Broadening national security and protecting crowded places - Performing the United Kingdom’s War on Terror, 2007-2010

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Broadening national security and protecting crowded places -
Performing the United Kingdom’s War on Terror,
2007-2010

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Department of Geography
Durham University
September 2011

This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Geography.
Because texts do not reflect the entirety of their authors or their worlds, they enter a field of reading as partial provocations, not only requiring a set of prior texts in order to gain legibility, but – at best – initiating a set of appropriations and criticisms that call into question their fundamental premises – Judith Butler, 1993.
Abstract

Emily Lindsay Jackson

Broadening national security and protecting crowded places - Performing the United Kingdom’s War on Terror, 2007-2010

This thesis critically interrogates the spatial politics of two ‘fronts’ of the UK’s on-going war on terror between 2007-2010: first, broadening national security, the extension of national security into non-traditional social and economic domains; and second, security in ‘crowded places’, counter-terror regimes in the UK’s public spaces. It responds to the neglect within security studies of the spatial politics of this conflict by considering the spatial performativities enabling these two contemporaneous iterations of national security. The first part applies critical geopolitics and biopolitics frameworks to a case study of the new National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. It argues that UK national security reiterates the ‘interconnecting’ performativities of neoliberal norms as a ‘broadening’ understanding of national security which licenses a ‘broadening’ register of coercive policy responses. The second part carries out an exploratory case study of one such coercive policy response: security at the ‘crowded place’ of the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead. It identifies crowded places security as reliant on practices of emptying out and ‘zero-ing’ space, pre-emptive ‘zero tolerance’ risk imaginaries, and extensive surveillance – both electronic and ‘natural’. In other words, counter-terrorism is becoming increasingly important in shaping daily life in the UK through a diverse range of spatial control practices.

The thesis uses an innovative methodological and conceptual strategy combining Foucauldian discourse analysis of security policies, participant observation of situated security practices, with theoretical frameworks from political geography, international relations and visual culture. It also develops Judith Butler’s theory of performativity as a conceptual tool to critique the materialisation of contemporary spaces of security and counter-terrorism, from the meta-imaginative geographies of national security to the micro-spaces of counter-terrorism in UK public space. In sum, this thesis points towards new avenues for understanding the on-going encroachment of the war on terror into everyday spaces in the UK.
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<td><strong>BALTIC</strong></td>
<td>The BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead, England.</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>CONTEST</strong></td>
<td>The UK government’s second public counter-terrorism strategy published by the Home Office in March 2009. Its full title is <em>Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare. The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CPPS</strong></td>
<td>The policy document <em>Crowded Places: The Planning System and Counter-Terrorism</em> published by the Home Office in March 2010, as part of the review of crowded places security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CTSA</strong></td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers are responsible for implementing counter-terrorism protective security at a local level. They report to NaCTSO (see below) but are seconded to local police forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GIS</strong></td>
<td>The Government Indemnity Scheme underwrites the risk of exhibiting valuable artworks in public buildings, and is run by the Museums, Libraries and Archives Council on behalf of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NaCTSO</strong></td>
<td>The National Counter Terrorism Security Office is an organisation within the police force funded by the Home Office. It is responsible for supporting the <em>Protect</em> and <em>Prepare</em> strands of CONTEST: specifically, the protection of crowded places and hazardous sites and substances, as well as the critical national infrastructure alongside the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PCP</strong></td>
<td>The policy document <em>Protecting Crowded Places. Design and Technical Issues</em> published by the Home Office in March 2010, as part of the review of crowded places security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WTP</strong></td>
<td>The policy document <em>Working Together to Protect Crowded Places</em> published by the Home Office in March 2010, as part of the review of crowded places security.</td>
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I would also like to thank the following for granting permission to reproduce copyright material: the controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office for Crown Copyright material; and the National Counter-Terrorism Security Office for material relating to crowded places and Project Argus. Finally, thank you to the staff at the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead, England, for their generosity in granting interviews and their candour therein.

I dedicate this labour to my wonderful supportive family –

my North, my South, my East, my West, my working week, my Sunday rest.
Chapter 1  Performing the United Kingdom’s
War on Terror – An introduction
1.1 The problem of the war on terror - From the September 11 attacks to crowded places security

This thesis critically interrogates the spatial politics of two ‘fronts’ of the UK’s on-going war on terror between 2007-2010: first, broadening national security, the extension of national security into non-traditional social and economic domains; and second, security in ‘crowded places’, counter-terror regimes in the UK’s public spaces. It responds to the neglect within security studies of the spatial politics of this conflict by considering the spatial performativities enabling these two contemporaneous iterations of national security. The first part of the thesis applies critical geopolitics and biopolitics frameworks to a case study of the new National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. It argues that UK national security reiterates the ‘interconnecting’ performativities of neoliberal norms as a ‘broadening’ understanding of national security which licenses a ‘broadening’ register of coercive policy responses. The second part of the thesis carries out an exploratory case study of one such coercive policy response: security at the ‘crowded place’ of the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead. It identifies crowded places security as reliant on practices of emptying out and ‘zero-ing’ space, pre-emptive ‘zero tolerance’ risk imaginaries, and extensive surveillance – both electronic and ‘natural’. In other words, counter-terrorism is becoming increasingly important in shaping daily life in the UK through a diverse range of spatial control practices.

However, despite the title of this section it is not quite correct to say that the problematisation of the war on terror that this thesis pursues began with the airplane bombings in New York and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001. For a start, and as I elaborate over the following pages, the two ‘fronts’ of the war on terror I interrogate, broadening national security and crowded places security, materialise regulatory norms that are reiterates in many other violences – petty and sublime, invisible and infamous - at many other times and in many other places. Furthermore, it is absolutely the case that growing up in the violently contested province of Northern Ireland in the 1980s - where highly disruptive counter-terror measures were literally a way of life - underwrites a personal interest in wars against terrorism which substantially predates September 11, 2001. Nonetheless, as an
For in the aftermath of that day, the study of terrorism veritably exploded across the British and North American academies, not to mention becoming a topic of intense interest within media and popular discourses (Burke, 2003). Of course, terrorism and political violence more broadly had already been an important object of academic study, in relation both to localised ‘ethnic’ conflicts such as those in Northern Ireland and the Basque country (Zulaika and Douglass, 1996), and to the more ‘far off’ phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, demonstrated so vividly for international audiences by the kidnapping and murder of eleven Israeli athletes and a German police officer at the Olympic games in Munich in 1972, and by the siege of the Iranian embassy in London in 1980. Scholars wishing to understand the events of September 11, 2001 could therefore draw on (and in their turn add to) a wide range of literatures on the historical, cultural, religious, and political backdrop to Al Qa’ida terrorism (Esposito, 2002; Scruton, 2003); as well as a wealth of quantitative analysis on the so-called structural causes of terrorism, which included variables of socio-economic depravation, political repression, and lack of educational attainment (Enders and Sandler, 2004; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Li, 2005; Pape, 2005, 2003; Testas, 2004).

But at the same time, a new or at least distinct movement was also taking shape. Almost immediately after the attacks, some scholars, particularly within poststructural international relations, were hanging back from the general stampede and advocating a slower, more thoughtful response to events (Campbell, 2002; Edkins, 2002; Jabri, 2005; Zehfuss, 2003). This was undoubtedly an act of resistance to the intensely military nature of the government response led by the United States and the United Kingdom. On 7 October 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched against the sovereign state of Afghanistan, and the succeeding months were also marked by the inexorable building of a case for war against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq.

But this new critical movement was also indicative of a wider and deep-seated disrespect for government warmongering, and a concern that a full-scale ‘war on terror’, fought through overseas military interventions and ‘homeland security’, was not only overblown and ineffective but also downright dangerous. Arguments were
put forward that security measures such as biometric technologies in airports (Amoore, 2006), widespread data monitoring (Amoore and de Goede, 2005), and restrictions on civil liberties including stop and search powers, posed more of a challenge to the everyday life of citizens in the ‘free world’ than the putative terrorists. Equally, there was concern for the lives of those outside the west, who found themselves ‘othered’ and rendered implacable enemies in the war on terror (Graham, 2005; Gregory and Pred, 2007). As a result, more and more scholars in international relations and related disciplines began to turn their attention from the causes of terrorism to what was identified as the other side of the coin: the logics and rationales of the hegemonic discourses that enabled western societies to be securitised and to securitise in such crude and repressive ways.

This thesis is located within this new critical security movement, and in particular the hugely influential work of Michel Foucault, whose late-1970s lecture seria at the Collège de France in Paris – 1976’s Society Must Be Defended, 1978’s Security, Territory, Population, and 1979’s The Birth of Biopolitics – have become almost synonymous with critique of the war on terror within international relations and associated disciplines. Foucault’s provocative arguments about the uniquely modern relationship between power and life – ‘biopolitics’ - though not always consistent, have nonetheless proved powerfully resonant in relation to a war on terror that has sought, and continues to seek, to securitise and control societies, populations, and individuals. His claims in these lectures that ‘politics is the continuation of war by other means’ (2004: 15); that ‘a society’s ‘threshold of modernity’ has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies’ (1998: 143) so that these societies become, in effect, an archetypal ‘society of security’ (2007: 10), seemed almost supernaturally prescient in the months and years after the September 11 attacks. This thesis makes use of all three of these claims in problematising the UK’s on-going war on terror through the performativity of broadening national security and crowded places security.

Finally, by locating itself within Foucault’s critique, this research is clearly distinguishable from the prominent work of ‘Critical Terrorism Studies’ (CTS) scholars, who, in the last ten years and driven by some of the same concerns, have made great strides in establishing a bona fide sub-discipline concerned with the normative analysis of political and state violence (Jackson, 2005; Jackson, Breen
Smyth and Gunning, 2009). Specifically, this research differs from CTS in two ways. First, it does not rely on recourse to an ‘outside’ – a normative position – beyond the babble of the social and from which the power plays of the war on terror can be opposed. Instead, it adheres to the view that what can be known about the war on terror, terrorism, and state violence acquires its status as ‘knowledge’ only through the regulatory parameters of discourse. Second, the research moves beyond the assumption widely implicit in CTS that discourse is constituted entirely by people and what they say and do. Whilst the social world can only be accessed through language, this is not the same as claiming that social phenomena are made possible only as linguistic representation. To the contrary, this research moves beyond one of the key limitations of both the poststructural and CTS scholarship on contemporary security discourses by making the spatial politics of the war on terror its primary concern. Such a concern focuses on space as a central consideration in the politics of security to the extent that it is generative of, rather than passive to, security practices. This necessarily involves the proliferation of agency - moving far beyond that of active human agents to that performed through buildings, documents, images, installation artworks, indemnity contracts, and even trees.

In this chapter I introduce the thesis in six stages. In the rest of this section I continue to discuss and clarify the academic context in which I commenced and carried out this research project, followed by the policy and political backdrops to its two case studies of broadening national security and crowded places security. By ‘political backdrops’ I mean not only the place of these two ‘fronts’ of the war on terror within their institutional settings, but also the importance of critiquing their emergence within security discourses. Second, I ‘frame’ the research conceptually through Judith Butler’s theory of performativity. Third, I set out the aims of the research and my guiding research questions. Fourth and fifth, I discuss the research design and methodology in turn, which I reformulate in terms of research ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’. Sixth and finally, I explain how I organised the thesis and why it departs from the format which is usual within the social sciences.
1.1.1 Contesting the ‘already-made geographies’ of the war on terror

Although spatial heuristics remain marginalised in much of the critical work on the war on terror – exempting of course the work of a number of political geographers – they have been gaining ground in the social sciences for some time, ably represented by Edward Soja’s assertion in 1989 that the world is not an ‘already-made geography’ (p. 14). ‘We must be insistently aware’, he wrote, ‘of how space can be made to hide consequences from us, how relations of power and discipline are inscribed into the apparent innocent spatiality of social life’ (Soja, 1989: 6). Space has also played a pivotal, if understated, role in Foucault’s work: the ‘epistemological space’ of discourse in The Order of Things (1989: xi); the utopias and heterotopias ‘Of Other Spaces’ (1986); and of course the forceful critique of space, knowledge and power unleashed by Discipline and Punish (1991). Still, Elden and Crampton (2007: 13) claim that ‘Foucault’s position in relation to geography remains unclear… it is fruitful to establish a critical encounter with his work’.

This thesis takes up the baton here, proposing that the nexus between space, knowledge, and security in the conduct of the war on terror is an ideal ‘site’ for such an encounter. In looking for a case study through which to explore this relationship which has been largely ignored in security studies, I turned to the UK government’s policy on crowded places security. A 2010 Home Office publication makes clear that preventing violent extremism is ‘not enough’ to meet the ‘significant threat from international terrorism’, and that attention must also be given to ‘protective security’ in so-called ‘crowded places’:

Crowded places remain an attractive target for international terrorists who have demonstrated that they are likely to target places which are easily accessible, regularly available and which offer the prospect for an impact beyond the loss of life alone (for example serious disruption or a particular economic/ political impact) (Home Office, 2010a: 4).

Although what counts as a crowded place is, according to a sister document, ‘a matter of judgment’, they are nonetheless categorised as bars, pubs, and clubs, restaurants and hotels, shopping centres, sports and concert venues, cinemas and
theatres, visitor attractions, the health sector, the education sector, and places of worship (Home Office, 2010b: 9). My research therefore questions the ‘already-made geographies’ by which the UK’s high street businesses and public services have become a front in the war on terror. What are crowded places? Or more precisely, what are the spatial knowledges from which crowded places are materialised, and how does this materialisation happen? What makes crowded places insecure? In other words, what knowledges make it possible to fight a war on terror in the UK high street?

Scholars in political geography and critical geopolitics, and even in cultural studies, have been unravelling the geographical knowledges or ‘imaginaries’ underpinning war and violence for many years (and some, like Edward Said, citing Foucault too). But whilst my research makes much use of this work in drawing out what Derek Gregory and Allan Pred (2007) might term the ‘violent geographies’ of crowded places security, and the contemporary broadening of national security which it cites (see section 1.5.1), it also makes use of literatures from visual culture, critical architecture, political economy and risk to conceptualise the spatial politics of these fronts of the war on terror. This thesis is therefore explicitly interdisciplinary and in this way closely reflects my own experience of hybridisation as a past student of politics and international relations (in which I completed my undergraduate and Masters degrees) and a current proto-academic in political geography (in which I undertook this thesis).

1.1.2 The context of crowded places security

The timing of this thesis is significant. Having just marked the tenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks and after a decade of the war on terror, it is no doubt getting more difficult to appreciate just how disturbing the presence of national

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1 This only applies to places of further and higher education and not schools. According to the Home Office, schools, unlike colleges and universities, are ‘generally controlled environments’, and ‘would address potential counter-terrorism issues within their broader security and emergency planning work rather than as a discrete issue’ (2010d: 9). But this doesn’t seem to make sense – although schools are more internally regulated than colleges and universities, they are just as ‘crowded’ and ‘accessible’, and therefore – by the logics of crowded places policy – just as vulnerable to terrorist attack.

2 In chemical terminology, ‘proto’ denotes the first of a series of compounds, or a compound containing the minimum amount of an element, which I thought was a rather fitting description.
security in restaurants, pubs, hotels, and even hospitals, is, and should remain. This research was partly born of a concern that the links between the global geopolitics of the war on terror and counter-terrorism policies within the UK are disintegrating with the passage of time. If such links are lost, I fear it will become all too easy for security regimes like crowded places, apparently made necessary by extraordinary times and events, to become ordinary, and the violences and exclusions they make possible will become similarly banalised. Indeed, ‘real world’ events are facilitating such a displacement.

Whilst at the time of writing the media is full of discussion and analysis ‘ten years after the attacks’, there is little if any attention given to on-going counter-terrorism programmes like crowded places. Indeed, the term ‘war on terror’ has been publicly dropped by both the UK and US governments. On 15 January 2009, midway through this PhD, the Labour Foreign Secretary David Miliband claimed in The Guardian newspaper that the use of the term had been ‘misleading and mistaken’.3 ‘The ‘war on terror”, he wrote, ‘implied that the correct response was primarily military. But… the coalition there [in Iraq] could not kill its way out of the problems of insurgency and civil strife’.4 Around the same time, a number of news and media outlets reported that the new US President Barack Obama sent an email to senior Pentagon staff explaining that ‘[his] administration prefers to avoid using the term Long War or Global War on Terror (Gwot)’.5

But as Angharad Closs Stephens quite rightly put it: ‘the very idea that we might be at the end of a war which we were once told must be without end, raises some questions… what exactly would have to end for us to agree that we have indeed reached the end of the War on Terror?’ (2011: 254). Would it be, for example, the death of Osama bin Laden, the putative leader of the Al Qa’ida terrorist organisation that claimed responsibility for the September 11 attacks? Would it be full military, political, and financial withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq? Would it be the end of national security practices in everyday spaces - a government statement informing the public that crowded places security is being abandoned?

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4 Ibid.

The death of Bin Laden, however, does not seem to have brought about an end to the war on terror. In July 2011, two months after he was killed in Pakistan by US special forces, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government published their first CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy – the third in five years. Withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq are always in progress – although the meaning of ‘withdrawal’ is itself highly problematic. Finally, rather than being wound down, crowded places security is, in my view, going from strength to strength.

To grasp and appreciate the spatial politics of crowded places security, then, and from there to its resilient role within the war on terror that is not over, requires approaching it from two directions. First, crowded places is one of the flagship policies of the UK government’s official CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy. The first version of CONTEST was put together by the Labour government in 2003 in response to the September 11 attacks - it was not, however, made public. A second version, titled ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy’, was quietly published in summer 2006. A third version was published amid great fanfare in March 2009 (Home Office, 2009). Titled ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare. The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (hereafter CONTEST), this is the version I will be interrogating in this thesis.

CONTEST is organised around four delivery ‘workstreams’ based on the four ‘Ps’ of the title, Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. Each workstream contains a set of objectives which ‘reflect the assumptions we have made about the future threat and the principles to which we hold’, and a series of ‘supporting programmes’ (CONTEST, 2009: 11). Crowded places security is part of the Protect workstream, which aims to enhance the ‘protective security’ of the UK’s assets. These assets include crowded places of course, as well as critical national infrastructure, the transport system, borders, ‘interests overseas’, the so-called ‘insider threat’ (discussed in chapter 5), and the ‘misuse of hazardous substances’, such as fertilizer (CONTEST: 104). Briefly, the other three are: Pursue, which aims to ‘stop terrorist attacks’ through intelligence, ‘non-prosecution actions’ such as revocation of UK citizenship, and ‘capacity building’ in ‘international partners’; Prevent, which aims ‘to

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6 This document is no longer available online although I have a copy. It has also been discussed, for example, by Assistant Commissioner Robert Quick (former head of Special Operations for the Metropolitan Police) in a 2009 Home Affairs Select Committee report. He references the first CONTEST in 2003 and then goes on to say that ‘certainly its refresh in 2006 led to the availability of more funding to grow police counter-terrorism resources’ (House of Commons, 2009: 34).
stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism’ through community-based intervention programmes; and finally Prepare, which aims to increase the long-term capacity of the UK to recover from a terrorist attack, through the development of emergency planning and crisis management (CONTEST, 2009: 60-1, 80, 118).

The CONTEST strategy has been reviewed and updated three times, including the latest version in June 2011. Furthermore, Prevent and crowded places security have already been subject to public review; and this attention is particularly impressive given the UK government’s previously dreadful reputation for updating and communicating defence policy (see chapter 2). Specifically, the review of crowded places security followed the attempted bombings of the Haymarket area in London and Glasgow International Airport in July 2007. The Labour government asked Lord West to ‘specifically consider how best to protect crowded places from terrorist attack’ (Home Office, 2010d: 3). A public consultation period followed between 20 April – 10 July 2009, and three policy documents were finally published in March 2010 - these are the documents I use in this thesis as being indicative of the crowded places security regime. Working Together to Protect Crowded Places (hereafter WTP) is positioned as a general, umbrella document – it was also the document that was used in the public consultation (Home Office, 2010d). Protecting Crowded Places. Design and Technical Issues (hereafter PCP) (Home Office, 2010: c) and Crowded Places: The Planning System and Counter-Terrorism (hereafter CPPS) (Home Office, 2010: a), are more detailed and directed towards the design of new buildings rather than so-called ‘retro-fitting’ (PCP: 3).

In general, CONTEST has received very little attention from the academy. This is surprising given that it represents the unprecedented ‘bedding down’ of counter-terrorism in political discourse, public spaces, and private lives. As illustration of this, CONTEST is explicitly designed for wide public consumption: it was a much larger document than its predecessors - a whopping 175 pages compared to the 38 pages

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8 Prevent was reviewed during 2010-11 by Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, whose official position was the Independent Reviewer of Counter-Terror Legislation. The review process included a three-month public consultation between 10 November 2010 and 9 February 2011, including eleven consultation events with local authorities, and focus groups with the general public. Carlile presented his report in May 2011, and the revised Prevent strategy was published the following month.
of the 2006 version – partially because it contained strategic and ‘historical analysis’, and it was positioned as a key part of the Home Office’s ‘orientation’ process for organisations and agencies involved in delivering counter-terrorism in the UK (House of Commons, 2009: 9, 4).

Any attention CONTEST does get tends to be directed towards Prevent. In this regard, the latter’s so-called ‘community-based intervention programmes’ are particularly notorious. Whilst CONTEST claims that the purpose of the CHANNEL programme, for example, is ‘to identify those at risk from violent extremism and provide help to them’ (CONTEST: 80), a report prepared by the Institute of Race Relations disagrees: it claims ‘there is strong evidence that a significant part of the Prevent programme involves the embedding of counter-terrorism police officers within the delivery of local services, the purpose of which seems to be to gather intelligence on Muslim communities’ (Kundnani, 2009: 6). The issue of the targeting of Muslim communities has therefore drawn some academic riposte, with the most sustained and policy-oriented engagement in the applied social sciences, especially criminology (Lambert, 2011; McGhee, 2010, 2008; Mythen, Walklate and Kahn, 2009; and Spalek et al., 2009). These issues also feature relatively frequently in the work of public organisations like the Institute for Race Relations, and in news stories on the attempts to tackle violent extremism, and the resulting difficulties and misfires.

Crowded places security, however, receives no such attention – indignant or otherwise. What little engagement with crowded places there is, is confined to a small number of critiques within the academy, including Aradau (2010a) in international relations, and Coaffee in spatial planning (2009; also Coaffee, O’Hare and Hawkesworth, 2009), both of which have important limitations, as I discuss below. Perhaps because it is a recent phenomenon – at most five years old – sustained critical engagement with CONTEST is merely suspended in a scholarly ‘time lag’. Or perhaps it reflects assumptions in public discourse, and scarcely less in academic discourse, that the securitization of space is not as politically relevant as that of identity and subjecthood. But it seems that from a policy perspective at least, materialising the geopolitics of the war on terror in public spaces may be no less important than in ‘at risk’ communities.
The holding of a crowded places review in 2007 is also important to the extent that there must be something already there to review. This, then, is the second direction from which to approach crowded places policy: through the work of the National Counter-Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO), a police unit created in 2002 and funded by the Home Office to roll out counter-terror measures to the ‘front line’ of the UK’s unprotected public spaces. As part of its remit to protect crowded places, NaCTSO provides advice for the full range of crowded places (as listed above) in the form of pdf documents openly available on its website. It is worth noting that the content of these documents has not changed as a result of the 2010 review – they are instead currently positioned as part of a ‘strategic framework’ developed through the review.⁹

The specific work carried out by NaCTSO is discussed more fully in chapter 5 – here, then, I will emphasise two key factors. First, although the exact dates are not clear, NaCTSO and crowded places security predate by at least four years the first public iteration of CONTEST, and is thus one of the earliest priorities of the UK government in the war on terror. Second, on its website NaCTSO identifies itself as ‘contribut[ing] to the UK government’s counter terrorism strategy (CONTEST) by supporting the Protect and Prepare strands of that strategy’: specifically, the protection of crowded places and hazardous sites and substances, as well as the critical national infrastructure alongside the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI).¹⁰ Yet NaCTSO is also closely tied to the police force through the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), and crowded places security is delivered via Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA) attached to local police forces: ‘bobbies on the beat’ war on terror-style. The post of CTSA was created in 2006 to facilitate the movement of ‘protective advice’ from the Home Office through NaCTSO to local police forces and from there to crowded places. So although CTSA are attached to local police forces they take their lead from NaCTSO. This means that like Prevent and its work with community groups and the education sector, crowded places can easily and quickly be materialised as part of daily life, so it must not be underestimated as ‘just policy’.

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1.1.3 Discontinuity and discourse – Crowded places in the national security imaginary

To summarise thus far: crowded places security - counter-terrorism in the UK’s high street businesses and public services - is an important phenomenon deserving of, and indeed demanding, the focused analysis provided in this thesis. Yet, that is not to say its practices or rationales have sprung from nowhere. The history of the last forty years of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is itself enough to disabuse anyone of that notion. But yet history has also moved on. Peace (for the time being) was struck between Northern Ireland’s warring parties in 1998 and many authors, like sociologist Zygmunt Bauman according to Mark Lacy (2008: 336), now write of a shift in security discourses: ‘from a focus on shields, states, and the engineering power of ‘heavy’ modernity to the ‘liquid modernity’ of swarms, networks, and the deterritorialized dangers that emerge from ‘network’ or ‘control society’’. Yet, plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose… the more things change, the more they stay the same. Recently, I heard a well-known Belfast-born singer describe a school-trip to London in the 1970s, when he stood in the doorway of a large department store with his hands up waiting for a pat down that never came. Of course, at that time no one was looking for bombs in London’s shops as they were in Belfast, although this can no longer be considered to be the case. So if crowded places security is not novel but it is different from what has gone before, how can its significance be grasped and its politics interrogated?

In a 1978 interview, Michel Foucault explained that his particular mode of critique was concerned with recognising singularity and ‘discontinuities’:

… making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness that imposes itself uniformly on all. To show that things ‘weren’t as necessary as all that’ (2002: 226).

For example, he treated the prison as a discontinuity in terms of its use as a means of juridical punishment at the beginning of the nineteenth century (2002: 225-6). ‘All

11 Originally titled ‘Round Table of 20 May 1978’ and published in 1980, the interview has been republished as ‘Questions of Method’ (2002).
the nineteenth-century texts and discussions’, he explained, ‘testify to the astonishment at finding the prison being used as a general means of punishment’; but instead of taking this ‘sudden change’ as ‘a result at which one’s analysis could stop’, he attempted ‘without eradicating it, to account for it’ (2002: 226).

The concept of the ‘discontinuity’ is a highly resonant one both within Foucault’s own work and in those works inspired by him. Nicholas Bourriaud, in his introduction to Foucault’s essay *Manet and the Object of Painting*, describes Foucault’s approach as that of ‘locating the tipping points in the field of knowledge… identifying with clinical precision… these moments where discourse splits up into a ‘before’ and an ‘after’’ (2009: 14, emphasis added). And in her genealogy of modern finance, Marieke de Goede argues that the ‘introduction of credit, paper money, and other modern monetary instruments was not a smooth or evolutionary process but a controversial, contingent, and ambiguous transformation’ (2005: xv, emphasis added). In particular, she isolates ‘moments of openness’ (after Jenny Edkins, 1999) as a way to not only better explore these controversies and contingencies, but to understand how ‘financial truth and monetary value’ are ‘created in discourse itself’ (2005: xxvi, xxii, emphasis added).

The roll-out of crowded places security between 2007-2010 intuitively struck me as another such discontinuity, even though - as with the emergence of the prison in the 1800s, or the introduction of paper money at around the same time - it could easily be occluded within historical constants and anthropological traits, and both behind a more general banality or ‘obviousness’. The historical constants of crowded places would include the constancy of deadly threat. David Campbell (1998), for instance, has discussed how the ‘old international threats’ of the cold war were superseded by the ‘new global issues’ of the 1990s: the environment, drug trafficking, disease, migration and population issues, and ‘new forms of violence such as ‘terrorism’ or ‘Islamic fundamentalism’” (p. 7). ‘For the most part’, he argues, ‘these developments have been represented in ways that do not depart dramatically from those dominant during the cold war’; that is, they ‘are represented as dangers, located in an external and anarchic environment, which threaten the security of an internal and domestic society’ (1998: 8). The September 11 attacks and Al Qa’ida’s brand of ‘global terrorism’ can thus be represented in terms of the constancy of external danger threatening an internal society. In this way, Lord West is able to
claim at the beginning of his report that the UK ‘faces a threat from international terrorism of a nature and magnitude different to any we have encountered before’, so that the objective of crowded places is ‘to make it harder for terrorists to attack targets in this country’ (WTP: 3, emphasis added). Although, as I discuss in the next chapter, materialisations of threat in a so-called ‘global age’ mean that UK counter-terrorism is no longer confined to, or a problem in, ‘this country’.

The immediate anthropological traits of crowded places security would ‘obviously’ be the existence of ‘the terrorist’ bogeyman. Crowded places, the policy explains, ‘remain an attractive target for terrorists’ because of their accessibility and availability, which in turn offer the prospect for ‘an impact beyond the loss of life alone (for example serious disruption or a particular economic/ political impact)’ (PCP: 3). At this and at other points (and as I discuss more fully in chapter 5), the terrorist bogeyman is portrayed in terms of almost magpie-like characteristics, attracted by the bright lights of the UK’s shiny shopping centres, restaurants, and visitor attractions. If the terrorist is typically portrayed as an individual who wants to destroy what is important in a particular polity – and this is as close to a definition as is probably possible, or indeed advisable, to get – what does it suggest when accessible and available spaces with economic/political impact are considered to be what is important? A question which also loops back into my earlier emphasis on the move of the crowded places literature away from an anthropocentric focus. So notwithstanding the fact that spaces frequented and used by the public have been attacked, and that people have lost their lives, what strikes me as singular here is the government’s desperation to protect the accessibility and availability of economic and commercial spaces through crowded places security.

However, recognising discontinuities within the continual and overlapping evocation of historical constants and immediate anthropological traits is only the opening gambit of what Foucault termed ‘the project of a ‘genealogy of morals’ (2002: 224) (for other appropriations of a Foucauldian genealogical project see Aradau and van Munster, 2011; Crary, 1992; Dean, 1990; and for general discussion, Hutchings, 1997; Kendall and Wickham, 1999; Saukko, 2003). Returning to the case of the prison, Foucault explained that ‘in order to get a better understanding of what is punished and why, I wanted to ask the questions how does one punish… how these divisions are effected’ (2002: 224, emphasis added). Likewise, I would question not
only what is crowded places security, but also how does one secure, and how are divisions effected between secure and insecure space, between crowded spaces and other spaces?

All this amounts to, then, ‘a history not of the prison as an institution, but of the practice of imprisonment’; and practices are ‘not just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, [or] guided by pragmatic circumstances’, but instead ‘possess their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence, and ‘reason” (Foucault, 2002: 225). Practices of imprisonment – or of counter-terrorism – are not random; they are ‘programs of conduct that have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done… and codifying effects regarding what is to be known’ (Foucault, 2002: 225). In this way, Paul Veyne writes of Foucault’s approach:

Heuristically, it is better to start off with detailed practices, details of what was done and what was said, and then make the intellectual effort to make explicit the ‘discourse’ surrounding them. This is more fruitful… than starting off from a general, well-known idea, for if that is what you do then you are in danger of looking no further than that idea and failing to notice the ultimate, decisive difference that would reduce it to nothing (2010: 10).

Exactly what kind of ‘intellectual effort’ is needed to make explicit the discourses of crowded places security is discussed in the next section.
1.2 Framing the problem - Performativity

Like Foucault, the social theorist Judith Butler is also concerned with making explicit the discourses surrounding otherwise ‘obvious’ phenomena. In her early work, Butler focused on interrogating and re-articulating discourses of gender, sexuality, and heteronormativity in two seminal texts: *Gender Trouble* (1990) and *Bodies That Matter* (1993). More recently she has extended her concerns to violence, war and mourning (2004; 2009), and to the state and the economy (2010). Butler’s work on the performativity of discourse forms the conceptual engine through which my concerns with practices of crowded places security are articulated.

In *Bodies That Matter*, Butler (1993: 9) claimed that bodies, sex, and thus ‘effects of gender’, are not natural but are instead materialisations of discourse, and stabilised through ‘ritualized repetition’ – in other words, performativity. ‘To claim that discourse is formative’, she writes:

… is not to claim that it originates, causes, or exhaustively composes that which it concedes; rather, it is to claim that there is no reference to a pure body which is not at the same time a further formation of that body (Butler, 1993: 10).

In this way, there is no prediscursive body with one gender which determines the subject; nor is there a prediscursive subject which chooses its gender: ‘the ‘I’ neither precedes nor follows the process of this gendering, but emerges only within and as the matrix of gender relations themselves’ (Butler, 1993: 7). Likewise, Butler writes that analysis of the state or the economy cannot begin with ‘already delimited understandings' of what they are, because there is no ‘metaphysical substance' that precedes the expressions and activities of the same (2010: 147).

If there are no *a priori* gendered bodies to be understood except through discourse, then their matter (for the body is, after all, material) should be understood not as a ‘site or surface’, but instead ‘a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter’ (Butler, 1993: 9, emphasis in original). This process of materialization is performativity, ‘the power of discourse to produce effects through reiteration’, and
is crucial to Butler’s theory of performativity (Butler, 1993: 20). Unlike a Goffman-esque ‘performance’, which focuses on interactions between audience and performer, performativity is not ‘a singular ‘act’, for it is always a reiteration of a norm or set of norms’ – in other words, it does not depend on the actions of subject agency (Butler 1993: 12).

Butler’s approach is thus both a dismissal of (linguistic) constructivism – a cultural or social agency which is ‘imposed upon the surface of matter’ or ‘acts upon a nature’ (1993: 2, 4) - and a re-working of J.L. Austin’s version of performativity (1962; also Culler, 2000; Parker and Kosofsky Sedgwick, 1995). Austinian performativity, Butler explains, distinguishes between ‘illocutionary’ and ‘perlocutionary’ performatives (2010: 147). Illocutionary performatives are ‘speech acts that bring about certain realities, as when judgments are pronounced by a court’ (Butler, 2010: 148); or what she terms the ‘biblical rendition of the performative, i.e. ‘Let there be light!’ (1993: 13). Perlocutionary performatives ‘characterize those utterances from which effects follow only when certain other kinds of conditions are in place’ – for example, ‘a politician may claim that ‘a new day has arrived’ but that new day only has a chance of arriving if people take up the utterance and endeavour to make it happen’ (Butler, 2010: 148). Butler’s theory of performativity as ‘a process of reiteration’ (1993: 10) may seem closer to Austin’s perlocutionary performative but for two crucial departures: first, her dismissal of the ‘model of the speaking subject’ (2010: 150); and second, her insistence on performativity as political.

First, by the terms of speech act theory which was Austin’s point of departure, ‘a performative is that discursive practice that enacts or produces that which it names’, but it is always ‘by virtue of the power of a subject or its will’ (1993: 13, emphasis in original). Against this interpretation, Jacques Derrida’s ‘critical reformulation’ asserted that the power of the performative is ‘not the function of an originating will, but is always derivative’ (1993: 13). Following on from this, then, Butler claims that ‘the model of the speaking subject fails to provide an adequate way

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12 He wrote: ‘Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a ‘coded’ or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a ‘citation’... in such a typology, the category of intention will not disappear; it will have its place, but from that place it will no longer be able to govern the entire scene and system of utterance’ (cited in Butler, 1993: 13).
of understanding how performativity works’ (2010: 150). Rather, in addition to the ‘explicit speech act’, other performative practices include: ‘mundane and repeated acts of delimitation’; ‘modes of prediction and anticipation that constitute part of… activity itself’; and ‘organizations of human and non-human networks… that enter into specific… activities’ (Butler, 2010: 150). Thus when a subject speaks it is not simply that a speech act is performed - rather, a set of relations and practices are constantly renewed and agency traverses human and non-human domains’ (Butler, 2010: 150).

Second, in this elaboration of practices, relations, and non-human alongside human agency, Butler obviously owes a debt to a Foucauldian understanding of discourse as a configuration or ‘matrix’ of regulatory productive power – a debt which she acknowledges (Butler, 1993: 2). Bodies That Matter ‘accepts as a point of departure Foucault’s notion that regulatory power produces the subjects it controls, that power is not only imposed externally, but works as the regulatory and normative means by which subjects are formed’ (1993: 22). In this way, discourses not only produce speaking subjects, but they are also exclusionary. As the performativity of gender, for example, produces the effect of ‘boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter’, at the same time it produces ‘abject beings, those who are not yet ‘subjects’; ‘the abject designates here precisely those ‘unlivable’ and ‘uninhabitable’ zones of social life’ (Butler, 1993: 3). This is precisely the reason for Butler’s move from construction to ‘discursive performativity’: ‘it is not enough’, she writes, ‘to claim that human subjects are constructed’, without recognising that this process is a ‘differential operation’ which produces the human as well as ‘the more and the less ‘human’, the inhuman, the humanly unthinkable’ (1993: 12, 8). ‘These excluded sites’, she continues, ‘come to bound the ‘human’ as its constitutive outside, and to haunt those boundaries as the persistent possibility of their disruption and rearticulation’ (Butler, 1993: 8).

In sum, there are two ways in which Butler is optimistic that exclusionary matrices can be contested. First, the reliance of performativity on recitation and repetition is a sign that it is never quite complete: that ‘bodies never quite comply with the norms by which their materialization is impelled’ (Butler, 1993: 2). Second, the production of a ‘constitutive outside’ of ‘abject beings’ and ‘uninhabitable zones
of social life’, is a ‘threatening spectre’ capable of exposing the ‘self-grounding presumption of the sexed subject’ (1993: 3).

1.2.1 Performativity in geography

Butler’s theory of performativity has been cited and reiterated in a range of disciplines, including (but by no means limited to) cultural economy and social studies of finance (see Aitken, 2007; Callon, 1998; Langley, 2010; Mackenzie, Muniesa and Siu, 2007), and human geography. In both these examples, performativity is made use of to account for the regulated and constrained conditions of subject formation, but also to account for the materialisation of discourses in ways that do not include, or perhaps it is better to say do not rely on, human agency at all.

In geography, Nicky Gregson and Gillian Rose have advocated and used performativity as a ‘conceptual tool’ for a ‘critical human geography’ (2000: 433). In so doing, their objective is to move geographical debate away from ‘a rather narrow focus on and identification with performing bodies’, towards ‘a more expansive engagement with ‘the performative” (2000: 435). In particular, this is an engagement with performativity as a field of power relations. Here, they claim to go both ‘beyond Butler’ and against the grain of the geographical literature, by suggesting that ‘space too needs to be thought of as being brought into being through performances and as a performative articulation of power’ (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 434) (also Cloke, May and Johnsen, 2008; Kaiser and Nikiforova, 2008; Rose, 1999).

Gregson and Rose go on to argue that ‘performances do not take place in already existing locations: the City, the bank, the franchise restaurant, the straight street’; instead, ‘specific performances bring these spaces into being’, so that ‘we need to think of spaces too as performative of power relations’ (2000: 441). In other words, such spaces are both materialised by, and in turn reiterate and reproduce, regulatory norms. They also transfer Butler’s notion of ‘disidentifications’ with political discourse to their own argument, suggesting that space is always

13 Butler writes: ‘Although the political discourses that mobilize identity categories tend to cultivate identifications in the service of a political goal, it may be that the persistence of disidentification is equally crucial to the rearticulation of democratic contestation… collective disidentifications can facilitate a reconceptualization of which bodies matter, and which bodies are yet to emerge as critical matters of concern’ (1993: 2).
‘threatened with its own instability’ (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 437). In this way, they declare their focus to be on the ‘complexity and instability’ of performed spaces. For example, in the discussion of the community arts research carried out by Rose, they argue that the full ‘radicalness’ of its politics lies not in what the artworks created ‘meant’, but rather ‘a certain refusal of interpretation, a refusal to render everything legible and assimilable and knowable’ (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 448). In the view of the authors, this was ‘a strategy to resist the discursive power that had repeatedly labelled, categorised, and either sanctified or demonised these people and places’ (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 448).

For me, the limitations of Gregson and Rose’s account (and I discuss these in more detail in chapter 4) appear partly in an over-emphasis on space as ‘unstable’ and ‘transitory’ as a way of speaking back to the recalcitrance of its formative discourses (2000: 447, 442). Whilst they do consider, for example, the role of gender differences in their example of the performativity of car-boot sale spaces, they do very little (and perhaps understandably so given their empirical material) to address Butler’s insistence on performativity’s ‘constitutive force of exclusion, erasure, violent foreclosure, [and] abjection’ – the primary reason she champions performativity over constructivism (1993: 8). Working to address this gap, scholars in political geography have used performativity to push further an understanding of how spaces are materialised by, indeed are materialisations of exclusion, erasure, and violence, and I discuss this scholarship further in chapter 2. If Butler’s theory of performativity is the conceptual engine for this thesis, then I am concerned to develop its usage in a specifically political geographical sense.

1.2.2 Thoughts on the performativity of security

‘What about the materiality of the body, Judy?’ I took it that the addition of ‘Judy’ was an effort to dislodge me from the more formal ‘Judith’ and to recall me to a bodily life that could not be theorized away. There was a certain exasperation in the delivery of that final diminutive, a certain patronizing quality which (re)constituted me as an unruly child, one who needed to be
brought to task, restored to that bodily being which is, after all, considered to be most real, most pressing, most undeniable – Judith Butler.\footnote{1993: ix-x.}

Butler’s description of her attempts to think about the materiality of the body beyond its supposedly ‘most real, most pressing, and most undeniable’ existence, and the incredulity and dismissal she met with as described in the passage above, put me in mind of the questions and doubts which are often put to critiques of security. How can one reject security? Or, if one can more pragmatically question whether security can exist in an absolute form, whether one can ever be truly secure, how can one deny the right to strive for it nonetheless? How can one deny there are people who want to hurt and maim, and a right to seek security in return?

It is not her objective, Butler writes, to deny the ‘irrefutable facts’ of the body: they ‘live and die; eat and sleep; feel pain, pleasure; endure illness and violence’ (1993: xi). But their irrefutability, she continues, ‘in no way implies what it might mean to affirm them and through what discursive means’ (1993: xi). In the same way, a critique of security (to be more precise, a poststructural critique of security, and to be even more precise, this poststructural critique of security), accepts that bombers bomb, people die and are injured, and lives are ruined. But these irrefutable occurrences are still not the same as, or mutually inclusive with, their meaning.

To give a simple but powerful example, why does terrorism mean catastrophic danger, whereas infant malnutrition, which kills millions more each year (not even taking into account the deep, lifelong, life-altering emotional distress of the mothers and fathers, the brothers and sisters, the families and friends left behind), does not? In his analysis of the September 11 attacks as the ‘beginning’ of the war on terror, Stuart Elden responds that such ‘tallies risk losing sight – and losing the site – of the problem in making such numerical accounts; with accountancy in place of grief’ (2009: xiii). ‘Let us not forget’, he continues, ‘that these events are a political, spatial, and temporal marker; yet they are one that we give a particular significance to through our complicity in a construction’ (Elden, 2009: xiii). In this way, the security which is the objective of crowded places security only appears and endures within a discourse (or discourses) of which 9/11 was a marker.
To conclude, using performativity as a conceptual framework for critiquing security enables me to apply a Foucauldian conceptualisation of discourse to empirical research by focusing on the ways in which discourse becomes ‘effects in the real’ (Foucault, 2002: 232). Performativity allows for this by foregrounding the process and practices of ‘ritualized repetition’ by which the regulatory norms of security discourses are (re)produced and stabilized (Butler, 1993: x). In terms of the security discourses of the war on terror, performativity foregrounds that what can be known about the war on terror, terrorism, and state violence acquires its status as ‘knowledge’ only through the regulatory parameters of discourse. In particular, it allows me to make visible a range of security practices that would not be visible with other critical accounts that focus on the ‘sayings’ and ‘doings’ of an ‘active human agent’ (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 438); or on national security which focuses on the state in global politics, thus ignoring more ‘prosaic’ practices. In addition, performativity allows me to make visible those practices that are invisible, in the sense that by identifying performativities of security one can also identify how the abject domains and beings of security are likewise constituted.
1.3 Aims and research questions

The thesis will use the critical theory of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler to develop a framework for understanding the phenomenon of crowded places security. As such it aims to:

• *Advance* understanding of the contemporary broadening of the meaning and coercive register of national security. This includes a deepened conceptual understanding of its regulatory discourses; a focus on how its performativities reiterate neoliberal globalisation; and a drawing out of the relationship between national security and counter-terrorism within the UK;

• *Move beyond* geopolitical critiques of national security practices using a biopolitics framework;

• *Develop* biopolitics as a conceptual framework for security practices by moving beyond a focus on circulation to consider cultural and other ‘prosaic’ practices;

• *Bring into view* crowded places as a citational, reiterative practice of national security discourses;

• *Develop* the potential uses of performativity as a tool for critical security scholarship by using it to account for and understand contemporary security practices of the war on terror.

In relation to these research aims, the following questions will be addressed:

1. What is broadening national security and what is politically at stake in its practices?

2. What is crowded places security? What makes crowded places insecure? How is ‘crowded space’ secured? What knowledges make it possible to fight a war in the UK high street?

3. How does crowded places security reiterate broadening national security and what are the implications of this relationship?
The logic of strategy is the logic of the connection of the heterogeneous and it is not, repeat not, the logic of the homogenisation of things which are contradictory – Foucault.\textsuperscript{15}

In his 1978 interview ‘Questions of Method’, Foucault also claimed that in critique the ‘only important problem is what happens on the ground’ (2002: 235). Unfortunately, he wasn’t so forthcoming on how like-minded researchers might recognise, understand, separate, collect, organise, analyse, and communicate (and not necessarily in that order) the what of what happens on the ground. Where most of the social sciences methodology literature begins by discussing research ‘design’ and ‘methods’ (such as Gibson and Brown, 2009; Glesne, 2011; Gray, 2009), I instead follow Colin Robson (2002: 77) in being guided by the notions of research ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’. ‘Strategy’, Robson writes, ‘refers to the general broad orientation taken in addressing research questions’ (2002: 77) - my research strategy is the subject of this section. In the next section 1.5 I discuss my ‘tactics’: the ‘specific methods of investigation’ (Robson, 2002: 77).

In terms of strategy, then, in their essay on postmodern methodology Atkinson and Coffey explain that ‘problems and methods come as part of packages of ideas, whether or not one chooses to call them ‘paradigms’” (2003: 111). In this way, the problems of broadening national security and crowded places security cannot be separated from the poststructural paradigm with which I identify and within which I work; nor, indeed, can the tactics I will use to collect and analyse information about them. In particular, this collection and analysis of information happens as part of the questioning mode which is central to qualitative research: as Limb and Dwyer put it in their book on qualitative methodologies in geography, ‘wanting to get behind the ‘facts’ as they appear to us in everyday life’ (2001: 1). Qualitative methodologies are ‘a means by which the ‘messiness’ and complexity of everyday life can be explored by using research methods that do not ignore such complexity but instead engage with it’ (Limb and Dwyer, 2001: 2).

\textsuperscript{15} 2008: 42.
But having set out my commitment to a qualitative strategy, I would like to put forward an important addendum about the difference my strategy recognises between on the one hand, the undoubted complexity of the social world, and on the other, assumptions about its ‘messiness’ and the political implications of such assumptions. Sociologist John Law, in his book on developing methodologies for engaging with what he terms the ‘messes of reality’, explains that ‘methods, their rules, and even more methods’ practices, not only describe but also help to produce the reality that they understand’ (2004: 5, emphasis in original). Yet, ‘much of reality is ephemeral and elusive’, he continues, so that when ‘social science tries to deal with things that are complex, diffuse and messy’, invariably it ‘tends to make a mess of it’ (Law, 2004: 2). He therefore argues in favour of ‘remak[ing] social science in ways better equipped to deal with mess, confusion and relative disorder’ (Law, 2004: 2).

There is certainly a strong case for developing methodologies within the social sciences that are more intuitive and responsive to the specificities of social phenomena, and generally less beholden to the explanatory and experimental strictures of their natural science forebears. My disagreement with Law’s arguments, however, stems from his emphasis on what is ‘vague, diffuse or unspecific, slippery, emotional, ephemeral, elusive or indistinct’ in the world; what ‘changes like a kaleidoscope, or doesn’t have much of a pattern at all’ (2004: 2). He asks ‘how might we catch some of the realities we are currently missing?’ and ‘can we know them well? Should we know them? Is ‘knowing’ the metaphor that we need? And if it isn’t, then how might we relate to them?’ (Law, 2004: 2, emphasis in original). In effect, Law is suggesting that by accepting the mess and developing better ways to engage with it we may yet find some form of clarity. Therefore his argument for ‘greater methodological variety’ reproduces, in my view, the very limitations of the methodologies he purports to move beyond (Law, 2004: 4). Although academic, and moreover social science, traditions demand that research produces a specific kind of ‘clarity’, the strategy of using Foucault and Butler’s focus on the practices and performativities which materialise regulatory norms draws attention precisely to the contingent and political process through which notions of clarity, knowledge, and understanding may be arrived at. In rejecting the possibility of attaining clarity
through methods which are either explanatory or ‘elusive and indistinct’, my strategy is distinctive through two main concerns.

First, my strategy aims to connect, rather than homogenise, that which is heterogeneous and contradictory. Second, while I am sympathetic to Law’s argument that social science methods are ‘badly adapted to the study of the ephemeral, the indefinite and the irregular’ (2004: 4), my interest is in identifying, analysing, and communicating an understanding of the politicised constitution of the social world: particularly the relationship between performativities of space and performativities of security, a relationship that is very often overlooked and/or depoliticised. My reference point for analysis is what Butler terms the ‘constitutive force of exclusion, erasure, violent foreclosure, [and] abjection’ (1993: 8) (also Cloke, 2002). In terms of Law’s debate, then, I do not want to understand what is ‘slippery, indistinct, elusive, complex, diffuse, messy, textured, vague…’ etcetera (2004: 6). Instead I seek to understand what is closed, hard, discriminatory, exclusionary, and violent in the production of secure space (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Low and Smith, 2006; Schlottman, 2008). Instead, of the world as a ‘generative flux of forces and relations’ (Law, 2004: 7), I want to understand a world that is at best prone to stasis and sedimentation, and at worse, erasure and violence.

1.4.1 Strategy I: Broadening national security

The first part of my research strategy focuses on advancing understanding of the discourses and performativities of the contemporary ‘broadening’ of national security – the expansion of national security into non-traditional economic and social domains. The terminology is drawn from the new National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom (hereafter NSS), first published in March 2008 with an updated version in June 2009, which claims that ‘modern challenges require a broader understanding of national security and a broader range of responses’ (Cabinet Office, 2009: 14). The NSS makes for a useful and revealing case study of contemporary iterations of national security for three reasons. First, it is unique to the extent that it is the first of its kind. The terms ‘national security’ and ‘national security strategy’ are of course familiar to American security discourse - from the creation of a
national security apparatus after World War II (Neocleous, 2008), to President George W. Bush’s publication of *The National Security Strategy for the United of States of America* in September 2002 and March 2006 (Der Derian, 2003). The UK, however, has traditionally focused on defence policy (Cornish and Dormán, 2009; Hopkinson, 2000). Furthermore, it is very important to note that whilst the UK’s official moves towards a national security culture can be considered to have been ‘inaugurated’ by the New Labour government between 1997 and 2010, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government which succeeded it has further embedded and developed these changes. For example, it immediately set up a new National Security Council (NSC) in the Cabinet Office in May 2010 (which succeeded Labour’s Cabinet Committee on National Security), and appointed a new National Security Adviser Sir Peter Ricketts. The coalition government also published a third National Security Strategy in October 2010.

