Platonic or Aristotelian framework, this would not be in accordance with the general research programme(s) of today's biology and hence would place him- or herself outside the scientific community.

Still, our historical investigation is not beginning with the rise of Darwinism and of its sub-paradigms, but in this chapter with its ancient, mediaeval and modern philosophical predecessors. Later some pre-Darwinian schools will be distinguished, forming already an own discipline of biology.

This approach is obviously opposed to the historically innocent, almost ignorant, view uttered by an important author of the present debates that „all attempts to answer the question before 1859 are worthless and that we will be better off if we ignore them completely.“¹⁹⁹ Many historians, like, for example, Bowler, Cunningham, Depew, v. Engelhardt, Greene, Jardine, Rehbock, Richards and Weber, and also philosophers and biologists, like Weingarten and even Mayr, do seem—to put it moderately—to have a different opinion.

By an historical account which goes back much further than 1859 we will also gain a deeper understand of Darwinism, for example its distorted Christian-Newtonian underpinnings and its Pan-Adaptionism. Moreover we may broaden our horizons in regard to alternative biological accounts. The Darwinian paradigm-shift has no doubt brought improvements, but did it improve evolutionary theory in *all* respects? Even the early history of the philosophical notions of nature may enrich us by its great variety of concepts, from which we perhaps could learn something.

In this chapter, as already mentioned, we will not differentiate between an external and an internal history, because biology only lately becomes separated as a discipline.

3.1 The Ancient Views of φύσις — Nature as Organism

Western thought rises in ancient Greece. There are of course also interesting non-Western conceptions of nature. For example, earlier than all western accounts the book *I Ching*, the Chinese 'Book of Change', handed down to us by Confucius (c. 551-479 BC), gives a dynamic account of Nature, Cosmos and Humankind.

I am content, to concentrate on the mainstream of Western philosophies, firstly because of the limited space of this overview, secondly because of my lack of knowledge of non-Western philosophies and thirdly because of the predominant influence of Western thought.

¹⁹⁹ R. Dawkins quoting G. G. Simpson. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/1989 !), p. 1. This corresponds to the simplifying view that 'the growth of biological thought' is largely the story of Darwinism's triumph over alternative explanations of existence. Dawkins. *Universal Darwinism* (1983), p. 403.

a) *From Myth to the Pre-Socratics — the Development of Basic Notions*

Greek thought dawns in a **world of magic and myth**. In its beginning all ‘things’ were alive and animate. The Greek tribes (like presumably most other tribes) were surrounded by forces and ghosts of nature, present in the earth, the sea, the trees and the wind. In Greece these primordial dark forces became more and more personified, firstly in the pre-Olympian, still matriarchal goddesses like Gaia (goddess of the earth), then in the bright, heavenly, anthropomorphic Olympians. This living and animate nature (*hylozoism*) could still be studied in the writings of Thales’ (c. 624-546 BC): ‘*pánta plére theon éinai*’ (all is full of goddesses). The magic and mystical forces at the dawn of Greek thought were believed to be dynamic and ‘fluid’.²⁰⁰

Although today’s scientific neo-Darwinian view of nature is also dynamic, the magic and mystic intuition at the dawn of Greek philosophy does not only differ in the methodological respect, but was a dynamics of an ‘enchanted’ nature, alive as a whole, including storms and planets, and it was not a dynamics of mechanical clockworks or puppets of ‘selfish genes’, which in turn are programmed by the an eternal law of nature, the simple algorithm of mutation and selection.

It appears that the **very first philosophical approaches** to φύσις (*physis*—nature) gave direction to the further intellectual development. This might to a certain extent be interpreted as an unfolding of ideas which in a different way have already been present in the beginning. I will formulate them as three antitheses.

(1.) Matter and form: The philosophers of Miletus in Asia Minor, Thales and Anaximander (c. 610-545 BC), focus on the ‘material’, the οὐσία, as the essence of being. The Pythagoreans in contrast have formulated an antithesis by focusing on number and form.

(2.) Being and Becoming: Heraclitus (c. 544-484 BC) believed that everything is flowing (πάντα ῥεῖ); whereas the Eleatic Parmenides (c. 540-470 BC) stated that there could be no change at all, but only permanent being.

(3.) A resulting third primordial antagonism already present in pre-Socratic thought could be found in the conceptions of Democritus (c. 460-370 BC) opposed to those of Anaxagoras (c. 500-428 BC).

The mechanistic philosophy of Democritus could be interpreted as a specific synthesis of the being-becoming and the matter-form antagonism mentioned before: To him the world is built up out of basic elements, out of indivisible ‘atoms’. On the one hand elements (matter) are in a Parmenidian way eternal to him, on the other hand he assumes their combination (form) in a Heraclitian way to be always in flux. In a similar frame of mind Empedocles (c. 483-425 BC), a predecessor of Democritus, already stated a mechanistic theory of evolution. Anaximander had already pronounced a simple hypothesis of evolution, assuming a development of human beings out of fishlike creatures. Empedocles and later the Roman

²⁰⁰ K. Gloy. *Das Verständnis der Natur. Die Geschichte des wissenschaftlichen Denkens* (1995), Bd. 1, pp. 31.

Lucretius (97-55 BC)—because of their evolutionary vision of the survival of viable random combinations—may be regarded as early predecessors of Darwinism as a specific theory of evolution.

Anaxagoras tries to solve the ‘οὐσία versus form’-problem and the ‘being versus becoming’-problem in different way: He claims that the basic primordial substances, out of which the world is build are σπέρματα (*spermata*), germs which have the same essence like their resulting end-product. So although phenomena obviously do change, their essence stays the same. Anaxagoras differed from the later mechanistic monism of Democritus in another way: to him the Spirit (νοῦς) is the origin of motion of the Universe.²⁰¹

After the stage is now set, two main different basic meanings of the concept of nature or φύσις can be detected: Firstly the notion ‘nature’ is used for an all-including Oneness, understood either holistically or atomistically. Secondly, nature is also regarded as a part of this Oneness, and is contrasted with τέχνη (*techne*—culture, art), νοῦς (*nous*—spirit, reason) and νόμος (*nomos*—law, moral).²⁰² These two notions of nature and these antagonisms are largely still with us today.

We will see that Plato and Aristotle built their highly influential philosophical systems as a solution of the developments and basic tensions mentioned before.

b) *Platonism — Physis as ‘Techne’*

Plato (427-347 BC) states his philosophy of nature in the *Timaeus*²⁰³, which was very influential during the early medieval period and during the renaissance. Despite some shallow and obscure descriptions,²⁰⁴ today’s reader could still be impressed by its metaphysics. The core of his theory of ideas is also given in the central dialogues, *Politeia*, *Phaidon*, *Phaidros* and *Symposion*.

Plato, like Anaxagoras, opposes a mechanistic, materialistic metaphysics and provides a synthesis for the matter-form antagonism, for the being-becoming antagonism and to the physis-nomos antagonism: Behind the actual world, which is changing, he assumes the existence of forms or ideas (ἰδέαι), which are eternal. The actual, changing world is formed by (*metexis*) the unchanging world of ideas. Later on the actual world has been called *mundus sensibilis* and the world of ideas *mundus intelligibilis*. The factual world is formed by the world of ideas rather in a teleological (*causa finalis*) than in a ‘causal’ (*causa efficiens*) way. All things are striving to reach their end, their *telos* (τέλος), preformed by these eternal forms or ideas.

Since the nature (as a whole) is ordered by these ideas, Plato speaks in the *Timaeus* not only from ‘nature’ (φύσις) but from ‘cosmos’. This cosmos is created by the demiurge. The demiurge is not the

²⁰¹ Similar, e. g.: J. Hirschberger. *Geschichte der Philosophie. Band 1. Altertum und Mittelalter* (1991/1948). A view of history, as given in the present section, is characteristic of a dialectic, e. g. Hegelian, school of thought.

²⁰² L. Honnefelder. *Natur-Verhältnisse* (1992), p. 11.

²⁰³ Plato. *Timaios*. Transl.: H. Müller (1857). In *Werke*, ed.: G. Eigler (1990).

²⁰⁴ For example: men who are cowards are born in their next life as women. *Ibid*, p. 90e.

almighty Christian God, who is creating *ex nihilo*, but the demiurge is confronted with eternal matter in the state of chaos. This chaos is transferred into the state of order (*cosmos*) by eternal forms, by the *eidos* of the demiurge. In this sense, nature is to Plato harmonious, a thing of art (τέχνη ὄν), and designed in a rational way.

c) *Aristotelianism — Physis as 'Autopoiesis'*

Aristotle solves the outlined tensions of the early ancient thought in a modified way. With Aristotle (384-322 BC) the form (*eidos/morphe*) came into being *within* the world. Aristotle accused Plato of dividing the actual world and the world of forms/ideas by a gap (*chorismos*): The *one* World is doubled in as a perceivable and a true world. Aristotle hence tries to bridge this gap, or even to unite these two worlds again. To him the ideas are immanent *within* the actual things (*eide en hýle*) and not transcendent outside (*eide choristá*).

Thus, Aristotle is often contrasted to Plato. Aristotle is regarded as a proponent of a nature, active and creative in itself, a self-organising, autopoietic nature (αυτο = self, ποίεσις = making), whereas Plato is seen as a proponent of a made nature (τέχνη ὄν). In the terminology of the schoolmen the former proposes a creative nature (*natura naturans*), the latter proposes a created nature (*natura naturata*).

Although the different emphasis of Plato and Aristotle is not in question, it recently has been stressed that similarities of these most influential ancient philosophers are too often neglected: Aristotle, but also Plato, regarded the whole nature or cosmos as an organism.²⁰⁵

Given the Aristotelian concept of ideas or forms *immanent* in nature, we might understand his notion of *entelecheia* (ἐντελεχεία): A thing which has reached its telos, within its 'natural' form. The notion 'entelecheia' is also used for a possibility, a tendency of a thing to reach its form. Aristotle's teleology is an immanent, not a transcendent teleology.

This conception of telos is only understandable in the light of Aristotle's aetiology²⁰⁶. Aristotle distinguishes four causes, or better aspects of explanation²⁰⁷: (1.) *causa materialis*, the cause of the matter, (2.) *causa formalis*, for example, all notions of species and genera, (3.) *causa efficiens*, closest to modern billiard ball causality, and (4.) *causa finalis*, the end, goal or telos (τέλος) of something.

Today most scientists would presumably reject the concepts of *causa formalis*, and *causa finalis*. I am not going to grapple with this fundamental question whether these are reasonable concepts here, but it seems to be plausible to assume that it is at least questionable whether it is possible to demolish these conceptions completely. Does the periodic system of chemistry implicitly make use of the concept of 'ideal forms' and an 'teleology of reaching a stable state'?

²⁰⁵ It is being discussed whether this opposition is artificially build up by Aristotle, and if Aristotle should not be seen as a completer of Platonic thought rather than an opponent of it. (K. Gloy, *Das Verständnis der Natur. Die Geschichte des wissenschaftlichen Denkens* (1995), Bd. 1, pp. 108 ff.)

²⁰⁶ Aristotle, *Physics*, Second book, third chapter (e. g. the edition of Ross, 1936/1960). The Aetiology is also expounded in the *Metaphysics* Δ, 2. Outlines of Aristotles aetiology are also given in his zoological books, for example at the beginning and the end of the *De generatione animalium* (e. g. the edition of Peck, 1943).

²⁰⁷ The different causes, αἴτια, are not separable causes, but could only in union furnish a complete explanation of natural processes. Ross, *Aristotle's Natural Philosophy* (1936/1960), pp. 35-36.

In some subcultures of the scientific biological community there have been also explicit attempts to employ Aristotelian philosophy as a source for evolutionary theory. For example, Hans Driesch²⁰⁸ (a disciple of Haeckel) in the 1920s focused on the concept of *entelecheia*. Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela²⁰⁹ have, since the 1970s, put emphasis on the concept of *autopoiesis* or Rupert Sheldrake²¹⁰ has, since the 1980s, developed the concept of *morphogenetic* fields.

Aristotle, coming out of a family where the medical profession was hereditary, was very much interested in the Philosophy of Nature and Science. The *physics* (Φυσική), where he for example expounded the aetiology outlined and also critically discussed the notion of chance²¹¹, is one of his central books. Moreover, Aristotle (despite of course having predecessors) could be said to have founded biological taxonomy or even biology. His main biological books are the *Historia animalum*; *De partibus animalium* and *De generatione animalium*²¹². He not only collected many observations about many species of animals and built up a taxonomy, but (by doing this) he also built up specific biological theories. Aristotle for example focused on different ways of reproduction as a major feature to distinguish species²¹³ and in this respect anticipates most schools of modern biology.

It would be interesting to discuss how far Aristotle's general metaphysical stance, is mirrored by or has even been derived from his zoological works. Such a discussion would have extended the scope of this work, and the neo-Aristotelian approaches in evolutionary theory, mentioned previously, appear anyhow to have drawn mainly on general Aristotelian (meta)physics and less on specific aspects of the Aristotelian zoological work.

We shall touch upon the influence of Aristotle on modern taxonomy again later on (☺ p. 94). At this point I do not want to discuss the details of Aristotelian biology, but only to sketch some general aspects of metaphysics in which the corresponding philosophy of nature had been imbedded.

3.2 Medieval Philosophy — the Divine De-Enchantment of Nature

During the medieval period in Europe the ideas of the Judaeo-Christian tradition had become inseparably combined with the previously described Greek traditions. Here we will not follow in detail the single stages of this process: the first assimilation of Plato's *Timaeus*, then in the 13th century the influence of Aristotelianism and finally a new influence of Plato's rediscovered works.

Instead I will focus in the three following subsections on two aspects of the (much richer)²¹⁴ medieval synthesis. Firstly, I will try to point out why the combination of Judaeo-Christian and Greek thought

²⁰⁸ H. Driesch. *The Science & Philosophy of the Organism* (1929).

²⁰⁹ H. R. Maturana & F. J. Varela. *Der Baum der Erkenntnis* (1987/1988).

²¹⁰ R. Sheldrake. *Das Gedächtnis der Natur* (1991/1988).

²¹¹ Aristotle. *The Physics*. Book II, chapter 4-6.

²¹² Other zoological works of Aristotle are: *De incessu animalium*; *De anima*; *Parva naturalia*; *De motu animalium*. It should be noted that it has been argued that some of the zoological books attributed to Aristotle, e. g. parts of the *Historia Animalium*, show traces of other authors.

²¹³ Aristotle. *De Generatione animalium* (ed. A. L. by Peck: 1943).

²¹⁴ Scholars of medieval philosophy may forgive me, when I here could only touch upon this topic, because in my view it would be worse to neglect the medieval belief system and its underpinning of modern thought. This is indeed often done in accounts of the history and philosophy of modern biology, although we will show distorted echoes of these mediaeval beliefs paradoxically still present even in Darwinism.

had a tendency to undermine itself. Secondly it will be shown that Christian thought, despite the decline of medieval scholasticism, still has formed the great and also dangerous basis of modern thought.²¹⁵

a) *The World as 'Machina Mundi'*

Although it might seem paradoxically, Christianity was the main driving force for the demystification of nature: Christianity, as a monotheistic religion, has banned the goddesses who—for the pagans—had animated the trees, the wind and the earth. Also the sun and the moon lost their godlike properties.²¹⁶

Philo of Alexandria (c.20 BC - c. AD 50) and later on Saint Augustine (354-430) harmonised the Judaeo-Christian myth of creation of the *Genesis* with Platonism, equating God's ideas (which created the world in seven days) with the Platonic concept of *eidos*.²¹⁷ God, in this view, is the transcendent Creator (*natura naturans*), the actual world and what we call nature is created (*natura naturata*). This Platonic view is linked with the idea that we could read the 'book of nature' as we read the holy scripture. The phrase 'the book of nature' was coined by Augustine and gives support to the design argument as a rational basis for belief in the existence of God. This is the case although Augustine still strongly emphasised theological arguments based on revelation.²¹⁸

To Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274), although he was predominantly influenced by Aristotelian thought, nature was not godlike. But nor was nature machinelike to him: indeed *autopoietic*, but not created out of itself, but made by God, who is the *prima causa*, the *summum bonum* etc.²¹⁹

As Platonic thought became revived at the end of the medieval period, the concept of eternal forms (one might say paradoxically) became coherent with the rise of mechanistic explanations, also referring to eternal, repeatable patterns.

The living nature of the Greeks (also of the *original* text of Plato) had by then died. In the translation of Plato's *Timaeus* by Chalcidius, which had a huge impact on medieval thought, the term for the living cosmos was wrongly translated as "beautiful *machine* of the world".²²⁰ Despite such perhaps partly contingent facts, the demystification of nature seems also to follow the inner logic of the synthesis of Greek thought and transcendent Judaeo-Christian monotheism. The world as we enter the period of scientific discovery (☉ pp. 83 f.) had already increasingly been seen as a machine (*machina mundi*) following the eternal laws of a transcendent God.

²¹⁵ Lynn White stated as early as 1967 that Christianity is responsible for the environmental crisis. An overview on the controversial discussion about this and its further developments is given by: E. Hargrove. *Beyond the Lynn White Debate* (1986). Without being able to engage in this debate, in my view it is as absurd to assume that the present ecological crisis is a monocausal result from Christian tenets of the 15th century, as it is to assume that Christianity was not presumably the most important underlying and changing driving force which moulded both humanism and mechanicism. See e. g.: R. Groh, D. Groh. *Religiöse Wurzeln der ökologischen Krise* (1991/1990), esp. pp. 15-16, 35.

²¹⁶ Similar: M. Brumlik. *Die Gnostiker* (1992), p. 15.

²¹⁷ R. Groh, D. Groh. *Religiöse Wurzeln der ökologischen Krise* (1991/1990), p. 18.

²¹⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 22-23.

²¹⁹ St. Thomas Aquinas. *Summa Theologiae* (1963-75/1266-73).

²²⁰ K. Gloy. *Das Verständnis der Natur*. Bd. 1 (1995), pp. 157-158, 166.

b) *The Human as 'Alter Deus'*

One of the characteristics of Christianity—and one might cynically add, maybe one of the main reasons for its wide dissemination in the species of *homo sapiens*—is that its ethics is anthropocentric. 'Love thy neighbour' refers to interhuman ethics, not to ecosystems. But Christianity, of course, does not only advocate the uniqueness of mankind because of an egoistic 'speciesism'. Humans gain this unique position according to the Christian framework, because they are regarded as creatures between angels and beasts. Man are made "in the image of God and after his likeness".²²¹ Only humans are endowed with some divine properties, like freedom, the *ratio recta* etc.

In late scholasticism e. g. Nicholas Cusanus (1401-64) proclaims man to be an 'alter deus', to be similar to God especially in his creative abilities. This forecasted the modern idea of the creative genus, although throughout the medieval period, most persons were still humble and content with their providence. This development has built one of the foundations of the modern emphasis on the individual and his or her unlimited technical abilities; and thereby—combined with the demystified nature—the basis of the destructive realisation of the biblical instruction "subdue the earth and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing."²²²

c) *Universalia — from Realism to Nominalism*

The emphasis on the creative powers of the *individual* human, is paralleled by an important epistemological development: *universalia*—for example the *species* like 'squarehood' or 'doghood'²²³—become individualised. A traditional realist understanding of *universalia* would regard species as existing general entities. Contrary to this the nominalists predominant in the late medieval period, like William Ockham (c. 1285-1348), regarded species as unreal (neither *ante rem* nor *in re*): universals were only abstract notions which we build up in our mind (*universalia in intellectu*).

This resembles an 'individualisation' in two respects: firstly the *human being* now individually constructs the world, so traditions are less important than before. Secondly the single *individual entity* is real, not the general one.

It will be shown that the outlined concepts of *machina mundi* and *alter deus*, combined the rise of nominalism, still build the underlying agenda of many modern approaches.

3.3 Modern Philosophy — Nature as Clockwork, Creator as Watchmaker

During the Renaissance ancient thought was rediscovered in all its colourfulness: The books of Plato and Aristotle were now read in their original versions and not only their medieval commentaries. The pre-Socratics, like Democritus, the Greco-Roman traditions of Epicureanism and Stoicism, but also the

²²¹ *Genesis*, 1,26.

²²² *Ibid*, 1,28.

²²³ On universals in general → footnotes 912, 938.

occult traditions, like Cabbalism, and much else had been adopted. Within this great motley of Renaissance thought two broad intellectual movements stand out, humanism on the one hand and the rise of natural science on the other.²²⁴

We will see that these movements still carried on the Christian hidden agenda of the human as *alter deus*, and the universe as *machina mundi*. This is the case although God, the central notion of medieval thought, became less and less important in the course of modern philosophy.

a) *The Rise of Science — the Alter Deus Explores the Clockwork of God: Copernicus, Bacon, Newton*

The rise of science corresponded with an increasingly **mechanistic account of nature**. This account was made possible paradoxically by the revival of Platonic thought in the late medieval period and the Renaissance, combined with an increasing nominalist materialistic understanding of substance.

At least most of the early mechanists, like Newton, still thought that they were totally consistent with theology, because they had revealed mechanisms, eternal patterns, the *eidōs*, which are the eternal ideas in the mind of god.²²⁵ Driven by the notion of the *machina mundi* of the late medieval period and by the monotheistic de-enchantment of nature, the mechanistic understanding of nature celebrated one victory after another.

In the year of his death, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543), a Polish astronomer and orthodox ecclesiastic, published *De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium*, where he elaborated the hypothesis that the earth revolves the sun. Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) gave a unifying mechanical account of falling bodies and of inertia. Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) showed that the movement of the planets is elliptical, which was seen as evidence against the Aristotelian (and Copernican) conception that movement is naturally circular. But in Kepler's view still the Platonic-Pythagorean aspect was more important than the materialistic one; hence he as an astronomer could regard himself a priest of God's book of nature²²⁶.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626), himself Lord Chancellor of England, formulated the subliminal ideology of the flourishing mechanistic science. He banned teleological explanations (*causa finalis*) from science and thereby gave way to modern thought, focusing mainly on *causa efficiens* (causality) and *causa materialis* (matter). "Inquiry into final causes is sterile, and like a virgin consecrated to God, produces nothing."²²⁷ Bacon became *the* highpriest of the new science. Bacon turned against Aristotelianism and gave support to Platonism, which then moulded the English philosophy of nature.²²⁸ He continued and accentuated the Christian zeal of the god-like scientist, the *alter deus*, to read in the 'book of nature'

²²⁴ D. Cooper. *World Philosophies* (1996), pp. 226-237.

²²⁵ E. g.: R. Groh; D. Groh. *Religiöse Wurzeln der ökologischen Krise* (1991/1990), pp. 17 f.

²²⁶ Letter from Kepler to Herwart von Hohenburg, 26.3.1598. Mentioned in: *Ibid*, pp. 25-26, footnote 51.

²²⁷ Quoted in without source in: J. D. Barrow & F. J. Tipler. *The Anthropic Principle* (1990/1986), p. 49.

²²⁸ Mentioned by R. Groh, D. Groh *Religiöse Wurzeln der ökologischen Krise* (1991/1990), p. 36.

and to explore the *machina mundi* so as to change this world. But by dismissing teleological explanations, still central to Platonic schoolmen, Bacon contributed to the transformation of English Platonism into a mechanical Platonism and finally into mechanical materialism.

This outlined early scientific, and philosophical²²⁹, development culminated in Isaac Newton's (1643-1724) paradigmatic book *Philosophia Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (1687). Nature now had become "this vast Machine of the Universe, the wise Production of Almighty God, consisting of a great number of lesser Machines, every one of which is adjusted by the same Wisdom in Nature, Weight and Measure"²³⁰. The metaphor of the *machina mundi*, which referred at first, in the translation of Plato's *Timaeus* by Chalcidius (☉ p. 81), to the living whole of the universe— 'zoon'—, has changed its meaning to a dead machine, once made by a divine constructor and now running without any intervention.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth century the plain metaphor that the universe is a Clockwork once made by a divine watchmaker became increasingly common.²³¹ Kepler for example wrote in a letter that his aim is to show that "celestial machinery is not something like a divine living organism, but like a clockwork"²³². To him, as to Newton and Leibniz these metaphors refer to both a mechanistic universe, but also to the eternal harmony once created by a deistic God, who does not interfere with the actual world after its initial creation.

New science, in its early reading, was taken not to undermine theology, but on the contrary as providing evidence for a more rational theology. In those times of religious struggles, basing theology on a scientific argument of design also seemed to prevent dangerous religious disputes.²³³ Accordingly early modern scientists were still often vigorous believers in a deistic, but omniscient, watchmaker, which was much more than today's neo-Darwinian belief in only a 'blind watchmaker'²³⁴.

b) *Humanism — the Alter Deus Replaced the Christian Deus*

The second aspect of Christian dogma shaping modern thought is its humanism. The humanistic belief in the value of the human being has been linked to the Christian belief in the inherent worth of the human, as being created in the image of God. Accordingly humans are regarded as creatures between beasts and divinity. In the Renaissance the notion of the human as the *alter deus* had even be radicalised, by emphasising the free and god-like human ability to create and change the physical world.

²²⁹ G. Böhme. *Philosophische Grundlagen der Newtonischen Mechanik* (1989/1993), pp. 278-295.

²³⁰ J. Harris. *Lexicon Technicum*. London 1704/1710, Article 'Nature'. Quoted in J. Mittelstrass. *Leben mit der Natur* (1991/1987), p. 39.

²³¹ K. Gloy. *Das Verständnis der Natur. Die Geschichte des wissenschaftlichen Denkens* (1995), Bd. 1, p. 166.

²³² Quoted Ibid, pp. 166, 311. (Letter from the 10th of Feb. 1605. English translation by the author. Original: "Scopus meus hic est, ut Caelestem machinam dicam non esse instar divinij animalis, sed instar horologij". *Johannes Kepler in seinen Briefen*. ed. by M. Caspar & W. von Dyck. Bd. 1, München, Berlin (1930), p. 219.

²³³ R. Groh, D. Groh. *Religiöse Wurzeln der ökologischen Krise* (1991/1990), pp. 31-34, 46.

²³⁴ R. Dawkins. *The Blind Watchmaker* (1991/1986).

Mankind has the right and the duty to understand and to creatively change the mechanical world, to make use and even to exploit nature. Correspondingly early scientists and engineers explore nature and, based on this knowledge they invent machines. Between 1550 and 1750 there was a flood of so-called machine books, optimistically linking descriptions of constructions with theological or philosophical instructions. Here the argument of design was used the other way round, the mechanist, the engineer is constructing machines in analogy to the creating God.²³⁵

Hence as early modern science is linked to the Christian notion of *machina mundi*, the technical construction of machines is linked to the notion of the *alter deus*. These two developments are in the further course of history still interacting: on the one hand the understanding of the laws of God's nature built the basis for building machines, on the other hand the metaphor of *machina mundi* will become reformulated in terms of machines current at certain times (e. g. clockwork and today, perhaps, computers).

Moreover, the predominant belief in the value of the human being served and still serves as a basis of most systems of Western ethics. Although the notion of God through Reformation, deism, agnosticism and atheism had been increasingly removed from the modern *Weltbild*, the idea of human value is still with us. The *alter deus*, with all his creativity and freedom, replaced the *deus* of Christianity. Humankind has followed the Christian demand and became almost god-like. We learned to create nearly everything: materials, machines, artificial environments like houses and, today, by genetic engineering even organisms and, in principle, humans themselves. Hence, there seems to be less and less need for the notion of God as creator.

By means of this removal of the Christian god, modern philosophy became confronted with two main problems:

- Firstly, ethics increasingly emphasising the notion of the *alter deus* has lost support of the notion of a good God and become at least in danger of undermining its own basis. Today the partly divine human nature, and therefore its ethical value, has come under attack (☞ already pp. 48). We recognise an irony of history: The Christian belief in human value is, by realising its consequences and by replacing God, in danger of undermining itself.

It is one main modern task to build an ethical system not based on God, but on reason. This can be seen as trying to build humanism independently of its own original basis. The alternative is to build it on reasoning, which is of course itself a very humanistic notion. By doing this, philosophers of the enlightenment, often involuntarily, saved and carried on the Christian (and modern) hidden agenda to emphasise the unique human value.

- Secondly, ethics is under attack from the—also Christian based—belief in a mechanic universe. If the first problem, to give reason for the value of the human and humane, is not solved, an inclination

²³⁵ R. Groh, D. Groh. *Religiöse Wurzeln der ökologischen Krise* (1991/1990), p. 60.

arises for the mechanistic view of nature to be also applied to humanity itself. Hence the balanced dichotomy of mechanistic nature on the one hand and partly divine human nature on the other, is in danger of collapsing into a mechanistic monism. This mechanistic approach would exactly destroy that value, which it once aimed to support. It was especially Darwin who will move the boundaries between *machina mundi* and *alter deus*, as he gave a largely mechanistic account of biology and at least the origin of humankind.

Early modern philosophical accounts have still tried to keep the balance of the concept of human uniqueness and the concept of a mechanistic universe. Descartes' dualistic philosophy can be regarded as the first modern attempt to combine, on the one hand, the increasingly mechanistic assumptions of physics and astronomy, and, on the other, the uniqueness of the human and humane.

c) *Descartes and Kant — Dualism of Human Freedom and the Clockwork of Nature*

René Descartes (1596-1650), educated at the Jesuit college of La Flèche, is normally seen as 'the father of modern philosophy', and, despite generations of further predecessors, I think rightly. His first, and he thinks undeniable premise after all his Cartesian doubt, is the '*cogito ergo sum*'—not God. Although Descartes 'proves' the existence of God in the second step, it is important that in the first step it was possible for him, to start with the assumption of an evil deceitful demon, who is using all his power to mislead him.

The absolute certainty of the *cogito*, of the *I am thinking*, carries on the Christian belief in uniqueness of the human, and leads to its modern subjectivist form. Following his argument, the first thing one can conclude from the *cogito* is that there is a *sum*, an existing 'I' characterised by its thinking. If we are thinking, the first thing which is necessary given is a 'thinking thing' (*res cogitans*). It is crucial that this thinking thing is defined completely independent from the body.

The second key notion of Descartes' dualism is the material 'extended thing' (*res extensa*). Descartes gives the example of wax, which loses its qualities when it is heated. According to Descartes this example shows that qualities are changing and only matter, whose essence is extension, persists. Descartes, himself also a significant mathematician and scientist, shared the mechanical and deterministic view at which the physics and astronomy of his time had arrived. In *Le Monde* an early treatise of him on physics, he had already abandoned the scholastic concept of form. The complete transformation of Platonism resulted in a mechanistic, atomistic approach applied to all 'things' apart from the human *res cogitans*. Descartes "regarded the bodies of men and animals as machines; animals he regarded as automata, governed entirely by the laws of physics, and devoid of feeling or consciousness. [...] If we knew enough, we should be able to reduce chemistry and biology to

mechanics; the process by which a seed develops into an animal or a plant is purely mechanical.²³⁶ By this the Aristotelian idea of *entelecheia* and self-organisation (*autopoiesis*) had been ruled out—as is important in this context—also in biology.

The Cartesian position, like other dualist philosophies of a free mind and a determined body, implies—driven by the dyadic notions of the *alter deus* and the *machina mundi*—two of the most grave modern philosophical problems.

(a) Starting from the side of *alter deus* or *res cogitans*, how could the gulf to the *machina mundi* or *res extensa* be bridged? This is the radicalised modern question of epistemology and truth.

(b) Starting from the side of *machina mundi* or *res extensa*, how could the gulf to the *alter deus* or *res cogitans* be bridged? This is the main modern question of ontology, anthropology or, more precisely, the modern mind-body problem.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the most significant philosopher of the enlightenment, carried on Descartes' approach to save ethics in an deterministic Newtonian phenomenal world, by giving it a subjectivist turn. Kant "found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith"²³⁷. He went on with David Hume's (1711-76) sceptical answer to the epistemological question, which Hume applied even to causal explanations in general, which have been the core of the prevailing Newtonian physics. Kant agreed with Hume that we could not conclude from mere associations on a causal structure of reality. He states that although there is something out there, it is basically not possible to get knowledge about the 'thing in itself' (*Ding an sich*).

But Kant again retained some features of the world of appearances by his conceptual shift, similar to the shift of Copernicus, who found that we should seek "the observed motions not in the heavenly bodies, but in their observer"²³⁸. To Kant space and time are still existent in the sense that they are necessary conditions of our sensibility. Causality, likewise, is a necessary notion to make our experience possible. Kant calls this type of notion 'category' (*Kategorie* or *Verstandesbegriff a priori*).²³⁹ With his subjectivist stance, at least in an epistemological sense, Kant is part of the individualistic current of his time, which has—as we have seen—reaches back to the veneration of the human being as *alter deus*. However, by his subjectivist stance Kant distances himself from the deist Newtonian view, that the eternal mathematical clockwork of nature is created by God, as clockmaker. To Kant the rational being—the human—'creates' God, as an 'idea of reason' only imposed by us to the world. These ideas of reason could neither be proved, nor disproved.

²³⁶ B. Russell. *History of Western Philosophy* (1991/61/46), pp. 545-546.

²³⁷ I. Kant. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. p. B XXX, my translation. ("Ich mußte also das Wissen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen".)

²³⁸ *Ibid*, p. B XXII. My translation of "die beobachteten Bewegungen nicht in den Gegenständen des Himmels, sondern in ihrem Zuschauer".

²³⁹ *Ibid*, p. A 80, B 106.

Besides the subjectivist approach Kant also shares with Descartes some sort of dualism. In his third critique '*Kritik der Urteilskraft*' he gave an outline of his whole 'transcendental' philosophy: Accordingly philosophy is divided into two distinct parts; practical philosophy, which is based on our knowledge *a priori* of the moral law and our freedom and theoretical philosophy, which is based on our knowledge *a priori* of nature.²⁴⁰ The border between the worlds of practical and theoretical reason now cuts through the single subject: the totally causally determined self within the physical world and the self as a completely free rational being.

Kant in the second part of the *Critique of Judgement* tries to bridge the gap of these two approaches in his philosophy of biology. Although Kant in his theoretical philosophy had come, despite his subjectivist-logical turn, to similar results to Newton's, and phenomena (not *noumena* or *Dinge an sich*) were regarded as moving causally determined (*causa efficiens*) and machine-like in space and time, Kant in the third critique—at least to some extent—also re-established the notion of teleology (*causa finalis*) as an organising (regulative) principle, which connects our knowledge of nature and of moral truth.²⁴¹ Hereby Kant's philosophical account of biology, partly inspired by the reading of J. F. Blumenbach, turned against an exclusively mechanistic picture of the organism. Organisms are both their own cause and effect. The parts of an organism are according to Kant only understandable when referring to the whole: different from a clock they exist not only *for* the other parts of the whole, but *because* of the other parts.²⁴² Teleology, in Kant's view, helps us to structure our perception of the deterministic nature for the use of practical philosophy. But to Kant this *regulative* principle is only a useful intellectual tool to structure the multitude of appearances, not like causality a *constitutive* necessary one.²⁴³ (For example,—according to Kant—it is reasonable to say that the photosynthesis is a means to the end of supplying energy for the plant's metabolism. Nevertheless any understanding will be fundamentally also be causal.)

In summary then, in Kant's transcendental philosophy, with his great new answer to the epistemological problem, the concept of *machina mundi* is carried on within theoretical reason by the mainly causally determined universe of appearances, and the concept of the *alter deus* is in a sublime way carried on by the freedom within practical reason. He tries to make both realms compatible by introducing teleology as a regulative idea. Hence, it has been possible to Kant to be impressed by both, "the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me"²⁴⁴.

²⁴⁰ I. Kant. *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1799/1793/1790), pp. XVI-XX.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, part II.

²⁴² Mentioned in: M. Weingarten. *Organismen—Objekte oder Subjekte der Evolution* (1993), pp. 18, 21-22; R. J. Richards. *The Meaning of Evolution* (1992), pp. 22 f.

²⁴³ I. Kant. *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1799/1793/1790), p. 270.

²⁴⁴ *Idem.* *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (Critique of Practical Reason). pp. 161-162, original: pp. 288-289 ("der bestirnte Himmel über mir und das moralische Gesetz in mir").

d) *Idealism & Romanticism — the Dynamic Trial of a Unification*

It is One force, One interplay and weaving. One drive and impulsion to ever higher life.

Schelling, In: *The Proteus of Nature* (1800-1801)

Building on Kant's conception that all appearances (phenomena), are formed by our own sensibility, understanding and reason, and on Kant's conception of the freedom of (practical) reason, the philosophers of German Idealism changed and radicalised Kant's approach completely. Inspired by Spinoza, they tried to give a unified account of what Kant had torn into two pieces. They eliminated the 'thing in itself', and built up a pure (transcendental) *Geistesphilosophie*, which should comprise both parts, nature and what we might call human *logos* or *nous*.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) starts in his main work, *Wissenschaftslehre*, with the I (*Ich*). The first necessary distinction is that the absolute I sets the 'Non-I' (*Nicht-Ich*), and by this also a 'remaining' I.²⁴⁵ This is the distinction of world and self, which all of us experience *within* ourselves.

Friedrich Wilhelm J. Schelling (1775-1854) turned this subjective Idealism of the young Fichte, into an 'objective' one. Influenced by Spinoza's pantheistic idea of the *Deus sive Natura*, God is to Schelling the absolute I. This 'I', the 'I' of God or of the whole of primordial nature, develops against its own resistance, in opposed forces of productivity (*natura naturans*) and inhibition (*natura naturata*), throughout all stages of nature and human reason. To Schelling nature has been alive from its very beginning, and it is rather the permanent than the change which needs to be explained. Nature is not a machine but an organism and a soul. This approach radicalised Kant's criticism of an exclusively mechanistic account of the biological world, a criticism also present in the accounts of the early *Naturforscher* Blumbach, Wolf and Kielmeyer.²⁴⁶ Schelling already advocated an unfolding of nature, an *evolution* in the much more original sense of the word (*ex-volvere*), although he emphasised an idealised, theoretical and partly *a priori* conception, and not an empirical one. This (ideal) development culminates and has its end in humanity, where nature comes to consciousness.²⁴⁷

Schelling's objective idealism and also Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's (1749-1832) holism dominates the idealist or romantic understanding of nature. The poetic movement of romanticism was also influenced by Kant and the romantic philosophers. For example, the English romantic poets Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, Byron, Shelley and Scott—albeit speaking a more poetic language—share many views with these philosophers.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁵ J. G. Fichte. *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (1794), p. I. 104.

²⁴⁶ R. J. Richards. *Meaning of Evolution* (1992), p. 28; Th. Bach. *Kielmeyer als 'Vater der Naturphilosophie'?* (1994).

²⁴⁷ Important works of Schelling's early period, during which he expounded his *Naturphilosophie* were: *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur* (1797), *Von der Weltseele* (1798, 2nd 1806, 3rd 1809), *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie* (1799).

²⁴⁸ There is much material on this topic. See e. g. M. Sherwood. *Undercurrents of Influence in English Romantic Poetry*. AMS Press: New York (1971/34).

The **notion of romanticism**, like most interesting abstract notions, is at once indispensable and misleading. There are many different meanings of the term, slightly differing from literature to the sciences, from country to country. Often especially in the English speaking countries 'Romanticism' is used in a quite broad sense, closely linked to the work of Rousseau, the rise of objective idealism, to the work of Schelling, Hegel and Goethe. Historically speaking the period between 1790-1830 and into the 19th century is meant.

But although I am also going to use 'romanticism' in this broad sense, it has to be noted that Goethe, for example, never considered himself a Romantic. German history of literature often distinguishes between *Klassik*, and *Frühromantik*, *Hochromantik*, *Spätromantik*. Kant although also often subsumed under this broad meaning²⁴⁹, conceptually and in style was at odds with the idealists who abandoned any 'thing in itself' and with the rather poetic romantics. Also Hegel actually turned against Romanticism in its more strict sense. There are also other terms to cover a more specific meaning not so closely linked with the strongly poetic attitude of the Romantics, like *Naturphilosophie*, German idealism, morphology etc.

Still the broad meaning of Romanticism, is useful to contrast the sketched *Naturphilosophie* against a purely mechanistic approach to Nature. Later on we will distinguish different schools of biology (☺ see also pp. 98 f.).

Also some **scientists** had been strongly influenced by these idealist or romantic approach. Romantic *Naturforscher* (literally: investigators of nature) played, as new historical research has shown, an important role in the so-called 'Second Scientific Revolution'.²⁵⁰ Romantic scientists, like the physicists Johann Wilhelm Ritter²⁵¹ (1776-1810) and Hans Christian Ørsted²⁵² (1777-1851), the chemist Humphry Davy²⁵³ (1778-1829) and to a certain extent his assistant Michael Faraday, the biologists (☺ pp. 102 f.) Lorenz Oken (1779-1851) and Joseph Henry Green (1791-1863), the geographer Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) and many others were crucial in founding and inspiring many of our today's disciplines. "We can no longer simply assent to Justus von Liebig's view that *Naturphilosophie* was the Black Death of the nineteenth century."²⁵⁴

Besides a new scientific approach, the ideal of *Bildung* was the other basis of the central role of Romanticism in the Second Scientific Revolution. Especially in Germany there was a "radical call for 'die Neuerschaffung der Universität aus dem Geist des deutschen Idealismus' ('the new creation of the university out of the spirit of German idealism')." The discussion about the new creation of the university started from the "first principles, and extended from the nature of *Bildung*"²⁵⁵. The philosophers, Schelling, Fichte, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Wilhelm v. Humboldt (1767-1835), Friedrich v. Schiller (1759-1805) and also Kant, most of them at least associated with idealism or romanticism, played the leading role in this movement, also in practical terms, founding the new Humboldt University of Berlin.²⁵⁶ Romantic ideas have also been influential on the founders of London University and within the United States.²⁵⁷

Some of the previously mentioned scientists, like Ørsted, are utterly critical of the obscure and sometimes, in their view, false way Schelling used empirical propositions.²⁵⁸ Because of this and because of their at least partly empirical orientation, it seems sensible to distinguish Romantic *Naturforschung* and

²⁴⁹ A difference in usage is annotated e. g. in D. v. Engelhardt. *Wissenschaft und Philosophie der Natur um 1800* (1994), p. 257. For examples of a broad usage see: A. Cunningham; N. Jardine. *Romanticism and the sciences* (1990). A. Quinton. *Philosophical romanticism* (1995), p. 778.

²⁵⁰ This is the thesis of A. Cunningham's and N. Jardine's anthology *Romanticism and the sciences* (1990), see pp. 1-9. See also e. g.: D. Knight. *Science in the Romantic Era* (1998).

²⁵¹ W. D. Wetzels. *J. W. Ritter: Romantic physics in Germany* (1990).

²⁵² There is a new edition and translation (by L. & J. B. Horner) of Ørsted's writings: *Soul in Nature with Supplementary Contributions*, London: Dawsons (1966). See also footnote no. 258.

²⁵³ Ch. Lawrence. *The power and the glory: Humphry Davy and Romanticism* (1990), D. Knight. *Humphrey Davy. Science and Power* (1998/1992).

²⁵⁴ D. Knight. *Romanticism and the sciences* (1990), p. 22.

²⁵⁵ E. S. Shaffer. *Romantic philosophy and the organization of the disciplines* [...] (1990), p. 38 (both quotes).

²⁵⁶ In the ideas of university and *Bildung* the other romantic tenets are recurring: the concept of freedom of thought recurs in the concept of scientific freedom; the ultimate unity of all knowledge recurs in the concept of a university with all subjects, with the central unifying subject of philosophy and in the unity of teaching and research.

²⁵⁷ E. S. Shaffer. *Romantic philosophy and the organization of the disciplines* [...] (1990), pp. 39, 40.

²⁵⁸ H. A. M. Snelders. *Oersted's discovery of electromagnetism* (1990).

*Naturphilosophie*²⁵⁹. Apart from this, the romantic scientists share with romantic philosophers their basic tenets. By introducing these tenets into science, they have already favoured evolutionism (☉ pp. 102 f.) and paradoxically at least prepared the ground for Darwinism, which then vigorously attacked the remaining Romantics.

I will now outline three defining aspects of Romantic *Naturphilosophen* or *Naturforscher*:²⁶⁰ Unification, Dynamism and Organicism.

Unity: To Romantic philosophers and Romantic scientists, following Spinoza's conception of one substance, the idea of ultimate unity of the world (and by this of the absolute I, of god) was central: they claimed that there is an unity of nature and culture, a unity of mind and body, a unity of forces, a unity of body plans and a unity of the scientific and the artistic enterprise.

Nature and culture are not the opposed realms of necessity and freedom. Nature and culture are both alive and organic, they are one unity, developed out of the same origin, understandable with the same historico-genetic method. Advocates of objective idealism advocated a necessary 'logical' unfolding of *logos*. Corresponding to these tenets the Romanticists and Idealists also tried to unify the subjective (knowledge) and objective (nature) side of consciousness.²⁶¹ Owing to this urge for unity many of the leading Romantic scientists were both scientists *and* artists or philosophers, like Davy, Goethe, Oken and Ritter. One of the features which commonly drove the romantic scientists was this urge for unification and the search for a uniting force behind different forces. With the discovery of electromagnetism Ørsted united the previously separated physical forces electricity and magnetism; Ritter discovered that ultra-violet rays belong to the electromagnetic spectrum; Davy could introduce the fundamental conception of chemistry that chemical affinity and electricity are manifestations of one power. The tenet that all force is one "led some men of science in the next generation towards the conception of conservation of energy"²⁶².

In all fields of thought, and also in applied areas as education and politics the Romantic tenet of unity was present. For example in politics Fichte was one of the main promoters of the unity, still limited, of Germany and the biologist Oken got involved in the *Wartburgfest*, a political feast for German freedom and unity.

Dynamism: The unity of nature and culture is essentially complemented by the idea of a new and common history of nature and culture.²⁶³ The "unfolding of a generative history of nature through an 'original intuition'"²⁶⁴ is the aim of Schelling's *Naturphilosophie*. Similar approaches were taken by the late Fichte, Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843), Novalis (Freiherr v. Hardenberg, 1772-1801) and Johann Gottlieb v. Herder (1744-1803).

²⁵⁹ Similar: D. v. Engelhardt. *Historical consciousness in the German Romantic Naturforschung* (1990), p. 56.

²⁶⁰ Similar: M. Heidelberger. *Naturphilosophie* (1998), p. 739.

²⁶¹ D. v. Engelhardt. *Historical consciousness* (1990), p. 56.

²⁶² D. Knight. *Romanticism and the sciences* (1990), p. 21.

²⁶³ Similar: D. v. Engelhardt. *Historical consciousness* (1990).p. 63.

²⁶⁴ A. Cunningham; N. Jardine. *The age of reflexion* (1990), p. 5.

Although Schelling had not built up an empirical but an ideal or transcendental evolutionary scheme, this ideogenesis or 'dynamic evolution' built the intellectual foundation for the application of the historical-genetic method in science and art, and the theory of descent within biology and for evolutionism and transformism in general:

"The eighteenth century begins to perceive nature as subject to change."²⁶⁵ Many cosmological and geological studies state the transformation of nature, which suggests the transformation of the animated nature as well.²⁶⁶

Idealist and romantic biology emphasised both the notion of form or body plan *and* the notion of transformation (for details ⇨ pp. 102 f.). Many idealist and romantic authors (e. g. L. Oken, C. G. Carus, G. R. Treviranus, F. Tiedemann, J. F. Meckel and E. R. Serres, and already K. F. Kielmeyer and J. H. F. Autenrieth) combined these two notions within the concept of a recapitulation, that embryos of higher animals pass through stages of lower animals. Embryogeny repeats zoogeny. This concept of recapitulation, the 'law of parallelism' or Meckel-Serres law became closely bound to the notion of 'evolution'.²⁶⁷

In 1801 Henrik Steffens (1773-1845) explicitly speaks of "a 'theory of evolution', but in the sense of an idealist"²⁶⁸. The romantic palaeontologist Georg August Goldfuss (1782-1848) argued 1826 in favour of an actual metamorphosis of the animal kingdom, "similar to that of the foetus, its periods being contemporary with the formation periods of the globe."²⁶⁹ "It cannot be overemphasised that the task of *Naturphilosophie* was primarily historical, and Oken's definition makes this patent. *Naturphilosophie* had to demonstrate how the universe originated, and to reconstruct its development or *Entwicklung* from the original Idea thought by God to its highest manifestation as man."²⁷⁰ This concept of an *Entwicklung*, of an 'evolution' is a deeply romantic one, which Darwin, surely did not invent but only changed and connected with other concepts (⇨ pp. 163 f.).

Organicism: The analogy of Nature as developing organism, or the gestation of nature is the third Romantic tenet, with which I want to deal here. The whole is regarded as more than an accumulation of parts. *Naturforscher* emphasised the notion of the archetype (present in Kant's *Critique of Judgement*) searching, like Goethe, for unifying body plans. To Kant and even more to the idealist and romantic *Naturforscher* organisms are their own sources of activity, with a formative active striving, a Blumenbachian-Schellingian *Bildungstrieb*. Nature is not a mechanism, but alive, or a "slumbering

²⁶⁵ D. v. Engelhardt. *Historical consciousness* (1990), p. 56.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

²⁶⁷ For a detailed account of these recapitulation theories, and their influence on Darwin, see: R. J. Richards. *The Meaning of evolution* (1992), esp. chapter 3, 4, 5 and p. 47.

²⁶⁸ D. v. Engelhardt. *Historical consciousness* (1990), pp. 57 f.

²⁶⁹ G. A. Goldfuss. *Grundriss der Zoologie* (1826), p. 33.

²⁷⁰ E. Richards. *The Romantic gestation of nature* (1990). p. 132.

spirit”²⁷¹ In the poems of the great romantic chemist Davy “nature is not ‘it’ but [...] ‘she’; personified and active, ‘*natura naturans*’ rather than ‘*natura naturata*’, in progress rather than complete: God is working his purpose out.”²⁷² This aspect shows that the romantics certainly were hostile to the enlightenment’s mechanical account of nature.

The Breakdown of Romantic Science. Apart from the massive sublime influence of Romanticism on science, generally Romanticism has finally failed its quest to build up a unified, holistic framework of human knowledge. The positivist account seized power in science in general and also in biology. Of course, we know today—and this has been long ignored²⁷³—that even positivist accounts were strongly influenced by Romanticism. Especially the belief in the ultimate reality and unity of forces and also the dynamic account of nature and culture became accepted basic assumptions in science and art. Still, apart from these influences, the different positivistic, mainly mechanistic paradigm took over.

But why then had Romanticism and Objective Idealism failed? Although the answer is presumably highly complex, I will try to provide a provisory one: I think Romanticism and Objective Idealism were from their beginning basically one-sided. Despite the romantic aim to unify, to synthesise the (seemingly) opposed realms of subject and object, of ‘I’ and world, of nature and culture, Fichte and later Schelling built their systems only on one of Kant’s ‘two worlds’: they mainly built their system on the side of the freedom of reason, on the side of the transcendental I. Although it might be their merit to emphasise the necessity of (a priori) *rational* construction within science, at least some proponents of this approach underestimated the importance of *empirical* testability. Because of this, many concepts, especially the transcendental constructions of the genius Schelling, ‘lost ground’ and became cryptic. Romanticism became dominantly “poetic and aesthetic”²⁷⁴ and in parallel many different creative ideas arose. Even Science was pluralistic and speculative. Novalis declared: “The ways of contemplating nature are innumerable”²⁷⁵. At its worst, ‘facts’ of science were ignored: D. H. F. Link, “a most respected *Naturforscher* [...] complained that the *Naturforscher* had been advised to forget everything he had learned.”²⁷⁶ Because of these reasons Th. H. Huxley—the bitter enemy of Owen—, who became “probably the single most influential and destructive English-speaking critic of the ‘metaphorical mystifications’ of *Naturphilosophie*’ opposed sharply the ‘wild-eyed speculations’, ‘oracular utterances’ and general verbal gymnastics of the unruly Romantics”²⁷⁷.

²⁷¹ F. W. J. Schelling. *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature* (Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur), (1797/1988), p. 42. (Quoted by: D. Cooper: *World Philosophy*, 1996, p. 310.)

²⁷² D. Knight. *Romanticism and the sciences* (1990), p. 14 (paraphrasing P. Piper).

²⁷³ According e. g. to: A. Cunningham; N. Jardine. *Romanticism and the sciences* (1990).

²⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p. 5. Also e. g.: N. Jardine. *Naturphilosophie and the kingdoms of nature* (1996), p. 232.

²⁷⁵ Novalis. *Werke*. H.-J. Mähl, R. Samuel (eds.) München (1978-87). Vol. II, p.234. (Quoted in: N. Jardine, E. C. Spray. *Natures of cultural history* (1996), p. 4.)

²⁷⁶ S. R. Morgan. *Schelling and his ‘Naturphilosophie’* (1990), p. 35.

²⁷⁷ E. Richards. ‘*Metaphorical mystifications*’: *the Romantic gestation of nature in British biology* (1990), p. 130.

Still, Objective Idealism and Romanticism founded an impressive body of speculation and knowledge, and in my opinion it was wrong to dismiss this current altogether. True, I do not see a straight way back to this paradigm, but we may still regard this paradigm as an old sunken treasure, containing perhaps not only false strings of pearls. Especially in biology we might find conceptions (⊖ pp. 102 f.), which have been neglected by the mainly mechanistic account of the positivist successors.

In addition Romanticism moulded the currents which came afterwards. On the side of philosophy Romanticism got 'cleaned' of its central idealistic assumptions and was changed to a hollow dynamism, found in the philosophy of will and then in the philosophy of life. On the side of science the concept of evolution was carried on, but in an increasingly different positivistic and mechanistic framework.

3.4 The Rise of Biology as Science — Torn Between Eternal Form and Evolution

Aristotle founded European biological taxonomy and biology two thousand years earlier than Linnaeus and he was highly influential not only during the medieval ages but at least till the 18th century. For example, only Lamarck renamed Aristotle's classification of all animals into 'blooded' and 'bloodless' as 'vertebrates' and 'invertebrates'.²⁷⁸ Aristotle's general philosophy has already been mentioned before (⊖ p. 79), and here only his influence on taxonomy will be mentioned.

Aristotle had already described more than 500 species and arranged them in his *Historia animalium* (History of Animals) hierarchically along what was later called the *scala naturae* (Great Chain of Being). He had also included man among the *quadrupeds*.

After translations of Aristotle's zoological works from Arabic²⁷⁹, scholastic 'biologists' from the thirteenth century on were strongly influenced by Aristotle. But they passed over the dynamic and reproductive aspects of Aristotle's theory. The scholastics emphasised our proximity to angels and removed humans from nature.²⁸⁰ So it is important to distinguish between the ancient, and the mediaeval Aristotle. The scholastics transformed Aristotle's hierarchical taxonomy into a linear Great Chain of Being, with its origin rather in God than in matter, normally conceived in a completely static sense.²⁸¹

It was only in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century that **biology emerged as a specialised science**. Although Linnaeus and Buffon made important steps in building up this science, they were both still general naturalists, also working on the kingdom of minerals and on geological development.

Around 1800 several authors independently announced the birth of 'biology' as a new scientific discipline. The term 'biology' emphasised a specific methodology for studying organisms and was coined in contrast, on the one hand, to mere descriptions or classifications of nature and, on the other hand, to the exclusive mechanistic account predominant in physics: In 1797 Roose and in 1800

²⁷⁸ E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 152.

²⁷⁹ Only mentioned by A. L. Peck. *Introduction* to his translation of Aristotle's *De partibus animalium* (1937), p. 10.

²⁸⁰ L. Schiebinger. *mammals, primatology and sexology* (1994), pp. 186 f.

Burdach²⁸² coined this term. In 1802 Treviranus announced the birth of a new scientific discipline²⁸³ and almost in parallel, Lamarck made a similar application of the term 'biology'.²⁸⁴

It is difficult to structure the manifold different biological theories of that time—a time before the regime of Darwinism gave biology a unifying framework. Although many disputes are often described dichotomically, I think it is reasonable to distinguish at least the following three dominant groups:²⁸⁵

- a) **Romanticising Materialistic Biology**, focusing on the transmutation of species or organisms.
- b) **Transcendental Biology**, with the central concept of a necessary form or structure of an organism.
- a) **Romantic (and German Idealist) Biology**, with the concept of the unfolding of nature (evolution in the literal sense). This concept combines an emphasis on structure and on development of nature.

After a section on Linnaeus these groups will be described successively (section b, c, d). In conclusion I will once again give a comparative overview to justify this classification.

a) *Hierarchical Taxonomy Instead of 'Scala Naturae' — Linnaeus*

Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778), also called Carl von Linné, is often regarded as the 'father' of modern biological taxonomy. Of course there were also 'grandparents' in the early modern era, who could not be treated here.²⁸⁶

Linnaeus worked on all three classical kingdoms of nature, vegetable, animal and mineral. His hierarchical taxonomic 'tree' (each entity is only part of one higher entity) had five levels: class, order, genus, species and variety. Since *Philosophia botanica* (1751) Linnaeus gave organisms generally two-word names, denoting their genus and species. He overcame the habit of longer and transient phrase-names, which themselves gave a short description and contrasted the animal with other animals²⁸⁷. Certainly, he did not always display a 'natural' order, but at least he founded a stable, communicable and internationally accepted system of classification, which became a common basis for modern biology.

²⁸¹ D. Dennett proposes the metaphor of a chandelier hanging from God. In: *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995), p. 64.

²⁸² But Burdach, teacher of von Baer, still referred to the specialised meaning of the study of man. R. J. Richards. *Meaning of Evolution* (1992), pp. 17-18.

²⁸³ See: T. Lenoir. *Morphotypes in Romantic biology* (1990), p. 119.

²⁸⁴ T. G. A. Roose. *Grundzüge der Lehre von der Lebenskraft*. Braunschweig (1797, 2nd ed. 1800); K. F. Burdach. *Propädeutik zum Studium der gesamten Heilkunst*. Leipzig (1800), p. 62; G. R. Treviranus: *Biologie oder Philosophie der belebten Natur* (1802) Göttingen, Bd. 1, p. 2. J. B. Lamarck. *Recherches sur l'organisation des corps vivants*. Paris (1802), p. 202.

Quoted by: D. v. Engelhardt. *Wissenschaft und Philosophie der Natur um 1800* (1994), p. 260.

²⁸⁵ Later on it will be shown how some dichotomies can be derived from this classification (☞ p. Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.).

J. C. Greene implicitly also distinguishes in *The Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural History* (1971/1981) three similar types of theories, pp. 38-46.

²⁸⁶ I have to skip naturalists and taxonomists like Hieronymus Bock (1489-1554), Andrea Cesalpino (1519-1603), John Ray (1627-1705), Joseph Pitton de Tournefort (1656-1708) because the work of Linnaeus was most influential. See: E. Mayr. *Growth of Biological Thought* (1982).

²⁸⁷ L. Koerner. *Carl Linnaeus in his time and place* (1996), p. 149.

Linnaeus' system was by no means created *ex nihilo*. He adopted parts of his structure and many names from Aristotle. For example, the names of the classes in which he divided the animal kingdom (*Aves*, *Amphibia*, *Pisces*, *Insecta*, *Vermes* and *Quadrupedia*) are derived from the Latin translations of terms used already by Aristotle. Linnaeus himself only coined the class label '*Mammalia*', replacing the Aristotelian term '*Quadrupedia*' in later editions of his *Systema Naturae*.²⁸⁸

In his first and canonical 10th edition (1735/1758) of his *Systema naturae* he classified men very closely to monkeys. In the first edition he lumped men together with them under the *Anthropomorpha* division of the *Quadrupedia* and later he put *Homo sapiens* together with *Homo troglodytes* (orang-utan) under the genus *Homo*.²⁸⁹

It is obvious that such a mere classification is not free of any implicit theory. The way Linnaeus described and ordered nature has many theoretical and even socio-political²⁹⁰ aspects. Linnaeus believed in the rational order of God's creation, in the fixity of species (in his later days at least in the fixity of major groups) and because of this in the possibility of an adequate taxonomy of clearly distinguished taxons. On the other hand, this taxonomy could also be seen as a preparation for the overcoming of the idea of a linear order of a *scala naturae*: his hierarchical tree-formed taxonomy is the basis for the scientific conception of phylogenesis as a branching process with a common descent, stated by transformists like Geoffroy St. Hilaire and later on by Darwin.

b) (Romanticising) Materialistic Biology — Buffon, Lamarck

I call this school—in an apparent contradiction in terms—'*Romanticising*' *Materialistic Biology*, because the father of this school, Buffon, who could be regarded as the first modern 'biologist' who proposed evolutionism, is not only commonly regarded as a materialist, but had also been strongly influenced by Spinoza, favourite of the German Romantic philosophers.

Gorges-Louis Leclerc Comte de Buffon (1707-88) was the first influential modern naturalist who speculated about the transformation of species. He not only very early introduced some philosophical concepts to biology, but he also gave an example of great scholarly work, especially with his main work *Histoire naturelle* (1749-1789), which when completed, consisted of 36 volumes.

Buffon disputed Linnaeus' system²⁹¹ and focused himself not so much on the abstract and fixed definition of animals, but studied living animals in their natural surroundings, focusing on geographical differences.²⁹² He defined species in terms of the possibility of interbreeding rather than morphology.²⁹³ He realised differences of species in different ecosystems which led him to speculations about why these

²⁸⁸ L. Schiebinger. *mammals, primatology and sexology* (1994), pp. 185 f.

But Cuvier still used the term "quadrupeds" in his great 'fossils' volumes of 1812.

²⁸⁹ D. Knight. *Ordering the World* (1981), pp. 57, 79-80.

²⁹⁰ L. Schiebinger shows how the patriarchal view of Linnaeus is partly fossilised in the present taxonomy: *Mammals, primatology and sexology* (1994). *Gender and natural history* (1996).

²⁹¹ C. J. Greene. *Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural History* (1971/1981), pp. 34-37.

²⁹² D. Young. *Discovery of Evolution* (1992), p. 61.

differences arise: species can, according to him, to a certain extent adapt to their environment, but they could also degenerate and become extinct. At first, he believed that all of today's species derived from 40 prototypical species, while the late Buffon even played with the idea of common descent.²⁹⁴ When Buffon in 1749 proclaimed his theory of the formation of the earth, he called forth a strong critical response, particularly on religious grounds. But in 1778, when he published *Les époques de la nature* (*The Epochs of Nature*), a supplementary volume to his *Histoire naturelle*, he was only perfunctorily criticised for his claim that human history is only the last of seven epochs of the development of nature.²⁹⁵

Buffon's philosophical background is—as mentioned earlier—not sufficiently described by simply calling him a materialist. It is indeed true that he dismissed the doctrine of final causes: “Those who believe they can answer these questions by final causes do not perceive that they take the effect for the cause”²⁹⁶. But unlike Denis Diderot (1713-1784) and Paul Baron d'Holbach (1723-1789), his ultimate constituents of Nature were *living and active*. Although Buffon used a deistic language, he had a pantheistic philosophy, originating in Spinoza's ‘*deus sive natura*’ (God or Nature). Even more explicitly Jean Baltiste Robinet (1735-1820) presented a view of cosmic vitalism.²⁹⁷

Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck (1744-1829) stated his explicit theory of evolution at the *Muséum National d'Histoire Naturelle* (National Museum of Natural History) in Paris, which was founded during the French revolution with the commission to build up a rational biology “that would mirror the rationality of the new France and would distance it from the chaotic medievalism of the *ancien régime*”²⁹⁸

Lamarck was influenced by Buffon, whose son he tutored and who had, in pre-revolutionary times, been the administrator of the *Jardin du Roi*, which in 1793 was reorganised partially by Lamarck as the new museum.

Like Buffon, Lamarck was a convinced evolutionist. Lamarck thought of a time scheme of millions of years for earth history and continental changes. He was convinced of the transformation of animals as a consequence of his geological theory,²⁹⁹ through his biological studies of the mollusc collection of the Paris Museum³⁰⁰. Corresponding to his optimistic revolutionary zeal he strongly believed in an ‘upward’ progression also in nature. Despite this and although later in history saltationist theories were subsumed under the term Lamarckism, Lamarck himself was, like Darwin, not an advocate of

²⁹³ D. Knight. *Ordering the World* (1981), p. 79.

²⁹⁴ A. Wolf. *Buffon's philosophy*. In: *History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy* (?), pp. 792-793.

²⁹⁵ D. v. Engelhardt. *Historical consciousness* (1990), p. 64.

²⁹⁵ Mentioned in: M. Rudwick. *Minerals, strata and fossils* (1996), p. 285.

²⁹⁶ G. D. Buffon *History of animals*. Quoted in: J. Barrow & F. Tipler. *Design Arguments in Anthropic Cosmological Principle*. p. 68.

²⁹⁷ A. Wolf. *Buffon's philosophy*. In: *History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy* (?), pp. 792-793.

²⁹⁸ D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism evolving* (1995), p. 43.

²⁹⁹ J. C. Greene. *Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural History* (1971/1981), pp. 41, 43.

³⁰⁰ See: E. Mayr. *Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 346.

essentialism and was convinced of the gradualness of evolutionary change.³⁰¹ In this sense he has to be, along with Darwin, contrasted with the essentialism of transcendental and romantic biology.

In his early writings Lamarck assumed only one scale³⁰² of rising complexity. By this he (implicitly) took over the Christian idea of the Great Chain of Being and 'dynamised' it. Because of this unidirectional process, extinction does not play an important role in his system. Although the branching remained less central to him than later on to Darwin, from 1800 to 1815 he progressively replaced the picture of a linear upward progression by that of a branching tree.³⁰³

But to Lamarck the organisms were not objects but agents of this upward directed evolutionary process. Active individuals—like revolutionaries—“take their fate into their own hands”.³⁰⁴ First in his *Discours d'ouverture* (1800), then in his *Système des animaux sans vertèbres* (1801) and in his *Philosophie Zoologique* (1809) species “transformés en une espèce nouvelle, distincte de l'autre”³⁰⁵. Animals are able to face the change of the environment, by actively changing their behaviour, which in turn causes a change of their physical properties. In this sense new characters were not directly introduced by the environment, but produced as a response to the environment by the internal activities of the organism. Acquired properties are not lost in each generation, but they are inherited.³⁰⁶

Although Lamarck was a materialist to whom nature was mainly “a law-bound system of matter in motion”³⁰⁷, who did not believe in essentialism or teleology, I think it is still correct and necessary to describe him also, like Buffon, with the adjective ‘romanticising’, because his materialism was not based on Newton's mechanical vision, but on the idea that matter has “self-creating powers and self-developing energies”³⁰⁸.

c) *Transcendental and Essentialist Biology — Cuvier, (early) Owen, Agassiz*

The term ‘Transcendental Philosophy’ is normally applied to Kant and his followers. It also refers in general to a philosophy built on philosophical knowledge *a priori*.³⁰⁹ Knowledge *a priori* is a necessary precondition to our understanding and is not empirically but in a logical sense true. ‘Transcendental Biology’ would consequently mean the basic biological knowledge derived from such concepts *a priori*.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 346, 355.

³⁰² Lamarck had to acknowledge that not all species could be arranged on one scale, he changed this extreme view, assuming this scale only for larger taxa. He also stated the branching of lines, but this has never been (as in Darwin's theory) the core part of his theory. In *Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres* (1815) there are two main lines. Both especially the *articulés* (*vertebrata*) and *inarticulés*, both are branching. See: F. M. Wuketits. *Evolutionstheorien* (1995), p. 40.

³⁰³ E. Mayr. *Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 351.

³⁰⁴ D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism evolving* (1995), p. 45.

³⁰⁵ J. B. Lamarck: *Philosophie zoologique* (1809), I, p. 261.

³⁰⁶ See: E. Mayr. *Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 357; D. v. Engelhardt, *Wissenschaft und Philosophie um 1800*. (1994), pp. 261-262.

³⁰⁷ J. C. Greene. *Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural History* (1971/1981), p. 42.

³⁰⁸ D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism evolving* (1995), pp. 47-48.

³⁰⁹ I. Kant. *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*. A, B p. 25, 150.

Kant, especially to his *Critique of Teleological Judgement*, tried to give a unifying account of mechanistic and teleological principles. Apart from a certain rehabilitation of teleology as a regulative idea, he also formulated the (regulative) concept of a fundamental uniting ground plan of an organism.³¹⁰ Kant already at least even considered evolution with common descent.³¹¹ Still Kant's main focus is on necessary structure (in an aprioric sense), whereas Romanticism in the narrow sense (☉ small print) focused on the evolutionary unfolding *and* partly still on (aprioric) structure. But it has to be conceded that the line between transcendental and romantic biology is blurred.

Romanticism in the broad sense has been used to cover both accounts (☉ p. 89). Transcendental biologists and romantic biologists may be distinguished by referring either predominantly to Kant or to Schelling. But Schelling built his system of *Naturphilosophie* on some aspects of Kant's more rigorous transcendentalism, and some biologists also seem to have changed their views along these lines. Moreover, although many biologists of that time had a considerable knowledge of philosophy, they may have drawn from Kant *and* from Schelling or Goethe in a rather eclectic way. Hence these two approaches have been and often are used synonymously.

Because the notions of transformation and morphology are crucial to early evolutionary theories, I dare to use them to separate arbitrarily the two approaches: romantic biology should be defined with reference to the notions of transformation and form, whereas transcendental biology should refer only to a partly rehabilitated notion of *a priori* or essentialist form or body plan.

Classical essentialist biology should also be discussed here under the same heading. As already outlined, Platonists, Aristotelians and scholastics have believed in quite different ways in the existence of an essence of entities. Normally the underlying, defining and indispensable 'core' of an entity is meant. These more directly ontological currents should be lumped together with the more epistemological transcendental biology, because on different foundations both could advocate common *unity of plan* and often (at least in the limited sense of an regulative idea) also made use of the concept of teleology.

In biology we come across terms like *transcendental morphology* or *anatomy*, which can refer to both a biological discipline and a school which focuses on a unifying plan of the parts of an organism.³¹² Proponents have been influenced by Kantianism or by classical essentialist schools.

Biologists like **Caspar Friedrich Wolff** (1734-94) and **Johann Friedrich Blumenbach** (1752-1840) emphasised the historical-genetic method as biological methodology and that biological phenomena such as "ontogenesis, growth and reproduction could not be reduced purely and simply to physico-mechanical forces."³¹³ Recently also this role of Karl Friedrich Kielmeyer (1765-1844) had been stressed.³¹⁴ By their account these *Naturforscher* hoped—like Kant—to "chart a course between the Scylla of reductionistic mechanism and the Charybdis of vitalism".³¹⁵

³¹⁰ I. Kant. *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1799/1793/1790), pp. 289-298.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 368 f.

³¹² Ph. Rehbock. *Transcendental anatomy* (1990).

³¹³ W. Lefevre. *Die Entstehung der biologischen Evolutionstheorie*. Frankfurt am Main (1984), pp. 26-68. Referred to in: T. Lenoir. *Morphotypes in Romantic biology* (1990), pp. 119-120.

³¹⁴ K. T. Kranz (ed.). *Philosophie des Organischen in der Goethezeit: Studien zu Werk und Wirkung des Naturforschers Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer* (1994). Th. Bach. *Kielmeyer als 'Vater der Naturphilosophie'?* (1994). (☉ footnote 318.)

³¹⁵ T. Lenoir. *Morphotypes in Romantic biology* (1990), p. 120.

Blumbach and Kiehmeyer also influenced Schelling and have also adopted some transformationalist approach.³¹⁶ Hence, it might have also been reasonable to class them as romantic Biologists. They provide good examples how difficult a distinction between transcendental and romantic biology is. Blumbach has even coined the notion 'Bildungstrieb', crucial for romantic biology.

The most important biologist focusing on the unity of type argument was **Georges Cuvier** (1769-1832). He gained influence in the time of the Napoleonic Empire and also in postrevolutionary France after the defeat of Napoleon. Like Lamarck and Geoffroy St. Hilaire he worked at the *Muséum National d'Histoire Naturelle*. Probably he was more influenced by (the medieval conception of) Aristotle than by Kant, because it seems that teleology was more to him than only a regulative idea. Cuvier had spent his youth at the Karlsschule in Stuttgart where he had "been steeped in essentialism."³¹⁷ There he was a fellow student of and tutored by Kiehmeyer, who—methodologically influenced by Kant—turned against an exclusive mechanistic account of nature.³¹⁸

Influentially Cuvier advocated the concept of body plans: In his great work *Le règne animal*³¹⁹ (1817) he reduced the basic types of Aristotle and distinguished only four basic body plans or *embranchements*: *radiata* (e. g., jellyfish and starfish), *articulata* (e. g., bees and lobsters), *mollusca* (e. g., clams and octopuses) and *vertebrata* (e. g., fish and men). By this he focused not on the 'vertical' linear series of evolution³²⁰, like Lamarckism did, but on 'horizontal' unbridgeable differences between taxa, say between the exoskeleton of *articulata* and the inner skeleton of the *vertebrata*.

He stated the so-called 'principle of correlation': the parts are coadapted to the whole of the organism. This corresponds to Aristotle's idea of the principle unifying the parts of an organism (soul) or Kant's regulative idea of 'the whole structuring the part'. Because to Cuvier there is no part of an organism which can independently change on its own and because of the huge differences of the *embranchements* he, like Linnaeus, was normally considered an advocate of the concept of fixity.

But even Cuvier adopted the concept that *within* the *embranchements* species could accommodate their particular structure.³²¹ Himself famous for his research on fossils, Cuvier had to face the empirical fact that not all fossils, which he found around Paris, corresponded to living species. As also the theory of migration did not seem to explain the problem, he saved the hard-core of his indeed rather static paradigm by adopting geological catastrophism. He believed (like Buffon) that species could become extinct. To him there are whole series of extinct faunas, especially caused by geological catastrophes.³²²

³¹⁶ R. J. Richards. *Meaning of Evolution* (1992), pp. 25-29. D. v. Engelhardt, *Wissenschaft und Philosophie um 1800*. (1994), p. 262.

³¹⁷ E. Mayr. *Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 364.

³¹⁸ R. J. Richards. *Meaning of Evolution* (1992), pp. 18-19. D. v. Engelhardt, *Wissenschaft und Philosophie um 1800*. (1994), pp. 255, 260, 262. (☞ footnote 314.)

³¹⁹ Frz.: *The Animal Kingdom*.

³²⁰ Before 1800 Cuvier was similar to Lamarck in being convinced of a linear evolution.

³²¹ R. J. Richards. *The Meaning of Evolution* (1992), pp. 51-52.

³²² See: J. C. Greene. *Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural History* (1971/1981), p. 39.

Because there had been also newer fossils which could not be found in older strata, he also assumed that “new species, based on existing body plans, are inserted by God into a vacated ecological slot”.³²³

In any case, Cuvier was regarded rather as a strong advocate of the concept of fixed form, in Mayr’s terms ‘essentialism’, than of transformation.

Because of his rather static World View, Cuvier has sometimes been associated with reactionary politics opposing in the field of biology the radical, democratic ideas of the French Revolution of his opponents Lamarck and Geoffroy St. Hilaire.

Richard Owen (1804-92) is often regarded as ‘the British Cuvier’. He was as influential in Britain as Cuvier was in France, especially with his main works *On the Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton* (1848) and *On the Nature of Limbs* (1849). He took over the methodology of comparative anatomy and the concept of body plans. Like Cuvier he also was engaged in a dispute against the (mainly materialistic) theory of evolution.

Robert Edmond Grant and Robert Knox brought mainly Lamarck’s materialistic, but also Geoffroy’s and Oken’s romantic ideas, to Edinburgh. The emerging conflict of Owen versus Grant and Robert Knox in the 1830s mirrors the conflict between Cuvier versus Lamarck and Geoffroy St. Hilaire. The result of the conflict was also similar. Owen, at that time a non-transformational essentialist, at the end of the conflict gained dominance over the romanticising materialist Grant.

But from the 1840s Owen himself became strongly influenced by later rather evolutionary romantic currents of German *Naturphilosophie*. Because of this we might not only call him ‘the British Cuvier’, but also—later in his life—‘the British Geoffroy’,³²⁴ and because of this we will treat him once more in the next section on romantic biology.

Louis Rodolphe Agassiz (1807-1873), called ‘the American Cuvier’, was a Swiss-born palaeontologist and the founder of academic biology in the United States. Although he was influenced by Oken’s *Naturphilosophie*, while studying with him at Munich, he advocated the fixity of species. Hence he is not treated here in the section ‘romantic biology’, but we deal with him here directly after Cuvier.

To Agassiz, opposite to today’s biology, only genera and all higher taxa have real existence. The forms of higher taxa outlive the individual and they are like Platonic forms—more real than the individuals that exemplify them. Like Cuvier he believed that species could become extinct and are separately ‘created’.³²⁵ Also like Cuvier he focused on a ‘horizontal’ aspect. Agassiz not only saw the differences of body plans of different species, which could not be ordered in *one* linear *Scala naturae*, but he also focused on different—we would now say—‘ecological systems’. To Agassiz each zoological region is separately created.³²⁶

³²³ D. J. Depew & B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), p. 45.

³²⁴ See: Ph. Rehbock. *Transcendental anatomy* (1990), p. 153.

³²⁵ I could not judge here, whether the notion ‘creation’ to Agassiz might mean something similar as ‘unfolding of nature’ means to the romantics. If this were the case then I would have to treat Agassiz in the class of romantic biology.

³²⁶ D. Knight. *Ordering the World* (1981), p. 113 f.



d) *Romantic Biology — Oken, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, (late) Owen*

In response especially to Schelling (☉ pp. 89 f.) objective idealism and romanticism also gained an early influence in biology. Later on, at the end of the 19th century, when there was an eclipse of Darwinism, similar ideas had their second heyday in biology, corresponding to a world wide revival of idealism in philosophy (☉ pp. 124 f., 186 f.). Here we are concerned with pre-Darwinian approaches.

In Lorenz Oken's (1779-1851) book '*Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie*' (1809-11) *Naturphilosophie* is to him—as to Schelling—a historical as well as a structural enterprise. Man and Nature have both one *Entwicklungsgeschichte*, with its highest manifestation in the human being. But for the process of unfolding, the aspect of form or structure is central. Even more, differing from the Linnaean-Cuvierian tradition, structure is dictating function, not function form.³²⁷ Many scholars emphasise that Oken 'only' believed in an *ideal* transformation, not in *actual* transformation,³²⁸ whereas other authors seem to have different opinions.³²⁹ Anyway, in the tradition of Oken "it became the custom to look upon the different forms of animals as developed out of one another"³³⁰

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, poet and naturalist, was influenced by Spinoza, Schelling and even by Erasmus Darwin³³¹, Charles Darwin's grandfather. In *Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen* (1790) Goethe argues that the parts of plants could be understood as transformations of one underlying structure—that of the ideal leaf. He advocated the Blumbachian *Bildungstrieb*, an inherent drive to perfection, although he also accepted the importance of external conditions to evolution, on which Darwin would later on rest his theory. Goethe believed that repetition and transformation are crucial aspects of evolution. Goethe, like Oken, proposed a vertebral theory of the skull, meaning that the skull is composed out of transformed vertebrae. His search for a common archetype, basic to all organisms led to his discovery of the human intermaxillary bone.

Romantic biologists like e. g. Oken, Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869) or Geoffroy St. Hilaire are characterised by the focus on the unity of the morphology of an organism, on a common archetype, on necessary serial development, on an inner tendency to progress, on parallelism of ontogenesis and phylogenesis, on (ideal) transformation, and on the phenomenon of homology, which shows that certain ideal types of forms are reached in different lines of evolution.

The theory of recapitulation became very important for the notion of evolution, linking the notion of individual (embryological) and species development (or even ecological development). In early versions the theory of embryological recapitulation referred to stages of now-existing species, in the later to stages of now-extinct species.³³²

³²⁷ J. C. Greene. *Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural History* (1971/1981), p. 44.

³²⁸ See e. g.: E. Richard. *The Romantic gestation of nature* (1990), p. 133; R. J. Richards. *The Meaning of Evolution* (1992), p. 42; D. J. Depew & B. Weber *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), p. 49.

³²⁹ According to the German philosopher R. Löw, Oken defines zoology as 'science of the development of species of animals' (my transl.), but regards transmutation of species as an insight *a priori*. *Die Entstehung des Neuen in der Natur* (1984), p. 55. The interpretations of Oken may refer to the different importance attributed to knowledge *a priori*.

³³⁰ K. E. von Baer. *Über Entwicklungsgeschichte der Thiere*. Königsberg (1928), pp. 129-201 (trans. T. H. Huxley). Quoted in: E. Richards. *The Romantic gestation of nature* (1990), p. 132.

³³¹ D. King-Hele. *Erasmus Darwin and the Romantic Poets* (1986), pp. 169-171.

³³² This aspect is excellently treated in R. J. Richards. *The Meaning of Evolution* (1992).

Étienne Geoffroy St. Hilaire (1772-1844), who could be referred to as ‘the French Oken’, was influenced via Oken and Carus by Schelling. Organisms are not only *natura naturata* like in Platonism, but to him also *natura naturans*.³³³ He was clearly convinced of *actual* transformation. Still he believed like his German predecessors in an inner logic of development, in the explanatory force of concepts like serial development, parallelism and homology. To him the structures of the parts of an organism have to correspond with the whole in a necessary way (*unité de plan*). In this respect he is in accordance with Cuvier, whom he worked with for a long time. Still, Geoffroy abandoned teleology and even also introduced concepts of elimination and adaptation³³⁴. In 1820, still following the research programme of uniting body plans, he found parallels which united the *mollusca* and *radiata*, and the *articulata* and *vertebrata*. In 1830 he even proclaimed the unity of the whole animal kingdom. This transformational unification of the *embranchements* brought Geoffroy into conflict with Cuvier’s fixism.³³⁵

Geoffroy’s alignment with Lamarck in the Cuvier versus Lamarck debate is due to their common belief in transformation. But because of their co-operation, conceptual differences between them have often been ignored. Geoffroy did not believe in *one* ‘ladder of nature’ where every species has to climb up from the bottom, but in common descent. Moreover his explanation of evolution was mainly structural along idealist/romantic lines rather than being mechanistic, so that Goethe even in his last works still tried to support him.

After the death of Lamarck in 1829, Cuvier managed, because of his reputation and some reasonable points in the debate, to finish the dispute in his own favour. On the solemn occasion of Lamarck’s funeral, Cuvier, according to the tradition of the academy, gave a memorial lecture. He presented this lecture in the way that it seemed that he buried not only Lamarck, but also Lamarck’s and Geoffroy’s theories. Cuvier’s ideas dominated French biology after Cuvier’s death in 1832 till about 1850.

Since the 1840s Owen (☉ also p. 101) was increasingly impressed by the Romantics and even by their concept of an immanent divine unfolding of nature, although he had before vigorously attacked Grant’s rather materialist Lamarckian evolutionary approach.

In his conceptual change, Owen was especially influenced by Joseph Henry Green (1791-1863), who himself studied under Oken and was affected by the thought of the romantic poet and philosopher Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834). Green seemed to have come to the belief that the old argument from design must be “replaced with a new argument based on divine self-expression”; hence the origin of species was to him, as to the German romantic idealists “the creative self-externalisation of a divine mind immanent in nature, rather than as a collection of highly rigid, if well-adapted, machines produced

³³³ D. J. Depew and B. Weber in their usually very scholarly book *Darwinism Evolving* (1995) designate this current as ‘neomedievalizing obscurantism of Naturphilosophie’, which might be a bit one-sided. p. 55.

³³⁴ E. Mayr. *Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 363.

³³⁵ R. J. Richards. *The Meaning of Evolution* (1992), p. 52.

by a quaint eighteenth-century Deist designer.³³⁶ Green already argued that Evolution was not linear but treelike³³⁷. Coleridge played an important role in introducing the thoughts of Kant and the idealists to a larger public, particularly since translations did not begin to appear well into the 1830s. His mainly poetic approach did much for the accessibility of these thoughts, but in England gave them a reputation of flights into vague spiritual realms.³³⁸

Although the *young* Owen, the 'British Cuvier', had led the campaign against some materialist evolutionists, the *later* Owen, the 'British Geoffroy' came to believe in a romantic concept of transformation. In his *On the Nature of Limbs* (1849) he considers the possibility of an actual unfolding of the divine creation and although in the 1850s he was guarded enough to largely evade mentioning this issue in print, he still made suggestions about the branching process of natural development³³⁹.

Owen's biography might force us to distinguish even more periods of his intellectual development. After reading von Baer's critique of the principle of recapitulation, Owen dismissed this central romantic principle.³⁴⁰

Despite Owen's positive attitude towards evolution in general he opposed the mechanistic Darwinian account of evolution. There was for example a clash between Owen and T. H. Huxley, Darwin's bulldog, at the meeting, where the famous anecdote of a clash between Huxley and Bishop Samuel Wilberforce (1805-73) took place.³⁴¹ That Owen really believed in actual evolution, apart from his dislike of Darwin's *Origin*, is supported by his welcome to Robert Chambers' (1802-71) *Vestiges* in 1844, which had popularised romantic evolutionism in England.³⁴²

e) Conclusion: Overview of the Preceding Three Schools

In *table 3* a more formalised (and thereby strongly simplified) overview of the different characteristics of the previously described schools is given, with the two middle columns justifying my distinction that there are three groups of partly concurrent biological theories.

	Vertical aspect (mainly: species transform- or fixation)	horizontal aspect ³⁴³ (mainly: definition of species)	annotations
Plato	fixation	external eternal form (<i>eidos</i>)	in the medieval interpretation the form is an idea of God
Aristotle	fixation (? ³⁴⁴)	form (<i>eidos</i>)	<i>causa finalis</i> , <i>causa efficiens</i> (also of course <i>causa materialis</i> and <i>causa formalis</i>)

³³⁶ D. J. Depew; B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), p. 55.

³³⁷ R. J. Richards. *The Meaning of Evolution* (1992), pp. 74, 77.

³³⁸ S. M. den Otter. *British Idealism and Social Explanation* (1996), p. 22.

³³⁹ E. g. mentioned in: P. Bowler. *Charles Darwin* (1990), pp. 25, 30-31.

³⁴⁰ See: R. J. Richards. *The Meaning of Evolution* (1992).

³⁴¹ D. Knight. *Ordering the World* (1981), pp. 170 f., R. J. Richards. *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior* (1987), pp. 549-551.

³⁴² *Ibid*, p. 168. On the popularity of the vestiges: J. Secord. *Introduction to Chamber's Vestiges* (1994), pp. ix f., xxvi f.

³⁴³ See annotations of table 4.

³⁴⁴ But see: R. J. Richards. *The Meaning of Evolution* (1992), p. 63.

Linnaeus	fixation (later: <i>some</i> transformation)	morphology (and interbreeding ³⁴⁵)	
① Buffon	transformation (limited), degeneration	interbreeding ³⁴⁶	influenced by Newton, Spinoza, but mainly <i>e. efficiens</i> , multiple descent (later: common d.)
① Lamarck	transformation, upward development	no species ³⁴⁷ , groups (masses)	no common descent, gradual upward evolution, minor role of extinction; active adjustment
(①) Grant	transformation		largely Lamarckian, partly Geoffroyian gradual upward development, unity of form
② Cuvier	fixity (also extinction, special creation)	morphology (structure)	catastrophism, new species in old forms teleology (Aristotle)
② Owen (early)	fixity (also extinction, special creation)	morphology (function)	(teleology) ³⁴⁸
② Agassiz	fixity (also extinction, special creation)	morphology (function)	as well separate creation of whole zoological regions; teleology
③ Schelling	transformation (ideal)	form (<i>eidos</i>)	deus sive natura; differentiation of Oneness, development towards self-consciousness
③ Oken	transformation (ideal)	morphology (structure)	deus sive natura; development of nature towards self-consciousness
③ Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire	transformation (actual)	morphology (structure)	common descent, deus sive natura, development of nature towards self-consciousness
③ Green	transformation	morphology	common descent, development of nature towards self-consciousness
③ Chambers	transformation	morphology	popular science; development of nature towards self-consciousness
③ Owen (late)	transformation	morphology	deus sive natura, development of nature towards self-consciousness
Paley (already earlier, but impact on Darwin)	creationism, fixity		still a very mechanistic approach
Darwin (after 1838)	transformation (upward and downward)	Interbreeding, (later nominalistic morpho.)	<i>causa efficiens</i> ; gradualism; common descent; natural selection

Table 1: Simplified overview of some of the important biologists and naturalists from around 1800 to the time before Darwin's *Origin* (1859). The authors are not only ordered chronologically but also systematically. The numbers refer to what I regard the three main classes of theories: ① (Romanticising) materialistic biology, ② essentialist and transcendental biology, ③ romantic biology. The column headings 'vertical' and 'horizontal aspects' are referring to our *today's* picture of an evolutionary 'tree'. The vertical dimension is concerned with change of lineage throughout time. The horizontal aspect is concerned with differences at one time and their explanation. (Also ⇨ the sections b, c, d of this chapter.)

Despite all doubts about details of such a classification, one main reason to classify pre-Darwinian theories of (non-)evolution in (at least) three types, was to give an account of the background of the disputes, where seemingly only two opposed sides have been engaged. In the previously mentioned conflicts of Linnaeus versus Buffon, of Cuvier versus Lamarck/Geoffroy St. Hilaire and of early Owen versus Knox/Grant there normally seem to be only *two* camps: the biologists, who believed in the fixity of species (②) versus the biologists who believed in the transformation of species (① and ③). In this dispute the difference within the transformationalist camp between Oken and Geoffroy St. Hilaire on the one side and the Lamarckians on the other side is overshadowed by their alliance against the dominant third Cuvierian group emphasising the fixity of species.

Secondly, looking at the intellectual roots of these currents, we are inclined to lump all biologists, which focus on form, i. e. transcendental biologists, and romantic biologists advocating idealist

³⁴⁵ D. Young, *Discovery of Evolution* (1992), pp. 55-56, 61.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

³⁴⁷ E. Mayr, *One long Argument* (1991), p. 17.

evolution into one big group (Ⓜ and Ⓝ). Indeed this combination indeed mirrors the existing historical connection between Kant and the German idealists. The relation to a traditional essentialist view is that necessary ideas/forms and even notions like teleology could become reintroduced on the basis of Kant's 'subjective' turn. The intellectual history of the relevant biologists is also strongly interwoven: Geoffroy for example was influenced by Oken (Ⓝ) but worked also a long time together with Cuvier (Ⓜ), who himself studied in Germany. Owen, the British Cuvier, a prototypic proponent of (transcendental) fixity of species (Ⓜ), later also took a rather dynamic stance (Ⓝ). Hence the distinction between these two groups becomes also blurred.

Despite the similarities of Ⓜ and Ⓝ, and of Ⓜ and Ⓝ there are of course a few similarities between materialistic evolutionism (Ⓜ) and transcendental fixity (Ⓝ). A (simplifying) solution to describe both differences *and* similarities, is to group pre-Darwinian biologists into the three described groups according to the following logic.

Evolution		
→ evolution		
→ importance of form		Ⓜ
importance of form	Ⓜ	Ⓝ

Table 2: Ⓜ (Romanticising) materialistic biology, Ⓜ essentialist and (early) transcendental biology, Ⓝ romantic biology. This table gives us a simple clue, why the *similarities and connections* between authors are often seen in the ways mentioned in the text. In spite of this an abstract table like the present one loses much information. The table could not adequately show up all the *differences* between the groups. Certainly Ⓝ is not the logical conjunction of $\text{Ⓜ} \wedge \text{Ⓜ}$. The notion of evolution in Ⓜ is mechanical and in Ⓝ it refers to an 'organismic' unfolding of nature as a Godlike whole. Moreover the notion 'morphology' in Ⓜ focused on function, in Ⓝ on structure; and in Ⓜ we may from our present viewpoint regard form or morphology as an indicator of an 'horizontal aspect', whereas in Ⓝ form—thinking of the parallels of zoology and embryology—is not necessarily linked to a horizontal aspect!

In the next chapters we will give an account of the development of Darwinism, which in Britain had already gained influence in the 1860s, although evolutionists like Owen and Knox turned against this type of explanation of evolution,³⁴⁹ and although Victorian 'Darwinism' differed considerably both from Darwin's theory and modern Darwinism³⁵⁰. In chapter 4 we will focus on the *internal* history of the development of Darwinism, introducing three main sub-paradigms of its theoretical development. Discussion of which currents Darwinism and its sub-paradigms have been influenced by will be addressed in chapter 5, on the *external* history of Darwinism.

³⁴⁸ C. Darwin mentioned that Owen expressed the hopelessness of that concept in his work on the *nature of the limbs*. In: *Origin* (1859), p. 416.

³⁴⁹ Ph. F. Rehbock. *Philosophical Naturalists. Themes in Early Nineteenth-Century British Biology* (1983), pp. 192, 195

³⁵⁰ P. Bowler, ↻ footnote 387.

Chapter 4: The Internal Logic of Evolutionary Theories

— from Darwin to Dawkins

In this chapter on the *internal* history of evolutionary theories, the main claim is that there have been structurally different subparadigms within the main Darwinian framework. Only in Chapter 5, when dealing with an *external* history of these subparadigms (☉ pp. 160), will it for example be discussed how Darwin had come to his theoretical synthesis out of Newtonian and Romantic thought and how this synthesis was influenced by theories of Malthus and by the economic situation in Britain. Here, the main differences of these sub-paradigms will be investigated.

If we want to trace the subparadigms of a Darwinian research tradition through history one has to make clear what is meant by the term ‘Darwinism’. The way we **define** ‘Darwinism’ is crucial, because it determines, what and who is to be regarded as Darwinian. Even several aspects of Darwin’s own theory, the theory of acquired characters (which he took over from Lamarck) and his theory of pangenesis would today certainly not be regarded as an example of Darwinism (☉ pp. 110). Hence, we need at least a working definition of Darwinism to exclude such notions.³⁵¹ E. Mayr describes a whole range of meanings of the term ‘Darwinism’:³⁵² Darwinism is seen as ‘Darwin’s theory of evolution’, as evolutionism, as anti-creationism, anti-ideology, as selectionism, as variational evolution, as creed of the ‘Darwinians’, as new world view³⁵³ and as a new methodology.

At least for use in an internal history of Darwinism I think, in accordance with authors like E. Mayr and others³⁵⁴, that it is reasonable to regard evolution by natural selection as the conceptual core of the Darwinian research tradition. During the further course of the work it will become clear that this notion is central to Darwinism and contrasts best with other views of evolution. However, if we give so much importance to natural selection this notion needs further specification.³⁵¹ Normally the term ‘natural selection’ has a double meaning which is clarified by regarding natural selection (in its broad sense) as a two step process³⁵⁵ (or as a two step algorithm³⁵⁶). This two step process consists (a) of a blind chance

³⁵¹ Later on we will define Darwinism in an even stricter way, ☉ pp. 154, 348 f.

³⁵² E. Mayr. *One Long Argument* (1991), pp. 90-106. In *Darwin’s Five Theories of Evolution* (1985) and in *Weismann and Evolution* (1985), pp. 297-305, Mayr gave a list more confined to the biological meanings of the term ‘Darwinism’: (1) again evolution as such, (2) theory of common descent, (3) multiplication of species, (4) gradualism, (5) natural selection.

³⁵³ For example J. C. Greene defines ‘Darwinism’ more generally as the world view that seems to have been arrived at more or less independently by Spencer, Darwin, Huxley, and Wallace. See: *Darwinism As a World View*, in: *Science, Ideology and World View* (1981), pp. 128-130.

³⁵⁴ E. Mayr. *One Long Argument* (1991), pp. 107, 68; *Darwin, intellectual revolutionary* (1983), p. 33; *Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 510. Also e. g.: D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), p. 2.

³⁵⁵ E. Mayr. *Diversity of Life* (1978/79), p. 19; *Darwin, intellectual revolutionary* (1983), p. 34; *One long Argument* (1991), p. 68.

³⁵⁶ D. Dennett. *Darwin’s Dangerous Idea* (1995), pp. 48-60.

process³⁵⁷ of overproduction of varying entities, and (b) of natural selection in the narrow sense, the differential elimination of these varying entities (according to their degree of fit to a given environment). Following these basic theoretical principles the scarcity of resources follows and the ‘struggle for life’ will be severe. This process, which is an “opportunistic response to the moment”³⁵⁸ should lead to an evolution by common descent and to the ‘survival of the fittest’.

If Darwinism is understood as the above two step process, it is also easily contrasted to other historical concepts of evolution which have advocated a less wasteful and more directed evolutionary mechanism. In this work I mainly give an account of the *Darwinian* sub-paradigms. By doing this I mostly neglect the parallel development of a *Lamarckian* or *romantic* evolutionary research traditions.

For several reasons a closer scrutiny of these currents would also be important: These schools of thought are not simply replaced by the ‘Darwinian Revolution’, but they also form a research tradition which still exists and which has interacted with and sometimes challenged the Darwinian tradition. It may be even difficult to disentangle the traditions:

Some Darwinians might be not as thorough Darwinians as they suppose themselves to be, using e. g. the notion of body plans. Romantic and romanticising materialist biology seems even to have played a role already in the formation of Darwin’s quite different theory (☛ pp. 163 f.). P. Bowler has pointed out that it is a historical myth, created by modern Darwinists, to assume that with the ‘Darwinian Revolution’ a pure version of Darwinism already became predominant in the late nineteenth century.³⁵⁹ At the end of the 19th century, Darwinism was even supposed to be on its deathbed (☛ pp. 124 f.). The succeeding so-called ‘evolutionary synthesis’ also draws largely from non-Darwinian Mendelian sources. Even gene-Darwinism which seems to be the most thorough version of Darwinism paradoxically may in some regards be influenced by romantic aspirations. Moreover, despite the empirical and theoretical defeat of romantic biology by the accepted evolutionary synthesis (☛ pp. 136 f.), parallel to the hardening of the synthesis a little new bloom could be observed. Not only radical advocates of a morphological account should be counted to this tradition, but—to be historically fair—partly also those, who emphasise inner constraints and direction (☛ pp. 145 f.).

Later on in the light of a strict definition of Darwinism one may disentangle the Darwinian and Non-Darwinian aspects present in many partly syncretic ‘Darwinian’ subparadigms.

If we regard natural selection as the unifying core of Darwinism, it becomes clear that Darwinians have differed (and still do differ) considerably in many respects. Table 5 already should here provide a rough first impression that Darwinism has been far from being monolithic (without of course aiming to give any final or complete account of the mentioned authors).

	Mechanism of evolution	object (or subject) of evolution	definition of that entity	focus of the theory	application on humans?
Ch. Darwin (till 1837)	creation	– (fixity of species)	typological concept	–	–
Ch. Darwin (<i>Origin of Species</i>)	natural (& sexual) selection, inheritance of acquired characters	struggle between individuals	species: nominalistic, ‘biological’, then partly typological	strong belief in adaptionism of the individual	(presumably yes, but not formed out)
Ch. Darwin (<i>Descent of Man</i>)	natural & sexual sel. Acquired characters, correlation of parts	struggle between individuals and groups	(see previously)	no extreme adaptionism any more	yes (although with a certain ambivalence)
A. R. Wallace	selection (later: add. Mechanisms)	(individuals of) similar groups			yes, in the beginning, later not
T. H. Huxley	selection (but: ³⁶⁰) saltationism	many biotic levels			yes, in the beginning, later not

³⁵⁷ J. Monod, E. Mayr, K. R. Popper, R. Dawkins, D. Dennett ☛ footnote 1133.

³⁵⁸ E. Mayr. *One Long Argument* (1991), p. 44.

³⁵⁹ P. Bowler. *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988); *Darwin* (1990), particular chapter 1, 4, 9.

³⁶⁰ Huxley seems to have had at least some scientific doubts about the adequacy of natural selection, and mainly favoured ‘Darwinism’ because it advocated explanations by natural forces. E. Mayr. *Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), pp.

A. Weismann (middle period)	natural selection, extreme gradualism	whole genotype		<i>Keimplasma</i> → <i>Somatoplasma</i>	
R. Fisher	natural selection (gradualism)	genes in gene pools	'biological' concept of species	population genetics, no gene interaction	yes: eugenics
J. B. Haldane	natural selection, ?	genes in gene pools	'biological' concept of species	population genetics	
S. Wright	natural selection, genetic drift, etc.	group/deme-level, gene, individual ³⁶¹	'biological' concept of species	pop. genetics; theory of shifting balance, gene interaction.	
J. Huxley	natural selection, genetic drift, etc.		'biological' concept of species	against sexual selection, population genetics	ardent Darwinian, but ideological disengagement
Th. Dobzhansky	natural selection, genetic drift, etc. (macroevolution)	groups and individuals	'biological' concept of species	balancing sel., heterozygote superiority, gene interaction	ideological disengagement, pluralism
E. Mayr	natural selection, geographic isolation, founder effect, etc.	species ³⁶² and sub-populations, individuals	'biological' concept of species	allopatric speciation, gene interaction, phenotype	ideological disengagement, emergentism
G. G. Simpson	natural selection, genetic drift, etc.	lines, species	'evolutionary' concept of species	palaeontology, population genetics	contra teleology; still disengagement
K. Lorenz	natural selection, ?	species ³⁶³	'biological' concept of species	ethology; fulguration	yes, but restricted: fulguration
E. O. Wilson	natural selection & sexual selection	selfish genes, but also higher levels		explanation of social behaviour	yes (even ethics)
R. Dawkins	gene selection	selfish genes	unit of survival	selfish gene, vehicles, extended phenotype	yes (but reservations)

Table 5: Incomplete table on some 'characteristic features' of the theories of authors usually regarded as largely being Darwinian.

Because we can not treat each author separately, we have to try to order these different views. Focusing on the most important authors and with regard to the present discussion (mainly the unit of selection debate), I think it is reasonable to focus on the following **three sub-paradigms** within the Darwinian research tradition:

- The subparadigm of individual-Darwinism, focusing on the struggle between single individual organisms. In particular, Darwin's Darwinism in his middle period, which is of high historical importance, falls into this class. However, it would be wrong to assume that individual-Darwinism united all early Darwinians. Darwinism in this early period was very diverse. A. Weismann, the founder of so-called 'neo-Darwinism', may also be treated as an example of this sub-paradigm.
- The subparadigm of probabilistic population genetics. This paradigm is also often denoted as the 'evolutionary synthesis'. We here will distinguish two phases of this synthesis: In its first phase R. Fisher and J. B. S. Haldane introduced the probabilistic aspects into the synthesis and put emphasis on single genes within a panmictic gene pool. In the second phase S. Wright, Th. Dobzhansky, E. Mayr and others finished the evolutionary synthesis by introducing population structure into these models and by emphasising additional other evolutionary mechanisms (although natural selection still played a very central role).

510-511 [referring to E. B. Poulton. *Thomas Henry Huxley*, in his *Essays on Evolution*, Clarendon: Oxford (1908), pp. 193-219]. Also mentioned e. g. by P. Bowler. *Darwin* (1990), pp. 156-157, 161.

³⁶¹ *Evolution in Mendelian Populations* (1931). On the matter of the unit of selection Wright slips back and forth. Ruse, M. *Are Pictures Really Necessary? The Case of Sewall Wright's 'Adaptive Landscapes'* (1996), p. 326

³⁶² E. Mayr. *One Long Argument* (1991), p. 145.

³⁶³ H. W. Ingensiep. *Zur Kontroverse zwischen Soziobiologie und philosophischer Ethik* (1990), p. 55.

- The subparadigm of gene-Darwinism or of the selfish-gene viewpoint. This viewpoint is advocated e. g. by R. Dawkins, G. C. Williams and in some respect by E. O. Wilson. It focuses on single 'egoistic' genes.

The **notion of sub-paradigms** should be understood here only in a loose sense, not denying that within such a subparadigm change is possible. Actually I am going to argue that the sub-paradigm of the evolutionary synthesis was formed in two phases and that gene-Darwinism already bears germs to transcend itself. The notion subparadigm *should only emphasise that within the Darwinian tradition one could distinguish relatively coherent* (one may think of the 'principle of correlation of parts'), *in some sense incommensurable approaches*. These sub-paradigms are, I think, under different 'ontological regimes'³⁶⁴ and organised by specific central ideas, which are as essential to them as natural selection is to Darwinism in general. Despite this they could still exist beside each other. Gene-Darwinism became influential in ethology, sociobiology and in other disciplines, but the approach of the evolutionary synthesis remained influential as well and some proponents even strongly attacked gene-Darwinism as 'unfortunate misunderstanding by certain outsiders'³⁶⁵.

We will now treat the internal history and the differences of these Darwinian sub-paradigms in detail. Afterwards an outline of some approaches developed in contrast to the radicalised gene-Darwinian view will be given.

4.1 From Darwin to Weismann — the Birth of Darwinism

a) Darwin — Not a Darwinist in the Strict Sense

Charles Darwin (1809-82)³⁶⁶ himself was **not the founder of Darwinism**, or better, not the founder of the theoretical building blocks which compose Darwinism. Apart from the cultural and philosophical influences, which may at least be seen as 'co-authors' of the 'Origin' (☉ chapter 5 on the external history), nearly all components of the theory had first been proposed long before 1859:

The general idea of an actual 'evolving' biological world, was stated in modern times earlier by Buffon (1749), Lamarck (1809) and Geoffroy (1818), and also, by less known authors, Erasmus Darwin (1794), Treviranus (1805), Tiedemann (1808) and others, and later, but still prior to the publication of the *Origin*, by Grant, Chambers, (the late) Owen and Spencer. H. Spencer in 1851 even calls it "a trite enough remark that change is the law of all things"³⁶⁷. Darwin in his first edition of the *Origin*

³⁶⁴ D. J. Depew & B. Weber have argued that the first two of these three sub-paradigms are under different ontological regimes, roughly Newtonian and Boltzmannian (see text). *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), p. 24.

³⁶⁵ E. g., E. Mayr. *Darwin, Intellectual Revolutionary* (1983/1985), p. 35; see: *One Long Argument* (1991), pp. 141-164; E. A. Lloyd. *Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory* (1993), p. viii.; D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/1986), pp. 498 f. (D. Futuyma in his textbook advocates the orthodox evolutionary synthesis, only with little extensions).

³⁶⁶ Today libraries could be filled with books on Darwin's life and influence. An overview of his biographies is given in: R. Colp. *Charles Darwin's Past and Future Biographies* (1989). Here I mention only two bibliographies embedding Darwin in a larger context: A. Desmond and J. Moore, *Darwin* (1992/1991) and P. Bowler *Charles Darwin* (1990). A range of direct sources to Darwin's personal development has been made available by the so-called 'Darwin industry'. Besides scholarly editions of Darwin's publications, also his notebooks and full correspondence are being published in exemplary editions (for some sources ☉ bibliography).

P. Bowler has criticised that the focus of the Darwin industry mainly on Darwin as leading to the neglect of other aspects of the history of evolutionary theory. *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), pp. 14-19.

³⁶⁷ H. Spencer. *Social Statics* (1851), p. 32.

was rather reserved in mentioning advocates of evolution before him.³⁶⁸ But since the second edition, Darwin himself listed over thirty-four predecessors, and he was still accused of lack of generosity.³⁶⁹

The concept of common descent has already been considered by Buffon, at least for close relatives, such as horses and asses,³⁷⁰ and in an idealistic sense by Oken and more actually by Geoffroy, Unger³⁷¹, Green³⁷², von Baer and Chambers³⁷³.

Gradualism was advocated by Lamarck and, e. g., by Meckel, Grant or Chambers³⁷⁴. The role of geographically isolated populations, which played a certain role for Darwin and later was stressed by the advocates of the 'evolutionary synthesis', had been asserted earlier by von Buch and Wagner.³⁷⁵

The mechanism of natural selection was largely formulated by Malthus (1798), and at the time of Darwin by A. R. Wallace as well.³⁷⁶

But it was Darwin who had the unique "brilliant mind, great intellectual boldness, and an ability to combine the best qualities of a naturalist-observer, philosophical theoretician, and experimentalist"³⁷⁷ to merge all those parts³⁷⁸ into a coherent theoretical whole around the central notion of natural selection and provide a great amount of empirical evidence. For these reasons Darwin indeed deserves to be regarded as *main* founder of what today is called Darwinism.³⁷⁹

But apart from not being the *only* founder of Darwinism, throughout most of the different intellectual phases of his life Darwin was **not a Darwinist** according to today's sense of the word (☹ working definition, p. 107).

Before 1836/1837 Darwin was even a creationist of the brand of W. Paley (1743-1805), who believed in the fixity of species.

However his notebooks and his autobiography show that in 1837 he adopted the belief of transformation³⁸⁰ and he quickly—though perhaps not directly (☹ p. 167)—dismissed what Mayr called the 'typological concept' of species and replaced it with the so-called 'biological' concept, which is

³⁶⁸ D. Hull stresses Darwin's differences in his conception of science as a reason for neglecting them. *Darwin and the nature of science* (1983), pp. 63 f.

³⁶⁹ J. W. Burrow. *Editor's Introduction to Darwin's Origin of Species* (1968), p. 27. See the 'historical sketch' in the editions after 1859. They were not very respectable in the scientific pantheon.

³⁷⁰ E. Mayr. *One Long Argument* (1991), p. 23.

³⁷¹ *Idem*. *Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), pp. 390-391.

³⁷² R. Richards, *The Meaning of Evolution* (1992), pp. 74-75.

³⁷³ *Ibid*, pp. 133-134.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 54, 145.

³⁷⁵ E. Mayr. *One Long Argument* (1991), p. 32. See Darwin's *Notebook D* (ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. p. 69.

³⁷⁶ The Scottish naturalist P. Matthew already published the concept of natural selection in his book *Naval Timber and Arboriculture* (1831). However, he did not work out the concept and make it a whole long argument, because, curiously, it seemed to him to be only 'a self-evident fact'.

³⁷⁷ E. Mayr. *One Long Argument* (1991), p. 11.

³⁷⁸ See also: *Ibid*, Chapter *Ideological Opposition to Darwin's Five Theories*. pp. 35 ff.

³⁷⁹ Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) had of course come to a similar solution to Darwin. Here we mainly discuss the more influential theory of Darwin himself. (But ☹ also p. 115.)

³⁸⁰ S. Herbert in her introduction to Darwin's *Red Notebook* (1980/1836-37) supports Darwin's own account that Darwin indeed arrived at the concept of transformation (at least roughly) in March 1837, pp. 7-11. In his autobiography Darwin himself only mentions opening the first note-book exclusively devoted to the question of the *Origin of Species* in July 1837. *Autobiography* (ed. by F. Darwin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), pp. 68, 83.

based on the possibility to reproduce. He soon embraced a theory of common descent and of a tree of life.³⁸¹ It was only in September 1838, influenced by reading Malthus, that he adopted his concept of natural selection.³⁸² One might say that, at this point of his life, Darwin almost became a Darwinian, but even he first seemed to continue to believe in a teleological conception of evolution or at least speaks in terms of “a final cause of all this wedgings”.³⁸³ In addition, in his first unpublished systematic outlines of his theory, the sketch of 1842 and the ‘Essay’ of 1844, Darwin still saw transmutation as an “episodic rather than a truly all-pervasive process”.³⁸⁴

By 1859, when Darwin published the *Origin of Species*, or in full *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*, he had abandoned any teleological and saltationist concept. For ‘the Darwin of the *Origin*’, who has been the one of the best-known of the ‘different Darwins’, natural selection indeed played a crucial role and is even mentioned in the title of the *Origin*. However, in Darwin’s theory of natural selection, his theory of variation and environmental elimination, Lamarckian use and disuse still played an important role in producing variation.³⁸⁵ In this respect Wallace was more Darwinian in today’s sense than Darwin was. Additionally, Wallace was the first of the early selectionists to endorse Weismann’s thesis that there is no soft inheritance.³⁸⁶

Also, most of the Victorian early followers of Darwin still believed in several mechanisms of evolution and favoured orthogenesis or Lamarckian evolution. Although the influence of Darwinism was increasing in the 1860s and 1870s, Darwinism was often not very strictly interpreted. Also E. Haeckel (1834-1918), the most influential early German advocate of ‘Darwin’s theory of descent’, was at odds with Weismann’s pure doctrine of neo-Darwinism and furthermore argued in favour of a more directed evolution. Even Th. H. Huxley and A. Gray were even less strict Darwinians than Darwin himself was. P. Bowler has worked out that many early self-proclaimed Darwinians were still only “pseudo-Darwinians”, and that at least many—if not most—of the post-*Origin* nineteenth century evolutionists retained a developmental, more “orderly, goal-directed, and usually progressive” understanding of evolution. According to Bowler not only Darwinians but often non-Darwinians also played a role in building up a “creation myth” of evolutionary theory, thus overestimating the immediate influence of Darwin.³⁸⁷

The tolerant stance of Darwin and his early followers in regard of other evolutionary mechanisms is not only due to the fact that the moral consequences of a pure theory of natural selection were so

³⁸¹ Ch. Darwin. *Notebook B* (ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. pp. 21, 26, 36, 97.

³⁸² *Idem. Notebook D* (ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), 28th Sep., orig. p. 135e.

³⁸³ *Ibid.*, orig. p. 135e. See also: D. Kohn’s *Introduction to Notebook D*. (1987), p. 330.

³⁸⁴ P. Bowler. *Charles Darwin* (1990), p. 99 (referring to D. Ospovat, 1981). Also ↻ footnote 652.

³⁸⁵ Ch. Darwin. *Notebook D* (ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), pp. 173 ff.

³⁸⁶ E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 586.

unpalatable, but this attitude was at least partly borne out of the general ignorance of Darwin's time concerning the process of inheritance. Accordingly Darwin in the *Origin* treated the process of inheritance like a black box.

In *Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication* (1868) Darwin gave an account of his theory of inheritance, the 'provisional hypothesis of pangenesis': Particles present in all cells of the body, so-called 'gemmules', are modified according to use and disuse and are transported throughout the body. They accumulate in the sexual organs.³⁸⁸ Thus, especially Darwin's later theory became less Darwinian in assuming that the inheritance the phenotype *does* directly affect the genotype.

Moreover, as Darwin worked on non-sexual plants, he also became confused again concerning the definition of species and returned to a rather typological definition.³⁸⁹

In the *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871/1874) Darwin still adheres to the theory of pangenesis.³⁹⁰ He even concedes that he "perhaps attributed too much to the action of natural selection or the survival of the fittest"³⁹¹ and because of this he also altered the fifth edition of the *Origin*. Although he even at that time did not give up his central concept of natural selection, he at least gave room for sexual selection, correlation of growth, use and disuse, and even abandoned a strict adaptationism (☹ pp. 116).

To summarise, Darwin in opposition to modern neo-Darwinism (☹ pp. 121 f.; p. 107) advocated other mechanisms than selection. Even in the *Origin of Species*, Darwin's most 'Darwinian' book, he is—expressed in a modern way—convinced of a flux of information from the 'phenotype' to the 'genotype'. Darwin on the one hand still could be regarded as the main founding father of Darwinism, because it was he, who first gave natural selection its central place in a theory of evolution, on the other hand Darwin was not a pure Darwinist in the today's understanding; in our today's understanding he was both a Darwinian and a Lamarckian.

b) *Darwin's Biological Theory — Focus on the Individual Organism*

Darwin, because his emphasis on natural selection could still be regarded—despite the above qualifications—as the main proponent of the first 'subparadigm' of Darwinism. (For an account on the external influences on Darwin's theory, ☹ pp. 152 ff.)

At the very heart of Darwinism in general, closely linked to the notion of natural selection, which is—roughly speaking—common to all different subparadigms of Darwinism and even only seldom questioned in the recent unit of selection debate, is Darwin's concept that natural selection works "solely

³⁸⁷ P. Bowler. *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), esp. pp. 5, 16, 76 f., 105-107, 175. *Charles Darwin* (1990), e. g. pp. 81, 155-161, 166. Also e. g. R. J. Richards argued that most Victorian Darwinians were not materialists in the later sense of Darwinism, *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior* (1987), esp. p. 543.

³⁸⁸ See e. g.: E. Mayr, who distinguishes two subtheories of pangenesis. *Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), pp. 693 f.

³⁸⁹ E. Mayr. *One Long Argument* (1991), pp. 29-30, 57, 69-70. See also: A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin*. (1992/1991), p. 189.

³⁹⁰ Ch Darwin. *The Descent of Man* (1922/1874), pp. 352-357.

by and for the good of each being³⁹². Thereby Darwin implicitly introduces what I want to call the ‘**principle of egoism**’. This metaphysical principle may be stated explicitly in the following way: Any entity is by definition egoistic because an entity which shows the property of caring for itself is by definition an existent entity and not only an epiphenomenon or a side effect of another entity. We may express this principle in the statement ‘no entity without egoism, no egoism without entity’. We come back to this point in the more philosophical part of this work (⇒ pp. 406 f.).

But based on the notion of natural selection and the principle of egoism different levels of existence could still be proposed, like Nature or God as a whole (like in Spinoza’s one substance ontology), ecosystems, species, groups, organisms or single genes. We will now outline Darwin’s theory, emphasising the differences of Darwin’s own theory compared with Wallace’s selection theory or to later schools of Darwinism, especially in regard to the focused evolutionary entity.

The *differentia specifica* of Darwin’s subparadigm of Darwinism, apart from his still present Lamarckian tenets, is his **focus on the individual organism**.³⁹³ E. Mayr claims: “The importance of the individual became the cornerstone of Darwin’s theory of natural selection³⁹⁴”.

Correspondingly, Darwin, at least at the time of the *Origin of Species* defined species and even varieties in a nominalistic way. Darwin advocated a continuous variation of forms of the same descent. Type or form could be explained by common descent. Darwin at that time clearly was a nominalist and all genera and even species and varieties are artificial and arbitrary notions:

“[...] I look at the term species, as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set of individuals closely resembling each other, and that it does not essentially differ from the term variety, which is given to less distinct and more fluctuating forms.”³⁹⁵

Therefore—in contrast to proponents of the later synthetic theory of evolution—to Darwin species and varieties are as unreal as higher genera are. The similarity of representatives of species and of genera is due to common descent. The species of the large genera are related to each other, in the same manner as the varieties of any one species are related to each other.³⁹⁶

In the 1860s, Darwin’s interests have turned to botany and he came back to an at least slightly more typological definition of species.³⁹⁷ It has been argued that he even then retained his view that evolution selects only for the good of the single organism.³⁹⁸

Only individuals are selected and only properties beneficial to individuals can evolve. Something can evolve, “[...] only so far as it profits the individual in its complex struggle for life [...]”³⁹⁹

³⁹¹ *Ibid*, Chapter II, p. 91.

³⁹² Ch. Darwin. *Origin of Species* (1859), p. 459.

³⁹³ Similar: M. Ruse. *Charles Darwin and Group Selection* (1980/89). Ruse at that time does not distinguish between gene-Darwinism and individual-Darwinism and is hence—I think—incautious in speculating what preferences Darwin would have today. But: *Sociobiology and Reductionism* (1989), pp. 47 f., 61 f., *Mystery of Mysteries* (1999), p. 126.

³⁹⁴ E. Mayr. *One Long Argument* (1991), p. 42.

³⁹⁵ Ch. Darwin. *Origin of Species* (1859), p. 108. See also pp. 112, 455-456.

³⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 111.

³⁹⁷ E. Mayr. *One long Argument* (1991), esp. p. 30. ⇒ footnote 389.

Since Darwin emphasised the individual and individually inherited variations, he comes to the conclusion that the competition mainly takes place among individuals *within* a population. It has to be conceded, that in the *Origin* Darwin in the one case of sterile castes of insects was forced to assume something like group selection.⁴⁰⁰ Despite this, the obvious essence or core of his subparadigm is the struggle between individuals of the same species:

“[...] the struggle almost invariably will be most severe between the individuals of the same species, for they frequent the same districts, require the same food, and are exposed to the same dangers. In the case of varieties of the same species, the struggle will generally be almost equally severe [...]”⁴⁰¹

In the *Descent of Man*—as will be shown in the next section—Darwin appears to have been only a bit more positive towards the concept of *group selection*. Although being more ambivalent on this matter, especially in regard of humans, Darwin still generally held a rather individualist stance.

Darwin’s individualist view may seem a necessary pre-Mendelian view of Darwinism. But this is not the case. It is interesting that the co-founder of the theory of natural selection, Alfred Russell Wallace (1823-1913)—who generously introduced the term ‘Darwinism’⁴⁰²—, in many respects drew different conclusions. For Darwin, competition takes place among individuals *within* groups of closely related individuals; Wallace (a later socialist and then spiritualist) by contrast, stressed competition *between* closely related species. Darwin thought that individual competition favours only the *very fittest*, whereas Wallace thought it eliminated those varieties that were *totally unfit*. Hence, the main disputes within Darwinism were introduced by its first proponents, Darwin and Wallace: competition versus co-operation; individual selection versus group selection; and positive versus negative selection.⁴⁰³

c) Darwin’s *Descent of Man* — *Social-Darwinism?*

In the *Origin*, Darwin guardedly and mysteriously forecasted that “[l]ight will be thrown on the origin of man and his history”⁴⁰⁴—in the *Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871/1874) he actually applied his theory to the origin of mankind. We (1.) point out some changes in Darwin’s biological theory, as he applied it to humans, and (2.) look how far he assumed that the theory will also explain, higher human faculties, culture and ethics.

³⁹⁸ M. Ruse. *Charles Darwin and Group Selection* (1989/1980), pp. 41-47.

³⁹⁹ Ch. Darwin. *Origin of Species* (1859), p. 348.

⁴⁰⁰ Ch. Darwin. *Origin of Species* (1859), chapter on instincts, p. 258. (Because of Darwin’s predominant focus on the individual this might be seen as an ad hoc hypothesis to explain an anomaly in his subparadigm. Still there are authors who mention him as introducing the concept of group selection: e. g. E. O. Wilson. *Sociobiology* (1975), p. 106.)

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid*, p. 126.

⁴⁰² A. R. Wallace. *Darwinism. An Exposition of the Theory of Natural Selection* (1889).

⁴⁰³ M. J. Kottler. *Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace* (1985). Quoted in D. J. Depew, B. Weber (1995), pp. 75-76.

⁴⁰⁴ Ch. Darwin. *The Origin of Species* (1859), p. 458.

(1.) **Ambivalence about the Universality of Natural Selection**

In the 'biosociological' (☉ p. 38) book *Descent of Man* he presumably found difficulty in confining himself to his own paradigm, although Darwin earlier could "not avoid the belief that man must come under the same law"⁴⁰⁵. In this book an ambivalence about the universality of natural selection and—as will be shown afterwards—towards the individualist focus of natural selection can be found.

On the one hand, it appears that Darwin wanted to maintain his belief of one universal law governing the process of evolution (☉ also p. 163). Thus he stated that the development of the human being obeyed "the same general laws, as with the lower animals"⁴⁰⁶. This conception was stated repeatedly in this work.⁴⁰⁷ Hence, to Darwin "the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind."⁴⁰⁸

On the other hand, being concerned with the evolution of man, it seems that he had tried to a certain degree to change his view on the universality of the mechanisms of evolution.

Firstly, Darwin was an exceptionally humane man, and from the time when Darwin became largely a Darwinian in the modern sense of the word, he was shaken by the 'remorseless struggle'. His moderate changes of his genuinely mono-mechanistic approach might partly be due to his wish to reach what were morally at least bearable results.

Secondly, Darwin's own theory had at that time already largely undermined his own deistic underpinnings, which might be seen as the main cause of his former belief in an ubiquitous eternal law of nature.

Thirdly, Darwin's belief in the progress in nature by the simple process of natural selection (which was still present in the *Origin*) was shattered. As he himself concedes, he had to abolish his strict adaptationist view.⁴⁰⁹

In fact, it seems controversial whether Darwin's account is essentially **progressionist or not**. For example Bowler and Gould have argued that Darwin's theory—although often misinterpreted by early Victorians—does not allow the concept of a progression of populations because they always adapt only to local environments. Richards shows that in the *Origin* a belief in a progression at least based on environmental forces could be found and that progress was the intended consequence of Darwin's theory.⁴¹⁰

These views may be reconciled if we argue that Darwin first built his pan-selectionist, pan-adaptionist and hence progressionist and mono-mechanist theory on what was still a partly theological Paleyan basis. Darwin, at the time of the *Origin*, like Adam Smith, still optimistically and undiminishedly believed that by the egoistic individualist mechanism he found, still "all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection."⁴¹¹ But later on, Darwin on the basis of the selection theory he himself had developed, could neither sustain a theological basis for these tenets nor the biological claims in their wake (☉ 'external history', pp. 162 f.).

Hence, connected with his doubts about pan-adaptionism he emphasised, more than before, a certain *causal pluralism*. He even explicitly stated that he might have overemphasised the importance of natural

⁴⁰⁵ Ch. Darwin. *Autobiography* (ed. by F. Darwin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), p. 93.

⁴⁰⁶ *Idem*. *The Descent of Man* (1874), Chapter II, p. 71.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid*, e. g. pp. 43, 52, 93, 94, 928.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid*, Chapter IV, p. 193.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid*, Chapter II, p. 92; ☉ also footnote 718.

⁴¹⁰ R. Richards. *The Meaning of Evolution* (1992), pp. 84-90, 177 f.

selection.⁴¹² It is still the case that natural selection was a more important mechanism of evolution of man to Darwin than for example for Wallace⁴¹³ and Spencer⁴¹⁴. But compared with the *Origin*, he is less Darwinian in the *Descent of Man*. He did not only give up his belief in adaptationism, but largely replaced natural selection by sexual selection. To explain variation he again employed the concept of use and disuse⁴¹⁵ and now also an originally romantic concept, that of the correlation of parts⁴¹⁶.

Moreover, in regard to the ‘object’ of the mechanisms of evolution, Darwin—as we have seen above—still largely seems to have advocated selection of individuals, but is less clear about his position and wavered between the concept of individual selection and the additional concept of group selection at least in the exceptional case of the development man and morality.

Apart from the question concerning the mechanisms of evolution, Darwin also changes his view on the question which entity is the ‘object’ of these mechanisms in this later writing. Darwin—as we have seen—in the *Origin* had focused on the individual organism as the only real entity, as the source of variation and as the sole agent in the struggle of life.

In the *Descent of Man* he appears to be a bit more positive towards the concept of *group selection*, although he admittedly stayed ambivalent and still largely took an individualistic stance.⁴¹⁷

As in the *Origin*, he clearly advocated group selection, discussing group behaviour of ants and bees:

“With strictly social animals, natural selection sometimes acts on the individual, through the preservation of variations which are beneficial to the community. A community which includes a large number of well-endowed individuals increases in number, and is victorious over other less favoured ones; even although each separate member gains no advantage over the others of the same community.”⁴¹⁸

But Darwin now additionally advocated the conception of group selection not only in regard to castes of sterile insects, but in regard to the development of mankind and the gain of mental powers.⁴¹⁹ But even in regard of mankind Darwin was still wavering between his original concept of individual selection and an additional acceptance of group selection. Darwin already discussed the problem that egoistic individuals could override a group of more socially orientated individuals. Darwin in some remarks quite clearly stated a predominance of the individual level: with “the higher social animals, I am

⁴¹¹ Ch. Darwin. *Origin of Species* (1859), p. 459.

⁴¹² Ch. Darwin, *The Descent of Man* (1874), pp. 91-93. And see footnote 391.

⁴¹³ *Ibid*, pp. 73.

⁴¹⁴ J. C. Greene. *Darwinism As a World View*. In: *Science, Ideology and World View* (1981), p. 138.

⁴¹⁵ Ch. Darwin. *The Descent of Man* (1874). Chapter II, pp. 47-52, see also e. g. pp. viii, 928.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 64-65, 91.

⁴¹⁷ M. Ruse argued that Darwin in the *Descent of Man* quite clearly took an individualistic stance. *Charles Darwin and Group Selection* (1980/89), 47-52, ⊕ footnote 393. Based on unclear sections of the original text some authors have interpreted this differently. E. g.: R. Richards. *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior* (1987), pp. 599-601. A. Rosenberg. *Altruism Theoretical Contexts* (1998/1992), pp. 449-450.

⁴¹⁸ Ch. Darwin. *The Descent of Man* (1874), p. 94.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid*, Chapter II, p. 95, Chapter V, p. 200, see p. 203.

not aware that any structure has been modified solely for the good of the community, though some are of secondary service to it.⁴²⁰

However, in many cases it is not clear whether Darwin only stated his former confident belief that the action of self-interested *individuals* fighting for their own survival would also lead to the benefit of the group or species as a whole, or if he actually believes in something like group selection, where the group is an entity in its own right.⁴²¹

Thus in the *Descent of Man* Darwin, while abandoning pan-adaptationism and allowing some causal pluralism, was, at least in the exceptional case of mankind, wavering between the concept of individual selection and the additional concept of group selection.

(2.) Explaining Man, Culture and Ethics?

In correspondence with Darwin's ambivalence in regard to the universality of the evolutionary mechanism and in regard to group selection, there is a general ambivalence as to how far his theory of evolution could be applied to explain even higher human capacities. Here we only deal with the question in which way and how far Darwin intended to apply his theories to human beings as well; whereas the social influences on Darwin and Darwinism will be treated in Chapter 5 (☉ particularly, pp. 173 f.).

Within the history of science, the question whether Darwin's approach to culture goes so far to be called socio-Darwinian, is quite controversial.⁴²² T. H. Huxley, for example, who, like Haeckel, was regarded as one of Darwin's 'bulldogs', much more clearly than Darwin in his later development turned against natural selection and struggle for life as a prescription for human culture and ethics: "Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmical process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it."⁴²³ Scholarship has shown that Huxley should anyhow rather be regarded as a 'pseudo-Darwinian'.⁴²⁴ However, Darwin, in contrast, in the *Descent of Man* had given reason to assume that he was at least ambivalent towards the question of whether 'higher human capacities' could also be explained by his (modified) biological theory:

(a) On the one hand, from time to time Darwin (the former student of theology) sounds relatively **moderate or guarded**. Darwin does not state clearly that he thought that morals and ethics ought to be 'biologised'. This might be partly due to his social background and to the fact that he did not want to evoke more dismay than necessary in public and to his sincerely pious wife, Emma. Sometimes he even seems to refer to an independent cultural sphere and to an own inner logic of reason and religion:

"For the moral qualities are advanced, either directly or indirectly, much more through the effects of habit, the reasoning powers, instruction, religion, & c. than through natural selection."⁴²⁵

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95.

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*, Chapter VIII, p. 370, see also p. 933 f.

⁴²² J. C. Greene. *Darwin as a Social Evolutionist* (1977/1981), pp. 95 ff.

⁴²³ T. H. Huxley. *Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays* (1895), p. 83.

⁴²⁴ P. Bowler. *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), pp. 68, 70, 76 f.; ☉ footnote 387.

⁴²⁵ Ch. Darwin. *The Descent of Man* (1874), Chapter XXI, p. 945.

To refer to an inner necessity of reasoning powers may be seen rather as reminiscent of a romantic, structuralist view, than of a Darwinian one. It seems almost ironic, that Darwin states that moral development relies also on religion, which he himself had involuntarily at least partly undermined.⁴²⁶

Moreover, as outlined before, he tried to explain the Origin of Man not by *natural*, but by *sexual* selection, which he had only briefly mentioned in the *Origin*.⁴²⁷ It has been argued that even this emphasis, to a certain extent, was forced on him in countering Wallace, who had argued that the human development calls for explanations above the process of natural selection.

Sexual selection “depends on the advantage which certain individuals have over others of the same sex and species solely in respect of reproduction.”⁴²⁸ The struggle is focused on the “males for the possession of the females”.⁴²⁹ The reason that sexual selection comes into being is that it serves survival in terms of natural selection: “It has been shewn that the largest number of vigorous offspring will be reared from the pairing of the strongest and best-armed males, victorious in contests over other males, with the most vigorous and best-nourished females [...]”⁴³⁰. Although Darwin often sounds as if sexual selection in principle could be reduced to natural selection, he still pointed out that practically “[s]exual selection acts in a less rigorous manner than natural selection”⁴³¹.

(b) On the other hand, Darwin sometimes seems to have taken a more **rigorous biologicistic stance**. In this regard he is mirrored by parts of today’s sociobiology and also by the so-called ‘socio-Darwinians’.

Early ‘socio-Darwinians’ gave a naturalistic biologicistic account of human activity and applied Darwin’s theory of evolution, especially his theory of natural selection also to humans. But some of them, like Spencer—like even Darwin himself—still believed in an important role also for acquired characteristics, so that we today would regard them to a certain extent also as ‘socio-Lamarckians’⁴³².

Darwin argued that genius and insanity is inherited.⁴³³ This is according to Darwin also the case in regard to the intellectual differences of the sexes:

“The chief distinction in the intellectual powers of the two sexes is shewn by man’s attaining to a higher eminence, in whatever he takes up, than can woman—whether requiring deep thought, reason, or imagination, or merely the use of the senses and hands. If two lists were made of the most eminent men and women in poetry, painting, sculpture, music [...], history, science, and philosophy, with half-a-dozen names under each subject, the two lists would not bear comparison. We may also infer, from the law of the deviation from averages, so well illustrated by Mr. Galton, in his work on ‘Hereditary Genius’, that if men are capable of a decided pre-eminence over women in many subjects, the average of mental power in man must be above that of woman.”⁴³⁴

⁴²⁶ Darwin might have thought positivistically—like T. H. Huxley—that religion applies to the past and not to the future.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid*, Chapter VII pp. 307-308, whole Part III.

⁴²⁸ Ch. Darwin. *The Descent of Man* (1874), Chapter VIII, p. 322.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 328.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 340.

⁴³¹ *Ibid*, p. 349.

⁴³² P. J. Bowler. *Darwin* (1990), pp. 169-172, esp.: 171; ☞ footnote 441.

⁴³³ Ch. Darwin. *The Descent of Man* (1874), Chapter II, p. 41, see also pp. 81 ff. Darwin refers here like in the next quote to the work of his cousin Francis Galton: *Hereditary Genius: an Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences* (1869).

⁴³⁴ *Ibid*, Chapter XIX, pp. 857 f., also p. 847.

Although Darwin concedes that this mental inferiority of women could be superseded; to him this is mainly a biological problem—a problem a breeder has with its cattle:

“All women, however, could not be thus raised, unless during many generations those who excelled in the above robust virtues were married, and produced offspring in larger numbers than other women.”⁴³⁵

Because of this biologicistic views, Darwin even sometimes takes a prescriptive ‘socio-Darwinian’ view, in the sense that he draws far-going normative conclusions from his biological conception:

“We civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of every one to the last moment. [...] Thus the weak members of civilised societies propagate their kind. [...] but excepting in the case of man himself, hardly any one is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breed.”⁴³⁶

But—maybe because of his former Christian background—Darwin in this context shrunk back from directly calling for the abolition of the Poor Laws, as Malthus⁴³⁷ and Spencer⁴³⁸—for maybe different reasons—in fact did. But on other pages Darwin indeed considered that “it might be argued that the struggle for existence had not been sufficiently severe to force man upwards to his highest standard”.

J. C. Greene, also looking through Darwin’s annotations of books and articles, has shown, that Darwin, at the time he wrote the *Descent of Man*, was to a large extent convinced that his ideas of struggle for life have to be applied to culture as well and in this sense could be said to have shared socio-Darwinian ideas.⁴³⁹ Already Hofstadter in his canonical book on socio-Darwinism has pointed out that the term ‘Socio-Darwinism’ had been used with meanings besides laissez-faire capitalism, i. e. struggle between nations or artificial breeding policy.⁴⁴⁰ Bowler even pointed out that it was possible to associate almost every social and political position to biological ‘Darwinism’—but I think this had only been the case if we take the wide Victorian understanding of ‘Darwinian’ biology into account, which Bowler himself has illustrated.⁴⁴¹ Apart from this, I think Greene is right in arguing that Darwin, based on *his* biological theory, Spencer, Th. H. Huxley and Wallace on partly indeed different grounds, by 1860 had had reached a world view focused on the idea of competitive struggle and survival of the fittest.⁴⁴² However, the specific way Darwin argues,—I think—is not *only* due to an arbitrary construction on top of his theory, but is at least partly born out of the construction of his biological theory.

Still one might imagine Darwin even more vigorously arguing against poor laws and the like. In my opinion, Darwin’s still detectable ambivalence in applying his original struggle-for-life-view of nature

⁴³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 861.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid*, Chapter V, pp. 205-206.

⁴³⁷ ↻ p. 180.

⁴³⁸ H. Spencer. *Social Statics* (1851), pp. 311-329.

⁴³⁹ J. C. Greene. *Darwin as a Social Evolutionist* (1977/1981), pp. 95-127.

⁴⁴⁰ R. Hofstadter. *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (1955).

⁴⁴¹ P. J. Bowler. *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), pp. 152-173, esp. 155, 161, 165, 171. *Evolution* (1984), pp. 266 f., also: M. Hawkins. *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860-1945* (1997).

⁴⁴² J. C. Greene. *Darwinism as a World View*. In: *Science, Ideology and World View* (1981), pp. 148-150. Even Bowler concedes that the struggle metaphor was at variance with a formerly more directed and purposeful notion of evolution, *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), pp. 156, 165.

also to humans partly refers us to his ambivalence in regard to the universality of natural selection, his Lamarckian tenets and the modifications of his theory, which is vice versa connected with his attempt to apply his theory to mankind. In conclusion, Darwin became a 'Socio-Darwinist' not in a purely Darwinian sense, not even in the sense of the Darwin of the *Origin of Species*, but—here I agree to Greene—still in the sense of his own, a bit more moderate, biological theory of the *Descent of Man*.

In summary, Darwin in the *Descent of Man* put more emphasis on use and disuse, correlation of parts etc. than in the *Origin* and he also emphasised the concept of sexual selection. Yet, Darwin generally can be said to have remained quite steadfast in his basic faith that natural selection and struggle for life play at least a crucial role, even if this theory is applied to mankind.

Already in the *Origin of Species* Darwin was not a Darwinist in today's strict sense of the word, but still to some degree was e. g. a Lamarckist. Nevertheless, he introduced the concept of natural selection as a central mechanism of evolution. Besides his still vague view on inheritance etc. his subparadigm in the *Origin* is characterised by his focus on the individual organism as the source of variation, as the only real entity and therefore the unit of selection, of evolution and of the struggle for life.

In the *Descent of Man*, Darwin introduced a limited causal pluralism, but he seems still to have explained the evolution of 'lower' animals and of man by an unchanging universal set of laws. He generally estimated natural selection to be less important and also considered group selection at least for humans. Still at least in this moderated sense he applied his theories also to human capacities and culture.

d) *Neo-Darwinism: Weismann Turns Darwin's Theory into 'Darwinism'*

At Darwin's times, the mechanisms of inheritance were still totally obscure. Linked to this ignorance was Darwin's problem of how variability could arise on which natural selection then could act. "With respect to the causes of variability, we are in all cases very ignorant"⁴⁴³ Correspondingly,—as we have seen before⁴⁴⁴—Darwin in the *Origin* and even more in the *Descent of Man* still relied on inheritance of acquired characters and correlation of parts.

August Weismann (1834-1914) was an ardent supporter of the theory of natural selection and since 1882 rejected the concept of use inheritance. Because of this, George Romanes, a disciple of Darwin, who himself did not want to abandon the Lamarckian elements in Darwin's theory,⁴⁴⁵ coined the term 'neo-Darwinism' for Weismann's radicalisation of Darwin's original more moderate theory. Neo-Darwinism later on, after the crises of Darwinism and neo-Darwinism at the turn of the century, only became dominant under the again quite different regime of the evolutionary synthesis. As there were

⁴⁴³ Ch. Darwin. *The Descent of Man* (1874), Chapter II, p. 41.

⁴⁴⁴ ☞ 'Darwin — Not a Darwinist in the Strict Sense', pp. 110 f.; 'Ambivalence about the Universality of Natural Selection', pp. 116 f.

⁴⁴⁵ E. g.: R. J. Richards. *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior* (1987), pp. 334 f.

almost no original Darwinians left, people started to use ‘Darwinism’ for short, instead of the literally more correct terms ‘neo-Darwinism’ or ‘Weismannism’.

In *Weismann's intellectual development three main periods could be distinguished*.⁴⁴⁶

- Already from 1868 to 1881 Weismann ardently supported natural (and sexual) selection. But nevertheless he believed at the same time in inheritance of acquired characteristics. Like Darwin, he thought that use inheritance produces the variability on which natural selection could act.
- From 1882 to 1895 Weismann had dismissed the theory of use-inheritance and offered an alternative theory of inheritance. At that time he was almost totally a panselectionist on the level of the individual organism (☹ below).
- From 1896 to 1910 Weismann deviated from his panselectionist view. Despite having found a theory of inheritance which made the inheritance of acquired characters impossible, he still failed to give a convincing account of how variation is sustained. Lacking theories of mutation and population genetics, he had to accept that a mere chance combination and blending inheritance could not provide enough variation. Hence he had to introduce other mechanisms, mainly his theory of cell selection, germinal selection and even a theory of ‘induced germinal selection’. At this time he revoked his former strictly neo-Darwinian beliefs and again emphasised sexual selection and also other mechanisms.

In his middle period of his intellectual development Weismann stated in *his theory of inheritance*, that there is only one direction of information flux: we today would say ‘from the genotype to the phenotype’. Besides his theoretical considerations he also refuted inheritance of acquired characters by experiment: Selective breeding of the largest and the smallest individuals of pure lines, which are only due to environmental conditions of different height, should produce progressive results. Such experiments, which were conducted till the 1930s and 40s, came uniformly to negative results.⁴⁴⁷

In *Das Keimplasma: Eine Theorie der Vererbung* (1892) he gave a full account of his theory, called germ-plasma theory of inheritance, based on the cell nucleus theory of M. Schleiden, T. Schwann and R. Virchow.




Figure 2: Flux of information in Weismann's *Keimplasmatheorie*.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁶ See: E. Mayr. *Weismann and Evolution* (1985), 296 f., and also: *One Long Argument* (1991), pp. 111 ff.

⁴⁴⁷ E. Mayr. *Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 700.

⁴⁴⁸ E. g.: P. J. Bowler. *Evolution. The History of an Idea* (1984), p. 238. K. M. Wuketits. *Evolutionstheorien* (1995), p. 57.

Weismann advocated a continuity of the germ plasma (*Keimplasma*) which, according to him, is unaffected by any change of the soma plasma (*Somatoplasma*). This conceptions could not only be applied to the *nucleus* and *soma* of *single cells*, but to the relation of whole germ *cells* and somatic *cells*.

Weismann's much more complicated theory of inheritance got, from the viewpoint of today's biology, something wrong. He did not approve an 'activation' theory of the germ plasma but a 'dissection' theory: he thought that "the chromatin which controls them [the cells] cannot be the same in every cell but must differ according to the nature of the cell".⁴⁴⁹ Here Weismann was corrected by the research of Spemann, Driesch and others who emphasised the role of the location of cells in the whole organism. Despite this, Weismann has to be regarded as founder of what was later called the *central dogma of molecular biology*: no information could be passed from the phenotype to the genotype, from any cell molecules to the DNA.

By doing this he ruled out inheritance of acquired characters and also Darwin's theory of pangenesis, and by this the way was prepared for his version of panselectionism. In his middle period he also became critical towards sexual selection.⁴⁵⁰ Natural selection was to him, at that period, although still not totally breaking with developmental constraints, almost the only mechanism of evolution. In the beginning this was accompanied by a belief in panadaptionism, and only after he became an ardent selectionist he realised (as had Darwin before him) that natural selection does not necessarily lead to perfection.⁴⁵¹

Concerning our comparison of Darwinian subparadigms, Weismann in his middle period—like Darwin in the *Origin*—focused on selection (and hence evolution) only on the level of the individual, either seen as phenotype or as holistic system of the genotype.⁴⁵²

Although Weismann should be seen as clearly Darwinian arguing against a romantic understanding of a preformed 'evolution', he in a limited sense not only undermined, but continued this tradition which was especially strong in Germany: he applied preformationism now with a materialist spin only to the problem of ontogenesis and exactly by this he made the phylogenetic preformationism impossible, which had been central to romantic biology and had been based on *causa formalis*.

Weismann became Darwin's executor in finding a theory of inheritance which allowed an exclusive focus on Darwin's theory of natural selection; he radicalised Darwin's theory by ruling out causal pluralism still employed by Darwin himself and replaced it by his own panselectionist theory.

⁴⁴⁹ A. Weismann. *Keimplasma* (1892), p. 43. (Quoted in: E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 702.)

⁴⁵⁰ E. Mayr. *Weismann and Evolution* (1985), p. 309.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 308.

⁴⁵² E. Mayr. *Weismann and Evolution* (1985), pp. 308-309, *One Long Argument* (1991), pp. 117, 130.

Hence Weismann with even more reason than Darwin himself, could be called a Darwinian in the sense of our working definition. Because Weismann focused on the individual or on the genotype as a whole he has been treated here under the subparadigm of individual-Darwinism.

After Weismann had refuted romantic biology and Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characters, his panselctionist theory had the majority of supporters during the 1880s.

4.2 Darwinism on Its Deathbed

In the 1890s the influence of Weismann, and with this the influence of Darwinism, faded again and was not dominant until the occurrence of the evolutionary synthesis in the 1930s and 1940s. Victorian 'Darwinism', as P. Bowler has shown, had anyway not been a pure form of Darwinism. At any rate, after the short success of Weismann's mono-mechanistic purer brand of Darwinism, most biologists at the end of the century turned against this radicalised form of Darwin's theory. This might partly be due to the perhaps over-ambitious attack of Weismann upon other forms of explanation. At the time Weismann overcame the concept of use-inheritance, he was still not able to provide another explanation of how variance is sustained, a necessary precondition if the mechanism of natural selection was to be accepted.

Although natural selection was still one among other discussed factors of evolution—and no doubt still had some (subliminal) influence on other areas of human activity even at that time—, Weismann's attack on causal pluralism ended in a strong backlash in biology. During about 40 years the majority of biologists regarded themselves as followers of (a) neo-Lamarckism, (b) a theory of orthogenesis or (c) a Mendelian kind of saltationism.⁴⁵³

(a) Neo-Lamarckism in the narrow sense mainly focused on use inheritance. Often this term is used as in the broader sense as umbrella notion also for the other non-Darwinian schools.

Social-Lamarckism, in the narrow and in the broad sense, was present in the works of Joseph LeConte, Lester Ward, the psychologist G. Stanley Hall and the playwright George Bernhard Shaw. Apart from Spencer who at least partly was an early 'social-Lamarckist' these conceptions were often linked with the goal of social reform and state education and an opposition towards *laissez-faire*.⁴⁵⁴

(b) The conception of orthogenesis resembles the tenet of romantic biology to focus on an inner tendency, a necessary unfolding of nature. This culminates in the gain of self-consciousness of nature or God. The concept of orthogenesis had often been combined with finalism. Among the proponents of orthogenesis were Carl von Nägeli, Theodor Eimer, Leo S. Berg, Edward Drinker Cope, Henry Fairfield Osborn, as well as the Jesuit and palaeontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. In this context the vitalists Hans Driesch and Jakob von Uexküll should also be mentioned, as these authors emphasised the non-

⁴⁵³ The division of different schools is adopted from: E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), pp. 525-531. See also: P. J. Bowler. *Evolution. The History of an Idea* (1984), pp. 243-265. A canonical book on this topic, which I have not considered here, is P. J. Bowler, *The Eclipse of Darwinism* (1983).

reducibility of biology to physics. They referred—often in a somewhat mystical way—to vital forces. Driesch also reintroduced the teleological Aristotelian concept of *entelecheia*. Generally vitalism was influenced also by German *Gestalt*-psychology.⁴⁵⁵ Like this school they were opposed to reductionism and atomism. Also the process philosophy of A. N. Whitehead—although different in form and background—resembles this general position.

(c) Saltationism was also already a tenet of romantic biology. Romantic biologists favoured this concept largely because of their belief in given forms. Today it might be easier to understand, if we use the term ‘ecological niche’, into which a species only suddenly could ‘slip’. Saltationism traditionally has corresponded to the belief in an essence of a species.⁴⁵⁶ Darwin, in contrast, had favoured a species nominalism and an gradualist view of evolution.

In 1900 three European biologists, among them Hugo de Vries (1848-1935), rediscovered the laws of heredity already developed and published in the year 1866 by the Austrian monk Gregor Mendel (1822-84).

Mendel, as historians of science recently have pointed out, was not the lonely originator of modern population genetics ‘whose only associates lived in the next century’, but in a historized view Mendel should be seen as part of a tradition founded by the plant geographer and pre-Darwinian evolutionist Franz Unger, who was Mendel’s teacher at Vienna University, and who had himself been influenced by A. v. Humboldt and by idealist morphology.⁴⁵⁷

To de Vries the rediscovered laws provided evidence for the existence of sudden changes in species (which he named ‘mutations’). Although this has not necessarily to be interpreted along the lines of romantic biology, in de Vries’ view this also provides support at least for a saltationistic speciation as opposed to Darwin’s gradual one. The English scientist who had coined the term ‘genetics’, also opposed Darwinism: William Bateson (1861-1926), after being influenced by de Vries, focused even more strongly than de Vries on evolution by mutation pressure. The first phase where Mendelism became influential runs from the 1900 to 1910 and is dominated by Vries, Bateson and Johannsen. The second phase of Mendelism beginning in 1910 was dominated by the Morgan school, focusing on more specific genetic questions.⁴⁵⁸ However, even in the early times of the evolutionary synthesis e. g. the geneticist R. Goldschmidt and the palaeontologist O. H. Schindewolf (like most other German palaeontologists) supported saltationism. Today’s palaeontological theory of punctuated equilibrium may in a way be seen as a revised form of saltationism⁴⁵⁹.

⁴⁵⁴ P. J. Bowler. *Evolution. The History of an Idea* (1984), p. 278-282; G. B. Shaw. *Back to Methuselah* (1990/1921), introduction; but see also: P. J. Bowler. *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), pp. 152-173.

⁴⁵⁵ See L. v. Bertalanffy’s (1901-1972) *Kritische Theorie der Formbildung*. Berlin (1928), pp. 166 ff. (cited in Woodger, 1929, p. 484).

⁴⁵⁶ It is not possible for me to judge here whether saltationism at the beginning of the 20th century shared this essentialist belief.

⁴⁵⁷ S. Gliboff. *Gregor Mendel and the Laws of Evolution* (1999).

⁴⁵⁸ The distinction in two Mendelian periods from: E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought*. (1982), pp. 731 ff.

⁴⁵⁹ But ☞ footnote 564.

Although the opposition against Darwinism was predominant till 1930, the different directions and disciplines were unable to build up *one* coherent synthesis. In 1929 the philosopher of science J. H. Woodger wrote: the “general theoretical results which have been reached by investigation along the lines of physiology, experimental morphology, genetics, cytology, and the older descriptive morphology are extremely difficult to harmonise with one another [...]”⁴⁶⁰ He even described the basic biological principles of his time in terms of antitheses, like vitalism and mechanism, structure and function, organism and environment, preformation and epigenesis, teleology and causation, mind and body. He predicted a fundamental change in biology, which would incorporate all these aspects. And indeed another paradigm was really in the making, although Woodger would probably have regretted that not all these notions found entrance in this synthesis. The so-called evolutionary synthesis was at least mainly a revival of a moderated form of Darwinism. However, it is still difficult to decide if Darwinism had changed its conceptual hard core and assimilated other ideas, or if it had changed only its ‘protective belt’. Here a middle position is held; a new subparadigm was born, which still is at least largely a Darwinian one, though it is in some respects less radically Darwinian than Weismann’s pan-selectionism. Thus, if we look back, it seems adequate to state that the time between 1890 and 1930 was only a short ‘eclipse of Darwinism’, which then gained dominance again⁴⁶¹.

4.3 Evolutionary Synthesis

In 1943 Julian Huxley (1887-1975), grandson of Thomas Henry Huxley, pronounced in his book *Evolution, the Modern Synthesis* the birth of a unified, mainly Darwinian, biology. The basis of the so-called evolutionary synthesis was built in the 1920s and 1930s and its elaboration was largely finished in the 1940s and early 1950s.⁴⁶² It was a synthesis of different theoretical approaches, as well as of different fields—which often correspond to different approaches.

In the following four subsections the main aspects of this impressive convergence of views and the main characteristic of the resulting paradigm will be elaborated. The influences on this synthesis *external* to biology are worked out in 5.2. Here the *internal* history of the synthesis is treated. In the first and second section we will introduce the main contributors and main tenets of the first and second phase of the evolutionary synthesis. In section three the main different features of this Darwinian paradigm, its focus on additional evolutionary—largely Darwinian—factors and its focus on the level of populations will be worked out. Finally it will be discussed whether advocates of this view were inclined to be more guarded in applying their approach towards man as well.

⁴⁶⁰ J. H. Woodger. *Biological Principles. A Critical Study* (1929), p. 12.

⁴⁶¹ The term ‘eclipse of Darwinism’ is coined by J. Huxley, and is the title of a book by Peter Bowler.

⁴⁶² W. B. Provine mentions that all participants of a conference on the history of the synthesis agreed that a theoretical consensus was met at this frame of time. *Epilogue* (1980), pp. 399. Still, especially in France there was a resistance to accepting the synthesis until at least well into the 1960s. C. Limoges. *A Second Glance at Evolutionary Biology in France* (1980), pp. 323, 327. ☞ also the following differentiation of the two phases of the evolutionary synthesis.

The synthesis generally was neither solely based on the developments in genetics⁴⁶³ nor solely on the development of population thinking; it seems that both contributed to it.⁴⁶⁴ Nevertheless the synthesis always has been far from being monolithic.⁴⁶⁵

I think, one might even challenge the often held assumption that the resulting evolutionary synthesis has itself in its different wings or phases been purely Darwinian.

On the one hand many proponents of the synthesis have quite clearly stated something like: "All known evolutionary rules can be explained by mutation and selection."⁴⁶⁶

On the other hand, it must firstly be acknowledged that population genetics was already a Mendelian-Darwinian synthesis (☉ below) and Darwinism had to some extent to give up its own emphasis on the continuity of variation and hereditary change. Secondly, as we will see, Darwin's exclusive focus on the individual organism was abandoned, and concepts like population, isolation and species were developed which, according to Mayr, were in Darwin's day still rather nebulous.⁴⁶⁷ Thirdly, it has been argued that earlier developments in phylogenetic research, by proponents who did not yet see mutation and selection as the sole mechanisms of evolution, still paved the way for population genetics.⁴⁶⁸ Fourthly—which in my opinion is of most importance—, in the later period of the synthesis some tenets such as Lerner's concept of genetic homeostasis, which is rooted in rather non-Darwinian traditions, had been incorporated into the synthesis.⁴⁶⁹ Sometimes, for example, Waddington, who is normally contrasted to Darwinism, has also been declared to have contributed to the synthesis.⁴⁷⁰

What we call Darwinism is in any case a function of our definition and our own theoretical position. I personally think that the notion *Darwinism*, especially as it expands to other fields, is used too broadly. Whether this also applies to the synthesis cannot be discussed here. A more precise definition of Darwinism would be needed (☉ p. 348). For the time being, according to our working definition (☉ p. 107) and because the synthesis no doubt owes much to the concept of natural selection,⁴⁷¹ here we will treat the synthesis simply as another *Darwinian* paradigm.

In this treatment of the evolutionary synthesis I shall try to give reason to the hypothesis that the evolutionary synthesis was logically and historically achieved in two relatively distinct phases.⁴⁷² Although the term 'phase' should indeed indicate a logical succession, I have to concede that they

⁴⁶³ W. B. Provine. *Genetics* (1980), pp. 51 f.

⁴⁶⁴ E. Mayr. *Prologue* (1980), pp. 28-44 (also e. g. 1982, pp. 550-570; 1991, pp. 132-140); also e. g. Wuketits, *Evolutionstheorien* (1995), pp. 59-65.

⁴⁶⁵ Tensions could be observed e. g. in: E. Mayr, W. B. Provine (eds.). *The Evolutionary Synthesis* (1980).

⁴⁶⁶ B. Rensch. *Historical Development of the Present Synthetic Neo-Darwinism in Germany* (1980), p. 298; here quoting an article of his from 1943, p. 52. See also E. Mayr. *Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 514.

⁴⁶⁷ ☉ pp. 113 f., 132 f.; E. Mayr. *Animal Species and Evolution* (1963), p. 2.

⁴⁶⁸ P. Bowler. *Life's Splendid Drama*. (1996), e. g. pp. 39, 442-443.

⁴⁶⁹ G. E. Allen instead distinguishes mechanistic, holistic and dialectical materialism *within* Darwinism. *The Several Faces of Darwin* (1983), for a discussion of Lerner see: pp. 92 f.

⁴⁷⁰ E. Mayr. *Animal Species and Evolution* (1963), p. 6.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid*, p. 2.

⁴⁷² Similar e. g. P. Bowler. *Evolution*. (1984), pp. 290-300.

actually existed in parallel for a while and could in this respect also be seen as the two wings of the synthesis. Still, the second wing—at least for a while—gained predominance.

E. Mayr normally uses the term 'evolutionary synthesis' to refer only to the proponents of the second phase,⁴⁷³ whereas other authors emphasise the contributions of the first phase⁴⁷⁴. Historical positions might reflect biological viewpoints, that is, which wing of the synthesis an author belongs to. In history and philosophy of science Mayr's viewpoint—possibly also because of his own contributions to these fields—seems to prevail. By arguing that the synthesis has taken place in two phases, one apprehends a certain unity of both views, the necessity of early contributions and—largely acknowledged and only recently challenged—the superiority of the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis.

a) *First Phase —Synthesis of Genetics and Population Statistics*

Early Darwinism had the problem of explaining how there could be enough variability on which natural selection could work. In particular since Weismann had refuted the concept that variance is sustained by properties acquired during an organism's lifetime this problem became pressing and even challenged Darwinism in general. Natural selection would quickly weed out any variance.

Moreover, Darwin and most of his followers advocated blending inheritance, which even without any selection pressure, would in each successive generation lead to a diminution of individual differences. The variance of populations would fade and would quickly tend to centre closely around the mean.⁴⁷⁵

The saltationistic school, at odds with Darwinism, was continued after 1910 predominantly by the late Mendelian Thomas Hunt Morgan (1866-1945), who had founded the work on *Drosophila*⁴⁷⁶ in the famous fly room at Columbia University. Morgan and his school stressed the independence of individual genes and discontinuous variation. The discontinuity given by Mendel's laws seemed inconsistent with a gradualist Darwinian view.

Only the evolutionary synthesis was able to hijack this concept and integrate it as a central building stone for the still—largely—Darwinian framework, which at that point could explain how variability is sustained on a higher level, the level of population.

The core of this synthesis was the development of **population genetics**, including both the genetic level and the level of statistical analysis of the population. In this context, the term *population* is defined as all individual organisms which could freely interbreed with each other. The sum of all genes of such a

⁴⁷³ E. Mayr often repeats his distinction and contrasts the synthesis with Fisherism. E. g.: *One Long Argument* (1991), p. 144. But sometimes he concedes that his distinction is somewhat arbitrary: *Ibid*, p. 134. Also C. H. Waddington *Epigenetics and evolution* (1953) [quoted by W. Provine. *Epilogue* (1980), pp. 402, 411.] focused on the importance of the second phase.

⁴⁷⁴ See: W. B. Provine. *Epilogue* (1980), pp. 401-402.

⁴⁷⁵ This view resembles Mayr's position. But see also P. Bowler. *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), pp. 91 f., 106.

⁴⁷⁶ *Drosophila* has become for a long time the paradigmatic experimental object of population geneticists. The mathematical approach and the standardised laboratory experiments have been criticised as *Drosophilosophy-obsession* (notion of the biologist E. B. Ford). Mentioned by: M. Midgley. *Beast and Man* (1995/1978), p. 135.

population is called *gene-pool*. *Alleles* are different genes at the same locus (on the same or on corresponding chromosomes).

The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium is the equation which builds the heart of population genetics. This 'law or principle'⁴⁷⁷ had already been formulated in 1908 by the British mathematician Godfrey H. Hardy and the German physician Wilhelm Weinberg independently. It says that, if mating between individuals occurs at random and there are no external influences, the relative frequencies of two alleles would remain constant in a gene pool. Hence, the variance of a population does not fade without any external cause, as would have been the case in models of blending inheritance.

Given a diploid genetic system, where chromosomes correspond to each other in pairs. Provided that for the discussed gene locus (or more exactly, for the two corresponding loci), there are only two different kinds of genes (=alleles) present in the population. These possible gene expressions, *A* and *a*, have a relative frequency in the gene pool, *p* and *q*. In this two allele case the equation $p + q = 1$ is valid by the definition of relative frequencies.

During (sexual) reproduction two reproductive cells, which both have a reduced (haploid) set of chromosomes, unite. This results again in a cell with a proper set of pairs of chromosomes (diploid set). If a random mixing of alleles is taken for granted (☉ below) than the probability that on an of the corresponding loci is one of the two alleles *A* or *a* corresponds to their relative frequencies *p* and *q* in the gene-pool.

Hence, the allele combinations *AA* should have the relative frequency $p \times p = p^2$, *Aa* should have the relative frequency $(p \times q) + (q \times p) = 2pq$, and *aa* finally should have the relative frequency $q \times q = q^2$. If we now check the new overall relative frequency of the alleles *p* and *q* in the gene pool, we have to sum up the relative frequencies of the alleles of the different combinations: $p^2 + 2pq + q^2 = (p + q)^2$. Because of the definition of relative frequencies $(p + q)^2$ is equal to 1 which is consistent with the definition that $p + q$ equals 1.

In conclusion, the relative frequency of two alleles in a gene pool could remain constant. The resulting combinations on the two chromosomes of the organisms is, as we have seen, distributed according to a binomial distribution. The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium could be generalised also for cases of *n* alleles and *m* chromosomes and is distributed as a multinomial distribution: $(p + q + \dots + n)^m$.⁴⁷⁸

The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium is valid only under the precondition that there is an 'ideal population'. A population is ideal if it is panmictic (all reproductive combinations of the same individuals have the same possibility); if it has an endless (or at least sufficient high) number of organisms; and if it is not exposed to either mutation, selection, migration, or inner isolation. The artificial character of these assumptions is at least partly intended, because the equilibrium provides a yardstick against which evolutionary change, e. g. the strength of selection, could be measured.

Still, such a measurement is of course only valid when we do know from other considerations that all other preconditions are fulfilled. Otherwise the different influences would be attributed to the measured factor.

The biologists Ronald A. Fisher (1890-1962), also an important contributor also to modern statistics, and John Burdon Sanderson Haldane (1892-1964) made far reaching mathematical contributions, based on this framework. Both believed that natural selection is the predominant force which causes changes in the above equilibrium and thus leads to gradual evolution.

⁴⁷⁷ A dispute has taken place as to whether the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium is a law of nature or a principle. The main opponents were M. Ruse and D. Hull. See: E. Lloyd. *The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory* (1994), p. 5.

⁴⁷⁸ For example: D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/1986), pp. 95 f.; H. Knodel: *Linder Biologie*, 1988 (1948), p.315.

Philosophically this perspective seems to me to be a synthesis of two extreme aspects, the macroscopic and the microscopic aspect. On the one hand, this view introduced the macro-level of a whole population (or better: 'gene pool') into the Darwinian research tradition. On the other hand, they have combined this with a genetic perspective. Fitness in this view becomes defined by the changes of frequencies of a given gene at a given locus compared with its alternative genes—its alleles—on that locus in a given population. Hence, fitness is now in one aspect a property of a single gene, in another only definable in relation to a distribution of alleles in its population.

Fisher, in particular, did not treat the phenotypic individual organism or visible population, but arrays of genes.⁴⁷⁹ Fisher largely based his work on the three assumptions which were later disputed: the exclusive importance of the genotype, the neglect of interactions of individual genes and the concept of complete random recombinations.

b) *Second Phase — Population Structure and Macroscopic Mechanisms*

The second step of the evolutionary synthesis is mainly characterised by the conceptual introduction of population structure into the theoretical mathematical models, which had been based on the assumption of total panmictic 'ideal' populations. This was paralleled with a stronger focus on the actual situation in which naturalists find populations, and by an introduction of additional evolutionary factors.

Proponents of the second step of the evolutionary synthesis, in particular Mayr, have often emphasised that nothing in the evolutionary writings of Fisher and Haldane could explain the process of multiplication of species.⁴⁸⁰

We will now outline the contributions of only three of the main figures of the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis, before we give a more systematic account in the following section.⁴⁸¹

The American geneticist Sewall **Wright** (1889-1988), who together with Fisher and Haldane was one of the founding fathers of mathematical population genetics, took already the real, complex structure of what he called "adaptive landscape"⁴⁸² into account. Wright was the first, who focused more on the concepts of gene-interactions⁴⁸³, of subpopulations and of 'interdemic' selection. In very small subpopulations it is more probable that a different subset of genes becomes fixed than in the underlying distribution of the whole population, independent from any selection pressure. In terms of the probability theory this is an obvious effect and had already been recognised by Fisher, who thought it a deviation from the main process of natural selection. Wright on the contrary regarded this process as an essential part of evolution and called it 'genetic drift'. The fixation of a combination of genes in small

⁴⁷⁹ D. J. Depew & B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), p. 246.

⁴⁸⁰ E. Mayr. *One Long Argument* (1991), p. 133; also e. g.: R. Lewontin. *Theoretical Population Genetics in the Evolutionary Synthesis* (1980), p. 61.

⁴⁸¹ I have to neglect some founders of the synthesis, like e. g. the zoologist Bernhard Rensch and George Gaylord Simpson, who with his book *Tempo and Mode in Evolution* (1944) brought palaeontology into the new synthesis.

⁴⁸² On this metaphor: M. Ruse. *Are Pictures Really Necessary? The Case of Sewall Wright's 'Adaptive Landscapes'* (1996).

⁴⁸³ R. C. Lewontin. *Theoretical Population Genetics in the Evolutionary Synthesis* (1980), p. 61. But ↻ footnotes 484, 485.

populations by chance and not by natural selection, is an additional (we might say macroscopic) way in which variance, now not *within* but *between* subpopulations, is sustained.

Till then this had continued to be a problem. Although the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium gave an answer to the question why the variation will not diminish without selection pressure, it was still difficult to explain how variation can be maintained if there *is* selection pressure. In this situation, in his 'theory of shifting balance' Wright stated that genetic drift plays a central role in producing variance between small, interbreeding subpopulations, which are partly isolated from the total population.

The Russian geneticist Theodosius **Dobzhansky** (1900-75), who had emigrated to the USA, but was already influenced by a Russian school of genetics based around Sergei Chetverikov, followed Wright's argument that drift plays an important role in sustaining variation. Even more than Wright, he emphasized in his book *Genetics and the Origin of Species* (1937) the adaptation of whole populations, and that a gene's fitness is always context related.⁴⁸⁴ Presumably because of this Mayr has praised him—and not Wright—as the founding father of the synthesis.⁴⁸⁵ (Wright, although mathematically also concerned with structured populations, did not yet focus so much on the actual populations observed by the naturalists. In this sense he can be located somewhere between the first and second phase of the evolutionary synthesis.)

In Dobzhansky's model of 'balancing selection' (partly opposed to Wright's 'shifting balance') he proposed that the variation within heterozygotes is an adaptation which allows populations to ride over large maladaptive valleys. In this emphasis, he mirrors his former teacher Sergei S. Chetverikov who came to the conclusion that, "a species, like a sponge, soaks up heterozygous mutations, while remaining from first to last externally (phenotypically) homozygous"⁴⁸⁶. I think, that the concept of accumulated variability, which is adaptive, not in the short but in the long run, foreshadowed the later anti-selectionist claim of genetic neutralism (Kimura).⁴⁸⁷

Mayr (*1904) worked in a similar framework but in *Systematics and the Origin of Species* (1942) stressed the actual circumstances in which populations and individual organisms are found by the naturalist. Among the proponents of the evolutionary synthesis it was mainly he who highlighted the phenotypic side of the evolutionary process. This, I suppose, is due to a radicalisation of the concept of the context relatedness of genes, already emphasised in Dobzhansky's work. Mayr strongly advocates that genes "not only act but interact", that there is a "harmoniously integrated" "unity of the genotype" and hence opposed what he has called beanbag genetics.⁴⁸⁸ Pushed to its extreme it does not make sense

⁴⁸⁴ Th. Dobzhansky. *Genetics and the Origin of Species* (1951), e.g. p. 254.

⁴⁸⁵ E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 568.

⁴⁸⁶ S. S. Chetverikov. *On certain aspects of the evolutionary process* (1926); engl. trans. (1961). Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, p. 105, p. 178. (Quoted in E. Mayr, *Ibid*, p. 557)

⁴⁸⁷ The matter is actually more complicated. Kimura was vigorously criticised by R. C. Lewontin, who because of his emphasis on allelic polymorphism is often counted among the main defenders of Dobzhansky's legacy.

⁴⁸⁸ E. Mayr. *Animal Species and Evolution* (1963), chapter 10 'Unity of the Genotype', pp. 263 f., 295.

any more to look at single genes or gene pools, but phenotypic individuals and populations or species.⁴⁸⁹ According to Mayr genes mutate, organisms are selected and species evolve.

Mayr focused on the concept of allopatric speciation and geographical isolation. Like other proponents of both phases of the synthesis he used a definition of species and populations based on reproduction (the so-called *biological* concept of species), but by these conceptions he focused on phenotypic conditions which are, according to him, important, if not necessary, for speciation. He also established the recognition of a similar chance effect like genetic drift, namely the *founder effect* (1954). Genetic drift focuses on the fact that in small populations, elimination of individuals is largely due to chance and not to natural selection. The founder effect states the same process not in the case of existent small groups, but in the case of the founding of a new group; for example a pregnant bird which starts a settlement on a remote island.⁴⁹⁰ Corresponding to his focus on the phenotypic aspects Mayr uses a term for this mechanism denoting the phenotypic level.

c) *Evolutionary Factors and the Importance of Populations*

The evolutionary synthesis, although most of its proponents were self-proclaimed Darwinians,—especially after its second phase—had properties which had been missing in or even contradicted Darwin's and Weismann's Darwinism. Although to the proponents of the evolutionary synthesis *natural selection* and also individual natural selection was still the main driving force of evolution, they enriched evolutionary theory with several **additional factors**. After this has been shown, the stress of the synthesis on the population level will be worked out.

Now, *mutations* were regarded as source of *new* variability, and in a way as an additional factor. The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium had explained only the stability of a given variance if there are no external influences, especially no selection.

Mutations were now understood as sudden random changes in the nucleotide sequence of the DNA. Mutations provide for the emergence of entirely new genes, a concept necessary for evolutionary change above the change of mere gene-frequencies in a gene pool. Mutations exist on all 'levels' of the genome, from single base pairs of a gene (point mutations) to full chromosomes.

The concept of mutation was originally reintroduced to biology by de Vries, who—although natural selection played a role in his theory—was rather a Mendelian.⁴⁹¹ Mendelians, like Bateson favoured a theory of mutation pressure. Correspondingly this conception was originally rather allied with anti-Darwinian orthogenetic theories. But Mendelism at the same time also undermined the analogy of

⁴⁸⁹ E. g.: E. Mayr. *Evolution und die Vielfalt des Lebens* (1978), p. 242.

⁴⁹⁰ A short outline of other differences between genetic drift and founder effect is given in E. Mayr. *Growth of Evolutionary Thought* (1982), pp. 602 f.

⁴⁹¹ See: G. E. Allen. *The Evolutionary Synthesis: Morgan and Natural Selection Revisited* (1980), p. 366 f.

evolution and growth, even more than Darwin did, and separated genetics from embryology.⁴⁹² Hence the evolutionary synthesis was able to transform the concept of mutation into a process of blind chance⁴⁹³, fitting neatly into a Darwinian frame of mind, since Darwin had also sometimes written of chance variation at the individual level.⁴⁹⁴

Although this factor was new, one may hence argue that in principle this—transformed—concept of mutation modernised but did not add much to the theory.

Today the notion of a total chance character of mutation central to population genetics comes under pressure from genetics. In genetics one speaks of so-called *mutation genes* making certain mutations more probable than others. I personally think, it is largely up to our interpretation, to argue whether on an imagined continuum between Darwinism and Lamarckism, we move by this insight more towards Lamarckism again.⁴⁹⁵

Moreover, the evolutionary synthesis in its second phase, was mainly inspired by contributions of the naturalists, which also statistically led to slight change in focus. The crucial point is the subdivision of the 'ideal' population in many sub-populations. This macrobiological concept has resulted in several new evolutionary factors:

- *Isolation (reproductive)* is regarded as necessary precondition for the development of sub-populations, and thus as a prerequisite for speciation.
- *Migration* between partly isolated subpopulations increases the regional variability.
- *Genetic drift* takes place among small populations, where mere chance can play a role in fixing certain gene-combinations.
- The *founder effect* similarly states that the sample of genes which a founder of a new population contributes, influences the gene-distribution considerably. This effect is also largely due to chance and is understood as directionally blind.

According to the Evolutionary Synthesis, all these factors, adding to the mechanism of individual chance variation and elimination, in the first place play an important role in sustaining the necessary variability within the population as a whole, and, secondly, enable the change of gene distribution in a gene pool necessary for speciation. The acknowledgement of macrobiological preconditions for speciation also led to the distinction of cladogenesis, branching, and anagenesis, phyletic evolution⁴⁹⁶.

Despite the novelty of the factors, they may be seen as pointing to the concept of natural selection, except on the level of populations. Natural selection, in its broad sense, is normally regarded as

⁴⁹² P. Bowler. *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), pp. 106, 114, 117-120, 123-125.

⁴⁹³ See: F. Wuketits. *Evolutionstheorien* (1995), p. 71.

⁴⁹⁴ Still, the word 'mutation', which could be found seven times in the *Origin of Species*, there just means change.

⁴⁹⁵ ↻ p. 148 and the section on 'Directed Variation rather than Blind Variation — Discussion of the Second Criterion', pp. 358 ff.

⁴⁹⁶ See e. g.: Th. Dobzhansky, *Mankind evolving* (1962), p. 220; R. Lewontin, *Theoretical Population Genetics in the Evolutionary Synthesis* (1980), p. 61. This distinction refers to the distinction between micro- and macroevolution, which was earlier proposed by de Vries, and is, I think, not compatible to Darwin's originally more individualistic approach. Hence this view has sometimes be regarded to be at odds with the essentially Darwinian programm of the evolutionary synthesis, e. g.: G. Masuch. *Zum gegenwärtigen Stand der Diskussion* (1987), pp. 50 f.

composed out of two sub-processes: chance variation and elimination of the unfit.⁴⁹⁷ In my opinion the evolutionary synthesis seems to have introduced this process on the level of populations as well. The factors of *reproductive isolation*, *genetic drift* and *founder effect* are all mainly regarded as chance processes which increase the variance between sub-populations. *Migration* and other forms of gene flux increase the variability within subpopulations. This parallel is not always made explicit; but, for example, Mayr—in disagreement with J. Huxley—has argued: “Every new species is an ecological experiment, an attempt to occupy a new niche [...], species, in the sense of evolution, are quite comparable to mutations.”⁴⁹⁸

But under closer scrutiny that analogy might be too simplifying, because these mechanisms also change the working of phylic evolution. However, I think one can conclude that despite the many concrete mechanisms the evolutionary synthesis was mostly perceived as only introducing a slight causal pluralism, which in its mechanism still essentially resembles Darwinism. Linked to these new mechanisms is the philosophical innovation of the introduction of the importance of the population level.

A side-effect of the application of the concept of natural selection (in the broad sense) to the population level is that individual organisms are not necessarily highly adapted. If organisms act for the good of the species they do not necessarily act for their own good. Hence the population level of adaptation may also have reduced the strong adaptationism on the level of individual organisms.

Correspondingly, **populations** (groups of interbreeding organisms), or gene pools are at the very centre of evolutionary biology: “Evolution is a change in the genetic composition of populations”⁴⁹⁹

Nearly all advocates of the evolutionary synthesis have defined species in terms of reproduction, i. e. the so-called ‘*biological*’ *concept of species*.⁵⁰⁰ Strictly speaking a definition, fitting to the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis, has to mention partly isolated sub-populations. Hence, in textbooks one will usually find a definition like: a species is “a group of interbreeding natural populations, which are reproductively isolated from other such groups”⁵⁰¹.

Only G. G. Simpson slightly differs from the other main proponents of the synthesis in this respect and has defined a species generally differently. “An evolutionary species is a lineage (an ancestral-descendent sequence of populations) evolving separately from others and with its own unitary evolutionary role and tendencies.”⁵⁰²

This predominant definition of species is linked to *species realism*.⁵⁰³ “The Species is the real unit of evolution, it is this changing entity, which specialises and adapts”⁵⁰⁴. The species nominalist Darwin had largely assumed that species are only convenient notions, which artificially describe a close similarity

⁴⁹⁷ ↻ working definition of natural selection on p. 107.

⁴⁹⁸ E. Mayr. *Animal Species and Evolution* (1963), p. 621. E. Mayr. *Evolution und die Vielfalt des Lebens* (1978), p. 241.

⁴⁹⁹ Th. Dobzhansky. *Genetics and the Origin of Species* (1951), p. 16.

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 262-263.

⁵⁰¹ G. Vogel, H. Angermann. *dtv-Atlas der Biologie* (1990), p. 495 (own literal trans.).

⁵⁰² G. G. Simpson. *Principles of Animal Taxonomy* (1961), p. 153 (quoted in E. Mayr. *One long Argument* (1991), p. 28).

⁵⁰³ See Th. Dobzhansky. *Genetics and the Origin of Species* (1951), p. 256. E. Mayr. *Animal Species and Evolution* (1963), e. g. pp. 422-423.

⁵⁰⁴ E. Mayr. *Evolution und die Vielfalt des Lebens* (1978), p. 241 (free re-translation by v. Sydow).

between individual organisms.⁵⁰⁵ According to the synthesis species and gene pools, unlike individual organisms and single genes, are long lasting. A precondition for genetic recombination in sexually reproducing organisms is the existence of a common gene pool. Based on the outlined evolutionary factors the units of evolution (not necessarily of selection) are structured populations or gene pools. Dobzhansky goes farthest when he speaks of the 'organism-like integration' of interbreeding populations.⁵⁰⁶

This realism of species or, better, of structured populations differs of course from the classical typological species realism.⁵⁰⁷ It is not due to what Mayr calls a typological concept, a pre-existing form, which is given externally to the species itself,⁵⁰⁸ but it is based on a populational concept, a concept of a common gene pool of a species, a pool of information, a common fountain of youth, from which all organisms and sub-populations derive from and to which all reproducing organisms contribute. According to the synthesis populations and species are real, but at the same time they are the only real taxa; all other higher taxa, like genera and so on, are in principle nothing but useful artificial conventions.

This population realism is accompanied by **gene realism and only partly by a nominalistic attitude towards organisms**. Populations are understood as arrays of genes which mix freely. This assumption, emphasised in the first period of the evolutionary synthesis, has never been completely superseded. A panmictic population is a precondition for most of the statistical tools of population genetics and is linked to the notion of independent and not contextually defined genes. In the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis this concept has statistically been dismissed only in regard to the relation between different sub-populations, not—as far as I can judge—*within* sub-populations.

Despite this, it was an explicit conviction of the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis, especially during the years between 1950 and 1965, that there were gene interactions.⁵⁰⁹ In the wake of Dobzhansky, absolute fitness values of single genes were denied, and it was emphasised that fitness of genes depends strongly on the genetic and the environmental milieu.⁵¹⁰ Mayr in particular advocated the importance of gene interactions and quite clearly arrived at a realist position concerning individual organisms, by simultaneously dismissing the focus on population genetics. Apart from him, the general trend of the statistical approach led, in the second phase of the synthesis as well, to what Mayr called "bean-bag genetics"⁵¹¹, at least *within* sub-populations.⁵¹²

⁵⁰⁵ ↪ pp. 113 f.; Darwin and the synthesis is contrasted e. g. in: E. Mayr. *Animal Species and Evolution* (1963), 13-14, 29.

⁵⁰⁶ Th. Dobzhansky. *Genetics and the Origin of Species* (1951), p. 15.

⁵⁰⁷ E. Mayr. *Animal Species and Evolution* (1963), chapter 2-4, see also chapter 14.

⁵⁰⁸ ↪ also my concept of exformation and external memory, which tries additionally to reestablish some aspects of this historical conception; pp. 307 f., 316 f.

⁵⁰⁹ R. Lewontin. *Theoretical Population Genetics in the Evolutionary Synthesis* (1980). R. Lewontin. *Gene, organism, environment* (1983), 277.

⁵¹⁰ E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 592.

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Where are we?* (1959). [Quoted in Mayr's *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), pp. 558.] But see also a reply of J. B. S. Haldane. *A defence of beanbag genetics* (1964).

The emphasis on a gene-pool, with the concomitant assumption of largely independent genes, led—I presume—to the overwhelming *disapproval of sexual selection* by most proponents of the Evolutionary Synthesis. Any concept of sexual selection violates the assumption of panmixia. Correspondingly, many advocates of the synthesis, in particular Julian Huxley, campaigned against the concept of sexual selection.⁵¹³

But, as already has become apparent, the evolutionary synthesis was and is *not a monolithic block*. Although Mayr, for example, emphasises the whole individual organism as a real entity and as a unit on which selection apparently works, still to him the ‘unit of evolution’ is the population. Other followers of the synthesis focus even more strongly on the population as the unit of selection.⁵¹⁴ S. Wright, for example, states that there is also selection on the level of demes⁵¹⁵. The importance and function of different levels of selection had already been a source of dispute to advocates of the Evolutionary Synthesis. However, it was generally agreed that events on the population level were somehow crucial to the formation of new species.⁵¹⁶

The sub-paradigm of gene-Darwinism later on started to argue against the importance of the population level in general and group selection in particular. (➔ pp. 41, 126, 191)

The focus on populations goes along with the concept that entities, mainly populations, could have properties which their components did not have. This *emergentist belief* is for example expressed by Dobzhansky: “The rules governing the genetic structure of a population are, nevertheless, distinct from those which govern the genetics of the individuals, just as rules from sociology are distinct from physiological ones, although the former are in the last analysis integrated systems of the latter.”⁵¹⁷ This emergentist belief is advocated, although the Evolutionary Synthesis—as we have seen previously—is still largely Darwinian in regard to the processes employed and indeed emphasises chance production of variation and differential elimination.

Still, the emergentist attitude and the changed general conceptualisation of evolution affected in which way this school applied their biological theory to culture.

d) *Disengagement from Ideological Programmes?*

In the literature on the attitude of the Evolutionary Synthesis towards culture one could find the position that it was accompanied by a disengagement from ideological programmes.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹² In discussing models of group selection M. J. Wade makes the criticism that the underestimation of interaction of genes in the mainly genotypic models of population genetics biases the results. *A critical review of the models of group selection* (1978).

⁵¹³ S. J. Frankel. *The Eclipse of Sexual Selection Theory* (1994).

⁵¹⁴ W. Wieser. *Energetische und soziale Aspekte der Evolution* (1989), p. 101.

⁵¹⁵ S. Wright. *Evolution in Mendelian Populations* (1931).

⁵¹⁶ See e. g.: D. Young. *The Discovery of Evolution* (1992), p. 218.

⁵¹⁷ Th. Dobzhansky. *Genetics and the Origin of Species* (1951), p. 15.

⁵¹⁸ E. g.: D. J. Depew & B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), p. 13.

This is not the case in regard of the first phase of the Evolutionary Synthesis, which by many authors is designated as Fisherism. Fisher was in fact a particularly ardent supporter of positive eugenics, which he explicitly regarded as Nietzschean in character.⁵¹⁹

Only with the second phase of the synthesis, especially with the works of Dobzhansky, Mayr and Simpson, a relative ideological disengagement seems to have taken place.

I think, this ideological disengagement in the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis is, despite important reservations, due to two aspects of the Evolutionary Synthesis: (a) The synthetic evolutionary theory in its second phase advocated some properties which make an application to man less harmful. (b) The evolutionary synthesis gave reason to be cautious in any direct application, and to acknowledge the entire dissimilarity of biological evolution and cultural development.

(a) First, the final Evolutionary Synthesis did not support a panslectionist view. New evolutionary factors, besides natural selection working on the level of the organism came into play. Factors working on the macro-level of populations, like the chance processes of genetic drift, and the founder effect, show that besides natural selection also chance plays a role in the moulding of organisms. This resulted in an abolishment of a radical adaptationism; not all aspects of an organism are naturally adaptive.

Secondly, in its later phase, proponents of the evolutionary synthesis largely accepted a certain degree of context relatedness with regard to a gene. A gene which might be maladaptive in one population, could in a successive gene-pool with changed gene distributions or in a different environment suddenly turn out to be adaptive again.

Thirdly, the recognition of the positive importance of variation in the evolutionary synthesis contributed something to the abolishment of a simplifying programme of eugenics. This was mainly due to Dobzhansky, who had imported this view from Chetverikov's school of genetics, and who strongly believed in democratic plurality. The structuredness of a population supports variation, which on the long run is itself adaptive.

Last but not least, the focus on the population level and the possibility of group selection might have weakened the 'Malthusian' character, social-Darwinism had hitherto had.⁵²⁰ This focus on species or on populations was also predominant in classical ethology and even today there are influential proponents of this school like I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, who emphasises group selection at least as far as early humans are concerned—also giving a basis for truly altruistic behaviour.⁵²¹

The known primatologists Jane Goodall and Frans de Waal in my opinion also belong to this paradigm. They did not already theoretically assume unrestrained and ruthless competition in groups of animals and would not easily reduce

⁵¹⁹ D. J. Depew & B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), pp. 244 ff. These authors in accordance with Mayr only call the second phase 'evolutionary synthesis'.

⁵²⁰ Here Malthus' emphasis on population growth and scarcity of resources in combination with his general support for individual *laissez-faire* economics is meant. For a closer discussion of such a usage, see pp. 173 f.

⁵²¹ I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt. *Die Biologie des menschlichen Verhaltens* (1984), p. 131. (Eibl-Eibesfeldt on the other hand also combines this with results of the gene-Darwinian view, and in a way already takes a multi-level-viewpoint.)

primate behaviour to simple gene-egoism. Although their approach might be regarded as rather a descriptive one, their results seem to me to fit rather into the explanatory framework of the evolutionary synthesis than into the framework of gene-Darwinism.

But there had been also ethologists concerning whom it would be wrong to generalise about the concept of ideological disengagement. In particular, the inglorious role of one of its founders should at least be mentioned. But the role of the Nobel laureate Konrad Lorenz in the time of Nazism in Germany can be opposed to the exemplary role of the co-founder of ethology Niko Tinbergen.

There are many important questions, which could not be treated here at length: How did evolutionary theory, especially the evolutionary synthesis, influence Nazism, with its focus on racism? Which other aspects led to the blunt racist ideology of 'blood and territory (*Blut und Boden*)'? What was the theoretical difference of most of the founding fathers of the today still actual second phase of the synthesis and the Nazi-biologist in Germany (and other parts of the world)?

Proponents of classical ethology, like K. Lorenz and N. Tinbergen, introduced the focus on populations of the Evolutionary Synthesis into the biological study of behaviour of animals and humans. By this they indeed made the study of instinctive behaviour in animals and man popular again. Lorenz was accused because of this focus on instincts and the 'natural' aggression of humans.⁵²²

Still Lorenz—based on the focus on the species—could also argue, that there is still something like 'species-preserving purposefulness' (*arterhaltende Zweckmäßigkeit*) of instinctive behaviour, like the killing inhibition of wolfs and dogs⁵²³. This at least in principle left some room for something like a basis for an altruistic behaviour, at least within a species. M. Midgley in the last decades has pointed out that this allows a much more positive approach to human biology than gene-Darwinism (☹ p. 56). Even Dawkins himself had called the ethology founded by Lorenz 'old benevolent regime'.

Despite this it has to be acknowledged that Lorenz, indeed had been involved in the racist research politics of the Nazis. It is a dispute, how far Lorenz' involvement into 'racial hygienics' had gone, but some involvement took place. The Dutch zoologist Tinbergen, who had strongly opposed the Nazis, after the war helped to rehabilitate Lorenz. However, a huge number of biologists especially in Germany, but also in many other countries have shared socio-Darwinian racism.

What role did biology have in this catastrophe? Neo-Darwinian explanations, according to Rensch, already prevailed in German textbooks between 1912 and 1945. Nevertheless, it was only slowly that accompanying sceptical remarks and defenders of different views were overcome.⁵²⁴ According to Mayr, selectionist thinking began to spread in Germany not so much in the 1920s but mostly in the 1930s.⁵²⁵ A proper treatment of biology in the time of Nazism would have to answer whether the involved biologists belonged to the first or to second step of the Evolutionary Synthesis, or whether their views differed from both of these theories.⁵²⁶

Also the—in my view originally positive—force of German idealism and romanticism with its urge for unification of knowledge in a perverted way seems to have played a crucial role, as it was combined with resurrected Darwinism. A treatment of this topic would have to discuss the position held by the British idealist Muirhead in regard of the first world war, that not Kant and Hegel, but the abandonment of these views were responsible for the highly aggressive attitude of the Germans at that time.⁵²⁷ It has been argued that materialism and especially Darwinism played a role for moral decay, for Nazism and the second world war.⁵²⁸ But this topic is too complicated and too important for any simplifying treatment: Not only vitalists like H. Driesch, but also Darwinians of a similar brand as Lorenz, like Tinbergen, opposed Nazism.

Apart from these important reservations, I think it overall still appears to be correct that the new aspects of the *second* phase of the evolutionary synthesis, at least in Britain and the United States, have to some degree mitigated the social implication of the revival of biological neo-Darwinism.

(b) The other aspect of the ideological disengagement of the proponents of the evolutionary synthesis was a critique of directly drawing conclusions from the biological evolution to cultural development.

⁵²² M. F. Ashley Montagu (ed.). *Mensch und Aggression* (1974/1969/1968).

⁵²³ K. Lorenz. *On Aggression* (1967/1966/1963), pp. 104 f, 206-207.

⁵²⁴ B. Rensch. *Historical Development of the Present Synthetic Neo-Darwinism in Germany* (1980), pp. 285 f.

⁵²⁵ E. Mayr. *Germany [and the Evolutionary Synthesis]*. Introduction to a chapter with articles on this topic in: Mayr, Ernst; Provine, William B. (ed.): *The Evolutionary Synthesis*. (1980), pp. 281-283. See also e. g.: P. Bowler. *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), pp. 123, 125.

⁵²⁶ See: U. Deichmann. *Biologist under Hitler* (1996), pp. 179-205. A very critical view emphasising the continuity in K. Lorenz views also after the second world war is given by: Th. J. Kalikow. *Konrad Lorenz's Ethological Theory: Explanation and Ideology, 1938-1943* (1983).

⁵²⁷ See: S. M. Den Otter. *British Idealism and Social Explanation*. (1996), p. 32.

For example, J. Huxley, although writing much not only about evolution but also about ethics, finally rejected any *simple* analogy from biological evolution: “The human situation is so different from the biological, that it may prove best to abandon the attempt to apply concepts like natural selection to modern human affairs.”⁵²⁹ Such a rejection of a biologisation of human affairs was uttered by different authors of the synthesis, but could have many different reasons:

Firstly, it might be due to developments within sociology and psychology. In particular behaviourism, which in an increasingly moderate form dominated psychology till the 1960s or 1970s, opposed any reduction of psychological phenomena to specific biological instincts or drives.

Of course behaviourism at the same time reduced inner phenomena to external behaviour. Moreover, paradoxically the trial and error process which behaviourism employs resembles a Darwinian process (☞ pp. 218 f.).

Secondly, valid for writings after the Second World War, the traumatic experiences of Holocaust, racism and millions and millions of war victims, has been a remaining memorial against all simplifying biologicistic accounts.

Thirdly,—beyond external influences—the Evolutionary Synthesis itself provided already within biology examples of emergentism. The dynamics of the macro-evolution is explained by some emergent properties (e. g. genetic shift) on the population level.⁵³⁰ In spite of this, the proponents of the Evolutionary Synthesis have always emphasised that this is fully compatible with the micro-processes of evolution. More adequately, they tried to steer a middle course between reductionism and emergentism. For example, Mayr explicitly supports the notion of emergence, Simpson refers to it as compositional method and Lorenz (at least after the war) uses the term ‘fulguration’ and refers to the ontological stratology of Nicolai Hartmann.⁵³¹

Corresponding with the general Newtonian background of Darwinism, some proponents still regarded human evolution to be governed by the same eternal set of laws as animal evolution.⁵³² Accordingly their ideological disengagement has not been at all total. For example, Simpson applied the neo-Darwinian paradigm to man: “Man is the result of a purposeless and materialistic process that did not have him in mind. He was not planned.”⁵³³ Huxley, despite trying to extend the Darwinian concept of an apparently purposeless selection of random variations into a new general world view, still saw a purpose in evolution.⁵³⁴ Even Simpson, although he explicitly fought against any vitalistic and teleological explanations in evolutionary theory, came to the conclusion that man today is guided by

⁵²⁸ R. Nachtwey. *Der Irrweg des Darwinismus* (1959), chapters 1, 6, 7 see also chapter 8.

⁵²⁹ J. Huxley. *Introduction* of the 2nd edition of *Evolution: A Modern Synthesis* (1963), quoted in J. C. Greene (1981), p. 165.

⁵³⁰ ☞ footnote 517.

⁵³¹ E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), pp. 63-64. K. Lorenz. *Die Rückseite des Spiegels. Versuch einer Naturgeschichte menschlichen Erkennens* (1973/77), pp. 44-64. For my own treatment of emergentism see pp. 262 ff.

⁵³² ☞ the account of the external history of Darwinism, pp. 168 f.

⁵³³ G. G. Simpson. *The Meaning of Evolution* (1949), pp. 343-344. (Quoted in Greene, below, p. 171.)

⁵³⁴ P. Bowler. *Evolution* (1987), pp. 309-310.

‘interthinking’ rather than by interbreeding,⁵³⁵ and that finally the concept of the human uniqueness seems to have gained the upper hand: “The best human ethical standard must be relative and particular to man and is to be sought rather in the new evolution, peculiar to man, than in the old, universal to all organisms. The old evolution was and is essentially amoral. The new evolution involves knowledge, including the knowledge of good and evil.”⁵³⁶

Most proponents of the final synthesis on the one hand similarly seem to have abandoned any strict biologicistic stance. They had not the intention of reviving the crude message of social Darwinism. On the other hand they still claimed the relevance of natural selection for the understanding of the *homo sapiens*. For example, Dobzhansky argued against a biologicistic stance proposed by Darlington, but at the same time also criticised the “staunchest nurture hypothesis” of the psychologist Watson and the radical culturalism of L. White.⁵³⁷ It is typical for Dobzhansky, steering a middle course, that he advocated that the main *biological* trait of humanity is its plasticity and educability, and—although he allows some variance—this generally holds “in all classes and races of people, in short, in the species *Homo sapiens*.”⁵³⁸

More work to substantiate the outlined position would be needed. But for the time being we can conclude that many proponents of the later phase of the synthesis were ideologically comparatively more disengaged than some early socio-Darwinians and also than some of the present day gene-Darwinians.

4.4 ‘Sociobiology’ as Gene-Darwinism — a New Synthesis?

‘Sociobiology’ as a special Darwinian sub-paradigm, not as a discipline, has already been characterised by a focus on selfish genes, and by a largely gene-deterministic approach towards culture and ethics (☉ pp. 6 ff.). Therefore here only a short *comparative historical* outline of its biological features will be given. Moreover, we will not treat this paradigm mainly in its own terms as a phenomenon, but use a more abstract description in order to grasp its paradigmatic core.⁵³⁹ Only thereafter the more general, external historical background to this subparadigm will be analysed (☉ pp. 191 f.) and then the basic assumptions of this approach will be criticised (☉ pp. 237 f.).

The discussed subparadigm in this work has been called **gene-Darwinism** to distinguish it from other approaches in sociobiology and evolutionary theory. In this section am going in detail to

⁵³⁵ C. G. Greene. *Science, Ideology and World View* (1981), p. 172.

⁵³⁶ G. G. Simpson. *The Meaning of Evolution* (1949), p. 281. (Quoted in Greene, above, p. 173.)

⁵³⁷ Th. Dobzhansky. *Man Evolving* (1962), pp. 75, 97, 99, 252, 320.

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*, e. g. pp. 8, 100, 252, 320.

⁵³⁹ R. Dawkins emphasised the first aspect mentioned in the first sentence of the paragraph, whereas E. O. Wilson has emphasised the second one. Any differences from both aspects is here understood as a deviation of the pure form of this paradigm (☉ pp. 38 f.).

The proponents of sociobiology do not always regard themselves as proponents of a paradigm shift. Even Dawkins wavered as to whether he regarded his approach as a new paradigm or only as a new perspective which is equivalent to the old one (*Extended Phenotype*, 1982/89). But Dawkins finally made it clear that his approach is intended to break with the old benevolent regime of classical ethology and the evolutionary synthesis (e. g. preface to 1989 edition of *The Selfish Gene*). Here the hypothesis is supported that there is indeed a new sub-paradigm with a certain inner cohesion.

characterise and define this sub-paradigm biologically by what I will call ‘germ-line reductionism’, ‘gene-atomism’ and (with certain a certain reservation) ‘Darwinian process monism’.

Basically the discussed sub-paradigm is a Darwinian paradigm, because—according to our working definition—it focuses on natural selection as the main evolutionary mechanism and does this even more clearly than earlier Darwinian sub-paradigms (☞ below).

The ‘selfish gene’ view of evolution⁵⁴⁰ could be contrasted to the organism or genome centred theories of Darwin or Weismann as well as to the gene-pool or population centred conceptions of the evolutionary synthesis. But in different respects gene-Darwinism does not break with, but radicalises Darwin, Weismann and the Evolutionary Synthesis.

a) *Germ-Line Reductionism*

Dawkins radicalises Darwinism with an extreme interpretation of Weismann’s concept of the continuity of the germ-plasm. This interpretation leads Dawkins to the conception of genes as immortal survivors in the battle of life and of phenotypes as largely epiphenomenal ‘vehicles of genes’ or ‘gene machines’.⁵⁴¹

Darwin, still partly a Lamarckian, favoured his theory of pangenesis, whereas later Weismann adopted a stricter neo-Darwinian approach. The Weismann barrier (☞ pp. 121), of course, has also been central to the proponents of the evolutionary synthesis. Hence the evolutionary synthesis—like gene-Darwinism—was in this respect a neo-Darwinian or Weismannian theory. However, the evolutionary synthesis, which accepted macroevolutionary factors, interpreted the Weismannian barrier in a way which we could evaluate either as being less radical or less clear than the interpretation of gene-Darwinism. Dawkins’ interpretation of Weismann’s barrier leads him to take a harsh nominalistic attitude towards the phenotypic side of evolution, whether organisms or groups are meant. Because Weismann’s barrier allows only a direct flux of information from the genotype to the phenotype—and not the other way round—the phenotype in the view of gene-Darwinism has to be regarded as epiphenomenal.

In contrast, the advocates of the second step of the evolutionary synthesis emphasised the functional reality of macroevolutionary phenotypic properties, like geographic isolation or founder effect. Correspondingly proponents of the synthesis generally came to accept the reality (evolutionary causal relevance) of phenotypic properties of groups and some, like Mayr, additionally emphasised the reality of the individual phenotypic organism. As far as I can judge, this acceptance of the phenotypic structure became dominant only in the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis. This emphasis may have

⁵⁴⁰ E. g.: R. Dawkins. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), p. 4 and ☞ footnote 56.

⁵⁴¹ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), pp. 11, 23 f., 254 f.; *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 68; *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), pp. 97 f..

needed further theoretical clarification to prevent succeeding generations from the scourge of a simplifying interpretation of Weismann's barrier.

I will later describe in detail and discuss the radical gene-Darwinian interpretation of the central dogma of microbiology, i. e. what I call 'germ-line reductionism' (☉ pp. 303 f.).

b) *Gene-Atomism*

An aspect of gene-Darwinism which has to be disentangled from the discussed germ-line reductionism is its atomistic attitude towards genes. If germ-line reductionism, the sole relevance of the genotype, is taken for granted, an atomistic attitude additionally means that within the genotypic side of evolution only single selfish genes and not genomes or gene pools as wholes are causally relevant.⁵⁴² Genes are competing for survival and in principle they are in conflict even within a single body.⁵⁴² In this respect gene-Darwinism puts itself in contrast firstly to Weismann's generally holistic understanding of the organismic germ-plasm, and secondly to the evolutionary synthesis, whose early proponents focused on gene-pools and whose later proponents have focused on natural populations.

Despite this, the single selfish-gene viewpoint owes much to earlier Darwinian paradigms. It generally shares a reductionistic spirit with Darwin and Weismann, although those authors did not extend reduction to a thorough sub-individual reductionism.

But the atomism of Gene-Darwinism more directly finds its main source in the first step of the evolutionary synthesis. This synthesis of genetics with mathematical models of unstructured populations (☉ pp. 128 f.), partly developed by Fisher, incorporated the perspective of separate independent genes in a common unstructured gene pool. Based on this Fisherian phase or wing of the synthesis, Dawkins—abandoning the focus on the gene-pool—still favours the idea of the primordial independence of single egoistic genes.⁵⁴³ Because of this shared gene-atomism gene-Darwinism mirrors Fisherism in a nominalist understanding of genomes as wholes and individual organisms.

This nominalism is linked to the concept of random mixing during genetic recombination and to the chance interpretation of the first variational step of natural selection. On an evolutionary time scale genomes or organisms are only evanescent confederations of approximately immortal genes, and because of this ephemeral character they are regarded as unreal.

According to Dawkins, neglecting the concept of a gene-pool still present in Fisherism, not populations but single genes are the units of selection.⁵⁴⁴ The paradigm shift becomes obvious, not only in regard of the different positions of the unit of selection debate, but already in what different problems these approaches are interested in; whereas speciation was an important question of the second phase of

⁵⁴² R. Dawkins. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), pp. 71-72

⁵⁴³ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. ix. A supporting fact is that Dawkins according to the index of his first three books mentions Fisher on a total of 34 pages and Dobzhansky not at all.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 10.

the evolutionary synthesis, Dawkins never summoned up much enthusiasm for ‘the species problem’.⁵⁴⁵ Correspondingly the spotlight of gene-Darwinism is not on the Hardy-Weinberg equation, but on the formulas of Hamilton and Trivers.⁵⁴⁶

As already mentioned, there are additional differences to the second step of the evolutionary synthesis, because Dobzhansky had emphasised the contextuality of genes and Mayr has focused on phenotypes as existing wholes.⁵⁴⁷ Nevertheless, also in the second phase of the synthesis, the Fisherian inclination towards ‘bean-bag genetics’ was not completely superseded.

However, the changed emergentist attitude of the second step of the synthesis towards new entities and evolutionary factors, like drift and founder effect, also made the concept of group altruism possible. Differing from classical ethology, group selection and group altruism are anathema to proponents of pure gene-Darwinism.⁵⁴⁸ The rise of new textbooks in the spirit of the new sociobiological paradigm corresponds to an increase of a “kind of unsentimental, dog eat dog, language”.⁵⁴⁹ All animal communication, even within species, is now interpreted “as manipulation of signal-receiver by signal-sender” and in terms of “arms races”.⁵⁵⁰ Now generally mistrust, manipulation and exploitation is the normal gene-Darwinian yardstick. Every explanation which seems to confirm group altruism is regarded as anomalous and that in turn automatically leads to its critical reassessment.

What I have called ‘gene-atomistic reductionism’, or ‘gene atomism’ for short, that is, the concept that single genes are the exclusive causally relevant agents of biological evolution, will critically be discussed in detail in part IV.⁵⁵¹

c) *Darwinian Process Monism*

Finally, we will now analyse the differences of gene-Darwinism to other largely Darwinian sub-paradigms in regard of the evolutionary process itself.

Gene-Darwinism is usually a paean, praising pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism and is built on the metaphysics of universal Darwinism⁵⁵². In this regard gene-Darwinism appears to be even more Darwinian than Darwin’s own approach, because the major, if not exclusive, evolutionary force is natural selection. Darwin did still thought of use inheritance as a source for variation. Moreover, the

⁵⁴⁵ R. Dawkins. *Universal Darwinism* (1983), p. 404.

⁵⁴⁶ In Dawkins’ *The Selfish Gene* Hamilton and Trivers are universally quoted, whereas the Hardy-Weinberg principle is not mentioned at all. Nevertheless Hamilton reconsidered his early view on this matter ☞ footnote 1001.

⁵⁴⁷ ☞ footnote 512 and its context.

⁵⁴⁸ It has already been shown in earlier sections that Dawkins denies the possibility of group selection. But he—I suspect, inconsequentially—accepts e. g. the mechanism of genetical drift. However, he definitely does not focus on this mechanism. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), p. 33.

⁵⁴⁹ R. Dawkins. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), p. 56.

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 57, 61. Also: R. Dawkins & J. R. Krebs. *Animal signals: information or manipulation?* (1978). Historically the *biological* concept of arms races has of course further roots, but in these writings its competitive nature is very condensed.

⁵⁵¹ ☞ pp. 259 ff. (The argumentation of gene-atomism and germ-line reductionism may be not completely separable, but they may support each other and only together build the basis for the conclusion that organisms and groups are ephemeral and epiphenomenal.

later Darwin became unsure whether natural selection could universally provide optimal adaptation. Although the evolutionary synthesis, in continuation of Weismann's neo-Darwinism, had dismissed the Lamarckian concept of use inheritance and also defined the variance producing step of evolution in a more strictly Darwinian way as a blind chance process, the synthesis in its second step still allowed a certain causal pluralism. To some extent it took non-adaptive evolutionary factors into account. Moreover, the synthesis introduced some macroevolutionary factors to explain the evolutionary process. For example genetic drift is based on chance fluctuations and an adaptive interpretation would need additional assumptions.⁵⁵³ It is indeed controversial how far this causal pluralism has distanced the synthesis from Darwinism in its most extreme conceivable sense,⁵⁵⁴ but in any case it is clear that gene-Darwinism again started to treat macroevolutionary factors as if they were reducible to the concept of natural selection. Dawkins: "[A]ll my books have been devoted to expounding and exploring the almost limitless power of the Darwinian principle"⁵⁵⁵.

Despite the general focus on natural selection, it should not be neglected that the rise of gene-Darwinism was accompanied by the introduction of the concept of kin selection and the reintroduction of the concept of sexual selection.

But gene-Darwinism regards the sociobiological mechanism of *kin selection* as a mere logical consequence of gene selection. "If we accept neo-Darwinian gene-selectionism, kin selection necessarily follows. There is, indeed no need for the term kin selection to exist, and I suggest that we stop using it."⁵⁵⁶

Since the 1960s, with the rise of sociobiology, also the concept of sexual selection as non-random mating became dominant again.⁵⁵⁷ Furthermore, the application of this explanation to higher human capacities, like the intellect, has become common.⁵⁵⁸ The main proponents of the Evolutionary Synthesis, due to their central assumption of panmictic gene pools, had largely abandoned sexual selection. Although gene-Darwinism has taken up their concept of 'bean bag genetics', it on the other hand deviates from another central conception of the early phase of the Synthesis. By accepting sexual selection indirectly the concept of complete random combination of genes is challenged.⁵⁵⁹ This in my view corresponds to the fact, already mentioned, that in regard to central equations population-Darwinism (the 'Evolutionary Synthesis) has been built around the Hardy-Weinberg equations, whereas

⁵⁵² ↗ pp. 207 f., 213 f.; 330 f., 340 f.

⁵⁵³ See my proposal that drift seems to be interpreted as the chance variation part of a natural selection process on the level of a species and also my reservations concerning this proposal, ↗ p. 133.

⁵⁵⁴ This controversy obviously depends on the question of the definition of Darwinism. ↗ pp. 107 and esp. 348 f.

⁵⁵⁵ R. Dawkins. *River Out of Eden* (1995), p. xii. ↗ chapter on Universal Darwinism, pp. 205 f., esp. pp. 207 f., 213 f.

⁵⁵⁶ R. Dawkins. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 67. ↗ also footnotes 80, 826.

⁵⁵⁷ S. J. Frankel. *The Eclipse of Sexual Selection Theory* (1994), p. 182. See also: R. Thornhill & S. Gangestad. *The evolution of human sexuality* (1996).

⁵⁵⁸ E. g.: M. Ridley. *The Red Queen. Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature* (1995/1993), p. 21.

⁵⁵⁹ Later on I will argue that this aspect of gene-Darwinism has an inherent tendency also to undermine its own genatomism.

gene-Darwinism (the sociobiological paradigm) has taken the equations of Hamilton and Trivers as its theoretical centre (though Hamilton himself is in his later work not a strict gene-Darwinian⁵⁶⁰).

Gene-Darwinism attributes a much more active role to the gene. Gene-Darwinism, in many respects the pinnacle of Darwinism, appears in this regard paradoxically almost non-Darwinian. In my opinion this aspect of gene-‘Darwinism’ even has a tendency to undermine the Darwinian understanding of adaptation to an *external* environment and hence Darwinism itself. However, because gene-Darwinians usually do not put emphasis on this subversive aspect, I will not treat it any further in this historical part, but will examine it later in the systematic discussion.

Practically, the acceptance of sexual selection has not helped to turn gene-Darwinism into a moderate position. This might have been assumed, because Darwin in his later publications, more directly concerned with human evolution, tried to smooth his relatively harsh explanation of the evolutionary process by introducing the less cruel mechanism of sexual selection.⁵⁶⁰ But gene-Darwinism not only additionally still emphasises the *competition of single genes*, but also seems to interpret sexual selection only as a convenient term, a mere *flatus vocis*, which—like kin selection⁸⁰—is in principle reducible to the generalised term of gene-selection, and is hence no substantial mechanism on its own. However, the resulting interpretation replaces sexual partnership by an unchangeable ‘battle of the sexes’ and results in a harsher view of relationship than any Darwinian paradigm had ever before. Partnership is represented to be essentially and eternally “a relationship of mutual mistrust and mutual exploitation.”⁵⁶¹ The evolutionary synthesis has seen sexual behaviour “as essentially a co-operative venture undertaken for mutual benefit, or even for the good of the species!”⁵⁶²

As we have seen already in the first and preceding second part of this work the rise of sociobiology brought not only many interesting stimulations to other subject areas, but also ended the period of relative ideological disengagement of biology. In the following chapter 5 we will come to the external historical reasons for the development of these paradigms.

But as the influence of radical gene-Darwinism has increased, alternative approaches started to flourish also, which criticise especially gene-Darwinism and even Darwinism in general.

4.5 Criticism — a Better Synthesis in Sight?

Today, at the turn to the 21st century, it appears appropriate to pose the question of whether Darwinism, at least in its purest gene-Darwinian form, is on its deathbed again. Since the evolutionary synthesis hardened in the 1970s, criticism became influential and many alternative concepts have been proposed and vigorously discussed. Although Darwinism in its broad sense is no doubt the most

⁵⁶⁰ ↗ pp. 115 ff.

⁵⁶¹ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 140.

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 140.

influential approach in biology, there has been an increasing plurality of views within Darwinism some which came to oppose even the originally almost unchallenged Darwinism in general.⁵⁶³

The present crisis of the hardened evolutionary synthesis resembles the crisis of the radicalised neo-Darwinism between 1890 and 1930. That crisis at the turn at the end of the 19th century had been triggered by the discontent with Weismann's radicalised neo-Darwinism and its apparent inconsistency with new genetic findings and Mendelism. Today, at the turn of the 2nd millennium, the disputes are again triggered by a radicalisation. This time the Evolutionary Synthesis, especially in continuation of its Fisherian wing, is radicalised by what we have called 'gene-Darwinism', which in an openly disdainful sense also has been called 'ultra-Darwinism'⁵⁶⁴. The biological concepts of this Darwinian paradigm and their far-reaching application to culture came into conflict with traditional systems of morality, and also with the theoretical approach of the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis. As in the first crisis of Darwinism, a flourishing theoretical pluralism—now generally more moderate—challenged the radicalised Darwinism. New conceptions of selforganisation have emerged and old developmental conceptions have reappeared. Punctuated equilibrium, genetic neutralism, cladism and dynamic systems theory challenged ultra-Darwinism and in part even Darwinism itself. If Darwinism had not to start to struggle for its life, it at least started to struggle for its unity and its proper definition.

The central tenets of gene-Darwinism—exclusive focus on selfish genes, gradualism, pan-selectionism and pan-adaptationism—have led to heated popular and scientific controversies. Certain biologists and philosophers of biology attacked gene-Darwinism to vindicate both the ontological and epistemological existence of higher genetic units, phenotypes and populations as causal relevant wholes and even an ontological reality of ecosystems. There was a revival of a different form of saltationism.⁵⁶⁵ Moreover it has been maintained that other forces than exclusively natural selection play irreducible roles in evolution, i. e. chance mechanisms (drift etc.), moderate versions of Lamarckian mechanisms, Baldwinian mechanisms or developmental constraints. The connection of natural selection and adaptation has been dissociated by R. C. Lewontin, who has claimed that natural selection does not necessarily always lead to adaptation. (In economic terms we may say he broke with the belief in a biological *invisible hand*.) Hence all main aspects of gene-Darwinism have been challenged.

As in the time before the Evolutionary Synthesis, it is today not clear, how a new different synthesis may finally unite most of these proposals. Although there are signs of a convergence even on the side of

⁵⁶³ Overviews on these new frontiers in evolutionary biology are given e. g. by N. Eldredge (1996/1995); D. J. Depew, B. Weber (1995), pp. 347-427; F. Wuketits (1995), pp. 83-156; E. Mayr (1991), pp. 141-164; P. Bowler (1984), chap. 12.

⁵⁶⁴ N. Eldredge in *Reinventing Darwin* (1995), uses 'ultra-Darwinism' extensively in a meaning similar to my term 'gene-Darwinism' (e. g. pp. xi, 4, 35 f.). But sometimes he uses 'ultra-Darwinism' also to denote positions, for which I would not use 'gene-Darwinism' e. g. referring to a still realist view of organisms and populations (p. 57; or see his p. x and ↪ my footnote 85).

⁵⁶⁵ But ↪ footnote 577.

gene-Darwinism, the influence of their austere research programme seems to be undiminished.⁵⁶⁶ One group advocates that the old evolutionary synthesis is generally open enough to provide a framework for most of these approaches.⁵⁶⁷ The opposed group advocates a more fundamental theoretical turn, but is far from being united. Some of them want to expand Darwinism into a multi-level Darwinism; others want to supplement or even replace natural selection either by less blind mechanisms or by mechanisms which are not adaptive, but based on chance or structural constraints. Furthermore, some rather favour a historicisation of nature replacing scientific universal rules by narratives; others favour an even stronger reliance on mathematics and physics in the context of the complexity revolution⁵⁶⁸.

a) *New Views in Micro- and Macrobiology*

The present criticism of the gene-Darwinian *subparadigm* and also of Darwinism in general is motivated by new empirical results and new theoretical concepts. It is convenient to distinguish developments in microbiology and in macrobiology.

Microbiology had already been an obstacle to Darwinism at the time of the first bloom of Mendelian genetics (de Vries and Bateson). Afterwards Mendelian genetics had been absorbed into the evolutionary synthesis by combining it with statistical models of biological populations. Also the discovery of the actual structure of the germ plasm, the double helix of DNA, by James Watson and Francis Crick in 1953, and the discovery of the biological protein synthesis at that time gave support to the largely neo-Darwinian Evolutionary Synthesis.

Now, at the turn of the 20th century, genetics again seems to become an obstacle to Darwinism, especially for the concept of genetic atomism, but partly also for the evolutionary synthesis and thus for Darwinism in general.

(1.) The *neutral theory of protein evolution*, firstly stated by the Japanese population geneticist Motoo Kimura in 1968, is based on the information redundancy empirically found in the protein synthesis. In this process different triplets of nucleotides encode the same amino acid, and in many proteins different amino acids are equifunctional. Thus, mutations in the sequence of amino acids only seldom lead to phenotypic change and most mutations are not 'visible' to selection. Moreover large

⁵⁶⁶ But R. Dawkins in *River out of Eden* (1995) in regard of his gene-atomistic claims seems more guarded than ever before. Dawkins' central metaphor of this book, the branching digital river of genes, refers mainly to species, not to single genes. Hence it appears that *in this respect* he almost resembles the position of the synthesis, which he had always opposed (e. g. pp. 4-6, 20, 29, 35. f.). But even in this respect he finally seems to come to his old conclusions (pp. 5, 28, 118, 121-122). Moreover—as far as I know—he has in either case never explicitly renounced his original gene-atomism, central in particular to his most influential book *The Selfish Gene* (☛ also footnote 45).

Additionally, Dawkins argues as strong as ever in favour of his other tenets of germ-line reductionism and ubiquitous natural selection. Gene-Darwinism is far from becoming extinct and its ordinary followers are inspired by all aspects of the original paradigm.

⁵⁶⁷ This is mainly advocated by moderate proponents of the second phase of the synthesis, like E. Mayr in *One Long Argument* (1991), esp. pp. 147, 149, 164, and finds its result in textbooks, like D. J. Futuyma, *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/86), who is incorporating the heterodox views into the framework of the evolutionary synthesis.

⁵⁶⁸ See e. g. D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), e. g. pp. 315-316, chap. 15-16.

parts of the DNA are not read at all during the DNA-RNA-transcription. Kimura follows from these facts that the central genetic role of natural selection has to be reduced. Kimura's neutralism alternatively rather focuses on the chance accumulation of mutations.

Kimura's theory has also been connected with the conception of a 'molecular clock', assuming that the changing rate of an allele has its own fixed tempo.

(2.) The *operon model* of the French geneticists Francois Jacob and Jacques Monod was stated in 1961. It was an important step to show an inner organisation of the genome. It was shown that the expression of structural genes is controlled by regulatory genes. If a regulatory gene mutates or structural genes come under the regime of a different regulatory gene this can result in sudden huge changes of the phenotype. Although Monod counts as a proponent of Darwinism, his approach enabled a new far more active and organised understanding of the genome and a new form of saltationism.

In the further development of genetics genes have increasingly been seen not as mere genetic atoms, but as being parts of a highly contextual and complex genetic system of functional 'checks and balances'.

(3.) Microbiology also inspired attempts to revive a—comparatively moderate—version of Lamarck's long-discredited mechanism of inheritance of acquired characteristics. This mechanism is seen as an addition rather than an alternative to a selection theory.⁵⁶⁹

Ted Steele in 1979 proposed that RNA can in fact influence the DNA of the germ cells, just as a retrovirus transmits information to its host's DNA. Steel proposed a process of feedback between the immune system—in his view working on the basis of 'somatic selection'—and the DNA. He influenced the neo-Lamarckian Arthur Koestler, who opposed the Darwinian passive understanding of organisms as mere genetic machines moulded externally by selection (here differential environmental elimination). But it was argued that Steele's heretical empirical results could not be replicated.⁵⁷⁰ A similar dispute on the scientific respectability of empirical results took place in regard to the results of Cairns *et al.*⁵⁷¹ Recently Edward J. Steele, together with two co-authors, wrote the book *Lamarck's Signature*, where Ted Steele's original theory has been defended, elaborated and popularised.⁵⁷²

Already in the late 1950s H. Termin, who received the Nobel price in 1975, had discovered reverse transcription, which is central for the replication of retroviruses. Actual *gene transposition* had then been proven by Barbara McClintock (1902-1992), also a Nobel laureate. According to McClintock's research, genes could be moved within a chromosome or even between different ones. These results in

⁵⁶⁹ E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley, R. V. Blanden. *Lamarck's Signature* (1998), pp. 1, 6, 11, 23, chap. 5. A short survey of the precursors of this present Lamarckian attempt is given e. g. by P. J. Bowler. *Evolution* (1984), pp. 319-321.

⁵⁷⁰ P. J. Bowler. *Evolution* (1984), pp. 320-321.

⁵⁷¹ J. Cairns, J. Overbaugh and St. Miller. *The Origin of Mutants* (1988). Contra: L. Partridge, M. Morgan. *Is bacterial Evolution Random or Selective?* (1988); Charlesworth, D. et al. *Origin of the Mutants Disputed* (1988). R. Lenski et al. *Another Alternative to Directed Mutation* (1989). [Literature of this footnote from: E. Khalil. *Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism* (1992).]

⁵⁷² E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley, R. V. Blanden. *Lamarck's Signature* (1998).

principle may violate the central dogma of molecular biology. If the transposition is catalysed by certain states in the cell, theoretically an external influence could also have an impact on the genome, and if this takes place in the germ cells it would have an impact on the germ line.

However, the work of McClintock and the general development of genetics, for example the largely adaptive way in which gene transpositions work, seem to imply a much more self-organised view of the genome. This presumably will be difficult to harmonise with the perspective of a genome build up by 'selfish' independent genes. One can even say that a more selforganised understanding of genomes and organisms, even if a strictly Lamarckian theory will not turn out to be true, in some sense may rather mirror the active Lamarckian or orthogenetic understanding than the originally passive Darwinian one⁵⁷³.

Macrobiology had resisted an integration into the Evolutionary Synthesis more than other biological disciplines, especially in its ecological and palaeontological branches. Some concepts in these disciplines have continuously resembled tenets of romantic biology. In palaeontology—even after Darwinism seized power—the concept of saltationism was still discussed (e. g. Schindewolf, 1950 and even Simpson advocated 'quantum evolution'). In ecology the view of romantic science comprehending ecosystems as 'superorganisms' in their own right, had its peak in the time of the eclipse of Darwinism, but it continued as a undercurrent in biology afterwards. This view has also influenced the philosophy of deep ecology. Today these ideas are again receiving some support. They oppose the genetic atomism and gradualism of gene-Darwinism. The following two approaches, which have much in common, both focus on macrobiology, although they both try to combine their theories with microbiological evidence.

(1.) The theory of punctuated equilibrium, first stated in 1972 by the palaeontologists Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge⁵⁷⁴, repudiates the gene-Darwinian paradigm in several respects.

Richard C. Lewontin is another persuasive critic of gene-Darwinism. He has written influential articles together with Gould against ubiquitous adaptation,⁵⁷⁵ and could count as his ally. Although Lewontin definitely has an interesting own theoretical viewpoint and standing, and although he comes from the microscopical side of genetics, he will here simply be treated under the same headline.

Although Gould, Eldredge and Lewontin in their earlier publications still followed in the wake authors like Dobzhansky, Mayr and Wright, at the time as the synthesis hardened in particular Gould and Lewontin became critical of the synthesis itself. Here I will only briefly contrast the position of this three writers with gene-Darwinism, that is with 'ultra-Darwinism'⁵⁶⁴.

⁵⁷³ For such claims the definition of Darwinism and Lamarckism is crucial, ⇨ pp. 348 f.

⁵⁷⁴ N. Eldredge, St. J. Gould. *Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism* (1972). St. J. Gould; N. Eldredge. *Punctuated equilibria: The tempo and mode of evolution reconsidered* (1977).

⁵⁷⁵ S. J. Gould; R. C. Lewontin. *The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm* (1979).

Firstly, punctuated equilibrium turns against Darwinian phyletic gradualism and in this regard may be seen as a continuation of the saltationistic tradition of palaeontology.⁵⁷⁶ This tradition could be traced back to Schindewolf and Goldschmidt, and could recently also be found in S. Løvtrup's writings. Although some proponents of punctuated equilibrium have distanced themselves from the *traditional* type of saltationism,⁵⁷⁷ a general saltationist leaning is obvious: According to punctuated equilibrium the normal status of evolution is one of stasis, of equilibrium and only minor change. The stasis is punctuated by phases of rapid change and speciation.

Punctuated equilibrium claims that this description, opposed to gene-Darwinian gradualism finds empirical support by the fossil record. Darwinians in contrast have of course often dismissed the fossil record as not being directly conclusive, because of its assumed incompleteness.

Although gene-Darwinism is opposed to any deviation from gradualism, already the evolutionary synthesis had acknowledged the phenomenon of sudden changes in evolution. Eldredge and Gould (1972) even turned to Mayr's writings on geographic isolation and the founder effect as they formulated their theory.⁵⁷⁸ Even Simpson acknowledged periods of rapid change in evolution, which he called 'quantum evolution'; Mayr worked on 'adaptive radiation'⁵⁷⁹. In recent years it was nevertheless especially Gould and Eldredge who emphasised that punctuated stasis is central for evolution and who since the 1970s have defended this claim against the rising tide of gene-Darwinism.

The biological controversy between gradualism and saltationism could also be found in the geological dispute between Hutton's (and Lyell's) uniformitarianism and Cuvier's catastrophism; or in history of science, where Kuhn challenged the conception of a continuous scientific approximation of the truth and replaced it by discontinuous phases of normal and revolutionary science. Such parallels might indicate that actually deeper values and metaphysical commitments may be at stake.

Secondly, Gould and Eldredge differ from the sociobiological paradigm in their claim of a certain autonomy of macroevolution from microevolution. This concept had also to some extent been present in the second phase of the Evolutionary Synthesis.⁵⁸⁰ According to the theory of punctuated equilibrium speciation is the primary source of evolutionary change.

Especially if such an explanatory autonomy is given, palaeontology could be regarded as an important biological discipline, which has the fossil record at its disposal and hence almost exclusively has empirical access to the long term macrobiological evolutionary process. Gould has argued against the often assumed irrelevance and de facto submission of palaeontology.⁵⁸¹

Thirdly, Gould, Lewontin and Eldredge, together with the followers of the Dobzhanskyian wing of the evolutionary synthesis, have opposed gene-Darwinism not only in regard of macroevolutionary

⁵⁷⁶ This parallel is also drawn by other authors: e.g. M. Wuketits. *Evolutionstheorien* (1995), p. 93.

⁵⁷⁷ N. Eldredge. *Reinventing Darwin* (1995), pp. 100, 98, 27.

⁵⁷⁸ N. Eldredge, St. J. Gould. *Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism* (1972).

⁵⁷⁹ A term originally introduced by H. F. Osborn, a proponent of orthogenesis.

⁵⁸⁰ ↪ footnote 496.

⁵⁸¹ St. J. Gould. *Irrelevance, submission, partnership: the changing role of palaeontology in Darwin's three centennials and a modest proposal for macroevolution* (1983). N. Eldredge. *Reinventing Darwin*. (1995), pp. 166, 169.

mechanisms, but—closely linked to this—in regard of the existence of macroevolutionary entities. They, despite some ambivalence and restrictions,⁵⁸² have generally vindicated the existence of organisms, populations and species.⁵⁸³ According to them, evolution and also natural selection work on higher levels of organisation than exclusively on the level of single genes.

Fourthly, they advocated the causal relevance of phenotypes and opposed the exclusive relevance of genotypes.⁵⁸⁴ In this regard they continued and radicalised the second phase of the Evolutionary Synthesis, in their recognition that the phenotypic population structure and—at least according to Mayr—the organismic phenotype are uneliminable factors of evolutionary theory.

Besides theoretical reasons for adopting this view, a phenotypic approach is also more suitable for the classical methodology of palaeontologists, who only seldom had the opportunity to study palaeontological DNA.

Fifthly, Gould and Lewontin in particular attacked the simplifying ‘adaptationism’ of gene-Darwinism.⁵⁸⁵ Again, by doing this, they radicalised aspects of the second step of the evolutionary synthesis—here Wright’s concept of genetic drift—and argued that especially in speciation random fluctuations—as opposed to adaptations—are central for the evolutionary process.

Finally, proponents of punctuated equilibrium have incorporated tenets, which historically have to be regarded as being originally concepts of romantic biology. Inner constraints, *Baupläne* and an inner developmental necessity and direction of evolution here started to play a role again.⁵⁸⁶ This is the case although proponents of this approach still advocate natural selection as a very important factor of evolution.

(2.) *Systems theory of evolution* stresses that entities have to be regarded as parts of larger systems.⁵⁸⁷ This viewpoint is the opposed (or may be the complementary) view to atomism, either of a genetic, an individualistic or a ‘speciestic’ kind. If such a more holistic approach is applied to

It has been argued that the emancipation of palaeontology even the other way round has been a reason for stressing the autonomy of macrobiology: M. Ruse. *Mystery of Mysteries* (1999), p. 143.

⁵⁸² N. Eldredge. *Reinventing Darwin*. (1995), pp. 138, 145, 216.

⁵⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 105, 109, 123, 135.

⁵⁸⁴ R. C. Lewontin. *Gene, Organism and environment* (1983).

⁵⁸⁵ S. J. Gould; R. C. Lewontin. *The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm* (1979), pp. 581-598.

⁵⁸⁶ M. Ruse. *Mystery of Mysteries* (1999), pp. 137-138, 141, 144. R. J. Richards at least also sees similarities with an (pseudo-Darwinian) ‘older nineteenth-century version’ of human nature: *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior* (1987), p. 546. P. Bowler. *Evolution* (1984), 324-325.

Despite the stress on inner direction, Gould—taking natural selection still as basic process—has argued against the notion of evolutionary progress, which was central to the Romantics and the pseudo-Darwinians. Ruse has pointed out that Gould’s understanding of complete random contingency is inconsistent with Christian religion. I would agree with Ruse, but I doubt that Dawkins’ unmodified concept of unrestrained struggle for life leads further? See: M. Ruse. *Being Mean to Steve* (2000), p. 4.

⁵⁸⁷ Punctuated equilibrium may also owe something to systems theory, especially the notion of a dynamic equilibrium. Lewontin was likewise concerned to analyse different kinds of homeostasis. However, because of their actual influence and because of the palaeontological roots of punctuated equilibrium, punctuated equilibrium is here treated as an approach on its own.

ecosystems⁵⁸⁸, this can be seen as a demystified form (normally working in terms of *causa efficiens*) of the idea of ecosystems as superorganisms.

Ludwig von Bertalanffy founded a general systems theory at the end of the eclipse of Darwinism.⁵⁸⁹ Of course this system theory in turn has older origins. Today systems theories have become influential again. I limit myself to distinguish three sub-schools: (a) The Austrian biologist Rupert Riedl and the philosopher of biology Franz Wuketits revitalised the 'systems theory of evolution' rather as a modification of the synthetic theory than a different paradigm. Also, for example, the German biologist Bernhard Hassenstein (Freiburg) has reformulated processes of variation and natural selection in terms of feedback loops. (b) The Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela have put emphasis on the reintroduction of the ancient term *autopoiesis* and rather have favoured a radical constructivist paradigm shift than only a modification of the synthesis. (c) The British scientist James Lovelock has introduced and popularised the concept of selfregulation on the level of the whole planet earth, his so-called 'Gaia-hypothesis' (the historian will be reminded of the Antique concept of *anima mundi*).⁵⁹⁰

As we will see in the next section, in recent years physics, chemistry and information science also contributed to extend and dynamise systems theory so that it has become an even more interesting source for our search for a new synthesis.

b) *A Multilevel Synthesis — Darwinism versus Developmentalism?*

A huge range of different micro- and macrobiological approaches are in contradiction to or at least different in emphasis from gene-Darwinism. Is there another synthesis in sight? Will this pluralism of alternative proposals be transcended? Where in the theoretical 'space', which is highly dimensional, non-Euclidean and itself changing, will this discourse settle and find again at least a local maximum of truth?

In my view gene-Darwinism, which today plays an important role in sociobiology and in other subject areas, will indeed contribute to such a synthesis. But, although gene-Darwinism is a highly appealing theory in regard of its empirically bold predictions and its theoretically austere simplicity, it will not dominate future evolutionary theory. In my systematic fourth part of this work reasons for the inconsistency of gene-Darwinism will be given (☛ pp. 240 f.). The evolutionary synthesis, which in my opinion has at least as much to contribute to a new synthesis, would itself need to change some of its central basic assumptions to incorporate both gene-Darwinian tenets and its alternatives.

If there will be a new unified theory (as an alternative to gene-Darwinism) two multi-level approaches appear to propose themselves:

⁵⁸⁸ See e. g.: W. Wieser. *Energetische und soziale Aspekte der Evolution* (1989), p. 101.

⁵⁸⁹ L. v. Bertalanffy. *Kritische Theorie der Formbildung*. Berlin (1928).

⁵⁹⁰ ☛ also the list of names in small print on p. 316.

(1.) An approach which accepts many levels of evolution, but which, concerning the evolutionary mechanisms, will still remain predominantly Darwinian. This approach could be called 'multi-level-Darwinism'.

(2.) An even fuller paradigm shift, which not only favours a multi-level approach in regard to evolutionary objects, but which also abandons an exclusive focus on natural selection and introduces different or additional evolutionary mechanisms. We may call this 'multi-level-evolutionism', or in the extreme specific case of a rather developmental or romantic approach 'multi-level-developmentalism'.

Both approaches would clearly be opposed to pure gene-atomism and favour a multi-level account of evolution. But concerning the evolutionary mechanisms, multi-level-Darwinism and multi-level-Developmentalism would be the extremes of a continuum. Most present actual authors would have to be placed somewhere in the middle on this continuum: Proponents of the Evolutionary Synthesis, like proponents of Punctuated Equilibrium—and even Dawkins⁵⁹¹—all have in principle accepted that natural selection *and* chance *and* inner constraints do play a role in evolution. But because gene-Darwinism has vigorously attacked the compromise reached by the evolutionary synthesis, the opponents of this gene-Darwinism were forced to pin-point their own alternative views more distinctly and explicitly. This may have ended the period in which thoughts from many different ideological and philosophical backgrounds had all been easily subsumed under the term Darwinism.⁵⁹² (If nothing else of gene-Darwinism remained, this clarification would be an important lasting contribution of this paradigm.)

I am going to outline these rather artificial extreme options, because they could help to understand the possibility space in which a new evolutionary synthesis may take place:

(1.) **Multi-level-Darwinism** in biology and philosophy of biology tries to overcome the substance reductionism of gene-Darwinism, but in regard of processes remains in radical sense Darwinian, basing its argumentation on a selectionist argument.

Proponents of this approach argue that selection takes place on many levels and hence also these levels are real in evolutionary terms. In a frequently quoted paper from 1970, Lewontin introduced the term '*unit of selection*', arguing in favour of group selection.⁵⁹³ Proponents of a selectionist argument may, for example, maintain that the individual phenotypic organism rather than the selfish gene is an entity which is eventually 'visible' to selection, because selection (in the sense of differential environmental elimination and survival) acts on each actual organism. For the time being we will leave aside the discussion of possible objections.⁵⁹⁴ It is concluded that organisms hence have to be regarded to be real, because having an effect on entities seems to be a sufficient (if not necessary) condition for

⁵⁹¹ In reaction to Gould and others R. Dawkins, while still holding to his gene-atomism, concedes in *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89, pp. 30-54) that there indeed are quantitative constraints.

⁵⁹² ↪ also footnote 387.

⁵⁹³ R. C. Lewontin. *The units of selection* (1970).

⁵⁹⁴ Objections may be based on a different internal-external distinction or a stronger focus on the replication process.

↪ the treatment of substance reductionism in chap. 8.

being real. There is an increasing number of biologists and philosophers who advocate a refined multi-level extension of individualist Darwinism or gene-Darwinism.⁵⁹⁵ Some authors extend a selectionist argumentation even to species or even ecosystems. That an ecosystem may be doomed to become extinct as a whole, may gain some plausibility as we understand that if man destroys other species, he may be next on the list.

Such arguments appear to be valid, only if the whole would indeed have additional properties, which its parts did not already had on their own; in terms of the *Gestalt*-psychology, if the whole is more than the sum of its parts; in terms of variance analysis, if there are not only main effects of the parts, but also interaction effects. But whether there are such effects is of course the very question of the unit of selection debate from the outset. We will currently not engage in this controversial and detailed debate, but will return to it later on (☉ pp. 240 f.). At present we may simply assume that there are ontologically properties on different hierarchical levels, which may play a role in the being or survival of entities. In this sense they would be real and not reducible to or collapsible into each other. Such a view would indeed be at odds with pure gene-Darwinism.

But is this view still Darwinian enough to found a position which we would dub ‘multi-level-Darwinism’ in its most radical sense? (Remember: we aimed at outlining the most radical positions at the end of a hypothetical continuum of multi-level-theories.) Would the approach outlined before—which in my view would indeed be an improvement compared with gene-Darwinism—be as clearly an Darwinian position as possible? I think not. The outlined approach, although historically clearly inspired by Darwinism, would mean not much more than merely stating that there are higher properties of entity collectives. Such a claim is not an especially Darwinian one. The only additional epistemological aspect would be that the reality of properties would be linked to their role in survival, that is, to the probability of a thing to be or not to be. This argumentation answers the question ‘what entities do exist?’ with ‘entities which change the probability to exist exist’. This answer may be metaphysically interesting, may be true or false, or may be close to a tautology, but does definitely not encapsulate the complete essence of Darwinism.

Natural selection indeed is usually regarded as the core of Darwinism. But the term ‘selection’ is normally—and in this work as well—used in a weak and in a strong sense: Selection in the weak sense only means the second step of a Darwinian process, i. e., elimination or differential survival of entities. In this weak sense it has largely been used in the present section above. But this weak meaning does not necessarily involve notions like replicators, evolutionary lines etc.

Alternatively, selection in its strong sense could mean the whole Darwinian process of blind variation of replicators *and* external selection. Multi-level-Darwinism as a pure paradigm should hence on many ontological levels refer to this natural selection in the strong sense, to a stratification of full Darwinian

⁵⁹⁵ E. g.: E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. *Unto Others* (1998), pp. 100 f.; R. N. Brandon. *The Levels of Selection: A Hierarchy of*

processes of blind variation *and* external elimination. (For questions concerning the definition of Darwinism, ☞ pp. 107, 348.) Multi-level-Darwinism in either case carries on the process-monism of gene-Darwinism. Moreover multi-level-Darwinism in its strong sense puts comparatively more emphasis on the first step of or the replicator side of the Darwinian process and is hence less concentrating on the second step concerned with phenotypes: Dawkins, who has emphasised the importance of replicators, regards phenotypes only as their ‘vehicles’; correspondingly he argued that in this strong sense of selection there is only one exclusive unit of selection, i. e. that of selfish genes.⁵⁹⁶

But in principle this replicator and vehicle argumentation may also be applied to gene-pools as wholes, for example. Gene-pools as wholes may also be regarded as replicators which as vehicles, phenotypic groups, become selected (☞ also already p. 133).

Lewontin, although he coined the term ‘unit of selection’, should not be classified as belonging to such a radically Darwinian multi-level-approach, because he does not exclusively focus on natural selection and is one of the main proponents who fought against pan-adaptationism.⁵⁹⁷

The first replicational or variational step of evolution is bound to the notion of a replicator; the second eliminational step of evolution is bound to the notion of a vehicles (Dawkins) or the notion of an interactor (Hull)⁵⁹⁸. Here we may already detect an interesting unity of processes and objects. However, why use the two terms ‘interactor’ and ‘vehicle’? On the first view these notions seem to resemble each other, but the interactor-terminology Hull (who always has advocated the species-as-individual-view) seems to concede at least a somewhat more active role to the phenotype (☞ pp. 217 f.). If we are in search for the purest version of multi-level-Darwinism, the notion of a mere vehicle seems to me to be more clearly and purely Darwinian—in its present radically neo-Darwinian understanding—and finally more problematic.

In the following chapters we will see that multi-level-Darwinism tends to be extended to an all-pervasive approach.

In chapter 5, on the external history of Darwinism, we will see how biological Darwinian theories developed in interaction with non-biological Darwinian approaches. Today these theories with which Darwinism interacted may provide the material for a universalised multi-level-Darwinism.

Darwinian processes found in such different areas will be focused in part III, with chapter 6 and 7. The specific non-biological theories based on a Darwinian process will be described in detail in chapter 7. In chapter 6 we aim at unifying these accounts within a more general metaphysical approach, which I will call ‘Process-Darwinism’ (☞ pp. 214 f. 218 f.). Process-Darwinism could be understood as a metaphysics, because its ontological (and epistemological and ethical) demands are ubiquitous and exclusive.

Interactors (1998/1988).

⁵⁹⁶ Selection here is obviously meant in its strong sense, because Dawkins bases his focus on the gene on his interpretation of the full Darwinian process.

⁵⁹⁷ ☞ footnote 585, 593. Also the way how he has proposed the hierarchy of Darwinian processes has itself been contrasted to a replicator-vehicle approach. H. Plotkin. *Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge* (1994/95), pp. 82-101.

Moreover it is an almost archetypal metaphysical theory because in regard of its abstractness, its explanatory power, its simplicity and also its connection to actual sciences. It is a theory of which metaphysicians have long dreamt of. If the paradigm of pure gene-Darwinism declines, multi-level-Darwinism intuitively appears to be to be the next step, because it still shares the processes with gene-Darwinism, but incorporates much of the criticism against the gene-atomism of gene-Darwinism. I had to find out that the actual historical development had already drawn this inductive inference and already many contributions on (universal) process-Darwinism have been made (e. g. Campbell, Dennett, Hull, Munz and Plotkin). Often these proposals still sustain pan-selectionist and pan-adaptationist beliefs.

Although I think we have to work our way through all-pervasive process-Darwinism, I think inconsistencies of this approach could also be shown (☛ part IV, pp. 327 f., 330 f., 340 f.). Although process-Darwinism is in some respects indeed a wonderful approach from which much can be learned, and although process-Darwinism in my opinion would definitely be an improvement compared with gene-Darwinism, it is in my opinion still built in a too one-sided way on the Darwinian metaphor, focusing more on competition than on co-operation and more on the passive process of being selected than on the active process of selforganisation. This critique of process Darwinism will be substantiated in chapter 9.

(2.) The other extreme approach of the assumed continuum of possible multi-level accounts, would be a far-reaching replacement of natural selection; we called it **multi-level-evolutionism** (evolution here meant in remembrance of the original connotation of the term). Natural selection on different levels would not any more be regarded as necessarily the only essential mechanism of evolution, to which all other mechanisms are in principle reducible.

Approaches which are critical towards Darwinism could generally proceed in two ways: They may firstly start from a given, even radically Darwinian starting point and only thereafter try to 'reconstruct the ship on the open sea', i. e. to supplement the ubiquitous Darwinian mechanism by additional processes, constraints etc. The other procedure would be to build independently an alternative conception of the unfolding of nature. In either cases, the focus could already be on the evolutionary beginnings or (possibly additionally) on the further evolutionary process, which, in its further course, is itself regarded to be a changeable object of evolution.

My own approach in the present work starts from within radical Darwinism and then tries to show the need to extend or even in some respects to transcend this paradigm, already partly concerned with the beginnings, but even more pronounced when concerned with the further course of evolution.

We have already outlined above some specific contributions in micro- or microbiology which have appeared to be at odds with Darwinism. Presently, we want to outline a multi-level-approach which also breaks with the emphasis on Darwinian processes. In the following two general multi-level-approaches

⁵⁹⁸ D. Hull. *Units of Evolution: A Metaphysical Essay* (1981).

will be described, which—independent of questions of procedure—may in my view contribute to a radical extension or even replacement of Darwinism.

a) Firstly, **multi-level-developmentalism**, which in aspects was revitalised during the last decade, fully breaks with the predominant focus on Darwinian explanations. This approach with a focus on an inner structural or morphological logic is a reformed version of what we have called romantic biology,⁵⁹⁹ linked with terms like ‘Morphogenesis’, ‘Rational Morphology’ or ‘*Entwicklungsmechanik*’.

For reasons of simplicity we here also subsume other non-Darwinian evolutionary approaches which are not strictly romantic, but which also have opposed the sole dominance of *causa materialis* and *causa efficiens*, like e. g. the neo-Aristotelian or neo-Thomist teleological approach of Spaemann and Löw.⁶⁰⁰ This is done, since different philosophical understandings of nature, which could not easily be harmonised with Darwinism, have moved closer together.⁶⁰¹

The romantic (or dynamic transcendental-idealist) tradition could be traced back to the pre-Darwinian biology of Oken, Geoffroy St. Hilaire, the late Owen or at least to the ‘romanticising materialist biology’ of Buffon and Lamarck, who advocated at least also an active understanding of the organism.⁵⁹⁹ The tradition of romantic biology was taken up in a modified way, mainly during the eclipse of Darwinism, by Conrad Hal Waddington, D’Arcy Thompson, Hans Driesch and later again, for example, by Jean Piaget.

Today, the biologist Brian Goodwin⁶⁰² and his school explore the possibilities to revive a similar hierarchical theory of forms, which puts emphasis on the reality of organisms, and opposes a purely Darwinian approach to biology.⁶⁰³

b) The second possibility of how a multi-level-theory without any or without a main focus on Darwinism might be built, is linked to theories of **selforganisation** or dynamic systems theory.

We have already mentioned contributions to systems theory in the last section, especially in their application to macrobiology (☞ pp. 151).

But there are also scientific theories not yet mentioned, which are less closely linked to biology but coming out of physics, chemistry or information science still have a generalist aim. Most of them dynamise and extend systems theory. I am only going to list some of these approaches: the theory of dissipative structures (I. Prigogine), the theory of synergetics (H. Haken)⁶⁰⁴, the theory of co-evolution

⁵⁹⁹ For a full treatment of pre-Darwinian biology ☞ pp. 96 f.; for a treatment of what we called specifically romantic biology ☞ pp. 102 f.

⁶⁰⁰ On R. Spaemann and R. Löw see: R. Isak. *Evolution ohne Ziel?* (1992), esp. p. 145.

⁶⁰¹ On a Thomistic-Whiteheadian metaphysics, e. g.: J. S. Felt. *Proposal for a Thomistic-Whiteheadian Metaphysics of Becoming* (2000).

⁶⁰² Goodwin did his PhD studies at Edinburgh under Waddington.

⁶⁰³ G. Webster, B. Goodwin. *Form and Transformation. Generative and Relational Principles in Biology* (1996). Although also the authors put themselves in the above tradition (e. g. pp. ix, 7), they also differ in some respects from the tradition they come from (e. g. pp. 10 f.). B. Goodwin, G. Webster, J. Wayne-Smith. *The 'evolutionary paradigm' and constructional biology* (1992).

⁶⁰⁴ H. Haken. *Synergetics. An Introduction. Nonequilibrium Phase Transitions and Self-Organization in Physics, Chemistry, and Biology.* (1983/1977).

of macro- and microcosm (E. Jantsch)⁶⁰⁵, the theories of deterministic chaos (E. N. Lorenz & B. Mandelbrot), and the conception of an 'elastic' ecosystems (C. S. Holling). Other important names in these quite heterogeneous areas are: H. von Foester, W. Krohn and G. Küppers.⁶⁰⁶ It is still not clear how or even if these theories could be integrated into a larger well defined theory, but they might be integrated into a dynamised and enlarged systems theory, the theory of *selforganisation*.

Selforganisational approaches often have developed in isolation or in opposition to Darwinian approaches; or sometimes are regarded rather as a completion than an alternative to Darwinism. In my opinion both views are true in a certain respect. Maybe the future will show that Darwinism and theories of selforganisation are compatible complementary parts of a future synthesis. Still dynamic systems theory at present is best understood as an antithesis to entity and process atomism and the passive understanding of entities normally found in full-blown Darwinism.

Could selforganisational approaches clearly be distinguished from the above romantic or developmental approaches? It seems that theories of selforganisation have their roots rather in physics, whereas multi-level-developmentalism is directly linked to philosophy and the romantic tradition of biology. Moreover, developmentalism more openly favours the importance of form or morphology, whereas theories of selforganisation seem to stand in a rather mechanistic tradition. In this sense multi-level-developmentalism appears to be the more radical alternative to Darwinism.

But in my opinion a closer investigation may show that both approaches have quite similar roots which could similarly be contrasted to Darwinism. Moreover, both approaches focus on systemic organisation (whether it is called form or system) rather than on microscopic components.

Depew and Weber, for example, have stressed that the developmentalist tradition is not at odds with, but has been revitalised by complex systems dynamics.⁶⁰⁷ Webster and Goodwin also tie their own originally more traditionally morphologically inspired approach to new approaches concerned with dynamic complexity.⁶⁰⁸ Similarly, a German research group on 'critical evolutionary theory' at Frankfurt on the Main at the Senkenberg museum appears to combine aspects of a morphological organismic argumentation with concepts drawn from theories of selforganisation.⁶⁰⁹

A convergence of developmentalism and theories of selforganisation has not necessarily got to be a surprise: morphological and field-theoretical approaches often claim not only romantic legacies, but a further (dynamised) Aristotelian legacy. The notion of 'selforganisation'—as often ignored—in its literal translation also reminds us of the Aristotelian term *autopoiesis*.

⁶⁰⁵ E. Jantsch. *Die Selbstorganisation des Universums. Vom Urknall zum menschlichen Geist*. (1988/1982).

⁶⁰⁶ A bibliography on this topic: R. Paslack, P. Knost: *Zur Geschichte der Selbstorganisationsforschung* (1990).

⁶⁰⁷ D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), p. 395 f.

⁶⁰⁸ G. Webster, B. Goodwin. *Form and Transformation. Generative and Relational Principles in Biology* (1996), p. 130 and final chapter.

In this chapter we have worked out three different Darwinian paradigms and also outlined the present and mainly biological criticism of gene-Darwinism and Darwinism in general. By discussing the Darwinian sub-paradigms it becomes clear that Darwinism is itself not as united, not as easy to define and not as unchangeable as it is often supposed to be. In the following part we will work out the external influences, which moulded these paradigms, in order to reveal what additional non-biological theoretical background may also be at issue when we discuss these paradigms.

⁶⁰⁹ Members of the group are W. F. Guttman, M. Grasshoff, J. L. Franzen, D. S. Peters, M. Weingarten etc. See: M. Weingarten. *Organsimen - Objekte oder Subjekte der Evolution. Philosophische Studien zum Paradigmenwechsel in der Evolutionsbiologie* (1993), pp. 2, 279 f.

Chapter 5: The External History of Darwinism — From Whig Biology to Neoliberal Biology?

In the present chapter a survey of the main cultural, intellectual and ideological influences on the formation and further development of Darwinism will be given. This *external* history complements the account on the *internal* history of different Darwinian subparadigms, given in Chapter 4. It will be shown that the development of Darwinism is not only due to an inner logic of biological conceptions and empirical findings, but also underpinned by philosophical and methodological assumptions, which partly came from outside biology.

To describe this development of the different successive Darwinian paradigms exclusively by the sentence ‘from Whig Biology to Neoliberal Biology’ appears to me rather too radical and oversimplifyingly political, but I think it indeed contains a grain of truth; hence I have put this sentence into the headline, though only as a question. The evidence for an interaction of politics and economics with biology will be summarised. To accept such an interaction should not imply a mono-causal understanding of history, neglecting the role of inner-biological theoretical necessities and empirical evidence.

A simple one-to-one relationship between scientific theories and external metaphysical commitments or values could normally not be given, because the definition of a scientific theory on the one side, the description of dominating values on the other side and finally the historical endeavour to establish a link between these sides are all three complex cultural processes.⁶¹⁰ To acknowledge this complexity by no means implies that the external aspect of the history of science should be ignored; on the contrary there is a need to supplement the internalist approach, often competently treated by scientists themselves, by a profound externalist approach. Although the link between a certain scientific theory and certain metaphysical commitments (and vice versa) will normally not be deterministic, we may still search for probabilistic links between them. Although Darwinism in general, in my opinion, owes much to some general metaphysical commitments, this might be disguised by differences between its subparadigms. Hence to differentiate between different Darwinian subparadigms, each (again in a probabilistic way) with their specific metaphysical commitments, may help to reveal and clarify the essence of Darwinism and of its metaphysical commitments.

My external approach to Darwinism does not focus on the socio-economic background (without from the outset regarding this as irrelevant), but on intellectual ideas. Besides the possible influence of some political or socio-economic *theories*, I also want to give an outline of how other intellectual

⁶¹⁰ P. Bowler. *The Non-Darwinian Evolution* (1988), e. g. p. 171. ↻ also footnotes 387 and esp. 441.

currents like Newtonianism, the probability revolution and modern reductionism might have influenced the different Darwinian sub-paradigms.

Evolutionism of the early modernity, as we have seen in chapter 3, already existed before the rise of Darwinism and had to some extent been rooted in Spinoza's and his adherents' approach to give a *unified* account of the World and of God. Since Descartes, the picture of the World had been ripped into two pieces by a dualistic account, which mirrors the Christian distinction of *Machina Mundi* and *Alter Deus*.⁶¹¹ Opposed to this, romanticism and romantic biology followed Spinoza's approach, focusing on the active (ideal) unfolding of Nature or—in other words—on the self-realisation or incarnation of God.⁶¹² It has been argued that Buffon, the founder of what I have called 'romanticising *materialist* biology', had been influenced by Spinoza and came to a more *active* understanding of matter and evolving entities than Darwin did.⁶¹³

Darwinism—as I am going to show—has interpreted the originally romantic idea of evolution along *atomistic*, mechanistic lines. By explaining evolution in terms of unchanging, eternal, mechanical laws of nature the concept of evolution was transformed and placed in the respected Newtonian research tradition predominant at Darwin's time, especially in Britain. Newtonianism in turn could be regarded as a peculiar blend, on the one hand, out of the mechanicism based on the Christian notion of *Machina Mundi*, and, on the other hand, out of the atomistic, reductionistic and individualistic tenets, present in the increasingly nominalistic attitude at the end of the mediaeval period.⁶¹⁴

But Darwinism at the same time undermined Newtonianism, on which it relied: God's eternal law is largely reduced to a process of blind chance. God became blind. This aspect of the Darwinian revolution of evolution had already been foreshadowed by the development of the philosophy of will, which had changed the romantic approach from a purposeful unfolding of nature or God, to a blind development of the universal will. To Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) in his work *The World as Will and Representation* (1818) the will is the general driving force of the development: everywhere: "the will [...] is obviously at work [...] but in blind activity."⁶¹⁵ This concept is radicalised by today's gene-Darwinian paradigm, which in some respects could be regarded as pinnacle of pure and radicalised Darwinism. In this paradigm God is 'a blind watchmaker'. Still, in my opinion, this biological world-view also bears the seeds to partially undermine itself, and even Darwinism in general.

But first we start with Darwin, who brought the conception of a largely blind evolution into the realm of the respectable Newtonian research tradition.

⁶¹¹ ⇨ pp. 80 f., pp. 86 f.

⁶¹² ⇨ 'Idealism & Romanticism — the Dynamic Trial of a Unification', pp. 89 ff.

⁶¹³ ⇨ pp. 94 ff.

⁶¹⁴ ⇨ pp. 82 ff.

⁶¹⁵ A. Schopenhauer. *The World as Will and Representation* (1818, trans. 1883), p. 118.

5.1 Darwin — A Malthusian Synthesis of Romantic and Newtonian Thought

The biological precursors of Darwin, who had already formulated the building blocks of Darwin's theory of descent, without combining them into a coherent whole, have already been mentioned in chapter 4 on the internal history of Darwinism.⁶¹⁶ Here I will try to give an account of the external, more general influences which moulded and constrained the composition of Darwin's theory as a whole.

It has been argued that in the times of Darwin there was a certain (scientific) *Zeitgeist in Britain* which made the development of Darwinism more probable there, than, for example, on the European continent.⁶¹⁷ This is supported by the fact that Darwin and Wallace, who concurrently developed roughly the same theory of evolution by natural selection, were both British.

Alternatively, one may argue, that the empirical evidence for the Darwinian theory was overwhelming and because of the expanding British empire, naturalists, who sailed the world, were often British. The conception of geological transformation at Darwin's time had anyway become largely accepted in many countries, and the fossil findings provided striking empirical evidence for evolution.⁶¹⁸ Darwin and Wallace had the extraordinary opportunity of getting insight from an enormous amount of empirical evidence. Darwin's voyage on H. M. S. Beagle (1831-36) around the world and Wallace's journey to the Amazon and Malay Peninsula gave them both the possibility to observe related species on different islands.

Although empirical argumentation surely played a role, it also is plausible that this argumentation had to be complemented by a certain *Zeitgeist* in Britain. In France and Germany the concepts of romantic and Lamarckian biology with their claim of evolution and ideogenesis had been common much earlier than in Britain.⁶¹⁹ In France and especially in Germany there was at this time a huge number of competent professional biologists.⁶²⁰ Additionally, it would be wrong to assume that these biologists were completely isolated from the new empirical findings from the new colonies. Since the founding of Linnaean school of taxonomy many biologically educated explorers from different countries had the same opportunities as Darwin and Wallace; in Germany Humboldt, Leichhardt and v. Müller, for example. But still the theory of evolution by natural selection was not developed in these countries. Additionally, the biographies of Darwin and Wallace show similar influences. For example, both were entrenched with a Newtonian ideal of science, both read Lyell during their travels, both were exposed to romantic or French materialist proposals of evolution and both read T. R. Malthus' *Essay on*

⁶¹⁶ ↻ 'Darwin — Not a Darwinist in the Strict Sense', pp. 110 ff.

⁶¹⁷ J. C. Greene. *The Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural Selection* (1971/1981), e. g. pp. 49, 54. S. S. Schweber. *The Wider British Context in Darwin's Theorizing* (1995), pp. 36-38, also stressing the Scottish influences on Darwin.

⁶¹⁸ For example, Herschel, as Darwin met him already in 1836 in Cape Town, had already written a letter to Lyell, criticizing Lyell for not grasping the implication of his own theory of gradually evolving landscapes for the successive appearance of new species. Mentioned in: A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), p. 185.

⁶¹⁹ ↻ pp. 96 ff. Also: E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), pp. 388-391.

⁶²⁰ E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), pp. 389.

Population. Thus, it seems to me to be a reasonable working hypothesis to accept that the intellectual milieu in Britain has played a role in the parallel development of the theories of Darwin and Wallace.

In the next three sections I will give reason for the claim that for Darwin three external influences were of special importance: a) Romantic and the ‘romanticising materialist’ concept of evolution; b) Newtonian thought, which provided the general pattern of a mechanical, universal explanation, and c) economic thought, especially of Malthus (but also of A. Smith), which gave to this synthesis the specific Darwinian spin.

Of course, the influences on Darwin were much more complex and diverse. For example, Darwin, after reading Comte, noted that he generally agrees with Comte’s positivistic approach.⁶²¹ But given that the manifold of influences on Darwin needs to be structured I think the three described schools could be regarded as corner stones of Darwin’s philosophy.

Before we come to discuss these influences, I have to concede that the claim of any **synthesis of Newtonism and Romanticism** at first glance might appear absurd. As already outlined, Newtonian thought and romantic thought were traditionally two *opposed* currents. Moreover, Darwin got beyond *both* Newtonism *and* Romanticism: Darwin firstly abandoned the strictly nomothetic character of Newton’s laws, accepting a probabilistic law and by this turned *against* the Newtonian (in a sense still Platonic) world view of an unchangeable eternal world. Darwin secondly rejected most of the metaphysical presumptions which had been at the very heart of romanticism. His theory is not based on ideogenesis, but is a mechanistic theory based exclusively on *causa efficiens*. It is only reasonable to speak of Darwin’s synthesis of Newtonian and Romantic thought if we see it—like most syntheses—as a partial synthesis which also changes the adopted aspects of the synthesised schools.

a) *Romanticism and Romanticising Materialism*

Only quite recently some historians of thought claimed that one “of the most significant and distinctive features of the positivist historiographic tradition has been its denial of the positive contribution of Romanticism to science.”⁶²² It has already been shown that romanticism generally had a larger impact on the development of modern science than had often been assumed.⁶²³ This also holds for Darwinism, although some of today’s neo-Darwinians tackle history anyway with surprising ignorance.⁶²⁴ Historians increasingly see Darwinism not only as breaking with romantic biology and with what I have called ‘romanticising materialist biology’, but as continuing at least some aspects of these traditions.⁶²⁵ Darwin’s concept of evolution, despite using different explanatory mechanisms from his predecessors, was itself no *creatio ex nihilo*.

Even in the time before romanticism, in the late enlightenment, the general idea of development or evolution gained more and more influence. For example, the pre-critical Kant, independently followed

⁶²¹ Ch. Darwin, Notebook M (1838, 1987, ed.: P. Barrett), orig. pp. 69-70. See also e. g.: A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), pp. 260-261.

⁶²² E. Richards. *The Romantic gestation of nature* (1990), p. 130. See also: P. Bowler. *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), pp. 5, 19, 29, 31, 48 f. etc.

⁶²³ ↪ the sections ‘Idealism & Romanticism — the Dynamic Trial of a Unification’, pp. 89 f. and ‘Romantic Biology — Oken, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, (late) Owen’, pp. 102 f.

⁶²⁴ ↪ footnote 199.

⁶²⁵ E. Richards. *The Romantic gestation of nature* (1990). See e. g. also: P. Bowler. *Charles Darwin* (1990), pp. 17-32.

by Laplace, proposed in 1755 a hypothesis on the dynamic formation of planets, the so called Kant-Laplace nebular hypothesis.⁶²⁶

Nevertheless, since the 'romanticising' materialist and romantic idealist movement (☉ pp. 89 f., 96 f., 102 f.), the concept of universal development became central to philosophy as well as to science. In particular, in biology a romanticising materialist biology and romantic idealist biology spread the idea of evolutionism.

I treat the influences of these two different—partly opposed—schools of thought together, because both made Darwin at least prepared to finally outgrow his belief in the fixity of species and than motivated him to work out his—quite different— explanatory account of evolution. Moreover, both schools had been influenced by Spinoza. Correspondingly the (romanticising) materialist school, advocated a more active notion of matter and had a firmer belief in progress than Darwin had. The idealist school had an belief in the necessary progressive unfolding of form. Moreover, despite the differences in their reception especially in England⁶²⁷, both schools for example in the early evolutionary debate in France were allied in the persons of Lamarck and Geoffroy against Cuvier. Also after 1859 both schools became allies against Darwinism⁶²⁸.

Although it is credible that Darwin indeed long believed in the fixity of species, the notion of evolution was at any rate 'in the air'. The theories of Lamarck, Geoffroy and some German romantics were known—also in Britain. Grant, Knox, Green and later Chambers and even Owen were clearly in favour of these concepts, although Owen became cautious in publishing them. Although Darwin's intellectual starting point indeed was indeed an Paleyian-Newtonian understanding of the world, it would be wrong to neglect the influence of the Pre-Darwinian evolutionary theories, both of romanticising materialist and romantic biology.

Darwin, like most of his generation, read Romantic poetry. Darwin in his youth and also in the time he adopted his belief in evolution took much delight in reading poems of Byron, Scott, Coleridge, Shelley and Wordsworth.⁶²⁹ The romantic poets in a poetic way have expressed ideas also advocated by Romantic biology.⁶³⁰

Charles of course knew of the evolutionary speculations of his famous grandfather Erasmus and read his medico-evolutionary book *Zoonomia* while studying medicine at Edinburgh (1825-27). Although Charles at that time presumably was not transmutationalist he greatly admired Erasmus' work and he even himself concedes in his autobiography that hearing early in life of such evolutionary views may probably have moulded his own—of course different—account.⁶³¹ Being the grandson of the known

⁶²⁶ I. Kant. *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels* (1755).

⁶²⁷ A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), see also footnote 653.

⁶²⁸ P. Bowler. *Darwin* (1990), chapter 9, esp. p. 167.

⁶²⁹ Ch. Darwin. *Autobiography* (ed. by F. Darwin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), pp. 33, 69, 100.

⁶³⁰ ☉ footnote 248.

⁶³¹ Ch. Darwin. *Autobiography* (ed. by F. Darwin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), p. 38.

early evolutionist and poet Erasmus Darwin surely played a role in putting the species question on Darwin's agenda.

Erasmus has to be classified as a romantic biologist or at least as a romanticising materialist biologist. Erasmus favoured the belief in the improvement of species by their "own inherent activity"⁶³². D. King-Hele, who has edited Erasmus' letters, writings and life, has even argued that Erasmus' writings did not only resemble the writings of the romantic poets, but that he directly made his mark on Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Keats and also on Goethe.⁶³³ Coleridge for example, a good friend of the romantic biologist Green, thoroughly knew Erasmus' works. And, Darwin although finally turning strongly against Erasmus' approach⁶³¹, kept his work in mind as he himself adopted a concept of evolution. After re-reading the *Zoonomia*, he even took this title as opening heading of his Notebook B, his first notebook mainly on species transmutation⁶³⁴.