To recognise that the NSS is, in the UK context, unique and in many ways innovative, does not mean that it is not situated in dense discursive relations. For example, does it indicate a cold war-esque national security *redux*, as has been argued in the US context? (Gaddis, 2002). Or rather the increasing securitisation of everyday life in the era of a war on terror? (Collier and Lakoff, 2008). Or is this nascent national security era in UK policy simply a necessary policy recalibration by government to meet the ‘broader demands of the global age’? (NSS 2009: 5). Rather than being attributable to particular governments or individuals, it is one of the arguments I pursue in the thesis that these changes are tied to, and reproduce, the discourses of the war on terror.

Second, one of the features that designates the NSS as a singular new type of UK security policy, is that it is publicly and easily available on the internet. Indeed, a 2009 parliamentary report on the CONTEST counter-terrorism policy – a key component of broadening national security - welcomes the ‘government’s desire to be as open as possible on matters of counter-terrorism and security matters and to put as much information as possible into the public domain’ (House of Commons, 2009: 4). In terms of conducting research, this easy availability circumvented the issue of trying to obtain confidential, or at least guarded, security policy. In terms of probing what makes the NSS singular, its uniquely ‘public-facing’ status raises the intriguing issue of the relationship between *broadening* national security and the
broad domain of ‘the public’. Indeed, Cloke et al. (2004) have commented that official documents ‘are not first and foremost a public service. The principal aim of their construction is to inform government policy’ (p. 52). In other words, the relationship between official security policy and its audience, ‘the public’, should be approached with a questioning attitude. Of course, this relationship could easily be situated in narratives of democratisation and the accountability of government, but I think it would be naïve to assume that the conduct of national security is any more transparent or benevolent than it ever was, as the on-going controversy around the UK’s complicity in so-called ‘extraordinary renditions’ illustrates. Rather, it is my view that the bringing together of national security strategy, public-facing availability and information technology in ways that support and facilitate each other, indicates an important step-change in the conduct of national security, and this thesis takes the first steps towards conceptualising the political implications of this relationship.

Third and finally, national security strategy – albeit in the US context – has received particular attention in political geography and critical security literatures (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007; Campbell, 2007b, 1998). Focusing on the NSS therefore offers the additional benefit of allowing me to build on and develop existing scholarship making use of Butler’s theory of performativity to critique national security strategy.

My discourse analysis of the National Security Strategy makes use of two prominent critical frameworks. The first is critical geopolitics, which emerged in the late 1980s and early to mid-1990s through the work of scholars including Gearoid Ó Tuathail (1996; 1986) and Simon Dalby (1991). Critical geopolitics, according to Campbell and Power (2010), builds on the work of Foucault and Derrida in seeking to develop not ‘a theory of how space and politics intersect’, but rather ‘a mode of interrogating and exposing the grounds for knowledge production’ (p. 243). It was thus, Ó Tuathail claims, the ‘starting point for a different form of geopolitics’ (cited in Campbell and Power, 2010: 243).

Furthermore, in 2009 Ó Tuathail described three other characteristics of critical geopolitics which may support my objective of critiquing broadening national security. First, it recovers ‘textuality within practices which are represented as objective or practical… Geopolitics is inescapably cultural’ (Ó Tuathail cited in Campbell and Power, 2010: 243). Second, it displaces ‘state-centric readings of world
politics and aims for the recovery of the many messy practices that constitute the modern inter-state system. Geopolitics is inescapably plural' (Ó Tuathail cited in Campbell and Power, 2010: 243). And third, it develops ‘critical histories of geopolitical thinkers and discourses. Geopolitics is inescapably traversed by relations of power and gender’ (Ó Tuathail cited in Campbell and Power, 2010: 243). Finally, Campbell and Power comment that this focus on the displacement of state-centric readings and the recovery of ‘complex and prosaic practices’ has ‘opened up the range of sites/ texts/ practices where ‘geopolitics’ is seen to take place’ (2010: 244). I therefore recognise that prosaic practices of national security can take place in a range of domains: cinema (Power and Crampton, 2007; Weber, 2007); video games (Power, 2009, 2007); magazines, comics, and cartoons (Dittmer, 2009, 2007; Dodds, 2007; Sharp, 2000); art practice (Ingram, 2009); and military and media maps (Graham, 2004; Gregory, 2010).

The second framework I use to critique broadening national security is biopolitical security, which emerged only in the last ten or even five years and draws heavily on Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France in the late 1970s. As Michael Dillon claimed in 2007, ‘western security practices are as biopolitical as they are geopolitical’ (2007a: 7). Biopolitical security, with its emphasis on the relationship between security and circulating and contingent ways of life, may seem in many ways a more appropriate framework than critical geopolitics for understanding national security in a globalising world. But as it stands, the literature largely neglects precisely those features which have been identified by poststructural scholarship as essential features of contemporary politics - the textual, cultural and prosaic - in favour of what Jenny Edkins terms ‘a purely bare biological life of emergence’, so that the ‘goal of life, envisaged in this way, is nothing but the endless circulation of and reproduction of life’ (2008: 221). So whilst I use the concept of biopolitical security to further interrogate the discourses and performativities of broadening national security and crowded places security, my analysis also discusses in some depth the limitations of the extant literature.
1.4.2 Strategy II: Crowded places security

The second part of my research strategy focuses on finding out about, understanding, and critiquing practices of crowded places security through an exploratory case study of the BALTIC Centre of Contemporary Art in Gateshead, England. Crowded places security is important as a further elaboration of broadening national security, but also, as I discussed above, as a key front of the war on terror in its own right. My objective with this case study was not only to gather information on practices of crowded places security, but also to explore how public spaces previously unconnected with national security were responding to inclusion within one of the government’s counter-terror programmes; and how everyday enactments and experiences of crowded places security contrasted with elite discourses.

This sort of context-specific approach could be described as ‘ethnographic’, although as I discuss below, in this particular case it is better to say ‘micro-ethnography’ in the style of participant observation (Gray, 2009). In this way, I aim to circumvent Nick Megoran’s (2006) criticism of the tendency of political geographers towards discourse analysis (drawing on critical social theory), which, he argues, puts such scholarship in danger of becoming ‘both repetitious and lopsided, relegating or even erasing people’s experiences and everyday understandings of the phenomena under question’ (p. 622). In contrast, ethnographic participant observation, ‘a method largely neglected by political geographers’, can be used to ‘address these imbalances and open new research directions’; with both approaches used to complement each other in a ‘critique of state violence’ (Megoran, 2006: 622).

Because of the lack of literature on crowded places security, the structure of this case study was exploratory, flexible and iterative, and encompassed nine months of active information collection from January to September 2009. BALTIC was chosen as the site of my case study for two main reasons. First, in order to address particular gaps in the critical geopolitics and security studies literatures. Of all the social science disciplines, geography has unsurprisingly been exemplary in exploring the performativity of space, but as yet little attention has been given to performativities of security in cultural spaces and/ or visitor attractions. Security studies and international relations have a better record. In addition to analyses of security at borders (Amoore, 2006; Vaughan-Williams, 2010, 2009), airports (Salter,
2008), and critical national infrastructure (Aradau, 2010b; Collier and Lakoff, 2008), there has been considerable attention given to how dominant political discourses, including security, are articulated through cultural practices and institutions. Debbie Lisle, for example, looks at the post-9/11 reproduction of American superiority in the Whitney Museum of American Art (2007), and how war exhibitions in the US Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Imperial War Museum, London, function to restore the consensual politics of the status quo (2006) (also Luke, 2002).

But these analyses typically lack a direct engagement with how politics not only takes place within space, as players act on a stage, but is also made possible by space. And it is precisely such an engagement that this thesis carries out in relation to broadening national security and crowded places security, therefore making a clear contribution to the security studies literature on the war on terror. What is at stake in this contribution includes, but also goes beyond, the recognition - such as that of Christine Sylvester (2008) - that art galleries have political agendas. For example, she writes that art museums cater to the ‘middle classes and middlebrow tastes’, and that ‘most surveys... indicate time and time again that the well-educated, affluent and/or upwardly mobile classes choose museum-going as their leisure pursuit’ (2008: 3). It is rather, as Gregson and Rose would have it, the explicit un-working of how performativities of space materialise, reiterate and reproduce regulatory norms. How performativities of ‘zero space’ in modernist art galleries such as BALTIC reproduce zero change in the prevailing political status quo, and also make possible the emptying out or zero-ing of space sought by contemporary security practices. This relationship is absolutely key not only because it means that certain spaces make possible certain practices – that art galleries make possible crowded places security (and certainly they do) – but also that spaces are performed so as to make certain practices not possible, or certainly more difficult. And this has obvious repercussions for the possibilities of contesting the politics of security.

This lack of attention to how space makes certain actions possible or, alternatively, more difficult is the same neglect that haunts urban geography analyses of security in public space. They are typically limited by what could be termed ‘banal materialism’; where the objects and practices of security just ‘are’ rather than being materialised through the citation of regulatory norms. One example would be Jon Coaffee’s (2004) analysis of the ‘ring of steel’, which was erected around London’s...
financial district, the ‘City’, in the early 1990s in response to threats from the Provisional IRA, and maintained more recently because of the alleged additional threat from Al Qa’ida terrorism. Coaffee concludes that counter-terror strategies in the City, like the ring of steel, have to date ‘succeeded in creating an environment where the needs of safety and security sit side by side with business vibrancy’ (2004: 295). Indeed, they might have done so. But I would counter to what extent do the counter-terror strategies represented by the ring of steel cite and regenerate the same discourses from which ‘business vibrancy’ draws its meaning? In other words, in this case ‘security’ and ‘business vibrancy’ may be both the means to the same end of a particular political and economic status quo.

The second reason for choosing BALTIC as the site of my case study is that, most obviously, crowded places security is there. If crowded places security does indeed represent the encroachment of the war on terror into the UK’s public space, as has been argued (Coaffee, O’Hare and Hawkesworth, 2009), and as I believe also, then logically crowded places security should be observable in any crowded place. BALTIC has a very high profile both internationally as an important venue for contemporary art and in the northeast of England as a tourist and leisure attraction. It is also part of the equally high-profile regeneration of ‘NewcastleGateshead’,16 including the Gateshead quayside area where BALTIC is located. BALTIC is therefore exactly the type of ‘prominent... crowded places business sector[s]’ which is the particular focus of crowded places policy (WTP: 18). So using BALTIC as my case study means that not only could I address the gaps in the literature, but also I could do so at a space where crowded places security has already gained a foothold.

16 ‘NewcastleGateshead’ is the brand developed by the Newcastle and Gateshead Councils to promote the area ‘nationally and internationally as a place at the forefront of innovative culture-led regeneration’. See ‘About the area – NewcastleGateshead’ on NewcastleGateshead website. Available at http://www.newcastlegateshead.com/site/about-the-area/newcastlegateshead (Accessed 17 March 2011).
1.5 Tactics in crowded places

1.5.1 Official documents

As I discuss above, my research strategy posits the NSS and, it should be noted, crowded places publications as being indicative of the imaginative knowledges underpinning contemporary discourses of national security; discourses which are *elite* rather than everyday (although this is not to say that they are not ‘lived’ in the sense of impacting upon lives outside typical elite domains of government and policy) (Cloke et al., 2004). For this reason it is necessary to probe a little deeper into what documents actually are.

When discussing the use of documents in social research, Lindsay Prior claims that like Marcel Duchamp’s urinal artwork *Fountain*, ‘it is no easier to specify what a document is than it is to specify, in abstraction, what is and what is not a work of art’ (2003: 1). Instead, Prior advises moving away from abstract definitions – for example, defining the NSS and crowded places publications as ‘policy documents’ – to instead ‘consider them in terms of fields, frames and networks of action’ (2003: 2). In this way, I might point to the actions of the politicians and civil servants in central government who requested that these documents be produced, as well as in the Ministry of Defence and the police force. I might also point to the framing in which these individuals and these documents exist: that of the state. But does this take me any closer to what might be considered the ‘nature’ of these documents?

There is the possibility of turning to the creators of the documents themselves – surely the persons who devised and produced these documents - the persons whose words they are – would know what they were? For Prior, however, returning to the original intentions of the creators would not solve the problem, ‘for their involvement with things was (necessarily) ephemeral’ (2003: 2). If we imagine that the creators of the NSS and crowded places publications were civil servants ‘doing their job’, invariably through discussions with a range of people and under instructions from more senior colleagues, in what ways could they access the nature of the document they produced? Indeed, in Prior’s account human agency of any kind – whether of the ‘creator’ or ‘receiver’ of documents – is bounded. ‘We should remain alert’, he writes, ‘to the fact that there is far more in heaven and earth than
human agents… for it is quite clear that human beings necessarily live and act and work in a field of things as well as of people’ (2003: 3). For this reason, ‘documents and the information that they contain can influence and structure human agents every bit as effectively as the agents influence the things’ (Prior, 2003: 3).

Above all, Prior urges us to consider documents as products or works ‘produced by humankind in socially organized circumstances’ – ‘consequently, one set of questions that may quite justifiably be asked by the social science researcher concern the processes and circumstances in terms of which document ‘X’ has been manufactured’ (2003: 4). In chapter 2, I consider the ‘processes and circumstances’ in which the NSS, CONTEST, and crowded places policy are manufactured – specifically through an account of how they materialise, through performativities of broadening national security, contemporary discourses of neoliberal globalisation. For this reason, I must also be cognisant that my analysis of these texts is part of the same citation; by ‘assuming’ the materiality of crowded places policy and practices to the extent that I am able to research them, to make them the subject of a PhD, I am part of their reiterative materialisation.

1.5.2 Participant observation

In the literature on social science methodologies, ethnography is used to describe extended periods of research in social and organisational settings (Gray, 2009: 170); though ethnography itself has a distinct lineage tracing back to traditional anthropological studies. Furthermore, ethnography and participant observation can be used interchangeably (Gray, 2009: 170; also Megoran, 2006: 625). Following Gray, however, my research at BALTIC is best described as participant observation in terms of ‘micro-ethnography’, which ‘adopts a more focused approach on, say, one aspect or element of a work or social setting, allowing for observation over a few weeks or months’ (Gray, 2009: 170). During the nine months of my active on site research at BALTIC, I varied the time between mornings, 10.00am to 12.30pm, and afternoons, 12.30pm to 6pm, as well as the point of the week between early week - Monday and Tuesday - late week - Wednesday, Thursday and Friday - and the weekend.
Within the discipline of political geography, Nick Megoran strongly advocates the use of ethnography to produce fuller accounts of the ‘spatiality of political processes’ (2006: 625) (see Crang and Cook, 2007; and also Herbert, 2000 on ethnographies in human geography more generally). Megoran makes an explicit distinction between ethnographic participant observation and other ‘social science research methods’ such as surveys, semi-structured interviews, oral histories, and focus groups; which, he writes, ‘produce unique forms of data by creating particular controlled environments that are structured by power relations and discursive formats generally alien to everyday forms of interaction’ (2006: 626). Ethnographic participant observation, he continues, ‘tries to obviate these factors as the researcher patiently listens and takes part in social interactions that he/she has not created and does not control’ (Megoran, 2006: 626). Of course he admits that the physical presence of a researcher can alter the ‘dynamics of interaction’, that ‘power relations are never absent from research’, and that there is ‘no guarantee that an ethnographer can correctly understand what he or she witnesses'; but overall, in his view, ‘ethnography remains more sensitive to emic (self-described) than etic (researcher-described) categories and meanings’ (Megoran, 2006: 626).

I cannot disagree that research on the spatial politics of security could be immensely improved within the disciplines of security studies, and to a lesser degree political geography, by more (in many cases any) attentiveness to the specific context of security practices. But at the same time, notwithstanding Megoran’s obvious experience - having spent three and a half years carrying out fieldwork in the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley studying the imposition of a new international boundary after the dissolution of the Soviet Union - his case for ethnography does revert to a naivety which is problematic for carrying out the kind of research on security practices which I have outlined above. In particular, his claim that ethnographers are able to ‘witness’ social interactions which they will be able to ‘understand’, ignores the important work which specifically problematises sight and the capacity to witness in the constitution of social phenomena (Berger, 1972; Crary, 1992), including in relation to the production of space (van Hoven and Sibley, 2008) and to security (Amoore, 2009, 2007; Campbell, 2007a).

There were also important ways in which in BALTIC I participated in that which I was aiming to observe. For example, walking around the spaces – not just the art
and commercial spaces, but also the lifts, hallways, and stairwells - going on the history and exhibit tours, and so on. In this way, it was difficult to separate myself the ‘researcher’ from the performativities of security and space which were the object of the ‘research’. Of course, the object of Megoran’s research was the impact of re-bordering practices on the local inhabitants – his friends and acquaintances. But as I discussed above in relation to spaces of security, it is not only problematic to posit the epistemological separation of social phenomena from their spatial context – the performativity of the political from the performativity of space - it is also politically self-defeating. For as long as this separation is maintained, understanding of how space makes possible political exclusion and makes impossible political contestation remains constrained.

Indeed, it was precisely my participation in, as well as my observation of, BALTIC which led me figuratively and bodily to its Library & Archives, and the revelation that is the ‘BALTIC story’: a glut of highly manufactured narratives about the gallery’s origins and operations relentlessly churned out in a range of guidebooks and conceptual/intellectual texts. This ‘discovery’ convinced me that I was definitely not in an innocent ‘good’ space which played reluctant host to ‘bad’ security practices. As I discuss in chapter 4, BALTIC is subtly but effectively organised as what Keller Easterling (2005) terms ‘a spatial product’. A visitor to BALTIC is figuratively and literally navigated towards its shop and café, as well as its art spaces, whilst security remains firmly ‘back of house’. There are physical barriers in BALTIC – access control doors and walls – and there are also attitudinal, political barriers.

Finally, regarding the limitations of discourse analysis, Megoran writes that while it has made an important contribution to the field of critical geopolitics, yet the ‘study of elite discourses remains only a partial contribution to the construction of a fuller understanding of the spatiality of political processes’ (2006: 625). ‘Without a complementary study of the reception of these discourses by ‘ordinary people’, in other words ethnographic participant observation, ‘there is an ever present danger of crafting lopsided or even irrelevant accounts’ (Megoran, 2006: 625). Here I would disagree with Megoran to the extent that he seems to be suggesting that elite discourses are separate from ‘ordinary’ life. I would counter that elites, like academics, live in the same world as ‘ordinary people’, although of course they may

17 Megoran understands ‘ordinary people’ not as a homogeneous subject group, but as ‘anyone who is not actively producing public geographical knowledge’ (2006: 625).
in many respects experience and understand that world differently. I do not think that critique of elite discourses can ever be ‘irrelevant’: the point, it seems to me, is precisely to fathom the ways in which they impact – and often violently so – on lives which are outside typical elite domains.

So although perhaps in an empty field a falling tree makes no sound, it does not follow that if political geographers desert elite discourses to focus on ‘ordinary people’, that the lives of the latter (or indeed their own) will stop being shaped by elites. Yes, the ‘Foucauldian model’ emphasises that power is dispersed, circulating, and productive, thus moving away from the notion that power can only be found at the top. However, it would be unhelpful I think for scholars to neglect the way in which elites continue to hold and to exercise a capacity for unilateral action. Anecdotally, this can be illustrated by the police action taken against student protestors at the end of 2010, and in any number of on-going military campaigns unleashed by UK parliamentarians and senior military personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and on and on.

I think it is possible to get round this issue of which method is better, which method can ‘save the day’ (as Megoran elsewhere in the article claims to aspire to), by considering how methods can work together and supplement each other – indeed, with difficult to research phenomena like security and counter-terrorism this is not a matter of choice, it is absolutely imperative.

1.5.3 Interviews and talk

In contrast to the large range of material on the ‘BALTIC story’, BALTIC’s Library & Archives unsurprisingly had nothing on security practices in the building. I was already aware, for example, that there was no bag check at the front door (see chapter 4), but I had no way of understanding the context of these practices (or lack thereof), without speaking to those who were directly involved with security at BALTIC. In this way, Gubrium and Holstein describe the ‘postmodern interview’ as distinct from the ‘modern interview’, with its ‘designated roles, search for objective knowledge, and lack of political consciousness’ (2003: 4; also 1997). In contrast, the postmodern interview is ‘more a set of orienting sensibilities that contrast on many
fronts with modern interview prescriptions than it is a particular kind of interviewing’ (Gubrium and Holstein, 2003: 4).

My leading questions were drawn from my understanding of the crowded places publications. In addition to finding out what crowded places security was, at the same time I wanted to put those practices in context, not least with broadening national security. How did staff feel about the intensification of security in the war on terror? Did they feel it was something to be concerned about? Had they noticed an intensification at all, or would another description be better? In this way, I was testing my own assumptions about the problem of crowded places security – in other words, my own research questions. I was also paying attention to the participants’ perceptions of the ‘reality’ I (thought I) was researching, which is a key characteristic of qualitative research (Gray, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1994).

With these objectives in mind, the interviews as a set of ‘orienting sensibilities’ didn’t disappoint. Staff had noticed an intensifying emphasis on counter-terrorism, but they also appeared to accept that such an emphasis was necessary. This raises the issue of how much of what I was told accurately reflects what happens on the ground at BALTIC, as well as how the interviewees felt about it. Were the interviewees presenting things in the ‘best possible light’ and/or telling me what they thought the academic researcher wanted to hear? Is it even appropriate to make a distinction between actual, ‘true’ events and accounts of them? Atkinson and Coffey write that ‘we need to treat interviews as generating accounts and performances that have their own properties’ (2003: 116; also Gillham, 2005; Gubrium and Holstein, 2002). In this way, the researcher does not need to be concerned about whether the interviewee is ‘telling the truth, if by that one understands the analyst’s task to be that of distinguishing factual accuracy from distortion, bias, or deception’ - rather, ‘attention is paid to… their performative qualities’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 2003: 116).

The interviews also revealed the existence of other security practices beyond those referenced by either the NSS or crowded places: primarily, the Government Indemnity Scheme (GIS). Indeed, during the interviews it became almost immediately clear that staff were not familiar with the terms which were so prominent in the documents - ‘crowded places’, ‘NaCTSO’, ‘CTSA’, and so on. The Head of Building Services at BALTIC, who is responsible for security, referred to the Counter-
Terrorism Security Advisers with whom he was in contact as ‘officers from Project Argus’ – whereas Project Argus is only one part of their role.

At the time, however, and for the purposes of analysis, I decided to assume that, because BALTIC staff were involved in implementing counter-terrorism in consultation with CTSAs, I could call the ‘what’ of what was happening in BALTIC the implementation of crowded places security. But the question of my active involvement in the production of knowledge about crowded places security in BALTIC remains. Actually, my analysis draws out the different discourses which performativities of security in BALTIC cite and reinscribe, so I hope that in this way I make clear that the ‘what’ of what was happening on the ground depends on lots of other ‘whats’: some very visible, like the ‘BALTIC story’, and others largely silent and hidden, like the commitment of the contemporary art gallery to the political status quo.

To sum up, then, what is important about my tactics in researching crowded places security is that one tactic is not meant to yield more valid or ‘true’ materials than the others. Atkinson and Coffey write that observation can yield ‘a more complete record and understanding’ of social processes than interviews alone (2003: 112). Indeed, in the social sciences interviews are generally held to be particularly problematic. Atkinson and Coffee claim, for example, ‘it is hard to quarrel with the assertion that the study of observable events is better accomplished by the observation of those events than by the collection of retrospective and decontextualised descriptions of them’ (2003: 112). However, the assertion that observation is more reliable than interviews, obviously relies on the assumption that researchers are better able to identify and even understand what is going on better than ‘lay person’ interviewees. In terms of researching performativities of security, however, I would argue not only that observation is not more ‘reliable’ than interview material, but in fact the opposite may be more relevant. It is often very hard to observe security practices in the classic sense of with one’s own eyes. Of course, there are observable practices of security which can be recognised as such – CCTV, bag searches – but this is a very impoverished understanding of ‘security’, and one which I do not adhere to in this thesis.

In other words, therefore, I do not hierarchise the material and information I collected from my time visiting, participating in, and observing BALTIC, and my
interviews and talk with staff. I do not use the interview material to verify my observations, or vice versa. Rather, they work together in what Atkinson and Coffey term a ‘productive combination’ (2003: 110). ‘Actions are understandable’, they argue, because ‘they can be talked about. Equally, accounts – including those derived from interviewing – are actions. Social life is performed and narrated, and we need to recognise the performative qualities of social life and talk’ (2003: 110).
This thesis steers away from the more usual format in the social sciences of first, the elaboration of a theoretical context; second, the description of a methodological approach; and third, the production of the ‘results’ of analysis, which is based on the experimental and explanatory format of the natural sciences. As Foucault wrote of his genealogical project: ‘[it is] certainly not a matter of contrasting the abstract unity of theory with the concrete multiplicity of the facts’; nor is it ‘a matter of some form or other of scientism that disqualifies speculation by contrasting it with the rigour of well-established bodies of knowledge’ (2004: 8-9). Instead, each of the following chapters blends conceptual frames, empirical material(isations), and analysis. It is, as I discussed above, a strategy of connecting rather than homogenising that which is heterogeneous and contradictory. In this way, the organisation of the thesis reflects my emergent attempt to play different knowledges off against each other, to resist their organization into ‘a true body of knowledge’ (Foucault, 2004: 9).

**Chapter 2 ‘The National Security Strategy and the geopolitics of the war on terror’** uses critical geopolitics literatures to set out my argument that contemporary national security practices, including counter-terrorism and crowded places security, must be understood as part of a broadening understanding of national security and a broadening register of coercive policy responses, which in turn cites and reinscribes neoliberal discourses. After discussing how national security can be conceptualised as a site of performative politics, I provide a genealogy of broadening national security which focuses on its role in the re-ordering of global politics after the end of the cold war. In this way I circumvent a weakness of similar security policy analyses which tend to neglect the necessarily historical, but moreover discursive and regulatory context in which such policies and practices emerge. I then consider how the broadening of national security in the war on terror depends on performativities of interconnection. In the final part of the chapter I work these insights through my case study of *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom*.

**Chapter 3 ‘Broadening national security and biopolitical security’** uses the biopolitics literature to question how the contemporary broadening of national security can be further interrogated through the lens of biopolitical security. My
analysis in this chapter proceeds on the basis that broadening national security depends on modes of circulation and population, which have been analysed extensively as the object-products of biopolitical technologies. But my reading, in which biopolitics is considered as a mode of performative politics, diverges in one crucial respect: for me, circulation and population are the *materialisations*, rather than the objects, of biopolitical discourses. Specifically, they are performativities of ‘natural reality’: the realities natural to liberal governance. In the final part of the chapter I feed this argument back into my case study of the NSS.

**Chapter 4 ‘Crowded places security I - Innocent and zero space’** uses literatures from critical architecture, social and cultural geography, and visual culture to assert that crowded places security cannot be interrogated while research maintains a stake in space as an innocent backdrop to counter-terrorism. To begin, using Keller Easterling’s concept of the ‘spatial product’, I argue that BALTIC’s spaces are already deeply politicised. In the rest of the chapter I trace the intertwining of performativities of space and security in BALTIC, arguing that performativities of ‘zero space’ in modernist art galleries such as BALTIC reproduce zero change in the prevailing political status quo, and also make possible the emptying out or zero-ing of space sought by contemporary security practices.

**Chapter 5 ‘Crowded places security II – Risk and biopolitical control’** uses literatures from security studies and political economy to explore the ways in which crowded places security is materialised through two performativities of contemporary biopolitical government: risk and control. Resisting the tendency of the extant literatures on biopolitical control to stray into a fetishised technologism, this chapter focuses on the way performativities of risk and control intersect with the daily business of the public art gallery. My argument is that counter-terrorism is becoming increasingly important in shaping daily life in the UK through a diverse range of spatial control practices.

**Chapter 6 Conclusion** revisits the main themes and arguments of the thesis. It considers the value of the methodological and conceptual strategy in relation to the difficulty of researching the politics of security as an empirical phenomenon. It then discusses three main themes that have emerged in the thesis, and discusses directions for future research. These themes relate to terrorism in a global age, the biopolitics of national security, and the meaning of crowded places security.
Chapter 2  The National Security Strategy and the geopolitics of the war on terror
The UK is, in many ways, safer than ever before and the new, global age provides many opportunities. But it also gives rise to newer and more disparate threats to citizens. These modern challenges require a broader understanding of national security and a broader range of responses – *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom.*

This chapter argues that contemporary national security practices, including counter-terrorism and crowded places security, must be understood as performativities of a *broadening* national security. Citing discourses of intensifying neoliberal globalisation since the end of direct confrontation between the ‘West’ and the Soviet Union in 1989, the broadening of national security is performed through a ‘broader understanding’ of threats, thereby licensing a ‘broader range’ of coercive, violent responses. The *National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom* (hereafter NSS) is an important site at which to interrogate performativities of broadening national security because, for the first time in UK security policy, it explicitly identifies ‘interconnectedness and interdependence between economies, societies, businesses, and individuals’ as the rationale of national security (2008: 16, emphasis added).

The reasons for publicly acknowledging the prioritising of neoliberal globalisation, which had already been underway for some time, in the form of a National Security Strategy - when previously the UK government had confined itself to more narrowly-focused iterations of defence policy - is itself an interesting site of investigation, and one into which I make some in-roads in this chapter. My main objective, however, is two-fold: first, to explore performativities of broadening national security through their iteration in current UK policy, and in the critical geopolitics literature; and second, to consider the violent consequences of

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19 The concept of and/or usage of the term ‘neoliberalism’ are controversial according to Peck, Theodore and Brenner: they describe it ‘simultaneously as an oppositional slogan, a zeitgeist signifier, and an analytical construct’ (2010: 96). In this thesis I use it most definitely in a critical sense, as a way of ‘denaturalizing globalization processes, while calling attention to their associated ideological and political constructions’ – in this case, national security and more specifically, the terrorist threat (Peck, Theodore and Brenner, 2010: 96).
broadening national security in more detail, particularly in relation to the re-making of the threat from terrorism.

I begin in section 2.2 with David Campbell’s (1998) argument that the purpose of national security is to perform or ‘(re-)write’ the contemporary nation-state. Borrowing from Judith Butler’s work on the performativity of gender, Campbell argues that the state as a coherent identity is materialised through the ritualized repetition of boundaries between inside and outside, secure and dangerous, and domestic and foreign. Practices of national security therefore, by reiterating and reinscribing these boundaries, materialise domains of insecure others who can reside both outside and within the state’s territorial borders. In the second part of the section, I move on to discuss Edward Said’s seminal account of the ‘Orient’ as precisely such a materialisation of a dangerous Other in ‘their land’ (but also occasionally in ‘our land’) (2003: 54). The usefulness of this concept of the ‘imaginative geographies’ of Orientalism (Said, 2003: 55), is its direct engagement with the materialisations of ‘foreclosure’ and ‘radical erasure’ which are at the centre of Butler’s account.

In section 2.3 I begin to work these insights on the materialisation of national security and insecurity through the contemporary example of the 2008 and 2009 NSS; focusing on their central demand for a ‘broadened view’ of national security appropriate for a ‘new, global age’. I discuss how broadening national security materialises discourses of neoliberal globalisation as a complex (in)security landscape and, in particular, as the ‘interconnectedness’ of threats and risks, which in turn licenses more extensive policy responses than has hitherto been the case. But broadening national security is both not as novel as the NSS claims, and distinct from the inside/outside, us/them problematics identified by Campbell and Said. In the second part of the section, I argue that broadening national security must be situated in the re-making of the geopolitical order after the end of the cold war. Taking the New Labour government as my jumping-off point, I look at its defence policy record from the much-trumpeted Strategic Defence Review in 1998 through the 2004 Defence White Paper to the NSS and CONTEST in 2008 and 2009. My argument is that in the period after 1989, successive UK security policies were part of the ongoing materialisation of a geopolitical order which both enabled and protected the development of neoliberal globalisation.
In section 2.4, I consider how political geographers have sought to understand and challenge the contemporary role of national security in enabling neoliberal globalisation - in particular through the conduct of the war on terror. I focus on Bialasiewicz et al.’s (2007) argument that ‘a process of incorporation and the policy of integration’ are the ‘basis for the imaginative geography of the ‘war on terror’’ (p. 415, 419). Whilst incorporation and integration are no less violent and exclusionary than Orientalism, they do move beyond the latter’s ‘simple binary oppositions’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 415). ‘Integrating’ national security, they argue, is distinctive in the way it materialises insecurity as those actors and domains which will not join or participate in the global economy. In the rest of the section I work through how performativities of integration violently materialise interconnection through the ‘God’s eye view’ of threat and response, and the assembling of roles of ‘leader’ and ‘follower’ based on hegemonic claims to ‘core values’.

In the final section 2.5, I return to the NSS to draw out how its own performativities of interconnection license a broadening register of coercive policy responses. These practices materialise or ‘bring to life’ a world in which the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence is increasingly woven into everyday spaces. In the final part, I focus on how through the re-making of the terrorist threat, broadening national security materialises a ‘domain of abject beings’ of diasporic communities in the UK (Butler, 1993: 2). In this way I argue that broadening national security, like the national security practices Campbell highlighted, cannot be an ‘obvious’ response to an external threat, but is instead the continued and violent reiteration of neoliberal discourses of global (in)security.

This chapter takes a very different approach to the rationalist analyses which thus far make up the very small body of academic and public response to the NSS. These analyses debate national security strategy within the parameters of what Campbell termed ‘epistemic realism’ - whereby the ‘world comprises objects whose existence is independent of ideas or beliefs about them’ (1998: 4). So for example, James Gow (2009: 126) questions whether the NSS is ‘genuine strategy’ or just ‘bland aspirational statements’; and Charlie Edwards (2007), in a report for the think tank DEMOS, foresees the potential of the NSS as a ‘collaborative strategic framework’ through which ‘departments and agencies can be more efficient and effective in working together’ (p. 3) (also Johnson, Kartchner and Larsen, 2009). In
contrast, my reading of the performative politics of the NSS foregrounds a different question: what do performativities of broadening national security make of the world, and make of us?

2.2 Performing national security - Boundary-producing practices and imaginative geographies

Providing security for the nation and for its citizens remains the most important responsibility of government – *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom*.20

This statement is taken from the first page of the first ever *National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom* published in March 2008. As I go on to discuss in the following two chapters, the rationale of this document depends on the existence of ‘external’ dangers and threats from which a government can secure its ‘nation and its citizens’. In the NSS, these threats include weapons of mass destruction, inter-state conflict, failed states, pandemics, transnational crime, and, of course, international terrorism. Indeed, it is because these threats are posited as existing in a ‘real’, objective sense that the ‘aim of this first National Security Strategy’ is ‘to set out how we will address and manage this diverse though interconnected set of security challenges and underlying drivers’ (2008: 3).

David Campbell, however, challenges these claims of national security strategy precisely by stressing that, ‘danger is not an objective condition. It [sic] is not a thing that exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat’ (1998: 1). To illustrate this he gives the example, vis-à-vis François Ewald’s influential 1991 essay *Insurance and Risk*, of how contemporary insurance constitutes danger as ‘risk’ through the mathematical calculus of probabilities. In insurance, Campbell explains, ‘danger (or, more accurately, risk) is ‘neither an event nor a general kind of event occurring in reality’, but instead, ‘a specific mode of treatment of certain events capable of happening to a group of individuals’ (1998: 2). Therefore, ‘nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all

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20 2008: 3.
depends on how one analyses the danger’ (Ewald cited in Campbell, 1998: 2, emphasis in original). In performativity terms, then, insurance technologies materialise particular discourses of danger through citational practices including mathematical calculation.

This understanding of the ‘necessarily interpretive basis of risk’, Campbell writes, has important implications for understanding geopolitical dangers and threats, such as those put forward in the NSS. Primarily, ‘those events or factors that we identify as dangerous come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of their various dimensions of dangerousness’ (Campbell, 1998: 2). Campbell does not want to deny that ‘there are ‘real’ dangers in the world: infectious diseases, accidents, and political violence (among others) have consequences that can literally be understood in terms of life and death’ (1998: 2). Instead, his argument is two-fold: first, that threat is interpretive; and second, that the interpretation of threat tends to coalesce around particular referents, for example things and persons that are ‘alien, subversive, dirty, or sick’ (Campbell, 1998: 3).

So if national security strategy cannot, as the NSS claims, ‘address and manage’ threats because such threats do not exist external to the interpretive process which constitutes them, where does this leave the government and the state - the main responsibility of which according to the NSS is to do precisely the former? For Campbell, the state, like insurance risks, is performatively constituted. ‘Whether we are talking of ‘the body’, or ‘the state’, or of particular bodies and states’, he writes, ‘the identity of each is performatively constituted’ (1998: 9). Drawing directly on Judith Butler’s early work on gender, Campbell writes:

I want to suggest that we can understand the state as having ‘no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality’… and that the identity of any particular state should be understood as ‘tenuously constituted in time… through a stylized repetition of acts’, and achieved ‘not [through] a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition’ (1998: 10, emphasis in original).

21 Cynthia Weber, also drawing on Butler, puts it thus: ‘sovereign nation-states are not pre-given subjects but subjects in process’, and ‘all subjects in process (be they individual or collective) are the ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted’ (1998: 78).
Specifically, the materialisation of state identity ‘is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside’, a ‘self’ from an ‘other’, a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign’’ (Campbell, 1998: 9). Just as the ‘stable contour’ of the body is achieved through citational and reiterative practices (Butler, 1993: 13), so too a stable state identity is materialised through citational ‘boundary-producing practices’ between the self/other, and – in Campbell’s development of the argument - inside/outside and domestic/foreign (1998: 73). Furthermore, as the ‘heterosexual matrix’ reproduces itself through the ‘forcible production of ‘sex’’ (Butler, 1993: 11-12), likewise Campbell argues that the production of external threat is compelled by the state matrix which needs that danger to survive. ‘For a state to end its practices of representation’, Campbell writes, ‘would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death’ (1998: 12). Ironically then, ‘the inability of the state project of security to succeed is the guarantor of the state’s continued success as an impelling identity’ (Campbell, 1998: 12).

As I discussed in chapter 1, the performativity of threat through practices of national security takes places at many sites; indeed, as Butler puts it, while performativity may ‘acquire[s] an act-like status in the present, it conceals or dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition’ (1993: 12, emphasis added). In Campbell’s argument, then, performativities of national security threats reiterate the problematic of identity/difference that serve the state and its survival. ‘Foreign policy’, Campbell explains, ‘is one part of a multifaceted process of inscription that disciplines by framing man in the spatial and temporal organisation of the inside and outside, self and other: i.e. in the ‘state’” (1998: 10-11). The state, then, is the ‘outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistance elements to a secure identity on the ‘inside’ are linked through a discourse of ‘danger’ with threats identified and located on the ‘outside” (Campbell, 1998: 12, emphasis added).

Campbell illustrates his arguments using the example of American foreign policy texts, and in particular the Basic National Security Policy documents produced, drafted, and re-drafted by the US National Security Council (NSC) throughout the 1950s. He describes how on the one hand, these documents focused on the danger represented by the ‘hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR’ – and certainly this was the perception of US foreign policy at this time – yet on the other hand, the American national security establishment was equally, if not more,
exercised by the more ‘fundamental’ danger of anarchy and disorder. For example, the document NSC-17 opined that ‘from the very beginning of organized living, of society, there have existed negative elements which would tear down and destroy the established order by force if necessary’, and of these ‘negative elements’ communists were only the ‘most dangerous’ and ‘contemporary’ (cited in Campbell, 1998: 27). Likewise, NSC-68 was concerned with the USSR as ‘a new fanatical faith, antithetical to our own... [which] seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world’ (Campbell, 1998: 23). Yet the document went on to claim that, ‘in a shrinking world... it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check Kremlin design, for the absence of order is becoming less and less tolerable’ (Campbell, 1998: 23-4).

This duality of national security – directed at the same time to the repulsion of a threat made ‘external’ and the maintenance of an order made ‘internal’ - leads Campbell to conclude that although the post-war texts of US national security materialised insecurity as all things Soviet, yet ‘they always acknowledge that the absence of order, the potential for anarchy, and the fear of totalitarian forces... - whether internal or external – was their initial concern’ (1998: 31). The purpose of the NSC documents then, and US national security strategy more broadly, was to literally ‘(re)write’ a source of danger in order to materialise a stable, coherent American identity: ‘not rewriting in the sense of changing the meaning, but rewriting in the sense of inscribing something so that that which is contingent and subject to flux is rendered more permanent’ (Campbell, 1998: 31).

Campbell’s analysis is important to the extent that it transfers Butler’s theory of performativity to the materialisation of state identity through reiterative practices of national security. In particular, Campbell argues that state identity materialises regulatory norms regarding what is internal and external, domestic and foreign, secure and dangerous. Next I consider how such norms are materialised as what Edward Said (2003) terms ‘imaginative geographies’.
2.2.1 Said’s imaginative geographies – Materialising ‘us’ and ‘them’

In his 1978 book *Orientalism*, Edward Said writes that he accepts that ‘all cultures impose corrections upon raw reality’, and that it is ‘perfectly natural for the human mind to resist the assault on it of untreated strangeness’ (2003: 67). But he argues that with representations of the ‘Orient’, this ‘process of conversion’ has become ‘more, rather than less, total in what it tries to do’; to the extent that there is a ‘schematic, almost cosmological inevitability with which Islam and its designated representatives are creatures of Western geographical, historical, and above all, moral apprehension’ (Said, 2003: 67-8). Indeed, writing in 2003 in a preface for a new edition of the book, Said ‘raises the question of whether modern imperialism ever ended’ – and it seems not, as he laments the ‘illegal and unsanctioned imperial invasion and occupation of Iraq by Britain and the United States’ in March the same year (2003: xiii). He continues:

... the terrible reductive conflicts that herd people under falsely unifying rubrics like ‘America’, ‘The West’ or ‘Islam’ and invent collective identities for large numbers of individuals who are actually quite diverse, cannot remain as potent as they are, and must be opposed, their murderous effectiveness vastly reduced in influence and mobilizing power (Said, 2003: xxii).

As a means of unworking both the process of ‘herding’ into collective identities, and the ‘false unification’ of geographical rubrics like ‘The West’ and, of course, the ‘Orient’, Said proposes the concept of the ‘imaginative geography’, as opposed to the ‘positive geography’ (2003: 55). He argues that the ways in which the Orient is known as something ‘other’ depends on how an imagined ‘we’ (specifically the British, French, and latterly Americans) position themselves in a particular temporal, spatial, and moral order (Said, 2003: 16). ‘For there is no doubt’, Said writes, ‘that imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own self of itself by

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22 In terms of explaining where and what is the ‘Orient’, the point of Said’s argument is that it does not exist outside out of a discourse of European otherness. 'I shall be calling *Orientalism*', he writes, 'a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in European Western experience'. He continues that ‘the Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe’s greatest and richest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other’ (2003: 1).
dramatizing the distance between what is close by and what is far away’ (2003: 55). But at the same time, he makes clear that ‘it would be wrong to conclude that the Orient was essentially an idea, or a creation with no corresponding reality’ (Said, 2003: 5, emphasis added). To the contrary, ‘ideas, cultures and histories cannot seriously be understood or studied without their force, or more precisely their configurations of power, also being studied’ (Said, 2003: 5, emphasis added). He therefore borrows heavily from Foucault’s notion of discourse (especially *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and *Discipline and Punish*):

My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment (Said, 2003: 3).

In performativity terms, then, there are two important movements within Said’s account of the imaginative geography. First, geographical ‘knowledges’ can be understood as performativities which reiteratively materialise discourses of ‘us’ and ‘them’: ‘one big division, as between West and Orient, leads to other smaller ones’ (Said 2003: 57). In this way, the Orient and the Occident are performed or ‘made up of human effort, partly affirmation, partly identification of the Other’ (Said, 2003: xii). Drawing on the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, Said claims that imaginative knowledge is a function of the human mind which ‘requires order, and order is achieved by discriminating and taking note of everything, placing everything of which the mind is aware in a secure, refindable place’ (2003: 53, emphasis added). Accordingly, ‘there is always a measure of the purely arbitrary in the way the distinctions between these things are seen’:

… this universal practice of designating in one’s own mind a familiar space which is ‘ours’ and an unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs’ is a way of making geographical distinctions that can be entirely arbitrary. I use the word ‘arbitrary’ here because imaginative geography of the ‘our land-barbarian land’ variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction.
It is enough for ‘us’ to set up these boundaries in our own minds; ‘they’ become ‘they’ accordingly (Said, 2003: 54, emphasis in original).

Consequently and second, the ‘human effort’ of imaginative knowledge is enabled by a power relationship. ‘The Orient was Orientalized’, Said writes, ‘because it could be – that is, submitted to being – made Oriental’ (2003: 6, emphasis in original). So alongside the identification of that which is produced and enabled by imaginative geographies, Said also pays considerable attention to that which is effaced and erased. For example, Said reproduces the encounter between the French writer Gustave Flaubert and an Egyptian courtesan Kuchuk Hanem which resulted, he claims, in ‘a widely influential model of the Oriental woman’:

... [she] never spoke of herself, she never represented her emotions, presence, or history. He spoke for and represented her. He was foreign, comparatively wealthy, male, and these were historical facts of domination that allowed him not only to possess Kuchuk Hanem physically but to speak for her and tell readers in what way she was ‘typically Oriental’ (2003: 6, emphasis in original).

Submission to Oriental geographies is leveraged by the constant and enduring ‘positional superiority’ of the Westerner (Said, 2003: 8). Thus, ‘it is Europe that articulates the Orient’; and this articulation ‘is the prerogative, not of a puppet master, but of a genuine creator, whose life-giving power represents, animates, constitutes the otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (Said, 2003: 57). So while Orientalism is assumed to be ‘a field of learned study’, in Said’s formulation it becomes a set of power relationships that are unprecedented in the degree to which they take ‘a fixed, more or less total geographical position towards a wide variety of social, linguistic, political, and historical realities’ (2003: 50). Orientalism is ‘enormous’ and ‘indiscriminate’ in size, and has an ‘almost infinite capacity for subdivision’ (Said, 2003: 50).

Both Campbell and Said’s analyses illustrate how geopolitics take place within an ‘imaginative’ context, in which collective identities materialise discourses of internal and external, domestic and foreign, secure and dangerous, and us and them. But this emphasis on binary divisions or problematics has two important limitations. First, it
effects a somewhat totalizing and all-too-neat *reinscription* of the dominant terms of
global politics, which seems to foreclose the possibility of what Butler termed
‘disidentification’ with regulatory norms (1993: 2). Although the ‘political discourses
that mobilize identity categories tend to cultivate identifications in the service of a
political goal’, she writes, ‘it may be that the persistence of disidentification is equally
crucial to the rearticulation of democratic contestation’ (Butler, 1993: 2). At the
very least, the world is always more complex than is belied by a constant reiteration
of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ problematic.

Second, in important ways the world has moved on. As I illustrate in the rest of
the chapter, performativities of national security in what has been termed a ‘global
age’ present their own particularities. Nonetheless, twenty-five years after the
original publication of *Orientalism*, Said explained that it is still ‘quite common to hear
high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak of changing the map of the Middle
East, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many
peanuts in a jar’ (2003: xiii). In so doing, he put his finger on the importance of the
conceptual framework of performativity for the social sciences, including the
discipline of security studies: the emphasis on ‘power acting through an expedient
forms of knowledge’ (Said, 2003: xiii).

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23 NSS 2009: 3.
2.3  Broadened national security - Performing a(nother) new world order

... the nature of the threats and risks we face have – in recent decades – changed beyond recognition and confounded all the old assumptions about national defence and international security... [therefore] new threats demand new approaches – Prime Minister Gordon Brown, 2008.²⁵

What our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow – Edward Said.²⁶

The inaugural 2008 UK National Security Strategy ‘Security in an interdependent world’, immediately situates itself within a particular geopolitical order. ‘Since the end of the Cold War’, it claims, ‘the international landscape has been transformed. The opposition between two power blocs has been replaced by a more complex and unpredictable set of relationships’:

Economic trends, including more open global markets, and technological trends, particularly in communications, have strengthened the connections between individuals, businesses, societies and economies. Travel is faster and cheaper than ever, the flow of ideas and capital around the world can be almost instantaneous, and distances between people are becoming less relevant (NSS 2008: 3).

²⁴ This is a fairly generic term typically used by western governments in regards to their assumptions about a significant change in the international order. For example, the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office has recently been discussing the ‘rise of emerging powers’ in Latin America, China, and South East Asia, and the ‘new world order their rise is creating’. See ‘Navigating the new world order: The UK and the emerging powers’, available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=Speech&Id=633554682 (Accessed 4 August 2011).
²⁶ 2003: xiii.
Whilst the NSS presents these as ‘positive changes, empowering individuals and creating new opportunities for businesses, organisations and whole nations’, it also claims they can ‘create new challenges’: for ‘if the international landscape as a whole is increasingly complex and unpredictable, so too is the security landscape’ (2008: 3). This is explicitly recognised in the NSS’s demand for a new and different mode of setting priorities in national security. ‘The scope and approach of this strategy’, it explains, ‘reflects the way our understanding of national security has changed’ (NSS 2008: 3). ‘In the past’:

… the state was the traditional focus of foreign, defence and security policies, and national security was understood as dealing with the protection of the state and its vital interests from attacks by other states. Over recent decades, our view of national security has broadened to include threats to individual citizens and to our way of life, as well as to the integrity and interests of the state (NSS 2008: 3, emphasis added).

In this way, discourses of neoliberal globalisation, and in particular regulatory norms around open global markets and the free mobility of ‘ideas and capital’, are materialised as a broadening threat register.

The broadening threat register of national security is reiterated in a number of ways. First, through the interconnection of threats. For example, the NSS explains that although ‘no state threatens the United Kingdom directly’, the ‘cold war threat’ has nonetheless been replaced by ‘a diverse but interconnected set of threats and risks, which affect the United Kingdom directly and also have the potential to undermine wider international stability’ (2008: 3, emphasis added). Second, through the designation of new, non-traditional ‘disruptive threats’ (NSS 2009: 27). ‘It is not straightforward to define national security’, the NSS explains, for while traditional approaches have ‘focused on military threats, on espionage, and on other threats to the state and its interests’, the ‘disruptive threats which could endanger our freedom

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27 There are of course many many dissenting voices from this happy diagnosis of neoliberal globalisation (see Roberts, Secor and Sparke, 2003; Smith, 2005).

28 Though not, it should be noted, free mobility of people. Although the NSS claims that ‘global migration’ supports ‘economic growth and labour market flexibility’, it also brings challenges for security: ‘including identifying, among these increasing flows, those individuals who are security threats; and managing the effects on infrastructure and social cohesion of large and relatively rapid inflows of people’ (2008: 22) (also Amoore, 2006; Larner, 2008).
come from a wide range of sources’ (NSS 2009: 27, emphasis added). Specifically, disruptive threats are those which ‘have the potential to provide severe and sudden damage to our people, our institutions or our way of life’ (NSS 2009: 27-8). This designation of disruptive threats allows diverse phenomena including transnational crime, health pandemics, and flooding to be incorporated into the register of broadening national security (NSS 2008: 4). Because they ‘can affect large numbers of our citizens’ they ‘demand some of the same responses as more traditional security threats’ (NSS 2008: 4).

The third way in which the broadening threat register of national security is reiterated and resignified is through the designation of so-called ‘symbiotic’ threats, such as terrorism and insurgency: a process which absolutely depends on the particular performativity of neoliberal interconnectedness which characterises the NSS. Insurgencies, because of globalisation and the ‘increasing dependence of societies on international financial information and communication networks’, rarely pay heed to ‘geographical boundaries’ (NSS 2009: 81). In particular, the ‘networked migration of ideas’ characteristic to globalisation fuels the ‘unprecedented’ transfer of ‘ideas, money, tactics and personnel’ between insurgent and terrorist groups (I discuss this further in chapter 3) (NSS 2009: 81).

2.3.1 Driving insecurity after 1989

In materialising neoliberal norms as interconnected threats, the NSS makes use of another key catalyst of imaginative knowledge: ‘underlying drivers of security and insecurity’ (2008: 4). These so-called ‘drivers’, including climate change, competition for energy, poverty, inequality, and poor governance, as well as the ‘vulnerabilities’ of global economic, technological and demographic trends, are described as being ‘not in themselves direct security threats to the United Kingdom’, but that which ‘can drive insecurity, instability, or conflict’ (NSS 2008: 20, 16, emphasis added). Indeed, such is their status as ‘major global issues’ with ‘implications beyond national security’, that the latter ‘may not even be the reason for tackling them’ (NSS 2008: 16). Of course, such provisos are nonsensical: the NSS is precisely materialising these ‘global issues’ as threats within a broadening view of national security.
The concept of the driver of insecurity is not, however, an innovation of the NSS. According to James Gow (2009), its use in the NSS locates broadening national security precisely as the one of the ways in which the Western ‘victors’ re-shaped the geopolitical order after 1989. It is difficult to overstate the pervasiveness of the assumption within government, the academy, and what Campbell and Power refer to as ‘popular geopolitical representations’ (2010: 244), that the end of the cold war radically changed the context for national security, and therefore the meaning of security. Hopkinson (2000: 2) exemplifies this assumption when he discusses the ‘shift in the meaning of security’ which took place alongside the ‘geopolitical and geostrategic change’ represented by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact from late 1989, which was followed in December 1991 by the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. ‘The shift’, he continues:

... was not easy to define but consisted essentially of a heightened awareness of the significance of the potential impact on Western well-being of non-state actors and non-conventional threats such as terrorism, drugs and crime (Hopkinson 2000: 3).

Despite being ‘not easy to define’, the international community under the leadership of the UN attempted to rewrite the meaning of (in)security. Now that the threat from the Soviet Union was no longer, it seemed that Francis Fukuyama’s infamous ‘end of history’ thesis - first set out in an article in the conservative magazine The National Interest in 1989, and developed into a 1992 book - was a possibility, and a consensus emerged in the UN that the international community should set about ‘winning the peace’ by removing what were assumed to be the last recalcitrant sources of international insecurity. In January 1992, the first ever Summit of Heads of State and Government of the UN Security Council released a statement proclaiming ‘a time of momentous change’, at which the ‘end of the Cold War has raised hopes for a safer, more equitable world’. But optimism (and, needless to say, self-congratulation) had to be tempered with the recognition that the ‘absence of

war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security; rather, ‘non-military sources of instability in the economic, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security’. The Security Council therefore affirmed its commitment to urgently addressing ‘all the other problems, in particular those of economic and social development, requiring the collective response of the international community’.

This re-imagining of a broader range of national security priorities was further developed in the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s much-lauded Agenda for Peace, published five months later in June 1992. ‘In the course of the past few years’, he wrote:

… the immense ideological barrier that for decades gave rise to distrust and hostility, and the terrible tools of destruction that were their inseparable companions has collapsed… the improvement in relations between States east and west affords new possibilities, some already realized, to meet successfully threats to common security… our aims must be… in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.

Notwithstanding Boutros-Ghali’s powerful message of hope, the UN and the western-dominated Security Council, by automatically moving from the ‘old’ threat of Soviet communism to a roster of potential ‘new’ threats in the ‘economic, humanitarian and ecological fields’, acted to close down political debate about the grossly danger-oriented and grossly unequal structure of global politics. Of the UK’s place in these events, Gow writes that as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council the UK was ‘not only aware of developments there, but also highly significant in leading others to support them’ (2009: 127). Furthermore, the (allegedly) ‘changing nature of security questions has not been restricted to the dealings of the UN Security Council… those changes have affected all states, especially in the liberal and developed worlds’ (Gow, 2009: 127, emphasis added).

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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
Unfortunately, Gow does not consider that this is the case precisely because the ‘liberal and developed worlds’ are driving this broadened insecurity agenda.

Scholars in critical geopolitics have been more vocal in their condemnation of the actions taken by the UN and the Western-dominated Security Council in the 1990s. Simon Dalby (2007) argues that while ‘nuclear weapons may have imposed a stalemate on the United States and the USSR in the period of the Cold War’, what he calls ‘the victory of the globalizers’ in 1989 functioned to clear the way for ‘a new strategic landscape on a much larger scale’ (p. 300). Specifically, this is the strategic landscape of neoliberalising interconnection whereby ‘globalization will be an unstoppable force if it can be appropriately accelerated by the use of the American military’ (Dalby, 2007: 300). Bialasiewicz et al. (2007) also see neoliberal performativities of interconnection as emerging from this period. ‘To understand the power of the imaginative geographies guiding current US strategy’, they write, ‘it is important to look back at the recitation, reiteration and resignification of previous strategic formulations’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 409). Specifically these are the ‘geopolitical opportunities and threats of a post-Cold War era’: from ‘specifications of the threat posed by international terrorism, ‘failed states’ and ‘rogue regimes”, to ‘the dangers posed by cultural/ civilizational conflicts’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 409).

In this way, David Campbell challenges the assumption that the end of the cold war marked ‘a qualitative change in world politics’ (1998: 7). Referring to US foreign policy (which was a major driving force in the broadened insecurity agenda of the so-called ‘international’ community at this time), he argues that ‘one does not have to deny that world politics exhibits considerable novelty at [that] juncture to appreciate that... a range of new dangers… might occupy the place of the old’ (1998: 7, emphasis added). So Campbell purposely sidesteps the question of whether the ‘new global issues’ of the 1990s – the environment, drug use and trafficking, disease, migration, Islamic fundamentalism etcetera - were indeed new (1998: 7). Instead, he advocates ‘a more radical response’ directed at the ‘strategies and tactics by which they are calculated as dangers’ (Campbell, 1998: 7). In particular, his approach focuses not on any sense of an inevitable globalisation of liberal systems (see Larner, 2008) but instead on a phenomenon he terms the ‘globalisation of contingency’:
The globalization of contingency invokes the increasing tendencies toward ambiguity, indeterminacy, and uncertainty on our horizon… these contingencies… can no longer be contained within established power structures and spatializations. Danger, in short, can no longer just be written as ‘out there’. Security is not to be found ‘within’. This is more than just a result of interdependence, the proliferation of threats, or the overflowing of domestic issues onto the world state (the conventional response). This is an irruption of contingencies that renders all established containers problematic (Campbell, 1998: 7).

Unfortunately but predictably, the New Labour party which succeeded John Major’s Conservative government in May 1997 sought to override this ‘irruption of contingencies’ in its successive defence policies. As Campbell admits, ‘over time, of course, ambiguity comes to be disciplined, contingency is fixed, and dominant meanings are established’ (2007b: 133). Thus, by the time of the attacks in New York and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001, it was the government’s conclusion that the warnings in their 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) about ‘a changing and uncertain world’ (Ministry of Defence, 1998: 323), had simply been borne out – a self-fulfilling security prophecy. In ‘A New Chapter’, added to the SDR in July 2002 in response to the attacks, the new defence minister Geoff Hoon conveyed the government’s shock at ‘a day we will never forget’, and announced their aim to ‘eliminate terrorism as a force in international affairs’ (Ministry of Defence, 2002: 4). The government would pursue this aim with a broadened range of initiatives ‘involving political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement, as well as military, measures’ (Ministry of Defence, 2002: 4).

So while the 2008 National Security Strategy heralds a changed, broadened understanding of national security, Gow counters that ‘nothing in this change is new to the United Kingdom’ (2009: 127). Instead, the disjunction between the NSS’ claim that it is a new approach to national security, and what is actually a new approach is ‘a marker of the limitations to be found in the document as a whole’ (2009: 127). Chiefly, the NSS ‘does not deal with strategy, as such, and does not constitute one’ (2009: 128). ‘Strategy’, Gow continues, ‘is at once concept and process’: ‘in its narrowest form it is about the creation and application of the use of force. It is,
therefore, about the relationship of means and ends’ (2009: 128). Yet of all these features, he argues are ‘absent from the putative national security strategy’:

While there are broad and somewhat bland aspirational statements concerning the United Kingdom’s aims, these are not presented in terms of likely prospective achievement. Even less is there a conceptualisation and practical scheme for how to achieve these goals – in part because they are of such generality as to be effectively un-achievable. The document fails to identify seriously the key challenges faced by the United Kingdom and its allies. It follows, therefore, that it cannot offer anything in terms of the way in which the challenges to British security can, or will be faced (Gow, 2009: 128).

But I argue that to conceptualise a practical scheme for achieving the UK’s national security aims is not the principal aim of the NSS. It is instead to drive the materialisation of a specifically neoliberal geopolitical order; the other, the abject domain of which, is an international landscape of broadened dangers and interconnected threats.

2.3.2 Policy changes, the NSS and CONTEST

The New Labour government that came to power in 1997 was especially prolific in the production of security policies. This is somewhat surprising given that previously the formulation of defence policy in the UK had been peripatetic and insular (Hopkinson, 2000). But at the same time it should perhaps have been expected given the new Prime Minister Tony Blair’s penchant for ‘modernisation’. Indeed, one of Labour’s election pledges had been to undertake a major public Strategic Defence Review (SDR); the motivation for which, according to Gow, was ‘to bring approaches to national security in line with the realities of an increasingly internationalised and globalised world’, and to ‘settle Labour’s sometime demons and weaknesses in dealing with defence matters’ (including a unilateralist and anti-NATO stance in the 1970s) (2009: 126).
In the 1998 SDR, then, the Defence Minister George Robertson discussed the need to modernise the UK’s Armed Forces ‘to meet the challenges of the 21st century’: specifically, ‘a changing world, in which the confrontation of the Cold War has been replaced by a complex mixture of uncertainty and instability’ (Ministry of Defence, 1998: 4). ‘If we are to discharge our international responsibilities in such areas’, Robertson continued, ‘we must retain the power to act’ (Ministry of Defence, 1998: 4).

Cornish and Dorman (2009: 252) describe the SDR as ‘a major shift in the way government presented national defence policy’. First, the SDR reflected Robertson’s view that ‘defence should move to a more systematic approach’, similar to the US Quadrennial Defense Review whereby defence policy undergoes a major review every electoral cycle to ensure it remains in line with fiscal resources (Cornish and Dorman, 2009: 252). In promising to reinvent defence policy as ‘a recalibration by government, a sensible, periodic reflection’, the SDR could not have contrasted more sharply with the previous attempts of the Thatcher and Major governments to carry out defence reviews (Cornish and Dorman, 2009: 248). Hopkinson describes the unhappy experience of the Nott Review in 1981, which was carried out with little consultation either within or outside the cabinet, and which created considerable tension between the government and the services, including the resignation of a junior defence minister Keith Speed (2000: 8-9).

The Nott Review, which had been launched in 1980 at a time of ‘great financial difficulty’, proposed substantial cuts with the Royal Navy particularly affected; the justification for these cuts being that the ‘future weight of Britain’s defence commitment was to be towards a continental strategy, and the maintenance of strong land forces in Europe’ (Hopkinson, 2000: 9). Little did Margaret Thatcher’s government know that less than ten years later these land forces in Europe would be defunct. Much sooner however, in April 1982, General Galtieri’s Argentinian military invaded the Falkland Islands, and the reliance on the Royal Navy for the UK’s military response only served to confirm the general opinion that the Nott Review was a disaster (Hopkinson, 2000: 10).

The Nott Review was therefore the ‘last defence review which a Conservative government dignified by that name’ (Hopkinson, 2000: 10). The next attempt, the so-called ‘Options for Change’ in 1990, was only undertaken by John Major’s
government in response to the complete and wholly unforeseen collapse of the Warsaw Pact in late 1989. As a result, half of the UK’s much-vaunted land forces in Germany were cut, two RAF bases (out of four) were closed, and six jet squadrons withdrawn (Hopkinson, 2000: 6). However, despite the ‘quite radical changes proposed for forces in Germany’, Hopkinson describes Options as ‘far too modest given the changes which had taken place in the outside world’ (2000: 7, emphasis added).

Second, the SDR was held to be unique in the extent to which it was conducted openly (after some initial opacity), and with input and discussion from academics, NGOs, and the media. Hopkinson comments that the SDR ‘was conducted in a more open manner than any other review in recent history’ (2000: ix). This new, more open and ‘touchy-feely’ way of formulating and communicating defence policy was considered a major success: it ‘enjoyed widespread support within the MoD and parliament, among the various London-based think tanks and policy research institutions and within the defence industry and academia’ (Cornish and Dorman, 2009: 248).

Third, and perhaps most importantly for my analysis of broadening national security in 2007-2010, the SDR was widely lauded for ‘bringing foreign and defence policy together in a clear, coherent and affordable fashion’ (Cornish and Dorman, 2009: 248). Traditionally, defence policy is ‘concerned with why we have armed forces, what we expect to be able to do with them’, and what sort of ‘capabilities’ should be sought (Hopkinson, 2000: vii). By identifying itself as ‘foreign policy-led’, however, the SDR was able to absorb and reproduce elements of the new, post-cold war security agenda thus circumventing what were seen as the more narrow parameters of defence policy (Hopkinson, 2000: 8).

This new security agenda is precisely what Gow (2009) is referring to when he discusses an iterative ‘broadening’ of security policy during the Labour government, which itself drew on the driving of insecurity in the post-1989 period. As part of this process the ‘old style ‘national security’ which ‘focused on a country’s defence policy with some elements of foreign policy… had to give way to the realities of a world in which security had wider connotations and requirements, including social and developmental aspects’ (Gow, 2009: 126). In this context of the ‘wider connotations’ of security, Gow also identifies as important Labour’s transferral of international development work from a small section of the Foreign and

Although the 2002 New Chapter was a hasty addition to the 1998 SDR, which was itself supplanted by the 2004 Defence White Paper ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World’ (Ministry of Defence, 2004), it should not in my view be dismissed simply as a kneejerk response to the events of September 11, nor as a filler document. First, the New Chapter re-iterated the familiar but important themes of a changing world with complex and uncertain security challenges – although in some senses in 2002 the wait for the ‘next big threat’ was over. Indeed, it is precisely because the New Chapter brought together the broadened security agenda of the 1990s with the so-called ‘international terrorist’ threat – what Tony Blair described in a speech to the Trade Union Congress only an hour after the attacks as ‘the new evil in our world today’ that makes it so important. The ‘range of political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement, and military initiatives’ with which the New Labour government proposed to confront terrorism, serve as a prototype for the ‘broader understanding of national security’ and ‘broader range of responses’ which emerged in their NSS six years later (NSS 2009: 14).

According to a report by the pro-New Labour think tank DEMOS in 2007, the shock of the September 11 attacks had provoked the government into a major overhaul of the UK’s ‘archaic security architecture and systems’ (Edwards, 2007: 3). This overhaul was not unlike that attempted by the 1998 SDR by a modernisation-obsessed new government, but it took place under intense political pressure to ‘make Britain safe’ from terrorism, and had, I would argue, much more wide-ranging and significant results not only for defence and foreign policy, but for security practices within the UK. Just as Bialasiewicz et al. (2007) discuss in regard to the wide range of security documents issued by the US government and military in the aftermath of September 11, the policy changes in the UK each played their part in reciting, reiterating, and resignifying ‘both earlier strategic statements as well as each other, creating a sense of boundedness and fixity which naturalizes a specific view of

the world’ (2007: 414). In the case of the UK this is a broadening view of national security which builds on – and indeed is literally *founded* on – post-cold war concepts of a wider range of threats, but which is also an intensification and significant development of these concepts, producing a dangerous ‘God’s eye view’ of the world in which security threats can be, potentially, connected to and interdependent with many other social phenomena.

Key in these changes was the consolidation in March 2007 of ‘various elements of the Government’s counter-terrorism apparatus’ in a new Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) (House of Commons, 2009: 5). This new organisation was created ‘to provide advice to ministers and develop policy and security measures to combat the threat of terrorism’, and was placed under the control of the Home Secretary (House of Commons, 2009: 5).

The OSCT, operating therefore as part of the Home Office, was responsible for many of the key developments in UK counter-terrorism policy and practice towards the end of the decade. A counter-terrorism strategy which had been circulating in government since 2003 and released as a short document in 2006 – garnering little attention - was ‘refreshed’ and made public in March 2009 as *Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*: better known as CONTEST (House of Commons, 2009: 9). Like previous defence policies from the 1998 SDR onwards, the publication of CONTEST was calculated to represent the government’s ‘determination to place as much information as possible in the public domain…. [with regard to] security matters’ (House of Commons, 2009: 4). Indeed, according to the 2009 parliamentary report the new CONTEST contained ‘as much material that could be left unclassified as possible’, as well as ‘historical analysis, in order to provide context for readers’ (House of Commons, 2009: 9). The report also praised CONTEST’s ‘full and open nature’: as I discussed in Chapter 1, it covered 175 pages compared to 38 pages in the previous 2006 version (House of Commons, 2009: 3). The report even urged the government to make more of their successes: ‘while we understand the constraints of the *sub judice* convention’, it explained, ‘we are concerned that the Government is imposing too strict a self-denying ordinance on itself and could be more open about the extent to which it is winning the battle against terrorism’ (House of Commons, 2009: 3).
CONTEST (2009) set out four strands for counter-terrorism strategy: Pursue, ‘stopping terrorist attacks’; Prevent, ‘stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism’; Protect, reducing the ‘vulnerability’ of the UK’s critical national infrastructure, ‘crowded places’, transport infrastructure, borders, and overseas interests; and finally, Prepare, ‘mitigating the impact of attacks’ by increasing CNI and community resilience (pp. 11-14). In my view, it is difficult to overstate the importance of these developments. Although the four strands are given an unifying coherence within the strategy, they are in fact incredibly diverse; deeply embedded in, but also productive of, practices, roles, policies, and even departments across government: from the Security Services to the Departments of Health, Education, and Communities and Local Government. CONTEST has also made a profound impact in the public and private sectors, as well as in ‘civil society’ (see Kundnani, 2009). Indeed, the Protect workstream and its ‘crowded places’ policy which I investigate in the second part of the thesis, is a formidable ‘iterable structure’ (Butler, 2010: 149), which folds in and develops through scientists, trees, closed-circuit television (CCTV), the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), devolved administrations, and assessments of the ‘relative risk’ for crowded places of terrorist attack (PCP: 18).

It is particularly important to note that the Select Committee report explicitly links the noisy publication of CONTEST in 2009 to that of the first NSS the previous year. The new NSS, it noted, addressed the ‘diverse though interconnected set of security challenges and underlying drivers’ facing the UK, with the objective of ‘safeguard[ing] the nation, its citizens, our prosperity and our way of life’ (House of Commons, 2009: 9). In the same way, CONTEST was situated to ‘reflect the changing security situation at home and abroad’ (House of Commons, 2009: 8). One factor of this ‘changing security situation’ was, according to the then Minister for Security Lord West, ‘to raise our game, break out of specialist ‘silos’, avoid being London-centric and ensure that lessons learned were being incorporated via a stronger central hub’ (House of Commons, 2009: 9). This unity of purpose was reflected in the identical objectives shared by the NSS, CONTEST and crowded places security:
Our vision of national security: our vision is to protect the UK and its interests in order to enable its **people to go about their lives freely and with confidence** – *The National Security of the United Kingdom, 2009*.  

The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that **people can go about their lives freely and with confidence** – *Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, 2009*.  

Counter-terrorism protective security measures for crowded places must be proportionate to risk, reducing vulnerability but allowing **individuals and businesses to go about their daily lives freely and with confidence** – *Working to Protect Crowded Places, 2010*.  

These three policies must therefore be seen as part of an unprecedentedly centralised, organised, and integrated security policy. This is not to give credit to the UK government where it is not due, by suggesting that this centralisation somehow makes the policies more successful ensuring that people can in fact ‘go about their lives freely and with confidence’. This is, after all, the ‘imaginative’ goal of neoliberal ways of living.

In recognising the integration of these three policies then, it becomes absolutely central to question the discursive norms which makes it possible. In particular, I would like to draw attention to the way in which this particular terrorist threat was understood as demolishing the traditional divisions between external national security and internal counter-terrorism. ‘The threat we face crosses our borders and is international in scope’, CONTEST claims, and it therefore describes itself as ‘an integral element of the UK’s National Security Strategy published for the first time in March 2008’ (2009: 11, 54). In addition, CONTEST shares both the ‘broader security principles’ of the NSS - such as tackling the ‘causes as well as the symptoms’ of threats to national security – as well as its ‘core values’:

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34 Cabinet Office, 2009: 7, emphasis added.  
35 Home Office, 2009: 10, emphasis added.  
36 Home Office, 2010: 5, emphasis added.
Our approach to national security in general and to counter-terrorism in particular is grounded in a set of core values. They include human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance and opportunity for all (2009: 10, 54).

In this way, CONTEST explicitly reflects what Bialasiewicz et al. identify as the primary performative function of national security in the era of the war on terror: to dissolve inside/outside spatializations and therefore open up new spaces for the movement and entrenchment of neoliberal globalisation (2007: 416).

In this section I have carried out a genealogy of broadening national security to circumvent the weakness of similar policy analyses which tend to neglect the necessarily historical, but moreover discursive and regulatory context in which security policies emerge. In this way, I argue that the NSS and broadening national security is part of an on-going drive to materialise a specifically neoliberal geopolitical order; the other, the abject domain, of which is an international landscape of broadened dangers and interconnected threats. New Labour made an absolutely central contribution to this drive in two ways. First, by moving towards the more systematic and open review of security policies. Second, by striving to bring together the traditionally separate domains of foreign and defence policy into one modernised conception of security policy, in which traditional distinctions between the ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ of national security became more blurred. In many ways, the policy changes which followed the September 11 attacks, including CONTEST and crowded places, were made possible by New Labour’s innovations in this domain. But more important is the overall result: the multiplication of ‘contact zones’ between national and everyday security (Campbell, 2007b), and the accompanying translation of the monopoly of violence exercised by the state through national security into the everyday.
2.4 Broadening national security in the war on terror

This is a moment to seize. The kaleidoscope has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us re-order this world around us – Prime Minister Tony Blair, 2001.37

... a range of economic, technological and social trends, often grouped under the heading 'globalisation', are increasing the interconnectedness and interdependence between economies, societies, businesses, and individuals. That generates new opportunities to work together to build not just a more prosperous world but a more secure world, based on shared economic interests – The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom.38

In attempting to critique the ‘imaginative geographies’ of the war on terror, there is no doubt that those of Orientalism remain a potent force for violence. Indeed, Derek Gregory has claimed they are at the ‘roots of the global crisis which erupted on September 11’ (2004: 11). ‘For what else’, he asks, ‘is the war on terror, other than the violent return of the colonial past, with its split geographies of ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarism’, ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’?’ (2004: 11) (also Graham, 2004; Gregory and Pred, 2007). In Gregory’s argument, the war on terror is part of an on-going and vastly unequal power relationship between ‘us’ - the ‘colonial modern’ - and ‘them’ - the ‘non-modern’, so that the September 11 attacks, whilst a ‘horrifying event’, do not mark ‘an epochal rupture in human history’ (2004: 13). Instead, that day had ‘a complex genealogy that reached back into the colonial past’, and, at the same time, ‘was used by regimes in Washington, London, and Tel Aviv to advance a grisly colonial present (and future)’ (Gregory, 2004: 13) (also Elden, 2009).

Gregory’s argument about the resilience of violent Orientalist geographies foregrounds the ‘production of spacings that set Europe off against its exterior ‘others’’: a production that is moreover, ‘an economy of representation’ in which different spacings are of different value (2004: 3, emphasis added). In this way, the

38 2008: 16.
production of spacings within colonial systems – as within all political systems for that matter – ‘was always as much about making other people’s geographies as it was about making other people’s histories’ (Gregory, 2004: 11).

There are, however, scholars who while acknowledging the importance of Said’s and latterly Gregory’s arguments, nonetheless propose moving the concept of the imaginative geography beyond its foundational ‘us’ and ‘them’ binaries. Drawing on postcolonial frameworks, Angharad Closs Stephens (2011) argues that if the analytic tool of the imaginative geography is confined to the ‘exposure of Orientalism at work’, to the ‘identification of the terms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized”, then it risks becoming a closed system just like the representations of the Oriental other that it purports to contest (p. 255, 260).

For Closs Stephens, drawing on Butler’s 2008 article about the ‘problem of time’ in sexual politics, the task of critique in the war on terror is to ‘go further than correcting our ways of seeing: it must also subvert the terms of the debate’ (2011: 261). Specifically, this means rejecting the origins and limits of linear temporal time as a refusal of the ‘origins and limits of what we are able to imagine’ (Closs Stephens, 2011: 261, emphasis in original). Instead, world politics should be understood as ‘plural and heterotemporal’: an understanding which is not about extending the space of the political but ‘allowing for the ‘possibility that the field of the political is constitutively not singular” (Closs Stephens, 2011: 265). I would add here that the war on terror may be opportune for exactly such a heterotemporal re-imagining of community and the political. As Samuel Weber (1997) has argued, ‘wartime’ has uniquely temporal and spatial characteristics. ‘The whirlwind of war has a temporal dimension’, he writes, it ‘marks time, as it were, inscribing it in a destructive circularity that is both centripetal and centrifugal, wrenching things and people out of their accustomed places, displacing them and with the places as well’ (Weber, 1997: 92). Wartime, he concludes, ‘wreaks havoc with traditional conceptions of space and time and with the order they make possible’ (Weber, 1997: 92; also Edkins, 2008 on the ‘trauma time’ of the war on terror).

Arguments in favour of breaking away from the limitations of previous critical approaches in the time of the war on terror are important, but yet they still do not engage directly with the broadening of national security, which, as I argued in the previous section, has multiplied the contact zones between national and everyday
security since the end of the cold war, and intensified in the war on terror. What I will focus on then in the rest of the chapter are the performativities through which this process has been occurring over the last ten years. As Wendy Larner asks:

… is it simply a discursive coincidence that both economic globalization and terrorism are now being described and analysed in terms of supranational flows, networks and mobilities? And what about the political mechanisms through which these flows, networks and mobilities are governed? Are there family resemblances between the techniques used to govern globalizing production processes and those being developed to combat terrorism? (2008: 42).

2.4.1 Performing interconnection

In exploring the imaginative geographies of the war on terror, Bialasiewicz et al. while not wholly abandoning the ‘exposure of Orientalism at work’ nonetheless move the debate forward in important ways with their argument that ‘a policy of integration’ rather than the ‘simple binary oppositions’ of us and them, characterises the ‘principal foreign policy and security strategy’ of the US (2007: 415). Speaking about integration policy in a 2002 interview with The New Yorker magazine, Richard Haass, then Policy Director in the US State Department, claimed

… the goal of US foreign policy should be to persuade the other major powers to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate: opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, support for free trade, democracy, [and] markets (cited in Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 414, emphasis added).

The ‘key ideas’ of integration are further explored in Thomas Barnett’s infamous 2004 book The Pentagon’s New Map: war and peace in the twenty-first century. The New Map represents the world as being divided into a ‘Functioning Core’ and a ‘Non-Integrating Gap’; whereby the ‘Gap’ is ‘figured as a dark stain spreading from the
equator, spanning most of Latin America, Africa and Asia, and leaching into the Balkans and Central Asia’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 413). In Simon Dalby’s reading, the ‘basic structure of Barnett’s world is one of a divided planet, one in which the majority of the world’s population is becoming integrated in the globalized core while the remaining parts live in the nonintegrated gap’ (2007: 297). What primarily distinguishes the Core from the Gap, then, is the latter’s estrangement or disconnection from the ‘global economy and the rule sets that define its stability’ (Barnett cited in Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 413). As Dalby puts it: ‘connectivity is the key’: ‘those not connected are prone to violence and live under a variety of tyrannies’, whilst ‘those who are connected in the core live in better conditions because connectivity means a substantial degree of freedom to follow one’s own course in life’ (2007: 297).

Even though Barnett is not a politician but at best an ‘intellectual of statecraft’ (Kuus, 2008), his schema of interconnection is closely linked to, and makes explicit, that which is implied by Haas and the US State Department’s idea of ‘signing on’ to key American ideas.39

Remembering that disconnectedness itself is the ultimate enemy, America can, by extending globalization in a fair and just manner, not only defeat the threats it faces today but eliminate in advance entire generations of threat that our children and grandchildren would otherwise face (Barnett cited in Dalby, 2007: 124).

In particular, Barnett makes explicit what the US, having identified the alleged benefits of interconnection, should do to enforce it. ‘Eradicating disconnectedness’, he writes, ‘becomes the defining security task of our age’ - where ‘eradication’ specifically means ‘pre-emptive war against regimes that openly transgress the rule set’ (Barnett cited in Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 413). As a result of the US strategy of integration Bialasiewicz et al. argue that ‘conflict is inevitable’ - ‘it is a foundational truth confirmed by the severed map’ (2007: 414).

As performativities of integration materialise an interconnected globe as a condition of possibility for neoliberalism – backed up, it must be noted, by the full

39 Bialasiewicz et al. (2007) discuss the relationship between the neoconservative administration of George W. Bush and ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ including Barnett and Robert Kagan in more detail.
force of the US (and allies’) military machine - they likewise materialise an ‘abject domain’ of insecure, disconnected peoples and spaces (closely linked to the geopolitical performativities of ‘ungoverned spaces’ discussed by Katharyne Mitchell, 2010). So the policy of integration, despite what might appear as its positive associations of inclusiveness and even familiarity, is still a violent and exclusionary materialisation of self/other and inside/outside problematics through the writing of external danger. In the same way that Presidents Truman and Eisenhower spoke of communist satellites and an Iron Curtain during the cold war, President George W. Bush referenced rogue states and an ‘axis of evil’ in the conduct of the war on terror.

But at the same time the literature also identifies important distinctions between performativities of global interconnection and the ‘Manichean conceptions of the world so familiar to Cold War politics’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 415). Primarily, integration dissolves the ‘inside/outside spatialization of security policy’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 416; also Bigo, 2001; Mitchell, 2010). And as illustration they point to the Strategy for homeland defense and support published by the US Department of Defense in 2005 which claims: ‘[we can] no longer think in terms of the ‘home’ game and the ‘away’ game. There is only one game’ (cited in Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 416).

Wendy Larner takes up this argument by challenging the widespread view that in the war on terror an assumedly ‘borderless’ world of economic globalisation is at odds with the closed borders of national security. ‘Does the new focus on security and risk-based technologies’, she asks, ‘mark the end of economic globalization?’ and ‘have these new surveillance and security technologies indeed ‘brought back the walls’ and drastically curbed the flows of money, goods and people across national boundaries?’ (Larner, 2008: 41). Obviously the answer is no, and Larner points to the fact that ‘after a brief hiatus, global flows of goods, services and people have continued unabated’ (2008: 42). Her main argument, then, is that economic globalisation and the war on terror are ‘premised on the same political-economic imaginary’: they are both performativities of global governance dependent on ‘openness and mobility rather than on boundedness and territoriality’ (Larner, 2008: 45) (see chapter 3).

Other writers go further than Larner in arguing that the national security practices of the war on terror do not so much share the political-economic
imaginary of globalisation, so much as they violently enforce it. Alan Ingram and Klaus Dodds, for example, claim that the war on terror is 'linked into a much wider project: the goal of securing not just specific homelands but liberal globalization itself' (2009: 2). Likewise, Stuart Elden returns to Giovanni Arrighi’s arguments in 1976’s *The Geometry of Imperialism*, that the United States ‘freed itself from the shackles of formal imperialism… in order to exercise its hegemony through market forces’ (2009: xix). Indeed, Elden continues that the war on terror has ‘demonstrated that military force may be needed to shore up the financial hegemony’ (2009: xix).

David Campbell also traces the dissolution of inside/outside spatialisations in a 2007 essay on the relationship between national security, oil policy, and automobile driving. Specifically, he argues that performativities of national security should be approached through ‘a spatial understanding’ which goes beyond the ‘domestic versus ‘the foreign”, to ‘consider how the domain of the cultural, social, and political can be conceptualized so that the complexity of the interconnections can be appreciated’ (2007b: 132).

Campbell begins by arguing that the discursive complex of ‘automobility’- a ‘self-organizing autopoietic, non-linear system that spreads worldwide, and includes cars, car-drivers, roads, petroleum supplies and many novel objects, technologies and signs’ - performs ‘an ‘unbordered’ sense of the state’ in which ‘security interests extend well beyond the national homeland’ (2007b: 130-1). But he also points out – and a crucially important point it is too - that this ‘does not mean we exist above and beyond territory’ (2007b: 131) (also Elden, 2009, 2005). To the contrary, the ‘globalization of automobility and its security implications results in the creation of new borderlands with uneven consequences’ (2007b: 131, emphasis added). These ‘borderlands’ may be understood as ‘distant, wild places of insecurity’ - ‘zones of exploration’ and ‘spaces traversed by pipelines’ (Campbell, 2007b: 131).

But these spaces are also not borderlands at all. When viewed and experienced from agendas and positions other than that of the US, they are places where indigenous communities find themselves marginalized, impoverished, and subjected to ‘necessary’ foreign military intervention - all in the name of the ‘privilege accorded a resource central to the American way of life’ (Campbell, 2007b: 131). Nor need they even be considered as ‘distant’. If they are understood instead as ‘contact zones’, where ‘practices intersect, actors and issues meld into one another, and
conflicts potentially arise’, then the borderlands of automobility ‘encompass networks that connect cultures of individual consumption [of automobiles] with practices of global security through multiple sites of materialization and territorialisation at ‘home’ and ‘abroad” (Campbell, 2007b: 131-2, emphasis added). In this way, the invasion of Iraq and the oil strategy that acted as its condition of possibility, ‘reborder[s] the state in a multitude of cultural and political sites as a way of negotiating the social forces that have splintered both conventional locales and frames of mind’ (Campbell, 2007b: 132, emphasis added). Using Campbell’s arguments, if integration is a performativity of national security whereby a new ‘unbordered sense of the state’ is materialised, then this terminally undermines those assumptions both that national security happens elsewhere, and that it occupies its own privileged domain distinct from those nominally called ‘culture’, ‘society’, and the ‘economy’.

The project of securing neoliberal globalisation through the war on terror is made possible by the citation of political-economic discourses of neoliberalism through performativities of interconnection, which themselves depend on the prolific recitation of terms of geopolitical abstraction. If Said and latterly Gregory’s imaginative geographies are about ‘our land’ as a place of safety, versus ‘their land’ as places of danger (also Graham, 2008), then performativities of interconnection re-imagine the world as ‘our land’. Dalby explains that following the September 11 attacks, the ‘ensuing political crisis was resolved by invoking categories of warfare’, and in particular the need for ‘global war’ to meet the ‘apparent violation of the sanctity of the metropolitan center by terrorists, who had penetrated from the peripheral areas (2007: 295) (also Gregory and Pred, 2007). For Dalby, the ‘new language of the ‘global war on terror’” (2007: 295) – what he elsewhere calls ‘a global war script’ (2010: 54) – recasts the entire world as a source of threat: a global cartography of danger. Yet that danger, he continues, ultimately turns back on itself and moreover on those caught in its path, just like the people described by David Campbell who find themselves in the unfortunate position of populating America’s oil borderlands. ‘The dangers of all geopolitical categories’, Dalby writes, ‘is precisely that they include too much and simplify the complex mess of human geographies into abstract human entities’ (2007: 303). Or to put it another way, ‘geopolitical
abstraction given the ‘objectivity’ of cartography renders people and places ready for military action’ (Dalby, 2007: 303).

So although integration relies on representational and coercive practices of connection, at the same time it absolutely also ‘involves its own set of exclusions, with forms of violence awaiting those who are either unwilling or unable to be incorporated’ (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007: 419). As Paul Langley has argued, ‘performativity embodies its others’ (2010: 75). In this way, Dalby adds to his criticism of the geopolitical abstractions of the New Map, by challenging its crude caricatures of an ‘affluent technologically capable Last Man and a Hobbesian First Man mired in poverty and violence’, which are then mapped ‘very loosely on to contemporaneous specifications of the world into tame zones of civilization and the wild zones beyond’ (2007: 296). In this way, the ‘others’ embodied by global interconnection are not so much a danger to others, as they are a danger to themselves: in an age of economic globalisation, ‘[global] insecurity comes not from a specific threatening other but from all those unwilling to integrate; all those refusing their (prescribed) place on the map’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 414).

Larner supplements these insights by arguing that interconnection and exclusion are also materialised through performativities of the network: the ‘metaphor of the current global movement’ (2008: 49). The emphasis accorded to free market deregulated networks vis-à-vis the ‘dominant nation-state geographic imaginary’ (Shapiro, 1997: ix), and the resulting difficulty of managing the former’s flows and mobilities with traditional statist methods, has led, Larner argues, to the emergence of particular ‘calculative regimes’ (2008: 50). These calculative regimes bring together benchmarking and best practice standards, with risk assessments and so-called ‘expert knowledge’ into ‘an assemblage that makes it possible to put objects and subjects into the same space even though they may be geographically dispersed’ (Larner, 2008: 50, emphasis added). In other words, they make ‘objects and subjects visible in particular forms’, but the calculations on which they are based ‘embody particular conceptions of how these objects and subjects should be governed’ (Larner, 2008: 50).

When these calculative regimes are used in the war on terror to manage global flows and mobilities in the name of security, they function to ‘visibilize’ terrorism as a global problem (Larner, 2008: 51). This in turn intensifies the so-called ‘problem of
mobility’ – another trope from the globalisation/interconnection rostrum – in which the movement of particular population groups becomes a security problem by virtue of their ethnic, national, religious, or political origins and/or affiliations (Larner, 2008: 53; also Amoore, 2006). Therefore, those whom Larner terms the ‘irreal subjects’ of globalisation (in an attempt to emphasise the imaginative rendering of this subject-position), are cast into a binary of secure versus insecure mobility. In this binary, ‘global nomads, transnationals, cosmopolitans, asylum seekers, economic refugees, migrants, [and] diasporic citizens’, are re-made as potential ‘religious fanatics’ and terrorists (Larner, 2008: 53). In other words, the ‘bad’ intermediaries who work against rather than go with the flow of the global system (Larner, 2008: 53).

Equally important as drawing attention to such dividing practices, is the recognition that performativities of global interconnection also materialise those who can act – the leaders – and those who cannot – the ‘victim’, who is invariably the abject subject identified by Butler. Because the debased Hobbesian First Man cannot help himself, Western Last Man must act on his behalf – it is his ‘moral responsibility’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 413). This is, of course, the invocation of a particular kind of leadership role for the US (and its allies):

… [it is] the only state able, due to its power-position, to perceive threats clearly; the only one with a God’s eye view of international affairs. It is thus, at once, the world’s geo-politician and its geo-police; the only state with the ‘knowledge’ but also the capability to intervene (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 412, emphasis in original).

In this way, the US can assume a position of unilateral leadership. But as well as an almost God-given knowledge, leaders must have the capability – the military nous and hardware – to act. As Barnett puts it, ‘if other Core powers want a greater say in how we exercise… our [American] power, they simply need to dedicate enough defense spending to develop similar capabilities’ (cited in Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 412).

Following the comfortable circuitry of this argument – that others cannot help themselves and the US is the only state with the knowledge as well as the capabilities to fill the breach - it becomes clear that, as I argue throughout this thesis, imaginaries
and performativities of space are in no sense whimsical or accidental. By assembling those who can and cannot act, the performativity of global connectedness licenses (or as Foucault would have it, makes ‘obvious’ and ‘self-evident’) particular policy responses – including the decision that a policy response – invariably backed up the coercive capabilities of the state – is needed at all. In the US, Bialasiewicz et al. trace how Barnett’s *New Map* was rearticulated in the 2002 and 2006 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* as the doctrine of pre-emptive war (also Der Derian, 2003; Massumi, 2007). I will carry on with this work in the rest of the chapter by exploring how the representative and coercive practices of global interconnection have made it into UK national security policy.
2.5 The NSS and the broadening of policy responses

As our understanding of national security has broadened, so too has the range and nature of our response to security challenges — The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom.\(^{40}\)

Just like the comfortable circuitry of the arguments for integration – the US re-imagines the world as interconnected, thus licensing military force which actually ‘brings to life’ that same interconnectedness – the reiteration and reinscription of broadening national security licenses a broadening register of coercive practices, which in turn bring to life a world in which national security is increasingly woven into everyday life.

This broadening register of coercive practices begins with the ‘rigorous approach’ the NSS deems necessary for assessing and meeting the interconnected threats and risks of a globalised world (2008: 6, emphasis added). This is the privileged knowledge to perceive threats clearly - the ‘God’s eye view’. The UK government therefore perceives that ‘in an increasingly interdependent world, we cannot opt out of overseas engagement’; on the flip side of which is that within the UK ‘our aim should be that people are able to go about their business without fear and with a reasonable assurance of safety’ (NSS 2008: 6). These are integrated within the assurance that the government will be ‘hard-headed about the risks, our aims, and our capabilities’: meaning, it continues, using a God’s eye view to be ‘clear and realistic about our aims, and about the capabilities we and others have to achieve them’ (NSS 2008: 6).

By sticking close to the workings of the NSS’s particular brand of ‘realism’, it is nonetheless possible to get a clear idea of the actual policy responses licensed by broadening national security. ‘Capabilities’ is a term which typically refers to the use of military manpower and hardware. The 1998 SDR, for example, discusses ‘military capabilities’ and the ‘capabilities of our Armed Forces’ many times over. Whilst the 2004 Defence White Paper is subtitled ‘Future Capabilities’, and Jane’s Defense Weekly magazine is almost entirely geared towards assessing the weaknesses or otherwise, of various state, regional, and institutional capabilities. The NSS therefore

\(^{40}\) 2009: 17.
discusses continued investment in a ‘broad range of military capabilities’ including aircraft carriers, air defence, and submarine warfare: thus ‘safeguard[ing] our ability to prevent aggression, reinforcing our membership of NATO and our commitment to the international system’ (2008: 45).

But the term capabilities is also used in other instances, for example ‘developing our capabilities for preventative action’, so that the UK government may tackle ‘future security risks’ early (NSS 2008: 7). Here I would argue that the NSS’s use of ‘preventative action’ crosses into what Brian Massumi (2007) discussed in relation to President George W. Bush’s own 2002 NSS as ‘potential politics’ and pre-emption (also Der Derian, 2003). ‘Prevention’, Massumi writes, ‘assumes an ability to assess threats empirically and assess their causes. Once the causes are identified, appropriate curative methods are sought to avoid their realization’ (2007: 5). And indeed, this straightforward process of threat assessment and avoidance is precisely what the NSS portrays and would have its audience believe. For example, in relation to the broadened security issue of disruptive threats, discussed in section 2.3, the NSS claims the need to address threats such as climate change, ‘even though its most serious impact may not occur within the next twenty years’, for in that period the ‘global exhaustion of hydrocarbon fuel sources could become acute enough to constitute a security threat (2009: 28) (see Campbell, 2007b). For this reason the government will ‘continue to assess, through horizon scanning and on-going analysis, whether further refinement might be necessary’ (NSS 2009: 28).

It is in this concept of ‘horizon scanning’, however, that broadening national security moves definitively away from prevention towards a more dangerous preemptive attitude. The practice of horizon scanning was officially inaugurated in the register of broadening national security by the creation of a Strategic Horizon’s Unit in central government (the Cabinet Office) in July 2008. Horizon scanning, the NSS explains, is the ‘systematic examination of potential future threats and opportunities, including those at the margins of current and future thinking or planning’ (2009: 44). The practice aims ‘to tackle not just threats as and when they become real, but also the drivers or causes of threats before they lead to potential damage to our security’ (NSS 2009: 28). This rather terrifying concentration of whimsy – tackling threats before they become real, before they may lead to potential damage – resonates with Massumi’s conception of pre-emption. The epistemology of
pre-emption, he writes, is ‘unabashedly one of uncertainty’ (2007: 13). This is not only ‘due to a simple lack of knowledge. There is uncertainty because the threat has not only not yet fully formed but... it has not yet even emerged’ (Massumi, 2007: 13). The only certainty within pre-emptive performativities of national security is that ‘threat will emerge where it is least expected’ (Massumi, 2007: 13). This is because, Massumi continues, ‘what is ever-present is not a particular threat or set of threats, but the potential for still more threats to emerge without warning. The global situation is not so much threatening as threat-generating: threat-o-genic’ (2007: 13). In this way, broadening national security not only materialises an interconnected globe, but also a ‘threat-o-genic’ interconnected globe.

Closely tied to the production of coercive capabilities – whether in military hardware or pre-emptive ‘horizon scanning’ - is the assembling of particular roles of those who can and cannot exercise agency and leadership. ‘Overseas’, the NSS explains, ‘we will favour a multilateral approach’; in particular ‘a rules-based approach led by international institutions’ (2008: 7). This ‘rules-based approach’ depends on so-called ‘core values’: ‘human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all’ (NSS 2008: 6). Echoing Barnett’s ‘rule sets’, these core values represent ‘a potential basis for broad agreement, not just in the United Kingdom but everywhere’, and according to the NSS, the ‘best way to spread not just well-being and prosperity but also security is to build a progressive coalition of governments and people in support of those values’ (2008: 6, emphasis added). The institutions cited by the NSS are the UN, the European Union (EU), and the World Bank - all of which have been criticised for their exclusivity and neoliberal agendas - and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), whose capacity to act is explicitly supported by UK aircraft carriers, submarines, and so on.

Actually, these ‘values’ are an interpretive grid for threat. In other words, they are materialised within regulatory norms and and through their reiteration materialise an ‘outside’: particular dangers and threats. It is in no way contradictory, then, that the UK’s core values are accompanied by coercion. For if ‘issues’ cannot be resolved through ‘discussion’ and ‘due process’, then force will be used as ‘a last resort’ (NSS 2008: 6). So while multilateralism may bring ‘greater legitimacy’ to ‘collective action’, military capabilities ‘remain[s] the most effective way of managing
and reducing the threats we face’ (NSS 2008: 7). And not just the UK’s military capabilities either. ‘We also recognise’, the NSS explains, ‘that sometimes the best approach will be more flexible alliances, coalitions or bilateral relationships’ (2008: 8). Of these, the United States, the progenitor of integration as national security strategy, is ‘our most important bilateral relationship and central to our national security’ (NSS 2008: 8).

This policy of cloaking unilateral military action behind a veneer of collective legitimacy is not original. But it is important to emphasise here that this ‘core values’ rule set applies as much within the UK as it does ‘everywhere’ else, and therefore illustrates that broadening national security licenses particular roles and policy responses within the UK. ‘Traditionally’, the NSS explains, ‘the Government has been expected to deal with the threats and risks to national security through the Armed Forces, the police, border staff, and the intelligence and security agencies’ (2008: 8). But the ‘changing nature’ of these threats - that is, the accession of neoliberal globalisation as the primary objective of national security and the impossibility of protecting it solely through military force – and ‘our improved understanding of the best way to respond to them’ – the God’s eye view again – demand ‘broader partnerships’ (NSS 2008: 8, emphasis added). These include between ‘public, private and third sectors’ to protect critical national infrastructure, improve resilience, plan for emergencies, and counter violent extremism, as well as with ‘individuals, where changing people’s behaviour is the best way to mitigate risk’ (NSS 2008: 8).

2.5.1 The 2007 financial crisis

If broadening national security performs particular forms of external danger in order to protect ‘our spaces’ of neoliberal globalisation, then it would logically gain momentum as a result of the 2007 financial crisis.41 ‘The truly global nature of the crisis’, the NSS claims, ‘has emphasised the integration and interdependence of all countries into the world economy’ (2009: 6). As a result, the broadening of national

41 What the NSS terms the ‘global banking crisis’ began with the failure of American sub-prime mortgages in autumn 2007, and hit its crisis peak in autumn 2008 with the collapse of the New York-based investment bank Lehman Brothers (2009: 3) (also Langley, 2010).
security is reiterated and intensified in a number of ways. First, the ‘core values’ of national security have mutated into a ‘wider vision’ for society:

The Government has a wider vision to create a strong, fair, prosperous and secure society in which everyone has the opportunity to live their lives and make the most of their abilities, with fair chances for all, and governed by fair rules. This wider vision embraces a world based on cooperation between people and nations, with collective responsibility taken for collective problems, and every nation state, including the UK, playing its part in working for this better world (NSS 2009: 27).

Second, the drivers of insecurity have both intensified and been intensified by the crisis. For example, while NSS 2009 assesses that the ‘crisis has not fundamentally altered our assessment of key security threats’, it also issues a proviso: ‘That is not to say it has no impact. The downturn has increased the risk that poverty acts as a driver of insecurity at the global level’ (p. 6). This linking of poverty to insecurity is not original, and since the September 11 attacks it has been put forward many times to ‘explain’ the phenomenon of so-called ‘international terrorism’ (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Pape, 2005, 2003). The NSS explains its claim that poverty is a driver of insecurity through its ‘contribution to conflict and fragility in developing countries’, which in turn poses a threat to the UK ‘whether manifested through flows of illegal drugs and firearms into our cities, or the current terrorist threat’ (2009: 59).

The NSS’s response to poverty includes ‘continued action towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)’ and ‘an increased development budget’ (2009: 60). Regarding the links between poverty and conflict, national security is part of an approach which ‘brings together the full range of development, diplomatic and military tools’: specifically the Foreign Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Department for International Development. The ‘priorities for UK engagement’ regarding the alleviation of poverty include Pakistan, Africa (particularly Sudan and the Horn of Africa), the Middle East, and the Balkans (NSS 2009: 69-70). But foremost is Afghanistan, which the NSS claims is ‘relevant to at least four of the major sources of threat set out in the National Security Strategy’: terrorism; conflict;
transnational crime; and weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, Bialasiewicz et al. claim that integration as an ‘emergent imaginative geography’ precisely ‘materialized in the invasion and occupation of Iraq – which was carried out in the name of terror and has created the very terror it named’ (2007: 419). Likewise in Afghanistan: ‘Al Qa’ida grew under the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and its senior leadership now operates out of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan’ (NSS 2009: 69) (see Amoore and de Goede, 2011). Yet when Osama bin Laden, the assumed leader of Al Qa’ida, was executed by US special forces in May 2011, he was hiding out in a large villa in metropolitan Pakistan, not in the borderlands.

NSS 2009 also uses the financial crisis to reinforce the performativity of global interconnection in two further ways. First, the world is interconnected through the global economy: there is no alternative. In the twentieth century, UK national security was ‘dominated by direct threats to the UK as a sovereign nation of free citizens’ (NSS 2009: 19). But now, the ‘absence of a competing, state sponsored challenge to the democratic, liberal, free market based societies of the UK and our allies’, goes hand-in-hand with ‘a drive towards the opening up of trade and travel routes... sometimes called the ‘Washington Consensus’” (NSS 2009: 19).

Second, ‘prosperity and financial stability are critical for security’ (NSS 2009: 22). On this interdependent global stage, a challenge to the global economy becomes a challenge to global security, and vice versa, so that military force applied in the service of national security becomes legitimate in the service of the global economy. So the NSS goes from an emphasis on multilateralism in 2008, to extending the ‘range of international partners needed to deliver decisive action’ under the leadership of the UK and the ‘UK’s closest ally, the United States’ in 2009 (NSS 2009: 25, emphasis added). In other words, NSS 2008 was more restrained, but by NSS 2009 the UK government was panicking and switching all too quickly to unilateralism and military action. Likewise, ‘global problems’ need ‘global responses’ (NSS 2009: 3).