In his second year at Edinburgh, Darwin was under the tutelage of the transformist Grant. Grant was mainly influenced by a Lamarckian view of evolution; to a certain extent only he was also influenced by romantic biology (e. g. by Geoffroy) in adopting the theory of recapitulation.⁶³⁵ Grant advocated that species have certain life cycles. His transformist leanings were evident in his papers in Jameson's *Edinburgh Philosophical Journal*.⁶³⁶ Grant and Charles Darwin—the grandson of Erasmus Darwin—became closely acquainted. Darwin also helped Grant with observations on the larvae of molluscs and sea-mats, which played part in Grant's evolutionary attempt to show homologies from people to polyps, and Darwin even had to look something up in a publication of Lamarck for him.⁶³⁷ Once, as they were walking together, Grant "burst forth in high admiration of Lamarck and his views of evolution".⁶³⁸ Although in his autobiography Darwin assumed that listening in silent astonishment to this position was "without any effect" on his mind,⁶³⁸ it certainly suggested this research topic to him.⁶³⁹

Generally, most idealist or materialist evolutionists in Britain had a predominantly Scottish, mostly Edinburgh, training.⁶⁴⁰ Knox, gave lectures on Comparative Anatomy fully based on the principles of 'Autenrieth, Goethe, and Geoffroy' exactly in the years, when Darwin was at Edinburgh.⁶⁴¹ Darwin did not hear Knox's extra-academic lectures himself, presumably mainly because he was disgusted by

⁶³² E. Darwin. *Zoonomia* (1794), vol. I, p. 505, quoted by D. Kohn in Ch. Darwin. *Notebook D* (ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), pp. 170.

⁶³³ D. King-Hele. *Erasmus Darwin and the Romantic Poets* (1986), esp. pp. 275-280.

⁶³⁴ Ch. Darwin. *Notebook B*, commenced about July 1837 (ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. pp. 1 f., also Kohn's introduction, pp. 167-168.

⁶³⁵ R. J. Richards. *The Meaning of Evolution* (1992), pp. 71-72.

⁶³⁶ A. Desmond. *Robert E. Grant: The Social Predicament* (1984), pp. 200.

⁶³⁷ A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), pp. 37-39.

⁶³⁸ Ch. Darwin. *Autobiography* (ed. by F. Darwin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), p. 38.

⁶³⁹ See P. Bowler. *Charles Darwin* (1990), p. 21 (referring to P. R. Sloan. *Darwin's Invertebrate Program, 1826-1836*. In: D. Kohn (ed.): *The Darwinian Heritage*. Princeton Univ. Press: Princeton, NJ (1985), pp. 71-120).

⁶⁴⁰ Ph. Rehbock. *Transcendental anatomy* (1990), pp. 11, 32 f.; see e. g. also: A. Desmond. *Robert E. Grant: The Social Predicament* (1984), pp. 195-202. It has also been argued that generally 'the Scottish enlightenment inquiries on the nature of the social and economic order were evolutionary in outlook'. S. Schweber. *The Wider British Context in Darwin's Theorizing* (1985), pp. 35-38.

⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

dissecting anyway.⁶⁴² But Knox' lectures were the largest anatomical classes in Edinburgh, even in British history,⁶⁴³ and it seems improbable that Darwin, who took an active part in the naturalist societies, should never have heard about his ideas. Even the respected R. Jameson, curator of the University's Natural Museum, to whose course Darwin went, had—anonously—published a paper in praise of Lamarck's mechanism of evolution.⁶⁴⁴ Darwin, who had almost stopped studying medicine, took part in two naturalistic societies, which were among the most probable places in Edinburgh to find students or lectures concerned with these topics. One was the Plinian student society, founded originally by Jameson, at that time penetrated by radical students. To the other, the *Wernerian Natural History Society* in Jameson's room in the museum, Darwin was regularly brought by Grant as his guest. Knox had already become a member of this society in 1821.⁶⁴⁵

At Cambridge, while studying theology Darwin mainly strengthened his Newtonian understanding of science (☉ pp. 168 f.). Still, Darwin also read A. v. Humboldt's *Personal Narrative* with great interest and later on as he published his *Journal of Research* modelled on Humboldt he even sent him a copy. Humboldt delightedly answered his letter, mentioning that, for him, Erasmus Darwin had been a source of inspiration.⁶⁴⁶

On the H. M. S. Beagle, Darwin had leisure to examine Lamarck's *Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertèbres* and he found in the second book of Lyell's *Principles of Geology* a full presentation of Lamarck's theory of evolution and also an outline of Serres' and Tiedemann's concept of recapitulation of the embryological development through stages of lower animals. Despite Lyell's disapproval of these theories, he substituted nothing in their place⁶⁴⁷.

Although Darwin—like Lyell—seems not to have become convinced by these evolutionary concepts of his time immediately, all these ideas probably played a role in preparing him for his later conversion to evolutionism. And indeed, at least in the early part of the period between March 1837, when Darwin actually converted to the belief of transformism of species, and before September 1838, when he arrived at his theory of natural selection, passages in his notebooks indicate a understanding of evolution which could be attributed to some romantic brand of evolution. For example, Darwin directly after adopting

⁶⁴² A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), pp. 42-43.

⁶⁴³ Ph. Rehbock. *Transcendental anatomy* (1990), p. 40.

⁶⁴⁴ A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), pp. 40, 42.

⁶⁴⁵ A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), p. 37. Ph. Rehbock. *Transcendental anatomy* (1990), p. 37.

⁶⁴⁶ Humboldt to Darwin 18th Sept. 1839. In: *The Correspondence of Charles Darwin*, Vol. 2 (1986). Darwin in his early notebooks mentions Humboldt repeatedly. S. Herbert. Introduction to Darwin's *Red Notebook* (1980/1836), p. 16. Humboldtian science combined Romantic holism, emphasis on large-scale phenomena and aesthetic sensibility with a new enthusiasm for meticulous empirical description and measurement. Humboldt, in his younger years wanted to write 'a history and geography of plants or historical information on the gradual dispersal of plants over the whole globe' (1805). Humboldt's later works were mainly devoted to present distributions, but I can not judge how far his early intentions are still recognisable in these works. The pre-Darwinian evolutionist Franz Unger is also normally placed in Humboldt's research tradition.

See: S. Gliboff. *G. Mendel* (1999), pp. 219-220; E. Mayr. *Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 442.

⁶⁴⁷ See: D. Hull. *Darwin and the nature of science* (1983), pp. 68-70.

his belief in evolution claims that evolution works ‘per saltum’.⁶⁴⁸ Moreover, in this period he also studied not only Cuvier, but also Geoffroy’s *Principles de philosophie zoologique* (published 1830).⁶⁴⁹

The historian Richards has argued that Darwin’s very early reflections on transformation largely followed a romantic concept of embryological-zoological recapitulation. Thereby Charles Darwin followed in the footsteps of his grandfather Erasmus Darwin and found confirmation of his views in an article of Serres, a disciple of Geoffroy.⁶⁵⁰ Moreover, Martin Barry’s representation of von Baer’s treelike conception of the vertebrate and invertebrate archetypes and their development (1837) might have inspired Darwin’s conception of common descent.⁶⁵¹

The theory of common descent, to Darwin, as earlier presumably to Geoffroy, was so useful because it acknowledged the evidence of two opposed schools. It firstly acknowledges the unbridgeable difference of species, which had been advocated by essentialists, like Cuvier and, at that time, by Owen (with whom Darwin rubbed shoulders), at least in a ‘horizontal’ sense. It secondly acknowledges the concept of ‘vertical’ transmutation.

Even later on, as Darwin in 1842 and 1844 prepared first systematic unpublished formulations of his theories, he, like some romantic and some former essentialist authors, formulated a theory of periodical change, as a “compromise between static creationism and a totally dynamic model of natural change”⁶⁵².

According to Desmond and Moore the discussion of revolution and of Lamarckian transmutation took already place on the streets, as by the mid-forties transmutation was moving “out of the shabby dissecting theatres, [...] into the drawing-rooms”⁶⁵³. This was partly due to Robert Chambers anonymously published and journalistically written book *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*, which made a romantic understanding of cosmic self-development and progression of nature accessible to a larger public.⁶⁵⁴ According to Chambers evolution could be seen as a continuous divine creation.

Anyway, evolution was in the air, long before Darwin published his *Origin*. But to Darwin the materialist Lamarckian notion of evolution in the air smelled like the gun powder of the excesses of the French Revolution. Presumably mainly because of this, Darwin—himself silently thinking about evolution—distances himself from Grant and even witnessed a conspiracy against his old teacher Grant, which was only the first attack in a larger war against him.⁶⁵⁵ This was the case, although Darwin, in respect of the source of variation, stayed a Lamarckian throughout his life.⁶⁵⁶ But also the other, the

⁶⁴⁸ S. Herbert (ed.): *Red Notebook of Charles Darwin* (1980/1836), p. 65 (orig. p. 130).

Darwin’s early views on species change are recorded in the red notebook and the ‘transmutation’ notebooks B, C and D. These and other notebooks have been transcribed and edited by P. Barrett, P. Gautrey, S. Herbert, D. Kohn, S. Smith (ed.): *Charles Darwin’s Notebooks, 1836-44* (1987).

⁶⁴⁹ Ch. Darwin. *Notebook B* (ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. pp. 110 f.

⁶⁵⁰ R. J. Richards. *The Meaning of Evolution* (1992), pp. 92 f.

⁶⁵¹ *Ibid*, pp. 108 f.

⁶⁵² P. Bowler. *Charles Darwin* (1990), p. 99 (referring to D. Ospovat, 1981). Also ↻ footnote 384.

⁶⁵³ A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), p. 320.

⁶⁵⁴ See new edition: R. Chambers. *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation [and Other Evolutionary Writings]*. Ed. by J. A. Secord (1994/1844).

⁶⁵⁵ A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), pp. 199-203, 274-276. A. Desmond. *Robert E. Grant: The Social Predicament of a Pre-Darwinian Transmutationist* (1984).

⁶⁵⁶ ↻ ‘Darwin — Not a Darwinist in the Strict Sense’ on pp. 110 f.

idealist romantic, notion of evolution seemed from Darwin's Newtonian viewpoint too obscurantist to be scientifically respectable.

The emphasis of history mainly on the break in the transition from romanticism to Darwinism, underestimates the **continuity in the belief of evolution**. This might partly be due to the overbearing importance Darwin awards to a causal, Newtonian explanation. Darwin indeed in many respects was opposed to some idealistic explanations. Moreover his theory of natural selection undermined romantic biology, which might have caused evolutionists like Knox and Owen to oppose this theory of evolution. The "unity of type", a concept central not only to advocates of a fixity of species but also to dynamic romantic biology, "is" as Darwin pointed out in his *Origin* "explained by unity of descent"⁶⁵⁷. Also because the quickly abandoned static essentialist school of biology shared some notions with romantic biology, it might have been easier to underrate the impact of the second school.

Although Darwin totally transformed the conceptions of romantic and romanticising materialist biology, he started not from blank paper, but was prepared and influenced also by the hotly discussed theories of evolution of his day.

b) *The Impact of Newtonism — Darwin's Process-Monism*

Nearly 200 years after Newton's *Principia* (1687) Darwin's *Origin* (1859) extended Newtonism to biology. Darwin indeed became the 'Newton of a blade of grass' (Kant) and he at the same time also strongly modified, changed and maybe even undermined the generalised Newtonian approach.

Darwin—like Wallace—has developed his theory in an intellectual *milieu* with strong Newtonian underpinnings:

William Paley's (1743-1805) *Natural Theology* (1802), which Darwin enthusiastically read⁶⁵⁸ at Cambridge, where he studied to become a priest, was utterly Newtonian in its spirit. From our today's viewpoint this might appear paradoxical, because to us science—and hence Newtonism—often is conceived being opposed to theology. But Paley indeed was a creationist in a quite Newtonian sense. To Paley, as for Newton—but not for the romantics—the universe *ought* to be seen as world machine. Accordingly, in the beginning of the *Natural Theology*, Paley describes the world with the metaphor of a clockwork. Putting himself in contrast to Kant, Paley, like Descartes, advocated that even organisms are machines. But according to Paley organic machines are perfected to such a high degree, that we are forced to postulate the most skilful creator we can imagine, that is God.

The original association between Newtonism and Natural Theology based on the Christian-Platonic notion of *machina mundi* had been pointed out already (☉ pp. 81 f.). The concept of *machina mundi*

⁶⁵⁷ Ch. Darwin. *Origin of Species* (1859), p. 233.

⁶⁵⁸ Letter to J. Lubbock, 22 Nov. 1859: "I do not think I hardly ever admired a book more than Paley's *Natural Theology*". In: *The Correspondence of Charles Darwin*. Vol. 7. (1991), p. 388. Ch. Darwin. *Autobiography* (ed. by F. Darwin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), p. 47.

was increasingly changed from a Platonic to a mechanistic sense. But its original link to the design argument for the existence of God stayed a powerful driving force in the development of the increasingly mechanistic sciences (☞ pp. 83 f.).

It has even been argued (in the tradition of Weber and Merton), that, perhaps due to Puritanism, the link of the new sciences and theology in natural theology had a particularly strong impact in Britain.⁶⁵⁹ However, it is undisputed—also maybe due to the Cambridge Platonism⁶⁶⁰—that both Newtonism and Natural Theology became very influential, especially in England. In Paley's time, particularly at Cambridge, Newtonian science had become predominant.⁶⁶¹

In Darwin's time Paley, although already dead, was still one of the most important natural theologians. In the late 1820s and early 1830s, despite a then growing fear of deism, England's natural theology was still in bloom, in particular in the natural sciences community at Cambridge. And in this community the young Darwin, really studying 'arts' in order to become a priest, spent most of his time.⁶⁶² Darwin, coming to Christ College, moved apparently into the same room where Paley had lived.⁶⁶³ Darwin had to read other works of Paley for his exams, but although he was not a very ambitious student, he read Paley's *Natural Theology* voluntarily and 'with delight' even after he finished his exams—and it was one of the few books he read at Cambridge which made a permanent impression on him.⁶⁶⁴

Paley does not only leave to Darwin his Newtonian mechanical understanding of Nature, but, by this, the belief in an unchangeable law of God. "As it was in the beginning, it is now, and even shall be: world without end" (*Gloria*). In an irony of history this seems present in today's claims of a universal Darwinian Metaphysics. Moreover, Darwin, as personified secularisation, in the time of the *Origin* still preaches largely with unbroken zeal, not only pan-selectionism, but the metaphysical optimism of physicotheology, panadaptationism.⁶⁶⁵ Although Darwin's own theory had not only finally discredited the fixity of species, but later on made him an agnostic and shattered his optimism, Darwin's work at that

⁶⁵⁹ See: R. Groh, D. Groh. *Religiöse Wurzeln der ökologischen Krise* (1991/1990), pp. 36-40, 43-47. These authors regard optimistic Puritan (Calvinist) and Anglican denomination as most inclined to develop the argument of natural design (also p. 30). The Lutheran (evangelical) Protestant denomination had been less prone to adopt the design argument, because of its pessimistic emphasis on the original sin and its emphasis on faith as opposed to predetermination (pp. 25, 27, 29, 37).

But the Grohs also annotate that there were also Catholics (p. 51) who argued in favour of a (deistic) natural theology based on the new sciences. Additionally, they concede there were many reasons external to science and religion, especially the optimism linked with the increasing importance of Britain (p. 37), for the flourishing of natural theology in Britain.

⁶⁶⁰ E. g.: H. More. *An Antidote Against Atheism* (1652).

⁶⁶¹ See e. g.: D. Knight. *Romanticism and the sciences* (1990), p. 14. R. Groh, D. Groh. *Religiöse Wurzeln der ökologischen Krise* (1991/1990), esp. chapter 'Natürliche Theologie und mechanistisches Weltbild'. D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), pp. 99-102.

⁶⁶² For an account of the complexities and details of Paley's reception at Cambridge: *The Reception of William Paley's 'Natural Theology' in the University of Cambridge* (1997).

⁶⁶³ A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), pp. 63-64.

⁶⁶⁴ Ch. Darwin. *Autobiography* (ed. by F. Darwin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), p. 47.

⁶⁶⁵ ☞ pp. 330 f., 340 f..

time—cynical as it may be—still could at least partially be regarded to have been in the venerable tradition of a physico-theology, explaining and justifying the necessity of the natural suffering⁶⁶⁶.

Another important implicit Newtonian influence on Darwin was **Charles Lyell** (1797-1875), who had carried on Hutton's work to introduce Newton's idea of gradual change (of e. g. the gradual change of the direction of the movements of the planets around the sun) to geology. In Lyell's *Principles of Geology* (three volumes, 1830-3, 1872 the 11th ed.) he expounds a theory of geological change not based on a sudden and violent, but on a gradual change. So he took position as a 'uniformitarian' geologist, opposing the 'catastrophists'. Darwin had read the *Principles* on the Beagle and later Lyell became Darwin's academic mentor⁶⁶⁷.

French saltationism and catastrophism might have been associated with the excesses of the French revolution, although they have earlier been advocated by the rather conservative biologist Cuvier. It can not be assessed here, how far such sentiments played a role for dominance of (geological) gradualism in Britain.

More *explicitly* Newtonian was the influence of the famed astronomer **John F. W. Herschel** (1792-1871), who was presumably England's most important 'philosopher of science' in the 1830's. I think D. Hull has been right in claiming that the "Darwinian revolution was as much concerned with the promotion of a particular view of science as it was with the introduction of a theory on the transmutation of species."⁶⁶⁸

In the English speaking world, Philosophy of Science had become a largely independent and self-conscious discipline not much earlier than in the time of Darwin. Hull has argued that there has been two camps: Darwin tried to continue in the vein of Herschel, Lyell and John Stuart Mill, whereas Owen, Forbes and Agassiz followed in the (modified) Kantian wake of William Whewell.⁶⁶⁹ In contrast to this view, Ruse has pointed out that, despite differences in the metaphysical aspects of science, Herschel and Whewell were not only close friends, but differed little with respect to 'methodological' questions. Not only Herschel, but Whewell as well paid a lot of respect to the Newtonian research program.⁶⁷⁰ However this may be, we will mainly focus on the less controversial views of Herschel here.

Herschel, in a Newtonian manner, demands that science should not only search for mere empirical correlations but to explain true causes (*vera causae*), in terms of cause and effect. Still, like Newton, he did not think that this might rule out God, indeed, rather the contrary. In his view to state that there is something not causally explainable, would mean that there is no God, because the Creator works through these 'intermediate' or 'secondary' causes.

Darwin, as an undergraduate, had read Herschel's *Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy* (1830).

⁶⁶⁶ Examples for this general tradition of natural theodicee are given in R. Groh, D. Groh. *Religiöse Wurzeln der ökologischen Krise* (1991/1990), p. 56.

⁶⁶⁷ E. g.: M. J. S. Hodge. *Darwin's general biological theorizing* (1985/1983), pp. 44-48.

⁶⁶⁸ D. Hull. *Darwin and the nature of science* (1983), p. 65.

⁶⁶⁹ *Ibid*, esp. pp. 66, 70.

Darwin, still at Cambridge also knew Whewell quite well and Whewell at the time Darwin returned from his travels seems to have supported Darwin's scientific career. How far he represents an Newtonian or non-Newtonian influence on Darwin could not be assessed here.

Since his travels Darwin also knew Herschel personally. Moreover both were active members of the London Geological Society. Darwin reread parts of the *Preliminary Discourse* in 1838, when he was going to build a theory based on the concept of natural selection. His theory of natural selection should fulfil the criteria set up by Herschel.⁶⁷¹ Among many aspects, Darwin in his theory hoped to provide *vera causa* in the sense of Newtonian 'secondary' causes, of eternal mechanisms. Still, to Darwin's disappointment finally not only Whewell, but also Herschel and Mill dismissed his theory.⁶⁷²

In his *Descent of Man* Darwin generally mentions Newton explicitly as the individual who achieved highest status on the scale of the evolution of human mental capacities; and it is also not by chance that Darwin mentions the eternal law of gravity in the last sentence of the *Origin*.⁶⁷³

Let us now have a general look in which respect Darwin took over Newtonian thought? What is **Darwin's Newtonism** like? The main and most important feature is that Darwin stated one universal law which mechanistically governs the world of organisms, as the material world is governed by eternal Newtonian laws. As the effect of gravity on stars and on a falling apple could be explained by the same laws, all the special creations of animal species should in Darwin's view be explained by one universal mechanism. Even before Darwin adopted his characteristic mechanism of evolution, he writes in his notebooks: "Astronomers might formerly have said that God ordered, each planet to move in its particular destiny.— In same manner God orders each animal created with certain form in certain country, but how much more simple, & sublime power let attraction act according to certain laws such are inevitable consequen let animal be created, then by the fixed laws of generation, such will be their successors.—"⁶⁷⁴ This mechanism later got its final shape by the influence of Malthusianism, but the main Newtonian ingredient is the early deep belief in a mono-mechanistic eternal explanation. This explanation should have no historical or spatial constraints. One mechanism or one set of laws should rule the *whole* of evolution and should rule in all regions of the earth and on all planets where there might be life (although, as far as I know, Darwin did not state this in regard of other planets, he certainly would do this today). Although Darwin had, as has been shown, stepped back in the *Descent of Man* from his radical adaptionism he still largely upheld his mono-mechanistic creed. Throughout time variation had been introduced "by the same general causes, and governed by the same general and

⁶⁷⁰ M. Ruse. *Darwin's Debt to Philosophy* (1989/1975), pp. 12-13, 18, 14, 23.

⁶⁷¹ See: D. Young. *The Discovery of Evolution* (1992), pp. 114-115, 120.

⁶⁷² D. Hull. *Darwin and the nature of science* (1983), p. 66. M. Ruse. *Darwin's Debt to Philosophy* (1989/1975), p. 30.

⁶⁷³ Ch. Darwin. *The Descent of Man* (1874). Chapter IV, p. 194 (implicitly: p. 947). *Origin of Species* (1859), p. 460.

⁶⁷⁴ Ch. Darwin. *Notebook B* (ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. pp. 101.

complex laws as at present.”⁶⁷⁵ Giving a universal account of evolution is also Romantic, but to give a mechanistic law is obviously rather Newtonian.

But Newton’s influence goes further: Newton favoured a passive understanding of matter.⁶⁷⁶ Matter, on which no force impinges, will only act according to its inertia. Hence, the natural movement is straight and not circular, like Aristotle had believed for celestial bodies. Apart from its inertia, the cause for its movement is externally given. To Darwin—if we focus on his theory of natural selection—organisms are not *actively* adapting but are adapted by the *external* force of natural selection. This opposed the Buffon/Lamarckian view of active matter and organisms (☉ pp. 96 f.).

This parallel between Darwin’s theory of natural selection and Newton’s model of a law bound system of matter in motion has been more fully elaborated by Depew and Weber. According to them, species could be compared to objects, say planets moving around the sun, which have a certain inertial tendency, but at the very same instant they are pulled back by the external force of gravity. Organisms—without any force acting on them—would tend to reproduce similar organisms, but natural selection, like gravity, is acting upon them, causing them to go off this tangent, causing them to transform.⁶⁷⁷ Moreover, the “Newtonian construction of the action of the force as occurring incrementally in infinitesimally small steps is also present in Darwinism.”⁶⁷⁸

Notwithstanding this parallel, it is still important to see that at the same time as Darwin found a universal law which might meet the Newtonian standards for theories, he also transcended the Newtonian framework. In following Herschel’s Newtonian idea of giving a universal causal explanation for the whole process of evolution, Darwin had to pay the price in accepting only a probabilistic law. (Cf. Maxwell on gases, also 1859). Involuntarily Darwin turned against Herschel’s idea of *vera causae* as necessary, nomothetic laws. To Darwin’s disappointment, Herschel did not approve his theory of natural selection, but as Darwin was told, condescendingly called Darwin’s mechanism of evolution ‘the law of higgledy-piggledy’.

Darwin had dynamised the conception of nature by introducing on a second level a fixed, ahistorical, eternal mechanism in a Newtonian way. “God was, for Darwin then, still the traditional good and wise creator, but one never working in so many separate acts of interference, always through the natural consequences of a few initial enactments of general laws: as with planetary orbits and the law of gravitation.”⁶⁷⁹ But differently from the Platonic conception the advocated unchanging background of the changing world, is not provided by a universe of eternal forms, but by one blind process of

⁶⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Chapter II, p. 94.

⁶⁷⁶ This passive understanding of matter was a central aspect of Hegel’s critique of Newton. K.-N. Ihmig. *Hegels Deutung der Gravitation* (1989), pp. 55 f. See also: M. Jacob. *The Newtonians and the English Revolution* (1976).

⁶⁷⁷ D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), pp. 9, 89.

⁶⁷⁸ S. Schweber. *The Wider British Context in Darwin’s Theorizing* (1985), p. 49.

⁶⁷⁹ M. J. S. Hodge. *Darwin’s general biological theorizing* (1983), p. 48.

overproduction and elimination. Later, it will be shown that it is disputable, to accept a historisation of nature, but to oppose a historisation of its evolutionary laws (☉ pp. 353 ff., esp. 395 ff.).

In conclusion, it appeared adequate to me to call Darwin the ‘Newton of a blade of Grass’⁶⁸⁰, a phrase Kant had introduced. Kant himself was convinced that there could in the strict sense never be such a Newton of a blade of Grass; there could never be an adequate explanation for organisms only using *causal* explanations.⁶⁸¹ In this thesis it will be argued that there is still a need for an Einstein or an modernised Aristotle of a blade of Grass.

c) *Thomas Malthus, Adam Smith — Influence of Economic Thought and Practice*

When discussing the external history of Darwinism an often-discussed characteristic of Darwin’s theory (and of the later following neo-Darwinian theory) should also be considered; it is its closeness to some central aspects of political economy and social practice of Whig individualism, competition and *laissez-faire* economy. This sort of economy was favoured by A. Smith, Malthus and Ricardo, the then influential British school of ‘political economy’, and since the middle 1830s these theories had partly become bitter social practice in Britain. The theory of natural selection, according to J. C. Greene, came “naturally to Englishmen“ of that time, steeped in this tradition of ‘political economy’, and correspondingly it “is no mere coincidence that all of the men who arrived at some idea of natural selection in the first half of the nineteenth century—one thinks of William Wells, Patrick Matthew, Charles Lyell, Edward Blyth, Charles Darwin, A. R. Wallace, and Herbert Spencer—were British.”⁶⁸² A closer scrutiny shows that these formulations of ‘natural selection’ differ considerably in how far they focus on the struggle of individuals.⁶⁸³ But a certain resemblance appears to remain. However, I do not base my argument on these parallels. Instead I concentrate on Darwin’s theory of natural selection in particular. Though I shall, of course, not claim that Darwin’s theory is *merely* a projection of the concepts of *laissez-faire* capitalism onto nature, it will be shown that it is apparent that Darwin’s theory, in some respects, is similar to and was actually inspired by economic thought.

There are two ways to discuss a resemblance of theories of quite different subject matter. Firstly one might work out that there is a structural similarity, an analogy. Secondly actual direct influences, a line of descent, a homology, may explain this similarity. If no direct influence could be found, it is reasonable—as in the romantic search for convergent lines of evolution—to search for indirect influences, intellectual resonances, or otherwise for common influences from a third source, in short, reasons to claim that these homologies are due to something which was in the air, which was necessary

⁶⁸⁰ D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), p. 113.

⁶⁸¹ I. Kant. *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1799/1793/1790), p. 338.

⁶⁸² J. C. Greene. *The Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural Selection* (1971/1981), p. 49.

⁶⁸³ P. Bowler. *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), pp. 41 f. See also: *Evolution* (1984), p. 155.

at least at a certain stage of the *Zeitgeist*.⁶⁸⁴ I am firstly going to outline the general analogy of Darwin's theory and some basic tenets of early 'political' economics, which still forms the basis of neo-classical economics. Then, in more detail, I discuss the analogy and actual influence of the theories firstly of Malthus and then of Smith. Finally, we come to discuss the impact of the actual contingent social situation of Darwin's time.

It has often been stated, and I think to a certain extent rightly, that there is a striking **general analogy of theories of (Neo) classic economy and (Neo) Darwinian biology**.⁶⁸⁵ The agents in the competition on the free market are, according to the main Smithian presumptions, rational individuals maximising their *own* benefit. Like them, organisms in Darwin's *Origin* are necessarily egoistic individuals, which tend to maximise their *own* reproduction. In both cases resources are scarce. This implies economic competition on the free market—or struggle for existence between organisms. The competition is severest between individuals or firms offering *similar* products, or between most *similar* organisms. Both views focus on competition and both introduce, what I have called 'principle of egoism', mainly on the level of the individual.

Now I come to the discussion of the more specific theory of Malthus. The analogy between Malthus and Darwin, and the actual influence of Malthus on Darwin will be discussed. Darwin himself in the *Origin* described his theory of natural selection as "the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms".⁶⁸⁶

Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), also a Cambridge educated Newtonian clergyman⁶⁸⁷, in his *Essay on the Principle of Population, as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society* (1798, 1803, ..., 6th ed.: 1826) stated as a law of nature that human population increases in a geometrical (exponential) progression, whereas the food production of the land can increase only in an arithmetical (linear) way.⁶⁸⁸ This, according to him, naturally results in a necessary scarcity of resources,⁶⁸⁹ in famine, misery, war and pestilence, which act as 'positive checks' of population growth. Correspondingly, Malthus thought that it was and would never be possible to build a society where all citizens "should live in ease, happiness, and comparative leisure", an argument which is in his view "conclusive against the perfectibility of the mass of mankind".⁶⁹⁰

⁶⁸⁴ This methodology is paralleled by my theory of exformation, ☉ pp. 307 f.

⁶⁸⁵ This idea has largely been discussed. The idea newly has been elaborated by the economist E. L. Khalil, who criticises both paradigms in a similar way. *Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism: Clearing the Way for Historical Thinking* (1993), pp. 22-72.

⁶⁸⁶ Ch. Darwin. *Origin of Species* (1859), p. 117.

⁶⁸⁷ To Malthus God is acting by eternal and general laws. R. Malthus. *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798, 1st ed.), e. g. pp. 159, 353.

⁶⁸⁸ R. Malthus. *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798, 1st ed.), pp. 14, 18 f., 21.

⁶⁸⁹ *Ibid*, e. g. 291.

⁶⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 17, ☉ also e. g. footnote 735, but pp. 395-396.

Before Malthus' time, poor laws had been instituted in Britain to partially remedy the distress of the poor of each parish. Malthus wrote against these poor laws⁶⁹¹: "The poor-laws of England tend to depress the general condition of the poor", because of an increased price for food, a more than proportionate increase of population of the poor, and an increasing laziness of the fancied rich.⁶⁹² Malthus even went further: "A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence from his parents on whom he has a just demand, and if the society does not want his labour, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has no business to be where he is. At nature's mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him."⁶⁹³ Thus, instead of arguing that we should directly strive to prevent or alleviate misery, Malthus recommended a harshening of the conditions of life of the poor. "Dependent poverty ought to be held disgraceful"⁶⁹⁴. Although he tried in the more academic second edition of his *Essay* to soften some of the most remorseless conclusions of the first edition, he still held an extremely critical stance towards welfare.

Because of such a position today one is inclined to call Malthus a pre-Darwinian social-Darwinist. Darwin was born only eleven years after the publication of the first edition of Malthus' *Essay*. Accordingly, historians, like, for example, Robert M. Young, have emphasised that Darwin's view of nature arose naturally out the social debates centred on Malthus' works.⁶⁹⁵ Darwin, as we will see later, read Malthus and rubbed shoulders with important Malthusians. Here the structural resemblance is important. Darwin's and Malthus' works resemble each other in the concept of a necessity of overpopulation, which leads to a general scarcity of recourses and to a struggle for existence. Malthus also provided a mathematical formulation, suited to Darwin's Newtonian understanding of science. Moreover, Darwin's belief that individual struggle for existence leads to progress seems to resemble at least Malthus' general Whig belief that individual competition leads by an invisible hand to the common good.

Internal historians (☉ pp. 107), like E. Mayr, have pointed out that Darwin's theory was at least not primarily a socio-economic theory, although also Mayr concedes that the reading of Malthus' was of some importance for Darwin.⁶⁹⁶

P. Bowler tried to steer a middle course, accepting that Malthus provided an important step to Darwin's theory of natural selection, but arguing that Darwin's and Malthus' view still differed considerably.⁶⁹⁷ Malthus indeed impressed Darwin by his emphasis on an inevitable 'struggle for existence' in general and by the resulting concept of scarcity of resources for the species as a whole. Both

⁶⁹¹ *Ibid*, pp. 74-99, esp. 98.

⁶⁹² *Ibid*, pp. 83; 76, 77, 78.

⁶⁹³ *Ibid*, p. ?.

⁶⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 85.

⁶⁹⁵ See: P. J. Bowler. *Malthus, Darwin and the Concept of Struggle* (1976), p. 635, Young, R. M., *Darwin's Metaphor* (1985). A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), pp. 267 f., 413-414.

⁶⁹⁶ E. Mayr. *Darwin, intellectual revolutionary* (1983), p. 33. See: *One long Argument* (1991), pp. 69 f.

⁶⁹⁷ P. J. Bowler. *Malthus, Darwin and the Concept of Struggle* (1976), pp. 631, 636, 637; similar: *Evolution* (1984), pp. 96-97, 162-164; *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), pp. 34 f.; *Charles Darwin* (1990), 82-84. Also: M. J. S. Hodge: *The Development of Darwin's general biological theorizing* (1985/1983), pp. 56 f.

emphasise pressure of the environment on populations always tending to expand.⁶⁹⁸ But, in Bowler's view, Malthus did not—like Darwin—advocate a struggle on the individual level as a basis for change or progress.⁶⁹⁹ The distress of the poor should be held disgraceful, not because poor persons with superior ability should win in the struggle for existence relative to others, but because the general situation should prevent further birth of children and should be a stimulus for the lazy.⁷⁰⁰

These differences between Darwin's and Malthus' position, seem in my opinion to be valid; though I would less stress their importance. Bowler is right, that differential survival is on the individual level clearly less central in Malthus' *Principle of Population* than one would suspect if Malthus had taken a strict 'socio-Darwinian' position. Still, there are some passages, where Malthus in the context of the overpopulation problem and of the Poor Laws draws not only distinctions between few rich and the mass of the comparatively poor, but also within the rather poor. Malthus distinguishes firstly the unemployed very poor of the workhouses, who "cannot in general be considered as the most valuable part" and secondly the "more industrious, and more worthy members", whose part is diminished by the former.⁷⁰¹ Moreover, Bowler himself concedes that Malthus in later editions recognises at least some struggle for existence within species⁷⁰² and generally there is also according to Bowler "no doubt that Malthus assumed modern society operated on a basis of self-interest and competition."⁷⁰³ I think, Darwin, in some respects came to share with Malthus a political view critical towards any state intervention and welfare.⁷⁰⁴

"The advancement of welfare of mankind is a most intricate problem:" "if he is to advance still higher, it is to be feared that he must remain subject to a severe struggle. Otherwise he would sink into indolence and the more gifted men would not be more successful in the battle of life than the less gifted. Hence our natural rate of increase though leading to many and obvious evils, must not be greatly diminished by any means. There should be open competition for all men"⁷⁰⁵

Bowler worked out, that Malthus did not, at least not explicitly, favour the differential elimination of the unfit, i. e. of the poor, and that he may have hoped that their disgraceful situation would encourage 'slothful mankind' to work.⁷⁰⁶ Nevertheless Malthus accepted and demanded such a situation of the poor and accepted even their starvation—of course in the service of achieving a higher good⁷⁰⁷.

Moreover, the other structural similarities of Malthus' demographic and economic theory to Darwin's theory make it clear that it was only a little step for Darwin to transform Malthus' theory into

⁶⁹⁸ P. J. Bowler. *Malthus, Darwin and the Concept of Struggle* (1976), p. 637, 647.

⁶⁹⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 634, 636, 639. Similar: E. Mayr. *One Long Argument* (1991), pp. 80-82.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 636, 642; 641 the first reason is not mentioned by Bowler, but ↪ footnote 692.

⁷⁰¹ R. Malthus. *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798, 1st ed.), pp. 84.

⁷⁰² P. J. Bowler. *Malthus, Darwin and the Concept of Struggle* (1976), pp. 638, 647.

⁷⁰³ *Ibid*, p. 639. See also: *Evolution* (1984), p. 164.

⁷⁰⁴ For a more detailed analysis of Darwin's view ↪ the section on the *Descent of Man*, pp. 115 f. In the *Descent of Man* Darwin in fact is in some respects more guarded than in the *Origin*. This is in a way mirrored by the moderating attempts of Malthus' 2nd edition of the *Essay*, where he puts at least some more emphasis on education and self-introduced restrictions, with the hoped result of postponing marriage and reproduction etc..

⁷⁰⁵ Ch. Darwin. *The Descent of Man* (1874), Chapter XXI, p. 945.

⁷⁰⁶ P. J. Bowler. *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), pp. 37-38.

his own—albeit different—theory of natural selection. The parallel concepts of natural population pressure, of scarcity of resources, of a general struggle for existence, and of the opposition against poor laws are striking. Already convinced of evolution anyway, prepared by empirical facts and by his population thinking derived from animal breeders, all these tenets—combined with a public conception of Malthus as a proponent of a politics of free labour market and individualistic *laissez-faire* — were missing links for Darwin's formulation of his own specific theory of individual natural selection⁷⁰⁸.

The above parallels are not only analogies but at least partly *homologies*: the concepts are not only similar, but in fact Malthus' approach had been the most important external influence on Darwin's theory of natural selection.

Apart from Darwin's statement in the *Origin*, Darwin also stated in his autobiography that he got the idea for his theory of natural selection on the 28th September 1838 while reading the sixth edition of Malthus' *Essay on Population*⁷⁰⁹:

"[...] fifteen months after I had begun my systematic enquiry, I happened to read for amusement Malthus on Population, and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on, from long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these circumstances favourable variations would tend to be preserved and unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would be the formation of new species. Here, then, I had got a theory by which to work"⁷¹⁰.

The reading of Malthus had no doubt shaped the similarities of Darwin's and Malthus conceptual core. To acknowledge the importance of Malthus for Darwin's theory of natural selection is in my view not in contradiction to Hodge's or Bowler's argumentation that the reading of Malthus provided only an important step to Darwin's causal theory of evolution.⁷¹¹

Apart from this, Malthus, famous for his strict opposition to the poor laws, ironically *also influenced John Maynard Keynes* (1883-1946), normally regarded as a moderate *left wing* economist, who supported active intervention of the state in the case of an economic crisis. This influence is not based on Malthus' theory of population, but on his view that cyclical crises in economy are caused by underconsumption.⁷¹² Malthus thought that, for example, the post-Napoleonic War distress was caused by a deficiency in effective demand. This brought him into conflict with his friend David Ricardo (1772-1823), who upheld the so-called Say's Law, stating the impossibility of a general underconsumption and who for this different reason followed Smith's theory of governmental non-interference. However, we are here concerned with Malthus' writings on population, which effected a *laissez-faire* politics.⁷¹³

Darwin had personal ties to outstanding Malthusians of his day and anyway, Malthus' "name was on everybody's lips, as either Satan or Saviour."⁷¹⁴ Darwin, as Desmond and Moore have pointed out, was in contact with relatives and still living friends of Malthus' circle. But more important was that

⁷⁰⁷ See Malthus' almost romantic and almost evolutionary theodicee, at the end of his book. R. Malthus. *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798, 1st ed.), pp. 354 f.

⁷⁰⁸ ⇨ pp. 113 f.

⁷⁰⁹ The date refers not to his autobiography, but to his notebooks. Darwin's entries on Malthus at least start on this day. Ch. Darwin. *Notebook D* (ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. 134 f. See also p. 678.

⁷¹⁰ *Idem. Autobiography* (ed. by F. Darwin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), p. 83.

⁷¹¹ M. J. S. Hodge: *The Development of Darwin's general biological theorizing* (1985/1983), pp. 52-54. See also: E. Mayr: *Darwin, intellectual revolutionary* (1983), p. 37. For Bowler's argumentation ⇨ section above.

⁷¹² Some signs of a cyclical theory could be found already in his *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798), pp. 31 f.

⁷¹³ See: H. Landreth. *History of Economic Theory* (1976), pp. 108-111. D. Winch. *Malthus* (1987), p. 9.

Charles' brother Erasmus seemed to be close to marrying Harriet Martineau, well known for her popularisation of the writings of Malthus.⁷¹⁵ After he came back from his travels Darwin was delighted to join regularly their dinner parties at Erasmus' house, a hive of evolutionary and Malthusian ideas. Here Darwin was imbued with Malthusian ideals of overpopulation, competition and free trade.⁷¹⁶

Adam Smith (1723-90) could be considered as another economic influence on Darwin's thought. With his main work, the *Wealth of Nations* (1776), the Scotsman and professor of Moral Philosophy is regarded as the reputable founding father of Whig economics, which before Darwin's days had already extended the Newtonian paradigm to economics and combined it with radicalised enlightenment individualism. Smith favours capitalist self-interest, competition, and natural consumer preferences as mathematically describable forces leading to optimal prosperity and freedom.

The foundation of *laissez-faire* economics coincides with the general founding of economics as an independent subject, because now philosophy and politics did not have to define the purposes of the economic development beforehand; instead economics was now regarded as a self-sustained machinery, which had to be examined as a separate science. Although the school of Smith and the early economists in his wake is usually called 'political economy', because till then economy was regarded as serving politics, it would be more appropriate if this school would rather be called the first 'non-political' economics.

There are many structural parallels of Darwin's and Smith' approach:

(a) Smith has to be regarded as one of the modern founders of what has here been called the 'principle of entity egoism' on the level of the individual. Economic agents, capitalists, descriptively do act—and in Smith view even should act—out of self-interest. We have already shown that Darwin had also applied the principle of egoism on the level of the individual organism.

(b) Smith favoured capitalist free competition and the notion of unrestrained competition was central to Darwin as well. To Smith any intervention by government is almost certain to be injurious. Still, of course, the competing agents were, to Smith as to other early liberal thinkers, still bound to basic moral rules.

(c) The concept of 'division of labour' was introduced by Smith into economics. Darwin applied this idea to biology, where it was one source for his idea of speciation with of common descent.

(d) The confidence of Smith in the self-interest of egoistic individuals is also at least to some extent present in Darwin's work. To Smith the sole maximisation of one's own interests is not wicked, as Plato had thought, and will not lead to the collapse of society, but the other way round: it will achieve, as if effected by an 'invisible hand', the wealth of *all* members of a nation. This is mirrored by Darwin's

⁷¹⁴ A. Desmond; J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), p. 197.

⁷¹⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 153, 201, 216.

⁷¹⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 216, 218.

belief, largely present in 1859, that most organismic properties are adapted, and that these adaptations, of species and ecosystems, could be full explained by the egoistic striving of single organisms for their *own* survival and reproduction. In a letter to Lyell, who was critical of Darwin's non-progressive mechanism of evolution, Darwin still wrote: "If I have a second edition, I will reiterate 'Natural Selection', and, as a general consequence, Natural Improvement."⁷¹⁷ As he wrote the *Descent of Man*, this belief in only the level of the individual and in the process of natural selection as the sole evolutionary factor had partly crumbled:

"[...] I was not however, able to annul the influence of my former belief, then almost universal, that each species had been purposely created; and this led to my tacit assumption that every detail of structure, excepting rudiments, was of some special, though unrecognised, service. Any one with this assumption in his mind would naturally extend too far the action of natural selection [...]"⁷¹⁸

Besides the structural similarities, the *actual influences* of Smith's optimistic Whig individualism on Darwin is less direct and striking than the influence of Malthus—still it is quite plausible.

Desmond and Moore have argued that the general Darwin-Wedgwood family background was a 'world of wealthy Whiggism'. Not only at liberal Edinburgh, but also later on—despite other influences—Darwin stayed imperturbably a Whig.⁷¹⁹ Cambridge was less a bulwark of 'High Church Thoryism' than Oxford was. Many of Darwin's friends from the (new) scientific establishment, like Babbage, Henslow, Herschel, Lyell, Sedgwick and Whewell, were moderate Whigs. Darwin, on the one hand, had argued with staunch Tories, like FitzRoy, and on the other hand shared his "family's abhorrence of the 'fierce & licentious' radicals".⁷²⁰

Nevertheless, many of Darwin's moderate scientific Whig friends remained critical of his radicalised Malthusian solution of the species problem. They at least partly looked for a more lawful, inherently progressive and finally also more harmonious solution. Darwin's theory pleased only some aspects of the shared Victorian, and especially Whig, "cluster of respectable values: a gospel of work, a trust in self-help, a belief in thrift, and a sense of duty as the foundation of character."⁷²¹ Although individual effort (opposed to biological determination), 'moral reformation' and the concept of a resulting harmony was to them inseparable from improvement, they indeed also shared a belief in liberalisation and individual competition. But like Smith many Victorian religious Whigs still optimistically believed in a final harmony of self-interest and common good. Bowler has speculated that Smith may have played a role to give Darwin's theory the individual spin, which, as he has stressed, is not explicitly present in Malthus' writings on population.⁷²² Darwin in fact read some books of Smith. Furthermore, he stated

⁷¹⁷ Darwin to Lyell, 25th October 1859. In: *The Correspondence of Charles Darwin*, Vol. 7 (1991), p. 358.

⁷¹⁸ Ch. Darwin. *Descent of Man*. Chapter II, p. 92. ☞ also pp. 116 f.

⁷¹⁹ A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), pp. xv, 24, 93, 139.

⁷²⁰ *Ibid*, e.g. pp. 90, 93, 104-105, 120, 139, 199, 212.

⁷²¹ A. Briggs. *Victorian Britain* (1998), section on Victorianism.

⁷²² P. J. Bowler. *Evolution* (1984), p. 162; *Charles Darwin* (1990), p. 84.

that he acquired the concept of division of labour from Henri Milne-Edwards, who in turn acknowledged that he got this idea from Adam Smith.⁷²³

In conclusion, it is plausible to assume that Darwin was also inspired by Smith's hopeful belief, shared by many Whigs, that individual self-interest finally also leads to the achievement of the common good. Despite this, Darwin not only took a strongly individual stance, but, based on it, also for a while retained a strong belief in the progress and adaptation of a species. Nonetheless, Darwin came to undermine this optimistic belief of the mid Victorian Whigs: competition for Darwin does not lead to the well-being of all members of a species, but only to the surviving ones.⁷²⁴ Moreover Darwin played a role in undermining religion, on which much of the optimism of the Victorian ethos was based.

Another often mentioned reason why Darwin was prepared for a mainly Malthusian solution of the species problem was the **social situation in Britain**.⁷²⁵

When Darwin came back from his voyage on H. M. S. Beagle, while he still was wrestling to build a theoretical structure to bring order into the massive amount of data he had accumulated throughout his travels, Britain fell into a deep economic depression.

Moreover, the rapid growth of population in early and middle Victorian period, the time when Darwin formed his theory and published the *Origin*, seemed to be consistent with the Malthusian population doctrine, although the abolishing of the Poor Laws seems not to have had much overall effect on the growth of population. Only in the late Victorian period there was talk not about overpopulation, but about underpopulation as well.⁷²⁶

But also for another reason it could be said that Darwin was returning to a "Malthusian world—Malthus's words had finally been acted on: the old outdoor charity had been scrapped, and the poor made to compete or face the workhouse."⁷²⁷ Malthus had largely god-fathered the Poor Law Amendment Act in 1834, which had ended the relief for all but the most destitute.⁷²⁸ F. Engels wrote that the New Poor Law had been "constructed as far as possible in harmony with the doctrine of Malthus, which is yet more barbarous than that of laissez-faire, because it interferes actively in cases in

⁷²³ D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), p. 82; see also M. Ruse. *Mystery of Mysteries. Is Evolution a Social Construct?* (1999), pp. 241-245.

⁷²⁴ P. J. Bowler. *Evolution* (1984), pp. 94-98, 158. *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), p. 37.

⁷²⁵ E. g. J. Browne states the different influence of colonialism, which I do not follow here. *Biogeography and empire* (1996), p. 305.

⁷²⁶ See: A. Briggs. *Victorian Britain* (1998), section on population.

⁷²⁷ A. Desmond, J. Moore. *Darwin* (1992/1991), p. 196, also p. 154.

⁷²⁸ D. Winch. *Malthus* (1987) pp. 13, 16. — According to W. Peterson, *Malthus* (1979), pp. 114 f, Malthus influence was only an indirect one and Malthus also was critical towards the *New Poor Law*, because it was still working within parishes, although to him the 'whole business of settlements [...] is utterly contradictory to all ideas of freedom.'

which the latter is passive.”⁷²⁹ Between 1837 and 1842 this in combination with the additional crisis led to enormous misery; riots and starvation were common.⁷³⁰

That this social situation prepared Darwin could partly be regarded as the ‘social resonance’ of Malthus’ theory: Malthus ideas on population had affected the Amendment of the Poor Laws, which in turn had the effect that the economic crisis resulted in extreme and widespread pauperism. In this unconstrained capitalism Darwin indeed could have seen Malthusian principles at work and was perhaps prepared by these circumstances to adopt the theory of natural selection from Malthus and even in principle to apply it also to human society. Thus society at the time of this economic crisis and pauperism seemed to confirm Malthus’ principles in regard of humans, although—ironically—one can see these principles at least partly as a cause of the misery and not only the explanation of them:

Today’s demography takes a rather critical stance towards a pure Malthusian approach and is hence closer to the position of Malthus’ opponent Johann Peter Süssmilch (1707-1767): Contrary to the Malthusian principles there actually has been generally more additional production of food than average population growth—even in the case of most developing countries. Moreover, especially in many ‘developed’ countries with a welfare system, like for example, Germany after the Second World War, the poor were treated not treated in a disgraceful way as Malthus demanded; but the population growth has been comparatively small, in Germany for example even negative. Herwig Birg maintains a demographic *theory of transformation* according to which the birth and death rate changes corresponding to the *social transformation of a society*.

The biologist and eminent writer Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker also emphasises the high correlation of poverty and the increase of population. According to him, this makes it evident that an increase in population is strongest where children are needed for individual survival, because there is no pension scheme.

Thus the consequences of Malthusian theory, to make the human struggle for survival more severe, is diametrical from the consequences, which—I think—have to be drawn from these empirically supported concepts: welfare is not necessarily an obstacle to the reduction of growth in populations, indeed it might even be one precondition among others allowing for the reduction of population growth.⁷³¹

Hence, it appears to be correct that Darwin is not only directly intellectually influenced by Malthus’ and Smith’s ideas, but also by the contingent state of the society in his time, which again had been influenced by economic theories. Although it is wrong to neglect the differences between socio-Darwinism and the originally more optimistic view of, for example, Adam Smith, one can see the point which Karl Marx made as early as 1862 in a letter which he wrote to Friedrich Engels:

“It is remarkable how Darwin recognises among beasts and plants his English society, with its division of labour, competition, opening up of new markets, ‘inventions’, and the Malthusian struggle for existence. It is Hobbes’ *bellum omnium contra omnes*”⁷³².

It could be **summarised** that Malthus’ emphasis in his *Principle of Population* on overpopulation, scarcity of resources and the general struggle for existence, and also the Smithian optimistic belief in the fruitfulness of individual competition, had in many ways influenced Darwin’s theory of natural

⁷²⁹ F. Engels. *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844* (1845), quoted in Winch, *Malthus* (1987), p. 71. See generally also: R. L. Meek. *Marx and Engels on Malthus* (1953).

⁷³⁰ It would be interesting to analyse—following a Keynesian viewpoint—whether the abolition of the old poor laws in a cynical way reduced the demand and hence had itself been a factor in triggering the crisis.

⁷³¹ H. Birg. *Der überfüllte Planet. Lebenserwartung, generatives Verhalten und die Dynamik des Weltbevölkerungswachstums* (1993). Studieneinheit 27, pp. 25-37. E. v. Weizsäcker. *Erdpolitik. Ökologische Realpolitik an der Schwelle zum Jahrhundert der Umwelt* (1990), pp. 114-115.

selection. We have worked out the structural similarities between Malthus and Smith, on the one hand, and Darwin on the other. We also traced the ways in which these ‘political’ economists have actually directly influenced Darwin. Additionally it has been shown that they, especially Malthus, also influenced Darwin via ‘social resonance’: Malthus inspired the amendment of the old Poor Laws and this was at least one of the reasons for the deterioration of the situation of the poor in the 1830s, which in turn gave support for Darwin’s belief that the Malthusian principles were actually at work in society.

Darwin transformed these—at least partly more optimistic—theories of the ‘political’ economists into his own different theory of natural selection. This theory then was not only applied to biology, but exported back, via various forms of socio-Darwinism, to politics and economics.

We will show that this ‘cross-fertilisation’ has also gone on in the further development of evolutionary theory. Interaction of theories from different subjects areas is, of course, in principle not negative. However, such an interaction reminds us, like other externalist explanations in history of science, that some aspects of a scientific construction of the world *may be* also due to historically contingent factors. For example, the focus on individuals in Darwin’s Darwinism, has for various internal and external reasons been shifted in the evolutionary synthesis. Of course, what is seen as contingent is a function of our present systematic position. Moreover, there was an interaction of internal and external reasons for Darwin to adopt his theory. Still to find external reasons, which are contingent, might also inspire our systematic discussion. Also the method of ruling out criticism of the basic presumptions in one of these fields by referring to the other field developed in interaction, becomes suspect.

Writing on the external influences on Darwin’s theory, it seems correct to regard his theory not only as a synthesis of romantic and Newtonian ideas, but also one out of Malthusian and Smithian concepts. Besides the also valuable internalist argumentation, we—treating its external history—also have to keep in mind that Darwin in some respects undermined not only romanticism and Newtonism, but also the optimistic and harmonic aspects of Victorian Whiggism. Only in this limited sense, Darwin’s Darwinism could be regarded as a form of Whig biology.

d) *God — a Blind and Brute Creator?*

The atomistic Platonism of the Newtonian search for causal natural explanations and eternal divine laws, at least in its Darwinian synthesis, finally turned against Christianity.

Darwin banned *causa formalis* and *causa finalis* from biology and explained the world in terms of *causa materialis* and *causa efficiens*. The Darwinian paradigm overcame the concept of Platonic, Aristotelian or Kantian forms or ideas. To Darwinians there are no necessary morphological types, no *embranchements* and no regulative idea of wholes which are both their own cause and effect.

⁷³² K. Marx. 18th June, 1862. In: R. L. Meek. *Marx and Engels on Malthus* (1953), p. 173.

Darwinism, in a strict sense and not a Victorian misconception of it, also implies no necessary inner logic, no direction and no purpose of evolution—not even as a mere regulative idea. In the Newtonian system of matter in motion, there were only eternal ‘atoms’ and eternal laws pertaining their movement. But Newton could still think of God, not of an intervening God, but of a God, who governs by harmonious laws, which need neither revision nor supervision. As we have seen, Darwin had similarly adopted a rather deistic stance, before he adopted his theory of natural selection, assuming that God does not actively interact with the world, but acts through secondary causes, Newtonian eternal and universal laws of nature. To assume that God is concerned with the “long succession of vile Molluscous animals”, Darwin thought anyway to be “beneath the dignity of him”⁷³³.

Since Darwin combined the Newtonian concept of eternal laws and matter in motion, in a Malthusian way with the romantic idea of evolution, it inevitably resulted in a catastrophe for religious thought. One of the traditional proofs of God’s existence was the perfection of the world (the fourth proof of Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa Theologiae*, or Paley’s mechanist proof).—How could a merciful, good God use such a cruel, blind and wasteful mechanism to create the world? Paradoxically, Darwin in his search for certain, eternal and ubiquitous “laws of harmony”⁷³⁴ finally adopted the law of natural selection; and by adopting this mono-mechanistic account, harmony metaphysically became based on and explained by struggle. The hopeful Christian credo “As it was in the beginning, it is now, and even shall be: world without end” (*Gloria*)—if in this context applied to man as well—leads to its most cynical or unhappy conclusion: “To prevent the recurrence of misery, is, alas! Beyond the power of man.”⁷³⁵ Wilberforce might indeed have grasped that this is at least an inclination inherent to Darwinism. Nietzsche, for example, whose philosophy is by some regarded as strongly influenced by Darwinism and at the same time a reaction against Darwinism, was forced to believe that “The total nature of the world, is [...] to all eternity chaos”.⁷³⁶ And it was Nietzsche, who at least as a diagnosis for his present age coined the phrase: “God is dead.”⁷³⁷

Darwin himself still held a belief in a creator, and even some years after he adopted his theory of natural selection he still struggled with its implication; possibly for psychosomatic reasons he became ill and finally became an agnostic. In Darwin’s theory the Platonic element of Newtonian thought is reduced to only one universal and eternal mechanism; which is itself not harmonious, but wasteful and cruel. Hence it appears preferable to become an agnostic—to regard Darwin’s mechanism as a

⁷³³ Ch. Darwin. 16th Aug. 1838. *Notebook D* (ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. p. 37.

⁷³⁴ *Ibid*, org. p. 36.

⁷³⁵ Th. R. Malthus. *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798), p. 98 (☞ also footnote 690).

⁷³⁶ F. Nietzsche. *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (1882), p. 109. R. J. Hollingdale. *Nietzsche. The Man and His Philosophy* (1965), pp. 88-90. Nietzsche also retained at least some belief in Lamarckism. Still, paradoxically, his critique of Darwin’s and Spencer’s theory (both more Lamarckian themselves, than almost any of today’s Darwinians) seems to emphasise that Darwin still finally vindicates the values of Victorian England. Spencer, still drawing ‘a line of hope’ of an eventual reconciliation of egoism and altruism, even more clearly was adopting the decadent ‘herd values’, which Nietzsche castigated. See also: L. Caill. *Anti-Darwin, Anti-Spencer: Friedrich Nietzsche’s Critique of Darwin and ‘Darwinism’* (1998).

'secondary cause', put in place by God, as Asa Gray in fact still tried to believe, was finally doomed to failure.

If God had created this mechanism, which leads to a purposeless, unchangeably cruel and wasteful development, lacking any direction, he would not be the benevolent God of Christianity: in this framework God becomes a blind and brute demiurge.

5.2 Evolutionary Synthesis — Thermodynamics and the Philosophical 'Zeitgeist'

The evolutionary synthesis, the *second* Darwinian sub-paradigm we have discussed here (for its internal history \Rightarrow p. 126), was externally influenced (a) in its first phase by models imported from the probability revolution, especially from thermodynamics, and (b)—more speculatively—by the change of the more general philosophical *Zeitgeist*, *episteme*, *nous* or *logos* in the second quarter of the 20th century, corresponding to the changing positivist attitude in philosophy.

a) *The Influence of Thermodynamics*

There is an impressive structural similarity between population genetics of the *first* phase of the evolutionary synthesis and thermodynamics.⁷³⁸

To start with, both approaches explain macroscopic phenomena by the behaviour of large numbers of identical microscopic, unconnected components. Fisher, the arch-proponent of 'bean-bag genetics' during the first phase of the evolutionary synthesis, focused on independent genes in an amorphous, ideal gene-pool, as if they were molecules moving independently in an ideal gas, modelled by thermodynamics. Both currents mainly draw from the theory of probability to explain macroscopic effects. In order to save some aspects of the originally deterministic Newtonian research programme the introduction of probability theory was necessary. This was necessary for pragmatic reasons to manage the complexity of phenomena which had to be explained, but perhaps also for deeper reasons—even today the three body problem has no classical solution.

Thermodynamics describes the macroscopic phenomenon of temperature as the average kinetic energy of the molecules in a gas. Similar, evolutionary change is understood as the average change of gene frequencies. In thermodynamics, energy is transferred between molecules as a result of collisions. By assuming that all combinations of molecular motion are equally likely, it can be concluded that this transfer continues until a statistical uniformity or thermal equilibrium is achieved. This probabilistic tendency, called entropy, is stated in the second law of thermodynamics. Transferred into the language

⁷³⁷ K. Jaspers. *Nietzsche* (1950/1935), p. 247.

⁷³⁸ D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995). (See also e. g. E. A. Lloyd. *The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory* (1993), p. 4.)

of Fisherian population genetics, equilibrium is the state of the best possible adaptation, where no selection pressure is left.⁷³⁹

Fisher's radical adaptationism was discarded in the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis, mainly by Wright, Dobzhansky and Mayr. They, as we have seen, rather focused on interaction effects of gene loci and the structure within populations, which are now regarded to be necessary for speciation and for providing the variance for evolution. Moreover, some macroscopic mechanisms had to be introduced into this framework. This second phase is generally regarded as the final realisation of the evolutionary synthesis and for a good while it gained almost unquestioned dominance in biology. Despite these changes many aspects of the statistical view of thermodynamics were taken on board.⁷⁴⁰

Depew and Weber have shown that Fisher's theory was not only *structurally analogous* to the probabilistic and atomistic spirit of thermodynamics, but that Fisher was *actually influenced* by the probabilistic revolution. Besides being impelled by the eugenics-driven biometrical research programme of Galton; Fisher—under the tutelage of the physicist James Jeans—was also directly imbued with the spirit of Maxwell and Boltzmann. In the 1860s and 1870s they had introduced the probability revolution in their formulation of statistical thermodynamics. It still needed almost a half century till the probability revolution in its mathematical formulation reached biology.

Maxwell and Boltzmann thought that they would extend the Newtonian concept rather than replacing it. They related the phenomenological gas laws concerned with temperature, pressure and volume, to the microscopic probabilistic concept of collisions of molecules. But, by doing this, they also undermined the classical Newtonian deterministic framework and introduced a rather statistical view. By the time of Werner Heisenberg, and Niels Bohr, the interpretation of probability changed from a mere epistemological one, to an ontological one. Although the models of Fisher resembled thermodynamics and not quantum mechanics, Fisher adopted those models with an objective interpretation of probabilities.⁷⁴¹

b) *Impact of the Philosophical 'Zeitgeist' and the Development of Logical Positivism and Logical Atomism?*

The general *Zeitgeist* might also have had an impact on origin and establishment of the evolutionary synthesis.

Such a broad hypothesis is of course highly problematic. The assumption that there was a general *Zeitgeist* tends to neglect the differences of various schools and countries at a certain time. Moreover, the notion of a general intellectual climate is too wide-ranging to be supported here. Any such approach

⁷³⁹ This far going analogy is especially peculiar because entropy generally leads to a decline of order, whereas evolution in this sense leads to an increase of order. (On 'bean-bag genetics', see p. 128.)

⁷⁴⁰ For the differences and similarities of the second phase of the synthesis, see p. 130.

⁷⁴¹ Paragraph: D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), pp. 243-273. (They are partly referring to M. J. S. Hodge. *Biology and Philosophy (including ideology): A Study of Fisher and Wright*. 1992.)

is doomed to be relatively speculative. Still, in my view it would be worth neglecting the possibility of more general and indirect influences only for methodological reasons.

Hence I want to steer a middle course; on the one hand I dare to embark into this speculative discussion, on the other I want to delimit its scope in several ways. In the first place the investigation is limited mainly to philosophy. Other interesting parallels, like that of the development of psychology, can only be mentioned⁷⁴². Focusing on this '*philosophy of biology*' I have had to leave aside whether in this period there had even been a '*politics or economics of biology*': Has there been a direct political motivation for the way the evolutionary synthesis had been shaped? It would be interesting to examine the hypothesis that the proponents of the second step of the synthesis (stressing the relevance of groups) had been motivated by social commitments of whatever ilk. (Haldane, for instance, sometimes took a socialist perspective.) Moreover, I limit my investigation to only Britain and the US, because these countries seem to me to have been the main—although not the sole—birth countries of the evolutionary synthesis. Finally, I only point to what is, in my opinion, an intriguing parallel. I leave open how these sides are causally linked, whether this analogy is due to direct or indirect influences or whether this is due to inherent developments on both sides or to shifts in the external culture or whether they are mere chance coincidences.

Firstly, we will return to the philosophical climate which was rather metaphysical when Darwinism was on its deathbed. Secondly, we are going to discuss the parallel of the atomistic positivism of the first step of the evolutionary synthesis, i. e. Fisherism, on the one hand, and the philosophy of logical atomism, on the other hand. Thirdly, we will outline the parallel development in the second step of the evolutionary synthesis and in analytic philosophy, both advocating a less atomistic and a more contextual approach.

(1.) Philosophy at the Time of the Eclipse of Darwinism

We have already shown that Darwin himself had been influenced by Newtonism and positivism.⁷⁴³ He shared the positivists' belief in the crucial explanatory role of science. Although Darwin came from a Christian background and was guarded (not wanting to be recognised as a radical), he de facto established a materialistic theory of evolution which undermined teleology and formal causation in biology. In the 1870s—the heyday of early Darwinism and pseudo-Darwinism—positivism, materialism and empiricism were not only biologically, but also philosophically most influential. When Darwinism was at the height of its powers, even psychology was directed by the promising prospects of a biological perspective, founded on the theory of evolution⁷⁴⁴. The decay of Christianity, the increasingly indifferent or critical attitude of science towards religion, and, even more pressing, the importance of eugenic ideas,

⁷⁴² See e. g.: L. D. Smith. *Behaviorism and Logical Positivism* (1986).

⁷⁴³ ↻ pp. 168 f. and footnote 621.

⁷⁴⁴ L. S. Hearnshaw. *A Short History of British Psychology 1840-1940* (1964), p. 120.

and the prevalence of a general biologicistic attitude, led to a sharp parallel reaction in philosophy, psychology and biology:

Despite earlier influences of idealism in Britain (☉ pp. 102 f.), objective or absolute idealism became pre-eminent in British philosophy by the mid-1880s, although some late Victorian theorists still continued in a Darwinian and Lamarckian vein to apply concepts of biological evolution (partly even in semi-idealistic way) to society and ethics.⁷⁴⁵ The main proponents of idealism in Britain were T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley at Oxford and J. Ellis McTaggart at Cambridge.⁷⁴⁶ British idealism was to some extent motivated by the search for a religion and an ethics, “which would be less vulnerable to [...] Darwin” and at the same time “nobler [...] than Benthamite utilitarianism”.⁷⁴⁷ Although earlier, in the days of an unchallenged high church, idealism was hailed as a danger for Christian faith, and indeed idealism and not utilitarianism finally broke down the authority of the clerical party even in Oxford, idealism was revitalised as the remaining promising saviour of the spiritual world against mere materialism. In social regards the idealists favoured a more harmonious community in the face of increasing fears about the fragility of the society.⁷⁴⁸

Although philosophers in Germany had already partly abandoned this position, idealism gained influence almost all over the world as, for example, with the work of Josiah Royce in the United States.

Likewise different non-Darwinian persuasions blossomed, such as Bergson’s conception of life and, later, Whitehead’s conception of processes and Husserl’s pure phenomenology. Despite the huge differences between these approaches many of these schools were opposed to reductionism, materialism and naive realism. Moreover, communism, philosophies of life and pragmatism gained influence in this time. The general philosophical situation is, of course, more complex and a differentiated assessment of these schools can not be provided here.

Based on the general speculative and metaphysical attitude just mentioned, Bergson’s concept of Creative Evolution in particular appears not only to have played a pivotal role during the ‘eclipse of Darwinism’, but also in the re-establishment of Darwinism later on. Bergson always stressed the irreducibility of the ‘elan vital’ and—although himself partly influenced by Darwinism—generally aimed at developing “a non-Darwinian evolutionism that made room for religion, albeit not for orthodox Christianity”.⁷⁴⁹ Nevertheless the concept of indeterministic progress, creativity and the openness of evolution, favoured by this non-Darwinian philosopher, in turn also seems to have influenced some proponents of the largely Darwinian evolutionary synthesis.⁷⁵⁰

In biology the pre-eminent anti-atomistic metaphysical tendency in philosophy is mirrored by the eclipse of Darwinism, which started about 1890 and by particular alternative theories such as morphological, orthogenetic and early saltationist approaches. Besides some inherent biological problems within Weismann’s neo-Darwinian perspective, this metaphysical tendency presumably played a role in the moral reaction against this radicalised mono-mechanistic explanation of evolution (☉ p. 124) and in the promotion of different evolutionary factors.

During a similar period psychology too was divided into various groups with different philosophical and methodological commitments: there were *Gestalt* psychologists, structuralists, functionalists, early

⁷⁴⁵ S. M. Den Otter. *British Idealism and Social Explanation* (1996), pp. 1-2, 88-119 (chapter 3).

⁷⁴⁶ The cradle of British Idealism was primarily Oxford. See: *Ibid.*, 36-44.

⁷⁴⁷ T. L. S. Sprigge. *Idealism*, p. 667, in: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998), vol.4, pp. 662-669.

⁷⁴⁸ S. M. Den Otter. *British Idealism and Social Explanation* (1996), pp. 5, 13, 17, 27, 44.

⁷⁴⁹ A. R. Lacey. *Bergson*. In: T. Honderich. *Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (1995), pp. 88-89

behaviourists and various brands of depth psychologists. This turmoil certainly had some bad consequences, but it served the aspiration of preventing the dominance of a simple psychological biologism.⁷⁵¹

In philosophy, biology and psychology, at least some of the schools were united in their opposition; still, all failed to construct a consistent, accepted and lasting synthesis.

(2.) Parallels of Logical Atomism and Logical Positivism to Fisherism?

In the 1920s, after the First World War, logical atomism and logical positivism gained influence. Logical atomism has been developed particularly by Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and—the early—Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Logical positivism has been developed by Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), Otto Neurath (1882-1945), Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-) and Alfred J. Ayer (1910-89). These two approaches differed in some respects but were united in their interest in mathematical or scientific explanations, and their common opposition to the endless controversies of traditional metaphysics.

Although both these related groups of philosophers saw things differently, the rise of logical positivism and logical atomism in *some aspects* paralleled the rise of the evolutionary synthetic theory. These parallels are described best with the programmatic notions *positivism* and *atomism*:

- **Atomism:** Although Fisher also worked with the notion of populations, Fisher's 'bean-bag genetics', as we have seen, is obviously a strongly atomistic theory (☉ pp. 128, 184).

According to the logical atomism of Russell and the early Wittgenstein we describe the world in a language built of propositions. These propositions can be analysed into elementary independent atomic propositions, which are connected to compound complex propositions by logical operators. These atomic propositions are, according to logical atomism, the only *real* entities—besides logic—in the sense that they are, in the empiricist interpretation, the immediate connection to our sense experiences. In the atomistic vision of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* these facts can be combined, for example, in a disjunctive way, but this component is not real on its own, but reducible into its components. "Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely."⁷⁵²

Not all Logical Positivists or members of the Vienna Circle were atomists, on the contrary, they regarded atomism in the sense of a supposed structure of the world as a metaphysical view, hence a view they want to get rid of. Even in Logical Atomism, although claiming ontological relevance, logical atoms of course need not to be chemical atoms. Logical Positivism and Logical Atomism were not two totally separated movements. Wittgenstein although officially no member of the Vienna Circle, at least for a time, was closely associated with that group. Moreover later the Circle engaged

⁷⁵⁰ Personal communication with Prof. Dr. Peter Bowler.

⁷⁵¹ L. S. Hearnshaw. *A Short History of British Psychology 1840-1940* (1964).

in intensive discussions of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Although, for example, Neurath challenged the assumption of Carnap and Schlick that basic propositions must express private experience, as being inconsistent with the required intersubjectivity of science, most Logical Positivists at least epistemologically also wanted to reduce complex propositions to simple ones, to basic protocol sentences.⁷⁵³

However, early evolutionary synthesis and at least logical atomism treat their different basic building blocks as context-independent elements, as atoms, and regard their combinations essentially as unreal.

- **Positivism:** The synthetic theory of evolution is certainly a highly scientific empirical and mathematical theory. Especially in its first phase there was a strong emphasis on mathematical formulations of the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. For both theories atoms are connected in a mathematical way, although the apparatus of course is different—in one case formal logic, in the other probability theory.

Moreover, the modern synthesis resembled models of *physics* (☉ above). This corresponds to the tendency of the Vienna Circle and of Logical Positivists to regard physics as the paradigmatic science. The evolutionary synthesis has also distanced itself from the more metaphysically orientated biology of the period of the 'eclipse' of Darwinism. Similarly, the philosophy of logical positivism was a revolt against the general metaphysical turmoil and the still-influential idealism.⁷⁵⁴ If Fisher in his main writing⁷⁵⁵ does nearly not quote any philosophers, not even the Logical Positivists, this, in my view, does not falsify his assumed positivist background. Logical Positivism, though also being concerned with questions of logical analyticity, to a large extent accepted and even favoured the autonomy of science.

Additionally, biotic and scientific evolution were both understood as two-step processes; the production of new mutations or theories was regarded as if they "just come from the sky", while the methods for testing them, the second step, was regarded to be "highly rigid and predetermined".^{☉1140}

The outlined parallel, of course, has its limits. The biological and philosophical schools are in many respects utterly different, even opposed. Fisher's topics were evolution and survival, Logical Atomism and Logical Positivism were concerned with epistemological problems and the ideal of truth. Additionally, Fisher—although distancing himself from philosophy—was central in founding an ideologically engaged biologicistic research programme, whereas for instance Russell, like Moore, was a

⁷⁵² L. Wittgenstein. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1966/1922/1921), 2.0201.

⁷⁵³ C. f.: M. Friedman. *Logical Positivism*. p. 793. In *Routledge Encyclopedia* (1998), vol. 5, pp. 789-795

⁷⁵⁴ A. J. Ayer. *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* (1992/1982), pp. 19-86. (Although Russell in his early period for example advocated a *platonic* atomism.)

⁷⁵⁵ R. Fisher. *The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection* (1930).

proponent of an ideological disengagement of philosophy, especially a disengagement from a biologicistic research programme⁷⁵⁶.

Despite such differences, both currents in different subject areas represent a positivistic and atomistic approach, and (only) in this respect it may not only be historical contingency that Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (the English translation in 1922) and Fisher's *On dominance ratios* (1922) were both published at a similar time.

Hence, it appears that the growth of Fisherism—despite all differences—was externally made possible not only by the existence of the new models imported from thermodynamics, but by the increasingly positivistic and atomistic conviction of the time, linked in philosophy to logical positivism and logical atomism.

(3.) Contextual Turns in Philosophy and Biology

After the Second World War analytical philosophy underwent a huge change, known as the linguistic turn, expressed in the works of Gilbert Ryle, John L. Austin, J. R. Searle and the later Wittgenstein. This tendency in analytic or now linguistic philosophy criticised the approach built on prepositional atomism and on formal logic. Still, its proponents mostly did not go the whole way back to adopting a traditional metaphysical system. The philosophy which was dominant in the English speaking world from about 1945 to 1960, dismissed its focus on the formal (logical) language and only replaced it by a focus on the ordinary language, where propositions are regarded to be highly context dependent.⁷⁵⁷

These developments are mirrored by aspects of the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis. Despite also shifting the emphasis to more contextuality of genes, the proponents of this phase or wing of the synthesis likewise did not return to an Aristotelian or an idealist philosophy and did not advocate notions like teleology or orthogenesis. Their approach has been closely linked with Darwinian-Mendelian population genetics. They only stressed the contextual dependence—here of genes—and, in this respect also resembling ordinary language philosophy, they put more emphasis on the 'ordinary' observations of naturalists and on the actual situation populations are found in. Although the early proponents of the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis had published their works in the late 1930s till the late 1940s, this way of thinking only gained acceptance, roughly speaking, at the end of the Second World War.⁷⁵⁸

⁷⁵⁶ Moore in his *Principia Ethica* (1994/1903) criticises the naturalistic fallacy, also of H. Spencer's Evolutionism (sections 29-35). After the World War II and "the welter of conflicting fanaticisms", a scientifically truthful approach was seen by Russell as one of the few unifying forces. *History of Western Philosophy* (1991/61/46), p. 789. Despite Moore's early ethical theory and Russell's political engagement, this general attitude of logical positivism also finally led to a neglect of normative discussions. Only recently, analytical philosophy is marked by an increasing interest in questions of morality. J. Nida-Rümelin (ed.). *Philosophie der Gegenwart in Einzeldarstellungen von Adorno bis v. Wright* (1991), pp. XXIII-XXIV.

⁷⁵⁷ E. g.: A. Quinton. *Analytic philosophy* (1995), p. 30.

⁷⁵⁸ According to E. Mayr this view reached general acceptance in about 1947, although there were still few adherents of Fisherism till the 50s. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), pp. 568-569.

Apart from this possible influence of the changing philosophical climate in the English speaking world, obviously also many other external events may have had an impact on the second phase of the synthesis. The ideological disengagement, the acceptance of a moderate dualism and an accepted autonomy of culture presumably played a role in its own right. A fuller treatment would also need to take the developments of sociology, psychology and of society itself into account.

On the whole, there seems to have been a striking parallel development in biology and philosophy even at the time of the evolutionary synthesis, although this theory claimed to be philosophically neutral. During the eclipse of Darwinism, and then during the first and second phase of the evolutionary synthesis there are parallels first to British Idealism, then to logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy. It seems probable that this parallel is not only a mere coincidence, but is presumably due either to similar challenges in the fields or even to a direct interaction of these approaches.

5.3 Gene-Darwinism—Reductionism Generalised

A radical “gene’s-eye view of Darwinism” became explicit—after the earlier partly similar Fisherism—in the 1960s⁷⁵⁹ and gained influence from the 70s till today.

The main biological claims of sociobiology have already been worked out (☺ pp. 6 ff.). In the chapter on the internal biological history we tried to gain a deeper understanding of what I called gene-Darwinism and which I regard to be at the very heart of many approaches in sociobiology. In that chapter we also compared gene-Darwinism within biology to other Darwinian sub-paradigms (☺ pp. 140 ff.). Now the intellectual influences on gene-Darwinism external to biology will be discussed.

The creative, rebellious spirit of the 1960s and 70s made it generally possible to break with traditions. In these years one not only sought for new ways to live, but also for new ways in which to interpret life scientifically. E. O. Wilson’s war-cry to biologise culture, Dawkins’ radicalisation of the gene’s viewpoint of evolution, but also the somewhat antagonistic claims (☺ pp. 145 f.) of, for example, R. C. Lewontin would not have been possible in the conservative 1950s. Because of these extremely different tendencies, it is especially difficult to speak in this time of a predominant paradigm in the sense of a uniform *Zeitgeist* or an approach dominating biology as a whole.⁷⁶⁰

Soon even some biologists levelled the charge against gene-Darwinism that it is not only warranted by inner-biological support, but that it is also based on external hidden ideological or metaphysical commitments. For example Lewontin and Levins, former colleagues of Wilson at the University of Chicago,—who are also themselves not free of commitments external to biology⁷⁶¹—loudly opposed gene-Darwinism and its application to man. Instead of a synthesis of sociobiology with sociology, they favoured the synthesis of population genetics with ecology. Against “the agitated background of the

⁷⁵⁹ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1989 ed.), p. ix.

⁷⁶⁰ Hence I have to stress once more that I use the term sub-paradigm rather with the meaning of school and only want to emphasise its abstract character, its incommensurability and its inner coherence.

⁷⁶¹ I do not want to deny that the criticism of Darwinism and gene-Darwinism has inevitably some cultural or ideological aspects. See e. g. M. Ruse. *Mystery of Mysteries* (1999), pp. 162-167, 142-146. However, here I focus on the external history of gene-Darwinism.

Vietnam War, in protest against which Lewontin resigned from the National Academy of Science, Levins and Lewontin formed the Science for the People, and later the Dialectics of Biology Group, to oppose genetic reductionism (= mechanism), atomism (= individualism), and determinism (= social and political passivity)⁷⁶².

It is difficult to assess historically how far metaphysical or ideological reasons, external to biology, were actually central in formulating the gene-Darwinian sub-paradigm in question, because this area of the history of science is still comparatively young. I agree with Ruse that it would be too easy to argue directly, that, for example, when the white southerner Wilson talks of 'slave species' of ants he is thereby showing solidarity with the antebellum South (cf. also Darwin's *Origin*). Nevertheless—and this has also been conceded by Ruse—it has also some plausibility that despite a biological basis for such ways of speaking, describing ants as 'invaders' and 'colonisers' with 'caste systems' seems to be not completely value free. Ruse in regard of Dawkins points out that a repugnance towards religion—in this respect Dawkins differs from Wilson—from the outset may have played a role in formulating his position.⁷⁶³ But even in this case it seems to me that a closer treatment would be needed to decide whether the detectable repugnance is a cause or a symptom of Dawkins' gene-Darwinism.

Still being in the wood, one cannot see it for the trees. Generally the historiography of gene-Darwinism is still too young and compared with Darwin's Darwinism there is not yet an as accepted canon of literature concerning its intellectual and social history.

Despite such historiographic problems I will at least present some hypotheses of mine as to what the four main external theoretical influences on gene-Darwinism and its universal application within sociobiology may have been: firstly,—and completely uncontroversially—a direct legacy from Fisherism; secondly, a neo-romantic urge of the 1960s and 70s for interdisciplinarity; thirdly, a tide of reductionism and materialism in Anglo-American philosophy; and fourthly, further conceptual 'imports' from economics.

a) *The Different Biological Legacies of the Schools of Evolutionary Biology*

A continuation of existing traditions certainly played an important role for all of the currently opposed theories. Gene-Darwinism continues and radicalises Fisherism, which had been dismissed by the proponents of the second phase of the synthesis.

Contrariwise especially Gould and Lewontin, are in some respects continuing and radicalising the approach of Dobzhansky, Mayr and Wright, in their emphasis on macroevolutionary autonomy (genetic drift, founder effect) variability and heterozygote superiority. They even partly advocate concepts, linked to the notion of structural constraints, which were central to romantic biology.

⁷⁶² D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), p. 375.

⁷⁶³ M. Ruse. *Mystery of Mysteries* (1999), pp. 187-191, 239; pp. 131-134.

Today's situation is even more heterogeneous and the proponents, for example, of orthogenesis, systems theory or modified neo-Lamarckism again have their own precursors (☉ pp. 145 f.).

Here the Fisherian tradition, from which gene-Darwinism draws, is at least mentioned, because it is external to gene-Darwinism; all the same it is internal in respect to the history of biology as a whole. Thus these influences are discussed more extensively in the chapter on internal history of biology (☉ pp. 140 f.).

b) A Mised Neo-Romantic Aspiration for Unification and Interdisciplinarity

A force which might have influenced sociobiology, gene-Darwinism and their wide application was a (possibly misled) let us say 'romantic' aspiration for unification and interdisciplinarity, present in the new *Zeitgeist* of the 1960s and 70s.

There are of course many different ways as to how one may describe the spirit of the rebellious youth of 1960s and 70s. For example, one may argue that at this time a materialist revolt of the body and sexuality against culture took place; or, the other way round, that it was a revolt of an authentic spirituality against the materialism 'after the gold rush' of the 1950s.

Even if we would assume that the student movement has been incarnated in the critical theory of H. Marcuse, M. Horkheimer and Th. Adorno—a blend out of Hegelian, Marxist and Freudian thoughts—things do not get much easier.

This general ambivalence appears to be mirrored by the flourishing of a wide range of directions in biology. The easiest plausible way to link these two sides, would be simply to link on the one hand gene-Darwinism, as the reductionist core of present sociobiology, to the materialistic aspect; and on the other hand the new introduction of some tenets of romantic biology to the generally rather non-materialistic aspects of that time. Such a description may be valid as a rule of thumb, but I think the mapping of these approaches could not be done as simply as this.

Here we are concerned with the external background especially of gene-Darwinism. Gene-Darwinism as we have shown is clearly a quite reductionist and materialist position,⁷⁶⁴ but I am going to argue in the present section, that in certain ways it has also been influenced by what we may call the romantic aspects of the 1960s and 70s.

The much more obvious thesis, that gene-Darwinism is linked to reductionism and materialism, is discussed in the next section. Actually we will not discuss this tendency as an aspect of the *Zeitgeist*, because it is easier to pinpoint a parallel to the development of the academic Anglo-American mainstream philosophy of that time (☉ pp. 196).

But before, my less intuitive hypothesis will be developed that the romantic aspects of the movement of the 1960s and 70s paradoxically influenced gene-Darwinism and not only its quite diverse biological antitheses (from a strictly romantic morphological approach, to something like Lewontin's materialist approach of dialectical biology). It will become clear that the current opposition of these two directions does not need to imply a complete historical isolation of each of them. If such a view on this matter

would be supported by further evidence, this would parallel the recent acknowledgement that the non-romantic mechanistic account of Darwin owed something to romantic biology (☞ pp. 163).

I will now outline how three attitudes of the movement of the 1960s and 70s resembled the metaphysical commitments we have found central for the original romantic science (☞ pp. 89 f.): i. e. an organic and not mechanistic approach, a dynamic rather than static approach to society and science, and—here of most importance—an aspiration of unification and interdisciplinarity.

Firstly, the movement of the 1960s and 70s, like romanticism at the turn of the 19th century, could be regarded as a revolt of feeling and freedom against the sole predominance of a mechanistic rationality. This movement was at least ambivalent towards the enlightenment, which in its positivist disenchanted form, tends to undermine its own originally liberating aspects, neglecting ethical concerns and being dominated by a cold exploitive manipulative ‘instrumental rationality’ (*Zweckrationalität*), which rigidly serves only self-preservation as the remaining absolute overriding goal.⁷⁶⁵

The 1960s and 70s aspired a more holistic or organic understanding of the world—often also inspired by East Asian religions, like Buddhism—and contrasted its own intellectual desires to the alienating, individualist and capitalist ‘Western rationality’.

This aspect of the 1960s/70s rather seems to be at odds with gene-Darwinism, which even tries to treat moral behaviour in terms of mathematical formulas and which compared to an economic school would resemble a totally unrestrained version of neo-classic economics⁷⁶⁶. As far as there was a holistic non-individualistic attitude in the 60s and 70s, this attitude will instead have inspired the flourishing of alternative biological movements, for example, as concerned with ecological questions (☞ pp. 145 f.).

Nevertheless, youthful opposition towards the technical sterility of the 1950s may have contributed to the setting of the sociobiological agenda. As subconscious mind or universal love were discussed in public, the darker and brighter sides of the human nature were also discussed under the new heading of ‘sociobiology’, which from its very start was concerned with questions of aggression, sexuality and morality. As we have seen before, neither sexual behaviour nor sexual selection was a main topic under the sober regime of the evolutionary synthesis.

Secondly, the political and social movement and the student rebellion optimistically hoped that everything was changing, or was at least changeable. Processions of demonstrators hoped that the relations between the sexes, between nations and between economic agents could be newly invented. The 1970s—despite a critical attitude towards mere technical progress—shared with romanticism a belief in dynamics and in social progress.

⁷⁶⁴ ☞ pp. 140 f., but see also pp. 250 f..

⁷⁶⁵ M. Horkheimer, Th. W. Adorno. *Dialektik der Aufklärung*. 1988 (1947). This book is not an rejection of enlightenment, but it is argued that enlightenment needs to be protected and enlightened about its own inherent barbarian tendencies.

⁷⁶⁶ ☞ pp. 197, 232.

This belief was presumably one of the reasons why the biological evolutionary discourse (in all its different deviations from the orthodox), as the prototypic discourse of change, became publicly important and was extended to the social sphere. In this sense also the romantic aspirations may have set the agenda for sociobiology. Despite this, the way sociobiology and especially gene-Darwinism worked on the topics of this agenda were in contrast to the original aspirations. Sociobiology and gene-Darwinism had the very reactionary aspect of *denying* changeability and emphasising a given human nature. Moreover the evolutionary mechanism were still largely regarded as something external and eternally given. Gene-Darwinism has continued not a romantic, but mainly a mechanistic approach, which, in a lingering echo of deism and a materialistically transformed Platonism, still bases its argumentation on almost eternal material and on an eternal and external—almost God-given—force, that is selection.⁷⁶⁷

Thirdly,—and for our concerns of most importance— the spirit of the 1960s and 70s was driven by a romantic urge to unify the separate. Generally old boundaries and borders, in politics, human relationships as well as in science, were criticised. The border of the private and the public sphere was threatened. (The private is political!) In some respects the spirit of unification went even further than during Romanticism, when it only had led to the unification of national states (☹ p. 91). The protest movement of the sixties and seventies was explicitly anti-nationalistic and was committed to the idea of international companionship and universal peace. Especially during the Vietnam war, it became a movement for universal peace against national imperialism and egoistic capitalism.

Within science, this urge for unification, the aspiration to join the separate, had the consequence that more emphasis was put on interdisciplinarity. Correspondingly the strict border between cultural and natural sciences was challenged—and biology was close to this border. This border could be seen as a result of the Cartesian division of the world in *res extensa* and *res cogitans* (☹ pp. 86 f.), which then had been challenged by the romantics (☹ pp. 89 f., 102 f.). Of course also materialist and positivist approaches have, now in a clearly bottom up way, continued the programme of disciplinary unification,⁷⁶⁸ but this quite radical, finally physicalist, programme was often carried out in a simplified way (and left no room for values etc.). Hence it has either naturally provoked criticism or problematic historical consequences.

After the Second World War a cultural compromise in the demarcation of these two realms again had become nearly universally accepted. Biology worked in a Darwinian framework, but was marked by a comparatively ideological disengagement in regard of cultural questions (☹ pp. 136 f.). Psychology and sociology regarded learning as a mechanism in its own right and human culture as a distinct strata. '*Omnis cultura ex cultura*'—whether one was a follower of a mechanistic or a holistic approach,

⁷⁶⁷ As argued elsewhere in this work, gene-Darwinism also bears the seeds of transcending a purely externalist view of Darwinism.

⁷⁶⁸ Hence scientific unification in this sense became a central objective of modern science. In physics, for example, one aims at a so-called 'general unified theory' (GUT) or a 'theory of everything' (TOE).

culture was again largely regarded as a thing *sui generis*.⁷⁶⁹ C. P. Snow (1959) referred to this—I think basically Cartesian—split of intellectual life into two polar groups, with literary intellectuals at one pole and scientists at the other as “the two cultures”, with biology now on the side of the sciences. This gap between the two cultures was increasingly felt to be a “gulf of mutual incomprehension” and a cause of mutual paralysis.⁷⁷⁰

In the 1960s and 70s it once more became possible, probably also due to the generally romantic unifying aspirations of this time, to question this division. But in different intellectual milieus, this interdisciplinary approach led to different results. On the side of the arts the sciences have been made an object of the flourishing disciplines of cultural and intellectual history. On the side of biology interdisciplinarity led not only to a possible increase in the use of metaphors⁷⁷¹, but to an universalisation of biological evolutionary accounts⁷⁷² and hence—opposed to the approach of the arts—to a stronger acknowledgement of the biotic aspects of the human nature. Thus the romantic aspiration of the 1960s and 70s to join the separate may have also catalysed the new, finally non-romantic, rather mechanistic sociobiologist synthesis of the biotic and the cultural world.

In conclusion, the agenda of sociobiology to give an evolutionary explanation to the social (especially sexual and moral) behaviour even of humans, has plausibly been influenced by the neo-romantic aspirations of the 1960s and 70s: firstly by an interest in shedding light on the darker and brighter aspects of human life, secondly, by the goal of giving an evolutionary account of these matters and thirdly, by the aspiration to give an interdisciplinary account.

The transformation of Darwinism to gene-Darwinism, which in an atomistic way worked out (and altered) the neo-romantic agenda of a unified evolutionary explanation of the biotic and cultural world, could in my opinion only be understood, if we additionally take materialism and reductionism into account, partly present in the general spirit of the time and which clearly became dominant in philosophy.

c) ‘Naturalistic Turn’ — Reductionism and Materialism in Philosophy

In the 1960s and 70s analytical philosophy, especially influential in the English speaking world,⁷⁷³ turned away from the semantic approach mentioned before (☉ pp. 185 f.).⁷⁷⁴ Instead a materialist, naturalist view started to hold centre-stage.⁷⁷⁵

⁷⁶⁹ J. Tooby, L. Cosmides, proponents of evolutionary psychology, describe this view as the ‘Standard Social Science Model’. *The Psychological Foundations of Culture* (1992), pp. 24–49.

⁷⁷⁰ C. P. Snow. *The Two Cultures and A Second Look* (1959/1963), e. g. pp. 3, 4, 9, 50.

⁷⁷¹ Metaphorical language is normally regarded as a hallmark of romanticism. E. Richards. *The Romantic gestation of nature*. 1990, p. 131. Although metaphors are actually generally used in science (‘spin’ or ‘flavour’ in physics or ‘natural selection’ in biology) for example Dawkins had the special will and gift to use metaphors (‘selfish gene’, ‘puppet’, ‘vehicles’, ‘blind watchmaker’ etc.).

⁷⁷² E. g. H. Krings, a German philosopher, mentioned the *neo-Romantic* character of a universal evolutionism which became increasingly influential during that time. *Evolution und Freiheit* (1984), p. 168.

⁷⁷³ In Germany, for example, analytical philosophy, although of increasing influence, was still far from being dominant even in the 1990s. This becomes clear in a guide which the author has co-published with the contributions of 200 German philosophy professors: M. v. Sydow, St. Rabanus, P. Steinfeld. *Studienführer Philosophie* (1996).

This development is especially striking for the philosophy of mind: Quine proposed a more naturalistic approach to epistemology.⁷⁷⁶ D. M. Armstrong's *A Materialist Theory of Mind* (1968) or D. Davidson's *Mental events* (1970) influentially developed a physicalist and reductionist perspective. One might say that the eliminative materialism of the Churchlands is a recent radicalisation of the materialist approaches of that time. However, such attitudes—perhaps not always voluntarily—paved the way for a far reaching denial of inherent properties and purposes of culture also influential in sociobiology.

Within psychology as well the minimalist movement—despite a growth of alternative approaches—reached its peak in the years when gene-Darwinism started to come into full bloom. Complex intentional activities were analysed as chained sequences of atomic bits of behaviour.⁷⁷⁷

Reductionism, especially in philosophy and philosophy of science, presumably will not only have paralleled the reductionism in gene-atomistic Darwinism, but also may have influenced it. Gene-atomism is—according to Mayr's terminology⁷⁷⁸—a 'proximate' reductionism. Another even more important form of reductionism is an 'ultimate', here functional one, claiming that there is only one relevant existing mechanism, i. e. selection. Some present philosophers like D. C. Dennett, himself coming from philosophy of mind, take the latter view.⁷⁷⁹

As the reductionism of gene-Darwinism in its sociobiological application definitely had a repercussion on philosophy, sociology and ethics (☉ pp. 48 f., 205 f.), it also seems plausible that the reductionist attitude dominant in philosophy may likewise have influenced the reductionism of gene-Darwinism.

d) 'Import' of Economical Concepts — Gene Capitalism?

Milton Friedman was awarded the Nobel price for economics in 1976, the same year Dawkins published his seminal book *The Selfish Gene*.

It is doubtful that Friedman, as ardent supporter of pure capitalism, had been directly influenced by what we have called gene-Darwinism, i. e. a gene-atomistic and germ-line-reductionist Panglossism⁷⁸⁰, but it is striking that both of these approaches became popular at about the same time. Leaving aside the question whether Friedman was influenced by *this* school of Darwinism especially, he was

⁷⁷⁴ Also e. g.: A. Quinton. *Analytic philosophy* (1995), p. 30.

⁷⁷⁵ D. Cooper. *World Philosophies* (1996), pp. 459 f.

⁷⁷⁶ W. v. Quine. *Epistemology Naturalised* (1968/1969), esp. p. 90.

⁷⁷⁷ R. J. Richards. *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior* (1987), p. 539.

⁷⁷⁸ E. Mayr uses the terms 'proximate questions', which asks for a physiological explanation of a trait, and 'ultimate question' which asks for an evolutionary explanation.

⁷⁷⁹ D. C. Dennett. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995). But functionalist views, as in the case of H. Putnam, need not necessarily result in materialism. For example, a mental state of pain can be realised on different physiological grounds. This seems to be valid even within the machine metaphor: Computer programs can (sometimes) run on different operating systems and different hardware.

⁷⁸⁰ The notion Panglossism indicates a radical adaptationist view, either in a religious, teleological or secularised form, for example in Darwin's *Origin*. In Voltaire's *Candide* (1759) Dr. Pangloss states total adaptationism for teleological reasons (☉ footnote 783).

unquestionably influenced by Darwinism in general.⁷⁸¹ Moreover, this approach was equally combined with a very reductionist individualistic approach.

This should not indicate that Friedman himself adopted a biologicistic stance: His approach did not focus on the reduction of economy to neurology, but he adopted the Darwinian *mechanism* and applied it as the natural order of economy. In this sense he could be seen as what I am going to call a ‘process reductionist’, advocating ‘process-Darwinism’, rather than as a ‘substance reductionist’ (☉ pp. 237 f.).

Friedman indeed adopted the notions of natural selection, competition and survival of the fittest from evolutionary biology. He believed that increased competition automatically leads to adaptation. The general belief in an overall positive result of the individual’s pursuit of selfish interests, although purged of all religious and moral overtones, goes back to Adam Smith’s belief in the *invisible hand* and his optimistic foundation of *laissez faire* capitalism (☉ p. 178). Friedman defended the claim of rational maximisation of profit based on the concept of natural selection. But the Panglossian belief that natural selection and competition necessarily leads to adaptation—also held by Darwin in his middle period⁷⁸²—has become criticised within both biology⁷⁸³ and economics^{784 785}.

Like Malthus, who had strongly influenced the reduction of the Poor Laws (☉ p. 180), Friedman had a strong impact on politics. As the leading protagonist of the politics of a highly competitive unrestrained market economy and the abolition of almost all government intervention, he became the counter-player to Keynesianism. In the 1980s he god-fathered the economic politics of R. Reagan in the United States, M. Thatcher in Britain and A. Pinochet in Chile.

This Friedmanian politics led in these countries to a decrease of the inflation rate, but also to an extraordinary rise in the unemployment rate and to a decline in production.⁷⁸⁶

Similar to Friedman’s plan of the abolition of almost any state intervention, gene-Darwinians theoretically abandoned (or at least neglected) all macroevolutionary mechanisms, which had before been emphasised by the largely Darwinian evolutionary synthesis. M. Ridley, a writer in the field of sociobiology, shows how interwoven biological and economical thoughts are: “Society is composed of competing individuals as surely as markets are composed of competing merchants; the focus of economics and social theory is, and must be, the individual. Just as genes are the only things that replicate, so individuals, not societies, are the vehicles for genes.”⁷⁸⁷ If we also allow ourselves such simplifying associations between approaches in biology and economics, the evolutionary synthesis

⁷⁸¹ G. M. Hodgson. *Economics and Evolution* (1993), pp. 199, 201, 208 (on Friedman and Darwinism).

⁷⁸² Darwin had left this tenet behind by the time he published the *Descent of Man* (☉ footnote 718).

⁷⁸³ A canonical paper on this topic is: S. J. Gould, R. C. Lewontin. *The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme* (1979).

⁷⁸⁴ See e. g.: G. M. Hodgson. *Economics and Evolution* (1993).

⁷⁸⁵ For the differences of this biological and the original economical approaches ☉ p. 175. For a general overview of different critiques of Panglossism ☉ pp. 197-213 (☉ also footnote 781).

⁷⁸⁶ P.-H. Koesters. *Ökonomen verändern die Welt. Wirtschaftstheorien die unser Leben bestimmen* (1982), Hamburg: Gruner & Jahr, pp. 283-300.

⁷⁸⁷ M. Ridley. *The Red Queen* (1995/1993), p. 11.

appears to be linked with a social market economy, whereas gene-Darwinism would be associated with unrestrained neo-liberal economics. Herewith I do not want to deny inner-biological necessities, but I agree with Midgley, that gene-Darwinism as an economic metaphor is “biological Thatcherism [...] celebrating evolution as a ceaseless crescendo of competition between essentially ‘selfish’ individual organisms”⁷⁸⁸.

It has to be conceded that Dawkins’ gene-Darwinism, unlike Darwin’s individual Darwinism, argues even sub-individually. In this regard it is even more reductionistic than Darwin’s Darwinism, but—although likewise arguing against any true within-group-altruism—gene-Darwinism at least in a limited phenotypic sense allows in principle the existence of unselfish behaviour. Still, it seems to me, that gene-Darwinism could metaphorically be linked to the Chicago School of Economics, because the proponents of explicit or implicit gene-Darwinism have always emphasised the contrast to the ‘benevolent’ synthesis and they regarded the assumption of an unrestrained selfishness of organisms as a good approximation to the truth.⁷⁸⁹

It appears to me that gene-Darwinism in the early 1990s gained even more influence (despite the discussed parallel growth of subversive approaches), as after the end of the Cold War also the temper of the age in the West and East for a while became emphatically individualistic, egoistic and competitive.

In conclusion, Darwinism in general has not only influenced Friedman, but combined with Friedman’s especially reductionist anti-interventionist approach, it indeed resembles the denial of group altruism also present in gene-Darwinism.

Besides the general parallel of Friedmanian economics and gene-Darwinism, also **specific biological ‘imports’ of economic language or models** could be detected.

The language of sociobiology is interspersed with economical analogies. The originally economic concept of the division of labour has already long been imported from biology and has continuously been used in the whole tradition reaching from Darwin to also Wilson and Dawkins.⁷⁹⁰

Sociobiology adopts the metaphors around the notion of ‘investment’, which is generally used in its explanations of apparent ‘altruism’, i. e. kin selection and reciprocal altruism. Here the language of costs and returns is prevailing. Any parental behaviour is now called investment “which increases the probability the offspring’s chance of surviving [...] at the cost of the parent’s ability to invest in other offspring”.⁷⁹¹

⁷⁸⁸ M. Midgley. *Beast and Man* (1995/1978), p. xvi.

⁷⁸⁹ R. Dawkins, ☉ footnote 64; G. C. Williams, ☉ footnote 53.

⁷⁹⁰ M. Ruse. *The Mysteries of Mysteries*. 1999, pp. 241-245, 180.

⁷⁹¹ This has been the case at least since R. Trivers article *Parental investment and sexual selection* (1972), where he generalised the notion of investment as it has been used before. See e. g. K. Grammer. *Signale der Liebe* (1998/95), pp. 45 f.

Even more arresting is Dawkins' way of speaking, for example, of the 'casino' or 'stock market' of evolution.⁷⁹² Dawkins in *The Selfish Gene* takes an outspoken view of unrestrained gene capitalism in which the atomistic, egoistic genes are the only agents.

However, in later publications, Dawkins also speaks of maximising DNA as the true Darwinian "utility function", which lends itself to an economic treatment and in its result is very different from "maximizing the economic welfare of the species or population".⁷⁹³ But "God's Utility function, as derived from a contemplation of the nuts and bolts of natural selection, turns out to be sadly at odds with such utopian visions" and is necessarily based on an "uncoordinated scramble for selfish gains".⁷⁹⁴

Moreover a further explicit adoption of specific economical theories took place. J. Maynard Smith embraced the mathematics of the *Theory of Games*.⁷⁹⁵ This theory had been developed by J. v. Neumann and O. Morgenstern (1944) and as a mere mathematical theory indeed appears to be neutral. Nevertheless, its application presupposes certain metaphysical commitments: especially the validity of the axiom of entity egoism has to be assumed on a certain basic level of explanation.⁷⁹⁶

Maynard Smith himself has cautiously speculated about connections between his increasingly reductionist theoretical approach and his political increasingly critical attitude towards Marxism.⁷⁹⁷

Generally game theory is at least in its simple applications concerned with basically competitive 'games', or more generally, with conflicts.⁷⁹⁸ A mathematical theory only can be applied if its axioms are applicable. The axiom of entity egoism, here the egoistic goal to win a game, is no doubt usually valid in cases like roulette or checkers (where the rules of the game normally make players fulfil these axioms). For gene-Darwinism, where the principle of entity egoism is assumed to work on the level of single genes, it of course appears consistent to introduce this principle on the gene-level. But this is not self evident and needs a theoretical and empirical discussion. A cautious application of game theory may indeed shed light even on the evolution of morals,⁷⁹⁹ but it should be realised that supporters of the evolutionary synthesis, like E. Mayr, would, for example, not have taken the axiom of gene egoism as a default explanation. In their view the burden of proof in the unit of selection debate would rest rather on the selfish gene approach than on the population approach (☹ pp. 130 f.).

Although the incorporation of economical models has no doubt enhanced the complexity of sociobiology, still the basic question which the philosopher in particular has to pose, is whether the

⁷⁹² R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89). pp. 55-56.

⁷⁹³ *Idem.*; *River out of Eden* (1995), pp. 106-107, 118.

⁷⁹⁴ *Ibid.*; pp. 121-122.

⁷⁹⁵ See especially: J. Maynard Smith. *Evolution and the Theory of Games*. 1982.

⁷⁹⁶ However, without having worked on Maynard Smith's account in detail, I think that his concept of evolutionarily stable strategies may well be interpreted to transcend gene-atomism in its most austere sense; ☹ p. 46.

⁷⁹⁷ J. Maynard Smith. *Shaping Life* (1998), p. 43, also p. 45.

⁷⁹⁸ A. J. Jones. *Game Theory: Mathematical Modes of Conflict* (1980). (Actually Neumann and Morgenstern also treated co-operative games, but they are more complicated and are less often found in the evolutionary literature.)

⁷⁹⁹ E. g.: M. Schefczyk. *Die Evolution der Kooperation. Perspektiven und Grenzen spieltheoretischer Modelle* (1996).

principles on which this edifice is build are always applicable—this means whether they are true, useful and ethical (☉ pp. 237 f.).

Sociobiology, in its radical version, claims that models of game theory can also explain *human moral* behaviour. But it is highly problematic, whether the axiom of total entity egoism—either on the level of the gene or on the level of the individual—is in particular always applicable to human *moral* behaviour. It totally neglects the fact that humans appear to be able to act morally, not only because it is from time to time also profitable, but because it is good. Game theorists may translate this into their language. ‘Entity egoism’ does not always have to be a valid axiom. The pay-off for humans can sometimes lie not in the maximisation of their own profit, but in being intrinsically moral, that is in following an external end in itself. Expressed in different words closer to traditional philosophy we may say, that the essence of being human—which is indeed not always realised—is to live not only to survive, but to live to be good (☉ pp. 406 f.).

Whether such an critique is theoretically possible will be discussed at length in the last part IV.

Summary: Biology as ‘Geisteswissenschaft’?

In the current chapter 5 of part II on the external history of Darwinism, it became clear that all Darwinian sub-paradigms, we had distinguished in biological respects in chapter 4, have also been externally influenced by the intellectual developments of their time. These influences reach from the application of theoretical tools of other disciplines, over a striking parallel to the mainstream development in philosophy, to an interaction for example with economic theories and commitments.

Firstly, theoretical or mathematical tools had been adopted from other disciplines. For example, concepts of the ‘probability revolution’, partly developed in thermodynamics, with some relay had been applied to what I have called the first step and also the second step of the evolutionary synthesis. Another example would be the mathematical theory of games applied in present sociobiology.

Secondly, we have worked out that the rise and fall of the discussed Darwinian sub-paradigms has in some central respects been paralleled by the development mainstream philosophy at least in the English speaking world: Darwin’s Darwinism—compared with earlier romantic or essentialist biologist—already mirrors the increasingly secularised theism of universal laws of nature dominating his time more and more and the rise of positivism, materialism and mechanicism. Moreover, his individualism could also be found in utilitarian approaches at about that time. Correspondingly the decline of Darwinism at the turn of the century is paralleled by a bloom of idealist philosophy. Another tide of a much more technical Darwinism corresponds also another tide of positivism in philosophy, now logical positivism. But above these bold parallels in the climate of philosophy and biology there are also further more detailed parallels. We have worked out that strict logical atomism in philosophy has been paralleled by Fisherism in biology. Fisherism, the first step of the evolutionary synthesis, also treated genes in a gene-

pool in an very atomistic way. Because of this Mayr dubbed this school 'bean bag genetics'. As the second, final phase of the evolutionary synthesis differs from the first one mainly in its acknowledgement of genetic context and of the evolutionary importance of naturally observable groups, we analogously find the 'linguistic turn' away from propositional atomism towards ordinary contextual language in the mainstream of analytical philosophy. Gene-Darwinism in its radicalised revival of Fisherian genetic atomism is then paralleled by the increasing influence of materialism and reductionism in the philosophy of that time. Matters are not quite as simple as described here—for example, it might paradoxically be the rather romantic aspect of the 1960s and 70s which was interested in interdisciplinarity and which finally has contributed to the generalisation of the atomistic approach of Gene-Darwinism. Moreover, I only have shown general parallels of the biological or philosophical climate, without elaborating how these parallel developments actually have influenced each other.

Thirdly, we have found interactions of biological thought, in particular with economics. Darwin was influenced by Malthus and in turn has influenced economical thought. Further I think we have shown that gene-Darwinism, not only imports economic ideas and often uses economic language, but, at least as a metaphor, depicts the world in Friedmanian terms of unrestrained neo-'liberalism'.

It is difficult for a historian of science—and especially if he originally is a philosopher—to simplify these much more complex interactions in an adequate way. Although this is not the only concern of this work, I hope to have taken enough care in this chapter to substantiate the claim that in any discussion of the biological paradigms, more may be a topic of discussion than isolated biological questions.

I am the last one who would want to deny that there are inner-biological necessities and inner-biological evidence. Moreover I am fully in awe of and respect of the scientific enterprise of creating objective and culturally neutral knowledge!

But in fundamental disputes of biology and other sciences, it is not only ethical implications which have to be considered. Even in regard of the very premises of the theory in question, much more may be at stake than mere inner-biological or inner-scientific assumptions. I think we should not simply claim that all science is ideology—in its worst or best sense. In some aspects it is ideology, in others it is not. But anyone who wants to claim that a specific theory is to a certain extent based on ideological commitments firstly has to take on the painstaking work of disentangling its internal and external history, secondly has to show alternative theoretical options and thirdly has to argue why these scientific theories and their corresponding background ideologies have to be preferred.

Nevertheless, particularly in basic controversies or in phases of a scientific revolution, even science is and has to be also partly a *Geisteswissenschaft*, a cultural science, an art. With such an intention the label 'sociobiology' would indeed get a new meaning.

Based on the shown interactions with other subject areas it became apparent, that non-biological disciplines also employ Darwinian processes as theoretical core. We will in the following part embark into the search for a metaphysics of process-Darwinism build out of theories found in different subject areas.

Part III: Universal Darwinism

“Some indeed attribute our Heaven and all the worlds to chance happenings, saying that the vortex and shifting that disentangled the chaos and established the cosmic order came by chance.”

Aristotle (transl.), *The Physics*, II, 4, 169a

In this part the philosophical position of Universal Darwinism will be developed. I will provide evidence for the claim that Darwinism, as special kind of Evolutionism, has already conquered many areas of the academic and popular world view. I will explain some of the (often implicit) philosophical arguments which seem to support this approach.

In chapter 6 I am going to outline the metaphysics, the basic conceptual structure, of Universal Darwinism. I shall distinguish two types of Universal Darwinism, Biologistic Darwinism with the prototypic example of gene-Darwinism, and Process-Darwinism, which is not biologistic but still only based on Darwinian processes.

In chapter 7 an outline of the 'phenomenology' of universal Darwinism will be given. Actual theories from different subject areas will be described, which make an exclusive use of Darwinian Processes and which thus could be regarded as building blocks of process-Darwinism. Our historical treatment of the interrelations of Darwinism with other academic disciplines builds the basis of this systematic treatment of theories with a process-Darwinian core.

For example trial-and-error-psychology—albeit build as a protective dike against Darwinian biologism—could be regarded as an approach built around a Darwinian process. Moreover falsificationism, a predominant theory of scientific justification, or aspects of neoliberal economic theory share structural similarities with Darwinism. The concepts of trial and error, conjecture and refutation, mutation and selection may serve as a possible basis for an ideology of universal Process Darwinism.

Since gene-Darwinism has been treated earlier as a phenomenon and as abstract theory, both chapters of this part will mainly focus on the development of process-Darwinism.

At the beginning of the third millennium after Christ the theory of the concept of the survival of the fittest, whether one follows gene-Darwinism or process-Darwinism, is almost as ubiquitous as the concept of 'God' was 1000 years ago.

The development of universal Darwinism will be a prerequisite for its partial criticism in part IV of this work.

Chapter 6: Darwinian Metaphysics—Biologistic and Process Darwinism

In this chapter we are concerned with Darwinism as **metaphysics**, because, firstly, the theories in question claim relevance for many (if not all) subject areas and secondly because they are abstract and not directly affected by experience or empirical tests. They will shape the implicit premises of empirical hypotheses, but as part of a complex theoretical system they will neither be directly verified nor falsified. Nevertheless these concepts could be made the object of a rational discussion both within special sciences and within philosophy in general.

There are **two types of ‘Universal Darwinism’**.⁸⁰⁰ I am going to call them ‘*Biologistic Darwinism*’ and (Universal) ‘*Process-Darwinism*’.⁸⁰¹

To define these terms it is necessary to distinguish between **substances** and **processes**. This distinction mirrors not only the subject-predicate or noun-verb distinction of most languages, but is an almost ubiquitous aspect of (Western) common sense ontology. The substance-process distinction is historically based on the traditional conceptual antagonism of being—defined as an antithesis of becoming (Parmenides)—and of becoming—defined as an antithesis of being (Heraclitus).⁸⁰² Today this distinction is, par example, inherent in evolutionary biology on the one hand in the words ‘genes’ and ‘species’ and on the other hand in the words ‘natural selection’ and ‘genetic drift’.

Instead of ‘*becoming*’ I am using the specific term *process* which normally refers to *ordered* forms of becoming, because here we are interested in explanations; and explanations by definition are always concerned with some form of order.

I am using the specific term *substance* as an antonym of ‘becomings’, because the possible alternative general notions ‘being’ or ‘entity’ (*ens*) are in their broad sense also used to include becomings.

Nevertheless the term *substance* carries two problems with it. Firstly substance is often understood in the sense of *essence*, which is not necessarily opposed to process but rather to *accidentia*. Indeed we may think of an *essential process*. The essential process of Darwinism, for example, is natural selection. Similarly, essence traditionally implies lastingness. But processes may be lasting as well, following e. g. Newtonian physics both substances *and* processes are regarded to be eternal. Hence substance understood as essence is not always opposed to the notion of a process.

⁸⁰⁰ The term ‘Universal Darwinism’ is used by R. Dawkins, *Universal Darwinism* (1983) and e. g. by H. Plotkin, *Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge* (1994/95), pp. 59 ff.

⁸⁰¹ Within the specific area of evolutionary *epistemology* M. Bradie in *Asserting Evolutionary Epistemology* (1986) proposed a different distinction. He proposed the two classes of ‘Evolutionary Epistemology of Mechanisms’ and of ‘Evolutionary Epistemology of Theories’. Roughly speaking the former term corresponds to Biologistic Darwinism and the latter to Process Darwinism. This distinction has been adopted e. g. by W. Bechtel, *Towards Making Evolutionary Epistemology into a Truly Naturalised Epistemology* (1990).

I do introduce a different terminology, firstly, to denote specifically Darwinian approaches, secondly, not to be limited to epistemology and thirdly, because the term ‘mechanism’ in the present context would misleadingly refer to an approach based on processes instead to a biologistic approach. ☞ also p. 218.

⁸⁰² See: J. Mittelstrass, *Werden* (1996), p. 659; also ☞ p. 77.

Secondly, substance in its modern meaning has a connotation associated with a materialist atomistic ontology. In this sense the substance of a table is not its 'tableness', but exclusively its *causa materialis*, its constituting matter, i. e. wood, a mixture of water and certain carbohydrates—finally its constituting elementary particles.

Here the term 'substance' should only be understood as antonym of process and therefore should imply neither an essentialist nor a materialist metaphysics. Substance should, for example, denote atoms, chairs, duck-rabbits, minds or theories, whereas gravity, natural selection or the event of running can be considered as processes or forces causing processes.

Employing the existing antagonism of being and becoming for descriptive reasons should not imply that I advocate its metaphysical truth. On the contrary, I rather sympathise with the position of process philosophy that 'an actual entity is a process'. It might turn out that the being of 'things' is identical with a continuous processes and *vice versa* that continuous processes are identical with the being of things.⁸⁰³ But based on the substance-process distinction we could subsequently understand biologistic Darwinism and process Darwinism more explicitly as specific Darwinian cases of two more general types of Reductionism.

Subsequently I will not distinguish between *reductionism* and '*eliminativism*'. For simplicity reasons I shall also not always distinguish between reduction of theories and reduction of entities. Reduction in the present work is normally used in the sense of what I shall call '*downward* reduction', corresponding to the intentions of the physicalist research programme (☞ pp. 240 f.).

Biologistic Darwinism is a Darwinian form of Biologism. Note the difference between *Biologistic* Darwinism and *biological* Darwinism, which does not need to deny the existence of higher ontological strata. Biologistic Darwinism is *universalised* biological Darwinism. The 'ism' in *biologism* implies its universalisation or the reduction of all higher ontological layers.

Hence biologism, like physicalism, advocates a certain form of '*substance reductionism*': Higher ontological levels, psychological, social and cultural entities should (proximately or ultimately⁸⁰⁴) be reduced to biological entities. Mental and social substances should be reduced to biotic substances. In this view our cognitive 'apparatus' is finally nothing but a physiological entity, which must have evolved solely according to the laws of biology (and physics).

Biologism is not necessarily Darwinian. We can also conceive a Lamarckian biologism, although Lamarckism more than Darwinism may tend to accept the autonomy of culture.⁸⁰⁵ Hence Darwinian biologism does not only employ substance reductionism but also an inner-biological Darwinian process reductionism.

Process-Darwinism should only be defined by an exclusive use of Darwinian processes. Darwinian processes the other way round should not imply process-Darwinism as long as also other processes

⁸⁰³ ☞ e. g. pp. 324, 353, 397.

⁸⁰⁴ ☞ footnote 778.

⁸⁰⁵ The prevailing biologism of the 1920s was actually not always a Darwinian but partly a Lamarckian one. If romantic and Lamarckian biology would replace or modify pure Darwinism (☞ pp. 145 f.). This hence would not *necessarily* result in an abolition of biologistic attitudes towards culture.

build an essential part of the ontological inventory in question. Process-Darwinism in regard of substances may employ substances on levels above biology, but each process finally has to be reducible to the Darwinian process of natural selection (☉ p. 107).

Process-Darwinism can either be used in the sense of *Universal Process Darwinism* (UPD), which denotes Process-Darwinism as world view, or in the sense of a *Particular Process Darwinism* (PPD), which denotes Process-Darwinism—the exclusive application of Darwinian processes—in a certain subject area.

Process Darwinism is a special Darwinian case of what we may call ‘*Processism*’ or (universal or particular) *process reductionism*. To introduce the clumsy term ‘Processism’ appears pardonable to me because of the analogy to the different types of substance reductionism (physicalism etc.). Processism is not concerned with the reduction of ‘things’ to lower ontological substances, but with the explaining of all processes by one process or one class of processes.

Besides UPD there are also other approaches which have favoured a universal process reductionism. For example dialectical philosophy either in its idealist (Hegel) or materialist (Marx) version have universalised the one process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.

Biological Darwinism—like any Darwinism—in its strict understanding always implies process-Darwinism (but not vice versa). This is the case because the essence of Darwinism itself is the exclusive usage of the *process* of natural selection.

Before discussing biologistic Darwinism and process Darwinism in detail, I shall discuss the epistemological problem of induction at the logical centre of Darwinism in general and hence of both outlined types of a Darwinian metaphysics.

6.1 Problem of Induction—Necessity of Blind Variation & External Elimination?

a) *Darwinism Seen as Universal Principle*

In a Darwinian Metaphysics—either gene-Darwinian or process-Darwinian—natural selection is often understood to be more than a quasi-physical force, it amounts to an all-powerful principle.

Such a claim can either rest on an “extrapolation” of an empirically found hierarchy of selection processes “to all knowledge processes”⁸⁰⁶ or on logical or metaphysical considerations. Examples of the empirical basis will be outlined only in the following chapter, whereas the logical argumentation linked to the problem of induction will be outlined in the next section of the present chapter. In the present section some striking examples of a universalisation of Darwinism will be documented, without treating their justification in detail.

⁸⁰⁶ E. g.: D. T. Campbell. *Evolutionary Epistemology* (1974), p. 421; Donald T. Campbell, *Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes* 1987 (1960), p. 111. (From the viewpoint of Universal Darwinism the term ‘extrapolation’ would in my opinion not be appropriate. ☉ pp. 208.)

Dawkins has claimed that Darwinism is not only empirically but theoretically “probably the only theory that *can* adequately account for phenomena that we associate with life.” Other explanations are “in principle incapable of [...] explaining the evolution of organized, adaptive complexity.”⁸⁰⁷ For example Lamarckian “acquired characters are not always improvements. There is no reason why they should be, and indeed the vast majority of them are injuries.” Dawkins argues in principle against instructivism and in favour of selectionism: “Even if acquired characters are inherited on some planet, evolution there will still rely on a Darwinian guide for its adaptive direction”.⁸⁰⁸

Campbell generally argued that a Darwinian process, “a blind-variation-and-selective retention process”, “is fundamental to all inductive achievements, to all genuine increases in knowledge, to all increases in fit of system to environment.”⁸⁰⁹ “Considered as improvements or solutions, none of these variations has any a priori validity.” According to him “at no stage has there been any transfusion of knowledge from the outside, nor of mechanisms of knowing, nor of fundamental certainties.”⁸¹⁰

Campbell concedes that there could be shortcuts of these processes. But these shortcuts are completely achieved “originally by blind variation and selective retention, and contain their own blind variation and selective retention concept on some level.”⁸¹¹

These two formulations of universal Darwinism, might be regarded as a cynical interpretation of the biblical text: “What has been is what will be, and [in regard of processes] there is nothing new under the sun” (Ecclesiastes, 1:9).

b) *The Problem of Induction (Hume and Popper)*

Although not every advocate of the outlined generalised Darwinian approach will be aware of it, these claims have a deeper and older philosophical grounding, which has to be taken seriously. Besides important empirical questions, the logical core of universal Darwinism is the proposed purely negative ‘solution’ to the problem of induction.⁸¹² If any possibility of ‘sight’ is theoretically deemed to be impossible, if any possibility of induction in its broadest sense is denied, it will be shown that only blind Darwinian mechanisms remain to explore the unknown.

The problem of induction goes at least back to Hume (☉ p. 86), who realised the logical problem to warrant causal laws like any claims about unobserved instances, based on an actually finite number of observed instances. According to Hume “there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience.”⁸¹³

⁸⁰⁷ R. Dawkins. *Universal Darwinism* (1983), pp. 403, 404.

⁸⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p. 409, also p. 408.

⁸⁰⁹ D. T. Campbell. *Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes* (1987/1960), p. 91; identical: *Evolutionary Epistemology* (1974), p. 421.

⁸¹⁰ *Idem*. *Evolutionary Epistemology* (1974), pp. 415, 411.

⁸¹¹ *Idem*. *Evolutionary Epistemology* (1974), p. 421. *Blind Variation and Selective Retention* (1987/1960), p. 91.

⁸¹² For other central theoretical aspects ☉ also pp. 324 f.

⁸¹³ D. Hume. *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739/40; 1888, 1978), Book I, part III, section VI, p. 89.

If we would adopt an extreme Humean position and we would self-referentially apply this view to this claim itself, this claim might be also regarded as an unwarranted inductive generalisation of empirical knowledge.

Although Hume did not solve the problem of induction, generalisation or extrapolation on logical grounds, he stayed convinced that human thought and science strongly relies on induction and that we actually do and have to regard some general theories as more valid than others. This tension between missing logical justification and heuristic mental necessity of a theory of induction could be called Hume's general problem of induction.⁸¹⁴

Popper restated Hume's problem of induction along the lines of simple modern formal logic. Universal (lawlike) empirical claims of knowledge, like 'all strawberries are edible', can never be completely verified on the basis of evidence, as long as not all instances, all strawberries, have been tested. There is—as almost everyone will agree—no necessity, why we should not suddenly come across a counterexample of a poisonous strawberry. But Popper goes further than this: Since induction could never have the security of deductive logic, every inductive methodology is strictly speaking not logical and hence not valid at all. Hence Popper radicalised Hume in arguing that there is no general problem of induction, because there is no induction at all. Moreover, Popper has stressed that a single counter-evidence, a poisonous strawberry, is—logically—conclusive to refute or falsify the proposition in question. Hence Popper—also inspired by biological Darwinism—concludes that scientists in a process of conjecture and refutation can and do only try to falsify laws and never try to verify them. This 'logic of discovery', which as we will see resembles a Darwinian process, was mainly worked out in the field of theory of science, but it was intended as a universal logical principle.⁸¹⁵

Quine called this approach 'negative doctrine of evidence'. Evidence does not serve to support a hypothesis, but only to refute it.⁸¹⁶ (In our more general context we may think not only of theoretical intellectual hypotheses but also of 'biotic hypotheses', i. e. varieties of organisms.)

In my opinion the basic assumptions of thorough (universal) Darwinism can be and have to be qualified to a further extent. Following a truly negative doctrine of evidence, one would not only deny any flux of information from the external to the internal, but one would additionally deny any internal reasoning or improvement of information or, to speak in a Kantian way, any synthetic truth *a priori*. This additional precondition naturally corresponds to the actual historical opposition of this school to the Kantian concept of synthetic truth *a priori*. It implies two additional more radical core assumptions of (Universal) Darwinism (☉ also pp. 348 f.). A denial of any induction and internal improvement, a learning process indeed has to be a Darwinian process, which in its first variational step is *blind* and in its second eliminational step is caused *externally*. Only with this additional second justification—as far

⁸¹⁴ K. R. Popper distinguishes Hume's logical and empirical problem of induction. *Objective Knowledge* (1979/1972), esp. 1.2, 2.26-2.29.

⁸¹⁵ K. R. Popper. *My Solution of Hume's Problem of Induction* (1974), *Objective Knowledge* (1979/1972), 1, 2; *Logik der Forschung* (1966/1934). ☉ pp. 229 f.

as I know, normally not formulated explicitly—radical Darwinism seems to become justified. If we face the totally new and we have to step into the dark and our guesses are necessarily blind, the corrections of our guesses will be necessarily external (\ominus next section).

c) *Towards a Critique of a Falsificationist Necessity of Universal Darwinism*

In the current section I am not yet concerned with a full criticism of the outlined metaphysical foundation of Universal Darwinism (\ominus part IV), but I want to point out that this view has not remained unchallenged.

Kant did not only follow Hume in attacking dogmatism, but also opposed Hume's sceptical despair concerning the logical justification of causal laws. Kant favoured the rational *a priori* existence of a principle of causality. Moreover—in contrast to the above Darwinian metaphysics—he advocated the possibility of a (critically limited) synthetic reasonable extension of the *a priori* (or empirically) given.⁸¹⁷

Within a more pronounced empiricist approach, Mill developed the inductivist Method of Agreement and Difference which had been developed earlier by Scotus, Ockham, Grosseteste and even Aristotle. But also later, within the Vienna Circle—already versed in modern formal logic—, Popper's falsificationism was challenged and stood in antithetical opposition to the influential inductivist approaches. Carnap and Reichenbach in particular advocated that hypotheses have truth probabilities, according to their positive degree of confirmation.

It is neither possible to elaborate nor to access these alternative approaches here. Instead, I want to mention some objections which have been made directly in reaction to Popper's 'negative doctrine of evidence', which in the extended outlined version could be regarded as a possible basis of a Darwinian metaphysics.

Quine, who partly shows sympathy for Popper's way of arguing, also pointed to a flaw if Popper's logical argumentation is taken as basis for a *general* negative doctrine of evidence. Quine firstly pointed out that on the grounds of deductive logic a negative doctrine of evidence is not reasonable for existential statements like 'some strawberries are edible'. On the contrary, for existential statements supportive evidence is decisive and negative evidence does contribute as little as positive evidence does in the case of universal statements. But because science is normally concerned with universal laws, he concedes that this argument might not be a refutation of a predominantly negative methodology. Secondly, Quine argued that complex propositions with multiple quantification are logically not directly falsifiable. Hence to Quine a *general* negative doctrine of evidence also becomes questionable.⁸¹⁸

⁸¹⁶ W. v. O. Quine. *On Popper's Negative Methodology* (1974), p. 218.

⁸¹⁷ I. Kant. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. (1781/1787), B pp. 19 f., 127-128, 232 f., 786-797.

⁸¹⁸ W. v. O. Quine. *On Popper's Negative Methodology* (1974), pp. 218-220.

Putnam criticised that if there “were no suggestion at all that a law which has withstood severe tests is likely to withstand further tests”, no theory would be more verified than another one, and “science would be a wholly unimportant activity”. Science actually seeks for predictive power. According to Putnam, Popper could only argue the way he does, because—against Popper’s own views—Popper’s theory of corroboration *is* a theory of induction.⁸¹⁹ Similarly Lakatos argued that, understood properly, Popper’s approach—albeit conjectural—implies a ‘thin’ metaphysical principle of induction.⁸²⁰

Secondly Putnam, in its results similar to Quine’s logical second argument, urged that theories in fact are not directly falsifiable; instead of their central claims often only less central ‘auxiliary sentences’ become rejected.⁸²¹ Lakatos’ treatment of theory development stresses that the core of a theory is protected by a belt of auxiliary sentences and hence could not directly be falsified by contradictory observations.

It is an essential feature of the argumentation of Quine, Putnam and Lakatos that in a complex situation—not limited to simple protocol sentences—a falsificationist approach is neither descriptively nor normatively the philosopher’s stone.

My own criticism of universal Darwinism in the subsequent part IV shall build on this way of arguing. Nevertheless, I want to point out here that the Darwinian critique of induction does indeed make a valid point—although may be a tautological and trivial one, which in my view is finally not at odds with inductive methodology. If newness is strictly defined as the totally unknown we will by definition not know anything at all about it. (This differs, for example, from the situation in which we are entering a dark room, where we would still at least know something about gravity and we would have the rough idea that a room has a limited seize etc.). Provided that we could think of the *totally* unknown—it almost seems to be a non-thought⁸²²—*any* strategy to explore it would *a priori* have the same value (this is a precondition for our understanding of the term ‘unknown’), and in this sense any strategy could indeed by definition be interpreted as a process of blind variation and external elimination. That the *totally* unknown by definition could not be known in advance is true, tautological and trivial.

Although this true—if tautological—claim has too seldom been acknowledged, it is worse that this claim even is more seldom separated from a claim which, in my opinion, is indeed controversial. Although the unknown is of course by definition always unknown, the only reasonable problem of induction is whether the new, the yet unobserved, is always completely unknown and whether the apparently new always needs to be explored by the same simple blind mechanism. Is it legitimate to

⁸¹⁹ H. Putnam. *The ‘Corroboration’ of Theories* (1974), esp. pp. 222-223.

⁸²⁰ I. Lakatos. *Popper on Demarkation and Induction* (1974), pp. 256, 261.

⁸²¹ H. Putnam. *The ‘Corroboration’ of Theories*, (1974), esp. pp. 226-237, but also see: K. R. Popper. *Putnam on ‘Auxiliary Sentences’, Called by Me ‘Initial Conditions’* (1974).

⁸²² It could be argued that the totally new or unknown could in principle not be a matter of explanations, otherwise it would not be totally new or unknown. See similar: R. Spaemann, R. Isak. *Evolution ohne Ziel?* (1992), p. 154.

assume that the sun will rise tomorrow? Such questions opened the dispute on induction and inductivists only have hoped that there is a solution to such a problem. Could we legitimately claim to know something about what had not been directly observed before, could we infer from observed to unobserved instances, is it justified to generalise, to extrapolate, to synthesis or—to put it boldly—to reason in a bottom up way? If induction supports that the sun will rise tomorrow, it will—of course—never have the same degree of security as strict, deductive reasoning.⁸²³ Although I welcome the fallibilist claim that our (scientific) knowledge always remains vulnerable, this in my opinion does not require a research programme of strict blindness and falsificationism.⁸²⁴ I am going to argue that knowledge (intellectual or biological knowledge) in facing the new is neither necessarily blind nor omniscient; instead there are different degrees of sight (☞ particularly pp. 361 f.).

Following Quine's, Putnam's and Lakatos' arguments, complex systems of (biological or intellectual) knowledge do not logically need to function according to a falsificationist methodology of discovery. In the fourth part of this work I shall argue that not everything new to a theory (or to an organism) is necessarily totally unknown, in the sense that only blind trial and external elimination is the only possible mechanism to explore it. I am arguing against the view that the world on the relevant levels of explanation is *a priori* limited to the one and only search algorithm of a strictly Darwinian process. I am going to argue that guesses logically, and empirically already in the biological layer, neither need to be blind nor to be externally selected. If an organism, for example, literally has the capacity of sight, it can see new paths even if these paths have never existed before. Of course, this capacity might have evolved based on the existence of other paths in the phylogenetic history of that organism. Nevertheless it seems that generalisations (inductions) may play a crucial role even in biological evolution. The organism may also perceive streets and cars which did definitely not exist in the evolutionary history. An 'epistem-ontology' which only reduces this to old patterns (despite the importance of such an explanation) and limits itself to an inevitable blind trial-and-error process, would I think neglect this essential tendency for openness to new possibilities.