Just as the other of integration is non-integration into the global economy, the other of broadening national security is non-integration too, but it is also the neglect of, and laissez-faire towards, the global economy, whereby it is left to the devices of the so-called invisible hand of the market. In this way, broadening national security reconfigures and combines ‘national security’ and ‘economy’ in a Butlerian ‘iterable structure’ (2010: 149). Yet, notwithstanding what Campbell refers to as a Marxist
‘economistic understanding’ of international relations, in which the ‘underlying forces of capital accumulation are determinative of state behaviour’ (1998: 4-5), this iterable structure exceeds traditional disciplinary approaches to national security. Peter Gill’s (1994) claims are representative of the usual separation of the two domains. ‘In one sense’, he writes, ‘the idea of an economic threat to national security is a contradiction in terms, particularly where the state supports the pre-eminence of a market economy’ (Gill 1994: 93). ‘Uncertainty, competition, and risk’, he continues:

… are all indispensable conditions of the market place which is alleged to be the most superior method of organising production and distribution. Therefore ‘threat’ to national economic actors may be no more than a reflection of their inferior performance, and to attempt to protect them would be simply to distort the operations of the market (Gill, 1994: 95).

Of course, Campbell argues that these domains were never separate anyway. He points out how the ‘economic disintegration of Europe’ was a danger cited by US policymakers during the cold war, even though it did not pose a threat in terms of a ‘traditional calculus of (military) power’, nor was it reducible to the Soviet Union (Campbell, 1998: 31). Instead, economic collapse was seen as a fundamental threat to a particular political-economic status quo, the maintenance of which was then, as now, the rationale of national security.

Using performativity enables us to understand that ‘national security’ and the ‘economy’ are materialisations of particular regulatory norms. As Judith Butler puts it: ‘it is not possible simply to situate certain processes and activities within a state or, indeed, an economy, as if ‘state’ and ‘economy’ were pre-given entities, already bounded, identifiable, and knowable’ (2010: 147). She continues that ‘if such notions of the state are produced through state effects’ – as I argued at the beginning of the chapter – then the ‘same goes for ‘the economy’ which only becomes singular and monolithic by virtue of the convergence of certain kinds of processes and practices that produce the ‘effect’ of the knowable and unified economy’ (Butler, 2010: 147). In this way, broadening national security is one of the practices by which the global economy is performed as ‘knowable’ and ‘unified’.
2.5.2 Re-making the terrorist threat - The place of diasporic communities

... immigration becomes a problem, a challenge for European societies because scenes from everyday life are politicized, because day-to-day living is securitized, and not because there is a threat to the survival of society and its identity – Bigo.\(^{42}\)

In this final section I look at how performativities of global interconnection re-imagine and re-shape the terrorist threat and their impact on diasporic communities in the UK, beginning with the reiteration of the core values of neoliberal globalisation. ‘We cannot predict’, NSS 2009 explains, ‘what causes or ideologies will give rise to terrorism in the future’, however:

Globalisation, the Internet and the increasing ease of travel will increase the extent to which territorially driven or constrained grievances are played out on a worldwide stage. The UK may be particularly exposed to this risk because we are a very open and diverse society with numerous diaspora communities. Political events in countries thousands of miles away are closely reflected in communities in the UK (p. 77).

The abstractions of broadening national security are also used to situate the 9/11 attacks. ‘The preparations for the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001’, NSS 2008 explains, ‘spanned several continents, and so did the effects: the World Bank estimated the reduction of global GDP at almost 1%’ (p. 7). In this way, trans-national threats and drivers require ‘trans-national responses’ (NSS 2008: 7). Likewise, the international terrorist threat is ‘rapidly evolving’, and it functions something like a meta-enzyme present in the global system, which can metabolise any number of latent drivers of insecurity into threats (NSS 2009: 19). For example, as regards energy, it is ‘a fundamental building block of the global economy’, and ‘secure supply is crucial to ensuring stability and growth’ (NSS 2009: 54). Yet, energy supply is highly vulnerable: it could be used as ‘a geopolitical lever’ by a state threatening to restrict its supply; and, of course, ‘we also know that some terrorists

\(^{42}\) 2001: 100.
aspire to attack critical national energy infrastructure’ (NSS 2009: 54, 56). This almost works as an extreme example of Campbell’s argument that:

… given the amorphous and often virtual nature of the ‘war on terror’, in which the adversary is by definition largely unseen, the association of other resistant elements with terrorism has become a mechanism for materializing the threat (2007b: 129).

This materialisation also takes place through the linking of diasporic communities to terrorism as I discuss below.

Enzyinic international terrorism works equally well with: state-led threats, whereby leaders may ‘sponsor[ing] terrorist activities against the UK or its interests’; with threats from failed states, whereby ‘instability and violent conflict overseas provide an opportunity for other threats such as terrorism… to flourish’; and lastly, with a range of threat domains. ‘The asymmetric, low cost, and largely anonymous, nature of cyber space’, the NSS explains, make it an ‘attractive domain’ for use by terrorists, as well as organised (as opposed to disorganised) criminals, and state-led espionage (NSS 2009: 102). The UK public are already very aware of the claim that terrorists wish to acquire CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons), as this was the justification given by Prime Minister Tony Blair for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Closely tied to the re-shaping of the terrorist threat is the assembling of particular roles of those who can and cannot exercise agency and leadership. NSS 2009 announces the ‘theme’ of ‘protecting and involving our citizens in national security’, with priority given to ‘countering international terrorism’ (p. 30, emphasis in original). ‘Our approach’, it continues, ‘seeks to engage the public as fully as possible on national security issues’ (NSS 2009: 30). This would include then, services such as the Confidential Anti-Terrorist Hotline, which exhorts the public to ‘remain alert and aware of their surroundings at all times’ (see Amoore, 2007).43

The ‘Preventing Terrorism’ page on the Northumbria Police website (see chapters 4 and 5) asks that:

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If something strikes you as suspicious and out of place then trust your instincts and call the police. Terrorists have to live somewhere. They store their equipment and materials somewhere. They need vehicles... They may make unusual financial transactions or use false documents to hide their real identities. Perhaps someone you know has been behaving differently lately?

Other examples of when ‘citizens’ can be involved in national security include combating serious crime (‘recognising the harm and direct consequences that such crime can have on our people, communities and economy, through drugs, violence, people-trafficking and fraud’), and managing the risks of cyber security (‘so that our people’s ability to do business, communicate, learn, and interact socially... [is] secure’) (NSS 2009: 30-1).

Whilst British citizens – ‘our people’ – can play an important role in national security, the UK’s ‘diaspora communities’ are written into a powerless binary of ‘us’ and ‘them’. The NSS may begin by positioning diasporic communities as having a positive role within the ‘key characteristics of the UK’ (with their ‘key implications’ for national security strategy), but this is a brief respite. ‘We are one of the few major European states with a growing population’, the NSS claims, and ‘an increasing proportion of our population (8.9 per cent in 2005) is made up of ethnic minorities’ (NSS 2009: 38). ‘In an increasingly globalised world’, it continues, ‘diaspora communities can contribute to the UK’s economic and cultural success’ (NSS 2009: 38).

But the NSS goes on to claim that diasporic communities simultaneously undermine the UK’s national security, precisely because the world is ‘increasingly globalised’. The UK’s identity as ‘a hub of international communications, travel and migration’ means that ‘it can act as a stage where international events can be played out domestically’, yet it gives only one example: the ‘growth of diaspora communities in the UK means that some overseas conflicts or instability can be felt acutely at home’ (NSS 2009: 38, emphasis in original). In other words, ‘they’ bring danger into ‘our land’. This is why Cynthia Weber (2006), in a critique of Werenotafraid.com’s attempt to promote an ‘imaginary of British unity’ and fearlessness after the 7 July 2005 bombings in London, argues that the website

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44 Ibid, emphasis added.
ultimately failed. It failed because it was unable to reconcile its message of a rational and cosmopolitan British fearlessness of terrorist violence with the fact that the bombers were British nationals. And furthermore, that the British security services unlawfully killed the Brazilian Jean Charles de Menezes in the name of maintaining an environment of fearlessness which British Muslims and other ethnic minorities felt did not extend to them.

In this way, it must be clearly understood that the global discourses of integration and broadening national security, and the performativities of global interconnection on which they rely, are not ‘global’ in the sense that they are ‘spaceless’ or operate beyond territory (Elden, 2009). Rather they perform an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’, a secure and an insecure, to the neoliberal economy which can be located at many sites. With the materialisation of the international terrorist threat through broadening national security, and the linking in of diasporic communities, this happens chiefly through the flow of violent ideologies. Diasporic communities ‘resident here’ are linked in with ‘Al Qa’ida inspired ideology’ and other ‘regionally based ideologies’ in ‘the countries and regions from which they come’ through the internet and the increasing ease of travel (NSS 2009: 38, 40-41).

Interestingly, this process also happens in reverse: the NSS justifies UK counter-terror operations in Pakistan because the latter represents ‘important national interests’ for the UK that are founded, it continues, ‘in our historical association with the Indian sub-continent’, and the ‘close familial links between many UK and Pakistani citizens’ (NSS 2009: 75). But the NSS considers military operations in Pakistan to be entirely legitimate, in a way that the presence of diasporic communities in the UK, and their own ‘core values’, are not.
In this chapter I explored how the inaugural UK National Security Strategies published by the New Labour government in 2008 and 2009 make explicit that neoliberal globalisation is the objective of UK national security in the ‘new global age’. The significance of this is that discourses of neoliberal globalisation must be understood as the condition of possibility for UK national security, in the sense that through ritual repetition and reiteration the latter’s many practices ‘fix’ on the one hand, security as economic interconnectedness, and on the other, insecurity as an unwillingness to cooperate with the global economy. This is illustrated in obvious ways, such as NSS 2009’s claim that the ‘continued openess of global economies’ is the ‘best route to long-term stability and security’, whilst ‘moves towards closed societies, or economies, would decrease overall stability and increase risk’ (p. 51). But it is also illustrated in less obvious ways too. For example, ‘values’ become a border too – where acquiescence demonstrates connectedness, and dissent points to danger.

My discussion of national security as performative politics distills into two main points: first, the key role of national security in performing a coherent, stable state identity; and second, how collective identities exist as the reiteration of ‘imaginative geographies’. This is more than claiming that the state imposes certain political knowledges on pre-existing spaces and populaces. Rather, what is known about space – either that which we assume is ‘ours’ or ‘theirs’ – is already the constitutive force of exclusion, erasure, and abjection. Therefore if, as David Campbell argues, national security strategy during the cold war was a bordering practice materialising the identity of the sovereign nation-state, can broadening national security be understood as a bordering practice materialising the neoliberalised global? And if so, what are the violent geographies of this performativity? Who are the ‘us’ and ‘them’, and what are the coercive practices by which this violent division is maintained?

Broadening national security performs the abstracted global spatialities of a neoliberal geopolitical order, which have been materialised by UK security policy in successive Labour defence policies from the 1998 Strategic Defence Review up to and including the 2009 National Security Strategy and CONTEST. In the war on terror, broadening national security reiterates neoliberal performativities of
interconnection as a broadening register of coercive practices. For example, ‘horizon scanning’ – the dubious art of materialising threats which do not yet exist – and the building and strengthening of broader partnerships between national security, the public and private sectors, and citizens. These practices materialise or ‘bring to life’ a world in which the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence – which is at present what national security remains – is increasingly woven into everyday spaces.

Finally, broadening national security re-materialises the terrorist threat and the place of diasporic communities, so that the latter have become trapped in the ‘abject domains’ materialised by performativities of terror and counter-terror. In an ‘interconnected globe’ the UK is materialised as ‘a stage where international events can be played out domestically’ (NSS 2009: 38, emphasis in original). In other words, and to paraphrase Edward Said, interconnection – particularly through the internet and ease of travel - means that ‘they’ bring outside dangers into ‘our land’.

This thesis proposes and begins to tease out the significance of the relationship between the broadening view of national security put forward by the NSS and contemporary counter-terrorism practices, a relationship which becomes crucially important in the light of my main claim in this chapter: a broadening understanding of threat with a broadening range of coercive policy responses brings to life a world in which the violence of national security can be more present in everyday life. In the final section I suggested that the re-making of the terrorist threat through broadening national security coalesces around the flow of violent ideologies into the UK through diasporic communities. I continue with this focus in the next chapter by considering how the materialisation of global interconnection through the reiterative practices of broadening national security can be conceptualised using the biopolitical security frameworks of Michel Foucault.
Chapter 3  Broadening national security and biopolitical security
3.1 Introduction

The UK has a particular interest in contributing to shared responses to shared problems, because our way of life is dependent, to a greater extent than in many other countries, on the free movement of goods, money, people and ideas – *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom.*\(^{45}\)

... almost every aspect of national security has an important information dimension. In the information age, the world is increasingly interconnected and information is instantaneous. The sphere of public opinion, of culture and cultures, and of information and information operations is therefore an important domain in its own right – *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom.*\(^{46}\)

The performativities of interconnection by which broadening national security reinscribes, extends and enforces neoliberal globalisation is about more than co-option into shared economic values. As the above quotations from the NSS demonstrate, in addition to economic and financial interconnection, a neoliberal globe is also underwritten by the ‘free movement’ of people, ideas, information, and culture: amounting to a ‘way of life’ requiring protection from a broadening coercive register of national security. In this chapter, I develop my critique of broadening national security by a closer examination of these performativities of ‘free movement’ and ‘ways of life’; how they have been analysed as the object-products of biopolitical security (Dillon, 2010, 2007a, 2007b; Reid, 2006); and how this latter concept, as it currently stands in security studies, must be re-formulated to meet the critical challenge of broadening national security

The biopolitical security literature has been useful to the extent that it has begun the necessary task of re-conceptualising contemporary security practices through Foucault’s arguments on biopolitical government and the securitisation of docile populations (2004; 2007; 2008). Specifically, it deals with the government of contemporary ways of living recognisable by their unprecedented complexity (Dillon

\(^{45}\) 2009: 59.
\(^{46}\) Ibid: 14.
and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009). However this literature also has a number of important limitations which I will explore over the course of this chapter. Foremost, it largely skims over Foucault’s linking of biopolitical security mechanisms to a ‘political-economic program’ performed by ‘laws of nature’: specifically, circulation and uncertainty (2007: 41; 2008: 16). This chapter re-orientates the concept of biopolitical security in relation to this ‘political-economic program’, and uses Judith Butler’s theory of performativity to explore how performativities of circulation, population, and so on, materialise this programme. They are, in effect, the already-secured realities natural to political-economic government, rather than pre-existing ‘analytical categories’ which biopolitics must address, as Michael Dillon would have it (2007a: 8).

Re-orienting biopolitical security as political-economic government, however, leads to a further conceptual challenge. For while my approach does not seek to dismiss the important ways in which biopolitical discourses are materialised as complex ways of living, it is nonetheless primarily concerned with grasping and appreciating the inescapable prosaic-ness of broadening national security; specifically, crowded places security. Crowded places security is the biopolitical government of ways of life too, but the biopolitical security literature as it stands simply offers no framework to adequately conceptualise this domain. For example, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero’s (2009: 13) argument that ‘biopolitical rule’ addresses the ‘radical relationality of the circulation of species-being as emergent life’, appears somewhat inadequate for grasping the political stakes of national security in the UK’s high street businesses and public services.

To finish, I would point out that there is no binding reason why the concept of biopolitical security has to be trapped in this way. In 2003, the art historian and critic Jonathan Crary wrote that ‘our lives are divided between two essentially incompatible milieus’: on the one hand, the ‘spaceless electronic worlds of contemporary technological culture’, and on the other, the ‘physical extensive terrain on which our bodies are situated’ (2003: 7, emphasis added). But rather than commit to ‘hyperbolic theories about the disappearance of space or the ubiquity of instantaneous speed’, Crary instead quite sensibly counsels that ‘we must begin to understand the strange kinds of dislocations and associations that now constitute subjective reality’ (2003: 7). In this chapter I begin to develop an alternative
framework by which the ‘strange dislocations’ of contemporary biopolitical security practices may be understood.

In the next section 3.2, I step back from the chapter’s analytic focus on broadening national security to consider how scholars in security studies and political geography have theorised biopolitics: the relations between power, life, and security. I begin with Foucault’s work on biopolitics - ‘power’s hold over life’ (2004: 240) – which by and large remains the template for biopolitical critique in the social sciences. In the second part of the section, I consider the ways in which a Foucauldian biopolitics has been used to counter what is to many scholars the failure of geopolitical imaginaries to adequately account for the practices and violences of global politics in the era of the war on terror. Finally, in the third part of the section, I consider how such engagements have raised the question of the emergence of a biopolitical subject.

In section 3.3, I explore Foucault’s biopolitics in greater detail, beginning with his initial work in 1976 which focused, I argue, on three biopolitical performativities of the multiplicity, population and the milieu. In the second part, I discuss his work on biopolitics in 1978 and 1979 which moved on to consider biopolitics as the materialisation of realities natural to a political-economic liberal form of government.

In section 3.4, I consider how, and with what results, Foucault’s biopolitics schema has been re-worked in the last decade. In particular, I consider the ‘biopolitics of security’ approach within security studies, and its attempts to re-imagine what Foucault posited as the natural realities of political-economic government in terms of complexity, contingency, and emergence (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009, 2008). In the second part of the section, I consider a possible direction for moving beyond this literature which takes into account Foucault’s ‘other’ biopolitics of sexuality, as well as recent work on the nexus between biopolitical security and culture (Campbell, 2007b; Gregory, 2010).

An exploration of biopolitical security norms cited and reiterated by broadening national security is my task in the final part of the chapter. In section 3.5 I look at three such materialisations: traditions of openness and a British ‘way of life’; cyber space and the ‘symbiotic nature’ of terrorism and insurgency; and lastly ‘Public opinion, culture and information’ (Poci).
3.2 Situating biopolitics - From Society Must Be Defended to terror

The current attention given to the concept of biopolitics in security studies is based, and draws very heavily (through not exclusively), on the work of Foucault in his late-1970s lecture seria: 1976’s *Society Must Be Defended* (2004), 1978’s *Security, Territory, Population* (2007), and 1979’s *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2008). Although the concept appears as a largely ‘political’ one, it has travelled with surprising speed and penetration across the social sciences and the humanities since the lectures were translated into English between 2003 and 2008. Thus, biopolitics has been used as a critical framework in, for example, anthropology (India, 2005), cultural geography (Comaroff, 2007), and literary studies (Morton and Bygrave, 2008). There are, however, dissenting voices. Most notably, in 1998’s *Homo Sacer* the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben contested what he termed the ‘Foucauldian thesis’ of biopolitics:

Foucault argues that the modern Western state has integrated techniques of subjective individualization with procedures of objective totalization to an unprecedented degree… Yet the point at which these two faces of power converge remains strangely unclear… where, in the body of power, is the zone of indistinction (or, at least, the point of intersection) at which techniques of individualization and totalizing procedures converge? (pp. 5-6).

In response to Foucault’s ‘blind spot’, Agamben sets out a genealogy of modern biopolitics going back to a classical Greek distinction between *zoe* – that which ‘expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings’ - and *bios* - that which ‘indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or group’ (1998: 6,1). In Agamben’s framework, modern power relations – biopolitics – are materialised not in the optimisation of *bios*, as Foucault argues, but instead in *zoe*, bare life (1998: 4). Bare life is exemplified in the figure of *homo sacer*, sacred man, ‘whose life cannot be sacrificed, yet may nevertheless be killed’ (Agamben, 1998: 10). Homo sacer is ‘an object of violence that exceeds the sphere of both of law and of sacrifice’ (Agamben, 1998: 86). This understanding of biopolitics as the materialisation/inclusion of bare life as the constitutive outside of contemporary politics, fits well with Butler’s
argument that performative politics 'require[s] the simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings', whereby the abject designates:

... those ‘unlivable’ and ‘uninhabitable’ zones of social life which are nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the subject, but whose living under the sign of the ‘unlivable’ is required to circumscribe the domain of the subject (1993: 2; also 2004).

These arguments have been combined implicitly or explicitly by scholars in disciplines including international relations (Edkins, 2008), and geography (Minca, 2007; Minca and Giaccaria, 2011).

The intersections and divergences between the biopolitics of Foucault and Agamben are the subject of a scholarly genre in its own right (see Okajangas, 2005). My thoughts on the matter are that despite the shared usefulness of Agamben’s and Butler’s approaches in analysing the constitutive outsides of contemporary politics - for example ‘queerness’ or the camp – in many cases such a movement cannot even become a possibility until certain ways of living are recognised as being (bio)political as such. That is, until it is recognised that certain spatialities and identities are only made possible within the regulatory matrices of biopolitical norms. This is the urgent political problem posed by the broadening of national security and the protection of crowded places which this thesis begins to address.

3.2.1 The politics of making life live

Foucault first began to discuss an explicit schema of biopolitics in 1976: in the last of the Society Must Be Defended lectures (hereafter SMBD), and in the final chapter of the first volume of The History of Sexuality (hereafter HoS), titled ‘Right of Death and Power over Life’ and published the same year. His analysis in these opening salvos centred on the now-famous claim that biopower, distinct from sovereign and disciplinary power, ‘optimize[s] a state of life’: that it is ‘bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them’ (SMBD: 246, 258; also

He had spent the first ten lectures, ‘trying to raise the problem of war, seen as a grid for understanding historical processes’ (Foucault, 2004: 239).
HoS: 136). ‘I wouldn’t say’, he continued, ‘that sovereignty’s old right – to take life or let live was replaced’; instead, from the nineteenth century ‘it came to be complemented by a new right which does not erase the old right but which does penetrate it, permeate it’ (SMBD: 241). This new right is ‘precisely the opposite right… the power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die’ (SMBD: 241, emphasis added).

The sovereign right to take life is therefore joined by the biopolitical right to make life live; a formidable combination witnessed no more clearly, Foucault argued, than in the phenomenon of genocide. When the sovereign power of the gallows is joined by the ‘right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life’, wars are ‘waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital’ (HoS: 136-7). The most important implication or political problem of biopolitics, then, is that ‘a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavours to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations’, is at the same time, ‘a formidable power of death’ (HoS: 137). In other words, biopolitics are a uniquely modern way of retaining life within its old relation with power.

Much space has been devoted in the secondary literature on Foucault to discussing the import and meaning of these shifts (Collier, 2009; Dillon, 2004). How, and to what extent the biopolitics schema replaced in Foucault’s thought the disciplines, which themselves seemed to succeed a model or paradigm of sovereignty (see Foucault, 1991). But as Foucault illustrated in the example of genocide discussed above, and as he made explicit at many other points during the three lecture seria, he was not interested in theories of power as such. He did not want to analyse biopolitics at the ‘level of political theory, but rather at the level of the mechanisms, techniques, and technologies of power’ (SMBD: 241). He thus goes on to argue that biopolitics emerged in the nineteenth century through two main performativities, or, as he put it, around two ‘poles’ (HoS: 139). The first of these is of:

... the body as as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls (HoS: 139).
Whilst the second:

... formed somewhat later, [and] focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the population (HoS: 139).

Foucault’s main claim here then, is that disciplinary mechanisms perform what he terms ‘an anatomo-politics of the human body’, confined and extorted, whilst biopolitics materialise the ‘species body’ or population through the ‘mechanics of life’: the birth and death rate, and so on (HoS: 139). As Stephen Collier (2009) puts it, in HoS and SMBD Foucault is offering an analytic of biopolitical government in which disciplinary ‘micro-powers’ take ‘care of the details in circumscribed spaces’, whilst regulatory ‘macro-powers’ form ‘complex systems of coordination and centralization’ over populations, allowing for ‘control over new domains: the population, productive processes, biological life’ (p. 84). Collier goes on to argue, however, that this concept of two interlocking but distinct poles of disciplinary and regulatory power is not the ‘definitive elaboration’ of Foucault’s biopolitics – it is too indebted to a ‘systemacity’, a ‘functional coherence’ and a ‘totalizing’ sense of reach which does not reflect the usual sophistication of Foucault’s analysis (2009: 85, 79, 80). Instead, the notion of two poles is something like a ‘warm-up’, to be replaced with the ‘more supple analysis’ of 1978’s Security, Territory, Population (hereafter STP) (Collier, 2009: 80).

A second important point to draw out from Foucault’s initial analysis in HoS and SMBD is that biopolitical performativities are regulatory. ‘A power whose task is to take charge of life’, he wrote, ‘needs continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms’ (HoS: 144, emphasis added). In other words, reiterative ‘regulatory and corrective mechanisms’ function to materialise ‘a normalizing society’ in which ‘it is no longer a matter of bringing death into play but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility’ (HoS: 144, emphasis added). These mechanisms include ‘more economically rational’ social interventions than were traditionally provided by the
charity of the church, such as 'insurance, individual and collective savings, safety measures, and so on' (SMBD: 244).

Foucault took sabbatical leave in 1977. In 1978's STP he returned to the theme of biopower: 'namely, the set of mechanisms through which the biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy' (p. 1). As their title suggests, these lectures, as well as the following year's The Birth of Biopolitics (hereafter BoB), are key to the 'biopolitical security' literature which has emerged in security studies and international relations in recent years. In particular, Foucault’s (STP: 7) concept of 'security mechanisms' as the interface between 'biological features' and power, has become very popular as a rebuke to practices of so-called 'homeland security' since 2001, as well as to the inability of geopolitical frameworks to adequately conceptualise and critique them.

The concept of the ‘mechanism’ is key in STP, and Foucault spends a large part of the first lecture explicating 'mechanisms of power' vis-à-vis his disinclination to do likewise for a theory of power. The 'analysis of these mechanisms of power', he claimed, 'is not in any way a general theory of what power is. It is not a part or even the start of such a theory' (STP: 2). Instead, it 'simply involves investigating where and how, between whom, between what points, according to what processes, and what effects, power is applied' (STP: 2). He then goes on to discuss how mechanisms of security manage the open and ever-widening seria of 'natural givens' (STP: 18). The 'management of these series', he writes, 'because they are open series, can only be controlled by an estimate of probabilities, [and this] is pretty much the essential characteristic of the mechanism of security' (STP: 20). This idea of making life live by materialising ‘open seria’ and ‘ever-widening circuits’ (STP: 20, 45), is absolutely key to understanding broadening national security.

3.2.2 Biopoliticising the war on terror

In 2007 Michael Dillon wrote - taking up where he assumed Foucault had left off in his work on security mechanisms - that ‘modernity has been distinguished by at least two great dispositifs for the problematizations of security’: 
One, revolving around the referent object of sovereign territoriality has been the geopolitics of security. The other, revolving around the problematic of life, specifically addressed in terms of population, has been the biopolitics of security (2007a: 10).

In the war on terror, however, Dillon claimed that ‘it is neither geopolitics nor biopolitics alone but the toxic combination of the two that now drives western security practices’ (2007a: 9, emphasis added). Indeed, while there have been a number of critiques focusing on either the geopolitical (see chapter 2) or the biopolitical problematisation, there have been few which explicitly address this ‘toxic combination’.

Dillon begins by allowing that the war on terror is ‘driven by a complex of geopolitical factors both local and global’: in particular, ‘a contingent terroristic event directed against the epicentre of geopolitical hegemony in the United States’ (2007a: 8, emphasis added). Or as John Agnew puts it, the US ‘sustained the attacks because of its global geopolitical centrality’ (as well as he adds, because of its ‘support for governments – particularly those of Israel and Saudi Arabia – that excite much hostility from Muslim extremists’) (2003: 1, emphasis added). Dillon’s overall claim, however, is that to approach the war on terror through geopolitical imaginaries is in a very important sense to miss the point. For the war on terror, he argues, ‘emerged out of a generic biopolitics of contingency in the west and is being conducted according to its political technologies and governmental rationalities’ (2007a: 8, emphasis added). In particular, these are technologies and rationalities of risk emanating from the ‘economic, techno-scientific, and political supremacy of the west’, which have turned back on themselves as the ‘occasioning of terrifyingly dangerous uncertainties amplified and circulated by its [the west’s] very own forms of existence’ (Dillon, 2007a: 9). Dillon would therefore seek to explain the phenomena of globalisation (and much more besides) as the reiteration and reinscription of contingency on a global scale:

The contingency around which biopolitics revolves has been evolving since the beginning of the modern age. It includes within its compass almost every aspect of western life: from capital accumulation, financial flows, information and
communication systems, business continuity, health care, container shipping, port management, food chains, and energy grids to counter-terrorism, globalized criminality – especially in people, drugs, sex, organs, and many other illegal substances – popup warfare, transcontinental tourism, the design of street architecture, and the risk-based governance of life assurance, pension funds, school outings, and nursery provisions (2007a: 9).

However, there might not be such a wide gulf between geopolitical and biopolitical imaginaries as Dillon argues. According to Alan Ingram and Klaus Dodds, geopolitical security practices make use of the spatial vocabulary of the state and the inter-state system: they are concerned with securing ‘zones’ of instability and failed ‘states’, as ‘western governments worry that such regimes might ‘export’ security threats’ (2009: 7-10; also Jeffrey, 2009). On the other hand, biopolitical security practices include ‘stabilizing civilian populations in global danger zones’, ‘stemming refugee and migrant flows’, and ‘protecting welfare systems from undesirables’ (Ingram and Dodds, 2009: 10). But in distinguishing geopolitical from biopolitical imaginaries it is important, I think, not to cling too rigidly to the concept of population. My concern is that, as with traditional geopolitics and international relations approaches in which the state and the inter-state system are taken as pre-existing facts, biopolitics may come to be confined to performativities of population: their absence or presence, their patterns or aporia.

But an even more troubling implication from this biopoliticising of the war on terror is the way in which the concept of population becomes part of what is essentially a sovereign rather than biopolitical relationship. The populations of global politics may indeed become stabilised or repressed, but these actions more closely indicate the sovereign power of the sword rather than the biopolitical making life live. Furthermore, the particular populations caught up in these analyses – of civilians, refugees, migrants, and so on – completely miss out the other senses of multiplicity which figure in biopolitical control: such as Deleuze’s (1992) ‘dividuals’, as I discuss in chapter 5, or even Foucault’s own sense of security as the production of multiple, ever-widening circuits. What emerges, then, is a need for a recognition of the specifically biopolitical aspects of the war on terror that does not just substitute ‘population’ for ‘state’, thereby repeating the limitations of the critical geopolitics
literature: its relationship to the inter-state system, albeit a negative relationship of repudiation. Rather, the biopolitics of the war on terror would more appropriately signal a geopolitics of everyday spaces and making life live. This thesis takes the first steps towards the development of such a framework.

3.2.3 The emergence of a biopolitical subject

Although in Dillon’s argument biopolitical security practices do not result from the war on terror so much as they produce the discursive parameters within which it is conducted, many scholars have nonetheless brought attention to their increasing intensity since 2001. Louise Amoore (2006) focuses on the biometric border, a prominent practice of ‘homeland security’, arguing that it ‘cannot be understood simply as a matter of the geopolitical policing and disciplining of the movement of bodies across mapped space’ (p. 337, emphasis added). Instead, it is ‘a mobile regulatory site through which people’s everyday lives can be made amenable to intervention and management’, and is therefore ‘more appropriately understood as a matter of biopolitics’ (Amoore, 2006: 337) (also Adey, 2009; Muller, 2008).

In her critique, Amoore draws attention to how in the practice of the biometric border, personal and biological data such as health, financial, and travel records, facial and gait recognition, and fingerprints and iris scans, are used to pre-emptively assign risk profiles to travellers; segregating ‘legitimate’ mobilities for leisure and business, from ‘illegitimate’ mobilities including terrorism and illegal immigration. Amoore rejects the depoliticising framing of the biometric border as simply an expert or ‘smart scientific solution to fighting the war on terror without impeding globalization’ (2006: 343). Instead, she draws attention to the ways in which the biometric border produces the human body as an ‘indisputable anchor[s] to which data can be safely secured’ (Amoore, 2006: 342). Through technologies like the biometric border, bodies become ‘infallible and unchallengeable verifiers of the truth about a person - the ultimate guarantors of identity’; leaving people, in the words of one civil rights lawyer, ‘having to dispute their own identity’ (Amoore, 2006: 340).

Such contradictions may not trouble former US Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge who launched the scheme in 2005, with his ‘trusted traveller’ status. But
an assortment of advocacy groups, civil liberty and privacy organizations, and immigrant rights groups were extremely concerned about how the ‘preemptive fixing of identities’ by which the biometric border operates can fix the ‘wrong’ identity; and what happens to the person at the end of this process. Amoore therefore concludes that the biometric border is not simply geopolitical, because under its purview ‘the bodies of migrants and travellers themselves becomes sites of multiple encoded boundaries’ (2006: 336, emphasis added).

Amoore’s analysis also sheds light on the conditions of emergence of what could be termed a biopolitical subject. As Foucault argues in Discipline and Punish, ‘we must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’; rather, ‘power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth’, and ‘the individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production’ (Foucault, 1991: 194). Amoore’s analysis therefore points us towards how in the war on terror new economies of power are being produced at the border, in which the rights-bearing citizen gives way to (wo)man stripped naked to his or her biological essentials; sometimes literally, as in the case of the controversial body scanners installed at airports which render ‘naked’ images of passengers (Amoore and Hall, 2010).

A key difference between geopolitical and biopolitical imaginaries of security, then, is the different political subjectivities they make possible. Geopolitical imaginaries are concerned with the citizen of the nation-state (or, if one were very cynical, the issue of who can die and who may live vis-à-vis the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence). Biopolitical imaginaries do not produce apolitical subjects, even if the former could be confined to scientific renderings of species life and population. So while biometric bordering practices may rely on technological innovation, Wendy Larner (2008) argues that the power/knowledge claims about safe and dangerous forms of life on which they rely, have a much deeper and violent history. In this way, the biometric border may be more familiar to those who have experienced imperial and/or colonial rule, than to those travellers or holiday makers encountering body scanners at Manchester Airport.
3.3 Foucault’s biopolitics

… to act in the political domain is still to act in the domain of nature – Foucault.48

Liberal thought held that the attribution by nature of goods and ills is, in itself, just – François Ewald.49

In the last chapter of HoS, Foucault described the ‘circular process’ which marked the ‘entry of life into history… into the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of political techniques’ (pp. 141-2). This circular process includes of course the development of the life sciences – particularly biology - but it also takes in the improvement of agricultural techniques, the Industrial Revolution, and the birth of capitalism (HoS: 142). Together these events brought about ‘a relative control over life’, and ‘in the space for movement thus conquered… methods of power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life processes and undertook to control and modify them’ (HoS: 142). The circular links between politics and biology have been thoroughly dealt with in the literature (Braun, 2007; Marks, 2008), as have those between biology and political economy (Cooper, 2008; Mitchell and Waldby, 2010; Sunder Rajan, 2006). In the next two sections I will explore the lesser-spotted relationship between biopolitical performativities, discourses of political economy, and security.

In his earliest work on biopolitics, then, Foucault focused on how the development of capitalism from the 1700s onwards depended on biopolitical performativities. Capitalism, he wrote, ‘would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes’ (HoS: 141).50 But:

48 STP: 47.
49 1991: 207.
50 Populations are not, of course, the only political subjects possible of capitalism. In visual culture, Gen Doy writes of capitalism (and rationalist Enlightenment thought) in terms of the production of ‘strong, controlling and exploitative subjects increasingly required by a developing capitalist, and later imperialist, economy’ (2005: 2). As John Stuart Mill famously stated in 1859’s On Liberty: ‘over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign’ (1999: 47). This notion of an ‘entrepreneurial subject’ also features in recent cultural economy analyses of the contemporary financial system (see Langley, 2008, 2006).
… it also needed the growth of both these factors, their reinforcement as well as their availability and docility; it had to have methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern… The adjustment of the accumulation of men to that of capital, the joining of the growth of human groups to the expansion of production and the differential allocation of profit, were made possible in part by the exercise of bio-power in its many forms and modes of application (HoS: 141).

This is not to say, however, that capitalism did not also need the disciplines. In his essay on spaces of biopolitical control, William Bogard (2007) explains that ‘disciplinary institutions, like the factory or the school, physically enclose diverse populations and force their unification’, so that the ‘confinement of labour within the factory and factory-city gave Capital much power over the accumulation process in the 18th and 19th centuries’ (p. 2). Indeed for Bogard, the shift from the disciplines to biopolitics identified by Foucault, is ‘a problem of capitalist governance'; reflecting ‘a move by Capital to modify disciplinary forms of enclosure, to counter the resistance they provoke and intensify the accumulation process’ (2007: 2).

Bound up in the re-adjustment of social domains to capitalism, then, were new performativities and thus new materialisations of power, as Foucault describes in SMBD. ‘Unlike discipline which is addressed to bodies’, he wrote, ‘the new nondisciplinary power is applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-living being; ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species’ (SMBD: 242, emphasis added). The materialisation of ‘man-as-species’ is in turn reiterated by three other biopolitical performativities, which I will explore in turn.

First, there are performativities of the ‘multiplicity’ and/or ‘mass’. Whilst discipline performs ‘a multiplicity of men to the extent that their multiplicity can and must be dissolved into individual bodies that can be kept under surveillance’, biopolitics instead performs ‘a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on’ (SMBD: 243). This notion of the ‘global mass’ emphasises the contiguity of the concept of population with the emerging life sciences. Foucault explores this new performativity of multiplicity through the ‘problem of morbidity’ (SMBD: 243). He looks back to the
‘famous epidemics’ such as the Black Death, which between 1348 and 1350 is estimated to have claimed anywhere between 30-60% of Europe’s population, and has ‘haunted political power’ since then (Foucault, SMBD: 243). He then moves forward to the eighteenth century when epidemics were not the primary problem but ‘something else – what might broadly be called endemics, or in other words, the form, nature, extension, duration, and intensity of the illnesses prevalent in a population’ (SMBD: 243, emphasis added).

Population, then, is the second biopolitical performativity Foucault identified: ‘biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as a political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem’ (SMBD: 245). In HoS, Foucault described population as the ‘underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence’, so that the right to life exists alongside the ‘wholesale slaughter’ of ‘entire populations’ (p. 137). In SMBD, he draws out the ‘biological or biosociological processes’ of population: birth, death, and reproductive rates (p. 250, 243). As Colin Gordon put it, ‘[biopolitics is] a politics concerned with subjects as members of a population, in which issues of individual sexual and reproductive conduct interconnect with issues of national policy and power’ (1991: 5). In STP, Foucault claims that population emerged, ‘when for the first time, men are no longer called ‘mankind’ (le genre humaine), but instead begin to be called ‘the human species (espèce humaine)’ (p. 75, emphasis in original). Continuing with this ‘biosociological’ theme, he goes on to describe population as ‘a datum that depends on a series of variables’ such as climate and ‘material surroundings’, rather than the ‘simple sum of individuals inhabiting a territory’ or the expression of ‘a sovereign that may encourage or shape it’ (STP: 71) (for another, more neglected reading of population in Foucault’s biopolitics see section 3.4.1). Again through the example of epi-/en-demics, Foucault also illustrates how biopolitical performativities re-imagine death itself: death became ‘no longer something that suddenly swooped down on life – as in an epidemic’, but instead ‘something that slips into life, perpetually gnaws at it, diminishes it and weakens it’ (SMBD: 244).
Third and finally, Foucault introduces the milieu, not surprisingly a term drawn from the life sciences.51 ‘Biopolitics’ last domain’, he wrote, is ‘control over relations between the human race, or human beings insofar as they are living beings, and their environment, the milieu in which they live’ (SMBD: 244-5). Here Foucault is explicitly focusing on the materialisation of connections and relations within ‘life’, rather than discrete entities like the disciplined, extorted, and docile body.

Before going on I would like to draw attention to a key point emerging from this somewhat schematic rendering of the biopolitical performativities in Foucault’s 1976 work. Rather than presenting the multiplicity, population, and milieu in the mode of the ‘key analytical categories’ of biopolitics as per Dillon (2007a: 8), I want to emphasise instead that as biopolitical performativities, as the materialisation of biopolitical norms, there is nothing inevitable, or as Foucault would put it ‘obvious’, about them. As Butler points out, performativity is ‘a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter’ (1993: 9-10, emphasis added). So the concept of population, for example, has proved so resilient in contemporary political imaginaries (and it must be noted, in academic imaginaries of these imaginaries) not because it is the perfect or natural exemplar of biopolitics, but because it has been reiterated and reinscribed – that is, produced as fixed – with more success. Foucault points towards the reasons for this: the contiguity with the life sciences and their classification of the natural world into domains, classes, orders, genera and so on, and of course the needs of Capital backed up by the military force of the State.

But Foucault, it should be pointed out, is also to blame for such misunderstandings. Throughout his long and varied body of work he repeatedly stressed that power is productive, that social phenomena can only acquire the status of that which can be known through discourse. Yet in this early work on biopolitics he focused so intensely on how it – for want of a better word – works, that he neglects the larger argument that discourses, whether sovereign, disciplinary, or biopolitical, do not do anything – rather they make possible what can be done. For

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51 Foucault explains that his ‘resignification’ of the term milieu as an ideal space of security follows directly from its appearance in 19th century biology, particularly in the writings of Jean-Baptiste Monet de Lamarck (SMBD: 20). According to George Canguilhem, Lamarck used milieu to designate ‘fluids like water, air, and light’ (cited in SMBD: 27 n.36). ‘When Lamarck’, Canguilhem continues, ‘wants to designate the set of actions exerted on a living being from outside... he never says the milieu, but always ‘influential circumstances’” (cited in SMBD: 27 n. 36).
example, in SMBD he comments that one of the most important things about biopolitics is the ‘nature of the phenomena that are taken into consideration’: ‘phenomena that are aleatory and unpredictable when taken in themselves or individually, but which, at the collective level, display constants that are easy, or at least possible, to establish’ (p. 246).

Statements like these have led contemporary scholars like Dillon to posit contingent ways of life, for example, as the exclusive targets of biopolitics, like enzymes that can only catalyse certain reactions from certain chemicals and no others. Whilst it is certainly important to consider how contingent, circulating, and emergent ways of living are governed, like for example global maritime trade (Lobo-Guerrero, 2008) and immigration (Gill, 2009), at the same time it must be remembered that they are materialised and given meaning within biopolitical discourses. They cannot therefore be ‘revolved around’, ‘considered’, or ‘taken in themselves’ in any way which implies they exist previous to or independent of (bio)power. This recognition is so important for my own account of the biopolitics of broadening national security and crowded places security because it enables me to consider the performativity – the ‘constitutive constraint’ – by which other ways of living are materialised beyond population and contingency (Butler, 1993: 15).

3.3.1 The politics of ‘natural reality’

In the STP and BoB lectures in 1978 and 1979 respectively, Foucault develops his earlier concern with the ‘biological or biosociological processes’ to which he claimed biopolitics is variously directed (misleadingly as I have argued), by resolving them into a more unified imaginary of ‘natural reality’ or the ‘naturalness of the human species’ (STP: 41, 21). ‘It seems to me’, he explained in STP, ‘that this sudden emergence of the naturalness of the species within the political artifice of a power relation is something fundamental’ (p. 22). It is fundamental I would argue, because it points towards biopolitics as being not directed to the ‘natural processes’ of life as such (STP: 45), but instead as those performativities which materialise realities which are natural to a specific form of government. This form of government is no longer the crude capitalism of Foucault’s 1976 work, but is instead the ‘political-economic program’ of liberalism; and the realities natural to liberalism are no longer the
closed, constructed spaces of the disciplines, but instead the ‘open series’ and ‘natural givens’ of security (STP: 40, 20, 18). So, whilst ‘baldly… we could say that sovereignty is exercised within the borders of a territory, discipline is exercised on the bodies of individuals, and security is exercised over a whole population’ - this does not ‘hold together’ (STP: 11). Instead, the materialisation of the political-economic norms of liberalism - their effects of boundary, fixity, and surface as per Butler (1993: 9) – are better explained through performativities of circulation and uncertainty.

First, then, what was at stake in political-economic government was ‘the question of the spatial, juridical, administrative, and economic opening up of the town’: ‘resituating the town in a space of circulation’ (STP: 12) (also Elden and Crampton, 2007). But the problem of ‘opening up’ is of course that it potentially opens up to or lets in everything. So in the example of the town, ‘connecting up th[e] network of streets to external roads in such a way that goods from outside can arrive or be dispatched’, also means that the ‘insecurity of the towns was increased by the influx of the floating population of beggars, vagrants, delinquents, criminals, thieves, murderers, and so on’ (STP: 18). In BoB, Foucault explains that circulation was a ‘modern problem’ in that natural reality was imagined to be essentially ‘poly-functional’: in other words, circulation had both positive and negative functions (p. 13, 19).

The sovereign thus becomes in addition to the ‘architect of the disciplined space’, the ‘regulator of a milieu’: involving ‘not so much establishing limits and frontiers, or fixing locations, as, above all and essentially, making possible, guaranteeing and ensuring circulations’ (STP: 29, emphasis added). In this way, the reality natural to political-economic government is paradoxical or even necessarily unstable because it simultaneously makes possible both good circulations – which it effects to maximise - and bad circulations – which it effects to minimise (STP: 30). As I discuss further in section 3.5, this instability can be clearly observed in the materialisation of neoliberal globalisation by broadening national security, which strives to maximise the opportunities of global, and mainly economic, interconnectedness, whilst constantly engaging with and seeking to remove the (security) ‘challenges’ arising from the same.
Second, because political-economic norms are concerned with opening up, Foucault explains that ‘the town is seen as developing: a number of things, events, and elements, will arrive or occur’ (STP: 19, emphasis added). This ‘involves organizing, or anyway allowing the development of ever-wider circuits’: ‘an infinite series of mobile elements... an infinite series of events that will occur... an indefinite series of accumulating units’ (STP: 45, 20). So the performativity of circulation is also that of a particular kind of uncertainty: the integration of ‘possible future developments within a present plan’ (STP: 19). What then, Foucault asks, ‘must be done to meet [that is, secure] something that is not exactly known in advance?’ (STP: 19, emphasis added).

To elaborate further on biopolitical performativities of uncertainty, Foucault gives the example of food scarcity. He describes how within the ‘new conception of the economy’, food scarcity was not denounced as an ‘evil’ event, unpredictable and devastating, which had to be stopped at all costs through legal controls on prices, storing, export, and cultivation (STP: 33-36). Instead, it was resituated as ‘a phenomenon that, in the first place, is natural, and so consequently... neither good nor evil, it is what it is’ (STP: 33-36, emphasis added). Situated within political-economic rather than moral and/or supernatural discourses, unpredictable food scarcity was re-materialised as that which would cancel itself out naturally: ‘by connecting up with the very reality of these fluctuations [in the food supply] and by establishing a series of connections with other elements of reality’, Foucault explained, ‘the phenomenon is gradually compensated for, checked, finally limited, and in the final degree, cancelled out’ (STP: 37). Therefore by rejecting an understanding of food scarcity ‘in terms of morality’, biopolitical performativities materialise not the ‘obsessive fear of scarcity’ but the ‘reality of grain’ (STP: 36, emphasis added). Biopolitical performativities materialise not the closed, fixed space of the disciplines but the space of an event: specifically, a reality which is open, uncertain, and not known in advance.

Such an open reality, Foucault continues, is therefore necessarily also ‘centrifugal’ with the ‘constant tendency to expand’, in contrast to the reality natural to disciplinary norms which is centripetal to the extent that it isolates a space - concentrating, focusing, and enclosing (STP: 44-45). Into this space, ‘new elements are constantly being integrated: production, psychology, behavior, the ways of doing things of producers, buyers, consumers, importers, and exporters, and the world
market’ (STP: 45). As Graham Burchell puts it, ‘liberal governmentality carves out a space in which the natural processes of the population are designated as economic; namely market competition, enterprise and entrepreneurial spirit (1993: 274). An expanding, natural reality amounts to what Foucault describes as a ‘broadened analysis’ and ‘conception of market mechanisms’:

First, [analysis] had to be broadened on the side of production... we must consider not only the market, but also the entire cycle from the initial actions of producers up to the final profit... Second, the analysis was broadened on the side of the market, for it is not just a matter of considering one market... the world grain market must be taken into account and connected with every market on which grain may be put on sale... So, the analysis must be broadened on the side of production and on the side of the market... [Third] the analysis must be broadened also on the side of the protagonists, inasmuch as instead of subjecting them to obligatory rules, we will try to identify, understand, and know how and why they act... that is to say that completely concrete element of the behaviour of *homo oeconomicus* must also be taken into account. In other words, it is an economics, or a political-economic analysis that integrates the moment of production, the world market, and, finally, the economic behaviour of the population, of producers and consumers (STP: 40, emphasis in original).

Finally, the materialisation of an open, uncertain, and broadened reality natural to political-economic norms enables, and indeed is reiterated and enforced by, a self-limiting form of government:

... this fundamental principle, that political technique must never get away from the interplay of reality with itself is profoundly linked to the general principle of what is called liberalism. The game of liberalism – not interfering, allowing free movement, letting things follow their course; *laisser-faire, passer et aller* – basically and fundamentally means acting so that reality develops, goes its way, and follows its own course according to the laws, principles, and mechanisms of reality itself (BoB: 20).
Indeed, it is not difficult to apprehend how liberal tenets of laissez-faire government, independent civil society, and the invisible hand of the market were materialised alongside and reiterated by performativities of species life as self-governing and naturally occurring beyond human (and even divine) agency.

As I outlined above, Foucault’s working out of the ‘space of security’ as the ever-wider circuits materialising reality natural to the regulatory norms of liberalism is absolutely central to my analysis in the rest of the thesis. First, much of what is termed ‘biopolitical security’ in security studies, based on Foucault’s late-1970s lectures, should be conceptualised as performativities of political-economic liberal norms. Specifically, biopolitics is the regulation and enforcement of that which is ‘natural’ or ‘alive’ to liberal modes of governmentality as well as that which is considered to be ‘alive’ in the biological, vitalist sense. I am not ignoring Foucault’s arguments that the contiguous emergence of the life sciences and liberal governmentality point to how they depend on each for meaning (see for example HoS: 142). But I feel that much of the biopolitical security literature labours these links – either explicitly or, in the case of Dillon’s arguments about the ‘biopolitics of contingency’ (2007a: 8), implicitly - and neglects those of the ‘natural reality’ of liberalism. This thesis is aimed directly at this gap. After all, if biopolitical performativities were reiterated only within scientific discourses, with no impact upon governmental practices, they would not exercise such dominance over contemporary politics.

In consequence, I suggest developing the concept of biopolitical security using Butler’s theory of performativity, and in this way shifting the emphasis from how biopolitics work - the securing of various biological and biosociological processes - to how biopolitics fix liberal norms. Liberal norms are fixed through a broad range of biopolitical performativities: multiplicity, population, the milieu, circulation and the uncertain. The reality natural to liberal norms is the space of security: a reality which is open, uncertain, and broadening. In this way, biopolitics do not regulate or even secure populations and circulations: instead, they materialise the space of security, and in this sense populations and circulations are already secured. This is not to claim that ways of living characterised by circulations and populations – including the neoliberal globalisation which is the object of broadening national security - do not exist without, or independent of, biopolitical performativities. Rather that they
cannot be materialised — given the effect of boundary, fixity, and matter — outside regulatory discourse.

The implication of this argument is that what are commonly posited as biopolitical security mechanisms in the security studies literature — biometrics, etc. — are instead the attempt to bring the excess of human life — ‘bio’ — into line with these already-secured realities. Here I do not mean excess as any tangible or even intangible object — such as Dillon’s contingency of species life — rather excess is only that which operates beyond founding political-economic liberal imaginaries. It is something like the constitutive outside, the abject domain, of contemporary biopolitics. Essentially, these are not mechanisms situated within the ordinary workings of biopolitical discourses, they are practices at the very edge of political possibility, made necessary when biopolitics fails or goes wrong. Though it may be little consolation, the biopolitical practices of the war on terror, which have galvanised an entire counter-discourse in the academy, the media, and the general public, demonstrate not the apogee of power over life but its glitches — the failure of its founding imaginaries.
3.4 Beyond biopolitical security?