Although I conceded the above developed (tautological) principle of blindness, I think our metaphysics should stress something else: I will argue that the biological and cultural evolutionary process should rather be understood as an evolving process itself, whose rules are changing and which may partly even be changeable for us. On the relevant explanatory level there is no principle of conservation of blindness and wastefulness, but the possibility of progression towards sight. Newly evolved forces may gain some autonomy and direct evolution in a different direction. For example moral beliefs may direct human, cultural (and even biological) development into a direction which is not always opportunistically adaptive, but in accordance with religious or philosophical principles.

⁸²³ I think it was Strawson, who argued that inductive inference is inductively valid just as deductive inference is deductively valid.

After developing the metaphysical background to Universal Darwinism and a sketch of my critique of this approach, we now come back to the two types of universal Darwinism, biologistic Darwinism and process-Darwinism.

6.2 Biologistic Darwinism — Gene-Darwinism as its Prototype

The Darwinian paradigm of gene-Darwinism could be seen as today's most influential representative of a theory of Darwinian Biologism.⁸²⁵

Generally many of its proponents claim that psychology and social sciences should become biologisted (☞ pp. 42 f.). Although this Darwinian paradigm could not yet be counted as accepted basis for all social science, it can already be detected as an assumption in a wide range of subject areas.

Gene-Darwinism is a *prototypic* reductionist theory, because, even compared with other largely Darwinian paradigms, it continues the reductionist programme in regard of substances and processes most radically.

In regard of *substance reductionism* gene-Darwinism within biology vigorously advocates the reduction of all other explanatory levels like organisms, groups, gene-pools and ecosystems to only one unit of selection. The ultimate Reality is built by single egoistic genes only. Earlier we distinguished the germ-line-reductionism and the gene-atomism inherent in such a claim (☞ pp. 141 f.).

In regard of *process reductionism* gene-Darwinism is presumably the most radical example of pure Darwinism. In contrast to Darwin's Darwinism and even to the synthetic theory, gene-Darwinism is purged from all remaining non-Darwinian aspects and advocates a minimalist Darwinian process monism (☞ pp. 143 f.). It is only natural selection, which 'drives' evolution:

Firstly, processes especially on the level of populations, like genetic drift or founder effect, which have been emphasised by proponents of the second step of the evolutionary synthesis, are not clearly strictly Darwinian as a process of atomistic trial-and-error. These processes are clearly less emphasised by gene-Darwinism—like the level of population is in general. If these processes are not explicitly rejected, they are regarded either to be comparatively irrelevant or reducible to natural selection.

Secondly, the new processes which paradoxically have been newly advocated in the gene-Darwinian parent discipline of sociobiology, are, according to gene-Darwinism, finally reducible to natural selection. Sociobiology has distinguished new types of selection, especially kin selection and selection of reciprocal altruism (☞ pp. 43 f.). Although—as mentioned in the referred section—it might be possible to argue that these mechanisms gain a certain autonomy, I think that gene-Darwinism regards them as mere applications of one fundamental selection principle. Dawkins pronounces that we should move "towards giving up the term 'kin selection' as well as group selection and individual selection. Instead

⁸²⁴ It appears possible to me that both seemingly apposed positions partly may only use a different terminology and may somehow be reconcilable.

⁸²⁵ On gene-Darwinism and sociobiology ☞ pp. 36 f., 140 f., 191 f., 205 f.

of all these we should substitute the single term ‘replicator selection’. Evolutionary models, whether they call themselves group-selectionist or individual-selectionist, are fundamentally gene-selectionist.⁸²⁶

Thirdly, sexual selection as alternative process to natural selection has been revitalised by gene-Darwinism and sociobiology. The evolutionary synthesis, for reasons mentioned earlier, has neglected or denied its existence. I very much appreciate this revitalisation, but I think that gene-Darwinism still does not regard sexual selection as a proper *noumenon*. (a) Sexual selection is normally not understood as a new emergent process with a certain *autonomy*, but at most as a short-cut version of natural selection. (b) Sexual selection is not (yet) integrated into a general theory of process emergentism.

Although I indeed think that the more active understanding of the genes and even the proposed or revitalised mechanisms also bears germs for the transcendence of pure Darwinism (☉ pp. 145, 348 f.), I think gene-Darwinism both in regard of *substance reductionism* and in regard of *process reductionism*, could, at least in its own understanding, serve as a prototypic example of Darwinism.

6.3 Universal Process Darwinism — a New Alkahest

Today, the general idea of a universal—not necessarily Darwinian—evolution is widely accepted. Nature and culture is described in an increasingly evolutionary and dynamic way.⁸²⁷ Today’s physics teaches us that even the structure of atoms, stars and the basic physical forces are not static, but changing, unfolding or emerging in time. Palaeontology provides us with an account of the changes of the biotic world. History tells us about the development of culture and politics. History of philosophy and history of science is concerned with the development of techniques, theories and disciplines, telling us something about the change of *nous*. Despite this unanimous appeal to evolution, different schools and disciplines strongly differ on *how* to interpret this process of evolution.⁸²⁸

Universal Process Darwinism (UPD, ☉ pp. 153 f., 205 f.) is a world view that Darwinian Processes could provide an adequate exhaustive explanation not only for biology, but for any subject areas, where evolution occurs. This approach results in a ‘nested hierarchy’⁸²⁹ of Darwinian Processes.

I define a Darwinian Process as the process of natural selection in the broad sense, which we have already identified as the conceptual core of today’s Darwinism.⁸³⁰ Natural selection in the broad sense is a two step process³⁵⁵ of blind production of entities and their environmental elimination. This

⁸²⁶ R. Dawkins. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 62. ☉ also footnotes 80, 556.

⁸²⁷ E. g.: I. Prigogine. *From Being to Becoming. Time and Complexity in Physical Science* (1979). K. Gloy. *Das Verständnis der Natur* (1995), pp. 224-5; J. Götschl. *Zur philosophischen Bedeutung des Paradigmas der Selbstorganisation* (1993), pp. 66-73; G. Vollmer. *Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie* (1975/1990), chapter C ‘Universelle Evolution’.

⁸²⁸ Like Darwinism, different philosophical, developmental or selforganisational theories likewise claim to have a quite universal scope, ☉ e. g. pp. 152 f.

⁸²⁹ D. T. Campbell. *Evolutionary Epistemology* (1974), 419 f.; *Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes* (1987/1960).

⁸³⁰ For our working definition of Darwinism ☉ p. 107, esp. footnote 354. Correspondingly Darwin himself was not a strict ‘Darwinian’, ☉ pp. 110 ff.

algorithm⁸³⁶ has adequately been described by D. Campbell as a process of “blind-variation-and-selective-retention”⁸³¹.

This definition of a Darwinian process may need further clarification. What does ‘blindness’ and ‘selective retention’ mean? To build up a position worth attacking, we will once more examine and clarify this definition (☞ p. 324).

Particular theories of Process Darwinism have actually not only been proposed for biological evolution but also, for example, for the immune system, for operant conditioning, for the selection of theories and even in economics (☞ pp. 218 f.). Here Darwinian Processes are dominating particular subject areas.

Both as a collection of theories and as a general approach, process Darwinism has gained influence. Important steps towards UPD have been made by Campbell, Hull, Dennett and, in a way also, by Dawkins, who radicalised the biological discussion as well as contributing to a two level process Darwinism of atomistic genes and memes.⁸³² Lewontin’s notion of the unit of selection, though himself rather critical of an exclusively Darwinian metaphysics, has also contributed to the flourishing of this school.⁸³³ Other proponents of UPD are, for example, H. Plotkin⁸³⁴ and, in some respects, P. Munz.⁸³⁵

As already mentioned UPD is defined by its Darwinian process reductionism. The concept of Darwinian Processes is regarded to be the ‘alkahest’—the alchemists’ universal solvent. ‘Dennett’s dangerous idea’ appears to be a prototype of an abundant application of Darwinian Processes as well as of the reduction of all processes to Darwinian ones. Though Dennett told me in a personal discussion that he would not interpret his position as radical process reductionism, I would still hold that his book *Darwin’s Dangerous Idea* has to be seen as a prototypic example for process reductionism (in type, not in token).⁸³⁶ According to Dennett the Darwinian algorithm could be seen as universal acid which eats through all traditional concepts.⁸³⁷ The algorithm could be applied to everything; “all exist as fruits of a single tree, the Tree of Life, and the processes that have produced each and every one of them are, at bottom, the same.” Dennett concludes, on the last page of *Darwin’s Dangerous Idea*, that there “is no

⁸³¹ D. T. Campbell. *Epistemological Roles for Selection Theory* (1990), p. 7.

⁸³² ☞ pp. 60 f.

⁸³³ ☞ pp. 153 f., esp. footnote 597.

⁸³⁴ H. Plotkin. *Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge* (1995/94).

⁸³⁵ P. Munz. *Philosophical Darwinism. On the Origin of Knowledge by Means of Natural Selection* (1993), pp. 144, 153, but pp. 167, 169.

⁸³⁶ Dennett and I had a longer discussion in a train to London, after he had given a talk at the conference of the Royal Institute of Philosophy at Reading in 1996. Drawing the parallel between processes and objects I argued in favour of something like process emergentism (☞ pp. 324 f.). Although he denied thorough process reductionism, he was also critical of process emergentism. I would interpret in hindsight that he—maybe surprisingly—was not convinced of thorough substance reductionism and advocated that Darwinian processes—despite being critical of group selection—indeed took place on different levels. Nevertheless, he did argue in favour of what I call process reductionism, i. e. the reduction to one *type* of process.

⁸³⁷ D. Dennett. *Es geht auch ohne Gott und Geist. Darwins ätzende Idee zerfrisst die letzten Mythen. Als Sinn des Lebens bleibt nur Neugier und die Liebe zur Wahrheit* (1996). Also: *Darwin’s Dangerous Idea* (1995), pp. 61 ff.

denying, at this point, that Darwin's idea is a universal solvent, capable of cutting right to the heart of everything in sight."⁸³⁸

As physicalism claims that all *entities* (*substances* in contrast to processes) could finally be completely reduced to elementary particles, or as gene-Darwinism claims that all biological or even cultural 'substances' could be reduced to the action of selfish genes, process-Darwinism claims that all evolutionary *processes*—biological and cultural—could be reduced to the ultimate processual unit of natural selection. The Creator had been as lazy as could be imagined. According to the metaphysics of Process Darwinism natural selection is the unchangeable processual atom of evolution, and all other evolutionary processes in essence are nothing but these processual atoms (⇒ pp. 207 f.).

Dawkins has contributed the general notion of a **replicator** to this approach, which he claims to be central to any process of natural selection. Dawkins has abstracted the logical essence of 'genes' and generalised it (although Dawkins within biology remained a gene-Darwinian). Replicators are "any entity in the universe which interacts [...] in such a way that copies of itself are made"⁸³⁹.

I also think, perhaps even more strongly than Dawkins, that the notion of a replicator could be regarded to be a unifying central notion of Darwinism. (Although I differ from Dawkins in thinking that this notion also points beyond Darwinism. For details ⇒ also pp. 252 f.)

1. The concept *replicator* somehow leads to the concept of a evolutionary line of replicating entities and slightly changed entities. The notion of an evolutionary line is not new and other proponents of UPD have claimed that this is a necessary component of a Darwinian process (besides blind variation and 'natural' elimination).⁸⁴⁰ But from this it can be concluded that drops of water and planets are excluded from being objects of Darwinian processes, because it would be difficult to define what a evolutionary line based on replication should be. This is the case although drops of water and planets may vary and be selected and even evolve according to some law of nature.

Drops of water and planets may even lawfully increase or decrease in number. Still it is difficult to think of them being copied. I will agree that copying is an important emerging property. However, a certain kind of evolution seems to be excluded by this definition, which on 'higher' evolutionary levels may also wrongly be ignored.

2. The notion replicator (almost) entails the two other normally acknowledged features of a Darwinian processes, blind variation and natural elimination (⇒ pp. 252 f.). "In practice no replication process is infallible, and defects in a replicator will tend to be passed on to descendants."⁸⁴¹ The differential elimination of these varying entities even under most simplest circumstances seem to follow.

I think that the notion of a replicator indeed could serve to conceptually unify all three components of a Darwinian Process. Simple replicators may imply natural selection. Natural selection may even imply replicators. But I am going to

⁸³⁸ D. Dennett. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995), pp. 63 f., 511, 521.

⁸³⁹ R. Dawkins. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 67.

⁸⁴⁰ E. g.: D. H. Campbell. *Evolutionary Epistemology* (1974), p. 421; *Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes* (1987/1960), p. 92.

⁸⁴¹ R. Dawkins. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 67.

argue that there is the possibility that new more complex replicators have come into being which are linked to less wasteful mechanisms, which for reasons of clarity should not be called Darwinian Processes.

3. The concept of a replicator, at least in Dawkins' works, is closely connected with an assumed ontological primacy of replicators. In the biological context this is expressed in his germ-line reductionism, the claim that selfish genes (in his view the sole replicators) have exclusive evolutionary reality whereas phenotypes, like organisms or groups, are only their ephemeral and epiphenomenal vehicles⁸⁴².

David Hull in his early writings took a rather 'organicist' or 'holist' stance and opposed the radical *substance reductionism* of gene-Darwinism. Together with Michael Ghiselin he has even vindicated the existence of species as individual wholes or—for short—as 'individuals'.⁸⁴³

Nevertheless, in an irony of history, Hull seems to have become an ardent supporter of *Darwinian process reductionism*. Extending the unit of selection argument to other entities than atomistic genes, it paradoxically was he, who gave respectability for a larger audience to the claim that all evolutionary processes are Darwinian processes.

Hull distinguished two classes of evolutionary entities, *replicators* and *interactors*. Thereby he adopted the notion of a replicator and also the genotype-phenotype distinction from Dawkins' replicator-vehicle distinction (which in turn could be regarded as a materialist reformulation of the Platonic distinction of *mundus intelligibilis* and its expression in the recognisable *mundus sensibilis*). Hull, replacing the term 'vehicle' by the term 'interactor', still appears to struggle against an epiphenomenal understanding of what Dawkins called vehicles. According to Hull there are *two* units of *evolution*, one unit of replication and one unit of interaction. Whereas the replicators, are the exclusively information carrying entities which form lineages, the interactors are units which are interacting and which are selected by the external environment.⁸⁴⁴

New questions arise: How far is an interactor truly differing from a vehicle? Do we have to opt either for vehicles or interactors in general, or is this a domain-specific question? Although Hull's position appears very Darwinian in style, it is questionable whether his replicator-interactor position should be regarded to be as neo-Darwinian as Dawkins' replicator-vehicle position is.

In the following chapter we will discuss particular theories of Process Darwinism especially in the fields of psychology and theory of science, which might be incorporated into larger Darwinian phalanx.

UPD results in a world view, where genes, organisms, humans, ideas and companies are all at war and fighting for survival. It is a radicalisation of Hobbes' *homo hominem lupus est*. In the fourth part of this work, it will be worked out, why such a view, despite its simplistic appeal—at least as an exclusive and complete world view—becomes self-contradictory.

⁸⁴² R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), e. g. pp. 15-20 (☉ also e. g. footnote 944). Dawkins later extended his concept of a vehicle. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89).

⁸⁴³ M. Ruse. *David Hull through two decades* (1989), pp. 3-4, 8, 12; M. T. Ghiselin. *A radical solution to the species problem* (1974). D. Hull. *Individuality and Selection* (1980).

⁸⁴⁴ D. Hull. *Individuality and Selection* (1980). D. Hull. *Units of Evolution: A Metaphysical Essay* (1981). (Hull still often uses 'units of selection' for 'units of evolution'. This might be due to the different narrow and broad meanings of 'selection', ☉ p. 107.)

Chapter 7: Process Darwinism in Particular Subject Areas

7.1 Darwinian Epistemologies and Darwinian Philosophies of Science

a) *Darwinian Biological Epistemology and Darwinian Process Epistemology*

The two general types of Universal Darwinism, (Universal) Biologicistic Darwinism and Universal Process Darwinism, could presumably best be exemplified in the areas of epistemology or psychology, where both analogous classes of a Darwinian Biological Epistemology and a Darwinian Process Epistemology are especially apparent.⁸⁴⁵

Epistemology, as opposed to ontology starts its investigation not directly with the question 'what is the case' but indirectly with the question 'what can we know'. Nevertheless, epistemology has always more or less directly interacted with ontology.

A **Darwinian Epistemology** can either be grounded on the conception that our percipient and mental capacities are massively moulded by Darwinian biological evolution, or could be based on the application of Darwinian process not only within biology but also in regard of trials, thoughts and theories.

'Darwinian Epistemology' should not be conflated with '*Evolutionary Epistemology*'. Although the term Evolutionary Epistemology—with its pleasing alliteration—has been made popular predominantly by Darwinian thinkers,⁸⁴⁶ it would be inadequate to equate Evolutionary Epistemology exclusively with Darwinian Epistemology:

Evolutionary Epistemology firstly could be understood as an epistemology which puts emphasis on how the biological or historical situation came into being. Being is understood based on its becoming; diachronic understanding sheds light on synchronic understanding. In this sense the antonym of evolutionary epistemology would be systematic epistemology. In this interpretation Evolutionary Epistemologies need not to be Darwinian but could also be Lamarckian, Hegelian etc.

Secondly, the term 'evolution' especially in a philosophical work could be understood in its traditional sense, meaning the unfolding of a preformed potential structure, interpreting the whole nature by the metaphor of embryological development. In this sense evolutionary epistemology would almost be an antithesis of Darwinian Epistemology (☹ pp. 89)!

Thirdly, Evolutionary Epistemology could simply refer to the 'fact' of biological evolution. As long as there is dispute about the mechanisms and interpretation of biological evolution this understanding need not to be synonymous with Darwinian biological epistemology. The premiss of biological pan-Darwinism is neither an obvious logical necessity nor favoured in this work.

A generally biologically inspired approach to epistemology is not new (whether directly biological or only adopting biological processes). Particularly since Darwin a number of important thinkers, like Baldwin, Bergson, T. H. Huxley, James, Mach, Peirce, Poincaré, Simmel, Spencer and von Uexküll have contributed to such an epistemology; but according to Campbell most of these approaches kept a

⁸⁴⁵ On M. Bradie's terminology ☹ footnote 801.

⁸⁴⁶ D. T. Campbell. *Evolutionary Epistemology* (1974); G. Vollmer *Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie* (1976).

critical distance from a purely Darwinian epistemology.⁸⁴⁷ Under closer scrutiny I think it may even turn out that some of the apparent advocates of a Darwinian Epistemology are also not appropriately labelled as *pure* Darwinians.

We are now going to outline the classes of *Darwinian Biological Epistemology* and *Darwinian Process Epistemology*.

Darwinian Biological Epistemology is a discipline or an approach which explains questions concerning epistemology by referring to the biotic stratum which is in turn understood in a Darwinian way. For the moment we leave the Darwinian aspect of such an epistemology aside. The term 'biological' in Biological Epistemology can be understood in a twofold way, either it could specify the part of epistemology which is meant (thereby accepting other aspects or approaches), or it could be an exclusive characterisation of epistemology (thereby excluding, for example, transcendental or sociological epistemology).

Biological epistemology, understood as a part of epistemology, appears to me to be the legitimate discipline. One may object that it is generally a more valuable task to seek other explanations, for instance, to unveil a securer aprioric foundation of knowledge, to take subjective phenomena as true starting points, or to investigate the social construction of knowledge. I think, as long as (*prima facie*) such epistemologies are also accepted and as long as we also keep a critical distance from biological 'facts', an acknowledgement of our biological nature is an essential part of epistemology—even if it turned out that this human nature is a *tabula rasa*.

Biological epistemology, understood as biological characterisation of epistemology, is a sort of biologism, which, of course, is disputable. If biologicistic epistemology is also Darwinian this results in a full sub-theory of the already discussed Biologicistic Darwinism. As proponents of sociobiology have claimed that ethics should become biologised, here the biologization of epistemology would be advocated. In its purely Darwinian version this would imply that all our mental and epistemic capacities (like our visual cortex etc.) are explainable by their evolution by natural selection. In such a view even "language is no different from other complex abilities such as echolocation and stereopsis" and "the only way to explain the origin of such abilities is through the theory of natural selection."⁸⁴⁸

Like evolutionary theory in general, Darwinian biological epistemology has often wrongly been conceived as being monolithic. But authors actually vary considerably in their evolutionary assumptions and how far their position could be called biologicistic and Darwinian. Although most authors of a biological epistemology definitely advocate at least a *partly* Darwinian position, even most founders of the

⁸⁴⁷ D. T. Campbell. *Evolutionary Epistemology* (1974), pp. 437-441.

⁸⁴⁸ St. Pinker, P. Bloom. *Natural Language and Natural Selection* (1990), p. 708. Quoted in D. Dennett *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995), pp. 384 ff.

discipline have not been as purely Darwinian as today's gene-Darwinians are (☹ pp. 143). Instead of developing their epistemological position I will mention their position in regard of evolutionary theory.

Biological epistemology has a long history, at least reaching back to the pre-Darwinian schools of evolutionism. Darwin—no pure Darwinian in its today's definition—also contributed to this field. Important steps to an at least partly Darwinian Biological Epistemology have been made by K. Lorenz. He even contributed to a more general selection theory.⁸⁴⁹ However, it should be noted that Lorenz in many respects also took an opposed position to today's radical and purely gene-Darwinian view (☹ pp. 136 f., 151 f.).

Biological epistemology, then, has been elaborated especially by the philosopher and physicist G. Vollmer in *Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie* (1976) and in *Was können wir wissen?* (1988). Vollmer favoured hypothetical realism. In regard of the employed evolutionary theory Vollmer was sympathetic towards the 'valid' moderate Darwinism of the evolutionary synthesis.⁸⁵⁰ However, it seems to me that Vollmer in this early writings was not so much concerned with the differences between more or less Darwinian paradigms, but more generally tried to argue and exemplify that our epistemological capacities have evolved and hence should be made object of an evolutionary (biological) epistemology. Although Vollmer supported the 'valid' evolutionary theory, he even conceded its incompleteness.⁸⁵¹ But from a conference in 1996, where Vollmer chaired a workshop on the evolution of morality, I had the—indeed fallible—impression that he has now become inclined to swim with the tide of gene-Darwinism.⁸⁵²

Another now classical book on biological epistemology is R. Riedl's *Biologie der Erkenntnis* (1979). Riedl was also orientated towards the synthetic theory, which he regards as 'no doubt completely valid' but still also incomplete.⁸⁵³ Riedl, like, for example, Wuketits, advocates a moderate systems theoretical extension of the synthetic theory (☹ pp. 151).

Maturana and Varela have also on system theoretical grounds in *El árbol del conocimiento* (1984) rather stressed their opposition to the Darwinian assumption of an externally given environment to which organisms are adapting. Their epistemology instead proposes a radical constructivism of organism and environment.

J. Barkow's, L. Cosmides' and J. Tooby's anthology *The Adapted Mind* (1992) is a landmark for the reintroduction of biological evolution to psychology and for providing empirical evidence for this

⁸⁴⁹ K. Lorenz. *Die Rückseite des Spiegels. Versuch einer Naturgeschichte menschlichen Erkennens* (1973), p. 294.

⁸⁵⁰ G. Vollmer. *Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie* (1976), e. g. pp. 58, 64. *Was können wir wissen? Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie*; Band 1. *Die Natur der Erkenntnis*. Band 2. *Die Erkenntnis der Natur* (1988), e.g. Bd. 2, p. 4.

⁸⁵¹ *Idem.*; *Was können wir wissen?* (1988), Bd. 2, pp. 1-38.

⁸⁵² On the conference of the AGPD 1996 in Leipzig I as a listener critically commented on E. Voland's *Moral durch Manipulation? Ein evolutionäres Szenario* (1996). An interesting discussion arose, where Vollmer in my view rather adopted Voland's thorough gene-Darwinian position. But I can not judge whether Vollmer had converted to full-blown gene-Darwinism or whether he only valued a certain but limited acknowledgement of the gene-level. See also G. Vollmer. *Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer evolutionären Ethik* (1993), esp. pp. 122, 125-126, but p. 112.

approach. Tooby and Cosmides argued that explanations of biological evolution had been ignored because of the exclusive dominance of cultural explanations in a 'Standard Social Science Model'.⁸⁵⁴ Most of the articles of this anthology already strongly adopt Darwinian explanations on the gene level. This is also the case for Cosmides' and Tooby's own theory of human rationality⁸⁵⁵, which was subsequently radicalised by Gigerenzer.⁸⁵⁶ Nevertheless there are still differences within evolutionary psychology. Cosmides and Tooby (as important proponents of evolutionary—biological—psychology), for example explicitly opposed the strict reductionism of gene-Darwinism.⁸⁵⁷

The linguist N. Chomsky is also often wrongly conceived to be an advocate of a radically Darwinian biologicistic epistemology because he has proposed that the ability to develop the universal generative grammar is due to an innate disposition. It should be noted that Chomsky himself maintains critical distance from the ultra-Darwinian camp.⁸⁵⁸

In my opinion an acknowledgement of a biological *basis* of knowledge is definitely a merit. But even apparently Darwinian theories are not as unified as they are often supposed to be. One ought to be cautious; nothing less is at stake than human nature and how much room is left for culture.

Some cases of a (mainly Darwinian) biological epistemology seem uncontroversial. For example the range of electromagnetic waves which our eye could recognise, roughly corresponds to the range of light rays passing through the atmosphere.⁸⁵⁹ Nevertheless even here some problems remain:

The correspondence of visual receptivity and atmospheric window seems to be most easily explainable by a Darwinian epistemology and in turn seems to support this view. Such a result would not contradict my position developed later, because I will not turn against any Darwinian explanation, but against pan-Darwinism. Here a Darwinian explanation seems especially suitable, because an adaptation to a given environment is evident. Nevertheless even here things may turn out to be more complicated.

Firstly, although adaptation to an external environment is a common necessary characterisation of Darwinism, it is not a sufficient one. Adaptation was also advocated by utterly different authors, like Paley and Lamarck. One may object that their approaches are no more viable today. But does this imply that Darwinism remains as only option? If our evolutionary theory advocated a more active organism and a less blind evolution—and in these respects rather resembled Lamarckism—then I think it would be inappropriate to call this a Darwinian theory (⇒ pp. 348 f.).

Secondly, even in the given example it could be questioned whether the environment is indeed externally given. For example bees are receptive to a range of higher frequent electromagnetic waves, seeing no 'red' but additionally 'ultraviolet' light.

Thirdly, biology in its further course may develop an improved definition of Darwinism to distinguish between more or less Darwinian sub-paradigms (⇒ pp. 348 f.). It may turn out that not all these approaches are purely Darwinian. The fitting between atmospheric window and the receptivity of most animals, does not directly decide whether we should advocate group or gene selection, saltational (punctuated) or gradual evolution. If these theories are not all equally Darwinian, then adaptation would not necessarily imply the purest Darwinian paradigm of them.

From the philosophical viewpoint it seems more controversial if some authors generally equate ideas *a priori*, advocated from Plato to Kant, simply with innate ideas. With this idea in mind Darwin

⁸⁵³ R. Riedl. *Strategie der Genesis* (1984/1976), p. 27.

⁸⁵⁴ J. Tooby, L. Cosmides. *The Psychological Foundations of Culture* (1992).

⁸⁵⁵ L. Cosmides, J. Tooby. *Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange* (1992).

⁸⁵⁶ G. Gigerenzer. *Domain-specific reasoning* (1992).

⁸⁵⁷ J. Horgan. *Die neuen Sozialdarwinisten* (1985), pp. 82, 86.

⁸⁵⁸ D. Dennett. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995), chapter 'Chomsky contra Darwin'.

⁸⁵⁹ G. Vollmer. *Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie* (1976), e. g. pp. 45-49, 97-100. H. v. Ditfurth. *Im Anfang war der Wasserstoff* (1972/1981), pp. 97-101, Abb. 7.

predicted that Plato would be rehabilitated, while Locke would be degraded. Preformed ideas are interpreted as being innate. Today Darwinian and other schools of biological epistemology follow in this wake and thereby take aspects of transcendental and sociological epistemology by storm. Haeckel explicitly interpreted the *a priori* of Kant in the sense of innateness, Lorenz later made this claim famous and many authors have followed in their footsteps.⁸⁶⁰ Whoever is right, it should be clear that such an interpretation is not in accordance with the intentions of Kant himself. Kant in the *Critique of pure Reason* explicitly argued that concepts *a priori* are not simply innate concepts, but—independent of whether they are inherited or learned—they are *logically* necessary preconditions for understanding.⁸⁶¹

Darwinian Process Epistemology is the other sub-class of Darwinian Epistemology. Based on process Darwinism the *ontological inventory* of this sub-class is again not limited to biological entities (substances), but applies Darwinian processes in higher ontological strata. In regard of processes this epistemology is confined to Darwinian processes.

Despite differences in emphasis as to what substances should actually be regarded as being real, there is a consensus that there are roughly at least three ontological strata where Darwinian processes do work.⁸⁶²

Firstly, Darwinian processes are working within the biotic layer. From the viewpoint of pure Darwinian orthodoxy a Darwinian process is the only evolutionary mechanism in this layer. In this respect Darwinian Process Epistemology is identical with Darwinian *Biological* Epistemology. Inner-biological multi-level-Darwinism (☉ pp. 153 f.) is also in line with Process Darwinism, and—although it is at odds with pure gene-Darwinism—it may also be regarded as a case of biological Darwinism. However, in the present section we are rather concerned with supra-biological layers.

Secondly, it has been argued that Darwinian processes were working within the individual psychological stratum and could even provide an *exclusive* explanation for the heterogeneous mental and behavioural phenomena. Donald T. Campbell, based on the older theory of operant conditioning, elaborated that, for example, creativity, pattern recognition and visual perception could all be understood solely on the basis of Darwinian processes. Later on he also integrated these approaches with a Darwinian approach of theory development into a generalised selection theory.⁸⁶³

Thirdly, it has been claimed that Darwinian processes also were working in the cultural stratum, based on to the evolution of *logoi* or *memes*, like words or poems, thoughts and theories (☉ pp. 60 f.). Dawkins has proposed memes as general atomistic units of the Darwinian evolution in the cultural

⁸⁶⁰ K. Lorenz. *Kants Lehre vom Apriorischen im Lichte gegenwärtiger Biologie* (1941), p. 99. G. Vollmer. *Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie* (1975), pp. 91, 126-31; P. Munz. *Philosophical Darwinism* (1993), pp 151-153.

⁸⁶¹ I. Kant. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. pp. B 167, 168.

⁸⁶² Similar: H. Plotkin. *Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge* (1994).

⁸⁶³ D. T. Campbell. *Adaptive Behaviour from Random Response* (1956); *Evolutionary Epistemology* (1974); *Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes* (1987/1960); *Epistemological Roles for Selection Theory* (1990).

sphere. In the field of theory development other earlier and more elaborated proposals have been made. Already T. H. Huxley's and E. Mach's views on theory development were affected by Darwinism. More recently it was especially Popper and, to some extent, S. Toulmin who have elaborated a Darwinian theory of theory development.⁸⁶⁴

Kuhn is also sometimes discussed in an evolutionary context and he seems to share with Darwinism in its strict sense that there could be no absolute progress, since he regards different paradigms to be incommensurable. Nevertheless Kuhn should not be regarded to be a Darwinian, since his view of theory development is essentially not gradualist but salutatorian.

These approaches, as seen already, became more and more integrated into a general theory of process-selection. As epistemology it has been stressed that all these processes are processes of knowledge acquisition. Often neglected, even the economic concept of competition—sometimes interpreted as resembling a Darwinian process—has been understood as a discovery procedure.⁸⁶⁵ All biological, psychological and cultural evolutionary phenomena should be explainable as a learning process of blind-variation-and-selective-retention. As evolution is regarded as a process of exploring possibilities, as a process of learning, first in the biotic, then in the mental and the cultural sphere, Darwinian Process Epistemology more than other epistemologies is conflated with ontology. Ontogeny in its broadest sense *is* knowledge acquisition. Ontology *is* Epistemology and vice versa.

In my opinion such an argumentation could be taken as an example for a tendency of Darwinism to undermine and transcend its own materialistic roots. Here process Darwinism suddenly loses its affinity to traditional mechanistic materialism and rather resembles a neo-Platonic, a Christian or a Schellingian idealism, where nature is understood as a process of 'intellectual' unfolding. As will afterwards appear, I share a view of evolution as intellectual process. Correspondingly, how the epistemological problem of induction may bear on ontological questions is discussed. Nevertheless, I will also stress the differences of ontological strata and an unfolding of the process of unfolding itself. Darwinian processes, although important concepts, in my approach are not understood as the final solution to our theory of knowledge.

Nevertheless an equation of ontology and epistemology raises fundamental problems. This is especially the case in a Darwinian framework, where biological, psychological or cultural knowledge *is* a Darwinian adaptation and blind adaptation to an external environment *is* knowledge. Such an approach would tend to dismiss anything which does not aim at short-term survival, but at sustainable survival because short-sightedness is a defining aspect of Darwinism. Moreover, if survival is made the only yardstick moral and aesthetic reasons would not be appreciated as autonomous as they should be. A position with such inclinations is I think neither true nor—to formulate it in a self-refuting way—adaptive. Finally, we should not forget the disastrous example of the Nazis, who claimed that everything is true which is adaptive for the race, justifying an anti-intellectual and anti-religious attitude and a racist selection programme. Hence, I think that if epistemology and ontology are equated, the further characterisation of such an 'epistemontology' would be vital.

In the following sub-sections two prototypic examples of Darwinian Process Epistemology will be elaborated. One is in the psychological and one in the cultural area, that is operant conditioning and

⁸⁶⁴ St. Toulmin. *Human Understanding* (1974), pp. 394-406. ☞ pp. 229 (especially on Popper).

Popper's falsificationism. As we have seen already and as we will see in the next section there are also other ways how Darwinism has been applied in different subject areas.⁸⁶⁶ There is not only a complex unit of selection debate in biology, but also one in process-Darwinian branches of psychology and of cultural science.

However, the chosen examples were influential and have preceded the general formulation of Process Darwinism by Campbell, Dawkins, Hull and Dennett. Both treatments show a different irony of history: Behaviourism, though built as a bulwark against biologism, paradoxically adopted Darwinian processes as central mechanisms. Popper advocated an actually Darwinian theory of falsification and was led by this very theory to attack Darwinism.

b) *Operant Conditioning — Learning as Darwinian Process?*

The conception of trial-and-error learning was introduced into psychology by Edward Lee Thorndike (1874-1949) and was later continued under the label of operant (or instrumental) conditioning, which was particularly promoted by the American psychologist Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904-90). Operant conditioning, together with classical conditioning, formed the theoretical core of psychology and behaviour therapy during the second wave of psychological behaviourism from after World War II to the early 1970s. To achieve a further theoretical unification it was even considered whether classical conditioning, as second pillar of the behaviourist theory of learning, could at least partly be understood as being reducible to operant conditioning.⁸⁶⁷ Provided that there are no additional 'higher' processes of learning, such a reduction would imply that trial-and-error psychology would not only be one of many legitimate psychological theories, but only the very core of the psychology of learning and hence of psychology as whole.

In the present section I want to point out three parallels between trial-and-error-psychology and Darwinism. Firstly, the mechanisms proposed are strikingly similar. Secondly, both schools are in a similar respect tautological. Finally, I should suggest and subsequently develop, that biology in its future course might—despite all differences—take a historical turn as psychology has, replacing a mere trial-and-error theory by more complex mechanisms of learning.

1. Behaviourism not only rejected the flourishing biologicistic instinct theories but paradoxically also established a theory which in regard of processes could justly be called a 'Darwinian' theory.⁸⁶⁸

The metaphysical or methodological confinement to behaviour forbade the flourishing speculations of philosophical schools and psychoanalyses as of physiological and instinct theories,⁸⁶⁹ around the turn

⁸⁶⁵ F. A. Hayek. *Competition as a Discovery Procedure* (1978/1968). Hayek even mentions 'a trial and error' process of 'cultural selection'. *The Atavism of Social Justice* (1978/1976), p. 67. In general ☞ pp. 232 f.

⁸⁶⁶ For different psychological applications of Darwinian processes see: D. T. Campbell. *Evolutionary Epistemology*, (1974), pp. 422-327.

⁸⁶⁷ See e. g.: J. Bredenkamp, W. Wippich. *Lern- und Gedächtnispsychologie* (1977), pp. 55-60

of the century. A rigorous or even rigid scientific standard was established which made it possible to show that based on trial-and-error learning even animals like dogs, pigeons and rats were not completely driven by instincts, but could to a large extent modify their behaviour due to a given environment. But as behaviourism restricted itself only to the external, i. e. directly observable behaviour in a given situation, the internal became neglected. In principle any first person account was excluded. Moreover, although operant conditioning complemented classical 'respondent' conditioning and hence seemingly was concerned with a more active aspect of behaviour, this theory was still placed within the behaviourist framework of the 'empty organism' and was actually limited to simple, rather passive processes.⁸⁷⁰ Despite advanced experimental designs the construction of more complex inner mechanisms, whether inherited or learned, actually became neglected. The only learning process that remained after the dust of the earlier theoretical turmoil had settled was trial-and-error learning.

Trial-and-error learning resembles the Darwinian two step process of blind-variation-and-selective-retention. In trial-and-error learning the trials, like mutations, could be broken down into small units, which retain their identity.⁸⁷¹ A pigeon in a 'Skinner box' which needs to push a button to get food shows a variety of different trials in a random way. This corresponds to the first step of the Darwinian process, the process of blind-variation.

It is assumed that any behaviour (here the pushing of a button) correlated e. g. with food will be reinforced—only, of course, if the pigeon is hungry or, empirically speaking, if it had been deprived of food. Generally it is argued that behaviour which has an approximately simultaneous positive outcome is reinforced, i. e. it becomes more probable to occur again. The trials which failed to have such effects tended to become extinct, like less favoured genes or species. This aspect of trial-and-error learning corresponds to the selective-retention step of natural selection where different trials are selected according to their adaptation to a given environment. The theory of operant conditioning—like Darwinism—stringently advocates that the 'evolution of individual behaviour' takes place in a gradual way and in this respect differs, for example, from *Gestalt*-psychology.

In the same way that biological Darwinism has emphasised that the Procrustean law of natural selection is in a Newtonian way universal and immutable throughout nature, proponents of psychology based on operant conditioning—with only little reservation⁸⁷²—have also tended to advocate an exhaustive applicability of trial-and-error-learning equally for flatworms, rats and humans.

⁸⁶⁸ This has also been stressed by the recent tide of process-Darwinism: H. Plotkin. *Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge* (1995/1994), pp. 73 f., D. Campbell. *Epistemological Roles for Selection Theory* (1990).

⁸⁶⁹ E. g. B. F. Skinner. *The Behavior of Organisms* (1938), pp. 4, 44. *Contingencies of Reinforcement* (1969), pp. 75-78.

⁸⁷⁰ "I do not mean that there are no originating forces in spontaneous behavior but simply that they are not located in the environment. We are not in a position to see them, and we have no need to." B. F. Skinner. *The Behavior of Organisms* (1938), p. 20.

⁸⁷¹ B. F. Skinner. *The Behavior of Organisms* (1938), p. 33. *Contingencies of Reinforcement* (1969), p. 106.

⁸⁷² *Idem*. *The Behavior of Organisms* (1938), p. 442.

Thorndike's approach finally fundamentally resembles Darwin's treatment of phylogenetic purpose, moving the explanation of an adaptation from the future to the past and abandoning the original meaning of concepts "like purpose, intention, expectancy, or utility"⁸⁷³.

Nevertheless it may of course be objected that the outlined analogy is not valid in every respect. For example the 'extinction' of a behaviour is not as irreversible as the final extinction of a species.

2. Both psychological trial-and-error learning and biological natural selection have been criticised for being tautological in a similar respect.

One of the main claims of the Darwinian research tradition is that natural selection leads to '*the survival of the fittest*'. It has often been pointed out that this claim (not natural selection as a whole) has regularly been understood in a tautological way, because *fitness* is naturally defined by *survival*: The ultimate test for the fitness of an entity (gene or organisms etc.) is whether it survives. But such a definition leads to the proposition that the *survivor will survive*, an indeed undeniably true but empty tautology.

To avoid this problem alternative definitions of fitness have also been proposed. Fitness for example could be defined by the probability of *long term* survival. In this case the claim 'survival of the fittest' will no longer be tautological—but also no longer always true. Short term adaptations do not imply long term adaptations. The dinosaurs became extinct, and humans try to achieve the same result today. The charge of tautology needs to be taken seriously.

This does not imply that the claim that a Darwinian two step algorithm leads to evolutionary change is tautological. Nevertheless, I think that strict (but non-tautological) pan-adaptationism—despite claims of many Darwinians—could not be warranted. (On the tautological aspects of Darwinism, ↻ pp. 330 f.)

In operant conditioning an analogy to the tautology of 'survival of the fittest' could be found in Thorndike's law of effect or Skinner's principle of reinforcement: "If the occurrence of an operant is followed by presentation of a reinforcing stimulus, the strength is increased."⁸⁷⁴ The likelihood or strength of a behaviour is increased if it becomes reinforced. But the explanans is in turn defined by the explanandum. Reinforcement is normally defined by an increased likelihood or strength of a shown behaviour. The resulting proposition 'the likelihood of a behaviour is increased, if the likelihood of a behaviour is increased' is once more logically true, but not helpful. If the likelihood to be (here of a behaviour) is equated with survival than this claim becomes structurally similar to the above claim of 'the survival of the survivor'.

Nevertheless, besides their mere different level of application, other differences between both claims remain. The proposition 'the likelihood of a behaviour is increased, if the likelihood of a behaviour is increased' is not the direct but rather the dynamic and probabilistic equivalent of 'the survival of the survivor'. But to use the terms 'increase' and 'likelihood' may not make an essential difference and also 'survival of the fittest' might be understood in a dynamic and probabilistic way.

It appears to be more relevant that fittest seems to refer to the past, present or future, whereas reinforcement seems to refer the past and present only. Furthermore the superlative 'fittest' has an emphatic connotation of the *very* best, which is

⁸⁷³ *Idem. Contingencies of Reinforcement* (1969), p. 106.

⁸⁷⁴ *Idem. The Behavior of Organisms* (1938), p.21.

less so in the case of the law of effect. Finally, the law of effect often treats the probability of *one* behaviour, whereas 'survival of the fittest' treats the differential survival of *different* entities.

If the mentioned differences turned out to be essential, then the discussed propositions could not both completely be tautological. Despite this problem, I hope to have shown that both claims have, at least partly, to be interpreted as an tautology of the 'survival of the survivor'. Further comparative investigations are needed.

In the field of operant conditioning attempts have also been made to avoid the charge of tautology and to re-define reinforcement.⁸⁷⁵ I am not going to discuss these alternative definitions, but I would tend to suggest that some of them may mirror the chances and problems of the refined definitions introduced to avoid the mentioned biological tautology.

3. I finally want to suggest that Darwinism may follow the fate of trial-and-error theory to be complemented or replaced by a different paradigm which allows also less blind and more complex forms of learning or evolving.

We have seen that the theory of operant conditioning while denying biologism paradoxically introduced the blind and gradual Darwinian mechanism into psychology. The theory of operant conditioning stayed dominant in psychology till the early 1970s and often was advocated as a universal (ubiquitous and unchanging) explanation of learning. Also in this respect it resembled the orthodox Darwinian claims to provide a universal explanation of biological 'learning'.

But already while still being orthodox the theory of conditioning—like Darwinism—kept being challenged by remaining heterodox schools, like, for example, Piaget's structuralist developmental psychology.⁸⁷⁶ Also, for example, remaining *Gestalt*-psychologists favoured a sudden process of understanding, an *Aha-Erlebnis*, and hence advocated what we may call a saltational theory of learning.

Likewise in the history of science there are continuous disputes how far discoveries are gradual and saltational. What happened as the famous anecdotal apple fell on Newton's head or as Darwin read Malthus?⁸⁷⁷

In psychology much of the external criticism was first advocated in a less radical form from within a transformed version of the original orthodoxy. Nevertheless (and despite the radicalisation of the orthodoxy by Campbell) as mainstream the paradigm of behaviourism and trial-and-error learning finally became replaced by the paradigm of cognitive psychology.

Already Bandura, still rooted in behaviourism, criticised the sole behavioural 'adaptation' to an external environment and stressed a 'reciprocal determinism' of environment, person and behaviour.⁸⁷⁸ Moreover one increasingly acknowledged further complex psychological entities and processes, like

⁸⁷⁵ H. Westmeyer. *Kritik der psychologischen Unvernunft* (1973) quoted in J. Bredenkamp, W. Wippich. *Lern- und Gedächtnispsychologie* (1977), pp. 115-124.

⁸⁷⁶ E. g.: J. Piaget. *The construction of reality in the child* (1953).

⁸⁷⁷ Darwin himself wrote of a sudden insight while reading Malthus on the 28th September 1838. Correspondingly it was often advocated that Darwin was an intellectual revolutionary. E. g. E. Mayr. *Darwin, intellectual revolutionary* (1983). Nevertheless even Mayr sometimes argues that "Darwin had been gradually conditioned". E. Mayr. *One Long Argument* (1991), p. 78. (☞ footnotes 709-711)

In my view it seems wrong both to assume that Darwin had no predecessors but only a sudden ingenious idea and to describe the rational combination and transformation of theories as a mere act of 'gradual conditioning'.

cognitive maps, the information content of situations, concept learning, metacognitions and the (rather teleological) concept of expectations. These concepts partly complemented, partly contradicted the strict assumptions of trial-and-error psychology. Important early contributions to an initiation of a psychological paradigm shift have e. g. been made by R. Rescorla and E. Tolman.

In a similar way as after many years of dominance orthodox trial-and-error-psychology became questioned and replaced by an approach which also took 'higher' mechanisms into account, I think the biological trial-and-error theory of Darwinism might also be urged to drop its universalism and acknowledge a certain evolution of evolutionary mechanisms.

In psychology there is also of course still good evidence of the simple learning processes of trial-and-error learning, from flatworms to humans. Nevertheless, simple trial-and-error processes do not seem to suffice for an exhaustive explanation of all learning processes. Learning does not proceed unchanged from flatworms to humans.

Instead of emphasising a mere paradigm shift from behaviourism to cognitive psychology, it would be preferable to stress that the current paradigm partly encloses older approaches and advocates the unfolding of mechanisms which indeed finally necessitate an almost opposed approach to learning.

In 1949 Harlow already had shown that rhesus monkeys could 'learn the learning' and acquire new learning mechanisms transferable to other situations. The learning of a discrimination task at first proceeded gradually, but the monkeys in later experimental series showed that they had acquired the ability to solve a problem suddenly 'by insight'. Stressing insightful behaviour—now clearly interpreted as learned—has to be interpreted as rehabilitation of the Gestalt-psychologist Köhler.⁸⁷⁹ However, here the apparent change of the learning process itself is remarkable.

Kendler and Kendler have subsequently shown that young children more easily learn to identify a second concept if only a few properties of that concept are changed and not a full reversal shift of all properties is required; the converse is true for older children.⁸⁸⁰ Whereas the learning of younger children appears to be consistent with ordinary conditioning theory, the learning of older children appears to require an additional theory of mediation, which is maybe based on, but is not, I think, reducible to this original theory. It has also been shown that not all animals that could be conditioned are capable of such reversal learning; for example M. E. Bittermann has shown recently that some species of fish are not capable of reversal learning.

If such a perspective of an unfolding manifold of learning mechanisms were extended to all acknowledged mechanisms of cognitive psychology (in a way in part opposed to the original behaviourist concepts), the theory of universal trial-and-error learning would not be replaced but transcended by a theory

⁸⁷⁸ A. Bandura. *The self system in reciprocal determination* (1978). Quoted in H. M. Trautner. *Lehrbuch der Entwicklungspsychologie* (1991), pp. 140-145.

⁸⁷⁹ H. F. Harlow. *The formation of leaning sets* (1949). See e. g.: J. Bredenkamp, W. Wippich. *Lern- und Gedächtnispsychologie* (1977), pp. 154-157.

⁸⁸⁰ T. S. Kendler, H. H. Kendler. *An ontogeny of optional shift behavior* (1970).

of the learning of learning. Trial-and-error-mechanisms may be existing simple learning mechanisms, but this would not be the end, but the beginning of a theory of learning. In the further course of this work I am going to argue that biological Darwinism might be similarly transcended by a more truly evolutionary metaphor of the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms. (☉ pp. 353 f.)

c) *Popper's Falsificationism — Science as Darwinian Process?*

Sir Karl Raimund Popper's (1902-1994) falsification theory of knowledge in some respects resembles a Darwinian process. The process of conjecture and refutation turns out to be a process of blind-variation-and-selective-retention.

Apart from Popper's approach **other recent metascientific works** are also based on a metaphor of biological evolution. According to Toulmin scientific disciplines evolve like biological species. But I think closer scrutiny shows that the biological analogy to Toulmin's approach would rather be Lamarckism than Darwinism. Richards who, in the wake of Campbell, proposes a selectionist view for the historiography of science, only uses Darwinism as a loose analogy. In my understanding his metaphor would have to be located somewhere between what I call Lamarckism and Darwinism.⁸⁸¹

Basing his position on the Humean problem of induction, Popper in *Logik der Forschung* (1934) criticised the prevailing view that science is fundamentally inductive.⁸⁸² Alternatively he advocated his theory of falsification, based on the *logical* argument that strictly one contradiction could prove a theory to be wrong, whereas no theory could ever be totally verified and not even verified at all. According to Popper in principle there is neither a guaranty nor even a higher probability that new phenomena will support old generalisations.

Popper nevertheless offered a theory of corroboration. This theory has been interpreted as re-introducing a crypto-theory of induction through the back door.⁸⁸³

At the latest in *Objective Knowledge* (1972) I think Popper also admitted that the strict argument derived from formal logic is not applicable; otherwise practically no theories which could be regarded as acceptable would be left at all. Even in the case of the prototype of a mature science, physics, its central theory of relativity or of quantum physics both show some anomalies.⁸⁸⁴ But Popper is not only inspired by this logical argument; he is also directly influenced by Darwin, whose books he had read before he started to write philosophical texts.⁸⁸⁵ Popper himself advocated that the development of knowledge 'from the amoeba to Einstein' could largely be seen as a Darwinian process.

The "growth of our knowledge is the result of a process closely resembling what Darwin called 'natural selection'; that is, *the natural selection of hypotheses: our knowledge consists, at every moment, of those surviving so far in their struggle for existence; a competitive struggle which eliminates those hypotheses which are unfit.* [...] The theory of knowledge which I wish to propose is a largely Darwinian theory of the growth of knowledge. From the amoeba to Einstein, the growth

⁸⁸¹ R. J. Richards. *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior* (1987), pp. 578, 581, 592.

⁸⁸² K. R. Popper. *My Solution of Hume's Problem of Induction* (1974); ☉ also pp. 208 f.

⁸⁸³ H. Putnam. *The 'Corroboration' of Theories* (1974), esp. pp. 222-223. I. Lakatos. *Popper on Demarkation and Induction* (1974), pp. 256, 261; ☉ footnotes 819, 820.

⁸⁸⁴ For critical aspects of applying Popper's logical argumentation to complex phenomena, see also: W. v. O. Quine. *On Popper's Negative Methodology* (1974). ☉ footnotes 818.

⁸⁸⁵ K. R. Popper. *Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach* (1972), p. 67.

of knowledge is always the same: we try to solve our problems, and to obtain, by a process of elimination, something approaching adequacy in our tentative solutions.”⁸⁸⁶

“In order to make the method of selection by elimination work, and to ensure that only the fittest theories survive, their struggle for life must be made severe for them.”⁸⁸⁷

Popper’s concept of conjecture and refutation is a Darwinian two step process of blind-variation-and-external-elimination (☉ pp. 348 f.). In regard of the first step, it has often been advocated that Popper interprets “scientific discovery as fundamentally an accidental occurrence, a chance mutation of ideas”⁸⁸⁸. Those aspects which do not appear to be chance trials are due to a (blind) re-application of older knowledge.⁸⁸⁹ In regard of the second step these blind trials are tested against nature or the real external world.

Although these parallels are far reaching, I also want to mention that Popper partly stepped back:

a) The tree of *biological* evolution branches more and more, growing up *from* one common stem, whereas the tree of human *knowledge* springs from countless roots, which tend to *unite into* one common stem. b) Human knowledge is regulated by the idea of truth rather than by the idea of helping us to survive.⁸⁹⁰ c) In the second step of the Darwinian process, the agent who eliminates is not nature, but the scientist or the scientific community. It is questionable whether one should equate the scientific community with ‘(natural) selection’, because one may argue that than *any* cause for the selection of an entity, i. e. for its being or not being, could inappropriately be called ‘natural selection’ (☉ pp. 348 f., 384 f.).

Hence Popper seems to be more cautious than some modern Darwinian epistemologists, nevertheless it is not disputable that the concept of a process of conjecture and refutation has mainly been inspired by the concept of a Darwinian process.

It is paradoxical that Popper, in particular, imported a concept of a Darwinian process into the theory of science: By deriving the pivotal criterion of falsifiability in its refined form not from logic but from Darwinism, he cannot help applying this criterion to Darwinism itself. But the Darwinian concept of ‘survival of the fittest’ often understood as ‘the survival of the survivor’ is at least partly tautological (☉ pp. 226, 330 f., 340 f.) and thus Darwinism did not fulfil his (Darwinian) criterion of falsifiability. It was indeed Popper who pointed out that a “considerable part of Darwinism is not of the nature of an empirical theory, but is a *logical truism*.”⁸⁹¹ But as Popper wanted to build up a *normative* metascientific approach—to him theories *ought to be* constructed in a falsifiable way. Popperians need to criticise unfalsifiable aspects of Darwinism. Nevertheless I think that Popper himself based the normative aspect of his methodology on exactly the tautological belief that a ‘Darwinian process’ leads

⁸⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p. 261.

⁸⁸⁷ K. R. Popper. *The Poverty of Historicism* (1957), p. 134.

⁸⁸⁸ R. J. Richards. *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior* (1987), p. 576.

⁸⁸⁹ K. R. Popper. *Campbell on the Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge* (1974).

⁸⁹⁰ *Idem*. *Objective Knowledge* (1972), pp. 262-4.

⁸⁹¹ *Ibid*, (1972), p. 69.

to the 'survival of the fittest'. Only on this basis could he assume that the Darwinian process of conjecture and refutation ultimately leads to the growth of knowledge and an approximation to the truth. If alternatively fitness is *not* defined tautologically in terms of momentary survival, it is not guaranteed that natural selection implies survival of the fittest. If Popper had applied this insight not only to Darwinism but to his own theory of theory development, the assumed best approximation of the truth by a Darwinian process would, I think, have become doubtful. Thereby the descriptive basis for Popper's normative claim would largely have been lost.

Lakatos may also have pointed to a similar problem when he moaned that Popper never answered the question "Under what conditions would you give up your demarcation criterion?"⁸⁹²

Popper not only charged Darwinism with being partly tautological, but he also tried to reform it along the lines of the Baldwin effect. The alterations in the executive organs must follow alterations in central organs. In a way he reintroduces a moderate form of orthogenesis and Lamarckism within a largely Darwinian framework.⁸⁹³ But if this insight were transferred back to his process-Darwinian theory of science, a unmodified falsificationist theory would be incomplete.

In summary, I think that the Darwinian core of Popper's own theory becomes inconsistent if his theory becomes applied to itself.

7.2 Other Components of Process Darwinism

The Darwinian processual monism was not only transferred to the fields of psychological learning and the theory of science, but was also applied in different ways *within* biology and also in other fields such as, for example, economics.

a) *Antibodies and Neurones*

The prototypic inner-biological field of applying a Darwinian process is evolutionary biology. The Darwinian process has often been applied only on one level. For example, gene-Darwinians claim that the gene is ultimately the only level of selection. But we have already outlined the more moderate multi-level-approach, applying Darwinian processes on many levels, for example, on the level of groups. Whereas processes of Darwinian theories of evolution are normally concerned with the germ-line, in biology Darwinian processes of *somatic* selection have also been proposed, e. g. for the neural development and the immune system.

From the viewpoint of universal Process Darwinism these processes will be regarded as the same algorithm or heuristic as Darwinian evolution itself, nested upon the primary Darwinian process. Such nested algorithms evolved by chance and simply have never been eliminated.

⁸⁹² I. Lakatos. *Popper on Demarkation and Induction* (1974), pp. 245, 246.

⁸⁹³ K. R. Popper. *Objective Knowledge* (1972), p. 278.

But actually somatic theories of selection have often been opposed to pure theories of germ-line selection.⁸⁹⁴ Somatic theories at least ontogenetically are concerned with *acquired* characters.⁸⁹⁵ Theories of somatic selection are Darwinian on a certain level, but might have quite non-Darwinian results on another. I will not discuss here whether these theories should hence indeed be regarded to be Darwinian. Only later I will generally discuss inconsistencies of an approach of nested Darwinian processes (☞ pp. 327 f.).

In addition to his theory of selection of individual organisms Weismann after 1895 postulated a theory of somatic selection of cells, tissues and organs, as postulated already by Roux, and proposed a theory of '*Germinalselektion*', claiming a struggle among 'determinants' for nutrition available within the germ plasm.⁸⁹⁶

Here I can only briefly touch upon a Darwinian approach to the functioning of the immune system. The immune system for a long time was thought to work according to purely Lamarckian instructional mechanisms. It was thought that the immune response of the antibodies is not very wasteful but a flexible variable reaction informed by antigens. In contrast, the presently widely held theory of 'clonal selection' is normally understood along Darwinian lines. The theory was proposed by N. K. Jerne and elaborated by F. M. Burnet, who coined the term 'clonal selection'⁸⁹⁷. According to this theory the immune system in a first step blindly produces a vast abundance of cells which produce specific antibodies (immunoglobulins). These cells preexist before their first antigenic encounter. If an antibody is 'selected' by an antigen, its mother cell becomes multiplied in a process of cloning.⁸⁹⁸ Even T. Steel, a main present proponent of scientific neo-Lamarckism—on the level of the organism—, advocates somehow a somatic selection theory on the level of the antibodies.⁸⁹⁹

However, following process-Darwinism this secondary algorithm of an immune 'reaction' is identical with and iterating the primary algorithm of evolution, i. e. natural selection.

b) *Darwinian Economics?*

The structural similarity of some aspects of neo-classical economics and neo-Darwinian biology has recently been newly acknowledged.⁹⁰⁰

In our historical treatment we already came across structural similarities of (neo-)classical economics and (neo-)Darwinian biology. Such resemblances appeared to be due partly to a *direct* historical interaction of Darwinian biology with Smithian, Malthusian and Friedmanian economics, and partly to an *independent* yet similar development of both subjects, growing in a similar intellectual

⁸⁹⁴ E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley, R. V. Blanden. *Lamarck's Signature* (1998), e. g. p. 101.

⁸⁹⁵ P. Medawar and Burnet were awarded the Nobel price in 1960 for the discovery of '*acquired* immunological tolerance'.

⁸⁹⁶ E. Mayr. *Weismann and Evolution* (1985), p. 321.

⁸⁹⁷ See: F. M. Burnet. *The Clonal Selection Theory of Acquired Immunity* (1959). E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley and R. V. Blanden give a historical sketch. *Lamarck's Signature* (1998), pp. 95-102, esp. 95.

⁸⁹⁸ It might be questioned whether this 'selection' should properly be called 'natural' or external, because the organism itself actively contributes much more than in normal natural selection to create this process (☞ pp. 384 f.).

⁸⁹⁹ ☞ p. 148.

⁹⁰⁰ See some critical comparisons, e. g. of: E. L. Khalil. *Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism* (1992); G. M. Hodgson. *Economics and Evolution* (1993).

environment on the same fertile Newtonian soil. Here I shall give only a simplified, idealised account of these comparisons (☉ pp. 173 ff., 197 f.).

Economists following in Smith's wake of classical economics till today mostly applied what I called the 'principle of egoism' on the level of individuals and favoured unrestrained competition. Individuals strive and even ought to strive only to maximise their own benefit. Darwin adopted the principle of egoism in his middle period and likewise applied it on the level of single organisms.

Darwin first conceived his concept of natural selection as he read Malthus' *Essay on the Principle of Population*. Malthus' influence on Darwin has been much discussed. The Darwinian concepts of unconstrained growth of population, of scarcity of recourses, and of struggle for life definitely owed much to Malthus, who also counts as one of the founders of neo-classical economics. Although Malthus also firmly advocated that dependent "poverty ought to be held disgraceful"⁹⁰¹, he like Smith still optimistically held that egoism, competition and struggle would finally lead to the good of all and not only to the survival of the fittest.⁹⁰² Notwithstanding such differences, I have shown earlier that some parallels of classical economics with Darwinian economics remain to be striking.

With few exceptions the application of the principle of egoism on the level of the individual (or of the household) dominated mainstream economics since Smith. This was consolidated by the rise of neo-classical economics after 1870. But other explanatory levels had also been proposed. In economics there is an old 'unit of explanation' or even 'unit of selection' debate. Even a substantial autonomy of macroeconomics has been proposed, e. g. by Keynes. Additionally a macroeconomic approach resulted naturally from new methods like national income accounting.⁹⁰³

In the 1970s the microfoundationalist approach was advocated with new vigour and for a while forced back the concept of a certain autonomy of macroeconomy. Friedman, without taking a biologicistic stance, has explicitly adopted the central concepts of natural selection, competition and survival of the fittest from Darwinian biology as building blocks of his microfoundationalist approach. Specifically he shared with gene-Darwinians a Panglossian brimming with natural selection, which led him to his normative demand of severe competition (☉ p. 197). Similarly Hayek—though not strictly a neo-classical economist—strongly emphasised the universal necessity of competition and even also mentioned a trial-and-error process of cultural selection. Moreover he demanded the abandoning of the 'atavistic concept' of social justice.⁸⁶⁵ Becker and Hirshleifer—inspired by gene-Darwinism—have advocated an account of the biological evolution of the 'rational economic man', providing the bridgehead for the 'principle of egoism' and the maximisation of profit, as is predicted by neo-classical economics.⁹⁰⁴

⁹⁰¹ R. Malthus. *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798, 1st ed.), p. 85; ☉ pp. 174 f.

⁹⁰² P. J. Bowler. *Malthus, Darwin and the Concept of Struggle* (1976). For more ☉ footnote 697.

⁹⁰³ G. M. Hodgson. *Economics and Evolution* (1993), pp. 236 f, 259 f.

⁹⁰⁴ G. S. Becker. *Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology* (1976). Hirshleifer, J.; *Economics from a Biological Viewpoint* (1977). *Natural Economy versus Political Economy* (1978). *Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation and Conflict Strategies* (1982). See: G. M. Hodgson. *Economics and Evolution* (1993), pp. 28-31.

But let us step back for a moment. Not every 'evolutionary economics' is necessarily Darwinian.⁹⁰⁵ Many seemingly Darwinian approaches may only have been inspired by certain aspects of Darwinism, but, according to our stricter definition of a Darwinian Process, should not properly be called 'Darwinian' economics.

We should distinguish two different Darwinian approaches to economics. There is one Darwinian economics which is *biologistic* and focuses on the biological nature of humans (this theory is a component of universal biological Darwinism) and another Darwinian economics which focuses on the Darwinian process of natural selection (a component of Process Darwinism).

It is possible and even probable that the predictions of these two types of Darwinian economics are not compatible. Biologistic Darwinism may result in a psychology where rationality is understood as being adapted to stone age conditions, whereas an economics of process Darwinism in some versions presupposes a perfectly rational optimising economic agent as a *conditio sine qua non* (☞ pp. 327 f).

If theories of economic Darwinism are scrutinised more closely interesting problems arise. Are we indeed concerned with an irrational trial-and-error-mechanism? Is there an equivalent to *blind* overproduction of economic products, agents and firms? What entity has to be regarded as selector? Is the selector 'natural'? Should we call selection by humans exogenous, like Darwinism claims that natural selection is exogenous? Which entities are the units of economic evolution, genes, individuals, social groups, firms, global companies or countries? Is economy in some regards autonomous from the biotic world?

It is even questionable whether 'real existing capitalism' could be interpreted in a Darwinian way. E. g. the tendency to build global companies may contrarily be interpreted as a tendency to build large co-operative and planned entities.

It is not within the scope of this work to discuss these problems of Darwinian economics separately, but in part IV a *general* discussion of universal Darwinism will be given.⁹⁰⁶

Darwinism—in a historical variety of meanings—combined with several different ideologies has actually influenced economics and politics in many more ways than could have been mentioned here.⁹⁰⁷ In the present section we were only concerned with the interaction of Darwinism with neo-classical economics.

In this context it also should be mentioned that in politics Thatcherism and Reaganomics was inspired by Friedman, who explicitly had imported some central concepts from Darwinism (☞ pp. 197 f., also pp. 180 f.).

Also later after the collapse of the 'real existing socialism' in Eastern Europe the only remaining utopia seemed to have been the harshening of the economic struggle for existence on all levels. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, countries, primarily in the Third World and East Europe, during the early 1990s 'liberalised' some hundred economic laws.⁹⁰⁸ I do not intend here to argue that this was plainly wrong. But since then even known advocates of a market economy have pointed out that this predominant tendency may go to far and that a totally unconstrained capitalism and a resulting pauperisation of large parts of the society may become the true enemies of an 'open society'.⁹⁰⁹

⁹⁰⁵ G. M. Hodgson provides a classification of a variety of different approaches to evolutionary economics: *Economics and Evolution* (1993), pp. 39 ff.

⁹⁰⁶ For a biologically informed critique of economic Darwinism: G. M. Hodgson, *Economics and Evolution* (1993), pp. 234-250. E. L. Khalil, *Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism* (1993), pp. 36-57.

⁹⁰⁷ P. J. Bowler (1988, 1984), J. C. Greene (1977/1981), M. Hawkins (1997), R. Hofstadter (1955); ☞ footnotes 439-442.

⁹⁰⁸ Spiegel. *Allein der Markt regiert* (1996), p. 85.

⁹⁰⁹ G. Soros, a Hungarian multi-millionaire, formerly influenced by Popper, now criticises boundless capitalism. *Die kapitalistische Bedrohung* (1997). See also a reply of C. C. v. Weizsäcker, *Die populistische Herausforderung* (1997), who also acknowledged parallels of economics and Darwinism, but criticised a still exaggerated welfare ideology.

Conclusion — *the Universal War of Entities*

Worse than the worst of Hobbes' dreams, the wonderfully simple metaphysics of Universal Darwinism forces us to believe in an ontology of total war. Entities are by definition egoistic and strive to outstrive each other. Panglossism is explained by Panbellicism. The reason for any apparent harmony is an eternal and omnipresent struggle, a truly *bellum omnium contra omnes*.

Two types of Universal Darwinism have been proposed: Universal biological Darwinism (biologistic Darwinism) reduces all entities and processes of culture to Darwinian biology. In its most radical gene-Darwinian version genes have replaced God as the puppeteer, pulling the strings from within our bodies.

Universal Process Darwinism—on which we have focused in the present part—has a slightly richer ontological inventory. There are not only genes, but possibly also genomes, gene-pools, organisms, groups and species; and even cultures, theories and economic firms may be accepted as causal agents. Nevertheless there is only *one* mechanism: blind-variation-and-external-retention (☉ p. 349). The relentless struggle continues on all existing levels. The existence of entities even appears to be defined by their egoistic struggle for life. Other entities are mere means and sometimes not regarded to be essentially real. Antibodies, organisms, the economic man, but also friends, ideas and theories are all fighting only for their own survival.

Whether biologistic or process Darwinism, it seems that Darwinism has replaced theism as a universal explanation: everything exists not because of God's creation, but because of the eternal unchangeable mechanism of natural selection.

It seems hopeless to try to transcend the state of nature culturally, because either culture essentially does not exist, or culture is condemned to work according to the same brute and blind mechanism. Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, dressed in a more respectable Newtonian mantle, seem to celebrate their ultimate victory. Will and life are blind and the world is necessarily and exhaustively bad (or 'value-free'). From a more traditional viewpoint it appears that existence is indeed a mistake and we are living not in the best, but in the worst of all possible worlds.

The blind and irrational aspect of life are now declared to be universal; neither in nature nor in culture a preordained, rationally and ethically ordered *logos* remains. The romantic urge for unification (☉ p. 193) which challenged Descartes' dualism is now not formulated in the way of traditional idealism or traditional life philosophy, but in a materialistic, mechanistic and largely atomistic way. The long-accepted Cartesian cultural compromise had been based on the contrast of *machina mundi* and *alter deus*: of an atomistic and causal world of physics and biology, and a teleological world of culture, ethics and purpose. As historically sketched the modern *alter deus*, the free human subject, finally has become incorporated into the mechanistic vision of *machina mundi*. The enormous project of the Christian disenchantment of Nature (☉ p. 80) has not only achieved the eradication of polytheism, but

finally turned against Christianity itself and even against the remaining secularised humanism. Gene-Darwinism and even process-Darwinism may be seen as the final nails in the coffin of the free *alter deus*. According to modern gene-Darwinism, humans are nothing but gene-machines. Even according to the already much more moderate process-Darwinism nature and culture are blind by definition.

Even today Universal Darwinism is, in my opinion, paradoxically sustained by the theistic concept of universal laws, eternal ideas of God. Whereas the Darwinian blind understanding of evolution undermined any essence and purpose, gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism are surprisingly themselves based on the almost last remaining island of Platonic statics, on a probabilistic but itself eternally unchangeable mechanism, natural selection. As it was in the beginning, it is now, and ever shall be: a world of unrestrained and ruthless competition.

In this part we were concerned to develop versions of Universal Darwinism, not at least to make it accessible, disputable and worth attacking. A mere stigmatisation of these approaches would ignore their positive aspects, which may even partly serve as seeds to transcend this paradigm itself. It would indeed be an tribal conception of science to think simply of two opposed theoretical camps fighting against each other. There is a dynamics of theories, where we indeed have to decide what theory we prefer, but thesis and antithesis are not only opposed, but often mutually dependent. Moreover the intentions of developing a theory may sometimes differ from its final implications.

Even gene-Darwinism, the pinnacle of Darwinian materialism, mechanicism and reductionism, could, in my view, be seen as a turning point towards a metaphysics based rather on information than on matter. The information of genes, not their incorporation by particular molecules is crucial to gene-Darwinism. (⇒ pp 250 f.)

Although in this part we aimed at developing a metaphysics of Darwinism we have already found some cracks within this position. These inconsistencies are more systematically treated in part IV. As the different approaches inspired by Darwinism have fortified each other, I think the criticisms uttered in different subject areas may also support each other.

Part IV: Transcendence of Gene-Darwinism and Universal Process Darwinism

*“A civilisation which cannot burst through its current abstractions is doomed to sterility
after a very limited period of time”*

Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (1926/1925)

A Critique of Universal Darwinism, covering particularly gene-Darwinism but also process-Darwinism,⁹¹⁰ needs to be written. This became clear as much from the unbearable ethical tendencies, which these world views appear to have, as from their inconsistencies,⁹¹¹ such will be addressed systematically in the course of this fourth part. A first account will be given of how these metaphysical frameworks should be transcended. It appears to me that the current scientific and philosophical discourse concerning Universal Darwinism, though in some respects quickly progressing, in others is trapped by a set of mutually supporting assumptions, which need to be challenged in parallel, if a preferable theoretical position should be reached.

I use the term ‘transcend’ (from Latin *transcendere*, to go beyond) to indicate that my criticism methodically does not start the discussion from an *alternative* viewpoint, but from *within* the metaphysics of Universal Darwinism. By criticising these dangerous, but also unifying and innovating ideas from within, we still try to go beyond this position.

I am also using the old-fashioned word ‘transcend’ to indicate the belief that by attacking the metaphysical system of Universal Darwinism we may also learn something from traditional metaphysical systems. I am advocating this without approving a generally backward-looking approach. New problems often do need to be solved in new ways, but after much of the metaphysical lumber had been cleared out by analytical philosophy (at least in the English-speaking world), two points, I think, should be realised. Firstly, the remaining scientific world view—as it also becomes clear in this work—itself is based on some highly general, empirically not directly testable, and in this sense metaphysical assumptions (☹ e. g. pp. 11 f.). Secondly, also some concepts have been abandoned, which we require to resist a metaphysics of Universal Darwinism. While we should try to retain the achieved clarity of analytical philosophy, I think, we should realise again that we are only ‘dwarves on the shoulders of giants’; but surely these dwarves—we—now have to try to see further than the giants have ever seen before.

This present criticism of mine will focus on two main classes of **reductionism**, which have been shown to be at the very heart of the two strands of Universal Darwinism (☹ pp. 203 f.), specific types of *substance reductionism* and *process reductionism*.

Gene-Darwinism, today’s most radical form of Universal Biologistic Darwinism, has been characterised by an extreme biological *substance reductionism*, advocating what I have called ‘gene-atomism’ and ‘germ-line reductionism’. The selfish gene view of evolution is also tied to the principle of entity (gene) egoism. Moreover, also gene-Darwinism is characterised by a radical form of *process reductionism*, i. e. Darwinian process-monism, according to which the process of mutation and elimination is the only real evolutionary mechanism. Modern nominalism indeed has reached another heyday (☹ pp. 140 f., 191 f., 213 f.).

⁹¹⁰ These terms have been introduced earlier, ☹ pp. 203 f.

The other class of theories which could be subsumed under Universal Darwinism is Universal Process Darwinism. Universal Process Darwinism, contrary to Universal Biologistic Darwinism, allows the emergence of new entities like biological species, theories or economic companies, but still denies the emergence of new evolutionary processes. Universal Process Darwinism is hence characterised only by *process* reductionism, advocating that there is only one essential process in both biotic and cultural evolution, the Darwinian process of natural selection. (⇒ pp. 214 f.)

In the following discussion substance reductionism and process reductionism will be criticised in two separate sections. Alternative accounts, which only can be outlined, are presented where they would replace the related types of reductionism.

⁹¹¹ ⇒ esp. pp. 47 f., 229-235.

Chapter 8: Transcendence of Substance Reductionism

In this chapter, I argue that the substance reductionism, which is employed in gene-Darwinism, leads to fundamental theoretical problems.

Generally speaking, the discussion of reductionism, particularly of substance reductionism, seems to be a modernised version of the mediaeval *Dispute about Universalia*. Do general entities or terms (universals like 'species', 'genera' etc.) exist before and out of particular things (*ante rem*), do they exist inseparably within particulars (*in re*), or are they mere convenient abstractions (*in intellectu / post rem*)?⁹¹²

In today's philosophy of biology this dispute is concerned with the question of the unit of selection, or more generally the unit of explanation. Different largely Darwinian subparadigms, as we have seen, employed quite different types of substance reductionism (☞ pp. 107 f.). Darwin himself during his middle period, at the time when he wrote the *Origin*, believed only in the existence of single organisms; only later did he put a little more emphasis on groups and even returned to a typological definition of species. In Fisherism, the first step towards the evolutionary synthesis, the evolutionary relevance of single genes and whole gene pools was advocated. Proponents of the second step of the synthesis added the essential importance of the phenotypic population structure. Gene-atomism and germ-line reductionism of gene-Darwinism, often found in sociobiology, supposes that single selfish genes are the sole agents of evolution, the rest are gene machines, vehicles, or mere means to the genes' end. The impressively meagre gene-Darwinian ontology, with which we are concerned here, claims to cover all apparently existing things, including complex forests outside of us, up to the moral beliefs inside us.

To approach the critique of substance reductionism of this genetic kind, we must first discuss problems of (entity) reductionism in general and then get closer to the specific problems of genetic substance reductionism.

8.1 Problems of Physicalism and Reductionism in General

a) *The Difference between Explanation and (Downward) Reduction*

If 'reduction' is defined in a very general way, *some sort of* reductionism seems to be unavoidable. The core of the notion of reduction (Lat.: *reducere*) is to trace something back to something different. This seems to be linked to the indispensable notion of 'explanation'. An explanation has something to do with restating a phenomenon in different words, which are themselves understood better.

⁹¹² A broad collection of classical and modern texts concerning the dispute about universals is: H.-U. Wöhler. *Texte zum Universalienstreit*, 2 vol. (1994).

But the term ‘reduction’ in philosophy of science today is normally not used so generally. In the wake of logical positivism primarily downward, rather than upward or horizontal, reduction is implied. With this geometric metaphor I presuppose an hierarchy of complexity: from particle physics, atomic physics, chemistry, biology up to sociology. Within the vertical dimension it is not normally upward reduction but downward reduction that is desired, resulting in a physicalist ontology. Downward reductionism, here often for short ‘reductionism’, is the epistemological process of explaining wholes by their parts. I use the *epistemological* notion of ‘downward reductionism’, roughly associated to the *ontological* notions of ‘atomism’, ‘materialism’ and ‘physicalism’.

Although the generally reductionist research programme has brought a gain in downward consistency⁹¹³, three sorts of problems have to be faced and will be discussed subsequently. Firstly, the resulting physicalism provides us with an ontology which itself casts doubt on the materialistic assumptions on which it is built. Secondly, its premiss that wholes are nothing but their elements will be called into question. Thirdly, genetic reductionism, although originating from the same current of thought, comes in contradiction to strict downward reduction, and demands a different frame of thought.

b) *Problems of Modern Physicalism with Traditional Materialism*

If downward reduction (especially in its eliminative form) is strictly applied, we end up in an ‘atomistic’ physicalism. If a whole is nothing but its parts, an ecosystem is nothing but its organisms, a society nothing but its individual members, thoughts are nothing but neuronal activity patterns, a person is nothing but organs, these organs ultimately are molecules, molecules are atoms, atoms are hadrons, and hadrons nothing but elementary particles, then we indeed would have to concede, that there is nothing but elementary particles.

Such an understanding of part-whole relations seems to be the core of materialism, and particularly physicalism, which advocates that only microscopic physical entities (and some eternal laws of nature) are real. According to this view the whole is not only constituted by its parts, but it actually *is* its parts and *nothing but* its parts. This view has been linked to a ‘billiard ball-concept’ of matter, figuring matter as solid and independent bits. Although this concept was strongly inspired by physics, the confirmed concepts of modern physics (relativity and quantum physics) paradoxically have broken with this ‘billiard ball picture’.⁹¹⁴

- The ‘particles’ of physics are not particles in the classical sense, opposed to fields of forces, but are themselves entities which have properties of both particles *and* waves. After the problem has arisen that light, traditionally a wave, also had properties of a particle (Einstein), it soon became apparent *vice versa* that matter could be described by wave equations (L. V. de Broglie, E. Schrödinger).

⁹¹³ Mostly high level terms have been made consistent with low level terms. Though this is of course positive, it becomes, I think, one-sided if this is done at the expense of *upward* consistency, for example denying—without much resistance—the existence of whole strata, like the cognitive world (e. g. qualia).

Also experimentally this counter-intuitive wave-particle dualism can easily be made apparent. For example in two-slit experiments single electrons which have passed through slits could be detected individually at the end of their route (as particle), but it could also be shown that ‘particles’ each behave differently depending on whether one or two slits are open, as if each would have passed *several* slits (like a wave actually does). According to the so-called Copenhagen Interpretation (N. Bohr, W. Heisenberg), the orthodox view today, reality can be ascribed only to a measurement and the wave-particle dualism does not reflect an inadequacy in present scientific knowledge, but is in this sense fundamental reality. Hence, elementary ‘particles’ are ontologically no longer only understood as ‘billiard balls’, but also as waves and distributions of probability.⁹¹⁵

- The Uncertainty Principle (Heisenberg) states that it is impossible to precisely specify certain quantities simultaneously, like the position and the momentum of a particle. In contrast to classical physics an electron can no longer be said to be at any precise point at any given time. The Copenhagen Interpretation understood this indeterminacy ontologically. Despite a strong opposition to this interpretation (A. Einstein, M. Planck) this opinion is nowadays still favoured by most physicists.⁹¹⁵
- The Uncertainty Principle likewise shows (and measures) the dependence of physical facts upon observation.
- The finding of new elementary ‘particles’ is an ongoing process. In the eliminative-materialistic sense it is not clear (and even improbable) whether today's elementary particles, and hence the basis of our ontology, does strictly speaking ‘exist’. Moreover, in principle it is not clear whether there is an explanatory bottom, a level of basic elements, which could ever be reached.
- $E = mc^2$ expresses the equivalence and, in principle, even the convertibility of energy and matter.⁹¹⁶
- According to the theory of relativity the distinction of particles and space could not be sustained. Particles influence the space in which they move.

If we accept the truth of modern physics and dismiss the ‘billiard-ball’ model of matter, it might still not be logically necessary to abandon materialism and (eliminative) downward reductionism as well. But in several respects they lose most of their intuitive appeal:

(a) The concept of fields is not materialistic. It is doubtful if a resulting ontology, where ‘matter’ and energy are convertible and where ‘matter’ is not only described by particles but by waves, probability distributions or fields, should still be called a *materialistic* position. Although it is of course possible to stipulate the definition of matter in a new way, I think this is not reasonable from the vantage point of

⁹¹⁴ Similar: M. v. Sydow. *A Discussion of Paul M. Churchland's Neurocomputational Perspective* (1993).

⁹¹⁵ Cf.: C. F. v. Weizsäcker. *Aufbau der Physik* (1985), pp. 490 f. 526 f.; also e. g.: A. J. Leggett. *Physik. Probleme - Themen - Fragen*. Basel, Boston, Berlin: Birkhäuser (1989), pp. 216 f..

⁹¹⁶ Also the less intuitive aspect of this Einsteinian prediction recently has been confirmed. In a Stanford particle accelerator a huge amount of energy was used to create matter (less than one atom). U. Schnabel. *Warum ist etwas?* (1997).

the history of thought. The concept of fields is in my understanding rather reminiscent of Antique *hylemorphism*, of the Aristotelian kind, than of pure materialism.

(b) The concept of higher strata would not be materialistic. Proponents of the 'billiard ball concept of matter' will be inclined to believe that the whole is nothing but its parts. Who alternatively thinks in terms of fields, forms or '*Gestalten*' will presumably be rather inclined to think of wholes as something more or something different from their parts. In this view it appears more appropriate to understand properties not only as being determined by the parts, but by their structure. Bohr, for example, in regard to two-slit experiments has always stressed the particle-wave individuality, which could not be decomposed into parts. This still may not be conclusive for an ontology of strata above particle physics. Additionally, the particularly modern physical theory of synergetics has favoured properties on the level of whole systems (H. Haken). It is doubtful whether a position which allows such higher partly autonomous explanatory levels, can still be called 'materialistic'.

(c) Scepticism concerning the 'thing in itself' is rather associated with theories opposed to materialism. In regard to epistemological questions materialism is at least historically correlated with realism. But modern physics rather appears to oppose any strong version of realism. If we accepted the physicalistic belief that physics is cardinal also for epistemology, then the uncertainty principle as well as doubts about the indivisibility of 'elementary particles' (and thus about their reality) would, I think, support at least a limited scepticism concerning the 'thing in itself' (*'Ding an sich'*). But a sceptic attitude towards our empirical knowledge has particularly been a hallmark of idealism.

(d) Matter is in an epistemological sense not simple. Materialism historically tried to base our philosophy on obvious experiences of the physical world. Modern physics at a first glance is a paradigm case for the success of a research programme of exhaustive downward reduction of complexes into simples. But the conception of a simple idea and of a simple ontological entity has become dissociated. The search for ontological simple indivisible entities actually resulted in concepts of entities which are epistemologically not simple, but complex in the sense of being non intuitive. In this sense materialism has lost the advantage of epistemological simplicity.

(e) The actual complexity of the world casts at least a pragmatic doubt on the full feasibility of the materialistic research programme. Even if it would in principle be possible to explain every whole completely in terms of its parts, this programme of reduction might get into difficulties. Not even the three body problem is exactly solvable (not even in the relatively simple mathematics of classical dynamics) and only a single drop of water contains more than a million million billion atoms.

c) *Logical Problems of the Modern Understanding of Substance — Is a Tree a Million Matches?*

The scientific question of reductionism in the 21st century is bound up with very old philosophical difficulties, concerning the concepts of *substance* and *accident*. The concept of **substance** had already

been central in Antique and scholastic philosophy. In its Cartesian twist it became crucial to the modern era. Today the concept is still with us, for example, in the search for elementary particles or single 'egoistic' genes.

Substance traditionally has been regarded as (the concept of) a being which does not need another (concept of a) being for its own existence. A substance is unchangeable, indivisible and independent. It is what is constant and what continuously underlies the changing flux of phenomena. This is the core of the notion throughout two and a half millennia. (In a way this is the unchanging substance of the notion substance.) This is already found in Plato's concept of underlying eternal forms or 'ideas'. Equally Aristotle regards substances mainly as the underlying form (*eidōs*) of actual beings.⁹¹⁷

Also *Descartes' notion of substance* retained these meanings, but was not understood in the sense of *causa formalis*, but more and more in the sense of *causa materialis*. I will call this understanding of substance the '*modern understanding*', because its predominance starts at the beginning of modern philosophy with the Cartesian notion of *res extensa* (although substance was still sometimes understood differently). The concept of *res extensa* led to the 'billiard ball' model of simple bits of matter and to downward reductionism. Now the concept of substance denotes unchangeable elements constituting a whole, strictly speaking, only the smallest eternal bits of matter. This modern understanding of substances can be spelled out as the complete immanence of properties of the whole within its single material parts. Elements are defined not only historically, but also logically prior to the whole, and they are assumed independent and not defined by the relation in which they are involved. In such a world there *are*, in principle, no new wholes, since there are no wholes. There are only new configurations.⁹¹⁸ But configurations do not have any causal impact themselves.

Eliminative Downward Reductionism transposes this ontological idea to epistemology. The whole has no own (relational) properties, which could not be explained by properties of the single elements.

This modern understanding of substance could be regarded as the fundament of ontological or methodological individualism and atomism, present in many areas of physics, psychology and economy etc. Without getting involved in this topic in detail, this philosophy seems to me to be even embedded in some seemingly neutral instruments, for example classical test theory which presupposes the independence of all test items. In our context this modern understanding of substance has a pivotal role for the gene-Darwinian focus on single genes (☞ pp. 140).

In this context, the current **debate**, concerning the question of **eliminative materialism and reductionism versus emergentism, fulgurationism**⁵³¹ and **supervenience**⁹¹⁹ is of interest, but a full

⁹¹⁷ Aristotle. *Metaphysics*. 7th book. (It is only not clear whether this *eidōs* is something individual or general.)

⁹¹⁸ L. Wittgenstein. *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (1922/1921), 2.027; ☞ footnote 752.

⁹¹⁹ See, for example: E. J. Lowe. *Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism* (2000); J. Kim. *Mind in a Physical World* (1998); A. Beckermann. *Supervenience, Emergence, and Reduction* (1992); J. Kim. 'Downward Causation' in *Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism* (1992); R. v. Gulick. *Nonreductive Materialism and the Nature of Intertheoretical Constraint* (1992). W. Krohn, G. Küppers (ed.). *Emergenz: Die Entstehung von Ordnung*,

treatment of this lively dispute, mainly concerned with the mind-body problem, would have extended the scope of this work. Moreover, it appears to me that most disputants unanimously start from a modern understanding of substance (as *causa materialis*) and only discuss whether systemic properties are acceptable on this basis. Often the presupposition that there are constituting elements is not questioned. Instead it is only considered whether there are emergent properties, what character such properties might have and whether they could have causal relevance (downward causation).⁹²⁰

My discussion of this problem starts from the opposite direction. It is not the possibility of the existence of emergent properties, but the possibility of the exclusive existence of basic elements (substances in the modern sense) that is questioned. But, first I have to make clear why there is a problem at all because the intuitive concept of emergent properties appears questionable, if one starts with the modern understanding of substance.

Emergent properties *prima facie* appear to be unproblematic. If elements are combined, they might form new relations and we might experience a new phenomenon. This holds for all sorts of subject areas. For example, if two people meet, they have the possibility of chatting; but—unsurprisingly—neither of them could (if they are sane) chat on their own.

This has also been stressed by synergetics, a new school or discipline of physics, which in my opinion implicitly modifies the modern understanding of substance.⁹²¹ We take one class of the ontologically simplest bits of matter as an example. Three quarks (or antiquarks) could form a hadron (or antihadron), the smallest compound bits of matter. An example of a hadron is a proton or a neutron. The system of a hadron has the property to be in different energetic states, although the single elementary particles do not have this property.⁹²² On the next level of complexity, an atom, built by up to 350 constituting parts (protons, neutrons, electrons), has again many new properties. New properties may not only emerge by adding new elements to the system, but also if a mere relational change of an identical set of elements occurs.⁹²³ This becomes apparent e. g. in the different properties of physical isomers (nuclei, which are identical in regard of their *number* of protons *and* neutrons, but have a different radioactive decay) or in chemical isomers (molecules, which consist of the same chemical elements, but whose atoms are arranged differently). But the phenomenon of structural properties seems

Organisation und Bedeutung (1992). J. Kim. *The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism* (1989); P. Bieri. (ed.) *Analytische Philosophie des Geistes* (1981); J. A. Fodor. *Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)* (1974).

⁹²⁰ But, for example, ↪ footnote 1029.

⁹²¹ H. Haken is the nestor of synergetics. See his *Synergetics, Nonequilibrium Phase Transitions and Self-Organisation in Physics, Chemistry and Biology* (1983). There is also a Springer series on synergetics published by him. K. Stierstadt, *Physik der Materie* (1989), is an excellent textbook on physics in general, written from the viewpoint of synergetics.

⁹²² Epistemologically hadrons are even prior to quarks, not that they have been known earlier, but in the sense that Quarks could never be observed themselves. We only observe that hadrons get into different energetic states and infer the existence of quarks, because we have to assume an internal structure of these hadrons.

⁹²³ Moreover, one could distinguish two types of properties of a system: 'collective' properties, which build an average of the properties of the parts (e. g. compressibility of an ideal gas), and 'co-operative' properties, which are mainly determined by a certain interaction of the parts (e. g. polarizability).

to be even more general. I think, one might also conceive phase transitions in this way, e. g. the transition of H₂O from ice to water to gas, or in principle also any chemical reactions. In all cases the elements remain (broadly) the same, only energy changes. Elements primarily change partners or change their structural position, but this results in completely different properties.

The appearance of new phenomena seems to be too obvious to be disputed, but the crucial question is how to explain the nature of these phenomena.

Eliminative materialism or downward reductionism can be seen as ontological or epistemological expressions of a position, both of which advocate (1.) that in principle there is nothing new⁹²⁴ and (2.) that apparently 'new' phenomena should be theoretically completely explainable by their old elements. According to this conception society is nothing but its individual members and humans are finally nothing but basic material elements.

Dawkins, distinguished radicaliser and populariser of a gene-Darwinian biology, but philosophically not particularly well versed, apparently regards downward reductionism as the only possible form of explanation.⁹²⁵

(1.) The first of the above assumptions about the impossibility of newness could be stated in different words. The actual and changing world is not the real World based on eternal substances. This still mirrors the Platonic concept of eternal ideas (ἰδέαι) and the scholastic distinction of a changing world (*mundus sensibilis*) and a real eternal world (*mundus intelligibilis*). (☉ p. 83)

Although an assertion of an impossibility of newness seems quite daring—especially after we have shown above the intuitiveness of emergent phenomena—I think there is logically, or at least heuristically, an argument in favour of this view. If we equate 'new' with 'unknown', and 'old' with 'known', then it should become obvious, that we always have to understand the *unknown* by the *known*, hence the *new* by the *old*. Any phenomenon which would be *radically* 'new', would not be *understandable*. Thus, the assumption that the new is in fact old (if we do not want to call it a miracle or actually give up trying to explain it) seems strangely to be a necessary precondition of any understanding (in a way, a truth *a priori*)⁹²⁶. Here I do not discuss this argument any further, which unites the traditional *and* modern conception of substance, but concentrate on the second position, which is specific to the modern conception of substance.

(2.) The second assumption at first glance only restates aspects of the first. There is nothing new, the new is the old and the new has to be explained by the old elements.

But the second assumption almost silently introduces another aspect, which I shall oppose. Now, the new should not only be explained generally by the old or the known, but by old or known *elements*. We again face the modern understanding of substance. Substance is seen as composing bits of matter. *Causa materialis* has supplanted *causa formalis*—or, I think, one might also say *causa relationalis*.

⁹²⁴ Cf.: R. Löw. *Die Entstehung des Neuen in der Natur* (1984), p. 58.

⁹²⁵ R. Dawkins. *The Blind Watchmaker* (1986/1991), pp. 11-15.

⁹²⁶ Cf.: I. Kant. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781/1787), 'Grundsatz der Beharrlichkeit der Substanz' and A 206/B 251.

According to this modern understanding of substances there is eternal matter, but no eternal form or relation; a whole has no explanans apart from its elements. The form, the structure or the relations of the compounds are understood as being epiphenomena and conceptually have to be woven separately into each element composing that compound. Positively this makes causes locatable. But is a conception, according to which *all* phenomenal properties are reduced to separate *basic* elements, viable?

With this question we come back to the task (instead of arguing positively in favour of higher level explanations) of challenging the assumption that reality is in principle understandable in terms of basic elements.

In the following argument I aim to show that such a conception is not free from fundamental difficulties. I shall argue that it is impossible to explain an apparent property, apparently given on the level of a system, only by referring to its constituent elements (substances in the modern sense), without making use of notions like form, relation or higher level explanations.

If we were to collect all compounding atoms of a human, we would of course not yet have created a human. A supporter of *causa formalis* may interpret this simple fact as support for the conception that not only matter but also form is a necessary causal factor. A supporter of an approach exclusively based on *causa materialis* would of course not directly surrender. Whereas the former would argue that the form or, here understood synonymously, the specific relations between the elements have an independent role in explanation, the latter would have to build the confining conditions under which a 'higher' property appears into the concepts of each basic component.

But if one tries to do this, an aporia of reductionism becomes apparent. The confining conditions for an element to produce a certain property are necessarily related to other entities, to the constellation of the relevant system. The properties of water become apparent only if oxygen (under certain conditions) builds a compound with hydrogen atoms. The relation can not be eliminated.

A relation R is a two place predicate which has to connect at least two entities, a and b (or the concept of these entities). The reductionist might argue that it is possible to restate the property P of the relation Rab , on the side of entity a with a proposition, like 'the entity a , if in a certain relation R to b , has a certain property P ', and on the side of entity b with the proposition 'the entity a , if in a certain relation R to b , has a certain property P '.

I want to argue, that according to such a redefinition, both entities, a and b , would, against our intention, not be defined as substances in the strict sense any more.

(a) As we have seen, it is a crucial aspect of the notion of a substance that it is '(a concept of) a being which does not need another (concept of) being for its own existence'.

But the redefinition of the entities a and b does not eliminate the relation. The relation is still mentioned in the definition of the entities as a constraining condition for showing certain properties.

Moreover, now *a* would even need to incorporate *b* within its own definition! Oxygen, for example, would be defined as an entity which, if in a certain relation to two hydrogen atoms, shows the properties of water. Thereby, the entity *a* is not at all defined independently, but it is *by definition* related to the other entity *b*. Furthermore the entity *b* is in turn also related to *a*, and this proceeds *ad infinitum*. This implies that each definition would become self-referential, since the entity which is used in the redefinition (a part of the *definiens*) is in turn related to the entity which is to be defined (the *definiendum*). Self-reference is in my view an interesting property, but it is definitely an unintended one from the viewpoint of a reductionist. However, the idea of the independence of the substance is not fulfilled. Hence, an understanding of substances as independent basic elements, appears to me generally to be self-refuting and inconsistent.

(b) A second aspect of a substance is usually that it is simple. The simplicity of unrelatedness has been discussed above. Reductionists with only a weaker concept of substance (maybe claiming that alternative concepts also end up in aporia) may still refer to a *prima facie* appeal to simplicity. It appears at least epistemologically simple, if all properties are located in final elements. Although we of course daily make use of the concept of components (just as we make use of wholes), I want to show that a radical application of this idea is not reasonable. Taking up the line of argument from the last paragraph, a thorough reductionist redefinition of entities, would paradoxically finally force us to incorporate the whole world into the definition of each entity. Oxygen builds compounds not only with hydrogen but with many other elements, which would have to be incorporated into our definition. Not enough, these compounds would have to be extended to large systems to integrate, for example, properties of humans, like walking or thinking, in which water definitely somehow plays a role. One would have to consider all such higher level properties. Even the sober biologist Mayr mentioned that a thorough reductionist account—instead of accepting emerging entities—would, strictly understood, force its advocates to adopt pan-psychic or hylozoic theories of matter (if they do not simply deny phenomena like thought).⁹²⁷ It would also follow, that all elements and constraining relational conditions which are involved in producing such properties or processes would have to be incorporated into the definition of oxygen as well. In a general downward reductionist epistemology all other elements would also have to be defined likewise. Hence if a certain element were not yet *directly* part of this definition of oxygen, it would definitely in a secondary, tertiary etc. way (via the definition of hydrogen etc.) be integrated. Hence, it follows from taking reductionism to its true conclusions that the whole world — with all its elements and its higher properties — would finally have to be incorporated into the definition of each single element!

Such an result would be totally opposed to the original idea sought after by the independent definition of basic elements. Concerned with the aspect of simplicity, we see how the apparently

⁹²⁷ E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 64.

beautiful simple concept of (downward) reductionism, explaining all phenomenal properties of 'higher' systems in terms of 'lower' systems, quickly degenerates into a highly complicated and inconvenient philosophy. Even if it were in principle possible to transfer all properties of the known compound entities into the concept of elementary particles (which is of course actually not done), then these concepts would become loaded with an infinite bulk of conditions under which potential properties are shown.

(c) Finally, it follows that the concept of the unchangeability of substances can not be sustained. I am not concerned with our factual knowledge that hydrogen itself only becomes stable in a certain stage of the evolution of the universe (one may circumvent this problem by referring to currently basic elements). I am concerned with the rather logical problem that the relationships, which are part of our definition change in time, as nature, history and also our knowledge of these processes develops. For example, the definition of the basic components of genes, the nucleotide bases adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine, would not only have to integrate the possibility of replication, but also sexual reproduction (of which it builds the basis) as well as this present thought of mine.

In conclusion, an ontology built exclusively out of single substances—in the sense of *causa materialis*—bears huge difficulties. Three defining criteria of elementary 'substances' could not be sustained. Above all (a), a material substance seems not to be definable without relation to other entities, it could thus not said to be independent from other entities. Secondly (b), the resulting view seems far from being epistemologically simple, and thirdly (c), the definition of a substance changes throughout time.

It is not within the scope of this work to elaborate a positive alternative account on this general level. Here it should be enough to have pointed out that metaphysical problems weight heavily upon the seemingly simple modern notion of substance and its epistemological counterpart of downward reductionism. To assume from the outset that the whole is nothing but its parts, is at least no less problematic than assuming properties on the level of a system. Although not trying to elaborate an alternative on such a general level, in specific areas I still shall contribute in the further course of this work to the rehabilitation of a modified Aristotelian aetiology, by introducing some ideas which may help to render *causa formalis* more acceptable. Nevertheless, I want already here, without making use of explicitly Aristotelian concepts show how the concept of downward reductionism as the only possible form of explanation might be transcended.

I conceded that one may need to explain the new by the old, the unknown by the known. But given this premiss, how can one conceive an explanation which is not completely downward reductionist. Although (downward) reductionism is an important way of explaining the new by the old, there are, I think, other forms of explanation as well.

I want to distinguish at least four types of explaining the new by the old. The first two types could be called 'analyses' since they are concerned with a closer scrutiny of the details of the entity in questions. Besides an (a) analysis of elements (downward reductionism), there is, I think, also an irreducible (b) analysis of the relations of these elements. The other two types of explanation may be called synthesis, since they explain by taking the larger context into account. There is (c) a

synthesis with analogous (external) cases and (d) a synthesis with external conditions or causes. I do not discuss whether these explanations are types or aspects, or whether in an analyses synthesis always plays a part and vice versa, etc. I only want to give an impression that there are aspects of an explanation going beyond downward reductionism.

Additionally I give examples for each of the two latter points, which may appear more opaque. (c) Chemistry, a field which has often served to provide examples for downward reductionism, could also illustrate the concept of a 'synthesis with analogous cases'. Chemistry has not only derived its knowledge of the elements by an analysis of its components, but *also* by analogies with other elements, which had become systematised in the periodic table (1869/1870 by Mendeleev and Meyer). Only from such analogies could 'new' elements and their properties be predicted. (d) An example for a 'synthesis with external conditions' could be the 'Coriolis force'. If we must explain the direction of a whirl in a wash-basin we could only reach a sufficient understanding, if we actually take the rotation of the whole earth into account.

The consequences and problems of such an alternative account could not be accessed here. I only proposed this classification to show that there are types or aspects of explanation which are often ignored by staunch reductionists.⁹²⁵

d) *The Inconsistency between Biologism and Physicalism — Genes or Information instead of Quarks?*

This section firstly sets out to show that a gene-ontological approach, despite being biologically downward reductive, is itself in contradiction with strict downward reductionism, i. e. physicalism. Secondly, the notion of a replicator is introduced as the specifically gene-Darwinian justification for stopping reduction at the explanatory level of selfish genes. Thirdly, closer scrutiny of the notion of a replicator reveals that the very notion of a replicator—against the intention of the gene-Darwinians—undermines a materialistic account, and proposes an ontology which is built on form and information as opposed to matter.⁹²⁸ I shall argue that the resulting informational or semiotic ontology paradoxically undermines the inner-biological reductionism of gene-Darwinism from which this view derived.

(1.) Biologism on the one hand is inspired by general downward reductionism, defining cultural phenomena in terms of biological phenomena. On the other hand biologism comes into **contradiction** with thorough downward reductionism, which would finally result in physicalism. In principle, downward reduction should not stop until it has reached the lowest possible level of explanation (☹ pp. 243 f.). Leaving my earlier general objections aside, taken as a general philosophy, *any* wholes would have to be determined in terms of their parts, till we reach the final a-toms, the smallest non divisible entity, or, still more modern, the elementary particles of physics.

The ambivalent relation of biologism to downward reductionism also holds for gene-Darwinism as a prototypic biologicistic approach (☹ pp. 140 f., 191 f., 240 f.). Advocates of a gene ontology on the one hand are notoriously enthusiastic about substance reductionism: ecosystems, societies, gene-pools, organisms and genomes are regarded as mere epiphenomena, and single genes are regarded to be essentially the only real biological (and sociological) entities (☹ pp. 42 f.; 259 f.). On the other hand this downward reductionist account suddenly stops at the 'bottom' of the biological sphere, at the explanatory level of single selfish genes. Despite a particularly strong inner-biological reductionism, this approach is still inconsistent with thorough reductionism. Later on, the assumption of genes as the only unit of explanation, denying all larger units, will be challenged (☹ pp. 258 f.). Presently, we have to

grapple with the problem of why genes themselves are not too *large* as units of explanation, provided that one favours a downward reductionist account.

An advocate of gene-Darwinism might object to this reproach for being inconsistent with thorough downward reductionism, that he or she still subscribes to downward reductionism, but that any reduction has to be done in pragmatic and viable steps. In the long run, the gene will also be reduced to biochemistry, etc.

I would oppose such an interpretation of their enterprise, since it is apparently inconsistent with the claims and scientific practice of this school. I think, gene-Darwinians truly believe in the existence of genes. Normally promoters of this approach, as we saw, contrast the reality of genes with the epiphenomenality of genomes, groups and ecosystems. This contrast would not be reasonable if genes were ultimately supposed to be as unreal as groups are believed to be. The entire debate concerned with the unit of selection would be misconceived, if in principle all levels were not real anyway, i. e. there would finally be no entity which is replicating or which is being selected, but only chemical reactions.

Additionally, assuming that there were no theoretical framework in biology, it would not be obvious why so much attention should be given to genes, any DNA molecules. Plain downward reductionism should proceed continually. If one only wanted to proceed in the reductionist quest pragmatically step after step, one would also from time to time use levels above or below the level of single genes.

Explanatory levels above the level of the gene (e. g. individual animals, genomes etc.) are indeed sometimes employed, but these explanations are consistently used as provisory or short-cut explanations only. I see also no general tendency that in this paradigm explanations are increasingly given on a *sub-genetic* level. Gene-Darwinians (though seldom geneticists) do not, of course, deny the existence of bio-chemical or subatomic reactions, but they do not focus on them. They might use a 'deeper' explanatory level to explain aspects of the gene-level above (for example to show how X-rays could cause random genetic mutations), but they will always be interested, not in the chemical reaction itself, but in the higher explanatory level of the survival of genes.

If advocates of gene-Darwinism only claimed that larger units have to be explained by smaller ones, resulting in physicalism, and there had been a book called 'The Selfish Gene Pool', 'The Selfish Genome' or 'The Selfish Quark', this would presumably not have triggered the same paradigm and the same dispute.

I conclude, that advocates of gene-Darwinism do attribute to genes a stronger degree of reality than would be justifiable on the ground of plain downward reductionism.

(2.) Now it is our task to show that supporters of a gene-ontology might, even within their generally reductive framework, have reason to stop reduction at the level of what is called replicators.

Whatever such an explanation might look like, I think, one cannot deny that any such explanation is by definition in contradiction with an exclusively downward reductionist approach. This exception may undermine the downward reductionist approach and it would become more plausible that explanatory

⁹²⁸ This section was first presented as a talk at the post-graduate philosophy seminar (*eidosis*) at the University of Durham under the title: *Gene-Darwinism, Form and Information* (22nd Sep. 1999).

levels above selfish genes became accepted. Still it would also be possible—albeit implausible—to accept only *one* new entity or process which could not be reduced to physics. We have to look for an explanation which might justify the special treatment of ‘selfish genes’ without already at first glance, being incoherent with the remaining reductionist attitude of the gene-Darwinian paradigm.

Many gene-atomists in fact do not ponder questions of this rather metaphysical kind: *why* reduction should stop at this explanatory level, or *why* it is at least pragmatically convenient to stop at this level. They—as we have seen—usually simply proceed in this way.

I think, the extraordinary centrality and the irreducibility of the gene in gene-Darwinism is linked to certain aspects of the notion of a replicator. “What is important about the gene is just that it has a certain combination of logical features. It is a replicator”.⁹²⁹ Dawkins in particular has made the importance of this notion explicit. I agree with Hull, that Dawkins has in this regard committed an act of metaphysics.⁹³⁰ Dawkins defines a replicator as “any entity in the universe which interacts [...] in such a way that copies are made”.⁹³¹ The notion of a replicator is, I think, indeed general enough (like Aristotle’s notion of *anima*), to also serve as a criterion to divide the inanimate world of physics and chemistry, from the animate world of biology and sociology.

It may be odd to assume that Dawkins, a renown ardent downward reductionist, should be regarded as a defender of the autonomy of biology. I do not know, whether he ever explicitly argued in this way, but his writings, in my opinion, suggest that he would have to support such a view, especially his emphasis on and his definition of the notion replicator, but also his neglect of physical and chemical evolution.

Anyway, given that gene-Darwinism has to justify an explanatory level of genes above physics, I think, no other argument is provided by this paradigm. Hence, in my view advocates of a gene-ontology—if they were more concerned with these philosophical topics—would have to argue this way.

Before we come to *justify* why a replicator could count as unit of explanation, not reducible to chemistry or physics, we should pause and consider whether the notion of a replicator might be a one-sided starting point of an inquiry. Although the main part of this work is dedicated to criticising gene-atomism and germ-line reductionism, I generally agree that the metaphysical (abstract and general) notion of a replicator is helpful for establishing the autonomy of the life sciences. Nevertheless, I concede that the notion of a replicator has a downward reductive leaning.

Even if we were to adopt my later informational interpretation of a replicator as the basis for reconstructing the autonomy of the life sciences, we should be aware that this starting point still may have a **reductionist leaning**. A replicator—and hence of the origin of life—is normally imagined merely as being a molecule, presumably RNA or DNA. The concept of a replicator is normally a single entity and not a system or a part of a larger whole, say a cell.⁹³² A definition of life based on replicators not only excludes stars and volcanoes from the animate world (a consequence we may welcome), it may also have a general tendency to neglect larger systems like ecosystems etc.

I think it would make a difference to take the notion of a metabolism as starting point for the life sciences. The Nobel laureate M. Eigen has proposed the concept of a hypercycle with a stronger focus on systems, on the structure of the phenotype and maybe even on change without proliferation. I do not want to exclude the possibility, that the two concepts

⁹²⁹ J. L. Mackie. *The Law of the Jungle* (1978), p. 459.

⁹³⁰ D. Hull. *Units of Evolution: A Metaphysical Essay* (1981), pp. 30.

⁹³¹ R. Dawkins. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 67. See: *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 15

⁹³² Cf. e. g.: Ch. v. Guttenberg. *Biologie als Weltanschauung* (1967), 63-64.

may be made coherent.⁹³³ Since I am trying to transcend gene-Darwinism from within, I only mention this slightly different starting point, without elaborating upon it.

Also in regard to processes, the notion of a replicator is in my view linked with a position, which takes Darwinian processes at least as starting point (⇒ the following argument b) and hence might exclude a strong understanding of developmentalism.

For the time being we may ignore this possible one-sidedness. Why should a replicator count as a unit of explanation, not being reducible to chemistry or physics? I give two answers. The first answer (a) would emphasise properties of wholes, and is not be worked out at detail, because it somehow states a position opposed to downward reductionism. The second answer (b) resembles better the reasons why gene-Darwinians actually hold this position. The second answer, however, replaces the problem rather than solving it. I do not think it is necessarily inconsistent with my first one so, instead I am going to show that—involuntarily—it hinges on arguments of the first answer. Linked to this, it will also be shown why the notion of a replicator undermines a strict materialist account.

(a) A replicator, in my view, is a *system* of chemical components, and relations between them, with a certain relation to its surrounding. Only the whole system with its relations has the property of copying itself. Simpler entities, even, for example, 'organic' molecules do not have this property of copying themselves. My general critical account of radical downward reductionism has already been given, and does not need to be repeated here.

(b) A replicator, in the view of gene-Darwinism, may have acquired its special status, because of its link with *Darwinian processes* (⇒ pp. 216 f.).⁹³⁴ Despite my critical stance towards any *exclusive* Darwinian metaphysic, I have to draw attention to the fact, that the simplest notion of a replicator is, I think, indeed linked with the simplest notion of evolution, i. e. Darwinian evolution. Imagine the simplest thinkable atomistic replicator in the primeval soup. This replicator, like every replicator, is defined by the process of copying. But this first replicator will copy either quickly or slowly, accurately or inaccurately, with huge or little variance, and hence this process of proliferation is, I concede, as blind as possible (on blindness ⇒ pp. 358 f.). The proliferated replicators lack (nearly) any structure of their own and are not part of a larger whole and could, as far as it is possible, be regarded as being *externally* selected. This simple notion of a replicator leads within the limits of even our strict definition, to what we have called a Darwinian process (⇒ pp. 348 f.).

Following this line of argument, regarding the existence of a replicator as the dividing line between biology and chemistry appears obvious. Gene-Darwinism, implicitly following this argument, accordingly regards the resulting property of evolving replicators and the corresponding process of natural selection as irreducible topics of biology.

⁹³³ Cf.: R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1989/76), his added footnote to p. 14 on p. 269.

⁹³⁴ Also R. Dawkins points out (without elaborating it) that the notion of a replicator implies the notion of natural selection. *River Out of Eden* (1995), pp. xi-xii.

Although I also want to draw this conclusion, I think that this quite Darwinian argument, defending the reality of replicators, leads it on further, and finally undermines its own roots. The argument hinges on assumptions, which, if spelled out in detail, undermine the materialistic legacy of this approach.

Firstly, even if we accepted the presupposed evidence of the existence of Darwinian processes (as I actually do) the above argument has only replaced the problem rather than solving it. In a *regress* a gene-Darwinist replaces the problem of the irreducibility of a replicator to mere matter in motion by the problem of the irreducibility of natural selection to mere matter in motion.

Secondly, given that the notion of a simple replicator implies a Darwinian process, it does not follow that the other way round the existence of Darwinian Processes also implies the existence of simple replicators. This depends on how both notions are defined. It might indeed be reasonable to define these notions in a way that they imply each other. A disadvantage of a resulting strict definition of Darwinian processes might be that drops of water and planets—also somehow ‘evolving’—would be excluded from the scope of a Darwinian metaphysics. However, such a definition, in my opinion, would, surprisingly, tend to undermine Darwinian process-monism. Each new ‘higher’ biological object, accepted in our ontological inventory, while refuting pure gene-atomism, would be a candidate to undermine Darwinian process-monism as well.

Thirdly, if we had accepted the equivalence of a simple replicator and a gene-Darwinian process, the notion of a Darwinian Process emphasises—besides blind variation—a second step of external selection. This reference to the external world (though a relationship in a quite limited sense) may be crucial to why this process could not be reduced to its internal parts. In my proposed classification of explanations this would be a ‘synthesis with external causes’ (type 4). But if this is the hidden reason to resist downward reduction in this specific case, this reference to external causes may also be necessary for many other explanations, undermining downward reductionism generally.

Fourthly, this kind of external relationship appears not to suffice, neither to sustain the irreducibility of a replicator nor to characterise a replicator. External selection alone, in the mere sense of surviving or not surviving, being or not being (depending on the external circumstances), could also be applied (in an almost tautological way) to drops of water and planets. Hence, this either undermines the discussed account, or we need an additional characterisation to differentiate between drops of water and replicators.

Following this line of argument, the notion of a replicator, although itself intimately linked to gene-Darwinism, either directly undermines gene-Darwinism or requires that we find another aspect of the notion of a replicator, which renders genes irreducible, but does not transcend gene-Darwinism. In the following subsection I show that the other aspect of the notion of a replicator, the reference to the sameness of the copy, generally tends to undermine a materialistic approach.

(3) In the following subsection it is shown that the concept of a replicator, which was needed to justify stopping the eliminative quest at the level of the gene, involves (a) the concept of a catalyst, i. e. a concept of an entity which changes the probabilities that a certain entity emerges and involves (b) the concept that the copied entity could not only be described in material terms, but that the identity of the replicator and the replica could only suitably be described in terms of form (*eidōs* in a very simple rather Aristotelian than Platonic sense) or information.

We take Dawkins’ definition that a replicator is “any entity in the universe which interacts [...] in such a way that copies are made”⁹³¹ as a starting point. But our task is not finished by giving this definition; in my opinion the essential metaphysical quest only starts at this point! What property of a replicator makes it such a special entity that we are entitled to take it methodologically, or even ontologically, as a reason for an autonomy of the life sciences? We will (a) discuss what it means to ‘interact’ and (b) what it means to ‘be a copy’.

(a) What do we mean in our definition of a replicator, when we are concerned with its first defining aspect, that of interaction?

The first explication of this term would be that by interaction we mean some causal interrelation of two objects. (Here I will not dwell on the Humean problem of causality.)

But, by interaction, we, of course, do *not* mean the mere existence of a certain entity at the same time its copy emerges. This is not as trivial as it seems, because we know since Newton that the gravity of any body interacts in principle with every other body. Gravity as a special form of interaction diminishes over distance, but is in principle not limited by distance. But if we accepted gravity as an interaction in our sense, any structural identical entity (as far as it has mass) would count as a replicator, when a new structural identical entity emerged (existing already before, within the distance of the speed of light). Obviously, such a proposal would be absurd. But why? Presumably, because *an* interaction is not enough to count as interaction proper. An extremely weak long distant influence within other, almost infinite, stronger influences is not enough.

Moreover, we would neither accept all and every case of chemical interaction, taking place as close distance electromagnetic interaction. As a thought experiment we can look at a real experiment. Since the work of F. Wöhler (we also may think of Stanley Miller), we know that 'organic' molecules like urea can be produced in normal chemical reactions. Urea, chemically speaking $\text{CO}(\text{NH}_2)_2$, consists out of the 'inorganic' components, two times N, five times H, one C and one O. We assume that in Wöhler's test tube another molecule of $\text{CO}(\text{NH}_2)_2$ 'by chance' was around already when the new molecules of $\text{CO}(\text{NH}_2)_2$ emerged. We assume that this first molecule of urea even chemically interacted with one of the inorganic components, say with the hydrogen, shortly before a new molecule of urea was composed. Would we then be entitled to call the first molecule a replicator? Would we be entitled to deny that Wöhler has himself produced 'organic' molecules out of inorganic ones and to claim that it was the 'replicating' organic molecule which has been in the test tube before? No, I think not! If the interaction was not 'essential' for the emergence of the new molecule of urea, and (expressed the other way round) if the emergence of this molecule had taken place 'independently' of this old molecule of urea anyway⁹³⁵, the interaction of these two molecules, would not qualify the first molecule as a replicator (and hence Wöhler's honour remains undiminished).

Hence, the actual presence of a causal interrelation is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for qualifying as an interaction proper. The sufficient condition is that a replicator by its presence has (to a relevant extent) to *enhance the probability of the emergence of the identical entity* (the replica). The notion of a replicator demands that this entity is 'actively' contributing something to this emerging new whole. Without the existence of a replicator, the probability that single elements become compounded into the entity in question, simply by hitting on one another (or what one may call chance),

would be lower. In short, a replicator is an entity which has the property that its existence enhances (perhaps without changing itself) the probability of the emergence of the (structurally) same entity.

Although the aspect of ‘enhancing the probability of an entity to come into existence’ appears to me to be philosophically particularly interesting, this is obviously not an exclusive property of replicators. In chemistry any **catalyst** also has the property of altering the probability, the rate or the velocity of a reaction (without itself undergoing any essential chemical change).

In this philosophical work, I am not interested in chemical catalysts for their own sake, but rather in a generalised notion of a catalyst, i. e. any entity which changes the probability of the creation of other entities, without being altered itself. By introducing such a notion we, no doubt, enter upon interesting but difficult ground. Besides the chemist’s endeavour to look for the reactional mechanisms of catalysis, a metaphysics of catalysis appears to be needed.

Which entities could count as catalysts in the generalised sense? What does it mean to change the probability of the elements to build a component? How could this notion of a catalyst be made coherent with the deterministic understanding of causality of (classical) physics? Are we entitled to use in our definition of a catalyst the complex notions of probability and counterfactuals?

Back to our main line of argument. We have found that the notion of a replicator involves catalytic properties, to enhance the probability of the emergence of the identical entity. This appears to me to be in contrast to a simple notion of matter in motion. This also plays a role in the next section, where we focus on an additional property of replicators: unlike mere catalysts, such as enzymes, they are *self-referential*.

(b) The second notion which plays an important role in our definition of a replicator is the notion of a ‘copy’. Besides interaction, this involves a notion of sameness.

Replicators are enhancing the probability that a copy is made of the *same* entity, which enhances the probability that a copy is made of the *same* entity, which enhances the probability that a copy is made of the *same* entity... . Subject and object of this process of copying are in some respects identical. A notion of identity is needed, which links the subject and the object of the catalytic process. I am going to argue that even a notion of **informational identity** is needed, which would change the focus from matter to structure or form (Greek: *eidos*) and which, historically, has been almost the antithesis of matter (☞ pp. 76 f.).⁹³⁶

The concept *information* should here be understood in a common sense way, and not be interpreted in the specified and specialised way of Shannon’s information theory or of semiotics. Later on, I shall introduce the term ‘formation’ which is less burdened with given meanings (☞ pp. 307 f.).

⁹³⁵ Whether we are entitled to argue in terms of counterfactuals or not is not my topic here. Our actual usage of the notion of a replicator entails such a complex concept.

⁹³⁶ For a similar antagonist understanding of matter and information, see e. g. G. Webster, B. Goodwin. *Form and Transformation* (1996), p. 4.

But what do I mean by informational identity. For my purposes I want to distinguish two dimensions of identity: a) Selfsameness and sameness⁹³⁷; b) material and formal identity. The notions are made clear in the further course of the argument.

Obviously the notion of a replicator essentially involves something different from selfsameness. Herewith we mean that the replica is spatially distinguished from the replicator. The notion of selfsameness (material or formal) is already a precondition of any concept of an entity existing at different points of time! Hence, in regard to the first mentioned dimension the *differentia specifica* of a replicator is the catalysis not of the selfsame but of the *same* entity.

Does this already imply *informational* identity? Not necessarily. If we think of a replicator for example as merely a fragment of DNA, the sameness of form, structure or (in)formation—at this point used equivocally—seems to be inextricably linked with material sameness. The compounding elements, the nucleic acids, are the same in the replicator and the replica. Hence one might argue that the formal sameness is only due to the material sameness, or, put differently, that formal sameness is reducible to material sameness. Ockham's razor (i. e. theoretical parsimony) would demand us to abandon the additional notion of (in)formational sameness.

This objection would be invalidated if we are able to give an example, where formal (informational) sameness is not entangled with material sameness, and hence could not be generally reduced to material sameness. Keeping up to Dawkins' generalised definition, that a replicator is 'any entity in the universe which interacts [...] in such a way that copies are made', it is in fact easy to find such an example. In our *Lebenswelt* we are today provided today with a subject area which has become almost prototypic for the notion of information itself, i. e. the notion of software. A computer virus, a bit of software, obviously fulfils this general criterion for being a replicator.

Our definition of a replicator implies that computer viruses are also alive, although of course not in a greater sense than a biological virus is.

A computer virus produces copies of itself in a computer network. Such copies could also be made to a compatible, but different, computer system, with a different operating system, different underlying semiconductors, and different material basis (like silicon, gallium arsenide, or optical circuits).

Based on this example, it should become clear that the essence of the property of copying is (or at least could be) the copying of the form, the structure or information, not that of its material elements. The notion of a replicator, does in principle not require the sameness of the underlying material elements! Hence, formal or informational sameness, opposed to the material one, does play an indispensable role in defining the notion of a replicator.

⁹³⁷ In German there are the terms '*das Selbe*' and '*das Gleiche*' to express this distinction.

In conclusion, a replicator can be regarded as an entity which catalyses the building of an entity (i. e. it enhances the probability that such an entity is built) which is informationally, not necessarily materially the same as the replicator. Thereby we have in my view already left or transcended a strict materialistic ontology. In the dispute about universalia the nominalists have claimed that universalia (“the sort of thing which can be wholly present in distinct individuals at the same time”⁹³⁸) are mere abstractions, which allow us to order intellectually the changing flux of experience. Formal sameness would normally be interpreted by a materialist as a mere nominalist abstraction (*universalia in intellectu*), whereas material sameness would be regarded as real. Opposed to this it has been shown that the property of form is required. Although I would concede that ontological and epistemological issues can never be completely disentangled (“Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”⁹³⁹), the need to introduce formal sameness appears to be rather ontological.

In any case it appears plausible that, if we should adopt an informational or semiotic metaphysic, it would undermine the reductionism of gene-Darwinism *within* biology and sociology. The notions of form and information may in this case also justify other levels of being. But although this becomes more plausible, it is not necessarily conclusive. At least in principle materialistic downward reductionism might be replaced by a similar ‘informational downward reductionism’. Thus, in addition to our general criticism of reductionism, the following sections on gene-atomism (☞ pp. 258 f.), on germ-line-reductionism (☞ pp. 303) and on process reductionism (☞ pp. 324) will challenge more specific aspects of gene-Darwinism.

In conclusion, if gene-Darwinism tries to justify the actual stopping of its reductive quest at the level of single genes, it has to introduce the notion of a replicator. But this notion of a replicator, closely linked with gene-Darwinism, has been demonstrated not to be based on the notion of matter, but on notions of form or information. If this holds true, then an at least partly **informational or semiotic metaphysic** needs to be elaborated. On such grounds it might be easier to vindicate the existence of higher ontological levels, like organisms or groups, or even psychological states or culture.

8.2 Genetic Reductionism I: Gene Atomistic Reductionism and Its Transcendence

Leaving the *general* problems of substance reductionism behind me, I will now discuss the *specific* problems of genetic reductionism, as advocated by today’s gene-Darwinism (☞ pp. 140 f., 191 f.).⁹⁴⁰

⁹³⁸ J. Bigelow. *Universals* (1998), p. 543. According to Bigelow universals do not have to be ‘universally’ present in all entities, but they are “characteristically the sort of thing which some individuals may have in common, and others may lack.”

⁹³⁹ I. Kant. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. p. A 51/B 75. (☞ also p. 74.)

⁹⁴⁰ This needs to be done cautiously, since some critics—though correctly recognising reductionism as a general hallmark of this paradigm—have sometimes slightly misinterpreted its specific type of reductionism. For example, L. Frith in *Sociobiology, ethics and human nature* (1992), I think correctly, criticised the biologicistic reductionism of sociobiology. But, firstly, she, in my view wrongly, attributes an individualist view to this paradigm

Genetic reductionism could be regarded as being composed out of two different reductionistic tenets: firstly, the *reductionism of gene-atomism*, the veneration of the single, independent, selfish gene; and, secondly, *germ-line reductionism*, an extreme interpretation of the Weismannian 'central dogma of molecular biology', an interpretation venerating the genotype and dismissing the phenotype as a mere vehicle.

If one follows a replicator-vehicle distinction⁹⁴¹, *gene-atomism* is a position that exclusively states that *single genes* are the *replicating* entities, and *germ-line reductionism* is the position that organisms, groups, species and ecosystems are *mere vehicles* of the true agents of evolution, the genetic replicators.⁹⁴²

a) *Gene Atomism — an Empty or a Wrong Claim*

Gene atomism claiming that there are no other ontological and epistemological levels despite the level of single selfish genes (☞ pp. 142 f.).

From a historic perspective this view could be contrasted against essentialistic (☞ pp. 78, 98 f.), romantic (☞ pp. 89, 102 f.) and even Kantian biology (☞ pp. 87, 98, f.), which all emphasised that wholes are highly relevant for the existence or interpretation of parts. Additionally, gene-atomism also turns against other mechanistic accounts of evolution, like the evolutionary synthesis, which has largely focused on properties of populations (☞ pp. 130 f.). Today, gene atomism is a prominent view, but it is increasingly challenged by approaches which advocate many levels of evolutionarily relevant entities (☞ pp. 152 f.).

Gene atomism advocates that single genes, small genetic fragments, are the only real units of (biological) evolution. Different levels of replicators are discarded. According to gene-Darwinism it is essential that a unit of evolution or selection is a replicator (this guarantees its stability).⁹⁴³ For the time being, we are not concerned with the replicator-vehicle distinction or the *phenotypic* versus *genotypic* debate, i. e. with the *phene-versus-gene*, *individual-versus-genome*, *group-versus-gene-pool* debate. Instead, we engage in the *gene-versus-genome-versus-gene-pool* debate, which is only concerned with the *genotypic* side.⁹⁴⁴

(p. 150). The paradigm is indeed opposed to the existence of groups, but treats individualism only as an approximation of the truth; correctly the hard-core principle of gene-Darwinism, predominant in today's sociobiology, is the sub-individual selfish *genes'* viewpoint. Secondly, she states that sociobiologists treat family units in the same way as society and environments (p. 151). This also gives a too simplified impression. Although it is true that families like single organisms are seen in a nominalistic, reductionistic way, they are based on their relatedness, according to the theory of kin selection and understood to be much more real than other groups or ecosystems.

⁹⁴¹ For Hull's modifications and Dawkins' later extension of his own primordial terminology ☞ p. 217. The distinction itself will be discussed in the section on germ-line reductionism (☞ pp. 303 f.).

⁹⁴² R. Dawkins draws this distinction in a similar, but different, way. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), p. 82; sometimes a link of these two arguments becomes apparent, p. 95.

⁹⁴³ E. g.: R. Dawkins. *Replicator Selection* (1978), p. 69.

⁹⁴⁴ According to R. Dawkins, one of the most passionate supporters of gene atomism, there may be a hierarchy of vehicles, not of replicators. He even claimed that the individual-versus-group debate is only concerned with vehicles and assumes that his gene-atomism—what replicators are concerned—is not questioned. Cf.: *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 254, *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), p. 82. Nevertheless, Dawkins, at least half-heartedly, discusses the question of gene-pool-selection. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), p. 114.

Are single selfish genes essentially the sole (biological) replicators? Or is it in principle possible to regard larger genetic units as replicators as well, like compounds of genes, whole genomes or gene pools of organisms, groups, species or ecosystems?

In traditional terms this could be reformulated as the question of what is the genetic 'substance' and 'accident' of evolutionary change. Gene-atomism, linked to the modern understanding of substance, seeks this substance of evolution exclusively within smallest genetic bits (⊖ pp. 243 f.).

The claim of the *selfishness* of small genetic fragments results from two assumptions. Firstly, according to what I have called the 'principle of egoism' (⊖ e. g. p. 114), every substance (at least, if it has active powers) 'cares' only for itself. Based on this principle, one may generalise the term 'selfish gene' to any—active—substance and call them more generally 'selfish entities'. The second assumption of gene-atomism is that the only genetic substances are single genes. At this point we are only concerned with the latter assumption.⁹⁴⁵

I regard the gene-atomistic claim as either (1.) empty or (2.) wrong:

(1.) The notion *gene* is microbiologically closely linked to the discovery of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). In that context a gene is conceptualised as a strand of DNA, a short pattern of information, coded in the simple alphabet of the nucleotide bases, adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine. According to this understanding a gene is frequently equated with a piece of three nucleotide bases (a triplet), which often codes an amino acid, those components from which proteins are build. It is also often restricted to those triplets, which actually code amino acids (codons). Sometimes a 'gene' also refers to a DNA-sequence which is the basis for an RNA-transcription or a polypeptide.

However, Dawkins and other protagonists of the gene-Darwinian paradigm, as we have seen, have favoured exclusively single 'atomic' genes as replicators.⁹⁴⁶ Although this at first glance seems to be a radical claim—any larger genetic units, genotypes and gene-pools become excluded—, it may well turn out to be an almost empty statement if the adopted definitions of a gene are taken into consideration.

In contrast to the microbiological understanding, a gene here is usually defined in evolutionary rather than primarily chemical terms. Williams defines a gene as "any hereditary information for which there is a favourable or unfavourable selection bias equal to several or many times its rate of endogenous change"⁹⁴⁷. Dawkins (referring to Williams) defines a gene as "any portion of chromosomal material which potentially lasts for enough generations to serve as a unit of natural selection".⁹⁴⁸ But given such a general notion of a gene, it then means almost nothing to claim that the gene is the sole unit of (replicator) selection. The question 'what is the entity which lasts through generations and could count as replicator?', is answered with 'the entity (defined as 'gene') which lasts through generations and could count as replicator'. This is evidently true—but only because the answer tautologically repeats the question. The formulation only tacitly introduces a second criterion for being a unit of selection. Besides

⁹⁴⁵ Although I think that the principle of egoism bears some truth, I do not regard it as being generally true (⊖ pp. 406 f.).

⁹⁴⁶ But ⊖ also p. 39.

⁹⁴⁷ G. C. Williams. *Adaptation and Natural Selection* (1966), p. 25.

⁹⁴⁸ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 28.

being a replicator now also longevity is required, which refers back to the concept of substance. However, we currently simply accept this criterion as well. In regard of a tautological formulation of gene-atomism, an early critic of the selfish-gene view of evolution pointed out that this is like “someone analysing language, who insists that we must find its fundamental elements, but talks as if it did not matter whether we take those elements to be letters, words or sentences.”⁹⁴⁹ And indeed sometimes it appears as if Dawkins himself intended to define genes completely tautologically, allowing much larger units than *single genes*.⁹⁵⁰ “What I have now done is to define the gene in such a way that I cannot help being right!”⁹⁵¹

But there are several reasons which speak against the view that Dawkins and other gene-Darwinians use the term ‘gene’ merely to speak about any replicator, however complex. Firstly, gene-atomism would have stated nothing new, apart from that there are units of selection. It would still not be clear, if a small bit of DNA, a genotype, a whole gene pool, or a whole hierarchy of levels should be regarded as replicator. In spite of obvious tautological aspects of the above definition, Dawkins and other proponents of gene-atomism, of course, have not chosen the word ‘gene’ by chance and could scarcely have used ‘system of genes’, ‘genome’ or ‘gene-pool’ instead. As indicated earlier, a title like ‘The Selfish Genome’ or ‘The Selfish Gene-Pool’ would have implied a totally different research programme.⁹⁵² Additionally in some definitions of genes smallness is mentioned: a gene is “a genetic unit that is small enough to last for a large number of generations and to be distributed around in the form of many copies”⁹⁵³. Although still advocating a fading-out definition of genes, Dawkins, in regard to sexually reproducing organisms (like humans), has always argued that because of the meiotic shuffle, “small fragments of genome” are the only biological candidates for a replicator.⁹⁵⁴ “The shorter the genetic unit is, the longer—in generations—it is likely to live” and to count as a replicator. He has also called his view ‘atomistic’.⁹⁵⁵ Moreover, Dawkins himself regards ‘higher’ forms of selection and the concept of a hierarchy of replicators as utterly wrong⁹⁵⁶.

Hence, I think we are entitled, to conclude that gene-Darwinism, as advocated by Dawkins, despite tautological aspects in the definition of genes, has actually favoured a concept of selection exclusively on the level of small genetic fragments. Apart from exceptions like non-sexually reproducing plants, the term ‘gene’ according to this paradigm exclusively refers to small piece of DNA.

⁹⁴⁹ M. Midgley. *Gene-juggling* (1979), pp. 450-451.

⁹⁵⁰ R. Dawkins. *Replicator Selection* (1978), pp. 68-69, *In Defence of Selfish Genes* (1981), pp. 568-570, *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), pp. 85-87, 89.

⁹⁵¹ *Idem*. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 33.

⁹⁵² Cf. e. g.: R. Dawkins, *In Defence of Selfish Genes* (1981), p. 559, *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 33.

⁹⁵³ *Idem*. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 32.

⁹⁵⁴ *Idem*. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), pp. 29 f., even his, in this regard, more guarded *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 62, even p. 68.

⁹⁵⁵ *Idem*. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 29; *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), p. 113.

⁹⁵⁶ E. g.: *Idem*. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), pp. 2, 39. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 62.

(2.) But, if according to this strict gene-atomism *small* piece of DNA are the *only* units of (replicator) selection, I think this paradigm has to be rejected. Reasons for a rejection of this approach are worked out in the next three sections.

This should, of course, not imply that I want to damn single genes in general as one level of explanation. I do appreciate that sociobiology has introduced this level.⁹⁵⁷ Still, I shall argue that gene-atomists have gone much too far in claiming that single genes are the only units of evolution and to understand them as being totally independent and radically selfish. In contrast to gene-atomism I shall advocate a multi-level approach in which single genes also have their place, and in which the acceptance of higher levels reduces, though not necessarily completely eliminates, the selfishness on the level of genes.

b) *Higher Genetic Units—also Despite the Meiotic Shuffle*

(1) **The general possibility of emergent higher genic units.** The denial of larger units of present gene-Darwinism refers back to Fisher, often quoted by Dawkins.⁹⁵⁴³ Alternatively, authors of the second step of the evolutionary synthesis have tried to reduce the atomism of 'bean-bag genetics' (Mayr) in their work, and stressed the contextuality and interaction of genes (⇒ pp. 130 f.). Some of these authors even explicitly advocated a general position stressing emergent properties on the level of systems.⁹⁵⁸

Although gene-Darwinism brought back gene-atomism, there are also theoretical germs within this paradigm itself, which, I think, point beyond atomism. I have worked out that the central concept of a replicator refers to information rather than to matter (⇒ pp. 250 f.). In my opinion it is a general tendency in sociobiology to emphasise the information-transferring property of genes, which not only make copies of themselves, but support copies of themselves in other organisms. This also becomes apparent in the (helpful) metaphors of DNA as 'a text', the four amino acids as 'the alphabet'⁹⁵⁹, or the 'river of DNA' as a "river of information, not a river of bones and tissues"⁹⁶⁰. Taken to its own logical conclusion, it would become clear that genes understood as information could not be interpreted without their context.

Philosophers might be reminded of the debate about basic sense data, where philosophers from different schools of thought like Gadamer, Quine and Rorty criticised the concept of elementary units of interpretation.

Likewise genetics, as it appears to me, increasingly understands the genome not by the analogy of atoms or beans, but rather by the analogy of a computer program. The genome becomes characterised by contextuality and structuredness. This becomes apparent if one considers concepts like codogenes, exons, introns, regulatory genes, reparation mechanisms, mobile genetic elements etc.

Even without explicitly referring to information it becomes apparent that genes could not be understood without considering their phenotypic effects and its genotypic context. If one thinks, for example, of a 'monogenic' inheritance for blue eyes. Even in this very simple case, where only one

⁹⁵⁷ E. g.: *Idem. Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 66.

⁹⁵⁸ E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), pp. 63 f., ⇒ pp. 136 f.

⁹⁵⁹ E. g.: R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 23; *The River out of Eden* (1995), pp. 11 f, 41, 43.

homozygous allele is said to have a phenotypic effect, selection of that single allele can only take place in a certain genic context. In the case of albinism a missing enzyme (tyrosinase) and the resulting lack of the pigment melanin leads to colourless eyes, which appear pink because the blood vessels of the retina are visible. This may be the case although alleles 'for blue eyes' are still at its locus, but because of the missing enzyme they are actually not 'expressed'.⁹⁶¹ In this sense there is even in the case of monogenic inheritance no real independence of genes, there is, strictly speaking, no 'monogenic' inheritance. In order to provide the colour of something, that something has to be in place. The gene 'blue (eyes)' can only develop and survive together with the totality of genes required 'for the character of eyes'. Hence, could we to a certain extent regard this unit as a higher-level gene and itself as a unit of selection?

Particularly, within a Darwinian paradigm, it appears possible to say that where the new unit has a different inclusive fitness from its separate parts, the unit, will—by definition—have an effect on the selection process. Hence this higher-level gene fulfils the criteria of being a unit of selection.⁹⁶² It is a chunk of DNA, which carries genetic information, which is longer than a single gene (in Dawkins sense); it replicates and has an evolutionary impact.

In the case of asexual organisms, where no crossing-over takes place, any higher level gene, which improves the inclusive fitness of the organism as a whole, directly fulfils the criteria, of potentially being immortal or at least long-lived (which we currently simply accept). In case of sexual organisms, we additionally have to face the problem of the meiotic shuffle.

(2) Higher genic units despite the meiotic shuffle. Sexually reproducing organisms have always been of foremost interest, since we ourselves belong to this group. The evolutionary synthesis particularly focused on them, because its theoretical core of population genetics is concerned with sexually reproducing interbreeding organisms. Gene-Darwinism, although in many respect at odds with the synthesis, also focuses on this class, since only there this "central argument"⁹⁶³ of meiotic shuffle supporting gene atomism comes into play. In the genetic shuffling during meiosis (the special kind of cell division to produce sex cells), the "genome is shredded to smithereens" and gene-Darwinians, like Dawkins, conclude from this fact that only *short bits* of DNA can be regarded as continuous units of selection.⁹⁶⁴ As outlined earlier, gene-Darwinians thus argue that the "shorter a genetic unit is, the longer—in generations—it is likely to live"⁹⁶⁵. Even if a gene-atomist would concede that a gene can not

⁹⁶⁰ *Idem. The River out of Eden* (1995), p. 4, also p. 19.

⁹⁶¹ R. Dawkins seems to accept such facts, but presumably due to his germline-reductionism and to his argument concerning the meiotic shuffle he draws opposed conclusions: *In Defence of Selfish Genes* (1981), pp. 565-568.

⁹⁶² For quite small units this is accepted also by R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 32. (☞ also footnote 950)

⁹⁶³ *Idem. The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 29.

⁹⁶⁴ *Idem. The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), pp. 25 f., *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 68 (quote). As mentioned earlier, Dawkins in the latter publication is in this respect much more guarded, than in his *Selfish Gene*.

⁹⁶⁵ *Idem. The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), pp. 25, 29.

be interpreted without its context, he or she, based on the fact of meiotic recombination, would still conclude that it is not this context which is preserved, and hence there are no higher-level replicators.⁹⁶⁶

There are two possibilities for challenging this view. Either replicators have not to be lasting to qualify as units of evolution or larger units are actually in some sense lasting as well. I focus on the latter aspect and advocate that larger units in a probabilistic sense are actually lasting, but thereby I also challenge the assumption that units need to be lasting in the (materialistic) sense of permanent presence in each concerned instance.

Gene-atomists argue that as a gene travels from genome to genome through the generations, the genic context changes completely. This, in my opinion, is wrong. Gene-atomists, although in other respects having started to understand genes as information, here in a somewhat old-fashioned way remain materialistic. This is linked to the—already old—‘modern’ materialist understanding of substance. According to gene-atomists, permanence is only given if a nexus of 100%, in the sense of a material continuous unity of one body, is given (which excludes systematic synergetic properties).

But despite the meiotic shuffle, obviously some contextual continuities do still exist. The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, which is concerned with alleles, is based on this fact. In regard of different loci, the very notion of a locus already assumes a certain structure and a given context. A chunk of DNA ‘determining the eye colour of humans’ on its own, put into a test-tube with nutrients, will, of course, never develop the blueness without an eye, or an eye without a body. Also in regard of loci continuities result from frequency distributions of gene-pools, and not only from the direct descent of organisms⁹⁶⁷. Not only in asexual organisms but in sexually reproducing organisms too, the gene for eyes being blue will of course usually find itself united with genes for the general existence of the eye. Standard contexts could even be regarded to be a precondition for speaking of certain genes at all.⁹⁶⁸ If this is provided, I see no reason to deny in principle the possibility of higher-level genes in gene pools, only because they do not assemble in each and every generation.

An entity based on probability distributions does not need to appear remarkable, the more so, if we think of modern physics. Playing a causal role and being potentially long-lived, it should in principle (despite further qualifications) be possible for such higher units to count as a unit of evolution.

One is even inclined to argue that the longer the genetic unit is, the more it is on average interpretable in terms of phenotypes and the larger is its evolutionary role. The wholes only exist in a pro-

⁹⁶⁶ R. Dawkins, for example, replies to E. Mayr’s stress on the context of a gene in this way. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 69.

⁹⁶⁷ The term ‘gene pool’ still has the misleading connotation of being totally structureless, which is usually not the case.

⁹⁶⁸ K. Sterelny, P. Kitcher. *The Return of the Gene* (1998/1988), p. 163.

In that paper it is argued that the stability of the context is given, in order to defend the gene-Darwinian tenet that single genes do exist. The authors objected to Goulds argumentation in *Caring Groups and Selfish Genes* (in *The Panda’s Thumb*, 1980, p. 77). Although in my view Gould was right in stressing the context dependence of genes, I agree that the not direct visibility of genes, does not entail that they do not exist. I do not deny the existence of single genes, but I criticise the claim of their exclusive existence. An acceptance of a stable context, using Sterelny’s and

probabilistic sense of context, where the whole does not only determine the parts, but the parts in their particular combination and inner dynamics also determine the whole. Hence, the envisioned non-reductive holism, which does not deny the relevance of parts and which is based on a probabilistic or field understanding of wholes, need not be linked to that sort of Platonic (opposed to an Aristotelian) essentialism, which neglects varieties and which has been criticised by Popper, Hull and Mayr.⁹⁶⁹

It lies outside the scope of this work to clarify the relation of this field interpretation to my field theory of exformation (☉ pp. 314 f.).

To sum up, if there is a sufficiently high probability of coming together and togetherness causing a property which causes an increase in the fitness of this system compared with each of its parts, then—leaving all other things equal—the union will itself have the tendency to survive. Despite the meiotic shuffle higher level genes can probabilistically have an evolutionary relevance.

Matters, as we will see, are more complicated, since the tendencies of the parts have also to be considered. Only under certain causal conditions the effects of a whole lead to stabilise the system.

Synergetic or systemic properties, which I have tried to justify probabilistically are often discussed under the keyword of the **additivity criterion**.

The additivity criterion of a unit of selection was first in detail made explicit by W. Wimsatt and then, in a different way, was elaborated by E. Lloyd.⁹⁷⁰ I abstract from their views and state an—I think—similar formulation in my own words. Perhaps this definition rather mirrors Wimsatt's position: A unit of selection is any heritable entity or type of entity, which has an additional fitness (and in this regard varies to entities which have not this property), which does not appear at any lower level of organisation.

This is not much more than the general old idea that 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts', applied in a Darwinian context. This simplified—and thereby maybe trivial—idea is implicitly present in many earlier evolutionary texts, for example in those of Gould and Lewontin. Also my argument above of the possibility of synergetic higher genic units in principle repeats these ideas, although applied on the side of the replicator, and not on the side of interactors.

The actual definitions of Wimsatt and Lloyd are actually more refined, one focusing on context independence, the other on strict additivity. But for my purposes the further details appear not to be relevant. My proposed definition is maybe even in contradiction with some aspects of Lloyd's definition⁹⁷¹.

Given a Darwinian framework, additivity or synergetic properties with a fitness effect seem to me to be necessary conditions for the evolutionary existence of wholes and thus for the transcendence of gene-atomism.⁹⁷²

Kitcher's argument with a different intention, also allows for higher-level units and thereby undermines gene-Darwinian atomism.

⁹⁶⁹ Cf. also: M. Ruse. *David Hull Trough Two Decades* (1989); G. Webster; B. C. Goodwin. *Form and Transformation* (1996), pp. 9, 17 f., 99-100. (On the Plato's and Aristotle's understanding of forms, ☉ also pp. 78 f.)

⁹⁷⁰ E. Lloyd. *The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory* (1994/1988), pp. 69 f.; W. Wimsatt. *Reductionistic Research Strategies and their Basis in the Units of Selection Controversy* (1980), p. 236.

⁹⁷¹ E. Lloyd. *The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory* (1994/1988), p. 102.

⁹⁷² In a not purely Darwinian framework, it may be questioned, whether evolutionary morphological constraints, which also may have an impact on the direction of evolution, are adequately treated in terms of fitness.

Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson opposed the additivity criterion, although they criticised the philosophy of egoistic genes in a different way.⁹⁷³ I do not want to discuss whether Sober and Wilson are right in respect of any specific formulation of the additivity criterion,⁹⁷⁴ but I think that they did not turn against the above more moderate exposure of synergetic properties (or if they did, they were wrong in doing so):

Sober and Wilson in regard of a specific formulation of the additivity criterion argued, that groups which properties which are in a linear way dependent on the proportion of altruist members would by this definition be excluded from counting as wholes. But this assumption is central for their group selectionist models, and I agree that it would be absurd to exclude such groups from being a counterexample to gene-Darwinism. But, I think, a well understood concept of synergetic properties does not exclude these wholes. Such a linear relationship, does not entail that the resulting entity is merely the sum of its parts. Instead the wholes or groups in Sober's and Wilson's examples show supersummative properties, which depend in their amount on the proportion of certain members. Hence, in my understanding, this could be counted as an example of a synergetic property. Thus, I tend to follow Lloyd, who had pointed out that Sober implicitly employs the additivity criterion.⁹⁷⁵ At least provided a general understanding of synergetic properties this appears to be valid. Otherwise Sober and Wilson would not have been able to propose group selectionist models, based on the additional fitness of the whole group, differing from the fitness of its elements.

However, I think that Sober and Wilson were right in having pointed out that additionally a causal approach is also needed,⁹⁷⁶ to show why a structural property of the super-summative whole (for example due to the altruism of its members) is not overrun by selfish members.⁹⁷⁷

Therefore further scrutiny of this topic is needed. We will in the next sections be concerned with several questions in how far wholes can have a causal impact on their parts and in how far wholes are not undermined by selfish tendencies of their parts. We also treat once more the question whether it would be more appropriate to convert the parlance of higher-level units into single gene-parlance. And we will be concerned with the question in how far the results for loci in one individual are valid for alleles in different organisms as well.

c) *Top-Down Causation and High-Level Genes at Different Loci*

In this section we will firstly be concerned with the general relationship of higher-level properties to downward causation. Secondly, the question is treated, whether higher-level genes (a system of genes, which only together have synergetic properties for the good of the system), are probabilistically stable enough not to be overrun on a lower level by alleles which do not have this property.

(1) The relationship of higher-level genes and downward-causation. Above I have advocated the probabilistic existence of synergetic properties of alleles at different loci, despite the meiotic shuffle. Now we additionally assume the stability of these probabilistic high-level genes, in the sense of not

⁹⁷³ E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. *Philosophical Work on the Unit of Selection Problem* (1994/1998), pp. 203 f.

⁹⁷⁴ E. g. E. Lloyd opposed this view. *The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory* (1994/1988), pp. 72 f.

⁹⁷⁵ Cf.: *Ibid.*, pp. 82, 85.

⁹⁷⁶ Cf.: *Ibid.*, pp. 82 f.

⁹⁷⁷ E. g.: E. Sober. *What is Evolutionary Altruism?* (1998/1988), p. 462.

being undermined by selfish components (this will be discussed below). We discuss whether high-level genes under these conditions imply what has been called 'downward causation'⁹⁷⁸.

Properties of systems of genes in a way have to be causally relevant, otherwise we would not perceive them and would not speak of a property being there at all. But here we are not interested in some causal relevance, but specifically in an evolutionary relevance. In a selectionist model, from which we started our discussion, all properties which bear on the fitness are by definition (in average) evolutionarily relevant and, hence, synergetic properties which have such an effect (higher-level genes) are also evolutionarily relevant (we may think of the example of eyes as wholes).

Does this entail downward-causation, a top-down causation, which I use in the sense that wholes may be causally relevant for their parts?

In principle it is not obvious that wholes could have an impact on parts. According to a generally downward reductive, materialistic ontology, which advocates a modern understanding of substances, wholes do not exist at all or are at best regarded to be epiphenomena. Wholes in this view are merely effects of the composing parts. It is, of course, true that a whole can by definition not exist without its parts (at least not in an actual sense), but this does not imply that the whole is nothing but its parts. A whole is not something alien to its parts, but it is its parts *and* specific relations between them. Based on my earlier critique of the modern downward reductive understanding of substances in general, I treat properties of systems, as long as they are not shown by their parts on their own (or at least in most other combinations) as properties of these systems, of larger wholes. I do not deny the existence of atoms, but I regard molecules with their specific relationships of parts to be real as well, having specific new properties which their elements do not have on their own (☞ p. 240).

In a selectionist context, properties of a system, which change the fitness of that system, by definition not only influence the survival of the system, but thereby also influence its parts. Hence, parts may become selected, because of the properties of higher genic wholes (properties of systems of genes). Depending on the importance of such higher level properties, alternative compounding alleles may perish, although, taken separately, they might have a higher fitness. Hence, higher-level genes can in principle have an evolutionary effect on the composing genes. Any such top-down effect, if actually found, is in contradiction to the spirit of the arguments and polemics of gene-Darwinians that single genes are maximally egoistic and can never serve any higher wholes.

It is scarcely conceivable that properties of a high-level gene (here at several loci) have no effect on the composing alleles. The only case in which this may be conceivable is that of a restructuring of the genome without changing which genes are necessary. If different high level genes are based on the same underlying alleles, a more advantageous system may become established, without affecting which alleles build these systems. Here an evolutionary pathway may be taken which is best for the larger unit, with no effect for its elements. For example, if the genome of an organism by a specific type of mutation like an inversion or a translocation became restructured and this organism founded an isolated new population (founder effect), an improved high level-gene may evolve by changing the relations of the loci, without changing what composing alleles are advantageous. It might, for instance, be advantageous if the loci of a high-level gene are on one chromosome.

⁹⁷⁸ A term, I think, first proposed by D. T. Campbell.

Actually the species *drosophila melanogaster*, *d. subobscura*, *d. pseudoobscura* and *d. willistoni* differ mainly in their chromosomal structure.

If this population and the other population remained functionally isolated, the new founded population only differing in respect of its advantageous high-level gene—and not in respect of its genetic components—would probably outbreed the other. In this sense, here no direct top-down effect is given. Nevertheless the increased fitness of the whole may indirectly still change the fitness of its parts.

In conclusion, the existence of fitness changing properties of a system of genes (higher-level genes) are not only a *necessary* but a *sufficient* condition for top-down causation, at least as long as we are not only concerned with a restructuring of the genome.

(2) Stability of higher-level genes on different loci. Probabilistic higher-level genes, can be stable in the sense of not being overrun by alternative ‘egoistic’ genes on the lower level.

In the present section we will be concerned with genes at different loci and we only later turn to the slightly more difficult problem of alleles in different organisms (although this will play a role here as well). The question of higher level genes at different loci has long been ignored, since the evolutionary synthesis was concerned with allelic competition and, at least in its early phase, which Mayr called ‘bean bag genetics’, the assumption of the independence of genes has often been taken for granted. Although the synthesis later increasingly acknowledged the dependence of different loci and alleles, the synthesis remained to be based on models of population genetics, where loci have been treated as somehow given, whereas the alleles were seen to be objects of competition and evolution. Proponents of the second phase of the synthesis, like Mayr, were also not required to defend higher level genes, because they claimed that the individual phenotype, not the gene, is the unit of selection, and the species, not the gene, is the unit of evolution.

A defence of higher-level genes only becomes necessary against the background of the gene-Darwinian claim that any selection is ultimately gene-selection and that all evolutionary entities are reducible to single genes (☞ pp. 142 f.). In principle the unity of the organism remains mysterious to gene-Darwinians.⁹⁷⁹ “Fundamentally, all that we have a right to expect from our theory is a battleground of replicators, jostling, jockeying, fighting for a future in the genetic hereafter.”⁹⁸⁰ Hence it was only consistent, and that gene-Darwinians, in principle have broken the dike between genes at different loci and genes on the same locus (alleles), though, of course, not denying their differences. Gene-Darwinians have shown that genes on different loci in one genome are competing.⁹⁸¹ Moreover, it became obvious in section *a*, that gene-Darwinians have argued that in respect of sexual organisms only short strands of DNA could count as evolutionary units.

⁹⁷⁹ Cf. e. g.: R. Dawkins. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), p. 5.

⁹⁸⁰ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1989), p. 256.

⁹⁸¹ *Idem*. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), pp. 156 ff.

It should now be shown that higher-level genes at different loci, whose existence I advocated earlier, can under certain conditions be evolutionarily stable and are not undermined by single alleles which do not show the synergetic properties of the system.

In order to show this, we take a closer look at the concept of a genetic system of genes A , B at two loci, the simplest possible genic system. For our purposes their distance on the chromosome or whether they are located on different chromosomes should not be taken into account. Although this distance is one factor determining the probability of the genes appearing together in directly successive generations, this point is uncontroversial. Here we are concerned with higher level genes, whose probability of being united in the same genome, despite the meiotic shuffle, is a probability function of the frequency of both genes in the population. We assume that only in union do these two genes have a certain synergetic property improving the fitness of the two locus system:

$$F(A, B) > F(A, b_j), \quad F(A, B) > F(a_i, B), \quad F(A, B) > F(a_i, b_j)$$

Here a_i and b_j are the classes of alternative alleles corresponding to A and B (for our present example it does not matter how many alternative alleles there are). Focusing on this one higher level effect, we stipulate for reasons of simplicity, that there are no such synergetic effects in the case of other combinations of alleles and that all these other combinations have the same, lower, fitness value: $F(a_i, b_j) = F(A, b_j) = F(a_i, B)$.

In figure 3 the fitness values of these gene combinations are depicted as being dependent on the frequency of A and B relative to their alternative alleles in a given population. In order to present such a two locus model in one graph, which is normally used for presenting the relative frequency of two alternative alleles at only one locus⁹⁸², we have to make some simplifying assumptions. We stipulate, only for reasons of representation, that the frequencies of A and B , and of their alternative alleles should be coupled: $f(A) = f(B)$; $f(\neg A) = f(\neg B)$. This is irrelevant for my argument, but makes it possible to depict the relative frequencies of alleles of both loci on one axis.

We also assume that synergetic effects have an absolute, not a relative, advantage in the population. Therefore all fitness values for certain combinations of genes are parallel to the x-axis.⁹⁸³ For our present question this is of no concern.

Furthermore we, of course, employ the usual assumption of population genetics that the gene pool is unstructured and that all genes mix randomly. (These assumptions will be criticised later, but for the time being they are helpful.)

⁹⁸² Cf.: E. Sober. *What is Evolutionary Altruism?* (1998/1988), p. 463. E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. *Philosophical Work on the Unit of Selection Problem* (1994/1998), p. 207.

⁹⁸³ In a different context: E. Sober. *What is Evolutionary Altruism?* (1998/1988), p. 463.




Figure 3 and 4: The high-level gene *AB* could be fitter than their components *A* and *B*. Even if their components are less fit outside of this system compared with each of their alternative alleles, the systemic advantage may still make them evolutionarily stable, if these genes are frequent enough so that the synergetic effect counterbalances this undermining effect.

In the chart the gene-combinations of *A* with *B* is called briefly ‘*AB*’. The other combinations, of *A* with some *b_j*, of *B* with some *a_i*, and of some *a_i* with some *b_j* are called ‘*A_c*’, ‘*B_c*’ and ‘*0_c*’.

If the basic frequencies of *A* and *B* are low, there will only seldom be an *AB* combination and its synergetic advantage will almost never come into play. Hence also the average fitness in this population (*w*) stays almost as low as if the synergetic property did not exist at all. In this first model *A* and *B* on their own (combined with some different alleles on the other locus) are neutral, if compared to their alternative alleles. Hence, if *A* or *B* evolved by mutation they will not directly be counter-selected. Instead one day the combination of *As* and *Bs* will come together to form a high level gene and then have a higher probability to multiply. The more *As* and *Bs* are present in the gene pool the more often the *AB*-system will have an advantage, until finally all *a_i* and *b_j* alleles become extinct. Although the fitness of *A* and *B* gave each of them, on their own, no advantage, their systemic two locus interaction leads them to gain dominance in the population. Already in this case, I think, it would be inappropriate to reinterpret this in terms of gene-atomism or gene-egoism (☹ below and section e and f).

In figure 4 my point becomes easily apparent. I am only changing one assumption. Now we stipulate that the *As* and *Bs*, as long as they are not building their system, are less fit than their alternative alleles *a_i* and *b_j*.

$$F(A, B) > F(a_i, b_j) > F(A, b_j) = F(a_i, B)$$

A single *A* or *B* mutant will now be counter-selected and will soon die out. Here the genes which together (systemically) are advantageous for the larger system, will not survive. Only if *A* and *B* (as by a founder effect) both have a high enough relative frequency that the advantages of the *AB*-system often enough came into play and could counterbalance the other effects, would the *AB*-system soon come to dominate the population. With other words, the *AB*-system, under these conditions, is an evolutionarily stable strategy. A mutant *a_i*, or *b_j* gene, which under different conditions would have had a higher fitness than *A* and *B* on their own, would now have a lower fitness value.

One should note, that besides the synergetic property of *A* and *B*, we are here also concerned with the phenomenon of the changing of fitness values dependent on the frequency of composing genes in the population. In my view, this, based on the existence of higher level genes, is another synergetic property of the relative frequency of genes in a given population.

Back to our starting question, higher level genes which have a positive effect on a system at large, could under certain conditions be evolutionarily stable, even if each of their composing genes, taken on its own, is less fit than their alternative alleles. This corresponds to the intuition that without higher level genes, which are based on elementary genes and are good for a larger whole, despite being less fit outside this specific allelic context, the actual quite harmonious whole of the individual genome would be inconceivable.

I have to concede that up until this point we have not much concerned ourselves with the question of the possibility of altruism *between* organisms, since we have treated higher level genes at two loci of one genome (although also the synergetic property of a population became apparent). Later, we will discuss to which extend these arguments can be generalised. In any case this argument, possibly trivial from the viewpoint of other Darwinian paradigms, clearly undermines the gene-Darwinian philosophy that (in sexual organisms) only single genes are the units of selection and all higher levels are epiphenomenal.

But we have not yet reached secure ground, because gene-Darwinians may still object that the above phenomenon could be better expressed in gene-Darwinian terms. I shall argue that such a claim is at odds with our common understanding of a system. If based on systemic properties, those genes become selected which establish the system and, although they are disadvantageous on their own, it would be absurd to claim that the system does not exist, but rather only single selfish genes. But this needs to be scrutinised more closely. In the next section I argue that strict gene-atomism has to be either refuted or one has to define the gene as a unit of selection tautologically.

d) *The Fallacy of Claiming Gene-Atomism Tautologically*

Dawkins in the *Extended Phenotype* proposed that different evolutionary perspectives may be like two different views of a Necker Cube, a visual illusion, where a two dimensional representation of a cube could be interpreted in two completely different ways as a three-dimensional cube.⁹⁸⁴ Dawkins, with his own gift of creating illuminating metaphors, captures an experience of the flipping over of evolutionary perspectives apparent to anyone, who has seriously pondered these matters. Dawkins compared the gene-perspective with that of a whole individual, but I think one can do this equally well when one compares the single gene perspective with the group perspective or that of higher-level genes, as done in the last section.

⁹⁸⁴ R. Dawkins. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), pp. 1 f.; cf. the preface of the second edition of *The Selfish Gene* (1989), p. iix.

Should we hence simply draw the pluralistic conclusion that all these perspectives are true? This appears absurd, because these perspectives appear at least partly to be inconsistent, particularly in their philosophical message. Gene-Darwinism, but equally my opposed position above, would become *a priori* irrefutable.

Of course, gene-Darwinians do not actually advocate such a pluralism, but, as I have shown earlier, they do strictly take sides. They finally advocate an exclusively gene-atomistic perspective. Dawkins even in the *Extended Phenotype*, slightly more guarded on this matter than in the *Selfish Gene*, clearly takes the view of gene-atomism (☞ pp. 142 f., 259 f.).

Above I have opposed the idea of an undecided pluralism on this matter as well. I oppose strict gene-atomism, although I think that even gene-atomism has a true core. Unlike some authors who have denied them, I accept that single genes could have evolutionary effects. Nevertheless I object to gene-atomistic denial of all larger wholes. In terms of the atom metaphor, I try not to discard genetic 'atoms' (although they are even more context-dependent than atoms proper are), but argue in favour of the existence of genetic 'molecules', of high level genes, in their own right. I do this particularly in a selectionist context (but I also literary have argued for the existence of molecules in their own right, ☞ pp. 243 f.).⁹⁸⁵ To argue that parts *and* wholes could play an evolutionary role and that the task is to determine in each case how far wholes are important, differs not only from the view that parts are exclusively the units of evolution, but also from a pluralism, which regards this to be a mere question of perspective.

We now have to settle the question whether it is always possible to convert higher-level explanations, as for example mine above, into a gene-atomistic language and, if this is the case, whether this is an appropriate and preferable representation of given facts.

It is obvious that in a certain sense one can transform the proposed concept of higher-level genes (as, I shall argue, of all other higher wholes) into the language of single separate genes, since biological replicators, whether whole gene-pools or genomes in some way consist of single genes. A whole always consists of its parts. Hence, one may always somehow distribute the effect of the whole to its parts, and thereby make the whole disappear. Even if the whole is more than the sum of its parts, one can still proceed in a similar way. In this case it is not possible to directly distribute the effects to its parts, because the parts lose these properties if they are not part of the system. But indirectly it is still possible to distribute these properties, if one introduces the additional condition that this 'distribution' is valid for each of the involved elements only if they are together and standing in a certain relation with these other elements which before were said to form a system. Besides, the sense of distributing the effects has changed. In my example of high-level genes the process of distributing could, of course, not mean dividing the fitness by two and adding these halves to *A*'s and *B*'s fitness. Instead, the synergetic fitness

⁹⁸⁵ I am aware that even molecules are, of course, a poor analogy for systems of genes. Cf.: St. J. Gould. *Caring Groups and Selfish Genes* (in *The Panda Thumb*, 1980), p. 78.

of the system AB would be 'distributed' in a way that A , under the condition of the presence of B , would have a *completely* changed fitness value; and, vice versa, B as well. Hence, with these two additional modifications, we can always rephrase the phenomenon of higher level genes in terms of single genes. The question is whether this is reasonable and if this implies that single selfish genes could justly be called the only units of selection.

In my opinion a redefinition for which the mentioned additional assumptions have to be made does harm to what we usually call a system. These assumptions of our definition only conceal any system, which by any reasonable definition would be said to exist. With that definition one would also be able to redefine the result of the most radical group selectionist approach, against which gene-Darwinians always have turned, in terms of single genes only. It shall be made apparent in the course of this section that this is not an aspect of the gene-Darwinian claim which is scientifically respectable, but a vacuous argument; however organised a system may be, it can only be described in terms of its composing parts. This does not contribute anything to the discussion concerned. To clarify this matter we must once more take a look at gene-atomism.

In my view two different gene-atomistic claims, which are often found in gene-Darwinism, need to be distinguished. The first claim is at least somehow empirically based and indirectly testable, the second claim, however, is, as I shall show, tautological. Rather like Sober and Wilson, I think that officially gene-Darwinians normally only made the testable claim, but that in the argumentative twilight of many discussions the tautological idea has contributed much to the appeal of this paradigm.⁹⁸⁶ If one wants to oppose gene-atomism one needs to disentangle the testable and the tautological arguments which somehow support this paradigm.

(1) **The testable claim of gene-atomism.** During recent decades, many concepts and many phenomena have necessitated the use of an explanatory level of single egoistic genes. I think this has become sufficiently apparent in the several treatments of gene-Darwinism represented in this present work. Although I do not agree that all concepts and phenomena employed by apparent gene-Darwinians are purely gene-Darwinian, I, in any case, basically agree, for example, with Sterelny and Kitcher as far as they argue, that it was indeed reasonable, empirically justified, and likewise a fruitful research programme, that lies behind gene-Darwinians stress on the existence of single genes, below the level of the whole genome and below whole gene pools.⁹⁸⁷ This, in my opinion does not, of course, entail that there are no higher levels of explanation existent as well.

Gene-Darwinians, as we have seen earlier, do make a stronger claim. To them, selfish genes are the *exclusive* units of selection, excluding all higher levels.

⁹⁸⁶ E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. *Onto Others* (1998), pp. 33-34.

⁹⁸⁷ K. Sterelny, P. Kitcher. *The Return of the Gene* (1998/1988), pp. 161 f., 167 f.

This idea has been supported by the success of explaining some important cases of traditional group selection by the new concepts of kin selection and reciprocal altruism (☉ p. 43). Gene-Darwinians have interpreted these theories as supporting their exclusive gene-atomism. Although it appears correct to me that single genes do play a role in these explanations, they, even in these examples, do not play an exclusive role. I have called into question whether reciprocal altruism is exclusively a single gene phenomenon, since the condition under which this evolutionary mechanism itself becomes an evolutionarily stable strategy, and is not undermined by cheaters, is also dependent on gene frequencies of populations, which are properties of the population and not of single genes. More strikingly, group phenomena of the hymenoptera—traditional examples of group selection—have been reinterpreted. Genetic relationship and not group selection, appears to be pivotal. Nevertheless the entomologist and co-founder of sociobiology E. O. Wilson himself still seems to have interpreted these explanations in a less radical gene-atomistic way than, for example, Dawkins.^{☉ 41} We see that even these matters are entangled with interpretation. The involved theoretical changes were, it seems, in any case no mere redefinition of terms. Since its interpretation is problematic, however, we turn to a less ambiguous example.

It was most crucial for the radical formulation of radical gene-atomism, that theoretical considerations and supporting empirical evidence, had, seemingly, shown that the remaining pure group selectionist models were flawed. Although theory here almost also seems more important than the facts (as I think it should be), these group selectionist models were not challenged by a mere redefinition of terms. Instead it was argued that groups, where true altruism of genes and individuals is possible because group selection, could easily be undermined by selfish genes. In this argument the group advantage is not simply defined away and distributed among the individual members, but a causal problem is stated, relevant also for those who hold the opposed view. We are hence concerned with a testable or changeable claim.

Later I shall actually discuss whether this problem, which some naive group selectionist models contain, can be surmounted, ☉ p. 278.

In my view, gene-Darwinism, also correctly point out that there is inner organismic genetic competition. Phenomena like meiotic drive could be interpreted in this way. I think, it was a false simplifying assumption that alleles at one locus as well as at different loci necessarily evolved, which are advantageous for the individual. As we have seen above, it may well be that a combination of favourable genes will not become fixed in a population, although this would be the most advantageous solution on a higher level of genomic organisation of an individual (fig. 4).

Since we are concerned with a challengeable claim, it was possible to challenge it above, at least in its exaggerated version not only claiming the existence of single genes, but completely denying the existence of *all* higher units of replicator selection.

(2) The tautological claim of gene-atomism. Firstly, the gene-atomistic tautology eliminates wholes from our semantic framework by defining wholes as being merely elements, and then makes the claim, by only restating this assumption, that it has been found that wholes do not exist. Secondly, linked to this first aspect, gene-atomists have reasoned tautologically that irrespective of the system of which a gene is part of the fittest genes always survives, only restating that fitness is defined by survival. In either case this results in an unjustified claim that genes, only because of matters of definition, are the only possible units of evolution.

These gene-atomistic tautologies are slightly different to the found straight definition of the gene as a unit of evolution and the tautological claim that the unit of evolution hence is the gene (☞ section a).

(a) I have outlined that one can always simply redefine a whole in terms of its parts, even if the whole is more than the sum of its parts (☞ p. 272). One only has to extend the definition of each part by introducing the conditionals that the former systemic property has only been shown, if the other components of the 'system' are present as well. Even though the property can not be distributed directly to its parts, the whole property (in my example of a genetic higher level unit) would appear under the given conditions.

If any whole, by force, is redefined to be only its elements, the non-existence of wholes is discursively *a priori* given. It is then of course true by definition that wholes can not be units of evolution. But, is it reasonable and relevant to the questions we are concerned with to proceed in this way?

I argued earlier, that the general philosophy of downward reductionism and eliminative materialism, if applied thoroughly, leads to fundamental problems and does not achieve its aims of an independent definition of explanatory elements, of explanatory parsimony, and of an explanatory basis independent of historical change (☞ p. 243). Also in the present more specific context it becomes apparent that by a redefinition of a genetic whole, the other genetic elements would need to be introduced in the definition of each single gene and that the result in this regard would not fulfil the criterion of theoretical parsimony.

More important for our present concerns is that such a redefinition would conceal the difference between a whole, or a system, and a mere aggregation. Certainly, by such a redefinition the synergetic properties would not be lost, but would only be hidden in each of the composing parts. Nevertheless, the philosophical message differs considerably if any wholes, however well integrated, are said to be only their parts. This undoubtedly would have the inclination to neglect synergetic properties. But an aggregation like sand is obviously something completely different from a system, where the sum is more than its parts. Any definition which conceals this difference, is wrong in the sense of neglecting to focus on aspects which are essential to our discussion. It makes a huge difference to argue that wholes can not be evolutionarily stable because they are undermined by selfish genes, or to argue that wholes are anyway to be defined in terms of single selfish genes. Particularly in a selectionist context we want to know whether traits which are good for the whole exist and are stable.

Through my example of higher level genes, it has been shown that combinations of genes with an advantageous systemic property and a certain frequency in the population will survive, although taken in isolation, alternative alleles are advantageous. I think it would miss the point, if one argued that in this case no systemic aspect existed. Of course, in that example, the composing genes of a whole survive too and even need to survive if that whole should be evolutionarily stable. But this does not mean that the whole is merely its parts. I do not think that it has to be a precondition of being a system, that members sacrifice themselves for it. Instead I think it is enough if genes create systemic properties (properties which the parts separately did not have), which have an evolutionary impact and which are evolutionarily stable. Also in this case genes in a way are less selfish than one may conceive, since they build up a system. In this example they do indeed profit from the system. I do think, however that it makes a difference to the case in which even such systems are undermined by genes which do not have this systemic advantageous tendency and which are more advantageous on their own.

I concede that this is not the most radically thinkable case of sacrificing genic altruism (☹ pp. 278 f.), but nevertheless, I think, we want to make the difference between systemic genes and those which are fitter outside of a system. I will argue in the next section that ruthless genetic egoism on the one hand and radical forms of group selectionist altruism on the other hand are extreme forms of a continuum. In the above example genes, albeit not self-sacrificing, become advantageous in a certain system, although they are relatively disadvantageous on their own. Such genes differ considerably from genes, which do not build such a system. Based on systemic changes the adaptive landscape for the single genes has changed considerably. It would be unintelligible to redefine this in terms which neglected these important changes.

But even if one assumed that an altruist group evolved by group selection, which for some reason has not been undermined by selfish genes, such groups could also be redefined as outlined, since their replicators are of course somehow composed out of single genes too. This, of course, would obviously miss the issue of the unit of evolution debate.

The case of a mere restructuring of the genome, where the composing genes stay the same likewise renders the outlined redefinition absurd. If chromosomal restructuring, for example, plays a role in formation of new species, the changed species are not only reproductively isolated, but also change some of their phenotypic properties. One would normally attribute the phenotypic changes not to the single genes, since they remain identical, but to the structure of the whole. Yet one may still proceed with a redefinition, simply by including different structural relationships into the definition of each gene. Although this is formally possible, I think it is apparent that this only conceals, what we normally mean when saying that the phenotypic change is due to the structure of the whole and not to its parts.

Finally the idea of a redefinition would be inconsistent with the concession made by most gene-Darwinians, at least by actually discussing only cases of sexual organisms, that in the unimportant case of asexual organisms genomes are the units of replicator selection. In the case of a redefinition, one would absurdly have to state that here too only single selfish genes were the appropriate level of explanation.

In conclusion a mere redefinition of wholes as simply the sum of their elements, is logically possible, but misses the central point of how far wholes are evolutionarily relevant and stable.

(b) A tautological formulation, which is in my opinion linked with the first one, is hidden in the argument that (in a certain sense) always the fittest single genes survive, and that it is thus appropriate to only call them units of selection.

This has similarly been elaborated earlier by Sober and D. S. Wilson, who I generally follow here. I only differ in stressing the importance of synergetic properties, which they in my view also implicitly assume when discussing group selection instead of synergetic gene pools with fitness effects (☉ p. 265).⁹⁸⁸ (Additionally Sober and Wilson are only concerned with the difference of group selection and individual selection.)

If one integrates in the above ways all synergetic properties of wholes into the notion of single genes, it is of course true that the fittest genes always survive, because all systemic properties and top down effects then count in favour of single genes. This is because all assumed higher levels involved are somehow based on the genes composing them. Whatever survives, whether a certain gene-pool by group selection, a high-level gene (although its components were less fit on their own), or a truly selfish gene which does not contribute to any larger system, one may state that without any difference the fittest genes have always survived.

In particular E. Sober and D. S. Wilson have shown that, if one argues this way, even a model, where altruistic groups evolve because as a whole they are more fit than non-altruistic groups, would paradoxically still be taken as evidence for the gene-atomistic and gene-egoistic viewpoint.⁹⁸⁹ The group which was fitter as a whole, is somehow composed out of individuals or single genes. Hence one may argue that it was the individuals or single genes of that group which were fitter, since they are the survivors. No matter how synergetic the genes of a group are, we can decompose them into single genes. No matter how altruistic they are redefined to be the most egoistic genes since they survived. Not taking into account whether their fitness is created by the group or the single gene, whether it is object of genic, individual or group selection etc., it is of course by definition true that those genes which survive are always the fittest genes, because fitness is ultimately defined by survive. Although true, this is, of course, completely uninformative. One would not distinguish between cases of ruthlessly selfish genes which are bad for the whole, and cases where the wholes determine what is good for the genes.

If one really were to favour such a redefinition, the more substantive gene-Darwinian argument that adaptive wholes may be subverted from within by single selfish genes, would not be necessary and meaningless, since one could in any case redefine the systemic advantage in terms of selfish genes.

In principle a similarly absurd tautological argument in favour of levels of selection could easily be proposed. If we define a group as flexible as we defined a gene, of course the fittest group always survives. We would simply still call it a group independent of whether even its synergetic properties are subverted by selfish genes or not.

It is a tautological truth that only those genes survive which survive. If we claim that all genes are egoistic and atomistic only because they survive, however altruistic and systemic they may be, then by

⁹⁸⁸ E. Sober; D. S. Wilson. *Onto Others* (1998), pp. 31-50.

⁹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p. 42.

definition and not as an empirical result, all genes must be atomistic and selfish. It is, of course, inappropriate to simply exclude wholes from the semantic framework, since this does not solve but only conceals the crucial issues of the unit of selection or unit of evolution debate.

e) *Higher Level Properties of Different Organisms — Four Possibilities to Achieve the Good of the Group*

In the last section higher level genes (at different loci of one organism) have been shown to be possible. They can exist despite the meiotic shuffle and they are also stable if their components are less fit on their own. Hence it appears plausible

that this also somehow holds for *alleles* in different organisms. In principle interaction effects of alleles in different organisms may exist in the different cases of alleles at the same locus, higher level alleles and cross-loci interactions of alleles. Why should there be no evolutionarily stable synergetic wholes with a fitness effect in different organisms too?

Firstly, I shall discuss how far these two different types of wholes differ, in order to learn what conditions have to be met to transfer our successful result to this type as well. Secondly, I will give a survey of four different ways in which properties which are good for the group may evolve. The first discussion may be skipped, but it may help to clarify the functional difference of these two types of higher level properties and also gives an, I think, interesting example of a selection above individual selection.

(1) Wholes in one and in many individuals — loci and alleles. Despite the tautological undertones in gene-atomism, as outlined before, one should not forget the lessons which indeed had to be learned from the reasonable aspects of gene-atomism. Groups of members which altruistically support the group may be advantageous for that group, but, as has been pointed out by Dawkins and Williams in particular, these groups may be subverted from within by ruthless selfish genes or individuals. Gene-atomists came to conclude that no higher level of organisation and no true altruism can evolve since genes always only ‘aim’ at reproducing themselves. Anyone who wants to object to the gene-Darwinian view of life needs to show that not only systemic properties exist on a supra-gene level, but that these properties are also evolutionarily stable. This has been shown above for higher level genes, now it needs to be shown for groups as well.

In order to do this, it appears helpful to work out the differences of higher level properties of alleles at different loci in single organisms, $L_{11}OL_{12}$, and of genes at the same locus or the same loci in different organisms, $L_{11}OL_{21}$, $L_{11}OL_{22}$, $(L_{11}OL_{12})O(L_{21}OL_{22})$. Confer figure 5. Since we are concerned




Figure 5: A simplified visualisation of different loci in the same and in different organisms, in order to clarify my terminology. The first index stands for the organism, the second for the locus. (For simplicity reasons the two different alleles of each locus *within* diploid organisms are not shown.)

with sexual organisms it is a simplification not to mention their populational background and that each organism has two alleles at each locus. However, this is enough to clarify the main differences:

(a) The components of a higher level allele at different loci in one organism ($L_{11}OL_{12}$) are coupled, whereas alleles being in different organisms are not. In sexual organisms they are, of course, mixed with each and every generation, but nevertheless they are coupled in the sense of having a common fate; and are tied to the other alleles on the other loci at least as long as they 'inhabit' that particular individual, thus until that individual dies or reproduces.

This does not entail, as is often simply assumed, that only those genes survive, which are most advantageous for individuals. We have seen that genes which are good on a higher level of individual integration will not always be evolutionarily stable.

(b) The distinction of genes at different loci versus genes at the same locus is usually conflated with the above distinction whether genes and their interaction are in one organism or different ones. In a single organism we are usually concerned with systemic effects of different loci, $L_{11}OL_{12}$, whereas in different organisms we are concerned normally with the same locus in different organisms, $L_{11}OL_{21}$. Although this is an important case, this conflation is obviously a simplification, since in sexual organisms there are firstly two alleles of the same locus, from the father's and the mother's side, and secondly we can also think of interaction effects of genes in different organisms at different loci, $L_{11}OL_{22}$, (these interaction effects play an essential role in some of my following proposals).

If the genes of the same loci are alleles, they are competitors in the sense that one may replace the other at that locus. Genes at two different loci ($L_{11}OL_{12}$, but also $L_{11}OL_{22}$) may together become predominant in a given population. Besides additional preconditions for not being subverted in principle a common universal victory is possible for these genes. This is not possible for two alleles on the same locus in different organisms ($L_{11}OL_{21}$, but alleles at the same locus in one organism).

To define an allele as being "synonymous with rival"⁹⁹⁰, nevertheless overstates the case, because in principle alleles may also cooperate with other alleles at the same locus (absolutely or relatively). This could be exemplified by heterozygote superiority (e. g. in the case of sickle-cell anaemia), where there is a negative interaction effect between two identical alleles in one organism. Although here the interaction takes place within an organism, this also leads to the advantages of a certain amount of allelic pluralism in a population.

Higher level properties of genes at one locus of different organisms in any case have not to be limited to *different* alleles at the concerned locus. Traditional group selection has advocated a synergetic property of the *same* alleles at the same locus in different organisms. One normally concerned with altruistic alleles, which enhance the group fitness so much that their individual disadvantage becomes balanced by the advantage to the whole. Although in these group selectionist models the altruists are

⁹⁹⁰ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1989), p. 26.

blindly altruistic to non-altruists as well (the alternative allele), the stability of this effect would be a synergetic property of the interaction of several altruist alleles in different organisms.

Nevertheless, there is still a difference between different loci in single organisms and one locus in different organisms even if in the latter case there are the same alleles at the loci of the different organism. This is because of the background of the populations which are basic to these processes. In this case subversion from within is still a much graver problem. In principle both wholes may become subverted. In the case of the same altruistic alleles at the same locus in different organisms, however, the very property which is advantageous for the whole, if supporting the other group members, in particular also supports the competitors of the genes with that altruistic property. In higher level genes of one organism this could not happen since (mainly) different loci are concerned.

After this analysis we will better understand what preconditions facilitate the stability of higher level genes. Likewise in this case stability is not trivial, since we have seen that certain populational preconditions need to be met if such a whole is not become subverted. In which way does the fact that we were concerned with alleles at different loci of one individual facilitate the possibility of genetic higher level units? Based on the outlined coupledness of genes, providing that is they inhabit the same organism and on the fact that the whole that they build does not particularly support their rival alleles (we here neglect that diploid phenotypes have on each locus two alleles) we could distil two transferable facilitating preconditions for the stability of a whole. Firstly, the fitness effect is only shown when these genes together 'inhabit' an organism. Secondly, their synergetic co-operative effect also gives a fitness advantage for its composing genes and not for its competing alleles (neglecting the allelic loci within the organism). I have argued earlier that it would be wrong to deny the existence of a whole which is different from the sum of its parts, only because its composing parts profit from its existence.

These facilitating preconditions for building a stable synergetic system which serve the common good are, as we will see later, not necessary. The stronger claim of sacrificing group selection will be discussed below.

I shall now consider whether the conditions which facilitate the stability of larger wholes in regard to inner-organismic higher level genes of different loci can also be applied generally in the inter-organismic case. In regard to groups this would mean that synergetic properties have only to be shown if all (or many) members of a group have the underlying gene, and that the fitness effect, if it is shown, is profitable to those members which have this property in particular. It is difficult to think of a strict coupledness as in the case of inner-organismic higher-level genes. Still one is able to think of similar cases.

We may for example think of a pack of wolves hunting together and sharing their prey. This is group behaviour where something is achieved which one individual could not achieve on its own. If the food is shared between those who have hunted, it is those members in particular who are profiting from this synergetic property, who have created it.

The non-zero sum advantage of hunting together, clearly a group phenomenon, is linked here to the support of those genes which create this holistic effect. It seems that the only problem is that a gene frequency needs to become established so that the holistic effect comes into play frequently enough to lead to the predominance of the underlying gene in the population. A gene for hunting together only has its synergetic effect if others want to hunt together as well. Like in the above case of higher level genes, $L_{11}OL_{12}$, the establishment of a starting frequencies can be achieved, for example, by a founder effect—a new population with a strong proportion of mutants.

But true gene-atomists would object that there may be a selfish mutant which is too lazy to hunt, but still tries to get the same share of the prey which had been caught. Equally all such group cooperations are in principle a riddle to gene-Darwinians. But let us assume that the pack would after a while somehow exclude this selfish mutant from eating, from reproduction or from the group generally. Then hunting together and its profit are again coupled.

It is indeed obvious that the selfish mutant who is too lazy to hunt, but still tries to eat equally from the prey of the pack, would under the above conditions become extinct. (For the time being we are not concerned with the possibility of an evolutionarily stable sacrificing altruism.) But despite our massively simplified assumptions this argument does not yet secure the stability of the synergistic system which serves the good of those who establish it. Additionally the stability of the genetic basis for exclusion of the selfish organism has to be considered as well.

One simple solution of this problem would be to add the precondition that both properties, hunting and excluding the non-hunters from the profit, have to be based simply on one gene, in the gene-Darwinian sense a relatively short strand of DNA. Since genes mostly have many effects—they are polyphenic (pleiotropic)—this is not as implausible as it may appear.⁹⁹¹

Another relatively simple solution would be that we were concerned with two genes, but they are again for some different polyphenic effect morphologically or functionally linked. But since I want to make my argument as general as possible, I do not want to rest my position on this assumption.

We assume that the two properties are based on genes at two different loci, which are not necessarily directly linked in any way. We are not merely concerned with another example of higher level genes in the $L_{11}OL_{12}$ sense, since the advantage is a group advantage, communal hunting and sharing could only be done in a group. Whether in a larger group the hunting gene H and the excluding gene E are present in one individual at $L_{11}OL_{12}$ instead of in two different ones at $L_{11}OL_{22}$ is here only secondary.

We have assumed that in our population of wolves H and E are already predominant and is for example based on a founder effect. As mentioned above, it is obvious that an egoistic non-hunting mutant allele h will die out, because the E genes will exclude the lazy selfish individuals from the advantage created by the non lazy group. A more interesting question is whether the excluding gene E could not be subverted by a mutant gene e without this property. Indeed e -alleles might enter the population without being directly counter-selected, although in the long run they may cause a subversion

⁹⁹¹ Cf. for example: St. Gould, E. Vrba. *Exaptation* (1982/98), pp. 60 f.; generally ↷ p. 307 f.

of the systemic advantage of the group. But only as long as no *h* mutants are around, the *e*-allele is evolutionarily neutral. As long as this is the case the *e*-alleles will normally remain in the population without coming to predominate it. But if a *h* mutant appears, things change. The lazy non-hunter *h* may now be lucky in the rare case of him meeting two *e*-mutants with their prey (without any other *E*-wolf there trying to exclude him). In this case organisms with the *h*-allele will be lucky, but equally the *e*-allele organisms will be unlucky because they themselves become less of the food they hunted. Hence the few neutral *e*-alleles now presumably become less fit than the *E*-alleles and will be reduced in number. The case in which the *h*-mutant meets a group of *e*-mutants may occur so rarely, that it still gets excluded from the group advantage and becomes extinct. Hence the egoistic *h*-alleles will directly perish and as long as they are around the ignorant *e*-alleles will also have a disadvantage.

It follows that based on the interaction between different organisms and different loci, which is often ignored, a synergetic advantage which would not exist outside of the group and which is advantageous particularly to those which create this whole, could be evolutionarily stable and will not be subverted by selfish organisms, which try to profit from that group and do not contribute to it.

Below I shall argue that further radical cases of group altruism and group selectionism are possible. There the problem of subversion is graver. In this section the difference of loci and alleles has been clarified and an example of stable synergetic properties which are good for the group, involving a system of different interacting genetic loci on the population level, has been given. Here I only wanted to point out that less radical forms of cooperation and of synergetic properties exist, in contrast to the assertion that there are merely selfish genes. Thereby I objected to the gene-Darwinian spirit that selfish genes always undermine systems which serve the common good. If the population itself is endowed with the necessary internal mechanisms to sustain the course favourable to the common good, a subversion of this system may become prevented.

(2) Four Possibilities To Achieve the Good of the Group. In my view ruthless genetic egoism on the one hand and radical group selectionist altruism on the other hand are extreme ends of a range of possibilities. In the polemics of some gene-Darwinians it is often wrongly assumed that the absence of radical sacrificing altruism implies the selfishness of genes. But the absence of one extreme does not imply the other. Without the concept of higher levels one is caught in this dichotomy, taking it into consideration, the world has more grades and this dichotomy appears to be a false simplification.

Sober and D. S. Wilson focus predominantly on group selection of sacrificing altruism. But they have acknowledged that group selection of what I call sacrificing altruism and mere altruism have to be distinguished.⁹⁹² Nevertheless, as far as I can judge, they exclude lower levels of selection which may count in favour of group properties. This is the case although they have treated at length the fallacy of claiming gene-atomism tautologically. They may have excluded these phenomena, because these phenomena do not *necessarily* lead to higher level properties, although they may lead to these properties. Although I agree with Sober and Wilson that gene-Darwinism could in any case be shown to be wrong, to neglect the differences below group selection leaves, I think, too much ground to this approach.

⁹⁹² E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. *Onto Others* (1998), p. 30.

As I have elaborated in the above section on the tautological definition of gene-atomism, it is not only reasonable to distinguish between ruthless egoism and sacrificing altruism, but also between ruthless egoism undermining a synergetic whole and the stabilisation of a system which is advantageous to the whole, even though the composing genes profit from it. We of course normally want to make a difference between a criminal robbing a bank and someone who is conscientiously working for a bank (thereby I do not want to claim that people working for a bank could not become criminals).

In the above example, the genes, although not altruistic in a self-sacrificing way, are sustaining a system which is advantageous to a larger whole of contributors to that system, but also to themselves. It is a group hunting co-operatively and the excluding selfish mutants, which try to make use of the advantage of the group without contributing to that result is part of a strategy, which could secure this system. It would be wrong to redefine such an example in terms of gene-atomism and gene-egoism. Besides the reality of single genes, a system has been established which changes the paths of evolution. Now a higher over-all fitness is achieved and individuals become advantaged who are, albeit not totally self-sacrificing, less 'selfish' compared with alternative alleles. They do not exploit and undermine the common good. A redefinition in terms of ruthlessly selfish genes misses the relevant questions of the dispute and in its resulting simplified philosophical message is, I think, simply outright false and dangerous.

Based on these considerations I now outline four ways in which properties which are advantageous for a group may become established. For the time being (despite differences) I follow Dawkins, Hull and others in distinguishing the profiting units of replication (on the genetic side) and the units of interaction. I showed earlier that in sexually reproducing organisms selection of individuals, against a common simplifying assumption, does not necessarily, but may lead to an adaptation on that individual level. This depends on frequency and fitness distributions in the basic population. Here I argue that 'lower' types of selection can also lead to advantages for higher types of entities.

In particular the mechanism which I propose for systemic individual selection may be interesting where the interaction of several loci of different organisms is shown to lead possibly to a systemic stability of group properties, although without relying on group selection. Treating group selection in structured populations I largely rely on Sober's and D. S. Wilson's approach, but I add a proposal whereby the applicability of this model is strongly extended. Group selection of whole populations if combined with systemic individual selection may according to my proposal lead to stable wholes, even without the need for permanent group selection.

(a) **Individual selection which may promote the common good.** To state this possibility may appear trivial, but I think it is not as trivial as one might think and anyway gene-atomism has largely concealed this possibility.

Let us assume that the running speed of deer evolved because it benefited the individual organisms.⁹⁹³ For this trait only individual selection should play a role and it is assumed that neither synergetic properties nor a system of individual selection exist (⇒ pp. 285 f.). Only those individual deer would have been successful in surviving which could individually run fast enough.

We are hence concerned with absolute fitness values of individuals, but in principle one may construct similar arguments using relative values (not running fast but running faster than the rest in the group).

For assuming an individual selection of the trait of running speed we in my view do not need to stipulate that deer in general are in all respects selected individually.

Despite these assumptions it is in my opinion still possible that the survival of the fastest individuals, as a side effect, is also good for the group or for the species. The main objection to this claim is that in regard of this trait it does not make sense to speak of a larger whole which may benefit from this selection on the individual level, because according to the above stipulation, there is no such whole. Nevertheless in a selectionist context the intuitive claim that the individual good may sometimes lead to the common good can, I think, be justified. Here three possible arguments supporting this view will suffice.

Firstly, if we can not speak of wholes in regard to the particular trait of running fast, but we actually aim to distinguish whether individual selection does at the same time undermine a synergetic whole, we still may take other traits in that group into account, which may have a synergetic group property. Presumably, a greater individual running speed will not strongly undermine any other traits based on group selection. This, of course, would need to be analysed in each case and is a matter of degree. But in the example of the pack of wolves hunting together, a subversion of the allele for the exclusion of the cheater by individual selection, would clearly subvert the synergetic property of hunting in groups.

Secondly, individual selection may even increase the fitness of a group, at least in the sense of the fitness of all its members. We assume a second trait that the group would always to some extent wait for its slowest members, which should be stable for another reason, for example because it is advantageous for vital group coherence. It would result that the fitness of all group members would be partly dependent on its slowest member. Although this leaves the austere world of individualism, running speed should still predominantly be selected individually; the slowest members should still be the easiest prey for predators. Individual selection eliminating very slow deer, would have a particularly positive side-effect for the fitness of each other member, by enhancing their absolute fitness (here the resulting running speed). Hence, although the physical running speed itself is based here on individual selection, its interaction with the waiting trait leads to an increase of the fitness of all members of the group.

⁹⁹³ Cf.: E. Sober; D. S. Wilson. *Philosophical Work on the Unit of Selection Problem* (1994/1998), pp. 199, 203.

Thirdly, the most relevant positive side-effect of individual selection for a group may be that the group does not become extinct in the long run. Permanent individual selection pressure for running speed may also lead to a herd with enhanced running speed, which then may survive a new more dangerous species of predators migrating into their habitat. Survival is at least in some respects in sexual organisms a property of an evolutionary line, because no organism can reproduce alone and all genes come back to a gene-pool. An early strong selection pressure on individuals may *sometimes* lead to the survival of the group or species as a whole.

These examples are obviously not meant as an exhaustive treatment of how individual selection may lead to group advantages. Definitely many aspects need closer scrutiny, further distinctions could be made and a classification might be developed. Here I only wanted to point out that this matter is neither completely trivial nor only leads to negative results.

Individual selection does of course not necessarily lead to the good of the whole and to the good of most members of the whole. The subversion of altruist synergetic groups by selfish genes or individuals is the prototypic example where lower levels of selection lead to a disadvantage for the whole and thus for most of its members. Nevertheless, gene-Darwinism has concealed that sometimes lower levels of selection may, as a side-effect, also lead to an advantage for a higher-level. If gene-Darwinians do not contradict this claim explicitly, their approach in any case is different in spirit.

(b) Systemic individual selection. This proposed type of selection is not based on group selection and can not guarantee that only properties which are good for the group come into being. It is also different from plain individual selection, because a system of individual selection may create a change of the direction of the whole which is not understandable on the basis of its parts. Hence, by chance or with only a little help of group selection, properties which are good for the group, but perhaps disadvantageous for the selfish individual, could become established. Systemic individual selection could, as I argue in the following, stabilise a property which has been established by group selection without the further need of group selection.

The example I give is linked to sexual selection, but in principle other examples without mate choice could also be taken.

One may also take examples similar to our earlier one of the pack of wolves which hunt together and stabilise this property by excluding those selfish mutants who eat equally but are too lazy to hunt. This has been shown to be evolutionarily stable against subversion from within without necessitating group selection.

Now I consider how for a pack of wolves how the bravery of the attacking wolves could be evolutionarily stable. One possibility, discussed below is permanent group selection among those packs with particularly brave wolves, which have a higher overall fitness. Presently, I am concerned with the question of how, if taking other loci into account, such a gene or genetic system, leading to the good of the group, could evolve without the existence of group selection. We assume (in the usual simplifying

way) that there is a mutant gene *B* for attacking prey in a particularly brave way. In a way a *B*-wolf shall be an altruist in making more effort and risking more than the others in order to achieve the synergetic common good of bringing down the prey, which one wolf would not have achieved on its own. Now there is of course the danger that this gene, though good for the group at large, will not be evolutionarily stable. It may become established for example by a founder effect, but in absence of group selection it will soon be subverted, because it is disadvantageous for the bearer. It will soon be outproduced by less brave and comparatively selfish *b*-mutants. Hence, mere individual selection would lead to the extinction of *B*.

But if a system of interacting gene loci is considered, all each regulated by individual selection, things do not remain that simple. Given, for example, that reproduction in these wolves would be based on female choice and that each of the wolf bitches only reproduces a few times. If a gene *C* were predominant in this pack that wolf bitches prefer to choose to mate with brave wolves (*B*), the tables have turned, then the *B*-gene, which is also good for the group at large, will soon be more frequent than the comparatively selfish *b*-gene.

But this is not really conclusive yet; it needs also to be shown that the choosing gene *C* is stable in the population. Mutant *c*-alleles appear to have an advantage since they would not always mate with the individually non-fit altruists, who always risk their life, and whose offspring will later often have the same individually disadvantageous property. But this conclusion is false, as long as *C* alleles are predominant in the population. The brave wolf and its descendants will actually, based on the interaction with the *C*-genes in other organisms, be better off. Of course if *c*-alleles already dominated the group, *B* and *C* would not become evolutionarily stable. A founder effect, genetic drift or group selection would be needed to first establish these starting conditions preferable for the whole, which then would be stable.

It has been shown, that synergetic groups may have a certain stability and need not become subverted by selfish organisms or genes, even if this is not secured by group selection. However, if certain conditions are not given such a system may collapse. But claiming that such system does not exist and that we are still only concerned with nothing but atomic and selfish genes, is committing the outlined fallacy of claiming gene-atomism tautologically (⇒ pp. 271 f.). One may of course somehow redefine the systemic whole which has changed the adaptive landscape of each gene in terms of single genes, but this would miss the point of what is implied by 'system'. One may also reinterpret the brave gene *B*, which is advantageous for the group, as being truly a selfish gene, since it ultimately survives and becomes evolutionarily stable. Any result can be redefined in this way, including the more radical forms of group selection, treated below. The composing genes have always survived, but it of course makes a difference if they survive because they serve a larger system or not. Here systemic individual selection leads to the stabilisation of genes with synergetic properties which are advantageous for the whole (in this sense they are not merely individual genes), although they would not have been

advantageous on their own. Moreover, this system under certain conditions prevents the subversion by selfish individuals.

Although systemic individual selection may stabilise synergetic properties which are advantageous for the common good (here still simply for survival), it has to be pointed out that this does not necessarily lead to the adaptation on the group level.

In principle one may imagine that in the preceding example the situation would have changed so that bravery of individuals would not be adaptive any more for the group. Nevertheless systemic individual selection would up to a certain point still sustain this property. The assumption that bravery becomes disadvantageous for wolves is implausible; it may in some respects be more plausible for humans, who also have a cultural system of medals, honours and personal appreciation supporting bravery. However, the point is that such a system could have its own stability and inner dynamics to some extent autonomous from external selection pressure.

One may think of the enormous antlers of the palaeontological titanotheres or of present species of deer. It has often been argued that the enormous size of the antlers in some cases is not adaptive, neither for the individual nor for the group.²¹⁹ Something like this, as I will discuss later, may well evolve through systemic individual selection. In a way it may be wrong to call this evolutionary process selection at all. Although this is a type of selection in the trivial sense that some survive and others do not survive, it does not fulfil the externality of the selection process which is normally implied by this term, particularly in an adaptationist Darwinian context.

It may appear disappointing that systemic individual selection leads to an autonomous system level above individuals, but does not ensure that this system is necessarily the best for the group. Actually, as given in our example systems which are advantageous for the group, could and presumably often are stabilised by such a kind of organisation. If this is not based on chance, it at least needs one instance of group selection (☞ below). However, the process itself indeed gains a certain autonomy. This need not to be understood as a problem, instead it may point to the fundamental fact that evolution is not only an adaptation to an outside environment, but also has inner tendencies of its own, transcending individual *and* group selection.

This work started with an interest in the evolution of the biological basis of morals. The outlined process firstly shows that adaptations which are good for the group, could be sustained based on certain frequencies and gene interactions in a population. Secondly, this is a basis for an internal definition of what becomes selected. Inner tendencies of groups may come to lead evolution in new directions, which are not necessarily adaptive on the whole, but in which in any case the individuals are urged to adopt. Although parts of our moral presumably serve the survival of the whole, helping the weak and wounded is not necessarily adaptive (at least not in any direct sense), neither for those individuals who show this behaviour nor for the group as a whole. This may point to the deeper truth that evolution is not only an adaptation, but is the establishment of new principles which from within may direct the further development. (For a treatment of autoselection and autonomy ☞ pp. 384 f., pp. 398 f.)

(c) **Group selection in structured populations.** Group selection directly relates to the fitness of groups with advantageous synergetic properties.

Many group selectionist models require that one **group** has an advantage over another to speak of group selection, similar to when one normally speaks only of a gene which may become selected if there is an alternative allele. "If all groups are exactly alike, there can be no group selection."⁹⁹⁴ Although this may be controversial, it will not be discussed here, since I only want to show that it is in principle possible that traits could be and are stabilised by group selection, because they are good for a larger whole. I only present one model here and make a proposal to extend the conditions of its applicability.

Everything which is advantageous for a larger whole, but is not directly advantageous from the perspective of the individual or of the gene requires **altruism**. In evolutionary parlance no consciousness is required for 'altruism'.⁹⁷⁵ Altruism is understood as a general matter, including all properties and all behaviour that is good for a larger group or for one of its members. This of course does not imply *vice versa* that every altruism, where single organisms without an advantage help group member is necessary advantageous at the level of the group. This has to be shown in each particular case. However it is commonly accepted that we could think of properties which are good for the group; gene-Darwinians normally only argue that such properties could not be stable based on this effect. I have worked out above that it is not always necessary that advantage of group properties have to be disadvantageous to its bearer. Hence sometimes altruism, instead of sacrificing altruism, is involved. Still sacrificing altruism remains a particularly important question.

I distinguish group selection of structured populations and group selection of whole populations. For structured population models groups do not need to be wiped out completely. The assumption behind structured populations has been central for the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis.

Group selectionist models of structured populations differ considerably. They vary, for example, in regard to the assumed population structure, the conditions of mating, the mechanism of population subdivision, the selection pressures, the coherence of subpopulations or the incorporation of migration. Lloyd provides an overview of the differences of possible models referring to more literature on this topic.⁹⁹⁵ Each model has its own advantages and constraints. They partly even contradict each other, but there may well be different valid models for different conditions.

For simplicity reasons I here only summarise one model which has been proposed by Sober and D. S. Wilson.⁹⁹⁶ Their model is restricted to certain conditions and it may also be treated as a model of a selection of whole groups. I shall add a proposal as to why their model could more generally be applied to groups of relatively small size, which mix with the basic population, in any case resulting in a model of structured populations par excellence. Sober and Wilson show that group selection in structured population can also lead to the evolutionary stability of sacrificing altruism. Sacrificing altruism presupposes that the organism which supports the whole or which helps other members has an evolutionarily relevant disadvantage on the individual level. The fitness of an individual who is a self-sacrificing altruist is by definition, in regard of mere individual selection, lower than that of the egoist. The synergetic advantage for the whole is here not coupled to the advantage of the individual. The problem is clear. If no synergetic multi-loci-system of individual selection secures the stability of that

⁹⁹⁴ *Idem. Onto Others* (1998), p. 47.

⁹⁹⁵ E. Lloyd. *The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory* (1994/1988), pp.48 f.; see also M. J. Wade. *A critical review of the models of group selection* (1978); on the relationship of group selection and kin selection: E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. *Onto Others* (1998), p. 55 f..

⁹⁹⁶ E. Sober. *What is Evolutionary Altruism?* (1998/1988), pp. 463, 470-474; E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. *Onto Others* (1998), pp. 23 f.

trait, as shown above, altruism will soon decline, even if advantageous for the group. How could group selection lead to and stabilise an adaptation on the group level?

Figure 6 shows that, albeit altruism is less fit within each group and will decline in every generation in each group where egoists are members, the synergetic advantage of a group with a high number of altruists could lead to quicker multiplying of the average member of those groups. Although this has also a positive effect for the egoists and the proportion of altruists decreases in each group, this could be balanced by the different contribution to the total number of offspring. Without here calculating the involved frequencies in detail, figure 6 gives an impression of possible outcomes.⁹⁹⁷ The frequency of altruists in the two population,

taken together, first was 50%. Although the frequency of altruists in each population has declined in one (or several) generations in the largely egoistic group from 10 % to 5 % and in the largely altruistic group from 90 % to 80 %, the altruists on the total, paradoxically, have increased not only in number but in proportion! Now in our hypothetical total population 165 altruists and 135 egoists could be found. The relative frequency of altruists although falling within each group increases from 50 % to 55 %.




Figure 6: Although the proportion of egoists within each group increases in each generation, the proportion of altruists rises in regard to the total population, because the group advantage in this example more than balances the individual advantage of the egoists. Please note the differences on the y-axis. (Similar to Sober and Wilson, 1998, p. 24.)

Sober calls this non-intuitive statistical phenomenon that something on the whole may increase, although it decreases in each sub-class, in tribute to a statistician, Simpson's Paradox.⁹⁹⁸

This model requires the additional assumption that from time to time new groups are formed, otherwise the subversion effect within each group becomes stronger than the group advantage of altruistic groups. This differs for example to my above proposal of systemic individual selection, which could stabilise properties advantageous for the group and which requires a certain basic frequency within a group to be stable. Here, the groups need to be different enough in their composition that the difference

⁹⁹⁷ For E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, *Onto Others* (1998), pp. 23 f.

⁹⁹⁸ E. Sober, *What is Evolutionary Altruism?* (1998/1988), pp. 470-473.

of their synergetic effects can be 'seen' by group selection. This variation may be provided by certain population structures. Sober argues that this can be achieved by a permanent fragmentation particularly of the quickly growing altruist groups, without a mixing too strongly with other populations.⁹⁹⁹ These groups will statistically vary in their composition. Sober and Wilson have also pointed out that this assumption is given in the case of sibling groups. Here in sexually reproducing organisms the frequency of 50% or of 100 % altruists could easily be achieved.¹⁰⁰⁰ Although this is close to what has been called kin selection, Sober and Wilson show that this is a kind of group selection through working on kin groups.

This, according to Sober and Wilson has actually even been advocated by W. Hamilton himself, who has contributed much to the development of the theory of kin selection. In his later publications, particularly in an article from 1975, Hamilton, based on equations developed by G. Price, has reconsidered his theory of inclusive fitness as representing a multilevel selection process. This continues to be ignored by gene-Darwinians.¹⁰⁰¹

I want to propose two extensions of the conditions where these requirements for stable group selection could be met, where no fragmentation but a mix and a formation of new groups is sufficient. Particularly the second proposal may be of interest.

Firstly, there may be the possibility that phenotypic altruists may recognise other altruists to form a group, 'in order to' guarantee that differences in groups are found. This altruism would not have to be based on the same genes and no siblings need to be involved.¹⁰⁰² The alternative blind formation of groups regardless of the properties of its members anyhow appears bizarre, particularly in regard to 'higher' organisms. (However, this assumption is usual of most models which for mathematical reasons have to be simple.)

Secondly, groups which should vary enough can also be formed 'blindly', regardless of the properties of their members. Besides the conditions mentioned above, I shall show that Sober's and Wilson's model is also applicable, if the groups mix again and again with the basic population, even if they formed again in a random way and if no sibling structure were involved. It may appear that this would lead to groups which always have a number of altruists similar to the average of the population. But in my view this could be prevented if the formed groups are small enough, that they strongly vary by chance. In regard to small groups the statistical central limit theorem does not become applicable. Simple statistics could show that the average of compositions of each subpopulation (here the relative number of altruists) varies on average strongly from the average composition in the basic population if the normal population size of the subpopulation is small.

⁹⁹⁹ *Ibid.* (1998/1988), p. 474.

¹⁰⁰⁰ E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. *Onto Others* (1998), pp. 62 f..

¹⁰⁰¹ *Ibem.* pp. 71-77. Cf. E. Sober. *What is Evolutionary Altruism?* (1998/1988), his footnote 9, Cf. R. Dawkins. *The Extended Genotype* (1982), pp. 187 f.

¹⁰⁰² This proposal in my opinion has not to be conflated with mere reciprocal altruism. Although, in any group selection, the individual somehow in average profits from the group, in group selection the synergetic property is essential, which is not necessarily given in the case of reciprocal altruism. Moreover, I have also argued that reciprocal altruism already transcends strict gene-Darwinism. (Cf. also the subsection on claiming gene-atomism in a tautological way, ☹ pp. 271).

What in textbooks of statistics is taken as a sample of a larger population to estimate a variable, for instance the mean value, of a certain property in a basic population, here could be seen as a group. The property we are concerned with is altruism.

Whereas in measurement one is usually interested in getting an as adequate measurement as possible, here we are interested in the opposite. When does the mean of the altruistic property in different groups vary enough from the mean of the total population to allow group selection to play a central role? The statistical central limit theorem shows, as visualised in figure 7, that independent from the form of the distribution of the basic population, the means of different groups (or samples) of n members (or observations)¹⁰⁰³ approaches a normal distribution, as n becomes high enough

(normally $n > 30$). Confer the graphs of a, b, c. More important is that this normal distribution of means of different observations (groups), has the variance of σ^2/n (where σ^2 is the variance of the population, which is not depicted). This implies, that the smaller the groups are, the more they vary on average in their mean from the populational mean, even if the groups are random samples.¹⁰⁰⁴

Normally one also depicts the population structure in such a graph. Since we are concerned with a dichotomic property, 'to be or not to be altruistic', this would have resulted merely in two columns one at 0 the other at 1. It makes more sense to depict a graded property (which I have done only as an intuitive help). Normally the central limit theorem is used for cases with a graded property. Sober's and Wilson's model will presumably also work similarly with graded properties, but this would need to be shown in detail, since the basic model would need to be modified. However, the central limit theorem is applicable to *all* forms of basic distributions. Hence I have confined myself to this case.

This shows that under the condition of small group sizes sufficient variance of the mean of the involved groups may be given, even if random group formation is assumed. Hence also small group sizes appear to fulfil the conditions required for Sober's and Wilson's basic model of group selection.

(d) Group selection of whole populations. Another possibility of group selection is the wiping out of whole populations. In popular presentations of evolutionary biology this is sometimes falsely presented as the one and only model of group selection. I shall only mention it shortly and also only mention the possible combination with the proposed systemic individual selection.

Let us assume that a group or a species of altruists which are advantageous for the group had become established by the founder effect or by genetic drift (phenomena well studied by the evolutionary synthesis). Now, the problem of subversion from outside and from within may become




Figure 7: The distribution of the number of groups with a certain relative frequency or mean of altruists. The groups in each graph are randomly chosen out of a main population.

Graph *a* may represent the means of 100 groups with the group size $n = 2$. Graph *b* 100 groups with $n = 10$, *c* for $n = 20$.

¹⁰⁰³ There is a difference between observations and groups relevant to the central limit theorem in its normal form. Observations are usually understood as random samplings *with* replacement, whereas the application above on groups is actually a random sampling *without* replacement. In our model members can only be member of one group. Also if we do not want to change this assumption (this would be interesting as well) the general lesson from the argument is in a different formulation also applicable to random sampling without replacement.

pressing. One simply could assume that if egoism becomes too predominant in a group this group simply will not survive, whereas other will. Similar to Sober's and Wilson's original proposal above, only assuming complete isolation, the permanent division of successful groups and the frequent elimination of whole groups could stabilise the altruistic trait. But one may also think of two other ways in which a subversion may be prevented without the need of permanently wiping out whole groups.

Firstly, the concept of evolutionary constraints may provide the possibility that something which is advantageous for the group, but not advantageous for a single selfish gene, may once become established and may then be stable for other reasons. The concept of structural constraints has recently been reanimated for example by Gould and more radically by Goodwin. Evolutionary constraints stress that because of certain morphological (or functional) necessities not all directions are open to evolution. According to this view, pathways, once adopted, may have an inner direction, which do not allow their subversion.

I shall also argue that the phenotypic structure is not only a result of the genome, but itself also an evolutionary factor, channelling possible evolutionary pathways (☞ pp. 315 f.).

Secondly, group selection may once establish a system of individual selection, which is advantageous to the group and is kept stable by the inner stabilising dynamics of the system. In this case only the installation of such a system requires group selection. (This concept will be treated in more detail when discussing species selection below.)

Without such modifications frequent selection of groups is required. However, the elimination of groups in some species may play a role. Also in regard to the human species this might have played a role, if tribes were permanently at war with each other. But this is obviously not a promising model for the present day sociobiology of humans. If we indeed want to treat such matters biologically (I would advocate a relative strong autonomy of cultural aspects), there are, as have been shown, other alternatives to strict gene-egoism. In regard to present human sociobiology I would generally prefer a structured population model of the advantage of social groups, which mix with other groups, and also my model of autoselection, because these models appear more adequately to resemble the presently given situation. Additionally, we should not forget that scientific models of human behaviour may also have the aspect of a self fulfilling prophecy.

To sum up, I have outlined four different ways, in which the good for a group may become achieved: individual selection, systemic individual selection, group selection in structured populations and group selection of whole populations. It has been particularly shown that systemic individual selection may gain a certain autonomy relative to mere individual selection and if combined with group selection may secure the good of the group without the need of permanent selection. In regard to the presented group selectionist model of E. Sober and D. S. Wilson I have shown that its applicability could be extended to

¹⁰⁰⁴ Cf. e. g. J. Bortz. *Statistik*. Springer-Verlag: Berlin (1993), pp. 87 f.

all groups which mix with the population, if the usual group size is small enough to guarantee the required inter-group variation.

f) Stable Synergetic Properties and Selection above Groups — Species and Ecosystems

Also at higher levels selection is conceivable. This has been proposed in the evolutionary discourse for species as wholes and in principle also for synergetic systems of several species up to whole ecosystems.

It is questionable, as is in regard to group selection, whether the term natural selection could be appropriately applied in the sense of a full Darwinian process of blind variation and external elimination. Another less Darwinian proposal would be that only the second step of this process, differential external elimination, comes into play (☹ definition of Darwinism, pp. 107, 348 f.). Differential external elimination of synergetic wholes appears to be enough to make such wholes evolutionarily relevant (the evolutionary stability has to be discussed in any case). It may still be an interesting question whether there is a Darwinian blind variation of species and ecosystems? In regard of species this has actually been proposed. In the subsequent chapter 9 the transcendence of universal process Darwinism will be discussed. Here I am not primarily concerned whether the particular evolutionary process is strictly Darwinian, but rather whether these higher levels of organisation could in any case reasonably be said to exist and possibly also secure their own stability. Here I can only touch upon the discussions on the possibility of the evolutionary relevance first of species and secondly of systems of species up to ecosystems.

(1) Species. The evolutionary relevance and the selection of species in the present discourse has early been advocated by Ghiselin¹⁰⁰⁵ and Hull. Hull has explicitly understood species as 'individuals', having a beginning and an ending in time and exhibiting a certain degree of integration. According to Hull, the evolution of such 'individuals' could be modelled along Darwinian lines.¹⁰⁰⁶

In biology particularly Gould and Eldredge have defended the autonomy of the explanatory level of species and argue that the involved processes are at least similar to those of Darwinian individual selection.¹⁰⁰⁷

Prior to this, the proponents of the evolutionary synthesis, Wright, Dobzhansky and Mayr have in principle also supported the existence of species as an evolutionary factor. They advocated that the species is the unit of evolution which provides a basic frequency distribution of genes. To them the

¹⁰⁰⁵ M. T. Ghiselin. *A radical solution to the species problem* (1974).

¹⁰⁰⁶ D. Hull. *Are Species Really Individuals* (1976); *Individuality and Selection* (1980). Cf. the proposal of B. Mishler and R. Brandon to decompose the different aspects of the notion of individuality, *Individuality, Pluralism, and the Phylogenetic Species Concept* (1998/1987), pp. 300-305.

¹⁰⁰⁷ N. Eldredge; S. J. Gould. *Punctuated equilibria* (1972); Gould, Eldredge. *Punctuated equilibria* (1977); cf.: E. Lloyd. *The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory* (1994/1988), p. 97. (On punctuated equilibrium ☹ p. 149)

phenotypic structuredness of a population, caused partly by environmental, is evolutionarily relevant and an evolutionary factor. The concept of species in this view is linked to a number of properties and evolutionary factors like sexual reproduction, recombination, migration and isolation. Additionally, at least some advocates have even advocated the possibility of species selection along similar lines to individual selection, i. e. a blind overproduction of species and an external selection (☹ pp. 130 f.). Heretofore, for example Wallace advocated that the species is itself a unit of selection (☹ p. 115).

The properties and evolutionary factors linked to the concept of a species, in my view pose the question, how far a species should be regarded as being an object of selection or in how far it itself changes the process of evolution. At least for reasons of comprehensibility, I think, we better distinguish two aspects of the reality of species, on the one hand the existence of the basic properties of a species, which change the character of evolution itself and on the other hand the result of the selection process of different species with possible adaptations on this level.

The basic properties which more or less define the very existence of a species, like a common gene pool, recombination of genes, the building of subpopulations, the possibility of isolation, inner-specific migration, founder effect etc. already make the reality of species, transcending the individuals, apparent. But why should these properties make the species real? In my view these properties are themselves changing the very process of evolution. Inner-specific groups which we have treated above only become possible based on the existence of interbreeding populations. But also the very notion of single genes becomes only reasonable based on meiosis in sexually reproducing organisms, transcending the asexual evolution of whole organisms and their genomes (also the concept of higher-level genes, presupposes single genes in the first place). Genes as treated by population genetics are dependent on the existence of interbreeding populations. Semi-isolated gene pools are also necessary to sustain the variability on the species level, but equally for evolution on lower levels. But, likewise, phenotypic properties of a species like geographical isolation contribute to the way a species evolves too.

The existence of species makes evolution quicker and less blind, and also changes the direction of evolution. Based on recombination new genetic combinations could be found more quickly. From the viewpoint of the evolutionary line, now the species, this process is less blind, because these combinations are tested in subpopulations, and if successful may become predominant. Before new species evolve much will have been 'tested' before, within a species. Based on new combinations and on the fact that some genes are recessive, 'valleys' of an adaptive landscape could be crossed which could not be crossed before. But, what is even more important, also the adaptive landscape itself changes. If an evolutionary line is a species, as outlined, the evolution of inner-specific groups, as discussed above is possible and even probable. (☹ chapter 9, on the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms.)

It is cardinal that a species is a central unit of heredity in the sense of our earlier emphasis on genetic context. All genes, all high-level genes and all gene-pools, although they may vary in their reproductive rate, are part of this river of information. The species, as interbreeding population, is the ultimate

context in which all lower units are finally interpreted. However, this does not yet guarantee that all evolutionary products of the species are for the good of the species.

Nevertheless these properties of a species, as far as they change the process of evolution, are in a way inherent in all adaptations which result from this changed process. The crossing of valleys which would not have been crossed otherwise, the change of the adaptive landscape, are products of species, in the sense that if the species would not have existed these things would not have happened. Therefore, species appear to be real in the sense that they change the very process of evolution itself. Although most evolutionary results in a species appear to rely on the basic properties which a biological species has, not all aspects which are enabled by the very existence of species lead to the good of the species.

We come to the second aspect, that of the selection of species and whether properties could be established which are for the good of the species. Egoistic genes, which may have an inner-specific advantage at the cost of the adaptation of the whole species, may gain dominance in the species.

It appears that species selection is the only way that this could be prevented. I have outlined above, that it has often been argued that the general properties of a species, could lead to the process of species selection, similar to the neo-Darwinian concept of individual selection. (Actually, as mentioned, I think that variation on the species level is less blind, because combinations usually become tested before a new population becomes founded. On blindness, ☞ pp. 358).

Species selection and the problem of subversion could be understood in a similar way as the selection of whole groups, only a species is a group which is, reproductively, completely isolated from other such groups. Correspondingly, again a frequent selection of species appears to be required if subversion is to be prevented. To arch-Darwinians in particular this precondition should be no problem, since to them evolution anyhow consists almost only of blind allies.

Subversion may also be prevented by the existence of evolutionary structural constraints (☞ p. 292). Another possibility would be that species selection leads to the installation of what I described as a systemic system of individual selection, which has a stability against egoistic subversion (☞ pp. 285 f.). Such systems, as we have seen, have a certain autonomy relative to mere individual selection, but do not necessarily serve the group or the species. But if such systems which is advantageous on the species level once becomes established by species selection, this systems sustains it own inner stability. Species selection would only need to change these stable selection systems if they become non-adaptive for the species because of an environmental change or the inner evolution of other loci in the gene-pool.

Species selection has often wrongly been understood in isolation from other evolutionary mechanisms. Here a combination of species selection and systemic individual selection is proposed, which, I think has a synergetic property and each on their own do not have. If both concepts are combined it becomes possible that adaptations for the good of the species are installed by species selection, but are stable without the need of permanent species selection. This may help to explain why some adaptations

on the level of species, have not been undermined by selfish genes, if permanent elimination of species is, likewise, no plausible assumption.

(2) **Ecosystems** are obviously less integrated than species are. Different species are not reproductively linked to each other as the genes or sub-populations of a sexually reproducing species are. Although it is also much more normal for members of different species to hunt, exploit and kill each other, it is not *a priori* excluded that properties for the common good of systems of several species or even of ecosystems could exist.¹⁰⁰⁸

Ecosystems are dynamic complex systems almost defined by the interaction effects of their compounding different species, organisms and abiotic environments. As we are here still concerned with replicators only, one may rephrase this concept as a synergetic ecological interaction of several reproductively isolated gene-pools with their environment (☉ the following critique of germ-line-reductionism, pp. 303 f.). In either case ecosystems appear to be partly self-regulatory with frequent negative feedback loops, giving rise to new synergetic properties. (On the relevance of self-referential causation, ☉ pp. 398 f.).

The predator-prey relationship, as a simple two species system described by the Volterra-Lotka equations¹⁰⁰⁹, exhibits neither exponential growth, nor linear stability, as usual patterns to describe single populations, but an oscillation of the population size of the two species with a phase lag. Although this oscillation could be regarded as a synergetic property, it is not directly apparent that this relationship is for the good, neither of this higher system nor for the involved species. In a predator-prey relationship it appears that only the predator species profits from this interaction and will always exploit this system without constraints. But even such a system may lead also to the common good and may have self-stabilising properties.

Firstly, restraints for the predator may evolve. If we imagine that in a predator species a larger mutation took place and that this species may 'win' the evolutionary race and capture all the existing prey, or so much that the prey species collapses. (We may also think of a highly virulent bacteria killing almost all of its hosts.)¹⁰¹⁰ In this case the winning of the evolutionary race could cause the extinction of the winner. Actually such close prey-predator or parasite-host relationships are quite rare. But in any case the winning mutant will have a disadvantage and a geographically isolated group without this 'advantageous' mutation, may have a better chance to survive and may one day also reconquer this area. On the species level the predator which does not wipe out the prey population may become selected by group or species selection and the stability of this feature may also be secured by what I

¹⁰⁰⁸ J. Lovelock has even radically advocated that the Earth as a whole should be regarded as one organism. *Gaia* (1979). *The Ages of Gaia* (1988).

¹⁰⁰⁹ Lotka and Volterra took a systemic approach to evolution, albeit accepting natural selection and arguing for a more harmonious understanding of ecosystems than the ascendent Darwinism of the 1930s.

¹⁰¹⁰ On the group selection of low-virulence strains, cf. E. Sober; D. S. Wilson. *Onto Others* (1998), pp. 48-49.

called systemic individual selection (\ominus pp. 285 f.). But the real cause here would be the breakdown of an ecological system on which a predator depends; in a way we would be concerned with ecological selection for the good of that ecological system.

Secondly, if we assume that the prey would win the race, it appears that this would be only advantageous for the prey. But as long as the prey species is not completely wiped out by the predator it may, as mentioned before, profit from the resulting evolutionary race, because it may also become fitter in relation to other predators it may one day encounter. Additionally, this victory also in part due to the effects on the larger ecological system might turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory. For example the possibly exponentially growing population may disrupt the balance of the ecosystem on which the species relies.

Besides maintaining a moderate population size, predators (and generally consumer species), have also other ecological positive 'functions', necessary for the stability of an ecological system. For instance, the consumer species in the fragile ecosystem of the tundra are probably necessary for breaking down the dead plant matter. In the tundra the decomposers are not abundant enough to break down all the dead plant matter of the producers directly, to provide the nutrients and soil for the plants.

Hence, even in the case of predator-prey relations something like ecological selection for the good of an ecological system may under certain preconditions take place. Nevertheless the probability of an subversion of such system is still high, since for example the predator may wipe out a prey species and if the disadvantage is not too high feed on another species.

We now consider the less problematic example of a synergetic system of species which more directly serves the involved species. In such cases of symbiosis (mutualism) the interaction of species has a direct positive fitness effect for all involved species. Following my general approach, it would be absurd to argue that these systems do not exist, because they are obviously more than the sum of their parts.¹⁰¹¹

Lichens, for example, are composite plants consisting of a fungus and one or more algae. The involved kinds of organisms are different in kind, but form a common body. The alga synthesises carbohydrate that is taken up as food by the fungus, the fungus provides a structure that protects the alga from dry and other harsh conditions. Some lichens have even metabolic products which each of its composing forms does not produce themselves. Because of the symbiotic and hence synergetic advantageous properties of this system, lichens are able to live as pioneers for example on rocks, in deserts or in alpine regions.

But, a synergetic advantageous property of a system which could be selected, is, as we have seen, not enough for a synergetic whole to be evolutionarily stable. Additionally it has to be shown that a synergetic ecological system could prevent its subversion by an egoistic species. Again we may think of a 'cheating' species, which profits from the system, but does not contribute enough to sustain the system and thus undermines the surplus fitness of the system. In our example of lichens a hypothetical mutant alga may produce not enough carbohydrate for the fungus and instead replicate within the lichen

independent from the fungus. Those egoistic algae would undermine the symbiotic system, but would internally have an advantage relative to other algae. But the symbiotic system in which such a subversion would have taken place, would have had a much reduced probability to multiply as a whole. This is quite analogous with group selection of whole groups. Those groups which as a whole are less advantageous may become extinct. Although from the viewpoint of the single organism we are concerned with something like group or species selection the ultimate relevant property here, however, exists on the level of the ecosystem. Hence, this is an example of a synergetic property of a system of organisms of different species which is not easily subverted by selfish mutants.

Although this is an example at odds with a view that there are no ecological properties with evolutionary relevance in their own right, lichens are based on a particular form of symbiosis, which pervades almost all aspect of the life of the species involved and where even the reproduction of the two species is usually linked to each other (only the involved alga can under some conditions reproduce independently). The symbiotic system of these organisms has caused or is partly itself a selection system where normally ecological selection, via something like group selection, outweighs individual selection. The common reproduction of these different organisms guarantees that their synergetic properties are tested together in the next generation. Here the common reproduction in a way serves as the geographical isolation of different groups.

That such stable symbiotic communities are not necessarily undermined by selfish mutants, also becomes apparent in regard of ourselves, as we, like all other multicellular organisms, are build out of complex, eukaryotic cells. According to L. Margulis hypothesis of endosymbiosis, the eukaryotic cell resulted from the association of various single celled species. Today these species in ourselves form a permanent symbiosis obligatory for their, and our, survival. In this sense each of us humans *is* herself or himself a symbiotic system.

A strict link between the reproduction of two species (which still do not interbreed) appears to be a very successful strategy to secure a close and intimate symbiosis against subversion. It could also in a way be found, for example, in ants which tend and protect aphids and periodically 'milk' them. Although here the aphids could reproduce independently and the reproductive link is less close in some ant species, some aphids are taken with the queen when founding a new colony. But neither a strict nor a less strict reproductive link appears to be a necessary precondition for a stable symbiosis.

In analogy, ecological selection can not only work like the inner-specific selection of whole groups, but also like group selection in structured populations, where the individual animals are not strictly bound to a group but mix again to form new groups. Concerning systems of species, a certain isolation or particular close interaction of the involved species also appears normally to be given, if this symbiosis should be evolutionarily stable. This common isolation and interaction of subpopulations of

¹⁰¹¹ On the problem of a tautological definition of wholes as parts, ↻ pp. 271 f..

two species corresponds to what inner-specifically in respect of individuals is called a 'group'. But the common functional and geographical isolation and interaction of the sub-populations of both species, need not be a strict one as in the example of lichen above. A link of the subpopulations of the species limited in time or in amount (in analogy one can think of a semi-isolation of groups) could obviously be sufficient to stabilise a symbiosis. For example, there are ant species where new colonies usually take new aphids. These sub-populations of two species are, for the time the colony exists, linked to each other. For this time they are in a way commonly isolated and dependent on each other, although their reproduction is not closely linked in the sense that the ants species also keeps the aphids in new colonies. But the link between the subpopulations of these species is close enough that ecological selection may act on this system and that a subversion becomes prevented.

But symbiotic relations also appear to exist if the relation of the involved species is weaker, particularly in relationships where many species are involved. Up until here we were mainly concerned with two-species relationships, but ecosystems are vastly more complex. The interactions in these systems are only beginning to be appreciated, but I think, although this can not be shown in detail here, that also some properties of a larger system are for the good of such systems and have been object of ecological selection. Different species are linked in complex food chains and food webs. Likewise, in regard to shelter and other aspects of life they are often mutually dependent, not necessary only in a one-to-one relationship.

A more complex, but also quite clearly symbiotic, interaction is the coevolution for example between flowers and pollinators or similarly between fruit-bearing plants and birds or apes etc. Many flowers have nectaries to provide nectar which serves as food for butterflies and many other insects, which in turn pollinate them. The successfulness of the involved species relies on this symbiotic system they constitute. But for many-species systems the problem of a subversion is particularly obvious. Cases of subversive 'cheating' actually do exist, there are for example flowers, which imitate normal flowers with nectaries, but which actually do not 'invest' in producing nectaries. They do not support the synergetic symbiotic system, but still profit from it by being pollinated. There are also insects which the other way round make use of nectaries without pollinating the flowers which provide the nectar. But obviously this cheating is not so abundant, since such symbiotic systems obviously still do exist. Some insects even actively, with no direct advantage (but presumably with an indirect ecological one), help in pollinating flowers. Here a kind of ecological selection appears to play a role securing that the mutual advantages of this system are not subverted. This would be rather analogous to group selection in structured population, because the involved species are not reproductively linked. How such complex ecological systems are stabilised against subversion is only beginning to be understood by evolutionary ecology (mosaic evolution etc.).¹⁰¹²

¹⁰¹² Confer also my defence of the evolutionary relevance of phenotypes, based on inter-specific interactions, ☞ pp. 316 f.

The even much more complex interdependence of different species in an ecosystem becomes particularly apparent by the succession of different relatively coherent communities of plants and animals in areas which are either colonised by life for the first time, like the bare rock of a volcanic island, or which have been devastated, for example, by a forest fire. In the beginning of a succession only a few species constitute this system. The system is very fragile and the energy flux through the system is quick. Although the first species will soon be replaced they are normally the only species which can gain ground under these harsh conditions. As the succession proceeds the simple old communities are replaced again and again by characteristic new other ones, which are often more complex, often stratified, and enable more species to coexist with one another. If one is concerned with a resettlement of a devastated region by already existing species, the succession will cumulate in a constellation of an equilibrium, by ecologists called 'climax', where further changes usually take place only slowly. At this point the ecosystem, despite fluctuations, is stable and invading species largely fail to gain a foothold. Likewise if these species are able to enter this ecological system or if environmental conditions fluctuate, the increased richness of species and the complexity of relationships normally buffer the ecological system. The biomass, the number of species and individuals and the complexity of their relationships has increased. The energy flux has slowed down. The degree of organisation is sometimes expressed by the informational content and the entropy of a system, by the quotient of biomass (stored energy, *enthalpy*) and the used energy (*entropy*). One may dispute this as a simplistic understanding of organisation, but in any case it is striking that this systemic property, which also if measured in such a simplistic way appears to increase in such successions.

One may argue that the involved species during an ecological succession create an environment for each other. I do not want to deny the crucial role of competition in this development and the possibility that ecosystems may be subverted by egoistic species and may collapse, but I do oppose a reformulation of the described ecological phenomena in terms of single species or even single genes and their environments. This would be inappropriate, since this would neglect the supersummative aspects of this processes and the systemic dependencies involved.

Often the importance of inter-specific interactions unfortunately only becomes apparent after a system has become disrupted. The building of highly organised ecosystems in evolutionary terms also is assumed to need a long time, many millions of years, but their destruction can proceed much quicker. Although extinctions of species are something normal in evolution, we for example currently live in a period of mass extinction. Despite being caused by human activity, the concealed danger of the ecological problems lies in an inner dynamics based, for example, on the breakdown of food chains. We also experience the instability of the remaining fragile ecological systems if non-endemic organisms are introduced into a system or if pests could easily destabilise an ecological system. The current ecological crisis also leads to an abiotic problem, like the depletion and erosion of soil, or, since less water becomes stored in plants, flood disasters and catastrophic draughts.

Palaeontologically, the beginning and end of the Mesozoic era, the 'age of the reptiles', is marked by the world's largest mass extinctions. Besides external causes a dynamics of a collapsing ecosystem should also be considered.

The difference between species and ecosystems remains apparent and the problem of subversion appears to be more pressing in the ecological case. Of course, not everything which a species does, is necessarily positive for its ecosystem. Our own species gives an excellent example of this possibility. But if a species tends radically to destroy its ecosystem, it will not survive for long. A first step to prevent so-called *Homo sapiens sapiens* sharing such a destiny, seems to me, to stop denying the existence of ecosystems.

I sum up the main results of the sections on the transcendence of gene-atomism as follows: Firstly, it has been shown that gene-Darwinian gene-atomism is not defined to be true by definition. Single genes, which are claimed to be the units of selection, are not defined as any stretch of DNA. Despite some echoes of such a tautological approach to the unit of selection debate, it is apparent that gene-Darwinians argue that in sexually reproducing organisms short and selfish stretches of DNA are the only units of selection.

Secondly, the general concept of higher genetic units is introduced and it is shown that the meiotic shuffle in sexually reproducing organisms does not prevent the existence of higher genetic units. Corresponding to my critique of the physicalist research program (☹ pp. 240 f.), I advocate that genetic wholes with synergetic properties can be regarded to exist particularly in their own right.

Thirdly, probabilistic higher-level genes have a top down effect on single genes. This downward selection or downward sorting is presumably the simplest kind of downward causation. But higher level genes even *within* individuals need not become established by individual selection. High-level genes still may be subverted by selfish genes not serving the individual good. But, provided certain frequency distributions in the population, these high-level genes not only have an evolutionary effect, but they could become evolutionarily stable against subversion.

Fourthly, I discuss the fallacy claiming gene-atomism tautologically. Here wholes are excluded from the semantic framework, because wholes are simply redefined in terms of their parts. This is different from the first point, where such a tautology is given by the definition of a gene as a stretch of DNA of any length. Now larger wholes are not simple redefined to be called single genes as well, but wholes are defined in terms of their *several* composing single genes, with no regard whether the wholes are more than the sum of their parts or not and with no regard to whether these synergetic properties cause their own stability or not. This is linked to the claim that those genes which have survived are the fittest. This is true since fitness is defined by survival. This tautological view could even be applied to cases of radical group selection. Even there, of course, the genes are the fittest that have survived. This is true but does not contribute anything to the question of whether wholes can determine the course of

evolution. This tautological defence of gene-atomism has never been seriously proposed by gene-Darwinians, but implicitly it may well have played a role in immunising gene-atomism against any critique.

Fifthly, higher level properties in different organisms of a species are discussed. I describe four ways in which the good for the group may be achieved. In my view the proposed concept of systemic individual selection, transcending mere individual selection, is of particular interest. Systemic individual selection, based on an interaction of alleles at different loci could lead to a stabilisation of traits which are not favourable on their own. If once combined with group selection, this process may stabilise properties for the good of the group without the need of further group selection. In regard to group selection itself, I largely only follow the model of Sober and D. S. Wilson, but propose an extension of the applicability of their model to all groups which mix with the main population, if they are small enough to lead to the required group variance.

Sixthly, the concept of species selection is discussed, which becomes particularly interesting in combination with the proposed process of systemic individual selection. Moreover, I have outlined that predator-prey relationships, symbiotic relationships and more complex ecological relationships could have a synergetic effect and their own stability. It appears possible that properties for the good of a larger ecological system may exist, which have been favoured by something like 'ecological selection'.

In conclusion, it generally appears to be wrong that—as gene-atomism suggests—an adaptation is never 'for the good' of a larger genetic wholes, but only for the good of selfish genes. Still, of course, we have not concluded that adaptations are *only* for the good of higher units and *never* for the good of selfish single genes. Based on the refutation of strict gene-atomism and based on the supported view of higher ontological levels of existence, likewise William's (1960) methodological assumption that the burden of proof should always rest on the higher levels of explanation, is called into question. It appears more balanced that the burden of proof should rest equally at all different levels.

Even if we adopted the 'principle of egoism' in regard to substances and accept the classical dichotomy of substance and accident, genes have to a certain extent to be seen not as substances but to some extent as accidents of higher wholes. The survival of the whole is not only determined by its parts but the survival of the parts is to some extent also determined by the whole. In regard to Dawkins' concept of selfish genes, both the exclusive existence and the ruthless 'selfishness' of single genes have in their radicalness been shown to be wrong.

8.3 Genetic Reductionism II: Germ-Line Reductionism and Its Transcendence

a) *Germ-Line Reductionism — the Strong Interpretation of the Weismann Barrier*

The second form of genetic reductionism of gene-Darwinism, which is even accepted by some of its critics, is germ-line reductionism. This is a strong interpretation of the so-called *central dogma of microbiology*, the modern version of the Weismannian theory of the continuity of the germ plasm. Germ-line reductionism emphasises that there are *only* causal arrows leading from genes to body, but none “leading from body to genes.”¹⁰¹³

If we replace ‘gene’ with ‘eidos’/idea, this, paradoxically, becomes reminiscent of a Platonic view: Genes are regarded as being somehow eternal, like ideas in the Platonic *mundus intelligibilis* they are the true underlying background of the actual, changing *mundus sensibilis*.¹⁰¹⁴ (Of course, neither Plato nor the modern germ-line reductionists would be happy about this parallel, because—as we have seen above—both employ opposed concepts of substance, the former focusing on form, the latter on matter. ☞ pp. 243 f.) Although germ-line reductionists obviously do not regard vehicles as *completely* negligible (just as a Platonist would not *completely* ignore the actual world), to them the germ-line is the primary, approximately eternal, biological substance. Vehicles, like individuals or groups, according to germ-line reductionism, are less real, unstable and temporary “like clouds in the sky or dust-storms in the desert.”¹⁰¹⁵

The view radicalises the general tendency of neo-Darwinism stressing that the developed exists for the undeveloped, the tree exists for the germ, and thereby opposes earlier traditional approaches.¹⁰¹⁶

Weismann (☞ pp. 121 f.) stated that the germ plasm is never modified by the somato plasm. The modernised version of this view, the so-called **central dogma of microbiology** (cf. J. Watson, 1952), states that the genotype, the DNA, is never modified by the phenotype (figure 8).




Figure 8: Flux of information according to the ‘central dogma of microbiology’—an updated version of Weismann’s *Keimplasmatheorie*.

This modernised Weismannian view, bound to the theory of random mutation and external selection, is the backbone of all neo-Darwinian paradigms. Since the end of the eclipse of Darwinism, this Weis-

¹⁰¹³ R. Dawkins. *The Extended Gene* (1982/89), p. 97, see p. 98.

¹⁰¹⁴ ☞ p. 78.

¹⁰¹⁵ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), p. 34, *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), p. 99.

¹⁰¹⁶ H. Jonas. *Organismus und Freiheit* (1994/1974/1966), p. 94.

mannian theory has successfully refuted alternative Lamarckian approaches (e. g. T. D. Lysenko), and today it is a theory which is very widely held.

I would agree that much evidence speaks in favour of this modernised Weismannism with its implications for our understanding of evolution, but I think one should also acknowledge the following three points in order to reach a balanced position. Firstly, even Darwinian subparadigms differ a lot in their interpretations of the neo-Weismannian dogma. The Weismannian central dogma does not appear to entail germ-line reductionism. Secondly, even the central dogma has recently been challenged by a heterodox group of biologists and may become modified in the course of the molecular revolution. Thirdly, even if one accepts the basic Weismannian doctrine as a currently valid hypothesis, as I do, it does not give a complete account of the interaction between genotype and phenotype.

(1) Different interpretations of the central dogma. The acceptance of the central dogma of microbiology does not necessarily entail germ-line reductionism. The central dogma is presupposed by germ-line reductionism. It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for germ-line reductionism. Germ-line reductionism is a particularly strong interpretation of this dogma, which regards the genotypic side of evolution as being substantial and real, whereas the phenotypic side is regarded as only providing the temporary and less real vehicles for the genes. Dawkins advocates a clear and radical germ-line reductionism according to which interactors are mere 'vehicles', 'gene-machines' or 'survival machines of the genes'.¹⁰¹⁷ In principle Dawkins even goes further. "Fundamentally, all that we have a right to expect from our theory is a battleground of replicators".¹⁰¹⁸

This approach radicalises the general tendency of Darwinism that organisms are understood as being the object of and not subject to evolution. According to this approach organisms are not only externally moulded by natural selection but internally determined by genes, which in turn are determined by natural selection.¹⁰¹⁹ Gene-Darwinism, of course, accepts statistical fluctuations in the phenotypic expression of the genotype, but the organism is, nevertheless, seen as a mere vehicle, which does not contribute anything to evolution that has not already been given by the single genes.

Proponents of the evolutionary synthesis have differed from the strict gene-Darwinian interpretation of the central dogma, which is also vital for their also largely Darwinian theory (☞ pp. 126 f.). Proponents particularly of the second phase of the synthesis do not support and partly explicitly oppose strict germ-line reductionism. They advocate that the phenotype plays a crucial role in selection. Notably E. Mayr has emphasised the role of the phenotypic organism.¹⁰²⁰ But proponents of the second step of the synthesis generally also emphasised phenotypic properties at the level of populations, especially if the population structure of a species is phenotypically changed by geographic isolation

¹⁰¹⁷ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1976/89), *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), ☞ footnotes 541, 842.

¹⁰¹⁸ *Idem. The Selfish Gene* (1989), p. 256, see p. 266.

¹⁰¹⁹ Cf. K. Bayertz. *Autonomie und Biologie* (1993), p. 346.

¹⁰²⁰ E. g.: E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), p. 588.

(☉ pp. 130 f.). Nevertheless some aspects of the evolutionary synthesis particularly in its first phase of 'bean-bag genetics', also prepared today's germ-line reductionism (☉ p. 192). However, in its second phase the synthesis can not be said to have advocated a full-blown form of germ-line reductionism.

The importance of the phenotype is even more strongly emphasised by explicit critics of radical Darwinism (☉ pp. 98 f., p. 106.), who have reintroduced concepts of romantic biology to evolutionary theory. Despite many differences they all emphasise that evolution is not only determined by genes, but is also constrained and directed by morphology, body plans or morphological fields.¹⁰²¹ (Often this tradition only has focused on structural necessities, but, I think, in principle the idea of phenotypic constraints can and has to be extended to functional constraints as well.¹⁰²²) Although proponents of such an approach may accept the Weismannian central dogma, they may still emphasise that interactors may also play their own cardinal role in evolution and are not mere 'vehicles' or 'survival machines of the genes'.

(2) Violations of the neo-Weismannian dogma? Despite the considerable differences in the interpretation of the Weismannian dogma, all approaches would regard something like the systematic appearance of reverse transcription of RNA to DNA in germ cells as being rather contrary to the neo-Weismannian dogma.

Despite earlier refutations of a radical Lamarckism, some more recent findings in molecular biology render a more moderate comeback of such a view to be not totally implausible. Actually, the existence of reverse transcription was first observed in the late 1950s. It was fully confirmed in 1970 for retroviruses (H. Temin, D. Baltimore were awarded the Nobel Prize for their findings in 1975). Now many retroviruses are known to infect mammals or birds; HIV belongs to this class. Although this in a subtle way challenges the central dogma, retroviruses are, of course, not processes in healthy organisms.

However, the general molecular revolution, and the modelling of complex systems, has increasingly unsettled the assumption of a totally stable organismic genome, which only becomes changed randomly during meiosis (☉ p. 148). We now know that DNA is capable of repairing itself. Generally, the Nobel laureate B. McClintock has shown that genes can be moved within or between chromosomes. If now the cellular 'milieu' had a systematic influence on such gene transpositions, especially in the germ cells, this would definitely violate the neo-Weismannian central dogma.¹⁰²³

¹⁰²¹ E. g.: G. Webster, B. Goodwin. *Form and Transformation. Generative and Relational Principles in Biology* (1996).

¹⁰²² Cf. J. W. Bock; G. v. Wahlert. *Adaptation and the Form-Function Complex* (1965/1998), pp. 119-120.

¹⁰²³ Not all organisms have specialised germ cells. In many plants or fungi the variation of somatic cells can be inherited. From the viewpoint of the organism this violates the Weismannian dogma. L. W. Buss. *Evolution, development, and the units of selection* (1983), in E. Lloyd., *The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory* (1988/1994), pp. 66-67. Although this indeed violates the classical Weismannian theory, it does in my opinion not equally violate its modern formulation and its radical germ-line reductionist interpretation. Modern germ-line reductionists do not accept organisms as real entities anyway and to them the germ line is not defined by certain cells but by DNA.

Also in regard of mutational change germ-line reductionism may become violated by further research. It is acknowledged that some chemicals cause mutation, which are located specifically in certain chromosomal areas.¹⁰²⁴ If an organism under certain circumstances would produce such mutagenic substances itself, this might once be interpreted as a systematic violation of the Weismannian doctrine.

One may paradoxically argue that Darwinian adaptationists should in principle predict that Lamarckian mechanisms have evolved.

The non-existence of such a Lamarckian mechanism would also point to the limits of adaptationism. An interesting objection to such an argument would be that the Weismann barrier may also have an adaptive advantage. It may, for example, serve as a defence against viruses or it may secure equal reproductive chances of the genes, rendering the organism as a whole more stable.

Since the late 1970s Ted Steel has been proposing and developing a Lamarckian theory of the immuno system of higher animals based on somatic mutation and selection and the reverse transcription of the aquired properties to the DNA. Although some of his results have been disputed, he and his school in recent years appear to have come closer to a full confirmation of their theory.¹⁰²⁵ If his theory became accepted, a moderate explicitly Lamarckian perspective in genetics would gain ground.

Generally, I think, the self-organisation of the genome is still underestimated. Firstly, most research is still limited to very simple organisms, like viruses or the genome of fruit flies. Secondly, the evolutionary synthesis had reached a discursive equilibrium, allowing both pluralism and group properties. Despite their comparatively moderate interpretation of the Weismannian view, it assumed a simple relationship between genotype and phenotype as an artefact of their Mendelian methodology¹⁰²⁶.

Research which stresses the self-organisation of the DNA, even under somatic influences, may be promising, but it can not be evaluated here in how far particular Steel's approach is empirically supported and whether, in the case of its confirmation, it is applicable to other phenomena besides the immune systems of higher animals.

I shall hence not rest my argumentation on the validity of this empirical claim. Moreover, an enhanced interpretation of acknowledged facts, in my opinion, refutes the radical germ-line reductionist interpretation of the central dogma, and defends the evolutionary relevance of phenotypes in their own right.¹⁰²⁷

(3) The central dogma as only a partial description of the relationships between genotype and phenotype. In the first point above we have distinguished the central dogma and its radical germ-line reductionist interpretation. Here and in the following sections I argue that the central dogma is not an exhaustive account of the genotype-phenotype interaction, as claimed by gene-Darwinians.

The central dogma merely states that the DNA could not be physically altered by the phenotype (of that organism). More radically, germ-line reductionism claims that "there is no causal arrow leading

¹⁰²⁴ See e. g. R. Fahrig (ed.). *Mutationsforschung und genetische Toxikologie* (1993), pp. 6, 50.

¹⁰²⁵ E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley, R. V. Blanden. *Lamarck's Signature* (1998). ♻ p. 148.

¹⁰²⁶ Cf.: R. Lewontin. *Gene, organism, environment* (1985/1983).

¹⁰²⁷ In any case I do not think that a *purely* Lamarckian view is in sight. If, for example, you start regularly to sunbathe or you went regularly to a solarium, your baby will presumably not be born with a darker skin colour than you have. But

from the body to genes”¹⁰¹³ and hence “organisms are but the transient engines of long-term gene replication.”¹⁰²⁸ Germ-line reductionism argues that there is no flux of information from the phenotype to the genotype and no autonomous role of the phenotypes in evolution. Phenotypes are regarded as mere vehicles which are in principle reducible to single selfish genes and which are ultimately the only agents of evolution.

We have seen that there have been biologists who accepted the central dogma, but have still advocated the relevance of phenotypes in their own right. In the next sections I propose a justification for such a view which is at odds with strict germ-line reductionism.

I argue that not only the information of the genotype but also what I call ‘exformation’ influences the phenotype. I do not deny the existence of genes, but argue that the phenotype based on exformational aspects is full of ‘stuffiness’¹⁰³⁶ as well. A reduction to the gene level in this view is a false simplification. The phenotype even determines what parts of the genetic code are read and how this code is interpreted, otherwise the cells with identical genes in different tissues would not behave completely differently. Moreover, the phenotype itself constrains and directs its possible evolutionary pathways. It will be argued that phenotypes themselves are evolutionary factors. I shall finally expose a somewhat more daring proposal of how mutual morphological resonance of co-evolving species may be evolutionarily relevant. For this argument the concept of form is replaced by the concept of a probabilistic morphological field.

Hence, the ‘central dogma’ in the next sections will be shown not to be an exhaustive theory of genotype-phenotype relations and, thus, germ-line reductionism, as found in gene-Darwinism, is rejected.

b) *Information, Exformation and the Phenotype as Evolutionary Factor*

(1.) **The General Concept of Exformation**

The concept proposed here of exformation can not only be applied to biology, but is intended as more general. It arises out of the critique of the modern materialistic concept of substance and epistemological downward reductionism above. Ontologically, it has been argued that it is not reasonable to reduce all wholes to their parts. Epistemologically, it has been shown that it is not reasonable to favour downward reductionism as the only type of explanation (☺ pp. 243 f.).

Somewhat analogous to the proposed types of explanation (☺ p. 249) an entity, according to this view, is itself understood as a form or a system, determined not only by its elements but also by the

instead of seeing Lamarckism and Darwinism as a dichotomy, I shall argue that it is more appropriate to see them as extremes of a spectrum of theoretical options, which may even be valid in different respects (☺ pp. 350 f.).

¹⁰²⁸ R. Dawkins. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 68

(irreducible) relations between its elements (form in the narrow sense).¹⁰²⁹ For the 'formation' of an entity, it is not only its in-formational aspects but also *ex*-formational ones which are important. The elements and the relations between the elements are additionally co-constituted by an 'external' environment. Only those elements of the external world are relevant which are related to that entity (Uexküllian understanding of environment). The entities themselves will normally only be stable under certain external conditions. For instance atoms have not always been stable throughout the history of the universe. Also the relations of the elements are *ex*formationally influenced; we may, for instance, think of a whirl in a wash-basin (☉ p. 249), where the direction of relative movements of the involved water molecules, the direction of the 'Coriolis force', is ultimately determined by the rotation of the whole earth. Neglecting these *ex*formational explanations by restricting oneself to only an proximate¹⁰³⁰ downward reductionist explanation of a whole by its parts, seemed epistemologically and ontologically inadequate to me.

The concept of *ex*formation becomes particularly apparent in respect to computer programs. The information in a certain application program is always only interpretable if it is interpretable by the *ex*formational operating system. Together they build, so to speak, a formational whole. Many functions of a certain application program refer to externally defined functions of a larger system. Likewise while the text file I am currently working with contains information, it only becomes readable when a certain *ex*formational program which can interpret this file interacts with it.

Yet in this view how should entities be treated which have no further parts but are in themselves final elements? The only physical entities which may have this character are the elementary particles in physics. To sustain the proposed position one could simply concede that these are the only entities where there is no need to refer to *ex*formation since they exist in an unchanged way, independent of any inner relation and any outer conditions. Although not a physicist, I tend to interpret these entities differently in terms of *ex*formation. Quarks and antiquarks only emerge and disappear in couples; the so-called baryon number is always preserved.¹⁰³¹ Thus a kind of context dependence, reminding one of an positive and negative electrical charge, apparently exists here as well.

In respect to human memory it is not difficult to find examples of *ex*formation: we only have to think of a knot in one's handkerchief or of a digital personal assistant. But *ex*formation also plays a role in less obvious cases. Let us think of the activity of tying one's shoe-laces. Some aspects of this activity are obviously stored in our memory itself (information). But although we are capable of tying our shoe laces, we might not easily be able to carry out the exact movement without holding the actual laces in

¹⁰²⁹ Aristotelian hylemorphism may also help us to reach more appropriate results in the mind-body problem as well. M. McGinn. *Real Things and the Mind Body Problem* (1999, unpubl.). It has even been argued recently that there "is nothing absurd in the notion of form without matter". J. Lowe. *Form without Matter* (1999).

¹⁰³⁰ The terms 'ultimate' and 'proximate' are used here in a similar but different way from their usual sense in the evolutionary discourse.

¹⁰³¹ Such a 'contextual' concept of preservation is also advocated in regard to the lepton numbers L^e , L^μ , L^τ of the three lepton families. See e. g. K Stierstadt. *Physik der Materie* (1989), p. 19 f.

our hands. Exformation lies in the laces themselves and in the specific interaction of the laces while one is tying them. Exformation is most intimately linked with information. Exformation in respect to our own memory is also often present when we are not aware of it, for example, in the way we structure our rooms or we organise our desks etc. The external is not always really external but rather a part of us.

Although the concept of exformation, and more specifically also that of external 'memory', is in my view applicable to many areas, it will in the following sections only be developed in a biological respect, in contrast to biological germ-line reductionism.

(2.) Exformation and the Stuffness of the Phenotype

The phenotype, and also the extended phenotype, is not only a result of genomic information but of exformation as well. In the section on gene-atomism I have argued that together genes may form synergetic wholes with a higher fitness than each individual part (☛ pp. 258 f.). Also their synergetic properties can only be understood if the phenotypes are considered. In this sub-section another context argument is proposed now for information *and* exformation.

In this view 'external' environments of genes are not only mere accidental surroundings of these entities but also essential parts of their being. Lewontin, for instance, has stressed that genetic and environmental causes are „inseparable“¹⁰³². Nevertheless, I think that it is still possible to argue, for example, that the atomic structure of a hydrocarbon molecule itself is not coded into the genes. Although they make use of this structure, the structure is stored externally to the DNA. Likewise, the synergetic larger physical and chemical properties of a cell and of organs are neither completely stored in the genes. There is an exformational side as well and a morphological logic caused by the information-exformation interaction. From the viewpoint of the genetic informational side, exformational aspects simply appear as given, but they are nevertheless aspects of reality in their own right, essential for the genes and not themselves stored within the genes. Hence the phenotype is not only based on information, but on exformation as well.

This argument appears to be linked to the argument that only the phenotype is visible to selection, whereas the genes or the genotype are not. This argument has, for example, been elaborated in a more formal way by R. Brandon, who makes use of the statistical concept of 'screening of'. Without treating his formalization of that concept in detail he generally argues that the phenotype and not the genotype determines and directly explains the fitness of an organism or a group. For example, the phenotypic property of the height of a tree may determine their fitness. Selection only 'sees' the phenotype irrespectively of the genotype.¹⁰³³

This claim, in my view, implicitly refers to two reasons why this may be the case. Firstly, the phenotype, as outlined above, is not determined by the genotype alone, but by exformation as well.

¹⁰³² R. Lewontin. *Gene, Organism, Environment* (1985/1983).

¹⁰³³ R. N. Brandon. *The Levels of Selection: A Hierarchy of Interactors*. 1998 (1988), pp. 180 f.

A genotype alone does not determine the properties and fitness of a phenotype but exformational aspects like the soil in which the tree grows could equally change the 'seen' fitness. Secondly, given constant exformation, different combinations of genes may also lead to the same phenotype. If height is an advantageous property, then a certain gene is not favoured but possibly quite different combinations of genes. This refers to the contextuality within the genotypic side itself and is treated in detail in section 8.2 (☞ pp. 258 f.). In any case the interaction of genes occurs on the phenotypic side, which is entangled with exformation.

Although Brandon is right in some respects, I partly agree with his critics Sterelny and Kitcher, who argue that one can indirectly still speak of genes being selected, if one takes all the different environments into account and abstracts from them.¹⁰³⁴ I think they are right as far as they claim that one can investigate in which genetic and exformational environments certain genes are fit in. But in my view this does not imply that single genes are the only units of selection. (I have treated earlier larger units of the informational side of evolution ☞ pp. 258 f.) and does not at all entail that phenotypes are epiphenomenal, a point which is more important for our present concern.

On the contrary, phenotypes are ontologically and epistemologically prior to genotypes. Brandon is, in my opinion, completely right in arguing that only the phenotype could directly be seen by natural selection. We, and in a way natural selection, can finally calculate the advantages and disadvantages of single genes, but this is always abstracted from properties phenotypes have, which are in turn not only dependent on genetic information but on exformation as well. Evolution selects certain phenotypic properties, which are the result of certain information-exformation interaction. Only based on the very existence of phenotypic properties, can we speak of a gene for such a property. Of course, today's geneticists have a direct acquaintance with DNA, but they also still need phenotypes to interpret a sequence of DNA as being a gene for something. The sequencing of the genome in the human genome project only reveals the informational code, an understanding of the meaning of the code, will only be acquired if the phenotypic interaction of the parts of this code and their interaction with exformation is understood (☞ p. 21).¹⁰³⁵ I do not deny the reality of genes, but I advocate the reality of phenotypes as well, which have properties not stored in the genes. Moreover, phenotypes are the very basis from which we and selection abstracts the meaning of genes. This gives us a first impression of why "anatomical or morphological structure is full of 'stuffness'."¹⁰³⁶ The phenotype is based on a synergetic interaction of *information* and *exformation*. A view centred exclusively on *information* has to be rejected. It is not possible to reduce phenotypes completely to genic *information*.

¹⁰³⁴ K. Sterelny, P. Kitcher. *The Return of the Gene* (1988/1998), pp. 165 f.

¹⁰³⁵ Cf.: H. Markl. *Von der Mediengesellschaft zur Wissensgesellschaft* (1997), p. 16.

¹⁰³⁶ P. Beurton. *Organismic Evolution and Subject-Object Dialectics* (1981), p. 49.

(3.) The Phenotype Interpreting the Genotype

Although I have accepted the neo-Weismannian central dogma, the phenotype is hence not reducible to the informational side of evolution. I now argue that the phenotype, or indirectly also the outer exformation of genes, is crucial for the interpretation of the DNA itself. It would be wrong to assume that in a phenotype the genetic information itself interacts in an unaltered way with exformation. It is more appropriate to argue that, although the physical DNA structure is not altered, the information content (here in the sense of meaning) of the DNA itself is often changed by different exformational contexts. The 'semiotics of the genotype' are not context free and unambiguous.¹⁰³⁷ The influence of the phenotypes and the cellular milieu on the interpretation of the genotype becomes apparent by the different functioning of cells in different tissues, which all physically have the physically the same code of DNA. In developmental biology it becomes apparent that during the phases of ontogenesis different genetic sections are decoded by the phenotype.

The importance of somatic and extra-somatic ex-formation was, for example, stressed earlier on by Driesch, who showed that during the early growth of a frog the cells of the frog's head could be transposed to its foot and vice versa. Their function at this stage solely depends on their position, i. e. their morphological and functional relation within the body.

Exformational aspects could even change the mode of reproduction. For example the Alpine Meadow Grass (*Poa alpina* var. *vivipara* L.) or some orchids reproduce either sexually or asexually depending on their environment.¹⁰³⁸ The informational side, of course, allows this possibility, but to ignore the importance of exformation in such an example is particularly absurd.

On the other hand the genotype likewise, in an Uexküllian sense, determines to a certain extent itself what exformational or environmental aspects become important. In turn the resulting somatic and extra-somatic exformation determines to a certain extent which aspects of the genome are read and how they are interpreted. Despite their differences information and exformation mutually determine each other dialectically. P. Beurton argued that "the evolutionary nature of genes is non-existent outside the whole."¹⁰³⁹ I would not go that far, but, despite the existence of genes, I think it is true that biological information and exformation are concepts which are mutually dependent on each other. The information plays a role in interpreting the environment, as the exformation and the inner dynamics of the phenotype do in interpreting the DNA.


The importance of exformation particularly becomes obvious in human culture as a special example of exformational memory (☉ pp. 315 f.). Medicine has mainly changed not the genetic makeup of humans, but has exformationally achieved the improvement of phenotypes. Particularly in a philosophical treatment of biology one should be aware that general biological concepts are often equally applied to humans as well. It would be wrong to conceal the evolutionary importance of exformation terminologically.

¹⁰³⁷ E. L. Khalil. *Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism: Clearing the Way for Historical Thinking* (1992), p. 34.

Contextualism, normally used in cultural epistemology has recently been advocated e. g. by Putnam and Derrida.

¹⁰³⁸ Personal communication with Simon Pierce (Univ. of Durham, Dept. of Biology, 1997).

¹⁰³⁹ P. Beurton. *Organismic Evolution and Subject-Object Dialectics* (1981), p. 49.



(4.) Stuffness and Inner Dynamics of the Phenotype

Stressing the information-exformation interaction one may still neglect the inner dynamics of phenotypic development. For example, Lewontin has turned against the view that organisms can be seen merely as effects with internal and external causes.¹⁰⁴¹ He continues: „The fundamental general fact of phenogenetics is that the phenotype of organisms is a consequence of non-trivial interaction between genotype and environment during development. [...] The phenotype at any instant is not simply the consequence of its genotype and current environment, but also of its phenotype at the previous instant. That is, development is a first order Markov process in which the next step depends upon the present state. [...] Organisms as entities are one of the causes of their own development“¹⁰⁴²

One may object that this might only be a plausible concept for ontogenesis, not for phylogenesis, since organisms die and only genes are transferred to the next generation.

Later I shall propose how phenotypic structures are not only exformationally influenced, but that in a limited sense properties can be inherited by morphological resonance (☹ pp. 315 f.).

Here I only want to point out that it is not correct to assume that the genotype at any time of reproduction is bare of any phenotypic context. Cytoplasm always embeds the nuclear genes even in the germ cells. A phenotypic context with which to interpret the DNA appears to be needed.

More controversially, it has recently been argued, by M. W. Ho, that the cytoplasm also stores acquired characteristics of the phenotype, which may be transmitted to the next generation in this way.¹⁰⁴³ However, the continuous phenotype provides a necessary context for the interpretation of the genome, not reducible to genetic information alone.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Cf. also: R. Sheldrake. *Das Gedächtnis der Natur* (1988, 1991), p. 135 (referring to B. Goodwin).

¹⁰⁴¹ R. Lewontin. *Gene, Organism, Environment* (1985/1983), p. 274.

¹⁰⁴² *Ibid*, p. 277, p. 279.

¹⁰⁴³ See: M.-W. Ho, P. T. Saunders (eds.). *Beyond Neo-Darwinism: An Introduction to the New Evolutionary Paradigm* (1984). p. 280 ff.

(5.) The Phenotype as Evolutionary Factor in Its Own Right

The phenotype is not only irreducible to the genotype because of its partly exformational basis and its inner dynamics, but can itself be regarded as an evolutionary factor in its own right.

Opponents of gene-Darwinism have often criticised the germ-line reductionist position which ignores the phenotypic morphology constraining or directing evolution. The concept of evolutionary constraints and inner direction is also historically rather opposed to Darwinism and is a hallmark of Platonic, Aristotelian, idealistic (*eidōs* = form) or romantic biology, which claim a structural logic of development, rather in terms of form than in terms of matter (☞ pp. 98 f., 102 f.). Notwithstanding the triumph of Darwinism there has always been a more or less continuous, presently iconoclastic, research tradition of structurally orientated approaches in biology. H. Driesch, D'Arcy Thompson and C. H. Waddington are some of the main figures of this heterodox tradition. Today, the British biologist Goodwin, a disciple of Thompson, appears to be the most well known proponent of a morphologically orientated school of thought in the English speaking countries.¹⁰⁴⁴ But implicitly also proponents of the evolutionary synthesis, particularly Mayr (despite his critique of essentialism) may still have been somewhat influenced by this research tradition through their acceptance of a realist stance towards phenotypes. S. J. Gould, who is, modifications aside, largely a Darwinist, even more explicitly advocates the non-Darwinian concept of structural necessities and constraints.