Having to take into account the autonomous nature of the thing to be governed biopolitics therefore seeks to govern through contingency since contingency is what characterises its very object of government, namely the life of species existence – Michael Dillon.52

Taking up Foucault’s work on the relationship between biopolitics, liberal governmentality and security, Dillon argues that scholars have been slow to appreciate both the extent to which ‘liberal societies are themselves governed and seek to govern globally through… biopower’, and the ‘kinds of imperatives to which the biopower of biopolitics now orders the political rationalities and governmental technologies of the west’ (2007a: 8). In seeking to remedy these twin lacks, Dillon outlines a conceptual framework of what he variously terms ‘biopolitical security’ or the ‘biopolitics of security’, and which I will critique in this section (for a different critique of biopolitics of security vis-à-vis Karl Marx, see Aradau and Blanke, 2010).

Dillon claims that for Foucault, security ‘did not mean a universal value, or condition of possibility for a political subject, but instead ‘a certain set of mechanisms through which species life is regulated’ – in other words, biopolitics (2007a: 8). And biopolitics, he continued, is ‘itself governed by certain key analytical categories, foremost among which is contingency’ (Dillon, 2007a: 8). In other words, biopolitical security describes the mechanisms by which an irrevocably contingent species life is governed.

In developing his biopolitical security approach ‘with Foucault beyond Foucault’, Dillon along with Luis Lobo-Guerrero, argues that from the twentieth century the ‘generic referent object of biopower which is ‘life”, has changed under ‘the twin pressures of the molecular and digital revolutions’ (2008: 66). So whereas in 1970’s The Order of Things Foucault discussed life, labour, and language as the quasi-transcendentals of Man, and in his biopolitical lectures he elaborated the circulating and aleatory phenomena of ever-widening natural seria, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero claim to ‘unpack and extend’ these quasi-transcendentals further so that contemporary life should be conceptualised as the ‘contingency that now unites

52 2007b: 46.
circulation, connectivity, and complexity’ (2009: 11, 1). Furthermore, this complex life is emergent. Whilst ‘complicated refers to closed systems of many elements’, they write, ‘complex refers to dynamic open systems’ characterised by ‘emergent properties, phase changes and nonlinear transformation and change’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009: 13). Although they concede that the ‘vocabulary of connectivity and complexity is not Foucault’s’, nonetheless they position it as being ‘consistent with the operational dynamics and generative principles of formation that characterize the biopolitical imaginary of species-being that takes ‘life’ as its referent ontological and epistemic object of being’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009: 13).

This approach to biopolitical security effectively splits Foucault’s ‘political-economic program’ into on the one hand, ‘empiricities’ and objects such as population and open systems, and on the other, an ontological category of life – what they elsewhere refer to as ‘Being’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009). This latter move especially Foucault was always loath to carry out.53 In other words, Dillon re-imagines Foucault’s account of biopolitical security from the production of realities natural to political-economic government, to an ontological grid in which that which is natural is ‘life’, and that which is life is what it is before it becomes dangerous vis-à-vis biopolitical security mechanisms. In this way, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero argue that living beings pose a problem for biopolitical security because biopower seeks their ‘fructification’ rather than ‘their simple protection’ (as per Foucault’s claims about the biopolitical optimisation of life), yet that fructification necessitates a sort of radical contingency or freedom of existence (2008: 271). ‘In order for living entities to fructify’, they claim, ‘they have to be allowed to do so. Their biological freedom to adapt and change is integral to securing their very existence and the realisation of its potentialities’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 271). And it is this very freedom which means that ‘for contemporary biopolitics being tout court is becoming-dangerous’ (Dillon, 2007a: 17, emphasis in original).

53 In the first lecture of STP, for example, Foucault explains that although his analysis of biopower relations ‘may, of course, open out onto or initiate something like the overall analysis of a society’, this was not his objective (p. 2). Rather than making truth claims about biopower, Foucault’s aim was a ‘politics of truth’; insofar, he claimed, ‘as what is involved in this analysis of mechanisms of power is the politics of truth, and not sociology, history, or economics, I see its role as that of showing the knowledge effects produced by the struggles, confrontations, and battles that take place within our society’ (STP: 3, emphasis added). There, is, then a significant problem with analyses like Dillon’s which draw directly on Foucault’s work in order to explicitly produce more truth claims.
Two important concerns emerge from this biopolitical security literature. First, in effect its arguments lead back to an account of (bio)power as repressive – another move which Foucault explicitly rejected. Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero’s claim that biopolitical security is directed to the ‘fructification’ of species life cannot disguise that what they are positing is the repression – the making dangerous – of some kind of pure, or at least pre-existing, life/Being. The need to move beyond this limited appraisal of a ‘repressive biopolitics’ becomes particularly apparent when, in chapter 5, I discuss the norms of biopolitical security and control performed by counter-terrorism in the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art. BALTIC is a space devoted to the pleasures of life such as leisure, culture, eating, drinking, and shopping, and biopolitical control mechanisms play their part in making these pleasures possible. But until the concept of biopolitical security is developed so as to distinguish between on the one hand, the making possible of certain ways of living, and on the other hand, a more or less crudely imagined constraint upon ways of living, it will fall short of the task of contesting contemporary security practices.

The theory of performativity provides such a useful intervention into this debate because it moves the focus away from how regulatory norms repress something – which, as the above demonstrates, is an easy trap to fall into no matter how committed a Foucauldian one is - to how a constrained something is materialised and given the appearance of ‘fixity’ through repetition and reiteration. In other words, performativity is absolutely committed to contesting repressive norms; but it emphasises, like Foucault, that that repression is only visible in its effects, in those subjects and spaces which are its materialisation, and not in a repressive-type relationship with pre-existing ‘preferred’ targets. In this way, the objective of biopolitical critique should not be on trying to work out how we are secured through our biological features or our Being - because neither of these can be known independently of their iteration within regulatory discourses. This is not to say that biological processes and even a core essence of ‘life’ do not, or could not, ‘exist’; only that their meaning and their materialisation cannot be accessed outside discourse. In this way, biopolitical security mechanisms do not ‘intervene’ at the level of population, circulation, and so on, because, as materialisations of regulatory discourse, population and circulation are already ‘secured’. 
The second concern that emerges from the biopolitical security literature regards the important political implications which attend the unreflexive use of analytical abstractions, whether they are those of a 'global war script' as per Simon Dalby in the previous chapter, or those of 'emergent life' or 'fructifying living entities' as per Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero. Referring precisely to the account of life given in the biopolitical security literature, Jenny Edkins (2008) problematises this notion of the biopolitical 'state of emergency' that is assumed to arise when 'life is conceived as always emergent, always becoming, and hence always dangerous' (p. 221). She equates it with the 'form of life that liberal governance sees... a purely bare biological life of emergence', so that the 'goal of life, envisaged in this way, is nothing but the endless circulation of and reproduction of life' (Edkins, 2008: 221).

In other words, to what extent do academic accounts of the question of 'emergent life' contribute to – or at least reiterate in a performative sense – the instrumentalisation of life that Edkins argues was so brutally set in motion by the authorities in the aftermath of the London bombings in July 2005? ‘There is no room in this vision’ of biopolitics, she writes, ‘for the person or for responsibility’ (Edkins, 2008: 221). Marieke de Goede (2005) discusses a similar blind spot in some critiques of late modern capitalism. The ‘emphasis on the depersonalizing effects of money on social relations’, she writes, ‘obscures the fact that modern monetary instruments are equally dependent on social networks and geographical nodal points of authority’ (de Goede, 2005: xxiii). The account of biopolitical security that I develop in the rest of the thesis attempts to ‘fold back in’ these neglected facets: people, social and government responsibility, and, of course, the politicised spaces in which security practices are made possible and, indeed, ‘authorised’. I begin in the next section by reviewing the work already done by Foucault and others in the direction of the ‘human’ and ‘cultural’ realities natural to biopolitics.

3.4.1 Securing a human and cultural reality?

The emphasis in the biopolitical security literature on what Edkins terms the ‘purely bare biological life of emergence’, becomes even more problematic given its neglect even of all of Foucault’s published work on the subject. I do not mean to
suggest that writing on one aspect of Foucault's work cannot be regarded valid unless all of his work is taken into consideration – perhaps it is better articulated as a question of what claims can be made. In Dillon's case, these are totalising claims about what Foucault's biopolitics is, and what therefore it cannot be. For example, he writes:

How biopolitics operates is also simply put, and it is as well to put it now. Biopolitics is a dispositif de sécurité that secures – that is to say regulates, strategizes, and seeks to manipulate the circulation of species life – by instantiating a general economy of the contingent throughout all the processes of re-productive circulation that impinge upon species existence as such (Dillon, 2007a: 9, emphasis added).

As I have argued above, 're-productive circulation' does not 'impinge' on species life as such. Rather what can be known of species life, including the ways in which it can be considered circulating, is known through regulatory discourse.

So to Dillon’s claim that biopolitics is the security of the circulation of species life, I would counter that Foucault’s work after 1979 (and, as I illustrate, before this year too), which is so often dismissed as the ‘ethics of the subject’ or ‘technologies of the self’ and considered peripheral, at best, to political questions, instead points to his own further thoughts on how modern forms of power act on the individual. In performativity terms, this work develops Foucault’s ideas on how contemporary subjects are materialised through the reiteration of biopolitical discourses.

First, I would like to consider population, considered by the extant literature – and most certainly by Dillon - as the ‘ideal’ biopolitical performativity. In the latter parts of STP, Foucault begins to talk about the population as a ‘political personage’ (p. 67). Previous to the 1600s, he explained, the behaviour of the population was understood vis-à-vis ‘epidemic, war, or food shortage’ – in other words, ‘one of these great dramatic moments in which people died with a spectacular rapidity and intensity’ (STP: 67). In the 1600s, mercantilists imagined the behaviour of the population in relation to ‘the strength of the state and sovereign’: the population was the ‘source and the root’ of the state’s power and wealth if it could be made to ‘work properly, in the right place, and on the right objects’ (STP: 69; also Gordon,
With the emergence of liberal political economy in the 1700s, however, the behaviour of the population began to be imagined differently. As I discussed above, political economy was primarily addressed to a natural reality, which encompassed but was not limited to a biological life - accordingly, population was ‘considered as a set of processes to be managed at the level and on the basis of what is natural in these processes’ (STP: 70).

This is an interesting point in Foucault’s analysis. Previously he described the naturalness of the population in socio-biological terms (birth and death rates, and so on), but here for the first time he seems to split it up into first, the socio-biological concept of the population as a regulable milieu, and second, as ‘different kinds of conduct’ (STP: 71). The natural reality of the population is therefore not the biological bare life it offers up to power, but instead its ‘transparency’ (STP: 27). That is, ‘if one says to a population ‘do this’, there is not only no guarantee that it will do it, but also there is quite simply no guarantee that it can do it’ (STP: 72). The naturalness of population can only be intervened in through ‘a range of factors and elements that seem far removed from the population itself and its immediate behaviour, fecundity and desire to reproduce’ (STP: 72).

Foucault continues that one of the first of these elements through which the naturalness of the population could be penetrated was ‘desire’. Within this imaginary of natural reality, ‘every individual acts out of desire. One can do nothing about desire’ (STP: 72). But if the desire of the individual is given ‘free play’ it will - by what Foucault describes as ‘arbitrary’ but what I would describe as an imaginative process - ‘produce the general interest of the population’ (STP: 72). Finally, then, ‘from one direction... population is the human species, and from another it is what will be called the public’:

The public... is the population seen under the aspect of its opinions, ways of doing things, forms of behaviour, customs, fears, prejudices, and requirements; it is what one gets a hold on through education, campaigns and convictions (STP: 75).

This brief discussion illustrates that in STP Foucault was already beginning to move towards a more ‘embodied’, or at least more humanised, reading of biopolitics.
than he had heretofore offered, so that despite its grandiose claims, Dillon’s work on biopolitical security is far from capturing the essence of a Foucauldian biopolitics, even within the pages of STP. In my view, Dillon’s ‘de-humanised’ reading of life as emergence is still indebted to the ‘biopolitics as biology’ reading that was so prominent in Foucault’s 1976 work and in much of the secondary literature.

There is, then, a counter-proposition that it was precisely Foucault’s attempt to develop his biopolitics schema – and by develop I mean to consider its ‘effects in the real’ – that led to his focus after 1979 on the ethics of the modern subject through the problem space of sexuality. This proposition finds support both from Foucault scholars and Foucault himself. Michel Senellart in his essay on the context of the STP course commented that:

… the question of bio-power… is inseparable from the work on the history of sexuality pursued concurrently with the courses [STP and BoB]. In 1976 he [Foucault] asserted that sexuality ‘exists at the point where body and population meet’. From 1978, and throughout the development that results in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self in 1984, it will take on a new meaning, no longer representing only the point of articulation of disciplinary mechanisms and regulatory apparatuses (dispositifs), but the main theme of an ethical reflection focused on techniques of the self. A level of analysis is brought to life that was no doubt absent from the earlier works, but the contours of which are outlined from 1978 in the problematic of governmentality (STP: 370-1).

So if, as Merquior (1985) claims, sexuality was the ‘chief subject matter of a generalized thrust of truth about the individual’, with sex as the ‘epitome of this soul searching individuality’ (p. 121), is it and not security (nor the camp as Agamben would have it) the biopolitical exemplar? Sexuality had, after all, been present in the biopolitics literature from the beginning - in 1976’s HoS – and it thus both precedes and succeeds the relatively brief sojourn into security. And more than that, does it matter? In HoS, Foucault wrote:
By creating the imaginary element that is ‘sex’, the deployment of sexuality established one of its most essential internal operating principles: the desire for sex – the desire to have it, to have access to it, to discover it, to liberate it, to articulate it in discourse, to formulate it in truth. It constituted ‘sex’ as something desirable. And it is this desirability of sex that attaches each one of us to the injunction to know it, to reveal its law and power; it is this desirability that makes us think we are affirming the rights of our sex against all power, when in fact we are fastened to the deployment of sexuality that has lifted up from deep within us a sort of mirage in which we think we see ourselves reflected – the dark shimmer of sex (p. 157).

Does it change that much if we substitute ‘sexuality’ for ‘security’?

Whilst these arguments have yet to be taken up, there is a nascent body of literature which approaches biopolitical security through its ‘cultural strategies’. In his critique of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, Derek Gregory (2010: 68-9) identifies a ‘cultural turn’ or ‘new cultural awareness’ in American military imaginaries. Perhaps this cultural turn is a result of the extreme detachment which characterises ‘late modern war’: the global cartographies and ‘war scripts’ in which war is global but at the same time violence happens somewhere else; the visual economies by which ‘the space of the enemy’ is performed as ‘an abstract space on a display screen’ (Gregory, 2010: 69-70). Gregory gives the example of the ‘Shock and Awe’ bombardment of Baghdad in March and April 2003, which ‘at once de-materialized (‘targets’, ‘the capital’) and de-linked (‘buildings’, ‘bunkers’)’ (2010: 70). ‘We are’, he continues, ‘invited to contemplate such scenes not only from a safe distance and without human presence... but also without any sense of the very interconnectedness of life that is being sundered’ (Gregory, 2010: 70, emphasis added).

Nor can America’s military imaginaries in Iraq and their ‘discourse of object-ness’ be separated from neoliberal globalization, and vice versa: in the military imaginary of ‘culture-centric warfare’, Gregory claims, ‘the economic and political march in lockstep’ (2010: 70, 66. 68).

Gregory goes on to describe how various US military officials involved in the occupation of Iraq came to focus on the acquisition of ‘cultural knowledge’ to enhance their ability to meet ‘the ‘basic social and political needs’ of the population’;
thereby reducing, so the argument goes, ‘domestic’ support for the ‘insurgents’ (2010: 73). This cultural knowledge was then processed, packaged, and passed on to soldiers at training bases in the US through, for example, virtual simulations which staged military operations ‘in the places of everyday life, not in an abstracted battlespace, but in homes, neighbourhoods and clinics’ (Gregory, 2010: 80). Furthermore, these simulations foregrounded interpersonal transactions: gaining the trust of the local population was the condition of the soldier’s success (in this virtual simulation, at least) (Gregory, 2010: 80).

According to Gregory, these simulations ‘mimic the closeness and intimacy that is the fulcrum of the cultural turn’, but it is a ‘presumptive’ and ‘transactional intimacy’ which he argues may claim ‘familiarity, understanding, and even empathy’ but is nonetheless ‘conditional [and] forcefully imposed’ (2010: 83, 76). These virtual worlds register military violence as a sort of present absence: it makes the scenarios possible and necessary, but yet it is scripted firmly in the background (Gregory, 2010: 80). He concludes that the cultural turn in fact reiterates and reproduces cultural difference:

... the attempt to hold the Other at a distance while claiming to cross the interpretative divide produces a diagram in which violence has its origins in ‘their’ space, which the cultural turn endlessly partitions through its obsessive preoccupation with ethno-sectarian division, while the impulse to understand is confined to ‘our’ space, which is constructed as open, unitary, and generous: the source of a hermeneutic invitation that can never be reciprocated (Gregory, 2010: 82).

The security practices identified by Gregory perform a forced intimacy between that which is imagined to be benign and that which is imagined to be malignant, which nonetheless runs alongside a permanent estrangement. In this way, they mirror the practices of the biometric border identified by Amoore which juxtapose an intrusive, physical, even biological intimacy with a detached and ‘business-like’ deference towards frequent flyers (2006, also Amoore and Hall, 2010).

David Campbell (2007b: 129) also discerns biopolitical performativities in attempts in the US since 2001 to make ‘a causal connection between individual
behaviour and international danger’. For example, the Bush administration’s linking of individual drug use to support for terrorism abroad, and, in retaliation, the Detroit Project’s attempts to link petrol consumption by SUVs to ‘the international threat of the moment’ through increased revenues for Middle Eastern states which (are considered to) assist Islamist extremists (Campbell, 2007b: 130). Campbell goes on to point out that foreign military interventions in order to secure flows of petrol to the US, and the marginalisation (and worse) of the indigenous people that get in the way, are done in the name of securing ‘the American way of life’ (2007b: 131). For Campbell, the connections between the cultural, social, and political foregrounded by the SUV controversy are more usefully conceptualised as ‘a cultural politics of desire’ (2007b: 132), which is, as both Foucault (in the previous section) and Hardt and Negri tell us, a biopolitical strategy:

In the postmodernization of the global economy, the creation of wealth tends ever more toward what we will call biopolitical production, the production of social life itself, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another (cited in Campbell, 2007b: 134, emphasis added).

These arguments represent, I think, the starting point for understanding the performative securing of natural reality beyond biological and/or the ontological category of barest life, and within so-called cultural, popular, and commercial domains.

The importance of the arguments in this section is not to suggest a new ‘gold standard’ understanding of biopolitics whereby biology is replaced by political-economy, which is replaced by contingency and emergence, which is replaced by culture and the ethics of the subject. Although the latter in particular is an important and necessary future direction for work on Foucault’s biopolitics, it is a furrow which remains largely unploughed. Rather, I want to suggest only that other readings of biopolitical security are possible and important if scholars are to understand contemporary materialisations of power as security practices. Such readings do not have even to rigidly stick to the terminology used in this section - sexuality, ethics, culture - as the literature has in the past tended to cling to Foucault’s (few) quotable comments on ‘security’. But at the least it must acknowledge that both biology and
emergence are limited for understanding contemporary security practices. Support for my argument is not far away – in the next section I discuss how the broadening of national security performed by the NSS casually defeats both geopolitical and biopolitical security frameworks as they currently stand.

Indeed, it is important for security scholars not to be naïve here, or, for that matter, cautious and unsure in their choice of research object. Broadening national security and crowded places security at the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art both demonstrate that performativities of national security are necessarily intertwined with those of the ‘public’ – their opinions, expectations, behaviour and attitudes – and of culture. This is not a novel argument. Dillon (1996: 16), for example, describes security as a ‘radically inter-textual signifier’ floating through the ‘defining technologically inspired discourses of Modernity: state security; national security… economic security; financial security; individual security; collective security; personal security; physical security’, and so on. Then in the succeeding two chapters I explore alternative conceptions of biopolitics through the analysis of performativities of broadening national security at BALTIC.

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54 Not to mention sport, as evidenced by the centrality of the London 2012 Olympics to broadening national security (see NSS 2009: 45). The relationship between politics, security and sport is the subject of a wide literature (see for example Bairner, 2011; and Whannel, 2008).
In this final part of the chapter I will draw out the ways in which the policies and practices of broadening national security materialise ‘realities’ which are ‘natural’ to neoliberal discourses, and – equally importantly - how those realities are violently enforced under the rubric of the war on terror. First, I look at the stated objective of broadening national security to protect a British ‘way of life’, imagined as economic and social ‘traditions of openness’, and in particular, open flows of energy, information, resources and capital - in other words, the project of neoliberal globalisation (NSS 2009: 37). I then discuss how broadening national security ‘responds’ to two particular issues: first, the ‘emerging national security challenge’ of cyber space; and second, the remaking of an old threat, terrorism, as the insecurity of ‘public opinion, culture and information’ (NSS 2009: 40, 105). My objective here is progressively to illustrate that practices of broadening national security strive to bring the excess of human life into line with the founding imaginaries of (neo)liberal governmentality.

3.5.1 ‘Traditions of openness’

Broadening national security sets out the ‘positions and interests’ of the UK ‘as a free market economy, with a tradition of openness’ (NSS 2009: 37). The UK is ‘relatively densely populated’ but has ‘limited domestic food and energy resources’; thus it relies on its economic links with other states to import primary and manufactured products; export services and high value-added manufactured products; and for ‘substantial foreign investment in our infrastructure and economy’ (NSS 2009: 37). Given ‘the openness of our economy and our dependence on trade from around the world, and flows of energy, information, resources and capital, we need to be able to ensure that these flows are open and secure’ (2009: 38, emphasis added).

The UK’s open economy and dependence on ‘open and secure’ flows is reinscribed by the UK’s ‘open’ social characteristics. The ‘core British values’, the NSS claims, are ‘fair play, human rights, openness, individual liberty, accountable
Government and the rule of law (2009: 3, emphasis added). The UK is also variously described as ‘an open, pluralist democracy based on the rule of law’; as having ‘a tradition of open debate supported by a lively free press’; and as ‘a very open and diverse society with numerous diaspora communities’ (NSS 2009: 7, 38, 77, emphasis added).

Furthermore, the UK’s current identity as ‘a highly ‘globalised’ nation’, reflects ‘our long history as an open, outward facing, trading nation and a hub of global activity’ (NSS 2009: 49, emphasis added). This ‘long history’ includes, the NSS claims, the willingness of ‘our people’ to support ‘overseas intervention and/or the use of military force… given our history in past centuries’ (2009: 37, emphasis added). Of course, the issue not being addressed here is precisely the role of violence in the long history which has shaped the UK’s present as an ‘open nation’ (NSS 2009: 49) (see for example, Gregory, 2004, and Kearns, 2009, on the legacy of violent imperialist geographies in the Arab world and Ireland). The NSS does all but admit that ‘openness’ goes hand-in-hand with military force.

Performing ‘traditions of openness’ is an attempt to naturalise broadening national security, by, in a sense, losing it in history - much like with the constant citation of the end of the cold war and the dawn of a new international order which I discussed in the previous chapter. Indeed, the latter also makes an appearance in the UK’s traditions of openness: the removal of the Soviet threat in 1989 cleared the way for the ‘liberal market-oriented vision of a free society championed by the UK and our key allies’ (NSS 2009: 5). And the ‘triumph’ of the liberal vision has been accompanied by ‘a drive towards the opening up of trade and travel routes’, with all the benefits that follow: ‘wider choices of goods and services’, and ‘considerable increases in capital flows and trade opportunities’ at home, and increased productivity and ‘millions lifted out of poverty’ abroad (NSS 2009: 19, 5).

There is no doubt that performativities of ‘traditions of openness’ cite discourses of liberal government, and they can be linked to similar projects: for example, the ‘democratic peace theory’ – that no liberal democratic state has ever gone or will ever go to war with another liberal democratic state (see Russett and Oneal, 2001) - and a liberal ‘end of history’ global order where states co-exist in

\[55\] This phrase was made famous by Francis Fukuyama in his 1992 book *The End of History and the Last Man*; in which he argued that contemporary western liberal democracy signals both the endpoint and the highpoint of social evolution. Although Fukuyama’s thesis has been largely rejected as the
prosperous, and thus peaceful, tranquility. For example, the NSS discusses its commitment to ‘internationalism’: ‘in an increasingly globalised world, the UK’s security and prosperity are dependent on international stability’ (NSS 2009: 106). Actions that threaten international stability are those which are ‘isolationist’: ‘one country may be tempted to take damaging action in its own interests… [which] may only have limited impact but it might then provoke a similar response by other states’ (NSS 2009: 106-7). The example that is given is - unsurprisingly given the earlier reiteration of the financial crisis as a national security threat - of economic isolationism. ‘In the economic context’, the NSS explains, ‘this risk [of isolationism] can be seen in the… temptation to impose restrictive trade measures for the benefit of a particular country’, and ‘more generally, it can be seen in the potential for states to use energy supplies or other economic levers as hostile policy tools’ (NSS 2009: 107).

What is missing of course from this account of damaging isolationist behaviour is that its meaning is materialised within neoliberal discourses – what the NSS earlier described in typical ‘newspeak’ as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (2009: 19, emphasis added). But as Dillon and Reid point out, such claims conveniently ignore what they term the ‘liberal way of war’, which is so often used to enforce the failure of biopolitical performativities. That is, the ways in which ‘war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 7). For in the attempt of liberal democracies ‘to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in pursuit of its own global project of emancipation’, they claim that ‘the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 7).

simplicity and speciousness of its claims became progressively harder to ignore through the 1990s and 2000s, the belief that western liberal democracy is both unrivalled and desirable remains powerful, especially but not surprisingly in government documents like the NSS.

56 ‘Newspeak’ is the official language of the fictional ideology of ‘Ingsoc’ or English Socialism in George Orwell’s novel 1984. ‘The purpose of Newspeak’, Orwell wrote, ‘was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible… Its vocabulary was so constructed as to give exact and often very subtle expression to every meaning that a Party member could properly wish to express, while excluding all other meanings and also the possibility of arriving at them by indirect methods’ (2009: 1176).
3.5.2 Cyber space

But there is something other than just the reiteration of liberal internationalism in the NSS’s identification of how openness can, at the same time as boosting the UK’s economy and ‘maximis[ing] welfare for all countries’, also challenge and undermine that same security. The most obvious elements of this challenge relate to the perception of how easily flows can be exploited to cause harm, amply illustrated by the materialisation of cyber technologies as a security issue - so much so that ‘cyber security’ is a major theme of the NSS, as well as the subject of its own separate Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom (CSS). While cyber space is described by the NSS as the ‘most important new domain of national security of recent years’ (2009: 13, emphasis added), Miriam Dunn Cavelty (2010), writing in the American context, traces the emergence of so-called ‘cyber security’ back to the 1980s. She cites the increasing take up of home computers during the decade, as well as the development of ‘cyber-counter-culture’ (the proverbial loner hacking into government computer systems), and rising incidents of cyber-crime, related, but not exclusive to, foreign espionage. All of which account for, she claims, the first links between cyber space and national security.

The way in which cyber space has become such an important focus of UK national security – despite not being ‘new’ as such - can be explained, I would argue, by conceptualising it precisely as a reality natural to neoliberal discourses – and moreover the failure of its imaginaries. This is not to claim either that if there were no NSS, no CSS, no national security regime, that individuals (or organisations) would not use cyber technologies to inflict damage, but instead to argue that the materialisation of these cyber technologies as a threat which makes possible an entire range of security practices - including a new Office of Cyber Security - must be understood through regulatory discourses, including those of neoliberalism.

It is also interesting and important to note that the most important early advances in cyber technologies – especially relating to personal computing and

58 The Office of Cyber Security was set up in 2009. It is based in Cheltenham but comes under the remit of the Cabinet Office. For further information see the Cabinet Office webpage, available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/office-cyber-security-and-information-assurance-ocsia (Accessed 10 September 2011).
electronic networking - were inspired by the ‘Californian Ideology’, whereby the openness and accessibility of cyber space was held to represent an ‘electronic direct democracy, in which everyone would be able to express their opinions without fear of censorship’ (Dunn Cavelty, 2010: 159). According to Dunn Cavelty, however, the end of the cold war and the loss of ‘bipolar balance’ raised the spectre that cyber space, despite its ability to give states an ‘information edge’ (including a Revolution in Military Affairs), would be used by ‘malicious actors’ to gain asymmetric advantage. It was feared that ‘those likely to fail against the American war machine might instead plan to bring the USA to its knees by striking vital points at home: critical infrastructures’ (Dunn Cavelty, 2010: 159). In other words, the openness and accessibility that had been so attractive about the information revolution – its ability to exceed existing realities and governmentalities - had become a source of vulnerability and danger.

The CSS and NSS give insights into the paradoxical advantages and disadvantages of cyber flows, which as I argue above characterise the materialisation of biopolitical norms. For example, ninety per cent of high street purchases are transacted using wired and wireless communication; global trade relies on the ‘real-time nature of cyber space’ to co-ordinate complex, round-the-clock supply chains across different time zones; and critical national infrastructures such as utilities, food distribution, transport, the health service, and the financial system all rely on the internet. But whilst ‘interdependent, open and networked societies benefit greatly from the strengths and resilience that arise from information sharing, co-operation and efficiency’ - hence the government’s support for and protection of cyber space - ‘it is also the case that such societies present unique opportunities for people to cause harm’ (NSS 2009: 77). Elsewhere the NSS claims that the new cyber security regime:

… gives priority to ensuring that our people’s ability to do business, communicate, learn, and interact socially through the internet and other networked activities are secure, and that the risks inherent in our dependence on networks for the critical infrastructure that underpins all our lives are managed (2009: 30).

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For example, ‘hostile states, terrorists, and criminals, can all potentially use cyber space to undermine our interests’ (NSS 2009: 3). This exploitation of cyber flows in order to undermine the UK’s interests and cause harm can happen at the national level, through attacks on critical national infrastructures, as well as at the level of businesses and individuals (NSS 2009: 3). In this way, initiatives like the Office of Cyber Security, which provides ‘strategic direction’ and ‘coordinates action’ on cyber security on behalf of government, ‘international partners’ and ‘private sector partners’, must be understood precisely as a policy response licensed and made possible by broadening national security.  

3.5.3 Re-making the terrorist threat - Symbiosis and ‘Public opinion, culture and information’ as a threat domain

As everyone in this House knows, to succeed, those [counter-terror] measures will require not just military and security resources but more policing and intelligence, and an enhanced effort to win hearts and minds – Prime Minister Gordon Brown, 2007.  

Whilst the NSS can perhaps reasonably claim cyber space as a ‘new’ domain of national security, the same cannot be said of terrorism and insurgency. Yet a key part of the rematerialisation of terrorism within broadening national security takes place through performativities of interconnected open flows vis-à-vis the phenomena of violent insurgency. The NSS claims that ‘insurgencies in the last century were largely fought within the boundaries of single states (though not devoid of outside influence), and were rarely, if ever, linked to wider acts of terrorism’ (2009: 81). ‘Today’, it continues, ‘globalisation and the increasing dependence of societies on international financial information and communication networks ensure that grievances and agendas can pay little heed to geographical boundaries’ (NSS 2009: 81). As a result, terrorism and insurgency are ‘woven together’ through the ‘networked migration of ideas’, and the ‘unprecedented’ transfer of ‘money, tactics, 

and personnel’, so that ‘what began in Iraq as an insurgency’ (and not an invasion by coalition forces in 2003) ‘became a theatre in which Al Qa’ida sought to attack not only the Coalition but Iraqi forces and civilians too’ (NSS 2009: 81, emphasis added).

What is therefore referred to as the ‘symbiotic nature’ of terrorism and insurgency through flows of money, tactics, personnel, and ideas, licenses the ‘design of mutually supporting counter insurgency and counter terrorism strategies’ (NSS 2009: 81). The ‘core’ of these strategies aims ‘to resolve local issues and negate the grievances that feed terrorism’ (NSS 2009: 81). Gregory (2010) describes precisely such an approach being used by the US military strategy in Iraq. In 2007 David Kilcullen, Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to David Petraeus, then Commanding Officer of the multi-national force, argued that ‘insurgent violence was part of ‘an integrated politico-military strategy’ that could only be met by an integrated politico-military counter-strategy’ (Gregory, 2010: 75). This ‘integrated politico-military strategy’ is an old one - better known as ‘winning hearts and minds’. It emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in the context of ‘colonial’ wars in Vietnam, Ireland, and what was then Malaya (now Malaysia) to name a few, as a specific response to the difficulties encountered by military forces in separating out the ‘insurgents’ from the presumably peaceful local population, in order to defeat the former ‘on the battlefield’ (Mumford, 2011). The NSS, however, resignifies hearts and minds for the ‘information age’:

Almost every aspect of national security has an important information dimension. In the information age, the world is increasingly interconnected and information is instantaneous. The sphere of public opinion, culture and information is therefore an important domain in its own right. This has long been recognised in both the military and diplomatic arenas [and] the Government is adapting and extending this approach (NSS 2009: 14, emphasis added).

The policy responses licensed by winning hearts and minds for the ‘information age’ begin with the designation of ‘Public opinion, culture, and information’ (Poci) as a threat domain. The concept of the ‘threat domain’ is distinct both from ‘drivers of insecurity’ - which as I discussed in the previous chapter emerged as a performativity
of neoliberal geopolitics after the end of the cold war - and the more traditional
category of ‘threat actors’ (human or natural, state or non-state) (NSS 2009: 8-15).
In this way, broadening national security is also performed through what the NSS
terms ‘a key development’ in national security policy: the designation of ‘domains in
which threats can become apparent’, and ‘the environments in which threats may
become manifest’ (2009: 12, 32, emphasis added). It is not immediately clear, then,
what a threat domain is, beyond an umbrella term covering unknown threats about
which the only thing known is that they will become apparent and manifest, and they
must be dealt with. And this, I would argue is precisely the point: ‘in the modern age,
these domains are evolving rapidly and so our response, as elsewhere, needs to be
effective, fast, coordinated and adaptable’ (NSS 2009: 11, emphasis added). The
concept of the ‘threat domain’ therefore reiterates both the habitual theme of ‘a
changing world’, and the particular ‘pre-emptive’ policy response demonstrated by
for example horizon scanning.

The NSS describes three different types of threat domain, of which two are
familiar. First, the ‘hostile and destructive capabilities’ of conventional weapons,
including small arms and cluster munitions, and weapons of mass destruction known
by the ‘CBRN’ label – chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (NSS
environments, the air, and ‘emergent, technology driven domains like space and
cyber space’ (NSS 2009: 93). The third threat domain, however, so-called ‘domains
of influence’, are notably different because they are ‘areas of human activity which
are of fundamental importance to global stability’ (NSS 2009: 104, emphasis added).
In particular, the NSS identifies ‘Public opinion, culture and information’ (Poci) as a
threat domain as a means of assessing how the ‘information dimension’ of
globalisation relates to national security, how ‘debates around the globe… affect the
attitudes of people’, and ‘what drives the behaviour of individuals, groups and nations’
(2009: 104-5, emphasis added).

It is the case that the importance to national security of people’s attitudes and
behaviour has ‘long been recognised in both the military and diplomatic arenas’ (NSS
2009: 14). The NSS makes explicit these links in relation to the longstanding reliance
of military campaigns on the ‘support of public opinion’ and the ‘support of the
people amongst whom they are carried out’ (2009: 105). So, for example, in the
counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations that the UK Armed Forces are most likely to be involved in abroad, success ‘will depend less on battlefield success and more on shaping behaviours and gaining support for political change’ (NSS 2009: 42-3, emphasis added). In terms of international diplomacy, the NSS explains that ‘we continue to promote our values of freedom, tolerance, justice and human rights’ through international outreach programmes such as the British Council (2009: 14). Regarding terrorism, broadening national security ‘seeks to challenge the ideology that drives Al Qa’ida inspired violent extremism’ (NSS 2009: 78). ‘We can challenge’, it continues, ‘Al Qa’ida’s distorted interpretation of Islam, exposing its inaccuracies and shortcomings in order to reduce the support and motivation which Al Qa’ida and associated groups rely on’ (NSS 2009: 78).

But because of the impossibility of separating the flows used by terrorists and insurgent groups from those used by the good, interdependent and networked societies, and the good interacting peoples of the world, violent ideology must be challenged ‘at home’ too. In this way, broadening national security easily segues into countering terrorism under the CONTEST rubric: preventing people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism; challenging Al Qa’ida’s ideology; and addressing perceived grievances against western society (NSS 2009: 105). In this way, it should become clear that the CONTEST policies, including crowded places security, are part of the ‘military arena’, and that the reliance of military campaigns on public opinion includes that within the UK. ‘In our own communications we recognise the need to engage with the public on the counter-terrorism agenda; publishing the full CONTEST strategy this year was a key step in this direction (NSS 2009: 105).’62

Finally, the NSS also ‘recognises’ the importance to national security of ‘wider community cohesion’ vis-à-vis the information domain: or in other words, the cooption of British Muslims into the values of a supposedly homogenous British ‘community’ (2009: 106). ‘Since some communities and individuals can be suspicious of governments as a source of information’, the NSS explains, ‘we are finding credible voices within communities... to enable us to quickly and effectively distribute

62 The NSS also explains that under CONTEST’s purview, the government established a Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), staffed and directed by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), the FCO, and the Home Office. The purpose of RICU is to ‘communicate effectively to reduce the risk of terrorism’, primarily by ‘exposing the weaknesses of violent extremist ideologies and supporting credible alternatives’ (NSS 2009: 14).
the facts about our policies and rebut distortions’ (2009: 106). This is at the same
time an empty invitation and a veiled threat: the NSS makes surprisingly little
attempt to conceal the martial origins and rationale of the policy of securing public
support, and ultimately offers no alternative to those who do not want to be
‘rebutted’ in this way. Here, broadening national security and its attempts to bring
‘public opinion, culture and information’ into line reflects what Gregory (2010)
discussed as the ‘cultural turn’ inherent in biopolitical security. This is not only the
performing of binary divisions between ‘we’, ‘our’, and ‘us’ versus ‘British Muslims’,
but it is also made possible by performativities of an openness that is ultimately one
way: the ‘hermeneutic invitation that can never be reciprocated’ (Gregory, 2010: 82).
3.6 Conclusion

Broadening national security is materialised through a range of biopolitical performativities in addition to the geopolitical performativities of interconnection discussed in chapter 2. Indeed, performativities of global interconnection are characterised by the maximisation of good flows and the minimisation of bad flows, which represent the materialisation of political-economic liberal norms. The concept of biopolitical security should not therefore be used to conceptualise attempts to secure or control flows and populations, for these are the already-secured realities of liberal norms.

If biopolitical security mechanisms do not secure natural reality - because as the materialisation of liberal norms they are already ‘secured’ - they must have another function. In this chapter I argued that performativities of biopolitical security, including broadening national security, (attempt to) bring the excess of human life into line with liberal natural reality. If the ‘massifying’ performativities of populations make it difficult to identify and individualise threat, such as who is the insurgent and who is the non-combatant, or who uses the internet for lawful personal banking and who uses it to illegally transfer funds for extremist activity, the excess must be brought into line in other ways. Specifically, this excess is imagined in terms of certain human and cultural characteristics, so that ‘hearts and minds’ or its global age equivalent ‘public opinion, culture and information’, becomes that which is at stake in the monopoly of violence exercised through national security.

The point, then, is not that the threats which contemporary national security addresses are ‘new’ or ‘broadening’ as such – and this includes the terrorist threat. Rather that, understood as a set of biopolitical performativities, broadening national security materialises an ever-widening space of security. David Campbell (2007b: 131) recognises this when he discusses the biopolitical security of American oil policy and SUV driving in terms of ‘contact zones’ with everyday life. The ‘translocal borderlands of automobility’, he writes, ‘connect cultures of individual consumption with practices of global security through multiple sites of materialization and territorialisation at ‘home’ and ‘abroad’’ (2007b: 131). In the following chapter I

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63 In SMBD, Foucault comments that bio-power is ‘not individualizing but, if you like, massifying, that is directed not at man-as-body but man-as-species’ (p. 243).
explore my case study of crowded places security in order to further interrogate the ever-widening space and deepening contact zones of broadening national security.
Chapter 4  Crowded places security I -
Innocent and zero space
We must be insistently aware of how space can be made to hide consequences from us, how relations of power and discipline are inscribed into the apparent innocent spatiality of social life – Edward W. Soja.\(^6^4\)

Architecture – the discipline often assumes – is innocent, and therefore not an activity like that of other pirates of both Empire and counter-Empire. Yet it is typically considered to be a conservative profession, involved in fortifying the very worlds under discussion here. It even seeks the same political immunity – Keller Easterling.\(^6^5\)

In the previous chapters I considered how broadening national security rematerialises the terrorist threat through performativities of interconnection and open flows. In this chapter I turn my attention to a case study of one particular policy response licensed by these performativities: crowded places security in the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead. What are the spatial knowledges and imaginaries which make it possible to fight the war on terror in the UK high street? In other words, how do practices of crowded places security cite and reinscribe broadening national security in the UK’s visitor attractions, businesses, and public services?

Heeding Edward Soja’s warning, an engagement with these questions must once and for all depart from the ‘innocent spatiality’ that dominates analyses of the security practices of the war on terror in public space. But to question the innocent spatialities of crowded places also requires negotiating a shift from the broad-brush imaginative geographies I focused on in chapters 2 and 3, to the politicised imaginaries at work in specific crowded places like BALTIC. Thus, in the same way that taken-for-granted ‘global’ spatialities make possible the violence of broadening national security, so too Keller Easterling argues that politically conservative discourses – specifically those of neoliberalism - are cited and reinscribed by seemingly ‘innocent architecture’. The main questions I will address in this chapter,

\(^6^5\) 2005: 13.
then, are: what are these politically conservative discourses in BALTIC? How are they cited and reinscribed by security practices in BALTIC? And, what does this tell us about the discourses of crowded places security?

I begin in section 4.2 by considering how Easterling’s (2005) concept of the ‘spatial product’ is useful for identifying politically conservative discourses in otherwise ‘innocent’ public spaces – and how such a process is important when doing research on, and within, the latter. In this way, I argue that the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art is dominated by the ‘BALTIC story’: manufactured and interlocking narratives about the gallery’s origins and operations which are relentlessly churned out in a range of guidebooks and conceptual/intellectual texts, and performed throughout the architecture and organisation. Although these performativities, or in Easterling’s parlance ‘dispositions’, are very successful in dominating representations of BALTIC, they also provide many insights into the relations of power and discipline which, I will argue through the chapter, are cited and regenerated by security practices.

Next I move on to look at these security practices in more detail. Since opening in July 2002, security at BALTIC has been dominated by and defined through the ‘security conditions’ of government indemnity (see chapter 5) and the ‘normal security’ practices of a public building. In addition, since 2007 BALTIC has been increasingly involved in the crowded places security being rolled out to the high street businesses of north and south Tyneside. In section 4.3, I begin my analysis of security practices at BALTIC by illustrating how they depend on the emptying of space and everything being in its place, and how the ‘unanticipated spaces’ created by different installation artworks can create disruptions (Crary, 2003: 7). Because performativities of biopolitical security attempt to bring that which is not known in advance into line with an already-secured natural reality, this notion of strangeness, dislocation and ‘un-anticipation’ – what JJ Charlesworth describes as the interruption of difference in the ‘open circuitry of things’ (2008: 22) – is a key site for contestation and ‘disidentification’ (Butler, 1993: 2).

In section 4.4, I juxtapose the security emphasis on controlling space with the flexible spaces boasted about in the ‘BALTIC story’. The flexibility which is a key arrangement at BALTIC may appear to reiterate the interruptions made possible by

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66 Drawing on interviews with BALTIC Crew and senior staff.
installation art, but in this section I argue that it instead functions to reinscribe the authority of the modernist gallery - what artist and critic Brian O'Doherty (2000) critiqued as the ‘white cube’ gallery. In this way, and despite the potential of the artworks to disrupt security practices at BALTIC, the apparent tension between security practices of emptying out and the apparent freedom of art 'to take on its own life' in the modernist gallery is, in a very important sense, not a tension at all (McEvilley, 2000: 7). In section 4.5 I explore the ways in which performativities of space and security at BALTIC can both be considered as the materialisation of ‘zero space’: the construction of an empty, unchanging space as 'sympathetic magic' to 'promote unchanginess in the real world... to cast an appearance of eternality over the status quo' (McEvilley, 2000: 9). In this way, my main argument of the chapter is that the drive to empty or 'zero' space at BALTIC in the name of security also functions – perhaps primarily functions - to reproduce dominant political-economic discourses.

Finally, in section 4.6 I explore how zero space is reinscribed by practices of vigilance, or, in crowded places parlance, 'security awareness' (NaCTSO, 2007: 15). I also consider how the translation of visitors’ behaviour into 'normal' or 'suspicious' is made possible in relation to performativities of zero space.

This chapter's investigation of the spatial politics of crowded places security makes an important contribution to the critical geopolitics and security studies literatures in two main ways. First, it illustrates how important it is to move beyond analyses of security in public space in which security and space are wrongly positioned as separate, even conflicting, realities; or at least in which the reality of security may be constructed and contingent, but the reality of space is pre-existing and static – the proverbial blank slate. In contrast, my analysis argues that deeply politicised performativities of space make possible performativities of security, and the former must be taken into account when attempting to understand and contest the exclusions and violences of the war on terror in UK public space. Understanding this relationship is absolutely key, not only because it means that art galleries/visitor attractions make possible crowded places security, but also because the performativity of such spaces makes contestation not possible, or certainly more difficult.
Second, the chapter argues that crowded places security performs an ‘ideal space’ estranged from the demands of temporal and spatial situatedness: a ‘crowded’, busy, accessible space which is at the same time empty and bare of all potential security threats. In so doing, the space of crowded places security cites and regenerates the liberal status quo I discussed in chapters 2 and 3. This is a potent argument which goes a great distance, I think, towards an understanding of the spatial politics of contemporary security practices; not just those of crowded places, but also health and safety, civil contingencies, and valuable objects like artworks (see chapter 5).
4.2 BALTIC the spatial product

We are taught that corporations have a soul, which is the most terrifying news in the world – Deleuze.67

In their conceptualisation of a Butler-esque performativity of space, Nicky Gregson and Gillian Rose (2000) advocate moving beyond a narrow focus on performing bodies to space understood as ‘brought into being through performances and as a performative articulation of power’ (p. 434, emphasis added). Nonetheless, they focus mainly on the performativity of space by people – car boot sales vendors and customers, community arts workers and clients – so that other types of performative agency are considered only as far as they are part of this relationship. In my view, however, performativity becomes even more useful as a spatial heuristic if it incorporates Butler’s much later comments on the multiple agencies involved in performativity. ‘It is not simply that a subject performs a speech act’, she writes, ‘rather, a set of relations and practices are constantly renewed, and agency traverses human and non-human domains’ (2010: 150).

If architecture is not politically innocent - and not just in terms of the agendas of architects, but also the politicised arrangement of buildings and organisations - then the theory of performativity must be able to conceptualise not only how discourses become materialities, but also how materialities reiterate and reproduce regulatory norms in turn. Remember that Butler was very clear that the body and sex are materialised - given boundary and fixity - by the citation of regulatory norms. But her insights have seldom been applied to the ‘non-human’ materialities which are a necessary part of performative politics.

Second, Gregson and Rose’s argument that the performativity of space, like the performativity of identity is unstable, becomes somewhat problematic when applied to a largely static architecture and organisation like BALTIC, which celebrates its first decade in July 2012. It may indeed be possible for the community arts worker and car-boot sale vendor who are the subjects of Gregson and Rose’s research to perform space in ‘transitory and temporary’ ways (2000: 442). But this formula does

67 1992: 5.
not fit so comfortably with the arrangements at BALTIC, which emphasise the legacy and endurance of the building - and from that to the gallery itself.

The BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art is located in the former grain warehouse of Joseph Rank Ltd’s Baltic Flour Mills, which between 1950 and 1982 was a dual-purpose factory for the production of flour and animal feed. ‘The brick building we now know as BALTIC’, Andrew Guest explains in his BALTIC guidebook, was ‘only part of a large flour mill… that extended along the river [Tyne] to the east of the present building and away from the river to the south’ (2008: 4). The Baltic Flour Mills were designed in the 1930s by architects Gelder and Kitchen based in Hull, Yorkshire, and completed and ready for use in 1950 – ironically when most other industries in the Gateshead quayside area were closing down (Guest, 2008: 4; also Histon, 2006).

In 1982, four of the mill’s five buildings suffered the same fate by way of a serious fire in the complex. The fifth building, the distinctive yellow brick tower of the grain silo (and today’s BALTIC), only survived according to Guest because of its strength as a work of civil engineering. It could hold 22,000 tons of grain, and indeed for the next two years until 1984 it was used to store part of the European Economic Community’s (EEC) controversial grain mountain (Guest, 2008: 4-5). The stranded silo building was then the subject of plans for conversion into flats, but these fell through in the late 1980s. It is at this point that B.HERE, a BALTIC guidebook written by two staff members, takes up the story (Martin and Thomson, 2002). In 1992 the building was purchased by Gateshead Council as the site for its proposed new contemporary art centre. Two years later Dominic Williams of Ellis Williams Architects, London, was announced as the winner of the design competition and the ‘enabling works’ began in December 1998 (B.HERE: 32).

These works focused on clearing the 148 interior concrete silos, each measuring 2.5m x 2.5m², which fortified the already formidable exterior brick walls. Guest’s BALTIC guide provides a dramatic re-telling of how this ‘50-metre-high building designed to store grain’, was converted into a six-floor art centre (2008: 16). In particular, he recounts how the daring removal of the interior silos left the brick facades unsupported and vulnerable, so that a ‘special temporary 1,000-tonne steel

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68 Guest was the Director of Northern Architecture - the architecture centre for the north east of England - at the time he wrote this book.
69 The Assistant Curator and the Head of the Education and Public Programme.
frame was designed to wrap around and support the whole structure, its weight resting on the building’s original foundations’ (Guest, 2008: 16). Once this steel frame was in place, ‘all the new materials to create the new interior had to be craned in through the top of the building through this lattice frame’ (Guest, 2008: 16).

This discussion of the BALTIC building is intended to raise two important points that I will discuss in turn in this section. First, it introduces the ‘BALTIC story’: a number of manufactured and interweaving narratives which are continually reproduced in a range of guidebooks and conceptual/intellectual texts (including Guest’s book and B.HERE), and reproduced throughout the organisational structure. In this way, the conversion from the old industrial building to the new, modern, and technically sophisticated art gallery is important in establishing the authority of ‘BALTIC art’ and the ‘BALTIC centre’, which I discuss further in section 4.4.

Second, and following on, it highlights the need for an alternative account of the performativity of space beyond that offered by Gregson and Rose. This is not a simple case of the performativity of transitory versus static spaces, car-boot sales versus art galleries. Nor is it to claim that largely fixed architectures and organisations like BALTIC somehow ‘pre-exists’ their own performance; only that they do not, like car-boot sales, ‘depend for their very existence, for their bringing into being, on specific performances’ of promoters, marshals, vendors, and so on (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 442). Instead, the peculiar performativities of BALTIC that I have begun to allude to here - which bring together history, architecture, and, as I discuss below, retail business – demand, I think, a more canny awareness of what Easterling terms the collusive, persuasive, and aggressive constitution of space.