Structural phenotypic necessities and resulting pathways in developmental biology have led Waddington to coin the metaphor of an epigenetic landscape. This notion has been applied to individual ontogeny and to phylogeny as well. Similarly, the concept of a body plan stressed phenotypic constraints. Arthropods (i. e. crabs, centipedes, spiders and insects) for example have exoskeletons, which protect them, but which are somewhat ineffective if the organism increases in size, since it needs to repeatedly burst out of its old skeleton. The body plan of an exoskeleton constrains the evolution of larger arthropods.

The notion of a body plan need not necessary be understood in a Platonic way favouring only one ideal realisation but could also be understood in a rather Aristotelian sense, allowing variance, where the form, despite its own causal relevance is established by its parts. Later I shall for similar reasons replace the concept of forms by the concept of fields.¹⁰⁴⁵

The emphasis on forms, morphology and evolutionary constraints has been alien to Darwinism particularly because this aspect of the evolutionary process is not necessarily adaptive.¹⁰⁴⁶ Organismic constraints limit the number of possible pathways which selection may take. Hence not all aspects of evolutionary change are adaptive. Moreover, the traditional focus of Darwinism is on matter, not on form, and on a structural developmental logic. The focus is on the selection by an external environment and not on directions resulting from the inner phenotypic morphology.

¹⁰⁴⁴ G. Webster, B. Goodwin. *Form and Transformation. Generative and Relational Principles in Biology* (1996).

¹⁰⁴⁵ ☞ footnote 969 and pp. 315 f.

Some gene-Darwinians have simply excluded such structural questions from the scientific agenda. They are just simply interested in adaptive phenomena. If one then claims the truth of pan-adaptationism one commits a tautological fallacy (☹ pp. 330 f.). Despite my critical attitude to radical Darwinism (☹ chapter 9), I, like Gould, think that morphological approaches could be harmonised with a modified selectionist account.¹⁰⁴⁷ But since adaptation is closely entangled with structural aspects I agree with Lewontin that the metaphor of adaptation has to be generally replaced—or has at least to be complemented—by a metaphor of construction.¹⁰⁴⁸

It is not only these phenotypes of organisms but also those of groups that are full of stuffness and can be regarded as evolutionary factors. Earlier I showed why gene-pools could develop properties which are good for the group and which are not necessarily subverted by selfish genes (☹ pp. 278 f.). These properties have been discussed on the genotypic side (gene-pools). Nevertheless, these properties, which are similar to the properties of individuals, can only be understood when based on an interaction of genetic information and exformation. This view would also rehabilitate the view of the evolutionary synthesis that the phenotypic structuredness of populations and the intensity of their geographical isolation are themselves evolutionary factors.

Phenotypes, organisms as well as groups etc. have to be taken seriously. They are full of stuffness, are not reducible to the genetic side and their constraints have an own evolutionary effect. The results of the last five sub-sections are partly visualised in figure 9. The phenotype is not formed by genetic information alone, but by exformation as well. It is full of stuffness and can not be reduced to the germ-line. Despite accepting the neo-Weismannian central dogma, the phenotype also plays an important role in regard to how the genotype is interpreted and which sections of the DNA-code are transcribed at all. Finally the phenotypic structure, has its own causal relevance in constraining, enabling and facilitating certain evolutionary pathways. The phenotype is not only irreducible to the genotype but itself shapes evolution. Hence it is wrong to regard phenotypes merely as accidental vehicles or temporary epiphenomena without their own causal role, instead it is more appropriate to regard them as evolutionary factors in their own right.

c) *Forms, Fields and the Concept of an External Memory*

After having shown the stuffness of the phenotype and even its role as an evolutionary factor, I shall now advocate the more controversial case that, rather than only having phenotypes influenced by exformation, changes of exformation may, in a way, be stored systematically outside the phenotype in

¹⁰⁴⁶ A more differentiated account on different relations of constraints and adaptation is given by: R. Amundson. *Two Concepts of Constraint: Adaptationism and the Challenge from Developmental Biology* (1994/1998), p. 96 f

¹⁰⁴⁷ In my view selectionism in a very broad sense, does not imply a strict Darwinian process of blind-variation-and-external-elimination, ☹ pp. 348 f..

question. This additional argument is, in my view, not essential for my critique of germ-line reductionism, but it may still be an interesting proposal based on the concept of exformation.

In the claimed 'external' memory other genotypes do play an essential role, but from the viewpoint of a certain organism or evolutionary line this is a flux of exformation, since another evolutionary line is involved and the phenotypical interaction of this line is cardinal. This proposed alternative interpretation would also have consequences for our taxonomy, rendering some folk biological assumptions truer than a strictly Darwinian taxonomy would concede.

I first want to develop why we may speak of more or less given environmental forms. This merely resembles a phenotypic formulation for the concept of a niche. It will be argued that since these forms are probabilistic in nature we should rather interpret them as fields. Secondly, the concept of morphic resonance and exformational memory will be developed. Thirdly, possible taxonomic consequences are explored.

(1.) Environmental Forms and Fields

Based on the stuffiness of phenotypes shown above one can also interpret the interaction of phenotypes in terms of phenotypic forms. We have seen that despite the crucial role of genes, a fitness advantage is a property of a phenotype. The height of trees is advantageous and not directly assigned to a certain gene for height. But this property of an organism, is not only a property of that organism, but a property of the interaction with phenotypes of other organisms, here with an interaction with other trees with a certain height. A structure is advantageous only in relation to a phenotypic context of the organism or species in question. In this sense a form is at least partly environmentally given.

This concept of an external form is largely identical with that of an ecological niche. In both cases the concept of potentiality is involved. An increase in height would increase the fitness of the phenotype. Environmental form is, firstly, a very broad application of the niche concept and, secondly, interprets it in a phenotypic sense. Contrarily germ-line reductionists regard a biotic niche, as a short cut with which to talk about genes. Despite the importance of genes, such a view, I think, neglects the stuffiness of niches, based on the stuffiness of the compounding organisms.

This form or niche is environmental since its location is external to the organism. Nevertheless, it is not strictly external, for, according to our partly constructivist view, it is related to the interaction of a certain phenotype. A niche is a part of the specific environment of a phenotype. Environment is here understood in a subjective Uexküllian sense¹⁰⁴⁹. A niche for bacteria does not equally exist for mammals.

¹⁰⁴⁸ R. Lewontin. *Gene, Organism, Environment* (1985/1983), pp. 279-280. Cf. also M. Ruse. *The Mysteries of Mysteries*. 1999, pp. 167.

¹⁰⁴⁹ J. v. Uexküll. *Theoretische Biologie* (1928/73). A. Pobjewska. *Die Umweltkonzeption Jacob von Uexkülls* (1993). Also: R. Lewontin. *Gene, Organism, Environment* (1985/1983), pp. 280, 282.

We are confronted with a dialectics of the inner and the outer. The phenotype partly defines what aspects of the external world are exformationally relevant and the exformation partly moulds the phenotype.

The resulting notion of an environmental form is here used in a partly adaptationist and a partly constructivist way. The niche is partly given, partly constructed by features of the phenotype itself.

Despite the venerable tradition of the concept of form (reaching back in different ways to Plato and Aristotle) I think that it is important in the current context to replace the concept of form with the concept of a **field**, or, to denote the subject area, with a 'morphogenetic field'.

Also, for example, R. Sheldrake proposed that biological forms, should in an evolutionary context rather be regarded as fields.¹⁰⁵⁰ Goodwin and Webster in detail have elaborated a morphological approach and have advocated a concept of hierarchical fields.¹⁰⁵¹

Also proponents of biological systems theory, not influenced directly by a morphological tradition often advocated the reality of the phenotype. I think also these approaches may in principle be open to a field idea (L. v. Bertalanffy, B. Hassenstein, E. Jantsch, R. Riedl, G. P. Wagner, F. Wuketits, ☉ p. 151.).

In my view the concept of form should be replaced with the concept of fields, because a phenotype encounters these external forms in a probabilistic way.

For example flowers are not adapted to and 'exformed' by individual bees, although each pollinating bee contributes to this process. In this sense, the property of pollination refers rather to the 'beehood' at large or even to the 'pollen collecting insecthood'. (☉ pp. 293 f.)

Hence in their effect environmental forms are rather reminiscent of physical fields or patterns in a neural net, where there are only fuzzy borders. Their effect is not that of rigidly defined forms or moulds with defined borders. Here, the negative aspect of essentialism, neglecting pluralism (as criticised by Hull, Mayr and Popper) can be prevented. Nevertheless, we may still think of an evolutionary logic of such probabilistic forms in an environmental context too. The actual forms or fields can be understood in an Aristotelian sense to be also determined by their parts, but still a cause in its own right. Only a probabilistic fit between the form of the organism and varying instantiations of the niche is needed (whereby the niche is partly externally given, partly a result of the organism and similar organisms).¹⁰⁵²

Once more, such an argument requires also an adaptationist component complementing the constructional component. (On the critique of process reductionism ☉ pp. 324 f.).

(2.) External Memory

The proposed external biological memory does not reflect a fundamentally new mechanism, but is rather intended as a different interpretation of known facts. Besides the stuffness of the phenotype being

¹⁰⁵⁰ R. Sheldrake has contributed to the development of the notions morphogenetic field and morphic resonance. Sheldrake's book *The Presence of the Past* is inspiring, but some of his basic notions stay opaque. I shall try to contribute to a further clarification of this ideas. E. g. R. Sheldrake. *Das Gedächtnis der Natur* (1991/88), pp. 130 f., 143 f.

¹⁰⁵¹ G. Webster, B. Goodwin. *Form and Transformation. Generative and Relational Principles in Biology* (1996). I only had a glance at this book upon correcting this work. Although I have partly taken the book into account I had not the opportunity to elaborate in detail on the similarities or differences of my field conception to the one in that very interesting book. See also: Goodwin, Webster, J. Wayne-Smith. *The 'evolutionary paradigm' and constructional biology* (1992).

an evolutionary factor constraining and directing evolution, I, of course, agree that genes are the main stores of evolutionary change. Nevertheless, I think that exformation not only plays a role in constituting the phenotype, but also that changes in the exformation may in a way become inherited. This inheritance is normally based on the inheritance of another germ-line, but from the viewpoint of a focused evolutionary line this is still exformational.

Firstly, I suggest that organisms normally not only adapt to a given environment, but that they also choose, alter and construct that environment. The result of this changed exformation sometimes also affects their descendants. Secondly, I propose that from the viewpoint of a certain evolutionary line other evolutionary lines may in a way serve as dynamic external memories as well. This could be formulated as the morphological resonance of morphological fields.

(a) Organisms do not only adapt to the external world, as Darwinism has always emphasised (☉ pp. 348 f., 384 f.), but they construct their environment to some extent themselves.¹⁰⁵³ A strong exformational change could be achieved by migration. Even locomotion as such creates statistical patterns of environments. Of course genetic *information* plays a role in what exformation will become chosen, but nevertheless these exformational aspects can not be reduced to genes. Acquired exformational properties could at least to some extent—in interaction with genetic information—be passed on to progeny as well. A migrating organism may have the property to stay at the place where it had found favourable conditions. These positive experiences are in a way passed on to the progeny since the progeny is from its birth onwards exposed to the same favourable exformation.

But organisms also more directly alter the external world as it becomes part of their environments. They tread down paths, dig out burrows, build nests and establish signals.¹⁰⁵⁴ Often, although not always, these changes are advantageous to certain genes, individuals, groups or species.¹⁰⁵⁵ For example, paths or nests may be used by several successive generations of one kin group.

Even more obvious are cases of the transfer of acquired knowledge to other organisms in an exformational non-genetic way. Young birds have been shown in experiments to imitate the songs also of 'foster' parents. More complex observational learning is known, for example, from monkeys, and of course also from humans.

But Dawkins in a certain sense is right when he argues that "the accidental incorporation of a pine needle instead of the usual grass, is not perpetuated in future 'generations of nests'."¹⁰⁵⁶ Nevertheless, firstly there are, as the previous point shows, also extra-genetic traditions which are passed on in animals. Here direct observational learning and learning from the products of the parents can transfer

¹⁰⁵² Still a process like selection in its broadest sense is required. On process reductionism, ☉ pp. 324 f.

¹⁰⁵³ Cf. R. Lewontin. *Gene, Organism, Environment* (1985/1983), pp. 273-5, 279 f.

¹⁰⁵⁴ See: R. Margalef. *Perspectives in Ecological Theory* (1968). In E. Jantsch: *Die Selbstorganisation des Universums* (1982/88), p. 202.

¹⁰⁵⁵ On the units of selection debate ☉ pp. 258 f.

¹⁰⁵⁶ R. Dawkins. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 68.

changes exformationally. The change of the exformation is also transferred in the migration example. Secondly, when the information transfer is in principle limited to the existence, for example, of a particular nest which is used for several generations only, the role of exformation indeed differs considerably from that of the germ-line. But this does not imply that this exformation transfer is an evolutionary irrelevant phenomenon. Thirdly, even in the nest example exformational changes may be preserved, for more than the lifetime of a particular nest. If in the pine population certain pines with needles, normally used for nests, with an improved water resistant property become predominant, this will cause a permanent change in the exformation of the nest building bird. This phenotypic change of the pine may take place because of an environmental change or because of some genetic mutation. Even if this change in the pine is genetically caused—informationally from the viewpoint of the pine—it is still exformational from the viewpoint of the DNA or the phenotype of the bird. I do not deny differences between informational and exformational inheritance, but I do oppose the terminological neglect of exformation. The main difference here is that the exformational change, if advantageous, is not an adaptation, but rather—to use Gould’s and Vrba’s terminology—an exaptation.¹⁰⁵⁷ Those birds which profit from this change will also presumably have a reproductive advantage, but the changed exformation itself has been and is currently not selected for this reason, but because of an advantage for pines with such a property. I do not want to limit my approach to evolution in cases of adaptations. Although not being an adaptation, here a relevant permanent change in the exformation of the bird species actually has occurred. But I think there are also examples where the storage of a structure based on another evolutionary line may even be interpreted as an adaptation.

(b) Now two coevolving symbiotic species (mutualism) will be interpreted as their mutual external memory.

This idea may in some regards also be extended to predator-prey relationships. This may appear peculiar: „After all, hares do not sit around constructing lynxes! But in the most important sense they do“¹⁰⁵⁸. I have pointed out before that a predator-prey relationship may not only have synergetic properties, but, in an of course limited sense, also certain properties advantageous to *both* species (⇒ p. 296). But here I confine myself for simplicity reasons to cases of symbiosis (mutualism).




Figure 10: Flux of formation also considering the concept of external memory.

¹⁰⁵⁷ S. J. Gould, E. Vrba. *Exaptation — A Missing Term in the Science of Form* (1982/98).

¹⁰⁵⁸ R. Lewontin. *Gene, Organism, Environment* (1985/1983), p. 282.

As an example we discuss the co-evolution of flowers and pollinating insects. During their evolution flowers evolved presumably from at first wind-pollinated plants, and became increasingly adapted to insect pollination. Pollinating insects in turn evolved from non-pollinating arthropods, and became increasingly adapted to flowers. Flowers and pollinating insects can be understood as mutually interdependent environmental fields for each other. Both are not only influenced by the others environmental field, but each in turn influences the other's field—a feedback-loop is closed (☞ pp. 398 f.). In the section on the unit of selection debate I have advocated the existence of ecological wholes which are not necessarily subverted by selfish species (☞ pp. 296 f.). Here I simply take ecological wholes with an increased fitness for granted. The evolutionary interaction of two (or several) symbiotic species, which are fitter than each species on its own, may lead to a coevolutionary process, where the involved species are mutually adapted and build a synergetic whole. Such a whole may indeed be an irreducible level of description, but this whole may still be described from the viewpoint of a single species as an adaptive transformation of each species to the structure of the other one. This results for each species in an advantageous change in their exformation. Nevertheless it is a whole, since the sum of the involved species are fitter than each one on its own. In this (of course limited) sense the pollinating insect species is part of the flower species and vice versa. Analysed on the species level, the co-evolving species provides a changing exformation, which is rather an adaptation than an exaptation²¹⁰⁵⁷ for the species in question.

This approach may resemble Dawkins' concept of an extended phenotype, which I have approved. However, this application rather turns this concept upside down.

If a pollinating insect species on an island becomes extinct because of a hurricane, we cannot conclude from the fact that the *informational* evolutionary line has died out that the external memory of the species will necessarily immediately vanish as well. As long as the corresponding plant type does not immediately also become strongly diminished, insects of the same or a similar species could become blown to this island and will find perfect environmental conditions there. And why should it not be appropriate to interpret this in the sense that the exformation of their predecessors is still present?

It should not be denied that genetic inheritance in the co-evolving species is a precondition for this process as well. But firstly, phenotypes play a crucial role in this interaction, because the interaction of species is defined phenotypically (☞ pp. 309 f.) and the advantageous phenotypic property may be realised by different gene combinations. Secondly, from the viewpoint of a certain evolutionary line its evolution is in any case not shaped by its information and its own genetic code alone, but by the dynamic change in the other co-evolving species as well. That, from this viewpoint exformational, species, is of course itself based on its information and exformation as well as the feedback from the dependent evolution of the first species.

This dynamic, possibly even adaptive, change in exformation, which is normally based on other organisms, I call a bit anthropomorphically 'memory'.

The term memory here should not imply a full identity of the stored and retrieved information. Although this is implied by the use of this term in computer science, this is not a defining characteristic for example of human memory. Here a further information processing takes place and thus the information becomes somehow changed (☞ pp. 307 f.).

The idea of an external memory may possibly generalised to other cases of larger wholes. We have discussed other wholes in the section on the unit of selection debate. It might be generally possible to regard the components of a whole as (synergetic) mutual external memories of each other.

In this section the concept of an external memory has been proposed as an additional argument against germ-line reductionism. However, the existence of exformation and of inner phenotypic constraints as its own evolutionary factor already refutes this particularly radical interpretation of the here accepted central dogma of microbiology.

d) *A Partial Revival of Morphological Taxonomy?*

In how far are the preceding considerations relevant to the *dispute about universalia* and biological taxonomy. The unit of evolution or unit of selection debate has been treated above (☞ pp. 258 f.), and here I only argue that exformation and phenotypes are evolutionary factors in their own right. Still this also could have bearings on the unit of evolution debate.

Not only gene-Darwinians, but Darwinians in general have in principle denied the existence of higher taxa and asexual species. This is due to the missing flux of *informational* between different species and between different asexual organisms. Moreover, this is due to the general neglect of form as an evolutionary factor. Hence, higher taxa or asexual species were regarded not to have any causal relevance. In this sense asexual organisms do not exist as species. Higher taxa and asexual 'species' were regarded as mere notions of convenience, which catalogue organisms or species according to their distance of informational descent. Although we have seen that advocates of the evolutionary synthesis have rejected germ-line reductionism, they still have not explicitly claimed that the form of the phenotypes is an evolutionary factor in its own right.

Opposed to this general position, transcendental and romantic biologists have always held that asexual species and higher taxa are real and have stressed the relevance of the morphological structure.

If taxonomy should only mirror the line of informational descent, Darwinians appear to be right to focus only on (sexual reproducing) species. There is, of course, no direct exchange of *information* between asexual organisms of one 'species' or between different species of the same taxon. Nevertheless, this taxonomic criterion itself is a principle particular to Darwinism.

If we accept this view of genetic information, does this imply that the view of romantic biology or folk biology is completely wrong in saying that 'species' of asexual organisms and higher taxons are in a way real as well?

(a) **The evolutionary factor of constraints as object of taxonomy** (☞ pp. 313 f.). If the morphological and functional structure of phenotypes is understood as an evolutionary factor, taxa could be used to express such causally relevant properties species (or organisms of an asexual 'species') have in common, like the exoskeletons of arthropods which partly determine the evolutionary pathways of these species. In a morphological view one may argue that it is of secondary importance whether this group has a common descent. It is important that they have the same basic morphological constraints, a similar body plan (*Baupläne*), because this is causally relevant. One may object that there may be no flux of information between morphologically similarly constrained organisms or species. One may reply that questions of descent are, in such a view, not the relevant questions anyhow, but that a focus on the structural (and functional) similarities and differences raises the more interesting questions.

I regard the indicated different views as complementary rather than opposed. It may be systematically helpful to order organisms or species according to such factors, in principle regardless of their descent. But since adaptation also plays an important evolutionary role, the ordering of species according to their informational line of descent also provides us with much interesting information about their former environment and their properties as well.

(b) **Morphological resonance as the object of taxonomy** (☞ pp. 316 f.). Could a mutually external memory of a system of co-evolving species somehow unify similar species (or similar organisms of an asexual species)? The environmental memory of flowers is neither built by a single bee nor usually by a single species of bees. A flower species will normally be adapted to the pollination of the beehood or to a certain extent to the pollen collecting insecthood. Such relationships hence may render the (exformational) existence of (some) species of asexual organisms and of (some) higher taxa possible. These partly adaptationist and partly constructivist aspects may also play a role in homologies and evolutionary convergence.

It may be still more convenient to order organisms and species only according to their line of informational descent. The proposed criteria may force the taxonomist to abandon the convenient hierarchical classification, which has the advantage of clearly localising certain species within only one taxon of each level. In my proposal one species may in principle be a member of several taxons at a time based on morphological constraints or morphological resonance.

In any case a refutation of gene-atomism and germ-line reductionism is much more urgent. It is possible to accept the importance of exformation and phenotypes as evolutionary factors, and still to advocate a systematics which focuses exclusively on informational lines of descent and neglects morphological constraints and resonance. I here only wanted to point out, that it is in principle possible to advocate changes in taxonomy as well. It is not given *a priori* that systematics has to limit itself to the lines of informational descent.

e) *Summary*

In this section 8.3 on germ-line reductionism we were concerned with the question of whether the different levels of genetic selection, which we discussed in a previous section (☹ pp. 258 f.), are the only relevant aspects of evolution and whether the corresponding phenotypic entities can be regarded to be the mere vehicles of genotypic units of evolution.

Firstly, the central microbiological dogma has been described as an updated version of Weismann's germ-plasm theory. Some challenges to this theory were outlined. Nevertheless I took this theory as a currently valid hypothesis and focused on the critique of the particular radical germ-line reductionist interpretation of this theory.

Secondly, I have proposed the general concept of exformation, resembling my earlier critique of a downward reductionist understanding of substance. Instead a hylomorphic understanding of substance, which challenges a simple view of inner and outer, has been proposed. Then phenotypes are shown as not being reducible to the germ-line, since they are not only based on genetic information, but on exformation which is not itself coded in all its details in the genes as well. Not denying the importance of the genotype, the phenotype determines what genetic information is read and how it is interpreted. Moreover, phenotypes are causes of their own development. As Lewontin puts it, a phenotype is a "first order Markov process in which the next step depends upon the present state". Additionally, the structure of an organism bears evolutionary constraints and, vice versa, possible directions. These constraints need not be adaptive. The morphological and functional constraints of phenotypes can be understood as an evolutionary factor.

Thirdly, not necessary as a refutation of germ-line reductionism, I develop the concept of environmental forms (similar to a niche) which exist in relation to a certain phenotype. The concept of forms is replaced by the concept of fields to take into account the probabilistic pluralistic influences, which have been ignored by some earlier morphological traditions. (Goodwin and Weber, for example, propose a field understanding of form as well.) Based on the co-evolution of symbiotic species, I advocate that some properties of a focused species may in a way be exformationally stored in the co-evolving species and hence inheritable outside of its own genome.

Fourthly, it is shown that taking the phenotype seriously, may have consequences for taxonomy as well. Darwinism regards asexual species and higher taxa as not existing causally, but as mere nominalistic conventions to describe the (in-formational) distance of descent. Based on the concept of morphological and functional constraints as evolutionary factors one may treat the species or organism with similar constraints as members of a taxon even if they are not united by common descent, since their structure independent of their descent is evolutionarily primary. Another aspect which systematics may take into account is the morphological resonance which may have an equal effect for similar species or organisms of an asexual species. I conceded, that one may for reasons of convenience reject these taxonomic proposals without necessarily rejecting the proposed concepts.

Here the primary goal was to show that although the central dogma is accepted as a currently valid hypothesis, germ-line reductionism does not need to be valid. The phenotype has been shown to be partly based on exformation and to be full of stuffness. Additionally morphology and function of the phenotype constrains and directs evolution. My proposals should focus attention upon the neglected but fundamental evolutionary role of the phenotype itself. The phenotype is not only a vehicle of selfish genes, but an evolutionary factor in its own right.

Chapter 9: Transcendence of Process Reductionism

A metaphysic that was truly evolutionary, would have to deal with the evolution of its own evolutionary mechanisms. Opposed to this, universal Darwinism advocates a process monism. In this chapter Darwinian process reductionism is discussed and criticised and some proposals are made, concerning how a more evolutionary theory of evolution may be achieved.

Universal Darwinism, in its gene-Darwinian but also in its process-Darwinian version (☞ pp. 203 f.), advocates a static monistic view of the evolutionary process itself. According to these approaches all evolutionary processes can in principle be reduced to the unmutable process of blind-variation-and-external-selection. Darwinians often regard the evolutionary mechanism of natural selection as itself externally and eternally given and in principle exclude a true self-transcendence of processes. Hence, paradoxically the arch-opponents of fixism and essentialism—those such as Darwin, Dawkins and Dennett—are, in respect of processes, radical promoters of fixism and essentialism.

Darwinian process monism refers back to its historical Paleyan Newtonian roots. Although Darwinism also undermined this, the soil on which it is built, it in a Paleyan-Newtonian manner still advocates one eternal law of nature, simple and invariant, as if it were preordained. Natural selection in some regards ironically resembles natural theology. There is still a certain Platonism inherent in Darwinism—albeit materialistically and mechanistically transformed.

Also, for example, Lyell's actualism influenced Darwin and thereby Darwinism. Actualism also stresses that forces are not changed in quality or in quantity throughout time. According to actualism the observation of present geological processes, could fully explain the change of geological formations during the history of the earth.

The concept of an unchangeable law of evolution can often be found in Darwin's own writings, even before he formulated his specific theory of evolution.¹⁰⁵⁹ The later evolutionary synthesis, despite some pluralistic aspects, stressed the unchangeable blindness and externality of selection. Finally, gene-Darwinism advocates a radical version of Darwinian process monism and, likewise, promotes the idea that a process like sexual selection is essentially the same process as the natural selection of selfish genes (☞ pp. 143 f.).

In this chapter I oppose a radicalised Darwinian process reductionism. In the introduction I have already clarified that my approach still draws strongly from Darwinism and that in a very broad understanding of Darwinism my approach could even be regarded as a quite Darwinian approach in itself, since it, for example, accepts the importance of variational evolution (☞ pp. 24 f.). Many concepts of the different paradigms of Darwinism and 'pseudo-Darwinism'^{☞424} are, in my view,

indispensable to evolutionary theory. Nevertheless, I do oppose radical Darwinism in criticising pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism.

Moreover, my criticism is not only concerned with this radical Darwinism, but with some aspects basic to Darwinism in general. To prevent misunderstandings, I concede and agree that the Darwinian process (natural selection), *if* understood in a very broad (up to an almost tautological) sense, is *the* central mechanism of evolution. But I think that such a broad understanding of Darwinism, conceals the fact that the evolutionary mechanism is itself evolving and the role of developmental constraints and chance processes. Natural selection itself, in my view, is actually not one constant mechanism, valid in an equal way from the amoeba to Einstein, but, when put under close scrutiny, many mechanisms become apparent. These processes may have some aspects in common, but in others they differ essentially and have changed during evolution. To make these changes apparent and to exclude tautological aspects of the definition (☹ next sections), I propose a stricter definition of Darwinism, but one which is still in accordance with the evolved meaning of that term. I shall show that evolutionary processes differ from that more strictly defined Darwinian process. I shall argue that variation on certain explanatory levels is not necessary equally blind and that ‘heteroselection’ becomes supplemented by ‘autoselection’. I argue that evolutionary processes can gain a certain autonomy from natural selection. I can, of course, here only make some proposals about how such a more evolutionary theory of evolution might be achieved by outlining what may count as a process in its own right. I cannot, however, elaborate a full treatment dealing with all mechanisms.

Taken together with the above argumentation that there are different evolutionary levels (☹ pp. 258 f.) and that phenotypes can be regarded as evolutionary factors in their own right (☹ pp. 303 f.) this results in an interpretation of evolution, which in any case differs considerably from gene-Darwinism—but also from Darwinism in general. A differentiation between evolutionary processes would also render simplifying claims absurd, like, for instance, the claim that the human emotional system, the hypothalamus and limbic system “evolved by natural selection”¹⁰⁶⁰. This does not distinguish between the levels of evolution, or whether say this was due to what I call ‘autoselective’ or ‘heteroselective’ processes. Darwinism, despite its indispensable contribution to evolutionary theory, has to be replaced by an evolutionary theory of evolution (☹ p. 24).

One may be inclined to argue that Darwinism in a strict sense has been already refuted by the previous critique of entity reductionism (chapter 8), since strict Darwinism was often also defined by its reductive attitude towards groups. In our discussions of different kinds of genic reductionism this aspect

¹⁰⁵⁹ E. g. Ch. Darwin. *Notebook B* (ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. p. 101. Confer also *Notebook E*, orig. p. 3 (referring to Malthus). Generally, ☹ pp. 162 f.

¹⁰⁶⁰ E. O. Wilson. *Sociobiology* (1975), p. 3. Wilson apparently has a much more complex understanding of evolution. (Cf.: Ch. J. Lumsden; E. O. Wilson. *Genes, Mind, and Culture*, 1981, but the metaphor of an unchangeable mechanism of evolution, i. e. of natural selection still dominates his writings.

of Darwinism has been challenged. However, a refutation of Darwinian process-monism, which I here take as the core of Darwinism, does not follow—at least not directly.

Because Darwin's own Darwinism was individualistic, or generally reductionist, gene-Darwinians have sometimes been regarded as the only true—albeit more radical—successors of Darwin, since they advocate a completely reductive view of evolution. Under this definition the last chapter has to be understood as a critique not only of gene-Darwinism but also of Darwinism in general. I, however, define Darwinism, more cautiously, with regard to processes.

If one accepted the above results of different levels of evolution, one would still be a multi-level Darwinist (☉ pp. 152 f., 258 f., 278 f., 293 f.). In particular some of the main opponents of gene-Darwinism and defenders of a richer ontological inventory (e. g. Campbell, Hull) became supporters of universal process Darwinism (☉ p. 152). Process-Darwinism is even possible if one accepts the autonomy of cultural processes. It has been shown that Darwinian processes could be found in psychological trial-and-error theory, the theory of science and some economic proposals (☉ pp. 205 f., 214 f., 218 f.).

Nevertheless, an acceptance of synergetic or emergent entities and of top-down causality, in some respects puts reductionism, also in regards to processes, into question. Why should there not be any synergetic and emergent processes as well? This becomes particularly problematic in the light of a *Whiteheadian process philosophy*, in which entities are regarded as processes, and processes *vice versa* are regarded as entities.¹⁰⁶¹

I have argued that the concept of a single gene somehow corresponds to the concept of a Darwinian process of blind replication and external elimination (☉ p. 216). I shall argue in this chapter that, for example, species can also be regarded as evolutionary processes. But these processes, despite some similarities, are not identical to natural selection. For instance, a species allows for a synthesis of evolutionary lines (sexuality and mixture of subpopulations). Although there is no blending inheritance, the splitting up of evolutionary lines is complemented by a certain, and of course limited, possibility of synthesis. Moreover, species may be regarded to be less blind than single sexual organisms, since new adaptive valleys can be crossed, based on the recombination of genes from a larger gene pool. Furthermore, a species changes the adaptive landscape itself, since, for example, new forms of cooperation can now become adaptive. From a Whiteheadian perspective it should not be a surprise to regard phenotypes, as I argued in the last chapter, to be evolutionary factors in themselves, constraining and directing possible evolutionary pathways. But morphological 'logic' is not identical to a Darwinian process; the changes can differ from those predicted on Darwinian adaptationist grounds (☉ pp. 313 f., 358 f.). Here, I shall show that selection is not necessarily blind and externally given on all levels and that evolutionary processes can gain a certain autonomy.

Hence, in this proposed view of nature, Darwinian processes are not a sufficient explanation of biological and cultural evolution. "Darwin's dangerous idea"—understood not in too broad a sense—is

¹⁰⁶¹ Also in modern physics matter and energy are in principle convertible, ☉ footnote 916.

not the “universal solvent, capable of cutting right through the heart of everything in sight”.¹⁰⁶² Organisms are not only objects but also, to some extent, subjects of evolution, whereas the evolutionary mechanisms are not only subjects but also objects of evolution. Since Universal Darwinism, in its gene-Darwinian or only its process-Darwinian versions currently ‘cannibalises’ the social sciences, time has come to put emphasis on the inconsistencies of this view and on the evolving nature of the evolutionary mechanism itself.¹⁰⁶³ Only in a truly evolutionary framework, not delimited only to one algorithm, we can realise the full range of freedom we humans have, to change these mechanisms, especially in the social stratum.

I shall first point to some inconsistencies in the process Darwinian approach and discuss two possible Darwinian tautologies (9.1). This discussion results in the already mentioned redefinition of Darwinism and a proposed spectrum of theories reaching from radical Darwinism to approaches, which stress inherent tendencies and a less wasteful evolution (9.2). Subsequently, I discuss the single aspects of this definition and show the existence of synthesis, autoselection and directed variation. I focus mainly on biological evolution, since this is the most controversial case. Finally, it is shown that new processes can gain a certain autonomy and, based on Kant, systemic circularity or selfreferentiality is discussed as a criterion for the emergence of a ‘new’ synergetic process (9.3).

9.1 Inconsistencies and Tautologies of a Darwinian Mono-Mechanistic Metaphysic

In this section it will first be shown that the claim of process Darwinism that there are different levels describable as evolving exclusively by Darwinian processes, leads to inconsistencies and actually to changed or compound processes which not equally appear to be Darwinian. Secondly and thirdly, Darwinian pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism will be scrutinised. It is argued that both claims could only be made due to a partly tautological definition of adaptation and of natural selection. This discussion will build the basis for my stricter non-tautological definition of Darwinism.

a) *Inconsistencies of Different Levels of Multi-Level Darwinism*

Universal Process Darwinism (☉ pp. 214 f.) is a metaphysic focusing on the simplest possible evolutionary algorithm, the Darwinian algorithm of natural selection. This metaphysic interprets all other evolutionary processes in a downward reductionist way. All (relevant) evolutionary change comes into being through Darwinian algorithms. Although a theoretical unification under the one and only flag of process Darwinism has much appeal (exactly because of its simplicity), the exclusive application of

¹⁰⁶² D. Dennett. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995), p. 521.

¹⁰⁶³ This may in some respects for example correspond to Lewontin's view that evolution should be represented by the metaphor of construction instead of that of adaptation. R. Lewontin. *Gene, Organism, Environment* (1985/1983), pp. 279-280.

Darwinian algorithms in many ontological strata leads to contradictions, even if a particular application of process-Darwinism appears to be justified on its own. If one favours many different levels of selection (as I did above, ☹ pp. 218 f., 258 f.) these levels are not independent from each other.

Selection processes, particularly if they belong to a *part-whole relationship*, like individuals and species, may have effects on each other. As mentioned, the proliferation of species may be less blind than thought, because more combinations could be tried than in evolutionary lines of asexual organisms and, likewise, combinations could be tested in advance in sub-populations. From the viewpoint of the whole—which I argued to exists—evolution is less blind. Moreover, the whole, as I have shown, could now have an inner dynamic leading to a certain autonomy from environmental selection (☹ pp. 285 f.). But, I think, as far as parts—the individual organisms—are concerned, matters also from their viewpoint have changed; their reproductive prospects change as does their evolutionary landscape. The organisms, for example, can now be members of interbreeding synergetic groups, and may thereby enhance their fitness.

The process-Darwinian claim of the equivalence of higher evolutionary levels to simple natural selection generally conceals the resulting autonomy of new processes (☹ pp. 386 f., 398 f.).

The other type of relationship between selection processes one may call *nested (secondary) selection*. Darwinian selection processes of that kind are, for example, claimed to enable the development of the immune system, the brain or is given in psychological trial-and-error learning (☹ pp. 224 f., 231 f.). Let us take the example of organisms with an ability to learn by trial-and-error, which is describable as a Darwinian process. What is the difference between such a nested relationship and a part-whole relationship of selection processes? The trial-and-error learning, which is also a *part* of the functions of that organism, does not directly change the information of the organism, the whole. This is different in the part-whole relationship of species and individuals.

However, here one can also argue that nested selection processes could reduce the blindness of evolution in a way. At the level of the organism nested selection processes lead to plasticity. This plasticity, of course, may itself be an object of natural selection. Still, the process of evolution has changed considerably. In the interaction with environmental influences (exformation, ☹ pp. 307 f.) new optima may be reached without or with only a little change in the biological information. On the explanatory level of the organism a feedback loop with the environment is created, leading to a flexible adaptation of the organism. The organism does not need to explore every single possibility of the environment genetically, but does this via trial-and-error learning. This way of exploring the evolutionary landscape at the level of organisms is less wasteful—and in this sense less Darwinian—than achieving the same result, by the proliferation and selection of particular ‘hard-wired’ instincts. Still a fundamental change may only be achieved by biological mutation, but now the organism could flexibly and quickly adapt to smaller fluctuations in the environment without the need for biological mutations. Although this is different from the part-whole multi-level selection process, the genetic

makeup itself is not altered by the nested selection process and the evolutionary line is to some extent open to respond to new challenges by trial-and-error learning. The line to some extent gains an independence from momentaneous changes in the environment.

One may of course argue that this does not make a difference, since—according to the assumptions we have accepted—the composing processes of individual selection and the trial-and-error process are both Darwinian. But the resulting effect for the organismic level differs considerably.

And I think we also should and want to make a difference whether we as biological entities have to die, or whether only our trials, thoughts and theories die instead of us.¹⁰⁶⁴ A theory concealing this difference, is in my view wrong—at least in its emphasis.

Moreover, this is a good example which shows that, even if we assume both composing processes were purely Darwinian processes, the resulting synergetic whole of an evolving asexual organism or species can be said to be less blind. This may be an example which shows that the concept of synergetic wholes, developed above with regard to the unit of selection debate, is applicable to processes as well. In regard to a part-whole relation we discussed earlier the case that successive individual selection within a self-referential system could lead to the synergetic property of a certain autonomy from adaptation to an external environment (☉ pp. 285 f.). Even if the processual atoms are Darwinian processes, the resulting processual whole can behave quite opposed to Darwinian processes.

Another example for such a synergetic property is that habits, which may become established in a trial-and-error way, may, as Popper has shown, change what becomes selected. In this regard use could somehow direct inheritance, although only in a quasi-Lamarckian sense.¹⁰⁶⁵

Equally the initial universality of the theory of operant conditioning has also been challenged the other way round by biological Darwinism. I have outlined earlier that the theory of conditioning was intended as a general approach to psychology and it has even been proposed to subsume classical conditioning as a particular case for operant conditioning. In which case the universality of trial-and-error learning, which is today only rarely supported, would have been shown. Since we have shown operant conditioning to be a process-Darwinian approach—despite being opposed to biologism—a universality of process-Darwinism in psychology would have resulted. But, besides other influences, the understanding of the biological underpinnings of human behaviour and learning—mostly understood in Darwinian terms—have in particular undermined the universality of this approach. Biological preparedness has been shown to constrain and direct which associations become established and which trials are made.¹⁰⁶⁶ Also other more complex types of learning and understanding have been established, with a biological basis partly of its own, like observational learning or processes of problem solving. Additionally, the general cognitive turn claiming a multitude of—partly learned—different cognitive

¹⁰⁶⁴ This has been stressed by P. Munz, although he draws rather Darwinian conclusions. *Philosophical Darwinism*. (1993).

¹⁰⁶⁵ K. Popper. *Objective Knowledge* (1971/1992), pp. 272 f. This, I think, refers back to the Baldwin effect.

¹⁰⁶⁶ J. Garcia and M. E. P. Seligman played an important role in exploring the concept of biological preparedness.

processes, challenged the universality and exhaustively of the trial-and-error process of operant conditioning (☞ pp. 224 f.).

Likewise, process-Darwinian economics—which have to be distinguished from biologicistic Darwinian economics¹⁰⁶⁷—come into contradiction with a partly biologised psychology. According to this type of Darwinian economics the ‘struggle for life’ and the ‘survival of the fittest’, in a way similar to that of the biological process, takes place on a new ontological level, on the level of economic agents. I have mentioned, that the Friedmanian belief in severe competition was actually historically influenced by the concept of natural selection and survival of the fittest (☞ p. 197). But economists of the Chicago school have also to assume that some preconditions have to be met under which severe competition in fact leads to the economic survival of the fittest economic agent. Such preconditions are complete information and rational choice of the economic agents. But Darwinian biology and psychology shows that exactly these assumptions are violated, since the information processing capacity of humans is limited and rational thinking is to some extent domain specific and not free from systematic errors.¹⁰⁶⁸ Hence, Darwinian biology and psychology undermine pan-adaptationism of Darwinian economy.

In conclusion it is apparent that components of process-Darwinism in different subject areas not necessarily support each other theoretically, but can and often do contradict each other. I do not deny, that despite such inconsistencies, Universal Darwinism still has a certain appeal. This may also partly be due to the tautological *aspects* of this theory. In the next two subsections we will try to separate the tautologically true, but largely meaningless, aspects of Universal Process Darwinism from the testable and meaningful aspects of it, before going on to achieve a more precise definition of a Darwinian process.

b) *On the Tautological Basis of Pan-Adaptationism*

There is a broad dispute about whether and to what extent Darwinism is marked by tautological aspects.¹⁰⁶⁹ We have already briefly discussed the tautological aspects of psychological trial-and-error theory, which are analogous to those in biological Darwinism (☞ pp. 224 f.).

¹⁰⁶⁷ ☞ pp. 232 f., also pp. 173, 197.

¹⁰⁶⁸ See, for example, the recent evolutionary literature on the implication fallacy and the Wason selection task: L. Cosmides, J. Tooby. *Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange* (1992). G. Gigerenzer. *Domain-specific reasoning* (1992), ☞ footnotes 855 f.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Only a selection of literature on this matter can be mentioned here. It is not unproblematic to distinguish between two camps of writers, since different authors have discussed different aspects of Darwinism and have differed considerable, in what degree they have advocated their position. Nevertheless, in a simplifying way one may distinguish two opposed directions, one stressing the tautological aspect of Darwinism the other denying it.

Tautological aspects of Darwinism have, for example, been emphasised by: Campbell (1960/1987), p. 385 f./p. 109 f., Popper (1972), pp. 69 f. (Popper has elaborated his position later, 1973, 83; 1974, pp. 133 f., but has softened it in 1987), Midgley (1978/1995), pp. xx, 139, 161 and Spaemann and Löw (1981), p. 242. Some authors regard tautological aspects rather as a justification, others as an object of criticism. The charge that Darwinism is partly tautological, in a particular way, has also been advocated by some proponents of the taxonomic school of cladism.

The accusation of tautology has been rejected or has been judged rather critically for example by: Dennett (1995), pp. 238-51; Dawkins (1989/1982), pp. 179-194 (Dawkins in this work guardedly concedes tautological aspects of certain definitions of adaptation, but still advocates a rather panadaptationist and panselectionist view); Hodge

I distinguish between two aspects of process monism, as promoted by universal Darwinism, which are related to corresponding possible tautologies. Firstly we discuss pan-adaptationism and, secondly, pan-selectionism. In both sections it will be shown that the views, if valid, are in certain respects based on an *tauto-logical* argumentation, which according to the etymological meaning of the original Greek term means that what has been said or assumed before is merely restated. Both interrelated tautologies are in different ways linked to a certain interpretation of the concept of the *survival of the fittest*, resulting in a concept of the *survival of the survivor*.

I do not, of course, advocate that Darwinism as a whole, either in respect to adaptation or in respect to selection, was thoroughly tautological, but I intend to point out tautological aspects which may often have been endorsed only implicitly, but still may have helped to immunise the Darwinian paradigm against criticism. I try to disentangle the tautological and the more empirical aspects of universal Darwinism and to show that, without a tautological argument, the universality of Darwinian processes—although not the existence of Darwinian processes—becomes doubtful.

The tautologies discussed at this point differ from other tautologies treated in this work. But the tautological aspect of the falsificationist refutation of inductivism, discussed previously, is closely related (☞ pp. 211 f., 361 f.). We have also discussed a tautology of defining genes so broadly that they, by definition, become the unit of selection (☞ pp. 259 f.). Instead of redefining genes, one can similarly redefine wholes as being only their parts, even if a whole is more than the sum of its parts. Provided such a definition, it becomes a tautological and empty truth that larger wholes are not evolutionarily relevant, since they, by definition, do not exist (☞ pp. 271 f.).

Darwinian pan-adaptationism, often called ‘adaptationism’ for short, is the claim of the universality of adaptation which, in the present context, is understood as being based on natural selection. All evolving entities have adapted and adaptation is the only direction giving evolutionary process.

Adaptation, as a state, is often understood as the fit of an entity to its environment.¹⁰⁷⁰ Adaptation, as a process, is normally understood as the increased fit of an entity to an environment. To assume that, in this sense, adaptation exists, is, of course, not yet tautological.

Moreover, I myself even would stress that all entities (maybe apart from ultimate elementary particles in physics) have, to some extent, to be adapted to their environments.¹⁰⁷¹ For example, molecules are stable only under certain chemical conditions. Even today atoms are known to be stable only under particular conditions of the physical evolution of the universe. Macroscopic objects of our day-to-day life trivially under certain conditions become unstable as well. Actually no biological organisms can exist, if they are, for example, exposed to fire for too long. A certain adaptation, in the sense of a minimal *fit of entity to environment*, is necessary and hence ubiquitous. All entities are to

(1983/1985), pp. 58-59; Vollmer (1985/1988), pp. 274 f.; Wuketits (1995), pp. 99 f. Also Ruse in many works has rejected the methodological problems of Darwinism and even Gould turned against a too far going accusation of tautology (e. g. 1991/1973).

See generally, for example, Bowler (1984), pp. 327-334; S. J. Gould, R. C. Lewontin (1979); Isak (1992), pp. 150-152; E. Sober (1996/1998).

¹⁰⁷⁰ Gould and Vrba have called this an ‘aptation’. St. Gould, E. Vrba. *Exaptation — A Missing Term in the Science of Form* (1982/98), p. 54.

¹⁰⁷¹ See also my concept of exformation, ☞ pp. 307 f.

some extent adapted to their environments, otherwise they would not exist. If adaptation as state is in a certain degree a necessary condition for existence, a process of adaptation appears to follow. Those entities—atoms, biscuits, genes and species—which are not adapted will simply not survive.¹⁰⁷²

Does this argumentation hence entail pan-adaptationism? No, pan-adaptationism is not entailed as long as one does not modify the meaning of adaptation in a tautological way. To argue that a certain minimal adaptedness is necessary, is not the same as to argue that entities are strongly adapted and only formed as result of adaptive processes. Even if adaptive processes play an important role, this does not imply that non-adaptive processes did not exist.

Still, pan-adaptationism has implicitly at least often been assumed to be valid, and, I think, this has been made possible by a subtle modification of the underlying understanding of adaptation. Pan-adaptationists implicitly or explicitly often seem to argue that all those entities which survive are generally more adapted, since they survive. Fitness becomes defined—as has actually often been done—by survival. Thereby the Darwinian claim of the survival of the fittest results in the tautological claim of the survival of the survivor. Such a tautological proposition, is obviously true, but meaningless.¹⁰⁷³ In regard to such a basis for adaptationism M. Midgley is completely right in being pessimistic when she asks “whether it is possible to invent any trait so disadvantageous that it could not be whitewashed in this way”¹⁰⁷⁴. Of course, any entity, which survives, survives. Only those drops of water, those trees, tigers, tables and theories survive, which survive. In this sense adaptation is always given and in each and every existing respect valid; thus pan-adaptationism seems to follow. The result would be reminiscent of the pan-adaptationism of early design arguments and Paley’s natural theology or of Leibniz’s pre-established harmony.¹⁰⁷⁵ But current pan-adaptationism is linked to Darwinian naturalism, associated with struggle and not with preordained harmony. The earlier pan-adaptationism was based on theology, but Darwinian pan-adaptationism is—at least partly—based on tautology.

Pan-adaptationism in general, in regard to a state of being, may indeed be called a ‘Leibnizian paradigm’¹⁰⁷⁶, although, in regard to processes, Leibniz’s concept of a pre-established harmony is rather diametrically opposed to the wasteful mechanism of natural selection. However, with regard to a tautological pan-adaptationism I, in any case, prefer to use Gould’s and Lewontin’s term of a Panglossian Paradigm. This term is named after Dr. Pangloss, Voltaire’s caricature of Leibniz.¹⁰⁷⁷

But how does this tautological argumentation differ from the non-tautological one above, which I supported myself? Previously we defined adaptation as the fit (or the process of an increase of fit) of an entity to an environment, a certain relation between inner and outer. In this definition adaptation is in principle falsifiable. Entities may become adapted to an environment, or—based on an internal dynamic or on chance—may evolve in another direction. Opposed to this, tautological pan-adaptationism defines

¹⁰⁷² Here we implicitly use a definition of natural selection which is later criticised as being too broad, ☉ pp. 340 f.

¹⁰⁷³ It is meaningless in the sense of not being falsifiable or verifiable. It of course still confers an ideological load.

¹⁰⁷⁴ M. Midgley. *Beast and Man* (1995/78), xx.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Cf. also R. Dawkins. *Universal Darwinism* (1983), p. 404, *The Blind Watchmaker* (1986/91).

¹⁰⁷⁶ D. Dennett. *Darwin’s Dangerous Idea* (1995), section 9.2 *The Leibnizian Paradigm*, pp. 238-251.

any entities which survive as having adapted. Accordingly, properties which in the former sense would have falsified that an adaptation took place, like a stable inner dynamic in a non-adaptive direction, would also still count as adaptation, since this also confirms the survival of the survivor. Based on a definition leading to such a tautological claim, I am and everyone else is, of course, a pan-adaptationist. But, it should be obvious that an unmodified definition of adaptation by survival is not a reasonable premiss, particularly since the claim of the survival of the survivor is not at all informative.

If one instead adopts the non-tautological definition of adaptation which is based on an increasing fitness to an externally given environment, adaptation will definitely play an important role in evolution—but pan-adaptationism can be shown to be false. I name three types of explanation where this is the case.

(a) Systemic individual selection could, as I have argued, lead to trends which are not adaptive (☞ pp. 285 f.). I have shown that the self-referential interaction of individual selection processes—which on the individual level appear to be adaptive—could stabilise or develop properties which are not adaptive in regard to the environment of the system. Such inner dynamics could be stable until either the system breaks down or another system is installed by group selection. In regard to the environment of the system, neither the system nor its parts become more adapted. The evolutionarily relevant dynamic at the system level is not adaptive. Based on the self-referentiality of the internal selection processes, a new synergetic property of autonomy from the outside world comes into being on the system level. I later shall discuss this as a case of autoselection, which does not necessary lead to an adaptation to an external environment (☞ pp. 384 f.).

(b) Chance processes, playing a role in genetic drift or in the founder effect, may also lead to the establishment of non-adaptive gene-combinations in a gene-pool. But in an account which allows many units of evolution, these processes can sometimes be regarded as parts of a larger adaptive process. For example, if one assumes a selection process at the group or species level, chance effects within the population could lead to the adaptive result that, if accumulated in a certain sub-population, for example by a founder effect, it may become possible to cross an adaptive valley which would not have been possible otherwise. If one were to claim a strictly Darwinian process at the level of the species, these chance effects, like mutations, will be non-adaptive in most cases but still be very adaptive in a few cases. Hence chance processes may be part of a process which is itself adaptive (☞ pp. 293 f.).

But chance effects are also presumably equally often only side effects which, for example result from a given population structure, and may really lead to the establishment of partially non-adaptive properties. Also mutations, as the neutralists have stressed, are often neutral and can often by chance drift to genetic fixation in a population.¹⁰⁷⁸

¹⁰⁷⁷ St. Gould, R. Lewontin. *The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm* (1982/89). ☞ footnote 780.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Cf. e. g.: D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionary Biology* (1990/86), p. 161 (mainly referring to M. Kimura), also pp. 75, 85, 509.

(c) Inner morphological dynamics or, more apparent still, developmental constraints of an evolutionary line have, according to the non-tautological understanding of adaptation, also to be regarded as counter-evidence to the claim that only adaptation to an environment determines the course of evolution. The morphology itself constrains and directs the pathways evolution could take. Morphology can either constrain possible variations or can itself act as a selecting force. The phenotypic morphology, besides the adaptation to an external environment, is an evolutionary factor in its own right (⇒ pp. 313 f.).

It is actually difficult to disentangle internal and external causes in regard to morphology, but this, according to the above argumentation, is not only a problem for developmentalists, but for adaptationists as well. If it were not somehow possible to disentangle these two aspects then adaptationism does, as argued, not have its own empirical content, but only refers to the survival of the survivor (the empirical content of a Darwinian process is discussed separately in the next section). This distinction, however, does not lead to a problem in regard to point (a), nevertheless the distinction seems problematic here. It appears as if there are no evolutionary cases where either internal dynamics or a certain environmental adaptive pressure were completely absent. Evolutionary accounts have in fact always been concerned with entities in certain environments, the inner and outer of which seeming to be inseparable, related in a dialectical way. But this, I think, does not need us relapse into claiming adaptation tautologically. Despite the interrelationship between inner and outer, we seem to be able to distinguish what is relatively more due to outer than to inner factors. For example, it seems reasonable to regard the exoskeleton of arthropods as morphological constraints on the size of organisms, whereas those characters of the whale—originally a land living mammal—which are fish like, can, rather reasonably, be regarded to be adaptations to the aquatic environment. To evaluate the relative importance of internal or external factors may possibly involve comparisons to other species¹⁰⁷⁹.

But other proposals have also been made to disentangle the role of the inner dynamics of organismic morphology and external adaptationism. For example, R. Amundson (referring to P. Alberch) describes a thought experiment to test whether and in how far the separation of two species of organisms in morphospace (whose dimensions show in how far certain phenotypic properties x , y , z etc. are expressed) is caused by adaptations to an external environment or by internal constraints. If one were to reduce external selection to a minimum and increased mutation (by mutagens) to a maximum, the strict adaptationist hypothesis would be that the descendent morphologies would tend to be no longer (or much less) clustered, whereas the developmental hypothesis would predict that the clusters would—with certain modifications—roughly stay the same.¹⁰⁸⁰

¹⁰⁷⁹ Cf. e. g.: G. Lauder. *Historical Biology and the Problem of Design* (1998/82), p. 513. Lauder also points out the necessity of comparisons, but does this, perhaps, in a slightly different way.

¹⁰⁸⁰ R. Amundson. *Two Concepts of Constraint* (1994/1998), pp. 96 f. I would add that a moving of still equally existing clusters in morphospace would indicate an internal dynamics.

An acknowledgement of evolutionary side-effects is weaker than the stress on the existence of inner developmental constraints and dynamics in evolution. The concept of properties which are evolutionary side-effects does emphasise that they do not have own causal relevance. They may one day of course become evolutionarily relevant as constraint or adaptation (more correctly: as exaptation¹⁰⁸¹). However, a side-effect without adaptive relevance actually refers to an inner causal necessity and the property itself is in fact not an adaptation, it may even be counter-adaptive. If the formerly adaptive trait perishes and the neutral side-effect continues to exist, one can, only even based on the weak notion of side-effects, argue that traits could exist which neither actually have any adaptive use, nor have had any adaptive use for themselves earlier on. Although still being relatively close to an adaptationist view,¹⁰⁸² it also, on these grounds, would be wrong to argue that all evolved traits are adaptations.¹⁰⁸³

As a preliminary conclusion a neglect of the difference between internal and external causes of survival appears to entail a tautological understanding of adaptation. If one instead accepts that the survival of the fittest does not necessarily mean survival of the survivor, but survival of those entities which fit best to a given environment, an adaptationist claim is not tautological any more. For this case it has been shown that adaptation is essential to evolution, but that it is not the only direction giving force. Hence, in this understanding, pan-adaptationism is wrong. It appears that pan-adaptationists actually often waver in their use of the term 'adaptation'. If concerned with testability they refer to the non tautological fit to an environment and if concerned with its universal validity they refer (implicitly) to the tautological concept of survival of the survivor. Only when based on such a peculiar mixture of argumentations, can pan-adaptationism neither be criticised for being tautological nor for being empirically false.

But we have not reached our final conclusion on this matter yet. I can think of two general objections that pan-adaptationist may raise to the argument I have put forward above.

Firstly, they might argue that evolutionary theory *should* not primarily be concerned with non-adaptationist explanations, like inner dynamics, chance effects and morphological constraints.¹⁰⁸⁴ But if evolutionary theory limits its investigations to adaptations from the outset and if then adaptation is found to be ubiquitous, then pan-adaptationism is again a mere vacuous tautological truth.

Secondly, one may argue that the currently used notions of fitness are much more refined than the ones I have treated above and do not lead to a tautological understanding of adaptation, even if one did not adopt the requirement of an increased fit to an external environment. Moreover, if current technical definitions would still lead to tautological results, one could argue that these definitions could be modified in another way to make the claim of the existence of adaptations a non-tautological claim, without thereby directly leading to a refutation of pan-adaptationism. These objections need to be treated in more detail, but finally I shall conclude that my argument above remains largely valid.

¹⁰⁸¹ S. Gould, E. Vrba. *Exaptation — A Missing Term in the Science of Form* (1982/98).

¹⁰⁸² Cf.: E. Sober. *Six Sayings about Adaptationism* (1996/1998), pp. 76-80.

¹⁰⁸³ See: S. Gould, R. Lewontin. *The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme* (1979).

¹⁰⁸⁴ See e. g.: R. Dawkins. *Universal Darwinism* (1983), p. 404; *The Extended Phenotype* (1982), pp. 29, 32.

Do the existing technical definitions of fitness in evolutionary biology—particularly the ones preferred by gene-Darwinians—prevent a tautological understanding of the ‘survival of the fittest’, without referring to the internal-external distinction?

(a) After a period of unprecise and speculative use of the term fitness (☉ also p. 337), fitness became to be used in a general way that was designed to show that natural selection always leads to adaptation (higher fitness). Fitness—as discussed above—became defined by survival. Also Dawkins concedes, biologists redefined the intuitive term fitness more exactly by “whatever it takes to make the survival of the fittest into a tautology”.¹⁰⁸⁵ One still, of course, had some idea of what adaptation should mean apart from a tautologically empty usage of the term. But this, I think, has either been due to implicitly adopting the above concept of an increased fit to an environment or has been due to specific additional theories on what traits will actually have a high probability of future survival. In any case these existing additional theories where not the core of adaptation as survival always remained the ultimate test for fitness. Understood in this sense, the claim of adaptationism, taken as such, has no predictive value at all and only gains predictive power by other theories with which it is implicitly associated. Despite its intuitively, based on these implicit or additional aspects, adaptation itself, as far as it is understood in this sense, is merely the tautological concept of the survival of the survivor.

(b) Later fitness becomes defined, in a slightly different way, by *reproductive success*, and no longer by the survival of a single organism.¹⁰⁸⁶ If taken as basis for pan-adaptationism, this, in my view, still carries the burden of the same tautological project. Actually ‘survival’ had presumably even earlier on never just meant the length of life span, since it would be absurd to assume that only this is optimised in evolution. If this had been the case, the definition would itself not have been tautologically enough in the Dawkinsian sense given above. Natural selection may well lead to a reduction in the life-span if reproductive success is enhanced. To measure the fitness of an organism by its reproductive success seems a more relevant way of representing survival. But, if fitness “is measured as the number of children born it neglects juvenile mortality and fails to account for parental care. If it is measured as number of offspring reaching reproductive age it neglects variation in reproductive success of the grown offspring. If it is measured as number of grandchildren it neglects... and so on ad infinitum.”¹⁰⁸⁷ Hence the concept of reproductive success too, if defined in a precise way, is not a strictly appropriate measure of fitness. One still aims at the probability of survival in general. But this general aspect of the term ‘fitness’, which seems to be its core, leads, without additional qualifications, to an interpretation of adaptation as the ‘survival of the survivor’. Post hoc, it is of course possible to determine which organism was fit or which survived, but the general tautological understanding of adaptation is not itself linked to any

¹⁰⁸⁵ R. Dawkins. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982), p. 182.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Cf. e. g.: R. Dawkins. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 63.

¹⁰⁸⁷ *Idem.* *The Extended Phenotype* (1982), p. 184.

specific prediction. I think that any definition of fitness which tries to emulate the general concept of survival through the use of another term, remains in the sense given above, at its core tautological.

Nevertheless, a term which is not identical with the term 'survival' is also entangled with non-tautological aspects as well. To define adaptation by reproductive success, assumes the existence of reproductive success, i. e. an evolutionary line and a varying number of descendants. This may even be linked to some central aspects of a Darwinian process, which we discuss below. Nevertheless the core of the concept of adaptation, remains in this case the tautological claim of the survival of the survivor—and not an increased fit to an external environment.

(c) The notion of *inclusive fitness* is concerned with survival not only in terms of the number of descendants of an organism, but also in terms which also consider the organism's effects on the reproductive success of its relatives (weighted by their relatedness).

It seems to me that here an additional non-tautological aspect, linked to the concept of kin selection, is introduced besides keeping the generally tautological view of adaptation. A certain claim in regard to the possibility of certain evolutionary mechanisms or of the unit of selection debate is involved in this definition. The concept appears to emphasize the possibility and advantage of mutual help within a kin group. That theory of kin selection is (presumably) a falsifiable theory. But the concept of kin selection has been interpreted in a gene-atomistic,¹⁰⁸⁸ an individualistic or a group-selectionistic way¹⁰⁰¹ (☉ pp. 44 f.), and would lead us on to a discussion about what that specific additional non-tautological aspect is involved in our definition.

However, also here fitness is measured by future survival. Now survival, however, is that of the descendants of a particular gene in a certain gene-pool *including* its effect on its copies in other relatives. The still present basic tautological aspect may more easily become apparent if one adopts Orlove's reformulation of Hamilton's 'inclusive fitness'. Orlove has reformulated the inclusive fitness of an organism in a way which does not focus on the organism's effect on its relatives, but on the equivalent effect of relatives on a certain (average) organism. This equivalent reformulation he calls 'personal fitness'. This is the same ordinary reproductive definition of fitness, "but don't forget that this must include the extra offspring he gets as a result of help from his relatives"¹⁰⁸⁹.

Apart from possible additionally integrated non-tautological aspects, the concept of the survival of the fittest still points generally to the tautological survival of the survivor.

An alternative to such, still at least partly tautological definition of adaptation, would be to define 'fittest' in the sense of its *ordinary meaning*, as the strongest, the quickest and the most intelligent. These 'athletic' common sense meanings may actually have provided the context in which the actual tautology did not become apparent. It is, of course, not tautological to claim that the strongest will

¹⁰⁸⁸ *Idem. Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 63

¹⁰⁸⁹ R. Dawkins. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982), p. 187.

survive. Each of these concrete properties we may—or may not—personally value. But besides the problem of priorities of these properties, fitness in this concrete sense obviously does not necessary predict survival: we only have to think of the still living order of amoebae or of the extinct Mesozoic order of dinosaurs. Thus, if one adopted such a concrete definition of fitness, the claim of the survival of the fittest would in very many cases plainly turn out to be wrong.

Likewise if one uses the definition of fitness as increased complexity, one can object that bacteria in terms of number are quite predominant. Moreover, such a claim on directed evolution would in any case not resemble the spirit of Darwinism.

Another alternative would be to define fitness in an abstract way by the probability of survival *in the long run*, the long-term probability to survive.¹⁰⁹⁰ A pan-adaptationism under such a definition of fitness would be much more justified in being called a naturalised analogy to Leibniz's claim that we live in the best of all possible world than the formulations above.¹⁰⁷⁶ For some reasons such a definition of fitness may be useful. But on these grounds the claim of the 'survival of the fittest' would be interpreted in a way that would mean especially those entities survive in the short run, which have the best chances at surviving in the long run. This formulation is not tautological and also appears not to be true, especially in regard to natural selection. Natural selection can in fact, in single cases, lead to long term adaptation. But particularly since natural selection is assumed as being blind towards long term development and as acting instantly, it is not at all guaranteed that those entities survive which will be adapted in the long run. Any extinction of a species after a time of development would be a counter-example to pan-adaptationism. Paradoxically, pan-selectionism appears to be particularly inconsistent with pan-adaptationism.

Moreover, for example, subversion of altruistic co-operative groups by egoistic individuals too leads to the survival of selfish individuals which are less adapted in the long run. This would lead not only to a reduced fitness of the group, but also to a reduced fitness of its average members and even of those now predominant selfish individuals.¹⁰⁹¹

Hence, also these alternative non-tautological proposals to circumvent a tautology do not lead to pan-selectionism.

But if one does not adopt these alternative definitions, the largely tautological definitions above, likewise seem to have more non-tautological aspects than we have worked out here up until now. Otherwise, it would be implausible that a mere tautological definition could apparently still yield fruitful results.

It is obviously possible and even useful to check, in a *post hoc* way, which entities survived and which did not. Nevertheless, we have also seen that the concept of adaptation, if directly or indirectly defined as the survival of the survivor, does not itself have any predictive power; it could not be exposed

¹⁰⁹⁰ Cf.: S. Mills, J. Beatty. *The propensity interpretation of fitness* (1979); J. M. Thoday. *Components of fitness* (1953).

to a proper testing and does not itself contribute anything to an explanation. In my view, more specific theories of why organisms or species survive contribute to the missing predictions, but they are *additional* theories. These theories could also be tested.

Also the previously proposed concept of an increased fit to an external environment is a testable assumption (and which is actually sometimes not given). On the other hand the hypothesis that internal factors direct evolution is also testable. But besides these aspects and the already mentioned non-tautological components of the mainly tautological definitions of adaptation, especially additionally adopted theories, in my view render the general—tautological—concept of adaptation as a seemingly testable claim.

Sober, rather critical of the existence of tautological aspects in Darwinian explanations, conceded that although specific adaptive explanations are testable, the general claim that there, in a particular case, exists an adaptive explanation is hard to prove wrong.¹⁰⁹² This, I think, still somewhat resembles Gould's objection to adaptationism that it is always possible to invent a new "just so story". In my view, the problem of testing adaptationism in general is due to the often implicitly adopted tautological definition of adaptation as the survival of the survivor, which is never ever challenged by any refutation of a specific theory about which entity will probably survive. Only those additional specific theories about what will evolve and survive can be tested. These theories are crucial since we in fact want to predict what traits are evolutionarily stable. Indeed these reasonable specific theories sometimes become falsified as well. For this reason the measurement of, for example, gene-frequencies, numbers of offspring or life spans is central in order to evaluate these theories. But it adds nothing, to call, without qualification, any trait which survives an adaptation. In this sense the actual use of the term 'adaptation' seems to be modified in each case, based on the involved specific theories. Specific hypothesis on evolutionary mechanisms could be tested. General adaptationism could not be tested and does not contribute to an explanation, if adaptation is merely understood as *survival in whatever possible way*.

In conclusion, firstly one may abandon the term adaptation all together, since adaptation in its non-tautological usage is too often entangled with a tautological usage. Secondly, one may keep the notion, as an empty tautological umbrella notion referring to all the traits which according to currently valid and more specific theories are regarded as leading to survival. In this sense pan-adaptationism can not be refuted, since any specific theory, which is shown to be false, is by definition no longer covered by this umbrella notion. In this way of thinking any causes, also internal trends, orthogenesis and chance effects would simply be called adaptations as long as they had some effect on evolution. Thirdly, one may keep the notion of adaptation, but purge it from its tautological aspects. This possibility is advocated here. I have advocated understanding adaptation as an increased *fit to an external*

¹⁰⁹¹ E. Sober. *What is Evolutionary Altruism* (1988/1998), pp. 463-467. E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. *Philosophical Work on Units of Selection Problem* (1994/1998), pp. 206-207. (☞ also pp. 278 f.)

environment. I have shown that this understanding is not tautological. This particular non-tautological understanding has also always been an ideological core of adaptationism, but easily becomes neglected when this understanding proves pan-adaptationism to be wrong—as it does. If adaptationism wants to be taken seriously, I think, it ought to take its own conceptual core seriously itself.

Nevertheless, it may, for other reasons, be useful to keep the general notion of fitness, defined by survival. It is only wrong to apply this definition to adaptation in a way which leads to the absurd tautological claim of the survival of the survivor. It is reasonable to examine what entities survive or which have a probability to survive, but it is absurd to call any kind of survival adaptation, since then everything is an adaptation. Besides this, we still want to have a language with which to express our more specific hypothesis of which trait will or will not survive, independently of whether it is an internally directed development or an adaptation to an external environment. Also the non-adaptationist hypothesis that an internal dynamic may lead a certain trait (and not to another trait) may be expressed by the short cut that this internal dynamic enhances the fitness of that trait. But in this case an enhanced fitness is not an adaptation to an externally given environment. Here the concept of fitness itself does not contribute anything to the explanation, but is only a short cut for the probability of survival. And, of course, any evolutionary entity survives or does not survive. Fitness in its general understanding, only provides a terminology to express our more specific adaptationist or non-adaptationist hypothesis which forces lead to survival, it is in this respect not a theory which can be tested.

Darwin himself, in the period in which he wrote the *Origin*, believed in pan-adaptationism, based only on natural selection and thus took over the Spencerian slogan of the *survival of the fittest* to characterise his theory. As far as I know he, like many of his followers, did not distinguish between the tautological and the non-tautological aspect of pan-adaptationism. Darwin, although challenging the ontological fixity of natural theology, still stood in Paley's wake with regard to his belief in pan-adaptationism. The term 'natural selection' even mirrors the imagery of God's guiding hand, similar to the 'invisible hand' of another Christian inspired pan-adaptationist, Adam Smith. In Darwin's later period, when his religious belief was shaken (mainly by his own theory), he in the fifth edition of the *Origin* abandoned strict pan-adaptationism and the exclusiveness of natural selection (☹ p. 113). Although it has been to Darwin's merit to see that the simple mechanism of natural selection could in fact lead to *some* adaptation, the strong pan-adaptationist assertion inherent in it becomes highly doubtful if we do not base it on either a tradition of natural theology or interpret the concept of natural selection in a tautological but vacuous way.

c) *On the Tautological Basis of Pan-Selectionism*

Since selectionism has become universal (☹ pp. 203 f.), I, perhaps with a different intention, have to agree with Dawkins when he says that it "is time to go back to first principles. What really happens in natural selection?"¹⁰⁹³

Pan-selectionism, which is opposed to approaches which favour the synergetic emergence of processes, normally asserts that besides natural selection—which itself once emerged—no other essentially new types of evolutionary processes ever have emerged. Natural selection is understood as a universally present ontological principle to which all other evolutionary processes can be reduced

¹⁰⁹² E. Sober. *Six Sayings about Adaptation* (1996/1998), p. 81

¹⁰⁹³ R. Dawkins. *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype* (1978), p. 67.

(☞ pp. 143 f., 207 f.). Natural selection in this view is as basic and exhaustive in respect of processes as elementary particles are to radical supporters of physicalist substance reductionism.

The pan-selectionist claim of process-Darwinism can be formulated as ‘all relevant evolutionary processes are processes of natural selection’. This often is formulated in a more specific way as ‘all *adaptive* processes are processes of natural selection’. Even so, the two formulations are equivalent providing that pan-selectionists advocate pan-adaptationism as well. If this is so however, then developmental constraints, an internal dynamics or the fixation of traits based on chance, which (as we have seen in the last section) do all not necessarily lead to an adaptation to an external environment, are ignored as limiting the scope of this claim. Tautological pan-adaptationism simply calls these non-adaptive processes adaptations because they also play a role in shaping future existence. Another assumption leading to the mere tautological truth of the equivalence of the two formulations is that one is only interested in adaptive processes anyhow (☞ the preceding section on pan-adaptationism).

Based on an assumed equivalence of (relevant aspects of) evolution and adaptation a pan-selectionist may additionally simply define natural selection as an equivalent to any adaptation. Natural selection would then merely mean that entities survive or do not survive, which is, of course, always true. Such an approach, which by definition regards any evolutionary change, without qualification, as being naturally selected, trivially and tautologically implies pan-selectionism. The proposition ‘this evolves by natural selection’ would then not be able to make any more predictions than the proposition ‘this evolves because of Gods will or because of Providence’, since no particular cause or direction is explicitly specified (nevertheless the connotations of these propositions obviously differ considerably). Pan-selectionism, if based on this tautological argumentation, is obviously too absurd to merit closer discussion. Perhaps, no one has ever explicitly promoted this understanding of natural selection, but, presumably, it often plays an implicit role in statements, which in regard to certain properties and without any closer scrutiny of the involved process, assume that these properties evolved by ‘natural selection’.

Alternatively, a Darwinian process can still quite broadly, but more appropriately, be defined as being characterised, firstly, by different trials and, secondly, by the existence of a selecting force. Often a Darwinian process, is, as we have already seen, defined even more strictly. But such a definition from the viewpoint of a pan-selectionist may appear to be able to navigate between the Scylla of being a mere tautology and the Charybdis of obviously proving pan-selectionism to be wrong.

I shall argue that this definition of a Darwinian process is still generally too unspecified. In regard to the first criterion, it is argued that the concept of different trials is almost—although not totally—empty and requires further qualification. The second criterion, the existence of a selecting force, is shown to be a completely empty tautological condition—as long as one does not assign a more specific meaning to this term.

(0.) Before I come to discuss the afore mentioned criteria of a Darwinian process, it has to be mentioned that the definition above is still generally so broad that it can be applied to almost any subject area and even to many physical objects. This seems appropriate since we are concerned with universal Darwinism and not necessarily just with biological Darwinism. But universal Darwinism, if not claimed in a tautological way by calling any change as being a Darwinian process, usually limits itself to biological and cultural entities. However, the concept of 'natural selection' has, for example, also been proposed by a known physicist to be applicable with regard to the order of atoms in a laser beam.¹⁰⁹⁴

Let us take another example—single drops of rain—which may appear particularly implausible. A drop of rain is an entity with certain properties such as cohesion etc. The starting point at which a drop is formed can be regarded as a chance process when H₂O molecules come together during condensation (trials). Small drops then evolve, one may say, based on natural selection, due to the density of H₂O molecules in the air etc.

If we would accept that in some cases at least the two criteria (at least in their broad and, as we shall see, almost empty sense) would be fulfilled by merely physical entities, we might still argue that in these cases no inheritance and replication is given.¹⁰⁹⁵ I, of course, think that inheritance and replication are crucial to biological evolution, since they are preconditions with which past experiences could become accumulated and transferred to the future.

None the less, it should at least be annotated that it is, in my opinion, not entirely trivial that such a necessary additional criterion of inheritance and replication would necessarily exclude all merely physical processes from counting as objects of a Darwinian process.

Even in regard to a drop of rain, whose order in a way stabilises itself, and one might say 'inherits' its structure to the next moment: the drop although possibly loosing some molecules, collects smaller droplets upon falling. (It is astonishing to learn that there are intensive scientific studies also on the matter of precipitation.) Moreover, it is known that drops which have become very large tend to be broken into smaller drops. Here the macroscopic structure of a drop in a way even duplicates itself. Something like this may cause a domino effect and may play a role when it is raining.

Also in more obvious cases of self-organisation in physics something like 'inheritance' seems to be involved. There is a huge field of study concerning non-equilibrium irreversible thermodynamics, a field to which the Nobel laureate I. Prigogine has made considerable contributions. It seems that in this subject area states of macroscopic order come into being by chance fluctuations. These once established states of order in a process of self-organisation again influence the future range of possible fluctuations. One may doubt whether such an inner self-organisational dynamics may violate other criteria of a Darwinian process, which refer to an adaptation to an *external* environment. However, if successive irreversible states of order dependent on each other, this process in a way may be said to have a memory. Also in regard to the physical or chemical evolution of the universe in general, the present structure obviously determines to some extent the future structure. An extended physical notion of inheritance may possibly question whether the biological notion of inheritance is formulated sufficiently general.

Leaving aside the question of whether or not properties in physical processes also are somewhat inherited from former states, we, in any case, add that for a Darwinian process one also requires inheritance.

¹⁰⁹⁴ H. Haken. e. g. *Indeterminismus, Wahl und Freiheit - wie sind diese Begriffe im Bereich des Anorganischen zu verstehen?* (1984), p. 18. Haken's general theory of synergetics, in my view, still seems rather non-Darwinian since he allows new autonomous self-regulative 'regimes' to govern a situation.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Cf.: R. Dawkins. *Universal Darwinism* (1983), p. 421.

(1.) The criterion of the existence of different trials, although not totally vacuous, is, nevertheless, too broad to represent properly the essence of a Darwinian process.

The concept of different trials—in biology, particularly different mutations, recombinations and speciations—merely excludes the possibility that there is only one possible development or direction. All trials or steps in more than one direction, however directed they may be, would then qualify as being parts of Darwinian processes. Instead of one determined direction a Darwinian process requires a probability function of trials with different directions.

This criterion is not completely empty, since processes which really only produce steps in one direction are excluded from being Darwinian processes. This aspect of a definition would indeed exclude historical pure Lamarckism from being a Darwinian process, because in a purely Lamarckian process each adaptive step is assumed to be a 'trial' in one adaptive direction, which is directly informed by the environment. This shows the non-tautological aspect of this definition without leading to a refutation of pan-selectionism, since radical biological Lamarckism—besides some open questions (☹ pp. 148, 305 f.)—largely has to count as having been refuted.

But according to this definition, all semi-directed processes would count as Darwinian processes as well. Likewise, all evolutionary inner constraints, if still allowing at least two minimally different directions, would be counted as natural selection. The concept of constraints on variation leading only to precisely one possible direction, is, admittedly, a concept, which can be thought of, but since all morphological processes are rather fussy, this would at best be approximated by the actual facts. None the less, I think we do want to distinguish between more or less directed processes.

In the cultural area, which, according to process-Darwinians, is also exclusively describable by Darwinian processes, it is simpler to find a counter example even for the very cautious definition of pan-selectionism given above. For instance, the possibly directly correct response to a mathematical problem, not known to the solver before, would, at least on the level of the individual, obviously not be a Darwinian process.¹⁰⁹⁶

One may object that internally, cognitively, there has perhaps still been a production of a broad variety of proposals. Firstly, this would be a hypothesis which is not proven at all and which even seems difficult to test. Secondly, such a general perspective seems to neglect the particular properties of different forms of exploration, here of rational reasoning. Thirdly, even if on some basic level there indeed were a broad variation of trials, this would provide us with an example of a processual synergetic whole, since the level of the individual is directed in any case. This interpretation would confirm process emergentism, by showing that the combination of Darwinian processes, does not lead to another Darwinian process itself, but may, for example, gain properties of directed evolution.

But also in regard to this example the criterion of 'trials' in any case seems not to differentiate appropriately between different processes. In problem solving it does not only make a difference

¹⁰⁹⁶ One may object that here the basic information is already given by the axioms of logic. Nevertheless it obviously requires in some sense a 'new' knowledge to solve new mathematical problems. In this regard I tend to follow Kant in regarding complex mathematical judgements as synthetic judgements a priori.

whether we directly solve problems or not, but also how many trials we need or how directed the process of solving the problem is.

The criterion of different trials defines a Darwinian process so broadly that processes which are partly directed would simply be counted as Darwinian processes. Pan-selectionism is not claimed in a strictly tautological way, but reinterprets almost all counter-evidence that suggests it is still close to a tautology. Hence a stricter definition appears to be needed.

(a) Directed non-adaptive variation. Developmentally constrained variation may only lead to evolutionary products which are not optimally adapted.¹⁰⁹⁷ If the range of variation is so narrow that no proper adaptation can be achieved one may not regard it as a proper Darwinian process.

Developmentally constrained variation can in my view partly be interpreted as a form of autoselection, which in any case will be shown to be non-Darwinian as well. Somewhat differently, Amundson, for example, interprets all developmental constraints as constraints on variation and I agree that they may play a role. If, for example, mutations are always interpreted along the predominant established developmental pathways, certain phenotypic variation—and we are of course concerned with phenotypic properties—will, at least probabilistically, not occur. In regard of an evolutionary line as a whole, one can in both cases speak anyway of *variational* constraints.

Whales, mammals which earlier lived on land, are in many respects adapted to spending their whole life cycle in water. For example, the broad horizontal tail flukes which provide the main propulsive thrust bear no anatomical connection to the lost hind limbs. Nevertheless, whales still have, for example, lungs and have not evolved secondary gills to breath air resolved in water, which possibly would have been advantageous for their deep dives. This may be interpreted either to be due to the developmental pathway making such a mutation highly improbable, or because any mutation in this direction in an autoselective way turned out to be disadvantageous.

The difficulty, but necessity, of distinguishing between an internally caused direction and adaptation to an external environment has been discussed before (☞ pp. 334 f.). This has been shown to be particularly important in preventing a mere tautological understanding of adaptation.

Amundson, as mentioned above, exposes an interesting proposal about how to distinguish what features of given populations are due to internal constraints on variation and to adaptation to an external environment.¹⁰⁹⁸

(b) Directed adaptive variation. With regard to adaptations, I think, we should distinguish between cases where a blind vast abundance of trials is needed for an adaptation and cases where an adaptation may be possibly achieved in a more directed way.

It appears reasonable to require for our definition that the trials of a Darwinian process are blind, as has actually been assumed by the majority of neo-Darwinians.¹⁰⁹⁹ Trials are blind if no trial has an

¹⁰⁹⁷ Confer also in section (b) the treatment of the necessary range of variation, ☞ p. 345 f.

¹⁰⁹⁸ R. Amundson, in *Two Concepts of Constraint* (1994/1998), esp. p. 108. ☞ footnote 1080.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Including most proponents of the evolutionary synthesis and of gene-Darwinism, ☞ also footnote 1133. Darwin himself had still allowed directed adaptations, even based on an explicitly Lamarckian mechanism, ☞ pp. 110 f.

enhanced probability for being adaptive, relative to other actual or hypothetical trials.¹¹⁰⁰ The probability function of the different trials causing changes should not correlate with their adaptability.

The strict blindness of a trial could be interpreted as radical *antithesis to inductivism*. Blindness assumes that former experiences, former adaptations, do not improve the probability of solving new problems in the future. Dawkins' in *Universal Darwinism*, argued—on a generally anti-inductivist basis—that Darwinism “is probably the only theory that can adequately account for the phenomena that we associate with life”¹¹⁰¹ Elsewhere he states, that “Darwinism is the only known theory that is in principle capable of explaining certain aspects of life. If I am right it means that, even if there were no actual evidence in favour of the Darwinian theory (there is, of course) we should still be justified in preferring it over all rival theories”¹¹⁰². “The ‘Darwinian world view’ is not only the theory which happens to be true, but it is the only theory which is possibly explaining our existence”¹¹⁰³. (☞ pp. 207 f.)

Although we aimed at making our definition of a Darwinian process more testable by requiring trials to be blind, at this point another tautology seems easily to creep in if one pleads for pan-Darwinism based on an assumed refutation of inductivism. I have argued before that anti-inductivism can simply be based on a trivial tautological truth: one does not know what one does not know (☞ pp. 208 f.). If this were the claim of the inductivists they would of course simply be wrong. I have argued earlier, that this has never been upheld by inductivists. Inductivists argue that old knowledge has a certain enhanced probability to be valid in new situations. We are entitled to think that the sun will rise tomorrow as well. This is the claim that our knowledge has a higher probability than a chance guess of also being valid tomorrow, although the world may have changed. Also if situations change an inductivist may either argue that we are directly informed by the environment or, in a less radical way, that we may to some extent be able to skilfully rearrange our knowledge so that the resulting generalisations, transformations etc. have normally a higher probability of being right than mere chance guesses. The question is not whether the unknown could be known (of course not), but, whether former knowledge in its generalisations and other transformations could also—on average—have any validity in new situations.

In evolutionary theory the question is whether variation (mutation, recombination etc.) is always necessarily blind whether, earlier adaptations, newly combined have a higher probability of being adaptive, than completely chance trials. Of course here an aspect of chance is necessarily involved. The question is whether all trials really in principle have to be assumed to be completely blind. Linked to this discussion is the question of whether an evolutionary line of a species could appropriately be said to be less blind in finding an adaptive optimum than a line of asexual organisms. If biological or cultural processes of knowledge acquisition could be speeded up, we would presumably not call them all equally blind, at least not on the level of the focused whole.

Since I have discussed anti-inductivism earlier on and argued against an *a priori* refutation of inductivism, we here continue with the assumption that the blindness of trials is not *a priori* given, but a matter of empirical investigation (☞ pp. 210 f.).

If blindness could be assumed, but the Darwinian process should still lead to adaptation, an *abundance of trials and a certain range of their variation* appears to be required. If the range of variation or the number of trials is small, either the assumption of adaptation or of blindness would have to be abandoned. With a very limited number and range of blind trials it is not guaranteed that in a given adaptive landscape within a reasonable amount of time even a close adaptive optimum will be found. Alternatively, if adaptation is assumed to have taken place, only a few trials with a limited range of variation leading to that adaptation, would not properly be regarded as blind and more variation in non-adaptive directions as well would have needed to occur in order to sustain the assumption of blindness. Hence, if we do not want to abandon adaptation or blindness of trials as essential aspects of a Darwinian process, a certain range and number of trials appears also to be required.

Hence for a comparison of different theories on evolution the amount of claimed variation seems to qualify as a yardstick as to just how Darwinian they are. We may, for example, think of two theories of language evolution, one of which claims the elimination of a vast number of populations with different

¹¹⁰⁰ ☞ also e. g. footnote 1134.

¹¹⁰¹ R. Dawkins. *Universal Darwinism* (1983), p. 403.

¹¹⁰² *Idem*. *The Blind Watchmaker* (1986/1991), p. 287.

¹¹⁰³ *Ibid*, p. xiv.

language structures which in turn, led to the existing language structure, other of which claims only very few eliminations. Whatever position one holds on this matter (I am personally not committed to any position on this specific dispute), it appears to be reasonable to distinguish these theories according to where natural selection is 'doing more work'.¹¹⁰⁴ A theory which assumes that only a few trials have led to the evolution of a property either implies that the trials have somehow been directed towards this adaptation or that the trials, if they are assumed to be blind, have probably not reached a very adaptive result. It would in my view be absurd to claim alternatively that, for instance, Chomsky, advocating a minor role for blind trials and for external elimination, basically supports the same theory as someone who pleads for its omnipresent role.

In spite of this Sober, pointed out that in respect to a given observed variation it is difficult or even impossible to judge how far this variation is directed towards an adaptation, since there are no fixed standards for how broad variation has to be.¹¹⁰⁵

It should be noted that this is not only a problem for the critics of Darwinism but equally for Darwinism itself. If not solved, it would mean that any possible empirical evidence for directed variation would become excluded, not empirically but theoretically. Moreover it would equally be possible to regard all processes as directed, because one could also always think of a larger range of variation. Directionalism and Darwinism were in danger becoming mere matters of opinion, not of empirical evidence.

Although I agree with Sober that there is a difficulty since no strict general standards are available, this does not mean that we cannot make any distinctions. In regard to specific traits we may well think of a sufficiently broad variation of blind trials leading to a certain adaptation. We are definitely concerned with a question of degree, but in a specific context may still determine whether the range and the number of blind trials will probably lead to an adaptation in a given time. This becomes particularly apparent in regard of alternative hypotheses, like in those of language acquisition above. It would be wrong to call both in an equal way Darwinian.

In regard to directed adaptive variation, we can generally conclude that we require blindness as a criterion for a Darwinian process and not only different trials. Moreover, it appears reasonable—although remaining slightly more problematic—to require that the trials are also abundant and varying enough if it is another precondition that they should lead to adaptation.

(2.) The second criterion proposed for a Darwinian process—the existence of a selecting force—represents, if taken as such, not a substantial assertion at all. Without a more restricted use of the term 'selector' this criterion is vacuous. If a selector, differing from the original connotation of the word, is broadly understood as *all* external *and* internal conditions under which an entity is formed, then simply all conditions and causes which lead to its existence are meant. If possible non-adaptive inner constraints or an inner dynamics are also taken as selectors then selectors are by definition always

¹¹⁰⁴ Cf.: E. Sober. *Six Sayings about Adaptation* (1996/1998), p. 78.

¹¹⁰⁵ *Idid.*, p. 79.

given, since simply any cause is meant. If any explanation is defined to fulfil this criterion of a Darwinian process, the claim of its universal validity is tautological and vacuous. (Cf. the problem of the definition of adaptation, ☞ pp. 330 f.).

An alternative, which would not make this criterion of pan-selectionism a mere tautology, would be to define the selecting force as being external. This is actually often done and it is only this that also guarantees that selection leads to an adaptation to an external environment.

Given this, internal developmental constraints leading to a certain evolutionary direction would, appropriately, not be interpreted as being Darwinian processes (☞ pp. 334 f.). An external selector is also absent in regard to the dispersion of genetic neutral genes or to genetic drift, and hence these processes also, as it is often argued, would not fulfil this criterion of a Darwinian process. (Drift, however, may sometimes play a role in the variational step of a Darwinian process on the population level.) Likewise, what I have called systemic individual 'selection' (☞ pp. 285 f.) is, on the level of the system, not a Darwinian process. Here internally a Darwinian process leads to the adaptation (in the afore outlined non-tautological sense) of organisms to other organisms belonging to that system. Even so the system as a whole has gained a certain independence from external selectors and, as such, the direction of evolution is not necessarily adaptive but determined by the inner dynamics of this system. Hence, the system as a whole is not ruled by a Darwinian process. This is, I think, a good example of the synergetic properties of compound processes, in which in regard to processes a whole is not merely the sum of its parts (☞ pp. 384, 398).

Hence, if a selector is defined more appropriately as being external, this criterion of the pan-adaptationist claim, is not tautological any more—but often false.

Conclusion. If simply identified with pan-adaptationism, pan-selectionism is fully tautological and merely claims the survival of the fittest in the sense of the survival of the survivor (☞ previous section).

Another seemingly much more differentiated way of defining a Darwinian process is to define it as a process of trial and selection. I argue that this is in fact no longer tautological, yet still close to a tautology.

Firstly, the criterion of trials, strictly understood, only completely excludes directed stages of evolution. All processes with a minimal variation would fulfil this criterion, even if we are either concerned with a strong internally constrained variation not-leading to adaptation or with an adaptively directed variation which very quickly leads to an adaptation. Hence, processes which are appropriately called non-Darwinian, because they do not lead to an adaptation at all, or because they are directed towards adaptation, would absurdly still count in favour of Darwinism. Also in accordance with the generally strict neo-Darwinian understanding of a Darwinian process, I argue that a stricter criterion for a Darwinian process is required: trials have to be blind; there should be no enhanced probability that

they lead to adaptation. Moreover, there should be no strong constraints on this blind variation if we want to assume that these blind trials lead to adaptation.

Secondly, the criterion for the existence of a selecting force is vacuous, if understood so broadly that any cause and condition, whether internal or external, can be taken as such force. Since any entity has internal and external conditions of existence, a claim that there is a selecting force only refers to the trivial fact that there are some explanations for the existence of an entity. This is, of course, true, but vacuous. If internal constraints and internal tendencies not leading to adaptations were also all called selecting forces, since they are causally relevant and thereby contribute to the survival of a particular kind of entity, then this criterion would be, of course, universally fulfilled—without saying anything.

I argue that the second criterion for a Darwinian process has thus to be understood as selection by an environment. This aspect of a refined non-tautological definition is also in accordance with the core of the Darwinian tradition. Processes based on an inner dynamics which are not leading to an adaptation, could then not be redefined as Darwinian processes. I have pointed to some examples which prove pan-selectionism to be wrong.

In the next section the resulting definition of Darwinism and its alternatives will be discussed.

9.2 Re-Defining the Notions of Darwinism and Lamarckism

a) *A Strict Definition of Darwinism*

From the universal application of Darwinism¹¹⁰⁷ and from the last two sections on its tautological aspects it is apparent that a strict definition of Darwinism is needed which is not tautological but which aims at a conceptual resolution that distinguishes different types of processes in the physical, biological and cultural spheres as effectively as possible. Aiming at a conceptual resolution is something like an *a priori* condition (roughly in the Kantian sense) to make process emergentism visible. If we believe in the existence of the evolution of evolutionary processes, the probability of detecting such an evolution will be higher the more strictly we formulate our definition of Darwinian processes.

Still in accordance with the normal use of the notion, but strictly excluding its possible tautological or semi-tautological aspects that were discussed before, I define a—pure—Darwinian process as follows.

(0) The basis for a Darwinian process has to be a direct continuous line of descent and heredity, which preserves information. (1a) The first step of a Darwinian process is signified by a diversification or variation of informational lines. (1b) That variation of the informational line is completely blind. Moreover, variation should be abundant and broad enough that relatively close adaptive optima can be

¹¹⁰⁶ Cf.: R. Dawkins. *Universal Darwinism* (1983), p. 420.

¹¹⁰⁷ ⇨ pp. 203 f. Cf. also e. g. K. Shrader-Frechette. *Should Epistemologists Take Darwin Seriously?* (1990).

found. (2) The second step of a Darwinian process is external selection leading to adaptation in respect of a temporally given environment.

A Darwinian process as a whole leads to the survival of those blindly produced entities, which are most opportunistically adapted to their momentaneous environment.

Proposition zero is normally uncontroversial, and is accepted by most critics.¹¹⁰⁸ The other propositions also boil down only to a stricter formulation of our working definition, which is widely accepted (☉ pp. 107 f.). However, it also becomes apparent that tautological formulations of Darwinian processes too may often have helped to immunise the Darwinian paradigm and, equally, that a stricter definition may challenge pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism (☉ pp. 330 f.). Despite the resemblance to our working definition, the definition is now more precise and we have acquired certainty about the essential role of the components of the definition. The most important aspects of the definition above can be summarised in the following phrase, which I already occasionally have used earlier in this work.¹¹⁰⁹ A Darwinian process is a process of blind variation (1) and external selection (2).

This conceptualisation is also historically appropriate in respect to modern Darwinism. Modern Darwinism is a synthesis of Darwin's externalism and Mendel's belief in the internal factors of evolutionary variation.¹¹¹⁰ But the evolutionary synthesis transformed the originally anti-Darwinian Mendelian and mutationist contribution, so to speak, in a way that was radically Darwinian: the internal force of variation, was now understood to be a completely undirected, blind force, producing random material on which natural selection could work. The Darwinian evolutionary process is generally described as "genetic chance and environmental necessity".¹¹¹¹ Likewise Mayr regards modern Darwinism in essence as a synthesis of mutationism (in the sense of random events or accidents) and externalism.¹¹¹²

Although it may have been the originally intended consequence of Darwinism to explain *progress*,¹¹¹³ I suppose that Darwin's believe in progress became shattered by his own theory (☉ pp. 116 f.). At least based on the modern strict definition of Darwinism, progress is not at all an essential aspect of that theory. Bowler similarly argued that "Darwinism does not really guarantee progress or at least makes it very difficult to define."¹¹¹⁴ I also agree with Gould that from the viewpoint of Darwinism, understood as the negation of innate progression and as adaptation only to present and local environments, "we are glorious accidents of an unpredictable process with no drive to complexity."¹¹¹⁵

In the section which directly follows I propose to regard regarding Darwinism, defined in the strict way that I previously elaborated, as one extreme of a spectrum of approaches. In the subsequent sub-

¹¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, in a way, this aspect has also been challenged here as being an exclusively valid description of evolution. The concept of an informational line has been complemented by the concept of exformation. Although the storage of exformation is itself partly based on the information of another evolutionary line, it has been stressed above that certain features of one species may, in a way, be stored in another co-evolving species. (☉ the concept of external memory, pp. 316 f.)

¹¹⁰⁹ This appears to resemble Campbell's terminology, but in the second aspect voluntarily differs from his formulation.

¹¹¹⁰ R. C. Lewontin. *Gene, organism, environment* (1983), pp. 273 f.

¹¹¹¹ E. g.: E. O. Wilson. *On Human Nature* (1978/95), p. 1.

¹¹¹² E. Mayr. *Animal Species and Evolution* (1963), pp. 1-2.

¹¹¹³ R. Richards. *The Meaning of Evolution* (1992), pp. 89-90.

¹¹¹⁴ P. J. Bowler. *Evolution* (1984), p. 310 (referring to Simpson and other authors), cf. also pp. 315-316.

sections different aspects of this definition will be clarified and discussed separately in detail. In addition to our earlier discussion of pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism this will lead to a critical evaluation of the universality of Darwinian processes.

b) *A Spectrum Between Darwinism and 'Lamarckism'*

Darwinism has, sometimes been understood only negatively by the absence of a strictly Lamarckian type of evolution. If one accepts such a negative definition, Darwinism seems to gain strength because of the weakness of radical Lamarckism. All middle positions then would simply count in favour of Darwinism, which would then wrongly mostly still be associated with the implications of Darwinism in the strict sense.

For another reason such a negative definition of Darwinism via Lamarckism is problematic. The term 'Lamarckism' leads to a preoccupation with Lamarck's alternative theory of acquired characters only, which, in regard to biology—with some reservations—has to count as having been refuted (☹ pp. 303 f.). In regard to the blindness of evolution Lamarckism might still represent an extreme antithesis to Darwinism although only less radical theories may appear possible today. Darwinism, however, was also opposed by different theories. Lamarck's original theory (☹ also pp. 96 f.) even resembles Darwinism in understanding evolution as a process of adaptation to an externally given environment. Lamarckism stressed that organisms "take their fate into their own hands"¹¹¹⁶ only in respect of the directedness of trials. Nevertheless, Lamarckism was originally an essentially adaptationist approach. But Darwinism has not only been criticised for the concept of the blindness of trials, but also for being—like Lamarckism—a theory which stresses adaptation to an external environment. Pre-Darwinian and post-Darwinian idealists or romantic biologists, until today, have stressed the internally directed unfolding of forms (☹ also pp. 102 f., 156 f.). Also today's criticism of adaptationism, in my view, still partly follows—albeit often only implicitly—in this wake. Other critics of adaptationism stress that chance processes, like drift and neutral mutations, not directly controlled by any survival value, play an important role in evolution. Another kind of criticism of Darwinian adaptationism—although closely resembling a Darwinian argumentation—is found in my proposal that self-referential systems of selection, could acquire a certain autonomy from adaptation to an external environment (☹ pp. 285 f., 384 f.). In any case, Lamarckism, if used as an antithesis to Darwinism conceals the fact that criticism of Darwinism is not confined to Lamarckism in its narrow sense, but itself even sometimes differs considerably from Lamarckism.

A more appropriate notion covering approaches to evolution which are less blind or less adaptive, but more directed and internally governed, is not known to me. It would be presumably correct to use the purely negative term 'non-Darwinism'. In the headline of this section I have, however, kept the

¹¹¹⁵ S. J. Gould. *Full House* (1996), p. 216, quoted in M. Ruse. *The Mystery of Mysteries* (1999), pp. 146.

¹¹¹⁶ D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), p. 45.

misunderstandable, but well known, positive term ‘Lamarckism’ which is meant here in its broad sense. This broad usage is also actually found in the later nineteenth century, where ‘Lamarckism’ often referred generally to theories which advocated a less blind and more progressive evolution, orthogenesis and inner trends included.¹¹¹⁷ Lamarckism in the narrow sense is often found as an aspect of these more generally ‘Lamarckian’ approaches—as it could actually also be found in early so-called ‘Darwinian’ theories—, but the inheritance of acquired characteristics has only been one aspect of these non-Darwinian or anti-Darwinian approaches. Lamarckians in a broad sense generally favoured a more directed and internally governed form of evolution than Darwinism, and in principle do not need to be considered Lamarckians in the strict sense at all. However, one may choose a different term that would be less easily misunderstood to cover the different non-Darwinian theories. Here I am mainly concerned with developing the concept that Darwinism in our strict definition should be understood as one extreme of a spectrum of theories.

From a Darwinian starting point, it appears reasonable to define a non-Darwinian antithesis with regard to the two components of the above definition of Darwinism, i. e. blind variation and external selection. This does not result in only *one* spectrum, but in *two* spectra or rather one spectrum with two dimensions.¹¹¹⁸ One dimension reaches from blindness to the directedness of trials, the other reaches from stress on increasing fit with an external environment to stress on internal, for example developmental, dynamics (fig. 11).




Figure 11: Visualisation of the two-dimensional spectrum of Darwinian and non-Darwinian theories

The *first dimension* contrasts blindness versus directedness. Darwinism, in the above sense, is characterised by the blindness of trials, which—if linked to adaptationism—requires a wasteful abundance of trials if they were to lead to adaptation (☉ pp. 344 f.). Strict Lamarckism *in the narrow sense*—which is also an adaptive process—would compose the other extreme only on this dimension (upper *left* corner of the figure), since for each evolutionary step only one trial is needed, because it is directly informed by the environment. Approaches which neither support strictly blind trials nor direct informedness by the environment could be

more appropriately located somewhere in between these radical poles. Likewise, approaches, of course, which concede a role to both aspects would be located between these poles. Darwin himself was partly

¹¹¹⁷ Cf. e. g.: Peter J. Bowler: *Charles Darwin* (1990), p. 21, *The Non-Darwinian Revolution* (1988), pp. 99-103. (Bowler himself, as already the title of the latter book indicates, prefers to use Lamarckism in the narrow sense.)

¹¹¹⁸ This should not imply that these dimensions in regard of a particular theory were completely independent.

Lamarckian (☉ pp. 110 f.), and neo-Lamarckians came to accept Darwinian concepts. But although strict Lamarckism—in regard to biology—has to be taken as having been largely refuted, an approach which showed that variation is itself adapted and could be more or less blind (without upholding Lamarckian omniscience) would also be in contradiction to strict Darwinism as defined by our above understanding. Furthermore, a theory would differ from strict Darwinism, if it stressed that processes which themselves may be described in a Darwinian way could lead on another level of synergetic wholes, which are less blind.

I shall argue below, that even in the biological stratum—although they are more obvious in the cultural stratum—mechanisms can gain a certain ‘sight’. In this sense none of the radical positions, be it Darwinism or Lamarckism, appears to me to be true. I do not want to deny the role of chance. Blindness and wastefulness play an important role in evolution. (Even authors like Aristotle admitted the existence of chance.¹¹¹⁹) But in a certain sense I dare to argue that even in the field of biology the blindness of processes, can be reduced. This becomes even more apparent with respect to culture. Universal Darwinism is wrong to stress the unchangeability of blindness and wastefulness. I shall propose that it appears possible and appropriate to reinterpret the given evolutionary facts in such a way, that variation is neither omniscient nor necessarily completely blind.

The *second dimension* in figure 11 represents approaches to evolution which understand evolution as an adaptation to an external environment in contrast to those which stress an internal unfolding. In short a contrast between externalism and internalism. The externalism of Darwinism becomes apparent by the very word selection—a selector being normally regarded to be external to the entity which becomes selected. The whole Darwinian stress on adaptation to a certain environment is linked to this externalism (☉ pp. 330 f., 340 f). A. N. Severtsov, who himself was an influential Russian Darwinian, places Darwinism together with Lamarckism on the side of external causes, ectogenesis, and opposes them to autogenesis.¹¹²⁰ Also Mayr contrasts Darwinism with theories advocating changes from intrinsic forces.¹¹²¹ This dimension corresponds to the traditional alternative of whether the evolving entity is regarded as the subject or the object of evolution.¹¹²¹

I have argued above and I shall argue in the further course of this chapter that internal dynamics not only constrains evolution, but that inner dynamics can gain a certain autonomy from external selection (☉ pp. 285 f., 330 f., 384 f.).

In the following sections I shall neither advocate strict Lamarckism nor strict internal developmentalism, but shall oppose the universality and unchangeability of the Darwinian blind, wasteful and

¹¹¹⁹ Aristotle. *Physics*, II, VI, p. 197 b, but see also p. 198 a.

¹¹²⁰ M. B. Adams. *Severtsov and Schmalhausen*. In: E. Mayr, W. Provine. *The Evolutionary Synthesis* (1980), pp. 193 f.

¹¹²¹ Cf.: K. Bayertz. *Autonomie und Biologie* (1993), p. 346. M. Weingarten. *Organismen - Objekte oder Subjekte der Evolution?* (1993).

externally imposed mechanism of evolution. The position I want to contribute to appears to be located somewhere in the middle of the two dimensions shown in figure 11. Although this would be the best approximation for localising my position, it would still misrepresent it, since I argue that the process itself evolves and hence its properties vary along both mentioned dimensions according to the focused evolutionary line. I am even inclined to argue that there may be an overall tendency away from blind externally governed evolution towards seeing internally governed evolution, but this lies beyond the scope of this work. Since actual evolutionary processes will never be ‘omniscient’ there will always be cases where the process itself becomes less seeing. A different interpretation of the understanding of evolution favoured here would stress the full openness of evolution in regard to processes also. This is equally consistent with my argumentation put forward in this work. Here I more generally argue that the Darwinian stress on universality, unchangeable blindness and externality of evolution is misconceived.

Although I am concerned with universal process-Darwinism in general—also at the cultural level—, I confine myself in the following discussion mainly to *biological* Darwinism, which is the paradigm case for Darwinian evolution. Instead of trying to build another protective dike in the cultural sciences against the rising Darwinian flood,¹¹²² I mainly try to tackle this flood at source.

In the remaining sections, it is, of course, not possible to provide a full genealogy of evolutionary processes. Instead the inappropriateness of universal process Darwinism will be shown and some alternative proposals which may contribute towards a more evolutionary theory of evolution are made.

9.3 Towards Radical Evolutionism — the Evolution of Evolutionary Mechanisms

Subsequently I shall show more systematically that, if we apply the above definition of a Darwinian process to existing processes, it becomes doubtful that evolution on all its different explanatory levels could appropriately be described by a Darwinian process alone.¹¹²³

It will be argued that even in the biotic stratum it becomes necessary to accept at least limited evolution of evolutionary mechanisms. Early critics of Darwinism, from scientists to theologians, although wrong in many respects, may have, to some extent, been right in their critical stance toward what Herschel, astronomer and predominant philosopher of science in Darwin’s times, called the “higgledy-piggledy” mechanism of natural selection. A Darwinian process, in the strict sense set out above of course can lead to *some* adaptation. (Logically it is presumably the simplest process which does this.) We have seen that the concept of a simple replicator even entails the concept of a chance process of natural selection. This may be accepted as a starting point, but I argue that evolutionary processes come into play which are less wasteful and externally governed in the same way that I have argued that single genes become organised and unified into more complex systems of organisation,

¹¹²² Described by: D. Dennett. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995), pp. 64 f.

¹¹²³ Cf. generally also the results of section 9.1 on pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism, ☉ pp. 327 f.

which have their own synergetic properties. More complex entities, on some explanatory level, may also involve the existence of more complex and less blind and externally governed evolutionary mechanisms. Although I, of course, do not deny the millions of years of evolution, I agree with the old criticism that if blind-variation-and-external-selection had remained the *exclusive* mechanism of evolution, the velocity of biotic evolution and then, even more so, of cultural evolution could not be properly explained.

Based on our strict non-tautological definition of natural selection, the pointed proposition of G. C. Williams that “the laws of physical science plus natural selection can furnish a complete explanation for any biological phenomenon”¹¹²⁴ will be challenged. Such views, which are also claimed to include the cultural sphere as well (☞ pp. 207 f.), still mirror aspects of a Newtonian-Platonic *Weltanschauung*, although Darwinism has forcefully undermined other aspects of these philosophies. As far as Darwinism is concerned, there still is only one type of process of evolution, natural selection, which is regarded to be externally and eternally given, although physics too has started to stress the unfolding of the universe as well as of its inner forces and laws (☞ also pp. 168 f.). Although drawing strongly upon Darwinism myself, I think the time has come to transcend the Newtonian-Platonic static understanding of process, particularly because its only concern with the very simplest process of evolution one can think of, and to transform our evolutionary theories in a way in which they become coherent with a more truly evolutionary world view.

In the following sections, based on the definition of a Darwinian process above, I start from within the Darwinian paradigm. Firstly the phenomenon of diversification is contrasted with the phenomenon of synthesis. Secondly, blind variation is contrasted with directed variation—at least on certain levels of explanation. Thirdly, the concept of heteroselection, characteristic for Darwinian adaptationism, is contrasted to the phenomena of autoselection, which may lead to a certain amount of autonomy. Finally, Kant’s concept of self-referentiality is discussed as a possible criterion for the autonomy of processes.

a) *Synthesis instead of Pure Diversification of Information — The First Criterion for a Darwinian Process*

A Darwinian process ‘is signified by the diversification or variation of informational lines.’ This is one defining aspect of our strict definition of a Darwinian process, given above. The conceptual core of Darwinism only predicts the diversification of evolutionary lines, not their synthesis. This is associated with the picture of a branching and diversifying evolutionary tree. In order to differentiate strictly between Darwinian aspects of evolution and non-Darwinian ones, we apply this widely accepted aspect of definition in a strict way. This may be considered unusual, because one is usually concerned with finding explanations rather than answering meticulous questions of delineation involved in differentiating different evolutionary paradigms. Another reason for the neglect of this topic is that,

¹¹²⁴ G. C. Williams. *Adaptation and Natural Selection* (1966), pp. 6-7.

perhaps, the beauty of unified pan-Darwinism has rendered a less strict application—leading to fewer problems—more suitable.

In respect to *physical processes* we can exclude some processes from classified as Darwinian due to this aspect of the definition. Planets, for example,—like drops of water (☉ p. 342)— may in fact be said to have a probability curve indicating where the mass concentrations will unify in order to form a larger planet, depending on the general density concentrations of interstellar mass. This physical process resembles a




Fig. 12: Visualisation of the diversification of informational lines, one criterion of a Darwinian process.

Darwinian process in regard to the existence of the necessary variation of the starting points and different 'trials' of unification. Moreover, one may also, perhaps, speak of external conditions for the emergence and further accumulation of mass concentrations. However, this process differs from a Darwinian process particularly in the sense that the 'evolutionary lines' (mass concentrations) do not diverge, but rather converge. Instead of a multiplication of such lines, one could more reasonably speak of a synthesis of different mass concentrations: different concentrations of interstellar mass unite at the place of their gravitational centre. In this respect a process like this is diametrically opposed to a Darwinian process, whose emphasis is on the diversification of evolutionary lines (and elimination of those which are less adapted to a given environment).

Despite the claims of universal Darwinism, *cultural evolution* cannot, I think, in regard to the criterion discussed in this section, be described by exclusively Darwinian processes.

As biological-cultural integral wholes, humans can obviously acquire some experiences and transfer them to other humans. On such a level of explanation, evolution, if including culture, is in part radically Lamarckian, since acquired knowledge could be transferred to offspring, and, of course, also even to unrelated organisms.

But promoters of process-Darwinism (☉ p. 214)—which in its consequences is less radical, compared with gene-Darwinism—do not normally take the perspective of human biological-cultural wholes. They hold that thoughts, theories and cultural habits, what I have called '*logoi*' (☉ p. 60), gain a life on their own, which has to be dealt with separately. According to process-Darwinism these entities are competing with each other and their evolution is to be described by Darwinian processes.

I also support the view that *logoi* have to some extent a life of their own. But, this in my view does not have to entail the belief that the biological-cultural human as a whole does not exist and can not provide proper unit of investigation. The interaction of these two independently existing levels is crucial

for both. Hence, the perspective on the biological-cultural whole of a human is both possible and suitable. But within this perspective one has to acknowledge the strictly Lamarckian aspects of culture. Furthermore, even if one accepted that one always—not only for specific reasonable purposes—has to disentangle biological and cultural levels, cultural knowledge itself is not adequately describable by Darwinian processes alone.¹¹²⁵ Here the criterion for differentiation versus synthesis is focused—whereas other equally problematic criteria, such as the blindness of trials, are left aside. If one traces some units of cultural development, for example concepts or symbols, throughout intellectual history (the daily bread of any historian of thought) it appears that diversification, which obviously plays a vital role, is balanced by the synthesis of different meanings.¹¹²⁶ Especially in a connectionist understanding of the cortical functions of the brain it becomes plausible that representations of different concepts are not independent from each other, but influence each other and even may melt into each other.

Likewise, theories and schools of thought diversify and compete with one another, but they may also influence and improve each other, and may even melt and develop a common synthesis. The most important intellectual triumphs appear to be the syntheses of views which were previously regarded as being opposed to one another—Mendelian genetics and Darwin's original theory provide an example of such a synthesis.¹¹²⁷

Furthermore different cultures are also strongly interwoven. One may, for instance, think of the fact that the occidental philosophical heritage of Greek Antiquity was preserved and partly developed by philosophers of the Arab world.

Hence, it appears to me that on all levels of cultural evolution diversification is complemented by synthesis.

Similarly in *biological evolution* Darwinism has stressed the diversification of evolutionary lines and their differential survival. The only diagram in Darwin's *Origin* illustrates the branching character of the tree of descent, without any synthesis.¹¹²⁸ This concept appears to be valid at least in respect to the level of species. This is almost true by definition, because today species are normally defined by the absence of any interbreeding. However, in 1994 S. Bartl, D. Baltimore and I. Weissman have influentially argued that through viral infection genes appear to be transmitted between what are normally regarded as species.¹¹²⁹ One may also argue that what I have called 'external memory', in a way involves a synthesis of common effects of different organisms (☞ pp. 316 f.).

¹¹²⁵ Cf. generally: D. Holdcroft, H. Lewis. *Memes, Minds and Evolution* (2000).

¹¹²⁶ Even some supporters of Process Darwinism doubt whether cultural evolution could adequately be described as a Darwinian process in its strict sense. E. g.: H. Plotkin. *Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge* (1994), pp. 220 f.

¹¹²⁷ As mentioned earlier, this may not be a good example of a synthesis which has been balanced, since the 'evolutionary synthesis' may in some respects be regarded as a purification of the Darwinian paradigm. Also Darwin's theory itself is in the present work described as a Malthusian synthesis of romantic and Newtonian thought (☞ p. 162).

¹¹²⁸ Ch. Darwin. *Origin of Species* (1859/68), pp. 160-161.

¹¹²⁹ Cf. also: E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley, R. V. Blanden. *Lamarck's Signature* (1998), pp. 168 f. D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/86), pp. 79, 541-542.

But one does not need to trouble oneself with such, perhaps, rather specific or peculiar points, since the obvious process of *biological sexuality* involves the unification of organismic informational lines. It may appear senseless to criticise Darwinism based on a process of which all Darwinians have been aware and which has even been at the very core of the evolutionary synthesis (itself at least largely Darwinian). But generally, it is not impossible to use aspects of a theory against itself. In this way Darwinism incorporated previously-opposed Mendelism. If we take my (non-idiosyncratic) definition of a Darwinian process seriously, it turns out that the synthetic aspect of sexuality is not Darwinian at all. Diversification, opposed to synthesis, is anyhow normally regarded as an essential aspect of Darwinism,¹¹³⁰ but even if this were not the case we set out to find a particularly strict definition of a specifically Darwinian process. Although sexuality also serves the proliferation of varying descendants—being perfectly compatible with Darwinian views—, the synthetic process equally involved here is itself not a predicted or essential part of Darwinism. Dawkins is in my view right about Darwinism in general, when he argues that, fundamentally, “all that we have a right to expect from our theory is a battleground of replicators”.¹¹³¹ If one does more than to pay lip service to the definition above, the replicational and variational aspect of sexuality at once becomes Darwinian and the role of synthesis entangled with these forms of variation is no longer describable as a Darwinian process.

A true entity reductionist would object that biological sexuality is *not* a true synthesis in any case, and hence no truly new mechanism has come into being. Genes—as we have known since Mendel—do *not* blend. In regard to single genetic elements this is correct, they are genotypically not themselves altered in a physical way during sexuality. If one were only to focus on single genes, there would be no true syntheses—although one may object in this case that the genetic context, as we have seen, also changes the interpretation of single genes (cf. *epistasis*). But I have argued previously at detail that in my view it is not adequate to regard single genes only as units of evolution (☞ pp. 258 f.). In a more holistic interpretation organisms that sexually reproduce are biologically a *synthesis* of the different genomes of their parents (and their current environmental conditions). In that synthesis genes have a certain, slightly changed phenotypic expression. (If the new whole did not somewhat influence the interpretation of the parts, the genic features from the mother and the father would not normally fit together.) Only if the synthesis is harmonious enough, will the resulting organism have the chance to reproduce. The variation aspect, the reproduction aspect, and the survival aspect of sexual reproduction are easily linked to Darwinism. But the aspect of synthesis itself, is, as mentioned above, not itself part of a Darwinian process.

The specific aspect of synthesis in sexual reproduction is, if we keep the above strict definition of a Darwinian process in mind, not only thoroughly opposed to a Darwinian process, but may also be linked with non-Darwinian consequences. The trials in sexual reproduction could be said to be less blind than

¹¹³⁰ ☞ pp. 107, 348 f., also footnote 1133.

mutations. Although it is possible that the genes of the parent generation do not harmonise with each other, they are, one may say, pre-selected. In a roughly similar genetic context the genes were tried out during the life of the parents and many other combinations will have been 'tested' before in the population. Although proponents of the evolutionary synthesis may have expressed this fact differently, the apparent differences to mutations, led them to regard recombination as an evolutionary factor in its own right (☉ pp. 132 f., 367 f.). Moreover, the evolutionary line is now broader than one organism, and rather becomes an evolutionary river of one basic population or gene-pool into which all changes are flowing back.²⁵⁶⁶ If combinations of advantageous mutations are a limiting factor and populations are large enough, a population with synthesis (as part of sexuality) will on average find advantageous combinations of mutant genes faster than asexual populations can.¹¹³² Based on synthesis new forms of inner organisation also become possible, for example some mechanisms which I shall later call 'autoselection', which in regard of a system as a whole not necessarily lead to an adaptation to an externally given environment.

If one accepts explanatory levels higher than that of single genes, sexuality does not only involve proliferation but also, in a rather non-Darwinian way, synthesis. This also leads to the situation in which populations are not necessarily closed entities, but on some level of description may also melt their best—or worst—features.

b) Directed Variation rather than Blind Variation — Discussion of the Second Criterion

'The variation of the informational line is completely blind'. This is the next criterion of our strict definition of a Darwinian process. It is a criterion that is largely accepted. A Darwinian process is normally regarded as being composed of the two steps of variation and selection²³⁵⁵, the first of which—which is scrutinised here—is regarded as being completely blind or random.¹¹³³

Campbell has pointed out that the word 'blind' should be preferred to the more usual 'random', because equiprobability is not needed—and is actually often not given. But the criterion of blindness nevertheless requires that variations are produced without prior knowledge of how adaptive they will probably turn out to be. Moreover, their occurrence is assumed to be independent of environmental conditions. No trial should be more likely than another one to be correct, and later trials should not

¹¹³¹ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1989), p. 256.

¹¹³² D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/86), pp. 317 f. (referring partly to J. F. Crow, M. Kimura, 1965).

¹¹³³ D. T. Campbell. *Evolutionary Epistemology* (1994), pp. 421-422; R. Dawkins. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982/89), p. 168; D. Dennett. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995), p. 59; N. Eldredge. *Reinventing Darwin* (1995/96), p. 133; D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/86), pp. 49, 86 (but e. g. 522); E. Mayr. *Evolution and the Diversity of Life* (1978/79), pp. 16-20, 204; J. Monod. *Le hasard et la nécessité* (1970/91), p. 110; K. R. Popper. *Objective Knowledge* (1972/1979), p. 270. But cf. also: M. J. S. Hodge. *Darwin's general biological theorizing* (1983), pp. 57-58.

make use of the direction of the previous ones.¹¹³⁴ Thus Campbell has described a Darwinian process generally as a process of “blind-variation-and-selective-retention”.⁸³¹

To define Darwinism in such a way contrasts Darwinism with more directed and predictable approaches to evolution.¹¹³⁵ It is assumed that variation does not ‘see’ what will be positive for the survival of the entity in question; in this sense Dawkins uses the phrase the ‘blind watchmaker’.¹¹³⁶ If a Darwinian process were to guarantee adaptation, the blindness of variation would require an abundance and wastefulness of trials (☹ e. g. pp. 345 f.).

Universal Darwinism (☹ pp. 203 f.) claims that Darwinian processes are the only relevant evolutionary processes. In its more moderate version of process Darwinism (☹ pp. 214 f.), which accepts cultural entities, this blindness should equally hold for different types of biological variation like, for instance, psychological variation or the variation of theories. In this section I mainly focus on the discussion of variation in the biotic sphere.

I think it is disputable to rest the burden of proof one-sidedly on the view that there is directed variation. Despite my objections to pan-adaptationism (☹ pp. 330 f.), Darwinians (as Lamarckians and other adaptationists) no doubt have shown that adaptation plays an important role in evolution, and it is hence implausible to assume that adaptation plays no role in improving the trials of evolutionary mechanisms themselves.

An often repeated general argument for the implausibility of an unchanged blindness of evolutionary processes has been that the *limited time span* to produce the multitude of different complex organisms. Historically the period of time for evolution was estimated incorrectly as being much shorter as we know it to be today. This point was used to render Darwinism absurd (e. g. Lord Kelvin). None the less, this argument may appear to contain a core of truth, particularly if unchangeable blindness is taken in a strict sense, and likewise if the present estimations of the time of the origin of life are taken as a basis for it.

The following argument follows an early, but in principle still applicable, calculation of G. G. Simpson which has been re-interpreted by some critics of Darwinism as showing the implausibility of a strict blindness of trials. Simpson assumes, strongly simplifying, a general mutation rate of 0.000 01. (Simpson makes some additional assumptions which slightly change the outcome of the calculation but are not important for the line of argument.) The probability for only five simultaneous mutations in five specific genes according to Simpson’s calculations is not larger than 0.000 000 000 000 000 000 000 1. Such an event in 100 million individuals with a generation period of only one day will on average take place every 274 billion years. But according to the present scientific estimations the first organic life arose about 3 or 4 billion years ago. Hence, given the complete unchangeable blindness of this process, it appears very improbable that such an event (in regard of certain specified genes) will have taken place only once in a species of the above parameters.¹¹³⁷

One may object that evolution has found natural ways in which mutations have an enhanced probability of being phenotypically expressed together. The fact that many mutations for a time remain silent if they are part of long undecoded strands of DNA (introns) allows variation to spread by drift also, if the mutations would not be advantageous outside a certain combination (when they would be transcribed). The mutations which have not appeared at the same time, but

¹¹³⁴ D. T. Campbell. *Evolutionary Epistemology* (1994), pp. 421-422. Almost word-for-word the same text: *Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes* (1987/60), p. 91; *Evolutionary Epistemology*, 1974, p. 421. Similarly Dawkins, ☹ footnote 1176.

Campbell, however, considers the possibility of “shortcuts”, which I rather regard as a violation of the strictest understanding of Darwinian process, linked to the concept of the unchangeable blindness of evolution.

¹¹³⁵ See e. g.: P. Bowler. *Darwin*. (1990), pp. 155-156, 160-161.

¹¹³⁶ R. Dawkins. *The Blind Watchmaker* (1986/91), pp. 306 f.

¹¹³⁷ Ch. v. Guttenberg. *Biologie als Weltanschauung* (1967), 1967, p. 42; very similar: R. Nachtwey. *Der Irrweg des Darwinismus* (1959), pp. 79-80.

successively, by a, as we shall see, relatively frequent mutation of switching on a certain piece of genetic code, causally appear together. Moreover, sexuality and recombination in particular leads, as mentioned, to a quicker evolution by combining (earlier tested) mutations from different organisms with one another (☞ e. g.: pp. 327 f.; 354 f., 367 f.).

But such arguments are very close to the point I want to make. Unlike to some authors, I am also looking for 'natural' evolutionary explanations. But if the tempo and mode of evolution has actually changed systematically, enabling a quicker adaptation, I think it may often be possible to reinterpret this as a change in the evolutionary process itself, and also as a change in the production of variation which, perhaps, on some level may suitably be said to have become less blind.

I here dare to challenge the orthodox neo-Darwinian view that evolution was and is unchangeably blind. Since I am not intending to advocate radical biological Lamarckism, this is based on the assumption that there are not just two poles, but a whole spectrum of approaches on the dimension of blindness versus directedness of variation (☞ pp. 348 f.).

The trial aspect of Darwinism has been discussed before in the section on the tautological basis of pan-selectionism (☞ pp. 340 f.). In it I have already elaborated the possibility of developmentally constrained variance (☞ p. 344) and of a lacking abundance of variance. This is also inconsistent with Darwinism, but rather on the other dimension of our definition of our two-dimensional spectrum of Darwinism and non-Darwinism (☞ p. 345, pp. 350 f.). Here we are more concerned with the possibility of adaptively directed variation which has been mentioned as well. I am concerned with a re-interpretation of given evolutionary and genetic mechanisms in a way that some adapted mechanisms, may systematically produce trials with a higher probability of leading to survival. Instead of the fitness of the organism, a certain variation producing mechanism could in my view be fit as well, and enhance the probability of producing varying organisms with comparatively good chances to survive.

Although most examples will be concerned with directed adaptive variation, the aspect of an adaptation to an external environment and the inner dynamics is here particularly difficult to disentangle, because they often go in the same direction. However, we are here concerned with the aspect of blindness and this blindness is in my view by some mechanisms in any case apparently reduced.

Since I am advocating a spectrum of approaches, an alternative to radical Darwinism does not necessarily entail a violation of the Weismann doctrine in the sense required for radical Lamarckism.¹¹³⁸ Nevertheless, I advocate that several evolutionary mechanisms have evolved which on some appropriate levels of explanation render the average trials less blind. Whether this is logically possible is closely linked to our understanding of explanatory levels and particularly of change, newness and induction (☞ pp. 361 f.). I do not challenge any commonly acknowledged empirical 'facts', but only their interpretation in Darwinian evolutionary biology. One may either regard the point I make as a daring interpretative shift or as an almost trivial plausible truth. My re-interpretation of long acknowledged facts is based on the strict definition of Darwinism given above (☞ pp. 348 f.) and the elaborated multi-level account of evolution (☞ pp. 258 f.). It draws strongly from findings from the rapidly developing field of microbiology (☞ generally pp. 147 f.).

¹¹³⁸ Such a dichotomy also often implicitly appears to be assumed by normally highly differentiated writers, from whom I very much draw in more specific respects. E. g.: D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/86), p. 86 (but e. g. 522).

Firstly, it is discussed, whether trials should be regarded as being blind by definition, based on a certain understanding of newness. Secondly, different types of variation are distinguished, like mutation, genetic recombination and specification. This appears to follow from a multi-level account of evolution. Thirdly, we come to the main point in which it is shown that not all variation appears to be equally blind. Some processes producing evolutionary variation seem, themselves, to be adaptations leading to trials which, on average, have a higher fitness than they would have on the basis of pure chance. Although evolution may have started in a purely Darwinian way, it appears not always to have remained strictly blind. Fourthly, some cases will be mentioned where one may, perhaps, additionally speak of a particular kind of adapted variation as a direct response to an environment (without necessitating a violation of the Weismann barrier).

(1.) Not Blind by Definition

It appears possible that biological or cultural knowledge is blind simply by definition, because evolutionary trials explore changed conditions and change might be defined as the totally unknown and something which cannot be seen in advance. This problem has been discussed above under the keyword of the problem of induction (☞ pp. 208 f., also p. 345). Here I am not particularly interested in the direct transfer of information from the outer to the inner, since I do not promote radical Lamarckism. Instead I am concerned with the more original question, of whether knowledge could in principle have any predictive power, since the 'reality' to which knowledge refers—if knowledge is referential at all—may always have changed.


I should also like to shortly examine the first question of a *direct information transfer*. To some extent I share the critical attitude of process-Darwinism towards inductivism as direct information transfer, even on the level of psychology and sociology. As equally held by constructivists and idealists knowledge is in my view at least in some respects based on an elaboration of prior existing (biological, psychological or social) knowledge.

All the same, a radical blindness also in this sense and a radical denial of bottom-up processes appears to be one-sided. Psychologically we are for example apparently able to 'see' things about which we had no particular hypothesis before. (Here seeing could equally be understood literary and figuratively for other ways of perception.) If such phenomena are conceded, obviously bottom-up processes take place, otherwise one would not be able to see, for example, an unexpected candle placed on the table.

A process-Darwinist and any other anti-inductivist, may have two objections against this argument. Firstly, an anti-inductivist may claim that this openness to see an unexpected candle is a result of former (biological and cultural) trial-and-error learning. As a result, it is absurdly claimed that one, in a way, has the permanent hypothesis that candles could be on the table. The ability of sight itself is regarded in the usual simplifying parlance to be a product of natural selection. Sight includes the ability to detect entities of roughly the size, density, wavelength etc. But even if this is conceded, nonetheless, our perceptive capacities have a remarkable openness to see objects, which did not exist earlier in evolutionary history or in our individual biography of learning. We may actually perceive something like a candle, even if we had not encountered a specific candle before (we ourselves and any of our predecessors). This apparent openness to new forms and combinations obviously transcends the earlier experiences we have made. In this sense inductivism seems to be right.

Secondly, an anti-inductivist may object that there are still trial processes—possibly blind trial processes—on lower levels, fluctuations of attention, receptivity of our retina or our neural system. Such aspects, of course, exist, but the question is whether there are synthetic bottom-up aspects as well. On some level of explanation there are apparently bottom-up processes, for instance the causation of a nerve impulse is controlled by the light density on a certain area of the retina.

Moreover, even if this were not so, it has been argued above that nested levels of blind Darwinian processes could be organised in a way which still allow for a broad openness on a higher level of explanation. In this interpretation the whole is not blind even if its parts are. The concept of synergetic properties on higher levels of explanation has previously been discussed in respect to processes, for example, in regard to biological specification (☞ pp. 327 f.). Such an approach would, I think, not correspond to pan-Darwinism, but rather to a process-emergentist viewpoint, which nevertheless largely draws from the concept of processual Darwinian 'atoms'.



Hence, even if it would be correct to evaluate the inductivist aspect of a direct information transfer critically in the two outlined ways, I hope to have shown that the inductivist equally makes a valid point. Hence also in the respect to information transfer, it appears plausible to me that neither inductivism nor non-inductivism are generally valid alone.

The question which I am mainly interested in here, is the more original question of induction, concerned with the possibility of prediction, which is here applied in a biological context. Hume's problem was that 'all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past'. It appears to me that some proponents of universal Darwinism base their claim of a universal blindness of trials on a supposed negative 'solution' to the problem of induction. They argue that prediction, which compared with chance guesses has an enhanced probability of being right, is, strictly speaking, not possible at all.¹¹³⁹ This 'solution' has generally been critically discussed before in this work (☞ pp. 210 f.).

With respect to biology it is often ignored that this problem would not only affect changes in an evolutionary line, like mutations, but also evolutionary stability. Actually any concept of fitness, any survival and identical replication of an organism would be affected by this problem! Argued the other way round, the very survival of organisms and their unchanged replicas proves already a certain stability of the (external) world. It is apparent that replication of formerly advantageous properties often brings an advantage for the future. If this were not the case not only would pan-adaptationism be wrong, but the concept of adaptation would be completely without any foundation. Whether this should be regarded as referring to a probabilistic logic of induction or rather to the factual advantage of such a heuristic, in any case the existence of a minimal stability of the world, which Hume doubted, is supported on these grounds. On the other hand obviously fallibilism was right in stressing that old knowledge could always turn out to be wrong; induction never has, of course, the security of deduction (☞ also pp. 330 f.).