4.2.1 Introducing the ‘BALTIC story’

The ‘BALTIC story’ is a number of manufactured inter-locking narratives about the origins and operations of BALTIC, continually reproduced in a range of guidebooks and conceptual/intellectual texts and on sale in the BALTIC Shop or available for perusal in the well-stocked and open access Library & Archive. BALTIC has its own copyrighted typeface, which acts as a sophisticated and aesthetically
distinct form of branding on everything from the menus in the café to the floor guide on the interior wall of the visitor lifts. Alongside, and also through this typeface, the BALTIC story is reproduced throughout the building and organisational structure. You will notice BALTIC’s distinctive industrial aesthetic as soon as you enter the building: the entrance hall is framed with Cor-Ten steel with its layer of authentic ‘stabilised rust’, and you will read about it in the books (B.HERE: 39). Then you will see it everywhere: the steel-finished toilet doors, the iron girders used for the stairs.

I re-appropriated the term ‘BALTIC story’ from one of these books: BALTIC: The Art Factory and its description of BALTIC’s ‘time line’ as ‘not one story but many’ (Martin and Thomas, 2002: 97). ‘The twenty-year progress of BALTIC from disused industrial building to centre for contemporary art’, the book explains, ‘is only one part of the ‘story’ of the art history of the North East, and indeed, could not have taken place at all without those chapters that both preceded and unfolded concurrently around it’ (Martin and Thomas, 2002: 97). BALTIC, it concludes, has ‘not one story, but many’ (Martin and Thomas, 2002: 97).

BALTIC: The Art Factory, like many of these purportedly neutral BALTIC story texts, was written by staff members and published by BALTIC itself. I write purportedly neutral, because none of them – at least not in my readings – spoke in anything other than a detached third person, as if neither BALTIC the organisation nor BALTIC staff members had to offer up an account of themselves: they simply ‘were’. Indeed, this is flagrantly admitted to in the The Art Factory. ‘Looking back at the development of the BALTIC project over the years’, it opines, ‘it is difficult to pinpoint the precise moment of its genesis: perhaps because such a moment never, in fact, existed’ (Martin and Thomas, 2002: 97). Rather, the genesis of BALTIC is lost in the many histories of its locale. But the BALTIC story is more than just an abstract narrative – it is an embodied discourse, so that ‘doing’ in BALTIC, including by security practices, ‘cites already established formations of knowledge’ (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 437). Therefore it is important, I think, to understand something of the politics of the BALTIC story, and in particular, the political conservatism which Easterling argues enables and is reproduced by architectures and organisations.
4.2.2 The politics of the BALTIC story

But BALTIC is not just about art. BALTIC will be a place where people can come simply to hang out in the café, in the Riverside Restaurant or in the Rooftop Restaurant, to browse through the bookshop, or simply to sit in Baltic Square enjoying one of the most amazing views in the world.\(^70\) As Chairman, I am extremely excited about the way in which it will be an exemplary Pan-European demonstration of how people can connect at all sorts of levels with the visual arts – Alan J. Smith, BALTIC Chairman.\(^71\)

In the concept of the ‘spatial product’, Keller Easterling (2005) is no less committed to the performative politics of space than Gregson and Rose. Spatial products are the tourist resorts, information technology campuses, retail chains, golf courses, and global sea ports which although often treated as ‘banal or unresponsive’ by architects (and I would add many politics scholars), are nonetheless imbued with ‘myths, desires, and symbolic capital’ which make them densely political (Easterling, 2005: 1). ‘As lubricating agents of a market’, she writes, ‘spatial products are usually presumed to be innocent of involvement in the extreme spaces of war’ (2005: 3). ‘Yet even the most banal space’, she continues, ‘has been a military target, acting as an apparatus or a provocation of aggression’ (Easterling, 2000: 3). The idea that space can be, and indeed in many ways is, militarized is not original, and it is pursued with more attention elsewhere (Coward, 2008; Graham, 2010). Yet, in Easterling’s formulation the violent properties of space are not confined to its use and abuse by a state’s military, or even to an unfortunate fate as a military target. Instead spatial products are violent because they are the ‘lubricating agents of a market’; they are the ‘Teflon formulas of neoliberal enterprises’ (Easterling, 2005: 1).

As such, spatial products create ‘worlds’: domains of logic that naturalize certain narratives - particularly those which enable capital accumulation - and segregate others. They maintain their coherence Easterling writes, ‘by limiting and excluding information. Worlds aspire to be perfect utopias, singular domains attempting to coerce compliance and compatibility from anything foreign to them’ (2005: 5). Their borders ‘expand and exclude, extend and tighten’, thus ‘allowing the world to

\(^70\) Surely a gross exaggeration!
\(^71\) Martin and Thomas, 2002: 12.
increase in size but not necessarily in diversity or intelligence’ (Easterling, 2005: 5). I would argue then that although Easterling does not explicitly use Butler’s performativity schema, her concept of the spatial product captures (or attempts to capture) the spatial performativities – the citation and reinscription – of neoliberal norms.

So, how do spatial products cite and reinscribe global neoliberal discourses? Which are the telltale practices? Instead of, for example, negotiations between buyers and sellers at a car-boot sale, spatial products cite and reinscribe regulatory norms through what Easterling terms ‘dispositions’: ‘heavy information that becomes a nuanced, unexpressed subtext of action or practice’ (2005: 6). So while ‘spatial products perhaps resist semiotics’, they ‘offer other precise expressions of value and exchange stored in arrangement and presence’ (Easterling, 2005: 7). She gives two examples.

First, the ‘data and logistics’ which simplify messy human geographies through any combination of commercial formulas, marketing protocols, and digital capitalisms, thus ‘avoiding the political inconveniences of location’ (Easterling, 2005: 1). Spatial products ‘substitute spin, logistics, and management styles for considerations of location, geometry or enclosure’ (Easterling, 2005: 2). The agent of the spatial product, the ‘architect and salesman’, is the ‘orgman’, whose ‘tools are acronyms, stats, and datastreams’ (Easterling, 2005: 2). The orgman has a ‘frontier enthusiasm for this abstract territory. He derives a pioneering sense of creation from matching a labour cost, a time zone, and a desire to generate distinct forms of urban space’ (Easterling, 2005: 2, emphasis added). In this way, Guest’s description of the process of gutting out the old Baltic silo building and winching in the ‘new interior’, with its ground-breaking design solutions and ‘metres squared this’ and ‘how many tonnes that’, has more than a whiff of the orgman and spatial product about it.

I propose, then, two possible ways to interpret the BALTIC story as a source of empirical material for a research project. On the one hand, it is possible to dismiss its tone and bracket its claims as the PR patter of marketing materials – frustrating but unavoidable. I should qualify here that many, though not all, of these texts were written and published in the years immediately before and after BALTIC opened in July 2002, and their authors perhaps felt justified in proportion to the perceived
need to generate publicity for the new gallery. But on the other hand, if we are to take seriously the ways in which space makes security possible and contestation not possible, then it is crucial, I think, to pay close attention to how such spaces are performed and the discourses they cite and reinscribe.

Second, Easterling is also concerned with how the dispositions of the spatial product are performed through ‘elaborate costumes and stylistic affectations’ – ‘window dressing for a product that supposedly achieves neutrality by operating as a revenue envelope’ (2005: 1). In this way, the ‘innocent’ globally dispersed fairways of the Arnold Palmer Golf Management company are instead shown as greedy mouthpieces for an insincere form of (invariably western) ‘genteel family urbanism’, where ‘players walk the greens, merging with advertisements for banks and insurance companies’ (Easterling, 2005: 83). ‘The trappings of Arnold Palmer Golf’, Easterling continues, ‘are the rewards that the privileged give to themselves for bearing the responsibilities of leading a privileged life’: ‘air conditioners, tinkling ice, and grass being watered or mowed’; athletic gear with special performance characteristics designed by Hugo Boss, Tommy Hilfiger, or Ralph Lauren, featuring endorsements by Nike or the Ford Motor Company (Easterling, 2005: 82-3).

As a spatial product, then, we could point to BALTIC’s commercial attributes boasted about by the first chairman Alan Smith: the café, two restaurants, and bookshop. BALTIC Café Bar is positioned towards both the BALTIC visitor and the non-art viewing casual diner:

Whether it is a lunch date or for refreshment during a visit, BALTIC Café Bar is on hand. There is an extensive list of hot and cold drinks plus sandwiches, pastries and an array of mouth watering cakes.\footnote{See ‘BALTIC – Visit - Food & Drink’. Available at \url{http://www.balticmill.com/visit/Eating.php} (Accessed 22 July 2011).}

Or, for those who fancy something a little stronger, the Café Bar also targets the gastro pub market:

… with its fully licensed bar, outside seating for hot summer days overlooking Baltic Square and beyond, the Café Bar is a great place to go to meet friends, chill out and watch the world go by.\footnote{See ‘BALTIC – Visit - Food & Drink’. Available at \url{http://www.balticmill.com/visit/Eating.php} (Accessed 22 July 2011).}
The SIX restaurant on the uppermost sixth level (formerly the Rooftop Restaurant) claims to provide an even more enticing, upmarket location for lunch and dinner. According to BALTIC’s website it combines ‘breathtaking panoramic views’ with ‘great food... British modern cuisine featuring the very best ingredients’, with ‘great service and a great experience’. Lastly, BALTIC Shop stocks a wide range of artist products, ‘BALTIC stuff’ (specially manufactured BALTIC memorabilia including stationery, tea towels, and key rings), books, fashion, jewellery, gifts, and homewares. BALTIC Shop also has an online purchasing facility and is heavily marketed in the main ‘From BALTIC with love’ email newsletter, and its own ‘BALTIC Shop’ email newsletter.

The public is heavily encouraged to visit all of these facilities without the onus of venturing into the main art spaces – although in this sense BALTIC is typical rather than unique. The move towards the commercialisation of galleries separate from, or at least not mutually inclusive with, the viewing and appreciation of art has been much discussed and lamented (see for example Kuspit, 2004; Sylvester, 2008). But to infer that it is a particularly modern citation of neoliberal norms would be misleading. When the Tate Gallery at Millbank on the Thames (now Tate Britain) first opened in 1897, it explicitly offered a pleasant aesthetic environment alongside that of the art. Helen Searing (2004) in her Tate-commissioned book on Tate architecture, explains that visitors to the new Tate – the middle classes and, for the first time, the ‘proletariat’ – could choose from a range of pleasures (also Lorente, 1998; Moore and Ryan, 2000). They could admire ‘popular narrative pictures’; visit the fountain in the central hall complete with goldfish, or the ‘bookshop of sorts’ squeezed into the vestibule; or simply people-watch from the rotunda balcony (Searing, 2004: 36, 60).

Yet, the somewhat quaint features of Tate Britain in 1897, cannot compare with Tate the bona fide commercial powerhouse in 2011, which operates a franchise of four galleries (two in central London, and one each in Liverpool and St Ives, Cornwall); a catering company serving the four galleries’ many cafes, restaurants, and

73 Ibid.
functions; a large and successful publishing company; and Tate Online which features the Tate’s own TV channel, a Learn Online facility, and Tate Online Shop. Nor is it simply the case, as Searing puts it, that the art gallery has changed from a space performed through one discourse - ‘the conservation, display and contemplation of art’ – to many (2004: 19). Art galleries, she writes, are now ‘arbiter of value, engines of education, revitalisers of community, generators of economic wealth, sites of corporate philanthropy and reward, purveyors of entertainment, refreshment and consumer goods’ (Searing, 2004: 19).

But in my view, the relationship between art, galleries, and commercial and economic interests is more enduring, more difficult to untangle, and deserving of more nuanced analysis. To give just one example, the Victoria and Albert Museum in London opened in May 1852 with the original name of The Museum of Manufactures, and was explicitly positioned towards developing the relationship between the arts and the foremost obsession of Great Britain’s ruling classes: the international competitiveness of British industry (Searing, 2004: 17). Public art galleries have therefore always functioned as a form of ‘cultural capital’, and research into political phenomena at these organisations - including security – must pay attention to this enduring, albeit mutating, discourse (Searing, 2004: 36).

Finally, if spatial products cite and reinscribe neoliberal discourses, then what kind of disruptions are possible? How can spatial products subvert the discourses they are both enabled by and regenerative of? To begin, unlike Gregson and Rose who discuss in depth the ways in which their research subjects can and do speak back to power, Easterling does not explicitly engage with the issue of disrupting discourse. Instead, one of the most interesting, provocative, but perhaps disheartening, aspects of Easterling’s schema is her insistence that the performativity of spatial products embodies ‘a capacity for collusion, persuasion, and aggression’ (2005: 1). So whereas Gregson and Rose look to the ‘instability’ of performed spaces and the ‘creativity of everyday life’ (2000: 433), Easterling is deeply suspicious of what she terms ‘masquerades of openness’, at least when they are performed in conjunction with commercial organisations (2005: 115).

Drawing on Deleuze and Guatarri’s ‘The Smooth and the Striated’, Easterling writes that ‘capital is smooth and elastic to avoid detection or perpetrate a

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77 See the Tate website at [www.tate.org.uk](http://www.tate.org.uk).
confidence game’ (2005: 17). Analogously, ‘soft’ organisations purport to represent ‘a new organisational paradigm - not the corporate hierarchy but an open, fluid, feminized, connected structure’ (Easterling, 2005: 17). Furthermore, ‘soft executives are enlightened team players. They speak of synergy and feedback’ (Easterling, 2005: 17). Yet, she counters that the ‘illusion of an inclusive disposition masks an exclusive disposition… The goal of soft is to devour extrinsic information, remain intact, and avoid contradiction’ (Easterling, 2005: 17-18, emphasis in original). In this way, the spatial product and its dispositions of softness, openness, and flexibility is just as commercially driven and politically devious as the more easily recognisable ‘hard’ dispositions.

In this discussion of the ‘soft’ organisation with ‘exclusive dispositions’ I recognise some of the contradictions of the BALTIC story which I discuss in the rest of the chapter. So if thus far I have seemed to conflate – or at least imply no difference between - BALTIC the centre for art and the essentially commercial, profit-making ventures which Easterling explicitly positioned as spatial products, this is purposely done. My argument is that in order to understand crowded places security it is essential to take seriously the performativities of space where it occurs, and if performativities of space cite and reinscribe discourses, then we must also be sensitive to what these discourses could be. Hence my exploration and critique of the BALTIC story and BALTIC as a spatial product. It would however be misleading to suggest that neoliberal globalisation is the only, or even dominant, discourse at BALTIC. To begin to probe what these other discourses could be, I will turn to the security practices themselves.
When artworks arrive at BALTIC and before they go on public display – sometimes only moments before - they are photographed by the programme team as part of what was described to me in an interview as ‘health and safety and the normal security of the building’. Specifically, health and safety regulations require that, ‘so far as is reasonably practicable, every floor in a workplace and the surface of every traffic route shall be kept free from obstructions’ – that is, from ‘any article or substance which may cause a person to slip, trip or fall’. In this way, if a visitor or member of staff should trip and decide to take legal action, the photographs can be used as visual evidence that ‘reasonably practicable’ steps were taken to prevent obstructions.

The crowded places security advice for visitor attractions (hereafter CPAVA) published by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) in 2007 and available on their website, reiterates the importance of abiding health and safety laws as a first step in ensuring adequate protective security. In its section on ‘Physical security’, CPAVA advises owners and managers that ‘you will need to ensure that all necessary regulations are met, such as local planning permission, building consents, health and safety and fire prevention requirements’ (p. 15). And to drive home the point that protective security against terrorism can in many cases dovetail with ‘normal security’, CPAVA also warns that ‘criminal prosecution and heavy penalties under health and safety laws… are a real possibility in the wake of a terrorist incident, particularly if it emerges that core standards and statutory duties have not been met’ (p. 5).

Crowded places security also reiterates the security discourse of health and safety through an emphasis on ‘good housekeeping’. For example, workplace fire regulations discuss the importance of good housekeeping to reduce specific ‘fire risks’ (materials which can go on fire), and to keep emergency exits unobstructed. CPAVA foregrounds good housekeeping because it ‘improves the ambience of your

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78 The programme team includes the curator, the technical manager, and the exhibition technicians.
visitor attraction’, and ‘reduces the opportunity for placing suspicious items or bags’ (p. 9). Measures include using a clear bag for waste disposal (‘as it provides an easier opportunity for staff to conduct an initial examination for suspicious items’); ‘avoid[ing] the use of litter bins around the attraction if possible’ (while ensuring there is ‘additional and prompt cleaning’); and keeping all public and communal areas clean and tidy, such as exits, entrances, reception areas, stairs, halls, lavatories, and washrooms, as well as back of house service corridors and yards (CPAVA: 19).

Likewise, all vegetation and trees should be pruned back, especially at entrances, as this will ‘assist in surveillance and prevent concealment of any packages’ (CPAVA: 19). In an intriguingly absurd passage, the Protecting Crowded Places: Design and Technical Issues (PCP) publication discusses the use of trees in counter-terrorism. Trees of ‘sufficient girth and rooting can be used as a vehicle security barrier’, PCP explains, as long as their ‘limbs do not provide an easy climbing aid close to a perimeter’, and foliage does not ‘obscure sight lines for guard force surveillance’ (p. 27). Ultimately, however, they are not considered a reliable counter-terrorism practice, ‘due to the inability to grow sufficient trees close enough to each other to deny vehicle access between them’ (PCP: 27).

Good housekeeping emphasises how crowded places security relies on a control of space facilitated by the provision of ‘sight lines’ for surveillance: seeing through materials, for example rubbish bags, around materials, for example vegetation and trees, and seeing no materials at all, for example removing litter bins. CPAVA also stresses the importance of ‘ensur[ing] that everything has a place and is returned to that place’ (p. 19, emphasis added). Crowded places security can therefore be conceptualised as a performativity of clearing out space which materialises a particular kind of secured ‘order’.

Performativities of clearing out space are very much in evidence at BALTIC. What BALTIC staff term their ‘clear floor policy’ is maintained by banning bins in the building (except small slot bins in the toilets), and by not allowing visitors to bring large bags into the art spaces. Instead, BALTIC provides lockers in a small hallway to the left of the front reception desk, which are ‘checked and cleared every night’. As a result, BALTIC is ‘quite a big building, [but] quite an empty building if that makes sense… it is quite an easy building to clear each night’ (emphasis added).
Yet the materialisation of a secured order at BALTIC - unobstructed floors with everything in its place, prompt cleaning, cleared lockers and an 'empty building' - are undermined by the business of the gallery itself: the public display of artworks. Staff interviewees described an incident which seems to have become a sort of BALTIC legend, in which a 'suspicious package' appeared in The Hoerengracht (1983-88), a life-size walk-through recreation of Amsterdam’s Red Light District which was part of an exhibition of works by artists Edward and Nancy Kienholz in summer 2005 (see figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 Kienholz’s The Hoerengracht (1983-88), with bike rack in the bottom left corner.81

This is what happened:

… it had an Amsterdam street set-up so you could walk in between buildings and there was the actual bike racks, that very authentic look – I don’t know if they were the actual ones from Amsterdam – kind of all built into the scene,

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and there was just like this carrier bag tied up and shoved in one of the bike wheels, [in the] spokes.

However, using the photographs taken by the programme team, staff were able to verify that the carrier bag (which contained a plastic box) was a legitimate part of the installation.

In a much less dramatic example, American artist Sarah Sze’s Tilting Planet exhibit at BALTIC in April–August 2009, was a sculptural installation ‘cobbled together out of disposable items such as water bottles, drawing pins, paper, salt, string, lamps, matchsticks and wires’ (see figures 4.2 and 4.3).  

Figure 4.2 Sarah Sze’s Tilting Planet installation, taking up the whole of BALTIC’s Level 4 art space.

So here, in contrast to the recursive performativities of a secured order based on emptiness, ‘Sze’s is an art of additions, of one thing being added to and playing off the

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next. In antithesis to the attempt to bend or curtail the organic life of vegetation and trees to security, figure 4.3 shows how Sze’s ‘syntax of stuff’ takes over the whole space of BALTIC’s Level 4, ‘moulding themselves into spaces’ and ‘spreading ivy-like through the gallery.’

Similarly problematic for performativities of secured order was Tomás Saraceno’s 14 Billions (Working Title) exhibit in July–October 2010. It was a large scale model of a black widow spider’s web made out of 8000 black strings and elastic cords, and 23,000 individually tied knots (see figure 4.4). When I visited this installation only three visitors were allowed into the space at any one time so that the BALTIC Crew member on duty could closely monitor interaction between artwork and viewer.

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85 Ibid.
According to the exhibit guide, ‘scientists have used spiders’ webs when describing the early origin and structure of the Universe’, and the title *14 Billions* refers to the Universe’s approximate known age in years. By making these links between the universe, spiders’ webs, and the space of the contemporary gallery, and how each either spins out scale (from the spider’s web to the universe) or squeezes scale (from the universe to the gallery), Saraceno is commenting on the effort that goes into materialising space - what Edward Said referred to as ‘willed human work’ (2003: 7). In the case of crowded places security, and as I discuss more below, this is a substantial effort to materialise cleared out and rationalised spaces, whilst at the same time the objective of these spaces is precisely to attract visitors to visitor attractions or to be busy for business. As an alternative to these kinds of onerous efforts, Saraceno’s work is purposely utopian: ‘he challenges our ideas about the

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89 Ibid.
stability of the built environment and the structure of urban environments’, in order to explore ‘possible visions of a better world’.90

This drawing in of the viewer to the performativities of space carried out by Tilting Planet and 14 Billions, explains why floor staff in BALTIC – or the BALTIC Crew as they are known - are much more active than staff in other galleries, something remarked upon during an interview. BALTIC Crew are ‘not security guards’, I was told, ‘they’re there to interact with the public and communicate with them’, but:

… quite a few galleries you go to, I’ve just recently been to one and it’s so different when you go round them, the one where I was in Paris, there they are sat in their chairs in the corners, sitting at Tate Modern, Tate Britain. Here, staff will approach you, talk to you, and go through and talk to you about the artworks, so they are very engaging with the public.

But despite this engagement with the public, the BALTIC Crew perform a particular role in mediation between the subversive performativities of the artworks and the discourses of the status quo: health and safety and crowded places security.

These insistent challenges to the materialisation of secured order through health and safety and crowded places security are perennial and unavoidable at BALTIC because of the particular art it showcases. Contemporary art, according to Jonathan Crary (2003), responds to the particular conditions of advanced capitalist industrialisation. In contrast to art after the Renaissance, in which artists tended to ‘critically engage with the experience of human perception’, the ‘last 125 years have seen a dramatic transfer of human capabilities to machines, especially capabilities involving vision, thought and memory’ (Crary, 2003: 6).

This emergence and embedding of technological culture has also led, Crary argues, to a dislocation from locale. ‘There is more and more disconnection of economic circulation from physical space’, he argues, ‘as abstract forms of wealth have a mobility and a fluidity unrelated to what we used to think of as location’ (Crary, 2003: 8). This chimes with my discussion in chapter 3 of the biopolitical security arguments that contemporary liberal discourses are materialised as

90 Ibid.
contingent and complex – thus highly abstracted - ways of living, and Crary’s counter-argument that in response we should engage with the ‘strange kind of dislocations and associations that now constitute subjective reality’ (2003: 8). Installation art like that of Sarah Sze and Tomás Saraceno takes up this injunction by, to put it crudely, re-materialising the ‘spaceless electronic worlds’ that Crary identifies (2003: 7). It provides a ‘theatrical’ and ‘immersive’ environment ‘into which the viewer physically enters’, and it therefore distinguishes itself from other artistic mediums such as painting, sculpture, photography, and video (although it can make use of them), because it ‘addresses the viewer directly as a literal presence in the space’ (Bishop, 2005: 6). Rather than being a pair of disembodied eyes, the viewer becomes embodied (Bishop, 2005: 6) (also Serota, 1996). In this way, installation art provokes and demands a sensory and indeed sensual engagement between artwork and viewer, which directly challenges the empty, rationalised, secured order of health and safety and crowded places policy. It also speaks back to what Jenny Edkins identified as the empty abstractions of the biopolitical security literature, exemplified by Dillon’s claim that the ‘emergent eventual character of living things’ now characterises contemporary ways of living (2007a: 16).

Yet tactility cannot be unquestioningly regarded as a form of liberation from power. William Bogard (2007), for example, describes the forms of ‘tactile control’ emerging as part of contemporary biopolitical societies. Like installation art, tactile control aims to simulate the sense of touch, but the ‘larger goal is to create ‘immersive’ environments that synthesize visual, auditory, and olfactory messages with tactile or vibratory information, to create so-called ‘multi-media’ interfaces that produce ‘complete’ sensory experiences’ (Bogard, 2007: 4). He also notes Marshall McLuhan’s argument that ‘information media are tactile systems. They demand not just the eyes and ears of the viewer but the intensive involvement of the body’ (2007: 4). Inverting McLuhan’s famous aphorism ‘the medium is the message’, Bogard claims that the ‘medium is not just the message but the massage, a technology of the flesh’ (2007: 4, emphasis in original).

Sometimes, however, installation artworks can be disconcertingly sparse, and can almost look like the empty secured order strived for by security practices. Turner Prize-winning artist Steve McQueen’s two installations at BALTIC in autumn 2008, Running Thunder and Pursuit, are good examples of this. Running Thunder
consisted of a film of a decomposing horse projected onto the wall of a small and darkened room, with a bench for viewing the only other object in the space. *Pursuit* was a large and utterly pitch-black space, a ‘theatre of war’,91 with only the random projection of black and white images - ‘molecular particles’ – around the walls, and a discordant soundtrack of unidentified deep reverberating sounds. In performativity terms, McQueen’s works sought to subvert or disidentify with contemporary discourses around war and death, in particular *indifference* to war in other places and the death of others, by reciting and subverting their various moods and dynamics – darkness, fear, and decay. ‘In shadowing these associations’, the exhibit guide explained, ‘the catastrophe to which the works themselves seem to allude is… the dissociation of mediated images from the experience of daily life’.92 In important ways, all of these installations – Sarah Sze’s organic life-like sculptures, Tomás Saraceno’s modelling of the universe as a spider’s web, and McQueen’s references to hidden violences in inner and outer spaces - illustrate that performativities of space are not contiguous with the sense of enclosure within four walls. So although BALTIC may be a static architecture, at the same time it does not have the exclusive rights to the articulation of space within its four walls. As I discuss in the next section, this is a key factor in understanding the politics of security in the art gallery.

To sum up, crowded places security can be conceptualised as a performativity of clearing out space which materialises a particular kind of emptied and rationalised, but most of all secured, order. The important implication arising from this materialisation of secured order is that it blurs the line between what was previously the ‘normal’ security of health and safety and public buildings, and the new counter-terror regime of crowded places security. In this way, objects which were previously problematic in terms of the obstruction of floors, now also become potential terrorist bombs. In a more absurd example, trees become a security issue because they can conceal objects and can even be used as an ‘easy climbing aid’. As I discuss in section 4.6, this blurring becomes especially problematic when it is no longer objects but *people* which are rendered ‘suspicious’ by virtue of a very often valid presence within the meshes of counter-terror regimes. In contrast, the various

92 Ibid.
installation artworks posit the legitimacy of surprise, abundance, and sensuality within performativities of an emptied and rationalised secured order.
4.4 Flexible space – Establishing the authority of the ‘white cube’

gallery

If the performativities of the installation artworks are important in speaking back to the emptied and rationalised order of crowded places security, it becomes important to understand the ways in which they are enabled by another dominant performativity at BALTIC: the flexible art gallery. Officially, BALTIC is neither a gallery nor a museum of art, but instead a ‘centre for contemporary art’. For those who produce and use these labels, like BALTIC’s founding Director Sune Nordgren (1998-2003), they have precise meanings and implications – in particular, as I discuss in this section, they reproduce particular authoritative types of space.

The label of ‘centre’ rather than gallery or museum distinguishes between the contemporary art shown at BALTIC (including installation) and other, older genres: ‘classical’ and ‘modern’ in that order. These genres in turn correspond to very different performativities of space. Classical art buildings appear imposing and static, to the contemporary eye at least. Helen Searing explains that they were typically built in an architectural language of ancient Greek and Roman, and Renaissance features, in order to communicate their status as ‘elevated sanctuaries of accepted masterpieces’ (2004: 18-19). Their interiors were organised as ‘symmetrical compositions with deliberated orchestrated circulation patterns’; the appropriate response, it was felt, to ‘exalted’ collections which rarely changed (Searing, 2004: 18).

At a BALTIC International Seminar held in April 2000 (hereafter B.READ), which functioned as a sort of art debate/ publicity before the official opening in July 2002, Tuula Arkio, then Director of Kiasma Museum of Contemporary Art in Helsinki, Finland, noted that classical art buildings were ‘completely closed’, and had ‘a huge staircase so that when you come in you feel that you are small, you do not know what is waiting for you when you go up into the galleries’ (Martin and Nordgren, 2001: 39). In contrast, Kiasma, which opened to the public four years before BALTIC in May 1998, was built in Steven Koll’s ‘phenomenological’ style of architecture which is about the ‘feeling that you get in the building, the movement and what you feel in your own body’ (B.READ: 38, emphasis added). So for example, Kiasma’s western façade is made entirely of glass, and is thus ‘very open’ (B.READ:
39). ‘It was important’, Arkio explained, ‘that people could see what is happening inside the building’ (B.READ: 39). Kiasma’s commitment to openness extends to the positioning of a ‘free zone’ on its ground floor: people can use the gallery café and shop without having to pay the €10 fee for the rest of the building.93 In these ways, Arkio claimed that the aim of Kiasma was to ‘reshape the museum concept… we wanted to be active, vital and pluralistic in all our operation [sic] and we also wanted to emphasise the idea that the museum is not just a physical space, its also a conceptual space’ (B.READ: 39, emphasis added).

The idea of the gallery as a space performed through art, rather than as an enclosure in which art was simply displayed, emerged after the second world war and in particular through the work of the German architect Ludwig Mies van der Rohe. Mies’ Neue Nationalgalerie, which opened in West Berlin in 1968, is held as the paradigmatic example of the conceptual gallery (see figure 4.5).

![Figure 4.5 Ludwig Mies van der Rohe’s Neue Nationalgalerie (1962-8) in Berlin with its ‘undifferentiated universal space’.](http://www.kiasma.fi/kiasma_en)

The Neue Nationalgalerie was designed to materialise Mies’ ‘motto of ‘beinahe Nichts”, which Searing translates as ‘almost nothing’ (2004: 20). It was a square glass

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93 The €10 fee was correct as of 14 July 2011. Information available on the Kiasma homepage http://www.kiasma.fi/kiasma_en.

pavilion with two steel supports on each wall holding up a continuous plate roof (Searing, 2004: 20). There are no rooms, partitions or features inside to break up the open, continuous space. ‘At the time’, Searing continues, ‘many critics argued that such box-like volumes of undifferentiated ‘universal spaces’ best suited the museum programme’ (2004: 20, emphasis added).

The notion of a ‘undifferentiated universal space’ for art in turn cites and reinscribes claims about the transcendent experience of art. For example, Searing’s almost breathless claim that the public art gallery became a substitute for the ‘elements of awe and ritual’ previously fulfilled by religious worship, and that ‘just as the architecture of temples and cathedrals was integral to the liturgy, so the museum building makes an indispensable contribution to the experiences on offer’ (2004: 14) (also Lorente, 1998). Yet Frascina and Harris (1992) refer warily to art’s authoritative position as an ‘aesthetic experience’, which like religion is assumed to act as ‘a necessarily transcendent ‘other’ to everyday life’ (p. 11). To the authority of art’s transcendent and, moreover, consensual universal values, the contributions to Frascina and Harris’ anthology assert differences of class, gender, and race (also Bradley and Esche, 2007).

The idea of the art gallery as a universal space was, however, found wanting. Searing explains how in the 1960s concerns grew about how its ‘amorphousness and lack of direction’ impacted upon the aesthetic and educational functions of the art gallery: ‘visitors were sometimes puzzled as to where and how to proceed, and traditional works of art often seemed swallowed up in the undefined space’ (2004: 21). Consequently, architects and curators, influenced in particular by Louis Kahn’s reintroduction of symmetry and hierarchy into gallery and museum space – his concept of the ‘society of rooms’ – began to favour the return of ‘distinctive galleries while maintaining freedom of circulation and options for recurrent reconfiguration according to curatorial needs’ (Searing, 2004: 125, 21, emphasis added).

Contemporary art spaces, then, heed the authority of a different kind of spatial organisation. ‘I deliberately do not say ‘museum’’, Sune Norgdren explained of BALTIC in 2000, ‘and I deliberately do not say ‘gallery’ for the art spaces, because I want these spaces to be flexible’ (B.READ: 28, emphasis added). So BALTIC does not have a permanent art collection, but instead, in the words of the BALTIC story, ‘a dynamic, innovative and experimental artistic programme made up of artists’
residencies’ (B.HERE: 14). This ‘dynamic, experimental’ programme depends in turn on the spatial flexibility that was ‘built in’ to the new gallery. After the gutting out of the old silo building described above, a new flexible interior was put in, beginning with four main floor plates which Guest describes once again in an orgman-like manner:

The four new principal floors were formed from post-tensioned beams cast in situ, tied to the 300mm stubs left over at 2.5 metre centres from where the grain silos connected to the side walls. Additional support for the long floor spans was provided by rows of pillars set out 2.5 metres from the side walls (also following the original grid of silos), the two side aisles that they formed providing the logical route for the main services to the new spaces. The floor can support six-tonne point loadings (i.e. six tonnes at any one particular point) (2008: 16).

In between these four principal floors, temporary ‘mezzanine’ levels were constructed: what Guest describes as ‘intermediary floors of lightweight, non-structural and removable steelwork’, rather like meccano (2008: 9). ‘The whole idea behind this’, the architect Dominic Williams explained at the BALTIC International Seminar, ‘is that between floors there is flexibility, so that you can build the mezzanines in steel frame in order to strip them down’ (B.READ: 14). Likewise with the interior walls and ceilings, which are constructed from panels that can be added or removed according to the different needs of the space. This is particularly the case with the smaller space at the front of Level 2. Installations are frequently shown here, but must be arranged in such a way as to allow access to the ‘Quay’ education and play area towards the rear. As Quay’s most typical users are children of school age, the exhibits in this area must also be ‘child friendly’.

This performativity of flexible space extends even into BALTIC’s back of house physical plant, and it is flourishes like this – going the extra mile, as it were - which are given particular prominence in the BALTIC story. Guest describes how beyond the ground level art space, behind a (predictably flexible) removeable partition, are ‘artists’ studios, workshops, [and] exhibition storage’, as well as the ‘loading area where full-size trucks can drive in and off-load directly into the building’ (2008: 26).
The idea is that trucks can off-load more or less into the two vast ‘arts lifts’. Five metres high with two metres squared volume and a load bearing capacity of ten tonnes, B.HERE informs readers the lifts can be used ‘to put a Sherman Tank on the 4th Floor!’ (p. 37). Also behind the partition, though Guest does not mention it, is the security office where personnel watch the bank of screens hooked up to BALTIC’s 44 closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras (see chapter 5).

Alongside, then, the cleared out order of security practices and the ‘unanticipated’ spaces of the installations, BALTIC is also performed through the flexible arrangements of walls and floors, and, moreover, of imagination which are appropriate to a conceptual art gallery. The installations drive this flexibly at the same time as they are made possible by it: BALTIC’s ‘dynamic, innovative, and experimental’ artworks require a correspondingly dynamic space. Yet, as a consequence of this mutually constitutive relationship, perhaps the artworks concede some of their potential for ‘disidentification’? (Butler, 1993).

At this point, it may seem that security practices at BALTIC - which effect a control or locking-down of space through emptying and rationalisation - must be in tension with its multiple flexible dispositions as a conceptual art space. In my view, however, this is not the case. Certainly, the latter are significant; extending beyond the art spaces not only into the back of house plant and the very construction of the renovated building itself, but also into the books and narratives of the BALTIC story. Indeed, the ways in which the BALTIC story reiterates this notion of flexible dispositions is particularly telling; for if the installations’ themes illustrate that their performativities of space are not contiguous with enclosure within BALTIC’s four walls, then the BALTIC story illustrates that the four walls of BALTIC need not even be contiguous with its own ‘sense of self’. For BALTIC’s performativities of flexibility are neither as flexible nor as different from those of security as the BALTIC story would suggest, and as I now discuss.

The consistent and insistent performativity of flexibility at BALTIC is far from accidental or indeed obvious. Instead, it points to the authority of the modernist gallery. In a set of three seminal essays published in the magazine Artforum in 1976 and reprinted in 2000, artist and writer Brian O’Doherty unleashed a scathing critique of the postwar and predominantly western modernist art gallery which he referred to as the ‘white cube’. These essays confronted the ‘assumptions on which
the modern commercial and museum gallery were based’, in particular, the ‘complex and sophisticated relationship between economics, social context, and aesthetics as represented in the gallery space and system (O’Doherty, 2000: inside front cover, emphasis added).

O’Doherty contrasts the modernist white cube with the nineteenth century Salon gallery, demonstrated by Samuel Morse’s painting Exhibition Gallery at the Louvre, 1832-33 (see figure 4.6). The Salon, O’Doherty explains, ‘implicitly defines

![Figure 4.6 Samuel Morse’s Exhibition Gallery at the Louvre painting, 1832-33.](http://faculty.washington.edu/dillon/Morse_Gallery/) (Accessed 5 August 2011).


95 Taken from http://faculty.washington.edu/dillon/Morse_Gallery/ (Accessed 5 August 2011).
what a gallery is, a definition appropriate for the esthetics of the period': specifically, ‘a gallery is a place with a wall, which is covered with a wall of pictures’ (2000: 15). In this sense, Morse’s painting depicts a scene which is ‘upsetting to the modern eye: masterpieces as wallpaper’ (O’Doherty, 2000: 16). The rationale for this arrangement was that ‘each picture was seen as a self-contained entity’, separated from each other by a heavy frame and the unified perspective contained within the painting (O’Doherty, 2000: 16). Space in the nineteenth century Salon was ‘discontinuous and categorizable, just as the houses in which these pictures hung had different rooms for different functions’ (O’Doherty, 2000: 16). As Foucault has already argued in 1970’s The Order of Things, the nineteenth century mind was ‘taxonomic’, and its eye ‘recognized hierarchies of genre and the authority of the frame’ (O’Doherty, 2000: 16).

In contrast, in the postwar white cube, wall, floor, and ceiling melt into one, demonstrated by BALTIC’s Level 4 art space in figure 4.7. The gallery, O’Doherty explains, was ‘filled with consciousness. Its walls became ground, its floor a pedestal, its corners vortices, its ceiling a frozen sky’ (2000: 20). Rather than the heavy picture frame which indicated that ‘art’ was located within its parameters, the white cube itself became the signifier. According to Thomas McEvilley, who wrote the introduction to the reprinted essays, art ‘stepped once and for all outside the frame of the painting and made the gallery space itself the primary material to be altered by art’ (2000: 10). For this reason, in the white cube art was not only ‘what was deposited therein’, but also ‘all impediments except ‘art” had to be removed; so that ‘once completed by the withdrawal of all apparent content’, the white cube becomes ‘a zero space, infinitely mutable’ (O’Doherty, 2000: 87). ‘Is the empty gallery’, O’Doherty asks, ‘modernism’s greatest invention?’ (2000: 87, emphasis added).

In O’Doherty’s reading, performativities of space at the white cube gallery do not reiterate and materialise ‘infinitely mutable’ space as an innocent backdrop to new and emerging genres of art, such as collage and installation. Zero space is a discourse – in O’Doherty’s view, a specifically modernist discourse - by which through a process of ‘productive constraint’ certain practices, dispositions, and arrangements are made possible (Butler, 1993: x). It is in relation to this discourse of zero space, then, that I argue both performativities of space and performativities of security at BALTIC must be understood.
4.5 BALTIC the neo-white cube and the politics of ‘zero space’

... galleries are in the paradoxical position of editing the products that extend consciousness, and so contribute, in a liberal way, to the necessary anesthesia of the masses – which goes under the guise of entertainment, in turn the laissez-faire product of leisure – Brian O’Doherty.  

Although in his guidebook, Guest (2008: 14-15) claims that BALTIC has made ‘a conscious attempt to avoid creating spaces that would be the classic, bland ‘white cubes’ so beloved of the contemporary art gallery’, it nonetheless apes them in many ways (see figure 4.8).

![Image](image_url)

**Figure 4.8 BALTIC’s neo-white cube art space on Level 4.**

For the white cube has its own ‘rigorous laws’ which reiterate modernism’s ‘laws of progress’, as O’Doherty explains:

> The outside world must not come in, so windows are usually sealed off. Walls are painted white. The ceiling becomes the source of light. The wooden floor is polished so that you click along clinically... The art is free, as the saying used to go, ‘to take on its own life’ (2000: 13,15).

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97 2000: 90.
In BALTIC’s art spaces, the walls are also painted white, the ceiling is the only source of natural light (for Level 4 – the other art spaces have no natural light source), and it has a wooden floor. BALTIC is, then, a neo-white cube.

The white cube – or in BALTIC’s case, the neo-white cube - is a ‘highly controlled context’ (McEvilley, 2000: 7). Complying with certain ‘laws’ - white walls, no windows, wood floors – the white cube materialises a form of control which is spatial, but more importantly McEvilley and O’Doherty argue, is also a form of social control. The white cube, not unlike a religious building, is designed to eliminate awareness of time and place, wherein the artworks are ‘like religious verities… untouched by time and its vicissitudes’ (McEvilley, 2000: 7). This is the space of ‘eternal display’: ‘a kind of non-space, ultra-space, or ideal space where the surrounding matrix of space-time is symbolically annulled’ (McEvilley, 2000: 8). But the space of ‘eternal display’ is at the same time a political manoeuvre:

The eternity suggested in our exhibition spaces is ostensibly that of artistic posterity, of undying beauty, of the masterpiece. But in fact… by suggesting eternal ratification of a certain sensibility, the white cube suggests the eternal ratification of the claims of the caste or group sharing that sensibility. As a ritual place of meeting for members of that caste or group, it censors out the world of social variation, promoting a sense of the sole reality of its own point of view and, consequently, its endurance or eternal rightness (McEvilley, 2000: 9).

The form of control in the white cube is not just then a problem for curators to mediate and for artists to circumvent and subvert, for it reproduces and reaffirms the ‘political interests of a class or ruling group’ – specifically, O’Doherty claims, the ‘liberal way’ - ‘attempting to consolidate its grip on power by seeking ratification from eternity’ (McEvilley, 2000: 8). The performativities of zero space which

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And not just any wood floor. They are made from 200-year old swedish pine trees grown north of the polar circle, and for every tree felled, another was planted (B.HERE: 39). The wooden flooring, Guest explains, gives ‘an appropriate natural and workshop feel’, and was untreated ‘so that the floors could wear honestly with age’ (2008: 19, emphasis added). At the time, Director Sune Nordgren claimed that the mantra for the building, inside and out, was ‘truth to materials… nothing is painted, nothing is covered’ (Guest, 2008: 19). This ‘truth to materials’, Nordgren wrote elsewhere, is the ‘same attitude that I think should run through the whole experience of BALTIC’ (B.HERE: 39).
materialise this ‘grip on power’ through ritualized repetition are also what McEvilley terms ‘a kind of sympathetic magic’: ‘an attempt to obtain something by ritually presenting something else that is in some way like the thing that is desired’ (McEvilley, 2000: 9). ‘The construction of a supposedly unchanging space’ is therefore ‘sympathetic magic to promote unchanginess in the real or non-ritual world; it is an attempt to cast an appearance of eternality over the status quo in terms of social values’ (McEvilley, 2000: 9).

Security practices at BALTIC, as performativities of zero space, attempt to remove all ambiguities within space. This process of emptying space is also a process of social censorship which is both made possible by and reaffirms liberal discourses, which promote the ‘sole reality’ of one particular point of view and its ‘eternal rightness’, rather than the desire to save lives. In this way, the space of crowded places security can also, I think, be considered as an ‘ideal space’. ‘Crowded places’, the Working Together to Protect Crowded Places document explains, ‘are locations frequented by the public, which are judged to be possible terrorist targets by virtue of their crowd density’ (WTP: 7, emphasis added). The design advice for crowded places in PCP details case studies of a ‘busy regional shopping centre’, a ‘large busy railway station’, and a sports stadium which, due to its success in protective security, becomes not more zero-ed but even busier as a ‘favoured venue for high profile business conferences’ (pp. 34-5, emphasis added). While the recipients of crowded places security practices are no doubt ‘real’ places, the space of crowded places security itself is an ideal space to the extent that it is only secure when it is cleared out and ordered, even though such a state of emptiness and stasis would undermine the claims to vulnerability to terrorist attack – accessibility, availability, and ‘economic/ political impact’ - in the first place (Home Office, 2010a: 3).

Returning to Sarah Sze’s Tilting Planet at BALTIC, the exhibition guide claims that its ‘impulsive… jumble of colourful components’ would ‘amount to nothing if its combination of architecture and objects did not attain a rhythmic order’ (emphasis added). 100 ‘This order’, the guide continues, ‘imbues the elements with an urgency of placement within her built environment’; it is a ‘fragile ecosystem’. 101 One critic

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101 Ibid.

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wrote of an earlier Sze installation, ‘Bees make honey, beavers made dams, and people make plastic’, so that Sze’s ‘obsession to create an expressive order from our synthetic surroundings feels somehow natural’ (emphasis added).\(^{102}\) Approached in this way, it is quite clear how installation art can be understood as challenging zero space. *Tilting Planet* performs an order which is ‘rhythmic’, ‘urgent’, and ‘expressive’, plainly contrasting with the static order re-inscribed within the white cube. Furthermore, Sze’s art is built to break down. The guide describes the ‘inevitable destruction and implicit vulnerability of Sze’s art’:

\[\ldots\text{ the disposability of its components and the fragility of its construction encourage ‘an experience that feels as though it is limited by time’. You are not so much looking at her art as you are witnessing its entropic decay.}^{103}\]

Thus presenting a clear opposition to the ‘enduring’ and ‘eternal’ presence strived for by the white cube. Indeed, like crowded places security, zero space in BALTIC is never, and can never, be complete because the art spaces, the artworks, and (as I illustrate in the next section) the visitors are always changing.

However, it is important to remember that there are dissenting voices - those who believe that contemporary art no longer has the power to challenge or subvert the power of the status quo. Jean Baudrillard has argued that contemporary art, rather than challenging the ‘material environment’ of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as Crary would have it, instead reproduces that materialism as rampant consumerism and banal politics. ‘My point of view’, he said, ‘is anthropological’:

\[\text{From this perspective, art no longer seems to have a vital function; it is afflicted by the same fate that extinguishes value, by the same loss of transcendence. Art has not escaped this tendency to effectuate everything, this drive to make everything totally visible to which the West has arrived. But hypervisibility is a way to extinguish sight (2005: 65, emphasis added).}\]

\[\text{So, as art has lost its transcendent value (in Baudrillard’s opinion), it has come to privilege value in and of itself: in other words, art has become a market. Similarly, the}\]

\(^{102}\) Ibid.

\(^{103}\) Ibid.
art critic Donald Kuspit writes in his 2004 book *The End of Art* that, ‘art has been subtly poisoned by social appropriation, that is, the emphasis on its commercial value and its treatment as upscale entertainment, turning it into a species of social capital’ (p. 8).

These counter-arguments that contemporary art can ‘no longer’ challenge political conservatism rely on the view that art did once hold a privileged position as social critique, and of the art gallery as, to a greater or less extent, indivisible from that status. In the same mode, in March 2002 Peter Hewitt, then Director of the Arts Council of England, argued that the arts were uniquely placed to help the public understand and even control feelings of terror and trauma after the September 11 attacks. Music, poetry, and prose he said can ‘provide a common language to share deeply intimate feelings of grief and sorrow. Art provides a bridge to coax the private and intimate out into a shared, public setting’ (Hewitt, 2002: 5). In recent years the so-called ‘aesthetic turn’ has introduced these narratives formally into the social sciences (see for example Bleiker, 2009), to the extent that referencing a book, a film, or an artwork has become a sort of shorthand for critique, often to the point of banality.

Certainly from my own experience at BALTIC it is difficult to challenge an interpretation like that of Kuspit’s, in light of the elephantine apparatus around, and the huge effort that goes into, ‘securing’ an artwork based on criteria set down by the Government Indemnity Scheme (GIS) which underwrites the financial risk of displaying art to the public (and which I discuss more fully in chapter 5).
4.6 Security awareness in crowded places

The crowded places security advice for visitor attractions emphasises the importance of ‘security awareness’, while at the same time acknowledging ‘there is a need to maintain a friendly and welcoming atmosphere within visitor attraction environments’ rather than a ‘fortress mentality’ (CPAVA: 5). Indeed, the vulnerability of crowded places to terrorist attack is based precisely on their busy-ness and business: accessible and available spaces offer the ‘prospect for an impact beyond the loss of life alone’, for example ‘serious disruption or a particular economical/ political impact’ (PCP: 3). It may even be possible to say (within discursive parameters) that crowded places become more vulnerable in direct proportion to their accessibility and availability. This only heightens awareness that the zero space materialised by crowded places security is an ‘ideal’ space, but it is no less problematic for that - reiterating and promoting as it does an ‘unchangingness in the real world’, specifically a liberal status quo.

BALTIC appears to fit into this mould of the crowded place in terms of accessibility and availability. It does not have a bag search or, indeed, any kind of security screening process at its public entrance, preferring instead for visitors to enter and leave freely, and, if appropriate, to leave large bags in lockers off to the side of the reception desk. This process is certainly assumed to enhance the accessibility of BALTIC. The decision not to have a bag search was described to me in an interview as an ‘internal political decision’ made by the previous director Sune Nordgren: ‘the reasoning behind it was not wanting to put people off… it was a visitor numbers political game’.104

This ‘political decision’ in favour of maintaining accessibility and the ‘welcoming atmosphere’ described in CPAVA raises, however, precisely the problem of the space of security: how to incorporate or bring into line with natural reality that which is not known in advance. In the absence of what Jon Coaffee (2009) might term ‘territorial interventions’, which would disrupt circulation - in other words interfere with the ability of a liberal natural reality to function in relation to itself - the excess of accessibility at BALTIC is brought into line – secured - in three main

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104 For accounts of a much more muscular and visible post-9/11 security regime in the Museum of Metropolitan Art, New York, see Danziger (2008).
ways. First, through zero-ing space: in addition to the emptying and clearing out practices described above, the lockers are also ‘checked daily that nothing is left in there… [we] try and secure them as best possible’. Second, through the closed circuit TV (CCTV) surveillance of BALTIC’s ‘level 4 control’ security system (see chapter 5). Third, through the particular interactions between the BALTIC Crew and visitors to BALTIC.

4.6.1 Vigilant Crew

In addition to avoiding a ‘fortress mentality’, the practice of security awareness in crowded places emphasises a broad-based vigilance which aims to make it easier to see ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ behaviour on either side of the public front (see Amoore, 2009). So staff should ‘know their own work areas or offices very well’, and ‘be alert to anything unusual’ in their colleagues’ ‘behaviour and attitudes’ (CPAVA: 15, 34). Once again emphasising that contemporary national security practices are just as concerned with prosaic ‘human’ realities as with complex, contingent, and emergent ways of life. This notion of being vigilant to colleagues’ unusual behaviour is represented within crowded places as ‘Personnel security’ (CPAVA: 33-36). For alongside the dominant narrative promoted by crowded places policy documents, and indeed by the NSS, of a terrorist exploiting the accessibility of a shopping centre or nightclub, personnel security addresses the issue of ‘some external threats, whether from criminals, terrorists, or competitors seeking a business advantage’ making use of the ‘co-operation of an ‘insider”’ (CPAVA: 33). In this way, crowded places are encouraged to make use of ‘good recruitment and employment practices’: collecting proofs of identity from staff, as well as their national insurance numbers and educational qualifications, and verifying that these documents are legitimate. ‘Good personnel security’, CPAVA continues, ‘is best achieved by creating a culture in which security is accepted’ (p. 35).

105 So for example the NSS discusses the issue of ‘personnel security’, which necessarily brings in the ‘expertise and knowledge held by citizens, industry and the third sector’ (2009: 79).
106 CONTEST also discusses personnel security and the so-called ‘insider threat’ as part of the Protect workstream and the protective security of the UK’s assets, which includes crowded places. The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) provides personnel security advice
Staff vigilance must also, of course, be trained on the public: staff should ‘look out’ for the now familiar ‘items out of place’ and ‘unusual behaviour’ (CPAVA: 15). They should have the ‘confidence to report any suspicions, knowing that reports – including false alarms – will be taken seriously’; no doubt part of an idealised crowded places ‘security culture’ (CPAVA: 15). In BALTIC, the Crew members – the staff who are in situ in the public areas and identified by their distinctive black and white t-shirts – were described to me as being ‘really vigilant’: ‘they’re vigilant because of the artworks being damaged but also they’re conscious of their own space’. In this way, if an item is ‘out of place’, like an object in a plastic bag in an artwork, ‘it would be noted straight away, there’s a reporting process to it, radio alarm, messages, and procedures in place for us to back up to that’.

During the interviews, the importance and competence of the BALTIC Crew in security was continually emphasised. They are trained in security procedures when they commence employment: everything from how to use security radios to evacuation routes. They were described to me as being, alongside CCTV and intruder detection systems (see chapter 5), the ‘third prong’ of BALTIC’s security regime. But in an important sense, just as biopolitical performativities attempt to bring into line with a liberal natural reality that which cannot be known in advance, staff vigilance must exceed specific security practices and policies. As I was told, ‘you can’t write a policy for every single incident, as in what if it is there [a bomb], what if it is there, what if this happens’. In general, the ‘right people are there to make the decision in the situation they find themselves in’. In other words, in the space of security at BALTIC the staff play a key role in the knowledges and practices by which the unanticipated challenges of accessibility are governed.

Furthermore, these knowledges and practices rely on what is portrayed as a unique relationship between BALTIC Crew and the public. BALTIC’s main priority is an ‘overall learning experience’ and ‘excellence in service’. Key to this is that the Crew are ‘active out there providing art information, engaging with visitors proactively’. To make this engagement possible, approximately 80 per cent of the Crew (I was told) have their own art practices, and many had completed arts degrees at nearby Newcastle and Northumbria universities. In addition to this arts

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in order to ‘minimise and manage the risk of staff exploiting legitimate access to an organisation’s assets or premises for unauthorised, malicious purposes from theft to terrorism’ (CONTEST: 105-6).
experience, BALTIC also requires that the Crew have previous customer experience, through retail employment for example.

Therefore ‘one of the skills BALTIC Crew learn is ‘should I approach that person, should I not?’… [it is not] something ‘taught’ as much as it is an intuitive thing the Crew members develop’. So the arrangement at other galleries whereby staff sit ‘in a corner on a chair with their head down reading an old book’, is dismissed at BALTIC. Rather, it is ‘quite proactive walking around the space, [and] it is a good deterrent to those who may be thinking along naught lines’.

At the time of the interviews, BALTIC staff in line with visits from the two Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA) attached to Northumbria Police, were also preparing to further develop and enhance vigilance with updated procedures for reporting ‘unusual behaviour’. The new process identified three categories of unusual behaviour: banned; nuisance (‘drugs, teenagers running amok on a skateboard’); and suspicious – ‘people who haven’t done anything but just weren’t right’. Suspicious people:

… can make staff feel uncomfortable, just with the conversations that they have or just the closeness that they get or just an action that seems to worry staff, it is that kind of suspicion, and that can often lead to being a nuisance or being a banned.

With the updated procedures, ‘[every]thing gets reported in’, including ‘even a conversation with a slightly odd person’:\(^{107}\)

… in terms of ‘I’ve had a strange conversation and I want to log it with you’.
As a duty manager then we log those instances, and you can then start to build up some visitors’ patterns of strange behaviour.

As well as ‘strange conversations’, other logged visitor behaviours include ‘whether someone’s a bit active with a camera’ or ‘they’re just actively strange

\(^{107}\) It was not made clear whether in practice all conversations with so-called ‘odd persons’ are recorded. Certainly my impression was that the interviewee was keen to emphasise that BALTIC took the issue of odd/strange/suspicious behaviour seriously, as it is a key part of crowded places and counter-terrorism security.
around the space… and if we have CCTV footage of them then that goes in the file as well’. The fact that being ‘a bit active with a camera’ counts as potentially suspicious behaviour at BALTIC is ironic in two ways. First, in relation to its intensively visual security regimes: staff vigilance of their colleagues and the general public, and the use of extensive use of CCTV (see chapter 5). Second, because alongside the emphasis placed by installation art upon materiality and sensory and immersive encounters between artwork and art viewer, BALTIC’s visitors are in an important sense still spectators – they are there to see the art. The way that divisions are effected between what Louise Amoore (2009) has termed legitimate ‘lines of sight’ – of the art – and illegitimate ‘lines of sight’ – capturing views on camera - are therefore a key part in crowded places security, as they are in other security practices of the war on terror’s ‘homefront’.

Finally, a large part of the Crew’s public vigilance role consists of preventing visitors from touching the artworks:

… those conversations [between staff about suspicious behaviour] often start if someone was persistent in wanting to touch that work then it would become slightly abnormal behaviour once you’re told [not to] and you continue to do that.

For BALTIC the immediate issue is that artworks are sensitive and valuable, and ‘can get damaged by thousands of people touching it every day’. William Bogard (2007), however, has another viewpoint on this regulation of touch in his essay on the role of haptic technologies – the electronic mimicking or simulation of the body’s sense of touch – which he conceptualises (after Deleuze) as a flexible form of control analogous to a serpent’s coil. Haptic or ‘tactile control’, he writes, ‘manage[s] and counter[s] the body’s most basic capacity to resist, its sensitivity to its own power’ (Bogard, 2007: 2, emphasis added). In this way, he argues that tactile control supplements the ‘optical control’ of surveillant technologies:

… because they enclose the body at its surface, effectively reducing the interior to the body itself, coils form a kind of mobile confinement.
Surrounding you as you go out the door and into the open, they go where you go, or stay where you stay (Bogard, 2007: 3).

However, it is important to add here that recent scholarship, and indeed the case of crowded places security, illustrates that ‘optical control’ is still very much a part of contemporary security regimes, be it through surveillance (Lyons, 2007, 2003) or more insidious forms of securitised ways of seeing (Amoore, 2007).

In the same way, the primary reason for having the lockers to the side of the front entrance was to protect the art from physical contact with visitors:

... to be honest, the reason we have lockers is for the protection of the artworks. Somebody going in with a great big rucksack – and I’m not trying to justify it, you have to say well it is only art what are we trying to protect? – but on Level 4 the pieces can be so fragile... a great big bloody Berghaus flying around isn’t going to help.¹⁰⁸

This is not to say that, for BALTIC staff, the lockers do not also serve an important security function, but I think that in important ways the performativities of security awareness and staff vigilance at BALTIC illustrate an unwillingness to cede the authority of art and the neo-white cube to that of security.

The role of the lockers also indicates another dimension of the authority of the neo-white cube: the protection of the value of artworks, even to an extent which is contradictory to the aims of installation art to provide immersive, sensory environments. In an essay on the performativities of art spaces, published to accompany an exhibition of the Zabludowicz Collection titled When We Build Let Us Think That We Build Forever at BALTIC between September 2007–January 2008, JJ Charlesworth explains that ‘there is a way in which spaces and objects go together, which tells us what they are, what they are for, and what we should do with them’ (2007: 11). This is why, he continues, Marcel Duchamp’s upside-down urinal Fountain – ‘the founding myth of modern art’ - caused such controversy when it was submitted to an exhibition of the Society of Independent Artists in New York in

¹⁰⁸ Berghaus is a popular manufacturer of rucksacks and outdoor equipment.
... when we walk into a supermarket and buy a box of soap powder, we don’t set it apart, contemplate it for a while, then leave. If we enter an art gallery, contemplating a urinal produces a sort of feedback loop, in which we notice that the thing we are looking at somehow rejects or rebuffs the way we anticipate looking at it (Charlesworth, 2007: 12).

The context of attention in an art gallery, then, is determined by ‘effects of visual concentration’ that point to the presence of art: Duchamp’s *Fountain* was placed on a plinth to distinguish it (with intended irony, of course) from an everyday ‘non-art’ urinal. Effects of visual concentration are how ‘art commands authority in the space in which it is presented’, a performativity of space which is common to other forms of ‘privileged’ object:

In commercial culture, the paradoxical dynamic is that the more valuable, desirable or expensive the item, the more space around it has to be evacuated of all other meaning... the visual paradox of the luxury object, when it is presented, is that it demands a zone of visual scarcity around it... It is clear that the technique of concentration on an object to be contemplated never was exclusive to the space of the gallery’ (Charlesworth, 2007: 14).

The import of Charlesworth’s analysis is that performativities of ‘concentration’ are, like performativities of zero space, at the same time performativities of valuing and de-valuing. It is this process of *commercial valuing* which much contemporary art tries to subvert (even if Jean Baudrillard argued that it fails). If Duchamp had placed a diamond on the plinth instead of a urinal, would there have been the same controversy over whether it was art? Indeed, this is more or less what the artist Damien Hirst did nearly a century later with his *For the Love of God* sculpture: a diamond-encrusted skull which cost £14 million to make in 2007, and was sold in August that year for £50 million.109 In the next chapter I explore the question that if

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109 There are, however, rumours that Hirst was not able to find a buyer, and so ‘bought’ it himself for less than the £50 million asking price.
BALTIC did not have to protect valuable artworks – as opposed to valuable people - would security practices be different?

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I argued that crowded places security at BALTIC is not performed in an innocent space. Instead, its performativities of zero space, emptying out and putting everything in its place, cite and reproduce the authority of the modernist gallery. And, as Brian O’Doherty argued in Inside the White Cube, the authority of the modernist gallery is itself a kind of ‘sympathetic magic’ which cites and reinscribes ‘unchangingness in the real world’: specifically the unchangingness of a western liberal status quo. It is therefore crucial to disregard once and for all the assumption that public spaces are an apolitical backdrop to contemporary security practices like crowded places; an assumption aptly represented by the question put to me more than once, ‘what has an art gallery got to do with security?’ Security at BALTIC is a front in the war on terror – its inclusion in crowded places counter-terrorism since 2007 demonstrates that. But more than this, security practices at BALTIC cite and reinscribe already deeply politicised performativities of space.

Practices of emptying space and putting everything in its place may allow for the quicker identification of bombs or other potentially harmful objects, as with the discovery of a concealed plastic object in The Hoerengracht exhibit (which turned out to be a lunch box). But the result of counter-terrorism practices is different from, or at least not mutually inclusive with, the discourses they draw on and indeed depend on for their coherence. And the meaning of coherence here can include the reason that many people (not least the government and other officials who put together regimes like crowded places, and the individuals who carry them out) do not seem to think it curious, illogical, or question that ‘crowded’ places can only be truly secure when they are cleared out and ordered, even though such a state of emptiness and stasis would undermine the very claims to vulnerability to terrorist attack – accessibility, availability, and ‘economic/political impact’ - in the first place. Perhaps this is because the people who devise counter-terrorism policy recognise that the aim of total security is unrealistic and, indeed, undesirable. Nonetheless this
does not stop them rolling out crowded places security to high street businesses and public services across England.

In this chapter, then, I have considered one discourse that crowded places security might be considered to cite: the authority of the modernist art gallery and the freedom of art. An important part of this citation is the paying of homage to what O’Doherty referred to as the ‘god of the empty gallery’: ‘once completed by the withdrawal of all apparent content’, he writes, ‘the gallery becomes a zero space, infinitely mutable’ (2000: 87). And I have looked at how, in this way, security practices at BALTIC perform a deeply politicised ‘zero space’. I have considered this performativity of space before. In chapter 2 I argued that the ‘broadened’ globalised spatialities of the NSS make possible a ‘broader range’ of coercive and violent responses. In chapter 3, I argued that the privileging of emergent circulating forms of life, while intended as critique, instead bleaches out the closures resulting from biopolitical performativities of space and identity.

Therefore the performativity of zero space in the ‘white cube’ gallery – or, in BALTIC’s case, the ‘neo-white cube’ – is far from being only an issue for artists and curators. The construction of an empty, static space at BALTIC as a backdrop to everything that occurs within it – art, visitors, eating, drinking, and so on - is ‘sympathetic magic’ to ‘promote unchangingness in the real world… to cast an appearance of eternity over the status quo’ (McEvilley, 2000: 9). In this way, my main argument of the chapter is that the objective of crowded places security to empty or ‘zero’ space at BALTIC functions – perhaps primarily functions - to reproduce dominant liberal discourses – the same discourses which Foucault argued are reproduced as biopolitical forms of control. In the next chapter I further explore biopolitical control through crowded places performativities of risk and control. Just as BALTIC does not have exclusive rights to the performativities of space within its four walls, these performativities illustrate the ways in which the control of space in the war on terror is not confined to the four walls of crowded places.
Chapter 5  Crowded places security II – Risk and biopolitical control
In this chapter I explore how in addition to performativities of zero space, made possible by and reaffirming norms of what Brian O’Doherty terms the ‘liberal way’ and its ‘eternal rightness’, crowded places security is also materialised through performativities of risk and control. Since BALTIC opened in 2002, the Government Indemnity Scheme (GIS) and its particular performativities of risk around the exhibiting of valuable artworks in public buildings have dominated security practices. After 2007, however, these have increasingly taken place alongside performativities of ‘terrorism risk’ through the work of the Counter-Terrorism Security Adviser (CTSA) network. In addition, the GIS and CTSA are also both responsible for the installation at BALTIC of a sophisticated security assemblage known as ‘level 4 control’.

I begin in section 5.2 by introducing the GIS and discussing how it performs specific forms of risk through the reproduction of artworks as ‘indemnified material’ - at the expense, it must be noted, of other inanimate objects as well as living persons. In the second part of the section I discuss competing conceptualisations of the relationship between risk, insurance, and security in the war on terror. On one side can be considered to be Ulrich Beck’s (1999) influential ‘world risk society’ thesis, which holds that terrorism represents an unknowable and thus uninsurable catastrophic risk. Ranged on the other side are a number of scholars from both security studies and political economy who argue that contemporary insurance technologies are characterised by their embracing of risk - what Aradau and van Munster describe in terms of ‘a permanent adjustment’ (2007: 89) - rather than its avoidance, including ‘catastrophic risks’ such as terrorism. Following on from this second group of arguments then, I argue that the GIS illustrates a number of key points about the use of insurance technologies in the security of public spaces.

In section 5.3, I explore how crowded places security is also materialised by performativities of ‘terrorism risk’ through the work of the two CTSA attached to Northumbria Police. In particular, I look at how the CTSA perform the terrorism risk of high street businesses, including BALTIC and its neighbours, in two ways: first, through the so-called ‘crowded places risk assessment’; and second, through their organisation of the ‘Project Argus’ counter-terrorism event. My key argument in this
section is that the work of the CTSAs (re)produces so-called ‘business sectors’ not individuals as the privileged objects of crowded places security. In so doing, crowded places security is more usefully understood in terms of regulatory norms which first and foremost value the economic activity of the UK’s business places and, moreover, its continuity. In this way, whilst the GIS can be considered to materialise norms associated with the value of the artworks, crowded places risk is geared towards the ‘value’ of business continuity.

In section 5.4, I move on to consider how crowded places security is materialised through biopolitical performativities of control primarily through BALTIC’s ‘level 4 control’ security system. After setting out the different aspects of level 4 control – CCTV, intruder detection, and the networked ‘steel box’ - in the second part of the section I discuss different ways of conceptualising ‘biopolitical control’ (Lacy, 2008: 339) as that which brings the excess of liberal norms into line with so-called ‘natural reality’ (STP: 41). In the third part I argue that much of this scholarship with its emphasis on the repressive aspects of control, misses the point of Foucault’s original argument: that the norms of biopolitics make and exhort life to live. Recognising the distinction between on the one hand, living one’s life, and on the other, that which exhorts and makes possible the living of life in certain ways, may release the possibilities of a ‘counter-politics’ to biopolitics (Gordon, 1991). Finally, I consider how different practices in BALTIC speak back to control, thereby inscribing their own counter-politics.
5.2 The Government Indemnity Scheme – Risk and security

As a technology for managing risk, insurance extends far beyond what might ordinarily be understood as the insurance field – Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon.110

BALTIC’s head of security described his two main priorities thus: ‘first of all, we’ve got the art side, the security of the art work, obviously for their value, and [second] also anti-terrorism… as in the normal security, as in every day-to-day life’. The first priority, then, is the security of the art work ‘obviously for their value’; and in particular, this is the ‘quite strict conditions of government indemnity insurance’, without which ‘we couldn’t insure quite a few of our exhibitions, couldn’t afford it’. Government indemnity insurance is the Government Indemnity Scheme (GIS), run by the Museums, Libraries and Archives Council (MLA) for the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. The GIS guidelines (hereafter GISG) explain that the borrower, i.e. BALTIC, pays a notional premium of around 0.5 per cent of a commercial insurance premium, in order for the Government to ‘underwrite[s] the risk of loss of, or damage to, objects loaned for the public benefit to museums, galleries, libraries, the National Trust and other similar bodies’ (Museums, Libraries and Archives Council: 5).111 BALTIC as the borrower accepts a minimum liability of £300 for each object, plus one per cent if the object is valued at £4000 or above (GISG: 32).

The Government Indemnity Scheme comes under the MLA’s remit to ‘protect cultural property’, which includes other measures such as export controls112 and tax incentives (GISG: 4).113 The specific purpose of the scheme is ‘to enhance and widen access to objects of a scientific, technological, artistic or historic nature’ for ‘the benefit of the public within the United Kingdom’ (GISG: 4, emphasis added). Because any money paid out under the terms of the scheme ‘falls on the UK public purse’

111 On risk and disaster management specifically in libraries and archives see Matthews and Feat her (2003).
112 The MLA issues licences for the export from the UK of ‘cultural objects’ which are over 50 years of age and valued over specific thresholds. See ‘Export controls’ on the MLA website. Available at http://www.mla.gov.uk/what/cultural/export (Accessed 17 April 2011).
113 For example, UK taxpayers can transfer a work of art into public ownership in lieu of paying Inheritance Tax. See ‘Tax Incentives’ on the MLA website. Available at http://www.mla.gov.uk/what/cultural/tax (Accessed 17 April 2011).
(GISG: 4), the guidelines are absolutely clear on two points. First, the valuation on which the indemnity is based ‘should represent a fair estimate of the value that the object might reach if sold on the open market at the time of loan’, and the MLA may seek ‘expert advice’ if borrowers, in consultation with the owner, present a valuation that is too high (GISG: 13) (for critical discussions of pricing in the international art market see Velthius, 2003 and Werner, 2005). Second, the loan must meet the stipulated security conditions: ‘indemnity will only be issued when the loan in question is made in accordance with MLA’s security… guidelines’ (GISG: 12).

5.2.1 Indemnified material

At BALTIC, the Government Indemnity Scheme can be considered to make possible the public display of art, and thus the accompanying business of an art gallery, only when the calculated risks of access have been met by the imposition of its security conditions. As a result, the GIS has a major role in performing security at BALTIC in two ways: first, through the ‘level 4 control’ security system which I discuss in section 5.4; and second, through the reproduction of ‘objects of a artistic nature’ as ‘indemnified material’ in need of extensive protection, which in turn (re)produces particular, and sometimes contradictory, ways of valuing and securing objects and people.

To begin, in terms of architecture the GIS conditions state that the ‘indemnified material must be accommodated in a strong building which has physically well-protected windows, doors and skylights’ (GISG: 54). In the previous chapter I discussed Keller Easterling’s arguments regarding the political uses of performativities of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ in architecture. The GIS reappropriates the ‘strength’ of the BALTIC building – which itself went through several stages of softening and hardening during its conversion from a flour mill to an art gallery - as necessary to protect the valuable art works within. Furthermore, in the BALTIC story (and in other contemporary art galleries such as Kiasma Museum of Contemporary Art in Finland), windows and glass features are materials of openness and light – an important way in which gallery spaces perform the ‘transcendental’ experience of art. In the GIS security conditions, however, glass is a hard substance
which plays a crucial role in ‘well-protected windows’, and in the ‘anti-bandit laminated glazing’ which must be used for the display cases of ‘small portable’ indemnified material such as gold, silver, and jewellery (GISG: 54).

Crowded places security effects yet another recombination of these qualities, whereby the hardness of glass is a source of both security and danger. NaCTSO’s counter-terrorism advice for visitor attractions (CPAVA) emphasises that ‘good quality doors and windows are essential to ensure building security’ (p. 16). But it continues with an important proviso: ‘many casualties in urban terrorist attacks are caused by flying glass, especially in modern buildings and glazing protection is an important casualty reduction measure’ (CPAVA: 16). This lethal combination of glass and bomb is a recurrent theme. In the typology of ‘explosive effects’ provided by Protecting crowded places. Design and Technical Issues (PCP),

114 glass (and roof slates, timber, and metal) constitutes a ‘secondary fragment’ of a bomb (PCP: 6). After the ‘direct weapon effects’, these secondary fragments cause the most fatalities and injuries (PCP: 6). As BALTIC’s east and west elevations are made of glass, another, largely insurmountable, security issue emerges in relation to evacuation: in the event of a terrorist attack, should evacuation routes lead outside – and potentially into the path of another bomb - or inside – at the mercy of shattering glass?

As a result of the danger posed by glass, crowded places security appears to recommend minimising its use or avoiding it altogether. CPAVA focuses on the use of anti-shatter film, which, in the event of a bombing, holds glass fragments together, and is a ‘relatively cheap and rapid improvement to existing glass’ (p. 16). For new windows, it advises installing laminated glass (CPAVA: 16). PCP, which is after all the crowded places publication specifically addressing the ‘design and technical issues’ of counter-terrorism, is more unequivocal: in new buildings it advises consideration of ‘whether large windows are essential’ and to ‘minimise the use of glazing’ (p. 21). Further on, however, when discussing ‘better oversight’ as a best practice example of crowded places security, PCP appears to do an about-turn, lauding the example of

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114 PCP identifies six ‘explosive effects’ deemed relevant to designing-in counter-terrorism protective security to new buildings: first, the blast wave, ‘a very fast moving high pressure wave created by the rapidly expanding gas of the explosion’; second, the fire ball, ‘created as part of the explosion process... local to the seat of the explosion... [and] generally associated with high explosives’; third, brisance, ‘the shattering effect’, which is also local to the explosion and associated with high explosives; fourth, primary fragments, which are parts of the bomb shattered by the brisance itself and secondary fragments; fifth, secondary fragments like ‘glass, roof slates, timber and metal’; and sixth, ground shock which is ‘produced by the brisance effect’ (p. 6).
a major train station’s main hall which has ‘a large expanse of glazing across most of the roof area’ (p. 34). The glazing:

... [permits] high levels of natural light and provides an excellent basis for *natural surveillance*. The comprehensive CCTV system has been integrated with internal lighting to provide a similar environment in low natural light conditions. This is further enhanced by the use of glazed panels in place of solid barriers to manage and separate pedestrian traffic and define security zones (PCP: 34, emphasis added).

In this demonstration of crowded places security, the capacity of light to support ‘natural surveillance’, to ‘manage’ pedestrian traffic, and to ‘define’ security zones, trumps the dangers of glass. Finally, the changing performativities of the benefits and/or dangers of glass within contemporary security programs also points to their spatial and historical contingencies; sometimes relying on the latest technological advances in blastproof toughened glass, or at other times returning to the surveillance qualities of natural light.

In addition to measures regarding the built environment in the reproduction of art objects as indemnified material, there is also a prescribed role for staff. The staff in this case are BALTIC Crew, who can always be spotted in the art spaces in their black ‘CREW’ t-shirts. ‘We have staff on all floors’, I was told in an interview, ‘every floor that’s open to the public has a member of staff on’. This is because the GIS conditions demand that ‘all indemnified material must be displayed so that it is invigilated by trained personnel’; invigilation literally meaning ‘to watch over’ (GISG: 54-55). Proper ‘relief arrangements’ must also be made for invigilating staff ‘for their relief for refreshment and other purposes’ (GISG: 55). Note, that this is not for the comfort of staff, but because ‘they must concentrate on the safety and security of the displayed material at all times’ (GISG: 55).
5.2.2 Risk, insurance and security in the war on terror

The Government Indemnity Scheme therefore enjoys a privileged position in shaping security at BALTIC, and crowded places security reiterates and indeed ‘piggybacks’ on the scheme’s performativities of risk. This stands in contrast then to Ulrich Beck’s (1999) classic account of the world risk society, which Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster describe as ‘a society in which there are uncontrollable and unpredictable dangers against which insurance is impossible’, and whereby so-called ‘international terrorism’ becomes another example of ‘a risk that goes beyond rational calculation into the realm of unpredictable turbulence’ (2007: 90; also 2008). However, in opposition to this claim, Aradau and van Munster argue that ‘although Beck presents risk society as riddled with risks of which we can have neither knowledge nor measure’, the war on terror instead ‘displays an insatiable quest for knowledge: profiling populations, surveillance, intelligence, knowledge about catastrophe management, prevention etc.’ (2007: 91). Note here that Aradau and van Munster’s account includes ‘classical’ disciplinary performativities of surveillance alongside the biopolitical profiling of populations. The mass of information gathered as part of the war on terror then feeds into the emergence of a ‘precautionary’ element in the governmentality of terrorism. ‘What is new’, Aradau and van Munster claim, ‘is not so much the advent of a risk society’ but instead ‘the emergence of a ‘precautionary’ element that has given birth to new configurations of risk that the catastrophic prospects of the future be avoided at all costs’ (2007: 91).

In his work on biopolitical security, Michael Dillon goes further than Aradau and van Munster in arguing that the war on terror has not ‘given birth to new configurations of risk’ but rather marks the highpoint of modernity’s constitution through risk. The ‘commodification of the contingent as risk’, Dillon argues, ‘is not an epiphenomena of the social that gives rise to something called risk society’ - rather contingency has been the ‘very principle of formation for the social and the political alike for some considerable historical time’ (2007a: 9). In Dillon’s reading, contingency is a mutation of liberal governance – or at least, it represents liberal governance turning back on itself. ‘The contingent that now governs western life’, he writes, ‘radically subverts what it first made possible as such – liberal biopolitics – widely circulating and intensifying its security neuroses’ (Dillon, 2007a: 9).
What both Aradau and van Munster and Dillon are describing, albeit to different extents, are the biopolitical performativities of risk associated with what Brian O’Doherty termed the ‘liberal way’. These are risks which recognise the challenges of the catastrophic – or, as Dillon argues, bring about those challenges by intensifying the ‘security neuroses’ of liberal biopolitics - but nonetheless embrace the opportunities it presents. In this way, such performativities are enrolled in materialising the biopolitical spaces I discussed in chapter 3: the reality natural to liberal norms which is paradoxical or even necessarily unstable because it simultaneously makes possible both good circulations – which it effects to maximise in open seria and ever-wider circuits - and bad circulations – which it effects to minimise.

Insurance is therefore key in materialising biopolitical spaces through its role as a contemporary technology – perhaps the dominant contemporary technology – of risk. François Ewald (1991: 1999) explains that insurance materialises ‘a certain type of objectivity, giving certain familiar events a kind of reality which alters their nature’ – specifically, I would argue, a reality which is natural to liberal norms. By ‘objectivizing certain events as risks’, Ewald claims, ‘insurers can invert their meanings: it can make what was previously an obstacle into a possibility. Insurance assigns a new mode of existence to previously dreaded events; it creates value’ (Ewald, 1999: 199-200, emphasis added). In this way, Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle (2004) argue that American insurance companies were far from rendered immobilised by the September 11 attacks and subsequent imaginaries of catastrophic terrorism risks, and that the latter can in fact mobilize multiple actions and practices (also Bougen, 2003). In the United States, after the attacks the ‘insurance industry, along with government… imaginatively reconfigured markets to continue terrorism insurance coverage’ (Ericson and Doyle, 2004: 135). This is what Baker and Simon refer to as the ‘endurance of the risk-spreading infrastructure’ (2002: 6-7), especially with government as the ‘ultimate risk manager’ (Ericson and Doyle, 2004: 135).

The GIS fits into these arguments because, first, it contradicts assertions about the limits to insurability in the ‘world risk society’. The GIS, to borrow from Baker and Simon (2002), ‘embraces risk’: for example, it is prepared ‘in exceptional circumstances’ to remove the so-called ‘war exclusion’ clause, if the owners of artworks are ‘concerned about the risk of terrorism, especially in England or
Northern Ireland’ (GISG: 14). Through the GIS, the UK government as the ‘ultimate risk manager’ operates security programs which allow cultural-economic activity to take place.

Second, the GIS supports both Baker and Simon and Ewald’s claim that insurance is a technology rather than a product or genre of products. The UK government does not make profit from the scheme – rather, as the indemnifier of art objects it functions as an arbiter of value. Biopolitical security analyses have claimed that the ‘value of lives, goods, ideas and services depends on their continuous capacity to connect and circulate’ (Lobo-Guerrero, 2010: 3). I disagree with this assessment, and instead I would argue that circulation is a biopolitical performativity of value, in the sense that it brings forward a reality natural to political-economic liberal norms.
At the time of the interviews, as I discussed in chapter 1, BALTIC staff had neither heard of ‘crowded places’ security nor read any of its publications. Nonetheless, they were involved in implementing counter-terror protective security – the updating of reporting procedures I discussed in chapter 4, for example – in consultation with ‘officers from Project Argus’. These officers are the two CTSAs, who, although they are attached to Northumbria Police, are nonetheless managed by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO). In this way the CTSAs form a ‘nationwide network’ of (self-styled) ‘local physical security experts’ (WTP: 12). And their counter-terror work is defined by two main tasks (or at least two that are made public): first, to assess the ‘vulnerability’ of crowded places using an agreed ‘crowded places risk assessment matrix’ and to advise on protective security improvements; and second, to deliver Project Argus events up and down the UK (WTP: 18).\(^\text{115}\)

The crowded places risk assessment matrix was created by a consortium of government security agencies as a result of Lord West’s review of crowded places security in summer 2007.\(^\text{116}\) According to Working Together to Protect Crowded Places, West recommended that despite substantial progress having been made in the protective security of crowded places, more was needed to turn advice into ‘action on the ground’ – in particular through engagement with local authorities and local businesses (WTP: 7). The matrix was therefore developed as ‘a standard way of assessing vulnerability’, with the CTSA acting as a ‘liaison’ figure (WTP: 18, emphasis added).

\(^{115}\) It is worth noting that in addition to the crowded places risk assessment there is also a ‘National Risk Register’ (NRR), first published by the Labour government in 2008 as part of a commitment made in the NSS, and updated and published by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government in 2010. The NRR contains the government’s ‘most current assessment of the likelihood and potential impact of a range of different risks’, and is designed to ‘encourage individuals and organisations to think about their own preparedness’ for civil emergencies. See ‘National Risk Register’ on the Cabinet Office’s website. Available at [http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/national-risk-register](http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/national-risk-register) (Accessed 10 August 2011).

\(^{116}\) The consortium was led by the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office, in conjunction with the Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters); NaCTSO; the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure; and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) (WTP: 18).
The CTSAs exercise their performative agency early and throughout the risk assessment process. They begin by ‘drawing up a list of crowded places which may be at a relatively high risk of a terrorist attack’ (WTP: 25). This judgment is based on an idiosyncratic combination of four types of information: the CTSA’s own knowledge of the local area; information about the ‘generic threat crowded places face’; the ‘threat profile at particular local sites’ (drawing on crime figures, details of licensed premises, and reports from Special Branch and other police offices); and lastly, the views of local authorities on the ‘crowded places business sectors that feature most prominently in their local area’ (WTP: 18, 25, emphasis added). The CTSAs then carry out the risk assessment process in four stages.

In the first stage, the CTSA ‘filters out’ supposedly ‘low risk’ sites based on ‘an assessment of the attractiveness of a site to terrorists and the potential impact of a terrorist attack’ (WTP: 25, emphasis added).117 ‘Attractiveness’ is graded on a five-point scale from ‘Very High’ attractiveness to ‘Very Low’ attractiveness. In the second stage, the CTSA produces a judgement about the ‘vulnerability’ of a site, once again using the five-point scale. Bringing together a site’s attractiveness and vulnerability is assumed to provide the CTSA with ‘an assessment of the relative likelihood of a terrorist attack’ (WTP: 25, emphasis added). The third stage, then, is the ‘risk assessment of a site’, which seems as if it is the point at which the CTSA investigates the site ‘on the ground’ and advises on specific improvements (WTP: 25). WTP, however, describes it as the bringing together of the ‘relative likelihood and impact of a terrorist attack to provide a measure of the overall relative risk of a terrorist attack’ (p. 25, emphasis added).

BALTIC would perhaps score highly in terms of the likelihood of attack because of its attractiveness as a high profile target, in the northeast of England at any rate, but at the same time score low in terms of impact. That is to say, with BALTIC’s ‘level 4 control’ security system, an attempted terrorist attack would be less successful than on a similar target with a less sophisticated security system. However, it is one of the key points of crowded places security that it is not necessarily reducible to individual buildings. So fourth and finally, the CTSA groups the ‘risk assessments of individual sites by crowded places sector for each local authority area’: for example, ‘a town centre with a group of pubs and nightclubs

117 For these ‘low-risk’ sites, NaCTSO developed in 2008 a ‘vulnerability self-assessment tool’ (VSAT) which is available through its website http://www.nactso.gov.uk/OurServices/VSAT.aspx.
adjacent to each other’ (WTP: 25). This is what was described above in terms of ‘crowded places business sectors’.

There are three important points to make about the crowded places risk assessment. First, although it obviously relies on the accumulation of information which Aradau and van Munster (2007) argued is characteristic of the war on terror, it must be emphasised that any claims about the veracity and validity of this information are themselves performed within narrow discursive parameters. This point is crucial, lest, as Louise Amoore has argued, ‘when we advance a critique of biopolitical systems in the war on terror, we inadvertently reproduce the certainties and assurances of the technical matrix that has become the mainstay of… homeland security programmes’ (2006: 338). She continues that the ‘authority of risk profiling in the war on terror precisely relies upon the representation of a world that would be safer if only ambiguity, ambivalence and uncertainty could be controlled’ (Amoore, 2006: 338).

Second, then, this notion of authority and some form of control over the vulnerability attributed to crowded places is precisely what the risk assessment is aiming for. Yet in my view, it falls rather short of the mark. The way the assessment process is set out in WTP makes the actions taken by the CTSA, and in particular how they make their decisions, opaque and almost purposely cryptic, rather than clear and straightforward, and for that reason just a shade farcical. For example, at the start of the assessment they choose which businesses are at high or low risk to begin with, and although they may make use of information from local authorities, police colleagues, and the businesses themselves, ultimately the decision is theirs. Also the decision process seems to be based on some kind of bizarre quasi-numeric system. But instead of $1 + 1= 2$, $2 + 1= 3$, and $3 + 1= 4$, the CTSA adds together the attractiveness of a site to terrorists and the potential impact to capture the ‘attractiveness of site/threat’. To this they add the vulnerability of a site, to come up with the ‘relative likelihood of a terrorist attack’; and to relative likelihood is added potential impact, to ‘provide a measure of the overall relative risk of a terrorist attack’ (WTP: 25). Furthermore, WTP includes the proviso that crowded places risk assessments ‘do not reflect a view of the chances of one particular site or area being targeted by terrorists’ - rather, the assessments generate ‘the relative risk of a crowded place to terrorist attack compared to others’, for the purposes of
'prioritising counter-terrorism protective security activity' (WTP: 18, emphasis added).

To some extent what appears as a highly artificial process for assessing the terrorism risk of crowded places could be done on purpose – or rather, it could serve a purpose. The conduct of counter-terrorism remains secretive at the best of times, and although BALTIC staff were very generous with information during my interviews and participant observation, the two CTSAs at Northumbria Police declined to be interviewed on more than one occasion. The results of the crowded places risk assessments are not published, being subject to confidentiality arrangements under the Government Protective Marking Scheme. Indeed, the ‘survey’ which is given to individual sites like BALTIC is marked at the ‘Protect - Commercial’ level; and the ‘aggregated site information’, referring to for example Gateshead quayside where BALTIC is situated, can be marked up to ‘Confidential’ or ‘Secret’ level (the highest is ‘Top Secret’).

What mitigates somewhat against this interpretation of deliberate opacity, however, is the fact that the publications provide a great deal of information about the specific objectives and dimensions of crowded places security. PCP, for example, goes into substantial detail about how the built environment can be planned and designed using protective security measures such as bollards to control traffic; CCTV; access control; visitor searches; and crowd management. WTP discusses how crowded places work is funded and ‘owned’ by lead local partnerships. ‘Options include’, it explains, ‘Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and the Resilience Network’ (WTP: 5). In the case of BALTIC on Gateshead quayside, the lead local partner is Gateshead Council within the Northumbria Local Resilience Forum (LRF). WTP’s discussion about responsibilities for crowded places at the local level – clarification of which was one of the key aspects of Lord West’s review - also brings into view the ‘leadership role’ of police Basic Command Units (BCUs) (WTP: 5). BCUs are tasked with briefing the lead local partner and ‘private/third sector owners’ of crowded places on risk and vulnerability assessments, ‘so that they are in a position to respond’ and vice versa: ‘local businesses’ who are the owners of crowded places have ‘key contributions to make’ (WTP: 19, 5).

I think it is more likely, then, that the crowded places risk assessment matrix is standardised within England only to the extent that it flows down from policy formulation at central government level – in particular, the Home Office. Likewise, crowded places policy is monitored and evaluated through the centralised measures of the Public Service Agreement (PSA) 26, which sets targets for national and local government specifically in relation to counter-terrorism, and by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office vis-à-vis the ‘NaCTSO secure data information channel’ (WTP: 26). But in other important ways the risk assessment process is highly idiosyncratic, by which I mean it relies heavily on distributed performative agencies. Most notably these are of the CTSAs, who decide which businesses are to be fed into the risk assessment and liaise with those businesses on a person-to-person level, and of business owners and local authorities who have to undertake to do the work to improve their protective security when certain vulnerabilities have been ‘identified’.

As a result of BALTIC’s own risk assessment, staff have begun to develop in consultation with the two CTSAs from Northumbria Police a security ‘briefing document’ for staff: ‘we’ve met them [the CTSAs] three or four times now to go through the paperwork’. This document is what WTP refers to as a ‘crowded places action plan’, which should ‘detail the actions that will reduce the vulnerabilities highlighted in the risk assessment’; be ‘proportionate to the level of risk’; and ‘set out clear and tangible milestones in tracking progress’ (p. 19). As I discussed in chapter 4 in relation to staff vigilance, BALTIC’s new security action plan does not address individual threats such as terrorism, flooding, or some other emergency. It is not possible or certainly not desirable, I was told, to have a security plan addressing only one type of incident: ‘[that’s] too tunnelled’. It is, after all, part of the materialisation of a biopolitical space of security whereby ever-wider circuits precisely mean that everything cannot be known in advance. The plan therefore aims to match the ever-wider and unknown rostrum of dangers with a broad, almost ‘one size fits all’ approach: ‘you have to look at the ‘what ifs’, it has to be more open to cover everything, a more general area… putting all your eggs in one basket is a dangerous thing’. The final plan will be ‘a good concise briefing’ for all staff on ‘what

119 There are significant variations in crowded places policy in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
to expect, because you can never say well, you go to there and you do this, you can’t be so specific’.

The third and final important point about the crowded places risk assessment is the use of the concept of ‘attractiveness’ to measure and convey in turn the likelihood, potential impact, and overall relative risk of a terrorist attack on a crowded place. The three main 2010 crowded places publications all begin by stating that ‘crowded places remain an attractive target for international terrorists’ (see WTP: 5, PCP: 3, and CPPS: 3). Constructing levels of attractiveness as a way of measuring threat and justifying the imposition of added security in public space is, I think, a very important development deserving of further investigation, because it seems to me to be precisely a way of performing the ever-wider circuits of biopolitical security. How is it possible to know in advance what may become ‘attractive’? Just as the viewer in the art gallery is moved by the art work isolated on the plinth, and the consumer desires the luxury object brightly lit on the shop shelf, so too terrorists are ‘attracted’ to crowded places. Crowded places are constructed as separate from the surrounding urban context because of the values they represent – the ability of people to ‘go about their lives freely and with confidence’ – and, therefore, the unique ‘economic/political impact’ they offer to terrorists (Home Office, 2010a: 4).

5.3.1 Project Argus and business places

As a result of their increasing involvement in crowded places security, BALTIC staff attended a ‘Project Argus’ event delivered by CTSAs on behalf of NaCTSO in Newcastle-upon-Tyne city centre. According to NaCTSO’s website, Project Argus ‘tak[es] businesses through a simulated terrorist attack’, in which participants work on their own and with ‘other local business representatives’. The event provides ‘a unique opportunity’ to learn both ‘valuable lessons helping to protect you, your business and your community, whether you are a small chain or a national business’,

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120 As I discussed in section 2.3.2, this aim of ‘going about life freely and with confidence’ is the main objective which directly links the NSS, CONTEST and the crowded places policy.

and the ‘importance of being prepared and having the necessary plans in place to help safeguard your staff, customers and your company assets’ (emphasis added). In my view, the most important point about Project Argus is how it (re)produces crowded places as business places.

Project Argus is ‘specifically aimed at the various sectors of the business community such as retail, leisure, and commercial centres’ (WTP: 23). These sectors are reflected in the participants who attended the event in Newcastle alongside BALTIC: ‘[we were] with all the public houses, publicans, the big... shopping centres, Eldon Square [and] the Gate were in attendance... We went, the Sage went, and did this table top exercise’. Eldon Square is a large indoor shopping centre, and the Gate is an entertainment complex with an Odeon cinema, a range of restaurants, bars, and clubs, and an Aspers casino – both are in central Newcastle. The Sage is a concert hall and ‘centre for music education’, and is located on Gateshead quayside adjacent to BALTIC. In addition to this Project Argus for ‘retail, leisure, and commercial centres’, there is one for night-time economy businesses; ‘Argus Professional’ for architects and property developers; and ‘Argus Planners’ for, obviously, planners. Furthermore, PCP claims that ‘Project Argus will continue to be developed as required’ – in other words, as the crowded places security agenda identifies more spaces which are ‘attractive’ to terrorists (PCP: 43).

Like the crowded places security plan, Project Argus focused on the ‘what if?’ of a terrorist attack in Newcastle city centre:

...people automatically assume if an incident happens... let's take for example there’s a terrorist attack... everybody thinks that the police and ambulances would be here within minutes, well no they're not, it may be an hour and a half before they even attempt to come anywhere near secondary IEDs and so on and so forth.

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122 Ibid.
124 See WTP: 12.
125 See PCP: 42.
126 Ibid.
127 IEDs are improvised explosive devices. It was this procedural delay in the arrival of the emergency services after the 7/7 bombings that led to so much criticism from the families of victims, and was a particular focus of the recent public inquiry, which reported its findings in May 2011. In her final
But it is revealing, I think, that in relation to this question of ‘what if?’ BALTIC staff did not find Project Argus as useful as another event organised by Gateshead Council:

We did another table-top exercise on Gateshead Quay [for] major incidents [which was run] by Gateshead Council, which I thought was far more productive as it actually talked about site-specific, you know, there’s an incident there or this has happened, what would happen then?

Gateshead Quay is styled as an attractive target because of the ‘amount of events and high profile buildings’. The high profile buildings include BALTIC of course, and the Sage, but also Baltic Square, which hosts open air events like the Evolution Weekender music festival, and the Millennium Bridge (or the ‘iconic Gateshead Millennium Bridge’). There is also HMS Calliope, headquarters of the Tyne Division of the Royal Naval Reserve Unit, which is ‘slap bang in between... us and the Sage’.

So if Project Argus focused on Newcastle city centre, why then were Gateshead’s top leisure venues in attendance? Not because a terrorist attack would affect any of them through the six ‘explosive effects’ identified in crowded places policy: the blast wave; the fire ball; brisance; primary or secondary fragments; or ground shock (PCP: 6). Indeed, BALTIC and Newcastle city centre are almost 1km apart (as the crow flies), not to mention being separated by the River Tyne. Perhaps it was because BALTIC is in the jurisdiction of the Northumbria Police, and it was simply more convenient to include them rather than run another event in Gateshead?

Principally, I would argue that BALTIC and the retail, leisure, and commercial centres of Newcastle-upon-Tyne are connected to each other in a way which is essential to understanding the regulatory norms by which crowded places security is materialised. They are the jewels of the ‘NewcastleGateshead’ brand developed by the Newcastle and Gateshead Councils to promote the area ‘nationally and

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ruling. Lady Justice Hallett concluded that ‘on the balance of probabilities’ the delay of the emergency services did not cause or contribute to any of the 52 deaths.

Internationally as a place at the forefront of innovative culture-led regeneration’ (for logo see figure 5.1). In this case, as a consequence of the NewcastleGateshead brand and the CTSA’s ‘local knowledge’ of that brand, it may ‘make sense’ for these sites to be grouped together as a crowded places business sector (WTP: 25).

![NewcastleGateshead Logo](image)

**Figure 5.1 The logo of the NewcastleGateshead tourist brand.**

Project Argus therefore produces ‘business sectors’ as privileged objects of crowded places security, and in so doing situates this genre of counter-terrorism in a security discourse quite different to that of the National Security Strategy: business continuity. NaCTSO advises that attendance at Project Argus workshops should be supplemented with two business continuity publications available on their website: *Expecting the Unexpected* and *Secure in the Knowledge*. *Expecting the Unexpected* was published by NaCTSO in 2003 in conjunction with London First, an organisation of the city’s top businesses, and the Business Continuity Institute. *Secure in the Knowledge* provides business continuity advice specifically for small and medium-sized businesses, and was published by NaCTSO in 2005, also in conjunction with London First.

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131 See [http://www.london-first.co.uk/](http://www.london-first.co.uk/).
Finally, in the same way as crowded places security at BALTIC reiterates and ‘piggybacks’ on the Government Indemnity Scheme’s performativities of risk, it can also be conceptualised through performativities of biopolitical control. In accordance with the GIS security conditions, indemnified artworks must be displayed at BALTIC in ‘level 4’ secure spaces:

... in the insurance industry level 5 is a bank - basically, we have to go to level 4 on parts of the building, and that involves links to the police, very tight control of keys, [and] lock down procedures followed to a tee.

The ‘parts of the building’ is more specifically the third floor, which is described as ‘a closed control floor’. ‘Closed control’ has two applications in this context. First, it provides environmental control for ‘any artworks that would be sensitive... and have to be kept in climate conditions, which is set temperatures, humidity, obviously to stop them receiving damage through the environment they’re in’. As the GIS guidelines state, the Secretary of State for Culture, as nominal head of the scheme, must be satisfied that there is a ‘level of environmental monitoring and control necessary for the appropriate and effective care of the object loaned’ (GISG: 13). Second, closed control provides protection for the artworks by which the third floor can be converted into a so-called ‘steel box’:

... [with] huge steel doors... an alarm separate from the building – neither security nor any of our staff have access to that floor, and it is directly linked to the police through an alarm which is password and code word protected.

CCTV and intruder detection systems (IDS) are also key elements of ‘level 4 control’, and they operate both within and beyond the steel box. When BALTIC opened in 2002 there were only eight CCTV cameras, and many of the back of house areas were not connected to the IDS. Since then, however, BALTIC has undergone two major security upgrades: one through ‘working with government
indemnity’, and the other, ‘our security review of the whole building’. As a result, there are now 44 CCTV cameras:

... and the system that we have, we can put a camera anywhere in the building, just using a web browser, for our quiet little corners or areas that we’re worried about, whether it is a piece of artwork or... it is cheaper to put a camera than it is a person.

Likewise, most of the back of house windows and doors have now been added to the IDS – ‘we control back of house areas a lot more now’ - and the system itself has been ‘linked up with the [Northumbria] police’.

Although it is the financial considerations of government indemnity that are the most immediate and pressing motivation for BALTIC’s installation of level 4 control, at the same time it is difficult to distinguish its usage in terms of individual perceived security issues:

... if someone can get into an area to steal, graffiti or vandalise, or leave something, [security systems] cover an area that we can’t cover for a multitude of reasons. [The upgrades] weren’t specifically done, ‘oh, anti-terrorism, we need a camera here’, they were done for ‘we need to control this area’.

In other words, level 4 control is understood in BALTIC as a means to ‘control space’ rather than address a specific security threat.

But what is the ‘control’ of controlling space? Level 4 control obviously fits into my earlier discussion about insuring against catastrophic risk. Indeed, insurance technologies like that of the GIS materialise a paradox in a way that fits with the paradoxical performativities of the biopolitical space of security, which make possible economic activity in ever-wider circuits whilst effecting to minimise the resulting vulnerabilities. So at the same time as the GIS embraces risk making possible the cultural and economic activity of the art gallery, Baker and Simon also discuss how insurance technologies increasingly take a ‘zero risk’ approach: ‘taking risks’, they write, ‘is only one part of a complex emerging configuration that also includes new demands for precaution and even abstinence’ (2002: 7). Likewise, Ericson and Doyle
point to insurance’s ‘key but often hidden role in establishing preventive security and loss prevention infrastructures, whether based on environmental design, electronic surveillance technologies, or private security operatives’ (2004: 139). These risk prevention infrastructures:

… are increasingly within the precautionary principle, which emphasises that low frequency but high severity risks must be addressed through extraordi

The GIS with its ‘security condition’ of level 4 control therefore demonstrates how the ever-wider circuits of cultural and economic activity also draw forth ‘extraordinary control measures’.

Mark Lacy (2008) extends this argument by situating advances in environmental design and so-called techniques of ‘geo-engineering’ precisely in terms of intensifying control mechanisms. ‘Obsessed with controlling the future, control societies’, he writes, ‘seek to find techniques for ‘geo-engineering’ a safe future or developing financial techniques to profit from ‘catastrophic risk’” (Lacy, 2008: 334). Indeed, when allied with advances in science and information technology, Lacy suggests that precautionary environmental engineering is being ‘supplemented with the adaptation principle’: the ‘most extreme plans suggest that responses to global warming/ climate change will involve ‘bioengineering ourselves and our environment to survive and thrive on an increasingly hot and potentially less hospitable planet” (2008: 334). Level 4 control at BALTIC therefore points towards a development in which performativities of risk – mutable and contingent in line with the ever-wider space of security - overlap with more problematic and indeed more static control assemblages.
5.4.1 Biopolitical control

... control societies simulate disciplinary societies – they have all their ‘feel’ without their walls – Bogard.133

The kind of co-presence of enclosed spaces and networked systems represented by level 4 control has been theorised in a number of ways. Gilles Deleuze, in a short but highly influential essay originally published in L’Autre Journal in 1990 and re-published in English in 1992 as ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, outlined his theory that:

... we are in a generalized crisis in relation to all the environments of enclosure – prison, hospital, factory, school, family... It is only a matter of administering their last rites and of keeping people employed until the installation of the new forces knocking at the door. These are the societies of control, which are in the process of replacing the disciplinary societies (pp. 3-4, emphasis added).