Despite this parallel the question of the possible probabilistic advantageous use of old knowledge in regard to evolutionary *change* is more difficult. One can, I think, in this respect easily commit the fallacy of claiming blindness on tautological grounds only. If change is defined as the unknown and the unpredictable, then it is by definition true that no aspect of change can be predicted and that every trial to reach an understanding of this change is necessarily completely blind. But such a definition does not face what is actually controversial, rather it simply excludes any alternative view from being possible in our semantic framework. The very question is, whether change is actually completely unpredictable and whether old knowledge can help us in facing the changed world by reapplying the old in a changed way. Change, does not necessarily imply unpredictable change. There may be a certain stability in the first derivation of existence (in change) as in existence itself. There can be stability in the change of knowledge itself, which may systematically enhance the probability of a correspondence with the external world (relative to mere chance changes). This could firstly be the case if there are continuities

¹¹³⁹ R. Dawkins. *Universal Darwinism* (1983). ☞ pp. 207 (see also Popper).

in environmental change to which internal change has become adapted. Other possibilities are internal continuities of change, which are particularly advantageous when facing external change, because they do not need a continuous external dimension or direction of change. We may think of building blocks which have turned out to be particularly advantageous in quite different situations. A trial based on such building blocks and containing a higher probability than a chance process of producing a system which fits a changed environment, could not properly be said to be just as blind as chance guesses. On the view expounded here, the question of whether variation is completely blind or not is not a logical, but an empirical one. Are there adaptive continuities in biology and has evolution developed mechanisms which make use of possible internal or external adaptive continuities?

Change still mostly contains an unpredictable component, even more than stability itself does. However, I shall argue in the following sections that evolutionary change does not always mean change to the totally unknown. Trials are never as certain as being completely externally informed or as deductions, but trials are neither blind by definition nor are they actually always blind. We could think of continuities of change, and we may think of changes which have a higher probability of being adaptive than blind chance trials. I shall argue, in a quite Darwinian way, that those evolutionary lines with a higher probability to produce trials which have an enhanced probability to lead to a higher fitness than mere chance trials, have themselves a higher chance of surviving. If one speaks of organisms with an increased probability of surviving, one may also speak of mechanisms which have an increased probability of leading to the survival of an evolutionary line (particularly since I have previously defended a multi-level account of evolution). A certain amount of continuity in the changes of the organism-organism or the organisms-environment interaction, has—as we will see—been shown to be advantageous by evolution. Although a certain degree of blindness always remains, the trials are not equally blind throughout. But this empirical question is the topic of the next sections.

Humean scepticism and the Darwinian concept of blindness are, in my view, right in their fallibilism, which stresses that empirical knowledge, both biologically and culturally, could never reach absolute certainty. But even so I think the metaphysical dichotomy of blindness versus certainty conceals the possible degrees of sight and short-sightedness. Advanced internal model construction, which is still fallible, is not the same as simple blind trial-and-error learning.

In this section I have argued that we cannot judge *a priori* that biological change is always equally blind, but that this has to be investigated empirically.

In the broader cultural context, which as we have seen also seems to have influenced the evolutionary synthesis (⇒ pp. 188 f.), I think H. Putnam is right: “The idea that correct ideas just come from the sky, while the methods for testing them are highly rigid and predetermined, is one of the worst legacies of the Vienna Circle.”¹¹⁴⁰

¹¹⁴⁰ H. Putnam. *The 'Corroboration' of Theories* (1974), p. 238.

(2.) Different Types of Variation

Because Darwinian processes are characterised by the blindness of variation of an informational line, we should take a closer view at the phenomena described as variation, before we come to discuss whether empirically they always appear to be blind.

Here variation means changes in an evolutionary line, and not in what one may call 'stable variation'. Stable variation refers to given unchanged distributions of genes as expressed in the Hardy-Weinberg equation. This does not mean that all continuities of change are excluded because, as set forth above, this resulted in claiming the blindness of trials in a tautological way. Yet stable variations, and not stabilities in change itself, correspond on the population level to an identical replication of genes on the level of genes or individuals and is part of the statics rather than the dynamics of evolution. We are hence concerned with any evolutionary change—opposed to identical reproduction—, which still possibly includes continuities of change itself (preferred dimensions or directions of change).

There are different types of such variation. The most prominent and basic class of evolutionary changes are mutations. There are simple point mutations (mutations of single base pairs), but also more complex mutations like inversions, translocations, frameshift mutations or mutations in which the whole genome is restructured.

I shall argue that some particularly complex mutations may often make systematic use of structures evolved earlier and can often be said to be systematically less blind than mere chance.

Alternatively, genetic cross-over and recombination do not lead to new sequences of base pairs at a certain locus, but only to new combinations of such base pairs. Nevertheless, new combinations also have to be blind to count as being a Darwinian process.

I have already indicated above that I regard these trials as less blind, because they are somewhat pre-selected. Although they lead to new combinations, they are tested beforehand in a similar context. Moreover, mate choice may enhance the probability of certain new combinations, even if the places where cross-overs happen were random. This is discussed in the next section.

If multi-level Darwinism, which is defended above (☞ pp. 258 f., 152 f.), is to be taken seriously, specification also has to be regarded as a factor producing evolutionary variance in its own right.

I have mentioned already that specification may not necessarily be blind. Besides the possibility of adaptive speciation rates, there may be a pre-selection on the level of individuals or sub-populations, so that specification, on the defended level of the species, may well not be totally blind. This has been discussed before (☞ pp. 327 f.) and we will also touch on this topic in the next section.

In a truly multi-level account one may also think of other levels of variation, like the level of groups or the level of ecosystems. But for reasons of simplicity this is not elaborated in the following section.

Tendencies in the process of group formation determine what genetic combinations will actually have newly been tested at the group level. There are presumably mechanisms with which a group is formed at least in 'higher' animals, which may systematically enhance the fitness of the group. If this were the case then variation would not be blind. I have discussed, for example, the very simple mechanism of the influence of a—perhaps partly inherited—average group size on the stability of certain genetic combinations which are advantageous to groups. One may well think of the possibility that the average group size itself is a product of group selection, which leads to a stabilisation of this group structure and favours group

selection (☞ pp. 278 f.). In this case groups would vary in a way which is particularly adaptive for these groups and not blind in the most radical sense.

Independent of the level at which variation takes place, evolutionary change can have different characteristics. We can distinguish, for instance, the average amount of variants, the average difference of the variants in relation to the reproducing entity, and the average specific direction of variation. In a diagram of different evolutionary trees these types of variation can be visualised (☞ fig. 13).

These possible characteristics of variation are actually partly quantified by biological measures. The *amount of variation* of organisms or genes is usually gauged by their general or specific mutation rate as well as by their recombination rates. In regard to species the same is measured by the general speciation rate.¹¹⁴¹ The average *difference of variants* and the *direction of variation* (column two and three) are normally not actually assessed, but they are in principle given by the distribution between how new genotypes or phenotypes differ from the old ones.

Different Amounts of Variation	Different Variations of Variation	Different Directions of Variation
The number n of variants	The standard deviation $\sigma(x)$ of the variants (e. g. severity of mutations)	The different direction of variation, different means $\mu(x)$ of variation

Fig. 13: Simplified visualisation of types of variation of informational lines or their phenotypic expression. (Here we are only concerned with variation in the sense of evolutionary change.) In the diagram only *one* generation of reproductive entities (e. g. complex genes, organisms or species) is shown. The vertical dimension in each diagram is time. The horizontal dimension is something like genetic difference or, differently, distance in the morphospace. Although making some distinctions, naturally, this visualisation still makes simplifying assumptions. In regard to species it could, for example, be disputed if the genotypic variance were to emerge suddenly, which is indicated by the sharp edged corners of the trees. Also the emergence of new lines does not need to take place only when old lines have declined.

With our distinctions between the different types of variation made, the stage is set to discuss whether it is reasonable to regard evolutionary variation as a result of blind chance. Firstly, I discuss whether aspects of the actual variation can be regarded as adaptations rather than as the direct results of blind chance (we are concerned with all three columns). Secondly, I briefly consider, whether some

¹¹⁴¹ Indirectly also the individual birth, death rate and extinction rate play a role here.

variations could possibly be interpreted as occurring systematically even as a particular reaction to certain environmental conditions.

(3.) Is there Adaptive Variation?

There seem to be different classes of cases where one, using a fine grained terminology, wants to speak of particularly adaptive variation. We are interested in variation which is systematically less blind than the production of trials, exclusively based on chance, even if the central dogma of microbiology (in its most constrained sense) is not violated. I distinguish here between two types of *adaptive* variation.

Firstly, in a multi-level account of evolution, which I have supported above (☉ pp. 152 f., 258 f.), there may be interactions between different evolving levels which may render the variance on a certain level less blind. For example in speciation the variance on the species level of newly evolved species, may be directed by the earlier selection process on the level of individuals or sub-populations. Even if the variance at the individual level were completely blind, the species level, which we have argued exists as well, is not necessarily equally blind. One may argue that only blind processes count as true evolutionary processes, but this again makes the claim of blindness a mere tautology. If one accepts many evolutionary levels it may well be that selection processes can be arranged in such a way that blindness is reduced on a certain level of explanation, that may even provide the reason for why a particular multi-level arrangement has turned out to be evolutionarily more stable. Moreover, as argued before, synthetic aspects playing a role on the species level may reduce the blindness (☉ p. 357). Previously I also discussed two sub-classes of interactions between selection processes, multi-level selection and nested selection, which may both lead to an adaptively directed variation (☉ p. 327 f.). However, in both sub-classes adaptive variation relies on a selection process at another level, without itself necessarily being blind. These forms of directed variation are flexible in their response to a certain environment. They do not need, like the next class, to assume a certain stability inherent in the evolutionary change itself.

Secondly, some dimensions or directions of change may be permanently more advantageous than totally blind trials. In this section I argue that internal molecular structures and sometimes macroscopic morphology provides evidence that a repetition of already existing structures was often more advantageous than the production of completely new structures by single steps. There are preferred building blocks, dimensions of change and sometimes, perhaps, even directions of change, themselves partly the result of adaptation. A recycling of old structures, equal to that in the class above, both refers to a previous selection process and to the empirical fact that the use of these *particular continuities* often—but not always—has turned out to be more adaptive than mere chance combinations. If such arguments are admissible, then one can no longer claim blindness in a tautological way (☉ p. 361). I do not, of course, deny that most changes (particularly mutations) are still harmful,¹¹⁴² but I think the building of a

¹¹⁴² D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/86), pp. 69, 76.

complex structure from scratch without ‘recycling’ pre-selected structures would normally require many more harmful steps. In this sense it is reasonable to speak of comparatively less wasteful and more directed trials. Certainly, it is never certain whether a particular dimension or tendency of preferred change will not become disadvantageous, in the same way as that any adaptation may one day turn out to be no longer adaptive. In such a case a tendency may even constrain possible adaptation and in this sense adaptive tendencies—although being for a certain time less blind—will remain short sighted. In any case, the facts from microbiology, as we shall see, indicate that preferred dimensions and directions of change have played a role in evolution and can often be regarded as adaptations. Such tendencies have allowed for an often much quicker evolution than one would otherwise think possible, on the basis of totally blind mutations alone. Opposed to the class of directed adaptations, which were firstly dealt with, here a *stable* fitness increasing dimension or direction of change is needed. This is either due to external continuities or internal building blocks, which are particularly advantageous in many different contexts.

It is not always easy to distinguish between these two classes, because in both cases some sort of pre-selection takes place and because these classes of a more directed variation are in principle applicable to most of the mentioned levels on which evolution can take place.

Speciation, which is described at the species level, may be directed because of a pre-selection at the level of sub-populations (class 1). But one can also think of a regular and itself adapted speciation rate (class 2). It is actually known that different evolutionary lines have different speciation rates,¹¹⁴³ and it is possible—although the object of a vigorous debate—that speciation rates (or even more radically also specification directions) may themselves be the object of adaptation at the species level. One might, for example, explain the actual differences in the production of evolutionary change in generalists or specialists in such terms.¹¹⁴⁴

I now clarify the two possible classes of directed variation in respect to *genetic recombination* of sexual reproduction and crossing-over.

a) Recombination is indeed *largely random* in the sense that alleles at a locus coming from both parents are normally mixed in a purely random way, so that both have an equal 50% probability of being included in a certain sperm or egg cell. This randomness is a key presumption of the Hardy-Weinberg equation, itself pivotal to population genetics. It has also been proposed that the adaptedness of sexual recombination would break down if its randomness were not secured.¹¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless there are actually cases of so-called segregation distortion or meiotic drive which violate this random mixing

¹¹⁴³ E. g. mentioned in: N. Eldredge. *Reinventing Darwin* (1995), p. 120.

¹¹⁴⁴ Instead this is often explained exclusively by E. S. Vrba’s so called ‘effect hypothesis’. *Ibid*, p. 139.

¹¹⁴⁵ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1989, added chapters), pp. 264 f. Although Dawkins presumably also regards this aspect as gene-Darwinian, it appears to me that the benefit of the whole evolutionary line may equally be regarded to be the cause for the existence of the randomness. This refers back to the discussion of the levels of evolution ☞ pp. 258 f.

and are, perhaps, best explained by selfish DNA.¹¹⁴⁶ However, I do not question that, apart from such exceptions, sexual reproduction in this respect is generally largely random.

b) Even so in an important and, I think, often neglected respect, the blindness of recombination is reduced. Here I am referring to the *first class of directed adaptive variation* above. Recombination only recombines genes which have previously existed at the same gene locus and survived. More radically mutations create new base pair sequences at a given locus. However, recombination, as argued above, is a kind of trial in combining genes. Interaction effects of new combinations are tested, which might have never been tested before. At least on the level of what I have called 'higher-level genes' (☉ pp. 262 f.) new genes are formed. Such trials still involve the risk that some gene combinations may prevent the building of a coherent organism. Nonetheless these trials only use material which has been tested before on another level. Thereby the risk involved in the new trials is reduced. Although recombination is limited in its range of which combinations could be achieved, recombination within this range is less blind than mutation. The positive results of the more daring mutations which took place in different single organisms using this less risky method are combined. In this sense, I think it would be wrong to neglect that the process of recombination, on the level of the whole evolutionary line, reduces the blindness of evolution (☉ also p. 357).

c) Similarly in respect to *the other class of possible directed adaptive variation*, recombination seems not always to be necessarily blind.¹¹⁴⁷ Moreover, the strength at which the two groups of alleles are mixed, i. e. how many crossovers take place, is not random. There is a finite number of crossovers that take place, and there is a specific average number for each species (such 'arm-chair' arguments could be as conclusive as expensive laboratory work). Of course, it would be possible that this specific number of crossovers strongly varies inner-specifically and that its average is constant in all species. This is implausible, because the number of crossovers is a function of many properties of the reproductive system. Actually there are rates for different species as regards how many inter-allelic recombinations take place (recombination rate). Also any two specific gene loci have a recombination rate or recombination frequency indicating how many crossovers will usually take place between them¹¹⁴⁸.

Moreover, there is no reason why an inherited specific number of cross-overs should not itself sometimes be the result of adaptations (sometimes it may, certainly, only be the result of drift or constraints etc.). If there is an inherited rate, it appears plausible that this rate is itself an object of adaptation. The recombination rate may either be due to differences in the distribution of genes on their chromosomal basis or to different probabilities of recombination at certain points. Both could be based on adaptation. The simple distance of genetic loci is definitely at least one determining factor in their

¹¹⁴⁶ R. Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene* (1989), pp. 235-37. *The Extended Phenotype* (1981/89), pp. 133 f.

¹¹⁴⁷ I am not concerned with sexual selection here, also leading to an enhanced probability of certain combinations, possibly even of adaptive ones.

recombination frequency. A large part of the genome are introns, which do not become decoded.¹¹⁴⁹ The length of an intron, whether evolved for this reason or for a different reason (being an adaptation or an exaptation¹⁰⁵⁷), may give an advantage to adaptive distances. Advantageous distances causing advantageous phenotypic recombination frequencies will enhance the probability of an evolutionary line to survive. But the direct modification of a specific recombination frequency of two loci has also experimentally been shown. Chinnici has shown that the rate of crossovers of two gene loci pairs in *Drosophila melanogaster* (as far as I know, without changes to the introns) can become selected.¹¹⁵⁰ Another phenomenon which supports an adapted (not blind) aspect of recombination is, for example, that crossovers are suppressed if an inversion took place where crossover would only lead to gametes with almost no probability of surviving¹¹⁵¹.

In the following, I shall mainly focus on particularly controversial question, whether it is plausible to speak of less blind variation in regard to *mutations* as well. Here it will not always be clear which particular level of evolution is involved. In regard to mutations one may make the distinction between the two classes of adaptive variation made above, but it is more suitable to structure the discussion along different lines.

It will, firstly, be shown that the production of new patterns out of repeated genetic and microbiological patterns is more effective than production based on single chance mutations. Such microscopical repetitions will be shown to be found abundantly in surprisingly different parts of the body. Although this may partly refer to constrained evolution, such repetitions have apparently enabled very complex adaptations, which otherwise would not have been possible. A certain blindness remains, however, as it appears not only possible, but even necessary to distinguish between different degrees of blindness and of changed velocity of evolution.

Secondly, I shall discuss reduced blindness based on preferred macroscopic dimensions of change or on the repetition of morphological structures (compared with mere chance structures). The advantage of such preferred macroscopic dimensions of change may either lie in the (external) relevance of a particular dimension of change over a long period of time or in the (internal) advantage of certain macroscopic building blocks, like repeated segments (compared, as in the case of the above repetitions, to chance building blocks).

If these two points can be shown, it would follow that even if one accepts the central dogma of microbiology (in a restricted sense) it is nevertheless still necessary, also in regard of mutations, to distinguish between different degrees of blindness or sight.

¹¹⁴⁸ E. g.: D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/86), p. 59.

¹¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 55, 57.

¹¹⁵⁰ J. P. Chinnici. *Modification of recombination frequency in Drosophila* (1971).

¹¹⁵¹ D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/86), p. 71.

1. *The adaptive role of genetic continuities in evolutionary change.* Some internal continuities of change may be said to be themselves adaptive. I discuss mutation rates at specific loci, the general interpretation of any mutation in terms of the genetic code, the overwhelming role of iterations in adaptive sequences and the role of transposable elements. These phenomena, I argue, strongly suggest that evolutionary trials could reasonably be said to be not always totally blind.

*Mutation rates*¹¹⁵² of genetic loci may also enhance the fitness of an evolutionary line. For certain point mutations a low rate may cause less harm. A higher rate may be advantageous if the phenotypic dimension controlled by this gene has played an important changing role in evolution. A relatively high mutation rate—also in the sense of a predetermined break point—may cause larger mutations (transpositions, duplications etc.). The role of resulting repetitions is discussed below (☞ pp. 371 f.).

A precondition for regarding mutations as being adaptive is that mutation rates are inherited and can themselves be modified. Advances in genetics have shown that mutation rates do not simply fall from the sky, but are at least partly caused by the inherited and modifiable structure of the reproductive system. There are also systematic causes which can change the mutation rates of certain types of mutations, like specific chemicals or other genes (mutator genes). Mutator genes, playing a role in regulating replication, may for instance enhance the probability of a certain direction of base pair mutations in the whole organism.¹¹⁵³ The mutation rate of single loci can also be modified by transposable elements, as elaborated further down (☞ pp. 373 f.).

If there are predispositions to certain mutations, provoked by genes or chemicals, and if there are certain trials, which are systematically more advantageous than others (as I argue below), then it is plausible to assume that those rates become inherited more often. If a species or a certain gene of a species has a particular average number of variants (column one of figure 13), or an average amount of change (column two), those species will flourish which produce such variations. Then mutations, like other evolutionary processes should (partly) be understood as having an enhanced fitness. Without advocating pan-adaptationism, the process of evolution itself, as I have emphasised in this work, is also object to evolution as well as partly object to adaptation.

Before discussing the phenomenon of repetition, I briefly want to treat the general and seemingly trivial phenomenon of the *genetic code*. Even if the mutation rate in question is not internally advantageous or externally adaptive, the genetic code, I think, already renders any mutation less blind than one would otherwise conceive.

At the lowest level of this code, only the four base pairs, the four letter alphabet of the nucleotides, is used. Theoretically, one may well think of mutations which do not use this code. But actually the code is universal (neglecting some minor differences in the code of mitochondria) and, likewise, mutations are

¹¹⁵² E. g. see: R. Fahrig (ed.). *Mutationsforschung und genetische Toxikologie* (1993).

¹¹⁵³ Cf.: D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/86), p. 83.

almost always expressed in this code. More deviant changes do seldom take place and are largely excluded by repair mechanisms. One may argue that this inner dynamic is constraining evolution and preventing the evolution of a fundamentally new code. This would also be problematic to universal Darwinism. However, the nucleotide code is widely regarded as having particularly positive properties for information transfer. Hence the exclusion of other trials from the outset can, at least partly, be interpreted in an equally problematic way for Darwinism as for adaptive directedness and the reduction of evolutionary blindness.

The next level of the genetic code organises the four letters into three-letter syllables: triplets. These so-called codons are the blueprints for the basic amino acids. There are $4^3 = 64$ possible triplets. But not all combinatorial variations are used. The calculation already presumes a unified left winding of these amino acids. Moreover, these 64 variations are actually only interpreted in 20 different ways; the code is redundant. There are only 20 amino acids used as the basic building blocks for the protein synthesis. Hence the space for possible mutations is already drastically reduced—or one may say directed—, since any genetic code for protein synthesis is interpreted in terms of these 20 amino acids.¹¹⁵⁴ A mutation which hence only again leads to one of these amino acid—only at another locus—, in any case produces a building block of high usefulness and internal compatibility; this mutation has an enhanced chance of being adaptive or non lethal compared to a hypothetical production of another completely random molecule. In so-called frame shift mutations, where the pattern of how the triplets are decoded is radically shifted, at least still amino acids are produced¹¹⁵⁵. Although mutations that only change the used amino acid may still well be harmful and, on the level of the metabolism, may lead to relatively new molecules, such directed and constrained mutation will generally be more adaptive than a trial based on chance only.

The genetic code itself appears to repeat structures which have generally turned out to be advantageous building blocks (and to some extent may also have constrained evolution). In this sense mutations which are almost all expressed and interpreted in terms of the genetic code can for this reason already be regarded as being somewhat less blind and wasteful than, theoretically, one may conceive.

We now come to the role of more complex *repetitions* in the genetic code and the microbiological structure. The duplication of complex genes is apparently a central aspect of evolution, based on inherited mechanisms and linked to different mutation rates, mutator genes, the organisation of the genome and movable elements (☉ below). The existence of repetitions within and between different complex structures appears to support the view that a ‘recycling’ of old complex tested structures could more easily lead to complex adaptive structures than a process which builds such structures by blind single steps.

¹¹⁵⁴ The redundancy of the code also leads to the fact that many mutations are ‘silent’ with no direct effect on the phenotype.

I think it is wrong to ignore the common phenomenon of a duplication of genes and the largely identical repetitive sequences as an evolutionary factor; they appear to be indispensable for most complex adaptations. Especially in eukaryotic 'higher' organisms can many repetitive sequences be found, whereas almost none are found in the genome of viruses and prokaryotes, which were long the main objects of genetic research. Sequences of single copies only still build 90 % of the genome of the lower eukaryotes, like fungi, but only 20 % of the DNA of some plants and amphibia. In higher organisms, generally the repetition of existing complex genes, and not only point mutations, appear to be a highly important phenomenon.¹¹⁵⁶

A part of these repetitive sequences however, seems to be counter-adaptive at the level of the individual, the group or the species. A class of such repetitive sequences indeed appears best explained in the sense of selfish DNA (☹ below). But, as we shall see, complex repetitions also play a role in almost any complex adaptive structure. The two cases can not always be strictly distinguished. Selfish DNA may, as a side effect, produce an adaptive sort of variation (this mechanism would be an exaptation). This will then be less counter-selected at the level of the organism, group or species and may be regarded as an adaptation on these corresponding levels. In such cases the border between selfish and adaptive repetitions is blurred. There also seems to be different types of repetitive DNA; highly repetitive DNA, for example, is often not transcribed¹¹⁵⁷. I do not promote the idea that all cases of repetitions are adaptive, but think it is enough to show that without repetitions the complex adaptations which have been achieved would not have taken place in the given time. In this sense, I argue that inclinations to a certain kind of repetitions may have made evolution less blind.

Repetition is found in many functionally important sequences of the genome. In the coding sequences (exons), for example, the regulation for a starting point of a transcription is regularly controlled by the same repeated code.¹¹⁵⁸ Also many, if not most structural genes, which code the proteins of eukaryotes, are members of *families of gene-complexes*¹¹⁵⁹, whose members have a similar structure. Even gene-complexes with many thousands of members are found to be very homogeneous in their nucleotide sequence.¹¹⁶⁰ There are, for example, over ten nucleotide sequences which are very similar to the overall sequence of haemoglobin. Moreover, the haemoglobin protein of human adults itself consists of the repetition of *two* α and *two* β polypeptides ($\alpha_2\beta_2$). But besides the repetition of each polypeptide α and β , α and β also strongly resemble each other in their exons and in their groupings of exons. It is actually assumed that the different haemoglobin chains of vertebrates have evolved through gene-duplication

¹¹⁵⁵ Cf.: D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/86), p. 75.

¹¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 57, 74 f., 85, 512 f. When I am quoting Futuyma in this section I mainly refer to the facts provided by his profound textbook. My interpretation seems to me to be suggested by these facts, but Futuyma himself in a more guarded way does not—at least not explicitly—give the interpretation I am promoting here.

¹¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 57.

¹¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p. 55.

¹¹⁵⁹ I here use the term 'gene complex' to indicate the difference to single genes, as defined by gene-atomists. Gene complexes are longer strands of DNA, which may code a whole long polypeptide (☹ pp. 259 f.).

from much simpler structures. Also many so-called pseudo genes, which do not become expressed phenotypically, have this structure.¹¹⁶¹ If reactivated, they may have a higher—although still low—probability of being adaptive than a random nucleotide sequence of the same length. It actually appears that both the repetition of large genetic sequences as well as an repetitive internal structure are quite general evolutionary phenomena, which appear to be crucial for many adaptive structures.¹¹⁶²

Repetitive and only slightly differing structures, interrupted by long introns, can also lead to what is called 'exon-shuffling'.¹¹⁶³ Such a 'recombination' of codons presumably leads with a higher probability to a protein which works better than other mutational changes. The long introns may lower the probability of cutting through an exon.

The duplication of existing complex genes appears to be more advantageous for the building of new structures than building them in single chance trials only. Single steps, do of course also play a role in the divergence of these duplicated genes,¹¹⁶⁴ but it appears that evolution has shown that the use of formerly tested building blocks in another context can often lead to quicker adaptation than the production of each newly used building block completely from scratch. In this sense building blocks which have turned out to be advantageous may, systematically, have survived better, and hence more often became used in further trials. In this—of course limited sense—such trials are less blind than trials based on untested building blocks.

Transposable genetic elements play a role in the production of duplicated repetitive DNA and gene-families. Other causes for repetitive DNA are adaptive points of fracture, mutator genes and the general structure of the reproductive system. Transposable genetic elements appear to be a general characteristic of eukaryotes.¹¹⁶⁵

There are two types of transposable elements, one type of which is replicated only if integrated in the genome (transposons) and another type of which whose replication is not bound to the replication of the nuclear DNA at all (episomes).

Transposons seem to have a characteristic sequence-structure at their endings and in some species build 10 % of their DNA. Some transposons code RNA which by reverse transcription is introduced as a new copy into the DNA. It appears that the fidelity of transposons is regulated by general factors and by specific other genes. There seem to be different probabilities for an insertion at different regions of the chromosome.¹¹⁶⁶

Both types of transposable elements seem to play a role in the reverse transcription of DNA sequences. In the human genome the so-called Alu-group produced by reverse transcription has over 500 000

¹¹⁶⁰ D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/86), pp. 57-58, 526 f., 535.

¹¹⁶¹ *Ibid*, pp. 58, 79, 509, 513, 514.

¹¹⁶² Cf.: *Ibid*, pp. 530, 537.

¹¹⁶³ *Ibid*, pp. 76 f., 538.

¹¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 537.

¹¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 57, 78 f., 516 f.

¹¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 518.

copies. A relevant part of the mammalian genome seems to be based on reverse transcription. Transposable elements could particularly lead to mutations by inserting regulatory stop and start signals.¹¹⁶⁷

Some transposable elements multiply genes with apparently adaptive phenotypic effects. In bacteria particularly genes for resistance against medicaments and for the metabolism of new substrates are often found in episomes and transposons.

But there are also many transposable elements where the adaptive function is not, at least not directly, apparent, because they mainly carry the information to reduplicate themselves. Here Dawkins' concept of selfish DNA seems to be appropriate.¹¹⁶⁸ Such selfish genes may flood the genome with sequences which are not useful to the organism as a whole.

Nevertheless, here also one has to consider that such a proliferation will sometimes lead to exaptations. The abundantly copied structure may still be more similar to a possibly adaptive structure than to a mere chance base sequence, because the sequence is at least coding something and only relatively small changes may be necessary to change the sequence in order to code something useful. Moreover, such genes may reactivate or deactivate genes and seem to play a role in causing the inversion and deletion of genes. Although most mutations are lethal, an increased overall rate of certain mutations may also be positive for an evolutionary line. An effect started as selfish DNA can become an adaptation. Alternatively, if the effects of selfish genes are too radically counter-adaptive at the level of the organism (or group or species) they will have a higher probability of either facing counter-selection within an evolutionary line or of dying with the whole line which they had subverted. It is actually known that selection can regulate the number and the sort of transposable elements. For instance, selection may favour transposons or episomes which produce genes that transcribe rRNA, to be found some hundred times in the genome¹¹⁶⁹.

The similarities of the above mentioned families of gene complexes become even more remarkable, since these similarities are not even always due to their common origin. The central role of repetitions, independent of this point, is remarkable on its own, since the recycling of used *complex* structures in my view has to be interpreted to be less blind than the totally blind production of single trials. However, members of gene-families which evolved based on duplication long ago, often additionally show the obvious effects of parallel evolution, a phenomenon called '*concerted evolution*'. For example, a certain genetic change which is not observed in apes at all, is found in all 400 copies of a certain human gene family, whose members are also mostly found in apes. Either this parallel mutation arose in all 400 cases incidentally and became fixed—something that is quite implausible—, or one mutation was transferred to other mutations in a more systematic way. Concerted evolution appears to propose that

¹¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 79, 81, 512, 518.

¹¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 519; ☞ footnote 1146.

¹¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 522 f.

members of a family of gene-complexes do not evolve totally independently from each other.¹¹⁷⁰ There are different hypotheses about how this may become explained. Transposable elements may play a role here as well. In any case concerted evolution points to a relatively organised way of changing different sequences of the genome. It appears plausible that there are adaptive mechanisms which secure the compatibility of different processes and codes, i. e. which lead to trials which are in this sense less blind. More research on the phenomenon of concerted evolution is required.

Not only in respect to gene-complexes but also in respect to complete parts of chromosomes, chromosomes as wholes and sets of chromosomes repetition seems to be crucial for evolution.

We have already seen that close species are often only distinguished by restructured karyotypes created by reciprocal or non-reciprocal translocation of parts of chromosomes (\ominus p. 268). Duplication of single chromosomes and also general polyploidy appear to be important evolutionary factors. Here the trials are, in a way, less blind—although such mutations are also often lethal. The mutation can often directly lead to enhanced robustness and organisms of a larger size. But, perhaps more important, such organisms, if they survive, have a pool of identical genes which work, and which then through a few small (blind) modifications can adopt new differentiated complex functions. The evolutionary line again becomes diploid. A process like this is known, for instance, in the fish family *salmonidae*.¹¹⁷¹ A process which would have evolved new complex functions from scratch through many little mutational steps, would have taken much longer. In this sense I think it would also be wrong to call this recycling of existing complex structures as equally unchangeable, blind and wasteful as an evolution of such structures by single point mutations (although these point mutations certainly here have their role as well).

In conclusion it appears plausible to assume that in regard to change there seem to be certain internally advantageous continuities. The ubiquitous ‘recycling’ of complex adaptive structures at least in ‘higher’ organisms seems to show that repetitions and recombinations of apparently generally useful building blocks produce new complex adaptive structures more easily than single chance steps. If blindness is understood as strictly as possible, it is reasonable, even based only on the present evidence, to assume, that there are degrees of blindness and sight. I think that, based on the current evidence, it is plainly wrong to claim that it is decided that evolution is unchangeably blind. It appears plausible, and is clearly possible on the basis of present genetic knowledge, that mutation rates, building blocks and mechanisms like transferable DNA are themselves at least partly adapted to produce trials which on average have an increased fitness, compared with totally blind trials.

¹¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 526-535.

¹¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, pp. 69 f, also 74, 512, 514-516.

2. *The adaptive role of microbiological continuities in evolutionary change.* The role of a macroscopic advantage of preferred dimensions of change or of repetitions is a more specific topic than that of genetic continuities, since macroscopic continuities are somehow based on genetic ones, whether directly or mediated by developmental mechanisms. A continuity, for example, of adaptive building blocks, as we have seen, can sometimes also be advantageous, without an apparent macroscopic continuity, if based on the usefulness of such building blocks in quite different structures. However, here we are concerned with properties which show continuities in a more direct relation to an environment (in the sense of all columns of figure 13).

One may even think of adaptive directions of change² (third column), as being based on a trend in the changing environment. But are there trends in the changing environment? One possibility would be the permanent change in a certain environmental variable, another an arms race in a predator pray relation, where the same evolutionary direction may be permanently advantageous for each species. A further possibility for adaptive trends could be given even if the relevant aspect of the environment is stable and if many steps in only one direction are adaptive for a long time. Such trends do not in any case last forever. Nevertheless, if they last long enough it appears, based on the above microbiological grounds, reasonable to assume that an adaptively biased production of variation evolves. Although there is, of course, never a complete guarantee for the future, such trials are adapted, as static characteristics are also adaptive only a certain period of time. But if trials are adaptive they are less blind.

In any case, not only evolutionary trends with a certain direction (third column) could give rise to less blind mutations, but also only the evolution of a preferred dimension of change with many different trials in all directions would violate the assumption of strict blindness (first and second column).

If there are externally given preferred dimensions, or even directions, of change there is no reason why corresponding inner tendencies should not become inherited as adaptations, particularly if we think of the mutation genes and mechanisms mentioned above as causing genetic duplication and concerted evolution. If a dimension of change has played a role over long periods of time it appears probable that those organisms in particular have survived which produce more variation on one such adaptive dimension than on another one. It is not difficult to think of *examples* in which such a general view appears to shed light upon empirical facts.

Firstly, physical height or size have often been important dimensions of adaptation in the evolution of many species, independently of whether it is adaptive to be of large or of little size. The view expound here would predict that variation rates (also the mutation rates) regarding this dimension are higher than on the average (at least for organisms which are known to have evolved most of the above microbiological mechanisms).

Secondly, one may predict a high mutation rate, for example, of the colour of fur of those prey species, which conceal themselves from beasts of prey and which have lived in changing environments, favouring different colours. The *muridae* in its different species may be an example for such an animal.

In evolutionary time spans presumably the different colours of fur were advantageous for evolutionary lines of this class. Mouse species today are active at different times of the day and in very different surroundings. The fur of the *muridae* is black, grey, brown, reddish brown, or in some species even bright yellowish. It is known that mouse species have a relatively high mutation rate in the colour of their fur.¹¹⁷²

Thirdly, there appears to be a phenomenon of *evolutionary integration*, when changes of certain phenotypic properties are (statistically) linked. The biologist R. Riedl has argued that many traits do not appear to vary independently from each other, because then many more non-adaptive mutations would actually occur. There seems to be a regulatory system which leads to the fact that, for example, the length of legs more often vary together than alone.¹¹⁷³ Although this is proposed within the framework of the evolutionary synthesis, this, I think, to some extent refers to the concept of correlation of parts, which historically was promoted earlier rather by romantic biology (⇒ pp. 98 f.). Independent of how such regulation is genetically and developmentally realised, the question is whether it leads to variation which is pre-adapted. If this is given, as it apparently seems, the strict definition of blindness should in my opinion be taken seriously, which would entail that such phenomena are in contradiction to the assumption of complete blindness of variation. Even if, say, the genetic regulation for legs were simply based on one genetic locus, the variation at the phenotypical level would not be a maximally blind. Another possibility how such a mechanism may be realised, is the coupling of genes based on either a close location on the same chromosome or on genetically concerted evolution, which is treated above. In any case, if the occurrence of non-adaptive variations is probabilistically reduced, then it is false to assume an unchangeable blindness of evolution.

Fourthly, we may think of a typical phenomenon, in which explicit morphological repetition is central—a phenomenon which is also particularly pondered on by romantic biology. Goethe claimed that the parts of plants, could be understood as the transformations of one underlying structure, that of an ‘ideal leaf’.¹¹⁷⁴ I have argued above that genetic repetition should be regarded as an evolutionary factor in its own right, which has often reduced the blindness of variation. Closer scrutiny of developmental logic and self-iterative mathematical structures may show that Goethe was not totally wrong in stressing the role of macroscopic repetition in its own right (although he apparently took his claim too far). Although totally new changes caused by point mutations obviously play a role in evolution, I think research should be much more concerned with the role of repetition as a developmental and evolutionary factor. (Phenotypic repetition is even found in such basic phenomena as the structural units of the body, the cells.)

¹¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 83 (referring to Dobzhansky, 1970).

¹¹⁷³ Cf.: *Ibid.*, p. 497.

¹¹⁷⁴ J. W. Goethe. *Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen* (1790).

In regard to macroscopic structures, here I here only mention the one example of body segmentation, which is particularly well exemplified in the taxon of *articulata*, and especially in the *annelids* (worm-like animals) and the *arthropods* (e. g. the millipedes), but can also be found in humans. Could a totally undirected variation really be said to lead to such immense receptions of highly structured modules? Although matters are presumably more complicated, than I suggest here, as a rule of thumb, in species with a high segmentation, all other things left equal, there will be more mutants which vary in regard to the number of segments, than in species with no or few segments.

It is not *a priori* evident that there is really a simple link between genetic and morphological repetition. But actually, the phenomenon of segmentation is known to be linked to the phenomenon of genetic repetition, shown above as itself being possibly adaptive. The correspondence of phenotypic segmentation and repetitive genetic sequences support the hypothesis of the central importance of repetition of whole gene complexes (and only their later specialisation) for macroscopic morphological properties as well.¹¹⁷⁵

A last example in which the role of a preferred dimension of change may have played a role, is the phylogenetic increase in volume and in the microstructure of the human brain. The acceleration of evolution in this adaptation has often been regarded as a problem for strict Darwinism and might *partially* have been made possible by an increased probability of variation in these dimensions.

If there are any systematically preferred adaptive dimensions of change, as actually suggested by empirical evidence and theoretical plausibility, this would violate the assumption of the total blindness of trials. This is independent of the question of how such mechanisms are genetically and developmentally realised. But the repetition of complex morphological structures is sometimes linked to the repetition of complex genetic structures, as was shown in the last section, and is often based on mechanisms which themselves appear to be inherited and the object of adaptation. The production of complex morphological structures out of adapted building blocks, appears to be easier than simple production out of chance elements. Although naturally a degree of blindness always remains to be given, certain dimensions of variation which have turned out to be particularly adaptive may have accelerated evolution and reduced its blindness. The more radical claim, that there are not only adaptive dimensions, but also adaptive directions, can not be supported explicitly here. This represents an open question, which may soon become resolved by evidence from the growing field of genetics. In respect of adaptive dimensions of change I hope to have provided some evidence which supports the view of a less radically blind evolution. Also here genetics should, in principle, soon provide us with more rigid investigations. Based on present evidence, however, I think, it appears reasonable to assume that there are preferred dimensions of biological variation which are partly adaptations and hence less blind. Given this, it is

¹¹⁷⁵ D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/86), p. 491 f.

plainly false to assume that evolutionary variation has, systematically, never a “bias towards bodily improvement”¹¹⁷⁶.

(4.) Adaptive Variation as Reaction to the Environment?

It might even be possible to go one step further: some aspects of variation may be regarded as an active reaction of the biological entity to certain environmental conditions. In this sub-section I focus mainly on the level of organismic variation.

If there are adaptive dimensions of change or adaptive mutation rates, then there is, in principle, no reason why there should not also be cases of environmentally triggered adaptive types of variation. Although this presupposes a slightly more complicated mechanism, one does not need to assume direct instruction by the environment, but simply a process of triggering a dimension of variation or certain mutation rate which has become adapted. More research has to be done on the correlation of mutation rates, about which we know increasingly more, with certain environmental situations. Here only a few possible examples, mostly of unspecified reactions of variation rates to environmental situations, will be discussed. We consider, whether apparent systematic changes in organismic variation in response to environmental change, might be interpreted as a systematically advantageous strategy for an evolutionary line that is used to better get out of an adaptive valley.

(a) It is commonly acknowledged that, when “stressed, most organisms quickly stop reproducing, conserving energy and waiting for better times.”¹¹⁷⁷ This is a quite common phenomenon which is also found in humans (lecturers, for example, may be acquainted with passion killers such as stress).

Such influences on the reproductive activity do not directly influence the percentage of mutants in a population. Nevertheless, an adaptively reduced number of offspring may still be regarded as a less blind way of producing variation. Here only indirectly is the number of variants (column one in figure 13) affected, not the breadth of the variation. At least in respect to the abundance of trials (offspring) it is worth noting that this is not totally blind.

I have to concede that this example does not strictly fulfil the criterion which I defined as evolutionary variation at the outset of this treatment of evolutionary blindness. Nevertheless this phenomenon appears to suit in my interpretation of evolution as a process with changing blindness; therefore I mention it here. The following two examples b and c more strictly fulfil the outlined understanding of evolutionary variation.

Another passion killer for human beings is, for instance, depression. In this example the influence of cultural values on the reproductive system is apparent. Missing contentment could also influence activities necessary to sustain one’s own survival, like eating and concentration etc.

Even something like what Freud called ‘*Thanatos*’ may play a role here. This assumes that the self destructive tendencies of an individual, which are at odds with the values of his or her group, have an advantage at the group level. I am aware that this might have some similarities to Wynne-Edwards’

¹¹⁷⁶ R. Dawkins. *The Blind Watchmaker* (1986/91), p. 307. (☞ footnote 1134.)

conception of group selection, a theory which is still widely in disrepute. Nevertheless, we have seen that the gene-Darwinian denial of any properties which are good for the group went to far. It has also been shown that there are different more refined models in which traits advantageous to groups do not have to be undermined by subversion from within (not even always requiring permanent group selection, ☞ 278 f.). Hence in the light of such models, also some phenomena discussed by Wynne-Edwards may become rehabilitated, and shown to, in fact, be referring to the good of the group.

Mechanisms that cause self-destruction or reduced reproductive activity may possibly not be adaptive at all, but the mere side effects of the exhaustion of an organism. But actually most opponents of group selection also interpret this partly as adaptation but now on the individual or gene level. I also think that, independently of the question of the evolutionary level, this behaviour, at least in part, seems to be an adaptation. In this case, the number of variants produced (column one) seems to be changed as an adapted reaction to the environment. This is normally acknowledged, but not taken to point to a fundamental aspect of evolution. I think one should stress it as an aspect of the general possibility of reduction of evolutionary blindness that offspring, in higher organisms, are not blindly born into an unknown future, but with respect to their probable chances of survival. In this limited sense of affecting the number of offspring, variation is not totally blind, but is itself tuned in an adapted way (☞ but see small print above).

(b) It is known that the rate of incidence of cancer is higher when the immune system is running at a low level. From psycho-immunology we know that problems of the immune system are often caused by general frustration or stress in the organism. The normal interpretation of this phenomenon is that full functioning of the immune system simply cannot be kept up if the organism is stressed.

An alternative explanation would—somewhat cynically—consider the possible adaptedness of the mutations themselves, at least for the evolutionary line as a whole. It may be plausible that an increased mutation rate in those evolutionary lines where organisms are stressed is advantageous. It could be assumed that the generally increased probability of mutations occurring also enhances the probability of mutations in the germ line. If organisms, which are stressed over long periods, develop an especially high number of mutant offspring, this would ensure that organisms or populations in a disadvantageous situation have an increased probability of finding a way out of a maladaptive valley.

(c) Sexual selection, in a way also produces variation that may be adaptively directed. This directedness may even react to very particular changes in the environment. At least in human beings it is plausible to assume that in the complex cognitive processes of human partner choice, aspects may be involved which react to the needs given in a changed environment. Human partner choice also seems to be linked generally to changing cultural values. These values may, apart from a certain autonomy of

¹¹⁷⁷ This is commonly acknowledged. N. Eldredge. *Reinventing Darwin* (1995), p. 187.

culture, also partly lead to a flexible adaptive response to a changed environment—as well as in respect of biological reproduction (☺ on the concept of autoselection, pp. 384 f., 398 f.).

In respect to the above examples I have to concede that they are partly in danger of being just-so stories and may actually rather refer to side-effects than to adaptations. Although I think it is reasonable to apply the idea of adaptation to the evolutionary process itself, which has been strangely separated by Darwinians, I do not want to commit the criticised fallacies of promoting an unqualified pan-adaptationism. Moreover, although the examples appear to me to make sense, only a more concrete empirical foundation for such claims render these views secure. Here only a certain plausibility of such views should be pointed out. Furthermore, I have not argued in favour of a even more radical position, claiming the direct chemical control of particular directions of mutations. Although also such a position may in principle have some plausibility, particular of one thinks of the known phenomena of reverse transcription, mutator genes and chemical catalysts of mutations, it may well be given that such a more complex mechanism has never evolved. Actually, Ted Steele, as mentioned earlier, has defended such a more radical view. In any case, such a more extreme position, as we have seen, is not necessarily required for a concept of adaptive variation as a reaction to the environment.

These more daring concepts have not been so clearly supported as, for example, the concept of simple adaptive dimensions of change, discussed in the last section. But based on a multi-level account and a strict understanding of blindness, it at least appears not implausible, that, following my general interpretation, there is also adaptive variation in a particular response to the environment (without assuming a violation of the Weismann doctrine). In this sense variation may even directly react to the changing 'needs' of an evolutionary line.

(5.) Summary and Conclusion

It has been shown that it is reasonable to regard biological variation rates (e. g. mutation rate, recombination rate, and speciation rate) as not being totally blind in every case, but in being partly themselves adaptations. Such a view gains plausibility if one takes into consideration that these rates can be shown to be somehow inherited. Even at the level of mutation rates there are certain chemicals, genes and extra-chromosomal episomes which appear to catalyse mutations in a systematic way. It seems reasonable to regard some aspects of variation itself as meta-adaptations. In such cases adaptations are not a given state of an organism, but an enhanced probability to mutate along a certain evolutionary dimension.

Firstly, we were concerned with the possibility of claiming the blindness of trials in a tautological way. If change in an evolutionary line is defined as being that which is not known in advance, then by definition every trial is blind. Aiming at a strict definition of Darwinism I have had to abandon this tautological definition, which would otherwise build a impregnable bastion of Darwinism, build on merely terminological grounds. I rather regard the blindness of evolutionary lines as a topic for empirical research. Although trials are concerned with change, there may be continuities in that change, which may be used for mere adaptive strategies. If in particular those lines survive which produce trials which are more adaptive, then the evolved direction of trials could itself be regarded as being adapted, i. e. not blind. It is hence inappropriate to argue tautologically that all change is blind. Likewise in regard to change there may be continuities, so that the old may help to explore the new. In the

subsequent sections, I argued that there actually are, for instance, adaptive dimensions of change, adaptive mutation rates and an adaptive linkage of genes.

Secondly, I distinguished between different levels, in which evolutionary variation, in a multi-level account of evolution, is appropriately regarded as taking place. Different descriptive aspects of variation have also been disentangled.

Thirdly, in a longer treatment, I gave support to the view that variation is not always and not on all explanatory levels equally blind. I have distinguished between two types of adaptive variation. There is a flexible type of adaptive variation, which in a multi-level account of evolution is based on pre-selection at another level. Although the composing processes are blind, the relevant fact is that the trials at the level of the whole are not equally blind. The other type of adapted variation requires an enduring importance of a certain dimension of change over a long period of time. I have clarified these two types of adaptive variation for the level of species and for genetic recombination.

The most problematic topic is the possible directedness of mutations. Here I did not structure the discussion along the lines of the above distinction, but firstly treated genetic and microscopic continuities and secondly macroscopic, mainly morphological, continuities.

In respect to the genetic level I have discussed the genetic basis of mutation rates, the role of episomes, concerted evolution and repetition. I can here only mention some aspects of this discussion. Mutation rates are shown to be inherited and also genetically changed. They appear to be the basis for adaptive dimensions of change. Another important point is that the genome of higher organisms shows an enormous number of repetitive sequences—also in most coded adaptive structures. This suggests the interpretation that the repetition of previously tested complex genetic structures builds the basis of most complex adaptations. Genetic repetitions do not necessarily imply macroscopic repetitions, instead they could also contribute similar building blocks to quite different macroscopic structures. These building blocks seem to have turned out to have a generally higher probability of producing advantageous mutations than plain chance mutations. Without denying the role of blind point mutations, it appears that without the duplication of complex sequences, evolution would not have been able to design complex structures in the time given. There seem to be particular mechanisms that enhance the probability of the duplication of whole gene-complexes. Transposable elements also seem to figure in causing these phenomena. The apparent repetitive use of adapted building blocks, and other phenomena which have been discussed, clearly speak in favour of the concept of directed variation.¹¹⁷⁸ Despite the constraining aspect of resulting directions, the strong amount of repetition in complex structures seems at least partly to point also to an adaptive directedness, for example, of a repeated use of such advantageous building blocks.

¹¹⁷⁸ Critics of Darwinism have always pointed out that trials are more directed, either in an adaptive or in a constraining sense. Cf. e. g.: Ch. v. Guttenberg. *Biologie als Weltanschauung* (1967), p. 43.

More briefly, I discussed possible macroscopical and morphological continuities. There may be preferred dimensions of change or even certain directions of change. It appears plausible to assume that some dimensions of change over long periods of time were important for evolutionary lines. If many steps are needed for a certain adaptation or if there is a permanent external trend, then even a certain adaptive *directedness* of trials is thinkable (I have, however, focused on the less daring claim of adapted *dimensions*). Likewise morphologically, repetition, I argue, appears to play an adaptive role. Another class of macroscopic adaptively directed variation that I mentioned appears to be an adaptive coupledness of genes, which can systematically lead to a reduced number of blind trials.

Finally, I have argued that these adaptive aspects of variation may even be regulated more particularly in direct response to a situation in the evolutionary line.

In conclusion, without favouring a strictly Lamarckian kind of evolutionary mechanism in biology, variation does not necessarily seem to be always equally blind in its strictest sense. Variation even on the level of mutations appears itself to be adapted, but be it only in the sense of a preferred dimension of mutations. If this is given, the strictly interpreted assumption of a Darwinian blindness of evolution is violated. Likewise, if variation is not totally blind, but could to a certain extent itself be adapted, the other extreme, proposed earlier by the mutationists¹¹⁷⁹, that mutations are very well informed and almost omniscient, is also false.¹¹⁸⁰ The variation step of evolution seems to be neither strictly Darwinian nor strictly mutationistic. It is neither totally blind, nor omniscient, but located somewhere in between on the dimension I have outlined above (☞ pp. 350 f.). A precise value in how far variation is adaptive, can not generally be given. The adaptedness, for example, of mutation rates depend on the specific evolutionary line and the specific locus under discussion.

A Darwinian might object that he or she regards this position as still being predominantly Darwinian. I indeed have not criticised universal adaptationism in this section, but have done earlier on (☞ pp. 330 f.). I have shown here that it is wrong to regard the process of variation as being unchangeably blind, and to artificially exclude it from becoming adapted itself. Variations, for example, in respect to preferred dimensions, could also be adapted. In this sense Darwinism, if thoroughly applied, undermines its own basis. Measured against the vast number of variants that are theoretically possible (a more than astronomical number¹¹⁸¹), many actual mutations, according to my strict interpretation, appear to be less blind and rather directed. The degree of their sight differs, as the wastefulness of evolution appears to differ as well. The dogma of an unchangeable blindness, if based

¹¹⁷⁹ The term is alluding to a school of biologists at the turn from the 19th to the 20th century, who saw (directed) mutation (mutation pressure) as the main driving force of evolution, opposed to natural selection. Proponents were H. de Vries (who still accepted natural selection), W. Bateson and T. H. Morgan.

¹¹⁸⁰ See: R. Dawkins. *The blind Watchmaker* (1986/91), p. 308.

¹¹⁸¹ D. Dennett (referring back to Dawkins, Quine and J. L. Borges) has nicely illustrated the hugeness of such a number in his section on the 'Library of Mendel'. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea*. pp. 107 f. (The number is even much bigger since Dennett does not consider the code argument, given above, ☞ pp. 370 f.)

on a differentiated understanding of blindness and sight, can in my opinion not be sustained. Hence it appears that a Darwinian process in regard of the criterion of blindness, has been transcended by evolution. Evolution evolves and in this respect too has not remained unchanged from the amoebae to Einstein.

c) *From Hetero-Selection to Auto-Selection — Discussion of the Third Criterion*

The last criterion for our strict definition of a Darwinian process (☉ p. 348) is concerned with the second step in the process. This could either, be positively called 'selection in the narrow sense' or, negatively, 'elimination'. In our definition we have mentioned two aspects of how this step should be specified: selection is (1.) external and (2.) an opportunistic response to the moment. Subsequently, I summarise the justification for why an externality in the second step of a Darwinian process should be assumed. Following this, I discuss the aspect of the opportunistic response to the moment. Finally, I come back to criticise the concept of externality and introduce the concept of autoselection.

(1.) **Darwinian Externalism**

The characterisation of Darwinism as externalism has been justified earlier in this work and was part of my strict definition of Darwinism. I had the intention of formulating a strict definition in order to reveal an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms which is possibly concealed by often imprecise usage of the term 'Darwinism'. The afore mentioned characterisation has arisen naturally from my historical treatment of Darwinism, out of the need to contrast Darwinism with alternative approaches and out of the discussion of a mere tautological understanding of pan-adaptationism.

Historically, Darwin took over the passive Newtonian understanding of matter (☉ pp. 168 f.). Like matter on which an external force impinges, organisms, according to Darwin, are "not *actively* adapting, but are adapted by the *external* force of natural selection". Organisms, like planets, have an inertial tendency, and—without any force acting on them—they would tend to reproduce similar organisms. Their transformation is only brought into existence by the force of natural selection, which (like gravity) acts externally upon the them.¹¹⁸²

For example, Lewontin has argued that for "Darwin, the external world, the environment, acting on the organism was the cause of the form of organisms", whereas organisms themselves are the "passive objects moulded by the external force of natural selection".¹¹⁸³

Darwin devised his theory to explain organismic adaptations to changes in the environment in natural ways. Darwin inherited this interest in adaptation from Paley. Although Darwinism, of course, can today, not simply be equated with Darwin's theory (☉ pp. 107 f., 110 f.), this assumption is still part of the core of this paradigm. The concept of an exogenous force moulding evolution is also found in

¹¹⁸² D. J. Depew, B. Weber. *Darwinism Evolving* (1995), pp. 9, 89.

process-Darwinism and not only in respect to biological processes, but also in respect to other levels as well; this has also been a main object of criticism.¹¹⁸⁴ However, Darwinism has always understood evolution mainly as an adaptation of the body to an environment, or, more generally, an adaptation of the internal to the external.

Thereby Darwinism contrasts itself with other evolutionary theories, which have rather emphasised internal direction and internal constraints. Generally Darwinism, in arguing that evolution is “brought about solely in response to local environmental pressures”¹¹⁸⁵, is opposed to approaches which promote an inherent tendency towards perfection, a *Bildungstrieb* or an internal autonomy of processes.

One may object, that not only did Darwin formulate the theory of natural selection, but that of *sexual selection* as well. Sexual selection, however, can, likewise, be regarded as stressing an active aspect of the evolutionary line itself.

But Darwin in his middle period, his most ‘Darwinian’ period, focused predominantly on natural selection. The title of the *Origin* is significantly ‘The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection’ and even in other editions of this main work there are only few paragraphs on sexual selection. Hence, why should sexual selection be regarded as being more at the core of Darwin’s theory than the evolution of acquired characters, which he also mentions in about the same length?

Moreover, Darwin in his middle period only believed in the existence of single organisms. But if there were no larger units of explanation, then sexual selection is also exogenous simply in respect to each organism. Only in a multi-level account, which I have also supported in this work, may sexual selection be said to transcend Darwinian externalism.

Proponents of the evolutionary synthesis in its second phase, as we have seen, have partly accepted higher explanatory levels, but as also mentioned, sexual selection was also met with disapproval by important advocates of the synthesis.¹¹⁸⁶

Gene-atomists again have rehabilitated sexual selection, but have not regarded it as an emergent new mechanism but, rather, a phenomenon reducible to (external) gene-selection (☞ pp. 143 f.).

I think Rensch summed up the spirit of Darwinism excellently: “All known evolutionary rules can be explained by mutation and selection. The assumption of autonomous creative principles or driving forces is inappropriate. Only alterations to environmental factors are decisive for the formation of new species and higher categories.”¹¹⁸⁷

Furthermore, if selection were to be defined differently as being external *or* internal, then the claim would lose any meaning. If, for example, internal tendencies and needs determining the course of evolution, were called Darwinian, then simply everything would be called a selection process and the second step of a Darwinian process would itself become a completely vacuous claim. In the earlier section on pan-adaptationism I elaborated in detail upon the fallacy of making Darwinian claims in a tautological way, something which also redefines internal tendencies as being adaptations. If any internal direction giving force is called adaptive then simply any process can be called adaptive, since the survival of the survivor is a true but an empty tautology (☞ pp. 330 f.). Similarly, as discussed in the section on tautological aspects of pan-selectionism, the second step in a Darwinian process becomes vacuous (and also does not necessarily lead to adaptation in any meaningful sense) if simply any cause

¹¹⁸³ R. C. Lewontin. *Gene, organism, environment* (1983), pp. 273, 275; ☞ also footnote 1110.

¹¹⁸⁴ For example, in respect to economics: E. L. Khalil. *Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism* (1992), pp. 35-36. G. Soros. *Die kapitalistische Bedrohung* (1997), p. 26.

¹¹⁸⁵ P. Bowler. *Darwin* (1990), pp. 155, also 156, 161.

¹¹⁸⁶ S. J. Frankel. *The Eclipse of Sexual Selection Theory* (1994), ☞ also p. 136.

of survival is meant. I do not dispute that there are causes in general for an entity 'to be or not to be' (☉ pp. 340 f., particularly pp. 346 f.).

We come back to a critical evaluation of Darwinian externalism, after the concept of momentaneous opportunism, the other defining aspect in the selective step of a Darwinian process, has briefly been expounded and discussed.

(2.) Opportunistic Response to the Moment?

As I am aiming at a strict definition of a Darwinian process in order to achieve the conceptual resolution necessary to distinguish different evolutionary processes, another criterion for the discussed selection step of a Darwinian process becomes evident. In Darwinism, the term 'selection'—despite its almost theological connotations—points to a process of differential survival, which is, as Mayr states, a totally "opportunistic response to the moment"¹¹⁸⁸. If we were not to demand this criterion for Darwinian selection, then it would also be possible to call any forward-looking, foresighted selection process, even a provident external selection undertaken by God, Darwinian. Darwinians have always stressed that the present and local environment alone is relevant to selection. Hence, it is appropriate, to require of a proper Darwinian process that its second selection step be such an opportunistic response to the moment and that it be taken without any foresight. (This is somewhat similar to the concept of the blindness of *variation* which I dealt with earlier, ☉ pp. 358 f.).

This criterion is normally accepted and is even fundamental to the ideological message which Darwinism conveys. But if taken seriously and applied without double standards, I think, it becomes apparent, that not all selection processes actually fulfil this criterion. This, however, would be in contradiction to the claim of a general validity of universal Darwinism (☉ pp. 203 f., 324 f., 340 f.). This can only be sketched here.

For example, artificial selection by human breeders is not necessarily Darwinian in this strict sense. Breeders may, for example, select cattle for breeding because they are resistant to a certain virus, which has not yet become epidemic. Selection, of course, happens at the very moment it happens, but in this example the selector uses his or her knowledge in order to anticipate selection pressures which might occur in the future.

A similar line of argument appears to be applicable to biological 'selectors' (even to what in the next section should be called their 'autoselection'). Here I give an example concerning involuntary abortions which seem to occur during the human gestation period. From 100 fertilised egg cells only about one fifth survives until birth. About 70 % of these abortions are involuntary, while 30 % are deliberate.¹¹⁸⁹

¹¹⁸⁷ B. Rensch. *Historical Development of the Present Synthetic Neo-Darwinism in Germany* (1980), p. 298; here quoting an article of himself from 1943, p. 52.

¹¹⁸⁸ E. Mayr. *One Long Argument* (1991), p. 44. *Evolution und die Vielfalt des Lebens* (1978/79), p. 204.

¹¹⁸⁹ These statistical numbers relate to Germany, but they, I think, should, in principle, roughly be similar for other countries as well. H. Rauh. *Frühe Kindheit*. p. 137. In: R. Oerter, L. Montada. *Entwicklungspsychologie* (1987).

Of course, perhaps, all involuntary abortions might simply be regarded as accidents. But partly, at least, they appear to be explainable as adaptations. In the long run, those organisms or species, which in the case of a developmental monstrosity or of a breakdown of large parts of the embryo's metabolism, develop a mechanism of an *early* natural abortion will save resources and have advantages in survival. Actually 55 % of aborted embryos die very early and are even unrecognised by their mothers in the first weeks of pregnancy. In terms of evolution it would be plausible—particularly if starting from a Darwinian viewpoint—that, if there is apparently no chance for survival in the long run, involuntarily abortions may take place as adaptations (and, perhaps, also constrain evolution). How fine such a process could be and how well tuned it is is disputable, but there is in principle no reason why the existence of such a mechanism should be denied. Given the existence of *some* mechanism like this, selection can no longer be seen as totally an 'opportunistic response to the moment'¹¹⁸⁸. According to our definition it is, hence, not strictly and purely Darwinian. Based on an adaptive process of its own, an internal selection process may on the whole render evolution a little less wasteful and even somehow more directed.¹¹⁹⁰ This can be regarded as another type of example for the tendency of Darwinism to undermine and transcend itself.

(3.) Autoselection and Autonomy

In the last but one section (☞ p. 384) the externality of selection has once more been justified as being a defining criterion of the second, selectional, step in a Darwinian process. This has been based on historical as well as on systematic considerations. In the present section, it is shown that the criterion is not always fulfilled by existing evolutionary processes. In respect to it the universality of Darwinism, as sometimes assumed, is also shown to be wrong. It is also in this regard that the evolutionary processes themselves appear to evolve. Given a concession to an evolutionary multi-level account, which I elaborated upon previously (☞ pp. 240 f.), the necessity in acknowledging—in an of course limited way—that the evolutionary mechanism itself even changes in the biological stratum will be shown. In this sense evolutionary processes that have evolved themselves are not always Darwinian in the strictest sense of the word.

Particularly the number of deliberate abortions will vary, but also the number of involuntary abortions may well differ due to differences in health systems, environmental factors and their genetic basis.

¹¹⁹⁰ There are many other empirical facts which may be interpreted in this way. We may, for example, think of a combination of group selection and, what I called, systemic individual selection, in which a once installed system which may internally stabilise a property whose loss could result in the extinction of the whole group. Systemic individual selection was discussed in a detailed way, earlier on (☞ pp. 278 f.).

Even the gene-atomist view, with its metaphors of almost conscious genes, not only proves to be a most radical form of Darwinism, but also once more to undermine its own approach. It has become commonplace to emphasise the investment of genes (e. g. of parents) into their future. E. g.: R. Dawkins. *Parental investment, mate desertion and a fallacy* (1976), p. 132. In my opinion these phenomena should rather be interpreted in the sense developed here and in the subsequent section. The active internal process of autoselection may replace the passive Darwinian concept of heteroselection, and may include an foresightful pre-selection which is itself an adaptation.

The criterion for the externality of selection adequately contrasts Darwinism with certain classes of *alternative schools of thought* (☉ pp. 350 f.), which have actually often criticised this aspect. As mentioned, Darwinism was historically opposed to earlier evolutionary theories, which stressed the role of internal form. This concept was cardinal both to early essentialist conceptions in biology, which denied evolution (☉ pp. 98), and to romantic biology (☉ pp. 102), that stressed an inner evolutionary unfolding of form.

Later on, these research traditions partly continued to exist as relatively unimportant heterodox schools of thought. Likewise, the evolutionary synthesis had and has difficulties in integrating in particular the disciplines of morphology, developmental biology and palaeontology into a common, mainly Darwinian, framework.¹¹⁹¹ In these disciplines these heterodox schools still have a certain hold, which is presumably partly due to the disciplines' demand that a focus be placed on the internal logic of forms.

However, in contrast to the radicalisation of Darwinism, the role of internal constraints and internal direction have recently once more become a topic of increased interest (☉ pp. 145 f., 334 f.). Critics of ultra-Darwinism have partly even favoured a full paradigm shift to a more morphological or developmental biology, as, for instance, advocated by the biologist Goodwin. Likewise the school of so-called *critical evolutionary biology* (Senkenberg Museum), for example, focuses on the internal process of reconstructing body plans by determining invariant necessities.¹¹⁹² Theories of *self-organisation* (*autopoiesis*) too, which are based on system theory and the complexity revolution, stress the complex *internally* governed organisation of change. But many critics of pure Darwinism do not favour a full paradigm shift, but, for instance, like Gould, only stress the incompleteness of current Darwinian evolutionary theory. The critical stance towards strict Darwinian externalism and the support of a more active role for the internal in an evolutionary process of construction, is not necessarily restricted to the above mentioned disciplines, but may today, for instance, also be found in microbiology (☉ pp. 147 f., cf. also pp. 369 f.). Moreover, there are phenomena at the core of Darwinian evolutionary biology, which reveal the necessity of accepting the relevance of internal dynamics in evolution (☉ pp. 285 f., 398 f. and below).

Even authors who clearly regard themselves as Darwinians sometimes seem to accept such internal tendencies which are here treated as the hallmarks of theories opposed to Darwinism. For instance, the (perhaps rather existentialistic) Darwinist Monod stresses that to a certain extent the organism itself chooses its selection pressure.¹¹⁹³

Even phenomena pivotal to sociobiology, which are often interpreted as evidence for militant gene-Darwinism, could in this respect be interpreted as undermining Darwinism. The concept of investment, crucial to the theories of kin selection and reciprocal altruism, presumes a self-selection on the level of related or co-operating organisms, which takes probabilities of future happenings into account (☉ also footnote 1190 and pp. 361 f.).

Before discussing particular cases myself, I discuss this phenomenon of internal selection in general and introduce a clearer terminology.

¹¹⁹¹ Cf.: E. Mayr, W. Provine. *The Evolutionary Synthesis* (1980).

¹¹⁹² This school seeks invariants not in pure morphology, but rather in bio-mechanical terms. Cf.: M. Weingarten. *Organismen - Objekte oder Subjekte der Evolution?* (1993), p. 280; ☉ footnote 609.

As concluded above, Darwinism in its strict sense requires the selection step in a Darwinian process to be external. In order to make this requirement more transparent and explicit here I use the term 'heteroselection'. This term is in a way a pleonasm, since selection in any case appears to refer to an external selector. Moreover, it has been shown, that alternatively if one were to understand selection as *any* cause relevant for the survival of a certain evolutionary line, then selection in an empty tautological sense would always be given, since it is an apparent truth and not a particularly Darwinian assumption to suggest that there are, of course, always reasons why survivors survive (☉ pp. 346 f.). Such a largely empty claim, would entail that selection became understood in such a broad sense that it is not required to lead to adaptation to an external environment at all, since internal trends would also be redefined as processes of selection (☉ also pp. 330). Nevertheless, selection is actually sometimes used in such a tautological way. This is the reason why I explicitly use the term 'heteroselection' here.

To refer to internal, rather non-Darwinian, causes of survival which do not necessarily lead to adaptation, I use the corresponding opposite term 'autoselection'.¹¹⁹⁴ If one uses 'selection' in its restricted and proper sense, it is a *contradictio in adiecto*. But since 'heteroselection' is used here in this proper meaning, the term 'selection' is set free to mean in fact merely any cause of survival. 'Autoselection' should in this sense refer to any *internal*—not necessarily externally adaptive—cause of preferred survival of an evolutionary line. In autoselective processes the entity in question is itself, in a rather non-Darwinian way, a main cause of the direction of its own evolution. The term 'selection' within 'autoselection', if restricted to the second step in a Darwinian process, is also still conceptually linked to the Darwinian aspect of the variation of evolutionary lines. The concept of variation, however, has been dealt with previously (☉ pp. 354 f., 358 f.).

But why introduce the term 'heteroselection' at all, if one can use Darwin's original term 'natural selection' instead? The notion heteroselection, as introduced here, is not, at least not directly, synonymous with natural selection. Heteroselection is a more general notion since it can be directly applied to very different ontological levels, not only to biological ones, but also to other levels accepted at least by process-Darwinism. To take an example from the history of ideas, historically, 'Darwin's dangerous idea' had a difficult start. Presumably this was partly due to the external counter-selection represented by certain theological convictions of that time. (The clash between Huxley and Bishop Wilberforce has become the icon of the conflict between Darwinism and theology³⁴¹.) It is inappropriate to call such a process '*natural* selection', since the selecting force in this example is not meant in any direct sense to be nature, but rather other ideas. Since the selector may still be exogenous one can still speak of heteroselection.

None the less, heteroselection and natural selection are closely linked and not only in the sense that natural selection is a specific type of heteroselection. If one assumes that only processes of

¹¹⁹³ J. Monod. *Le hasard et la nécessité* (1970/91), pp. 27, 115-116.

heteroselection are involved at different levels, it appears plausible that heteroselection—indirectly and possibly with a time lag—is ultimately only a mediation of natural selection. In opposition to this, the approach I favour in this work, can be seen as regarding heteroselection as not always referring ultimately to natural selection, since, for example, on the level of culture many relatively autonomous processes of autoselection take place, so that cultural heteroselection may not necessarily only mediate natural selection but also autonomous tendencies of culture. However, process-Darwinism, which does not accept autoselection in general, has, I think, to claim that heteroselection ultimately refers to natural selection. In this view there is no true autonomy; biological external nature remains the only ultimate selector. As we have seen, in this understanding, cultural entities, like words, concepts or theories, finally only serve the biological survival of the entity in question. Heteroselection and natural selection finally coincide, and in this respect process-Darwinism becomes identical to biologicistic Darwinism. Indeed, it only differs from it in assuming the existence of mediation processes. In such a view it is in fact justified to conclude that “no species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history”¹¹⁹⁵.

I now come to the treatment of particular mechanisms which may be interpreted as autoselection, without, of course, thereby intending to deny or neglect processes of heteroselection. In respect to the cultural stratum, I only, without discussing them in detail, briefly mention cases in which autoselection seems to be involved, I then turn to examples of biological autoselection, which have partly been discussed at depth in this work before. Biological processes are scrutinised more closely, since their existence appears to be more controversial.

To a great extent human beings appear to be ‘selected’ by the cultural world they themselves have created. Human survival is in general not only determined by the changing climate (even this is influenced by humans), but also, for instance, by a system of values, morals and laws. These created values also appear to have a certain, I think partly positive, autonomy. They somehow ‘reproduce’ themselves without referring to an advantage in biological nature. These norms, for example, to some extent help the weak and vulnerable, and sometimes also those who help them (but cf. also ☉ pp. 48 f.).

Similarly theories, even if we regard them as a problem, may to a certain extent select themselves. This becomes apparent, for example, when we look at Lakatos’ concept of theoretic protective belts (something that we have come across repeatedly in this work).

In respect to economic processes, previously I pointed to some structural similarities among the thinking of certain economic schools of thought and Darwinism. E. L. Khalil, who has pointed to many

¹¹⁹⁴ On possible ways to disentangling internal and external causes even in respect of morphology, ☉ p. 334.

¹¹⁹⁵ E. O. Wilson. *On Human Nature* (1995/1978), p. 2.

similarities between neo-Darwinian biology and neo-classical economics, particularly criticises the concept of an externally given selector likewise found in neo-classical economics.¹¹⁹⁶

According to Khalil, neo-classical economics idealises consumer preferences as an ultimate selector. Consumer satisfaction was wrongly assumed to be the externally given gauge of economic efficiency. Actually, however, consumers do not have perfect knowledge and may even have, for instance, a certain 'irrational' loyalty to firms. Additionally, firms are not simply externally selected in regard to how far they satisfy consumers' needs and interests, but may themselves have the power to shape the preferences of consumers and even possibly to manipulate their knowledge.¹¹⁹⁷

Equally evolutionary biology has, in my view, to acknowledge that selection (here broadly meant as the causes of survival) are not always external in a Darwinian way. (Cf. generally, ☉ pp. 333 f., p. 346.) Alternative internal autoselective processes can generally lead to two results.

Firstly, autoselection may reduce blindness in the evolution of an evolutionary line and in a way may even accelerate the adaptive process. This resembles the possible reduction of blindness of variation, as elaborated above (☉ pp. 366 f.). Likewise, autoselection may itself be adapted to accelerate the adaptive process and may eliminate the variation of organisms with particularly small prospects very early on. Some microbiological examples have been discussed which can, presumably, be subsumed under this interpretation. An example of this is provided by the genetic repair mechanisms that prevent mutations not expressed in the established genetic code from taking place (☉ p. 370). Here mutations using different molecules to the usual ones in the genetic code, are eliminated in advance. Thereby mutations which on average have very little chance of producing an improvement that would be compatible with the metabolism of the organism would be eliminated. Similarly sexual selection can accelerate the process of natural selection, by pre-selecting, for example, those which are perhaps particularly brave hunters (☉ pp. 285 f.). Although here the direction of evolution may largely remain the same, its wastefulness and blindness is reduced. Despite referring to adaptation, the interpretation that the mediation of autoselection may reduce the blindness of an adaptive process is, I think, still rather non-Darwinian.

Secondly, autoselection always contains the possibility of autonomy. Since the evolutionary entity in question becomes one of its own causes, it may also internally turn evolution in a direction, that, if judged in relation to the external environment, is not advantageous. From this external viewpoint, self-determination may sometimes appear as a constraint on adaptation to an external environment. Autoselective processes may often have evolved as blindness reducing adaptations in the sense illustrated above, but because of the self-referentiality involved, they may have acquired a certain autonomy. If internal criteria were to come to dominate, by chance or through some other means, then simply those entities would survive which best fulfil these internal criteria. In this case the causes for

¹¹⁹⁶ This has generally been criticised, for example, by Boulding and Th. Veblen. H. Driefenbacher, U. Ratsch. *Verelendung durch Naturzerstörung* (1992), p. 241.

¹¹⁹⁷ E. L. Khalil. *Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism* (1992), pp. 35, 50-52.

selection are partly *sui generis*. In this sense autocatalytic circular causation¹¹⁹⁸ and *autopoiesis*, opposed to passive adaptation to an external environment, should be acknowledged as playing a relevant role in evolution.

Throughout this work phenomena have been dealt with, which may be interpreted as autoselective processes.

At the level of *individual morphology and genetic mechanisms* autoselection is generally discussed under the keywords of internal constraints and direction. Starting from amidst the Darwinian paradigm, terminologically, these internal constraints and directions may also refer to certain variational processes, which I dealt with earlier on. I have already shown that—despite difficulties—it is generally possible and even necessary to distinguish between the internal and external causes of a trait, particularly if one wants to speak of adaptations to external environments in a reasonable way (☉ pp. 334 f.). Although I did not work out the differences between the variational and autoselective causes of constraints,¹¹⁹⁹ I am not going to repeat my argumentation here, because it has become apparent that both causes can be involved and that the given argumentation is equally applicable to either case.

Autoselection in a similar way may play a role but not in respect to microbiological and genetic mechanisms (which we may distinguish from macroscopical morphological constraints). In this section I have already mentioned the repair mechanism that selects those mutations which are not expressed in the genetic code. Although this case is most appropriately regarded as an adaptation, as it has been treated above, such genetic autoselective processes can also lead to constraints on the direction of evolution (as seen from the viewpoint of an adaptationist) or to an autonomous tendency of evolution. The exclusion mechanisms and autoselective repair mechanisms might, perhaps, have prevented the evolution of a much more adaptive evolutionary code (☉ also pp. 370 f.).

Systemic individual selection provides an example of autoselection at group level (☉ pp. 285 f.). In the detailed treatment of this case it has become apparent that many cases of heteroselection at the level of individuals or of single genes may compose a system, which has new systemic properties. The system they compose may possibly have the additional property of stabilising a certain distribution of properties or a certain internal trend. This distribution or trend need not result in an adaptation for an environment external to the system as a whole. Based on the internal self-referentiality of selection processes as a whole, the system is autoselective, and, for good or bad, may have a certain autonomy in relation to external selection pressures.

The most obvious class of such autoselective systems of individual selection is *sexual selection* (above I gave different examples, and this interpretation can, perhaps, also be applied to evolutionarily stable strategies). Sexual selection, as has been mentioned before, does not necessarily have to be

¹¹⁹⁸ An excellent treatment on the importance of such processes in nature is, for example, given by: E. Jantsch. *Die Selbstorganisation des Universums* (1979/88), pp. 255 f.

regarded as autoselection. On the contrary, surprisingly Darwinians have often failed to acknowledge the autoselective aspect of sexual selection or have not been concerned with sexual selection at all (☞ p. 385, small print). If one only regards individual organisms as being real it is actually consistent to also conclude that sexual selection is—in respect to individual organisms—external, and, hence, only another example of heteroselection. But, following the above refutation of gene-Darwinian nominalism¹²⁰⁰, we are entitled to regard sexual selection at a certain relevant level of explanation as being a autoselective process.¹²⁰¹ If those organisms are, internally, strongly selected, because they follow an—perhaps externally non-adaptive—trend, only those organisms will survive that follow this trend and that mate with organisms which follow this trend. The autonomy of the internal tendency is, of course, restricted—a too strong internal tendency would simply end in the extinction of a whole species. Yet, it is plainly false to assume that on all relevant evolutionary levels evolved characteristics are only moulded by an external environment as they may also be the product of such internal dynamics.

*The behaviour, particularly learned behaviour, of organisms (or groups of organisms), provides us with a particular kind of autoselection. Learned behaviour may change the way in which the parts of the body are used. Thereby behaviour could determine what features are actually adaptive and which are not. A change in behaviour may render formally adaptive properties to be particularly non-adaptive. This can be understood as a special kind of autoselection, because here the organism contributes to the direction of evolution. It is particularly interesting that by such a mechanism learned habits indirectly exercise a systematic influence on the direction of bodily evolution and on the genetic makeup of an evolutionary line.*¹²⁰²

This effect is called the ‘Baldwin effect’, after the psychologist James Mark Baldwin, who—although not opposing Darwinism throughout—sought to infuse some mind and rationality into the evolutionary process. Like Baldwin, C. H. Waddington proposed a mechanism of genetic assimilation (1957) and Sir Alistair Hardy (1965) argued that innovative behaviour and habits in this way could influence the course of evolution, without requiring a violation of the Weismann barrier¹²⁰³.

Popper, when considering inborn central behaviour-controlling parts of an organism rather than learned features, argued that a change in the central parts is less likely to be lethal and, what is more important here, that changes in these parts direct the evolution of the executing parts.¹²⁰⁴

Phenomena in which the central organismic propensity structure, or even learned behaviour, determines the direction of evolution (more than simply being selected themselves), were often regarded

¹¹⁹⁹ At certain levels of explanation this distinction may not be reasonable anyhow. Particularly where any autoselection leads to constrained variation.

¹²⁰⁰ ☞ chapter 9 on the transcendence of substance reductionism.

¹²⁰¹ In the section on systemic individual selection an example of sexual selection was interpreted in this autoselective sense, ☞ pp. 285 f.

¹²⁰² On a rather critical stance towards this effect see e. g.: J. Watkins. *A Note on Baldwin Effect* (1999).

¹²⁰³ Mentioned by: P. J. Bowler. *Evolution* (1984), p. 321.

as evidence which was counter to strict Darwinism.¹²⁰⁵ Such phenomena, if explained as I have done so above, do not, I think, support Lamarckism in its strict sense; nevertheless neither do they support strict Darwinism. An emphasis on the active organism, on internal goals and on learning stand in contrast to the main message of unchangeably blind and passive adaptation to an external environment. Particularly if we aim at defining Darwinism as strictly as possible in order to reveal an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms, one will not subsume such a changed mechanism as being purely Darwinian. In respect to the criterion which is presently to be discussed, the Baldwin effect involves autoselection in which the central propensity structure of the organism, and perhaps even its learning, and not only blind external selection, guides the direction of its evolution.

This Baldwinian kind of autoselection, which is based on self-referentiality, may also lead to both, increased sight or increased self-determination—effects which were mentioned before generally. If organisms can find more advantageous ways of behaving through learning, the selection pressure caused by this behaviour, itself becomes changed to support the further evolutionary biological refinement of it. On the other hand there may be behaviour, which is itself so deeply build into the propensity structure of an organism, that it canalises evolution in this direction. The effect of which is that evolution tends to refine that behaviour, although, perhaps, different behaviour may have favoured evolutionary changes which would have been more consistent with the overall bodily endowment of the organism.

In this section I have justified the third criterion of our strict definition for a Darwinian process. It is part of the core of Darwinism to regard selection as external and as an opportunistic response to the moment. But if this is given, it has also been shown that both aspects of this criterion of our non-tautological definition are not always factually fulfilled. Paying considerable attention to the role of external and internal causation in respect to the second step of a Darwinian process, I have shown that not all evolutionary processes fulfil the Darwinian criterion of externality. If we understand Darwinism and non-Darwinism as the two extremes of a spectrum, instead of being the only two alternatives, then neither Darwinism nor the non-Darwinian position opposed to it—advocating inner dynamics as the only evolutionary force—appears to be generally right. Without aiming to diminish the role of heteroselection, the claim of a universality of Darwinian processes has to be criticised. The necessary assumption of externality is not only problematic in respect to process-Darwinian economics, but also in respect to biological Darwinism itself. Instead the phenomena discussed here, rather point to an evolution of evolutionary processes—which already exists in biology.

¹²⁰⁴ K. R. Popper. *Objective Knowledge* (1972/1979), Chapter 7; particularly p. 278.

¹²⁰⁵ G. Masuch. *Zum gegenwärtigen Stand der Diskussion*. (1987), p. 49; J. Schlüter. *Kritische Aufarbeitung des gegenwärtigen Forschungsstandes* (1987), p. 94; R. Nachtwey. *Der Irrweg des Darwinismus* (1959), pp. 171-173.

d) *The Evolution of Evolutionary Mechanisms*

In this final section of the chapter on process reductionism, firstly I argue, that, based on the results of the preceding sections, a theory of evolving evolutionary mechanisms is generally required. It should replace universal Darwinism, which regards the evolutionary process as being unchangeably blind, wasteful and externally governed. Secondly, I discuss in detail how the emergence of evolutionary processes may become conceptualised, and how the many cases of process emergence we came across, are linked to the notion of autonomy. Since this chapter is only intended as a critique of Darwinian process reductionism and not as a full proposal for an alternative approach, I only show that such an approach generally proves to be necessary and, additionally, provides some concepts and examples helpful in imagining such an approach.

(1.) **The Necessity of a Concept of an Evolution of Evolutionary Mechanisms**

Darwinism has been characterised by a materialistically transformed Newtonian-Platonic concept of an eternally given pre-existing law of nature (☞ e. g. pp. 168 f.) The ubiquity and unchangeability generally inherent in a Darwinian view of life, is fully expressed in some recent proposals, in which the Darwinian process is regarded in a strait forward way as “the universal solvent capable of cutting right to the heart of everything in sight.”¹²⁰⁶ We have dealt with universal Darwinism in its gene-Darwinian and process-Darwinian forms in detail before (☞ pp. 203 f.). A Darwinian approach, be it applied to biology and repudiative of all other ontological levels, or also to psychology, economy or theory of science, entails, in either case, a theory in which the evolutionary mechanism is essentially regarded as being unchangeably a Darwinian process.

Our previous discussion of different criteria for a Darwinian process is based on a strict definition of such a process (☞ pp. 348 f.). This definition avoids tautological justifications of Darwinism (☞ pp. 330 f.), and has been formulated in order to enhance our conceptual resolution and to make the possibly concealed evolution of evolutionary mechanisms detectable. A Darwinian process has been defined—for short—as a process of blind-variation-and-external-selection. A definition which, as I have shown, does no injustice to the essence of the Darwinian paradigm. A strict definition made it possible to regard Darwinism as one extreme of the dimensions of blindness of variation and the externality of selection (☞ p. 350). Only the externality of the selection process secures a certain adaptation to an external environment. Based on this definition, processes, as we have seen, may well be located somewhere between being blind or omniscient (☞ p. 358) or between being determined externally or internally (☞ p. 384). Hence, in this view a denial of radical Lamarckism does not necessarily imply Darwinism and *vice versa*.

¹²⁰⁶ D. Dennett. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995), pp. 521; 21, 40, 42, 51, 133, 232 etc.

In the preceding sections, we have discussed in detail to what extent actual processes fulfil these criteria. Although we partly discussed cultural processes, we did not patrol the borderlands between biology and the social sciences extensively. Although I regard culture as the most relevant change in the evolutionary process, here I focused on biology itself.¹²⁰⁷ Despite the relevance of process-Darwinism to other fields, the core of the Darwinian paradigm is located in biology and the alternative theory of an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms (transcending Darwinian processes) which I have suggested will be most controversial in this field.

The last sections proved that even in biology all the criteria for Darwinian processes, if applied in a strict way, are violated by actual evolutionary processes. It became evident that there is not only variation, but also true synthesis, that variation on many explanatory levels cannot always be regarded as being blind, that variation does not always remain equally wasteful, that selection is not always an opportunistic response to the moment and that there are autoselective processes which do not necessarily lead to adaptations in respect of an externally given environment.

But given such processes which reduce the blindness and wastefulness of evolution and which gain a certain autonomy from external selection, it plainly follows that, according to our definition, evolutionary processes do not always remain strictly Darwinian. Evolutionary processes evolve themselves and can be changed, composed into new wholes or emerge completely new.

As far as they increase the sight of an evolutionary line, the processes which I have discussed already, like the re-use of adaptive building blocks, the re-shuffling and recombination of pre-selected genes, adaptive autoselection etc., in my view, have presumably played a role in enabling an increased velocity of evolution, or better of particular evolutionary lines (☞ also p. 359). Such mechanisms, I think, made it possible to cross over maladaptive valleys which prior to that may have been unsurpassable parts of the adaptive landscape. Without elaborating upon this, it appears to me—and in this I follow in the footsteps of a whole tradition of authors—that the palaeontological record itself could well be interpreted in a way that would suggest that evolution in its early beginnings occurred at a slower rate than it did later on. The oldest fossils indicate that life started about 3.1-3.4 billion years ago. For a long period of about two billion years only prokaryotes, a simple type of unicellular organisms, populated the earth. After which eukaryotes, still single celled organisms with a more complex cell-structure, started to predominate. The first multicellular organisms emerged only about 640 million years ago.¹²⁰⁸ Then in many further steps the course of evolution seems to have speeded up somewhat.¹²⁰⁹ In my interpretation the apparent increase in evolutionary velocity is not only an irrelevant epiphenomenon, but appears partly at least to reflect changes in the evolutionary processes themselves.

¹²⁰⁷ ☞ also e. g. pp. 355 f., 328 f., 390.

¹²⁰⁸ E. g.: D. J. Futuyma. *Evolutionsbiologie* (1990/86), pp. 365 f.

Such a view may gain more plausibility through the use of an analogy using algorithms in information technology. Darwinian processes can be regarded as a representation of a certain algorithm.¹²⁰⁹ The same simple mechanism always becomes repeated. In information technology, evolutionary strategies have been modelled for technological problem solving as search strategies in an (multidimensional) adaptive landscape. A strictly Darwinian process of chance-variation-and-external-selection in these models indeed leads to some adaptation. But although a purely Darwinian process has the advantage of being very simple, and is still open to all directions, it has in most settings been shown to have the important disadvantage of being slow and resting on only local maxima.¹²¹⁰

It has been shown that many evolutionary processes are not Darwinian processes in their strict sense—strict Darwinian processes may even be rare. I have argued, for example, that variation rates at many levels are not always systematically blind. In this view many processes, which are often loosely said to be Darwinian processes, should, under closer scrutiny, not be characterised in this way. To elaborate a theory of the evolution of evolutionary processes in more detail, it will be important to disentangle the Darwinian and non-Darwinian aspects of the processes. In this way processes which are commonly accepted have to be scrutinised as to how far they change the wastefulness and the direction of evolution. Evolutionary processes generally have to be understood not as being externally and eternally given, but as evolving and themselves being partly inner properties of the evolving entities in question.

Besides a reinterpretation of acknowledged evolutionary phenomena, other phenomena which would normally not be focused upon in this field, need to become understood as evolutionary mechanisms in their own right; the mechanisms of duplication of complex genetic structures, evolutionary constraints and some neglected mechanisms of autoselection provide good examples of this.

Generally, I am even inclined to take the somewhat Whiteheadian stance that whether a new type of entity has evolved (e. g. a species opposed to asexual reproducing single organisms only), or whether a new process has come into being, changing the speed or course of evolution is largely equivalent.¹²¹¹ Although one has to note that this parallel has some limitations,¹²¹² someone who accepts the synergetic emergence of new independent levels of organisation in respect to things, a view which is supported in this work as well (☞ pp. 243 f.), will not be startled by a similar emergence of processes.

For example the emergence of biological sexuality, not only brings a new entity (thing) into being, a species in the reproductive sense, but also equally changes the evolutionary process itself. As argued elsewhere, this process can, for example, be characterised by the recombination of pre-selected genes, a process which in part does not fulfil our strict definition of a Darwinian process (☞ pp. 367 f., 357 f.). Moreover, sexuality enables a bunch of other evolutionary processes, like genetic drift, founder effect or frequency dependent evolution.

¹²⁰⁹ Ironically even the evolutionary trees given in D. Dennett, *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995), pp. 86-90, could be interpreted in roughly this way.

¹²¹⁰ See: Th. Blümecke. *Wunder der Evolution. Optimierung mit Evolutionsstrategien und genetischen Algorithmen* (1991). Cf. also: K.-P. Zauner. *Vorbild Natur. Biologische Viren unter dem informationstheoretischen Mikroskop* (1992).

¹²¹¹ On the parallel of a truly Darwinian process and a truly atomistic replicator, ☞ pp. 216 f., 253 f.

¹²¹² A new kind of entity may refer to a new process of an old kind, only on another level. However, often the different levels will be linked and may nevertheless lead to new systemic properties.

Apart from considerations about the speed of evolution and about the, so to speak, Whiteheadian parallel of processes and things, which may render the view of an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms more plausible, it, as shown, in any case plainly follows from the exposed differences of actual evolutionary processes to strict Darwinian ones that evolutionary processes themselves evolve, transcending strictly Darwinian processes.

(2.) Process Emergence, Circularity and Autonomy

The preceding sections have shown that the defining criteria of a Darwinian process are all violated by existing processes. Darwinian processes may nevertheless serve as a base line, against which more complicated and less blind processes can be measured.

In this section I am concerned with summarising the discussion of the different new processes we came across earlier. In this section I try to characterise the emergence of processes in a positive way and to link this to different notions of freedom. Although the negative characterisation shown by the difference to Darwinian processes remains the ultimate criterion for the discussion of a transcendence of Darwinism, and although no general *positive* criterion for new processes is found (apart, of course, from the almost tautological aspect in which way the new process works has somehow to have a causal effect which is systematically changed), the differently elaborated ideas in this section may possibly contribute to a general theory of process emergence.

I start by discussing causal feedback or *circular causation*. This can be regarded as one possible condition for the emergence of new processes. In regard to things, Kant argued that it is a precondition for the oneness of parts that they are mutually cause and effect for each other.¹²¹³

This is discussed in the context of Kant's moderate teleological understanding of nature, in which the mutual interdependence of parts is understood as a precondition which is entitled to assume (as a regulative idea) that parts serve a certain purpose (not only lying in themselves). This had a general impact on romantic biology.¹²¹⁴

One may argue that new wholes can be formed by closing a causal circle, this means that they are formed by mutually relating entities which have not been causally related or only related in one direction before. If one also applies this thought to processes, the two independent linear causal processes, $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$, and $C \rightarrow A$, can be assumed to form a new whole, which would, potentially, contain new properties, if the feedback loop is closed: $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow A$.

This concept of emergence is similar to that found, for example, in the later work of K. Lorenz. Generally, self-referentiality is fundamental to cybernetics, system theory and theories of self-organisation (☉ p. 151), by which Lorenz appears to have been influenced.¹²¹⁵

Lorenz in his book *Die Rückseite des Spiegels* (1973) applied such a emergence concept in an, I think, illuminating way, to organismic learning processes, starting with a treatment of the amoeba and

¹²¹³ I. Kant. *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790/93/99), orig. pp. 290-291. ☉ pp. 87 f.

¹²¹⁴ T. Lenoir. *Morphotypes and the historical-genetic method in Romantic biology* (1990), pp. 120-121.

¹²¹⁵ K. Lorenz. *Die Rückseite des Spiegels* (1973/77), pp. 48-50 (Lorenz regards this as an important subtype of emergence)

ending with a treatment of cultural development. However, although the emergent learning processes, which have already been discussed may indeed be interpreted as parts of the evolutionary process, it appears to me that Lorenz does rather dissociate evolved processes from the evolutionary process itself. In any case Lorenz does not treat processes which are close to evolutionary biology and, perhaps, does not sufficiently clarify the relation of nested learning mechanisms in terms of their being part of this process.¹²¹⁶

In general the proponents of the evolutionary synthesis have to a certain extent worked with the concept of emergence (☉ p. 139).¹²¹⁷ They introduced mechanisms on the species level, which are now, as has been shown, underrated by proponents of gene-Darwinism. None the less, they have promoted the complete blindness of trials, which on different explanatory levels has been questioned in this work and but have not developed a concept of autoselection (they even played down the role of sexual selection, which may be interpreted as a type of autoselection.)

I see no reason why Lorenz's idea of new feedback loops should not be applied to evolutionary processes themselves.

Implicitly, this concept has been essential to the concept of autoselection, as I have dealt with it above (☉ pp. 384 f.). We were concerned with morphological, genetic and systemic autoselection. It has been shown, that these mechanisms can either lead to the systematic pre-selection of the adaptive direction or to an internally determined tendency which does not result in an adaptation to an external environment.

In this sense this type of process is linked with the possibility of *autonomy*. The circularity of the process may induce an inherent dynamic, which can have an independent influence on the further course of the evolution of the entity or the system of entities in question. Thereby, it is not only the speed of evolution that may be changed, but also the direction that can be changed in a way which need not be adaptive in respect to an external environment.

Here I will once more discuss sexual selection, which, in my interpretation as a particular case of autoselection, may lead to non-adaptive trends and even in the long run may be able to sustain its inner tendency. Above I have outlined why my interpretation of sexual selection can be regarded as being different to the strict Darwinism one (☉ p. 385, cf. also: pp. 285 f.).

Sexual selection often evolves as an adaptation. In this respect autoselective aspects which are involved in it may work to accelerate the work of heteroselection. Even this, according to our strict definition of Darwinism, is non-Darwinian, since systematically this reduces the average blindness of trials. Sexual selection, selecting in an adaptive way, for example, those animals which are strong in combat, so to speak, selects earlier than natural selection does. In a population where sexual selection is developed it is not necessary that a huge mass of organisms are raised and nurtured, which only go on to have extremely bad chances of survival. Hence, the number of dead-ends gets reduced and in this sense

¹²¹⁶ E. g.: The evolved processes were always "bound to results of the trial and error method of the genome". (Own translation). *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹²¹⁷ E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought* (1982), pp. 63-64

evolution becomes somehow less wasteful and, in our understanding, less Darwinian. Moreover, species which have evolved the process of adaptive sexual selection may gain a certain independence from short term fluctuations in the environment, which would otherwise produce many blind alleys.

But the adaptive advantages of this autoselective mechanism are linked to the possibility that this process gain a certain independence. From an adaptationist viewpoint autonomy would rather be described in terms of disadvantageous constraints. If *every* wrong path does not have to be tested, then some advantageous paths may also be missed. If the process of sexual selection produces counter-adaptive results it will possibly be counter-selected itself. But a counter-adaptive tendency to some extent and for a certain time is continued.¹²¹⁸

Moreover, sexual autoselection can even lead to a stronger form of independence. It might not only gain a certain autonomy which after a while will still be reduced by natural selection, but also an autonomy with which to determine its own direction quite independently of natural selection. As an example I take the enormous antlers of palaeontological (and perhaps also present) deer, the existence of which represents a phenomenon which, historically, was important to proponents of inherent possible non-adaptive evolutionary trends.¹²¹⁹ Let us assume that the remarkable relative size of the palaeontological species *titanotheres*'s antlers have evolved by sexual selection, be it by male combat or by female choice. In terms of natural selection, the enormous size of antlers may well be regarded as maladaptive. If one takes this as given, I think, sexual selection could have led to such an autonomous trend which is even maladaptive from the viewpoint of natural selection. I have shown earlier that sexual selection does not need to become reduced to a strength which would be suitable from the viewpoint of natural selection. The autoselective process of sexual selection, could, up to a certain extent, take over and may itself determine the direction of the evolution of a given line. On average only those animals will be able to reproduce, that have followed the, in terms of natural selection, maladaptive trend to big antlers. In a way then it will only be these animals that are exposed to natural selection. If the process of sexual selection is strong enough, this may lead to continuing inner dynamics, although natural selection may work against it. The process of sexual selection itself will not necessarily be reduced, because those organisms that mate especially with organisms with big antlers, obtain an advantage through mating with these organisms, since based on this very trend in the filial generation their offspring have an increased relative probability of reproducing. Both, the genetic basis of antlers and that of the preference of mating are stabilised by this tendency. (for a more technical elaboration of this argument, ☉ pp. 285 f.). If, however, such a trend becomes too maladaptive, and

¹²¹⁸ Strangely enough even R. A. Fisher has conceded that: "The importance of this situation lies in the fact that the further development of the plumage character will still proceed [...] so long as the disadvantage [in natural selection] is more than counterbalanced by the advantage in sexual selection." In: *The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection* (first 1930), pp 135-6. (Quoted in S. J. Frankel. *The eclipse of sexual selection theory* (1994), p. 182.

¹²¹⁹ The concept of an inner momentum of change has been cardinal to orthogenesis as for instance advocated by T. Eimer. One main research interest of H. F. Osborn, another proponent of orthogenesis, was the evolution of antlers of the palaeontological mammal *titanotheres*, which in the following is taken as example.

does not at some point become balanced (not even reduced) by natural selection on the level of individuals or groups, it is, of course, possible that the whole line becomes extinct. The species of *titanotheres* has become extinct—possibly partly for this reason. In this sense the freedom from natural selection, remains limited. But nevertheless, mechanisms could in this way have a certain inner autonomy, without the need for indirect dependence on natural selection.

In respect to such possible autonomous tendencies (and equally in respect to the mechanisms of reduced blindness) it is not only false but also irresponsible to claim—even if only meant as a popularisation—that the human limbic system, our emotional structure and hence¹²²⁰ our morals have “evolved by natural selection”.¹²²¹

Homo sapiens spend an exceptional amount of time and endeavour on their sexual lives and on matters of partner choice. There may well be much ground for autonomous tendencies here as well. Matters are actually even much more complicated in regard to humans because of the additional stratum of culture. Also at the level of culturally transmitted ideas (what I have called *logoi*), such autonomous processes may take place. For instance the idea of the Good may foster self-sustaining tendencies, which may not always be necessarily adaptive in respect of the outside world. (This may be due to the particular character the notion of the Good has, which cannot be discussed here.) Such autonomous cultural trends may then also have a downward effect on the, partly autonomous, biological feedback loop of sexual selection.

We have shown that feedback, the establishment of a partly self-referential causal circle, is one mechanism, which can lead to the emergence of processes with new properties. Moreover, emergent processes of this type can potentially not only lead to a less wasteful process of adaptation, but also to autoselective trends, which do not have to be adaptive in respect to an environment external to the system in question. Kinds of autoselection may even lead to permanent autonomous inner dynamics, which, up to a certain extent, are no longer controlled by natural selection.

Not all the processes mentioned in this work, which differ from the elaborated base line of a strictly defined algorithm of a Darwinian process fulfil (at least in its full sense) the positive criterion for self-referentiality (☉ pp. 398 f.). Apparently other changes also seem to qualify as changes in the evolutionary process.

We turn to the *class of processes which have been characterised by their adaptively reduced blindness of trials* at different explanatory levels (☉ particularly pp. 358 f., 327 f.; here I do not deal with the concept of constrained variation). Likewise within this class one can distinguish between processes which have changed themselves and processes which are combined in such a way as to acquire new synergetic properties as a whole.

In respect to composed processes we may think of nested selection processes (I shall mention the part-whole relationships of processes below; ☉ also pp. 328 f.) Examples of nested selection processes were operant conditioning and, according to a certain theory, the neural development of organisms (☉ pp. 224 f., 231 f.). One may—opposed to the view supported here—assert that the biological process

¹²²⁰ Such a conclusion actually silently assumes an emotive theory of ethics.

¹²²¹ E. O. Wilson. *Sociobiology* (1975), p. 3, *On Human Nature* (1978), p. 6 (☉ also footnotes 96, 151).

has, as a whole, not changed, since the underlying evolutionary process remains a Darwinian one. Although, if the processes are judged in isolation, this proves to be true, it does not remain so if they are judged in their natural unity. Taken as a whole, processes of compound nested selection, could much more quickly find adaptive optima. Special niches, which only exist as environmental fluctuations for a short period of time, can still also be used even if they do not exist permanently. Biological selection alone would not have been quick enough to find these niches, which for the basic biological process alone, would only lead to blind alleys. In this sense, I think, one has to acknowledge, that on some level this process involves a reduced blindness (☉ pp. 328 f.).

In respect to processes which have themselves been changed, the possibility and, even, plausibility of the evolution of processes with a reduced blindness of variation on different levels of the multi-level account of evolution have been discussed in detail earlier in this work (☉ pp. 366 f.). Even at the level of mutations, this is rendered plausible by the many phenomena which we treated in the different and quickly developing fields of genetic research: the heritability and selectability of mutation rates, transposable genetic elements, the pivotal role of repetition of gene-complexes in most complex adaptive structures, the apparently adaptive evolutionary integration of certain genes, the phenomenon of so-called concerted evolution, etc. (☉ pp. 369 f.). Taken together with our above dismissal of the tautological argument that any change has to be blind, it has been argued that it is highly plausible that, on this level too, variation is not actually always blind, but sometimes itself systematically adapted. One may, for example, think of building blocks, which are apparently useful in many respects and found in many adaptive genetic codes, in which quite different macroscopic properties are encoded. Those species which, through one of the mechanisms which I have mentioned and which are acknowledged today, have evolved a higher probability that these multi-purpose building blocks are copied within the genome, have an increased probability of evolving in an adaptive way, relative to other species which have not evolved such mechanisms and building blocks. Today genetic facts provide enough of a basis to assume—without thereby proposing a strictly Lamarckian theory—that mutations are often to a certain, but limited, extent themselves adapted. But the adaptation of variations implies a systematic reduction of blindness and an increased evolutionary speed in reaching a new adaptive optima.

It may seem that the preceding example of a new and changed variational mechanism, may entail a certain circularity, by which we originally characterised another group of mechanisms, that were dealt with previously. Repetition seems to be linked to circularity. Here we discussed the repetitions of complex structures which have turned out to be adaptive in many contexts. There is in fact a certain interaction between variation and external selection, but, it would, I think, be misconceived to regard this as a circular process in the sense I gave earlier. Here we are concerned with a *linear* repetitive causal process. None the less this iterative aspect has in fact played a role in the evolution of the changed properties. (A similar argument seems to me to be applicable to the above example concerning composed nested selection processes. Yet this cannot be elaborated upon here.)

Hence, such emergent processes (as long as they are adaptive¹²²²) are not linked with the *autonomy* that I discussed before, i. e. with an inherent and possibly non-adaptive tendency which is independent of selection by an external environment. But in another sense, processes, which I have just discussed, which increase the general adaptability and reduce the blindness of a certain evolutionary process, can also be said to be free.¹²²³

In philosophy autonomy is often distinguished to imply two meanings: the first is a negative notion of *freedom from* external determination, the second is a positive notion of *freedom to* do the things which are necessary. Above I have once more outlined that, even in biology, processes can evolve a certain negative autonomy from heteroselection. It may be suitable to say, that, in a way, processes have also evolved a certain positive autonomy which still leads to an adaptation to an external environment, but which has become less blind in achieving this adaptation.

I am aware that the notion of positive autonomy in respect to ethics usually has crucial connotations, which are not fulfilled by such a simplistic application of this in biology and which still normally only refers to an adaptive necessity. But equally I agree with Jonas, that we should build the basis of the notion of autonomy into our basic ontology.¹²²⁴ Otherwise, evolutionary accounts, as shown in this work, will tend to sweep away the notion of freedom altogether (☹ on the natural fallacy, pp. 65 f.). Indeed, in respect to the level of human culture both aspects of autonomy may become combined. If in culture the notion of the Good (due to a certain inner reasonableness of this notion) or, likewise, more specific values, became the basis of an inner and autonomous self-replicating trend, then processes which in a less blind way lead us to do good—to follow these specific values—would fulfil the outlined positive criterion for freedom, without thereby necessarily referring to natural selection.

In the preceding sections, many more processes have been discussed, which are not dealt with here. Finally I mention a *class of mechanisms which are enabled by the aspect of synthesis in biological sexuality* that I dealt with earlier. I have discussed at several places in this work why evolutionary lines of sexually reproducing species could, on the level of the whole, be regarded as being less blind. It made it apparent that sexuality enables an evolutionary line to cross broader and deeper valleys of an 'adaptive landscape', than would be possible for lines of single asexual organisms,¹¹³² whose evolution in this respect is more closely modelled by a simple Darwinian process. It has been pointed out before that a Darwinian process in information technology is known to get caught at local optima easily.¹²¹⁰ It has also been shown that such an evolutionary line not only becomes quicker at finding adaptive optima, but also changes the adaptive landscape itself, by, for example, rendering certain kinds of co-operation between individuals possible, which had been impossible before. Generally the phenomenon of sexuality, aside from its obviously Darwinian aspects, partly appears to point to aspects of positive freedom as well as negative freedom, since a quicker adaptation is partly secured and a certain inner tendency can also be involved.

The synthetic aspect of sexual reproduction is also linked to, or provides the basis for, many other processes, which may be said to partly transcend Darwinian processes in their strict sense as well. Here I only mention two of these mechanisms, which may be re-interpreted in this way: the part-whole relationship of the processes of individual and group selection and also the process of genetic recombination. They have both been dealt with before as involving a certain preselection and leading to a somewhat reduced blindness of evolution on some relevant evolutionary level.

¹²²² An adaptational directed variation (for instance, an enhanced probability of the repetition of adaptive genetic building blocks), may also lead to an evolutionary constraint or non adaptive trend. Although such trends are in my opinion not as stable as those based on sexual selection, they still have a certain independence.

¹²²³ This, as shown, can be a property of an autoselective process as well. Strictly speaking both, processes of increased variation and processes of autoselection, can, at least indirectly, be linked with both types of freedom outlined below.

¹²²⁴ H. Jonas. *Evolution und Freiheit* (1984); *Organismus und Freiheit* (1973/1994), pp. 17 f. ☹ footnotes 118 f.

The *part-whole relationship* of individual selection and group selection are somehow linked by sexual reproduction. Of course, not every adaptation on the individual level, as we have seen, is adaptive at the group level. But any adaptation at the group level also requires a minimal adaptation at the individual level (and *vice versa*). In this—limited—respect it might be possible to argue that individual selection—despite the possible differences with group selection that I have conceded—will often produce less radically absurd trials as a preselecting factor for group variation than blind chance alone. In this sense this combination of Darwinian processes might, at the level of the group, often lead to more adapted trials than mere chance trials. In this sense the trials at the group level may possibly be regarded as being of reduced blindness.

More clearly, the process of *recombination*, i. e. the cross-overs of chromosomes of different parental organisms, —although actually remaining blind in some respects—have been interpreted as a less blind type of secondary selection. Only new genetic combinations, which at their particular locus have been pre-selected before, are combined. Although this recombination still involves a risk and a certain blindness, it is less blind than a process without such a preselection (⇒ pp. 367 f.).

To sum up, it has become apparent that a theory of evolution of evolutionary mechanisms is generally needed. The strict definition of a Darwinian process has been taken as base line against which the differences in other processes can be measured. In this section the mechanisms elaborated upon earlier have been reviewed. Self-referentiality as an important cause of process emergence has been discussed (a proposal whose basis can at least be traced back to Kant). We have seen that in regard to both the main defining Darwinian criteria, that of blindness and externality, that processes can evolve and that this can be linked to proposed notions of positive and negative autonomy of processes.

Summary of the chapter on process reductionism

This chapter has been concerned with a refutation of the claim of universality, as found both in biologicistic Darwinism and in process-Darwinism and which were elaborated upon in earlier chapters. The influence of Universal Darwinism seems to be increasing and D. Dennett has pointed out, while new waves of Darwinism keep coming, new protective dikes are busily being built always at the expense of the land on the inward side. Here I have supported endeavours to reverse this process, not by trying to build another dike, but by critically scrutinising the concept of a Darwinian process itself, especially in biology. This chapter objects to the transformed Newtonian-Platonic view of Darwinism which states that in its essence evolution can exclusively be described as a Darwinian process, which is itself eternal, essentially unchangeable and ubiquitous. I think that this view conveys a pessimistic message, which is also found in the work of Spencer: “But there is bound up with the change a normal amount of suffering, which cannot be lessened without altering the very laws of life.”¹²²⁵ Although I mainly focus on biology, I think that through my critique of Darwinian process reductionism ‘light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history.’

Firstly, I have shown that an application of process-Darwinian at different levels, as proposed by proponents of a Darwinian multi-level account, may actually lead to inconsistencies. Darwinian processes, whether in a part-whole relationship or whether nested, may, as a whole, have different properties to their parts. I have, in detail, have scrutinised the tautological aspects of pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism. In these, presumably the most refined sections of the work, it is shown that pan-

¹²²⁵ H. Spencer. *Social Statics* (1851), p. 325.

adaptationism and pan-selectionism can not be sustained if they are not defined tautologically. Based on the treatment of possible tautological aspects of Darwinism, a strict definition of a Darwinian process has been formulated. This definition has led us to a two-dimensional spectrum of theories, in which Darwinism in both dimensions can be regarded as an extreme pole. It follows, that if one denies strict Darwinism, one does *not* have to adopt strict Lamarckism or a romantic inner unfolding of evolution either.

Following this I critically discussed the different criteria of Darwinism, partly in great detail. I illustrated that variation in biological evolution can not reasonably be said to be always and in all respects to be ruled by blind chance (despite its undeniable 'short-sightedness'). Equally I have shown that not all evolutionary processes are based on external selection, which is a precondition for adaptation to an external environment. Instead to some degree internal trends can determine the direction of the evolution of a certain line. Although essential for the validity of my argumentation, the complexity of these sections can not be reflected in this summary. However, it became apparent that the criteria which I discussed are clearly all violated by existing evolutionary processes, most of which are violated on many levels of the multi-level account which I promote in this work. I conclude that the difference between actual evolutionary mechanisms and Darwinian processes in a strict sense necessitates a concept of an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms. Finally I discussed how the emergence of processes may be conceptualised, linking them to two notions of autonomy, which, in a way, can be said to have already been found in biology (although the notion of autonomy in respect to human beings is additionally related to ethics and morals).

In the previous chapter, substance reductionism was criticised and a multi-level account of evolution was proposed; in this chapter, partly along similar lines, Darwinian process reductionism has been criticised and a view of nature has been proposed which stresses the evolution of, to some extent, autonomous evolutionary processes.

Chapter 10: Towards the Transcendence of Selfishness

“Not only does man need the earth for his life and activity but the earth also needs man”

C. G. Carus. *Von den Naturreichen, ihrem Leben und ihrer Verwandtschaft*. 1820, p. 26 f.

“Nur wer Sinn sucht, wird Sinn finden.”

Hans Georg Gadamer, 2000

This work on Universal Darwinism and its transcendence does deal not directly with ethics, even so it has some ethical bearings and represents an investigation that has also partly been led by moral intentions. Proponents of the theories I have criticised have actually claimed that these theories have a strong impact on ethics. Without intending to favour a naturalistic fallacy, one’s ethics somehow appear to depend on one’s ontological and metaphysical stance (and *vice versa*). It is important to ethics which entities exist, whether there are only genes, or also organisms, groups, species and ecosystems. It is likewise relevant to ethics to know whether the ontological framework only allows Darwinian processes to exist, or if it also allows new processes to come into being which are less blind or which may possess a certain autonomy and intrinsic direction.

The limits of gene-Darwinism in respect to the claim that it should be taken as an exclusive basis for ethics were discussed at the outset of this work. After later on having gained a deeper understanding of gene-Darwinism and process Darwinism in part II and III, I criticised their substance reductionism and process reductionism at detail in part IV. Our treatment *ex negativo* resulted in an approach which recommends different evolutionary levels and an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms.

Although the ethical implications of my metaphysical and ontological proposals have not been discussed within the main parts of the work itself, I, here at least, want to give a rough sketch of some ethical considerations, which may follow from the general spirit of the previous work. In the concluding outlook on *ecological idealism* (☺ next section) some more features of a corresponding metaphysics will be clarified. In respect to ethics, it appears to me that the view of nature suggested in this work leaves more room for ethics than, in particular, that of gene-Darwinism. Here only three aspects of ethical relevance can be sketched (and a sketch, of course, is not a fresco).

(1.) The idea that we are, to a certain extent, **part of larger wholes** is a feature of many metaphysical systems. It has been a main purpose of this work to show the falsity of the gene-Darwinian claim that the ontological inventory is limited to single selfish genes only. Without denying that even these sub-organismic entities exist to some extent in their own right, I have shown that strict germ-line-reductionism and gene-atomism, inherent in gene-Darwinism, are false and have to be

transcended. It was demonstrated as being reasonable to accept the 'stuffiness' of the organism and to some extent also to accept the existence of ontological wholes, like groups, species and even ecosystems. Although mainly concerned with biology, I, likewise, advocated the existence of different cultural entities.

Even in the biological stratum it has, for example, been shown that true individual altruism towards a group can under certain conditions be evolutionarily stable, whether it is based on structured population models of group selection which are more refined than those originally criticised by gene-Darwinism, or whether without ongoing group selection by a certain systemic constellation of individual selection processes (☞ pp. 278 f.).

I am aware that the claim that higher ontological levels have to some extent an existence on their own, is not only controversial but also at some point may perhaps even become dangerous. In this work I have therefore tried to steer a course between the Scylla of atomism, with its danger of venerating the ruthless selfishness of its elementary parts, and the Charybdis of holism, with its danger of rendering a rather totalitarian interpretation. Surely, we should not completely surrender to larger wholes, but we have and we should still have a feeling of responsibility for some of them, as we should also have one for ourselves.

(2.) Another aspect of the view of nature advised in this work, which appears relevant for ethics, is the possibility of a notion of **autonomy** which is not incoherent with a theory of evolution.

It appears necessary to me that the notion of freedom already becomes built into our basic ontological concepts. In this point I differ from a Cartesian position and generally follow Hans Jonas,¹²²⁶ notwithstanding that I, of course, also favour a particular role for culture and consciousness. If a notion of freedom, essential to many ethical systems, becomes not built already into our basic ontological concepts, at least as a potential, I think that it might easily become swept away by approaches which demand consistency with such a basis.

In this work I have shown that even biological processes are not always reducible to natural selection. Processes can to a certain extent become autonomous. (Since process reductionism and substance reductionism was discussed along similar lines, the notion of autonomy may—in a Whiteheadian wake—be similarly applicable to both processes and substances.) The germ of that notion of autonomy, which we have found in biology, is, of course, not as refined as the notion we want to use in respect to culture and consciousness. An approach which starts in a bottom-up way will always have problems explaining the highest phenomena, which can partly only be understood if treated directly. But, I think, once a certain basis for such a notion and a general evolution of evolutionary processes itself is conceded, approaches that more directly deal with such higher phenomena in culture will also tend to be taken seriously more easily.

In this work, a basic notion of autonomy has been developed both in a positive and in a negative sense. At this point I focus on a notion of negative freedom (☉ generally, pp. 398 f.).

The positive freedom to do what is necessary in the biotic world will still normally refer to adaptation, here, however, it will be interpreted as the increased reduction of blindness and wastefulness of the evolutionary processes themselves.

I think the general idea that a reduction of blindness and wastefulness is possible may also somehow be of interest for ethics. But the general possibility of a certain directedness, may become particularly interesting if in cultural history it becomes linked to values partly transcending adaptation. This leads us to the second, negative, notion of freedom.

The notion of negative freedom from external determination, can in a basic sense already be used in biology. It has been shown that processes can acquire a certain autonomous inner dynamic, which need not lead to adaptation to an external environment. In this sense processes could, to a certain extent, become self-governed and free from external determination.

Generally, this concept of inherent tendencies may also make intrinsic autonomous tendencies in culture more plausible. The cultural sphere in general may already appear to be free, but only because it is, as I also supported in this work, based on an informational stratum of its own. For example, concepts can themselves be stored, transferred and copied—without a change in biological information (cf. also the treatment of ‘memes’ and what I rather called ‘*logoi*’). Culture can thereby accelerate the adaptation process and reduce its wastefulness and blindness. Such tendencies have here also been regarded as being rather non-Darwinian.¹²²⁷ But this does not yet directly imply negative freedom from external, natural determination. Yet, it has been shown that such autonomous inherent tendencies even exist in biotic nature, particularly if autoselection is involved. If this is conceded, it will, I think, become even more plausible for culture, in which there is such an additional level of information transfer above biological inheritance. Autonomous cultural tendencies in turn may have strongly influenced, for example through sexual selection, even our biotic nature.

The war-cry of some radical sociobiologists that morals have evolved “by natural selection”¹²²¹ and that morals only serve survival, neglects the multitude of actual evolutionary processes within the biotic world, which involve autonomous tendencies; moreover it wrongly, I think, denies the possibility of autonomous dynamics in culture.

(3.) The **idea of the good**, in the most general understanding of the term is fundamental for most philosophical and religious systems. Here it can be regarded as being to a certain extent an autonomous idea, which itself regulates the organisation of other ideas. A proper treatment of the idea of the good, even if conceived roughly along such lines, would refer to the complex discourse of ethics itself, and hence lies rather outside the scope of this work. Nevertheless, I still dare to make at least some speculative suggestions on this topic.

¹²²⁶ H. Jonas. *Evolution und Freiheit* (1984); *Organismus und Freiheit* (1973/1994), pp. 17 f. ☉ footnotes 118 f., 1224.

¹²²⁷ Such tendencies may be regarded as being linked to positive freedom in its most basic sense. Cf. small print above.

The approach of an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms, which can, up to a certain degree, lead to autonomous inner trends, suggests, as mentioned above, that presumably even more autonomous internal trends exist within culture. Although this cannot be elaborated upon here, the view may allow for intrinsic values which, in turn, may have an influence on our daily lives. A discussion of these trends would require to consider the historical character of human culture, the complexities of human reason as well as all the processes involved, in the case values evolve and change. My emphasis on the autonomy of values (understood in a broad sense) should not conceal the fact that values obviously also partly serve survival on the biotic level. Biotic survival is, in a way, a precondition for all other values. Yet, even survival, as I have shown in this work, need not be restricted to the interests of single selfish genes (☞ point one) and, moreover, values may also achieve this survival in a rather non-Darwinian, less wasteful, way. Values may lead, for example via sexual selection, to the effect that properties which are favourable for the group become evolutionarily stable without necessitating permanent group selection. But it is likewise plausible, in an analogy to the autonomous processes even in the biotic sphere that I have already discussed, that values can also acquire a certain autonomy from adaptation to an external environment. It is, for instance, widely held that one should value the absence of pain or the pursuit of happiness as being positive. This is the case—at least to some extent—even if these values no longer serve survival (otherwise the pains of those who are dying should not bother us).

Autonomous values, however, are not unrelated to each other and often acquire their autonomy not only by direct autoselection, but by being related to what we regard as being *good*. The abstract notion of the Good may be regarded as the supreme value towards which other values could become directed.

But how does the notion of the Good come into being? Only a few possible aspects can be mentioned here. Early on this notion may have at least primarily served adaptive purposes at the biotic level. It may have served to secure group cohesion or social exchange etc. The notion may have also been linked also with advantages it gave to the members who fulfilled the culturally and flexibly defined values of prehistoric societies. But one may also think of a certain inner stabilisation and autonomy of such a trend from external criteria, along similar lines, as it has been discussed in regard to sexual selection before. In culture, of course, the process of increasing autonomy will presumably have been much more refined, based on aspects of our rationality and certain processes which only appear on the level of culture itself. For instance, open discourses, on how things *should* develop seem to necessitate, at least, a very simple version of such a notion: it is actually difficult not to agree that we should organise our relationships or our society in such a way as good as possible. Even most dictators—who seem not to have relied on open discourses—often have tried to justify their rule as being good. However manipulative such discourses on what is good sometimes may have been, the notion of the Good somehow refers to a search for a common perspective (☞ pp. 412 f.).

The more concrete aspects of particular understanding of the Good that certain individuals or groups hold, can, I think, also be regarded as a unification of all the more particular values. In this perspective,

the Good is the hypothetical and always changing point of synthesis for all values which are regarded as being positive. The notion of the good, then, would, like the single values from which it draws, refer to survival aspects and equally to some autonomous tendencies, such as the afore mentioned value of the absence of pain. Such a synthesis would, of course, not have to be understood as a mere additive list of values, but a complex and self-referential (reflective) process which is based on all our cognitive-emotional capacities, which are in turn strongly moulded by the notions and procedures that we have learned. Our rationality and all involved processes have their own inner necessities. (The concept of selfreferentiality and multitude of processes will, perhaps, be plausible if one adopts an approach advocating the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms.) The good in this concrete sense is always constructed anew and is based on the multitude of processes, which in its most developed form may be called reason or wisdom. The notion of the good thereby transcends the particular autonomous tendencies, values and concepts from which itself draws. In this respect I agree with Moore: the notion of the Good is, once established, irreducible.

But how does the resulting notion of the Good again have an effect on the values which had been given before? Even values which do not represent an autonomous trend at all (which are exclusively based on heteroselection) need not refer to the natural criteria of survival alone, because, if a general and partly autonomous (partly autoselective) trend of the Good is established they may refer to this trend. This trend may constitute their new environment. Values within a general cultural development may become selected because they serve the general tendency of the Good, which in turn partly serves survival and partly the particular autonomous tendencies involved. In this sense the Good would have become, to voluntarily misuse a Kantian term, a '*regulative idea*'.

Generally this work is open to very different conceptions of the Good; I distinguish three types of approaches which are in principal compatible with the proposed view of nature.

(a) *Relativistic (normative) subjectivism*. Approaches which I denominate in this way, do not deny the causal force (shown above) of what is regarded as being good—in this weak sense they remain normative. They may additionally even hold that there are certain standards of the good within an individual or a community. In the above outlined understanding, the notion would still refer to a certain hypothetical point of synthesis for all the tendencies which are actually given. Nevertheless, this approach does not claim that this good refers to any *objective* truth.

(b) *Relativistic objectivism* likewise acknowledges the possible multitude of forms, but, nevertheless, still favours an logic of forms (*eidōs*) which is objective. A general stress on form, reminiscent of Aristotelian or Platonic approaches, may be coherent with my rather hylomorphic definition of entities (☞ pp. 243 f.). Although in such an approach it would be argued that different structures may have their own optimal form, these ideal forms are still objective for each case. For example Aristotle understands rightness in an objective but still situational way. More practically one may, for instance, say that, *if* organisms have evolved feelings, consciousness, and a notion of the Good, it *then* will be a

necessary ethical truth for them that the prevention of pain is a good in itself (which to some extent transcends mere survival). In such a formulation the objective law of form is located in the if-then relation, whereas the relativistic pluralism is found in the different possible premises.

(c) *Universal objectivism* could still possibly argue that the actual difference in the organisation of our highest values may be due to our ignorance. If this view should become possible in a context accepting evolution, it is necessary that the diversification of beings, which is obviously a basic phenomenon in biology, could become transcended on some level. The concept of the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms, developed in this work, renders it at least possible that on some level of cultural organisation it is not only diversification but also synthesis that may become cardinal. Even Popper argued that the process of evolution, understood as a process of knowledge acquisition, in the cultural quest for truth enters into a new mode, which does not lead to the diversification of opinions, but tends to unite them into one common stem.¹²²⁸ One may also speculate that such a cultural process, which leads to synthesis, had in evolution one time also to come into being, particularly if one considers the concept of processes of increased sight and self-referentiality as they are dealt with in this work. It may be possible to make plausible the idea that one day evolution needed to produce beings with feelings, consciousness and reason. These beings in their accidental properties would possibly differ considerably from humans, but certain values may be essential to any entity with such basic properties. For instance the partly autonomous value involved in the reduction of pain and the pursuit of happiness, may, in this sense, be regarded as being preordained. I think, however, that such a position could only possibly be made reasonable in respect to the most general ethical concepts that we may hold, like, for example, the *a priori* concept of Kant's categorical imperative, or, perhaps, a general religious or Christian, love commandment.

These three approaches need not to exclude each other but, if each approach is applied to different phenomena, they may also become combined. It may, for instance, be plausible to combine the third view, applied to the most abstract aspects of the notion of the Good, with the second (and perhaps the first) one, if applied to more specific aspects. I do not want to weigh these different options here against each other, but only aimed to point out that they may all more or less be compatible with the view of nature as exposed in this work.

In any case it appears plausible that values and our understanding of the Good plays part in moulding the actual world. (At least in the second and third case this may even be called *metexis*, ☉ pp. 78 f.).

None the less I finally want to consider an aspect of the notion of the Good which, in my view, is in any case essential to the notion itself. (Without discussing it here, this, perhaps, involves a certain inclination towards one of the above positions.) The notion of the Good is in my view tied to a search

¹²²⁸ K. R. Popper. *Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach* (1972/1979), pp. 262-263.

for *transcending a mere subjective position*. Although our ethical considerations will always start from a subjective or culture-specific viewpoint; a very property of the notion of the Good appears to be to aim to transcend these specific viewpoints. Although it is essential that existing internal autonomous tendencies are considered and possibly valued, it is, in my view, equally essential for ethics to search for a more general viewpoint. Ethics itself can even be understood as the quest for such a viewpoint in respect to the normative aspects of the world (as ontology can be regarded as being such a quest in respect to the descriptive aspects of the world). Although Kant is concerned with what he called the ‘moral law *within me*’¹²²⁹, his categorical imperative can be understood to entail such a search for a viewpoint on the Good which is as general as possible; the maxim one ought to search for must equally be a possible principle of a *general* legislation. The scope of this generality is in principle unrestricted. The most general viewpoint is the view from nowhere or from everywhere. Such a hypothetical objective viewpoint is compatible with the acknowledgement of the existence of individual or cultural subjectivity.¹²³⁰ The objective viewpoint which is sought after, points to something like what Rawls has called a ‘veil of ignorance’¹²³¹: while determining what is just and good, we try to abstract from the particular role we find ourselves in. Such a position does not need to deny that there are different inherent tendencies, which may also come in conflict with each other. Such a basic position does not entail a particular theory of justice, such as for example egalitarianism. These more concrete theories are linked to our further ontological, metaphysical and ethical positions. Likewise, this view from nowhere does not necessarily imply that we are personally responsible for everyone alike. Our personal duties may well be linked to the role we actually find ourselves in. Such a position only assumes that we try to determine what is just or good independent of our actual own position in the world.

But even if the notion of the common Good entails such a search for an impartial evaluation, the actual starting points of our search for the Good, and even the way in which we construct the world, will differ. None the less, it is of relevance whether one seeks impartiality or not. Such a quest implies a certain openness towards the Other. In a still different way also evolution from its outset is also not only directed towards *self*-preservation, but is open to the Other. Becoming, understood as a dialectical resolution (*Aufhebung*) of being and not-being, is not self-preservation, but self-transcendence. This becomes, in a changed way, even more so, if, in culture, the process of self-transcendence becomes directed by the notion of the good.

After much hard analysis in earlier chapters, I have in this short chapter only sketched some thoughts in as to what respect the ontological view that I have proposed here may have bearings on ethics and the

¹²²⁹ I. Kant. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (1990/1788), pp. 161-162, org.: pp. 288-289 (‘der bestimmte Himmel über mir und das moralische Gesetz in mir’).

¹²³⁰ Cf.: Th. Nagel. *The View from Nowhere* (1986), pp. 3 f.

¹²³¹ J. Rawls. *A Theory of Justice* (1990/1971), pp. 159 f.

general possibility of ethics. I, likewise, want to end this chapter in an open and slightly speculative way. It appears plausible to me that we are to a certain degree free to determine our own course of evolution and historical development. We are, as Sartre expressed 'condemned to be free'. We are thrown beyond open skies, and the light which leads us out of the dark is the idea of the Good. In order to determine the meaning of this notion constantly anew, we have to critically take into account and assess the treasures of all of our knowledge and ethical traditions. This has always been one of the primary tasks of philosophy. Contrary to some verdicts passed on it, philosophy is far from being dead. If it were, its 'rebirth' would be required.

Summary and Outlook — Towards Ecological Idealism

This work has been concerned with the historical understanding of gene-Darwinism and other Darwinian paradigms, with the exposure of Universal Darwinism and finally with a critique of the different types of gene-reductionism and Darwinian process reductionism.

In this last section, the work is first placed in a broader philosophical context. Then its contents are summarised with a particular focus on the work's last part. Finally an outlook on ecological idealism is sketched out.

On the General Philosophical Context

With respect to the general intellectual context, this work can be regarded as being concerned with the gene-Darwinian approach to re-unify the so-called 'two cultures' (Snow) in an especially downward-reductive way. The phenomenon of two cultures of understanding, given in the different subject areas, which are either concerned with the natural or the cultural world, goes back to Cartesian dualism which, in general, moulded the discourses of modern philosophy. It has been pointed out in this work that Cartesian dualism itself has even been influenced by a hidden Christian agenda regarding the human as a free *alter deus* and the physical world as a law governed, created *machina mundi* (☉ pp. 81 f.). In modern times the concept of *Machina mundi* has become increasingly understood in a *hylomorphic* sense, but in a mechanistic sense of matter in motion.

There have been many attempts to re-unify what only later became called the 'two cultures'. Often this has been undertaken in a downward-reductive way. Materialism asserted that everything could be reduced to matter in motion and, perhaps, a few basic physical laws of nature. In this work we have been concerned with the biologicistic claim that the social sciences and ethics can and ought to become reduced to biology and that these disciplines ought to become disciplines of evolutionary biology. The discussed radical paradigm of gene-Darwinism resembles earlier materialist approaches not only in its harsh generally biologicistic downward reductionism, but also in its particular atomism and understanding of laws of nature. Gene-Darwinism claims a thorough gene-atomism, in which single genes alone are the ultimate units of selection and all other seemingly existing layers of organisation are only their ephemeral vehicles. Moreover, gene-Darwinism (and process-Darwinism alike) advocates that Darwinian processes are the only and essentially unchangeable evolutionary processes. As already elaborated in more detail in this work, Darwinism in general can be understood as materialist transformation of a Newtonian-Platonic understanding of laws of nature, in which the laws of nature, and particularly the law of natural selection, are still regarded as eternally given. A force acts on organisms,^{☉677} which remain the blind and passive objects of evolution.

Although I share the intention that we should aim at formulating a unifying ontological framework, I think there is also some truth in dualism, at least in the limited sense that consciousness and culture are

hallmarks of the human being and that they are linked with a particular degree of sight and autonomy. Only because of this can human beings truly be characterised as having attributes like *homo symbolicus* (Cassirer), *homo metaphysicus* (Schopenhauer), or *homo politicus* (Aristotle). Any simple reduction of one realm to the other bears difficulties and the danger of neglecting the specific character of the other realm.

However, instead of defending the autonomy of consciousness and culture, I have in this work analysed radical gene-Darwinism, which is normally engaged in biologising these concepts. Instead of ignoring biology or pursuing the downward reduction of all layers above selfish genes, here I try to take a third way in criticising gene-Darwinism in order to achieve a paradigm which is, firstly, more suitable for biology itself and, secondly, also provides a better ontological basis for cultural freedom and ethics. Hence, although I also have treated process-Darwinian explanations in culture, I have been mainly concerned with biological questions.

This work generally suggests that an evolutionary theory of evolution is needed. Without denying the existence of selfish genes, it has proved impossible to reduce all evolving entities to simple selfish genes. Likewise, without denying the existence and importance of Darwinian processes, the Newtonian-Platonic understanding, still silently inherent in Darwinism, that the laws of nature do not essentially evolve, can, if based on a strict definition of Darwinian processes, not become sustained. A truly evolutionary theory, in which the processes of evolution are not static, is required. Apparently, new processes evolve which are not as radically blind and externally governed as it has to be assumed of Darwinian processes. It is shown that processes already become autonomous and self-determined in the biotic world.

If Darwin—as, for instance, Depew and Weber have suggested—can adequately be regarded as the “Newton of a blade of Grass” (an originally Kantian term), not only for Darwin’s importance but also because of his passive understanding of organisms on which external selection is acting, it appears to me—far from intending to belittle the great contributions of Darwin—that still an ‘Einstein of a blade of Grass’ is needed to come. Einstein has shown that the external categories of space and time are themselves not completely unchangeable, but are object to the structuredness of the physical world. Likewise, it appears that blind Darwinian processes are not eternally and externally given but to some extent can be said to evolve and change themselves.

Summary

In this summary, like generally in this concluding section, I mainly focus on the last critical part of the work. The earlier parts are rather briefly mentioned, but there are local summarising remarks at the beginnings or endings of most chapters as well as of several long sections. The main line of argument has also been outlined in the introduction.

In part I, chapter 1 deals with the description of sociobiology and as such pays attention to relevant sub-theories. At that point I have not elaborated in detail upon the distinction between the subject area and the paradigm, which I have clarified in the further course of the work. Even so the way in which I have described sociobiology in this chapter can, in retrospect, be regarded as closely resembling what

I later understand to be gene-Darwinism. Nevertheless, it also has become apparent that not all specific theories dealt with in this chapter have to be interpreted in a strictly gene-Darwinian way.

In chapter 2 the claim to biologise morality, as is often found in sociobiology, is discussed. I have argued that this claim, if taken seriously, would not only lead to a neutral acknowledgement of some aspects of our biological nature—to which, no doubt, sociobiology can contribute—but to a dismissal of what, from quite different viewpoints, has been called ‘ethics’. If one does not dismiss ethics altogether, a, so to speak, biological imperative, conceived exclusively along gene-Darwinian lines, can, because of the denial of any higher form of organisation aside from single selfish genes, and any other process aside from natural selection only venerate the prudent, but unconstrained, ruthless egoism of genes.

In part II, the historical part, I have in chapter 3 outlined pre-Darwinian conceptions of nature in the history of philosophy and early biology. Pre-Darwinian concepts of evolution have also been mentioned. This chapter later helped to contrast Darwinism with other possible philosophical viewpoints and other understandings of evolution.

In chapters 4 and 5 an account of the internal and external history of Darwinism has been given. Chapter 4 on the inner-biological theoretical and empirical appeal of different Darwinian sub-paradigms has revealed that what is often broadly called ‘Darwinism’ is not as uniform as is often assumed. This phenomenon was one of the reasons for the later endeavour to formulate a strict, but still appropriate, definition of a Darwinian process. In this chapter, resulting from a comparison with other discussed paradigms, I have also worked out what I regard to be the essence of gene-Darwinism.

Chapter 5 is an inquiry into the external influences on biological Darwinism and its sub-paradigms. It has been shown that Darwinism developed in intensive interaction with the more general philosophical *Zeitgeist* and also with some specific ideas from other subject areas, such as physics and economics. Such a historical understanding suggests, that—without denying inner-biological necessities—biology should also be conceived as being in part a *Geisteswissenschaft*.

In part III on universal Darwinism, Darwinian processes in many other non-biologistic subject areas have been laid bare. This was done partly based on the historical inquiry into the interaction of Darwinian processes. In chapter 6 two types of universal Darwinism have been distinguished, biologistic Darwinism, at best exemplified by radical gene-Darwinism, and (universal) process-Darwinism. It has not only been shown that these approaches actually regard Darwinism as a kind of new alkahest, a universal solvent for any problem, but an argument that has been developed which might substantiate a Darwinian metaphysic. I have considered in this respect the possible denial of any kind of induction. This has been understood in a broad sense as the claim that, in principle, any mechanism of change can never transcend blind guesses. I, however, ultimately opposed this argument at the point at which it is set out (and also later on). I have contended that this argument would only be justified if one had already defined any change as being totally unknowable. It is then only a true but empty tautology to claim that no change can be known in advance. I have opposed this position and

argued that certain processes of change can also have an enhanced probability of leading to positive results, and that it is an empirical and not merely a theoretical question to ask whether universal Darwinism is true or not.

In chapter 7 I have given a brief survey of how Darwinian algorithms have actually been applied in different subject areas outside of biology. It became apparent that there are not only structural similarities between, for instance, random-mutation-and-natural-selection processes in biology, trial-and-error learning in psychology and Popper's falsificationism, but also that the processes found in other subject areas have been partly criticised along similar lines. This is also true in respect to the discussion of tautological aspects. This treatment contributed to the later and detailed discussion of the possible tautological aspects of Darwinism particularly in biology. This part has also built also the basis for the later discussion of substance reductionism (as found in gene-Darwinism) and process-reductionism (as found in gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism).

In part IV different types of substance reductionism and process reductionism have been discussed and criticised. In its two relatively long chapters this criticism also resulted in many suggestions for a multi-level account of evolution and an approach emphasising the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms.

In Chapter 8, the first section is on problems of reductionism in general while the second is on the transcendence gene-atomism and the third on the transcendence of germ-line reductionism.

Discussing reductionism in general, it has first proved to be necessary to disentangle reduction from explanation: normally only a certain kind of explanation is meant by reduction—that of wholes to their parts. Only this more specific notion can reasonably be the object of criticism. For reasons of clarity I have named reduction, understood in this sense, as 'downward reduction'. The epistemological notion of downward reduction is here understood to correspond with the ontological notion of eliminative materialism. After these terminological preliminaries, I show that materialism leads to physicalism, but that modern physics does not at all support a simplistic concept of matter in motion. In the next subsection, which is pivotal for the general case against downward reductionism, I have not mainly defended the feasibility of wholes in their own right. Instead I have argued that the modern understanding of substances, which regards wholes as essentially being made up exclusively of their parts, is misconceived and turns out—if taken seriously—to be an inconsistent and not a viable conception. Besides this ontological argumentation, I, in parallel to this, positively propose a classification of different ways of explanation which would involve relations and structurally analogous cases as well. (From this perspective substance emergence has not to be linked to total unpredictability, which is otherwise entailed by occasionalism and, perhaps paradoxically, prevents the possibility of process emergentism.) Finally, I have discussed the general inconsistency of biologism with downward reductionism and I have advocated that the actual biologism in an interesting and subtle way already involves a subversion of the general principle of downward reduction.

In respect to gene-atomism it has, firstly, been made clear that the atomism involved cannot be interpreted in a tautological sense, meaning simply any stretch of DNA. Although such a tautological understanding seems sometimes to have immunised this view against criticism, a closer analysis reveals that selfish genes are taken to be relatively short sequences of DNA.

In the following I argued that, despite the meiotic shuffle, it is nevertheless reasonable to accept the existence of higher level genes which exist in a rather probabilistic sense and which, because of their synergetic properties, have a causal impact. Synergetic properties alone, however, do not necessarily lead to a stable larger wholes. I concede that these higher level units may, under certain conditions, become subverted by selfish genes that do not contribute to these advantageous wholes. Even so, I also showed that in certain populational constellations higher level genes may well be evolutionarily stable and even increasingly come to dominate the more selfish genes.

Then I discuss another tautological fallacy, namely that of defining any surviving gene as being selfish and then accepting this as a new finding. According to such a definition even genes which favour radical group altruism, and possibly survive through group selection, would, absurdly, be redefined as being selfish.

In the following sub-sections on the criticism of gene-atomism, I have discussed different possibilities of how genes which serve the good of the group can be established and become evolutionarily stable. I have discussed what I have called 'systemic individual selection', in which individual selection processes may occur in systemic combination and stabilise certain properties which would otherwise be subverted by selfish genes. If once such a system becomes established, for instance, by group selection, then such a system is stable against subversion from within by selfish genes and without the necessity of further permanent group selection. Moreover, following and developing on the proposals of Sober and Wilson in particular, it has been shown that refined structured population models of group selection, including groups of mixing individuals, can lead and stabilise evolutionary properties serving the common good. Gene-Darwinism, although correctly having pointed to some problems in some simple models of group selection, has gone much too far in claiming that such models are never viable at all. (I have also proposed that the conditions of applicability for the particular model discussed, can apparently—leaving everything else equal—, and based on a statistical effect, be generally extended to small groups of a certain maximal size.)

Finally, the species level and the possibility of multi-species systems up to the level of ecosystems have been discussed. I have come to the conclusion, that many different levels of evolutionary organisation seem, more or less, to have a causal relevance and, additionally, under certain conditions can not be subverted by selfish entities of a lower level. Gene-Darwinism has, in my view, been right to point out the existence of sub-organismic units of selection. Even so I have argued that the existence of larger levels of organisation can be proved and are also evolutionarily relevant. In this sense I reject the strong nominalism of gene-atomism.

In the next section on germ-line reductionism, I have started to make clear that the Weismann barrier does not imply germ-line reductionism. Although the Weismann barrier is currently being put to question by a few authors and some empirical phenomena, I take this so-called 'central dogma of microbiology' as generally given. Nevertheless, I have reasoned that germ-line reductionism has to be seen as a particularly radical gene-Darwinian interpretation of the central dogma, which regard phenotypes as mere vehicles of the genes, that have causal impact of their own. After introducing the general concepts of 'information' and 'exformation', I contended that phenotypes are not reducible to genetic information alone but also rely on exformation. Although this exformation is only indirectly altered, it is still a cause, which is, for instance, structurally present in the material which is used. These forms have their own necessities and can favour a certain direction or lead to certain evolutionary constraints. I argue that the morphological and functional constraints, albeit which also rely on genetic information transfer, are a causal factor in their own right.

The, perhaps, more daring concepts of morphological fields (also Goodwin), of external memory (still relying on genetic information transfer in another evolutionary line) and of a partial revival of morphological taxonomy cannot be summarised here. (Cf. the longer summary at the end of that section.)

To sum up, in chapter 8 I have opposed downward reductionism in general as well as gene-atomism and germ-line reductionism. As an alternative I have proposed a different understanding of substance and explanation; I have presented a multi-level account of evolutionary entities and I have also advocated that phenotypes have a certain importance in their own right.

In chapter 9, I have discussed and opposed process-reductionism, which is particularly marked in radical gene-Darwinism but also characteristic of process Darwinism. Process reductionism is in this work also generally regarded as being in principle a hallmark of pure Darwinism.

In the first section of this chapter I have pointed out that if Darwinian processes are applied on many ontological levels, as claimed by process-Darwinism or inner-biological multi-level Darwinism, then this will lead to inconsistencies. Moreover, I have shown that combinations of Darwinian processes taken as a new whole may have quite non-Darwinian effects.

Following this, two types of tautological arguments which are sometimes implicitly present in Darwinian approaches have been discussed at detail. Firstly, I have discussed tautological aspects of pan-adaptationism linked to the concept of the survival of the fittest and understood in the sense of the survival of the survivor. In this section, which I regard as one of the most refined of this work, I have analysed different notions of fitness and how far particular theories on what will actually survive can reasonably be called Darwinian. I have concluded that pan-adaptationism is either based on a tautological argument or is plainly false. The concept of adaptation, if understood as an increasing fit to an external environment, is, however, not a tautology. The subsequent discussion of possible tautological aspects of pan-selectionism follows along similar lines and provides the basis for our strict non-tautological definition of Darwinian processes.

To prevent tautological aspects of Darwinian processes I have subsequently defined Darwinian processes in a stricter way. I likewise aimed at such a definition in order to render a possibly concealed evolution of evolutionary mechanisms detectable. A Darwinian process is, for short, understood as a process of blind-variation-and-environmental-selection. Darwinism according to this definition turns out to be an extreme on the two dimensions of the blindness of trials and the externality of selection. In this understanding a refutation of, for instance, radical Lamarckism or predominantly internally directed evolution, as favoured by romantic biology, does not necessarily entail Darwinism and *vice versa*. I have argued that there can be positions between these extremes.

In the further course of chapter 9, I have shown that the different defining criteria of Darwinian processes are not met by many actual processes—even in biology. Besides diversification, synthesis also becomes an important factor of evolution in its own right. I argued at depth that variation is not always equally blind and wasteful but may gain a certain sight. I have started this argumentation by coming back to the earlier argument that variation should not be regarded as being blind by definition (only because it is concerned with change). There may be inner or outer continuities within evolutionary change itself. I have argued that evolutionary variation is actually not always totally blind. This has been argued within the proposed multi-level account of evolution. But I have also contended—without thereby promoting Lamarckism—that, based on our present knowledge of genetics, it appears reasonable to assume the existence of the variation of reduced blindness even in respect to mutations.

I have considered acknowledged genetical phenomena, like mutation rates, transferable elements, the role of repetition in complex adaptations, concerted evolution and genetic integration. I have argued, for example, that intricate genetic building blocks are often repeatedly found in quite different complex adaptive structures. It appears plausible to assume a certain enhanced fitness of such building blocks, since it is apparent that the involved complex adaptive structures would have never been build from scratch by single blind mutations. I have reasoned that a repetition of certain building blocks, relative to radically blind chance trials, could be assumed to have been internally advantageous. This, however, does not entail that these mutations are not mostly lethal as well, but that evolution only actually shows that they have—relatively—a much enhanced probability of leading to advantageous complex mutations than single radically blind trials, which would be needed for such complex adaptations instead. I also have advocated the existence, for example, of adaptive dimensions (perhaps even directions) of adaptation, not only in respect to microscopic structures but also in respect to macroscopic properties of the organism. But if one concedes that there are—internal or external—dimensions of variation, which are on average more relevant to adaptation than others, it becomes, based on the proven heritability and selectability of mutation rates and of transposable elements (and the other outlined mechanisms), highly plausible that to some degree also mutational variation has not always to be regarded as totally blind.

Furthermore, I have contrasted Darwinian heteroselection with the concept of autoselection, which can either also lead to less blind evolution or to inner autonomous dynamics. Processes based on autoselection do not need to lead to an adaptation to an external environment.

In the concluding sub-section of chapter 9 I once more discuss but somewhat more directly the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms and once more mention different ways in which new processes can evolve by being combined, changed or by emerging completely anew. Although Darwinian processes in this section have remained the baseline against which the differences of processes are measured, other more positive characteristics have been discussed. I have particularly reviewed the role of causal feedback for the emergence of new processes, a conception which, in a way, can be traced

back to the works of Kant at least. I argue once more that processes, which partly become their own determining cause, can give rise to developments which are truly independent of external selection. This has been linked to the notion of *negative freedom from* external determination. I then discussed other processes in which in a multi-level account of evolution the blindness of variation could be regarded as being reduced. In these cases autonomy, in the above sense, is not automatically achieved. Nevertheless the classes of processes which I discussed with a reduced blindness might also be said to have acquired a certain *positive freedom to* do what is necessary. Although necessity in biology will still be mostly understood as adaptation, particularly in the cultural realm, this general concept of directedness may also become linked to autonomous values or the pursuit of the good.

In chapter 10, which is brief, I have only sketched out how an ethical theory might look like, which is in accordance with the general results of this work. The 'regulative idea' of the Good could be understood to be a partly a autonomous idea, which possesses actual causal relevance. I have argued that the view proposed in this work builds a much better basis for ethics than universal Darwinism does, and is open to many quite different conceptions of the Good as they are actually found in different schools of ethics.

Ecological Idealism—an Outlook

After the ethical outlook put forward in chapter 10 I should now like to present an also slightly speculative more general outlook. The disputes within biology and philosophy concerning the understanding and interpretation of evolution seem to have a streak of W. Wordsworth's blissful dawn within them. A new synthesis seems to be in the making, leaving gene-Darwinism and, perhaps, Darwinism in general behind. This new evolutionary synthesis does, I think, still strongly draw from Darwinism—even from gene-Darwinism—, but does nevertheless transcend Darwinism and also differ considerably in its message (also Einstein's theory of relativity did not deny most of the phenomena observed by Newtonian physics, but gave them a different general framework). But I think that more than a new evolutionary synthesis is at stake and that more might be won. I hope that a new general paradigm, to which this work can of course only be a humble contribution, neither simply rests on the complete separation of the two cultures, nor simply tries to unify them by 'biologising' the social sciences. I risk to speculate that a new general philosophical framework—clearly differing from strict universal Darwinism, but still providing a unified ontological account—will arise. In post-modern times this might sound absurd, but surely such a framework would not be as restrictive as scholasticism had been. Equally, because today's known *Lebenswelten* differ enormously, a framework of this kind would definitely have to leave much space for plurality. Still, a common framework might become constructed in which the basic convictions of classical *Philosophia Perennis* and knowledge of modern science are synthesised. In this work I have pointed to the possible and, I think, necessary concept of the evolution of new layers of organisation and even to the concept of the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms.

The more general approach which I have in mind might be called '*ecological idealism*'. I think that this approach is also in line with what has been elaborated upon in this work, but may not directly follow on from it. I should therefore like to shortly characterise this approach. *Idealism* may refer to the following three aspects.

Firstly, the whole evolutionary process can broadly be understood as an *intellectual process*. Indeed, despite stressing the possibility of enhanced sight, I do not deny the blindness of this process at its very beginning and its remaining short-sightedness, particularly in biological evolution. Generally, in this view every organism is partly considered as representing a theory about its environment (and partly also revealing something about its inner reflective dynamics).

Secondly, there are *inherent tendencies* of evolution. The evolution of entities is not just externally governed. This inner dynamic can, to a certain extent, gain some freedom and detachment. The 'theories' (for instance, of organisms or real concepts alike) are not to be understood in a naively realistic sense. Although this appears to me to be even more valid in regard to the cultural sphere, it has been made apparent in this work that, up to a certain degree, there are autonomous internal trends already in the biological sphere. Although entities are also 'tested' against the 'external' world, they have also an own inner structure and possibly an inherent tendency which may, up to a point, even come to dominate the direction of evolution. (Cf. the treatment of autoselection and autonomy.)

Thirdly, in respect of culture, I have advocated the possibility that the values, which may partly serve survival and also partly refer to autonomous tendencies, might become unified and controlled by the *regulative idea of the Good*. We human beings not only live to survive but also to realise our ideals. I have argued, that the Good has, in any case, to be understood as taking part in moulding the actual world. I have contended that the outlined understanding is still open to be filled in by the different ethical traditions, which either interpret the Good in a relativistic and subjective sense or refer to the necessities of an inner logic of forms, understood in an Aristotelian, in an *a priori* or even Platonic sense. (Cf. the treatment of the notion of the Good; the discussion of the evolution of evolutionary processes and the criticism of the modern understanding of substance, in which I favoured a rather hylomorphic conception.)

Despite these three reasons to choose the term 'idealism', I want to make clear that I do not intend to neglect the outer because I stress the importance of the inner. In terms of epistemology this approach would aim at the combination of a coherence theory and a correspondence theory of truth (as, perhaps, also became apparent in the argumentations of this work). Both empiricism and rationalism possess a certain truth. Moreover, there is a certain inner freedom and an unfolding of inner forms, but this freedom is limited and there are also external necessities (and forms). In this sense I do not intend to defend radical idealism, but use the term in contrast to other theories which do not put emphasis on the three points made above.

The first reason why the adjective '*ecological*' has been adopted, is exactly to moderate the possible understanding of idealism. Ecology usually—from the human perspective—stresses the importance of the outer. Moreover, ecology is linked with a materialist understanding of nature, although not in a radical downward-reductive sense. However, these aspects of the notion ecology should serve to somewhat counterbalance an over-ambitious understanding of idealism: although we may exist to serve the idea of the Good, we should neither ignore the actual world nor our own limitations in doing what we suppose to be good.

Secondly, the term '*ecological*' should also stand for the aspect of this envisioned approach that neither focuses on single entities nor on the whole, but rather on their *relations* or interconnections. The conception of substance which I introduced abandoned the modern elementary materialistic formulation and has reformulated the classical conception, putting a stronger emphasis on the concept of relation. (Cf. the criticism of the modern understanding of substance and also, perhaps, the concept of exformation.)

Thirdly, the term '*ecological*' points to the fact that humanity has developed far enough to take aspects of the biotic world into 'the expanding circle' of ethically relevant creatures. This is on the one hand necessary to save the survival of the '*zoon ethicon*', while on the other hand, it is touchstone for whether this animal deserves this name.

Bibliography

- Allen, Colin; Bekoff, Marc; Lauder, George (ed.). *Nature's Purposes. Analyses of Function and Design in Biology*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT-Press, 1998.
- Allen, Garland E.: *The several faces of Darwin: materialism in nineteenth and twentieth century evolutionary theory*. In: Bendall, D. S. (ed.): *Evolution from Molecules to Men*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 81-102.
- *The Evolutionary Synthesis: Morgan and Natural Selection Revisited*. In: Mayr, Ernst; Provine, William B. (ed.): *The Evolutionary Synthesis*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1998 (1980), pp. 356-382.
- Alexander, Richard D.: *Darwinism and Human Affairs*. University of Washington Press, Seattle, Washington, 1979. [Quoted in: Voland, E.; Winkler, P.; 1990.]
- Amundson, Ron: *Two Concepts of Constraint: Adaptationism and the Challenge from Developmental Biology* (first publ. in: *Philosophy of Science*, 61, 1994, 556-578). Hull, David Lee; Ruse, Michael (ed.): *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 93-116.
- Aquinas, St Thomas (ed: Gilby, Thomas): *Summa Theologiae* (60 vols.; Latin & English), various translators. Cambridge: Blackfriars, 1963-1975 (1266-1273).
- Ayer, Alfred Jules: *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*. London: Orion, 1992 (1982).
- Aristotle (ed.: W. D. Ross): *Physics*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1960 (1936).
- (ed. & transl.: P. H. Wicksteed): *The Physics*. London: William Heinemann; Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1957.
- (ed. & transl.: A. L. Peck): *Generation of Animals (De generatione animalium)*. London: William Heinemann; Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1943.
- (ed. & transl.: A. L. Peck): *Parts of Animals (De partibus animalium)*. London: William Heinemann; Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1937.
- Bach, Thomas: *Wissenschaft und Philosophie der Natur um 1800. Prinzipien, Dimensionen, Perspektiven*. In: Kanz, Kai Torsten (ed.): *Die Philosophie des Organischen in der Goethezeit: Studien zu Werk und Wirkung des Naturforschers Carl Friedrich Kilmeyer*. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1994, pp. 232-251.
- Bandura, A.: *The Self System in reciprocal determinism*. In: *American Psychologist*, 33, 1978, pp. 344-358.
- Barkow, Jerome H.; Cosmides, Leda; Tobby, John (ed.): *The Adapted Mind. Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Barrow, John D.; Tipler, Frank J.: *The Anthropic Cosmological Principle*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1990 (1986).
- Bateson, Patrick P. G.: *Rules for changing rules*. In: Bendall, D. S. (ed.): *Evolution from Molecules to Men*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1985 (1983), pp. 483-506.
- Baumgartner, Hans Michael: *Metaphysik der Natur. Natur aus der Perspektive spekulativer und kritischer Philosophie*. In: Honnefelder, Ludger (ed.): *Natur als Gegenstand der Wissenschaften*. Freiburg (Breisgau), München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1992, pp. 237-266.
- Bayertz, Kurt (ed.): *Evolution und Ethik*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1993.
- *Evolution und Ethik. Größe und Grenzen eines philosophischen Forschungsprogramms*. In: Bayertz, Kurt (ed.): *Evolution und Ethik*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1993, pp. 7-36.
- *Autonomie und Biologie*. In: Bayertz, Kurt (ed.): *Evolution und Ethik*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1993, pp. 327-359.
- Bechtel, William: *Toward Making Evolutionary Epistemology into a Truly Naturalized Epistemology*. In: Rescher, Nicholas (ed.): *Evolution, Cognition, and Realism; Studies in Evolutionary Epistemology*. Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1990, pp. 63-77.
- Becker, Gary S.: *Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology*. In: *Journal of Economic Literature*. vol. 4, no. 3, 1976, pp. 817-26.
- Beckermann, Ansgar: *Supervenience, Emergence, and Reduction*. In: Beckermann, Ansgar; Flohr, Hans; Kim, Jaegwon (ed.): *Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism*. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1992, pp. 94-118.
- Bendall, D. S. (ed.): *Evolution from Molecules to Men*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Berwick, Robert C.: *The alpinist's pledge. Why genes do not explain everything*. In: *Times Literary Supplement*. 6, 1996, pp. 24-25.

- Beurton, P.: *Organismic Evolution and Subject-Object Dialectics*. In: Jensen, U. J. ; Harré, R. (ed.): *The Philosophy of Evolution*. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981, pp. 45-60.
- Bieri, Peter: *Analytische Philosophie des Geistes*. Königstein/Ts.: Hain, 1981.
- Bigelow, John: *Universals*. In: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (gen. ed.: Craig, Edward; vol. 9): London, New York: Routledge (1998), pp. 539-544.
- Birg, Herwig: *Der überfüllte Planet. Lebenserwartung, generatives Verhalten und die Dynamik des Weltbevölkerungswachstums*. In: Schlieffenhövel, Wulf, Vollmer, Gerhard; Vogel, Christian (ed.): *Der Mensch. Anthropologie heute* (Heft 9, Studieneinheit 27). Tübingen: Deutsches Institut für Fernstudien an der Univ. Tübingen, 1993, pp. 1-50.
- Blackwell, Ron; Chatha, Jaspal; Nell, Edward J. (ed.): *Economics as Worldly Philosophy. Essays in Political and Historical Economics in Honour of Robert L. Heilbroner*. London: Macmillan Press, 1993.
- Blümecke, Thomas: *Wunder der Evolution. Optimierung mit Evolutionsstrategien und genetischen Algorithmen*. In: c't magazin für computer und technik. 12, 1991, pp. 228-239.
- Bock, J. Walter; von Wahlert, Gerd. *Adaptation and the Form-Function Complex* (first publ. in *Evolution*, 19, 1965). In: Allen, Colin; Bekoff, Marc ; Lauder, George (ed.). *Nature's Purposes. Analyses of Function and Design in Biology*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT-Press, 1998, pp. 117-167.
- Böhme, Gernot: *Am Ende des Baconschen Zeitalters. Studien zur Wissenschaftsentwicklung*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993.
- Bowler, Peter J.: *Malthus, Darwin, and the Concept of Struggle*. In: *Journal of the History of Ideas*. Vol. 37, No. 4, 1976, pp. 631-650.
- *The Eclipse of Darwinism: Anti-Darwinism Evolution Theories in the Decades around 1900*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983.
 - *Evolution; The History of an Idea*. Berkeley, Los Angeles etc.: University of California Press, 1984.
 - *The Non-Darwinian Revolution*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988.
 - *Charles Darwin: the Man and His Influence* (Science Biogr., gen. ed.: D. Knight). Oxford, Cambridge (Mas.): Basil Blackwell, 1990.
 - *Life's Splendid Drama. Evolutionary Biology and the Reconstruction of Life's Ancestry. 1860-1940*. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- Bradie, Michael: *Assessing Evolutionary Epistemology*. In: *Biology and Philosophy*. 1, 1986, pp. 401-59. [Quoted in: Bechtel, W.; 1990.]
- Brandon, Robert N.: *The Levels of Selection: A Hierarchy of Interactors*. (First published in H. Plotkin. *The Role of Behavior in Evolution*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988) In: Hull, David Lee; Ruse, Michael (ed.): *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998 (1988), pp. 176-197.
- Bräuer, Günter: *Vom Puzzle zum Bild. Fossile Dokumente der Menschwerdung*. In: Schlieffenhövel, Wulf, Vogel, Christian; Vollmer, Gerhard (ed.): *Der Mensch. Anthropologie heute* (Heft 2, Studieneinheit 4). Tübingen: Deutsches Institut für Fernstudien an der Univ. Tübingen, 1992, pp. 1-56.
- Bredenkamp, Jürgen; Wippich, Werner: *Lern- und Gedächtnispsychologie* (Bd. 1). Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1977.
- Briggs, Asa: *Victorian Britain*. In: *Encarta 99 Encyclopedia*. Microsoft, 1993-1998.
- Browne, Janet: *Biogeography and empire*. In: Jardine, Nicholas; Secord, James A.; Spary, Emma C. (ed.): *Cultures of Natural History*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 305-321.
- Brumlik, Micha: *Die Gnostiker. Der Traum von der Selbsterlösung des Menschen*. Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn Verlag, 1992.
- Buffon, Gorges-Louis Comte de: *Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière*. Paris: Imprimerie Royale, puis Plassan, 1749-1789.
- Burnet, F. M.: *The Clonal Selection Theory of Acquired Immunity*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1959.
- Burrow, John W.: *Editor's Introduction to Darwin's 'Origin of Species' (from 1968)*. In: Darwin, Charles (ed: Burrow, John W.): *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*. London, New York etc.: Penguin Books, 1985 (1859), pp. 11-48.
- Cairns, John; Overbaugh, Julie; Miller, Stephen: *The Origin of Mutants*. In: *Nature*. 8th Sep., vol. 335, 1988, pp. 142-145.
- Call, Lewis: *Anti-Darwin, Anti-Spencer: Friedrich Nietzsche's Critique of Darwin and 'Darwinism'*. In: *History of Science*. Vol. 36, 1998, pp. 1-22.
- Campbell, Donald T.: *Adaptive Behaviour from Random Response*. In: *Behavioral Science*. Vol. 1, 1956, pp. 105-110.
- *Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes*. In: Radnitzky, Gerhard and Bartley, W. W.. *Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge* (first publ. in: *Psychological Review*, 67, 1960, pp. 380-400). La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co.; 1987, pp. 91-114.

- *Evolutionary Epistemology*. In: Schilpp, Paul A.: *The Philosophy of Karl R. Popper*. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974, pp. 413-463.
- *Epistemological Roles for Selection Theory*. In: Rescher, Nicholas (ed.): *Evolution, Cognition, and Realism: Studies in Evolutionary Epistemology*. Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1990, pp. 1-19.
- Caplan, A. L. (ed.): *The Sociobiology Debate*. New York: Haper and Row, 1978.
- Chambers, Robert (ed.; Secord, James A.): *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation [and Other Evolutionary Writings]*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994 (John Churchill, 1844).
- Charlesworth, D.; et. al.: *Origin of Mutants Disputed*. In: *Nature*. Vol. 336, 1988, pp. 525-528.
- Chinnici, J. P.: *Modification of recombination frequency in Drosophila*. In: *Genetics*, 69, pp. 71-83; 85-96 [Quoted in: D. J. Futuyma, 1990 (1986), p. 316.]
- Churchland, Paul M.: *A Neurocomputational Perspective. The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: MIT Press (A Bradford Book), 1989.
- Colp, Ralph: *Charles Darwin's Past and Future Biographies*. In: *History of Science*, Vol. 27, 1989, pp. 167-197.
- Cooper, David E.: *World Philosophies, An Historical Introduction*. Oxford (UK), Cambridge (USA): Blackwell Publishers, 1996.
- Cooper, David E.; Palmer, Jay A. (ed.): *The Environment in Question. Ethics and Global Issues*. New York, Routledge, 1992.
- Cornell, John F.: *From Creation to Evolution: Sir William Dawson and The Idea of Design in the Nineteenth Century*. *Journal of the History of Biology*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1983, pp. 137-170.
- Cornwell, John: *Is mind merely matter?* In: *The Sunday Times*. 15th May, 1994, pp. 10'4-10'6.
- Cosmides, Leda; Tobby, John: *Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange*. In: Barkow, Jerome H.; Cosmides, Leda; Tobby, John (ed.): *The Adapted Mind. Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 163-228.
- Craig, Edward (gen. ed.): *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. London, New York: Routledge (1998).
- Carus, Carl Gustav: *Von den Naturreichen, ihrem Leben und ihrer Verwandtschaft*. *Zeitschrift für Natur- und Heilkunde*, 1, 1820.
- Cunningham, Andrew; Jardine, Nicholas (ed.): *Romanticism and the sciences*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Dahl, Edgar: *Im Anfang war der Egoismus. Den Ursprüngen menschlichen Verhaltens auf der Spur*. Düsseldorf, Wien etc.: Econ Verlag, 1991.
- Darwin, Charles (ed: Burrow, John W.): *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*. London, New York etc.: Penguin Books (Penguin Classics), 1985 (new publication of the first edition, John Murray, 1859, with *Historical Sketch* and *Glossary* from the sixth edition).
- *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*, 2nd edn. London: John Murray, 1922 (1874/1871).
- (ed.: Barlow, Nora): *The Autobiography of Charles Darwin*. London: Collins, 1958 (1876).
- (transcribed and edited by: Barrett, Paul H.; Gautrey, Peter J.; Herbert, Sandra; Kohn, David; Smith, Sydney): *Charles Darwin's Notebooks, 1836-1844*. Cambridge, New York: British Museum, Cambridge University Press.
- (ed.: Darwin, Francis): *Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* (3 vols.). London, John Murray 1887 (including Charles Darwins autobiography written 1876).
- (ed.: Herbert, Sandra): *The Red Notebook of Charles Darwin*. Ithaca, London: British Museum, Cornell University Press (1980/1836).
- (ed.: Smith, Sydney & Burkhard, Frederick et al.): *The Correspondance of Charles Darwin*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1985 series continuing.
- Dawkins, Richard: *The Selfish Gene*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1990 reprint of 1989 edition (1976).
- *Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype*. In: *Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie*. Vol. 47, 1978, pp. 61-76.
- *In Defence of Selfish Genes*. In: *Philosophy*. 56, 1981, pp. 556-573.
- *The Extended Phenotype. The Long Reach of the Gene* (the first edition had the different subtitle: *The Gene as the Unit of Selection*). Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1989 (1982).
- *The Blind Watchmaker*. London, New York etc.: Penguin Books, 1991 (1986).
- *Universal Darwinism*. In: Bendall, D. S. (ed.): *Evolution from Molecules to Men*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1985 (1983), pp. 403-425.
- *River out of Eden. A Darwinian View of Life*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson (Orion), 1995.
- *Climbing Mount Improbable*. London, New York etc.: Penguin Books, 1996.

- Dawkins, Richard; Carlisle, T. R.: *Parental investment, mate desertion and a fallacy*. In: *Nature*. Vol. 262, 1976, pp. 131-133.
- Dawkins, Richard; Krebs, J. R.: *Animal signals: information or manipulation?* In: Krebs, J. R.; Davis, N. B.: *Behavioural Ecology*. Oxford (UK), Cambridge (USA): Blackwell Publishers, 1978, pp. 282-309.
- Degler, Carl N.: *In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Deichmann, Ute: *Biologists under Hitler*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1996 (Campus Verlag, 1992).
- Dennert, E.: *At the Deathbed of Darwinism*, transl. by E. V. O'Hara. Burlington (Iowa): 1904.
- Dennett, Daniel C.: *Darwin's Dangerous Idea. Evolution and the Meanings of Life*. London, New York etc.: Penguin Books, 1995.
- *Es geht auch ohne Gott und Geist. Darwins ätzende Idee zerfrisst die letzten Mythen. Als Sinn des Lebens bleibt nur Neugier und die Liebe zur Wahrheit*. In: *Die Zeit*, transl. by Büning, Meinhard. Nr. 8, 16th Feb., 1996, pp. 30-31.
- Depew, David J.; Weber, Bruce H.: *Darwinism Evolving. Systems Dynamics and the Genealogy of Natural Selection*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: MIT Press (A Bradford Book), 1995.
- Desmond, Adrian: *Robert E. Grant: The Social Predicament of Pre-Darwinian Transmutationist*. *Journal of the History of Biology*, vol. 17, no. 2, 1984, pp. 189-223.
- Desmond, Adrian; Moore, James Richard: *Darwin*. London, New York etc: Penguin Books, 1992 (Michael Joseph, 1991).
- Diefenbacher, Hans; Ratsch, Ulrich: *Verelendung durch Naturzerstörung. Die politischen Grenzen der Wissenschaft*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1992.
- Ditfurth, Hoimar von: *Der Geist fiel nicht vom Himmel. Die Evolution unseres Bewußtseins*. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980 (Hoffmann und Campe, 1976).
- *Im Anfang war der Wasserstoff*. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1981 (Hoffmann und Campe, 1972).
- Dobzhansky, Theodosius: *Genetics and the Origin of Species*, 3rd edn. New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1951 (1937).
- *Mankind Evolving. The Evolution of the Human Species*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1962.
- Driesch, Hans: *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*. London: A. & C. Black, Ltd., 1929 (1908).
- Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus: *Die Biologie des menschlichen Verhaltens. Grundriß einer Humanethologie*. München: Piper Verlag, 1984.
- Eldredge, Niles: *Reinventing Darwin. The Great Evolutionary Debate*. London: Phoenix (Orion), 1996 (1995).
- Eldredge, Niles; Gould, Stephen Jay: *Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism*. In: Schopf, T. J. M. (ed.): *Modells in Palaeontology*. San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper & Company, 1972, pp. 82-115.
- Encyclopædia Britannica* (CD Standard Edition, Version 1999). Bristol: Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 1994-1999.
- Engelhardt, Dietrich von: *Historical consciousness in the German Romantic Naturforschung*. In: Cunningham, Andrew; Jardine, Nicholas (ed.): *Romanticism and the sciences*, transl. by Salazar, Christine. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 55-67.
- *Wissenschaft und Philosophie der Natur um 1800. Prinzipien, Dimensionen, Perspektiven*. In: Kanz, Kai Torsten (ed.): *Die Philosophie des Organischen in der Goethezeit: Studien zu Werk und Wirkung des Naturforschers Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer*. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1994, pp. 252-269.
- Engels, Eve-Marie: *Herbert Spencers Moralwissenschaft - Ethik oder Sozialtechnologie?* In: Bayertz, Kurt (ed.): *Evolution und Ethik*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1993, pp. 243-287.
- Eysenck, Michael W.; Keane, Mark T.: *Cognitive Psychology*. East Sussex: Psychology Press, 1995.
- Fahrig, Rudolf (ed.): *Mutationsforschung und Genetische Toxikologie*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993.
- Felt, James W., S. J.: *Proposal for a Thomistic-Whiteheadian Metaphysics of Becoming*. In: *International Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. XL, no. 2, issue no. 158 (2000), pp. 253-263.
- Fichte, Johann Gottlieb: *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*, 4th edn. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988 (1794).
- Fisher, Ronald A.: *Statistical Methods for Research Workers*. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1925.
- *The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930.
- Flohr, Hans: *Qualia and Brain Processes*. In: Beckermann, Ansgar; Flohr, Hans; Kim, Jaegwon (ed.): *Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism*. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1992, pp. 220-238.
- Fodor, Jerry A.: *Special Sciences (or: the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)*. In: *Synthese*. 28, 1974, pp. 97-115.

- Frankel, Simon J.: *The Eclipse of Sexual Selection Theory*. In: Porter, Roy; Teich, Mikulás (ed.): *Sexual Knowledge, Sexual Science. The History of Attitudes to Sexuality*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 158-183.
- Frith, Lucy: *Sociobiology, ethics and human nature*. In: Lamp, David (ed.): *New Horizons in the Philosophy of Science*. Aldershot, Brookfield etc.: Avebury, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1992, pp. 127-155.
- Futuyma, Douglas J.: *Evolutionsbiologie*. (Transl. and revised by B. König.) Birkhäuser Verlag: Basel etc., 1990 (1986).
- Fyfe, Aileen: *The reception of William Paley's 'Natural Theology' in the University of Cambridge*. In: *British Journal for the History of Science*, 30, 1997, pp. 321-335.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg: *Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*. Gesammelte Werke, Band 1; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960/1990.
- Geoffroy St. Hilaire, Étienne: *Philosophie Anatomique*. Paris: Mequignon-Marvis, 1818.
- Giere, Ronald N.: *Evolutionary Models of Science*. In: Rescher, Nicholas (ed.): *Evolution, Cognition, and Realism; Studies in Evolutionary Epistemology*. Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1990, pp. 21-32.
- Gigerenzer, Gerd: *Domain-specific reasoning: Social contracts, cheating, and perspective change*. In: *Cognition*, 43, 1992, pp. 127-171.
- Gilboff, Sander: *Gregor Mendel and the Laws of Evolution*. In: *History of Science*, 37, 1999, pp. 217-235.
- Goldfuss, G. A.: *Grundriss der Zoologie*. Nürnberg. 1826. [Quoted in: D. v. Engelhard, 1990.]
- Gloy, Karen: *Das Verständnis der Natur. Bd. 1 Die Geschichte des wissenschaftlichen Denkens*. München: C. H. Beck, 1995.
- *Das Verständnis der Natur. Bd. 2 Die Geschichte des ganzheitlichen Denkens*. München: C. H. Beck, 1996.
- Goodwin, Brian C.; Webster, Gerry; Wayne-Smith, Joseph: *The 'evolutionary paradigm' and constructional biology*. In: Lamp, David (ed.): *New Horizons in the Philosophy of Science*. Aldershot, Brookfield etc.: Avebury, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1992, pp. 156-168.
- Gore, Al: *Wege zum Gleichgewicht. Ein Marshallplan für die Erde* (Org.: *Earth in the Balance — Ecology and Human Spirit*). Translated by F. Hörmann, W. Brumm. Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1992 (1992).
- Götschl, Johann: *Zur philosophischen Bedeutung des Paradigmas der Selbstorganisation*. In: Allgemeine Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Deutschland e. V. (AGPD) (ed.): *Neue Realitäten. Herausforderung der Philosophie* (XVI. Deutscher Kongress f. Philosophie der AGPD, 1993). Berlin: Technische Universität Berlin, Bibliothek, 1993, pp. 66-73.
- Gould, Stephen Jay: *Ever Since Darwin. Reflections in Natural History*. London, New York etc.: Pinguin, 1991 (The American Museum of Natural History, 1973).
- *The Panda's Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History*. London, New York etc.: Pinguin, 1983 (1980).
- *Irrelevance, submission, partnership: the changing role of paleontology in Darwin's three centennials and a modest proposal for macroevolution*. In: Bendall, D. S. (ed.): *Evolution from Molecules to Men*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1985 (1983), pp. 347-365.
- *Evolutionäre Flexibilität und menschliches Bewußtsein*. In: Koslowski, Peter; Kreuzer, Philipp; Löw, Reinhard (ed.): *Evolution und Freiheit*. Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag, 1984, pp. 24-35.
- Gould, Stephen Jay; Eldredge, Niles: *Punctuated equilibria: The tempo and mode of evolution reconsidered*. In: *Paleobiology*, 3, 1977, pp. 115-151.
- Gould, Stephen Jay; Lewontin, Richard C.: *The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm*. In: *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B*, 205, 1979, pp. 581-598.
- Gould, Stephen Jay; Vrba, Elisabeth S.: *Exaptation—A Missing Term in the Science of Form*. (First published in *Paleobiology*, 8/1, 1982, pp. 4-15.) In: Hull, David Lee; Ruse, Michael (ed.): *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 52-71.
- Grammer, Karl: *Signale der Liebe. Die biologischen Gesetze der Partnerschaft*. 3rd edn., Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag: München, 1998 (1995).
- Greene, John C.: *Biology and Social Theory in the Nineteenth Century: August Comte and Herbert Spencer*. In: *Science, Ideology and World View* (first publ. in: Marshall Clagett, ed., *Critical Problems in the History of Science*). Berkeley etc.: University of California Press, 1981 (1959), pp. 60-94.
- *The Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural History*. In: *Science, Ideology and World View* (first publ. in: Duane Roller, ed., *Perspectives in the History of Science and Technology*). Berkeley etc.: University of California Press, 1981 (1971), pp. 30-59.
- *Darwin as a Social Evolutionist*. In: *Science, Ideology and World View* (first publ. in: *Journal of the History of Biology*, 10). Berkeley etc.: University of California Press, 1981 (1977), pp. 95-127.
- *Science, Ideology and World View. Essays in the History of Evolutionary Ideas*. Berkeley, Los Angeles etc.: University of California Press, 1981.

- Gregory, Frederick: *Theology and the sciences in the German Romantic period*. In: Cunningham, Andrew; Jardine, Nicholas (ed.): *Romanticism and the sciences*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 69-81.
- Griffin, Susan: *Woman and Nature. The Roaring Inside Her*. London: The Women's Press Ltd., 1994 (1978).
- Groh, Ruth; Groh, Dieter: In: *Religiöse Wurzeln der ökologischen Krise. Naturtheologie und Geschichtsoptimismus in der frühen Neuzeit* (first published 1990). Groh, Ruth; Groh, Dieter: *Weltbild und Naturaneignung. Zur Kulturgeschichte der Natur*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991, pp. 11-91.
- Group of Lisbon: *Grenzen des Wettbewerbs. Die Globalisierung der Wirtschaft und die Zukunft der Menschheit*. Org. title: *Limits of Competition*, transl. by Colon, V.; Grüber, K. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1998 (MIT-Press, 1995).
- Gulick, Robert van: *Nonreductive Materialism and the Nature of Intertheoretical Constraint*. In: Beckermann, Ansgar; Flohr, Hans; Kim, Jaegwon: *Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism*. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1992, pp. 157-179.
- Guttenberg, A. Ch. von: *Biologie als Weltanschauung. Eine erkenntniskritische Analyse der Darwinismen*. Ratingen: A. Henn Verlag, 1967
- Hacking, Ian: *The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Haeckel, Ernst Heinrich: *The History of Creation or the Development of the Earth and its Inhabitants by the Action of Natural Causes*, 3rd edn, transl. by Lankester, E. Ray. London: Kegan Paul, 1883.
- Haken, Hermann: *Synergetics. An Introduction. Nonequilibrium Phase Transitions and Self-Organization in Physics, Chemistry, and Biology*. Berlin, Heidelberg etc.: Springer-Verlag, 1983 (1977).
- *Indeterminismus, Wahl und Freiheit - wie sind diese Begriffe im Bereich des Anorganischen zu verstehen?* In: Koslowski, Peter; Kreuzer, Philipp; Löw, Reinhard et al. (ed.): *Evolution und Freiheit*. Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag, 1984, pp. 13-23.
 - *Erfolgsgeheimnisse der Natur. Synergetik: Die Lehre vom Zusammenwirken*. Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995 (1991).
- Hamilton, William D.: *The genetical evolution of social behaviour, I. + II*. In: *Journal of Theoretical Biology*. 7, 1964, pp. 1-16, 17-32.
- *Innate social aptitudes in man: An approach from evolutionary genetics*. In: Fox, R. (ed.): *Biosocial Anthropology*. New York: Wiley, 1975, pp 133-155. [Quoted in: E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, 1998].
- Hargrove, Eugene C. : *Religion and Environmental Ethics: Beyond the Lynn White Debate*. In: Hargrove, Eugene C. (ed.): *Religion and Environmental Crisis*. Athens, London: University of Georgia Press, 1986, pp. ix-xix.
- Harlow, H. F.: *The formation of leaning sets*. *Psychological Review*, 56, 1949, pp. 51-66.
- Hartmann, Nicolai: *Der Aufbau der realen Welt. Grundriß der allgemeinen Kategorienlehre*, 3rd edn. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1964.
- Hawkins, M.: *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Hayek, Friedrich August von: *Competition as a Discovery Procedure*. In: Hayek, F. A.: *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas*. London: Routledge & Kegan, 1978 (1968).
- *The Atavism of Social Justice*. In: Hayek, F. A.: *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas*. London: Routledge & Kegan, 1978 (1976).
- Hearnshaw, L. S.: *A Short History of British Psychology 1840-1940*. London: Methuen & Co., 1964.
- Heidegger, Martin: *Sein und Zeit*. 17th ed.; Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993 (1926/1953).
- Heidelberger, Michael: *Naturphilosophie*. In: *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (gen. ed.: Craig, Edward; vol. 6): London, New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 737-742.
- Heisenberg, Werner: *The Representation of Nature in Contemporary Physics*. In: May, Rollo (ed.): *Symbolism in Religion and Literature*. New York: Haper and Row, 1960.
- Hemminger, Hansjörg: *Der Mensch - eine Marionette der Evolution? Eine Kritik an der Soziobiologie*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1983. [Quoted in: Hemminger, H.; 1994.]
- *Soziobiologie des Menschen - Wissenschaft oder Ideologie*. In: *Spektrum der Wissenschaft*. June 1994, pp. 72-80.
- Hempel, Carl Gustav: *Philosophy of Natural Science*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966.
- Hirschberger, Johannes: *Geschichte der Philosophie. Band I: Altertum und Mittelalter*, 14th edn. Freiburg im Breisgau, Basel, Wien: Herder Verlag, 1991 (1948).
- *Geschichte der Philosophie. Band II: Neuzeit und Gegenwart*, 13th edn. Freiburg im Breisgau, Basel, Wien: Herder Verlag, 1991 (1952).

- Hirshleifer, Jack: *Economics from a Biological Viewpoint*. In: Journal of Law and Economics. Vol. 20, no 1, 1977, pp. 1-52. [Quoted in: Hodgson, G. M.: *Economics and Evolution*.]
- *Natural Economy versus Political Economy*. In: Journal of Social and Biological Structures. 1978.
 - *Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation and Conflict Strategies*. In: Research in Law and Economics. Vol. 4, 1982, pp. 1-60. [Quoted in: Khalil, E. L.: *Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism: Clearing the Way for Historical Thinking*.]
- Ho, Mae-wan; Saunders, Peter T. (ed.): *Beyond Neo-Darwinism: An Introduction to the New Evolutionary Paradigm*. London: Academic Press, 1984. [Quoted for example in: D. J. Depew; B. H. Weber, 1995.]
- Hodge, M. J. S.: *The Development of Darwin's general biological theorizing*. In: Bendall, D. S. (ed.): *Evolution from Molecules to Men*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1985 (1983), pp. 43-61.
- *Biology and philosophy (including ideology): A study of Fisher and Wright*. In: Sakar, S. (ed.): *The Founders of Evolutionary Genetics*. Dordrecht-Holland: Kluwer, 1992, pp. 231-293. [Quoted in: D. J. Depew; B. H. Weber, 1995.]
- Hodgson, Geoffrey M.: *Economics and Evolution. Bringing Life Back into Economics*. Cambridge, Oxford: Polity Press in assoc. with Blackwell Publishers, 1993.
- Hofstadter, Richard: *Social Darwinism in American Thought*. Beacon Press: Boston (MA), 1955 (1944).
- Holdcroft, David; Lewis, Harris: *Memes, Minds and Evolution*. In: Philosophy. Vol 75, no. 292, 2000, pp. 161-182.
- Hollingdale, R. J.: *Nietzsche. The Man and His Philosophy*. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1965.
- Honderich, Ted (ed.): *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Honnetfelder, Ludger (ed.): *Natur als Gegenstand der Wissenschaften*. Freiburg (Breisgau), München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1992.
- *Natur-Verhältnisse. Natur als Gegenstand der Wissenschaften. Eine Einführung*. In Honnetfelder (ed.): *Natur als Gegenstand der Wissenschaften*. Freiburg (Breisgau), München: Karl Alber, 1992, pp. 9-26.
- Horgan, John: *Die neuen Sozialdarwinisten*. In: Spektrum der Wissenschaft. Dec. 1995, pp. 80-88.
- Horkheimer, Max; Adorno, Theodor Wiesengrund: *Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente*. Fischer Taschenbuch: Frankfurt a. M.; 1988 (1944/1969).
- Höfle, Vittorio: *Philosophie der ökologischen Krise: Moskauer Vorträge*. München: C. H. Beck, 1994 (1991).
- Hull, David Lee: *Are Species Really Individuals?* In: Systematic Zoology, 25, 1976, pp. 174-191.
- *Individuality and Selection*. In: Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics. 11, 1980, pp. 311-332. [Quoted in: Hull, D. L.: *The Metaphysics of Evolution*.]
 - *Units of Evolution: A Metaphysical Essay*. In: Jensen, U. J.; Harré, R. (ed.): *The Philosophy of Evolution*. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981, pp. 23-44.
 - *Darwin and the nature of science*. In: Bendall, D. S. (ed.): *Evolution from Molecules to Men*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 63-80.
 - *The Metaphysics of Evolution*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988.
- Hull, David Lee; Ruse, Michael (ed.): *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Hume, David (ed. L. A. Selby-Brigge, 2nd ed: Nidditch, Peter Herold): *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 2nd edn. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1978 (1888/1739-40).
- Huxley, Julian: *Evolution, The Modern Synthesis*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1942.
- Huxley, Thomas Henry: *Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays*. London: Macmillan, 1895.
- Imig, Karl-Norbert: *Hegels Deutung der Gravitation* (first published as PhD-Dissertation at the Universität Bielefeld, 1987). Frankfurt a. M.: Athenäum Verlag, 1989.
- Ingensiep, Hans Werner: *Zur Kontroverse zwischen Soziobiologie und philosophischer Ethik*. In: Ingensiep, Hans Werner; Voland, Eckart; Winkler, Paul (ed.): *Evolution des Verhaltens - Biologische und ethische Dimensionen*. Tübingen: Deutsches Institut für Fernstudien an der Univ. Tübingen, 1990, pp. 55-144.
- Isak, Rainer: *Evolution ohne Ziel. Ein interdisziplinärer Forschungsbeitrag*. Freiburg im Breisgau, Basel, Wien: Herder Verlag, 1992 (accepted as PhD-dissertation at the Univ. Freiburg/Br 1990/1991: *Evolutionismus und Teleologie: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem teleologischen Denken Robert Spaemanns und Reinhard Löws mit einem Ausblick auf die zielgerichtete Deutung der Evolution bei Carsten Bresch*).
- Jacob, Margaret. *The Newtonians and the English Revolution*. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976.
- Jantsch, Erich: *Die Selbstorganisation des Universums. Vom Urknall zum menschlichen Geist*, 4th edn. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988 (1982).
- *Systemtheorie* in Seiffert, Helmut; Radnitzky, Gerhard (ed.). *Handlexikon zur Wissenschaftstheorie*. Ehrenwirth: München (1989), p. 331 ff.

- Jardine, Nicholas: *'Naturphilosophie' and the kingdoms of nature*. In: Jardine, Nicholas; Secord, James A.; Spary, Emma C. (ed.): *Cultures of Natural History*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 230-245.
- Jardine, Nicholas; Spary, Emma C.: *The natures of cultural history*. In: Jardine, Nicholas; Secord, James A.; Spary, Emma C. (ed.): *Cultures of Natural History*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 3-13.
- Jaspers, Karl: *Nietzsche*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1950 (1935).
- Jensen, U. J.: *Preconditions for evolutionary thinking*. In: Jensen, U. J.; Harré, R. (ed.): *The Philosophy of Evolution*. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981, pp. 1-19.
- Jensen, U. J.; Harré, R. (ed.): *The Philosophy of Evolution*. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981.
- Jonas, Hans: *Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984 (1978).
- *Das Prinzip Leben*. Transl. from English by K. Dockhorn (Org.: *Organismus und Freiheit. Ansätze zu einer philosophischen Biologie*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; English org.: *The Phenomenon of Life. Toward a Philosophical Biology*. New York: Harper & Row) Frankfurt a. M., Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 1994 (1973, 1966).
 - *Evolution und Freiheit*. In: Koslowski, Peter; Kreuzer, Philipp; Löw, Reinhard (ed.): *Evolution und Freiheit*. Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag, 1984, pp. 147-161.
- Jones, A. J.: *Game Theory: Mathematical Modes of Conflict*. Wiley, 1980.
- Kalikow, Theodora J.: *Konrad Lorenz's Ethological Theory: Explanation and Ideology, 1938-1943*. In: *Journal of the History of Biology*, vol 16, no. 1, 1983.
- Kanz, Kai Torsten (ed.): *Die Philosophie des Organischen in der Goethezeit: Studien zu Werk und Wirkung des Naturforschers Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer*. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1994.
- Kant, Immanuel (ed: Schmidt, Raymund): *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag (Philos. Bibliothek), 1990 (1787/1781).
- (ed: Vorländer, Karl): *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, 10th edn. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990 (1788).
 - (ed: Vorländer, Karl): *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 7th edn. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990 (1799/1793/1790).
- Kendler, T. S.; Kendler, H. H.: *An ontogeny of optional shift behavior*. *Child Development*, 41, 1970, pp. 1-27.
- Khalil, Elias L.: *Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism: Clearing the Way for Historical Thinking*. In: Blackwell, Ron; Chatha, Jaspal; Nell, Edward J. (ed.): *Economics as Worldly Philosophy. Essays in Political and Historical Economics in Honour of Robert L. Heilbroner*. London: Macmillan Press, 1992, pp. 22-72.
- Kim, Jaegwon: *Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind - Body Problem and Mental Causation*. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 1998.
- *'Downward Causation' in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism*. In: Beckermann, Ansgar; Flohr, Hans; Kim, Jaegwon (ed.): *Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism*. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1992, pp. 119-138.
 - *The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism*. In: *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association*. 63, 1989, pp. 31-47.
- King-Hele, Desmond: *Erasmus Darwin and the Romantic Poets*. London: Macmillan Press, 1986.
- Kitchener, Richard F.: *Towards a critical philosophy of science*. In: Lamp, David (ed.): *New Horizons in the Philosophy of Science*. Aldershot, Brookfield etc.: Avebury, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1992, pp. 4-25.
- Kitcher, Philip: *Vier Arten, die Ethik zu „biologisieren“*. In: Bayertz, Kurt (ed.): *Evolution und Ethik*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1993, pp. 221-242.
- Knight, David Marcus: *Ordering the World. A History of Classifying Man*. London: Burnett Books, 1981.
- *Romanticism and the sciences*. In: Cunningham, Andrew; Jardine, Nicholas (ed.): *Romanticism and the sciences*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 13-23.
 - *Humphry Davy. Science and Power*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1998 (Blackwell Publishers, 1992).
 - *Getting Science across* (Presidential address). In: *British Journal of History of Science*. 29, 1996, pp. 129-38.
 - *Thomas Henry Huxley and Philosophy of Science*. In: Barr, Alan P.: *Thomas Henry Huxley's Place in Science and Letters*. Athens, London: University of Georgia Press, 1997, pp. 51-66.
 - *Science in the Romantic Era*. Aldershot, Brookfield: Ashgate, 1998.
- Knodel, Hans: *Linder Biologie*, 19th edn. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1988 (1948).
- Kohn, David (ed.): *The Darwinian Heritage*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- Koerner, Lisbet: *Carl Linnaeus in his time and place*. In: Jardine, Nicholas; Secord, James A.; Spary, Emma C. (ed.): *Cultures of Natural History*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 145-162.

- Koesters, Paul-Heinz: *Ökonomen verändern die Welt. Wirtschaftstheorien die unser Leben bestimmen*, 5th edn. : Goldmann Verlag (Bertelsmann), 1990 (1982).
- Koslowski, Peter; Kreuzer, Philipp; Löw, Reinhard (ed.): *Evolution und Freiheit*. Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag (Civitas Resultate), 1984.
- Krings, Hermann: *Sokrates überlebt. Zum Verhältnis von Evolution und Geschichte*. In: Koslowski, Peter; Kreuzer, Philipp; Löw, Reinhard (ed.): *Evolution und Freiheit*. Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag, 1984, pp. 162-176.
- Krohn, Wolfgang; Küppers, Günter: *Emergenz: Die Entstehung von Ordnung, Organisation und Bedeutung*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992.
- Kuhn, Thomas S.: *Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen*; org. title: *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, transl. by Vetter, Hermann. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991 (University of Chicago Press, 1962).
- Lakatos, Imre: *Popper on Demarkation and Induction*. In: Schilpp, Paul A. (ed.): *The Philosophy of Karl Popper* (2 vol.). La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974, pp. 241-273.
- Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste de: *Philosophie zoologique, ou Exposition des considérations relatives à l'histoire naturelle des animaux*. Paris: Chez Dentu, 1809 (reprint: Brussels, 1969).
- Lamp, David: *New Horizons in the Philosophy of Science*. Aldershot, Brookfield etc.: Avebury, Ashgate Publishing, 1992.
- Landreth, Harry: *History of Economic Theory. Scope, Method, and Content*. Boston, London etc.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976.
- Lauder, George V. : *Historical Biology and the Problem of Design* (first published in *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 97, pp. 57-67, 1992). In: Allen, Colin; Bekoff, Marc; Lauder, George (ed.). *Nature's Purposes. Analyses of Function and Design in Biology*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT-Press, 1998, pp. 507-518.
- Lawrence, Christopher: *The power and the glory: Humphry Davy and Romanticism*. In: Cunningham, Andrew; Jardine, Nicholas (ed.): *Romanticism and the sciences*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 213-227.
- Lenoir, Timothy: *Morphotypes and the historical-genetic method in Romantic biology*. In: Cunningham, Andrew; Jardine, Nicholas (ed.): *Romanticism and the sciences*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 119-129.
- Levins, R.; Lewontin, Richard C.: *The Dialectical Biologist*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1985.
- Lewontin, Richard C. : *The units of selection*. *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics*. 1, 1970, pp. 1-18.
- *Theoretical Population Genetics in the Evolutionary Synthesis*. In: Mayr, Ernst; Provine, William B. (ed.): *The Evolutionary Synthesis*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1998 (1980), pp. 58-68.
 - *Gene, organism and environment*. In: Bendall, D. S. (ed.): *Evolution from Molecules to Men*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Linnaeus, Carl: *Systema naturae per regina tria naturae*, 10th edn. Stockholm: 1758 (1735).
- Limoges, Camille: *A Second Glance at Evolutionary Biology in France*. In: Mayr, Ernst; Provine, William B. (ed.): *The Evolutionary Synthesis*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1998 (1980), pp. 322-327.
- Lloyd, Elisabeth Anne: *Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory*. Princeton (New Jersey): Princeton University Press, 1994 (Greenwood Press, 1988).
- Lorenz, Konrad Zacharias: *Kants Lehre vom Apriorischen im Lichte gegenwärtiger Biologie*. In: *Blätter für deutsche Philosophie*. 15, 1941, pp. 94-125.
- *On Aggression* (with a foreword of J. Huxley), 2nd edn., transl. by Latzke, Marjorie. London: Methuen & Co Ltd., 1967/1966 (Dr. G. Borotha-Schoeler Verlag, 1963).
 - *Die Rückseite des Spiegels. Versuch einer Naturgeschichte menschlichen Erkennens*. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1977 (Piper Verlag, 1973).
- Losee, John: *A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*, 3rd edn. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press (Opus), 1993 (1972).
- Lovelock, James E.: *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1995 (1979).
- *The Ages of Gaia. A biography of our living Earth*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1989 (1988).
- Löw, Reinhard: *Die Entstehung des Neuen in der Natur. Berechtigung und Grenzen gegenwärtiger Erklärungsmodelle*. In: Koslowski, Peter; Kreuzer, Philipp; Löw, Reinhard (ed.): *Evolution und Freiheit*. Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag, 1984, pp. 54-74.
- Lowe, E. Jonathan: *The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time*. Oxford, New York, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- *Form without Matter*. In: *Ratio*, 11 (3), D98, 1999, pp. 214-234.
 - *Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism*. In: *Philosophy*. 75, 2000, pp. 571-585.

- Lumsden, Charles J.; Wilson, Edward Osborn: *Genes, Mind, and Culture*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1981.
- Lütterfelds, Wilhelm; Mohrs, Thomas (ed.): *Evolutionäre Ethik zwischen Naturalismus und Idealismus. Beiträge zu einer modernen Theorie der Moral*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993.
- Mackie, John Leslie: *The Law of the Jungle: Moral Alternatives and Principles of Evolution*. In: *Philosophy*. 53, 1978, pp. 455-464.
- Malthus, Thomas Robert: *An Essay on the Principle of Population, as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Goodwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers*, 1st edn., reprinted for the Royal Economic Society, London: Macmillan, 1926 (London: J. Johnson, 1798).
- Margulis, Lynn; Lovelock, James E.: *Biological Modulation of the Earth's Atmosphere*. In: *Icarus*. 21, 1974, pp. 471-489.
- Markl, Hubert: *Natur als Kulturaufgabe*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1986.
- *Unser Standort im Strom. Die ewige Wiederkehr des Neuen*. In: Deutscher Hochschulverband. *Jahrbuch*. Deutscher Hochschulverband: Bonn (1994), pp. 87-96.
 - *Was wird aus Menschen, die unter Bildgewittern frühstücken? Von der Mediengesellschaft zur Wissensgesellschaft*. In: *Frankfurter Rundschau*. 21st Juli 1997, p. 16.
- Marx, Karl; Engels, Friedrich (ed.: Meek, Ronald L.): *Marx and Engels on Malthus. Selections from the writings of Marx and Engels dealing with the theories of Thomas Robert Malthus*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1953.
- Masuch, Georg: *Zum gegenwärtigen Stand der Diskussion*. In: Masuch, Georg; Staudinger, Hugo (ed.): *Geschöpfe ohne Schöpfer? Der Darwinismus als biologisches und theologisches Problem*. Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus Verlag, 1987, pp. 47-65.
- Maturana, Humberto R.; Varela, Francisco J.: *Der Baum der Erkenntnis*. 2nd edn; org. title: *El árbol del conocimiento*. transl. by Ludewig, Kurt. Goldmann Verlag (Bertelsmann), 1991 (1984).
- Maynard Smith, John: *Evolution and the Theory of Games*. Cambridge University Press, 1982.
- *Shaping Life. Genes, Embryos and Evolution*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson (Orion), 1998.
- Mayr, Ernst: *Systematics and the Origin of Species*. New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1942.
- *Where are we? Cold Spring Harbor Symposia Quant. Biol.*, 24, 1959, pp. 307-328. [Quoted in: E. Mayr. *The Growth of Biological Thought*.]
 - *Animal Species and Evolution*. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1973, (1963).
 - *Evolution und die Vielfalt des Lebens*; org. title: *Evolution and the Diversity of Life*, transl. by Karin de Sousa Ferreira. Berlin, Heidelberg etc.: Springer-Verlag, 1979 (1978).
 - *The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1982.
 - *Darwin, intellectual revolutionary*. In: Bendall, D. S. (ed.): *Evolution from Molecules to Men*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 23-41.
 - *Darwin's Five Theories of Evolution*. In: Kohn, David (ed.): *The Darwinian Heritage*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 755-772.
 - *Weismann and Evolution*. In: *Journal of the History of Biology*, vol. 18, no. 3, 1985, pp. 295-329.
 - *One Long Argument. Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought*. London, New York etc.: Penguin Books, 1993 (1991).
- Mayr, Ernst; Provine, William B. (ed.): *The Evolutionary Synthesis*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1980.
- McDowell, John: *Two Sorts of Naturalism*. In: Hursthouse, R.; Laurence G.; Quinn, W.: *Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 149-179.
- McGinn, Colin: *Left-over life to live*. In: *Times Literary Supplement*. 24th Nov. 1995, pp. 3-4.
- McGinn, Marie: *Real Things and the Mind Body Problem*. Unpublished paper (talk given at the philosophy department of the University of Durham): University of York, 1999.
- Meadows, Dennis L.; Meadows, Donella H.; Zahn, Erich; Milling, Peter: *Die Grenzen des Wachstums. Bericht des Club of Rome*. Transl.: Heck, Hans-Dieter (am. org: *The Limits of Growth*, New York: Universe Books). Stuttgart: DVA, 1972.
- Meyer-Abich, Klaus M.: *Kultur - der menschliche Beitrag zur Naturgeschichte*. In: *Information Philosophie*. 3, 1996, pp. 5-15.
- Meyers, Robert G.: *Evolution as a ground for realism*. In: Rescher, Nicholas (ed.): *Evolution, Cognition, and Realism: Studies in Evolutionary Epistemology*. Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1990, pp. 111-118.
- Midgley, Mary: *Beast and Man. The Roots of Human Nature*. London, New York: Routledge, 1995 (1979).

- *Gene-juggling*. In: *Philosophy*. 54, 1979, pp. 439-458.
- *Human Ideals and Human Needs*. In: *Philosophy*. 58, 1983, pp. 89-94.
- *Selfish Genes and Social Darwinism*. In: *Philosophy*. 58, 1983, pp. 365-377.
- *The Ethical Primate. Humans, Freedom and Morality*. London, New York: Routledge, 1995 (1994).
- Millikan, Ruth G.: *White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: MIT Press, 1993.
- Mills, S; Beatty, J.: *The propensity interpretation of fitness*. *Philosophy of Science*, 46, 1979. [Quoted in G. Vollmer, *Was können wir wissen? Band 1*, 1988.]
- Mittelstrass, Jürgen : *Leben mit der Natur*. In: Schwemmer, Oswald (ed.): *Über Natur. Philosophische Beiträge zum Naturverständnis*, 2nd edn. Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991 (1987), pp. 37-62.
- *Werden*. In: Mittelstrass, Jürgen (ed.): *Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie*. Bd. 4. Stuttgart, Weimar: Verlag J. B. Metzler, 1996, pp. 659-661.
- Mishler, Brent D.; Brandon, Robert N. *Individuality, Pluralism, and the Phylogenetic Species Concept* (first publ. in 1987). In: Hull, David Lee; Ruse, Michael (ed.): *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 300-318.
- Mohr, Hans: *Freiheit und die biologische Natur des Menschen*. In: Koslowski, Peter; Kreuzer, Philipp; Löw, Reinhard (ed.): *Evolution und Freiheit*. Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag, 1984, pp. 36-53.
- Mohr, Thomas: *Zwischen genetischer Statik und Dynamik der Lebensbedingungen - das anthropologische Dilemma*. In: Allgemeine Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Deutschland e. V. (AGPD): *Cognitio humana - Dynamik des Wissens und der Werte* (XVII. Deutscher Kongress f. Philosophie der AGPD, 1996). Leipzig: Universität Leipzig, Institut für Philosophie, 1996, pp. 1108-1115.
- Monod, Jacques: *Zufall und Notwendigkeit. Philosophie Fragen der modernen Biologie*; org. title: *Le hasard et la nécessité*, transl. by Giese, Friedrich. München: Deutscher Taschenb. V., 1991 (Éditions du Seuil, 1970).
- Montagu, M. F. Ashley (ed.): *Mensch und Aggression*; org. title: *Man and Aggression*. Weinheim, Basel: Beltz Verlag (Oxford University Press), 1974 (1969/1968).
- Moore, George Edward: *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1903.
- Morgan, Sue R.: *Schelling and the origins of his Naturphilosophie*. In: Cunningham, Andrew; Jardine, Nicholas (ed.): *Romanticism and the sciences*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 25-37.
- Morris, Desmond: *The Naked Ape. A Zoologist's Study of the Human Animal*. London, Sydney etc.: Vintage, 1994 (1967).
- Munz, Peter: *Philosophical Darwinism. On the Origin of Knowledge by Means of Natural Selection*. London, New York: Routledge, 1993.
- Nachtwey, Robert: *Der Irrweg des Darwinismus*. Berlin: Morus-Verlag, 1959.
- Nagel, Thomas: *The View from Nowhere*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1986, esp. 78-82.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm: *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, 1882.
- Nida-Rümelin, Julian (ed.): *Philosophie der Gegenwart in Einzeldarstellungen von Adorno bis v. Wright*. Stuttgart: Kröner Verlag, 1991.
- Oelschlaeger, Max: *The Idea of Wilderness: from Prehistory to the Age of Ecology*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1991.
- O'Hear, Anthony: *Has the Theory of Evolution any Relevance to Philosophy?* In: *Ratio*, 29, 1987.
- *Beyond Evolution. Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Paley, William: *Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity Collected from the Appearances of Nature*. London: Fauldner, 1802.
- Partridge, Linda; Morgan, Michael J.: *Is Bacterial Evolution Random or Selective?* In: *Nature*. 336, 1988, pp. 22. [Quoted in: Khalil, E. L.: *Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism: Clearing the Way for Historical Thinking*.]
- Paslack, Rainer; Knost, Peter: *Zur Geschichte der Selbstorganisationsforschung* (Bibliographie). Bielefeld: Kleine Verlag, 1990.
- Peterson, William: *Malthus*. London: Heinemann, 1979.
- Piaget, Jean. *The construction of reality in the child*. New York, Basic Books, 1953.
- Plato (ed: Eigler, Gunther): *Platon Werke*, transl. by Schleiermacher, Friedrich. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990.
- Plotkin, Henry: *Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge*. London, New York etc.: Penguin Books, 1995 (1994).

- Pobojewska, Aldona: *Die Umweltkonzeption Jakob von Uexkülls*. In: *Neue Realitäten. Herausforderung der Philosophie* (XVI. Deutscher Kongress f. Philosophie der AGPD, 1993). Berlin: Technische Universität Berlin, Bibliothek, 1993, pp. 94-101.
- Pollard, Bill: *The Nature of Rule-Following* (unpublished Seminar Paper, University of Durham). 1996, pp. 1-8.
- Popper, Karl Raimund: *Logik der Forschung*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1966 (1934).
- *Objective Knowledge; An Evolutionary Approach*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1972 (1991).
 - *Putnam on "Auxiliary Sentences", Called by Me "Initial Conditions"*, pp. 993-999; *My Solution of Hume's Problem of Induction*, pp. 1013-1023; *Campbell on the Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 1059-1065. In: Schilpp, Paul A. (ed.): *The Philosophy of Karl Popper* (2. vol.). La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974, part III, 13.
 - *The Poverty of Historism*. London, New York: Routledge, 1994 (1944).
- Prigogine, Ilya: *Vom Sein zum Werden, Zeit und Komplexität in den Naturwissenschaften*; org. title: *From being to becoming. Time and Complexity in Physical Science*. München: Piper Verlag, 1979.
- Provine, William B.: *Epilogue*. In: Mayr, Ernst; Provine, William B. (ed.): *The Evolutionary Synthesis*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 399-411.
- *Genetics*. In: Mayr, Ernst; Provine, William B. (ed.): *The Evolutionary Synthesis*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 51-58.
- Putnam, Hilary: *Reichenbach's Metaphysical Picture*. (Org. in: *Erkenntnis*, 35, nos. 1-3, pp. 61-76) In: James Conant (ed.) *Words and Life. Hilary Putnam*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1996 (1991), pp. 99-114.
- *The 'Corroboration' of Theories'*. In: Schilpp, Paul A. (ed.): *The Philosophy of Karl Popper* (2 vol.). La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974, pp. 221-240.
- Quine, Willard von Orman: *Epistemology Naturalized* (org. 1968). In: Quine, Willard von Orman: *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*. Columbia University Press: New York and London, 1969, pp. 69-90.
- *On Popper's Negative Methodology*. In: Schilpp, Paul A. (ed.): *The Philosophy of Karl Popper* (2 vol.). La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974, pp. 218-220.
- Quinton, A.: *analytic philosophy* (pp. 28-30) and *philosophical romanticism* (p. 778). In: Honderich, Ted (ed.): *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Rachels, James: *Created from Animals. The Moral Implications of Darwinism*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Rauh, Hellgard: *Frühe Kindheit*. In: Oerter, Rolf; Montada, Leo. *Entwicklungspsychologie*. München: Psychologie Verlags Union, 1987, pp. 131-158.
- Rawls, John: *Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit* (org.: *A Theory of Justice*). Suhrkamp, 1990 (1971).
- Rehbock, Philip F.: *The Philosophical Naturalists. Themes in Early Nineteenth-Century British Biology*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.
- *Transcendental anatomy*. In: Cunningham, Andrew; Jardine, Nicholas (ed.): *Romanticism and the sciences*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 144-160.
- Rensch, Bernhard: *Das universale Weltbild; Evolution und Naturphilosophie*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991 (1977).
- *Historical Development of the Present Synthetic Neo-Darwinism in Germany*. In: Mayr, Ernst; Provine, William B. (ed.): *The Evolutionary Synthesis*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1998 (1980), pp. 284-303.
- Rescher, Nicholas (ed.): *Evolution, Cognition, and Realism; Studies in Evolutionary Epistemology*. Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America (CPS Series in Philosophy of Science, Pittsburgh), 1990.
- Richards, Evelleen: *'Metaphorical mystifications': the Romantic gestation of nature in British biology*. In: Cunningham, Andrew; Jardine, Nicholas (ed.): *Romanticism and the sciences*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 130-143.
- Richards, Robert J.: *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior* (series gen. ed.: D. Hull). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
- *The Meaning of Evolution*. Chicago, London: Chicago University Press, 1992.
- Ridley, Mark: *Female of the species at work. The strange mechanics of cryptic sexual selection. Review of William G. Eberhard's book 'Female controle'*. In: *Times Literary Supplement*. 29th Nov. 1996, pp. 5.
- Ridley, Matt: *The Red Queen. Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature*. London, New York etc.: Penguin Books, 1995-1993.
- Riedl, Rupert: *Die Strategie der Genesis. Naturgeschichte der realen Welt*, 7th edn. München: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1989 (1976).
- *Biologie der Erkenntnis. Die stammesgeschichtlichen Grundlagen der Vernunft*. Hamburg: Parey, 1980.

- Ross, W. D.: *Aristotle's Natural Philosophy* [Part of: Aristotle: *Physics*. (ed.: by W. D. Ross), 1960 (1936)].
- Rosenberg, Alexander: *Altruism: Theoretical Context* (first publ. in: Keller, E. F., Lloyd, Elisabeth Anne (ed.): *Keywords in Evolutionary Biology*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). In: Hull, David Lee; Ruse, Michael (ed.): *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998 (1992), pp. 448-458.
- Rudwick, Martin: *Minerals, strata and fossils*. In: Jardine, Nicholas; Secord, James A.; Spary, Emma C. (ed.): *Cultures of Natural History*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 267-286.
- Ruse, Michael: *Darwin's Debt to Philosophy* (first publ. in: *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 6, pp. 159-181). In: Ruse, Michael: *The Darwinian Paradigm*. London & New York, Routledge, 1989 (1975), pp. 9-33.
- *Charles Darwin and Group Selection* (first publ. in: *Annals of Science*, 37, pp. 615-630). In: Ruse, Michael: *The Darwinian Paradigm*. London & New York, Routledge, 1989 (1980), pp. 34-54.
 - *Sociobiology and Reductionism*. In: Hoyningen-Huene, Paul; Wuketits, Franz M.: *Reductionism and Systems Theory in the Life Sciences. Some Problems and Perspectives*. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989, pp. 45-83.
 - (ed.): *What the Philosophy of Biology Is. Essays Dedicated to David Hull*. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic, 1989
 - *David Hull Through Two Decades*. In: Ruse, Michael (ed.): *What the Philosophy of Biology Is*. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic, 1989, pp. 1-15.
 - *Does Evolutionary Epistemology Imply Realism?* In: Rescher, Nicholas (ed.): *Evolution, Cognition, and Realism; Studies in Evolutionary Epistemology*. Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1990, pp. 101-110.
 - *Evolutionary Ethics. The Debate Continues*. In: Ruse, Michael: *Evolutionary Naturalism*. London, New York: Routledge, 1995, chapter 9, pp. 257-291.
 - *Are Pictures Really Necessary? The Case of Sewall Wright's 'Adaptive Landscapes'*. In: Baigrie, Brian S.: *Picturing Knowledge. Historical and Philosophical Problems Concerning the Use of Art in Science*. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1996, pp. 303-337.
 - *Mystery of Mysteries. Is Evolution a Social Construct?* Harvard University Press. Cambridge (MA), London, 1999.
 - *Being Mean to Steve*. In: Meta Lists on Science and Religion, www.meta-list.org, forwarded to this list by William Grassie, 12.1.2000, about pp. 1-5.
- Ruse, Michael; Wilson, Edward Osborn: *Moral Philosophy as Applied Science*. In: *Philosophy*. 61, 1986, pp. 173-192.
- Russell, Bertrand: *History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances*. London, New York: Routledge, 1991 (1961/1946).
- Schefczyk, Michael: *Die Evolution der Kooperation. Perspektiven und Grenzen spieltheoretischer Modelle*. In: Allgemeine Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Deutschland e. V. (AGPD): *Cognitio humana - Dynamik des Wissens und der Werte* (XVII. Deutscher Kongress f. Philosophie der AGPD, 1996). Leipzig: Universität Leipzig, Institut für Philosophie, 1996, pp. 1148-1155.
- Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph: *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature* (org.: *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*). Transl.: E. Harris & P. Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 (1797).
- *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie*. In: *Sämtliche Werke*. Bd. 3, München, 1927 (1799).
 - *Proteus of Nature*. In *Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik*. Jena, reprinted Hildesheim, 1967 (1800). p. 155. (Quoted in and transl. by S. R. Morgan, 1990.)
- Schiebinger, Londa: *Gender and natural history*. In: Jardine, Nicholas; Secord, James A.; Spary, Emma C. (ed.): *Cultures of Natural History*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 163-177.
- Schiebinger, Londa: *Mammals, Primatology and Sexology*. In: Porter, Roy; Teich, Mikulás (ed.): *Sexual Knowledge, Sexual Science. The History of Attitudes to Sexuality*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 184-209.
- Schilpp, Paul A. (ed.): *The Philosophy of Karl Popper* (2 vol.). La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974.
- Schlieffenhövel, Wulf; Vogel, Christian; Vollmer, Gerhard: *Von der Wiege bis zur Bahre. Was uns am Menschen interessiert*. In: Schlieffenhövel, Wulf; Vogel, Christian; Vollmer, Gerhard (ed.): *Der Mensch. Anthropologie heute* (Heft 1, Studieneinheit 1). Tübingen: Deutsches Institut für Fernstudien an der Univ. Tübingen, 1992, pp. 1-64.
- Schlüter, Johannes: *Versuch einer kritischen Aufarbeitung des Standes der Forschung*. In: Masuch, Georg; Staudinger, Hugo (ed.): *Geschöpfe ohne Schöpfer? Der Darwinismus als biologisches und theologisches Problem*. Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus Verlag, 1987, pp. 84-104.
- Schnabel, Ulrich: *Warum ist etwas? Amerikanische Physiker schufen erstmals Materie aus reinem Licht*. In: *Die Zeit*. 9th Oct. 1997, p. 49.
- Schopenhauer, Arthur: *The World as Will and Representation*; org. title: *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, transl. by E. Payne. New York: Dover, 1969 (1818).

- Schweber, Silvan S.: *Darwin and the political economists*. In: Journal of History of Biology. 12, 1980, pp. 175-192.
- *The Wider British Context in Darwin's Theorizing*. In: Kohn, David (ed.): *The Darwinian Heritage*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 35-70.
- Schwegler, Helmut: *Systemtheorie als Weg zur Vereinheitlichung der Wissenschaften?* In: Krohn, Wolfgang; Küppers, Günter: *Emergenz: Die Entstehung von Ordnung, Organisation und Bedeutung*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992, pp. 27-56.
- Schwemmer, Oswald (ed.): *Über Natur: Philosophische Beiträge zum Naturverständnis*, 2nd edn. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991 (1987).
- Secord, James A.: *Introduction*. In: Chambers, Robert (ed.: Secord, James A.): *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation [and Other Evolutionary Writings]*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994, pp. ix-xlviii.
- Shaffer, Elinor S.: *Romantic philosophy and the organization of the disciplines: the founding of the Humboldt University of Berlin*. In: Cunningham, Andrew; Jardine, Nicholas (ed.): *Romanticism and the sciences*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 38-54.
- Shaw, George Bernhard: *Back to Methuselah. A Metabiological Pentateuch*. London, New York: Penguin Books, 1990 (1921).
- Sheldrake, Rupert: *Das Gedächtnis der Natur. Das Geheimnis der Entstehung der Formen in der Natur*, 5th edn; org. title: *The Presence of the Past*, transl. by Eggert, Jochen. Bern, München, Wien: Scherz Verlag, 1991 (1988).
- Shrader-Frechette, Kristin S. (ed.): *Environmental Ethics*. Pacific Grove: Boxwood Press, 1988 (1981).
- Siep, Ludwig: *Was ist Altruismus?* In: Bayertz, Kurt (ed.): *Evolution und Ethik*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1993, pp. 288-306.
- Simon, Jens: *Die Evolution und der Sandhaufen. Prinzipien der Artentwicklung in einfachsten Computernmodellen*. In: FAZ. 206, 1996, p. N2.
- Simpson, George Gaylord: *The Meaning of Evolution: A Study of the History of Life and of Its Significance for Man*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1949.
- *This View of Life: The World of an Evolutionist*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964.
- Singer, Peter: *The Expanding Circle*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.
- Skinner, Burrhus Frederic: *The Behavior of Organisms*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938.
- *Contingencies of Reinforcement*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969.
- Snow, Charles Percy: *The Two Cultures and A Second Look*, part two added. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1963 (1959).
- Sober, Elliott: *What is Evolutionary Altruism?* (First published in Canadian Journal of Philosophy vol 14, 1988, pp. 75-99.) In: Hull, David Lee; Ruse, Michael (ed.): *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 459-475.
- *Six Sayings about Adaptationism* (First published as part of *Evolution and Optimality—Feathers, Bowling Balls, and the Thesis of Adaptationism*, Philosophical Exchange, 26, 1996, pp. 41-51). In: Hull, David Lee; Ruse, Michael (ed.): *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 73-86.
- Sober, Elliott; Wilson, David Sloan. *A Critical Review of Philosophical Work on the Unit of Selection Problem* (First published in Philosophy of Science, 61, 1994, pp. 534-555.) In: Hull, David Lee; Ruse, Michael (ed.): *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 198-220.
- *Unto Others. The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
- Soros, George: *Die kapitalistische Bedrohung. Übertriebener Individualismus, zuviel Konkurrenz und zuwenig Kooperation sind die Feinde der offenen Gesellschaft*. In: Die Zeit, transl. Büning, Meinhard. 17th Jan. 1997, pp. 25-27.
- Spaemann, Robert: *Die Frage Wozu: Geschichte und Wiederentdeckung des teleologischen Denkens*. München: Piper Verlag, 1981.
- Spencer, Herbert: *Social Statics: or, the Conditions Essential to Human Happiness specified, and the First of them Developed*. London: John Chapman, 1851.
- Spiegel-Redaktion: „*Allein der Markt regiert*“. In: Spiegel. 39, 1996, pp. 80-95.
- Staudinger, Hugo: *Die Wirkungen Darwins und des Darwinismus*. In: Masuch, Georg; Staudinger, Hugo (ed.): *Geschöpfe ohne Schöpfer? Der Darwinismus als biologisches und theologisches Problem*. Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus Verlag, 1987, pp. 25-46.
- Steele, Edward J.; Lindley, Robyn A.; Blanden, Robert V.: *Lamarck's Signature. How retrogenes are changing Darwin's natural selection paradigm* (Series editor: Paul Davies). St. Leonards (Aus.): Allen & Unwin, 1998.
- Sterelny, Kim; Kitcher, Philip: *The Return of the Gene*. (First published in Journal of Philosophy, 85/7, 1988, pp. 339-361.) In: Hull, D.; Ruse, M. (ed.): *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998 (1988), pp. 153-175.
- Stierstadt, Klaus: *Physik der Materie*. Weinheim; Basel etc: VCH Verlagsgesellschaft, 1989.

- Strawson, Galen: *In deepest sympathy. Towards a natural history of virtue. Review of Matt Ridley's 'The Origins of Virtue'*. In: Times Literary Supplement. 29th Nov., 1996, pp. 3-4.
- Syal, Rajeev: *Are humans evolved from peaceful, female-led apes?* In: The Sunday Times. 15. Oct. 1995, p. 8.
- Sydow, Momme von: *Evolutionismus und Utilitarismus* (unveröffentlichte Hausarbeit). Bonn: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Univ., Sem. f. Philosophie, 1992.
- *Probleme von Churchlands 'Neurocomputational Perspective'* (unveröffentlichte Hausarbeit). Bonn: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Univ., Sem. f. Philosophie, 1993.
 - Rabanus, Stefan; Steinfeld, Patricia (ed.): *Studienführer Philosophie* (mit etwa 200 Kurzbeiträgen von Professor/inn/en), 3rd edn. Sankt Augustin (bei Bonn): Academia Verlag, 1996.
- Thoday, J. M.: *Components of fitness*. Society for Experimental Biology Symposium, 7, 1953, pp. 69-113. [Quoted in: R. Dawkins. *The Extended Phenotype* (1982), p. 193.]
- Thompson, William Irwin (ed.): *Gaia 2 - Emergence. The New Science of Becoming*. New York: Lindisfarne Press (Biology, Cognition and Ethics), 1991.
- Thornhill, Randy; Gangestad, Steve W.: *The evolution of human sexuality*. In: Trends in Ecology & Evolution. Vol. 11, no. 2, Feb. 1996, pp. 98-102.
- Tobby, John; Cosmides, Leda: *The Psychological Foundations of Culture*. In: Barkow, Jerome H.; Cosmides, Leda; Tobby, John (ed.): *The Adapted Mind. Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 19-136.
- Toulmin, Stephen: *Human Understanding* (first vol.). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
- Trautner, Hanns Martin. *Lehrbuch der Entwicklungspsychologie*. 2 vols., Göttingen etc.: Hogrefe, 1991, 1992.
- Trivers, Robert L.: *The evolution of reciprocal altruism*. In: Quaterly Review of Biology. 46 (4), 1971, pp. 35-57.
- *Parental investment and sexual selection*. In: Campbell, B. (ed.): *Sexual selection and the descent of man 1871-1971*. Chicago: Aldine, 1972, pp. 136-179.
- Tyler, Christian: *Darwin still gets under the skin*. In: Financial Times. 15. Feb. 1997, p. 1.
- Uexküll, Jakob von: *Theoretische Biologie*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973 (1928).
- Vogel, Günter; Angermann, Hartmut: *dtv-Atlas zur Biologie (Band 3)*, 4th edn. München: DTV, 1990 (1984).
- Voland, Eckart: *Moral durch Manipulation? - Ein evolutionäres Szenario*. In: Allgemeine Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Deutschland e. V. (AGPD): *Cognitio humana - Dynamik des Wissens und der Werte* (XVII. Deutscher Kongress f. Philosophie der AGPD, 1996). Leipzig: Universität Leipzig, Institut für Philosophie, 1996, pp. 1116-1123.
- Voland, Eckart; Winkler, Paul: *Aspekte der Homonisation aus Sicht der Soziobiologie*. In: Ingensiep, Hans Werner; Voland, Eckart; Winkler, Paul (ed.): *Evolution des Verhaltens - Biologische und ethische Dimensionen*. Tübingen: Deutsches Institut für Fernstudien an der Univ. Tübingen, 1990, pp. 9-54.
- Vollmer, Gerhard: *Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer evolutionären Ethik*. In: Bayertz, Kurt (ed.): *Evolution und Ethik*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1993, p. 103-132.
- *Was können wir wissen? Band 1. Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie. Mit einem Geleitwort von Konrad Lorenz*, 2nd edn. Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag, 1988.
 - *Was können wir wissen? Band 2. Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie. Mit einem Geleitwort von Hans Sachsse*, 2nd edn. Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag, 1988.
 - *Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie. Angeborene Erkenntnisstrukturen im Kontext von Biologie und Wissenschaft*, 5th edn. Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag, 1990 (1975).
- Vrba, Elisabeth S.; Gould, Stephen Jay: *The hierarchical expansion of sorting and selection: Sorting and selection can not be equated*. In: Paleobiology. 12, 1986, pp. 217-228. [Quoted in: E. A. Lloyd, 1988.]
- Waal, Frans B. M. de: *Frieden durch Sex*. In: Geo. June 1995, pp. 14-30.
- Waddington, Conrad Hal: *Epigenetics and evolution*. Symposia for the Society of Experimental Biology 7. New York: Academic Press (1953). [Quoted by W. Provine; 1980.]
- *Evolutionary adaptation*. In: Tax, S. (ed.): *Evolution after Darwin*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960, pp. 381-402. [Quoted in: Vollmer, G.; 1988]
- Wade, Michael J.: *A critical review of the models of group selection*. In: Quaterly Review of Biology. 53, 1978, pp. 101-114. [Quoted in: Lloyd, E. A.; 1988.]
- Wallace, Alfred Russel: *Darwinism. An Exposition of the Theory of Natural Selection with some of its applications*. London: Macmillan, 1923 (1889).
- Watkins, John: *A Note on Baldwin Effect*. In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50, 1999, pp. 417-423.
- Weber, Bruce H.; Depew, David J.; Smith, James D. (ed.): *Entropy, Information, and Evolution: New Perspectives on Physical and Biological Evolution*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: MIT Press, 1988.

- Webster, Gerry; Goodwin, Brian C.: *Form and Transformation. Generative and Relational Principles in Biology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Weingarten, Michael: *Organismen - Objekte oder Subjekte der Evolution? Philosophische Studien zum Paradigmawechsel in der Evolutionsbiologie*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993.
- Weismann, August: *Das Keimplasma: eine Theorie der Vererbung*. Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1892.
- Weizsäcker, Ernst Ulrich von: *Erdpolitik. Ökologische Realpolitik an der Schwelle zum Jahrhundert der Umwelt*, 2nd edn. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990 (1989).
- Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von: *Aufbau der Physik*. München: dtv, 1988 (1985).
- Westmeyer, H.: *Kritik der psychologischen Unvernunft*. Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1973. [Quoted in: Bredenkamp, J., Wippich, W.; 1977.]
- Wetz, Franz Josef: *Hermeneutik der Natur - Hermeneutik des Universums*. In: *Philosophia naturalis*, Heft 2, 1995.
- Wetzels, Walter D.: *Johann Wilhelm Ritter: Romantic physics in Germany*. In: Cunningham, A.; Jardine, N. (ed.): *Romanticism and the sciences*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 199-211.
- Whitehead, Alfred North: *Science and Modern World*. Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1936 (1926).
- *Nature and Life* (two lectures, delivered before the University of Chicago in 1933). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934.
- Wickler, Wolfgang: *Die Biologie der zehn Gebote*. München: Piper Verlag, 1971.
- Wickler, Wolfgang; Seibt, Uta: *Das Prinzip Eigennutz. Ursachen und Konsequenzen sozialen Handelns*. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1977.
- Wieser, Wolfgang: *Vom Werden zum Sein. Energetische und soziale Aspekte der Evolution*. Berlin, Hamburg: Parey, 1989.
- Williams, George C.: *Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought*. Princeton (New Jersey): Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Wilson, David Sloan: *On the Relationship between Evolutionary and Psychological Definitions of Altruism and Selfishness* (First published in *Biology and Philosophy*, 7, 61-68.) In: Hull, David Lee; Ruse, Michael (ed.): *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998 (1992), pp. 479-487.
- Wilson, Edward Osborn: *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, 4th edn. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1976 (1975).
- *On Human Nature*, 4th edn. London, New York etc.: Penguin Books, 1995 (Harvard University Press, 1978).
- *The Diversity of Life*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992.
- Winch, Donald: *Malthus*. Oxford, New York etc.: Oxford University Press (Past Masters), 1987.
- Wimsatt, William : *Reductionist research strategies and their biases in the units of selection controversy*. In: T. Nickles (ed.). *Scientific Discovery: Case Studies*. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980. [Quoted in E. A. Lloyd, 1994 (1988) and E. Sober, D. S. Wilson, 1998 (1988).]
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The German text of Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung'*. Transl.: D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness. London, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966 (first ed. of this transl.: 1961, first translation 1922, org. 1921).
- *Philosophical Investigations* (org.: *Philosophische Untersuchungen*). Transl.: G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1976 (1958/1953).
- Wöhler, Hans-Ulrich (ed.): *Texte zum Universalienstreit*. 2 vols., transl. by the editor. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994.
- Wolpert, L.: *Animal forces at work*. In: *The Guardian*. 22nd Sep. 1995, p. 8.
- Woodger, J. H.: *Biological Principles. A Critical Study*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1929.
- Wright, Sewall. Evolution in Mendelian Populations. *Genetics* 16, p. 97-159. [Quoted in S. J. Gould, 1984, p. 29.]
- Wright, Robert: *The Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We Are. The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology*. London: Abacus, 1996 (Pantheon, 1994).
- Wuketits, Franz M.: *Evolutionstheorien. Historische Voraussetzungen, Positionen, Kritik*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (Dimensionen der modernen Biologie), 1995.
- Wynne-Edwards, V. C.: *Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour*. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1962.
- Young, David: *The Discovery of Evolution* (publ.: Natural History Museum). Cambridge, New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Zauner, Klaus-Peter: *Vorbild Natur. Biologische Vieren unter dem informationstheoretischen Mikroskop*. In: *c't magazin für computer und technik*. 1992, pp. 236-241.

Index

- A*
- Adams, Mark B..... 352
Adorno, Theodor Wiesengrund ... 11; 193; 194; 430
Agassiz, Louis Rodolphe..... 101; 105
Alexander, Richard D. 45; 424
Allen, Colin..... 56; 424; 425; 432
Allen, Garland E..... 127; 424
Amundson, Ron..... 314; 334; 344; 424
Anaxagoras..... 77; 78
Anaximander..... 77
Angermann, Hartmut..... 134; 438
Aquinas, Thomas..... 55; 66; 81; 157;
183; 424
Aristotle..... 53; 55; 66; 79–80;
82; 94; 96; 100; 104; 105; 158; 172; 173; 178;
182; 243; 252; 424; 436
Armstrong, D. M. 197
Augustine 81
Austin, John L. 190
Autenrieth, Johann Heinrich F. 92; 165
Axelrod, R. 46
Ayer, Alfred Jules 188; 189; 424
- B*
- Babbage, Charles 179
Bach, Thomas 89; 99
Bacon, Francis 83
Baer, Karl Ernst von 95; 102; 104;
111; 167
Baldwin, James Mark..... 218; 329; 393
Baltimore, David..... 305; 356
Bandura, A. 227; 228; 424
Barkow, Jerome H..... 40; 220; 424;
426; 438
Barlow, Nora 426
Barr, Alan P..... 431
Barrett, Paul H. 163; 167; 426
Barrow, John D. 83; 97; 424
Barry, Martin..... 167
Bartl, Simona..... 356
Bartley, W. W. 425
Bateson, Patrick P. G. 424
Bateson, William 125; 147; 383
Baumgartner, Hans Michael..... 424
Bayertz, Kurt 48; 50; 54;
63; 304; 352; 424; 427; 431; 437; 438
Beatty, J. 338; 434
Bechtel, William..... 205; 424
Becker, Gary S. 233; 424
Beckermann, Ansgar..... 244; 424; 427;
429; 431
Bekoff, Marc 56; 424; 425; 432
Bendall, D. S..... 56; 424; 426;
428; 430; 432; 433
Berg, Leo S. 124
Bergson, Henri-Louis 187; 218
Bertalanffy, Ludwig von..... 125; 152; 316
Berwick, Robert C. 424
Beurton, P. 310; 311; 425
Bieri, Peter..... 245; 425
Bigelow, John..... 258; 425
Birg, Herwig 181; 425
Bittermann, M. E. 228
Blackwell, Ron..... 425; 431
Blake, William..... 89; 165
Blanden, Robert V..... 148; 232; 306;
356; 437
Bloom, Paul 219
Blumbach, Karl Friedrich..... 89
Blümecke, Thomas..... 397; 425
Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich..... 88; 92; 99
Blyth, Edward 173
Bock, Hieronymus..... 95
Bock, J. Walter..... 305; 425
Böhme, Gernot..... 12; 84; 425
Bohr, Niels Henrick David 185; 242
Boltzmann, Ludwig..... 185
Borges, Jorge Luis..... 383
Bortz, Jürgen..... 292
Boulding..... 391
Bowler, Peter..... 188
Bowler, Peter J. 34; 72; 73;
76; 104; 106; 108; 110; 112; 113; 118; 119;
120; 122; 124; 125; 126; 127; 128; 133; 138;
146; 148; 160; 163; 164; 165; 173; 175; 176;
179; 180; 233; 234; 331; 349; 351; 359; 385;
393; 425
Bradie, Michael..... 205; 218; 425
Bradley, Francis Herbert..... 187
Brandon, Robert N. 154; 293; 309;
425; 434
Bräuer, Günter 425
Bredenkamp, Jürgen..... 224; 227; 228; 425
Briggs, Asa 179; 180; 425
Brogie, Luise Victor de 241
Browne, Janet..... 180; 425
Brumlik, Micha..... 81; 425
Buber, Martin..... 65
Buffon, Gorges-Louis Leclerc Comte de 96–97; 98;
105; 110; 111; 157; 161; 172; 425
Burdach, Karl Friedrich 95

Burkhard, Frederick 426
 Burne, F. M. 232
 Burnet, F. M. 232; 425
 Burrow, John W. 111; 425; 426
 Buss, Leo W. 305
 Byron, Lord 89

C

Cairns, John 148; 425
 Call, Lewis 183; 425
 Campbell, Donald T. 64; 207; 208;
 214; 215; 216; 218; 219; 222; 224; 225; 227;
 267; 326; 330; 349; 358; 359; 425
 Caplan, Arthur L. 54; 56; 426
 Carlisle, T. R. 427
 Carnap, Rudolf 10; 188; 210
 Carus, Carl Gustav 92; 102; 103;
 406; 426
 Caspar, M. 84
 Cesalpino, Andrea 95
 Chambers, Robert 104; 105; 110;
 111; 167; 426; 437
 Chardin, Pierre Teilhard de 54; 124
 Darwin 126
 Charlesworth, D. 148; 426
 Chatha, Jaspal 425; 431
 Chetverikov, Sergei S. 131; 137
 Chinnici, J. P. 369; 426
 Chomsky, Noam 221; 346
 Churchland, Patricia Smith 197
 Churchland, Paul M. 197; 242; 426
 Coleridge, Samuel Taylor 89; 103; 164; 165
 Colp, Ralph 110; 426
 Comte, Auguste 163
 Cooper, David 15; 83; 93;
 197; 426
 Cope, Edward Drinker 124
 Copernicus, Nicolaus 83
 Cornell, John F. 426
 Cornwell, John 426
 Cosmides, Leda 40; 51; 196;
 220; 424; 426; 438
 Craig, Edward 425; 426; 429
 Crick, Francis 147
 Crow, J. F. 358
 Cunningham, Andrew 76; 90; 91;
 93; 426; 427; 429; 431; 432; 437
 Cusanus, Nicholas 82
 Cuvier, Georges Baron de 100–101; 102;
 103; 104; 105; 106; 150; 164; 170

D

Dahl, Edgar 426
 Darlington, C. D. 140
 Darwin, Charles 9; 12; 17;
 19; 20; 22; 24; 34; 57; 74; 75; 102; 104; 105;
 106; 107; 108; 110–21; 124; 133; 146; 153;
 161; 163; 168; 174; 183; 191; 198; 205; 216;

221; 227; 229; 234; 235; 238; 325; 326; 340;
 350; 355; 383; 384; 385; 425; 426
 Darwin, Emma 118
 Darwin, Erasmus 102; 110; 165; 167
 Darwin, Francis 111; 116; 164;
 165; 168; 169; 177; 426
 Davidson, Donald 197
 Davies, Paul 437
 Davis, N. B. 427
 Davy, Humphry 90; 91; 93
 Dawkins, Richard 5; 12; 17;
 20; 21; 26; 34; 38; 39–42; 40; 41; 42; 43; 45;
 49; 51; 52; 53; 56; 57; 60; 63; 65; 67; 70; 74;
 84; 107; 108; 109; 110; 140–45; 142; 143; 144;
 153; 155; 191; 199; 200; 205; 208; 215; 216;
 217; 224; 246; 250; 252; 253; 257; 259; 260;
 261; 263; 264; 268; 271; 279; 290; 303; 304;
 307; 317; 330; 332; 335; 336; 337; 340; 342;
 345; 358; 359; 362; 367; 368; 379; 383; 387;
 426; 427
 Dawson, William 426
 Degler, Carl N. 427
 Deichmann, Ute 138; 427
 Democritus 77; 78; 82
 Den Otter, Sandra M. 104; 138; 187
 Dennert, E. 427
 Dennett, Daniel 12
 Dennett, Daniel C. 5; 23; 30;
 34; 40; 57; 58; 60; 95; 107; 108; 156; 197; 215;
 216; 224; 324; 327; 358; 383; 395; 397; 404;
 427
 Depew, David J. 32; 76; 97;
 98; 101; 103; 104; 107; 110; 115; 130; 136;
 137; 146; 147; 158; 172; 173; 180; 184; 185;
 192; 350; 384; 427; 438
 Derrida, Jacques 73; 311
 Descartes, René 10; 32; 62;
 66; 86–87; 88; 161; 168; 235; 244
 Desmond, Adrian 73; 110; 113;
 162; 163; 164; 165; 166; 167; 169; 175; 178;
 179; 180; 427
 Diderot, Denis 97
 Diefenbacher, Hans 15; 427
 Dilthey, Wilhelm 61
 Ditfurth, Hoimar von 221; 427
 Dobzhansky, Theodosius 17; 109; 131;
 133; 134; 135; 136; 137; 142; 143; 149; 150;
 185; 192; 293; 427
 Driefenbacher, Hans 391
 Driesch, Hans 80; 123; 124;
 138; 157; 311; 313; 427
 Duhem, Pierre 26
 Dyck, W. v. 84

E

Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus 137; 427
 Eigen, Manfred 252
 Eigler, Gunther 78

- Eimer, Theodor 124; 400
 Einstein, Albert 173; 241; 242
 Eldredge, Niles 57; 146; 149;
 150; 151; 293; 358; 367; 380; 427; 428
 Empedocles 77
 Engelhardt, Dietrich v. 74; 76; 90;
 91; 92; 95; 97; 98; 100; 427
 Engels, Eve-Marie 67; 427
 Engels, Friedrich 181; 433
 Eysenck, Michael W. 427
- F*
- Fahrig, Rudolf 306; 370; 427
 Faraday, Michael 90
 Felt, James W., S. J. 157; 427
 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 73; 89; 90;
 91; 427
 Finnis, John M. 67
 Fisher, Ronald A. 109; 129; 130;
 142; 184; 185; 188; 189; 190; 400; 427
 FitzRoy, R. 179
 Flohr, Hans 424; 427; 429; 431
 Fodor, Jerry A. 245; 427
 Foester, Heinz von 158
 Forbes, Edward 170
 Ford, E. B. 128
 Foucault, Michel 73
 Fox, R. 429
 Frankel, Simon J. 136; 144; 385;
 400; 428
 Franzen, J. L. 159
 Freud, Sigmund 193
 Friedman, Milton 197–98; 232;
 233; 330
 Frith, Lucy 258; 428
 Futuyma, Douglas J. 110; 129; 147;
 333; 356; 358; 360; 366; 369; 370; 372; 373;
 374; 375; 377; 378; 396; 428
 Fyfe, Aileen 428
- G*
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg 13; 262; 428
 Galilei, Galileo 83
 Galton, Sir Francis 119; 185
 Gangestad, Steve W. 144; 438
 Garcia, J. 329
 Gautrey, Peter J. 167; 426
 Geoffroy St. Hilaire, Étienne 100; 101; 103;
 104; 105; 106; 110; 111; 157; 164; 165; 167;
 428
 Ghiselin, Michael T. 293
 Giere, Ronald N. 428
 Gigerenzer, Gerd 221; 330; 428
 Gilboff, Sander 428
 Gilby, Thomas 424
 Gliboff, S. 166
 Gloy, Karen 77; 79; 81;
 84; 214; 428
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang v. 89; 90; 91;
 102; 103; 165; 377
 Goldfuss, Georg August 92; 428
 Goldschmidt, Richard 125; 150
 Goodall, Jane 137
 Goodwin, Brian C. 32; 57; 157;
 158; 265; 292; 305; 312; 313; 316; 428; 439
 Gore, Al 15; 428
 Götschl, Johann 214; 428
 Gould, Stephen Jay 26; 32; 34;
 43; 56; 57; 149; 150; 151; 153; 192; 265; 281;
 292; 293; 313; 318; 331; 333; 335; 339; 350;
 427; 428; 438
 Grammer, Karl 428
 Grant, Edmond Robert 101; 105; 110;
 111; 164; 165
 Grasshoff, M. 159
 Grassie, William 436
 Gray, Asa 33; 112; 184
 Green, Joseph Henry 90; 103; 104;
 105; 111
 Green, Thomas Hill 187
 Greene, John C. 73; 76; 95;
 96; 97; 98; 100; 102; 107; 117; 118; 120; 139;
 140; 162; 173; 234; 428
 Gregory, Frederick 429
 Griffin, Susan 429
 Groh, Dieter 81; 84; 85;
 169; 170; 429
 Groh, Ruth 81; 84; 85;
 169; 170; 429
 Grosseteste, Robert 210
 Gulick, Robert van 244; 429
 Guttenberg, A. Ch. von 32; 34; 252;
 359; 382; 429
 Guttmann, W. F. 159
- H*
- Hacking, Ian 429
 Haeckel, Ernst Heinrich 80; 118; 222; 429
 Haken, Hermann 157; 243; 245;
 342; 429
 Haldane, John Burdon Sanderson 109; 129; 130;
 135
 Hall, G. Stanley 124
 Hamilton, William D. 41; 44; 45;
 46; 62; 143; 145; 290; 429
 Hardy, Godfred H. 128–29; 131;
 143
 Hargrove, Eugene C. 81; 429
 Harlow, H. F. 228; 429
 Harré, R. 56; 425; 430; 431
 Harris, J. 84
 Hartmann, Nicolai 139; 429
 Hassenstein, Bernhard 152; 316
 Hawkins, Mike 234; 429
 Hayek, Friedrich August von 224; 233; 429
 Heackel, Ernst 112
 Hearnshaw, L. S. 186; 188; 429

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich ...61; 73; 193; 244
 Heidegger, Martin 13; 429
 Heidelberger, Michael 429
 Heilbroner, Robert L 431
 Heisenberg, Werner 37; 185; 242; 429
 Hemminger, Hansjörg 429
 Hempel, Carl Gustav 188; 429
 Henslow, John 179
 Heraclitus 77
 Herbert, Sandra 111; 166; 167; 426
 Herder, Johann Gottlieb v. 91
 Herschel, John F. W. 24; 162; 170;
 171; 172; 179; 353
 Hirschberger, Johannes 78; 429
 Hirshleifer, Jack 233; 430
 Hitler, Adolf 138
 Ho, Mae-Wan 312; 430
 Hobbes, Thomas 53; 181; 217; 235
 Hodge, M. J. S. 170; 172; 175;
 177; 185; 330; 358; 430
 Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 198; 232; 233;
 234; 430
 Hofstadter, Richard 120; 234; 430
 Hohenburg, Herwart von 83
 Holbach, Paul Baron d' 97
 Holdcroft, David 61; 356; 430
 Hölderlin, Friedrich 91
 Holling, C. S. 158
 Hollingdale, R. J. 183; 430
 Honderich, Ted 430; 435
 Honnfelder, Ludger 78; 424; 430
 Horgan, John 221; 430
 Horkheimer, Max 11; 193; 194; 430
 Horner, Joanna B. 90
 Horner, Leonora 90
 Hösle, Vittorio 15; 430
 Hoyningen-Huene, Paul 436
 Hull, David Lee 56; 60; 111;
 129; 155; 156; 166; 170; 171; 215; 217; 224;
 252; 259; 265; 293; 326; 424; 425; 428; 430;
 434; 435; 436; 437; 439
 Humboldt, Alexander v. 90; 125; 162
 Humboldt, Wilhelm v. 90
 Hume, David 3; 10; 66;
 87; 208; 209; 210; 229; 430
 Husserl, Edmund 187
 Hutton, James 150; 170
 Huxley, Julian 54; 109; 126;
 136; 137; 139; 430
 Huxley, Thomas Henry 33; 68; 93;
 104; 108; 112; 118; 120; 126; 389; 430

I

Ihmig, Karl-Norbert 172; 430
 Ingensiep, Hans Werner 109; 430; 438
 Isak, Rainer 55; 157; 211;
 331; 430

J

Jacob, Francois 148
 Jacob, Margaret 172; 430
 James Watson 303
 James, William 218
 Jameson, Robert 166
 Jantsch, Erich 38; 158; 316;
 392; 430
 Jardine, Nicholas 76; 90; 91;
 93; 425; 426; 427; 429; 431; 432; 436; 437
 Jaspers, Karl 184; 431
 Jeans, James 185
 Jensen, U. J. 56; 425; 430; 431
 Jerne, Niels Kai 232
 Johannsen, Wilhelm Ludvig 125
 John Paul II 36
 Jonas, Hans 9; 24; 55;
 303; 403; 408; 431
 Jones, A. J. 200; 431

K

Kalikow, Theodora J. 138; 431
 Kant, Immanuel 4; 10; 53; 54;
 66; 87-88; 89; 90; 92; 93; 98; 99; 100; 106;
 163; 168; 173; 182; 210; 221; 246; 398; 412;
 431
 Kanz, Kai Torsten 424; 427; 431
 Keane, Mark T. 427
 Keats, John 89; 165
 Keller, E. F. 436
 Kelvin, Lord Thompson William 359
 Kendler, H. H. 228; 431
 Kendler, T. S. 228; 431
 Kepler, Johannes 83; 84
 Keynes, John Maynard 177; 181; 198
 Khalil, Elias L. 148; 232; 234;
 311; 385; 390; 391; 431
 Kilmeyer, Karl Friedrich 89; 92; 99;
 100
 Kim, Jaegwon 244; 424; 427;
 429; 431
 Kimura, Motoo 131; 147; 333; 358
 King-Hele, Desmond 165; 431
 Kitchener, Richard F. 431
 Kitcher, Philip 48; 50; 264;
 273; 310; 431; 437
 Knight, David Marcus 4; 5; 90;
 91; 93; 96; 97; 101; 104; 169; 431
 Knodel, Hans 129; 431
 Knost, Peter 158; 434
 Knox, Robert 101; 105; 106;
 164; 165; 166; 168
 Koerner, Lisbet 95; 431
 Koesters, Paul-Heinz 198; 432
 Köhler, Wolfgang 228
 Kohn, David 22; 24; 34;
 111; 112; 165; 167; 171; 177; 183; 325; 426;
 431; 433; 437

König, Barbara 428
 Koslowski, Peter 55; 428; 429;
 431; 432; 434
 Kottler, M. J. 115
 Kranz, Kai Torsten 99
 Krebs, J. R. 49; 143; 427
 Kreuzer, Philipp 55; 428; 429;
 432; 434
 Krings, Hermann 48; 196; 432
 Krohn, Wolfgang 158; 244; 432; 437
 Kuhn, Thomas S. 72; 73; 150;
 223; 432
 Küppers, Günter 158; 244; 432; 437

L

Lacey, A. R. 187
 Lakatos, Imre 211; 229; 231;
 390; 432
 Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste 95; 97–98; 100;
 101; 103; 105; 110; 111; 112; 113; 121; 124;
 157; 166; 172; 231; 306; 350; 352; 432
 Lamp, David 428; 431; 432
 Landreth, Harry 177; 432
 Laplace, Jean-Baptiste 164
 Lauder, George V. 56; 334; 424;
 425; 432
 Lawrence, Christopher 90; 432
 LeConte, Joseph 124
 Lefevre, Wolfgang 99
 Leggett, Anthony J. 242
 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 26; 84; 338
 Leichhardt, Ludwig 162
 Lenoir, Timothy 99; 398; 432
 Lenski, Richard 148
 Lerner, Michael 127
 Levinas, Emmanuel 65
 Levins, R. 432
 Levins, Richard 191; 192
 Lewis, Harris 61; 356; 430
 Lewontin, Richard C. 56; 57; 130;
 131; 133; 135; 146; 149; 150; 151; 153; 155;
 191; 192; 193; 198; 215; 265; 306; 309; 312;
 314; 315; 317; 318; 322; 327; 331; 333; 335;
 349; 384; 385; 428; 432
 Liebig, Justus v. 90
 Limoges, Camille 126; 432
 Lindley, Robyn A. 148; 232; 306;
 356; 437
 Link, D. H. F. 93
 Linnaeus, Carl 94; 95–96;
 100; 102; 105; 431; 432
 Lloyd, Elisabeth Anne 56; 129; 265;
 266; 288; 293; 305; 432; 436; 439
 Locke, John 222
 Lorenz, E. N. 158
 Lorenz, Konrad 40; 56; 64;
 109; 138; 139; 220; 222; 398; 432
 Losee, John 432

Lotka, Alfred 296
 Lovelock, James E. 152; 296; 432; 433
 Løvtrup, Soren 150
 Löw, Reinhard 55; 102; 157;
 211; 246; 330; 428; 429; 431; 432; 434
 Lowe, E. Jonathan 10; 244; 308; 432
 Lubbock, John 168
 Lucretius 78
 Lumsden, Charles J. 40; 64; 325; 433
 Lütterfelds, Wilhelm 54; 433
 Lyell, Charles 24; 25; 150;
 162; 166; 170; 173; 179
 Lysenko, Torfim Denisovich 304

M

Mach, Ernst 218
 Mackie, John Leslie 46; 56; 252; 433
 Mähl, H.-J. 93
 Malthus, Thomas Robert 33; 34; 75;
 107; 111; 112; 162; 174–78; 174; 176; 177;
 183; 198; 227; 233; 433
 Mandelbrot, Benoit B. 158
 Marcuse, Herbert 193
 Margalef, Ramón 317
 Margulis, Lynn 298; 433
 Markl, Hubert 50; 310; 433
 Marx, Karl 73; 181; 182;
 193; 433
 Masuch, Georg 133; 394; 433;
 436; 437
 Matthew, Patrick 111; 173
 Maturana, Humberto R. 80; 152; 220; 433
 Maxwell, James Clerk 185
 May, Rollo 429
 Maynard Smith, John 44; 46; 200; 433
 Mayr, Ernst 14; 17; 57;
 72; 76; 94; 95; 97; 98; 100; 103; 107; 108; 109;
 110; 111; 113; 114; 122; 123; 124; 127; 128;
 130; 131–32; 131; 134; 135; 136; 137; 138;
 139; 143; 146; 147; 149; 150; 162; 166; 175;
 176; 177; 185; 190; 197; 200; 227; 232; 248;
 262; 264; 265; 268; 293; 304; 349; 352; 358;
 386; 388; 424; 433; 435
 McClintock, Barbara 148; 305
 McDowell, John 433
 McGinn, Colin 433
 McGinn, Marie 55; 308; 433
 McTaggart, J. Ellis 187
 Meadows, Dennis L. 15; 433
 Meadows, Donella H. 433
 Meckel, Johann Friedrich 92; 111
 Medawar, Peter 232
 Meek, Ronald L. 181; 182; 433
 Mendel, Gregor 125; 128; 132; 147
 Mendeleyev, Dimitry 250
 Merton, Robert 169
 Meyer, Julius Lothar 250
 Meyer-Abich, Klaus M. 433

Meyers, Robert G. 64; 433
 Midgley, Mary 5; 16; 42;
 44; 55; 56; 128; 138; 199; 332; 433
 Mill, John Stuart 170; 171
 Miller, Stanley 255
 Müller, Stephen 148; 425
 Millikan, Ruth G. 64; 434
 Milling, Peter 433
 Mills, S. 338; 434
 Milne-Edwards, Henri 180
 Mishler, Brent D. 293; 434
 Mittelstrass, Jürgen 84; 205; 434
 Mohr, Hans 43; 434
 Mohr, Thomas 16; 434
 Mohrs, Thomas 49; 433
 Monod, Jacques 108; 148; 358;
 389; 434
 Montada, Leo 386
 Montagu, M. F. Ashley 138; 434
 Moore, George Edward 66; 67; 434
 Moore, James Richard 73; 110; 113;
 162; 163; 164; 165; 166; 167; 169; 175; 178;
 179; 180; 427
 More, Henry 169
 Morgan, Michael J. 148; 434
 Morgan, Sue R. 93; 434
 Morgan, Thomas Hunt 128; 383
 Morgenstern, O. 200
 Morris, Desmond 434
 Muirhead, J. H. 138
 Müller, Baron Ferdinand von 162
 Müller, Hieronymus 78
 Munz, Peter 215; 222; 329; 434

N

Nachtwey, Robert 34; 139; 359;
 394; 434
 Nagel, Thomas 55; 412; 434
 Nägeli, Carl von 124
 Nell, Edward J. 425; 431
 Neumann, John von 200
 Neurath, Otto 188
 Newton, Isaac 10; 12; 24;
 25; 28; 66; 84; 87; 88; 98; 105; 107; 161; 163;
 168-73; 172; 178; 182; 183; 184; 227; 233;
 235; 354; 395
 Nickles, T. 439
 Nida-Rümelin, Julian 190; 434
 Nidditch, Peter Herold 430
 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm 49; 53; 137;
 183; 235; 434
 Nortmann, Ulrich 4
 Novalis (Freiherr v. Hardenberg) 91

O

O'Hear, Anthony 55; 434
 Ockham, William of 32; 82; 210; 257
 Oelschlaeger, Max 434

Oerter, Rolf 386
 Oken, Lorenz 90; 91; 92;
 101; 102-3; 102; 103; 105; 106; 111; 157
 Ørsted, Hans Christian 90; 91
 Osborn, Henry Fairfield 124; 150; 400
 Ospovat, Dov 112; 167
 Overbaugh, Julie 148; 425
 Owen, Richard 93; 101; 103-4;
 105; 106; 110; 157; 170

P

Paley, William 9; 24; 25;
 33; 111; 116; 164; 168; 183; 324; 340; 434
 Palmer, Jay A. 15; 426
 Parmenides 77
 Partridge, Linda 148; 434
 Paslack, Rainer 158; 434
 Peck, A. L. 79; 94; 424
 Peirce, Charles Sanders 218
 Peters, D. S. 159
 Peterson, William 180; 434
 Philo of Alexandria 81
 Piaget, Jean 157; 227; 434
 Pierce, Simon 311
 Pinker, Steven 219
 Pinochet, Augusto 198
 Piper, P. 93
 Planck, Max (Karl Ernst Ludwig) 242
 Plato 9; 36; 53;
 66; 78-79; 80; 81; 82; 83; 84; 101; 103; 104;
 163; 172; 182; 217; 221; 244; 246; 303; 354;
 395; 434
 Plotkin, Henry 40; 60; 61;
 205; 215; 225; 425; 434
 Pobojevska, Aldona 315; 435
 Poincaré, Jules Henri 218
 Pollard, Bill 64; 435
 Popper, Karl Raimund 3; 23; 108;
 208; 209; 210; 211; 223; 224; 229-31; 229;
 230; 231; 234; 265; 329; 330; 358; 394; 411;
 426; 432; 435; 436
 Porter, Roy 428; 436
 Price, George 290
 Prigogine, Ilya 157; 214; 342; 435
 Provine, William B. 126; 127; 128;
 138; 352; 388; 424; 433; 435; 438
 Putnam, Hilary 10; 211; 229;
 311; 363; 435
 Pythagoras 77

Q

Quine, Willard von Orman 54; 197; 209;
 210; 211; 229; 262; 383; 435
 Quinton, Lord A. 90; 190; 197; 435

R

Rabanus, Stefan 196; 438

- Rachels, James..... 435
 Radnitzky, Gerhard..... 425; 430
 Ratsch, Ulrich..... 15; 391; 427
 Rauh, Hellgard..... 386; 435
 Rawls, John..... 234; 412; 435
 Ray, John..... 95
 Reagan, Ronald..... 198; 234
 Rehbock, Philip F..... 76; 99; 101;
 106; 165; 166; 435
 Reichenbach, Hans..... 210
 Rensch, Bernhard..... 127; 130; 138;
 386; 435
 Rescher, Nicholas..... 424; 426; 428;
 435; 436
 Rescorla, R. A..... 228
 Ricardo, David..... 173; 177
 Richards, Evelleen..... 92; 93; 102;
 163; 196; 435
 Richards, Robert J..... 58; 66; 68;
 76; 88; 89; 95; 100; 102; 103; 104; 111; 113;
 116; 117; 121; 151; 165; 197; 229; 230; 435
 Ridley, Mark..... 435
 Ridley, Matt..... 51; 144; 198; 435
 Riedl, Rupert..... 152; 220; 221;
 316; 377; 435
 Ritter, Johann Wilhelm..... 90; 91; 439
 Robinet, Jean Baltiste..... 97
 Romanes, George J..... 21; 22; 26; 121
 Roose, T. G. A..... 94
 Rorty, Richard..... 262
 Rosenberg, Alexander..... 46; 117; 436
 Ross, W. D..... 424; 436
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques..... 90
 Rudwick, Martin..... 97; 436
 Ruse, Michael..... 47; 56; 58;
 59; 64; 115; 129; 130; 151; 171; 180; 191; 192;
 199; 217; 315; 350; 424; 425; 428; 430; 434;
 436; 437; 439
 Russell, Bertrand..... 87; 188; 436
 Ryle, Gilbert..... 190
- S
- Sakar, S..... 430
 Samuel, R..... 93
 Sartre, Jean Paul..... 413
 Saunders, Peter T..... 312; 430
 Say, J. B..... 177
 Schefczyk, Michael..... 200; 436
 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph..... 73; 89; 90;
 91; 92; 93; 102; 103; 105; 436
 Schiebinger, Londa..... 94; 96; 436
 Schiller, Friedrich v..... 90
 Schilpp, Paul A..... 426; 432; 435; 436
 Schindewolf, Otto H..... 125; 149; 150
 Schleiden, Matthias..... 122
 Schleiermacher, Friedrich..... 90
 Schlick, Moritz..... 188
 Schlieffenhövel, Wulf..... 425; 436
 Schlüter, Johannes..... 394; 436
- Schmidt, Raymund..... 431
 Schnabel, Ulrich..... 242; 436
 Schopenhauer, Arthur..... 161; 235; 436
 Schwann, Theodor..... 122
 Schweber, Silvan S..... 24; 162; 165;
 172; 437
 Schwegler, Helmut..... 437
 Schwemmer, Oswald..... 434; 437
 Scott, Sir Walter..... 89; 164
 Scotus, John Duns..... 210
 Searle, John Rogers..... 190
 Secord, James A..... 104; 425; 426;
 431; 436; 437
 Sedgwick, Adam..... 179
 Seibt, Uta..... 40; 439
 Seiffert, Helmut..... 430
 Selby-Brigge, L. A..... 430
 Seligman, M. E. P..... 329
 Serres, Etienne Reynaud..... 92; 166; 167
 Severtsov, Alexei Nikolaevich..... 352
 Shaffer, Elinor S..... 90; 437
 Shannon, Claude Elwood..... 256
 Shaw, George Bernhard..... 124; 125; 437
 Sheldrake, Rupert..... 80; 312; 316; 437
 Shelley, Mary..... 89; 164; 165
 Sherwood, Margareth..... 89
 Shrader-Frechette, Kristin S..... 15; 348; 437
 Sidgwick, Henry..... 66
 Siep, Ludwig..... 437
 Simmel, Georg..... 218
 Simon, Jens..... 437
 Simpson, George Gaylord..... 109; 130; 134;
 139; 140; 149; 150; 185; 437
 Singer, Peter..... 36; 54; 58;
 66; 437
 Skinner, Burrhus Frederic..... 224; 225; 226; 437
 Smith, Adam..... 118; 163; 173;
 174; 177; 178-80; 232; 340
 Smith, James D..... 438
 Smith, Laurence D..... 186
 Smith, Sydney..... 167; 426
 Snelders, H. A. M..... 90
 Snow, Charles Percy..... 32; 196; 437
 Sober, Elliott..... 18; 41; 44;
 56; 154; 266; 269; 273; 277; 278; 282; 284;
 288; 289; 290; 296; 331; 335; 339; 340; 346;
 429; 437; 439
 Soros, George..... 234; 385; 437
 Spaemann, Robert..... 55; 157; 211;
 330; 437
 Spary, Emma C..... 425; 431; 436
 Spemann, H..... 123
 Spencer, Herbert..... 54; 66; 110;
 117; 119; 120; 173; 190; 218; 404; 437
 Spiegel-Redaktion..... 437
 Spinoza, Baruch de..... 89; 91; 96;
 97; 102; 105; 114; 161
 Sprigge, T. L. S..... 187
 Staudinger, Hugo..... 433; 436; 437

Steele, Edward J. 148; 232; 306;
356; 437
Steffens, Henrik 92
Steinfeld, Patricia 196; 438
Sterelny, Kim 264; 273; 310; 437
Stierstadt, Klaus 245; 308; 437
Strawson, Galen 438
Strawson, Peter F. 212
Süssmilch, Johann Peter 181
Syal, Rajeev 438
Sydow, Momme v. 62; 196; 242;
251; 438

T

Teich, Mikuláš 428; 436
Temin, H. M. 305
Termin, Howard 148
Thales 77
Thatcher, Margaret 198; 234
Thoday, J. M. 338; 438
Thompson, D'Arcy 157; 313
Thompson, William Irwin 438
Thorndike, Edward Lee 224; 226
Thornhill, Randy 144; 438
Tiedemann, Friedrich 92; 110; 166
Tinbergen, Nicolaas 56; 138
Tipler, Frank J. 83; 97; 424
Többe, Sandra 5
Tobby, John 424; 426; 438
Tolman, Edward C. 228
Tooby, John 40; 51; 196; 220
Toulmin, Stephen 223; 229; 438
Tournefort, Joseph Pitton de 95
Trautner, Hanns Martin 228; 438
Treviranus, Gottfried Reinhold 92; 95; 110
Trivers, Robert L. 46; 143; 199; 438
Tyler, Christian 438

U

Uexküll, Jakob von 124; 218; 315;
435; 438
Unger, Franz 111; 125

V

Varela, Francisco J. 80; 152; 220; 433
Veblen, Th. 391
Virchow, Rudolph 122
Vogel, Christian 425; 436
Vogel, Günter 134; 438
Volland, Eckart 39; 45; 49;
50; 220; 424; 430; 438
Vollmer, Gerhard 50; 52; 64;
67; 214; 218; 220; 221; 222; 331; 425; 434;
436; 438
Voltaire, François Marie Arouet 197
Volterra, Vito 296
Vorländer, Karl 431

Vrba, Elisabeth S. 32; 281; 318;
331; 335; 367; 428; 438
Vries, Hugo de 125; 132; 133;
147; 383

W

Waal, Frans B. M. de 137; 438
Waddington, Conrad Hal 127; 128; 157;
313; 438
Wade, Michael J. 136; 288; 438
Wagner, G. P. 316
Wagner, Moritz 111
Wahlert, Gerd von 305; 425
Wallace, Alfred Russel 108; 111; 115; 117;
120; 162; 173; 294; 438
Ward, Lester 124
Watkins, John 438
Watson, James 147
Watson, John Broadus 140
Wayne-Smith, Joseph 57; 157; 316; 428
Weber, Bruce H. 32; 76; 97;
98; 101; 103; 104; 107; 110; 115; 130; 136;
137; 146; 147; 158; 172; 173; 180; 184; 185;
192; 350; 384; 427; 438
Weber, Max 169
Webster, Gerry 32; 57; 157; 158;
265; 305; 313; 316; 428; 439
Weinberg, Wilhelm 128-29; 131; 143
Weingarten, Michael 50; 56; 76;
88; 159; 352; 388; 439
Weismann, August 19; 26; 27;
109; 121-24; 128; 132; 146; 259; 303; 305; 439
Weissman, Irving 356
Weizsäcker, Carl Christian 234
Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von 12; 242; 439
Weizsäcker, Ernst Ulrich von 15; 181; 439
Wells, William Charles 173
Westmeyer, H. 227; 439
Wetz, Franz Joseph 13
Wetzels, Walter D. 90; 439
Whewell, William 170; 171; 179
White, Lynn 15; 81; 140
Whitehead, Alfred North 2; 71; 125;
157; 187; 237; 326; 397; 439
Wickler, Wolfgang 40; 439
Wicksteed, Philip H. 424
Wieser, Wolfgang 136; 152; 439
Wilberforce, Samuel 33; 104; 183; 389
Wilberforce, William 33
Williams, George C. 40; 41; 110;
199; 260; 354; 439
Wilson, David Sloan 18; 41; 44;
56; 154; 266; 269; 273; 277; 278; 282; 284;
288; 289; 290; 296; 339; 429; 437; 439
Wilson, Edward Osborn 16; 38; 39;
43; 46; 47; 49; 50; 51; 52; 59; 64; 65; 69; 109;
110; 115; 140; 191; 325; 349; 390; 401; 433;
436; 439