In Deleuze’s formulation, disciplinary societies (located in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries) were made possible by the production of what he variously termed ‘environments of enclosure’, ‘internments’, ‘interiors’, and ‘closed systems’ (1992: 3-4). The ‘ideal project’ of environments of enclosure, he wrote, is ‘to concentrate; to distribute in space; to order in time’ (Deleuze, 1992: 3). As Foucault himself put it in the Security, Territory, Population lectures: the ‘first action of discipline is... to circumscribe a space in which its power and the mechanisms of its power will function fully and without limit’ (STP: 44).

In contrast, the ‘new monster’ of the control society is made possible by highly flexible and adaptable ‘forms of free-floating control’ (Deleuze, 1992: 4). The corporation – ‘a spirit, a gas’ - replaces the factory; perpetual training replaces the school; and continuous control replaces the examination (Deleuze, 1992: 5). ‘Even art’, Deleuze writes, ‘has left the spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the open circuits of the bank’ (1992: 5). Therefore if enclosures are ‘molds, distinct castings’,

133 2007: 3.
controls are ‘a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point’ (Deleuze, 1992: 4, emphasis in original). As I discussed in the previous chapter, William Bogard conceptualises one such expression of this new modulating control in terms of haptic or ‘tactile control’. Modulating controls, Bogard writes, ‘adjust to the body as it moves and wherever it moves… they contract and release in waves, substituting for control of the body’s optical environment the regulation of its tactile milieu’ (2007: 3, emphasis in original).

Key to modulating control are the codes and passwords which ‘mark access to information, or reject it’; so that the computer, or more precisely the networked computer becomes the primary machine of the control society (Deleuze, 1992: 5). ‘Not that machines are determining’, Deleuze writes, ‘but because they express those social forms capable of generating them and using them’ (1992: 6). Bogard writes that ‘codes are flexible systems of capture in ways that fixed enclosures are not’ (2007: 3). ‘Embedded today in technologies like barcoded ID cards’, he continues, ‘and tomorrow in your genetically modified cells, codes eventually aim to control capitalist accumulation at the haptic or tactile level’ (Bogard, 2007: 3).

The way in which BALTIC’s third floor is secured through passwords and code words without the intervention of BALTIC’s own staff, in a networked computer system coterminous with the police force area of the Northumbria Police,134 most obviously equates with Deleuze’s notion of control mechanisms which ‘giv[e] the position of any element within an open environment at any given instant (whether animal in a reserve or human in a corporation, as with an electronic collar)’ (1992: 7). Or, as Bogard, puts it: the ‘new [control] mechanisms can position and fix the body independently of its location. They expand its territory but more tightly control the information parameters within which it functions’ (2007: 2). Ultimately what is most important, then, ‘is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s position – licit or illicit – and effects a universal modulation’ (Deleuze, 1992: 7).

At this point, it is important to emphasise that level 4 control makes use of both the barrier - the steel box and the ‘strong’ BALTIC building itself - and the universal

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134 Northumbria Police cover the metropolitan areas of Newcastle, Gateshead, and Sunderland, as well as South and North Tyneside boroughs, and county Northumberland. See the website [http://www.northumbria.police.uk/](http://www.northumbria.police.uk/).
modulation (aspired to) by networked CCTV and IDS. Going by this evidence, then, arguments about the replacement of disciplinary societies by control are somewhat premature. Level 4 control could therefore perhaps be better conceptualised using Stephen Collier’s ‘topological analysis’ of biopower: which ‘examines how existing techniques and technologies of power are re-deployed and recombined in diverse assemblies of biopolitical government’ (2009: 79). For Collier, Foucault’s discussion of security in STP is as a ‘configurational principle’ that ‘determines how heterogeneous elements – techniques, institutional arrangements, material forms and other technologies of power – are taken up and recombined’ (2009: 89, emphasis added).

The co-presence or ‘recombination’ in BALTIC of environments of enclosure like the steel box, and modulations of control spanning CCTV, intruder detection systems, and Northumbria Police’s security system, could therefore suggest a contemporary form of biopolitical government which, as Bogard puts it, allows ‘Capital… to keep its grip on bodies, in fact, to extend and tighten that grip’ (2007: 2). But of course, Collier’s ‘topological’ analysis of biopolitics must be subject to the same critique as that of the biopolitical security literature in chapter 3: namely, that there cannot be a ‘configurational principle’ of biopower which determines how pre-existing ‘institutional arrangements’ and ‘material forms’ are recombined, any more than there can be pre-existing ‘analytical categories’ of circulating, emergent life which biopower exclusively addresses. Indeed Marieke de Goede (2011) puts precisely this critique to the concept of the modulating network set out by Deleuze. The ‘network has no outside’, she claims, ‘neither spatially nor discursively’; and for this reason, ‘there is no external point from which to critique the network; the binary language of being ‘with us’ or ‘against us’ seems obsolete’ (de Goede, 2011).

Ultimately, she advises that ‘new avenues of critique have to be entertained, that include critical reflection on our own discourses of networked danger, including the language of hubs, nodes, links and associations’ (de Goede, 2011).

In my view, Deleuze’s account of the modulating principle of the control society puts too much emphasis on ‘metastability’ and ‘continuous variation’ to be entirely convincing as a framework for understanding BALTIC’s level 4 control (1992: 5). After all, level 4 control both results from, and relies on, a number of juridical and sovereign institutions; what de Goede terms ‘indispensable authoritative bases’
To what extent would the kind of control mechanisms represented by level 4 control even be in place at BALTIC if they were not required by the government as a condition for the indemnifying of valuable artworks? To what extent could BALTIC go about its business of the public display of artworks if the GIS did not exist and it had to pay for prohibitive commercial insurance policies? And what would level 4 control even be worth if videotape from CCTV systems could not be used to prosecute individuals in the courts?¹³⁵

Bogard extends Deleuze’s short exposition of the control society by explicitly framing its emergence through the ‘telos of the disciplines’ (though complex and incomplete) as ‘a problem of capitalist governance, involving the limits of enclosure as a tool of capitalist accumulation’ (2007: 1-2). Specifically, he writes, capitalism began to encounter the ‘resistance of bodies to concentrated containment and regimentation’ (Bogard, 2007: 2) - but this was only part of the reason. After the second world war, the development of information technologies ‘make it possible to release populations more into the open’:

… rather than pack them into closed spaces, capital begins a new strategy to disperse them. Network controls, like remote surveillance and electronic passwords, allow it to keep its grip on bodies, in fact, to extend and tighten that grip… The forces of accumulation, exploiting the capacities of openness and accessibility in networks, begin to follow you on the road and… turn ‘on the road’ into work, home into work, play into work, the whole planet into a flexible, controlled space of work (Bogard, 2007: 2).

The way in which the control society can be considered to blend the road, the home, and play into work is precisely the movement going on with the provision of internet and wireless internet ‘Wi-Fi’ services in airports and coffee shops, for example. Lacy, also staying close to Deleuze’s formulation, conceptualises ‘biopolitical control’ as an iterative ‘breaking down [of] the interior and exterior spaces of control and confinement in the name of new freedoms and security’ (2008: 339). In other words, being ‘released into the open’ as Bogard put it cannot be

¹³⁵ PCP explains that ‘CCTV can help clarify whether a security threat is real and identify suspect activity… It can also be vital in post-incident investigations, but only if the images are good enough to identify what happened over the timeframe and can be used evidentially in court’ (p. 17).
considered as a ‘freedom’ as such, but instead must be scrutinised for the ways in which it leads to and manifests biopolitical control.

To demonstrate this ‘breaking down’, Lacy gives the example of the airport in the war on terror. He writes that biometric technologies ‘are presented as a major leap forward in how we can move through an airport’ – ‘a new freedom’, with ‘no more waiting in queues’ and ‘more time to hook up to a wireless network and check e-mails from your networks’ (Lacy, 2008: 339; also Amoore, 2006). In this way, he continues, the ‘space of the airport becomes less exceptional, designed to be more like home/ work or a hotel/ shopping mall, with all manner of services for work or relaxation’ (Lacy, 2008: 339). But, crucially, at the same time it moves closer to the control society which will ‘depend less on sites of confinement, because everywhere will become part of systems of control’ (Lacy, 2008: 339). Here I would have to challenge to a certain extent Bogard’s claim – echoed by Lacy – that control societies feel like disciplinary societies, but without the walls. Does it ring true that the home feels like work, or it is necessary to have a more nuanced understanding of the control society which does not rely simply on more-or-less binary opposites to the disciplines?

To put it another way: it is possible to view the aim of art galleries, including that of BALTIC, to break down the distinction between art and commerce, home and away, leisure and education within the regulatory parameters of control, and if so what are the implications? Alan Smith, BALTIC’s first chairman, promoted the concept of the ‘third place’ art gallery in his foreword to The Art Factory (Martin and Thomas, 2002). ‘At the start of the 21st century’, he writes:

… there is a recognised need for a ‘third place’, a place which is neither work nor home, where people can engage in a stimulating intellectual environment and where the edges between learning and leisure, education and entertainment are blurred (Martin and Thomas, 2002: 12, emphasis added).

And if this concept of the third place is juxtaposed with BALTIC’s decision not to have a bag search in order to appear more inviting to customers, or the way in which BALTIC facilitates visitors’ enjoyment and education whilst at the same time rigorously governing their movement and behaviour through a broad range of
control practices, then links emerge between leisure, culture, control and commerce that cannot simply be represented in negative terms. What Lacy, vis-à-vis Paul Virilio, describes as ‘a consumerism driven by a ‘permanent feeling of insecurity’” (2008: 226).

5.4.2 Optimising life and counter-politics

Thus far it is possible to discern how the extant literatures on biopolitical control make two main movements. First, they concentrate on the import and meaning of the different ‘strategic shift[s] in power relations’; pursuing the question of whether, how, and to what extent biopolitics and/or control and/or biopolitical control have replaced the disciplines (Bogard, 2007: 1-2). Second, they seek to expose the ‘mechanics’ of biopolitical control; whether as a ‘modulating principle’ as Deleuze would have it (1992: 5), or the ‘topological recombination’ Collier describes. In my view, however, such wrangling must not be allowed to – but invariably does - obscure what is fundamentally at stake in these debates, and what was the key point of Foucault’s biopolitics. That is, when life, first, and that which is natural reality, second, can no longer be regarded as neutral with regard to power, this relationship and its performativities must be viewed in terms of optimisation.

From this perspective, the biopolitical security literature appears doubly limited. First, as I argued in chapter 3, it fails to appreciate that the ‘key analytical categories’ (Dillon, 2007a: 8) of biopolitics cannot ‘explain’ the relationship between politics and life because they themselves are materialised within biopolitical discourses. But now, second, it also misses the bull’s eye by substituting a focus on the ways in which life is optimised for what is ultimately just another rendering of the ‘bare life of emergence’ (Edkins, 2008).

To put the argument another way, if as Foucault claimed in the Society Must Be Defended lectures, ‘sovereign power’s effect on life is exercised only when the sovereign can kill’ (SMBD: 240), then biopower is exercised whenever life is lived. Admittedly, this may seem like a fairly appalling statement, foreclosing – or, as one of Foucault’s interviewers put it, ‘anaesthetising’ – the possibility of resistance. 136 To

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the contrary, I would argue that it has the potential to breathe new life (pardon the pun) into resistance, by foregrounding the absolutely central distinction between the living of life and the ways in which that living is made possible or exhorted.

In chapter 2 I discussed the unfavourable responses of political geographers to Thomas Barnett’s *The Pentagon’s New Map* and the various geopolitical rationales for interconnection, which rely precisely on this notion that connectivity into the global economy results in ‘a substantial degree of freedom to follow one’s own course in life’ (Dalby, 2007: 297). Whilst in no way wanting to dismiss the many, many privileges afforded to westerners including a large degree of choice in personal expression – especially in relation to life experiences outside the west - this is still *not the same* as living one’s own life. The ways of living which are bestowed ‘a substantial degree of freedom’ within the global economy are made possible by and materialise neoliberal norms. And of equal importance to these constrained and normative ways of living, are the ways of living which are made impossible or certainly much more difficult: for example, ways of living in the neoliberal borderlands of the oil industry discussed by David Campbell (2007b). This recognition opens up, then, possibilities for contestation which are specifically purposed to engage with the many ways in which the living of one’s life is made possible, enhanced, and optimised, as Colin Gordon explains:

… modern biopolitics generates a new kind of counter-politics. As governmental practices have addressed themselves in an increasingly immediate way to ‘life’… individuals have begun to formulate the needs and imperatives of that same life as the basis for political counter-demands (1991: 5).

Lacy recognises this absolutely key distinction between the living of life and the ways in which that living is made possible when he points out that, ‘far from the dystopias depicted in many popular visions of the future’, societies of control are instead shaped by ‘ecologies of control’ which ‘can become ‘benignly’ woven into our lives’ (2008: 333). Design, he argues, is one such benign ecology of control; and he returns many times to the means by which control mechanisms effortlessly mingle with the beautiful objects and ‘smart products’ of everyday life, such as biometric
MP3 players, and email - the ‘most successful aspects of contemporary wired economies’ (Lacy, 2008: 336-7; also Weber and Lacy, 2011). As I have illustrated in the discussion about the role of the Government Indemnity Scheme at BALTIC, I would add that insurance technologies are another.

Yet although the GIS demands a long-term level 4 control infrastructure of architectural modifications, staff invigilation procedures, and electronic security systems, paradoxically few exhibitions at BALTIC require full government indemnity because the contemporary art it shows tends not to count as ‘valuable’:

... [with] contemporary art, that chair [the office chair that I was sitting on] could be worth £50 million, you know, it is not necessarily the Mona Lisa sat there... if you’ve got a Picasso in here, well yeah, that’s well expensive, but the normal person walking in the building wouldn’t necessarily know the value behind what something actually is... it is not that kind of art.

This, then, opens up interstitial spaces and opportunities between different security programs and competing performativities of value at which it becomes possible to unwork level 4 control as a counter-politics to biopolitical control.

In chapter 4 I described the incident at BALTIC when an unidentified object in the Kienholz installation The Hoerengracht – a life-size walk-through recreation of Amsterdam’s Red Light District – set off a security alarm, but then turned out to be a lunchbox in a plastic bag which was indeed part of the artwork. But security threats at BALTIC are not limited to unexpected objects being ‘discovered’ in the artworks. ‘Over the last few years’, I was told, an ‘artistic’ inattentiveness to certain religious and moral values has coincided with a growing awareness of the vulnerability of public spaces:

... terrorists used to be on their home ground, but not any longer. But also I think it is not just the international terrorism part of it, you know - we can and have, albeit not in a terrorist way, highlighted aggravation in a certain sector of the population, if sector’s the right way [to put it].
This ‘non-terrorist’ threat was illustrated in reference to the installation Gone, Yet Still by Terence Koh, shown at BALTIC in September 2007–January 2008 as part of the Zabludowicz Collection, which stimulated ‘aggravation’ as well as a law suit. Koh’s installation featured 74 small figurative statues, which were:

... all the things that he would want to be in a room with when he died; there was ET, and they were all just made of plaster of paris, with no real features on them; Mickey Mouse, ET, lots of things, but they all had kind of phalluses on them, and he’s a gay artist, he’s kind of very controversial, his work generally anyway.

The controversy specifically focused on a figurative statue of Jesus Christ with an erection which ‘upset a lot of deeply religious people’, and was the subject of a private prosecution for outraging public decency and causing harassment, alarm and distress to the public, brought by a British christian woman and funded by the Christian Legal Centre.137 In the end, the case was thrown out by the Crown Prosecution Service in November 2008, and in a statement BALTIC stated:

We are particularly pleased that... the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] has recognised and fully taken into account the importance and influence of the right of freedom of expression. This was the critical issue for BALTIC and we take the CPS’s decision as supportive of the role that galleries have in promoting such freedoms. Yesterday’s decision will be welcomed by galleries across the UK.138

Although BALTIC staff are aware that ‘some of our art can be quite political’, at the same time they are insistent that ‘we’re not trying to control our artwork, because that’s not what it is about’. In stark contrast, then, to the substantial effort, financial resources, and attention that goes into installing and maintaining level 4 control in


BALTIC, in anticipation of artworks that may not even require indemnification and in turn this advanced level of security, staff are wholly averse to any effort to ‘control’ the artworks themselves. For example, the name of an exhibiting artist may be known for some time but the content of the show is confirmed much later – sometimes only when the boxes containing the artworks are opened for the first time. And then: ‘if we think it might provoke reaction then we look at ways to deal with that rather than thinking ‘we can’t have that work here because it would provoke a reaction”. Working in such a process, with tight deadlines and where control over the content resides with the artist, it is difficult to deal with the security challenges posed either by the challenge to religious and/or moral values, or by the artworks themselves:

… to be honest you could have a room like this as an exhibition and right up to the last minute you’ll find nothing that would hurt anybody, and the next thing you come in ten minutes before the opening and there are 55,000 razor blades put on the table… or the artist just feels ‘I wanna put a nail through the middle of that chair’, so that’s why it is run to the last minute.

Of course, I am not suggesting that BALTIC should control the artworks they exhibit, either in relation to the values they may challenge or any other bloated construction of risk, but I think that the contrast between level 4 control and the complete aversion to controlling the artworks is very interesting.
5.5 Conclusion

What emerges at BALTIC then is a much more complex account of security practices in the war on terror than that offered either by the crowded places publications or by the National Security Strategy. Indeed, despite BALTIC’s increasing involvement in crowded places security through the relationship between staff and the two Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers from Northumbria Police, it is my conclusion that security at BALTIC is still very much dominated by the ‘level 4 control’ required by the Government Indemnity Scheme.

By emphasising the importance of the GIS and level 4 control in this way, however, I would not wish to imply that the other security practices at BALTIC have little or no performative agency. Crowded places security is made possible at BALTIC precisely because it builds on the level 4 control infrastructure of CCTV cameras, alarmed card-access doors and staff vigilance, as well as the ‘zero-ing’ or emptying out and rationalisation of space associated with health and safety and the forms of control exercised by the white cube gallery. But more to the point, all of these practices are made possible by the regulatory norms of the ‘liberal way’. It therefore becomes vital not to confuse the materialisation of the norms – the different security practices - with the norms themselves, or, to put it another way, to reduce the norms simply to the practices.

The work of the Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers in performing terrorism risk through the crowded places risk assessment and Project Argus confirms this argument. These performativities of terrorism risk materialise the (in)security of the UK’s business places, and the need to maintain business continuity. In other words, neither crowds, individuals, nor any national security imaginary of ‘our people’ or ‘our citizens’ (NSS 2009: 3, 5) are the objective of crowded places security – although their wellbeing is certainly most welcome, as BALTIC staff demonstrated in what I felt was a genuinely solicitous attitude towards their visitors. Indeed, it may not even be correct to claim that security practices are directed towards ‘objects’ – people or business – in the sense of means directed towards ends, although this does not of course mean that people cannot suffer at the end of security practices, as much scholarship over the last ten years has been, rightly, at pains to point out. Rather, it may be better to address the question ‘what is crowded places security?’
by focusing on the norms that make it possible and the performativities which give boundary and fixity to certain security practices and secured spaces – and these are the particular liberal values of art, business and business continuity.

It is not an exaggeration to say that all of the security practices at BALTIC are characterised by an obsession with the ‘what ifs?’ - exemplified by the attempt of staff to write a new security plan in line with crowded places policy that addresses all potential security threats:

... [the aim is] one document which would cover hopefully any kind of major incident because if you try to take the specifics of an incident, you can’t write that, it is too tunnelled, you have to look at the ‘what ifs’… it has to be open enough to cover everything.

The ‘what ifs?’ represent, I think, what David Campbell (1998) has argued are the aporia, gaps, and rifts that are always present in security discourses. Rather than achieve an all-embracing control of space, performativities of crowded places security are continually and agonisingly confronted by the sheer density and volume of the alternatives that cannot be controlled. If crowded places were empty and ‘zero-ed’ they would no longer offer up the ‘political economic impact’ which makes them an ‘attractive target’ for terrorists (PCP: 3). Thus, the fact that crowded places exist as an object of contemporary security practice in the UK demonstrates that they are instead ‘a carefully constructed and never completed political project’ (de Goede, 2005: xxv).
6.1 Introduction

In this concluding chapter rather than repeat the arguments of the individual chapters, I present an overview of the research project as a whole. In the next section 6.2, I discuss the value of the methodological and conceptual strategy used in the thesis in relation to the challenges of researching the politics of security as an empirical phenomenon. Then in section 6.3, I outline and summarise the three main themes that have emerged in the thesis, and discuss directions for future research. These themes relate to terrorism in a global age, the biopolitics of national security, and the meaning of crowded places security.

6.2 Value of the methodological and conceptual strategy

The thesis critically interrogated the UK’s on-going war on terror between 2007-2010 through the performativities of two ‘fronts’ of broadening national security and crowded places security. At the same time, however, the experience of both carrying out the research project and writing it up in the form of a PhD thesis, carved out a deep awareness that the closer I tried to get to the politics of security as an empirical phenomenon to serve as the ‘object’ of my research, the more it slipped away. I want to clarify this claim on two points.

First, I am not suggesting that attempts to research, and thereby understand, the politics of security are in any way futile. Indeed, it is one of the main implications emerging from my use of critical geopolitics and biopolitical security frameworks that both – but particularly the latter - would be improved by a closer engagement with security practices ‘on the ground’, as Foucault put it in his 1978 interview ‘Questions of Method’ (2002: 235). Nonetheless, it is worth considering that the limitations of these frameworks may be less a result of theoretical nuances – geo-politics versus bio-politics for example – than a certain failure of scholarly imagination. I am aware of the irony of having critiqued the power effects of different geographical imaginations throughout this thesis, and now to be advocating it as a research strategy. However, the problem remains that the politics of security cannot be relied upon by researchers to materialise as phenomena easily identifiable as ‘politics’...
and/or ‘security’. When they do, such as the national security practices which were the focus of chapters 2 and 3, by all means they should be rigorously identified and critiqued. In terms of the prosaic practices of crowded places security, however, far away from the familiar intelligibilities of state politics which governments and some academics have grown so comfortable using (even if, as is the case with critical geopolitics and security studies literatures, the aim is critique and refusal), this is not in my view the case. Performativities of crowded places security melt into, weave through, and burst from a range of unexpected phenomena and domains, which might nominally – but only nominally - be called ‘culture’, ‘the economy’, ‘insurance’, and so on.

In such circumstances, my objective of developing Judith Butler’s theory of performativity as a conceptual tool for critiquing contemporary security practices met with both successes and limitations. Performativity, I argue, can bridge what is assumed to be a problematic – even irreconcilable - gap between the abstract power relationships of discourse and the ‘real world’ of empirical phenomena. As I explain in greater detail below, performativity allows me to position a greater range of everyday security practices within their discursive context, and, conversely, to identify security discourses in their everyday empirical form. Performativities of broadening national security may be intuitively recognisable as power relationships, although their role in the current re-materialisation of neoliberal discourses as the ‘international terrorist’ threat and as counter-terrorism regimes is poorly understood – a gap which this thesis began to address. But the same cannot be said for chapter 4’s highlighting of how performativities of ‘zero space’ in contemporary white cube galleries do not simply co-exist alongside the emptying out and rationalising of space carried out by security practices, but rather make such practices possible. In other words, ‘zero-ing’ space can be considered to materialise liberal norms rather than being an objective of crowded places security in its own right. Such an argument adds considerable depth and insight into contemporary security practices in public space.

But on the other hand, there is an inherent challenge in all this because Foucault’s conceptualisation of discourse was necessarily of a centrifugal epistemological domain of ever-increasing links, ties, and relations. In ‘Questions of Method’, Foucault described his approach as ‘rediscovering the connections,
encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on, that at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal, and necessary' (2002: 227). It is, he continued, ‘a sort of multiplication or pluralization of causes' (Foucault, 2002: 227). The problem, of course, is that such a ‘pluralization of causes' is difficult to reconcile with and represent within academic discourse: either in the conduct of research, or even less so when ‘writing up'. This thesis developed performativity as a tool for matching this ‘pluralization of causes' – in other words, for approaching discourse empirically – and thus shed light on the possible direction – and limitations – of a ‘Foucauldian methodology'.

Foucault's genealogical method is not about creating a history of social phenomena, but rather an analysis of historical practices as ‘programs of conduct', with ‘effects regarding what is to be done... [and] what is to be known’ (Foucault, 2002: 225). The importance of these ‘effects' of discourse is precisely that they are ‘effects in the real': ‘they crystallize into institutions, they inform individual behaviour, they act as grids for the perception and evaluation of things’ (Foucault, 2002: 232).

Butler (1993: 22, 20) acknowledges Foucault's arguments on regulatory power as the ‘point of departure' for her theory of performativity: whilst he writes of effects in the real, she investigates ‘the power of discourse to produce effects through reiteration'. This notion of reiteration is absolutely key. Foucault was hard to pin down on how discursive effects crystallized into institutions, informed behaviour, and so on. Central to performativity, however, is the argument that discourse becomes real through 'citational practices': the ‘ritualized repetition' of discursive norms which ‘produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter' (Butler, 1993: 2, x, 9, emphasis in original).

Using performativity I was thus able in chapters 2 and 3 to investigate how contemporary UK national security discourses materialise as particular spatial (and political) configurations. The reiteration of ‘broadening national security' by a wide range of policies and practices including the National Security Strategy and crowded places security, gives fixity to the imaginary of an interconnected globe. Whilst dramatic advances in communication technologies have undoubtedly produced new spatialities and relations of global reach, I argued that performativities of an interconnected globe primarily function to reproduce and legitimise a neoliberal geopolitical order.
But Butler also went beyond Foucault’s conception of discourse: ‘it is not enough to claim that human subjects are constructed’, she wrote, without recognising that this process is a ‘differential operation’ which produces the human as well as ‘the more and the less ‘human” (1993: 8). These are the abject subjects and domains which are produced within regulatory power as its ‘constitutive outside’, and which ‘haunt’ discursive norms with ‘the persistent possibility of their disruption and rearticulation’ (Butler, 1993: 8). In this way, when performativities of an interconnected globe fail, and fixity is not achieved or is disrupted, violence under the remit of national security is used to re-enforce the norms and maintain the status quo. As the NSS claims that the alternative to global economic and social uniformity is an ever-broadening landscape of interconnected threats and risks, it is those who reject or are ‘disconnected’ from such British and western norms (or can be portrayed thus) such as diasporic communities who get written into this domain of danger.

Finally, performativity has been used more recently to account for the materialisation of discourses beyond the citational practices of subjects alone. This attention to material agency – the constitutive power of objects in political assemblages – was also largely absent from Foucault’s work. Nicky Gregson and Gillian Rose (2000: 434) argue that space is not only ‘brought into being’ through performativity but is also ‘a performative articulation of power’. This understanding of space as reiterating and reproducing discourse allowed me to make visible a range of security practices that would not be visible with other critical security or performativity approaches that focus solely on the ‘sayings’ and ‘doings’ of people. In chapter 4 I explored the role of buildings, documents, installation artworks, and even trees in materialising the emptied and rationalised ‘zero space’ of crowded places security, which in turn reproduces a (neo)liberal status quo. At the same time, however, this material culture – unidentified objects in artworks for example - confronts crowded places security with the reality of that which cannot be controlled.

139 Although he did not discount the importance of ‘more than human’ agency in discourse. For example, in STP he counselled that ‘a field of forces… cannot be created by a speaking subject alone and on the basis of his words, because it is a field of forces that cannot in any way be controlled or asserted within this kind of imperative [human-willed] discourse” (p. 3).
I also attempted to match this pluralization of causes in the politics of security by using a range of literatures which engaged with the performativities at hand, rather than forcing the performativities to fit the literature – which in the case of crowded places security would have been impossible as the literature is negligible. So as chapter 2 testifies, when I encountered the ways in which broadening national security depends on geographical knowledges, specifically of global interconnection, I turned to the work of Edward Said and others on the concept of the imaginative geography. As Chapter 4 illustrates, during my fieldwork at BALTIC I encountered not only a range of security practices - health and safety, ‘normal’ building security, and crowded places security – which to a large extent reflected and reiterated each other, but also a revolving cast of tensions between such practices and the daily ‘business’ of the gallery itself: the showing of art. In attempting, then, to understand the particular performativities of space involved in the daily business of art I looked to visual culture and Brian O’Doherty’s work on the ‘white cube’. There I found a scathing critique of the political conservatism of the modernist gallery through performativities of zero space – a fitting conceptualisation, it seemed to me, of what allowed the different security practices in BALTIC to speak with one voice or read from the same hymn sheet, as it were.

But advocating the use of a wider range of literatures and conceptual frameworks to approach the politics of security is not as good as admitting that security is everywhere or everything is (or can potentially be) security. Such claims would only repeat the unhelpful logics of abstracted ways of knowing and prescribing. Indeed, this is one of my main criticisms of the biopolitical security literature, as I discussed in chapters 3 and 5. By claiming that biopolitics secures ‘by instantiating a general economy of the contingent throughout all the processes of reproductive circulation that impinge upon species existence as such’ (Dillon, 2007a: 9), the literature not only fails the test of intuition (when one thinks to oneself ‘that does not ring true’ or ‘that does not describe my experience’), but it also does not stand up to investigation. In its designation of ‘Public opinion, culture and information’ as a threat domain, broadening national security demonstrates it is still very concerned not with ‘species existence’ but with the human capacity to think, behave, emote, and enjoy. And my case study of crowded places security at BALTIC illustrated how contemporary forms of biopolitical control are navigating, if anything,
an even closer intimacy with the human capacities made possible by contemporary technologies such as the internet. The human desire to interact with others, for example, is not being repressed and diminished to a bare biological life – it is being exploited, it is being opened up to new vistas of contact with forms of control. Perhaps, then, this exploitation and opening up is the most important implication of the biopolitical making life live. My research strategy therefore illuminates the first steps in the direction of a more responsive and receptive attitude (for want of better words) in researching the politics of security.

As I discussed in chapter 1, qualitative methodologies respond to the specificities and unpredictability of social phenomena, and this objective was reflected in my research strategy. By employing a ‘micro-ethnographic’ approach combining interviews, participant observation, and textual analysis of documents to investigate and critique crowded places security at BALTIC, I was able to circumvent the criticism (e.g., Megoran, 2006) that research in political geography tends towards discourse analysis at the expense of everyday experience.

Furthermore, conceptualising the empirical material on security that I gathered at BALTIC through the theoretical lens of performativity consolidated this strategy in two ways. First, by focusing on citational practices, and, moreover, the possibility of their failure, performativity foregrounds precisely the contingent and incomplete process through which imaginaries of ‘secure’ and ‘insecure’ space are rendered fixed and bounded over and over again every day. For example, zero space may be the objective of crowded places security at BALTIC, but my research illustrated how easily a range of objects – from rubbish on the floors to bits of the artworks themselves – can undermine the possibility of securing a crowded place. Second, then, by attending to the performative role of material culture and space alongside citational practices, recent developments in performativity theory - such as that of Gregson and Rose (2000) - are more receptive to the broader range of agencies that go into materialising security discourses on a daily basis. This is particularly important with ‘new’ security policies such as crowded places which it would be easy to slot into existing frameworks, with the result that the implications of these distinct policies could be missed. Indeed, the role of the Government Indemnity Scheme and its associated objects – e.g., glass cases - and practices – e.g., staff invigilation - sheds light on the extent to which crowded places security is concerned
to protect business and commercial interests. In these ways, research into security that uses performativity adds an important ‘everyday’ counter-narrative to official security discourses.

My second point about the challenge of researching the politics of security is that, despite the fact that it is only ever partially and fleetingly captured within the meshes of academic research, this is in no way reflected by a downgrading or lessening of security’s violent effects in the real. For whilst academics struggle to conceptualise the politics of security manifested or intensified by the war on terror, the security politics of the war on terror go blithely on – mostly unaware of, and untroubled by, the many frustrated attempts to understand what they are. But this is not about hopelessness – after all, achieving success or suffering failure both depend on the goals that were set out to begin with.

Indeed, Foucault was pressed to reflect precisely on how and why the effects of critique fail in regard to effects in the real. It was put to him that his critique of prisons in Discipline and Punish had ‘an absolutely sterilizing or, rather, anesthetizing effect’ on social workers and other social reformers, because they felt that rather than create instabilities in the real life of prisons and their prisoners, he instead offered up only ‘an implacable logic that left them no possible room for initiative’ (Foucault, 2002: 236). Whilst in Bodies That Matter, Butler is if not optimistic then certainly determined that that which has been ‘foreclosed or banished from the proper domain of ‘sex’’ might be ‘produced as a troubling return… a radical rearticulation of the symbolic horizon’ (1993: 23), Foucault replied to his interlocutor somewhat drolly that he didn’t feel capable of ‘subverting all codes’, ‘dislocating all orders of knowledge’, and ‘overturning all contemporary culture’ (2002: 234). Instead, his objective was ‘to give some assistance in wearing away certain self-evidences and commonplaces’ (2002: 234) – a very modest claim for a man whose work is still hugely influential as a form of critique almost thirty years after his death. For Foucault then, critique:

… doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction that concludes, ‘this, then, is what needs to be done’. It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn’t have to lay down the law for the law.
It isn’t a stage in programming. It is a challenge directed to what is (Foucault, 2002: 236, emphasis added).

With these sentiments in place, in the next section I discuss three key challenges emerging from the thesis and directions for future ‘essays in refusal’.

6.3 Summary of main research themes

6.3.1 Terrorism in a global age

Chapter 2 argues that broadening national security, of which the new UK National Security Strategies of 2008 and 2009 are both a description and reinscription, materialises the norms of neoliberal globalisation – what then Prime Minister Gordon Brown referred to in classic Orwellian newspeak as the ‘opportunities of the global age’ (NSS 2009: 3). But as Wendy Larner (2008) has pointed out, citations of neoliberal discourses are neither monolithic nor homogeneous – they take a number of forms. Chapter 2 highlights performativities of interconnection, and argues that broadening national security reiterates interconnection as a broadening register of coercive practices. For example, ‘horizon scanning’ – the dubious art of materialising threats which do not yet exist – and the building and strengthening of broader partnerships between national security, the public and private sectors, and citizens. These practices materialise or ‘bring to life’ a world in which the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence – which is at present what national security remains – is increasingly woven into everyday spaces.

Although broadening national security did not begin with the war on terror, it has and continues to enable the re-imaging of both the terrorist threat and the objectives and conduct of counter-terrorism which have been such distinctive features of the conflict, and which have legitimated many of its violences. Diasporic communities in particular have become trapped in the ‘abject domains’ materialised by performativities of terror and counter-terror. Chapter 2 illustrates how in an ‘interconnected globe’ the UK is materialised as ‘a stage where international
events can be played out domestically’ (NSS 2009: 38, emphasis in original). In other words, and to paraphrase Edward Said, interconnection – particularly through the internet and ease of travel - means that ‘they’ bring outside dangers into ‘our land’. Chapter 3 highlights how broadening national security performs the terrorist threat as an issue of ‘Public opinion, culture and information’. This has a number of implications ranging from the use of international diplomacy to promote the UK’s so-called ‘core values’ abroad, to challenging the ideology of international terrorism within the UK, whereby diasporic communities are, once again, disproportionately targeted. When the NSS discusses ‘wider community cohesion’ as an element of national security, it means the more or less coercive cooption of British Muslims into a supposedly homogeneous British community, an excellent example of what Brian O’Doherty referred to as the ‘eternal rightness’ of the liberal way, and how it censors the world of social variation.

This on-going re-imagining of the terrorist threat illustrates, then, that just because broadening national security materialises norms of neoliberal globalisation does not mean that its practices are confined to the global level - this would be to mistake the materialisation of the norms for the norms themselves. Instead, performativities of interconnection and broadening national security precisely herald the disregard of neoliberal discourses for traditional spatialisations of national/international and inside/outside. In this sense the war on terror is not simply a war that happens on domestic and international fronts simultaneously; it is a singular conflict in which the notion of domestic and international with which scholars are used to working are outdated. Counter-intuitively perhaps, the UK government demonstrates a much better grasp of these new meanings than the academy – which is what makes the security policies I have used in this research project such compelling case studies.

So if scholars aim to understand and critique contemporary counter-terror regimes they must likewise address themselves to the ways in which its objectives and conduct are changing as national security shifts focus from sovereign interests to protecting the global economy. And just as broadening national security is not solely a New Labour story (emerging as a set of practices key to the western-led re-ordering of global geopolitics after the end of the cold war), it has been retained by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government which succeeded New
Labour in May 2010. Not the least in the form of third versions of the National Security Strategy and the CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, published in October 2010 and July 2011 respectively.\textsuperscript{140} Broadening national security and its re-imagining of the terrorist threat is therefore very much a clear and present, and future, challenge for critical security scholarship.

My case study of crowded places security in the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art, Gateshead, was designed precisely as an in-depth exploration of the new policy responses being licensed by broadening national security, and it threw up some interesting and important points about terrorism in a global age. On the one hand, ‘elite’ representations of broadening national security in the National Security Strategy are performed through what Simon Dalby termed a ‘global war script’ of interconnection. But on the other hand, crowded places security in BALTIC is materialised through ostensibly quite different performativities of emptying out or ‘zero-ing’ space, pre-emptive ‘zero tolerance’ risk imaginaries, and extensive electronic surveillance. In conceptualising these performativities - which are still after all national security - as well as the step-change itself, I found critical geopolitics frameworks of limited value. This is because despite claims like those of Campbell and Power (2010: 244) that critical geopolitics has displaced state-centric readings and ‘opened up the range of sites/ texts/ practices where ‘geopolitics’ is seen to take place’, in my view its frameworks nonetheless remain indebted to the legacy of inter-state/ international/ global relations – albeit in a relation of negative repudiation. Therefore they are in many ways not up to the task of conceptualising, for example, the insurance technologies and performativities of business continuity by which national security is materialised in the UK’s businesses and public services.

The failure may also be, as I discussed above, one of ‘academic imagination’: particularly in terms of confusing the materialisation of norms with the norms themselves. In my view, it is less an issue of understanding how the war on terror is fought simultaneously through domestic practices (counter-terrorism in crowded places) and foreign practices (military interventions) – in other words, of categorising and clarifying these practices in terms of national and international, inside and outside the state.

\textsuperscript{140} It is also interesting to note that the coalition government has produced Arabic and Urdu (and Welsh) translations of CONTEST, which were not available under the Labour government. See ‘Counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST)’ on the Home Office website. Available at 
outside, and so on. It is rather an imperative for scholars to recognise that neoliberal norms are materialised as a range of security practices where national and international no longer have the same meaning. Whereby, for example, the global market determines the value of artworks on public display in the UK, and the value in turn determines the level of control to which both the artworks and the visitors and users of public space are subjected. In seeking to advance such an understanding of national security which moves beyond the spatialisations of a bygone ‘inter-state’ age, the thesis posited Foucault’s concept of biopolitics as an absolutely essential conceptual framework.

6.3.2 The biopolitics of national security

Chapter 3 develops the concept of biopolitical security using Butler’s theory of performativity; shifting the emphasis from how biopolitics work to how they perform liberal norms. It is argued that biopolitical performativities – such as multiplicity, population, the milieu, circulation and the uncertain - materialise realities natural to liberal norms. Specifically, these natural realities are spaces of security: realities which are open, uncertain, and broadening. Going against the grain of the extant security studies literatures, I conclude that biopolitics neither regulate nor secure populations and circulations; instead, they materialise spaces of security, and in this sense populations and circulations are already secured. This is not to claim that ways of living imagined in terms of circulation and population – migrating populations or ‘globalisation’ itself - do not or cannot exist without biopolitics. Rather, they cannot be given the effect of boundary, fixity, and matter outside regulatory discourse.

The implication of this argument is that what are commonly posited as biopolitical security mechanisms in the security studies literatures – biometrics, etcetera – are instead the attempt to bring the excess of human life into line with these already-secured realities. Here I do not mean excess as any tangible or even intangible object – rather, excess is that which operates beyond liberal imaginaries. It is something like the constitutive outside, the abject domain, of contemporary biopolitics. Essentially, these are not mechanisms situated within the ordinary workings of biopolitical discourses, they are practices at the very edge of political
possibility, made necessary when biopolitics fails or goes wrong. Though it may be little consolation, the biopolitics of the war on terror, which have galvanised an entire counter-discourse in the academy, the media, and the general public, demonstrate not the apogee of power over life but its glitches – the failure of its founding imaginaries. The ghost that haunts national security, therefore, is how best to bring excess into line with political-economic realities.

This return to Foucault’s work in his late-1970s lecture seria on biopolitics, and the recovery of his emphasis on its ‘political-economic program’ (STP: 41), is crucial in adapting the concept of biopolitical security to deal with the contemporary challenges of broadening national security. I would not want to dismiss the concerns of the extant biopolitical security literature: the ways in which biopolitical norms are materialised as complex ways of life, aided and abetted by advances in information technology and genetic engineering – or what Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero describe as ‘species life understood as emergent being is radically contingent being’ (2009: 14). But nonetheless, if the terms of the debate are shifted from species life to ‘natural reality’ (STP: 41), from ‘biological and biosociological processes’ to liberal political economy (SMBD: 250), it becomes much easier to understand the ways in which counter-terrorism and crowded places security are made possible by the neoliberal discourses which are increasingly the condition of possibility for national security. Indeed, chapter 5 argues that crowded places security is the biopolitical government of ways of life too. But the literature as it stands simply offers no framework to adequately conceptualise its control practices with their mélée of people, objects, legal frameworks, and so on.

What emerges, then, is a need for a recognition of the biopolitical performativities of broadening national security that does not just substitute ‘population’ or ‘circulation’ for ‘state’; thereby reiterating the limitations of the critical geopolitics literature’s indebtedness to the increasingly less useful frameworks of inter-state relations. Rather, the biopolitical performativities of broadening national security would more appropriately signal a geopolitics of everyday spaces. By ‘everyday spaces’ I do not mean in any micro- or intra-state sense, but in terms of a spatial politics of the optimisation of life. This is no doubt a clumsy phrase, but I want to capture the sense of a spatial biopolitics which do not return in the end to traditional geographies of national/international and
inside/outside - although, as Foucault always took care to point out in this lectures, there may be many points of overlap and indistinction. One example from the thesis is the Government Indemnity Scheme, which is primarily responsible for introducing multiple forms of biopolitical control at BALTIC, but which is still after all a state-led, sovereign practice. The state is therefore still a major producer of violence, both in its traditional sovereign form as demonstrated by national security, and as a mediator within performativities of biopolitical control, as demonstrated by the role of the GIS at BALTIC. The point then, is not to dismiss the importance of governments and the state, but to appreciate the ways in which they may be involved in biopolitical as well as geopolitical security practices, including in counter-terror regimes.

The thesis therefore takes the first steps towards a conceptualisation of the spatial politics of the optimisation of life, which can be summed up in three ways. First, it responds to the limitations of the nation-state imaginary resulting from processes of neoliberal globalisation: in particular, the breaking down of traditional sovereign borders between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, and the increasing importance within national security policy of protecting the global economy. Such limitations have only been further exacerbated by trends and events in global politics under the rubric of the war on terror: practices of so-called ‘homeland security’ such as national ID cards which deeply unsettle the traditional notion of the rights-bearing citizen through their focus on the body as political signifier; and of course the focus of the thesis crowded places security, which rematerialises the UK’s high streets and public services as sites of national security.

So second, there is an important sense in which notions of biopolitics and control are better able to conceptualise more ‘prosaic’ and diffuse forms of governance beyond the geopolitical state imaginary. This has been argued extensively by scholars across the social sciences, and some of whom I discussed in chapter 5. However, I also suggested an important way in which this literature could be developed to be even more receptive to prosaic forms of governance through security. Specifically, I argued that there needs to be a deeper working through by scholars of Foucault’s emphasis on biopolitics as the optimisation and control, rather than repression and control, of contemporary ways of living. Foucault had already made this argument in 1975’s *Discipline and Punish*: ‘we must cease once and for all’,

Third then, I want to argue that biopolitics should be conceptualised as the politics of the bad days, when one does feel oppressed and powerless, and of the good days, for example when one is spending time at an art gallery, enjoying art, tasty food, and luxury shopping, while all the while those sensations are being made possible through an extensive range of spatial control practices and regulatory norms. To do so is not to surrender all hope and optimism to a dystopian reality in which the innermost and sacrosanct human qualities are being ‘securitised’. I do not believe this to be the case, nor is it the intended implication of my argument. But to remain blind to the ways in which life is the object of politics – that is, the ways in which the natural realities of contemporary life are already the materialisation of regulatory norms - are already secured in certain ways towards certain ends - would be naïve. The importance of developing the concept of biopolitical security in the ways I have argued, and in particular of learning to recognise the distinction between living one’s own ‘natural reality’, and the norms and control practices which make certain realities natural, is that, as chapter 5 argues, it creates the possibility of capitalising on those moments and sites of excess at which biopolitical norms are most vulnerable.

6.3.3 Crowded places security

Chapter 1 discusses the importance of paying attention to what makes social phenomena singular. Crowded places security is an insight into the results when national counter-terrorism policy arrives in a contemporary art gallery where security is primarily understood as that of the artworks on display. Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate, however, that the practices of crowded places security were not so unfamiliar at BALTIC as might at first be assumed (and as at first I did assume). Indeed, crowded places security ‘piggy backs’ on existing security practices at BALTIC put in place by the GIS: the use of glass for example, and, of course, level 4 control. Furthermore, conceptualised through a performativity framework, it is not so much that crowded places security reiterates existing performativities of security at BALTIC. Rather, it would be a more accurate assessment that performativities of
security – be they health and safety, crowded places and so on – coalesce around the ‘zero-ing’ of space, and in this way materialise liberal norms. In other words, it is not a question of what crowded places security does to space at BALTIC, but what space can do for crowded places security – specifically, crowded places security reiterates the forms of spatial and social control associated with the ‘liberal way’.

Chapter 5 develops this argument by considering the role of risk imaginaries and biopolitical security at BALTIC. The logic of crowded places security is that they are particularly vulnerable because they are particularly accessible and available, and in this way they seem to illustrate precisely the biopolitical space of security I discussed in chapter 3: the ever-wider circuits materialising liberal norms of ‘not interfering, allowing free movement, letting things follow their course; laisser-faire, passer et aller…’ (Foucault, 2007: 20). Therefore biopolitical performativities should be considered not in terms of securing life in the manner of a directly repressive expression of power, but as bringing the excess of these norms into line with so-called ‘natural reality’ (STP: 41). And this is precisely the point: that there is a difference between one’s own ‘natural reality’ and that of liberal norms, and biopolitical performativities attempt to reconcile – more or less coercively – the former to the latter.

Recognising this distinction becomes crucially important when attempting to understand the biopolitical performativities of crowded places security, where the key terms of the biopolitical security literature, such as circulation, are much less ‘obvious’ than they would be in airports or train stations. The latter are spaces purposed for rapid and transient mobilities; thus they intuitively ‘fit’ with the narratives of speed and movement which overlay the extant biopolitical security literature. Indeed, it is for this reason that this literature must be considered as reiterating and thus materialising the very phenomena they seek to critique.

Instead, my interpretation of biopolitical security draws on William Bogard’s eloquent appraisal that the control materialised by biopolitics has all the ‘feel’ of discipline without its walls (although as contemporary examples in the Middle East demonstrate, walls are still important in the materialisation of regulatory norms). What is most interesting and important about my case study of the biopolitical space of security at BALTIC, then, is the closer access it affords to what contemporary forms of control ‘feel’ like. Biopolitical control does not prevent movement or
enclose bodies in the manner of disciplinary mechanisms – this much has been argued in the literature. Rather, it makes possible, exhorts and optimises ways of living within certain regulatory norms, and makes other ways of living more difficult – particularly through what Bogard describes as ‘direct adjustments of the sensitivity of the body, its capacities to affect and be affected’ (2007: 3). An example would be how BALTIC facilitates visitors’ enjoyment, education and appreciation whilst at the same time rigorously controlling those experiences by a zero-ing of space, regulation of touch and optical control.

The problem arises, of course, precisely when these forms of control do not work. When the excess represented by that which cannot be known in advance is too challenging, too overwhelming to be brought into line. Here, then, ever-wider forms of control must match ever-increasing possibilities. The ‘complex, diverse and unpredictable challenges’ arising in an interconnected global age must be matched by ‘a broader range’ of coercive responses (NSS 2009: 19, 14). The unknown dangers in the art gallery must be matched with an all-encompassing ‘control of space’, sacrificing much of the human detail. In other words, the response to an ever-wider biopolitical space of security is an ever-broadening range of coercive security practices.

In terms of future work on crowded places security, I want to make three points. First, BALTIC does not represent a definitive case study of crowded places security. After all, it is a key characteristic of the kind of qualitative research carried out in this thesis not to make generalisations as in ‘traditional science’, but rather to provide results that are ‘dependable and trustworthy’ within specific contexts (Gray, 2009: 165). How, then, might my argument about crowded places security reiterating the ‘liberal way’ through performativities of zero space, risk, and biopolitical control work in other crowded places such as shopping centres, sports stadia, and so on? Alongside this consideration of other crowded places, it will be important to monitor the development of the policy itself as it moves further away from its immediate post-review phase and into, literally, everyday life. As Working Together to Protect Crowded Places warns, crowded places security is continually being developed.

Second, it is also my view that it is important not to focus on crowded places security at all. By this paradoxical statement I want to emphasise that crowded
places security reiterates discourses which are not mutually inclusive with its practices – once again the materialisation of the norms must not be confused with the norms themselves. Indeed, one of the most important implications of developing performativity as a conceptual framework for contemporary spaces of security is, as I signalled in chapter 1, that it draws out or at least draws attention to the multiple performativities which materialise the ‘iterable structure’ of security in public space (Butler, 2010: 149). I have referred to some of these in the thesis: civil contingency, resilience, and the protection of critical national infrastructure. There is still work to be done in understanding these emerging performativities of security.

Thus at the same time, third, scholars must be able to locate and challenge the sometimes violent but always exclusionary norms enabling the war on terror, without getting distracted or even terminally lead off course by whatever new policy the government produces.¹⁴¹ Policy-oriented critique is dangerous for two reasons. First, policies and governments change, but the exclusions remain. During the course of this research project there was a change in government – indeed, a rather fundamental change from majority to coalition government – the publication of two new CONTEST strategies (March 2009 and July 2011), and the review and publication of two specific security policies: the Prevent strategy in June 2011, and of course crowded places in March 2010. For this reason, it is important to provide genealogies of security policies – as chapter 2 provided for the National Security Strategy and CONTEST – alongside contemporary analysis. Second, the way in which the new security policies are presented in glossy portable document format (‘pdf’) publicly available on the internet, and in particular the use of management jargon, go a long way to banalising and depoliticising security policy. Indeed, I am suspicious that even if this is not the objective of these presentational tricks, they may still be implicitly acknowledged as a useful side effect. In my view, maintaining a balance between an empirical focus on policy and practices ‘on the ground’, and a genealogical approach can yield important ‘essays of refusal’ to the UK’s on-going war on terror.

¹⁴¹ Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster (2011: 4) make exactly this point in relation to the political management, the securing, of so-called ‘catastrophic’ events. ‘If we are to understand the governmental regime that emerges in our encounter with an unknown and unexpected future’, they write, ‘it is equally important to move beyond discursive differences’. For, ‘even when naming an event as ‘catastrophe’ is carefully avoided, unknown, unpredictable and worst case scenario events are added to the knowledge of disaster, risks, crises, emergencies and dangers’ (Aradau and van Munster, 2011: 4).
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